Enemies of My Enemy

Enemies of My Enemy

The 'Jewish Threat':

Anti-Semitic Politics of the U.S. Army

Joseph W. Bendersky

New York: Basic Books, 2000

$30 US

xvii + 539pp.

Reviewed by Kevin MacDonald

Since the latter decades of the 19th century there has been a
remarkable increase in the cultural and political power of
Jewish groups and an equally remarkable decline in the
cultural and political power of Northern European peoples.
In 1880 the vast majority of the Jewish population lived in
Eastern Europe well removed from the centers of Northern
European power. These Jewish populations had expanded
dramatically during the 19th century ~ more rapidly than
any other European group. This rapid expansion placed
enormous strains on both the Jewish and non- Jewish
populations of Eastern Europe. As they have in so many
traditional societies, Jews had achieved a dominant position
in the economies of Eastern Europe.

But there was also a large mass of impoverished Jews who
were strongly attracted to messianic religious and political
ideologies, especially Zionism and leftist political
radicalism. Because of Jewish economic and cultural
domination and lack of assimilation, there was also an
upsurge in popular and governmental anti-Semitism

throughout the area, most famously with the pogroms in
Russia beginning in 1881, but extending throughout
Eastern and Central Europe. The result was an effort by
Jewish organizations to remove Jews from Eastern Europe
to other countries, most notably the United States. Between
1880 and 1924, approximately 2 million Jews immigrated
to the United States from Eastern Europe. This event was
of momentous importance for the history of the United
States in the 20th century and beyond.

Joseph Bendersky's book is a history of the conflict
between an increasingly powerful Jewish group and a
declining Northern European group as revealed in the
writings of U.S. Army officers gleaned from the files of the
Military Intelligence Division (MID) of the War
Department. As recounted by Bendersky, Americans of
Northern European descent in the United States thought of
themselves as part of a cultural and ethnic heritage
extending backward in time to the founding of the country.
The Anglo-Saxon heritage of the British Isles was at the
center of this self-conception, but Americans of German
and Scandinavian descent also viewed themselves as part of
this ethnic and cultural inheritance. They had a great deal
of pride in their accomplishments. They believed that their
civilization was a product of their own unique ingenuity
and skills, and they believed that it would not survive if
other peoples were allowed to play too large a role in it.

Christianity was a deeply embedded aspect of the culture of
the Northern Europeans, but it played a remarkably small
role in the battles with the emerging Jewish elite. Far more
important for framing these battles were Darwinian theories

of race. The early part of the 20th century was the high
water mark of Darwinism in the social sciences. It was
common at that time to think that there were important
differences between the races ~ that races differed in
intelligence and in moral qualities. Not only did races
differ, but they were in competition with each other for
supremacy. Schooled in the theories of Madison Grant,
Lothrop Stoddard, Henry Pratt Fairchild, William Ripley,
Gustav Le Bon, Charles Davenport, and William
McDougall, this generation of U.S. military officers viewed
themselves as members of a particular race and believed
that racial homogeneity was the sine qua non of every
stable nation state. They regarded their racial group as
uniquely talented and possessed of a high moral sense.

But, more importantly, whatever the talents and
vulnerabilities of their race, they held it in the highest
importance to retain control over the lands they had
inherited as a result of the exploits of their ancestors who
had conquered the continent and tamed the wilderness. And
despite the power that their race held at the present, there
was dark foreboding about the future, reflected in the titles
of some of the classic works of the period: Grant's The
Passing of the Great Race and Stoddard's The Rising Tide
of Color Against White World Supremacy and The Revolt
Against Civilization: The Menace of the Under- Man.

This world of Northern European cultural pride and
self-confident hegemony has vanished, and there can be
little doubt that the rise of the Jews and the decline of
Northern Europeans are causally linked. Bendersky's book
is as much a marker of that transformation as it is an

extraordinary record of an important arena in the conflict
between Jews and Northern Europeans. Bendersky's sense
of intellectual and moral superiority and his contempt for
his Northern European subjects ooze from every page. The
book is a triumphalist history written by someone whose
sympathies are with the winners of the intellectual and
political wars of the 20th century.

