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Full text of "Political Science Of The State"

siderably increased, and allowed to decide without being
unanimous, say by a majority of two-thirds. What would
be the effects of the increase ? Perhaps a small increase
might add to the weight of the verdict; sixteen, for instance,
out of twenty-four, would carry opinion with them more than
eight out of twelve. Perhaps it would prevent any one or
two men from controlling a jury when they had retired for
its verdict. Perhaps it might on the other hand increase the
practical difficulties of finding a good jury, and somewhat
change the style of addressing them. Certainly, if they were
augmented to four or five times the present number, much of
the calmness which now is usually demanded in the proceed-
ings in jury trials would be lost. If, on the other hand, it is
now possible for a party in a suit to bribe one or two jury-
men the motive in that case would be diminished.
The question how shall the judges be appointed is a very
Appointment, ten- important one.    In most of the monarchies of
ure, and salary   of          A .                                                             -111
judges.               Christendom, they are appointed by the crown ;
under the constitution of the United States and in several of
the states they are nominated by the chief executive officers,
and chosen or rejected by the senate or by both houses of
the legislature ; in other states they are voted for by the
people, like other officers, whenever a seat becomes vacant.
Absolute appointment has its advantages in constitutional
countries, for the sovereign will generally, and in England,
of course, always follow the opinion which prevails among
his advisers. There will be less reference to political con-
(siderations than there would be in our country, where a great
I and wise lawyer of the faction out of power would stand a
small chance of election. Of all modes of appointment the
worst is that by direct vote of the people. This appears
from several considerations. I. The people know little of
the men out of their own district who are,fit to make good
judges, and the talent which is best fitted for this position is
not often of the kind which attracts the public eye ; sound-