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France ? The author finds it difficult to believe this. The
great and long struggles in the United States between the
president and congress " are endured valiantly by the Amer-
icans, thanks to their long practice of political liberty, their
great experience in the institutions of their country, and their
imperturbable confidence in the employment of legal means.
Could we in France be involved in such prolonged strifes
with the sang-froid which the Americans bring into them ?
We should need at least prompt solutions. Neither system,
then, that of the English nor that of the Americans, ought
to be copied. We can borrow something, but must net ser-
vilely imitate." " In spite of the contrary example of the
great American republic, we must needs renounce the direct
election of the president by the nation," . . . for " he will
believe himself superior to the national representatives, as
being the agent of the nation elected by universal suffrage.
And since we do not wish any longer to confide to the
country, acting as a whole, the election of the chief officers
of state, the legislative body ought to perform this office. A
power delegated by parliament will have its inconveniences
and its dangers, but these may be remedied in various ways,
and at all events, there is no other practical way of securing
the preponderance of parliament/1
The next question in  order discussed by our  author is
English race pre- whether the executive power shall be put into
fer a single chief ex-     t                           r
ecutive.               the hands of one or more persons, of a presi-
dent or of a directory like the body so-called in France, or-
ganized by the convention, or like the Swiss federal council.
His decision is that an unstable divided power is unfit to
manage the affairs of a government centralized like that of
France, and finds its place rather in a confederation. Its
mobility, weakness and want of prestige would make it soon
fall into contempt. " Nothing is more contrary to our genius
than the institution of an anonymous and collective govern-
ment. "óWe may add that the English race has never tried
this expedient, whether because the single head of the state
under the monarchy and the single governor in all the colo-