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Full text of "Berlin airlift : a USAFE summary"

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RESTRICTED 




26 JUNE 1948 
, , ,30 SEPTEMBER 1949 



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PREPARED BY: 
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE 




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RESTRICTED 



BERLIN AIRLIFT 



A USAFE SUMMARY 



This document contains information affecting 
the National defense of the United States within the 
meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U.S.C., 
Sections 793 and 794. Its transmission or the rev- 
elation of its contents in any manner to an un- 
authorized person is prohibited by law. 

Retain or destroy this copy in accordance with 
AFR 205-1; Do not return. 



JUL241987 

L/BRAR^ 



HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE 



RESTRICTED 



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INTRODUCTION 

During the period when there was free traffic between 
the Western zones of Germany and Berlin, approximately 
12,000 tons were shipped info Berlin daily by rail, barge, 
and truck. 

Early in April 1948, Soviet guards attempted to search 
an Army military train enroute to Berlin. To prevent sub- 
mission of similar shipments to this indignity, the United 
States resorted for 1 1 days to airlifting all supplies required 
to fill Allied needs. Military aircraft were concurrently used 
to provide transportation for authorized travelers who 
otherwise would have been subjected to this initial Soviet 
blockade. 

Again on 10 June, the Russians stopped five Berlin- 
bound coal trains at the British-Soviet Border Control 
Point because the train papers did not specify the sta- 
tions at which the trains would stop. This new control 
measure gave rise to speculation as to whether Soviet 
authorities might stop all surface traffic from the Western 
zones to Berlin. Accordingly, the emergency plan for 
Allied airlift which had been evolved during the April 
crisis was readied for possible use. On 22 June the Soviet 
Union took action to suspend all traffic and travel across 
the Soviet Zone of Occupation. 

The suspension of Western zone Berlin traffic virtually 
created in the Western sectors of Berlin an Allied island 



in the Soviet Occupation Zone. The surface blockade 
permitted official access only by air through three cor- 
ridors extending from Berlin toward Hamburg and Hanover 
in the British zone and Frankfurt am Main in the American 
zone. It was through these narrow air lanes that, on 26 
June, the Western nations initiated an airlift not only to 
supply the Allied agencies of Western Berlin, but also 
to furnish for the German population of the Western sec- 
tors, some 2,500,000 people, minimum daily needs in 
sustenance and fuel. 

The mission of mercy which the Western Allies under- 
took was a challenge in joint operation, planning, and 
execution which had not been equaled in time of peace. 
The following chapters portray the activities of the United 
States Air Forces in Europe to meet this challenge. The 
participation of the many other agencies without whose 
help the Lift could not have been possible is portrayed 
in other reports, and no attempt is made herein to dupli- 
cate their presentation. 

For training purposes and simplicity of approach, this 
presentation is composed of separate chapters for each 
staff function or activity. The statistics presented, unless 
otherwise indicated, cover United States operation only. 

This report has purposely abstained from glorification 
of individuals or activities, since such mention of any 
specific individuals or activities would mean inequitable 
omission of others also deserving praise. 



CONTENTS 

FOREWORD iii 

INTRODUCTION v 

OPERATIONS 1 

INTRODUCTION 3 

ORGANIZATION OF THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . 4 

Organization 4 

Army Support 5 

Navy Participation 5 

MANPOWER AND REQUIREMENTS 7 

Manpower 8 

Aircraft - 11 

Recommendations 11 

OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES 13 

Introduction 14 

Flight Procedures 21 

Routes and Terminal Procedures .... 22 

Altitudes 22 

Pilot Standardization 22 

Briefing 24 

Emergency Procedures 24 

Flow Control 25 

Planned Diversions 25 

Weight and Balance 26 

Operations Summary 26 

TRAFFIC 27 

Introduction 28 

Commodities Airlifted 29 

Production Control 31 

Minimum Turn-Around Time 32 

Allocation of Load 32 

Berlin Off-Loading 33 

Diversion of Aircraft 33 

Utilization of Payload 34 

Loading Techniques and Equipment ... 34 

Passengers 36 

Conclusions 37 



COMMUNICATIONS 39 

Introduction 40 

Personnel 40 

Fixed Wire Communications 40 

Low Frequency Radio Beacons 42 

Low Frequency Radio Ranges 43 

VHF Ranges 43 

Fan Marker Beacons 44 

Air/Ground Communications 44 

Ground Control Approach System .... 45 

Air Traffic Control Radar System .... 45 

Airborne Radar and Associated Equipment 47 

Mobile Radio Equipment 48 

RAF Navigational Aids 49 

WEATHER 51 

Introduction 51 

Organization 52 

Effects of Weather 52 

Forecasting 53 

Observing 53 

Upper Air and Aerial Reconnaissance ... 54 

Pilot Reports 56 

Operational Use of Forecasts 56 

Records and Climatology 57 

Dissemination 58 

Technical Aspects 58 

Conclusions 59 

SAFETY 61 

Ground Safety 62 

Flying Safety 63 

Summary 68 

Recommendations 68 

INTELLIGENCE 69 

Functions 70 

Personnel 70 

Conclusions 70 



PLANS 71 

Coordination 72 

Planning Staff 72 

Conclusions 72 

Recommendations 72 

MATERIEL 73 

INTRODUCTION 74 

SUPPLY 75 

Mission 76 

General 76 

Automotive Supply 77 

Engineer Supply .78 

Air Supply 79 

AOCP Control 82 

Electronics 85 

General Supply 88 

Conclusions 90 

MAINTENANCE 91 

Mission 92 

Sources of Workload 92 

Organization 94 

Aircraft 96 

Aircraft Engine Maintenance 99 

Service Tests 103 

Statistical Reports 104 

Motorized Equipment 104 

Electronics and Communications 106 

AIR INSTALLATIONS 109 

General 110 

Tempelhof Air Base 110 

Tegel Airfield 111 

Rhein/Main Air Base 112 

Wiesbaden Air Base 112 

Celle and Fassberg RAF Stations . . . . 112 

Approach Lighting 113 

Conclusions 113 



TRANSPORTATION 115 

Mission 115 

Organization 116 

Early Planning 116 

Airlift Operations 117 

Conclusions 117 



ERSONNEL 



119 



MILITARY PERSONNEL 121 

The First Days 122 

Requirements 122 

Temporary Tours and Short-Term PCS 122 

Aircrew Replacements 123 

Periods of TDY 124 

Requisitions on PCS Basis 124 

Manning of Special Projects 125 

Requisitions for Key Officer Personnel . . 125 

Classification and Audit 128 

Awards and Decorations 129 

The Phase-Out 129 

Conclusions 130 

HOUSING 131 

Policies 131 

Minimizing the Shortage 131 

Housing and Morale 132 

Conclusions 132 

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 133 

Utilization of U.S. Civilians 133 

German National Authorizations 134 

Recruiting and Training 134 

European Civilians Other than Germans 135 

Phase-Out of Airlift Operations 135 

Conclusions 135 

PERSONNEL SERVICES 137 

Special Services 138 

Airman Information and Education 141 

Personal Affairs 143 



Summary 144 

Conclusions 144 

AIR CHAPLAIN 145 

Morale 145 

Conclusions 146 

AIR SURGEON 147 

Organization 148 

Health of the Airlift 148 

Removal from Flying 148 

Air Evacuation 151 

Causes of Disabilities 151 

Conclusions and Recommendations . 152 

AIR JUDGE ADVOCATE 153 

PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE 155 

Prelude 156 

The Blockade 156 

Plans 156 

Problems 157 

Summary of Coverage 158 

INSPECTOR GENERAL 159 

AIR INSPECTOR 160 

Functions 160 

Organization 160 

Operation 160 

Specific Problems 161 

Results 162 

Conclusions 162 

AIR PROVOST MARSHAL 162 

Mission 162 

Organization 162 

Operations 163 

Conclusions 165 

Recommendations 165 



OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS ... 166 

Organization 166 

Counter Intelligence 166 

Recommendations 166 

COMPTROLLER 167 

INTRODUCTION 168 

BUDGET AND FISCAL 169 

Funding Structure 169 

Organization 169 

Audit of Non-Appropriated Funds .... 169 

Conclusions 170 

FINANCE DISBURSING 170 

Payment of Personnel 170 

Per Diem 170 

Reports of Survey : 170 

Conclusions 171 

COST CONTROL AND ANALYSIS 171 

Development 171 

Operation 171 

Analysis 171 

Conclusions 171 

STATISTICAL SERVICES 178 

Development 178 

Airlift Reports 179 

Reporting 179 

Personnel Accounting 182 

Aircraft and Operation Reporting 183 

Conclusions 184 

Recommendations 184 

CHRONOLOGY 185 



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AIRLIFT BASES 



* U.S. BASES 

• BRITISH BASES 

A FRENCH BASES 

O U.S. OPERATED 



INTRODUCTION 

When it became apparent on 25 June 1948 that 
supplies would have to be airlifted to Berlin due to the 
Soviet closure of the last land route into the four-power 
occupied capital, USAFE was called upon to deliver 
supplies to Berlin. Aircraft of the 60th and 61st Troop 
Carrier Groups and other aircraft in the pilot proficiency 
pool at Wiesbaden were marshalled to perform the task. 
Except for one or two B-17 flights, all the aircraft initially 
used were C-47's. As many of these aircraft did not have 
assigned crews, pilots were detailed for the flying from 
all types of duties. When the mission gave the indica- 
tion of lasting more than a few days, a special Task 
Force was organized to which officers from the Opera- 
tions Division, Headquarters USAFE were detailed. 

During these early days, USAFE personnel were also 
accomplishing the initial organization and development 
in England of the 3rd Air Division, which was to direct 
the training of B-29 groups and be responsible for the 
Bu'tonwood Air Depot where Airlift C-54's were later 
put through 200-hour inspections. Needless to say, the 
presence of potent U. S. tactical aircraft in England in 
moderate numbers was a morale booster for both the 
people of Western Europe and the personnel directly 
engaged in the Airlift. However, the development of the 
3rd Air Division also necessitated an aerial supply build- 
up from USAFE stocks, and initially this had to be done 
largely by air with the same C-47's being used on the 
Airlift to Berlin. 

The fact that one type route to the besieged city 
was not closed — the 20 mile wide air corridors — was 
due to wise diplomatic tactics in 1945 when the quadri- 
partite agreement was negotiated defining the corridors 
and granting their free use under established rules. This 
agreement effected the necessary coordination of opera- 
lions of the four nations' aircraft in Berlin by creating 
a four-power Air Safety Center where all flight notices 
were posted. In March of 1948, the Russians requested 
that the agreement be modified on the basis that several 
alleged infringements of its provisions by U. S. aircraft 
had been noticed. Had these modifications been agreed 



RESTRICTED 

upon by the Western Powers, the Airlift could never have 
existed as no longer would night flying or instrument 
flying have been permitted through the corridors in and 
out of Berlin. But the proposals were flatly rejected by 
the Western Powers. This proposed curtailment of West- 
ern air rights, combined with other disagreements and 
unfriendly Russian statements, acts, and demands, should 
have provided basis for suspecting the imposition of 
more drastic measures by the Russians, designed to force 
the other three occupying powers from Berlin by placing 
them in an untenable position in which there existed no 
positive and continual means of transportation to and from 
the city. 

To perform aerial supply exclusively for a civil me- 
tropolis is an entirely different project from fulfilling 
military requirements with airlift to a theater of operations 
or an isolated unit. In contrast to a Table of Allowance 
and prescribed levels of supply for a military organization, 
a city's requirements are limitless. It was therefore 
initially necessary to establish the minimum amount of 
supplies required to sustain the life of the civilian and 
military population and provide the city's essential 
industries with sufficient materials for partial operation. 
This basic requirement was set at 4,500 tons per day, and 




strict rationing within Berlin was instituted. However, the 
directive calling for the airlifting of minimum tonnage re- 
quirements was later changed to airlift the maximum 
tonnage possible. Nothing was to be airlifted which was 
not requested by the Air Staff Committee in Berlin. 

To support the Airlift to Berlin it was estimated that 
a fleet of 225 C-54's would be required. This necessitated 
the marshalling of these aircraft with crews from other 
USAF commands all over the world. Some units were 
transferred in their entirety from their permanent duty 
stations to bases in Germany. By the end of September 
1948, all C-54 units were in place and operational in the 
Airlift. A flight of C-82's was also present to move 
specialized cargo to and from Berlin. 

Originally the USAF flew from its two major bases in 
the Frankfurt area — Rhein/Main and Wiesbaden. How- 
ever, as the project grew, other bases were necessary 
because of the ground and air traffic in the Frankfurt 
area. RAF bases in the British zone at Fassberg and Celle 
were assigned to the USAF for its use. Operationally, all 
of these bases were well situated near the entrances to 
the corridors and near the supply points for the com- 
modities hauled. The original USAF terminal base in 
Berlin was Tempelhof, but later Tegel Airfield was 
constructed in the French sector and operated by the 
USAF. These various installations are discussed in more 
detail in a later chapter. 

At the inception of the Airlift, standard navigational 
aids existed in the terminal areas and along the routes 
used. With precision navigation and flying procedures 
required for intense operations from congested areas 
through narrow corridors, other aids were required. 
Additional beacons were positioned to indicate turning 
or reporting points. Four Visual-Aural radio ranges (VAR) 
were installed to delineate accurately the air corridors. 
One localizer was installed to indicate a definite position 
fix for reporting purposes, and the installation of CPS-5 
surveillance radar at Tempelhof provided radar air traffic 
control in the Berlin area. The system of navigational 
aids which existed at the end of the Airlift is part of 
communication projects discussed in greater detail in a 
special section on that subject. 



RESTRICTED 




:;:.■;=; 






WmmM&M*MmMWM& 



iWli-Jlillil'liliiiVil'lTM 



THE AIR MINISTRY 
LONDON, ENGLAND 



HEADQUARTERS 
US. AIR FORCE 



WASHINGTON DC 



HEADOUARTERS 
BAR) 



HEADOUARTERS 
USAFE 



HEADOUARTERS 
CALTF 



HEADQUARTERS 

NO. 46 GROUP 



SCHLESWIGLAND 



HEADOUARTERS 
1st ALTF 



FUHLSBUTTEL 



* BASE SUPPORT ELEMENTS BRITISH UNITS 



ORGANIZATION OF 



The American Airlift effort began as an operational 
activity of Headquarters USAFE. It was designated first 
as Headquarters, Berlin Airlift Task Force and was later 
established as the Airlift Task Force (Provisional), effec- 
tive 29 July. The provisional status was removed 4 No- 
vember with the official establishment of the 1st Airlift Task- 
Force (1st ALTF). 

Initially, U. S. and British efforts were independently^ 
conducted. Early in the operation, however, it was re- 
alized that some form of unified control was necessary 
in order to coordinate the RAF-USAF effort. When the 
subject was first discussed, there was a slight difference 
of opinion as to how far the integration of command 
should go. While one group believed that coordination' 
of air traffic control matters was all that was necessary, 
the other held that one officer should be charged with 
the overall operational control. 

The discussion between the Headquarters of the 
United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and British | 
Air Forces of Occupation, Germany (BAFO) resulted in j 
the establishment 15 October 1948 of the Combined Air- 
lift Task Force (CALTF) as an integrated subordinate 
command of both USAFE and BAFO. Due to effort in- 
volved, the Commanding General of the U. S. element 
was selected as the Commander of the combined organi- 

AIRLIFT OPERATION AT TEMPELHOF. 



THE BERLIN AIRLIFT 



zation, with the Air Otficer commanding the RAF element 
as his deputy. CALTF was given operational control of 
all participating units. Administrative responsibility re- 
gained respectively with the American 1st ALTF and the 
British 46th Group. 

ARMY SUPPORT 

The U. S. Commander-in-Chiet, European Command, 
charged the Army Forces in Europe with the responsibility 
»for furnishing all supplies for Berlin, establishing railheads, 
receiving supplies at the terminal points, and handling 
and transporting the supplies from the railhead to the 
airplane, and from the airplane to ultimate destination. 
Effective execution of these functions was facilitated by 
an Army liaison representative at Headquarters 1st ALTF 
and, later, by organization of the Army Airlift Support 
Command, consolidating all U. S. Army activities under 
one Army commander. 

NAVY PARTICIPATION 

Two Naval units flew from Rhein/Main Air Base as 
integral parts of ihe operation. Naval Transport Squadrons 
VR-6 and VR-8 were attached to the 513th and 61st 
Troop Carrier Groups, respectively, and operated under 
the control of ihe group commanders. The squadrons 
were provided with logistical support and housing in the 
same manner as USAF Airlift units. 





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MANPOWER 

If was evident from fhe beginning fhat fhe T/O&E oi 
a Troop Carrier Wing (Heavy) did nof authorize sufficien 
personnel for 24-hour operation seven days a week 
Therefore, in October 1948 the flight crew authorization 
were augmented to three crews per aircraft. Since addi 
fional maintenance and supply personnel and personne, 
for base operation were also required, Headquarters USAF 
authorized the reorganization from the "P" Column tc 
the "W" Column strength of the T/O&E on 20 Januarw 
1949. Even at the increased strength authorization, a re* 
quirement existed for additional authorization in ttw 
maintenance categories. A comparison of these requirep 
ments is indicated in the accompanying table. 

The reorganization to the "W" Column strength of thi 
troop carrier T/O&E made it apparent that many of thdj 
SSN's authorized were surplus and that reports to Head 
quarters USAF depicted an erroneous picture. Some o. 
the surplus authorizations that were noted are as follows 1 

(1) Navigators (SSN 1037). Flights to Berlin did no 
require navigators. However, flights to Burton* 
wood and the Zone of Interior (Zl) required com* 
plete crews. Only 90 navigators for the entire Air 
lift were needed, while the T/O&E authorized 984; 

(2) Radio operator mechanics (SSN 2756). Not re- 
quired for Airlift flights. 

(3) Cook's helpers or mess attendants (SSN 062). Al 







GERMA 
HELPERS 



of the authorization was surplus, as German 
civilians were utilized for such duties. 
(4) The Base Service Squadrons of each wing were 
surplus. The authorization therefor consisted pri- 
marily of laborers, and German nationals were 
utilized in that capacity. 
In late February 1949 requests were submitted to 
Headquarters USAF to reorganize to "P" Column strength, 
delete surplus SSN's from the T/O&E's, and inactivate 
the base service squadrons. Spaces made available were 
to be converted on a grade-for-grade basis, to the USAFE 
non-T/O&E allotment. These requests were approved the 
following April and the corresponding reorganization was 
directed in May. 

A problem of major concern was that the USAFE 
Troop Basis did not increase concurrently or commen- 
surately with the additional requirements. The accompany- 
ing chart indicates that requirements continuously exceeded 
the authorized personnel; e.g., in October 1948 the re- 
quirement for both officers and airmen was almost double 
the authorization. This made planning particularly diffi- 
cult in that an all-out effort was required of every organi- 
zation without any advance or current information on 
authorizations. 

The disparity in authorizations was alleviated by the 
utilization of German nationals. Qualified personnel of this 
type were obtained whenever possible and utilized as 
mechanics' helpers and in normal base support activities 
where military personnel were not authorized in sufficient 
numbers. 




AN ANALYSIS OF MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS 






■OW w h UJt 


c <- 


S; "£"T30 


in c"0° 


c-o = COO) 






ized by Col. 
1-1313 (U. 
-Eng acft plu 
eserve - wc 

) 

d in T/O& 
fororgn mair 
sserve acft 


co -c 


?.E a>io— - 


S>E <u^-~ 


<D C 05 C C 


JOB TITLE 


SSN 


1-1313, or 
personnel 
zed for 12 
aircraft (50 
■nonthly) 


Manpow 

orgn ma 

nel requir 

4-Eng acft ( 

ng monthly 


Manpow 

orgn ma 

nel requir 

-Eng acft (2 

ng monthly 


nee betwe 
zations a 
mentsforor 
for 12 4-E 
40 hrs flyi 

y) 






Author 
T/O&E 
of 12 4 
3 in r 
column 


Include 
1-1313 
of 3 re 


T/O&E 

maint 
authori 
4-Eng 
flying i 


USAF 
Guide, 
person 
for 12- 
hrs flyi 


USAF 
Guide, 
person 
for124 
hrs flyi 


Differe 

authori 

require 

rnaint 

acft (2 

monthi 


A 


B 


C (A-B) 


D 


E 


F (E-A) 


Painter 


144 


1 




1 


1 


2 


+ 1 


Clerk-Typist 


405 


1* 




1 


1 


3 


+ 2 


Airplane Hydraulic Mechanic 


528 


3 


1 


2 


1.92 


4.18 


+ 1.18 


Fabric & Dope Mechanic 


548 


2 




2 






- 2 


Airplane Sheet Metal Work 


555 


4 




4 


■ 2.4 


5.14 


+ 1.14 


Aircraft Welder 


573 








1.32 


2.82 


+ 2.82 


Airplane Power Plant Mechanic 


684-A 


30 


6 


24 






— 30 


Airplane Electrical Mechanic 


685 


5 


1 


4 


3 


6.42 


+ 1.42 


Airplane Instrument Mechanic 


686 


5 




5 


1.92 


4.18 


— 82 


Airplane & Engine Mechanic 


747-C 


28 


3 


25 


72 


154.08 


+ 126.08 


Airplane Inspector 


750-C 


2 




2 


2 


6 


+ 4 


Airplane Line Chief 


750-C 


1 




1 


1 


1 




Airplane Flight Chief 


750-C 


3 




3 


3 


3 




Airplane Crew Chief & Assistant 


750-C 


15 


3 


12 


24 


51.36 


+ 36.36 


Radio Mechanic, AF 


754 


5 


1 


4 


12 


25.68 


+ 20.68 


AF Supply Technician 


826 


3 




3 


2 


5 


+ 2 


Supply Clerk 


835 


1* 




1 


1 


3 


+ 2 


Radar Mechanic, Troop Carrier 


849 


9 




9 






- 9 


Radar Mechanic Navigator 


853 


10 


1 


9 






— 10 


Special Vehicle Operator 


932 








1 


2 


4- 2 


Radio Operator-Mechanic 


2756 


24 




24 






- 24 


Total 




152 


16 


136 


130.56 


278.86 


+ 126.86 


* Personnel in squadron headquarters not included. 










Based on 201 4-Eng 


ne aircraft, a requirement exists for 2,123 addition 


al personnel for organi- 




zational maintenanc 


e with supporting administrative personnel. Field 


maintenance, based on 




27% of 2,123, woulc 


i require 573 personnel or a total of 2,696 additional for both organiza- 




tional and field ma 


intenance. Deducting 784 used in 200-hour inspection at Burtonwood, a 




requirement existed 


for 1,912 additional troop spaces 


for "Vittles" 


maintenance 


and troop 




carrier squadrons. 















U.S., ALLIED AND GERMAN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL STRENGTH 




ERDING EMPLOYED GERMAN CARPENTERS . 































i 


| AUT PRIZED | 
















^~~ 


^^. 

^ 














| ASSIGNED | 
























**«■» ^ 








\ 


















































USLAND ALLIED CMUANS 










































































| 






















| ASSIGNED | 




v 


„. — — •■ 


■ — — ™ 


*"" •" — 




.— — 






















"^ 


— rs 
















\ 




















| AUTH IRIZED | 
























































mmn avtuANs 



































































ASONDJFMAMJJA 



AIRCRAFT 

As has been pointed out, the 60th and 61st 
Troop Carrier Groups were initially charged with tlying 
Hie maximum possible number ot missions to Berlin. By 
30 June 1948, 102 C-47's were available tor the operation. 
But the establishment ot a combined goal ot 4,500 tons 
a day for support of the Western sectors ot Berlin made 
it apparent that the 2 1/2 ton capacity ot the C-47 was 
not adequate for the operation. By 1 July the addition of 
two C-54's to the fleet marked the beginning of a heavy 
transport fleet which by 1 January 1949 had grown to 
201 USAF and 24 Navy aircraft. The accompanying chart 
portrays the gradual build-up of C-54's and the retire- 
ment of C-47's on the Airlift. 

On 16 September 1948 five C-82 aircraft arrived in the 
command. Carrying unwieldy cargo, such as heavy equip- 
ment and automobiles, became their primary function. In 
November, Navy Squadrons VR-6 and VR-8 began 
operations with 24 R-5D (C-54 type) aircraft. After the 
fleet had been built up to 225 aircraft, the available air- 
craft engaged in the mission varied between 209 and 
228 until final phase-out. In addition, a steady pipeline 
flow of some 100 C-54's into Zl reconditioning depots 







sc 


ENE 


F 


R 


DA 


It 


A 


T 


EMPELHOF 


H 


ANGAR. 










! T 








































1 
















































































BUILDUP OF AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT- 


1948 




NUMBER 
200 






























150 
100 
50 














16- 


54 1 










*' 










\ 

/ 
/ 


*' 










\ 










|c- 


W 










/ 
















































IC-821 








8 15 22 29 5 12 19 26 2 9 16 23 30 
JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER 



PHASE0UT OF AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT- 1949 



NUMBER 
200 

150 

100 

50 































x » 


\ 
\ 

\ 


***». 
































V 

\ 




, Ic 


-54) 














\ 




















N 
\ 
N 

\ 

\ 

S 








''••.4 




























JR-5D 


r 






8 15 22 30 7 14 21 28 30 1 
AUGUST SEPTEMBER 


' 14 21 28 4 
OCTOBER 



and back to the command was maintained until the phase- 
out of the operation. 

When the phase-out began 1 August 1949, 204 C-54's 
(USAF) and 21 Navy R-5D's were on hand. Forty-five of 
these aircraft were withdrawn from the available list for 
return to the Zl. The accompanying chart shows the re- 
duction phase of the operation. 

After the official termination of the Airlift on 1 Oc^ 
tober 1949, the C-54 aircraft were reduced to the number 
authorized for one Troop Carrier Group (H). 



RECOMMENDATIONS 

The wing-base organization was used in "Operation 
Vittles" and proved satisfactory. The Troop Carrier Wing 
T/O&E authorizing 1 x Column 5 (column "P") is adequate 
with augmentation for additional crews, maintenance and 
supply personnel, and additional base support personnel 
for the augmented strength and support of dependents. 

A major item of concern in an extensive air operaiion 
should be the reporting responsibility of the aircraft. In 
this case, such responsibility was retained in a command 
other than the command requiring and using the aircraft. 
As a result, for the first five months of operation all statistics 
pertaining to the C-54 aircraft were reported to the parent 
commands of the aircraft. Parent commands had to be con- 
tacted for the using command to obtain these records. 
This always resulted in delays and often in inaccurate in- 
formation. 

When it has been established that the operation will 
be of more than 90 days' duration, and when two factors 
have been established — (1) the tonnage required, and 
(2) the most suitable aircraft to transport the tonnage — 
the accountability of the aircraft should be transferred to 
the using command as the aircraft are delivered. This 
accountability should include the pipeline aircraft coming 
from or returning to depots for reconditioning. The 
maximum required number of aircraft should be de- 
termined, and the operation adjusted to the availability 
of these aircraft. 

Support aircraft which deliver supplies to the com- 
mand of operations should be accountable to the com- 
mand directing their activities, and aircraft required for 
Zone of Inferior training schools should be accountable 
to the command providing the training. 

When the total number of aircraft available for all 
operations is limited, the Department of the Air Force 
should direct adjustments between commands. For a 
sustained operation it is necessary that replacement air- 
craft from manufacturers, or leased aircraft from civilian 
agencies, be made available to all commands concerned, 
to meet backlogs due to accidents, weather, and un- 
scheduled maintenance. 



11 



SUMMARY OF COMBINED OPERATIONS 


TOTAL INBOUND TONNAGE 


2325509.6 

X 1 


1404.0 69005.7 


1190026 1396229 


I4758Q8 


1/35879 


14/438/ 


171959.2 


(522407 


196160.7 


2353637 


2508185 


2403250 2530900 


777586 


161511 


U S TOTAL 


1783572.7 


1 199.0 


39971. 


73658.1 


101846.7 


1157922 


87979.3 


1145672 


139218.8 


203946 


1544750 


1899572 


1922714 


1827223 


20632.2 


55940.0 


I2047.r 


FOOD 


296319.3 


1 100.0 


26825. 


21424.0 


25506.1 


27592.1 


23043.0 


366345 


16386.6 


19548.1 


25445.1 


301342 


30032.6 


1 1614.6 


1033.4 





o ; 


COAL 


1421 118.8 





12426. 


50074.0 


70910.2 


825084 


6055Q8 


71923.4 


1178886 


95927.1 


1226022 


1503324 


153220.1 


1670077 


1984833 


552765 


119881 


OTHER 


66134.6 


99.0 


720. 


2160.1 


54304 


5691.7 


4385.5 


6009.3 


4943.6 


4919.4 


6427.7 


9490.6 


9018.7 


41006 


2015.5 


6635 


590 


BRITISH TOTAL 


541936.9 


205.0 


29034.7 


45344.5 


37776.2 


317886 


25608.6 


26870.9 


32740.4 


31846.1 


416857 


45406.5 


58547J 


57602.1 


515578 


21818.6 


4104! 


FOOD 


240386.0 


205.0 


199170 


14549.9 


19994.2 


16934.4 


17439.5 


177860 


173370 


15545.5 


18047.0 


18251.8 


24512.0 


21929.1 


1-47110 


32266 





COAL 


164910.5 





7511.8 


27269.8 


14591.4 


10570.6 


33107 


35878 


6216.5 


5178.0 


8621.0 


7126.1 


10091.4 


14619.0 


25124.3 


16988.0 


4104.1:' 


OTHER 


1366404 





1605.9 


3524.8 


3190.6 


4283.6 


4858.4 


5497.1 


91869 


III2Z6 


15017.7 


20028.6 


239437 


21054.0 


11722.5 


1604.0 





TOTAL OUTBOUND TONNAGE 


81730.8 





1439.4 


1806.0 


3622.4 


3625.7 


6446.7 


9480.8 


7106.1 


6/09.2 


7952.0 


9897.9 


8295.8 


7727.5 


65274 


1646.9 


470 


U S TOTAL 


458877 


* 


* 


* 


* 


* 


3234.8 


5768.7 


4128.5 


3181.2 


4631.0 


6488.9 


6149.8 


5346.5 


5488.4 


1469.9 


* 


BRITISH TOTAL 


35843.1 





1439.4 


18060 


3622.4 


3625.7 


3211.9 


3712.1 


29776 


2928.0 


3321.0 


3409.0 


2146.0 


2381.0 


1039.0 


177.0 


47.0 


TOTAL PASSENGERS AIRLIFTED 


227655 


4/06 


16498 


12282 


14665 


17544 


18441 


18937 


16620 


15447 


19743 


18885 


16660 


10584 


10354 


10077 


68/2, 


US INBOUND 


25263 





1408 


1321 


1441 


1858 


2359 


1713 


1871 


1736 


1993 


2058 


1850 


1822 


1587 


1254 


992i 


BRITISH INBOUND 


34815 


1925 


3157 


1965 


2230 


3120 


2565 


2760 


2905 


2602 


3092 


3258 


2429 


1336 


693 


453 


325 ( 


US OUTBOUND 


37486 


531 


6262 


2764 


2897 


2711 


2491 


1944 


1729 


1812 


2576 


2694 


2489 


2151 


1877 


1435 


1123 


BRITISH OUTBOUND 


130091 


1650 


5671 


6232 


8097 


9855 


11026 


12520 


101 15 


9297 


12082 


10875 


9892 


5275 


6197 


6935 


4372 


TOTAL FLIGHTS 


277569 


500 


13528 


18142 


19729 


18235 


13352 


16492 


19492 


17086 


22163 


26026 


277/8 


26545 


27592 


8984 


1985' 


US FLIGHTS 


189963 


474 


7550 


9770 


12904 


12135 


9047 


11660 


14095 


12043 


15530 


19130 


19366 


18451 


20488 


5886 


I434> 


BRITISH FLIGHTS 


87606 


26 


5978 


8372 


6825 


6100 


4305 


4832 


5397 


5043 


6633 


6896 


8352 


8094 


7104 


3098 


551 


MONTH 


TOTAL 


JUN-48 


JUL 


AUG 


SEP 


OCT 


NOV 


DEC 


JAN-49 


FEB 


MAR 


APR 


MAY 


JUN 


JUL 


AUG 


SEP i 



12 



* UNAVAILABLE 



LOADING BASE 



«MMM 




-2»^2k 




CORRIDOR ^&T7^T/ 








MITF TONNAGE 




M* Y 




250,318-9 | 235(36LZ 



ti BERLIN 



147 580.8 1 139.622.9 1 1».»"- 5 1 m. 



■M.o.w.S 1,40+0 









:' 







14' 




INTRODUCTION 

The mission accomplishment of the Airlift is reflected 
adequately by a total of 2.3 million tons of food, fuel, and 
supplies transported to Berlin. During the life of the 
mission, the USAF units primarily carried the bulk-type 
tonnage, while the British excelled in hauling specialized 
commodities such as liquid fuels. It should be borne in 
mind in making comparisons of the effort, that the tonnage 
goals established early in the Airlift for the American 
participation were based almost exclusively upon the C-54 
capacity of 10 tons, while the British used various types 
of aircraft with different cargo capacities. 

The following charts not only depict the amount of 
food, coal, and other supplies that were carried into Ber- 
lin, but also furnish an indirect portrayal of the build-up 
of the Lift, and of weather and other factors that 
affected it. 



USAF OPERATIONS 



PERCENT 
OF TOTAL 
100 P"~ 



RHEIN/MAIN AIR BASE 



f 



LI 



j_u 



I 









O, 




WIESBADEN AIR BASE 



ll 



HOURS 



% TOTAL TONS 



E?x?3 % TOTAL TRIPS 



% TOTAL HOURS 



PERCENT 
OF TOTAL 
1001 — 



FASSBERG RAF STATION 






I 



I 




n 



,1 



I 



PERCENT 
OF TOTAL 
1001 — 



CELLE RAF STATION 




I 






HOURS 



878Q2 30299.1 30079.8 37 3969 44 1943 42939.2 436987 4631 IB 



8940 30SQO 30320 37920 4489.0 43740 44390 4729.0 



22170 66970 67690 84860 97490 949IO 974IO 10 1 100 



* NO USAF OPERATIONS 



% TOTAL TONS 



FH!?*! % TOTAL TRIPS 



% TOTAL HOURS 



15 



AIRLIFT TONNAGE 










2 000 




4 000 



2 000 



16 



DAY - BY - DAY 




10 20 
OCTOBER — 



10 20 

— NOVEMBER — 



10 20 
DECEMBER — 



10 20 

— JANUARY 1949 - 



TONS 
10000 



8000 



6000 



4000 



2000 




TONS 
10000 



8000 



6000 



4000 



2000 



10 20 

SEPTEMBER — 



17 



TONS 
2 500 000 



2 000 000 



I 500 000 



I 000 000 



500 000 



US AND BRITISH CUMULATIVE TONNAGE 







I252002.6h487 366.3 1736184.8 



302900.7 346307.2 1 406854.3 
349 101.9 I 139 059.1 1331330.5 



18 




TONS 
2, 500, 000 



2,000, 000 



1,500,000 



1,000,000 



500,000 



CUMULATIVE CALTF TONNAGE BY TYPE 



/ .., 




■|f:f 



I 404.0 TO 409.7 



89 4123 329 0352 



84O20.9 129 521.2 



I 738 164 8 | 978 5Q9.8 2 23 1 5998 



2 309 3564 2 325 508£ 



497 672S I 569 937.1 






19 



THOUSANDS OF 

HOURS 

60 



MONTHLY FLIGHT TIME BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 




REPLACED BY C-54 AIRCRAFT 



27 873.0 34716.0 39 924.0 36 798.0 45 780.0 57877.0 56 532.0 53 436.0 60 636.0 




thousands of MONTHLY FLIGHT TIME 

HOURS 




60 




























l61 023 






50 
































40 
30 
20 
10 













1 TOTAL | 


















































1 NIGHT | 










«* 
• 


» — *"" 


"\ 










* — 


-'T\ 


\ 


/ X 


f — ' 


,y 






















\ 


L\ 


J J 


1S0NDJFMAMJJAS 


TOTAL 


1896 


28 298 


35 249 


43 087 


36 800 


28 178 


34 902 


40 167 


37 037 


46 217 


58 398 


57 077 


54 007 


61 023 


19 303 


5 262 


NIGHT 


234 


6 727 


8 862 


15 466 


16 947 


1 1 145 


17519 


19 091 


15 307 


17 381 


20445 


18 134 


16 259 


19 806 


5 752 


2 075 



20 



FLIGHT PROCEDURES 

With the facilities made available to the operating 
organizations and the supplies provided them at the 
departure airfields, delivery of the required tonnage to 
Berlin became primarily an operations task. The accept- 
ance capabilities of the terminal airfields were limiting 
factors in the expansion of the operations. Determination 
of the traffic flow, therefore, had to be accurate, and 
.precision flight procedures became tantamount to full 
utilization of the airfields. 

To provide the positive time control required, all 
flights were flown under instrument flight rules, with two 
methods used to regulate take-off: 

(1) The block system was employed when airfields 
were widely separated or when aircraft having 
different cruisinn <np^rU wprp utilized. This system 



established a time block for each base covering 
all take-offs of similar type aircraft. 
(2) The integrated dispatch was employed when two 
airfields were in proximity or when aircraft dis- 
patched had the same cruising speed. This system 
insured the proper interval at the point of merg- 
ing. 
Standard operating procedures were established 
setting forth airspeeds for climb, cruise, and descent so 
that there would be a minimum deterioration of flow 
interval. Blind position reports over designated fixes 
permitted pilots to adjust their intervals as necessary. To 
insure that intervals were maintained and that the accept- 
ance capabilities of the Berlin terminals were fully utilized, 
almost no traffic other than that engaged in the Airlift 
was permitted in the established flow. In fact, Airlift 
operations at Rhein/Main became so extensive that all 



non-Airlift traffic was excluded except a bare minimum 
of 10 flights per day, authorized as follows: 



CARRIER 


No. FLIGHTS 


Military Air Transport Service 


3 
2 
2 
1 

1 
1 




Seaboard and Western orTransocean Airlines . . 

British European Airways 

European Air Transport Service 



Only these flights were permitted daily scheduled use 
of Rhein/Main; itinerants were prohibited except for 
high dignitaries on governmental business as specifically 
authorized. 





ROUTES AND TERMINAL PROCEDURES 

The canalized nature of this operation, with its terminal 
bases located in confined areas, created a need for 
precise routes. These had to be utilized by all aircraft 
regardless of weather, and the procedures had to be 
standard. The routes and procedures developed are 
portrayed in the accompanying diagrams. 



ALTITUDES 

After numerous experiments to determine the minimum 
adequate separation between successive aircraft of the 



same speed en route to the same receiving airfield, it was 
determined that two altitudes, with a time separation of 
six minutes between aircraft at the same altitude, afforded 
the maximum over-all safety for each stream of aircraft 
from any one base. For short flights of approximately one 
hour's duration, a 500-foot altitude and three-minute time 
separation was adequate. Additional altitudes had to be 
provided whenever aircraft of different cruising speeds 
were on the same route to the same destination. It was 
found that the number of altitudes used should be kept 
to a minimum, in order to expedite flow into the receiv- 
ing terminal by reducing the time of descent from cruising 
to approach altitude. 



PILOT STANDARDIZATION 

To insure that the procedures established were 
constantly and rigidly adhered to, standardization o'i 
pilot performance became an important project. Average 
USAF pilots, although possessors of instrument certificates) 
are not consistently as precise in their instrument flying 
as this operation required. Further, the types of flying 
previously done by the personnel varied greatly. There- 
fore, all pilots had to be indoctrinated in the standard 
procedures employed, and their proficiency had to bei 
maintained at a high level, both in techniques and ir 
adherence to published procedures. 



22 



STANDARD PATTERN OF OPERATION 




Since there were no surplus aircraft for training 
purposes, the indoctrination of approximately 1,400 pilots 
had to be done on-the-job while actually engaged in 
flying the Airlift. A substantial number of Airlift pilots 
were trained at the Great Falls Replacement Training 
Unit in C-54 aircraft along simulated corridor routes. These 
pilots merely required sufficient indoctrination in the 
actual Lift procedures and operation. However, continuing 
checks on them as well as all others were made to maintain 
a uniform standard of operation. 

This standardization was accomplished by fhe adoption 
of the Chief Pilot system. A "Standardization Board" was 
established at Headquarters 1st ALTF. The men chosen for 
this board were experienced in precision instrument 
flying. Their duties involved the development and adop- 
tion of standard techniques and operating procedures and 
the indoctrination of aircrews in their use. 

The hard core of the system lay in the Chief Pilot 
and check pilots at group level. These men received 
instructions and indoctrination from the Crew Qualifi- 
cation Board; thus standardization of performance and 
instruction was achieved throughout the Airlift Task Force. 

In addition to non-standard pilot techniques, there was 
definite evidence from engine failure analysis and equip- 
ment failure analysis that some of the procedures originally 
in effect were definitely injurious to equipment. Here 
again the check system proved beneficial. Manuals on 
equipment use, detailed training regulations, and check 
procedures were prepared in coordination with the 
technical representatives of both aircraft and engine 
manufacturers. Using this material as a guide, additional 
instructor pilots at squadron level were selected and 
trained for the purpose of carrying out the required 
standardization. 

The new Airlift crews received under the replacement 
flow of approximately 17 percent per month had a 
relatively low average of flying time. This necessitated 
the upgrading of an average of 8 pilots per squadron 
per month. However, during certain periods the turnover 
of crew personnel in a unit was 80 percent in a period 
of 60 days. Though costly in personnel, this check system 
accomplished the detailed indoctrination and training of 



each individual pilot assigned to duty flights. Discrepancy 
reports by air traffic controllers, approach controllers, GCA 
operators, and pilots were constantly studied; and any 
trends away from established procedures were quickly 
corrected throughout the command. The most effective 
control of standardization and efficiency was that established 
at group level. 

The Chief Pilot, the responsible standardization officer in 
the group, worked closely with operations and was familiar 
with the many details of the Lift. This put him in an 
advantageous position to anticipate difficulties, observe 
performance, and point out any limitations. Through the 
cooperation of unit commanders, fhe system assured a 
consistent standard of performance in flying personnel. 
Operation on a 24-hour basis posed problems of sched- 
uling crews for such maximum permissible utilization com- 
patible with the limits imposed by health, distance from 
place of work, availability of transportation, and irregular- 
ities caused by weather diversions. It was not feasible to 
classify pilots as to experience and to schedule fhem 
accordingly; therefore, all flight crews had to be standard. 
Governed by these factors, flying time on this short-haul 
operation averaged 68 hours per pilot per month. 

BRIEFING 

Since crew members had to be cognizant of current 
Airlift rules and procedures at all times, a system of daily 
briefings was established. Under the "block" system of 
flying, crews were briefed en masse just prior to going 
on flight duty, a satisfactory system since there was rel- 
atively little waiting between briefing and departure to 
Berlin. When the block system was discontinued, aircraft 
were dispatched from various bases to attain an integrated 
flow. Because of delays between briefing and departure, 
in many cases the information given at briefing had be- 
come obsolete by take-off time. Accordingly, the daily 
group briefings were eliminated, and thorough weekly 
briefings on over-all procedures were instituted. In ad- 
dition, pilots were briefed individually prior to each 
departure on changes in flight plans, weather, NOTAMS, 
alternates, and harassing measures to be expected from 



the Russians. After the briefing, pilots were given navtl 
gation and briefing kits containing current flighf informal 
tiort, emergency procedures, maps, and charts. Emergene 
procedures sometimes required diversions of as mud 
as 400 to 600 miles from normal Airlift routes. 

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 



The emergency procedures included in the briefing kil 
established what to do in fhe event of communication 
failures, engine failures, crash landings, or emergen 
diversions. Normally, an aircraft in distress would turn 
of the traffic flow, proceed to an emergency altitude whl 
was kept free, and return to its base or divert to a 
alternate, depending on fhe emergency and the weatheij 
In the event of a communications failure which woult 
preclude the aircraft's remaining under the precise ai 
traffic control required, fhe aircraft would leave th( 
stream of traffic and proceed to a clear weather air base 
either its home base or a designated alternate. Aircraf 
with engine failure which did not justify the jettisoning o 
cargo could proceed to Gatow or Tegel Air Bases fd 
unloading. If the trouble could not be rectified in Berlin* 
a take-off on three engines was permitted if the pilot ha< 
been designated as qualified for such take-offs. 

So that those Airlift bases which had one runwa* 
would not have their traffic flow interrupted due to 'J 
crash landing, another base wifhin the U. S. occupii 
zone not directly engaged in the Airlift was designati 
as the crash landing base to which all aircraff with landi 
gear trouble or other evidence of possible crash iandin 
would proceed. 

Weather diversions were avoided if at all possible b' 
suspension of operations when forecasts indicated th6 
approach of weather below Airlift minimums. If possible) 
any necessary diversions were effected to other Airlif 
bases. Certain other airfields within Europe, some as fa> 
as 600 miles from the Airlift home base, were designated 
as weather alternates. 

On those rare occasions when diversions were 
necessary, they were directed by Airliff operations officers 
on duty in the Air Traffic Control centers. 



24 




FLOW CONTROL 

In order to effect the flow control mentioned above 
and expedite and regulate all air traffic in the corridors, 
operational control of the Air Traffic Control centers 
which had jurisdiction over the Airlift routes and terminal 
areas was delegated to the Airlift commander. He, in turn, 
placed his representatives in the towers and Air Traffic 
Control centers concerned to insure that Airlift policies 
were carried out. Air Traffic Control directly supervised 
the rate of flow, the number of landings, the traffic pat- 
terns, and the procedures of Airlift and itinerant aircraft 
entering and leaving the control area. A central control 
was established within the Airlift staff with the responsibility 
of continually monitoring the flow of traffic through the 
corridors, issuing necessary instructions to the Air Traffic 
Control centers for diversions, and making decisions on 
controversial issues involving the dispatch and landing of 
itinerant aircraft. For informational purposes this central 
office maintained an up-to-the-minufe record of tonnage 
flown. 

The authority delegated to Airlift Task Force for the 
control of air traffic in the corridors and terminal areas 
was necessary in the early phases of the operation in order 
to expedite the establishment of procedures required to 
accomplish this mission most effectively. This authority 
included prompt departures from International Civil 



Aviation Organization procedures and Air Force standards 
whenever necessary. However, the division of responsibili- 
ties in Air Traffic Control centers and control towers was 
difficult to define, and there was considerable overlap of 
authority and responsibility which on occasion resulted 
in confusion, delay, and possible hazardous operations. 
These were due largely to the inexperience of the Airlift 
representatives in matters pertaining to Air Traffic Control 
because they were not trained air traffic controllers but 
were, for the most part, operations officers. 

All Air Traffic Control clearances were expedited and 
voice transmissions were held to a minimum. The detailed 
routes and procedures were defined and described in a 



booklet for pilots which eliminated additional instructions 
except in emergencies. After early operations indicated 
the tonnage loss by stacking and holding, positive aircraft 
flow was established, and aircraft which had missed 
approaches at Berlin returned to home bases. 



PLANNED DIVERSIONS 

Planned diversions were attempted in an effort to 
continue operations when weather at home bases was 
below Airlift minima. When aircraft were diverted, 
operational control of aircraft and crews had to be as- 






sumed by the diversion base, which often experienced 
difficulty in the integration of diverted aircraft into its 
established system of crew scheduling and aircraft mainte- 
nance. 

Long-range weather forecasts for this area were not 
sufficiently reliable to justify moving large numbers of 
personnel and equipment to another station for extended 
operations. Emergency diversions were attempted only to 
those terminals located in the area receiving Lift support. 
The number of aircraft diverted and the length of diversion 
were determined by the availability of supplies and 
maintenance facilities at the diversion base. 

WEIGHT AND BALANCE 

In order to expedite Airlift clearances, a simplified 
weight and balance clearance was required. This was ac- 
complished by transcribing aircraft weight and balance 
data to a loading chart installed in each aircraft. This chart 
indicated a maximum allowable load for the various com- 
partments and served as a guide for both loading and 
flying crews. Copies of the chart were on file at unit 
operations, unit loading, and weight and balance offices. 
Changes in weight and balance data were immediately re- 
flected on the loading chart. This action insured current 
and accurate information for proper loading of each air- 
craft. Precomputation of weight and balance data on 
the aircraft loading charts eliminated the necessity for 
individual weight and balance clearances and thereby 
minimized the loading and ground time of the aircraft. 

OPERATIONS SUMMARY 

Transport aircraft should be stripped of equipment ex- 
cess to the needs of the operation so that their full 
payload may be utilized and maintenance problems re- 
duced. 

Aircraft types may differ greatly from those used in 
this operation. It was proved that the C-54 with its 10-ton 
load operated more efficiently, economically, and 
effectively than the C-47 with its two and one-half ions. 
The C-74 operated very efficiently over the Transatlantic 



route with Airlift supplies, and the YC-97 was used ex-l 
perimentally for a short period in the Airlift. These largel 
aircraft with greater payloads, faster cruising speeds, ancl 
greater cargo compartment capacity will pose actual 
operational problems not too different from those solved- 
in this operation. 

The restricted flight paths available to aircraft in this, 
operation necessitated the use of a single stream for all 
traffic. However, in future operations where this limitation 
may or may not be present, other means for navigation 
such as zero reading or distance measuring equipment with 1 
omni-directional ranges, Loran or Shoran, and other future, 
developments in air navigation may effect precision flow 
control along specified routes. 

Operations personnel in transport units must be in a 
continuous state of training to maintain maximum 
proficiency so that precision techniques may be employed 
without further specialized training. 

Air Traffic Control agencies should have at their dis-l 
posal the latest accepted control techniques so that their 
proficiency in employing such techniques will remain at 
a high standard. The attainment of this high standard will' 
permit the control agency to be called upon at any time 
to provide Air Traffic Control service in accordance with 
any.desired procedures, without change in its operational r 
control or its normal mission. However, it is recommended 
that the using agency accomplish effective liaison with the 
central traffic control agency in order to pass to aircraft 
concerned specific operational directives which have 
definite bearing on the successful completion of the 
operation. 

An important principle which the Airlift clearly illus-i 
trated was that positive flow control of traffic must be j 
maintained between the loading areas and the airhead] 
bases, with the maximum acceptance rate at the airhead j 
bases as the determining factor. Since each operation may; 
differ in its detailed air traffic or flow control problems, ' 
this chapter has not stressed such details as exact turning 
points and altitudes. These are problems which must be 
met through flexibility of operational planning based on 
the Lift requirements, type of aircraft, terrain features, and 
distances involved. 



INTRODUCTION 

Wifh the rapidly increasing speed and capacity of 
modern cargo aircraft and the tremendous importance of 
the time element in modern logistics, efficient traffic 
management in the air transportation of cargo is an ab- 
solute necessity. Future operations may not be accurately 
envisaged, but the Berlin Airlift experience and the prin- 
ciples it demonstrated should improve any future mass 
air cargo movement and assist in its planning. 

The apparent lasting requirement for airlift to Berlin 
and its development as a sustained operation necessitated 
the creation of a Traffic Section on the staff of Airlift Task 
Force so that air cargo handling would be efficiently 
accomplished. It was this section which obtained the 
estimated sortie rate for the following month from other 
agencies within the headquarters so that advance monthly 
tonnage capabilities could be given to the Air Staff Com- 



mittee in Berlin for allocation according to the needs of 
the city. The committee would then establish priorities and 
designate the type commodity to be airlifted when the 
estimated daily average was exceeded. These priorities 
afforded the Berlin Airlift Committee (BEALCOM) in Frank- 
furt with the information necessary to establish the priority 
of movement of cargo to be handled at each airfield. 

Upon delivery to an airfield of the commodities pre- 
scribed by the Air Staff Committee, prompt handling was 
demanded so that transportation facilities would not be 
delayed, cargo back-logged, or perishable items spoiled. 
This need for expeditious handling warranted the assign- 
ment of a traffic section to each unit and the development 
of the Airlift Support Command, which was comprised of 
Army Transportation Corps units working directly with Air- 
lift personnel. The responsibilities of these organizations 
were as follows: 



Airlift Support Command. 

(1) Unloading trains at railhead into trailers. This included 
the marrying of high and low density cargo to assure 
a manageable 10-ton load aboard every C-54 lypek 
aircraft, and the weighing and documentation of 
trailer contents so that accurate aircraft manifests! 
could be prepared. 

(2) Transporting cargo to airfield trailer parks, for subse-l 
quent pick-up by line tractors. 

(3) Selection of loads to be standing by, with loading! 
crews aboard the trailers on the ready line for iitffl 
mediate dispatch to aircraft. 

(4) Loading of cargo aboard aircraft in accordance with' 
instructions of Air Force traffic representative. 

(5) Off-loading and holding of outlifted cargo for dis- 
position by BICO licensed agencies. 




MANIFESTING CARGO AND DISPATCHING TRUCKS AND 
CREWS TO HARDSTANDS .... 




Airlift Task Force Traffic. 

(1) Manifesting of cargo aboard aircraft. 

(2) Dispatching of trucks and loading crews to correct 
hardstands and specific aircraft. 

(3) Supervision of loading in accordance with weight and 
balance criteria to include proper tie-down. 

(4) Compilation of traffic statistics on commodities and 
tonnage lifted, loading and off-loading times, etc. 

As pointed out, the initial requirement of 4,500 tons 
daily was revised upwards to a minimum comfort re- 
quirement of 5,620 tons per day, broken down as shown 
below: 



Cargo 


Tons 


For the German Populace 

Food 


1,435 

3,084 

255 

35 

16 

2 


Coal 


Commerce & Industrial Supplies . . . 

Newsprint 

Liquid Fuel 


Medical Supplies 


Sub-total . . . 
For U. S., British & French Military .... 
Three Passenger Flights (U.S. and French) 


4,827 

763 

30 


Total Combined . . 


5,620 




However, when the maximum tonnage within the 
capabilities of the Airlift was requested, this minimum was 
exceeded daily from January on. All in excess of the city's 
requirements was for stockpiling. 

COMMODITIES AIRLIFTED 

Many types of commodities were airlifted to and from 
Berlin, but coal constituted approximately 2/3 of all tonnage 
lifted. Approximately 20 percent was food products, and 
the remainder included liquid fuel, raw materials, indus- 
trial supplies, construction equipment, mail, medical sup- 
plies, newsprint, manufacturer's goods, delicate instruments, 
heavy machinery, empty coal and flour sacks, vehicles, 
and household effects. This variety of commodities 
presented special handling and loading difficulties because 
of variances in weight, shape, size, density, or physical 




properties. To reduce these difficulties as much as possible, 
special type cargo was handled from only two airfields, 
Wiesbaden being the U. S. field used because of 
its flight of C-82's and specialized equipment. A few 
difficulties in handling certain types of cargo are highlight- 
ed below: 

Coal. At first it appeared relatively easy to handle 
coal as it was compactly sacked and could be roughly 
handled both in loading and unloading. However, it was 
discovered that a sharp and abrasive dust would sift out 
from the sacks and seep into the inner fuselage, wings, 
and engines. This dust had a harmful effect on the air- 
craft surfaces with which it came in contact, and conse- 
quently the coal-carrying aircraft as a group presented the 
most difficult problems during inspections and main- 
tenance, especially in their cleaning. Dust control was at- 
tempted by laying a tarpaulin on the floor of the aircraft, 
by dampening the cloth sacks, or by doubling the paper 
sacks with tied ends opposite; but the dust still persisted, 
although in smaller amounts when the paper sacks were 
used. Thorough sweeping after each loading further re- 
duced the problem. At the end, tests were being con- 
ducted at Burtonwood to develop a sealing compound to 
be sprayed on the floor to prevent dust seepage into the 
fuselage. 

Considerable dead weight was carried when canvas 
or jute sacks were used, especially as they became older 



29 





i t I t 1 

FOOD WAS SECOND 'N COMMODITY TONNAGE. 



in use and heavier with dus*. The development of the 
paper sack and its use assisted in providing more coal 
per load and reduced the dust as mentioned above. The 
paper sacks were durable through three to tive trips, and 
. their cost was not prohibitive when balanced against the 
additional actual payload in coal resulting from their use. 
Food. Food was second in commodity tonnage hauled 
to Berlin. Types included were sacked grains, vegetables, 
frozen meats, fish, dairy products, and fresh fruits. Dehy- 
dration was accomplished on all food items which coulc 
be processed in that manner to obtain the maximum 
calorie value per food ton. No spoilage loss was incurred 
in frozen foods because of the rapid handling they re- 
ceived. 

The major food-handling problem was that caused 
by the corrosive effect of salt on aircraft control cables 
when the salt would seep through the aircraft floors. This 
was resolved by the use of British flying boats with 
overhead cables treated against corrosion, and later 
through the use of converted RAF bombers by storing 
the salt in cargo boxes in the bomb bay and by outside 
cargo "panniers" attached to the fuselage of British Hal- 
tons. Security measures were continually necessary in the 
handling of food to prevent pilfering, as its actual value 



was much greater than the newly established currency, 
and it could be readily disposed of. 

POL. The initial method for transporting POL products — 
in 55-gallon metal drums — proved very unsatisfactory be- 
cause of the material tonnage lost in the drum's weight and 












I If 




^^^m 


,*j-" m 




r ^ ***** *M ^-^ Bffl 

JTtgaad ■ ^P 

1 ml If 


Uh « 


I THE C-82's CARRIED BULKY CARGO AND VEHICLES. 1 


^ ' \ WKSKBm 




the necessity for steam-cleaning the empty containers anc 
outlifting them from Berlin. Then the British contracted fo 
the services of a fleet of commercial tanker aircraft capable 
of delivering 550 tons a day of liquid fuel. Since the tanke 
method of fuel transport proved by far the most efficient 
the airlift of all liquid fuels was assigned to this fleet 
British bases were used, with approximately half of the fo-i 
tal fuel airlifted originating at Wunstorf, where a unique 
loading system was installed. This consisted of rail sidings 
which permitted tank cars to deliver directly to unden 
ground storage pools from which the various fuels were 
pumped to 12 distributing points at aircraft parkinc 
positions. To load an aircraft, the desired quantity was: 
selected on the regulator dial, and the electric pumps; 
provided a flow of 100 gallons per minute and stopped 
automatically when the pre-set gallonage was delivered.; 
The tankers flew into Gatow and Tegel, where pipes to; 
underground storage tanks enabled unloading by gravity 
flow directly from the aircraft at a rate of eight and one- 
half tons in 18 minutes. 

Industrial Supplies. Certain essential industries for the 
preservation of life or the economic recovery of Berlin 
needed raw materials and supplies to remain partially ac- 
tive. Keeping these industries active eliminated extensive 



30 



unemployment and demoralization. However, the greatly 
varying types of materials presented new problems be- 
cause of sizes, weights, shapes, or special handling re- 
quirements. These had to be solved on the spot. As men- 
tioned above, however, an initial planning step, designed 
to centralize the problem, established Wiesbaden as the 
base to handle miscellaneous type cargo. 

Engineering and Construction Material. The demand 
for improvements at existing airfields in the Western sec- 
tors of Berlin and the need for construction of another 
necessitated the airlift of much heavy construction equip- 
ment and material. Some pieces of equipment had 
to be cut into sections for the frip and welded 
together in Berlin. C-82 aircraft were used to great ad- 
vantage in the transportation of unusual shape construc- 
tion cargo. Asphalt in 400-pound drums was transported 
in sufficient quantities to provide paving material for the 
new base and runways. To control damage from leakage 
of this material, tarpaulins were used over and under the 
cargo. Tiedown ropes had to be replaced frequently, as 



CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES FROM DUMP- 
TRUCKS TO ASPHALT WERE DELIVERED BY AIR. 



they became slick and would not hold the cargo. 

Miscellaneous Supplies. Of the many types of mis- 
cellaneous cargo, medical supplies received most urgent 
handling. One item which required special handling due 
to its extreme volatility was ether. It had to be packed 
in very small containers and treated as fragile to prevent 
escape of fumes. Six-hundred-pound rolls of newsprint 
loaded by fork-lifts and unloaded by chutes were trans- 
ported regularly. 

PRODUCTION CONTROL 

Sustained Airlift operational complexities dictated the 
need for a new staff section to expedife all ground 
activities. On the assumption that an aircraft on the ground 
was not contributing to the Airlift effort, emphasis was 
placed on minimizing the ground time of all aircraft in 
the operation. To direct this function, a production control 
unit was organized. A 24-hour operation, fhe new activity 
utilized a central control room equipped with direct tele- 



phone and intercom lines to all ground-handling agencies, 
Air Traffic Control, and Task Force Headquarters Opera- 
tions. The production control duty officer was given com- 
plete authority to monitor and expedite the functions of 
all activities concerned with furn-around of aircraft — i. e., 
loading, unloading, maintenance, and crew and aircraft 
dispatch. 

To preclude possible ground delays in the handling 
of incoming aircraft, an aircraft status call-in procedure 
was established. This air-to-ground notification of me- 
chanical and load status enabled the controller to alert 
sections concerned prior to the aircraft's arrival. To provide 
a constant check on the location and status of all aircraft, 
locator and maintenance status boards were maintained 
in the central control room. This considerably aided in 
coordinating crew assignments, loading, and servicing of 
aircraft, and generally expedited the over-all operation. 
Ramp expeditors in radio-equipped jeeps were highly 
effective in eliminating delays by making on-the-spot re- 
ports of ramp activities to the controlling officer. 




MINIMUM TURNAROUND TIME 

By means of a coded VHF message, the pilot of each 
aircraft returning from Berlin reported, approximately 10 
minutes before landing, its hardstand number and whether 
it was in commission and had a load. A report of "Positive- 
Positive" indicated an aircraft in commission for which off- 
loading was required. However, when an aircraft re- 
quired a load, the trailers were at the hardstand, and the 
loading was commenced simultaneously with refueling, 
turn-around maintenance, and placing of tail stands. 

Manifesting was accomplished by traffic personnel 
from the loading lists of the first trailer on the ready- 



-*&. 



line. Manifests listed the commodities, their piece count 
and piece weight, total commodity weight, and total load 
weight for all commodities. Except where miscellaneous 
cargo was handled, this process was routinely automatic 
as to data inserted. The total allowable cabin load was 
obtained from an aircraft index card file, and the com- 
partment break-down, also pre-computed on the index 
card, was quickly transcribed in terms of commodity piece 
count to the manifest. The complete loading diagram by 
compartment referred to under Weight and Balance ena- 
bled traffic supervisors to load each aircraft with maximum 
speed and safety. 



LOADING BASE 

M£M6E Tl/M AKOMD TIM /HOI//! 2SMMrE$ 



ALLOCATION OF LOAD 

Cargo hauling problems were met with the objecfiv 
of delivering to Berlin the maximum useful tonnage to th ! 
airfield best suited to receive it. Consequently, loadinc 1 
for the various bases were determined by the type carg I 
handled by that base and its Berlin base destination! 
Routing of supplies was the responsibility of the Berli I 
Airlift Committee (BEALCOM), which was guided by th I 
following general procedure: 

Wiesbaden aircraft landed at Tempelhof. 

Rhein/Main aircraft landed at Tempelhof. 

Fassberg aircraft landed at Tegel. 

Celle aircraft landed at Gatow. 

/M 45 MM fy 



/M 50 MM ft 



,*mm*m 




32, 



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it- 



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f/£4MjV&\ 







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BERLIN OFF-LOADING 

The main features of the off-loading operation at the 
firee airhead bases were: 

(1) Central ramp facilities in which unloading could be 
concentrated. 

(2) Central dispatch of vehicles to planes. 

(3) Wooden chutes to expedite unloading, except 
where fork-lifts or cranes were required for irregular 
items. 

(4) Land piers for transit docks to transfer cargo to Ger- 
man trucks or into rail cars. 

(5) Warehouse or terminal space to store outlift cargo. 



(6) Underground storage tanks and pipeline at Gatow 
and Tegel for direct discharge of liquid fuel from 
British tanker aircraft. 

