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Full text of "Memorizable Public-Key Cryptography (MePKC) & Its Applications (version 3.0)"

MEMORIZABLE PUBLIC-KEY 
CRYPTOGRAPHY (MePKC) & ITS 
APPLICATIONS 
Third draft (version 3.0) 



LEE KOK WAH 



DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
MULTIMEDIA UNIVERSITY 
APRIL 2011 



MEMORIZABLE PUBLIC-KEY 
CRYPTOGRAPHY (MePKC) & ITS 
APPLICATIONS 



BY 

LEE KOK WAH 

B. Eng. (Hons.) (Electrical Eng.), University of Malaya, Malaysia 

M.Eng.Sc. (Computer Communications), Multimedia University, 

Malaysia 



THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 

(by Research) 
at the 

Faculty of Engineering & Technology 



MULTIMEDIA UNIVERSITY 
MALAYSIA 

April 2011 



Copyright License of This Open-Source Book 



The copyright of this thesis, i.e. print edition, electronic edition, 
etc., as a remix and derivative from an online publication (14 Mar. 2009) 
at a website [i.e. http://www.archive.com/details/MemorizablePublic- 
keyCryptographymepkcItsApplications] for public peer review (Lee, 
2009a), belongs to the author under the terms of the Copyright Act 1987 
in Malaysia and international treaties, as qualified by Regulation 4(1) of 
the Multimedia University (MMU) Intellectual Property Regulations. So 
far for this Regulation 4(1), there exists only one mutual agreement 
between the author and MMU about the patent right of anti-hacking data 
storage using improved DIP switch in Malaysia. 

The author, hereby, grants the reader an open-source copyright 
license, which is revocable, perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, non- 
transferable and royalty-free, needs attribution to the originality of 
resources, charges free, non-commercial, and no derivatives. This license 
type is alike the current common license of IEEE articles, which is for 
personal use and no derivatives. For commercial and other usages, please 
get a written permission from the author. To know more on the attributes 
of this open-source copyright license, please refer to an article by 
Engelfriet (2010). 

© Lee Kok Wah, 30 April 201 1 
All rights reserved. 



ii 



DECLARATION 



I hereby declare that the novel works have been done by myself and no portion of the 
work contained in this thesis has been submitted in support of any application for any 
other normal doctorate degree (i.e. Ph.D.) or qualification at this or any other 
university or institute of learning. 



LEE Kok Wah 



iii 



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 



I hereby would like to express my gratitude to the following persons together 
with their inputs that have been given me in completing the electronic book of this 
PhD research project, which has contributed mainly in the novel knowledge field of 
key /password security leading to the memorizable public-key cryptography 
(MePKC) and its applications. Here are the listees: 

(i) My parents, relatives and friends together with those anonymous people 

- For help and giving me the physical, emotional and spiritual supports. 

(ii) The nine investors, Malaysia 

- For a total financial investment at about MYR$20,000 on the patent rights 
of DIP switch. 

(iii) Lake-Tee Khaw, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 

- For giving the advantages and disadvantages of SD (Statutory Declaration). 

(iv) Gita Radhakrishna, Multimedia University (MMU), Melaka, Malaysia 

- For supplying the legal contents about copyright. 

(v) Alan Wee-Chiat Tan, Multimedia University, Melaka, Malaysia 

- For supplying C++ class of big number arithmetic after my given idea; and 

- For being a nominal PhD supervisor since 16 August 2008 till 14 April 
2009 and from 08 February 2010 till 20 March 2011. 

(vi) Voon-Chet Koo, Multimedia University, Melaka, Malaysia 

- For prototyping the RJ45 switch using conventional DIP switch on PCB. 

(vii) Hong-Tat Ewe, Multimedia University, Cyberjaya, Malaysia 

- For being a nominal PhD supervisor since 27 May 2004 till 15 August 
2008; and 

- For having lots of unpleasant and trust-less interactions. 

(viii) Matt Bishop, University of California at Davis, CA, USA 

- For supplying a proceedings paper. 

(ix) Alex X. Liu, Michigan State University, MI, USA 

- For supplying a journal paper. 

(x) Chee-Onn Chow, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 



iv 



- For supplying a journal paper. 

(xi) Ching-Weng Hong, Multimedia University, Melaka, Malaysia 

- For conducting an experiment to look for the bounds of key strengthening. 

(xii) Those three external thesis examiners 

- For their criticisms to improve further the format and contents of this thesis. 

(xiii) Vishnuvajjula Charan Prasad (Prof.), Multimedia University, Melaka, Malaysia 

- For assisting to finalize the thesis format acceptable by MMU. 

- For being a PhD supervisor since 21 March 2011 till 27 May 2011 or later. 



V 



DEDICATION 



特将这 本 博士 级 研究 论 文献 给于我 敬 爱的父 亲李厚 芳和母 亲徐亚 妹。 



This normal doctorate thesis is dedicated to my respected and beloved parents, 
Hew-Fong Lee and Ah-Mooi Choi. 



H-( A _ A )-H 

Find me Xpree or XpreeLi in the Internet! 



AAA Mottoes AAA 
Chinese: 语言与 文字 是 了解 一 个 文化的 终极 密铜。 
Japanese: 言語 (げ ん ご) と 文字 (も じ) は 文化 (ぶ んか) のか ぎ です。 
English: Language and Writing are the ultimate keys to understand a culture. 
Malay: Bahasa dan Tulisan adalah kunci-kunci terdasar untuk memahami satu ketamadunan. 



0— * 



vi 



ABSTRACT 



This normal doctorate (i.e. Ph.D. degree in engineering) thesis proposes four 
main novel knowledge contribution components in the knowledge field of 
information security generally, and key management particularly. Kok-Wah Lee the 
author aims to realize the MePKC (Memorizable Public-Key Cryptography) by using 
fully mnemonic private key. 

The prior arts of private key storage since year 1976 are encrypted private 
key, split private key, and roaming private key. Memorizability of secret key at a 
practical maximum key size at 100 bits has been an obstacle or open hard problem 
for about 30 years. A following problem is how to support a great number of needed 
passwords for important offline and online accounts. 

Firstly, the author proposes 2D (Two-Dimensional) key input method and 
system to create high-entropy secret key. 2D key is in a 2D space to exceed the limits 
of single-line password field, due to its graphical nature to have mnemonic for easy 
memorizability, big key size till 256 bits, and high randomness to resist guessing 
attack and dictionary attack. Possible key styles of 2D key include multiline 
passphrase, crossword, ASCII art I Unicode art, colourful text, and sensitive input 
sequence. 

Secondly, multihash key is proposed to have one master key from 2D key to 
generate multiple slave keys using key strengthening, hash truncation, and optional 
identity name (ID) or domain name (URL) for both the offline and online accounts. 
Those slave keys can fulfil the technical and legal demands of various cryptographic 
schemes to have different symmetric keys and asymmetric key pairs. 

Thirdly, MePKC is proposed by using ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) to 
use 2D key directly or indirectly via multihash key till 256-bit MePKC. Both 192-bit 
encryption scheme and signature scheme have been tested. 

Lastly, anti -hacking data storage using improved DIP (Dual In-Line Package) 
switch is proposed to securely store original plaintext and decrypted ciphertext from 
virtual hacking over the computer communication network. 



vii 




000 



Figure 0.1a Multiline passphrase 



111111 
111111 
— 11 — — 
—— 11 —— 
—— 11 —— 
111111 
111111 



^이 



002 



Figure 0.1c ASCII art 



HAPPY* 
0*R*K* 
M*INCH 
E*D*U* 
SPELLS 



ᄉ\끼 



001 



figure 0.1b Crossword 



¥¥¥¥¥ 
©©¥©© 
©©¥©© 
©©¥©© 
¥¥¥¥¥ 



003 



Figure O.ld Unicode art 



Figure 0.1 Two-dimensional (2D) key 



Keywords: Key/password security, key management, Dig secret(s) creation methods, 
2D key, multihash key, memorizable public-key cryptography (MePKC), anti- 
hacking data storage. 



Vlll 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



COPYRIGHT PAGE ii 

DECLARATION iii 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iv 

DEDICATION vi 

ABSTRACT vii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS ix 

LIST OF TABLES xiii 

LIST OF FIGURES xiv 

PREFACE XV 

CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW 1 

1.1 Introduction 1 

1.2 Motivation 1 

1.3 Research Aims 3 

1.4 Research Methodology 4 

1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 4 

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW (PART 1): CONTEMPORARY 

MEMORIZABLE SECRET 7 

2.1 Required Protection Periods and Their Key Sizes 7 

2.2 Review of the Secret for Symmetric Key Cryptosystem 10 
2.2.1 Related Work: Single-Line Key/Password Field 12 

2.3 Review of the Secret for Asymmetric Key Cryptosystem 12 

2.4 Potential Methods to Create Big and Yet Memorizable Secret 14 

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW (PART 2): CREATING BIG 

MEMORIZABLE SECRETS 17 

3.1 Passphrase Generation Methods 17 

3.1.1 Acronym 17 

3.1.2 Full Sentence 18 



ix 



3.1.3 Diceware 18 

3.1.4 Coinware 19 

3.2 Other Matters about Creating Password 20 

3.2.1 Environ Password 20 

3.2.2 Password in Unicode Encoding 20 

3.3 Related Work of 2D Key: Single-Line Key/Password Field 21 

3.4 Key Strengthening 22 

3.5 Memorizable Secret as a Master Key 23 

3.5.1 Introduction 23 

3.5.2 Related Works 26 

3.6 Related Works of MePKC: Storages of Private Key 29 

3.7 Related Prior Arts of Tools to Resist Hacking 30 

3.8 Conclusion 31 

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (PART 1): CREATING BIG 

MEMORIZABLE SECRET USING TWO-DIMENSIONAL (2D) KEY 32 

4.1 Introduction 32 

4.2 2D Key Input Method 34 

4.3 Styles of 2D Key: Multiline Passphrase 37 

4.4 Styles of 2D Key: Crossword 37 

4.5 Styles of 2D Key: ASCII Art I Unicode Art 37 

4.6 Styles of 2D Key: Colourful Text 39 

4.7 Styles of 2D Key: Sensitive Input Sequence 39 

4.8 Requirement of Key Size for 2D Key 39 

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (PART 2): 

画 LTIHASH KEY 41 

5.1 Overview 41 

5.2 Introduction 41 

5.3 Basic Model of Multihash Key 42 

5.4 Acceptable Time Bounds of Multihash Key 47 

CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (PART 3): APPLICATIONS 

OF BIG MEMORIZABLE SECRET & MePKC 48 

6.1 Methods and Systems to Create Big Memorizable Secret 48 

6.2 Potential Applications of Available Big Memorizable Secret 48 

6.3 Main Applications for Symmetric and Asymmetric Key Cryptosystems 50 

6.4 Prototyped Applications of Created Big Memorizable Secret(s) 5 1 

6.5 Memorizable Symmetric Key to Resist Quantum Computer Attack 52 

6.6 Memorizable Public-Key Cryptography (MePKC) 53 

6.6.1 The Proposed MePKC Applications 6.4(ii)-(iii) 53 

6.6.2 Selection of ECC Curve to Prototype MePKC Schemes 56 



X 



6.6.3 Encryption Scheme of MePKC 57 

6.6.4 Signature Scheme of MePKC 59 
6.7 Other Cryptographic, Information-Hiding, and Non-Cryptographic 

Applications of Secret beyond 128 bits 60 

CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (PART 4): ANTI HACKING 

DATA STORAGE USING IMPROVED DIP SWITCH 62 

7.1 Overview 62 

7.2 Introduction 62 

7.3 Proposing Improved DIP Switch 64 

7.4 Method and Device to Secure Anti-Hacking Data Storage 66 

7.5 Other Forms of Innovation 67 

CHAPTER 8: RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS 69 

8.1 Overview of Results 69 

8.2 Two-Dimensional (2D) Key 69 

8.2.1 Discussions: High-Entropy Secret 69 

8.2.2 Limitations 70 

8.2.3 Conclusion 70 

8.3 Multihash Key 71 

8.3.1 Discussions: Comparisons 71 

8.3.2 Discussions: Suitable Time Bounds 71 

8.3.3 Limitations 75 

8.3.4 Conclusion 76 

8.4 Memorizable Public-Key Cryptography (MePKC) 76 

8.4.1 Discussions: Enablement of Amazing Functions 76 

8.4.2 Limitations 79 

8.4.3 Conclusion 79 

8.5 Anti-Hacking Data Storage Using Improved DIP Switch 80 

8.5.1 Discussions: Costs and Reliability 80 

8.5.2 Limitations 82 

8.5.3 Conclusion 83 

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS 84 

9.1 Concise Summary 84 

9.2 Suggestions for Future Research 84 

9.2.1 512-Bit Multihash Key Needs Hash Function beyond 1024 Bits 84 

9.2.2 MePKC Extension to Other Non-Conventional Cryptographic 

Schemes 85 

9.2.3 Big Secret(s) for Information-Hiding and Non-Cryptographic 

Applications 86 

9.2.4 Safety Box Using Computerized Lock 86 



xi 



9.2.5 Provable Security Studies 87 

9.2.6 Statistical Surveys for Various Security Schemes 87 

9.3 Future Development of Keys the Secret 87 

9.4 Conclusions 89 

APPENDIX A: WRITING SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 90 

APPENDIX B: CHILDREN-MADE 2D KEYS 93 

APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY OF MY PhD STUDY 94 

REFERENCES 97 

ACRONYMS 122 

PUBLICATION LIST BY K.-W. LEE 127 



xii 



LIST OF TABLES 



Table 2.1 Minimum symmetric key sizes for different security levels of protection 

8 

Table 2.2 Minimum asymmetric key sizes in equivalent with the security levels of 



symmetric key sizes 9 
Table 2.3 Various key sizes corresponding to the numbers of ASCII characters and 

Unicode (version 5.0) characters 11 
Table 3.1 Passphrase generation from acronym 17 
Table 3.2 Minimum diceware words (7776 word list) for different security levels 

19 

Table 3.3 Conversions between binary and hexadecimal numeral systems 19 
Table 3.4 Environ password 20 
Table 4.1 Various key sizes corresponding to the numbers of ASCII characters, 
Unicode (version 5.0) characters, and settings sufficiency of 2D key 
input method 40 
Table 5.1 Binary-to-text encoding Bin2Txt(H) of multihash key 45 
Table 6.1 Dimensions of 2D key for various symmetric key sizes 50 
Table 7.1 Operating modes of method and device to secure anti-hacking data 

storage 66 
Table 8.1 Comparisons of key management tools 72 
Table 8.2 One-second time bounds of several computer systems 74 
Table A.1 Functional classification of writing systems 91 
Table A.2 List of languages by number of native speakers 92 
Table C.l Development timeline of K. W. Lee's research project 94 



xiii 



LIST OF FIGURES 



Figure 0.1 Two-dimensional (2D) key viii 

Figure 4.1 Operation of 2D key input method and system 33 

Figure 4.2 Pseudocode of 2D key input method and system 35 

Figure 4.3 Styles of 2D key: Multiline passphrase 37 

Figure 4.4 Styles of 2D key: Crossword 37 

Figure 4.5 Styles of 2D key: ASCII art 38 

Figure 4.6 Styles of 2D key: Unicode art 38 
Figure 5.1 Pseudo-code to determine the numbers of hash iteration for multiple 

security levels of multihash key methods and systems 43 

Figure 5.2 Operation of the basic model of multihash key method and system 44 

Figure 5.3 Proposed usages of 20 security levels 46 

Figure 6.1 Generations and applications of one/more big memorizable secrets 49 

Figure 6.2 Operation of MePKC method and system 54 

Figure 6.3 Encryption stage of MePKC encryption scheme (P-192) 58 

Figure 6.4 Decryption stage of MePKC encryption scheme (P-192) 58 

Figure 6.5 Signing stage of MePKC signature scheme (P-192) 59 

Figure 6.6 Verification stage of MePKC signature scheme (P-192) 60 

Figure 7.1 Structural diagram of conventional 10-way DIP switch 65 

Figure 7.2 Structural diagram of proposed 10/ 12- way anti-hacking DIP switch 65 
Figure 7.3 Innovated 10-way 8PST+2PST DIL switch activated in opposite 

direction 68 

Figure 8.1 Overview of the four major novel knowledge contributions 69 

Figure A.1 Writing systems of the world 90 
Figure B.l 2D keys using ASCII art and Chinese characters meaning "twenty first 

day" [二 i - E'] 93 
Figure B.2 2D keys using ASCII art and Chinese characters meaning "cloudy sky 

nurtures the woods" [7、 へ: ォ ] 93 



xiv 



PREFACE 



This thesis is an output documentation of a research project applied on 12 
November 2003 and registered on 27 May 2004 to achieve three aims at one stroke. 
These three aims are to solve an imperative research problem, to develop intellectual 
properties (IPs) to support an entrepreneur ship, and to qualify a person for a doctoral 
degree. 

The proposal defence seminar, first work completion seminar, second work 
completion seminar, notice of thesis submission request, and MMU (Multimedia 
University) approval of this thesis title to enable its experts' evaluation are on 14 
March 2005, 18 February 2008, 2 July 2008, 23 July 2008, and 1 December 2008, 
respectively. Nevertheless, this thesis is mainly prepared in October 2008. 

Upon the author's decision for not furthering his doctoral research studies 
under the Lee Foundation Scholarship as communicated by Professor Michael T.-C. 
Fang due to a sudden author's family constraint, this research project began with its 
idea conception in the end of 2003 by having the official PhD project application 
date on 12 November 2003. It began with the studies of multimedia communications 
security in general and autosophy communications in particular. Then, in October 
2005, some novel ideas were conceptualized on how to protect the data crystal of 
autosophy communications in particular, which was then generalized for any 
common computer data protection, to networked information security, and any 
applications of big secret beyond 128 bits in information engineering. Here, for these 
idea series conceptualized since October 2005 and applied for MMU financing as 
investment to protect the IP (Intellectual Property) rights like patent, MMU refused 
to finance the patent protection but utility model of partial idea series, and gave up 
the patent rights on 25 September 2007 and 29 August 2008. 

Let's create and maintain a networked info-computer age for a more 
paperless, trip-less, petroleum-less, and environment-friendly human society by 
having safer multipartite electronic computer communications as from the original 
and novel knowledge contribution of this research project. 



XV 



The copyright of this thesis is a print edition as a remix and derivative from 
an earlier online electronic publication (Lee, 2009a) in the Internet for public peer 
review. I hereby notify that the novel work have all been done by myself and no 
portion of the work contained in this thesis, except Appendix B to have some new 
and creative child-made ASCII arts by Wei-Tong Chui and Wei-Jian Chui. 

Kok-Wah LEE @ Xpree Jinhua Li (李 国 华 @ 李 锦华) 
Find me Xpree or Xpreeli in the Internet! 

Email: E96LKW@hotmail.com (Home); contact@xpreeli.com (Business) 

URL: www.xpreeli.com/homepage/kwlee.htm (Home); www.xpreeli.com (Business) 

First unpublished draft (06 April 2009) 

Second unpublished draft (17 March 2010) 

Third unpublished draft (30 April 2009) 



xvi 



CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW 



1.1 Introduction 

The world human population in April 2010 has achieved beyond 6.9 billion. 
At the same time, the world climate, resources, and environment are having red 
alarms on. Information communications technologies (ICT), especially the electronic 
communications of Internet, are believed to be tools to reduce the paper usages and 
transportation demands, as well as to cultivate a global economy with smoother 
demands and supplies. Security, health, food and beverages, accommodation, family, 
career, education, finance, sex, entertainment, sport, etc. are human major concerned 
topics. Their importance is in descending order for a majority of people. 

Here, when ICT is applied to preserve more Earth resources and to conserve 
friendly environment, information security is always a major people concern for 
important computer communications. As for the Internet, identity theft is a serious 
crime in the electronic commerce and electronic government. Yet another serious 
offence is copyright piracy of literary works, software, music, image, and video. Due 
to the hacked computer databases of human records, the rights of privacy and 
publicity are also hard to be controlled and guarded. 

1.2 Motivation 

In term of information security, it mainly consists of cryptology, information 
hiding, and random number generator (RNG). Cryptology further consists of 
cryptography and cryptanalysis. Information hiding further consists of steganography 
and digital watermarking. RNG further consists of hardware RNG and software 
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). 

To access and control a user identity of an information security system, there 
are four types of authentication factors: What you know like secret, what you have 
like token, what you are like biometrics (Menezes, Oorschot, & Vanstone, 1996; 
Boatwright & Luo, 2007), and whom you know like introducer (Brainard, Juels, 
Rivest, Szydlo, & Yung, 2006), in the ascending order of implementation costs. 



1 



These factors can be used individually or mixed. Among them, password the 
secret is the most prevailing one for applying the symmetric key cryptography in the 
Internet due to the low implementation costs, as well as good hardware and software 
compatibilities. However, a secret, especially a long one, is subject to the 
forgetfulness or the exposure of a secret written down. The situation becomes worse 
when there are lots of accounts to be handled. If a secret is used for multiple accounts, 
there exists domino effect of password reuse problem (Ives, Walsh, & Schneider, 
2004). Moreover, the memorizability size of a secret using the current prior art is 
limited to 128 bits for a protection period of 30 years. To solve these problems, token 
or biometrics, optionally together with a bi-factor using another secret, is used. 

Nevertheless, token has the weaknesses of poor hardware and software 
compatibilities, low portability when number of tokens per user is many, high 
implementation costs due to installation and maintenance, easy loss, possible 
dropping damages, and token cracking (de Koning Gans, Hoepman, & Garcia 2008; 
de Winter, 2008; Garcia, de Koning Gans, Muijrers, van Rossum, Verdult, Schreur, 
& Jacobs, 2008). 

Meanwhile biometrics has the disadvantages of poor hardware and software 
compatibilities, domino effect due to limited biometrics to support multiple accounts, 
no perfect accurate system due to FAR (False Acceptance Rate) and FRR (False 
Rejection Rate), low usability and efficiency due to no universal accessibility and no 
permanent availability from physiological and medical factors (Maghiros, Punie, 
Delaitre, Lignos, Rodriguez, Ulbrich, Cabrera, Clements, Beslay, & van Bavel, 2005) 
like plastic surgery, high implementation costs due to installation and maintenance, 
as well as irreplaceability and irreusability problems of biometrics upon hacking and 
stealth. 

For examples of no universal accessibility of biometrics authentication 
systems, there is no support for homozygotic twins, 5% of human are not fingerprint 
recognition supported (Haylock, No date; Maltoni, Maio, Jain, & Prabhakar, 2003; 
Vacca, 2007, p. 280) due to diseases like eczema ("Singaporean Female," 2008) and 
arthritis, human undergone surgery changing the facial structure needs re-enrolment 
for face recognition, 1.8 aniridia patients out of 100,000 births and patients after laser 



2 



iridotomy to correct angle-closure caused by glaucoma have no iris and are not iris 
recognition supported, eyes alignment problem with camera of blind people and 
patients of pronounced nystagmus (tremor of the eyes) are poorly iris recognition 
supported, wheelchair users have usability problems of camera location and 
insufficient height variation, cataract patients after operation may need re-enrolment, 
and today DNA methods fail to differentiate monozygotic twins. For example of no 
permanent availability, the high biometrics deformation rates of very young and very 
old require frequent re-enrolment. 

For the fourth authentication factor of "whom you know" like introducer and 
referee, even though the authentication burden of the introducee can be relieved, the 
burden has in fact been transferred to the introducer and it is up to the introducer to 
use the authentication factor of what you know, what you have, and/or what you are. 
Furthermore, there exist trust, responsibility, and obligation problems between the 
introducer and introducee. The human interaction models (Kurokawa, 1988, 1990, 
1991, 1997) are then required to analyze the security probability of this factor. 

In view of the limitations of token and biometrics, how good if the 
weaknesses of secret like memorizability and entropy size can be improved until the 
token and biometrics are not needed for majority applications. 

1.3 Research Aims 

Here, the first main focus of this research project is for this direction: 
Methods and systems to create big and yet memorizable secret(s). From a sufficiently 
large and yet memorizable master key, it shall be possible to derive multiple unique 
slave keys for multiple offline and online accounts. These slave keys shall be 
impossible to be used to derive other slave keys. 

For public-key cryptography (PKC), the smallest practically secure private 
key size is 160 bits by using the FFC (Finite Field Cryptography) or ECC (Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography) (Gehrmann & Naskmd, 2005, 2006, 2007; E. Barker, W. 
Barker, Burr, Polk, & Smid, 2007a, 2007b). Using the current prior arts like 
encrypted private key, split private key (Ganesan, 1996b), and roaming private key 
(Baltzley, 2000), there has been no fully memorizable private key yet. 



3 



Here, the second main focus of this research project is to develop fully 
memorizable private key towards MePKC (Memorizable Public-Key Cryptography), 
aka MoPKC (Mobile Public-Key Cryptography). The third research focus is to 
securely store the original plaintext and decrypted ciphertext of the first and second 
foci for various cryptographic applications in the field of information engineering. 

