NSTITUTION NOIinillSNI NVINOSH1IWS S3iavaai1 LIBRARIES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIinillSNI NVINOSH1IWS S3iavaai1 LIBRARIES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTH
z <s> z ... w z in z w z *.-.. w z
2 tn *. z — [g •»•, z to z w ». z w
ssiavaan libraries Smithsonian institution NouniiiSNi nvinoshiiws ssiavaan libraries smithsonian_institution NouniiiSNi nvinoshiiws ssiavaa
5 ^^ 5
LINSTITUTION Z NOIinillSNI~ l NVINOSHllWS 2 S3iavaan" , LIBRARIES Z SMITHSONi'AN^INSTITUTION NOIinillSNI^NVINOSHllWS z S3 I avaa H^LI BRAR I ES SMITHSONIAN^JNSTITU«
rS3iavaai"~LIBRARIES" SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION" NOIinillSNI~NVINOSHHNS S3 I avaa II LI B RAR I Es"'sMITHSONIAN~INSTITUTION U 'NOIinillSNrNVINOSHllWs"'s3 I avafl
P l/> Z CO Z . (/) Z 2 Jfc. 5 > ^ ^-rr-^ 5 *• 5 ^5? - .. ^
^INSTITUTION '"N0linillSNrNVIN0SHllWs' /, S3 I a Va a n^LI B RAR I Es"WrHSONIAN Z INSTITUTION W N0linillSNI_NVIN0SHllWS^S3 I a Va 3 H_LI B RAR I ES~'SMITHSONIANJNSTITUTIj
m •- tfi — tn — CO ^ ^
; S3 1 ava a ii libraries Smithsonian institution NouniiiSNi nvinoshiiws ssiavaan^LiBRARiEs^sMiTHsoNiAN^NSTiTUTioN^ouniiiSNi^NViNOSHiiws^ssiavaa
M = INSTITUTI0N W N0linillSNrNVINOSHllWS t,, S3iavaan""LIBRARIES W SMITHSONIAN-|NSTITUTION € NOIinillSNI NVIN0SH1IWS S3 I avaa 11 LI BRAR I ES^SMITHSONIAN INS
?^ /> mm&r *■ v> iJft: rim v> w^k& N ^ >^
^ -^^ >*-=>- > •# -^ ^ju^ g ^ ^ 55 z w V z - — - Zn
s w s3 1 ava a n 2 li b rar i es w smithsonian 2 institution NoiinniSNi_NviNOSHiiws S3 , y va a n_ li b rar i ES (/) SMiTHS0NiAN_iNSTiTUTi0N w N0iiniusNi_NViN0SHiiws OT S3 1 ava.
N- , |NSTITUTI0N Z N0linillSNl" J NVIN0SHllWS Z S3iavaan" J LIBRARIES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIinillSNI NVIN0SH1IWS S3 I BVa 3 H LI B RAR I ESSMITHSONIAN^INSTITUl
MCTiTiiTinM"kini i n l I I cm I — MWIKirvQU I IIAIQ 51 I MW H
RAR I ES^SMITHSONlAN^INSTITUTlON^NOIinillSNI^NVINOSHllWS^SB | d Vd 3 II* LI B RAR I ES^SMITHS0NlAN_INSTITUTI0N^N0linillSNI_NVIN0SHllWS^S3 I d Vd a 1 1 _ LI B R AR I I
lninsNi^NViNOSHiiiMS^sa i dvda ii^li brar i es^smithsonian^institution NioiiniiiSNi^NiviNOSHii/JS S3 1 nvaan LIB RAR I ES^SMITHSONIAN^INSTITUTION z Noiinms
-*"^ to — to — to — c/> — c/> t/, _ —
IRARIES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIinillSNI NV1NOSH1IWS S3ldVdail LI B RAR I ES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIinillSNI NVINOSH1IWS S3 I d Vd 3 1 1 L I B R AR I I
to z oj z w .j. z •« " _^-s=-^ 5 ¥> ^5 .. ^ ^ -dj*. ?
XnillSN^NVINOSHllWS^Sa I dVM a H Z LIB RAR I ES^SMITHSONIAN^NSTITUTION* NOIinillSNI NVINOSHllWS^SS I d Vd 3 1 1 LIBRARIES^SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIinillS
to — & — en = > to ~ co = <o
\. <
y ^
I RAR I ES Z SMITHS0NIAN" J |NSTITUT10N Z N0linillSNl" J NVIN0SHllWS Z S3 I dVd BlAlB RAR I ES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIinillSNI "'nvINOSHIIWS S3 I d Vd 8 II LI B RAR I I
m z — co \ z — "> - w - ^ • -
linillSNI NVINOSHIIWS S3ldVd8ll LIBRARIES SMITHS0NIAN"|NSTITUTI0N NOIinillSNI NVINOSH1IWS S3 I dVd a 11 LI B RAR I ES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION^ NOIinillS
z ^ — ^ w z „., co z to «
3 RAR I ES^SMITHSONIAN^INSTITUTION^NOIinillSNI^NVINOSHllWS^SS I dVd a 11^ LI B RAR I ES^SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIinillSNI NVIN0SH1IWS C/> S3 I dVd a ll_ L ' B RAR I
in — en — in —- CO — CO = .... CO -r _ .
linillSNI^NVINOSHHIAlS^SS I d Vd a II ""l! B R AR I ES Z SMITHSONIAN^INSTITUTION_NOIinillSNl2!NVINOSHllWS _S3 I d Vd 3 II ~LI B R AR I ES^SMITHSONlAN^INSTITUTION., NOIinillS
- CO
IDDADITC CMITUCnMlflM IMCTITIITIHM Kl ni I n I I I C M I MMI MHCU I I IAIC CIIMWUflH LIBRARI
RESTRICTED
26 JUNE 1948
, , ,30 SEPTEMBER 1949
:ted
PREPARED BY:
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
^ICAAXt^
'<
RESTRICTED
BERLIN AIRLIFT
A USAFE SUMMARY
This document contains information affecting
the National defense of the United States within the
meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U.S.C.,
Sections 793 and 794. Its transmission or the rev-
elation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person is prohibited by law.
Retain or destroy this copy in accordance with
AFR 205-1; Do not return.
JUL241987
L/BRAR^
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
RESTRICTED
\3*
^
*0^
S^
3 ^Ol ••
"8© T
1^
0-
t^
^
to'-
ie -U° s
S ^e^. ?0t ° B
2&
•o
0-
^a
s^'
^
^e
d a
tx®
ec
•a J
id©
**V£«^o**
t^ c
i ^ e ^ r<
[^ a>
*^-V***A\V^V tf*
d^ 1
^<i>
: \° x
t a
c^
es
? 0SS od -
: \A
itv
as _:;^ otv8
fU
^
OP
eta
OP***
P^V^c^ P
XOg
i^
j&*-"~~
1A
INTRODUCTION
During the period when there was free traffic between
the Western zones of Germany and Berlin, approximately
12,000 tons were shipped info Berlin daily by rail, barge,
and truck.
Early in April 1948, Soviet guards attempted to search
an Army military train enroute to Berlin. To prevent sub-
mission of similar shipments to this indignity, the United
States resorted for 1 1 days to airlifting all supplies required
to fill Allied needs. Military aircraft were concurrently used
to provide transportation for authorized travelers who
otherwise would have been subjected to this initial Soviet
blockade.
Again on 10 June, the Russians stopped five Berlin-
bound coal trains at the British-Soviet Border Control
Point because the train papers did not specify the sta-
tions at which the trains would stop. This new control
measure gave rise to speculation as to whether Soviet
authorities might stop all surface traffic from the Western
zones to Berlin. Accordingly, the emergency plan for
Allied airlift which had been evolved during the April
crisis was readied for possible use. On 22 June the Soviet
Union took action to suspend all traffic and travel across
the Soviet Zone of Occupation.
The suspension of Western zone Berlin traffic virtually
created in the Western sectors of Berlin an Allied island
in the Soviet Occupation Zone. The surface blockade
permitted official access only by air through three cor-
ridors extending from Berlin toward Hamburg and Hanover
in the British zone and Frankfurt am Main in the American
zone. It was through these narrow air lanes that, on 26
June, the Western nations initiated an airlift not only to
supply the Allied agencies of Western Berlin, but also
to furnish for the German population of the Western sec-
tors, some 2,500,000 people, minimum daily needs in
sustenance and fuel.
The mission of mercy which the Western Allies under-
took was a challenge in joint operation, planning, and
execution which had not been equaled in time of peace.
The following chapters portray the activities of the United
States Air Forces in Europe to meet this challenge. The
participation of the many other agencies without whose
help the Lift could not have been possible is portrayed
in other reports, and no attempt is made herein to dupli-
cate their presentation.
For training purposes and simplicity of approach, this
presentation is composed of separate chapters for each
staff function or activity. The statistics presented, unless
otherwise indicated, cover United States operation only.
This report has purposely abstained from glorification
of individuals or activities, since such mention of any
specific individuals or activities would mean inequitable
omission of others also deserving praise.
CONTENTS
FOREWORD iii
INTRODUCTION v
OPERATIONS 1
INTRODUCTION 3
ORGANIZATION OF THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . 4
Organization 4
Army Support 5
Navy Participation 5
MANPOWER AND REQUIREMENTS 7
Manpower 8
Aircraft - 11
Recommendations 11
OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES 13
Introduction 14
Flight Procedures 21
Routes and Terminal Procedures .... 22
Altitudes 22
Pilot Standardization 22
Briefing 24
Emergency Procedures 24
Flow Control 25
Planned Diversions 25
Weight and Balance 26
Operations Summary 26
TRAFFIC 27
Introduction 28
Commodities Airlifted 29
Production Control 31
Minimum Turn-Around Time 32
Allocation of Load 32
Berlin Off-Loading 33
Diversion of Aircraft 33
Utilization of Payload 34
Loading Techniques and Equipment ... 34
Passengers 36
Conclusions 37
COMMUNICATIONS 39
Introduction 40
Personnel 40
Fixed Wire Communications 40
Low Frequency Radio Beacons 42
Low Frequency Radio Ranges 43
VHF Ranges 43
Fan Marker Beacons 44
Air/Ground Communications 44
Ground Control Approach System .... 45
Air Traffic Control Radar System .... 45
Airborne Radar and Associated Equipment 47
Mobile Radio Equipment 48
RAF Navigational Aids 49
WEATHER 51
Introduction 51
Organization 52
Effects of Weather 52
Forecasting 53
Observing 53
Upper Air and Aerial Reconnaissance ... 54
Pilot Reports 56
Operational Use of Forecasts 56
Records and Climatology 57
Dissemination 58
Technical Aspects 58
Conclusions 59
SAFETY 61
Ground Safety 62
Flying Safety 63
Summary 68
Recommendations 68
INTELLIGENCE 69
Functions 70
Personnel 70
Conclusions 70
PLANS 71
Coordination 72
Planning Staff 72
Conclusions 72
Recommendations 72
MATERIEL 73
INTRODUCTION 74
SUPPLY 75
Mission 76
General 76
Automotive Supply 77
Engineer Supply .78
Air Supply 79
AOCP Control 82
Electronics 85
General Supply 88
Conclusions 90
MAINTENANCE 91
Mission 92
Sources of Workload 92
Organization 94
Aircraft 96
Aircraft Engine Maintenance 99
Service Tests 103
Statistical Reports 104
Motorized Equipment 104
Electronics and Communications 106
AIR INSTALLATIONS 109
General 110
Tempelhof Air Base 110
Tegel Airfield 111
Rhein/Main Air Base 112
Wiesbaden Air Base 112
Celle and Fassberg RAF Stations . . . . 112
Approach Lighting 113
Conclusions 113
TRANSPORTATION 115
Mission 115
Organization 116
Early Planning 116
Airlift Operations 117
Conclusions 117
ERSONNEL
119
MILITARY PERSONNEL 121
The First Days 122
Requirements 122
Temporary Tours and Short-Term PCS 122
Aircrew Replacements 123
Periods of TDY 124
Requisitions on PCS Basis 124
Manning of Special Projects 125
Requisitions for Key Officer Personnel . . 125
Classification and Audit 128
Awards and Decorations 129
The Phase-Out 129
Conclusions 130
HOUSING 131
Policies 131
Minimizing the Shortage 131
Housing and Morale 132
Conclusions 132
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 133
Utilization of U.S. Civilians 133
German National Authorizations 134
Recruiting and Training 134
European Civilians Other than Germans 135
Phase-Out of Airlift Operations 135
Conclusions 135
PERSONNEL SERVICES 137
Special Services 138
Airman Information and Education 141
Personal Affairs 143
Summary 144
Conclusions 144
AIR CHAPLAIN 145
Morale 145
Conclusions 146
AIR SURGEON 147
Organization 148
Health of the Airlift 148
Removal from Flying 148
Air Evacuation 151
Causes of Disabilities 151
Conclusions and Recommendations . 152
AIR JUDGE ADVOCATE 153
PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE 155
Prelude 156
The Blockade 156
Plans 156
Problems 157
Summary of Coverage 158
INSPECTOR GENERAL 159
AIR INSPECTOR 160
Functions 160
Organization 160
Operation 160
Specific Problems 161
Results 162
Conclusions 162
AIR PROVOST MARSHAL 162
Mission 162
Organization 162
Operations 163
Conclusions 165
Recommendations 165
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS ... 166
Organization 166
Counter Intelligence 166
Recommendations 166
COMPTROLLER 167
INTRODUCTION 168
BUDGET AND FISCAL 169
Funding Structure 169
Organization 169
Audit of Non-Appropriated Funds .... 169
Conclusions 170
FINANCE DISBURSING 170
Payment of Personnel 170
Per Diem 170
Reports of Survey : 170
Conclusions 171
COST CONTROL AND ANALYSIS 171
Development 171
Operation 171
Analysis 171
Conclusions 171
STATISTICAL SERVICES 178
Development 178
Airlift Reports 179
Reporting 179
Personnel Accounting 182
Aircraft and Operation Reporting 183
Conclusions 184
Recommendations 184
CHRONOLOGY 185
r
g
w-
AIRLIFT BASES
* U.S. BASES
• BRITISH BASES
A FRENCH BASES
O U.S. OPERATED
INTRODUCTION
When it became apparent on 25 June 1948 that
supplies would have to be airlifted to Berlin due to the
Soviet closure of the last land route into the four-power
occupied capital, USAFE was called upon to deliver
supplies to Berlin. Aircraft of the 60th and 61st Troop
Carrier Groups and other aircraft in the pilot proficiency
pool at Wiesbaden were marshalled to perform the task.
Except for one or two B-17 flights, all the aircraft initially
used were C-47's. As many of these aircraft did not have
assigned crews, pilots were detailed for the flying from
all types of duties. When the mission gave the indica-
tion of lasting more than a few days, a special Task
Force was organized to which officers from the Opera-
tions Division, Headquarters USAFE were detailed.
During these early days, USAFE personnel were also
accomplishing the initial organization and development
in England of the 3rd Air Division, which was to direct
the training of B-29 groups and be responsible for the
Bu'tonwood Air Depot where Airlift C-54's were later
put through 200-hour inspections. Needless to say, the
presence of potent U. S. tactical aircraft in England in
moderate numbers was a morale booster for both the
people of Western Europe and the personnel directly
engaged in the Airlift. However, the development of the
3rd Air Division also necessitated an aerial supply build-
up from USAFE stocks, and initially this had to be done
largely by air with the same C-47's being used on the
Airlift to Berlin.
The fact that one type route to the besieged city
was not closed — the 20 mile wide air corridors — was
due to wise diplomatic tactics in 1945 when the quadri-
partite agreement was negotiated defining the corridors
and granting their free use under established rules. This
agreement effected the necessary coordination of opera-
lions of the four nations' aircraft in Berlin by creating
a four-power Air Safety Center where all flight notices
were posted. In March of 1948, the Russians requested
that the agreement be modified on the basis that several
alleged infringements of its provisions by U. S. aircraft
had been noticed. Had these modifications been agreed
RESTRICTED
upon by the Western Powers, the Airlift could never have
existed as no longer would night flying or instrument
flying have been permitted through the corridors in and
out of Berlin. But the proposals were flatly rejected by
the Western Powers. This proposed curtailment of West-
ern air rights, combined with other disagreements and
unfriendly Russian statements, acts, and demands, should
have provided basis for suspecting the imposition of
more drastic measures by the Russians, designed to force
the other three occupying powers from Berlin by placing
them in an untenable position in which there existed no
positive and continual means of transportation to and from
the city.
To perform aerial supply exclusively for a civil me-
tropolis is an entirely different project from fulfilling
military requirements with airlift to a theater of operations
or an isolated unit. In contrast to a Table of Allowance
and prescribed levels of supply for a military organization,
a city's requirements are limitless. It was therefore
initially necessary to establish the minimum amount of
supplies required to sustain the life of the civilian and
military population and provide the city's essential
industries with sufficient materials for partial operation.
This basic requirement was set at 4,500 tons per day, and
strict rationing within Berlin was instituted. However, the
directive calling for the airlifting of minimum tonnage re-
quirements was later changed to airlift the maximum
tonnage possible. Nothing was to be airlifted which was
not requested by the Air Staff Committee in Berlin.
To support the Airlift to Berlin it was estimated that
a fleet of 225 C-54's would be required. This necessitated
the marshalling of these aircraft with crews from other
USAF commands all over the world. Some units were
transferred in their entirety from their permanent duty
stations to bases in Germany. By the end of September
1948, all C-54 units were in place and operational in the
Airlift. A flight of C-82's was also present to move
specialized cargo to and from Berlin.
Originally the USAF flew from its two major bases in
the Frankfurt area — Rhein/Main and Wiesbaden. How-
ever, as the project grew, other bases were necessary
because of the ground and air traffic in the Frankfurt
area. RAF bases in the British zone at Fassberg and Celle
were assigned to the USAF for its use. Operationally, all
of these bases were well situated near the entrances to
the corridors and near the supply points for the com-
modities hauled. The original USAF terminal base in
Berlin was Tempelhof, but later Tegel Airfield was
constructed in the French sector and operated by the
USAF. These various installations are discussed in more
detail in a later chapter.
At the inception of the Airlift, standard navigational
aids existed in the terminal areas and along the routes
used. With precision navigation and flying procedures
required for intense operations from congested areas
through narrow corridors, other aids were required.
Additional beacons were positioned to indicate turning
or reporting points. Four Visual-Aural radio ranges (VAR)
were installed to delineate accurately the air corridors.
One localizer was installed to indicate a definite position
fix for reporting purposes, and the installation of CPS-5
surveillance radar at Tempelhof provided radar air traffic
control in the Berlin area. The system of navigational
aids which existed at the end of the Airlift is part of
communication projects discussed in greater detail in a
special section on that subject.
RESTRICTED
:;:.■;=;
WmmM&M*MmMWM&
iWli-Jlillil'liliiiVil'lTM
THE AIR MINISTRY
LONDON, ENGLAND
HEADQUARTERS
US. AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC
HEADOUARTERS
BAR)
HEADOUARTERS
USAFE
HEADOUARTERS
CALTF
HEADQUARTERS
NO. 46 GROUP
SCHLESWIGLAND
HEADOUARTERS
1st ALTF
FUHLSBUTTEL
* BASE SUPPORT ELEMENTS BRITISH UNITS
ORGANIZATION OF
The American Airlift effort began as an operational
activity of Headquarters USAFE. It was designated first
as Headquarters, Berlin Airlift Task Force and was later
established as the Airlift Task Force (Provisional), effec-
tive 29 July. The provisional status was removed 4 No-
vember with the official establishment of the 1st Airlift Task-
Force (1st ALTF).
Initially, U. S. and British efforts were independently^
conducted. Early in the operation, however, it was re-
alized that some form of unified control was necessary
in order to coordinate the RAF-USAF effort. When the
subject was first discussed, there was a slight difference
of opinion as to how far the integration of command
should go. While one group believed that coordination'
of air traffic control matters was all that was necessary,
the other held that one officer should be charged with
the overall operational control.
The discussion between the Headquarters of the
United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and British |
Air Forces of Occupation, Germany (BAFO) resulted in j
the establishment 15 October 1948 of the Combined Air-
lift Task Force (CALTF) as an integrated subordinate
command of both USAFE and BAFO. Due to effort in-
volved, the Commanding General of the U. S. element
was selected as the Commander of the combined organi-
AIRLIFT OPERATION AT TEMPELHOF.
THE BERLIN AIRLIFT
zation, with the Air Otficer commanding the RAF element
as his deputy. CALTF was given operational control of
all participating units. Administrative responsibility re-
gained respectively with the American 1st ALTF and the
British 46th Group.
ARMY SUPPORT
The U. S. Commander-in-Chiet, European Command,
charged the Army Forces in Europe with the responsibility
»for furnishing all supplies for Berlin, establishing railheads,
receiving supplies at the terminal points, and handling
and transporting the supplies from the railhead to the
airplane, and from the airplane to ultimate destination.
Effective execution of these functions was facilitated by
an Army liaison representative at Headquarters 1st ALTF
and, later, by organization of the Army Airlift Support
Command, consolidating all U. S. Army activities under
one Army commander.
NAVY PARTICIPATION
Two Naval units flew from Rhein/Main Air Base as
integral parts of ihe operation. Naval Transport Squadrons
VR-6 and VR-8 were attached to the 513th and 61st
Troop Carrier Groups, respectively, and operated under
the control of ihe group commanders. The squadrons
were provided with logistical support and housing in the
same manner as USAF Airlift units.
HQ 1st AIRLIFT TASK FORCE
WIESBADEN
APO 633
7350 th AIR
GROUP
BASE
TEMPELHOF AFB
APO 742 A
1
1
1
FLT. A
6AT0W
FLT B
TEGEL
7l50thAF COMPOSITE
WING
WIESBADEN AFB
APO 633
r~
1
60th
AIR BASE
GP
60th
ME.S
GP
i
1
60th
TP CARR
GP, HEAVY
60th
MED
GP
i
1
10th
TP CARR
SQ»
12th
TP CARR
SQ
333rd
TP CARR
SO
6lst TROOP CARRIER
WING, HEAVY
RHEIN/MAIN AFB
APO 57
61st
TP CARR
GP, HEAVY
6lst
MED
GP
513th
TP CARR
GP, SP
14th
TP CARR
SQ
53rd
TP CARR
SQ
VR 6
NAVAL TRANS
SQ
VR8
NAVAL TRANS
SO
330th
TP CARR
SQ
331 tt
TP CARR
SQ
317th TROOP CARRIER
WING, HEAVY
CELLE RAF STA
APO 147
1
1
317th
AIR BASE
GP
317th
M£.S
GP
1
1
317th
STA MEO
GP
317th
TP CARR
GP, HEAVY
1
1
39th
TP CARR
SQ
40th
TP CARR
SQ
41st
TP CARR
SQ
60th TROOP CARRIER
WING, HEAVY
FASSBERG RAF STA
APO I47A
1
1
513th
AIR BASE
GP
513th
M6.S
GP
1
1
513th
STA MED
GP
313th
TP CARR
GP.SP
1
1
29th
TP CARR
SQ
11 in
TP CARR
SQ
1
1
48th
TP CARR
SQ
47th
TP CARR
SQ
332 nd
TP CARR
SQ
•NOT MANNED
fV£J?£ st/ppi/m
J- *> i
tK
/"
t |Ol
MANPOWER
am/
REQUIREMENTS
$te»*.
*'..
ec, "»- -
7 >:>:
3 **,.
«/2
ttr.
"""«>>,
" f "Persy "'eni.^ ? P °arr;° r C °°"0a„
NUMBER
6 000 I
NUMBER
36 000
AUTHORIZED, REQUIRED AND ASSIGNED USAFE STRENGTH
-■ '
J REQl
IIRED |
\ ASS GNED |
m *
S
*""" *■•
X^
*--*-5-*j
us»"-I_t
'""
L~
"*-..
• %
J
'' /
/
N
X:
•V " "
\
| AUTH
DRIZED |
..
J i
\
5 C
3 I
i
3
I
I
A
4
A
J
J
4 S
MANPOWER
If was evident from fhe beginning fhat fhe T/O&E oi
a Troop Carrier Wing (Heavy) did nof authorize sufficien
personnel for 24-hour operation seven days a week
Therefore, in October 1948 the flight crew authorization
were augmented to three crews per aircraft. Since addi
fional maintenance and supply personnel and personne,
for base operation were also required, Headquarters USAF
authorized the reorganization from the "P" Column tc
the "W" Column strength of the T/O&E on 20 Januarw
1949. Even at the increased strength authorization, a re*
quirement existed for additional authorization in ttw
maintenance categories. A comparison of these requirep
ments is indicated in the accompanying table.
The reorganization to the "W" Column strength of thi
troop carrier T/O&E made it apparent that many of thdj
SSN's authorized were surplus and that reports to Head
quarters USAF depicted an erroneous picture. Some o.
the surplus authorizations that were noted are as follows 1
(1) Navigators (SSN 1037). Flights to Berlin did no
require navigators. However, flights to Burton*
wood and the Zone of Interior (Zl) required com*
plete crews. Only 90 navigators for the entire Air
lift were needed, while the T/O&E authorized 984;
(2) Radio operator mechanics (SSN 2756). Not re-
quired for Airlift flights.
(3) Cook's helpers or mess attendants (SSN 062). Al
GERMA
HELPERS
of the authorization was surplus, as German
civilians were utilized for such duties.
(4) The Base Service Squadrons of each wing were
surplus. The authorization therefor consisted pri-
marily of laborers, and German nationals were
utilized in that capacity.
In late February 1949 requests were submitted to
Headquarters USAF to reorganize to "P" Column strength,
delete surplus SSN's from the T/O&E's, and inactivate
the base service squadrons. Spaces made available were
to be converted on a grade-for-grade basis, to the USAFE
non-T/O&E allotment. These requests were approved the
following April and the corresponding reorganization was
directed in May.
A problem of major concern was that the USAFE
Troop Basis did not increase concurrently or commen-
surately with the additional requirements. The accompany-
ing chart indicates that requirements continuously exceeded
the authorized personnel; e.g., in October 1948 the re-
quirement for both officers and airmen was almost double
the authorization. This made planning particularly diffi-
cult in that an all-out effort was required of every organi-
zation without any advance or current information on
authorizations.
The disparity in authorizations was alleviated by the
utilization of German nationals. Qualified personnel of this
type were obtained whenever possible and utilized as
mechanics' helpers and in normal base support activities
where military personnel were not authorized in sufficient
numbers.
AN ANALYSIS OF MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
■OW w h UJt
c <-
S; "£"T30
in c"0°
c-o = COO)
ized by Col.
1-1313 (U.
-Eng acft plu
eserve - wc
)
d in T/O&
fororgn mair
sserve acft
co -c
?.E a>io— -
S>E <u^-~
<D C 05 C C
JOB TITLE
SSN
1-1313, or
personnel
zed for 12
aircraft (50
■nonthly)
Manpow
orgn ma
nel requir
4-Eng acft (
ng monthly
Manpow
orgn ma
nel requir
-Eng acft (2
ng monthly
nee betwe
zations a
mentsforor
for 12 4-E
40 hrs flyi
y)
Author
T/O&E
of 12 4
3 in r
column
Include
1-1313
of 3 re
T/O&E
maint
authori
4-Eng
flying i
USAF
Guide,
person
for 12-
hrs flyi
USAF
Guide,
person
for124
hrs flyi
Differe
authori
require
rnaint
acft (2
monthi
A
B
C (A-B)
D
E
F (E-A)
Painter
144
1
1
1
2
+ 1
Clerk-Typist
405
1*
1
1
3
+ 2
Airplane Hydraulic Mechanic
528
3
1
2
1.92
4.18
+ 1.18
Fabric & Dope Mechanic
548
2
2
- 2
Airplane Sheet Metal Work
555
4
4
■ 2.4
5.14
+ 1.14
Aircraft Welder
573
1.32
2.82
+ 2.82
Airplane Power Plant Mechanic
684-A
30
6
24
— 30
Airplane Electrical Mechanic
685
5
1
4
3
6.42
+ 1.42
Airplane Instrument Mechanic
686
5
5
1.92
4.18
— 82
Airplane & Engine Mechanic
747-C
28
3
25
72
154.08
+ 126.08
Airplane Inspector
750-C
2
2
2
6
+ 4
Airplane Line Chief
750-C
1
1
1
1
Airplane Flight Chief
750-C
3
3
3
3
Airplane Crew Chief & Assistant
750-C
15
3
12
24
51.36
+ 36.36
Radio Mechanic, AF
754
5
1
4
12
25.68
+ 20.68
AF Supply Technician
826
3
3
2
5
+ 2
Supply Clerk
835
1*
1
1
3
+ 2
Radar Mechanic, Troop Carrier
849
9
9
- 9
Radar Mechanic Navigator
853
10
1
9
— 10
Special Vehicle Operator
932
1
2
4- 2
Radio Operator-Mechanic
2756
24
24
- 24
Total
152
16
136
130.56
278.86
+ 126.86
* Personnel in squadron headquarters not included.
Based on 201 4-Eng
ne aircraft, a requirement exists for 2,123 addition
al personnel for organi-
zational maintenanc
e with supporting administrative personnel. Field
maintenance, based on
27% of 2,123, woulc
i require 573 personnel or a total of 2,696 additional for both organiza-
tional and field ma
intenance. Deducting 784 used in 200-hour inspection at Burtonwood, a
requirement existed
for 1,912 additional troop spaces
for "Vittles"
maintenance
and troop
carrier squadrons.
U.S., ALLIED AND GERMAN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL STRENGTH
ERDING EMPLOYED GERMAN CARPENTERS .
i
| AUT PRIZED |
^~~
^^.
^
| ASSIGNED |
**«■» ^
\
USLAND ALLIED CMUANS
|
| ASSIGNED |
v
„. — — •■
■ — — ™
*"" •" —
.— —
"^
— rs
\
| AUTH IRIZED |
mmn avtuANs
ASONDJFMAMJJA
AIRCRAFT
As has been pointed out, the 60th and 61st
Troop Carrier Groups were initially charged with tlying
Hie maximum possible number ot missions to Berlin. By
30 June 1948, 102 C-47's were available tor the operation.
But the establishment ot a combined goal ot 4,500 tons
a day for support of the Western sectors ot Berlin made
it apparent that the 2 1/2 ton capacity ot the C-47 was
not adequate for the operation. By 1 July the addition of
two C-54's to the fleet marked the beginning of a heavy
transport fleet which by 1 January 1949 had grown to
201 USAF and 24 Navy aircraft. The accompanying chart
portrays the gradual build-up of C-54's and the retire-
ment of C-47's on the Airlift.
On 16 September 1948 five C-82 aircraft arrived in the
command. Carrying unwieldy cargo, such as heavy equip-
ment and automobiles, became their primary function. In
November, Navy Squadrons VR-6 and VR-8 began
operations with 24 R-5D (C-54 type) aircraft. After the
fleet had been built up to 225 aircraft, the available air-
craft engaged in the mission varied between 209 and
228 until final phase-out. In addition, a steady pipeline
flow of some 100 C-54's into Zl reconditioning depots
sc
ENE
F
R
DA
It
A
T
EMPELHOF
H
ANGAR.
! T
1
BUILDUP OF AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT-
1948
NUMBER
200
150
100
50
16-
54 1
*'
\
/
/
*'
\
|c-
W
/
IC-821
8 15 22 29 5 12 19 26 2 9 16 23 30
JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER
PHASE0UT OF AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT- 1949
NUMBER
200
150
100
50
x »
\
\
\
***».
V
\
, Ic
-54)
\
N
\
N
\
\
S
''••.4
JR-5D
r
8 15 22 30 7 14 21 28 30 1
AUGUST SEPTEMBER
' 14 21 28 4
OCTOBER
and back to the command was maintained until the phase-
out of the operation.
When the phase-out began 1 August 1949, 204 C-54's
(USAF) and 21 Navy R-5D's were on hand. Forty-five of
these aircraft were withdrawn from the available list for
return to the Zl. The accompanying chart shows the re-
duction phase of the operation.
After the official termination of the Airlift on 1 Oc^
tober 1949, the C-54 aircraft were reduced to the number
authorized for one Troop Carrier Group (H).
RECOMMENDATIONS
The wing-base organization was used in "Operation
Vittles" and proved satisfactory. The Troop Carrier Wing
T/O&E authorizing 1 x Column 5 (column "P") is adequate
with augmentation for additional crews, maintenance and
supply personnel, and additional base support personnel
for the augmented strength and support of dependents.
A major item of concern in an extensive air operaiion
should be the reporting responsibility of the aircraft. In
this case, such responsibility was retained in a command
other than the command requiring and using the aircraft.
As a result, for the first five months of operation all statistics
pertaining to the C-54 aircraft were reported to the parent
commands of the aircraft. Parent commands had to be con-
tacted for the using command to obtain these records.
This always resulted in delays and often in inaccurate in-
formation.
When it has been established that the operation will
be of more than 90 days' duration, and when two factors
have been established — (1) the tonnage required, and
(2) the most suitable aircraft to transport the tonnage —
the accountability of the aircraft should be transferred to
the using command as the aircraft are delivered. This
accountability should include the pipeline aircraft coming
from or returning to depots for reconditioning. The
maximum required number of aircraft should be de-
termined, and the operation adjusted to the availability
of these aircraft.
Support aircraft which deliver supplies to the com-
mand of operations should be accountable to the com-
mand directing their activities, and aircraft required for
Zone of Inferior training schools should be accountable
to the command providing the training.
When the total number of aircraft available for all
operations is limited, the Department of the Air Force
should direct adjustments between commands. For a
sustained operation it is necessary that replacement air-
craft from manufacturers, or leased aircraft from civilian
agencies, be made available to all commands concerned,
to meet backlogs due to accidents, weather, and un-
scheduled maintenance.
11
SUMMARY OF COMBINED OPERATIONS
TOTAL INBOUND TONNAGE
2325509.6
X 1
1404.0 69005.7
1190026 1396229
I4758Q8
1/35879
14/438/
171959.2
(522407
196160.7
2353637
2508185
2403250 2530900
777586
161511
U S TOTAL
1783572.7
1 199.0
39971.
73658.1
101846.7
1157922
87979.3
1145672
139218.8
203946
1544750
1899572
1922714
1827223
20632.2
55940.0
I2047.r
FOOD
296319.3
1 100.0
26825.
21424.0
25506.1
27592.1
23043.0
366345
16386.6
19548.1
25445.1
301342
30032.6
1 1614.6
1033.4
o ;
COAL
1421 118.8
12426.
50074.0
70910.2
825084
6055Q8
71923.4
1178886
95927.1
1226022
1503324
153220.1
1670077
1984833
552765
119881
OTHER
66134.6
99.0
720.
2160.1
54304
5691.7
4385.5
6009.3
4943.6
4919.4
6427.7
9490.6
9018.7
41006
2015.5
6635
590
BRITISH TOTAL
541936.9
205.0
29034.7
45344.5
37776.2
317886
25608.6
26870.9
32740.4
31846.1
416857
45406.5
58547J
57602.1
515578
21818.6
4104!
FOOD
240386.0
205.0
199170
14549.9
19994.2
16934.4
17439.5
177860
173370
15545.5
18047.0
18251.8
24512.0
21929.1
1-47110
32266
COAL
164910.5
7511.8
27269.8
14591.4
10570.6
33107
35878
6216.5
5178.0
8621.0
7126.1
10091.4
14619.0
25124.3
16988.0
4104.1:'
OTHER
1366404
1605.9
3524.8
3190.6
4283.6
4858.4
5497.1
91869
III2Z6
15017.7
20028.6
239437
21054.0
11722.5
1604.0
TOTAL OUTBOUND TONNAGE
81730.8
1439.4
1806.0
3622.4
3625.7
6446.7
9480.8
7106.1
6/09.2
7952.0
9897.9
8295.8
7727.5
65274
1646.9
470
U S TOTAL
458877
*
*
*
*
*
3234.8
5768.7
4128.5
3181.2
4631.0
6488.9
6149.8
5346.5
5488.4
1469.9
*
BRITISH TOTAL
35843.1
1439.4
18060
3622.4
3625.7
3211.9
3712.1
29776
2928.0
3321.0
3409.0
2146.0
2381.0
1039.0
177.0
47.0
TOTAL PASSENGERS AIRLIFTED
227655
4/06
16498
12282
14665
17544
18441
18937
16620
15447
19743
18885
16660
10584
10354
10077
68/2,
US INBOUND
25263
1408
1321
1441
1858
2359
1713
1871
1736
1993
2058
1850
1822
1587
1254
992i
BRITISH INBOUND
34815
1925
3157
1965
2230
3120
2565
2760
2905
2602
3092
3258
2429
1336
693
453
325 (
US OUTBOUND
37486
531
6262
2764
2897
2711
2491
1944
1729
1812
2576
2694
2489
2151
1877
1435
1123
BRITISH OUTBOUND
130091
1650
5671
6232
8097
9855
11026
12520
101 15
9297
12082
10875
9892
5275
6197
6935
4372
TOTAL FLIGHTS
277569
500
13528
18142
19729
18235
13352
16492
19492
17086
22163
26026
277/8
26545
27592
8984
1985'
US FLIGHTS
189963
474
7550
9770
12904
12135
9047
11660
14095
12043
15530
19130
19366
18451
20488
5886
I434>
BRITISH FLIGHTS
87606
26
5978
8372
6825
6100
4305
4832
5397
5043
6633
6896
8352
8094
7104
3098
551
MONTH
TOTAL
JUN-48
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN-49
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP i
12
* UNAVAILABLE
LOADING BASE
«MMM
-2»^2k
CORRIDOR ^&T7^T/
MITF TONNAGE
M* Y
250,318-9 | 235(36LZ
ti BERLIN
147 580.8 1 139.622.9 1 1».»"- 5 1 m.
■M.o.w.S 1,40+0
:'
14'
INTRODUCTION
The mission accomplishment of the Airlift is reflected
adequately by a total of 2.3 million tons of food, fuel, and
supplies transported to Berlin. During the life of the
mission, the USAF units primarily carried the bulk-type
tonnage, while the British excelled in hauling specialized
commodities such as liquid fuels. It should be borne in
mind in making comparisons of the effort, that the tonnage
goals established early in the Airlift for the American
participation were based almost exclusively upon the C-54
capacity of 10 tons, while the British used various types
of aircraft with different cargo capacities.
The following charts not only depict the amount of
food, coal, and other supplies that were carried into Ber-
lin, but also furnish an indirect portrayal of the build-up
of the Lift, and of weather and other factors that
affected it.
USAF OPERATIONS
PERCENT
OF TOTAL
100 P"~
RHEIN/MAIN AIR BASE
f
LI
j_u
I
O,
WIESBADEN AIR BASE
ll
HOURS
% TOTAL TONS
E?x?3 % TOTAL TRIPS
% TOTAL HOURS
PERCENT
OF TOTAL
1001 —
FASSBERG RAF STATION
I
I
n
,1
I
PERCENT
OF TOTAL
1001 —
CELLE RAF STATION
I
HOURS
878Q2 30299.1 30079.8 37 3969 44 1943 42939.2 436987 4631 IB
8940 30SQO 30320 37920 4489.0 43740 44390 4729.0
22170 66970 67690 84860 97490 949IO 974IO 10 1 100
* NO USAF OPERATIONS
% TOTAL TONS
FH!?*! % TOTAL TRIPS
% TOTAL HOURS
15
AIRLIFT TONNAGE
2 000
4 000
2 000
16
DAY - BY - DAY
10 20
OCTOBER —
10 20
— NOVEMBER —
10 20
DECEMBER —
10 20
— JANUARY 1949 -
TONS
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
TONS
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
10 20
SEPTEMBER —
17
TONS
2 500 000
2 000 000
I 500 000
I 000 000
500 000
US AND BRITISH CUMULATIVE TONNAGE
I252002.6h487 366.3 1736184.8
302900.7 346307.2 1 406854.3
349 101.9 I 139 059.1 1331330.5
18
TONS
2, 500, 000
2,000, 000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
CUMULATIVE CALTF TONNAGE BY TYPE
/ ..,
■|f:f
I 404.0 TO 409.7
89 4123 329 0352
84O20.9 129 521.2
I 738 164 8 | 978 5Q9.8 2 23 1 5998
2 309 3564 2 325 508£
497 672S I 569 937.1
19
THOUSANDS OF
HOURS
60
MONTHLY FLIGHT TIME BY TYPE AIRCRAFT
REPLACED BY C-54 AIRCRAFT
27 873.0 34716.0 39 924.0 36 798.0 45 780.0 57877.0 56 532.0 53 436.0 60 636.0
thousands of MONTHLY FLIGHT TIME
HOURS
60
l61 023
50
40
30
20
10
1 TOTAL |
1 NIGHT |
«*
•
» — *""
"\
* —
-'T\
\
/ X
f — '
,y
\
L\
J J
1S0NDJFMAMJJAS
TOTAL
1896
28 298
35 249
43 087
36 800
28 178
34 902
40 167
37 037
46 217
58 398
57 077
54 007
61 023
19 303
5 262
NIGHT
234
6 727
8 862
15 466
16 947
1 1 145
17519
19 091
15 307
17 381
20445
18 134
16 259
19 806
5 752
2 075
20
FLIGHT PROCEDURES
With the facilities made available to the operating
organizations and the supplies provided them at the
departure airfields, delivery of the required tonnage to
Berlin became primarily an operations task. The accept-
ance capabilities of the terminal airfields were limiting
factors in the expansion of the operations. Determination
of the traffic flow, therefore, had to be accurate, and
.precision flight procedures became tantamount to full
utilization of the airfields.
To provide the positive time control required, all
flights were flown under instrument flight rules, with two
methods used to regulate take-off:
(1) The block system was employed when airfields
were widely separated or when aircraft having
different cruisinn <np^rU wprp utilized. This system
established a time block for each base covering
all take-offs of similar type aircraft.
(2) The integrated dispatch was employed when two
airfields were in proximity or when aircraft dis-
patched had the same cruising speed. This system
insured the proper interval at the point of merg-
ing.
Standard operating procedures were established
setting forth airspeeds for climb, cruise, and descent so
that there would be a minimum deterioration of flow
interval. Blind position reports over designated fixes
permitted pilots to adjust their intervals as necessary. To
insure that intervals were maintained and that the accept-
ance capabilities of the Berlin terminals were fully utilized,
almost no traffic other than that engaged in the Airlift
was permitted in the established flow. In fact, Airlift
operations at Rhein/Main became so extensive that all
non-Airlift traffic was excluded except a bare minimum
of 10 flights per day, authorized as follows:
CARRIER
No. FLIGHTS
Military Air Transport Service
3
2
2
1
1
1
Seaboard and Western orTransocean Airlines . .
British European Airways
European Air Transport Service
Only these flights were permitted daily scheduled use
of Rhein/Main; itinerants were prohibited except for
high dignitaries on governmental business as specifically
authorized.
ROUTES AND TERMINAL PROCEDURES
The canalized nature of this operation, with its terminal
bases located in confined areas, created a need for
precise routes. These had to be utilized by all aircraft
regardless of weather, and the procedures had to be
standard. The routes and procedures developed are
portrayed in the accompanying diagrams.
ALTITUDES
After numerous experiments to determine the minimum
adequate separation between successive aircraft of the
same speed en route to the same receiving airfield, it was
determined that two altitudes, with a time separation of
six minutes between aircraft at the same altitude, afforded
the maximum over-all safety for each stream of aircraft
from any one base. For short flights of approximately one
hour's duration, a 500-foot altitude and three-minute time
separation was adequate. Additional altitudes had to be
provided whenever aircraft of different cruising speeds
were on the same route to the same destination. It was
found that the number of altitudes used should be kept
to a minimum, in order to expedite flow into the receiv-
ing terminal by reducing the time of descent from cruising
to approach altitude.
PILOT STANDARDIZATION
To insure that the procedures established were
constantly and rigidly adhered to, standardization o'i
pilot performance became an important project. Average
USAF pilots, although possessors of instrument certificates)
are not consistently as precise in their instrument flying
as this operation required. Further, the types of flying
previously done by the personnel varied greatly. There-
fore, all pilots had to be indoctrinated in the standard
procedures employed, and their proficiency had to bei
maintained at a high level, both in techniques and ir
adherence to published procedures.
22
STANDARD PATTERN OF OPERATION
Since there were no surplus aircraft for training
purposes, the indoctrination of approximately 1,400 pilots
had to be done on-the-job while actually engaged in
flying the Airlift. A substantial number of Airlift pilots
were trained at the Great Falls Replacement Training
Unit in C-54 aircraft along simulated corridor routes. These
pilots merely required sufficient indoctrination in the
actual Lift procedures and operation. However, continuing
checks on them as well as all others were made to maintain
a uniform standard of operation.
This standardization was accomplished by fhe adoption
of the Chief Pilot system. A "Standardization Board" was
established at Headquarters 1st ALTF. The men chosen for
this board were experienced in precision instrument
flying. Their duties involved the development and adop-
tion of standard techniques and operating procedures and
the indoctrination of aircrews in their use.
The hard core of the system lay in the Chief Pilot
and check pilots at group level. These men received
instructions and indoctrination from the Crew Qualifi-
cation Board; thus standardization of performance and
instruction was achieved throughout the Airlift Task Force.
In addition to non-standard pilot techniques, there was
definite evidence from engine failure analysis and equip-
ment failure analysis that some of the procedures originally
in effect were definitely injurious to equipment. Here
again the check system proved beneficial. Manuals on
equipment use, detailed training regulations, and check
procedures were prepared in coordination with the
technical representatives of both aircraft and engine
manufacturers. Using this material as a guide, additional
instructor pilots at squadron level were selected and
trained for the purpose of carrying out the required
standardization.
The new Airlift crews received under the replacement
flow of approximately 17 percent per month had a
relatively low average of flying time. This necessitated
the upgrading of an average of 8 pilots per squadron
per month. However, during certain periods the turnover
of crew personnel in a unit was 80 percent in a period
of 60 days. Though costly in personnel, this check system
accomplished the detailed indoctrination and training of
each individual pilot assigned to duty flights. Discrepancy
reports by air traffic controllers, approach controllers, GCA
operators, and pilots were constantly studied; and any
trends away from established procedures were quickly
corrected throughout the command. The most effective
control of standardization and efficiency was that established
at group level.
The Chief Pilot, the responsible standardization officer in
the group, worked closely with operations and was familiar
with the many details of the Lift. This put him in an
advantageous position to anticipate difficulties, observe
performance, and point out any limitations. Through the
cooperation of unit commanders, fhe system assured a
consistent standard of performance in flying personnel.
Operation on a 24-hour basis posed problems of sched-
uling crews for such maximum permissible utilization com-
patible with the limits imposed by health, distance from
place of work, availability of transportation, and irregular-
ities caused by weather diversions. It was not feasible to
classify pilots as to experience and to schedule fhem
accordingly; therefore, all flight crews had to be standard.
Governed by these factors, flying time on this short-haul
operation averaged 68 hours per pilot per month.
BRIEFING
Since crew members had to be cognizant of current
Airlift rules and procedures at all times, a system of daily
briefings was established. Under the "block" system of
flying, crews were briefed en masse just prior to going
on flight duty, a satisfactory system since there was rel-
atively little waiting between briefing and departure to
Berlin. When the block system was discontinued, aircraft
were dispatched from various bases to attain an integrated
flow. Because of delays between briefing and departure,
in many cases the information given at briefing had be-
come obsolete by take-off time. Accordingly, the daily
group briefings were eliminated, and thorough weekly
briefings on over-all procedures were instituted. In ad-
dition, pilots were briefed individually prior to each
departure on changes in flight plans, weather, NOTAMS,
alternates, and harassing measures to be expected from
the Russians. After the briefing, pilots were given navtl
gation and briefing kits containing current flighf informal
tiort, emergency procedures, maps, and charts. Emergene
procedures sometimes required diversions of as mud
as 400 to 600 miles from normal Airlift routes.
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
The emergency procedures included in the briefing kil
established what to do in fhe event of communication
failures, engine failures, crash landings, or emergen
diversions. Normally, an aircraft in distress would turn
of the traffic flow, proceed to an emergency altitude whl
was kept free, and return to its base or divert to a
alternate, depending on fhe emergency and the weatheij
In the event of a communications failure which woult
preclude the aircraft's remaining under the precise ai
traffic control required, fhe aircraft would leave th(
stream of traffic and proceed to a clear weather air base
either its home base or a designated alternate. Aircraf
with engine failure which did not justify the jettisoning o
cargo could proceed to Gatow or Tegel Air Bases fd
unloading. If the trouble could not be rectified in Berlin*
a take-off on three engines was permitted if the pilot ha<
been designated as qualified for such take-offs.
So that those Airlift bases which had one runwa*
would not have their traffic flow interrupted due to 'J
crash landing, another base wifhin the U. S. occupii
zone not directly engaged in the Airlift was designati
as the crash landing base to which all aircraff with landi
gear trouble or other evidence of possible crash iandin
would proceed.
Weather diversions were avoided if at all possible b'
suspension of operations when forecasts indicated th6
approach of weather below Airlift minimums. If possible)
any necessary diversions were effected to other Airlif
bases. Certain other airfields within Europe, some as fa>
as 600 miles from the Airlift home base, were designated
as weather alternates.
On those rare occasions when diversions were
necessary, they were directed by Airliff operations officers
on duty in the Air Traffic Control centers.
24
FLOW CONTROL
In order to effect the flow control mentioned above
and expedite and regulate all air traffic in the corridors,
operational control of the Air Traffic Control centers
which had jurisdiction over the Airlift routes and terminal
areas was delegated to the Airlift commander. He, in turn,
placed his representatives in the towers and Air Traffic
Control centers concerned to insure that Airlift policies
were carried out. Air Traffic Control directly supervised
the rate of flow, the number of landings, the traffic pat-
terns, and the procedures of Airlift and itinerant aircraft
entering and leaving the control area. A central control
was established within the Airlift staff with the responsibility
of continually monitoring the flow of traffic through the
corridors, issuing necessary instructions to the Air Traffic
Control centers for diversions, and making decisions on
controversial issues involving the dispatch and landing of
itinerant aircraft. For informational purposes this central
office maintained an up-to-the-minufe record of tonnage
flown.
The authority delegated to Airlift Task Force for the
control of air traffic in the corridors and terminal areas
was necessary in the early phases of the operation in order
to expedite the establishment of procedures required to
accomplish this mission most effectively. This authority
included prompt departures from International Civil
Aviation Organization procedures and Air Force standards
whenever necessary. However, the division of responsibili-
ties in Air Traffic Control centers and control towers was
difficult to define, and there was considerable overlap of
authority and responsibility which on occasion resulted
in confusion, delay, and possible hazardous operations.
These were due largely to the inexperience of the Airlift
representatives in matters pertaining to Air Traffic Control
because they were not trained air traffic controllers but
were, for the most part, operations officers.
All Air Traffic Control clearances were expedited and
voice transmissions were held to a minimum. The detailed
routes and procedures were defined and described in a
booklet for pilots which eliminated additional instructions
except in emergencies. After early operations indicated
the tonnage loss by stacking and holding, positive aircraft
flow was established, and aircraft which had missed
approaches at Berlin returned to home bases.
PLANNED DIVERSIONS
Planned diversions were attempted in an effort to
continue operations when weather at home bases was
below Airlift minima. When aircraft were diverted,
operational control of aircraft and crews had to be as-
sumed by the diversion base, which often experienced
difficulty in the integration of diverted aircraft into its
established system of crew scheduling and aircraft mainte-
nance.
Long-range weather forecasts for this area were not
sufficiently reliable to justify moving large numbers of
personnel and equipment to another station for extended
operations. Emergency diversions were attempted only to
those terminals located in the area receiving Lift support.
The number of aircraft diverted and the length of diversion
were determined by the availability of supplies and
maintenance facilities at the diversion base.
WEIGHT AND BALANCE
In order to expedite Airlift clearances, a simplified
weight and balance clearance was required. This was ac-
complished by transcribing aircraft weight and balance
data to a loading chart installed in each aircraft. This chart
indicated a maximum allowable load for the various com-
partments and served as a guide for both loading and
flying crews. Copies of the chart were on file at unit
operations, unit loading, and weight and balance offices.
Changes in weight and balance data were immediately re-
flected on the loading chart. This action insured current
and accurate information for proper loading of each air-
craft. Precomputation of weight and balance data on
the aircraft loading charts eliminated the necessity for
individual weight and balance clearances and thereby
minimized the loading and ground time of the aircraft.
OPERATIONS SUMMARY
Transport aircraft should be stripped of equipment ex-
cess to the needs of the operation so that their full
payload may be utilized and maintenance problems re-
duced.
Aircraft types may differ greatly from those used in
this operation. It was proved that the C-54 with its 10-ton
load operated more efficiently, economically, and
effectively than the C-47 with its two and one-half ions.
The C-74 operated very efficiently over the Transatlantic
route with Airlift supplies, and the YC-97 was used ex-l
perimentally for a short period in the Airlift. These largel
aircraft with greater payloads, faster cruising speeds, ancl
greater cargo compartment capacity will pose actual
operational problems not too different from those solved-
in this operation.
The restricted flight paths available to aircraft in this,
operation necessitated the use of a single stream for all
traffic. However, in future operations where this limitation
may or may not be present, other means for navigation
such as zero reading or distance measuring equipment with 1
omni-directional ranges, Loran or Shoran, and other future,
developments in air navigation may effect precision flow
control along specified routes.
Operations personnel in transport units must be in a
continuous state of training to maintain maximum
proficiency so that precision techniques may be employed
without further specialized training.
Air Traffic Control agencies should have at their dis-l
posal the latest accepted control techniques so that their
proficiency in employing such techniques will remain at
a high standard. The attainment of this high standard will'
permit the control agency to be called upon at any time
to provide Air Traffic Control service in accordance with
any.desired procedures, without change in its operational r
control or its normal mission. However, it is recommended
that the using agency accomplish effective liaison with the
central traffic control agency in order to pass to aircraft
concerned specific operational directives which have
definite bearing on the successful completion of the
operation.
An important principle which the Airlift clearly illus-i
trated was that positive flow control of traffic must be j
maintained between the loading areas and the airhead]
bases, with the maximum acceptance rate at the airhead j
bases as the determining factor. Since each operation may;
differ in its detailed air traffic or flow control problems, '
this chapter has not stressed such details as exact turning
points and altitudes. These are problems which must be
met through flexibility of operational planning based on
the Lift requirements, type of aircraft, terrain features, and
distances involved.
INTRODUCTION
Wifh the rapidly increasing speed and capacity of
modern cargo aircraft and the tremendous importance of
the time element in modern logistics, efficient traffic
management in the air transportation of cargo is an ab-
solute necessity. Future operations may not be accurately
envisaged, but the Berlin Airlift experience and the prin-
ciples it demonstrated should improve any future mass
air cargo movement and assist in its planning.
The apparent lasting requirement for airlift to Berlin
and its development as a sustained operation necessitated
the creation of a Traffic Section on the staff of Airlift Task
Force so that air cargo handling would be efficiently
accomplished. It was this section which obtained the
estimated sortie rate for the following month from other
agencies within the headquarters so that advance monthly
tonnage capabilities could be given to the Air Staff Com-
mittee in Berlin for allocation according to the needs of
the city. The committee would then establish priorities and
designate the type commodity to be airlifted when the
estimated daily average was exceeded. These priorities
afforded the Berlin Airlift Committee (BEALCOM) in Frank-
furt with the information necessary to establish the priority
of movement of cargo to be handled at each airfield.
Upon delivery to an airfield of the commodities pre-
scribed by the Air Staff Committee, prompt handling was
demanded so that transportation facilities would not be
delayed, cargo back-logged, or perishable items spoiled.
This need for expeditious handling warranted the assign-
ment of a traffic section to each unit and the development
of the Airlift Support Command, which was comprised of
Army Transportation Corps units working directly with Air-
lift personnel. The responsibilities of these organizations
were as follows:
Airlift Support Command.
(1) Unloading trains at railhead into trailers. This included
the marrying of high and low density cargo to assure
a manageable 10-ton load aboard every C-54 lypek
aircraft, and the weighing and documentation of
trailer contents so that accurate aircraft manifests!
could be prepared.
(2) Transporting cargo to airfield trailer parks, for subse-l
quent pick-up by line tractors.
(3) Selection of loads to be standing by, with loading!
crews aboard the trailers on the ready line for iitffl
mediate dispatch to aircraft.
(4) Loading of cargo aboard aircraft in accordance with'
instructions of Air Force traffic representative.
(5) Off-loading and holding of outlifted cargo for dis-
position by BICO licensed agencies.
MANIFESTING CARGO AND DISPATCHING TRUCKS AND
CREWS TO HARDSTANDS ....
Airlift Task Force Traffic.
(1) Manifesting of cargo aboard aircraft.
(2) Dispatching of trucks and loading crews to correct
hardstands and specific aircraft.
(3) Supervision of loading in accordance with weight and
balance criteria to include proper tie-down.
(4) Compilation of traffic statistics on commodities and
tonnage lifted, loading and off-loading times, etc.
As pointed out, the initial requirement of 4,500 tons
daily was revised upwards to a minimum comfort re-
quirement of 5,620 tons per day, broken down as shown
below:
Cargo
Tons
For the German Populace
Food
1,435
3,084
255
35
16
2
Coal
Commerce & Industrial Supplies . . .
Newsprint
Liquid Fuel
Medical Supplies
Sub-total . . .
For U. S., British & French Military ....
Three Passenger Flights (U.S. and French)
4,827
763
30
Total Combined . .
5,620
However, when the maximum tonnage within the
capabilities of the Airlift was requested, this minimum was
exceeded daily from January on. All in excess of the city's
requirements was for stockpiling.
COMMODITIES AIRLIFTED
Many types of commodities were airlifted to and from
Berlin, but coal constituted approximately 2/3 of all tonnage
lifted. Approximately 20 percent was food products, and
the remainder included liquid fuel, raw materials, indus-
trial supplies, construction equipment, mail, medical sup-
plies, newsprint, manufacturer's goods, delicate instruments,
heavy machinery, empty coal and flour sacks, vehicles,
and household effects. This variety of commodities
presented special handling and loading difficulties because
of variances in weight, shape, size, density, or physical
properties. To reduce these difficulties as much as possible,
special type cargo was handled from only two airfields,
Wiesbaden being the U. S. field used because of
its flight of C-82's and specialized equipment. A few
difficulties in handling certain types of cargo are highlight-
ed below:
Coal. At first it appeared relatively easy to handle
coal as it was compactly sacked and could be roughly
handled both in loading and unloading. However, it was
discovered that a sharp and abrasive dust would sift out
from the sacks and seep into the inner fuselage, wings,
and engines. This dust had a harmful effect on the air-
craft surfaces with which it came in contact, and conse-
quently the coal-carrying aircraft as a group presented the
most difficult problems during inspections and main-
tenance, especially in their cleaning. Dust control was at-
tempted by laying a tarpaulin on the floor of the aircraft,
by dampening the cloth sacks, or by doubling the paper
sacks with tied ends opposite; but the dust still persisted,
although in smaller amounts when the paper sacks were
used. Thorough sweeping after each loading further re-
duced the problem. At the end, tests were being con-
ducted at Burtonwood to develop a sealing compound to
be sprayed on the floor to prevent dust seepage into the
fuselage.
Considerable dead weight was carried when canvas
or jute sacks were used, especially as they became older
29
i t I t 1
FOOD WAS SECOND 'N COMMODITY TONNAGE.
in use and heavier with dus*. The development of the
paper sack and its use assisted in providing more coal
per load and reduced the dust as mentioned above. The
paper sacks were durable through three to tive trips, and
. their cost was not prohibitive when balanced against the
additional actual payload in coal resulting from their use.
Food. Food was second in commodity tonnage hauled
to Berlin. Types included were sacked grains, vegetables,
frozen meats, fish, dairy products, and fresh fruits. Dehy-
dration was accomplished on all food items which coulc
be processed in that manner to obtain the maximum
calorie value per food ton. No spoilage loss was incurred
in frozen foods because of the rapid handling they re-
ceived.
The major food-handling problem was that caused
by the corrosive effect of salt on aircraft control cables
when the salt would seep through the aircraft floors. This
was resolved by the use of British flying boats with
overhead cables treated against corrosion, and later
through the use of converted RAF bombers by storing
the salt in cargo boxes in the bomb bay and by outside
cargo "panniers" attached to the fuselage of British Hal-
tons. Security measures were continually necessary in the
handling of food to prevent pilfering, as its actual value
was much greater than the newly established currency,
and it could be readily disposed of.
