Full text of "Post-Ugandan Zionism"

niSm

Post-Ugandan
^ On Trial

^W %idy of the Factors that Cam

It; Misialc^s Made by the Zionist Mpfvemcr
dyjing the HolotausL

S. B. Beit Zvi

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Post-Ugandan Zionism
On Trial

A Study of the Factors that Caused

the M i stakes M ade by the Zi oni st M ovement

during the Holocaust

Volume I

S. B.Beit Zvj

Translation from Hebrew
By Ralph Mandel

ISBN No. 0-9628843-0-8

Publishers S.B. Beit-Zvi

1991, Zahala-Tel-Aviv

Israel

Cover Design : Laurinda Phakos

I NTERNET EDITION (Fair and non-commercial use)
AAARGH PUBLISHING HOUSE

2004

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

CONTENTS
VOLUME ONE

Foreword pageiv

I ntroduction to the English Translation page vi

Introduction: Correspondence and conversations with David Ben-Gurion and Moshe
Sharett pagevii

PARTONE:THE INFORMATION DEBACLE

Preface page 1

Chapter 1 The Secret Operation to Destroy thej ews page 3

Nazi methods to preserve secrecy—Against whom it was preserved—What the Germans
knew and what they did not know

Chapter 2: The Truth Suppressed page 26

The Zionist movement as a rescuer of J ews, in theory and in practice-Beri Katznelson
and the newspaper Davar

Chapter 3: What the Leaders Knew page 70

David Zakai' s sensational revelation and Yitzhak Gruenbaum's reply-
Correspondence between J erusalem, London and Geneva-The November 23
announcement and the Yishuv's response

PARTTWO: THE WAR ON TERRITORIALISM

Preface page 124

Chapter 4: Friendship Only page 127

Gruenbaum and his colleagues at a session of the Zionist Executive-Melech
Neustadt's rhetorical question— The difference between a son and a non-son, a father
and a non-father

Chapter 5: Interim Summaries, Psychology and Ideology page 165

Chapter 6: The Uganda Crisis page 178

Britain's proposal to establish a J ewish state in Africa triggers a crisis-A split in the
Zionist movement and the Yishuv-"Ugandists" (Zangwill, Syrkin) vs. "Zionei Zion"
(Ussishkin, Chelnov)-Fol lowing Herzl's death the two sides part, each pursuing
different goals and missions

Chapter 7: TheEvian Conference: An Ideology Incarnate page 195

I n the thirty years since the Uganda crisis, the Zionist movement recovered, expanded
and strengthened itself organizationally--Yet the legacy of Uganda left its imprint in
the split that occurred in the 6th and 7th Zionist Congresses-Objections to
territorialism became second nature for Zionism--When the test came, it emerged that

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Zionism was not ready for the tasl< of rescuing J ews unconditional ly--Weizmann and
Ben-Gurion struggle against the "danger" of the conference-Arthur Ruppin:
unorthodox Zionist

Chapters: FromEviantotheWar page 240

The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (the "Evian Connmittee") continues
the conference's activity to extricate the Jews of Germany-At Hitler's order, Goering
retracts Germany's non-recognition of the Evian Committee and proposes negotiations
on the orderly exodus of J ews from Austria and Gerrnany-The Rublee-Wohlthat Plan
and the dogged war against it-How many Jews were extricated between August 1938
and the onset of the war

Chapter 9: Territorial ism Vanquished page 315
(Tlie Santo Domingo A ffair)

Following the Dominican Republic's generous offer at the Evian Conference to absorb a
large number of refugees from Europe, "Dorsa," a subsidiary of Agro-Joint, is set up in
the U.S.-ln January 1940 a contract is signed between Dorsa and the Dominican
Republic on the absorption of 100,000 refugees-The first settlement is established at
Sosua- Encouragement and assent from liberal and progressive circles in America-
Vigorous intervention by Ida Silverman, associates of Stephen Wise and Nahum
Goldmann, and the commissioned counsel of the Brookings Institution lead to the
invalidation and expiration of the plan

Notes and references page 364

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

FOREWORD

The correspondence and conversations with David Ben-Gurion and JVloshe Sharett
which serve as the introduction to this bool<, reflect the two reasons that impelled me to
write it: the frustrating results of my efforts on behalf of Russian Jewry, and the
Eichmann trial.

In the first two or three years of my activity for the J ews of Russia, from 1958-
1961, I spoke about their plight in numerous assemblies throughout lsrael--in cities,
moshavot, moshavim and kibbutzim. The audiences were attentive and highly
responsive-from this point of view the campaign was a success. People heard, were
moved, and literally lived the issue. After every lecture I had the feeling that the
cumulative activity of myself and my colleagues would effect a shift in public opinion
toward readiness to work for Soviet J ewry.

This feeling gradually gave way to a sense of disappointment and bitterness. The
desired result was not achieved. I found that people with whom I had often discussed
the problem in detail seemed unable to grasp the basic point: that urgent action was
required on behalf of Soviet Jewry, and that such action had substantial prospects for
success. Some time after each such talk they would ask me rhetorically, 'But what can
be done?' Now, as these lines are being written (1977), when the need to pressure the
Soviet Union to open its gates to J ewish emigration is clear and obvious to everyone, it
is strange to recall that less than ten years ago this view was shared by no more than a
handful of people, who were generally considered "extremists." Yet even a cursory
perusal of the press from that period will prove the point.

That painful experience led me to reflect that ponderous reasons, which I could
not fathom, underlay thedisinclination of Israeli society and the Zionist movement to
initiate the struggle and sacrifice required to save the Jews of the Soviet Union. That
thought was reinforced by the subsequent course of events.

In the Eichmann trial, I was struck by the way Israeli commentary totally
disregarded the failure of free Jewry and the Zionist movement during the Holocaust
years. While the press was full of accusations against the Gentiles for not helping and
not coming to the rescue, not a word was said about those whose primary obligation it
had been to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the rescue effort.

It crossed my mind that perhaps the blunders in the Holocaust period and the
unwillingness to help Soviet J ewry were in some way interconnected, that perhaps
their common origin lay in something organic (if not rooted) in Zionism. Could it be
that an egocentric element had evolved within the Zionist movement that shunned
concern for diaspora J ewry if this were not directly related to Zionism (and Israel)? Had
such a trait wormed its way into the foundations of Zionist sensibility, and was it now
eating away its moral basis?

These thoughts led me to examine the Yishuv press of the Holocaust years. What I
read in those yellowing pages brought me to the conclusions I spelled out in the letters
to Ben-Gurion and Sharett that follow immediately. After conversing with these two
personages, the most prominent among those connected with the blunders of the
Holocaust years, I embarked on the research of which this book is the result.

The experience of my activity on behalf of Russian Jewry may well have helped
me to grasp and take in more concretely the "deep silence" described in Chapter 2, and
similar phenomena of collective anomaly to which other chapters of the book are
devoted. For many years I encountered a similar anomaly regarding the J ews of
Russia.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

That experience also disabused me of tine temptation to seel< tine reasons for tine
events of the Holocaust years in negative traits of the Yishuv's leaders. I was well
acquainted with the Israeli and Zionist leaders whose attitude toward the plight of
Soviet J ewry drew my criticism. And clearly it was not their personal traits that
generated their behavior.

The book is intended in the first place for researchers and students of the
Holocaust. For this reason it examines in detail several issues which are of importance
to these researchers. I n the majority of these cases, such as the three-way
correspondence between Jerusalem, Istanbul and Geneva (Chapter 3), the reader, I
believe, will profit if he "overcomes" the details.

I wish to thank the institutions that furnished me with needed documentary
material, and the personages who were kind enough to meet with me concerning
matters related to the book. All of them helped me in my work, but naturally, none of
them is responsible for the conclusions I reached.

S.B. Beit-Zvi
M ay 1977

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Introduction to the English Translation

The English translation is being published in the full scope of the Hebrew
original, save for a few unimportant minor emendations.

For the reader's convenience, it was decided to publish the English edition in two
volumes. Volume I contains nine chapters, and Volume II contains six chapters, as
well as three articles I wrote after the Hebrew edition had appeared.

Two of the articles-- "Golda Meir on the Evian Conference" and 'The Great
Erasure"--are devoted to the Evian Conference which took place in J uly 1938, and to the
period from December 1938 until the outbreak of World War II in September 1939.
These subjects are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 of the book. Recently, however, I
discovered that besides its negative assessment of Evian, the historical establishment
in Israel has steadfastly attempted to disregard, and to conceal from Holocaust
researchers, important fact and developments relating to the Rublee-Wohlthat Plan.
I n these two articles, I try to set the record straight.

The article "Sensitive Matters" was written in reaction to the summation speech
of Prof. Yehuda Bauer at a conference of Holocaust researchers devoted to the
destruction of Hungarian Jewry and to an article he published in the journal Yalkut
Moreshet in 1978. "Sensitive M atters" is a supplement to Chapter B of the book.

S.B. Beit-Zvi, 1989

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

INTRODUCTION

(Correspondence and conversations with David Ben-Gurion & Moslne

Sliarett)

M ay B, 1962

The Prime M inister of Israel,
J erusalem.

M r. Prime M inister,

The undersigned, S. Beit-Zvi, is a resident of Tel Aviv and a teacher by profession.
Some years ago I published articles in the press under the nom deplume"B. Shvivi." In
recent years I have been active in "Maoz," the association to aid Russian Jewry. My
public interest led me to make a detailed study of the rescue efforts made by J ews, and
by the Zionist movement in particular, during the years of the Holocaust in Europe
(1939-1945). The research was conducted by examining the press and literature of or
about that period and through conversations with persons who could help me and were
also willing to do so.

The great amount of material that I perused during my years of studying the
subject led me to conclude that the Zionist movement and the J ewish Yishuv in Eretz-
Israel sinned grievously against their brethren in Europe, both by omitting to do what
was necessary to save them, and by committing acts that seriously harmed rescue
possibilities. The following are some of these omissions and commissions:

Upon the outbreak of the war, the rescue of J ews was not posited as the primary
goal of the Zionist movement and the Yishuv. Indeed, this goal was not even listed
alongside the two main objectives which you yourself proclaimed upon the outbreak of
the war (the war against Hitler and the war against the White Paper).

Never during the years of the Holocaust, even after the scale of the destruction
was known and made public, was the rescue mission, as such, placed at the center of
Zionist activity, and never was it a "full-time" concern for the movement's major
leaders (yourself. Dr. Weizmann, B. Katznelson). At most, in the "peak" period, it was
dealt with on a "part-time" basis by a few Zionist leaders and a few of the movement's
marginal institutions. The WZO, which was then the paramount J ewish instrument

in the world, capable of acting and mobilizing others, did not demote itself
sdflessly to the rescue of European Jewry. And without selfless devotion, rescue
activity was foredoomed.

Yet with all that was not done, even graver is what the Zionist movement did do
that adversely affected the rescue of J ews.

In the emergency conditions that were generated with the war's outbreak,
Zionism pursued unabated its war against "territorialism." The Zionist movement
declared war on every J ew who would escape from Europe and find shelter elsewhere
than in Eretz-lsrael. You yourself declared at the Biltmore Conference that "the
meaning of these ships Patria and Struma is simple: Eretz-lsrael or death." This
statement, although meant as a description of objective reality, was in fact an
expression of the Zionist movement's political line. That line finally drove the British
government (which in any case was not made up of saints) to become Hitler's concrete
allies in the campaign to destroy Europe's Jews (see Lord Cranborne's infamous
declaration in the British Parliament and Eden's argument, in his meeting with
Roosevelt, against the rescue of BulgarianJ ewry--R. Sherwood, Roosevelt and l-iopl<ins,
Ch. 28).

Nor, with its cruel behavior toward European Jewry, did the Zionist movement
hesitate to exploit its calamity to aid and abet its own purposes, even planning openly
and publicly the utilization of the post-war period when, it was hoped, there would be a
surviving remnant whose plight could advance the realization of Zionism. (You will
find salient examples of this approach in your own book. In the Campaign, Vol. 3, pp.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

123, B4; Vol. 4, pp. 31, 90, 102; Vol. 2, pp. 255, 268.) This hope was fulfilled, but that
anyone survived was in no way due to the efforts of the Zionist movement.

Overweighing all of these misdeeds was the sin committed by the Zionist
institutions and the Yishuv in proffering direct aid to Goebbels' propaganda and
deception apparatus in the critical years. I n September 1944 you yourself declared that
"the reports about the slaughter in Poland reached us late, and even when they did
reach us--no one would believe us." Unfortunately, I could find no confirmation of this
statement. The truth is that for over three years, until the end of November 1942,
Davar (and a few other papers) waged a vigorous and systematic campaign against the
"exaggerations" that reached Palestine from various sources concerning the
destruction of the J ews. You yourself, if I am not mistaken, were in London (or New
York) in August and September 1942, when Zygelboim and the Polish government
provided the general public with many authoritative reports about the events in
Poland; yet it was not until

the end of November that these same reports, unaccompanied by reservations
and denials, were made known to the Yishuv. Until then, so "immunized" was the
Yishuv against "atrocity propaganda" that it continued to attach a degree of
exaggeration to everything it was told, even though hints about the events in Europe
could occasionally be found in remarks by Yishuv leaders (such as your own comment
in March 1943 on "a great massacre of the J ews--tens and hundreds of thousands"-- not
yet millions!).

These facts and others, with which I do not wish to weary you, led me to the
conclusions spelled out at the beginning of this letter. It seems to me that I also
understand the reason for the behavior of the WZO-a reason rooted in Zionism's
instinct, not in its nature. I need hardly say that it was with a heavy heart that I
arrived at these conclusions, and if I have not exaggerated them, their importance is
absolutely crucial. Since I am apprehensive that perhaps I did not take into account
something basic that may have escaped my notice, or that I failed to understand
something properly, I respectfully request that you receive me for a conversation on
this subject.

Yours sincerely and
thanking you in advance,
S. Beit-Zvi

The Prime Minister

J erusalem, J uly 5, 1962

To Mr. Beit-Zvi, Shalom,

I read your letter with great interest. I understand your bitterness and your
contentions- because the Holocaust, which was unexampled even in our history,
cannot but overwhelm us whenever we recall it.

However, it is difficult to agree with your accusations against the Yishuv and the
Zionist movement. The Haganah made desperate efforts to organize "Aliyah B"
("illegal" immigration); the government was in foreign and not the friendliest of
hands; not all the J ews, not the majority and not the greater part, were ready to settle
here--and the few who were ready to do so found closed gates. There were many in the
country who demonstrated genuine "selfless devotion"--and indeed sacrificed

themselves: Hannah Szenes, Enzo Sireni, and others. What could Weizmann
have done in the way of selfless devotion? What could you have done?

It is possible that newspapers and personages in the country did not believe in the
gravity of the Holocaust. Even the J ews in the Nazi-occupied countries did not believe
it. And I will not dare accuse them--even though I know noi/v that they were wrong, but
I know this after the fact.

If, heaven forbid, there should be a disaster in South Africa-and the possibility
exists--a [future] researcher will accuse people of not having foreseen the disaster. But

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

I have spoken with intelligent and important Jews from South Africa about a possible
disaster, and they are not impressed--they have plenty of excuses: it's not so terrible,
it's impossible to get money out, and if things become unbearable, they will escape to
Israel or to England.

It may be too late, but that is the nature of Jews (and perhaps also of non-Jews),
and you yourself admit that you arrived at your conclusion following research and
what you learned from various conversations. That research was not carried out before
the act. This is not meant as an accusation against you, heaven forbid, but I do not
believe in accusations after the fact. I could quote you warnings that were voiced even
before the outbreak of the war, but I understand why the Jews did not listen, I know
that nearly all the finest Zionist leaders did not leave Russia until they could no
longer tolerate the events of the Bolshevik Revolution. Some of them missed the boat--
and were thrown into prison.

As for a meeting for a conversation—willingly.

Yours sincerely,
David Ben-Gurion

J anuary 22, 1963

M r. Prime M inister.

Allow me to thank you, sir, for receiving me yesterday, and to sum up the results
of the meeting for my research on the Holocaust. I noted your remarks as follows:

(a) You are interested in what relates to the present and the future-ensuring the
existence and prosperity of the state, with all the problems

this entails. The question of the Holocaust, which deals with the past, does not fail
within these categories.

(b) Whoever has studied the Holocaust and has something to say about it, should
publish what he has to say. Since you said this after I had outlined to you again, in
addition to my detailed letter of half a year ago, the principal conclusions I arrived at
in my research (the obligation of outside help, foresight, selfless devotion, harmful
publications, and so forth), I took your comments as assent and encouragement
regarding the publication of my conclusions, and I am most grateful to you for this.

I am sevenfold grateful to you, sir, for agreeing to receive from me and to read

carefully a memorandum regarding the second subject that was raised in the meeting

[i.e., the problem of Russian Jewry]. I shall draw up the memorandum immediately
and send it to you soonest.

Respectfully,
S. Beit-Zvi

April 26, 1962

Mr. MosheSharett

Chairman, J ewish Agency Executive

J erusalem

Dear Mr. Sharett

The undersigned, S. Beit-Zvi, met with you two years ago concerning "Maoz." You
may also perhaps know me by the name "B. Shvivi," under which I wrote articles for
Hador and BTerem. Lately, my public interest has been focused on the issue of
Russian Jewry, and together with my colleagues in Maoz I tried to do something for
them.