The main thrusts of Jewish activism against Northern
European hegemony focused on several critical power
centers in the United States: The academic world of
information in the social sciences and humanities, the
political and legal world where public policy on
immigration and other ethnic issues is decided, and the
mass media where "ways of seeing" are presented to the
public (MacDonald, 1998/2001). As recounted in The
"Jewish Threat, " all of these power centers were important
in the battle against the generation of U.S. army officers
who came to power after World War I. In focusing on these
power centers, these Jewish efforts essentially sidestepped
the U.S. military. Their effort was aimed not at achieving
an influential position within the officer corps but rather at
nullifying the ability of the officer corps to influence public
policy. As the old guard retired or died off, it was replaced
by a new generation of officers who eventually, as the
century wore on, became increasingly steeped in the
ideology of the new elite.

One of the advantages of being on the winning side in these
intellectual and political battles is that Bendersky can safely
assume that any statement by a U.S. military officer that
reflects negatively on Jews or Judaism is a reflection of the

prejudices and bigotry of the officer and has nothing to do
with the actual behavior of Jews or the nature of Judaism.
Further, any statement reflecting the Darwinian theories of
race differences so prevalent in the early 20th century can
safely be discounted as well because such theories have
been shown to be "erroneous" (p. 262). The basic style of
the book is simply to catalog the attitudes of U.S. Army
officers. To the extent that the attitudes of the officers
require any rebuttal at all, Bendersky deems it sufficient
simply to cite statements of Jewish activist organizations
and his belief that science has placed Jewish ethnic
interests firmly on the side of the angels. In the following
discussion, I will try to show that the officers had a
basically accurate view of Jews and Judaism and that they
were quite correct in their fear that Jewish influence would
have a disastrous effect on the ability of their race to retain
control of the United States.

Beliefs about Jews and Judaism

Jews and Bolshevism: The "Jewish Threat" shows that the
commonly held belief in a strong association between Jews
and Bolshevism was based on a very wide range of official
and unofficial sources spanning a great many countries
over the entire period from World War I into the Cold War
period after World War II. This information thus buttresses
scholarly accounts from other sources of the predominant
role of Jews in leftist radicalism (see MacDonald,
1998/2001). While prone to exaggerations at times — as
expected on the basis of psychological theory — the
attitudes of U.S. Army officers were basically sound.

Nevertheless, Bendersky ascribes any special attention
given to Jews as revealing "the conservative, racial, and
nativist perspective of the officers" (p. 51). For example, an
agent in Paris reported in 1919 that among Jews there was
"a remarkable unanimity of opinion in favor of the Russian
Bolshevist movement." Jews were "dazzled by the sudden
access to power of their race" (p. 48). Such reports — and
there were many like them — should be taken at face
value that Jewish policy, in which numerous mainstream
Jewish activist organizations were engaged from at least
1880 — was to topple the Czar. Jewish celebration over
the success of the revolution is not in the least surprising, if
only because the revolution ended czarist anti- Jewish
policies, and it is well attested by other sources, including
some cited by Bendersky (e.g., Szajkowski 1974). For
example, in 1907 Lucien Wolf, a leader of the Jewish
community in England, wrote to Louis Marshall of the
American Jewish Committee that "the only thing to be done
on the whole Russo-Jewish question is to carry on
persistent and implacable war against the Russian
Government" (in Szajkowski 1967, 8). "Western Jewish
leaders actively participated in general actions in favor of
the liberal and revolutionary movements in Russia both
during the revolution and after its downfall" (Szajowski
1967, 9).

In the same way, when Bendersky (pp. 109, 1 14) reports
that MID agents in Riga and Berlin commented that the
Soviet embassies were staffed primarily by Jews, I am
inclined to believe the agents, not Bendersky's assumption
that all of the masses of similar data are the paranoid

ravings of racist military officers. Such a finding fits well
with the general finding that Jews were massively over-
represented in the early Bolshevik governments.