POL. The initial method for transporting POL products —
in 55-gallon metal drums — proved very unsatisfactory be-
cause of the material tonnage lost in the drum's weight and
I If
^^^m
,*j-" m
r ^ ***** *M ^-^ Bffl
JTtgaad ■ ^P
1 ml If
Uh «
I THE C-82's CARRIED BULKY CARGO AND VEHICLES. 1
^ ' \ WKSKBm
the necessity for steam-cleaning the empty containers anc
outlifting them from Berlin. Then the British contracted fo
the services of a fleet of commercial tanker aircraft capable
of delivering 550 tons a day of liquid fuel. Since the tanke
method of fuel transport proved by far the most efficient
the airlift of all liquid fuels was assigned to this fleet
British bases were used, with approximately half of the fo-i
tal fuel airlifted originating at Wunstorf, where a unique
loading system was installed. This consisted of rail sidings
which permitted tank cars to deliver directly to unden
ground storage pools from which the various fuels were
pumped to 12 distributing points at aircraft parkinc
positions. To load an aircraft, the desired quantity was:
selected on the regulator dial, and the electric pumps;
provided a flow of 100 gallons per minute and stopped
automatically when the pre-set gallonage was delivered.;
The tankers flew into Gatow and Tegel, where pipes to;
underground storage tanks enabled unloading by gravity
flow directly from the aircraft at a rate of eight and one-
half tons in 18 minutes.
Industrial Supplies. Certain essential industries for the
preservation of life or the economic recovery of Berlin
needed raw materials and supplies to remain partially ac-
tive. Keeping these industries active eliminated extensive
30
unemployment and demoralization. However, the greatly
varying types of materials presented new problems be-
cause of sizes, weights, shapes, or special handling re-
quirements. These had to be solved on the spot. As men-
tioned above, however, an initial planning step, designed
to centralize the problem, established Wiesbaden as the
base to handle miscellaneous type cargo.
Engineering and Construction Material. The demand
for improvements at existing airfields in the Western sec-
tors of Berlin and the need for construction of another
necessitated the airlift of much heavy construction equip-
ment and material. Some pieces of equipment had
to be cut into sections for the frip and welded
together in Berlin. C-82 aircraft were used to great ad-
vantage in the transportation of unusual shape construc-
tion cargo. Asphalt in 400-pound drums was transported
in sufficient quantities to provide paving material for the
new base and runways. To control damage from leakage
of this material, tarpaulins were used over and under the
cargo. Tiedown ropes had to be replaced frequently, as
CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES FROM DUMP-
TRUCKS TO ASPHALT WERE DELIVERED BY AIR.
they became slick and would not hold the cargo.
Miscellaneous Supplies. Of the many types of mis-
cellaneous cargo, medical supplies received most urgent
handling. One item which required special handling due
to its extreme volatility was ether. It had to be packed
in very small containers and treated as fragile to prevent
escape of fumes. Six-hundred-pound rolls of newsprint
loaded by fork-lifts and unloaded by chutes were trans-
ported regularly.
PRODUCTION CONTROL
Sustained Airlift operational complexities dictated the
need for a new staff section to expedife all ground
activities. On the assumption that an aircraft on the ground
was not contributing to the Airlift effort, emphasis was
placed on minimizing the ground time of all aircraft in
the operation. To direct this function, a production control
unit was organized. A 24-hour operation, fhe new activity
utilized a central control room equipped with direct tele-
phone and intercom lines to all ground-handling agencies,
Air Traffic Control, and Task Force Headquarters Opera-
tions. The production control duty officer was given com-
plete authority to monitor and expedite the functions of
all activities concerned with furn-around of aircraft — i. e.,
loading, unloading, maintenance, and crew and aircraft
dispatch.
To preclude possible ground delays in the handling
of incoming aircraft, an aircraft status call-in procedure
was established. This air-to-ground notification of me-
chanical and load status enabled the controller to alert
sections concerned prior to the aircraft's arrival. To provide
a constant check on the location and status of all aircraft,
locator and maintenance status boards were maintained
in the central control room. This considerably aided in
coordinating crew assignments, loading, and servicing of
aircraft, and generally expedited the over-all operation.
Ramp expeditors in radio-equipped jeeps were highly
effective in eliminating delays by making on-the-spot re-
ports of ramp activities to the controlling officer.
MINIMUM TURNAROUND TIME
By means of a coded VHF message, the pilot of each
aircraft returning from Berlin reported, approximately 10
minutes before landing, its hardstand number and whether
it was in commission and had a load. A report of "Positive-
Positive" indicated an aircraft in commission for which off-
loading was required. However, when an aircraft re-
quired a load, the trailers were at the hardstand, and the
loading was commenced simultaneously with refueling,
turn-around maintenance, and placing of tail stands.
Manifesting was accomplished by traffic personnel
from the loading lists of the first trailer on the ready-
-*&.
line. Manifests listed the commodities, their piece count
and piece weight, total commodity weight, and total load
weight for all commodities. Except where miscellaneous
cargo was handled, this process was routinely automatic
as to data inserted. The total allowable cabin load was
obtained from an aircraft index card file, and the com-
partment break-down, also pre-computed on the index
card, was quickly transcribed in terms of commodity piece
count to the manifest. The complete loading diagram by
compartment referred to under Weight and Balance ena-
bled traffic supervisors to load each aircraft with maximum
speed and safety.
LOADING BASE
M£M6E Tl/M AKOMD TIM /HOI//! 2SMMrE$
ALLOCATION OF LOAD
Cargo hauling problems were met with the objecfiv
of delivering to Berlin the maximum useful tonnage to th !
airfield best suited to receive it. Consequently, loadinc 1
for the various bases were determined by the type carg I
handled by that base and its Berlin base destination!
Routing of supplies was the responsibility of the Berli I
Airlift Committee (BEALCOM), which was guided by th I
following general procedure:
Wiesbaden aircraft landed at Tempelhof.
Rhein/Main aircraft landed at Tempelhof.
Fassberg aircraft landed at Tegel.
Celle aircraft landed at Gatow.
/M 45 MM fy
/M 50 MM ft
,*mm*m
32,
^W*W A? Mf0MfA0 -?*/*
it-
/W /fM/A*
J ss/s/yw I
f/£4MjV&\
'Juh«*V-— »
BERLIN OFF-LOADING
The main features of the off-loading operation at the
firee airhead bases were:
(1) Central ramp facilities in which unloading could be
concentrated.
(2) Central dispatch of vehicles to planes.
(3) Wooden chutes to expedite unloading, except
where fork-lifts or cranes were required for irregular
items.
(4) Land piers for transit docks to transfer cargo to Ger-
man trucks or into rail cars.
(5) Warehouse or terminal space to store outlift cargo.
(6) Underground storage tanks and pipeline at Gatow
and Tegel for direct discharge of liquid fuel from
British tanker aircraft.
At the Berlin airfields, British, American, and French
ground force agencies performed the off-loading and any
necessary loading function under Air Force supervision
until the airhead personnel were sufficiently trained to
meet joint Air Force and Army Transportation Corps re-
quirements.
All of the measures discussed above were designed to
restrict to a minimum the ground time of Airlift aircraft.
With the existence of the requirement to deliver the
maximum tonnage within Airlift capabilities, it was essen-
tial to obtain the maximum productivity from each indi-
vidual, vehicle, and aircraft engaged in the project. Out-
lifting of cargo from Berlin, while causing some additional
ground time in Berlin, was necessary so that manufactured
products, empty coal sacks, vehicles, and possessions of
personnel transported from Berlin could be taken to the
West.
DIVERSION OF AIRCRAFT
The term "diversion" in traffic movement control ter-
minology traditionally has denoted the change from one
means of transport to another, i. e., air-to-surface. How-
'£/££
UNLOADING BASE
jrexAse ti//?n mound t/aie 49 mms
;.
!
i^i
■'!,.'■
33
•**. sm
ever, in this operation, it took on a new concept in mean-
ing the diverting ot the air transport tleet from one load-
ing terminal to another to take advantage of favorable
weather conditions.
During three very bad-weather days in January, a
planned diversion of Rhein'Main and Wiesbaden aircraft
to Fassberg and Celle was conducted. Within the period,
145 trips (carrying approximately 1,450 tons) were made by
the diverted aircraft, in addition to the trips flown and
tonnage hauled by the aircraft normally based at the
diversion fields. However, during the five-day period
following the diversion, Rhein Main operated at a below-
average level due fo the increased maintenance required
on the aircraft operated away from their squadron facilities.
OOD EXAMPLE OF CENTRAL RAMP
FACILITIES AND CENTRAL VEHICLE DISPATCHING.
UTILIZATION OF PAYLOAD
The payload utilization of a cargo aircraft must be
maintained in keeping with the dictates of safety in regard
to proper weight and balance of the aircraft. Internal space
available, the designed stresses for the flooring, and the
desired center of gravity of the loaded aircraft all influence
the establishment of allowable compartment loads. Al-
though improper loading may have tragic consequences,
lost tonnage attributable to underloading is a reprehen-
sible, expensive, and irredeemable loss.
In an effort to increase the payload of the C-54, an
experimental weight-stripping program was conducted at
Burtonwood Air Depot on the D, E, and G series of this
aircraft. The C-54's were weighed prior to the stripping
program and were found to average 300 pounds lighter
than indicated in the weight and balance data book. The
aircraft were then stripped of approximately 2,200 pounds
of unessential equipment, thereby increasing the over-all
payload 2,500 pounds. Flight tests proved that the air-
craft flight characteristics were unchanged by the modifica-
tion. Maintenance was slightly less complicated due to the
reduction of equipment.
LOADING TECHNIQUES AND EQUIPMENT
Accurate Loading. Platform scales were utilized where
available, to weigh heavy trailer loads and cargo before
they proceeded to the ready-line for dispatch to an
aircraft. At the base where these scales were continually
used, several overloads were reported by the pilots when
the scale was out of operation during a brief period. To
assure weight accuracy, additional control was exercised
by rechecking the individual package weights at the rail-
heads. At one time 200 freight carloads of coal were re-
turned fo the sacking plant for correction after the check-
ing had indicated serious discrepancies. Without these
weight adjustments or frequent checking, it was possible
thaf an aircraft could have been overloaded by as much
as 6,000 pounds. However, the absence of checking could
also result in short loads. On many occasions, the tonnage
receipted for in Berlin was less than that manifested at the
loading bases. Discrepancies on coal deliveries were
usually caused by moisture loss, leaky or broken sacks,
inaccurate checking or inaccurate sacking. When some of
these discrepancies are compared, the importance oj
accurate cargo checking and weighing is positively illus-
trated. Traffic loading technicians were responsible for
correct piece and weight count loaded aboard aircraft af!
Rhein/Main and Wiesbaden in addition to the proper
loading of the cargo and its tie-down. This method was
under continuous comparison to that utilized at the)
northern bases, where a British Ground Force checker ac-
companied the loading crew and accomplished the check-
ing of the cargo during the loading. The latter system re-,
quired extra men as a checker was needed with each
OTHER MAIN FEATURES OF THE OFF-LOADINO OPER/'
INCLUDED WOODEN CHUTES ....
.... AND LAND PIERS FOR TRANSFER OF CARGC
GERMAN TRUCKS OR RAIL CARS.
THIS FUSELAGE WAS USED IN TEACHING LOADING METHODS.
mi
THE EVANS
TIE-DOWN KIT WAS
STANDARD
EQUIPMENT. 1
' ' HHV ¥ W
loading crew. However, in view of the discrepancy reports
received on loads checked under the tormer method, the
additional manpower required under the latter method
may well have been justified.
"Marrying" Loads. In order to utilize fully the 10-
ton load capacity of each aircraft, it was necessary to
"marry" commodities of high density with those of low
density to comply with the aircraft loading requirements.
This "marrying" process, a major operation of the Trans-
portation Corps at Airlift base railheads, was best accom-
plished when personnel responsible for aircraft loading
aided in the preparation of the trailer loads. Heavily con-
centrated cargo was placed at the rear of a truck or trailer
so that it could be easily loaded forward in the aircraft
fuselage for proper aircraft balance and so that light, bulky
cargo could be loaded on top of the heavy pieces to
avoid crushing.
At USAF bases 10-ton truck trailer units were employed
for the transport of cargo from railheads to aircraft. These
vehicles presented the advantages of a large bed area
which permitted easier load-marriage and versatility in
use as mobile storage for built-up loads. The difficulties
encountered in backing and positioning this equipment,
however, prevented its use from being completely satis-
factory.
Loading crews were generally standardized into units
of 12 German laborers under the supervision of an Air
Force loading technician. Cargo weighing less than 250
pounds was ordinarily handled without the use of me-
chanical aids. Experience proved that the loading and un-
loading of aircraft could in most cases be accomplished
more effectively by utilizing manpower.
Training of Loading Crews. Continued supervision and
training of loading crews was essential to expedite all
loads and meet changing requirements due to new types
of cargo not formerly moved. To train these crews, one of
the bases used an old fuselage with a dummy load. This
facility provided training in loading, computation of weight
and balance data, and tie-down techniques. Hundreds of
officers and men were trained in actual operation in air-
craft loading methods which provided both speed and full
payload utilization.
Cargo Tie-down. The Evans tie-down kit equipment
was standard equipment on U. S. aircraft when they
arrived for duty with the Airlift. However, normal attrition
rendered much of the available equipment unserviceable
early in the operation. There was but a small stock of
resupply items on hand for the kit, and its workload was
heavy. While the attrition rate was not excessive, replace-
ment of worn parts involved considerable expense.
Traffic units carried on continuous research to develop
new tie-down methods and equipment which would be
both effective and lasting for heavy equipment. As sup-
plies of the standard equipment dwindled, a web strap
tie-down was investigated. Preliminary tests of the web
strap were encouraging, and a supply was ordered. How-
ever, certain modifications were necessary on the buckle
assemblies before this equipment was considered versatile
enough for regular use.
For securing high density cargo such as construction
machinery, a steel cable tie-down was used with satisfac-
tory results. However, because of its lack of elasticity, this
type could not be utilized with cargo which tended to
settle or pack as a result of vibration in flight.
Cargo Handling. Heavy industrial and construction
materials called for the use of mechanical loading aids.
35
Pallet loading with fork-lifts was found unsatisfactory be-
cause unfavorable ground conditions often restricted
maneuverability. High-lift truck loading proved slow, be-
cause the limited capacity of these vehicles necessitated
the positioning of more than one truck to an aircraft. Both
of the systems mentioned increased the possibility of
damage to aircraft by loading equipment.
Platform loading entailed a definite loss of time for
platform and plane positioning. An experimental mobile
conveyor belt was employed during the service testing of
the YC-97. This system has proved to have definite ad-
vantages over other methods in loading large-type trans-
ports.
The nature of the cargo handled, the types of aircraft
utilized, and the availability of labor dictated the equip-
ment and techniques employed in loading and unloading.
On this project, abundance of labor prescribed its use
in preference to mechanical aids. This principle would be
true in all cases in which the cargo is of a type which
can be readily manhandled and the load capabilities of
the aircraft used do not exceed 10 tons. Where adequate
manpower is not available, systems employing equipment
such as forklifts, high-lift trucks, roller conveyors, and
conveyor belts must be utilized. In the service testing of
larger type aircraft, it was definitely established that the
maximum utilization of mechanical aids for such craft is
mandatory.
Safety measures introduced on the Airlift resulted in
a minimum amount of damage to aircraft and vehicles.
Loading trucks which could handle sufficient cargo to
load an aircraft in one trip were utilized to reduce the
number of vehicle-to-aifcraft approaches. Wheel blocks
were used to insure that a safe distance was maintained
between trucks and aircraft. Lighting for night loading
was augmented by the installation of additional flood-
lights on ramps and spotlights on vehicles and fork-lifts.
PASSENGERS
The blockade not only applied to supplies going to
and from Berlin, but also restricted the ground movement
of personnel. Many Western zone residents were trapped
in Berlin at the beginning of the blockade. In addition,
British, French, and U. S. personnel frequently had of-
ficial need for transportation between Berlin and the
Western zones. Therefore, provisions had to be made for
ol
removing from or transporting to Berlin personnel whosi
travel was absolutely necessary.
The first personnel which were moved en masse from
Berlin were those who required medical treatment which
was not available in Berlin; they included pre-tuber-i
culosis and early tuberculosis cases, persons medically!
certified as needing long periods of rest and good food,
and delicate or undernourished children. In all, the Royal 7
Air Force transported 130,000 people out of Berlin during
the Lift. Regularly scheduled passenger flights operated
from Rhein/Main for the transportation of administrative
personnel between the U. S. zone and Berlin. From the
start of these flights 16 August 1948 to the termination
of the operation, more than 44,000 persons were carried
by the U. S. into and out of Berlin. Another daily pas-
senger flight from Wiesbaden provided exclusively for
the French, transported 19,000 French personnel to and
from the city.
36
CONCLUSIONS
Traffic. In traffic as well as other aspects of an operation
| )f this nature, an inherent clanger lurks in the drawing of
., specific conclusions from the Berlin Airlift for direct
ipplication to another mass air cargo movement, be-
muse of factors which may differ completely from those
sxisfing during this operation. Any principles developed
n this operation must be weighed as to their degree of
ipplicability to any type of operation. Many solutions
if problems are conditioned by existing circumstances,
ind such problems must be solved by studying them both
n their environment and out of it. The character of an
lirlift operation may be changed to a significant degree
>y the alteration of one or two of the factors upon which
t depends — weather, length of the haul, availability of
nanpower, and the type of aircraft employed. Such
alterations may pose new problems and require new
solutions.
Traffic functions include the recognition of the im-
portance of cargo control and liaison requirements be-
tween all agencies involved in the handling of cargo,
the training of traffic technicians, and the development
of support facilities to expedite the movement of cargo
The fusing of troop carrier ana* transport squadrons into
the Airlift Task Force underscored the importance of the
traffic management and its many ramifications. The need
for traffic administrators and technicians within the
organization of the airlifting agency, as well as within
supply and ground transport organizations and all co-
ordinating and control boards, for the allocation, schedul-
ing, control, handling, loading, tie-down, unloading, and
distribution of Airlift supplies has given greater recogni-
tion to traffic responsibilities. Personnel to execute these
EFFICIENCY IN GROUND OPERATIONS
TOWARD MAXIMUM AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION
A MAJOR STEP
traffic functions must be selected and trained rather than
merely assigned and utilized. Qualified personnel should
be selected rather than those who cannot fulfill other
tasks satisfactorily. Officers and men who are skilled in
administration, supply, transportation, and cargo handling,
and who possess aggressive, conscientious, and imagina-
tive mentalities, can insure satisfaction in the movement
of cargo for the shipper, the mover, and the receiver.
An air transport aircraft is a money loser when not
delivering cargo. It is economically wise to utilize fully
the capabilities of the transport fleet. Standardization and
streamlining of procedures, preplanning of loads, and the
reduction of ground times and maintenance outages
increase the economic worth of each aircraft assigned fo
an operation.
Full payload utilization by weight, cube and optimum
product value per ton must be ever present in the trans-
port operation. Measures to achieve this include stripping
excess gear from the aircraft to increase its payload,
increasing the air transportability by dehydration of
foodstuffs, reducing container weight, and "marrying"
high and low density cargo into a load which utilizes both
space and weight capacities of the aircraft.
Operational performance alone is not a full measure
of the success or failure of an air transport operation.
Such an operation may indicate complete success when
measured in terms of aircraft utilization, ground times,
surpassing of arbitrary goals, and prompt deparfures cf
scheduled flights. However, behind these may be hidden
37
economic wastages of personnel and inefficient ground
handling methods which do not produce full satisfaction
to the shipper and the receiver.
Priorities as established must be met, and priority
cargo must be moved on schedule. This is a responsibility
of support agencies, for the air carrier merely moves what
is delivered when it is delivered. To assure cargo being
at the right spot at the right time and in the right quantity,
extensive liaison must be fulfilled between all the agencies
involved in the operation. In this operation, the creation
of the Berlin Air Staff Committee, the Berlin Airlift Com-
mittee, and the Airlift Support Command evidenced the
need for this close liaison and such liaison proved of
inestimable value. Air transport is an extremely flexible
and effective logistics tool. The speed with which carrier
operations can shift requires slower moving ground
agencies to be geared for rapid changes. Thus, ground
liaison personnel must be included in the planning and
informed of all operational orders and new requirements
as soon as they exist.
Ground Control. The major requirements of successful
traffic movement control, as highlighted in the Berlin Air-
lift are listed below and should be vested in a central
agency.
0)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Central control of all cargo traffic in an area.
Accurate, complete, and timely information of
movements and backlogs in the immediate area
and in those areas which directly affect, or are
directly affected by, the control of traffic in the
immediate area.
Authority to route, re-route, divert, delay, or ex-
pedite all traffic in the area.
Up-to-date information regarding pipe-line flow,
and authority over the flow commensurate with
defined responsibilities.
Dependable information and first-hand knowledge
of traffic and supply conditions at destinations
served by transportation agencies from the sup-
plying area. It is imperative that traffic and trans-
port officials maintain close, constant touch with
actual field conditions.
(6)
(7)
(8)
Complete information concerning schedules, spt
cific types of aircraft used on each flight, route t
connections, transit facilities, maintenance an I
operational conditions, and local transport an]
supply services.
Flexibility and speed of action.
Aggressive and imaginative personnel experience
in supply and all types of transportation.
Support Facilities. Inefficient ground operation ma
adversely affect the conduct and economies of a majo f
airlift operation. Therefore, ground support facilities sud
as transportation and warehouse installations and centre
loading ramps should be planned and constructed earN
in the operation so that the job can be performed
economically and efficiently. Although the duration of ail
operation has direct bearing on expenditures for construe I
tion, these factors must be weighed in each individual
case. Construction costs, while seemingly high, becomct
infinitesimally small when compared directly to the cost cM
inefficient air transport and air base operations.
38
INTEGRATED GROUND CONTROL IS ONE OF THE KEYS TO
SUCCESSFUL CARGO MOVEMENT.
39
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Airlift, in keeping with USAF policy, a
general reduction in force was being effected within
USAFE. This reduction in force resulted in serious short-
ages of communications personnel.
From a communications and navigational aids stand-
point, facilities between Berlin and Western Germany
were limited to the barest necessities before the Airlift.
There was only one GCA set in the Berlin area and only
one radar aid for corridor control; GCA sets were also
located at each of the air fields at Rhein Main and
Wiesbaden. Navigational aid facilities consisted of radio
ranges installed at Rhein Main, Fulda, Frankfurt, and Tem-
pelhof. Radio beacons were installed at Offenbach, Tem-
pelhof, and Wiesbaden. All navigational aids had been
removed from the corridors leading to Berlin. These facili-
ties, of course, were wholly inadequate for handling heavy
traffic during instrument-weather conditions.
With the implementation of the Airlift on 26 June 1948
it was immediately apparent that the proposed intensity
of traffic would require additional electronic aids of all
types, expansion of wire and radio communications facili-
ties, and more rigid air traffic control. Analysis of the
problem confronting communications personnel revealed
unusual requirements for Airlift operation that made a
difficult task much more difficult. Berlin tonnage require-
ments were such as to necessitate a constant flow of air-
craft predicated on three-minute intervals of no "stacking"
or "missed approaches". The geographical location of Ber-
lin, well within Russian-controlled territory, precluded the
installation of route navigational aids to serve as check
points and contain the Aircraft within the twenty-mile-
wide corridors. Certain restrictions were placed on
altitudes to be flown because of agreements with the
Russian authorities, terrain features, and operational prob-
lems. Approach and let-down patterns in the Berlin area
intersected in a vertical plane because of the small area
into which certain patterns had to be fitted. This condition,
of course, meant fhaf rigid air traffic control, both laterally
and vertically, had to be maintained on a split-second time
schedule. An idea of traffic density can best be derived
by the feat of the Airlift "Easter Parade," when on Easter
Sunday of 1949, approximately 13,000 tons of cargo were
airlifted into Berlin. This meant approximately, 1,400 air-
craft arrivals and approximately 1,400 departures within
24 hours, using three fields within a radius of twenty miles.
The attendant problems and solutions of the various com-
munications phases of this operation are presented under
the specialized subjects which follow.
PERSONNEL
The low degree of proficiency of technical personnel
was a handicap in the Airlift operation. In August 1949 a
study was made to determine the degree of proficiency of
personnel in each communications specialty. The informa-
tion was derived from the consensus of opinion of super-
visory personnel at each Airlift base. Where practicable,
the amount of additional training required to meet the
desired standards was established. This study indicated
that the average degree of proficiency for all communica-
tions specialties was 70 percent.
Due to the nature of the Airlift mission, very little
training could be accomplished other than on-the-job. It
was absolutely necessary that every person in an already
under-staffed specialty be utilized to the utmost even
though greater supervision was required, thereby reduc-
ing over-all efficiency per capita. It was mandatory that
airborne radio operators (SSN 2756) be familiar with ICAO
procedures in order to comply with regulations governing
international flights. To meet these qualifications it was
necessary for each unit to emphasize this type of training
to the utmost. Although radio operators were not a
normal requirement for Airlift planes flying to Berlin, they
were required for flights to Burtonwood and the Zl.
Many of the individuals in radio mechanic specialties
(SSN's 754, 648, etc.) had been permitted to specialize in
specific types of equipment during previous assignments
and were not adequately trained in all types of equip-
ment employed in this operation. This lack of versatility
was a definite handicap. Units were in a position of having
an overage of personnel that was familiar with specific
types of equipment, yet untrained in the types required
by the Airlitt.
On-the-job training was accomplished to a deg
all the skills employed. It was, however, impossible to.
place much emphasis on any project of this type due tc
employment of personnel on a 24-hour basis and to th(
pressure of operating with a shortage of electronic:
technicians. The total requirement for communication:
personnel in the support of Operation Vittles was 590;
officers and 6,156 airmen.
FIXED WIRE COMMUNICATIONS
At the very beginning of the operation, it was quite
evident that a rapid and reliable method of voice com-
munication between Airlift Headquarters and the field
organizations was a necessity. Fortunately, wire communi-
cation was available and was preferred over radio be-
cause of its greater reliability and the non-susceptibility
to ionspherics.
Direct "hot" land-line voice circuits were installed from
Airlift Headquarters to the operations offices at the various
bases and air traffic-control centers. One BD-96 switch-
board was installed at Airlift Headquarters for the control
of these lines and for "patching through" so that bases
could be interconnected. Likewise, direct lines were
installed between control towers within an area and be-
tween the control centers and the bases. These circuits
were required for constant supervision, for the establish-
ment of intervals, and to direct diversions. Since the sys-
tem of operation was predicated on an uninterrupted
flow of traffic 24 hours a day, it was necessary to be in-
formed on all aircraft activity. On "missed approaches" in
the Berlin area, aircraft were directed to return to their
home bases. Any attempt to land these aircraft would
have required "stacking", thereby causing confusion and
delaying operations in order to cope with the 40 aircraft
already in the corridor. Diversion of aircraft demanded
instant communications since the operation was conducted
on bare minima of ceiling and visibility (200 feet and one-
half mile at most bases). It was, therefore, constantly
necessary to watch all weather reports.
Weather-teletype circuits and voice-conference circuits
40
AIRLIFT COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
AIRLIFT OPERATIONAL VOICE NET
, L.
7497 TH AIR LIFT
WING OPERATIONS
WIESBADEN
60TH TC GROUP
LUNEBURG RAF
FASSBERG
(BD-72)
CELLE TWR
(BD-72)
FRANKFURT -,
RHEIN/MAIN J
61 ST TC GROUP
OPERATIONS
5I3TH TC GROUP
OPERATIONS
61 ST MAINT
CONTROL
513 TH MAINT
CONTROL
FRANKFURT
WEATHER CONTROL
— OPERATIONS
CALTF OPERATIONS
(BD-96)
TEMPELHOF AFB
CPS-5 (BD-96)
CALTF
MAINT CONTROL
WIESBADEN
MILITARY SWBD
FRANKFURT ATC
ROTHWESTON "—
— OPERATIONS
— TOWER
BERLIN AIR
SAFETY CENTER
SPEECH CIRCUIT CHART-ATC
SPEECH CIRCUITS
MR TRAFFIC CONTROL RADAR \
( FASSBERG j I TE6EL 1
AIRLIFT WEATHER NET CHART
~^-:^. ::...:.■::::. -:-;;-..
inn _*j_
41
were installed in the weather ottice at the bases involved
and Headquarters CALTF so that hourly coherences could
be held in making forecasts and directing diversions.
Four-hourly reports were required by the Maintenance
Control Section of that Headquarters as to the status of
aircraft in commission. These reports were handled over
the "hot line" system on a second priority basis. An AOCP
teletype system was also installed to assist in procurement
of spare parts. Teletype drops were provided at each base
and at the Erding Air Depot.
Because of the frequent use of telephones to coordinate
between supply, maintenance, production control, traffic,
and other staff agencies, and because of the speed re-
quired, full manual switchboards were found unsatisfactory.
Inter-office communication systems were in demand so
that commanding officers could hold frequent conferences
with various division chiefs while in their respective offices.
Similar systems were required for coordination between
maintenance, production control, and supply sections.
A condition not generally known is that wire com-
munication between Western Germany and Berlin was
accomplished through the Russian Zone of Germany. Lines
and repeaters were at the mercy of the Russians; however,
good service without interruption was maintained through-
out the operation. Plans were made for replacement of
these circuits by the provision of FM links, a major
project.
CONCLUSIONS
Engineering consideration should be given to the
design of a small, light, air-transportable, automatic
telephone system with 200 automatic lines and
manual attendants' cabinets with a minimum of 20 frur
lines. Such equipment should be an integral part of a
transport units.
The policy of restricting the use ot inler-office coir
munications system equipment to control towers, eras
crews, and other operational functions should be rt
viewed. A system similar to Webster Teletalks should b
included as troop carrier T/O&E equipment to provide Ic
the maintenance, production control, and supply staff tunc
tions. The loudspeaker system of "squawk boxes" is pre
ferred as it permits personnel to continue without inter-
rupting other duties such as entering statistics on
boards, and eliminates the necessity for remaining at the
instrument.
VHF/FM voice and automatic teletype facilities have!
become a major requirement in air transport operations.
LOW FREQUENCY RADIO BEACONS
To prevent international incidents, it was necessary lor
all aircraft to fly exact routes in the 20-mile-wide corridors,
Fourteen low frequency radio beacons operating in the
200/400 Kcs band were installed for use with the radio :
compass AN/ARN-7 in the Berlin, Celle-Fassberg, and
Rhein/Main - Wiesbaden areas. Other low frequency
beacons were located several miles off the center line
all runways to permit instrument approaches.
The provision of mobile-type homing beacons for the
Lift was necessary until final traffic control plans were
completed and implemented. These beacons comprised
an HO-17 shelter with duplicate BC-191 transmitters, RA-34
rectifiers, PE-197 power units, and other associated equip-
ment.
The shelters were mounted on a 6x6 truck. Masts for
the installation of the inverted "L" type antenna were
provided. By using this type of mobile homing equipment
it was possible to install beacons and make changes
locations in a matter of a few hours. As the Airlift ope
tions progressed and requirements became firm, ihese
installations were removed from the truckbeds and p
42
3n five-foot plafforms to provide a more permanent type
nsfallation.
One of the disadvantages in the use of low frequency
adio beacons for this operation lies in the limited avail-
ibility of frequencies within this portion of the spectrum,
he 200/400 Kcs band used for navigation is in many cases
:oncurrenfly assigned to European broadcast stations. Be-
cause of the close proximity of the countries in this area,
nterference was a continuously mounting problem and
Jrought complaints. It was a dangerous condition for air
tavigation in that many stations using these frequencies
vere of the non-directional type. Aids of this type could
>e installed only at the entrance to the corridor, as no
jround navigational aids could be installed within the
orridor over Russian-occupied territory.
Generally speaking, the BC-191 radio transmitter is
ncapable of satisfactory performance on a continuous
schedule. Even by operating two transmitters alternately
at beacon sites, it was found that the transmitters, rectifiers,
and power units were too light for the heavy duty re-
quired. Difficulty was encountered with frequency failures.
All beacons were equipped with one keyer only; the lack
of a second was definitely a handicap since the keying
equipment was required to operate continuously. Any
failure in the keying mechanism precluded beacon identi-
fication.
At RAF bases 300 W-type LM 300 transmitters were
used. They were unreliable and frequently inoperative due
to transformer failures. Difficulties were also encountered
in obtaining the American spares necessary to maintain
serviceability.
In September 1948 arrangements were made to have
21 T-5 beacons airlifted from the U.S. to replace the tem-
porary BC-191 installations. They arrived in the theater
about 1 February 1949. This fype of equipment was
necessary to maintain continuous operation and adequate
radio coverage during the most adverse weather and
atmospheric conditions. It was vitally important that ade-
quate beacon coverage be available to maintain two- and
three-minute intervals of aircraft space. The increased
power of these new beacons presented problems of in-
terference with the European radio broadcast stations in
the 200/400 Kcs band. It was generally agreed that 500-
Watt power was not necessary; however, 50-Watt power
on the other hand is insufficient for positive operation
under adverse weather and atmospheric conditions.
The greatest lesson learned from the use of low fre-
quency homing equipment is that the Air Force equip-
ment available is either over- or under-powered.
CONCLUSIONS
Future engineering and procurement should include a
low and medium frequency transmitter which is capable
of continuous operation with a minimum of maintenance
through use of a higher safety factor. At least one new-
type transmitter should be developed which is capable of
continuous operation with an output of 300 Watts, with
provisions for reducing power to 150 Watts.
LOW FREQUENCY RADIO RANGES
Only three low frequency radio ranges were utilized
in Airlift operations. These were located at Rhein/Main,
Fulda, and Tempelhof.
The low frequency radio range could be used for
homing as well as fixed course navigation; however, its
disadvantages made it undesirable as the prime means of
navigation. These disadvantages include leg instability on
loop-type ranges and the same problems encountered
with low frequency beacons on the assignment of fre-
quencies, as discussed above.
VHF RANGES
As the Airlift operation continued and the trend in-
creased toward the utilization of VHF, it was desirable that
these frequencies also be employed in radio navigational
aids.
Radio ranges were used at critical points along the
routes to provide safety, but medium frequency ranges
were not entirely satisfactory due -to atmospherical dis-
turbances and other interferences. The need for VHF
facilities was evident.
During October 1948 arrangements were made to ob-
tain six VAR ranges from the Civil Aeronautics Authority
(CAA) for use in Airlift operations. CAA civil and radio
engineers were assigned to the Lift and travelled by air
from the U. S. to accomplish the installations. One of the
ranges was airlifted to the theater and five were trans-
ported by "MARINEX". The work of surveying the sites
began about 15 October. By the end of January 1949 all
of the installations were completed and operating. Their
locations were:
Fulda - (Zone-side of southern corridor)
Braunschweig - (Zone-side of center corridor)
Dannenberg - (Zone-side of northern corridor)
Tempelhof - (Berlin-side of southern corridor)
Lubars - (Berlin-side of northern corridor)
Wolfenbuttel - (to project a beam perpendicular to
the southern corridor as a check
point).
43
In general, the results ot these facilities were considered
very satisfactory although some difficulty was encountered
in the siting. The final sites were such that the leg of the
ranges could not in every case be projected down the
center-line of the corridor. The transmission ranges, al-
though not as great as desired, were within the line-of-sight
characteristics of VHF. The outage of the equipment was
negligible, and the reliability of received signals was
considered good under all flying conditions.
Since all frequencies of the VHF transceivers were al-
ready being used in air/ground communications, it was
necessary to utilize the "Glide Path" receiver for range re-
ception. The "localizer" portion of this receiver was em-
ployed for this purpose and stations were received through
channel selection.
Although it was desirable to install more of these sta-
tions at several important points along Airlift routes, their
non-availability made this impossible. It was never possible
to utilize more than one leg of any of the ranges installed
due to the peculiar routes flown by Airlift aircraft. The
Omni-directional Range would have been the ideal aid.
FAN MARKER BEACONS
In October 1948 it became apparent that fan marker
beacons would be required for the precise navigation re-
quired in the operation. Although pilots were getting indi-
cations from the radio compass equipment when they
passed the stations enroute, there was no precise indication
as to when aircraft were directly over the station.
Requests were initiated on 23 October to install a fan
marker beacon at each of the radio beacons and radio
ranges then utilized on the Airlift routes. Since the equip-
ment was not available in the theater, a supply requirement
was placed upon the Zone of Interior. Because fan marker
beacons were not immediately available in the United
States, the procurement of this equipment became quite
involved.
During the latter part of February 1949, the installation
of the first fan marker beacon was completed at Frohnau.
Equipment arrived at the sites at Celle and Staden during
May, but the other installations were not completed
because of the termination of the Airlift.
CONCLUSIONS
With precision flying and "tight" let-down patterns
within a concentrated area, a positive indicating aid for
beacon and range sites is a necessity.
AIR-GROUND/COMMUNICATIONS
The magnitude of air/ground operations can be visual-
ized by the 6,000 daily contacts made at the Tempelhof
Air Base by Airways, Control Tower, and GCA. This base
is one of three bases in the Berlin area.
With certain exceptions, VHF was used exclusively in
the control of Airlift operations. These frequencies worked
very satisfactorily where range, static-free operation, and
readability were concerned. However, the limitation of
the equipment utilized was one of the drawbacks of the
entire operation.
Due to the confined area in which it was necessary to
maneuver the aircraft for landings on the three Airlift bases
in Berlin, the obvious mutual radio interference preclude' II
the use of any frequency for more than one facility. Ti t
provide complete radar control of the aircraft from thil
time it was received from the corridor by the CPS-5 unti
it was landed by use of GCA and given taxi and take-of
instructions by the tower, four frequencies were requirec
at each base. This meant that 12 frequencies were requirec
in the Berlin area.
Certain British aircraft and U.S. C-47 aircraft during the
early phase posed the greatest limitation as they were
equipped with a four-channel set equivalent to the USAF
SCR-522. Of the RAF aircraft, only the YORKS and
HASTINGS were equipped with eight-channel equipment,'
Another limitation of British equipment was its inability 1 ,
to tune through the frequency range of the AN/ARC-3 or.
above 125 Megacycles, where many of the USAF fre-
quencies were provided.
Although it was not required that each Airlift aircraft
possess all frequencies utilized in the Airlift, the possibility
of diversions made it desirable to install at least five of
these plus the frequencies used at the home base. To offset
(his limitation it was necessary as tar as possible to dupli-
cate trequencies in the ground stations on a stand-by basis.
n order to provide 100 per cent back-up required by Air-
ift policy, a very large requirement for VHF ground trans-
mitters and receivers existed. The immediate answer to
jiese limitations was the provision of more frequencies in
the airborne equipment.
At the termination of the Airlift, plans had been com-
pleted to modify the ARC-3 eight-channel set *to provide
16 channels. Although this was a step in the right direction,
it can be visualized that many more frequencies should
be used for such an operation.
It was found that definite requirements exist for air/
ground communications between the aircraft and the main-
tenance activities.
CONCLUSIONS
The use of line-of-sight transmission with adequate
standard VHF or UHF equipment is desirable for air trans-
port operation. High frequencies can never be satisfactory
due to static and "long haul" interference problems. Line-
of-sight transmissions during the Airlift provided sufficient
range without the disadvantages of HF.
GROUND CONTROL APPROACH SYSTEM
Possibly the greatest contributing factor to the success
jjof the Airlift operations was the installation and efficient
operation of GCA equipment at all Airlift landing strips.
Two GCA units were installed and operated continuously
in VFR conditions as well as IFR conditions to expedite
landings of aircraft at all Airlift airfields. Instrument con-
ditions prevailed generally between 70 and 80 percent
of the time during the months of November through March.
In January 1949 the CPS-5 airport control radar set
went into operation in the Berlin area to control traffic
from the corridors to the three airfields in the Allied Sec-
tors of Berlin. The CPS-5 controlled traffic from "reporting
}' time until the aircraft turned on final approach at its
destination and was then turned over to GCA Final. This
made it unnecessary for the GCA personnel to monitor the
search scope and allowed them to concentrate all effort
on aircraft making final approaches.
The greatest problem confronting the GCA program
was the maintenance and overhaul of the GCA units. It
was found that the GCA units used in the Airlift by the
USAF had never undergone a 3,000-hour inspection and
overhaul. Some of these units were as much as 4,000 hours
overdue for a major depot Inspection. In April 1949 depot
overhaul and inspection was started on all GCA units in
use.
During the early months of Operation Vittles, GCA had
"operational outages" due to moisture collecting in the
various components after the unit was turned off during
standby periods. This trouble was cured by leaving the
standby unit turned on during standby periods with ex-
ception of the high voltages. This kept the unit warm,
preventing condensation; and the standby unit was ready
for immediate use in case landing directions were
changed.
CONCLUSIONS
GCA should be one of the first landing aids installed
for landing aircraft in a small confined area where all
types of weather are encountered. GCA units, time
permitting, should have a major inspection and overhaul
prior to heavy use.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL RADAR SYSTEM
In August 1948 it was found that as the number of
aircraft increased, the problem of properly spacing air-
craft entering the Berlin area increased tremendously.
Under then-existing procedures, if aircraft were not spaced
properly prior to arrival in Berlin, it would become
necessary to stack them or to return the aircraft in the
southern and northern corridors to their home bases. This
in time would defeat the purpose of the entire operation.
To conquer this problem it was decided to install a search
radar system at Tempelhof. The installation was placed on
top of the eight-story Tempelhof Airdrome building. This
45
location is almost in the center of metropolitan Berlin;
therefore, fixed or permanent echoes filled the entire radar
scope for a distance of 10 to 15 miles, preventing the con-
trol of close-in aircraft. To eliminate this "clutter" on the
scope an MTI (Moving Target Indicator) was installed. The
unit went into full time operations during January 1949.
Included in the equipment arriving at Berlin was a
video mapping unit. This unit was used to super-impose on
the controller's scopes a map of the surrounding territory
showing locations of local and remote runways, airfields,
beacons, range legs, corridors, etc. These locations were
prepared on special photographic overlays by hand, rather
than by normal photographic negatives of a normal map.
In the "operations" room of the approach control sys-
tem were the controller's scopes, SKIATRON, and data
boards of edge-lighted Plexiglas or lucite. A search and
"off-center" PPI (Planned Position Indicator) scope was
provided for Tempelhof, Tegel, and Gatow airfields. The
search scope showed all traffic entering the area and the
"off-center" scope showed air traffic at the particular field
to which the controller was directing traffic. The data
boards showed the flow of traffic into each field and
indicated the time "reported in" over an established point,
the altitude maintained, times arriving at definite altitudes
during let-down, time over the beacons, and time turned
over to GCA Final or control tower at the destination. This
information was placed on the board by a man behind the
board writing in reverse with a grease pencil. Weather
data for the entire area was also indicated.
Each controller had at his disposal communication
channels to aircraft by VHF and HF radio frequencies and
to the individual control towers and GCA units by land-
line telephone. The SKIATRON unit is a very large PPI
scope with a persistent screen to enable the chief con-
troller to monitor all traffic in the entire area. Due to the
precise traffic patterns used, the SKIATRON Was of no
great value to the Airlift operation at Berlin.
One of the largest problems encountered by the Berlin
CPS-5 was identification of individual aircraft after fhey
reported in. The CPS-5 does not receive IFF signals
directly on the controllers' scope. The only method of
identification worked out by the controllers was that of
46
directing the aircraft to turn 45 degrees right or left for 45
seconds and then resume the normal heading to Berlin.
"Strobing" of the scopes by automatic VHF/DF equip-
ment was not practical for identification of aircraft in an
area containing a heavy flow of air traffic. This equipment,
when used, places a bar of light or "strobes" on the scope
from the center of the scope to the aircraft being DF-ed.
When used in an area of heavy traffic, this placed so many
lines on the scope that tracking of aircraft was very diffi-
cult. Also, with two aircraft transmitting simultaneously on
the same frequency, the strongest signal was DF-ed. ■
Altitude information was not needed and, therefore
was not incorporated in the unit. The vertical separation ol
aircraft on the Airlift was entirely dependent upon the pilot
and the accuracy of the altimeter in the aircraft.
Maximum "positive" range on Ihe Berlin CPS-5 vm
found to be 60 miles, positive range being that range ft
which the aircraft is first observed and stays on the scop4
until it lands. Some aircraft were observed as far oilffl
100 miles, but the returns on the scope were sporadic.
AND A CLOSE-UP OF ITS SCREEN. THE BRIGHT "BLIPS-
ARE AIRCRAFT. THE SMALL CIRCLES NEAR THE CENTER
INDICATE LOCATION OF RUSSIAN AIRFIELDS. THE CON-
CENTRIC CIRCLES INDICATE THE RANGE OF THE OBJECTS
FROM THE TEMPELHOF AIR BASE EQUIPMENT.
CONCLUSIONS
With the success of the CPS-5 Radar Set in Berlin a
proved fact, it is believed that radar can be better adapted
to all phases of air traffic control— that is, airways control
or area control, approach control, landing control, and
taxi control. Excellent results were achieved with the area-
control type of longe-range radar, which greatly aided
traffic channeled info the Berlin area. Furthermore, the
need for a type of taxi control radar occurred many times.
IFF equipment capable of exact identification of
individual aircraft is urgently needed, to avoid the
necessity for turning of aircraft to effect radar identifica-
tion.
AIRBORNE RADAR AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT
The military requirements for airborne radar navigation
equipment became apparent early in the fall of 1948.
After careful consideration, the AN/APS-10 was chosen as
the airborne radar set to be used on the Airlift. This choice
was founded on the following reasoning:
(1) The AN/APS-10 was already installed in MATS
C-54 aircraft.
(2) It was believed to be the most available equip-
ment in large quantities.
(3) It required less installation time.
(4) It had a comparatively light weight of 200 pounds.
An initial survey of Airlift aircraft indicated that only
a small percentage of assigned aircraft had AN/APS-10
equipment installed. Headquarters USAF advised that
insufficient AN/APS-10 equipment was available for the
entire fleet and proposed that the AN/APS-4 radar be
installed after the stockpile of AN/APS-10 equipment was
exhausted. This proposal was accepted, and arrangements
were made for installation during the 1,000-hour inspec-
tions and recycling of aircraft. By January 1949, 53 per-
cent of the aircraft had been equipped; by March 1949,
12 percent and in May the installation of AN/APS-10 or
AN/APS-4 on all Airlift aircraft had been completed.
Radar Beacons, AN/CPN-6, for use with the AN/APS-10
and AN/APS-4, were located in storage at Burtonwood,
47
England, in November 1948. In December six complete
sets of AN/CPN-6 were shipped to Erding Air Force
Depot in Germany. During February 1949 Radar Beacons
(AN/CPN-6) were planned for Rhein/Main, Tempelhof,
Gatow, and along Airlift routes at Frohnau and Braun-
schweig. The AN/CPN-6 installation at Rhein/Main was
completed in March and the Tempelhof installation in
early June.
No critical problems were encountered in the installa-
tion of the airborne and beacon radar equipment. How-
ever, it was found that when the pilot's scope for the
AN/APS-4 was pulled down in the operating position, a
deviation of 40 degrees was introduced in the magnetic
compass due to the magnetic field set up in the sweep
coils of the scope. There was no apparent deviation when
the pilot's indicator was left in the "stand-by" position,
even though the AN/APS-4 equipment was in operation.
The complete use of airborne search radar equipment
for navigation had not been made prior to termination of
operations, since:
(1) Crew personnel were not familiar with the opera-
tion and use of the equipment.
(2) A lack of fully qualified radar mechanics for
organizational maintenance existed.
(3) Sufficient beacon equipment had not been in-
stalled.
(4) No critical need existed for it.
CONCLUSIONS
The USAF should institute a vigorous program to bring
all Troop Carrier and similar organizations up to full T/O&E
strength in qualified radar mechanic positions, SSN's 849,
853, and 955.
All pilots and navigators assigned to organizations
using airborne search equipment should be indoctrinated
in the use of such equipment and required to undergo
frequent refresher courses.
Every tactical multi-engine aircraft should be equipped
with an airborne search radar set, employing the PPI
method of presentation.
48
MOBILE RADIO EQUIPMENT
Ground communications at Airlift bases for the control
of loading operations, maintenance, and dispatching of
aircraft were found to be a very important factor in increas-
ing the number of daily trips made by each group. Vehi-
cles used for aircraft taxi control, maintenance, and cargo
loading operations were directed by radio from a dis-
patch control center.
Three different types of mobile radio equipment were
used in jeeps at different bases with the following results:
AN/VRC-1 Mobile Radio Equipment proved to be a
very poor piece of equipment since it utilizes the SCR-542
VHF transmitter-receiver, which does not stay tuned
properly when operated over bumpy roads and runways.
Logistical support for the AN/VCR-1 was very difficult since
the equipment was practically obsolete. For installation
on jeeps, a special 1 2-volt generator and battery are re-
quired. The high frequency component cannot be utilized
satisfactorily. Maintenance of the equipment was ex>
ceedingly great and interfered with other communications
maintenance missions.
SCR-610 Radio Sets also proved very unsatisfactory
Vibration and bouncing over rough roads and runways,
easily de-tuned this equipment. Logistical support for this
radio equipment had to come from Army sources and
maintenance parts were almost unobtainable. Maintenance
of the equipment was excessive. Four of these sets were
obtained in February 1949 for Fassberg RAF Station; ore
set was converted for fixed station operation and three
sets were installed in jeeps. Operation logs on this equip-
ment indicated that the mobile equipment was operative
less than 50 per cent of the time.
VRC-2 FM Motorola Radio sets were originaffl
designed as police radio sets and have been used by Air
Force units as guard vehicular radio equipment. Although
these radio sets are not the perfect military equipment
they proved to be the best available for Airlift operations,
MOBILE RADIO EQUIPMENT FOR TAXI CONTROL. THE SET IS
A VRC-1.
Reports indicated that this equipment would operate over
i long period ot time with a minimum of maintenance,
ransmitter and receiver equipment remained stable in
ravel over rough roads and ramps. This set is designed for
six-volt operation and while an oversized six-volt genera-
or is desirable, it can be operated with existing jeep
equipment. Shock mountings, dustproof coverings, and
satisfactory antenna equipment are provided with this
'adio set.
CONCLUSIONS
There is a very definite need for a minimum of one
ixed station and three mobile radio sets for each troop
:arrier group or separate squadron, to permit expeditious
landling in dispatching of aircraft. Back-up equipment for
he fixed radio station should be complete, since any
ailure will result in decreased efficiency.
The immediate need for mobile radio equipment
should be considered and every effort made to have ade-
quate six-volt equipment available for mobile radio
Nations when the new UHF Radio Frequency Plan be-
:omes effective. Consideration should be given to the
desirability of engineering the proposed multi-channeled
airborne UHF equipment so that it can also be used as
vehicular and fixed station equipment in conjunction with
proper power supply units. This would simplify logistic
support and provide optimum flexibility.
Any operation which requires the immediate main-
tenance and dispatching of large numbers of aircraft should
be provided with mobile radio equipment. Information
from the ramp on the condition of aircraft is always re-
quired by production control officers or flight control of-
ficers to ascertain the condition or status of all aircraft
under their control. The use of high frequency for this
purpose is unsatisfactory due to the circuit congestion and
interference within the high frequency spectrum and due
to the undesirability of transmission beyond the base per-
imeter.
Line-of-sight transmission within a base area by the use
of UHF permits reemployment of the same frequencies by
adjacent bases which lie beyond line-of-sight coverage.
UHF has the added advantage of easy maintenance, less
weight, less cubage, and stability of frequency.
A multi-channeled set would also reduce interference
by the assignment of a separate frequency for each func-
tion. It would provide communication between the air-
craft and control towers, maintenance squadron, parking
and loading jeeps, and production control. Since this
problem has arisen in the past without a satisfactory solu-
tion, some study should be given to the development of
adequate equipment and to the assignment of sufficient
quantities of equipment to each Air Force group or
squadron concerned.
Any of the above equipment procured for Air Force
use should be designed so that power supplies would be
provided for either six-volt DC, 28-volf DC or 110-volt
AC power.
RAF NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
REBECCA-EUREKA
This system was a primary navigational aid used by
those RAF ground installations located to give continuous
coverage for all aircraft flying above 1,500 feet. The re-
stricted radar range of the equipment made it impracticable
to give complete coverage along the corridors for air-
craft flying below this level.
In addition to the beacons sited as navigational aids,
two were installed at Gatow, the British airfield in the
Berlin area, to indicate the points at which aircraft were to
turn onto the final leg of the landing pattern.
The results generally obtained from this system were
excellent; ranges depended largely upon altitudes assigned
to the aircraft and varied from 20 miles at 1,500 feet up
to about 60 miles at 5,000 feet. The use of this system,
which proved to be very accurate, made it essential to
carry a navigator as the equipment cannot be operated
from the pilot's position.
The RAF found this system of navigation of great ad-
vantage in the operation particularly since with it, position
fixes could be obtained under IF.R conditions.
BABS
This aid was installed at all RAF fields and at Tegel
Airfield in the French Sector of Berlin. Sites were chosen
at the ends of every runway at each airfield.
Although there were a certain number of disputes re-
garding the accuracy of the "touch-down" point given by
Babs, this aid proved invaluable.
GEE
The Central German Gee chain was used throughout
the operation. Since this chain was installed before the
Lift started, it was not sited to give coverage at low
altitudes over the Berlin area. Consequently, no accurate
fixes could be taken within approximately 20 miles of
that city. Good fixes were generally obtained in the
Western Zone, south of a line running approximately
from Hamburg to Lubeck and along the central corridor
as far east as about fifteen miles from Berlin.
Gee is a reliable and accurate navigational aid only if
the topography of the area is such that the ground station
can be sited so as to enable aircraft at any altitude to
take reliable "fixes".
49
NUMBER OF GCA CONTROLLED LANDINGS
TEMPELHOF
AIR
BASE
TOTAL
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMI
VFR
10 090
9
686
510
783
516
327
1 84
571
988
1 198
1 345
1 846
1 198
619
90
IFR
17 089
se
180
497
1 835
1 785
8 073
8 836
8 880
1 488
1 836
1 005
1 309
1 498
197
190
BELOW
IFR
3 067
30
44
867
68
396
68 1
498
447
178
86
138
884
65
3
TE6EL
AIR
BASE
VFR
4 713
*
*
*
*
*
188
37
* 79
39 1
393
1 467
1 699
380
1
* i
IFR
8 398
*
*
*•
#
*
641
1 184
1 335
1 088
616
1 034
1 568
1 858
*
BELOW
IFR
463
*
*
*
*
*
174
65
1 65
89
3
6
1 1
18
*
RHEIN/MAIN
AIR
BASE
VFR
4 330
85
148
133
77
845
893
198
1 009
778
507
589
879
107
IFR
3 338
53
34
TO
834
973
963
1 013
1 018
395
159
150
141
133!
BELOW
IFR
37
37
WIESBADEN
AIR
BASE
VFR
8 300
88
698
8 865
630
585
139
197
184
157
30 1
583
1 184
436
556
306
IFR
4 649
855
41
649
796
550
678
178
1 33
389
108
14
851
85!
BELOW
IFR
8
8
8
4
FASSBERG
RAF
STATION
VFR
3 634
*
*
343
58
101
146
339
479
518
377
458
484
141
*
IFR
3 649
*
*
815
938
497
734
659
468
496
359
549
440
106
* 1
BELOW
IFR
326
#
*
889
6
3
84
4
* 1
CELLE
RAF
STATION
VFR
2 111
#
*
*
*
*
34
585
390
1 17
384
387
140
841
13
*
IFR
3 882
*
*
*•
*
*
89
498
885
464
45 1
580
584
451
6
*
BELOW
IFR
37
*
*
*
*■
*
8
3
8
86
1
3
*
TOTAL VFR
33 180
94
/ 403
3 120
/ 773
/ 176
826
/ 274
/ 796
2 270
3 943
3017
5 168
3 208
1609
303
TOTAL IFR
43 £03
103
134
1 422
1 723
4 279
3 001
6 169
6 729
4 003
2 932
3 666
4 236
3 633
701
406
TOTAL BELOW IFR
3 960
30
44
316
119
378
730
663
478
207
32
148
323
69
3
# NO USAF OPERATIONS
50
INTRODUCTION
Of all the difficulties facing the Airlift, the factor
constituting one of the greatest single problems was
weather. Low clouds, fog, freezing rain, turbulence, and
ice were contingencies of great operational significance;
and they posed problems that had to be met and overcome
before the accomplishment of the Airlift mission could be
realized. With this fact in mind, Airlift planners throughout
the early days of the Lift prepared the flight procedures,
traffic control measures, and landing aid installations that
enabled the Airlift to operate in weather conditions
well below established Air Force minima.
With the establishment of the Airlift's reduced operat-
ing minima, the Air Weather Service was called upon to
observe and forecast within heretofore little needed ceiling
and visibility limits. Before this, in the weather service,
when ceilings were in the neighborhood of 200 feet and
visibilities near 1/2 mile, airfields were well below the
closed minima and there existed no great operational re-
quirement to know whether the ceiling was actually 250
feet or the visibility 3/4 mile instead of 200 feet and 1/2
mile. Under the Airlift's urgency, this situation was changed.
Operations demanded knowledge of the exact ceiling and
visibility, for 50 feet of ceiling or 1/4 mile of visibility either
way could open or close an airfield; and further, they
demanded exact forecasts of such ceilings and visibility for
a minimum of three hours in advance.
■' . .
Such accuracy is not possible in the present state of
meteorological science. The AirWeather Service, however,
willingly concentrated the best available in personnel and
equipment in an effort to approach as nearly as possible
the standard of accuracy required; and as a by-product
of fhis concentrated effort, new ideas and techniques were
developed and fried, and shortcomings discovered and
corrected. As a result of this unique, invaluable ex-
perience, the Air Weather Service has, without doubt,
gained knowledge and experience that will enable it to
render increasingly better service.
51
ORGANIZATION
Before the Airlift began, weather service requirements
for Military Air Transport Command and for the United
States Air Forces in Europe were met by a sinqle weafhei
squadron. With the beginning of the Airlift, this squadron,
the 18th, found itself almost without warning faced with a
sudden and tremendous increase in the demand for its
services. The weather stations at Wiesbaden, Rhein/Main,
and Tempelhof had been able to provide the necessary
weather service for the few daily trips into Berlin within
their normal commitment, but there was now a requirement
for a special weather service that could observe and fore-
cast, as well as brief aircrews, for a steady 24-hour-per
day stream of traffic. In addition to the increased traffic
it became apparent that the Airlift's low operating minima
dictated the need for special attention to the Airlift area:
i. e., if forecasts of useable accuracy within sub-GCA
limits were to be achieved, special observations would
have to be taken, special charts and maps drawn, and
special forecasts made.
Within the same period, since the Airlift was in the
process of organizing and expanding, Task Force planners
AIR WEATHER
SERVICE ORGANIZATION
AS
OF JUNE 1948
HQ. 181* W.S.
WIESBADEN
| RHEIN/MAIN
1
1
ADEN
| FRANKFURT
iLHOF- BERLIN 1
1
| ERDING
ENFELDBRUCK 1
1
"| FURST
| KAUFBEUREN
| NEUBIBERG
J~T
FAFFENHOFEN |
1
| STUTTGART
1
_J
HING - AUSTRIA |
| TULLN- VIENNA
.1 -LIBIA
— 1
52
AIR WEATHER SERVICE ORGANIZATION
AS OF MARCH 1949
HQ. 21051* A.W.G.
WIESBADEN
HQ.28™ W.&-,
[burtonwood f -
>
>
>
SCULTHORPE
LAKENHEATH
FLT. A 514 SQ. I
308 RCN.GR
-|erding
-JFASSBERG~
- \ FRANKFURT
- |furstenfeldb'k
— . — .-UNDER OPERA-
TIONAL CONTROL
FOR 20 DAYS FROM
10 TO 30 MAR. 1949
-X— X-BRIEFING TEAMS
r HQ. 181* W.S.
- j KAUFBEUREN
- | NEUBIBERG
- |OBERPFAFFENH'N
HoRly FIELD
- |rhein/main
- | STUTTGART~
Htegel
- TEMPELHOF-BERLIN
- | TULLN- VIENNA
H
r HQ.29lH W.S.
WHEELUS FIELD
-|rome
'tx- |lSTRES~
- | ANKARA
7169
WX. RCN. SQ.
began calling upon the Weather Service for longer and
longer period forecasts in their efforts to determine the
needs in personnel and aircraft for the oncoming winter's
operation. These increased requirements were apparent to
the Chief, Air Weather Service, during his tour of the Air-
lift in November 1948. He authorized the personnel in-
crease necessary to expand the weather squadron to
group status. The Weather Service in Europe was thereby
increased to three squadrons, the 18th serving the Airlift
and Central European area, the 28th serving the United
Kingdom, and the 29th in Tripoli and Dhahran. This re-
organization relieved the 18th of its excessive workll
With the increased personnel resources, new wea,
stations were opened and existing stations strengthen,
for long-term operation under the Airlift load.