The failure of the activity undertaken by Maoz, despite the great personal efforts
that were expended, led me to seek out and study objective causes for this outcome in
Israeli society. The Eichmann trial showed me that in the Holocaust period, too, the
rescue efforts of "the state on the way" were incommensurate with what was called for,
and, I believe, with the possibilities as well. Similarities between the rescue of

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

European Jewry, which was neglected, and the saving of Russian Jewry, which I
deeply believe is currently being neglected, led me to make a close study of the
questions relating to rescue in the Holocaust period.

My study of the issue during the past year has turned up a great deal of material
which, in my opinion, enables, with the most cautious

approach, unequivocal conclusions to be drawn concerning mistakes made by the
Zionist movement-mistakes which bore disastrous results. These mistakes derived
from immanent (not organic) features of Zionism. I fear that these mistakes are now
also causing alienation vis-a-vis the plight of Russian J ewry.

Becauseof the public interest in these matters, I am about to commit the results
of my work to writing, and publish them. In order to preclude the possibility of
conveying imprecise facts related to your activities in that period, as head of the
Jewish Agency's Political Department, or incorrectly interpreting things you said at
the time, I respectfully request that you receive me for a talk on this subject.

If you agree to receive me, I would ask that the meeting be in the evening, so as not
to cause me to miss work or deprive my pupils (I am a teacher) of their studies.

Respectfully and thanking you in advance,
S. Beit-Zvi

J uly20, 1962

My Dear Hirshke! *

The meeting with Moshe Sharett took place today at 12. I immediately launched
into my remarks, as I had prepared them, in the following order:

(a) At the beginning of World War II the WZO was the only world J ewish body in
terms of its size and strength, and it also exercised great influence on other Jewish
bodies (the World J ewish Congress, etc.). Therefore it bore responsibility for the fate of
the J ewish people even outside the realization (by mistake I said "implementation"
and Sharett corrected me--there were no more corrections) of the Zionist program. The
responsibility was not only moral-political but also actual -operational. This meant
that against the will of the WZO or without its support, no major project could be
executed among thej ewish people (up to this point Sharett listened silently, though he
jotted down something). Upon the

* Hirshke was my good friend, the lateZvi Hagivati, who showed great interest in
my research and was its first reader.

outbreak of the war and the destruction, and earlier, upon Hitler's assumption of
power, the WZO took a negative stand toward territorial ism along the lines of the 1904
debates. The WZO fought against every rescue proposal which did not involve Eretz-
Israel and did not help in the realization [of Zionism], as Rubashov put it at the time (I
quoted from material I had brought with me): "We will not rest until the gates of the
homeland are opened to everyj ew who will be saved from the clutches of the Nazis."

At this point Sharett began to get upset and to maintain that I was distorting the
Zionist stand. I read him a quote from his own remarks which I had brought with me
and which seemed to embarrass him. He began to explain and interpret in a very
rout/ne and unconvincing way. When I saw that I was not about to hear anything new,
I stopped him politely and asked to be allowed to go on presenting my case.

(b) Ttie absence of selfless demotion. Neither he, Weizmann nor Ben-Gurion had
been engaged in rescue efforts, but only second-rank leaders, and even they did so on a
"part-time" basis. Many possibilities were not followed up, no contact was maintained
with the Polish government, with the Soviet government... Here Sharett stopped me: "I
reject your contentions" (or words to that effect). He began by declaring that neither he
nor Ben-Gurion had been engaged exclusively in establishing the state. Then he
abandoned this peculiar statement and reminded me that he had spoken with Maisky

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

(i.e., contact with the USSR), and in conclusion \r\e insisted ardently (which greatly
disturbed me, because I was afraid I would make him lose control of himself) that he
had constantly been engaged in rescue work. He spoke a lot about those days and
warned against prophets of hindsight who could now tender good advice. I rejected this
argument and said that a leadership had the duty to understand, all the more so the
leadership of catastrophic Zionism. I quoted Rubashov on Ignominy No. 1 ("Who
allowed us not to know"), and that made an impression on him.

(c) Information. Here \ launched into an emotional attack (I begged his pardon for
speaking emotionally). I rejected the contention that others had concealed the facts
from us; I reminded him that in J une 1942 London was buzzing with the information
made public by the Polish government and Zygelboim, while in the Yishuv, for some
reason, nothing was said about this. I told him of Davar's ploys in that period. This
time he was quite affected. He said he did not have a clear memory of the events and

asked me a few questions. I told him that in the Yishuv the reports appeared in
November 1942, and I pointed out that according to Ha'aretz, the J ewish Agency
Executive had held up publication of the reports as long as the North African
campaign was being fought. Sharett repeated that he could not recall the exact details.

When I mentioned Zygelboim, I said "Zygelboim of blessed memory" and stressed
that I said his name tremblingly and admiringly. Sharett replied that Zygelboim
merited this. Then it turned out that he couldn't remember whether Zygelboim had
committed suicide alone or with someone else (he did so alone). He also thought
Zygelboim had taken his life in Downing Street (no). As for Davar, he said that the
writer had been Dan Pinnes, and that perhaps Berl had not been in Tel Aviv at the
time...

(d) I asked him about the War Refugee Board. He said he could remember
nothing. He knew only that it had been and remained of negligible importance. Then it
turned out he hadn't understood what I meant, he thought I was referring to the
Refugee Department in the 6r/t/s/i Foreign Office. During the conversation, he told me
that he had heard the words "what will we do with a million J ews," which many
attributed to Lord Moyne, spoken by a senior British Foreign Office official, Randall.

(e) I asked him why the paratroopers had been sent. In reply he told me a long
story about how he had managed to push this question through "in two ways" for
Churchill's personal decision, and how he had cabled Palestine: "Reached top." I
repeated my question: Why had they been sent? The reply: 'To try to save." I remarked:
'The paratroopers did not succeed in their mission anywhere." The reply: 'That is the
tragedy of history." He then added that the paratroopers' mission had been to stir up
resistance (or as you, Hirshke, say: to incite revolt).

Me: To savej ews by resistance? Maybe the intention was to save J ewish honor?

Sharett: Both.

We exchanged a few words about Jewish honor (our views differed). The talk
lasted an hour. When we started Sharett, told someone on the phone that he would be
available at 1 p.m. Because of this, and because he was tired and worn outfrom the talk
(that was quite apparent) I thanked him and took my leave.

Sharett: You managed it in just one hour. I thanked him again.

Yours,
Shabtai

N.B. In the partabout information and earlier, Sharett emphasized that everyone
was then of unanimous opinion and that the people at Davar weregood and honest, "no
worse than yourself." He didn't want to hear about Rabbi Binyamin (and I didn't
insist).

J uly22, 1962

Moshe Sharett

J ewish Agency for Palestine
J erusalem

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Mr. S. Beit-Zvi

95 Shalom Avenue

Tel Aviv.

Dear /-/aver.

Enclosed are notes that you left on my desk in Tel Aviv.

I want to take this opportunity to express my amazement concerning the
distinction you drew between saving lives and saving honor. If our people had not
preserved its honor--from the revolt of the Hasmoneans, the wars against Rome,
martyrdom throughout the generations, defense against the pogroms in Russia, to the
heroic exploits of the new Yishuv in Eretz-lsrael and the desperate uprising of the
ghettos in the diaspora--it is doubtful whether it would have remained alive; that is,
whether it would have regarded its life as worth maintaining and preserving for the
coming generations.

Sincerely,
Moshe Sharett

J uly 31, 1962

Dear Mr. Sharett,

I would like to respond to the amazement you expressed in your letter of J uly 22
concerning my comments on saving Jewish lives and saving Jewish honor. Although
this subject was marginal to our conversation, and we exchanged only a few
fragmented sentences about it,

it can, I believe, serve to exemplify the differences between us which are so much
concern to me.

As you will recall, the problem arose in connection with my question on the goal
of the paratroopers' mission. You replied that they had been sent "to try to save," and
explained that their aim was to get the J ews to revolt against their persecutors. I said
that I doubted whether in the conditions then existing, such uprisings could have
saved people. I then said: Perhaps the idea was "to save honor." To which you replied:
Both. We then exchanged a few remarks about our different approaches to the to the
notion of saving honor. Your letter shows, unfortunately, that my comments could
have been construed as suggesting that I was belittling the idea of saving Jewish
honor. Naturally, this is not the case.

I agree with you that the revolt of the Hasmoneans, the wars against Rome, the
acts of martyrdom throughout the generations, and a similar actions in our people's
history, preserved our honor and helped make our national life worthy of being
preserved and maintained. Such deeds excelled, among other points, in that:

- They thwarted the designs of our enemies to infringe on our liberty, our faith,
our independence, our life.

- In most cases the individual (or the group) who took part in the heroic act had a
choice: to sacrifice their lives or to accept the edict of the enemy as the price of
remaining alive.

- By sacrificing (or being ready to sacrifice) the life of the individual, many lives
were saved, or values which the enemy sought to eradicate.

Jewish uprisings in the ghettos during the Holocaust years did not thwart the
designs of the German oppressor--to annihilate us--and were under no circumstances
capableof doing so cf/rect/y. (If combined with propitious conditions, such as existed in
the Warsaw Ghetto, an uprising could signal the free world to mobilize forces to help,
and thereby indirectly bring about a major rescue operation. But thanks to our very
great omissions, the signal from Warsaw was not received and no help was given.)

Every ghetto uprising necessan'/y entailed much loss of life, in addition to those
actually involved in the revolt. Because of this fact which was very pronounced in the
Warsaw Ghetto revolt, not one responsible official in the Holocaust countries held up
revolt as an "ordinary" means of salvation. The planners of the revolts always
designated them as last- minute operations, [to be carried out only] after it

was clear that the-J ews in the ghetto were doomed to immediate, irrevocable
perdition.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Far be it from us today to dispense advice retroactively to our wretcined brotiners
wino cinose one way or anotiner to inescapable deatin (in tine absence of outside help). All
the uprisers are martyrs, and revolt was an act of heroism. But equally heroic is an act,
like "the last of the just," of one who gives his life in order to ease the final moments of
his dear ones. This was the path chosen by tens and hundreds of thousands of men,
women and youth, who of their own volition gave up their final chance for personal
rescue and went "like sheep to the slaughter," in the words of those who criticized them
from a safe distance.

The ghetto uprisings were not necessary in order to save Jewish honor. They
caused the immediate deaths of many precious lives for every Nazi corpse. Had every
ghetto taken the road of revolt, absolutely nothing would have remained of Europe's
J ews who were trapped by the Nazis (with the exception of the very few who managed to
escape to the forests) .

Therefore, when you confirmed to me that young men and women from the
Yishuv had been sent to sacrifice their lives in order to organize revolts among the
survivors of European J ewry, I found this difficult to accept.

I take this opportunity to thank you again for the illuminating talk you granted

me.

Respectfully,
S. Beit-Zvi

August 5, 1962
Mr. S. Beit-Zvi
95 H ashalom Avenue
Tel Aviv.

Sir,

As regards saving honor, I did not grasp the distinction you draw between
different kinds of sacrifice: the collective act of suicide of those besieged on Massada
also brought their nation perpetual honor.

So much for the theory, whereas in practice you did not take my precise meaning.
Where I said "also" you have me saying "only." I said that the paratroopers were sent
first and foremost to try and save, both to organize acts of sabotage, and to stir up
revolt--all in accordance

with the circumstances and possibilities. From afar and away from the front and
whi le the events were taking place--not now, when we are all blessed with the wisdom
of hindsight and allow ourselves the luxury of prophesying the past--it was absolutely
impossible to know in advance what would happen. The general assumption was that
if we could succeed in breaching the front even with a handful of people- provided they
possessed resourcefulness, daring and intelligence- we might perhaps generate the
possibility of action partaking of both salvation and honor. At all events, we did not
regard ourselves as exempt from this attempt, with all its attendant risks.

Sincerely,

Moshe Sharett

August 15, 1962

Dear Mr. Sharett,

Thank you very much for your letter of August 5. I take the liberty of replying to
your contention about "the luxury of prophesying the past." I had thought, during our
conversation, that you were persuaded by my comments on this topic. But evidently I
was mistaken.

If the argument against retroactive criticism is directed against the critic, it
may be justified in certain cases. In my own case this is a personal question without
public importance. But this is not the case, I maintain, when those being criticized are
the leaders of the nation and bear responsibility for its future. Leaders, I submit, must
know what is //aJb/e to happen, even if things are not inevitable. The destruction of six
million Jews was not causally inevitable, just as there is nothing inevitable about a
"third round" with the Arabs, or about the annihilation of Russian Jewry in a new

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

version of the "Doctors' Plot." But just as Israel's leaders do not cease thinking about
the reasonable poss/Jb/V/ty of a third round, and just as my friends and I cannot ignore
the equally reasonable possibility of the destruction of Russian J ewry, so the Zionist
leaders were duty-bound not to disregard Hitler's threat to destroy the Jews in Europe.
It seems to me that Zaiman Shazar was absolutely right when in December 1942 he
placed at the head of his 'Triple Ignominy" the ignominy of not knowing ("Why were
we stunned? Who gave this movement.., which is obligated to be aware of all the
possible dangers to the nation, permission to be surprised?").

A few of my interlocutors noted that even the Jews in the ghettos did not know
about or did not believe the stories about the destruction. This is understandable. The
operation to destroy European Jewry was a well-kept state secret in the Third Reich.
Goebbels' vast propaganda apparatus was mobilized to deny, and to mislead people
about the "atrocity propaganda." It is hardly surprising that the ghetto residents, cut
off from the world, did not know about what was occurring in the initial stages of the
Holocaust. The Zionist leaders could have known about the events had they preoccupied
themselves with this and had they been willing to believe what they were told. The fact
that they were willing victims and unknowing abetters of Goebbels' efforts certainly
does not make them immune from criticism. The more so because such criticism is
valuable for the future.

In fact, Mr. Sharett, "prophesying the past" exists, and in the most outrageous
manner--on the part of "official" circles, shapers of public opinion, writers of history,
and so forth. That prophecy is expressed in the first place in the anemic argument that
our brothers in Europe went "like sheep to the slaughter," and in the arrogant
question: "Why did they not revolt?" As though it was up to them to fulfill the task that
devolved upon free Jewry. In its "positive" form, this prophecy finds expression in
extensive "corrections" of history of which the aim is, ostensibly, to defend those who
need no defense. The Holocaust has become "Holocaust and Heroism," the destruction
is now "the Destruction and the Uprising." Compounded by the political parties'
takeover of the past (The Book of the Partisans, one-hundred-percent Hashomer
Hatza'ir, The War of the Ghettos published by Hakibbutz Hameuhad; and others),
prophesysing the past has brought about a situation in which a considerable part of
our Holocaust literature is unfit for use. A war against prophesying of this kind, I
submit, can be of great service to the past and the future.

Respectfully,
S.Beit-Zvi

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Part One

THE INFORMATION DEBACLE

Preface

Speaking in a Histadrut Council session in early December 1942, Shneour
Zaiman Rubashov, who as Zaiman Shazar would become Israel's third President,
devoted his remarks to the 'Triple Ignominy" that had been generated by the
destruction of European Jewry. The First Ignominy was the very fact of not knowing.
"Why were we stunned?" he asked "Who gave this movement, which is obligated to be
aware of all the possible dangers to the nation, permission to be surprised? After all,
we were warned that this would be the culmination of their reckoning with us.
Pobiedonosdev said it, Lueger said it, and Hitler said it: they said it and prophesied it.
So why were our ears deaf to the point where we, too, were surprised, did not know it was
possible?"

Anshel Reis, from the Association of Polish Immigrants, who took part in the
meeting, went further. Besides the accusation of not knowing, he spoke of the guilt of
silence and suppression. He mentioned a pamphlet that had been published in London
three months earlier, with a preface by Wedgewood and Zygelboim, that contained a
detailed description of the atrocities. "Where were we? Why did our news agencies not
report this? What did we do to stop the slaughter?"

Moshe Aram summed up: "Reis is right. For months, we-the Yishuv and the
Histadrut and the ha ver/m and the functionaries-have been unwitting accomplices to
murder. Someone concealed things from us.. .and we went on living, arguing... and at
the very same time a people was being destroyed!" (Emphases in the original press
report.)

These strong words appeared in the newspaper Davar on December 4, 1942, two
days after the conclusion of the mourning period declared by the Yishuv institutions
following the publication of "authoritative reports" about the destruction of the J ews
in Europe. It is a safe assumption that the paper's readers regarded these accusations
as exaggerated, of the kind uttered by righteous people when they confess ("we are
guilty, we have betrayed...," in the words of the Yom Kippur prayer), or such as people
who have lost a dear one torment themselves with. To the Zionist Yishuv, loyal to its
institutions, well acquainted with its leaders, knowing their dedication and vigor, it
was inconceivable to take seriously the talk about "ignominy," let alone the idea of
being "an unwitting accomplice to murder." Very possibly the speakers themselves
used deliberate hyperbole. At all events, no opposition to the

establishment arose against this background (with the exception of the
mi nuscule/4/-Dam/ group), nor was this the issue or even one of the issues underlying
the splits then wracking the Yishuv.