1.4 Research Methodology 

This research project originally contributes novel methods and systems to 
create big and yet memorizable secret(s), and then MePKC for various applications 
in information engineering. As from Spafford (1993), there are three types of 
techniques to prove a model in a computing dissertation: Analytic method using 
formal manipulations, stochastic method using statistical measurements, and building 
a prototype for experimental testing. 

For the research methodology of this research project, the third method of 
building a prototype is used to show that it is possible to create big and yet 
memorizable secret by using 2-dimensional (2D) key (Lee, 2006a, 2008i, 2009c, 
2010a), and further for the practical realization of MePKC (Lee & Tan, 2006; Lee, 
2008j). 

For security strength and protection period of various security schemes in this 
research project, the first method of analytically formal manipulations is needed, 
where Kok-Wah Lee the author has mainly adopted other researchers' analytic and 
experimental results. Since the author cum researcher is an electrical engineer and 
not educated as a mathematician, the reduction-based security (aka provable security) 
approach is only tried on his best effort as time allows. Hence, those cryptographers 
from the mathematics field are expected to carry out some provable security studies 
on the security schemes proposed here, whenever the big secret creation method(s) is 
applied, especially for the MePKC and its applications. 

1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 



4 



Generally, the present invention of this thesis relates to computer 
communications security. Particularly, the present invention relates to key 
management of cryptography and information security. Most particularly, the present 
invention relates to methods and systems to create big and yet memorizable secrets 
that are large enough for the higher levels of security strength of security systems 
like AES-256, 256-bit ECC, 256-bit PRNG, and so on, (where AES stands for 
Advanced Encryption Standard; ECC stands for Elliptic Curve Cryptography; and 
PRNG stands for Pseudo -Random Number Generator), together with their derived 
applications in the general field of information engineering and specific field of 
information security like memorizable public-key cryptography (MePKC). 

Specifically, the present invention broadly provides novel generation method 
and system of big memorizable secrets to practically realize stronger security levels 
of cryptographic, information-hiding, and non-cryptographic applications in the 
information engineering, especially MePKC (Memorizable Public-Key 
Cryptography). 

The first independent embodiment of the present invention is the method and 
system to create big and yet memorizable secrets. The second independent invention 
embodiment is mutlihash key using hash iteration and hash truncation to create 
multiple slave keys from a single master key. From these two independent inventions, 
there are then various types of dependent inventions for various practical applications 
mainly due to the existence of big memorizable secrets, especially the important 
MePKC as the third main novel contribution of this doctorate study. For the fourth 
main novel contribution, Kok-Wah Lee the inventor has proposed an anti -hacking 
data storage using improved DIP (Dual In-Line Package, aka DIL) switch to securely 
keeping the original plaintext and decrypted ciphertext. 

The organisation of this thesis has three components: Preliminary section, 
chapter section, and postscript section. The preliminary section consists of front page, 
copyright page, declaration, acknowledgements, dedication, abstract, table of 
contents, list of tables, list of figures, and prefaces. For the postscript section, it has 
appendices to show the writing systems of the world, children-made 2D keys, and 



chronology of my PhD study; references; acronyms; and a publication list by K.-W. 
Lee. 

There are nine chapters in the chapter section. Chapter 1 is an overview of 
this research project. Chapters 2 and 3 present the literature review in two parts. 
Chapters 4 to 7 are the main body to propose all the four main novel knowledge 
contributions done by Kok-Wah Lee, where they are 2D key, multihash key, MePKC 
and its applications, and anti-hacking data storage using improved DIP switch, 
respectively. Chapter 8 presents the results and discussions on four of the main 
novelty claims. Chapter 9 is the conclusions of this thesis by giving a concise 
summary on the originally contributed novel knowledge and some suggestions for 
future research. 

In details, Chapter 4 proposes a big memorizable secret creation method 
called 2D (two-dimensional) key by entering key styles like multiline passphrase, 
crossword, ASCII art I Unicode art, colourful text, sensitive input sequence, etc., into 
a matrix-like 2D space. 

Chapter 5 presents a method and system called multihash key to generate 
multiple unique slave keys (aka site keys) from a master key for both offline and 
online accounts. This multihash key uses hash iteration and hash truncation. Every 
slave key is computationally infeasible to be used to derive another slave key. The 
multihash key is integrated with 2D key for various applications of big secrets. 

Chapter 6 tells the influential applications of big secrets from the integration 
of 2D key and multihash key. The most important one will be the MePKC, like its 
encryption scheme and signature scheme. 

Chapter 7 is a hardware contribution to further secure the computer 
communications of MePKC from virtual hacking over a connected computer 
communications network like Internet. It is about an anti-hacking data storage using 
improved DIP switch. 



6 



CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW (PART 1): 

CONTEMPORARY MEMORIZABLE SECRET 



2.1 Required Protection Periods and Their Key Sizes 

According to Kerckhoffs' law (Schneier, 1996), a cryptosystem shall depend 
100% on the secrecy of password or key only. In the words of Shannon's maxim, it 
means "enemy knows the system". This law makes the civilian cryptosystem to have 
publicly known algorithm except the classified governmental and military 
information. This is needed to gain the public confidence for general daily 
applications from the fear of possible backdoor. There are various applications of 
secret in information engineering. Here, the required protection periods and their key 
sizes are briefly discussed to know how big a memorizable secret shall be. 

If a cryptographic algorithm is securely tested, the required key length in 
character (L c ) of a password will depend on the factors of number of characters (C), 
key space (S), secure period (T), guesses per unit of time (G), and probability of 
guessing (P) (U.S. Department of Defense, 1985). The minimum key length has to be 
able to resist the brute force attack. The relationships of L c , C, S, T, G and P are 
given in Equations (2.1) and (2.2). 

^ = f ( 2 .1) 



■ 



log 2 S 
log 2 C 



(2.2) 



Nowadays, character encoding of ASCII is the most popular computing code. 
ASCII has some key sets of 26 lowercase characters, 26 uppercase characters, 10 
digits, 62 alphanumeric characters, 33 non- alphanumeric characters, 95 printable 
characters, etc. If a key only has symbols of digits, its specialized name is passe ode. 
If a key is long or consists of printable characters, it is named as passphrase. 

There were once three Data Encryption Standard (DES) challenges as in year 
1997, 1998, and 1999. Using the distributed network computing, maximum guesses 
of 2.45x1 9 keys per second was once recorded. For the latest guesses per computer 



as at end of year 2005, it was about 1.5x10 keys per second. The increment rate 
follows the Moore's Law, where computer performance is doubled for every 18 
months. This indicates that strong password has to be longer as time passing by if 
there is no special key processing added. 

Key length in bit (L) means that there are 2" possible keys for n-bit key. By 
year 2010, the required key is 80 bits for symmetric key algorithm as announced by 
U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). Meanwhile, 
asymmetric key algorithm, like RSA, needs 1024 bits to be equivalently strong with 
80-bit symmetric key algorithm as claimed by RSA Security. The key space varies 
and depends on the security requirements. 

For the AES suggested by NIST to replace the DES, it has three types of 
symmetric key sizes. These key sizes are 128, 192, and 256 bits. Therefore, we have 
AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 to fulfill the demands of security levels at 128, 
192, and 256 bits (E. Barker, W. Barker, Burr, Polk, & Smid, 2007a, 2007b). For 
other security levels at 80 and 112 bits, NIST suggested two-key Triple Data 
Encryption Algorithm (2TDEA) and three-key Triple Data Encryption Algorithm 
(3TDEA), respectively (E. Barker, W. Barker, Burr, Polk, & Smid, 2007a, 2007b). 



Table 2.1 Minimum symmetric key sizes for different security levels of protection 



Key Size, bit 


Protection 


# 1 


32 


Individual attacks in "real-time". Only acceptable for authentication tag size. 


#2 


64 


Very short term protection. Obsolete for confidentiality in new systems. 


#3 


72 


Short to medium term of protection depending on organization size. 


#4 


80 


Smallest general purpose level, < 5 years protection. 


#5 


112 


Medium term protection. About 20 years. 


#6 


128 


Long term protection. Good, generic application independent 
recommendation, about 30 years. 


#7 


256 


Foreseeable future. Good protection against quantum computers. 



Password choice depends on the strength and memoriz ability. Strength 
depends on key size in bit. Memorizability depends on number of memorized secrets 
in a human brain. For minimum key sizes at different security levels, it is shown in 
Table 2.1 (Gehrmann & Nashmd, 2005, 2006, 2007). 



8 



For short term memory of English-based digit, Miller (1956) showed an 
average of 7 items plus or minus 2 (7 ± 2) (Jones, 2002). The good option is longer 
key size in bit and still memorizable. Some articles on memory can be referred 
(Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975; Ellis & Hennelly, 1980; Hoosain & Salili, 
1988; Cowan, 2001) and we can see that a user has 6.5 unique passwords in average 
(Florencio & Herley, 2007), or 4 to 5 unrelated keys (Adams & Sasse, 1999). These 
are textual secret; whereas graphical secret has higher memorizability (Standing, 
Conezio, & Haber, 1970; Standing, 1973). 

On the other hand, there are 3 conventional mathematical hard problems used 
in asymmetric key cryptosystem, which is also called public-key cryptosystem. 
These problems are integer factorization problem, discrete logarithm problem, and 
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. NIST categorizes the applications of these 
problems for public-key cryptography as integer factorization cryptography (IFC), 
finite field cryptography (FFC), and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), respectively. 

IFC has a long key size for public and private keys. FFC has a long public 
key and a short private key. ECC has a short key size for public key and private key. 
The minimum asymmetric key sizes for IFC, FFC, and ECC in equivalent with the 
security levels of symmetric key sizes are shown in Table 2.2 (E. Barker, W. Barker, 
Burr, Polk, & Smid, 2007a, 2007b). 



Table 2.2 Minimum asymmetric key sizes in equivalent with the security levels of 

symmetric key sizes 



Security 
(bits) 


IFC 


FFC 


ECC 


Public 


Private 


Public 


Private 


Public 


Private 


80 


1024 


1024 


1024 


160 


160 


160 


112 


2048 


2048 


2048 


224 


224 


224 


128 


3072 


3072 


3072 


256 


256 


256 


192 


7680 


7680 


7680 


384 


384 


384 


256 


15360 


15360 


15360 


512 


512 


512 



A good password has to be strong and memorizaole (Gehringer, 2002). The 
random password with printable ASCII characters is the strongest password but it is 



9 



poor in memorizability (Yan, Blackwell, Anderson, & Grant, 2004). However, 
password with good memorizability tends to be weak password and under the 
password cracking threats of guessing and dictionary attack (Klein, 1990). As time 
lapses, longer key length is needed due to the advancement of computer technology. 
Hence, the trend is the strong and memorizable passphrase or special key processing 
technique like key strengthening is adopted to get rid of the quest of longer key size. 

The most popular email encryption software called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 
9.0 (PGP Corporation, 2006) allows a maximum of 255 characters to be the 
passphrase. Microsoft Windows operating systems also have this feature. Methods 
exist on how to create secure keys (Adams, Sasse, & Lunt, 1997; Brown, Bracken, 
Zoccoli, & Douglas, 2004). Thus, a research problem is here asking on how to have 
big enough and yet memorizable secret(s) for various applications in information 
engineering, generally, and information security engineering, particularly. 

2.2 Review of the Secret for Symmetric Key Cryptosystem 

In civilian information security, according to Kerckhoffs' law, a security 
system shall depend fully on the secrecy of a key, and not the algorithmic software 
nor its hardware. The main reason for this law is that public confidence has to be 
earned to show that there is no backdoor in the security system relying solely on the 
secrecy of key, and disclosing its algorithm and hardware to the public, especially 
academic and corporate researchers, for comments. 

For authentication to a security system, it basically has four methods: Secret 
for what you know, token for what you have, biometrics for what you own, and 
person for whom you know. Due to the factors of cost, hardware and software 
compatibilities, password/key the secret is the most popular. Short key is called 
password and long key is called passphrase. The key selection is always the balance 
of the factors of memorizability and security. Long and random key is securer but 
harder to remember. The current prior art of single-line key input field limits the 
practical memorizable key size to a maximum of 128 bits for majority normal users. 

To create longer password called passphrase, there are now four existing 
methods: Sentence-type passphrase, acronym-type passphrase, diceware, and 



10 



coinware. Sentence-type passphrase is memorizable and has long key size, but 
vulnerable to dictionary attack; whereas acronym-type passphrase taking the first, 
last, other locations, or hybrid location is memorizable and resists to dictionary 
attack, but has a small key size. Diceware and coinware use several dices and coins, 
respectively, to randomly select a word from monolingual, bilingual, or multilingual 
wordlists, where they can resist dictionary attack, but memorizability reduces as the 
key size becomes longer. Hence, these passphrase generation methods are still 
insufficient to create random, memorizable, and yet big secret, that can resist 
guessing attack and dictionary attack, to fulfil the need for secret bigger than 128 bits. 



Table 2.3 Various key sizes corresponding to the numbers of ASCII characters and 

Unicode (version 5.0) characters 



Key size (bit) 


80 


96 


112 


128 


160 


192 


256 


384 


512 


Number of ASCII character (6.57 bits) 


13 


15 


18 


20 


25 


30 


39 


59 


78 


Number of Unicode character (16.59 bits) 




6 


7 


8 


10 


12 


16 


24 


31 



According to Bruce Schneier (2006, 2007), for a survey of 34,000 MySpace 
users' passwords, about 99% of the passwords had 12 ASCII characters or less. An 
ASCII character carries about 6.57 bits, which means 99% of the 34,000 MySpace 
passwords had 78.84 bits or less. This reflected the facts that almost all the 
symmetric keys of the current symmetric key cryptosystems in practice reached at a 
key size less than 128 bits. In other words, memorizable key the secret is only 
practically applicable to the current popular symmetric key cryptosystems like 112- 
bit 3TDES (3 -Key Triple Data Encryption Standard) and 128-bit AES (Advanced 
Encryption Standard). However, in a large-scale password habit survey (Florencio & 
Herley, 2007), the average password size is about 40.54 bits, most key size is rare to 
be more than 100 bits, and a user has 6.5 passwords for 25 accounts where 8 
accounts in average are used daily. 

Table 2.3 shows the numbers of ASCII and Unicode (version 5.0) characters 
for various key sizes. In Unicode 5.0, there are 98,884 graphic symbols or 16.59 bits 
per graphic symbol. The repertoire of Unicode graphic symbols can be upgraded 



11 



from time to time in future versions to enlarge the number of graphic symbols. 
Memorizable keys for 192-bit and 256-bit AES are out of the reach of the current key 
management method and system. Hence, need exists to have better key management 
method and system to create larger key/password the secret larger than 128 bits. 

2.2.1 Related Work: Single-Line Key/Password Field 

Conventionally, when secret is used for authentication, single-line key field 
will be the area for a user to enter a key. For the current longest possible key, it is a 
single-line passphrase. Passphrase can be formed from acronym, sentence, diceware, 
and coinware (Lee & Ewe, 2006). Nevertheless, limit exists due to the problems of 
memorizability and ASCII character input from keyboard. The first problem is due to 
the human factor; whereas the second is due to the user interface. These problems 
prohibit the applications of symmetric key sizes at higher security levels, whenever a 
user cannot remember and/or conveniently enter a long single-line passphrase. 

2.3 Review of the Secret for Asymmetric Key Cryptosystem 

Besides the symmetric key cryptography, asymmetric key cryptography or 
public-key cryptography (PKC) is one of the two main components in the field of 
cryptography. PKC emerged in the 1970s (Diffie & Hellman, 1976; Goldwasser, 
1997). Symmetric key cryptosystem has a shared secret key between a pair of users, 
but each PKC user has an asymmetric key pair consisting of a private key known 
only to the user and a public key shared with the other users. Amazingly, PKC can 
solve the key sharing and distribution problems of symmetric key cryptosystem. 
Moreover, PKC can resist the guessing attack, dictionary attack, and pre-computation 
attack that symmetric key cryptosystem is susceptible to. Nevertheless, PKC 
processing speed is about 1000 times slower than the symmetric key cryptography. 
Consequently, PKC and symmetric key cryptosystem have to be used in hybrid mode 
for maximum performance of effectiveness. 

Now, there are three main conventional asymmetric cryptosystems: IFC 
(Integer Factorization Cryptography), FFC (Finite Field Cryptography), and ECC 



12 



(Elliptic Curve Cryptography). IFC is based on the mathematical hard problem of 
integer factorization. FFC is based on discrete logarithm problem. And ECC is based 
on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. 

RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) cryptosystem is a type of IFC being the very 
first practical realization of PKC since 1977. FFC like ElGamal encryption and DSA 
(Digital Signature Algorithm), as well as ECC were firstly introduced in the 1980s. 
Then, there are other PKC based on different mathematical hard problems but not yet 
well-standardized. Nevertheless, so far all the key sizes of asymmetric private key 
for IFC, FFC and ECC are too big to be human-memorizable. The large key sizes of 
RSA cryptosystem for its both private and public keys, as well as FFC cryptosystem 
for its public key, have even caused the USA government to shift to ECC having 
significantly smaller public and private key sizes. For more details on their 
practically secure key sizes, please refer to two NIST articles (E. Barker, W. Barker, 
Burr, Polk, & Smid, 2007a, 2007b). 

Due to the reason that private key is not fully human-memorizable using the 
current prior art, a private key is either fully or partially in the form of a token. In the 
mean time among the prior art, there are three basic methods for private key storage: 
(i) Encrypted private key stored in the local computing system or device; (ii) split 
private key firstly proposed by Ravi Ganesan (1996b) on 18 July 1994 in the US 
Patent US5,557,678; and (iii) roaming private key firstly proposed by Cliff A. 
Baltzley (2000) on 25 November 1998 in the US Patent US6,154,543. All the three 
methods are bi-factor or multi-factor authentication, where at least one factor is a 
secret and another factor is a software token or hardware token. 

The first method of private key storage encrypts the private key using a 
symmetric key and stores ciphertext of private key in the local computing system like 
hard disk drive or a device like smartcard, floppy disk, or USB flash drive. Encrypted 
private key method suffers from the problems of loss, damage, side-channel attacks, 
mobility, hardware and software compatibility, and password domino cracking effect 
of its digital certificate carrying only one asymmetric public key. 

The second method splits a private key into two or more portions, where the 
first portion is a memorizable password or derivable from the memorizable password 



13 



kept by the owner of that private key. The second and possibly other portions of the 
private key are kept by one or more servers in the encrypted form like the first 
method. The first, second and possibly other split portions of the private key may 
also be derived from various authentication factors like token and biometrics. Split 
private key method suffers from the problems of malicious central authority attack 
on the user's short password, dictionary attack on the stolen encrypted partial private 
key, and password domino cracking effect of its digital certificate carrying only one 
asymmetric public key. 

For the third method, roaming private key also has encrypted private key but 
its ciphertext is stored in a network system like server, and owner of the private key 
can download it from anywhere and anytime as long as the user has network access. 
The roaming private key method suffers from the problems of side-channel attacks, 
hardware and software compatibility, malicious central authority, dictionary attack 
on the stolen encrypted private key, and password domino cracking effect of its 
digital certificate carrying only one asymmetric public key. 

In the US Patent US7,1 13,594, Boneh and Franklin (2006) described a new 
type of PKC called identity-based cryptography (IDC). In this method, a user's 
unique public identity like email or phone number is the public key and hence 
memorizable. However, its private key is not memorizable and has to be generated 
by a trusted third party (TTP). 

Notwithstanding, as compared with symmetric key cryptosystem using 
password or key the secret, the popularity of token-based PKC using fully or 
partially encrypted private key, is low due to the problems of mobility convenience, 
implementation costs, hardware and software compatibilities, and management 
difficulty of certificate revocation list. Hence, there exists a need to get rid of fully or 
partially encrypted private key, and to invent key input method to let the private key 
fully human-memorizable as like the symmetric key. 

2.4 Potential Methods to Create Big and Yet Memorizable Secret 

One of the many invented methods here to create big and yet memorizable 
secret is to innovate the graphical password or picture password. From psychological 



14 



studies, it claims that human graphical memory is stronger than human textual 
memory. The graphical password is categorized into recognition-based and recall- 
based methods by Xiaoyuan Suo, Ying Zhu, and G. Scott Owen (2005). For 
recognition-based method, it can be the types of cognometrics and locimetrics. 
Meanwhile for recalled-based method, it can be the type of drawmetrics. 

Passfaces invented by J. H. E. Davies (1997), as in the US Patent 
US5, 608,387, is a type of cognometircs, where a user is requested to recognize some 
pre-selected image sequence of human faces as password. Davies' method has the 
weakness of low entropy per image. For G. Blonder' s method (1996), as in the US 
Patent US5,559,961, it is a type of locimetrics, where a user has to select a few areas 
of an image in sequence as password. Blonder' s method is vulnerable to hot-spot 
attack and shoulder-surfing attack. For Draw-a-Secret scheme by I. Jermyn, A. 
Mayer, F. Monrose, M. Reiter, and A. Rubin (1999), it is a type of drawmetrics, 
where a user draw lines and points on a grid in the form as like a hidden hand 
signature. For this Draw-a-Secret scheme, its weakness is its authentication process 
for either acceptance or rejection is not exact as in the previous two graphical 
password methods, but estimation having FAR (False Acceptance Rate) and FRR 
(False Rejection Rate). 

Besides these three main groups of graphical password, there are icon-like 
graphical password scheme by P. V. Haperen (1997), as in the UK Patent 
Application GB2,313,460, and event-based graphical password scheme by J. 
Schneider (2004), as in the US Patent Application US2004/0250138. The both of 
these latter methods are cognometric. Their common weakness is that the key space 
or password space is limited by the fine differentiation capability of human visual 
memory over images that may have only minor differences. This causes the entropy 
per image selection to be still unsatisfactory not big enough for the demands of 
information engineering for the stronger security levels to carry more bits of strength. 
Hence, need exists to boost the key space of graphical password for higher entropy 
per image selection, and yet still human-memorizable and visually differentiable. 

Another potential method to have big memorizable secret is to create Chinese 
language password (CLPW) through Chinese character encodings and their 



15 



Romanization. T. D. Huang (1985), as in the US Patent US4,500,872, proposed on 
19 February 1985 to use phonetic encoding and symbolic encoding to represent a 
Chinese character. The character space of Chinese language is huge by more than 16 
bits per character and yet human-memorizable and differentiable. This CLPW 
method can also be extended to other CJKV languages due to the common sharing 
for the usages of Han characters (、漢字 or 、汉 字) like Chinese Hanzi, Japanese Kanji, 
Korean Hanja, and Vietnamese Han Tu. However, the current CLPW has a weakness 
that it is subject to dictionary attack. Hence, there exists a need to create CLPW 
resisting the dictionary attack. 

There are some inventions to create password that can resist the dictionary 
attacks. Among them are (i) "System and Method for Generating Unique Passwords" 
by Martin Abadi, Krishna Bharat, and Johannes Marais (2000) in the US Patent 
US6, 141,760; (ii) "Password Generation Method and System" by M. R. McCulligh 
(2003) in the US Patent US6,643,784; (iii) "Method and System for Automated 
Password Generation" by P. M. Goal and S. J. Kriese (2004) in the US Patent 
Application US2004/0 168068; (iv) "Method and Apparatus for Password 
Generation" by M. R. Dharmarajan (2005) in the US Patent Application 
US2005/0 132203; and (v) "Method and System for Generating Passwords" by B. E. 
Moseley (2006) in the US Patent Application US2006/0026439. Nevertheless, even 
though these five methods can resist dictionary attacks, they have lower 
memorizability. Hence, there exists a need not only to have a password generation 
method that can resist dictionary attack, but can have high memorizability as well 
even for a big secret at least and beyond 128 bits. 

Yet another method to create a memorizable secret bigger than the current 
prior art was proposed by Whitfield Diffie and William A. Woods (2006) in their 
patent application filed on 22 June 2006 entitled "Method for Generating Mnemonic 
Random Passcodes", US Patent Application US2007/0300076. However, the 
password created by this method is not yet big enough for many applications in the 
information engineering. 



16 



CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW (PART 2): CREATING 
BIG MEMORIZABLE SECRETS 



3.1 Passphrase Generation Methods 

Civilian cryptosystem applies Kerckhoffs' law to have security dependency 
100% on the password secrecy. This reflects the fact that key length and key space 
are very important to ensure enough entropy or randomness to secure a cryptosystem. 
For stronger password, passphrase is suggested. Currently, there are three methods to 
generate passphrase: Acronym, full sentence and diceware. Moreover, an alternate 
method to diceware is proposed by Kok-Wah Lee the author: Coinware (Lee & Ewe, 
2006), by using the coin. This method is not included in detailed in this thesis but 
only brief introduction. For more information, please refer to the published article. 



Table 3.1 Passphrase generation from acronym 



Sentence 


Passphrase 


Passwords should be impossible to remember and never written down 


psbitranwd 


Passwords should be impossible to remember and never written down 


PsBiTrAnWd 


Good or bad, you have to do it. 


