G I ROUNDTABLE
The United States Armko Forces Institute
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
August 19 44
This pamphlet is one of a scries made available by the War
DepartmeDt under the series title C. /. Roundtable. As the general
title indicates, G. I. Roundtable pamphlets provide material
which information-education officers may use in conducting group
discussions or forums as part of an off-duty education program.
The content of this pamphlet has been prepared by the Histori-
cal Service Board of the American Historical Association. Each
pamphlet in the series has only one purpose: to provide factual
informal ion and balanced arguments as a basis for discussion of
all sides of the question. It is not to be inferred that the Wat-
Department endorses any one of the particular views presented.
Specific suggestions for the discussion cr forum leader who
plans to use this pamphlet will he finmd tin page 57.
EM 42, G. I. Roundtable: Our Chinese Ally.
Additional copies should be requisitioned from USAFT, Madi-
son, Wisconsin, or nearest Overseas Branch.
WHERE IS CHINA AND WHAT DOES
IT LOOK LIKE? 2
WHO ARE THE CHINESE? 7
THE OLDEST LIVING CIVILIZATION.. 14
CHINA AND THE WEST 21
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 25
THE WAR IN CHINA 34
TODAY AND TOMORROW 44
TO THE LEADER 57
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
' .tEl in 'i' ■
OUR CHINESE ALLY
HALF the people in the world live in Asia, and about half
of that half are Chinese. Hardly any of the other people
in Asia rule themselves. The Chinese do rule themselves. For
this reason alone what the Chinese do and what happens tu
them is important to everybody.
Many American soldiers in China today are wishing that
they understood more of what China is all about. They wish
they had studied some Chinese history at school along with
Ancient and Modern European history. They wish that they
had read some hooks about modern China before being
plunged into the middle of it, for they suddenly realize that
they do not know the answers to the simplest questions:
What kind of government does China have*/ What kind of
religion? What is the Chinese system of writing, which looks
so different from ours? Why is there so much poverty and
dirt and disease?
Or, if they know the answers to such questions, there are
others in their minds. What is there about the Chinese that
has enabled them to resist Japan for seven years, almost with
their bare hands? Is China really a democracy? Who are
the Chinese Communists? Will there he civil war in China
after Japan is defeated? Will there he opportunities for for-
eign trade? Does China have imperialistic ambitions in Asia?
The answers to these questions are becoming increasingly
interesting and important. The purpose of this pamphlet is
to present a background which will help you to interpret
the problems and events of modern China, about which you
see so much in the newspapers and magazines.
WHERE IS CHINA AND WHAT DOES
IT LOOK LIKE?
To understand a country we need to know a little of it**
geography. China is not unlike the United States in size and
even in shape. They lie at about the same distance between
the north pole and tlie equator, and they have many similari-
ties in climate and vegetation.
Siberia stretches to the north of China much as Canada
lies to the north of the United States, and on the south and
southwest of China, French Indo-China and Burma corre-
spond roughly to Mexico. Peiping stands almost exactly on
latitude 40 while New York is just a little above 40. From
— "Ming,- _
-, v -
MAP OF THE UNITED STATES SUPERIMPOSED ON THE MAP OF CHINA
IN CORRESPONDING LATITUDES
Reprinted from Owen ond Eleanor Lallimore, Making of Modern China
Courtesy of W. W. Norton & Company
Peiping to China's westernmost frontiers is ubuut as far an
from New York to Oregon. Just as New England reaches tip
lo ihe east and north of New \ ork, Manchuria extends to
the northeast of Peiping.
North and South
China's climate, like ours, is cold in the north, hot in ihe
south) and temperate in between, with much the same seasonal
changes. In Manchuria there are forests like those in our
Northwest and vast wheat fields like those of the Dakotas.
In Mongolia and the northwest provinces there are deserts
that look much like ours in Arizona and New Mexico. Rising
abruptly from the flat plain of Peiping. the bare yellow hills
and little groves of trees look much like a landscape in north-
ern California. The Yangtze Valley is green and fertile like
the Caroliuas. Farther south, China is as semitropical as
Florida, while Yunnan has the flowers and fruits and sun-
shine of southern California.
Our greatest waterway, the Mississippi, runs from north to
south, while the Yangtze runs from west to east. The ^ angtze
is in some ways even more important than the Mississippi.
Ocean-going steamers can navigate- it for six hundred miles
to ihe. great inland port of Hankow.
South China lias more rain than our south and the country
is therefore greener, with rice as the principal crop. Regular
rainfall explains the rich growth of trees in the south, where
much of the eountry in ancient times was covered with forest.
Now most of the forests have been cut off and the hillsides
terraced lo grow rice.
North China is a good deal drier than our north, and the
landscape is more brown and yellow. Wheat, millet, and corn
grow in the north, together with all the fruits and vegetables
that we know in New Knjdand. In most of North China there
probably never was heavy forest, even in ancient times, partly
because of scant rainlall and parllv because of the nature "I
the soil. In Manchuria, however, particularly near the
Siberian border, there are remnants of great ami noble ancient
I he provinces of China Correspond to the American states.
There arc twenty-eight provinces, not counting Outer Mon-
golia ami 'libel. These two, though technically a pari of
Cnhia, have certain claims to self "government.
The expression "China Proper," which is quite often heard.
THE PROVINCES OF CHINA
Courtesy of Institute of Pacific Relations and John Day
applies lo the eighteen provinces that lie south of ihe Great
Wall. In these provinces the overwhelming majority of the
people are Chinese and have been Chinese for many centuries.
The oilier ten provinces stretch in a wide hand between
ihe Great Wall and the Siberian frontier. They reach from
the Pacific in the east lo the huge mountain ranges which in
the west divide China from India, and include the three
provinces of Manchuria, the four of Inner Mongolia, two
carved from ihe eastern side of Tibet, and Sinkiang or Chinese
I urkestan. Except for Manchuria these provinces are peopled
largely by non-Chinese races. All of them taken together
cover an area about as large as the eighteen provinces of China
Proper, but their population amounts to only about 10 per
cent of China's total population. The opening of modern com-
munication by road, rail, and air, and the development of
mines anil oilier sources of industrial raw materials will soon
add tremendously to the importance of the marginal provinces
of China and the great outer territories of Tibet and Outer
Thirty Centuries of Isolation
There is one important geographical difference between
the United Slates and China. Instead of living between two
vast oceans like the Americans, ihe Chinese have on their
west a deep barrier of desert and mountain ranges* During
all hut the last two of China's thirty centuries, however, the
ocean frontier has been a more complete barrier to foreign
intercourse than the land frontier.
The art of sailing was never highly developed by the Chi-
nese and, although their medieval navigators made a few
voyages as far as Arabia and Africa, they kept close to land
and depended on the regularity of the monsoon winds, blow-
ing for six months from southwest lo northeast and six months
from northeast to southwest. After Magellan's voyage around
the world in the 1520*s, European navigator and Americans
later on began to reach China by sea, but until comparatively
recent times China's chief intercourse with tlie rest of the
world was by land across the western borders.
The land approaches to the Near and Middle Kasl have
been in use from the most ancient times. About two thousand
years ago, when the Roman Kmpire reached the height of its
development, the civilization of China was quite as mature
and elaborate as that of Rome and, while these two empires
were separated from eacli other by vast mountain ranges and
waterless deserts, there was some exchange both of things and
of ideas. The silks, furs, rhubarb, and cinnamon of China
reached markets in India, Arabia, and the Roman Empire,
and to China in return came ivory, tortoise shell, precious
stones, horses of fine Central Asian breeds, and asbestos.
Chinese caravans did not travel all the way to Rome, but
made shorter journeys to oases in the Central Asian desert
where they exchanged their wares with traders who had
bought cargoes from other caravans coming from the west.
Ideas also traveled. Foreign influences in Chinese art can
be traced from the ages of stone and bronze. Buddhism was
introduced from India in the first century A.D. and Moham-
medanism found its way to China from Arabia by way of
Central Asia. \et all this time probably no lady of ancient
Rome who wore fine silk from China ever saw a Chinese and
very few Chinese Buddhists ever saw a native of India. China
was not entirely cut ofF from the rest of the world, but it was
remote and detached.
In the nineteenth century, when steam succeeded sail, the
nations who were masters of the seas broke down that isola-
tion. Today, in the stress of war. the sea approaches to China
have been again cut off, but at the same time new approaches
have beeu opened by land and air. from Central Asia and
from the far southwest. In the next chapter of history China
will be open all around, from the land an well as from the
sea. The times in which we are now living no longer allow
China or any other country to he isolated.
WHO ARE THE CHINESE?
Of every five persons in the world, one is Chinese. What
are these people like who form so large a portion of the
human race? Many writers and travelers from China have
tried to make us believe that the Chinese are just about as dif-
ferent from us as human beings could be. They have described
them as backward, exotic, mysterious, even sinister, because
quaint picturesque people made travel books more interest-
ing. It is difficult for Westerners to learn the Chinese language
well, and die fact that few of us have been able to talk freely
with Chinese or read their literature has helped to make
them seem difficult to understand. The truth is, however, that
they are much more like us than we have been led to suppose.
It is as hard to describe a "typical Chinese" as it is a "typical
Englishman." Would you choose a London cockney, an Ox-
ford scholar, a country squire, or a "man about town"? There
are as many "typical" Chinese as there are "typical" British-
ers. But one tiling it is safe to say — the exotic and inscrutable
Chinese depicted in American fiction is no more true to life
than the la-di-da Englishman with an exaggerated Oxford
accent so popular in our plays and stories.