In the course of this book, we will see that the remarks of the three speakers were
not exaggerated. Basing ourselves on reliable facts, we will attempt to prove:

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

(a) That the World Zionist Organization and its leadership succeeded
astonishingly well in not knowing about the situation of European J ewry, although, as
Rubashov argued cogently, the essence of Zionism obligated them to know.

(b) That this phenomenal state of ignorance was not the result of a paucity or
absence of information, but stemmed from a desire not to know, not to investigate, and
not to believe, even as numerous reports arrived about the events.

(c) That for months on end the Zionist leadership and the press in the Yishuv
effectively served the Nazis' deception campaign which was designed to conceal from
the world the facts surrounding the destruction and to downplay it as much as
possible. In a crucial and critical period, the stand taken by Zionist papers reflected
open and vigorous support for the versions put out by the Nazi M inister of Propaganda,
Goebbels, in thefaceof the "exaggerations" and "fabrications" of his opponents in the
free world.

(d) That this position did an incalculable service for the Nazi campaign to
destroy European J ewry and was in large measure responsible for the failure of rescue
efforts which were or should have been undertaken.

1 1 bears stressi ng here that these appal I i ng acts were committed i n good faith and
with the actors' certainty that they were doing "what was needed" to the best of their
understanding.* They were supported by the various strata of the Zionist public,
which willingly followed its leaders and responded forgivingly to its mistakes and
blunders. It was this mass support that generated the Zionist leaders' inordinate self-
confidence, their intolerance of self-criticism. As in other instances in Zionist (and
Israeli) history, the leadership sinned not by being unfaithful to its public, but in
representing them instead of leading.

*This feeling was expressed years later in Moshe Sharett's angry comment to the
present writer that the people at Davar were good and honest, and "no worse than
yourself." (Seethe I ntroduction.)

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Chapter One

The Secret Operation to Destroy the J ews

It is axiomatic tinat antisemites everywinere and at all times (excepting only
unusual isolated instances) would be delighted if the Jews somehow were to vanish
from the face of the earth, or at least from the proximity of the antisemites. Every form
of antisemitism bears within it the seed of destruction. The disappearance of the Jews
constitutes an "ideal" of J ew- haters across the generations, a "final goal" to which
they fervently aspire. However, before this "final goal" becomes the direct objective of
immediate actions, certain developments must take place which will help finalize the
destruction decision in the hearts of the antisemites and their leaders. Further,
special circumstances need to prevail which will enable the decision to be
implemented without encountering insurmountable obstacles. The distinctive feature
of the Nazis' antisemitism was its derivation from racist theory. For the Nazis, then,
the disappearance of the Jews was not to be effected by means of their religious
conversion or their removal from social and economic positions, but by their expulsion
or their physical destruction. Upon the outbreak of the Second World War the
expulsion of the J ews from Europe (and not necessarily their physical annihilation)
was the declared objective of the National-Socialist state. In the course of the war,
apparently early in 1941 but certainly no later than the middle of that year, the
destruction of Europe's Jews became a primary war aim for the Nazi regime. The
decision rested with one person, Adolf Hitler. What the decisive factors were that led
him to issue the destruction order and who the persons were that exercised the crucial
influence on him, are not known and may never be known. The comments of Rabbi
M .D. Weissmandel are well taken:

"Who can know definitively who it was that spawned the initial thought
advocating this notion of the destruction of Jewry? Did the idea really work its way
down from top to bottom in the orderly hierarchy of these murderers--or is it possible
that it actually began its course from below and rose to the top in the form of a proposal
before once again working its way down from top to bottom in the form of laws and
clauses and paragraphs and subsections. And who can know how insignificant was
each rung on the hierarchical scale and who was the lowest person on it: whether it
was the evil M ufti, the inveterate hater of all things J ewish, as Wisliceny always

maintained, or his fiendish German colleague who sought revenge because his
craving for wealth was unsated."!

1 Rabbi Michael Dov Weissmandel, From the Depths (Hebrew), Emunah, New York, 1960, pp. 44-45. For interesting ideas on

this subject, see Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews 1933- 1945 , New York, 1975.

Abbreviations :

CZA — Central Zionist Archives

YVA -- Yad Vashem Archives

FRUS — Foreign Relations of the United States

Br. Doe. — Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1929

Ger. Doc. ~ Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945

Record ~ Contemporary Jewish Record

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

It is possible, however, to elucidate the conditions which enabled the
implementation of the murder plan and the principal means employed by Hitler and
his gang in order to ensure its execution. The objective conditions involved an
extraordinary concatenation of circumstances originating in a world war: when great
nations fought for their very survival and questions of victory or defeat were being
decided in the daily onrush of events; when public opinion fluctuated between apathy
and awakening in wild swings of fateful developments; when the communications and
information media were skewed and unreliable. Under these conditions--when the act
could be isolated and concealed from the view of the world; when the destruction
operation was accorded priority over vital wartime necessities (with respect to the use
of the railways); when at the Fuehrer's beck and call stood a highly trained and
disciplined apparatus, utterly devoid of any moral scruples--under these conditions
H itier succeeded within four years in murdering nearly six million J ews.

The paramount means, without which the exploitation of all the ancillary efforts
would have been unavailing, and destruction on the scale that was perpetrated would
have been inconceivable, was the secrecy of the operation. Manifestly, the plan for the
total annihilation of thej ews was a strict state secret of the Third Reich. The Germans
who effected it were "bearers of a secret" (G^amn/sstrager) and were obligated, under
pain of the stringent Nazi discipline, to ensure that the plan remained unknown to all
outsiders. Strict rules of conspiracy and of oral and written camouflage were observed
by everyone involved from the heads of government to the last of the murderers.
Correspondence between the collaborators in the scheme was subject to the same rules.
Even in speeches delivered in the innermost circles of the Nazi leadership,
euphemism and equivocation were the order of the day. The only exceptions permitted
were in practical discussions relating to technical and organizational aspects of the
destruction plans, and in reports by the perpetrators themselves. As this facet bears
considerable importance for our theme, we shall now proceed to examine it in some
detail.

The secrecy began with the source itself. As we noted, the decree of total
destruction was contained in a personal order issued by Hitler. This order was
apparently given orally on a date and under circumstances which were carefully
guarded and which to this day remain unknown. Nor

is it known whether one order only was issued or a series of orders graded
according to their decisiveness and scope. Rudolf Hoess, the commandant of
Auschwitz, relates that in the summer of 1941 he was informed by Himmler that the
Fuehrer had ordered the destruction of all the J ews in Europe and that Auschwitz was
designated as one of the operation's centers. It was evidently at about that time that
Eichmann learned of the Fuehrer's directive. Earlier, in March 1941 when the plans
for the invasion of the Soviet Union-Operation "Barbarossa"-were being drawn up.
Hitler had ordered the formation of "strike forces" (Einsatzgruppen) which were to
advance together with the army and annihilate in the occupied territories the Jews,
the Communists and the political commissars of the Red Army. This seems to have
been a prefatory order for the general destruction of the J ews. Not long afterwards, the
Nazi leader Rosenberg wrote in his diary that the Fuehrer had told him certain things
which "I would not wish to commit to writing now but that I will never forget."2 It is
not inconceivable that he was alluding to the satanic plot to murder all the Jews, a
decision which even Rosenberg considered too inconvenient at that time to be set down
on paper. Seven months later, in November 1941 when Rosenberg was addressing a
group of German journalists on the need to solve the Jewish question through total
biological liquidation, the secrecy of the topic was underscored by the fact that no one
was permitted to take notes. 3

The Fuehrer's decision was thus kept secret and for purposes of implementation
was passed on orally by the Nazi hierarchy.4 It bears noting that among the vast array
of papers uncovered from the Nazi era, testimony of Hitler's explicit support for the
murder of the Jews is documented in one instance only. The occasion was a
conversation between the Fuehrer and the Hungarian Regent Horthy on April 17, 1943.

IMT — Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal.

2 Robert M.W. Kempner, Profession: Annihilation (Hebrew), 1964, p. 78.

3 Ibid., p. 69.

4 An exception was the letter from Himmler to Eichmann which, according to Dieter Wisliceny, Eichmann showed him when he
revealed to Wisliceny the fate of the Jews who were exiled from Slovakia.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Responding to remarks by the latter, Hitler said that because the Jews of Poland did
not want to work, it was necessary "to deal with them as with tubercular viruses which
are liable to infect a healthy body. "5 This admission escaped Hitler's lips in the heat of
the discussion, and even then probably because the Fuehrer was certain that the
rumors about thefate of Polish J ewry had surely reached the H ungarian ruler.

The first document emanating from the Nazi leadership alluding to the onset of
the operation to destroy the J ews takes the form of a letter dated J uly 31, 1941, from
Marshal Goering to the Gestapo chief, Heydrich. The letter charges Heydrich with the
task of heading up "the comprehensive solution of the Jewish question in the German
sphere of influence in Europe," and instructs him to submit to Goering a plan setting

forth the operations required "for the implementation of the desired final
solution of thej ewish question." This letter, which constituted the formal basis for the
Wannsee Conference, is clearly and distinctly devoted to the topic of the destruction.
Yet the word itself appears nowhere in it. Instead we find the euphemism: "the final
solution."

At the conference convened by Heydrich within the context of executing Goering's
order, held on Wannsee Street in Berlin on January 20, 1942, the total annihilation of
European Jewry was discussed openly and in detail. Various possible forms of
destruction were considered, and special emphasis was placed on the need to refrain
from stirring up the non-J ewish population. Yet even in the minutes of this meeting,
labelled "top secret," the word "destruction" is nowhere to be found. In addition to the
concept of "the final solution," the murder of the Jews is alluded to in the notion of
"transport to the East." These two euphemisms were to serve the Nazi apparatus
throughout the entire Holocaust period. I ndeed, the first of them was actually ingested
and put into use by some Holocaust researchers.

The logistics of the destruction engendered a unique lexicon of codewords and
euphemisms which were employed by the perpetrators. The letters "S.B." on the transit
papers of a prisoner meant that the prisoner was to be accorded "special treatment,"
namely, that he was to be put to death. "Action," "selection" and "segregation" referred
to the rounding up and choice of candidates for immediate destruction. 'Transfer of
residence" (uJbers/ecf/ung): transport to the place of murder. Correspondence about the
vehicles for asphyxiation by gas referred to "five-ton S vehicles."6 Blueprints of the
crematoria were labelled "washing facilities for a special operation."? The
interdepartmental correspondence relating to the destruction is replete with similar
euphemisms and codewords.

The operation to destroy the Jews was kept secret from the following: (a)
Germany's opponents in the war; (b) the neutral countries;

(c) Germany's satellite states and the occupied countries; (d) the population of
Germany itself; and (e) in particular from theJ ews, both those who were designated for
destruction and their brethren living outside the sphere of Nazi rule. It was absolutely
crucial for the German authorities to maintain their secret vis-a-vis all these groups.

If Germany's opponents in the Second World War, and the great powers in
particular, had been in possession of advance knowledge about what was being
implemented and what was being planned, armed with this

information, they could have-with the means at their disposal-effectively
disrupted the destruction operation and narrowed its scope considerably, perhaps
halting it completely in certain places or even in all locales. This is evidenced by the
success of the efforts undertaken--albeit too late--to rescue the remnants of the J ewish
community in the Balkans, and in particular the partial rescue of the remnants of
Hungarian J ewry, in Budapest. 8

These operations came very late in the day. An earlier effort would have required
the Allies to be in possession of up-to-date intelligence, to be ready to believe the
incoming reports, and then be willing to act on them. For the last condition to have

5 Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution , A.S. Barnes, 1961. p. 417 (hereafter: Reitlinger).

6 Kempner, p. 74.

7 Reitlinger, p. 150.

8 For the details, see Ch. 13.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

been met in the democracies during tine inarsin circumstances of tine war, substantial
public pressure would have had to be exerted on the governments involved-whether
their members were righteous, wicked or half-righteous. This would have been
possible only if the public had believed the reports about the destruction and identified
with its victims. Only, that is, if the treacherous attack by the J apanese on Pearl
Harbor and the bombings of London, Coventry and Rotterdam did not overshadow the
slaughter in Warsaw and Vilna, in terms of concrete visual impact and in generating
moral outrage. To obviate this possibility, the Nazis created a ramified system of
concealment, deception and confusion. Their success in this area must have surprised
even them.

Today, over forty years after the Holocaust, we cannot imagine how it was possible
not to know or, in good faith, not to believe the reports about the destruction.
Illustrative of the Nazis' success in the realm of deception, was the reaction of a
personality whom everyone would agree was a friend of the J ewish people and could
certainly not be suspected of harboring ill will or malice against the J ews. In HaZman
(May 29, 1944) Yitzhak Gruenbaum related that the exiled president of
Czechoslovakia, Benes, did not believe the stories about the destruction; he was certain
that after the war all those in the ghettos and labor camps would emerge safe and
healthy.9 This, it bears stressing, was in mid- 1944, when the operation to destroy
European J ewry was nearing its completion. The speaker was an exiled head of state
who by dint of his situation and position was undoubtedly close to the sources of
information about events in Europe. And the place was London which since the
summer of 1942 had known no shortage of reliable reports about the annihilation of
European Jewry. Yet Goebbels had managed to convince Benes that all these reports
amounted to nothing more than atrocity propaganda...

Where the neutral countries were concerned, the Germans had pressing reasons
to maintain a veil of secrecy. Reports about the systematic mass murder of civilian
populations--not sparing infants, women or the elderly--could have proved harmful to
Germany's "image" in those countries in which it had an interest, and indeed could
have obstructed the destruction operation itself as well as thwarting other war aims.
Had the true situation been known in the neutral countries adjacent to Germany or in
the German-occupied lands, the governments there, as well as various public groups,
might have been more amenable to smuggling Jews across the various frontiers and
offering them refuge. One underlying cause of the appalling cases in which border
guards in enlightened lands sent back to the German hell J ews who were trying to
escape, was that even these countries considered the risk of death faced by returned
J ews to be exaggerated; at all events, the reasoned, it was not worth taking the risk of
aggravating their own relations with the immensely powerful Nazi state. It is not
surprising that the campaign of deception and deceit launched by the offices of
Goebbels, Ribbentrop and Himmler were directed primarily toward the neutral
countries and the humanitarian organizations which were active in them. The camp
for the elderly at Theresienstadt, with its relatively "liberal" regime, was specially
designed at the Wannsee Conference in order to serve as a showcase for Red Cross
delegations and other organizations and public figures from countries which were not
taking part in the war.

Far more important was the preservation of secrecy vis-a-vis the German
satellite states and the German-occupied lands. It bears noting that in all these
countries, including Poland, Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Ukraine-in the latter
Jews were murdered in full public view-the Germans moronically persisted in
concealing from the population the purpose of the murders and their intended scope.
Even in these locales, where the situation permitted, the pretexts offered for the
murder of J ews were, on the one hand, that no more than an extended pogrom was i n
progress, and on the other that these actions were actually aimed against the
partisans and the Communists. The transports to the places of destruction were
described as transfers to areas in the East. It was common knowledge that the
conditions in these "areas in the East" were not exactly luxurious and that a
considerable portion of the J ews would not survive there. But the secret itself was
preserved meticulously: that the transfer trains and the wagon convoys travelled
straight to the gas chambers or to the murder ditches where their occupants were

I Yitzhak Gruenbaum, Destruction and Holocaust (Hebrew), Haverim, 1946, p. 117.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

disposed of on the spot. Inevitably, however, in the countries mentioned above, the
secret was

soon out. By the end of 1942 every Lithuanian or Ukrainian child knew where the
Jews were being taken, as did every Polish shmaltzobnik w\r\o for money handed Jews
over to the German police. If the technical details of the destruction process itself were
unknown, they used their imaginations to fill in the gaps and their conclusions were
not far from the mark. Thus, instead of execution by gas, they imagined murder by
electrocution; extraction of the gold teeth of the dead was "supplemented" by the very
widespread stories about the manufacture of soap from the bodies of J ews.
Nevertheless, even in these countries the secrecy proved beneficial to the Nazis for the
first year or two of the destruction campaign.

In the occupied Western countries and in the satellite states the strict
maintenance of secrecy played was crucial for the operation of transporting the J ews to
the annihilation sites. It is doubtful whether the Germans would have been able to
move so many J ews out of Holland, France and Belgium had they not been able, until
the very end of the war, to conceal from the local inhabitants the destination of the
transports. The same holds true for Greece and Yugoslavia, as well as for the satellite
states and Germany's allies. For all that they were saliently antisemitic, it emerges
that several of the satellite and puppet governments nevertheless evinced hesitation
or even actual opposition when it came to sending the Jews to certain death. Whether
this unwillingness stemmed from humanitarian grounds, from pressure wielded by
various elements, or from fear of retaliation and punishment, is irrelevant. The fact is
that such unwillingness did crop up sporadically and that the Nazis were compelled to
overcome it not by convincing the countries in question of the "justness" of their deeds,
but by concealing those deeds. From the wealth of material on this subject, we shall
cite two noteworthy episodes: Rome and Bratislava.

Acting under Hitler's influence, Mussolini in 1938 introduced anti-J ewish laws
in Italy. However, during the war itself the Fascist leader objected to the idea of
sending Italy's J ews out of the country, and ranking personnel in the Italian army did
much to savej ews in Italian-occupied areas in southern France, Greece and Croatia. In
February 1943 the Duce came under heavy pressure from Germany to order his
generals to desist from rescuing Jews. Mussolini, who by then was in possession of
reliable information about the destruction, rebuffed the pressure.lO This situation
persisted until Mussolini's arrest by his Italian opponents and his subsequent
liberation by German commandos. Following the Germans' capture of Rome, they
moved to round up the J ews for deportation.

