Introduction to the proposed Bill of Rights

Solonian Reprints

No. 3

Introduction to the proposed

Bill of Rights

by James Madison (1 789)

I will state my reasons why I think it
proper to propose amendments, and state
the amendments themselves, so far as I
think they ought to be proposed. If I
thought I could fulfil the duty which I owe to
myself and my constituents, to let the subject
pass over in silence, I most certainly should
not trespass upon the indulgence of this House.
But I cannot do this, and am therefore
compelled to beg a patient hearing to what I
have to lay before you. And I do most
sincerely believe, that if Congress will devote
but one day to this subject, so far as to satisfy
the public that we do not disregard their
wishes, it will have a salutary influence on the
public councils, and prepare the way for a
favorable reception of our future measures. It
appears to me that this House is bound by
every motive of prudence, not to let the first
session pass over without proposing to the
State Legislatures some things to be
incorporated into the constitution, that will
render it as acceptable to the whole people of
the United States, as it has been found
acceptable to a majority of them. I wish,
among other reasons why something should be
done, that those who have been friendly to the
adoption of this constitution may have the
opportunity of proving to those who were
opposed to it that they were as sincerely
devoted to liberty and a Republican
Government, as those who charged them with

wishing the adoption of this constitution in

order to lay the foundation of an aristocracy or
despotism. It will be a desirable thing to
extinguish from the bosom of every member of
the community, any apprehensions that there
are those among his countrymen who wish to
deprive them of the liberty for which they
valiantly fought and honorably bled. And if
there are amendments desired of such a nature
as will not injure the constitution, and they can
be ingrafted so as to give satisfaction to the
doubting part of our fellow-citizens, the friends
of the Federal Government will evince that
spirit of deference and concession for which
they have hitherto been distinguished.

It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen
in this House, that, notwithstanding the
ratification of this system of Government by
eleven of the thirteen United States, in some
cases unanimously, in others by large
majorities; yet still there is a great number of
our constituents who are dissatisfied with it;
among whom are many respectable for their
talents and patriotism, and respectable for the
jealousy they have for their liberty, which,
though mistaken in its object, is laudable in its
motive. There is a great body of the people
falling under this description, who at present
feel much inclined to join their support to the
cause of Federalism, if they were satisfied on

this one point. We ought not to disregard their

inclination, but, on principles of amity and
moderation, conform to their wishes, and
expressly declare the great rights of mankind
secured under this constitution. The
acquiescence which our fellow-citizens show
under the Government, calls upon us for a like
return of moderation. But perhaps there is a
stronger motive than this for our going into a
consideration of the subject. It is to provide
those securities for liberty which are required
by a part of the community; I allude in a
particular manner to those two States that have
not thought fit to throw themselves into the
bosom of the Confederacy. It is a desirable
thing, on our part as well as theirs, that a re-
union should take place as soon as possible. I
have no doubt, if we proceed to take those
steps which would be prudent and requisite at
this juncture, that in a short time we should see
that disposition prevailing in those States
which have not come in, that we have seen
prevailing in those States which have
embraced the constitution.

But I will candidly acknowledge, that,
over and above all these considerations, I do
conceive that the constitution may be
amended; that is to say, if all power is subject
to abuse, that then it is possible the abuse of
the powers of the General Government may be
guarded against in a more secure manner than
is now done, while no one advantage arising
from the exercise of that power shall be
damaged or endangered by it. We have in this
way something to gain, and, if we proceed
with caution, nothing to lose. And in this case
it is necessary to proceed with caution; for
while we feel all these inducements to go into
a revisal of the constitution, we must feel for
the constitution itself, and make that revisal a
moderate one. I should be unwilling to see a
door opened for a reconsideration of the whole
structure of the Government — for a re-
consideration of the principles and the
substance of the powers given; because I
doubt, if such a door were opened, we should
be very likely to stop at that point which would
be safe to the Government itself. But I do wish
to see a door opened to consider, so far as to