There are a few characteristics, however, which most people
who know the Chinese will agree are typical.
What Are Chinese Like?
The typical Chinese is honest. Foreigners coming to China
for a short lime sometimes question this and fret about the
Chinese practice of "squeeze," which seeniB dishonest accord-
ing to American custom. Tins judgment, however, is based
on luck of understanding of the Chinese custom. Chinese who
buy groceries, colled taxes, ami do many other forms of
business for others, large and small, are by common consent
entitled to keep for themselves a small percentage of the
money passing through their hands. This "squeeze" is a rec-
ognized practice, like brokerage, and iberefore not actually
dishonest. It is only when the percentage becomes unduly
large that "squeeze" can be classed as graft.
Foreigners, on the other hand, are often amazed to discover
that in China a man's word is really as good as his bond. Many
large deals are made and contracts let without any written
document, and it is just as much the custom in China to live
up to these verbal agreements as it is the custom in America
to live up to a written contract- — though of course, in China
as in America, there are men who will wriggle out of any
Men who laugh at the same things are not apt to misunder-
stand each other. The typical Chinese has a very keen sense
<»f humor and one much nearer to the American sense of
humor than that of many other peoples.
Chinese, like Americans, reliflh molher-in-law jokes. They
also have "Scotch" jokes, which arc lold about the people
of Shansi province. J\or is China lacking in stories which are
the equivalent of the one ahout the traveling salesman and
the farmers daughter. JNot only is Chinese humor a good
deal like American humor, hut Chinese good humorediiess
is also much like American gooil humorcdness. The jolly.
perspiring, jostling crowd that gathers at a Chinese country
fair is not very different from an American crowd on the day
a circus comes lo town.
The typical Chinese is in many ways more "civilized" than
we are. He does not admire directness and frankness ihe way
we do. In fact, he thinks these characteristics are rather bar-
barian and uusuhtlc. He is more tactful, his chief concern
being to make the other fellow feel comfortable, lo give him
"face," rather than to tell the truth. This comes from thou-
sands of years of having to get along with each other, often
in crowded and uncomfortable surroundings. And this is one
reason why we like the Chinese. They know better than any
people on earth how to make the awkward foreigner feel com-
fortable and happy. Foreigners, however, occasionally find
this tactfulness exaggerated and the emphasis on face irritat-
ing and incomprehensible.
The typical Chinese is naturally democratic, and in this
he is as much like most Americans as he is unlike most Japa-
nese. In the Japanese language there are whole separate vocab-
ularies for ordering servants ahout, for keeping your wife
in her place as a subordinate being, or for showing servility to
your social superiors. The Chinese are not like this. They
have ceremonial ways of saying things, hut they use these
formalities on occasions when it is polite for each man to
act as if the other were well educated, financially well off,
and socially important — regardless of whether either of them
actually is all these things. Bui as soon as the ice is broken,
Chinese like to be easy and informal with each other, much
like Americans. Above all, no matter how poor, I ..nil \ dressed,
or uneducated a Chinese is, you must, when you first speak
to him, show your respect for him as an independent human
being. To treat him in any way as socially inferior is bad
mannered and is regarded as showing that you yourself are
ill-bred. A further Chinese characteristic is that anybody will
pick up a casual conversation with a boatman, ricksha puller,
or mule-cart driver in the same friendly way that Americans
talk with taxi drivers. They feel that the act of paying money
for personal services is made more civilized by friendly con-
Most people think of the Chinese as being more philosoph-
ical than Americans. This is only partly true. In the old
China, everything was pretty well settled. The life story of
the average man was something that had been repeating itself
for centuries. There was very little reason for supposing that
the world as a whole was going to gel noticeably better in
Uie next few years. It was rather obvious that very few-
poor men got rich quickly, while anyone who looked around
him could st'e that it was quite common for people who were
fairly well off to meet sudden disaster in the way of Hood or
famine or disease. All of this tended to encourage a philo-
sophical acceptance of fate, and even to make successful
people feel that their success was due as much to luck as to
Americans are different in this respect, because we are still
a young people in a new country. According to our tradition,
there is always another opportunity around the corner; even
if what you are doing now turns out to be a failure, you are
as likely to get another chance as the next man is. Chinese
philosophicalnesg is changing, however. The things that are
happening in modern China affect the whole people and go
far beyond the good luck or bad luck of individuals. The
horizon of the future promises far more than a mere repeti-
tion of the past; it is crowded with new prospects and new
opportunities. Accordingly, it is not at all surprising to find
that the younger Chinese are much less philosophical and
fatalistic than their parents, anil more like Americans — rest-
less, eager, experimental, ready to assert that what you do
for yourself counts more than what happens to you.
Where Do the Chinese Live?
There is no accurate census of the population of China. The
most generally accepted estimate is 450.000,000,, hut the true
ii umher may he nearer to 500,000,000 or considerably more
than three times the population of the United States. This
enormous population is very unevenly distributed. One-third
of the area of China Proper contains no less than six-
sevenths of the people. This area of dense population is in
th,e east, in the lower valleys of the Yellow and Yangtze rivers
and the rice-growing areas south of the Yangtze.
The general practice is that wherever irrigation is possible
the land is watered and cultivated with minute care in small
plots which resemble market gardens more than they do an
American farm. There is also a relationship between cities
and farming that is quite different from that in America. In
China, the biggest cities do not stand apart from the most
important farming regions, but right in the middle of them.
This is not only because the farms feed the cities. It is ;ilsi>
because the most important fertilizer is human excrement-
known throughout the Orient as "night soil." Instead of being
disposed of through sewage systems, this fertilizer is col-
lected and sold to the farmers near the. cities. A large Chinese
city, seen from the air, is surrounded by concentric circles of
different shades of green. The densest growth and llie darkest
green is nearest the city, where the fertilizer is cheapest and
most plentiful. The crop yield per acre diminishes in pro-
portion to the distance from the source of fertilizer in iJie city.
More than 80 per cent of the Chinese people are farmers,
and the typical farmer does not live in a house in the middle
of his own land. like the American farmer, hut in a village.
A city in the densely populated part of China is therefore not
surrounded hy residential suburbs, hut by clusters of villages.
Two Occupational Groups
Before the war two occupational groups of Chinese- might
have been vailed the largest in China as a whole. They are
still two of the most important groups, but their importance
relative to each other is changing in a way which typifies the
emergence of the new China out of the old China. One of
these types is the peasant, the other is the landlord-gentleman.
Judged numerically, since four-fifths of the people live by
farming, the typical or average Chinese is a peasant — just the
kind of simple, honest. limited, but shrewd and likeable
peasant we have come to know through The Good Earth and
other books by Pear! Buck. Comparatively few Chinese farm-
ers own the land they cultivate, and exorbitant rents and taxes
have kept their standard of living very low. They are indus-
trious and self-reliant, however, and go ahead rapidly when
not too much restricted hy the paternalism and oppression
which have been traditional in China.
Both the paternalism and the oppression trace hack to the
"entry, or landlord class, in the Chinese Empire before 1911.
These gentry are the Chinese that Lin Yutang had chiefly in
mind when he wrote My Country and My People, From the
landlords' families came the old-fashioned scholars whose Ion*!;
fingernails were the proof that they did no physical work,
and who combined the grossest corruption (particularly as
officials appropriating squeeze from state revenues) witli the
most delicate artistic refinement and the most subtle training
of the intellect. The power of the landlords rested on the
fact that grain, accumulated and stored, was until very re-
cently the Standard of wealth. This made the landlords more
powerful than the merchants, because the landlords actually
Controlled agriculture. In fact, merchants were often merely
the agents of landlords.
Almost all the officials — the "mandarins of the empire —
came from the landlord-gentry class. It is true that according
to the law of the empire the way to appointment was through
the public examinations, which anybody could take, but since
the knowledge of literature and philosophy required for these
examinations demanded years of study, the sons of landlords,
who did not have to work in the fields and could study at
home with private tutors, had a big advantage over the sons
of peasants. Accordingly, while peasants did occasionally rise
to high official rank, the vast majority of mandarins came
from families which produced a regular crop of candidates
for the examinations, generation after generation.
China's contact with the West in the nineteenth century
began a new process which has meant the gradual destruction
of the old way of life. Today many of * .lima"- leaders come
from families that continue to hold large landed properties
hut at the same time arc active in trade, industry, and
The artisan class is being rapidly changed into an industrial
proletariat, divorced from the villages and the peasant family
standard. The last to he affected have been the peasants. This
makes the fate of the peasant decisive for the nation. If he is
to he held down to the old way of life while the rest of the
nation changes, then China will hecome a vast Japan, with
an industrial development high in certain activities, hut
uneven as a whole, and with a disastrous and widening gap,
as in Japan, hetween the mechanical progress of the factories
and the human-labor standard of the farm. Hither the peasant
must be granted equal rights to progress with the rest of the
nation or else the low standards of human labor on the farm
will drag down the wages and standards of factory labor
and undermine the whole national economy — again, as in
THE OLDEST LIVING CIVILIZATION
An old missionary student of China once remarked that
Chinese history is "remote, monotonous, obscure, and — worst
of all there is too much of it/' China has the longest con-
tinuous history of any country in the world — 3,500 years of
written history. And even 3,500 years ago China's civilization
was old! This in itself is discouraging to the student, particu-
larly if we think of history as a haflling catalogue of who begat
somebody, who succeeded somebody, who slew somebody,
with only an occasional concubine thrown in for human in-
terest. Bill taken in another way, Chinese history can be made
to throw sharp lights and revealing shadows on the story of
all mankind— from its most primitive beginnings, some of
winch were ill Asia, to its highest point of development in
philosophy and religion, literature and art.