Goby,htdi. 


Good or bad, you have to do it. 


Drd,ueoot. 


It may be a few sentences. One, two or more. 


Imbafs.O,tom. 



3.1.1 Acronym 

For the passphrase created using the acronym (Schneier, 1996; PGP 
Corporation, 2006; Yan, Blackwell, Anderson, & Grant, 2004), a user has to 
remember one or a few sentences. Then, the first, second, or last, etc. characters of 
each word in the sentence(s) are joined to form an acronym. Both alphanumeric and 
non- alphanumeric ASCII characters may become the character of the acronym. The 
techniques of capitalization and permutation may be used to increase the randomness. 
This acronym will then act as the key. It has the features of high randomness and 
short key length. The examples of this method are shown in Table 3.1. 



17 



3.1.2 Full Sentence 



The passphrase generation using the acronym is sufficient if the key length 
requirement is short. When the minimum key size demand is long, normally one full 
sentence or a few short sentences are entered directly as the key (Schneier, 1996; 
PGP Corporation, 2006; Yan, Blackwell, Anderson, & Grant, 2004). So far, it is an 
open problem to type the entire phrase into a computer with the echo turned off 
(Schneier, 1996). If the masked password is shown during the password entering 
process, then it will subject to shoulder surfing attack. 

Besides, since the passphrase of full sentence has each word to be selected 
associatively, its randomness is magnitude-wise high but relatively low if password 
ciphertext is available. For example, super-user of any computing system can easily 
obtain ciphertext of the password. By gaining access to the encrypted password, the 
threats of ciphertext-only attack and frequency analysis of short cryptogram (Hart, 
1994; Lee, Teh, & Tan, 2006) are then possible. For instance, the unicity distance of 
English language is about 30 characters. Once the encrypted password is equal to or 
more than the unicity distance, unique decipherability of the encrypted password will 
be feasible. 

3.1.3 Diceware 

Using full sentence for passphrase generation, the word frequency 
distribution can be under computational analysis (Kucera & Francis, 1967). To get 
rid of the association of words, diceware (PGP Corporation, 1996) introduced by A. 
G. Reinhold is an improved passphrase generation method. 

There are many software pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs). 
Unfortunately, they have lots of pitfalls (Eastlake, Crocker, & Schiller, 1994) to ease 
any possible attack. Hence, some hardware random number generators (RNGs) such 
as coin and dice are very much better than the software PRNGs. 

Diceware uses dice to select a word from an ordered word list. The word list 
can be in any language and based on senary or base-6 numeral system. For the most 
popular diceware, it is an English word list with 7,776 (= 6 5 ) words. Five dice values 



18 



are needed to locate one word randomly. Every selected word carries entropy of 
12.92 bits. Table 3.2 shows the minimum diceware words for different security levels. 



Table 3.2 Minimum diceware words (7776 word list) for different security levels 



Key Size (bit) 


32 


64 


72 


80 


112 


128 


256 


Diceware 


word 


3 


5 


6 


7 


9 


10 


20 


bit 


38 


64 


77 


90 


116 


129 


258 



3.1.4 Coinware 

In addition to diceware using dice, we have coinware using coin as proposed 
by (Lee & Ewe, 2006). Coin tossing is conducted to generate random passphrase. 
Each face of the coin is labelled as binary bits "0" and "1", respectively. Four coin 
values are used to derive a hexadecimal digit. Therefore, the word list is in 
hexadecimal order. Table 3.3 shows the conversions between the binary (BIN) and 
hexadecimal (HEX) numeral systems. 



Table 3.3 Conversions between binary and hexadecimal numeral systems 



BIN 


HEX 


BIN 


HEX 


BIN 


HEX 


BIN 


HEX 


0000 





0100 


4 


1000 


8 


1100 


C 


0001 


1 


0101 


5 


1001 


9 


1101 


D 


0010 


2 


0110 


6 


1010 


A 


1110 


E 


0011 


3 


0111 




1011 


B 


1111 


F 



Coinware uses four coins to create one hexadecimal digit. The created word 
lists are in hexadecimal order and can be applied for multilingual passphrase 
generation. Its exemplary application for Chinese language password is very useful. 
Readily-made Chinese character word list in the Unicode CJK unified ideographs 
enables fast hexadecimal reading for random passphrase generation. Hanyu Pinyin 
and Sijiao Haoma are used to Romanize and uniquely represent each Han character. 
Meanwhile, Jyutping and Romaji are used for Cantonese and Japanese languages, 
respectively. 



19 



3.2 Other Matters about Creating Password 

3.2.1 Environ Password 

An analogue to the Romanization of Chinese language to have alphabets and 
digits is the Environ password (Anderson, 2001, p. 49). Good memorizability exists 
when it is linked to a learnt language. For English language, U.K. government 
introduced the case insensitive Environ password in October 2005 for short-term 
protection. It has an 8 -character key pattern as in Table 3.4. This pronounceable 
password has 34.9 bits per unit. 



Table 3.4 Environ password 



Form 


[consonant - vowel - consonant - consonant - vowel - consonant - digit - digit] 
[consonant - vowel - consonant - digit - consonant - vowel - consonant - digit] 


Example 


pinray34, yankan77, supjey56, kinkin99; pin3ray4, yan7kan7, sup5jey6, kin9kin9 



3.2.2 Password in Unicode Encoding 

Unicode unifies the Han characters of CJK languages into CJK unified 
ideographs or Unihan under ISO 10646. There are three major blocks of Han 
characters or Chinese characters in the Unicode character encoding: CJK unified 
ideographs, CJK unified ideographs extension A, and CJK unified ideographs 
extensions B. For the mean time, Unicode Consortium is preparing the CJK unified 
ideographs extension C and CJK unified ideographs extension D. The CJK unified 
ideographs extension C with 4,251 Han characters will be included into the next 
version after Unicode 5.1. 

For Unicode 4.1, the first block lists the Han characters from [4E00] to 
[9FBB] in hexadecimal value. The second block lists from [3400] to [4DB5]. The 
third block lists from [20000] to [2A6D6]. Hence, there are three readily made word 
lists or character lists for Chinese language. These word lists have 20924, 6582 and 
42711 words or characters, respectively. In addition, there are CJK compatibility 
ideographs having 12 characters. For a combined word list, it is a key space of 70229 



20 



characters. After radical exclusion, the key space has about 70000 characters. This 
forms a Chinese language word list with high entropy of 16.10 bits per Han character. 

To start coinware, first flip or toss a coin to randomly select a binary bit "0" 
or "1". If bit "0", the first and second blocks of CJK unified ideographs and CJK 
unified ideographs extension A are chosen. If bit "1", the third CJK block of CJK 
unified ideographs extension B is chosen. Then continue with coin tossing to obtain 
four coin values representing four binary bits. These four binary bits are converted 
into one hexadecimal digit. Repeat coin tossing to get four coin values for another 
three rounds. Four randomly obtained hexadecimal digits will locate the unique Han 
characters in the previously selected CJK block(s). These three blocks are available 
at [URL: http://www.unicode.org/charts/]. If the hexadecimal digits do not hit any 
Han character, get another set of hexadecimal digits. 

Coming to here, the selected Han character will need operating system with 
Chinese language environment to enable computer input. For other languages in 
Unicode encoding, to create password in those languages needs computing support. 
The entropy per key in a particular language depends on its character set in Unicode. 
Nevertheless, for bilingual or multilingual users, larger entropy per key can be 
obtained, especially when one of the languages is Chinese language. 

3.3 Related Work of 2D Key: Single-Line Key/Password Field 

Conventionally, whenever secret is used as the authentication method, single- 
line key field will be the area for a user to enter a key. For the current longest 
possible key, it is a single-line passphrase. For passphrase, it can be formed from 
acronym, sentence, diceware, and coinware. Nevertheless, there is a limit due to the 
problems of memorizability and ASCII character input from keyboard. The first 
problem is due to the human factor; whereas the second is due to the user interface. 
These problems prohibit the applications of symmetric key sizes at higher security 
levels whenever a user cannot remember and/or conveniently enter a long single-line 
passphrase. 



21 



3.4 Key Strengthening 



Key strengthening is also called key stretching. It is used to make a weak key 
stronger. There are two forms of key strengthening. One uses password supplement 
(Manber 1996; Abadi, Lomas, & Needham, 1997; Abadi, Needham, & Lomas, 2000), 
and another uses many rounds of hash iterations (Kelsey, Schneier, Hall, & Wagner, 
1997). In this thesis, key strengthening is applied to achieve larger protection periods 
for symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems like AES and MePKC. 

K.-W. Lee (2009b) had a computational analysis on the effect of using key 
strengthening as presented again as follows. 

S = n*L*R/P (3.1) 
S = Key space 

n = Number of networked computers 

L = Maximum lifetime of a key in years 

R = Number of guesses per unit of time per unit of computer 

P = Probability that a key can be guessed in its lifetime 

Typical values: 

n= 10 9 units = 29.9 bits 

L = 4, 10, 20, 30, 300 years = 2, 28.2, 29.2, 29.8, 33.1 bits 
R = 1.5 X 10 7 s" 1 = 23.8 bits (best performance in year 2005) 
R = 1 s _1 = bit (using key strengthening) 
p= 10" 6 = -19.9 bits 

Equation (3.1) is a password length equation. When key strengthening is used. 
R becomes 1 guess per second and the variety of computer is a main factor to set the 
number of hash iterations. The computer performance of a variety of computers 



22 



varies from 1 time for the slowest computer to 20 times for the fastest computer. This 
contributes a factor of log220 = 4.3 bits to Equation (3.1). Moore's Law states that 
the number of transistors on an integrated circuit for minimum component cost 
doubles every 24 months. 

S = (n*L*R/P)* 2 4 " 3 * 2 L/2 (3.2) 

When the variety of computers and Moore's Law are considered, it becomes 
Equation (3.2). From Equation (3.2), key strengthening can make a weak key to 
become 19.5 bits stronger. 

3.5 Memorizable Secret as a Master Key 

3.5.1 Introduction 

For friendly environment, cost effectiveness, and efficiency, human 
civilizations are heading towards a paperless and electronic society. Every human is 
getting numerous offline and online accounts. These accounts require authentication 
to gain system access. There are four types of authentication approaches: Secret, 
token, biometrics, and introducer. 

Secret is about something you know like password or key. Token is about 
something you have like smart card. Biometrics is about something you are like 
fingerprint. Introducer is whom you know. For the sake of cost and compatibility, 
secret in the form of key is the most popular authentication approach. 

According to Forrester Research (Kanaley, 2001), an active Internet user 
manages an average of 15 keys on a daily basis. Most people, who are majority-wise, 
not using the password management tools, either maintain the same key for all the 
accounts, write down different keys for different accounts, or keep closely related 
keys for various accounts. These are all poor password management practices. 

The HTTP basic authentication protocol (even over SSL) (Franks, Hallam- 
Baker, Hostetler, Lawrence, Leach, Luotonen, & Stewart, 1999) allows a server to 



23 



know the key of each account. This causes possible malicious server attacks from the 
administrators and crackers. The server may be untrustworthy or compromised. 

For another HTTP specification, i.e. HTTP digest authentication protocol, 
challenge-response protocol is used (Franks, Hallam-Baker, Hostetler, Lawrence, 
Leach, Luotonen, & Stewart, 1999). The server can still see the clients' keys. Since 
the response from a client to a server is not specific to the server, HTTP digest 
authentication protocol is vulnerable not only to malicious server attacks, but 
password file compromise attacks, spoofing attacks, and phishing attacks. 

If a key is reused, the success of an attack on an account in a weak system 
may cause a strong system to be compromised. This password reuse can trigger a 
domino effect from the weakest system to the strongest system (Ives, Walsh, & 
Schneider, 2004). 

Therefore, every key has to be uniquely set for each account, regardless of 
weak or strong system, to get rid of the risk when one system is compromised. 
However, according to (Adams & Sasse, 1999), normal users can only be expected to 
cope with a maximum of four or five keys that are unrelated and regularly used. 
When key relevancy is allowed, a user can cope with average 6.5 unique keys 
(Florencio & Herley, 2007). This reflects the need to balance the usability and 
security. 

To address this problem, some key management tools are invented. These 
tools allow users to remember only one master secret as master key and assign 
unique slave keys (aka site keys) to multiple accounts. They allow users either to 
choose their own master key and then store the slave keys somewhere safe, or to 
assign fixed keys to each website that can be computed whenever they are needed. 

The examples of the first approach are Password Safe and Windows Live ID. 
The examples of the second approach are LPWA (Lucent Personal Web Assistant), 
HP Site Password, Password Multiplier, SPP (Single Password Protocol), PwdHash, 
and Passpet. A special example using the hybrid approach is CPG (Compass 
Password Generator). 

Password Safe is a password vault that can be used for offline and online 
accounts. However, its mobility is low due to the requirement to have a safe storage 



24 



for multiple keys encrypted by a common master key. Another form of solution for 
online accounts only is to use a single sign-on server and its proxy servers. Microsoft 
Windows Live ID (aka Microsoft Passport Network) is one of these examples. Its 
weaknesses are single point of failure and high cost of integration. 

Another method to reduce the memory burden of online account passwords 
uses key hashing and key strengthening (aka key stretching) of a master key 
concatenated with a domain name and optional username. Exemplary applications of 
this method are (i) LPWA (Lucent Personal Web Assistant) (Gabber, Gibbons, 
Matias, & Mayer, 1997); (ii) HP Site Password (aka System-Specific Passwords or 
Site-Specific Passwords) (Karp & Poe, 2002; Karp, 2003); (iii) Password Multiplier 
(Halderman, Waters, & Felten, 2005); (iv) PwdHash (Ross, Jackson, Miyake, Boneh, 
& Mitchell, 2005); and (v) Passpet (Yee & Sitaker, 2006). 

There is also a method using unique random number assignment to different 
online accounts called CPG (Compass Password Generator) (aka Common Password 
Method) (Luo & Henry, 2003). Yet there is another method using the key hashing of 
one-time ticket, server name, and master password to generate different site keys 
(aka slave keys) called SPP (Single Password Protocol) (Gouda, Liu, Leung, & Alam, 
2005). 

All these methods of single master key generating multiple site keys or slave 
keys apply only to online accounts having a domain name. Its weakness is a change 
of master key requires all the accounts to be updated one by one, which is required 
by some key management strategies. 

For offline account, the current prior art uses a password vault to store all the 
unique passwords the secret. These password vaults can be simply an encrypted 
spreadsheet or document file, or application software like Password Safe by Bruce 
Schneier [URL: http://www.schneier.com/passsafe.html]. The disadvantage of 
password vault is its low mobility and danger of disclosing the ciphertext of 
password vault to the public domain. Hence, there exists a need to have a method to 
generate multiple slave keys of online and offline accounts from a master key, and 
yet an individual slave key can be changed without changing the master key and 
other slave keys. 



25 



With the realization of big memorizable secret for cryptographic, 
information-hiding, and non-cryptographic applications, especially MePKC, there 
are even more types of offline accounts like symmetric key, asymmetric private key, 
stego-key, symmetric watermarking key, asymmetric watermarking private key, and 
PRNG seed. Among them, for MePKC cryptographic applications like encryption, 
signature, authentication, key exchange, and other schemes, different schemes 
require a different pair of asymmetric key pair, by the technical and law requirements 
to have a safer electronic information society. Hence, there exists a need to generate 
multiple private keys as slave keys from a common memorizable master key. 

The present invention called multihash key (Lee & Ewe, 2007) can be applied 
to offline and online accounts with good mobility. Domain name is not necessary but 
optionally needed to resist phishing attacks and spoofing attacks. A single sign-on 
server is also not needed. The required components are numeric 4-digit passcode, 
key hashing, key strengthening, and hash truncation. 

To allow diversity of site keys from a single master key, there are two 
optional entries: Username ID and domain name (or website) URL. Domain name 
that is also used to resist phishing attacks can be replaced by adopting an anti- 
phishing tool. In other words, the proposed new method and system can be used 
together with an anti-phishing tool. 

These anti-phishing tools are SpoofStick, Netcraft Toolbar, Earthlink Toolbar. 
SiteKey, DSS with SRP (Dynamic Security Skins with Secure Remote Password 
Protocol), Petname Tool, TrustBar, and Passpet (Yee & Sitaker, 2006). 

3.5.2 Related Works 

Here, the prior arts of key management tools are discussed, where a single 
key can be used for multiple accounts, in a deeper context. Anti-phishing tools will 
not be discussed. Accounts are divided into two types: Offline and online. Offline 
accounts have no domain name while online accounts have domain name. Example 
of offline accounts is file encryption; whereas example of online accounts is email. 



26 



Password Safe is an application software originally developed by Bruce 
Schneier [URL: http://www.schneier.com/passsafe.html]. It uses the Twofish 
encryption algorithm to protect the stored passwords by a master password. Users 
need only to remember one master password to access multiple passwords. Its 
mobility depends on the available password database. It can be used for both offline 
and online accounts, but cannot resist spoofing attacks and phishing attacks. 

Windows Live ID (No date) is also known as "Microsoft Passport Network" 
[URL: http://www.passport.netJ. Jsers need a master password to sign on a central 
server. This central server will authenticate users for multiple servers which have 
joint network. Besides single point of failure, it has high cost of integration. Some 
security loopholes are reported (Kormann & Rubin, 2000). It can be used for online 
accounts only, but can resist phishing and spoofing attacks. 

LPWA (Gabber, Gibbons, Matias, & Mayer, 1997; Matias, Mayer & 
Silberschatz, 1997) uses key hashing of master password and domain name to 
generate a specific site password via a server. It has single point of failure but not the 
high cost of integration. However, the malfunction of central authority will mean the 
breakdown of all services. It can be used for online accounts only and can resist 
phishing and spoofing attacks. Nowadays, it has stopped providing the services. 

HP Site Password (Karp, 2003; Karp & Poe, 2004) is also called "System- 
Specific Passwords" or "Site-Specific Passwords". A master password and a system 
name are concatenated, hashed using MD5 (Rivest, 1992) and converted into Base64 
encoding (Borenstein & Freed, 1992) to get a site password. It is not centralized 
using a server but operates as stand-alone application in the terminal computers. It 
can be used for online accounts only and cannot resist phishing and spoofing attacks. 

It is important to note here there were few successful collision attacks over 
the MD5 in the years 2004-2006. The successor of MD5, which is SHA-1, is also 
discovered to be subject to collision attacks on its reduced version in the years 2004- 
2006. Consequently, NIST announced that SHA-1 would be phased out by the year 
2010 in favour of SHA-2 variants: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 
(NIST, 1995a, 2002b, 2007b; Lilly, 2004). 



27 



CPG (Luo & Henry, 2003) is also called "Common Password Method". It 
assigns unique random numbers to different website accounts. The random number is 
hashed using MD5 and converted using a binary-to-text transform to generate a 
specific password for multiple accounts. The random number is encrypted and stored 
in an account server or proxy server. When a user needs to access a specific account, 
the encrypted random number is retrieved from the server, decrypted, hashed, and 
converted into a specific password to authenticate the access. Therefore, it has the 
weakness of single point of failure, but does not involve the high integration cost like 
LWPA. It is for online accounts only and can resist phishing and spoofing attacks. 

Password Multiplier (Halderman, Waters, & Felten, 2005) uses key hashing 
and key strengthening. There are two levels of hash iterations using the inputs of 
username, master password and site name. Both the numbers of hash iterations are 
fixed for 100 seconds and 1/10 second, respectively. It is a stand-alone application 
without using a server and implemented using browser extension to Mozilla Firefox. 
It can be used for online accounts only and can resist phishing and spoofing attacks. 

SPP (Gouda, Liu, Leung, & Alam, 2005) is also a stand-alone application. It 
applies the techniques of challenge-response protocol, one-time server-specific ticket 
and key hashing using MD5 or SHA-1. The site password is hashed from the one- 
time ticket, server name, and master password. Ihe one-time ticket and site password 
will be updated after every login access. It can be used for online accounts only and 
can resist phishing and spoofing attacks. 

PwdHash (Ross, Jackson, Miyake, Boneh, & Mitchell, 2005) is implemented 
using browser extensions to Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Opera. Its key 
hashing inputs the domain name of remote site into a pseudo-random function 
controlled by user's master password. The domain name acts as a hash salt. It can be 
used for online accounts only and resist phishing and spoofing attacks. 

Passpet (Yee & Sitaker, 2006) is also implemented using browser extension 
to Mozilla Firefox. It applies the techniques of petname system, key hashing, key 
strengthening, and UI customization. Petname system is a naming system possessing 
the properties of globality, security and memorizability. It is used for anti-phishing 
attacks. Key hashing and key strengthening in Passpet are alike the Password 



28 



Multiplier using the SHA-256, except that its first level of hash iterations is flexible 
in amount allowing updates according to the computer technology advancement 
without changes of software. It uses local storage for login access via a fixed 
machine, and remote storage in a server for login access with mobility feature. The 
remote server stores the first level of hash iterations and site label file that is 
encrypted from the site label list. Due to the dependency of server for newly used 
machines, Passpet has some risks of single point of failure. However, there is no high 
cost of integration. It can be used for online accounts only and can resist phishing 
and spoofing attacks. 

3.6 Related Works of MePKC: Storages of Private Key 

For the current asymmetric key cryptosystem, a private key is normally 
encrypted using another symmetric key. The encrypted private key is stored in a 
local computing system or token; whereas the symmetric key is stored in the human 
brain. The present possible attacks for this method are guessing attack, dictionary 
attack, and pre-computation attack. 

Another method is to split the private key into two or more portions (Ganesan. 
1996b; Bishop, 2003, pp. 264-265). There are other literary works about split private 
key cryptography over here (Ganesan, 1996a, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1999; Ganesan, 
Sandhu, Cottrell, & Austin, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c; Ganesan, Sandhu, Cottrell, 
Schoppert, & Bellare, 2006; Ganesan & Yacobi, 1996; Sandhu, deSa, & Ganesan, 
2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2006f; Sandhu, 
Schoppert, Ganesan, Bellare, & deSa, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2006f, 
2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d; Sandhu, Ganesan, Cottrell, Renshaw, Schoppert, & 
Austin, 2007). The first portion of the private key can be derived from a normal 
human-memorizable symmetric key. The other portions of the private key are stored 
as encrypted partial private key alike the normal encrypted private key. This method 
resists the pre-computation attack. 

A third method is to store the encrypted private key in a server connected to a 
computer communication network, called roaming private key (Baltzley, 2000, 
2001a, 2001b). A user has the roaming capability where the encrypted private key 



29 



can be downloaded from the server for decryption at anywhere. Proxy servers are 
needed for this method to avoid single point of failure. Its possible attacks are the 
same as encrypted private key stored in the local computing system. 

3.7 Related Prior Arts of Tools to Resist Hacking 

Besides complicated networking settings and firewall software, a simple 
hardware device was proposed by Fonseca (2003) by using a simple push/pull level 
of a switch box to connect or disconnect the networking connection for the hacking 
elimination. Fonseca called it as data line switch and filed for patent in the US on 24 
July 2001. Later, Macuch (2005) designed the data line switch for the applications of 
coaxial and DSL cables to control the computer connection to the Internet. Macuch 
filed for a design patent in the USA on 17 November 2003. Of course, there is yet 
another current practice by some end users to plug and unplug the networking cable. 
Nevertheless, this method suffers from the hook damage of RJ45/RJ11 and 
inconvenience access of networking port. 

Here later, a proposed component with similar function to data line switch is 
also applicable to modular jack (aka modular connector) like RJ45 and RJ11. 
Modular connector was firstly invented by Hardesty (1975), who filed it for patent in 
the US on 6 July 1973. RJ stands for registered jack. RJ45 and RJ11 are used as 
Ethernet jack and telephone jack, respectively. Our new component is innovated 
from the dual in-line package (DIL/DIP) switch by adding a collective actuator, 
which can be slide-type, rocker-type, or piano-type (aka side/level). 

The miniature DIP switch was found in the US patent database to be firstly 
invented by Lockard (1977, 1979), who filed for patent in the US on 25 March 1975 
for the first time. Since then, there are various innovations on the DIP switch. 
Hoffman (1982) had improved the manufacturing of DIP switch. Liataud and 
Maloney (1983) had reduced the size, decreased the cost, and increased the reliability 
of DIP switch. Brown (1983) had created the piano-type DIP switch. In the late 
decade, Lin (1999) and Tai (2001) from Taiwan, R.O.C., had concomitantly 
decreased the size, improved the manufacturing process, and increased the reliability 
of DIP switch. 



30 



Normal slide switch wipes in parallel with the pin pairs. The slide actuator of 
my proposed component wipes transversely to the pin pairs. The first slide switch 
that can be found in the US patent database was invented by Bailey (1969). Even 
though the wiping directions of normal slide switch and our switch are different by 
90° degrees, their function is the same, i.e. to connect and disconnect the poles, 
except the 10-way secure DIP switch oppositely switches two groups of poles. 

