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Full text of "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003)"

ACLU 2 



004 Remand_Documents 



CIA OlG^Releases 



1. 
2 



4 



5 



2 004 CIA OIG Report 



6 



w onnq CIA business plan 
07 March 2003 C ^ [0IG Vaughn # 

discussxng BDI P^°y 
Other ~29] 

onn-^ nraft psychological 
31 January 200o Dr f? J * r 0XG Vaughn # 
assessment of Abu Zubaydah [O 

Other --3 9] 

oaao anot report discussing 
20 November 2002 ^P^ [QXG Va ughn # 
interrogation of al 

Other-63] 

assessment ox ^^ 
Other-711 

Hf : pat ion sheet used in 
Undated certrf xcat o ^^ # 

interrogation tracing 
Other-93] 

7 . undated blank r^^^^G^aSn 
US ed for waterboaid trai 
# Other-103] 

«no -^-rview with a senior CIA 
8 17 July 2003 ^ Le ™ RDl pE ogram [OIG 
officer regarding CIA RDx p 
Vaughn # Interview-Si 1 



9. 22 January 2.003 Email with attached spot 
report regarding interrogation of al-~ 
Nashiri [OIG Vaughn # Email-196] 



CIA LOAN COPY 
DO NOT COPY 



Central Intelligence Agency 
Inspector General 



fecial Review 




j) COUNTBRTERRORISM DETENTION AND 
INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES 
(SEPTEMBER 2001 - OCTOBER 2003) 
(2003-7123-IG) 

7 May 2004 












TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

INTRODUCTION. « ......................... -1 

SUMMARY...,..., ......... ■ •—■•"•• '"— " 2 

BACKGROUND;............. -« ............. » —9 

DISCUSSION —.«.•• ......»«..» «••• — •- 11 

GENESIS OFPQST9/12 AGENCY DETENTION AND INTERRO GATTON ^ 

ACTIVITIES «" "'" 

THE CAPTURE OF ABU ZlIBAYDAH AND DEVELOPMENT OFEITS ........... 12 

DOj LEGAL ANALYSIS - «••• 

NOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION WITH EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL 

..................... —23 

OFFICIALS. • ' 

GUIDANCE ON CAPTUR E, DETENTION, AND IN TERROGATION........-.....^ 

DCI Confinement Guidelines - • • rI 

fyQ 

DCI Interrogation Guidelines - • - - 

Medical Guidelines • •• """ '""° 

"VI 
Training for Interrogations - * 

■ DETENTION AND INTfiKHOGATION OPERATIONS ATBBHRHlli 

, ......33 

..34 

34 

Videota pes of Interrogations...... • • 36 

|HjI|§ ^ ^ < _ % ^ _, .,...37 

Background and Detainees •«■■• ; .......38 




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_ ( _ .-. .........39 

Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines - 40 

Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques 41 

Handgun and Power Drill — ••— 

42 
Threats —■ « ......... * - 

43 
Smoke.... «• ............«—«».•—• **•* 

. . 44 

Stress Positions .»•— - • »•«»"« — 

Stiff Brush and Shackles....... .- - • - ; *' 44 

Waterboard Technique.. - • • 44 

'—^ ^ A6 

47 

..48 

.........48 

50 

..54 

57 

58 

.....61 

..........65 

67 

Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques 69 

en 

Pressure Points.. • - "" 

70 

Mock Executions..... .••• ■•— "••• ••••■* /v 

Use of Smoke..........—.- «• — «•-'* ** .......72 

Use of Cold.. ■• ........-.<» ..............................73 

Water Dousing • ■• • 76 

Hard Takedown ,........................—.. - ..»•»— .............77 




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Abuse gggHB at Other Locations Outside of the CTC 
Program........... - — •— •—* ** "*" * ' " M 

on 

Analytical support to interrogations «... —«°* 

85 

EFFECTIVENESS..,...., ••- " " 

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE DEIENITON 

and Interrogation Program. •• 

92 
Policy Considerations........... • - * "" 

Concerns Over Participation in the CTC Program 94 

„.. 35 

Endgame ....-« - ..,..„.........«..« ....»»« 

CONCLUSIONS.., ,...,..—.. »«« • — "" 10 ° 

RECOMMENDATIONS....................— — ............ 106 

APPENDICES 

A. Procedures and Resources 

B . Chronology of Significant Events 

C. Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, Re: interrogation of an Al-Qa'ida 
Operative, 1 August 2002 

■ D. DCI Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 

28 January 2003 
E. DCI Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted P^rrsuanUo^fce 

28 January 2003 



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F. Draft Office of Medical Services Guidelines on Medical and 
Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations, 4 September 
2003 



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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 



Special Review 



„ COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND 
INTERROGATION ACnvnTES 
(SEPTEMBER 2001 - OCTOBER 2003) 
(2003-7123-IG) 

7 May 2004 
INTRODUCTION 




2 ^ ^— ^ November 2002, fee Deputy Director for 
Operations (DDO) informed the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
that the Agencv had established a program in the Counterterronsl 
Center to detain and interrogate terrorists at sites abroad ( ^J^^ 

gea^^ a ^ MMW| ||H "fa January 2003, the DDO informed OIG 
that he had received allegations that Agency personnel had used 
unauthorized interrogation techniques with a detainee, 
'Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, at another foreign site, and requested that 



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OIG investigate. Separately, OIG received information that some 
SL were concerned that certain covert Agency achvjt.es at an 
oveLl detention and interrogation site might involve vrolat^of 
human rights. ^^ U ^ 2m \^^^Z7m 

^^^^ ^^^cc^^^^^tem^er^ o^- 
October 2003 2 



SUMMARY 



M -JMBM|^H^B|th- ' " ' r ^g^d responsibility for . 

Director of the DCI Counterterrorist Center (D/CTC). When U.b 
military forces hegmdet^u^^M^^^^^ ™* at 




4. 



ranraH^HH Ul e Agency began, to detain and interrogate 
SectiyT^nbo^ suspected terrorists. The capture and initial 
Agency interrogation of the first high value detainee, Abu Zubaydah, 



1 ^U®^^£) Appendix A addresses the Procedures and Resources feat OK employed in 

«™H!^^ sency 

"^"^^^dbl^^rfsiBnlficanl events that occurred during the period of this 
Review. 




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ia March 2002, presented the Agency with a sigiiifican dilemma- 
Thelgency was under pressure to do everything possible to prevent 
IddihonalLroristattacks. Senior Agency ofWs bekeved Abu 
Zubaydah was withholding inf omrafcion that could not b e obtained 
through then-authorized interrogation techniques. Agency ofhciak 
believed that a more robust approach was necessary to ehcrt threat 
informationfrom Abu Zubaydah and possibly from other senior 
Al-Qa'ida-high value detainees. 

5 C^SKBBI The ccmduct of detentioR and taterro .g ation 
activities presented new challenges for CIA. These mcluded 
determining where detention and interrogation facilities could be 
securely located and operated, and identifying and preparing 
qualified personnel to manage and carry out detention and 
interrogation activities. With the knowledge that Al-Qa ida 
personnel had been trained in the use of resistance techniques 
another challenge was to identify interrogation techniques that 
Ao-ency personal cotdd lawfully use to overcome the resistance. In 
Ms context, CTC, with fee assistance of the Office o Tetal 
Service (GTS), proposed certain more coercive physical techniques to 
use on Abu Zubaydah. AH of these considerations took place against 
the backdrop of pre-September 11, 2001 CIA avoidance of 
interrogations and repeated U.S. policy statements condemning 
torture and advocating the humane treatment of political prisoners 
and detainees in the international community. 

6 r feB M JJj Th fi Office of General Counsel (QGC) took 
the lead in determining and documenting the legal parameters and 
constraints for interrogations. OGC conducted independent research 



4 mmm The use of "high value" or "medium value" to descnbe tenonst targe^nd 
detaSsHsRevfew is based on how they have been generally categorized by CTC CTC 
£«he sT,Zs according to the quality of the intelligence that they are beheved hkely to be 
SSk about current terrorist threats against the United States. Senror Al-Qa^da 
plalS an^operators, such as Abu Zubaydah «d Khalid Sha>*h Muhammad, aH mto ehe 
K of "high value" and are given the highest priority for capture detention, and 
Z SogaL. CTC categorizes those individuals who axe believed to have lesser a,ect 
Kowledge of such threats, but to have information of intelligence value, as medium value 
targets/detainees. 



m 



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and consulted extensively with Department of Justice (Do}) and 
National Security Council (NSC) legal and policy staff. Working with 
DoJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), OGC determined that in most 
instances relevant to thecount^torc^sm detention and 
interrogation actMtiesBHHW ^ criminal prohibition 
against torture, 18 U.S.C. 2340-234013, is the controlling legal 
constraint on interrogations of detainees outside the United States In 
Au-ust 2002, DoJ provided to the Agency a legal opinion in which it 
determined that 10 specific "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 
(EITs) would notviolate the torture prohibition. This work provided 
fiie foundation for the policy and achrdnistrative decisions that guide 
the CTC Program. 

7. C^dBBHB By November 2002, the Agency had Abu 
Zubaydah and anothe r high value detamee,^ dAjgahfo^ 
Al-Nashiri, in custody 




fandtlie Office of Medical Services (UMb) 

provided medical care to the detainees. 




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JFrom the begrnrring, OGC briefed DO officers 
"Signed to Hies JHl^alities on their legal authorities, and Agency 
personnel staffing these facilities documented interrogations and the 
condition of detainees in cables. 



10. ''-t-gpiff f^M Mft There were fe^j° nstai !£S S|{j $ deviations 

notTble exception described in this Review. With respect to two 
detainees at those sites, the use and frequency of one BIT, the 
watexboard, went beyond the projected use of the technique as 
originally described to DoJ. The Agency, on 29 July 2003, secured 
oral DoJ concurrence that certain deviations are not significant for 
purposes of DoJ's legal opinions. 




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15 ffSJHBS^S Agency efforts to provide systematic, 
dear and timely guidance to those involved in the CTC Detention 
and Interrogation Program was inadequate at first but have 
improved considerably during the life of the Program as problems 
have been identified and addressed: CTC implemented teaming 
programs for interrogators and debrief ers. 6 Moreover, bt^tog upon 
operational and legal guidance previously sent to the field, the DC1 



° u>^«S)fiSSIia Before 11 September (9/11) 2001, Agency personnel sometimes used I the 
JS^Siintcrre^L ^nefin^nef, interchangeably. ^^^ ™- 
since evolved and, today, CTC more clearly distinguishes their meanings. A debnefe ngag e, a 
detainee solely through question and answer. An interrogator s a person who ">™P™* a 
two-week interrogations txaining program, which is designed to tram, qualify, -d cerhfy a 
person to administer ElTs. An interrogator can administer EITs during an *%£&*»<* a 
detainee only after the field, in coordination with Headquarters, assesses the detainee as 
^thholding information. An interrogator transitions the detainee horn a non-cooperauve to a 
cooperative phase in order that a debriefer can elicit actionable intelligence through 
^aggressive techniques during debriefing sessions. An interrogator may debnef a detamee 
during an interrogation; however, a debriefer may not interrogate a detainee. 



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on 28 January 2003 signed "Guidelines on Confinement Coitions 
for CIA Def^s"^ 

I^din or -supporting .jjn^o^gjBWWW^^u: ~ 
^JMjgg^^ aware of ' 

^SSSfSS^S^S^^t they have read them. 
Se DCI Men-ogata Guidelines make formal the « CTC 
practice of requiring the field to obtain specific Hea dqmrte s 
approvals prior to the application of all BITs. Although^ fee VO. 
Guidelines are an improvement over the absence of such DCI 
Guidelines in the past, they still leave substantial room for 
misinterpretation and do not cover all Agency detention and 
interrogation activities. 

16 NBBBi The Agency's detention and interrogation 
of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled fee 
identification and apprehension of other terrorists °°*™^ 
terrorist plots planned for the United States and around the w arid. 
The CTC "Program has resulted in the issuance of thousands of 
^dividual indigence reports and analytic products supporting the 
counterterrorism efforts of U.S. policymakers and rmlitary 
commanders. 

17 * * — Wi Thf current CTC Detention and 
Interrogatior^SrK been subject to DoJ legal review and 
AomSshation approval but diverges sharply from previous Agency 
policy and rules mat govern interrogations by U.S. notary and law 
Lforcement officers. Officers are concerned that public revelation of 
the CTC Program will seriously damage Agency officers personal 
reputations, as well as the reputation and effectiveness of the Agency 
itself. 

18 ^jJllBlpa^Mirecoeiuzed that detainees may 
be held Ln U.S. Government custody indefinitely if appropriate law- 
enforcement jurisdiction is not asserted. Although there has been 
ongoing discussion of the issue inside the Agency and among NSC, 



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Defense Department, and Justice Department officials, no decisions 
on any "endgame" for Agency detainees have been made. Senior 
Agency officials see this as a policy issue for the U.S. Government 
rather than a CIA issue. Even with Agency initiatives to address the 
endgame with policymakers, some detainees who cannot be 
prosecuted will likely remain in CIA custody indefinitely. 



19. (tSH The Agency faces potentially serious 
long-term political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC 
Detention and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of EITs and 
the inability of the U.S. Government to decide what it will ultimately 
do with terrorists, detained by the Agency. 



20. C^SHHI This Review makes a number of 
recommendations that are designed to strengthen the management 
and conduct of Agency detention and interrogation activities. 
Although the DCI Guidelines were an important step forward, they 
were only designed to address the CTC Program^m&ertijarijl^ 
Agency debriefing or interrog ation activities, ^ M *— "™*^ 







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y 







BACKGROUND 

22. & The Agency has had intermittent tavolvement in the 
mterrogarion of individuals whose interests are opposed to chose or 
Se Urited States. After the Vietnam War, Agency personnel 
f4™edi the field of interrogans left the Agency o, rnoved to 

other assignments. ^^^"^"Zl^l 
teaching interrogation techniques developed as one of se « tal 
metho! to foster foreign liaison relationships. Because of poktal 
TenStiviues the fhen-DeputyDirectcr of Central hrtelhg«ce > (0DCl) 
forbade Agency officers from using the word "mterrogation The 
Agency ten dLloped the Human Resource Explottahon (HEB) 
training program designed to train foreign liaison services on 
interrogation techniques. 

23. (Si In 1984, OIG investigated allegations of misconduct on 



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interrogations, debriefings, and human rights issues Headquarters 
sent officers to brief Stations and Bases and provided cable guidance 
to the field. 



24 ^ In 1986, the Agency ended the HRE training program 
because of allegations of human rights abuses ^jg.^ffig: 



^ DO Handbook! 

^chre^ain^ri effect, explains the Agency's general interrogation 
policy: 




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DISCUSSION 



Genesis ofpost9/11 Agency detention and inteerogation 
activities 

in detentions and inter rogations isfflMMff^^™™^ , Jv 

I the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. 




27 (SWni)' The DCI delegated responsibility for 
implementationHHM»o the DDO and D/CTC. Over time., 
CTC also solicited assistance from other Agency components, 
including OGC, OMSJH aud OTS - 



7 (U//FOUO) DoT takes the position that as Conmander-in-Chief, the President independently 
has the Article ii constitutional authority to order the detention and Interrogation of enemy 
combatants to gain intelligence information. 




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28. (f SMBI To assist Agen cy officials in 

understanding the scope and implica tions 1 

HjHHWHHHHHn|H|^g^|OGC researched, analyzed, and 
wrote "draft" pap ers on multiple legal issues. These indudgd_ 
discussions of thej 




"draft" papers with Agency officers responsible 




THE OIPTLIRE OF ABU ZUBAYDAH AND DEVELOPMENT OF EITS 



30- (^JHHHI) The capture of senior Al-Qalda operative 
Abu Zubaydah on 27 March 2002 presented the Agency with the 
opportunity to obtain actionable intelligence on future threats to the 
United States from the most senior Al-Qa'ida member in U.S. custody 
at that time. This acc elerated CLAs development of an in terrogation 
programj 




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31- t^§HHH To treat the severe wounds that Abu 
Zubaydah suffered upon his capture, the Agency provided him 
intensive medical care from the outset and deferred his questioning 
for several weeks pending his recovery. The Agency then assembled 
a team that interrogated Abu Zuba ydah usinfi non -aggressive^ 
non- physical elicitation techniques . 

| The Agency believed Abu Zubaydah 
was withholding imminent threat information. 

32. {l^flBHB Several months earlier, in late 200^1A 
had task ed an independent contractor psychologist, who hadR 
ffiHMexperience in the U.S. Air Force's Survival Evasion, 
■iBSSSce, and Escape (SERE) training program, to research and • 
write a paper on Al-Qa'ida's resistance to interrogation techniques. w 
This psychologist coll ab ora ted wi th, a Department of Defense (DoD) 
psychologist who hadHH|SERH experience in the U.S. Air 
Force and DoD to producethepaper, "Recognizing and Developing 
Countermeasures to AI-Qa'ida Resistance to Interrogation 
Techniques; A Resistance Training Perspective." Subsequently, fee 
two psychologists developed a list of new and more aggressive ElTs 
that they recommended for use in interrogations. 




13 (U//FOUO) The SERE training program falls under the DoD Joint Personnel Recovery 
Agency QVRA). JPRA is responsible for missions to include the training for SERE and Prisoner of 
War and Missing In Action operational affairs including repatriation. SERE Training is offered 
by the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force to its personnel, particularly air crews and special 
operations forces who are of greatest risk of being captured during military operations. SERE 
students are taught how to survive in various terrain, evade and endure captivity, resist 
interrogations, and conduct themselves to prevent term to themselves and fellow prisoners of 



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33 (~m &®EaEB &\ CIA's OTS obtained data on Ae use of the 
proposed EffSSS^otential long-term psychological effects on . 
detainees. OTS input was based in part on information solicited from 
a number .of psychologists and knowledgeable academics in the area 
of psychopathology. 

34 ^TS/SH^^K OTS also solicited input from DoD/Joisxt 
Personnel RecJ55y5^£y (JPRA) regarding techniques used in its 
SERE training and any subsequent psychological effects on students. 
DoD/TPRA concluded no long-term psychological effects resulted 
from use of the EITs, including the most taxing technique, the 
waterboard, on SERE students ." The OTS analysis was used by OGC 
in evaluating the legality of techniques. 

35 f^BHRB Eleven ElTs were proposed for adoption 
in the CTC MterSg^oiTprogram. As proposed, use of ETTs would • 
be subject to a competent evaluation of the medical and psychological 
state of the detainee. The Agency eliminated one proposed 
tecteique- «M» -after learning from DoT that this could 
delay the le|al^ieTTne following textbox identifies the 10 EITs 
the Agency described to Do]. 



14 >Si According to individuals with authoritative knowledge of the SbBB program, the 
wateAoard was used for demoBStration purposes on a very small number of students m a cl^ 
Except for Navy SERE training, use of the waterboard was discontinued because of its dramatic 
effect on the students who were subjects. 



m, 



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Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 

hSd and neck are supported with a rolled towel to prevent whrplash. 

♦ The facial hold is used to hold the detainee's ^f^^^^ 
places an open palm on either side of the detainee's face and the interrogator . 
fingertips are kept well away from the detainee s eyes- 

chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe. 

n^more thai two hours and in dae larger space it can last up to 18 hours. 
♦ Insects placed in a confinement box involve placing a harmless insect in the box 
with the detainee. 

^fSand^fe^^oa^waUloaapportanofhJBbodywe^tlhe 

detainee is not allowed to reposition his hands or feet- 

♦ The application of stress positions may include having the detainee sit on the floor 

* £ h h£ legs extended straight out in front of him with Ms anna *u*d above hrs 
head or kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a to degree angle. 

* Sleep deprivation will not exceed 11 days at a time. 

♦ ^ application of'the waterboard technique involves binding toe detainee to a 
Deuel, withlus feet elevated above his head. The detainee's head us rmmobihzed 
and an interrogator places a cloth over the detainee's mouth and nose whne 

To Jmg water°onto L cloth in a controlled manner. Airflow is rested for 20 .to 
Ends aud the technique produces the sensation of drowning and suffocaUon. 

TO 



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Do/legal analysis 

36 (*£■■■■■ CIA's OGC sought guidance from DoJ 
regarding the legal bounds of EITs vis-a-vis individuals defamed 
^™feaB Mjjj^^p |p^ The ensuing legal opinions focus on 
^^^^^^Tortu7e and Other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Conventon)^ 
especially as implemented in the U.S. criminal code, 18 U.S.C. 2340- 
2340A. 

37. (U/'/FOUO) The Torture Convention specifically prohibits 
"torture; 1 which it defines in Article 1 as: 

■ any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is in tentkmathf inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has comrrutted or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercrng him or 
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination ot any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public oinaai 
ox other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include 
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanction. [Emphasis added.] 

Article 4 of the Torture Convention provides that states party to the 
Convention are to ensure that ail acts of "torture" are offenses under 
their criminal laws. Article 16 additionally provides that each state 
party "shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its 
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
ptuusliment which do not amount to acts of torture as defined in 
Article 1." 



* (U//FOUO) Adopted 10 December 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988) 1465 U N.T.S. 85 
(entered into force 26 June 1987). The Torture Convention entered into force for the United States 
. on 20 November 1994. 



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38. (U/ /FOUO) The Torture Convention applies to the United 
States only in accordance with the reservations and nnderstandings 
made by the United States at the time of ratification.^ ^ As explained 
to the Senate by the Executive Branch prior to ratification: 

Article 16 is arguably broader than existing U.S. law. The phrase 
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" is a 
standard formula in international instruments and is found in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant 
■ on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. To the extent the phrase has been interpreted in the 
context of those agreements, "cruel" and "inhuman" treatment or 
punishment appears to be roughly equivalent to the treatment or 
punishment barred in the United States by the Fifth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. "Degrading" treatment or punishment, 
however, has been interpreted as potentially including treatment 
that would probably not be prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. 
[Citing a ruling that German refusal to recognize individual's 
gender change might be considered "degrading" treatment.] To 
make clear that the I Inited States construes the phrase to be 
coextensive with its constitutional guarantees against cru el, 
unusual; and inhumane treatment the following understanding is 
recommended: 

"The United States understands the term 'cruel, inhuman or^ 
degrading treatment or punishment,' as used in Article 16 of 
the Convention, to mean the cruel unusual, and i nhumane 
treatment or piinishrnent prohibited by the Fift h, Eighth 
and /or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States." 17 [Emphasis added.] 



16 (U) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into 
force 27 January 1980). The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention on treaties, but 
it generally regards Its provisions as customary international law, 

17 (U / /FOUO) S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 15-16. 



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39. (U//K3UO) Inaccord^cewi&theConvento te 
United States criminalized acts of torture m 18 U.S.C 2340A(a), 
which provides as follows: 

Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit 
torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct 
prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or 
imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 

The statute adopts the Convention definition of "torture" as "an act 
comrruttedby a person acting under the color of law ^f^ . 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pam or suffering (othei 
than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanction^) upon another 
person wrthxnhis custody or physical control/- "Severe physical 
pain and suffering" is not further defined, but Congress added a 
definition of "severe mental pain or suffering: 

[T]he prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from- 

(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe 
physical pain or suffering; 

(B) the administration or application, or threatened 
administration or application, of mind-altering substances or 
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense, or 
the personality; 

(C) the threat of imminent death; or 

CD) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected 
to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration 
or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures 
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. . . . 

These statutory definitions are consistent with the understandings 
and reservations of the United States to the Torture Convention. 