In art and philosophy, many people think, no culture has
ever surpassed that of China in its great creative periods. In
material culture, though we think of the roots of our own
civilization as being almost entirely European, we have also
received much from Asia -paper, gunpowder, the compass,
silk, tea, and porcelain.
We Were Once the "Backward" Ones
There is nothing like a brief look at Chinese history to
give one a new and wholesome respect for the Chinese people.
We are likely today to think of the Chinese as a "backward"
people who are less civilized than we are, and it is true that
in what we carelessly speak of as civilization — mechanization
and the fruits of scientific discovery — they have, in the last
hundred years, lagged behind the procession and are only
beginning to catch up. There are reasons for this temporary
backwardness which we will take up later. It is wholesome to
realize, however, that this attitude of superiority on the part
of Western nations has existed for only about a hundred years.
Until the Opium War of 1840*42 the European merchants
and voyagers who reached the distant land of China had
looked upon the Chinese with a good deal of awe as a people
of superior culture. They still had much the same attitude
as Marco Polo, who, in the thirteenth century,' had told the
people of Italy that China under the rule of the Mongols had
a much more centralized and efficient system of government
than European countries had. Coming from the hanking and
trading city of Venice, he admired the wide use of paper
money in China. To a Europe' which had not yet begun to
use coal he also described how the Chinese mined and burned
a kind of stone which was much superior to wood as fuel.
COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL CHART
NEOLITHIC AGE. Agricultural communities in
Yellow River valley cultivated loess soil with
stone tools. Domesticated dog and pig.
Hunting and ashing tribes in Yangtse
EGYPTIAN NEW EMPIRE
BRONZE AGE. Primitive Yellow River city states.
Probable use ol irrigation. Shang-inscribed bones
give base line of history. Sheep and goats domesti-
cated. Writing. Beautiful bronze castings. Potter's
wheel. Stone carving. Silk culture and weaving.
ANCIENT FEUDALISM. Expansion from Yellow
River to Yangtse valley. "City and country" cells.
Increased irrigation. Eunuchs. Horse-drawn war
chariots. 841 b.c earliest authenticated date.
Creek lyric poets
IRON AGE. Round coins. Magnetism known.
CLASSICAL PERIOD. Confucius, Lao-tze.
BEGINNING OF EMPIRE. Great Wall.
Carthage and Corinth destroyed
Palace architecture. Trade through Central Asia
with Roman Empire. Ink.
Birth of Christ
Roman Empire divided
Odoacer lakci Rome
Moslems stopped at Tours
Holy Roman Empire
Printing in Europe
Turks take Constantinople
ACE OF DISCOVERY
First World War
Second World War
First Buddhist Influences.
Political disunity hut cultural progress and spread.
Buddhism Nourishing. Use of coal.
Trade with Judo-Chun and Siam.
Large-scale unification. Grand Canal.
ZENITH OF CULTURE. Chinese culture reaches
Japan. Turk and Tungus alliances,
.evivat of Confucianism weakens power of
Buddhist monasteries. Mohammedanism. Cotton
from India. Porcelain. First printed l>ook.
Slate examinations organized. Rise of Khitan.
Fool binding. Poetry, painting, sculpture.
Classical Renaissance. Paper money.
Rise of Jurchid. Compass.
Navigation and mathematics.
MONGOL ACE. Jenghis Khan. Marco Polo. Franciscans
Operatic theater. Novels.
Yung Lo builds Peking.
Period of restoration and stagnation.
Portuguese traders arrive.
Clash with Japan over Korea.
Canton open to Western trade.
Treaties with Western powers. Snread o!
Western culture. Taipmg Rebellion.
Boxer Rebellion. 1911 Revolution. Nationalist
Revolution. Unification under Chiang Kai-shek.
Japanese invasion and World War II.
China in fact had a civilization similar to that of Europe
before the Industrial Revolution, and superior to it in many
ways. The agriculture of China was more advanced and pro-
ductive than thai of Europe because of the great use of irri-
gation; and the wide network of canals that supplied water
for irrigation also provided cheap transport. The Chinese
had reached a high level of technique and art in the making
of such tilings as porcelain and silk, and in general the guild
craftsmen of their cities were at least equal to those of the
cities of pre-industrial Europe.
Moreover the Chinese had gone a good deal further than
Europeans in the use of writing as a vehicle of civilization
and government, and everything which that means. They had
extensive statistics of government and finance at a time when
Europe had practically none. They used written orders and
regulations when Europe was still dependent on government
by word of mouth.
The historical chart shows what was happening in China
at the time of well-known events in the Western world. Note
that some of the highest points in Chinese civilization came
during the darkest days in Europe. The central column of
the chart shows a succession of Chinese dynasties. A dynasty
is the reign of one ruling family, and some families remained
in power for several hundred years before they were over-
thrown either by another Chinese family or by barbarians
from the north.
In the Beginning
The Chinese people did not come to China from somewhere
else as did our own early settlers but are thought to be the
direct descendants of the prehistoric cave men who lived in
North China hundreds of thousands of years ago. Chinese
civilization as we know it first developed along the great
bend of the Yellow River, where the earth was soft and easily
worked by the crude tools of China's Stone Age men who
lived before 3000 B.C.
From the Yellow River the Chinese spread north, east, and
south, sometimes absorbing aboriginal tribes, until by the
time of Confucius (500 B.C. I they occupied most of the coun-
try between the Yangtze River and the Great Wall, and had
developed from primitive Stone Age men to men who could
domesticate animals, irrigate land, make beautiful bronze
weapons and utensils, build walled cities, and produce great
philosophers like Confucius.
At the time of Confucius, China consisted of many small
states ruled by feudal lords. While they were loosely feder-
ated under an emperor it was not until 221 B.C.. when the last
of China's feudal kingdoms fell, that China was united as a
single empire. The imperial form of government lasted from
221 B.C. to 1911 A.I).
China's first emperor, Sbih Huang Ti, is known as the
builder of the Great Wall, which runs from the sea westward
into the deserts of Central Asia — a distance about as great as
from New York City to the Rockies. The purpose of this
stupendous job of engineering was to protect the settled Chi-
nese people from the raids of barbarian nomads who lived
beyond it. Much of this great walled frontier is still standing
How Dynasties Rose and Fell
Through the 2,000 years of China's empire, students can
trace a sort of pattern of the rise and fall of dynasties. A
dynasty would come into power after a period of war and
famine had reduced the population to the point where there
was enough land and food to go around. There would he pros-
perity, a civilized, sophisticated, and lavish court, families of
great wealth and culture scattered over the country, and a
flowering of art, literature, and philosophy. Then gradually
the population would increase and the farms he divided, the
landlords would refuse to pay taxes, thus weakening the
government, and at the same time would collect more and
more rent from the peasants. There would be savage peasant
rebellions. Out of these rebellions would arise warriors and
adventurers who enlisted the outlawed peasants, seized power
by the sword, and overthrew tlie dynasty.
Once in power, the successful war lord would need to bring
into his service scholar* who understood administration and
the keeping of records. These scholars were largely from the
landlord class, the only class with leisure to acquire an edu-
cation. While they built a government service for the new
dynasty they founded landed estates for themselves and their
heirs. As the power of the landlords grew the state of the
peasants worsened and the same things would happen all over
Several times dynasties were founded by nomad warriors
from beyond the Great Wall. The last dynasty of the empire
was founded by Manchus from Manchuria, who ruled in China
from 16-14 until the empire fell in 1911. It is said that China
has always absorbed her conquerors. Until the Japanese in-
vasion her conquerors have been barbarians who looked up
to the higher civilization of China and eagerly adopted it. The
armored cars and tanks of a more mechanized civilization are
not so readily digested.
Of What Use Today Is an Old Civilization?
One may ask, "What good does it do the Chinese to have
such an old civilization?" There is a very real advantage,
which visitors to China often sense when they cannot explain
it. The values of culture and of being civilized have existed
in China so long that they have soaked right through the
whole people. Even a poor Chinese with no education is likely
to have the instincts and hearing of an educated man. He
sets great store by such things as personal dignity, self-respect,
and respect for others. Even if he knows the history of his
country and his native region only by legend anil folklore in-
stead of reading, still he knows it — usually a surprising
amount of it. And he has a tremendous hunger and aptitude
for education, which is one of the reasons why the future
progress of China, once it is freed from foreign aggression, is
likely to be amazingly rapid.
CHINA AND THE WEST
Japan was not the first modern and mechanized power to
menace the freedom of China. It was the rapid encroachment
of the Western powers after the British defeated China in the
Opium War in 1842 which caused China to fall suddenly
from the proud position of the advanced and enlightened
Cathay of earlier centuries to the weak and half-conquered
China of the past hundred years.
As a result of the great voyages which had opened a way
across the Atlantic, a way around the Cape of Good Hope,
and a way around Cape Horn, Western traders and mission-
aries had begun to reach the coast of China by sea even before
the end of the seventeenth century. Portuguese, Spanish, and
Dutch merchants came in search of commodities that had a
high value of rarity and luxury on the European market.
Toward the end of the eighteenth century the English be-
came the most numerous and active among the foreigners
along the coast of Chinu. ami their trade was practically
monopolized by the British East India Company.