3.8 Conclusion 

Till here, we have discussed the prior arts and related works to all the four 
main novel works proposed by me, in which they are (i) 2D key for big and yet 
memorizable secret; (ii) multihash key for multiple offline/online slave keys from 
one master key the big memorizable secret; (iii) MePKC for various public key 
cryptographic schemes using fully memorizable private key; and (iv) anti-hacking 
data storage using improved DIP switch for secure storage of original plaintext and 
decrypted ciphertext from virtual hacking over the computer communication 
networks. All those four major novel knowledge contributions here can act as a 
whole for safer and more convenient electronic computer communications. 



31 



CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (PART 1): 

CREATING BIG MEMORIZABLE SECRET 
USING TWO-DIMENSIONAL (2D) KEY 

4.1 Introduction 

Conventionally, single-line key field is used to input a key. The selection of a 
key depends on the factors of memorizability and security. The minimum key sizes 
for symmetric and asymmetric key cryptosystems are 80 and 160 bits, respectively. 

For symmetric key cryptosystem, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) of USA proposed security level of 80-bit key to be phased out by 
year 2015 and used until year 2010 (E. Barker, W. Barker, Burr, Polk, & Smid, 
2007a, 2007b). US government has an export policy to control the power of 
cryptographic algorithm by setting the maximum key size. The current export limit 
of symmetric key size has been raised from 40 bits to 128 bits. 

For the symmetric key cryptosystem of Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES), there are three key sizes: 128, 192, and 256 bits. The asymmetric key 
cryptosystems, which demand for the minimum private key size at 160 bits by year 
2010, are finite field cryptography (FFC) and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). 
FFC and ECC are based on the mathematical hard problems of discrete logarithm 
problem and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, respectively. The 
corresponding sizes of private keys to the AES are 256, 384, and 512 bits, 
respectively (E. Barker, W. Barker, Burr, Polk, & Smid, 2007a, 2007b; Gehrmann & 
Naslund, 2005, 2006, 2007). The symmetric key is normally remembered by brain; 
whereas the asymmetric private key is encrypted using another symmetric key. 

ASCII characters have absolute entropy of 6.57 bits per character. Therefore, 
the nominal bit of an ASCII character is 8 bits, but its effective bit is 6.57 bits. To 
cater for the different symmetric key sizes at 80, 96, 112, 128, 192, and 256 bits as in 
Table 2.3, 13, 15, 18, 20, 30, and 39 ASCII characters are needed, respectively. An 
amount of 15 ASCII characters is perhaps still affordable and convenient for the 
human users. However, higher amounts may introduce two problems. 



32 



Memorizability is the main problem. The difficulty to type a long passphrase into a 
computer will be another open problem (Schneier, 1996). 



400 



\ 


1 


Optionally activate the anti-keylogging software. 


\ 


f 



401 



Open the 2D key application software for its input interface: 

(1) Select row and column sizes 

(2) Select to view or hide the secret to be entered 



402 



V 



User enters a secret into the 2D field using one or a combination 
of the secret styles as follows: 

(1) Multiline passphrase 

(2) Crossword 

(3) ASCII graphics/art 

(4) Unicode graphics/art 

(5) Colourful text 

(6) Sensitive input sequence 

(7) Other hybrid combinations 



403 



V 



Further secret processing over the password using the optional 
techniques as follows in sequential order or not in order: 

(1) Key hashing 

(2) Key strengthening 

(3) Multihash key 

(4) Other secret processing techniques over the password like 
generating multiple slave keys from a master key 





1 


Apply the finally generated secret(s) for various applications. 




1 


Clear the memory storing the initial, intermediate, and final 
secrets. Then, close all the application software. 



404 



405 



406 



Figure 4.1 Operation of 2D key input method and system 



33 



Here, a high-entropy key input method called 2-dimensional (2D) key as in 
Figure 4.1 is proposed to solve these problems. 2D key facilitates particularly the 
recognition of reference points of each sub-unit of a passphrase, and generally the 
creation of various secret styles of 2D key like multiline passphrase, crossword, 
ASCII graphics/art, Unicode graphics/art, colourful text, sensitive input sequence, 
and two or more of their hybrid combinations as partially illustrated in Figures 4.3- 
4.6, for Latin language users. 

It uses a 2D display as user interface to improve the human factors of 
memorizability and input of ASCII characters from keyboard. The 2D key has the 
styles of multiline passphrase, crossword, ASCII art, colourful text, or sensitive input 
sequence. It can resist dictionary attack and fulfil the demands of human- 
memorizable key sizes even until 256 bits, which is impossible by using the single - 
line passphrase. 

In addition to fulfilling the various key sizes of symmetric key cryptosystem, 
2D key has novel revolution to the private key storage of asymmetric key 
cryptosystem. For the prior arts, we have encrypted private key, split private key, and 
roaming private key. With the introduction of 2D key, there shall be no more need to 
store the private key in a computing system, but inside the brain as like the 
symmetric key. This allows the creation of memorizable public-key cryptosystem 
(MePKC) as discussed in Chapter 6. MePKC has the special features of mobility, 
lower cost, and higher efficiency. 

4.2 2D Key Input Method 

For single-line passphrase, the numbers of ASCII characters for different 
symmetric key sizes are shown in Table 2.3. An amount of 15 ASCII characters or 
96 bits is a maximum memorizability limit for many human users. This fact is 
statistically proven by Florencio and Herley (2007) in their large-scale study of web 
password habits for half a million users over a 3 -month period, where the average 
key size is 40.54 bits ranging from exclusive to inclusive 100 bits or ]0, 100]. The 



34 



difficulty of user interface to enter a key using keyboard into the single-line key field 
is another big problem. 

The problems of human factor and user interface limit the practical 
application of symmetric key cryptosystem to be at the key size of 96 bits with 10 
years of protection. Using key strengthening, the 96-bit key can be made 19.5 bits 
stronger, and 20-year protection is the maximum theoretical limit. 

The 2-dimensional (2D) key input method is created to allow high-entropy 
keys. Figure 4.2 displays the pseudocode of 2D key input method. It tries to solve the 
human factor of memorizability and user interface of key input. 2D key has a 2- 
dimensional display alike a 2D matrix, where each character of a key is an element 
of the matrix. The key styles drawn in the space of 2D matrix are a mixture of 2D 
text in pictorial form. Thus, 2D key can create big and yet memorizable secret. 



1.0 User selects row size. 
2.0 User selects column size. 

3.0 User enters ASCII characters or Unicode symbols one by one. 
4.0 User ends the key input by pressing the "Enter" key. 
5.0 Computer hashes the input key. 

6.0 Computer compares the hashed key with the stored hash. 

6.1 If the hashes match, authentication is verified. 

6.2 If the hashes mismatch, authentication is rejected. 

Figure 4.2 Pseudocode of 2D key input method and system 

The font used for 2D key has to be fixed-width font. Fixed-width font is also 
called non-proportional font and monospaced font. It is a typeface using fixed width 
for every glyph. Examples of fixed-width fonts are Courier for ASCII and MS 
Mincho for Unicode. When ASCII encoding is used, the 2D key has 6.57 bits per 
character. Meanwhile, when Unicode is used, it has 16 bits per character. Even 
though Unicode-based 2D key has higher entropy, it is inconvenient to enter a 
Unicode symbol for the mean time, and the fixed-width font for all the Unicode 
symbols has not yet been created. Hence, ASCII-based fixed-width font is used 
currently for the discussions as well as prototype demonstration. 



35 



To use 2D key input method and system, firstly a user needs to select the row 
size and column size of the 2D matrix for 2D key. The currently built prototype has a 
maximum row size or height of 10 characters, and a maximum column size or width 
of 13 characters. The column size is set at 13 due to the Chinese-character-encoded 
passphrase (Lee, 2009a) has a maximum size of 13 per Chinese character. 
Alternatively, it can be a word in English language or other languages that has a size 
of 13 characters per word with character stuffing. 

The input styles of 2D key are multiline passphrase, crossword, ASCII art, 
Unicode art, colourful text, and sensitive input sequence. Multiline passphrase, 
crossword, and ASCII art are currently implemented in the prototype; whereas 
Unicode art, colourful text, and sensitive input sequence require additional supports. 

After selecting the row size and column size, the user can input ASCII 
characters using keyboard as the elements of the 2D matrix. The input characters can 
have any style or a mixed style of 2D key. These styles have good memorizability, 
and the 2D nature of 2D key generates more references at the user interface for key 
input. Single-line key field has only one reference at the first location of the only line. 
2D key has a number of horizontal lines and each first location of the horizontal lines 
acts as references for key input. In addition, the first locations of the vertical lines 
can be secondary set of references for key input. This solves the location recognition 
problem of user interface in facilitating a user to enter a high-entropy key by having 
more indexed references. 

Good memorizability allows a user to repeat a high-entropy key. The 
elements of 2D matrix can be either partially, fully, or extraordinary filled. To fill 
extraordinarily means adding some extra trailing characters as noise (Lee, 2009a) 
after the last element of the 2D matrix. The characters entered into the 2D key field 
are read by a computer line by line horizontally from top to bottom, hashed, and 
processed as usual alike the single-line key field. The hashing process is one round if 
key strengthening is not used. If key strengthening is used, the hashing iteration is set 
according to the computer response time per access ranging from 0.05 to 1 second, or 
any other tolerable ranges. 



36 



4.3 Styles of 2D Key: Multiline Passphrase 

For single-line key field, it is hard to input a high-entropy single-line 
passphrase due to the problem of user interface. A user may lose the reference of 
starting character of a word in a passphrase. Using 2D key, multiline passphrase can 
be input, where each line consists of one word of a passphrase. Each word is padded 
to the longest word in the passphrase. The padding character can be any ASCII 
character and acts as a text-based semantic noise (Lee, 2009a). Figure 4.3 shows a 
2D key example using multiline passphrase. Its dimensions are 4x5, and uses 
character as the padding character. This 2D key has absolute entropy of 131 bits. 



Have* 
^ * ^ 
happy 
day ! * 

Figure 4.3 Styles of 2D key: Multiline passphrase 



HAPPY* 
0*R*K* 
ェ NCH 

SPELLS 



WELCOME 
TO: : : : 
:USE: : 
: : :2D: 
: : :KEY 



Figure 4.4 Styles of 2D key: Crossword 



4.4 Styles of 2D Key: Crossword 

The second style of 2D key is crossword. Instead of horizontal and vertical 
multiline passphrase, a user can enter a mixture of horizontal, vertical, and slanted 
passphrases. Figure 4.4 shows two 2D key examples using crossword. Their 
dimensions are 5 x 6 (left) and 5x7 (right), and use characters '*, and ':,, 
respectively, as the background character. These 2D key have absolute entropy or 
key size of 197 and 229 bits, respectively. 



4.5 Styles of 2D Key: ASCII Art / Unicode Art 



37 



The third style of 2D key is ASCII art or Unicode art. ASCII art is a graphical 
presentation of computer using the 95 printable ASCII characters. Unicode is a 
variant of ASCII art, where instead of using ASCII characters, Unicode symbols are 
used to create artistic graphics. 



111111 



111111 
—11 — — 
—— 11 —— 
—— 11 —— 
111111 
111111 



222222 






2D2DDD 






2D2D2D 






2D2D2D 






2D2DDD 







Figure 4.5 Styles of 2D key: ASCII art 

Figure 4.5 displays three 2D key examples using ASCII art. For the left 
example, ASCII characters T and are used to display a Chinese character 
meaning "engineering". Its dimensions are 7 x 6 with key size of 275 bits. For the 
middle example, ASCII characters '2' and 'D' are used to display a digit '10' with 
background character '2,. Its dimensions are 5 x 6 with key size of 197 bits. For the 
right example, ASCII characters T and are used to display a Chinese character 
meaning "centre" with background character Its dimensions are 5 x 6 with key 
size of 197 bits. 

Figure 4.6 shows a 2D key example using Unicode art. Unicode symbols '¥' 
and are used to display a Chinese character meaning "engineering" again. 
Unicode is entered using the keyboard by pressing the keys "0165" while holding 
the key of 'Alt'. Unicode is entered using the keyboard by pressing the keys 
"0169" while holding the key of 'Alt'. Once the 'Alt' key is released, the Unicode 
symbol is entered. Its dimensions are 4 x 5. This 2D key has key size of 320 bits. 



¥¥¥¥¥ 
©©¥©© 
©©¥©© 
¥¥¥¥¥ 

Figure 4.6 Styles of 2D key: Unicode art 



38 



4.6 Styles of 2D Key: Colourful Text 

The style of this 2D key needs some additional supports. Colour encoding, 
special graphical user interface, and special computer processing are required. 
Although these supports make the user interface complicated for the computer, they 
can be implemented and have better memorizability for the human users. Colour is 
definitely a main element of good memorizability. For example, by having 16 types 
of colours, every character in the 2D key will have an additional 4 bits. ASCII-based 
2D key will become 10.57 bits per character; whereas Unicode-based 2D key is 
20.59 bits per character. The entropies per character of ASCII-based and Unicode- 
based 2D keys will be increased by 60.9% and 24.1%, respectively. The additional 
colour secret also carries more randomness to resist dictionary attack. 

4.7 Styles of 2D Key: Sensitive Input Sequence 

For the secret style of sensitive input sequence, it is an additional feature over 
the current 2D secret style where there is added entropy from the input sequence of a 
character to a specific element location of the 2D matrix. If a 2D key has the 
dimensions of m x n, the key space is increased by [(m ^ n)!]. If a 2D key of 4 x 5 as 
in Figure 4.3 is used, the key space is increased by [20!] or 61.1 bits from 131.40 bits 
to 192.47 bits, which is close to the left example in Figure 4.4 for the 2D key of 
dimensions 5x6 with 197.10 bits. 

This key style requires the space encoding for the element location of 2D 
matrix, table-like graphical user interface ofmxn matrix, and human memory for 
the sequence of characters. In term of memorizability, there is not much 
improvement. However, the time to enter a 2D key of similar size is greatly reduced 
for the same amount of key size. 

4.8 Requirement of Key Size for 2D Key 

Table 4.1 shows the setting sufficiency of various dimensions of 2D key as 
compared with ASCII-based and Unicode-based passwords for various key sizes. 



39 



Based on enough key size by using 2D key, different levels of security strength for 
symmetric key cryptosystem like AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 can be 
practically realized. For fully mnemonic private key, maximally easily achievable 
MePKC is FFC-256 and ECC-256. For 512-bit MePKC, more conditions for 2D key 
are needed, in which it may restrain to a specially trained human group. 



Table 4.1 Various key sizes corresponding to the numbers of ASCII characters, 
Unicode (version 5.0) characters, and settings sufficiency of 2D key input method 



Key size (bit) 


80 


96 


112 


128 


160 


192 


256 


384 


512 


Number of ASCII character (6.57 bits) 


13 


15 


18 


20 


25 


30 


39 


59 


78 


Number of Unicode character (16.59 bits) 




6 


7 


8 


10 


12 


16 


24 


31 


ASCII-based (4 * 5) 2D key (131.4 bits) 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


ASCII-based (5 * 6) 2D key (197.1 bits) 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


No 


No 


ASCII-based (7 * 6) 2D key (275.9 bits) 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


No 


Unicode-based (5 * 5) 2D key (414.8 bits) 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


No 



40 



CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (PART 2): 
MULTIHASH KEY 



5.1 Overview 

A human's e-life needs multiple offline and online accounts. It is a balance 
between usability and security to set keys or passwords for these multiple accounts. 
Password reuse has to be avoided due to the domino effect of malicious 
administrators and crackers. However, human memorizability constrains the number 
of keys. Single sign-on server, key hashing, key strengthening, and petname system 
are used in the prior arts to use only one key for multiple online accounts. The unique 
slave keys (aka site keys) are derived from the common master secret and specific 
domain name. These methods cannot be applied to offline accounts such as file 
encryption. New method and system are invented to be applicable to offline and 
online accounts. It does not depend on http server and domain name, but numeric 4- 
digit passcode, key hashing, key strengthening, and hash truncation. Domain name is 
only needed to resist spoofing and phishing attacks of online accounts. 

5.2 Introduction 

There are lots of situations that require a user to have many online and offline 
accounts. Examples of online and offline accounts are login access and file 
encryption, respectively. For safer security, a secret cannot be re-used to avoid 
password domino cracking effect (Ives, Walsh, & Schneider, 2004), where an 
attacker starts the password cracking process from the weakest link. However, 
according to R. Kanaley (2001), an Internet user manages an average 15 keys on a 
daily basis. Yet in another survey by Adams and Sasse (1999), a user can only be 
expected to handle 4 to 5 unrelated and regularly used keys. For user's unique keys 
without the constraint of relevancy, Florencio and Herley's survey (2007) reported 
an average 6.5 keys, repeated 3.9 times each for 25 accounts and typing 8 keys daily. 
Hence, there is a memory burden to the user unless these secrets are written down 



41 



somewhere. However, important password the secret is discouraged to be jotted 
down somewhere. 

5.3 Basic Model of Multihash Key 

The proposal here requires users to remember an at least 128-bit master key 
and a numeric 4-digit passcode. The master key can be derived from creation 
methods of big memorizable secret (Lee, 2008h, 2008k, 20081, 2009a, 2010b, 2010c), 
like 2D key. This method and system is named "multihash key". 

The passcode is used together with key hashing, key strengthening (Manber, 
1996; Abadi, Lomas, & Needham, 1997; Abadi, Needham, & Lomas, 2000; Kelsey, 
Schneier, Hall, & Wagner, 1997) and hash truncation to generate exemplary 20 
unique hashes at 20 security levels for 20 accounts. Each security level has 1 account. 
These hashes are site keys. All the security levels are ranked from the highest 
security (#1) to the lowest security (#20). This is because knowing the multihash key 
at the higher level can reveal the multihash key at the lower level, but not the reverse, 
through partial brute-force attack via guessing. 

From Kanaley's survey (2001), 20 accounts are set since an active Internet 
user manages an average of 15 keys daily. Five accounts are added by assuming that 
there are five offline accounts. The number of accounts can be increased by changing 
the settings or remembering another pair of (master key, passcode). 

There are three pseudo-codes for multihash key to show how the method and 
system work: Determination of hash iterations of multiple security levels, generation 
of multihashes as site keys, and changes of key pair (master key, passcode). 

As an example, Figure 5.1 shows the determination of 20 security levels via 
the experiments to locate the lower bound b L and upper bound bu for 1 -second hash 
iterations for an old computer that is slow but still popular in early years of 2000 AD. 
Each security level is partitioned by 2 s . 

Figure 5.2 presents the basic model of multihash key to generate multihashes 
as site keys. A user needs to remember the selected security level for a specific 
account. In case of forgetfulness, all the 20 security levels shall be tried one by one. 



42 



1400 

V 

Settings to determine the lower and upper bounds of 1 -second hash iteration 

(1) b L = lower bound for 1 -second hash iteration 

(2) b H = upper bound for 1 -second hash iteration 

(3) Si = security level (i = 1, 2, 3, ..., x), where x = 20, 32, or other values 

(4) si = highest security level, s x = lowest security level 

V 

Determination of bound b t for each security level s t is as follows: 

(1) bi < 一 0.2b L + 2 8 X (i - 1), b t < 2.0b K ^ 

(2) /ᅳ/-1 

(3) If i = 0, exit; else go to step 1 of Box 1402 again. 



Figure 5.1 Pseudo-code to determine the numbers of hash iteration for multiple 
security levels of multihash key methods and systems 

Necessary entries are master key d and numeric 4-digit passcode d N . Optional 
entries are username ID and website (or domain name) URL. The username and 
website are used to create diversity of multihash key from a key pair (master key, 
passcode). Domain name can also help to resist phishing and spoofing attacks. 

The 512-bit hash of the concatenated master key and passcode is truncated 
into 20 partitions with 8-bit each from the MSB bit. This increases the randomness of 
specific keys for different accounts. If an attacker does not know the exact security 
level, then 5120 (= 2 8 * 20) hashes have to be checked for any key pair (master key, 
passcode). If the attacker knows about the security level, then 2 8 hashes have to be 
validated for any key pair (master key, passcode). 

For the settings of bound bu it can be either fixed or random. If the fixed 
option is chosen, the number of hash iterations will use the standard settings. A user 
is mobile and can use this method without remembering the number of hash 
iterations while accessing offline and online login account from different computing 
systems. 



〜應 



43 



1500 

V 

Settings to create various slave keys d s (aka site keys) of multihash key: 

(1) Necessary entries: Master key d, numeric y-digit passcode d n where y can be 4 

(2) Optional entries: Username ID, domain name URL, or else NULL 

(3) Bounds of hash iteration for various security levels s; : b\, b 2 , b 3 , . -., み;, ...,b x 

(4) User selects security level s t among x security levels, where x = 32 or others 

(5) Use 2n-bH hash function where In > 512 like SHA-512 



V 

Processing the master key d and passcode d n to create the determinants H h of hash 
iteration number for each security level within their bounds: 

(1) H b SHA-512 (d II d n , 1) for one round of hash iteration 

(2) H h (z\ , Z2) = bit truncation of H h from Dit z\ to bit z 2 



Nj/ 

Calculate the hash iteration number j of a slave key: 

(1) Choose either Fixed or Random j 

(2) if Fixed 

if/=l, j ^ (^i-2 8 +l) + H b (0 , 7), j<b { - 

else if 1 </<x,j^- (b^+l) + H h (8i-8 , 8/-1), j < b t ; 
else if i = x, j ᅳ 외 +1) + H h (8x-S , 8x-l), j<b x . 
else if Random 

j <— random[b 1-2^+1 , b x ] , where human remembers a random value 



V 

Generate slave key d s : 

(1) Do if ID = URL = NULL, //, ^- SHA-512(J ,7) ; 

else if ID = NULL, //, ― SHA-512(J II URL , f) ; 
else if URL = NULL, H t ト SHA-512(J II ID J) ; 
else if ID and URL are not NULL, //, ト SHA-512(J II ID II URL J). 

(2) H <- Hi(0 , 255), n-bit truncation of H t from MSB bit, where n = 256 

(3) d s < 一 Bin2Txt( «-bit CSPRBG (H) ), Bin2Txt = Binary-to-text encoding 



\レ 

Apply the slave key d s . Then, clear the memory storing all forms 
of secrets and close all the application software. 



Figure 5.2 Operation of the basic model of multihash key method and system 



44 



〜蒲 



〜蒲 



세 504 



예 505 



If the random option is chosen, the number of hash iterations will be 
randomly selected by a user within a given range. User's mobility is weakened 
unless one can remember the random values of hash iterations while accessing 
offline and online logins. However, if a user can remember the hash iterations, this 
option offers stronger resistance to dictionary attack. The best option is a hybrid 
scheme. Choose fixed option for lower security levels and random option for higher 
security levels. 

Depending on the value existence of username ID and domain URL, the 
master key undergoes different key hashing and key strengthening using SHA-512 to 
generate hash Hi. Hi is then encoded from binary to text to fulfil the demands of 
password requirements such as alphanumeric, mixed lowercase and uppercase, and 
with punctuation marks. 



Table 5.1 Binary-to-text encoding Bin2Txt(H) of multihash key 



Bin 


00 


01 


02 


03 


04 


05 


06 


07 


08 


09 


10 


11 


12 


13 


14 


15 


Txt 


a 


b 


c 


d 


e 


f 


g 


h 


i 


j 


k 


1 


m 


n 





P 


Bin 


16 


17 


18 


19 


20 


21 


22 


23 


24 


25 


26 


27 


28 


29 


30 


31 


Txt 


A 


B 


C 


D 


E 


F 


G 


H 


I 


J 


K 


L 


M 


N 


O 


P 


Bin 


32 


33 


34 


35 


36 


37 


38 


39 


40 


41 


42 


43 


44 


45 


46 


47 


Txt 





1 


2 


3 


4 




6 


7 


8 


9 






< 




> 


? 


Bin 


48 


49 


50 


51 


52 


53 


54 


55 


56 


57 


58 


59 


60 


61 


62 


63 


Txt 


! 




# 


$ 


% 


& 




( 


) 


* 


+ 








1 


@ 


Bin 


Padding 






























Txt 

































N.B.: Bin: For easy understanding, decimal value is shown to represent binary values 



Here, a binary- to -text encoding of Bin2Txt(H) is proposed as in Table 5.1. 
Base64 encoding is not used as there are only two punctuation marks included 
(Borenstein & Freed, 1992). Bin2Txt(H) converts 6 binary bits into one 8-bit ASCII 



45 



character. It has a bit expansion of 33%. All types of ASCII characters are included: 
lowercase, uppercase, digit, and punctuation marks. The last group of 4 binary bits of 
H from 253rd to 256th is padded with 2 binary bits of at the right or LSB side. The 
output of Bin2Txt(H) is a string of 43 ASCII characters and is used as key hash. 

Lastly, copy the hash as site key into the clipboard and paste it on the prompt 
key field for authentication access. Remember to clear the clipboard before 
leaving the computer. 