However, the J ews, the Italian public and the Catholic Church knew exactly what
wasat stake. The result: of Rome's 8,000 J ews (10,000 according to another version) the
Germans were able to seize only 1,000 for transport to Auschwitz. The remainder found
shelter in monasteries and private homes. 11

The second example concerns Slovakia, where the antisemitic government was
all too ready and willing to accede to the German suggestion to expel the local Jews and
seize their property. In the course of 1942 nearly 60,000 Jews were sent to Lublin and
Auschwitz; about 250 eventually returned. It then emerged that the nemesis of the
J ews. Prime M inister Tuka, was under the impression that the J ews were being sent to
organized labor camps. For two years he pestered the Reich representatives in
Bratislava with a request to allow an official Slovakian delegation to visit these
camps. 12 It is doubtful whether Tuka himself did not know the truth about the murder
of Slovakian J ewry from credible sources of some kind. Still, it is of interest that as late
as February 1944 Eichmann was evasive about relating the truth: in place of a tour of
the non-existent camps of the murdered Slovakian J ews he proposed that the Slovakian
commission visit the show-camp of Theresienstadt. He writes:

"It is likely that this put an end to the concerns-in themselves totally
unjustified--of various members of the Slovakian government." A secret is a secret...

10 Kempner, p. 260.

11 Ibid., p. 275; on the humane attitude of the Italians— leaders and common people alike— toward the Jews, see also Ruth Bondy
The Emissary: The Life and Death of Enzo Sereni (Hebrew), p. 388.

12 Ibid., pp. 225-227.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

WeJ ews are seriously hampered in attempting to determine whether the German
public knew about the total murder of the J ews perpetrated by the German
government. One difficulty stems from our justified contention that the entire German
nation bears responsibility for the murder of our people. In the light of this, and in
view of the impudent denials of thousands of certain murderers who pretend that they
"do not know about" or "do not remember" the acts of murder, our attitude is one of
suspicion and mistrust vis-a-vis every German who lived through the period and
refuses to admit that he knew what was afoot. We find it inconceivable that all or most
of Germany's eighty million citizens did not know about this vast operation, in which
thousands and tens of thousands took part and hundreds of thousands if not millions
benefited materially. So utterly convinced are we of this, that any opinion or even
speculation to the contrary arouses in us fierce mental resistance, as though we were
denying one of the moral linchpins of our relations with the Germans. However, so
crucial a chapter in the annals of our people is the Holocaust, and so fateful for our
future, that we are not at liberty to exempt ourselves

from examining thoroughly each and every detail in this horrific episode. And
the fact is that the widespread view concerning the Germans' knowledge of the total
destruction visited on thej ews is consistent neither with a close study of the facts nor
with elementary logic.

I n the first place, extensive knowledge in Germany about the ongoing murder of
theJ ews would have ruled out the possibility that secret could be safeguarded from the
international community. The disruptions in communications between countries did
not prevent the existence of a broad and many-sided network of contacts between
Germans and the residents of the neutral and occupied countries. Had eighty million
Germans whispered secretly amongst themselves about the destruction, that whisper
would have burst out of the country via thousands of possible channels of
communication. I n the summer of 1942, when the representative of the World Jewish
Congress in Switzerland sought confirmation of the destruction from Germany, he was
forced to make do with a single individual, a trustee of the Allies, with access to the
circle close to Hitler. There, of course, they knew.B

It is self-evident that if the German public at large had known about the
destruction, that knowledge could not have been concealed from their neighbors, the
Jews of Germany, who lived among the Germans throughout the country and
maintained close touch with them until their very transport to the killing centers.
However, the naivete and astonishing ignorance manifested by German Jewry
concerning the fate that awaited them at those centers, are well known.

It should also be pointed out that widespread knowledge of the destruction would
have been reflected in the diaries and other written records kept by tens of thousands of
Germans during the war years. In fact, such references are extremely sparse, if not
actually negligible.

As for the arrival of information via the opposite route-into Germany from
outside the country-it is as clear as it is well known that such information had no
effect whatever on the Germans. The reports that came in via the radio were relatively
meager and were countered by a well-oiled deception system aimed at shielding
Germans against the enemy's "atrocity propaganda." No great leap of the imagination
is required to grasp why and how the Germans believed Goebbels while rejecting as
"stupid fabrications" and "malicious lies" the few reports about the destruction that
did filter through from outside sources.

The organizers of the destruction operation were well aware that secrecy begins at
home, and they acted accordingly. In addition to the concealment modes noted above,
an array of secret means was employed

to prevent the reports about the murders from becoming common knowledge
among the German public. Some of these means were determined in advance during
the planning for the operation. Others were introduced in the wake of practical
experience. Vigorous measures for maintaining secrecy were instituted following the
commencement of operations by the Einsatzgruppen. These squads advanced together
with the German army as it invaded the Soviet Union, murdering the Jewish
population they encountered on the spot. It soon became apparent that the secrecy in

13 Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Died, Seeker & Warburg, London, 1968, p. 3.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

this case was not tight enough. I n the initial days of the operation the regular German
troops evinced considerable interest in the murders, gathering around to watch the
"shows," photographing the deeds and jotting down descriptions of what they saw.
However, the army soon issued orders which put an end to the unnecessary curiosity
and the harmful chitchat. It was explained to the troops that the dissemination of
photographs and written descriptions of the destruction operations constituted
subversion of the army and that the guilty would be duly punished. The military
authorities were called upon to collect all the photographs, negatives and written
descriptions, and to hand them over to a certain department at general headquarters
together with a list of the soldiers from whom the material had been confiscated. The
army was also instructed to cooperate with the Einsatzgruppen in preventing soldiers
from being present during the murder operations. Subsequently Heydrich barred
photography even by the perpetrators themselves and ordered searches to be carried
out with the aim of confiscating every photograph found in the area of operations of the
units involved. The film taken by officially assigned photographers was forwarded to
Berlin undeveloped as "Reich secret material. "14

In this manner the secrecy of the destruction campaign was maintained even
during the most "inconvenient" period--when it was carried out across broad zones of
the battle front. It bears noting that the murder of Jews at this time was perpetrated
under the guise of war operations and the drive against Communism; as yet no explicit
indication had emerged of an intention to annihilate all J ews everywhere.
Maintenance of secrecy was greatly facilitated later in the operation, when the
destruction actions were concentrated in a few remote and closed areas, with relatively
small team of murderers in charge.

Various evidence suggests that efforts were made to keep the destruction secret
even from the staff of the Nazis' administrative apparatus in Poland. One such case
involved the J ewish residents of the village of Mielec in the Zamosc district who were
annihilated at the

Belzec camp in March 1942. Officially it was said that the Jews of Mielec would
have to move eastward in order to make room for German J ews who were slated to arrive
in their place. When the officer Richard Turk requested information from the Interior
Administration of the Nazi regime in Poland about the current whereabouts of the
Jews who had disappeared, he was stonewalled for three full months. Finally he
"learned" in J uly thatthej ews had been transferred and resettled in Russia. 15

The testimony at the Nuremberg trials of Hans Frank, the Nazi
General gouverneur of Poland, is not without interest in this connection. Frank related
how he was personally prevented from observing the killing of J ews. On one occasion
he travelled to Belzec for this express purpose. The head of the murderers there,
Globocnik, showed him some Jews who were engaged in digging a huge ditch. To his
question about the fate of these Jews he received a standard reply: they would be sent
East. On another occasion Frank attempted to pay a surprise visit to Auschwitz.
However, his vehicle was stopped at the entrance to the camp on the pretext that an
epidemic was raging there. When Frank later complained to Hitler about the abortive
visit, the latter told him that anti-Nazi rebels were apparently being executed at
Auschwitz at the time. Hitler advised Frank to approach Himmler on the matter, but
since it was evidently Himmler who was behind the original order not to allow him
into the camp, Frank was back to square one. 16

This testimony is not absolutely reliable. It is possible (albeit not very probable)
that Frank invented the story as part of his attempt to escape the hangman's noose. It is
also conceivable that Himmler's order stemmed from the uneasy relations that
prevailed between him and Frank. True or not, however, the story in all its details is
important as a symbolic illustration of the Nazis' camouflage policy in general and
vis-a-vis Germans in particular. Hans Frank was among the chief murderers in the
senior Nazi hierarchy. His representative attended the Wannsee Conference and
demanded "priority" for Poland in the destruction timetable. Frank himself was
known, among other remarks, for having told his senior staff-even before Wannsee--
that the talk about transferring thej ews to Russia and the Ukraine was fatuous in the
extreme and for urging them: "Liquidate them yourselves! " There is absolutely no
doubt that he knew why the J ews were being concentrated at Auschwitz and Belzec and

14 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of European Jewry , Quadrangle, Chicago, 1967, pp. 213-214.

15 Reitlinger, pp. 251-252.

16 Hilberg, pp. 622-623.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

what was being done to them. What he wanted--but was denied him--was to see with
his own eyes how it was being done. Hitler himself told this confidant of his that any
killing that might be taking place at Auschwitz was of anti -government insurgents
and not J ews. Both of

them, Hitler and Frank, well knew what was transpiring at Auschwitz. But
because this particular conversation was not a "business" talk on the subject, it was
incumbent upon everyone, not excluding Hitler himself, to lie brazenly and preserve
the "Reich secret."

(One is reminded of a conversation at the other pole of the destruction campaign.
I n the Kovno ghetto, following one of the mass murders of the ghetto inhabitants at the
Ninth Fort, the head of the J udenrat. Dr. Elkes, put a rhetorical question to the local
chief killer: "May I ask you where these people were taken?" To which Jordan replied
cynically: "They were taken to live elsewhere. "17)

To the considerations we have thus far adduced concerning the Germans' lack of
knowledge about the destruction, we shall add three testimonies, given in Jerusalem,
Bialystok and Warsaw. The first is that of the writer and journalist R. Binyamin, who
would later head the El-Dami group. In Davar of July 30, 1942, Binyamin wrote:
"Reports reaching us from the refugees in recent months, testimonies recorded in
protocols, confirm that even officers of the Nazi army do not know what is taking
place... Is it then so strange to assume that the vast majority of the German people does
not know what is going on?" Since Binyamin cites this argument to underscore his
demand that leaflets be dropped over Germany from the air, his testimony may
perhaps said to be flawed because he was an "interested party"--something which
cannot be said about the other two cases.

The second testimony is that of Mordechai Tenenbaum-Tamruf, leader of the
underground in Warsaw, Vilna and Bialystok. On February 17, 1943, he wrote in his
Bialystok Ghetto diary that he had handed over to the engineer Barash, the head of the
J udenrat, documents confirming that the J ews being taken to Treblinka were being
murdered there. Barash needed these documents in order to show them to the
Wehrmacht personnel at Bialystok, since "under no circumstances do they want to
believe that the J ews are being put to death there. According to their statements and
their belief, [thej ews] are being sent to work in Silesia. "18 The tone of these remarks,
combined with other comments in which he refers to "good" Germans (who advocate
leaving the ghetto intact) shows that this sharp-witted and sarcastic writer was, in
this case, not seeking to confute the notion that the Germans truly did not know; hence
he had asked Barash to furnish the German troops with proof of those events whose
existence they refused to believe.

The third testimony, more general and unequivocal in nature, is found in the
literary remains of Emmanuel Ringelblum, who took upon

himself the dreadful task of historian of the Holocaust and fulfilled it faithfully
until the very moment of his murder. On June 30, 1942, Ringelblum wrote: "Everyone
who has had occasion to meet with a German is well aware [in the Yiddish original:
wasse? gantz gut] that the Germans do not know about the killings and the massacres
being perpetrated by gangs of murderers outside towns or at killing centers such as
Belzec. The occupier is apprehensive that the German population or even the German
troops will learn about the slaughters. Therefore he arranges matters so that the
killing of theJ ews is donecovertly."19

At this point it behooves us to determine with the utmost clarity what, exactly,
was concealed from the Germans, what it was that they did not know. For the sake of
convenience, we shall attempt to answer the reverse question: what the Germans did
know and of what they were ignorant.

The Nazis made no secret of their active interest in the "Jewish question" and of
their intention to "solve" that question urgently and thoroughly. The Stuermer, the

17 L. Garfunkel, Jewish Kovno in Ruins (Hebrew), Yad Vashem,
1959, p. 84.

18 Mordechai Tenebaum-Tamarof, Pages from the Conflagration (Hebrew), Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1948, p. 85.

19 Emanuel Ringelblum, Writings from the Ghetto (Yiddish), Vol. 1, p. 379.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

antisemitic weekly that spewed virulence and incitement, continued to appear;
Goebbels continued to preach his antisemitism as before; radio and the press were
replete with reports and articles which continued to remind the population what they
had been taught over the years by National-Socialist ideology and propaganda: that it
was the Jews who were to blame for all the troubles afflicting the German people, the
J ews who had brought war to the world, the J ews who were Germany's paramount
enemy. Above all, they continued to hammer home the fundamental tenet of Nazi
doctrine: thatthej ews were not like other people but were a unique race of subhumans,
untermenschen, to whom the usual rules of human relations did not apply. All this
was "clear" and "known" to every German man and woman, and as a whole they
assented to it heart and soul.

No secret was made of the intention to "solve" the Jewish problem by uprooting
the J ews from Germany and from Europe. The German nation was told openly that the
conditions of war afforded a suitable opportunity to effect the desired "solution." This
was "prophesied" by the Fuehrer himself in January 1939. Three years later Hitler
could declare with a victor's delight that his prophecy was being realized and that the
J ews were no longer laughing at him. I n two statements the Nazi leader made explicit
use of the term "extermination [Vernichtung] of the Jewish race." And the Germans
heard and accepted what he said.

This much they knew and, according to all the signs, assented to. Yet here we
come to the boundary between knowledge and non--knowledge. The German public
knew that its government was engaged in implementing the "final solution" of the
Jewish question. It knew further that this solution meant the disappearance of the
Jews from Germany and from Europe. How this was being carried out, what the
technique of the solution was--on these matters they relied on the government and
gave credence to its explanations and commentaries. Goebbels told them that in
accordance with the Fuehrer's directive, thej ews were being resettled in the East, and
the Germans saw no reason not to believe him. It was claimed that the authorities were
treating the J ews fairly--far more fairly than they deserved. The Germans accepted
this with trust and appreciation. As for the reports about the murders of J ews which
were broadcast by enemy radio, these were rebutted by vigorous and credible
government denials. Moreover, as we noted, the German citizen rejected these reports,
complacently and contemptuously, as atrocity propaganda. Deep in his heart the
German knew that there was no basis for torturing himself with doubts that there
might be some substance to this atrocity propaganda, after all. In the last analysis, the
J ews were subhumans, so there was no reason to expect that they should be over-
pampered.

The Germans were wel I aware of the deportations of J ews, and they knew about the
existence of concentration camps where Jews were incarcerated. As for the mass
murders being perpetrated in the camps and elsewhere-of this the overwhelming
majority of Germans knew nothing.

Morally speaking, it is surely inconsequential that the Germans were unaware of
the ongoing total destruction operation and had no knowledge of the techniques being
employed. The cardinal sin of the German people against the Jews and against
humanity lies in its having accepted and assimilated, as an incontestable and
universally valid tenet, the thesis that the J ews were not human beings and that in
principle they could be attacked at will. In the conversation with Horthy referred to
above. Hitler likened theJ ews to tubercular viruses which had to be destroyed. Later in
that talk the Fuehrer offered "moral justification" for the murder of Poland's Jews:
"There is nothing cruel about this if we remember that even innocent creatures, such
as rabbits or turtles, have to be destroyed if they are disease-ridden."

In ongoing Nazi propaganda the J ews were more usually depicted as hyenas or
snakes, creatures evoking fear and repulsion. Yet it is probable that during the actual
perpetration of the destruction, a comparison with H itier's "rabbits and turtles" would
have been more

appropriate and more convincing, particularly for those who operated the
machinery of death and encountered their victims, including women and children, on
a face-to-face basis. The experience of the killing squads, the Einsatzgruppen, is highly
instructive from this point of view.

As will be recalled, three thousand Germans were selected and mobilized for the
special task of advancing with the invading army into Soviet Russia and murdering

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

J ews indiscriminately along the way. To round up the victims and have them brought
to the murder sites, the squads sometimes enlisted the help of the regular army. Gangs
of murderous Ukrainians and Lithuanians were extensively involved in every stage of
the destruction process, including the murders themselves. Nevertheless, it was the
Einsatzgruppen themselves who did the bulk of the planning, organizing and
implementation.