East India ships came to China primarily for cargoes of
silk, tea, and porcelain. The first (lowered wallpaper used in
Europe also came from China. In return the Chinese bought
such luxury goods as clocks and watches. American clipper
ships brought furs, silver dollars from Mexico, and ginseng
root which the Chinese valued as medicine. But on the whole
the Chinese, who considered their civilization infinitely supe-
rior to that of the West, had much more interest in Belling
to the Westerners than in buying from them, and therefore
all trade was carried on according to terms dictated by China.
When the Chinese emperor replied to George Ill's request
for more trade by refusing to open any more ports and mak-
ing it plain thai trade at Canton could be continued only at
his pleasure, the reply was accepted only because there was
nothing George III could do about it.
The force which reversed the relationship between China
and the West was the Industrial Revolution in Europe. The
Industrial Revolution had a double effect. First, the use of
machinery and the development of modern science improved
the weapons of war to such an extent that England had an
overwhelming superiority in arms. Second. British merchants
had far more manufactured goods to sell than could be sold
in England and so they had no patience with any restrictions
put on trade by either their own or the Chinese government.
They first smashed the monopoly of the East India Company
and then demanded of China that she open her ports to for-
eign trade and accept for all merchants the principle of free
opportunity to trade in any commodities.
Britain chiefly wanted a market in China for her textiles,
and all ships sailing from Kngland had to carry a quota of
cotton cloth, even though the market for it in China was as yet
so undeveloped that mtirh of it had to he sold at a loss. How-
ever, the British commodity most unwelcome to the Chinese
government was opium from India.
The Opium War and the Superior West
The new British drive for free trade came to a crisis when
a zealous Chinese official seized and burned a large stock of
British-owned opium. This started the Opium War which
ended in the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. This treaty, and one
which followed establishing the principle that any privilege
won by any foreign country would be equally enjoyed by all
other foreign countries, laid the foundation for a series of
wars and diplomatic dealings which completely changed the
international status of China.
Defeated in the Opium War, China was forced to recognize
the Western nations as equals and to open her markets to
Western merchants. From then on other nations more and
more refused to treat the Chinese as equals, ami China became
shackled by what are known as the "unequal treaties." When-
ever the Chinese were defeated they not only suffered the
normal consequences of defeat but bad to pay an indemnity
to cover the expenses of whatever country defeated them.
Partly in order to insure the collection of these indemnities
a customs service was created, supervised by representatives
of foreign powers, to collect dues on foreign trade* Duties
were collected at the low rate of 5 per cent, which opened
the way to the penetration of China by foreign commodities
and at the same time prevented the Chinese from developing
industries of their own under the protection of a tariff framed
in their national interest.
In a number of cities international settlements, or foreign
concessions, were established over which foreign powers had
complete control, and a Chinese having a civil suit against a
foreigner had to have it judged under foreign law. These
cities were known as "treaty ports," and the system by which
Americans and other foreigners were exempt from Chinese
law was called "extraterritoriality."
Thus China, instead of being conquered and made a colony
by one nation, became virtually the colony of all nations
which had merchant ships to send to China and gunboats to
accompany them. More treaties were signed as the nineteenth
century progressed, all increasing foreign control. Then in
1894 came the calamitous war with Japan. Its consequences
were even worse than a defeat by Britain or France might
have been, for it meant that Japan now claimed a place in
the ring of despoilers closing in on China — and Japan was in
closer striking distance of China than any other naval power.
This intensified the competition for strategic bases and eco-
nomic spheres of influence in China to the point where Giina
was threatened with actual dismemberment.
The Open Door Held China Together
This crisis was deferred by the policy of the Open Door,
proposed by American Secretary of State Hay in 1899 in a
series of notes to the treaty powers. The Open Door did not
propose to stop imperialistic demands on China. It simply
registered a claim that, whatever any other country took in
China, it must leave an Open Door for American trade and
enterprise. Even though it was an expression of American
self-interest, the practical effect of this arrangement was to
halt the process of cutting China up into colonial possessions.
There developed instead a uniform procedure of presenting
joint international demands to the Chinese government. This
also restrained Japan from acquiring exclusive rights, privi-
leges, and territorial control.
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION
Since the first years of this century China has been in the
throes of a revolution in which it has been struggling for two
things: to free itself from foreign control and to build a
strong and modern nation with a government representing the
people. Suji Yat-sen, the great leader of die revolution, died
in 1925, but the movement for democracy in China is still far
from its goal and his principles are the tilings for which the
Chinese people are fighting today.
The chief result of the impact of the West on China had
been to weaken her and to postpone the day when she eould
form a strong new government to replace the tottering Manchu
Dynasty. In other ways, however, the West helped to bring
about the Chinese Revolution. Chinese who went abroad to
study or who came in contact with Western education in
China soon realized that China must develop a strong govern-
ment along Western lines if it was to take its place in the
modern world. Also, the growth of modern trade and industry
in the treaty ports developed an entirely new class in China,
a middle class of merchants, manufacturers, and bankers who
did business with the West and shared many of its ideas. This
class provided much of the leadership and the money for a
nationalist movement which came to be organized under the
name of the National People's Party, or, in Chinese, the
The political genius of the revolution was Sun Yat-sen, a
physician who had studied in Hawaii and Hongkong. He built
a politically disciplined revolutionary party, worked out a
theory of the aims of the Chinese Revolution, and developed
the methods by which to achieve them. In a series of lectures
lo thousands of his followers at Canton he described these
aims as the "Three Principles of the People," which are usu-
ally translated as "Nationalism, Democracy, and the People's
The First Revolution Got Rid of the Manchus
The first revolution, in 1911, aimed to rid the country of
the Manchus and to set up a republic modeled on the govern-
ments of the United States and Great Britain. It was com-
paratively simple to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty. It fell
because it was loo rotten to stand. But the long task of form-
ing a strong and representative government was not go simple
and has not yet been completed.
For the first fifteen years after 1911 little apparent progress
was made. This was the period of the war lords: politicians
with private armies who fought, shadow-boxed, and bargained
among themselves and with or against the central government.
Various foreign governments had dealings witli one war lord
or another, in search of someone who could be set up as the
internationally recognized dictator of China, able to mortgage
China's minerals and other resources in return for loans.
Japan, on the other hand, pursued a calculated policy of
always supporting more than one war lord, since japan did
not want a unified dictatorship any more than any other form
of unity in China.
During these years the Nationalists, under Sun Yat-sen,
were slowly gaining popular support, but realized that they
needed help from abroad in order to overthrow the war lords
and set up a strong central government. After appealing in
vain to the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, they
turned to Soviet Russia. Sun Yat-sen invited Russian techni-
cal and political advisers to come to Canton to help to re-
organize the Kuomintang and build up a revolutionary army.
The Chinese Communist Party, which had lieen organized in
1921, was admitted into partnership with the Kuomintang and
helped to organize factory workers and peasants so that they
could assist in the revolution.
The Second Revolution United China
In 1926 die army of the Nationalists, under the leadership
of a young general, Chiang Kai-shek, began to inarch north
from Canton to unify all China. Ahead of them went an army
of propagandists who roused the people against the war lords
and in support of the Nationalist ideals. As a result the war
lord armies, which were not hound together by either patriot-
ism or nationalism, were overwhelmed.
The rapid advance of the Northern Expedition slowed after
Hankow, Nanking, and Shanghai were occupied. As they ad-
vanced up the railway from Nanking toward Tientsin and
Peking the Japanese military forces in the province of Shan-
tung obstructed them, provoking an armed clash.
In North China there loomed the threat of war with Japan.
There was also the threat of intervention by Britain and
America, which did not wish to see a new government in
China under Communist or Russian influence. In these cir-
cumstances Chiang Kai-shek felt that he could not afford to
alienate either Britain and America or his own landlord and
growing capitalist class who had become alarmed by the grow-
ing left wing of the Kuomintang — the Communists, students,
and intellectuals who wanted to base their power on the
peasants and workers of China. He therefore decided to break
with Russia and to destroy the Chinese Communists. The
Russian advisers fled, many thousands of Communists were
killed, and the right wing of the Kuomintang, backed by the
army, set up a government in Nanking. Thus, in 1928, the
present Nationalist government of China was founded and
was immediately recognized by most of the great powers.
The struggle between the Chinese Communists and the gov-
ernment lasted from 1928 to 1937, when a united front was
formed to faee the growing menace of Japan.
Preparing for the Storm
The Nanking government was a one-party government, eon-
trolled by the Kuornintang or Nationalist Party. Among its
leaders one man stood out as the supreme representative of
the China of this generation. That man was Chiang Kai-shek,
who proved to he not only a soldier but a statesman who could
balance all the different forces in both the old China and the
new China, not merely by playing them off against each other,
but by welding them into something new.
When Chiang Kai-shek came into power in 1928 he knew
that sooner or later be would have to light Japan, and all he
asked was time to build up an army and to strengthen the
nation. He was given only three years before Japan invaded
Manchuria in 1931, and only nine years before the storm
broke in full fury in the summer of 1937.
Japan's imperialist ambitions had long been clear to China.
During the first World War Japan had presented to China her
fc "Twenty-one Demands" which, if granted, would have given
Japan a stranglehold over China. While the intervention of
America and Britain temporarily saved the situation, China
never forgot this illustration of Japaifs real intentions. Dur-
ing the next ten years, as we have seen, Japan did all she
could to interfere with the Nationalist movement. In Japan
the power of the militarists was growing and the writings
and public utterances of their leaders were making it increas-
ingly clear that they fanatically believed in their god-given
mission to rule the world, the first step to which was the
conquest of China.