18 (U//FOUO) 18 U.S.C. 2340(1). 
W (U//FOUO) 18 US.C 2340(2). 



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40. (U//FOUO) DoJ has never prosecuted a violation of the 
torture statute, 18 U.S.C §2340, and there is no case law construing 
its provisions. OGC presented the results of its research into relevant 
issues under U.S. and international law to DoJ's OLC in the summer 
of 2002 and received a preliminary summary of the elements of the 
torture statute from OLC in July 2002. An unclassified 1 August 2002 
OLC legal memorandum set out OLCs conclusions regarding the 
proper interpretation of the torture statute and concluded that 
"Section 2340A proscribes acts inflicting, and that ate specifically 
intended to inflict, severe pain or suffering whether mental- or 
physical." 20 Also, OLC stated that the acts must be of an "extreme 
nature" and that "certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, 
but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to 
Ml within Section 2340A's proscription against torture." Further 
• describing the requisite level of intended pain, OLC stated: 

Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity 
to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ 
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely 
mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under Section 23-10, it 
must result in significant psychological harm of significant 
duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years. 21 

OLC determined that a violation of Section 2340 requires that the 
infliction of severe pain be the defendant's "precise objective." OLC ■ 
also concluded that necessity or self-defense might justify 
interrogation methods that would otherwise violate Section 2340 A. 22 
The August 2002 OLC opinion did not address whether any other 
provisions of U.S. law are relevant to the detention, treatment, and 
interrogation of detainees outside the United States. 23 



20 (U/7FOUO) Legal Memorandum, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 
18 U.S.C. 2340-234QA (1 August 2002). 

21 (U//FOUO) Ibid., p. 1. 

22 (U//FOUO) Ibid., p. 39. 

23 (U /,'POUO) OLCs analysis of the torture statute was guided in part by judicial decisions 
under the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) 23 U.S.C. 1350, which provides a tort remedy 
for victims of torture. OLC noted that the courts in this context have looked at the entire course 



"TOP~5EQl-gE/ 







"^TOFSEGBEli 




41 (U/ /FOUO) A second unclassified 1 August 2002 OLC 
™minn addressed the international law aspects of such 

that do not violate 18 U.S.C. 2340 would not violate die Torture 
Convention and would not come within the ,unsd,ctton of me 
International Criminal Court. 

47 ItSmmm^m In addition to the two unclassified 
opinions, OLcTroducXnother legal opinion on 1 August 2002 at 
EauestofCIA.^ (Appendix C.) This opinion, addressed to 
C^ Acfag General Junsel, disused whether the proposed use 
omrfSerrogadng Abu Zubaydahwould vie ate ^ ; « 
vji,; H on nn torture The opinion concluded thai use ot Hi i s on 
Ct^ycSi woiifd not violate the torture sta^te because^ong 

inflict severe pain or suffering, and (2) would not in 1a 
pain or suffering. 

sped^JjSHB ^°™***^^?h* HTS 

would be applied in the interrogation of Abu Z«by dah. For 
Sample, OLC was told that the EFT "phase" would likely tat no 
more than several days but could last up to thirty days. The EITs 
would bTiLed on » an as-needed basis" and all would not necessanly 
be °tl ZL, the EITs were expected to be used "in some sort of 
escdatag fashion, culminating with the waterboard though not 
necessity ending with this technique." Although some of the EITs 



Counsel Memorandum at 22 - 27. . ln , r 

24 (U// FOUO} OLC Opinion by JohnCYoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney general, OLC 

i'SM^) Memorandum for John Kizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central 
IhteBSSR. .'interrogation of al Qaida Operate" (1 August 2002) at 15. 



Tx5Fseo&ix/| 



might be used more than once, "that repetition will not be substantial 
because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several 
repetitions." With respect to the waterboard, it was explained that: 

, . , the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench .... The 
individual's feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the 
forehead and eyes. Water is' then applied to the cloth in a 
controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it 
covers both the nose and mouth, Once the cloth is saturated and 
completely covers the mouth arid nose., the air flow is slightly 
restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This 
causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual's blood. 
This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effort 
to breathe. This effort plus the cloth produces the perception of 
"suffocation and incipient panic/' i.e., the perception of drowning. 
The individual does not breathe water into his lungs. During those 
20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of [12 
to 24] inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the 
individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full 
breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the 
removal of the cloth. The procedure may men be repeated. The 
water is usually applied from- a canteen cup or small watering can 
with a spout. . ' - [T]his procedure triggers an automatic 
physiological sensation of drowning that the individual cannot 
control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not 
drowning, [I]t is likely that this procedure would not last more 
than 20 minutes in any one application. 

Filially, the Agency presented OLC with a psychological profile of 
Abu Zubaydah and with the conclusions of officials and 
psychologists associated with the SERE program that the use of EITs 
would cause no long term mental harm. OLC relied on these 
representations to support its conclusion that no physical harm or 
prolonged mental harm would result from the use on him of the 
EITs, including the waterboard. 26 



26 ( t rW B^^^B According to the Chief, Medical Services, OMS was neither consulted nor 
involved ip the initial analysis of the risk and benefits of EITs, nor provided with the OTS report 
cited in the OLC opinion. In retrospect, based on the OLC extracts of the OTS report, OMS 
contends that the reported sophistication of the preliminary EIT review was exaggerated, at least 
as it related to the waterboard, and that the power of this EFT was appreciably overstated in the 
report. Furthermore, OMS contends that the expertise of the SBBE psychologist/interrogators on 



"ror^sgesEx/ 







tDfsb 




44 '^-' ^ ff ff ft OGC continued to consult with DoJ as the 
CTC Mterrogation Program and the use of EITs expanded beyond the 
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. This resulted in the product of 
an undated and unsigned .document entitled, "Legal Principles 
Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured 
Al~Qa'ida Personnel.^ According to OGC this anafysis was fofly 
coordinated with and draftedin substantial Pf\°^^T. 
^reaffirming the previous conclusions regarding the ^*^p 
the analysis concludes that the federal War Crimes statute, 18 U.S.C 
2441, does not apply toAl-Qa'ida because members of ^oup are 
not entitled to prisoner of war status. The analysis adds that the 
[Torture] Convention permits the use of (cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment] in exigent circumstances, such as anabond 
emergency or war." It also states that the interrogation of Al-Qa ida 
members does not violate the fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
because those provisions do not apply extraterritorial nor does it 
violate me Eighth Amendment because it only applies to persons 
npon whom criminal sanctions have been imposed. Finally, the 
analysis states that a wide range of EITs and other te^qnes would 
not constitute conduct of the type that would be prohibited by the 
Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments even were they to be 
applicable: 

The use of the following techniques and of comparable, approved 
techniques does not violate any Federal statute or other law, where 
the CIA interrogators do not specifically intend to cause the 
detainee to undergo severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
(i e„ they act with the good faifti belief that their conduct will not 
cause such pain or suffering): isolation, reduced caloric intake (so 
long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of 
the detainees), deprivation of reading material, loud music or white 



the waterboard was probably unrepresented at the toe, as the SERE waterboard experi en c » 
» different from the subsequent Agency usage as to make it almost urelevant Consequently 
according o OMS, there was no apnori reason tobelieve that applying the waterboard *«* the 
h-ew and intensity wth which it was used by the P sychologist/mterto g ators was eifcec 
efficacious or medically safe. 
27 hvWmMM "Legal PrindplesApplicableto^D^e^on and Interrogation of 

CaptuS^S Personnel," attached to^K^^K 16 Iune 2003) - 



noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the 
detainees' hearing), the attention grasp, walhng, fcefaaal hold, the 
facial slap (insult slap), die abdominal slap, cramped contmement, 
wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, the use of 
diapers, the use of harmless insects, and the water board. 

According to OGC, this analysis embodies DoJ agreement that the 
reasoning of the classified 1 August 2002 OLC opinion extenas 
beyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and the conditions that 
were specified in that opinion. 

NOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION mm EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL 
OFFICIALS , 

45 (^§fH^H§) A-t the same time that OLC was reviewing 
illegality ofl^^^snmmer of 2002, the Agency was ^suiting 
■ with NSC policy staff and senior Administration officials, the DU 
briefed appropriate senior national security and legal officials on the 
proposed EfTs. In the fall of 2002, the Agency briefed the leadership 
of the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees on the use of 
both standard techniques and EiTs. 

46 0:SH1^^» In early 2003, CIA officials, at the urging 
of the General Counsel, continued to inform senior Administration 
officials and the leadership of the Congressional Oversight 
Committees of the then-current status of the CTC Program. The 
Agency specifically wanted to ensure that these officials and the 
Committees continued to be aware of and approve CIA's actions. 
The General Counsel recalls that he spoke and met with mite House 
Counsel and others at the NSC, as well as DoJ's Criminal Division 
and Office of Legal Counsel beginning in December 2002 and briefed 
them on the scope and breadth of the CTCs Detention and 
Interrogation Program. 

47. I^WM^D Representatives of the DO, in the 
presence of trie Director of Congressional Affairs and the General 
Counsel, continued to brief the leadership of the Intelligence 
Oversight Committees on the use of EITs and detentions m February 



"T0F§€€BEL7 




and March 2003. The General Counsel says that none of the 
participants expressed any concern about the techniques or the 
Program. 

48 ( ^mmmmm On 29 My aOOS, tire DCI and the General 
Counsel' provided a detailed briefing to selected NSC Principals on 
•CIA's detention and interrogation efforts involving "high value 
detainees/' to include the expanded use of BETs/* According to a 
Memorandum for the Record prepared by the General Counsel 
f olowing that meeting, the Attorney General confirmed that DoJ 
approved of the expanded use of various EITs, including multiple 
applications of the waterboard P The General Counsel said he 
believes everyone in attendance was aware of exactly what CIA was 
doing with respect to detention and interrogation, and approved of 
the effort. According to OGC, the senior officials were again briefed 
regarding the CTC Program on 16 September 2003, and the 
Intelligence Committee leadership was briefed again in September 
2003. Again, according to OGQ none of those involved in these 
briefings-expressed any reservations about the program. 

Guidance on capture, detention, and interrogation 

49. T?§HW^MI Guidance and training are fundamental 
to the success and integrity of any endeavor as operationally, 
politically, and legally complex as the Agency's Detention and 
Interrogation Program. Soon after 9/11, the DD 2i™affi^^S| 
the standards for the capture of terrorist ? ^ l^MHMHMHEEi 




50. r mmmmsmm The DCI, in January 2003 approved 
formal "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees' 
(Appendix D)and "Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted 






"TOFBEeREX/ 




Pursuant b 



whuh are discussed leK' 



nor 



to the DCI Guidelines. Headquarters provided guidance via mrcrmal 
briefings and electronic co mmun ications, to includpcable^trom CIA 



Headquarters, to the field 




I 



In November 2002,. CTC initiated training 



courses for individuals involved in interrogation 




TOFSEGREi/ 



TOPSEGREI/I 




TUFSfitfiEX/ 










"TSPseeREi, 




DCI Confinement Guidelines 

57 ^sJMiMH BGfore l anuarv 2003 ' officers assi S m - d to 
^, Z »\^^T%° ^ develop »nH irnplPmcntcdcontogncjnt 

condition procedures. 

| The~Iamtary 200: 

TTrTril,iHplinS'?™em the conditio ns oit<M^}E}lJ£L^ 
detainees -held fa. dgtentionja.ciUtig§J 





"tDp^esrex/ 




They must 
"revtlxvihe Guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have 




59. rTS ^fM ) The DC! Guidelines specify legal 
"minimums''' and require that "due provision must be taken to protect 
the health, and safety of all CIA detainees." The Gmdelmes do not 
require that conditions of confinement at the detention facilities 
conform to U.S. prison or other standards. At a minimum, however, 
detention facilities are to provide basic levels of medical care: 




Further, the guidelines provide that: 




TdP^B€R£X/ 






^TO^SBSBSSU 




DCI Interrogation Guidelines 

60 (S77NE1 Prior to January 2003, CTC and OGC 
disseminated guidance via cables, e-mail or orally on a case-by-case 
basis to address requests to use specific interrogation techniques, 
Agency management did not require those involved in interrogations 
to sign an acknowledgement that they had read, understood, or 
agreed to comply with the guidance provided. Nor did the Agency 
maintain a comprehensive record of individuals who had been 
briefed on interrogation procedures. 




Interrogation Guidelines require that all personnel directly engaged 
in the interrogation of persons detained have reviewed these 
Guidelines, received appropriate training in their implementation, 
and have completed the applicable acknowledgement. 

62. ISTVNEI The DCI Interrogation Guidelines define 
"Permissible Interrogation Techniques" and specify that "unless 
otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA officers and other 
personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only Permissible 
interrogation Techniques. Permissible Interrogation Techniques 
consist of both (a) Standard Techniques and (b) Enhanced 




Techniques. 1 ^ ETTs require advance approval from Headquarters, as 
do standard techniques whenever feasible. The Held must document 
the use of both standard techniques .and ETTs. 

63- XTSyHHEflH Th e DCI Interrogation Guidelines define 
"standard interrogation techniques" as techniques that do not 
incorporate significant physical or psychological pressure. These 
techniques include, but are not limited to, all lawful forms of 
questioning employed by U.S. law enforcement and military 
interrogation personnel. Among standard interrogation techniques 
are the use of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours, 34 
reduced caloric intake (so long as the amount is calculated to 
maintain the general health of the detainee), deprivation of reading 
.material, use of loud music or white noise (at a decibel level 
calculated to avoid damage to the detainee's hearing), the US( y* 

psychological pressure. The DCI Interrogation Guidelines do not 
specifically prohibit improvised actions. A CTC/Legal officer has 
said, however, that no one may employ any technique outside 
specifically identified standard techniques without Headquarters 
approval. 



64. fTSjgH9f§|} ElTs include physical actions and are 
defined as "techniques that do incorporate physical or psychological 
pressure beyond Standard Techniques." Headquarters must approve 
the use of each specific EIT in advance. EITs may be employed only 
by trained and certified interrogators for use with a specific detainee 
and with appropriate medical and psychological monitoring of the 
process. 35 



33 ^The 1Q approved EITs are described in the textbox on page 15 of this Review. 

34 tf$WEBB& According to the General Counsel, in late December 2003, the period for 
sleep deprivation was reduced to 48 hours. 

35 "trSjjgSSSt) Before EITs are ^minis terpd, a detainee must r e c eivea defaLtled^ 
sychological assessment and physical exam. 1 









TOFSEtSREI/ 




Medical Guidelines 



65. 
medical and ps 



OMS prepared draft guidelines for^ 
ical suot>of t to detainee inter rogations. 




Training for Interrogations 

66 TFsBHNHB In November 2002 / L -1— , b _ 

H-yHBiH^Hinitiated a pilot running of a two-week 
fSofatoffiSSJcouise designed to train, qualify, and certify 
"dials as Agent interrogators.* SeveralCTC officers, 

37 




TOFSEeftgty 



including a former SERE instructor, designed the curriculum, which 
included a week of classroom ins tructionjoli owed by a weekrt 
"hands-on" training in 




TOFSEeftEI/ 









"rOrs&egsiz 





i-Students 
^SSSS^SIS^^^ required to sign an 
acknowlef gment that they have read, understand, and will comply 
with the DCI's Interrogation Guidelines, 

69 ■rWJmmm I* Jtme2003,CTC established a debriefing 
course for Agency substantive experts who are involved in q^onmg 
detainees after they have undergone interrogation ™^f^ 
deemed "compliant." The debriefing course was established to torn 
non-interrogators to collect actionable intelligence from high value 
detainees in CIA custody. The course is intended to fanuhanze 
non^interrogators with key aspects of the Agen^ieflogalion 
Program, to include the Program's goals and legal auihot^ he DCI 
Interrogation Guidelines, and the xo^^T^^goi^go 
interact with a high Value detainee. 



Detention and interrogation operations at 






74 7 v t^5 j H IIIIBIiJ ^WIH H HBW ^ 5 ^'' ^ ' 10 ^"^^' ^ r - i - eri ' fi at01 " s ' 

lied each interrogation of Abu Zubiwiah and AhN^sniri 
whe re EITs were used. T he- psychologist/ interrogators awiirrred 
, Af i .-h Ip p pil il llB Bl tea m members before each interrogation 
session. Psychological evaluations were _ 

r : cholot 




?~&02a&&&S::'*zy£3§& 









"toFsbsbse/ 




psychologist/taterrogators began Al-Nashiri's mterrogahon usrng 
EITs immediately upon Ms arrival. AWashta provided lead 
Morr^tiononototettotistedmtagl^tdayofmterxogahoa 

On the twelfth day of vnterrogation,|||^Hpsycnologrst/ 
interrogators administered two applications of the «a*»to 
Al-Nashiri during two separate interrogate sessions, fctaoed 
jn^^fa of Al-Nashiri continued through 4 December 2002J 



Videotapes of Interrogations 

' 77 rfgJHHH Headquarters had intense interest in 
kee^g^SSSa^pects of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation® 
SlHixicluding compliance with the guidance provided to he 
BSto thereof EITs. Apart fr o^tMs^we ver, and before 
the use of EITs; the interrogation teamsfgj|MK cleciaea lQ 
videotape the interrogation sessions. One initial purpose was to 
ensure a record of Abu Zubaydah's medical condition and ^ataent 
should he succumb to his wounds and questions arise *^ e 
medical care provided to him by CIA. Mother purpose w* to assrst 
in the preparation of the debriefing reports, although die team 
advised CTC/Legal that they rarely, if ever, were used for that 
purpose. There are 92 videotapes, 12 of which include fall 
applications. An OGC attorney reviewed the videotapes rn 
November andDecember 2002 to ascertain compliance with the 
August 2002 DoJ opinion and compare what actually happened with 
whSLs reported to Headquarters. He reported that there was no 
deviation from the DoJ guidance or the written record. 

—.-„,. OIG reviewed the videotapes, logs, and 
cables^^™Jh^y 2003 - OIG identified 83 waterboari 
rtrSsSstof which lasted less thanj^seconds^ 



« M JBHfflll ForthepuxposeofthisReYiev^awatexboardaiplIcationcoBStitutedeach 
dlSS which wait ?vas applied for any pexiod of toe durmg a ™, 



TOFSESSEI/ 




"TOrsBe&Bx/] 




^^^^^^^^^^^^^ . interrogation ' 

uTSSS blankexcept for one or two minutes of 
recording. Two nthors wer e broken and could not be reviewed. OIG 
compared the videotapes toHBlogs and cables and identified 
■ a 21-hour period of time, which included two waterboaf d sessions, 
that was not captured on the videotapes. 

79. b^BBBi OIG's review of tijev^ofapes revealed 
that the waterboard technique employed ^gSHKi ^tent 
from the technique as described in the DoJ opinion and used in the 
SERE training. The difference was in the manner in which the 
detainee's breathing was obstructed. At the SERE School and m the 
DoJ opinion, the subject's airflow is disrupted by the.firm application 
of a damp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator applies a small 
amount of water to the cloth in , a controlled manner. By contrast, the 

Agency interrogator^HM c ^ fouousl y *&?** ^ ^^ 
of water to a cloth that covered the detainee's mouth and nose. One of 
the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the Agency's use 
of the teclmique differed from that used in SERE training and 
explained that the Agency's technique is different because it is "for 
real" 'and is more poignant and convincing. 




J Duririg this time, Headquarters issued 
the formal DCI Confinement Guidelines, the DCI Interrogation 
Guidelines, and the additional draft guidelines specifically 



"TOFStGREX/ 



addressing requirements for OMS personnel. This served to 
strengthen the command and control exercised over the CTC 
Program. 

Background and Detainees 




TOFSEGREI/ 










TOF^eessc/ 





"TDFSBeREI/ 




TOFSBeRW 




Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines 



89. 




Ithe Ag ency was prov iding legal and operational 
briefings and cablesHMBBthat contained Headquarters^ ■ _ 
guidance and discussed the torture statute and the DoJ legal opinion. 
CTC had also establishMAHgcgto t of detailed cables between 

^^^^^SSSr^ofdetainees. The written guidance did 
not address the four standard interrogation techniques that, 
according to CTC/Legal, the Agency had identified as early as 
November 2002 *> Agency personnel were authorized to employ 
standard interrogation techniques on a detainee without 
Headquarters 7 prior approval. The guidance did not specifically 



WlSTimji* four standard interrogation techniques were: (1) sleep deprivation not to _ 
exceed 72houis, (2) continual use or light or darkness in a cell, (3) loud musk, and (4) white noise 
(background hum) . 



TOF^sesrol 



*&£-" 



TOP 



address the use of props to imply a physical threat to a ^e^nor 
did it specifically address the issue of whether or not Agency officers 

were in place to ensure that personnel going to the field were briefed 
on the existing legal and policy guidance. 

Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques 

90 TT&JHHB This Review heard allegations of the use 

handgun and power drill incident, discussed below, is tire subject of a 
separa^OIGLestigation. In addition, individuals mterviewed 
dmL the Review identified, other techniques that caused concern 
becTJe Doj Had not specifically approved them. These included the 
making of threats, blowing cigar smoke, employing certain stress 
positions, the use of a stiff brush on a detainee, and ^stepping , .on a 
detainee's ankle shackles. For all of the instances, the allegations 
were disputed or too ambiguous to reach any authoritative 
detei— n regarding the facts. Thus, although these alteganons 
are illnstrative of the nature of the concerns held by individuals 
associated with the CTC Program and the need for clear guidance, 
they did not warrant separate investigations or administrative action. 

Handgun and Power Drill 

m >r ci^^^B |aj i 8B l |M|interrog:ation team members, 
^Jl^BfJg gSHB N^hm and debrief Abu 
Zubaydah, initially staffedHH The mterrogaUon ^ 
continued EITs on Al-Nashiri for two weeks rn December 2«2» 
they assessed him to be "compliant." Subsequently , CTC officers at 

Headquart ers BHaMj iilnroMiliMtlff"^^™"^™ , . 
_ _ ^ enioroperations ofiicer(the debrief er)| 

l^d^bTierand assess Al-Nashiri. 

92. TT^^gMHBffjThe debriefer assessed Al-Nashiria^ 
withholding information, at which pomtgBB reinstated « 
SSjSsaBBaHaraB |hooding, and handcuffing. Sometime between 





28 December 2002 and 1 January 2003, the debriefer used an 
unloaded semi-automatic handgun as a prop to frighten AWtasfcm 
into disclosing information « After discussing this plan witn« 
MM debriefer entered the cell where Al-Nashiri sat shackled and 
S the handgun once or twice close to Al-Nashiri's head « On 
what was probably the sa me day, the debriefer used a power drill to 

frighten Al-Nashiri. WithHBBfc onseilt ' ** debliefer ent f ed 
the detainee's cell and revved the drill while the detainee stood 
naked and hooded The debriefer did not touch Al-Nashiri with the 
power drill. 



93. TS/WI^ TheJBand debriefer did not request 
authorization or report the use of these unauthorized techniques to 

rs. However, in January 2003, newly arrived TDY officers 
Lho had learned of these incidents reported them to 
"Headquarters, OIG investigated and referred its findings to the 
Criminal Division of DoJ. On 11 September 2003, DoJ declined to 
prosecute and turned these matters over to CIA for disposition. 
These incidents are the subject of a separate OIG Report of 
Investigation. 46 



Threats 



the 



94:. ^ WK^S ^j^mDvti^ another incident 
same Headquarters debriefer, according to aHJjJiilfflMiBw-ho 
was present, threatened Al-Nashiri by saying "that if he did not talk, 
"We could g et your mother in here," and, "We can bring your family 
in here/' TheHHMBHdebriefer reportedly wanted Al-Nashiri 
to infer, fo r psychological reasons, that the debriefer might begg 

Nashiri was ^i J lllill W^to^Y i ^ ^ ause U waS wi(My believed in 
Middle East H™™t TilMM^ terrogation technique involves 



44 (&7VNE1 This individual was not a framed interrogator and was not authorized to use ETTs. 