EFFECTS OF WEATHER
The splendid success of the Airlift, its precise Air W, ,
Control system, low operating minima, and unsurpS
tonnage record are likely to convey an erroneous
pression of the effect of weather upon the operation. 1
Airlift operated in low ceiling and visibility conditio
icing and turbulence aloft, and icing on the surface, V( ;
seldom completely stopping for weather — neverthele;
weather was the largest of the factors determining the tor
delivered capacity of the Lift. Tonnage and bad weafhi
conditions, considering the same number of operating a;
craft, were indirectly proportional throughout the entit
operation. (See Weather and the Frankfurt-Berlin Airl'
Chart). Although the Airlift was seldom complete
stopped by weather, instrument weather conditions di
require extended intervals between aircraft, thus reducini
FORECASTERS TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CIRCUIT I
FRANKFURT
FLIGHT
SERVICE
number of trips that could be landed in Berlin during
adverse weather period and constituting weather's
leatest effect.
I Of the times when the Lift was halted by weather, the
/eather phenomenon mostly responsible was fog. Percent-
ige tabulations, based upon an operating potential of 24
lours per day for each of seven Airlift airfields, show the
argest percentages of closed weather as occurring during
he months of November 1948 and February 1949 (see
Weather Percentages for USAF Airlift Operation); and
hese were the two months in which fog was the major
light hazard.
On two short occasions a single field was forced to
;uspend operation because of turbulence. Taken overall,
little effect upon in-flight operation was caused by rough
air. There were, however, reports from maintenance per-
sonnel to the effect that during periods of heavy tur-
bulence, gas leaks in the C-54 wing tanks became more
common and a larger amount of maintenance work was
required.
Icing aloft, although anticipated to be one of the major
in-flight hazards, proved to be of little difficulty. The
operation has conclusively proved that the present anti-
and de-icing equipment, if kept in proper operation, can
safely handle any in-flight icing occurring in this area.
FORECASTING
One of the major problems facing the Air Weather
Service, one that has been a difficulty since World War
demobilization, was the low level of experience among
weather service forecasting personnel. The first move by
'he 18th Weather Squadron personnel office to meet the
Airlift's forecasting needs was the transfer of European-
sxperienced personnel from weatherstations in the southern
zone of Germany into Airlift fields. By carefully canvass-
ing forecasters' experience throughout the entire squad-
ran, the bulk of European experience among the fore-
pasting personnel was concentrated on the Airlift.
Early in the operation it became obvious that special
weather organizations and services would be necessary
if operational commanders were to realize full benefits
of a weather service organization. The Airlift was be-
ginning to operate as a single unit, with each base acting
as a part of the whole rather than as an individual organi-
zation. To fit into this picture, the Weather Service had to
do likewise. It had to be able to present to the Air Traffic
Control center a single forecast agreed upon by all station
forecasters, covering all Airlift bases and routes. To achieve
this, a master Control Weather Station was established in
the Frankfurt Air Traffic Control Office with a sub-central
station in the weather office at Tempelhof. A telephone
conference line was established with outlets in each
weather station on the Lift, and a conference schedule set
up so that all Airlift forecasters could discuss the weather
situations at least four times a day and arrive at a com-
posite forecast for the Lift area. The Master Control Station
was given forecast control authority so that agreements
could always be reached. Of the several values obvious in
this conference net, the greatest was the combining of ex-
perience of the forecasters taking part. Regardless of the
care exercised in selecting the most experienced fore-
casters for the Airlift bases, there existed a considerable
difference in the experience level of personnel on duty
in the various stations at any given time. The telephone
conference circuit gave all forecasters the benefit of the
most experienced man's opinions and reasoning and
acted, in effect, as a means of bringing the experience
level of all forecasters on duty up to that of the most
experienced man. (See diagram in Communications sec-
tion).
This conference proved of such value in the American
weather service that an effort to accomplish a similar
circuit between the American and British weather services
was begun, and was just ready to begin functioning at the
Airlift's end. Although no operational benefit was obtained,
there is little doubt that this inter-service conference
net would have accomplished a worth-while improvement
in the joint weather services proportional to that ac-
complished in the U. S. weather service alone.
To those not technically trained, it may appear that this
report lays undue stress on experience among weather
forecasters. It is therefore advisable to explain here that
the limited development of the science of meteorology
places perhaps more weight upon forecasier experience,
particularly experience in the operating locale, than upon
any other phase of training.
There were many new ideas and methods in the science
of forecasting developed and tried by Airlift forecasting
personnel, but due to their highly technical nature if is not
considered advisable to present them here.
OBSERVING
As previously mentioned, the real winter weather began
in November. At this time the Lift was operating with the
minimum conditions of 200 feet 1/2 mile except Tempelhof,
at which minima were 400 feet and 1 mile. At most of the
fields, weather observers during this period were relying
almost entirely upon estimated ceiling heights. Some ceiling
lights were in operation for night observations, and infre-
quent ceiling balloon runs (due to shortages of supplies)
were made for the accurate determination of daytime
ceilings. Due to the amorphous and variable nature of the
average low cloud and the natural limitations of the human
eye, it has always been understood by weather people,
though perhaps not by most operational personnel, that an
estimated ceiling of 200 feet means that the ceiling is
somewhere between 150 and 250 feet. Even those
measurements made by ceiling light or balloons, due to
the aforementioned causes, have been known to be in-
accurate by as much as plus or minus 50 feet. It was ob-
vious that the Airlift's low landing and take-off minima
dictated the use of ceiling measurement equipment which
could not only make accurate measurements, but make
them continuously; so that dependable ceiling heights
would be readily available for operations under those
conditions. The Chief, Air Weather Service, during his
earlier mentioned tour of the Airlift, recognized this
necessity and authorized the installation of new type
weather service ceilometers at all Airlift bases, giving them
immediate priority for this job.
Except in rare cases, the regular report of visibility
made by a weather observer is normally the general all-
around visibility taken from the weather station, with a
53
FREQUENCY OF VFR FLYING WEATHER
30-
5 25_
g 20-
o '0-
z 5-
o-L
30-
£25-
g 20-
u. 15-
z 5-
0-
30
w 25-
g 20-
z 5-
1900 LST
LEGEND: 03% 6 YEAR AVERAGE
| OBSERVED IN 1948
special note for more or less visibility in any particular
quadrant it it deviates as much as 1/2 mile from the
general visibility. With the Airlift operating at 1/2 mile,
the runway visibility might frequently differ from the
average by an amount not large enough to require a
remark on the weather report, yet enough to open or
close the runway at Airlift minima. To obtain a special
observation which would give the accurate runway visi-
bility, a line for a field telephone was installed at the
landing end of the active runway. When the visibility
was less than one mile, a weather observer with a field
telephone was stationed in this position. By counting
the visible runway fights, with a knowledge of the
distances between them the observer in this position
could telephone accurate runway visibility reports direct
to the weather office. Any variation in runway visibility
which might open or close the field was thus instantly
available to the weather office, and through them to
operations personnel at all Airlift bases by way of the
weather teletype net.
UPPER AIR AND AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
When forecasts were begun to supply the Airlift with '
special weather service, one of the first points 9
consideration was the upper air observation program.
Perhaps one of the weakest links in the 18th Squadron^
observation service was their shortage of upper air data.
Use was being made of such foreign observations made
by PIBALS (pilot balloons) and RAWINS (radio-equipped
balloons) as were available, and a few strategically \oi
cated stations in the U. S. zone of Germany were In
ing these observations and transmitting the informal™
on the international weather net. The British were making!
several upper air runs in their zone of occupation afl
likewise transmitting on the international net, so thafS
far as the American and British zones of Germany weH
concerned, upper air information for a normal Air Force
operation was available. When the Airlift started, it viB
only necessary to increase the frequency of these runs
to provide adequate coverage of the air aloft over the
54
British and American zones.
\ Even with the increased frequency of upper air runs,
if became apparent with the advent of November
Wather that more information was necessary for the
longer range forecasts required by the Airlift, and that
lis added information must come from a specific locality
the area to the northwest, or "weatherward," of the
Airlift corridors. Ground controlled balloon runs in this
area were entirely too scattered in the low countries and
northern France, and few or none were being made in
the Channel and the North Sea.
• As a result of requests made by the weather organiza-
■l), a squadron of B-29 reconnaissance aircraft was
Hmed and based in the Marham area of the United
Kingdom. A weather reconnaissance track was recom-
mended, and operations by this squadron began in late
^Bovember. Their route was set up from Marham north-
eastward to the coast of Denmark and back in a triangular
yack that completely covered the Central North Sea and
'enfral and Southern England. Qualified weather ob-
servers on these flights reported over predesignafed check
points, and their reports were coded and put on the
*
weather service wires. This was information of real fore-
casting value because, with the predominantly north-
westerly circulation during the winter, the flights were
encountering the weather that would be over the cor-
ridors in 24 to 48 hours.
The value of these reconnaissance flights to Airlift
weather forecasting can be reduced to a simple lesson:
If adequate upper air information is unavailable from
already established RAWIN and PIBAL stations, this in-
formation can be obtained by aerial reconnaissance more
expeditiously than by attempting to establish and man the
necessarily complex upper air observation stations.
Aerial reconnaissance ships can cover a much larger area,
and thereby give more complete upper air coverage, than
could conceivably be covered by the establishment of
even a large number of observing stations. At the same
time they can render valuable service in obtaining the
data necessary for special studies in aircraft icing, thunder
storms, and other specific meteorological phenomena.
Although aerial reconnaissance does not generally provide
information to as high a level as that supplied by
RAWIN's it proved adequate for the Airlift, especially
when combined with data supplied by a minimum number
of RAWIN stations.
With the North Sea and coastal countries adequately
covered by the B-29 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron
based in England, attention was turned to a more general
weather reconnaissance of Central Europe. In November
1°48 USAFE formed a squadron of B-17's, the 7169th
Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, with the intention of
placing it under the operational control of the Air
Weather Service as was the B-29 squadron at Marham.
Headquarters USAFE placed this squadron under Task
Force operational control as an Air Traffic Control scout
squadron, with the weather squadron permitted to place
weather observers on these flights. Little benefit was
realized as far as weather forecasting was concerned by
this arrangement, because flights by these aircraft were
confined to the Airlift corridors. Since a satisfactory
arrangement had not been worked out to serve both
interests, on 10 March operational control of this squad-
ron was placed with the Air Weather Group. Twenty
days later, due to improved weather conditions and the
questionable value of the results obtained, this recon-
•NOR RAIN, NOR SLEET, NOR SNOW SHALL STAY THESE
COURIERS FROM THEIR APPOINTED ROUNDS'.
W '
55
naissance squadron was inactivated by order of USAFE.
Although no particular value was obtained by this
operation, it was established on the two or three occasions
when these aircraft flew tracks outside the corridors to
the weatherward, that a similar squadron operating
entirely under Weather's operational control could play
the same part and return the same value as the squadron
in England; and by flying to the weatherward nearer the
corridors, would encounter the weather that would be
over the route in the next six to twelve hours, thereby
increasing by a substantial degree the short-range fore-
casting accuracy.
PILOT REPORTS
For those aerial observations near the bases them-
selves and along the corridors, the usual system of pilot
reports was used. When the bad weather started, Air
Weather Service requested that pilots be required to re-
port weather at designated intervals. These reports were
collected and placed on weather service wires, and a
system for the utilization of pilot reports was effected
much the same as the Civil Aeronautics Administration
and Weather Bureau set-up in the Zone of the Interior.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty encountered in this system
was that of busy communication personnel being unable
to relay weather information from the pilot to the weather
office. Such a hold-up caused a consequent delay in
dissemination of the reports over the weather service
wires. When the final organization allowed a workload in-
duction for communication personnel, this difficulty dis-
appeared.
One of the points of friction that has long existed
between weather officer and pilot is the matter of pilot
ceiling and visibility reports. The Air Weather Service,
like the U. S. Weather Bureau and CAA, has heretofore
followed regulations that forbid the weather officer
accepting a pilot report as the official report, when an
observed report by a qualified weather observer could
be had. In perhaps one of the first large-scale deviations
from this rule, weather stations on Airlift bases found it
mandatory that as often as possible, they accept pilot
56
reports on ceilings and visibilities. This was especially true
before the installation of electronic ceiling reporting
instruments and the inauguration of a special runway
visibility observation. Even with the large human error
factor involved when a pilot is busy with an instrument
let-down, there were several reasons for the necessity of
accepting pilot reports.
First, with the ceiling as variable as it usually is when
at or near 200 feet, it is impossible without making
continuous observations (or without the use of a ceilo-
meter) for the ground observer to be absolutely current
with his ceiling and visibility; and with aircraft landing
PILOTS WERE BRIEFED AND DEBRIEFED BY WEATHER '
PERSONNEL.
or taking off at less than five-minute intervals, it woi
have been necessary for the observer to be outside CO!
tinuously in order to meet the Airlift's requirements.
Secondly, since most of the Airlift weather statics
were in offices from which the observers could not ke>
a constant watch on the sky in all directions, they we)
often forced to rely on the pilots, through the tovw
to let them know when special observations were
order. In this respect, it is here strongly recommend?
that the physical location of a weather station be su<
that a clear and unhampered view of 360 degrees of fh
horizon can be had at all times.
OPERATIONAL USE OF FORECASTS
ill
I!
Perhaps the best picture of the operational use a
forecasts and the weather forecaster's position in fhi
general operations picture can be drawn by a comparisoi
between use of the weather services by the two nationi
engaged in "Operation Vittles". American and British
weather services were very similar, it being in this instance
the operational use of forecasts where the major differ^
ences occurred. The United States Air Force C-54's, due la
tank and wing construction, were better stressed wifh a
minimum of 1,500 gallons of fuel in the wing tanks. This
constituted a considerable fuel reserve over that necessary!
for the shorthaul operation. With this reserve fuel, U.S.
aircraft could be dispatched without regard to terminal"
forecasts. Aircraft could continue to make approaches un-
til the field had actually gone below minimum. When the |
field did go below minimum, there still remained ade-J
quate fuel aboard for the aircraft to return to fheir home,
bases or to alternates. Therefore, for the most part fore-
casting was used for dispatching aircraft so they would;
arrive at terminals as weather rose to minima, and fori
estimating icing and turbulence hazards en route.
On the other hand, the British operation was conducted |
with aircraft carrying a minimum of reserve fuel. They werej
therefore unable to divert the sometimes necessary lonch
distances in order to reach operational weather conditions
British traffic controllers were forced to rely more com-
pletely upon weather forecasts; and in contrast to the
American operation, they stopped dispatch when weather
personnel were able contidently to forecast below-
minimum operational conditions.
As a partial solution to the recognized inaccuracies of
meteorological science, both British and American fore-
casters exercised their initiative by warning the dispatcher
„ i| of weather features likely to affect the operation. Based
upon an adequate knowledge of the nature and urgency
I, j of the operation and the controller's problems, they
presented a balanced picture of the future weather with
fheir degree of certainty for the forecast. Forecasters often
filled an easier and more productive role in being con-
fidently able to forecast the continuance of good weather
when crews and controllers felt doubts and anxiety.
RECORDS AND CLIMATOLOGY
One of the most productive roles filled by the Air
Weather Service, as well as one of the best illustrations
of the value of maintaining longterm records and statis-
tics, was in the field of special studies and special fore-
casts. Studies in answer to many difficult problems, in-
cluding probable and possible duration of periods when
GCA teams might be continuously employed; European
meteorological conditions involving fog, icing, thunder-
storms, seasonal freezing levels, and statistics regarding
snowfall, rainfall, and estimates of the effect of winter
weather on aircraft were prepared. Papers such as these
were continuously in demand at command level and
proved to be of singular value to headquarters engaged
in over-all planning.
Airlift logistical problems were to a large extent af-
fected by the weather. Because considerable portions of
the supplies for Berlin were of a perishable nature, and
could not be held at air bases during periods of bad
weather without causing far-reaching effects upon surface
transportation facilities, long-term climatological studies
and extended-interval forecasts enabled ground traffic
agencies to plan the flow of supplies to Airlift air bases.
Forecasts were given the Traffic and Production Control
Sections of CALTF Headquarters for weekly, monthly and
AIRLIFT AREA CLIMATOLOGICAL TRENDS
57
three-monthly periods. By utilizing these studies, logis-
tical agencies were able to plan fhe delivery of supplies
to the American and British Zone Airlift stations so that
an even flow could be kept moving into Berlin.
DISSEMINATION
To be fully utilized, weather observations and fore-
casts must be disseminated with speed and accuracy. On
the Airlift this was accomplished through the media of
staff briefings, special staff weather sections, crew brief-
ings, and written forecasts.
Weather briefings were presented at practically any
time or place they were needed. The Commanding
General, Headquarters USAFE, was briefed daily at 1000
hours and the Commanding General, CALTF, at 1100.
Both of these briefings laid stress on the expected Air-
lift weather and its causes.
A staff weather officer was assigned to Headquarters
TEMPELHOF GAVE PILOTS QUICK, COMFORTABLE "CURB-
SERVICE" BRIEFINGS.
CALTF for procurement and presentation of additional
weather information. Under his supervision there was a
special weather section in the flight operations office of
that Headquarters. There, for the use of the Duty Opera-
tions Officer, a board displaying present and forecasted
weather for all Airlift bases and alternates was maintained
from telephone and teletype reports. Weather overlays,
written forecasts, and a telephone conference connection
with CALTF bases enabled the staff weather officer to
advise and brief Airlift personnel on request.
Beginning with a system of twice-a-day group weafher
briefings, Airlift bases progressed to a system of in-
dividual briefings immediately prior to take-off, if the
location of the weather station and time factors made
this procedure practical. In those cases where the dis-
tance of the weather station from the flight line made
individual briefing between trips impractical or where
the size of the weafher station made group briefings
impossible, written forecasts covering a six-hour period
were published every three hours and distributed in
organization mess halls and all the flight lines. Where
used, the pre-take-off briefings were supplemented in a
mass briefing held once a week to discuss general weather
trends, changes in flight procedures, and intelligence
matters.
The Airlift terminals at Tegel and Gatow both main-
tained briefing services, although regular briefing opera-
tions were normally unnecessary because of the short
routes these bases served. Tempelhof initially had in-
dividual briefing in the terminal building, but converted
later to a system of "portable" briefing, firsf from a jeep
and later from an inclosed van in which the weather of-
ficer met arriving aircraft, briefed crews at fhe parking
sites, and returned to the station during breaks in traffic
to pick up later sequences and forecasts. The arrange-
ment was most convenient for all concerned, especially
in inclement weather.
TECHNICAL ASPECTS
Germany, with the latitude of Labrador and the tern
perature of the U. S. middle east coast, presents one of
the most difficult forecasting areas in the world. During
the winter the proximity of the warm Gulf Stream and the
cold North Sea causes inter-mixture of air masses of
widely varying temperatures and humidity, and frequent
fronfal passages with inconsistent rates of movement make
accurate forecasting a major problem. The primary prob-
lem, however, and one that has proved intractable so far,
is forecasting in and near marginal operating conditions.
Advances have been made in the technique of bad
weather flying, and marginal conditions are now so near
to zero conditions that they cannot be forecasted or even
observed with absolute accuracy. Marginal operating con-
ditions— 200 to 400 feet ceilings and 1/2 to 1 mile visi-
bility — are so narrow from the viewpoint of the mete-
orologist that accurate forecasting within these limifs is
usually improbable. With cloud bases within this range
a variation of 200 feet is of great operational importance;
yet it can result from a change of only 1 degree Faren-
heit in surface temperature or a few knots change in wind
-""*.
MARCH, 1949, BLEW INTO RHEIN/MAIN WITH SNOW AND ICE.
force. A variation of 1/4 mile in visibility may be similarly
caused.
These difficulties have been aggravated by the tact
that cloud bases below 600 feet are normally so diffuse
and fluctuating that even air crews are unable to observe
the effective height with any useful degree of unanimity,
so that individual air crew reports of the height of low
clouds are sometimes misleading and always have to be
regarded with reserve. For this reason crews and con-
trollers seldom agree with forecasts of low stratus height.
The timing of sudden changes of weather within one
hour has hitherto been regarded as a good standard of
forecasting; however, this was much below the desirable
standard for the Airlift, where an error of one hour in
forecasting the sudden onset of zero conditions may
have caused a large number of aircraft to miss their ap-
proaches.
CONCLUSIONS
Of all the lessons learned and conclusions drawn
by the Air Weather Service as a result of experience
gained, in "Operation Vittles", the most important and
outstanding was simply the verification of a fact that has
long been known in the weather service. Relying upon
the present state of scientific development in the field of
meteorology, the Air Weather Service is incapable of
furnishing the exact weather forecasting required by such
an operation. As previously stated, during the entire win-
ter the operational minima at Airlift bases were 200' 1/2
mile except Tempelhof, where minima were 400' i mile.
To meet the requirements fully, it was mandatory that
the weather service be able to forecast with absolute
accuracy within these minima over a period of at least
three hours.
As mentioned above, it is not within the present
scope of meterological science to accomplish this. It ap-
pears that advancements in instrument flying have out-
distanced the science of meteorology and placed fore-
casting requirements on ceiling and visibility limits
wherein weather people cannot forecast or even observe
with sufficient accuracy. The only corrective measure for
this forecasting deficiency is basic research, and that is
being carried out to the limits of facilities available.
The deficiencies in present weather observing tech-
niques, however, pose problems less difficult to solve.
Speaking from a strictly operational viewpoint, the four
necessary weather observations are ceiling, visibility, wind
direction, and wind velocity. At the beginning of the Air-
lift these observations were taken in the approved weather
service manner: i. e., ceiling from estimation or from a
ceilometer placed somewhere near the weather station;
visibility in a 360 degree circle from the instrument shelter;
wind direction and velocity from an annemometer placed
59
on top of the operations building or tower.
As an example, due to the peculiar construction of
Tempelhof Air Base and since present regulations would
not allow the ceilometer to be installed on the field, it
was placed a considerable distance behind the terminal
building. The annemometers were installed on top of
the terminal building and tower, some 100 feet above
the ground. Because of the high terminal and neigh-
boring buildings, a good visibility observation in all
directions was impossible.
The error in this placement of instruments and physical
construction is obvious. Weather elements were not ob-
served where they mattered most at the approach zone
and runway. The ceiling over a spot somewhere behind
the terminal buildings may or may not be the ceiling over
the approach end of the runway, the visibility taken from
the instrument shelter may not be the visibility on the
approach and on the runway, and the wind direction and
velocity on top of the terminal building or tower, 100 feet
above the field, may nof be the same as that on the
runway — particularly in the case of Tempelhof where
the field is almost entirely surrounded by tall buildings.
Observational inaccuracies caused by this placement
of instruments and physical characteristics of the field
were duplicated in one or more cases on each of the
Airlift fields, and were responsible for some loss of con-
fidence in the weather service by the pilots and opera-
tion personnel. Ceiling and visibility inaccuracies contrib-
utable to these faults were at least partially responsible
for the record of almosf 5,000 Airlift landings when
official weather service observations placed the field
below GCA minima, and accounted for a large measure
of disregard for official weather service reports.
A situation even more dangerous than the loss of
confidence resulted from the difference in wind directions
and velocities between the official weather service re-
ports taken at a considerable height above the ground
and a considerable distance from the runway, and those
winds existing on the runway itself. These wind reports
became highly critical, particularly in the case of Tempel-
hof when continuous GCA approaches were being made.
Throughout the final approach, the GCA controller was
able to estimate the wind drift and incorporate the
necessary correction in his instructions to fhe pilot. After
holding this correction during the entire final run, neither
the GCA controller nor the pilot was prepared for the
I AFTER WINTER'S HEAVIEST SNOW, C-54'S UNLOADED SIDE
BY SIDE UNTIL SNOW REMOVAL CREWS CLEARED THE TEM-
PELHOF PARKING APRON.
60
sudden 20 to 30 degree shift of wind at times encountered
when the aircraft descended below fhe level of the sur-
rounding buildings. This necessitated a rapid, last-minute
correction, and even though the pilot was contact af fhe
time, caused rough landings and offered a definite ground-
loop hazard.
These observational inaccuracies, coupled with m
scientific limitations of the forecasting service, created a
lack of respect for the weather service in a number ol
operational people, and the "flying without regard lo
weather" attitude was subscribed to by quite a few.
In its efforts to improve its service, the Air Weafher
Service made every effort to correct the deficiencies
herein mentioned. The forecasters' telephone conference
net was instituted and proved to be of definite value.
Visibility observations by an observer on the end of the
runway were inaugurated and certainly proved to be a
step in the right direction. An effort was made to have
the ceilometer placed on fhe flying field near the runways,
but this move was prevented by installation regulations
A similar effort to mount annemometers on the field near
the runways was stopped by technical limitations involved
in electrical losses between the annemometers and their
recording instruments.
The apparent need for electronically-determined run-
way visibilities and approach ceilings has confribufed to
the development by weather people of the newl
constructed transmissometer-ceilometer units, instruments
which make and record continuous observations of
ceilings and visibility in the approach zone and on the
runway. In the field of forecasting, new techniques have
been developed and tried and will undoubtedly contrib-
ute toward improving forecasting accuracy, but no
definite progress on fhe basic research problems can be
claimed from this operation.
In the future, electronic recording instruments wf
undoubtedly improve the accuracy of weather observa-
tions, and perhaps some forecasting techniques learned
in fhis operation will improve fhe forecasting. There M
remains, however, a tremendous amount of fundamenl
research to be done before the science of meteorolol
will be capable of fully meeting aviation requireme(|
/
\
Considerable difficulty was encounfered in fhe ac-
tivation of flying and ground safety programs at newly
established Airlift bases and in the integration of safety
activities of the Airlift units operating from permanent
USAFE installations. With the arrival and assignment of
additional safety personnel, accident control activities
were accelerated, and aggressive flying and ground safety
programs were initiated at each installation.
61
GROUND SAFETY
The ever-present major problem in ground safety
was the treight-handling operation. Many aircraft were
damaged by motor vehicles, trucks, and fork lifts engaged
in loading or unloading of aircraft. Operators were un-
familiar with the procedures prescribed for operating their
equipment in close proximity to aircraft. Operators of ma-
terial handling equipment, moreover, were frequently in-
adequately trained; and the training of special purpose
equipment operators, most of them German, proved a
slow process.
Several aircraft were extensively damaged during
maintenance as a result of fires caused by igniting gasoline
or gasoline fumes. The malpractice of using gasoline for
cleaning purposes presented a constant problem to super-
visory personnel, and repeated efforts were necessary to
attain rigid enforcement of regulations and operating
procedures covering the use of flammable liquids.
The adoption of appropriate corrective measures was
often hindered by failure of personnel to report all ground
accident damage to government property. In an effort to
achieve more complete accident reporting fhis Head-
quarters devised and prescribed an aircraft ground
accident form to be prepared on each aircraft accident
not reportable on AF Form 14 and 14A, the flying safety
reports.
To eliminate the damaging of aircraft by backing cargo
trucks, the use of wooden chocks and the assistance of
backing guides were prescribed as standard operating
procedures. To reduce the problem of dusts caused by
handling coal and flour, sprinkling and wetting down of
loading ramps and areas was necessary. The control of
motor vehicle traffic on airfields also proved a major
problem, since the operators of these vehicles were fre-
quently foreign nationals and ground force personnel not
always familiar with the safety factors governing vehicular
traffic on crowded airfields.
Constant instruction and training, coupled with super-
visory vigilance, were necessary to obtain compliance with
existing operating procedures and to keep the number of
ground mishaps to a minimum. German safety engineers
USAFE GROUND ACCIDENTS DURING AIRLIFT
MAJOR CAUSE OF ALL DISABLING INJURIES
30
40
80
FALL OF PERSONS SAME LEVEL
STRIKING AGAINST
FALL OF PERSONS DIFFERENT LEVELS
SLIDING, RUNNING, JUMPING
STRUCK BY FALLING OBJECTS
ALTERCATIONS
EXPOSURE, EXPLOSION, AND USE OF
HAZARDOUS OPERATING PROCEDURES
ACIDS, TOXICS, ASPHYXIATION
EQUIPMENT FAILURE
MATERIEL HANDLING
SS3 ALL OTHERS
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
qPERGENT|0 20 30 40 30 60
MOTOR VEHICLE RATE
BASED ON NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS
PER 100,000 VEHICLE MILES
MILITARY INJURY RATE
BASED ON NUMBER OF DISABLING
. INJURIES PER 100,000 MAN-DAYS
RATE
CIVILIAN INJURY RATE
BASED ON NUMBER OF DISABLING
INJURIES PER IjOOOpOO MAN-HOURS
RATE
10
62
were utilized fo supplement USAFE safety personnel. Their
services were used in the instruction and training of Ger-
man employees and in administering examinations of Ger-
man motor vehicle and special purpose equipment
operators.
Available ground accident statistics do not indicate
unusual or unsatisfactory trends; however, their com-
pilation cannot be considered complete in view of the
slow organization of the ground safety program during
the early stages of the operation. The ground accident
rates shown on the opposite page have been compiled
from reports submitted by USAFE installations engaged
in Airlift activities. In the compilation of these rates neither
the accidents nor the military and civilian man-days of ex-
posure of supporting Army personnel were included.
FLYING SAFETY
The exceptionally fine flying safety record of the Airlift
was not achieved by, nor can it be attributed to the skill,
ability, or contribution of any single man or any group
of men. It was achieved through the cooperative efforts
of many teams of skilled technicians. Yet in evaluating this
safety record, attention must be focused on a particular
group — the aircrews, the problems they faced, and the
manner in which they accomplished their mission.
In order for the aircrews to attain maximum results
demanded in this around-the-clock, all-weather type of
operation with its tremendous accident potential, if was
mperative that all precautions be taken to reduce opera-
fional hazards to a minimum. It has long been established
hat human error is by far the greatest cause factor in-
/olved in aircraft accidents, and it was constantly em-
)hasized that every possible means of keeping this
actor to a minimum must be utilized. This was accom-
plished through three general methods.
First, aircrews were provided with the best flying aid
acilities that science could offer. Every modern means of
adio, radar, and electronic navigational aid was installed
>n the routes flown. Each operational base was fully
'quipped with qualified GCA crews to guide aircraft in
for landings in bad weather. Weather service set up for
Airlift operations was more elaborate and extensive than
any forecasting service heretofore developed. Airfields
were equipped, and in some instances rebuilt, for the sole
purpose of facilitating the Airlift. Countless other devices
and services were made available to the aircrews fo
provide them with maximum safety in the course of their
duties.
Secondly, thorough supervisory control was maintained
over the aircrews at all times. Frequent flight checks were
conducted on all crew members to insure their ability to
meet the high standards of proficiency demanded. Train-
ing of personnel was a continuing process. Due to the
saturation of the air space on the routes flown, it was
necessary to monitor all flights and in some cases actually
to control them from ground air control centers. These
centers worked in direct conjunction with the operational
bases in allocating and coordinating flight schedules.
Split-second timing, altitude spacing, and flight adjustments
were mandatory fo provide aircraft a safety space-margin.
Flying safety officers made frequent supervisory field
trips to ascertain the adequacy of accident prevention
programs and to assist safety personnel with unusual
problems. Constant surveys and analyses were accom-
plished on accident data to determine whether cause factors
were indicating a general accident trend due to faults in
equipment, practices, or procedures. Close coordination
with subordinate commands was maintained so that im-
mediate action could be taken on any peculiar problem
or difficulty encountered.
The third means of reducing human error was through
safety education. Operational bases received all available
safety publications for use in aircraft accident study classes.
Following each accident, immediate TWX dissemination of
cause factors was made in order that all bases might profit
by .the mistakes of others.
Throughout the entire period of the operation, the
Airlift's safety record consistently bettered that of the
overall Air Force in spite of all-weather and around-the-
clock schedules. During the summer months of 1949 the
Airlift shattered safely records for the amount of hours
flown, bringing a full realization of safety efforts. Based
63
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT SUMMARY
MONTH
TOTAL
BY TYPE AIRCRAFT
BY TYPE ACCIDENT
BY CAUSE FAC1
"ORS
C-47
C-54
R-5D
C-82
TAKE OFF
IN FLIGHT
APPROACH
a LANDING
TAXIING
OTHER
PERSONNEL
ERROR
MATERIEL
FAILURE
OTHER
MAJ.
MIN.
MAJ.
MIN.
MAJ.
MIN.
MAJ.
MIN.
MAJ.
MIN.
MAJ.
MIN.
MAJ.
MIN.
MAJ.
MIN.
MAJ.
MIN.
MAJ.
MIN.
MAJ.
MIN.
MAJ.
MIN.
MAJ.
MIN. !
JUNE 1948
JULY
8
3
6
1
2
2
2
1
3
2
2
1
7
2
1
1
AUGUST
5
1
3
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
4
1
1
SEPTEMBER
6
6
5
3
1
3
1
1
2
2
5
1
2
5
3
1
1
OCTOBER
6
3
5
3
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
3
2
3
1
NOVEMBER
5
3
3
3
2
1
3
3
1
4
3
1
DECEMBER
7
5
5
3
1
2
1
1
4
1
1
5
4
5
3
JANUARY 1949
9
8
9
6
2
1
1
1
6
3
1
3
1
7
5
1
1
1
2
FEBRUARY
4
7
3
6
1
1
1
1
4
3
2
3
3
1
4
MARCH
8
2
8
2
4
3
1
2
3
1
5
1
APRIL
1
3
1
1
2
1
3
1
3
MAY
*6
5
1
1
4
3
1
1
1
5
1
3
4
4
2
1
JUNE
8
3
6
2
2
1
1
2
5
1
1
1
6
2
1
2
JULY
2
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
AUGUST
1
i
1
1
1
1
1
1
SEPTEMBER
TOTALS
76
50
16
7
51
36
6
6
2
1
6
2
17
9
37
6
II
32
5
1
50
35
24
3
2
12
i
* INCL
JOES
YC-9
7 MAJ
OR AC
;ft a
cc
1
64
AIRLIFT ACCIDENT RATES
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
NO.
RATE
USAF(WORLD WIDE)
480
48.0
56.0
61.0
52.0
58.0
61.0
67.0
61.0
56.0
49.0
49.0
43.0
44.0
52.0
49.0
TOTAL
II
38.8
6
16.9
12
27.8
9
24.4
8
28.3
12
34.4
17
423
II
29.7
10
21.6
4
6.8
II
19.3
II
20.4
2
3.3
2
10.4
MAJOR
8
28.2
5
14.1
6
13.9
6
16.3
5
17.7
7
20.1
9
22.4
4
10.8
8
17.3
1
1.7
6
10.5
8
14.8
2
3.3
1
5.2
MINOR
3
10.6
1
2.8
6
13.9
3
8.1
3
10.6
5
14.3
8
19.9
7
18.9
2
4.3
3
5.1
5
83
3
5.6
1
5.2
FATALITY
5
17.6
4
11.4
4
10.9
4
11.5
10
24.9
1
2.2
3
49
65
TAXIING
MAJOR
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
ol
MINOR
2
1
5
2
3
5
3
2
2
3
3
1
PERCENT
lOOi
TAKE-OFF
LEGEND
MAJOR MINOR
80
60
40
20
J J A S N D
A
/ V
F M A M J
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS B'
I
on the total ot 586,901 hours flown during the operations
the accident breakdown is as follows:
TYPE
Fatal Accidents
Fatalities
Wrecked Aircraft
Major Accidents
Minor Accidents
Total Accidents
NUMBER
12
31
22
70
56
126
RATE PER 100,000
FLYING HOURS
2.045
5.282
3.749
11.927
9.542
21.469
An analysis of these accidents reveals nothing unusuali
that might be anticipated for the type of operation in-i
volved. During the early period of the Airlift the ratio of
night accidents to day accidents was seven to four;
however, this ratio balanced fairly evenly during the latter
half. The number of accidents occurring under instrument;
IN FLIGHT
A S
MAJOR
1
1
1
1
1
1
MINOR
1
1
MAJOR
2
1
1
2
4
1
1
4
1
MINOR
1
1
1
4
2
66
PHASE OF FLIGHT
flight conditions was reduced approximately 83 percent
during the second half of the operation.
As to types of accidents, there were two major cate-
gories. Most prevalent were taxi accidents, accounting for
more than 34 percent of all accidents. Landing accidents
accounted for approximately 26 percent of the accidents.
Other categories included collision with ground, take-
offs, fire in air, fire on ground, collision wifh other objects,
forced landings, abandoned plane, and collision in flight.
Cause factors of these accidents fall into four major cate-
gories: pilot error, other personnel error, materiel failure,
and miscellaneous. The latter includes such factors as
weather, navigation, lack of fuel, airports and facilities,
and less-than-full crew.
The majority of all accidents involved more than one
cause factor. In approximately two-thirds of the accidents
that occurred, pilot error was charged as a cause factor.
Material failure of the power plant, air frame, landing
gear, instruments, hydraulic system, electrical system, or
PERCENT
100
LANDING
.
PERCENT
100
80
60
40
20
OTHER
/ k/\y\
/\
SON
MAJOR
1
1
1
I 1
-
1
MINOR
1
LEGEND
-MAJOR MINOR
PERCENT
I00|
OVERALL
60
60
40
20
-TAXIING— LANDING^
MAJOR
3
2
2
2
3
1
6
3
3
5
5
, 1 o
MINOR
1
3
1 1
67
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
BY CAUSE FACTORS
DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR
J
J
A
S
N
D
J
F
M
A
M
J
J
A
S
MAJOR
7
4
2
3
4
4
7
3
3
1
4
6
1
I
MINOR
2
1
5
2
5
5
5
3
1
3
4
1
DUE TO MATERIEL FAILURE
MAJOR
1
1
3
3
1
3
1
1
5
2
2
1
MINOR
1
f
1
c
DUE TO OTHER CAUSES
O^
k^.
JJASONOJFMAM
MAJOR
1
1
fj
MINOR
1
1
2
4
1
1
2
radio equipment was charged in approximately five-
twelfths of the accidents that occurred. Error on the part
of other personnel was charged in approximately one-
fourth of the accidents. Airports and facilities were
considered a factor in one-third of all the accidents, and
weather in approximately one-fourth.
SUMMARY
No aspects of the Airlift were of greater significance
than the constant effort directed toward safety. Records
established were not easily achieved. They required co-
operative effort on the part of all personnel throughout
all echelons of command. Safety programs were based on
the principle that needless waste of manpower and
materiel can and must be eliminated. Policies regarded
as imperative included complete standardization of operat-
ing procedures and techniques, a comprehensive system
of supervisory checks, periodic proficiency checks of air-
crew personnel regardless of the initial proficiency level,
continuous training programs, and complete operational
control both in the air and on the ground.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Flying safety officers must be members of the com-
mander's staff. The flying safety program is defeated in
direct proportion to the number of intermediate officers
through whom the flying safety officer must report.
T/O&E's should be modified to include flying safety
officers, authorizing not less than one field grade officer,
one non-commissioned officer, MOS 502 or 405, and one
clerk-typist at the wing level. Similarly, in order to achieve
satisfactory ground accident prevention results, adequate
and qualified ground safety personnel must be made
available and included in the organization, preferably
through allocations in pertinent Tables of Organization. A
full-time ground safety officer and ground safety techni-
cian, MOS 486, at headquarters level and at each operaf- '
ing installation are considered the minimum personnel re-
quirements, when supplemented by adequate clerical
assistance.
Adequate training must be given to operators of all
types of motor vehicles, special purpose, and material
handling equipment. Emphasis must be placed on safe
operation near aircraft and on hazards prevalent on an ]\
air base.
Competent and adequate supervision of all loading
and unloading operations is imperative. Rigid enforcement
of safe operating practices and procedures should be
maintained at all times.
PERCENT
1001 —
OVERALL
PERSONNEL
ERROR
MATERIEL
FAILURE OTHER
CAUSES
67%
21%
12%
68
INTELLIGENCE
!
The Airlift did nof initially establish any new intelligence
requirements, since intelligence agencies were in operation
af each USAFE base used by Airlift units, and the Airlift
keif had the primary mission of delivering tonnage to
Berlin. Rather than creating new requirements, the in-
creased tempo of operations intensified already existing
ones. As a consequence this Headquarters did not include
a specific intelligence mission in its letter of instructions
'o fhe Airlift commander.
The lack of a specific intelligence requirement in the
letter of instructions did not presuppose, however, the
complete absence of an intelligence mission. As a USAFE
ur >itiall intelligence regulations, letters, and other directives
applicable within USAFE applied to the 1st ALTF. The
A "liH commander had all the intelligence responsibilities
normal to a command.
FUNCTIONS
With the continuation of the Airlift and its subsequent
expansion into an operation which included American,
British, and French elements, certain new problems not
originally encountered were posed. These problems con-
cerned the briefing of aircrew personnel on the corridor
situation; the institution of measures for the prevention of
compromise of classified information and equipment and
the prevention and detection of sabotage, espionage, and
subversion at the British and French bases; and finally the
manning of Airlift units with sufficient intelligence per-
sonnel to accomplish the increased workload.
The first problem arose from the fact that the narrow
corridors running to Berlin from the American and British
Zones of Occupation were restricted flying areas and any
interference with Airlift flights within the corridors created
safety hazards. Although the air corridor agreements did
not anticipate the volume of traffic occasioned by the air-
lift of supplies into Berlin, they did provide the basis for
a safe operation if all the signatories abided by the
agreements. Violations of or exceptions to the rules on the
part of any one nation would have had a serious effect
on the success of the Airlift.
Soon after the Airlift began, pilots reported that they
had encountered Soviet formation flying within the cor-
ridors, buzzing, and other nuisance tactics. To obviate
the effects of these tactics intelligence officers were
instructed to inaugurate a system of daily pilot briefings
and debriefings. This system provided the means of
notifying all Airlift pilots of the kind of violation they
might expect and of preparing them to take the necessary
counfermeasures. Additionally, the daily briefing brought
to the pilots' attention those flights other than Airlift which
were posted in the Berlin Air Safety Center. By daily re-
ports to this Headquarters, it was possible to make known
violations the basis for complaint against the Soviets.
Measures necessary to prevent compromise of clas-
sified information and equipment, and prevention and
detection of sabotage, espionage, and subversion at U. S.
installations did not present an unusual problem since they
had been under USAFE control prior to the Airlift. The
70
expansion of the American participation in the Airlift to
the use of air bases in the British Zone of Occupation
and in the British and French Sectors of Berlin did pose
new problems, for it placed American commanders in a
position in which they did not have complete responsibility
for these intelligence functions at the installations they
occupied. The local British or French commander was the
proprietor while the American commander was the tenant.
In order to continue the prerogative of a commander to
insure that necessary measures were taken to impede and
counteract any effort to subvert his personnel or to
sabotage his equipment, arrangements were completed
whereby the British and French commanders retained area
responsibility while the American commander was re-
sponsible for local protection of U. S. personnel and
equipment.
In the British Zone of Occupation, where large num-
bers of foreign nationals were employed, British hiring
methods were accepted, but the American element re-
tained the right to control their use. In those instances
where foreign personnel were considered a threat to the
security of U. S. classified information and equipment, the
U. S. Air Force instituted action for their removal and the
British accomplished their dismissal.
The use of foreign nationals at Airlift installations
presented a favorable opportunity to any faction interested
in undermining the Airlift effort by means of disaffection
or sabotage. While no estimate exists as to the extent to
which foreign nationals attempted to create disaffection
or to sabotage, it is known that disaffection never be-
came a problem and that sabotage efforts were singularly
unsuccessful. Twenty-seven cases of suspected sabotage
were reported, but only four cases could be proved.
PERSONNEL
The requirements for holding daily briefings and
maintaining security combined to cause a shortage of
trained intelligence personnel. A survey of the intelligence
personnel requirements at all Airlift bases indicated that
a total augmentation of 24 officers and 31 airmen was
necessary .to carry out the function.
These additional requirements represented the minimuir
necessary to carry on a 24-hour-a-day type of operation
While they could not be met by the assignment o-
trained intelligence personnel, every effort was made fc
procure and assign experienced personnel. In many
instances individual commanders in the field placed per-i
sonnel in these positions irrespective of T/O&E and:
augmentation authorizations, for they realized the neces-
sity of providing intelligence information to their crews
in the air and of providing counterintelligence coverage
on the ground.
CONCLUSIONS
While the Airlift represented a unique situation big
cause of the specific circumstances under which it arose
and was carried ouf, the experience gained does permit
certain conclusions to be drawn which may be of value
elsewhere.
In a mass transport operation, a specific intelligence
mission is not necessarily required provided that normal
intelligence functions are included as a part of command.
If the necessity arises, specific intelligence missions may
be assigned without interference with the primary mission
of transporting personnel and supplies.
If the operation requires flying through narrow coj^
ridors in the face of nuisance tactics, daily briefings of
all aircrew personnel will afford fhem sufficient information
to enable them to carry out their flights with safety.
In the event that the U. S. Forces operate from allied
bases, protection from espionage, sabotage, and other
subversive activities can be obtained by assigning a
specific responsibility to each element on the base.
The rules governing the allocation of additional per-
sonnel to meet new problems must remain sufficiently
elastic to enable commanders to meet changing intel-
ligence requirements; otherwise the commander is forced
to improvise in critical areas.
The Airlift proved that existing Air Force intelligence
principles and procedures are sufficiently flexible to
insure success in such a restricted type of operation.
TONNAGE STUDV
COMFAR
C Akl AC A
iPfRAFT POTFN
The Berlin Airlift came into being as an unplanned
operation. The action of closing the surface routes to the
city of Berlin and the need for immediate establishment
of a flow of supplies by air precluded formal preplanning
for the operation.
The Airlift was envisioned at first as a short-term ex-
pediency. Planning was therefore conducted principally
by the operating agencies during the initial stages. As
the scope and probable duration of the operation became
apparent, planning was formalized. With the establish-
ment of Headquarters 1st ALTF, that agency assumed
the responsibility for detailed operational planning under
the general guidance of Headquarters USAFE. Long-
range planning and top-level coordination with British and
French forces and with other interested U. S. agencies re-
mained under direct control of Headquarters USAFE.
71
COORDINATION
The status of the Airlift as a combined operation
necessitated complete and rapid coordination at all
echelons. The Army was responsible for transport of cargo
from "railhead to airhead"; the Navy participated in the
Lift with two squadrons of transport aircraft, as well as
ferrying cargo across the Atlantic; depot maintenance be-
came the responsibility of the 3rd Air Division; OMGUS
computed the type and amount of supplies required for
the city of Berlin; and the British participated as full
partners in the operation.
PLANNING STAFF
The rapid expansion of the Airlift and fhe lack of prec-
edent for the operation necessitated individual planning
by all staff agencies and at all echelons as problems
peculiar to their functions arose.
Formal long-range planning was normally conducted
jointly by the plans sections of fhe various Directorates of
Headquarters USAFE and Headquarters 1st ALTF in close
coordination with EUCOM and other interested agencies.
72
Combined planning was simplified by the inclusion of
both USAF and RAF officers on the planning staff of
Headquarters CALTF.
CONCLUSIONS
In an ideal situation in which the problem could be
foreseen, advance planning by a central planning staff
composed of specialists representing all participating
services would unquestionably have aided in per-
formance of the mission.
Prior warning and consequent advance planning by
qualified specialists would have facilitated solution of the
numerous problems which arose in fhe early stages of fhe
operation.
Rapid and close coordination between all echelons is
essential to the accomplishment of the mission.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A combined planning staff in which all participating
agencies are represented would form the most efficient
planning agency.
A centralized competent plans section is a vifal
necessity. The commander of a special operation shod
establish his plans section at the earliest possible time.
COMPARISON OF AIRCRAFT POTENTIAL
3 jjjjjjjj 25 ° 50 ° 79 ° 1000 leSO 1900 1750
CREWS
AT 90 HRS MONTH
C-47
Wfflffli,. wmfflMmmmmmmmmMmmwMui** i
C-74
m^^k^MU^ ^-^
rtNtti»cj ]
FACTORS: 3.4 TONS FOR 4. HR ROUNDTRIP BY C-47
9.7 TONS FOR 3.3 HR ROUNOTRIP BY C-54
23 TONS FOR 3. HR ROUNDTRIP BY C-74
NOTES: THE ABOVE CHART SHOWS A COMPARISON OF OPERATING POTENTIAL FOR 3
TYPES OF AIRCRAFT. IT IS BASED UPON FLYING 4500 TONS DAILY FOR A
30 DAY PERIOD.
#
INTRODUCTION
The initial action ot the USAFE Deputy Chief ot Staff
for Materiel was to make transport aircraft available for
the operation. At that time the C-47 was the only cargo-
type aircraft available for immediate use.
Meanwhile, action was initiated to obtain C-54's. On
1 July 1948 the first C-54 type aircraft to supplement
the Airlift C-47's arrived at Rhein/Main Air Base. By 1
October the complete Airlift fleet of C-47's had been
replaced by C-54's.
A comparatively new aircraft to this command, the
C-54 created numerous problems in its support. Parts for
this aircraft were foreign to supply personnel, and mainte-
nance personnel were for the most part unfamiliar with
it. These problems were intensified by the fact that the
C-54 was designed for long-range flights with a minimum
of take-offs and landings, while Airlift operation entailed
an abnormally high number of loaded take-offs and land-
ings for the small amount of flying time involved. Conse-
quently, appropriate consumption data and maintenance
experience were not available.
The construction of new runways and taxi strips, plus
the rebuilding of old runways and taxi strips that had
broken down under heavy loads, was a further Materiel
responsibility.
These are just a few of the many problems that had
to be met and dealt with. Action taken in meeting these
Materiel responsibilities will be related in the following
pages.
#
SU PPLY
MISSION
The rapidity with which the Airlift expanded imposed
unforeseen supply requirements. To prevent supply chan-
nels from breaking down, and to insure a minimum of de-
lays in delivery of supply and materials for the Airlift
,operation, all branches of the Supply Division went on a
24-hour schedule at the start of the Airlift and continued
so throughout the entire operation.
During this period, a Theater Equipage Program was
underway whereby all T/O&E units, especially tactical
lunits, were being brought up to 100 percent strength in
their authorized equipment. Required implementation ac-
tion had been taken to insure equipment for the various
T/O&E units affected, and considerable progress had been
made when it was discovered that the immediate mission
of Airlift units, particularly troop carrier units, was being
impaired by efforts expended in obtaining equipment not
primarily required for Airlift support. Accordingly, USAFE
requested a waiver of the T/O&E equipage requirements
during the Airlift. Headquarters USAF's favorable consider-
ation of this request greatly aided the effectiveness of the
Airlift operations, in that the emphasis could be concen-
trated on shortages of those items required for the suc-
cessful completion of the Airlift mission, the goal of 100
percent equipage thereby becoming secondary in im-
portance for the time being.
Concurrent with the above and nearing completion was
a Theater Disposal Program through which all World War
II equipment in excess of current theater needs was being
disposed of by sale through OFLC (Office of Foreign Liqui-
dation Commission) and other governmental agencies or
by return shipment to the Zl.
Vast quantities were packaged and stored at Erding
Air Base awaiting shipment to the Zl. This equipment, plus
that recalled from governmental disposal agencies, was
utilized as the supply source for an internal theater supply
system.
Here, another problem was encountered. The unpack-
ing, sorting, and reshelving of this equipment had to be
accomplished at the same time that issues were being
made in support of the Airlift. However, after a period
of time this problem was solved with the assignment of
additional personnel who were given on-the-job training.
As a matter of temporary expediency, units at Fass-
berg and Celle during the initial stages of the operation
were supplied from the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation
for all items of technical service equipment and supplies.
While this plan continued in force during the entire oper-
ation, procurement of large quantities of technical service
items was greatly expedited by an agreement between
EUCOM and USAFE whereby requisitions direct to the
appropriate EUCOM depots were authorized. In effect
there was a direct supply channel from the respective
EUCOM depots to the using organizations.
i
POST-WAR SUPPLY DISPOSAL PROGRAM WAS I
PROCESS WHEN THE AIRLIFT BEGAN.
'jj£* IHfc -SUkPLUS- EQUIPMENT SERVED AS THE
^* INITIAL SUPPLY
GENERAL
Simultaneous arrival of operating units, personnel, and
supplies caused a great deal of confusion at Fassberg and
Celle and made necessary the temporary stockpiling of
supplies in hangers. The early tempo of the operation did
not permit proper warehousing, binning, identifying,
sorting, and inventorying of items prior to issue. Spares
aniving at the various air bases had to be issued to
maintenance units without proper paper work, since air-
craft began operating almost immediately upon arrival.
When shipping tickets were processed, it was impossible
to make a physical count of actual property received.
Processing of vouchers had to be made a month after re-
ceipt of issue. Arrival of many items of supplies without
accompanying shipping tickets and subsequent issue of
these supplies before an accounting system had been
established resulted in the need for a large inventory sec-
tion. However, once the records were adjusted no prob-
lems were encountered in keeping them up to date.
Considerable difficulty was caused during the early
portion of the Lift by the overlapping command jurisdic-
tion of the C-54's shuttling between Westover AB,
Massachusetts, and Rhein/Main. While on the westbound
trip passengers were carried, on the east-bound leg none
were authorized. Time after time, the liferaffs and other
overwater equipment were removed at Westover, and
installation of similar equipment was required af Rhein/
Main before the next trip. This drain on the command's
equipment was eliminated through discussion with Head-
quarters MATS, and the surplus equipment at Westover
was returned to Rhein/Main.
Coupled with the changes in equipment status of the
C-54's was the lack of uniformity in the maintenance of
Aircraft Checkers Reports, AF Forms 263. A partial solution
was reached by establishing a unit at Rhein/Main with
responsibility for the installation and removal of overwater
equipment and parachutes and for making corresponding
entries on AF Forms 263.
Tool kits brought over by airmen posed another prob-
lem. As destinations were unknown at the station of de-
parture, a plan was devised at Headquarters AMC where-
)y the shipping documents would be forwarded to the
Headquarters 1st ALTF with the consignee space left blank,
"hat Headquarters then had the responsibility of routing
he forms to the appropriate station accountable officer.
Difficulties similar to those cited in preceding para-
raphs were encountered in connection with flying cloth-
ng and equipment brought by individuals. In numerous
nstances it was necessary to return the shipping tickets to
he consignor because the individual had completed his
our and returned to the Zl prior to receipt of those doc-
jments.
During the mass exodus of airmen at the cessation of
Viftles", the matter of transfer of accountability for or-
ganizational-type clothing and equipment taken with the
ndividuals caused difficulties. Although long before the
ermination of the operation a simplified procedure was
ecommended to AMC for approval, no decision was re-
vived prior to the phase-out. Therefore, the transfer of
iccounfabilify was accomplished in accordance with the
tandard procedure prescribed for transfer of memoran
ium-receipt property. Since in no instance was the des-
ination of fhe airmen known, it was necessary to prepare
ndividual shipping documents and route them to the Zl
'orfs of Entry for transmittal to the airmen's destination,
his was accomplished during the inactivation period by
upply personnel.
Shortly after the inception of the Airlift, Unit Property
Records and Equipment Lists (UPREL) were authorized.
Headquarters USAFE requested first priority in the prep-
aration of the form for the property books of the troop
carrier wings. Since the original books had not been re-
ceived before cessation of Airlift operations, only in
isolated cases was it possible to complete book entries;
but in these cases fhe use of fhe UPREL proved invaluable
in the transfer of the organizations to the Zl.
Stock control levels had to be established from issue
data. The firsf group came from Fairfield Air Base and
brought hastily prepared fables, but these were not of
much value as they were based on experience gained
from flights averaging 12 to 16 hours' duration with light
loads. The large number of landings, especially in the case
of the Fassberg- and Celle-based aircraft, outmoded all
previous data, particularly as to brakes, struts, and other
parts of the landing gear. Adequate levels were finally
determined and established. Pending establishment of the
proper levels, the ultra-rapid service rendered by stateside
depots was invaluable and accounted in great part for the
low AOCP (Aircraft out of Commission for Parts) rate
evidenced throughout the operation.
SUPPLY ORGANIZATION
AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY
It was apparent that additional vehicles would be re-
quired in direct proportion to the scale of the Airlift itself.
The initial demand for general purpose and special
purpose vehicles and material-handling equipment was
satisfied by transferring items from other USAFE bases to
Wiesbaden and Rhein/Main Air Bases. As the Airlift ex-
panded, it became necessary to draw on fhe EUCOM
Ordnance Division for major items on a temporary loan
basis.
With the opening of Fassberg and Celle, fhe temporary
loan arrangement with EUCOM was extended, and ship-
ments of vehicles were begun well in advance of fhe ac-
tivation dates of the bases. A total of 958 Ordnance
general purpose vehicles were loaned for the Lift, and
frequent replacements of some types resulted in more
'« ORDNANCE DEPOTS STEPPED UP THE REBUILD OF
PEC M PURPOSE VEHICLES
HtanM
than double this number of vehicles being issued from
EUCOM Ordnance stocks.
During the fall of 1948, the rebuild and rehabilitation
of AF special purpose vehicles was stepped up by Erding
Air Base in its shops at Munich, Bruck, Weinheim, and Ulm
in order to meet fhe rapidly increasing demand for
Cletracs, refueling units, wreckers, and busses. Over 1,000
AF special purpose vehicles, including 206 fuel servicing
trailers, came off fhe production lines at these four shops
during the period 1 July 1948 to 1 July 1949.
With the arrival of the 317th Troop Carrier Wing and
313th Troop Carrier Group and the opening of Celle and
Fassberg RAF Stations, a period of unprecedented vehicle
utilization began. All four Airlift bases operated around
the clock, with many vehicles in service 24 hours daily
The consequent lack of vehicle maintenance made replace-
ment rates high.
The support of the Airlift furnished by EUCOM Ord-
nance and Quartermaster Divisions was superb. Demands
for all types of Ordnance general purpose vehicles were
promptly met. Shipments of spares and tools were ex-
pedited, and a resupply system was set up to handle the
heavy demand for "VDP" (Vehicles Deadlined for Parts)
parts on an emergency basis. Vehicles which had been
reduced to a state of unserviceability by constant use
were removed from bases, and replacements were fur-
nished from Ordnance rebuild shops.
Forklifts and tugs in the hands of Airlift units were
77
given heavy maintenance in depot shops on an exchange
basis. Supply action on parts for field maintenance of ma-
terial handling equipment (MHE) was prompt and com-
plete. At no time was there a critical shortage of any
MHE spares. Thirty Planeloaders received for the Airlift
from AMC were processed, stored, and issued for USAFE
by the Giessen Depot.
Stocks of Air Force Special Purpose (AFSP) vehicles
and spares for their maintenance proved inadequate, and
it became necessary to call on Headquarters AMC for
shipments of refueling units, Planeloaders, crashfire trucks,
and large numbers of replacement parts. Since stocks of
many spares had been depleted in the Zl and no pro-
curement action had been confemplated prior to the Air-
lift demand, supply action was at first very slow, and
vehicle deadline rates were high. However, with the ar-
rival of new major items from the Zl during the winter
and the increased flow of spares, the critical shortage of
AFSP vehicles was relieved. By March 1949 no difficulties
were being experienced in supplying any type of vehicle.
At the phase-out of the operation, vehicles on loan
from the Army were debited against the USAFE credits
set up in Ordnance depots upon the allocation of Army-
Air Force stocks and were shipped to Erding Air Base for
inspection and disposition.
ENGINEER SUPPLY
Increased traffic necessitated construction of new run-
ways at Tempelhof and Tegel Air Base. Since Engineer
Heavy Mechanical Equipment could be moved into the
Berlin area only by air, a crew of mechanics was stationed
at Rhein/Main Air Base to disassemble the equipment and
prepare it for air shipment. C-82's and a C-74 were
used in movement of this equipment, which weighed
approximately 400 tons. In addition to the equipment for
construction, Engineer supplies had to be airlifted, among
them approximately 3,500 tons of pierced steel planking
(PSP) and clips, 1,000 tons of asphalt, and about 500 tons
of assorted Engineer supplies.
The responsibility for repairs and utilities supplies at
Fassberg and Celle RAF Stations was a British function.
However, the British and U. S. Forces have different views
as to repairs and utilities requirements and standards. The
shipment of numerous carloads of Engineer supplies
furnished by the U. S. Air Forces was necessary to meet
the minimum U. S. requirements at those RAF stations.
Two steam-cleaning units for aircraft wash racks were
required at Celle and Fassberg. U.S. personnel constructed
them from available boilers transferred from Army stocks
at Hanau Engineer Base Depot. The improvised steam-
cleaning units worked out very well.
Construction had to be stepped up at Rhein/Main and
Wiesbaden Air Bases to handle in-shipment of supplies
to be flown to Berlin and to provide additional house-
keeping facilities for Airlift personnel. This new construc-
tion required many tons of Engineer construction Ma-
terials, which were procured locally or requested from
Hanau Engineer Base Depot. To expedite the receipt of
supplies from the depot, a liaison team was established
between the Engineer Supply Division, Headquarters
USAFE, the 555th Engineer Regiment at Rhein/Main, and
the Hanau Engineer Base Depot. This team was instrumental
in maintaining a continual flow of the supplies required
for increased construction.
During the Lift, Rhein/Main Air Base received
approximately 25 carloads of Engineer supplies daily. At
times this amount increased to as many as 200 cars of
bulk Engineer items in a day.