After 1928 the Nationalist government had two main lines
of policy which it pushed with all possible speed: to
strengthen and modernize the country and to bring it all
under the administrative control of the central government.
Great advances were made in education, medicine and public
health, in banking, mining and engineering, in communica-
tions, and in industry. Rapid extension of road and rail com-
munications met both strategic and economic needs. The
primary railway systems of China ran parallel with the coast
and had been built with foreign loans and under foreign
control in order to increase the trade of tlie treaty ports in
the interests of foreign enterprise. The government now began
to build lines directly opening up the hinterland, extending
its hold over the country as a whole, and increasing trade
without increasing foreign control.
Beyond and between the railways the network of motor
roads was even more rapidly expanded; and still deeper in
the interior air lines began to reach points to which even the
motor roads had not yet penetrated. In far inland China
today there are actually millions of people who have seen
airplanes but never an automobile, and many more who have-
seen cars and trucks but never a railway train. When the
remotest regions, where life has hardly changed for centuries,
are reached first by the most advanced technological develop-
ments, there are startling effects. Vast areas in China will
move directly into the age of electric power, skipping almost
entirely the age of steam power.
In the same period China's industry expanded with un-
precedented rapidity. In all kinds of enterprises which had
once been carried on only under foreign management, the
Chinese began to show more and more competence. Quanti-
tatively, in numbers of factories or total of horsepower, the
achievements of Chinese industry by 1937 were so small that
they would hardly show on a comparative world chart.
Qualitatively, they were as important as yeast is to bread.
Every power-driven machine in China does two things: it
makes things and it teaches people. Every factory is a tech-
nical training school. The transformation of China's economy
is at flash point. As in early Yankee New England when the
machine was just coming into its own, the transition from
journeyman-worker to inventor and skilled engineer can be
made in an astonishingly short time.
The new government rapidly extended its authority over
North China, but when Manchuria joined the national gov-
ernment it was a political event of the first importance, for
not only had Manchuria long been known for its political
separatism, but Japan had special interests there in the way
of railway and mining concessions.
Manchuria was not a backward region but one of China's
most important frontiers of progress. Chang Tso-lin, the old
war lord of Manchuria, had been succeeded by his son Chang
Hsueh-liang, the "Young Marshal," who had been notified
by the Japanese in an unmistakably menacing way that it
would not he a good thing for Manchuria to participate in
the unification of China by having anything to do with the
new government at Nanking. In spite of this warning, Chang
Hsueh-liang identified Manchuria with the rest of the nation
of China by hoisting the Nationalist flag in 1929. Japan
struck two years later.
THE WAR IN CHINA
The War Began in Manchuria
The second World AX'ar began with Japan's aggression in
China. Many people think of the war between China ami
Japan as starting after the Marco Polo Bridge incident in
1937. The fact is that the war really began in 1931 when an
explosion on the South Manchurian Railway near Mukden
touched off a well-planned invasion of Manchuria.
Japan struck in 1931 because China was becoming united.
China's new armies, however, were neitber well enough
trained nor well enough equipped to resist Japan. China
therefore appealed to the League of Nations, hoping that
this would force other countries to share in the crisis.
Instead of taking prompt action to halt Japanese aggression
in Manchuria the League sent out the Lytlon Commission to
investigate what had happened. The commission reported
that Japan waft guilty of deliberate aggression, but even then
the League took no action which would effectively restrain
her. In tbe meantime Japan had firmly established in Man-
churia a puppet state which it called "Manchukuo."
The "Manchurian Incident" proved that in a real crisis the
League of Nations was useless. The consequences have been
recited again and again. Hitler rose to power in Germany
and was immediately offered bank accounts all over the world.
Italy went on an old-fashioned slave-catching expedition in
Ethiopia. Fascism was established in Spain wilb the overt
aid of Germany and Italy. The ultimate repudiation of
common decency was the betrayal of Czechoslovakia at
Many Americans were inclined to I dink that perhaps
China's loss of Manchuria wasn't so very serious. There was,
a smug assumption that tbe seizure of Manchuria would
"satisfy" the Japanese for a long time, because they would
have lo "digest" 360.000 square miles of territory with a great
variety of undeveloped resources. Actually the Japanese did
not pause or hesitate. The I^eague of Nations had abandoned
Manchuria to them. Following up this advantage they re-
lentlessly continued their pressure against China.
Between 1931 and 1936 the Japanese edged their way into
North China. In 1933 they annexed the province of Jehol
to Manchukuo. They then demanded that the Chinese gov-
ernment set up a "political council" in North China, headed
by men acceptable to Japan, and they encouraged local mili-
tarists to accept Japanese patronage and to detach their
military forces from allegiance lo the national government.
The Sian Kidnaping
Though the Japanese appeared almost to have succeeded
in severing North China from the rest of China, in that part
of the country not yet reached by the Japanese the will to
resist was hardening. The feeling that the time was coming
for a great national effort spread back again into North
China, heartening people with the knowledge that they did
not stand alone.
This feeling crystallized in December 1936, when Generalis-
simo Chiang Kai-shek was kidnaped at Sian. In 1935 the
Chinese Communists had hern dislodged from tlmir position
south of the Yangtze. Withdrawing in a spectacular retreat
known as the "Long March." they had taken up a new posi-
tion in northern Shcnsi, where they occupied a stretch of
territory that was economically very poor but strategically
The Communist forces were hemmed in by troops of the
national government, among them many thousands who had
been withdrawn from Manchuria in 1931, under the com-
maud of the Young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-iiang. Since 1934
an important part of the Communist propaganda had heen
the demand for a truce between the Communists and the
national government and a united front against the Japanese.
The Young Marshal and his troops had been impressed by
their arguments, and when Chiang Kai-shek Hew to Sian to
see why his Manchurian troops weren't lighting the Com-
munists, they held him under arrest for nearly two weeks
while they attempted to convince him that the time had come
to resist the Japanese.
Instead of causing further civil war, the incident resulted
in the forming of a united front against Japan and a tre-
mendous rallying to the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. The
Japanese began to sense a new toughness in the Chinese
people and knew that they would either have to back down
or shoot to kill.
The "China Incident"
Six months after the Sian kidnaping, on July 7, 1937, at
the Marco Polo Bridge outside Peiping, the Japanese made
a deliberate attempt at a Putsch as a last alternative to a full-
scale invasion of China. They had taken great care to get
everything fixed up in advance, and with respect to many of
the higher-up Chinese they had good reason to believe that
things would stay fixed.
An unexpected factor, however, saved North China long
enough to make the lighting spread beyond the proportions
of a "local incident" and become a war of national survival
clearly understood by the whole Chinese people. This un-
expected factor was the Chinese common soldier- the man
most underestimated, and often despised, by foreign observers.
Even though a number of officers in the right positions had
been "fixed" by the Japanese the common soldiers refused
to be sold out. In regiment after regiment, division after
division, the spirit of resistance flared up among the rank
and file; men refused to he marched off to places where they
could not fight. Once Chinese resistance had begun it spread
like wildfire, and while too lacking in organization to save
North China, it delayed the Japanese timetable first by hours,
then by days, and then by weeks.
Altbough Japan intended to restrict the war to North
China, the Japanese in Shanghai felt the loss of prestige from
the failure of their Putsch in the north. Their navy, largely
as a gesture of bravado, tried to take Shanghai, with massed
cruisers and destroyers moored alongside the city and pouring
a terrible gunfire into it.
Once more Chinese resistance amazed the world. In the
attempt to salvage its prestige the Japanese navy lost thou-
sands of men and was finally forced to let the army land
troops. These compelled the Chinese to withdraw by threat-
ening to outflank and encircle them. The fighting then moved
toward Nanking, the capital.
Out in ill'* open country, the Japanese could fully exploit
their superiority in planes, artillery, and motorized equip-
ment. They pressed on so hard that it was impossible for
the Chinese to make a major stand between Shanghai and
Nanking or at the city itself. They had to abandon their
capital. The Japanese ran amuck when they entered it.
While the city burned, looting, raping, and the murder of
military prisoners and civilians- went on for weeks. Not only
did Japanese officers fail to control their troops; many of
them did not want to, and joined in the atrocities themselves.
So terrible were the horrors of Nanking that their military
significance has been overlooked. When the Japanese reached
Nanking, they had such an advantage that they probably
could have pushed on, split up and encircled most of the
best divisions of the Chinese army, and won a victory that
would really have crippled China and made a short war
possible. The opportunity they lost at Nanking has never
1m-i-,i within their reach again.
Trading Space for Time
After the bloody interlude of Nanking, the Japanese col-
umns began to batter their way ahead again. It was now too
late to entrap and annihilate the Chinese armies, which were
engaged in delaying actions on a vast scale. Their strategy
was the same defense in depth which the Russians, with more
and better equipment, later used even more effectively against
the Germans. The Chinese tactics were to give way at the
point of heaviest Japanese pressure, but to close in on the
flanks and communications of the Japanese columns or
wedges. This was the strategy and tactics which Chiang
Kai-shek called "trading space for time." Its greatest success
was in the famous battle of Taierhchwang, when a Japanese
mechanized spearhead, trying to thrust too daringly along
the Lunghai Railway from the coastal railway system to the
I'eiping-IIankow line, was cut off and almost annihilated by
In spite of the skill with which the Chinese forced the
Japanese to light their kind of war, the Japanese had one
advantage. They had a navy, and the Yangtze River is so
deep and wide that ocea?i-going vessels and large cruisers can
steam all the way up to Hankow, in the heart of the country.