45 (U//FQUQ) Racking is a mechanical procedure used with firearms to chamber a bullet or 
simulate a bullet being chambered. WHSH^H 

46 (S^y*© Unauthorized Interrogadon Techniques ^^M^g 29 October 2003. 






sexually abusing female relatives in front of the detainee. The 
debriefer denied threatening Al-Nashiri through his family. The 
debrief er also said he did not explain who he was or where he was 
from when talking ^ .^f^g; The debriefer said he neVer S& 

Al-Nashiri draw his own conclusions . 

I^HBHB^errogators said to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad that 
TS^ t fri r ^^e happens in the United States, "We're going to Ml 
yo ur children." Accordmg to me inteCTOga^one^he 
_ ~ iterrogators sale" 



jWith respect to the report 
" provided to hi m of the threats ||[|||jj|HBl that report did not 
indicate that the law had been violated. 




Smoke 

mterroga torldmtted'ir a?m December 2002, he and another 
^ggg/ P^BSmmmm ^mokeA cigars and blewsmoke in 
Al-Nashiri's face during an interrogation. The interrogator claimed 
they did this to "cover the stench" in the room and to help keep the 
interrogators alert late at night. This interrogator said he would not 
do this again based on "perceived criticism." Another Agency 
interrogator admitted that he also smoked cigars during two sessions 
with Al-Nashiri to mask the stench in the room. He claimed he did 
not deliberately force smoke into Al-Nashiii's face. 



Stress Positions 

97 ^^BHHHi oIG recdved re p° rts * atinterr °g ation 

team membeSSSffiotentially injurious stress positions on 
Al-Nashiri. Al-Mashiri was required to kneel on the floor and lean 
back. On at least one occasion, an Agency officer reportedly pushed 
Al-Nash iri backwa rd while he was- in tins stres s^p^iton^ another 

occasionflBBft 53 ^ he had to ^^^^ ^ tei BBH 
_„„bxpressed concern t hat Al-N ashiri's arms might be 

■disto^from his shoulders. HHI ex P lailied *"*' at ^ ^ 
the interrogators were attempting to put Al-Nashiri in a standing 
stress position. Al-Nashiri was reportedly lifted off the floor by his 
arms while his arms werebound behind his back with a belt. 

Stiff Brush and Shackles 

og VdHHHHHHSHKnteriogator reported that 
he witnessed other techniques used on Al-Nashiri that the 
interrogator knew were not specifically approved by DoJ. These 
included the use of a stiff brush that was intended to induce pain on 
Al-Nashixi and standing on Al-Nashiri's shackles, which resulted m 
cuts and br uises. When questioned, an interrogator who was at 

" ■"Tacknowledged that they used a stiff brash to bathe 

Am^hiri. He described the brush as the kind of brush one uses in a 
bath to remove stubborn dirt. A CTC manager who had heard of the 
incident attributed the abrasions on Al-Nashiri's ankles to an Agency 
officer accidentally stepping on Al-Nashiri's shackles while 
repositioning him into a stress position. 

Waterboard Technique 

99- t^jHBBB The Review determined that the 
interrogators used the waterboard on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in 
a manner inconsistent with the SERE application of the waterboard 
and the description of the waterboard in the DoJ OLC opinion, in that 
the technique was used on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad a large 
number of times. According to the General Counsel, the Attorney 




General acknowledged he is fully aware of the repehhve use of te 
waterboard and that CIA is well within the scope of the Do] opinion 
and the authority given to CtAby that opinion. The Attorney 
General was informed the waterboard had been usea 119 times on a 
single individual. 

J) Cables indicate that Agency 
annli ed the v^aterboajd te^irdgueto 

Khalid'shaykh Muhammad 18; 



100. (TS 
interrogate: 







48 

informed us ih 

in 



HJJ The OLC opinion dated I Au S -js« 200: suie*. ">ou hr.o -^ ora:iy 

at U is ukdv chat this procedure hvalerbeard] would, noi last n ' 0fe ,|,^" V'S 111 '^' 




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53 ^TsJBflHR The « rsi session of the irUerrogalion course began in Novoimtvr 2u02. ^ce 
paragraphs 64-65 



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Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques 

^^^ tlZlZa^^^S^JnlLi^ues that . 
WHKdquarters had not approved. Agency personnel 

Agency's insufficient attention to interrogations m^ffiffil 




165. 

two incidents: iiMiiww i iiiiM i i i| ||MiilWiiWii i ' " L i m i 

^d the death 5SSS5^p3E^B«^<»^ 

Af ghanistan (discussed further in paragraph 192) _ These two case, 

pjsented facts that warranted criminal ™*&™^Z wfflbe 

techniques discussed below were used witrgg— — « — 

further addressed in connection with a Report 

In other cases of undocumented or unauthorized techniques, the tacts 

a e amoiguous or less serious, not warranting further mveshganon. 

Some actions discussed below were taken by employees or 

contractors no longer associated with the Agency. Agency 

Pressure Points 



166 TT^iliiHIBMiJ^Bl 1 ^ T"^ v ^m?- 1 , m, „ i -— — 

to restrict the detainee's carotid artery. 



TOFSfiS 








■ f i r m i i iiiiinniiiiii i ^ n was 

i^Ze^SSe^^^^^^o the point 

that fee detainee would nod and start to pass out; then, the 
piMflMi^BHBBi chnnV the detainee to wake hum This 
^^^^^^^oratotal of three W^^on ft^etofi^ 

^^^^SHPHBStog people and until 
recen% had neve, been instructed how to conduct interrogation, 

168 (57WED CTC management is now aware of this reported 
. incident, 'the slely of which was disputed. ^£™££ ^ 
Domts is not/and had not been, authored, and CTC has advised me 

——^ ""Ifchat such actions are not authorized. 



Mock Executions 

ft ^^tof^ predicated on a technique he h adj^gpj^ in 
^gg^^grhe debrief er stated ^^^ ^^^ ^^jP^ff 
between September and October 2( ^'BHHHHP° f 1 ? fp ! 
fire a handgun outside the interrogation room while ^ debneier 
Ihte A^^^ waB thought to be wxthholdmg ^ ^ 

£ards. When L guards moved the detainee from ™^f» 
L, they passed a guard who was dressed as a hooded detamee, 
lying motionless on the ground, and made to appear as if he had 
been shot to death. 










170. B&aWBi ^ defaiefer dajgedhgfidgo t fhtok 
he needed to report this incidentbeca^etheHBBWW 1311 

"fscusafd this pla^W— iseveral^^l^ 
after the incident. When the debriefer was hOe^gg^ggg^o. 
believed he needed a non-tta dilionaijec hnigue to induce the 
Deue\ eu ne nc- ^^HHHShe wanted to wave a handgun 

detainee to cooperate, he foldg^W^ ^,, - A ^ a; a n rt 
in front of the detainee to scare him. The debriefer said he did not 
S^ve he was required to notify Headqnartersof^tetoqne, 
citing the earlier, unreported mock execuhorMMMHBIUMfflllB 

had staged a mock execution. Mvas not present but understood it 

-t^twas^^ 

from it lifrbserved that there is a need to be creative as long as u is 
not conSd torture. Mi tated that if such a W^j^e 
.o w.it would invol ve a great deal of consrr taton *™^*V* 
witilM^MHmanagement and would include CTC/ Legal, 




^M^^^ the technique was his idea but was not effective 
SSSeaooas as being staged- Itwasbased on ^concept, 
from SERE school, of showing something that looks real, butis not 
TheMMBrecalled that a particular CTC iaterrog^ojte 
told Mm about employing a mock execution technique. Thej^ 
HMBM did not know when this incident occurred or if it was 
TSful. He viewed this technique as ineffective because it was not 
believable. 




TOFSEQ 



"tofss 




- „p ollr ) 

iio were interviewed admitted to either participating in 
ribed incidents orbggring about them. 



„— j-nrjJ^pfif-'^p^ staging a mock execution of a detainee. 
Reportedly, a detainee who witnessed the 'body" in the af termath of 
the ruse "sang like a bird." 

four days before his interview w ith OIG, gi JU HM W stated he 
had conducted a mock executiorffl fiBiilll in October or 
November 2Q02. Reportedly, the firearm was discharged outside of 
tire building, and it was done becau se the detainee reportedly 
possessed critical threat informationHBH» stated that he told 
&4BBBHB not to d o it again. He stated that he has not heard 
of a similar act occurring p PJJB8^ i ^ i nce merL 



Use of Smoke 



175. 



CIAoffi 



{ revealed that 

cigarette smoke was once used as an fo terr °ga ^ ^ ^Sj jjii"* 
October 2002. Report edly, at the request of HHBHHi 
S aa j aa aS S B nOllffir i interrogator, the officer, who does not 
^moE' , Sew "e smoke from a thin cigarette /cigar in the -detainee's 
face for about five mi nutes. The detainee sta rted talking so the 

smoke ^m mmm & m ^ a ***** 

officer had used smoke as air interrogation teclmic £i^j5£L gffiL 
questioned numerous personnel who had workedjJawHiiw lboilt 
the use of smoke as a technique. None reported any knowledge of 
the use of smoke as an interrogation technique. 

i76j^HH^BHHHHI^HHI^^HK 

P^g J^dmitted that he has personally used smoke 
inhalation techniques on detainees to make them ill to the point 
where they would start to "purge." After this, in a weakened state, 



72 



TO. 



these dAtainflft s would then po^ g 

■jpfrvr-mafinn .70 gffl .,„„|„., ,.„„ 

abusing detainees or knowing anyone who has. 



denied ever physically 



Use of Cold 




178. TP S^B— «l ln l^hnoea^toust 2002^ 

detainee was being interrogated^^^^BiHsM--. 
Prior to proceeding with any of the proposed methods,! 
officer responsible foj the detaineeHHBMi rec l uestm S 
HeadquarLs authority to employ a preserved rnterrogahon plan 
over a two-week period. The plan included the following. 

' Physical Comfort Level Deprivation: With use of a window air 
conditioner and a judicious provision/ deprivation of ™J* 
clothing /blankets, believe we can increase I the detainee s] physical 

• discomfort level to the point where we may lower his 
mental/trained resistance abilities. 

CTC/Legal responded and advised, IQaution must be used when 
employing the air conditioning /blanket deprivation so that [the 
detamee'sl discomfort does notlead to a serious illness or worse. 




70 ^This was substaafefed in part by theCIA officer who participated in this act with the 



73 



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183 TfsyisMsri Man y of ^ officers interviewed about 

the use of coM^e^Ttechnique cited that the water heater was 
inoperable and there was no other recourse except for cold showers. 

fooperati^ he would be given a Tarm shower. He stated that when 
a detainee was uncooperative, the interrogators accomplished two 
goals by combining the hygienic reason for a shower with the 
unpleasantness of a cold shower. 



184. 



In December 2002,] 



i cable 



^^^^SdetahS^Eac^r^TsSdJd and naked, 
until he demonstrated cooperation. 

- 185. t^lHfflH When asked m^^^OOS, if cold 
was used as an interrogation technique; fhel^^BBrespQnded, 
"not perse." He explained that physical and environmental 
discomfort was used to encourage the detainees to improve their 
environmentMBibserved that cold is hard to define. He 
asked rhetorically, "How cold is cold? How cc Mis h feflu eatennig? 
He stated that cold water was still employed gBWg however ' 
showers were administered in a heated room. Hestate d there was no 
specific guidance on it from Headgu^rtes, andB»vas left to its 
own discretion in the use of cold. jfflWMded there is a cable 
fromBBSdocmnenting ^ e use of "manipulation of the 
environment." 



186. -r mWB{BBmmB& Although the PCI Guidelines do not 
mention cold as a technique, the September 2003 draft CMS 
Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee 
Interrogations specifically identify an "uncomfortably cool 
environment" as a standard interrogation measure. (Appendix F.) 
The OMS Guidelines provide detailed instructions on safe 
temperature ranges, including the safe temperature range when a 
detainee is wet or unclothed. 







"roFsee 




Water Dousing 

dowonaVsttc sheet a^pouringwato^rtafelO^ 
1 <5 minutes Another officer explained that the loom was n 
a S^es or more; the guards used ""- ~ 
temperature while the interrogator questioned the detamee. 

188. waH^A^i^rtHfefa^ 11 ^ 

rTSMito e employ a specific techniques for a number of detainees. 
S^^meliLLeVeBted techniques w^te^dorf 

Subsequent cables reported the use and durahon of the tecmuques > 

notin g that water dousing appeared to be a most etrecn i 

requeued CTC to confirm guideBnes On water — v ™ ef 
cable directed that the detainee must be placed on . towd ^or s heet, 

temperature must exceed 65 degrees if the detameewui 
immediately. 

water dousin^SteSe. ^ e 4 ***?*? ^ n o^dard 

Guidelines,however,iden^^^ 

measures that QMS listed, in ascending degree of >»^s the 

11th standard measure. OMS did not further address water 

dousing" in its guidelines. 




water dousing as a technique used, but 



ma 



Iat»pSrap5h ™"d She term "cold, warefbath." 










Hard Takedown 
190 




takedown wiuHfoRSnn mterrogationsl^HMB* 5 ''P art ° f *f 
ataosXks.^ For a time.it was the standard procedure foi—g 
Sffito the sleep deprivation cell It was done focto* £* 
psychological impact and signaled the transition to another phase of 
Sintelgation The act of putting a detainee into a diaper can 
cause abrasions if the d etainee struggl es because the. floor of the 
caused t t- HMMBBHHhtated he did not discuss the 

facility is concrete. TheJHHHMt^ e f u ne . Q1 , 

hard ikedown withHH^r^gers.buthe t ho^tftjej 

understood what techniques were being used at^j»BL_. 
' """ stated that the hard takedown had not been used recent!) 
After taking the interrogation class, he understood that it 





• TOF5g€&g 



3 
S3 



TOTSBGKEI! 



he was going to do a hard takedown, he must report it to 
Headquarters. Although the DCI and OMS Guidelines address 
physical techniques and treat them as requiring advance 
Headquarters approval, they do not otherwise specifically address 
the "hard takedown." 



192. If ^B B^pMBBIB^ MB stated ^ lcli [lC was g enerall y 
familiar with the technique of hard takedowns. He asserted that they 
areauihorized and believed they had been used one o r more times at 
BHBGua order to intimidate a detainee. HHHR stated that he 
would not necessarily know if they have been used and did not 
consider it a serious enough handling technique to require 
Headquarters approval Asked about the possibility that a detainee 
may have been dragged on the ground during the course of a hard 
takedown JSiHHfli responded that he was unaware of that and did 
riot understand- the point of dragging someone along the corridor in 



at Other Locations Outside of the CTC 



Abuse 



Program 



193 * -f£S /iHBJHiiiiiiiul Altho ugh not within t he scope of the 
CTC Program, tw o other incidentsp BBHBBHwere reported in 
2003. 




noted ab ove, one 
resulted in the death of a detainee at Asadabad Base 76 ! 



194. "(57WE)L.In June 2003, the US. military sought an Afghan 
citizen who had been implicated in rocket attacks on a joint U.S. 
Army and CIA position in Asadabad located in Northeast 
Afghanistan. On 18 June 2003, this individual appeared at Asadabad 
Base at the urging of the local Governor. The individual was held in 
a detention facility guarded by U.S. soldiers from the Base. During 



76 *£S^ For more than a year, CIA referred to Asadabad Base asl 










the four days the individual was detamed, an « *denj : 
contractor/who was a paramilitary officer, is alleged to have severely 
beaten the detainee with a large metal flashlight ^and krcM torn 
durine interrogationsesskms. The detainee died in custody on 

f anulTon *e Mowing date without an autopsy being performed. 
Neither the contractor nor his Agency staff supervisor had been 
S^d or authorized to conduct interrogation. The .Agency -id no, 
renew the independent contractor's contract, which was up for 
renewal soon after the incident. OIG is investigating fas incident m 
concert with DoJ. 77 

1 95. (§7VME) MJu ly 2003^ TTIilllfllllll " a 

— —— fo ffirpr assigned tuM MlMMFSsauitea a 

■ ■ i — r 3 ^nBHH^H This assault occurred 

teacher at a religious school gggg^gHHRH ^ — 

rh,r w the course of an ^^ 

^^^^l^e'objeS was to determine if anyone at 
aSSSoTfficnSSStion about the detonation of a remote- 
"ued improvised explosive device that had killed eight border 
guards several days earlier. 

196 (S7V&ffii A teacher being interviewed HBBP 
MBBM rpWe dlv smiled and laughe d inappropriately, 
^ " ^ T^ ^m^m mmjg^llM used the butt stock of his rifle 
to s e tXe P or n 'butt S trol<e ,, the teacher at least twice in his torso, 
followed by several knee kicks to historso. This incident was 
witnessed by 200 students. The teacher was reportedly not seriously 
Mured. In response to his actions, Agency management retaned the 
^(i f \ M^ l l ^ l ^ S ^^ U ' , Headquarters. He was counseled and 
given a domestic assignment. 



I 







.'OpiSEtrRE 










~TOF3t€-3 




ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO INTERROGATIONS 

204 (T^HHHB Directorate of Intelligence analysts 
assigned to CTC^d^alytical support to mterrogation terms m 
tihe field. Analysts are responsible ^r d^opmg ^™^° F 

some cas ^JBB^^H|H^^HB^^^^H^^HB8B||^ 











205 Tl-S/HHMt According to a number of toe 
iJSfflS, the Agency', intelligence on AW> «ta 
wsTirllSpriattc. the taltiationof the CTC Interrogate Program, 
tt "ylcked adequate linguists or subject matter experts and 
Slve^HLhardtaowledgeofwhatparucuteM-Qa^ 
leaders-who later became detamees-taew.^laArttaov.leQg 

edaTalvsts to speculate about what a detainee "should know vrce 
ied analysts t_ sp _ ^ ^^ demor.txatetetoamee 

did know. ' 



206 ' I ■■■■ll«WIIMlllMIIIM«ll^i™illll« ■ 

J fflTeii 

«X at Headers was to the detainee was holing back 
"ew more; consequently, Headquarters recommended 
resumption of EITs, 





"TOFSEeRE 




evidenced in the final waterboard session of Abu Zubayciah 
According, to a senior CTC officer, the interrogation team^ 
BBMk o^si dered Abu Zubaydah to be compliant and wanted to 
terSateEiTs. HHPBbelieved Abu Zubayd ah continued to 
withhold information,' 








generated substantial pressure from Headquarters to continue use of 
L EITs . According to this senior officer, the decision to resume use 
of the ^^jjgr^^^^^ ^hS^SjSSSSm 

Sv^terboard session, afterwhich, they reported back to 
Headquarters that the EITs were no longer needed on Abu 
Zubaydah- 




Effectiveness 

in ^HHB The <i etention ° f terorists has p revented 

to front-engaging in further terrorist activity, and their 
interrogation has provided intelligence that has enabled the ^ 
identification and apprehension of other terrorists, warned I o, 
terrorists plots planned for the United States and around the world, 
and supported articles frequently used in the finished intelligence 
publications for senior policymakers and war Hghters. In this regard, 
there is no doubt that the Program has been effective. Measuring the 
effectiveness of EITs, however, is a more subjective process and not 
without some concern. 

212. (fsJHHB When the Agency began captui-ing 
terrorists^ management indeed the success of ftie.^Qrttobejsettinf 
them off the streets,! 




"tots? 




,,.„._- -apture of terrorists 

significant, actionable information, the measure of success of the 

Program increasingly became the intelligence obtained from the 

detainees. 

213. Cr^HHHH Quantitatively, the DO has significantly 
increased the number of counterterrorism intelligence reports with 
the inclusion of information from detainees in its custody. Between 
9/11 and the end of April 2003, the Agency produced over 3,000 
intelligence reports from detainees. Most of the reporg^came from | 
intelligence provided by the high value detainees atf lHlu, ™™ JSBBSHB 



214. CTSMHHHHHHH CTC frequently uses the 
information from one detainee, as well as other sources, to vet the 
information of another detainee. Although lower-level detainees 
provide less information than the high value detainees, information 
from these detainees has, on many occasions/ supplied the 
information needed to pro be the high v alue detainees further. 

( the hiangulationof 
intelligence provides a fuller knowledge of Al-Qa'ida activities &an 
would be possible from a single detainee. For example, Mustafa 
Ahmad Adam al-Hawsawi, the Al-Qa'ida financier who was 
captured with Khalid Shaykh Muh^rnmao^ovide^^ Agency's 
first intelligence pertaining t°flHi^ another 
participant in the 9/11 terroristplotHHB^^MHawsawi's 
information to obtain additional det ails about^ ^^Hrole from 
Khalid Shaykh Muhammadl 



215. n S Wmmmmm HBBBmm Detainees have provided 
information on Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist CT0 Hg| M |i^g^^piMfi 
note includes: th e modus operandi of AK&'idaJBBHIBMMI 
IMl^fWfS^^i terrtiiisIs who are ca pable of mounting attacks in the 

United States! 



86 



TOP 












TOFSBQK 




216 C^flHHB Detainee information has assisted in tlie 
identification of terrorists. For example, information from Abu 
Zubaydah helped lead to the identification of Jose Padilla and 
Binyam Mtmammed--operatives who; had plans to detonate a 
uranium-topped dirty bomb in either Washington D.C, or New 
York City. Biduan "HambaM" Isomuddin provided mf orrnationthat 
led to the arrest of previously unknown members of an Al-Qaid a cell 
in Karachi. They were designated as pilots for an aircraft attack 
inside fee United States. Many other detainees, including lows-level 
detainees such as Zubayr and Majid Khan, have provided leads to 
other terrorists, but probably the most prolific has been KhaM 
ShaykhMuhamrnad. He provided information that helped lead to 
the arrests of terrorists including SayfuHah Paracha and his son Uzair 
Paracha, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muhammad planned to 
use to smuggle explosives into the United States; Saleh Almari, a 
sleeper operative in New York; and Majid Khan, an operative who 
could enter the U nited States easily an d was tasked to research 
attacksMHHBHMM*^ ShayM, Muhammad's 
information also led to the investigation and piosecu tonofljjman 
Faris, the truck driver arrested in early 2003 in Ohio. HHHiMHBi 







"rSraeRSE' 





01* I I ■ I IlIIIIMIII Detainees, both planners 

a nd D aSSISS'II'S^ency aware of s^plots 
planned for the ttjfedS|t||||r^r|fe^^||||. 

[blow upseveral 
fWHSSSSSfSSSha^hiPkSd fly an airplane 
Sfo S tallestbuilding in Califonria in a west <- ™ * * 
World Trade Center attack; cut the hnes oi suspensrcmbndgesm 
t-Ictat York in an effort to inakf^emcollapse;^MB^^^M 



^^gTOsfe!BSKtSS!ny evidence that oua*^ 
■SSrnSent. Agency senior managers believe that ^avebeen 
«ved as a result of the capture and interrogation of terrorists who 
wli pTan^g attacks, in partial KhaUd Shaykh Muharnnrad, Abu 
Zubaydah,Hambali, and Al-Nashin. 