At the Berlin airfields, British, American, and French 
ground force agencies performed the off-loading and any 
necessary loading function under Air Force supervision 
until the airhead personnel were sufficiently trained to 
meet joint Air Force and Army Transportation Corps re- 
quirements. 

All of the measures discussed above were designed to 
restrict to a minimum the ground time of Airlift aircraft. 
With the existence of the requirement to deliver the 
maximum tonnage within Airlift capabilities, it was essen- 



tial to obtain the maximum productivity from each indi- 
vidual, vehicle, and aircraft engaged in the project. Out- 
lifting of cargo from Berlin, while causing some additional 
ground time in Berlin, was necessary so that manufactured 
products, empty coal sacks, vehicles, and possessions of 
personnel transported from Berlin could be taken to the 
West. 

DIVERSION OF AIRCRAFT 

The term "diversion" in traffic movement control ter- 
minology traditionally has denoted the change from one 
means of transport to another, i. e., air-to-surface. How- 



'£/££ 



UNLOADING BASE 

jrexAse ti//?n mound t/aie 49 mms 







;. 



! 



i^i 



■'!,.'■ 




33 



•**. sm 



ever, in this operation, it took on a new concept in mean- 
ing the diverting ot the air transport tleet from one load- 
ing terminal to another to take advantage of favorable 
weather conditions. 

During three very bad-weather days in January, a 
planned diversion of Rhein'Main and Wiesbaden aircraft 
to Fassberg and Celle was conducted. Within the period, 
145 trips (carrying approximately 1,450 tons) were made by 
the diverted aircraft, in addition to the trips flown and 
tonnage hauled by the aircraft normally based at the 
diversion fields. However, during the five-day period 
following the diversion, Rhein Main operated at a below- 
average level due fo the increased maintenance required 
on the aircraft operated away from their squadron facilities. 




OOD EXAMPLE OF CENTRAL RAMP 
FACILITIES AND CENTRAL VEHICLE DISPATCHING. 




UTILIZATION OF PAYLOAD 

The payload utilization of a cargo aircraft must be 
maintained in keeping with the dictates of safety in regard 
to proper weight and balance of the aircraft. Internal space 
available, the designed stresses for the flooring, and the 
desired center of gravity of the loaded aircraft all influence 
the establishment of allowable compartment loads. Al- 
though improper loading may have tragic consequences, 
lost tonnage attributable to underloading is a reprehen- 
sible, expensive, and irredeemable loss. 

In an effort to increase the payload of the C-54, an 
experimental weight-stripping program was conducted at 
Burtonwood Air Depot on the D, E, and G series of this 
aircraft. The C-54's were weighed prior to the stripping 
program and were found to average 300 pounds lighter 
than indicated in the weight and balance data book. The 
aircraft were then stripped of approximately 2,200 pounds 
of unessential equipment, thereby increasing the over-all 
payload 2,500 pounds. Flight tests proved that the air- 
craft flight characteristics were unchanged by the modifica- 
tion. Maintenance was slightly less complicated due to the 
reduction of equipment. 

LOADING TECHNIQUES AND EQUIPMENT 

Accurate Loading. Platform scales were utilized where 
available, to weigh heavy trailer loads and cargo before 
they proceeded to the ready-line for dispatch to an 
aircraft. At the base where these scales were continually 
used, several overloads were reported by the pilots when 
the scale was out of operation during a brief period. To 
assure weight accuracy, additional control was exercised 
by rechecking the individual package weights at the rail- 
heads. At one time 200 freight carloads of coal were re- 
turned fo the sacking plant for correction after the check- 
ing had indicated serious discrepancies. Without these 
weight adjustments or frequent checking, it was possible 
thaf an aircraft could have been overloaded by as much 
as 6,000 pounds. However, the absence of checking could 
also result in short loads. On many occasions, the tonnage 
receipted for in Berlin was less than that manifested at the 



loading bases. Discrepancies on coal deliveries were 
usually caused by moisture loss, leaky or broken sacks, 
inaccurate checking or inaccurate sacking. When some of 
these discrepancies are compared, the importance oj 
accurate cargo checking and weighing is positively illus- 
trated. Traffic loading technicians were responsible for 
correct piece and weight count loaded aboard aircraft af! 
Rhein/Main and Wiesbaden in addition to the proper 
loading of the cargo and its tie-down. This method was 
under continuous comparison to that utilized at the) 
northern bases, where a British Ground Force checker ac- 
companied the loading crew and accomplished the check- 
ing of the cargo during the loading. The latter system re-, 
quired extra men as a checker was needed with each 




OTHER MAIN FEATURES OF THE OFF-LOADINO OPER/' 
INCLUDED WOODEN CHUTES .... 



.... AND LAND PIERS FOR TRANSFER OF CARGC 
GERMAN TRUCKS OR RAIL CARS. 





THIS FUSELAGE WAS USED IN TEACHING LOADING METHODS. 



mi 






THE EVANS 


TIE-DOWN KIT WAS 


STANDARD 


EQUIPMENT. 1 


' ' HHV ¥ W 



loading crew. However, in view of the discrepancy reports 
received on loads checked under the tormer method, the 
additional manpower required under the latter method 
may well have been justified. 

"Marrying" Loads. In order to utilize fully the 10- 
ton load capacity of each aircraft, it was necessary to 
"marry" commodities of high density with those of low 
density to comply with the aircraft loading requirements. 
This "marrying" process, a major operation of the Trans- 
portation Corps at Airlift base railheads, was best accom- 
plished when personnel responsible for aircraft loading 
aided in the preparation of the trailer loads. Heavily con- 
centrated cargo was placed at the rear of a truck or trailer 
so that it could be easily loaded forward in the aircraft 
fuselage for proper aircraft balance and so that light, bulky 
cargo could be loaded on top of the heavy pieces to 
avoid crushing. 

At USAF bases 10-ton truck trailer units were employed 
for the transport of cargo from railheads to aircraft. These 
vehicles presented the advantages of a large bed area 
which permitted easier load-marriage and versatility in 
use as mobile storage for built-up loads. The difficulties 



encountered in backing and positioning this equipment, 
however, prevented its use from being completely satis- 
factory. 

Loading crews were generally standardized into units 
of 12 German laborers under the supervision of an Air 
Force loading technician. Cargo weighing less than 250 
pounds was ordinarily handled without the use of me- 
chanical aids. Experience proved that the loading and un- 
loading of aircraft could in most cases be accomplished 
more effectively by utilizing manpower. 

Training of Loading Crews. Continued supervision and 
training of loading crews was essential to expedite all 
loads and meet changing requirements due to new types 
of cargo not formerly moved. To train these crews, one of 
the bases used an old fuselage with a dummy load. This 
facility provided training in loading, computation of weight 
and balance data, and tie-down techniques. Hundreds of 
officers and men were trained in actual operation in air- 
craft loading methods which provided both speed and full 
payload utilization. 

Cargo Tie-down. The Evans tie-down kit equipment 
was standard equipment on U. S. aircraft when they 



arrived for duty with the Airlift. However, normal attrition 
rendered much of the available equipment unserviceable 
early in the operation. There was but a small stock of 
resupply items on hand for the kit, and its workload was 
heavy. While the attrition rate was not excessive, replace- 
ment of worn parts involved considerable expense. 

Traffic units carried on continuous research to develop 
new tie-down methods and equipment which would be 
both effective and lasting for heavy equipment. As sup- 
plies of the standard equipment dwindled, a web strap 
tie-down was investigated. Preliminary tests of the web 
strap were encouraging, and a supply was ordered. How- 
ever, certain modifications were necessary on the buckle 
assemblies before this equipment was considered versatile 
enough for regular use. 

For securing high density cargo such as construction 
machinery, a steel cable tie-down was used with satisfac- 
tory results. However, because of its lack of elasticity, this 
type could not be utilized with cargo which tended to 
settle or pack as a result of vibration in flight. 

Cargo Handling. Heavy industrial and construction 
materials called for the use of mechanical loading aids. 



35 




Pallet loading with fork-lifts was found unsatisfactory be- 
cause unfavorable ground conditions often restricted 
maneuverability. High-lift truck loading proved slow, be- 
cause the limited capacity of these vehicles necessitated 
the positioning of more than one truck to an aircraft. Both 
of the systems mentioned increased the possibility of 
damage to aircraft by loading equipment. 

Platform loading entailed a definite loss of time for 
platform and plane positioning. An experimental mobile 
conveyor belt was employed during the service testing of 
the YC-97. This system has proved to have definite ad- 
vantages over other methods in loading large-type trans- 
ports. 

The nature of the cargo handled, the types of aircraft 
utilized, and the availability of labor dictated the equip- 
ment and techniques employed in loading and unloading. 
On this project, abundance of labor prescribed its use 
in preference to mechanical aids. This principle would be 
true in all cases in which the cargo is of a type which 
can be readily manhandled and the load capabilities of 
the aircraft used do not exceed 10 tons. Where adequate 
manpower is not available, systems employing equipment 
such as forklifts, high-lift trucks, roller conveyors, and 
conveyor belts must be utilized. In the service testing of 
larger type aircraft, it was definitely established that the 
maximum utilization of mechanical aids for such craft is 
mandatory. 

Safety measures introduced on the Airlift resulted in 
a minimum amount of damage to aircraft and vehicles. 



Loading trucks which could handle sufficient cargo to 
load an aircraft in one trip were utilized to reduce the 
number of vehicle-to-aifcraft approaches. Wheel blocks 
were used to insure that a safe distance was maintained 
between trucks and aircraft. Lighting for night loading 
was augmented by the installation of additional flood- 
lights on ramps and spotlights on vehicles and fork-lifts. 



PASSENGERS 

The blockade not only applied to supplies going to 
and from Berlin, but also restricted the ground movement 
of personnel. Many Western zone residents were trapped 
in Berlin at the beginning of the blockade. In addition, 
British, French, and U. S. personnel frequently had of- 
ficial need for transportation between Berlin and the 
Western zones. Therefore, provisions had to be made for 



ol 



removing from or transporting to Berlin personnel whosi 
travel was absolutely necessary. 

The first personnel which were moved en masse from 
Berlin were those who required medical treatment which 
was not available in Berlin; they included pre-tuber-i 
culosis and early tuberculosis cases, persons medically! 
certified as needing long periods of rest and good food, 
and delicate or undernourished children. In all, the Royal 7 
Air Force transported 130,000 people out of Berlin during 
the Lift. Regularly scheduled passenger flights operated 
from Rhein/Main for the transportation of administrative 
personnel between the U. S. zone and Berlin. From the 
start of these flights 16 August 1948 to the termination 
of the operation, more than 44,000 persons were carried 
by the U. S. into and out of Berlin. Another daily pas- 
senger flight from Wiesbaden provided exclusively for 
the French, transported 19,000 French personnel to and 
from the city. 



36 




CONCLUSIONS 

Traffic. In traffic as well as other aspects of an operation 
| )f this nature, an inherent clanger lurks in the drawing of 
., specific conclusions from the Berlin Airlift for direct 
ipplication to another mass air cargo movement, be- 
muse of factors which may differ completely from those 
sxisfing during this operation. Any principles developed 
n this operation must be weighed as to their degree of 
ipplicability to any type of operation. Many solutions 
if problems are conditioned by existing circumstances, 
ind such problems must be solved by studying them both 
n their environment and out of it. The character of an 
lirlift operation may be changed to a significant degree 
>y the alteration of one or two of the factors upon which 
t depends — weather, length of the haul, availability of 
nanpower, and the type of aircraft employed. Such 



alterations may pose new problems and require new 
solutions. 

Traffic functions include the recognition of the im- 
portance of cargo control and liaison requirements be- 
tween all agencies involved in the handling of cargo, 
the training of traffic technicians, and the development 
of support facilities to expedite the movement of cargo 
The fusing of troop carrier ana* transport squadrons into 
the Airlift Task Force underscored the importance of the 
traffic management and its many ramifications. The need 
for traffic administrators and technicians within the 
organization of the airlifting agency, as well as within 
supply and ground transport organizations and all co- 
ordinating and control boards, for the allocation, schedul- 
ing, control, handling, loading, tie-down, unloading, and 
distribution of Airlift supplies has given greater recogni- 
tion to traffic responsibilities. Personnel to execute these 



EFFICIENCY IN GROUND OPERATIONS 
TOWARD MAXIMUM AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION 



A MAJOR STEP 



traffic functions must be selected and trained rather than 
merely assigned and utilized. Qualified personnel should 
be selected rather than those who cannot fulfill other 
tasks satisfactorily. Officers and men who are skilled in 
administration, supply, transportation, and cargo handling, 
and who possess aggressive, conscientious, and imagina- 
tive mentalities, can insure satisfaction in the movement 
of cargo for the shipper, the mover, and the receiver. 

An air transport aircraft is a money loser when not 
delivering cargo. It is economically wise to utilize fully 
the capabilities of the transport fleet. Standardization and 
streamlining of procedures, preplanning of loads, and the 
reduction of ground times and maintenance outages 
increase the economic worth of each aircraft assigned fo 
an operation. 

Full payload utilization by weight, cube and optimum 
product value per ton must be ever present in the trans- 
port operation. Measures to achieve this include stripping 
excess gear from the aircraft to increase its payload, 
increasing the air transportability by dehydration of 
foodstuffs, reducing container weight, and "marrying" 
high and low density cargo into a load which utilizes both 
space and weight capacities of the aircraft. 

Operational performance alone is not a full measure 
of the success or failure of an air transport operation. 
Such an operation may indicate complete success when 
measured in terms of aircraft utilization, ground times, 
surpassing of arbitrary goals, and prompt deparfures cf 
scheduled flights. However, behind these may be hidden 



37 



economic wastages of personnel and inefficient ground 
handling methods which do not produce full satisfaction 
to the shipper and the receiver. 

Priorities as established must be met, and priority 
cargo must be moved on schedule. This is a responsibility 
of support agencies, for the air carrier merely moves what 
is delivered when it is delivered. To assure cargo being 
at the right spot at the right time and in the right quantity, 
extensive liaison must be fulfilled between all the agencies 
involved in the operation. In this operation, the creation 
of the Berlin Air Staff Committee, the Berlin Airlift Com- 
mittee, and the Airlift Support Command evidenced the 
need for this close liaison and such liaison proved of 
inestimable value. Air transport is an extremely flexible 
and effective logistics tool. The speed with which carrier 
operations can shift requires slower moving ground 
agencies to be geared for rapid changes. Thus, ground 
liaison personnel must be included in the planning and 
informed of all operational orders and new requirements 
as soon as they exist. 




Ground Control. The major requirements of successful 
traffic movement control, as highlighted in the Berlin Air- 
lift are listed below and should be vested in a central 
agency. 




0) 
(2) 



(3) 
(4) 

(5) 



Central control of all cargo traffic in an area. 
Accurate, complete, and timely information of 
movements and backlogs in the immediate area 
and in those areas which directly affect, or are 
directly affected by, the control of traffic in the 
immediate area. 

Authority to route, re-route, divert, delay, or ex- 
pedite all traffic in the area. 

Up-to-date information regarding pipe-line flow, 
and authority over the flow commensurate with 
defined responsibilities. 

Dependable information and first-hand knowledge 
of traffic and supply conditions at destinations 
served by transportation agencies from the sup- 
plying area. It is imperative that traffic and trans- 
port officials maintain close, constant touch with 
actual field conditions. 



(6) 



(7) 

(8) 



Complete information concerning schedules, spt 

cific types of aircraft used on each flight, route t 

connections, transit facilities, maintenance an I 

operational conditions, and local transport an] 

supply services. 

Flexibility and speed of action. 

Aggressive and imaginative personnel experience 

in supply and all types of transportation. 



Support Facilities. Inefficient ground operation ma 
adversely affect the conduct and economies of a majo f 
airlift operation. Therefore, ground support facilities sud 
as transportation and warehouse installations and centre 
loading ramps should be planned and constructed earN 
in the operation so that the job can be performed 
economically and efficiently. Although the duration of ail 
operation has direct bearing on expenditures for construe I 
tion, these factors must be weighed in each individual 
case. Construction costs, while seemingly high, becomct 
infinitesimally small when compared directly to the cost cM 
inefficient air transport and air base operations. 



38 




INTEGRATED GROUND CONTROL IS ONE OF THE KEYS TO 
SUCCESSFUL CARGO MOVEMENT. 















39 



INTRODUCTION 

Prior to the Airlift, in keeping with USAF policy, a 
general reduction in force was being effected within 
USAFE. This reduction in force resulted in serious short- 
ages of communications personnel. 

From a communications and navigational aids stand- 
point, facilities between Berlin and Western Germany 
were limited to the barest necessities before the Airlift. 
There was only one GCA set in the Berlin area and only 
one radar aid for corridor control; GCA sets were also 
located at each of the air fields at Rhein Main and 
Wiesbaden. Navigational aid facilities consisted of radio 
ranges installed at Rhein Main, Fulda, Frankfurt, and Tem- 
pelhof. Radio beacons were installed at Offenbach, Tem- 
pelhof, and Wiesbaden. All navigational aids had been 
removed from the corridors leading to Berlin. These facili- 
ties, of course, were wholly inadequate for handling heavy 
traffic during instrument-weather conditions. 

With the implementation of the Airlift on 26 June 1948 
it was immediately apparent that the proposed intensity 
of traffic would require additional electronic aids of all 
types, expansion of wire and radio communications facili- 
ties, and more rigid air traffic control. Analysis of the 
problem confronting communications personnel revealed 
unusual requirements for Airlift operation that made a 
difficult task much more difficult. Berlin tonnage require- 
ments were such as to necessitate a constant flow of air- 
craft predicated on three-minute intervals of no "stacking" 
or "missed approaches". The geographical location of Ber- 
lin, well within Russian-controlled territory, precluded the 
installation of route navigational aids to serve as check 
points and contain the Aircraft within the twenty-mile- 
wide corridors. Certain restrictions were placed on 
altitudes to be flown because of agreements with the 
Russian authorities, terrain features, and operational prob- 
lems. Approach and let-down patterns in the Berlin area 
intersected in a vertical plane because of the small area 
into which certain patterns had to be fitted. This condition, 
of course, meant fhaf rigid air traffic control, both laterally 
and vertically, had to be maintained on a split-second time 
schedule. An idea of traffic density can best be derived 



by the feat of the Airlift "Easter Parade," when on Easter 
Sunday of 1949, approximately 13,000 tons of cargo were 
airlifted into Berlin. This meant approximately, 1,400 air- 
craft arrivals and approximately 1,400 departures within 
24 hours, using three fields within a radius of twenty miles. 
The attendant problems and solutions of the various com- 
munications phases of this operation are presented under 
the specialized subjects which follow. 

PERSONNEL 

The low degree of proficiency of technical personnel 
was a handicap in the Airlift operation. In August 1949 a 
study was made to determine the degree of proficiency of 
personnel in each communications specialty. The informa- 
tion was derived from the consensus of opinion of super- 
visory personnel at each Airlift base. Where practicable, 
the amount of additional training required to meet the 
desired standards was established. This study indicated 
that the average degree of proficiency for all communica- 
tions specialties was 70 percent. 

Due to the nature of the Airlift mission, very little 
training could be accomplished other than on-the-job. It 
was absolutely necessary that every person in an already 
under-staffed specialty be utilized to the utmost even 
though greater supervision was required, thereby reduc- 
ing over-all efficiency per capita. It was mandatory that 
airborne radio operators (SSN 2756) be familiar with ICAO 
procedures in order to comply with regulations governing 
international flights. To meet these qualifications it was 
necessary for each unit to emphasize this type of training 
to the utmost. Although radio operators were not a 
normal requirement for Airlift planes flying to Berlin, they 
were required for flights to Burtonwood and the Zl. 

Many of the individuals in radio mechanic specialties 
(SSN's 754, 648, etc.) had been permitted to specialize in 
specific types of equipment during previous assignments 
and were not adequately trained in all types of equip- 
ment employed in this operation. This lack of versatility 
was a definite handicap. Units were in a position of having 
an overage of personnel that was familiar with specific 
types of equipment, yet untrained in the types required 



by the Airlitt. 

On-the-job training was accomplished to a deg 
all the skills employed. It was, however, impossible to. 
place much emphasis on any project of this type due tc 
employment of personnel on a 24-hour basis and to th( 
pressure of operating with a shortage of electronic: 
technicians. The total requirement for communication: 
personnel in the support of Operation Vittles was 590; 
officers and 6,156 airmen. 

FIXED WIRE COMMUNICATIONS 

At the very beginning of the operation, it was quite 
evident that a rapid and reliable method of voice com- 
munication between Airlift Headquarters and the field 
organizations was a necessity. Fortunately, wire communi- 
cation was available and was preferred over radio be- 
cause of its greater reliability and the non-susceptibility 
to ionspherics. 

Direct "hot" land-line voice circuits were installed from 
Airlift Headquarters to the operations offices at the various 
bases and air traffic-control centers. One BD-96 switch- 
board was installed at Airlift Headquarters for the control 
of these lines and for "patching through" so that bases 
could be interconnected. Likewise, direct lines were 
installed between control towers within an area and be- 
tween the control centers and the bases. These circuits 
were required for constant supervision, for the establish- 
ment of intervals, and to direct diversions. Since the sys- 
tem of operation was predicated on an uninterrupted 
flow of traffic 24 hours a day, it was necessary to be in- 
formed on all aircraft activity. On "missed approaches" in 
the Berlin area, aircraft were directed to return to their 
home bases. Any attempt to land these aircraft would 
have required "stacking", thereby causing confusion and 
delaying operations in order to cope with the 40 aircraft 
already in the corridor. Diversion of aircraft demanded 
instant communications since the operation was conducted 
on bare minima of ceiling and visibility (200 feet and one- 
half mile at most bases). It was, therefore, constantly 
necessary to watch all weather reports. 

Weather-teletype circuits and voice-conference circuits 



40 



AIRLIFT COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK 



AIRLIFT OPERATIONAL VOICE NET 



, L. 







7497 TH AIR LIFT 
WING OPERATIONS 



WIESBADEN 
60TH TC GROUP 



LUNEBURG RAF 



FASSBERG 
(BD-72) 



CELLE TWR 
(BD-72) 



FRANKFURT -, 



RHEIN/MAIN J 



61 ST TC GROUP 
OPERATIONS 



5I3TH TC GROUP 
OPERATIONS 



61 ST MAINT 
CONTROL 



513 TH MAINT 
CONTROL 



FRANKFURT 
WEATHER CONTROL 



— OPERATIONS 



CALTF OPERATIONS 
(BD-96) 



TEMPELHOF AFB 
CPS-5 (BD-96) 



CALTF 
MAINT CONTROL 



WIESBADEN 
MILITARY SWBD 



FRANKFURT ATC 



ROTHWESTON "— 



— OPERATIONS 



— TOWER 



BERLIN AIR 
SAFETY CENTER 



SPEECH CIRCUIT CHART-ATC 




SPEECH CIRCUITS 
MR TRAFFIC CONTROL RADAR \ 




( FASSBERG j I TE6EL 1 




AIRLIFT WEATHER NET CHART 



~^-:^. ::...:.■::::. -:-;;-.. 



inn _*j_ 




41 



were installed in the weather ottice at the bases involved 
and Headquarters CALTF so that hourly coherences could 
be held in making forecasts and directing diversions. 

Four-hourly reports were required by the Maintenance 
Control Section of that Headquarters as to the status of 
aircraft in commission. These reports were handled over 
the "hot line" system on a second priority basis. An AOCP 
teletype system was also installed to assist in procurement 
of spare parts. Teletype drops were provided at each base 
and at the Erding Air Depot. 

Because of the frequent use of telephones to coordinate 
between supply, maintenance, production control, traffic, 
and other staff agencies, and because of the speed re- 
quired, full manual switchboards were found unsatisfactory. 

Inter-office communication systems were in demand so 
that commanding officers could hold frequent conferences 



with various division chiefs while in their respective offices. 
Similar systems were required for coordination between 
maintenance, production control, and supply sections. 

A condition not generally known is that wire com- 
munication between Western Germany and Berlin was 
accomplished through the Russian Zone of Germany. Lines 
and repeaters were at the mercy of the Russians; however, 
good service without interruption was maintained through- 
out the operation. Plans were made for replacement of 
these circuits by the provision of FM links, a major 
project. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Engineering consideration should be given to the 
design of a small, light, air-transportable, automatic 




telephone system with 200 automatic lines and 
manual attendants' cabinets with a minimum of 20 frur 
lines. Such equipment should be an integral part of a 
transport units. 

The policy of restricting the use ot inler-office coir 
munications system equipment to control towers, eras 
crews, and other operational functions should be rt 
viewed. A system similar to Webster Teletalks should b 
included as troop carrier T/O&E equipment to provide Ic 
the maintenance, production control, and supply staff tunc 
tions. The loudspeaker system of "squawk boxes" is pre 
ferred as it permits personnel to continue without inter- 
rupting other duties such as entering statistics on 
boards, and eliminates the necessity for remaining at the 
instrument. 

VHF/FM voice and automatic teletype facilities have! 
become a major requirement in air transport operations. 

LOW FREQUENCY RADIO BEACONS 



To prevent international incidents, it was necessary lor 
all aircraft to fly exact routes in the 20-mile-wide corridors, 
Fourteen low frequency radio beacons operating in the 
200/400 Kcs band were installed for use with the radio : 
compass AN/ARN-7 in the Berlin, Celle-Fassberg, and 
Rhein/Main - Wiesbaden areas. Other low frequency 
beacons were located several miles off the center line 
all runways to permit instrument approaches. 

The provision of mobile-type homing beacons for the 
Lift was necessary until final traffic control plans were 
completed and implemented. These beacons comprised 
an HO-17 shelter with duplicate BC-191 transmitters, RA-34 
rectifiers, PE-197 power units, and other associated equip- 
ment. 

The shelters were mounted on a 6x6 truck. Masts for 
the installation of the inverted "L" type antenna were 
provided. By using this type of mobile homing equipment 
it was possible to install beacons and make changes 
locations in a matter of a few hours. As the Airlift ope 
tions progressed and requirements became firm, ihese 
installations were removed from the truckbeds and p 



42 




3n five-foot plafforms to provide a more permanent type 
nsfallation. 

One of the disadvantages in the use of low frequency 
adio beacons for this operation lies in the limited avail- 
ibility of frequencies within this portion of the spectrum, 
he 200/400 Kcs band used for navigation is in many cases 
:oncurrenfly assigned to European broadcast stations. Be- 
cause of the close proximity of the countries in this area, 
nterference was a continuously mounting problem and 
Jrought complaints. It was a dangerous condition for air 
tavigation in that many stations using these frequencies 
vere of the non-directional type. Aids of this type could 
>e installed only at the entrance to the corridor, as no 
jround navigational aids could be installed within the 
orridor over Russian-occupied territory. 

Generally speaking, the BC-191 radio transmitter is 
ncapable of satisfactory performance on a continuous 



schedule. Even by operating two transmitters alternately 
at beacon sites, it was found that the transmitters, rectifiers, 
and power units were too light for the heavy duty re- 
quired. Difficulty was encountered with frequency failures. 
All beacons were equipped with one keyer only; the lack 
of a second was definitely a handicap since the keying 
equipment was required to operate continuously. Any 
failure in the keying mechanism precluded beacon identi- 
fication. 

At RAF bases 300 W-type LM 300 transmitters were 
used. They were unreliable and frequently inoperative due 
to transformer failures. Difficulties were also encountered 
in obtaining the American spares necessary to maintain 
serviceability. 

In September 1948 arrangements were made to have 
21 T-5 beacons airlifted from the U.S. to replace the tem- 
porary BC-191 installations. They arrived in the theater 
about 1 February 1949. This fype of equipment was 
necessary to maintain continuous operation and adequate 
radio coverage during the most adverse weather and 
atmospheric conditions. It was vitally important that ade- 
quate beacon coverage be available to maintain two- and 
three-minute intervals of aircraft space. The increased 
power of these new beacons presented problems of in- 
terference with the European radio broadcast stations in 
the 200/400 Kcs band. It was generally agreed that 500- 
Watt power was not necessary; however, 50-Watt power 
on the other hand is insufficient for positive operation 
under adverse weather and atmospheric conditions. 

The greatest lesson learned from the use of low fre- 
quency homing equipment is that the Air Force equip- 
ment available is either over- or under-powered. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Future engineering and procurement should include a 
low and medium frequency transmitter which is capable 
of continuous operation with a minimum of maintenance 
through use of a higher safety factor. At least one new- 
type transmitter should be developed which is capable of 
continuous operation with an output of 300 Watts, with 
provisions for reducing power to 150 Watts. 



LOW FREQUENCY RADIO RANGES 

Only three low frequency radio ranges were utilized 
in Airlift operations. These were located at Rhein/Main, 
Fulda, and Tempelhof. 

The low frequency radio range could be used for 
homing as well as fixed course navigation; however, its 
disadvantages made it undesirable as the prime means of 
navigation. These disadvantages include leg instability on 
loop-type ranges and the same problems encountered 
with low frequency beacons on the assignment of fre- 
quencies, as discussed above. 



VHF RANGES 

As the Airlift operation continued and the trend in- 
creased toward the utilization of VHF, it was desirable that 
these frequencies also be employed in radio navigational 
aids. 

Radio ranges were used at critical points along the 
routes to provide safety, but medium frequency ranges 
were not entirely satisfactory due -to atmospherical dis- 
turbances and other interferences. The need for VHF 
facilities was evident. 

During October 1948 arrangements were made to ob- 
tain six VAR ranges from the Civil Aeronautics Authority 
(CAA) for use in Airlift operations. CAA civil and radio 
engineers were assigned to the Lift and travelled by air 
from the U. S. to accomplish the installations. One of the 
ranges was airlifted to the theater and five were trans- 
ported by "MARINEX". The work of surveying the sites 
began about 15 October. By the end of January 1949 all 
of the installations were completed and operating. Their 
locations were: 

Fulda - (Zone-side of southern corridor) 

Braunschweig - (Zone-side of center corridor) 
Dannenberg - (Zone-side of northern corridor) 
Tempelhof - (Berlin-side of southern corridor) 
Lubars - (Berlin-side of northern corridor) 

Wolfenbuttel - (to project a beam perpendicular to 
the southern corridor as a check 
point). 



43 



In general, the results ot these facilities were considered 
very satisfactory although some difficulty was encountered 
in the siting. The final sites were such that the leg of the 
ranges could not in every case be projected down the 
center-line of the corridor. The transmission ranges, al- 
though not as great as desired, were within the line-of-sight 
characteristics of VHF. The outage of the equipment was 
negligible, and the reliability of received signals was 
considered good under all flying conditions. 

Since all frequencies of the VHF transceivers were al- 
ready being used in air/ground communications, it was 
necessary to utilize the "Glide Path" receiver for range re- 
ception. The "localizer" portion of this receiver was em- 
ployed for this purpose and stations were received through 
channel selection. 

Although it was desirable to install more of these sta- 
tions at several important points along Airlift routes, their 
non-availability made this impossible. It was never possible 
to utilize more than one leg of any of the ranges installed 
due to the peculiar routes flown by Airlift aircraft. The 
Omni-directional Range would have been the ideal aid. 




FAN MARKER BEACONS 

In October 1948 it became apparent that fan marker 
beacons would be required for the precise navigation re- 
quired in the operation. Although pilots were getting indi- 
cations from the radio compass equipment when they 
passed the stations enroute, there was no precise indication 
as to when aircraft were directly over the station. 

Requests were initiated on 23 October to install a fan 
marker beacon at each of the radio beacons and radio 
ranges then utilized on the Airlift routes. Since the equip- 
ment was not available in the theater, a supply requirement 
was placed upon the Zone of Interior. Because fan marker 
beacons were not immediately available in the United 
States, the procurement of this equipment became quite 
involved. 

During the latter part of February 1949, the installation 
of the first fan marker beacon was completed at Frohnau. 
Equipment arrived at the sites at Celle and Staden during 
May, but the other installations were not completed 
because of the termination of the Airlift. 

CONCLUSIONS 

With precision flying and "tight" let-down patterns 
within a concentrated area, a positive indicating aid for 
beacon and range sites is a necessity. 

AIR-GROUND/COMMUNICATIONS 

The magnitude of air/ground operations can be visual- 
ized by the 6,000 daily contacts made at the Tempelhof 
Air Base by Airways, Control Tower, and GCA. This base 
is one of three bases in the Berlin area. 

With certain exceptions, VHF was used exclusively in 
the control of Airlift operations. These frequencies worked 
very satisfactorily where range, static-free operation, and 
readability were concerned. However, the limitation of 
the equipment utilized was one of the drawbacks of the 
entire operation. 

Due to the confined area in which it was necessary to 
maneuver the aircraft for landings on the three Airlift bases 



in Berlin, the obvious mutual radio interference preclude' II 
the use of any frequency for more than one facility. Ti t 
provide complete radar control of the aircraft from thil 
time it was received from the corridor by the CPS-5 unti 
it was landed by use of GCA and given taxi and take-of 
instructions by the tower, four frequencies were requirec 
at each base. This meant that 12 frequencies were requirec 
in the Berlin area. 

Certain British aircraft and U.S. C-47 aircraft during the 
early phase posed the greatest limitation as they were 
equipped with a four-channel set equivalent to the USAF 
SCR-522. Of the RAF aircraft, only the YORKS and 
HASTINGS were equipped with eight-channel equipment,' 

Another limitation of British equipment was its inability 1 , 
to tune through the frequency range of the AN/ARC-3 or. 
above 125 Megacycles, where many of the USAF fre- 
quencies were provided. 

Although it was not required that each Airlift aircraft 
possess all frequencies utilized in the Airlift, the possibility 
of diversions made it desirable to install at least five of 
these plus the frequencies used at the home base. To offset 




(his limitation it was necessary as tar as possible to dupli- 
cate trequencies in the ground stations on a stand-by basis. 
n order to provide 100 per cent back-up required by Air- 
ift policy, a very large requirement for VHF ground trans- 
mitters and receivers existed. The immediate answer to 
jiese limitations was the provision of more frequencies in 
the airborne equipment. 

At the termination of the Airlift, plans had been com- 
pleted to modify the ARC-3 eight-channel set *to provide 
16 channels. Although this was a step in the right direction, 
it can be visualized that many more frequencies should 
be used for such an operation. 

It was found that definite requirements exist for air/ 
ground communications between the aircraft and the main- 
tenance activities. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The use of line-of-sight transmission with adequate 
standard VHF or UHF equipment is desirable for air trans- 
port operation. High frequencies can never be satisfactory 
due to static and "long haul" interference problems. Line- 
of-sight transmissions during the Airlift provided sufficient 
range without the disadvantages of HF. 

GROUND CONTROL APPROACH SYSTEM 

Possibly the greatest contributing factor to the success 
jjof the Airlift operations was the installation and efficient 
operation of GCA equipment at all Airlift landing strips. 
Two GCA units were installed and operated continuously 
in VFR conditions as well as IFR conditions to expedite 
landings of aircraft at all Airlift airfields. Instrument con- 
ditions prevailed generally between 70 and 80 percent 
of the time during the months of November through March. 

In January 1949 the CPS-5 airport control radar set 
went into operation in the Berlin area to control traffic 
from the corridors to the three airfields in the Allied Sec- 
tors of Berlin. The CPS-5 controlled traffic from "reporting 
}' time until the aircraft turned on final approach at its 
destination and was then turned over to GCA Final. This 
made it unnecessary for the GCA personnel to monitor the 




search scope and allowed them to concentrate all effort 
on aircraft making final approaches. 

The greatest problem confronting the GCA program 
was the maintenance and overhaul of the GCA units. It 
was found that the GCA units used in the Airlift by the 
USAF had never undergone a 3,000-hour inspection and 
overhaul. Some of these units were as much as 4,000 hours 
overdue for a major depot Inspection. In April 1949 depot 
overhaul and inspection was started on all GCA units in 
use. 

During the early months of Operation Vittles, GCA had 
"operational outages" due to moisture collecting in the 
various components after the unit was turned off during 
standby periods. This trouble was cured by leaving the 
standby unit turned on during standby periods with ex- 
ception of the high voltages. This kept the unit warm, 
preventing condensation; and the standby unit was ready 
for immediate use in case landing directions were 
changed. 

CONCLUSIONS 

GCA should be one of the first landing aids installed 
for landing aircraft in a small confined area where all 
types of weather are encountered. GCA units, time 
permitting, should have a major inspection and overhaul 
prior to heavy use. 



AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL RADAR SYSTEM 

In August 1948 it was found that as the number of 
aircraft increased, the problem of properly spacing air- 
craft entering the Berlin area increased tremendously. 
Under then-existing procedures, if aircraft were not spaced 
properly prior to arrival in Berlin, it would become 
necessary to stack them or to return the aircraft in the 
southern and northern corridors to their home bases. This 
in time would defeat the purpose of the entire operation. 
To conquer this problem it was decided to install a search 
radar system at Tempelhof. The installation was placed on 
top of the eight-story Tempelhof Airdrome building. This 



45 



location is almost in the center of metropolitan Berlin; 
therefore, fixed or permanent echoes filled the entire radar 
scope for a distance of 10 to 15 miles, preventing the con- 
trol of close-in aircraft. To eliminate this "clutter" on the 
scope an MTI (Moving Target Indicator) was installed. The 
unit went into full time operations during January 1949. 

Included in the equipment arriving at Berlin was a 
video mapping unit. This unit was used to super-impose on 
the controller's scopes a map of the surrounding territory 
showing locations of local and remote runways, airfields, 
beacons, range legs, corridors, etc. These locations were 
prepared on special photographic overlays by hand, rather 
than by normal photographic negatives of a normal map. 

In the "operations" room of the approach control sys- 
tem were the controller's scopes, SKIATRON, and data 
boards of edge-lighted Plexiglas or lucite. A search and 
"off-center" PPI (Planned Position Indicator) scope was 
provided for Tempelhof, Tegel, and Gatow airfields. The 
search scope showed all traffic entering the area and the 
"off-center" scope showed air traffic at the particular field 
to which the controller was directing traffic. The data 
boards showed the flow of traffic into each field and 
indicated the time "reported in" over an established point, 
the altitude maintained, times arriving at definite altitudes 
during let-down, time over the beacons, and time turned 
over to GCA Final or control tower at the destination. This 
information was placed on the board by a man behind the 
board writing in reverse with a grease pencil. Weather 
data for the entire area was also indicated. 

Each controller had at his disposal communication 
channels to aircraft by VHF and HF radio frequencies and 
to the individual control towers and GCA units by land- 
line telephone. The SKIATRON unit is a very large PPI 
scope with a persistent screen to enable the chief con- 
troller to monitor all traffic in the entire area. Due to the 
precise traffic patterns used, the SKIATRON Was of no 
great value to the Airlift operation at Berlin. 

One of the largest problems encountered by the Berlin 
CPS-5 was identification of individual aircraft after fhey 
reported in. The CPS-5 does not receive IFF signals 
directly on the controllers' scope. The only method of 
identification worked out by the controllers was that of 



46 





directing the aircraft to turn 45 degrees right or left for 45 
seconds and then resume the normal heading to Berlin. 
"Strobing" of the scopes by automatic VHF/DF equip- 
ment was not practical for identification of aircraft in an 
area containing a heavy flow of air traffic. This equipment, 
when used, places a bar of light or "strobes" on the scope 
from the center of the scope to the aircraft being DF-ed. 
When used in an area of heavy traffic, this placed so many 
lines on the scope that tracking of aircraft was very diffi- 
cult. Also, with two aircraft transmitting simultaneously on 



the same frequency, the strongest signal was DF-ed. ■ 
Altitude information was not needed and, therefore 
was not incorporated in the unit. The vertical separation ol 
aircraft on the Airlift was entirely dependent upon the pilot 
and the accuracy of the altimeter in the aircraft. 

Maximum "positive" range on Ihe Berlin CPS-5 vm 
found to be 60 miles, positive range being that range ft 
which the aircraft is first observed and stays on the scop4 
until it lands. Some aircraft were observed as far oilffl 
100 miles, but the returns on the scope were sporadic. 



AND A CLOSE-UP OF ITS SCREEN. THE BRIGHT "BLIPS- 
ARE AIRCRAFT. THE SMALL CIRCLES NEAR THE CENTER 
INDICATE LOCATION OF RUSSIAN AIRFIELDS. THE CON- 
CENTRIC CIRCLES INDICATE THE RANGE OF THE OBJECTS 
FROM THE TEMPELHOF AIR BASE EQUIPMENT. 




CONCLUSIONS 

With the success of the CPS-5 Radar Set in Berlin a 
proved fact, it is believed that radar can be better adapted 
to all phases of air traffic control— that is, airways control 
or area control, approach control, landing control, and 
taxi control. Excellent results were achieved with the area- 
control type of longe-range radar, which greatly aided 
traffic channeled info the Berlin area. Furthermore, the 
need for a type of taxi control radar occurred many times. 

IFF equipment capable of exact identification of 
individual aircraft is urgently needed, to avoid the 
necessity for turning of aircraft to effect radar identifica- 
tion. 




AIRBORNE RADAR AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT 

The military requirements for airborne radar navigation 
equipment became apparent early in the fall of 1948. 
After careful consideration, the AN/APS-10 was chosen as 
the airborne radar set to be used on the Airlift. This choice 
was founded on the following reasoning: 

(1) The AN/APS-10 was already installed in MATS 
C-54 aircraft. 

(2) It was believed to be the most available equip- 
ment in large quantities. 

(3) It required less installation time. 

(4) It had a comparatively light weight of 200 pounds. 
An initial survey of Airlift aircraft indicated that only 

a small percentage of assigned aircraft had AN/APS-10 
equipment installed. Headquarters USAF advised that 
insufficient AN/APS-10 equipment was available for the 
entire fleet and proposed that the AN/APS-4 radar be 
installed after the stockpile of AN/APS-10 equipment was 
exhausted. This proposal was accepted, and arrangements 
were made for installation during the 1,000-hour inspec- 
tions and recycling of aircraft. By January 1949, 53 per- 
cent of the aircraft had been equipped; by March 1949, 
12 percent and in May the installation of AN/APS-10 or 
AN/APS-4 on all Airlift aircraft had been completed. 

Radar Beacons, AN/CPN-6, for use with the AN/APS-10 
and AN/APS-4, were located in storage at Burtonwood, 



47 



England, in November 1948. In December six complete 
sets of AN/CPN-6 were shipped to Erding Air Force 
Depot in Germany. During February 1949 Radar Beacons 
(AN/CPN-6) were planned for Rhein/Main, Tempelhof, 
Gatow, and along Airlift routes at Frohnau and Braun- 
schweig. The AN/CPN-6 installation at Rhein/Main was 
completed in March and the Tempelhof installation in 
early June. 

No critical problems were encountered in the installa- 
tion of the airborne and beacon radar equipment. How- 
ever, it was found that when the pilot's scope for the 
AN/APS-4 was pulled down in the operating position, a 
deviation of 40 degrees was introduced in the magnetic 
compass due to the magnetic field set up in the sweep 
coils of the scope. There was no apparent deviation when 
the pilot's indicator was left in the "stand-by" position, 
even though the AN/APS-4 equipment was in operation. 

The complete use of airborne search radar equipment 
for navigation had not been made prior to termination of 
operations, since: 

(1) Crew personnel were not familiar with the opera- 
tion and use of the equipment. 

(2) A lack of fully qualified radar mechanics for 
organizational maintenance existed. 

(3) Sufficient beacon equipment had not been in- 
stalled. 

(4) No critical need existed for it. 



CONCLUSIONS 

The USAF should institute a vigorous program to bring 
all Troop Carrier and similar organizations up to full T/O&E 
strength in qualified radar mechanic positions, SSN's 849, 
853, and 955. 

All pilots and navigators assigned to organizations 
using airborne search equipment should be indoctrinated 
in the use of such equipment and required to undergo 
frequent refresher courses. 

Every tactical multi-engine aircraft should be equipped 
with an airborne search radar set, employing the PPI 
method of presentation. 



48 



MOBILE RADIO EQUIPMENT 

Ground communications at Airlift bases for the control 
of loading operations, maintenance, and dispatching of 
aircraft were found to be a very important factor in increas- 
ing the number of daily trips made by each group. Vehi- 
cles used for aircraft taxi control, maintenance, and cargo 
loading operations were directed by radio from a dis- 
patch control center. 

Three different types of mobile radio equipment were 
used in jeeps at different bases with the following results: 

AN/VRC-1 Mobile Radio Equipment proved to be a 
very poor piece of equipment since it utilizes the SCR-542 
VHF transmitter-receiver, which does not stay tuned 
properly when operated over bumpy roads and runways. 
Logistical support for the AN/VCR-1 was very difficult since 
the equipment was practically obsolete. For installation 
on jeeps, a special 1 2-volt generator and battery are re- 
quired. The high frequency component cannot be utilized 



satisfactorily. Maintenance of the equipment was ex> 
ceedingly great and interfered with other communications 
maintenance missions. 

SCR-610 Radio Sets also proved very unsatisfactory 
Vibration and bouncing over rough roads and runways, 
easily de-tuned this equipment. Logistical support for this 
radio equipment had to come from Army sources and 
maintenance parts were almost unobtainable. Maintenance 
of the equipment was excessive. Four of these sets were 
obtained in February 1949 for Fassberg RAF Station; ore 
set was converted for fixed station operation and three 
sets were installed in jeeps. Operation logs on this equip- 
ment indicated that the mobile equipment was operative 
less than 50 per cent of the time. 

VRC-2 FM Motorola Radio sets were originaffl 
designed as police radio sets and have been used by Air 
Force units as guard vehicular radio equipment. Although 
these radio sets are not the perfect military equipment 
they proved to be the best available for Airlift operations, 




MOBILE RADIO EQUIPMENT FOR TAXI CONTROL. THE SET IS 
A VRC-1. 




Reports indicated that this equipment would operate over 
i long period ot time with a minimum of maintenance, 
ransmitter and receiver equipment remained stable in 
ravel over rough roads and ramps. This set is designed for 
six-volt operation and while an oversized six-volt genera- 
or is desirable, it can be operated with existing jeep 
equipment. Shock mountings, dustproof coverings, and 
satisfactory antenna equipment are provided with this 
'adio set. 

CONCLUSIONS 

There is a very definite need for a minimum of one 
ixed station and three mobile radio sets for each troop 
:arrier group or separate squadron, to permit expeditious 
landling in dispatching of aircraft. Back-up equipment for 
he fixed radio station should be complete, since any 
ailure will result in decreased efficiency. 

The immediate need for mobile radio equipment 
should be considered and every effort made to have ade- 
quate six-volt equipment available for mobile radio 
Nations when the new UHF Radio Frequency Plan be- 
:omes effective. Consideration should be given to the 
desirability of engineering the proposed multi-channeled 
airborne UHF equipment so that it can also be used as 



vehicular and fixed station equipment in conjunction with 
proper power supply units. This would simplify logistic 
support and provide optimum flexibility. 

Any operation which requires the immediate main- 
tenance and dispatching of large numbers of aircraft should 
be provided with mobile radio equipment. Information 
from the ramp on the condition of aircraft is always re- 
quired by production control officers or flight control of- 
ficers to ascertain the condition or status of all aircraft 
under their control. The use of high frequency for this 
purpose is unsatisfactory due to the circuit congestion and 
interference within the high frequency spectrum and due 
to the undesirability of transmission beyond the base per- 
imeter. 

Line-of-sight transmission within a base area by the use 
of UHF permits reemployment of the same frequencies by 
adjacent bases which lie beyond line-of-sight coverage. 
UHF has the added advantage of easy maintenance, less 
weight, less cubage, and stability of frequency. 

A multi-channeled set would also reduce interference 
by the assignment of a separate frequency for each func- 
tion. It would provide communication between the air- 
craft and control towers, maintenance squadron, parking 
and loading jeeps, and production control. Since this 
problem has arisen in the past without a satisfactory solu- 
tion, some study should be given to the development of 
adequate equipment and to the assignment of sufficient 
quantities of equipment to each Air Force group or 
squadron concerned. 

Any of the above equipment procured for Air Force 
use should be designed so that power supplies would be 
provided for either six-volt DC, 28-volf DC or 110-volt 
AC power. 

RAF NAVIGATIONAL AIDS 

REBECCA-EUREKA 

This system was a primary navigational aid used by 
those RAF ground installations located to give continuous 
coverage for all aircraft flying above 1,500 feet. The re- 
stricted radar range of the equipment made it impracticable 



to give complete coverage along the corridors for air- 
craft flying below this level. 

In addition to the beacons sited as navigational aids, 
two were installed at Gatow, the British airfield in the 
Berlin area, to indicate the points at which aircraft were to 
turn onto the final leg of the landing pattern. 

The results generally obtained from this system were 
excellent; ranges depended largely upon altitudes assigned 
to the aircraft and varied from 20 miles at 1,500 feet up 
to about 60 miles at 5,000 feet. The use of this system, 
which proved to be very accurate, made it essential to 
carry a navigator as the equipment cannot be operated 
from the pilot's position. 

The RAF found this system of navigation of great ad- 
vantage in the operation particularly since with it, position 
fixes could be obtained under IF.R conditions. 



BABS 

This aid was installed at all RAF fields and at Tegel 
Airfield in the French Sector of Berlin. Sites were chosen 
at the ends of every runway at each airfield. 

Although there were a certain number of disputes re- 
garding the accuracy of the "touch-down" point given by 
Babs, this aid proved invaluable. 



GEE 

The Central German Gee chain was used throughout 
the operation. Since this chain was installed before the 
Lift started, it was not sited to give coverage at low 
altitudes over the Berlin area. Consequently, no accurate 
fixes could be taken within approximately 20 miles of 
that city. Good fixes were generally obtained in the 
Western Zone, south of a line running approximately 
from Hamburg to Lubeck and along the central corridor 
as far east as about fifteen miles from Berlin. 

Gee is a reliable and accurate navigational aid only if 
the topography of the area is such that the ground station 
can be sited so as to enable aircraft at any altitude to 
take reliable "fixes". 



49 







































NUMBER OF GCA CONTROLLED LANDINGS 


TEMPELHOF 

AIR 

BASE 




TOTAL 


JULY 


AUGUST 


SEPTEMBER 


OCTOBER 


NOVEMBER 


DECEMBER 


JANUARY 


FEBRUARY 


MARCH 


APRIL 


MAY 


JUNE 


JULY 


AUGUST 


SEPTEMI 


VFR 


10 090 


9 


686 


510 


783 


516 


327 


1 84 


571 


988 


1 198 


1 345 


1 846 


1 198 


619 


90 


IFR 


17 089 


se 


180 


497 


1 835 


1 785 


8 073 


8 836 


8 880 


1 488 


1 836 


1 005 


1 309 


1 498 


197 


190 


BELOW 
IFR 


3 067 


30 





44 


867 


68 


396 


68 1 


498 


447 


178 


86 


138 


884 


65 


3 


TE6EL 

AIR 

BASE 


VFR 


4 713 


* 


* 


* 


* 


* 


188 


37 


* 79 


39 1 


393 


1 467 


1 699 


380 


1 


* i 


IFR 


8 398 


* 


* 


*• 


# 


* 


641 


1 184 


1 335 


1 088 


616 


1 034 


1 568 


1 858 





* 


BELOW 
IFR 


463 


* 


* 


* 


* 


* 


174 


65 


1 65 


89 


3 


6 


1 1 


18 





* 


RHEIN/MAIN 

AIR 

BASE 


VFR 


4 330 





85 





148 


133 


77 


845 


893 


198 


1 009 


778 


507 


589 


879 


107 


IFR 


3 338 


53 


34 


TO 


834 


973 


963 


1 013 


1 018 


395 





159 


150 





141 


133! 


BELOW 
IFR 


37 














37 
































WIESBADEN 

AIR 

BASE 


VFR 


8 300 


88 


698 


8 865 


630 


585 


139 


197 


184 


157 


30 1 


583 


1 184 


436 


556 


306 


IFR 


4 649 








855 


41 


649 


796 


550 


678 


178 


1 33 


389 


108 


14 


851 


85! 


BELOW 
IFR 


8 

















8 


8 














4 











FASSBERG 

RAF 

STATION 


VFR 


3 634 


* 


* 


343 


58 





101 


146 


339 


479 


518 


377 


458 


484 


141 


* 


IFR 


3 649 


* 


* 





815 


938 


497 


734 


659 


468 


496 


359 


549 


440 


106 


* 1 


BELOW 
IFR 


326 


# 


* 





889 





6 





3 














84 


4 


* 1 


CELLE 

RAF 

STATION 


VFR 


2 111 


# 


* 


* 


* 


* 


34 


585 


390 


1 17 


384 


387 


140 


841 


13 


* 


IFR 


3 882 


* 


* 


*• 


* 


* 


89 


498 


885 


464 


45 1 


580 


584 


451 


6 


* 


BELOW 
IFR 


37 


* 


* 


* 


*■ 


* 





8 


3 


8 


86 





1 


3 





* 


TOTAL VFR 


33 180 


94 


/ 403 


3 120 


/ 773 


/ 176 


826 


/ 274 


/ 796 


2 270 


3 943 


3017 


5 168 


3 208 


1609 


303 


TOTAL IFR 


43 £03 


103 


134 


1 422 


1 723 


4 279 


3 001 


6 169 


6 729 


4 003 


2 932 


3 666 


4 236 


3 633 


701 


406 


TOTAL BELOW IFR 


3 960 


30 




44 


316 


119 


378 


730 


663 


478 


207 


32 


148 


323 


69 


3 



# NO USAF OPERATIONS 



50 



INTRODUCTION 

Of all the difficulties facing the Airlift, the factor 
constituting one of the greatest single problems was 
weather. Low clouds, fog, freezing rain, turbulence, and 
ice were contingencies of great operational significance; 
and they posed problems that had to be met and overcome 
before the accomplishment of the Airlift mission could be 
realized. With this fact in mind, Airlift planners throughout 
the early days of the Lift prepared the flight procedures, 
traffic control measures, and landing aid installations that 
enabled the Airlift to operate in weather conditions 
well below established Air Force minima. 




With the establishment of the Airlift's reduced operat- 
ing minima, the Air Weather Service was called upon to 
observe and forecast within heretofore little needed ceiling 
and visibility limits. Before this, in the weather service, 
when ceilings were in the neighborhood of 200 feet and 
visibilities near 1/2 mile, airfields were well below the 
closed minima and there existed no great operational re- 
quirement to know whether the ceiling was actually 250 
feet or the visibility 3/4 mile instead of 200 feet and 1/2 
mile. Under the Airlift's urgency, this situation was changed. 
Operations demanded knowledge of the exact ceiling and 
visibility, for 50 feet of ceiling or 1/4 mile of visibility either 
way could open or close an airfield; and further, they 
demanded exact forecasts of such ceilings and visibility for 
a minimum of three hours in advance. 






■' . . 




Such accuracy is not possible in the present state of 
meteorological science. The AirWeather Service, however, 
willingly concentrated the best available in personnel and 
equipment in an effort to approach as nearly as possible 
the standard of accuracy required; and as a by-product 
of fhis concentrated effort, new ideas and techniques were 
developed and fried, and shortcomings discovered and 
corrected. As a result of this unique, invaluable ex- 
perience, the Air Weather Service has, without doubt, 
gained knowledge and experience that will enable it to 
render increasingly better service. 



51 



ORGANIZATION 

Before the Airlift began, weather service requirements 
for Military Air Transport Command and for the United 
States Air Forces in Europe were met by a sinqle weafhei 
squadron. With the beginning of the Airlift, this squadron, 
the 18th, found itself almost without warning faced with a 
sudden and tremendous increase in the demand for its 
services. The weather stations at Wiesbaden, Rhein/Main, 
and Tempelhof had been able to provide the necessary 
weather service for the few daily trips into Berlin within 
their normal commitment, but there was now a requirement 
for a special weather service that could observe and fore- 
cast, as well as brief aircrews, for a steady 24-hour-per 
day stream of traffic. In addition to the increased traffic 
it became apparent that the Airlift's low operating minima 
dictated the need for special attention to the Airlift area: 
i. e., if forecasts of useable accuracy within sub-GCA 
limits were to be achieved, special observations would 
have to be taken, special charts and maps drawn, and 
special forecasts made. 

Within the same period, since the Airlift was in the 
process of organizing and expanding, Task Force planners 



AIR WEATHER 


SERVICE ORGANIZATION 


AS 


OF JUNE 1948 




HQ. 181* W.S. 
WIESBADEN 














| RHEIN/MAIN 


1 






1 




ADEN 






| FRANKFURT 






iLHOF- BERLIN 1 


1 








| ERDING 






ENFELDBRUCK 1 


1 


"| FURST 






| KAUFBEUREN 


















| NEUBIBERG 




J~T 


FAFFENHOFEN | 


1 






| STUTTGART 


1 






_J 




HING - AUSTRIA | 




| TULLN- VIENNA 






.1 -LIBIA 


— 1 





52 



AIR WEATHER SERVICE ORGANIZATION 
AS OF MARCH 1949 



HQ. 21051* A.W.G. 
WIESBADEN 



HQ.28™ W.&-, 



[burtonwood f - 

> 

> 
> 



SCULTHORPE 



LAKENHEATH 



FLT. A 514 SQ. I 
308 RCN.GR 



-|erding 



-JFASSBERG~ 



- \ FRANKFURT 



- |furstenfeldb'k 



— . — .-UNDER OPERA- 
TIONAL CONTROL 
FOR 20 DAYS FROM 
10 TO 30 MAR. 1949 

-X— X-BRIEFING TEAMS 



r HQ. 181* W.S. 



- j KAUFBEUREN 
- | NEUBIBERG 



- |OBERPFAFFENH'N 
HoRly FIELD 



- |rhein/main 



- | STUTTGART~ 



Htegel 



- TEMPELHOF-BERLIN 



- | TULLN- VIENNA 



H 



r HQ.29lH W.S. 



WHEELUS FIELD 



-|rome 



'tx- |lSTRES~ 
- | ANKARA 



7169 
WX. RCN. SQ. 



began calling upon the Weather Service for longer and 
longer period forecasts in their efforts to determine the 
needs in personnel and aircraft for the oncoming winter's 
operation. These increased requirements were apparent to 
the Chief, Air Weather Service, during his tour of the Air- 
lift in November 1948. He authorized the personnel in- 
crease necessary to expand the weather squadron to 
group status. The Weather Service in Europe was thereby 
increased to three squadrons, the 18th serving the Airlift 
and Central European area, the 28th serving the United 
Kingdom, and the 29th in Tripoli and Dhahran. This re- 



organization relieved the 18th of its excessive workll 
With the increased personnel resources, new wea, 
stations were opened and existing stations strengthen, 
for long-term operation under the Airlift load. 



EFFECTS OF WEATHER 

The splendid success of the Airlift, its precise Air W, , 
Control system, low operating minima, and unsurpS 
tonnage record are likely to convey an erroneous 
pression of the effect of weather upon the operation. 1 
Airlift operated in low ceiling and visibility conditio 
icing and turbulence aloft, and icing on the surface, V( ; 
seldom completely stopping for weather — neverthele; 
weather was the largest of the factors determining the tor 
delivered capacity of the Lift. Tonnage and bad weafhi 
conditions, considering the same number of operating a; 
craft, were indirectly proportional throughout the entit 
operation. (See Weather and the Frankfurt-Berlin Airl' 
Chart). Although the Airlift was seldom complete 
stopped by weather, instrument weather conditions di 
require extended intervals between aircraft, thus reducini 



FORECASTERS TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CIRCUIT I 




FRANKFURT 

FLIGHT 
SERVICE 



number of trips that could be landed in Berlin during 

adverse weather period and constituting weather's 
leatest effect. 

I Of the times when the Lift was halted by weather, the 
/eather phenomenon mostly responsible was fog. Percent- 
ige tabulations, based upon an operating potential of 24 
lours per day for each of seven Airlift airfields, show the 
argest percentages of closed weather as occurring during 
he months of November 1948 and February 1949 (see 
Weather Percentages for USAF Airlift Operation); and 
hese were the two months in which fog was the major 
light hazard. 

On two short occasions a single field was forced to 
;uspend operation because of turbulence. Taken overall, 
little effect upon in-flight operation was caused by rough 
air. There were, however, reports from maintenance per- 
sonnel to the effect that during periods of heavy tur- 
bulence, gas leaks in the C-54 wing tanks became more 
common and a larger amount of maintenance work was 
required. 

Icing aloft, although anticipated to be one of the major 
in-flight hazards, proved to be of little difficulty. The 
operation has conclusively proved that the present anti- 
and de-icing equipment, if kept in proper operation, can 
safely handle any in-flight icing occurring in this area. 

FORECASTING 

One of the major problems facing the Air Weather 
Service, one that has been a difficulty since World War 
demobilization, was the low level of experience among 
weather service forecasting personnel. The first move by 
'he 18th Weather Squadron personnel office to meet the 
Airlift's forecasting needs was the transfer of European- 
sxperienced personnel from weatherstations in the southern 
zone of Germany into Airlift fields. By carefully canvass- 
ing forecasters' experience throughout the entire squad- 
ran, the bulk of European experience among the fore- 
pasting personnel was concentrated on the Airlift. 

Early in the operation it became obvious that special 
weather organizations and services would be necessary 
if operational commanders were to realize full benefits 



of a weather service organization. The Airlift was be- 
ginning to operate as a single unit, with each base acting 
as a part of the whole rather than as an individual organi- 
zation. To fit into this picture, the Weather Service had to 
do likewise. It had to be able to present to the Air Traffic 
Control center a single forecast agreed upon by all station 
forecasters, covering all Airlift bases and routes. To achieve 
this, a master Control Weather Station was established in 
the Frankfurt Air Traffic Control Office with a sub-central 
station in the weather office at Tempelhof. A telephone 
conference line was established with outlets in each 
weather station on the Lift, and a conference schedule set 
up so that all Airlift forecasters could discuss the weather 
situations at least four times a day and arrive at a com- 
posite forecast for the Lift area. The Master Control Station 
was given forecast control authority so that agreements 
could always be reached. Of the several values obvious in 
this conference net, the greatest was the combining of ex- 
perience of the forecasters taking part. Regardless of the 
care exercised in selecting the most experienced fore- 
casters for the Airlift bases, there existed a considerable 
difference in the experience level of personnel on duty 
in the various stations at any given time. The telephone 
conference circuit gave all forecasters the benefit of the 
most experienced man's opinions and reasoning and 
acted, in effect, as a means of bringing the experience 
level of all forecasters on duty up to that of the most 
experienced man. (See diagram in Communications sec- 
tion). 

This conference proved of such value in the American 
weather service that an effort to accomplish a similar 
circuit between the American and British weather services 
was begun, and was just ready to begin functioning at the 
Airlift's end. Although no operational benefit was obtained, 
there is little doubt that this inter-service conference 
net would have accomplished a worth-while improvement 
in the joint weather services proportional to that ac- 
complished in the U. S. weather service alone. 

To those not technically trained, it may appear that this 
report lays undue stress on experience among weather 
forecasters. It is therefore advisable to explain here that 
the limited development of the science of meteorology 



places perhaps more weight upon forecasier experience, 
particularly experience in the operating locale, than upon 
any other phase of training. 

There were many new ideas and methods in the science 
of forecasting developed and tried by Airlift forecasting 
personnel, but due to their highly technical nature if is not 
considered advisable to present them here. 

OBSERVING 

As previously mentioned, the real winter weather began 
in November. At this time the Lift was operating with the 
minimum conditions of 200 feet 1/2 mile except Tempelhof, 
at which minima were 400 feet and 1 mile. At most of the 
fields, weather observers during this period were relying 
almost entirely upon estimated ceiling heights. Some ceiling 
lights were in operation for night observations, and infre- 
quent ceiling balloon runs (due to shortages of supplies) 
were made for the accurate determination of daytime 
ceilings. Due to the amorphous and variable nature of the 
average low cloud and the natural limitations of the human 
eye, it has always been understood by weather people, 
though perhaps not by most operational personnel, that an 
estimated ceiling of 200 feet means that the ceiling is 
somewhere between 150 and 250 feet. Even those 
measurements made by ceiling light or balloons, due to 
the aforementioned causes, have been known to be in- 
accurate by as much as plus or minus 50 feet. It was ob- 
vious that the Airlift's low landing and take-off minima 
dictated the use of ceiling measurement equipment which 
could not only make accurate measurements, but make 
them continuously; so that dependable ceiling heights 
would be readily available for operations under those 
conditions. The Chief, Air Weather Service, during his 
earlier mentioned tour of the Airlift, recognized this 
necessity and authorized the installation of new type 
weather service ceilometers at all Airlift bases, giving them 
immediate priority for this job. 

