on the thing thought than the latter on the former. A
subject deprived of its object is deprived of its reality.
Something thinking in itself alone exists—in thought:
first, as its product and object, as a limiting idea -without
an imaginable subject; secondly, by anticipation, in the
definition of death, which can be replaced by its likeness
of the deep sleep, which is just as impenetrable ; and
lastly, in the affirmation of the doctrine concerning a
condition of absorption, resembling deep sleep, which
is by nature without consciousness and memory.
These are the loftiest peaks of the language of It. The
sublime strength of their disregard must be respected,
and in the very glance of respect recognised as what is,
at most, to be experienced, but not to be lived.
The Buddha, the " fulfilled " and the fulfiller, makes
no affirmation on this point. He refuses to assert that
unity exists or that it does not exist, that he who has
passed all the tests of absorption exists after death in
unity or that he does not exist in unity. This refusal, '
this " noble silence ", is explained in two ways: one,
theoretical, because fulfilment is beyond the categories
of thought and expression; and two, practical, because
disclosure of the existence of fulfilment does not estab-
lish a true life of salvation. Combination of the two
explanations indicates the truth that he who treats
what is as an object of assertion pulls it into division,
into the antithetics of the world of 7^ where there is no
life of salvation. " If, 0 monk, the opinion dominates
that soul and body are one in being, there is no life of
salvation; if, O monk, the opinion dominates that the
soul is one and the body another, then too there is no
life of salvation ". In the mystery that is observed as