218 Pl^JHHIH^^H^^ udge the re P orting from 

™ vfts' taoKo "terrorist target as having muclr more 
Tepth as flit oi information from detainees and estunated that 
ctSree reporting is used in all ccjrnt^^^^jjg 
for the most 1 ' " ""'" 




an interview, the DCI 











said he believes the use of EITs has proven to be extremely valuable 
L oWainta—ouB ammmts of critical teeat tatoahon from 
dei^who had otherwisebelieved they were safe from anyham, 

in the hands of Americans. 




??(] ^ ■ ■■■ i Inasmuch as HITs have been used only 

since Z^SSS^l^r^^^^^^T^ 
value detainee, there is limited data on which to assess their 
Ll^dSfertvenfifla. ■ This Review identiaed concerns about the 

Justified by the results, whether it has been urmecess^ used m 
some rnst4ces, and whether the fact that itisbeing agdma 
manner different from its use in SERE training brings ^o question 
the continued applicability of the Do] opinion to its use. Although 

■ tte vaterboard^ 
precautions havebeen taken to provide on-site medrcal oversight in 
ttie use of all EITs is evidence that their use poses risks. 

m tTgjHHHi Determining the effectiveness of each 
EIT isln^artoSSSStating Agency management's decision as to 
which techniques should be used and for how long. Measuring the 
overall effectiveness of EITs is challenging for a number of reasons 
including: (1) the Agency cannot determine with any certamty the 
totality of the intelligence the detainee.actuaUy possesses; (2) each 
detainee has different fears of and tolerance for EITs; (3) the 
application of the same EITs by different interrogators may have 



"tSFbe€rex1 



different results; and 




222. ( 
detainees: AbuZuba 
Muhammad 



The waterboard has been used on three 
Al-Nashiri, and Khalid Shaykh 




possessed perishable information about imminent threats against the 
United States. 

223. T^ JHMH J l Prior to the use of EITs, Abu Zubaydah 
provided mformato reports- Interrogators 

applied the waterboard to Abu Zubaydah at least 83 times during - 
August 2002. During the period between the end of the use of the 
waterboard and 30 April 2003, he provided information for 
approximateryMI additional reports. It is not possible to say 
definitively that the waterboard is the reason for Abu Zubaydah's 
increased production, or if another factor, such as the length of • 
detention, was the catalyst. Since the use of the waterboard^ 
however, Abu Zubaydah has appeared to be cooperative; 





224. (^/gHHI pB With respect to Al~Nashiri,[ 

1 reported two waterboard sessions in November 2002, after 
wlucir trie psychologist/ interrogators deter mined that Al-Nashiri 
was compliant . However, after being movec 

j A™Nashiri was thought to be withholding 
infonnation. Al-Nashiri su bsequently received additional EiTs, 

determined Al-Nashiri to be "compliant." Because of the' litany of 













teetedquesusedby differed mterrogators ™*f*$f?£* 
period of time, it is difficult to identify exactly why Al-Nashin 
It '« willing to provide interna Hon. H = « 
ft* use of EITs, he provide^o^^tog^^ ^ 
operational planning and^BHBHiWH^^" 1 ™ „, 
the historical information he provided before the use of BTTs. 

■ 225 nsWBBBk On the other hand, KhalidShaykh 
Mutammad, an accomplished resistor provided only ^ 
intellieence reports prior to the use of the waterboard and analysis or 
2— « -eaiedtha, much of it was o-^™ £ » 
incomplete. As a means of less active resistance at the ^grrarng or 
jSLm.gi.tion, detainees routinely provide mformahon that they 
SSwtalreldy known. Khalid Shayfch Mr^^g^ _ 
.mirations of the waterboard m^laxdi20^J ■■■ 




FOUCY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING mEDETENTION 
AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM 

2?6 mwmm®m The EITs used b y tiie A g enc >" Lmder ^ 

CTC Pmgram^en^Sent with the public policy positions that the 
UnTted sLs has taken regarding human rights. ^^^ 
been a cause of concern to some Agency personnel involved with the 

Program. - 



TOFSE€R® 



Policy Considerations 

227. (U/ /FOUO) Throughout its history, the United States has 
been an international proponent of human rights and has voiced 
opposition to torture and mistreatment of prisoners by foreign 
countries. This position is based upon fundamental principles that are 
deeply embedded in the American legal structure and jurisprudence. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth- Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, for 
example, require due process of law, while die Eighth Amendment 
bars "cruel and unusual punishments." 

228. (U//FOUO) The President advised the Senate when 
submitting the Torture Convention for ratification that the United 
States would construe the requirement of Article 16 of the Convention 
to "undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other 
acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment which 
do not amount to torture" as "roughly equivalent to" and "coextensive 
with the Constitutional guarantees against cruel, unusual, and 
inhumane treatment."^ To this end, the United States submitted a 
reservation to the Torture Convention stating that the United States 
considers itself bound by Article 16 "only insofar as the term 'cruel, 
inhrrman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel, 
unusual, and inhumane treatment or, punishment prohibited by the 
Stir, 8th and/or 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
Stales." Although the Torture Convention expressly provides that no 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever,- including war or any other 
public emergency, and no order from a superior officer, justifies 
torture, no similar provision was included regarding acts of "cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment:' 



81 (U//FOUO) See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the 
Convention AgainstTorture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Sen. Treaty Doc. 100-20, 100* Cong., 2d Sfiss., at 15, May 23, 1988; Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Executive Report 101-30, AugustSO, 1990, at 25, 29, quoting summary and analysis 
submitted by President Ronald Reagan, as revised by President George H.W, Bush. 



T^FSESRS 





TroTSEe 



229 (U//FOUO) Annual U.S. State Department Country 
Reports on Human Eights Practices have. repeatedly condemned 
harsh-interrogation techniques utilized by foreign governments. Fox 
example, the 2002 Report, issued inMarch 2003, stated. 

[The United States] have been given greater opportunity to make 
good on our commitment to uphold standards of human dignity 
and liberty . . . .' [N]o country is exempt from scrutiny, and all 
countries benefit from constant striving to W entl ^heir 
weaknesses and improve their performance . . . . jTJhe Reports 
serve as a gauge for our international human rights efforts, 
piling to^arL of progress and drawing our a ttenuon to new and 
continuing challenges. 

■ In a world marching toward democracy and respect for human 
rights, theUnited States is a leader, a partner and a «> Jnbuto^ 
We have taken this responsibility with a deep and abtdmgbehef 
that human rights are universal. They are not grounded 
exclusively in American or western values. But then protection 
worldwide serves a core U.S. national interest. 

The State Department Report identified objectionable practices in a 
variety of countries including, for example, patterns of abuse of 
prisoners in Saudi Arabia by such means as "suspension from bars by 
handcuffs, and teats against family members, . [being] forced 
constantly to lie on hard floors [and] deprived of sleep .... Olhei 
reports have criticized hooding and stripping prisoners naked. 

230 (U/ / FOUO) In June 2003, President Bush issued a 
statement in observance of "United Nations International Day in 
Support of Victims of Torture:" The statement said in part: 

The United States declares its strong solidarity with torture victims 
across the world. Torture-anywhere is an affront to human dLgmty 
everywhere. We are committed to building a world where human 
rights are respected and protected by the rule of law. 






Freedom from torture is an inalienable human right .... Yet 
torture continues to be practiced around fee world by rogue 
regimes whose cruel methods match their determination to crush 
the human spirit 

Notorious human rights abusers . • - have sought to shield their 
abuses from the eyes of the world by staging elaborate deceptions 
and denying access to international human rights monitors .... 

The United States is" committed to the worldwide elimination of 
torture and we are leading this Eght by example. I call on all 
governments to join with the United States and the community of 
law-abiding nations in prohibiting, investigating, andprosecutmg 
all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and 
unusual punishment .... 

Concerns Over Participation in the CTC Program 

' 231 (SyWEX During the course of this Review, a number of 
Agency officers expressed unsolicited concern about the possibility of 
recrimination or legal action resulting from their participation in the 
CTC Program. A number of officers expressed g^em ^ta human 

sgr ° ^7^ AdditionallY/ they feared &at the Agency 

would not stand behind them if this occurred. 

232 "(S77NE1. One officer expressed concern that one day, 
Agency officers will wind up on some "wanted list" to appear before 
the World Court for war crimes sternming from activities^ 
WSMSM Another said, "Ten years from now we're going to be sorry 
l^tetog this . . . [but] it has to be done." He expressed concern 
that the CTC Program will be exposed in the news media and cited 
particular concern about the possibility of being named in a leak. 










TOFSKfc 



i=«ip- 







"tOf^s 




237 



/.or C^HBHHi The number of detainees in CIA custody 
is relatively small by comparison with those in U.S. military custody. 
Nevertheless, the Agency, like the military, has an interest m the 
disposition of detainees and particular interest in those who, if not 
kept in isolation, would likely divulge information about the 
circumstances of their detention. 





TSrSgGRE] 






~TDF^€ft 






245. fYx 




; poiH-viri.-ikcr^ havr ifiwn v .-'iwiitT.:r-"ii 
to prosecution as. a viable posSibilii} .ai iea>i Mr ^Tlam Jolihu-l - i 
date, however, no deci^on Has K-en made to piv\ i-l-ci with this 
option. 




83 (U//FOUO' Nv-n-.-.i 
SSCI. 











T0r3B€REXS 



TR5FSE6R 




CONCLUSIONS 

interxogatioJotaS 

fee identification and apprehension of other terrorists ^ warn d of 
terrorists planned for the United States and around ttu world. 
The CTC Detention and Interrogation Program has resulted in the 
issuance of thousands of individual intelligence reports and analytic 
products supporting the counterterrorism efforts of U .b. 
policymakers and military commanders. The effectiveness of 
particular interrogation techniques in ehciting mformation that might 
not otherwise have been obtained cannot be so easily measured, 
however. 

251 mJHH) After 11 September •2001/numerous 
Agency compSSteSd 'individuals invested immen, ^e and 
effort to implement the CTOProgrdm quickly, effectively and wi tar 
the law. The work of the Directorate of Operations, Cotmterterroist 
Center (CTC), Office of General Counsel (OGQ, OJficMM^^L 
Services (OMS), Office of Technical Service P^HHHHff™ 
«a« has been especially notable. In effect, they began with 
^^So foundation, as the Agency had discontinued virtually all 

involvement in interrogations after encountering difficult issues with 
• earlier interrogation programs in Central America and the Near East. 
Inevitably, there also have been some problems with current 
activities. 

• 252. (STWEIOGC worked closely withDoJ to determine the 
legality of the measures ihatcame to be known as enhanced 
interrogation techniques (EITs). OGC also consulted with White 
House and National Security Council officials regarding the 
proposed' techniques. Those efforts and the resulting DoJ legal 
opinion of 1 August 2002 are well documented. That legal opinion 
was based, in substantial part, on OTS analysis and the experience 
and expertise of non-Agency personnel and academics concerning 
whether long-term psychological effects would result from use of the 
proposed techniques. 




!@ 










253. USTim.^ D°J legal opinion upon ^^^ 
relies is based upon technical derations of "severe treatoent and 
the "intent" of the interrogators, and consists of finely delated 
analysis to buttress the conclusion that Agency officers properly 
carrying outETTs would not violate the Torture Conventions 
proMbirion of torture, nor would they be subject to criminal 
prosecution under the US. torture statute The opmion < ^J not 
address the separate question of whete the «PP™ ° f »andard 
or enhanced techniques by Agency officers *<^f? ™* ^ e 
undertaking, accepted conditionally by the United States regardmg 
Article 16 of the Torture Convention, to prevent cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment" 

254 7TS,^W» Periodic efforts by the Agency to elicit 

■ A-encVs use of EfTs-as they have actually been employed-^have 
to well advised and successful. However, in this process, Agency 
oLials havener sought 

of policy or a formal signed update of the Do] legal opinion, 
including such important determinations as the ™^JT ^ 
ant>Bcablity of Article 16 of the Torture Convention. In July 2003, the 
Dcfa^d ^General Counsel briefed senior Administration off icxals 
on the Agency's expanded use of Wis. At that time the Attorney 

G^rallffrW 

scope of the 1 August 2002 DoJ legal opinion. 

255. - IHW Anumber of Agency officers of various 
oxade levels who are involved with detention and interrogation 

■ ' activities are concerned that they may at some nature date be 

vulnerable to legal action in the United States or abroad and that die 
U S. Government will not stand behind them. Although the current 
detention and interrogation Program has been subject to DoJ legal 
review and Administration political approval, it diverges sharply 
from previous Agency policy and practice, rules that govern 
interrogations by U.S. military and law enforcement officers 
statements of U.S. policy by the Department of State, and public 



101 



"tDfs© 




statements by very senior U.S. officials, including the President, as 
well as the policies expressed by Members of Congress, other 
Western governments, international organizations, and human rights 
groups, in addition, some Agency officers are aware of interrogation 
activities that were outside or beyond the scope of the written DoJ 
opinion. Officers are concerned that future public revelation of the 
CTC Program is inevitable and will seriously damage Agency 
officers' personal reputations, as well as the reputation and 
effectiveness of the Agency itself. 

256. >a BHHBK > The Agency has generally provided 
good guidance and support to its officers who have been detain^ 
and h^rco gat mg high value terrorists using ErjVgursuant top^ 

interrogations of high value detainees at | 

At these foreign locations, Agency personnel— with one notable 
exception described in this Review— followed guidance and 
procedures and documented their activities well. 



257. (tSs^ pWHW By distinction, the Agency— especially 
in "theearly months of the Program— failed to provide adequate 
staffing, guidance, and support togios^hrvolve^wiMiedetento 
and interrogation of detainees in 




258. (mgjggHHUnauthorized, improvised, inhumane, 
and undocumented detention and interrogation techniques were 

usedl 

~~ "preferred 

"to "tiie" Department of Tustice (Poll for potential p rosecution.! 

lincident will be the 



TDFSSS 










T0FSE6RBI 




subject of a separate Report of Investigati on by the °^^^g^ „ 

individual who died at Asadabad Base while under interrogation by 
an Agency contractor in June 2003. A ^^^^^ d ^ n0rmaUy 
conduct interrogations at that location^jggjmthe Agency 
officers involved lacked timely and adequate guidance, training, 
experience, supervision,- or authorization, and did not exercise sound 
judgment. 



259. f^ n llllffllllinr The Agency failed to issue in a timely 
manner comprehensive written guidelines for detention and 
interrogation activities. "Although ad hoc guidance was provided to 
many officers through cables and briefings in the early months of 
detention and interrogation activities, the DCI Confinement and 
Interrogation Guidelines were not issued until January 2003, several 
months after initiation of interrogation activity and after many of the 
unauthorized activities had -" 




260. <' R qHUHB Such written guidance as does exist to 
address detentions and i nterrogations under taken by Agency officers 

fc s inadequate. The 

Directorate of Operations H andbook contain^^in^ktjarag^raph that 
is intended to guide offic ersBBMBBBHBHHBBBSI 
HHHHbIHHR Neither this dated guidance nor general 
Agency guidelines on routine intelligence collection is adequate to 
instruct and protect A gency officers involved in corttextxpo r a r y^ 
interrogation activities] 




261. fTS^HPfp^) During the interrogations of two 
detainees, the waterboard was used in a manner, inconsistent with the 
written DoJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002. DoJ had stipulated that 



103 



"tOp-sbs 




its advice was based upon certain facts that the Agency had 
submitted to DoJ, observing, far example, that \ . . you (the Agency) 
have also orally informed us that although some of these techniques 
may be used with more than once [sic], & at repetition will not be 
substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness 
after several repetitions." One key A^datgor^^sutec^ 
to the w aterboard at least 183 nme^HHHHBHB^5E£S£&^ 

In this and another instance, the technique of application and volume 
of water used differed from the Do] opinion. 

2 g,2 C rcHHm J fc QMS provided comp rehensive medical 
attention to dS3Bffli^«Wwhere EITswere 
employed w ith high value detainees, 



I nMfi , "d not issue formal medical- guidelines 

SfApril2003 H ?er the advice of CTC/Legal, the OMS Guidelines 
were then issued as "draft" and remain so even after being re-issued 
in September 2003, 




264. (l^BHi Agency officers report that reliance on 
analytical assessments that were unsupported by credible intelligence 
may have resulted in the application of ElTs without justification. 
Some participants in the Program, particularly Held interrogators, 
judge that CTC assessments to the effect that detainees are 
withholding information are not always supported by an objective 






T0F3EQS 



WW*^ * 



evaluation of available information and the evaluation of the _ 
interrogators but are too heavily based, instead, on presumptions of 
what the individual might or should know. 




266. n SfBaaamm The Agency faces potently. serious 
long-term political and legal challenges as a result of the C1C 
Detentionandlnterrogation Program, particularly its use of ETTs arid 
the inability of the U.S. Government to decide what it will ultimately 
do with terrorists detained by the Agency. . 



"TOP 




RECOMMENDATIONS 







TtJTSI 




10S 



TOF5B=Hc 









Appendix A 






PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES 

General, and comprising the Assistant Inspector General for 
Investigations, the Counsel to the Inspector General, a senior 
Investigations Staff Manager, three Investigators, two Inspectors, an 
Auditor, a Research Assistant, and a Secretary participated in this 
Review. 

information regarding the treatment and interrogation of all 
individuals detained by or on behalf of CIA after 9/11. Agency 
components provided OIG with over 38,000 pages of documents. 
OIG conducted over 100 interviews with individuals who possessed 
potentially relevant information. We interviewed senior Agency 
management officials, including the DCI, the Deputy Director of 
Central Intelligence, the Executive Director, the General Counsel, and 
the Deputy Director for Operations.- As new information developed, 
OIG re-interviewed several individuals. 




visited j 

of Abu Zubavdahl 



OIG personnel made site visits to the 
[interrogation facilities. OIG personnel also 
to review 92 videotapes of interrogations 



T0FSE6R 




! 



Appendix B 







o 
o 




•-Xi 




"15 




-?i 


: w 


Jii : -*.* cs 


■: r 


: p v5S] s*»! 


: ix 


!a !s'-s! 














: fv: 


'S -N 










i"3 
1 s* 


LI giiS 




: ^ 


.3 3is 


l^V 


11 


1 




J! 


f 3 






"^i 


O 'Si 5-c»; 


;o 


€ 


§8 


% 


^ 

O; 







Appendix C 







U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Legal Counsel 



OraeeofifeAjiisUfttAiMrtwy&MWil fl>ta*fc**». i>.C .30530 

August 1, 2002 

Memorandum for John Rizzo 
Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency 

Interrogation of Hi Qanda Operative 

You have asked for this Office's views oil whether certain proposed conduct would 
violate the prohibition against torture found at Section 2340 A of title 1 8 of the United Stales 
Code. You have asked for this advice in the course of conducting interrogations of Abu 
Zubaydah. As we understand it, Zubaydah is one of the highest ranking members of the a! Qaeda 
terrorist organization, with which the United States is currently engaged in an international armed 
conflict following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 1 1, 

2001. This letter memorializes our previous oral advice, given on July 24, 2Q02 and My 26, 

2002, that the proposed conduct would not violate this prohibition. 

L 

Oar advice is cased upon Hie felfe iwirig facts-, which, ym have-provided-to us. W'e also 
understand that you do not have any facts in your possession contrary to the facts outlined, h£re, 
and this opinion is limited to these facts. If these facts were to change, this advice would not 
necessarily apply. Zubaydah is cunentiy being held by the United States. The interrogation team 
is certain that he has additional information that he refuses to divulge. Specifically, he is 
withholding hifbrroation regarding terrorist networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia and 
information regarding plans to conduct attacks within the United States or against our interests 
overseas. Zubaydah has become accustomed to a certain level of treatment and displays.no signs 
of willingness to disclose further irv&rrnafiqri. Moreover, your intelligence indicates -that there is 
currently a level of "charter" equal to that which preceded the September i 1 -attacks. In light of 
(he information you believe Zubaydah hasand the high level of threat you believe now exists, 
you. wish to move the interrogations into what you have-described. as an "increased pressure 
phase." 

As part of tin's increased pressure phase, Zubaydah will have contact only with a new 
interrogation specialist whop he has not met previously, and the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, 
Escape ("SERE") training psychologist who has been involved with the interrogations since they 
began. This phase will likely last no more than several days but could last up to thirty days, hi 
litis phase, you would like to employ ten techniques that you believe will dislocate his 




TO&&ECRET 




expectations regarding the treatment he believes he will receive and encourage him to disclose 
the crucial information mentioned above. These ten techniques are: (I) attention 8n*P. W 



lite crucial nuouiiauuu iuwummi ^^.w. ». k - „ , ,• 

walling, (3) fecial hold, (4) facial slap (insult slap), (5) craved confiacmeat, (6) *ali aandmg, 
< 7) stress positions, f 8) sleep deprivation, (9-) insects placed in a comment box, and (10 dv 
waterboard. You have informed us that the use of these techniques would be on an as-needed 
"basis and thai not all of ttese techniques will necessarily be used. Tlw interrogation roarn woulu 
use these techniques in some combination to convince Ztrbaydah. that the only way .he On 
influence his surrounding, environment is through cooperation. You teve however-, iMonned us 
that vou expect these techniques to be used in some sort of escalating fashion, cutmmatag with 
the waterboard, thrush hSt necessarily ending vflfttlfismclmique. Moreqve*, youfcawafcq 
orally informed us thai although some of these techniques may be used wiih more than once, that 
repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness arlet 
several repetitions. You have alsainfotmed us that Zabaydah sustained a wound daring his 
capture, which is being treated. 

Based on the facts you have eiveu us., we understand, each of these techniques to be as 
follows. The attention grasp consists of grasping the individual withboth hands, one hand on 
each side of lite, collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion, lathe same motion as the 
grasp; the individual is drawn toward the interrogator. 

' For walling, a flexible false wall will be constructed. The individual is placed with bis 
WgT«3BZhtH^haiwll: Iheirtiaragp&r palls the individual fcwardandfhenqracklyand 
firmly pushes the individual into the wall. It is the individual's shoulder blades that hit the wall. 
Durins this motion, the head and neck are supported with a roll ed hood, or towel that provides a 
c-collar effect to help orevent whiplash. To further reduce the probability of injury, the 
individual is allowed to rebound from the flexible wail. You have orally informed us that the 
false wall is in part constructed to create a loud sound when the individual hits it, which will 
further shock or surprise in the individual. In part, the idea is to create a sound that wilt make the 
impact seem far worse than it is and that will be far worse than any Injury.that might result from 
the action. 

The facial hold is used to hold' the. head immcihiie. One opan palm isplaced on.eith.er 
side of the individual's face. The fingertips arc kept well away from the individual's eyes. 

With the facial slap or insult slap, the interrogator- slaps the individual's face with fingers 
slightly spread. The hand makes contact with the area directly between the tip of the individuals 
chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe. The interrogator invades the individual's 
personal space. The goal of the fecial slap is not to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting. 
Instead, the purpose of the facial slap is to induce shock, surprise, and/or humiliation. 

Cramped confmement involves the placement of the individual in a confined space, the 
dimensions of which, restrict the individual's movement The confined space is usually dark. 

TOPSKRET 2 




The duration of confinement varies based upon the size of the container. For the Targer confined 
space, the individual can stand up or sit dawn- the smaller space is large enough for tile. subject ta- 
sk dawft. Confinement in die larger space can last up_to eighteen hours; for (he smaller space, 
coofinsmeni lasts for no more than two hours. 