Except in rare cases, the regular report of visibility 
made by a weather observer is normally the general all- 
around visibility taken from the weather station, with a 



53 




FREQUENCY OF VFR FLYING WEATHER 



30- 



5 25_ 

g 20- 

o '0- 
z 5- 

o-L 



30- 



£25- 
g 20- 
u. 15- 

z 5- 

0- 






30 



w 25- 
g 20- 

z 5- 



1900 LST 
LEGEND: 03% 6 YEAR AVERAGE 




| OBSERVED IN 1948 



special note for more or less visibility in any particular 
quadrant it it deviates as much as 1/2 mile from the 
general visibility. With the Airlift operating at 1/2 mile, 
the runway visibility might frequently differ from the 
average by an amount not large enough to require a 
remark on the weather report, yet enough to open or 
close the runway at Airlift minima. To obtain a special 
observation which would give the accurate runway visi- 
bility, a line for a field telephone was installed at the 
landing end of the active runway. When the visibility 
was less than one mile, a weather observer with a field 
telephone was stationed in this position. By counting 
the visible runway fights, with a knowledge of the 
distances between them the observer in this position 
could telephone accurate runway visibility reports direct 
to the weather office. Any variation in runway visibility 
which might open or close the field was thus instantly 
available to the weather office, and through them to 
operations personnel at all Airlift bases by way of the 
weather teletype net. 



UPPER AIR AND AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE 

When forecasts were begun to supply the Airlift with ' 
special weather service, one of the first points 9 
consideration was the upper air observation program. 
Perhaps one of the weakest links in the 18th Squadron^ 
observation service was their shortage of upper air data. 
Use was being made of such foreign observations made 
by PIBALS (pilot balloons) and RAWINS (radio-equipped 
balloons) as were available, and a few strategically \oi 
cated stations in the U. S. zone of Germany were In 
ing these observations and transmitting the informal™ 
on the international weather net. The British were making! 
several upper air runs in their zone of occupation afl 
likewise transmitting on the international net, so thafS 
far as the American and British zones of Germany weH 
concerned, upper air information for a normal Air Force 
operation was available. When the Airlift started, it viB 
only necessary to increase the frequency of these runs 
to provide adequate coverage of the air aloft over the 



54 






British and American zones. 
\ Even with the increased frequency of upper air runs, 
if became apparent with the advent of November 
Wather that more information was necessary for the 
longer range forecasts required by the Airlift, and that 
lis added information must come from a specific locality 
the area to the northwest, or "weatherward," of the 
Airlift corridors. Ground controlled balloon runs in this 
area were entirely too scattered in the low countries and 
northern France, and few or none were being made in 
the Channel and the North Sea. 
• As a result of requests made by the weather organiza- 

■l), a squadron of B-29 reconnaissance aircraft was 

Hmed and based in the Marham area of the United 
Kingdom. A weather reconnaissance track was recom- 
mended, and operations by this squadron began in late 

^Bovember. Their route was set up from Marham north- 
eastward to the coast of Denmark and back in a triangular 

yack that completely covered the Central North Sea and 
'enfral and Southern England. Qualified weather ob- 
servers on these flights reported over predesignafed check 
points, and their reports were coded and put on the 



* 



weather service wires. This was information of real fore- 
casting value because, with the predominantly north- 
westerly circulation during the winter, the flights were 
encountering the weather that would be over the cor- 
ridors in 24 to 48 hours. 

The value of these reconnaissance flights to Airlift 
weather forecasting can be reduced to a simple lesson: 
If adequate upper air information is unavailable from 
already established RAWIN and PIBAL stations, this in- 
formation can be obtained by aerial reconnaissance more 
expeditiously than by attempting to establish and man the 
necessarily complex upper air observation stations. 
Aerial reconnaissance ships can cover a much larger area, 
and thereby give more complete upper air coverage, than 
could conceivably be covered by the establishment of 
even a large number of observing stations. At the same 
time they can render valuable service in obtaining the 
data necessary for special studies in aircraft icing, thunder 
storms, and other specific meteorological phenomena. 
Although aerial reconnaissance does not generally provide 
information to as high a level as that supplied by 
RAWIN's it proved adequate for the Airlift, especially 



when combined with data supplied by a minimum number 
of RAWIN stations. 

With the North Sea and coastal countries adequately 
covered by the B-29 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron 
based in England, attention was turned to a more general 
weather reconnaissance of Central Europe. In November 
1°48 USAFE formed a squadron of B-17's, the 7169th 
Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, with the intention of 
placing it under the operational control of the Air 
Weather Service as was the B-29 squadron at Marham. 
Headquarters USAFE placed this squadron under Task 
Force operational control as an Air Traffic Control scout 
squadron, with the weather squadron permitted to place 
weather observers on these flights. Little benefit was 
realized as far as weather forecasting was concerned by 
this arrangement, because flights by these aircraft were 
confined to the Airlift corridors. Since a satisfactory 
arrangement had not been worked out to serve both 
interests, on 10 March operational control of this squad- 
ron was placed with the Air Weather Group. Twenty 
days later, due to improved weather conditions and the 
questionable value of the results obtained, this recon- 



•NOR RAIN, NOR SLEET, NOR SNOW SHALL STAY THESE 
COURIERS FROM THEIR APPOINTED ROUNDS'. 






W ' 



55 



naissance squadron was inactivated by order of USAFE. 

Although no particular value was obtained by this 
operation, it was established on the two or three occasions 
when these aircraft flew tracks outside the corridors to 
the weatherward, that a similar squadron operating 
entirely under Weather's operational control could play 
the same part and return the same value as the squadron 
in England; and by flying to the weatherward nearer the 
corridors, would encounter the weather that would be 
over the route in the next six to twelve hours, thereby 
increasing by a substantial degree the short-range fore- 
casting accuracy. 

PILOT REPORTS 

For those aerial observations near the bases them- 
selves and along the corridors, the usual system of pilot 
reports was used. When the bad weather started, Air 
Weather Service requested that pilots be required to re- 
port weather at designated intervals. These reports were 
collected and placed on weather service wires, and a 
system for the utilization of pilot reports was effected 
much the same as the Civil Aeronautics Administration 
and Weather Bureau set-up in the Zone of the Interior. 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty encountered in this system 
was that of busy communication personnel being unable 
to relay weather information from the pilot to the weather 
office. Such a hold-up caused a consequent delay in 
dissemination of the reports over the weather service 
wires. When the final organization allowed a workload in- 
duction for communication personnel, this difficulty dis- 
appeared. 

One of the points of friction that has long existed 
between weather officer and pilot is the matter of pilot 
ceiling and visibility reports. The Air Weather Service, 
like the U. S. Weather Bureau and CAA, has heretofore 
followed regulations that forbid the weather officer 
accepting a pilot report as the official report, when an 
observed report by a qualified weather observer could 
be had. In perhaps one of the first large-scale deviations 
from this rule, weather stations on Airlift bases found it 
mandatory that as often as possible, they accept pilot 

56 



reports on ceilings and visibilities. This was especially true 
before the installation of electronic ceiling reporting 
instruments and the inauguration of a special runway 
visibility observation. Even with the large human error 
factor involved when a pilot is busy with an instrument 
let-down, there were several reasons for the necessity of 
accepting pilot reports. 

First, with the ceiling as variable as it usually is when 
at or near 200 feet, it is impossible without making 
continuous observations (or without the use of a ceilo- 
meter) for the ground observer to be absolutely current 
with his ceiling and visibility; and with aircraft landing 



PILOTS WERE BRIEFED AND DEBRIEFED BY WEATHER ' 
PERSONNEL. 




or taking off at less than five-minute intervals, it woi 
have been necessary for the observer to be outside CO! 
tinuously in order to meet the Airlift's requirements. 

Secondly, since most of the Airlift weather statics 
were in offices from which the observers could not ke> 
a constant watch on the sky in all directions, they we) 
often forced to rely on the pilots, through the tovw 
to let them know when special observations were 
order. In this respect, it is here strongly recommend? 
that the physical location of a weather station be su< 
that a clear and unhampered view of 360 degrees of fh 
horizon can be had at all times. 

OPERATIONAL USE OF FORECASTS 



ill 



I! 



Perhaps the best picture of the operational use a 
forecasts and the weather forecaster's position in fhi 
general operations picture can be drawn by a comparisoi 
between use of the weather services by the two nationi 
engaged in "Operation Vittles". American and British 
weather services were very similar, it being in this instance 
the operational use of forecasts where the major differ^ 
ences occurred. The United States Air Force C-54's, due la 
tank and wing construction, were better stressed wifh a 
minimum of 1,500 gallons of fuel in the wing tanks. This 
constituted a considerable fuel reserve over that necessary! 
for the shorthaul operation. With this reserve fuel, U.S. 
aircraft could be dispatched without regard to terminal" 
forecasts. Aircraft could continue to make approaches un- 
til the field had actually gone below minimum. When the | 
field did go below minimum, there still remained ade-J 
quate fuel aboard for the aircraft to return to fheir home, 
bases or to alternates. Therefore, for the most part fore- 
casting was used for dispatching aircraft so they would; 
arrive at terminals as weather rose to minima, and fori 
estimating icing and turbulence hazards en route. 

On the other hand, the British operation was conducted | 
with aircraft carrying a minimum of reserve fuel. They werej 
therefore unable to divert the sometimes necessary lonch 
distances in order to reach operational weather conditions 
British traffic controllers were forced to rely more com- 
pletely upon weather forecasts; and in contrast to the 



American operation, they stopped dispatch when weather 
personnel were able contidently to forecast below- 
minimum operational conditions. 

As a partial solution to the recognized inaccuracies of 
meteorological science, both British and American fore- 
casters exercised their initiative by warning the dispatcher 

„ i| of weather features likely to affect the operation. Based 
upon an adequate knowledge of the nature and urgency 

I, j of the operation and the controller's problems, they 
presented a balanced picture of the future weather with 
fheir degree of certainty for the forecast. Forecasters often 
filled an easier and more productive role in being con- 
fidently able to forecast the continuance of good weather 
when crews and controllers felt doubts and anxiety. 



RECORDS AND CLIMATOLOGY 

One of the most productive roles filled by the Air 
Weather Service, as well as one of the best illustrations 
of the value of maintaining longterm records and statis- 
tics, was in the field of special studies and special fore- 
casts. Studies in answer to many difficult problems, in- 
cluding probable and possible duration of periods when 
GCA teams might be continuously employed; European 
meteorological conditions involving fog, icing, thunder- 
storms, seasonal freezing levels, and statistics regarding 
snowfall, rainfall, and estimates of the effect of winter 
weather on aircraft were prepared. Papers such as these 
were continuously in demand at command level and 
proved to be of singular value to headquarters engaged 
in over-all planning. 

Airlift logistical problems were to a large extent af- 
fected by the weather. Because considerable portions of 
the supplies for Berlin were of a perishable nature, and 
could not be held at air bases during periods of bad 
weather without causing far-reaching effects upon surface 
transportation facilities, long-term climatological studies 
and extended-interval forecasts enabled ground traffic 
agencies to plan the flow of supplies to Airlift air bases. 
Forecasts were given the Traffic and Production Control 
Sections of CALTF Headquarters for weekly, monthly and 



AIRLIFT AREA CLIMATOLOGICAL TRENDS 




57 



three-monthly periods. By utilizing these studies, logis- 
tical agencies were able to plan fhe delivery of supplies 
to the American and British Zone Airlift stations so that 
an even flow could be kept moving into Berlin. 

DISSEMINATION 

To be fully utilized, weather observations and fore- 
casts must be disseminated with speed and accuracy. On 
the Airlift this was accomplished through the media of 
staff briefings, special staff weather sections, crew brief- 
ings, and written forecasts. 

Weather briefings were presented at practically any 
time or place they were needed. The Commanding 
General, Headquarters USAFE, was briefed daily at 1000 
hours and the Commanding General, CALTF, at 1100. 
Both of these briefings laid stress on the expected Air- 
lift weather and its causes. 

A staff weather officer was assigned to Headquarters 



TEMPELHOF GAVE PILOTS QUICK, COMFORTABLE "CURB- 
SERVICE" BRIEFINGS. 



CALTF for procurement and presentation of additional 
weather information. Under his supervision there was a 
special weather section in the flight operations office of 
that Headquarters. There, for the use of the Duty Opera- 
tions Officer, a board displaying present and forecasted 
weather for all Airlift bases and alternates was maintained 
from telephone and teletype reports. Weather overlays, 
written forecasts, and a telephone conference connection 
with CALTF bases enabled the staff weather officer to 
advise and brief Airlift personnel on request. 

Beginning with a system of twice-a-day group weafher 
briefings, Airlift bases progressed to a system of in- 
dividual briefings immediately prior to take-off, if the 
location of the weather station and time factors made 
this procedure practical. In those cases where the dis- 
tance of the weather station from the flight line made 
individual briefing between trips impractical or where 
the size of the weafher station made group briefings 
impossible, written forecasts covering a six-hour period 




were published every three hours and distributed in 
organization mess halls and all the flight lines. Where 
used, the pre-take-off briefings were supplemented in a 
mass briefing held once a week to discuss general weather 
trends, changes in flight procedures, and intelligence 
matters. 

The Airlift terminals at Tegel and Gatow both main- 
tained briefing services, although regular briefing opera- 
tions were normally unnecessary because of the short 
routes these bases served. Tempelhof initially had in- 
dividual briefing in the terminal building, but converted 
later to a system of "portable" briefing, firsf from a jeep 
and later from an inclosed van in which the weather of- 
ficer met arriving aircraft, briefed crews at fhe parking 
sites, and returned to the station during breaks in traffic 
to pick up later sequences and forecasts. The arrange- 
ment was most convenient for all concerned, especially 
in inclement weather. 

TECHNICAL ASPECTS 

Germany, with the latitude of Labrador and the tern 
perature of the U. S. middle east coast, presents one of 
the most difficult forecasting areas in the world. During 
the winter the proximity of the warm Gulf Stream and the 
cold North Sea causes inter-mixture of air masses of 
widely varying temperatures and humidity, and frequent 
fronfal passages with inconsistent rates of movement make 
accurate forecasting a major problem. The primary prob- 
lem, however, and one that has proved intractable so far, 
is forecasting in and near marginal operating conditions. 

Advances have been made in the technique of bad 
weather flying, and marginal conditions are now so near 
to zero conditions that they cannot be forecasted or even 
observed with absolute accuracy. Marginal operating con- 
ditions— 200 to 400 feet ceilings and 1/2 to 1 mile visi- 
bility — are so narrow from the viewpoint of the mete- 
orologist that accurate forecasting within these limifs is 
usually improbable. With cloud bases within this range 
a variation of 200 feet is of great operational importance; 
yet it can result from a change of only 1 degree Faren- 
heit in surface temperature or a few knots change in wind 



-""*. 



MARCH, 1949, BLEW INTO RHEIN/MAIN WITH SNOW AND ICE. 



force. A variation of 1/4 mile in visibility may be similarly 
caused. 

These difficulties have been aggravated by the tact 
that cloud bases below 600 feet are normally so diffuse 
and fluctuating that even air crews are unable to observe 
the effective height with any useful degree of unanimity, 
so that individual air crew reports of the height of low 
clouds are sometimes misleading and always have to be 
regarded with reserve. For this reason crews and con- 
trollers seldom agree with forecasts of low stratus height. 

The timing of sudden changes of weather within one 
hour has hitherto been regarded as a good standard of 
forecasting; however, this was much below the desirable 
standard for the Airlift, where an error of one hour in 
forecasting the sudden onset of zero conditions may 
have caused a large number of aircraft to miss their ap- 
proaches. 



CONCLUSIONS 

Of all the lessons learned and conclusions drawn 
by the Air Weather Service as a result of experience 
gained, in "Operation Vittles", the most important and 
outstanding was simply the verification of a fact that has 
long been known in the weather service. Relying upon 
the present state of scientific development in the field of 
meteorology, the Air Weather Service is incapable of 
furnishing the exact weather forecasting required by such 
an operation. As previously stated, during the entire win- 
ter the operational minima at Airlift bases were 200' 1/2 
mile except Tempelhof, where minima were 400' i mile. 
To meet the requirements fully, it was mandatory that 
the weather service be able to forecast with absolute 
accuracy within these minima over a period of at least 
three hours. 

As mentioned above, it is not within the present 



scope of meterological science to accomplish this. It ap- 
pears that advancements in instrument flying have out- 
distanced the science of meteorology and placed fore- 
casting requirements on ceiling and visibility limits 
wherein weather people cannot forecast or even observe 
with sufficient accuracy. The only corrective measure for 
this forecasting deficiency is basic research, and that is 
being carried out to the limits of facilities available. 

The deficiencies in present weather observing tech- 
niques, however, pose problems less difficult to solve. 
Speaking from a strictly operational viewpoint, the four 
necessary weather observations are ceiling, visibility, wind 
direction, and wind velocity. At the beginning of the Air- 
lift these observations were taken in the approved weather 
service manner: i. e., ceiling from estimation or from a 
ceilometer placed somewhere near the weather station; 
visibility in a 360 degree circle from the instrument shelter; 
wind direction and velocity from an annemometer placed 



59 



on top of the operations building or tower. 

As an example, due to the peculiar construction of 
Tempelhof Air Base and since present regulations would 
not allow the ceilometer to be installed on the field, it 
was placed a considerable distance behind the terminal 
building. The annemometers were installed on top of 
the terminal building and tower, some 100 feet above 
the ground. Because of the high terminal and neigh- 
boring buildings, a good visibility observation in all 
directions was impossible. 

The error in this placement of instruments and physical 
construction is obvious. Weather elements were not ob- 
served where they mattered most at the approach zone 
and runway. The ceiling over a spot somewhere behind 
the terminal buildings may or may not be the ceiling over 
the approach end of the runway, the visibility taken from 
the instrument shelter may not be the visibility on the 
approach and on the runway, and the wind direction and 
velocity on top of the terminal building or tower, 100 feet 
above the field, may nof be the same as that on the 
runway — particularly in the case of Tempelhof where 
the field is almost entirely surrounded by tall buildings. 

Observational inaccuracies caused by this placement 



of instruments and physical characteristics of the field 
were duplicated in one or more cases on each of the 
Airlift fields, and were responsible for some loss of con- 
fidence in the weather service by the pilots and opera- 
tion personnel. Ceiling and visibility inaccuracies contrib- 
utable to these faults were at least partially responsible 
for the record of almosf 5,000 Airlift landings when 
official weather service observations placed the field 
below GCA minima, and accounted for a large measure 
of disregard for official weather service reports. 

A situation even more dangerous than the loss of 
confidence resulted from the difference in wind directions 
and velocities between the official weather service re- 
ports taken at a considerable height above the ground 
and a considerable distance from the runway, and those 
winds existing on the runway itself. These wind reports 
became highly critical, particularly in the case of Tempel- 
hof when continuous GCA approaches were being made. 
Throughout the final approach, the GCA controller was 
able to estimate the wind drift and incorporate the 
necessary correction in his instructions to fhe pilot. After 
holding this correction during the entire final run, neither 
the GCA controller nor the pilot was prepared for the 

I AFTER WINTER'S HEAVIEST SNOW, C-54'S UNLOADED SIDE 
BY SIDE UNTIL SNOW REMOVAL CREWS CLEARED THE TEM- 
PELHOF PARKING APRON. 



60 




sudden 20 to 30 degree shift of wind at times encountered 
when the aircraft descended below fhe level of the sur- 
rounding buildings. This necessitated a rapid, last-minute 
correction, and even though the pilot was contact af fhe 
time, caused rough landings and offered a definite ground- 
loop hazard. 

These observational inaccuracies, coupled with m 
scientific limitations of the forecasting service, created a 
lack of respect for the weather service in a number ol 
operational people, and the "flying without regard lo 
weather" attitude was subscribed to by quite a few. 

In its efforts to improve its service, the Air Weafher 
Service made every effort to correct the deficiencies 
herein mentioned. The forecasters' telephone conference 
net was instituted and proved to be of definite value. 
Visibility observations by an observer on the end of the 
runway were inaugurated and certainly proved to be a 
step in the right direction. An effort was made to have 
the ceilometer placed on fhe flying field near the runways, 
but this move was prevented by installation regulations 
A similar effort to mount annemometers on the field near 
the runways was stopped by technical limitations involved 
in electrical losses between the annemometers and their 
recording instruments. 

The apparent need for electronically-determined run- 
way visibilities and approach ceilings has confribufed to 
the development by weather people of the newl 
constructed transmissometer-ceilometer units, instruments 
which make and record continuous observations of 
ceilings and visibility in the approach zone and on the 
runway. In the field of forecasting, new techniques have 
been developed and tried and will undoubtedly contrib- 
ute toward improving forecasting accuracy, but no 
definite progress on fhe basic research problems can be 
claimed from this operation. 

In the future, electronic recording instruments wf 
undoubtedly improve the accuracy of weather observa- 
tions, and perhaps some forecasting techniques learned 
in fhis operation will improve fhe forecasting. There M 
remains, however, a tremendous amount of fundamenl 
research to be done before the science of meteorolol 
will be capable of fully meeting aviation requireme(| 







/ 



\ 



Considerable difficulty was encounfered in fhe ac- 
tivation of flying and ground safety programs at newly 
established Airlift bases and in the integration of safety 
activities of the Airlift units operating from permanent 
USAFE installations. With the arrival and assignment of 
additional safety personnel, accident control activities 
were accelerated, and aggressive flying and ground safety 
programs were initiated at each installation. 



61 



GROUND SAFETY 

The ever-present major problem in ground safety 
was the treight-handling operation. Many aircraft were 
damaged by motor vehicles, trucks, and fork lifts engaged 
in loading or unloading of aircraft. Operators were un- 
familiar with the procedures prescribed for operating their 
equipment in close proximity to aircraft. Operators of ma- 
terial handling equipment, moreover, were frequently in- 
adequately trained; and the training of special purpose 
equipment operators, most of them German, proved a 
slow process. 

Several aircraft were extensively damaged during 
maintenance as a result of fires caused by igniting gasoline 
or gasoline fumes. The malpractice of using gasoline for 
cleaning purposes presented a constant problem to super- 
visory personnel, and repeated efforts were necessary to 
attain rigid enforcement of regulations and operating 
procedures covering the use of flammable liquids. 

The adoption of appropriate corrective measures was 
often hindered by failure of personnel to report all ground 
accident damage to government property. In an effort to 
achieve more complete accident reporting fhis Head- 
quarters devised and prescribed an aircraft ground 
accident form to be prepared on each aircraft accident 
not reportable on AF Form 14 and 14A, the flying safety 
reports. 

To eliminate the damaging of aircraft by backing cargo 
trucks, the use of wooden chocks and the assistance of 
backing guides were prescribed as standard operating 
procedures. To reduce the problem of dusts caused by 
handling coal and flour, sprinkling and wetting down of 
loading ramps and areas was necessary. The control of 
motor vehicle traffic on airfields also proved a major 
problem, since the operators of these vehicles were fre- 
quently foreign nationals and ground force personnel not 
always familiar with the safety factors governing vehicular 
traffic on crowded airfields. 

Constant instruction and training, coupled with super- 
visory vigilance, were necessary to obtain compliance with 
existing operating procedures and to keep the number of 
ground mishaps to a minimum. German safety engineers 



USAFE GROUND ACCIDENTS DURING AIRLIFT 



MAJOR CAUSE OF ALL DISABLING INJURIES 




30 



40 



80 



FALL OF PERSONS SAME LEVEL 
STRIKING AGAINST 
FALL OF PERSONS DIFFERENT LEVELS 
SLIDING, RUNNING, JUMPING 
STRUCK BY FALLING OBJECTS 
ALTERCATIONS 

EXPOSURE, EXPLOSION, AND USE OF 
HAZARDOUS OPERATING PROCEDURES 

ACIDS, TOXICS, ASPHYXIATION 
EQUIPMENT FAILURE 
MATERIEL HANDLING 
SS3 ALL OTHERS 



MILITARY AND CIVILIAN 



qPERGENT|0 20 30 40 30 60 




MOTOR VEHICLE RATE 



BASED ON NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS 
PER 100,000 VEHICLE MILES 




MILITARY INJURY RATE 



BASED ON NUMBER OF DISABLING 
. INJURIES PER 100,000 MAN-DAYS 
RATE 




CIVILIAN INJURY RATE 



BASED ON NUMBER OF DISABLING 

INJURIES PER IjOOOpOO MAN-HOURS 

RATE 

10 




62 



were utilized fo supplement USAFE safety personnel. Their 
services were used in the instruction and training of Ger- 
man employees and in administering examinations of Ger- 
man motor vehicle and special purpose equipment 
operators. 

Available ground accident statistics do not indicate 
unusual or unsatisfactory trends; however, their com- 
pilation cannot be considered complete in view of the 
slow organization of the ground safety program during 
the early stages of the operation. The ground accident 
rates shown on the opposite page have been compiled 
from reports submitted by USAFE installations engaged 
in Airlift activities. In the compilation of these rates neither 
the accidents nor the military and civilian man-days of ex- 
posure of supporting Army personnel were included. 



FLYING SAFETY 

The exceptionally fine flying safety record of the Airlift 
was not achieved by, nor can it be attributed to the skill, 
ability, or contribution of any single man or any group 
of men. It was achieved through the cooperative efforts 
of many teams of skilled technicians. Yet in evaluating this 
safety record, attention must be focused on a particular 
group — the aircrews, the problems they faced, and the 
manner in which they accomplished their mission. 

In order for the aircrews to attain maximum results 
demanded in this around-the-clock, all-weather type of 
operation with its tremendous accident potential, if was 
mperative that all precautions be taken to reduce opera- 
fional hazards to a minimum. It has long been established 
hat human error is by far the greatest cause factor in- 
/olved in aircraft accidents, and it was constantly em- 
)hasized that every possible means of keeping this 
actor to a minimum must be utilized. This was accom- 
plished through three general methods. 

First, aircrews were provided with the best flying aid 
acilities that science could offer. Every modern means of 
adio, radar, and electronic navigational aid was installed 
>n the routes flown. Each operational base was fully 
'quipped with qualified GCA crews to guide aircraft in 




for landings in bad weather. Weather service set up for 
Airlift operations was more elaborate and extensive than 
any forecasting service heretofore developed. Airfields 
were equipped, and in some instances rebuilt, for the sole 
purpose of facilitating the Airlift. Countless other devices 
and services were made available to the aircrews fo 
provide them with maximum safety in the course of their 
duties. 

Secondly, thorough supervisory control was maintained 
over the aircrews at all times. Frequent flight checks were 
conducted on all crew members to insure their ability to 
meet the high standards of proficiency demanded. Train- 
ing of personnel was a continuing process. Due to the 
saturation of the air space on the routes flown, it was 
necessary to monitor all flights and in some cases actually 
to control them from ground air control centers. These 
centers worked in direct conjunction with the operational 
bases in allocating and coordinating flight schedules. 
Split-second timing, altitude spacing, and flight adjustments 
were mandatory fo provide aircraft a safety space-margin. 
Flying safety officers made frequent supervisory field 
trips to ascertain the adequacy of accident prevention 
programs and to assist safety personnel with unusual 
problems. Constant surveys and analyses were accom- 
plished on accident data to determine whether cause factors 
were indicating a general accident trend due to faults in 
equipment, practices, or procedures. Close coordination 
with subordinate commands was maintained so that im- 
mediate action could be taken on any peculiar problem 
or difficulty encountered. 

The third means of reducing human error was through 
safety education. Operational bases received all available 
safety publications for use in aircraft accident study classes. 
Following each accident, immediate TWX dissemination of 
cause factors was made in order that all bases might profit 
by .the mistakes of others. 

Throughout the entire period of the operation, the 
Airlift's safety record consistently bettered that of the 
overall Air Force in spite of all-weather and around-the- 
clock schedules. During the summer months of 1949 the 
Airlift shattered safely records for the amount of hours 
flown, bringing a full realization of safety efforts. Based 



63 

























































AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT SUMMARY 


MONTH 


TOTAL 


BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 


BY TYPE ACCIDENT 


BY CAUSE FAC1 


"ORS 


C-47 


C-54 


R-5D 


C-82 


TAKE OFF 


IN FLIGHT 


APPROACH 
a LANDING 


TAXIING 


OTHER 


PERSONNEL 
ERROR 


MATERIEL 
FAILURE 


OTHER 


MAJ. 


MIN. 


MAJ. 


MIN. 


MAJ. 


MIN. 


MAJ. 


MIN. 


MAJ. 


MIN. 


MAJ. 


MIN. 


MAJ. 


MIN. 


MAJ. 


MIN. 


MAJ. 


MIN. 


MAJ. 


MIN. 


MAJ. 


MIN. 


MAJ. 


MIN. 


MAJ. 


MIN. ! 


JUNE 1948 
























































JULY 


8 


3 


6 


1 


2 


2 














2 


1 


3 




2 


2 


1 




7 


2 


1 






1 


AUGUST 


5 


1 


3 


1 


2 
















1 




2 




1 


1 


1 




4 


1 


1 








SEPTEMBER 


6 


6 


5 


3 


1 


3 














1 


1 


2 




2 


5 


1 




2 


5 


3 




1 


1 


OCTOBER 


6 


3 






5 


3 






1 




1 




2 




2 


1 


1 


2 






3 


2 


3 


1 






NOVEMBER 


5 


3 






3 


3 


2 








1 








3 






3 


1 




4 


3 


1 








DECEMBER 


7 


5 






5 


3 


1 


2 


1 




1 




4 




1 




1 


5 






4 


5 


3 








JANUARY 1949 


9 


8 






9 


6 




2 






1 




1 


1 


6 


3 


1 


3 




1 


7 


5 


1 


1 


1 


2 


FEBRUARY 


4 


7 






3 


6 


1 


1 








1 


1 


4 


3 






2 






3 


3 


1 






4 


MARCH 


8 


2 






8 


2 














4 




3 




1 


2 






3 


1 


5 






1 


APRIL 


1 


3 




1 


1 


2 






















1 


3 






1 


3 










MAY 


*6 


5 


1 


1 


4 


3 




1 






1 


1 






5 


1 




3 






4 


4 


2 






1 


JUNE 


8 


3 






6 


2 


2 






1 


1 






2 


5 


1 


1 




1 




6 




2 


1 




2 


JULY 


2 





1 




1 
















1 




1 


- 










1 




1 








AUGUST 


1 


i 






1 


1 


















1 






1 






1 


1 










SEPTEMBER 
























































TOTALS 


76 


50 


16 


7 


51 


36 


6 


6 


2 


1 


6 


2 


17 


9 


37 


6 


II 


32 


5 


1 


50 


35 


24 


3 


2 


12 


















i 


* INCL 


JOES 


YC-9 


7 MAJ 


OR AC 


;ft a 


cc 


















1 







64 



AIRLIFT ACCIDENT RATES 




JUN 



JUL 



AUG 



SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP 





NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


NO. 


RATE 


USAF(WORLD WIDE) 




480 




48.0 




56.0 




61.0 




52.0 




58.0 




61.0 




67.0 




61.0 




56.0 




49.0 




49.0 




43.0 




44.0 




52.0 




49.0 


TOTAL 








II 


38.8 


6 


16.9 


12 


27.8 


9 


24.4 


8 


28.3 


12 


34.4 


17 


423 


II 


29.7 


10 


21.6 


4 


6.8 


II 


19.3 


II 


20.4 


2 


3.3 


2 


10.4 








MAJOR 








8 


28.2 


5 


14.1 


6 


13.9 


6 


16.3 


5 


17.7 


7 


20.1 


9 


22.4 


4 


10.8 


8 


17.3 


1 


1.7 


6 


10.5 


8 


14.8 


2 


3.3 


1 


5.2 








MINOR 








3 


10.6 


1 


2.8 


6 


13.9 


3 


8.1 


3 


10.6 


5 


14.3 


8 


19.9 


7 


18.9 


2 


4.3 


3 


5.1 


5 


83 


3 


5.6 








1 


5.2 








FATALITY 








5 


17.6 


4 


11.4 








4 


10.9 








4 


11.5 


10 


24.9 








1 


2.2 




















3 


49 















65 



TAXIING 




MAJOR 





2 


1 


2 


1 





1 


1 





1 


1 





1 








ol 


MINOR 





2 


1 


5 


2 


3 


5 




3 


2 


2 


3 


3 








1 









PERCENT 
lOOi 



TAKE-OFF 



LEGEND 

MAJOR MINOR 



80 
60 
40 

20 





J J A S N D 



A 

/ V 



F M A M J 



AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS B' 



I 



on the total ot 586,901 hours flown during the operations 
the accident breakdown is as follows: 



TYPE 



Fatal Accidents 
Fatalities 

Wrecked Aircraft 
Major Accidents 
Minor Accidents 
Total Accidents 



NUMBER 



12 
31 
22 
70 
56 
126 



RATE PER 100,000 
FLYING HOURS 



2.045 
5.282 
3.749 

11.927 
9.542 

21.469 



An analysis of these accidents reveals nothing unusuali 
that might be anticipated for the type of operation in-i 
volved. During the early period of the Airlift the ratio of 
night accidents to day accidents was seven to four; 
however, this ratio balanced fairly evenly during the latter 
half. The number of accidents occurring under instrument; 



IN FLIGHT 



A S 




MAJOR 














1 


1 


1 


1 











1 


1 











MINOR 


























1 








1 















MAJOR 





2 


1 


1 


2 





4 


1 


1 


4 











1 








MINOR 





1 





1 











1 


4 











2 












66 



PHASE OF FLIGHT 



flight conditions was reduced approximately 83 percent 
during the second half of the operation. 

As to types of accidents, there were two major cate- 
gories. Most prevalent were taxi accidents, accounting for 
more than 34 percent of all accidents. Landing accidents 
accounted for approximately 26 percent of the accidents. 
Other categories included collision with ground, take- 
offs, fire in air, fire on ground, collision wifh other objects, 
forced landings, abandoned plane, and collision in flight. 
Cause factors of these accidents fall into four major cate- 
gories: pilot error, other personnel error, materiel failure, 
and miscellaneous. The latter includes such factors as 
weather, navigation, lack of fuel, airports and facilities, 
and less-than-full crew. 

The majority of all accidents involved more than one 
cause factor. In approximately two-thirds of the accidents 
that occurred, pilot error was charged as a cause factor. 
Material failure of the power plant, air frame, landing 
gear, instruments, hydraulic system, electrical system, or 




PERCENT 
100 



LANDING 



. 



PERCENT 
100 



80 
60 
40 
20 




OTHER 

































/ k/\y\ 


/\ 



SON 






MAJOR 





1 


1 


1 


I 1 








- 









1 










MINOR 























1 


















LEGEND 
-MAJOR MINOR 




PERCENT 
I00| 



OVERALL 



60 
60 
40 
20 




-TAXIING— LANDING^ 




MAJOR 





3 


2 


2 


2 


3 


1 


6 


3 


3 





5 


5 


, 1 o 


MINOR 














1 








3 











1 1 






67 



AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS 
BY CAUSE FACTORS 



DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR 






J 


J 


A 


S 





N 


D 


J 


F 


M 


A 


M 


J 


J 


A 


S 


MAJOR 





7 


4 


2 


3 


4 


4 


7 


3 


3 


1 


4 


6 


1 


I 





MINOR 





2 


1 


5 


2 


5 


5 


5 


3 


1 


3 


4 








1 






DUE TO MATERIEL FAILURE 




MAJOR 





1 


1 


3 


3 


1 


3 


1 


1 


5 





2 


2 


1 








MINOR 














1 








f 














1 








c 



DUE TO OTHER CAUSES 



O^ 



k^. 



JJASONOJFMAM 



MAJOR 











1 











1 























fj 


MINOR 





1 





1 











2 


4 


1 





1 


2 












radio equipment was charged in approximately five- 
twelfths of the accidents that occurred. Error on the part 
of other personnel was charged in approximately one- 
fourth of the accidents. Airports and facilities were 
considered a factor in one-third of all the accidents, and 
weather in approximately one-fourth. 



SUMMARY 

No aspects of the Airlift were of greater significance 
than the constant effort directed toward safety. Records 
established were not easily achieved. They required co- 
operative effort on the part of all personnel throughout 
all echelons of command. Safety programs were based on 
the principle that needless waste of manpower and 
materiel can and must be eliminated. Policies regarded 
as imperative included complete standardization of operat- 
ing procedures and techniques, a comprehensive system 
of supervisory checks, periodic proficiency checks of air- 
crew personnel regardless of the initial proficiency level, 
continuous training programs, and complete operational 
control both in the air and on the ground. 




RECOMMENDATIONS 

Flying safety officers must be members of the com- 
mander's staff. The flying safety program is defeated in 
direct proportion to the number of intermediate officers 
through whom the flying safety officer must report. 

T/O&E's should be modified to include flying safety 
officers, authorizing not less than one field grade officer, 
one non-commissioned officer, MOS 502 or 405, and one 
clerk-typist at the wing level. Similarly, in order to achieve 
satisfactory ground accident prevention results, adequate 
and qualified ground safety personnel must be made 
available and included in the organization, preferably 
through allocations in pertinent Tables of Organization. A 
full-time ground safety officer and ground safety techni- 
cian, MOS 486, at headquarters level and at each operaf- ' 
ing installation are considered the minimum personnel re- 
quirements, when supplemented by adequate clerical 
assistance. 

Adequate training must be given to operators of all 
types of motor vehicles, special purpose, and material 
handling equipment. Emphasis must be placed on safe 
operation near aircraft and on hazards prevalent on an ]\ 
air base. 

Competent and adequate supervision of all loading 
and unloading operations is imperative. Rigid enforcement 
of safe operating practices and procedures should be 
maintained at all times. 



PERCENT 
1001 — 



OVERALL 



PERSONNEL 
ERROR 



MATERIEL 

FAILURE OTHER 

CAUSES 



67% 



21% 



12% 



68 




INTELLIGENCE 




! 

The Airlift did nof initially establish any new intelligence 
requirements, since intelligence agencies were in operation 
af each USAFE base used by Airlift units, and the Airlift 
keif had the primary mission of delivering tonnage to 
Berlin. Rather than creating new requirements, the in- 
creased tempo of operations intensified already existing 
ones. As a consequence this Headquarters did not include 
a specific intelligence mission in its letter of instructions 
'o fhe Airlift commander. 

The lack of a specific intelligence requirement in the 
letter of instructions did not presuppose, however, the 
complete absence of an intelligence mission. As a USAFE 
ur >itiall intelligence regulations, letters, and other directives 
applicable within USAFE applied to the 1st ALTF. The 
A "liH commander had all the intelligence responsibilities 
normal to a command. 




FUNCTIONS 

With the continuation of the Airlift and its subsequent 
expansion into an operation which included American, 
British, and French elements, certain new problems not 
originally encountered were posed. These problems con- 
cerned the briefing of aircrew personnel on the corridor 
situation; the institution of measures for the prevention of 
compromise of classified information and equipment and 
the prevention and detection of sabotage, espionage, and 
subversion at the British and French bases; and finally the 
manning of Airlift units with sufficient intelligence per- 
sonnel to accomplish the increased workload. 

The first problem arose from the fact that the narrow 
corridors running to Berlin from the American and British 
Zones of Occupation were restricted flying areas and any 
interference with Airlift flights within the corridors created 
safety hazards. Although the air corridor agreements did 
not anticipate the volume of traffic occasioned by the air- 
lift of supplies into Berlin, they did provide the basis for 
a safe operation if all the signatories abided by the 
agreements. Violations of or exceptions to the rules on the 
part of any one nation would have had a serious effect 
on the success of the Airlift. 

Soon after the Airlift began, pilots reported that they 
had encountered Soviet formation flying within the cor- 
ridors, buzzing, and other nuisance tactics. To obviate 
the effects of these tactics intelligence officers were 
instructed to inaugurate a system of daily pilot briefings 
and debriefings. This system provided the means of 
notifying all Airlift pilots of the kind of violation they 
might expect and of preparing them to take the necessary 
counfermeasures. Additionally, the daily briefing brought 
to the pilots' attention those flights other than Airlift which 
were posted in the Berlin Air Safety Center. By daily re- 
ports to this Headquarters, it was possible to make known 
violations the basis for complaint against the Soviets. 

Measures necessary to prevent compromise of clas- 
sified information and equipment, and prevention and 
detection of sabotage, espionage, and subversion at U. S. 
installations did not present an unusual problem since they 
had been under USAFE control prior to the Airlift. The 



70 



expansion of the American participation in the Airlift to 
the use of air bases in the British Zone of Occupation 
and in the British and French Sectors of Berlin did pose 
new problems, for it placed American commanders in a 
position in which they did not have complete responsibility 
for these intelligence functions at the installations they 
occupied. The local British or French commander was the 
proprietor while the American commander was the tenant. 
In order to continue the prerogative of a commander to 
insure that necessary measures were taken to impede and 
counteract any effort to subvert his personnel or to 
sabotage his equipment, arrangements were completed 
whereby the British and French commanders retained area 
responsibility while the American commander was re- 
sponsible for local protection of U. S. personnel and 
equipment. 

In the British Zone of Occupation, where large num- 
bers of foreign nationals were employed, British hiring 
methods were accepted, but the American element re- 
tained the right to control their use. In those instances 
where foreign personnel were considered a threat to the 
security of U. S. classified information and equipment, the 
U. S. Air Force instituted action for their removal and the 
British accomplished their dismissal. 

The use of foreign nationals at Airlift installations 
presented a favorable opportunity to any faction interested 
in undermining the Airlift effort by means of disaffection 
or sabotage. While no estimate exists as to the extent to 
which foreign nationals attempted to create disaffection 
or to sabotage, it is known that disaffection never be- 
came a problem and that sabotage efforts were singularly 
unsuccessful. Twenty-seven cases of suspected sabotage 
were reported, but only four cases could be proved. 

PERSONNEL 

The requirements for holding daily briefings and 
maintaining security combined to cause a shortage of 
trained intelligence personnel. A survey of the intelligence 
personnel requirements at all Airlift bases indicated that 
a total augmentation of 24 officers and 31 airmen was 



necessary .to carry out the function. 

These additional requirements represented the minimuir 
necessary to carry on a 24-hour-a-day type of operation 
While they could not be met by the assignment o- 
trained intelligence personnel, every effort was made fc 
procure and assign experienced personnel. In many 
instances individual commanders in the field placed per-i 
sonnel in these positions irrespective of T/O&E and: 
augmentation authorizations, for they realized the neces- 
sity of providing intelligence information to their crews 
in the air and of providing counterintelligence coverage 
on the ground. 

CONCLUSIONS 

While the Airlift represented a unique situation big 
cause of the specific circumstances under which it arose 
and was carried ouf, the experience gained does permit 
certain conclusions to be drawn which may be of value 
elsewhere. 

In a mass transport operation, a specific intelligence 
mission is not necessarily required provided that normal 
intelligence functions are included as a part of command. 
If the necessity arises, specific intelligence missions may 
be assigned without interference with the primary mission 
of transporting personnel and supplies. 

If the operation requires flying through narrow coj^ 
ridors in the face of nuisance tactics, daily briefings of 
all aircrew personnel will afford fhem sufficient information 
to enable them to carry out their flights with safety. 

In the event that the U. S. Forces operate from allied 
bases, protection from espionage, sabotage, and other 
subversive activities can be obtained by assigning a 
specific responsibility to each element on the base. 

The rules governing the allocation of additional per- 
sonnel to meet new problems must remain sufficiently 
elastic to enable commanders to meet changing intel- 
ligence requirements; otherwise the commander is forced 
to improvise in critical areas. 

The Airlift proved that existing Air Force intelligence 
principles and procedures are sufficiently flexible to 
insure success in such a restricted type of operation. 




TONNAGE STUDV 











COMFAR 



C Akl AC A 



iPfRAFT POTFN 



The Berlin Airlift came into being as an unplanned 
operation. The action of closing the surface routes to the 
city of Berlin and the need for immediate establishment 
of a flow of supplies by air precluded formal preplanning 
for the operation. 

The Airlift was envisioned at first as a short-term ex- 
pediency. Planning was therefore conducted principally 
by the operating agencies during the initial stages. As 
the scope and probable duration of the operation became 
apparent, planning was formalized. With the establish- 
ment of Headquarters 1st ALTF, that agency assumed 
the responsibility for detailed operational planning under 
the general guidance of Headquarters USAFE. Long- 
range planning and top-level coordination with British and 
French forces and with other interested U. S. agencies re- 
mained under direct control of Headquarters USAFE. 



71 




COORDINATION 

The status of the Airlift as a combined operation 
necessitated complete and rapid coordination at all 
echelons. The Army was responsible for transport of cargo 
from "railhead to airhead"; the Navy participated in the 
Lift with two squadrons of transport aircraft, as well as 
ferrying cargo across the Atlantic; depot maintenance be- 
came the responsibility of the 3rd Air Division; OMGUS 
computed the type and amount of supplies required for 
the city of Berlin; and the British participated as full 
partners in the operation. 



PLANNING STAFF 

The rapid expansion of the Airlift and fhe lack of prec- 
edent for the operation necessitated individual planning 
by all staff agencies and at all echelons as problems 
peculiar to their functions arose. 

Formal long-range planning was normally conducted 
jointly by the plans sections of fhe various Directorates of 
Headquarters USAFE and Headquarters 1st ALTF in close 
coordination with EUCOM and other interested agencies. 

72 




Combined planning was simplified by the inclusion of 
both USAF and RAF officers on the planning staff of 
Headquarters CALTF. 

CONCLUSIONS 

In an ideal situation in which the problem could be 
foreseen, advance planning by a central planning staff 



composed of specialists representing all participating 
services would unquestionably have aided in per- 
formance of the mission. 

Prior warning and consequent advance planning by 
qualified specialists would have facilitated solution of the 
numerous problems which arose in fhe early stages of fhe 
operation. 

Rapid and close coordination between all echelons is 
essential to the accomplishment of the mission. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

A combined planning staff in which all participating 
agencies are represented would form the most efficient 
planning agency. 

A centralized competent plans section is a vifal 
necessity. The commander of a special operation shod 
establish his plans section at the earliest possible time. 



COMPARISON OF AIRCRAFT POTENTIAL 








3 jjjjjjjj 25 ° 50 ° 79 ° 1000 leSO 1900 1750 




CREWS 
AT 90 HRS MONTH 


C-47 


Wfflffli,. wmfflMmmmmmmmmMmmwMui** i 


C-74 


m^^k^MU^ ^-^ 














rtNtti»cj ] 
















FACTORS: 3.4 TONS FOR 4. HR ROUNDTRIP BY C-47 
9.7 TONS FOR 3.3 HR ROUNOTRIP BY C-54 
23 TONS FOR 3. HR ROUNDTRIP BY C-74 



NOTES: THE ABOVE CHART SHOWS A COMPARISON OF OPERATING POTENTIAL FOR 3 
TYPES OF AIRCRAFT. IT IS BASED UPON FLYING 4500 TONS DAILY FOR A 
30 DAY PERIOD. 






# 






INTRODUCTION 

The initial action ot the USAFE Deputy Chief ot Staff 
for Materiel was to make transport aircraft available for 
the operation. At that time the C-47 was the only cargo- 
type aircraft available for immediate use. 

Meanwhile, action was initiated to obtain C-54's. On 
1 July 1948 the first C-54 type aircraft to supplement 
the Airlift C-47's arrived at Rhein/Main Air Base. By 1 
October the complete Airlift fleet of C-47's had been 
replaced by C-54's. 

A comparatively new aircraft to this command, the 
C-54 created numerous problems in its support. Parts for 
this aircraft were foreign to supply personnel, and mainte- 
nance personnel were for the most part unfamiliar with 
it. These problems were intensified by the fact that the 
C-54 was designed for long-range flights with a minimum 
of take-offs and landings, while Airlift operation entailed 
an abnormally high number of loaded take-offs and land- 
ings for the small amount of flying time involved. Conse- 
quently, appropriate consumption data and maintenance 
experience were not available. 

The construction of new runways and taxi strips, plus 
the rebuilding of old runways and taxi strips that had 
broken down under heavy loads, was a further Materiel 
responsibility. 

These are just a few of the many problems that had 
to be met and dealt with. Action taken in meeting these 
Materiel responsibilities will be related in the following 
pages. 




# 



SU PPLY 





MISSION 

The rapidity with which the Airlift expanded imposed 
unforeseen supply requirements. To prevent supply chan- 
nels from breaking down, and to insure a minimum of de- 
lays in delivery of supply and materials for the Airlift 
,operation, all branches of the Supply Division went on a 
24-hour schedule at the start of the Airlift and continued 
so throughout the entire operation. 

During this period, a Theater Equipage Program was 
underway whereby all T/O&E units, especially tactical 
lunits, were being brought up to 100 percent strength in 
their authorized equipment. Required implementation ac- 
tion had been taken to insure equipment for the various 
T/O&E units affected, and considerable progress had been 
made when it was discovered that the immediate mission 
of Airlift units, particularly troop carrier units, was being 
impaired by efforts expended in obtaining equipment not 
primarily required for Airlift support. Accordingly, USAFE 
requested a waiver of the T/O&E equipage requirements 
during the Airlift. Headquarters USAF's favorable consider- 
ation of this request greatly aided the effectiveness of the 
Airlift operations, in that the emphasis could be concen- 
trated on shortages of those items required for the suc- 
cessful completion of the Airlift mission, the goal of 100 
percent equipage thereby becoming secondary in im- 
portance for the time being. 

Concurrent with the above and nearing completion was 



a Theater Disposal Program through which all World War 
II equipment in excess of current theater needs was being 
disposed of by sale through OFLC (Office of Foreign Liqui- 
dation Commission) and other governmental agencies or 
by return shipment to the Zl. 

Vast quantities were packaged and stored at Erding 
Air Base awaiting shipment to the Zl. This equipment, plus 
that recalled from governmental disposal agencies, was 
utilized as the supply source for an internal theater supply 
system. 

Here, another problem was encountered. The unpack- 
ing, sorting, and reshelving of this equipment had to be 
accomplished at the same time that issues were being 
made in support of the Airlift. However, after a period 
of time this problem was solved with the assignment of 
additional personnel who were given on-the-job training. 

As a matter of temporary expediency, units at Fass- 
berg and Celle during the initial stages of the operation 
were supplied from the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation 
for all items of technical service equipment and supplies. 
While this plan continued in force during the entire oper- 
ation, procurement of large quantities of technical service 
items was greatly expedited by an agreement between 
EUCOM and USAFE whereby requisitions direct to the 
appropriate EUCOM depots were authorized. In effect 
there was a direct supply channel from the respective 
EUCOM depots to the using organizations. 



i 

POST-WAR SUPPLY DISPOSAL PROGRAM WAS I 
PROCESS WHEN THE AIRLIFT BEGAN. 




'jj£* IHfc -SUkPLUS- EQUIPMENT SERVED AS THE 
^* INITIAL SUPPLY 




GENERAL 

Simultaneous arrival of operating units, personnel, and 
supplies caused a great deal of confusion at Fassberg and 
Celle and made necessary the temporary stockpiling of 
supplies in hangers. The early tempo of the operation did 
not permit proper warehousing, binning, identifying, 
sorting, and inventorying of items prior to issue. Spares 
aniving at the various air bases had to be issued to 
maintenance units without proper paper work, since air- 
craft began operating almost immediately upon arrival. 
When shipping tickets were processed, it was impossible 
to make a physical count of actual property received. 
Processing of vouchers had to be made a month after re- 
ceipt of issue. Arrival of many items of supplies without 
accompanying shipping tickets and subsequent issue of 
these supplies before an accounting system had been 
established resulted in the need for a large inventory sec- 
tion. However, once the records were adjusted no prob- 
lems were encountered in keeping them up to date. 

Considerable difficulty was caused during the early 
portion of the Lift by the overlapping command jurisdic- 
tion of the C-54's shuttling between Westover AB, 
Massachusetts, and Rhein/Main. While on the westbound 
trip passengers were carried, on the east-bound leg none 
were authorized. Time after time, the liferaffs and other 
overwater equipment were removed at Westover, and 
installation of similar equipment was required af Rhein/ 
Main before the next trip. This drain on the command's 
equipment was eliminated through discussion with Head- 
quarters MATS, and the surplus equipment at Westover 
was returned to Rhein/Main. 

Coupled with the changes in equipment status of the 
C-54's was the lack of uniformity in the maintenance of 
Aircraft Checkers Reports, AF Forms 263. A partial solution 
was reached by establishing a unit at Rhein/Main with 
responsibility for the installation and removal of overwater 
equipment and parachutes and for making corresponding 
entries on AF Forms 263. 

Tool kits brought over by airmen posed another prob- 
lem. As destinations were unknown at the station of de- 
parture, a plan was devised at Headquarters AMC where- 




)y the shipping documents would be forwarded to the 
Headquarters 1st ALTF with the consignee space left blank, 
"hat Headquarters then had the responsibility of routing 
he forms to the appropriate station accountable officer. 

Difficulties similar to those cited in preceding para- 
raphs were encountered in connection with flying cloth- 
ng and equipment brought by individuals. In numerous 
nstances it was necessary to return the shipping tickets to 
he consignor because the individual had completed his 
our and returned to the Zl prior to receipt of those doc- 
jments. 

During the mass exodus of airmen at the cessation of 
Viftles", the matter of transfer of accountability for or- 
ganizational-type clothing and equipment taken with the 
ndividuals caused difficulties. Although long before the 
ermination of the operation a simplified procedure was 
ecommended to AMC for approval, no decision was re- 
vived prior to the phase-out. Therefore, the transfer of 
iccounfabilify was accomplished in accordance with the 
tandard procedure prescribed for transfer of memoran 
ium-receipt property. Since in no instance was the des- 
ination of fhe airmen known, it was necessary to prepare 
ndividual shipping documents and route them to the Zl 
'orfs of Entry for transmittal to the airmen's destination, 
his was accomplished during the inactivation period by 
upply personnel. 

Shortly after the inception of the Airlift, Unit Property 



Records and Equipment Lists (UPREL) were authorized. 
Headquarters USAFE requested first priority in the prep- 
aration of the form for the property books of the troop 
carrier wings. Since the original books had not been re- 
ceived before cessation of Airlift operations, only in 
isolated cases was it possible to complete book entries; 
but in these cases fhe use of fhe UPREL proved invaluable 
in the transfer of the organizations to the Zl. 

Stock control levels had to be established from issue 
data. The firsf group came from Fairfield Air Base and 
brought hastily prepared fables, but these were not of 
much value as they were based on experience gained 
from flights averaging 12 to 16 hours' duration with light 
loads. The large number of landings, especially in the case 
of the Fassberg- and Celle-based aircraft, outmoded all 
previous data, particularly as to brakes, struts, and other 
parts of the landing gear. Adequate levels were finally 
determined and established. Pending establishment of the 
proper levels, the ultra-rapid service rendered by stateside 
depots was invaluable and accounted in great part for the 
low AOCP (Aircraft out of Commission for Parts) rate 
evidenced throughout the operation. 

SUPPLY ORGANIZATION 
AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY 

It was apparent that additional vehicles would be re- 
quired in direct proportion to the scale of the Airlift itself. 

The initial demand for general purpose and special 
purpose vehicles and material-handling equipment was 
satisfied by transferring items from other USAFE bases to 
Wiesbaden and Rhein/Main Air Bases. As the Airlift ex- 
panded, it became necessary to draw on fhe EUCOM 
Ordnance Division for major items on a temporary loan 

basis. 

With the opening of Fassberg and Celle, fhe temporary 
loan arrangement with EUCOM was extended, and ship- 
ments of vehicles were begun well in advance of fhe ac- 
tivation dates of the bases. A total of 958 Ordnance 
general purpose vehicles were loaned for the Lift, and 
frequent replacements of some types resulted in more 



'« ORDNANCE DEPOTS STEPPED UP THE REBUILD OF 
PEC M PURPOSE VEHICLES 



HtanM 




than double this number of vehicles being issued from 
EUCOM Ordnance stocks. 

During the fall of 1948, the rebuild and rehabilitation 
of AF special purpose vehicles was stepped up by Erding 
Air Base in its shops at Munich, Bruck, Weinheim, and Ulm 
in order to meet fhe rapidly increasing demand for 
Cletracs, refueling units, wreckers, and busses. Over 1,000 
AF special purpose vehicles, including 206 fuel servicing 
trailers, came off fhe production lines at these four shops 
during the period 1 July 1948 to 1 July 1949. 

With the arrival of the 317th Troop Carrier Wing and 
313th Troop Carrier Group and the opening of Celle and 
Fassberg RAF Stations, a period of unprecedented vehicle 
utilization began. All four Airlift bases operated around 
the clock, with many vehicles in service 24 hours daily 
The consequent lack of vehicle maintenance made replace- 
ment rates high. 

The support of the Airlift furnished by EUCOM Ord- 
nance and Quartermaster Divisions was superb. Demands 
for all types of Ordnance general purpose vehicles were 
promptly met. Shipments of spares and tools were ex- 
pedited, and a resupply system was set up to handle the 
heavy demand for "VDP" (Vehicles Deadlined for Parts) 
parts on an emergency basis. Vehicles which had been 
reduced to a state of unserviceability by constant use 
were removed from bases, and replacements were fur- 
nished from Ordnance rebuild shops. 

Forklifts and tugs in the hands of Airlift units were 

77 



given heavy maintenance in depot shops on an exchange 
basis. Supply action on parts for field maintenance of ma- 
terial handling equipment (MHE) was prompt and com- 
plete. At no time was there a critical shortage of any 
MHE spares. Thirty Planeloaders received for the Airlift 
from AMC were processed, stored, and issued for USAFE 
by the Giessen Depot. 

Stocks of Air Force Special Purpose (AFSP) vehicles 
and spares for their maintenance proved inadequate, and 
it became necessary to call on Headquarters AMC for 
shipments of refueling units, Planeloaders, crashfire trucks, 
and large numbers of replacement parts. Since stocks of 
many spares had been depleted in the Zl and no pro- 
curement action had been confemplated prior to the Air- 
lift demand, supply action was at first very slow, and 
vehicle deadline rates were high. However, with the ar- 
rival of new major items from the Zl during the winter 
and the increased flow of spares, the critical shortage of 
AFSP vehicles was relieved. By March 1949 no difficulties 
were being experienced in supplying any type of vehicle. 

At the phase-out of the operation, vehicles on loan 
from the Army were debited against the USAFE credits 
set up in Ordnance depots upon the allocation of Army- 
Air Force stocks and were shipped to Erding Air Base for 
inspection and disposition. 




ENGINEER SUPPLY 

Increased traffic necessitated construction of new run- 
ways at Tempelhof and Tegel Air Base. Since Engineer 
Heavy Mechanical Equipment could be moved into the 
Berlin area only by air, a crew of mechanics was stationed 
at Rhein/Main Air Base to disassemble the equipment and 
prepare it for air shipment. C-82's and a C-74 were 
used in movement of this equipment, which weighed 
approximately 400 tons. In addition to the equipment for 
construction, Engineer supplies had to be airlifted, among 
them approximately 3,500 tons of pierced steel planking 
(PSP) and clips, 1,000 tons of asphalt, and about 500 tons 
of assorted Engineer supplies. 

The responsibility for repairs and utilities supplies at 
Fassberg and Celle RAF Stations was a British function. 
However, the British and U. S. Forces have different views 
as to repairs and utilities requirements and standards. The 
shipment of numerous carloads of Engineer supplies 
furnished by the U. S. Air Forces was necessary to meet 
the minimum U. S. requirements at those RAF stations. 

Two steam-cleaning units for aircraft wash racks were 
required at Celle and Fassberg. U.S. personnel constructed 
them from available boilers transferred from Army stocks 
at Hanau Engineer Base Depot. The improvised steam- 
cleaning units worked out very well. 

Construction had to be stepped up at Rhein/Main and 
Wiesbaden Air Bases to handle in-shipment of supplies 
to be flown to Berlin and to provide additional house- 
keeping facilities for Airlift personnel. This new construc- 
tion required many tons of Engineer construction Ma- 
terials, which were procured locally or requested from 
Hanau Engineer Base Depot. To expedite the receipt of 
supplies from the depot, a liaison team was established 
between the Engineer Supply Division, Headquarters 
USAFE, the 555th Engineer Regiment at Rhein/Main, and 
the Hanau Engineer Base Depot. This team was instrumental 
in maintaining a continual flow of the supplies required 
for increased construction. 

During the Lift, Rhein/Main Air Base received 
approximately 25 carloads of Engineer supplies daily. At 



times this amount increased to as many as 200 cars of 
bulk Engineer items in a day. 

During the winter months, snow and ice on runways 
became a hazard and threat to the continued operate 
of the Airlift; however, sufficient anticipation of condi- 
tions allowed supply agencies to requisition and receive 
from the Zl 36 tractors and sweepers and 20 snow plows. 
This equipment was continually in operation keeping the 
runways and taxiways open for fraffic. In late January 
heavy fog and mist and the persistant freezing weather 
caused the formation of ice on runways and taxiways. To 
meet this problem, sand spreaders developed by EUCOM 
Engineers were requisitioned by all stations and put into) 
immediate use. 

From the Engineer supply standpoint, the Airlift be- 
came a routine operation following the winter. Engineer^ 
supply personnel encountered no difficulties in obtaining 
requirements. A procedure adopted on 1 April 1949 
authorizing local procurement for the purchase of Engineer 
supplies was instrumental in saving both time and money. 

Upon the phase-out of the operation, disposition of 
excesses was made on the spot; this was a routine opera- 
tion that was performed smoothly and efficiently within 
the time allocated. 



THIS TEGEL CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT WAS AIRLIFTED TO 
BERLIN. 




AIR SUPPLY 

All USAFE C-47 aircraft were pooled at Rhein/Main 
Sand Wiesbaden Air Bases and utilized during the first 
three Airlift months. Spare parts and components were 
.available in the command in sufficient quantities to support 
?hem adequately. Although no major supply problems 
were encountered in their support, there was a tremendous 
overnight increase in supply operations. 

During this initial period, the equipment and facilities 
available within USAFE were being surveyed to de- 
termine their adequacy to meet the tonnage target 
already established as essential to a minimum-subsistence 
Berlin economy. Requirements were established at 225 
C-54 aircraft. The first of the C-54-type aircraft arrived in 
July 1948 to assist and later to replace the unsuitable 
C-47-type aircraft. The change-over was completed three 
months later. 

All planes sent to the command brought with them the 
C-54 Table II supplies necessary to support normal 
operations for a period of 30 days. The C-54's were 
designed for passenger purposes and for use on long 
runs. Consequently, the use of C-54's on short hauls for 
sustained operations increased the requirement for main- 
tenance supplies. Under the conditions imposed by the 
operation, aircraft hardly obtained cruising altitude when 
they had to be prepared for landing; the frequency of this 
cycle imposed severe loads on the engines. 

It was found that aircraft flying an around-the-clock 
operation required replacement of numerous parts which 
under operating conditions for which the aircraft had been 
designed had seldom, if ever, required replacement. These 
parts were not available in Germany, nor were they avail- 
able in sufficient quantity in the Zl. 

The usual Airlift loads — coal, flour, and salt — were 
the type which, regardless of how packaged, emanated 
a very fine dust that spread throughout the interior of the 
aircraft and over its working parts. This dust reacted as 
an abrasive on some parts and as a corrosive agent on 
others, requiring unforeseen replacements of electronic 
equipment, control cables, and electrical wiring which 
further aggravated the supply problem. 



RHEIN/MAIN BECAME A C-54 PECULIAR SPECIALIZED DEPOT 
ACTIVITY. 