Bendersky also makes it appear that MID reports of
Bolshevik atrocities are fantasies. Reports stated that
Bolshevik methods included not only seizure and
destruction of property but also "barbarism and butchery"
(p. xii). Included in the intelligence reports were
photographs of "naked bodies with butchered flesh,
hanging upside down from trees, while 'the Bolsheviki
soldiers were laughing and grinning and standing about'"
(p. xiii). Bendersky writes as if such claims are unworthy of
being rebutted, yet there is more than enough evidence that
such things did happen. Indeed, the recently published
Black Book of Communism not only documents the horrific
slaughter of some 20 million Soviet citizens, the
widespread torture, mass deportations, and imprisonment in
appalling conditions, but reproduces the photos from 1919
of a naked Polish officer impaled through the anus hanging
upside down from trees while Bolshevik soldiers are
laughing and grinning and standing about (Courtois et al.
1999, 202-203).

Bendersky acknowledges that large numbers of immigrant
Jews flocked to leftist movements but faults the MID for
not making subtle distinctions among leftists. However, his
own findings show that MID placed considerable
importance on the fact that American socialist groups,
including the Socialist Party, "expressed jubilant support"
for Bolshevik Russia (p. 123). Bendersky acknowledges
that the great majority of radical leftists were immigrants

but states, without support, that the concentration of the
MID on Jewish neighborhoods was unwarranted (p. 124).
However, MID based their estimates on the numbers of
radical meetings in particular ethnic neighborhoods and on
their observations at these meetings. The findings of the
MID fit well with the general finding that Jews were the
only immigrant group that developed an important and
influential radical sub-culture, that in fact the immigrant
Jewish community in the U.S. from 1886 to 1920 can best
be described as "one big radical debating society" (Cohn
1958, 621; see also MacDonald 1998/2001).

The idea that the Bolshevik Revolution was part of a
coordinated conspiracy is more problematic, but it rested
on the widespread intelligence reports that wealthy Jews
were important financiers of revolutionary movements

a belief that Bendersky assumes is complete fantasy but for
which there is good evidence. In fact, American Jewish
capitalists like Jacob Schiff did finance Russian radical
movements directed at overthrowing the Czar and may well
have had considerable impact (Goldstein 1990, 26-27;
Szajkowski 1967). Schiff, who had already distinguished
himself by leading efforts to abrogate a trade agreement
between the U.S. and Russia and had financed the Japanese
war effort against Russia in 1905, was repeatedly identified
in MID reports as behind the international collusion among
wealthy Jews and Jewish revolutionaries. Even then,
officers were often remarkably judicious in their appraisal
of claims by informants and agents that there was an
international Jewish conspiracy, as in the case of a senior
officer who responded to such claims by noting, "I am

rather in doubt as to whether the conclusions drawn by this
agent are based on observations sufficiently wide to be
valuable. However, I am myself convinced that the subject
would bear closer investigation and while I am not ready to
subscribe entirely to these conclusions, still I am convinced
that there may be more than a modicum of truth in them"
(p. 49).

Officers were also skeptical about the notorious forgery,
Protocols of the Elders ofZion, but were nonetheless
intrigued by it, not because of evidence of its authenticity
but because the Protocols seemed to describe actual Jewish
behavior. For example, an officer who doubted the
authenticity of the Protocols stated that "it is a fact that the
present activities of Lenin, Trotsky and other Bolsheviks in
Russia so correspond to the system as outlined herewith as
to lead one to believe that this is actually the basic plan
upon which the Bolshevik control functions" (pp. 64-65).
Nevertheless, there were examples among the officers of
"going too far" in suppositions of Jewish collusion,
including fantastic tales of international intrigue among
Zionist organizations, Lenin, Jewish media figures in the
U.S., Jewish infiltrators of the British Secret Service, etc.
(p. 136). This "going too far" in finding conspiratorial links
among different Jews is a fairly common theme of
anti-Semitism (see MacDonald 1998, ch. 1) but in no way
invalidates the strong factual basis of Jewish involvement
in Bolshevism and radical leftism generally.

Anti-Semitism: Bendersky touches on all of the themes of
anti-Semitism characteristic of the 20th century. Among the
most prominent is that Jews are interested only in what's

good for Jews and are only loyal to the countries they
reside in to the extent that Jewish interests coincide with
national policy (p. 37-38). In fact there is a great deal of
evidence that Jews have often been disloyal to the people
among whom they have lived, beginning in the ancient
world right up to the current fashionableness of dual loyalty
of American Jews to Israel. For example, during World
War I, the MID had information that Russian Jews favored
the Germans (p. 53) — hardly a surprise given their hatred
for the Czar. Indeed, Russian beliefs that Jewish subjects
favored Germany in the war effort resulted in eviction of
Jews from the zone of combat (Pipes 1990, 231).