During the winter months, snow and ice on runways
became a hazard and threat to the continued operate
of the Airlift; however, sufficient anticipation of condi-
tions allowed supply agencies to requisition and receive
from the Zl 36 tractors and sweepers and 20 snow plows.
This equipment was continually in operation keeping the
runways and taxiways open for fraffic. In late January
heavy fog and mist and the persistant freezing weather
caused the formation of ice on runways and taxiways. To
meet this problem, sand spreaders developed by EUCOM
Engineers were requisitioned by all stations and put into)
immediate use.
From the Engineer supply standpoint, the Airlift be-
came a routine operation following the winter. Engineer^
supply personnel encountered no difficulties in obtaining
requirements. A procedure adopted on 1 April 1949
authorizing local procurement for the purchase of Engineer
supplies was instrumental in saving both time and money.
Upon the phase-out of the operation, disposition of
excesses was made on the spot; this was a routine opera-
tion that was performed smoothly and efficiently within
the time allocated.
THIS TEGEL CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT WAS AIRLIFTED TO
BERLIN.
AIR SUPPLY
All USAFE C-47 aircraft were pooled at Rhein/Main
Sand Wiesbaden Air Bases and utilized during the first
three Airlift months. Spare parts and components were
.available in the command in sufficient quantities to support
?hem adequately. Although no major supply problems
were encountered in their support, there was a tremendous
overnight increase in supply operations.
During this initial period, the equipment and facilities
available within USAFE were being surveyed to de-
termine their adequacy to meet the tonnage target
already established as essential to a minimum-subsistence
Berlin economy. Requirements were established at 225
C-54 aircraft. The first of the C-54-type aircraft arrived in
July 1948 to assist and later to replace the unsuitable
C-47-type aircraft. The change-over was completed three
months later.
All planes sent to the command brought with them the
C-54 Table II supplies necessary to support normal
operations for a period of 30 days. The C-54's were
designed for passenger purposes and for use on long
runs. Consequently, the use of C-54's on short hauls for
sustained operations increased the requirement for main-
tenance supplies. Under the conditions imposed by the
operation, aircraft hardly obtained cruising altitude when
they had to be prepared for landing; the frequency of this
cycle imposed severe loads on the engines.
It was found that aircraft flying an around-the-clock
operation required replacement of numerous parts which
under operating conditions for which the aircraft had been
designed had seldom, if ever, required replacement. These
parts were not available in Germany, nor were they avail-
able in sufficient quantity in the Zl.
The usual Airlift loads — coal, flour, and salt — were
the type which, regardless of how packaged, emanated
a very fine dust that spread throughout the interior of the
aircraft and over its working parts. This dust reacted as
an abrasive on some parts and as a corrosive agent on
others, requiring unforeseen replacements of electronic
equipment, control cables, and electrical wiring which
further aggravated the supply problem.
RHEIN/MAIN BECAME A C-54 PECULIAR SPECIALIZED DEPOT
ACTIVITY.
In the meantime, top USAF supply personnel had
arrived to confer with USAFE personnel and work out
the logistics to solve the supply problems. At this
conference plans were laid that formed the foundation of
a supply system which enabled the C-54 aircraft to keep
an ever-increasing tonnage of food and supplies pouring
into Berlin.
Supply functions at Rhein/Main Air Base were con-
verted to those of a C-54 Peculiar Specialized Depot
Activity. Rhein/Main assumed responsibility for central re-
quisitioning, warehousing, and distribution of all com-
ponents and parts peculiar to the C-54 aircraft. Erding
AB retained its depot responsibilities for all common Air
Force supplies.
To combat the ever-increasing shortage of parts and
supplies, Rhein/Main established a system of daily cable
requisitions to Headquarters AMC. That Headquarters
acted promptly on those messages to expedite air ship-
ment of available items and to obtain items not in stock
by accelerating contract delivery or initiating emergency
procurement action. The requisitions initially covered only
C-54 peculiar items, but were later expanded to include
common items. Quantities requested on items peculiar to
C-54 aircraft represented an estimated 60 days' supply.
Although cable requisitions were given priority over
all others, immediate shipment was not always possible.
This fact further weakened the supply support so essential
to the operation. Limited funds were authorized to
purchase locally from stocks available at the Brussels
branch of the Douglas Aircraft Corporation. This source of
supply proved of benefit in certain individual cases where
an aircraft could be put back in commission through the
purchase of one or two items not immediately obtainable
through USAF stocks.
Building USAFE stockpile for C-54 parts was the next
major supply problem. To transport the parts without
delay, a special ocean shipping service, designated
"MARINEX," was set up. Eventually, stocks began to ac-
cumulate under this plan, and the utilization of costly air
transportation was reduced to emergency items only.
Initially, consumption data on C-54 aircraft items was
not available in the command. Quantities requisitioned on
priority cable requisitions and routine requests were
continually being adjusted to conform to the consumption
and requirement data collected daily. The magnitude and
nature of the operation made the important phase of de-
termining requirements and establishing stock levels a
most difficult task. The gradual increase in the number of
C-54 aircraft assigned to the Lift, from the first 50 in July
1948 to the peak of approximately 230 in December 1948,
necessitated continuous revision of stock levels.
Approximately 160 daily priority supply cables were
dispatched before the position of USAFE stocks was such
that this daily requisition system was no longer required.
Emergency requisitioning was still necessary in many
instances but was handled in the normal prescribed
manner. As requirements arose for new items which had
not previously been used, AMC was so advised with a
request for shipments of specified quantities by air,
"MARINEX," and routine surface to establish a stock
level as soon as possible. The pipeline time for the re-
ceipt of supplies from the Zl improved over a period of
time, and eventually supplies were being received in ap-
proximately one-half the shipping time previously re-
quired.
One of the major high consumption items was the
79
R-2000 engine. Due to the lack ot data on the operational
characteristics ot this engine under "Vittles" conditions,
consumption data could not initially be accurately esti-
mated. Theretore, shipments of engines trom the Zl during
the first few months were not based on actual consump-
tion, and it was difficult to maintain the problem of ade-
quate serviceable stocks on hand in this command. To
overcome this problem a "Weekly Report of R-2000
Engine Status" to Headquarters AMC was inaugurated.
This report afforded information to the AMC Engine Sec-
tion as of 1200 hours each Friday and contained the
following items:
(1) Quantity of R-2000-9 serviceable engines on hand
at end of period.
(2) Quantity of R-2000-9 reparable engines on hand
at end of period.
(3) Quantity of R-2000-1 1 serviceable engines on
hand at end of period.
(4) Quantity of R-2000-1 1 reparable engines on hand
at end of period.
(5) Quantity of R-2000-9 serviceable engines re-
ceived from Zl during period.
(6) Quantity of R-2000-1 1 serviceable engines re-
ceived from Zl during period.
(7) Quantity of R-2000-9 reparable engines returned
to Zl during period, and method of shipment.
(8) Quantity of R-2000-1 1 reparable engines re-
turned to Zl during period, and method of ship-
ment.
(9) Quantity of R-2000-9 engine changes during
period, and average engine hours.
(10) Quantity of R-2000-1 1 engine changes during
period, and average engine hours.
(11) Average daily flying hours per assigned aircraft
during period.
Rhein/Main Air Base, the command C-54 Specialized
Depot Activity, was designated as the only installation
which would receive engines from or ship engines to the
Zl; hence it was the only air base reporting items (5)
through (8) on the report. Daily teletype reports from all
80
NUMBER R-2000 ENGINE CHANGES
150
125
100
75
50
25
1
-
1
1
\
'->
/
4
/
v
R-2000-9
%
•m^
^
^
If
1
\
R-2000
—
sy
N
JJAS0NDJFMAM
J
J
A
S
R-2000-9
4
44
95
68
48
61
70
75
98
87
79
90
121
63
13
R-2000-1 1
18
35
42
68
53
59
54
57
54
76
91
81
1 34
51
23
TOTAL
22
79
137
136
101
120
124
132
152
163
170
171
255
114
36
HOUR
j AVERAGE HOURS AT CHANGE - R-2000 ENGINES
750
625
500
375
250
125
s. I
|
R-2000-9 1
1 }
^- — /— i
J*
X
„--'
~-^
^r*^
■ —
\
•
•
"*•»•
--
-*-
-,
^•~*
/
/
/
/
. . J JAS0NDJFMAU
J
J
A
S
R-2000-9
506
570
722
728
705
611
585
700
649
595
628
682
662
713
400
R-2000-1 1
407
592
637
552
609
577
592
577
518
628
612
592
561
530
568 1
i "Vittles" bases served as a basis for preparation of one
reporf by Headquarters USAFE.
Upon receipt of the report, AMC scheduled automatic
shipments of serviceable engines to USAFE as deemed
appropriate to the weekly consumption and "stock on
hand" data. Air delivery from Mobile, and "MARINEX"
from the New York Port of Embarkation (NYPE), were the
optional shipping routes.
Other information contained in the report enabled
AMC to schedule reparable engines shipped direct by
USAFE to the overhaul depot at San Antonio Air Ma-
teriel Area (SAAMA). During the major portion of
"Vittles", reparable engines were transported by air to
maintain a full pipeline of engines between Europe and
the Zl overhaul depot.
To expedite engine availability, an engine build-up
' line was established at Rhein/Main Air Base. At the height
of the Lift, engines were built-up at the rate of seven to
nine per day. Based on consumption, stock levels of built-
up engines were established at each base and maintained
via priority rail and air shipment from Rhein/Main Air
Base. "Reparables" generated at each base were rushed
to Rhein/Main, where the demountable power plants were
removed prior to shipment of the engines to the Zl.
In addition to the weekly report from USAFE to AMC,
cables were dispatched to USAFE from NYPE and Mobile
Area Materiel Area (MOAMA) indicating quantity, type,
date of departure, and estimated date of arrival of engines
enroute. Based on this information Rhein/Main Air Base
maintained current records of quantities due in and ex-
pedited deliveries from the Bremerhaven Port of Embar-
kation. These procedures proved extremely satisfactory in
eliminating the potential engine supply problem.
During the winter flying season the greatest single de-
terrent to operations was the weather. A large supply of
isopropyl alcohol was required for use in removing the
snow and ice that accumulated on the aircraft surfaces
while the aircraft was on the ground. Monthly require-
ments for the alcohol were forwarded to AMC. That
command initiated immediate procurement action and
expedited automatic shipments of alcohol from early
November through late March.
The F-1 aircraft heater was utilized as a space heater
for maintaining warmth in the individual maintenance
shelters constructed at "Vittles" bases. The procurement
of sufficient heaters for this purpose necessitated with-
drawal from the T/O&E equipment authorization of some
USAFE units not directly supporting the Airlift. Even then
complete requirements were not fulfilled until an
emergency requisition had been forwarded to AMC for
emergency procurement action to obtain the additional
heaters required.
Whereas the F-1 heater was originally intended for
operation of only 3 to 4 hours, its use as a space heater
entailed practically continuous operation. Such usage
shortened its serviceability and necessitated extra repair.
To alleviate this situation, an overhaul line was estab-
lished at the Bruck Air Ordnance Depot (Vehicle Repair
Depot) for processing reparable heaters on a priority
schedule. Stocks of repair parts for Bruck were main-
tained by emergency requisitioning and shipment from
the Zl to Erding Air Base. During the summer months
each base turned in all heaters for reconditioning and
repair. As heaters were returned to serviceability Bruck
transferred fhem to Erding Air Base for stock in anticipa-
tion of future requirements.
Other extremely high consumption items included
C-54 casings and tubes. Again, the impossibility of
estimating reliable requirements was encountered; there-
fore, it was necessary for AMC to arrange for automatic
shipments of these items. In instances where contractor
procurement was effected, direct shipments were made
from the contractors to USAFE.
The ever-increasing number of landings with maximum
loads caused a proportionate increase in the monthly
consumption of casings and tubes. However, the steady
flow of automatic shipments from the Zl enabled USAFE
to provide each base with sufficient stocks to eliminate
the possibility of aircraft becoming grounded for lack of
casings or tubes. Too, these shipments allowed Rhein/
Main Air Base to accumulate sufficient stocks so that in-
coming rubber shipments from Bremerhaven were in
many cases re-routed in carload lots to other Airlift bases.
UNLOADING AN AIR SHIPMENT OF SERVICEABLE ENGINES
FROM MOBILE.
AOCP CONTROL
Of primary importance to all supply personnel engaged
in the support of aircraft is the maintenance of the lowest
possible daily AOCP rate (Aircraft Out of Commission
for Parts). The effect of even one aircraft AOCP can well
be realized when it is considered that the average load
per C-54 aircraft in commission per day was 44 tons.
With the periodic assignment of additional aircraft and
the step-up in operations, the drain on world-wide C-54
stocks was ever-increasing. Aircraft parts and supplies
were consumed at a rate far in excess of the rate at which
they could be procured, brought into USAF supply
channels, and delivered to using installations. Certain high-
consumption items were of a continual "emergency"
nature. It was evident that special supply measures were
necessary to combat the situation.
To meet the problem, an AOCP Control Section in-
cluding both Supply and Maintenance personnel was
organized at Headquarters USAFE. A special technical
supply teletype network of the dual-conference type was
installed. Primary purpose of this net was to provide the
most expeditious method of transmitting supply priority
requisitions and information on the action taken thereon.
The network linked the four operational bases, the Spe-
cialized Depot at Rhein/Main AB, the Erding Air Depot,
and Headquarters USAFE. Headquarters CALTF was later
added. From the information received over the network,
a master AOCP Status Board was maintained showing
each AOCP aircraft, its location, parts causing the AOCP
and the up-to-the-minute action being taken to alleviate it.
A record card was maintained for each item that
caused an AOCP, and as AOCP's occurred, information
was immediately obtained and posted to the card, which
reflected the supply status of the missing item at each
installation.
The accompanying graphs outline the C-54 AOCP
trend during the full Airlift period and a six-month re-
cord of the number of repeat AOCP items by class.
Although the first factor was to satisfy the current I
AOCP demand, it was necessary at the same time to fake
all action possible to eliminate any future AOCP for the
AIRLIFT SUPPLY AND AOCP NETWORK
STATUS OF AIRLIFT C-54 AIRCRAFT
OUT OF COMMISSION FOR MAINTENANCE
PERCENT go r
J J A S NDJFMAMJ J AS
\
/
2GJs[:
10-HOUR INSPECTION
'iESBADEN AB.
OUT OF COMMISSION FOR PARTS
PERCENT 5 r
/
./
/
-V
JJASONDJFMAMJJAS
aaoUj
6.8 [ 1 1.
same item. An analysis of the overall command supply
status determined the course of action to be followed.
Items which were available within the command merely
required expedited shipping action to the requisitioning
activity. In such instances special flights were arranged
if the established air-courier and rail service could not
quickly meet the demand. Stocks of the causal item were
then redistributed proportionate to the number of aircraft
assigned to each base.
Concurrently, Headquarters USAFE maintenance per-
IN COMMISSION
PERCENT | 00
PERCENT
AV. ACFT
66.26 62 36
97.3
sonnel reviewed weekly production schedules estab-
lished at Erding AB and initiated the necessary action to
expedite the repair of items in order of their priority.
Minimum production schedules necessary to eliminate
the item from its critical status were furnished the depot.
As critical items were repaired and returned to service-
able stock, the supply status at each base was surveyed
and distribution instructions were issued. Reparables be-
yond the capabilities of USAFE repair facilities were
shipped by air to Zl repair depots.
OUT OF COMMISSION -TECH ORDER COMPLIANCE
PERCENT
mm
JJASONDJFMAMJJAS
OUT OF COMMISSION -OTHER REASONS
PERCENT
5
4
3
2
I
JJASONDJFMAMJJAS
PERCENT
AV. ACFT
83
ITEMS CAUSING AOCP'S
- NOVEMBER
1948 THRU APRIL 1949
NOV
DECEMBER
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
USAF
PROPERTY
CLASS
NO
ITEMS
AOCP
to
2
Hi
*
Ul
Z
tn
UJ
0-
UJ
cc
>
o
z
_i
g
H
a
*
tn
2
UJ
-i
g
i-
0)
2
Ul
*
UJ
z
tn
UJ
£L
Ul
CE
5
z
in
UJ
0.
UJ
cc
o
Ul
Q
_i
g
H ■
Z
<
->
*
tn
2
UJ
-i
<n
2
UJ
t
UJ
z
ti
Ul
a.
UJ
cc
z
in
UJ
Q.
UJ
(E
O
UJ
o
in
Ul
or
-a
_i
g
t-
ca
Ul
u.
*
2
UJ
H
_l
I
tn
2
Ul
UJ
z
in
UJ
Q-
UJ
CC
tn
UJ
0.
Ul
cc
a
o
to
Ul
cc
z
<
->
tn
UJ
a.
UJ
cc
m
UJ
u.
-i
IS
P
2
V)
2
UJ
H
-1
1
tn
2
UJ
g
UJ
a.
Ul
cc
5
z
UJ
a.
UJ
cc
8
o
to
UJ
a.
Ul
cc
z
tn
Si
UJ
£L
UJ
CC
m
UJ
u.
tn
UJ
a.
Ul
cc
cc
<
2
-1
1
cc
a.
<
*
tn
2
Ul
t
_i
1
Ol-D
88
68
7
75
156
96
14
8
118
252
76
6
8
16
106
328
33
3
4
6
3
49
361
15
3
3
2
1
24
376
02-H
6
1
1
2
7
6
1
7
13
6
1
7
19
4
2
1
1
8
23
5
1
6
28
03 -A
2
2
2
2
4
2
1
3
6
1
1
2
7
7
03- B
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
03-C
12
8
5
13
20
17
4
1
22
37
12
3
1
2
18
49
3
1
4
52
1
1
1
3
52
03-D
2
2
2
1
1
2
3
3
3
3
03-F
3
4
1
5
7
9
1
10
16
10
1
2
13
26
2
1
1
4
28
1
1
28
03-G
7
4
4
1 1
1
1
2
12
12
2
2
4
14
14
03-H
2
3
3
5
5
1
2
8
10
3
1
2
1
7
13
13
1
13
03-1
6
5
3
8
1 1
17
4
2
23
28
3
1
2
7
13
31
4
2
2
8
35
2
1
3
37
03- J
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
04- A
1 1
1 1
1 1
22
18
18
40
21
1
22
61
3
1
1
1
6
64
4
4
68
04-B
5
2
2
5
2
2
5
1
2
3
6
2
2
8
2
1
3
10
04-D
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
05-C
6
2
1
3
8
2
2
4
10
2
2
12
2
2
12
12
05-D
4
4
4
5
2
7
9
3
3
3
9
12
1
1
1
3
13
1
1
2
14
05-F
1
1
I
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
3
05-G
2
1
1
3
4
1
5
7
7
1
8
14
1
1
2
14
14
07
1
1
1
1
08-B
4
4
4
3
1
4
7
1
1
7
7
7
16-A
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
5
5
o
5
16-E
1
1
1
1
1
23-A
1
1
1
1
1
1
29
1
1
1
2
6
6
8
2
2
10
5
5
15
2
2
17
TOTAL
156
119
22
141
275
194
32
17
243
469
150
17
16
34
217
619
66
13
7
II
9
106
685
33
5
4
4
3
50
717
*
REPF
ESENT
S NC
VEM
3ER
TEMS
PLUS |\
IEW ITI
EMS
TOD
ATF
L
Aircraft undergoing reclamation were always checked
lor AOCP parts not otherwise available within the com-
mand. Cannibalization, utilized in many instances to get
another ship back on the Litt, was controlled by a daily re-
port to USAFE trom each base. Headquarters AMC was
continually abreast of the picture on critical items through
requisitioning information sufficient to enable them to ex-
pedite deliveries and to follow up on shipments in process.
Restriction of issues of C-54 parts solely for the Airlift, ex-
cept in emergency cases, aided considerably in removing
many items from the "critical" list.
To review station supply levels and assist base supply
personnel, teams were dispatched to Airlift bases with
itemized lists of critical items and supply statistics ob-
tained from the records maintained at Headquarters
- USAFE. This action was based on the theory that an
AOCP at one air base was always a potential AOCP at
others. The emphasis placed on the elimination of AOCP's
was so great that all supply personnel soon became fully
" AOCP-conscious. "
In an effort to further the efficiency of supply support,
a special monthly C-54 Stock Balance and Consumption
- Report was initiated in March 1949. This report proved
a valuable asset to supply personnel. Analysis of each
month's report furnished statistics which almost dictated
the action necessary to improve the supply status of each
item both at depot and at base level. The information
contained in the report was also utilized to fill AOCP
and ASSOC (priority requisition) requests, to redistribute
theater stocks, to insure that adequate stocks to maintain
theater levels were on hand or due in, to determine repair
priorities, to expedite repair in accordance with stock status
reflected in the report, to maintain follow-up and to ex-
pedite shipment of quantities due in from Zl depots where
warranted, and fo submit emergency request requisitions
where applicable. Review of subsequent reports indicated
for each individual item the degree of improvement since
the last report.
The supply phase-out of the Airlift was accomplished
in accordance with the "Vittles" Phase-out Plan. The
processing of Air Force supplies was accomplished in an
efficient manner by the accountable and Air Force supply
officers at the Airlift stations.
ELECTRONICS
Communication facilities and navigational aids are
two of the essentials of air travel. Without them the Air-
lift would have been impossible.
At the first indication that there would be an Airlift
operation, a communications conference was held at
Headquarters USAFE to consider communication and
navigational aids required for the operation. It was ob-
vious to all concerned that the degree of success or failure
of the operation depended greatly on the expeditious
procurement of electronics equipment and replacement
parts as the requirements arose.
As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the
Theater Supply Disposal Program was nearing completion
when the Airlift began; but large quantities packaged
for over-water shipment were stored at Erding Air Depot
awaiting shipment.
After the initial plans for the Airlift were drawn up
and electronics requirements determined, supplies at
Erding, plus those in the hands of OFLC which had not
been committed, were recalled, unpacked, and re-shelved.
Due to the vast quantity of this equipment an internal
theater electronics supply system was set up, utilizing
equipment on hand. Much of this equipment was in an
unserviceable condition, and the repair requirement at
that time was far greater than the physical capacity of the
depots. Nevertheless, this equipment was the basis of the
operations carried out.
Initial Airlift electronic requirements called for low-
frequency radio beacons for use with the airborne radio
compass, AN/ARN-7. To expedite the installation, a
mobile-type unit consisting of a BC-191 transmitter, RA-34
rectifier, PE-97 power units, and associated equipment
was installed in a 21/2-ton, 6x6 truck with an HO-17 shelter.
This equipment permitted movement of the beacon and
facilitated its being placed into immediate operation.
The BC-191 radio transmitter was not designed for
continuous operation. Since supply levels in the command
had been reduced prior to the Airlift, maintenance for this
equipment was not readily available. The RA-34 equip-
ment continually failed due to faulty selenium rectifiers.
Because of the shortage of keying equipment, only one
keyer could be initially installed with each beacon instal-
lation; any failure in the keying mechanism thereby pre-
cluded beacon identification.
Fortunately, USAFE was eventually able to procure
from depots in the Zl sufficient keyers to make possible
the installation of duplicate keyers at all radio beacons.
In September 1948 the Air Navigation Board decided
to employ T-5 high power beacons to replace the tem-
porary low power BC-191 radio beacon installations. These
were requisitioned in September for the Airlift from the Zl
and through expeditious procurement action the equip-
ment arrived in the command in February 1949. After the
equipment was installed, it was discovered that since it
was designed for high output emission, this type of radio
beacon interfered with various European radio stations
operating in the same frequency, and added to the dif-
ficulties already encountered.
Concurrently with the installation of the radio beacons,
arrangements were made by Headquarters USAFE to ob-
tain visual-aural ranges (VAR) from the Civil Aeronautics
Authority. CAA radar engineers were assigned to the
Airlift to accomplish the installations. One range was air-
lifted to fhe theater, and five others were transported by
"MARINEX." CAA engineers surveyed the sites, com-
pleted installation, and had the first ranges operating in
January 1949. It is interesting to note that USAFE had
difficulty in obtaining parts to maintain this equipment.
The spare parts were peculiar to CAA equipment, and
there were no established Air Force channels through
which these supply and maintenance parts could be ob-
tained.
Fan marker beacons were another problem. They were
not available in the United States and had to be procured
by AMC. However, during the latter part of February
1949 the installation of the first marker beacon was com-
pleted. The equipment for the beacon at Celle arrived
during May. Since plans were then already made for the
phase-out of fhe operation, installation of the Celle beacon
was not completed.
Plans formulated during the fall of 1948 indicated a
requirement for radar navigation equipment consisting of
AN/APS-10 as the airborne radar set and AN/CPN-6 as
the ground radar beacon. Because there were insufficient
AN/APS-10's available, Headquarters USAF decided to
use both AN/APS-10 and AN/APS-4 for airborne radar
sets.
An initial USAFE survey indicated that only a small
percentage of the assigned C-54's had the airborne radar
equipment installed. Consequently, equipment and stock
levels of maintenance parts had to be requisitioned from
A GCA INSTALLATION AN/MPN-1.
the Zl to allow installation on all Airlift C-54's.
After the radar sets began arriving, they were installed
in the C-54 aircraft while aircraft were undergoing main-
tenance. By May 1949 the installation of the airborne
<radar equipment had been completed. The shortage of
spare parts for these sets created great difficulty in their
maintenance. Spare parts for the equipment were not
available in the command, and only limited quantities were
available in the Zl. The radar beacons, AN/CPN-6, were
fortunately found in storage at Burtonwood in November
1948. The original requirement as submitted to DCS/M by
i Headquarters 1st ALTF was for the installation of 12
AN/CPN-6 beacons with three duplicate installations in
Berlin.
With the start of the Airlift, a requirement was
established for duplicate GCA equipment at all Airlift
bases. Available GCA sets within the command were im-
mediately moved to the bases, and the balance required
was requisitioned from the Zl. To satisfy the requirements
'or GCA in Berlin, AMC prepared a GCA set in the Zl for
airlift by C-82 aircraft to Tempelhof. The frailer body was
cut in two pieces prior to air shipment and reassembled
in Tempelhof for movement to Gafow. In addition to the
air transportable set furnished Gatow, an air transportable
GCA AN/CPN-4 was also airlifted from the Zl for use at
Tempelhof.
This new type GCA (AN/CPN-4) was a non-standard
piece of equipment; consequently, the supply of spare
parts was not available within Air Force channels. To
expedite supply directly from the manufacturer, AMC
established a separate supply channel for this item of
equipment. This deviation in supply channels caused
supply personnel many headaches; many of the items be-
came lost enroute, and others were delivered to the wrong
places. Since electronic items are highly technical equip-
ment, when an item of electronic equipment arrived at
an air base, inexperienced supply personnel would often
put it aside and forget it. Tubes and other spare parts
for the AN/CPN-4 were always in critical supply.
All GCA was placed on a 24-hour operation schedule
at the start of the Airlift and continued on that schedule
during the operation. However, the high voltage trans-
former designed for interim operation continually failed
and became a critical item of supply. Every effort was
made to secure this item from the Zl. When that source
failed, local procurement action was initiated. Some of
the transformers were locally rebuilt and others ware
locally manufactured.
In addition to the AN/CPN-4 equipment mentioned
above, an AN/CPS-5 ground approach radar set was air-
lifted from the Zl for operation in Berlin. This new radar
set presented supply difficulties because many of its com-
ponent parts were pre-production models built by com-
mercial laboratories in the Zl. Spare parts were unavail-
able when it arrived for installation in Berlin, and many
of the components were not even listed. Whenever an
item was required, it was necessary to cable the manufac-
turer with a description of the part to insure that he
would ship the correct items to Berlin.
Consumption experience dictated the supply levels to
be established for all electronic equipment. As con-
sumption experience was gained, levels had to be revised
and reset. VHF radio set AN/ARC-3, the airborne 8-channel
set installed in C-54's, presented considerable difficulties
because certain radio tubes for the airborne equipment
had not been engineered tor this type of operation. It
was impossible to keep a sufficient supply on hand; the
tubes were used up as fast as they were received. Quite
as suddenly as they started burning out, these tubes
instead began to enjoy a long life, and excess stocks on
hand became a headache.
GENERAL SUPPLY
The General Supply Division was responsible for de-
termining requirements and coordinating with Headquar-
ters EUCOM for the procurement, storage, maintenance,
and distribution of food and mess equipment, clothing for
personnel flying or serving the Airlift, gasoline for air-
craft and ground vehicles, and the myriads of other quar-
termaster items of individual, organizational, and station
supplies and equipment.
At the time the Airlift started, United States inven-
tories of reserve stocks of aviation fuef were such that
Air Force commanders throughout the world were
furnished allocations on a month-to-month basis. Prior to
the Airlift, Air Materiel Command had budgeted for
aviation petroleum products on the basis of normal flying
hours per aircraft; but with the start of the Lift and the
attendant increase in flying hours per aircraft, a precarious
petroleum supply position developed.
Ships on the high seas carrying cargoes of aviation
gasoline to other destinations were diverted to Bremer-
haven. The U. S. petroleum industry was pressed to the ut-
most to supply from scheduled production the sudden
tremendous demands of the Airlift, the normal demands
of the remainder of the Air Force, and the other military
and civilian commitments. An added problem for the
petroleum industry was the requirement that only
aromatic fuel be used by Airlift planes. The neoprene
gaskets and seals used on aircraft fuel systems caused
leakage and a great hazard to efficient Airlift operations
if exposed alternately to aromatic and nonaromafic fuels.
During the year prior to the start of the Airlift,
USAFE's monthly consumption of aviation gasoline
averaged about 30,000 barrels. In the month of July 1948
approximately 82,500 barrels of aviation fuel were con-
sumed. By January 1949 the monthly consumption had
climbed to 191,000 barrels, and in July 1949 a peak ex-
ceeding 291,000 barrels was reached.
The accompanying chart reveals graphically the quan-
tities of aircraft fuel consumed by USAFE Airlift operations
alone. The cumulative quantity depicted equals the cargoes
of 20 size T-2 tankers, each of which has a capacity of
88
AIRLIFT AVIATION GASOLINE CONSUMPTION
4.2
82.5
133.6
167.8
173.0
134.2
166.2
191.3
176.4
220.1 278.1
272.1
257.2
291.1
92.0
25.1
«.*pp,< AIRLIFT AVIATION
LUBRICANT CONSUMPTION
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
u
' J A *
V"DJFMAMJJA~S
84
1650
2672
3356
3501
2684
3324
3825
3527
4402 5562
5442
5144
5822
1838
500
AIRCRAFT FUEL CAME BY NAVY TANKER FROM THE UNITED
STATES TO BREMERHAVEN.
5,460,000 gallons. To this quantity must be added ap-
proximately another two percent tor the aircraft lubrica-
ting oil shown on the other chart. Additional large quan-
tities of aviation petroleum were consumed throughout
the rest of the world in support of the Berlin Airlift.
In addition to the responsibility of planning increases
in petroleum products, General Supply had to provide
coordination with EUCOM, so that adequate quantities of
food would be in the right places at the right time, and
maintain food service supervision. Supply of subsistence
did not pose any unusual problems; adequate stocks
were always available at quartermaster depots to meet
the increased Airlift food requirements.
In consonance with verbal agreements between BAFO
and USAFE, joint dining facilities for American and
British personnel were established at Celle and Fassberg.
Moss halls in permanent-type buildings built and used
by the German Air Force furnished all dining space re-
quired. However, very little equipment was available; and
before messes could be established, items such as dinner-
ware, glassware, tableware, kitchen utensils, mechanical
equipment, and refrigerators had to be requisitioned from
♦he Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation or direct from
EUCOM Quartermaster Depot stocks.
British and U. S. rations were pooled, and all troops
were fed the combined ration. A number of components
of the British ration, such as herring and tea (in lieu of
coffee) for breakfast, proved unappetizing to the American
palate. Too, the British ration consisted of about 2,600
calories, as compared to about 3,600 calories derived
from the regular field ration "A" fed U.S. airmen.
In order to make up for the caloric deficiency in the
British ration, the American type "A" ration for Celle
and Fassberg was increased 15 percent. A further in-
crease to 25 percent was made in December 1948. How-
ever, after due trial at Fassberg, if was found that an
increase of 15 percent was adequate.
Military personnel were fed mainly on "A" rations
inasmuch as they were preferred by all troops, thus
leaving the British rations for the German employees. As
a result, there was a daily saving to American stocks of
300 German rations. This method of feeding the Germans
also permitted return to the Bremerhaven Port of Em-
barkation of excesses of some components of the type
"A" ration.
The additional Airlift personnel at Wiesbaden Air Base
... AND BY TaNK-CaR, THE FUEL CAME TO AIRLIFT BASES
were easily absorbed, for messing, in the consolidated
dining hall. At Rhein/Main Air Base, however, it was
necessary to expand existing facilities and to improvise
others. At the peak of the operation, messing facilities at
Rhein/Main were severely overtaxed and inadequate. One
of the two flight-line messes was in a building formerly
condemned for a radio shack. The consolidated mess,
built to accomodate 1,500 persons, averaged 4,000 per
meal during the Airlift.
The use of flight-line messes for a special Airlift
operation is recommended. Line messes not only will
prevent disastrous overcrowding of regular messes, but
will save up to an hour for each man who must otherwise
return for his meal to a mess in the vicinity of his barracks.
It will be noted that during an around-the-clock operation
the "dinner" meal should be available at any time during
the day or night.
At Fassberg and Celle, because of the rapidity of
developments, supply personnel were not always among
the first to arrive. Even Wiesbaden and Rhein/Main Air
Bases, which were established installations when the Air-
lift began, experienced such rapid growth that base supply
problems were serious. Entire squadrons arrived by air
89
without quartermaster equipment. Many men came with
summer clothing only. T/O&E and station equipment was
obtained trom quartermaster depot stocks. Quartermaster
items from paper clips to forklitt trucks were supplied, but
each air base had to intorm the supply depot of its re-
quirements. Lack of sufficient trained supply personnel
made almost impossible the maintenance of records on
which requisitions could be predicated. Nevertheless,
adequate quantities of quartermaster supplies were re-
ceived at all Airlift stations.
Following are the tonnages of quartermaster Class II
and IV supplies flown to Berlin to support operations
there during the first six months of the Airlift:
MONTH
July 1948
August 1948
September 1948
October 1948 ...... .
November 1948
December 1948
TONS
7.2
9158
105.97
1057
87.4
81.6
In addition to making plans for quartermaster supplies,
the General Supply Division coordinated with EUCOM in
order that quartermaster services such as laundry, dry
cleaning, and shoe repair might be available. Scrap and
salvage disposal and repair of quartermaster equipment
also were involved. If an air installation had difficulty
rendering any necessary quartermaster service, assistance
was obtained from EUCOM. Such assistance was complete
at Fassberg and Celle. The Bremerhaven Port of Embar-
kation, backed by the Giessen Quartermaster Depot, not
only furnished Celle and Fassberg with dry stores,
perishable foodstuffs, and all other quartermaster supplies,
but also made available the various quartermaster services.
The EUCOM Exchange Service (EES) furnishes all ex-
change facilities throughout the European Command. A
USAFE officer in the General Supply Division maintains
liaison with EES.
In addition to the regular EES snack bars at all EUCOM
stations, additional mobile snack bars were maintained
90
during the operation at all Airlift bases, including Tegel
and Gatow.
The Wefzlar Post Exchange Officer operated exchange
facilities at Celle and Fassberg. The headquarters of EES
assigned that responsibility to the Wefzlar PX since Wetz-
lar Military Post, the northern-most in the U. S. Zone, is
the closest to Celle and Fassberg. The Fassberg and Celle
exchanges were in operation within three weeks after
USAFE made an official request for exchange service.
During the Airlift many exchange articles were in short
supply. This was due to a directive by Headquarters
EUCOM that the exchange system would be financially
solvent by 30 November 1948. In order fo achieve
solvency and reduce inventories, large quantities of sur-
plus stocks were offered to customers at reduced prices
and EES eliminaled or postponed the purchase of suffi-
cient quantities of at least 4,000 "must" and "essential"
items.
All station exchanges received full allocations of avail-
able merchandise except Rhein/Main Air Base. During most
of the Airlift the personnel strength at Rhein/Main was
credited to the Frankfurt Post Exchange, which received a
percentage of merchandise that should have been alloca-
ted to Rhein/Main. Toward the end of the Airlift this matter
was corrected, but not in time to obtain the additional
merchandise in the Rhein/Main store before the Lift ended.
Tempelhof Branch Exchange received only the "must"
and "essential" items during the Airlift because of re-
stricted air cargo shipping space.
EES FURNISHED REFRESHMENT FACILITIES RIGHT ON THE LINE
CONCLUSIONS
Electronics supply personnel should be brought into
the early planning stages to determine availability o'
electronic equipment necessary to perform desired func-
tions.
Duplicate installations should be made for all radio
beacons and ground control approach equipment. There,
should be standby spares provided for control tower
radio. Two sources of power for all installed ground
electronic equipment must be made available to insure
continuous operation.
Authorization for additional vehicles at the same time
as the base or unit is activated will enable expeditious:
issue of vehicles.
The establishment of post exchange facilities should
be concurrent with the movement of personnel into ai
new base.
The utilization of standard items of equipment, wherever
possible, will reduce work load required for requisition-
ing, storage, and issue. An AOCP and VDP staff agency
should be established at Task Force Headquarters for any i
Airlift operation, for the purpose of researching, record- .i
ing, and expediting the supply of parts to reduce VDP's
and AOCP's.
Normal supply channels should be used at all times.
The employment of non-Air Force channels for certain
items of supply has a tendency to confuse, complicate,
and at times to jeopardize operations.
MA/NTENANC
91
MISSION
SOURCES OF MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD
Although USAF allocated 324 C-54 aircraft to the
Airlift and support thereof, statistical records covering the
six peak months of Vittles Operation reveal that an
average of approximately 128 C-54 aircraft were "in
commission" daily. In other words, there were 128 air-
craft actually available io perform the prime mission of
Vittles — that of carrying tonnage into Berlin. The fact
that there were 196 more aircraft allocated than were
available for daily missions was generally lost sight of
in the maze of statistics and analyses of Airlift operations.
What became of these 196 aircraft and why were
they not available for daily utilization? The answer is
MAINTENANCE.
Tech Order No. 00-2A-1 formally defines "maintenance"
as the normal upkeep and preservation of equipment
which may be expected to recur from time to time in
consequence of usage, wear and tear, or deterioration by
the elements. It is further defined by Webster: "To hold
or keep in any condition, especially in a state of effi-
ciency or soundness."
The aircraft engines, accessory equipment, communi-
cations and radar installations, and all the myriad items
that make a C-54 aircraft fly reach a staggering total of
more than a quarter-million pieces or parts that are sub-
ject to wear and tear and, consequently, must be
maintained — if not in perfect order, at least in such con-
dition as to insure complete safety for the aircraft, its crew,
and its cargo. It was, therefore, the mission of the
Maintenance Directorate at USAFE Headquarters and
maintenance organizations at all lower echelons to or-
ganize, obtain necessary personnel and equipment, and
utilize every resource to insure adequate maintenance
support of the aircraft flying the Airlift. Similar maintenance
support had to be provided also for some 1,600 vehicles
and 500 items of powered ground equipment used in Air-
lift base functions and radio and radar installations both
in aircraft and on the ground.
THE LOAD AND APPROACH MADE FOR HARD LANDINGS
AND OVERSHOOTING OF RUNWAYS.
GROUND TRAI
EXCESSIVE ENGINE GROUND TIME CAUSED OVERHEATIr
Aircraft Utilization. The Airlift maintained an un
precedented utilization of 8 to 10 hours per day pe.
assigned aircraft. This utilization imposed a tremendou
load on maintenance as well as creating new problem;
peculiar to the locale and nature of the mission. Becaust!
it was possible to establish bases within a few hundrec
miles of Berlin, landings far exceeded the number o-
landings normally expected in an air transport operation!
Statistics indicated that while accumulating 586,901 flyinc
hours, 379,926 landings were made. Half of these landings
were made with a gross weight of approximately 68,000
pounds — much higher than the normal allowable landing!
gross weight. GCA weather landings and the glide angle
approach at Tempelhof Air Base were responsible for
many hard landings and overshooting of runways. All ofl
these factors increased maintenance workloads immeasur-i
ably.
Loading and Unloading. While close control of
cargo loading was exercised and every possible precau-
tion was taken to avoid damage to aircraft, the lack of
adequate cargo loading equipment and the speed of the
operation inevitably caused considerable damage to doors
and door jambs. The use of tiedown rods, stringers, and;
steel cable for securing cargo also resulted in damage;
to floors which had been originally installed primarily for
passenger carriers.
Ground Operation of Aircraft. To prevent delayed take-:
offs, an unusual condition arose involving excessive engine
ground time. There were often from five to nine aircraft
waiting take-off af the end of the runways, and statistics
show that the ground idling time averaged approximately!
30 minutes per trip. Excessive ground time increased the
maintenance work load by subjecting seals, gaskefs, and l
ignition wiring to excessive heating which resulted in their
deterioration and breakdown. Excessive ground time con-
tributed to engine failures, as did the nature of the shorH
haul operation. The latter required the use of high manifoldi
pressure and R.P.M. a much greater percentage of time|
than in a normal C-54 operation.
92
OUST DETERIORATED C
Cargo. The two principal types of cargo — coal and
"flour — caused unusual maintenance problems since the
dust generated by them was extremely difficult to remove.
Coal dust had an abrasive effect on control cables and
caused corrosion on electrical contacts, particularly in
cannon plugs on the radio wiring.
Ground Handling of Aircraft. The most prevalent type
of Airlift mishap was the taxiing accident, which accounted
for 34 percent of the total, or 43 out of 1 26 total accidents.
Inadequacy of airport facilities and heavy airdrome traffic,
both aircraft and vehicular, were predominant factors.
Causes of many headaches for maintenance personnel
were the instances where inexperienced crews with in-
adequate equipment attempted to tow aircraft, subjecting
the aircraft to unusual and unnecessary stresses and strains.
Unusual Vehicle Support Requirements. Many of
the problems that plagued aircraft maintenance per-
sonnel were also present in the operation of automotive
and ground-powered equipment. An abnormally high
percentage of vehicles had to be assigned on regular
24-hour dispatch to meet the requirements of using
organizations. This resulted in an almost complete lack
'of preventive maintenance and increased shop loads
correspondingly. Shortages of equipment, trained per-
sonnel, and adequate facilities paralleled those in aircraft
maintenance.
PERCENT
I00
PERCENT OF FLYING HOURS GENERATED
tHOURS IN COMMISSION VS HOURS ASSIGNED)
HOURS FLOWN
TOTAL HOURS IN COMV
\/^-\
// \
//
HOURS FLOWN
y
,--*> \
\ \
\ \
TOTAL HOURS ASGO
1 >
/
\ \
V \
J
s
C
u
9
% OF IN COMM
TIME FLOWN
%0F ASGD
TIME FLOWN
93
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION
Maintenance functions of a base and a group are very
closely allied and so interrelated that the over-all control
and direction should be under one authority. By having
a central control in one place, such as in the office of
the Director of Supply and Maintenance, over-all schedul-
ing of maintenance, inspections, engine changes, facilities,
and supplies dan be controlled in a much more efficient
manner. This organizational structure was attempted at
one Airlift base, but because of lack of qualified personnel,
proper planning and execution, the program foundered,
and maintenance reverted back to the squadron system.
It is recommended that maintenance organizational struc-
ture be designed to fit the mission. Such planning will
result in increasing efficiency and immeasurably easing
the execution of duties of maintenance personnel.
Generally, Airlift maintenance followed accepted Air
Force patterns. However, wing maintenance officers,
supposedly operating in a policy and staff capacity under
the wing-base plan, frequently found it necessary to take
command action as this was the first level where all
maintenance functions were centralized.
Maintenance Control. The heart of the maintenance
management element, carried through all echelons from
squadron to Task Force Headquarters level, was Main-
tenance Control. It was essential that precise scheduling be
organized, and, because of the urgency of the operation,
be followed accurately and adjusted as necessary on an
MAINTENANCE CONTROL INCREASED EFFICIENCY.
hour-to-hour basis. A standard system of control boards
was established and maintained at squadron, group, and
higher levels using color codes that indicated at a glance
the status of every airplane in the squadron or group and,
on the master control board in Task Force Headquarters,
the status of every aircraft in the fleet. The code used-
follows:
White Aircraft is operational. (Aircraft in com-,
mission)
Red Scheduled maintenance. (Squadron,
routine inspections, Tech Order com-
pliances)
Green Unscheduled maintenance. (Squadron,
breakdowns, engine failures)
Yellow .... In base shops for maintenance. (Third'
and fourth echelon maintenance)
Blue In 200-hour inspection. (Burtonwood) :
Black Aircraft AOCP (grounded for parts).
To maintain the control board at Task Force Headquarters, ■
NUMBER
C-54 200 HOUR
INSPECTIONS
250
200
150
100
50
•*,_
^^
^
y
*—,+''
\ \
|REQUIRED|
\
.../""
^
v^7
\ \
\ \
X
t+*
s*\
| ACTUAL |
*—
\
%
\
\
/
\~
%
i
I
BURTONWOOD AFD
18
u
49
J
57
F
85
M
177
A
209
M
258
J
244
j
256
A
134
CELLE RAF STA
8
II
5
2
FASSBERG RAF STA
9
9
5
2
2
3
7
OBERPFAFFENH'N AFD
43
108 I 137
45
RHEIN/MAIN AB
24
47
70
25
27
21
5
20
WIESBADEN AB
6
16
15
3
4
5
8
TOTAL INSPECTIONS
43
108
137
102
121
155
126
215
240
270
251
268
1765"
94
direct telephone connections were established with main-
tenance control offices at all bases, and the status of each
aircraft was phoned in hourly.
From the hourly information gained from the master
control board, it was possible to schedule aircraft to Bur-
tonwood for 200-hour inspection, to the Zl for 1,000-hour
cycled reconditioning, and to direct inter-group and inter-
squadron transfers of aircraft as required. If was also
possible to maintain comparisons between squadrons, to
uncover unsatisfactory conditions which arose within the
groups, and to eliminate or prevent other difficulties.
Concerned primarily with over-all efficiency in scheduling
aircraft through necessary maintenance, maintenance con-
trol was highly effective in reducing loss factors in the Air-
lift operation.
Personnel. Airlift experience, confirmed by a com-
prehensive study by manpower boards from Washington
and USAFE, indicated a squadron personnel requirement
of 15 maintenance family-group personnel per assigned
aircraft (19, if 200-hour inspections are performed by
squadrons). That number of personnel with balanced MOS's
should under most operating conditions permit a utiliza-
tion of 8 and possibly 10 hours per day per assigned
aircraft. Establishing the requirements was not a particularly
difficult problem, but obtaining well-trained, experienced
personnel and retaining them imposed a burden on
maintenance officials that should be avoided at all costs.
A definite tour of duty and a careful screening of per-
sonnel prior to assignment are mandatory. If sufficient
qualified maintenance personnel cannot be obtained, and
such was the case at the start of the Airlift, a comprehen-
sive on-the-job training program is a necessity.
It was proved beyond a doubt that inexperienced
personnel sometimes doubled and even tripled the time
required for the most elementary maintenance operation.
Many valuable flying hours were lost because personnel
were not sufficiently familiar with equipment to locate
sources of trouble and to take corrective action. This con-
dition was also responsible for increased requirements for
spare parts, as items removed without just cause entered
a long and costly pipeline before ultimately being re-
turned to serviceable stocks.
It was not until the final months of Airlift operation that
personnel became sufficiently stabilized and trained to
perform adequate and satisfactory maintenance on C-54
aircraft; but when this happy stage was reached, a definite
improvement was immediately discernible in the accom-
plishment of the primary Airlift mission. During April, May,
June, and July 1949, tonnage averaged better than 190,000
tons per month. This was 60,000 tons a month higher than
the average for the previous four months, although the
number of aircraft available remained approximately the
same.
Because of the personnel deficiencies noted above, it
became necessary to recruit and utilize German nationals.
At the peak of operation, approximately 80 German
mechanics were assigned to each Air Force squadron. Be-
cause these mechanics had no prior experience with C-54
aircraft, an extensive training program was required, and
it became necessary also to overcome the language
barrier. As a result, a translation section was organized by
the USAFE Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, and bi-
lingual inspection check lists were prepared and furnished
all activities utilizing German nationals. Ultimately, techni-
cal references such as the C-54 Tech Order, Maintenance
Hand Book, and AN-1-40NM-2 were similarly translated.
Provided with classroom teaching, OJT on the Airlift, and
technical publications in their own language, Germans
soon became extremely valuable. Their use was dem-
onstrated to be fully practical, and their contribution
was of major assistance to the maintenance program.
In order to handle the volume of engine and aircraft
technical problems, one Pratt and Whitney and two
Douglas Aircraft technical representatives were assigned
to the Aircraft Maintenance Section of Headquarters
USAFE for duty.
95
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
Scheduled Maintenance. With aircraft flying 24 hours
a day 7 days a week, the maintenance program in
support of Vittles required a 168-hour work week and in-
volved first a series of scheduled inspections, and then im-
mediate corrective action when these inspections revealed
defects or potential failures.
Each day every aircraft flying the Airlift was given a
pre-flight check. This check included such items as measure-
ment of fuel after a run-up, cockpit inspection, inspection
of fluids and pressures, hydraulics, landing gear, power
plants and nacelles, electrical system, internal and external
fuselage, wings, control surface and empennage, and radio
and radar inspection. In addition each aircraft was provid-
ed with turn-around maintenance, at which time crews
took care of deficiencies noted by pilots, and routine
maintenance servicing each time a plane landed.
Supplementing the daily pre-flight and turn-around
inspections, more detailed and comprehensive inspections
were performed at 50-hour intervals. Thus there was a
definite periodic cycle of inspections, identified as First
Intermediate Inspection (50 hours), Second Intermediate
Inspection (100 hours), Third Intermediate Inspection (150
hours), and Burtonwood Inspection (200 hours). After each
aircraft had gone through four such cycles and became
due for the fifth, it was returned to the Zl for cycled re-
conditioning (1,000-hour inspection) by contractors' facili-
ties located in New York, Texas, and California.
The above brief explanation of the inspection cycle,
with the accompanying graphic illustration, shows that to
keep 128 aircraft flying every day there were 196 ad-
ditional aircraft either undergoing maintenance or enroute
to and from facilities where major maintenance could be
performed.
Governing directives are considered adequate for
normal transport operations, but it is apparent from this
analysis that it was necessary to tailor Airlift inspections
C-54 AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO Zl FOR CYCLIC RECONDITIONING
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
/T
SCHEDULED
27
30
40
41
50
53
47
53
60
60
54
59
19
50
ACTUAL
1 1
1 1
30
16
24
36
51
45
60
60
52
42
84
50
CUMULATIVE
II
22
52
68
92
128
179
224
284
344
396
438
522
572
to fit the operation.
There was considerable discussion as to the merits oi
performing 200-hour inspection at Burtonwood, England;
but from the standpoint of maintenance, it was a wise ano
essential policy determination. In a high pressure operation
where continual emphasis is being placed on higher and
higher utilization, the group commander is inevitably
forced into at least a partial neglect of maintenance. The I
performance of 200-hour inspections at another base undes
another command solved this problem, and insured thai
at least every 200 hours aircraft were given a thorough
inspection and necessary repairs by an organization that
was not under the same pressure as was the commandei
at the home station of the aircraft. The same principle
applied to the 1,000-hour cycled reconditioning, and the <
general consensus of opinion among Airlift personnel at
the conclusion of the operation was that C-54 aircraft were
in far better mechanical condition at phase-out than they
had been on entry into the operation.
Unscheduled Maintenance. Significant conditions pe-t
culiar to the Airlift operation, which are briefly indicated
in the early part of this chapter, led to abnormally high
consumption of tires, brake discs, and other brake and
landing gear parts. The high rate of consumption foE
hours flown was reflected in the maintenance effort re-i
quired to repair, assemble, ^and install brakes, mounf newi
tires on wheels, and make very thorough inspections ol
landing gears. Airlift statistics indicate that the main cause
of unscheduled maintenance was fuel leaks. These resulted
from hard landings and from flying through air whose
turbulence caused seams and inspection plates to open
Resealing of fuel tanks consumed approximately 56 per-
cent of field maintenance support.
In an effort to obtain closer control on scheduled ana
unscheduled maintenance, maintenance personnel devised
a form entitled "CALTF Form 10 (C-54 Maintenance Re-
cord)." Groups were required to accomplish one of these
forms for each aircraft assigned during any one month and
to record thereon in the standard color code the portior
of each day, broken down to quarter-hour intervals, thai
96
V
— * BERLIN ; '
>,
NSPECTION CYCLE
324
AIRCRAFT
ALLOCATED BY USAF
TO AIRLIFT AND SUPPORT
I *
•?
28
AIRCRAFT
97
MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS OF C-54 AIRCRAFT
MARCH THRU JULY 1949
60™ TROOP CARRIER GROUP 6l*r TROOP CARRIER GROUP 513th TROOP CARRIER GROUP 313" TROOP CARRIER GROUP 317" TROOP CARRIER GROUP
PERCENT PERCENT
MAR APR MAY JUN JUL TARGET MAR APR MAY JUN JUL TARGET MAR APR MAY JUN JUL TARGET MAR APR MAY JUN JUL TARGET MAR APR MAY JUN JUL TARGET
the particular aircraft was in any of the following ca-
tegories:
In Commission
Unscheduled Maintenance
Major Maintenance (Burtonwood)
Scheduled Maintenance
In Base Shops
AOCP
These forms were accumulated by groups and forwarded
at the end of each month to Headquarters 1st ALTF where
they were summarized, analyzed, and charted. Copies of
the summary charts similar to that accompanying, showing
a comparison of groups and the month-by-month picture
within each group, were furnished group commanders. The
latter were thus kept informed not only of the progress of
their own groups but of the fleet average.
An arbitrary target of 72 percent of assigned aircraft
"In Commission" was set by Headquarters CALTF. While
this target was never quite reached, the five months'
OVERALL
MAR
APR
AOCP
IN SHOPS
SCHEDULED MAINT.
JUN JUL TARGET
lllllllll MAJOR MAINT. (BURTONWOOD)
Ev3 UNSCHEDULED MAINT.
[~~"1 IN COMMISSION
NOTE:
The charts on this page are samples of the
monthly studies made by Headquarters CALTF
and distributed to Airlift wings. Computations are
based on a local form, CALTF 10 (C-54). AF Form
1 10 figures reflect a slightly lower percent in com-
mission.
summary illustrated shows that in July 1949 the average
number of aircraft in commission for the fleet did reach
65 percent of those assigned. The summary chart also re-
flects a slight but consistent improvement in the over-all
maintenance picture. From a management viewpoint, the
CALTF Form 10 and subsequent analysis charts were con-
sidered well worth the time and effort devoted fo their
preparation and analysis.
98
THE ENGINE BUILD-UP LINE AT RHEIN MAIN REDUCED THE
CRITICAL ENGINE SHORTAGE
AIRCRAFT ENGINE MAINTENANCE
Engine Build-up. At the outset ot the Airlitt, engines
were so critically short that they had to be airlifted from
the Zl to Rhein/Main, at which point an engine build-up
production line was established. The supply of R-2000
engines fluctuated throughout the Airlift, but it was still a
source of considerable concern up to and including the
final month of operation. It was evident early in the
operation that although engine build-up is normally a
squadron or organizational maintenance function, the ra-
pidity with which engines were being changed and the
limited spare parts available for build-up made mandatory
a change in normal procedures.
One of the soundest policy decisions of the entire Air-
lift was made when if was decided to establish a central
engine build-up line at Rhein/Main. This line handled
engine build-up and tear-down for the entire operation,
me system used was a production-line method, using five
work stations with a sixth station for inspection. Starting
with a raw engine, specific parts and accessories were
added at each work station by a crew of specialists who
averaged approximately 19 hours elapsed time per engine
Juild-up. Supporting the operation was a completely
-quipped machine shop, a sheet metal shop, a wood
working shop, and electrical and accessories shops. The
engine tear-down line followed a similar work station pat-
em. Three men were able to disassemble an engine
n approximately three hours.
Engine Conditioning. The acute shortage of R-2000
type engines made it necessary to take every possible
measure to conserve those on hand, and under the super-
vision of Headquarters USAFE an engine conditioning pro-
gram was established with assistance from specialists sent
to Europe from AMC. Two classes in engine conditioning
were conducted — one at Erding Air Depot and one at
Rhein/Main. An engineering officer and two highly quali-
fied enlisted men in every squadron in the theater were
trained in each phase of engine conditioning as outlined
in T. O. 02A-1-88.
It was originally planned that personnel thus trained be
used as a nucleus in each squadron and that they in turn
could pass on instructions to other flying and maintenance
personnel of their respective squadrons. Pressure of the
operation, rapid turnover of personnel, a shortage of
cylinders, and lack of such equipment as Magic Wands for
determining cold cylinders, fop center indicators, and com-
pression gauges seriously retarded the desired engine
conditioning program.
Engine Overhaul. Engine overhaul was handled in
the same manner as was aircraft overhaul; and im-
mediately upon removal of an engine for either time
or failure, it was shipped to SAAMA for standard air
depot overhauling. When shipped by air, it took ap-
proximately five weeks to get an engine from Rhein
Main to the overhaul facilities at San Antonio, com-
pletely re-built, and returned to this theater
Spark Plug Troubles. From disassembly reports, it
was determined that 35 percent of engine failures ex-
perienced resulted from combustion chamber failures, 19
percent resulted from hydraulicing (a liquid lock caused
by collection of gasoline in the combustion chamber)
and the remainder were materiel failures of bearings, studs,
etc. Of the 35 percent of combustion chamber failures, a
majority were attributed to malfunctioning spark plugs.
To eliminate spark plug failures, extreme care was ex-
ercised in their handling and inspection, and various types
of plugs were tried. The Airlift ended before definite
factual data was obtained on the value of the various-type
plugs used, but based on Navy experience and opinions
from squadron engineering officers, it was generally
agreed that the platinum electrode type RB-19-2 spark
plug was considerably superior to the LS-88 or LS-87
type plug, for the air operation being performed.
I
MALf-UNCTIONING SPARK PLUGS CAUSED MOST COMBUSTION
CHAMBER FAILURI
99
DEPOT MAINTENANCE - AIRCRAFT
At the beginning ot the Lift, 200-hour inspections
were performed at Oberpfaffenhofen, an air depot located
in Bavaria approximately 200 miles south of Frankfurt. In
November 1948, 200-hour inspections were transferred to
Burtonwood Air Base, England, which operated under
control of the 3rd Air Division. With the phasing-out of
Oberpfaffenhofen, Erding Air Depot remained the only
depot in Continental Europe to provide logistical support
for the Lift.
Normally engaged in maintenance work and production
to keep the regular planes and bases of USAFE operating,
Erding was given an additional workload with the advent of
the Airlift. Airlift maintenance, of course, had 1-A priority,
and Erding's accomplishments contributed in a great
measure to the success of the Airlift operation. The types
of maintenance for which Erding shops were responsible
included: welding, woodmill, blacksmith, foundry, plugs,
repair of C-54 hydraulic mechanism, and repair and bal-
ancing of propellers. In addition, electrical shops repaired
and returned to serviceability aircraft generators, fuel
pumps, and solenoids; and carburetor and instrument shops
repaired gyro instruments, flight indicators, and automatic
pilot devices.
In addition to the normal depot functions at Erding,
the analytical laboratory analyzed contaminated hydraulic
fluid, strengths of metal found to be failing in performance,
and corrosion problems both on aircraft and materiel. On
many occasions it was possible to make such analyses
locally instead of using the time-consuming shipment of
samples to Headquarters AMC and awaiting the resulting
report.
HO
IBS
REPAIR OF DAMAGED AIRCRAFT AT ERDING
1 0, 000
5,000
f
MAN-HOURS
EXPENDED
\ /
AV. MAN-HOURS
»ER AIRCRAFT
~jt
X*:_.
01
J
j * * o n u j a m~ j ;; A '
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT BY TYPE
C-54
NO'VlTTLES"
2
3
4
2
4
1
3
3
2
4
I
C-82
AIRCRAFT REPAIRED
1
1
C-97
AT ERDING PRIOR
TO
1
C-47
| NOV
EMBE
R
1
.... AND CALIBRATION AND REPAIR OF AIRCRAFT |
INSTRUMENTS.