In the meantime, top USAF supply personnel had 
arrived to confer with USAFE personnel and work out 
the logistics to solve the supply problems. At this 
conference plans were laid that formed the foundation of 
a supply system which enabled the C-54 aircraft to keep 
an ever-increasing tonnage of food and supplies pouring 
into Berlin. 

Supply functions at Rhein/Main Air Base were con- 
verted to those of a C-54 Peculiar Specialized Depot 
Activity. Rhein/Main assumed responsibility for central re- 
quisitioning, warehousing, and distribution of all com- 
ponents and parts peculiar to the C-54 aircraft. Erding 
AB retained its depot responsibilities for all common Air 
Force supplies. 

To combat the ever-increasing shortage of parts and 
supplies, Rhein/Main established a system of daily cable 
requisitions to Headquarters AMC. That Headquarters 
acted promptly on those messages to expedite air ship- 
ment of available items and to obtain items not in stock 
by accelerating contract delivery or initiating emergency 
procurement action. The requisitions initially covered only 
C-54 peculiar items, but were later expanded to include 
common items. Quantities requested on items peculiar to 
C-54 aircraft represented an estimated 60 days' supply. 



Although cable requisitions were given priority over 
all others, immediate shipment was not always possible. 
This fact further weakened the supply support so essential 
to the operation. Limited funds were authorized to 
purchase locally from stocks available at the Brussels 
branch of the Douglas Aircraft Corporation. This source of 
supply proved of benefit in certain individual cases where 
an aircraft could be put back in commission through the 
purchase of one or two items not immediately obtainable 
through USAF stocks. 

Building USAFE stockpile for C-54 parts was the next 
major supply problem. To transport the parts without 
delay, a special ocean shipping service, designated 
"MARINEX," was set up. Eventually, stocks began to ac- 
cumulate under this plan, and the utilization of costly air 
transportation was reduced to emergency items only. 

Initially, consumption data on C-54 aircraft items was 
not available in the command. Quantities requisitioned on 
priority cable requisitions and routine requests were 
continually being adjusted to conform to the consumption 
and requirement data collected daily. The magnitude and 
nature of the operation made the important phase of de- 
termining requirements and establishing stock levels a 
most difficult task. The gradual increase in the number of 
C-54 aircraft assigned to the Lift, from the first 50 in July 
1948 to the peak of approximately 230 in December 1948, 
necessitated continuous revision of stock levels. 

Approximately 160 daily priority supply cables were 
dispatched before the position of USAFE stocks was such 
that this daily requisition system was no longer required. 
Emergency requisitioning was still necessary in many 
instances but was handled in the normal prescribed 
manner. As requirements arose for new items which had 
not previously been used, AMC was so advised with a 
request for shipments of specified quantities by air, 
"MARINEX," and routine surface to establish a stock 
level as soon as possible. The pipeline time for the re- 
ceipt of supplies from the Zl improved over a period of 
time, and eventually supplies were being received in ap- 
proximately one-half the shipping time previously re- 
quired. 

One of the major high consumption items was the 



79 



R-2000 engine. Due to the lack ot data on the operational 
characteristics ot this engine under "Vittles" conditions, 
consumption data could not initially be accurately esti- 
mated. Theretore, shipments of engines trom the Zl during 
the first few months were not based on actual consump- 
tion, and it was difficult to maintain the problem of ade- 
quate serviceable stocks on hand in this command. To 
overcome this problem a "Weekly Report of R-2000 
Engine Status" to Headquarters AMC was inaugurated. 
This report afforded information to the AMC Engine Sec- 
tion as of 1200 hours each Friday and contained the 
following items: 

(1) Quantity of R-2000-9 serviceable engines on hand 
at end of period. 

(2) Quantity of R-2000-9 reparable engines on hand 
at end of period. 

(3) Quantity of R-2000-1 1 serviceable engines on 
hand at end of period. 

(4) Quantity of R-2000-1 1 reparable engines on hand 
at end of period. 

(5) Quantity of R-2000-9 serviceable engines re- 
ceived from Zl during period. 

(6) Quantity of R-2000-1 1 serviceable engines re- 
ceived from Zl during period. 

(7) Quantity of R-2000-9 reparable engines returned 
to Zl during period, and method of shipment. 

(8) Quantity of R-2000-1 1 reparable engines re- 
turned to Zl during period, and method of ship- 
ment. 

(9) Quantity of R-2000-9 engine changes during 
period, and average engine hours. 

(10) Quantity of R-2000-1 1 engine changes during 
period, and average engine hours. 

(11) Average daily flying hours per assigned aircraft 
during period. 

Rhein/Main Air Base, the command C-54 Specialized 
Depot Activity, was designated as the only installation 
which would receive engines from or ship engines to the 
Zl; hence it was the only air base reporting items (5) 
through (8) on the report. Daily teletype reports from all 

80 



NUMBER R-2000 ENGINE CHANGES 












150 
125 

100 

75 

50 

25 





























1 


- 




























1 


1 


\ 




























'-> 




/ 
4 


/ 


v 




R-2000-9 














% 




•m^ 






^ 








^ 




If 








1 


















\ 


R-2000 


— 








sy 


























N 


JJAS0NDJFMAM 


J 


J 


A 


S 


R-2000-9 


4 


44 


95 


68 


48 


61 


70 


75 


98 


87 


79 


90 


121 


63 


13 


R-2000-1 1 


18 


35 


42 


68 


53 


59 


54 


57 


54 


76 


91 


81 


1 34 


51 


23 


TOTAL 


22 


79 


137 


136 


101 


120 


124 


132 


152 


163 


170 


171 


255 


114 


36 




HOUR 


j AVERAGE HOURS AT CHANGE - R-2000 ENGINES 












750 
625 

500 
375 
250 
125 













s. I 


| 






















R-2000-9 1 




1 } 




^- — /— i 


J* 


X 


„--' 


~-^ 


^r*^ 




■ — 


\ 


• 
• 




"*•»• 


-- 


-*- 


-, 








^•~* 








/ 
/ 
/ 

/ 




























































































































. . J JAS0NDJFMAU 


J 


J 


A 


S 


R-2000-9 


506 


570 


722 


728 


705 


611 


585 


700 


649 


595 


628 


682 


662 


713 


400 


R-2000-1 1 


407 


592 


637 


552 


609 


577 


592 


577 


518 


628 


612 


592 


561 


530 


568 1 



i "Vittles" bases served as a basis for preparation of one 
reporf by Headquarters USAFE. 

Upon receipt of the report, AMC scheduled automatic 
shipments of serviceable engines to USAFE as deemed 
appropriate to the weekly consumption and "stock on 
hand" data. Air delivery from Mobile, and "MARINEX" 
from the New York Port of Embarkation (NYPE), were the 
optional shipping routes. 

Other information contained in the report enabled 
AMC to schedule reparable engines shipped direct by 
USAFE to the overhaul depot at San Antonio Air Ma- 
teriel Area (SAAMA). During the major portion of 
"Vittles", reparable engines were transported by air to 
maintain a full pipeline of engines between Europe and 
the Zl overhaul depot. 

To expedite engine availability, an engine build-up 
' line was established at Rhein/Main Air Base. At the height 
of the Lift, engines were built-up at the rate of seven to 
nine per day. Based on consumption, stock levels of built- 
up engines were established at each base and maintained 
via priority rail and air shipment from Rhein/Main Air 
Base. "Reparables" generated at each base were rushed 
to Rhein/Main, where the demountable power plants were 
removed prior to shipment of the engines to the Zl. 

In addition to the weekly report from USAFE to AMC, 
cables were dispatched to USAFE from NYPE and Mobile 
Area Materiel Area (MOAMA) indicating quantity, type, 
date of departure, and estimated date of arrival of engines 



enroute. Based on this information Rhein/Main Air Base 
maintained current records of quantities due in and ex- 
pedited deliveries from the Bremerhaven Port of Embar- 
kation. These procedures proved extremely satisfactory in 
eliminating the potential engine supply problem. 

During the winter flying season the greatest single de- 
terrent to operations was the weather. A large supply of 
isopropyl alcohol was required for use in removing the 
snow and ice that accumulated on the aircraft surfaces 
while the aircraft was on the ground. Monthly require- 
ments for the alcohol were forwarded to AMC. That 
command initiated immediate procurement action and 
expedited automatic shipments of alcohol from early 
November through late March. 

The F-1 aircraft heater was utilized as a space heater 
for maintaining warmth in the individual maintenance 
shelters constructed at "Vittles" bases. The procurement 
of sufficient heaters for this purpose necessitated with- 
drawal from the T/O&E equipment authorization of some 
USAFE units not directly supporting the Airlift. Even then 
complete requirements were not fulfilled until an 
emergency requisition had been forwarded to AMC for 
emergency procurement action to obtain the additional 
heaters required. 

Whereas the F-1 heater was originally intended for 
operation of only 3 to 4 hours, its use as a space heater 
entailed practically continuous operation. Such usage 



shortened its serviceability and necessitated extra repair. 
To alleviate this situation, an overhaul line was estab- 
lished at the Bruck Air Ordnance Depot (Vehicle Repair 
Depot) for processing reparable heaters on a priority 
schedule. Stocks of repair parts for Bruck were main- 
tained by emergency requisitioning and shipment from 
the Zl to Erding Air Base. During the summer months 
each base turned in all heaters for reconditioning and 
repair. As heaters were returned to serviceability Bruck 
transferred fhem to Erding Air Base for stock in anticipa- 
tion of future requirements. 

Other extremely high consumption items included 
C-54 casings and tubes. Again, the impossibility of 
estimating reliable requirements was encountered; there- 
fore, it was necessary for AMC to arrange for automatic 
shipments of these items. In instances where contractor 
procurement was effected, direct shipments were made 
from the contractors to USAFE. 

The ever-increasing number of landings with maximum 
loads caused a proportionate increase in the monthly 
consumption of casings and tubes. However, the steady 
flow of automatic shipments from the Zl enabled USAFE 
to provide each base with sufficient stocks to eliminate 
the possibility of aircraft becoming grounded for lack of 
casings or tubes. Too, these shipments allowed Rhein/ 
Main Air Base to accumulate sufficient stocks so that in- 
coming rubber shipments from Bremerhaven were in 
many cases re-routed in carload lots to other Airlift bases. 



UNLOADING AN AIR SHIPMENT OF SERVICEABLE ENGINES 
FROM MOBILE. 



AOCP CONTROL 

Of primary importance to all supply personnel engaged 
in the support of aircraft is the maintenance of the lowest 
possible daily AOCP rate (Aircraft Out of Commission 
for Parts). The effect of even one aircraft AOCP can well 
be realized when it is considered that the average load 
per C-54 aircraft in commission per day was 44 tons. 
With the periodic assignment of additional aircraft and 
the step-up in operations, the drain on world-wide C-54 
stocks was ever-increasing. Aircraft parts and supplies 
were consumed at a rate far in excess of the rate at which 
they could be procured, brought into USAF supply 
channels, and delivered to using installations. Certain high- 
consumption items were of a continual "emergency" 
nature. It was evident that special supply measures were 



necessary to combat the situation. 

To meet the problem, an AOCP Control Section in- 
cluding both Supply and Maintenance personnel was 
organized at Headquarters USAFE. A special technical 
supply teletype network of the dual-conference type was 
installed. Primary purpose of this net was to provide the 
most expeditious method of transmitting supply priority 
requisitions and information on the action taken thereon. 
The network linked the four operational bases, the Spe- 
cialized Depot at Rhein/Main AB, the Erding Air Depot, 
and Headquarters USAFE. Headquarters CALTF was later 
added. From the information received over the network, 
a master AOCP Status Board was maintained showing 



each AOCP aircraft, its location, parts causing the AOCP 
and the up-to-the-minute action being taken to alleviate it. 

A record card was maintained for each item that 
caused an AOCP, and as AOCP's occurred, information 
was immediately obtained and posted to the card, which 
reflected the supply status of the missing item at each 
installation. 

The accompanying graphs outline the C-54 AOCP 
trend during the full Airlift period and a six-month re- 
cord of the number of repeat AOCP items by class. 

Although the first factor was to satisfy the current I 
AOCP demand, it was necessary at the same time to fake 
all action possible to eliminate any future AOCP for the 



AIRLIFT SUPPLY AND AOCP NETWORK 




STATUS OF AIRLIFT C-54 AIRCRAFT 



OUT OF COMMISSION FOR MAINTENANCE 

PERCENT go r 



J J A S NDJFMAMJ J AS 





















\ 


/ 































2GJs[: 





10-HOUR INSPECTION 



'iESBADEN AB. 



OUT OF COMMISSION FOR PARTS 

PERCENT 5 r 















/ 










./ 








/ 










-V 











JJASONDJFMAMJJAS 



aaoUj 

6.8 [ 1 1. 



same item. An analysis of the overall command supply 
status determined the course of action to be followed. 
Items which were available within the command merely 
required expedited shipping action to the requisitioning 
activity. In such instances special flights were arranged 
if the established air-courier and rail service could not 
quickly meet the demand. Stocks of the causal item were 
then redistributed proportionate to the number of aircraft 
assigned to each base. 

Concurrently, Headquarters USAFE maintenance per- 



IN COMMISSION 



PERCENT | 00 




PERCENT 



AV. ACFT 



66.26 62 36 



97.3 



sonnel reviewed weekly production schedules estab- 
lished at Erding AB and initiated the necessary action to 
expedite the repair of items in order of their priority. 
Minimum production schedules necessary to eliminate 
the item from its critical status were furnished the depot. 
As critical items were repaired and returned to service- 
able stock, the supply status at each base was surveyed 
and distribution instructions were issued. Reparables be- 
yond the capabilities of USAFE repair facilities were 
shipped by air to Zl repair depots. 



OUT OF COMMISSION -TECH ORDER COMPLIANCE 

PERCENT 



mm 



JJASONDJFMAMJJAS 




OUT OF COMMISSION -OTHER REASONS 

PERCENT 



5 

4 

3 
2 
I 





JJASONDJFMAMJJAS 



PERCENT 



AV. ACFT 



83 









ITEMS CAUSING AOCP'S 


- NOVEMBER 


1948 THRU APRIL 1949 










NOV 


DECEMBER 


JANUARY 


FEBRUARY 


MARCH 


APRIL 


USAF 

PROPERTY 

CLASS 


NO 
ITEMS 
AOCP 


to 

2 

Hi 

* 

Ul 

Z 


tn 

UJ 
0- 
UJ 

cc 

> 
o 

z 


_i 

g 

H 

a 


* 
tn 

2 

UJ 

-i 

g 

i- 


0) 

2 

Ul 

* 

UJ 

z 


tn 

UJ 

£L 
Ul 

CE 

5 

z 


in 

UJ 
0. 
UJ 

cc 
o 

Ul 

Q 


_i 

g 

H ■ 

Z 
< 
-> 


* 
tn 

2 

UJ 

-i 


<n 

2 

UJ 

t 

UJ 

z 


ti 

Ul 

a. 

UJ 

cc 

z 


in 

UJ 
Q. 
UJ 
(E 

O 

UJ 

o 


in 

Ul 

or 

-a 


_i 

g 

t- 
ca 

Ul 

u. 


* 

2 

UJ 

H 

_l 

I 


tn 

2 

Ul 
UJ 

z 


in 

UJ 
Q- 
UJ 
CC 


tn 

UJ 
0. 
Ul 

cc 

a 

o 


to 

Ul 

cc 

z 
< 
-> 


tn 

UJ 

a. 

UJ 

cc 
m 

UJ 

u. 


-i 

IS 
P 

2 


V) 

2 

UJ 

H 

-1 

1 


tn 

2 

UJ 


g 

UJ 

a. 

Ul 

cc 

5 

z 


UJ 

a. 

UJ 

cc 

8 
o 


to 

UJ 

a. 

Ul 

cc 

z 


tn 

Si 

UJ 

£L 
UJ 

CC 

m 

UJ 

u. 


tn 

UJ 

a. 

Ul 

cc 

cc 

< 
2 


-1 

1 

cc 
a. 

< 


* 
tn 

2 

Ul 

t 
_i 

1 


Ol-D 


88 


68 


7 


75 


156 


96 


14 


8 


118 


252 


76 


6 


8 


16 


106 


328 


33 


3 


4 


6 


3 


49 


361 


15 


3 


3 


2 





1 


24 


376 


02-H 


6 


1 


1 


2 


7 


6 


1 





7 


13 


6 


1 








7 


19 


4 


2 


1 





1 


8 


23 


5 


1 














6 


28 


03 -A 


2 











2 


2 








2 


4 


2 








1 


3 


6 


1 








1 





2 


7 























7 


03- B 


1 











1 


1 








1 


2 

















2 




















2 























2 


03-C 


12 


8 


5 


13 


20 


17 


4 


1 


22 


37 


12 


3 


1 


2 


18 


49 


3 











1 


4 


52 


1 








1 





1 


3 


52 


03-D 





2 





2 


2 


1 





1 


2 


3 

















3 




















3 























3 


03-F 


3 


4 


1 


5 


7 


9 


1 





10 


16 


10 


1 





2 


13 


26 


2 


1 





1 





4 


28 











1 








1 


28 


03-G 


7 


4 





4 


1 1 


1 


1 





2 


12 

















12 


2 


2 











4 


14 























14 


03-H 


2 


3 





3 


5 


5 


1 


2 


8 


10 


3 


1 


2 


1 


7 


13 




















13 




















1 


13 


03-1 


6 


5 


3 


8 


1 1 


17 


4 


2 


23 


28 


3 


1 


2 


7 


13 


31 


4 


2 





2 





8 


35 


2 


1 














3 


37 


03- J 


1 











1 














1 


1 











1 


2 




















2 























2 


04- A 


1 1 


1 1 





1 1 


22 


18 








18 


40 


21 








1 


22 


61 


3 


1 


1 





1 


6 


64 


4 

















4 


68 


04-B 


5 





2 


2 


5 





2 





2 


5 


1 


2 








3 


6 


2 














2 


8 


2 














1 


3 


10 


04-D 


1 


1 





1 


2 














2 

















2 




















2 























2 


05-C 


6 


2 


1 


3 


8 


2 


2 





4 


10 


2 











2 


12 














2 


2 


12 























12 


05-D 





4 





4 


4 


5 





2 


7 


9 


3 





3 


3 


9 


12 


1 





1 


1 





3 


13 


1 





1 











2 


14 


05-F 


1 





1 


I 


1 





1 





1 


1 

















1 


1 














1 


2 


1 

















1 


3 


05-G 


2 


1 





1 


3 


4 


1 





5 


7 


7 


1 








8 


14 





1 








1 


2 


14 























14 


07 


















































1 














1 


1 























1 


08-B 





4 





4 


4 


3 





1 


4 


7 











1 


1 


7 




















7 























7 


16-A 


1 





1 


1 


1 














1 





1 








1 


1 


4 


1 











5 


5 





o 

















5 


16-E 
































1 











1 


1 




















1 

























1 


23-A 

















1 








1 


1 

















1 




















1 























1 


29 


1 


1 





1 


2 


6 








6 


8 


2 











2 


10 


5 














5 


15 


2 

















2 


17 


TOTAL 


156 


119 


22 


141 


275 


194 


32 


17 


243 


469 


150 


17 


16 


34 


217 


619 


66 


13 


7 


II 


9 


106 


685 


33 


5 


4 


4 





3 


50 


717 




















* 


REPF 


ESENT 


S NC 


VEM 


3ER 


TEMS 


PLUS |\ 


IEW ITI 


EMS 


TOD 


ATF 








L 

















Aircraft undergoing reclamation were always checked 
lor AOCP parts not otherwise available within the com- 
mand. Cannibalization, utilized in many instances to get 
another ship back on the Litt, was controlled by a daily re- 
port to USAFE trom each base. Headquarters AMC was 
continually abreast of the picture on critical items through 
requisitioning information sufficient to enable them to ex- 
pedite deliveries and to follow up on shipments in process. 
Restriction of issues of C-54 parts solely for the Airlift, ex- 
cept in emergency cases, aided considerably in removing 
many items from the "critical" list. 

To review station supply levels and assist base supply 
personnel, teams were dispatched to Airlift bases with 
itemized lists of critical items and supply statistics ob- 
tained from the records maintained at Headquarters 

- USAFE. This action was based on the theory that an 
AOCP at one air base was always a potential AOCP at 
others. The emphasis placed on the elimination of AOCP's 
was so great that all supply personnel soon became fully 
" AOCP-conscious. " 

In an effort to further the efficiency of supply support, 
a special monthly C-54 Stock Balance and Consumption 

- Report was initiated in March 1949. This report proved 
a valuable asset to supply personnel. Analysis of each 



month's report furnished statistics which almost dictated 
the action necessary to improve the supply status of each 
item both at depot and at base level. The information 
contained in the report was also utilized to fill AOCP 
and ASSOC (priority requisition) requests, to redistribute 
theater stocks, to insure that adequate stocks to maintain 
theater levels were on hand or due in, to determine repair 
priorities, to expedite repair in accordance with stock status 
reflected in the report, to maintain follow-up and to ex- 
pedite shipment of quantities due in from Zl depots where 
warranted, and fo submit emergency request requisitions 
where applicable. Review of subsequent reports indicated 
for each individual item the degree of improvement since 
the last report. 

The supply phase-out of the Airlift was accomplished 
in accordance with the "Vittles" Phase-out Plan. The 
processing of Air Force supplies was accomplished in an 
efficient manner by the accountable and Air Force supply 
officers at the Airlift stations. 



ELECTRONICS 

Communication facilities and navigational aids are 
two of the essentials of air travel. Without them the Air- 
lift would have been impossible. 

At the first indication that there would be an Airlift 
operation, a communications conference was held at 
Headquarters USAFE to consider communication and 
navigational aids required for the operation. It was ob- 
vious to all concerned that the degree of success or failure 
of the operation depended greatly on the expeditious 
procurement of electronics equipment and replacement 
parts as the requirements arose. 

As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the 
Theater Supply Disposal Program was nearing completion 
when the Airlift began; but large quantities packaged 
for over-water shipment were stored at Erding Air Depot 
awaiting shipment. 

After the initial plans for the Airlift were drawn up 
and electronics requirements determined, supplies at 
Erding, plus those in the hands of OFLC which had not 
been committed, were recalled, unpacked, and re-shelved. 
Due to the vast quantity of this equipment an internal 
theater electronics supply system was set up, utilizing 




equipment on hand. Much of this equipment was in an 
unserviceable condition, and the repair requirement at 
that time was far greater than the physical capacity of the 
depots. Nevertheless, this equipment was the basis of the 
operations carried out. 

Initial Airlift electronic requirements called for low- 
frequency radio beacons for use with the airborne radio 
compass, AN/ARN-7. To expedite the installation, a 
mobile-type unit consisting of a BC-191 transmitter, RA-34 
rectifier, PE-97 power units, and associated equipment 
was installed in a 21/2-ton, 6x6 truck with an HO-17 shelter. 
This equipment permitted movement of the beacon and 
facilitated its being placed into immediate operation. 

The BC-191 radio transmitter was not designed for 
continuous operation. Since supply levels in the command 
had been reduced prior to the Airlift, maintenance for this 
equipment was not readily available. The RA-34 equip- 
ment continually failed due to faulty selenium rectifiers. 
Because of the shortage of keying equipment, only one 
keyer could be initially installed with each beacon instal- 
lation; any failure in the keying mechanism thereby pre- 





cluded beacon identification. 

Fortunately, USAFE was eventually able to procure 
from depots in the Zl sufficient keyers to make possible 
the installation of duplicate keyers at all radio beacons. 

In September 1948 the Air Navigation Board decided 
to employ T-5 high power beacons to replace the tem- 
porary low power BC-191 radio beacon installations. These 
were requisitioned in September for the Airlift from the Zl 
and through expeditious procurement action the equip- 
ment arrived in the command in February 1949. After the 
equipment was installed, it was discovered that since it 
was designed for high output emission, this type of radio 
beacon interfered with various European radio stations 
operating in the same frequency, and added to the dif- 
ficulties already encountered. 

Concurrently with the installation of the radio beacons, 
arrangements were made by Headquarters USAFE to ob- 
tain visual-aural ranges (VAR) from the Civil Aeronautics 
Authority. CAA radar engineers were assigned to the 
Airlift to accomplish the installations. One range was air- 
lifted to fhe theater, and five others were transported by 
"MARINEX." CAA engineers surveyed the sites, com- 
pleted installation, and had the first ranges operating in 
January 1949. It is interesting to note that USAFE had 



difficulty in obtaining parts to maintain this equipment. 
The spare parts were peculiar to CAA equipment, and 
there were no established Air Force channels through 
which these supply and maintenance parts could be ob- 
tained. 

Fan marker beacons were another problem. They were 
not available in the United States and had to be procured 
by AMC. However, during the latter part of February 
1949 the installation of the first marker beacon was com- 
pleted. The equipment for the beacon at Celle arrived 
during May. Since plans were then already made for the 
phase-out of fhe operation, installation of the Celle beacon 
was not completed. 

Plans formulated during the fall of 1948 indicated a 
requirement for radar navigation equipment consisting of 
AN/APS-10 as the airborne radar set and AN/CPN-6 as 
the ground radar beacon. Because there were insufficient 
AN/APS-10's available, Headquarters USAF decided to 
use both AN/APS-10 and AN/APS-4 for airborne radar 
sets. 

An initial USAFE survey indicated that only a small 
percentage of the assigned C-54's had the airborne radar 
equipment installed. Consequently, equipment and stock 
levels of maintenance parts had to be requisitioned from 



A GCA INSTALLATION AN/MPN-1. 



the Zl to allow installation on all Airlift C-54's. 

After the radar sets began arriving, they were installed 
in the C-54 aircraft while aircraft were undergoing main- 
tenance. By May 1949 the installation of the airborne 
<radar equipment had been completed. The shortage of 
spare parts for these sets created great difficulty in their 
maintenance. Spare parts for the equipment were not 
available in the command, and only limited quantities were 
available in the Zl. The radar beacons, AN/CPN-6, were 
fortunately found in storage at Burtonwood in November 
1948. The original requirement as submitted to DCS/M by 
i Headquarters 1st ALTF was for the installation of 12 
AN/CPN-6 beacons with three duplicate installations in 
Berlin. 

With the start of the Airlift, a requirement was 
established for duplicate GCA equipment at all Airlift 
bases. Available GCA sets within the command were im- 
mediately moved to the bases, and the balance required 
was requisitioned from the Zl. To satisfy the requirements 
'or GCA in Berlin, AMC prepared a GCA set in the Zl for 
airlift by C-82 aircraft to Tempelhof. The frailer body was 
cut in two pieces prior to air shipment and reassembled 
in Tempelhof for movement to Gafow. In addition to the 
air transportable set furnished Gatow, an air transportable 




GCA AN/CPN-4 was also airlifted from the Zl for use at 
Tempelhof. 

This new type GCA (AN/CPN-4) was a non-standard 
piece of equipment; consequently, the supply of spare 
parts was not available within Air Force channels. To 
expedite supply directly from the manufacturer, AMC 
established a separate supply channel for this item of 
equipment. This deviation in supply channels caused 
supply personnel many headaches; many of the items be- 
came lost enroute, and others were delivered to the wrong 
places. Since electronic items are highly technical equip- 
ment, when an item of electronic equipment arrived at 
an air base, inexperienced supply personnel would often 
put it aside and forget it. Tubes and other spare parts 
for the AN/CPN-4 were always in critical supply. 

All GCA was placed on a 24-hour operation schedule 
at the start of the Airlift and continued on that schedule 
during the operation. However, the high voltage trans- 
former designed for interim operation continually failed 
and became a critical item of supply. Every effort was 
made to secure this item from the Zl. When that source 
failed, local procurement action was initiated. Some of 
the transformers were locally rebuilt and others ware 
locally manufactured. 



In addition to the AN/CPN-4 equipment mentioned 
above, an AN/CPS-5 ground approach radar set was air- 
lifted from the Zl for operation in Berlin. This new radar 
set presented supply difficulties because many of its com- 
ponent parts were pre-production models built by com- 
mercial laboratories in the Zl. Spare parts were unavail- 
able when it arrived for installation in Berlin, and many 
of the components were not even listed. Whenever an 
item was required, it was necessary to cable the manufac- 
turer with a description of the part to insure that he 
would ship the correct items to Berlin. 

Consumption experience dictated the supply levels to 
be established for all electronic equipment. As con- 
sumption experience was gained, levels had to be revised 
and reset. VHF radio set AN/ARC-3, the airborne 8-channel 
set installed in C-54's, presented considerable difficulties 
because certain radio tubes for the airborne equipment 
had not been engineered tor this type of operation. It 
was impossible to keep a sufficient supply on hand; the 
tubes were used up as fast as they were received. Quite 
as suddenly as they started burning out, these tubes 
instead began to enjoy a long life, and excess stocks on 
hand became a headache. 




GENERAL SUPPLY 

The General Supply Division was responsible for de- 
termining requirements and coordinating with Headquar- 
ters EUCOM for the procurement, storage, maintenance, 
and distribution of food and mess equipment, clothing for 
personnel flying or serving the Airlift, gasoline for air- 
craft and ground vehicles, and the myriads of other quar- 
termaster items of individual, organizational, and station 
supplies and equipment. 

At the time the Airlift started, United States inven- 
tories of reserve stocks of aviation fuef were such that 
Air Force commanders throughout the world were 
furnished allocations on a month-to-month basis. Prior to 
the Airlift, Air Materiel Command had budgeted for 
aviation petroleum products on the basis of normal flying 
hours per aircraft; but with the start of the Lift and the 
attendant increase in flying hours per aircraft, a precarious 
petroleum supply position developed. 

Ships on the high seas carrying cargoes of aviation 
gasoline to other destinations were diverted to Bremer- 
haven. The U. S. petroleum industry was pressed to the ut- 
most to supply from scheduled production the sudden 
tremendous demands of the Airlift, the normal demands 
of the remainder of the Air Force, and the other military 
and civilian commitments. An added problem for the 
petroleum industry was the requirement that only 
aromatic fuel be used by Airlift planes. The neoprene 
gaskets and seals used on aircraft fuel systems caused 
leakage and a great hazard to efficient Airlift operations 
if exposed alternately to aromatic and nonaromafic fuels. 

During the year prior to the start of the Airlift, 
USAFE's monthly consumption of aviation gasoline 
averaged about 30,000 barrels. In the month of July 1948 
approximately 82,500 barrels of aviation fuel were con- 
sumed. By January 1949 the monthly consumption had 
climbed to 191,000 barrels, and in July 1949 a peak ex- 
ceeding 291,000 barrels was reached. 

The accompanying chart reveals graphically the quan- 
tities of aircraft fuel consumed by USAFE Airlift operations 
alone. The cumulative quantity depicted equals the cargoes 
of 20 size T-2 tankers, each of which has a capacity of 

88 



AIRLIFT AVIATION GASOLINE CONSUMPTION 




4.2 



82.5 



133.6 



167.8 



173.0 



134.2 



166.2 



191.3 



176.4 



220.1 278.1 



272.1 



257.2 



291.1 



92.0 



25.1 



«.*pp,< AIRLIFT AVIATION 


LUBRICANT CONSUMPTION 




5000 












4000 












3000 












2000 












1000 

























u 


' J A * 


V"DJFMAMJJA~S 



84 



1650 



2672 



3356 



3501 



2684 



3324 



3825 



3527 



4402 5562 



5442 



5144 



5822 



1838 



500 






AIRCRAFT FUEL CAME BY NAVY TANKER FROM THE UNITED 
STATES TO BREMERHAVEN. 




5,460,000 gallons. To this quantity must be added ap- 
proximately another two percent tor the aircraft lubrica- 
ting oil shown on the other chart. Additional large quan- 
tities of aviation petroleum were consumed throughout 
the rest of the world in support of the Berlin Airlift. 

In addition to the responsibility of planning increases 
in petroleum products, General Supply had to provide 
coordination with EUCOM, so that adequate quantities of 
food would be in the right places at the right time, and 
maintain food service supervision. Supply of subsistence 
did not pose any unusual problems; adequate stocks 
were always available at quartermaster depots to meet 
the increased Airlift food requirements. 

In consonance with verbal agreements between BAFO 
and USAFE, joint dining facilities for American and 
British personnel were established at Celle and Fassberg. 
Moss halls in permanent-type buildings built and used 
by the German Air Force furnished all dining space re- 
quired. However, very little equipment was available; and 
before messes could be established, items such as dinner- 
ware, glassware, tableware, kitchen utensils, mechanical 
equipment, and refrigerators had to be requisitioned from 
♦he Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation or direct from 



EUCOM Quartermaster Depot stocks. 

British and U. S. rations were pooled, and all troops 
were fed the combined ration. A number of components 
of the British ration, such as herring and tea (in lieu of 
coffee) for breakfast, proved unappetizing to the American 
palate. Too, the British ration consisted of about 2,600 
calories, as compared to about 3,600 calories derived 
from the regular field ration "A" fed U.S. airmen. 

In order to make up for the caloric deficiency in the 
British ration, the American type "A" ration for Celle 
and Fassberg was increased 15 percent. A further in- 
crease to 25 percent was made in December 1948. How- 
ever, after due trial at Fassberg, if was found that an 
increase of 15 percent was adequate. 

Military personnel were fed mainly on "A" rations 
inasmuch as they were preferred by all troops, thus 
leaving the British rations for the German employees. As 
a result, there was a daily saving to American stocks of 
300 German rations. This method of feeding the Germans 
also permitted return to the Bremerhaven Port of Em- 
barkation of excesses of some components of the type 
"A" ration. 

The additional Airlift personnel at Wiesbaden Air Base 



... AND BY TaNK-CaR, THE FUEL CAME TO AIRLIFT BASES 





were easily absorbed, for messing, in the consolidated 
dining hall. At Rhein/Main Air Base, however, it was 
necessary to expand existing facilities and to improvise 
others. At the peak of the operation, messing facilities at 
Rhein/Main were severely overtaxed and inadequate. One 
of the two flight-line messes was in a building formerly 
condemned for a radio shack. The consolidated mess, 
built to accomodate 1,500 persons, averaged 4,000 per 
meal during the Airlift. 

The use of flight-line messes for a special Airlift 
operation is recommended. Line messes not only will 
prevent disastrous overcrowding of regular messes, but 
will save up to an hour for each man who must otherwise 
return for his meal to a mess in the vicinity of his barracks. 
It will be noted that during an around-the-clock operation 
the "dinner" meal should be available at any time during 
the day or night. 

At Fassberg and Celle, because of the rapidity of 
developments, supply personnel were not always among 
the first to arrive. Even Wiesbaden and Rhein/Main Air 
Bases, which were established installations when the Air- 
lift began, experienced such rapid growth that base supply 
problems were serious. Entire squadrons arrived by air 

89 



without quartermaster equipment. Many men came with 
summer clothing only. T/O&E and station equipment was 
obtained trom quartermaster depot stocks. Quartermaster 
items from paper clips to forklitt trucks were supplied, but 
each air base had to intorm the supply depot of its re- 
quirements. Lack of sufficient trained supply personnel 
made almost impossible the maintenance of records on 
which requisitions could be predicated. Nevertheless, 
adequate quantities of quartermaster supplies were re- 
ceived at all Airlift stations. 

Following are the tonnages of quartermaster Class II 
and IV supplies flown to Berlin to support operations 
there during the first six months of the Airlift: 



MONTH 

July 1948 

August 1948 

September 1948 

October 1948 ...... . 

November 1948 

December 1948 



TONS 



7.2 

9158 

105.97 

1057 

87.4 

81.6 



In addition to making plans for quartermaster supplies, 
the General Supply Division coordinated with EUCOM in 
order that quartermaster services such as laundry, dry 
cleaning, and shoe repair might be available. Scrap and 
salvage disposal and repair of quartermaster equipment 
also were involved. If an air installation had difficulty 
rendering any necessary quartermaster service, assistance 
was obtained from EUCOM. Such assistance was complete 
at Fassberg and Celle. The Bremerhaven Port of Embar- 
kation, backed by the Giessen Quartermaster Depot, not 
only furnished Celle and Fassberg with dry stores, 
perishable foodstuffs, and all other quartermaster supplies, 
but also made available the various quartermaster services. 

The EUCOM Exchange Service (EES) furnishes all ex- 
change facilities throughout the European Command. A 
USAFE officer in the General Supply Division maintains 
liaison with EES. 

In addition to the regular EES snack bars at all EUCOM 
stations, additional mobile snack bars were maintained 



90 



during the operation at all Airlift bases, including Tegel 
and Gatow. 

The Wefzlar Post Exchange Officer operated exchange 
facilities at Celle and Fassberg. The headquarters of EES 
assigned that responsibility to the Wefzlar PX since Wetz- 
lar Military Post, the northern-most in the U. S. Zone, is 
the closest to Celle and Fassberg. The Fassberg and Celle 
exchanges were in operation within three weeks after 
USAFE made an official request for exchange service. 

During the Airlift many exchange articles were in short 
supply. This was due to a directive by Headquarters 
EUCOM that the exchange system would be financially 
solvent by 30 November 1948. In order fo achieve 
solvency and reduce inventories, large quantities of sur- 
plus stocks were offered to customers at reduced prices 
and EES eliminaled or postponed the purchase of suffi- 
cient quantities of at least 4,000 "must" and "essential" 
items. 

All station exchanges received full allocations of avail- 
able merchandise except Rhein/Main Air Base. During most 
of the Airlift the personnel strength at Rhein/Main was 
credited to the Frankfurt Post Exchange, which received a 
percentage of merchandise that should have been alloca- 
ted to Rhein/Main. Toward the end of the Airlift this matter 
was corrected, but not in time to obtain the additional 
merchandise in the Rhein/Main store before the Lift ended. 

Tempelhof Branch Exchange received only the "must" 
and "essential" items during the Airlift because of re- 
stricted air cargo shipping space. 



EES FURNISHED REFRESHMENT FACILITIES RIGHT ON THE LINE 



CONCLUSIONS 

Electronics supply personnel should be brought into 
the early planning stages to determine availability o' 
electronic equipment necessary to perform desired func- 
tions. 

Duplicate installations should be made for all radio 
beacons and ground control approach equipment. There, 
should be standby spares provided for control tower 
radio. Two sources of power for all installed ground 
electronic equipment must be made available to insure 
continuous operation. 

Authorization for additional vehicles at the same time 
as the base or unit is activated will enable expeditious: 
issue of vehicles. 

The establishment of post exchange facilities should 
be concurrent with the movement of personnel into ai 
new base. 

The utilization of standard items of equipment, wherever 
possible, will reduce work load required for requisition- 
ing, storage, and issue. An AOCP and VDP staff agency 
should be established at Task Force Headquarters for any i 
Airlift operation, for the purpose of researching, record- .i 
ing, and expediting the supply of parts to reduce VDP's 
and AOCP's. 

Normal supply channels should be used at all times. 
The employment of non-Air Force channels for certain 
items of supply has a tendency to confuse, complicate, 
and at times to jeopardize operations. 







MA/NTENANC 






91 



MISSION 



SOURCES OF MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD 



Although USAF allocated 324 C-54 aircraft to the 
Airlift and support thereof, statistical records covering the 
six peak months of Vittles Operation reveal that an 
average of approximately 128 C-54 aircraft were "in 
commission" daily. In other words, there were 128 air- 
craft actually available io perform the prime mission of 
Vittles — that of carrying tonnage into Berlin. The fact 
that there were 196 more aircraft allocated than were 
available for daily missions was generally lost sight of 
in the maze of statistics and analyses of Airlift operations. 
What became of these 196 aircraft and why were 
they not available for daily utilization? The answer is 
MAINTENANCE. 

Tech Order No. 00-2A-1 formally defines "maintenance" 
as the normal upkeep and preservation of equipment 
which may be expected to recur from time to time in 
consequence of usage, wear and tear, or deterioration by 
the elements. It is further defined by Webster: "To hold 
or keep in any condition, especially in a state of effi- 
ciency or soundness." 

The aircraft engines, accessory equipment, communi- 
cations and radar installations, and all the myriad items 
that make a C-54 aircraft fly reach a staggering total of 
more than a quarter-million pieces or parts that are sub- 
ject to wear and tear and, consequently, must be 
maintained — if not in perfect order, at least in such con- 
dition as to insure complete safety for the aircraft, its crew, 
and its cargo. It was, therefore, the mission of the 
Maintenance Directorate at USAFE Headquarters and 
maintenance organizations at all lower echelons to or- 
ganize, obtain necessary personnel and equipment, and 
utilize every resource to insure adequate maintenance 
support of the aircraft flying the Airlift. Similar maintenance 
support had to be provided also for some 1,600 vehicles 
and 500 items of powered ground equipment used in Air- 
lift base functions and radio and radar installations both 
in aircraft and on the ground. 




THE LOAD AND APPROACH MADE FOR HARD LANDINGS 
AND OVERSHOOTING OF RUNWAYS. 





GROUND TRAI 




EXCESSIVE ENGINE GROUND TIME CAUSED OVERHEATIr 



Aircraft Utilization. The Airlift maintained an un 
precedented utilization of 8 to 10 hours per day pe. 
assigned aircraft. This utilization imposed a tremendou 
load on maintenance as well as creating new problem; 
peculiar to the locale and nature of the mission. Becaust! 
it was possible to establish bases within a few hundrec 
miles of Berlin, landings far exceeded the number o- 
landings normally expected in an air transport operation! 
Statistics indicated that while accumulating 586,901 flyinc 
hours, 379,926 landings were made. Half of these landings 
were made with a gross weight of approximately 68,000 
pounds — much higher than the normal allowable landing! 
gross weight. GCA weather landings and the glide angle 
approach at Tempelhof Air Base were responsible for 
many hard landings and overshooting of runways. All ofl 
these factors increased maintenance workloads immeasur-i 
ably. 

Loading and Unloading. While close control of 
cargo loading was exercised and every possible precau- 
tion was taken to avoid damage to aircraft, the lack of 
adequate cargo loading equipment and the speed of the 
operation inevitably caused considerable damage to doors 
and door jambs. The use of tiedown rods, stringers, and; 
steel cable for securing cargo also resulted in damage; 
to floors which had been originally installed primarily for 
passenger carriers. 

Ground Operation of Aircraft. To prevent delayed take-: 
offs, an unusual condition arose involving excessive engine 
ground time. There were often from five to nine aircraft 
waiting take-off af the end of the runways, and statistics 
show that the ground idling time averaged approximately! 
30 minutes per trip. Excessive ground time increased the 
maintenance work load by subjecting seals, gaskefs, and l 
ignition wiring to excessive heating which resulted in their 
deterioration and breakdown. Excessive ground time con- 
tributed to engine failures, as did the nature of the shorH 
haul operation. The latter required the use of high manifoldi 
pressure and R.P.M. a much greater percentage of time| 
than in a normal C-54 operation. 



92 



OUST DETERIORATED C 




Cargo. The two principal types of cargo — coal and 
"flour — caused unusual maintenance problems since the 
dust generated by them was extremely difficult to remove. 
Coal dust had an abrasive effect on control cables and 
caused corrosion on electrical contacts, particularly in 
cannon plugs on the radio wiring. 

Ground Handling of Aircraft. The most prevalent type 
of Airlift mishap was the taxiing accident, which accounted 
for 34 percent of the total, or 43 out of 1 26 total accidents. 
Inadequacy of airport facilities and heavy airdrome traffic, 
both aircraft and vehicular, were predominant factors. 
Causes of many headaches for maintenance personnel 
were the instances where inexperienced crews with in- 
adequate equipment attempted to tow aircraft, subjecting 
the aircraft to unusual and unnecessary stresses and strains. 

Unusual Vehicle Support Requirements. Many of 
the problems that plagued aircraft maintenance per- 
sonnel were also present in the operation of automotive 
and ground-powered equipment. An abnormally high 
percentage of vehicles had to be assigned on regular 
24-hour dispatch to meet the requirements of using 
organizations. This resulted in an almost complete lack 
'of preventive maintenance and increased shop loads 
correspondingly. Shortages of equipment, trained per- 
sonnel, and adequate facilities paralleled those in aircraft 
maintenance. 



PERCENT 
I00 



PERCENT OF FLYING HOURS GENERATED 

tHOURS IN COMMISSION VS HOURS ASSIGNED) 





























HOURS FLOWN 




TOTAL HOURS IN COMV 






\/^-\ 




// \ 

// 




HOURS FLOWN 




y 


,--*> \ 

\ \ 

\ \ 


TOTAL HOURS ASGO 




1 > 


/ 










\ \ 

V \ 


J 


s 




C 




u 


9 



% OF IN COMM 
TIME FLOWN 



%0F ASGD 
TIME FLOWN 



93 



MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION 

Maintenance functions of a base and a group are very 
closely allied and so interrelated that the over-all control 
and direction should be under one authority. By having 
a central control in one place, such as in the office of 
the Director of Supply and Maintenance, over-all schedul- 
ing of maintenance, inspections, engine changes, facilities, 
and supplies dan be controlled in a much more efficient 
manner. This organizational structure was attempted at 
one Airlift base, but because of lack of qualified personnel, 
proper planning and execution, the program foundered, 
and maintenance reverted back to the squadron system. 
It is recommended that maintenance organizational struc- 
ture be designed to fit the mission. Such planning will 
result in increasing efficiency and immeasurably easing 
the execution of duties of maintenance personnel. 

Generally, Airlift maintenance followed accepted Air 
Force patterns. However, wing maintenance officers, 
supposedly operating in a policy and staff capacity under 
the wing-base plan, frequently found it necessary to take 
command action as this was the first level where all 
maintenance functions were centralized. 

Maintenance Control. The heart of the maintenance 
management element, carried through all echelons from 
squadron to Task Force Headquarters level, was Main- 
tenance Control. It was essential that precise scheduling be 
organized, and, because of the urgency of the operation, 
be followed accurately and adjusted as necessary on an 

MAINTENANCE CONTROL INCREASED EFFICIENCY. 





hour-to-hour basis. A standard system of control boards 
was established and maintained at squadron, group, and 
higher levels using color codes that indicated at a glance 
the status of every airplane in the squadron or group and, 



on the master control board in Task Force Headquarters, 
the status of every aircraft in the fleet. The code used- 
follows: 

White Aircraft is operational. (Aircraft in com-, 

mission) 

Red Scheduled maintenance. (Squadron, 

routine inspections, Tech Order com- 
pliances) 

Green Unscheduled maintenance. (Squadron, 

breakdowns, engine failures) 

Yellow .... In base shops for maintenance. (Third' 
and fourth echelon maintenance) 

Blue In 200-hour inspection. (Burtonwood) : 

Black Aircraft AOCP (grounded for parts). 

To maintain the control board at Task Force Headquarters, ■ 



NUMBER 




C-54 200 HOUR 


INSPECTIONS 






250 
200 
150 
100 
50 

















































•*,_ 




^^ 


^ 


y 

*—,+'' 


\ \ 


|REQUIRED| 








\ 










.../"" 


^ 


v^7 










\ \ 
\ \ 

X 








t+* 


s*\ 










| ACTUAL | 








*— 

\ 

% 
\ 
\ 








/ 
























\~ 

% 

i 


I 




























BURTONWOOD AFD 










18 


u 
49 


J 
57 


F 
85 


M 

177 


A 
209 


M 
258 


J 
244 


j 

256 


A 

134 


CELLE RAF STA 














8 


II 


5 


2 










FASSBERG RAF STA 










9 


9 


5 


2 


2 


3 


7 








OBERPFAFFENH'N AFD 




43 


108 I 137 


45 


















RHEIN/MAIN AB 










24 


47 


70 


25 


27 


21 


5 






20 


WIESBADEN AB 










6 


16 


15 


3 


4 


5 








8 


TOTAL INSPECTIONS 




43 


108 


137 


102 


121 


155 


126 


215 


240 


270 


251 


268 


1765" 



94 




direct telephone connections were established with main- 
tenance control offices at all bases, and the status of each 
aircraft was phoned in hourly. 

From the hourly information gained from the master 
control board, it was possible to schedule aircraft to Bur- 
tonwood for 200-hour inspection, to the Zl for 1,000-hour 
cycled reconditioning, and to direct inter-group and inter- 
squadron transfers of aircraft as required. If was also 
possible to maintain comparisons between squadrons, to 
uncover unsatisfactory conditions which arose within the 
groups, and to eliminate or prevent other difficulties. 
Concerned primarily with over-all efficiency in scheduling 
aircraft through necessary maintenance, maintenance con- 
trol was highly effective in reducing loss factors in the Air- 
lift operation. 

Personnel. Airlift experience, confirmed by a com- 
prehensive study by manpower boards from Washington 
and USAFE, indicated a squadron personnel requirement 
of 15 maintenance family-group personnel per assigned 
aircraft (19, if 200-hour inspections are performed by 
squadrons). That number of personnel with balanced MOS's 
should under most operating conditions permit a utiliza- 
tion of 8 and possibly 10 hours per day per assigned 
aircraft. Establishing the requirements was not a particularly 



difficult problem, but obtaining well-trained, experienced 
personnel and retaining them imposed a burden on 
maintenance officials that should be avoided at all costs. 
A definite tour of duty and a careful screening of per- 
sonnel prior to assignment are mandatory. If sufficient 
qualified maintenance personnel cannot be obtained, and 
such was the case at the start of the Airlift, a comprehen- 
sive on-the-job training program is a necessity. 

It was proved beyond a doubt that inexperienced 
personnel sometimes doubled and even tripled the time 
required for the most elementary maintenance operation. 
Many valuable flying hours were lost because personnel 
were not sufficiently familiar with equipment to locate 
sources of trouble and to take corrective action. This con- 
dition was also responsible for increased requirements for 
spare parts, as items removed without just cause entered 
a long and costly pipeline before ultimately being re- 
turned to serviceable stocks. 

It was not until the final months of Airlift operation that 
personnel became sufficiently stabilized and trained to 
perform adequate and satisfactory maintenance on C-54 
aircraft; but when this happy stage was reached, a definite 
improvement was immediately discernible in the accom- 
plishment of the primary Airlift mission. During April, May, 
June, and July 1949, tonnage averaged better than 190,000 
tons per month. This was 60,000 tons a month higher than 





the average for the previous four months, although the 
number of aircraft available remained approximately the 
same. 

Because of the personnel deficiencies noted above, it 
became necessary to recruit and utilize German nationals. 
At the peak of operation, approximately 80 German 
mechanics were assigned to each Air Force squadron. Be- 
cause these mechanics had no prior experience with C-54 
aircraft, an extensive training program was required, and 
it became necessary also to overcome the language 
barrier. As a result, a translation section was organized by 
the USAFE Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, and bi- 
lingual inspection check lists were prepared and furnished 
all activities utilizing German nationals. Ultimately, techni- 
cal references such as the C-54 Tech Order, Maintenance 
Hand Book, and AN-1-40NM-2 were similarly translated. 
Provided with classroom teaching, OJT on the Airlift, and 
technical publications in their own language, Germans 
soon became extremely valuable. Their use was dem- 
onstrated to be fully practical, and their contribution 
was of major assistance to the maintenance program. 

In order to handle the volume of engine and aircraft 
technical problems, one Pratt and Whitney and two 
Douglas Aircraft technical representatives were assigned 
to the Aircraft Maintenance Section of Headquarters 
USAFE for duty. 

95 



AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE 

Scheduled Maintenance. With aircraft flying 24 hours 
a day 7 days a week, the maintenance program in 
support of Vittles required a 168-hour work week and in- 
volved first a series of scheduled inspections, and then im- 
mediate corrective action when these inspections revealed 
defects or potential failures. 

Each day every aircraft flying the Airlift was given a 
pre-flight check. This check included such items as measure- 
ment of fuel after a run-up, cockpit inspection, inspection 
of fluids and pressures, hydraulics, landing gear, power 
plants and nacelles, electrical system, internal and external 
fuselage, wings, control surface and empennage, and radio 
and radar inspection. In addition each aircraft was provid- 
ed with turn-around maintenance, at which time crews 
took care of deficiencies noted by pilots, and routine 
maintenance servicing each time a plane landed. 

Supplementing the daily pre-flight and turn-around 



inspections, more detailed and comprehensive inspections 
were performed at 50-hour intervals. Thus there was a 
definite periodic cycle of inspections, identified as First 
Intermediate Inspection (50 hours), Second Intermediate 
Inspection (100 hours), Third Intermediate Inspection (150 
hours), and Burtonwood Inspection (200 hours). After each 
aircraft had gone through four such cycles and became 
due for the fifth, it was returned to the Zl for cycled re- 
conditioning (1,000-hour inspection) by contractors' facili- 
ties located in New York, Texas, and California. 

The above brief explanation of the inspection cycle, 
with the accompanying graphic illustration, shows that to 
keep 128 aircraft flying every day there were 196 ad- 
ditional aircraft either undergoing maintenance or enroute 
to and from facilities where major maintenance could be 
performed. 

Governing directives are considered adequate for 
normal transport operations, but it is apparent from this 
analysis that it was necessary to tailor Airlift inspections 



C-54 AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO Zl FOR CYCLIC RECONDITIONING 



100 
90 

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 




/T 




SCHEDULED 





27 


30 


40 


41 


50 


53 


47 


53 


60 


60 


54 


59 


19 


50 


ACTUAL 





1 1 


1 1 


30 


16 


24 


36 


51 


45 


60 


60 


52 


42 


84 


50 


CUMULATIVE 





II 


22 


52 


68 


92 


128 


179 


224 


284 


344 


396 


438 


522 


572 



to fit the operation. 

There was considerable discussion as to the merits oi 
performing 200-hour inspection at Burtonwood, England; 
but from the standpoint of maintenance, it was a wise ano 
essential policy determination. In a high pressure operation 
where continual emphasis is being placed on higher and 
higher utilization, the group commander is inevitably 
forced into at least a partial neglect of maintenance. The I 
performance of 200-hour inspections at another base undes 
another command solved this problem, and insured thai 
at least every 200 hours aircraft were given a thorough 
inspection and necessary repairs by an organization that 
was not under the same pressure as was the commandei 
at the home station of the aircraft. The same principle 
applied to the 1,000-hour cycled reconditioning, and the < 
general consensus of opinion among Airlift personnel at 
the conclusion of the operation was that C-54 aircraft were 
in far better mechanical condition at phase-out than they 
had been on entry into the operation. 

Unscheduled Maintenance. Significant conditions pe-t 
culiar to the Airlift operation, which are briefly indicated 
in the early part of this chapter, led to abnormally high 
consumption of tires, brake discs, and other brake and 
landing gear parts. The high rate of consumption foE 
hours flown was reflected in the maintenance effort re-i 
quired to repair, assemble, ^and install brakes, mounf newi 
tires on wheels, and make very thorough inspections ol 
landing gears. Airlift statistics indicate that the main cause 
of unscheduled maintenance was fuel leaks. These resulted 
from hard landings and from flying through air whose 
turbulence caused seams and inspection plates to open 
Resealing of fuel tanks consumed approximately 56 per- 
cent of field maintenance support. 

In an effort to obtain closer control on scheduled ana 
unscheduled maintenance, maintenance personnel devised 
a form entitled "CALTF Form 10 (C-54 Maintenance Re- 
cord)." Groups were required to accomplish one of these 
forms for each aircraft assigned during any one month and 
to record thereon in the standard color code the portior 
of each day, broken down to quarter-hour intervals, thai 



96 




V 



— * BERLIN ; ' 



>, 



NSPECTION CYCLE 



324 

AIRCRAFT 



ALLOCATED BY USAF 
TO AIRLIFT AND SUPPORT 



I * 









•? 



















28 
AIRCRAFT 




97 



MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS OF C-54 AIRCRAFT 

MARCH THRU JULY 1949 

60™ TROOP CARRIER GROUP 6l*r TROOP CARRIER GROUP 513th TROOP CARRIER GROUP 313" TROOP CARRIER GROUP 317" TROOP CARRIER GROUP 

PERCENT PERCENT 




MAR APR MAY JUN JUL TARGET MAR APR MAY JUN JUL TARGET MAR APR MAY JUN JUL TARGET MAR APR MAY JUN JUL TARGET MAR APR MAY JUN JUL TARGET 



the particular aircraft was in any of the following ca- 
tegories: 

In Commission 

Unscheduled Maintenance 

Major Maintenance (Burtonwood) 

Scheduled Maintenance 

In Base Shops 

AOCP 

These forms were accumulated by groups and forwarded 
at the end of each month to Headquarters 1st ALTF where 
they were summarized, analyzed, and charted. Copies of 
the summary charts similar to that accompanying, showing 
a comparison of groups and the month-by-month picture 
within each group, were furnished group commanders. The 
latter were thus kept informed not only of the progress of 
their own groups but of the fleet average. 

An arbitrary target of 72 percent of assigned aircraft 
"In Commission" was set by Headquarters CALTF. While 
this target was never quite reached, the five months' 



OVERALL 




MAR 



APR 



AOCP 
IN SHOPS 
SCHEDULED MAINT. 



JUN JUL TARGET 

lllllllll MAJOR MAINT. (BURTONWOOD) 
Ev3 UNSCHEDULED MAINT. 
[~~"1 IN COMMISSION 



NOTE: 

The charts on this page are samples of the 
monthly studies made by Headquarters CALTF 
and distributed to Airlift wings. Computations are 
based on a local form, CALTF 10 (C-54). AF Form 
1 10 figures reflect a slightly lower percent in com- 
mission. 



summary illustrated shows that in July 1949 the average 
number of aircraft in commission for the fleet did reach 
65 percent of those assigned. The summary chart also re- 
flects a slight but consistent improvement in the over-all 
maintenance picture. From a management viewpoint, the 
CALTF Form 10 and subsequent analysis charts were con- 
sidered well worth the time and effort devoted fo their 
preparation and analysis. 



98 



THE ENGINE BUILD-UP LINE AT RHEIN MAIN REDUCED THE 
CRITICAL ENGINE SHORTAGE 





AIRCRAFT ENGINE MAINTENANCE 

Engine Build-up. At the outset ot the Airlitt, engines 
were so critically short that they had to be airlifted from 
the Zl to Rhein/Main, at which point an engine build-up 
production line was established. The supply of R-2000 
engines fluctuated throughout the Airlift, but it was still a 
source of considerable concern up to and including the 
final month of operation. It was evident early in the 
operation that although engine build-up is normally a 
squadron or organizational maintenance function, the ra- 
pidity with which engines were being changed and the 
limited spare parts available for build-up made mandatory 
a change in normal procedures. 

One of the soundest policy decisions of the entire Air- 
lift was made when if was decided to establish a central 
engine build-up line at Rhein/Main. This line handled 
engine build-up and tear-down for the entire operation, 
me system used was a production-line method, using five 
work stations with a sixth station for inspection. Starting 
with a raw engine, specific parts and accessories were 
added at each work station by a crew of specialists who 
averaged approximately 19 hours elapsed time per engine 
Juild-up. Supporting the operation was a completely 
-quipped machine shop, a sheet metal shop, a wood 
working shop, and electrical and accessories shops. The 
engine tear-down line followed a similar work station pat- 
em. Three men were able to disassemble an engine 
n approximately three hours. 



Engine Conditioning. The acute shortage of R-2000 
type engines made it necessary to take every possible 
measure to conserve those on hand, and under the super- 
vision of Headquarters USAFE an engine conditioning pro- 
gram was established with assistance from specialists sent 
to Europe from AMC. Two classes in engine conditioning 
were conducted — one at Erding Air Depot and one at 
Rhein/Main. An engineering officer and two highly quali- 
fied enlisted men in every squadron in the theater were 
trained in each phase of engine conditioning as outlined 
in T. O. 02A-1-88. 

It was originally planned that personnel thus trained be 
used as a nucleus in each squadron and that they in turn 
could pass on instructions to other flying and maintenance 
personnel of their respective squadrons. Pressure of the 
operation, rapid turnover of personnel, a shortage of 
cylinders, and lack of such equipment as Magic Wands for 
determining cold cylinders, fop center indicators, and com- 
pression gauges seriously retarded the desired engine 
conditioning program. 

Engine Overhaul. Engine overhaul was handled in 
the same manner as was aircraft overhaul; and im- 
mediately upon removal of an engine for either time 
or failure, it was shipped to SAAMA for standard air 
depot overhauling. When shipped by air, it took ap- 
proximately five weeks to get an engine from Rhein 
Main to the overhaul facilities at San Antonio, com- 
pletely re-built, and returned to this theater 



Spark Plug Troubles. From disassembly reports, it 
was determined that 35 percent of engine failures ex- 
perienced resulted from combustion chamber failures, 19 
percent resulted from hydraulicing (a liquid lock caused 
by collection of gasoline in the combustion chamber) 
and the remainder were materiel failures of bearings, studs, 
etc. Of the 35 percent of combustion chamber failures, a 
majority were attributed to malfunctioning spark plugs. 
To eliminate spark plug failures, extreme care was ex- 
ercised in their handling and inspection, and various types 
of plugs were tried. The Airlift ended before definite 
factual data was obtained on the value of the various-type 
plugs used, but based on Navy experience and opinions 
from squadron engineering officers, it was generally 
agreed that the platinum electrode type RB-19-2 spark 
plug was considerably superior to the LS-88 or LS-87 
type plug, for the air operation being performed. 



I 



MALf-UNCTIONING SPARK PLUGS CAUSED MOST COMBUSTION 
CHAMBER FAILURI 




99 



DEPOT MAINTENANCE - AIRCRAFT 

At the beginning ot the Lift, 200-hour inspections 
were performed at Oberpfaffenhofen, an air depot located 
in Bavaria approximately 200 miles south of Frankfurt. In 
November 1948, 200-hour inspections were transferred to 
Burtonwood Air Base, England, which operated under 
control of the 3rd Air Division. With the phasing-out of 
Oberpfaffenhofen, Erding Air Depot remained the only 
depot in Continental Europe to provide logistical support 
for the Lift. 

Normally engaged in maintenance work and production 
to keep the regular planes and bases of USAFE operating, 
Erding was given an additional workload with the advent of 
the Airlift. Airlift maintenance, of course, had 1-A priority, 
and Erding's accomplishments contributed in a great 
measure to the success of the Airlift operation. The types 



of maintenance for which Erding shops were responsible 
included: welding, woodmill, blacksmith, foundry, plugs, 
repair of C-54 hydraulic mechanism, and repair and bal- 
ancing of propellers. In addition, electrical shops repaired 
and returned to serviceability aircraft generators, fuel 
pumps, and solenoids; and carburetor and instrument shops 
repaired gyro instruments, flight indicators, and automatic 
pilot devices. 

In addition to the normal depot functions at Erding, 
the analytical laboratory analyzed contaminated hydraulic 
fluid, strengths of metal found to be failing in performance, 
and corrosion problems both on aircraft and materiel. On 
many occasions it was possible to make such analyses 
locally instead of using the time-consuming shipment of 
samples to Headquarters AMC and awaiting the resulting 
report. 



HO 


IBS 


REPAIR OF DAMAGED AIRCRAFT AT ERDING 




1 0, 000 
5,000 
















f 




MAN-HOURS 
EXPENDED 






























\ / 


AV. MAN-HOURS 
»ER AIRCRAFT 




~jt 




X*:_. 


01 












J 


j * * o n u j a m~ j ;; A ' 

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT BY TYPE 


C-54 


NO'VlTTLES" 




2 


3 


4 


2 


4 


1 


3 


3 


2 


4 


I 


C-82 


AIRCRAFT REPAIRED 












1 


1 












C-97 




AT ERDING PRIOR 


TO 














1 










C-47 




| NOV 


EMBE 


R 


















1 








.... AND CALIBRATION AND REPAIR OF AIRCRAFT | 
INSTRUMENTS. 