Bendersky repeatedly implies that MID should not have
had U.S. interests at heart but Jewish interests. For
example, after the Bolshevik revolution, the U.S. saw
Poland as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. But from the
Jewish point of view, the Polish government was anti-
Jewish, and American Jewish leaders opposed recognizing
or giving assistance to the Polish regime until it guaranteed
minority rights. The MID was informed that Polish Jews
were sympathetic to the Bolsheviks, and this new issue was
mixed in with traditional Polish- Jewish animosity related to
Jewish separatism, clannishness, economic domination, and
disloyalty — all of which have a firm foundation in reality
(see MacDonald 1998, ch. 2). When the Soviet army was
expelled from Vilna in 1919, the Poles attacked Jews who
were accused of collaborating with the Soviets and
shooting at Polish soldiers. Jewish organizations rallied to
the defense of Polish Jews, while the U.S. tilted toward
Poland. The MID had reports, often from multiple sources,

that Jews welcomed Soviet troops with flowers or bands,
that Jews refused to fight in Polish armies, that Jewish
Bolshevik leaders engaged in "unspeakable barbarity," that
foreign Jews had stirred up anti-Polish propaganda in
Jewish-controlled newspapers by exaggerating the extent of
violence against Jews, etc. In fact, these allegations were
substantially true. Polish Jews did welcome the 1919 and
1939 Soviet invasions of Poland, because of perceptions of
Polish anti-Semitism combined with favorable opinions
about the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union — that in
fact Jews were an elite group in the USSR (Checinski 1982;
Schatz 1991).

Attitude of MID Officers toward Jews: Bendersky tries to
portray the officers as thinking of Jews as a lower race, but
his own data belie him. The officers thought Jews were
very good in business and disinclined to manual labor (p.
37). Jews were typically seen as very intelligent. In the
words of one officer, persecutions over millennia in
conjunction with the "desperate, pitiless struggle for
existence in occupations requiring sharpened mental
qualities ... [have] made the Jews the keenest race of
mankind and the best equipped for a successful struggle for
a 'spot in the sun' in our days of liberal laws and equal
opportunity for all" (p. 44). Intellectuals who lectured at the
Army War College had similar views. For example,
Lothrop Stoddard viewed "The Jewish mind [as]
instinctively analytical, and sharpened by the dialectic
subtleties of the Talmud." Despite such statements,
Bendersky, echoing the rhetoric of Jewish activist
organizations throughout the period, characterizes the 1924

immigration law as directed at "inferior racial types from
Southern and Eastern Europe" (p. 154).

Bendersky dismisses the officers' beliefs as resulting from
"xenophobic geopolitics, anticommunism, and racial
theories" (p. xiii), oftentimes using language that makes the
officers seem bizarre and paranoid: "insidious [Jewish]
political machinations" (p. 117), "diabolical I WW-
Bolshevik scheme" (p. 126), U.S. Army officers are
described as "racial sentinels" (p. 205); "officers
relentlessly pursued these surreptitious forces" (p. 129);
"paranoid intelligence" (p. 130); "obsession with radicalism
and alien forces" (p. 133); "dire predictions" of the
consequences of unrestricted immigration (p. 162); the
army's understanding of "the calamitous price of the
nation's neglecting the 'racial factor' in history" (p. 167); by
enacting the 1924 immigration law, "America had narrowly
escaped this disastrous fate [of race mixing]" (p. 181).

Officer Kenyon A. Joyce "described his work as a
necessary vigilant struggle against 'subversive' Russian
Communism" (p. 201). One wonders why the only word
directly quoted from Joyce is "subversive", as if his attitude
was weird. The activities of Communists in the U.S. were
indeed subversive, and they were indeed orchestrated from
Moscow. It is unconscionable that the attitudes of the
officers are ascribed simply to racist paranoia given the
findings of Klehr et al. 1995 showing that indeed the
CPUSA was directed by the Soviet Union and had a high
percentage of Jewish members, often above 40 percent.
And citing percentages of Jews fails to take account of the
personal characteristics of Jewish radicals as a talented,

educated and ambitious group. Leftist sympathies were
widespread in the American Jewish Congress ~ by far the
largest organization of American Jews during this period ~
and Communist-oriented groups were affiliated with the
Congress until being reluctantly purged during the
McCarthy era(Svonkin 1997, 132, 166).