incorporate those provisions for the security of
rights, against which I believe no serious
objection has been made by any class of our
constituents: such as would be likely to meet
with the concurrence of two-thirds of both
Houses, and the approbation of three-fourths of
the State Legislatures. I will not propose a
single alteration which I do not wish to see
take place, as intrinsically proper in itself, or
proper because it is wished for by a respectable
number of my fellow-citizens; and therefore I
shall not propose a single alteration but is
likely to meet the concurrence required by the
constitution. There have been objections of
various kinds made against the constitution.
Some were levelled against its structure
because the President was without a council;
because the Senate, which is a legislative body,
had judicial powers in trials on impeachments;
and because the powers of that body were
compounded in other respects, in a manner that
did not correspond with a particular theory;
because it grants more power than is supposed
to be necessary for every good purpose, and
controls the ordinary powers of the State
Governments. I know some respectable
characters who opposed this Government on
these grounds; but I believe that the great mass
of the people who opposed it, disliked it
because it did not contain effectual provisions
against encroachments on particular rights, and
those safeguards which they have been long
accustomed to have interposed between them
and the magistrate who exercises the sovereign
power; nor ought we to consider them safe,
while a great number of our fellow-citizens
think these securities necessary.

It is a fortunate thing that the objection
to the Government has been made on the
ground I stated; because it will be practicable,
on that ground, to obviate the objection, so far
as to satisfy the public mind that their liberties
will be perpetual, and this without endangering
any part of the constitution, which is
considered as essential to the existence of the
Government by those who promoted its
adoption.

The amendments which have occurred

to me proper to be recommended by Congress
to the State Legislatures, are these:

First. That there be prefixed to the
constitution a declaration, that all power is
originally vested in, and consequently derived
from, the people.

That Government is instituted and
ought to be exercised for the benefit of the
people; which consists in the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right of acquiring and
using property, and generally of pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety.

That the people have an indubitable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or
change their Government, whenever it be
found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of
its institution.

Secondly. That in article 1st, section

2, clause 3, these words be struck out, to wit:
"The number of Representatives shall not
exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each
State shall have at least one Representative,
and until such enumeration shall be made;"
and that in place thereof be inserted these
words, to wit: "After the first actual
enumeration, there shall be one Representative
for every thirty thousand, until the number

amounts to , after which the proportion

shall be so regulated by Congress, that the

number shall never be less than , nor more

than , but each State shall, after the first

enumeration, have at least two
Representatives; and prior thereto."

Thirdly. That in article 1 st, section 6,
clause 1 , there be added to the end of the first
sentence, these words, to wit: "But no law
varying the compensation last ascertained shall
operate before the next ensuing election of
Representatives. "

Fourthly. That in article 1st, section 9,
between clauses 3 and 4, be inserted these
clauses, to wit: The civil rights of none shall be

abridged on account of religious belief or
worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights
of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed.

The people shall not be deprived or
abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to
publish their sentiments; and the freedom of
the press, as one of the great bulwarks of
liberty, shall be inviolable.

The people shall not be restrained
from peaceably assembling and consulting for
their common good; nor from applying to the
Legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for
redress of their grievances.

The right of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed
and well regulated militia being the best
security of a free country; but no person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be
compelled to render military service in person.

No soldier shall in time of peace be
quartered in any house without the consent of
the owner; nor at any time, but in a manner
warranted by law.

No person shall be subject, except in
cases of impeachment, to more than one
punishment or one trial for the same offence;
nor shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor be
obliged to relinquish his property, where it
may be necessary for public use, without a just
compensation.

Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.

The rights of the people to be secured
in their persons; their houses, their papers, and
their other property, from all unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated by
warrants issued without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, or not
particularly describing the places to be
searched, or the persons or things to be seized.

In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the cause and
nature of the accusation, to be confronted with
his accusers, and the witnesses against him; to
have a compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor; and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence.

The exceptions here or elsewhere in
the constitution, made in favor of particular
rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish
the just importance of other rights retained by
the people, or as to enlarge the powers
delegated by the constitution; but either as
actual limitations of such powers, or as
inserted merely for greater caution.