100 








ER 


Dir 


sIG 


A 


IR 


B 


AS 


E 


AIRLIFT MAINTE 

MANUFACTURE & REPAIR 


NA 


NC 


;e 


s 


UP 


PO 


|RT 


















JULY 


AUGUST 


SEPTEMBER 


OCTOBER 


NOVEMBER 


DECEMBER 


JANUARY 


FEBRUARY 


MARCH 


APRIL 


MAY 


JUNE 


JULY 


AU6U9T 


SEPTEMBER 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEM3 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENOED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS 

EX- 
PENDED 


ITEMS 
PRO- 
CESSED 


M/HRS 

EX- 
PENDED 


FABRICATION SECTION 






























































MACHINE SHOP 


1609 


328 


1 3 


24 


300 


66 


310 


222 


1 


388 


46 


317 


26 


160 


17 1 


762 


14 


30 


8 


SO 






1 


68 


43 


9 










SHEET METAL SHOP 


1 4 


244 


1 2 


799 


38 


3 1 


1273 


390 


1 


3 


8 


320 


206 


1741 


SI 


1033 


31 


690 


31 


1 193 






6 


SI6 














WELDING SHOP 






10 


143 


50 


1 6 


8 


260 


310 


779 


300 1 


701 


34 


90 






7 


19 


1 


6 






















WOOOMILL 


1 


62 










2 


77 


i 14 


1667 


10 


128 1 


4 


64 


































PAINT, DOPE & FABRIC 


e i 


13 39 


9 


1125 


6 


990 


8 


1 191 






14 


1840 


8 


97 1 


13 


1676 


17 


1 ISO 


1 1 


362 


3 


327 


4 


76 


4 


27 3 










PLEXIGLASS SHOP 


so 


80 


























































TANK & RADIATOR 






1 03 


379 


27 


87 


57 


408 


28 


1306 


12 


136 


264 


646 


13 


65 


96 


1169 


46 


22 6 






















SHOPS SECTION 






























































ELECTRICAL SHOP 


94 


688 


132 


1216 


ESc 


1162 


161 


1746 


ISO 


120 1 


477 


3264 


693 


4762 


494 


4834 


766 


2866 


493 


3946 


241 


2173 


29 


304 


266 


1775 










SPARK PLUG SHOP 










3000 


282 






20000 


249 1 


16300 


2190 


38000 


6359 


337 2 


4626 


40000 


4130 


69133 


6813 


366 00 


6239 






291 10 


2673 


I0O40 


1307 






PROPELLER SHOP 


10 1 


1439 


73 


251 


29 


31 18 


33 


13 1 9 


66 


787 


22 6 


1733 


184 


2536 


306 


2636 


42 


100 1 


106 


1182 


62 


2102 


3t 


607 


3166 


1347 


40 


188 






HYDRAULIC SHOP 


17 


1 14 


194 


1023 


21 1 


E? i 


80 


380 


2080 


3303 


273 


1397 


70 1 


2313 


441 


188 1 


346 


1209 


266 


1361 


232 


1497 


110 


360 


302 


1356 


34 


106 






BATTERY SHOP 


36 


82 


























































FABRIC a LEATHER SECTION 






























































PARACHUTE SHOP 


S3 


61 1 






34 


1 1 2 


203 


907 


3028 


2016 


63 


202 


























60 


29S 










ASSOCIATED EOUIPMENT SECTION 






























































INSTRUMENT a BOMBSIGHT SHOP 


292 


348 


IBS 


962 


642 


2028 


56 


274 


831 


2900 


1022 


4334 


1319 


5366 


914 


2793 


13 


492 6 


330 


3661 


392 


5469 


III 


427 


369 


3131 


100 


1507 






SUPERCHARGER & CARBURETOR SHOP 


32 


263 


40 


73 2 


31 


723 


17 


239 


39 


1390 


338 


699 


82 


1862 


29 


379 


61 


1317 


31 


1100 


43 


1064 


83 


356 


93 


1086 


T 


148 






COMMUNICATIONS SECTION 






























































AIRBORNE EOUIPMENT RADIO, RADAR 


10 


120 










38 


392 


7 


177 


976 


4878 


B 


16 


98 


107 


39 


29 6 


467 


1474 


62 


449 


















GRD. COMM. R6R, GCA; VHF/DF 


16 


279 


3 


179 


1 


300 


199 


700 


4 


17 


1 


273 


299 


1 114 


1 1 


73 


31 


33 3 


3 


176 






1 


22 












TOTAL 


2348 


6019 


796 


6BSS 


4852 


10237 


264 7 


9103 


26804 


18623 


22969 


2399 9 


62024 


284C4 


3624} 


21109 


4I303\ 19462 


71136 


21176 


37867 


19332 


349 


3336 


33 SI 7 1 12106 


10241 [ 3426 







VEHICLE REPAIR 



PERSONNEL CARRIER, LIGHT STANDARD 



PERSONNEL CARRIER .MEDIUM STANDARD 



TRUCK 1/4 TON 4X4 C&R 



TRUCK 3/4 TON VARIOUS TYPES 



TRUCK I 1/2 TON VARIOUS TYPES 



TRUCK 2 1/2 TON VARIOUS TYPES 



TRUCK 4-5 TON VARIOUS TYPES 



TRUCK FIRE, CLASS 153 



TRUCK 6 TON VARIOUS TYPES 



TRUCK 7 1/2 TON VARIOUS TYPES 



TRUCK 10 TON VARIOUS TYPES 



[.CRANES VARIOUS TYPES 



| TRACTOR, CRAWLER-VARIOUS 
I TRAILERS VARIOUS TYPES 
MATERIAL HANDLING EOUIPMENT 
GROUND POWER EQUIPMENT 



RADAR SCREEN 



PRO- 
CESSED 



M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 



PRO- 
CESSED 



M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 



PRO- 
CESSED 



M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 



PRO- 
CESSED 



M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 



' 3348 I 44 I 8979 



NO. M/HRS. 

PRO- I EX- 

CESSEDIPENDED 



PRO- 
CESSED 



M/HRS NO M/HRS 

EX- I PRO- I EX- 
PENDED CESSED PENDEO 



PRO- 
CESSED 



M/HRS 

EX- 
PENDED 



M/HRS NO 

EX- PRO- 

PENDED CESSED 



M/HRS. 

EX- 
PENDED 



PRO- 
CESSED 



M/HRS 

EX- 
PENDED 



PRO- 
CESSED 



M/HRS 
EX- 

PENOEO 



9169 37 I 3032 I 



23 I 4666 '< 37 6361 27 



PRO- 
CESSED 



M/HRS 
EX- 

PENOCO 



PRO- 
CESSED 



M/HRS 
EX- 

PENOCO 



PRO 
CE39E0 



M/MUS 

EX- 
PENDED 



101 



SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT 

While personnel problems were acute in the early 
stages of the Airlift, the lack of special tools and equip- 
ment was crilical. Hastily thrown together, temporary 
maintenance docks were constructed of wood on dirt 
foundations and were poorly lighted and inadequately 
heated. Attempts to use this makeshift equipment, while 
not primarily responsible, were considered to have con- 
tributed to the loss through fire of four aircraft undergoing 
maintenance. Lack of proper light and heat lowered both 
the efficiency and the morale of maintenance personnel. 
Toward the end of the Lift, plans had been made calling 
for masonry docks on concrete floors, and some portable 
steel work docks had been locally manufactured. These 
docks, equipped with adequate firefighfing equipment, 
vapor-proof lighting, and adequate heating, are considered 
a "must" for the maintenance of any large aircraft. 

The lack of washing and cleaning facilities increased 
maintenance problems on aircraft which carried coal and 
flour as principal cargo. Planes soon became filthy from 
coal dust and flour that filtered through floors into lower 
compartments. While the maintenance problems thus 









I 04BUE 






MmL^ia-j*! 


Pk*fTl 


i 1 


^^w~T^^ 






'W' 


i -it? i 


1 ! ! 




*4jim 


i r^'\ 


; . -t 


+i* .* 


~* I ■ 


1 ffi 




j4#« - j 


- 1 ! 




. b 


w . 






















, 


■tW 


PORARY MAINTENANC 
GEROUS. 


:e docks 


WERE INAD 


EQUATE ANDjttj 




1 ° an 


^^^^™ 


■ 


102jB| 


- 





created were also related to the sealing of the cargo com- 
partment, the lack of adequate vacuum cleaners and 
portable washing equipment had serious results and made 
exacting inspections almost impossible. 

The winterization of Airlift aircraft did not require as 
extensive winterization equipment as was required in T. O. 
00-60B-1 for arctic operation. Germany is in the same lat- 
itude as the Hudson Bay region, but the climafe is mod- 
erated by other factors. The winter of 1948 was unusually 
mild and could be compared with winter operations in 
Washington, D. C. 

There were only about 20 sets of wing covers avail- 
able for the entire fleet of 225 C-54's. AMC did not have 
sufficient quantities and was acting through procurement 
to obtain them, but it was spring by the time they arrived 
in Germany. In lieu of wing covers, various substitutes 



were tried without success. Quartermaster burial paper was, 
tried, but it would not stay on the wings and was very 
difficult to use. QM tarpaulins were shaped in six sections' 
to fit the wings and horizontal stabilizer. They were not 
used because of their bulk, and analysis disclosed that they ' 
had a copper oxide impregnate that was highly corrosive 
to wing surfaces. 

The main method of removing ice, frost, and snow Was.' 
with house brooms and isopropyl alcohol. Some organi- ( 
zations tried such various mixtures as kerosene and i 




hydraulic fluid. Regulations were issued prohibiting this 
practice, as these oils were injurious to de-icer boots, and 
made the wings dangerously slippery for maintenance 
personnel and servicing crews. Quartermaster decontam- 
ination units were used to spray isopropyl on the wings. 
This procedure was fairly successful but consumed large 
quantifies of isopropyl. 

A jet de-icer unit was mounted on the back of a 6x6 
truck at right angles to the chassis and operated at 40 per- 
cent power 40 feet from the aircraft. The heat generated 



at this power was sufficient to warm the wing surfaces 
enough to remove light ice and frost. Only one of these 
units was tried. It was used at Tempelhof for approximately 
10 hours. Although this unit was operated for only a short 
period, it indicated that a jet engine has promising possi- 
bilities for removal of ice and frost from aircraft surfaces. 
It was a common misconception that this jet unit was 
used for removal of ice and snow from runways. The unit 
was unsuifed for such use because of its weight and 
horizontal mounting and was never used for that purpose. 
On the northern zone fields, the removal of snow was ac- 
complished by the engineers with mechanical equipment. 
At the southern bases the small amount of snow that fell 
melted after a few hours. However, because of icing con- 
ditions, sand was often needed to provide fraction on 
runways and taxi strips. 




SERVICE TESTS 

After most of the original operating, maintenance, and 
supply problems had been solved and the Airlift became 
what was sometimes referred to as a "routine operation," 
it became a proving ground for a series of service tests 
of various aircraft and items of equipment. Service tests 
were run on a Douglas C-74 aircraft; on a Boeing C-97 
aircraft; and on the Fairchild C-82 aircraft, which, in- 
cidentally, was also used throughout most of the Lift for 
carrying unusually bulky cargo. Because of the limited 
duration of .the service tests on these aircraft and because 
of the inadequacy of logistical support, the results of the 
tests were not considered at all conclusive, although many 
valuable lessons were learned in connection with the use 
of each aircraft in the Airlift. 

Other tests included a C-54 stripping program, the 
purpose of which was to increase the payload by re- 
moving from the aircraft everything except essential 
equipment; a cockpit instrument panel standardization 
program; and a tire usage study directed by Headquarters 
AMC. As was the case with the aircraft mentioned above, 
much valuable data was obtained and submitted to higher 
headquarters for analysis 



GLOBEMASTE* 




VALUABLE LESSONS WERE LEARNED FROM SERVICE TESTS 
WITH THE C-97A STRATOFREIGHTER 



103 



STATISTICAL REPORTS 

When it was realized that operations might continue 
indefinitely, a reporting system was established and per- 
manent statistical records and graphic charts were initiated 
and maintained for the duration of the Lift. The main- 
tenance statistics thus gathered proved extremely valuable 
management tools. Utilized to spot unsatisfactory condi- 
tions and trends as they developed, they permitted prompt 
remedial action. 

Data was obtained and charts were maintained daily 
on the following: 

(1) Aircraft in Commission (showing aircraft allocated, 
aircraft assigned, aircraft in commission, and per- 
centage of assigned aircraft in commission). 

(2) Percentage of aircraft in commission by groups. 

(3) Number and percentage of aircraft undergoing 
200-hour inspection. 

(4) Percentage of aircraft in scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance by groups. 

(5) Times at which R-2000-9 engines failed (per 
engine). 

(6*) Times at which R-2000-9 engines were changed for 
time (per engine). 

(7) Times at which R-2000-1 1 engines failed (per 
engine). 

(8) Times at which R-2000-1 1 engines were changed 
for time (per engine). 

Summary Charts: 

(1) Daily Airlift engine hours (showing monthly aver- 
ages and 90-day forecast). 

(2) Percentage of failures at indicated hours (per 100 
engines). 

(3) Engine changes by group by month (indicating the 
number of changes of each type of engine for 
failure and the time and total changes for each 
group each month). 




MOTORIZED EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE 

Automotive Activities. One of the unspectacular but 
none the less important supporting factors of the Air- 
lift was the operation and maintenance of approximately 
1,600 vehicles and 500 items of powered ground equip- 
ment used in Airlift base functions. 

This equipment, plus personnel to operate and maintain 
it, mushroomed into being during the early months of 
Airlift development. In most instances it was not possible 
to wait to train operators or to have maintenance fully 
organized. The equipment had to be put info service at 
once. As a result, maintenance and supply activities started 
out with a deficit and were continually faced with an in- 
creasing workload as more equipment arrived. 

The success attained in providing and maintaining 
transportation for the Airlift speaks highly of the effort put 
forth by motor pool, maintenance, and supply personnel. 
Only through hard work on the part of everyone was it 
possible to organize and develop the automotive opera- 
tions along effective lines and at the same time to meet 



the almost impossible transportation requirements the 
concurrently existed. 

Facilities. With the exception of Fassberg, all of rhi 
Airlift bases had usable motor pool and maintenanc 
facilities. Wiesbaden and Rhein/Main were most fortunal 
in that both bases had completed a reorganization of thei 
motor pools and maintenance shops prior to Lift operations j 
so that only minor changes were necessary to handle thi 
expansion required. Celle RAF Station also had usablt | 
facilities although the motor pool and shops had to b< 
organized and fully equipped after the site was selected^ 
At Fassberg the facilities available for motor pool anr 
maintenance shops were inadequate. The size and physica; 
arrangement of buildings precluded efficient operationl ( | 
This was an important factor contributing to the extremt j 
difficulty of operating and maintaining automotive equip-, ' 
ment at that base. 



Utilization of Equipment. One transportation problem . 
was that of trying, through improved utilization, ic 
meet requirements without additional equipment which E( 
would require more personnel, more supplies, and more 
maintenance. In some instances 90 percent of certain types 
of vehicles were on regular daily dispatch; this left only 
10 percent available for maintenance. In such a situation 
either the transportation could not be furnished to every- 
one, or scheduled maintenance could not be performed on 
all vehicles. The problem was never completely solved 
although improvement was effected as experience was 
gained and the operation became more stabilized. 

Personnel. It was extremely difficult to find fully 
qualified personnel for the motor pool and maintenance 
shops. In the majority of cases personnel assigned as 
drivers had not had adequate prior training, and because 
of their other duties it was not possible to give them the 
instructions normally considered necessary. At one of the 
bases approximately 10,000 operators' permits were issued 
during the Lift. This requirement arose through the turn- 
over in personnel and the necessity for three-shift 
operation. 



104 



I During early stages on the Lift there was an acute 
shortage ot personnel. For a time maintenance personnel 
at Wiesbaden AB worked eight hours as mechanics and 
the following eight as drivers. All of the bases used Ger- 
man mechanics to supplement the military personnel in the 
rl maintenance shops. Approximately 50 percent of the 
automotive mechanics were German nationals. 

Maintenance Services. The greatest difficulty in maintain- 
ing automotive equipment was that of getting vehicles 
to the shop for scheduled preventive maintenance 
services. Because of the high proportion of vehicles 
assigned on regular daily dispatch, it was usually im- 
possible to provide substitutes while an assigned vehicle 
was in the shop; consequently, the sections having 
vehicles assigned were unwilling or unable to spare their 
vehicles for the time required to perform maintenance. In 
many cases sections would release a vehicle for main- 



VEHICLE MAINTENANCE STATUS 

PERCENT DESIRED VS ACTUAL AT ONE AIRLIFT BASE 



SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE 



LEGEND 
^ DESIRED 
E2 ACTUAL 



MONTHLY ':\ WEEKLY 



UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE 




tenance only when it was actually broken down and 
unable to operate. 

Vehicles on 24-hour dispatch for use on three shifts 
usually resulted in arrival of the vehicle at the dispatcher's 
office once a day, when the driver turned in the old trip 
ticket for the new one. As a result, little or no supervision 
could be given driver maintenance. At one base where 
a check was made, 15 percent of the vehicles were re- 
ceiving weekly maintenance services and 40 percent were 
receiving monthly services. Although at first this permitted 
greater operational time, the long-range result was vehicle 
maintenance for unscheduled repairs that could have been 
prevented by scheduled preventive services. Within a few 
months this delinquency resulted in an abnormal loss of 
operational time and a requirement for heavier echelons 
of maintenance and consumption of parts which was dis- 
proportionately large. 

The accompanying chart is a graphic illustration of the 
status of maintenance observed at the Airlift base 
described above. 

Depot Maintenance. An important factor in equip- 
ping the bases and maintaining the equipment was the 
orogram initiated by Headquarters USAFE in December 
1947 to arrange contracts with certain existing German 
plants for rebuilding Air Force vehicles and motorized 
equipment. Four plants were in operation when the Lift 
started. They were able to supply many of the require- 
ments for Air Force special purpose vehicles and powered 




ground equipment, including Clefracs, fuel servicing units, 
power plants, and self-contained heating units. 

During the peak of operations approximately 2,000 
Germans were employed at the four plants working on 
Air Force scheduled equipment. Certain sections of the 
plants worked around the clock to complete emergency 
requirements, among them the F-1 heaters so urgently 
needed to heat the aircraft maintenance nose docks dur- 
ing the winter months. 

Phase-out of Automotive Operations. Prior to the 
phase-out of the Airlift detailed plans had been prepared 
as to turn-in and disposition of equipment. As the bases 
prepared vehicles and motorized equipment for turn-in, 
representatives of Erding Air Base inspected the equip- 
ment prior to its shipment to the depot. Surveys were 
required where necessary; and in this connection, it was 
found that all bases had an accumulation of uninitiated or 
incompleted surveys requiring last-minute attention. 

Equipment delivered to Erding Air Base was further 
inspected and classified as to whether it should go directly 
to storage, receive further field maintenance, or be re- 
turned to Ordnance depots for rebuild. The plan for 
inspection by Erding Depot personnel proved to be highly 
satisfactory, and it was possible to evacuate vehicular 
equipment at each base within the specified time limit of 
approximately one month from the day phase-out at that 
base began. 




£— m GERMAN PLANTS REBUILT NUMEROUS AIR FORCE SPEC" 
_%J PURPOSE VEHICLES 



105 





ELECTRONICS AND COMMUNICATIONS MAINTENANCE 

Mission. The assigned mission of fhis activity was 
to provide and maintain, on a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week 
basis, sufficient and adequate electronics maintenance 
for all USAFE electronics equipment employed directly, 
indirectly, or in conjunction with air navigational aids 
and communications facilities. In order to accomplish 
this mission, the following facts had to be considered: 

The electronics equipment available was mostly war- 
time equipment which had been in storage, since the end 
of hostilities. 

The personnel that were in the theater would have to 
suffice until augmented by arrivals from Zl. 

Aircraft to be utilized consisted mostly of C-47's, with 
the possibility of C-54's and/or C-82's becoming available 
at a future date. 

Duration of the operation was unknown. 

Availability of additional specialized equipment and 
personnel from the Zl was unknown. 

General Situation. At the beginning of the Airlift, no 
firm staff plan based on facts could be prepared since the 
sole assumption was that the mission would be accom- 
plished. To further complicate fhe problem of providing 
electronics maintenance support, the following general 
situation existed: 

Aircraft in USAFE were not equipped with a standard 
radio and radar installation. 

Electronics maintenance shops (organizational and 



field) established in accordance with the wing base plan 
were in the implementing stage. 

Officers in charge of USAFE radio and radar shops 
lacked operating and managing experience. 

All USAFE electronic shops were, and continued to be, 
short-handed; and, of those technicians available, an 
evaluation (roughly estimated) pointed to the fact that 
their training left much to be desired. 

The major percentage of electronics equipment avail- 
able in stock had not been fungi-and moisture-proofed, 
and had been in outdoor storage since the end of the war. 
The original boxes, in nearly every case, had been opened 
for classification. 

Radio compass screen rooms were not installed in any 
of the shops, and satisfactory instruments did not exist to 
calibrate the aircraft installed compasses. Test instruments 
and hand tools were not adequate and in most cases were 
unavailable. Those instruments which were on hand were 
of doubtful accuracy and condition. 

Spare parts used with electronic devices at base level 
were non-existent and, in the case of depot stocks, were 
critically short or unserviceable. 

Before the commencement of the Airlift in June 1948, 
USAFE electronics activities had been stretched to fhe 
limit by other unanticipated strategic requirements. 

Organization. Aircraft stored at Oberpfaffenhofen and 
Erding were in a very bad electronic condition. They 
needed new cables, racks, and components thereof; in 
short, a retrofit, or major replacement program, for all 
radio equipment was necessary, requiring an estimated 
3,000 manhours per aircraft. The fact that by July 1948 
there were 108 C-47 aircraft assigned to the Airlift in- 
dicates the extent of demands upon electronics and com- 
munications activities. 

It was necessary to "borrow" personnel to augment 
Airlift shops from Erding, Oberpfaffenhofen, Furstenfeld- 
bruck, and Neubiberg. Wiesbaden Air Base had no elec- 
tronics field maintenance facilities of any kind. Tempelhof 
in theory needed no large facilities since unserviceable 
equipment was to be returned to Rhein/Main. The elec- 
tronics maintenance staff believed, however, that an air- 
craft grounded at Tempelhof without radio service would 



be delayed in refurning to Rhein/Main or Wiesbaden if 
a replacement serviceable radio had to come from one of 
those bases. The impossibility of flying a 20-mile-wide 
corridor without radio aids in IFR weather was apparent, 
since this would constitute a potential hazard to all air- 
craft in the corridor. Therefore a single consolidated shop 
was established to fake care of the organizational and field 
maintenance needs at Tempelhof, wiih orders to concen- 
trate heavily on replacement of apparatus only. 

In the beginning it was necessary to fly replacement 
apparatus to the Tempelhof shops and to evacuate unser- 
viceable components. This was without question un- 
economical, since incoming Airlift space was wasted; and 
the futility of flying extra radios 300 miles to replace a 
tube or a 10-cent resistor was apparent. The Tempelhof 
shop later expanded to the extent of having "ready teams" 
available at Gatow and Tegel to repair radio failures ex- 
perienced by planes arriving at those bases. 

Rhein/Main Air Base had the most difficult airborne 
electronics maintenance mission since thoughout the 
operation more diverse missions and responsibilities were 
assigned to that base. Rhein/Main, for example, initially 
had to take care of all ouf-of-service radios from Tempel- 
hof; and, at a later date, Fassberg and Celle evacuated 
their equipment to the field shops of Rhein/Main during 
the time their shops were being established. In addition, 
Rhein/Main was used as a terminal for material coming 
from the Zl, and the many aircraft used on that run ob- 
tained radio service for their equipment from the Rhein/ 
Main shops. 




Operations. By 1 August 1948 the trickle of incoming 
maintenance personnel had increased to a small flow, but 
the new personnel were arriving without hand fools. 

While personnel and equipment were arriving in in- 
creasing numbers, the demand for new nav-aids, tele- 
phones, radios, and radar equipment was increasing at a 
much higher rate. Any increase in flying operational de- 
mands invariably results in establishment of large complex 
telecommunication nets. Men and materiel had to be 
provided to install, operate, and maintain these nets. 

With the activation of Headquarters 1st ALTF, much 
of the staff load was removed from the Electronics Main- 
tenance Section of USAFE. It was apparent, however, that 
although Headquarters 1st ALTF had an Electronics 
Maintenance Section, the critical personnel situation at 
base shops would not be changed. The equipment situation 
was partially relieved by the arrival of spare parts from 
the Zl. Records indicate that the electronics shops of 
USAFE had to effect approximately 50 AN ARC-3 ret- 
rofit installations in Airlift C-54's which had arrived without 
eight-channel equipment installed. Every shop and 
organization was provided spare components for mock- 
ups and replacement purposes from the USAFE retrofit 
stocks. This meant that the equipment was denied other 
tactical aircraft of USAFE. It was absolutely necessary to 
have eight-channel VHF in Airlift aircraft. In fact, by the 
end of the operation a project to "double" the channels 
by the addition of another VHF radio had become 
necessary. 

By October 1948 the operation had somewhat sta- 
bilized, permitting shops to commence planning for a 
"long pull." It was still evident fhat test equipment, hand 
tools, and mock-ups were inadequate at all echelons; and 
a concentrated effort was made to standardize all shops, 
both organizational and field, to a bare operating-mini- 
mum equipment level. 

During this same period great pressure was put on 
"cleaning up" the C-54 radio and radar shortcomings. 
However, this proved difficult because of the almost con- 
tinuous operation of each aircraft. 

If first was noticed in October that the seepage of 



hydraulic fluid, coal, and flour was causing considerable 
damage to the radio and radar equipment. By the end of 
the Airlift many C-54 aircraft were in need of complete 
electrical re-cabling. 

From October to the end of the Lift, electronics 
maintenance was plagued with serious operational pro- 
blems due to tool shortage, test equipment shortage, spare 
parts shortage, and most important, an ever-short supply 
of trained personnel. This lack of training of maintenance 
personnel was partially relieved by the assignment of 
Philco technical representatives to the various shops and 
organizations. Their services would have been unneces- 
sary, had the level of training of the military technicians 
been equivalent to that of the late war; however, under 
existing circumstances the mission of maintenance could 
not have been performed without them. 

Additional Electronics Missions. Little has been said 
in regard to the Navigation Aids - GCA, ILS, beacons, 
etc. — since this equipment was primarily the assigned 
responsibility of AACS for installation, operation, and 
field maintenance. However, 50 percent of all work 
in the depot area was devoted to assisting AACS in the 
performance of their mission. This work in general paral- 
leled that of the USAFE air maintenance shops, but was 
mainly performed by personnel of mobile depot teams. An 
organization such as the 1 1th Communications Maintenance 
Organization, due to the high mobility and equipment 
provided by their T/O&E (1-1010), was the one type which 
could be used to "fill a gap" on an overnight basis. While 
the primary mission of these teams is maintenance, fhe 



MOCK-UP AND TEST EQUIPMENT WERE INADEQUATE AT 
ALL ECHELONS. 





A SHORTAGE OF ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE PUBLICATIONS 
" m EXISTED. 

thousands of supply items delivered by them contributed 
materially in keeping the navigation aids and communi- 
cations devices operating. Due to the acute shortage ot 
spare parts for power units, it was necessary in 187 re- 
corded cases for a team to deliver a power unit from the 
depot, effect an installation, pick up the old unit, and re- 
turn it to the depot rebuild plant for manufacturing of the 
parts and repair. The situation on power units was so 
desperate that at times there was no apparent source of 
units for the next week's demands. On one occasion, 
power units of 3,000 pounds were airlifted from the Zl. 

Evaluation of Operations. During the course of the Air- 
lift every available man, tool, and instrument was utilized 
to the utmost. Two factors permitted the accomplishment 
of the mission of electronics maintenance. 

The factor of "over-design" built into every American 
radar and radio was one. The ability of the USAF equip- 
ment to take abuse day after day with low-caliber mainte- 
nance was a "plus" factor which kept the requirements of 
repair to a minimum and permitted a few men to do a 
big job. 

The other factor was relatively mild temperatures ex- 
perienced in Europe during the winter of 1948. The 
absence of heavy snow, ice, and freezing cold permitted 

108 



a high productive level of maintenance. Fortunately, all 
electronics maintenance work at air bases and at beacon 
and radio stations was possible in indoor areas. 

Comments and Suggestions. The electronics mainte- 
nance personnel available, both officer and enlisted, were 
not up to standard. Few officers of MOS 4415 or 4402 
were experienced in shop organization or management. 
No officers assigned were in possession of engineering 
degrees. Enlisted personnel in most cases were new to 
electronics maintenance or had a low experience level. 

The shortage of test apparatus, tools, and mock-ups 
was an ever-present problem. At the end of the Airlift 
these shortages still prevailed and continued to be a 
source of unsatisfactory electronics maintenance. One of 
the most difficult problems encountered was the repair and 
calibration of electronics instruments. This work required 
skilled technicians and "secondary standards" which were 
not available in USAFE, since wing-type depots had no 
provisions in their T/O&E's for this type of work. Tactical 
overseas depots must be provided with an electronics 
instrument repair shop, since the test equipment used to 
calibrate all electronics devices used by the Air Force is 
dependent on these instruments for their accuracy. 

The shortage of spare parts during the Airlift was a 
problem of great magnitude, flhMHHHIHIHfcHfcThis 
was due to many factors, among which were failure of 
maintenance and supply personnel to comply with AF 
Manual 67-1 ; lack of understanding of Technical Orders of 
the 00-30A Series; unusually high attrition rates due to 
increased hours of operation during the Airlift and to the 
"seepage" of the material into the electronic equipment; 
and lack of AF stock numbers on many parts used in air- 
borne equipment, most parts used in ground equipment, 
and all parts used in preproduction models. 

Shortages were experienced in Technical Orders, TM's, 
and maintenance publications of all types. TOC's and 
MWO's were not complied with because of non-receipt 
of publications. Standard publications had to be obtained 
by air mail from the Air Materiel Command and in 
numerous instances were reproduced locally in order to 
meet the operational needs of electronics shops throughout 
the command. 




THE AN/CPS-5 (PART OF WHICH IS PICTURED) WAS 
DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO BERLIN BY AIR. 



Deviation from Standard Procedures. The occasioffl 
necessity of "jumping channels" to provide special equip-/ 
ment in the course of a new type operation is recognized 
It is nevertheless believed that more time was lost and 
confusion caused by going out of channels than il 
established channels had been used. For example: 

The AN/CPS-5 was delivered direct to Berlin by aiifl 
is not generally known that this set was short much of Ihfcj: 
equipment needed to operate an effective control center," 
and that the tower plotting equipment and telephone; 
switchboard had to be provided from the theater AH 
depot. The resupply of items to maintain this set in 
operation was rendered extremely difficult because alP 
shipping documents and stock lists were lost. 

The AN/CPN-4 and the Visual Aural Range weffl 
delivered in a similar manner, and the logistical support 
mission was extremely difficult because of many loffl 
documents and supplies. 

The introduction of new equipment into a theatj 
should be primarily a depot responsibility during the eai 
phases, in order to permit computation of requirements 
before the equipment is installed. The depot is the solej 
organization with sufficient logistical personnel to meet al| 
requirements of installing new equipment and compufiffl 
requirements. 



AIR INSTALLATIONS 




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^1 





GENERAL 

The Air Engineer, as a staff officer, was responsible for 
the normal staff functions pertaining to repairs and utilities 
and new construction at USAFE air bases. At no installation 
was the organization of the installations office set up in 
contemplation of large-scale emergency construction. 

Rhein/Main, which was the major civil air terminal in 
Germany, had been built principally by USAFE, and its 
meager facilities were already badly overloaded. This base 
was known to those familiar with it as "Rhein-Mud." The 
pseudonym was not inapt. Wiesbaden Air Base was a 
former Luftwaffe fighter base and was in use for USAFE 
Headquarters administrative flying. Minimum facilities and 
utilities were existent. Tempelhof Air Base had one re- 
cently completed pierced steel planking (PSP) runway and 
a confusion of badly bombed facilities. It was then in use 
by one flight of a special missions group flying OMGUS 
personnel. 

The requirements immediately imposed by the Airlift for 
numerous construction jobs, each a "priority one" project, 
necessitated overall augmentation of personnel strength in 



all categories. The main difficulty encountered, a shortage 
of certain specialists, was largely obviated by use of Ger- 
man skilled workers and technicians. 

The problems encountered were, of course, manifold. 
The urgent necessity for new construction resulted, 
through sheer lack of manpower and equipment, in a 
tendency to neglect the also urgent necessity for main- 
tenance of existing facilities. Shortages of general classes of 
materials and specific critical items made necessary many 
expedients and substitutions not acceptable under ordinary 
conditions. 

The housing situation presented an extremely trouble- 
some problem. Existing buildings at all bases were reno- 
vated as rapidly as scarcity of materials and shortage of 
manpower permitted. No space was overlooked from attic 
to basement. Winterized tents, Nissen huts, and wooden 
prefabricated huts were utilized to the extent of availabili- 
ty. The whole problem was further complicated due to the 
highly inadequate existing sanitary facilities. Construction 
of adequate military housing accomodations was given the 
highest priority, and this work was pushed to the fullest 
extent possible. Projects were also initiated for additional 




dependent housing in Wiesbaden, Rhein/Main, Celle, 
and Fassberg. These difficulties, and many more, were 
eventually resolved; and as all of the airfields available to 
USAFE both in Berlin and in the American zone of Ger* 
many were inadequate, large scale, rapid construction was 
undertaken. The principal projects, together with per* 
tinent data, are as follows: 

TEMPELHOF 

Tempelhof Air Base in Berlin — initially the terminal 
for all USAFE planes — originally had a single PSP rurr- 
way 6,150'x150', with dispersed hardstands for tactical type 
aircraft, necessary connecting taxiways, and an apron of 
concrete block construction. The Lift tonnage requirements 
made it readily apparent that additional facilities were 
required. 

Accordingly, there was designed and constructed an 
Tempelhof, parallel to the existing runway, a new south 
runway of 18" compacted brick rubble, 5,750'x140' wilfri 
PSP and PAP (pierced aluminum planking) surface over 
asphalt. An additional runway, of similar construction but 
with a heavier asphalt surface and without PSP, was con-j 
strucfed to the north of the existing runway. All of this wait 
performed without interference to the operation; and con- 
currently, intensive maintenance was performed on fhe 
original runway. Requirements were as follows. 



South Runway: 

Excavafion 
Flexible base 
Topping stone 
Asphalt . . 
PSP and PAP 

North Runway: 

Excavation 
Flexible base 
Topping stone 
Asphalt . . 



60,000 cy (cubic yards) 

45,000 cy 

10,000 cy 
275,000 gal 
800,000 sq. ft. 



95,000 cy 
100,000 cy 

16,000 cy 
450,000 gal 



Manhours expended 540,000 

Cost 3,030,000 DM (Deutsche Marks) 



ASPHALT FOR TOPPING . 



TEGEL 

A site in the French Sector of Berlin on a loam Wehr- 
macht tank training area, now known as "Tegel Airfield," 
was selected for a new airfield on 5 August 1948. Com- 
pletion in six months was the target set. The first plane 
landed at Tegel three months after the first bulldozer 
moved in, and the field was operational one month later. 

During the above period of four months, the follow- 
ing construction was accomplished: 

5,500'x15O' of 18" compact brick rubble, asphalt surface. 
1,120,000 sq. ft. of apron, 6,020' taxiways, 50' to 100' in 
width, all of similar construction. 3,200' of 40' access road 
and 1,200' of 20' access road were constructed, as well as 
2,750' of access railroad. In addition were constructed an 

THE BUILDING OF AN AIRFIELD - THE STORY OF TEGEL: 



,;•" 









|H . . . . BREAKING GROUND (NOTE THE NUMBER OF WOMEN 






. SPREADING RUBBLE FOR THE RUNWAY BASE 




I 



administration and operations building, a control tower 
with complete facilities, a fire station, an infirmary, a 
transportation building, and GCA hardstands and facilities. 
Runway and taxiway requirements were as follows: 



Excavation . . 
Flexible base . . 
Topping stone . . 
Asphalt .... 
Manhours expended 
Cost 



1,225,000 cy 
250,000 cy 
30,000 cy 
900,000 gal 
9,029,560 
17,879,218 DM (Deutsche Marks) 



In addition to the above, a second runway capable of 
supporting C-74's was later constructed at Tegel at a more 
leisurely pace. 




. . . IN FULL OPERATION . * MONTHS AFTER BEGINNIN 
*ND 7 MONTHS AHEAD OF SCHEDULE. 



. . GRADING AND TERMINAL CONSTRUCTION . . , 




RHEIN/MAIN AIR BASE 

There existed at Rhein/Main one 8" concrete runway 
6,000'x150' with dispersed hardstand for tactical type air- 
craft. It was urgently necessary to expand the meager 
facilities as rapidly as possible, with all construction suited 
to the design requirements of C-54 type aircraft. The 
following construction projects were initiated and pushed 
to an early completion: 

PSP hardstand - 850,000 sq. ft. 

20' graveled roads - 19,900'. 

PSP parking aprons - 330,980'. 

50' PSP taxiway - 4,638'. 

Central aircraft loading ramp - 1,250,000 sq.ft. 







CONSTRUCTION AT RHEIN/MAIN AB. 



WIESBADEN AIR BASE 

When operation opened from Wiesbaden Air Base 
there was in existence a single 8" concrete runway 
5,500'x120', with similar hardstands and taxiways. The 
following construction was accomplished at this base dur- 
ing simultaneous construction at other bases: 

Runway extension 1,500'x120' - 8" concrete. 

37' additional hardstands - 5,620,220 sq. ft. 

PSP aprons - 593,300 sq. ft. 

50' concrete taxiway - 2,435'. 

40' PSP taxiway - 1,586'. 

120' PSP overrun - 2,000'. 

25' concrete access road - 4,760'. 



CELLE AND FASSBERG 

Fassberg had a new concrete runway, 6,000'x150', and 
the facilities there were expanded by the provision of a 
loading apron, 1,500,000 sq. ft. in area. This work involved 
the excavation and movement of 41,000 cu. yds. of dirt, 
the application of 70,000 tons of gravel, and the placing i 
of 120,000 panels of PSP. At Celle the following facilities , 
were constructed in approximately three months' time: i 
5,400'x150' runway with a Telford base, asphalt surfaced; : 
1,980,999 sq. ft. of PSP-covered loading apron; and 9,500' I 
x50' of PSP-covered taxiway. This involved the excavation i 
and movement of 99,000 cu. yds. of dirt, placing and 
compaction of 177,000 tons of stone, and the application of : 
520,000 gallons of asphalt. Intensive maintenance of exist- 
ing facilities, construction of additional quarters, expansion 
of water, sewage and electrical facilities, additional tech- 
nical facilities, flood lighting, etc., is not included in the 
list of major projects at any of the USAFE bases. 



ASSBERG LOADING AND PARKING AREA 



112 



APPROACH LIGHTING 

It was soon apparent that, in order to maintain constant 
deliveries of adequate tonnage into the blockaded sector, 
}\ would be necessary to supplement existing GCA 
equipment with additional landing aids, the most important 
of which was the installation of high intensify approach 
and runway lights. Conferences between appropriate Head- 
quarters 1st ALTF and installations officers established the 




priority and importance of installation as Tempelhof, 
Rhein/Main, Tegel, Fassberg, Celle, Wiesbaden, Gafow, 
and Burtonwood, in that order. A fable of the conse- 
quent construction projects follows. 



AIR BASE AND TYPE 
EQUIPMENT 



Tempelhof Air Base: 

D-2 Approach Lights 
Krypton Flash Beacons 

Center Runway 

South Runway 

Rhein/Main Air Base: 

D - 2 Approach Lights 
Krypton Flash Beacons 

Tegel Air Base : 
D-2 Approach Lights 

North Runway 

South Runway 
Krypton Flash Beacons 

North Runway 

South Runway 

Fassberg RAF Station : 
•D-2 Approach Lights 

Wiesbaden Air Base: 
D-2 Approach Lights 
Krypton Flash Beacons 

Burtonwood Air Base: 

D - 2 Approach Lights 

Construction by British; supplies 
and technical advice by U. S. 



INSTALLATION 



BEGAN FINISHED 



28 Oct 48 

1 Apr 49 
1 Jun 49 



27 Nov 48 
2 Mar 48 



21 Dec 48 

7 Jul 49 

4 Mar 49 
7 Jul 49 



22 Dec 48 



1 Mar 49 

15 Apr 49 



1 Aug 49 



1 Apr 49 

28 Apr 49 
30 Jun 49 



29 Jan 49 
15 Apr 49 



13 Mar 49 
1 Sep 49 

30 Apr 49 
1 Sep 49 



1 Mar 49 



9 Apr 49 
4 May 49 



15 Nov 49 



Note: 



Celle and Gatow RAF Stations were installed with British 
Calvert Bar System Approach Lights. 



Runways at ALTF bases were all equipped with D-1 
runway lights. They proved highly satisfactory. 



GENERAL COMMENT ON LIGHTING 

It is generally conceded that the installation of high 
intensity D-2 approach lights in conjunction with GCA was 
an invaluable aid in accomplishing landings under adverse 
conditions. 

All towers for high intensity D-2 approach lights were 
fabricated from PSP landing mat and have proved highly 
satisfactory. 

Some trouble was encountered in the regulation of 
intensity of approach lights, as there was no provision for 
control from the lower; rather, control was manual by reg- 
ulation of the generator voltage in accordance with 
instructions from tower operators. Quite frequently con- 
fusion resulted when German generator operators mis- 
interpreted lower instructions. 

A unique construction problem was encountered in the 
installation of towers for the D-2 approach lights at Tem- 
pelhof Air Base, as it was necessary to make practically the 
entire installation in a cemetery Since the outermost towers 
were approximately 70 feet in height, the removal of 
several bodies was necessary to get adequate depth for 
footage. To avoid grave stones, trees, and shrubbery, it 
was also necessary to dig cable trenches in a zigzag 
manner This slowed construction somewhat, but all 
problems were satisfactorily solved 



CONCLUSIONS 

The only material available in Berlin for construction 
of base courses for runways was brick rubble There was 
no experience background for use of this material, and soil 
testing kits were not available, but it was found that pro- 
perly compacted and surfaced with asphalt and PSP, the 
rubble gave excellent results When sufficient asphalt be- 
came available for laying an adequate asphalt surface 
course, it became possible to eliminate the PSP 

Engineering heavy equipment was disassembled and 
loaded in planes for air shipment to Berlin largely in ac- 
cordance with the package breakdown given in TB (Tech- 
nical Bulletin) Eng 33B There were, however, several im- 

113 



portant exceptions. Fewer cuts and rewelds than indicated 
in TB 33B were necessary, as outlined below: 

(1) Rock crusher jaw assemblies were disassembled 
when shipped by C-54 but were left intact when 
shipped in C-74's. This constituted a great saving 
in time and manpower. 

(2) When C-82 aircraft were available, the tandem 
drives (together with the transmission and final 
drive) on Gallion graders could be left intact. 

(3) Large items such as grader chassis and crushing 
and screening plant frames were loaded into the 
C-74 without cutting. However, these items proved 
much too heavy for the elevator equipment, with 
resultant damage to component elevator parts. 

(4) There was one important exception to cutting pro- 
cedures described in TB 33B. All cuts across box- 
girder sections were straight on the sides and 
V-shaped on top and bottom instead of straight 
cuts all around as shown in the TB. The V-cuts 
eliminated the need for using templates or center 
punch measurements for alignment during re- 
assembly and made it possible to align all welds 
using nothing more than a carpenter's square and 
spacing bars of 3/8" steel rods. Much time and 
labor was saved by this method. 

(5) The C-82 was extremely useful due to the open- 
end fuselage, which during this operation was 
used with the rear doors removed. Large items 
could thus be loaded with a minimum of dis- 



assembly. The five-ton maximum pay load was, 
however, a definite disadvantage. The average 
loading time and capacity of each type of aircraft 
in moving heavy Engineer equipment to Berlin 
were: 



AIRCRAFT 


AVERAGES 


LOADING TIME 


TONNAGE 


C-47 
C-54 
C 74 
C-82 


2 hours 

2Vi " 
2'A " 
T-Y* " 


3 
9 
19 
5 



There was a tremendous necessity for rapid expansion 
of facilities and utilities of all types — cargo storage, roads, 
ramps, wash racks, water, sewage, electric power, Av-gas 
storage, maintenance docks, etc. Each presented problems 
of an individual nature; however, from an engineering 
viewpoint these problems were not new, and no new 
methods of a helpful nature were developed. It is noted 
that temporary nose docks of wood construction were 
proved unsatisfactory. If at all possible, masonry or steel 
framework docks should be used. 

Approximately 81 flights from Rhein/Main to Berlin were 
made by C-97 and C-74 aircraft. These flights terminated 
at Gatow and Tegel. In addition, from two to four flights 
a week were made by C-74's and C-97's from Rhein/Main 




to Westover. The runway at Tegel, designed for C-74's, 
was not damaged by the use of these aircraft. However, 
the result of using aircraft heavier than those for which 
other runways were designed was nearly disastrous. Within 
four or five weeks the concrete runway at Gatow was so 
broken and damaged that it was temporarily out of use. 
This runway was closed and a four-inch asphalfic concrete 
overlay was applied. Through intensive maintenance, il 
was possible to keep the runway at Rhein/Main open fo 
traffic; however, the deterioration was so marked that 
construction of an additional runway designed for the 
heaviest existing types of aircraft became necessary. J 
Construction was started in July 1949 and was completed 
in November. 

Phasing-out presented no particular difficulties of aj 
engineering nature. Runway and field lighting was 
moved from some of the Airlift bases which were not in 
the U. S. zone. Several construction projects designed ex- 
clusively for Airlift needs were cancelled. The second' 
runway at Rhein/Main was continued because the need 
for it was not dependent upon the Airlift. 

On the whole, problems encountered by the air 
installations officer were unusual only in scope and time 
limitations. The shortage of construction materials in Ger- 
many was a serious problem and was troublesome 
throughout the operation. This lack was more evident in 
the construction of housing and technical facilities than ir^ 
heavier construction of runways, parking aprons, and faxi- 
ways. No ready-made solution to this problem ever be- 
came evident. Each shortage or complete lack of a given 
item had to be considered individually and circumvented 
through substitution or redesign. 

In the construction of runways, taxiways, and aprons, 
it became clearly evident that for an operation involving 
continued use by a large number of heavily loaded air- 
craft, under-design is false economy at ifs worst. Existing 
runways failed rapidly when overloaded. Once a runway 
or other paved surface had been extensively damaged, 
the cost of repairs equaled the cost of a new runway. II 
was further noted that pierced aluminum planking failed 
badly under heavy usage and was much inferior fo steels 
planking for long-time use. 



TXAMSPORTAT/ON 






MISSION 



The mission of the Transportation Division was to exer- 
cise general supervision over the use of rail, water, and 
air transportation pertinent to movement of all Air Force 
cargo and personnel. Through this activity, requirements 
were submitted to Headquarters USAF for air cargo capac- 
ity to and from the Zl, and air priorities were issued to 
control proper utilization of that capacity. 

East-bound air freight in support of Operation "Vittles" 
was divided into .'wo parts; the first was administered by 
the USAFE Liaison Office at the Headquarters of Middle- 
town Air Materiel Area, and the second by the Trans- 
portation Division, Headquarters USAF. 



HKCH ««•■ 



115 



ORGANIZATION 

The east-bound air allocation in June 1948 was 35,000 
pounds per month. All ot this weight was controlled at 
MAAMA. East-bound air cargo traffic during the Airlift 
increased to the point where the USAFE Liaison Officer 
controlled 100,000 pounds per month, and the reserve 
band controlled by Headquarters USAF amounted to 
700,000 pounds per month. This cargo was transported by 
Vittles aircraft returning from cycle reconditioning and by 
regularly scheduled C-54 and C-74 type MATS aircraft. 
The phase-out reduced east-bound tonnage to pre-Air- 
lift requirements. 

Prior to the operation, west-bound air cargo traffic 
consisted of air space allocation of 20,000 pounds per 
month. Due to support of fhe Airlift this traffic increased to 
a monthly average of 600,000 pounds. During the peak 
month, 750,000 pounds of air cargo were moved west- 
bound on Vittles aircraft returning to the Zl for cycle re- 
conditioning and on regularly scheduled MATS aircraft. 

To supplement air transportation, there was established 
an ocean service known as "MARINEX." All supplies 
indicated as "MARINEX" shipments were accorded priority 
handling and shipment in the Zl to the New York Port of 
Embarkation, top stowed on fast U. S. Army transports and 
U. S. commercial flag ships for first offloading at the Bre- 
merhaven Port of Embarkation, and from fhere were 



USAF ALLOCATION OF AIR CARGO FROM THE UNITED STATES 
INCREASED TO 800,000 POUNDS A MONTH. 




Pk 



u 



>'■ 



9 




shipped to their destination by the fastest available surface 
means. As originally established in September 1948, this 
express service was for east-bound traffic only, but was 
made applicable to west-bound traffic in December. 

The Transportation Division coordinated and expedited 
movements of freight, dependents, baggage, and private- 
ly-owned vehicles within the theater as well as to and from 
the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation. Constant liaison 
with fhe EUCOM Chief of Transportation, the EUCOM Air 
Priorities Board, and USAFE base transportation officers 
assured complete coordination. 



EARLY PLANNING 

A brief review of the operations background will illus-r 
trate the necessity for the coordination required. That co- 
ordination is illustrated in EUCOM's report on the Berlin 
Airlift which states: 

"Basic planning during the spring of 1948 revealed 
that S-4 staff members at Berlin had been long 
aware of the precarious status of rail supply for the 
military forces at Berlin. Intensive planning was 
undertaken in February and May 1948 to foresee 
emergency requirements in the event that air supply 
became necessary ." 

Some of the early planning included such plans as: 
"(1) USAFE will provide necessary aircraft and 
crews. 

(2) The Chief of Transportation, EUCOM, will re- 
establish TCP (Traffic Control Point) at Rhein/ 
Main Air Base. 

(3) All technical services will furnish the Chief of 
Transportation quantities, including weight and 
cubage, to be shipped to fill Berlin requisifions. 
The Chief of Transportation will call on tech- 
nical services to ship supplies to Rhein/Main 
as required." 

The first blockade was imposed on ground transporta- 



ALL ALONG THE LINE. 




lion to and from Berlin from 1 April fo 11 April 1948. Even 
ihough fhe Airliff during fhis period was almost too small 
lo mention when compared with Operation "Vittles," it 
provided valuable experience for the occupation forces. 
One of the principles which later proved invaluable was 
that of central clearance of cargo, which was the basis for 
lafer organization of a single agency at Berlin to establish 
cargo priority. 

&he Transportation Corps decided in April 1948 to 
operate its airhead transportation on a shuttle basis, with 
loaded trailers parked where they could be drawn in, as 
needed, to load the planes. The general lines of respon- 
sibility established in the April venture remained fhe back- 
bone of transportation plans for the subsequent Lift. 

fo prepare for a future emergency, the period between 
April and June 1948 was used to build up stock levels at 
Berlin and to ship out personnel and supplies due for 
evacuation; for example, military coal shipments to Ber- 
lin were increased from 67 carloads in March to 638 
carloads in April. 



AIRLIFT OPERATIONS 

Transportation service at all USAFE bases participating 
in the Airlift was generally performed by expansion of 
existing facilities rather than by addition of new services. 
In all cases the expanded operation was performed with 
very slight increases in personnel. The number of per- 
sonnel assigned to the staff office of the Transportation 
Division, Headquarters USAFE, did not increase although 
the volume of the workload multiplied. Erding Air Depot 
increased all classes of personnel 15 percent When a 
Central Receiving and Shipping Section was established 
there. 

During March 1949 the Transportation Section of 
Rhein/Main Air Base acquired an additional responsibility 
with the consolidation of receiving and shipping. To 
prevent a demurrage on critically short freight cars, the 
new section was made directly responsible for expediting 
the loading and unloading of all rail cars. 

The attached table shows fhe gradual upward trend of 
cargo handled at Wiesbaden Air Base, Rhein/Main Air 
Base, Erding Air Depot, and Furstenfeldbruck Air Base and 
the gradual downward trend as the phase-out was near- 




ing completion in September 1949. These tonnages rep- 
resent materials and supplies transported to Airlift bases 
by truck in support of Operation "Vittles." They do not 
reflect food, fuels, and other materials actually airlifted 
into Berlin for support of the German economy. Wies- 
baden is a typical example of the trend changes. Rhein/ 
Main Air Base and Erding Air Depot reveal a high con- 
stant loading and unloading trend for August and Sep- 
tember 1949 because of their acceptance of phase-out 
cargo from Celle and Fassberg Furstenfeldbruck Air Base 
shows a rather spasmodic and irregular trend, as an 
example ol an air base which did not participate directly 
in fhe Airliff. 



CONCLUSION 

The Transportation problems posed by the Airlift were 
not new; their change was only in degree. The pre-Lift 
pol^ies, procedures, and techniques in this field operated 
adequately and efficiently with no major changes. 



. imt^ 








































RAIL FREIGHT RECEIVED VS SHIPPED 1 


BASE 


ITEM 


JUN48 


JUL 


AUG 


SEP 


OCT 


NOV 


DEC 


JAN 49 


FEB 


MAR 


APR 


MAY 


JUN 


JUL 


AUG 


SEP ! 


ERDING 

AIR 
DEPOT 


TONS 
RECEIVED 


4050 


4766 


7436 


5354 


7790 


6775 


6646 


6184 


7 230 


5184 


6401 


7101 


7648 


7018 


7 902 


8 982 ( 


CARS 
RECEIVED 


597 


712 


758 


427 


582 


571 


649 


724 


515 


583 


730 


754 


785 


748 


888 


1 026 * 


TONS 
SHIPPED 


1684 


4 432 


5 885 


3 690 


7028 


3098 


3157 


2778 


2 360 


2 664 


2 067 


2211 


1886 


2 365 


1977 


I 771 


CARS 
SHIPPED 


186 


438 


654 


490 


769 


386 


342 


416 


335 


415 


350 


338 


298 


318 


341 


240 ! 


WIESBADEN 

AIR 

BASE 


TONS 
RECEIVED 


9350 


20980 


30 923 


25288 


26 544 


25 082 


23 965 


13 470 


14180 


12 100 


23150 


25 200 


24 480 


22404 


13104 


8 330 I 


CARS 
RECEIVED 


523 


1165 


1720 


1410 


1470 


1 395 


1360 


745 


784 


673 


1281 


1401 


1361 


1242 


729 


463 


TONS 
SHIPPED 


377 


1 772 


1196 


2 464 


882 


1382 


938 


840 


1058 


1948 


666 


2 372 


1504 


1242 


556 


737 


CARS 
SHIPPED 


21 


99 


67 


137 


49 


» 77 


51 


47 


59 


110 


37 


132 


84 


69 


31 


46 1$ 


RHEIN/MAIN 

AIR 

BASE 


TONS 
RECEIVED 


9 828 


46 908 


49 020 


92 000 


90750 


85 300 


56 115 


99 792 


117560 


129 900 


123658 


118 122 


108 354 


134 614 


63290 


54O00 p 


CARS 
RECEIVED 


546 


2 606 


3 482 


4 600 


4202 


4 265 


4 444 


5 544 


5 878 


7220 


7 274 


6 818 


5 853 


6923 


3 520 


. 2700 , 


TONS 
SHIPPED 


1080 


31086 


4176 


7600 


7 360 


7 500 


6 380 


6 003 


6 850 


7 354 


5 780 


5 986 


6 146 


8 334 


7 606 


4 640 

( 


CARS 
SHIPPED 


60 


1727 


232 


384 


368 


236 


319 


305 


341 


353 


340 


348 


342 


463 


347 


1 
232 ' 


FURSTENFELDBRUCK 

AIR 

BASE 


TONS 
RECEIVED 


3 143 


7 817 


5 371 


5 868 


4 677 


5 554 


5 627 


3 988 


4 915 


8612 


8 019 


4 805 


4 767 


3 376 


4 426 


4 351 


CARS 
RECEIVED 


165 


514 


461 


356 


300 


373 


275 


271 


320 


546 


547 


309 


281 


218 


262 


228 J 


TONS 
SHIPPED 


442 


1268 


1002 


449 


226 


700 


450 


407 


432 


54 


441 


1 448 


1873 


1300 


1384 


1038 


CARS 
SHIPPED 


61 


66 


101 


68 


49 


60 


48 


47 


55 


17 


73 


115 


148 


109 


137 


106 



118 



PERSONNEL 




119 









USAFE 


PERSONNEL STRENGTH 

(ASSIGNED AND TDY) 












CATEGORY 


JUN 


JUL 


AUG 


SEP 


OCT 


NOV 


DEC 


JAN 


FEB 


MAR 


APR 


MAY 


JUN 


JUL 


AUG 


SEP 


MILITARY 


































OFFICERS 


2 256 


2 395 


3 232 


4101 


4 452 


4 521 


4 383 


4 566 


4 565 


4 626 


4 753 


4815 


48 14 


4 594 


4012 


3 273 


AIRMEN 


16 352 


17240 


19 726 


23 352 


25446 


27055 


24 899 


26 522 


25 523 


26 269 


26688 


27 808 


28 126 


26 643 


22 948 


19 564 


SUB-TOTAL MILITARY 


18608 


19635 


22958 


27453 


29 898 


31576 


29282 


31088 


30088 


30895 


31441 


32 623 


32940 


31237 


26960 


22837 


CIVILIANS 


































US-ALLIED 


932 


925 


921 


947 


939 


1 007 


1 010 


1064 


1 1 12 


1 023 


974 


974 


886 


91 1 


906 


794 


* GERMAN 


22 144 


22692 


23 447 


23 276 


23 488 


23617 


23 367 


24062 


24 088 


24 598 


24732 


24 091 


22 152 


22545 


24833 


20931 


SUB-TOTAL CIVILIANS 


23 076 


23 617 


24368 


24223 


24427 


24624 


24 377 


25126 


25200 


25621 


25706 


25065 


23038 


23456 


25739 


21725 


TOTAL USAFE 


41684 


43 252 


47 326 


51 676 


54 325 


56 200 


53659 


56214 


55 288 


56 51 6 


57 147 


57688 


55 978 


54693 


52 699 


44562 ! 


* DOES NOT INCLUDE GERMAN CIVILIAN! 


> AT FASSB 


ERG AND C 


ELLE FURN 


ISHED BY 


THE BRITIi 


>H 










'■■■■■-■■y^~:-;-y- 


■'^o^v^x^W: 




W!'"-"; ■ !%;; 







120 



MILITARY PERSONNEL 



^-mtkm* 





121 



THE FIRST DAYS 

Analysis in early 1948 revealed that the command was 
faced with the loss and replacement ot 70 percent ot its 
airmen between October 1948 and February 1949, and 82 
percent of its officers between February and August 1949. 
To avoid these peaks a system of regulated rotation of 
personnel to the Zl in advance of their normally scheduled 
return was placed in operation in February 1948. The 
additional responsibilities of the Berlin Airlift forced the 
discontinuance of this advanced rotation effective 1 July 
1948. While the discontinuance permitted the retention of 
personnel on hand at the start of the Airlift, it later created 
a serious problem of replacing experienced personnel 
during the winter months when operation was the most 
difficult. 

Initially, the personnel at Rhein/Main and Wiesbaden 
Air Bases were augmented by attaching pilots from other 
USAFE stations on 14-day temporary duty. In the first 
weeks no long-range personnel planning was done as it 
was not contemplated that the operation would continue 
for more than 90 days. 

By 6 July 36 C-54 type aircraft had arrived from 
Alaska, the Panama Canal Zone, and Hawaii and were 
attached to Rhein/Main Air Base. These aircraft and their 




crews were initially placed on 45-day temporary duty, 
which was later extended to 180 days. Personnel were 
permitted to request permanent change of station (PCS) 
to USAFE. Those who did not request PCS were returned 
to their former stations if more than six months remained 
of their overseas tour after completion of 180 days of Air- 
lift flying duty, while those with less than that period re- 
maining on their current overseas tour or enlistment were 
returned to the Zl. 

An increase in the manning level to two crews per C-47 
aircraft required the assignment or attachment to the Air- 
lift of a total of 320 pilots later in July. This augmentation 
compelled new allocation from every station in USAFE, 
which resulted in the attachment of several fighter pilots 
who had never flown multi-engine aircraft. 

Utilization of every available pilot in USAFE provided 
an emergency pilot pool to stop the gap until reinforce- 
ments could be obtained from other commands. 

REQUIREMENTS 

The troop carrier groups that "carried the ball" during 
the incipient period of the Airlift were organized under 
the "Peace" columns of the "Medium" Tables of Or- 
ganization. Late in the summer all groups were reor- 
ganized under the "War" columns of the "Heavy" Tables 
to provide additional personnel. However, these wartime 
authorizations were unsuitable because they included a 
large number of unusable specialist SSN's such as armorers 
and ammunition handlers, and did not provide sufficient 
aircrew, air operations, and air transportation personnel. 
No guide was available to determine requirements in this 
specialized operation. 

As an expedient, group commanders were directed to 
specify their requirements, but their personnel requests 
lacked uniformity even though their group missions were 
comparable. The situation was improved by the issuance 
of Tables of Distribution based on manpower studies. This 
was not the final solution, however, for if was months 
before worthwhile conclusions could be drawn from ex- 
perience, and fhe periodic increase in tonnage targets 
precluded stabilizing personnel requirements. 



Even at the cessation of the blockade of Berlin the 
respective headquarters of USAF and USAFE were in 
disagreement as to the personnel required for a sustained 1 
airlift operation. 

In any operation of this nature, authorizations must be 
established as soon as possible to permit sound personnel 
planning. 

TEMPORARY DUTY, TEMPORARY TENURE, AND SHORT 
TERM (6 MONTHS) PCS 

The air transport and troop carrier squadrons were 
originally attached to USAFE for varying periods of 45-, 
60-, and 90-day temporary duty. The majority of the 
casuals were on 90-day temporary duty. The temporary 
duty period of all individuals and organizations on TDY 
was extended to 180 days in September by Headquarters 
USAF. 

To differentiate between the various categories of tem- 
porary duty personnel, those in organizations from other 
overseas commands were considered as being on "tem- 
porary tenure" while those in organizations from the Zl 
and all casuals were considered as being on temporary 
duty. 




As the tonnage targets increased, it was necessary 

11 either to obtain additional personnel or to retain the 

personnel then attached. Personnel in a temporary status 

were encouraged to extend to 1 1 months or to convert 

to permanent assignment to USAFE. 

f The criteria and administrative procedures tor convert- 
ing to permanent assignment status provided by Head- 
quarters USAF are worthy ot mention. Airmen who 
volunteered to remain in USAFE on a PCS status were 
^reported to their home stations tor the issuance ot new 
orders changing their status to PCS, after which they 
were assigned to units and duties in accordance with the 
requirements ot USAFE. Those who desired this change, 
yet tound it necessary to return to their former stations 
in the Zl to arrange for the settlement of persona! affairs, 
were authorized a 30-day leave upon the completion of 
180 days of duty on the Airlift. Casual officers who 
.volunteered to remain in USAFE in a PCS status were re- 
ported to Headquarters USAF for issuance of proper 
assignment instructions to home stations and were auth- 
orized the same leave privileges. Any property clearances 
required at Zl stations were arranged through appropriate 
boards of officers. Personnel from other overseas com- 
mands whose presence was required at home stations for 
'settlement of personal affairs were not permitted to con- 
vert to PCS, but were returned to their home stations on 
a permanent basis upon the completion of 180 days' tem- 
porary duty. 

During the build-up of the Airlift, aircrew personnel 
who graduated from the Great Falls Replacement Train- 
ing Unit were assigned to USAFE on a six-month PCS 
status, commonly called "Short Term PCS. "These personnel 
were also authorized to change to a normal overseas 
•our, and those who had already submitted applications 
or the movement of dependents to this command were 
:onsidered as having applied for such a tour. By 1 July 
949, 596 of the 1,675 RTU pilot graduates and 
ipproximately 280 of the 700 airmen graduates requested 
1 normal four. 

The peculiar status ot some 150 pilots and enlisted 
ircrew members who had reported to this command on 
'CS prior to the activation of the Great Falls RTU was 



clarified by Headquarters USAFE 1 April 1949. Personnel 
in that category, who desired, were authorized to return 
to the Zl after completion of a six-month Airlift tour. They 
were offered the same choice of six-month or normal tour 
as was permitted for RTU graduates. Again, personnel who 
had already submitted applications for the movement of 
dependents were considered to have requested retention 
for a normal overseas tour. 