Bendersky is thus one of a long line of U.S. intellectuals
who minimize the threat posed by the CPUSA, minimize
Jewish involvement in the CPUSA, and present a nostalgic
and exculpatory attitude toward the Jewish Old Left
generally. In this version there is never any mention of the
20,000,000 Soviet citizens killed by the actions of their
own government, no mention of the very large percentages
of Jews who sympathized with the Soviet Union at least
until after World War II, no mention of the intellectuals and
media figures who downplayed these atrocities or covered
them up completely. Nor is there any acknowledgement of
the reality of Soviet subversion of the U.S., if for no other
reason than that it successfully altered the military balance
after World War II.

Bendersky in several places accepts the accounts of Jewish
activist organizations' attempts to refute charges against
Jews. Two common moves were to argue that Jewish
radicals were apostates to Judaism and that most Jews were
not radicals. Bendersky makes no attempt to unravel the
subtleties of strong Jewish identification, albeit non-
religious, among the vast majority of Jewish radicals
(MacDonald 1998/2001). Nor is there any
acknowledgement that even though most Jews may not
have been radical in the period from 1920-1950, most

radicals were Jews (MacDonald 1998/2001; Novick 1999).
Nevertheless, it is at least doubtful that most Jews were not
sympathetic to radicalism. As noted, leftist sympathies
were widespread in the American Jewish Congress until the
1950s. MID also noted the well-known associations
between leftist radicalism and Zionism and that prominent
Jews (Louis Marshall, Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter)
supported Zionism. However, Bendersky does not
acknowledge the well-known connection between Zionism
and political radicalism among Jews during this period,
presumably because it attests to the intense Jewish
identification of the great majority of Jewish leftists.

The threat represented by Jews: Many officers "feared that
'true Americans' were losing control of something they
rightfully possessed by conquest, merit, heritage and even
divine providence" (p. 1). There was a tendency to see the
decline of their own ethnic group as tantamount to the
decline of civilization itself. Were they justified in these
attitudes? The view that conquerors control the territory
they conquer is hardly a novel idea, since this is exactly
what has happened from time immemorial — as applicable
to the invading Germanic tribes that overwhelmed the
Western Roman Empire at the end of antiquity as to the
establishment of Israel in modern times. One might argue
that the view that civilization itself depended on Northern
Europeans is not credible in light of what we now know
about the ability of other human groups to develop
advanced technology, art and literature. However, it was
certainly understandable that such an inference would be
made early in the 20th century when Northern European

colonial powers had divided up the rest of world among
themselves, when all of the scientific and technical
advances had been made by Northern Europeans, and when
there were huge differences in the economic and technical
development not only between Europe and the rest of the
world but also between Northern and Southern Europe and
between Eastern and Western Europe. Such assertions also
conform to the normal tendency among humans to glorify
their own group and denigrate outsiders. And, writing in
2001 when Europeans are slated to be a minority in the
United States within 50 years and when millions of non-
Europeans are living as minorities in European countries, it
certainly seems prescient that the officers' fears of "losing
control" have indeed come to fruition.

Part of this sense of losing control came from changes in
the media. It is remarkable that people like Lothrop
Stoddard and Charles Lindbergh wrote numerous articles
for the popular media, including Collier's, the Saturday
Evening Post and Reader's Digest between World War I
and World War II (p. 23). In 1920-1921, the Saturday
Evening Post ran a series of 19 articles on Eastern
European immigration emphasizing Jewish unassimilability
and the Jewish association with Bolshevism. At the time,
the Post was the most widely read magazine in the U.S.,
with a weekly readership of 2,000,000.