100
ER
Dir
sIG
A
IR
B
AS
E
AIRLIFT MAINTE
MANUFACTURE & REPAIR
NA
NC
;e
s
UP
PO
|RT
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AU6U9T
SEPTEMBER
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
ITEM3
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENOED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS
EX-
PENDED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS
EX-
PENDED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS
EX-
PENDED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS
EX-
PENDED
ITEMS
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS
EX-
PENDED
FABRICATION SECTION
MACHINE SHOP
1609
328
1 3
24
300
66
310
222
1
388
46
317
26
160
17 1
762
14
30
8
SO
1
68
43
9
SHEET METAL SHOP
1 4
244
1 2
799
38
3 1
1273
390
1
3
8
320
206
1741
SI
1033
31
690
31
1 193
6
SI6
WELDING SHOP
10
143
50
1 6
8
260
310
779
300 1
701
34
90
7
19
1
6
WOOOMILL
1
62
2
77
i 14
1667
10
128 1
4
64
PAINT, DOPE & FABRIC
e i
13 39
9
1125
6
990
8
1 191
14
1840
8
97 1
13
1676
17
1 ISO
1 1
362
3
327
4
76
4
27 3
PLEXIGLASS SHOP
so
80
TANK & RADIATOR
1 03
379
27
87
57
408
28
1306
12
136
264
646
13
65
96
1169
46
22 6
SHOPS SECTION
ELECTRICAL SHOP
94
688
132
1216
ESc
1162
161
1746
ISO
120 1
477
3264
693
4762
494
4834
766
2866
493
3946
241
2173
29
304
266
1775
SPARK PLUG SHOP
3000
282
20000
249 1
16300
2190
38000
6359
337 2
4626
40000
4130
69133
6813
366 00
6239
291 10
2673
I0O40
1307
PROPELLER SHOP
10 1
1439
73
251
29
31 18
33
13 1 9
66
787
22 6
1733
184
2536
306
2636
42
100 1
106
1182
62
2102
3t
607
3166
1347
40
188
HYDRAULIC SHOP
17
1 14
194
1023
21 1
E? i
80
380
2080
3303
273
1397
70 1
2313
441
188 1
346
1209
266
1361
232
1497
110
360
302
1356
34
106
BATTERY SHOP
36
82
FABRIC a LEATHER SECTION
PARACHUTE SHOP
S3
61 1
34
1 1 2
203
907
3028
2016
63
202
60
29S
ASSOCIATED EOUIPMENT SECTION
INSTRUMENT a BOMBSIGHT SHOP
292
348
IBS
962
642
2028
56
274
831
2900
1022
4334
1319
5366
914
2793
13
492 6
330
3661
392
5469
III
427
369
3131
100
1507
SUPERCHARGER & CARBURETOR SHOP
32
263
40
73 2
31
723
17
239
39
1390
338
699
82
1862
29
379
61
1317
31
1100
43
1064
83
356
93
1086
T
148
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AIRBORNE EOUIPMENT RADIO, RADAR
10
120
38
392
7
177
976
4878
B
16
98
107
39
29 6
467
1474
62
449
GRD. COMM. R6R, GCA; VHF/DF
16
279
3
179
1
300
199
700
4
17
1
273
299
1 114
1 1
73
31
33 3
3
176
1
22
TOTAL
2348
6019
796
6BSS
4852
10237
264 7
9103
26804
18623
22969
2399 9
62024
284C4
3624}
21109
4I303\ 19462
71136
21176
37867
19332
349
3336
33 SI 7 1 12106
10241 [ 3426
VEHICLE REPAIR
PERSONNEL CARRIER, LIGHT STANDARD
PERSONNEL CARRIER .MEDIUM STANDARD
TRUCK 1/4 TON 4X4 C&R
TRUCK 3/4 TON VARIOUS TYPES
TRUCK I 1/2 TON VARIOUS TYPES
TRUCK 2 1/2 TON VARIOUS TYPES
TRUCK 4-5 TON VARIOUS TYPES
TRUCK FIRE, CLASS 153
TRUCK 6 TON VARIOUS TYPES
TRUCK 7 1/2 TON VARIOUS TYPES
TRUCK 10 TON VARIOUS TYPES
[.CRANES VARIOUS TYPES
| TRACTOR, CRAWLER-VARIOUS
I TRAILERS VARIOUS TYPES
MATERIAL HANDLING EOUIPMENT
GROUND POWER EQUIPMENT
RADAR SCREEN
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
' 3348 I 44 I 8979
NO. M/HRS.
PRO- I EX-
CESSEDIPENDED
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS NO M/HRS
EX- I PRO- I EX-
PENDED CESSED PENDEO
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS
EX-
PENDED
M/HRS NO
EX- PRO-
PENDED CESSED
M/HRS.
EX-
PENDED
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS
EX-
PENDED
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS
EX-
PENOEO
9169 37 I 3032 I
23 I 4666 '< 37 6361 27
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS
EX-
PENOCO
PRO-
CESSED
M/HRS
EX-
PENOCO
PRO
CE39E0
M/MUS
EX-
PENDED
101
SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT
While personnel problems were acute in the early
stages of the Airlift, the lack of special tools and equip-
ment was crilical. Hastily thrown together, temporary
maintenance docks were constructed of wood on dirt
foundations and were poorly lighted and inadequately
heated. Attempts to use this makeshift equipment, while
not primarily responsible, were considered to have con-
tributed to the loss through fire of four aircraft undergoing
maintenance. Lack of proper light and heat lowered both
the efficiency and the morale of maintenance personnel.
Toward the end of the Lift, plans had been made calling
for masonry docks on concrete floors, and some portable
steel work docks had been locally manufactured. These
docks, equipped with adequate firefighfing equipment,
vapor-proof lighting, and adequate heating, are considered
a "must" for the maintenance of any large aircraft.
The lack of washing and cleaning facilities increased
maintenance problems on aircraft which carried coal and
flour as principal cargo. Planes soon became filthy from
coal dust and flour that filtered through floors into lower
compartments. While the maintenance problems thus
I 04BUE
MmL^ia-j*!
Pk*fTl
i 1
^^w~T^^
'W'
i -it? i
1 ! !
*4jim
i r^'\
; . -t
+i* .*
~* I ■
1 ffi
j4#« - j
- 1 !
. b
w .
,
■tW
PORARY MAINTENANC
GEROUS.
:e docks
WERE INAD
EQUATE ANDjttj
1 ° an
^^^^™
■
102jB|
-
created were also related to the sealing of the cargo com-
partment, the lack of adequate vacuum cleaners and
portable washing equipment had serious results and made
exacting inspections almost impossible.
The winterization of Airlift aircraft did not require as
extensive winterization equipment as was required in T. O.
00-60B-1 for arctic operation. Germany is in the same lat-
itude as the Hudson Bay region, but the climafe is mod-
erated by other factors. The winter of 1948 was unusually
mild and could be compared with winter operations in
Washington, D. C.
There were only about 20 sets of wing covers avail-
able for the entire fleet of 225 C-54's. AMC did not have
sufficient quantities and was acting through procurement
to obtain them, but it was spring by the time they arrived
in Germany. In lieu of wing covers, various substitutes
were tried without success. Quartermaster burial paper was,
tried, but it would not stay on the wings and was very
difficult to use. QM tarpaulins were shaped in six sections'
to fit the wings and horizontal stabilizer. They were not
used because of their bulk, and analysis disclosed that they '
had a copper oxide impregnate that was highly corrosive
to wing surfaces.
The main method of removing ice, frost, and snow Was.'
with house brooms and isopropyl alcohol. Some organi- (
zations tried such various mixtures as kerosene and i
hydraulic fluid. Regulations were issued prohibiting this
practice, as these oils were injurious to de-icer boots, and
made the wings dangerously slippery for maintenance
personnel and servicing crews. Quartermaster decontam-
ination units were used to spray isopropyl on the wings.
This procedure was fairly successful but consumed large
quantifies of isopropyl.
A jet de-icer unit was mounted on the back of a 6x6
truck at right angles to the chassis and operated at 40 per-
cent power 40 feet from the aircraft. The heat generated
at this power was sufficient to warm the wing surfaces
enough to remove light ice and frost. Only one of these
units was tried. It was used at Tempelhof for approximately
10 hours. Although this unit was operated for only a short
period, it indicated that a jet engine has promising possi-
bilities for removal of ice and frost from aircraft surfaces.
It was a common misconception that this jet unit was
used for removal of ice and snow from runways. The unit
was unsuifed for such use because of its weight and
horizontal mounting and was never used for that purpose.
On the northern zone fields, the removal of snow was ac-
complished by the engineers with mechanical equipment.
At the southern bases the small amount of snow that fell
melted after a few hours. However, because of icing con-
ditions, sand was often needed to provide fraction on
runways and taxi strips.
SERVICE TESTS
After most of the original operating, maintenance, and
supply problems had been solved and the Airlift became
what was sometimes referred to as a "routine operation,"
it became a proving ground for a series of service tests
of various aircraft and items of equipment. Service tests
were run on a Douglas C-74 aircraft; on a Boeing C-97
aircraft; and on the Fairchild C-82 aircraft, which, in-
cidentally, was also used throughout most of the Lift for
carrying unusually bulky cargo. Because of the limited
duration of .the service tests on these aircraft and because
of the inadequacy of logistical support, the results of the
tests were not considered at all conclusive, although many
valuable lessons were learned in connection with the use
of each aircraft in the Airlift.
Other tests included a C-54 stripping program, the
purpose of which was to increase the payload by re-
moving from the aircraft everything except essential
equipment; a cockpit instrument panel standardization
program; and a tire usage study directed by Headquarters
AMC. As was the case with the aircraft mentioned above,
much valuable data was obtained and submitted to higher
headquarters for analysis
GLOBEMASTE*
VALUABLE LESSONS WERE LEARNED FROM SERVICE TESTS
WITH THE C-97A STRATOFREIGHTER
103
STATISTICAL REPORTS
When it was realized that operations might continue
indefinitely, a reporting system was established and per-
manent statistical records and graphic charts were initiated
and maintained for the duration of the Lift. The main-
tenance statistics thus gathered proved extremely valuable
management tools. Utilized to spot unsatisfactory condi-
tions and trends as they developed, they permitted prompt
remedial action.
Data was obtained and charts were maintained daily
on the following:
(1) Aircraft in Commission (showing aircraft allocated,
aircraft assigned, aircraft in commission, and per-
centage of assigned aircraft in commission).
(2) Percentage of aircraft in commission by groups.
(3) Number and percentage of aircraft undergoing
200-hour inspection.
(4) Percentage of aircraft in scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance by groups.
(5) Times at which R-2000-9 engines failed (per
engine).
(6*) Times at which R-2000-9 engines were changed for
time (per engine).
(7) Times at which R-2000-1 1 engines failed (per
engine).
(8) Times at which R-2000-1 1 engines were changed
for time (per engine).
Summary Charts:
(1) Daily Airlift engine hours (showing monthly aver-
ages and 90-day forecast).
(2) Percentage of failures at indicated hours (per 100
engines).
(3) Engine changes by group by month (indicating the
number of changes of each type of engine for
failure and the time and total changes for each
group each month).
MOTORIZED EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE
Automotive Activities. One of the unspectacular but
none the less important supporting factors of the Air-
lift was the operation and maintenance of approximately
1,600 vehicles and 500 items of powered ground equip-
ment used in Airlift base functions.
This equipment, plus personnel to operate and maintain
it, mushroomed into being during the early months of
Airlift development. In most instances it was not possible
to wait to train operators or to have maintenance fully
organized. The equipment had to be put info service at
once. As a result, maintenance and supply activities started
out with a deficit and were continually faced with an in-
creasing workload as more equipment arrived.
The success attained in providing and maintaining
transportation for the Airlift speaks highly of the effort put
forth by motor pool, maintenance, and supply personnel.
Only through hard work on the part of everyone was it
possible to organize and develop the automotive opera-
tions along effective lines and at the same time to meet
the almost impossible transportation requirements the
concurrently existed.
Facilities. With the exception of Fassberg, all of rhi
Airlift bases had usable motor pool and maintenanc
facilities. Wiesbaden and Rhein/Main were most fortunal
in that both bases had completed a reorganization of thei
motor pools and maintenance shops prior to Lift operations j
so that only minor changes were necessary to handle thi
expansion required. Celle RAF Station also had usablt |
facilities although the motor pool and shops had to b<
organized and fully equipped after the site was selected^
At Fassberg the facilities available for motor pool anr
maintenance shops were inadequate. The size and physica;
arrangement of buildings precluded efficient operationl ( |
This was an important factor contributing to the extremt j
difficulty of operating and maintaining automotive equip-, '
ment at that base.
Utilization of Equipment. One transportation problem .
was that of trying, through improved utilization, ic
meet requirements without additional equipment which E(
would require more personnel, more supplies, and more
maintenance. In some instances 90 percent of certain types
of vehicles were on regular daily dispatch; this left only
10 percent available for maintenance. In such a situation
either the transportation could not be furnished to every-
one, or scheduled maintenance could not be performed on
all vehicles. The problem was never completely solved
although improvement was effected as experience was
gained and the operation became more stabilized.
Personnel. It was extremely difficult to find fully
qualified personnel for the motor pool and maintenance
shops. In the majority of cases personnel assigned as
drivers had not had adequate prior training, and because
of their other duties it was not possible to give them the
instructions normally considered necessary. At one of the
bases approximately 10,000 operators' permits were issued
during the Lift. This requirement arose through the turn-
over in personnel and the necessity for three-shift
operation.
104
I During early stages on the Lift there was an acute
shortage ot personnel. For a time maintenance personnel
at Wiesbaden AB worked eight hours as mechanics and
the following eight as drivers. All of the bases used Ger-
man mechanics to supplement the military personnel in the
rl maintenance shops. Approximately 50 percent of the
automotive mechanics were German nationals.
Maintenance Services. The greatest difficulty in maintain-
ing automotive equipment was that of getting vehicles
to the shop for scheduled preventive maintenance
services. Because of the high proportion of vehicles
assigned on regular daily dispatch, it was usually im-
possible to provide substitutes while an assigned vehicle
was in the shop; consequently, the sections having
vehicles assigned were unwilling or unable to spare their
vehicles for the time required to perform maintenance. In
many cases sections would release a vehicle for main-
VEHICLE MAINTENANCE STATUS
PERCENT DESIRED VS ACTUAL AT ONE AIRLIFT BASE
SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
LEGEND
^ DESIRED
E2 ACTUAL
MONTHLY ':\ WEEKLY
UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
tenance only when it was actually broken down and
unable to operate.
Vehicles on 24-hour dispatch for use on three shifts
usually resulted in arrival of the vehicle at the dispatcher's
office once a day, when the driver turned in the old trip
ticket for the new one. As a result, little or no supervision
could be given driver maintenance. At one base where
a check was made, 15 percent of the vehicles were re-
ceiving weekly maintenance services and 40 percent were
receiving monthly services. Although at first this permitted
greater operational time, the long-range result was vehicle
maintenance for unscheduled repairs that could have been
prevented by scheduled preventive services. Within a few
months this delinquency resulted in an abnormal loss of
operational time and a requirement for heavier echelons
of maintenance and consumption of parts which was dis-
proportionately large.
The accompanying chart is a graphic illustration of the
status of maintenance observed at the Airlift base
described above.
Depot Maintenance. An important factor in equip-
ping the bases and maintaining the equipment was the
orogram initiated by Headquarters USAFE in December
1947 to arrange contracts with certain existing German
plants for rebuilding Air Force vehicles and motorized
equipment. Four plants were in operation when the Lift
started. They were able to supply many of the require-
ments for Air Force special purpose vehicles and powered
ground equipment, including Clefracs, fuel servicing units,
power plants, and self-contained heating units.
During the peak of operations approximately 2,000
Germans were employed at the four plants working on
Air Force scheduled equipment. Certain sections of the
plants worked around the clock to complete emergency
requirements, among them the F-1 heaters so urgently
needed to heat the aircraft maintenance nose docks dur-
ing the winter months.
Phase-out of Automotive Operations. Prior to the
phase-out of the Airlift detailed plans had been prepared
as to turn-in and disposition of equipment. As the bases
prepared vehicles and motorized equipment for turn-in,
representatives of Erding Air Base inspected the equip-
ment prior to its shipment to the depot. Surveys were
required where necessary; and in this connection, it was
found that all bases had an accumulation of uninitiated or
incompleted surveys requiring last-minute attention.
Equipment delivered to Erding Air Base was further
inspected and classified as to whether it should go directly
to storage, receive further field maintenance, or be re-
turned to Ordnance depots for rebuild. The plan for
inspection by Erding Depot personnel proved to be highly
satisfactory, and it was possible to evacuate vehicular
equipment at each base within the specified time limit of
approximately one month from the day phase-out at that
base began.
£— m GERMAN PLANTS REBUILT NUMEROUS AIR FORCE SPEC"
_%J PURPOSE VEHICLES
105
ELECTRONICS AND COMMUNICATIONS MAINTENANCE
Mission. The assigned mission of fhis activity was
to provide and maintain, on a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week
basis, sufficient and adequate electronics maintenance
for all USAFE electronics equipment employed directly,
indirectly, or in conjunction with air navigational aids
and communications facilities. In order to accomplish
this mission, the following facts had to be considered:
The electronics equipment available was mostly war-
time equipment which had been in storage, since the end
of hostilities.
The personnel that were in the theater would have to
suffice until augmented by arrivals from Zl.
Aircraft to be utilized consisted mostly of C-47's, with
the possibility of C-54's and/or C-82's becoming available
at a future date.
Duration of the operation was unknown.
Availability of additional specialized equipment and
personnel from the Zl was unknown.
General Situation. At the beginning of the Airlift, no
firm staff plan based on facts could be prepared since the
sole assumption was that the mission would be accom-
plished. To further complicate fhe problem of providing
electronics maintenance support, the following general
situation existed:
Aircraft in USAFE were not equipped with a standard
radio and radar installation.
Electronics maintenance shops (organizational and
field) established in accordance with the wing base plan
were in the implementing stage.
Officers in charge of USAFE radio and radar shops
lacked operating and managing experience.
All USAFE electronic shops were, and continued to be,
short-handed; and, of those technicians available, an
evaluation (roughly estimated) pointed to the fact that
their training left much to be desired.
The major percentage of electronics equipment avail-
able in stock had not been fungi-and moisture-proofed,
and had been in outdoor storage since the end of the war.
The original boxes, in nearly every case, had been opened
for classification.
Radio compass screen rooms were not installed in any
of the shops, and satisfactory instruments did not exist to
calibrate the aircraft installed compasses. Test instruments
and hand tools were not adequate and in most cases were
unavailable. Those instruments which were on hand were
of doubtful accuracy and condition.
Spare parts used with electronic devices at base level
were non-existent and, in the case of depot stocks, were
critically short or unserviceable.
Before the commencement of the Airlift in June 1948,
USAFE electronics activities had been stretched to fhe
limit by other unanticipated strategic requirements.
Organization. Aircraft stored at Oberpfaffenhofen and
Erding were in a very bad electronic condition. They
needed new cables, racks, and components thereof; in
short, a retrofit, or major replacement program, for all
radio equipment was necessary, requiring an estimated
3,000 manhours per aircraft. The fact that by July 1948
there were 108 C-47 aircraft assigned to the Airlift in-
dicates the extent of demands upon electronics and com-
munications activities.
It was necessary to "borrow" personnel to augment
Airlift shops from Erding, Oberpfaffenhofen, Furstenfeld-
bruck, and Neubiberg. Wiesbaden Air Base had no elec-
tronics field maintenance facilities of any kind. Tempelhof
in theory needed no large facilities since unserviceable
equipment was to be returned to Rhein/Main. The elec-
tronics maintenance staff believed, however, that an air-
craft grounded at Tempelhof without radio service would
be delayed in refurning to Rhein/Main or Wiesbaden if
a replacement serviceable radio had to come from one of
those bases. The impossibility of flying a 20-mile-wide
corridor without radio aids in IFR weather was apparent,
since this would constitute a potential hazard to all air-
craft in the corridor. Therefore a single consolidated shop
was established to fake care of the organizational and field
maintenance needs at Tempelhof, wiih orders to concen-
trate heavily on replacement of apparatus only.
In the beginning it was necessary to fly replacement
apparatus to the Tempelhof shops and to evacuate unser-
viceable components. This was without question un-
economical, since incoming Airlift space was wasted; and
the futility of flying extra radios 300 miles to replace a
tube or a 10-cent resistor was apparent. The Tempelhof
shop later expanded to the extent of having "ready teams"
available at Gatow and Tegel to repair radio failures ex-
perienced by planes arriving at those bases.
Rhein/Main Air Base had the most difficult airborne
electronics maintenance mission since thoughout the
operation more diverse missions and responsibilities were
assigned to that base. Rhein/Main, for example, initially
had to take care of all ouf-of-service radios from Tempel-
hof; and, at a later date, Fassberg and Celle evacuated
their equipment to the field shops of Rhein/Main during
the time their shops were being established. In addition,
Rhein/Main was used as a terminal for material coming
from the Zl, and the many aircraft used on that run ob-
tained radio service for their equipment from the Rhein/
Main shops.
Operations. By 1 August 1948 the trickle of incoming
maintenance personnel had increased to a small flow, but
the new personnel were arriving without hand fools.
While personnel and equipment were arriving in in-
creasing numbers, the demand for new nav-aids, tele-
phones, radios, and radar equipment was increasing at a
much higher rate. Any increase in flying operational de-
mands invariably results in establishment of large complex
telecommunication nets. Men and materiel had to be
provided to install, operate, and maintain these nets.
With the activation of Headquarters 1st ALTF, much
of the staff load was removed from the Electronics Main-
tenance Section of USAFE. It was apparent, however, that
although Headquarters 1st ALTF had an Electronics
Maintenance Section, the critical personnel situation at
base shops would not be changed. The equipment situation
was partially relieved by the arrival of spare parts from
the Zl. Records indicate that the electronics shops of
USAFE had to effect approximately 50 AN ARC-3 ret-
rofit installations in Airlift C-54's which had arrived without
eight-channel equipment installed. Every shop and
organization was provided spare components for mock-
ups and replacement purposes from the USAFE retrofit
stocks. This meant that the equipment was denied other
tactical aircraft of USAFE. It was absolutely necessary to
have eight-channel VHF in Airlift aircraft. In fact, by the
end of the operation a project to "double" the channels
by the addition of another VHF radio had become
necessary.
By October 1948 the operation had somewhat sta-
bilized, permitting shops to commence planning for a
"long pull." It was still evident fhat test equipment, hand
tools, and mock-ups were inadequate at all echelons; and
a concentrated effort was made to standardize all shops,
both organizational and field, to a bare operating-mini-
mum equipment level.
During this same period great pressure was put on
"cleaning up" the C-54 radio and radar shortcomings.
However, this proved difficult because of the almost con-
tinuous operation of each aircraft.
If first was noticed in October that the seepage of
hydraulic fluid, coal, and flour was causing considerable
damage to the radio and radar equipment. By the end of
the Airlift many C-54 aircraft were in need of complete
electrical re-cabling.
From October to the end of the Lift, electronics
maintenance was plagued with serious operational pro-
blems due to tool shortage, test equipment shortage, spare
parts shortage, and most important, an ever-short supply
of trained personnel. This lack of training of maintenance
personnel was partially relieved by the assignment of
Philco technical representatives to the various shops and
organizations. Their services would have been unneces-
sary, had the level of training of the military technicians
been equivalent to that of the late war; however, under
existing circumstances the mission of maintenance could
not have been performed without them.
Additional Electronics Missions. Little has been said
in regard to the Navigation Aids - GCA, ILS, beacons,
etc. — since this equipment was primarily the assigned
responsibility of AACS for installation, operation, and
field maintenance. However, 50 percent of all work
in the depot area was devoted to assisting AACS in the
performance of their mission. This work in general paral-
leled that of the USAFE air maintenance shops, but was
mainly performed by personnel of mobile depot teams. An
organization such as the 1 1th Communications Maintenance
Organization, due to the high mobility and equipment
provided by their T/O&E (1-1010), was the one type which
could be used to "fill a gap" on an overnight basis. While
the primary mission of these teams is maintenance, fhe
MOCK-UP AND TEST EQUIPMENT WERE INADEQUATE AT
ALL ECHELONS.
A SHORTAGE OF ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE PUBLICATIONS
" m EXISTED.
thousands of supply items delivered by them contributed
materially in keeping the navigation aids and communi-
cations devices operating. Due to the acute shortage ot
spare parts for power units, it was necessary in 187 re-
corded cases for a team to deliver a power unit from the
depot, effect an installation, pick up the old unit, and re-
turn it to the depot rebuild plant for manufacturing of the
parts and repair. The situation on power units was so
desperate that at times there was no apparent source of
units for the next week's demands. On one occasion,
power units of 3,000 pounds were airlifted from the Zl.
Evaluation of Operations. During the course of the Air-
lift every available man, tool, and instrument was utilized
to the utmost. Two factors permitted the accomplishment
of the mission of electronics maintenance.
The factor of "over-design" built into every American
radar and radio was one. The ability of the USAF equip-
ment to take abuse day after day with low-caliber mainte-
nance was a "plus" factor which kept the requirements of
repair to a minimum and permitted a few men to do a
big job.
The other factor was relatively mild temperatures ex-
perienced in Europe during the winter of 1948. The
absence of heavy snow, ice, and freezing cold permitted
108
a high productive level of maintenance. Fortunately, all
electronics maintenance work at air bases and at beacon
and radio stations was possible in indoor areas.
Comments and Suggestions. The electronics mainte-
nance personnel available, both officer and enlisted, were
not up to standard. Few officers of MOS 4415 or 4402
were experienced in shop organization or management.
No officers assigned were in possession of engineering
degrees. Enlisted personnel in most cases were new to
electronics maintenance or had a low experience level.
The shortage of test apparatus, tools, and mock-ups
was an ever-present problem. At the end of the Airlift
these shortages still prevailed and continued to be a
source of unsatisfactory electronics maintenance. One of
the most difficult problems encountered was the repair and
calibration of electronics instruments. This work required
skilled technicians and "secondary standards" which were
not available in USAFE, since wing-type depots had no
provisions in their T/O&E's for this type of work. Tactical
overseas depots must be provided with an electronics
instrument repair shop, since the test equipment used to
calibrate all electronics devices used by the Air Force is
dependent on these instruments for their accuracy.
The shortage of spare parts during the Airlift was a
problem of great magnitude, flhMHHHIHIHfcHfcThis
was due to many factors, among which were failure of
maintenance and supply personnel to comply with AF
Manual 67-1 ; lack of understanding of Technical Orders of
the 00-30A Series; unusually high attrition rates due to
increased hours of operation during the Airlift and to the
"seepage" of the material into the electronic equipment;
and lack of AF stock numbers on many parts used in air-
borne equipment, most parts used in ground equipment,
and all parts used in preproduction models.
Shortages were experienced in Technical Orders, TM's,
and maintenance publications of all types. TOC's and
MWO's were not complied with because of non-receipt
of publications. Standard publications had to be obtained
by air mail from the Air Materiel Command and in
numerous instances were reproduced locally in order to
meet the operational needs of electronics shops throughout
the command.
THE AN/CPS-5 (PART OF WHICH IS PICTURED) WAS
DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO BERLIN BY AIR.
Deviation from Standard Procedures. The occasioffl
necessity of "jumping channels" to provide special equip-/
ment in the course of a new type operation is recognized
It is nevertheless believed that more time was lost and
confusion caused by going out of channels than il
established channels had been used. For example:
The AN/CPS-5 was delivered direct to Berlin by aiifl
is not generally known that this set was short much of Ihfcj:
equipment needed to operate an effective control center,"
and that the tower plotting equipment and telephone;
switchboard had to be provided from the theater AH
depot. The resupply of items to maintain this set in
operation was rendered extremely difficult because alP
shipping documents and stock lists were lost.
The AN/CPN-4 and the Visual Aural Range weffl
delivered in a similar manner, and the logistical support
mission was extremely difficult because of many loffl
documents and supplies.
The introduction of new equipment into a theatj
should be primarily a depot responsibility during the eai
phases, in order to permit computation of requirements
before the equipment is installed. The depot is the solej
organization with sufficient logistical personnel to meet al|
requirements of installing new equipment and compufiffl
requirements.
AIR INSTALLATIONS
m
^i.
ft
■«a
tf&
•L^
^1
GENERAL
The Air Engineer, as a staff officer, was responsible for
the normal staff functions pertaining to repairs and utilities
and new construction at USAFE air bases. At no installation
was the organization of the installations office set up in
contemplation of large-scale emergency construction.
Rhein/Main, which was the major civil air terminal in
Germany, had been built principally by USAFE, and its
meager facilities were already badly overloaded. This base
was known to those familiar with it as "Rhein-Mud." The
pseudonym was not inapt. Wiesbaden Air Base was a
former Luftwaffe fighter base and was in use for USAFE
Headquarters administrative flying. Minimum facilities and
utilities were existent. Tempelhof Air Base had one re-
cently completed pierced steel planking (PSP) runway and
a confusion of badly bombed facilities. It was then in use
by one flight of a special missions group flying OMGUS
personnel.
The requirements immediately imposed by the Airlift for
numerous construction jobs, each a "priority one" project,
necessitated overall augmentation of personnel strength in
all categories. The main difficulty encountered, a shortage
of certain specialists, was largely obviated by use of Ger-
man skilled workers and technicians.
The problems encountered were, of course, manifold.
The urgent necessity for new construction resulted,
through sheer lack of manpower and equipment, in a
tendency to neglect the also urgent necessity for main-
tenance of existing facilities. Shortages of general classes of
materials and specific critical items made necessary many
expedients and substitutions not acceptable under ordinary
conditions.
The housing situation presented an extremely trouble-
some problem. Existing buildings at all bases were reno-
vated as rapidly as scarcity of materials and shortage of
manpower permitted. No space was overlooked from attic
to basement. Winterized tents, Nissen huts, and wooden
prefabricated huts were utilized to the extent of availabili-
ty. The whole problem was further complicated due to the
highly inadequate existing sanitary facilities. Construction
of adequate military housing accomodations was given the
highest priority, and this work was pushed to the fullest
extent possible. Projects were also initiated for additional
dependent housing in Wiesbaden, Rhein/Main, Celle,
and Fassberg. These difficulties, and many more, were
eventually resolved; and as all of the airfields available to
USAFE both in Berlin and in the American zone of Ger*
many were inadequate, large scale, rapid construction was
undertaken. The principal projects, together with per*
tinent data, are as follows:
TEMPELHOF
Tempelhof Air Base in Berlin — initially the terminal
for all USAFE planes — originally had a single PSP rurr-
way 6,150'x150', with dispersed hardstands for tactical type
aircraft, necessary connecting taxiways, and an apron of
concrete block construction. The Lift tonnage requirements
made it readily apparent that additional facilities were
required.
Accordingly, there was designed and constructed an
Tempelhof, parallel to the existing runway, a new south
runway of 18" compacted brick rubble, 5,750'x140' wilfri
PSP and PAP (pierced aluminum planking) surface over
asphalt. An additional runway, of similar construction but
with a heavier asphalt surface and without PSP, was con-j
strucfed to the north of the existing runway. All of this wait
performed without interference to the operation; and con-
currently, intensive maintenance was performed on fhe
original runway. Requirements were as follows.
South Runway:
Excavafion
Flexible base
Topping stone
Asphalt . .
PSP and PAP
North Runway:
Excavation
Flexible base
Topping stone
Asphalt . .
60,000 cy (cubic yards)
45,000 cy
10,000 cy
275,000 gal
800,000 sq. ft.
95,000 cy
100,000 cy
16,000 cy
450,000 gal
Manhours expended 540,000
Cost 3,030,000 DM (Deutsche Marks)
ASPHALT FOR TOPPING .
TEGEL
A site in the French Sector of Berlin on a loam Wehr-
macht tank training area, now known as "Tegel Airfield,"
was selected for a new airfield on 5 August 1948. Com-
pletion in six months was the target set. The first plane
landed at Tegel three months after the first bulldozer
moved in, and the field was operational one month later.
During the above period of four months, the follow-
ing construction was accomplished:
5,500'x15O' of 18" compact brick rubble, asphalt surface.
1,120,000 sq. ft. of apron, 6,020' taxiways, 50' to 100' in
width, all of similar construction. 3,200' of 40' access road
and 1,200' of 20' access road were constructed, as well as
2,750' of access railroad. In addition were constructed an
THE BUILDING OF AN AIRFIELD - THE STORY OF TEGEL:
,;•"
|H . . . . BREAKING GROUND (NOTE THE NUMBER OF WOMEN
. SPREADING RUBBLE FOR THE RUNWAY BASE
I
administration and operations building, a control tower
with complete facilities, a fire station, an infirmary, a
transportation building, and GCA hardstands and facilities.
Runway and taxiway requirements were as follows:
Excavation . .
Flexible base . .
Topping stone . .
Asphalt ....
Manhours expended
Cost
1,225,000 cy
250,000 cy
30,000 cy
900,000 gal
9,029,560
17,879,218 DM (Deutsche Marks)
In addition to the above, a second runway capable of
supporting C-74's was later constructed at Tegel at a more
leisurely pace.
. . . IN FULL OPERATION . * MONTHS AFTER BEGINNIN
*ND 7 MONTHS AHEAD OF SCHEDULE.
. . GRADING AND TERMINAL CONSTRUCTION . . ,
RHEIN/MAIN AIR BASE
There existed at Rhein/Main one 8" concrete runway
6,000'x150' with dispersed hardstand for tactical type air-
craft. It was urgently necessary to expand the meager
facilities as rapidly as possible, with all construction suited
to the design requirements of C-54 type aircraft. The
following construction projects were initiated and pushed
to an early completion:
PSP hardstand - 850,000 sq. ft.
20' graveled roads - 19,900'.
PSP parking aprons - 330,980'.
50' PSP taxiway - 4,638'.
Central aircraft loading ramp - 1,250,000 sq.ft.
CONSTRUCTION AT RHEIN/MAIN AB.
WIESBADEN AIR BASE
When operation opened from Wiesbaden Air Base
there was in existence a single 8" concrete runway
5,500'x120', with similar hardstands and taxiways. The
following construction was accomplished at this base dur-
ing simultaneous construction at other bases:
Runway extension 1,500'x120' - 8" concrete.
37' additional hardstands - 5,620,220 sq. ft.
PSP aprons - 593,300 sq. ft.
50' concrete taxiway - 2,435'.
40' PSP taxiway - 1,586'.
120' PSP overrun - 2,000'.
25' concrete access road - 4,760'.
CELLE AND FASSBERG
Fassberg had a new concrete runway, 6,000'x150', and
the facilities there were expanded by the provision of a
loading apron, 1,500,000 sq. ft. in area. This work involved
the excavation and movement of 41,000 cu. yds. of dirt,
the application of 70,000 tons of gravel, and the placing i
of 120,000 panels of PSP. At Celle the following facilities ,
were constructed in approximately three months' time: i
5,400'x150' runway with a Telford base, asphalt surfaced; :
1,980,999 sq. ft. of PSP-covered loading apron; and 9,500' I
x50' of PSP-covered taxiway. This involved the excavation i
and movement of 99,000 cu. yds. of dirt, placing and
compaction of 177,000 tons of stone, and the application of :
520,000 gallons of asphalt. Intensive maintenance of exist-
ing facilities, construction of additional quarters, expansion
of water, sewage and electrical facilities, additional tech-
nical facilities, flood lighting, etc., is not included in the
list of major projects at any of the USAFE bases.
ASSBERG LOADING AND PARKING AREA
112
APPROACH LIGHTING
It was soon apparent that, in order to maintain constant
deliveries of adequate tonnage into the blockaded sector,
}\ would be necessary to supplement existing GCA
equipment with additional landing aids, the most important
of which was the installation of high intensify approach
and runway lights. Conferences between appropriate Head-
quarters 1st ALTF and installations officers established the
priority and importance of installation as Tempelhof,
Rhein/Main, Tegel, Fassberg, Celle, Wiesbaden, Gafow,
and Burtonwood, in that order. A fable of the conse-
quent construction projects follows.
AIR BASE AND TYPE
EQUIPMENT
Tempelhof Air Base:
D-2 Approach Lights
Krypton Flash Beacons
Center Runway
South Runway
Rhein/Main Air Base:
D - 2 Approach Lights
Krypton Flash Beacons
Tegel Air Base :
D-2 Approach Lights
North Runway
South Runway
Krypton Flash Beacons
North Runway
South Runway
Fassberg RAF Station :
•D-2 Approach Lights
Wiesbaden Air Base:
D-2 Approach Lights
Krypton Flash Beacons
Burtonwood Air Base:
D - 2 Approach Lights
Construction by British; supplies
and technical advice by U. S.
INSTALLATION
BEGAN FINISHED
28 Oct 48
1 Apr 49
1 Jun 49
27 Nov 48
2 Mar 48
21 Dec 48
7 Jul 49
4 Mar 49
7 Jul 49
22 Dec 48
1 Mar 49
15 Apr 49
1 Aug 49
1 Apr 49
28 Apr 49
30 Jun 49
29 Jan 49
15 Apr 49
13 Mar 49
1 Sep 49
30 Apr 49
1 Sep 49
1 Mar 49
9 Apr 49
4 May 49
15 Nov 49
Note:
Celle and Gatow RAF Stations were installed with British
Calvert Bar System Approach Lights.
Runways at ALTF bases were all equipped with D-1
runway lights. They proved highly satisfactory.
GENERAL COMMENT ON LIGHTING
It is generally conceded that the installation of high
intensity D-2 approach lights in conjunction with GCA was
an invaluable aid in accomplishing landings under adverse
conditions.
All towers for high intensity D-2 approach lights were
fabricated from PSP landing mat and have proved highly
satisfactory.
Some trouble was encountered in the regulation of
intensity of approach lights, as there was no provision for
control from the lower; rather, control was manual by reg-
ulation of the generator voltage in accordance with
instructions from tower operators. Quite frequently con-
fusion resulted when German generator operators mis-
interpreted lower instructions.
A unique construction problem was encountered in the
installation of towers for the D-2 approach lights at Tem-
pelhof Air Base, as it was necessary to make practically the
entire installation in a cemetery Since the outermost towers
were approximately 70 feet in height, the removal of
several bodies was necessary to get adequate depth for
footage. To avoid grave stones, trees, and shrubbery, it
was also necessary to dig cable trenches in a zigzag
manner This slowed construction somewhat, but all
problems were satisfactorily solved
CONCLUSIONS
The only material available in Berlin for construction
of base courses for runways was brick rubble There was
no experience background for use of this material, and soil
testing kits were not available, but it was found that pro-
perly compacted and surfaced with asphalt and PSP, the
rubble gave excellent results When sufficient asphalt be-
came available for laying an adequate asphalt surface
course, it became possible to eliminate the PSP
Engineering heavy equipment was disassembled and
loaded in planes for air shipment to Berlin largely in ac-
cordance with the package breakdown given in TB (Tech-
nical Bulletin) Eng 33B There were, however, several im-
113
portant exceptions. Fewer cuts and rewelds than indicated
in TB 33B were necessary, as outlined below:
(1) Rock crusher jaw assemblies were disassembled
when shipped by C-54 but were left intact when
shipped in C-74's. This constituted a great saving
in time and manpower.
(2) When C-82 aircraft were available, the tandem
drives (together with the transmission and final
drive) on Gallion graders could be left intact.
(3) Large items such as grader chassis and crushing
and screening plant frames were loaded into the
C-74 without cutting. However, these items proved
much too heavy for the elevator equipment, with
resultant damage to component elevator parts.
(4) There was one important exception to cutting pro-
cedures described in TB 33B. All cuts across box-
girder sections were straight on the sides and
V-shaped on top and bottom instead of straight
cuts all around as shown in the TB. The V-cuts
eliminated the need for using templates or center
punch measurements for alignment during re-
assembly and made it possible to align all welds
using nothing more than a carpenter's square and
spacing bars of 3/8" steel rods. Much time and
labor was saved by this method.
(5) The C-82 was extremely useful due to the open-
end fuselage, which during this operation was
used with the rear doors removed. Large items
could thus be loaded with a minimum of dis-
assembly. The five-ton maximum pay load was,
however, a definite disadvantage. The average
loading time and capacity of each type of aircraft
in moving heavy Engineer equipment to Berlin
were:
AIRCRAFT
AVERAGES
LOADING TIME
TONNAGE
C-47
C-54
C 74
C-82
2 hours
2Vi "
2'A "
T-Y* "
3
9
19
5
There was a tremendous necessity for rapid expansion
of facilities and utilities of all types — cargo storage, roads,
ramps, wash racks, water, sewage, electric power, Av-gas
storage, maintenance docks, etc. Each presented problems
of an individual nature; however, from an engineering
viewpoint these problems were not new, and no new
methods of a helpful nature were developed. It is noted
that temporary nose docks of wood construction were
proved unsatisfactory. If at all possible, masonry or steel
framework docks should be used.
Approximately 81 flights from Rhein/Main to Berlin were
made by C-97 and C-74 aircraft. These flights terminated
at Gatow and Tegel. In addition, from two to four flights
a week were made by C-74's and C-97's from Rhein/Main
to Westover. The runway at Tegel, designed for C-74's,
was not damaged by the use of these aircraft. However,
the result of using aircraft heavier than those for which
other runways were designed was nearly disastrous. Within
four or five weeks the concrete runway at Gatow was so
broken and damaged that it was temporarily out of use.
This runway was closed and a four-inch asphalfic concrete
overlay was applied. Through intensive maintenance, il
was possible to keep the runway at Rhein/Main open fo
traffic; however, the deterioration was so marked that
construction of an additional runway designed for the
heaviest existing types of aircraft became necessary. J
Construction was started in July 1949 and was completed
in November.
Phasing-out presented no particular difficulties of aj
engineering nature. Runway and field lighting was
moved from some of the Airlift bases which were not in
the U. S. zone. Several construction projects designed ex-
clusively for Airlift needs were cancelled. The second'
runway at Rhein/Main was continued because the need
for it was not dependent upon the Airlift.
On the whole, problems encountered by the air
installations officer were unusual only in scope and time
limitations. The shortage of construction materials in Ger-
many was a serious problem and was troublesome
throughout the operation. This lack was more evident in
the construction of housing and technical facilities than ir^
heavier construction of runways, parking aprons, and faxi-
ways. No ready-made solution to this problem ever be-
came evident. Each shortage or complete lack of a given
item had to be considered individually and circumvented
through substitution or redesign.
In the construction of runways, taxiways, and aprons,
it became clearly evident that for an operation involving
continued use by a large number of heavily loaded air-
craft, under-design is false economy at ifs worst. Existing
runways failed rapidly when overloaded. Once a runway
or other paved surface had been extensively damaged,
the cost of repairs equaled the cost of a new runway. II
was further noted that pierced aluminum planking failed
badly under heavy usage and was much inferior fo steels
planking for long-time use.
TXAMSPORTAT/ON
MISSION
The mission of the Transportation Division was to exer-
cise general supervision over the use of rail, water, and
air transportation pertinent to movement of all Air Force
cargo and personnel. Through this activity, requirements
were submitted to Headquarters USAF for air cargo capac-
ity to and from the Zl, and air priorities were issued to
control proper utilization of that capacity.
East-bound air freight in support of Operation "Vittles"
was divided into .'wo parts; the first was administered by
the USAFE Liaison Office at the Headquarters of Middle-
town Air Materiel Area, and the second by the Trans-
portation Division, Headquarters USAF.
HKCH ««•■
115
ORGANIZATION
The east-bound air allocation in June 1948 was 35,000
pounds per month. All ot this weight was controlled at
MAAMA. East-bound air cargo traffic during the Airlift
increased to the point where the USAFE Liaison Officer
controlled 100,000 pounds per month, and the reserve
band controlled by Headquarters USAF amounted to
700,000 pounds per month. This cargo was transported by
Vittles aircraft returning from cycle reconditioning and by
regularly scheduled C-54 and C-74 type MATS aircraft.
The phase-out reduced east-bound tonnage to pre-Air-
lift requirements.
Prior to the operation, west-bound air cargo traffic
consisted of air space allocation of 20,000 pounds per
month. Due to support of fhe Airlift this traffic increased to
a monthly average of 600,000 pounds. During the peak
month, 750,000 pounds of air cargo were moved west-
bound on Vittles aircraft returning to the Zl for cycle re-
conditioning and on regularly scheduled MATS aircraft.
To supplement air transportation, there was established
an ocean service known as "MARINEX." All supplies
indicated as "MARINEX" shipments were accorded priority
handling and shipment in the Zl to the New York Port of
Embarkation, top stowed on fast U. S. Army transports and
U. S. commercial flag ships for first offloading at the Bre-
merhaven Port of Embarkation, and from fhere were
USAF ALLOCATION OF AIR CARGO FROM THE UNITED STATES
INCREASED TO 800,000 POUNDS A MONTH.
Pk
u
>'■
9
shipped to their destination by the fastest available surface
means. As originally established in September 1948, this
express service was for east-bound traffic only, but was
made applicable to west-bound traffic in December.
The Transportation Division coordinated and expedited
movements of freight, dependents, baggage, and private-
ly-owned vehicles within the theater as well as to and from
the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation. Constant liaison
with fhe EUCOM Chief of Transportation, the EUCOM Air
Priorities Board, and USAFE base transportation officers
assured complete coordination.
EARLY PLANNING
A brief review of the operations background will illus-r
trate the necessity for the coordination required. That co-
ordination is illustrated in EUCOM's report on the Berlin
Airlift which states:
"Basic planning during the spring of 1948 revealed
that S-4 staff members at Berlin had been long
aware of the precarious status of rail supply for the
military forces at Berlin. Intensive planning was
undertaken in February and May 1948 to foresee
emergency requirements in the event that air supply
became necessary ."
Some of the early planning included such plans as:
"(1) USAFE will provide necessary aircraft and
crews.
(2) The Chief of Transportation, EUCOM, will re-
establish TCP (Traffic Control Point) at Rhein/
Main Air Base.
(3) All technical services will furnish the Chief of
Transportation quantities, including weight and
cubage, to be shipped to fill Berlin requisifions.
The Chief of Transportation will call on tech-
nical services to ship supplies to Rhein/Main
as required."
The first blockade was imposed on ground transporta-
ALL ALONG THE LINE.
lion to and from Berlin from 1 April fo 11 April 1948. Even
ihough fhe Airliff during fhis period was almost too small
lo mention when compared with Operation "Vittles," it
provided valuable experience for the occupation forces.
One of the principles which later proved invaluable was
that of central clearance of cargo, which was the basis for
lafer organization of a single agency at Berlin to establish
cargo priority.
&he Transportation Corps decided in April 1948 to
operate its airhead transportation on a shuttle basis, with
loaded trailers parked where they could be drawn in, as
needed, to load the planes. The general lines of respon-
sibility established in the April venture remained fhe back-
bone of transportation plans for the subsequent Lift.
fo prepare for a future emergency, the period between
April and June 1948 was used to build up stock levels at
Berlin and to ship out personnel and supplies due for
evacuation; for example, military coal shipments to Ber-
lin were increased from 67 carloads in March to 638
carloads in April.
AIRLIFT OPERATIONS
Transportation service at all USAFE bases participating
in the Airlift was generally performed by expansion of
existing facilities rather than by addition of new services.
In all cases the expanded operation was performed with
very slight increases in personnel. The number of per-
sonnel assigned to the staff office of the Transportation
Division, Headquarters USAFE, did not increase although
the volume of the workload multiplied. Erding Air Depot
increased all classes of personnel 15 percent When a
Central Receiving and Shipping Section was established
there.
During March 1949 the Transportation Section of
Rhein/Main Air Base acquired an additional responsibility
with the consolidation of receiving and shipping. To
prevent a demurrage on critically short freight cars, the
new section was made directly responsible for expediting
the loading and unloading of all rail cars.
The attached table shows fhe gradual upward trend of
cargo handled at Wiesbaden Air Base, Rhein/Main Air
Base, Erding Air Depot, and Furstenfeldbruck Air Base and
the gradual downward trend as the phase-out was near-
ing completion in September 1949. These tonnages rep-
resent materials and supplies transported to Airlift bases
by truck in support of Operation "Vittles." They do not
reflect food, fuels, and other materials actually airlifted
into Berlin for support of the German economy. Wies-
baden is a typical example of the trend changes. Rhein/
Main Air Base and Erding Air Depot reveal a high con-
stant loading and unloading trend for August and Sep-
tember 1949 because of their acceptance of phase-out
cargo from Celle and Fassberg Furstenfeldbruck Air Base
shows a rather spasmodic and irregular trend, as an
example ol an air base which did not participate directly
in fhe Airliff.
CONCLUSION
The Transportation problems posed by the Airlift were
not new; their change was only in degree. The pre-Lift
pol^ies, procedures, and techniques in this field operated
adequately and efficiently with no major changes.
. imt^
RAIL FREIGHT RECEIVED VS SHIPPED 1
BASE
ITEM
JUN48
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN 49
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP !
ERDING
AIR
DEPOT
TONS
RECEIVED
4050
4766
7436
5354
7790
6775
6646
6184
7 230
5184
6401
7101
7648
7018
7 902
8 982 (
CARS
RECEIVED
597
712
758
427
582
571
649
724
515
583
730
754
785
748
888
1 026 *
TONS
SHIPPED
1684
4 432
5 885
3 690
7028
3098
3157
2778
2 360
2 664
2 067
2211
1886
2 365
1977
I 771
CARS
SHIPPED
186
438
654
490
769
386
342
416
335
415
350
338
298
318
341
240 !
WIESBADEN
AIR
BASE
TONS
RECEIVED
9350
20980
30 923
25288
26 544
25 082
23 965
13 470
14180
12 100
23150
25 200
24 480
22404
13104
8 330 I
CARS
RECEIVED
523
1165
1720
1410
1470
1 395
1360
745
784
673
1281
1401
1361
1242
729
463
TONS
SHIPPED
377
1 772
1196
2 464
882
1382
938
840
1058
1948
666
2 372
1504
1242
556
737
CARS
SHIPPED
21
99
67
137
49
» 77
51
47
59
110
37
132
84
69
31
46 1$
RHEIN/MAIN
AIR
BASE
TONS
RECEIVED
9 828
46 908
49 020
92 000
90750
85 300
56 115
99 792
117560
129 900
123658
118 122
108 354
134 614
63290
54O00 p
CARS
RECEIVED
546
2 606
3 482
4 600
4202
4 265
4 444
5 544
5 878
7220
7 274
6 818
5 853
6923
3 520
. 2700 ,
TONS
SHIPPED
1080
31086
4176
7600
7 360
7 500
6 380
6 003
6 850
7 354
5 780
5 986
6 146
8 334
7 606
4 640
(
CARS
SHIPPED
60
1727
232
384
368
236
319
305
341
353
340
348
342
463
347
1
232 '
FURSTENFELDBRUCK
AIR
BASE
TONS
RECEIVED
3 143
7 817
5 371
5 868
4 677
5 554
5 627
3 988
4 915
8612
8 019
4 805
4 767
3 376
4 426
4 351
CARS
RECEIVED
165
514
461
356
300
373
275
271
320
546
547
309
281
218
262
228 J
TONS
SHIPPED
442
1268
1002
449
226
700
450
407
432
54
441
1 448
1873
1300
1384
1038
CARS
SHIPPED
61
66
101
68
49
60
48
47
55
17
73
115
148
109
137
106
118
PERSONNEL
119
USAFE
PERSONNEL STRENGTH
(ASSIGNED AND TDY)
CATEGORY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
MILITARY
OFFICERS
2 256
2 395
3 232
4101
4 452
4 521
4 383
4 566
4 565
4 626
4 753
4815
48 14
4 594
4012
3 273
AIRMEN
16 352
17240
19 726
23 352
25446
27055
24 899
26 522
25 523
26 269
26688
27 808
28 126
26 643
22 948
19 564
SUB-TOTAL MILITARY
18608
19635
22958
27453
29 898
31576
29282
31088
30088
30895
31441
32 623
32940
31237
26960
22837
CIVILIANS
US-ALLIED
932
925
921
947
939
1 007
1 010
1064
1 1 12
1 023
974
974
886
91 1
906
794
* GERMAN
22 144
22692
23 447
23 276
23 488
23617
23 367
24062
24 088
24 598
24732
24 091
22 152
22545
24833
20931
SUB-TOTAL CIVILIANS
23 076
23 617
24368
24223
24427
24624
24 377
25126
25200
25621
25706
25065
23038
23456
25739
21725
TOTAL USAFE
41684
43 252
47 326
51 676
54 325
56 200
53659
56214
55 288
56 51 6
57 147
57688
55 978
54693
52 699
44562 !
* DOES NOT INCLUDE GERMAN CIVILIAN!
> AT FASSB
ERG AND C
ELLE FURN
ISHED BY
THE BRITIi
>H
'■■■■■-■■y^~:-;-y-
■'^o^v^x^W:
W!'"-"; ■ !%;;
120
MILITARY PERSONNEL
^-mtkm*
121
THE FIRST DAYS
Analysis in early 1948 revealed that the command was
faced with the loss and replacement ot 70 percent ot its
airmen between October 1948 and February 1949, and 82
percent of its officers between February and August 1949.
To avoid these peaks a system of regulated rotation of
personnel to the Zl in advance of their normally scheduled
return was placed in operation in February 1948. The
additional responsibilities of the Berlin Airlift forced the
discontinuance of this advanced rotation effective 1 July
1948. While the discontinuance permitted the retention of
personnel on hand at the start of the Airlift, it later created
a serious problem of replacing experienced personnel
during the winter months when operation was the most
difficult.
Initially, the personnel at Rhein/Main and Wiesbaden
Air Bases were augmented by attaching pilots from other
USAFE stations on 14-day temporary duty. In the first
weeks no long-range personnel planning was done as it
was not contemplated that the operation would continue
for more than 90 days.
By 6 July 36 C-54 type aircraft had arrived from
Alaska, the Panama Canal Zone, and Hawaii and were
attached to Rhein/Main Air Base. These aircraft and their
crews were initially placed on 45-day temporary duty,
which was later extended to 180 days. Personnel were
permitted to request permanent change of station (PCS)
to USAFE. Those who did not request PCS were returned
to their former stations if more than six months remained
of their overseas tour after completion of 180 days of Air-
lift flying duty, while those with less than that period re-
maining on their current overseas tour or enlistment were
returned to the Zl.
An increase in the manning level to two crews per C-47
aircraft required the assignment or attachment to the Air-
lift of a total of 320 pilots later in July. This augmentation
compelled new allocation from every station in USAFE,
which resulted in the attachment of several fighter pilots
who had never flown multi-engine aircraft.
Utilization of every available pilot in USAFE provided
an emergency pilot pool to stop the gap until reinforce-
ments could be obtained from other commands.
REQUIREMENTS
The troop carrier groups that "carried the ball" during
the incipient period of the Airlift were organized under
the "Peace" columns of the "Medium" Tables of Or-
ganization. Late in the summer all groups were reor-
ganized under the "War" columns of the "Heavy" Tables
to provide additional personnel. However, these wartime
authorizations were unsuitable because they included a
large number of unusable specialist SSN's such as armorers
and ammunition handlers, and did not provide sufficient
aircrew, air operations, and air transportation personnel.
No guide was available to determine requirements in this
specialized operation.
As an expedient, group commanders were directed to
specify their requirements, but their personnel requests
lacked uniformity even though their group missions were
comparable. The situation was improved by the issuance
of Tables of Distribution based on manpower studies. This
was not the final solution, however, for if was months
before worthwhile conclusions could be drawn from ex-
perience, and fhe periodic increase in tonnage targets
precluded stabilizing personnel requirements.
Even at the cessation of the blockade of Berlin the
respective headquarters of USAF and USAFE were in
disagreement as to the personnel required for a sustained 1
airlift operation.
In any operation of this nature, authorizations must be
established as soon as possible to permit sound personnel
planning.
TEMPORARY DUTY, TEMPORARY TENURE, AND SHORT
TERM (6 MONTHS) PCS
The air transport and troop carrier squadrons were
originally attached to USAFE for varying periods of 45-,
60-, and 90-day temporary duty. The majority of the
casuals were on 90-day temporary duty. The temporary
duty period of all individuals and organizations on TDY
was extended to 180 days in September by Headquarters
USAF.
To differentiate between the various categories of tem-
porary duty personnel, those in organizations from other
overseas commands were considered as being on "tem-
porary tenure" while those in organizations from the Zl
and all casuals were considered as being on temporary
duty.
As the tonnage targets increased, it was necessary
11 either to obtain additional personnel or to retain the
personnel then attached. Personnel in a temporary status
were encouraged to extend to 1 1 months or to convert
to permanent assignment to USAFE.
f The criteria and administrative procedures tor convert-
ing to permanent assignment status provided by Head-
quarters USAF are worthy ot mention. Airmen who
volunteered to remain in USAFE on a PCS status were
^reported to their home stations tor the issuance ot new
orders changing their status to PCS, after which they
were assigned to units and duties in accordance with the
requirements ot USAFE. Those who desired this change,
yet tound it necessary to return to their former stations
in the Zl to arrange for the settlement of persona! affairs,
were authorized a 30-day leave upon the completion of
180 days of duty on the Airlift. Casual officers who
.volunteered to remain in USAFE in a PCS status were re-
ported to Headquarters USAF for issuance of proper
assignment instructions to home stations and were auth-
orized the same leave privileges. Any property clearances
required at Zl stations were arranged through appropriate
boards of officers. Personnel from other overseas com-
mands whose presence was required at home stations for
'settlement of personal affairs were not permitted to con-
vert to PCS, but were returned to their home stations on
a permanent basis upon the completion of 180 days' tem-
porary duty.
During the build-up of the Airlift, aircrew personnel
who graduated from the Great Falls Replacement Train-
ing Unit were assigned to USAFE on a six-month PCS
status, commonly called "Short Term PCS. "These personnel
were also authorized to change to a normal overseas
•our, and those who had already submitted applications
or the movement of dependents to this command were
:onsidered as having applied for such a tour. By 1 July
949, 596 of the 1,675 RTU pilot graduates and
ipproximately 280 of the 700 airmen graduates requested
1 normal four.
The peculiar status ot some 150 pilots and enlisted
ircrew members who had reported to this command on
'CS prior to the activation of the Great Falls RTU was
clarified by Headquarters USAFE 1 April 1949. Personnel
in that category, who desired, were authorized to return
to the Zl after completion of a six-month Airlift tour. They
were offered the same choice of six-month or normal tour
as was permitted for RTU graduates. Again, personnel who
had already submitted applications for the movement of
dependents were considered to have requested retention
for a normal overseas tour.
Only about one-third of the personnel originally on
TDY or on "short term PCS" with the Airlift volunteered
to convert to a normal tour. In the majority of cases
of personnel on TDY the emergency of the situation
prohibited advance notification of even as much as 10
days prior to overseas shipment. The lack of a sufficient
alert period was influential in the decision of many per-
sonnel not to convert to a normal overseas four, in spite of
authority to obtain a leave after the first six months. It is
generally agreed that a minimum of a 30-day alert should
be given personnel prior to overseas shipment.
AIRCREW REPLACEMENTS
The program of the Great Falls RTU scheduled a
monthly output of at least 208 pilots and 104 crew chiefs.
The first of these personnel arrived in USAFE 4 November
1948, and within a month a steady stream of replacements
was flowing into the Airlift.
The RTU graduates arrived in USAFE by air at the
7013th AF Replacement Squadron, Frankfurt, Germany.
To facilitate their assignment to duty, that squadron re-
ported them direct to Headquarters 1st ALTF without ref-
erence to Headquarters USAFE. This resulted in arrival
of these personnel at their duty stations within 24 hours
of their arrival in Germany.
Air Force Letter 35-143, 1 April 1949, announced the
rotation policy governing aircrew members assigned to
USAFE after graduation frqm the Great Falls RTU. In-
dividuals who had reported to the RTU prior to 1 May 1949
were authorized to return to the Zl for reassignment upon
the completion of six months of duty with the Airlift
Individuals who reported to the RTU on or subsequent
to 1 May 1949 were assigned to USAFE for a normal
overseas tour.
As noted in the previous section, RTU graduates who
so desired could request a change of status from six-month
to normal PCS. All of the 180 crew chiefs who had re-
quested a normal tour with USAFE were retained in that
duty. Of the 596 pilot RTU graduates who had requested
a normal overseas tour with USAFE, 412 were to be
utilized as pilots during all of their four. One hundred
and eighty-four were to be utilized in MOS's other than
pilot after the complefion of six months of flying duty. This
policy, based on these pilots' qualifications in critical and
acutely short non-flying MOS's, received the concurrence
of Headquarters USAF. Accordingly, it was possible to
reduce the flow of pilot trainees by 412 and reduce the
USAFE officer requisitions for other specialties by 184 as
projected to 1 December 1949.
By December 1948 sufficient pilot personnel had been
received to provide 2.63 crews for each operational air-
craft. Experience indicated that this manning level was
insufficient to meet constantly increasing tonnage require-
ments. The figure of 3.0 crews was determined as neces-
sary. Concurrently with the consideration of this proposal,
15 December 1948 to 8 January 1949, USAFE received 39
C-54 aircraft needed fo meet the ordered increase in
tonnage. Nineteen of the crews which ferried these air-
craft returned under orders to the United States. The
remaining 20 crews, mostly from MATS stations, were re-
tained in USAFE on an assigned basis.