Only about one-third of the personnel originally on 
TDY or on "short term PCS" with the Airlift volunteered 
to convert to a normal tour. In the majority of cases 
of personnel on TDY the emergency of the situation 
prohibited advance notification of even as much as 10 
days prior to overseas shipment. The lack of a sufficient 
alert period was influential in the decision of many per- 
sonnel not to convert to a normal overseas four, in spite of 
authority to obtain a leave after the first six months. It is 
generally agreed that a minimum of a 30-day alert should 
be given personnel prior to overseas shipment. 



AIRCREW REPLACEMENTS 

The program of the Great Falls RTU scheduled a 
monthly output of at least 208 pilots and 104 crew chiefs. 
The first of these personnel arrived in USAFE 4 November 
1948, and within a month a steady stream of replacements 
was flowing into the Airlift. 

The RTU graduates arrived in USAFE by air at the 
7013th AF Replacement Squadron, Frankfurt, Germany. 
To facilitate their assignment to duty, that squadron re- 
ported them direct to Headquarters 1st ALTF without ref- 
erence to Headquarters USAFE. This resulted in arrival 
of these personnel at their duty stations within 24 hours 
of their arrival in Germany. 

Air Force Letter 35-143, 1 April 1949, announced the 
rotation policy governing aircrew members assigned to 
USAFE after graduation frqm the Great Falls RTU. In- 
dividuals who had reported to the RTU prior to 1 May 1949 
were authorized to return to the Zl for reassignment upon 
the completion of six months of duty with the Airlift 
Individuals who reported to the RTU on or subsequent 




to 1 May 1949 were assigned to USAFE for a normal 
overseas tour. 

As noted in the previous section, RTU graduates who 
so desired could request a change of status from six-month 
to normal PCS. All of the 180 crew chiefs who had re- 
quested a normal tour with USAFE were retained in that 
duty. Of the 596 pilot RTU graduates who had requested 
a normal overseas tour with USAFE, 412 were to be 
utilized as pilots during all of their four. One hundred 
and eighty-four were to be utilized in MOS's other than 
pilot after the complefion of six months of flying duty. This 
policy, based on these pilots' qualifications in critical and 
acutely short non-flying MOS's, received the concurrence 
of Headquarters USAF. Accordingly, it was possible to 
reduce the flow of pilot trainees by 412 and reduce the 
USAFE officer requisitions for other specialties by 184 as 
projected to 1 December 1949. 

By December 1948 sufficient pilot personnel had been 
received to provide 2.63 crews for each operational air- 
craft. Experience indicated that this manning level was 
insufficient to meet constantly increasing tonnage require- 
ments. The figure of 3.0 crews was determined as neces- 
sary. Concurrently with the consideration of this proposal, 
15 December 1948 to 8 January 1949, USAFE received 39 
C-54 aircraft needed fo meet the ordered increase in 
tonnage. Nineteen of the crews which ferried these air- 
craft returned under orders to the United States. The 
remaining 20 crews, mostly from MATS stations, were re- 
tained in USAFE on an assigned basis. 

The manning of fhese additional aircraft required that 
the available pilots be spread even more thinly to the 
point of reducing the over-all manning level to 2.29 crews 
per aircraft. Tonnage obligations then being mef required 
an operating minimum of 2.5 crews per aircraft. The re- 
duction of this level to 2.29 created an emergency situation, 
and Headquarters USAF was requested to make available 
194 pilots direct from Zl stations. This direct assign- 
ment, by-passing the Great Falls RTU, was calculated to 
advance their arrival by as much as five weeks. Ap- 
proximately 30 pilots arrived againsf this emergency 
requisition before a stepped-up graduation rate at the 
RTU made it possible for USAFE to cancel the remainder 



124 



of the requisition. 

The increased flow from the RTU and the number of 
pilots converting from temporary duty to permanent 
change of station accomplished a build-up to the desired 
three crews per operational aircraft, with sufficient addi- 
tional pilots to perform the related duties of check pilots and 
standardization board members. The overage in crew 
chiefs at this time was utilized on ground maintenance. 

PERIODS OF TDY 

Accurate estimates of the geopolitical situation had 
been made both at the Department of the Air Force and 
the Department of State levels. We have noted that 
personnel and equipment were generally placed on 90- 
day temporary duty. In September 1948, approximately 
90 days after the commencement of the Airlift, the in- 
terested powers conferred on discontinuing the blockade 
of Berlin, but no agreement satisfactory to all governments 
was reached. The blockading power seemingly calculated 
that poor flying weather during the winter would render 
impossible the supplying of a city by air. In that same 
month the temporary duty period of all personnel was 
extended to six months. This action, in the majority of the 
cases, terminated the tours in January. By that time, it was 
believed, it would be possible to evaluate the success of 
operations during November and December, the worst 
months for flying weather. 

The bold geopolitical estimates were vindicated, for in 
the month of May 1949, final agreement fo cease the 
blockade was reached on high governmental levels. 

REQUISITIONS ON PCS BASIS 

Hundreds of personnel on temporary duty had been 
of indispensable assistance in building up the Airlift, but 
personnel on a permanently assigned basis were needed 
after the opening phase of such an emergency operation. 

At the commencement of the Airlift, requisitions for 
officer personnel had already been submitted to include 
requirements fo 1 December 1949. Requisitions for this 



period were for fewer officers than the number of fore- 
casted returnees, owing fo the reduction in authorizations 
and the implementation of a system of regulated ad- 
vanced rotation. 

Because of the immediate additional requirements ol 
the Airlift, an emergency requisition for 264 officers was 
submitted by teletype on 5 August 1948. The message 
included a request for 64 four-engine pilots and 10 air- 
craft maintenance officers on 90-day temporary duty to 
fill shortages in C-54 squadrons recently attached to 
USAFE. An emergency requisition was submitted on 9 
September 1948 requesting 62 officers in critical MOS's. 
On the same day a consolidated requisition was sub- 
mitted by letter to provide replacements for the 465 of- 
ficers who would complete normal tours and 6-monlri 
temporary duty tours during December 1948 and January 
and February 1949. 

The increase in tonnage targets and resulting increase 
in authorizations forced a change in the requisition 
schedule, which was altered to provide for the requisition' 
ing of anticipated shortages as of 1 January 1949 and ol 
replacements for the following months. Unfilled balances 
of all outstanding requisitions were cancelled, and this 
headquarters was notified by Headquarters USAF of the 
number of officers by MOS that had applied against each 
previous outstanding requisition. 

Requisitions for the months of January to August 1949 
were based on losses due to completion of a normal 
tour, a 6-month PCS tour (Great Falls RTU graduates), 
and periods of temporary duty varying from 6 to II 
months. However, the complexity of accurately computing 
the above losses for each month is readily apparent 
There were daily changes due to the number of officer) 
changing their status from temporary duty, temporar 
tenure, and 6-month PCS to normal PCS. There were 
also numerous early returns to the Zl because of hardship 
or for further training of rated officers whose primary 
aeronautical rating was bombardier. The reassignment d 
qualified navigators fo that primary duty and the reassign 
ment of Great Falls RTU graduates who were qualified if 
critical or acutely short MOS's to duties in those special 
ties, after the completion of six-month flying duty, con 



il'lt 



iribufed io the complexity ot accounting tor losses. 
These factors, coupled with the differences between the 
authorizations from Headquarters USAF and the require- 
ments as established by the DCS/Operations, Headquarters 
USAFE, resulted in some requisitions being nothing more 
than the broadest estimates of needs. 

Headquarters USAFE also submitted requisitions for 
the 59th Air Depot, Burfonwood, England, until 5 January 
1949, when that organization and the 3rd Air Division were 
assigned direct to Headquarters USAF. These requisitions 
requested that assignment of personnel be made direct 
to England and that information copies of related 
correspondence be furnished Headquarters USAFE. 

The accompanying tables illustrate USAFE's personnel 
requirements and resources during the Airlift period, and 
•he requisition actions taken to maintain the proper officer 
and airmen personnel levels. 

The procedure in requisitioning airmen was com- 
plicated by the same factors which affected the pro- 
curement of officers. In general, airmen requisitions were 
submitted in blocks of 1,000. A relatively small number 
of enlisted men was requisitioned for the 438th Signal 
Aviation Construction Company and the 862d Engineer 
Aviation Battalion, the two Department of the Army units 
assigned to USAFE. As requirements increased, emergency 
requisitions were submitted requesting large numbers of 
i airmen in the communication, maintenance, and supply 
fields. 

Subsequent to 28 February 1949 requisitions for air- 
men were no longer submitted, as Headquarters USAF 
m made assignments on the requirements reflected in the 
PI Report of Air Force Personnel, RCS AF-SC-P2, submitted 
°by Statistical Services, Headquarters USAFE. Submission 
%>f special requisitions for SCARWAF enlisted personnel 
ontinued. 

During some months as high as 70 percent of the air- 
F "nen assigned to USAFE from other commands were basic 
airmen, SSN 521. Over 4,000 basic airmen were assigned 
o USAFE between October 1948 and February 1949. 
^one of them had been requisitioned. Headquarters USAF 
vas informed that the responsibility of providing on-the- 
ob training for these airmen was seriously reducing the 




operational efficiency of the Airlift. The flow of basic air- 
men was stopped, and some already in the command 
were returned to the Zl. 

The most important shortage of airmen was in the 
maintenance field. Fifteen ground crew maintenance 
personnel per aircraft was the manning level considered 
essential for sustained operations. During January 1949 
the manning level was 7, and during July it was 12. Many 
of the maintenance personnel who were assigned to 
USAFE as late as April 1949 were not considered fully 
qualified for duty in an operation of emergency tempo. 
Communications to Headquarters USAF reporting these 
shortages resulted eventually in the assignment of many 
highly qualified maintenance personnel. The following 
figures illustrate that 28 percent of the airmen authorized in 
the maintenance field arrived after agreements had been 
reached to lift the blockade: 



Airmen Assignments in Maintenance Field 

April 1949 153 

May 1949 537 

June 1949 869 

July 1949 136 

(Total for May and June is 1,406, or 28 
percent of the 5,092 authorized.) 



MANNING OF SPECIAL PROJECTS 

An operation of (he magnitude of the Airlift invariably 
requires the manning of special organizations and projects 
with personnel of particular qualifications. 

Several liaison officers were required for attachment to 
Headquarters, British Air Forces of Occupation, and to 
Gatow and Tegel Airfields in Berlin. These personnel not 
only were qualified in air transport operations but also 
were screened for the attributes and personal characteris- 
tics essential to cordial relations with other nationalities. 

Prior to the arrival from Japan of a United States troop 
carrier wing at Celle RAF Station, a contingent of per- 
sonnel was dispatched to provide a housekeeping and re- 
ceiving unit. This contingent consisted primarily of 24 
officers and over 200 airmen on PCS and 16 officers on 
temporary duty. The spadework of this group was co- 
ordinated with an advance party of the incoming troop 
carrier wing consisting of the wing commanding officer, 
the group commanding officer, and the wing deputies for 
personnel and supply, who arrived in the command by 
air three weeks before the wing arrived by water trans- 
portation. 

The unfavorable flying weather forced the activation of 
an in-flight weather reconnaissance squadron in Novem- 
ber 1948. Twenty-four pilots, qualified in B-17 aircraft, 
were withdrawn from Ihe Airlift and assigned to this 
organization. 

As in the case of the C-54 personnel, the C-82 crews 
used at Wiesbaden Air Base were originally on 90-day 
temporary duty, extended to 180 days; but only one crew 
converted to permanent change of station. It was not 
difficult to find replacements, however, for many of the 
troop carrier personnel in the command were fully quali- 
fied in C-82 aircraft. 

REQUISITIONS FOR KEY OFFICER PERSONNEL 

A major personnel problem was the procurement of 
key officer personnel. Upon the request of the Command- 
ing General, Headquarters 1st ALTF, Headquarters USAFE 
on 16 October 1948 requested several key officers by 



125 



USAFE OFFICERS 



19 4 8 



30 June 31 July 31 Aug 30 Sept 31 Oct 30 Nov 31 Dec 



19 4 9 



31 Jan 28 Feb 31 Mar 30 April 31 May 30 June 31 July 31 Aug 30 Sept 



REQUISITION BASIS 

Authorized 

Required (Established by DCS/O, Hq USAFE) 

RESOURCES 

Assigned to USAFE 

Assigned to Organizations TDY to USAFE 
Individuals TDY to USAFE 

Total 
REQUISITIONS (Not including 4-Engine Pilots) 

Number Requisitioned to arrive during month 



Number Approved By Hq USAF 



2539 



2256 





1989 
2446 

2298 



97 



2172 
2516 

2427 
481 
324 



2386 
2720 

2720 
727 
654 



3284 
4057 

2851 
910 
691 



4222 
4926 

3136 
668 
717 



4189 
4958 

3402 
258 
723 



4307 
4227 

3853 



713 



4348 
4687 

4190 



375 



4574 
4704 

4481 



145 



4270 
4376 

4675 



78 



4234 
4195 

4770 


45 



3751 
4167 

4787 



*27 



3933 
3906 

4584 



10 



3990 
3851 

4009 

3 



2256 



125* 



2395 



90* 



3232 



80* 



4101 



43* 



4452 



117* 



# 



# 



# 



# 



116 



4521 



Normal 

130 

Emergency 

264 



129 

Emergency 

221** 



4383 



Dec-Feb 
Consolida- 
tion 

464 

Emergency 

62 

Consolida- 
tion 

171** 

Emergency 
11** 



4566 



Normal 

240 

1 Jan 
Shortages 

163 



Normal 

178 

1 Jan 
Shortages 

126 



4565 



165* 



4626 



272* 



4753 



243* 



4815 



206* 



4814 



113* 



4594 



68 



4012 



83 



199 



110 



87 



61 



53 



3198 
2946 

3273 





3273 



# Not Available 

DU tL?tn P ?6 jlf 1 C 948r UiSiti0nS " ^ e " ,ha " >he " Umber ° f r6tUrneeS ,0 ,He Zl dUe ,0 ,He P ' anned redUCH ° n In "**•"«««• «"« < h * ■*."■ of regulated advanced rotation. (The November requisition was submitted bv 

Items filled before cancellation on 2 December 1948. A new requisition procedure was established by Headquarters USAF (see text). 

Requisitions based on the figures in "Required" line above. Because these requirement figures established by Headquarters USAFE were 
requests were disapproved. 



of the authorizations established by Headquarters USAF, a considerable number of the 



126 



i 








USAFE AIRMEN 




















19 4 8 


19 4 9 


30 June 


31 July 


'31 Aug 


30 Sept 


31 Oct 


30 Nov 


31 Dec 


31 Jan 


28 Feb 


31 Mar 


30 April 


31 May 


30 June 


31 July 


31 Aug 


30 Sep 


REQUISITION BASIS 


































Authorized 


18402 


12645 


13856 


15596 


18605 


24524 
28794 


22898 
27719 


22219 
26012 


22366 
25354 


22724 
25229 


22716 
25013 


22717 
24210 


19678 
23587 


21514 
21673 


21514 
21235 


17387 
16834 


J- Required (Established by DCS/O, Hq. USAFE) 




17163 


17275 


18216 


24011 


RESOURCES 


































Assigned to USAFE . 


16352 


16733 


17268 


19410 


20555 


20836 


19613 


21590 


21988 


24701 


25853 


27361 


28006 


26569 


22925 


19559 


Assigned to Organizations TDY to USAFE . 








1515 


2068 


2583 


1570 


557 





























f Individuals TDY To USAFE 





507 


943 


1874 


2308 


4649 


4729 


4932 


3535 


1568 


835 


447 


120 


74 


23 


5 


Total 


16352 


17240 


19726 


23352 


25446 


27055 


24899 


26522 


25523 


26269 


26688 


27808 


28126 


26643 


22948 


19564 


REQUISITION DATA 


































Requisitioned (PCS & TDY) During month . 


1639 


1789 


4744 


4246 


# 


~ 


1364 


1078 


1132 


0' 


126* 


197* 


0* 


0* 


0* 


0* 


Arrived During Month 


247 


T217 


1050 


1369 


# 


— 


1006 

(Included 

70<"„ 
"Basics") 


2554 

(Included 

30% 

"Basics") 


926 

(Included 

30 s /,, 

"Basics") 


3133 

(Included 

30°/„ 
"Basics") 


1630 


2133 


1162 


274 


122 


68 


# Not available 




























* Figures include ARWAF and SCARWAF only. Effective 1 


March 1949 


no requisit 


ons were su 


emitted on USAF perso 


inel. Shipments were b< 


jsed on the 


Report of AF Personne 


, AF-SC-P2. 













127 



name, listing the candidates in the order of preference. 
The majority of these personnel were known to have 
performed duty with air transport units during or after 
World War II. 

Subsequent correspondence revealed that some of 
fhese personnel were unavailable as they were not on 
active duty, could not be released from their present 
assignments, were not vulnerable for overseas assignment 
and were unwilling to volunteer, or had by retraining lost 
the specialized ability for which they were sought. 

Late in February 1949 information was received giv- 
ing the names of' the key personnel to be shipped to this 
command. Their established time of arrival was late April. 
This list included a few of the personnel who were 
previously requested by name. Negative replies to sub- 
sequent name requests contained a reference to AFR 36-3, 
"Requisitioning of Officer Personnel," which prohibits req- 
uisitioning by name except for a limited number of du- 
ties. 

Emergency requisitions for key personnel by MOS 
and any other necessary special qualifications were being 
filled in two or three months. Requesting key personnel 
by name more than doubled the normal time between the 
date of request and the date of arrival. 

CLASSIFICATION AND AUDIT 

Personnel classification and audit, the activity of iden- 
tifying people by the skills they possess and monitoring 
their assignments, is essential to the success of any 
organization. When that organization is engaged in war 
or an emergency operation, the proper utilization of all 
available human skill becomes vital to success. 

Uncertainty as to the duration of the Airlift and the initial 
emphasis on operational rather than administrative prob- 
lems retarded the establishment of a vigorous personnel 
classification and audit system. After two months of opera- 
tion, shortages in certain skills became serious. On the 
theory that this could be partly alleviated by proper 
utilization of available personnel, a comprehensive study 
of personnel utilization was initiated in September 1948. 

128 



This study indicated that 20 percent of all airmen were 
assigned to duties other than those for which classified. 
Approximately two-thirds of these airmen were training 
out of specialties in which other airmen were undergoing 
on-the-job training. 

A study of personnel administrative procedures at the 
wing, group, and squadron levels failed to reveal any 
uniform method of distributing skills on the basis of 
position vacancies. Information concerning the occupational 
requirements of each unit and an inventory of the skills 
available were needed at all echelons of command. To 
meet this requirement, the USAFE Manning Chart was 
established. This chart was similar in form to the old AF 
Form 127, indicating the personnel authorized and assigned 
each unit within specification serial number. 

Meanwhile, USAFE Air Inspector reports indicated that 
the maintenance of Airlift personnel records and personnel 
accounting was deteriorating. Inspection revealed the 
causes to be a lack of qualified personnel specialists and 
inadequate distribution of directives. A means had to 
be provided to assure proper maintenance of personnel 
records, and the attention of the USAFE Personnel Audit 



i 

■ 1948 J 




Team was shifted to the Airlift during December 

Initial personnel audits of Airlift organizations were 
conducted in conjunction with inspections by the Sfaiis-i 
tical Services Directorate of the USAFE Comptroller. These,' ■ 
audits disclosed discrepancies in personnel accounting,)^, 
maintenance of personnel records, and personnel utiliza-J 
tion. The recommendations made led to correction oij 
many of the deficiencies. m; 

The magnitude of the audits required the formation oI|f c 
an additional personnel audit team operating under the tat 
jurisdiction of Headquarters 1st ALTF. During the fivetse 
months of its existence this new personnel audit team con^'o 
ducted two comprehensive audits of each Airlift unit, 
Specific recommendations were made for reclassification 
and reassignment of individuals, procurement and appli- 
cation of personnel directives, and readjustment of per- 
sonnel administrative procedures at wing, group, andjof 
squadron level. The effectiveness of the personnel audit 
team was demonstrated by vast improvements in personnel 
administration and a steady decrease in the number 
personnel mal-assignments. 



f 



AIRLIFT PERSONNEL WERE REWARDED FOR A JOB 



AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Credit for a job well-done has always been one of the 
nest rewards of military service. The personnel who 
participated in the Airlift received this recognition through 
ie presentation of awards and decorations. 

Authority to award the Air Medal in connection with 
ne Airlift was delegated by the Department of the Air 
orce to the Commanding General, USAFE. The presen- 
ition of this award recognized the round-the-clock 
ervices of aircrews who flew the narrow aerial corridor 
3 Berlin with three to seven-minute intervals between 
ircraff and who frequently executed take-offs and land- 
igs in dense fog that was penetrated only by the guid- 
ig instructions of the GCA operators. 

The primary basis for this award was the completion 
>f 100 missions to Berlin. The date 1 September 1949 
/as designated as the final date for the compilation of the 
umber of missions completed. Any airman or officer who 
3st his life while participating in aerial flight on the Lift 
sceived posthumous consideration for the award. Meri- 



torious achievement while participating in any mission 
where unusual circumstances prevailed constituted another 
basis. 

The Berlin Airlift device is a special Airlift decoration. 
Its official description is "a gold-colored metal miniature 
of a C-54 type aircraft of a 3/8-inch wing span, other 
dimensions proportionate, which is worn on the service 
ribbon or on the suspension ribbon of the Occupation 
Medal for Germany with the nose pointing upward at a 
30-degree angle and toward the wearer's own right." 
This device was awarded to personnel who had per- 
formed "service for 90 consecutive days while assigned 

or attached to a unit in the Occupation (Forces) 

of Germany which has been designated in General Orders 
of the Department of the Army or Department of the Air 
Force as participating in the Berlin Airlift between 26 June 
1948 and a terminal date to be announced later." 

The Congress of the United States has authorized 
"The Medal for Humane Action" to recognize those 
individuals who distinguished themselves by meritorious 
participation in the humane military effort to supply the 




necessities of life to the people of Berlin. The exact re- 
quirements for this award and the design of the medal 
have not been published. The colors for the ribbon of 
The Medal for Humane Action have been selected to rep- 
resent the colors of the Coat of Arms of Berlin - red, 
white, and black - against a background of blue sym- 
bolizing the sky from which the beleagered city was 
supplied. 

From July 1948 to October 1949, 2,709 awards were 
made to Airlift participants. This number included 2,374 
Air Medals, 1 Distinguished Flying Cross, 2 Distinguished 
Service Medals, 68 Legion of Merit Awards, 11 Soldier's 
Medals, 1 Cheney Award, 245 Commendation Ribbons, 
and 7 awards to civilians for meritorious service. 

Participating United States Naval personnel were 
eligible for and received awards on the same basis as 
United States Air Force personnel. 



THE PHASE-OUT 

Planning for the necessary reduction in force necessi- 
tated by the cessation of the blockade of Berlin began in 
1948. In the middle of May 1949 the personnel plan be- 
came operational; all organizations were directed to 
screen personnel to determine their individual desires 
for retention or non-retention in the post-Airlift program 
and to ascertain the corresponding recommendations of 
their commanding officers. Personnel were listed in four 
categories or groups as follows: 

GROUP I - Desires retention and retention is recom- 
mended by commanding officer. 
GROUP II - Does not desire retention and release is 

recommended by commanding officer. 
GROUP III - Desires retention but is not recommended 

for retention by commanding officer. 
GROUP IV - Does not desire retention but retention is 
recommended by commanding officer. 
The directive emphasized that the report was for 
planning purposes only and did not constitute a promise 
of retention in USAFE or of return to the Zl after the 
cessation of the blockade. 



129 



Plans were made for retention of a small number of 
overages in many specialties, since only tentative authori- 
zations for post-Airlift USAFE were available. It was not 
until 29 October 1949 that Headquarters USAFE forwarded 
to Headquarters USAF the breakdown of the USAFE bulk 
allotment for personnel. In spite of the drastic reductions 
in requirements, shortages in certain acutely short and 
critical MOS's still existed. In general, these shortages were 
the same as the USAF-wide "Critical USAF MOS's" 
enumerated in AFR 35-34, 16 March 1949. 

Personnel were earmarked as "retainable" or "non- 
retainable" on the basis of their desires and the recom- 
mendations of their commanding officers. At the direction 
of the Commanding General, USAFE, personnel with 
dependents in the command or enroute were given 
preference for retention. This policy was modified in late 
August because the large number of retainable personnel 
with dependents presaged a continued housing shortage. 
To avoid the creation of abnormal replacement conditions 
due to the rotation of personnel three years after the 
build-up of the Airlift, priority for retention was also given 
personnel who arrived prior to August 1948 and sub- 
sequent to May 1949. 

In July, lisfs of retainable and non-retainable personnel 
were forwarded to all bases for verification. In August, 
commanders were authorized to make substitutions within 
grade and MOS, for it was an acknowledged fact that 
many changes had occurred in the three months that had 
elapsed since the original survey was completed. Subse- 
quent to 1 1 October, only personnel who were listed as 
non-retainable and had dependents in the command re- 
mained in the non-retainable category. Following that 
date all other overages in USAFE were considered as 
retainable and were reassigned elsewhere in USAFE as 
required or returned to the Zl. 

Separate communications from Headquarters USAF 
authorized Headquarters USAFE to reassign surplus per- 
sonnel required by other overseas commands, including the 
Atlantic Division of MATS, the 1602d Air Transport Wing, 
the 3rd Air Division, the 1807th AACS Wing, and the 
2105th Weather Group. As of 1 November 1949, 71 of- 
ficers and 250 airmen were reassigned to those commands. 

130 



As stated above, this command was still short some 
specialists. Headquarters USAF was informed that 36 of- 
ficers of the many requisitioned and, presumably, then 
in the incoming pipeline, were still required in the post- 
Airlift program. 

A significant administrative function of the phase-out 
was the reporting of personnel to Headquarters USAF 
prior to their return to the Zl. Airmen with dependents 
in the command were individually reported by teletype 
and were not released until their assignment instructions 
were received. All other departing airmen were reported 
in daily teletype messages by totals in specification serial 
numbers. 

Headquarters USAFE reported officers daily by tele- 
type, utilizing a status file which contained a card on each 
officer indicating all information needed for his reassign- 
ment plus the date and method of his travel. This file not 
only expedited preparation of the reports, but also served 
as a convenient reference file. To facilitate reassignmenfs 
in the Zl, information copies of all messages were fur- 
nished the Air Force Overseas Replacement Depot and 
the Port of Aerial Debarkation. Officers who had been 
recommended for relief from active duty under the 
provisions of AFL 36-3, 5 August 1949, were reported in 
classified messages. 

Mainly for reasons of economy, the phase-out was 
expedited, and by 1 November the outshipment of per- 
sonnel was well in advance of planned reductions. As of 
that date 1,768 officers had departed against a required 
1,100, and 8,630 airmen had departed against a required 
4,576. This expedited reduction was made possible by 
the utilization of spaces aboard Airlift C-54 aircraft being 
returned to the Zl and additional spaces made available 
by Headquarters EUCOM aboard scheduled MATS air- 
craft and surface transports. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Experience in the Berlin Airlift indicates that, as a 
general rule, peak efficiency cannot be expected of 
personnel on a protracted period of TDY. The low morale 



of personnel absent from their families and obligations iork 
periods of several months severely reduces the quality ol| 
their job performance. Further, a large percentage of Ihef 
unmarried personnel have a "temporary" attitude whictij 
tends to restrict their job effort. Periods of necessary TDYr 
should not exceed 45 days, after which TDY peri 
sonnel should be replaced by others on a PCS status/,. 
The importance of this is considered sufficient to warrant! 
deviation from any existing policy governing frequency! 
of oversea tours of duty. 

Attempts to fill key officer positions by name reques! 
for certain individuals often proved unsuccessful in fhlj 
operation, as it has in the past. If requisitions for office 
for key positions had been limited to clear and compl 
descriptions of the position requirements, the delay I 
filling these positions caused by rejected name requesl: 
would have been prevented. 

The Berlin Airlift was formed from units, parts of uniji 
and individuals from areas throughout the world. Becaffl 
of difficulties arising from its heterogeneous character,! 
accurate personnel accounting was not obtained untirlj 
seven months after the operation started. Command-wide 
verification of the effective use of fhese personnel was! 
delayed until proper accounting could be established! 
After several months' experience indicated inability toi 
secure accurate accounting by usual methods, a special 
team of accounting and classification personnel was 
organized for first-hand analysis and correction of the 
deficiencies of personnel and classification sections at unit 
level. 

The work of fhe feam would have been simplified 
and its objective reached earlier had it been placed in 
operation in the first months of Airlift, before the passage 
of time made it increasingly difficult to unravel confusec 
accounting and classification records. Accordingly, it |! 
believed correct to anticipate that a confused personne 
accounting and utilization situation will exist in the initia 
phases of any future large-scale emergency air operatic" 
and that a similar team, which can make on-fhe-spo 
analyses and correction of errors, should be put at won 
during the opening days of the operation. 




HOUSING 
POLICIES 

Military personnel and their dependents in Germany 
are housed only in public buildings and private residences 
requisitioned from the German economy. With the gradual 
reduction of military personnel in USAFE prior to the 
Airlift, excess dependent housing was periodically de- 
requisitioned and only sufficient homes were kept to 
meet actual military requirements. Thousands of private 
German residences had been destroyed during the war. 
Throughout Germany there was a critical housing shortage, 
and it was theater policy to return buildings to the Ger- 
mans when the military need for their utilization had 
passed. There was also a theater policy which prohibited 
the renting of private residences or hotel accomodations 
Jby any member of the Armed Forces, and a policy that 
|no additional residences be requisitioned. 

It was thought that the Airlift operation would be of 
[short duration and personnel were brought to Germany 



on a temporary duty basis. It soon became evident, 
however, that the Airlift operation would continue for an 
indefinite period, and authority was given for temporary 
duty personnel to change to PCS. Personnel had been 
hurriedly transferred on temporary duty to USAFE, and in 
many instances transport air crews were ordered on 60- to 
90-day temporary duty to USAFE on only a few hours' 
notice. Many personnel ordered to USAFE from the Far 
East had been in that area without their dependents for 
more than a year. In some cases their dependents were 
on the high seas enroute to join them in Japan when the 
sponsors were suddenly sent to Germany by air 

MINIMIZING THE SHORTAGE 

In order to maintain the Airlift on a more permanent 
operational basis, it was felt necessary for morale purposes 
either to: (a) build the units up to strength with personnel 
on a PCS status, or (b) place personnel on duty with the 
Airlift on a temporary duty status for six months, leaving 



their dependents at their permanent stations. Both systems 
were actually utilized. 

Housing surveys were instituted at all Airlift stations, 
and small amounts of housing space were procured. A 
majority of this housing, however, was located at a 
considerable distance from the Airlift bases. 

Adequate housing on a permanent basis for the in- 
creased numbers of Airlift personnel at or near their 
places of duty was an immediate impossibility There was 
such a great morale factor involved, however, that every 
attempt was made to permit Airlilt personnel on per- 
manent change of station to bring their families to Europe. 
From a morale point of view dependent housing soon 
became the biggest personnel problem. 

An increasing number of Airlift personnel requested 
PCS orders; and the seriousness of the increasing housing 
shortage is illustrated by the fact that between 12 Novem- 
ber 1948 and 5 May 1949, 3,335 sponsors submitted 
applications lor movement ol their dependents to Ger- 
many. During the same period only 915 families were 

131 



returned to the Zl. In June 1948 USAFE had dependent 
housing in the locations and quantities indicated below 
(asteriks indicate Airlift bases): 



Location 


Family Units 


Wiesbaden Air Base* 

Wiesbaden Military Post* 

Rhein/Main Air Base (Frankfurt)* . . 
Erding Air Base 


5 
1,109 
555 
324 
225 
186 
301 
110 
361 


Neubiberg Air Base 

Furstenfeldbruck Air Base 

OberpfafFenhofen Air Base .... 

Landsberg Air Base 

Kaufbeuren Air Base 


TOTAL 


3,176 



Various arrangements were made to reduce the 
housing shortage. The British were able to provide very 



AIR FORCE FAMILIES AT 
BAD MERGENTHEIM 

( JANUARY - 8 NOVEMBER 1949 ) 

FAMILIES 


300 
225 
150 

75 









I 


I 10 JUNE I 










K 










/ 


\ 


\ 














/ 




\ 


, 
























J 


FMAMJJ ASO 



limited numbers of housing units at Celle and Fassberg, 
and plans were made for construction of several hundred 
sets of new dependent quarters at fhose bases. In the 
American zone the Dependent Housing Center at Bad 
Mergentheim, capacity 350 families, and vacant dependent 
housing in the Munich and other areas were made avail- 
able for the temporary housing of dependents. In addition, 
plans were drawn for construction of several hundred sets 
of permanent dependent quarters for Rhein/Main and 
Wiesbaden Air Base. 



HOUSING AND MORALE 

Each sponsor who desired to bring his family to the 
theater was informed of the critical housing shortage and 
advised that if his family was brought to Europe, they 
would possibly have to reside for an indefinite period at 
a temporary dependent housing center many miles from 
his duty station. It was pointed out to the individual that 
he would not receive rental allowance while his family 
occupied either permanent or temporary quarters in Ger- 
many; that he would assume a greater financial burden 
through being away from his family; and that family 
cooking and messing facilities were not available in the 
hotel-type dependent centers. Each sponsor, in making 
application for movement of his dependents, certified his 
understanding of the above facts. 

The original problems caused by the sudden dis- 
location of personnel from their families by temporary 
duty orders to Germany were lessened when these per- 
sonnel were permitted to rejoin their families temporarily 
to settle personal problems and to make application for 
the movement of their families to Germany. The very 
knowledge that their families could join them at some 
future date improved morale. 

A new and more immediate morale problem arose, 
however, among the hundreds of dependent families living 
in temporary or permanent quarters in Germany, far re- 
moved from their sponsors' base. The added cost of sub- 
sistence in hotel-type messes and family problems further 
aggravated the hardship. 



CONCLUSIONS 

Experience during the Airlift operation demonstrated 
conclusively that individuals will tend to be overly op- 
timistic when forewarned of housing and financial prob- 
lems, and will apply for movement of their dependents • 
overseas regardless of the possible difficulties. While tern- : 
porary relief of the morale problem was attained by: 
authorizing the movement of families to Germany, the re-' 
sulfanf financial problems and the enforced separation of i 
families within the command had a detrimental morale 
effect. 

A long-range program for the construction of housing 
at Airlift bases was well underway with the sudden ces- 
sation of the Airlift, but the new construction could not 
have been completed for approximately a year. 




INITIAL PHASE OF THE WIESBADEN HOUSING PROJECT. 



132 





CIVIILIAN 




t ii I *"■ 



PERSONNEL 



1^ 




S 




The mission of the Civilian Personnel Office was nof 
materially changed by the Lift; however, the work volume 
was substanlially increased. This increase required the 
establishment of some new positions, plus many identical 
with those currently existing. Since the procurement, 
training, and administration of U.S. civilians posed no 
significant problems, the subsequent paragraphs will cover 
primarily the many problems encountered in the employ- 
ment of German nationals. 

The British Forces were responsible for the employment 
and administration of civilian personnel in their zone. 



UTILIZATION OF U.S. CIVILIANS 

Large numbers of U.S. and Allied civilians were ac- 
tively engaged in all fields of Airlift endeavor and con- 
tributed substantially to the success of the mission. 

U.S. civilians, on temporary duty status from the U.S., 
were included with the cadre which initially established 
Airlift Task Force Headquarters. While their contribution 
was significant and effective, their temporary duty status 
presented the following problems: 

(1) Temporary duty status was limited fo 90 days, and 
extension of TDY was often delayed. 

(2) Civilians on TDY initially received $7.00 per 
diem, much in excess of the 25 percent pay 
differential given fo assigned civilian personnel 
for foreign duty; however, later the per diem rate 
was reduced to 83.00, a partial solution. 

It is strongly recommended that on similar foreign duty 
operations, U.S. civilians be employed on a permanent 
basis. 

U.S. civilians employed by Headquarters 3rd Air 
Division were originally administered by the Wiesbaden 
Military Post. Administering to personal at such a great 
distance was ineffective. On 26 June 1949 the respon- 
sibility for this civilian personnel administration was del- 
egated to Headquarters 3rd Air Division, which by then 
was sufficiently staffed to accomplish if. 



133 



GERMAN NATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS 



Due to the shortage of trained airmen with aircraft 
maintenance specialities, it was decided in September 
1948 to augment present Air Force authorizations with 
German national authorizations. This, it was hoped, would 
temporarily relieve a condition that was fast becoming 
critical. For security reasons, it was initially planned that 
German nationals perform only such menial duties as plac- 
ing workstands, removing cowling and rockerbox covers, 
changing spark plugs, washing down engines, checking 
tires, and cleaning aircraft. Later, German mechanics were 
employed in all ground maintenance activities which gave 
no control of the complete operation, and in which they 
were supervised by Allied personnel and allowed only 
a partial knowledge of a maintenance operation. 



V 



GERMAN MECHANICS PERFORMED MAINTENANCE UNDER 
ALLIED SUPERVISION. 






RECRUITING AND TRAINING 

The employment recruiting incentives for qualified 
German national aircraft workers were one free meal 
per day, inexpensive clothing, and free billets. 

Each Airlift base was given a quota of 50 mechanics 
per operational squadron, later increased fo 65 per 
squadron. 

Recruiting was assisted by the use of radio and articles 
in leading German daily papers. In addition, the German 
Labor Offices' files were screened for potential aircraft 
maintenance, machine tool designers, and workers in re- 
lated skills. German workers eager to do their part 
responded to the call for their assistance. 

The assignment of qualified mechanics introduced 
another question. Authorizations received had not spec- 
ified the number of individuals fo be employed at the 
various levels - i. e., Masters, Seniors, Journeymen, Juniors, 
and Helpers. Since this was an important point from the 



standpoint of management and economy, base-wide 
breakdowns based upon anticipated scheduling and 
utilization were agreed upon and uniformly applied 
throughout all squadrons. 

Some squadron maintenance officers were anxious fo 
employ electricians, locksmiths, carpenters, and similar 
personnel within their authorization of 50 persons. Head- 
quarters 1st ALTF initially required that all personnel 
must be employed as aircraft mechanics, but at a later 
date, in response to wide demands, each squadron was 
given an additional authorization for two persons to per- 
mit employment of a general clerk and an interpreter. 

While the mechanical skill of the German employees 
was for the most part satisfactory, the language barrier 
and the Germans' unfamiliarity with the American aircraft 
and equipment definitely retarded their initial effective- 
ness. The training problems were difficult, and the task of 
developing an English course which would include tech- 
nical aircraft terminology as well as general mechanical 





. - . ,.', 










•*HMEN 



WIN6-S *■■ ■- 

I RB , Eft 
GONTROi SURFACES - - 

ALIGHTING SEAR 



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AlLEl 




135 




terminology was an arduous one. 

While civilian training sections were developing this 
type of English course, those concerned with the mechani- 
cal side of the operation were considering the technical 
training of mechanics. 

For use as training aids, charts similar to the accom- 
panying one were developed from technical orders on all 
pertinent aircraft terminology. They were used both for 
mechanical and language .training. The mechanical and 
English training given German employees proved very 
effective. 

EUROPEAN CIVILIANS OTHER THAN MECHANICS 

Although the employment of German mechanics pre- 
sented the most difficult problem from the civilian per- 
sonnel standpoint, a major requirement existed for Ger- 
man personnel in almost every other function in support 
of the Airlift. Professionals, clerical personnel, and un- 
skilled laborers were assigned a wide variety of tasks in 
connection with these supporting functions. 

For the logistical support of the Airlift provided by 
the U.S. Army in Europe, it was largely necessary to 
utilize displaced persons and Germans. This group was 
primarily used to transport supplies from the railhead to 
the Aircraft. Owing to the speed with which the Airlift 

136 



was activated, little time was left for the normal recruit- 
ment of these laborers; however, a reserve was available 
in Labor Service Companies already organized and func- 
tioning in EUCOM depots and military posts. Schedul- 
ing of personnel in these companies did not present a 
problem, but it is well to note that maximum effectiveness 
was obtained from a 12-hour-on and 24-hour-off duty 
tour, with each man given one additional day off per 
week. 

PHASE-OUT OF AIRLIFT OPERATIONS 

Phasing out was a major civilian personnel problem. 
Many of the German civilian employees who had been 
of invaluable assistance throughout the Airlift were no 
longer required. Finding employment in Germany was 
difficult for skilled and the majority of unskilled persons; 
for many, the cessation of the Airlift meant unemploy- 
ment for an indefinite period. 

Recognizing this problem, Headquarters USAFE 
published a directive outlining the procedures for the 
large-scale reduction in force. The normal procedures 
used in the United States were considered impracticable. 
Rather, in selecting personnel to be retained, primary 
consideration was given to personnel who combined the 
longest service with the highest work performance; and 



the outstanding service of many employees separated 
was officially recognized through the issuance of ap-j 
propriate Certificates for Meritorious Civilian Service. 

Many of the aircraft mechanics were absorbed by 
the command in normal mechanical and maintenance 
functions. For permanent reference, however, all instal- I 
lations prepared rosters of the post-Vittles addresses of 
all German mechanics who had satisfactory employment - 
records. Should the need for mass utilization of Ger- ' 
man mechanical skills again arise, this recruitment refa-J 
erence will be invaluable. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Civilan employees assigned to duty with an overseas 
operation should be employed on a permanent basis^ 
if their period of duty is over thirty days. 

Plans for a project, program, or operation which will 
probably require the use of non-military personnel 
should include provisions for training of civilian personnel 
in their own language and for education in the English 
language, where appropriate. 

To maintain a high morale standard among civilian 
employees, their needs should be provided for im- 
partially, without discrimination or special privileges for- 
any class of personnel. 



SKutl :., SV »CES 




The problems encountered in providing a recreational 
I program tor Airlift personnel were many and varied. The 
\ measures taken to provide that program are set torth in 
! subsequent paragraphs. 



SERVICE CLUBS 

The first Special Services goal was that of establishment 
of the service clubs at newly activated bases and ex- 
pansion of the club facilities at existing bases. Acquiring 
buildings was made difficult by the necessary priority 
placed on structures for operations, traffic, supply, messing, 
and the housing of personnel. Although in some instances 
the physical facilities available left much to be desired, 
space was provided for service club activities at every 
base. 

Six additional service clubs were established at Airlift 
bases. The entertainment provided at these clubs was an 
effectively important part of the program for maintaining 
high morale among airmen. 

Assisted by a hand-picked group of four hostesses from 
established bases, the staff hostess of Headquarters USAFE 
planned and organized clubs for Airlift bases. Under her 
supervision, clubs were organized almost overnight. Host- 
esses chosen for these clubs, usually four to each club, 
were those with several years of club work or associated 
experience. Because of the careful selection of the host- 
esses, the clubs maintained programs of the highest 
standard throughout the operation. 

For the initial purchase of club furnishings, a grant of 
approximately $78,000 was obtained from fhe EUCOM 



SERVICE CLUB, 




Central Welfare Council. These furnishings were allocated 
to Airlift installations to start and expand service club 
operations. When the base central welfare funds became 
able to absorb the expense, local funds were available 
to pay for dance bands, floor shows, and refreshments 
and to purchase additional service club furnishings and 
recreational supplies. 



LIBRARIES 

Reading material was much in demand. Personnel who 
remembered the excellent distribution of pocket books, 
newspapers, and periodicals during the war asked for the 
same service; but distribution of this material had ceased. 
Only a few periodical subscriptions had been purchased 
from EUCOM Central Welfare Funds. To. alleviate this 
situation, bases were given small grants to purchase copies 
of Stars and Stripes, the New York Herald Tribune 
(Paris Edition), and the Air Force Times until such time 
as the base welfare funds were able to assume this expense. 

Bases made contracts or agreements with the publish- 
ers of Stars and Stripes to purchase copies of popular 
current magazines for distribution to newstands along the 
flight line and in pilot lounges and day rooms. Ad- 
ditional periodicals were collected at dependent billets 
and funds were • allocated to purchase pocket books 
stocked by Stars and Stripes. 

To obtain still additional books, an SOS was sent 
throughout the European Command for the scattered 
pocket books published by The Publishers' Council dur- 
ing the war. The response to this request was gratifying. 
In the two years since these books had been issued, the 
assortment of titles had been well "picked over." This 
necessitated careful sorting of these books for distribution. 
When a pilot or airman walked into a lounge and found 
80 copies of "The Life of Enrico Caruso" his appetite for 
reading became somewhat jaded. 

In order to keep periodicals and books in circulation, 
repositories were placed at various locations to receive 
the material people had finished reading. These reposi- 
tories were emptied regularly, and the material was re- 



distributed by librarians and hostesses. This was a cir- 
culating library in the literal sense. 

In the meantime, existing library bookstocks were 
increased; and as each installation was established, its 
library was organized. Librarians selected collections in 
groups of 500 books, and adequate library bookstocks 
were soon established. 



MOTION PICTURE SERVICE 

The Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service was 
appropriately expanded to meet the new requirements. 
Theater schedules were adjusted to the 24-hour operation, 
and film presentations were scheduled so as to accom- 
modate personnel of at least two of the three eight-hour 
shifts. 

The principal problem was the lack of adequate theater 
facilities. Sixteen-millimeter film service was installed tem- 
porarily until adequate and suitable theater facilities could 
be provided. To overcome the lack of trained projec- 
tionists, German civilians who could meet certain require- 
ments were employed and sent to the Army Signal School 
at Friedberg, Germany, where trainees were given an in- 
tensive five-day projectionist course. Upon satisfactory 
completion of the course, the German employees were 
licensed and placed on duty at Lift installations. 



USAFE'S SPECIAL SERVICES LIBRARIANS DISCUSS THE 
LATEST BOOK NEWS. 




ATHLETICS 



Provision of an Airlifl athletic program did not present 
a difficult problem at the established bases. At newly 
activated bases, however, the program had to be started 
with little or no facilities, supplies, or supervisory per- 
• sonnel. Improvisation was a dominant factor in the early 
development of athletics on the Airlift bases. 

At one station, the Special Services Officer, with the 
assistance of sports-minded airmen, transformed an old 
bombed-out hangar into a temporary gymnasium serving 
i approximately 6,000 participants monthly. A basketball 
I floor, a boxing room, a volleyball court, a badminton 
court, a weight-lifting room, and a steam-bath room were 
provided. With the help of Air Installations, softball and 
touch-football fields were built. Dilapidated tennis courts 
were renovated, and horseshoe pits and outdoor volley- 
ball courts were constructed for each squadron. An old 
cow pasture became one of the finest baseball diamonds 
in the European Command. 

The inter-squadron, mass-participation athletic programs 
at each base were generally excellent. Leagues were 
organized for softball in the summer, touch-football in the 
fall, and basketball in the winter. Both player and spec- 
tator interest in these inter-squadron leagues was excep- 
tionally high and contributed to improved morale of par- 
ticipating officers and airmen. 



with direct shipment of supplies from Aschaffenburg to 
these bases. 

Having profited by the experience gained in opening 
Fassberg, preliminary to the opening of Celle RAF Station, 
USAFE Special Services requested that the military post 
responsible for logistical support make available for im- 
mediate issue the necessary special services equipment. 
This procedure resulted in establishment of recreational 
programs at Celle with much less delay than at Fassberg. 
Locally manufactured furnishings were procured readily 
from Germany, Denmark, and England as the nucleus for 
development of special services activities of that station. 

As the Airlift passed through the third and fourth 
month, opinion changed about the temporary nature of 
this operation and steps were taken to procure additional 
equipment. EUCOM Special Services diverted to Lift ac- 
tivities, equipment that had been intended for installations 
not involved in the operation. Within approximately four 
months, all bases were receiving priority furniture and 
equipment for service clubs, libraries, and crew lounges. 



TOURS AND RECREATION CENTERS 

To help provide each individual with the opportunity 
to visit many beautiful and historic points throughout 
Europe, inexpensive tours were operated by various gov- 
ernmental and private travel agencies. The European 
Command operated recreation areas in the German Alps 
at Garmisch and Berchtesgaden, both famous winter sports 
centers. The finest hotels there were requisitioned as ac- 
comodations. Charges at these hotels were computed on 
a cost basis, thus bringing these luxurious vacation spots 
within the means of the lowest-paid individual. Provisions 
were made for granting pass privileges whereby, at 
the discretion of the commanding officer, deserving air- 
men could be sent to the recreation areas of their choice 
at no transportation expense or loss of leave credit. Spe- 
cial quotas allotted for Airlift personnel assured suitable 
billets for everyone. 



SPECIAL SERVICES SUPPLY 

USAFE Special Services surveyed the first temporary 
base, Fassberg, and formulated its requirements for a well- 
integrated athletic program. But responsibility for Fass- 
berg s logistical support was carried by the Bremerhaven 

1 °orf of Embarkation, more distant from the depot a\ 
Aschaffenburg than was Fassberg. This arrangement re- 

| quired shipment of supplies from Aschaffenburg through 
Celle (past Fassberg) to the Bremerhaven Port of Em- 
barkation, then back to Fassberg (and to Celle, when it 

J was activated). Improved arrangements were later made 
•o clear the supply papers with the port of embarkation, 



BERCHTESGADENER HOF, ONE OF EUCOM'S RECREATION 
AREA HOTELS. 





# 



a 



\ 




CELEBRITY SHOWS 



To supplement the entertainment program conducted 
throughout the Zone, big-name stage, screen, and radio 
performers were contacted. Through arrangements with 
the Special Services Division, Headquarters USAF, enter- 
tainment productions were packaged in the Zl and sent 
to Europe via MATS or special mission aircraft. The troupes 
were met upon arrival in Europe by an escort party of 
special service personnel responsible for billeting, mess- 
ing, scheduling, and touring with the troupe. Considerable 
advance planning concerning stage adaptation and pro- 
duction was necessary, but the only problem of any magni- 
tude was the large volume of stage properties required by 
the dramatic shows. 

Experience indicated that the variety type show pro- 
vided maximum entertainment for the minimum amount 
of equipment, expense, and personnel. 

The accompanying illustration names some of the 
shows that toured the Zone under the Air Force program. 
One of these, the "Christmas Caravan" starred Bob Hope, 



140 



Irving Berlin, Jinx Falkenberg and Tex McCreary, and 
29 other celebrities. Vice-President Alben W. Barkley 
and Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington ac- 
companied the show, which arrived in Europe 21 Decem- 
ber 1948 and during the following 10 days gave 
presentations at Wiesbaden, Berlin, Fassberg, Celle, Rhein/ 
Main, and Burtonwood, England. 




SOLDIER SHOWS 

To encourage and assist in the production of soldier 
shows, entertainment specialists with theatrical background 
or "Little Theater" experience were employed in the Zl 
and sent to this command. "Little Theater Guilds" were 
established at individual stations. Dependents of Airlift 
personnel also assisted with and at times performed in 
these shows, which provided an excellent source of en- 
tertainment. The best locally produced soldier shows \ 
toured other military installations throughout the U.S. 
Zone. 

Typical of these soldier shows was "Vittles Varietiesfj 
which was produced by the Special Services Section, 
Headquarters 1st ALTF. Talent was drawn from all Airlift 
stations, and the enthusiasm and conscientious effort of 
all who participated made the show a gratifying success. 
"Vittles Varieties" was presented at all Airlift bases and, 
in response to many requests, at other installations in the 
European Command. 







SCENE FROM THE 'VITTLES VARIETIES,' A SHOW STAGED 
AND PRESENTED BY AIRLIFT PERSONNEL. 

SUMMARY 

In both war and peace, a high degree of morale is 
indispensable if a military organization is to carry out its 
mission effectively. Unfortunately, this desired state of 
morale rarely exists unless advance planning recognizes 
the morale factor. Too often, advance planning neglects 
the special services program in the initial phase of opera- 
tions. This is particularly true when operations are im- 
plemented under hurried conditions. 

Provision must be made for a morale program to keep 
pace with other phases of operation. Adequate and quali- 
fied personnel must be assigned to organize and super- 
vise the recreational program; materiel requirements must 
be anticipated and requisitioned; and appropriate physical 
facilities must be provided commensurate with personnel 
strength. Unit commanders should be oriented on the 
conditions of the area into which they are moving so that 
consideration can be given to transportation of rec- 
reational equipment with the unit if necessary. 

Although the utilization of additional time and effort 
for morale and recreational planning may be at the ex- 
pense of some other phase of the operations in the initial 
stage, the increased efficiency of personnel resulting from 
such planning will inevitably further the accomplishment 
of the mission. 



all 
asize 



AIRMAN INFORMATION AND EDUCATION ACTIVITIES 

The Information and Education (l&E) Division of USAFE 
expanded its facilities to the utmost for the Airlift and 
experienced all the problems inherent in this type of 
enterprise. While its principal objectives remained the 
same — to provide commanders with personnel who were 
more competent on the job from every standpoint — the 
primary emphasis shifted from training to support of the 
actual operation. 

INFORMATION PROGRAM 

The l&E expansion program began with a TWX to 
l&E Officers on 9 July 1948, requiring that they emphasi__ 
the importance of the Airlift in the AIP (Airman Informa- 
tion Program). Headquarters EUCOM was requested to 
publish a TI&E Bulletin on the Airlift and its significance 
and importance. Entitled "Operation Vittles" and sub- 
titled "The Story of How Army and Air Force Cooperation 
Saved 2,500,000 Lives", the article was published 22 
August in Volume III, No. 34. 

The six-page illustrated account was distributed on the 
basis of 1 to every 15 Air Force personnel for use 
by discussion leaders during the regular AI&E hour. It 
showed the part played by each individual and empha- 
sized his importance in the total endeavor. The co- 
operative support of the Airlift by the Army, the Air 
Force, and other participating agencies was explained in 
this article; and the principles, political implications, and 
policies of the Airlift operation were summarized. Con- 
gratulatory comments were inserted where appropriate to 
provide the occasional "pat on the back" so necessary to 
preserve morale in an arduous operation. 

During the initial phase, information centers were 
established in response to the demands of pilots and 
crews for news on current events, particularly in connec- 
tion with the Airlift. Pilot lounges were crowded with 
men who had little time to leave the base. Magazine and 
newspaper stands, maps, posters with the latest news, and 
an AI&E specialist were available in the briefing rooms to 
satisfy the demands of the aircrews for news. The AI&E 
specialist operated as a librarian, an information source, 



and as a staff liaison representative, feeling the "pulse^ 
of the Airlift personnel. 

As the Airlift operation expanded, a shortage of 
trained l&E specialists made it necessary to discontinue 
the assignment of men to duty in information centers. But 
wherever possible, replacements were given orientation 
on the following subjects: 

(1) A review of the incidents which made the Air- 
lift operation necessary. 

(2) The current political significance of the Airlift. 

(3) Future implications of the operation. 

(4) The relationship of individual responsibilities to 
the successful accomplishment of the mission. 

(5) The importance of the USAFE mission in 
supporting Military Government in the oc- 
cupation of Germany. 

In addition current events, especially those pertaining to 
the Airlift, were thoroughly discussed; and question-and- 
answer sessions were held. The orientation program 
prescribed for each installation by a USAFE directive dated 
18 September 1948 was later supplemented to take care 
of the TDY personnel routed directly to Airlift bases. 

The effectiveness of thorough indoctrination was re- 
peatedly proved. The experience of l&E indicated that 



w0 RL-D N .. « 





TI&E INFORMATION CENTERS KEPT AIRLIFT PERSONNEL 
POSTED. 






indoctrinations at replacement centers and at individual 
installations helped to control their morale problems, 
serious incidents, and VD rate. Replacements who were 
not thorougly briefed on the Airlift added to the com- 
manders' problems. 

In October the type and number of questions en- 
countered by air inspector and personnel services activi- 
ties indicated the development of a potential morale 
problem. To meet the problem, the following actions were 
recommended: 

(1) An attitude research on morale at the four Air- 
lift bases. 

(2) An information program to tell the men at 
these bases of the significance and importance 
of this new use of air power for peace. 

The recommendation was approved, and work was 
immediately begun on an AI&E lecture incorporating 
answers to the complaints received. 

To carry out the information program, a team of eight 
men was selected — seven airmen with a sales or 
education background, to present material to small groups, 
and one officer to supervise the presentation, to present 
the material to officers, and to act for the team in matters 
of scheduling and administration. The 7700th TI&E Group, 
Headquarters EUCOM, trained the discussion team and 
reviewed the material to be presented. Following a re- 
view of the plan, the TI&E staff school recommended that 
30 minutes of the presentation be devoted to a lecture on 
the significance and importance of the Airlift, to be fol- 
lowed by a 30-minute quesfion-and-answer period. Mem- 
bers of the team formulated questions, which were referred 
to USAFE Headquarters for answers to be used as a train- 
ing aid. 

After completion of a week of training, the team 
presented the revised talk to various staff AIP meetings 
on 20 November. The action was timely; for Time 
Magazine had just published an article entitled "Airlift 
Blues" which was being widely discussed. During the 
presentations at Headquarters USAFE and Headquarters 
1st ALTF, the question period procedure was reversed, 

142 



and members of the team asked questions of the staff 
officers. This provided an excellent opportunity for ob- 
taining answers to the questions which the team believed 
would be asked at the bases. 

Prior to the visit at each base, commanders were in- 
formed of the program's details and were requested to 
arrange schedules for all personnel to hear "Operation 
Information," as the program was designated. To give 
every individual a chance to air his pet gripe, question- 
naires were circulated among all participants in the orien- 
tation programs. 

The questions submitted included every phase of the 
Berlin Airlift, from the number of pairs of socks available 
from quartermaster supply, to the extreme need for 
engine stands and other heavy equipment. Regardless of 
subject matter, an honest effort was made to contact 
every command source and every staff agency to obtain 
and provide definite and correct answers. 

It can be readily seen that through "Operation In- 
formation," l&E faced problems never encountered in 
normal activity. To meet this challenge, every phase of 
the information portion of l&E activity during the Lift was 
planned as a service to personnel and an instrument for 
raising morale. 

EDUCATION PROGRAM 

In addition to adding to the effective ability of an 
airman, education provides him with a worthwhile pursuit 
for his spare time. What little off-duty time was available 
to Airlift personnel under the strain of their workload 
could have been misspent, without facilities for whole- 
some relaxation and self-betterment. The education pro- 
gram filled a great part of these needs. In general, the 
education program had three tools available to work 
with: correspondence courses of the U. S. Armed Forces 
Institute (USAFI), group study classes, and formal off- 
duty schools. 

USAFI provided the most readily accessible educa- 
tional opportunities for all personnel. It was necessary 
only to advertise thoroughly and to bring the facilities of 



USAFI to the men. To accomplish this, AI&E officers at 
all bases were alerted to the need, and EUCOM was 
requested to divert ,as many USAFI trailers as possible 
to the service of personnel involved in the Airlift 
operation, wherever they were located. Headquarters 
EUCOM cooperated fully in every respect. 

One of the first bases to be serviced by the USAFI 
trailer was Fassberg. During the first three days that the 
trailer was at Fassberg, a total of 96 courses were sold. 
The campaign was so successful that plans for moving 
the trailer were cancelled, and Headquarters EUCOM 
directed that the trailer remain as long as interest in 
USAFI continued high. Two weeks later the USAFI 
trailer was still selling courses at a very satisfactory rate. 
At that time 700 courses had been sold, a coverage of 
one-third of the personnel at the base. Rotation of this 
USAFI trailer was thereafter governed entirely by the 
interest shown at bases where the service was rendered. 

Burtonwood, England, was faced with a situation 
peculiar to its mission in that the personnel stationed there, 
while subject to the same inadequacies and discomforts 
as those closer to the Airlift operation, were too far from 
its actual performance to feel the spirit and necessity for 
their efforts. The AI&E services described above were 



THE EDUCATION PROGRAM INCLUDED WEEKLY "INFORMATION 
AND EDUCATION" LECTURES. 







performed for Burtonwood as for ofher bases. In addition, 
one of the USAFI trailers which had been caught 
Dy the blockade in Berlin was dismantled, cut into pieces, 
and flown to Wiesbaden and thence to England. The 
remendous response which this trailer received is indi- 
cated by the fact that the Commanding General, 3rd 
Air Division, requested in September 1949 that the trailer 
be kept in England. 

Education centers providing off-duty classroom educa- 
tion were established at all bases. Through the use of 
non-appropriated funds and the cooperation of the 7700th 
TI&E Group, EUCOM, trained civilian educational ad- 
visors were provided to assist AI&E Officers in monitor- 
ing the education programs. Fully realizing the need for 
ihese trained civilians, Headquarters USAF later authorized 
replacements paid from Air Force appropriated funds. 

USAFE participation in the off-duty education pro- 
gram tripled during the period from July 1948 to January 
1949. The great demand for educational facilities, added 
to the information problem, necessitated considerable ex- 
pansion of l&E activities and personnel. Previous to the 
Airlift, all bases had operated with part-time l&E officers 
and an l&E non-commissioned officer. For the Lift, field 
staffs were augmented by a civilian educational advisor 
for each base, and necessary stenographic help was 



TRAILER USED IN BERLIN. 



m 



~a Jt ■ " "~ 1_ 



13 n 



f 



in tii nn n n n n f 

niiflfHInmnrn 




provided. When commanders became fully aware of the 
service l&E was performing for them, at least one officer 
was assigned with l&E as a principal duty; in many cases 
more than one officer was assigned to the section. Most 
of these additional people were authorized on a tem- 
porary basis and have since been assigned to other duties. 

SUMMARY 

There were many lessons learned In AI&E during the 
Airlift. Important among these is that the American airman 
must be informed to perform his duties to the full extent 
of his capabilities. This makes an information service man- 
datory under the present-day concept of the fools of 
leadership. 

AI&E must be prepared to furnish this information 
service at all echelons. However, its functions must be 
supported by commanders through provision of adequate 
personnel and facilities. At the beginning of the in- 
formation program during the Berlin Airlift, commanders 
generally were under such pressure that all of their efforts 
were devoted to the operational phases of their problems. 
However, command support was forthcoming when it 
could be shown that a decreasing VD rate, higher morale, 
and increased efficiency resulted from adequate orien- 
tation of personnel. 

The operation of an organized discussion period, where 
the individual could hear the answers to his questions and 
those of his friends, provided a constructive morale service. 

PERSONAL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES 

In June 1948 the USAF Personal Affairs Program, as 
such, was not in existence. Post-war reductions in per- 
sonnel and funds had necessitated the discontinuance of 
the program in mid-1947. Certain casualty assistance func- 
tions were assumed by the Chaplain, and all other func- 
tions were absorbed by other staff agencies. This decen- 
tralization of the program placed an extra burden upon 
the squadrons. Furthermore, specialists in matters per- 
taining to insurance, savings, allotments of pay, and family 
allowances were not ordinarily available at that level. 



The circumstances under which large numbers of 
personnel were ordered to duty with the Airlift precluded 
proper personal affairs counseling prior to arrival in this 
command and created a hardship on individuals of the 
operational groups. As this situation grew more critical, 
every effort was made to procure trained personnel who 
were former personal affairs specialists; however, those 
obtained were often assigned ofher duties since no 
authority existed for a personal affairs office at group 
level. As a result sound personal affairs counseling by 
properly qualified specialists was not available. 

As this situation became more obvious, Headquarters 
USAF announced in November 1948 that the Personal 
Affairs Program was to be re-established. With this 
advance information USAFE Regulation 34-4 was published 
14 December 1948 to establish a Personal Affairs Program 
for USAFE. Personal affairs officers were appointed at all 
echelons down to and including group level, and the 
entire program in USAFE was monitored by what had been 
the Personal Assistance Section, USAFE. 

By 1 February 1949 the effects of the establishment 
of this program were noticeable. Counsel and advice 
relative to personal affairs was available to Airlift per- 
sonnel, and conscientious efforts were being made to 
solve individual personal problems. 