The tide against the world view of the officers turned with
the election of Roosevelt. " Jews served prominently in his
administration," (p. 244) including Felix Frankfurter who
had long been under scrutiny by MID as a "dangerous
Jewish radical" (p. 244). Jews had also won the intellectual

debate: "Nazi racial ideology was under attack in the press
as pseudo-science and fanatical bigotry." (p. 244) Jews also
had a powerful position in the media, including ownership
of several large, influential newspapers (New York Times,
New York Post, Washington Post, Philadelphia Inquirer,
Philadelphia Record and Pittsburgh Post- Gazette), radio
networks (CBS, the dominant radio network, and NBC,
headed by David Sarnoff), and all of the major Hollywood
movie studios (see MacDonald 1998/2001).

It is remarkable that the word 'Nordic' disappeared by the
1930s although the restrictionists still had racialist views of
Jews and themselves (p. 245). By 1938 eugenics was
"shunned in public discourse of the day." (p. 250) Whereas
such ideas were commonplace in the mainstream media in
the 1920s, General George van Horn Moseley's 1938 talk
on eugenics and its implications for immigration policy
caused a furor when it was reported in the newspapers.
Moseley was charged with anti-Semitism although he
denied referring to Jews in his talk. The incident blew over,
but "henceforth, the military determined to protect itself
against charges of anti-Semitism that might sully its
reputation or cause it political problems .... The army
projected itself as an institution that would tolerate neither
racism nor anti-Semitism" (p. 252-253).

Moseley himself continued to attack the New Deal, saying
it was manipulated by "the alien element in our midst" (p.
253) — obviously a coded reference to Jews. This time he
was severely reprimanded and the press wouldn't let it die.
By early 1939, Moseley, who had retired from the army,
became explicitly anti- Jewish, asserting that Jews wanted

the U.S. to enter the proposed war in Europe and that the
war would be waged for Jewish hegemony. He accused
Jews of controlling the media and having a deep influence
on the government. His anti-Semitism was crude: In 1939,
he testified before the House Un-American Activities
Committee on Jewish complicity in Communism and
praised the Germans for dealing with the Jews properly (p.
256). But his testimony was beyond the pale by this time.
As Bendersky notes, Moseley had only articulated the
common Darwinian world view of the earlier generation,
and he had asserted the common belief of an association of
Jews with Communism. These views remained common in
the army and elsewhere on the political right, but they were
simply not stated publicly. And if they were, heads rolled
and careers were ended.

The new climate can also be seen in the fact that Lothrop
Stoddard stopped referring to Jews completely in his
lectures to the Army War College in the late 1930s, but
continued to advocate eugenics and was sympathetic to
Nazism in the late 1930s because it took the race notion
seriously. By 1940, the tables had turned. Anti- Jewish
attitudes came to be seen as subversive by the government,
and the FBI alerted military intelligence that Lothrop
Stoddard should be investigated as a security risk in the
event of war (p. 280).

From Bendersky's perspective, these changes are due
largely to the triumph of science: "Not only was Stoddard's
racial science erroneous, it was — despite his assertions to
the contrary — out of step with the major trends in science
and scholarship" (p. 262). What Bendersky does not note is

that the " scientific" refutation of the ideas of Stoddard and
the other Darwinian theorists was entirely due to a political
campaign waged in academic social science departments by
Franz Boas and his students and sympathizers. The political
nature of this shift in intellectual stance and its linkage to
Jewish academic ethnic activists has long been apparent to
scholars. (Degler, 1991; Frank, 1997; MacDonald
1998/2001; Stocking 1968, 1989.)

The racialist, isolationist right viewed World War II as a
looming disaster. During the 1930s many officers admired
the accomplishments of Nazism but worried that U.S.
national interests would be sacrificed over concerns about
Nazi treatment of Jews. While disapproving Hitler's Jewish
policies, they often sympathized with Nazi attitudes toward
Jews, feeling that the typical complaints had some basis in
reality. They wanted to avoid a war with Germany as not in
American national interests, distrusted Roosevelt whom
they saw as wanting a war, and worried that Jews wanted a
war because of their hatred for Hitler and his anti- Jewish
policies. Officers often worried that Roosevelt was
influenced to be anti-German by his Jewish advisors,
Samuel I. Rosenman, Felix Frankfurter, and Henry
Morgenthau, Jr., and they worried that Jewish interests and
the British would push the U.S. into a war with Germany.
There was often a perception that Jewish-controlled media
emphasized Nazi anti- Jewish actions. William Langer, a
Harvard historian, stated in a lecture to the War College
that the rising dislike of Nazi Germany in the U.S. was due
to "Jewish influence."