The manning of fhese additional aircraft required that
the available pilots be spread even more thinly to the
point of reducing the over-all manning level to 2.29 crews
per aircraft. Tonnage obligations then being mef required
an operating minimum of 2.5 crews per aircraft. The re-
duction of this level to 2.29 created an emergency situation,
and Headquarters USAF was requested to make available
194 pilots direct from Zl stations. This direct assign-
ment, by-passing the Great Falls RTU, was calculated to
advance their arrival by as much as five weeks. Ap-
proximately 30 pilots arrived againsf this emergency
requisition before a stepped-up graduation rate at the
RTU made it possible for USAFE to cancel the remainder
124
of the requisition.
The increased flow from the RTU and the number of
pilots converting from temporary duty to permanent
change of station accomplished a build-up to the desired
three crews per operational aircraft, with sufficient addi-
tional pilots to perform the related duties of check pilots and
standardization board members. The overage in crew
chiefs at this time was utilized on ground maintenance.
PERIODS OF TDY
Accurate estimates of the geopolitical situation had
been made both at the Department of the Air Force and
the Department of State levels. We have noted that
personnel and equipment were generally placed on 90-
day temporary duty. In September 1948, approximately
90 days after the commencement of the Airlift, the in-
terested powers conferred on discontinuing the blockade
of Berlin, but no agreement satisfactory to all governments
was reached. The blockading power seemingly calculated
that poor flying weather during the winter would render
impossible the supplying of a city by air. In that same
month the temporary duty period of all personnel was
extended to six months. This action, in the majority of the
cases, terminated the tours in January. By that time, it was
believed, it would be possible to evaluate the success of
operations during November and December, the worst
months for flying weather.
The bold geopolitical estimates were vindicated, for in
the month of May 1949, final agreement fo cease the
blockade was reached on high governmental levels.
REQUISITIONS ON PCS BASIS
Hundreds of personnel on temporary duty had been
of indispensable assistance in building up the Airlift, but
personnel on a permanently assigned basis were needed
after the opening phase of such an emergency operation.
At the commencement of the Airlift, requisitions for
officer personnel had already been submitted to include
requirements fo 1 December 1949. Requisitions for this
period were for fewer officers than the number of fore-
casted returnees, owing fo the reduction in authorizations
and the implementation of a system of regulated ad-
vanced rotation.
Because of the immediate additional requirements ol
the Airlift, an emergency requisition for 264 officers was
submitted by teletype on 5 August 1948. The message
included a request for 64 four-engine pilots and 10 air-
craft maintenance officers on 90-day temporary duty to
fill shortages in C-54 squadrons recently attached to
USAFE. An emergency requisition was submitted on 9
September 1948 requesting 62 officers in critical MOS's.
On the same day a consolidated requisition was sub-
mitted by letter to provide replacements for the 465 of-
ficers who would complete normal tours and 6-monlri
temporary duty tours during December 1948 and January
and February 1949.
The increase in tonnage targets and resulting increase
in authorizations forced a change in the requisition
schedule, which was altered to provide for the requisition'
ing of anticipated shortages as of 1 January 1949 and ol
replacements for the following months. Unfilled balances
of all outstanding requisitions were cancelled, and this
headquarters was notified by Headquarters USAF of the
number of officers by MOS that had applied against each
previous outstanding requisition.
Requisitions for the months of January to August 1949
were based on losses due to completion of a normal
tour, a 6-month PCS tour (Great Falls RTU graduates),
and periods of temporary duty varying from 6 to II
months. However, the complexity of accurately computing
the above losses for each month is readily apparent
There were daily changes due to the number of officer)
changing their status from temporary duty, temporar
tenure, and 6-month PCS to normal PCS. There were
also numerous early returns to the Zl because of hardship
or for further training of rated officers whose primary
aeronautical rating was bombardier. The reassignment d
qualified navigators fo that primary duty and the reassign
ment of Great Falls RTU graduates who were qualified if
critical or acutely short MOS's to duties in those special
ties, after the completion of six-month flying duty, con
il'lt
iribufed io the complexity ot accounting tor losses.
These factors, coupled with the differences between the
authorizations from Headquarters USAF and the require-
ments as established by the DCS/Operations, Headquarters
USAFE, resulted in some requisitions being nothing more
than the broadest estimates of needs.
Headquarters USAFE also submitted requisitions for
the 59th Air Depot, Burfonwood, England, until 5 January
1949, when that organization and the 3rd Air Division were
assigned direct to Headquarters USAF. These requisitions
requested that assignment of personnel be made direct
to England and that information copies of related
correspondence be furnished Headquarters USAFE.
The accompanying tables illustrate USAFE's personnel
requirements and resources during the Airlift period, and
•he requisition actions taken to maintain the proper officer
and airmen personnel levels.
The procedure in requisitioning airmen was com-
plicated by the same factors which affected the pro-
curement of officers. In general, airmen requisitions were
submitted in blocks of 1,000. A relatively small number
of enlisted men was requisitioned for the 438th Signal
Aviation Construction Company and the 862d Engineer
Aviation Battalion, the two Department of the Army units
assigned to USAFE. As requirements increased, emergency
requisitions were submitted requesting large numbers of
i airmen in the communication, maintenance, and supply
fields.
Subsequent to 28 February 1949 requisitions for air-
men were no longer submitted, as Headquarters USAF
m made assignments on the requirements reflected in the
PI Report of Air Force Personnel, RCS AF-SC-P2, submitted
°by Statistical Services, Headquarters USAFE. Submission
%>f special requisitions for SCARWAF enlisted personnel
ontinued.
During some months as high as 70 percent of the air-
F "nen assigned to USAFE from other commands were basic
airmen, SSN 521. Over 4,000 basic airmen were assigned
o USAFE between October 1948 and February 1949.
^one of them had been requisitioned. Headquarters USAF
vas informed that the responsibility of providing on-the-
ob training for these airmen was seriously reducing the
operational efficiency of the Airlift. The flow of basic air-
men was stopped, and some already in the command
were returned to the Zl.
The most important shortage of airmen was in the
maintenance field. Fifteen ground crew maintenance
personnel per aircraft was the manning level considered
essential for sustained operations. During January 1949
the manning level was 7, and during July it was 12. Many
of the maintenance personnel who were assigned to
USAFE as late as April 1949 were not considered fully
qualified for duty in an operation of emergency tempo.
Communications to Headquarters USAF reporting these
shortages resulted eventually in the assignment of many
highly qualified maintenance personnel. The following
figures illustrate that 28 percent of the airmen authorized in
the maintenance field arrived after agreements had been
reached to lift the blockade:
Airmen Assignments in Maintenance Field
April 1949 153
May 1949 537
June 1949 869
July 1949 136
(Total for May and June is 1,406, or 28
percent of the 5,092 authorized.)
MANNING OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
An operation of (he magnitude of the Airlift invariably
requires the manning of special organizations and projects
with personnel of particular qualifications.
Several liaison officers were required for attachment to
Headquarters, British Air Forces of Occupation, and to
Gatow and Tegel Airfields in Berlin. These personnel not
only were qualified in air transport operations but also
were screened for the attributes and personal characteris-
tics essential to cordial relations with other nationalities.
Prior to the arrival from Japan of a United States troop
carrier wing at Celle RAF Station, a contingent of per-
sonnel was dispatched to provide a housekeeping and re-
ceiving unit. This contingent consisted primarily of 24
officers and over 200 airmen on PCS and 16 officers on
temporary duty. The spadework of this group was co-
ordinated with an advance party of the incoming troop
carrier wing consisting of the wing commanding officer,
the group commanding officer, and the wing deputies for
personnel and supply, who arrived in the command by
air three weeks before the wing arrived by water trans-
portation.
The unfavorable flying weather forced the activation of
an in-flight weather reconnaissance squadron in Novem-
ber 1948. Twenty-four pilots, qualified in B-17 aircraft,
were withdrawn from Ihe Airlift and assigned to this
organization.
As in the case of the C-54 personnel, the C-82 crews
used at Wiesbaden Air Base were originally on 90-day
temporary duty, extended to 180 days; but only one crew
converted to permanent change of station. It was not
difficult to find replacements, however, for many of the
troop carrier personnel in the command were fully quali-
fied in C-82 aircraft.
REQUISITIONS FOR KEY OFFICER PERSONNEL
A major personnel problem was the procurement of
key officer personnel. Upon the request of the Command-
ing General, Headquarters 1st ALTF, Headquarters USAFE
on 16 October 1948 requested several key officers by
125
USAFE OFFICERS
19 4 8
30 June 31 July 31 Aug 30 Sept 31 Oct 30 Nov 31 Dec
19 4 9
31 Jan 28 Feb 31 Mar 30 April 31 May 30 June 31 July 31 Aug 30 Sept
REQUISITION BASIS
Authorized
Required (Established by DCS/O, Hq USAFE)
RESOURCES
Assigned to USAFE
Assigned to Organizations TDY to USAFE
Individuals TDY to USAFE
Total
REQUISITIONS (Not including 4-Engine Pilots)
Number Requisitioned to arrive during month
Number Approved By Hq USAF
2539
2256
1989
2446
2298
97
2172
2516
2427
481
324
2386
2720
2720
727
654
3284
4057
2851
910
691
4222
4926
3136
668
717
4189
4958
3402
258
723
4307
4227
3853
713
4348
4687
4190
375
4574
4704
4481
145
4270
4376
4675
78
4234
4195
4770
45
3751
4167
4787
*27
3933
3906
4584
10
3990
3851
4009
3
2256
125*
2395
90*
3232
80*
4101
43*
4452
117*
#
#
#
#
116
4521
Normal
130
Emergency
264
129
Emergency
221**
4383
Dec-Feb
Consolida-
tion
464
Emergency
62
Consolida-
tion
171**
Emergency
11**
4566
Normal
240
1 Jan
Shortages
163
Normal
178
1 Jan
Shortages
126
4565
165*
4626
272*
4753
243*
4815
206*
4814
113*
4594
68
4012
83
199
110
87
61
53
3198
2946
3273
3273
# Not Available
DU tL?tn P ?6 jlf 1 C 948r UiSiti0nS " ^ e " ,ha " >he " Umber ° f r6tUrneeS ,0 ,He Zl dUe ,0 ,He P ' anned redUCH ° n In "**•"«««• «"« < h * ■*."■ of regulated advanced rotation. (The November requisition was submitted bv
Items filled before cancellation on 2 December 1948. A new requisition procedure was established by Headquarters USAF (see text).
Requisitions based on the figures in "Required" line above. Because these requirement figures established by Headquarters USAFE were
requests were disapproved.
of the authorizations established by Headquarters USAF, a considerable number of the
126
i
USAFE AIRMEN
19 4 8
19 4 9
30 June
31 July
'31 Aug
30 Sept
31 Oct
30 Nov
31 Dec
31 Jan
28 Feb
31 Mar
30 April
31 May
30 June
31 July
31 Aug
30 Sep
REQUISITION BASIS
Authorized
18402
12645
13856
15596
18605
24524
28794
22898
27719
22219
26012
22366
25354
22724
25229
22716
25013
22717
24210
19678
23587
21514
21673
21514
21235
17387
16834
J- Required (Established by DCS/O, Hq. USAFE)
17163
17275
18216
24011
RESOURCES
Assigned to USAFE .
16352
16733
17268
19410
20555
20836
19613
21590
21988
24701
25853
27361
28006
26569
22925
19559
Assigned to Organizations TDY to USAFE .
1515
2068
2583
1570
557
f Individuals TDY To USAFE
507
943
1874
2308
4649
4729
4932
3535
1568
835
447
120
74
23
5
Total
16352
17240
19726
23352
25446
27055
24899
26522
25523
26269
26688
27808
28126
26643
22948
19564
REQUISITION DATA
Requisitioned (PCS & TDY) During month .
1639
1789
4744
4246
#
~
1364
1078
1132
0'
126*
197*
0*
0*
0*
0*
Arrived During Month
247
T217
1050
1369
#
—
1006
(Included
70<"„
"Basics")
2554
(Included
30%
"Basics")
926
(Included
30 s /,,
"Basics")
3133
(Included
30°/„
"Basics")
1630
2133
1162
274
122
68
# Not available
* Figures include ARWAF and SCARWAF only. Effective 1
March 1949
no requisit
ons were su
emitted on USAF perso
inel. Shipments were b<
jsed on the
Report of AF Personne
, AF-SC-P2.
127
name, listing the candidates in the order of preference.
The majority of these personnel were known to have
performed duty with air transport units during or after
World War II.
Subsequent correspondence revealed that some of
fhese personnel were unavailable as they were not on
active duty, could not be released from their present
assignments, were not vulnerable for overseas assignment
and were unwilling to volunteer, or had by retraining lost
the specialized ability for which they were sought.
Late in February 1949 information was received giv-
ing the names of' the key personnel to be shipped to this
command. Their established time of arrival was late April.
This list included a few of the personnel who were
previously requested by name. Negative replies to sub-
sequent name requests contained a reference to AFR 36-3,
"Requisitioning of Officer Personnel," which prohibits req-
uisitioning by name except for a limited number of du-
ties.
Emergency requisitions for key personnel by MOS
and any other necessary special qualifications were being
filled in two or three months. Requesting key personnel
by name more than doubled the normal time between the
date of request and the date of arrival.
CLASSIFICATION AND AUDIT
Personnel classification and audit, the activity of iden-
tifying people by the skills they possess and monitoring
their assignments, is essential to the success of any
organization. When that organization is engaged in war
or an emergency operation, the proper utilization of all
available human skill becomes vital to success.
Uncertainty as to the duration of the Airlift and the initial
emphasis on operational rather than administrative prob-
lems retarded the establishment of a vigorous personnel
classification and audit system. After two months of opera-
tion, shortages in certain skills became serious. On the
theory that this could be partly alleviated by proper
utilization of available personnel, a comprehensive study
of personnel utilization was initiated in September 1948.
128
This study indicated that 20 percent of all airmen were
assigned to duties other than those for which classified.
Approximately two-thirds of these airmen were training
out of specialties in which other airmen were undergoing
on-the-job training.
A study of personnel administrative procedures at the
wing, group, and squadron levels failed to reveal any
uniform method of distributing skills on the basis of
position vacancies. Information concerning the occupational
requirements of each unit and an inventory of the skills
available were needed at all echelons of command. To
meet this requirement, the USAFE Manning Chart was
established. This chart was similar in form to the old AF
Form 127, indicating the personnel authorized and assigned
each unit within specification serial number.
Meanwhile, USAFE Air Inspector reports indicated that
the maintenance of Airlift personnel records and personnel
accounting was deteriorating. Inspection revealed the
causes to be a lack of qualified personnel specialists and
inadequate distribution of directives. A means had to
be provided to assure proper maintenance of personnel
records, and the attention of the USAFE Personnel Audit
i
■ 1948 J
Team was shifted to the Airlift during December
Initial personnel audits of Airlift organizations were
conducted in conjunction with inspections by the Sfaiis-i
tical Services Directorate of the USAFE Comptroller. These,' ■
audits disclosed discrepancies in personnel accounting,)^,
maintenance of personnel records, and personnel utiliza-J
tion. The recommendations made led to correction oij
many of the deficiencies. m;
The magnitude of the audits required the formation oI|f c
an additional personnel audit team operating under the tat
jurisdiction of Headquarters 1st ALTF. During the fivetse
months of its existence this new personnel audit team con^'o
ducted two comprehensive audits of each Airlift unit,
Specific recommendations were made for reclassification
and reassignment of individuals, procurement and appli-
cation of personnel directives, and readjustment of per-
sonnel administrative procedures at wing, group, andjof
squadron level. The effectiveness of the personnel audit
team was demonstrated by vast improvements in personnel
administration and a steady decrease in the number
personnel mal-assignments.
f
AIRLIFT PERSONNEL WERE REWARDED FOR A JOB
AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Credit for a job well-done has always been one of the
nest rewards of military service. The personnel who
participated in the Airlift received this recognition through
ie presentation of awards and decorations.
Authority to award the Air Medal in connection with
ne Airlift was delegated by the Department of the Air
orce to the Commanding General, USAFE. The presen-
ition of this award recognized the round-the-clock
ervices of aircrews who flew the narrow aerial corridor
3 Berlin with three to seven-minute intervals between
ircraff and who frequently executed take-offs and land-
igs in dense fog that was penetrated only by the guid-
ig instructions of the GCA operators.
The primary basis for this award was the completion
>f 100 missions to Berlin. The date 1 September 1949
/as designated as the final date for the compilation of the
umber of missions completed. Any airman or officer who
3st his life while participating in aerial flight on the Lift
sceived posthumous consideration for the award. Meri-
torious achievement while participating in any mission
where unusual circumstances prevailed constituted another
basis.
The Berlin Airlift device is a special Airlift decoration.
Its official description is "a gold-colored metal miniature
of a C-54 type aircraft of a 3/8-inch wing span, other
dimensions proportionate, which is worn on the service
ribbon or on the suspension ribbon of the Occupation
Medal for Germany with the nose pointing upward at a
30-degree angle and toward the wearer's own right."
This device was awarded to personnel who had per-
formed "service for 90 consecutive days while assigned
or attached to a unit in the Occupation (Forces)
of Germany which has been designated in General Orders
of the Department of the Army or Department of the Air
Force as participating in the Berlin Airlift between 26 June
1948 and a terminal date to be announced later."
The Congress of the United States has authorized
"The Medal for Humane Action" to recognize those
individuals who distinguished themselves by meritorious
participation in the humane military effort to supply the
necessities of life to the people of Berlin. The exact re-
quirements for this award and the design of the medal
have not been published. The colors for the ribbon of
The Medal for Humane Action have been selected to rep-
resent the colors of the Coat of Arms of Berlin - red,
white, and black - against a background of blue sym-
bolizing the sky from which the beleagered city was
supplied.
From July 1948 to October 1949, 2,709 awards were
made to Airlift participants. This number included 2,374
Air Medals, 1 Distinguished Flying Cross, 2 Distinguished
Service Medals, 68 Legion of Merit Awards, 11 Soldier's
Medals, 1 Cheney Award, 245 Commendation Ribbons,
and 7 awards to civilians for meritorious service.
Participating United States Naval personnel were
eligible for and received awards on the same basis as
United States Air Force personnel.
THE PHASE-OUT
Planning for the necessary reduction in force necessi-
tated by the cessation of the blockade of Berlin began in
1948. In the middle of May 1949 the personnel plan be-
came operational; all organizations were directed to
screen personnel to determine their individual desires
for retention or non-retention in the post-Airlift program
and to ascertain the corresponding recommendations of
their commanding officers. Personnel were listed in four
categories or groups as follows:
GROUP I - Desires retention and retention is recom-
mended by commanding officer.
GROUP II - Does not desire retention and release is
recommended by commanding officer.
GROUP III - Desires retention but is not recommended
for retention by commanding officer.
GROUP IV - Does not desire retention but retention is
recommended by commanding officer.
The directive emphasized that the report was for
planning purposes only and did not constitute a promise
of retention in USAFE or of return to the Zl after the
cessation of the blockade.
129
Plans were made for retention of a small number of
overages in many specialties, since only tentative authori-
zations for post-Airlift USAFE were available. It was not
until 29 October 1949 that Headquarters USAFE forwarded
to Headquarters USAF the breakdown of the USAFE bulk
allotment for personnel. In spite of the drastic reductions
in requirements, shortages in certain acutely short and
critical MOS's still existed. In general, these shortages were
the same as the USAF-wide "Critical USAF MOS's"
enumerated in AFR 35-34, 16 March 1949.
Personnel were earmarked as "retainable" or "non-
retainable" on the basis of their desires and the recom-
mendations of their commanding officers. At the direction
of the Commanding General, USAFE, personnel with
dependents in the command or enroute were given
preference for retention. This policy was modified in late
August because the large number of retainable personnel
with dependents presaged a continued housing shortage.
To avoid the creation of abnormal replacement conditions
due to the rotation of personnel three years after the
build-up of the Airlift, priority for retention was also given
personnel who arrived prior to August 1948 and sub-
sequent to May 1949.
In July, lisfs of retainable and non-retainable personnel
were forwarded to all bases for verification. In August,
commanders were authorized to make substitutions within
grade and MOS, for it was an acknowledged fact that
many changes had occurred in the three months that had
elapsed since the original survey was completed. Subse-
quent to 1 1 October, only personnel who were listed as
non-retainable and had dependents in the command re-
mained in the non-retainable category. Following that
date all other overages in USAFE were considered as
retainable and were reassigned elsewhere in USAFE as
required or returned to the Zl.
Separate communications from Headquarters USAF
authorized Headquarters USAFE to reassign surplus per-
sonnel required by other overseas commands, including the
Atlantic Division of MATS, the 1602d Air Transport Wing,
the 3rd Air Division, the 1807th AACS Wing, and the
2105th Weather Group. As of 1 November 1949, 71 of-
ficers and 250 airmen were reassigned to those commands.
130
As stated above, this command was still short some
specialists. Headquarters USAF was informed that 36 of-
ficers of the many requisitioned and, presumably, then
in the incoming pipeline, were still required in the post-
Airlift program.
A significant administrative function of the phase-out
was the reporting of personnel to Headquarters USAF
prior to their return to the Zl. Airmen with dependents
in the command were individually reported by teletype
and were not released until their assignment instructions
were received. All other departing airmen were reported
in daily teletype messages by totals in specification serial
numbers.
Headquarters USAFE reported officers daily by tele-
type, utilizing a status file which contained a card on each
officer indicating all information needed for his reassign-
ment plus the date and method of his travel. This file not
only expedited preparation of the reports, but also served
as a convenient reference file. To facilitate reassignmenfs
in the Zl, information copies of all messages were fur-
nished the Air Force Overseas Replacement Depot and
the Port of Aerial Debarkation. Officers who had been
recommended for relief from active duty under the
provisions of AFL 36-3, 5 August 1949, were reported in
classified messages.
Mainly for reasons of economy, the phase-out was
expedited, and by 1 November the outshipment of per-
sonnel was well in advance of planned reductions. As of
that date 1,768 officers had departed against a required
1,100, and 8,630 airmen had departed against a required
4,576. This expedited reduction was made possible by
the utilization of spaces aboard Airlift C-54 aircraft being
returned to the Zl and additional spaces made available
by Headquarters EUCOM aboard scheduled MATS air-
craft and surface transports.
CONCLUSIONS
Experience in the Berlin Airlift indicates that, as a
general rule, peak efficiency cannot be expected of
personnel on a protracted period of TDY. The low morale
of personnel absent from their families and obligations iork
periods of several months severely reduces the quality ol|
their job performance. Further, a large percentage of Ihef
unmarried personnel have a "temporary" attitude whictij
tends to restrict their job effort. Periods of necessary TDYr
should not exceed 45 days, after which TDY peri
sonnel should be replaced by others on a PCS status/,.
The importance of this is considered sufficient to warrant!
deviation from any existing policy governing frequency!
of oversea tours of duty.
Attempts to fill key officer positions by name reques!
for certain individuals often proved unsuccessful in fhlj
operation, as it has in the past. If requisitions for office
for key positions had been limited to clear and compl
descriptions of the position requirements, the delay I
filling these positions caused by rejected name requesl:
would have been prevented.
The Berlin Airlift was formed from units, parts of uniji
and individuals from areas throughout the world. Becaffl
of difficulties arising from its heterogeneous character,!
accurate personnel accounting was not obtained untirlj
seven months after the operation started. Command-wide
verification of the effective use of fhese personnel was!
delayed until proper accounting could be established!
After several months' experience indicated inability toi
secure accurate accounting by usual methods, a special
team of accounting and classification personnel was
organized for first-hand analysis and correction of the
deficiencies of personnel and classification sections at unit
level.
The work of fhe feam would have been simplified
and its objective reached earlier had it been placed in
operation in the first months of Airlift, before the passage
of time made it increasingly difficult to unravel confusec
accounting and classification records. Accordingly, it |!
believed correct to anticipate that a confused personne
accounting and utilization situation will exist in the initia
phases of any future large-scale emergency air operatic"
and that a similar team, which can make on-fhe-spo
analyses and correction of errors, should be put at won
during the opening days of the operation.
HOUSING
POLICIES
Military personnel and their dependents in Germany
are housed only in public buildings and private residences
requisitioned from the German economy. With the gradual
reduction of military personnel in USAFE prior to the
Airlift, excess dependent housing was periodically de-
requisitioned and only sufficient homes were kept to
meet actual military requirements. Thousands of private
German residences had been destroyed during the war.
Throughout Germany there was a critical housing shortage,
and it was theater policy to return buildings to the Ger-
mans when the military need for their utilization had
passed. There was also a theater policy which prohibited
the renting of private residences or hotel accomodations
Jby any member of the Armed Forces, and a policy that
|no additional residences be requisitioned.
It was thought that the Airlift operation would be of
[short duration and personnel were brought to Germany
on a temporary duty basis. It soon became evident,
however, that the Airlift operation would continue for an
indefinite period, and authority was given for temporary
duty personnel to change to PCS. Personnel had been
hurriedly transferred on temporary duty to USAFE, and in
many instances transport air crews were ordered on 60- to
90-day temporary duty to USAFE on only a few hours'
notice. Many personnel ordered to USAFE from the Far
East had been in that area without their dependents for
more than a year. In some cases their dependents were
on the high seas enroute to join them in Japan when the
sponsors were suddenly sent to Germany by air
MINIMIZING THE SHORTAGE
In order to maintain the Airlift on a more permanent
operational basis, it was felt necessary for morale purposes
either to: (a) build the units up to strength with personnel
on a PCS status, or (b) place personnel on duty with the
Airlift on a temporary duty status for six months, leaving
their dependents at their permanent stations. Both systems
were actually utilized.
Housing surveys were instituted at all Airlift stations,
and small amounts of housing space were procured. A
majority of this housing, however, was located at a
considerable distance from the Airlift bases.
Adequate housing on a permanent basis for the in-
creased numbers of Airlift personnel at or near their
places of duty was an immediate impossibility There was
such a great morale factor involved, however, that every
attempt was made to permit Airlilt personnel on per-
manent change of station to bring their families to Europe.
From a morale point of view dependent housing soon
became the biggest personnel problem.
An increasing number of Airlift personnel requested
PCS orders; and the seriousness of the increasing housing
shortage is illustrated by the fact that between 12 Novem-
ber 1948 and 5 May 1949, 3,335 sponsors submitted
applications lor movement ol their dependents to Ger-
many. During the same period only 915 families were
131
returned to the Zl. In June 1948 USAFE had dependent
housing in the locations and quantities indicated below
(asteriks indicate Airlift bases):
Location
Family Units
Wiesbaden Air Base*
Wiesbaden Military Post*
Rhein/Main Air Base (Frankfurt)* . .
Erding Air Base
5
1,109
555
324
225
186
301
110
361
Neubiberg Air Base
Furstenfeldbruck Air Base
OberpfafFenhofen Air Base ....
Landsberg Air Base
Kaufbeuren Air Base
TOTAL
3,176
Various arrangements were made to reduce the
housing shortage. The British were able to provide very
AIR FORCE FAMILIES AT
BAD MERGENTHEIM
( JANUARY - 8 NOVEMBER 1949 )
FAMILIES
300
225
150
75
I
I 10 JUNE I
K
/
\
\
/
\
,
J
FMAMJJ ASO
limited numbers of housing units at Celle and Fassberg,
and plans were made for construction of several hundred
sets of new dependent quarters at fhose bases. In the
American zone the Dependent Housing Center at Bad
Mergentheim, capacity 350 families, and vacant dependent
housing in the Munich and other areas were made avail-
able for the temporary housing of dependents. In addition,
plans were drawn for construction of several hundred sets
of permanent dependent quarters for Rhein/Main and
Wiesbaden Air Base.
HOUSING AND MORALE
Each sponsor who desired to bring his family to the
theater was informed of the critical housing shortage and
advised that if his family was brought to Europe, they
would possibly have to reside for an indefinite period at
a temporary dependent housing center many miles from
his duty station. It was pointed out to the individual that
he would not receive rental allowance while his family
occupied either permanent or temporary quarters in Ger-
many; that he would assume a greater financial burden
through being away from his family; and that family
cooking and messing facilities were not available in the
hotel-type dependent centers. Each sponsor, in making
application for movement of his dependents, certified his
understanding of the above facts.
The original problems caused by the sudden dis-
location of personnel from their families by temporary
duty orders to Germany were lessened when these per-
sonnel were permitted to rejoin their families temporarily
to settle personal problems and to make application for
the movement of their families to Germany. The very
knowledge that their families could join them at some
future date improved morale.
A new and more immediate morale problem arose,
however, among the hundreds of dependent families living
in temporary or permanent quarters in Germany, far re-
moved from their sponsors' base. The added cost of sub-
sistence in hotel-type messes and family problems further
aggravated the hardship.
CONCLUSIONS
Experience during the Airlift operation demonstrated
conclusively that individuals will tend to be overly op-
timistic when forewarned of housing and financial prob-
lems, and will apply for movement of their dependents •
overseas regardless of the possible difficulties. While tern- :
porary relief of the morale problem was attained by:
authorizing the movement of families to Germany, the re-'
sulfanf financial problems and the enforced separation of i
families within the command had a detrimental morale
effect.
A long-range program for the construction of housing
at Airlift bases was well underway with the sudden ces-
sation of the Airlift, but the new construction could not
have been completed for approximately a year.
INITIAL PHASE OF THE WIESBADEN HOUSING PROJECT.
132
CIVIILIAN
t ii I *"■
PERSONNEL
1^
S
The mission of the Civilian Personnel Office was nof
materially changed by the Lift; however, the work volume
was substanlially increased. This increase required the
establishment of some new positions, plus many identical
with those currently existing. Since the procurement,
training, and administration of U.S. civilians posed no
significant problems, the subsequent paragraphs will cover
primarily the many problems encountered in the employ-
ment of German nationals.
The British Forces were responsible for the employment
and administration of civilian personnel in their zone.
UTILIZATION OF U.S. CIVILIANS
Large numbers of U.S. and Allied civilians were ac-
tively engaged in all fields of Airlift endeavor and con-
tributed substantially to the success of the mission.
U.S. civilians, on temporary duty status from the U.S.,
were included with the cadre which initially established
Airlift Task Force Headquarters. While their contribution
was significant and effective, their temporary duty status
presented the following problems:
(1) Temporary duty status was limited fo 90 days, and
extension of TDY was often delayed.
(2) Civilians on TDY initially received $7.00 per
diem, much in excess of the 25 percent pay
differential given fo assigned civilian personnel
for foreign duty; however, later the per diem rate
was reduced to 83.00, a partial solution.
It is strongly recommended that on similar foreign duty
operations, U.S. civilians be employed on a permanent
basis.
U.S. civilians employed by Headquarters 3rd Air
Division were originally administered by the Wiesbaden
Military Post. Administering to personal at such a great
distance was ineffective. On 26 June 1949 the respon-
sibility for this civilian personnel administration was del-
egated to Headquarters 3rd Air Division, which by then
was sufficiently staffed to accomplish if.
133
GERMAN NATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS
Due to the shortage of trained airmen with aircraft
maintenance specialities, it was decided in September
1948 to augment present Air Force authorizations with
German national authorizations. This, it was hoped, would
temporarily relieve a condition that was fast becoming
critical. For security reasons, it was initially planned that
German nationals perform only such menial duties as plac-
ing workstands, removing cowling and rockerbox covers,
changing spark plugs, washing down engines, checking
tires, and cleaning aircraft. Later, German mechanics were
employed in all ground maintenance activities which gave
no control of the complete operation, and in which they
were supervised by Allied personnel and allowed only
a partial knowledge of a maintenance operation.
V
GERMAN MECHANICS PERFORMED MAINTENANCE UNDER
ALLIED SUPERVISION.
RECRUITING AND TRAINING
The employment recruiting incentives for qualified
German national aircraft workers were one free meal
per day, inexpensive clothing, and free billets.
Each Airlift base was given a quota of 50 mechanics
per operational squadron, later increased fo 65 per
squadron.
Recruiting was assisted by the use of radio and articles
in leading German daily papers. In addition, the German
Labor Offices' files were screened for potential aircraft
maintenance, machine tool designers, and workers in re-
lated skills. German workers eager to do their part
responded to the call for their assistance.
The assignment of qualified mechanics introduced
another question. Authorizations received had not spec-
ified the number of individuals fo be employed at the
various levels - i. e., Masters, Seniors, Journeymen, Juniors,
and Helpers. Since this was an important point from the
standpoint of management and economy, base-wide
breakdowns based upon anticipated scheduling and
utilization were agreed upon and uniformly applied
throughout all squadrons.
Some squadron maintenance officers were anxious fo
employ electricians, locksmiths, carpenters, and similar
personnel within their authorization of 50 persons. Head-
quarters 1st ALTF initially required that all personnel
must be employed as aircraft mechanics, but at a later
date, in response to wide demands, each squadron was
given an additional authorization for two persons to per-
mit employment of a general clerk and an interpreter.
While the mechanical skill of the German employees
was for the most part satisfactory, the language barrier
and the Germans' unfamiliarity with the American aircraft
and equipment definitely retarded their initial effective-
ness. The training problems were difficult, and the task of
developing an English course which would include tech-
nical aircraft terminology as well as general mechanical
. - . ,.',
•*HMEN
WIN6-S *■■ ■-
I RB , Eft
GONTROi SURFACES - -
ALIGHTING SEAR
'
AlLEl
135
terminology was an arduous one.
While civilian training sections were developing this
type of English course, those concerned with the mechani-
cal side of the operation were considering the technical
training of mechanics.
For use as training aids, charts similar to the accom-
panying one were developed from technical orders on all
pertinent aircraft terminology. They were used both for
mechanical and language .training. The mechanical and
English training given German employees proved very
effective.
EUROPEAN CIVILIANS OTHER THAN MECHANICS
Although the employment of German mechanics pre-
sented the most difficult problem from the civilian per-
sonnel standpoint, a major requirement existed for Ger-
man personnel in almost every other function in support
of the Airlift. Professionals, clerical personnel, and un-
skilled laborers were assigned a wide variety of tasks in
connection with these supporting functions.
For the logistical support of the Airlift provided by
the U.S. Army in Europe, it was largely necessary to
utilize displaced persons and Germans. This group was
primarily used to transport supplies from the railhead to
the Aircraft. Owing to the speed with which the Airlift
136
was activated, little time was left for the normal recruit-
ment of these laborers; however, a reserve was available
in Labor Service Companies already organized and func-
tioning in EUCOM depots and military posts. Schedul-
ing of personnel in these companies did not present a
problem, but it is well to note that maximum effectiveness
was obtained from a 12-hour-on and 24-hour-off duty
tour, with each man given one additional day off per
week.
PHASE-OUT OF AIRLIFT OPERATIONS
Phasing out was a major civilian personnel problem.
Many of the German civilian employees who had been
of invaluable assistance throughout the Airlift were no
longer required. Finding employment in Germany was
difficult for skilled and the majority of unskilled persons;
for many, the cessation of the Airlift meant unemploy-
ment for an indefinite period.
Recognizing this problem, Headquarters USAFE
published a directive outlining the procedures for the
large-scale reduction in force. The normal procedures
used in the United States were considered impracticable.
Rather, in selecting personnel to be retained, primary
consideration was given to personnel who combined the
longest service with the highest work performance; and
the outstanding service of many employees separated
was officially recognized through the issuance of ap-j
propriate Certificates for Meritorious Civilian Service.
Many of the aircraft mechanics were absorbed by
the command in normal mechanical and maintenance
functions. For permanent reference, however, all instal- I
lations prepared rosters of the post-Vittles addresses of
all German mechanics who had satisfactory employment -
records. Should the need for mass utilization of Ger- '
man mechanical skills again arise, this recruitment refa-J
erence will be invaluable.
CONCLUSIONS
Civilan employees assigned to duty with an overseas
operation should be employed on a permanent basis^
if their period of duty is over thirty days.
Plans for a project, program, or operation which will
probably require the use of non-military personnel
should include provisions for training of civilian personnel
in their own language and for education in the English
language, where appropriate.
To maintain a high morale standard among civilian
employees, their needs should be provided for im-
partially, without discrimination or special privileges for-
any class of personnel.
SKutl :., SV »CES
The problems encountered in providing a recreational
I program tor Airlift personnel were many and varied. The
\ measures taken to provide that program are set torth in
! subsequent paragraphs.
SERVICE CLUBS
The first Special Services goal was that of establishment
of the service clubs at newly activated bases and ex-
pansion of the club facilities at existing bases. Acquiring
buildings was made difficult by the necessary priority
placed on structures for operations, traffic, supply, messing,
and the housing of personnel. Although in some instances
the physical facilities available left much to be desired,
space was provided for service club activities at every
base.
Six additional service clubs were established at Airlift
bases. The entertainment provided at these clubs was an
effectively important part of the program for maintaining
high morale among airmen.
Assisted by a hand-picked group of four hostesses from
established bases, the staff hostess of Headquarters USAFE
planned and organized clubs for Airlift bases. Under her
supervision, clubs were organized almost overnight. Host-
esses chosen for these clubs, usually four to each club,
were those with several years of club work or associated
experience. Because of the careful selection of the host-
esses, the clubs maintained programs of the highest
standard throughout the operation.
For the initial purchase of club furnishings, a grant of
approximately $78,000 was obtained from fhe EUCOM
SERVICE CLUB,
Central Welfare Council. These furnishings were allocated
to Airlift installations to start and expand service club
operations. When the base central welfare funds became
able to absorb the expense, local funds were available
to pay for dance bands, floor shows, and refreshments
and to purchase additional service club furnishings and
recreational supplies.
LIBRARIES
Reading material was much in demand. Personnel who
remembered the excellent distribution of pocket books,
newspapers, and periodicals during the war asked for the
same service; but distribution of this material had ceased.
Only a few periodical subscriptions had been purchased
from EUCOM Central Welfare Funds. To. alleviate this
situation, bases were given small grants to purchase copies
of Stars and Stripes, the New York Herald Tribune
(Paris Edition), and the Air Force Times until such time
as the base welfare funds were able to assume this expense.
Bases made contracts or agreements with the publish-
ers of Stars and Stripes to purchase copies of popular
current magazines for distribution to newstands along the
flight line and in pilot lounges and day rooms. Ad-
ditional periodicals were collected at dependent billets
and funds were • allocated to purchase pocket books
stocked by Stars and Stripes.
To obtain still additional books, an SOS was sent
throughout the European Command for the scattered
pocket books published by The Publishers' Council dur-
ing the war. The response to this request was gratifying.
In the two years since these books had been issued, the
assortment of titles had been well "picked over." This
necessitated careful sorting of these books for distribution.
When a pilot or airman walked into a lounge and found
80 copies of "The Life of Enrico Caruso" his appetite for
reading became somewhat jaded.
In order to keep periodicals and books in circulation,
repositories were placed at various locations to receive
the material people had finished reading. These reposi-
tories were emptied regularly, and the material was re-
distributed by librarians and hostesses. This was a cir-
culating library in the literal sense.
In the meantime, existing library bookstocks were
increased; and as each installation was established, its
library was organized. Librarians selected collections in
groups of 500 books, and adequate library bookstocks
were soon established.
MOTION PICTURE SERVICE
The Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service was
appropriately expanded to meet the new requirements.
Theater schedules were adjusted to the 24-hour operation,
and film presentations were scheduled so as to accom-
modate personnel of at least two of the three eight-hour
shifts.
The principal problem was the lack of adequate theater
facilities. Sixteen-millimeter film service was installed tem-
porarily until adequate and suitable theater facilities could
be provided. To overcome the lack of trained projec-
tionists, German civilians who could meet certain require-
ments were employed and sent to the Army Signal School
at Friedberg, Germany, where trainees were given an in-
tensive five-day projectionist course. Upon satisfactory
completion of the course, the German employees were
licensed and placed on duty at Lift installations.
USAFE'S SPECIAL SERVICES LIBRARIANS DISCUSS THE
LATEST BOOK NEWS.
ATHLETICS
Provision of an Airlifl athletic program did not present
a difficult problem at the established bases. At newly
activated bases, however, the program had to be started
with little or no facilities, supplies, or supervisory per-
• sonnel. Improvisation was a dominant factor in the early
development of athletics on the Airlift bases.
At one station, the Special Services Officer, with the
assistance of sports-minded airmen, transformed an old
bombed-out hangar into a temporary gymnasium serving
i approximately 6,000 participants monthly. A basketball
I floor, a boxing room, a volleyball court, a badminton
court, a weight-lifting room, and a steam-bath room were
provided. With the help of Air Installations, softball and
touch-football fields were built. Dilapidated tennis courts
were renovated, and horseshoe pits and outdoor volley-
ball courts were constructed for each squadron. An old
cow pasture became one of the finest baseball diamonds
in the European Command.
The inter-squadron, mass-participation athletic programs
at each base were generally excellent. Leagues were
organized for softball in the summer, touch-football in the
fall, and basketball in the winter. Both player and spec-
tator interest in these inter-squadron leagues was excep-
tionally high and contributed to improved morale of par-
ticipating officers and airmen.
with direct shipment of supplies from Aschaffenburg to
these bases.
Having profited by the experience gained in opening
Fassberg, preliminary to the opening of Celle RAF Station,
USAFE Special Services requested that the military post
responsible for logistical support make available for im-
mediate issue the necessary special services equipment.
This procedure resulted in establishment of recreational
programs at Celle with much less delay than at Fassberg.
Locally manufactured furnishings were procured readily
from Germany, Denmark, and England as the nucleus for
development of special services activities of that station.
As the Airlift passed through the third and fourth
month, opinion changed about the temporary nature of
this operation and steps were taken to procure additional
equipment. EUCOM Special Services diverted to Lift ac-
tivities, equipment that had been intended for installations
not involved in the operation. Within approximately four
months, all bases were receiving priority furniture and
equipment for service clubs, libraries, and crew lounges.
TOURS AND RECREATION CENTERS
To help provide each individual with the opportunity
to visit many beautiful and historic points throughout
Europe, inexpensive tours were operated by various gov-
ernmental and private travel agencies. The European
Command operated recreation areas in the German Alps
at Garmisch and Berchtesgaden, both famous winter sports
centers. The finest hotels there were requisitioned as ac-
comodations. Charges at these hotels were computed on
a cost basis, thus bringing these luxurious vacation spots
within the means of the lowest-paid individual. Provisions
were made for granting pass privileges whereby, at
the discretion of the commanding officer, deserving air-
men could be sent to the recreation areas of their choice
at no transportation expense or loss of leave credit. Spe-
cial quotas allotted for Airlift personnel assured suitable
billets for everyone.
SPECIAL SERVICES SUPPLY
USAFE Special Services surveyed the first temporary
base, Fassberg, and formulated its requirements for a well-
integrated athletic program. But responsibility for Fass-
berg s logistical support was carried by the Bremerhaven
1 °orf of Embarkation, more distant from the depot a\
Aschaffenburg than was Fassberg. This arrangement re-
| quired shipment of supplies from Aschaffenburg through
Celle (past Fassberg) to the Bremerhaven Port of Em-
barkation, then back to Fassberg (and to Celle, when it
J was activated). Improved arrangements were later made
•o clear the supply papers with the port of embarkation,
BERCHTESGADENER HOF, ONE OF EUCOM'S RECREATION
AREA HOTELS.
#
a
\
CELEBRITY SHOWS
To supplement the entertainment program conducted
throughout the Zone, big-name stage, screen, and radio
performers were contacted. Through arrangements with
the Special Services Division, Headquarters USAF, enter-
tainment productions were packaged in the Zl and sent
to Europe via MATS or special mission aircraft. The troupes
were met upon arrival in Europe by an escort party of
special service personnel responsible for billeting, mess-
ing, scheduling, and touring with the troupe. Considerable
advance planning concerning stage adaptation and pro-
duction was necessary, but the only problem of any magni-
tude was the large volume of stage properties required by
the dramatic shows.
Experience indicated that the variety type show pro-
vided maximum entertainment for the minimum amount
of equipment, expense, and personnel.
The accompanying illustration names some of the
shows that toured the Zone under the Air Force program.
One of these, the "Christmas Caravan" starred Bob Hope,
140
Irving Berlin, Jinx Falkenberg and Tex McCreary, and
29 other celebrities. Vice-President Alben W. Barkley
and Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington ac-
companied the show, which arrived in Europe 21 Decem-
ber 1948 and during the following 10 days gave
presentations at Wiesbaden, Berlin, Fassberg, Celle, Rhein/
Main, and Burtonwood, England.
SOLDIER SHOWS
To encourage and assist in the production of soldier
shows, entertainment specialists with theatrical background
or "Little Theater" experience were employed in the Zl
and sent to this command. "Little Theater Guilds" were
established at individual stations. Dependents of Airlift
personnel also assisted with and at times performed in
these shows, which provided an excellent source of en-
tertainment. The best locally produced soldier shows \
toured other military installations throughout the U.S.
Zone.
Typical of these soldier shows was "Vittles Varietiesfj
which was produced by the Special Services Section,
Headquarters 1st ALTF. Talent was drawn from all Airlift
stations, and the enthusiasm and conscientious effort of
all who participated made the show a gratifying success.
"Vittles Varieties" was presented at all Airlift bases and,
in response to many requests, at other installations in the
European Command.
SCENE FROM THE 'VITTLES VARIETIES,' A SHOW STAGED
AND PRESENTED BY AIRLIFT PERSONNEL.
SUMMARY
In both war and peace, a high degree of morale is
indispensable if a military organization is to carry out its
mission effectively. Unfortunately, this desired state of
morale rarely exists unless advance planning recognizes
the morale factor. Too often, advance planning neglects
the special services program in the initial phase of opera-
tions. This is particularly true when operations are im-
plemented under hurried conditions.
Provision must be made for a morale program to keep
pace with other phases of operation. Adequate and quali-
fied personnel must be assigned to organize and super-
vise the recreational program; materiel requirements must
be anticipated and requisitioned; and appropriate physical
facilities must be provided commensurate with personnel
strength. Unit commanders should be oriented on the
conditions of the area into which they are moving so that
consideration can be given to transportation of rec-
reational equipment with the unit if necessary.
Although the utilization of additional time and effort
for morale and recreational planning may be at the ex-
pense of some other phase of the operations in the initial
stage, the increased efficiency of personnel resulting from
such planning will inevitably further the accomplishment
of the mission.
all
asize
AIRMAN INFORMATION AND EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
The Information and Education (l&E) Division of USAFE
expanded its facilities to the utmost for the Airlift and
experienced all the problems inherent in this type of
enterprise. While its principal objectives remained the
same — to provide commanders with personnel who were
more competent on the job from every standpoint — the
primary emphasis shifted from training to support of the
actual operation.
INFORMATION PROGRAM
The l&E expansion program began with a TWX to
l&E Officers on 9 July 1948, requiring that they emphasi__
the importance of the Airlift in the AIP (Airman Informa-
tion Program). Headquarters EUCOM was requested to
publish a TI&E Bulletin on the Airlift and its significance
and importance. Entitled "Operation Vittles" and sub-
titled "The Story of How Army and Air Force Cooperation
Saved 2,500,000 Lives", the article was published 22
August in Volume III, No. 34.
The six-page illustrated account was distributed on the
basis of 1 to every 15 Air Force personnel for use
by discussion leaders during the regular AI&E hour. It
showed the part played by each individual and empha-
sized his importance in the total endeavor. The co-
operative support of the Airlift by the Army, the Air
Force, and other participating agencies was explained in
this article; and the principles, political implications, and
policies of the Airlift operation were summarized. Con-
gratulatory comments were inserted where appropriate to
provide the occasional "pat on the back" so necessary to
preserve morale in an arduous operation.
During the initial phase, information centers were
established in response to the demands of pilots and
crews for news on current events, particularly in connec-
tion with the Airlift. Pilot lounges were crowded with
men who had little time to leave the base. Magazine and
newspaper stands, maps, posters with the latest news, and
an AI&E specialist were available in the briefing rooms to
satisfy the demands of the aircrews for news. The AI&E
specialist operated as a librarian, an information source,
and as a staff liaison representative, feeling the "pulse^
of the Airlift personnel.
As the Airlift operation expanded, a shortage of
trained l&E specialists made it necessary to discontinue
the assignment of men to duty in information centers. But
wherever possible, replacements were given orientation
on the following subjects:
(1) A review of the incidents which made the Air-
lift operation necessary.
(2) The current political significance of the Airlift.
(3) Future implications of the operation.
(4) The relationship of individual responsibilities to
the successful accomplishment of the mission.
(5) The importance of the USAFE mission in
supporting Military Government in the oc-
cupation of Germany.
In addition current events, especially those pertaining to
the Airlift, were thoroughly discussed; and question-and-
answer sessions were held. The orientation program
prescribed for each installation by a USAFE directive dated
18 September 1948 was later supplemented to take care
of the TDY personnel routed directly to Airlift bases.
The effectiveness of thorough indoctrination was re-
peatedly proved. The experience of l&E indicated that
w0 RL-D N .. «
TI&E INFORMATION CENTERS KEPT AIRLIFT PERSONNEL
POSTED.
indoctrinations at replacement centers and at individual
installations helped to control their morale problems,
serious incidents, and VD rate. Replacements who were
not thorougly briefed on the Airlift added to the com-
manders' problems.
In October the type and number of questions en-
countered by air inspector and personnel services activi-
ties indicated the development of a potential morale
problem. To meet the problem, the following actions were
recommended:
(1) An attitude research on morale at the four Air-
lift bases.
(2) An information program to tell the men at
these bases of the significance and importance
of this new use of air power for peace.
The recommendation was approved, and work was
immediately begun on an AI&E lecture incorporating
answers to the complaints received.
To carry out the information program, a team of eight
men was selected — seven airmen with a sales or
education background, to present material to small groups,
and one officer to supervise the presentation, to present
the material to officers, and to act for the team in matters
of scheduling and administration. The 7700th TI&E Group,
Headquarters EUCOM, trained the discussion team and
reviewed the material to be presented. Following a re-
view of the plan, the TI&E staff school recommended that
30 minutes of the presentation be devoted to a lecture on
the significance and importance of the Airlift, to be fol-
lowed by a 30-minute quesfion-and-answer period. Mem-
bers of the team formulated questions, which were referred
to USAFE Headquarters for answers to be used as a train-
ing aid.
After completion of a week of training, the team
presented the revised talk to various staff AIP meetings
on 20 November. The action was timely; for Time
Magazine had just published an article entitled "Airlift
Blues" which was being widely discussed. During the
presentations at Headquarters USAFE and Headquarters
1st ALTF, the question period procedure was reversed,
142
and members of the team asked questions of the staff
officers. This provided an excellent opportunity for ob-
taining answers to the questions which the team believed
would be asked at the bases.
Prior to the visit at each base, commanders were in-
formed of the program's details and were requested to
arrange schedules for all personnel to hear "Operation
Information," as the program was designated. To give
every individual a chance to air his pet gripe, question-
naires were circulated among all participants in the orien-
tation programs.
The questions submitted included every phase of the
Berlin Airlift, from the number of pairs of socks available
from quartermaster supply, to the extreme need for
engine stands and other heavy equipment. Regardless of
subject matter, an honest effort was made to contact
every command source and every staff agency to obtain
and provide definite and correct answers.
It can be readily seen that through "Operation In-
formation," l&E faced problems never encountered in
normal activity. To meet this challenge, every phase of
the information portion of l&E activity during the Lift was
planned as a service to personnel and an instrument for
raising morale.
EDUCATION PROGRAM
In addition to adding to the effective ability of an
airman, education provides him with a worthwhile pursuit
for his spare time. What little off-duty time was available
to Airlift personnel under the strain of their workload
could have been misspent, without facilities for whole-
some relaxation and self-betterment. The education pro-
gram filled a great part of these needs. In general, the
education program had three tools available to work
with: correspondence courses of the U. S. Armed Forces
Institute (USAFI), group study classes, and formal off-
duty schools.
USAFI provided the most readily accessible educa-
tional opportunities for all personnel. It was necessary
only to advertise thoroughly and to bring the facilities of
USAFI to the men. To accomplish this, AI&E officers at
all bases were alerted to the need, and EUCOM was
requested to divert ,as many USAFI trailers as possible
to the service of personnel involved in the Airlift
operation, wherever they were located. Headquarters
EUCOM cooperated fully in every respect.
One of the first bases to be serviced by the USAFI
trailer was Fassberg. During the first three days that the
trailer was at Fassberg, a total of 96 courses were sold.
The campaign was so successful that plans for moving
the trailer were cancelled, and Headquarters EUCOM
directed that the trailer remain as long as interest in
USAFI continued high. Two weeks later the USAFI
trailer was still selling courses at a very satisfactory rate.
At that time 700 courses had been sold, a coverage of
one-third of the personnel at the base. Rotation of this
USAFI trailer was thereafter governed entirely by the
interest shown at bases where the service was rendered.
Burtonwood, England, was faced with a situation
peculiar to its mission in that the personnel stationed there,
while subject to the same inadequacies and discomforts
as those closer to the Airlift operation, were too far from
its actual performance to feel the spirit and necessity for
their efforts. The AI&E services described above were
THE EDUCATION PROGRAM INCLUDED WEEKLY "INFORMATION
AND EDUCATION" LECTURES.
performed for Burtonwood as for ofher bases. In addition,
one of the USAFI trailers which had been caught
Dy the blockade in Berlin was dismantled, cut into pieces,
and flown to Wiesbaden and thence to England. The
remendous response which this trailer received is indi-
cated by the fact that the Commanding General, 3rd
Air Division, requested in September 1949 that the trailer
be kept in England.
Education centers providing off-duty classroom educa-
tion were established at all bases. Through the use of
non-appropriated funds and the cooperation of the 7700th
TI&E Group, EUCOM, trained civilian educational ad-
visors were provided to assist AI&E Officers in monitor-
ing the education programs. Fully realizing the need for
ihese trained civilians, Headquarters USAF later authorized
replacements paid from Air Force appropriated funds.
USAFE participation in the off-duty education pro-
gram tripled during the period from July 1948 to January
1949. The great demand for educational facilities, added
to the information problem, necessitated considerable ex-
pansion of l&E activities and personnel. Previous to the
Airlift, all bases had operated with part-time l&E officers
and an l&E non-commissioned officer. For the Lift, field
staffs were augmented by a civilian educational advisor
for each base, and necessary stenographic help was
TRAILER USED IN BERLIN.
m
~a Jt ■ " "~ 1_
13 n
f
in tii nn n n n n f
niiflfHInmnrn
provided. When commanders became fully aware of the
service l&E was performing for them, at least one officer
was assigned with l&E as a principal duty; in many cases
more than one officer was assigned to the section. Most
of these additional people were authorized on a tem-
porary basis and have since been assigned to other duties.
SUMMARY
There were many lessons learned In AI&E during the
Airlift. Important among these is that the American airman
must be informed to perform his duties to the full extent
of his capabilities. This makes an information service man-
datory under the present-day concept of the fools of
leadership.
AI&E must be prepared to furnish this information
service at all echelons. However, its functions must be
supported by commanders through provision of adequate
personnel and facilities. At the beginning of the in-
formation program during the Berlin Airlift, commanders
generally were under such pressure that all of their efforts
were devoted to the operational phases of their problems.
However, command support was forthcoming when it
could be shown that a decreasing VD rate, higher morale,
and increased efficiency resulted from adequate orien-
tation of personnel.
The operation of an organized discussion period, where
the individual could hear the answers to his questions and
those of his friends, provided a constructive morale service.
PERSONAL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES
In June 1948 the USAF Personal Affairs Program, as
such, was not in existence. Post-war reductions in per-
sonnel and funds had necessitated the discontinuance of
the program in mid-1947. Certain casualty assistance func-
tions were assumed by the Chaplain, and all other func-
tions were absorbed by other staff agencies. This decen-
tralization of the program placed an extra burden upon
the squadrons. Furthermore, specialists in matters per-
taining to insurance, savings, allotments of pay, and family
allowances were not ordinarily available at that level.
The circumstances under which large numbers of
personnel were ordered to duty with the Airlift precluded
proper personal affairs counseling prior to arrival in this
command and created a hardship on individuals of the
operational groups. As this situation grew more critical,
every effort was made to procure trained personnel who
were former personal affairs specialists; however, those
obtained were often assigned ofher duties since no
authority existed for a personal affairs office at group
level. As a result sound personal affairs counseling by
properly qualified specialists was not available.
As this situation became more obvious, Headquarters
USAF announced in November 1948 that the Personal
Affairs Program was to be re-established. With this
advance information USAFE Regulation 34-4 was published
14 December 1948 to establish a Personal Affairs Program
for USAFE. Personal affairs officers were appointed at all
echelons down to and including group level, and the
entire program in USAFE was monitored by what had been
the Personal Assistance Section, USAFE.
By 1 February 1949 the effects of the establishment
of this program were noticeable. Counsel and advice
relative to personal affairs was available to Airlift per-
sonnel, and conscientious efforts were being made to
solve individual personal problems.
The obvious lesson is that since the modern air task
force is necessarily highly mobile, all Air Force personnel
must continually maintain their personal affairs so as to
permit movement to any part of the world with the least
practicable delay. This can be accomplished by the con-
tinuation of the Personal Affairs Program.
AIR FORCE AID SOCIETY
An additional program monitored by the Personal
Affairs Division was the Air Force Aid Society, which
provides emergency funds for Air Force personnel. Air
Force Aid sections were operational at all existing bases,
and additional sections were established upon activation
of new Airlift bases.
Although it is impossible to evaluate this program
143
properly, it is known that large sums were expended in
other commands in rendering assistance to Airlitt de-
pendents. In addition, during the 12-month period trom
1 August 1947 through 31 July 1948, approximately $.096
per capita in Air Force Aid Society funds was expended
for emergency aid in this command; and $.137 per capita
was expended during the following 12-month period. This
increase in aid is believed directly attributable to the per-
sonal problems brought about by the Berlin Airlift.
Air Force Aid Society Sections should be established
with other functions of a task force. In addition, it is
suggested that Headquarters USAF arrange for periodic
visits by the nearest Air Force Aid Society Officer to
dependents who are separated from their sponsors, to
render such counsel and financial aid as may be required.
The satisfaction to the sponsor in knowing that the Air
Force is interested in his family would be a vital morale
factor.
RED CROSS
Though not a responsibility of the Personnel Services
staff, the activities of the Red Cross are closely related
to the Air Force personnel affairs programs, and are
directly allied with the work of the Air Force Aid Society
Red Cross field directors assigned to Airlift ipstallations
handled over 10,000 personnel cases during the operation.
Their work involved a variety of services ranging from
reports on health and welfare of military personnel and
their dependents, and safety and first aid classes, to
assistance in obtaining government benefits, transfer of
funds, and actual emergency financial aid. Excluding the
assistance given dependents in the U. S. or at Bad Mer-
genfheim, Red Cross loans to Airlift personnel totaled
$12,000.
SAVINGS AND INSURANCE
To encourage participation of Airlift personnel in the
Savings and Insurance Program developed by USAFE,
plans were launched for a vigorous, continuing program
to stimulate and maintain interest in savings and insurance.
144
Maximum NSLI coverage for all personnel was stressed.
Reports indicate that 71.7 percent of the airmen assigned
to the 1st ALTF were covered by NSLI in some amount;
however, since figures were not available for the entire
operation, no conclusions can be drawn.
SUMMARY
The problem of pre-set attitudes of Airlift TDY per-
sonnel, who had been hastily assembled from Air Force
installations throughout the world, presented a unique
challenge to personnel services officers of the Airlift.
Some of the Airlift personnel services officers were
located at newly established bases with meager, over-
crowded facilities. At the British zone bases, there was a
definite difference of opinion between British and Ameri-
can personnel as to what constituted entertainment and
recreation. Through compromise and tact on both sides,
the problems presented were solved satisfactorily.
Theaters of a temporary nature were hastily constructed.
Athletic programs were emphasized, and by the organiza-
tion of intramural leagues on the various bases and the
inclusion of Airlift bases in EUCOM-wide league playoffs,
the athletic program was given impetus. A campaign of
publicity was initiated to alleviate individual problems
through the Air Force Aid Society.
Liberal pass policies were adopted to enable personnel
to take advantage of distant recreational facilities. When-
ever if was possible, base commanders were encouraged
to provide transportation to and from leave centers.
An immediate program of orientation was initiated,
though it was inadequate as a result of the confusing
policies existing in commands from which personnel were
drawn. A team of information specialists composed of
commissioned and enlisted personnel was sent to Airlift
bases.
Shows from the United States featuring top-rank artists
toured Airlift bases to impress upon airmen the gratitude
of the American people for the job they were doing.
Education through USAFI correspondence schools and
off-duty classes was encouraged.
Snack bars were improved and rolling lunch wagom
were established at the bases. Airman and officer club
were enlarged. Off-base clubs were established whereJ
space was not available on the station, and bus service
was provided in order to facilitate their use.
It was not until Airlift personnel were converted from
TDY, or newly assigned on a PCS basis, that morale began,
to improve. Then, airmen and officers began to adopt
an entirely new attitude toward their Airlift duties — an
attitude which developed from a sense of well-being andi
security within the individual.