Their officers were selected from among S.S. officials. Many of them held
academic degrees and before the war had practiced the free professions, as lawyers,
economists, actors, government officials, and the like. Heading them were Nazis from
the S.S. elite, "idealists" committed to the National-Socialist "mission." Yet the three
thousand soldiers of the killing squads were not Germans of some special breed. It is
truethat they were selected from the Waffen-S.S., but anyone known to be blood-thirsty
or to harbor sadistic tendencies was rejected. Volunteers were not accepted. These three
thousand were for the most part relatively older men who were unfit for combat duty.
Many of them had families, and as several Holocaust researchers point out, they did
not belong to the underworld and were not irresponsible or frivolous young people.
They were normal, almost "typical," Germans. 20

Jhe Einsatzgruppen were not eager to fulfill the duty assigned them, but once they
assumed it they carried it out with precision and dedication. Many testimonies
suggest that they found the scenes of mass murder disquieting and disturbing. In
some instances their mental burden was relieved by having the Ukrainians murder
the children, while the Germans executed "only" the adults.21 Still, their feelings did
not hinder them from searching through attics and basements and checking
meticulously every possible hiding place, in the hope of finding and murdering
another woman, another old man, another child.

Indeed, their emotional response was wholly divorced from any form of moral
outrage against the murder of human beings; it was perhaps more analogous to the
notion of "prevention of cruelty to animals," as it were. It was akin to the uneasy
feeling that strikes someone who finds himself in a slaughterhouse where large
numbers of cattle, sheep and fowl

are being put to death. True to the consensus of the society, this slaughter evokes
no sense of moral wrongdoing. But one is nevertheless upset by the sight of the death
throes of the animals. Yet despite the feeling of personal revulsion, under certain
circumstances this same visitor would consent to take part in the act of slaughter if
compelled to do so.

The soldiers of the Einsatzgruppen "knew" certain things. For them it was self-
evident that loyalty to the Fuehrer superseded all else. It was explained to them that
they were part of an "historic" and "grandiose" enterprise for which they would have
the undying gratitude of humanity. At the same time, they understood that their
"laudable" action called for secrecy, for, as the Reichsfuehrer-S.S. Himmler had told
them, "This is a glorious page in our history which we shall not write and which will
never be written. "22 But above all they were keenly aware-in line with the consensus
prevailing in German society--that thej ews were not really people. It was not the death
of thej ews that upset them, but the manner in which they were put to death. They felt
pity not for the J ews but for themselves, for having to engage in unpleasant work and
witness appalling sights. So they did what they did, some out of loathing, some
unwillingly, but for the most part they "fell into the task" and became a gang of
murderers with an appetite for their work.

These, then, were three thousand ordinary Germans. And surely there is no
escaping the conclusion that, with rare exceptions, every other German would have
done exactly as they did.

We prefaced this discussion with the comment that without secrecy being
maintained vis-a-vis the German public itself, the secret could not have been
safeguarded from external elements and from German Jewry. We have just arrived at
the conclusion that the cannibalistic consensus among the German people, to the

20 Hilberg, p. 218; Reitlinger, p. 183

21 Hilberg, p. 205.

22 Reitlinger, p 297.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

effect that the J ews were not people, generated an atmosphere in which every ordinary
German who might have been made privy to the J ews' destruction, would have
acquiesced in it. Had this ordinary German been assigned the task of assisting in the
murders, he would have done so. Yet the combination of these two assumptions is
liable to create in the reader the impression that in seeking to conceal the destruction
operation from the German nation at large, the Nazis' sole desire was to prevent the
spread of information beyond the borders of Germany itself. Such an impression would
be quite mistaken.

We shall begin with thesimpletruth that "every German" is still not equivalent
to "all the Germans." We have seen how three thousand ordinary Germans became
murderers once they were assigned this task

and after undergoing suitable "treatment." Many instances are known in which
individual Germans or groups acquiesced in and assented to the destruction operation
and the murders when they learned what was afoot. However, numerous instances are
also on the record in which the revelation of the truth produced a profound inner
shock, at least initially, until the knowledge could be digested. We can imagine what
the spontaneous reaction would have been had the truth been revealed concretely and
convincingly to all or most Germans, without the authorities being able to provide
intensive individual treatment as they did for the Einsatzgruppen .

Moreover, the consensus which held that the J ews were not people, hence putting
them to death was not murder, was partially assailed in one area: with respect to the
J ews of Germany. Whereas no one doubted for a mi nute that the "J ews of the East" were
subhumans, no such absolute certainty existed with regard to one's own Jewish
neighbors and acquaintances, persons with whom social relations in various forms
had been maintained for many years. From the abundance of evidence concerning the
vacillating attitude of the Germans toward their Jewish neighbors, we shall cite, as
especially noteworthy, the well-known complaint of Himmler and the demonstrative
stance of Wilhelm Kube, the Nazi governor of M insk.

In a speech to ranking S.S. officers, Himmler complained that while everyone
knew and agreed that the J ews were loathsome vermin, "after all, each of the eighty
million honorable Germans has onej ew of his own, whom he makes an exception and
considers to be a decent human being."23 As for Kube, his attempts to intervene on
behalf of German J ews who were taken to Minsk are well known, as was his bitterness
at the fact that these persons, who came "from our own cultural circles," were being
treated identically to "the bestial rabble of the local residents. "24

True, it can be argued with some justice that Kube was exceptional in his liberal
attitude (speaking in very relative terms) toward the Jews, and that he also protested
against the "unnecessary brutality" involved in the destruction of the Jews of Sluzk
and other local Jews (he made no objection to the destruction itself). However, what
made his deviation from the Nazi norm especially pronounced, was his open assertion
of his attitude toward thej ews of Germany, his readiness to clash with Einsatzgruppen
personnel in an effort to protect six thousand J ews "from our own cultural circles"--
moves which could have cost him his career had he not met his death at the hands of
partisans.

A unique instance of pub//c/y manifested sympathy by Germans for their Jewish
neighbors is related in Goebbels' diary entry for March 6, 1943. Many Germans (wrote
Minister of Propaganda Goebbels) gathered around an old-age home in Berlin when
Gestapo personnel arrived thereto seize J ews for deportation. Goebbels reveals that the
German crowd "took sides with the J ews" and demonstrated against the deportation.
These "regrettable scenes" forced him to intervene and postpone the deportation for
some weeks. 25 It would be no exaggeration to say that these protesting Germans must
have been moved by feelings sufficiently profound and powerful to override their fear
and enable them to come out against the Nazi authorities at the height of the war.

Moreover, another anti-government demonstration, unlike the protest at the old-
age home, is known to have achieved its purpose in full. The episode occurred in the
summer of 1941, when an angry mob stopped Hitler's train in order to protest against
"mercy killings" of the mentally retarded and the terminally ill. Hitler had sought to
takeadvantageof the general confusion and tension generated by the war situation in

23 Ibid., p. 297.

24 Ibid., p.225.

25 Ibid., p. 161; Hilberg, p. 278.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

order to dispose of the weak and the wretched. However, after having some fifty to sixty
thousand Germans put to death, he was forced to desist from this campaign under
public pressure, which reached its peal< in the 1941 protest demonstration. 26 What
these two incidents suggest is that Nazi totalitarianism was not able to reach full
fruition in its ten years of existence, and that its rulers remained partially bound to
their dependence on the ruled.

The necessity of taking at least some account of public opinion was undoubtedly
one of the guiding considerations of Himmler and Heydrich when they planned the
destruction of German Jewry. The difficulties this could entail found particular
expression in the question of the Mischlinge, the descendants of mixed marriages
between Jews and Germans. There were about 125,000 such persons in Germany, and
the "science" of racism was mobilized to classify and categorize them. In accordance
with the conventional division in the Nazi code of law, they were divided into two
principal groups: M ischling, first degree (half--J ewish), and Mischling, second degree
(quarter-Jewish or less). These partial Jews caused the devisers of the destruction
considerable headaches. They were discussed and considered in detail at the Wannsee
Conference and in meetings devoted especially to this topic. But no solution to the
problem presented itself. At an early stage it was decided to grant "amnesty" to the
Mischlings, second degree (some fifty thousand persons) and allow them, with certain
restrictions, to mingle with the German

community. However, no solution was forthcoming regarding the half-Jews. It
was proposed that they be sent to the destruction centers, but this idea was soon
withdrawn. Sterilization was considered, but no inexpensive method to implement
this on a mass scale could be found. The half-J ews were relentlessly harassed,
humiliated and tortured. Many Mischlings actually carried false papers, purchased
from Gestapo agents, stating that they had undergone sterilization. 27 Ultimately,
most of the descendants of these mixed marriages remained alive and continued to
reside in their homes in Germany.

That the guiding factor was not only concern for "German blood" which flowed in
part in the veins of the M/scW/nge, as has been claimed often, is attested to by another
and more surprising episode. There were in Germany twenty-eight thousand Jews who
had entered into mixed marriages with German men and women. They were wholly
J ewish, carrying not a drop of German blood. And the vast majority of them were still
al i ve at the end of the war. 28

There is some truth in the explanation offered by Raul Hilberg, to the effect that
thesej ews survived due to the Nazis' apprehension that their deportation would expose
the destruction operation to the German public. However, this explanation would seem
to falter with respect to the survival of the descendants of these persons, and in
particular the seventy thousand Mischlings, first degree. Actually, it is doubtful
whether the secrecy factor constituted the sole consideration. It seems probable that
the two demonstrations described above, and perhaps other, unknown, events as well,
made it clear to the Nazi rulers that the bitterness and outrage of the tens of thousands
of Germans who were relatives of J ews and half-J ews, simply could not be disregarded.
If this conclusion is correct, it serves to shore up a contention which was heard during
the Holocaust period itself: that if the German public had been bombarded relentlessly
with detailed information about the systematic murder of the Jews, combined with
warnings and reprisal measures, the resultant shock and fear among the German
population might have had the effect of disrupting the destruction process
substantially.

If serious obstacles hamper attempts to shed light on the degree of the German
public's ignorance about the destruction process, no such doubts or obstacles present
themselves with respect to the ignorance of Europe's J ews about the fate in store for
them at the hands of the Nazi murderers. Universal agreement also exists as to the
crucial importance of this state of affairs for the success of the destruction scheme. If
the

26 Reitlinger, p. 132.

27 Ibid., p. 179.

28 Hilberg, p. 277.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

following lines and chapters assail conventional opinions in this area, we shall
be referring to the fact that, with respect to certain places in Eastern Europe, it is an
exaggeration to think that actual knowledge of the destruction was tantamount to
salvation from it. For the time being, we shall consider the question in general terms.

Everywhere the Germans tried to conceal from the Jews their intention to
annihilate them. The means of camouflage and deception were many and varied. At
one pole of the destruction process, Treblinka was disguised as a way station of the
train to the "East," complete with appropriate signs and other paraphernalia. The
entry gate to Auschwitz solemnly assured those entering that "Work Liberates." There
were soothing speeches delivered by a friendly-looking German at Chelmno, just before
the J ews were herded into the asphyxiation vehicles. And instructions were given and
soap issued to those about to "shower" in the gas chambers in the various camps. At
one end of the transport the J ews were told that they were going to be resettled in the
East; they were given fictitious letters from those who had gone before and had arrived
at a place "where they feel good"; assurances were given of privileged jobs in the new
places of residence. I n the village of Kolo, whence the Jews were sent for destruction at
Chelmno, the sick were specially picked up on the final day of the deportation, and the
drivers had orders to drive slowly and carefully.29

The Germans were particularly careful to maintain the secret vis-a-vis those
J ews whose time for annihilation had not yet arrived, or had been postponed for some
reason. Those who remained after each deportation were constantly reassured that
they would definitely be staying "until the end of the war" because they were first-rate
workers and a boon to the German economy. Jews who disseminated true reports about
the destruction were put to death if the Germans found out. As a result, witnesses to the
mass murders were loath to talk about what they had seen before large audiences. The
history of the Holocaust is replete with stories of survivors of killing pits who fled to
ghettos but told what they had seen only to those closest to them, if they told it at all.
Naturally, this atmosphere was of considerable help to the Germans in keeping the
secret.

On the other hand, it is important to point out that thej ews in the ghettos who did
hear rumors about the mass-destruction campaign were highly distrustful of them
even when they originated with persons they had previously considered faithful and
reliable. Neither the ordinaryj ew nor the leaders of the community believed the tales.
A J ew who had escaped to the Shavli ghetto told how he had witnessed the murder of his

interlocutor's sister. Appalled, the latter rejected the testimony as an
hallucination. 30 J udenrat personnel sometimes barred escapees from relating their
dreadful tales-in order to protect their lives, and in order to prevent false panic (as
they believed) in the ghetto. The figure of a man or woman who walked about shadow-
like, with horror-filled eyes and lips tightly compressed for fear of talking and in
despair at not being believed-this was surely a familiar figure in every large ghetto
in Eastern Europe.

The phenomenon of disbelief in an atrocity which according to the tenets of
human morality is not credible, is not unique to the Jews in the ghettos. An identical
reaction typified the attitude of both J ews and non-J ews throughout the world vis-a-vis
isolated or initial reports concerning cold-blooded genocide unexampled in scope and
ferocity in the entire history of human civilization. When Ya'akov Kurtz, one of the
first survivors to arrive in Palestine, encountered disbelief concerning his stories
about events in Poland, he defended the reaction of theJ ews in theYishuv by recalling
that disbelief had been rampant in Radom and Petri kov as well. "When we were in
Poland, we heard rumors about the mass slaughter of Jews in Galicia and elsewhere;
J ews who escaped from there gave us details about how Jewish populations were being
brutally murdered in towns and villages. And we too did not believe the horrible
news!"31

The difference between the situation of theJ ews in the free world and the J ews in
Occupied Europe was that the latter did not have at their disposal the means of mass
communication (the press and radio) which the former did. Among the Jews in the
ghettos the period of disbelief persisted for weeks or months until the accumulation of
reports disabused them of every illusion and doubt concerning what had been done at

29 Dr. Israel Klausner, ed.. From the Holocaust: The Extermination Camps in Poland (Hebrew), Reuven Mass, p. 29.

30 L. Shalit. Thus We Died (Yiddish).

31 Ya'akov Kurtz, Book of Testimony (Hebrew), Am Oved, 1944, p. 7

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Penary to the J ews of Vilna and at the Ninth Fort to the J ews of Kovno, and until the
remnants of Warsaw] ewry were shocl<ed into the certainty of believing that the three
hundred thousand J ews removed from their city had not been resettled in the East but
had been annihilated atTreblinka.

In Germany and in the occupied countries in Central and Western Europe, the
secrecy of the destruction was maintained until virtually the last deported Jew. From
thej ewish perspective—that is, from the viewpoint of the prospects and possibilities of
salvation--it emerges that it was expressly in these countries that the obsession with
secrecy proved to have the most fateful consequences. With the exception of Germany,
there were no destruction centers in these countries. In some of them the population
was not anti Semitic or was actually sympathetic to thej ews;

moreover, hiding places were not lacking had they been sought in the clear
knowledge that the alternative to going underground was death. In certain places,
explicit and unequivocal knowledge concerning the danger of annihilation would
have generated greater readiness to help among the non-J ewish population, and on the
part of the Church and various local institutions which, besides hiding J ews, could
have placed obstacles in the way of the roundup and transport of the J ews--a case in
point being Italy (as we saw above). Had the J ews of France, Holland, Belgium, Greece,
Czechoslovakia, Italy and Hungary known definitely what awaited them upon
disembarkation from the deportation trains, they would certainly have made more
intensive efforts to ensure that they were not aboard those trains in the first place.
Some of these efforts would have been successful. If the functionaries of the Jewish
organizations in Holland had known what the final destination was of the transports
of J ews from their country, it beggars belief that they would have cooperated with the
German authorities in rounding up the Jews and organizing the transports. Even in
Germany, with its law-abiding citizenry and its enmity toward the Jews, a few
hundred Jews who went underground survived the war. Their number would
undoubtedly have been greater if more Jews had resolved to live a "submarine" life
(the term applied to the J ews who hid themselves) of suffering and danger, knowing
what the alternative was to even those harsh conditions. If the Jews of Hungary had
known what their leaders in Budapest knew, many of them would definitely have been
spared through escape or concealment.

Yet it must also be stressed that, despite the immense importance attaching to
the J ews' knowledge of the intention to annihilate them, that knowledge in itself, had
it been available, would not have sufficed to prevent the overall calamity. In theface of
the vast mechanism of the kingdom of the Reich, and its brutal and relentless
operation, theJ ews and their neighbors alone could not have thwarted the destruction
scheme. The rescue of the small community of Danish J ewry, thanks to the heroism
and nobility of the Danish people, was enabled by a rare conjunction of supportive
circumstances, geographical and other, which are hard to imagine elsewhere.
Nevertheless, in certain countries tens or hundreds of thousands, and ultimately
perhaps even more, could have been saved.

I n the countries of the destruction centers too--Poland, the Ukraine, Byelorussia
and the Baltic states—considerable importance attached to theJ ews' knowledge of what
awaited them. Although the relative importance of this knowledge declined as the
destruction process gained momentum, a certain number of Jews who were hidden by
non-J ews or who fled to the

forests were saved. It is quite likely that had the fact of the destruction process
become known at earlier stages, many more J ews would have made desperate efforts to
seek rescue as individuals and in organized groups. Some of them would have
survived. A cardinal case in point, and one which to this day evokes astonishment and
incredulity, is the first liquidation operation in the Warsaw Ghetto, an event to which
we shall return.

