(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Political Science Of The State"

DEPARTMENTS  OF  GOVERNMENT IN A STATE.        267
past history, must decide who and how many they shall be,
by what tenure they shall hold their offices, how much pow-
der shall be put into their hands. AS one who believes that
the constitution of the United States is a very wise instrument,
because it expresses just that which the States needed, and
grew out of the historical state of things, I could not blame
another nation for choosing a different form of government
more suited to their circumstances, if under it liberty and
justice, order and security could flourish. If a monarch were
one of the necessary elements, so let it be; we want no such
chief magistrate, and could not have it if we wanted it. The
great point is to have a stable set of institutions which a
people are willing to accept. How much better this than to
be groping for well-nigh a century under the control of theo-
ries, or the shifting winds of opposing parties, ever learning
and never able to come to true political wisdom. What a
satire on fabricated governments does an important part of
modern revolutionary history present to us—what a testimony
in favor of governments that grow !
The natural tendency in nations not democratically gov-
unity and plural- cmed,   especially  if they have  retained their
ity m the executive.  pr;mevai polity, is towards one supreme execu-
tive, on whom all other officers of administration and even
the judges are dependent. And by dependence we mean
that these are not only appointed by the head of the state,
but salaried by him, removable at his pleasure, and in prac-
tice obeying his orders as subordinates. In democratical
states, the tendency arising from the more direct sovereignty
of the people, and its interference in public affairs, is to split
up executive power to a great extent, so that there shall be
as little of dependence of one magistrate upon another as is
possible. And to supply that supervision which a hierarchy
of officers in an absolutism can secure, the people appoints
boards of control, abridges terms of office—for which the
hankering after office may be another cause—and puts into
the hands of a senate, or magistrate, or a private prosecutor,
the power of calling the official to account for illegality or