Fifthly. That in article 1st, section 10,
between clauses 1 and 2, be inserted this
clause, to wit:

No State shall violate the equal rights
of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or
the trial by jury in criminal cases.

Sixthly. That, in article 3d, section 2,
be annexed to the end of clause 2d, these
words, to wit:

But no appeal to such court shall be
allowed where the value in controversy shall

not amount to dollars: nor shall any fact

triable by jury, according to the course of
common law, be otherwise re-examinable than
may consist with the principles of common
law.

Seventhly. That in article 3d, section
2, the third clause be struck out, and in its
place be inserted the clauses following, to wit:

The trial of all crimes (except in cases
of impeachments, and cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or the militia when on actual
service, in time of war or public danger) shall
be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the
vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for
conviction, of the right of challenge, and other
accustomed requisites; and in all crimes
punishable with loss of life or member,
presentment or indictment by a grand jury shall
be an essential preliminary, provided that in
cases of crimes committed within any county
which may be in possession of an enemy, or in
which a general insurrection may prevail, the
trial may by law be authorized in some other
county of the same State, as near as may be to
the seat of the offence.

In cases of crimes committed not
within any county, the trial may by law be in
such county as the laws shall have prescribed.
In suits at common law, between man and
man, the trial by jury, as one of the best
securities to the rights of the people, ought to
remain inviolate.

Eighthly. That immediately after
article 6th, be inserted, as article 7th, the
clauses following, to wit:

The powers delegated by this
constitution are appropriated to the
departments to which they are respectively
distributed: so that the legislative department
shall never exercise the powers vested in the
executive or judicial nor the executive exercise
the powers vested in the legislative or judicial,
nor the judicial exercise the powers vested in
the legislative or executive departments.

The powers not delegated by this
constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively.

Ninthly. That article 7th be numbered
as article 8th.

The first of these amendments relates
to what may be called a bill of rights. I will
own that I never considered this provision so
essential to the federal constitution, as to make
it improper to ratify it, until such an
amendment was added; at the same time, I
always conceived, that in a certain form, and to
a certain extent, such a provision was neither
improper nor altogether useless. I am aware,
that a great number of the most respectable
friends to the Government, and champions for
republican liberty, have thought such a
provision, not only unnecessary, but even
improper; nay, I believe some have gone so far
as to think it even dangerous. Some policy has
been made use of, perhaps, by gentlemen on
both sides of the question: I acknowledge the
ingenuity of those arguments which were
drawn against the constitution, by a
comparison with the policy of Great Britain, in
establishing a declaration of rights; but there is
too great a difference in the case to warrant the
comparison: therefore, the arguments drawn
from that source were in a great measure
inapplicable. In the declaration of rights which
that country has established, the truth is, they
have gone no farther than to raise a barrier
against the power of the Crown; the power of
the Legislature is left altogether indefinite.
Although I know whenever the great rights, the
trial by jury, freedom of the press, or liberty of
conscience, come in question in that body, the
invasion of them is resisted by able advocates,
yet their Magna Charta does not contain any
one provision for the security of those rights,
respecting which the people of America are
most alarmed. The fi^eedom of the press and
rights of conscience, those choicest privileges
of the people, are unguarded in the British
constitution.

But although the case may be widely
different, and it may not be thought necessary
to provide limits for the legislative power in
that country, yet a different opinion prevails in
the United States. The people of many States
have thought it necessary to raise barriers
against power in all forms and departments of
Government, and I am inclined to believe, if
once bills of rights are established in all the

States as well as the federal constitution, we
shall find that although some of them are
rather unimportant, yet, upon the whole, they
will have a salutary tendency.

It may be said, in some instances, they
do no more than state the perfect equality of
mankind. This, to be sure, is an absolute truth,
yet it is not absolutely necessary to be inserted
at the head of a constitution.