CONCLUSIONS
No personnel services program, no matter howi
thorough, can make appreciable inroads to supplant the
feeling of insecurity felt by individuals as a result of
improper orientation.
To insure a successful personnel services program ini
future operations similar to the Airlift the following should
be provided each base:
(1) An adequate personnel services staff.
(2) A grant from the command central welfare fund
to the base central welfare fund for incidental;
operating expense until distribution of regular 1
central welfare funds can be accomplished.
(3) Building space for a service club, including
library, of 8,000 square feet, a 90'x50' basketball f
court, one complete portable boxing ring, storage
for supplies 30'x3O', an office and equipment i
issue room 20'x20', and 2,000 square feet for
AI&E center.
(4) Equipment and supplies for the service club, »
AI&E center, gymnasium, and for a balanced I
athletic program to include Softball, baseball, I
basketball, archery, volleyball, tennis, handball,
badminton, soccer, football, boxing, wrestling,
hunting, fishing, skiing, and ice skating, as ap-
propriate to the climate.
RAF chaplains look care of the religious and coun-
selling needs of American personnel at Fassberg and
Celle until the arrival of American chaplains at fhose
bases; but by October 1948, every Airlift base had ade-
quate American chaplain coverage, With the exception of
Rheih/Main. Whereas the personnel strength af that base
rose from 2,000 to approximately 8,000 during the Lift,
me number of chaplains increased only from two to three,
'his was an inadequate number for the workload imposed
D y me 24-hour base operation, which created a greater
proportionate need for additional religious services and
counsel periods.
A general idea of the increased chaplain activity at
'Hiff bases may be gained from the accompanying charts.
Had chaplains been requisitioned on the basis of existing
needs and not on the basis of future contingencies, there
would probably have been no shortage. As it was, three
additional chaplains were needed af Rhein'Main to provide
adequate services.
MORALE
It requires little imagination to picture the numerous
personal hardships which evolved as a result of fhe sudden
personnel changes incident fo establishment of the Airlift.
In addition, inability to foresee the duration of fhe Lift,
and inadequate knowledge of its importance and its
effects, made the men who were involved in its work
susceptible to innumerable morale problems.
Some of these eases were solved through "morale
leaves" which allowed the individual special leaves to
handle his difficulties. To review applications for such
leaves, some bases set up morale boards in which airmen
participated. Though successful, the boards' effectiveness
would have been greater if the final approval authority
had been at base level. The responsibility for processing
the applicafon through higher headquarters in time for it
to serve its purpose, was often left to the chaplain, which
naturally limitied his time and efforts in other fields.
Planning for chaplain work in a special operation
involving factors similar to those in the Airlift should
consider the following individual problem areas in which
145
the chaplain will probably be asked to give aid or
counsel:
(1) Difficulties arising from unstable dependent hous-
ing conditions - particularly if military personnel
are moved from a location while their dependents
are enroute thereto.
(2) Marital and other personal problems caused by
separation of families.
(3) Financial problems originating in the adjustments
incident to an unexpected change in status or
location.
(4) Personal problems of insecurity or loss of job in-
terest due to inadequate orientation on the in-
dividuals' mission, on the relation of his mission
to the total effort, and on his future status.
It is interesting to note in connection with the above
that the correspondence to chaplains from relatives of Air-
lift personnel more than doubled when the TDY period
was extended.
CHAPEL ATTENDANCE
NUMBER
10000
7500
5000
2500
°
AIRLIFT
BASES
•
JASONDJFMAMJJAS
CONCLUSIONS
The experience of chaplains serving on Airlift bases -
indicated that unstable morale was principally due to:
(1) Ineffectiveness of orientation on the importance
of the Airlift to the United States - European ,
policy.
(2) Lack of proper dissemination of information as to
the effect of the Airlifts' continuation on the in-
dividual — extension of TDY, rotation policies, :
emergency leave, movement of dependents, efc. I
(3) Inability of the command to deal adequately with
personal and family problems caused by the
numerous unexpected changes in personnel assign-
ment and location.
Chaplains' contacts with men permit them to obtain
information of importance in connection with morale. To I
permit the full consideration of morale problems at policy
levels, chaplains should serve as members of any morale
boards established.
A BERLIN CHAPEL SERVICE.
CHAPLAINS' CONFERENCES AND CONSULTATIONS
2000
AIRLIFT
BASES
1 500
1000
U J
J A .£
N [
) J F H
1
A M
t
J J A S
CONTACTS WITH AIRLIFT PERSONNEL KEPT CHAPLAINS
INFORMED OF THEIR MORALE.
I
A/R SURGEON
ORGANIZATION
HEALTH OF THE AIRLIFT
PHYSICAL CAPABILITIES
Pursuant io theater policy, all Air Force medical units
were under Army control and policy at the beginning of
the Airlift. This had a direct bearing on Airlift health be-
cause the Air Force (with the exception of Wiesbaden
Military Post) was allowed only dispensary level care.
JAAFAR 1-11-50, which allowed hospitalization in Air
Force units, was received in December 1948. However,
the details of subsequent transfer of troop spaces,
establishment of suitable T/O's, establishment of hospital
funds, and the indoctrination of personnel in the proper
procedures of hospitalization were of such magnitude that
hospitals were not established and functioning during the
Airlift. Due to distances involved, Celle and Fassberg were
allowed to deviate from the theater policy of only 72-hour
retention of patients, but even at these installations only
limited hospitalization was possible. The disadvantages of
dispensary level treatment were as follows:
„ (1) Excessive time lost by individuals needing hospitali-
zation, due to transportation and loss of individual
patient identity in large medical installations.
(2) Reference of patients with minor illnesses to quar-
ters, when such individuals would normally have
been hospitalized if suitable facilities were avail-
able. Retention in quarters of patients with respir-
atory diseases was epidemicologically unsound.
(3) Inadequate Vital Statistics. Referring patients to
hospitals rather than giving them care at station
level resulted in loss to the Air Force, for med-
ical statistics of a large number of personnel.
In consequence, it was impossible during the
entire Airlift operation to compute the rate of
non-effectiveness due to disease and injury. The
only accurate figures as to incidence of disease
and injury came from the Care of Flyer Reports
discussed in Section II below. The Care of Flyer
Reports, however, did not reflect the health of
the supporting troops except by inference.
148
v
GENERAL
The statistics presented in this section were taken from
the Care of Flyer Report (AF Form #203). To evaluate
health of flying personnel with the Airlift, reports from
Rhein/Main, Wiesbaden, Celle, and Fassberg were
analyzed. Comparative statistics of non-Airlift flying
personnel were taken from the reports of Furstenfeldbruck,
Neubiberg, Erding, and Oberpfaffenhofen. Tempelhof,
Tulln, and Landsberg were omitted from the analysis be-
cause their flying personnel strength was statistically
unimportant. In addition, pertinent material is presented
from a Flight Surgeon's Air Crew Questionnaire which was
submitted to all Airlift air crew members 15 June 1949 and
answered by 58 percent of the assigned personnel.
REMOVAL FROM FLYING
The number of Airlift personnel removed from flying
because of disease or injury, as compared to non-Airlift 1 i
personnel, was as follows:
BASES
PERIOD OF
REPORT
TOTAL PERSON-
NEL REMOVED
FROM FLYING
AVERAGE
STRENGTH OF
FLYING FER-
SONNEL
AIRLIFT
Rhein/Main Air Base
2 Jul 48 - 1 Oct 49
1,330
1,094
Wiesbaden Air Base
2Jul48-!Oct49
684
786
Fassberg RAF Station
1 Oct 48-28 Aug 49
614
700
Celle RAF Station
Uan49-29Jul49
416
505
NON-AIRLIFf
Furstenfeldbruck
(Fighter Base)
2 Jul 48-1 Oct 49
136
316
Neubiberg
(Fighter Base)
2 Jul 48-1 Oct 49
66
163
Erding
2Jul48-1 Oct 49
25
145
Oberpfaffenhofen
2 Jul 48 -29 Jul 49
21
81
The percentage of personnel removed from flying eadi
month at Airlift bases was approximately three to four
MEDICAL REMOVALS FROM FLYING
PERCENT
25
20
15
10
5
R
HEIN/M
AIN Al
R BAS
X
-v
Vn
\
A
%^
•^s
JASONDJFMAMJJAS
AIRLIFT
REMOVALS
54
62
78
118
67
t5S
99
110
85
143
66 93
109 50
4i
PERCENT
25
20
15
10
FASSBER
G RAF
STATION
x^i
A
NO USAF
OPERATIC*
s ^"* fc "*-.
---.,'-
***
\
\
JASONDJFMAMJJAS
| AIRLIFT
REMOVALS
34
30
57
ill
12042
50
51
43
57'
[&
times greater than at non-Airlift bases, and during the
winter months was generally in excess ot 10 percent of
the air crew strength, as compared to approximately 2 1/2
percent at non-Airlift bases. These percentages are ex-
pressed graphically in the accompanying charts. The per-
centages do not represent personnel off dufy for the entire
month, but rather the percentage of air crew personnel
that were removed for various reasons during the period.
There is no accurate method of computing time lost for
individuals; however, a minimum loss of five days is a
conservative estimate.
LEGEND
AIRLIFT
NON-AIRLIFT
REMOVALS AT N0N -AIRLIFT BASES
NUMBER
12
7
10
16
22
15
19
23
24
14
12
22
27
9
IS
jASONDJr-MAMJJAt
percent WIESBADEN AIR BASE
251
JASONDJFMAMJJAS
AIRLIFT
REMOVALS
16
60
79
62
22
23
13
31
55 52
50
55
49
47
20
PERCENT
25
20
CELLE RAF STATION
15
10
1
A
/
%
\
./
NO USAF
_J
OPERATIONS „-.-.>
JASONDJFMAMJ JAS
AIRLIFT
REMOVALS
19
|
15 75 126 56 69 56
149
REMOVALS FOR RESPIRATORY DISEASES
RATE
IOOO
800
600
400
200
RHEIN/MAIN AIR BASE
JASONDJ FMAMJJAS
AIRLIFT
REMOVALS
24
30
46
63 44
93
59
52
33
37
46
38
20
RATE
IOOO
800
600
400
200
FASSBERG RAF STATION
Jasondjfmamjjas
AIRLIFT
REMOVALS
17 17
40
73
89
23
10
150
Common respiratory disease and its complications was
the predominate cause of removal from flying. The number
of Airlift personnel removed from flying because of
respiratory disease alone was excessive, being about five
times higher than at non-Airlift bases. The rates of removal
for respiratory disease of Airlift personnel, as compared
to non-Airlift personnel, are shown in charts below. These
rates do not include such complications as aero-otitis
(236 removals), aero-sinusitis, etc.
LEGEND
AIRLIFT
NON-AIRLIFT
REMOVALS AT NON-AIRLIFT BASES
NUMBER
6
1 2 3 8
i 1 1
4
9
5
8
4
1
6
5
3
1
JASONDJFMAMJJAS
rate WIESBADEN AIR BASE
1000
RATE
1000
800
600
400
200
CELLE
RAF STATION
(
1
NO USAF OPERATIONS
— i
"*"•«
-
JASONDJ FMAMJJ*
AIRLIFT
REMOVALS
42
53
27
AIR EVACUATION
Airlift personnel stationed at Celle and Fassberg who
needed hospitalization were originally evacuated to the
97th General Hospital by train or by base aircraft, and in
emergencies were sometimes hospitalized in adjacent
British medical installations. This method was unsatisfactory
due to excessive time lost during rail transportation and
because non-scheduled air evacuation frequently resulted
in aborted missions, delivery of patients to the wrong
destinations, and other irregularities. In March 1949
scheduled air evacuation flights, with air crews containing
a flight nurse and other Medical Department personnel,
were inaugurated on a bi-weekly basis to evacuate pa-
tients from Celle and Fassberg. This procedure continued
until the termination of the Airlift. There was no incidence
of air evacuation aircraft accidents or of loss of patients
in flight. The total number of patients evacuated are
tabulated as follows:
MONTH
PATIENTS
TOTAL PATIENT
MILES FLOWN
TOTAL AIR
EVACUATION
HOURS
March
April
May
June
July
August
51
109
149
103
121
77
12,934
27,985
37,349
29,842
31,086
21,042
67
191
282
180
183
140
TOTAL
610
160,238
1,043
OPERATIONAL FATIGUE
During the period of the Airlift 28 crew members were
removed from flying because of operational fatigue, as
compared with no removals for this cause from other
USAFE bases. There is no method of measuring the
amount of sub-clinical fatigue or the number who sought
relief from flying because of fatigue under the guise of
other symptoms.
MISCELLANEOUS
While respiratory disease was excessive and fatigue
was a considerable factor, other disabilities did not
materially deviate from USAFE or theater averages. The
total removals during the period of the Airlift for the more
common disabilities were as follows:
Cause
Wsbn AB
R/M AB
Fassberg
Celle
Total
Pneumonia
2
6
3
1
12
Tuberculosis
1
3
4
Infectious Hepatitis
9
9
2
3
23
Peptic Ulcer
6
7
1
1
15
Appendicitis
9
5
2
16
Hemorrhoids
13
5
1
4
23
Hernia
1
1
1
3
Skin Diseases
12
41
3
6
62
Aircraft Injuries
7
4
8
3
22
Totals
60
81
21
18
180
CAUSES OF DISABILITIES
RESPIRATORY DISEASES
Over-crowding is considered the single most important
reason for the excessive respiratory rate. During the winter
of 1948 and 1949 a large number of air crews averaged
50 cubic feet or less housing space per individual, as
contrasted with the minimum requirement of 72 cubic feet.
At that time respiratory disability bordered on the vicious
MAKING A BLOOD COUNT
cycle stage, where replacements for the disabled would
add to the over-crowding and intensify the dissemination
of disease. Absence of any serious disabling epidemic,
such as influenza, allowed the Airlift to continue.
In the medical questionnaire comments of air crew
members there were numerous complaints of cold barracks.
The lack of heat in turn fed to keeping windows closed at
all times, thereby further spreading respiratory diseases.
During inclement weather there were frequent occasions
of inadequate shelter. A typical example was the turn-
around operation at Tempelhof and Gatow, wherein crews
would stand in the rain to get their coffee and sandwiches.
Schedules were such that many meals had to be eaten
at snack bars or line messes. Preserving proper nutrition
was difficult.
The initial 5,000 troops who arrived to participate in
the Airlift saw a concomitant arrival of only one medical
officer. This put a severe strain on USAFE medical person-
nel which was slowly rectified as additional Medical
Department personnel arrived. Shortages of doctors made
it almost impossible for a crew member to see a Flight
Surgeon without a period of waiting. Therefore, early
symptoms were neglected, and many of the prophylactic
measures such as medication of early colds were im-
possible to effect.
Completed questionnaires contained frequent remarks
to the effect that cockpit heating was inadequate, either
being too hot or too cold, and that proper temperature
regulation was impossible.
FATIGUE
In the Flight Surgeon's Questionnaire, schedules were
considered unsatisfactory by over 75 percent of the crew
members. Scheduling was largely left to the various
squadrons with the result that there was a wide variation.
The schedule of 12 hours on duty and 24 off used by
several squadrons appeared to be particularly undesirable
as there was continuous alteration between day and night
duty, allowing little time for adjustment. In all schedules
the hours worked were almost always in excess of those
scheduled.
The existing medical facilities of a command cannot
maintain proper medical standards when there is a sizeable
increase in troop strength. Medical components should
accompany major troop movements.
During a continuous operation, lack of guidance and
uniformity in scheduling will lead to the establishment of
routines that contribute to fatigue and lessen resistance to
disease. Schedules should be uniform, allowing sufficient
time off for recreation and attention to personal needs,
and shifts should not be changed at intervals of less than
seven days in order that individuals may adapt to change
in steeping habits.
Individuals sleeping during days suffer constant inter-
ruption if billeted with individuals on other shifts. Segre-
gation of day sleepers is essential to their proper rest.
Concern over families, especially in regard to housing,
contributes to fatigue and lowers effectiveness. Suitable
family housing in a non-combat operation is essential to
air crew adjustment.
In a continuous 24-hour-a-day operation, night crews
have difficulty in procuring regular hot meals, a condition
which in turn compromises their nutritional status and
resistance to disease. Under such circumstances messes
should operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis and meal times
adapted to the schedules.
Lack of temporary shelter, with resultant exposure,
contributes to the respiratory rate. Temporary shelter at
bus stops, at loading and unloading sites, and at outdoor
areas near mess halls and theaters should be included in
construction plans.
Exposure to coal dust and lack of suitable bathing
facilities results in a rise in incidence of skin disease. In
a continuous operation, an adequate supply of hot water
for troop needs should be provided.
In an operation of major magnitude requiring ex-
traordinary effort on the part of participating personnel,
there is a law of diminishing returns where losses through
fatigue and disability increase faster than productive re-
sults. A comparative study of troop disability and opera-
tional returns should be made to determine at what point
proportionate returns diminish.
Among other causes for air crew disabilities, two fac-
tors are worth mentioning:
(1) There was a moderate increase in diarrheal rate as
a consequence of over-crowded messes.
(2) There was a moderate increase in incapacitating
skin conditions in which inadequate hot water in
barracks and coal dust in planes were contribut-
ing factors.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
HOSPITALIZATION
Dispensary level medical care at large Air Force bases,
especially when engaged in an active and important i
flying mission, is inadequate for proper medical support.
The planning phase of any major Air Force operation
should include the establishment and construction of Air
Force hospitals of a size compatible with troop strength.
AIR EVACUATION
Scheduled air evacuation is superior to on-call flights
originating at the bases concerned, and should be
included in preliminary planning.
PHYSICAL DISABILITIES
When a troop population is established in excess of
existing facilities, a rise in physical disabilities can be ex-
pected. Construction of adequate housing prior to
occupancy is essential to proper troop health. Construction
to meet the population needs after occupancy is a less
suitable alternative.
AIR JUDGE ADVOC,
V ^ v
1
Creation of the Berlin Airlift gave rise to many prob-
ems in military justice, military affairs, and allied legal
matters. Because of the non-availability of qualified,
■legally trained personnel, Headquarters 1st ALTF
could not perform the functions necessary for the
efficient operation of courts-martial. For this reason, it
devolved upon Headquarters USAFE to provide tacilities
and personnel to absorb the functions associated with the
exercise of general courts-martial jurisdiction. Officers with
i'fle, if any, previous civil or military legal experience
were integrated into legal duties. After a period of ac-
:elerated on-the-job training at Headquarters USAFE
nese officers, supplemented by regularly assigned legal
dicers, were distributed throughout the command to
achieve effective and expeditious administration of legal
>nd justice affairs.
While the presence of Airlift personnel caused no
appreciable pro-rata increase in courts-martial, the trial
and processing of additional cases required the frequent
presence of regularly assigned Judge Advocates and the
constant attention to, and supervision of, proper processing
of such cases by other assigned personnel. Difficulties of
communications and transportation and absence of Airlift
personnel from legal proceedings resulted in many unusual
delays.
An additional workload was imposed by the necessity
for consideration of arrangements for the use of air fields
under the jurisdiction of friendly nations. In frequent
instances, consultations with British and French officials
were required in order to reach agreement on respective
obligations and benefits.
Other legal problems developed as a direct result of
the rapid transfer of personnel to assignments with the
Airlift. Legal aid was provided to adjust difficulties arising
from sales and purchases of real and personal property,
leases, mortgages, contracts, and probate affairs. Advice
was also given on personal problems connected with
divorce, separation, support and custody of children, and
similar troubles. Alleviation of these causes of irritation
and anxiety, it is felt, eliminated many potentially serious
disciplinary problems.
Operation of the Berlin Airlift helped point out that
many personal problems requiring legal aid and advice
manifest themselves when large numbers of personnel are
added to a command or transferred within the command.
Effecting a solution to each problem emphasized that mili-
tary legal administration must be flexible enough to adjust
to any unusual demands made upon it, and that the Judge
Advocate must constantly be ready to render advice on
transfer of legal personnel as needed.
153
RUSSIAN CHECK POIf
U.S. CHECK POINT.
154
HELMSTADT ZONAL BORDER TRAFFIC CHECK POINT
nday Chronicle
TRIM-ED IN 10MI0-", Jt \.\
,EM*LEY NE«5I'AP£J
rttr JJark $im^
Copyright, 1919, by Th« New York Tlmti Company.
INTERNATIONAL
AIR EDITION
NEW YORK, SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1048
Record
ejrlin in
AS STEEL IS SILENT
Week-End Lag in Negotiations
Union
ATOM CONTROL PUT
T0U.N.BYR0MUL0
AS A 'MUST' ISSUE
Ofienthd Says U. S.
Vi *hm.yAtQm
r^w
post of Small Nations
nbly Should
Question
fle^
.***:
dNK''
o
>\ds
#V^
•ess
a£ e
o
ft
: -.arj(»iP-ftl
Initiation in Tcsai— Founded
mom p&
in Cohesion, April U. M2-E>lMV«d in Dalto, Octobt, 1, 188?
___?gg^^ ,
1 |CIO Retards [those poor old pumpkins
EXPECTED TO GET IT AGAIN
Preside
Lei
$L E «M^m
Attm "^^>fc;zJ 5 . u -S. JL
The public relations aspects encountered immediately
preceding and during the Berlin Airlift were unique. From
the role of an occupational Air Force, USAFE suddenly
became a major factor in a crisis affecting the security of
millions throughout the world. The public world-wide
demanded a complete and accurate account of the
developments and implications of the Airlift. To satisfy
these demands, and to efficiently discharge other phases
of the Public Information mission, it was necessary to
create an expanded PIO net capable of swift dissemination
of facts, anticipation of developments, and satisfying the
ever increasing demands of the press.
PRELUDE
Months before the blockade was imposed, as the in-
ternational and political situation between the Western
nations and the USSR began to deteriorate, additional
Public Information personnel authorizations were requested.
As the tension between the occupying forces in Germany
mounted, the number of press releases in the theater
rose sharply. Proportionately the personnel requirements
of the Public Information Office increased.
An 18 percent addition to the USAFE Headquarters
PIO staff early in 1948 improved the situation consider-
ably. Later in the year, rumors and careless talk, origina-
ting with military personnel and their dependents, re-
sulted in a sharp rise in the number of dependents
returning to the United States. The press, attaching
considerable significance to this action, filed numerous
stories which contributed to a war "scare" within the
United States. The reaction of relatives requesting return
of dependent personnel added considerably to the public
relations problem and for a time the situation was without
a positive solution.
During this period the PIO was primarily concerned
with easing the tension of dependents in order to relieve
pressures which interfered with the overall military effi-
ciency of USAFE. To implement this, measures were
taken to minimize the cause of the anxiety. Meanwhile
the accelerated training of new personnel, both at base
156
and headquarters level, continued.
A crisis in the Berlin situation occurred 5 April 1948
when a Russian fighter crashed into a British airliner over
Berlin. U. S. fighter squadrons were alerted, to escort
cargo and passenger aircraft through the corridors unless
a satisfactory assurance could be obtained from the
Russians that U.S. and British aircraft would be unharmed.
On this date the Public Information Office began func-
tioning on a 24-hour basis, and hundreds of press
inquiries were handled.
THE BLOCKADE
Correspondents from Allied nations throughout the world
began arriving in the Zone in quest of spot coverage of
Airlift activities. The number of press inquiries handled
by Headquarters PIO mounted daily. Public Information
personnel were declared critical, and qualified officers
were requisitioned from the United States. In the meantime
Public Information officers and photographers from USAFE
bases not concerned with the Airlift were ordered to duty
with Headquarters USAFE. During this period it was
necessary to shift to longer duty hours, occasionally ex-
tending to a 24-hour operation.
Before the Airlift was a week old, Soviet-controlled
German newspapers were flooding Germany with propa-
ganda emphasizing its futility and accusing the Allies of
creating false hope for Germans in the western sectors of
Berlin. These papers ridiculed USAFE announcements of
increased tonnage and portrayed the operation to the Ger-
mans as a token gesture. The German people, so
susceptible to propaganda and distrustful of anything
represented as being in their interest, accepted this ridi-
cule as fact.
On 30 June the Commanding General, USAFE, ap-
proved a plan permitting German correspondents, photo-
graphers, and radio commentators to fly aboard Airlift
planes for a period of one month and thus give eyewitness
reports directly to the German people. Within a week,
German reporters from all news media of consequence in
the U.S. Zone had observed that the United States was
doing everything within its power for the people of
western Berlin. This action primarily benefited the position 'o
ol the U.S. Government by severely shaking the convic-
tions of the reading public of the Soviet-sponsored press 'l
In October 1948 the USSR announced that Russian' a
fighters had been ordered to force down any aircraft li
exceeding the 20-mile confines of the corridors leading' ll
into and out of Berlin. So great was the belief that this 1 1
action would touch off the delicate situation that a leading Jr.
wire service dispatched a reporter to full time duty in the it
Public Information Office of Headquarters USAFE to insure it
a scoop on the initial report of air hostilities. I
With the approach of winter, new factors requiring PIO
attention developed. There were questions in the minds ;
of the press and public that were yet to be answered,;!
Could the Airlift continue through the low ceilings and fog j<
of a European winter to supply sufficient food and coal? i
Was it possible to do it even under ideal conditions? ]l
Would the morale of the Airlift men be seriously affected J
by the hardships they were enduring? Were the planes !
wearing out? Would the Soviet interfere? In short, would ,i
the Airlift fail?
The Soviet-sponsored press thought if would, and so /
did some of the aviation experts. In November the Com- .
manding General of USAFE announced, "The Airliff Task Jl
Force can and will continue to supply Berlin just as long i
as necessary, regardless of weather or Soviet interference,'
PLANS
To convey most forcefully and effectively to the
American people the story of the United States Air Force
in the Airlift, the Public Information plan called for a shift
of emphasis from the preparation of handout material to
devoting a maximum of attention to the individual news-
papermen and representatives of all media. Stress was j
placed on making every minute of a visiting correspond- I
ent's time count. This could not be implemented fully until
sufficient trained personnel became available late in the ;
year. At the peak of the Airlift, approximately 60 percent
of the PIO staff were working full time escorting or directly
assisting correspondents by furnishing Air Force informa-
tion or by organizing facilities for their report on the
operation lo the world public.
In the furtherance of this plan the Commanding General,
USAFE, approved a recommendation that United States
and Allied newsmen be permitted to fly aboard Airlift
freighters info Berlin and gain first-hand information on
the operation. Newsmen accompanied an estimated 2,000
flights. Special tours and briefings were given the per-
manent press and correspondents visiting Germany under
the auspices of the United States Air Force. In addition,
the Public Information Office arranged tours and briefings
for numerous other groups.
At the request of the State Department, tours were
arranged for distinguished visitors of the western nations.
Frequently members of the foreign press were included,
and on occasion civic groups from the United States were
conducfed on these fours. Typical of these were the United
Nations Press Corps, the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce
Delegation to the World Conference, and occasional
smaller groups of U.S. citizens who represented only the
normal interest of the American taxpayer in the performance
of his Air Force. No accurate estimate of the thousands
of persons who saw the Airlift in operation can be made.
The PIO plan for Airlift publicity contemplated that
the lift operation would be "open" for inspection 24-
NUMBEF
2000
1500
1000
PHOTO RELEASES
' JASONDJFMAMJ J A J
number ACCREDITED CORRESPONDENTS
375
300
225
150
75
JASONDJFMAMJJAJ
hours a day; consequently, restrictions on U.S. or Allied
visitors to Airlift bases were kept to a minimum com-
mensurate with operational requirements. On occasion,
Lift bases were opened to the German civil population;
this caused the Soviet-sponsored German press consider-
able embarrassment and resulted in increased efforts on
the part of German laborers employed on the Airlift.
The smooth function of the Army-Navy-Air Force Team
and the splendid cooperation achieved by French, British,
and American units were the highlights of fhe Airlift from
the standpoint of Public Information.
PROBLEMS
Lower Echelon Cooperation. The PIO program was
not without minor internal problems. The Combined Airlift
Task Force was never able to develop an efficient system
of furnishing information of a Public Information nature to
USAFE. Frequently it was difficult to secure accurate
routine information for release to the press from the CALTF
Headquarters PIO due to a somewhat formidable system
of clearance enforced within that Headquarters. This handi-
cap was overcome fo a great measure by USAFE Head-
quarters personnel but at the expense of additional man-
hours.
Personnel. The major problem confronted by the Public
Information Office of USAFE was a lack of qualified PIO
personnel in the early days of the Airlift. It was several
monfhs before personnel began to arrive through the
pipeline. During this period all qualified PIO's worked 12
to 18 hours a day including weekends. Even this schedule
was insufficient.
The problem of being confronted with a public relations
situation overnight, far beyond the capabilities of a com-
mand organization normally staffed, is one that should be
anticipated. A crisis of this nature can focus world-wide
attention on the local capability of the United States Air
Force; therefore, public relations must be given immediate
attention to insure complete and accurate dissemination of
all facts of the situation.
When the greatest Air Force story in peacetime broke,
it took too long for PIO help to arrive. One possible
solution would be to increase the flexibility of the entire
USAF PIO organization so that qualified personnel could
be quickly assembled and dispatched on TDY where they
were needed in a matter of a few days or hours. The plan
adopted within USAFE of calling in PIO personnel from
HUU
^
v 1
V
/ \
JJASONDJFMAMJJAS
157
non-Airlift bases to augment the permanent personnel at
the hot spots was highly satistactory. Such a plan could
conceivably work on a larger scale involving commands.
Lack of Motion Picture Facilities. The Airlift created
many situations particularly favorable to newsreel type
coverage. On several occasions USAF sent motion picture
camera teams to cover specific aspects of the Lift. How-
ever, it is believed there was ample material to have
warranted a full time Air Force motion picture cameraman
on duty within the Zone. Headquarters USAFE had re-
>t&^
•$• $$"
u>\ \*
-4
"A* %
*%$
;V
«#»
$*
quested the assignment ot a motion picture cameraman
from USAF as early as August 1948 for the duration of the
operation, but unfortunately this request was not granted.
It is believed the Lift publicity program would have been
more effective had there been additional newsreel type
coverage.
Correspondents Arriving Unannounced. Throughout
the Airlift, the effectiveness of the PIO system of handling
USAF-sponsored correspondents visiting the Zone was
diminished because in many cases prior notification of the
arrival of a correspondent was never received. When this
occurred the correspondent could not be met or properly
briefed regarding Air Force activities. Frequently these
correspondents would proceed to the nearest Army Press
Center, and several days would pass before USAFE would
learn of their presence in the Zone.
With each correspondent operating on a strict time
budget, this delay necessitated a rushed tour of Airlift
bases which invariably omitted many important phases of
Air Force activity. A substantial loss of potential Air Force
publicity was entailed. Repeated efforts to emphasize the
necessity of prior notification from Hq. USAF resulted in
only temporary successes.
<#&?'
<&"
5.*
OV
>
S of>*
*S V»*
&
■A
V
**£
,H
\.
<\&
&*%&*
^
$>
<
■&
^
#■■
&
&*
*&
ctf
158
tf
^
w*:>£^
&
.<&
.<?."
^
&?<$&'
.!»
^v
:fi
&>
,V?
.^f***
^ ^
. , *<%
&^' #S
SUMMARY OF COVERAGE
Correspondents sponsored by the USAF were flown to
Germany and shown all phases of Airlift activity. Their '
observations and reporting, augmenting that of the pen
manent press group, brought the accomplishments ol
USAFE and the RAF into the daily lives of people every-
where.
One wire service alone reported filing an average ol
100 words per day on the Airlift over a period of 15
months. This service has approximately 2,500 newspaper 1
and radio subscribers world-wide and reaches an estimated |
60,000,000 readers in the United States.
The Public Information Office, USAFE Headquarters, J
produced more than 900 news releases and 15,000 photo-'
graphs on the Airlift operation. Radio and television media \
representatives were periodically escorted fo all Lift instal-
lations. Many motion picture shorts and one full-length
feature picture based on the Airlift were made, in addition
to weekly newsreel coverage. Fortune, Life, Saturday
Evening Post, and many others of the so-called "slick"
magazines carried Airlift stories at one time or another.
National Network broadcasts were made frequently from
Berlin and Frankfurt throughout the operation.
A USAFE Public Information Liaison Officer was assigned
to fhe Berlin Press Center in December 1948 fo assure that I
correspondents and observers seeking Air Force in- J
formation received full cooperation while in the blockaded i
area. i
Thoroughly briefed in advance, this officer arrangi
and scheduled the correspondent's itinerary prior to
arrival to include all aspects pertinent to the type of story
or information he was seeking. This officer additionally
served as official USAFE spokesman to the Berlin press
and advised Headquarters USAFE PIO of their interests
and of four-power developments in Berlin in advance of
normal channels.
The Airlift public relations program officially terminated
on 31 September 1949 with the last Airliff flight into Ber-
lin. Several minor PIO projects concerning the operation
still linger, but they are no longer considered the primary
mission of USAFE's Public Information activities.
&XV
<k/ ::.<:
yys
<<t
GENERAL
AjR PROVOST MARSH^T
159
AIR INSPECTOR
FUNCTIONS
The mission of the USAFE Air Inspector, as contained
in Air Force Regulation 123-1, 24 June 1948, is to:
"(1) Inquire into and report upon all matters affecting
the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative
effectiveness of the Air Force and the efficiency,
economy, and adequacy thereof.
(2) Keep appropriate commanders informed on the
current status of matters and conditions affecting
accomplishment of the command mission, includ-
ing the status of training and readiness for combat
of units, crews, and individuals of their commands;
and the causes and results of aircraft accidents
and other deterrents to successful accomplishment
of flying missions.
(3) Provide a facility through which personnel may
personally present to an inspector their questions
and grievances without prejudice.
(4) Assist commanders and their personnel in per-
formance of their duties by supplying information
when appropriate, by suggesting ways and means
of improving practices and procedures, and by
recognizing and reporting meritorious conduct."
No augmentations or deletions in this mission were made
during the period of the Airlift.
ORGANIZATION
During the Airlift the Air Inspection Division, Head-
quarters USAFE, was staffed under the Inspector General
as directed by the regulation mentioned above. At those
stations involved in the Airlift, the Wing-Base Air Inspec-
tion Sections were staffed under authorized Tables of
Organization and Equipment and functioned as directed
by AFR 123-1.
160
OPERATION
The first formal air inspections by a higher head-
quarters of Airlift activities were Survey Inspections con-
ducted by the Air Inspector, USAF, at Rhein/Main and
Wiesbaden Air Bases, at Erding and Oberpfaffenhofen Air
Depots and at three other USAFE non-Airlift units, during
the period 16 September -4 October 1948, prior to
completing the Annual Air Inspection of Headquarters
USAFE. The Air Inspector, USAF, reported:
"Inspection coverage by the Air Inspector, Head-
quarters USAFE, is considered thorough and adequate.
However, the inspection system at base and wing level
is considered weak due to a lack of qualified
personnel."
The USAFE indorsement thereon to the Chief of Staff,
USAF, stated:
"Every effort is being made to obtain qualified inspec-
tion personnel for base and wing level. However, the
experience level of inspection personnel will drop
considerably unless qualified replacements are fur-
nished from sources within the Zone of the Interior
during this fiscal year."
With the increased Airlift commitments and addition of
two air bases in the British Zone, inspection requirements
increased immensely. Established practices and procedures
had to be improved to cope with supply demands. This
action was taken by the Command and Staff Sections of
Headquarters 1st ALTF. These sections continually con-
ducted extensive staff visits and inspections to effect
compliance and improve procedures. Operations and
Training inspections by air inspectors at wing-base level
were practically non-existent due to shortage of qualified
inspectors. The problem of acquiring adequately trained
personnel for all duties, including air inspectors, was acute.
The USAFE Air Inspector was completely occupied with
Annual Air Inspections of Tempelhof, Rhein/Main, and
Wiesbaden Air Bases during the period 19 October- 10
December 1948. Airlift operations were directly supported
administratively and logistically from those air bases;
however, simultaneous inspections of the tactical operation
or functions of the tenant Airlift organizations were not
made at that time. The adequacy of inspections and reports
completed on these supporting air bases revealed thai
a major portion of the recommendations contained therein,
and the follow-up action by successively higher echelons
of command on irregularities and deficiencies reported,
aided materially in the overall accomplishment of the Air-
lift mission.
As a result of the Annual Air Inspection of Wiesbaden
Air Base, a letter was sent to the Commanding General, )
1st ALTF (for Airlift tactical units) and to USAFE wing-base '
commanders, directing utilization of wing-base air I
inspectors to conduct complete quarterly inspections ol ,
all tenant activities operationally assigned to 1st ALTF.
This action resulted in closer coordination between tactical (
units and base activities and, further, the results reduced '
duplication of critically short inspection personnel and re« (
lieved a tense situation developing between tactical
units and wing-base air inspectors.
By February 1949 trained air inspection personnel had
arrived from the Zl in numbers adequate to staff an Air
Inspection Division at Headquarters 1st ALTF and to assign
qualified air inspection personnel to the wing-base air ,
inspection sections at authorized T/O strength. In late |
February the Air Inspection Section of the Task Force '■
began to function. Survey Inspections were conducted on
Airlift units at Rhein/Main, Celle, Wiesbaden, and Tempel- I
hof Air Bases during February and March 1949. In March j
Headquarters USAFE delegated Annual Air Inspection \
responsibility to Headquarters 1st ALTF for units of thai j
command.
The 1st ALTF Air Inspector was primarily concerned j
with the Annual Air Inspections of 1st ALTF units located )
at Wiesbaden, Rhein/Main, Celle, Fassberg, and Tempel- |
hof Air Bases during the period 1 May through 30 July j
1949. The results of these initial Survey Inspections indi-
cated that there was much to be desired insofar as ade- i
quacy and qualification of air inspection personnel at the
base level, and the effectiveness of air inspection. Among •
other matters reported was a case report on the acule
shortage of wing-base air inspection personnel at one
station. Headquarters 1st ALTF immediately took action to
fill this requirement. While Headquarters CALTF occupied
the same physical location as Headquarters 1st ALTF and
certain staff divisions had British elements, the 1st ALTF
Air Inspection System was never extended to cover com-
bined operations.
SPECIFIC PROBLEMS
The Annual Air Inspection of Headquarters 1st ALTF
was conducted by a team of air inspectors under the
USAFE Inspector General during the period 15 March - 15
April 1949 and was preceded by complete Survey In-
spections of all Airlift bases. This inspection again reported
that Headquarters 1st ALTF had been handicapped in the
past by lack of qualified inspection personnel. Head-
quarters USAFE again initiated action to secure adequate
and qualified air inspection personnel.
COMMAND
Considerable disagreement and misunderstanding
existed between the USAFE wing-base organizations and
| e the troop carrier units assigned to 1st ALTF. Many of the
en administrative and logistical functions normally included
II as the responsibility of a headquarters having command
jei iurisdiction were still being performed by Headquarters
oi USAFE. This was due to the fact that functions other than
hose of operations had never been actually delegated to
ce Headquarters 1st ALTF. Channels of command were not
oc generally understood because of the "dual" command
Established.
If was recommended that consideration be given
assigning command jurisdiction of the wing-base
>rganizations at Wiesbaden and Rhein/Main Air Bases to
ommand jurisdiction of Headquarters 1st ALTF.
The Commanding General, USAFE, agreed with the
*bove recommendation and necessary instructions were
«ued for its implementation.
MAINTENANCE
Long range plans for full and economic utilization of
assigned aircraft were not sufficiently developed. Only
minimum maintenance on a day-to-day breakdown basis
was being performed. However, this minimum of main-
tenance being performed (Note chart summarizing aircraft
inspected) was reducing the expected life of these aircraft.
The USAFE Air Inspector recommended that main-
tenance be performed on a controlled long-range policy
and that attention be directed toward "preventive main-
tenance" rather than "breakdown maintenance" when
possible.
PHASE-OUT INSPECTIONS
The Annual Air Inspection of Headquarters USAFE was
conducted by the Air Inspector, USAF, during the period
25 July - 26 August 1949. It was preceded by Special
Inspections of two Airlift bases and the 85fh Air Depot
Wing, as well as three other USAFE non-Airlift units. A
USAF Special Inspection Report dated 5 August 1949 and
covering the 317th Troop Carrier Wing, which was the first
Airlift unit to be deactivated and was phasing out at time
of inspection, included a Special Annex report, "Phase-
Out Observations and Recommendations", which empha-
sized that "earlier and more complete distribution of per-
tinent sections of the phase-out plans to interested staff
activities and to lower echelons would have permitted
smoother initial execution." The USAFE Air Inspector re-
ported on 31 August 1949 that solutions to phase-out
problems encountered by this initial unit were utilized to
advantage in succeeding phases of the Airlift inactivation.
The Air Inspector, USAF, reported:
"'Operation Vittles' which was conducted within this
Command, is the most convincing demonstration of air
power since the war, and did much to enhance the
prestige of the United States and to assist in the at-
tainment of the national objectives. This operation
demonstrated the ability of USAF to perform an
emergency task of major magnitude in a highly credit-
able manner."
Headquarters USAFE placed emphasis during the inac-
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF DISCREPANCIES NOTED DURING INSPECTION
OF 48 AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT
I5 MARCH -2 APRIL 1949
AIRCRAFT STATUS AT TIME
OF SURVEY INSPECTION
ENGINE
DISCREPANCIES
AIRCRAFT GENERAL
DISCREPANCIES
COMMUNICATIONS
DISCREPANCIES
RECORD
DISCREPANCIES
TOTAL
AV/ACFT
TOTAL
AV/ACFT
TOTAL
AV/ACFT
TOTAL
AV/ACFT
TOTAL
AV/ACFT
"INSPECTIONS IN PROGRESS"
AIRPLANES INSPECTED -15
279
19
226
15
136
9
276
18
917
61
"FOLLOWING COMPLETED UNIT INSPECTIONS"
AIRPLANES INSPECTED -13
207
16
177
14
132
10
169
13
685
53
"OUT FOR UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE"
AIRPLANES INSPECTED -15
423
28
233
16
151
10
191
13
998
67
"AIRCRAFT RECEIVED FROM BURTONWOOD"
AIRPLANES INSPECTED -4
100
25
53
13
40
10
56
14
249
62
"AIRCRAFT RECEIVED FROM CONTRACTOR 1000 HR"
AIRPLANES INSPECTED - 1
17
17
II
1 1
9
9
25
25
62
62
TOTAL DISCREPANCIES
1026
700
468
717
2911
AVERAGE DISCREPANCIES
21
15
10
15
Si
161
tivafion phase on inspection activities and the responsibilities
ot all personnel towards completing inactivation responsibi-
lities in an orderly manner. The Vittles Phase-Out Plan
issued 18 July 1949 by Headquarters 1st ALTF contained
a provision that a special overseas movement inspection
would be conducted by that Headquarters of each organi-
zation returning to the Zl. A letter, Headquarters USAFE,
dated 19 August. 1949, subject: "Inspection Jurisdiction of
Units Assigned to 1st Airlift Task Force, APO 633, US Air
Force", delegated the responsibility for performing phase-
out and inactivation inspections of all subordinate units
to the 1st ALTF. These inspections, conducted by the 1st
ALTF Air Inspector during the period 8 August - 29 Sep-
tember 1949, were only advisory in nature, and the
findings were left with the responsible commander for
action without requiring an indorsement. Wing-base air
inspection personnel at Celle and Fassberg Air Bases par-
ticipated in production lines established for final clearance
of personnel and turn-in of all organizational equipment
in the phase-out of those bases. A specialized deactivation
team from Erding Air Depot operated a final inspection,
complete property acceptance, and disposition production
line. This type of phase-out operation assisted immensely
in assuring proper and expeditious deactivation in these
organizations.
On 30 September 1949 the USAFE Air Inspector con-
ducted the final inactivation inspection of Headquarters
1st ALTF. This report concluded that the 1st ALTF had
discharged its responsibilities in the phase-out of its sub-
ordinate units in an expeditious and adequate manner and
determined that adequate action had been taken or plans
were satisfactory for the disposition of personnel, prisoners,
property, funds, real estate, contracts, legal matters, and
records with the exception of fourteen items of unfinished
business. These items were reported directly to Head-
quarters USAFE for completion as Headquarter* 1st ALTF
ceased functioning at 2400 that date.
RESULTS
Through the medium of the air inspection system,
162
commanding officers of Airfift units were informed of con-
ditions affecting the accomplishment of their assigned
missions, economy of operation, and managerial efficiency,
including the commendable aspects thereof. While the
efficiency of such reporting was satisfactory, necessary
corrective and follow-up action by unit commanders to
prevent recurring deficiencies was hampered by the means
available to them and by the shortage of personnel who
had the necessary experience and initiative to accept and
discharge the responsibilities of the grade and position
held. It is believed that the air inspection system was also
helpful by bringing irregularities, deficiencies, and com-
mendable practices to the immediate attention of the
various individuals primarily concerned, thus serving to
assist on-the-job training.
Personal conference periods were scheduled and con-
ducted in conjunction with all Annual and Quarterly Air
Inspections. Complaints were also accepted by air inspec-
tors at any time. They reached an all time Airlift high in
June 1949 with a total of 83 complaints. Of this number,
19 were justified, 10 unjustified, and 54 were requests for
information. Majority of complaints were:
(1) Uncertainty of duration of temporary duty (TDY)
status.
(2) Shortage of family-type quarters.
(3) Uncertain delays in arrival of dependents.
(4) Unwarranted and unfair delays in arrival of
personal baggage.
CONCLUSIONS
Air inspection sections authorized under the present
Wing-Base T/O&E, are not adequate to accomplish air
inspection requirements effectively in an Airlift operation
committed to deliver the maximum tonnage possible.
The establishment and build-up of the air inspection
system should be proportionate to and concurrent with the
augmentation of any other activity rather than months later.
The air inspection system should endeavor to operate
in a similar manner to preventive maintenance, rather than
as a "Monday morning quarterback," in order that
necessary corrective and helpful action can be initiated
early enough to prevent development of serious condi-
tions. |
Air inspection should be welcomed as an opportunity I
to obtain a commendation and regarded in the same light /
as an inoculation against disease. Such inoculations sting
initially but results may prevent a disheartening epidemic. ]
AIR PROVOST MARSHAL
MISSION
Throughout the Airlift operation, the mission of the Air ,
Provost Marshal Division was supervision and formulation
of major policies on all matters pertaining to provost
marshal activities and supervision and inspection of all
matters pertaining to law and order and the enforcement
of internal security. The additional responsibility for fbe
security function of determining the loyalty and character i
fitness of all AF military and civilian personnel and re- i
porting the results of completed investigations was
assumed in December 1948.
ORGANIZATION
The responsibilities of the Air Provost Marshal during
the first seven months of the Airlift operation were ac-
complished through direct contact with wing or base com-
manders and through liaison with the air provost marshals
in the field. In February 1949 an air provost marshal was
assigned to the office of the Inspector General, Headquar-
ters 1st ALTF, and supervision of all provost marshal func-
tions within Airlift units was delegated to that office, which
functioned until 1 August, at which time the Inspector
General absorbed the functions because of early phase-
out plans.
Just prior to the beginning of the Airlift the provost
marshal function was transferred under the provisions of
'^ AF Letter 20-4 from A-1 (now Deputy Chief of Staff,
* Personnel) to the Inspector General. At that time the Air
Provost Marshal had under its direction two sections. The
'"y first of these was the law enforcement section of air
3^' police and auxiliary guards; the auxiliary guards were
n 9l Polish Guards (Polish nationals) and Industrial Police (Ger-
llc I man nationals). The second Air Provost Marshal section
(was the confinement and correction section, with responsi-
bility for supervision of guardhouses and rehabilitation of
prisoners. In December 1948 the Air Provost Marshal
I assumed the responsibilities of security, which up to that
time had been under the supervision of the Director of
Intelligence. From the beginning of the Airlift to March
' 1949 the Air Provost Marshal office, Headquarters USAFE,
! almost doubled in size, due to the increase in the number
Or 'of serious incidents and the additional workload acquired
3d ) with the loyalty investigation program.
islj During the initial phase of the Airlift, the requirements
ill I in personnel and transportation at the base level in the
American zone were met by air police squadrons and air
provost marshals assigned to the Airlift bases. Generally,
as the strength of these bases increased, the air police
J squadrons were increased. Air police guard responsibilities
is I were augmented at Rhein/Main, Wiesbaden, and Tempel-
i hof Air Bases by Polish Guards and Industrial Police,
| whose duties were confined to internal guard for the pro-
I tection of government property and personnel.
I When the bases at Fassberg and Celle in the British
I zone were established, the requirements for air police
9 personnel first appeared to be less, due to the presence
| of allied military police. It was found, however, that Ameri-
■I can airmen could not be successfully and fully controlled
s l by allied military police, and that the same complement
io{ air police would be required, based on the number
j °' personnel, as was required on bases in the American
■j zone.
j 'he influx of personnel for the operation consisted
mainly f pilots, crewmen, and mechanics. Consequently,
| "* procurement of qualified trained air police left much
be desired, and relatively large portions of air police
squadrons were unfrained basics. Military police schools
W,thln ,ne zone were utilized to the fullest extent to bring
these squadrons up to the desired qualifications. Trans-
portation and equipment resources such as jeeps, trucks,
sidearms, etc. were obtainable in an adequate amount.
OPERATIONS
LAW ENFORCEMENT
Inasmuch as discipline depends primarily on morale,
which is in turn influenced by living and working con-
ditions and recreational facilities, activities pertaining to
enforcement constituted a major problem within the Air-
lift installations. Considering the great influx of TDY
personnel, however, most of whom had departed from
their permanent stations without adequate preparations
for care of their families and personal matters, the rate
of major violations could not be considered excessive.
A study of the AWOL rate for USAFE reveals
some decrease beginning with July 1948 when the Airlift
came into being. This decrease was consistent throughout
SS AWOL RATES
150
125
100
75
50
25
16 MONTH AV
PRIOR TO
AIRLIFT
.1
/
JJAS0NDJFMAMJJAJ
i
the duration of the operation. Many explanations could be
advanced for the condition, but the most plausible would
appear to be the fact that the personnel generally were
well impressed with the mission of the Airlift and were
relatively busy as compared to normal peacetime employ-
ment in routine training.
The American VD rate at Fassberg and Celle,
although high, was not alarmingly so. The British
cooperated whole-heartedly in picking up loose German
women for necessary medical examination and confine-
ment when required. Steady progress in the control of
vice was made as air police became better trained and
commanding officers, chaplains, and character guidance
councils took a greater interest in the subject. The VD
rate declined perceptibly during the last months of the
Airlift.
Because of Berlin's isolation, certain necessities, espe-
cially cigarettes, candy, coffee, and cooking fats, became
very valuable to the German population and were there-
in
16 MONTH AV
PRIOR TO -
AIRLIFT
.*■
s
■**
\
\
J A S N D JFMAM
A S
163
fore considered attractive items for black market or illegal
trade. To prevent the use of Airlift aircratt for illegal trans-
port of these items into Berlin, air police were used to
search all aircraft baggage and packages transported info
Tempelhof, Tegel, and Gatow. Items found in excess of
personal needs or in commercial amounts and suspected
of being brought in for illegal trade were impounded.
This measure had the desired effect of eliminating the use
of aircraft for black market activities. Disciplinary action
taken against personnel who were reported for violation,
while not always of sufficient force to deter others at the
beginning, was of such nature that in the latter phase of
the operation very few violations were noted.
In January 1949 the serious incident branch was
established within the Air Provost Marshal. This section is
responsible for receipt and preparation of reports on
"serious incidents" and for weekly or daily follow-up
depending on the nature of the case. All serious incidents
are required to be reported from the field within 48 hours
J J
t
i s
c
*
1 c
V
F
k
t
.. IV
I 1
ll
t>
S
after the occurrence. They include:
a. All felonies in which the following type of personnel
are known or suspected to be involved or impli-
cated:
(1) US military or civilian occupational personnel
and/or their dependents.
(2) Allied military and civilian personnel who are
employed by, serving with, or accredited to
the US occupation forces and/or their de-
pendents.
(3) Any other person under US military control.
b. Motor vehicle accidents in which government or
privately owned vehicles registered with EUCOM are in-
volved, which result in death, serious injury, hit and run
incidents, or property damage in excess of $100.00.
The serious incident rate declined as did the AWOL
rate, as evidenced by the figures in the table below, until
September 1949. At that time operations had practically
ceased and some personnel again had ample time to get
into trouble, in spite of training schedules provided at
several bases.
CONFINEMENT AND CORRECTION
Due to the Air Force policy of confining only those
who were habitual repeaters or who had committed a
more serious crime, the prisoner rate was kept relatively
low at Airlift bases. Only those were confined where it
would have been prejudicial to the Air Force and to good
discipline not to have done so.
A study was made in the spring of 1949 relative to the
establishment of a command rehabilitation center for all
command garrison prisoners. Due to the low prisoner rate
and the short terms of confinement, it was decided that
a rehabilitation program designed for the individual base
guardhouse would accomplish the same end.
SECURITY
Early in December 1948 the screening of German na-
tionals became the responsibility of the Air Provost
USAFE AIR POLICE WORKED i
TO COMBAT CRIME. PMH
Marshal. At the same time the responsibility for procuring
personnel clearances of civilian and military personnel
was assumed.
To insure the proper placement of German nationals, l
screening centers were established throughout the com- i
mand under the supervision of fhe Air Provost Marshal. |
At Celle and Fassberg this screening responsibility rested
with the British. Labor Service Companies in the American
zone, formed to do the necessary loading and unloading
at Airlift bases, were screened by Headquarters EUCOM
before being sent to an air base to perform their assigned
mission.
As the strength of Airlift bases rose, the need for
personnel security clearances increased. From a mode:
beginning, the need for personnel securify investigatioi
increased to an average of 97 per month for the peril
January through September 1949 with a peak of 15
the month of May 1949.
164
■'"'■'"■: ; .'-
THE CIVILIAN GUARDS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICE
CONSTITUTED AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY FORCE AT AIRLIFT
BASES.
AUXILIARY GUARDS
Two fypes of auxiliary guards, the Civilian Guards
; (Polish) and the Industrial Police (German) were on hand
to supplement air police strength in accomplishing se-
curity needs at the U. S. zone Airlift bases. These guards
were strengthened and made more effective by the utili-
zation of guard dogs in perimeter and storage areas.
Both types of auxiliary guards were furnished with
guard dogs which were purchased from, and very ex-
cellently trained by, EUCOM Quartermaster Dog School
at Darmstadt. It has been found that for certain fypes of
duty, one man with a properly trained dog is more effec-
tive than two, or even three, men without dogs. The effec-
tive range of a perimeter guard post may in some cases
be extended two or three times by addition of a guard
dog. Of a total USAFE guard dog strength of 175 dogs,
approximately 50 were used for Airlift security.
CONCLUSIONS
If a commander is to be kept informed on the state
of discipline of his command, a sufficient air provost
marshal reporting system must be completely installed as
expeditiously as possible. As increasing administrative
responsibilities were assumed by the Air Provost Marshal,
his facilities in personnel and equipment should have been
increased in order to keep the Commanding General fully
informed at all times. Loyalty checks of any value were
difficult to make because of these shortages. With his
limited facilities, the greatest value of the Air Provost
Marshal to the command was his frequent field visits and
inspection-instructions.
As revealed by USAFE inspection reports and substan-
tiated by field visits and special inspections, the qualify
of air police was considerably below the standard set by
Hq. USAF. Careful screening to weed out the undesirables
should have been accomplished prior to assignment to
AF squadrons. None the less, this screening had to be
done constantly with few replacements available.
The quality of air provost marshals and air police
officers, on the other hand, was high; without such quality
a grave disciplinary problem would have resulted.
Base commanders generally accepted the principles
of the new concept — that is, the inspection and reporting
functions of the wing air provost marshal. Because of the
shortage in the beginning, air provost marshals sometimes
wore two hats, acting both as wing air provost marshals
and as air police squadron commanders. This dual func-
tion was eliminated as rapidly as additional air police of-
ficers became available.
The value of the Polish Guards and Industrial Police
cannot be too heavily stressed. Without these personnel
for added guard duties, the pilferage rate would have
been so high as to make the entire Airlift effort almost
too costly to continue.
In spite of a shortage of air provost marshals and air
police officers, the Military Personnel Branch at the base
level, with the approval of the base commander in several
instances, assigned officers in the primary MOS of 9100 to
entirely different tasks. Such malassignments were not
infrequent; to prevent them, the interested staff officer
should be consulted by military personnel for recommen-
dations as to assignments of officers qualified in such a
critical specialty.
The lack of regard by many officers and airmen in
illegally using Airlift aircraft for black market purposes
was particularly discouraging, and only the most drastic
measures ultimately cured the situation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The necessity for the immediate assignment of an Air
Provost Marshal with sufficient staff to keep the com-
mander of a task force informed of the state of discipline
of his command is paramount. On an equally important
basis is the necessity for immediate airtight security.
The highest type of trained air police is required in an
extensive special operation. No time is available to train
such raw recruits as were often assigned to air police
squadrons. The procurement of specialists in the air police
field deserves as careful planning as does the procurement
of personnel in maintenance, supply, and administrative
specialties.
The wing-base responsibility for discipline should be
impressed on all officers at each command level down
through that of the squadron.
I* ^
GUARD DOGS TRIPLED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AUXILIARY
GUARDS.
*165
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
The Office of Special Investigafions is an agency of
fhe Inspector General, USAFE, charged wifh the duty of
preventing, suppressing, and investigating major crimes,
other violations of public trust, prejudices to good military
order, and subversive and related activities; in addition,
it is charged with the exploitation of positive intelligence
sources within the jurisdiction of USAFE.
ORGANIZATION
During fhe period of the Airlift's operation the Office
of Special Investigations, USAFE, as such, barely came
into being. Its investigative activities were carried on,
SUMMARY OF MAJOR CRIMES INVESTIGATED
TYPE OF CRIME
JJASONDJFMAMJJAS
HOMICIDE
A
3
6
1
4
4
A
6
3
6
6
4
4
1 1
2
SUICIDE
1
1
1
1
1
SEX OFFENSES
1
2
4
6
1
5
4
ASSAULTS
2
1
1
1
S
6
7
4
LARCENY
3
7
4
6
2
4
5
3
8
5
8
3
4
4
e
1
ROBBERY
2
1
4
1
1
1
i
3
BURGLARY & UN-
LAWFUL ENTRY
?.
5
z
2
1
1
3
3
6
2
2
3
SUB TOTAL
VIOLENCE
5
16
10
16
7
8
15
9
16
//
20
16
27
19
34
17
FRAUD
(COUNTERFEIT)
1
1
1
1
1
1
2S
24
14
17
6
8
5
IMPERSONATION
1
NARCOTICS
1
1
2
1
BLACK MARKET
2
1
1
1
COUNTERFEIT
3
3
4
16
1 1
i
e
SMUGGLING
2
1
i
7
e
2
OTHERS
3
3
4
4
1
3
6
28
2
25
23
15
17
10
TOTAL
5
huh
20
19
25
17
28
30
20
25
76
55
55
68
40
60
J4
1 66 IIIH::
however, by its predecessors, the Army's 31st Military
Police Criminal Investigation Detachment (later the Air
Force Criminal Investigation Detachment) and the 7020th
Air Force Counter Intelligence Unit. On 1 July 1949 these
organizations were brought together under one staff
agency and on 1 September were redesignated as the Of-
fice of Special Investigations, USAFE.
Security restrictions prohibit the setting forth of the
actual requirements for an organization of this type. It
may be said, however, that there was not a sufficient
allotment of trained personnel at any period of the Airlift
to do a completely effective job, nor could necessary
normal and special items of equipment be provided to
aid the teams in the field. There was a serious lack of
transportation for investigative activities, and though a
complete crime laboratory was needed for CID work, only
one item of technical equipment was available and the
rest had to be furnished on a personal ownership basis.
The lack of personnel and equipment for this non-T/O
organization continued to hamper the efforts of the
organization throughout the Airlift.
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE UNIT
Very little may be said of the actual activities of the
Counter Intelligence Unit but a general outline of its duties
may be given. It was charged with the security of all of
the air bases. Its mission included the conducting of
security checks of personnel and of administrative security
procedures. It acted in an advisory capacity to the unit
commanders on matters of unit security. It investigated
cases ot subversion, sabotage, disaffection, and related
acts.
The increase in USAFE personnel necessary to meet
the demands of Airlift operations resulted in a marked
increase in major crimes. This upsurge was dispropor-
tionate to fhe increase in personnel as indicated by the
accompanying chart. Whereas crime incidents were
doubled, personnel increased only 50 per cent.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusions to be drawn from a study of case
histories of criminal incidents attributable to the Airlift
leads to the following recommendations:
The requisitioning of OSI personnel for an expanded]
operation should be considered an integral part of ex-
pansion plans. A comparable increase in pertinent equip- \
ment and in confidential funds should be similarly included,!
All personnel should be indoctrinated by unit com-ii
manders in fhe importance of security in connection with >
the special operation.