You have to face the fact that some of our most

important American newspapers are Jewish-
controlled, and I suppose if I were a Jew I would feel
about Nazi Germany as most Jews feel and it would be
most inevitable that the coloring of the news takes on
that tinge. As I read the New York Times, for
example, it is perfectly clear that every little upset that
occurs (and after all many upsets occur in a country of
70 million people) is given a great deal of prominence.
The other part of it is soft-pedaled or put off with a
sneer. So that in a rather subtle way, the picture you
get is that there is no good in the Germans whatever"
(p. 273).

Although not an officer at that time, Charles Lindbergh was
the best-known example of someone with these fears.
Lindbergh's thinking was shaped not only at his horror at
the destructiveness of modern warfare — the idea that
World War II would be the suicide of European culture —
but also that it would lead to race suicide by entering, in
Lindbergh's words, into "a war in which the White race is
bound to lose." Lindbergh believed that whites should join
together to fend off the teeming legions of non- whites who
were the real long-term threat. He viewed the Soviet Union
as a white bulwark against the Chinese in the East and
believed that in a racial alliance based on "an English fleet,
a German air force, a French army, [and] an American
nation" (p. 276).

Lindbergh made his famous comment of September 11,
1941 that the influence of the Jews was one factor leading
the U.S. into war, but he also noted that, "No person with a
sense of dignity of mankind can condone the persecution of

the Jewish race in Germany" (p. 285). Nevertheless, despite
the truth of Lindbergh's comments and its temperate tone,
the speech was greeted with a torrent of abuse and hatred
unparalleled for a mainstream public figure in American
history. Overnight Lindbergh went from cultural hero to
moral pariah. Clearly by the late 1930s or early 1940s at the
latest, the tide had turned.

During World War II, anti-Jewish attitudes were common
in the officer corps, but "the political climate created by the
Roosevelt administration had forced them into silence,
particularly concerning Jews and Communists" (p. 301). It
became common on the American right to see the
Roosevelt administration as influenced greatly by
Frankfurter and Morgenthau, as infiltrated by Jews
sympathetic to the Soviet Union, and as adopting
needlessly harsh policies on the Germans such as strategic
bombing (p. 304). Henry Stimson, Secretary of War,
"accused Morganthau and Baruch of succumbing to racial
'impulses,' calling their behavior "semitism gone wild for
vengeance" (p. 313).

One indication of Jewish power at this time is that Jews
were able to exert intense pressure on Eisenhower because
of accommodations he made with the Vichy French and
with Arabs in Morocco in order to facilitate a landing in
North Africa. There was fear that lifting anti-Jewish
policies in Morocco would set off an Arab riot against
Jews. General George C. Patton, who had negative attitudes
toward Jews, wrote to Eisenhower: "Arabs don't mind
Christians, but they utterly despise Jews. The French fear
that the local Jews, knowing how high their side is riding in

the U.S., will try to take the lead here. If they do, the Arabs
will murder them and there will be a local state of
disorder." (p. 316)

Within the army, long-term thinkers believed in a need to
form an alliance with the Moslem world because of oil, and
they worried about "the Jew-Arab problem" even before the
end of World War II. In 1948, Secretary of State George C.
Marshall told Truman that his support for Israel disregarded
national interests in order to obtain votes in New York. It
was common among the officers to think of Israel as an
intensely nationalistic, fascist-like state with a veneer of
democracy. For example, during World War II a report
described Zionism as "contrary to the very principles for
which the Allies fought" (p. 321, noting the intense
collectivist tendencies of Zionism, the emphasis on the
Hebrew language and militarism: "the National Socialist
outlook of modern Zionism" (p. 322).