In some instances they assert those
rights which are exercised by the people in
forming and establishing a plan of
Government. In other instances, they specify
those rights which are retained when particular
powers are given up to be exercised by the
Legislature. In other instances, they specify
positive rights, which may seem to result fi-om
the nature of the compact. Trial by jury cannot
be considered as a natural right, but a right
resulting from a social compact which
regulates the action of the community, but is as
essential to secure the liberty of the people as
any one of the pre-existent rights of nature. In
other instances, they lay down dogmatic
maxims with respect to the construction of the
Government; declaring that the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches shall be kept
separate and distinct. Perhaps the best way of
securing this in practice is, to provide such
checks as will prevent the encroachment of the
one upon the other.

But whatever may be the form which
the several States have adopted in making
declarations in favor of particular rights, the
great object in view is to limit and qualify the
powers of Government, by excepting out of the
grant of power those cases in which the
Government ought not to act, or to act only in
a particular mode. They point these exceptions
sometimes against the abuse of the executive
power, sometimes against the legislative, and,
in some cases, against the community itself; or,
in other words, against the majority in favor of
the minority.

In our Government it is, perhaps, less

necessary to guard against the abuse in the
executive department than any other; because
it is not the stronger branch of the system, but
the weaker. It therefore must be levelled
against the legislative, for it is the most
powerful, and most likely to be abused,
because it is under the least control. Hence, so
far as a declaration of rights can tend to
prevent the exercise of undue power, it cannot
be doubted but such declaration is proper. But
I confess that I do conceive, that in a
Government modified like this of the United
States, the great danger lies rather in the abuse
of the community than in the legislative body.
The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to
be levelled against that quarter where the
greatest danger lies, namely, that which
possesses the highest prerogative of power.
But this is not found in either the executive or
legislative departments of Government, but in
the body of the people, operating by the
majority against the minority.

It may be thought that all paper
barriers against the power of the community
are too weak to be worthy of attention. I am
sensible they are not so strong as to satisfy
gentlemen of every description who have seen
and examined thoroughly the texture of such a
defence; yet, as they have a tendency to
impress some degree of respect for them, to
establish the public opinion in their favor, and
rouse the attention of the whole community, it
may be one means to control the majority from
those acts to which they might be otherwise
inclined.

It has been said, by way of objection to
a bill of rights, by many respectable gentlemen
out of doors, and I find opposition on the same
principles likely to be made by gentlemen on
this floor, that they are unnecessary articles of
a Republican Government, upon the
presumption that the people have those rights
in their own hands, and that is the proper place
for them to rest. It would be a sufficient
answer to say, that this objection lies against
such provisions under the State Governments,
as well as under the General Government; and
there are, I believe, but few gentlemen who are

inclined to push their theory so far as to say

that a declaration of rights in those cases is
either ineffectual or improper. It has been said,
that in the Federal Government they are
unnecessary, because the powers are
enumerated, and it follows, that all that are not
granted by the constitution are retained; that
the constitution is a bill of powers, the great
residuum being the rights of the people; and,
therefore, a bill of rights cannot be so
necessary as if the residuum was thrown into
the hands of the Government. I admit that
these arguments are not entirely without
foundation; but they are not conclusive to the
extent which has been supposed. It is true, the
powers of the General Government are
circumscribed, they are directed to particular
objects; but even if Government keeps within
those limits, it has certain discretionary powers
with respect to the means, which may admit of
abuse to a certain extent, in the same manner
as the powers of the State Governments under
their constitutions may to an indefinite extent;
because in the constitution of the United
States, there is a clause granting to Congress
the power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into
execution all the powers vested in the
Government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof; this enables
them to fulfil every purpose for which the
Government was established. Now, may not
laws be considered necessary and proper by
Congress, for it is for them to judge of the
necessity and propriety to accomplish those
special purposes which they may have in
contemplation, which laws in themselves are
neither necessary nor proper; as well as
improper laws could be enacted by the State
Legislatures, for fulfilling the more extended
objects of those Governments. I will state an
instance, which I think in point, and proves
that this might be the case. The General
Government has a right to pass all laws which
shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the
means for enforcing the collection are within
the direction of the Legislature: may not
general warrants be considered necessary for
this purpose, as well as for some purposes
which it was supposed at the framing of their
constitutions the State Governments had in

view? If there was reason for restraining the
State Governments from exercising this power,
there is like reason for restraining the Federal
Government.

