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' I must, however, express my opinion that the veto power
in a democratic republic like ours is liable to be abused. The
president ought to feel, when he takes his office, that he was
elected by a party to be the president of all, just as a repre-
sentative elected by a party is elected to be the representative
of all, whether they all had a vote or not, and whether they
voted for him or not. But there is great danger that he will
not feel so, or rather almost a certainty that he will not.
Especially when in the changes of party he holds office while
the party which chose him has become a minority, he will be
apt to use this formidable weapon of the veto to protect laws
or measures of his partisans from being abrogated, and to
prevent those of the reigning party from passing. If the party
character of the government should grow more and more pro-
nounced, it might become a question whether the president
should not be stripped of the veto, or, at least, whether the
suspensive form of it might not be substituted for the present
one, so that two successive congresses  not two sessions 
could pass a law over the president's head. As for the value
of the power, looked at in the history of our politics, it must
be admitted to have been exercised in many instances with
great advantage to the country.

If there is in a state a class of independent landholders who
Compensation to can afford to serve the state without pay for
members of the le-                             .               ,
gishture.              their services, they would naturally make the
most disinterested and the ablest legislators. And if men
fitted for political life were needed who could not thus serve
the state without a fee, their friends might help them forward.
The danger in this plan would be that an aristocratic class
and their interests could too exclusively control legislative
proceedings. In a country like the United States gratuitous
services of this kind would be at present impossible. In
Great Britain, no salaries are paid ; the same is true of the
present German empire and the late French empire. If a
salary is given to members of a legislature, it must be suffi-