DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT IN A STATE. 301 least, checked by means of personal candidacy, by minor- ity representation, and voting independently of party, the indirect election would be much the less evil of the two ; although in a democratic state where the single election pre- vailed it would stand little chance of being substituted for the other. The reader will find something further on this sub- ject in the sections on parties in democratic states.* 222. In the system of estates, as has appeared, there were three Number of cham- or even f°ur distinct bodies, which often sat bers< aPart- Two chambers became, as we have seen, rather by historical accident than by any political tact, the established usage under the constitution of England, and * Mr. J. S. Mill discusses this subject in chap. 9 of his Considera- tions on Representative Government. He makes two points against indirect elections. The first is that the benefits incident to popular power are more certainly lessened by such elections than the dan- gers. The danger lies in entrusting with a vote for a member of parliament, a person who has not intellect and instruction enough to judge who would best fill such a place, and yet could pick out from among his neighbors a person fully able to judge and choose with wisdom. The benefit would lie in the public spirit and political intelligence which would be developed by the necessity of making a direct choice, while an indirect choice has no effect in cultivating either. Moreover, the voter who cannot cast a direct vote, cannot be expected to take much interest in the indirect one. Would he not, then, fail to discharge it? Again, if a person without intelli- gence is not a sufficient judge of the fitness of a person offered to his choice to be a member of parliament, and really wishes to have some one make the choice for him, "he has only to ask this confidential person whom he had better vote for. In this case the two modes of election coincide in their result, and every advantage of indirect election is obtained under the direct." If, however, he desires to make what would be substantially a direct choice when he can only cast a primary vote, "he has only to choose a well-known partisan of the candidate whom he prefers, or some one who will pledge him- self to vote for that candidate." The force of all this may be ad- mitted, and yet we may reply that he who cannot vote directly with intelligence would not take wise counsel whom he should vote for, but would assuredly in most cases take the advice of a plausible demagogue.