It may be said, indeed it has been said,
that a bill of rights is not necessary, because
the establishment of this Government has not
repealed those declarations of rights which are
added to the several State constitutions; that
those rights of the people, which had been
established by the most solemn act, could not
be annihilated by a subsequent act of that
people, who meant, and declared at the head of
the instrument, that they ordained and
established a new system, for the express
purpose of securing to themselves and
posterity the liberties they had gained by an
arduous conflict.

I admit the force of this observation,
but I do not look upon it to be conclusive. In
the first place, it is too uncertain ground to
leave this provision upon, if a provision is at
all necessary to secure rights so important as
many of those I have mentioned are conceived
to be, by the public in general, as well as those
in particular who opposed the adoption of this
constitution. Besides, some States have no
bills of rights, there are others provided with
very defective ones, and there are others whose
bills of rights are not only defective, but
absolutely improper; instead of securing some
in the full extent which republican principles
would require, they limit them too much to
agree with the common ideas of liberty.

It has been objected also against a bill
of rights, that, by enumerating particular
exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed
in that enumeration; and it might follow, by
implication, that those rights which were not
singled out, were intended to be assigned into
the hands of the General Government, and
were consequently insecure. This is one of the
most plausible arguments I have ever heard
urged against the admission of a bill of rights
into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be

guarded against. I have attempted it, as
gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause
of the fourth resolution.

It has been said, that it is unnecessary
to load the constitution with this provision,
because it was not found effectual in the
constitution of the particular States. It is true,
there are a few particular States in which some
of the most valuable articles have not, at one
time or other, been violated; but it does not
follow but they may have, to a certain degree,
a salutary effect against the abuse of power. If
they are incorporated into the constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians
of those rights; they will be an impenetrable
bulwark against every assumption of power in
the legislative or executive; they will be
naturally led to resist every encroachment
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the
constitution by the declaration of rights.
Besides this security, there is a great
probability that such a declaration in the
federal system would be enforced; because the
State Legislatures will jealously and closely
watch the operations of this Government, and
be able to resist with more effect every
assumption of power, than any other power on
earth can do; and the greatest opponents to a
Federal Government admit the State
Legislatures to be sure guardians of the
people's liberty. I conclude, from this view of
the subject, that it will be proper in itself, and
highly politic, for the tranquillity of the public
mind, and the stability of the Government, that
we should offer something, in the form I have
proposed, to be incorporated in the system of
Government, as a declaration of the rights of
the people.

In the next place, I wish to see that part
of the constitution revised which declares that
the number of Representatives shall not exceed
the proportion of one for every thirty thousand
persons, and allows one Representative to
every State which rates below that proportion.
If we attend to the discussion of this subject,
which has taken place in the State conventions,
and even in the opinion of the friends to the

constitution, an alteration here is proper. It is

the sense of the people of America, that the
number of Representatives ought to be
increased, but particularly that it should not be
left in the discretion of the Government to
diminish them, below that proportion which
certainly is in the power of the Legislature as
the constitution now stands; and they may, as
the population of the country increases,
increase the House of Representatives to a very
unweildy [sic] degree. I confess I always
thought this part of the constitution defective,
though not dangerous; and that it ought to be
particularly attended to whenever Congress
should go into the consideration of
amendments.

There are several minor cases
enumerated in my proposition, in which I wish
also to see some alteration take place. That
article which leaves it in the power of the
Legislature to ascertain its own emolument, is
one to which I allude. I do not believe this is a
power which, in the ordinary course of
Government, is likely to be abused. Perhaps of
all the powers granted, it is least likely to
abuse; but there is a seeming impropriety in
leaving any set of men without control to put
their hand into the public coffers, to take out
money to put in their pockets; there is a
seeming indecorum in such power, which leads
me to propose a change. We have a guide to
this alteration in several of the amendments
which the different conventions have
proposed. I have gone, therefore, so far as to
fix it, that no law, varying the compensation,
shall operate until there is a change in the
Legislature; in which case it cannot be for the
particular benefit of those who are concerned
in determining the value of the service.