The obvious lesson is that since the modern air task 
force is necessarily highly mobile, all Air Force personnel 
must continually maintain their personal affairs so as to 
permit movement to any part of the world with the least 
practicable delay. This can be accomplished by the con- 
tinuation of the Personal Affairs Program. 

AIR FORCE AID SOCIETY 

An additional program monitored by the Personal 
Affairs Division was the Air Force Aid Society, which 
provides emergency funds for Air Force personnel. Air 
Force Aid sections were operational at all existing bases, 
and additional sections were established upon activation 
of new Airlift bases. 

Although it is impossible to evaluate this program 

143 



properly, it is known that large sums were expended in 
other commands in rendering assistance to Airlitt de- 
pendents. In addition, during the 12-month period trom 
1 August 1947 through 31 July 1948, approximately $.096 
per capita in Air Force Aid Society funds was expended 
for emergency aid in this command; and $.137 per capita 
was expended during the following 12-month period. This 
increase in aid is believed directly attributable to the per- 
sonal problems brought about by the Berlin Airlift. 

Air Force Aid Society Sections should be established 
with other functions of a task force. In addition, it is 
suggested that Headquarters USAF arrange for periodic 
visits by the nearest Air Force Aid Society Officer to 
dependents who are separated from their sponsors, to 
render such counsel and financial aid as may be required. 
The satisfaction to the sponsor in knowing that the Air 
Force is interested in his family would be a vital morale 
factor. 

RED CROSS 

Though not a responsibility of the Personnel Services 
staff, the activities of the Red Cross are closely related 
to the Air Force personnel affairs programs, and are 
directly allied with the work of the Air Force Aid Society 

Red Cross field directors assigned to Airlift ipstallations 
handled over 10,000 personnel cases during the operation. 
Their work involved a variety of services ranging from 
reports on health and welfare of military personnel and 
their dependents, and safety and first aid classes, to 
assistance in obtaining government benefits, transfer of 
funds, and actual emergency financial aid. Excluding the 
assistance given dependents in the U. S. or at Bad Mer- 
genfheim, Red Cross loans to Airlift personnel totaled 
$12,000. 

SAVINGS AND INSURANCE 

To encourage participation of Airlift personnel in the 
Savings and Insurance Program developed by USAFE, 
plans were launched for a vigorous, continuing program 
to stimulate and maintain interest in savings and insurance. 



144 



Maximum NSLI coverage for all personnel was stressed. 
Reports indicate that 71.7 percent of the airmen assigned 
to the 1st ALTF were covered by NSLI in some amount; 
however, since figures were not available for the entire 
operation, no conclusions can be drawn. 



SUMMARY 

The problem of pre-set attitudes of Airlift TDY per- 
sonnel, who had been hastily assembled from Air Force 
installations throughout the world, presented a unique 
challenge to personnel services officers of the Airlift. 

Some of the Airlift personnel services officers were 
located at newly established bases with meager, over- 
crowded facilities. At the British zone bases, there was a 
definite difference of opinion between British and Ameri- 
can personnel as to what constituted entertainment and 
recreation. Through compromise and tact on both sides, 
the problems presented were solved satisfactorily. 

Theaters of a temporary nature were hastily constructed. 
Athletic programs were emphasized, and by the organiza- 
tion of intramural leagues on the various bases and the 
inclusion of Airlift bases in EUCOM-wide league playoffs, 
the athletic program was given impetus. A campaign of 
publicity was initiated to alleviate individual problems 
through the Air Force Aid Society. 

Liberal pass policies were adopted to enable personnel 
to take advantage of distant recreational facilities. When- 
ever if was possible, base commanders were encouraged 
to provide transportation to and from leave centers. 

An immediate program of orientation was initiated, 
though it was inadequate as a result of the confusing 
policies existing in commands from which personnel were 
drawn. A team of information specialists composed of 
commissioned and enlisted personnel was sent to Airlift 
bases. 

Shows from the United States featuring top-rank artists 
toured Airlift bases to impress upon airmen the gratitude 
of the American people for the job they were doing. 

Education through USAFI correspondence schools and 
off-duty classes was encouraged. 



Snack bars were improved and rolling lunch wagom 
were established at the bases. Airman and officer club 
were enlarged. Off-base clubs were established whereJ 
space was not available on the station, and bus service 
was provided in order to facilitate their use. 

It was not until Airlift personnel were converted from 
TDY, or newly assigned on a PCS basis, that morale began, 
to improve. Then, airmen and officers began to adopt 
an entirely new attitude toward their Airlift duties — an 
attitude which developed from a sense of well-being andi 
security within the individual. 



CONCLUSIONS 

No personnel services program, no matter howi 
thorough, can make appreciable inroads to supplant the 
feeling of insecurity felt by individuals as a result of 
improper orientation. 

To insure a successful personnel services program ini 
future operations similar to the Airlift the following should 
be provided each base: 

(1) An adequate personnel services staff. 

(2) A grant from the command central welfare fund 
to the base central welfare fund for incidental; 
operating expense until distribution of regular 1 
central welfare funds can be accomplished. 

(3) Building space for a service club, including 
library, of 8,000 square feet, a 90'x50' basketball f 
court, one complete portable boxing ring, storage 
for supplies 30'x3O', an office and equipment i 
issue room 20'x20', and 2,000 square feet for 
AI&E center. 

(4) Equipment and supplies for the service club, » 
AI&E center, gymnasium, and for a balanced I 
athletic program to include Softball, baseball, I 
basketball, archery, volleyball, tennis, handball, 
badminton, soccer, football, boxing, wrestling, 
hunting, fishing, skiing, and ice skating, as ap- 
propriate to the climate. 




RAF chaplains look care of the religious and coun- 
selling needs of American personnel at Fassberg and 
Celle until the arrival of American chaplains at fhose 
bases; but by October 1948, every Airlift base had ade- 
quate American chaplain coverage, With the exception of 
Rheih/Main. Whereas the personnel strength af that base 
rose from 2,000 to approximately 8,000 during the Lift, 
me number of chaplains increased only from two to three, 
'his was an inadequate number for the workload imposed 
D y me 24-hour base operation, which created a greater 
proportionate need for additional religious services and 
counsel periods. 

A general idea of the increased chaplain activity at 
'Hiff bases may be gained from the accompanying charts. 



Had chaplains been requisitioned on the basis of existing 
needs and not on the basis of future contingencies, there 
would probably have been no shortage. As it was, three 
additional chaplains were needed af Rhein'Main to provide 
adequate services. 

MORALE 

It requires little imagination to picture the numerous 
personal hardships which evolved as a result of fhe sudden 
personnel changes incident fo establishment of the Airlift. 
In addition, inability to foresee the duration of fhe Lift, 
and inadequate knowledge of its importance and its 
effects, made the men who were involved in its work 



susceptible to innumerable morale problems. 

Some of these eases were solved through "morale 
leaves" which allowed the individual special leaves to 
handle his difficulties. To review applications for such 
leaves, some bases set up morale boards in which airmen 
participated. Though successful, the boards' effectiveness 
would have been greater if the final approval authority 
had been at base level. The responsibility for processing 
the applicafon through higher headquarters in time for it 
to serve its purpose, was often left to the chaplain, which 
naturally limitied his time and efforts in other fields. 

Planning for chaplain work in a special operation 
involving factors similar to those in the Airlift should 
consider the following individual problem areas in which 



145 



the chaplain will probably be asked to give aid or 
counsel: 

(1) Difficulties arising from unstable dependent hous- 
ing conditions - particularly if military personnel 
are moved from a location while their dependents 
are enroute thereto. 

(2) Marital and other personal problems caused by 
separation of families. 

(3) Financial problems originating in the adjustments 
incident to an unexpected change in status or 
location. 

(4) Personal problems of insecurity or loss of job in- 
terest due to inadequate orientation on the in- 
dividuals' mission, on the relation of his mission 
to the total effort, and on his future status. 

It is interesting to note in connection with the above 
that the correspondence to chaplains from relatives of Air- 
lift personnel more than doubled when the TDY period 
was extended. 



CHAPEL ATTENDANCE 
NUMBER 


10000 
7500 
5000 
2500 

° 




















AIRLIFT 
BASES 






































• 






JASONDJFMAMJJAS 





CONCLUSIONS 

The experience of chaplains serving on Airlift bases - 
indicated that unstable morale was principally due to: 

(1) Ineffectiveness of orientation on the importance 
of the Airlift to the United States - European , 
policy. 

(2) Lack of proper dissemination of information as to 
the effect of the Airlifts' continuation on the in- 
dividual — extension of TDY, rotation policies, : 
emergency leave, movement of dependents, efc. I 

(3) Inability of the command to deal adequately with 
personal and family problems caused by the 
numerous unexpected changes in personnel assign- 
ment and location. 

Chaplains' contacts with men permit them to obtain 
information of importance in connection with morale. To I 
permit the full consideration of morale problems at policy 
levels, chaplains should serve as members of any morale 
boards established. 



A BERLIN CHAPEL SERVICE. 




CHAPLAINS' CONFERENCES AND CONSULTATIONS 



2000 




















AIRLIFT 
BASES 






1 500 
1000 








































U J 


J A .£ 


N [ 


) J F H 


1 


A M 


t 


J J A S 



CONTACTS WITH AIRLIFT PERSONNEL KEPT CHAPLAINS 
INFORMED OF THEIR MORALE. 



I 




A/R SURGEON 






ORGANIZATION 



HEALTH OF THE AIRLIFT 



PHYSICAL CAPABILITIES 

Pursuant io theater policy, all Air Force medical units 
were under Army control and policy at the beginning of 
the Airlift. This had a direct bearing on Airlift health be- 
cause the Air Force (with the exception of Wiesbaden 
Military Post) was allowed only dispensary level care. 
JAAFAR 1-11-50, which allowed hospitalization in Air 
Force units, was received in December 1948. However, 
the details of subsequent transfer of troop spaces, 
establishment of suitable T/O's, establishment of hospital 
funds, and the indoctrination of personnel in the proper 
procedures of hospitalization were of such magnitude that 
hospitals were not established and functioning during the 
Airlift. Due to distances involved, Celle and Fassberg were 
allowed to deviate from the theater policy of only 72-hour 
retention of patients, but even at these installations only 
limited hospitalization was possible. The disadvantages of 
dispensary level treatment were as follows: 

„ (1) Excessive time lost by individuals needing hospitali- 
zation, due to transportation and loss of individual 
patient identity in large medical installations. 

(2) Reference of patients with minor illnesses to quar- 
ters, when such individuals would normally have 
been hospitalized if suitable facilities were avail- 
able. Retention in quarters of patients with respir- 
atory diseases was epidemicologically unsound. 

(3) Inadequate Vital Statistics. Referring patients to 
hospitals rather than giving them care at station 
level resulted in loss to the Air Force, for med- 
ical statistics of a large number of personnel. 
In consequence, it was impossible during the 
entire Airlift operation to compute the rate of 
non-effectiveness due to disease and injury. The 
only accurate figures as to incidence of disease 
and injury came from the Care of Flyer Reports 
discussed in Section II below. The Care of Flyer 
Reports, however, did not reflect the health of 
the supporting troops except by inference. 



148 



v 




GENERAL 

The statistics presented in this section were taken from 
the Care of Flyer Report (AF Form #203). To evaluate 
health of flying personnel with the Airlift, reports from 
Rhein/Main, Wiesbaden, Celle, and Fassberg were 
analyzed. Comparative statistics of non-Airlift flying 
personnel were taken from the reports of Furstenfeldbruck, 
Neubiberg, Erding, and Oberpfaffenhofen. Tempelhof, 
Tulln, and Landsberg were omitted from the analysis be- 
cause their flying personnel strength was statistically 
unimportant. In addition, pertinent material is presented 
from a Flight Surgeon's Air Crew Questionnaire which was 
submitted to all Airlift air crew members 15 June 1949 and 
answered by 58 percent of the assigned personnel. 



REMOVAL FROM FLYING 

The number of Airlift personnel removed from flying 
because of disease or injury, as compared to non-Airlift 1 i 
personnel, was as follows: 



BASES 


PERIOD OF 
REPORT 


TOTAL PERSON- 
NEL REMOVED 
FROM FLYING 


AVERAGE 
STRENGTH OF 
FLYING FER- 

SONNEL 


AIRLIFT 








Rhein/Main Air Base 


2 Jul 48 - 1 Oct 49 


1,330 


1,094 


Wiesbaden Air Base 


2Jul48-!Oct49 


684 


786 


Fassberg RAF Station 


1 Oct 48-28 Aug 49 


614 


700 


Celle RAF Station 


Uan49-29Jul49 


416 


505 


NON-AIRLIFf 








Furstenfeldbruck 








(Fighter Base) 


2 Jul 48-1 Oct 49 


136 


316 


Neubiberg 








(Fighter Base) 


2 Jul 48-1 Oct 49 


66 


163 


Erding 


2Jul48-1 Oct 49 


25 


145 


Oberpfaffenhofen 


2 Jul 48 -29 Jul 49 


21 


81 



The percentage of personnel removed from flying eadi 
month at Airlift bases was approximately three to four 



MEDICAL REMOVALS FROM FLYING 



PERCENT 
25 

20 

15 

10 

5 




R 


HEIN/M 


AIN Al 


R BAS 














X 


-v 


Vn 


\ 


A 


%^ 






•^s 





JASONDJFMAMJJAS 



AIRLIFT 
REMOVALS 



54 



62 



78 



118 



67 



t5S 



99 



110 



85 



143 



66 93 



109 50 



4i 



PERCENT 
25 



20 



15 



10 



FASSBER 


G RAF 


STATION 






































x^i 


A 


NO USAF 
OPERATIC* 


s ^"* fc "*-. 





---.,'- 


*** 

\ 
\ 



JASONDJFMAMJJAS 



| AIRLIFT 
REMOVALS 



34 



30 



57 



ill 



12042 



50 



51 



43 



57' 



[& 



times greater than at non-Airlift bases, and during the 
winter months was generally in excess ot 10 percent of 
the air crew strength, as compared to approximately 2 1/2 
percent at non-Airlift bases. These percentages are ex- 
pressed graphically in the accompanying charts. The per- 
centages do not represent personnel off dufy for the entire 
month, but rather the percentage of air crew personnel 
that were removed for various reasons during the period. 
There is no accurate method of computing time lost for 
individuals; however, a minimum loss of five days is a 
conservative estimate. 





LEGEND 



AIRLIFT 
NON-AIRLIFT 



REMOVALS AT N0N -AIRLIFT BASES 


NUMBER 


12 


7 


10 


16 


22 


15 


19 


23 


24 


14 


12 


22 


27 


9 


IS 


jASONDJr-MAMJJAt 



percent WIESBADEN AIR BASE 

251 




JASONDJFMAMJJAS 



AIRLIFT 
REMOVALS 



16 



60 



79 



62 



22 



23 



13 



31 



55 52 



50 



55 



49 



47 



20 



PERCENT 
25 



20 



CELLE RAF STATION 



15 



10 









1 










A 








/ 


% 


\ 






./ 






NO USAF 

_J 


OPERATIONS „-.-.> 





JASONDJFMAMJ JAS 



AIRLIFT 
REMOVALS 














19 


| 
15 75 126 56 69 56 







149 



REMOVALS FOR RESPIRATORY DISEASES 



RATE 
IOOO 



800 



600 



400 



200 



RHEIN/MAIN AIR BASE 




JASONDJ FMAMJJAS 



AIRLIFT 
REMOVALS 



24 



30 



46 



63 44 



93 



59 



52 



33 



37 



46 



38 



20 



RATE 
IOOO 



800 



600 



400 



200 



FASSBERG RAF STATION 




Jasondjfmamjjas 



AIRLIFT 
REMOVALS 



17 17 



40 



73 



89 



23 



10 



150 



Common respiratory disease and its complications was 
the predominate cause of removal from flying. The number 
of Airlift personnel removed from flying because of 
respiratory disease alone was excessive, being about five 
times higher than at non-Airlift bases. The rates of removal 
for respiratory disease of Airlift personnel, as compared 
to non-Airlift personnel, are shown in charts below. These 
rates do not include such complications as aero-otitis 
(236 removals), aero-sinusitis, etc. 




LEGEND 

AIRLIFT 

NON-AIRLIFT 



REMOVALS AT NON-AIRLIFT BASES 


NUMBER 


6 


1 2 3 8 

i 1 1 


4 


9 


5 


8 


4 


1 


6 


5 


3 


1 


JASONDJFMAMJJAS 



rate WIESBADEN AIR BASE 

1000 




RATE 
1000 



800 



600 



400 



200 





CELLE 


RAF STATION 






















( 






1 
















NO USAF OPERATIONS 


— i 


"*"•« 

- 



JASONDJ FMAMJJ* 



AIRLIFT 
REMOVALS 



42 



53 



27 



AIR EVACUATION 

Airlift personnel stationed at Celle and Fassberg who 
needed hospitalization were originally evacuated to the 
97th General Hospital by train or by base aircraft, and in 
emergencies were sometimes hospitalized in adjacent 
British medical installations. This method was unsatisfactory 
due to excessive time lost during rail transportation and 
because non-scheduled air evacuation frequently resulted 
in aborted missions, delivery of patients to the wrong 
destinations, and other irregularities. In March 1949 
scheduled air evacuation flights, with air crews containing 
a flight nurse and other Medical Department personnel, 
were inaugurated on a bi-weekly basis to evacuate pa- 
tients from Celle and Fassberg. This procedure continued 
until the termination of the Airlift. There was no incidence 
of air evacuation aircraft accidents or of loss of patients 
in flight. The total number of patients evacuated are 
tabulated as follows: 



MONTH 


PATIENTS 


TOTAL PATIENT 
MILES FLOWN 


TOTAL AIR 

EVACUATION 

HOURS 


March 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 


51 
109 
149 
103 
121 

77 


12,934 
27,985 
37,349 
29,842 
31,086 
21,042 


67 
191 
282 
180 
183 
140 


TOTAL 


610 


160,238 


1,043 



OPERATIONAL FATIGUE 

During the period of the Airlift 28 crew members were 
removed from flying because of operational fatigue, as 
compared with no removals for this cause from other 
USAFE bases. There is no method of measuring the 
amount of sub-clinical fatigue or the number who sought 
relief from flying because of fatigue under the guise of 
other symptoms. 



MISCELLANEOUS 

While respiratory disease was excessive and fatigue 
was a considerable factor, other disabilities did not 
materially deviate from USAFE or theater averages. The 
total removals during the period of the Airlift for the more 
common disabilities were as follows: 



Cause 


Wsbn AB 


R/M AB 


Fassberg 


Celle 


Total 


Pneumonia 


2 


6 


3 


1 


12 


Tuberculosis 


1 


3 








4 


Infectious Hepatitis 


9 


9 


2 


3 


23 


Peptic Ulcer 


6 


7 


1 


1 


15 


Appendicitis 


9 


5 


2 





16 


Hemorrhoids 


13 


5 


1 


4 


23 


Hernia 


1 


1 


1 





3 


Skin Diseases 


12 


41 


3 


6 


62 


Aircraft Injuries 


7 


4 


8 


3 


22 


Totals 


60 


81 


21 


18 


180 



CAUSES OF DISABILITIES 

RESPIRATORY DISEASES 

Over-crowding is considered the single most important 
reason for the excessive respiratory rate. During the winter 
of 1948 and 1949 a large number of air crews averaged 
50 cubic feet or less housing space per individual, as 
contrasted with the minimum requirement of 72 cubic feet. 
At that time respiratory disability bordered on the vicious 



MAKING A BLOOD COUNT 



cycle stage, where replacements for the disabled would 
add to the over-crowding and intensify the dissemination 
of disease. Absence of any serious disabling epidemic, 
such as influenza, allowed the Airlift to continue. 

In the medical questionnaire comments of air crew 
members there were numerous complaints of cold barracks. 
The lack of heat in turn fed to keeping windows closed at 
all times, thereby further spreading respiratory diseases. 

During inclement weather there were frequent occasions 
of inadequate shelter. A typical example was the turn- 
around operation at Tempelhof and Gatow, wherein crews 
would stand in the rain to get their coffee and sandwiches. 

Schedules were such that many meals had to be eaten 
at snack bars or line messes. Preserving proper nutrition 
was difficult. 

The initial 5,000 troops who arrived to participate in 
the Airlift saw a concomitant arrival of only one medical 
officer. This put a severe strain on USAFE medical person- 
nel which was slowly rectified as additional Medical 
Department personnel arrived. Shortages of doctors made 
it almost impossible for a crew member to see a Flight 
Surgeon without a period of waiting. Therefore, early 
symptoms were neglected, and many of the prophylactic 
measures such as medication of early colds were im- 
possible to effect. 

Completed questionnaires contained frequent remarks 
to the effect that cockpit heating was inadequate, either 
being too hot or too cold, and that proper temperature 
regulation was impossible. 




FATIGUE 

In the Flight Surgeon's Questionnaire, schedules were 
considered unsatisfactory by over 75 percent of the crew 
members. Scheduling was largely left to the various 
squadrons with the result that there was a wide variation. 
The schedule of 12 hours on duty and 24 off used by 
several squadrons appeared to be particularly undesirable 
as there was continuous alteration between day and night 
duty, allowing little time for adjustment. In all schedules 
the hours worked were almost always in excess of those 
scheduled. 

The existing medical facilities of a command cannot 
maintain proper medical standards when there is a sizeable 
increase in troop strength. Medical components should 
accompany major troop movements. 

During a continuous operation, lack of guidance and 
uniformity in scheduling will lead to the establishment of 
routines that contribute to fatigue and lessen resistance to 
disease. Schedules should be uniform, allowing sufficient 
time off for recreation and attention to personal needs, 
and shifts should not be changed at intervals of less than 
seven days in order that individuals may adapt to change 



in steeping habits. 

Individuals sleeping during days suffer constant inter- 
ruption if billeted with individuals on other shifts. Segre- 
gation of day sleepers is essential to their proper rest. 

Concern over families, especially in regard to housing, 
contributes to fatigue and lowers effectiveness. Suitable 
family housing in a non-combat operation is essential to 
air crew adjustment. 

In a continuous 24-hour-a-day operation, night crews 
have difficulty in procuring regular hot meals, a condition 
which in turn compromises their nutritional status and 
resistance to disease. Under such circumstances messes 
should operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis and meal times 
adapted to the schedules. 

Lack of temporary shelter, with resultant exposure, 
contributes to the respiratory rate. Temporary shelter at 
bus stops, at loading and unloading sites, and at outdoor 
areas near mess halls and theaters should be included in 
construction plans. 

Exposure to coal dust and lack of suitable bathing 
facilities results in a rise in incidence of skin disease. In 
a continuous operation, an adequate supply of hot water 




for troop needs should be provided. 

In an operation of major magnitude requiring ex- 
traordinary effort on the part of participating personnel, 
there is a law of diminishing returns where losses through 
fatigue and disability increase faster than productive re- 
sults. A comparative study of troop disability and opera- 
tional returns should be made to determine at what point 
proportionate returns diminish. 

Among other causes for air crew disabilities, two fac- 
tors are worth mentioning: 

(1) There was a moderate increase in diarrheal rate as 
a consequence of over-crowded messes. 

(2) There was a moderate increase in incapacitating 
skin conditions in which inadequate hot water in 
barracks and coal dust in planes were contribut- 
ing factors. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

HOSPITALIZATION 

Dispensary level medical care at large Air Force bases, 
especially when engaged in an active and important i 
flying mission, is inadequate for proper medical support. 
The planning phase of any major Air Force operation 
should include the establishment and construction of Air 
Force hospitals of a size compatible with troop strength. 

AIR EVACUATION 

Scheduled air evacuation is superior to on-call flights 
originating at the bases concerned, and should be 
included in preliminary planning. 

PHYSICAL DISABILITIES 

When a troop population is established in excess of 
existing facilities, a rise in physical disabilities can be ex- 
pected. Construction of adequate housing prior to 
occupancy is essential to proper troop health. Construction 
to meet the population needs after occupancy is a less 
suitable alternative. 




AIR JUDGE ADVOC, 






V ^ v 





1 



Creation of the Berlin Airlift gave rise to many prob- 
ems in military justice, military affairs, and allied legal 
matters. Because of the non-availability of qualified, 
■legally trained personnel, Headquarters 1st ALTF 
could not perform the functions necessary for the 
efficient operation of courts-martial. For this reason, it 
devolved upon Headquarters USAFE to provide tacilities 
and personnel to absorb the functions associated with the 
exercise of general courts-martial jurisdiction. Officers with 
i'fle, if any, previous civil or military legal experience 
were integrated into legal duties. After a period of ac- 
:elerated on-the-job training at Headquarters USAFE 
nese officers, supplemented by regularly assigned legal 
dicers, were distributed throughout the command to 
achieve effective and expeditious administration of legal 
>nd justice affairs. 



While the presence of Airlift personnel caused no 
appreciable pro-rata increase in courts-martial, the trial 
and processing of additional cases required the frequent 
presence of regularly assigned Judge Advocates and the 
constant attention to, and supervision of, proper processing 
of such cases by other assigned personnel. Difficulties of 
communications and transportation and absence of Airlift 
personnel from legal proceedings resulted in many unusual 
delays. 

An additional workload was imposed by the necessity 
for consideration of arrangements for the use of air fields 
under the jurisdiction of friendly nations. In frequent 
instances, consultations with British and French officials 
were required in order to reach agreement on respective 
obligations and benefits. 

Other legal problems developed as a direct result of 
the rapid transfer of personnel to assignments with the 



Airlift. Legal aid was provided to adjust difficulties arising 
from sales and purchases of real and personal property, 
leases, mortgages, contracts, and probate affairs. Advice 
was also given on personal problems connected with 
divorce, separation, support and custody of children, and 
similar troubles. Alleviation of these causes of irritation 
and anxiety, it is felt, eliminated many potentially serious 
disciplinary problems. 

Operation of the Berlin Airlift helped point out that 
many personal problems requiring legal aid and advice 
manifest themselves when large numbers of personnel are 
added to a command or transferred within the command. 
Effecting a solution to each problem emphasized that mili- 
tary legal administration must be flexible enough to adjust 
to any unusual demands made upon it, and that the Judge 
Advocate must constantly be ready to render advice on 
transfer of legal personnel as needed. 



153 



RUSSIAN CHECK POIf 



U.S. CHECK POINT. 





154 



HELMSTADT ZONAL BORDER TRAFFIC CHECK POINT 




nday Chronicle 



TRIM-ED IN 10MI0-", Jt \.\ 



,EM*LEY NE«5I'AP£J 




rttr JJark $im^ 



Copyright, 1919, by Th« New York Tlmti Company. 



INTERNATIONAL 
AIR EDITION 



NEW YORK, SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1048 



Record 
ejrlin in 



AS STEEL IS SILENT 



Week-End Lag in Negotiations 
Union 



ATOM CONTROL PUT 
T0U.N.BYR0MUL0 
AS A 'MUST' ISSUE 



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Vi *hm.yAtQm 



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mom p& 

in Cohesion, April U. M2-E>lMV«d in Dalto, Octobt, 1, 188? 




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EXPECTED TO GET IT AGAIN 



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The public relations aspects encountered immediately 
preceding and during the Berlin Airlift were unique. From 
the role of an occupational Air Force, USAFE suddenly 
became a major factor in a crisis affecting the security of 
millions throughout the world. The public world-wide 
demanded a complete and accurate account of the 
developments and implications of the Airlift. To satisfy 
these demands, and to efficiently discharge other phases 
of the Public Information mission, it was necessary to 
create an expanded PIO net capable of swift dissemination 
of facts, anticipation of developments, and satisfying the 
ever increasing demands of the press. 

PRELUDE 

Months before the blockade was imposed, as the in- 
ternational and political situation between the Western 
nations and the USSR began to deteriorate, additional 
Public Information personnel authorizations were requested. 
As the tension between the occupying forces in Germany 
mounted, the number of press releases in the theater 
rose sharply. Proportionately the personnel requirements 
of the Public Information Office increased. 

An 18 percent addition to the USAFE Headquarters 
PIO staff early in 1948 improved the situation consider- 
ably. Later in the year, rumors and careless talk, origina- 
ting with military personnel and their dependents, re- 
sulted in a sharp rise in the number of dependents 
returning to the United States. The press, attaching 
considerable significance to this action, filed numerous 
stories which contributed to a war "scare" within the 
United States. The reaction of relatives requesting return 
of dependent personnel added considerably to the public 
relations problem and for a time the situation was without 
a positive solution. 

During this period the PIO was primarily concerned 
with easing the tension of dependents in order to relieve 
pressures which interfered with the overall military effi- 
ciency of USAFE. To implement this, measures were 
taken to minimize the cause of the anxiety. Meanwhile 
the accelerated training of new personnel, both at base 

156 



and headquarters level, continued. 

A crisis in the Berlin situation occurred 5 April 1948 
when a Russian fighter crashed into a British airliner over 
Berlin. U. S. fighter squadrons were alerted, to escort 
cargo and passenger aircraft through the corridors unless 
a satisfactory assurance could be obtained from the 
Russians that U.S. and British aircraft would be unharmed. 
On this date the Public Information Office began func- 
tioning on a 24-hour basis, and hundreds of press 
inquiries were handled. 

THE BLOCKADE 

Correspondents from Allied nations throughout the world 
began arriving in the Zone in quest of spot coverage of 
Airlift activities. The number of press inquiries handled 
by Headquarters PIO mounted daily. Public Information 
personnel were declared critical, and qualified officers 
were requisitioned from the United States. In the meantime 
Public Information officers and photographers from USAFE 
bases not concerned with the Airlift were ordered to duty 
with Headquarters USAFE. During this period it was 
necessary to shift to longer duty hours, occasionally ex- 
tending to a 24-hour operation. 

Before the Airlift was a week old, Soviet-controlled 
German newspapers were flooding Germany with propa- 
ganda emphasizing its futility and accusing the Allies of 
creating false hope for Germans in the western sectors of 
Berlin. These papers ridiculed USAFE announcements of 
increased tonnage and portrayed the operation to the Ger- 
mans as a token gesture. The German people, so 
susceptible to propaganda and distrustful of anything 
represented as being in their interest, accepted this ridi- 
cule as fact. 

On 30 June the Commanding General, USAFE, ap- 
proved a plan permitting German correspondents, photo- 
graphers, and radio commentators to fly aboard Airlift 
planes for a period of one month and thus give eyewitness 
reports directly to the German people. Within a week, 
German reporters from all news media of consequence in 
the U.S. Zone had observed that the United States was 
doing everything within its power for the people of 



western Berlin. This action primarily benefited the position 'o 
ol the U.S. Government by severely shaking the convic- 
tions of the reading public of the Soviet-sponsored press 'l 

In October 1948 the USSR announced that Russian' a 
fighters had been ordered to force down any aircraft li 
exceeding the 20-mile confines of the corridors leading' ll 
into and out of Berlin. So great was the belief that this 1 1 
action would touch off the delicate situation that a leading Jr. 
wire service dispatched a reporter to full time duty in the it 
Public Information Office of Headquarters USAFE to insure it 
a scoop on the initial report of air hostilities. I 

With the approach of winter, new factors requiring PIO 
attention developed. There were questions in the minds ; 
of the press and public that were yet to be answered,;! 
Could the Airlift continue through the low ceilings and fog j< 
of a European winter to supply sufficient food and coal? i 
Was it possible to do it even under ideal conditions? ]l 
Would the morale of the Airlift men be seriously affected J 
by the hardships they were enduring? Were the planes ! 
wearing out? Would the Soviet interfere? In short, would ,i 
the Airlift fail? 

The Soviet-sponsored press thought if would, and so / 
did some of the aviation experts. In November the Com- . 
manding General of USAFE announced, "The Airliff Task Jl 
Force can and will continue to supply Berlin just as long i 
as necessary, regardless of weather or Soviet interference,' 

PLANS 

To convey most forcefully and effectively to the 
American people the story of the United States Air Force 
in the Airlift, the Public Information plan called for a shift 
of emphasis from the preparation of handout material to 
devoting a maximum of attention to the individual news- 
papermen and representatives of all media. Stress was j 
placed on making every minute of a visiting correspond- I 
ent's time count. This could not be implemented fully until 
sufficient trained personnel became available late in the ; 
year. At the peak of the Airlift, approximately 60 percent 
of the PIO staff were working full time escorting or directly 
assisting correspondents by furnishing Air Force informa- 
tion or by organizing facilities for their report on the 



operation lo the world public. 

In the furtherance of this plan the Commanding General, 
USAFE, approved a recommendation that United States 
and Allied newsmen be permitted to fly aboard Airlift 
freighters info Berlin and gain first-hand information on 
the operation. Newsmen accompanied an estimated 2,000 
flights. Special tours and briefings were given the per- 
manent press and correspondents visiting Germany under 
the auspices of the United States Air Force. In addition, 
the Public Information Office arranged tours and briefings 
for numerous other groups. 

At the request of the State Department, tours were 
arranged for distinguished visitors of the western nations. 
Frequently members of the foreign press were included, 
and on occasion civic groups from the United States were 
conducfed on these fours. Typical of these were the United 
Nations Press Corps, the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce 
Delegation to the World Conference, and occasional 
smaller groups of U.S. citizens who represented only the 
normal interest of the American taxpayer in the performance 
of his Air Force. No accurate estimate of the thousands 
of persons who saw the Airlift in operation can be made. 

The PIO plan for Airlift publicity contemplated that 
the lift operation would be "open" for inspection 24- 



NUMBEF 
2000 

1500 

1000 


PHOTO RELEASES 



















































' JASONDJFMAMJ J A J 





number ACCREDITED CORRESPONDENTS 


375 
300 














225 

150 














75 




























JASONDJFMAMJJAJ 



hours a day; consequently, restrictions on U.S. or Allied 
visitors to Airlift bases were kept to a minimum com- 
mensurate with operational requirements. On occasion, 
Lift bases were opened to the German civil population; 
this caused the Soviet-sponsored German press consider- 
able embarrassment and resulted in increased efforts on 
the part of German laborers employed on the Airlift. 

The smooth function of the Army-Navy-Air Force Team 
and the splendid cooperation achieved by French, British, 
and American units were the highlights of fhe Airlift from 
the standpoint of Public Information. 

PROBLEMS 

Lower Echelon Cooperation. The PIO program was 
not without minor internal problems. The Combined Airlift 
Task Force was never able to develop an efficient system 
of furnishing information of a Public Information nature to 
USAFE. Frequently it was difficult to secure accurate 
routine information for release to the press from the CALTF 
Headquarters PIO due to a somewhat formidable system 
of clearance enforced within that Headquarters. This handi- 
cap was overcome fo a great measure by USAFE Head- 



quarters personnel but at the expense of additional man- 
hours. 

Personnel. The major problem confronted by the Public 
Information Office of USAFE was a lack of qualified PIO 
personnel in the early days of the Airlift. It was several 
monfhs before personnel began to arrive through the 
pipeline. During this period all qualified PIO's worked 12 
to 18 hours a day including weekends. Even this schedule 
was insufficient. 

The problem of being confronted with a public relations 
situation overnight, far beyond the capabilities of a com- 
mand organization normally staffed, is one that should be 
anticipated. A crisis of this nature can focus world-wide 
attention on the local capability of the United States Air 
Force; therefore, public relations must be given immediate 
attention to insure complete and accurate dissemination of 
all facts of the situation. 

When the greatest Air Force story in peacetime broke, 
it took too long for PIO help to arrive. One possible 
solution would be to increase the flexibility of the entire 
USAF PIO organization so that qualified personnel could 
be quickly assembled and dispatched on TDY where they 
were needed in a matter of a few days or hours. The plan 
adopted within USAFE of calling in PIO personnel from 



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157 



non-Airlift bases to augment the permanent personnel at 
the hot spots was highly satistactory. Such a plan could 
conceivably work on a larger scale involving commands. 
Lack of Motion Picture Facilities. The Airlift created 
many situations particularly favorable to newsreel type 
coverage. On several occasions USAF sent motion picture 
camera teams to cover specific aspects of the Lift. How- 
ever, it is believed there was ample material to have 
warranted a full time Air Force motion picture cameraman 
on duty within the Zone. Headquarters USAFE had re- 












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quested the assignment ot a motion picture cameraman 
from USAF as early as August 1948 for the duration of the 
operation, but unfortunately this request was not granted. 
It is believed the Lift publicity program would have been 
more effective had there been additional newsreel type 
coverage. 

Correspondents Arriving Unannounced. Throughout 
the Airlift, the effectiveness of the PIO system of handling 
USAF-sponsored correspondents visiting the Zone was 
diminished because in many cases prior notification of the 
arrival of a correspondent was never received. When this 
occurred the correspondent could not be met or properly 
briefed regarding Air Force activities. Frequently these 
correspondents would proceed to the nearest Army Press 
Center, and several days would pass before USAFE would 
learn of their presence in the Zone. 

With each correspondent operating on a strict time 
budget, this delay necessitated a rushed tour of Airlift 
bases which invariably omitted many important phases of 
Air Force activity. A substantial loss of potential Air Force 
publicity was entailed. Repeated efforts to emphasize the 
necessity of prior notification from Hq. USAF resulted in 
only temporary successes. 



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SUMMARY OF COVERAGE 

Correspondents sponsored by the USAF were flown to 
Germany and shown all phases of Airlift activity. Their ' 
observations and reporting, augmenting that of the pen 
manent press group, brought the accomplishments ol 
USAFE and the RAF into the daily lives of people every- 
where. 

One wire service alone reported filing an average ol 
100 words per day on the Airlift over a period of 15 
months. This service has approximately 2,500 newspaper 1 
and radio subscribers world-wide and reaches an estimated | 
60,000,000 readers in the United States. 

The Public Information Office, USAFE Headquarters, J 
produced more than 900 news releases and 15,000 photo-' 
graphs on the Airlift operation. Radio and television media \ 
representatives were periodically escorted fo all Lift instal- 
lations. Many motion picture shorts and one full-length 
feature picture based on the Airlift were made, in addition 
to weekly newsreel coverage. Fortune, Life, Saturday 
Evening Post, and many others of the so-called "slick" 
magazines carried Airlift stories at one time or another. 
National Network broadcasts were made frequently from 
Berlin and Frankfurt throughout the operation. 

A USAFE Public Information Liaison Officer was assigned 
to fhe Berlin Press Center in December 1948 fo assure that I 
correspondents and observers seeking Air Force in- J 
formation received full cooperation while in the blockaded i 
area. i 

Thoroughly briefed in advance, this officer arrangi 
and scheduled the correspondent's itinerary prior to 
arrival to include all aspects pertinent to the type of story 
or information he was seeking. This officer additionally 
served as official USAFE spokesman to the Berlin press 
and advised Headquarters USAFE PIO of their interests 
and of four-power developments in Berlin in advance of 
normal channels. 

The Airlift public relations program officially terminated 
on 31 September 1949 with the last Airliff flight into Ber- 
lin. Several minor PIO projects concerning the operation 
still linger, but they are no longer considered the primary 
mission of USAFE's Public Information activities. 



&XV 



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GENERAL 




AjR PROVOST MARSH^T 




159 



AIR INSPECTOR 



FUNCTIONS 



The mission of the USAFE Air Inspector, as contained 
in Air Force Regulation 123-1, 24 June 1948, is to: 

"(1) Inquire into and report upon all matters affecting 
the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative 
effectiveness of the Air Force and the efficiency, 
economy, and adequacy thereof. 

(2) Keep appropriate commanders informed on the 
current status of matters and conditions affecting 
accomplishment of the command mission, includ- 
ing the status of training and readiness for combat 
of units, crews, and individuals of their commands; 
and the causes and results of aircraft accidents 
and other deterrents to successful accomplishment 
of flying missions. 

(3) Provide a facility through which personnel may 
personally present to an inspector their questions 
and grievances without prejudice. 

(4) Assist commanders and their personnel in per- 
formance of their duties by supplying information 
when appropriate, by suggesting ways and means 
of improving practices and procedures, and by 
recognizing and reporting meritorious conduct." 

No augmentations or deletions in this mission were made 
during the period of the Airlift. 



ORGANIZATION 

During the Airlift the Air Inspection Division, Head- 
quarters USAFE, was staffed under the Inspector General 
as directed by the regulation mentioned above. At those 
stations involved in the Airlift, the Wing-Base Air Inspec- 
tion Sections were staffed under authorized Tables of 
Organization and Equipment and functioned as directed 
by AFR 123-1. 



160 



OPERATION 

The first formal air inspections by a higher head- 
quarters of Airlift activities were Survey Inspections con- 
ducted by the Air Inspector, USAF, at Rhein/Main and 
Wiesbaden Air Bases, at Erding and Oberpfaffenhofen Air 
Depots and at three other USAFE non-Airlift units, during 
the period 16 September -4 October 1948, prior to 
completing the Annual Air Inspection of Headquarters 
USAFE. The Air Inspector, USAF, reported: 

"Inspection coverage by the Air Inspector, Head- 
quarters USAFE, is considered thorough and adequate. 
However, the inspection system at base and wing level 
is considered weak due to a lack of qualified 
personnel." 
The USAFE indorsement thereon to the Chief of Staff, 
USAF, stated: 

"Every effort is being made to obtain qualified inspec- 
tion personnel for base and wing level. However, the 
experience level of inspection personnel will drop 
considerably unless qualified replacements are fur- 
nished from sources within the Zone of the Interior 
during this fiscal year." 

With the increased Airlift commitments and addition of 
two air bases in the British Zone, inspection requirements 
increased immensely. Established practices and procedures 
had to be improved to cope with supply demands. This 
action was taken by the Command and Staff Sections of 
Headquarters 1st ALTF. These sections continually con- 
ducted extensive staff visits and inspections to effect 
compliance and improve procedures. Operations and 
Training inspections by air inspectors at wing-base level 
were practically non-existent due to shortage of qualified 
inspectors. The problem of acquiring adequately trained 
personnel for all duties, including air inspectors, was acute. 
The USAFE Air Inspector was completely occupied with 
Annual Air Inspections of Tempelhof, Rhein/Main, and 
Wiesbaden Air Bases during the period 19 October- 10 
December 1948. Airlift operations were directly supported 
administratively and logistically from those air bases; 
however, simultaneous inspections of the tactical operation 
or functions of the tenant Airlift organizations were not 



made at that time. The adequacy of inspections and reports 
completed on these supporting air bases revealed thai 
a major portion of the recommendations contained therein, 
and the follow-up action by successively higher echelons 
of command on irregularities and deficiencies reported, 
aided materially in the overall accomplishment of the Air- 
lift mission. 

As a result of the Annual Air Inspection of Wiesbaden 
Air Base, a letter was sent to the Commanding General, ) 
1st ALTF (for Airlift tactical units) and to USAFE wing-base ' 
commanders, directing utilization of wing-base air I 
inspectors to conduct complete quarterly inspections ol , 
all tenant activities operationally assigned to 1st ALTF. 
This action resulted in closer coordination between tactical ( 
units and base activities and, further, the results reduced ' 
duplication of critically short inspection personnel and re« ( 
lieved a tense situation developing between tactical 
units and wing-base air inspectors. 

By February 1949 trained air inspection personnel had 
arrived from the Zl in numbers adequate to staff an Air 
Inspection Division at Headquarters 1st ALTF and to assign 
qualified air inspection personnel to the wing-base air , 
inspection sections at authorized T/O strength. In late | 
February the Air Inspection Section of the Task Force '■ 
began to function. Survey Inspections were conducted on 
Airlift units at Rhein/Main, Celle, Wiesbaden, and Tempel- I 
hof Air Bases during February and March 1949. In March j 
Headquarters USAFE delegated Annual Air Inspection \ 
responsibility to Headquarters 1st ALTF for units of thai j 
command. 

The 1st ALTF Air Inspector was primarily concerned j 
with the Annual Air Inspections of 1st ALTF units located ) 
at Wiesbaden, Rhein/Main, Celle, Fassberg, and Tempel- | 
hof Air Bases during the period 1 May through 30 July j 
1949. The results of these initial Survey Inspections indi- 
cated that there was much to be desired insofar as ade- i 
quacy and qualification of air inspection personnel at the 
base level, and the effectiveness of air inspection. Among • 
other matters reported was a case report on the acule 
shortage of wing-base air inspection personnel at one 
station. Headquarters 1st ALTF immediately took action to 



fill this requirement. While Headquarters CALTF occupied 
the same physical location as Headquarters 1st ALTF and 
certain staff divisions had British elements, the 1st ALTF 
Air Inspection System was never extended to cover com- 
bined operations. 

SPECIFIC PROBLEMS 

The Annual Air Inspection of Headquarters 1st ALTF 
was conducted by a team of air inspectors under the 
USAFE Inspector General during the period 15 March - 15 
April 1949 and was preceded by complete Survey In- 
spections of all Airlift bases. This inspection again reported 
that Headquarters 1st ALTF had been handicapped in the 
past by lack of qualified inspection personnel. Head- 
quarters USAFE again initiated action to secure adequate 
and qualified air inspection personnel. 



COMMAND 

Considerable disagreement and misunderstanding 
existed between the USAFE wing-base organizations and 
| e the troop carrier units assigned to 1st ALTF. Many of the 
en administrative and logistical functions normally included 
II as the responsibility of a headquarters having command 
jei iurisdiction were still being performed by Headquarters 
oi USAFE. This was due to the fact that functions other than 
hose of operations had never been actually delegated to 
ce Headquarters 1st ALTF. Channels of command were not 
oc generally understood because of the "dual" command 
Established. 

If was recommended that consideration be given 
assigning command jurisdiction of the wing-base 
>rganizations at Wiesbaden and Rhein/Main Air Bases to 
ommand jurisdiction of Headquarters 1st ALTF. 

The Commanding General, USAFE, agreed with the 
*bove recommendation and necessary instructions were 
«ued for its implementation. 



MAINTENANCE 

Long range plans for full and economic utilization of 
assigned aircraft were not sufficiently developed. Only 
minimum maintenance on a day-to-day breakdown basis 
was being performed. However, this minimum of main- 
tenance being performed (Note chart summarizing aircraft 
inspected) was reducing the expected life of these aircraft. 

The USAFE Air Inspector recommended that main- 
tenance be performed on a controlled long-range policy 
and that attention be directed toward "preventive main- 
tenance" rather than "breakdown maintenance" when 
possible. 



PHASE-OUT INSPECTIONS 

The Annual Air Inspection of Headquarters USAFE was 
conducted by the Air Inspector, USAF, during the period 
25 July - 26 August 1949. It was preceded by Special 
Inspections of two Airlift bases and the 85fh Air Depot 
Wing, as well as three other USAFE non-Airlift units. A 



USAF Special Inspection Report dated 5 August 1949 and 
covering the 317th Troop Carrier Wing, which was the first 
Airlift unit to be deactivated and was phasing out at time 
of inspection, included a Special Annex report, "Phase- 
Out Observations and Recommendations", which empha- 
sized that "earlier and more complete distribution of per- 
tinent sections of the phase-out plans to interested staff 
activities and to lower echelons would have permitted 
smoother initial execution." The USAFE Air Inspector re- 
ported on 31 August 1949 that solutions to phase-out 
problems encountered by this initial unit were utilized to 
advantage in succeeding phases of the Airlift inactivation. 
The Air Inspector, USAF, reported: 

"'Operation Vittles' which was conducted within this 
Command, is the most convincing demonstration of air 
power since the war, and did much to enhance the 
prestige of the United States and to assist in the at- 
tainment of the national objectives. This operation 
demonstrated the ability of USAF to perform an 
emergency task of major magnitude in a highly credit- 
able manner." 
Headquarters USAFE placed emphasis during the inac- 



NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF DISCREPANCIES NOTED DURING INSPECTION 
OF 48 AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT 

I5 MARCH -2 APRIL 1949 


AIRCRAFT STATUS AT TIME 
OF SURVEY INSPECTION 


ENGINE 
DISCREPANCIES 


AIRCRAFT GENERAL 
DISCREPANCIES 


COMMUNICATIONS 
DISCREPANCIES 


RECORD 
DISCREPANCIES 


TOTAL 


AV/ACFT 


TOTAL 


AV/ACFT 


TOTAL 


AV/ACFT 


TOTAL 


AV/ACFT 


TOTAL 


AV/ACFT 


"INSPECTIONS IN PROGRESS" 
AIRPLANES INSPECTED -15 


279 


19 


226 


15 


136 


9 


276 


18 


917 


61 


"FOLLOWING COMPLETED UNIT INSPECTIONS" 
AIRPLANES INSPECTED -13 


207 


16 


177 


14 


132 


10 


169 


13 


685 


53 


"OUT FOR UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE" 
AIRPLANES INSPECTED -15 


423 


28 


233 


16 


151 


10 


191 


13 


998 


67 


"AIRCRAFT RECEIVED FROM BURTONWOOD" 
AIRPLANES INSPECTED -4 


100 


25 


53 


13 


40 


10 


56 


14 


249 


62 


"AIRCRAFT RECEIVED FROM CONTRACTOR 1000 HR" 
AIRPLANES INSPECTED - 1 


17 


17 


II 


1 1 


9 


9 


25 


25 


62 


62 


TOTAL DISCREPANCIES 


1026 




700 




468 




717 




2911 




AVERAGE DISCREPANCIES 




21 




15 




10 




15 




Si 



161 



tivafion phase on inspection activities and the responsibilities 
ot all personnel towards completing inactivation responsibi- 
lities in an orderly manner. The Vittles Phase-Out Plan 
issued 18 July 1949 by Headquarters 1st ALTF contained 
a provision that a special overseas movement inspection 
would be conducted by that Headquarters of each organi- 
zation returning to the Zl. A letter, Headquarters USAFE, 
dated 19 August. 1949, subject: "Inspection Jurisdiction of 
Units Assigned to 1st Airlift Task Force, APO 633, US Air 
Force", delegated the responsibility for performing phase- 
out and inactivation inspections of all subordinate units 
to the 1st ALTF. These inspections, conducted by the 1st 
ALTF Air Inspector during the period 8 August - 29 Sep- 
tember 1949, were only advisory in nature, and the 
findings were left with the responsible commander for 
action without requiring an indorsement. Wing-base air 
inspection personnel at Celle and Fassberg Air Bases par- 
ticipated in production lines established for final clearance 
of personnel and turn-in of all organizational equipment 
in the phase-out of those bases. A specialized deactivation 
team from Erding Air Depot operated a final inspection, 
complete property acceptance, and disposition production 
line. This type of phase-out operation assisted immensely 
in assuring proper and expeditious deactivation in these 
organizations. 

On 30 September 1949 the USAFE Air Inspector con- 
ducted the final inactivation inspection of Headquarters 
1st ALTF. This report concluded that the 1st ALTF had 
discharged its responsibilities in the phase-out of its sub- 
ordinate units in an expeditious and adequate manner and 
determined that adequate action had been taken or plans 
were satisfactory for the disposition of personnel, prisoners, 
property, funds, real estate, contracts, legal matters, and 
records with the exception of fourteen items of unfinished 
business. These items were reported directly to Head- 
quarters USAFE for completion as Headquarter* 1st ALTF 
ceased functioning at 2400 that date. 



RESULTS 

Through the medium of the air inspection system, 
162 



commanding officers of Airfift units were informed of con- 
ditions affecting the accomplishment of their assigned 
missions, economy of operation, and managerial efficiency, 
including the commendable aspects thereof. While the 
efficiency of such reporting was satisfactory, necessary 
corrective and follow-up action by unit commanders to 
prevent recurring deficiencies was hampered by the means 
available to them and by the shortage of personnel who 
had the necessary experience and initiative to accept and 
discharge the responsibilities of the grade and position 
held. It is believed that the air inspection system was also 
helpful by bringing irregularities, deficiencies, and com- 
mendable practices to the immediate attention of the 
various individuals primarily concerned, thus serving to 
assist on-the-job training. 

Personal conference periods were scheduled and con- 
ducted in conjunction with all Annual and Quarterly Air 
Inspections. Complaints were also accepted by air inspec- 
tors at any time. They reached an all time Airlift high in 
June 1949 with a total of 83 complaints. Of this number, 
19 were justified, 10 unjustified, and 54 were requests for 
information. Majority of complaints were: 

(1) Uncertainty of duration of temporary duty (TDY) 
status. 

(2) Shortage of family-type quarters. 

(3) Uncertain delays in arrival of dependents. 

(4) Unwarranted and unfair delays in arrival of 
personal baggage. 



CONCLUSIONS 

Air inspection sections authorized under the present 
Wing-Base T/O&E, are not adequate to accomplish air 
inspection requirements effectively in an Airlift operation 
committed to deliver the maximum tonnage possible. 

The establishment and build-up of the air inspection 
system should be proportionate to and concurrent with the 
augmentation of any other activity rather than months later. 

The air inspection system should endeavor to operate 
in a similar manner to preventive maintenance, rather than 
as a "Monday morning quarterback," in order that 



necessary corrective and helpful action can be initiated 
early enough to prevent development of serious condi- 
tions. | 
Air inspection should be welcomed as an opportunity I 
to obtain a commendation and regarded in the same light / 
as an inoculation against disease. Such inoculations sting 
initially but results may prevent a disheartening epidemic. ] 



AIR PROVOST MARSHAL 



MISSION 



Throughout the Airlift operation, the mission of the Air , 
Provost Marshal Division was supervision and formulation 
of major policies on all matters pertaining to provost 
marshal activities and supervision and inspection of all 
matters pertaining to law and order and the enforcement 
of internal security. The additional responsibility for fbe 
security function of determining the loyalty and character i 
fitness of all AF military and civilian personnel and re- i 
porting the results of completed investigations was 
assumed in December 1948. 



ORGANIZATION 

The responsibilities of the Air Provost Marshal during 
the first seven months of the Airlift operation were ac- 
complished through direct contact with wing or base com- 
manders and through liaison with the air provost marshals 
in the field. In February 1949 an air provost marshal was 
assigned to the office of the Inspector General, Headquar- 
ters 1st ALTF, and supervision of all provost marshal func- 
tions within Airlift units was delegated to that office, which 
functioned until 1 August, at which time the Inspector 
General absorbed the functions because of early phase- 
out plans. 

Just prior to the beginning of the Airlift the provost 
marshal function was transferred under the provisions of 



'^ AF Letter 20-4 from A-1 (now Deputy Chief of Staff, 
* Personnel) to the Inspector General. At that time the Air 
Provost Marshal had under its direction two sections. The 
'"y first of these was the law enforcement section of air 
3^' police and auxiliary guards; the auxiliary guards were 
n 9l Polish Guards (Polish nationals) and Industrial Police (Ger- 
llc I man nationals). The second Air Provost Marshal section 
(was the confinement and correction section, with responsi- 
bility for supervision of guardhouses and rehabilitation of 
prisoners. In December 1948 the Air Provost Marshal 
I assumed the responsibilities of security, which up to that 
time had been under the supervision of the Director of 
Intelligence. From the beginning of the Airlift to March 
' 1949 the Air Provost Marshal office, Headquarters USAFE, 
! almost doubled in size, due to the increase in the number 
Or 'of serious incidents and the additional workload acquired 
3d ) with the loyalty investigation program. 
islj During the initial phase of the Airlift, the requirements 
ill I in personnel and transportation at the base level in the 
American zone were met by air police squadrons and air 
provost marshals assigned to the Airlift bases. Generally, 
as the strength of these bases increased, the air police 
J squadrons were increased. Air police guard responsibilities 
is I were augmented at Rhein/Main, Wiesbaden, and Tempel- 
i hof Air Bases by Polish Guards and Industrial Police, 
| whose duties were confined to internal guard for the pro- 
I tection of government property and personnel. 
I When the bases at Fassberg and Celle in the British 
I zone were established, the requirements for air police 
9 personnel first appeared to be less, due to the presence 
| of allied military police. It was found, however, that Ameri- 
■I can airmen could not be successfully and fully controlled 
s l by allied military police, and that the same complement 
io{ air police would be required, based on the number 
j °' personnel, as was required on bases in the American 
■j zone. 

j 'he influx of personnel for the operation consisted 

mainly f pilots, crewmen, and mechanics. Consequently, 

| "* procurement of qualified trained air police left much 

be desired, and relatively large portions of air police 

squadrons were unfrained basics. Military police schools 

W,thln ,ne zone were utilized to the fullest extent to bring 



these squadrons up to the desired qualifications. Trans- 
portation and equipment resources such as jeeps, trucks, 
sidearms, etc. were obtainable in an adequate amount. 

OPERATIONS 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 

Inasmuch as discipline depends primarily on morale, 
which is in turn influenced by living and working con- 
ditions and recreational facilities, activities pertaining to 
enforcement constituted a major problem within the Air- 
lift installations. Considering the great influx of TDY 
personnel, however, most of whom had departed from 
their permanent stations without adequate preparations 
for care of their families and personal matters, the rate 
of major violations could not be considered excessive. 

A study of the AWOL rate for USAFE reveals 
some decrease beginning with July 1948 when the Airlift 
came into being. This decrease was consistent throughout 



SS AWOL RATES 




150 
125 
100 
75 
50 
25 




































16 MONTH AV 

PRIOR TO 

AIRLIFT 










.1 
















/ 



































































































































JJAS0NDJFMAMJJAJ 


i 



the duration of the operation. Many explanations could be 
advanced for the condition, but the most plausible would 
appear to be the fact that the personnel generally were 
well impressed with the mission of the Airlift and were 
relatively busy as compared to normal peacetime employ- 
ment in routine training. 

The American VD rate at Fassberg and Celle, 
although high, was not alarmingly so. The British 
cooperated whole-heartedly in picking up loose German 
women for necessary medical examination and confine- 
ment when required. Steady progress in the control of 
vice was made as air police became better trained and 
commanding officers, chaplains, and character guidance 
councils took a greater interest in the subject. The VD 
rate declined perceptibly during the last months of the 
Airlift. 

Because of Berlin's isolation, certain necessities, espe- 
cially cigarettes, candy, coffee, and cooking fats, became 
very valuable to the German population and were there- 



in 





































16 MONTH AV 
PRIOR TO - 
AIRLIFT 


















.*■ 




s 












































■** 


\ 






















































































\ 







J A S N D JFMAM 



A S 



163 



fore considered attractive items for black market or illegal 
trade. To prevent the use of Airlift aircratt for illegal trans- 
port of these items into Berlin, air police were used to 
search all aircraft baggage and packages transported info 
Tempelhof, Tegel, and Gatow. Items found in excess of 
personal needs or in commercial amounts and suspected 
of being brought in for illegal trade were impounded. 
This measure had the desired effect of eliminating the use 
of aircraft for black market activities. Disciplinary action 
taken against personnel who were reported for violation, 
while not always of sufficient force to deter others at the 
beginning, was of such nature that in the latter phase of 
the operation very few violations were noted. 

In January 1949 the serious incident branch was 
established within the Air Provost Marshal. This section is 
responsible for receipt and preparation of reports on 
"serious incidents" and for weekly or daily follow-up 
depending on the nature of the case. All serious incidents 
are required to be reported from the field within 48 hours 

























































































































































J J 


t 


i s 


c 


* 


1 c 


V 


F 


k 


t 


.. IV 


I 1 


ll 


t> 


S 



after the occurrence. They include: 

a. All felonies in which the following type of personnel 
are known or suspected to be involved or impli- 
cated: 

(1) US military or civilian occupational personnel 
and/or their dependents. 

(2) Allied military and civilian personnel who are 
employed by, serving with, or accredited to 
the US occupation forces and/or their de- 
pendents. 

(3) Any other person under US military control. 

b. Motor vehicle accidents in which government or 
privately owned vehicles registered with EUCOM are in- 
volved, which result in death, serious injury, hit and run 
incidents, or property damage in excess of $100.00. 

The serious incident rate declined as did the AWOL 
rate, as evidenced by the figures in the table below, until 
September 1949. At that time operations had practically 
ceased and some personnel again had ample time to get 
into trouble, in spite of training schedules provided at 
several bases. 

CONFINEMENT AND CORRECTION 

Due to the Air Force policy of confining only those 
who were habitual repeaters or who had committed a 
more serious crime, the prisoner rate was kept relatively 
low at Airlift bases. Only those were confined where it 
would have been prejudicial to the Air Force and to good 
discipline not to have done so. 

A study was made in the spring of 1949 relative to the 
establishment of a command rehabilitation center for all 
command garrison prisoners. Due to the low prisoner rate 
and the short terms of confinement, it was decided that 
a rehabilitation program designed for the individual base 
guardhouse would accomplish the same end. 



SECURITY 

Early in December 1948 the screening of German na- 
tionals became the responsibility of the Air Provost 



USAFE AIR POLICE WORKED i 
TO COMBAT CRIME. PMH 



Marshal. At the same time the responsibility for procuring 
personnel clearances of civilian and military personnel 
was assumed. 

To insure the proper placement of German nationals, l 
screening centers were established throughout the com- i 
mand under the supervision of fhe Air Provost Marshal. | 
At Celle and Fassberg this screening responsibility rested 
with the British. Labor Service Companies in the American 
zone, formed to do the necessary loading and unloading 
at Airlift bases, were screened by Headquarters EUCOM 
before being sent to an air base to perform their assigned 
mission. 

As the strength of Airlift bases rose, the need for 
personnel security clearances increased. From a mode: 
beginning, the need for personnel securify investigatioi 
increased to an average of 97 per month for the peril 
January through September 1949 with a peak of 15 
the month of May 1949. 



164 



■'"'■'"■: ; .'- 




THE CIVILIAN GUARDS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICE 
CONSTITUTED AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY FORCE AT AIRLIFT 
BASES. 



AUXILIARY GUARDS 

Two fypes of auxiliary guards, the Civilian Guards 
; (Polish) and the Industrial Police (German) were on hand 
to supplement air police strength in accomplishing se- 
curity needs at the U. S. zone Airlift bases. These guards 
were strengthened and made more effective by the utili- 
zation of guard dogs in perimeter and storage areas. 

Both types of auxiliary guards were furnished with 
guard dogs which were purchased from, and very ex- 
cellently trained by, EUCOM Quartermaster Dog School 
at Darmstadt. It has been found that for certain fypes of 
duty, one man with a properly trained dog is more effec- 
tive than two, or even three, men without dogs. The effec- 
tive range of a perimeter guard post may in some cases 
be extended two or three times by addition of a guard 
dog. Of a total USAFE guard dog strength of 175 dogs, 
approximately 50 were used for Airlift security. 



CONCLUSIONS 

If a commander is to be kept informed on the state 
of discipline of his command, a sufficient air provost 
marshal reporting system must be completely installed as 
expeditiously as possible. As increasing administrative 
responsibilities were assumed by the Air Provost Marshal, 
his facilities in personnel and equipment should have been 
increased in order to keep the Commanding General fully 
informed at all times. Loyalty checks of any value were 
difficult to make because of these shortages. With his 
limited facilities, the greatest value of the Air Provost 
Marshal to the command was his frequent field visits and 
inspection-instructions. 

As revealed by USAFE inspection reports and substan- 
tiated by field visits and special inspections, the qualify 
of air police was considerably below the standard set by 
Hq. USAF. Careful screening to weed out the undesirables 
should have been accomplished prior to assignment to 
AF squadrons. None the less, this screening had to be 
done constantly with few replacements available. 

The quality of air provost marshals and air police 
officers, on the other hand, was high; without such quality 
a grave disciplinary problem would have resulted. 

Base commanders generally accepted the principles 
of the new concept — that is, the inspection and reporting 
functions of the wing air provost marshal. Because of the 
shortage in the beginning, air provost marshals sometimes 
wore two hats, acting both as wing air provost marshals 
and as air police squadron commanders. This dual func- 
tion was eliminated as rapidly as additional air police of- 
ficers became available. 

The value of the Polish Guards and Industrial Police 
cannot be too heavily stressed. Without these personnel 
for added guard duties, the pilferage rate would have 
been so high as to make the entire Airlift effort almost 
too costly to continue. 

In spite of a shortage of air provost marshals and air 
police officers, the Military Personnel Branch at the base 
level, with the approval of the base commander in several 
instances, assigned officers in the primary MOS of 9100 to 
entirely different tasks. Such malassignments were not 



infrequent; to prevent them, the interested staff officer 
should be consulted by military personnel for recommen- 
dations as to assignments of officers qualified in such a 
critical specialty. 