On how to change from an old key into a new one, a user can change either 
the master key, passcode, security level, username, or the domain name. There are 
also proposed usages of 20 security levels as shown in Figure 5.3. 



Security levels: usages 

1 Password file and key management tool like password vault. 

2 Finance =〉 Very important Internet banking. 

3 Finance => Important Internet banking. 

4 Finance =〉 Stock trading. 

5 Finance =〉 Insurance, income tax, ... 

6 Very important personal encrypted files, email accounts, instant messengers, ... 

7 Important personal encrypted files, email accounts, instant messengers, ... 

8 Very important accounts in working/studying place like email. 

9 Important accounts in working/studying place like database. 

10 Other accounts in working/studying place like library. 

11 〜: 20 Other not frequently used offline and online accounts. 

Figure 5.3 Proposed usages of 20 security levels 

New methods and systems called multihash key and its variants are presented 
here to generate multiple slave keys (aka site keys) from a single master key for both 
the offline and online accounts. Among various cryptographic, information-hiding, 
and non-cryptographic applications needing secrets for various types of key, here are 
some of the popular applications of secret key: (i) Master key for password vault 
hiding various keys; (ii) Internet banking; 사 m) online stock trading; (iv) insurance; (v) 
tax; (vi) office, school and home email accounts; (vii) instant messengers; (vm ; 
encrypted files; (ix) database accounts at the office and school; (x) library accounts; 
and (xi) verification key for credit card. Hence, the impact contribution of multihash 



46 



key shall be very high in the aspects of reducing the human memorization burden 
and system operating costs. 

5.4 Acceptable Time Bounds of Multihash Key 

The multihash key method and system uses the hash iteration and hash 
truncation, followed by optional n-bit CSPRBG to increase the randomness, as for a 
basic model of multihash key as in Figure 5.2, to generate slaves keys from a master 
key and an optional passcode. The master key and hash function shall be at least 2n 
bits. The passcode shall be at least 4 digits or more. The hash iteration applies the 
key strengthening for a period ranging from 0.2 to 2 seconds, or longer to 10 seconds 
in some of the variants of multihash key. Hash truncation halves the hash value or 
message digest. Multihash key supports infinite number of online accounts and 
limited number of offline accounts depending on the performance of the computer. 
Examples of online accounts are webmail, login, email, and instant messenger. 
Examples of offline accounts are encrypted file, public-key certificate, bank ATM 
card, and software token. 

For the present and future times, and in view of the needed number of secret 
keys for possible amount of offline and online accounts, computer systems with 
faster processing speed are needed as enabling technologies to accommodate more 
slave keys of multihash key within the acceptable time bounds. 



47 



CHAPTER 6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (PART 3): 
APPLICATIONS OF BIG MEMORIZABLE 
SECRET & MePKC 

6.1 Methods and Systems to Create Big Memorizable Secret 

Accordingly, the present invention mainly provides a method to create big 
memorizable master secret using 2D key, followed by another method to derive 
multiple slave keys for offline/online accounts from the master key. Every key style 
of 2D key input method and system can be used individually or mixed as a hybrid 
combination. The size of big memorizable secret is at least 128 bits. Figure 6.1 
illustrates the main and basic operations for the generations and applications of one 
or more big memorizable secret(s). 

6.2 Potential Applications of Available Big Memorizable Secret 

With the realization of big memorizable secret, not only the big secret keys of 
symmetric key cryptosystems of higher security strength like AES-192 and AES-256 
can be realized firstly, but memorizable public -key cryptosystem (MePKC) secondly, 
and other cryptographic, information-hiding, and non-cryptographic applications 
thirdly, in the information engineering field that need big and yet memorizable secret. 

These cryptographic applications include cryptographic schemes like 
encryption, signature, key exchange, authentication, blind signature, multisignature, 
group-oriented signature, undeniable signature, threshold signature, fail- stop 
signature, group signature, proxy signature, signcryption, forward-secure signature, 
designated-verifier signature, public-key certificate (aka digital certificate), digital 
timestamping, copy protection, software licensing, digital cheque (aka electronic 
cheque), electronic cash, electronic voting, BAP (Byzantine Agreement Protocol), 
electronic commerce, MAC (Message Authentication Code), key escrow, online 
verification of credit card, multihash signature (Lee, 2009), etc. 



48 



100 



Y 

User selects one or a mixture of the key styles of 2D key input 
method as follows to create one or more big memorizable secrets 
in a computing device: 

(1) Create two-dimensional key (2D key): ASCII encoding, 
Unicode encoding. 

(2) Use multihash key to create slave keys from the previously 
created 2D key as master key. 




101 



102 



The created secret is used as password, passcode (aka pin), symmetric key, 
asymmetric private key, stego-key, symmetric watermarking key, asymmetric 
watermarking private key, PRNG seed, etc., for one or a mixed combination of the 
systems as follows in the field of information engineering: 

(1) Cryptographic applications like 256-bit AES, DSA, ECC, MePKC 

(2) Information-hiding applications like steganography, watermarking 

(3) Non-cryptographic applications like PRNG, CSPRBG 



Perform one of the many functions as follows: 

(1) Creating an asymmetric public key using an asymmetric private key 

(2) Encrypting using a symmetric key, stego-key, asymmetric public key 

(3) Decrypting using a symmetric key, stego-key, asymmetric private key 

(4) Signing using an asymmetric private key 

(5) Embedding using a symmetric watermarking (WM) key, asymmetric WM private key 

(6) Verifying using a symmetric watermarking key 

(7) Creating an HMAC (Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code) using a secret key 

(8) Seeding PRNG, CSPRBG 

(9) Other functions using secret(s) 



After finishing the process using the secret, do either one of the 
processes as follows before the application is closed: 

(1) Delete the secret immediately during or after the application 

(2) Store the secret for limited time 

(3) Store the secret for limited amount of usages 

(4) Store the secret for limited amount of usages per unit of time 



104 



Figure 6.1 Generations and applications of one/more big memorizable secrets 



49 



Those information-hiding applications include steganographic and 
watermarking schemes like stego-key in steganography, secret key in symmetric 
watermarking, private key in asymmetric watermarking, etc. Meanwhile, the non- 
cryptographic applications are PRNG (Pseudo-Random Number Generator) and 
CSPRBG (Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Bit Generator). Hence, there 
exist lots of needs to have big memorizable secret for lots of cryptographic, 
information-hiding, and non-cryptographic applications in the field of information 
engineering, generally, and information security engineering, particularly. 

6.3 Main Applications for Symmetric and Asymmetric Key Cryptosystems 

With the emergence of 2D key having the styles of mutliline passphrase, 
crossword, ASCII art I Unicode art, colourful text, and sensitive input sequence, 
high-entropy key as high as 256 bits is possible. We can now overcome the human 
factor of memorizability and user interface problem of single-line key field, which 
have limited the key size to 96 bits or about 100 bits. 

Table 6.1 shows the possible dimensions of ASCII-based 2D key for various 
key sizes of symmetric key cryptosystem. Key strengthening can boost up another 
19.5 bits. If Unicode-based 2D key is used, the dimensions of 2D key can be greatly 
reduced. From Tables 2.3 and 4.1, the settings sufficiency of 2D key input method 
and system for various key sizes is shown. It can be observed that larger key sizes 
than 128 bits for cryptographic, information-hiding, and non-cryptographic 
applications like AES-128, AES-192, AES-256, ECC-256, etc., can be realized by 
using the 2D key, especially the MePKC using fully memorizable private key. 



Table 6.1 Dimensions of 2D key for various symmetric key sizes 



Symmetric key size (bits) 


80 


96 


112 


128 


192 


256 


Number of ASCII characters 


13 


15 


18 


20 


30 


39 


Dimensions of 2D key (ASCII) 


3x5 


3x5 


3x6 


4x5 


5x6 


5x8 



For asymmetric key cryptosystem, memorizable public-key cryptosystem 
(MePKC) can be created. This is possible by using the FFC and ECC with minimum 



50 



size of private key at 160 bits. The private key of MePKc is stored in the human 
brain, and not stored as encrypted, split, and roaming private keys as in the prior arts. 
This provides mobility, lower cost, higher efficiency, and resistance to dictionary 
attack and pre-computation attack. 

Assuming that the maximum memorizable key size is 256 bits, 256-bit 
MePKC using FFC and ECC with 128-bit security strength can be realized. It has a 
protection period of 30 years. If key strengthening is used, 19.5 bits is added, or an 
increase of 10-bit security, which extends the protection to 50 years. This is very 
much enough for many practical applications. 

A software prototype of this 2D key (Lee, 2006a, 2008i, 2009c, 2010a) with 
the function of multihash key (Lee, 2007a) has been built up by using the Microsoft 
Visual Studio (Marshall, 2003). The 2D key can have optional anti-keylogging 
application software (Log This, No date; McNamara, 2003, pp. 197-202) to achieve 
higher security during the input. To get a copy of this software, please visit [URL: 
www.xpreeli.com] . 

There are other potential applications of 2D key method and system. Firstly, 
2D key can be specialized to include only numeric digits or other sets of limitedly 
encoded characters for devices with limited space like the display and key pad of a 
bank ATM machine and computerized safety box. Secondly, the display of 2D key 
can be an LCD display or other display technologies integrated with a computer 
keyboard having a first partial 2D key optionally visible and a second partial ID key 
in hidden mode only to better resist the shoulder-surfing attack. 

6.4 Prototyped Applications of Created Big Memorizable Secret(s) 

For useful applications of the created big memorizable secret (s) and MePKC, 
the prototyped applications in software form, that have been built for experimental 
testing by Kok-Wah Lee the author, include: 

(i) method and system to realize memorizable symmetric key the secret till 
resistance to quantum computer attack; 



51 



(ii) method and system to realize encryption scheme of memorizable public- 
key cryptography (MePKC); and 

(iii) method and system to realize signature scheme of memorizable public- 
key cryptography (MePKC). 

6.5 Memorizable Symmetric Key to Resist Quantum Computer Attack 

Due to the successful cracking of 56-bit DES (Data Encryption Standard) in 
the 1990s, stronger symmetric ciphers with larger symmetric key sizes like 80-bit 
2TDES, 112-bit 3TDES, as well as 128-, 192-, and 256-bit AES (developed from 
Rijndael cipher) are introduced to replace the DES. 

Blaze, Diffie, Rivest, Schneier, Shimomura, Thompson and Wiener (1996) 
discussed the minimal key lengths for symmetric ciphers. The NIST (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology), USA, proposes different protection periods 
for security through years 2010, 2030, and beyond 2030, for 80, 112, and 128 bits, 
respectively (E. Barker, W. Barker, Burr, Polk, & Smid, 2007a, 2007b). ECRYPT of 
European Union (EU) proposes in its technical reports that 80-, 96-, 112-, 128-, and 
256-bit security have protection periods of 4 years through year 2010, 10, 20, 30 
years, and foreseeable future to be against quantum computer attack, respectively 
(Gehrmann & Naslund, 2005, 2006, 2007). Nevertheless, conventional methods and 
systems normally can only realize a key size of 128 bits or less. 

Hence, the first application in Section 6.4(i) of the present invention in 
applying the created big memorizable secret is to realize higher security levels of 
symmetric ciphers like AES- 192 and AES-256. By using the 2D key input method 
and multihash key as in Figure 6.1 and Table 4.1, it can be observed that the current 
highest security level of symmetric cipher at 256 bits can be practically realized and 
achieved using big memorizable 256-bit secret. 

Prototypes of application software have been built to experimentally test the 
applications of big memorizable secret using 2D key and multihash key for 
symmetric key cryptosystem like AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256. 



52 



6.6 Memorizable Public-Key Cryptography (MePKC) 

6,6,1 The Proposed MePKC Applications 6.4(H) 國 (iii) 

The second and third applications 6.4(ii)-(iii) of the present invention in 
applying the created big memorizable secret are to improve from the token-based 
public-key cryptography (PKC) to the realization of secret-based PKC using fully 
memorizable private key, which is named as MePKC (Memorizable Public-Key 
Cryptography) or MoPKC (Mobile Public-Key Cryptography) here. The main 
advantages of MePKC are full secret memorizability and mobility convenience. Yet 
another quite important advantage is that secret-based MePKC can resist some side- 
channel attacks vulnerable to token-based PKC, such as those attacks over the fully 
or partially encrypted private key. For illustration of MePKC, please refer to Figure 
6.2. 

The current lowest key size requirement of asymmetric private key is 160 bits 
operating in FFC and ECC. From Table 4.1 listing the dimensions of proposed novel 
2D key input method and system to create big memorizable secret, a 160-bit secret 
for 160-bit fully memorizable private key can be supported by a rather small 2D key 
space. This group of big memorizable secret creation method and system can easily 
support memorizable private key up to 256 bits at the symmetric bits of security 
strength of 128 bits and for a protection period of 30 years. 

For higher security levels up to 512-bit secret used by 512-bit MePKC, multi- 
factor multimedia key using software token (Lee, 2008h, 20081, 2009a) has to be 
adopted to halve the key size requirement towards a practical realization. Here, the 
mobility convenience is somehow sacrificed. 

The MePKC can be used for major PKC cryptographic applications like 
encryption and digital signature schemes. Other minor applied cryptographic 
schemes are key exchange, authentication, blind signature, multisignature, group- 
oriented signature, undeniable signature, threshold signature, fail-stop signature, 
group signature, proxy signature, signcryption, forward-secure signature, designated- 
verifier signature, public-key certificate (digital certificate), digital timestamping, 
copy protection, software licensing, digital cheque (aka electronic cheque), electronic 
cash, electronic voting, BAP (Byzantine Agreement Protocol), electronic commerce, 



53 



MAC (Message Authentication Code), key escrow, online verification of credit card, 
multihash signature (Lee, 2009), etc. 



1300 



Optionally activate the anti-keylogging software. 



\レ 



Open the MePKC application software operating on at least 160- 
bit ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) for its input interface. 



1301 



1302 



User creates an n-bit secret S like 256 oits using one or more methods as follows: 

(1) ASCII-based 2D key 

(2) Unicode-based 2D key 

(3) Conventional secret creation methods and other future methods 

- Next send secret S to Box 404 in Figure 4.1 for secret processing, like multihash 
key. 



1303 



User creates an asymmetric key pair as follows: 

(1) Let Kp te = private key, Kp Ub = public key 

(2) Kp te Box 404 (S), optional secret processing of memorizable secret S 

(3) K pub Public Key Generation (K pte ) 

(4) Store the Kp Ub and clear Kp te in the computer memory 

(5) Create public key certificate (aka digital certificate) from K pub using certificate 
authority or introducer of web of trust 

(6) Optionally publish and/or send the public key certificate to other PKC users 



1304 



Apply the asymmetric key pair and public key certificate for 
various MePKC applications like encryption, signature, etc. 



1305 



Clear the memory storing all forms of secrets. Then, close all the 
application software. 



1306 



Figure 6.2 Operation or MePKC method and system 



54 



The blind signature scheme includes its further applications for electronic 
cash (aka e-cash, electronic money, e-money, electronic currency, e-currency, digital 
cash, digital money, digital currency, or scrip), and electronic voting (aka e-voting, 
electronic election, e-election, electronic poll, e-poll, digital voting, digital election, 
or digital poll). 

Advancement of computing technologies requests for longer key sizes for a 
fixed protection period. To freeze this unwanted request, key strengthening (aka key 
stretching) through many rounds of hash iteration, together with hash truncation and 
a hash function with longer hash value like 768, 1024 bits or more, can be used. 

MePKC was extended by Lee (2008h, 20081, 2009a) there to other novel 
claimed inventions called multihash signature scheme, and novel innovations of 
some cryptographic schemes like digital cheque, software licensing, human- 
computer and human-human authentication via a computer communication network, 
as well as MePKC digital certificate with multiple public keys for password 
throttling and ladder authentication. 

These MePKC applications are best to be implemented using the ECC 
(Silverman, 1986; Blake, Seroussi, & Smart, 1999, 2005; Hankerson, Menezes, & 
Vanstone, 2004, 2005; Zhu & Zhang, 2006). This is because ECC needs a minimum 
private key size of 160 bits and it has been long time tested for its security strength. 
Alternatively, depending on further research and evaluation, shorter private key size 
at equivalent or better bits of security strength can be achieved by using hyperelliptic 
curve cryptography (HECC) (Pelzl, Wollinger, & Paar, 2004; Cohen & Frey, 2006; 
Wang & Pei, 2006) and possibly other cryptosystems like torus-based cryptography 
(TBC) (Rubin & Silverberg, 2003). 

For HECC, the genera 2 and 3 have so far been tested to have shorter key size 
requirement than ECC by twice and thrice. Between them, genus-2 HECC has a 
higher security without the demand to have a correction factor for its key size. In 
other words, the correction factor of HECC of genus 2 is 1. As information, genus-3 
and genus-4 HECC have a correction factor of 1.05 and 1.286 times of its field, 
respectively, for the key size to get a larger group order at equivalent bits of security 
strength. For more information, please refer to an article entitled "High Performance 



55 



Arithmetic for Special Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptosystems of Genus Two" by Jan 
Pelzl, Thomas Wollinger, and Christof Paar (2004). 



6.6.2 Selection of ECC Curve to Prototype MePKC Schemes 

For second applications 6.4(ii), prototype of application software has been 
built to experimentally test an example of encryption scheme of MePKC, i.e. 192-bit 
ECC, by using a software package called Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 2003 
(Academic Edition). 

For the settings of the 192-bit ECC, a 192-bit pseudo-random curve over 
prime field (P-192) (NIST, 2006c) has been selected as in Equation (6.1), following 
paragraphs for parameter definition and initialization, in which it is suitable for both 
the built prototypes of MePKC encryption scheme and MePKC signature scheme. 

y 2 = X 3 + ax + b (mod p) (6.1) 

To define the parameters of ECC curve P-192 (NIST, 2006c; Hankerson, 
Menezes, & Vanstone, 2004, 2005), we have: 

- the prime modulus p 

- the order n 

- the N-bit input seed S to SHA-512 based algorithm, like N = 160, 512 

- the output c of the SHA-512 based algorithm 

- the coefficient a 

- the coefficient b (satisfying cb 2 = a 3 (mod p)) 

- the cofactor h 

- the base point x coordinate G x of point G(G X , G y ) 

- the base point y coordinate G y of point G(G X , G y ) 



56 



The integers p and r are given in decimal and hex forms; bit strings and field 
elements are given in hex form. To initialize the parameters of ECC curve P-192 
(NIST, 2006c; Hankerson, Menezes, & Vanstone, 2004, 2005), we have: 

P-192: p = 2 192 — 2 64 — 1, a = -3i , h = 1 10 

p= 6277101735386680763835789423207666416083908700390324961279 10 

n= 6277101735386680763835789423176059013767194773182842284081k) 

n = Ox ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 99def836 146bc9bl b4d22831 

S = Ox 3045ae6fc8422f64 ed579528 d38120ea el2196d5 

c = Ox 3099d2bb bfcb2538 542dcd5f b078b6ef 5f3d6fe2 c745de65 

b = Ox 64210519 e59c80e7 0fa7e9ab 72243049 feb8deec cl46b9bl 

G x = Ox 188da80e b03090f6 7cbf20eb 43al8800 f4ffflafd 82ffl012 

G y = Ox 07192b95 ffc8da78 63101 led 6b24cdd5 73f977al le794811 

6.6.3 Encryption Scheme of MePKC 

Using a simple ECC encryption scheme (Stallings, 2006), we firstly define 
parameter as follows: 

k A = user A's private key from a 192-bit secret, where < k A < n 

P A = user A's public key 

k B = user B's private key from a 192-bit secret, where < k B < n 

Pb = user B's public key 

z = 192-bit random number, where < z < n 

Pz(Pzx , Pz y ) = point of random number z, satisfying P z = zG (mod p) 
Pd(Pdx , PDy) = point of random number z, satisfying P D = zP B (mod p) 
E = plaintext of 192-bit symmetric key, where < E < p 
F = ciphertext of 192-bit symmetric key 
M = plaintext of message 



57 



C = ciphertext of message 



To encrypt a plaintext of message M, we then use a hybrid encryption system 
of symmetric key cryptosystem and asymmetric key cryptosystem. This is because 
the latter system is 1000 times slower than the former system. Asymmetric key is 
used to encrypt the symmetric key; whereas symmetric key is used to encrypt the 
plaintext of message. The encryption stage of MePKC encryption scheme is 
experimentally tested (Lee & Tan, 2006) according to the pseudocode in Figure 6.3. 
Meanwhile Figure 6.4 shows the decryption stage of MePKC encryption scheme. 



(1.0) User A creates one's public key P A and send to user B: 

(1.1) P A — k A G (mod p) 

(2.0) User B creates one's public key Pb and send to user A: 

(2.1) P B — k B G (mod p) 

(3.0) User A is to send message M to user B: 

(3.1) P z ― zG (mod p); P D z(k B G) (mod p) ― zP B (mod p) 

(3.2) F — E*P Dx (mod p) 

(3.3) C encrypt(M, E), using AES-192. 

(3.4) Send P z , F, and C to user B. 



Figure 6.3 Encryption stage of MePKC encryption scheme (P-192) 



(1.0) User B receives P z , F, and C from user A. 

(2.0) User B decrypts for symmetric key E: 

(2.1) P D ― k B (zG) (mod p) ― k B P z (mod p) 

(2.2) F 1 multiplicativelnverse(F) (mod p) 

(2.3) E — P Dx * F 1 (mod p) — P Dx / F (mod p) 

(3.0) User B decrypts for message M: 

(3.1) M decrypt(C, E), using AES-192. 



Figure 6.4 Decryption stage of MePKC encryption scheme (P-192) 



58 



6.6.4 Signature Scheme of MePKC 

ECDSA stands for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Using the 
ECDSA signature scheme (Hankerson, Menezes, & Vanstone, 2004, 2005), we 
firstly define parameter as follows: 

k A = user A's private key from a 192-bit secret, where < k A < n 

Pa = user A's public key 

k B = user B's private key from a 192-bit secret, where < k B < n 

P B = user B's public key 

z = 192-bit random number, where < z < n 

P z (Pzx , Pz y ) = point of random number z, satisfying P z = zG (mod p) 
r, s = 192-bit bitstream, where 0<r<n, 0<s<n 
M = message 

e = message digest by hashing message M using hash function like SHA-512 
DS = digital signature consisting of (r, s) 



(1.0) User A creates one's public key P A and send to user B: 

(1.1) P A — k A G (mod p) 

(2.0) User B creates one's public key Pb and send to user A: 

(2.1) P B — k B G (mod p) 

(3.0) User A is to sign message M: 

(3.1) Select randomly z from [1, n-1]. 

(3.2) P z — zG (mod p) 

(3.3) r Pzx (mod n); if r = 0, go back to Step (3.1). 

(3.4) e Hash(M), using SHA-512 and 192-bit hash truncation from MSB. 

(3.5) z" 1 <— multiplicativelnverse(z) (mod n) 

(3.6) s ト z _1 * (e + rk A ) (mod n); if s = 0, go back to Step (3.1). 

(3.7) DS ᅳ (r, s) 

(4.0) User A sends message M and digital signature DS(r, s) to user B. 



Figure 6.5 Signing stage of MePKc signature scheme (P-192) 



59 



Software prototype has also been built and tested for MePKC signature 
scheme (Lee & Tan, 2006) based on elliptic curve P-192 in Section 6.6.2. Figures 
6.5-6.6 shows the signing stage and verification stage of MePKC signature scheme, 
respectively. 



(1.0) User B receives message M and digital signature DS(r, s) from user A. 

(2.0) User B verifies the digital signature DS: 

(2.1) If r = or r 〉 n-l, reject the signature. 

(2.2) If s = or s 〉 n-l, reject the signature. 

(2.3) e Hash(M), using SHA-512 and 192-bit hash truncation from MSB. 

(2.4) s" 1 multiplicativelnverse(s) (mod n) 

(2.5) w s" 1 (mod n) 1 / s (mod n) 

(2.6) ui ew (mod n); U2 = rw (mod n) 

(2.7) V(V X , V y ) ― uiG + u 2 P A (mod p) 

(2.8) If V = co, i.e. point at infinity or zero point, then reject the signature. 

(2.9) V — V x (mod n) ᄂ 

(2.10) If V = r, then accept the signature; else, reject the signature. 

Figure 6.6 Verification stage of MePKC signature scheme (P-192) 

6.7 Other Cryptographic, Information-Hiding, and Non-Cryptographic 
Applications of Secret beyond 128 bits 

Other useful applications of the present invention in applying the created big 
memorizable secret is various other cryptographic, information-hiding, and non- 
cryoptographic applications needing a big memorizable secret(s). Interested readers 
may try to imagine those applications, and then will know that abundant fully big 
memorizable secret keys are needed, in which 2D key and multihash key can jointly 
solve this problematic demand. 

The other cryptographic applications include various PAKE (Password- 
Authenticated Key Exchange) like SPEKE (Simple Password Exponential Key 
Exchange) (Jablon, 2006) and SRP-6 (Secure Remote Password Protocol version 6) 
(Wu, 2003). 