It was as if America, with no navy, were fighting an invader
whose navy could steam all the way up the Mississippi to
Although the Chinese front was never shattered, its Hank
was repeatedly turned along the Yangtze, and toward the end
of 1938 the Japanese navy enabled the land forces to reach
Hankow and simultaneously to take the great city of Canton
on the roast. These losses deprived the Chinese of both ends
of the Strategically important Canton-Hankow railway; but
they have never lost control of the inland section of the line.
Magnetic Warfare and Guerilla Fighting
A new phase of the war began after the fall of Hankow
and Canton at the end of 1938, and lasted until December 7,
1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Viith the
Japanese navy in control of the coast and the Yangtze, the
Chinese could receive no more supplies by ship and rail ex-
cept for a very small trickle through French Indo-China which
stopped entirely when the Japanese moved into that area in
1940. The Chinese were now limited to what they could get
over the truck road from Burma, which they had in the mean-
time built for themselves, and over the 2.000 mile truck route
from the Soviet Union.
During these three years the Chinese fought a new kind of
delaying war. You can draw on the map an almost straight
line from Peiping through Hankow to Canton, and this is all
that is needed for a rough diagram of the Japanese front in
China. Wherever the Japanese are to be found west of this
line, they are virtually besieged, as they are in the moun-
tainous province of Shansi, and at Iehaiig on the \angtze.
China east of this line contained, in 1937, almost the whole
of China's industrial production; almost the entire railway
system; most of the well-developed coal mines; tbe richest
agricultural production; and more than half the total popula-
tion. West of this line the Chinese have today less than 10
per cent of China's former industrial production; some frag-
ments of railway; mining resources that have largely been
developed since the war began; and a system of motor roads
that is badly hampered by the difficulty of getting fuel, new
trucks, and spare parts.
The kind of war that could he fought up to Pearl Harbor,
and to a large extent since Pearl Harbor, was dictated by this
division of China. West of the line from Peiping to Canton
through Hankow begins the hilly country of China, in con-
trast to the great open plains of the lower Yellow River and
Yangtze Valley to the east. It is in the open country that the
Japanese get the most advantage out of their motorized equip-
ment and artillery. With command of the air, they are able
to detect any Chinese attempt to concentrate a large striking
force. In the more hilly and broken country, the Chinese
are able to hide their movements and concentrations from
Japanese observation planes.
This is the explanation of what Chiang Kai-shek calls
"magnetic warfare." Whenever the Japanese attempt a major
thrust the Chinese retreat, without losing contact, until they
have drawn the Japanese column far from its starting point.
By scattering their defense, the Chinese force the Japanese
to weaken their main column by detaching units from it. As
the Chinese are very weak in artillery, the ideal moment for
tli em to strike is when they have drawn the Japanese into
country where their artillery cannot maneuver advanta-
geously. The Chinese then bring their trench mortars into
action; with these and with machine guns and rifles and
finally with hand grenades and bayonets, they close in on the
Japanese, preventing reinforcement from the rear and at the
same lime destroying the head of the column. It was in this
way that the Chinese won tbe battles of Changsha in 1°41
and 1942, and the Ichang campaign of I'M."!.
While the Chinese have been able to fight the Japanese to
a standstill by lliese methods, they fight under one terrible
disadvantage. They cannot convert a victory into a large-scale
counteroffensive of their own, because once tlicy come out
to the open country it is the Japanese who have the advantage
in mobility, concentration, and overwhelming superiority of
fire power. East of the great dividing line, therefore, the
Chinese resort to guerilla warfare. The region of guerilla
warfare is not really "Occupied China" as it is often called.
CHINESE THEATER OF WAR 1943
but "Penetrated China." The Japanese occupy many points,
and keep communications open between these points. The
bulk of the country and the mass of the population are sub-
ject to vindictive Japanese raids, but are not under Japanese
control ami are able to organize themselves. The guerillas
have greatly hampered Japanese exploitation of China's re-
sources* hut they have not been able to win hack wide terri-
tory or strategic points. Final Japanese defeat awaits tin*
strengthening of China's regular armies.
Some of the Chinese guerillas are irregular troops who
form an extension, behind the Japanese lines, of China's
regular forces. Some guerilla regions of Penetrated China
remit taxes to the national government at Chungking. Some
guerillas are Communists. Others, without being Communists,
are on friendly terms with the Communists and borrow ex-
perts from them to train their troops and show them how to
set up social and economic organization. The important
factor, however, is not whether guerillas are in touch with
national government organizers or Communist organizers.
What matters most is that millions of people arc fighting in
defense of their country by defending their own homes and
their own fields, and are surviving.
After Pearl Harbor
V\ ith the news of Pearl Harbor, a great wave of hope
spread over China. The Chinese were sure that, even though
the Western nations had failed to see that war with Japan
was inevitahle, at least they were powerful enough to deal
summarily with the Japanese once they were involved.
Optimism turned into deepening depression as the Japanese
overwhelmed Hongkong, the Philippines. Malaya. Nether-
lands India, and Burma. When the Burma end of the Burma
Road Wits lost, the Chinese no longer had any source of over-
land supply except from Russia.
Against the increasing disadvantages to China caused by
Allied disasters there was an agonizingly slow increase of
aid in the air, both in eomhal planes and in the cargo planes
flying from India as a substitute for ihe Burma Road. Even
before Pearl Harbor the policy of ibe United States bad been
to aid China as innrb as we could without being drawn into
war. Under this policy a small group of American fliers bad
been formed in China. These fliers were just completing their
training at the time of Pearl Harbor, and piled up an aston-
ishing record in the Burma campaign. They were then re-
formed into a unit of the United States Army Air Forces,
which has since become the Fourteenth Air Force, under the
command of General Chennault. This unit was equipped
with bombers as well as fighter planes. At the same time
Chinese pilots were brought to America for advanced training
and equipped with American planes.
With the growth of the American Air Force in China, the
tide began very slowly to turn in favor of China. This new
turn of the tide became unmistakable in 1943 when Chinese
and American planes gave a new punch and decisiveness to
Chinese "magnetic warfare" in breaking up the campaign
which the Japanese launched against Changtch and inlo the
so-called "rice bowl" area of norlh Hunan.
TODAY AND TOMORROW
China has been disrupted by the war more than any oilier
country, even Russia. By 1936 it was well launched on the
long slow process of transforming the old China inlo a modern
slate. The accompanying chart gives a dramatic picture of
advances made between 1927 and 1936. In the next two years,
Japan wrecked much of what had been accomplished by the
terrific effort of the previous decade. The war destroyed most
of China's industry, its railways and its foreign trade, drove
the students from its universities, and compelled 50,000,000
people lo migrate to the west.
W 1 1 r ■ 1 1 the government moved to Chungking at the end of
1938 it hud to establish itself in a purl of China close to the
source of raw materials but undeveloped industrially and
backward in many ways. It had the huge task of rehabilitat-
ing 50,000.000 refugees, more than one-third as many people
as there are in the whole United Stales. And it had to face
a wartime price inflation which developed at an alarming rate.
At the beginning of 1944 the price of a bowl of rice or a
pair of shoes in China was 150 times the prewar level and
still climbing. The reasons for this are many and complicated
■ — the difficulty of enforcing a satisfactory tax system, the loss
of the revenues from customs and the salt tax which had
contributed largely to supporting the government, heavy
issue of paper money, the hoarding of food and other com-
modities, lack of production of consumer commodities, and
the difficulties of transportation. The government has tried
to impose new taxes and to prevent hoarding but has not been
able to stop the tide of inflation.
Much of the progress in reconstruction that China had
CHINA'S PROGRESS BEFORE THE INVASION
made from 1927 lo 1937 and its reconstruction program for
subsequent years might easily have been wiped out by the
appalling disruptions of war. Bui all was not lost, and the
process of remaking China is still continuing, tbougli of course
at a slower rate. Industry is developing in Free China. There
are new schools, some new roads, and even new railroads.
And despite normal wartime tightening of controls, the
Chungking government has made some slight progress toward
the realization of the democracy that Sun Yat-sen promised
the Chinese people. If war weariness and defeatism exist in
some circles today, it is not to he wondered at. It is more im-
portant for as to do all we can to bolster the morale and
strengthen the fighting power of the Chinese than to carp and
criticize. For China is very important to us in the job of de-
Is China a Democracy?
Because China has a one-party government, and especially
since the time in 1943 when Chiang Kai-shek became presi-
dent of the Republic as well as generalissimo of the army,
one frequently hears China spoken of as a dictatorship. The
Chinese one-party system, however, differs from fascist one-
party systems in one important respect. Fascists are ideolog-
ically antidemocratic, whereas the Kuomintang is founded
on the democratic thought of Sun Yat-sen and is pledged to
the creation of a democratic system. Chiang Kai-shek has
promised that within a year after the end of the war an
assemhly will be called for the purpose of adopting a con-
stitution and a representative system of government. There
are millions of believers in Sun Yat-sen's program for China
who eagerly await this day.
In trying to judge how much democracy China has now
we are apt lo begin by comparing it with our own democratic
country. Has it the same institutions that we have and the
same kinds of procedure for seeing that the will of the
majority is carried out? If it hadn't, we hesitate to call it a
This way of looking at things can often lead to misunder-
standings. The most important standard hy which to measure
progress in a country like China is not "how near have they
got to our way of doing things?" but "how far have they got
ahead of the way things used to he done?" Judging them
by this standard, the Chinese have made very great progress.