I wish also, in revising the constitution,
we may throw into that section, which
interdicts the abuse of certain powers in the
State Legislatures, some other provisions of
equal, if not greater importance than those
already made. The words, "No State shall pass
any bill of attainder, ex post facto law," &c.
were wise and proper restrictions in the
constitution. I think there is more danger of

those powers being abused by the State
Governments than by the Government of the
United States. The same may be said of other
powers which they possess, if not controlled
by the general principle, that laws are
unconstitutional which infringe the rights of
the community. I should therefore wish to
extend this interdiction, and add, as I have
stated in the 5th resolution, that no State shall
violate the equal right of conscience, freedom
of the press, or trial by jury in criminal cases;
because it is proper that every Government
should be disarmed of powers which trench
upon those particular rights. I know, in some
of the State constitutions, the power of the
Government is controlled by such a
declaration; but others are not. I cannot see
any reason against obtaining even a double
security on those points; and nothing can give
a more sincere proof of the attachment of those
who opposed this constitution to these great
and important rights, than to see them join in
obtaining the security I have now proposed;
because it must be admitted, on all hands, that
the State Governments are as liable to attack
the invaluable privileges as the General
Government is, and therefore ought to be as
cautiously guarded against.

I think it will be proper, with respect to
the judiciary powers, to satisfy the public mind
on those points which I have mentioned. Great
inconvenience has been apprehended to suitors
from the distance they would be dragged to
obtain justice in the Supreme Court of the
United States, upon an appeal on an action for
a small debt. To remedy this, declare that no
appeal shall be made unless the matter in
controversy amounts to a particular sum; this,
with the regulations respecting jury trials in
criminal cases, and suits at common law, it is
to be hoped, will quiet and reconcile the minds
of the people to that part of the constitution.

I find, fi-om looking into the
amendments proposed by the State
conventions, that several are particularly
anxious that it should be declared in the
constitution, that the powers not therein
delegated should be reserved to the several

States. Perhaps words which may define this
more precisely than the whole of the
instrument now does, may be considered as
superfluous. I admit they may be deemed
unnecessary; but there can be no harm in
making such a declaration, if gentlemen will
allow that the fact is as stated. I am sure I
understand it so, and do therefore propose it.

These are the points on which I wish
to see a revision of the constitution take place.
How far they will accord with the sense of this
body, I cannot take upon me absolutely to
determine; but I believe every gentleman will
readily admit that nothing is in contemplation,
so far as I have mentioned, that can endanger
the beauty of the Government in any one
important feature, even in the eyes of its most
sanguine admirers. I have proposed nothing
that does not appear to me as proper in itself,
or eligible as patronized by a respectable
number of our fellow-citizens; and if we can
make the constitution better in the opinion of
those who are opposed to it, without
weakening its frame, or abridging its
usefulness, in the judgment of those who are
attached to it, we act the part of wise and

liberal men to make such alterations as shall
produce that effect.

Having done what I conceived was my
duty, in bringing before this House the subject
of amendments, and also stated such as I wish
for and approve, and offered the reasons which
occurred to me in their support, I shall content
myself, for the present, with moving "that a
committee be appointed to consider of and
report such amendments as ought to be
proposed by Congress to the Legislatures of
the States, to become, if ratified by three-
fourths thereof, part of the constitution of the
United States." By agreeing to this motion, the
subject may be going on in the committee,
while other important business is proceeding to
a conclusion in the House. I should advocate
greater despatch in the business of
amendments, if I were not convinced of the
absolute necessity there is of pursuing the
organization of the Government; because I
think we should obtain the confidence of our
fellow-citizens, in proportion as we fortify the
rights of the people against the encroachments
of the Government.

Source

Madison, James (1789) Annals of Congress. House of Representatives, 1" Congress, 1" Session, June 8, 1789. In:
History of The Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives of the United States at the First Session
of the First Congress, begun at the city of New York, March 4, 1789, pp. 448-459.

vetted by Casey Bowman
www.solonian.com

Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0
Madison text is public domain.