All indigenous civilian personnel who are to be used
in a special operation should be properly screened be-
fore employment.
CRIMES INVESTIGATED VERSUS PERSONNEL STRENGTH
PERCENT
350
300
250
CASES
TREND
ISO
100
50
STRENGTH
TREND
vJ-
*"**
N \
I*
X
</
100% EQUALS ASSIGNED
VALUE OF JAN-JUN 1948
AVERAGE. TREND LINES
SHOW PERCENT OF AVERAGE.
JJ.ASONDJFMAMJJAS
167
The Comptroller System established in Headquarters
USAFE was assigned the responsibility for assembling,
evaluating, and presenting to the commanders the essen-
tial elements of information necessary for effective con-
trol and management of Airlift operations. These respon-
sibilities were partially delegated to Comptroller agencies
at Headquarters 1st ALTF and to each Airlift base. This
system performed the technical functions of reporting,
budgeting, disbursing, and costing.
The Airlift afforded probably the first real opportunity
to observe the performance of the recently established
USAF Comptroller System under an emergency situation
of extended duration. The experience gained thereby
is presented in this chapter.
The accountability for supplies and funds for Airlift
activities is a special subject more fully covered in other
chapters. From the Comptroller viewpoint several instances
of laxity and negligence were revealed. This was parti-
cularly true in connection with the clean-up activities near
the end of phase-out operations involving terminal
audits of military property accounts and final audits of
non-appropriated funds. Recogniring the emergency na-
ture of the initial establishment of Airlift bases, par-
ticularly in the British zone, a much tighter control of
supply accounting and administration of non-appropriated
funds must be anticipated and provided in the future.
BUDGET AND FISCAL ACTIVITY
Preparation and support of budgetary estimates and
'central control of funding operations for the Airlift
organizations of USAFE were the responsibility of the
(Budget and Fiscal Directorate, DCS/Comptroller, Head-
| quarters USAFE, during the entire life of the "Vittles"
project. This staff agency was also responsible for insur-
ing the audit of non-appropriated funds of the Airlift
; organizations.
FUNDING STRUCTURE
To appreciate the fiscal responsibilities and functions
I of USAFE organizations in support of the Airlift, it is
necessary to understand the general funding structure
I whereby the command is provided with resources to sus-
tain its operation. The life blood of the financial structure
consists of Dollars from the U. S. economy and Deutsche
Marks from occupied Germany.
The first and principal source of support for operation
ot USAFE is, of course, the American taxpayer, who,
through Congress, authorizes appropriations of funds to
maintain the Air Force.
Budgetary and fiscal control responsibilities for the
major portion of the appropriated funds used to finance
such items as military personnel, aircraft, vehicles, pe-
troleum products, uniforms, etc., are handled through cen-
tral administering and procurement agencies and not
allocated to the operating units.
Other items charged to the dollar appropriations which
can be more economically financed from funds at the dis-
posal of the local commanders, such as U. S. civilian per-
sonnel, temporary duty travel, and minor items of supply,
are funded from amounts allotted through echelons of
command to the local field organizations. It is this type
of item for which the command has funding responsibilities.
The other source of support for the occupation forces
m Europe is derived from assessment of the German
economy. Such support, usually referred to as the Deutsche
Mark Budget, includes all items obtainable from Germany
Pessary fo support the occupation. The German support
budget is sub-divided into two principal categories —
the Occupation Cost Budget and the Non-Occupation Cost
Budget. Occupation Cost Deutsche Mark funds are derived
from the German economy and provide for normal U. S.
military occupation costs in Germany. Non-Occupation
Cost Deutsche Mark funds are also provided by the Ger-
man economy; however, they are expended for the direct
benefit of the German nation. Practically all items financed
by the German economy for direct support of the Airlift,
including construction, personnel, and supply items, were
charged to non-occupation funds.
The total cost of USAFE participation in operation
"Vittles" is presented in the section on Cost Control and
Analysis. Of the total cost of this operation, approximately
47 million Deutsche Marks and 330 thousand dollars was
obligated against funds made available in an allotted sta-
tus to Headquarters USAFE.
From a fiscal standpoint, the Airlift closely approximated
a wartime operation, inasmuch as its success transcended
practically all budgetary considerations. While budgetary
estimates were carefully prepared, activities in support
of the Airlift mission were not necessarily limited to man-
power ceilings and budget programs. This condition was,
of course, much more prevalent during the earlier period
of the Airlift than in the later phases when requirements
began to stabilize and standards were developed.
ORGANIZATION
From the beginning of the Airlift operation, only rel-
atively minor difficulties were experienced in discharging
budget and fiscal responsibilities, from a trained per-
sonnel standpoint, as three of the major terminus bases,
i. e., Rhein/Main, Wiesbaden, and Tempelhof, were staffed
with experienced budget and fiscal organizations. A
small budget and fiscal office was established at Head-
quarters 1st ALTF to serve in a liaison and advisory capac^
ity only, as funds were not allotted through that head-
quarters to the operating units in the field. Close coordina-
tion was maintained with Headquarters 1st ALTF, but
the actual funding channels were directly between
Headquarters USAFE and the various participating bases.
The 1st ALTF exercised full jurisdiction over only the
operational elements af such bases.
The participating installations in the British zone of
occupied Germany, Celle and Fassberg, were funded un-
der an agreement with the British whereby the United
Kingdom assumed full financial responsibility for all Air-
lift cost in the British zone chargeable to Deutsche Marks
derived from the German nation. Conversely, the United
States assumed responsibility for Airlift expenses incurred
af American zone installations chargeable to the Deutsche
Mark budget program. This simplified funding agreement
proved very effective and avoided many complications
which would likely have arisen under other possible ar-
rangements. Several areas, however, were not clarified in
the initial agreement from a budget and fiscal standpoint,
due primarily to the fact that budget and fiscal techni-
cians did not participate in drafting the original agreement.
AUDIT OF NON-APPROPRIATED FUNDS
Due largely fo the rapid establishment of clubs and
messes occasioned by the great influx of U. S. personnel
af Celle and Fassberg, a few special problems developed
regarding the proper supervision and control of non-
appropriated funds. A survey indicated that many of the
169
club and mess funds were in chaotic condition and that,
in some instances, no records ot monetary transactions
were being maintained. This situation was attributed
largely to the inexperience of the custodians, who were
usually newly-assigned personnel charged with a number
of other duties. Careful monitoring of the funds, however,
resulted in correction of minor irregularities, and quarterly
audits showed continued improvement in their operation.
In March 1949, a gradual increase was evident in the
net worth of many of the club and mess funds, partially
caused by the fact that German labor costs were borne by
the British DM appropriated funds. The auditors from USAFE
suggested to the custodians that reductions in net worth
should be made so that members might benefit from the
favorable financial condition. Until August 1949, however,
when Celle and Fassberg RAF stations were alerted for
close-out, a majority of the club and mess funds still
showed large net worths. From this close-out date, main-
tenance of records deteriorated as a result of rapid changes
in personnel, and funds were in some instances spent so
rapidly as to constitute unlawful dissipation of monies.
CONCLUSIONS
Continuing careful analysis should be made of obliga-
tions incurred at installations participating in or supporting
operational projects of great magnitude to determine the
amounts attributable to the direct and indirect support of
such special operations. This is essential in order to
prepare adequate budgetary estimates, evaluate per-
formance, and prepare interim and post operational re-
ports.
Funding agreements between nations and other gov-
ernmental departments, where applicable, should be
reached prior to or as soon as possible after commence-
ment of special operations such as the Berlin Airlift. Such
agreements should clearly indicate financial responsibilities
within various funding areas.
Administration and control of funding operations
should be restricted to previously established channels
170
wherever possible and not delegated to temporary task
force organizations.
Extreme care should be given during the initial phase
of a special operation to insure that policies and pro-
cedures controlling non-appropriated fund administration,
as well as personnel assigned, are adequate to cope with
a rapid growth of such activities due to a large influx of
personnel.
FINANCE DISBURSING ACTIVITIES
During the period of the Berlin Airlift, the finance ac-
tivities of the Comptroller were carried on in Headquarters
USAFE by the Directorate of Finance. Specific functions
for which the Directorate was held responsible included
payment of all USAFE personnel, and review of and re-
commendations on matters pertaining to loss of funds,
and loss, damage, or destruction of public property.
PAYMENT OF PERSONNEL
Payment of Airlift personnel was made through num-
bered finance disbursing units. Each of these units serviced
a specific area, and they were made operative as the
Airliff expanded. Continuous influx of personnel necessi-
tated that these units operate at peak load capacity, and
in some instances the work load excee'ded 300 percent
of previous norms.
It was necessary to operate under the increased work-
load with only slight increases in personnel, and in June
1949 it was further necessary to discontinue the 317th Unit
as an Accountable Disbursing Office because of the
shortage of disbursing officers. In spite of these diffi-
culties, payment of personnel was effected on time and in
accordance with prescribed regulations and directives.
PER DIEM
One of the primary and most demoralizing problems
arose from the inconsistency of travel orders under which
personnel from other commands were placed on temporary
duty with the Airlift. Although duties of the personnel from
a finance standpoint were identical, some personnel were
authorized per diem and others were not. Some com
mands, including MATS, had issued instructions for oper-
ational units to charge per diem to open allotments; otheri
commands had directed the charge to their respective re-J
stricted allotments; and still other commands had issuedl
instructions that no per diem be paid. The EUCOM policy)
prohibited authorization of per diem for personnel travel- 1
ing on TDY within the European Command who were)
assigned to any base in the command. j
Pursuant to a request of the Commanding General,j
USAFE, Headquarters USAF on 2 September 1948 advised!
all Air Force commands to amend existing orders so as to
discontinue per diem allowance for all personnel conned-,'
ed with Operation Vittles and eliminate the discrimination^
This action established a consistent Air Force-wide policy'
REPORTS OF SURVEY
During the first four months of Airliff operations
emphasis was placed on the utilization of reports of sur-j
vey in the adjustment of military property accounts be-'i
cause field follow-up disclosed that insufficient use was i
being made of these documents. Further review of reports.
PAYMENT OF PERSONNEL WAS EFFECTED PROPERLY
ON TIME. ' "' ^B -.
of survey from all Airlift stations indicated that there was
either a lack of technically qualified supply personnel, or
lhat supply accounting was not being rigidly maintained.
CONCLUSIONS
Finance activities require specialized training, and
many difficulties arise when operations are attempted with
only inexperienced personnel available. Experience during
the Airlift has shown that flexibilities must be introduced
into the finance organizations which will permit service to
Iroop units even when personnel assignments are changing
rapidly.
Air Force personnel under orders to participate in an
activity paralleling combat conditions, field exercises, or
maneuvers should be authorized per diem only to and
■ rom the location of such activity, wherever it may occur
01 COST CONTROL & ANALYSIS
:t
V' Particular interest and concern was shown by Head-
quarters USAF regarding the cost of the Airlift operation,
primarily in view of its budgetary implications. In order to
1 meet this requirement the USAF Cost Control System was
'"immediately expanded and applied to the Airlift activi-
lies.
DEVELOPMENT
Plans had just been completed for the initiation of the
USAF Cost Control System in USAFE on 1 July 1948.
Four days after the inception of the Airlift a survey was
""ade to implement cost reporting, to cover the addi-
tional special requirements peculiar to Airlift activities.
Among the problems encountered was the lack of ex-
perienced cost personnel and training information - no
cost reporting manuals were available. Required personnel
wer e drawn from all available sources, mainly from Sta-
tical Services, but also from surplus navigators. Necessary
AF cost reporting forms were reproduced and personnel
and equipment were assembled with minimum delay. The
adaptability of the USAF Cost Control System was indi-
cated by the fact that beginning 15 July 1948, actual cost
data from Airlift operations were abstracted and reported
to Headquarters USAF every ten days. The requirement
for these frequent reports was established by Headquarters
USAF during the early phase of the Airlift, when the in-
terest was at a high pitch, to keep the top staff currently
informed of cost developments.
OPERATION
The requirement for 10-day cost reporting was dis-
continued 31 October 1948. Thereafter and until the
phase-out, Airlift cost data were submitted with the re-
gular monthly cost control reports. Bases which were
devoting all their efforts to the Airlift submitted only the
regular cost reports; however, bases which devoted only
a part of their efforts to the Airlift submitted separate data
for Airlift and non-Airlift activity, with costs computed on
a proportionate basis.
To insure uniformity and accuracy of cost data, a sys-
tem of field auditing was established with immediate
beneficial results. During the early part of 1949 officers
and airmen trained in the special courses on cost report-
ing at Lowry Field began to arrive and were assimilated
into the cost system.
ANALYSIS
The cost data assembled and graphically portrayed on
the adjoining charts represents the Airlift costs of USAFE
and does not include the Airlift costs incurred by other
USAF Commands and activities.
The initial emphasis in cost analysis was placed on
breakdowns of base costs by function. Later, month-to-
month costs per ton, per plane-mile, and per ton-mile
were compiled and graphed with total monthly and ac-
cumulated tonnage and costs, to reflect trends in com-
parative cost and production.
As the daily tonnage increased and the Airlift settled
into a semi-permanent organization, a method was
established to stimulate productivity and to measure ef-
ficiency. In order that unit commanders could scrutinize
cost factors in comparison with Airlift groups, total cost
factors were segregated into the following three opera-
tional classifications:
Direct Flying Costs. Group operational costs which
rise and fall in direct proportion to tonnage airlifted —
on a comparable basis to the Air Transport Association's
"Civilian Airlift Breakdown."
Indirect Base Costs. Overhead service costs which
are relatively stable, regardless of the day-to-day fluc-
tuations in tonnage hauled.
Support Costs. Services rendered by off-the-base
installations (excluding Zone of Interior) over which the
group commander exercises no control from a cost stand-
point.
A monthly recapitulation of these cost breakdowns
showing cost per ton and per ton-mile by group was in-
augurated early in 1949, and the information was there-
after furnished to group commanders with appropriate
remarks for further analysis and necessary action.
CONCLUSIONS
One of the outstanding results of the establishment of
cost reporting for Project "Vittles" has been the accumula-
tion of total cost data of the entire operation. Statistics
gathered and tabulated will be of invaluable aid in bud-
geting for such an operation. However, a greater degree of
efficiency and savings might have been realized had there
been adequate personnel for further analysis of functional
cost and aggressive application of such evaluations.
The standardized cost reporting system permitted a
fair comparison of the information obtained therefrom and
resulted in better control of Airlift expenditures. It may
be concluded that while there were slight deviations from
standard cost procedures during the first few months, such
discrepancies were shortly rectified: Statistics accumula-
ted indicate a satisfactory accounting of project costs.
171
USAFE COST OF BERLIN AIRLIFT
COSr OF ML/FT W//LD\
COST OF AIRLIFT
Monthly Cost of the Airlift
-173
CONSOLIDATED AIRLIFT DOLLAR COSTS
COST DESCRIPTION
COST CODE
TOTAL COST
HQ 1st ALTF
Wl ESBADEN
TEMPELHOF
RHEIN/MAIN
FASSBER6
CELLE
ERDIN6
OBERPFAFFEN-
HOFEN
BURTONWOOD '
COMMANDER & STAFF
OI05I
1 459 463
289 521
86 100
125 713
451 708
229 261
167 186
83 421
—
26 553 \
ADMIN. £» SERVICES OH.
02061
1 093 703
1 1 8 861
12 1 830
38 717
277 687
159 980
1 70 676
174 791
—
31 161 -
MOTOR POOL
02136
1 624 482
—
134 240
82 393
630 032
338 701
161 1 26
208 459
18 373
5 1 158 \
BASE OPERATIONS
02142
1 072 685
4 942
139 145
251 450
503 291
93 316
34 038
20 556
4 022
2 1 925 r
WEATHER SERVICES
02144
579 848
—
170 990
121 962
224 631
14 516
30 612
10 560
—
6 577 \
A ACS & CONTROL TOWER
02146
2 490 270
—
392 154
538 74 1
1 159 523
229 596
103 236
19 740
—
47 280 -
TRAFFIC
02148
510 277
2 336
109 550
65 233
21 4 778
77 176
33 561
4 684
—
2 959
MISC. SERVICES
02150
3 343 674
77 232
220 047
228 471
1 225 546
540 1
477 1 19
434 985
463
139 801
INSTALLATIONS
02261
1 502 801
484
137 565
387 748
615 212
74 908
82 732
128 231
26 697
49 224 '
MAINT-AUTO E. EQUIP.
02302
709 061
54 206
64 723
287 982
133 325
67 553
70 543
1 8 835
1 1 894
MAINT.-ADMIN. AIRCRAFT
02306
248 391
—
70 766
3 451
1 3 706
65 425
3 2 957
58 340
—
3 746
MEDICAL
03277
501 178
1 102
44 069
36 720
180 644
78 222
80 822
53 179
—
26 420
UNDISTRIBUTED CHARGES
0415 1
8 354 734
170 950
805 577
425 293
3161 329
1 585 534
1 162 219
677 636
II 3 844
2 52 352
MAINT & SUPPLY OH.
05050
507 375
35,507
56 209
13 598
126 531
86 357
102 828
34 976
3 338
48 031
MAINT.— AIRCRAFT
05102
2 458 227
178 298
25 250
1 293 360
218 165
267 530
475 624
MAINT OTHER
05104
462 1 16
10 180
143 924
134 675
158 380
4 334
6 416
4 207
OTHER MAINTENANCE
05260
380 663
12 443
71 849
39 681
149 37 9
50 574
40 743
2 791
10 679
2 524
SUPPLY COST
05450
1 5 36 599
84 21 5
107 51 5
74 678
588 188
298 717
246 577
112 399
12 114
12 196
OPERATIONS & TRAINING
07061
2 294 304
2 19 539
325 708
1 3 34
1086 896
333 86 1
31 9 431
7 535
FLYING PERSONNEL
07102
36 1 56 896
5 760 99 2
88 866
18 256 755
7 964 407
4 018 728
67 148
— ]
MAINT. (1st & 2nd ECHELON)
071 10
7 084 429
1 373 51 6
76 130
3458 971
1 687 051
464 386
24 375
t
OTHER OPER.. & TNG. COST
07150
597 793
22 864
17 880
17 483
369 203
16 407
153 956
{
DEPOT MAINT. S. SUPPLY
7770
2 831 1 30
244
1 782 1 16
449 471
599 299
CONSTRUCTIONS
1 2126
1 301 837
261 543
214 420
777 669
25 432
19 367
3 406
OTHER ADDITIONAL CHARGES
1 2150
1 809 780
2 830
213 342
93 901
1 188 140
82 590
76 908
133 844
4 804
1 3 421
SUB-TOTAL COST REPORT
15196
80 911 716
/ 053 006
10 997 015
3 150 631
36 399 785
14 383 531
8 299 258
4 03 7 034
/ 244 935
/ 346 521
DEPRECIATION
20 544 422
6 536 324
1 844 357
7 180 544
2 646 559
2 31 4 538
22 100
29% USAFE COST O.H.
1 447 169
1447 169
SUB-TOTAL USAFE COSTS
102903 307
9 036 499
12 841,372
3 150 631
43 580329
17 030 090
10 6/3 796
4 037034
1 267035
* 1346 521 '
TRANSP. CORPS SUPPORT
5 121 908
78 400
824 76 2
2 072 20 1
2 146 545
i
BURTONWOOD NON USAFE
8 664 302
**8 664 302
GRAND TOTAL
116 689 517
9 114 899
13 666 134
5 222 832
45 726 874
17 030 090
10 613 796
4 037 034
1 267 035
10 010 823
174
^26 JUNE - 31 DEC 48 **l JAN- 30 SEP 49
CONSOLIDATED
AIRLIFT DEUTSCHE MARK COSTS
COST DESCRIPTION
COST CODE
#
TOTAL COST
HQ 1st ALTF
WIESBADEN
TEMPELHOF
RHEIN/ MAIN
ERDING
CELLE
OBERPFAFFEN-
HOFEN
COMMANDER b. STAFF
OI05I
133 446
38 047
10 390
43 51 1
27 095
14 403
ADMIN. &SV. OVERHEAD
02061
42 025
8 752
3 658
17 073
12 542
COMMUNICATIONS
02106
21 046
3 060
2 458
14 395
1 1 33
— —
PROVOST MARSHAL
02108
1 33 084
1 415
2 1 630
100 209
9 830
FOOD SERVICE
021 10
1 76 686
6 1 42 1
32 139
60 413
7 823
14 890
STATISTICAL SERVICES
021 16
216
216
PERSONNEL SERVICES
02124
1 320
1 320
MOTOR POOL
02136
172 21 1
4 7 621
1 1 948
89 345
6 020
17 277
MISC. ADMIN. & SERVICES
02139
1 28 444
228
7 719
29 1 14
87 055
4 328
BASE OPERATIONS
02142
99 281
7 856
40 67 1
50 754
WEATHER SERVICE
02144
57 2 84
280
54 628
2 376
AACS & CONTROL TOWER (ATC)
02146
126 489
91 684
• 34 428
377
BUILDINGS & OTHER STRUCTURES
02206
59 045
5 983
53 062
AIRFIELD PAVEMENT
02214
744 530
1 5 208
650 534 j
78 788
'
UTILITY SYSTEM
0221 6
44 5 59
4! 859
2 700
FIRE PROTECT. & ACFT RESCUE
022 18
52 375
20 818
28 857
2 700
MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES
02220
16 940
16 940
SERVICE GROUP HOUSING
02248
14 982
14 982
AIR INSTALLATIONS
02261
778 217
100 524
160 742
514 910
2 041
MAINT.-AUTO & G.R EQUIP
02302
142 116
23 914
10 007
87 617
629
19 949
ADMIN. & SERVICES
02477
2 1 776 084
5 525
1610 163
4637 62 1
12 434 737
3 088 038
MEDICAL
03277
101 396
10 707
8 872
55 975
25 842
UNDISTRIBUTED CHARGES
041 51
1 980 467
12 553
243 948
1 422 464
108 258
190 094
3 150
MAlNT.-ACFT(C-47)
05102
186 1 15
914
2 1 095
164 106
J MAINT.-ACFT(C-54)
05104
44 984
9 288
35 696
j AIRCRAFT SHOP MAINTENANCE
05160
163 094
2 421
18 623
15 559
216
126 275
: MAINTENANCE CONTROL
05202
5 247
648
4 599
- OTHER MAINTENANCE
05260
22 353
843
1 200
9 245
5 552
5 513
. SUPPLY CONTROL
05402
20 745
3 439
14 594
2 712
- SUPPLY WAREHOUSES
05404
4081
3 751
330
: SUPPLY COSTS
05450
77 580
8 153
19 251
46 980
| 1 709
1 487
1 MAINTENANCE E» SUPPLY
05581
19 18 907
1 1 691
102 174
481 265
1 190 265
133 512
: ACFT MAINT- (1st & 2 nd ECHEL)
071 10
100 753
4 574
96 179
\ OPERATIONS & TRAINING
07270
980 432
2 1 093
283 096
1 1 214
665 029
■
3 DEPOT MAINTENANCE
07402
158 510
126 673
31 837
J DEPOT MAINT & SUPPLY
07770
3 334 548
2 335
3 206
3,329 007
■
j CONSTRUCTION COSTS
12126
7 120 644
2 488 199
404 744
4 179 671
3 130
5 200
39 700
OTHER ADDITIONAL CHARGES
12150
26 632
1 994
23 982
656
= ■
_££^_ USAFE OVERHEAD
GRAND TOTAL
15196
79 629
41 046 497
(3 b^.y
168 143
4 888 318
7114 085
21 283 907
6876 167
195 294
520 583
TRANSP. (EUGOM COST)
1 1 855 142
740 575
8 226 379
2 888 188
TRANSP. (JEIA COST)
15 391 395
3316 700
12 074 695
J vial " VlTTLES" COST
68 293034
168 143
8945 593
15340 464
36 246 790
6 876 167
/ 95 294
520 583
Vi
AVERAGE AIRLIFT COSTS BY BASE
DOLLARS TON MILE COST
pV^J^^fiSft^
.35
0o ^^es
176
DOLLAR COST FACTORS
ADMINISTRATIVE
OVERHEAD
10.30%
177
STATISTICAL SERVICES
The Comptroller function ot reporting the develop-
ment, progress, and phase-out of the Airlift was vested in
those organizations and staff agencies formerly known in
all echelons of the Air Force as Statistical Services, and
at wing base level more recently designated as Report-
ing Divisions of the Comptroller. Air Force Regulations
charge these offices with the responsibility of providing
all echelons of command with timely, uniform, and ac-
curate information on all major program activities. Dur-
ing the Airlift, the principal duties of statistical services
at the wing bases were to control and audit all incoming
and outgoing reports and to analyze important trends.
At every level, however, statistical services rendered
other staff assistance. It functioned as a screening agency,
acting where appropriate to eliminate. duplicate reporting
and continuously encouraging the use of information
already available in the headquarters of the using agency,
so as to minimize unnecessary preparation of reports by
lower echelons. It maintained information as to source
of statistical data, and it provided the facilities and the
technical knowledge for graphic presentation of info -
mation suited to such media.
DEVELOPMENT
When the Airlift began, USAFE had two machine-
equipped statistical installations, the 32d Statistical Con-
trol Unit, located with Headquarters USAFE at Wiesbaden
and responsible for all USAFE machine reporting except
supply, and Detachment "A", 32d Statistical Control Unit
at Erding, responsible for supply reporting. One statis-
tical services office was operating at each USAFE wing
base, and one operated ai the Headquarters of the 1st
Airlift Task Force after its formation.
As the operation expanded, the new wings and groups
which had arrived from other commands established small
statistical offices of their own. Emphasis in these offices
was placed almost exclusively on the collection and
maintenance of information related directly to the trans-
port operations. Since the newly established bulk allot-
ment wings were station housekeepers only, with no
jurisdiction over the groups on the base, the previously
well integrated statistical services activities became de-
centralized, with no one statistical services office in con-
trol. Because of the TDY status of many elements, the base
statistical office was often bypassed completely; ac-
countability for personnel and aircraft remained with their
STATISTICAL SERVICES COMPILED FLASH REPORTS TO
URNISH INFORMATION ....
i5i 55$2£~
upj swF >
parent commands, until the units transferred to USAFE in
late 1948.
Expansion of activities created a shortage of personnel
trained in the reporting field. To minimize the super-
vision problems, surplus navigators, whose training in
mathematics had conditioned them for such work, were
given on-the-job training and assigned to the group
statistical offices. Airmen positions were filled where
possible from general clerical SSN's, but throughout the
operation there remained a shortage of trained statistical
clerks, SSN 212, and morning report clerks, generally
SSN's 405 and 055. On the other hand, the replacement
flow of experienced machine personnel was such that
after activation of the 26th Statistical Control Unit with fhe
3rd Air Division in Burtonwood, England, USAFE was
able to furnish the new SCU with approximately one-half
of the airmen required, the majority of whom were
machine operators.
W
AND TO MONITOR AIRLIF
AIRLIFT REPORTS
In June 1948 air transport units ot this command were
required by then current directives to submit 192 dif-
ferent recurring reports. Of these, 42 were required by
Headquarters USAFE, 20 by Headquarters USAF and
Headquarters AMC, 88 by Headquarters EUCOM, and 42
by the Department of the Army.
Since the operation held the spotlight of world interest,
additional flash reports were developed to feed the
appetite of those hungry for information on its progress.
Other new reports were developed to enable various
echelons effectively to monitor the activity. Twenty two
different reports peculiar to the Airlift were established,
many were not new — some in a sense duplicated other
standard reports, but diffeied in frequency or deadline or
approach. A summary of the reports is contained in the
accompanying fables.
REPORTING
Although certain special reports were required to re-
cord the status of the Airlift and its resources, much of the
data necessary was available from reports already estab-
lished, such as the organization morning report and the
aircraft "110" report. Coupled with such standard reports,
the processing facilities provided by punch-card tabulating
equipment at Headquarters USAFE saved countless ad-
ministrative man-hours which would otherwise have been
expended by every Airlift unit in preparation, audit, and
consolidation of additional reports.
When atmospheric disturbances during the spring of
1949 resulted in "garbling" of many statistical reports dur-
ing transmission, the necessity of retransmission was mini-
mized by air mailing "hard copies" of the transmitted
messages as confirmation. An interesting by-product of this
procedure was a reduction in the number of retransmis-
sions which had previously been required because of non-
receipt by the addressee due to misrouting or delay within
♦he receiving headquarters.
The speed with which the build-up of the Airlift pro-
gressed naturally created situations in which administrative
TITLE OF REPORT
RCS
DATE INITIATED
PURPOSE
FREQUENCY
REMARKS
Report of Cost of
AF-FO-F25
July 1948
To furnish all echelons
Monthly
All costs of Operation
Operation Vittles
with Airlift costs by
functional activity
Vittles reported in accor-
dance with cost code.
Prepared by all USAFE
Installations.
Report of Officers
AF-AP-P183
February 1949
To furnish data on all
Monthly
Name, grade, and AFSN
completing Airlift Task
officer personnel com-
of all officers complet-
Force and Short Term
pleting Airlift duty
ing Airlift duty, with
PCS Assignments
total aircraft hours flown
by type of aircraft during
Airlift tour. Prepared by
1st ALTF from feeder
reports from all ALTF
bases. Discontinued
28 Jun 49.
Ten Day Summary
AF-SC-U20
July 1948
To furnish a 10 -day
Tri-Monthly on
Consolidation of daily
Report of Operation
consolidation of the
10th, 20th and
reports furnished Hq
Vittles
Daily Vittles Report
last day of each
month
USAFon a 1 0-day basis.
Prepared by Hq USAFE.
Discontinued 21 Oct 49.
Daily Vittles Report
AF-SC-U21A
July 1948
To furnish all echelons
with complete data On
Airlift operations and
resources
Daily
Covered all phases of
Airlift Operation, in-
cluding aircraft data
and tonnage, and was
broken down by (1)
ALTF Aircraft data (2)
Traffic data,(3) Remarks.
Prepared by HqUSAFE,
Discontinued 1 Oct 49.
Report of R-2000
AMC-SD-AE29A
January 1949
To furnish data on
Daily from
Total supplies of en-
Engine Status
which Hq AMC could
Organizations;
gines on hand, total
base total engine re-
Weekly to AMC
engines enroute, and
quirements
average hours on en-
gines changed. Pre-
pared by each instal-
lation operating C-54
type aircraft.
Great Falls RTU
USAFE-PA-P4
January 1949
To furnish Hq USAFE
Each graduation
Information on total
Graduates
with Pilot information
on all RTU graduates
date
pilots fully qualified as
1st pilots and total
potentially qualified as
pilots and co-pilots.
Preparedby Great Falls.
Discontinued 1 Sept 49.
179
TITLE OF REPORT
RCS
DATE INITIATED
PURPOSE
FREQUENCY
REMARKS
Retention Status Great
USAFE-PA-P6
March 1949
To determine number
Monthly
Names of all officers
Falls Air Crew Members
of officers desiring re-
tention past 6 months.
desiring retention past
6 months. Prepared by
Hq 1st ALTF. Discon-
tinued 1 Sep 49.
R-2000 Engine
USAFE-SM-A2
October 1948
To furnish detailed data
Daily
Serial number, type.
Change Report
on R-2000 Engines.
hours since last over-
haul, date, and expla-
nation of each over-
haul. Prepared by all
Installations operating
C-54 Aircraft. Discon-
tinued 16 May 49.
Removal of Parts on
USAFE-SM-A4
January 1949
To furnish data on C-54
As Required
Detailed information on
Disabled C-54 Aircraft
parts cannibalized.
usable parts of canni-
balized C-54 aircraft.
Submitted by ALTF ba-
ses and Erding Air Base.
Critical C-54 Supplies
USAFE-SM-A3
November 1948
To furnish C-54 parts
information in order to
facilitate requisitions
from Zl.
Daily
Status of C-54 parts
on hand, on requisition,
due out, consumed, and
reparables received
daily at C-54 bases.
Prepared by all USAFE
bases operating C-54
type aircraft. Discon-
tinued 15 Feb 49.
Departure of C-54
USAFE-SM-A12
September 1949
To furnish MATS with
Daily
A 24-hour forecast of
Aircraft
advance requirements
C-54 aircraft complet-
ing inspection at Bur-
tonwood and departing
for ferry crews on C-54
aircraft returning to Zl.
for Rhein/Main. Appli-
cable only to 3rd Air
Division. Discontinued
18 Oct 49.
Weekly Activity Report
CALTF-CR-C4
October 1948
To gauge number of
and time required for
200 hour inspections
of C-54 type aircraft.
Weekly
Number aircraft (C-54)
released from 200-hour
inspection during week,
number aircraft on
backlog during week,
average time required
to accomplish 200-hour
inspection. Required
from Burtonwood Crew
Control Officer.
TITLE OF REPORT
Hourly Progress Report
Report of Field
Grade Officers
Manning Charts
Dependent Housing
Status Report
RCS
CALTF-CR-C6
DATE IN I
P
August Ij
CALTF-AP-1 Novembtf
Maintenance Control
Report
Monthly C-54 Aircraft
Maintenance Record
Weekly Personnel
Strength Report
CALTF-AP-5
CALTF-SD-H1
CALTF-MD-1
CALTF-MD-A6
CALTF-SC-2
t<
January II
March 194!
*t(
August 1%
February ]| e ,
March 10$,' ,
180
' PURPOSE
FREQUENCY
REMARKS
etermine tons
1 by air
Hourly
Number of flights at-
tempted, number flights
completed, and tons
carried. Required from
all stations exceptCelle.
etermine assign-
■ and distribution
Id grade officers
Monthly
Name, rank, primary
and duty SSN of all
field grade officers. Re-
port required from all
stations except Celle
and Fassberg.
ermine personnel
flower require-
Tri-Monthly
Statistics of assigned
and authorized per-
sonnel by function and
organization. Required
from all stations ex-
ceptCelleand Fassberg.
btermine current
" of dependent
Weekly
Housing authorized,
assigned, and available,
by districts. Districts
were broken down by
distances from bases
as follows: (1) 5 miles
from base. (2) 10 miles
from base. (3) 35 miles
and above from base.
Required from all sta-
tions except Celle.
[termine number
'ft available
Daily
Number aircraft alloca-
ted, assigned,departed
for Zl, arriving from Zl,
in commission, and
AOCP. Required from
all stations.
stermine overall
! snance status of
type aircraft
Monthly
Summary for month of
total aircraft in commis-
sion, AOCP. Required
from all stations except
Celle.
•termine current
ir| nel require-
Weekly
Personnel status sum-
mary by primary and
duty SSN. Required
from all stations.
TITLE OF REPORT
RCS
DATE INITIATED
PURPOSE
FREQUENCY
REMARKS
Daily Operational
CALTF-SC-3
July 1948
To furnish a complete
Daily
Personnel authorized,
Statistical Summary
overall statistical status
of personnel, aircraft,
and tonnage
assigned, aircraft in
commission, AOCP, tons
moved, number flying
trips made, and ag-
gregate flying time in
hours. Required from
all operational groups.
Report of Airlift
CALTF-SC-5
August 1949
To determine rate phase-
Daily
Number of personnel
Phase-out
out was accomplished
transferred and number
remaining. Equipment
and supplies, in tons
shipped, and number
tons remaining to be
shipped. Required from
Celle and Fassberg.
Monthly Report on V.D.
CALTF-AS-M1
July 1949
To determine V.D. status
of Airlift personnel
Monthly
Number cases V. D.
and rate.
Weekly Airborne Elec-
CALTF-CO-3
July 1949
To determine types of
Weekly
Failures and outages
tronics Equipment
airborne electronics e-
by type of airborne
Outage Report
quipment with largest
number of failures and
outages
electronics equipment.
Ground Training
CALTF-CT-1
May 1949
To gauge overall ac-
Monthly
Consolidated report of
Progress
complishment of training
in accordance with
USAFE Reg 50 Series
(50-1, 50-6, 50-6A,
50-7, 50-9)
all training accom-
plished as required in
USAFE Regs 50 series.
Included number per-
sonnel that completed
and numberto complete
courses such as military
justice, sanitation, care
of ammunition and
equipment, personal
hygiene, camouflage, in-
telligence, communica-
tions, and basic infantry
indoctrination.
181
• ••
•• 1
•••••••
• •• • «
• ••
» • • ••• •••• •*
•••••• • ••
•• • • • •
• •• ••
•••••• ••
••• •••• •••
•• • •••••• •
•• • • • «
•• •• • ••
• • •••
• • • 4
» •• <
•5
*
accuracy and completeness had to be sacrificed to meet
the deadlines set on operational directives. A great many
of the difficulties which developed as a result of this com-
promise were encountered in the reporting field of ad-
ministration. As is evident from another section of this
publication, the administrative complications did not
initially impede the material progress of the operation as
a whole, nor should they detract from the splendid over-
all record of achievement of the organizations involved.
There is no doubt, however, that the lack of adequate in-
formation was in many instances an impediment to staff
planning, and that deficient administrative procedures
more than once exercised a depressing influence on
(morale.
MACHINE-PROCESSED REPORTS SAVED MAN HOURS:
FIELD REPORTS WERE FIRST AUDITED ....
Analysis of the factors involved indicates that much of
the confusion could possibly have been prevented by
advance knowledge of specific potential problems.
Preventive rather than remedial action might then have
been taken. It is with this thought that the problems are
analyzed in the following pages.
PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING
The business of accounting for Airlift personnel was a
complicated one. As discussed in detail in another chapter,
personnel came individually and as organizations; by water
and by air; on regular orders, operational orders, and even
on VOCO, from all over the world. A large number
arrived without any records.
Personnel who travelled to USAFE as individuals were
often under orders which were ambiguous, obscure, or
incorrect. There were cases of orders which assigned per-
sonnel directly to USAFE organizations, to Army stations,
and even to geographic locations, all in conflict with Air
Force regulations requiring transfer of personnel through
specified AF accounting units. During the first few months
some trouble was experienced at air ports of debarkation;
incoming personnel often left the base without reporting
to the accounting unit, and similarly, sometimes were
present at their duty stations for several days before being
accounted for on any strength report. This situation re-
sulted from insufficient dissemination of instructions and
lack of definite control of incoming personnel. In order to
obtain complete and accurate strength information, if was
necessary to compare personnel accounting records with
those of the billeting offices, finance offices, and agencies
issuing Post Exchange permits. Subsequent establishmenl
of stringent controls at debarkation ports eliminated most
of those difficulties.
By far the greatest problem in personnel accounting
was that resulting from the large number of personnel on
temporary duty (TDY) from other commands. While the
nature of the emergency made this large mass movemenl
necessary, the uncertainty of its duration made permanent
changes of assignment appear impracticable.
Since normal accounting procedures were not fully
applicable to attached personnel, there was initially no
attempt to maintain complete punch-card records on these
TDY personnel. It was not long, however, until a definite
need for certain information was apparent. Mail delivery
and personal correspondence required locator service.
Housing facilities, ration requirements, and other logistical
planning were necessarily based on total numbers of per-
sonnel regardless of attached or assigned status.
ODUCE SUMMARY CARDS AW i
• • ••
• • •
1 • • • • •
» •••• ••
• • • «
• •• 4
o
• 4
••••••• •<
• ••
• ••
The initial attempt at solving this problem was the
lormation ot provisional organizations at all stations to ac-
count tor TDY personnel. Due primarily to lack of adminis-
trative control at wing level, however, these provisional
units proved inadequate and were discontinued in De-
cember 1948. In lieu thereof, each USAFE organization
with personnel attached from other commands submitted
an initial roster containing information on TDY personnel
normally maintained by statistical services only on
assigned personnel. Thereafter each organization was
charged with the responsibility of accounting for this type
of personnel on a special section of the morning report
designated as "Section V The Section V morning report
was processed by statistical services just as were regular
morning reports. From this information, verified by a
"head-count" 10 January 1949, punch-card status files on
TDY personnel were established and maintained in the
same manner as on assigned personnel until the end of
the Airlift.
The experience of this command indicates that certain
complications are likely to arise through the presence of
large numbers of TDY personnel within a command. Many
of these situations can be controlled, corrected, or even
eliminated by the use of PCA rather than TDY, by more
stringent accounting procedures for TDY personnel, and
by the effective use of the control data available through
the statistical services personnel reporting system. The
more important of these potential problems are as follows:
(1) The lack of records and the increase in workloads
for which no additional administrative personnel
are authorized will probably result in a substan-
tial increase in the number of morning report
errors and will inevitably delay the preparation
of personnel reports at every level.
(2) Movement of individuals on multiple TDY between
organizations, particularly on verbal authority, may
result in "cross-shipment" of personnel in the same
SSN's between two bases.
(3) Upon expiration of their tour of service, TDY per-
sonnel may be discharged and reenlisted by the
organizations to which they are attached, without
proper coordination with the organizations of as-
signment.
(4) Attached individuals may be retained past the date
of expiration of their term of service.
(5) An individual who has been on an extended
period of TDY may at the expiration of the TDY
period be erroneously returned to his former base
after his organization has been moved to another
base.
Personnel reporting problems are especially significant
during a period of major reorganization and redeployment
such as the Airlift phase-out. Unless care is exercised in
establishing the sequence in which individuals leave their
organizations, a shortage of reporting and administrative
personnel (due to early out-shipment) may occur at a
time when the need for these specialists is greatest. Per-
sonnel accounting records must balance as certainly as
supply records; and accuracy in the initial stages of per-
sonnel actions and reporting will save immeasurable time
and effort whjch would otherwise be required in subse-
quent analysis to locate the errors, amend or rescind
special orders, and make corrections to morning reports
and other basic records.
RED FROM SUMMARY CARDS WAS
HE REPORT.
AIRCRAFT AND OPERATION REPORTING
When the Airlift began, Aircraft Status and Operation
Reports (commonly referred to as "110 reports") on other
than USAFE aircraft were sent to the organizations to
which the aircraft were assigned (Japan, Alaska, MATS, etc.).
Until December 1948, the majority of these commands
were credited with the flying time of their respective air-
craft. In late 1948, however, the continuing nature of the
operation caused a policy change whereby the aircraft
were gained by USAFE on the newly established aircraft
"MTV" (Military Transport Vittles) 110 report. Aircraft from
the Far Eastern Air Force were the only ones transferred
prior to December, their flying time being reported to
this command beginning in October 1948.
In the expectation of an operation of short duration,
the Airlift staff initially procured operational control re-
ports on verbal authority and later on letter authority. It
was many months in some cases before printed directives
covering the reports were issued. This was a factor in the
creation of duplicating and overlapping reports.
Initial aircraft and flying time data were obtained from
a number of sources. The major ones were the 110 report
prescribed by USAF and the "Daily Operational Status
Summary", CALTF-SC-3, a flash report developed by
Headquarters CALTF and used as the basis for the
operations report submitted by USAFE. Extracts of the
latter report were submitted to other interested agencies
such as OMGUS Berlin, Headquarters EUCOM, and the
US Attache in London.
For various reasons, the cut-off time of the CALTF-SC-3
was set at 1200 hours, in contrast to the 110 report cut-
off time of 2400 hours. This 12-hour difference allowed
only an estimated comparison. Since some of the informa-
tion, such as flying time and gasoline consumption, was
duplicating in nature, and since the extremely tight dead-
line set by Headquarters USAF for the Daily Vittles Report
183
necessitated estimates of certain data, there were constant
discrepancies in the overlapping information which caused
trouble throughout the operation. The problem was ac-
centuated by a difference in some of the definitions used
in the two reports, such as those for "available aircraft"
and "crew utilization". Variations in the sources of data
required constant monitoring by every statistical services
office.
The collection, audit, and submission of the Daily
Vittles Report was an example of almost unbelievably
swift reporting. The report was quite detailed, including a
number of items by squadrons and groups on aircraft,
crews, maintenance personnel, operational data, accidents,
type of tonnage hauled, loading times, fuel consumption,
and other variables. The consolidated report was required
to be dispatched from USAFE Headquarters at 1600 hours,
only four hours after the cut-off. Obviously, to meet such
a schedule required minute-by-minute planning on the
part of all personnel engaged in collecting and assembling
the information.
Extreme care in the control of Airlift reports and re-
porting sources eliminated several potential problems. For
example, early in the Airlift, OMGUS in Berlin received
overlapping operational reports from seven different
sources: The three airfields in Berlin, Headquarters 1st
ALTF, Headquarters USAFE, the EUCOM Office of the
Transportation Corps, and Headquarters Berlin Sector. Re-
ports from the West were based on take-offs and those from
Berlin on landings. Aircraft in the air at cut-off time were
enough to cause considerable differences among the re-
ports. Such situations led to the establishment of Head-
quarters USAFE as the single source of statistical informa-
tion on the operation.
Certain problems arose, too, in the mechanics of col-
lection of aircraft and operational cost data. The fuel and
lubrication figures reported were weakened by inadequate
fuel measurement facilities at bases. Further, it was im-
possible to use normal consumption data as criteria, be
cause of the irregular waiting periods before take-off. AF
Forms 1A were sometimes improperly completed because
of weather, abnormal operation schedules, or carelessness.
Coordination of aircraft transfers was difficult An air-
184
craft delivered by the crew of the losing organization was
that organization's responsibility until delivery. Losing
activities, however, had difficulty in preparation of cor-
rect data on flying time and gasoline consumption, since
Forms 1A remained with the aircraft and the procedures
established for the return of necessary information to
losing units were inadequate.
During the phase-out period there were numerous
transfers in preparation for shipment of aircraft to the
United States, and gaining organizations sometimes re-
ceived aircraft without AF Forms 1A and other important
records. The deterioration in the quality and timeliness of
reports submitted by organizations involved in the phase-
out indicated a general reduction in the sense of respon-
sibility among personnel who were scheduled to leave
the Airlift. Such problems multiplied the difficulties which
confronted the small and sometimes inexperienced group
of personnel who were left to clean up loose ends and
submit the final phase-out reports.
CONCLUSIONS
In reporting the Airlift certain techniques and policies
proved their worth. Others were modified and used
successfully; still others were found wanting.
There are several points of view as to the most pref-
erable method of administering such a project. Although
the establishment of a sub-command solely responsible for
an Airlift operation has its advantages, from the stand-
point of statistical services it would be more efficient if
no separate command were established. Statistical services
in the major headquarters could carry out its function with
very little increase in personnel — only a fraction of the
number required for a separate command. The problem
of coordination would be reduced, along with the dupli-
cation of effort which stems from parallel functions.
The taxpayer's dollar could certainly be stretched by
adoption of stringent administration in closing out activi-
ties. The tendency so evident in 1945 and again in the
Airlift phase-out was to "drop it and get out". Therefore,
it is strongly recommended that any individual who has
departed without having properly completed his duty be
subject to a "call back" for a definite period of time. This,
period should be sufficient for the records to be cleared,
perhaps 60 to 90 days, and the call back should apply to
military personnel and civilians alike. Any necessity fori
such action should be registered in the individual's pg
sonal efficiency file.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following specific recommendations represent gainsl
in reporting experience believed valuable enough to make .
a matter of record:
Personnel moving to or from an overseas command lor
a period of duty of 45 days or longer should in all cases)
possible be moved on a permanent change of assignmenlj
(PCA).
Movements to or from an overseas command should!
never be made solely on VOCO or operational orders. II
PCA movement is not practicable, individuals should be
placed on detached service rather than on temporary duty.'
Suitable, adequate accounting procedures for detached
service personnel should be established worldwide.
The integrity of a wing-in-being contributes to its ad-T
minisfrative efficiency and should be carefully considered
prior to separate assignment of its elements
Officers and airmen, regardless of career field, should?
all have a fundamental knowledge of reporting and ad-
ministrative procedures. Service schools should emphasize
the importance of proper administration and its relation
to and effect on the primary mission. PIO agencies can
aid in making personnel administration-conscious.
Special reports developed for an operation should i
largely be based on existing standard reports, with such
supplementary requirements as are necessary.
To eliminate inconsistent information, operations re - /
ports should normally be released to outside agencies
through one central source — the major command head-
quarters.
Report deadlines should be established to obtain
maximum value from the reports. Accuracy and speed are
conflicting factors which must be resolved.
1 APRIL 1948
Rail and road traffic restrictions from British and U. S.
zones to Berlin imposed by Soviet authorities.
20 JUNE 1948
Currency reform initiated for Western zones of Ger-
| many and Western Sectors of Berlin. Soviets protested
action and refused to join plan.
22 JUNE 1948
I Autobahn closed to Allied vehicular traffic to and from
Berlin on Soviet contention that Marienborn bridge re-
j quired repairs. Soviets announced new separate currency
i reform.
23 JUNE 1948
Soviets suspended all travel and traffic into Soviet
zone. Soviets asserted that Berlin was part of the Soviet
Zone of Occupation.
25 JUNE 1948
Soviet authorities announced they would not supply food
to Western Sectors of Berlin.
26 JUNE 1948
Operation of full-scale airlift to Berlin became the sole
supply source for 2,500,000 persons in Western Sectors
and for Western occupational personnel. Limited airlift
had augmented military supply stocks since 1 April.
185
AIRLIFT SFAFFEB 26*
C- 54 s JOIN
AM IFF OFEFAFION
^/^f^V^R^^I
\2&
MIIOAIFH FON FLOWN
FO BERLIN
&
3L
fl
0*
l/SAF OEEXAFES MOM
£J?/F/$N ZONE 'BASE
CS2 S AWVE
AM IFF OBEtA
"easfee fa babe"
BLOCKADE LIFTED ll\,
: full e: 7
% & S A : i
*.-r> -'^Z .-iv^/>'
•.-
@f m Mi/fr
A/ii/fr
' ■ MBER
187
29 JUNE 1948
USAFE announced the formation of Berlin Airlift Task
Force.
1 JULY 1948
First C-54 aircraft joined Airlift.
7 JULY 1948
First coal flown to Berlin, packed in duffel bags for
industrial use.
29 JULY 1948
USAFE announced establishment of the Airlift Task
Force (Provisional) which replaced Berlin Airlift Task Force
organization.
14 AUGUST 1948
C-74 Globemaster aircraft arrived at Rhein/Main Air
Base, making 24 trips to Berlin before returning to the
United States in September.
21 AUGUST 1948
First USAF aircraft flown from Fassberg RAF Station
to Gatow RAF Station in Berlin. Fassberg used as coal
supply point because of strategic location between the
Ruhr and Berlin.
14 SEPTEMBER 1948
Five C-82 aircraft "Flying Boxcars" joined Airlift.
They carried bulky items and heavy engineering equip-
ment unsuitable for C-54 transport and flew automobiles
from Berlin to Rhein/Main and Wiesbaden Air Force
Bases.
*««***
18 SEPTEMBER 1948
USAFE celebrated Air Force Day with an all-out Air
lift effort, and with RAF participation hauled 7,058 lonv
to Berlin for distribution to Western Berliners as a special
bonus.
1 OCTOBER 1948
All C-47 aircraft replaced by C-54 aircraft on Airlift
15 OCTOBER 1948
Merger of USAF-RAF Airlift elements into one or-
ganization designated Combined Airlift Task FfflP
(CALTF).
5 NOVEMBER 1948
Dedication of Tegel Airfield in French Sector of Berlin^
third major airfield in Berlin area.
8 NOVEMBER 1948
First Naval transport aircraft arrived at Rhein/Main lor
participation in Airlift. H' rc
16 DECEMBER 1948
First USAF aircraft operated from Celle RAF Station.
18 DECEMBER 1948
Tegel Airfield in Berlin opened for full operation, j
31 DECEMBER 1948
100,000th Airlift flight arrives in Berlin.
i
,600 Id
19 JANUARY 1949
Food ration for West-Berlin is raised from 1,600 1?
1,880 calories a day. <
(ire
\
18 FEBRUARY 1949
1,000,000th ton is landed in Berlin by a British York
ircratt loaded with potatoes.
8 MARCH 1949
Six ambulances for Western Sector public health
srvices are flown info Berlin.
16 APRIL 1949
Special Airlift effort, "Easter Parade," shattered all
mnage records by lifting 12,940.9 tons of food and coal
ipplies in a 24-hour period.
4 MAY 1949
C-97 Sfratoliner aircraft flew first "payload" to Berlin
"■craft retained for special Airlift operations.
12 MAY 1949
Soviet announced lifting of the Berlin Blockade.
28 MAY 1949
Kail traffic to Berlin halted by Soviets, allegedly be-
|e of elevated railway (S-Bahn) strike.
7 JUNE 1949
Airlift allocated eight tons of first-class mail daily due
reported Soviet censorship.
RESTRICTED
26 JUNE 1949
First anniversary of Berlin Airlift. Lift ordered continued
until reserve supply stocks reached satisfactory level and
international situation clarified.
29 JUNE 1949
Rhein/Main Air Base converted to coal shipping point
for Airlift. RAF lifted food only from British bases at
Wunstorf and Fuhlsbuffel.
29 JULY 1949
Memorial ceremony held at Fassberg RAF Station for
Airlift dead by British, French, and United States forces.
30 JULY 1949
Official announcement of termination of Berlin Airlift
on 31 October 1949.
31 JULY 1949
317th Troop Carrier Group at Celle RAF Station flew
final mission with ten tons of coal. Flights of U. S. Naval
Air Transport Squadrons VR-6 and VR-8 discontinued at
Rhein/Main Air Base.
Record tonnage of 253,000 short tons of coal, food,
and supplies lifted by CALTF in July. Previous record was
250,818 tons in May.
3 AUGUST 1949
First C-54 aircraft left Rhein/Main for United States
under Operation VITTLES phase-out plan.
25 AUGUST 1949
U. S. Navy Transport Squadrons VR-6 and VR-8 re-
lieved from attachment to 1st Airlift Task Force.
26 AUGUST 1949
Wunstorf Airfield (RAF) in British zone closed. Total
Airlift flights 38,663 transporting 316,927.9 tons to Berlin.
27 AUGUST 1949
313th Troop Carrier Group at Fassberg RAF Station
flew last Airlift mission. Total Airlift flights 51,995 trans-
porting over 500,000 tons.
1 SEPTEMBER 1949
Headquarters, Combined Airlift Task Force inactivated
at Wiesbaden, Germany.
6 SEPTEMBER 1949
Participation of 1st Airlift Task Force in EUCOM Fall
Training Maneuver, Exercise HARVEST, from 6-16 Sep-
tember 1949 in troop carrier role.
18 SEPTEMBER 1949
Celle RAF Station discontinued as USAFE Airlift oase.
24 SEPTEMBER 1949
Memorial ceremony at Camp Lindsey, Wiesbaden
Military Post, for thirty-one USAF, U. S. Navy and U. S.
civilian Airlift dead. Camp streets renamed for deceased
personnel.
27 SEPTEMBER 1949
Fassberg RAF Station discontinued as USAFE Airlift
base. 60th Troop Carrier Wing, Heavy, transferred from
Fassberg to Wiesbaden Air Base, effective date 1 October
1949.
30 SEPTEMBER 1949
End of Operation, VITTLES. Last C-54 left Rhein/Main
for Berlin at 1845 hours, ending Airlift one month ahead
of schedule due to sufficient food stockpiles in Berlin.
RESTRICTED
189
Printed by
USAFE Reproduction Center.
ijJiUilMii)
IMiWaMW
"-.'iir-J'
^STiTUTI0N^N0linillSNl" J NVIN0SHllWS""S3 iavyan~LIBRARI ES*"SMITHS0NtAN - INSTITUTI0N~N0linillSNI~NVIN0SHllWS 2 S3 I HVU ail LIBRARIES SMITHSONIANJNSTITul
^ z 00 ± — co — E CO 5 co • • ± CO ± CO
3IMVMnn""LIBRARIES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIiniliSNI NVIN0SH1IWS S3iavyan LIBRARIES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIiniliSNI NVIN0SH11WS S3iavy0
co ,» 2 CO Z '•» (Q, . _ Z \ CO Z CO
v* co v^S&sssk 92 (iP ^>l co \s. *|*. co MW /%/■. co (pfc ^s) co Jem _aZ^. w \^/**&&§§& S2 lip. _^£l co ^^Sls.- co jBn!& f j%A. °? ISE
JSTITUTI0N UyN0linillSN CNVIN0SHllWS l ''S3iyvaan'"LIBRARIES , ''sMlTHS0NIAN^INSTITUTI0N" N 1 -l-nillSNrNVIN0SHilWS <O S3iavyan LI B RAR I ES^SMITHSONIAN INSTITUfJ
Z '
3iavaan libraries Smithsonian institution noiidiiisni nvinoshiiws S3iyvyan libraries Smithsonian institution NouniusNi nvinoshiiws ssiyvatJ
/Ic7§£\ ro /$1*S&\ f= / x > ro /^C^X p /2St§&\
H
52 ^£u|2^ n XMdc^ ^ '^s?- m \J*oc/
± co f: co ± to X ±
^stitution NonniiiSNi nvinoshiiws saiavuan libraries Smithsonian institution NouniusNi nvinoshiiws ssiyvyan LIBRARIES SMITHSONIAN institute
•, CO z CO Z .,. CO Z v- w Z CO Z ..-. CO Z v.- '
' z
CO
lii;^#'5#^ i Ais4»
3iyvyan_LiBRARiEs Smithsonian institution NouniusNi nvinoshiiws S3iavaan libraries Smithsonian institution NouniusNi nvinoshiiws S3iavae
z co — co = co 5 co
H Vfcfil
NSTITUTION N0linillSNrNVIN0SHllWS _ S3iyvyan _ LIBRARIES*"SMITHS0NIAN~ J |NSTITUTI0N :2 N0liniIlSNI -, NVIN0SHlIWS^S3iyvyan" J LIBRARIEs"SMITHS0NIAN"'lNSTITUTJ
3 1 yvy a n li b rar i es Smithsonian iNSTiTUTi0N , "N0iiniiisNi~NviN0SHiiws S3 1 y vy a n ~li brar i es SMiTHS0NiAN~iNSTiTUTi0N w N0iiniiiSNi~NViN0SHiiws w 's3 1 y val
j; » — <. ZyCo z co zs w z « co z f/1
oo ■* Z co -'- Z oo "^2^^ g ^ X^ g ^^^ 2 .^ > 2 ^vijw^ >
JSTITUTION NOIinillSNI_NVINOSHllWS S3iyvyail LIBRARIES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIiniliSNI NVINOSHIIWS S3 I yva a II LI B RAR I ES^SMITHSONIAN INSTITU^
W ^ ^ Z \ m ^ 00 — ,n = V CO — /^ —
! ^
co ^2£^H
ISNI^NVINOSHIMS S3iavyail LIBRARIES SMITHSONIAN~ , |NSTITUTION Z NOIiniUSN]~ J NVINOSHilWS S3iaViJail LIBRARIES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIinillSNI
•" v z r- z r- z r- x » z r- 2: r~ z
IIES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIinillSNI NVINOSH1IWS S3iavaai1 LIBRARIES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIlfUllSNI NVINOSH1IWS S3iaVaai1 LIBRARIES
60 " \ w 2: w , z -, w — z \ w z w ^ z '-
lSNrNVINOSHimS W S3iyvaan^LIBRARIES W SMITHSONIAN Z |NSTITUTION t/5 NO'J-nillSN| Z NVINOSHimS </> S3iavyan Z LIBRARIES W SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIlfUllSNI
=;>co = tn w z \ <" ^ 5 w ._ S °° - — ^
MES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIinillSNI NVIN0SH1IWS S3iavaaH LIBRARIES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIlfUllSNI NVINOSHIIWS S3 I a va a 11 LI B RAR I ES
z r- z r- z £ z - ^ — -. z •" v • -z H . .
C? Y -" u> — T W ± w V £: </>
ISNrNVINOSHllWS S3iaVaai1 LIBRARIES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIinillSNI NVIN0SH1IWS S3 I ava a II LI B RAR I ES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION NOIlfUllSNI
z w z ... w Z , W Z w z ..-. w z
lit SAiJi I^^I/^I,^^'!^ I
t/5
2
? I ES^SMITHSONIAN^INSTITUTION^NOIinillSNl'NVlNOSHllWS^SS I a Va a ll" LI B R AR I ES^SMITHSONIAN_INSTITUTI0N^N0linillSNI_NVINOSHllWS~S3 I a Va 8 I1_ L I B R AR I ES
o
z
lSN| J NVIN0SHllWS^S3iavaan J LlBRARIES^SMITHS0NIAN^INSTITUTI0N^N0linillSNI^NVIN0SHllWS
^5\
z
?l ES t/, SMJTHS0NIAN~INSTITUTI0N a, N0linillSNrNVIN0SHllWS C/, S3 I a Va 8 II LI B RAR I ES SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION^NOIinillSNI NVIN0SH1IWS S3 I dVMB H LI B RAR I ES
LSNI NVINQlAUwl" s9 /la a II^L. B RAR I ES^SMITHSONIAN^.NSTITUTION NOIinillSNI_NVINOSHllWS S3 I a Va a I1_L. B RAR I ES SMITHSONIAN ^INSTITUTION ^ NOIinillSNI
AS&h
■ &
.niu