What characterized these countries was the breakdown in communications
between the ghettos and the outside world, and amongst the ghettos themselves. Postal
ties were erratic or non-existent. To leave the ghetto without a permit meant hazarding
the death penalty; so did travel ling from place to place via train or any other means of
transport. Information about events in one ghetto would usually become known
elsewhere through rumors, some of them accurate, others fragmentary. For example,
in many instances the Vilna Ghetto learned late and in truncated form about events in
the Warsaw ghetto via broadcasts from London (many ghettos managed to listen to the

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

radio clandestinely). From the Jewish perspective, then, the constant flow of reliable
information was an absolute imperative. As in all the countries of Occupied Europe, a
center located outside the occupied zones was required to organize and handle
information, along with a public Jewish body possessing resources and international
contacts, a body which would regard the rescue of European J ewry as its paramount
task, its very raison d'dire in the years of the catastrophe. Given the situation at the
end of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s, that task could have been undertaken
only by the World Zionist Organization.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Chapter Two

The Truth Suppressed

As 1939 approached, the World Zionist organization (WZO) was at the apex of its
organizational development. With the exception of Soviet Russia, it had branches or
representatives in every country on earth where Jews resided. It controlled the World
J ewish Congress, whose executive was comprised of Zionists and whose president,
Stephen S. Wise, was considered a ranking Zionist. It had close connections with the
J ewish news agencies, and even had its own news agency (Palcor). Available to it were
considerable financial resources, and it maintained political ties--or potential ties--
with all states excepting the Soviet Union. And above all, it had an active and dynamic
base of operations in the form of the six hundred thousand Jews who constituted the
Yishuv in Palestine and who were at the disposal of the Zionist Executive for whatever
activity might be required.

Aware of its strength, the Zionist leadership was anything but reticent in
asserting its right to represent the entire Jewish people and to speak on its behalf.
Unfortunately, the manner in which this right of representation was implemented,
was not always congruous with a genuine sense of responsibility for the fate of the
J ews i n whose name the WZO sought to act. Thus, even before the outbreak of the Second
World War, the 21st Zionist Congress in Geneva saw fit to declare, as its president. Dr.
Chaim Weizmann, put it, that "the Jews stand behind Great Britain and will fight on
the side of the democracies." This declaration, which one month later was conveyed to
the British Prime Minister in an official letter dated August 29, referred not to the
Jewish Yishuv in Palestine and not even to Zionists, but, explicitly, to "the J ews" as
such. Throughout the entire course of the war it was to this Zionist statement of intent
that the Nazis always returned to prop up their canard that "the J ews are to blame for
the war."

Yet even though a declaration admitting of a bellicose interpretation was issued
"on behalf of the Jewish people," there is nothing to suggest that the Zionist Congress
gave any thought to the need to set up a body along the lines of a central headquarters
which would wage the war of the J ewish people or ensure that the J ews were shielded
from the consequences of the declaration. The worried Congress delegates returned to
their home countries, many of them to face torture and death together with their entire
community. However, in short order the Zionist Executive came up with a narrow
interpretation of the bellicose

declaration, to the effect that its referred solely to thej ewish Yishuv in Palestine.
Accordingly, negotiations were launched with the British government concerning the
Yishuv's participation in the war, with all that this entailed.

The decision had been a spontaneous one, stemming from a special feature of the
Zionist outlook. The essence of this feature was that Zionism and the Yishuv were
adduced in place of the J ewish people as a whole. This egocentric perception caused
innumerable mistakes and untold damage in the annals of Zionism, and it goes a long
way toward accounting for some of the events which this book describes. We shall
return to this matter in greater detail; for the moment we shall dwell on one detail of
the neglect of theJ ewish people. No /nformat/on service machinery worthy of the name
was established with a view to the fateful events expected to transpire in Europe and
throughout the world-events which were the subject of no little discussion at the
Zionist Congress meeting. And when, almost immediately, trying times did arrive,
fraught with danger and calling for crucial decisions, not only did the Zionist

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Movement lack up-to-date information about the situation of European Jewry, it was
actually unable to find secure means to verify the appalling reports reaching it from
foreign sources. This state of affairs, and indeed the movement's general tenor of
operation in this area, are well illustrated in the testimony of Yitzhak Gruenbaum,
who in December 1942 was installed as chairman of the Zionist "Rescue Committee":

"Faint echoes from the slaughter of the J ews in Poland reached Palestine by
diverse routes in fall 1942. Since these reports seemed to strain credence, we queried
the office of the J ewish Agency in Geneva and the Chief Rabbi of Sweden, Dr.
Ehrenpreis. From Geneva we received general confirmation and from Sweden a
telegram from which we inferred that fear of the Germans made it difficult to inform
us about what had transpired. At about the same time Dr. Kott, a former Polish
diplomatic representative to the Soviet Union, arrived in Jerusalem. From the [Polish]
government in London he had received reports and reviews conveyed to [the
government-in-exile] by the Polish underground which confirmed the general picture
of the murder of Jews, incessant maltreatment, and mass deportations. However,
detailed confirmation from Jewish sources was provided by a group of Jews, citizens
and

residents of Palestine, who arrived at that time as part of an exchange." 1

Thefirst sentence of this statement does not excel in its precision. At the time the
article was written (winter 1944-1945) the Jewish Agency was still reeling under the
fury of the charge that it had withheld from the public for months reports about the
Holocaust. Since this accusation was based, inter alia, on a fact which Gruenbaum
himself had discovered at the time (see Chapter 3), it stands to reason that he would
exercise caution about publishing documentation liable to reconfirm the initial
accusation. Sixteen years later the Zionist leader confirmed that thefirst direct reports
from Poland had reached the J ewish Agency in 1940 from the Zionist functionaries
Hartglass and Koerner who fled to Palestine via Trieste, and again in 1941 from
refugees who reached Palestine from Vilna via Soviet Russia. 2 As for the reports
which arrived in the spring and summer-not the fall-of 1942, they were hardly
"echoes" and anything but "faint echoes." In July and August 1942 protest rallies
against the murder of Jews were held in London following the arrival of detailed
reports about the situation in Europe. The press carried reports, articles and proposals
on the subject. August saw the publication of a pamphlet entitled "Stop Them Now,"
with an introduction by Wedgewood and Ziegelboim, containing a detailed description
of events in Eastern Europe. Reports of these events, along with detailed accounts
received in London from the Vale of Slaughter, were carried by news agencies and duly
published in the Palestine press. They were read by the general public, and surely also
by officials of the J ewish Agency.

What is most revealing about Gruenbaum's account is that, in order to
authenticate the plethora of reports which accumulated over the course of several
months, the Zionist leadership in Jerusalem was compelled to turn to its office in
Geneva and even to a rabbi in Stockholm. Geneva might well have considerable
information about events in Eastern Europe; but no one concerned himself about
making arrangements to receive ongoing information from these sources. Only with
the tidal wave of reports about the slaughter were the officials forced to seek such
verification.

It was only natural that the Zionist Executive should serve as a world center for
information about the fate of European J ewry. To that end it had the objective
possibilities and possessed the material and organizational resources. Instead, it was,
at least until the end of 1942, a

1 Yitzhak Gruenbaum, Destruction and Holocaust , pp. 204-205.

2 Etgar (weekly), June 29, 1961 (Hebrew).

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

passive consumer of information services provided by otiners. For many, tine
Zionist leadersinip was perceived as a cinannel of information v\i\r\\c\r\ was in closest
toucin witin events. Altinougin some international elements were inclined to consider
such evidence overwrought and tendentious, as it originated with an interested party,
it is unlikely that anyone even imagined that the Zionists themselves were not
knowledgeable about the subject. Yet that was precisely the situation.

Worse: the fatal results of the war on the battlefield of information between Hitler
and Goebbels on the one side, and the J ewish people on the other side, stemmed not so
much from the negligence of the Zionist leadership in monitoring events, but
principally from its actual information policy. We refer to the attitude of the Zionist
Executive toward the reports reachi ng it from the countries of the H olocaust, and to the
guidance it accorded the broad public in its sphere of influence. This was the cardinal
sin of omission from the Zionist perspective-a blunder which was castigated by S .Z.
Rubashov as the most ignominious of all.

Two sides confronted each other. Hitler and his henchmen decided to take
advantageof the special conditions conferred by war in order to annihilate the J ewish
people in Europe. They understood that a necessary condition for their success was to
cloak the operation under a mantle of absolute secrecy. Manifestly, to maintain
absolute secrecy in the literal sense of the term-- meaning no one would know anything
or hear anything-was unfeasible in such an extensive operation. Hence the
camouflage and deception campaign conducted by Goebbels' propaganda machinery,
calculated to sow confusion and incredulity, and to ensure that people did not
understand, heed, or believe any stories they might hear.

On the other side was the Zionist leadership of the Jewish people. The declared
mission of the self-styled movement of "catastrophic Zionism" which had arisen at the
end of the 19th century was to assure the Jewish people a "secure haven." Established
in the wake of the treason plot against Dreyfus in France, Zionism's evolution and
growth were attendant upon the Kishinev riots and the Beilis blood-libel in Russia. Its
spiritual and ideological underpinnings derived from the collective experience of the
Jewish people in the Middle Ages and the disasters of 1648-1649. The names of the
antagonists of the Jews cited by S.Z. Rubashov in his speech to the Histadrut Council
served as proof that hatred of thej ewish people had not passed from the world and that
the dictum that "I n every generation they seek to destroy us" remained valid.

The war erupted with a declared and fiercely antisemitic leadership entrenched
in Germany. Hitler asserted openly that "the destruction of the

J ewish race in Europe" was one of his war aims. But if the world at large thought
(with some reason) that he was not necessarily bent on physical annihilation but had
in mind the Jews' general disappearance, the Zionists-the advocates of "catastrophic
Zionism"--could certainly grasp that if the possibility arose of being rid of the J ews by
means of murder, the Nazi cannibals would not flinch at this.

This consideration necessitated intense alertness and the constant monitoring of
developments-areas in which Zionism failed-but it also required the adoption of an
intelligent policy vis-a-vis incoming reports. Given the clear understanding that the
general tendency was toward destruction, every such report should have been
interpreted accordingly. It would have been reasonable, given a Zionist sense of
catastrophic danger hanging over European J ewry, to place the emphasis on the more
worrisome reports which confirmed the destruction tendency. And even if reports
about the destruction were fragmentary in nature and originated with uncertain or
unauthorized sources, given a wartime situation, these reports should definitely not
have been rejected or not taken at face value, nor should the public have been
instructed to treat them with disbelief.

Weshall seethat the Zionist leadership did just the reverse. To that end we shall
first survey the reports that were published and the guidelines issued to the public
beginning in early 1942 in the two large newspapers in Palestine, Ha'ar&z and Davar,
and particularly the latter, the semi-official organ of the Zionist Executive. The fact
that the paper's editor-in-chief was Berl Katznelson, a Zionist leader and theoretician
whose moral sway over public opinion extended far beyond the paper's readership,
lends additional significance to the items published in Davar in these years.

A reading of the wire service reports and other items in Davar from 1942
establishes that technically speaking, the paper cannot be accused of withholding
from its readers information about events in the countries of the Holocaust. Although
the reports are meager in the first month of the year, they grow increasingly plentiful

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

in February and March. The dreadful news carried by the paper in this accursed year,
and the relative prominence accorded such items, expands in direct proportion to the
passage of time. Thefollowing is a chronological survey:

On J anuary 28 the paper's "Miscellany" feature, on an inside page, reported that
the mortality rate among Warsaw's J ewish population was nine times the rate among
the non-J ewish residents. J uly 1941 had seen the deaths of 3,459 persons; the J ewish
birth rate was four times lower than that among the general population.

Two days later a brief black- bordered item appeared, citing an item in the Nazi
paper Warsawer Zdtung, to the effect that "another 15 Jews were executed in Warsaw
for leaving the ghetto without a permit."

February 1 — "Jewish partisans in Minsk" and "Jewish companies from
Birobidjan fighting in Crimea" --- according to a report broadcast on German radio.

February 2-- Terrible mortality among Polish Jewry: 165,000 Jews died in 1941;
in Warsaw alone 72,279 J ews died, of them 7,412 in J uly.

February 3 -- According to the German press there are 173,000 J ews in the Lodz
Ghetto. The Nazi press writes that some 20,000 Lodz Jews are employed in productive
labor.

A February 4 editorial refers to "a ray of light in Nazi-occupied Europe." In
Serbia young J ews had obtained arms and had organized themselves. They had
liberated J ews from a concentration camp and brought them to a place of refuge under
the control of Commander M ichalowitz.

February 8 - A framed headline: JEWISH BLOOD BEING SPILLED LIKE WATER.
The number of J ews in Vilna has fallen to approximately 40,000 from its previous
70,000. The Polish circles in London who provided this report add that various stories
are circulating in Lithuania concerning the fate of the 30,000 missing Jews.
According to one report, nearly 15,000 were transferred to work on the Eastern Front
and the rest were imprisoned. However, many were gunned down, 1000 Jews were
executed in Trakai, 600 were murdered in the town of Niemenczyn, 200 in Eishiskes.
All thej ews in the town of Zgierz, near Lodz, were deported, according to a report in the
Nazi paper Litsmannzeitung. The ghetto had been razed and the J ewish residents
expelled. The paper sawfit to add thefollowing sentence: 'The dreadful oppression and
persecutions have not broken the spirit of the Jews in Poland." The same issue carried
a report about the murder of captured J ewish soldiers from the Red Army and about
the murder of J ews in Bessarabia.

February 9 - A report from Kuibyshev by the writer Ehrenburg. A horrific
account of the murder of children and old men and the rape of J ewish girls in
Vinnitsa, in Priluki and around Odessa. The report was given the florid headline,
"Lamentations, Dirges and Woes..." [Ezekiel 2:101 Close by was a wire service story in
bold lettering which reported a slackening in the deportation of Germany's J ews due to
the demand of the military authorities that they be employed in industry.

February 11 - A report from Sweden about the electrification of the walls
surrounding the ghettos in Warsaw, Lublin and elsewhere. Also noted was the
transportation of Czech J ews to the already overcrowded Lodz Ghetto.

February 19 -- A report about the distress of Austria's Jews: they are forbidden to
purchase coffee, cocoa, fruits, vegetables, honey, fats and milk, except for consumption
by infants and small children.

February 23 - A brief framed report- "Victims of the Ghetto in Warsaw"--
carrying the names of six women and two men who had been shot while trying to leave
the ghetto without a permit.

February 24 -- Another framed report, this time about seven killed in Bucharest.

On February 26 the entire front page of the paper was black-bordered, and the
following day an announcement appeared about the sinking of the Struma. For the
following two weeks the paper carried articles, accounts of demonstrations, reactions
and speeches devoted to the Struma episode, along with descriptions of the situation in
Romania and the other Balkan countries.

A report on March 1 told about the Transnistria deportations, with the numbers
involved said to be in the tens of thousands.

March 16 -A front-page report, once more headlined yeiv/s/7 Blood Being Spilled
LikeWater: 'The representative of the J DC in Hungary, Mr. S.B. J acobson, who has just
returned to America, states that according to the testimony of Hungarian soldiers
returning from the front, 240,000 Jews were murdered in the Ukraine after being

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

deported there from Germany and the Central European countries. The mass murder
was perpetrated by the Gestapo."

Appearing next to this report was the following news agency item, datelined
M oscow:

MOLOTOVNOTE ON MASSACRE BY NAZIS IN UKRMNE

Moscow (JTA) - Officials of the American legation intheUSSR have devoted much
of their time in the past few days to an examination of the material on the massacre
which the German army carried out in the Ukraine, and in which according to Soviet
lists 100,000 civilians perished, most of them J ews. The material, which was conveyed
to the American legation together with an official note from the Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, Molotov, and which will be forwarded to Washington, includes details and
descriptions by

eye-witnesses of the mass execution of thousands of J ews and Russians at Kiev,
Odessa, Kaminz-Podolsk, Mariupol and other towns in the Ukraine whose populations
are largely J ewish. In Lvov, too, some 6,000 Jews were executed following the Nazis'
capture of the city. In his note Molotov stresses that 'The murder of the victims was
perpetrated by means of hanging, shooting, knifing, strangulation and the use of
explosives. The Soviet Government will demand payment and compensation, and will
also receive them." A special section of Molotov's note is devoted to the appalling
massacre at Kiev (some 52,000 killed) during several days in the Jewish cemetery. A
similar massacre was carried out at DnieproPetrovsk (15,000 victims), Kaminz-
Podolsk (8,500), Odessa (8,000), Karch (7,000), Mariupol (3,000) and in seven other
Ukrainian towns. Molotov concludes his note by asserting:

"Never will the USSR forgive or forget these atrocities." [Translated from the
Hebrew.]

Afterward the paper continued to publish occasional reports about the mass
murders. On March 20 Davar reported the murder of 86,000 Jews in Minsk and the
liquidation of Estonian Jewry; the same day's paper provided details about the
deportation of Berlin's Jews to the Lodz Ghetto. A report on March 22 said that 300
rabbis and religious leaders had been killed or had taken their own lives at Auschwitz.
The following day a description appeared of the pogrom at J assy along with a report
about the deportation to Transnistria. On April 3 the deaths were reported of 1,200
Dutch J ews at Mauthausen. May 17 saw the publication of another list of killing sites
in Lithuania and Yugoslavia; on May 31 there was a report about atrocities perpetrated
against the J ews of Bucharest. On J une 18 a quite accurate report appeared stating that
no more than 20,000 J ews remained in Vilna after tens of thousands of J ews from that
city were put to death.