The lack of regard by many officers and airmen in 
illegally using Airlift aircraft for black market purposes 
was particularly discouraging, and only the most drastic 
measures ultimately cured the situation. 



RECOMMENDATIONS 

The necessity for the immediate assignment of an Air 
Provost Marshal with sufficient staff to keep the com- 
mander of a task force informed of the state of discipline 
of his command is paramount. On an equally important 
basis is the necessity for immediate airtight security. 

The highest type of trained air police is required in an 
extensive special operation. No time is available to train 
such raw recruits as were often assigned to air police 
squadrons. The procurement of specialists in the air police 
field deserves as careful planning as does the procurement 
of personnel in maintenance, supply, and administrative 
specialties. 

The wing-base responsibility for discipline should be 
impressed on all officers at each command level down 
through that of the squadron. 



I* ^ 




GUARD DOGS TRIPLED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AUXILIARY 
GUARDS. 




*165 



OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS 

The Office of Special Investigafions is an agency of 
fhe Inspector General, USAFE, charged wifh the duty of 
preventing, suppressing, and investigating major crimes, 
other violations of public trust, prejudices to good military 
order, and subversive and related activities; in addition, 
it is charged with the exploitation of positive intelligence 
sources within the jurisdiction of USAFE. 

ORGANIZATION 

During fhe period of the Airlift's operation the Office 
of Special Investigations, USAFE, as such, barely came 
into being. Its investigative activities were carried on, 





SUMMARY OF MAJOR CRIMES INVESTIGATED 




TYPE OF CRIME 


JJASONDJFMAMJJAS 




HOMICIDE 




A 


3 


6 


1 


4 


4 


A 


6 


3 


6 


6 


4 


4 


1 1 


2 




SUICIDE 










1 








1 


1 


1 




1 








SEX OFFENSES 






1 














2 




4 


6 


1 


5 


4 




ASSAULTS 








2 






1 


1 






1 




S 


6 


7 


4 


LARCENY 


3 


7 


4 


6 


2 


4 


5 


3 


8 


5 


8 


3 


4 


4 


e 


1 


ROBBERY 








2 


1 




4 


1 






1 




1 




i 


3 




BURGLARY & UN- 
LAWFUL ENTRY 


?. 


5 


z 




2 




1 




1 




3 


3 


6 


2 


2 


3 




SUB TOTAL 
VIOLENCE 


5 


16 


10 


16 


7 


8 


15 


9 


16 


// 


20 


16 


27 


19 


34 


17 




FRAUD 
(COUNTERFEIT) 




1 


1 


1 


1 




1 


1 




2S 


24 


14 


17 


6 


8 


5 




IMPERSONATION 






















1 














NARCOTICS 








1 


1 






2 










1 










BLACK MARKET 






2 






1 








1 










1 






COUNTERFEIT 






3 


3 


4 


16 


1 1 


i 


e 


















SMUGGLING 












2 




1 


i 


7 


e 










2 




OTHERS 




3 


3 


4 


4 


1 


3 


6 




28 


2 


25 


23 


15 


17 


10 




TOTAL 


5 

huh 


20 


19 


25 


17 


28 


30 


20 


25 


76 


55 


55 


68 


40 


60 


J4 




1 66 IIIH:: 



































however, by its predecessors, the Army's 31st Military 
Police Criminal Investigation Detachment (later the Air 
Force Criminal Investigation Detachment) and the 7020th 
Air Force Counter Intelligence Unit. On 1 July 1949 these 
organizations were brought together under one staff 
agency and on 1 September were redesignated as the Of- 
fice of Special Investigations, USAFE. 

Security restrictions prohibit the setting forth of the 
actual requirements for an organization of this type. It 
may be said, however, that there was not a sufficient 
allotment of trained personnel at any period of the Airlift 
to do a completely effective job, nor could necessary 
normal and special items of equipment be provided to 
aid the teams in the field. There was a serious lack of 
transportation for investigative activities, and though a 
complete crime laboratory was needed for CID work, only 
one item of technical equipment was available and the 
rest had to be furnished on a personal ownership basis. 
The lack of personnel and equipment for this non-T/O 
organization continued to hamper the efforts of the 
organization throughout the Airlift. 

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE UNIT 

Very little may be said of the actual activities of the 
Counter Intelligence Unit but a general outline of its duties 
may be given. It was charged with the security of all of 
the air bases. Its mission included the conducting of 
security checks of personnel and of administrative security 
procedures. It acted in an advisory capacity to the unit 
commanders on matters of unit security. It investigated 
cases ot subversion, sabotage, disaffection, and related 
acts. 

The increase in USAFE personnel necessary to meet 
the demands of Airlift operations resulted in a marked 
increase in major crimes. This upsurge was dispropor- 
tionate to fhe increase in personnel as indicated by the 
accompanying chart. Whereas crime incidents were 
doubled, personnel increased only 50 per cent. 



RECOMMENDATIONS 

The conclusions to be drawn from a study of case 
histories of criminal incidents attributable to the Airlift 
leads to the following recommendations: 

The requisitioning of OSI personnel for an expanded] 
operation should be considered an integral part of ex- 
pansion plans. A comparable increase in pertinent equip- \ 
ment and in confidential funds should be similarly included,! 

All personnel should be indoctrinated by unit com-ii 
manders in fhe importance of security in connection with > 
the special operation. 

All indigenous civilian personnel who are to be used 
in a special operation should be properly screened be- 
fore employment. 



CRIMES INVESTIGATED VERSUS PERSONNEL STRENGTH 

PERCENT 


350 
300 
250 


















CASES 
TREND 






























ISO 
100 
50 




STRENGTH 
TREND 


vJ- 










*"** 


N \ 






I* 






X 




</ 


















100% EQUALS ASSIGNED 
VALUE OF JAN-JUN 1948 
AVERAGE. TREND LINES 
SHOW PERCENT OF AVERAGE. 


























JJ.ASONDJFMAMJJAS 




167 





The Comptroller System established in Headquarters 
USAFE was assigned the responsibility for assembling, 
evaluating, and presenting to the commanders the essen- 
tial elements of information necessary for effective con- 
trol and management of Airlift operations. These respon- 
sibilities were partially delegated to Comptroller agencies 
at Headquarters 1st ALTF and to each Airlift base. This 
system performed the technical functions of reporting, 
budgeting, disbursing, and costing. 

The Airlift afforded probably the first real opportunity 
to observe the performance of the recently established 
USAF Comptroller System under an emergency situation 
of extended duration. The experience gained thereby 
is presented in this chapter. 

The accountability for supplies and funds for Airlift 
activities is a special subject more fully covered in other 
chapters. From the Comptroller viewpoint several instances 
of laxity and negligence were revealed. This was parti- 
cularly true in connection with the clean-up activities near 
the end of phase-out operations involving terminal 
audits of military property accounts and final audits of 
non-appropriated funds. Recogniring the emergency na- 
ture of the initial establishment of Airlift bases, par- 
ticularly in the British zone, a much tighter control of 
supply accounting and administration of non-appropriated 
funds must be anticipated and provided in the future. 








BUDGET AND FISCAL ACTIVITY 

Preparation and support of budgetary estimates and 
'central control of funding operations for the Airlift 
organizations of USAFE were the responsibility of the 
(Budget and Fiscal Directorate, DCS/Comptroller, Head- 
| quarters USAFE, during the entire life of the "Vittles" 
project. This staff agency was also responsible for insur- 
ing the audit of non-appropriated funds of the Airlift 
; organizations. 

FUNDING STRUCTURE 

To appreciate the fiscal responsibilities and functions 
I of USAFE organizations in support of the Airlift, it is 
necessary to understand the general funding structure 
I whereby the command is provided with resources to sus- 
tain its operation. The life blood of the financial structure 
consists of Dollars from the U. S. economy and Deutsche 
Marks from occupied Germany. 

The first and principal source of support for operation 
ot USAFE is, of course, the American taxpayer, who, 
through Congress, authorizes appropriations of funds to 
maintain the Air Force. 

Budgetary and fiscal control responsibilities for the 
major portion of the appropriated funds used to finance 
such items as military personnel, aircraft, vehicles, pe- 
troleum products, uniforms, etc., are handled through cen- 
tral administering and procurement agencies and not 
allocated to the operating units. 

Other items charged to the dollar appropriations which 
can be more economically financed from funds at the dis- 
posal of the local commanders, such as U. S. civilian per- 
sonnel, temporary duty travel, and minor items of supply, 
are funded from amounts allotted through echelons of 
command to the local field organizations. It is this type 
of item for which the command has funding responsibilities. 

The other source of support for the occupation forces 

m Europe is derived from assessment of the German 

economy. Such support, usually referred to as the Deutsche 

Mark Budget, includes all items obtainable from Germany 

Pessary fo support the occupation. The German support 



budget is sub-divided into two principal categories — 
the Occupation Cost Budget and the Non-Occupation Cost 
Budget. Occupation Cost Deutsche Mark funds are derived 
from the German economy and provide for normal U. S. 
military occupation costs in Germany. Non-Occupation 
Cost Deutsche Mark funds are also provided by the Ger- 
man economy; however, they are expended for the direct 
benefit of the German nation. Practically all items financed 
by the German economy for direct support of the Airlift, 
including construction, personnel, and supply items, were 
charged to non-occupation funds. 

The total cost of USAFE participation in operation 
"Vittles" is presented in the section on Cost Control and 
Analysis. Of the total cost of this operation, approximately 
47 million Deutsche Marks and 330 thousand dollars was 
obligated against funds made available in an allotted sta- 
tus to Headquarters USAFE. 

From a fiscal standpoint, the Airlift closely approximated 
a wartime operation, inasmuch as its success transcended 
practically all budgetary considerations. While budgetary 
estimates were carefully prepared, activities in support 
of the Airlift mission were not necessarily limited to man- 
power ceilings and budget programs. This condition was, 
of course, much more prevalent during the earlier period 
of the Airlift than in the later phases when requirements 
began to stabilize and standards were developed. 



ORGANIZATION 

From the beginning of the Airlift operation, only rel- 
atively minor difficulties were experienced in discharging 
budget and fiscal responsibilities, from a trained per- 
sonnel standpoint, as three of the major terminus bases, 
i. e., Rhein/Main, Wiesbaden, and Tempelhof, were staffed 
with experienced budget and fiscal organizations. A 
small budget and fiscal office was established at Head- 
quarters 1st ALTF to serve in a liaison and advisory capac^ 
ity only, as funds were not allotted through that head- 
quarters to the operating units in the field. Close coordina- 
tion was maintained with Headquarters 1st ALTF, but 
the actual funding channels were directly between 
Headquarters USAFE and the various participating bases. 
The 1st ALTF exercised full jurisdiction over only the 
operational elements af such bases. 

The participating installations in the British zone of 
occupied Germany, Celle and Fassberg, were funded un- 
der an agreement with the British whereby the United 
Kingdom assumed full financial responsibility for all Air- 
lift cost in the British zone chargeable to Deutsche Marks 
derived from the German nation. Conversely, the United 
States assumed responsibility for Airlift expenses incurred 
af American zone installations chargeable to the Deutsche 
Mark budget program. This simplified funding agreement 
proved very effective and avoided many complications 
which would likely have arisen under other possible ar- 
rangements. Several areas, however, were not clarified in 
the initial agreement from a budget and fiscal standpoint, 
due primarily to the fact that budget and fiscal techni- 
cians did not participate in drafting the original agreement. 



AUDIT OF NON-APPROPRIATED FUNDS 

Due largely fo the rapid establishment of clubs and 
messes occasioned by the great influx of U. S. personnel 
af Celle and Fassberg, a few special problems developed 
regarding the proper supervision and control of non- 
appropriated funds. A survey indicated that many of the 

169 



club and mess funds were in chaotic condition and that, 
in some instances, no records ot monetary transactions 
were being maintained. This situation was attributed 
largely to the inexperience of the custodians, who were 
usually newly-assigned personnel charged with a number 
of other duties. Careful monitoring of the funds, however, 
resulted in correction of minor irregularities, and quarterly 
audits showed continued improvement in their operation. 

In March 1949, a gradual increase was evident in the 
net worth of many of the club and mess funds, partially 
caused by the fact that German labor costs were borne by 
the British DM appropriated funds. The auditors from USAFE 
suggested to the custodians that reductions in net worth 
should be made so that members might benefit from the 
favorable financial condition. Until August 1949, however, 
when Celle and Fassberg RAF stations were alerted for 
close-out, a majority of the club and mess funds still 
showed large net worths. From this close-out date, main- 
tenance of records deteriorated as a result of rapid changes 
in personnel, and funds were in some instances spent so 
rapidly as to constitute unlawful dissipation of monies. 



CONCLUSIONS 

Continuing careful analysis should be made of obliga- 
tions incurred at installations participating in or supporting 
operational projects of great magnitude to determine the 
amounts attributable to the direct and indirect support of 
such special operations. This is essential in order to 
prepare adequate budgetary estimates, evaluate per- 
formance, and prepare interim and post operational re- 
ports. 

Funding agreements between nations and other gov- 
ernmental departments, where applicable, should be 
reached prior to or as soon as possible after commence- 
ment of special operations such as the Berlin Airlift. Such 
agreements should clearly indicate financial responsibilities 
within various funding areas. 

Administration and control of funding operations 
should be restricted to previously established channels 

170 



wherever possible and not delegated to temporary task 
force organizations. 

Extreme care should be given during the initial phase 
of a special operation to insure that policies and pro- 
cedures controlling non-appropriated fund administration, 
as well as personnel assigned, are adequate to cope with 
a rapid growth of such activities due to a large influx of 
personnel. 



FINANCE DISBURSING ACTIVITIES 

During the period of the Berlin Airlift, the finance ac- 
tivities of the Comptroller were carried on in Headquarters 
USAFE by the Directorate of Finance. Specific functions 
for which the Directorate was held responsible included 
payment of all USAFE personnel, and review of and re- 
commendations on matters pertaining to loss of funds, 
and loss, damage, or destruction of public property. 

PAYMENT OF PERSONNEL 

Payment of Airlift personnel was made through num- 
bered finance disbursing units. Each of these units serviced 
a specific area, and they were made operative as the 
Airliff expanded. Continuous influx of personnel necessi- 
tated that these units operate at peak load capacity, and 
in some instances the work load excee'ded 300 percent 
of previous norms. 

It was necessary to operate under the increased work- 
load with only slight increases in personnel, and in June 
1949 it was further necessary to discontinue the 317th Unit 
as an Accountable Disbursing Office because of the 
shortage of disbursing officers. In spite of these diffi- 
culties, payment of personnel was effected on time and in 
accordance with prescribed regulations and directives. 

PER DIEM 

One of the primary and most demoralizing problems 
arose from the inconsistency of travel orders under which 
personnel from other commands were placed on temporary 
duty with the Airlift. Although duties of the personnel from 



a finance standpoint were identical, some personnel were 
authorized per diem and others were not. Some com 
mands, including MATS, had issued instructions for oper- 
ational units to charge per diem to open allotments; otheri 
commands had directed the charge to their respective re-J 
stricted allotments; and still other commands had issuedl 
instructions that no per diem be paid. The EUCOM policy) 
prohibited authorization of per diem for personnel travel- 1 
ing on TDY within the European Command who were) 
assigned to any base in the command. j 

Pursuant to a request of the Commanding General,j 
USAFE, Headquarters USAF on 2 September 1948 advised! 
all Air Force commands to amend existing orders so as to 
discontinue per diem allowance for all personnel conned-,' 
ed with Operation Vittles and eliminate the discrimination^ 
This action established a consistent Air Force-wide policy' 



REPORTS OF SURVEY 

During the first four months of Airliff operations 
emphasis was placed on the utilization of reports of sur-j 
vey in the adjustment of military property accounts be-'i 
cause field follow-up disclosed that insufficient use was i 
being made of these documents. Further review of reports. 




PAYMENT OF PERSONNEL WAS EFFECTED PROPERLY 
ON TIME. ' "' ^B -. 



of survey from all Airlift stations indicated that there was 
either a lack of technically qualified supply personnel, or 
lhat supply accounting was not being rigidly maintained. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Finance activities require specialized training, and 
many difficulties arise when operations are attempted with 
only inexperienced personnel available. Experience during 
the Airlift has shown that flexibilities must be introduced 
into the finance organizations which will permit service to 
Iroop units even when personnel assignments are changing 
rapidly. 

Air Force personnel under orders to participate in an 
activity paralleling combat conditions, field exercises, or 
maneuvers should be authorized per diem only to and 
■ rom the location of such activity, wherever it may occur 



01 COST CONTROL & ANALYSIS 

:t 

V' Particular interest and concern was shown by Head- 
quarters USAF regarding the cost of the Airlift operation, 

primarily in view of its budgetary implications. In order to 
1 meet this requirement the USAF Cost Control System was 
'"immediately expanded and applied to the Airlift activi- 

lies. 



DEVELOPMENT 

Plans had just been completed for the initiation of the 
USAF Cost Control System in USAFE on 1 July 1948. 
Four days after the inception of the Airlift a survey was 
""ade to implement cost reporting, to cover the addi- 
tional special requirements peculiar to Airlift activities. 

Among the problems encountered was the lack of ex- 
perienced cost personnel and training information - no 
cost reporting manuals were available. Required personnel 
wer e drawn from all available sources, mainly from Sta- 
tical Services, but also from surplus navigators. Necessary 



AF cost reporting forms were reproduced and personnel 
and equipment were assembled with minimum delay. The 
adaptability of the USAF Cost Control System was indi- 
cated by the fact that beginning 15 July 1948, actual cost 
data from Airlift operations were abstracted and reported 
to Headquarters USAF every ten days. The requirement 
for these frequent reports was established by Headquarters 
USAF during the early phase of the Airlift, when the in- 
terest was at a high pitch, to keep the top staff currently 
informed of cost developments. 



OPERATION 

The requirement for 10-day cost reporting was dis- 
continued 31 October 1948. Thereafter and until the 
phase-out, Airlift cost data were submitted with the re- 
gular monthly cost control reports. Bases which were 
devoting all their efforts to the Airlift submitted only the 
regular cost reports; however, bases which devoted only 
a part of their efforts to the Airlift submitted separate data 
for Airlift and non-Airlift activity, with costs computed on 
a proportionate basis. 

To insure uniformity and accuracy of cost data, a sys- 
tem of field auditing was established with immediate 
beneficial results. During the early part of 1949 officers 
and airmen trained in the special courses on cost report- 
ing at Lowry Field began to arrive and were assimilated 
into the cost system. 

ANALYSIS 

The cost data assembled and graphically portrayed on 
the adjoining charts represents the Airlift costs of USAFE 
and does not include the Airlift costs incurred by other 
USAF Commands and activities. 

The initial emphasis in cost analysis was placed on 
breakdowns of base costs by function. Later, month-to- 
month costs per ton, per plane-mile, and per ton-mile 
were compiled and graphed with total monthly and ac- 
cumulated tonnage and costs, to reflect trends in com- 
parative cost and production. 



As the daily tonnage increased and the Airlift settled 
into a semi-permanent organization, a method was 
established to stimulate productivity and to measure ef- 
ficiency. In order that unit commanders could scrutinize 
cost factors in comparison with Airlift groups, total cost 
factors were segregated into the following three opera- 
tional classifications: 

Direct Flying Costs. Group operational costs which 
rise and fall in direct proportion to tonnage airlifted — 
on a comparable basis to the Air Transport Association's 
"Civilian Airlift Breakdown." 

Indirect Base Costs. Overhead service costs which 
are relatively stable, regardless of the day-to-day fluc- 
tuations in tonnage hauled. 

Support Costs. Services rendered by off-the-base 
installations (excluding Zone of Interior) over which the 
group commander exercises no control from a cost stand- 
point. 

A monthly recapitulation of these cost breakdowns 
showing cost per ton and per ton-mile by group was in- 
augurated early in 1949, and the information was there- 
after furnished to group commanders with appropriate 
remarks for further analysis and necessary action. 



CONCLUSIONS 

One of the outstanding results of the establishment of 
cost reporting for Project "Vittles" has been the accumula- 
tion of total cost data of the entire operation. Statistics 
gathered and tabulated will be of invaluable aid in bud- 
geting for such an operation. However, a greater degree of 
efficiency and savings might have been realized had there 
been adequate personnel for further analysis of functional 
cost and aggressive application of such evaluations. 

The standardized cost reporting system permitted a 
fair comparison of the information obtained therefrom and 
resulted in better control of Airlift expenditures. It may 
be concluded that while there were slight deviations from 
standard cost procedures during the first few months, such 
discrepancies were shortly rectified: Statistics accumula- 
ted indicate a satisfactory accounting of project costs. 



171 



USAFE COST OF BERLIN AIRLIFT 



COSr OF ML/FT W//LD\ 




COST OF AIRLIFT 



Monthly Cost of the Airlift 




-173 



























CONSOLIDATED AIRLIFT DOLLAR COSTS 


COST DESCRIPTION 


COST CODE 


TOTAL COST 


HQ 1st ALTF 


Wl ESBADEN 


TEMPELHOF 


RHEIN/MAIN 


FASSBER6 


CELLE 


ERDIN6 


OBERPFAFFEN- 
HOFEN 


BURTONWOOD ' 


COMMANDER & STAFF 


OI05I 


1 459 463 


289 521 


86 100 


125 713 


451 708 


229 261 


167 186 


83 421 


— 


26 553 \ 


ADMIN. £» SERVICES OH. 


02061 


1 093 703 


1 1 8 861 


12 1 830 


38 717 


277 687 


159 980 


1 70 676 


174 791 


— 


31 161 - 


MOTOR POOL 


02136 


1 624 482 


— 


134 240 


82 393 


630 032 


338 701 


161 1 26 


208 459 


18 373 


5 1 158 \ 


BASE OPERATIONS 


02142 


1 072 685 


4 942 


139 145 


251 450 


503 291 


93 316 


34 038 


20 556 


4 022 


2 1 925 r 


WEATHER SERVICES 


02144 


579 848 


— 


170 990 


121 962 


224 631 


14 516 


30 612 


10 560 


— 


6 577 \ 


A ACS & CONTROL TOWER 


02146 


2 490 270 


— 


392 154 


538 74 1 


1 159 523 


229 596 


103 236 


19 740 


— 


47 280 - 


TRAFFIC 


02148 


510 277 


2 336 


109 550 


65 233 


21 4 778 


77 176 


33 561 


4 684 


— 


2 959 


MISC. SERVICES 


02150 


3 343 674 


77 232 


220 047 


228 471 


1 225 546 


540 1 


477 1 19 


434 985 


463 


139 801 


INSTALLATIONS 


02261 


1 502 801 


484 


137 565 


387 748 


615 212 


74 908 


82 732 


128 231 


26 697 


49 224 ' 


MAINT-AUTO E. EQUIP. 


02302 


709 061 





54 206 


64 723 


287 982 


133 325 


67 553 


70 543 


1 8 835 


1 1 894 


MAINT.-ADMIN. AIRCRAFT 


02306 


248 391 


— 


70 766 


3 451 


1 3 706 


65 425 


3 2 957 


58 340 


— 


3 746 


MEDICAL 


03277 


501 178 


1 102 


44 069 


36 720 


180 644 


78 222 


80 822 


53 179 


— 


26 420 


UNDISTRIBUTED CHARGES 


0415 1 


8 354 734 


170 950 


805 577 


425 293 


3161 329 


1 585 534 


1 162 219 


677 636 


II 3 844 


2 52 352 


MAINT & SUPPLY OH. 


05050 


507 375 


35,507 


56 209 


13 598 


126 531 


86 357 


102 828 


34 976 


3 338 


48 031 


MAINT.— AIRCRAFT 


05102 


2 458 227 





178 298 


25 250 


1 293 360 


218 165 


267 530 





475 624 





MAINT OTHER 


05104 


462 1 16 


10 180 


143 924 


134 675 


158 380 





4 334 


6 416 


4 207 





OTHER MAINTENANCE 


05260 


380 663 


12 443 


71 849 


39 681 


149 37 9 


50 574 


40 743 


2 791 


10 679 


2 524 


SUPPLY COST 


05450 


1 5 36 599 


84 21 5 


107 51 5 


74 678 


588 188 


298 717 


246 577 


112 399 


12 114 


12 196 


OPERATIONS & TRAINING 


07061 


2 294 304 


2 19 539 


325 708 


1 3 34 


1086 896 


333 86 1 


31 9 431 





7 535 




FLYING PERSONNEL 


07102 


36 1 56 896 





5 760 99 2 


88 866 


18 256 755 


7 964 407 


4 018 728 





67 148 


— ] 


MAINT. (1st & 2nd ECHELON) 


071 10 


7 084 429 





1 373 51 6 


76 130 


3458 971 


1 687 051 


464 386 





24 375 


t 


OTHER OPER.. & TNG. COST 


07150 


597 793 


22 864 


17 880 


17 483 


369 203 


16 407 


153 956 








{ 


DEPOT MAINT. S. SUPPLY 


7770 


2 831 1 30 











244 








1 782 1 16 


449 471 


599 299 


CONSTRUCTIONS 


1 2126 


1 301 837 





261 543 


214 420 


777 669 


25 432 





19 367 


3 406 





OTHER ADDITIONAL CHARGES 


1 2150 


1 809 780 


2 830 


213 342 


93 901 


1 188 140 


82 590 


76 908 


133 844 


4 804 


1 3 421 


SUB-TOTAL COST REPORT 


15196 


80 911 716 


/ 053 006 


10 997 015 


3 150 631 


36 399 785 


14 383 531 


8 299 258 


4 03 7 034 


/ 244 935 


/ 346 521 


DEPRECIATION 




20 544 422 


6 536 324 


1 844 357 





7 180 544 


2 646 559 


2 31 4 538 





22 100 





29% USAFE COST O.H. 




1 447 169 


1447 169 


















SUB-TOTAL USAFE COSTS 




102903 307 


9 036 499 


12 841,372 


3 150 631 


43 580329 


17 030 090 


10 6/3 796 


4 037034 


1 267035 


* 1346 521 ' 


TRANSP. CORPS SUPPORT 




5 121 908 


78 400 


824 76 2 


2 072 20 1 


2 146 545 














i 


BURTONWOOD NON USAFE 




8 664 302 


















**8 664 302 


GRAND TOTAL 




116 689 517 


9 114 899 


13 666 134 


5 222 832 


45 726 874 


17 030 090 


10 613 796 


4 037 034 


1 267 035 


10 010 823 



174 



^26 JUNE - 31 DEC 48 **l JAN- 30 SEP 49 























CONSOLIDATED 


AIRLIFT DEUTSCHE MARK COSTS 






COST DESCRIPTION 


COST CODE 
# 


TOTAL COST 


HQ 1st ALTF 


WIESBADEN 


TEMPELHOF 


RHEIN/ MAIN 


ERDING 


CELLE 


OBERPFAFFEN- 

HOFEN 


COMMANDER b. STAFF 


OI05I 


133 446 


38 047 


10 390 


43 51 1 


27 095 


14 403 








ADMIN. &SV. OVERHEAD 


02061 


42 025 


8 752 


3 658 





17 073 


12 542 








COMMUNICATIONS 


02106 


21 046 





3 060 


2 458 


14 395 


1 1 33 


— — 





PROVOST MARSHAL 


02108 


1 33 084 





1 415 


2 1 630 


100 209 


9 830 








FOOD SERVICE 


021 10 


1 76 686 





6 1 42 1 


32 139 


60 413 


7 823 





14 890 


STATISTICAL SERVICES 


021 16 


216 











216 











PERSONNEL SERVICES 


02124 


1 320 











1 320 











MOTOR POOL 


02136 


172 21 1 





4 7 621 


1 1 948 


89 345 


6 020 





17 277 


MISC. ADMIN. & SERVICES 


02139 


1 28 444 


228 


7 719 


29 1 14 


87 055 


4 328 








BASE OPERATIONS 


02142 


99 281 





7 856 


40 67 1 


50 754 











WEATHER SERVICE 


02144 


57 2 84 





280 


54 628 


2 376 











AACS & CONTROL TOWER (ATC) 


02146 


126 489 








91 684 


• 34 428 


377 








BUILDINGS & OTHER STRUCTURES 


02206 


59 045 











5 983 








53 062 


AIRFIELD PAVEMENT 


02214 


744 530 





1 5 208 


650 534 j 


78 788 





' 





UTILITY SYSTEM 


0221 6 


44 5 59 





4! 859 





2 700 











FIRE PROTECT. & ACFT RESCUE 


022 18 


52 375 





20 818 


28 857 


2 700 











MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES 


02220 


16 940 











16 940 











SERVICE GROUP HOUSING 


02248 


14 982 





14 982 

















AIR INSTALLATIONS 


02261 


778 217 





100 524 


160 742 


514 910 


2 041 








MAINT.-AUTO & G.R EQUIP 


02302 


142 116 





23 914 


10 007 


87 617 


629 





19 949 


ADMIN. & SERVICES 


02477 


2 1 776 084 


5 525 


1610 163 


4637 62 1 


12 434 737 


3 088 038 








MEDICAL 


03277 


101 396 





10 707 


8 872 


55 975 


25 842 








UNDISTRIBUTED CHARGES 


041 51 


1 980 467 





12 553 


243 948 


1 422 464 


108 258 


190 094 


3 150 


MAlNT.-ACFT(C-47) 


05102 


186 1 15 





914 





2 1 095 








164 106 


J MAINT.-ACFT(C-54) 


05104 


44 984 











9 288 








35 696 


j AIRCRAFT SHOP MAINTENANCE 


05160 


163 094 





2 421 


18 623 


15 559 


216 





126 275 


: MAINTENANCE CONTROL 


05202 


5 247 











648 








4 599 


- OTHER MAINTENANCE 


05260 


22 353 


843 


1 200 


9 245 


5 552 








5 513 


. SUPPLY CONTROL 


05402 


20 745 





3 439 





14 594 








2 712 


- SUPPLY WAREHOUSES 


05404 


4081 











3 751 








330 


: SUPPLY COSTS 


05450 


77 580 





8 153 


19 251 


46 980 


| 1 709 





1 487 


1 MAINTENANCE E» SUPPLY 


05581 


19 18 907 


1 1 691 


102 174 


481 265 


1 190 265 


133 512 








: ACFT MAINT- (1st & 2 nd ECHEL) 


071 10 


100 753 





4 574 


96 179 














\ OPERATIONS & TRAINING 


07270 


980 432 


2 1 093 


283 096 


1 1 214 


665 029 








■ 


3 DEPOT MAINTENANCE 


07402 


158 510 














126 673 





31 837 


J DEPOT MAINT & SUPPLY 


07770 


3 334 548 


2 335 





3 206 





3,329 007 


■ 





j CONSTRUCTION COSTS 


12126 


7 120 644 





2 488 199 


404 744 


4 179 671 


3 130 


5 200 


39 700 


OTHER ADDITIONAL CHARGES 


12150 


26 632 







1 994 


23 982 


656 




= ■ 


_££^_ USAFE OVERHEAD 
GRAND TOTAL 


15196 


79 629 
41 046 497 


(3 b^.y 
168 143 


4 888 318 


7114 085 


21 283 907 


6876 167 


195 294 


520 583 


TRANSP. (EUGOM COST) 




1 1 855 142 





740 575 


8 226 379 


2 888 188 











TRANSP. (JEIA COST) 




15 391 395 





3316 700 





12 074 695 











J vial " VlTTLES" COST 




68 293034 


168 143 


8945 593 


15340 464 


36 246 790 


6 876 167 


/ 95 294 


520 583 




















Vi 



AVERAGE AIRLIFT COSTS BY BASE 



DOLLARS TON MILE COST 






pV^J^^fiSft^ 



.35 



0o ^^es 



176 




DOLLAR COST FACTORS 



ADMINISTRATIVE 

OVERHEAD 

10.30% 




177 



STATISTICAL SERVICES 

The Comptroller function ot reporting the develop- 
ment, progress, and phase-out of the Airlift was vested in 
those organizations and staff agencies formerly known in 
all echelons of the Air Force as Statistical Services, and 
at wing base level more recently designated as Report- 
ing Divisions of the Comptroller. Air Force Regulations 
charge these offices with the responsibility of providing 
all echelons of command with timely, uniform, and ac- 
curate information on all major program activities. Dur- 
ing the Airlift, the principal duties of statistical services 
at the wing bases were to control and audit all incoming 
and outgoing reports and to analyze important trends. 

At every level, however, statistical services rendered 
other staff assistance. It functioned as a screening agency, 
acting where appropriate to eliminate. duplicate reporting 
and continuously encouraging the use of information 
already available in the headquarters of the using agency, 
so as to minimize unnecessary preparation of reports by 
lower echelons. It maintained information as to source 
of statistical data, and it provided the facilities and the 
technical knowledge for graphic presentation of info - 
mation suited to such media. 




DEVELOPMENT 

When the Airlift began, USAFE had two machine- 
equipped statistical installations, the 32d Statistical Con- 
trol Unit, located with Headquarters USAFE at Wiesbaden 
and responsible for all USAFE machine reporting except 
supply, and Detachment "A", 32d Statistical Control Unit 
at Erding, responsible for supply reporting. One statis- 
tical services office was operating at each USAFE wing 
base, and one operated ai the Headquarters of the 1st 
Airlift Task Force after its formation. 

As the operation expanded, the new wings and groups 
which had arrived from other commands established small 
statistical offices of their own. Emphasis in these offices 
was placed almost exclusively on the collection and 
maintenance of information related directly to the trans- 
port operations. Since the newly established bulk allot- 
ment wings were station housekeepers only, with no 
jurisdiction over the groups on the base, the previously 
well integrated statistical services activities became de- 
centralized, with no one statistical services office in con- 
trol. Because of the TDY status of many elements, the base 
statistical office was often bypassed completely; ac- 
countability for personnel and aircraft remained with their 



STATISTICAL SERVICES COMPILED FLASH REPORTS TO 

URNISH INFORMATION .... 



i5i 55$2£~ 



upj swF > 









parent commands, until the units transferred to USAFE in 
late 1948. 

Expansion of activities created a shortage of personnel 
trained in the reporting field. To minimize the super- 
vision problems, surplus navigators, whose training in 
mathematics had conditioned them for such work, were 
given on-the-job training and assigned to the group 
statistical offices. Airmen positions were filled where 
possible from general clerical SSN's, but throughout the 
operation there remained a shortage of trained statistical 
clerks, SSN 212, and morning report clerks, generally 
SSN's 405 and 055. On the other hand, the replacement 
flow of experienced machine personnel was such that 
after activation of the 26th Statistical Control Unit with fhe 
3rd Air Division in Burtonwood, England, USAFE was 
able to furnish the new SCU with approximately one-half 
of the airmen required, the majority of whom were 
machine operators. 




W 



AND TO MONITOR AIRLIF 



AIRLIFT REPORTS 

In June 1948 air transport units ot this command were 
required by then current directives to submit 192 dif- 
ferent recurring reports. Of these, 42 were required by 
Headquarters USAFE, 20 by Headquarters USAF and 
Headquarters AMC, 88 by Headquarters EUCOM, and 42 
by the Department of the Army. 

Since the operation held the spotlight of world interest, 
additional flash reports were developed to feed the 
appetite of those hungry for information on its progress. 
Other new reports were developed to enable various 
echelons effectively to monitor the activity. Twenty two 
different reports peculiar to the Airlift were established, 
many were not new — some in a sense duplicated other 
standard reports, but diffeied in frequency or deadline or 
approach. A summary of the reports is contained in the 
accompanying fables. 

REPORTING 

Although certain special reports were required to re- 
cord the status of the Airlift and its resources, much of the 
data necessary was available from reports already estab- 
lished, such as the organization morning report and the 
aircraft "110" report. Coupled with such standard reports, 
the processing facilities provided by punch-card tabulating 
equipment at Headquarters USAFE saved countless ad- 
ministrative man-hours which would otherwise have been 
expended by every Airlift unit in preparation, audit, and 
consolidation of additional reports. 

When atmospheric disturbances during the spring of 
1949 resulted in "garbling" of many statistical reports dur- 
ing transmission, the necessity of retransmission was mini- 
mized by air mailing "hard copies" of the transmitted 
messages as confirmation. An interesting by-product of this 
procedure was a reduction in the number of retransmis- 
sions which had previously been required because of non- 
receipt by the addressee due to misrouting or delay within 
♦he receiving headquarters. 

The speed with which the build-up of the Airlift pro- 
gressed naturally created situations in which administrative 



TITLE OF REPORT 


RCS 


DATE INITIATED 


PURPOSE 


FREQUENCY 


REMARKS 


Report of Cost of 


AF-FO-F25 


July 1948 


To furnish all echelons 


Monthly 


All costs of Operation 


Operation Vittles 






with Airlift costs by 
functional activity 




Vittles reported in accor- 
dance with cost code. 
Prepared by all USAFE 
Installations. 


Report of Officers 


AF-AP-P183 


February 1949 


To furnish data on all 


Monthly 


Name, grade, and AFSN 


completing Airlift Task 






officer personnel com- 




of all officers complet- 


Force and Short Term 






pleting Airlift duty 




ing Airlift duty, with 


PCS Assignments 










total aircraft hours flown 
by type of aircraft during 
Airlift tour. Prepared by 
1st ALTF from feeder 
reports from all ALTF 
bases. Discontinued 
28 Jun 49. 


Ten Day Summary 


AF-SC-U20 


July 1948 


To furnish a 10 -day 


Tri-Monthly on 


Consolidation of daily 


Report of Operation 






consolidation of the 


10th, 20th and 


reports furnished Hq 


Vittles 






Daily Vittles Report 


last day of each 
month 


USAFon a 1 0-day basis. 
Prepared by Hq USAFE. 
Discontinued 21 Oct 49. 


Daily Vittles Report 


AF-SC-U21A 


July 1948 


To furnish all echelons 
with complete data On 
Airlift operations and 
resources 


Daily 


Covered all phases of 
Airlift Operation, in- 
cluding aircraft data 
and tonnage, and was 
broken down by (1) 
ALTF Aircraft data (2) 
Traffic data,(3) Remarks. 
Prepared by HqUSAFE, 
Discontinued 1 Oct 49. 


Report of R-2000 


AMC-SD-AE29A 


January 1949 


To furnish data on 


Daily from 


Total supplies of en- 


Engine Status 






which Hq AMC could 


Organizations; 


gines on hand, total 








base total engine re- 


Weekly to AMC 


engines enroute, and 








quirements 




average hours on en- 
gines changed. Pre- 
pared by each instal- 
lation operating C-54 
type aircraft. 


Great Falls RTU 


USAFE-PA-P4 


January 1949 


To furnish Hq USAFE 


Each graduation 


Information on total 


Graduates 






with Pilot information 
on all RTU graduates 


date 


pilots fully qualified as 
1st pilots and total 
potentially qualified as 
pilots and co-pilots. 
Preparedby Great Falls. 
Discontinued 1 Sept 49. 



179 



TITLE OF REPORT 


RCS 


DATE INITIATED 


PURPOSE 


FREQUENCY 


REMARKS 


Retention Status Great 


USAFE-PA-P6 


March 1949 


To determine number 


Monthly 


Names of all officers 


Falls Air Crew Members 






of officers desiring re- 
tention past 6 months. 




desiring retention past 
6 months. Prepared by 
Hq 1st ALTF. Discon- 
tinued 1 Sep 49. 


R-2000 Engine 


USAFE-SM-A2 


October 1948 


To furnish detailed data 


Daily 


Serial number, type. 


Change Report 






on R-2000 Engines. 




hours since last over- 
haul, date, and expla- 
nation of each over- 
haul. Prepared by all 
Installations operating 
C-54 Aircraft. Discon- 
tinued 16 May 49. 


Removal of Parts on 


USAFE-SM-A4 


January 1949 


To furnish data on C-54 


As Required 


Detailed information on 


Disabled C-54 Aircraft 






parts cannibalized. 




usable parts of canni- 
balized C-54 aircraft. 
Submitted by ALTF ba- 
ses and Erding Air Base. 


Critical C-54 Supplies 


USAFE-SM-A3 


November 1948 


To furnish C-54 parts 
information in order to 
facilitate requisitions 
from Zl. 


Daily 


Status of C-54 parts 
on hand, on requisition, 
due out, consumed, and 
reparables received 
daily at C-54 bases. 
Prepared by all USAFE 
bases operating C-54 
type aircraft. Discon- 
tinued 15 Feb 49. 


Departure of C-54 


USAFE-SM-A12 


September 1949 


To furnish MATS with 


Daily 


A 24-hour forecast of 


Aircraft 






advance requirements 




C-54 aircraft complet- 
ing inspection at Bur- 
tonwood and departing 








for ferry crews on C-54 
aircraft returning to Zl. 














for Rhein/Main. Appli- 












cable only to 3rd Air 












Division. Discontinued 












18 Oct 49. 


Weekly Activity Report 


CALTF-CR-C4 


October 1948 


To gauge number of 
and time required for 
200 hour inspections 
of C-54 type aircraft. 


Weekly 


Number aircraft (C-54) 
released from 200-hour 
inspection during week, 
number aircraft on 
backlog during week, 
average time required 
to accomplish 200-hour 
inspection. Required 
from Burtonwood Crew 
Control Officer. 



TITLE OF REPORT 



Hourly Progress Report 



Report of Field 
Grade Officers 



Manning Charts 



Dependent Housing 
Status Report 



RCS 



CALTF-CR-C6 



DATE IN I 



P 



August Ij 



CALTF-AP-1 Novembtf 



Maintenance Control 
Report 



Monthly C-54 Aircraft 
Maintenance Record 



Weekly Personnel 
Strength Report 



CALTF-AP-5 



CALTF-SD-H1 



CALTF-MD-1 



CALTF-MD-A6 



CALTF-SC-2 



t< 



January II 



March 194! 



*t( 
August 1% 



February ]| e , 



March 10$,' , 



180 



' PURPOSE 


FREQUENCY 


REMARKS 


etermine tons 
1 by air 


Hourly 


Number of flights at- 
tempted, number flights 
completed, and tons 
carried. Required from 
all stations exceptCelle. 


etermine assign- 
■ and distribution 
Id grade officers 


Monthly 


Name, rank, primary 
and duty SSN of all 
field grade officers. Re- 
port required from all 
stations except Celle 
and Fassberg. 


ermine personnel 
flower require- 


Tri-Monthly 


Statistics of assigned 
and authorized per- 
sonnel by function and 
organization. Required 
from all stations ex- 
ceptCelleand Fassberg. 


btermine current 
" of dependent 


Weekly 


Housing authorized, 
assigned, and available, 
by districts. Districts 
were broken down by 
distances from bases 
as follows: (1) 5 miles 
from base. (2) 10 miles 
from base. (3) 35 miles 
and above from base. 
Required from all sta- 
tions except Celle. 


[termine number 
'ft available 


Daily 


Number aircraft alloca- 
ted, assigned,departed 
for Zl, arriving from Zl, 
in commission, and 
AOCP. Required from 
all stations. 


stermine overall 
! snance status of 
type aircraft 


Monthly 


Summary for month of 
total aircraft in commis- 
sion, AOCP. Required 
from all stations except 
Celle. 


•termine current 
ir| nel require- 


Weekly 


Personnel status sum- 
mary by primary and 
duty SSN. Required 
from all stations. 



TITLE OF REPORT 


RCS 


DATE INITIATED 


PURPOSE 


FREQUENCY 


REMARKS 


Daily Operational 


CALTF-SC-3 


July 1948 


To furnish a complete 


Daily 


Personnel authorized, 


Statistical Summary 






overall statistical status 
of personnel, aircraft, 
and tonnage 




assigned, aircraft in 
commission, AOCP, tons 
moved, number flying 
trips made, and ag- 
gregate flying time in 
hours. Required from 
all operational groups. 


Report of Airlift 


CALTF-SC-5 


August 1949 


To determine rate phase- 


Daily 


Number of personnel 


Phase-out 






out was accomplished 




transferred and number 
remaining. Equipment 
and supplies, in tons 
shipped, and number 
tons remaining to be 
shipped. Required from 
Celle and Fassberg. 


Monthly Report on V.D. 


CALTF-AS-M1 


July 1949 


To determine V.D. status 
of Airlift personnel 


Monthly 


Number cases V. D. 
and rate. 


Weekly Airborne Elec- 


CALTF-CO-3 


July 1949 


To determine types of 


Weekly 


Failures and outages 


tronics Equipment 






airborne electronics e- 




by type of airborne 


Outage Report 






quipment with largest 
number of failures and 
outages 




electronics equipment. 


Ground Training 


CALTF-CT-1 


May 1949 


To gauge overall ac- 


Monthly 


Consolidated report of 


Progress 






complishment of training 
in accordance with 
USAFE Reg 50 Series 
(50-1, 50-6, 50-6A, 
50-7, 50-9) 




all training accom- 
plished as required in 
USAFE Regs 50 series. 
Included number per- 
sonnel that completed 
and numberto complete 
courses such as military 
justice, sanitation, care 
of ammunition and 
equipment, personal 
hygiene, camouflage, in- 
telligence, communica- 
tions, and basic infantry 
indoctrination. 



181 



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accuracy and completeness had to be sacrificed to meet 
the deadlines set on operational directives. A great many 
of the difficulties which developed as a result of this com- 
promise were encountered in the reporting field of ad- 
ministration. As is evident from another section of this 
publication, the administrative complications did not 
initially impede the material progress of the operation as 
a whole, nor should they detract from the splendid over- 
all record of achievement of the organizations involved. 
There is no doubt, however, that the lack of adequate in- 
formation was in many instances an impediment to staff 
planning, and that deficient administrative procedures 
more than once exercised a depressing influence on 
(morale. 



MACHINE-PROCESSED REPORTS SAVED MAN HOURS: 
FIELD REPORTS WERE FIRST AUDITED .... 




Analysis of the factors involved indicates that much of 
the confusion could possibly have been prevented by 
advance knowledge of specific potential problems. 
Preventive rather than remedial action might then have 
been taken. It is with this thought that the problems are 
analyzed in the following pages. 

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING 

The business of accounting for Airlift personnel was a 
complicated one. As discussed in detail in another chapter, 
personnel came individually and as organizations; by water 
and by air; on regular orders, operational orders, and even 
on VOCO, from all over the world. A large number 
arrived without any records. 

Personnel who travelled to USAFE as individuals were 
often under orders which were ambiguous, obscure, or 
incorrect. There were cases of orders which assigned per- 
sonnel directly to USAFE organizations, to Army stations, 
and even to geographic locations, all in conflict with Air 
Force regulations requiring transfer of personnel through 
specified AF accounting units. During the first few months 
some trouble was experienced at air ports of debarkation; 
incoming personnel often left the base without reporting 
to the accounting unit, and similarly, sometimes were 



present at their duty stations for several days before being 
accounted for on any strength report. This situation re- 
sulted from insufficient dissemination of instructions and 
lack of definite control of incoming personnel. In order to 
obtain complete and accurate strength information, if was 
necessary to compare personnel accounting records with 
those of the billeting offices, finance offices, and agencies 
issuing Post Exchange permits. Subsequent establishmenl 
of stringent controls at debarkation ports eliminated most 
of those difficulties. 

By far the greatest problem in personnel accounting 
was that resulting from the large number of personnel on 
temporary duty (TDY) from other commands. While the 
nature of the emergency made this large mass movemenl 
necessary, the uncertainty of its duration made permanent 
changes of assignment appear impracticable. 

Since normal accounting procedures were not fully 
applicable to attached personnel, there was initially no 
attempt to maintain complete punch-card records on these 
TDY personnel. It was not long, however, until a definite 
need for certain information was apparent. Mail delivery 
and personal correspondence required locator service. 
Housing facilities, ration requirements, and other logistical 
planning were necessarily based on total numbers of per- 
sonnel regardless of attached or assigned status. 



ODUCE SUMMARY CARDS AW i 




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The initial attempt at solving this problem was the 
lormation ot provisional organizations at all stations to ac- 
count tor TDY personnel. Due primarily to lack of adminis- 
trative control at wing level, however, these provisional 
units proved inadequate and were discontinued in De- 
cember 1948. In lieu thereof, each USAFE organization 
with personnel attached from other commands submitted 
an initial roster containing information on TDY personnel 
normally maintained by statistical services only on 
assigned personnel. Thereafter each organization was 
charged with the responsibility of accounting for this type 
of personnel on a special section of the morning report 
designated as "Section V The Section V morning report 
was processed by statistical services just as were regular 
morning reports. From this information, verified by a 
"head-count" 10 January 1949, punch-card status files on 
TDY personnel were established and maintained in the 
same manner as on assigned personnel until the end of 
the Airlift. 

The experience of this command indicates that certain 
complications are likely to arise through the presence of 
large numbers of TDY personnel within a command. Many 
of these situations can be controlled, corrected, or even 
eliminated by the use of PCA rather than TDY, by more 
stringent accounting procedures for TDY personnel, and 




by the effective use of the control data available through 
the statistical services personnel reporting system. The 
more important of these potential problems are as follows: 

(1) The lack of records and the increase in workloads 
for which no additional administrative personnel 
are authorized will probably result in a substan- 
tial increase in the number of morning report 
errors and will inevitably delay the preparation 
of personnel reports at every level. 

(2) Movement of individuals on multiple TDY between 
organizations, particularly on verbal authority, may 
result in "cross-shipment" of personnel in the same 
SSN's between two bases. 

(3) Upon expiration of their tour of service, TDY per- 
sonnel may be discharged and reenlisted by the 
organizations to which they are attached, without 
proper coordination with the organizations of as- 
signment. 

(4) Attached individuals may be retained past the date 
of expiration of their term of service. 

(5) An individual who has been on an extended 
period of TDY may at the expiration of the TDY 
period be erroneously returned to his former base 
after his organization has been moved to another 
base. 

Personnel reporting problems are especially significant 
during a period of major reorganization and redeployment 
such as the Airlift phase-out. Unless care is exercised in 
establishing the sequence in which individuals leave their 
organizations, a shortage of reporting and administrative 
personnel (due to early out-shipment) may occur at a 
time when the need for these specialists is greatest. Per- 
sonnel accounting records must balance as certainly as 
supply records; and accuracy in the initial stages of per- 
sonnel actions and reporting will save immeasurable time 
and effort whjch would otherwise be required in subse- 
quent analysis to locate the errors, amend or rescind 
special orders, and make corrections to morning reports 
and other basic records. 



RED FROM SUMMARY CARDS WAS 
HE REPORT. 



AIRCRAFT AND OPERATION REPORTING 

When the Airlift began, Aircraft Status and Operation 
Reports (commonly referred to as "110 reports") on other 
than USAFE aircraft were sent to the organizations to 
which the aircraft were assigned (Japan, Alaska, MATS, etc.). 
Until December 1948, the majority of these commands 
were credited with the flying time of their respective air- 
craft. In late 1948, however, the continuing nature of the 
operation caused a policy change whereby the aircraft 
were gained by USAFE on the newly established aircraft 
"MTV" (Military Transport Vittles) 110 report. Aircraft from 
the Far Eastern Air Force were the only ones transferred 
prior to December, their flying time being reported to 
this command beginning in October 1948. 

In the expectation of an operation of short duration, 
the Airlift staff initially procured operational control re- 
ports on verbal authority and later on letter authority. It 
was many months in some cases before printed directives 
covering the reports were issued. This was a factor in the 
creation of duplicating and overlapping reports. 

Initial aircraft and flying time data were obtained from 
a number of sources. The major ones were the 110 report 
prescribed by USAF and the "Daily Operational Status 
Summary", CALTF-SC-3, a flash report developed by 
Headquarters CALTF and used as the basis for the 
operations report submitted by USAFE. Extracts of the 
latter report were submitted to other interested agencies 
such as OMGUS Berlin, Headquarters EUCOM, and the 
US Attache in London. 

For various reasons, the cut-off time of the CALTF-SC-3 
was set at 1200 hours, in contrast to the 110 report cut- 
off time of 2400 hours. This 12-hour difference allowed 
only an estimated comparison. Since some of the informa- 
tion, such as flying time and gasoline consumption, was 
duplicating in nature, and since the extremely tight dead- 
line set by Headquarters USAF for the Daily Vittles Report 

183 



necessitated estimates of certain data, there were constant 
discrepancies in the overlapping information which caused 
trouble throughout the operation. The problem was ac- 
centuated by a difference in some of the definitions used 
in the two reports, such as those for "available aircraft" 
and "crew utilization". Variations in the sources of data 
required constant monitoring by every statistical services 
office. 

The collection, audit, and submission of the Daily 
Vittles Report was an example of almost unbelievably 
swift reporting. The report was quite detailed, including a 
number of items by squadrons and groups on aircraft, 
crews, maintenance personnel, operational data, accidents, 
type of tonnage hauled, loading times, fuel consumption, 
and other variables. The consolidated report was required 
to be dispatched from USAFE Headquarters at 1600 hours, 
only four hours after the cut-off. Obviously, to meet such 
a schedule required minute-by-minute planning on the 
part of all personnel engaged in collecting and assembling 
the information. 

Extreme care in the control of Airlift reports and re- 
porting sources eliminated several potential problems. For 
example, early in the Airlift, OMGUS in Berlin received 
overlapping operational reports from seven different 
sources: The three airfields in Berlin, Headquarters 1st 
ALTF, Headquarters USAFE, the EUCOM Office of the 
Transportation Corps, and Headquarters Berlin Sector. Re- 
ports from the West were based on take-offs and those from 
Berlin on landings. Aircraft in the air at cut-off time were 
enough to cause considerable differences among the re- 
ports. Such situations led to the establishment of Head- 
quarters USAFE as the single source of statistical informa- 
tion on the operation. 

Certain problems arose, too, in the mechanics of col- 
lection of aircraft and operational cost data. The fuel and 
lubrication figures reported were weakened by inadequate 
fuel measurement facilities at bases. Further, it was im- 
possible to use normal consumption data as criteria, be 
cause of the irregular waiting periods before take-off. AF 
Forms 1A were sometimes improperly completed because 
of weather, abnormal operation schedules, or carelessness. 
Coordination of aircraft transfers was difficult An air- 



184 



craft delivered by the crew of the losing organization was 
that organization's responsibility until delivery. Losing 
activities, however, had difficulty in preparation of cor- 
rect data on flying time and gasoline consumption, since 
Forms 1A remained with the aircraft and the procedures 
established for the return of necessary information to 
losing units were inadequate. 

During the phase-out period there were numerous 
transfers in preparation for shipment of aircraft to the 
United States, and gaining organizations sometimes re- 
ceived aircraft without AF Forms 1A and other important 
records. The deterioration in the quality and timeliness of 
reports submitted by organizations involved in the phase- 
out indicated a general reduction in the sense of respon- 
sibility among personnel who were scheduled to leave 
the Airlift. Such problems multiplied the difficulties which 
confronted the small and sometimes inexperienced group 
of personnel who were left to clean up loose ends and 
submit the final phase-out reports. 

CONCLUSIONS 

In reporting the Airlift certain techniques and policies 
proved their worth. Others were modified and used 
successfully; still others were found wanting. 

There are several points of view as to the most pref- 
erable method of administering such a project. Although 
the establishment of a sub-command solely responsible for 
an Airlift operation has its advantages, from the stand- 
point of statistical services it would be more efficient if 
no separate command were established. Statistical services 
in the major headquarters could carry out its function with 
very little increase in personnel — only a fraction of the 
number required for a separate command. The problem 
of coordination would be reduced, along with the dupli- 
cation of effort which stems from parallel functions. 

The taxpayer's dollar could certainly be stretched by 
adoption of stringent administration in closing out activi- 
ties. The tendency so evident in 1945 and again in the 
Airlift phase-out was to "drop it and get out". Therefore, 
it is strongly recommended that any individual who has 
departed without having properly completed his duty be 



subject to a "call back" for a definite period of time. This, 
period should be sufficient for the records to be cleared, 
perhaps 60 to 90 days, and the call back should apply to 
military personnel and civilians alike. Any necessity fori 
such action should be registered in the individual's pg 
sonal efficiency file. 



RECOMMENDATIONS 

The following specific recommendations represent gainsl 
in reporting experience believed valuable enough to make . 
a matter of record: 

Personnel moving to or from an overseas command lor 
a period of duty of 45 days or longer should in all cases) 
possible be moved on a permanent change of assignmenlj 
(PCA). 

Movements to or from an overseas command should! 
never be made solely on VOCO or operational orders. II 
PCA movement is not practicable, individuals should be 
placed on detached service rather than on temporary duty.' 

Suitable, adequate accounting procedures for detached 
service personnel should be established worldwide. 

The integrity of a wing-in-being contributes to its ad-T 
minisfrative efficiency and should be carefully considered 
prior to separate assignment of its elements 

Officers and airmen, regardless of career field, should? 
all have a fundamental knowledge of reporting and ad- 
ministrative procedures. Service schools should emphasize 
the importance of proper administration and its relation 
to and effect on the primary mission. PIO agencies can 
aid in making personnel administration-conscious. 

Special reports developed for an operation should i 
largely be based on existing standard reports, with such 
supplementary requirements as are necessary. 

To eliminate inconsistent information, operations re - / 
ports should normally be released to outside agencies 
through one central source — the major command head- 
quarters. 

Report deadlines should be established to obtain 
maximum value from the reports. Accuracy and speed are 
conflicting factors which must be resolved. 








1 APRIL 1948 
Rail and road traffic restrictions from British and U. S. 
zones to Berlin imposed by Soviet authorities. 

20 JUNE 1948 
Currency reform initiated for Western zones of Ger- 
| many and Western Sectors of Berlin. Soviets protested 
action and refused to join plan. 

22 JUNE 1948 
I Autobahn closed to Allied vehicular traffic to and from 
Berlin on Soviet contention that Marienborn bridge re- 
j quired repairs. Soviets announced new separate currency 
i reform. 




23 JUNE 1948 
Soviets suspended all travel and traffic into Soviet 
zone. Soviets asserted that Berlin was part of the Soviet 
Zone of Occupation. 

25 JUNE 1948 

Soviet authorities announced they would not supply food 
to Western Sectors of Berlin. 

26 JUNE 1948 

Operation of full-scale airlift to Berlin became the sole 
supply source for 2,500,000 persons in Western Sectors 
and for Western occupational personnel. Limited airlift 
had augmented military supply stocks since 1 April. 



185 



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29 JUNE 1948 
USAFE announced the formation of Berlin Airlift Task 
Force. 

1 JULY 1948 

First C-54 aircraft joined Airlift. 

7 JULY 1948 
First coal flown to Berlin, packed in duffel bags for 
industrial use. 

29 JULY 1948 
USAFE announced establishment of the Airlift Task 
Force (Provisional) which replaced Berlin Airlift Task Force 
organization. 

14 AUGUST 1948 
C-74 Globemaster aircraft arrived at Rhein/Main Air 
Base, making 24 trips to Berlin before returning to the 
United States in September. 

21 AUGUST 1948 

First USAF aircraft flown from Fassberg RAF Station 
to Gatow RAF Station in Berlin. Fassberg used as coal 
supply point because of strategic location between the 
Ruhr and Berlin. 

14 SEPTEMBER 1948 

Five C-82 aircraft "Flying Boxcars" joined Airlift. 
They carried bulky items and heavy engineering equip- 
ment unsuitable for C-54 transport and flew automobiles 
from Berlin to Rhein/Main and Wiesbaden Air Force 
Bases. 




*««*** 



18 SEPTEMBER 1948 
USAFE celebrated Air Force Day with an all-out Air 
lift effort, and with RAF participation hauled 7,058 lonv 
to Berlin for distribution to Western Berliners as a special 
bonus. 

1 OCTOBER 1948 
All C-47 aircraft replaced by C-54 aircraft on Airlift 

15 OCTOBER 1948 
Merger of USAF-RAF Airlift elements into one or- 
ganization designated Combined Airlift Task FfflP 
(CALTF). 

5 NOVEMBER 1948 
Dedication of Tegel Airfield in French Sector of Berlin^ 
third major airfield in Berlin area. 

8 NOVEMBER 1948 
First Naval transport aircraft arrived at Rhein/Main lor 
participation in Airlift. H' rc 

16 DECEMBER 1948 
First USAF aircraft operated from Celle RAF Station. 

18 DECEMBER 1948 
Tegel Airfield in Berlin opened for full operation, j 



31 DECEMBER 1948 
100,000th Airlift flight arrives in Berlin. 



i 

,600 Id 



19 JANUARY 1949 

Food ration for West-Berlin is raised from 1,600 1? 

1,880 calories a day. < 

(ire 











\ 



18 FEBRUARY 1949 
1,000,000th ton is landed in Berlin by a British York 
ircratt loaded with potatoes. 

8 MARCH 1949 
Six ambulances for Western Sector public health 
srvices are flown info Berlin. 

16 APRIL 1949 
Special Airlift effort, "Easter Parade," shattered all 
mnage records by lifting 12,940.9 tons of food and coal 
ipplies in a 24-hour period. 

4 MAY 1949 
C-97 Sfratoliner aircraft flew first "payload" to Berlin 
"■craft retained for special Airlift operations. 

12 MAY 1949 
Soviet announced lifting of the Berlin Blockade. 

28 MAY 1949 
Kail traffic to Berlin halted by Soviets, allegedly be- 
|e of elevated railway (S-Bahn) strike. 

7 JUNE 1949 

Airlift allocated eight tons of first-class mail daily due 
reported Soviet censorship. 



RESTRICTED 

26 JUNE 1949 
First anniversary of Berlin Airlift. Lift ordered continued 
until reserve supply stocks reached satisfactory level and 
international situation clarified. 

29 JUNE 1949 
Rhein/Main Air Base converted to coal shipping point 
for Airlift. RAF lifted food only from British bases at 
Wunstorf and Fuhlsbuffel. 

29 JULY 1949 

Memorial ceremony held at Fassberg RAF Station for 
Airlift dead by British, French, and United States forces. 

30 JULY 1949 

Official announcement of termination of Berlin Airlift 
on 31 October 1949. 

31 JULY 1949 

317th Troop Carrier Group at Celle RAF Station flew 
final mission with ten tons of coal. Flights of U. S. Naval 
Air Transport Squadrons VR-6 and VR-8 discontinued at 
Rhein/Main Air Base. 

Record tonnage of 253,000 short tons of coal, food, 
and supplies lifted by CALTF in July. Previous record was 
250,818 tons in May. 

3 AUGUST 1949 
First C-54 aircraft left Rhein/Main for United States 
under Operation VITTLES phase-out plan. 

25 AUGUST 1949 

U. S. Navy Transport Squadrons VR-6 and VR-8 re- 
lieved from attachment to 1st Airlift Task Force. 

26 AUGUST 1949 

Wunstorf Airfield (RAF) in British zone closed. Total 
Airlift flights 38,663 transporting 316,927.9 tons to Berlin. 

27 AUGUST 1949 

313th Troop Carrier Group at Fassberg RAF Station 
flew last Airlift mission. Total Airlift flights 51,995 trans- 
porting over 500,000 tons. 




1 SEPTEMBER 1949 
Headquarters, Combined Airlift Task Force inactivated 
at Wiesbaden, Germany. 

6 SEPTEMBER 1949 
Participation of 1st Airlift Task Force in EUCOM Fall 
Training Maneuver, Exercise HARVEST, from 6-16 Sep- 
tember 1949 in troop carrier role. 

18 SEPTEMBER 1949 
Celle RAF Station discontinued as USAFE Airlift oase. 

24 SEPTEMBER 1949 
Memorial ceremony at Camp Lindsey, Wiesbaden 
Military Post, for thirty-one USAF, U. S. Navy and U. S. 
civilian Airlift dead. Camp streets renamed for deceased 
personnel. 

27 SEPTEMBER 1949 
Fassberg RAF Station discontinued as USAFE Airlift 
base. 60th Troop Carrier Wing, Heavy, transferred from 
Fassberg to Wiesbaden Air Base, effective date 1 October 
1949. 

30 SEPTEMBER 1949 
End of Operation, VITTLES. Last C-54 left Rhein/Main 
for Berlin at 1845 hours, ending Airlift one month ahead 
of schedule due to sufficient food stockpiles in Berlin. 



RESTRICTED 



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