60 



Meanwhile, information-hiding applications (Petitcolas, Anderson, & Kuhn, 
1999; Moulin & O' Sullivan, 2003) include stego-key in steganography (Simmons, 
1984, 1998; Anderson & Petitcolas, 1998; Cachin, 1998; Mittelholzer, 1999; Fridrich 
& Goljan, 2004; Fridrich, Goljan, & Soukal, 2004; Lu, 2005), secret key in 
symmetric watermarking, and private key in asymmetric watermarking (Swanson, 
Kobayashi, & Tewfik, 1998; Low & Maxemchuk, 1998; Hartung & Kutter, 1999; 
Mittelholzer, 1999; Mohanty, 1999; Wolfgang, Podilchuk, & Delp, 1999; Eggers, Su, 
& Girod, 2000; Collberg & Thomborson, 2002; Hachez & Quisquater, 2002; Arnold, 
Schmucker, & Wolthusen, 2003; Furon, 2005; Furon & Duhamel, 2003; Barni & 
Bartolini, 2004; Cayre, Fontaine, & Furon, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; Lu, 2005; Cox, 
Doerr, & Furon, 2006; Furht & Kirovski, 2006a, 2006b). 

Lastly, non-cryptographic applications include seed for PRNG (Pseudo- 
Random Number Generator) and CSPRBG (Cryptographically Secure Pseudo- 
Random Bit Generator) (Eastlake, Crocker, & Schiller, 1994; Rukhin, Soto, 
Nechvatal, Smid, Barker, Leigh, Levenson, V angel, Banks, Heckert, Dray, & Vo, 
2001; Le Quere, 2004; Keller, 2005; Barker & Kelsey, 2007; Campbell & Easter, 
2007b) like the Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) CSPRNG (Mollin, 2007a, p. 508, 2007b). 



61 



CHAPTER 7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (PART 4): 
ANTI-HACKING DATA STORAGE USING 
IMPROVED DIP SWITCH 

7.1 Overview 

A dual in-line package (DIL/DIP) switch has been modified to collectively 
link all the poles using a single actuator and called anti-hacking DIP switch. The 
actuator can be a raised/recessed slide, raised/recessed rocker, or piano-type (aka 
side/level), selectively switching on or off one/two groups of poles oppositely. A 
specific inventive application is when a 10/12-way anti-hacking DIP switch is 
integrated with two modular jack RJ45 sockets and a second storage device 
preferably via USB connection, a secure data storage resisting the computer hacking 
in a malicious computer network is created. This new component is simple, cost- 
effective, and anti-hacking. Yet a novel variant is NiPST+N 2 PST DIP switch with 
reverse activation. 

7.2 Introduction 

Hacking or cracking into a computer from a malicious computer network is a 
great threat to the information security of private and confidential data in this 
electronic society. History of hacking and cracking can be traced. To resist the 
hacking and cracking, network settings and firewall software (Ogletree, 2000) are 
among the available best tools. However, these tools are complicated and not user- 
friendly to a networking novice like common Internet user. They are only good to 
network administrator who has undergone training and/or understood the operating 
manual. 

In other words, network settings and firewall software are excellent at the 
server side but not the client side. Technical difficulty and affordable cost are two 
main factors discouraging the users to adopt these two anti-hacking approaches 
effectively. Furthermore, end users normally do not require data sharing via web 
hosting like server. This indicates that private and confidential data of end users can 



62 



actually be partitioned from the data without security concern. For more information 
on the imperative demand of anti-hacking data storage, please refer to a book excerpt 
by Burgess and Power (2008) as follows: 

"The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that counterfeit and pirated 
products account for 5 percent to 7 percent of the global economy, and results in the 
loss of more than 750,000 jobs and approximately $250 billion in sales to the United 
States alone 

The threats of economic espionage and intellectual property (IP) theft are 
global, stealthy, insidious, and increasingly common. According to the U.S. 
Commerce Department, IP theft is estimated to top $250 billion annually and also 
costs the United States approximately 750,000 jobs. The International Chamber of 
Commerce puts the global fiscal loss at more than $600 billion a year." 

In addition to the financial loss of confidential information and business 
secret, there are cronies of organized crime using the hacked secrets, flash mob 
approach, and sound snatching to conspire for more serious crimes like to worsen a 
good human relationship and/or to fasten a cheating human interaction. Married 
couples may be made divorced. Lovers may be made suspicious between themselves. 
Relatives, friends, colleagues, and organization members may be made trust-less and 
negatively emotional. Cheaters may succeed to establish trust, cultivate positively 
false emotion, and build a dishonest relationship leading to a marriage for sharing or 
even controlling the power, wealth, reputation, and fame of a single man or woman 
with good social status. In short, the criminals may cheat for secret, sex, trust, 
emotion, power, money, and assets. 

Beaver (2004) reported that a networked computer without proper firewall 
(Ogletree, 2000) settings would be hacked within 30 minutes. Yet in the latest news, 
Markoff (2008) informed that the hacking period dropped to less than 5 minutes after 
a hacker had operated for 30 seconds to access a prey computer. This reflects how 
serious and dangerous the current computer communications network security 
(Stallings, 2000) is in this networked info-computer era. 



63 



Identity theft can happen when a hacker copies a prey's computer data as disk 
image using disk cloning software, and then put the disk image into a second 
computer and modify, add, delete, etc. on some contents, which can create imitator- 
type zombie computer and/or infected-type botnet. This imitator-type zombie 
computer, when connected to the Internet, can fool other prey hackers watching this 
zombie computer version 2. Of course, if there are any confidential information, 
business secret, and other intangible assets, in the prey computers, then they shall be 
considered as disclosed and released to the hackers, or wider to the public domain. 

Here, method and device are proposed to secure an anti-hacking data storage 
for end users. This method uses a new component called anti-hacking DIP switch 
integrated with two modular jack sockets and a second storage device like hard disk 
drive (HDD) or USB (Universal Serial Bus) flash drive. Private and confidential data 
is stored in the second storage device. An ti -hacking DIP switch controls the normal 
networking mode while it is switched into one direction and anti-hacking mode while 
it is switched into the opposite direction. This method is simple, cost-effective, and 
hack-proof. End users can use this method to have anti-hacking working 
environment without risking the firewall. 

7.3 Proposing Improved DIP Switch 

For conventional n-way nPST (n Poles Single Throw) DIP switch, all the n 
poles are independently switched on or off in parallel with the pin pairs 101 and 102. 
A simple structural diagram of a 10- way DIP switch is shown in Figure 7.1. Here, a 
modified DIP switch called anti-hacking DIP switch is innovatively proposed, where 
all the individual switches of the DIP switch are joined and controlled 
simultaneously by a transverse slider acting as an actuator in Figure 7.2. Alternative 
actuators are raised/recessed slide, raised/recessed rocker, or piano-type (aka 
side/level). When a USB connection is considered, an 8-way anti-hacking DIP switch 
for Ethernet cable will become 10/1 2- way, or an extra 2/4- way DIP switch. The 
slider 103 can be wiped transversely to the pin pairs 104 and 105 to either switch on 
the networking connection and off the connection of the second storage device, or 
oppositely. This means DIP switch is 10/ 12- way nPDT (n Poles Double Throws). 



64 



101 




> 102 



Figure 7.1 Structural diagram of conventional 10- way DIP switch 



104 < 




103 



105 



Figure 7.2 Structural diagram of proposed 10/12-way anti-hacking DIP switch 



There are two groups of poles in opposite connections: 8-way RJ45/RJ11 
networking connection and 2/4 -way USB connection. 10Mbps and 100Mbps 
Ethernet over twisted pair can use 4-way connection, but lGbps/ 1000Mbps Ethernet 
must use 8-way connection. For USB connection, it can be 4 or 2 ways by saving the 
power and ground cables. It is then integrated with two RJ45 sockets and two USB 
sockets to form a simple and cost-effective innovation (Lee, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). 

If Category 5/5e cable defined in ANSI/TIA/EIA-568-A and TIA/EIA-568-B, 
respectively, is used, the RJ45 socket will be backwards compatible with RJ11 for 
two running pairs and one running pair, respectively. 



65 



7 A Method and Device to Secure Anti-Hacking Data Storage 

Insofar as the anti-hacking DIP switch is specifically designed for a method 
and device to secure an anti-hacking data storage. An 8/ 10- way anti-hacking DIP 
switch is integrated with two modular connector RJ45 sockets to connect or 
disconnect the networking connection, and two optional USB sockets to oppositely 
disconnect or connect the second storage device on a PCB (Printed Circuit Board). 
The integration without USB sockets functioning as an RJ switch can be 
implemented as a wall plate for new installation or as an external interconnection box 
for old design and inconvenient switch access. 

For the end user's computer, a second storage device is needed. This can be 
either an internal or external hard disk drive (HDD). It can also be a USB flash drive. 
For external HDD and USB flash drive, they are hot-swappable when USB port is 
used. For internal HDD of the type of SATA (Serial Advanced Technology 
Attachment), a switch is needed to control the data connection. This switch called 
HDD switch can be an 8-way DIP switch installed at the back panel of computer with 
old design or at the front panel of computer with new design. Similarly, the 
connection of external HDD and USB flash drive via USB port can adopt a 2/4 -way 
switch. This can get rid of the plug-and-play which can cause reliability problem 
after frequent plugging and unplugging. 



Table 7.1 Operating modes of method and device to secure anti-hacking data storage 



Operating Mode 


Networking Connection 


Second Storage Device 


Anti-hacking 


Disconnected 


Connected 


Network access 


Connected 


Disconnected 



For real implementation, an RJ switch has been designed and constructed by 
Kok-Wah Lee, and burnt by Voon-Chet Koo on to a PCB, as an interconnection box 
from an 8-way DIP switch and two RJ45 sockets. The end user uses a computer 
connected to an external HDD via USB port. The storage device can also be a USB 
flash drive. An Ethernet cable links the RJ45 socket of the interconnection box and 



66 



computer. Second Ethernet cable links the second RJ45 socket of the interconnection 
box and the networking wall plate. Clearly, these can be easily understood by any 
normal end user. The 8-way switch can also be made 10/ 12- way if the optional USB 
connection is added. Then, there are two operating modes as in Table 7.1. 

For secure anti-hacking operating mode, the actuator is switched to 
disconnect the networking connection and then connect the second storage device. 
The end user can create, open, modify, and store one's private and confidential data 
in the second storage device. When network access is needed, the second storage 
device is disconnected and then the network is connected. The end user can now surf 
the Internet and one's data in the second storage device is safe from hacking via the 
malicious computer network. Once the demand for network access has finished, the 
end user can switch back to the anti-hacking operating mode to manipulate the 
private and confidential data. Thus, original plaintext and decrypted ciphertext can be 
securely stored from virtual hacking at the second storage device. 

7.5 Other Forms of Innovation 

An innovation of the improved 8-way 8PST DIL switch as in Figures 7.1-7.2 
is to become a 10- way 8PST+2PST DIL switch with an actuator activating 8PST and 
2PST in opposite direction, where 8PST controls the network connection of RJ-XX 
and 2PST is extendable to other nPST to control the hot-swappable USB or SATA 
data/power connection to create an anti-hacking data storage as in Figure 7.3. 

As in Figures 7.1-7.2, the 8-way 8PST DIL switch acting as RJ switch for 
wired Ethernet network can be modified to become 4-way 4PST DIL switch acting 
as hot-swappable USB switch to control the wireless network connection using the 
wireless USB network adapter operating on the wireless communication protocols 
like Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, 3G, WiMAX, etc. 

In Figure 7.3, the 10- way 8PST+2PST DIL switch with reverse activation 
630 can be modified to have the first 8PST 610 acting as RJ switch or to become 
4PST acting as a USB switch for wireless USB network adapter in similarity with 
Figures 7.1-7.2, and the second 2PST 620 is extendable to other nPST for other types 



67 



of data connection, like SAT A and USB, to a storage device like HDD and USB 
flash drive. 



630 



r 



610 



620 



610 



ノ 



620 



Figure 7.3 Innovated 10- way 8PST+2PST DIL switch activated in opposite direction 



The improved DIL switch so far can be other types of switch performing 
these enhanced functions to create anti-hacking data storage, where they can also 
switch on or off a few little switches to control the data and power connections like 
keylock switch, selector switch, pushbutton switch, rocker switch, rotary switch, 
slide switch, toggle switch, etc., with or without a light indicator of network 
connection. 

There are also some originally novel prototypes for this innovated DIP switch 
in the forms of layout-design of integrated circuit in Malaysia (Lee, 2005, 2006b, 
2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2008d, 2008e, 2008f, 2008g). 



68 



CHAPTER 8 RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS 



8.1 Overview of Results 

For all the four major novel knowledge contributions proposed by Kok-Wah 
Lee, they can work alone or be integrated to work as a whole as in Figure 8.1. 



(1.0) User creates an n-bit big memorizable secret, using 2D key. 
(2.0) User feeds the created 2D key as n-bit master key and optionally other 
parameters into the processing of multihash key to generate multiple n-bit slave 
keys for offline or online accounts. 

(3.0) Each n-bit slave key can be used for any application needing n-bit secret key. 
(4.0) Those application types are cryptographic, information hiding, and non- 
cryptographic types. 

(5.0) For PKC using fully memorizable private key directly from 2D key or 
indirectly, MePKC (Memorizable Public Key Cryptography) is created. 
(6.0) Anti-hacking data storage using improved DIP switch is used to securely 
store the original plaintext and decrypted ciphertext. 

Figure 8.1 Overview of the four major novel knowledge contributions 



8,2 Two-Dimensional (2D) Key 

8.2.1 Discussions: High-Entropy Secret 

The advantages of 2D key are good memorizability, high-entropy key, high 
randomness due to pictorial nature of key styles in 2D space, more references at the 
user interface to facilitate key input, and resistance to dictionary attack. Even pre- 
computation attack can be avoided if the 2D secret is used on the platform of 
MePKC. Moreover, for a long passphrase having many individual units like word, 
the key input time of 2D key is faster than the single-line key field whenever there is 
some interrupt and the user has forgotten the input sequence. This is because only 
that particular sub-unit has to be keyed in again and not the whole secret, such like 
the secret style of multiline passphrase. 

For memory medium, 2D key can be used in paper form and computer form. 
In term of memory scale, 256 bits can be maximally achieved by most people. The 



69 



user's capability in the graphical nature of 2D key decides a person's maximum 
mnemonic 2D key size. Key styles like crossword, ASCII art, and Unicode art are 
excellent in resisting guessing attack and dictionary attack. So far there is no feasibly 
comprehensive dictionary for ASCII art or Unicode art yet on Earth planet. 
Meanwhile for crossword, the bilingual or multilingual nature and its flexible word 
architecture can fail the operation of dictionary attack. 

Hence, 2D key is unique away from the currently practised ID (one- 
dimensional) nature of single-line key/password field, in which 2D key has 
collectively the features of bigger mnemonic key size and higher randomness. In 
other words, 2D key is a type of high-entropy secret. 

8.2.2 Limitations 

Table 4.1 shows the setting sufficiency of 2D key input method. Meanwhile, 
Table 6.1 shows the possible dimensions of 2D key to have fulfilled the equivalent 
threshold symmetric key sizes at different security strength. From these two tables, 
we can see that Unicode-based 2D key can be entered by a user using less number of 
characters than ASCII-based 2D key, but the current button set of keyboard design 
for ASCII encoding has limited the input speed of each Unicode character. Thus, 
regardless of ASCII-based 2D key or Unicode-based 2D key, one of its 
disadvantages is more time for key input. 

For the second weakness, due to non-simultaneous 2D key input upon 
disturbance, there is possible shoulder-surfing attack from the nearby people or 
camera, especially the currently popular usage of mobile phones with camera 
functions. Hence, small 2D key may be used at public areas; whereas bigger and 
stronger 2D key may be used at private areas, like personal room. This is because the 
bigger is the 2D key, the longer the time it needs to be entered, and the harder the 
simultaneity chance it can achieve. 

8.2.3 Conclusion 



70 



Here, the high-entropy 2D key input method has been proposed. It solves the 
memorizability problem due to human factor and user interface problem of single- 
line key/password field. For variability, 2D key has the key styles of multiline 
passphrase, crossword, ASCII art, Unicode art, colourful text, and sensitive input 
sequence. The memorizable limit of 96-bit key is increased to 256-bit key, where 
even the private key is memorizable. This creates 160-bit to 256-bit MePKC with 
protection period up to 50 years. 

8.3 Multihash Key 

8.3.1 Discussions: Comparisons 

Table 8.1 compares various key management tools with multihash key from 
the aspects of usability, security, and possible implementation. A lot of comparisons 
are attributed by Yee and Sitaker (2006) on Passpet. New features used for 
comparisons are applicability to offline and online accounts, integrated usages 
together with other key management tools and possible implementations. It is 
important to note here that multihash key can be used together with Passpet to earn 
"Yes" for items [L7-L9] under the security features in Table 8.1. 

Multihash key can be used for both offline and online accounts. Possible 
implementations are stand-alone application and browser extension. These are simple 
interfaces to input a password or key with unique key images for multiple accounts. 
Memorizability is improved since there is only one secret for various login accounts. 

Server is not used and hence there is no central authority. There are no single 
point of r ailure and high cost of integration. It is mobile and there is no encrypted 
storage of site keys. Since there is no integration, multihash key can be used for any 
existing computer systems. 

8.3.2 Discussions: Suitable Time Bounds 

The passcode is optional to be remembered by a user because it can be 
converted to be an 8-bit password supplement in one of the two methods of key 
strengthening (Manber, 1996; Abadi, Lomas, & Needham, 1997, 2000). Master key 



71 



is the password, and when it is combined with the password supplement, they form 
the full password. Another key strengthening method is also called key stretching, 
which uses a large amount of hash iterations (Kelsey, Schneier, Hall, & Wagner, 
1997). 



Table 8.1 Comparisons of key management tools 



Feature s\Key management tools 


Plain 

browser 


Password Password Windows 
autofill safe live ID 


LPWA 


HP site 
password 


CPG 


Password 
multiplier 


SPP 


Pwd 
Hash 


Passpet 


Multihash 

key 


Usability 


1. Make logging in more convenient 


No 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


No 




Yes 


? 


No 


Yes 




2. Work with existing websites 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


3. Allow site-by -site migration to 
tool 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


4. Change individual site keys 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 




Yes 


Yes 


5. Log in from other computers 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


6. Only need to memorize one secret 


No 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 




Yes 


Yes 


7. Enable changing the master secret 






Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


8. Applicability to offline accounts 






Yes 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


Yes 


9. Applicability to online accounts 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


10. Integrate usages together with 
other tools 






Yes 


No 


No 


Yes 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


Yes 


Security 


1. Unique key for each account 


No 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


2. Resist offline dictionary attacks 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


Yes 


No 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


3. Adapt to increasing CPU power 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


Yes 


No 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


4. Avoid storing keys 


Yes 


No 


No 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


5. Avoid a single central authority 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


6. Resist phishing by fake login 
forms 


No 


No 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


7. Resist mimicry of browser UI 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


Yes 


No 


8. Help the user identify websites 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


Yes 


No 


9. Stop entering secrets in webpages 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


Yes 


? 


Yes 


? 


No 


Yes 


? 


Possible implementation 


1. Stand-alone application 


No 


No 


Yes 


No 


No 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


2. single sign-on server 


No 


No 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


No 


No 


No 


No 


No 


3. Browser extension 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 



?: Unknown situation depending on implementation 



The variant of SHA-2, which is SHA-512, is used in the key hashing and key 
strengthening. This is because there are possible collision attacks to MD5 and SHA-L 



72 



The hash truncation creates a 256-bit hash as site key. The unused truncated bit 
creates a 128-bit security strength (256/2=128) preventing the compromised site keys 
at the higher security level from revealing the site keys at the lower security level. 
The passcode also has this feature but is very much less powerful. 

For the experimental data of lower bound k ᄂ and upper bound bu of some 
computer systems, there are reported as follows. For instance, for the first computer 
system of desktop PC [Example 1: Pentium II 266MHz, 192MB RAM, running on 
Windows XP Professional Edition SP1], the lower and upper bounds for 1 -second 
hash iteration, as in Figure 5.1, are 7600 and 8200, respectively. In other words, the 
first computer system can only support 20 offline accounts for a security level 
partitioning of 8 bits or 2 8 . 

Yet in the second computer system of desktop PC [Example 2: Pentium IV 
1.8GHz, 512MB RAM, running on Windows XP Home Edition (version 2002) SP2], 
the lower and upper bounds for 1 -second hash iteration are 39,400 and 41,700 
respectively. For this specification, the third computer system can support 100 offline 
accounts for a security level partitioning of 8 bits or 2 8 . 

Yet in the third computer system of laptop PC [Example 3: Centrino Duo 
1.66GHz, 1.5GB RAM, running on Windows XP Home Edition], the lower and 
upper bounds for 1 -second hash iteration are 81,700 and 93,700 respectively. For this 
specification, the second computer system can support 256 offline accounts for a 
security level partitioning of 8 bits or 2 8 . 

These three computer systems, together with other four, are summarized into 
Table 8.2. The fourth computer system is a desktop PC [Example 4: AMD Athlon 64 
Processor 3800+, 2.40GHz, 1GB RAM, running on Windows 7 Enterprise Edition 
(version 2009) (32-bit OS)]. The fifth computer system is a desktop PC [Example 5: 
Intel Pentium D (Dual Core) 2.80+2.79GHz, (512MB or 1GB) RAM, running on 
Windows XP Professional Edition (version 2002) SP3]. The sixth computer system 
is a desktop PC [Example 6: Intel Pentium Core2Duo CPU E4600, 2.40+2.39GHz, 
3.48/4GB RAM, running on Windows XP Professional Edition (version 2002) SP3]. 
The seventh computer system is a desktop PC [Example 7: Intel Core i3 2x2.93GHz, 
4GB RAM, running on Windows XP Home Edition (version 2002) SP2]. 



73 



Table 8.2 One-second time bounds of several computer systems 



No. 


CPU 


Lower 1 -Second 
Time Bound (loop) 


Upper 1 -Second 
Time Bound (loop) 


Range of Time 
Bound (loop) 


1 
丄 


Intel Pentium II 
266MHz 


ᄀ Ann 
/,ouu 


o,zuu 


ouu 


2 


Intel Pentium IV 
1.8GHz 


39,400 


41,700 


2,300 


3 


Intel Centrino Duo 
1.66GHz 


81,700 


93,700 


12,000 


4 


AMD Athlon 64 
Processor 3800+ 
2.40GHz 


69,900 


77,300 


7,400 




Intel Pentium D 
(Dual Core) 
2.80+2.79GHz 


78,200 


87,000 


8,800 


6 


Intel Pentium 
Core2Duo CPU 
E4600 2.40+2.39GHz 


69,000 


76,000 


7,000 




Intel Core i3 
2x2.93GHz 


185,300 


205,500 


20,200 



Using the proposed settings, the key strengthening has an access time from 
0.2 second to 2 seconds. This is an efficient range of acceptable login processing 
time. It can be calibrated to be parallel with the advances in computer technologies 
for new releases of multihash key. Moore's Law is a good rule to judge the 
calibration, which is about one bit faster for every two years. 

Key hashing and key strengthening are also good techniques to resist offline 
and online dictionary attacks as well as pre-computation attacks. To prevent phishing 
and spoofing attacks, multihash key can either be used together with other anti- 
phising tool like petname system and Passpet, or include domain name URL in its 
key hashing. Malicious server attack is also prevented as different accounts have 
unique passwords. For homograph attack due to visually similar Unicode graphic 
symbols, the implementation of multihash key shall support the Unicode characters. 

Up to here, the basic model of multihash key can support almost infinite 
number of online account. Meanwhile, the number of supported offline account by 
multihash key is given by Equation (8.1). From Figure 5.2, the security level x can be 



74 



increased up to the maximum of hash iteration number ゾ max . Also, hash functions 
beyond 512 bits like 768 and 1024 bits may be needed. 

Saco = X (8.1) 

8.3.3 Limitations 

Multihash key can be implemented as a stand-alone application with no 
change of setting at the server side. However, it is vulnerable to password file 
compromise attacks and message log file attacks. Nevertheless, domino effect of 
password reuse can be avoided. To get rid of password file compromise attacks and 
message log file attacks, some countermeasures (Gouda, Liu, Leung, & Alam, 2005) 
can be adopted by changing the settings of authentication approach at client and 
server sides. 

Acting as a stand-alone application, multihash key requires a user to perform 
extra steps. These steps are creating a key, copying, and pasting it to a login 
prompted textbox. The user also needs to remember the security level of an account, 
an at least 128-bit master key, and a numeric 4-digit passcode. These cause the 
solution to be not user-friendly. 

To facilitate the application, multihash key has to be integrated into the user 
interface of each authentication application. Therefore, the item [LI] of usability in 
Table 8.1 about convenient logging in depends on implementation. 

