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254                              POLITICAL SCIENCE.
interpreting power. Otherwise there are as many expounders
, and explainers as there are judges.*
Not* is there any serious danger from this high prerogative.
The interpretation can be overruled ; the constitution can be
alteffed ; the supreme court comfcs to consist of hew members;
the legal profession through the country acts on and rejudges
its decisions. Mr. Calhoun, in his " Discourse on Govern-
ment/' contends that the court is created by the dominant
party, and expresses their judgments. But as the court
changes not with a change of party, as it is removed almost
wholly from the influences of party and of existing public offi-
cers, as to a great extent it is not and cannot be selected from
active partisans but from busy, respected lawyers, as it must
have a certain fear of criticism from the profession which fur-
nished its members ; the opinion seems to be untrue and un-
just. The supreme judges may have biases. But did not
Mr. Calhoun have biases and very strong ones ?
If there were in our constitution no such ultimate power of
interpreting the laws and of deciding whether new laws were
consistent with the fundamental law, there is reason to believe
that the union could not have been kept together. If the
political chief of the time had been invested with an equal
power of interpretation, or a state had not been bound by the
decisions of the supreme court of the union, as it would be by-
its own courts in regard to its own constitution and laws, it
is plain that there might have been no general law in force
through the country or general agreement in regard to the
interpretation of our most important document. The supreme
tourt is the anchor of the United States, and there can be
but one such anchor.
4. The executive power of the United States is ample for
Executive of the a^ ^ nee<^s t'iat can afise under the constitu-
United states.       tion, and is so contrived as to give unity to th&
administration.    By the experience of a weak government
without a head, collapsing as soon as common danger was
* Comp. Pomeroy's Constit. I^aw,  136,