Officers commonly believed that there were many
anti-German Jews in the U.S. military government after
World War II who were bent on de-nazification and
revenge. "Feeling inhibited from speaking publicly by
alleged Jewish power, a number of officers, as well as some
government officials, complained incessantly in private that
Jewish 'refugees in American uniforms,' together with Jews
in the U.S. government, unduly affected American policy
toward Germany in a variety of detrimental ways." (p. 364)
Refugee officers (i.e., German Jews returning as members
of the U.S. military government) treated Germans brutally,
including sadistic beatings and starvation (p. 365). In
general, Jews advocated harsh treatment, the concept of

collective guilt, and trials for general staff officers. The
paradigm for this perspective was the Morgenthau plan
which called for destruction of Germany as an industrial
state and which, if implemented, would have resulted in
millions of deaths. Bendersky acknowledges that many
refugee Jews were in the occupation government and that
they were zealous denazifiers, but says only that "some
probably agreed with Morgenthau' s draconian idea of
punishing Germany and preventing its future resurgence"
(p. 366). The reputation of these refugee officers was so
bad that the Army ended up firing personnel who had
entered the U.S. after 1933.

And thus the saga ends. To be sure there were many
officers who retired with their beliefs intact, and some of
these, such as Moseley and Albert C. Wedemeyer, became
figures on the American right. In the 1970s, Wedemeyer
maintained that Zionists controlled Congress and that Jews
had huge political and economic power. He also blamed
Jews for U.S. entry into World War II. But it was the end of
an era. Bendersky, for all of his obvious hatred toward his
subjects, tells a compelling story, but, in the end, one just
has to believe the officers whose views he chronicles and
not their chronicler.

Kevin MacDonald is Professor of Psychology, California
State University ~ Long Beach, and the author of author of
a trilogy on Judaism as an evolutionary strategy: A People
that Shall Dwell Alone (1994), Separation and its
Discontents (1998), and The Culture of Critique (1998),
all published by Praeger 1 994- 1 998.

References

Checinski, M. Poland: Communism, Nationalism,
Anti-Semitism, trans, (in part) T. Szafar, New York.
Karz-Chol Publishing, 1982.

Cohn, W. "The politics of American Jews," In The Jews:
Social Patterns of an American Group, (ed.) M. Sklare.
Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958.

Courtois, S. "Introduction: The Crimes of Communism," In
Courtois, S., Werth, N., Pann |-_, J., Paczkowski, A.,
BartoK., & Margolin, J. The Black Book of
Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, trans. J. Murphy
& M. Kramer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1999.

Degler, C. In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and
Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Frank, G. "Jews, multiculturalism, and Boasian
anthropology," American Anthropologist 99:73 1-745,
1997.

Goldstein, J. The Politics of Ethnic Pressure: The
American Jewish Committee Fight against Immigration
Restriction, 1906-1917. New York: Garland Publishing,
1990.

Klehr, H. Communist Cadre: The Social Background of the
American Communist Party Elite, Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 1978.

MacDonald, K. B. Separation and Its Discontents: Toward

an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism, Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1998.

MacDonald, K. B. The Culture of Critique: An
Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in
Twentieth- Century Intellectual and Political Movements,
Westport, CT: Praeger. Revised Paperback edition, 2001,
Bloomington, IN: lstbooks Library, (1998/2001).

Novick, P. The Holocaust in American Life, Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1999.

Pipes, R. The Russian Revolution, New York: Knopf, 1990.

Stocking, G. W. Race, Evolution, and Culture: Essays in
the History of Anthropology, New York: Free Press, 1968.

Stocking, G. W. "The ethnographic sensibility of the 1920s
and the dualism of the anthropological tradition," History
of Anthropology 6:208-276. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1989.

Svonkin, S. Jews Against Prejudice: American Jews and
the Fight for Civil Liberties, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997.

Szajkowski, Z. "Paul Nathan, Lucien Wolf, Jacob H. Schiff
and the Jewish revolutionary movements in Eastern
Europe," Jewish Social Studies, 1967, 29(1):1-19.

Szajkowski, Z. Jews, Wars, and Communism: The Impact
of the 1919- 1920 Red Scare on American Jewish Life, New
York: KTAV Publishing, 1974.

Szajkowski, Z. Kolchak, Jews and the American

Intervention in Northern Russia and Siberia, 1918-1920,
Privately published, copyright by S. Frydman, 1977.