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Full text of "Political Science Of The State"

S60                              POLITICAL SCIENCE.
a problem as yet unsolved, the importance of which was never
fully comprehended by the people or by the makers of the
constitution. There was a degree of doubt at first whether
the power to appoint involved the power to remove, and
whether the President's undoubted power to fill up vacancies
that might happen during the recess of the senate, extended
to such vacancies as were created by his own act of removing '
an officer after the adjournment of the senate. In the first
congress Mr. Madison contended that the wanton removal of
meritorious officers would subject the president to impeach-
ment and removal from his own high trust. It was, however,
generally admitted that the president could remove from
office, and that his motives could not properly be subject to
examination ; and so this exercise of power has remained
with him until the present day. In regard to the other ques-
tion, precedent has established that he may create a vacancy
without alleging reasons. He and those who act under him
can either appoint directly by law, or a confirmation is
needed from the senate. This body will naturally confirm
the cabinet officers, unless in extreme cases, on the ground
that the chief magistrate ought not to be interfered with in
the selection of his own especial advisers and servants.
As the president is thus made the dispenser of power and
of office to a vast extent, his personal influence may be said
to reach to all the states, counties, and towns through the
whole land. As the sovereign is the fountain of honor in
England, so the president is the fountain of office wherever
there is a national office to be filled. But he is such within
the party which elected him. It is, indeed, quite possible
for him to disregard all party claims whatever, and to look
after, or see that his subordinates i'ook after, the fittest man;
but it has been found hitherto nearly impossible to cany out
such a rule very far. Or he may stop short of this, and make
it a rule to continue the present officials in their places (al-
though they are of opposite politics) until they are proved
to be inefficient or untrustworthy. But such would be the
pressure upon him to swerve from either of these rules, such