Wall standing is used to induce muscle fetigue. The individual siaads about four to -five 
feel from a wall, with his feet spread approximately to shoulder width. His arms are stretched 
out in front of him, with his fingers resting on' the wall. His fingers support all of his body 
weight The individual is not permitted to move or reposition his hands or feet. 

A variety of stress positions may be used. You have informed, us that these positions are 
not designed to produce the pain associated with contortions or twisting of the body. Rather, 
somewhat like walling, they are designed to produce the physical discomfort associated with 
muscle fatigue. Two particular stress positions arc likely to be used on Zubaydah: (Insisting on 
the floor with legs extended straight out in front of him with his arms raised above bis head; and 
(2) kneeling on the floor While leaning back at a 45 degree angle. You have also orally informed 
us that through observing Zubaydah in captivity, you have nored that he appears to be quite 
flexible despite his wound. 

Sleep deprivation may he used. You have indicated that your purpose in using tins 
technique is to reduce the individuaTs ability to think on Ms feet and, through the discomfort 
23So^i2ted.^dil3r;k'of3teep;'tomOTvafcdnm--to-<;oQperate-. Tme-eSfe«of-sBch-rie'epvdepriva£ien - 
will generally rerait after one or twa nights'of uninterrupted steep. You haveinfdtfned us that 
your research has revealed that in rare instances, sonic individuals who are already predisposed 
io psychological problems may experience abnormal reactions to sleep deprivation Even in 
those eases', however, reactions abate after the individual is permitted to' sleep. Moreover, 
personnel with medical training .are available to and wm intervene, in the-- unlikely event of an 
abnormal reaction. You have orally informed us that you wonld not deprive- Zubaydah of sleep 
for more man eleven days 3t a time and that you have previously keot him awake for 72 hours, 
from- which no mental' or physical harm resulted. 

Y'ou would like to place Zubaydah in a cramped confinement box. with an insect. You 
have informed us that he appears to have a fear of insects. In particular, you would like to tell 
Zubaydah that you intend to place a stinging insect into the box with him. You would, however, 
place a harmless insect in the box. Yon have orally irrforrne^i^ha^iiwmihlinfectpUjcea 
harmless inscct-such. as a catcroillar in the box i 




Finally, you would like to use a teehnijue called the "waterboaid." In this procedure, the 
individual, is hound securely to .an kiclhied bench, which is approximately four feet by .-seven feet. 
The individual's feet are generally elevated. A doth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water 

TOP^iCKET 3 




™SECR£T 

is then aoplicd to the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it 
coversboth the nose and month. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth 
and nose, air flow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This 
causes an increase « carbon dioxide- level in the individual's. Wood. This increase In the carbon 
dioxide level stimuiates-mereased effort to broths. This-effort plus the cloth produces $s 
perception of "suffocation and incipient panic,'* U,.the perception nf dtowtu-ng. Thfcladmdual 
does not breathe any. water into his lung?. During tho$e23 id 40 seconds, water is continuously 
applied from a height of twelve to twenfy-fduf inches, After fcls-jieriod. the cloth is lifted, and 
the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths, flie sensafion-of 
drowning is iimnedhtdyrefev.edby the removal Of theeloih. The-procedure may- then- be- 
repeated. The water is usually applied from a canteen cup or small watering can with a spout. 
You have orally informed us that this procedure triggers an automatic physiological- sensation of 
drowning that the individual cannot control even though he may be aware that he is- in fact not 
drowning. You have also orally informed us that it is likely that this procedure would not last 
more than 20 minutes in any one application. 

We also understand that a medical expert with SERE experience will be present 
throughout this phase and that the procedures will be stopped if deemed medically necessary to 
prevent severs mental or physical harm to Zubaydak As-mentioned above, Zuhaydah suffered 
an injury during his capture. You have informed ns that steps will be taken to ensure that this 
injur)' is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these methods and that adequate medical 
attention, will be given to ensure thai it -will heal properly.. 



In this part, we review- the context within 1 'Which these procedures will he applied. You 
have informed us that you have taken various steps to ascertain what effect, if any, these 
techniques would have on Zubaydah's mental health. These same techniques, with the- exception 
of the insect in the cramped confined space, have been used and continue to be used on some 
members of our military personnel during their SERE training. Because of the use of these 
procedures in training our own military personnel to resist interrogations, you have consulted 
with various individuals who .have extensive experience in the use of these techniques. You have 
done so in order to ensure that no prolonged infernal harm would result from the use of these 
proposed procedures. 

Through your consultation with various individuals responsible for such taking, you 

information concerning alleged injuries resulting from the training. One of these inquiries was 
prompted by the temporary physical injury a trainee sustained as result of being placed in a 




TOPJECRET 



OE^ECRET 



TOJ 

confinement box. The other inquiry- involved claims that the SERE training caused two 
individuals to engage in criminal behavior, nafnely, felony shoplifting and downloading child ^ 
pornography onto a military computer. According to this-offiriai, these claims were fir—' ™ 

.baseless. M oreover, he has indicated that during the three and a half yearshe spent/asj 

WKBU/ht the SERE program, he teamed 1 0,000 smdenrs. Of those students, only two 
dropped out of the training Mowing the use of these techniques. Although on care occasions 
some students temporarily postponed (he remainder of their training and received psychological 
counseling, those students were able to finish tire program without any indication of subsequent 
mental health effects. 




You have informed us that you 
years of gtoeriencs.wath.SERB jtauuflj 



fap has- ten 






.ose 
^!^"iJ|!!"^ any 

adverse mental health effects. He lafattVetlyou&at there was one person who dm ftat complete 
the tr"ainiflg. That person experienced' an adverse mental. health reaction that lasted, only two 
hours. 'After those two hours, the individual's symptoms spontaneously, dissipated without 
requiring treatment or counseling and no other symptoms were eve* reported by tills individual. 
According to tire information, you have provided to us, this assessment of the use of these 
procedures- includes the use of the waterboard. 

..from the j 

Ivirich yQu'suppliecI to us. 
has experience 'with theTuse of allot these pro c'eduresm a course of conduct, with the' etfcepti on 
of the insect in the confinement box and the waterboard. This memorandum confirms that the 
use of these procedures has not resulted in any repotted, instances of prolonged mental harm, and 
ven^^nstences of immediate and temporary adverse psychological responses to the training. 
■HHHHB-eported that a small minority of students have had temporary adverse 
psychological reactions during training. Of the 26,829 students trained from 1992 through 2001 
in the Air Force SERE training, 4.3 percent of those students had contact with psychology 
services. Of -those 4.3 percent, only 3.2 percent were pulled &omthemopara--fbr psychological 
reasons. Thus, out of tire students trained overall, only 0. l^gcedgefegmiled frarp. die 
program far psychological reasons. Furthermore, although JHB|^HBr^ < ^ cated ^ SQIveY3 
of students having completed this-, training are not done.lie^pess^ confidence mat the training 
did not cause any long-term psychological impact He basedhis conclusion on the debriefing of 
students that is done after the training. More importantly, he based (his assessment on the fact 
that although training is required to be extremely stressful in order to be effective, very few 
complaints have been made regarding the training. During his tenure, in which 10,000 students 
were trained^ no congressional complaints have been made. White there was she Inspector 
General complaint, it was not due to psychological concerns. Moreover, he was aware of only 
one Letter inquiring about the long-term impact of these techniques from an individual trained 

TOPSKRET S 



TOP^SCTLET 

over twenty years ago. H e found that it was impossible to attribute this Individual'* symptoms to 
his training. jfflgMfflffi oncluded that if there are any long-term psychological effects of the 
United States Air Force training using the procedures outlined above they "are certainly , 
minimal." 

With respect to the w&taboatti, you have also orally informed us thai UW Navy continues 
to use it in training. You have informed us that your on-site psychologist who have «xtensiv* 
experience with the use of the vratetbosfrd in Navy training, haw not encountered any significant 
iong-terrh mental health consequences from its use. Your Qn-ritcpsycftoiogists have also 
indicated 'that JPRA has likewise not reported any significant Long-term mental health 
consequences from (lis use of the -waterboatd. You- have informed us that.Q.&er-services ceased 
use of the waterboatd because it was so successful as an interrogation technique, but not because 
of any concerns over any harm, physical or ntentat^caused by it. It was als^e^|jgdjrna; 
almost 100 percent effective in producing cooperation among the trainees. ^BHinr' 50 
indicated that he had observed the* use of the Wtfboard faNavy trainingspms teff to twS-ve 
times. Each time it resulted in cooperation but it did not result fa any physical harm- to the- 
srudent 

You have also reviewed ihe relevant literature and found no empirical data on the effect 
of these tecluiiqiies, with the exception of sleep deprivation. With respect to sleep deprivation., 
you have informed us that is not uncommon for someone to be deprived of sleep for 72 hours and 
. still perform excellently on visual-spatial motor -tasks and short-term, memory tests. Although 
some individuals may experience hallucinations, according to the literature yon snrveyed, those 
who experience such'psychotic symptoms hive- almost always' had such episodes prior to the 
sleep deprivation. You have indicated the studies of lengthy sleep deprivation showed no 
psychosis, loosening of thoughts, flattening of ethof ops, delusions; or paranoid ideas;. In one 
case, even after eleven days of deprivation, no psychosis orpermaaent brain damaged occurred. 
In fact the individual, reported feeling almost back-to normal after one night's sleep. Further, 
based oa the experiences with its use fa miliary training (where t.t is induced for up to 48 hours), 
you found that rarely, if ever, will the individual suffer harm after the sleep deprivation is 
discontinued. Instead, .the effects remit after a few good nights of sleep. 

You have taken the additional step of consulting with U.S. interrogations experts, and 
other individuals with oversight over the SERE training process. None of these individuals was 
aware of any prolonged psychological effect caused by the use of any of the above techniques 
either separately or as a course of conduct. Moreover, you cdnsurted-with outside psychologists 
who reported that they were unaware of any cases where long-term problems have occurred ay a 
result of these techniques. 

Moreover, in consulting with a number of mental health experts, you have learned that 
the effect of any of these procedures will be dependant on the individual's personal history, 
cultural history and psychological tendencies. To that end, you {save informed us that you have 




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completed a psychological assessment of Zubadyah. This assessment Is based oa interviews with 
Zubaydah, observations of him, and information collected from odter sources such as intelligence 
and press reports. Our understanding of Zubaydah 's psychological profile, which we set forth 
below, is based on that assessment. 

According to this assessment, Zubaydah, though only 3 1 , rose quickly from very low 
level mqjahedin to third or fourth roan in al Qaeda. He has served as Usama Bin Laden's senior 
lieutenant. In. that capacity., he has managed a tietwotfe of training camps. He has been 
instrumental' in the training of operatives- for al Qaeda, the Egyptian- Islamic Jihad, arid other 
terrorist elements, inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. He acted as the Deputy Camp Commander 
for al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, personally approving entry and graduation of all 
rraiaees during 1999-2000. From 1996 until 1999, he approved all individuals going in and out 
of Afghanistan to the training camps. Further, no one went in and out of Peshawar, Pakistan 
without his knowledge and approval- He also acted as al Qaeda's coordinator of external 
contacts and foreign communications. Additionally, he has acted as al Qaeda's counter- 
intelligence officer and has been trusted to find spies within' the organization. 

Zubaydah has been, involved in every majorterroristoperatiari carried out by al Qaeda. 
He Was a planner for the MUleanium plot to attack U.S. and Ssrseli targets duringfhe Millennium 
celebrations in Jordan. Two of the central figures in this plot who were arrested have identified 
Zubaydah as the supporter of their cell and the plot. He also served as a planner for the Paris 
Embassy plot in 2001. Moreox'erj he was one of tire planners of the September 1 1 attacks. Prior 
to his capture, he was engaged in planning future terrorist attacks against U.S. interests. 

Your psychological assessment indicates that it is believed Zubaydah wrote al Qacda's 
manual on resistance techniques. Yon also believe that his experiences in al Qaeda make him 
well-acquainted with and well-verged! in such- tecktirenies. As part of his role in. al Qaeda. 
ZAtbayd^ visited indivrdualsin prison aid helped fherri up^n their ic-lease, Tff«Bugh this .contact 
and activities with other al Qaeda mujahediS, you believe that he knows many stories of capture, 
interrogation, and resistance- to such interrogation. Additionally, he' has spoken with Ayrdari al- 
ZawaoirL and you believe it is likely that the two discussed-Zawaliiri's experiences as a prisoner 
of the Russians and the Egyptians. 

Zubaydah stated during interviews dial he thinks of any activity outside of jihad as 
"silly." He lias indicated that bis heart and mind are devoted to serving Allah and Islam through 
jihad and he has stated (hat he lias no doubts or regrets about committing himself to jihad. 
Zubaydah believes that the global victory of Islam is inevitable. You have informed us that he 
continues to express his unabated desire to kill Americans and J^vs. 

Your psychological assessment describes his personality as follows. He is "a highly self- 
directed individual who prizes his independence." He has "narcissistic features," which are 
evidenced in the attention he pays to his personal appearance and his "obvious '•efforts' to 

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demonstrate to he is really a rather .'bumble- and regular guy. ™ We .s somewhat compulsive 
in how he organizes Ms environment and business. Re is confident, self-assured, and possesses 
an air of authority. While he admits to at times pestling with to* to d»e who is an 
"innocent" he has acknowledged celebrating tine destruction of the ^orld Trade Center. rt~ .. 
LnteUigent and intellectually curious. He displays "excellent self-disciphne; The ^™* 
describes him as a perfectionist, persistent private, ar.d highly capable ,n has socal mteraci.ons. 
He is very guarded about orating up to others and your assessment repeatedly emphasues tha. 
he rends not to trust others easily. He is also "quick to recognize and assess me moods and 
motivations of others." Furthermore, he is proud of his ability to lie and decew* others ^ 
successfully. Throughhis deception he has, among other things, prevented the location ot al 
Qaedi safehause* and- even acquired" a United Nations refugee: identlfl eauon card. 

According to your tsgoris, Zubaydah doesnot hawanypre-exlst^ toe&tal conditions or 
proMetasthat would make him likely to suffer prolonged mental harm from yourproposed 
interrogation methods. Through reading Ms diaries and interviewing lum, you have found no _ 
his^orf of "mood disturbance or other psychiatric paftiologyU" **°»#l disorder^] . . . enduring 
mood or mental health problems." He is in fact '■remarkably resilient and confident that he can 
overcome adversity.'* When he encounters stress or low mood, this appears to last only tor a 
*ort nme. He deals with stress by assessing its source, evaluating the coping resources available 
to him, and then taking action. Your assessment notes that he is "generally self-sufficient and 
relies on. his understanding and application ofreligious and psychological principles, intelligence 
and disaraline to avoid and overeomeproblems." Moreover, you hav<a-fcusd4hat h© has a 
"reliable arid durable 1 support system" in Bis feitrV, 'thebles-sirtgs ofreligious leaders, and 
camaraderie of like-minded raujahedin brothers." During detention, Zubaydah has managed Ins 
mood, remaining at most points "circumspect, calm, controlled:, arid deliberate" He has 
maintained this demeanor during aggressive interrogations and reductions m sleep, \oudescnoe 
that in an initial confrontational incident, Zubaydah showed signs of sympathetic nervous system 
arousal, which you think was possibly fear. Although this incident led him to disclose 
intelligence information, he was able to quickly regain his composure, his air of confidence, and 
his "strong resolve" not to reveal any information. 

Overall, you summarize his primacy strengths as the following: ability to focus, goa.1- 
dureoled discipline, iiUellifteucc, emotional resilience, street savvy, ability to organize and 
manage people, keen observation skills, fluid adaptability (can anticipate and adapt under duress 
and witii minimal resources), capacity to assess and exploit the needs of others, and- ability to 
adjust goals to emerging opportunities, 

You anticipate that he will draw upon his vast knowledge of interrogation techniques to 

. cope with the interrogation. Your assessment indicates that Zubaydah may be willing to die to 

protect the most important information that he hells. Nonetheless., you are of the view that his 

belief that Islam will ultimately dominate die world and thai this victory is inevitable may 

provide the chance that Zubaydah will give, information and rationalize it solely as a temporary 

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setback. Additional! v, vou believe he may be willing to disclose some information, particularly 
information he deems to not be critical, but which may ultimately be useful to us when pieced 
together with other intelligence information you have gained. 

HI. 

. Section 2340A makes it a criminal- offense for any person "outside of the United States 
[to] crkwnitQ or attempt[] to' commit torture." Section 2340(1 ) defines torture- as; 

an act committed by a person acting under tire cobr oi'law specifically intended to 
inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering^ 
incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person, within his custody of physical 
control 

U U.S.C. § 2340(1). As we outlined in our opinion on standards of conduct under Section- 
2340 A. a violation of 2340 A requires -a showing thai: (1) the torture occurred outside- the United 
Staies;"(2) tite defendant acted, under the color of law; (3) tire victim was within the de&ndauf's 
custody or control; (4) the defendant specifically intended to inflict severe paiti or suffering; and 
(5) thai the acted inflicted severe pain or suffering. See Memorandum for Mm Rizzo, Acting 
General Counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney 
General, Office of Legal Cotmsel, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 234Q-2348A at 3 (August 1. 2002) ("Section 2340A Memorandum"). You have asked us to 
assume that Zubayadsh is being held outside the United States, Zubayadah is within U.S. 
custody; and fee interrogators are acting under the color of law. At issue is whether tire last two 
elements would be met by the use of the proposed procedures, namely, whether those using these 
procedures would have the requisite mental state and. whether these procedures would inflict 
severe pain or suffering within the meaning of the statute. 

Severe Pam.br Suffering, in order for pain or suffering to rise to the level of torture, the 
statute requires that it be severe. As we have-previously explained, this reaches only extreme 
acts. See id, at 1 3 . Nonetheless, drawing upon cases under the Torinre Victim Protection Act 
(TV? A), which has a definition of torture that is- similar to Section 2340's definition, we found 
thai a single event of sufficiently intense pain may fall within this prohibition. See id. at 26. As 
a result, we have analyzed each of these techniques separately. In further drawing upon those 
cases, we also have found chat courts tend to take a totality-of-the-cifcmxistances approach and 
consider an entire course of conduct to determine whether torture has occurred; See id at 27. 
Therefore, in addition to considering each technique separately, we consider them together as a 
course of conduct. 

Section 2340 defines torture as the infliction of severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering. We will consider physical pain and mental pain separately. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). 
With respect to physical pain, we previously concluded that "severe pain" within the meaning of 

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Section 2340 is pain tbfit is difficult forthe individual to endure and is of m intensity akin to the 
pain accompanying serious physical injury. Sea Section 2340A Memoranda at 6. Drawing _ 
upon the TV? A precedent, we have noted that examples of acts inflicting severe -pain that typify 
torture are, among other things, severe beatings with weapons such as c) ubs, and tile burning of 
prisoners. See id at 24. We conclude below that none of (lie proposed techniques inflicts such 
pain. 

The facial hold and the attention grasp involve no physical pain. In the absence of such 
pain it is obvious that they cannot be said to inflict severe physical pain or suffering. The stress 
positions and wall standing both, may result in muscle fatigue. Each involves the sustained 
holding of a position. In. wall standing, it will be holding a position in which ail of the 
individual's body weight is placed on his finger tips. The stress positions will likely include 
"sitting on the floor with, legs extended straight out In front and arms raised above the head, and 
kneeling on the floor and leaning back at a 45 degree angle. Any pain associated with mtisele 
fatigue is not of the Intensity sufficient to amount to "severe physical pain or suffering* under the 
statute, nor, despite its discomfort, can it be said to be difficult to endure. Moreover, you have 
orally informed us that no stress j osition will be used that could interfere with the healing of 
Zubaydah's wound. Therefore, we conclude that these techniques involve discomfort that falls 
far below the threshold of severe physical pain. 

Similarly, although the confoernant boxes (both smalt and large) are physically 
uacsmfcrtable because theft size restricts movement, they are notso small as tn require the 
individual to contort his body to- sit (siurII box) or stand (large box). You have also orally 
informed us thai despite Ms wound, Zubaydah remains quite flexible, which would.substantially 
reduce any pain associated with being placed in the box. We have no irdforrnaiion firom tbe 
medjcal experts you have consulted that the limited duration for which the individual is kept in 
the boxes causes any substantial physical pain. As a result, we do not think the use of these 
boxes can be said to cause pain that is of the intensity associated with serious physical injury. 

The use of one of these boxes with the introduction of an insect does not alter this 
assessment. As we understand it. no actually harmful insect wili be placed in the box. Thus, 
though the introduction of an insect may produce trepidation in Zubaydah (which we discuss 
below), tt-certainiy does nut cause physical'puin. 

As for sleep deprivation, it is clear that depriving someone of sleep docs not involve 
severe physical pain within the meaning of the statute. While sleep' deprivation may involve 
some physical discomfort such as the fatigue or the discomfort experienced in the difficulty of 
keeping one's eyes open, these effects remit after the individual is permitted id sleep. Based on 
the facts you have provided us, we are not aware of any evidence'ihat sleep deprivation results in 
severe physical pain or suffering. As a result, its use does not violate Section 234QA. 

Even thsse techniques (hat involve physical contact between the interrogator and the 

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individual do not result in severe pain. The fecial slap and walling contain precautions to ensure 
that no pain even approaching this level results. The slap is delivered with Fingers slightly 
spread, which you have explained to us is designed to be less painful than a closed-hand slap. 
The slap is also delivered to the fleshy part of the face, further reducing any risk, of physical 
damage or serious pain. The facial slap does not produce pan that is difficult to endure, 
likewise, walling involves quickly pulling the person forward and then thrusting him against a 
flexible false wall You have infoiraed.us that die sound of hitting the wall will actually be' far- ' 
worse than any possible injury to the Individual. The use of the rolled to we! around the neck also 
' reduces any risk of iajOry. While it may hurt to be pushed against the wall, any pain experienced 
is not ofthe intensity associated with serious ptrystcal injury. 

As we understand it, when die walerboard is used, the subject's body responds as if the 
subject v/ere drowning — even though the subject may be well aware that Ire is in fact net 
drowning. You have informed us that this procedure does not inflict 3ctual physical harm,. Thus, 
although the subject tsay experience the fear or panic associated with the feeling of drovAimg. 
the waterboard does not inflict physical pain. As we explained in the Section 2340 A 
Memorandum, "pain and suffering'"' as used in Section. 2340 is best understood as a single 
concept, not distinct concepts of "pain" as distinguished from "suffering," See Section 2340A 
Tvfernoranduraat 6 n_3. The waterboard, which inflicts no pain or actual harm whatsoever, does 
not, in our view inflict "severe pain or suffering." Even if one were to parse the statute more 
finely to attempt to treat "suffering" as a distinct concept the waterboard could not be said to 
inflict severe suffering. The waferboana is simply a controlled acute episode, lacking the 
connotation of a protracted period of riffle generally given to suffering. 

Finally, as we discussed above, you have informed us that in determining which 
procedxires to use and how you will use them, you have selected techniques that will not harm 
Zubajdah's wound. You have also indicated that numerous steps will be taken to ensure that 
none of these procedures in any way interferes with the proper healing of Zubaydah ' s wound. 
You have also indicated (hat, should it appear at any time that.Zubaydsh is experiencing, severe 
pain or sufffetuig, die medical personnel, on hand will stop th&use of 'any technique. 