For security level, it can be jotted into a notebook in plaintext form because it 
is not an essential secret. Alternatively, for online account, the user can be reminded 
about the security level whenever the user sends the username to the server. This 
allows an attacker to reduce the number of hash testing by 20 times, or 4.32 bits 
Hog 2 20). 

For numeric 4-digit passcode, it gives an extra security of 13.29 bits 
(=log2l0 000) and is not an essential secret. This passcode can be made constant for 
user with poor memory. For user who can remember 128-bit master key, 4-digit 
passcode and security level, the effective security strength is 145.61 bits. For user 



75 



who can remember only the 128-bit master key, its security strength is 128 bits. 
Hence, security can be compensated for better usability. 

Using multihash key, limited number of multiple offline and online accounts 
can be supported as compared to the almost infinite number of online accounts for 
LPWA, HP Site Password, CPG, Password Multiplier, SPP, PwdHash, and Passpet. 
For more accounts, faster computer system is needed to have larger range of lower to 
upper 1 -second time bound. Or else, the partition between any two security levels has 
to be reduced. 

8.3.4 Conclusion 

The proposed invention of multihash key requires users to remember a master 
key and passcode to generate unique key hashes (aka site keys, slave keys) for 
multiple accounts. For security level, username, and domain name of a specific 
account, users can choose to write them down somewhere as they are not critical 
secrets. This is a balance between the usability and security. 

Multihash key can be used for offline and online accounts, where existing 
similar key management tools without encrypted site key storage can only be applied 
to online accounts. It is hoped that this proposal can release the human memory 
burden on required passwords or keys for various types of increasing accounts. To 
have better resistance to phishing and spoofing attacks, try to use multihash key 
together with an anti-phishing tool like petname system and Passpet. 

8.4 MePKC & Its Applications 

8.4.1 Discussions: Enablement of Amazing Functions 

Since the Diffie and Hellman's proposal (1976), PKC (Public Key 
Cryptography) has become a dream in public domain. Then the RSA of IFC (Integer 
Factorization Cryptography) (Rivest, Shamir, & Adleman, 1978, 1983) practically 
realizes the implementation of PKC for encryption scheme and digital signature 
scheme. Nevertheless, for about 30 years, the secure storage of private key at 
sufficient key size has been a long lasting open hard problem. The current prior arts 



76 



of private key storage are encrypted private key, split private key, and roaming 
private key. Their common feature, that there is no capable technique to create fully 
memorizable private key, has greatly constrained the popularity of public key 
certificate in particular, and the widespread of PKC applications in general. 

Mathematics and science with theory only and without any application can 
hardly stimulate a person's interest. For instance, mathematics is the queen of 
science, and number theory is the queen of mathematics. However, without the 
widespread applications of cryptography and computing, number theory would not 
have become a chapter in the further mathematics subject at pre-university (pre-U) 
level, like STPM in Malaysia (equivalent with Advanced Level (A-Level) in UK). It 
is because of the applications of knowledge, like mathematics and science, that 
humans have technologies later. 

Here, 2D key has enabled possible high-entropy private key, which is big, 
memorizable, and yet random. On the other hand, multihash key has solved the 
technical and legal problems to have different asymmetric key pairs for different 
PKC schemes. Gathering both the forces of 2D key and multihash key, a big secret 
from 2D key as the master key can generate multiple slave keys. Either the 2D key 
directly, or the slave keys indirectly, have solved the open hard problem of fully 
memorizable private key. In other words in term of authentication factor, "what you 
know" like secret can begin dominating the technology of private key storage, by 
replacing the currently dominant authentication factor "what you have" like token or 
encrypted ciphertext. 

Encryption scheme and signature scheme are the most common applications 
of PKC. Using Microsoft Visual Basic and Microsoft Visual C++ of Microsoft 
Visual Studio .NET 2003 (Academic Edition), Kok-Wah Lee has built prototypes of 
192-bit MePKC encryption scheme and signature scheme for experiment testing (Lee 
& Tan, 2006), based on the works of: 

(i) Kok-Wah Lee for ECC functions, multiplicative inverse function, data 
type conversion, and GUI in Microsoft Windows environment; 

(ii) multiplicative inverse function from a book by Menezes, Oorschot, and 
Vanstone (1996); 



77 



(iii) ECC functions from a few books (Blake, Seroussi, & Smart, 1999, 2005; 
Stallings, 2006); 

(iv) SHA-512 function from toolbox of Microsoft Visual C++ 2003; and 

(v) Alan Wee-Chiat Tan for programming the big number class in C++ 
language by sourcing the ideas of data type and arithmetic of school book from Kok- 
Wah Lee. 

Coming to Microsoft Visual Studio 2010, the class of big integer arithmetic 
(aka big number, arbitrary precision arithmetic) has now been included and provided. 
Thus, one can have more efficient and faster computations of big number, without 
inventing the wheels again. 

Other MePKC applications, that can be imagined for proof of concept, can be 
referred at Sections 6.2 and 6.6.1. They may or even can collectively solve some 
potentially critical social problems on Earth planet now in chain effect as follows: 

(i) Materials chain: Computer system as multi-purpose machine > electronic 
world > less demand for materials > less paper and more conserved jungle; less metal 
and more preserved ore supply > friendly Earth surface environment > green Earth. 

(ii) Residence chain: Computer communication network > Internet > online 
service providers > de-urbanization of population > de-centralization of water supply 

> less wasted clean water > more supply variety in terms of quality and quantity to 
suburban and village areas > friendly human living environment > green Earth. 

{in) Equipment chain: Recyclable materials to make computer? (i.e. an open 
problem) > computer system as multi-purpose machine > replacing other tools, 
machines, and equipment > nano-electronics > less space demand > more 
comfortable human population > friendly chemical environment > green Earth. 

(iv) Communications chain: Electronic communication and form processing 

> less transportation > less demand of petroleum > more efficient usage of electricity 
power > less energy demand > friendly climate environment > green Earth. 



78 



For the world summit conferences in the recent years, climate change is the 
main topic. From experts, they claim that upon an increase of 2°C (or 2 Kelvins) in 
temperature relative to the Earth average temperature in year 1900, then the Earth 
planet will fall into a positive feedback loop to keep on warming up the Earth planet. 
To prevent this event from happening, the present humans have to take immediate 
measures. 

8.4.2 Limitations 

For ASCII-based 2D key, the maximum key size of big secret for normal 
humans is 256 bits, where up to 256-bit MePKC can be realized and applied. To go 
until 512-bit MePKC, Unicode-based 2D key is needed. However, the present 
keyboard is designed for ASCII encoding, and it is not efficient to enter Unicode 
characters. 

During the input of 2D key, especially when it is really big, then a user may 
need to view the 2D key in plaintext form for the whole entry process. For small 2D 
key, the 2D key remaining in the hidden form of ciphertext can easily be ensured. 
Thus, shoulder- surfing attack and hacking attack exist for big 2D key. 

Shoulder-surfing attack can be avoided when big 2D key is used only at 
private areas like personal office, personal home, etc. Hacking attack can be stopped 
by firstly disconnecting the network access, before the input of big 2D key, and upon 
finishing entering the 2D key, then connect back to the network like Internet. We can 
adopt this approach by applying the anti-hacking data storage using improved DIP 
switch. 

Elliptic curve arithmetic is not an easy subject, but very difficult to 
understand. Thus, this subject may have hindered the progress and harbinger of 
MePKC and its applications. 

8.4.3 Conclusion 

MePKC and its applications can stretch from individual works, to small 
group works, to big group works, or even to super big group works. This can happen 



79 



depending on the human's needs for functions in the public key cryptography (PKC) 
to live in the electronic communications world. 

PKC is a way of secure communication. If one were at a university, one can 
observe the existence of some essential buildings like classroom for learning, library 
for book reading, hostel for accommodation, restaurant for food and beverage, bus 
stop and car parks for transportation, bank for financial services, and post office for 
mail communications and package delivery. There even exists an idiom saying that 
"Stamp collection is a hobby of kings, and a king of hobbies." as a reminder on the 
importance of message communications. In battles and wars, the military army is 
hence to attack, destroy, or capture the enemy's communication stations first. Thus, 
communications is an imperative, urgent, or important element in human life. 

"How to communicate more safely and efficiently in the electronic networked 
world?" is the main question to be answered by MePKC and its applications in this 
book. Till here, in this networked info-computer era, do you think that current human 
societies need computer hardware, computer software, communications network, 
Internet, multimedia informative contents, cryptography for secure communications, 
public key cryptography, and MePKC and its applications? Do they in great needs? 
Do they in immediate needs also? Otherwise, how to conserve a green Earth planet, 
in view of the current human population at about 7 billion in year 2011? 

8.5 Anti -Hacking Data Storage Using Improved DIP Switch 

8.5.1 Discussions: Costs and Reliability 

The current cost of a DIL switch in Malaysia ranges from MYR$3.88 to 
MYR$46.77 depending on the contact ratings of voltage and current, and operating 
life (Farnell, 2007). The FOREX (Foreign Exchange) of USD$1.00 was about 
MYR$3.50 in September 2007 and October 2008. Mass purchase over 500 pieces 
can reduce the unit price of DIL switch to MYR$2.56. Subsequently, it can be 
claimed that the added manufacturing cost is low and yet the added value of anti- 
hacking data storage is high. As at 26 April 2011, in Malaysia USD$1.00 would have 
MYR$2.9880. 



80 



The voltage and current of applied DIP switch will depend on the power over 
the Ethernet cable (i.e. PoE (Power over Ethernet), PoL (Power over LAN) or Inline 
Power), phone cable, and USB connection. Supplying power over Ethernet is 
strongly recommended to follow the IEEE Standard. Clause 33 of "IEEE 802.3-2005 
- Section Two" (LAN/MAN Standards Committee, 2005) provides 48 volts DC over 
two of the four available pairs on a Cat. 3 I Cat. 5 cable with a maximum current of 
400 mA for a maximum load power of 15.4 Watts. 

For the Ethernet cable over LAN in Malaysia, it is normally Cat. 5 T568B. 
Contact rating of phone cable for network usage is below the contact rating of 
Ethernet cable. If USB power cables travel through the DIP switch, then it is 4 ways 
and the contact rating is 5.25 V DC and 500 mA. Otherwise, it needs 2 ways and the 
contact rating of USB data cables is below 2.8 V and 20 mA for high speed USB 2.0. 

The reliability (aka operating life or service life) of DIP switch ranges from 
1,000 to 35,000 operations. The death of DIP switch depends on the change of 
contact resistance and the mechanical wear out of the actuator. It is expected that the 
improvements by Lin (1999) and Tai (2001) can further increased the operating life 
of DIP switch in parallel with the reduction of manufacturing materials, weight, and 
cost. It is a question on the balance of costs and reliability. 

This innovation is expected to be broadly used in the office environment, 
where there exists a lot of private and confidential data. If the anti-hacking operating 
mode and network access operating mode are activated once a day for five times per 
week, then the DIP switch can last for 3.85 years for the DIP switch with operating 
life of 1,000 operations. The contact ratings, operating life, and cost of DIP switch 
are closely correlated. Survey and research are needed for optimum manufacturing 
design and supply chain management. 

Yet another potentially broad application for men with good social status and 
women with good conditions, this anti-hacking data storage is also critical to protect 
their human interaction network, daily itinerary, future plans, and financial accounts 
from being maliciously conspired by the cronies of organized crime by using the 
hacked secrets, flash mob approach, and sound snatching. 



81 



8.5.2 Limitations 



There exists a possible loophole for anti -hacking DIP switch, where a skilful 
hacker can write spyware and send it to infect the first HDD of a networked 
computer during the network access operating mode. Then, the spyware is to copy 
the targeted original plaintext or decrypted ciphertext from the secure second storage 
device to the first hard disk drive during the anti -hacking operating mode. When 
back to the network access operating mode, the spyware automatically sends or the 
hacker hacks to get the duplicated secret files. 

In fact, this loophole is normally from an advanced hacker to have done so. 
Bait can be prepared to catch this type of hackers, but cooperation with the network 
services providers is needed. To get rid of the assistance of network services 
providers, or the network administrator of the network services provider is the 
malicious person, then partially true sensitive information or unique secrets have to 
be prepared in a bait computer to identity the hacker's human networks. 

This problem can also be avoided if the software architect of the OS like 
Microsoft Windows, Linux, and Apple Macintosh can cooperate and collaborate with 
the computer hardware architect to plant special local commands to execute, read, 
and write for a specially located storage device or computer port. For instance, a 
simple case is like the copying process from the secure second storage device to the 
first HDD can only be manually done via the keyboard command. In another case, 
the copying process may choose to ask for a password as pre-requisite first. 

To avoid another type of advanced hacker to do recovery of deleted file from 
the electronic storage devices like hard disk drive or flash disk drive, file shredder 
software can be used. So, for this anti-hacking method, system, and device, we can 
resist a big percentage of amateurish hackers using hacking tools designed by other 
expert hackers. 

To qualify for advanced hacker to break into this simple and cost effective 
method, the hacker has to know advanced computer programming language like 
C/C++ language and the secrets of common operating systems (OS) like Microsoft 
Windows. For some geniuses, they prefer to use Linux OS to do personalization. For 
instance, the advanced hacker has to know the network address of prey computer, file 



82 



location, file name, OS architecture, access time of isolated data storage device, 
online time of computer system, and anonymously safe IP address to receive the 
duplicated secret file to program one's hacking tools like spy ware to break into this 
proposed simple anti -hacking method and system. To resist this type of advanced 
hacker using personalized spyware, the secret file can be password protected by 2D 
key the big secret directly, or a slave key of multihash key indirectly. 

8.5.3 Conclusion 

Unless there is an advanced hacker who can interpret the weak 
electromagnetic radiation across the anti-hacking DIP switch, this proposed method 
and device for securing an anti-hacking data storage can be claimed to be fully 
resisting the hacking attacks. It is a simple integration consisting of an improved DIP 
switch, two RJ45 sockets, and two optional USB sockets. The proposed switch adds 
little manufacturing costs but highly added values, which may be a 10- way switch 
for a RJ45/RJ11 and a USB connection. This anti -hacking method and device is 
simple, cost-effective, and may even be hack-proof when cooperation of computer 
hardware architect and software architect has been achieved. 



83 



CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS 



9.1 Concise Summary 

In a nutshell, this doctoral research project has contributed a lot of originally 
novel knowledge contribution in the forms of methods, systems, and devices in the 
fields of information engineering, generally, and security engineering, particularly. 
Contribution impact by referring to the applications of research results for public 
usages is highly recommended in the operational direction of this project. 

Firstly, a method to create big and yet memorizable secrets called two 
dimensional (2D) key has been invented. To cater for the demands of multiple 
unique secrets to support various offline and online accounts, the multihash key 
using the hash iteration and hash truncation is then proposed. 

Later, we have applications of big secret(s), like the important MePKC 
(Memorizable Public-Key Cryptography). MePKC is realized by using the ECC 
(Elliptic Curve Cryptography). Then, to protect the original plaintext and decrypted 
ciphertext from hacking, anti-hacking data storage using improved DIP switch is 
designed. 

9.2 Suggestions for Future Research 

While reading the recommended supporting reading materials for this 
research project, readers may also consider developing any of the suggested research 
topics as discussed in this Section 9.2. 

9.2.1 512-Bit Multihash Key Needs Hash Function beyond 1024 Bits 

So far the popular and security intensively tested hash function is SHA 
(Secure Hash Algorithm) family. The longest message digest of this SHA is SHA- 
512 of SHA-2 with 512 bits. This has limited the application of multihash key to 
256-bit security for symmetric key and 128-bit security with 30-year protection for 
asymmetric private key. To achieve the higher security strength at 256 bits of 



84 



symmetric key strength for 512-bit asymmetric private key, multihash key needs to 
use 1024-bit hash function to generate 512-bit final slave key. 

For 1024-bit hash function, there exists a scalable polymorphic hash function 
(Roellgen, No date) to achieve this kind of message digest. Nevertheless, its security 
strength is not well tested by the peer researchers in information security. Therefore, 
while NIST is in the process of opening a website to accept the recommendation of 
SHA-3, even though its maximum hash value requirement is 512 bits, related 
researchers have to prepare themselves to go for a longer message digest up to 1024 
bits to realize the 256-bit to 512-bit MePKC (Memorizable Public-Key 
Cryptography). 

9.2.2 MePKC Extension to Other Non-Conventional Cryptographic Schemes 

In this thesis, the MePKC has been applied for encryption scheme and digital 
signature scheme. Other possible extensions are authentication, BAP (Byzantine 
Agreement Protocol), electronic commerce, and digital timestamping. 

Besides these conventional cryptographic schemes, interested researchers 
may apply MePKC for other non-conventional cryptographic schemes like key 
exchange, blind signature, multisignature, group -oriented signature, undeniable 
signature, threshold signature, fail-stop signature, group signature, proxy signature, 
signcryption, forward-secure signature, designated-verifier signature, copy protection, 
electronic cash, electronic voting, MAC (Message Authentication Code), key escrow, 
online verification of credit card, etc. Others include digital cheque (aka electronic 
cheque), software licensing, public-key certificate of public-key infrastructure (PKI), 
and multihash signature. 

The blind signature scheme includes its further applications for electronic 
cash (aka e-cash, electronic money, e-money, electronic currency, e-currency, digital 
cash, digital money, digital currency, or scrip), and electronic voting (aka e-voting, 
electronic election, e-election, electronic poll, e-poll, digital voting, digital election, 
or digital poll). 



85 



9.2.3 Big Secret(s) for Information-Hiding and Non-Cryptographic 
Applications 

In addition to the big secret(s) applications for cryptographic schemes, 
Section 6.7 has listed other applications of big secret(s) including the information 
hiding and non-cryptographic applications. The information-hiding applications 
include steganography, symmetric watermarking, and asymmetric watermarking. 
The non-cryptographic applications are to be the seeds of PRNG (Pseudo-Random 
Number Generator) and CSPRNG (Cryptographically Secure PRNG). 

Hence, there are lots of spacious rooms to evaluate the key sizes and 
corresponding bits of strength of these other applications of big secret(s). It is highly 
expected for the existence of some literatures about their practically secure key 
lengths and protection periods like the cryptographic schemes ("Cryptographic Key 
Length Recommendation," No date; E. Barker, W. Barker, Burr, Polk, & Smid, 
2007a, 2007b; Gehrmann & Nashmd, 2005, 2006, 2007). 

9.2.4 Safety Box Using Computerized Lock 

For safety box using computerized lock (Domenicone, 2000), its key pad is 
purely numeric and the display panel is single-line. The short-term memory limits of 
digits have been studied by Miller (1956) to be an average of 7 items plus or minus 2 
(7 土 2) (Jones, 2002; Doumont, 2002), and further studies show that they depends on 
languages (Jones, 2002) in general and phonological short-term memory of 2-second 
period (Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975) in particular. It is 9.9 digits in 
Chinese language (Hoosain & Salili, 1988) and 5.8 digits in Welsh language (Ellis & 
Hennelly, 1980). 

In other words, for single-line numeric passcode of this type of safety box, a 
user using English, Chinese, or Welsh language will have a passcode with average 
entropy of 23.25, 32.89, or 19.27 bits, respectively. The strength of these key lengths 
is insecure whenever a brute force attack can be launched towards the safety box. 



86 



Therefore, 2-dimensional (2D) key is highly appreciated to be applied into 
the safety box using computerized lock. For the key pad, it can remain to be purely 
numeric in decimal digits or enlarged to become in hexadecimal digits. 

9.2.5 Provable Security Studies 

The only researcher, who is Kok-Wah Lee @ Xpree Jinhua Li, contributing 
to the originally novel knowledge in this book, is educated in electrical engineering 
in general and computer communications in particular. Hence, a lot of the proofs of 
the inventions and innovations here are based on building up engineering prototypes. 
Consequently, researchers in provable security, who are also mathematicians, are 
expected to analyze thoroughly the security strength and loopholes of the algorithms, 
methods, systems, devices, and apparatuses in security engineering in this thesis. 

The initial name of "provable security" is more accurate as "reduction-based 
security", which has explicitly been telling the feature of "experimental then analytic 
proof for this information security field by depending on the available cryptographic 
primitives like AES, RSA, ECC, etc. 

9.2.6 Statistical Surveys for Various Security Schemes 

Besides the provable security research over the inventions and innovations 
proposed here, researchers in statistics can also consider conducting surveys like 
some surveys (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Schneier, 2006; Florencio & Herley, 2007) to 
know about the minimum, mean, maximum, and median key lengths of those 
applications of method and system to create big and yet memorizable secret as 
proposed here. Similar statistical surveys can also be carried out for multihash key to 
know the statistical values of master keys and slave keys. 

9.3 Future Development of Keys the Secret 

These keys the secret need good generation methods (Scalet, 2005) and key 
management (Fumy & Landrock, 1993; Beach, 2001; Witty, 2001). Wailgum (2008) 



87 



questioned on whether there were too many passwords or humans were lacking of 
memory power. In term of memory, there are two forms: Recognition-based and 
recall-based. Weinshall and Kirkpatrick (2004) presented those recall-based 
passwords. Bill Gates with Microsoft has once claimed the ending of the passwords 
(Allan, 2004; Kotadia, 2004; Fried & Evers, 2006). 

Subsequently, there are introductions of some password alternatives like 
Information Card, Windows CardSpace (Wilson, 2008), Higgins Project, OpenID, 
Identity Metasystem (Jones, 2005; Cameron & Jones, 2006), Identity Selector, digital 
identity (Cameron, 2005; Cavoukian, 2006), Authorization Certificate, Extended 
Validation Certificate, etc. 

Furnell (2005) analyzed whether human could get rid of passwords and 
concluded that passwords could not be replaced. Here, if the inventions and 
innovations on big secret(s) creation methods and their applications are adopted, 
especially MePKC (Memorizable Public-Key Cryptography), the complicatedly 
mentioned password alternatives may be made simpler or at best be avoided. More 
literatures on password are available at PasswordResearch.com (No date) website 
[URL: www.passwordresearch.com]. 

For security of asymmetric key cryptosystems, the mathematical hard 
problems depend on the researchers' creativity and innovation as well as the 
computing technologies to crack them. For example, the cryptanalytic attacks like 
Wiener (1990) and so on, that can be discovered in the future, may request for longer 
asymmetric key sizes and/or other mathematical hard problems. Challenges with 
awards offered by the PKC services providers to crack certain PKC with certain key 
sizes are always there for the public to attempt. 

Anyway, the practically secure key sizes for symmetric and asymmetric key 
cryptosystems at different protection periods are always under the regular 
evaluations by a lot of researchers (Williams, 2002). Website of KeyLength.com 
[URL: www.keylength.com] ("Cryptographic Key Length Recommendation," No 
date) is a collection database for lots of documentations on these practically secure 
key sizes for various applications in security engineering, particularly, and 
information engineering, generally. 



88 



9.4 Conclusions 

To emphasize again on the imperative aim of this research project, here is the 
last paragraph. 

Let's create and maintain a networked info-computer age for a more 
paperless, trip-less, petroleum-less, and environment-friendly human society by 
having safer multipartite electronic computer communications as from the original 
and novel knowledge contribution of this research project. 



