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Full text of "Political Science Of The State"

DEPARTMENTS  OF GOVERNMENT IN A STATE.        2/7
great branches of the government, while equally popular in
their origin and in their responsibility, an effective check
on one another." The plan accords with the sedulous avoid-
ance of the concentration of the great masses of power in
the same hands which marks the constitution of the United
States. <f But the advantage is purchased at a price above
all reasonable estimate of its value." Mr. Mill thinks it
better that the chief magistrate in a republic should be ap-
pointed avowedly, as the chief minister in a constitutional
monarchy is virtually, by the representative body. For this
opinion he gives two reasons—first, that the president thus
appointed would be sure to be a more eminent man than one
elected by the people, and again, the great mischief of uninter-
mitted electioneering would be prevented. " If a system
had been devised to make party spirit the ruling principle of
action in all public affairs, and create an inducement not only
to make every question a party question, but to raise ques-
tions for the purpose of founding parties on them, it would
have been difficult to contrive any means better adapted to
the purpose." But Mr. Mill is not prepared to admit that
" at all times and places it would be desirable to make the
head of the executive so completely dependent upon the
votes of a representative assembly as the prime minister is in
England." "If it were thought best to avoid this, he might
hold his office for a fixed period independent upon a parlia-
mentary vote, which would be the American system minus
the popular election and its evils/' He ought to have also>
Mr. Mill thinks, the power of dissolving the parliamentary
or legislative body placed in his hands, for with this arm of
independent action he never could be unduly dependent on
the legislature.
The objection to our system which is here made, that the
Mr. Murs views ablest men cannot get into the presidential chair
examined.            for ^ reason that the most eminent men have
to encounter local or personal prejudices, while a man with-
out antecedents, being without enemies, is the best candidate
of the party, was made by M. de Tocqueville, and has real