Even when all of these methods are considered combined in an overall course of conduct, 
they stilt would not inflict severe physical pain or suffering. A-s discussed above-, a number of 
these acts result in no physical pain, others produce only physical discomfort. ■ You have 
indicated that these acts will not be used with substantial repetition., so that there is no possibility 
that severe physical pain could arise from such repetition. Accordingly, we conclude that these 
acts neither separately nor as part of a course of conduct would inflict severe physical pain or 
suffering within the meamng of the statute. 

We next consider whether the use of these techniques would inflict severe mental pain or 
suffering within the meaning of Section 2340. Section 234G defines severe mental pain or 
suffering as "the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from" one of several predicate 

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act* 18 U S C § 2340(2) Those predicate acts are: (1) the intentional infliction or threatened 
infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened 
administration or application of mind-altering substances or oilier procedure's- calculated to- 
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of ifflmbsni deaflj or g) *«™ eat 
lint aw of the preceding aces will be- done 10 another person. See 18 U-.S.C. &234Q(i)CAKU). 
As we'-have explained, tills list of predicate acts Is exclusive. Sw Section 2340 A Memorandum 
at 8 No other acts can support a charge under Section 2340A based on rite infliction of severe 
mental pain or sufibrtaa See id. Thus, if the methods that you have described do uot wilier in 
and of themselves constitute one of these acts or as a course of conduct fulfill the predicate act 
requirement the prohibition lias not been violated, See id. Before addressing these tccluiieraes, 
v.'e note thal'it is plain thai none of these procedures, involves a threat to any third party, the-use 
of any kind of drugs, or for the reasons described above, the infl rcdon of severe physical pain. 
Tiros, the question is whether any of these acts, separately or as a course of conduct, constitutes a 
threat of severe physical pain or suffering; a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the senses, 
or a threat of imminent death. As we previously explained, whether an action constitutes a threat 
must be assessed fiom tire standpoint of a reasonable person in the subject's, position. $ne id at 



9. 



No argument can be made that the attention grasp or the facial hold constitute threats of 
imminent death or are procedures designed to disrupt profoundly fee senses or personality. In 
general The grasp and the facial hold will, startle the subject, produce fear, or even insult him- As 
you have informed us, the use of these techniques-is. riot accompanied by a-.specifk verbaLlhreat 
of severe physical pain or suffering. To the extent thai these techniques could be considered a 
threat of severe physical pain or suffering such a threat would have- to be inferred from die acts 
themselves.- Because these' actions themselves involve no pain, neither could be interpreted by a 
reasonable person in Zubaydah's position to constitute a threat of severe pain or suffering. 
Accordingly, these two techniques are not predicate acts within tire meaning of Section 2340. 

The facial slap likewise falls outside the set of predicate acts. It plainly is not a threat of 
imminent death, under Section 2340(2)(C), or a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the 
senses or-persotiaUty, under Section 2340(2)0). Though it may hurt, as discussed above; the 
effect is one of smarting or stinging and surprise or humiliation, but not severe pain. Nor does it 
alone constitute a threat of severe pain or suffering, under Section 2340(2)(A). Like the facial 
hold and the attention grasp, the use of this slap is not accompanied by a specific verbal threat of 
further escalating violence. Additionally, you have informed us that in one use this technique 
• will typically involve at most two slaps. Certainly, the use of this slap may dislodge any 
expectation thai Z-ubaydah had that he would not be touched in a physically aggressive manner. 
Nonetheless, this alteration in Iris expectations could hardly be construed by a reasonable person 
in Ms situation to be tantamount to a threat of severe physical pain or suffering. At most, this 
technique suggests that die circumstances of his confinement and interrogation have changed. 
Therefore, the facial slap is not within the statute's exclusive list of predicate acts. 

/ 

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Waiting plainly is not a procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or 
personality. While walling involves what might be characterized as rough handling, it does not 
involve ihe threat of imminent death or, as discussed above, the infliction of severe- physical pain. 
Moreover, once again we understand that use of this technique wilt not be accompanied by any 
specific verbal threat flat violence will ensue absent cooperation'. Thus, like the facial slap, 
walling can only constitute a threat ofsevere.physical pain if a reasonable person, would, infer 
such a threat from the use of the technique itself. Walling does not in and of itself inflict severe 
pain or suffering. Like the fecial slap, walling may alter the subject's expectation as to the 
treatment he believes he will receive. Wonetheless, -die character of the action Mis So tar short of 
inflicting severe pain or suffering wi.thia.riw meaning of the statute that even if he inferred that 
greater aggressiveness was to follow, die type of actions that could be reasonably be anticipated 
would still fall below anything sufficient to inflict severe physical pain or suffering under the 
statute. Thus, we conclude thai, this technique falls outside the proscribed, predicate acts. 

Like walling, stress positions; and wall-standing are not procedures calculated to disrupt 
profoundly the senses, nor are they threats of imminent death. These procedures, as discussed 
above, involve the use of rnuscie fatigue to encourage cooperation and do not themselves 
■constitute the infliction of severe physical pain or suffering. Moreover, there is no aspect of 
violence to either technique feat remotely suggests furore severe pain or suffering from winch 
such a threat of future harm could be inferred. They simply involve forcing thesubject to remain 
ir. uncomfortable positions. While these acts may indicate to the subject that he may be placed in 
these positions again if he does not disc-lose information, the use cf these techniques .would not 
suggest to a reasonable person in ih& subject's position thai he is being threatened with severe 
pain or suffering. Accordingly, we conclude that these two procedures do not constiture any of 
the predicate acts set forth in Section 2340(2). 

' As with "the other techniques discussed so far, cramped confinement is not a threat of 
imminent death. It may be argued that, focusing in. part on the fact that the boxes will be -without 
light, placement in these boxes would, constitute a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the 
senses. As we explained in our recent opinion, however, to "disrupt profoundly the senses" a 
technique must produce an extreme effect in the subject. See Section 23 4'QA Memorandum at 
10-12. We have previously concluded that this requires that the procedure cause substantial 
interference with the individual's cognitive abilities or fundamentally alter his personality. See 
id. at 11 . Moreover, the statute requires that such procedures must be calculated to produce this 
effect. See id at 10; 18 U.S.C- § 2340(2)(B). 

With respect to the small confinement box, you have informed us that he would spend at 
most two hours in this box. You have informed us thai your purpose in using Cne.se. boxes is not 
to interfere with 'his senses ot his personality, but to cause him physical discomfort that will 
encourage him to disclose critical information. Moreover, your imposition of time limitations on 
the use of either of the boxes also indicates that the use of these boxes is not designed or 
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. For the larger box, in which he can 

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bo* stand and sit, he may be placed in this box fij.r.up to eighteen hours at a time, while you have 
informed us that he will never spend more than an hour at time in tlie smaller box. These time 
limits further ensure that no profound disruption effe senses or personality, were it even 
possible, would result As suck the use of the co'nfmemcct boxes does not constitute a 
procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. 

Nor docs tlie use of the boxes threaten Zubaydah with -severe physical pain or suffering. 
While additional time spent in the boxes may be threatened, their use is not accompanied by any 
express threats of severe physical pain or suffering- Like the stress positions and walling, 
placement in the boKes is physically uncomfortable but any such discomfort does not rise to the 
level of severe physical' pain or suffering. Accordingly, a reasonable person in the subject's 
position would not infer from die use of this technique that severe, physical pain is the next step 
in his interrogator's -treatmeHt of him. Therefore, we conclude that the use of the confinement 
boxes 'does not MI within the statute's required predicate acts. 

In additroa to using theconfmeraent bo&es alone, you also would like to iarxoau.ee an 
insect into one of the boxes with Zubaydah. As we understand it, yon plan to inform Zubaydah 
that you are going to place a stinging uisectinto the box, but you will actually place a harmless 
insect in the box, such as a caterpillar". If you do so, to ensure that you are outside the predicate 
act requirement, you must inform him that the insects will not have a sting that would -produce 
death or severe pain. If, however, you were to place the insect in the box without inforrnkigrhim 
that ysuawdaffig-so.-tkea,- m Qr-der4e-not cotnmft a predicate act, you should not affirmatively., 
lead him to believe that any insect is -present which 1 




the approaches we have described, trie insect's placement in the box would not constitute a threat 
of severe physical pain or suffering to a reasonable person in his position. An individual placid 
in a box., even an individual with afear of insects, would not reasonably feel threatened with 
severe physical pain or suffering if a caterpillar was placed in the box, Further, you have 
informed us that you are not aware that Zubaydah lias any allergies to Insects, and you have not 
informed us of any other factors that would cause a reasonable person in that S3tne situation to 
believe that an unknown insect would cause him severe physical pain or death. Thus, we 
conclude that the placement of the insect in ths confinement box with Zubaydah would act 
constitute a predicate act. 

Sleep "deprivation also clearly does not involve a. threat of imminent death. Although it 
produces physical discomfort, ii cannot be said to constitute a threat of severe physical pain or 
suffering from the perspective of a' reasonable person in Zubaydah *s position. Nor could sleep 
deprivatioB constitute a procedure caiculated-to disrupt profoundly the senses, so long as sleep 
deprivation (as you have informed us is your intent) is used for limited periods, befofe 
hallucinations or other profound disruptions of the senses would occur. To be sure, sleep 
deprivation may reduce the subject's ability to think on his feet Indeed, you indicate that this is' 

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the intended result. His mere -reduced ability to evade your questions and resist answering does 
net, however, rise to the level cf disruption required by the statute. As we explained above, a 
disruption within the meaning of the statute is-an extreme one, substantially interfering with an 
individual's cognitive abilities, for example, inducing hallucinatrans ! or driving him Co engage in 
uncliaracterisucsdWestructrve behavior. See infra 13; Section 2340 A Memorandum at 11. 
Therefore, (he limited use of sleep deprivation does not constitute one of the required predicate 
acts. 

We find that the use of the waterbosrd constitutes a threat of imminent death. As you 
have explained the waterboard procedure to us, it creates is the subject the uncontrollable 
physiological sensation that the subject is drowning. Although the procedure will be monitored 
by personnel with medical training and extensive SERE school experience with this procedure 
who wili ensure tire subject's mental an'd physical safety, the subject is not aware of any of these 
precautions. From the vantage point of any reasonable person, undergoing this procedure in such 
circumstances, he would feel as if he is drowning at very moment of the procedure due to the 
uncontrollable physiological sensation he is experiencing. Thus, this procedure cannot be 
viewed as too uncertain to satisfy the imminence requirement. Accordingly, it constitutes a 
threat of imminent death and fulfills the predicate act requirement under the statute. 

Although the waterboard constitutes a threat .of imminent dearth prolonged mental harm 
must nonetheless result to violate the statutory, prohibition ou infliction of severe menial pain or 
suffering. See See-ton 2340A Memorandum at 7'. W-e have previously concluded .that prolonged 
mental barm, is mental harm of some lasting duration, e.g.,. mental harm lasting months or years. 
See id. Prolonged mental harm is not simply the stress experienced in, for example, an 
interrogation by state police. See id. Based on your research into fee use of these methods at the 
SERE school and consultation with others with expertise in the field of psychology and 
interrogation, you do not anticipate that any prolonged mental harm would result from the use of 
the waterboard. Indeed, you have advised us that the relief is almost immediate When the cloth is 
removed from the nose and mouth In the absence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental 
pr.in or .<;nffe.rin£ would have, been inflicted, and the use of these procedures would not constinuc. 
torture within the meaning of the statute. 

When these acts are considered as a course of conduct, we arc unsure whether these acts 
may constitute a threat of severe physical pain or suffering. You have indicated to us that you 
have not determined either the order or the precise timing for implementing these procedures. It 
is conceivable that these procedures could be used in a course of escalating conduct, moving 
incrementally and rapidly from least physically intrusive, eg., fecial hold, to the most physics! 
contact, e.g., walling or the waterboard. As we understand it, based on his treatment so far, 
Zubaydah has come to expect that no physical harm wjU be done to him. By using these 
techniques in increasing intensity and in rapid succession, the goal would be to dislodge this 
expectation. Based on the facts you have provided to us, we cannot say definitively that the 
entire course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to'believe that he-is being threatened 

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with severe pain or suffering within the meaning of section 2340. On. the other hand, however., 
under certain circumsiances-for example, rapid escalation in the use of these techniques 
culminating in the waterfeoard (which we acknowledge constitutes a threat of imminent death) 
accompanied by verbal or other suggestions that physical violence will foilow-nirght cause a 
reasonable personto believe that they arc faced widi such a threat. Without 'more information, 
we are uncertain whether the course of conduct would constitute a predicate act under Section 
2340(2). 

Even if the course of conduct were thought to pose a threat of physical pain or suffering, 
it would nevertheless-on the face before us—not constitute a violation of Section 234GA. Not 
oniv must the course of conduct be a predicate act, but also fltose who usethfc procedure must 
actually cause prolonged mental ham. Based on the information that you have provided to us, 
indicating that no evidence exists that. this course of conduct produces any prolonged mental 
harm, we conclude that a course' of conduct using these procedures and culnunatmg in the 
■waterboard would not violate Section 2340A. 

Specific toent To violate me statute; an individual must have the specific intent to 
inflict Severe pain or suffering. Because specific intent is an.elsment of the offense, the absence 
of specific intent negates the charge- of torture. As we previously opitied : to have the required 
specific intent, an individual must expressly intend to cause such severe pain or suffering. See ^ 
■ Section 2340A Memorandum at 5 citing Carter v. Untied Slates, 530 U.S. 255.257 (2000). We 
have further found that if a defendant acts with the good faith belief that his actions will not _ 
cause such suffering, he has not acted with specific intent. See id. at 4 citing South Ail Lmtd 
Ptishp, afloat, v. J?efo«,2l8FJd5l8, 53K4thClr.2G02). A defendant acts in good faith 
when he has an honest belief that Ms actions -wili hot result in severe pain or suffering. See id 
citing Cheekv. United 'States, 498 US. 192,202(1991). Although an honest belief need -not be 
reasonable, such a belief is easier to establish where there is & reasonable basis for it See id. at 5. 
Good faith' may be established by, among other things, the reliance on the advice of experts. See 
id at 8. . • 

Based on the information you have provided us, we believe that those carrying out these 
procedures would not have rhe specific intent to inflict severs physical pain or suffering. The 
objective of these techniques is not to cause severe physical pain. First, the constant presence of 
personnel with medical training who have the authority to stop the interrogation should it appear 
it is medically necessary indicatm thai 9 is not your intent to cause-severe physical pain. The 
personnel on site have extensive experience with these specific techniques as they are used in 
SERE school training! Second, you have Manned us that you are raking steps to ensure that 
Zubaydah's injury is. not worsened or his recovery impeded by the use of these techniques. 

Third, as you have described them to us, die proposed techniques involving physical 
contact between the interrogator and Zuhaydah actually contain precautions to prevent any 
serious physical harm to Zubaydah. In "walling," a rolled hood or towel will be used to prevent 




TOP SECRET 16 




TOP#ECR£T 

whiplash and he will bs permitted tp rebound ftora the flexible wall to reduce the likelihood of 
injury. Similarly, in fee "fecial hold," the fingertips will be kept well away from the Ms-eyes to 
ensure that there is: no •injury to them. The purpose of that facial hold is. uotinjure him but to 
hold the head immobile. Additionally, while-die stress positions and wall standing will 
uadoubtedly result in physical discomfort by tiring the muscles-, it is obvious that these positions 
are not intended to produce the kind of extreme pain required by the stature. 

Furthermore, no specific intern to cause severe mental pain or suffering appears to be 
present. As we explained in our recent opinion, an individual mass have the specific intent to 
cause prolonged mental harm in order to have the specific intent to inflict severe mental pain or 
suffering. See Section 2340A Memorandum al 8. Prolonged menial harm is substantial menial 
barm of a sostained duration, e,g., harm lasting months or even years after the acts were inflicted 
upon the prisoner. As we indicated above, a good faith- belief can. negate this element 
Accordingly, if an individual conducting the interrogation has a good' faith belief that the 
procedures he will apply, separately or together, would not result in prolonged-mental harm, that 
individual lacks the requisite specific intent This conclusion concerning specific intent is further 
bolstered by the due diligence that has been conducted concerning the- effects' of these 
interrogation procedures. 

The mental health, experts that you have consulted have indicated that the psychological 
impact of a course of conduct must be assessed with reference to the subject's psychological 
history and current.menta.1 health status. The healthier the individual, the less likely that the use 
of any one procedure or sec of procedures as a course of conduct will result in prolonged mental 
barm. A comprehensive psychological profile of Zubaydab has been created. In Creating tMs 
profile, your personnel drew on direct interviews, Zubaydah's diaries, observation of Zubaydab 
since his capture^ and ]^sss£S^£i^SL^SSL^^S^^^^^^Ji^^^^^^M^I^2^£i. 




As we indicated above, you have informed us that your proposed interrogation methods 
have been used and continue to be used in SERE training. It is our understanding that these 
techniques' are not used one by one in isolation, but as a full course of conduct to resemble a real 
interrogation. Thus, the information derived from SERE training bears both upon tire impact of 
the use of the individual techniques and upon their use as a course of conduct You have found 
that the use of these methods together or separately, including the use. of the watefboard, has not 
resulted in any negative long-term mental health consequences. The continued use of these 
methods without mental health consequences to the trainees indicates that it is highly improbable 

TGP^CRET 17 




TOLSECRFr 

that such consequences would result here. Because you have conducted the due diligence to 
determine that these procedures, either aione or in combination, do not produce prolonged menial 
harm., we believe that you do not meet (he specific intent requirement necessary to violate 
Section 2340 A. 

You have also- informed us that you haye reviewed the relevant literature on fee subject, 
and consulted with outside psychologists-. Your review of the literature uncovered na- empirical 
data on the use of these procedures, with the exception of. sleep deprivation for which no long- 
term health consequences resulted. The.oijtside psychbtogists with whom you ccmaihsd 
indicated were unaware of any cases where long-verm- problems have occurred as a result of these 
techniques. 

As described above, it appears you have conducted an extensive inquiry to ascertain what 
impact, if any, these procedures individually and as a course of conduct would have on 
Zubaydah. You have consulted with interrogation experts, including those with substantial 
SERE school experience., consulted with outside psychologists, completed a psychological 
assessment and reviewed the relevant literature on. this topic. Based on this inquiry, you believe 
that the use of the procedures, including !he waterboard. and as a course of conduct would not 
result in prolonged mental harm. Reliance on this information about Zubaydah and about the 
effect of the use of these techniques more generally demonstrates the presence- of a good faith 
belief (hat no prolonged mental harm will result from using these methods in the interrogation of 
Zubaydah. Moreover, we think that this represents not only an honest belief hut also a 
reasonable belief based on the inforrnation-that you have supplied to us. Thus, wc believe that 
the specific intent to inflict prolonged mental is not present and consequently, there is no 
specific latent to inflict severe mental pain or suffering. Accordingly, we conclude (hat on the 
facts in this case the use of these methods separately or a course of conduct would not violate 
Section 2340A. 

Based on the fdregoing. and based on the' facts that you have provided, we con&lude that 
die interrogation procedures that you propose would not violate Section 2340A. ■ We- wish to 
emphasize that this is our best reading of the law; however, you should he aware that there are no- 
cases construing this statute: just as there have been no prosecutions brought under it. 



Please let us know if we can be of further assistance. 




-„, S.Bybefe/ 
tant A.namev Genera 



*&. 



OP^CRU! 



TOPJECRiiT 18 



Appendix D 



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Guidelines oa Conf iaeinsnt Conditions For CIA Detainees 



■ These Guidelines govern the 'conditions of confinement for 
CIA Detainees, who are persons^ detaltted in de . tsn£ ion 
facilities that are under the 




wmm ^ m ^^ t ^ mmmmtmmmmmmmm These Guidelines recognize that 
environmental and other conditions/, as- well as particularized 
considerations affecting any given Detention Facility, will . 
vary from' case to case and- location to location. ■ 

1. HlniinranS ;-. 

Due provision must be taken to protect the health and 
all CIA Detainees , including b asic levels of 




2, Inrplemshtiiig SrooadiiJres 






TOS> SI 



Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees 




3. ResponsiBle CIA. Officer 

The Director, DCI Counter terrorist Center shall 
ensure (.a)- that, at all times, a specific Agency staff 
employee (the * Re sponsible CIA Officer*} is designated as 
responsible for each specific Detention Facility, . {b} that 
each Responsible CIA Officer has been provided with a copy of 
these Guidelines and has reviewed and signed the attached 
Acknowledgment , and (c) that each Responsible. CIA Officer and 
' each CIA- officer participating 




with a 

origin teraxiQ'ation Conducted pu rsuant 

[ and has 

reviewed and signed the Acknowledgment attached thereto. - 
Subject' to operational and security considerations, the 
Responsible CIA Officer shall be present at, or visit, each 
Detention Facility at intervals appropriate to the 
circumstances . 




APPROVED: 




ral Intelligence 



U<a>to% 



Date 



TO? 



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Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for -CIA Detainees 



ACKWOVQJEPGMEWj 



• I, ' , am the --Responsible CIA' Of f icer for the 

Detention Facility known as • , By ray signature . 

below, I acknowledge that 1 have read and understand and will 
comply with the "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for 'CIA 
Detainees" of ________ 2003. - 



ACKNOWLEDGED! 



Name . 



Date 



Appendix E 



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These Guidelines address .the. conduct of interrogations of 
persona who are detained pursuant to the authorities set 
dr 




These Guidelines complement internal Directorate of 
Operations guidance relating to the conduct of 
interrogations. In the event of any inconsistency between __ 
existing DO guidance and these Guidelines, the provisions or 
these Guidelines shall control. 

1. Permissible interrogation Techniques 

Unless otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA 
officers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA iray use 
only Permissible Interrogation Techniques. Permissible 
Interrogation Techniques consist of both (a) Standard 
Techniques' and (h) Enhanced Techniques. 

' standard Techniques are techniques that do not . 
incorporate physical or substantial psychological pressure. 
These techniques include, but are not limited to, all lawful 
forms of questioning . eraplc-yed by US law enforcement and ( 
military interrogation personnel. Among Standard Techniques 
.are the .use of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed 
72 hours-, reduced caloric intake (so long as the amount is 
calculated to maintain the general' health of the detainee) , 
deprivation of reading material,' use of loud music or white 
noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the 
detainee's hearing), and the use of diapers for "limited 
jeriods (generally,, no t to exceed 72 hours ,| 




ALL 1PQRCIPNS OF 
THIS I30CI 
CLASSIFIED TOP 





Guideline on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant bo the 



■ Enhanced Techniques are techniques that do 
incorporate physical or psychological pressure beyond 
Standard Techniques. The- use of each specific Enhanced 
Technique -must be approved by Headquarters in advance, and 
may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with 
the specific detainee, with appropriate medical and 
psychological participation in the process. These techniques 
are, the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the 
facial slap (insult slap) •, the abdoiaihal slap, cramped 
confinement, wail standing; stress positions, sleep 
deprivation beyond 72 hours, the use of diapers for prolonged 
periods, the use of. harmless insects, the- water board, and 
such other techniques as may -be specifically approved 
pursuant to paragraph 4 below.' The us.e of each Enhanced 
Technique is subject to specific temporal, -physical, and 
related conditions, including a competent evaluation of the 
medical and psychological state of the detainee. 

