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594                              POLITICAL SCIENCE.
or two ago, for the literature and journals continually place
them before the public eye.
Everything will prevent revolutions which impresses a
people with the conviction that the government aims at jus-
tice and the public welfare, and which places the people in a
condition to form judgments on public measures. All educa-
tion, if it embraces instruction in moral and political duties,
all practice and political experience in local and municipal af-
fairs, all historical knowledge, and other means by which
national feeling is increased, are sources of the spirit of order.
And when, from a people educated by the institutions of the
country, a voice comes demanding reform, such a voice will be
heeded; the opinion of an enlightened people has a power
that governments dare not resist. Thus mature, wise public
opinion is a great safeguard against revolutions.
What effect on the prevention of revolutions is to proceed
from the  modern practice of training up the young men for
a certain time to the use of arms ?    A standing army has a
natural antagonism to the ordinary people.    Being a pro-
fession, it will have a professional feeling separating it from the
general interests of the country.    But they who are in train-
ing, and especially they who have served out their time and
have returned to peaceful occupations, are not thus divided
off by a line from the rest of the nation.    It is to be sup-
posed that they will better comprehend what war means than
others, and will act on the side of existing order, if not of re-
form—not as soldiers, but as citizens who have had a little of a
soldier's experience.    On the other hand, a faction or a gov-
ernment can be less sure than formerly of the fidelity of the
soldiers of the line, if it is plotting the overthrow of a con-
stitution, than formerly ; for the soldier has been trained up,
under modern ideas, to feel himself a citizen also.    Yet there
is a danger, on the other side, that an administration, in con-
cert with officers of the army, will make use of the soldiery
in coups d'etat by which a constitution will be overthrown, or
so much of it as the government dislikes.    This would be one
of the worst kinds of revolution—a revolution in which the