346 POLITICAL SCIENCE.
tion in this respect. And there is no present probability of
any steps in the direction of a longer tenure or of a better
mode of election.
The lawyer, as an advocate present in the courts and tak-
ing the place of his client, is an essential part
The advocate. . . . . .
of civil and criminal justice in civilized coun-
tries. In criminal trials, where, above all, a man may de-
mand to have his rights protected, some of the freest coun-
tries have not until recent times granted to the accused this
'privilege. In indictments for treason the accused were al-
lowed to have counsel in England by a law of William and
Mary (7 Wm. III.), but in trials for felony not until 1836.
This great injustice seems to have taken it for granted that
there was presumption of guilt in being indicted, but why
should such a presumption prevent my clearing myself in the
best way I can. There seems to be more reason in allowing
counsel to the suitors in criminal than in civil cases. The
reasons for allowing^ counsel are chiefly these. The first is
that there is more equality between lawyers on the whole
than between suitors on the whole. This reason has especial
force in criminal trials, where the government prosecutes
through an attorney. The counsel of the accused will gener-
ally be more nearly the peer of the government officer than
the criminal can be. Many innocent men, when arrested on
suspicion, are unable to state their case or defend themselves,
with any kind of skill. Another is that the accused person
needs some protector, for although prosecuting officer and
judge ought to feel that they are the representatives of justice
only, they seem to be apt to have a hard feeling, the one, as
if it were the main thing to prove his point, whatever be the
truth; the other, from the habit of estimating accused per-
sons by their look and manner, or from distrust of men and
belief in the badness of human nature which experience in
courts is apt to inspire.
The advocate, being allowed to take the place of his client,