They have made so much progress that they certainly will
not slip back into the old condition of weakness, chaos, dis-
unity, and tyranny enforced hy independent regional military
chieftains, combined with foreign domination of their eco-
nomic life. They were slowly lifted from that condition hy
the long struggle of the Chinese Revolution.
The question is not one of further progress in China, hut
of how tbe progress will be accomplished. War always in-
creases the authority of a government, because it is necessary
for those in power to be able to act decisively with a minimum
of debate or discussion. But in spite of this fact China during
the years of war has to some degree increased the facilities
for the expression of popular opinion.
The People's Political Council is one example of this.
Formed during the war, it contains a Kuomintaiig majority,
but oilier political parties, including the Communists, are
represented, as well as members nominated or elected hy
provincial and city governments. Its powers are purely
advisory. It can suggest legislation, criticize government
policy, and call on all government departments, including
the army, for reports.
Going to School in Wartime
If progress toward democracy seems slow, progress in other
iielils has greaily accelerated. One of these is Ihe field of
Chinese have always had tremendous respect for learning
and faith in education in spite of the fact that a large propor-
tion of the population have always been illiterate. Today
there is a government policy of encouraging mass education
and a great hunger for learning tin the part of the masses
which has already markedly reduced illiteracy. In 1940 it
was estimated that in me preceding two years more than
46,000,000 people had learned to read. School children are
encouraged to teach their parents, and older children form
classes among their neighbors or in the villages.
Widespread illiteracy in China has chiefly been due to two
facts. Chinese writing is so extraordinarily difficult and com-
plicated that only the small leisure class had time to learn
it, anil books and even newspapers were written in a elassical
style quite unintelligible to the average man. To teach the
masses to read, it was necessary first to give them honks and
newspapers written in the style in which people talk, and
then to work out an easy system for teaching people to reatl
this simplified literature.
Movements were started in the 1920V which are making
easier the task of teaching a nation to read in wartime. One
was the so-called "literary renaissance" under the leadership
of Hu Shih, which developed the use in writing of the pai
hua (pronounced by hwa) or conversational language, making
it possible for the average person to learn to reatl in months
instead of the years it used to take. Another, often referred
to as the "thousand-character movement," promoted a system
for learning a thousand characters which would enable peo-
ple to reatl a simple book or newspaper in pai hua.
Because China has many more soldiers than she can
equip and fewer trained leaders than she needs, the govern-
ment has advised students to continue with their studies, in-
eluding those in American colleges, in spile of the lure of
more active patriotic ttork. The epic migration of thousands
of students from Occupied China into the interior has often
been told. Students and professors, with what little equip-
ment they could salvage from llieir bomhed eampuses, walked
thousands of miles into Free China and started sehool again in
mud huts or abandoned temples or caves dug in hillsides. In
spite of all the hardships and difficulties involved, university
enrollment jumped from 32,000 in 1936 to 45,000 in 1941 and
enrollment in secondary schools increased from 583.000 in
1936 to 622.1)00 in 1940.
Both large and small industries have sprung up in many
parts of Free China to meet the urgent demand for war male-
rials and consumer goods of all kinds. Wartime conditions
however favor small-scale investment and production. It is
difficult to invest on a large scale because with rapid inflation
a large investment piles up too much in the way of costs
before it can get into production. This condition encourages
owners of capital to buy existing commodities, hoard them,
ami speculate on the rise in prices rather than invest in
production of new commodities. On the other hand, the
scarcity of commodities is so great that a small investment
which gets into production rapidly, turning out needed com-
modities, is certain of a good profit and is at the same time
a direct contribution to the national welfare.
The difliculty and expensiveness of transport encourage the
decentralized kind of enterprise which uses local raw mate-
rials and sells to a hungry local market. This tends to even
out the development of industrial production over the whole
country, besides relieving wartime shortage of transport.
One of the methods used for setting capital to work quickly
and manufacturing local raw materials into commodities for
tlie local markets is the industrial cooperative. Early in the
war a movement known as the Chinese Industrial Coopera-
tives organized small workcr-owned-and-managed industries
in many parts of Free China, at first chiefly to provide a
livelihood for skilled refugees as well as to meet the crying
need for such articles as soap, candles, and shoes. Improvis-
ing simple machinery and using whatever raw materials were
available, they soon had their own machine shops, trans-
portation and marketing systems, and technical training
schools, and rapidly expanded to make large quantities of
blankets and clothing for the armies as well as civilian goods.
Today they are also manufacturing equipment for the Ameri-
can forces in China.
Modern Chinese Women
Nothing more revolutionary has happened in China than
the transformation in the lives of countless women in all
classes of society. Women have always been important and
influential in China. As in medieval Europe, an exceptional
few played leading roles in history as warriors, scholars, and
poets, while millions of others had an indirect effect on public
life tlirough the power or influence which they wielded
within the four walls of their own homes. Only within recent
years, however, have women begun to participate directly in
public and national life and to hold positions of influence
not merely as wives or mistresses but in tbeir own right.
In the early years of the Republic, schools were opened
for girls. As more of them left home to go to scbool, and
read Western books and saw American movies, the rigid
pattern of the old life began to crumble at the edges, par-
ticularly in the coastal cities where there was contact with
the West. But at the time of the Japanese invasion the great
mass of Chinese women still led the old life within their
MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK
The process which contact willi ihe West had started was
immeasurably speeded up by the war with japan. For one
thing, 50,000,000 refugees were forced to leave their homes
and Bee into the far interior of China under circumstances
which made it almost impossible for families to stay together.
Sometimes the young people would «;o and the old people
stay on the land. Sometimes the husband would £o and the
wife be left behind lo look after those too old or sick to
travel. Sometimes half :i family would he killed l>y bombs
and tlie rest would flee. Chihlrcn would heroine separated
from their parents and wives from husbands.
This great migration not only dislodged 50,000.000 people
from their homes, hut it also uprooted the family system of
China. Kven the families who were not foreed to move
hundreds of miles and those who were not bombed out of
their homes Cannot earry on in the old way, for high prices
and a labor shortage mean that almost everyone must work,
men and Women alike.
Today there is almost no held of work whieh is not open
to women. Not Jong ago a hank was opened in Chungking
owned and operated by women. There are industrial coopera-
tives in. in.: "-'J by women, am] women railway and mining
engineers and government officials. In 1°43 there were fifteen
women members of the People's Political Council.
Madame Chiang Kai-shek has organized a Women's Atl-
visory Council through which she has mobilized enormous
numbers of women all over Free China to do various forms
of war work, such as nursing, earing for orphans and refugees,
organizing cooperatives, and teaching women sewing and
The Chinese woman of today has exchanged her security
and seclusion for insecurity and freedom.
But China Is Not Yet Modernized
When we talk of the "progress" made by China in the
years since 1927, not only in political life, education, industry,
and the position of women, but in health anil sanitation,
famine control, improved methods of farming, and so forth,
we must bear one thing in mind. China is still "backward"
in all these fields by modern American standards and has
made remarkable progress only in relation lo ihe China of a
Americana going to China for the first time are still
shocked by ihe poverty and dirt and disease, the lark of
sanitary facilities, and the poorly equipped and under-
nourished soldiers about whose valor they have heard so
much. Americans need to understand that China has only
begun lo acquire the scientific and technical knowledge
(most of which we ourselves have had for less than a hun-
dred years) which is needed In deal with germs. Moods, and
famines, or to build machinery and modern plumbing. As
for poverty, most careful students believe that only by dealing
fundamentally with the age-old landlord-peasant conflict can
this be noticeably lessened.
China's roots are so deep and its ancient civilization so
strong that it is probable (and many think desirable) that
when China does become modernized, it will not. as Japan
did, simply copy the superficial features of Vi ester n life.
Rather, a new China will be created which is modern but
still different from the West. Symptoms of this deep change
are the new and creative painting and literature which have
blossomed in the war years and which are both truly modern
and truly Chinese.
At the moment China's difficulties may loom larger than
its progress. The ravages of seven years of war are serious.
Chinese are not all heroes, hut are very human, and we must
understand that they are in a tough spot. It is to our interest
to help i ln'in. and relief agencies have widely advertised their
need of help. Many Chinese today, however, prefer to have
us emphasize their ability to help themselves. The Chinese
have already accomplished more by their Nationalist revolu-
tion and by their resistance to Japan than almost any Ameri-
can dreamed possible twenty or even ten years ago.
After the War
There are several questions which are often asked about
China after the war. Will the Chinese really be able to
establish a democratic form of government ? Will the govern-
ment be able to maintain order or will there be civil war:*
Will there be opportunities in China for foreign trade and
investment? What will be the position of China among the
nations after a victorious war?
The degree of democracy attained in China during the war
is not an adequate indication of her democracy in the future.
The long battle front in China has been relatively stable now
for about four years. Behind this battle front the Kuomin-
tang, which controls the government, has tended to tighten
up discipline and to impose both uniformity and conformity.
It can be expected that when the process of recovering the
invaded parts of China begins there will be spontaneous but
often naive and even Utopian attempts to establish democratic
methods and procedures. Democracy is the opposite of the
system of terror and force which Japan has imposed. It is
what the Chinese people have been promised Tor the future
and what the people long for as something that will instantly
bring a happy life, free from abuses. The administrators who
are sent into the newly liberated areas will have to cope with
this outburst of the feeling of liberty. It is reasonable to
expect practical compromises between the popular instinct
for untrammeled liberty and the organized drive of the
Kuomintang for uniformity, discipline, and control.