2 . MeSical and Psychological Personnel 

■ Ap propr iate m edical and psychological personnel shall 
be HH9HHHSHHHBHfc° ea <3ily . available for consultation and 
travel to the .interrogation site during, all detainee 
.interrogations employing -Standard Techniques, and appropriate 
medical and .psychological personnel must be on site during 
all detainee interrogations . employing Enhanced Techniques. 
In each case, the medical and psychological personnel shall 
suspend the interrogation if they' determine that significant 
and prolonged physical or mental injury, pain, or suffering 
is likely to result if the interrogation is not suspended. 
In any. such instance, the interrogation team shall 
immediately report the facts to Headquarters for management 
and legal review to determine whether the interrogation may 
be resumed. 



3 « Interrogation Personnel 

The Director, DCI' Counterterrorist Center shall 
ensure that all personnel directly engaged 
^Jterrogat^^ofpersons -detained pursuant ________ 

HBHHHE^HBHHB ^ ave & een appropriately screened (trom 
cne ^ meaicaX^psycnolxjgical , and security standpoints), have 
reviewed these Guidelines, have received appropriate training 
ua .their implementation, and have completed the attached 
Acknowledgment . 




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Guideline on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant .to the 



4. .Approvals Rehired 

Whenever feasible, advance approval is- required for 
the use- of Standard Techniques by an interrogation team. In 
all instances, their use shall be documented in cable 
traffic.. ■ prior approval in writing '(e.g., by written 
memorandum or in cable traffic) from the Director,. DCI 
Counterterrorist Center,, with the concurrence of the Chief, 
CTC Legal Group, is required for- the use of any Enhanced 
Technique { a ), and may.be provided only where D/CTC has 
determined that- {a) the specific detainee is believed to 
possess information .about risks to the citizens of the United 
"States Or other nations, (b). the 'use of the Enhanced 
Technique'^) .'is appropriate in order to obtain that 
information, (c) -appropriate' medical and psychological 
personnel have- concluded that the use of. the -Enhanced 
Technique (s) is not expected to produce "severe physical or 
mental .pain, or suffering,* and (d)' the personnel authorized 
ta. employ the Enhanced- Technique (s) .have completed the 
attached Acknowledgment. Nothing in these Guidelines alters 
the right to act in self-defense. ■ - 

5. Recordkeeping 

In each, interrogation session in which an Enhanced 
Technique i.s employed, a contemporaneous record shall be 
created setting- forth the nature and duration of each such 
technique employed, the identities of those present, and a 
citation to the required Headquarters approval cable. This 
information, which stay be in the form of a cable, shall be 
provided to Headquarters . 



APPROVED : 




Intelligence 



l^U#yi%l£&S 



Date 



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Guideline on Interrogations Conducted Pur; 




ACKHOTCDEDGHSira 



I. 



it acknowledge that I have read and 



understand and will, comply with the 'Guidelines on 
Interrogat ions Con ducted P ursuant to !"*"* 

"of" 



ACKNOWLEDGED: 



Name 



Date 



Appendix F 



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DRAFT QMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AM) PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO 

DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS 
• ■ September 4, 2003 

The following guidelines offer geaeral references for medical officers supporting 
the detention of terrorists captured and turned over to the Central Intelligence Agency for 
interrogation and "debriefing. There are three, different contexts in which these guidelines 
may be applied: (1) during the' period of initial interrogation, (2)duringfliemore 
sustained period of debriefing; at an interrogation site, and (3)1 



INTERROGATION SUPPORT 




-j 



;■ Captured terrorists turned over to the GJ.A. for interrogation may be subjected to 
a wide range of legally sanctioned techniques, all of which axe also used on U.S. military 
personnel in SERE training programs. These are designed to psychologically "dislocate" 
the detainee, maximize .his feeling of. vulnerability and helplessness, and reduce or 
eliminate Ms will to resist our efforts to obtain critical intelligence. 

. Sanctioned interrogation techniques must be specifically approved in advance by 
the Director, CTC in the ease of each individual Case. They include, in approximately 
ascending degree of intensity: - 

Standard measures (i.e., without physical or substantial psychological pressure) 
• Shaving 

"■; Stripping 

: Diapering (generally for periods not greater than 72 hours) 

I Hooding 

! Isolation 

White noise or loud music (at a decibel level that will not damage hearing) 
' ) Continuous light or darkness 

Uncomfortably eool environment 
■ Restricted diet, including reduced caloric intake (sufficient to maintain 

general health) 
[ Shackling in upright, sitting, or horizontal position 

Water Dousing 
', Sleep.deprivatioa(upto72hoirrs) 

Enhanced measures (with physical or psychological pressure beyond the above) . 

Attention grasp 

Facial hold 

Insult (facial) slap 



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Abdominal slap 

Prolonged diapering 

Sleep deprivation (over 12 hours) 

Stress positions 

-on knees, body slanted forward or backward 

- -leaning with forehead on wall 
Walling 

Cramped _ confinement (Confinement boxes) 
Waterboard "' 

In all instances the general goal of these techniques is a psychological impact, and 
not some physical effect, with a specific .goal of "dislocat[ing] bis expectations regarding 
the treatment he believes he will receive. . . ." The more physical techniques are 
delivered in- a manner carefully limited- to avoid serious physical harm. The slaps ft* 
example -are'designed "to induce shock, surprise, and/or humiliation" and "not to inflict 
physical pain- that is severe or lasting." To this end they must be delivered in a 
specifically circumscribed manner, e.g., with fingers spread. Walling is- only against a 
springboard designed to be loud and bouncy (and cushion the blow). All walling and 
most attention grasps are delivered only with the subject's liead solidly supported with a 
towel to avoid extension-flexion injury. 

OMS is responsible for assessing and monitoring the health of all Agency 
detainees subject to "enhanced" interrogation techniques, ahdfor determining that the 
authorized adnnnistration of these techniques would, not be expected to cause serious or 
permanent harm, 1 "DC1 Guidelihes" have been issued formalizing these responsibilities, 
and these should be read, directly. 

Whenever feasible, advance approval isreqiiired to use any measures beyond 
standard measures; technique-specific advanced approval is required for ail "enhanced" 
• measures and is conditional on on-site medical and psychological personnel confirming 
from direct detainee examination that the enhanced technique(s) is not expected to 
produce "severe physical or mental pain of suffering." As a practical matter, the 
detainee's physical 'condition must be such that these interventions will not have lasting 



1 The standard used by the Justice Department for "mental" harm is "prolonged mental 
harm," i.e., "mental harm of some-lasting duration, e.g., mental harm lasting months or years." 
In the absence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental pain or suffering would haye been 
inflicted.". Memorandum of August 1, 2002, p. IS. 



Unless the waterboard is being used, the medical officer can be a physician or a PA; use of the 
waterboard requires the presence of a physician. 



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effect, and Ms psychological state strong enough that no severe psychological harm will 
result. 



The medical implications' of the DCI guidelines are discussed below. 
General intake evaluation 

New detainees are to have a thorough initial medical assessment, with- a complete, 
document ed history and physical addres sing in. depth any chronic or previous medical 
problems. 




Although brief, the data should reflect what was checked and include negative findings 




Medical treatment 

It is important that adequate medical care be provided to detainees, even those 
undergoing enhanced interrogation. Those requiring chronic medications should receive 
them, acu te medical problems should bejreated, and adequate fluids a nd nutrition 
provided. 




TOrEES^I 




The basic diet during the period of enhanced interrogation need not be palatable, 
but should include adequate fluids and nutrition. Actual consumption should be 
.monitored and recor ded. liquid Ensure (or equivalent) is a good way to assure_thatjfae re 

is ad equate nutrition. |_ __^ 

| Individuals refusing adequate Equidsufcrrhn^his 

stage s hould have fluids administered, at' the earliest signs of deh ydration. BBBBBH 

" | lf there is. any question 

sout adequacy of fluid intake, urinary output also should be monitored and recorded. 



Uncomfortably cool environments 



Detainees can safely be placed in unca 
lengths of time, ranging from hours to days 




Core body temperature falls after more than 2 hours at an ambient temperature of 
10°C/50°F. At this temperature increased metabolic rate cannot compensate for heat 
loss. The WHO recormnended minimum indoor temperature is 18°C/64 Q F. The 
"thexmoneutral zone" where ncnnimal compensatory activity is required to maintain core 
temperature is 20°C/68°F to 30°C/86°F . Within the thermoneutral zone, 26°C/78°F is 
considered o ptimally comfortable for lightly clothed individuals and 30 o C/86 o F for na ked 
individuals. 




If there is any possibility that ambient temperatures are below the t hermoneutral 
range, they should be monitored and the actual temperatures documented 



~TdT~S& 



At ambient temperator es below 18°C/64°F, .det^ea. stoujdbegflMtoredforflie 
development of hypomeirnia.| 




White noise orloud music 

As a practical guide, there is no permanent hearing risk for continuous, 24-hours- 
a-day exposures to sound at 82 dB.or lower; at 84 dB for up to IS .hours a day; 90 dB for 
up to 8 hours, 95 dB for 4 hoars, 'and 100 dB for 2 hours, ff necessary, instruments can 
be provided to measure these ambient sound levels. 




Shackling 



of 



Shackling in non-stressful positions requires only monitoring for the development 
rcessrae sores with appropriate treatment and adjustment .of the shackles as required. 




top s^ess 




Assuming no medical contraindications are found, extended periods (up to 72 
hours) in a standing position can be approved if the ^and^ar^cjiiphertiianhead^evd 
and weight is home fully by the lower extremities. 





Sleep 'dep rivatioa 




The standard approval for sleep deprivation, per se (without regard to shackling position) 
is 72 hours. Extension, of sleep deprivation beyond 72 co ntinuous hours is considered an 
enhanced measure, which requires P/GTG prior approval. 




NOTE: Examinations performed during periods of steep deprivation should' include the 
current number of hours without sleep; and, ifonlya brief rest preceded this period, the 
specifics of the previous deprivation also should be recorded. 

Cramped confinement (Confinement boxes') 




[confinement in- the 
small box is allowable up 'to 2 hours. Confinement in the large box is limited to 8 
consecutive hours,! 



"•""•rass^f 




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Waterboard 



This is by far Hie most traumatic of the enhanced interrogation techniques. The 
historical context here was limited knowledge of the use of the waterboard in SERE 
training (several hundred trainees experience it every year or two). la the SERE model 
the subject is immobilized on his back, and his forehead and eyes covered with a cloth. 
A stream of water is directed at the upper lip.. Resistant subjects then 'have the cloth • 
lowered to cover the nose and mouth, as the water continues to be applied, fully 
saturating the cloth, and precluding the passage of air. -Relatively little water enters the 
mouth. The occlusion (which may be partial) lasts no more than 20 seconds. On removal 
of the cloth, the subject is immediately able to breathe, but continues to have water 
directed at the upper lip to prolong the effect. This process can continue for several 
minutes, and involve up to 15 canteen cups-of water. Ostensibly the primary desired 
effect derives from the sense of suffocation resulting from the wet cloth temporarily 
occluding the nose and mouth, and psychological impact of the continued application of 
water after the cloth is removed,- SERE trainees usually have only a single exposure to 
this technique, and never more than two; SERE trainers consider it their most effective 
technique, and deem- it virtually irresistible in the training setting. 




The SERE training program has applied the waterboard technique (single 
exposure) to trainees for years, and reportedly there have been thousands of applications 
without significant or lasting medical complications. The procedure nonetheless carries 
some risks, particularly when repeated a large number of rimes or when applied to an 
individual less fit than a typical SERE trainee. Several medical dimensions need to be 
monitored to ensure the safety of the subject. 




In our limited experience, extensive sustained use of the waterboard can introduce 
new risks. Most seriously, for reasons of physical fatigue or psychological resignation, 
the subject may simply give up, allowing excessive filling of the airways and loss of 
consciousness. An unresponsive subject should be righted immediately, and the 
interrogator should deliver a sub-Xyphoid thrust to expel the water. If this fails to restore 
normal breathing, aggressive medical intervention. is required. Any subject who has 
reached this degree of compromise is not considered an appropriate candidate for the 
waterboard, and the physician on the scene can not approve thither use of .the waterboard 
without specific C/OMS consultation and approval. 

A rigid guide to medically approved use. of the waterboard in essentially healthy 
individuals is not possible, as safety- will depend on how the water is applied and the 
specific response eaeh rime iris used. The following general 'guidelines are based on 
very limited knowledge, drawn "from very few subjects whose experience and response 
was quite varied. These represent only the medical guidelines; legal guidelines also are 
operative and may be more' restrictive. 



J ''^--^™&cp4^fe ! 55pfeI^ 



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A series (within a "session") of several relatively rapid waterboard applications is 
medically acceptable i n all healthy subjects, so long as thete is no JMcationofsome, 

emerging v ulnerabilit __ 

■■■■■I Several such sessions per 24 hours have been employed -without 
apparent medical complication.. The exact number of sessions cannot be prescribed, and 
will depend on the response to each. If more than 3 sessions of 5 or more applications 
are envisioned vdthin a 24 hours period, a careful medical reassessment must be made 
before each later session. ' . . 

By days 3-5 of an aggressive program, cumulative effects become a potential 
concern. Without any hard data to quantify either this risk or the advantages of this 

•technique, we believe that beyond this point continued intensewaterboard applications ■ 
may not be medically appropriate. Continued aggressive use of the waterboard beyond 

■ this point should be review ed by the HVT tea m in consultation with Headquarters p rior to 
any further aggressive use. 




NOTE: In order to best inform future medical judgments and recommendations, it is 
important that every application of the waterboard be thoroughly documented: how long 
each application (and the entire procedure) lasted, how much water was used in the 
process (realizing that much splashes. off), haw exactly the water was applied, if a seal 
was achieved, if the naso- or oropharynx was filled, what sort of volume v/as expelled, 
how long was the break between applications, and how the subject looked between each 
treatment. 




y jr^. M ;. ;*■■■"*" 



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SECTION 1.0 -OVERVIEW 



1 .1 Overview 



Efforts against the Al Qaeda terrorist organization have ushered 



hundreds of suspected and known group members into custody. Many of these 
detainees have proven to be sources of actionable intellig ence dealing with a wide 
range of counter ter rorist issues. ■ A small number of these detainees are recognized 
as well-placed Al Qaeda operatives, who hold secret considerable information on 
their organization's past activities and future plans. These targets of higher value, or 
High Value Targets (HVT), have been uncooperative during debriefings, and 
resistant to our standard interrogation efforts, in fact, extensive experience with Al 
Qaeda prisoners has made -it evident that certain detainees have received formal 
training in techniques to resist interrogations, and that they are particularly adept at- ' 
using cultural differences as both an interactive impediment to the interrogation 
process and as a psychological support mechanism behind which to hide, from 
interrogative efforts. ' 



As the war against terrorism continues, more HVTs will be captured. In 
order to effectively deal with this special population. Director. Counter Terrorist 
Center tasked the 



to set up and train interrog ation 



teams whose members have the skills and experience necessary to. navigate past 
resistance, and employ systematic interrog ation strategies to acquire intelligence. 
Incumbent to this approach is resistance technique identification, and,. when 
serviceable, implementation of certain specialized countenmeasures. 



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countermeasures have been developed in such a way not to violate United States 
Federal and international torture prohibitions. 



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2.2 Anticipated Future Demand 



Results from the first Al Qaeda HVT interrogated using the 
aforementioned enhanced techniques, Abu Zubayda, have been outstanding. Abu 
Zubayda reached .a satisfactory level of compliance in August '2002. Since April, the 
interrogation team has produced^ ja ctionable intelligence disseminations 

from Abu Zubaydah. This has ultimately led to some instances of the US 
Government being able to neutralize A! Qaeda capabilities worldwide before there 
was an opportunity for those capabilities to engage in operations harmful to the 
United States. Because of this, US Governm ent decisi on makers have a positive 
view of the program, and there is pressure to increase HVT Interrogation Program 
capabilities in the shortest time possible. 



As the success of the prog r am and of other counter Al Qaeda activities 
con ti nues to lead to the capture of additional HVT ca ndidate s, it can- be reasonably 
expected. that intelligence disseminations will lead to even more HVT candidate 
captures an d the likewise increase in demand f or more HVT program servic es. 



2.3 Operational Assumptions 



Required resources will be approved and available for the HVT Interrogation 
" Program as depicted in Section 4. Such resources are cri tica l to the success. of the 
Program's ability to meet Men tiffed customer requiremen ts. 



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The program will provide for the increase in demand of fully qualified 
^psychological services by carefu'liy Increasing' the .number of 



interrogation psychologists from a limited pool of appropriate candidates, 
maintaining expertise through ah- aggfessive>trainlng and mentoring program with 
well documented oversight of ail activities to ensure quality control. 



C05403863 



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2.4 Technology 



_j As directed by the Director of Central Intelligence on 28 

"January 2003, Interrogators may only use "permissible interrogation 
techn iques". Permissible techniques include Standard and Enhanced- 

~]a\[ enhanced techniques require prior 



Headquarters approval based on the provision of a detailed interrogation 
plan. 



not 



Standard Interrogation Techniques: These are techniques that do 
incorporate physical and psychological pressure. These techniques 
include, but are not limited to all lawful-forms of questioning employed by 
U.S. law enforcement and military interrogation personnel. Isolation, 
sleep deprivation (not to exceed 48 hours), reduced caloric intake (so 
long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the 
detainee), deprivation of reading material, use of bud noise (not 





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damaging); and the use of "diapers" for limited : periods 

), and moderate psychological pressure are authorized. 



1 



Shackles may be used for security reasons while a detainee is 



standing? so long as due care is taken -to- ensure that the shackles are 
neither too loose nor too tight for ph ysical safety. 



. [Accordingly, where shackles are to-be employed on a 

standing detainee's wrists, they should be shackled loosely and -at the 
level of the detainee's head to avoid problems during this" phase. 



Please note that shackles may be used to keep a detainee in a 



standing position during periods of non-enhanced sleep deprivation 
(shorter than 72 hours), so long as the aforementioned considerations 
are followed. 



Enhanced Techniques: Involves techniques that DO 



incorporate physical or psychological pressure beyond standard 
techniques. All technique's are designed to not engender lasting and 
severe mental or physical harm to the detainee. It is understood that 
some interrogation techniques incorporate mild physical pressure 



It is not intended, 



-however, that the detainee actually suffer severe physical or mental pain; 




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in addition, appropriately trained medical and- psychological persohnel 'are 
present throughout the process. Our attorneys have presented our legal 
analysis to the legal adviser to the National' Security Council, to the Office 
of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, and to the Criminal 
Division at Justice, and the Counsel to the President has been briefed as 
well. These enhanced techniques include: 



Facial slap 

Facial hold 

Attention grasp 

Abdominal slap 

Waiting 

Stress positions. 

Sleep deprivation beyond 48 hours 

Use of diapers for prolonged periods 

Use of harmless insects 

Cramped confinement 



Water Board 



The use of each technique for each detainee is dependent to 
spec fie temporal, physical', and related conditions, including a competent 
evaluation of the medical and psychological state of the detainee. 



The use of each specific enhanced technique must be approved 
by Headquarters in advance, and may be employed only by approved 
interrogators for use with the specific detainee, with appropriate medical 
and psychological participation in the process. 



Compliance & safety and legal issues will be addressed before any 
"application of physical pressures can be used against the detainee. The 
detainee's physical and emotional state will be a prime consideration 
before any application of physical pressure. 



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_ These techniques will be used on arr as needed basis arid not 

alTorthese techniques will 'necessarily be used. The interrogation team 
will use these techniques in some combination to convince the detainee 
that the only way he can infiuencehis environment is through 
cooperation. Generally,' these techniques are used in an escalating 
fashion, culminating in the wacer'board ? but not necessarily ending in this 
technique. Note: the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after 
several repetitions. 



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00039 



|| Psychological Assessment of 

tthr- &i-'Abedi n al-^ifecriMT&airacad Hassan, a -k.a. Aba Zsbavdah 

":5 : j; ■ ; 

ft?. ■ : 

I . 1 

TKifoliowing psychological assessment of Zsra al-' Abeam ai-Abideert 

Miih;\niTr4| Kasssn, (adca. Abii Zubaydah) is based upon the rss-.ii.ts of direct interview; 

with and enervations of the subject, and tore, inf 




Badl groua d In fonnatioii . For at least a decade, subject has.'-ived and worked 
within an el|droi!Fvieru that has condoned nurtured, intensified, and rewarded bis radical 
beliefs. Tjf| following is a partial list of respcaisibijsties that the subject has held uk> 
particular offier). Subject is currently 31 years old. 

Abu Zubay<||h worked from very low-level HRrjahidin (called courier by some) by age of 
3 1 tllbird or fourth insntin ai-Qa'ida. No one rises to in at level in such a short 
psrujl nf time without being dedicated, trusted, and strong. 

Alleged to iM-e written al-Qa'idi/s manual en resistance techniques aad lectured on Sis 



involved in ifery major al-Qa'idi terrorist operation; served as the operatiftiiai pia-mer 
for ttMrxvi'lerrniiun plot (20O0), the Paris embassy (2001) snd a planner of the 1 3 
September hijackings wh&h killed and maimed thousands of Americans. 

I i 

Served as ser|%sr Ijsairm Eta Ladia htmtenant aua played a kev rofc in tae movement and 

training of operatives on behalf of al-Qa'ida, the Bgypnai Islamic Jihad, and 

other ffrro.rist elemenU inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. He was a. key player m 

the Mff esurinrrs threat last year and appears to be engaged its ongoing terrorism 

plannffg agairtsi US interests. Zubaydah Is v.-&r,?ed j« Jordan (or iris role it; the 

Millei^iura plot. ; 

Directed tire s|;|rt- up of a 3ir- Ladin ceil in Jordan that was disrupted in AiiiUian in 

Decanter 199v for piorting terrorist acts against US raid kraeli targets during die 

MiUefiHuiii celebrations uVdordan. Two central feares of the pint, usdsr arrest. 

sdentiiild Abn Zubavdah as being the nrimarv sttpDorter oi this cell and the plot. 
u ' " 

^ '■ 

I?; 
rviauassd a ne-lfork of traixjiss eaniss. saiehous&s, and mutaimin-zdsied efiices iz 

Pcshav^t and Afghanistan, assisted in. other ffxJrs^jis^raOTC^^TV^igggpg men. 

moseyed materials in sirpjcrt of various jihads I 

the? wcr^lM. 





/ s T5i3 j~ t 



:/j = . •»•:'. 




I 



P-grsffnally approved entity and graduation of all ^^ e&3 BHwBpHH 
■■(■■■■fcixcal' 15 ^ 5-20 ^' Frffm 1356-1999, approved aiiinciYvidQals 
gorrlj in and out of Afgikuistan. to lh.e (raining camps. No ojis came in and cm of 
Pss||wsr : Pakistan \vithbuthis knowledge and approval. Served as al-Qa'ida's 
eoorlisiator of external, cbntacts, or foreign eornrminications. 



Acted as aiffa'tda's CI officer did ^as trusted to find spies in ikei? midst. 

Rel i ant History : Subject reported that h-s persisted lor a few years is holding 
onto the p-o^FibUity that he eouhf eventually transition from jihas life back into college 
and -pursuit |f his traditional sdibationaL career, and iaraily goals. As time passed he 
appeared to|§nd a -special niche tor himself. Ha 'became Increasingly integrated into the 
jihadist ide(||ig> ! and lifestyle. Me periodically felt pangs of homesickness, longed for the 
company cfffirnily, sad fantasised about a tutors as a computer expert or engineer. 
However, oifrtirae, the frequency and intensity of these thoughts and feelings 
durB-dshed.Ilie began to think cjf airy activity outside jihad ss "silly". Eventually, he 
understood ff at his mind and heart were devoted to serving Allah asd Islam through his 
jihad. He asffrted ihaX he has had "no" doubts or regrets about choosing to pursue art'.'! 
devote hirn^f to jihad since lias mid •1990 > 3. 