On J une 30 the paper ran a brief four-line item under the headline, 'Terror": "A
spokesman of the World Jewish Congress said in New York that at least one million
Jews have been murdered lately in Europe by the Nazis, at least half of them in
Poland." The following day it was reported that the WJ C statement had been broadcast
by virtually every radio station in America. From this point on, there is an increase in
the published reports about persecutions, deportations and murder.

An item on August 16, based on a (tardy) report from Switzerland, recounts the
suicide of Adam Czerniakow, chairman of the Warsaw Jewish Council. A brief report
on September 4 describes a London assembly, sponsored by the British Labor Party, to
protest the anti-J ewish atrocities in Poland. Shmuel ("Artur") Ziegelboim, who spoke
at the rally, gave a harrowing description of the destruction. Two months later. On
November 1 Davar carried a report depicting an international protest meeting held
two days earlier in London's Albert Hall. Ten thousand persons had attended. Speaking
at the assembly, the prime minister of the Polish government- in-exile, Sikorski,
confirmed in the name of his government the facts about the ruthless mass
annihilation.

On November 23, 1942, after a group of PalestineJ ews had returned home within
the framework of an exchange agreement involving Germans, the Jewish Agency
leadership in J erusalem issued a statement that it had received "from reliable sources
detailed reports concerning the acts of murder and massacre against the Jews of
Poland and Central and Western Europe." Details were issued relating to specific cities
and to Nazi plans to annihilate the Jewish people in a lightning operation. A

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

campaign of awakening and protest was launclned in tine Yisinuv; four days later, tinree
days of mourning were declared.

The picture in Ha'aretz is essentially identical to that in Davar. Again, the
reports in J anuary are meager but become more frequent in the coming months. Again
we find florid or linguistically innovative headlines framed in black borders,
although often the body of the report itself consists of just a few lines. In some
instances significant reports carried in Davar are not to be found in Ha'aretz. Thus, for
example. Ha' aretz ran not a word about the wire service report from Geneva on the
murder of 240,000 J ews in the Ukraine and nothing about Molotov's note. On the other
hand, reverse cases also occurred, when Davar refrained from publishing certain
reports carried by Ha'ardiz. The many reports emanating from London during the
summer months were covered in two wire service items in Ha'aretz. On J une 28 the
paper ran a report datelined London stating that a delegate to the Polish State Council,
Shmuel Ziegelboim, had confirmed in a special statement to the J TA the veracity of the
reports published in the Da;7yTe/egraph concerning the mass murder of Polish Jewry
and the annihilation of 700,000 of their number, or one-third of Polish Jewry. The
systematic slaughter was said to have commenced the previous summer in Eastern
Gal Ida, spreading afterward to the Warthegau District and elsewhere in Poland.
Vague reference is

made in the report to death by gassing. It was also stated that, by special
arrangement, the BBC would from the following week devote part of its daily
broadcasts to accounts of the Nazi atrocities in Poland. Two days later, on J une 30,
/-/a'aretz carried a more extensive report, originally published in the Daily Telegraph,
on the murder of the 700,000 Polish J ews, including a numerical breakdown by towns
and a description of the methods employed. The report appeared below a two-column
black- bordered headline: 'The Slaughter of the J ews in Nazi-Occupied Poland." This
report, with its play on words in the headline [in Hebrew], seems to be the longest
published in /-/a'aretzaboutthe Holocaust in 1942-at least until November 23 of that
year.

A month later, on J uly 28, 1942, the paper carried a report bearing special import:

6,800 WARSAW GHETTOJ EWS-EXECUTED?

London, [J uly] 27 (R) - The Germans have begun the mass deportation of J ews
from the Warsaw Ghetto with the intention of destroying them, according to reports
received by the Polish Government in London. Announcements have been posted in the
streets referring to an order to deport 6,800 Jews to an unknown destination in the
East. It is feared that when they arrive at the site, they will be executed, as was done to
other J ews who were deported from other cities in Poland. Near Wlodomicz in Eastern
Poland there is a mass grave which is about a mile in length, containing the bodies of
thousands of murdered J ews. [Translated from the H ebrew.]

We shall have occasion to return to this item. For the time being, we shall note
only that the "R" in parentheses indicates that the report originated with the Reuters
news agency and that the question mark was appended by Ha'aretz itself. We shall note
also that Davar did not carry the report.

In general, as we indicated, no substantial difference is discernible in the
information service the two papers provided to their readers. In both, this service was
on a relatively small scale, in terms of both the number of reports and the prominence
allotted them. Prior to November 23, neither paper devoted its lead story to any of the
reports concerning the murder of hundreds of thousands of J ews. The fact that there
were instances in which one of the papers ran an important report which the other did
not, or that one of them devoted extensive space to an item

which the other ran in brief and inconspicuously, serves to overwhelmingly
refute the allegation that the paucity of reports was the result of faulty wartime
communications. Faulty communications there certainly were. Yet our survey of the
two papers demonstrates that the principal reports concerning the Holocaust did reach
Palestine, most of them without any major delay. Had each of the papers made

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

extensive and appropriately prominent use of all the informative material which was
conveyed to their readers, and had they accompanied these reports with suitable
commentary and guidelines, the Yishuv public would not have been outraged and
shocked at thej ewish Agency's November 23 statement.

But the country's editors, public leaders and opinion shapers did not believe these
reports--and they did not want the public to believe them either. More precisely: until
November 23, 1942, it was their explicit desire that the public not give credence to the
reports about the destruction. The papers, whose task this was, followed suit with a
success which would have been better put to a more noble end. All the reports
published about events in the countries of the Holocaust constituted, effectively, not
information but disinformation. They consisted of a series of items whose objective
function was to habituate the reader to the large numbers relating to the murders; to
implant in him disbelief regarding those numbers and regarding the reports
themselves; to blunt his alertness and generate in him confusion and indifference to
the events. This was accomplished through the actual manner in which the reports
were edited and served up, by means of implicit commentary, but chiefly by the papers'
overt and explicit guidance of their readers.

It was Davar which assumed the chief role in this matter. Let us now review what
it wrought.

On March 16, it will be recalled, two reports were published in Palestine
concerning the murder of European J ews who had been transported to the Ukraine, and
concerning the annihilation of Soviet Jewry. These were the first comprehensive
reports to emanate from sources affiliated with recognized and authoritative
institutions. The first report quoted S.B. J acobson, the representative of the Joint
Distribution Committee (J DC) in Hungary, to the effect that 240,000 Jews had been
murdered in the Ukraine after being transported there from Germany and Central
Europe. This report was based on the testimony of Hungarian soldiers returning from
the front. The second report, whose source was circles of the American legation in
M oscow, spoke about the murder of

100,000 Soviet J ews in the Ukraine, and added a numerical listing of the number
of victims in each locale, this according to the official message received on the matter
from the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov.

Patently, these reliable reports ought to have generated shock waves m the
Yishuv and galvanized the public into action. Indeed, although Ha'aretz, carried
neither report, the other three Hebrew- language papers gave them both prominent
space. Thus, HatMlaer led with the stories, framing its entire front page in a black
border; the report from Geneva was carried in full, with special emphasis placed on the
fact that "in an official document Molotov confirms that from among Soviet citizens
alone, nearly 100,000 Jews were massacred." A black border across the entire front
page was also employed by IHal^astildf the paper of the New Zionist Organization
(Revisionist-Zionists). In Hatzofeh, although the reports were accompanied by a
question mark, they still received prominent front- page coverage. It was to be expected
that this first appalling news about the murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews
would outrage the Yishuv and spur it to assistance and rescue efforts. (incidentally,
the period in question was some months before Rommel's advance in Africa, when the
imminent danger of Nazi conquest might have, as many believed, diverted the
Yishuv's attention from the more "remote" distress.)

In fact, however, because of the vigorous action taken by Davar's editor,
publication of these reports was transformed into a major signpost in the campaign of
disavowal of the vast catastrophe. True, the paper gave the first report a black- bordered
headline. But appended to the report was an editorial comment: "There is no doubt that
theNazi murderers spilled blood likewater in the areas of occupation. However, all the
large numbers cited from 'soldiers returning from the front' must naturally be taken
with considerable reservation."

The reader who may have wondered about this puzzling remark had only to wait
another 24 hours. The following day, March 17, he was given a reasoned explanation
accompanied by detailed guidelines about the attitude he was to adopt toward the
"large numbers." The column l^aslieiiu ("Something") included the following piece.

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which for the sake of historical accuracy we reproduce verbatim. All the emphases are
from the original.

J EWISH BLOOD - - "UP FOR GRABS"

Even in a period in which the sword has been unsheathed and blood
is being spilled I ike water, we must have mercy on every drop of blood and
refrain from straining nerves unnecessarily. None of us will want to be
consoled or to console others to the effect that the Nazi murderers did not
harm or trample or run roughshod over J ews. They did so and they are
doing so. However, the various irresponsible informants are continuing to
kill Jews with their own hands. They scoop up every rumor, search high
and low for every piece of bad news, for every lethal number--and submit it
to the papers and the readers in blood-curdling form and content, and they
actually "kill."

Undoubtedly there are those who will say: we here are too complacent,
our hearts are closed and insensitive to what is transpiring there in the
dark and ravaged Jewish world--and it is not to be regretted if a certain
report makes us less complacent. But do the disseminators of the reports
about tens of thousands of J ews and about a quarter of a million Jews killed
and slaughtered, not realize that many people are not inclined to become
overly excited about the facts and figures in these reports because their
exaggerated character renders them untrustworttiy?

For example, someone made a calculation based on "Hungarian
soldiers who returned from the Russian front" and found that 240,000
Jewswerel<illed. Hesentthestory around the world and it made its way to
us via thej TA--and the papers had a "field day." We know how trustworthy
the testimony is of soldiers returning from the front, who boast about their
great "deeds"-- in killing people and Jews in particular. We also know that
figures from such "eyewitnesses" must never be added together: one soldier
relates that such-and-such a number of Jews were killed at this-and-this
place. Comes another soldier and relates that a certain number were killed,
and a third has yet a different version: "x" number were killed. And
someone writes it all down, adds it up: a legendary total-and the
informant cables the report.

We still remember the reports cabled from this country around the
world during the days of the Arab Riots. How much exaggeration and
inaccuracy marked these reports from

our little land. All the more so from a huge country and [a situation
of] great chaos.

Take it easy, informants and journalists, in pouring Jewish blood
into your copy!

Perfectly plain: murders, yes; but not on such a massive scale. The reports about
"lethal numbers" are the exaggerations of irresponsible persons. It was emphasized in
particular that these reports were not to be believed and need not upset people. All this,
naturally, on the judicious and faithful responsibility of Davar. (The initials "DP"
were those of Dan Pinnes one of the paper's editors.)

DP does not especially mention the Molotov note, only alluding to it m speaking
about "the disseminators of the reports about tens of thousands of Jews" alongside the
disseminator of the report about the quarter of a million. It is self-evident that what
applies to ten thousands applies equally to a quarter-million, and that these reports
also fall under the not-to- be- believed rubric. Yet to be on the safe side, the Soviet
message is given special treatment, evidently meant to illustrate the methodology of
disbelief.

As will be recalled, the note of the Soviet foreign minister contained a detailed
list of the numbers of J ews killed in the various locales of the Ukraine. Heading the list
was Kiev, where the Germans had killed 52,000 Jews. Yet at the conclusion of the wire
from Moscow the paper's editors appended the following remark: "We have in our
possession a list from Red Star about the massacre at Kiev, from which it may be

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

gleaned that the majority of the victims at Kiev were not necessarily Jews..." (The
ellipsis is in the original.)

Two days later Davar published the report from Red Star (the organ of the Red
Army) on which it had based its reservation about the events at Kiev. Actually, this
report makes it abundantly clear that the 52,000 persons murdered at Kiev were
overwhelmingly] ews. True, the report notes that "not only Jews" were murdered, but
goes on to explain that these were non-J ews who had been falsely alleged to be J ews. In
fact, this is in one of the rare cases during the war in which a Soviet document, meant
for internal consumption, states openly that the "Soviet citizens" being murdered by
the Nazis are J ews. Attesting to this are the foil owing two passages:

All the Jews residing in Kiev were ordered to report with their luggage to 79
Melnik Street, corner of 9th of January Street, the former location of the "Party
Education House." The order specified times for registration according to place of
residence, and it was stressed that since the registrees would be taken out of the city,
they were to bring with a suitcase containing clothing and food. The bastards tricked
them. The intention of the hoodlums was not the evacuation of the city, but murder. As
was subsequently learned, the Fascists demanded of those who showed up to inform on
Soviet activists. They were beaten and tortured, and then taken to the Lukyanovka
cemetery and shot. The beasts abused the victims. The children were buried alive,
while the adults were forced to dig their own graves. The murders continued for some
days.

The second passage:

Every German soldier, every Petlura vermin may stop any passerby on the street,
say he is a J ew and take him to the Lukyanovka cemetery. Fifty-two thousand killed,
peaceful residents of Kiev: that is the bloody toll of the butchery.

Immediately after this item which was supposed to refute Molotov's note, the
paper struck again, delivering another blow designed to invalidate the contents of that
note incontrovertibly. Thus, the same issue of the paper carried an item, undated,
which read as follows: "One Thousand Jews Murdered At Kiev. Palcor reports from
London:

According to a war bulletin issued today by the Soviet legation, in the terrible
massacre perpetrated by the Nazis among the residents of Kiev, one thousand J ews
were murdered (and not 52,000, as reported a short time ago). The murder was
perpetrated by the Nazis in an extremely brutal manner.

Once again the paper's editors added an "editorial comment":

"According to the above report from Reef Star, it would be assumed that the
number of J ewish dead is greater than one thousand..." (The ellipsis is in the original.)

What the ellipsis says is actually this: You see, Jews, how they are driving you
crazy? Today they say one thing, tomorrow another. As we said: don't believe it and
don't get excited. If something really serious comes up, we will let you know.

The mischievous wink of the ellipsis brings to an end the episode of Kiev's J ews. I n
time, this episode would enter the annals of the J ewish people and the history of
mankind as the massacre at Babi Yar.

Davar's artful war to obscure the clear and terrible truth must certainly arouse
pity and rage. Yet for the researcher, the moral issue involved is matched in
importance by the logical and psychological aspects. Logically, it is difficult to grasp
how anyone could imagine that the representative of the J DC collected testimonies
about the murder of Jews expressly from their murderers, as DP suggests; or that he
disseminated worldwide the horrific news about the murder of a quarter of a million
J ews on the basis of frivolous summations, as described by the denier in Davar. No less
surprising is the manner in which the Kiev massacre is refuted. Where did the paper's
editors get the idea to discredit an official document of an Allied government in the
war against Hitler? How did they fail to see that they were attempting to confute the
information provided by the Soviet foreign minister with the aid of a report which
actually con ffrmecf his note? And then why did they complicate matters even further
with the Palcor report?

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Psychologically, one overriding question arises: How did it come to pass that the
terrifying jest of DP and his colleagues achieved its purpose? For, as it turned out, not
only did this prank fail to generate any opposition among the paper's readers and
correspondents, it actually secured the assent of the other papers and quickly became a
guideline for the entire Hebrew press in Palestine. I n subsequent numbers of Davar we
find not a word of objection—not in articles, not in letters to the editor, not in any other
way, shape or form. Among the other papers, Ha'ardiz considered itself exempt from
having to react: it did not publish the reports from Geneva and Moscow, it did not
publish the Palcor "correction"; it simply ignored the entire matter. What about the
three other dailies-/-/at)ofce-, Hatzofeh, and HaMashkif?

/-/aJbofca- was one of the principal targets of the accusations leveled by DP against
those who were playing up the "exaggerated" reports. Those reports, it will be recalled,
appeared on March 16. On March 17 Haboker's readers must have been amazed that not
one word of comment or reaction appeared concerning the appalling report which had
been given so much prominence just one day earlier. The editorial silence was
maintained on March 18, and the Palcor denial was published. Then, on March 20, a
report appeared concerning the murder of 86,000 Jews in Minsk and about a mass
slaughter in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia--but

once more without any comment. Finally, when ten days later the London Times
confirmed the murder of 50,000 Kiev J ews, Haboker carried the item once more, but
again without a word of comment in the form of editorials, feature articles or anything
else.

As a rule, Haboker followed the routine of Davar and Ha'aretz, as described above.
From time to time it printed various reports about the murder of Jews, albeit not
necessarily the same reports that appeared in other papers and not necessarily a// the
reports published by the others. Occasionally the paper framed a headline or a report
with a black border. It refrained adamantly from offering reaction or commentary, nor
would it lend credence to "exaggerated" reports. If we did not err as we perused its back
issues, Haboker was the only one of the five Hebrew- language papers to evince
restraint and not express openly its reservations about the "large numbers."
Nevertheless, its incredulity was manifest from the manner of its presentation or non-
presentation of informative material.

The reaction of Hatzofeh to the comments of DP was, effectively:

Weare at your command. On the day following the publication of DP's remarks,
Hatzofeh printed an unsigned item whose content and generosity of presentation
indicated that it was an editorial board statement. Cheeringly entitled "Bloody
Treading," the piece read as follows:

We have already remarked more than once in our paper about the unfortunate
habit of some of the papers here to inflate every bad rumor about the shedding of
J ewish blood, to magnify the number of fallen victims, and to frame it all with a black
border in order to blacken the black and intensify the impression. And for what? Does
the J ewish people not have enough troubles? And isn't the J ewish blood which is truly
being shed everywhere sufficient, that hyperbole and exaggeration must also be
employed? This fault is remarked upon by DP in Davar.

