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520                              POLITICAL  SCIENCE.
difference, he says, between the nature and the principle of
government:   its  nature  is that by which it is constituted
and its principle that by which it acts.    As for the nature of
governments, which he divides—illogically, as we have seen
into the despotic, monarchical, and republican, the latter in-
cluding aristocracy and democracy,—it depends, for the first
species, on the arbitrary will and law of the single ruler; for
the second, on the fixed and established laws of the single
ruler; for the third, on the fact whether a part or the whole
body of the people is possessed of supreme power.    This
division is illogical, it is obvious, because there may be aris-
tocratic and democratic tyrannies as well as monarchical ones.
But of this we have said enough in another place, and the
incorrectness of the division does not affect his remarks on
the principles of a government.    The principle of despotism
he makes to be fear; of limited monarchy, honor ; of aris-
tocracy, moderation ; and of democracy, virtue.    At the end
of the book he is careful to notice that these principles do not
always actually exist and have a controlling power in a given
state ; but simply that men ought to be virtuous in a republic,
to be actuated by honor in a monarchy, and in a despotism,
by fear; "otherwise the government is imperfect/'that is,
does not correspond  fully to the conception implied in its
name.    It would be more true to say that the government
cannot sustain itself without the special  support of virtue,
fear, etc., and that if virtue, e.g., exists with fear in a des-
potism, so much the better ; each of these is a governing,
essential principle, but not the sole principle.
Let us look at Montesquieu's explanation of his doctrine,
in the order in which we have mentioned the four forms,
which is, however, the reverse of his own. "By fear he does
not mean the princes fear of his subjects and ministers—al-
though a suspicion leading to vigilance, something like fear,
must in fact be his safety against plots—but their fear of him.
" When the despot for a moment ceases to lift up his arm, as
soon as he cannot at once crush those whom he has entrusted
with the highest places, all is over with him." " It is neces-