89 



APPENDIX A WRITING SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 



2J0A\ wlp jo susses slsuw I.v 




ᅵ t,s 一. ct ^UVJLLy ᅲ vn.mlllv£ 



«M V L、 . ^ ta a ^wsl 

t J- ^ ] 



4fc£M -J 




m -E- ■ - I 



90 



Legend of writing systems of the world today: 

Latin (alphabetic) 

Cyrillic (alphabetic) 
國 Hangul (featural alphabetic) 
國 Other alphabets 

Arabic (abjad) 
國 Other abjads 
國 Devanagari (abugida) 

Other abugidas 
~] Syllabaries 

Chinese characters (logographic) 



Table A.l Functional classification of writing systems 



Type 


Symbol Representation 


Example 


Pictographic 


Pictorgram or iconic picture 


Hieroglyph, Cuneiform 


Ideographic 


Ideogram 


Way-finding sign, mathematical notation 


Logographic 


Morpheme 


Chinese character 


Syllabic 


Syllable 


Japanese kana 


Alphabetic 


Phoneme (consonant or vowel) 


Latin alphabet 


Abugida 


Phoneme (consonant + vowel) 


Indian Devanagari 


Abjad 


Phoneme (consonant) 


Arabic alphabet 


Featural 


Phonetic feature 


Korean hangul 



91 



Table A.2 List of languages by number of native speakers 



Language 


Family 


Ethnologue (Y2005) 


1 . Mandarin 


Sino-Tibetan Chinese 


873,000,000 


2. Hindi + Urdu 


Indo-European, Indo-Iranian. Indo- Aryan 


366,000,000 


3. Spanish 


Indo-European, Italic, Romance 


358,000,000 


4. English 


Indo-European, Germanic, West 


341,000,000 


5. Arabic 


Afro-Asiatic Semitic 


206,000,000 


6. Portuguese 


Indo-European, Italic, Romance 


177,500,000 


7. Bengali 


Indo-European, Indo-Iranian. Indo -Aryan 


171,000,000 


8 ᅵ Russian 


Indo-European, Slavic, East 


170,000,000 


9, Japanese 


Ja.pa.nese-Ryukyua.n 


122,000,000 


1 German 


Indo-European, Germanic, West 


100 000 000 


1 ] Pnniabi 


Indo -European, Indo-Iranian. Indo - Aryan 


88 000 000 


1 ? French 


Indo-European, Italic, Romance 


79 572 000 


13. Wu 


Sino-Tibetan Chinese 


77 200 000 


14 Ta vanese 

丄 1 m t f LL \ "11 人 그ᄂ 


Anstronpsian Mala vo-Pol vnesian Sunda-Sula wesi 


75 500 000 


1 S Korean 


Considered either lanpua isolate or Altaic 


74 000 000 


1 6 Telupu 

丄リ- X 니 L!S U 


Dravinian South Central 


69 700 000 


17 Marathi 


Tndo-Kuronean Tndo-Tranian Tndo- Arvan 


68 000 000 


1 S Vietnamese 


A ustro- Asiatic Mon -Khmer Vietic 


67 400 000 


19. Tamil 


Dravidian .Southern 


66 000 000 


20 Italian 


Indo-European, Italic, Romance 


61,500,000 


2 1 . Cantonese 


Sino-Tibetan Chinese 


54 800 000 


22. Sindhi 


Indo-European, Indo-Ira.nia.n, Indo - Aryan 


54 500 000 


23. Turkish 


Altaic, Turkic. Oshuz 


50,625,000 


24. Min 


Sino-Tibetan Chinese 


46 200 000 


25. Gujarati 


Indo-European, Indo-Iranian. Indo - Aryan 


46, 100,000 


26. Maithili 


Indo -European, Indo-Iranian, Indo - Aryan 


45,000,000 


27 Polish 


Tndo-Ruronean Slavic "West 


42 700 000 


28. Ukrainian 


Indo-European, Slavic, East 


39,400,000 


29. Persian 


Indo-European, Indo-Iranian, Iranian 


39,400,000 


30. Malayalam 


Dravidian, Southern - India 


35,800,000 


31. Kannada 


Dravidian, Southern 


35,400,000 


32. Tamazight 


Afro-Asiatic, Berber, Northern 


32,300,000 



Ref.: Wikipedia Contributors. (2008a, July 22). List of languages by number of native speakers, 
[Online] . Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia. Available: 

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Lis ᄂ of_languages_by_number_of_native_speakers& 
oldid=227300820 [2008, July 23]. 



92 



APPENDIX B CHILD-MADE 2D KEYS 

Authored by Wei-Tong Chui (徐伟 栋), Wei-Jian Chui (徐伟 坚), and Kok-Wah Lee (李 国华) 
in January 2009 

In this part, it is shown that children are also capable to create simple 2D keys by using the 
key styles of ASCII art to draw some Chinese characters. The authors of these child-made 2D keys in 
January 2009 in this Appendix B were 13 -year-old Wei-Jian Chui born in year 1996 (Figure B.l) and 
9-year-old Wei-Tong Chui born in year 2000 (Figure B.2). To get the key size of every 2D key, just 
multiply the number of ASCII characters of a 2D key by the value of 6.57 bits, or to be more accurate 
log 2 9>. A note here: Kok-Wah Lee being the main author has integrated each four Chinese characters 
created by them to form a meaningful Chinese phrase for easy remembrance. 



AAAAAA 
AAAAAA 
AVVVVA 
AAAAAA 
WWW 
AAAAAA 
AAAAAA 



AAVVAA 
AAVVAA 
AAVVAA 
WWW 
AAVVAA 
AAVVAA 
AAVVAA 



AAAAAA 
AAAAAA 
AAAAAA 
WWW 
AAAAAA 
AAAAAA 
AAAAAA 



VAAAAV 
VAAAAV 
WWW 
VAAAAV 
VAAAAV 
WWW 



Two [二] Ten [十] One [一] Day [曰] 
Figure B.l 2D keys using ASCII art and Chinese characters meaning "twenty one days" [ ニ "| 日] 



AVVVVA 
AAAAAA 
WWW 
AAVAAA 
AVAAVA 



AAAAAV 



Cloud [云] 



AVVVVA 
AAAVAA 
AAAVAA 
WWW 
AAVVAA 
AVAAVA 
VAAAAV 



Sky [天] 



AAAAAA 
AAAAAA 
WWW 
AAVVAA 
AAVVAA 



AAAAAA 



Job [ェ] 



AAAVAAA 
AAAVAAA 
VVVVVVV 
AAVVVAA 
AVAVAVA 
VAAVAAV 
AAAVAAA 



Wood [木] 



Figure B.2 2D keys using ASCII art and Chinese characters meaning "cloudy sky nurtures the woods" 

[云 天工 木] 



93 



APPENDIX C CHRONOLOGY OF MY PhD STUDY 

Table C.l shows the important events during Kok-Wah Lee's PhD study at FET (Faculty of 
Engineering & Technology) of MMU (Multimedia University) in Bukit Beruang, Melaka, Malaysia 
from November 2003 to April 2011. 



Table C.l Development timeline of K. W. Lee's research project 



Date 


Event of Development Timeline 


12 Nov. 2003 


Application form of research project submitted to MMU CRPP. 


27 May 2004 


Official registration of doctorate (aka PhD) project. 


14 Mar. 2005 


Proposal defence seminar. Pass result. 


19 Sep. 2005 


Solid idea completion date for anti-hacking data storage using improved DIP 
switch. 


14 Oct. 2005 


Solid idea completion date for 2D (two-dimensional) key input method. 


Oct. 2005 


Kok-Wah Lee the student claimed for thesis submission, but Hong -Tat Ewe the 
nominal supervisor claimed for prototypes, and at least one accepted journal plus 
one submitted journal, or a journal replaced by an international patent (? ). 


24 May 2006 


Solid idea completion date for MePKC (Memorizable Public Key Cryptography). 


05 Nov. 2006 


Software prototype of 2D key input method (version 1.1) was completed. 


24 Nov. 2006 


Software prototype of MobileEC ᄂ (version 1.2) to test the MePKC encryption 
scheme and signature scheme was completed. 


24 Nov. 2006 


Kok-Wah Lee claimed for completion of prototypes. 


29 Nov. 2006 


Hardware prototype of RJ45 switch was completed. 


14 Dec. 2006 


Solid idea completion date for multihash key. 


Jan. 2007 


Software prototype to test the feasibility of multihash key was completed. 


May 2007 


Kok-Wah Lee claimed for fulfillment of minimum conditions to have at least one 
accepted journal and one submitted journal. 


1 O 1ᄀ- 、ᄂ ^f\f\0 

18 reb. 2008 


First work completion seminar. 


01 April 2008 


Result of first work completion seminar: Fail. More novel works were requested. 


02 Jul. 2008 


Second work completion seminar. 


23 Jul. 2008 


Result of second work completion seminar: Pass. The student entered ABD (All 
but Dissertation) stage. 


23 Jul. 2008 


Kok-Wah Lee submitted notice of thesis submission to FET and IPS. 


21 Sep. 2008 


Integration of multihash key into 2D key to produce 2D key input method 
(version 2.0). 


25 Oct. 2008 


Stop of literature study. First draft of PhD thesis (version 1.0) was ready. 


01 Dec. 2008 


Approval of specific thesis title. 


14 Mar. 2009 


Electronic online archive-type publication at www.archive.org. 


25 Mar. 2009 


Approval and confirmation of external expert examiners' list. 



94 



01 Apr. 2009 


First submission of thesis draft (version 1.0) to IPS was rejected due to format. 


(\f. Ar、r onno 


nrst submission of thesis draft (version 1.0) to IP^ again was accepted. 


14 Apr. 2009 


IPS letter stating completion of PhD study. 


18 Aug. 2009 


Electronic plagiarism detection using software was requested by IPS, but Kok- 
Wah Lee asked for postponement by not giving the electronic copy of thesis. 


25 Aug. 2009 


First open viva (aka oral exam). K.W. Lee was absent due to collisions of 
intellectual property rights with new MMU Rules and Regulations governing the 
thesis examination process. Moreover, short of preparation time from notice to 
oral exam. Fail result. 


Zo vjci. zuuv 


IPS rejected the PhD thesis and considered examination fail. 


HQ Nnv OOOQ 
iNuv. zyjyjy 


jv. w . i^cc s wriLLcii icLLcr rct[LicSLiiig iro lor cidxiiicdLiuii on dpprupridLc progress 
of PhD candidature. 


13 Jan. 2010 


IPS oral reply via A.W.C. Tan on termination of PhD candidature. 


18 Jan. 2010 


Written appeal for reinstatement of PhD candidature. 


08 Feb. 2010 


PhD candidature conditionally reinstated. The conditions were K.W. Lee to fulfill 

Lilc 1V11V1 U UIllVcrSlLy KUlcS allU KcgLlld. LIOIIS, dS Well as IIlcQlCd.1 CcrLlllCdLlOIl on 

K.W. Lee's fitness to sit for the PhD thesis examination. 


04 Mar. 2010 


K.W. Lee's written letter to IPS for second thesis submission. 


17 Mar. 2010 


Second draft of PhD thesis (version 2.0) was ready. 


18 Mar. 2010 


IPS requested for oral exam directly without second round of thesis submission 
and K.W. Lee's signed declaration to fulfill any possible MMU University Rules 
and Regulations governing the thesis examination process. 


30 Mar. 2010 


K.W. Lee secondly applied for and reasoned on the second round of thesis 
submission to fulfill the IPS conditions. 


f\ A ゥ八 1 八 

20 Aug. 20 10 


Second open viva (aka oral exam) chaired by three thesis reviewers, a chairman, 
who was Kek-Kiong Tio (Mr.) (Dr.) having expertise in mechanical engineering, 
and another five committee members. Kok-Wah Lee attended the event. Fail 
result. PhD thesis was rejected and required major revisions of format and 
contents. 


22 Sep. 2010 


Reviewers' comments over the PhD thesis were received by Kok-Wah Lee from 
IPS. A maximum of one year was given before the re-submission of PhD thesis 
for re-examination. 


22 Dec. 20 10 


The requested works to count the real entropy of Chinese password in ASCII 
encoding by the thesis examiners were dropped by removing the contents of 
Chinese password in the thesis. Alan Wee-Chiat Tan the nominal supervisor 
requested for revised abstract to locate a new batch of external thesis examiners. 


24 Dec. 20 10 


Kok-Wah Lee submitted the updated abstract to A. W. C. Tan but rejected due to 
format. A series of disputes on MMU thesis format occurred later for weeks. 


14 Jan. 2011 


K. W. Lee asked the IPS for official and certified research thesis format 
acceptable by MMU, preferably at least one thesis sample was needed. 


21 Mar. 2011 


To fulfill the demand for acceptable thesis format by MMU, PhD supervisor was 

annlipH tn hp phan (tpH to V PrasaH (^J\ «ihri 1 1 vnin ll n 厂 haran PrasaH) who was a 

£IJJJJ 丄 LAJ VJ\^ 니 ItXIl! 속 LVJ V . 니 J. 1 CiauLL 、 V 131111 ᄂ 1 V £IJJ ᄂ ll£l 니 Itll till J. 1 ClCtOXX Jy W 11VJ W ClJ O. 

full professor at MMU FET. 


30 Apr. 2011 


Third draft of PhD thesis (version 3.0) was ready. 







95 





Checking of copyright plagiarism over the thesis. 




Second submission of thesis draft (version 3.0) to IPS again was accepted (? ). 
Thesis examination fee at MYR$600 was paid by K. W. Lee. 




Third open viva (aka oral exam). 




MMU senate letter on award of normal doctorate degree (i.e. Ph.D.). 




Convocation day. 



N.B. 1: MMU = Multimedia University, which is a brand name of UTSB. 
N.B. 2: UTSB = Universiti Telekom Sdn. Bhd, Malaysia. 

N.B. 3: Sdn. Bhd. (Sendirian Berhad) in Malayan language, i.e. private limited in English language. 
N.B. 4: FET = Faculty of Engineering & Technology, MMU, Bukit Beruang, Melaka, Malaysia. 
N.B. 5: CRPP = Center for Research and Postgraduate Programmes, now called IPS, MMU. 
N.B. 6: IPS = Institute for Postgraduate Studies, previously called CRPP, MMU. 



96 



REFERENCES 



[I] Abadi, M., Bharat, K., and Marais, J. (2000, October 31). System and method for generating 
unique passwords. USPTO Issued Patent US6141760, Filing Date: 31 October 1997, Issue 
Date: 31 October 2000. 

[2] Abadi, M., Lomas, T. M. A., and Needham, R. (1997, December 16). Strengthening 
passwords (Tech. Rep. No. SRC-1997-033). Palo Alto, CA, USA: Hewlett-Packard 
Company, HP Labs, Systems Research Center (SRC). 

[3] Abadi, M., Needham, R. M., and Lomas, T. M. A. (2000, June 20). Method and apparatus 
for strengthening passwords for protection of computer systems. USPTO Issued Patent 
US6079021, Filing Date: 2 June 1997, Issue Date: 20 June 2000. 

[4] Adams, A., and Sasse, M. A. (1999, December). Users are not the enemy. Communications 
of the ACM, 42(12), 41-46. 

[5] Adams, A., Sasse, M. A., and Lunt, P. (1997, August 12-15). Making Passwords Secure and 
Usable. Proceedings of the HCI on People and Computers XII, Bristol, UK, 1-19. 

[6] Allan, A. (2004, December 6). Passwords are near the breaking point (Tech. Rep. No. 
Gartner GOO 124970). Stamford, CT, USA: Gartner, Inc. 

[7] Anderson, R. (2001). Security engineering: A guide to building dependable distributed 
systems. New York, NY, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 

[8] Anderson, R. J., and Petitcolas, F. A. P. (1998, May). On the limits of steganography. IEEE 
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 76(4), 474-481. 

[9] Arnold, M., Schmucker, M., and Wolthusen, S. D. (2003). Techinques and applications 
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[249] Zhu, Y. F. [祝跃 飞], and Zhang, Y. J. [张亚 娟]. (2006, October). 補 圆曲线 公 f 月 密码导 引 
[Guide to elliptic curve cryptography] . Beijing [北京], China [中国]: Science Press !/!^쿠 出 
版 社], (in Chinese language). 



121 



ACRONYMS 



2D Two-dimensional 

2TDEA 2 -Key Triple Data Encryption Algorithm 

3TDEA 3 -Key Triple Data Encryption Algorithm 

2TDES 2 -Key Triple Data Encryption Standard 

3TDES 3 -Key Triple Data Encryption Standard 

A-Level Advanced Level 

ACM Association for Computing Machinery 

AD anno domini in Latin language, meaning the Christian era 

AES Advanced Encryption Standard 

AIPO/OAPI African Intellectual Property Organization 

(Organisation Africaine de la Propriete Intellectuelle) 

ANN Artificial Neural Network 

ANN Based BAP Artificial Neural Network Based Byzantine Agreement Protocol 

APA American Psychological Association 

APWG Anti-Phishing Working Group 

ARIPO African Regional Industrial Property Organization 

ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange 

AUTM Association of University Technology Managers 

BAP Byzantine Agreement Protocol 

BAP -ANN Byzantine Agreement Protocol with Artificial Neural Network 

BGP Byzantine Generals Problem 

BTIRDM Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms 

for the Purposes of Patent Procedure 

CAPTCHA Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart 

Cat. Category 

CII Computer-Implemented Invention 

CIS Cryptography & Information Security 

CLJ Crime, Law, and Justice 

CLPP Chinese Language Passphrase 

CLPW Chinese Language Password 

CM Communication Management 

CO Central Office 

CPG Compass Password Generator 

CRPP Center for Research and Postgraduate Programmes, now called IPS, MMU. 

CSPRNG Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator 

DC Direct Current 



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DES Data Encryption Standard 

DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 

DIL / DIP Dual In-Line Package 

DNS Domain Name System 

DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions 

DSA Digital Signature Algorithm 

DSS Digital Signature Standard 

DSS Dynamic Security Skins 

EAPO Eurasian Patent Organization 

ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography 

ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 

EMAIL Electronic Mail 

EPO European Patent Office 

ESP Extra-Sensory Perception 

EU European Union 

FAR False Acceptance Rate 

FCN Fully Connected Network 

FET Faculty of Engineering & Technology, MMU, Bukit Beruang, Melaka, Malaysia. 

FFC Finite Field Cryptography 

FOREX Foreign Exchange 

FRR False Rejection Rate 

FTP File Transfer Protocol 

FTPS FTP over SSL 

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 

GCCPO Gulf Cooperation Council Patent Office 

GUI Graphical User Interface 

HDD Hard Disk Drive 

HMAC Keyed -Hash Message Authentication Code 

HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 

HTTPS HTTP over SSL 

IACR International Association for Cryptologic Research 

IATUL International Association of Technological University Libraries 

IDC Identity-Based cryptography 

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 

IEICE The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers 

(電子 情報通信 学会) 

IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 

IFC Integer Factorization Cryptography 

IIP A International Intellectual Property Alliance 



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ILBS International Law Book Services 

IM Instant Messaging 

IMAP4 Internet Message Access Protocol version 4 

IP Intellectual Property 

IP Internet Protocol 

IPOS Intellectual Property Office of Singapore 

IPR Intellectual Property Right 

IPS Institute for Postgraduate Studies, previously called CRPP, MMU. 

IRC Internet Relay Chat 

ITRC Identity Theft Resource Center 

JPO Japan Patent Office (日本 経済 産業 省 特許/ f) 

LCD Liquid Crystal Display 

LPWA Lucent Personal Web Assistant 

LSB Least Significant Bit 

mA milli-ampere 

MAC Message Authentication Code 

MCMC Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission 

MDC Multimedia Development Corporation Sdn Bhd 

MDeC Multimedia Development Corporation Sdn Bhd 

MePKC Memorizable Public-Key Cryptography I Memorizable Public -Key Crypto system 

MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions 

MITM Man In The Middle 

MMU Multimedia University, which is a brand name of UTSB. 

mod modulus 

MoPKC Mobile Public -Key Cryptography 

MSB Most Significant Bit 

MSVS Microsoft Visual Studio 

MTSO Mobile Telephone Switching Office 

MY Malaysia 

MylPO Intellectual Property Corporation of Malaysia (Perbadanan Harta Intelek Malaysia) 

NBER National Bureau of Economic Research 

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

nPDT n Poles Double Throw 

nPST n Poles Single Throw 

OAPI/AIPO Organisation Amcaine de la Propriete Intellectuelle 

(African Intellectual Property Organization) 

OS Operating System 

OSCAR Open System for CommunicAtion in Realtime 

(AOL Instant Messenger Protocol for ICQ and AIM) 



124 



OTP 


One-Time Password 


P-192 


192-bit Pseudo-Random Curve over Prime Field of ECC 


PAKE 


Password- Authenitcated Key Exchange 


PC 


Personal Computer 


PCB 


Printed Circuit Board 


PCPIP 


Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 


PCT 


Patent Cooperation Treaty 


PGP 


Pretty Good Privacy 


Ph.D. 


Doctor of Philosophy 


PKC 


Public-Key Cryptography 


PKC 


Public-Key Cryptosystem 


PLT 


Patent Law Treaty 


PNAS 


Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 


POP3 


Post Office Protocol version 3 


P.R.C. 


People's Republic of China (中华 人民 共和 国 ) 


PRNG 


Pseudo-Random Number uenerator 


PSTN 


Public Switched Telephone Network 


RFC 


Request for Comments 


RFID 


Radio Frequency Identification 


Rlogin 


Remote Login in UNIX Systems 


RNG 


Random Number Generator 


R.O.C. 


Republic of China (中華 民國) 


RSA 


Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Public-Key Cryptography 


S/MIME 


Secure 1 Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions 


SATA 


Serial Advanced Technology Attachment 


SD 


Statutory Declaration 


Sdn. Bhd. 


"Sendirian Berhad" in Malayan language, i.e. private limited in English language. 


SFTP 


Secure FTP over SSH 


SHA 


Secure Hash Algorithm 


SHS 


Secure Hash Standard 


SIP 


Session Initiation Protocol 


SMTP 


Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 


SIPO 


State Intellectual Property of the P.R.C. ( 中华 人民 共和 国 国 家 知 识产权 局 ) 


SMS 


Short Message Service 


SNMP 


Si mnlp NTptwnrV iV/l ana CFPmpnt t-rntofnl 


SPC 


Strasbourg Patent Convention 


SPEKE 


Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange 


SPLT 


Substantive Patent Law Treaty 



125 



SP1 Service Pack 1 

SP2 Service Pack 2 

SP3 Service Pack 3 

SPP Single Password Protocol 

SRP Secure Remote Password Protocol 

SRP-6 Secure Remote Password Protocol version 6 

SSH Secure Shell 

SSL Secure Sockets Layer 

STPM Sijil Tinggi Persekolahan Malaysia (in Malayan language), Malaysia Higher School 

Certificate (in English language) 

TAC Transaction Authorisation Code or Transaction Authentication Code 

TAP Transaction Authorization Pin 

TELNET Telecommunication Network 

TIPO The Intellectual Property Office of Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. 

(中華 民 國經濟 部 智慧 財產 局) 

TLS Transport Layer Security 

TRIPS Agreement on Traae Related Aspects or Intellectual Property Rights 

TSIG Transaction SIGnature Protocol 

TSA Timestamping Authority 

TSP Time -Stamp Protocol 

TTP Trusted Third Party 

UI Utility Innovation 

UK United Kingdom 

UKCS UK Copyright Service 

UN United Nations 

UNESCOBKK UNESCO Bangkok 

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 

US United States 

USA United States of America 

USB Universal Serial Bus 

USCO US Copyright Office 

USCOC US Chamber of Commerce 

USPTO US Patent and Trademark Office 

UTSB Universiti Telekom Sdn. Bhd., Malaysia. 

V Volt 

WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization 

WM Watermarking 

WTO World Trade Organization 



126 



PUBLICATION LIST BY K.-W. LEE 

[1] Lee, K. W. (2008a, May 8). An improved dual in-line (DIL) switch for securing data 
communication and storage. Malaysia Application of Utility Innovation (aka utility model or 
small patent) UI 20070733, MylPO, Filing Date: 11 May 2007, Grant Date: 30 June 2010, 
Patent No.: MY-141830-A. 

[2] Lee, K. W. (2008b, May 8). An improved dual in-line (DIL) switch for securing data 
communication and storage. PCT Patent Application PCT/MY2008/000040, WIPO, Filing 
Date: 8 May 2008, Publication Date: 20 November 2008. 

[3] Lee, K. W. [李國 華]. (2008c, May 9). 應用於 保護 資料 通 訊 及存儲 安全 之 改良 

式隻 行 I 开 3 ^ [An improved dual in-line (DIL) switch for securing data communication and 

storage]. Taiwan (ROC) Patent Application TW097 117364, TIPO, Filing Date: 9 May 2008. 
(in Chinese language). 

[4] Lee, K. W. (2008h, July 25). Methods and systems to create big memorizable secrets and 
their applications in information engineering. Malaysia Patent Application PI 20082771, 
MylPO, Filing Date: 25 July 2008. 

[5] Lee, K. W. (2008k, December 10). Methods and systems to create big memorizable secrets 
and their applications in information engineering. Singapore Patent Application Su 
200809162-1, IPOS, Filing Date: 10 December 2008, Now Abandoned. 

[6] Lee, K. W. (20081, December 18). Methods and systems to create big memorizable secrets 
and their applications in information engineering. PCT Patent Application 
PCT/IB2008/055432, WIPO, Filing Date: 18 December 2008, Publication Date: 28 January 
2010. 

[7] Lee, K. W. (2009b, April). High-Entropy 2-Dimensional Key Input Method for Symmetric 
and Asymmetric Key Cryptosystems. International Journal of Computer and Electrical 
Engineering (IJCEE), 7(1), 1-8. 

[8] Lee, K. W. (2010b, September 15). Methods and systems to create big memorizable secrets 
and their applications in information engineering. Singapore Patent Application Su 
200809162-1, IPOS, Filing Date: 15 September 2010. 



127 



[9] Lee, K. W. (2010c, November 08). Methods and systems to create big memorizable secrets 
and their applications in information engineering. United States Patent Application US 
2011/0055585, USPTO, Filing Date (Completion): 08 November 2010. 

[10] Lee, K. W., and Ewe, H. T. (2006, November 3-6). Coinware for multilingual passphrase 
generation and its application for Chinese language password. Proceedings of the 2006 
International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS 2006), 
Guangzhou, Guangdong, China, 1511-1514 (Part 2). 

[11] Lee, K. W., and Ewe, H. T. (2007, August). Multiple hashes of single key with passcode for 
multiple accounts. Journal of Zhejiang University Science A (JZUS-A), 5(8), 1183-1190. 



128