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1.  The cumulative plan, which consists in casting as many
votes as there are candidates, and being allowed to cast all or
more than one for the same person.    Thus let there be three
persons to be voted for, and let the parties be one thousand
and five hundred.  The minority, by throwing all their strength
upon one name could be sure of returning one representative.
But small minorities would still be of no account.
2.  Another plan, first proposed by Prof. Craik, of Belfast,
is that there are three places to be filled, but no one is allowed
to vote for more than two.     Thus  if, of fifteen hundred
voters, one thousand return the   candidates A and  B, the
minority, consisting of five hundred, can return the other.
But in this case, by the proper management, the majority
could overcome the voting power of the minority, unless the
numbers approached nearer to equality than in the case sup-
posed.*     This plan could also be combined with the first
mentioned.    It has been put to trial in the English reform
bill of 1867, in regard to certain boroughs returning three
members to parliament.
3. Another plan, devised by Mr. Walter Bailey, is " a scheme
for the proportional" or uninominal vote.    Here each elector
casts a single vote, and it may happen that such a number of
votes shall be thrown for a single candidate, as may be far
more than enough to secure his election.    The candidate is
allowed to publish beforehand a list of names of such persons
as may in succession receive the benefit of votes beyond his
necessary quota, which thus are put to their account.    Thus
the number of votes necessary to elect him being one thou-
sand, the next thousand of his surplus goes to B, the next
succeeding to C, and so on.    This plan would  involve an
arrangement of electoral quotas much beneath the majority
of votes to be cast, and the giving of power to a popular can-
didate to say who should be his associates, the latter of which
* That is, one thousand persons could so arrange their two thousand
votes as to give A, seven hundred and fifty, B. seven hundred, an$ C.
five hundred and fifty, but the highest number that the minority of
five hundred could reach would be only five hundred.