Persfbiitv: Subject is ^highly self-directed iuclividtiaj who prizes bis 
independent. He seeks to express his independence by doing things his o%vn way and 
having his e|fn style to the extent that he can within the stRschiiS of ridicsi salafist 
ssviroransrili- When he makes concessions* it is within the context of his ideological mi 
reiigions ccfldetions. He has narcissistic features that are evident ia his attention to his 
appearance ||d in Ins obvious 5; 4udrts" to demonstrate that be is really a rather "humble 
and regular Miv." Subject clearly 
author: __ ^^^^_^^^^^_^_^^^_^^^^^^^^^^_______ 

swhat t 
is orffajizes his emri^c-nmeM and conducts his 'atisinsss. 1 




s acknowledged that he 



celebrated thi destruction of the World Trade Center. 



$3 

He is||iitcilectuaily cutic-ds, skeptical and wary of others' iniersions, possesses 
excellent sel|discjplms mA readily sets aside his ffwa interests to bios: his 



resn-osisibOitlls. 



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private (ta||ly cautions regardrpg op* 

inier&ction||yit.h ethers from a variety of backgrounds. Nor surprisingly, he pos.« 

the di-scipllls, drive, creativitv kd ma*matism feat eharseierize effective iesders. 



sses 




perceptive and quick to recognise find assess gse xsoods and. 



motivauon§|Oi otiiers 



tliers. He is al^rt and keenly observant of others' interactions. Ee'is 
stroagiy stj||nsci to care&ily gakge a situation before voicing opinions or revealing 
feelings. l|i| is adept at chcosidg to conceal or convey a particular attitude or errioticr: . 
depending Hi the context and irhrriediats utility. Subject tends to be a very private perse* 
who is skeltical of others' mieritioiu? and alert . for ulterior natives. He is.niarkedr 
vr-ailaat au#encss not to frost ofeers eas: 




gmllioual/Mentai Sta&k'Copirig Skills: Overall, subject's background as 
revealed byjfeif-report (mcludiiig diaries and interview) does Boi indicate that he has a 
history of ifbod disturbance or ether psychiatric pathology, Indeed, his reported and 
kBcwn hisr||y indicates that he is rersarkabhy resiliem. and eonfideriX that he can 
overcome ipversity. During the occasions that he experiences increased stress aud-'or 
low mood, ||s may become sornfew'hai more withdrawn, melancholy and reflective. 
Ho waver, t||s shift in mood vrijj likely last a relatively short time. He defies aid there is 



leselln hi: 



•fled hist&rv of thought disorder or ssduoae snood or mental health 




2IK1 



sop'icationfff religious <t?.d psychological principles, intelligence, aas discipline to avoid 
sad overcome problems. Ws faith, the biessisgs of religious leaders, and camaraderie of 

like-mJs;dg||nuiahediii brothers have provided hira with a reliable aid durable support 

_, . if " ■ 

svstem. k i 



Of i||rticuiarDote has been subject's ability to manage Ms mood, and emotions 
during eapdff sty. Beir-g circumspect, calm, controlled, aad deliberate- is likely 
characterise of stxbiecfs tie 





when be ^erissced the mirk "hard" dislocation of expectation, intervention following 
session 6|1 Due to his incredilly strong resolve, expertise ia c-mliss warfare, resistance 
to iBtsvroJfiion techniques (&k latter two which he trshred hundreds of others on) this 
experieacfiwas ona of the fowilhai led to him providing sigaiflcsBC actionable. 
intel!igers|§. .As has been observed throughout his recent (kfainaieui, he was abse te 
qtsicidy hifmes bade from these most disconcerting arc-meats and regain an air of cairn 
eonfidencl aad strona. rssolvefin not parting with other threat isforrsaiion. 

Pifee Wgfjdview: According t o the sobjcci, the jihad wiil uUiraaisly be 
^dorio'w^'i^' A man can and the west 




Mll i'vaikres . Sumect'sf primary motivadons are (hx m particular order): 
sSatAK/preffgs, power, ksfluesqe.. serving the Ummsb, serving tha prophet said Allah, 
passing 4fpi!re i ihad", coairiliitirrg to the establishir.ssii of Short's amor;g Muslim 
coissarissj^snvribuxhia to the'lsnkg up" of Muslims throughout the 'world, &n& 
costribati^l to the restoration of the Falestiriaa homeland. 

Prflary Strengt hs, (in. rk> particular order) Ability to focus, goal-directed 
disdplineffiildHgsfice, errtonohal resilience, street savvy, ability to organize and manage 
people, ablity to delegate taski , keen observation skills, iiuid adaptability (car* aaticipak 
and adsptffidsr duress asd wiii n-inimai resources), capable of a^es^m^aderaiohh^ 
the needs If" others, ability to stijust goals to emerging opporturis 




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Cgrjf vitv and Interrogatio n. Subject recognizes that his duty as a 
£Oldier/wa|Ior/roujaffia is tc ciejay, mislead, and lie to protec- what is most critical to the 
success of Is cause. He ass-anU ihs.t we uijdersta-id this. Thus, he is not likely to bs 
iutimidasilli: wzaktntd by bsijis "caught" in lies. His job is tc lie. During interview he 
explained ||i he h'ed to his neiiO\bors : to shopkeepers, to bakers, travel agents, sirpen 
personnel, §-d many others in. drder to protect his people and sctivitks. Ke said, "I lie, 

ieccptions he managerial lb. 




^^^^^^^^^^^^^. ^aired 3. United Nations refugee identification curd by 

persistsntr||emng the s^me lis ; cver a period of several wesks or months. He has jearaed 
that the colfbmation. of skillful deception and lying pays off. 




about &s <f|rienence :*s :i captive of the Egyptians and Ru<s-3J:S. in addition, sudiccus 
fanjlliar at|| orobabl'- vvd; versed regarding al-Qshda's cspuvtry ana resistance braising 
•materials, ffivas, one would expect vhai subjec t would draw, upon ibjsjbjiri of kravviadae 
as he attcrsltits to cope v?ife hss;own eapUviiy- 




lect believer in the ultisisie destiny ct IsisTxs is to 
dominate ||e world. K* belisvas thai global victory is inevitable. Thus, tbers is die 
chance trdflhe couid rationsliz? that providing iiifareiaisea/wiiS htsro current ettbri s but 
represent 4|]y a ierriporsrv se&acL 





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Sus-gary ; 



Datei 



GTC's BVI Interrogation Srforts 



=\ 



cix: j a" LftEfe'fccogacion e_ sorts. | 

with the interrogation of Al-Hgshlri] 



jCTC 



^Al-Naahiri - With the recent capture of a 



high-ranking Al Pa/ida operative, Al-ttahim Al-STa -hiri , 



T3?&''s' "ihtexxagatJioa efforts . Al-Nashiri is believed to be 
responsible- for plaiuiing the USS Cole attaoX (which he has 
admittsd a role in this) and future actacks on US interests 
in the Ar ab Peninsula region including attacks on. US 
Warships'. ] 



|Ai-Naainir has undergone 



interrogation with che HVT Interrogators 




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To:|John Yoo 



Phone: {(202) 514-2069 

1(202)514-3713 
Fax; | (202) 514-9207 



Phone: I 




Data: 1 24 July 2002 
Pages including ibis 1 



cover page: f 7 



Hera Is ih§ psf etiological assessme; 
ma at work or at honfe, whenever. 



, Fbanks < 



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7.05&25:CH?t!- 




|| Esychol ogical Assessment df 

Jim s;-'Ab&dm ai-AJideea Muhammad Hassara ai 



,s. Abu Zabavdah 



Theftollowiag psychoio|icai assessment of Zaia af 'Abedis ai-Abideen 
Mubaxsmaiiiassaa, (a.k.a. Aba Zubaydah) is based uponkbe. results of direct interviews 
witxi asd ollfsr^atjons of Sis suijeci, and from iB&rman<|h|)Lai^G^GnKd1gga^ 
soarges sacjj as iateffigeace ainlgrsss reoc 

I 
3acj|rr ound Informattoi For at least a decade, surlject has lived and worked 

within air epdrocment'that has londer-ed, nurtured, irtfsrss|fied, and rewarded his radical 

beliefs, Tl§ following is a par|bl list of rsspoosibilitifts fiat .fee subject has held (so 

particular cfper). -Subject is curfeatly 31 years old. j 




Ab 



u Znbayf|h worked from vefy low-level xnujshidia (ca|lsd courier by some) by age of 
31 ttf third or fourtb ma| in. al-Qa'ida. No oss rises to that level in such, a short 



perffil of time v *'ithom b£ine dedicated, trusted,. arJ st 



\ii.ig. 



Alleged to l|.ve written af-Qa'siJa's tnasualori resistance ifchrriques and lectured on the 

Involved irffvery raajor al-Qa'ifa terrorist operation: servfd as fee operational plainer 
for ||e m jllemmusi plot pjOO), the Paris embass y |200 i ) and £ planner of the 1 1 
Seplkobsr hijackings vvlich killed and maimed thousands, of Americans. 

Served as sfjiior lisarna Bin Lafin lieutenant and played alkey role ir- she movement arcs 

trai|fag of operatives or|behii(f of al-Qa'ida, Che Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and 

oChal terrorist elements feide Pakistan, artd Afgharfistaa. He was a key player in 

the piliermisra threat Ia§t year and appears to be engaged in e&golag terrorism 

platffisg against US mflrssts. Zubaydah is wanted; in. Jordan for bis role is the 

Milfiisiuurn plot. | \ 

i& -■ ^ 

Directed thtfstart-up of a Bin L|dis cell is Jordan, last *a4 disrupted in Amman in 

£>e<||iiber 1999 for pIot|ng terrorist acts sgalnst Lip and Israeli targets during the 
Mnifnnium celcbratics^ia Jordan. Two centra! fi|ures of the plot, under arrest, 
ide?f|fied Aba Zabaydal as being the prtaarv mgi orier of this ceil and. the plot. 

Masaged affe&vork of saisingfarfips. safshouses, and miqakedin-rd&zi offices in 
£be|§orM. " | 





BSMT 
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Served as I%uty Carnp Ccrmalsder for al-Qalda traaiasfcarrs p m Aighamstaa, 
^mftgH^gnnmyed mtiv aad graduation of all trainees! 
_^^^^^^- cirea§999-2OO0. Bom 1996-lf 99, approved all indivlciu-als 
gou^5r^a3ouu>f Afgb|aistaa to the training cair|>s. No one casie is and out of 
Pesr§kar, Falostaa withfui his knowledge and appfovsL Served as al-Q?.W$ 
cootflaatcr of externa! contacts, or foreign comraulicatioEs. '■ 



Acted as al||aMa's CI office? sid was trusted to find spie| in their oid 



dst 



Rele vant History : Subject reported that he persisted for a few years is holding 
onto Ihepollbility thathecouil eventually transition froaljihad afeback into college 
and parsuklff his traditional educational, career, and family goals. As clras passed he 
appeared £o|M & special niche for himself. He became k^reasingly integrated into the 
jlhadist ideology and lifestyle, lie periodically felt pangs df homesickness, longed for the 
company or|f&rni-y, and faatasi?bd about a Mure 3s a. computer expert or engineer. 
However, of|ftiirre, the frequerify andktsBsity of these lights and. feelings 
dimiBJshed||fe began to think |f any activity outside jiha«f as "silly"! Eventually, he 
understood ||at bis mWx and. he|rt were devoted to servin| Allah and Islam through his 
jihad. He asflrted. that he has hs| "no" doubts or regrets albui dioosisg to pm&m md 
devote aimlflf to jihad since tasjrnfd-1990's. { 

Fsrslhatity ; Subject is sjhighly self-directed ineivtrual who prizes his 
i2d.epes.dea||. Be seeks to express his independence by dfdsg things; his own way and 
having his {j|?B style to the extelt that he can within tire structure of rhdicai salsfet 
envircffj.raer||. When he makes 'concessions, it is vrithin tbf . contest of his ideological and 
religious coltrictions. Hefcss afreissistic features that atelvident in his attention to his 
appearance §§id' in his obvious £< |ffcrts ; ' to demonstrate thaf he is .ready a rather "humble 
and idgulg 

; st^whaUomt Msiye in 
ills eaviroarsfet aBd~co5ducts his busings. 




'& acknowledged that he 



crated tffe destruction of thef World Trade Center, 
Jl 



Be s||isieltecrua% curious, skeptical and wary of <|hers r mtshtions, possesses 
excellent setf-dj scipiise and rea|jj.y sets aside his own rntetests to rnek his 

r esponsMiffba. 

|Subj4:t is peffeoriedstic (very 





woo: 



7/25AS 5:04 ill 






pci vase cMgily cauriws regardfag opeaiag up to others), led MgSUy icapabtein 
tnieractioaiwlth others from sfrariety of bsclgrousds. Nci surprisingly, he possesses 
the cfecfei§& drive, creativity Ind praamatism feat characterise effective leaders. 

SI i I 

** § \ 

SolM Skills aMRelatit;»shffis: Subject has excsfest social skills and social 




is bgmy sft laity perceptive axf qatcs to recognize and afsess Ui& trpods ar* 




d6 P 

who is skefheal of others" iace|tioas mi a terifonilt 

aJttends not to trust ethers easily 




Enlluottat /MenraJ Smtifs/Cophs Sk ills: OveraU, iubjeet\* background as 
repealed bffself-rqjort. {indudifig diaries and interview) dp&s sot indicate &at lis has a 
history of Jibod distarbasce crfciher psychiatric patho=og|\ Iradsed, his reported, and 
kaowa hisfjjry indicates that fc<§ is remarkably resilient afid conf iisnl that he can 
overcome ||vexsity. During tfi occasions thai he sxperi&ces iacressed stress and/or 
low m/Xi&Mz may become sortewhai mors withdrawn, flieiascsoly^asd reflective. 
However, His shift in mood w|i likely last a relatively sh|rt time, He denies and there is 
no evideacllr- Ms reported hisferv of thought disorder orfadtiring, rjgadjQL ffl e nta l h ealth 




svstem 



Of ffetieuiai r>oss has bfen suhieers ability to mafegc his mood and eraelkss 
during detection, Beicg drcsiifspect, calm, caalroiled, arfi deliberat e is Ukely 
character 




7/25/02 S;&4k|| 



8 




Da 

T02- 



addition, he||\owed strong sigaf of syrnpathetic nervous sisters arc-asal {possibly fear) 

when he exgifriesced the Inkiai ''fionlrostationaP dislocatiqa of expectation during an 

iataxogat5i^|'|essioa. Due to hi| incredibly strong resolve. Expertise in civilian warfare. 

resistance toffhtefrogatioE techniques, (the latter two Vrhich he trshaed hundreds of others 

oa). ibis expHicace was one of t|e few that led to him. providing sigBgieaat actionable 

mtelligeaee.f|*s has bee.fi obser\f q ihroughout liis recent alter! don, he was able to 

quickly bouf|e back from these fbost disconcerting rciasiet^s and regain an air of calm 

coaf ideace, fftd strong resolve irf aot partmg with other Christ iaforrsaticri. 
|s | | 

Fa&Ij Worklvie 'vy: Accef ding ti 
notorious;. 




Modtllkms. . Subject* * piff^y rsotivalioas are fir; $o particular order): 
staws/pr=sdg| power. tsfiueace,^erviEg the Ummah, serving she prophet and A!iaJ.i. 
pursuing a "rjtre jihad'\ coctxibafsg 10 the establishment of Shsri'a among Muslim 
countries, co|fribrixirig to the "Sif|ag tip" of Muslims throughout the world, and 
contributing !§ the restoration of fee Palestinian homeland, i 

Prima jy Stren gths, (is no jbartioular order) Ability colfccus, goal-directed 
discipline, ir-fipligerree, eiTvodona§ resilience, street savvy. afihty to organize a.ru.1 manage 

(car; anticipate 
ixrjlcsaji 




^s/sa^pisl 





Deiiltion snd ]r.arroaa|ori . Subject recftgsij«lhsth=5 duly ai & 
soMiesvya^r/muiah.id is to defey : mislead, and He to prc^c- voa;. ss meat ennca; ic tne 
saeeess of % cause. He a^u-sifs that sve understand this. [Thus, he -j not i-sely tc be ^ 
afeidasciir weakened by bei|g "c&ughi 11 is lies. His jotr.no Ue. L>uriEg intsrvtctv,- he 
explained tilt he lied to hU neighbors, tc shopkeeper*. ;o oinx;ri : crave.! agenb, sapor-; 
Bsrsoaael, d§<l manv others in o|\kr to protect. ii<» people £aj acttv:-;!-*. i * a.i.u. i t.-c. 
He, lis, He, is . a.nc 
great .suc-celi. 




fattens rtrus.v- • i' ^ri i-i t ic s t sor;- csru. ■ 
persistentlygslling the jam= lit fever a petied of ssvenl vak> t.-.- iiioslHs. tie has iearn 
that the cor||inaticB of skillful deception and lyksg ?:;y^ ctv. 




^has talked v4!h 4'nian al-Zawahiri. aid it isfiikely that Zawflhiri talked 
about his eifetkrsee a% a capm<e oi the, Bgy ptiaHs and Rus^s hs addition, subject Is 
hmYw au||)?Gbabiv weil ve;-?id regarding as-QaWs cqterdot! a?;1 resistance training 
materials. Hhus, one would e\cjen that subject would di<r* upon jk; i^jic _o!_kri0^tcdgg_ 




tubtbet believes in the ulttrottte destiny o; =slam ts to 
dominate tl§ world. -He believes that global viciory is irsevitzftle. Titus, there is the 
dt«rtcsths.l|ecooki rat tongues that pr oviding iaformstio-i ^ill hattr; current eifort s 
represent oily a temporary ysibjtck. 1 





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SBCRB1. 






00093 

Training 



^0092" 



(b)(1) 
-M3) 



Name 



Trainer 



Stat Date Certification Date Initials 



f£M'- 



i£/-/ef 



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NAME: 

Waterboard 



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Enhanced Pressures 



-nu 



0010 3 



Date: 



Trainer. 



Academics: 



Practice: 



Configuration: 



Subjected: Y • N 



Comments 



Operational Training 



Test 



Certification 



Signature: 
Trainer Signature: 



Date: 
Date: 



Refresher/ Requal Date: 



M*m> 



0000143 



SF.C^"^ 



/ 



17 July 2003 




MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 
SUBJECT : (UVMeet ing with 




(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(5) 




in -Qxrice of Inspector General spaces . The 
meeting, was conducted as part of a review of Agency 
practices regarding the custody and interrogation of 
individuals for counterterrorism purpose's . Specifically, 
the meeting was designed to gain information on the impact 
.of CTC's involvement in detention and interrogation.. 



2 . JRSflBKflnBBSu Ask-ed how we. jud ge the suc cess of 
the detention and interrogation program, {ERB8SBSS3, stated 
that- the value of the- program is taking the terrorists off 
the streets, and success is judged by the quality-. of the, 
information they provide. If they get unique, • valuable 
in format ion from the detainees, then they have done their 
job. . In jHBBIB&S8§f v i ew ; using the quality of the 
intelligence as the' yardstick, the program has been an 
absolute success. . She stated further that there was. no 
other way CTC could have gott en th e information they have 
obtained from the detainees. 




'provided information about the modus operandi o£ Al-Qa'ida, 




9000475 



TOP SECRET 




I/O/'/ 



- ... I 







SUBJECT: (U) H&eti.nq with 



provided 'in forma t . on 
terrorists, z .;:" 
raid that netted 



seated chat de- 
led to ' the arrest of 



,ees nave 



-.hfej 




. 5. HHHHBH9HI Because of his position, as chief of 
Al-Qa'ida operations outside of Afghanistan . Khalid Shaykh 
Mu'hajraned (KSM; personally recruited, trained, or otherwise 
had direct know 1 eon;-.- of many terrorist operatives. K.SM 
provided information that helped lead to the arrest of: 
lyman Paris, the Ohio truck driver; Uzair "oracha, a 
smuggler; Saleh .Minni. L , a sleeper operative in Mew York; 
Majid Khan, an op'-ranve -who could get into the U.S. easily; 
arid toar 'al Baluchi, KSM's nephev 

who Zubaydah identified as one of the most likely 
operatives to travel to the U.S. to carry out operations. 




x'/b(a 



TOP SECRET j 



SEC 




SUBtXECT: (0) Meeting with. 




? . ' ■■HHHHHBH . According to NSHBBRfir information 
from- detainees has also provided a wealth of information 
about Al-Qa'-ida plots. These include the following.: 




♦ A. plot against the U.S. Consulate in Karachi , 
Pakistan. 

« The Heathrow/Canary Wharf plot, which involved 
hijacking aircraft to fly into and destroy both 
'locations . 

* The train track plot where the operative .would 
loosen the spikes in an attempt to derail a train. 




• _ The gas station plot where several gas stations were 

to- be blown' up to create panic and havoc; 

• The Library Tower plot where the tallest building in 
California was to be attacked similar to the World 
Trade Center . 

• The suspension bridge plot where the lines of the 
-. bridge were to be cut, thus making it collapse. 




900047' 



TOP SECRET 



TM-i 



rur JrtSUKET 



7 



^•GSBSBBESSBBi. 




SUBJECT; (O) Meeting with 




• 9 . JHHHHHSBL 0n t he ques tion of whether actual 
plots had been thwarted, lflMHMHf. opined that- since the 
operatives involved in many of the above plots had been 
arrested, they have, in effect, thwarted the operation- The 
following captured terrorists were associated with plots; 



« Majid Khan, whose father owned a gas station, was 
associated- with the gas station' plot, as well as the 
poison operation.- 

» lyman Paris was task ed to work on the suspension 

Lot, 




to blow up the tall es t building in ,. 

' California * t 

Zubair was also involved in the Library Tower pi 

« Amar al Baluchi had the U.S. Consulate in Karachi as 
his target . 




9000478 



TOP/SECRET J 



X/oHf 



I'-? :/irn 




".''o| -5 



^wjwj^yj 



"O 



SEC 



TOP SECRST//21 



• (b)(1) • 

00196 < b >< 3 > 



800082' 



top sazkET//xi 



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CUb103993 



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TOP SECRET//X1 



Sent on 20 November 2002 at 06:54:55 PM 



3©QBS2S 



T.OP SECRET/ /Xl 



U~ 



L-uo^iujyyj 



TOP 



gBCRBlT 



Date: 



SUBJECT -. 



1. 



L 



CTC's HVT Interrogation Efforts 



Summary: 



CTC' a interxogat£on efforts. [_ 

with t he interrogation of AI-NashiriJ 



Al-Nashiri - With the recent capture of a 



hi gh-ranking Al Qa'ida operative, Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, 



CTC s interrogation efforts . Al-Nashiri is believed to Be 
responsible for planning the USS Cole attack (which he has 
admitted a role in this) and future attacks on US interests 

in the Ar ab Peninsula region including attacks fan US 

Warship a . 



Al-Washir has undergone 1 . 



int errogatio n with the HVT Interrogators" using": 

I land Al-Nashiri is becoming trie 

and is providing actionable intelligence. 



compliant 



800 829 



)?M 



TO? SECRET 



13 



lu34u jyyj 



>PiE 



TOP^ECRffll 



SUBJECT: 



CTC's HVT Interrogation Efforts 



80 COS 30 



to: 



ppfejji" 



/