At this point the question of the Chinese Communists will
become acute, but it is far from certain that it will be so
acute as to result in civil war. Agents of the Communists,
even more than the representatives of the Kuomintang, will
have to compromise between what they would like to do and
what the people want them to do. It must also be remembered
that the Kuomintang, as the established party controlling
China, has had freedom to teach the complete range of its
doctrines and theories. The Communists, in a marginal part
of Free China, hard pressed by tlie Japanese, have been able
to preach only a wartime doctrine of patriotism and survival.
They have had to persuade peasants that they stand for
lighter taxes and more popular representation, and at the
same time to persuade landlords; that they do not stand for
the seizing of private property. Thus they are already a party
of compromise, and it is at least possible that after the war,
instead of becoming a party of extremism, they will be found
to be a party of moderation. Both Communists and Kuomin-
tang have a great stake in avoiding civil war. All that China
has gained during the national war of survival would be
ruined by civil war.
The Chinese will have an enormous task after the war,
not only of rebuilding what die Japanese have destroyed, but
in carrying forward the process of transformation of their
whole life which was interrupted by the war. They will need
foreign capital and foreign trade, but they will not need it
badly enough to give to foreigners any measure of control
of China's internal affairs. They will welcome business on a
basis of equality but not on a basis of exploitation.
China's future policies toward other countries, like China's
developments at home, will be of primary concern to every-
one. The abolition of the unequal treaties by America and
Britain has already symbolized the end of the hundred years
of China's semieolonial subjection. China's part in the final
victory will give significance to that symbolic act
No longer will the destinies of Asia he dictated by imperial
powers. Nor, on the other hand, is it to be expected that
China will embark on an imperialistic career of its own.
Chiang Kai-shek advocates a genera] and rapid evolution
out of the colonial system for Asia, and has plainly stated
that China has no imperialistic ambitions. Without imperial-
ism it is highly probable that China will grow in importance
not only in Asia but in the world. The time may come when,
instead of its being important to have China on our side, as
it is today, it will be important in the world picture for us to
be on China's side.
We no longer live in a world of "the European question,"
"the Balkan question," "the Russian question," "the Near
Kastern question," "the Indian question," "'the Far Eastern
question." That era is over. We live in a world where such
questions are only local aspects of the world question.
Whether we make a success of that new world will depend
on the interaction of two things: the success or failure that
each nation makes of its own affairs, and the success or failure
of all nations in dealing with each other as neighbors in a
TO THE LEADER
China's heroic resistance lo the modern military might of
Japan lias caused many of us to wonder in astonishment how
such a nonimlusirializcd, loosely organized nation could
earry on as it has. We have heeu inclined to accept the con-
tinued resistance of the Chinese at* an unexplainahle miracle.
Bul the Chinese themselves are driven hy moral ami spiritual
forces, aided hy geographical and oilier considerations, thai
can he understood. That Americans should understand the
character of llie Chinese people ami government is important
because of llie hid this ancient nation is making for a high
place among modern powers. ^ on will find this pamphlet
contains material sufficient for several interesting meetings.
Much of this material gives background that is a necessary
basis for intelligent leadership nf discussion about China's
future. It may be used in a number of ways. The plans out-
lined here are intended as suggestions to be used as you
believe practicable within the local policies under which you
operate your educational program.
One or more forums. You have here material for four
meetings in which a twenty- lo thirty-minute talk is followed
by a question period. Each of the meetings might cover one
of the following topics:
1. The Chinese, their country, and their old civilization
2. China: Relations with the West and the story of the
.'$. War with Japan
1. China's future
Careful reading of the pamphlet will suggest to you appro-
priate arrangements of lliese topicH for either three or two
meetings. If you wish to plan only one session, it will prob-
ably be most fruitful to emphasize the two sections that
appear under the main headings, "Who Are the Chinese?"
and "Today and Tomorrow." No matter how many forum
type meetings you plan, be sure to secure the service of an
effective speaker or speakers. It is possible for a speaker to
study the pamphlet and make a forceful presentation, hut
your forum will be more successful if your speaker is already
well informed about China. He will be better prepared to
answer the variety of questions that are pure to be asked.
A series of informal discussions. The nature of this mate-
rial about China is such that you will probably wish to
organize study type discussions rather than the type that
naturally develops from a highly controversial subject. For
these you can very well use plans similar to those outlined
above as far as subject-matter is concerned. In an informal
study group, however, it would be a good idea to reduce the
opening lecture to the proportions of a five or ten minute
introduction that covers only especially important informa-
tion. You would then prepare a series of questions which
would be calculated to bring out points important for the
topic under study. It is well to remember also thai your
group members will take more constructive part in the pro-
ceedings if they have done some advance reading. Through
library, service club, or other central reading room try to
make it possible for each member to have access to a copy
of this pamphlet.
In planning questions for your discussion, those given below
may be helpful. The list is by no means exhaustive, so that
you may prefer to search out your own.
Who are the Chinese?
What are the Chinese like? Have we any accepted customs
similar to the practice of "squeeze"? Have Chinese a sense
of humor that Americans can understand? Do you think
that Chinese emphasis upon "face" is difficult to understand?
Is the typical Chinese friendly and democratic in his ways of
meeting people? Do Chinese believe in individual oppor-
tunity? Arc they fatalistic?
The oldest civilization — asset or liability?
Are there advantages and disadvantages to China in having
the oldest civilization in the world? Does it make modern
industrialization difficult? Does it foster desirable personal
qualities? Will it hinder or stimulate progress in education?
How do you explain the presence of poverty and disease so
evident everywhere in China?
How do you explain the fact that in spite of inferior and
inadequate equipment China has been able to resist Japan
for nearly seven years of war? Is it geography? Unity among
Chinese in their spirit of resistance? Quality of Chinese
leaders? Ideals of Sun Yat-sen? Aid from the other United
Is China a democracy?
In what sense can you call China a democracy today? Does
the Kuomiutang stand for democratic principles? How is the
war affecting Chinese Communist principles? Can China go
far toward democracy under war conditions? Why? Will
the Chinese after the war be able to establish a democratic
form of government as we think of democracy? Is our pat-
tern of democracy the only possible one? Would it suit
China? Do you think there is likely to he civil war in China
after Japan is defeated? Can the Chinese government meet
the problems of the Chinese Communists after the war? Will
the prewar pattern of rule by independent war lords be likely
What will he China's plaee in the postwar world? Will
there be opportunities for foreign trade and investment afler
the war? Will the Chinese try to develop heavy or light in-
dustries? Do you believe that China may embark on an
imperialistic career of its own when Japan is no longer a
menace? Will China assume a position of leadership anions
other countries of Asia?
How to conduct discussion meetings. Suggestions for
organizing a discussion program and for conducting forums,
informal discussion groups, panel discussions, symposiums,
and debates are given in KM I, G. /. Roundtable: Guide for
Discussion Lenders. This guide, a pamphlet published by
the War Department in the name series as the present one
on China, contains useful advice on the objectives of off-duty
discussions, on promoting the program, on choosing subjects,
on die use of visual aids, and on other practical matters.
Kvery discussion leader should have a copy for reference.
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
These publications are suggested if it so happens that you
have access to them. They are not approved nor officially sup-
plied by the War Department. They give more information
and represent different points of view.
Four pamphlets which might well be read to supplement
the material in this booklet arc: Changing China by George
E. Taylor, Chirm — America's Ally by Robert W. Barnett.
The (Jumping Far East by V illiam C. Johnstone, and War-
Time China by Maxwell S. Stewart. The first three are pub-
lished by the Institute of Pacific Relations. I East 54th Street.
New York 22. N.Y. (1942), and the third is No. 41 in the
Headline Series of the Foreign Policy Association. 22 East
38lh Street. New York 16. N.Y. (August 1943).
There is more about China's history and geography, ami
I he. way they help to explain her present problems, in The
Making of Miulrrn China by Owen and Eleanor Lattimore.
published by W. W. Norton and Company. 70 Fifth Avenue.
New York, N.Y. (1944), and in L. Carrington Goodrich's
Short History of the Chinese People, published by Harper
and Brothers, 49 East 33rd Street, New York 16, N.Y. (1943).
Is China a Democracy by Creighton Lacy, published bv
John Day Company, 2 West 45lh Street, New York 19, N.Y.
(1942), and The Battle for Asia by Ed»ar Snow, published
by Random House. Inc., 20 East 57th Street, New York. N.Y.
(1941), answer many questions about the China of today.
Far Eastern War 1937-41 by Harold S. Qui«ley, published
by the World Peace Foundation. 40 Ml. Vernon Street, Bos-
ton, Mass. (1942) gives a good survey and analysis of the
events within the period indicated in the title.
Three novels about China in the war years are: Dragon Seed
by Pearl Buck (John Day— New York! 1942) ; A Leaf in the
Storm by Lin Yutang (John Day— New York, 1941); and
Destination Chungking by Han Su Yin. published by Little.
Brown and Company. 34 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. (1942).
Translations of modern Chinese literature also help to fill
in the picture. Living China (John Day — New York. 1936) is
a collection of contemporary short stories. Village in August
published by Smith and Durrell. Inc., 25 West 45th Street,
New York, N.Y. (1942) is a novel about the war by a Chinese
1?? U. « GOVERNMENT PBIKTtNG OFFICE 600435—1944