I And Thou

Comparison of the religious with the philosophical
antinomy will make this clear* Kant may make the
philosophical conflict between necessity and freedom
into a relative matter by assigning the former to the
world of appearances and the latter to the world of
being, so that in their two settings they are no longer
really opposed, but rather reconciled—just as the
worlds for which they are valid are reconciled. But if I
consider necessity and freedom not in worlds of thought
but in the reality of my standing before God, if I know
that " I am given over for disposal" and know at the
same time that " It depends on myself", then I cannot
try to escape the paradox that has to be lived by
assigning the irreconcilable propositions to two separate
realms of validity; nor can I be helped to an ideal
reconciliation by any theological device: but I am
compelled to take both to myself, to be lived together,
and in being lived they are one.

An animal's eyes have the power to speak a great
language* Independently, without needing co-opera-
tion of Bounds and gestures, most forcibly when they
rely wholly on their glance, the eyes express the mystery
in its natural prison, the anxiety of becoming.
This condition of the mystery is known only by the
t animal, it alone can disclose it to us—and this con-
dition only lets itself be disclosed, not fully revealed.
The language in which it is uttered is what it says—
anxiety, the movement of the creature between the
realms of vegetable security and spiritual venture.
This language is the stammering of nature at the first
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