After quoting DP's comments in full, the paper adds: "Will the informants and
the journalists take note... Will they leam the lesson?"

The truth is that Hatzofeh published the report about the mass murder in the
Ukraine without a black border--and with a question mark in the headline. In so doing
it paid more heed to the admonition of Pi nnes from Davar than did Davar itself. In the
coming months as well (until November 23) Hatzofeh did its best to refrain from
running black- bordered headlines, save for a few exceptional cases. Thus, it used a
black

border on March 22 for the report about the murder of 300 rabbis in Poland, and
did likewise on June 18 for the report about the murder of 60,000 Vilna Jews. The
former instance is accounted for by the fact that rabbis were involved; whereas the
second instance bears all the hallmarks of a deviation or negligence by the paper's

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

night- editor. 3 As we sinall see, tine paper's editorial board was quite capable of
dissociating itself quickly and decisively from such deviations and putting matters in
the proportion it deemed correct.

Of particular interest is the reaction of HaMashkifthe only daily which took issue
with the editor of Davar. To elucidate where the disagreement lay and what the
argument was about, we shall quote its reaction in full. I n the issue of March IS, in the
regular department called "Perusing the Press With Scissors in Hand," the paper ran
the following comment, headlined "J ewish Blood--Up for Grabs":

The Jewish Telegraphic Agency has carried an appalling report: thousands of
J ews were slaughtered by the Nazis in the Ukraine. In fact, there were two reports: one
based on the representative of the J DC in Hungary, and the second-on an official
message from Molotov.

Was it possible to do otlierwisettian to usethis tiorri fie item as tlie lead and frame it
in a black border? (Even if there was a spark of hope in one's heart that the figure was
exaggerated...) But this is not what Mr. DP in Davar thinks.

[After quoting an excerpt from DP's comments, the paper goes on:] One can only
wonder: occasionally one receives (... as does Mr. DP) newspapers or bulletins from
Poles, Czechs, Greeks, Yugoslavs, and so forth. Every report about the execution of one
member of their nation (and all the more so when a larger number is involved) is
prominently covered in their press and their announcements. For them, every report of
this kind at times shunts aside even the most sensational war news. Because they, the
gentiles, understand: their blood is not up for grabs. A precise account is kept of every
drop of Polish, Greek, Czech, Yugoslav, etc., blood. And they also know it is an
elementary duty toward those caught in the bloody pincers of the enemy and toward
those still remaining alive, to take vengeance for the slaughtered and the killed-not
to put out of mind what "Amaiek did to them." More than that: to recall, to underscore,
to stress.

And while Mr. DP entitles his piece "Jewish Blood- 'Up For Grabs'" (with the
words up for grabs in quotation marks), we ask: is J ewish blood truly up for grabs? [All
emphases in the original.]

The emphasized words "take vengeance" reflect a significant and serious subject
on which the Revisionists had staked out a position of their own. DP did not touch on
this question, and HaMashkif adduced it in order to gird its argument in the debate.
But in fact, the entire debate was superfluous. DP was not calling into question the
need to publish and underscore every instance of the murder of a single J ew or a few
J ews; Davar, as we have seen, followed this policy in practice as did the other papers in
the country. As for the cardinal issue-the ostensible exaggerations-HaMashkif gave
its assent by means of thunderous silence and unmistakable hints. From the outset
the paper reduces the number of J ews murdered to "thousands"- not hundreds of
thousands, as the reports from Geneva and Moscow indicated, nor even tens of
thousands, but thousands only. And when it arrives at the parenthetical remark about
one's heart saying that the number of dead was exaggerated, and adds the ellipsis-
hint, the true subject of the paper's tirade emerges: true enough, we realize that,
naturally, a quarter of a million J ews were not killed, that is of course inane. But what
of it? Because such a report was received, are we barred from playing it up? After all,
the Poles, the Czechs, and so on and so forth.

Yet another interesting aspect of the HaMashkif item is the style in which it is
written. Relations between the Revisionist and Histadrut papers were then bitter in
the extreme. Every disagreement was a denunciation, every argument was
accompanied by vilifications and harsh accusations. While this behavior
characterized both sides, it was naturally more discernible in /-/aMasrtfc/f, which was a
relatively small paper and was in large part devoted to advocacy of opposition to the
Zionist institutions. It was while this atmosphere prevailed, then, that an item
appeared which on the face of it expressed disagreement but which actually reflected
assent and was even marked by an apologetic air; and all this in a quiet sociable-
professional, almost friendly tone. Following November 23, the style of the debate over
Holocaust- related issues resumed its vituperative character. Even before that date

3 There was a second case of sloppiness in this paper: On April 21 it reprinted, in full, the two reports—on the murder of the
240,000 western Jews in the Ukraine, and on the Molotov letter — against which it had fulminated a month earlier, in the wake of
D.P.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

there were outbursts of rage and fury over specific topics, sucin as tine question of
reprisal against the Germans. However, witin respect to information and
"exaggerations" in reports about tine destruction, tine two sides tool< a uniform outloolc
and expressed it in

uniform action. Lil<e the other dailies, HaMashkif continued to publish the
reports about the murders, and, like them, refrained from adding commentary or
reaction or from giving the reports credence. The paper's readers, I ike those of the other
papers, had solid grounds for feeling that the editorial board placed no trust in the
horrific reports the paper was printing, and was not asking the readership to evince
such trust either. In the future these readers would have an opportunity to see for
themselves the degree to which the editors of their paper identified with Davar and
with other papers in their negative attitude toward the "exaggerations."

It would be unjust to assume that the press forced on the Jewish public an
attitude of indifference and alienation vis-a-vis the atrocities of the Holocaust. It
would be more correct to say that the publ ic got from its press what it wanted to get. The
Yishuv wished to defend itself against the terrible reports by adopting a primitive
mode of self-defense: not to believe the reports and not to listen to them. As Berl
Katznelson put it at the Histadrut Convention on April 19, 1942:

"I do not know whether people here want to hear these things. Have you ever had
occasion to be next to a radio when many people are straining to hear the news? The
moment the world news ends and 'our' news begins a total change occurs in listening
power. I am not complaining, maybe people have no strength to hear. "4

As far as it went, this was an accurate and faithful description. However, in that
same speech Katznelson professed to be upset about the paucity of reports reaching
Palestine from the countries of the destruction, and following the custom of the period
he blamed the non-J ewish world for this state of affairs ("the world does not have much
interest in telling us"). Yet the Zionist leader and editor-in-chief of Davar was
blatantly disregarding the harsh fact that one month earlier two reports from reliable
and authoritative sources had reached Palestine concerning the murder of 340,000
J ews, and his own paper had made these reports a laughing-stock and had used them
as an anesthetic.

The public wished not to believe. Along came the Zionist leadership and told the
public via the press: correct, do not believe. Some especially diligent journalists took
the initiative and added: and do not get upset either.

As we have already had occasion to remark, the trouble with the Zionist
leadership lay not in its failure to serve its public faithfully, but in marching together
with the public instead of leading the way.

The denial operation of March 16-18 in Davar may be regarded as the onset of a
deep-sedation program which continued until November 23-akin to an initial
injection which dulls the senses and fogs consciousness. Once the condemnation of the
"exaggerations" was supported by other papers and encountered no opposition
anywhere-not from the press and not from public institutions-disbelief and
indifference became the underpinnings of the Yishuv's mental makeup. For these
traits to be maintained in the long term suitable conditions were required, along with
additional "booster shots" to strengthen the process of dulling and stupefying the
mind. The conditions were preserved, the injections were given. We alluded to some of
these conditions above; we shall not attempt to categorize and summarize them.

The first condition for the persistent suppression of the truth was that no public
body of any importance act otherwise. This condition was fulfilled absolutely and
completely. Not the Zionist Executive, not any of the political parties, no cultural or

4 Davar . April 22, 1942; see also the Writings of Berl Katznelson, Vol. V, p. 53 (Hebrew).

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

humanitarian association, no Lancfsmannscrtaft: no one expressed outrage against tine
gross and absurd and glaring fatuousness entailed in the rejection of reliable reports
about mass murders only because they disturbed people's inner tranquility.
Re[s]ponsibility for maintaining this condition rests, naturally, with the Zionist
Executive, to which all eyes were turned. This institution, which dominated the
Yishuv's public and political life, was itself silent and, it turns out, imposed silence on
public bodies which sought its help and guidance. Yitzhak Gruenbaum relates how he
dealt with his comrades from Poland who approached him at that time: 'They would
always ask me to sound the alarm and I would throw cold water on their ideas and cool
their enthusiasm. "5 In the atmosphere which prevailed in the Yishuv, a tendency to
believe the "exaggerated" reports was considered to be so extreme that not even the
most extreme among the extremists in public life dared risk a failure of such
magnitude.

Probably not even Goebbels in his wildest plans could have elicited the kind of
treatment the Hebrew press accorded to information about the Holocaust. Manifestly,
the papers could not conceal from the public the reports which were being published
around the globe. I ndeed, as we saw, they did carry the reports about the mass murders
frequently and at times even extensively. However, it seemed as though all the papers
agreed amongst themselves to maintain certain rules whose upshot was that readers
of these reports might grow angry and upset but would never be seized by genuine
concern. Three of the cardinal rules were as follows:

(a) Hardly any major report was published simultaneously in all the papers.
There were always one or two papers that disregarded even the most sensational items,
and if these included any of the large papers, the public took this as a definitive
indication that the report was unreliable.

(b) All the papers heeded the rule of never accompanying reports about mass
murders with any reactions or commentary (save for those cases in which the reaction
took the form of qualification or denial). This custom underlined the fact that the
paper's editorial board placed no trust in the reports and attached no importance to
them.

(c) Essays and articles relating to the distress of European Jewry did not base
themselves on "exaggerated" reports. The more severe the tone of an article (a
description of shocking persecutions, complaints about the apathy of the Jewish
public, denunciation of the non-Jewish world for not helping, and so forth), the more
powerful was its calming influence with respect to the awful reports about the mass
murders. 6

Hints and reservations expressed through tacit comments and mode of style,
served to round off the general impression desired and the requisite atmosphere. The
horrific reports seemed to constitute a section marked by morbid tension, which the
paper's editorial board felt duty-bound to print. Dipping into its stock of stories, the
paper on each separate occasion would publish the one it found fit. Patently, the
editors seemed to be saying, these appal ling tales bear no relation to reality. The paper,
evidently, has no choice but to publish them, but the reader definitely does have the
choice of whether to read them.

Reinforcing this attitude was direct and open exhortation to the readers not to
believe the reports about the murders. Although such calls were few in number, their
impact was enormous, and not only on the readers of the particular paper in which
they appeared. We have already examined the direct call in Davar which opened the
campaign of suppression. A similar call appeared in Ha'aretz at a later stage of the
campaign. On October 15, in reaction to some rare glad tidings, that paper ran an
editorial entitled "False Reports." The episode concerned a reporter, B. Zinger, whose
wife and daughter were in France. From Shmuel Ziegelboim it was learned that the
daughter had taken her own life and the wife had been deported. Zinger then
discovered, from a reliable source, that both wife and daughter were in fact alive and
well. The paper took the occasion to reflect on the plague of dreadful reports which were
coming in, and which it agonized about publishing:

It is quite conceivable that there are no grounds for many of the nightmarish
reports which have reached us from the area of Nazi occupation. Naturally, however.

5 Haboker , December 7, 1942~for details, see Ch. 3.

6 The same holds true for protest demonstrations that were held against the persecutions in the Nazi-occupied countries.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

there can be no doubting that the Nazis' deeds are terrible. The truth is surely so bitter
that there is no need to invent reports about imaginary acts. But it is human nature to
exaggerate bad news and to embellish it as it is conveyed from one person to the next.

The paper continued:

It is worth taking this opportunity to remind the reader that a// the reports from
the areas of occupation originate with dubious and extremely uncertain sources, and
the reader must treat them with caution and suspicion. Let us hope that at the end of
the war it will become clear that most of these reports were as groundless as the report
about the family of M r. Zinger. [The word "all" is emphasized in the original.]

The exhortation "not to believe and to hope" is not wholly identical with the
admonition "not to believe and not to become excited," as DP urged in Davar, although
the difference is not vast. At the same time, the editorial in Ha'aretz exposes the
elements of the dialogue with the readers which, in retrospect, can be seen to have
existed in that paper and in other papers as well. The effect of that dialogue was to
divide the reports about the destruction into two types. Reports of the first type were
salient fabrications, and the paper did not publish them; should the reader come
across them elsewhere, he must take into account that his own paper did not run them
because they were unfit for publication. As for the second type, the paper prints these
because of its professional obligation; but the reader must know that all of these reports
are of dubious origin, and if they seem an affront to his reason or his feeling, he will be
better off not to bel ieve them.

I n this way publication of the reports about the Holocaust became something like
a catalogue of false and untrustworthy rumors. Instead of expanding the information
about ongoing events, these items became exercises in alienation vis-a-vis additional
reports. Instead of a primitive concealment of the truth by simply hiding the facts,
came a sophisticated and profound form of suppression, engineered with the help of
repeated operations designed to anesthetize alertness and dull the senses. An entire
community sunk into a thick fog of mass stupor.

That this description is faithful to the Palestine situation prior to November 23,
1942, is attested to by an astonishing fact which admits of

no other explanation: Following the reports in March about the murder of 340,000
Jews, a report arrived in June which spoke of 700,000 dead, and immediately
thereafter another report claiming that one million had been murdered. Detailed
statistical breakdowns of the murders by country and by city arrived and were duly
published. Between J une and November assemblies of protest and shock were known to
have been held in England and America. The Yishuv read these reports in the papers
and heard them on the radio— and remained calm. Until one fine day the Jewish
Agency announced that it was all true. Then the public was jolted awake from its deep
slumber, and... began to blame the world for having supposedly concealed the truth.

Naturally, the task of calming the public was not confined solely to the
guidelines issued by newspaper editorial boards. An army of writers, correspondents
and commentators injected the drug of oblivion into their readers' veins by means of
soothing descriptions and counterfeit commentary. Speakers, lecturers, functionaries
and public leaders of various levels were engaged in the work of thickening the
narcotic fog which permeated every corner of the society: it's nothing... actually, it's
terrible, but not all that much... once the war ends it will become clear... the people will
turn up... most certainly.., things will work out...

An especially prominent role in misleading the public was played by the
correspondents whose specialty was commentary on the Holocaust. One of them, Moshe
Frager, admitted publicly after the shock of November 23: "I was among those who at
first did not believe all the atrocity reports of the recent past. I did not bel ieve them and
I urged others not to believe."? According to the testimony of Yitzhak Gruenbaum,8 the
J ewish Agency Executive at that time seems to have considered Frager something of an
authority on the destruction. This may account for the fact that his activity in the field

7 Davar, November 30, 1942.

; Etgar, June 29, 1961.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

wielded considerable influence. But he was hardly alone in this, he was but one among
many. What is most instructive and most characteristic is that in our perusal of the
papers from that period we did not come across even one item, or even the hint of an
item, which was directed against the trend of denial and suppression--with the single
exception of the writer R. Binyamin, who, as a member of Brit Shalom was considered
something of an anomaly in the Zionist Yishuv.9 The suppression was thorough, all-
embracing.

The following story serves as additional proof that e>dernal elements, no matter
how overbearing, were incapable of getting the Yishuv worked up. At the time a so-
called "V League" was operating in

Palestine whose aim was to support the Soviet Union in its war against Hitler.
Various public groups were involved in this organization, and its activity caused quite
a stir. At the end of August the League held a national meeting which was attended by
two representatives from the Soviet Union itself. As was customary in those days, the
Soviet delegates were welcomed affectionately and admiringly, and people hung on
their every word. At a press conference following the meeting a leading journalist of
the Yishuv, Yeshayahu Kalinov, asked them about the murder of J ews at the hands of
the Nazis. The question was explicitly couched in the form of a request-the aim being
to elicit a response of encouragement and comfort, "for perhaps it will contain
something calming in the face of thedismaying reports which have appeared to date."
Peterenko, one of the Soviet representatives, rejected the request out of hand. He "is
afraid that the reports he would give would not have a calming effect." Backing up his
answer, the guest cited, as was to be expected, the most reliable and authoritative
document possible, namely, Molotov's memorandum about the murders in the
Ukraine.lO Since the reply did not fulfill the request, it was left dangling in the air,
without any echo or reaction.

The terrible mistake of the Zionist leadership lay in thinking that in its war
against the exaggerations surrounding the annihilation of Jews, the choice was
between reliability and unreliability--and that it was safely on the side of reliability.
Disastrously, the reliability was on the side of the large numbers, and the Zionist
information system was operated in the service of the wrong factual side. Actually,
however, the choice at the time lay not between reliability per se and unreliability,
but between abetting H itier or the] ewish people.

I n conditions of war or looming war, reliable information about the enemy is not
only a desirable but an essential commodity. This is especially true with respect to the
weaponry at the enemy's disposal and the manner in which he intends to employ it.
Yet it can transpire that the information itself, its publication and its presentation to
public opinion, itself becomes a cardinal weapon. This was the case in the war between
Nazi Germany and the Jewish people-a campaign which Hitler declared openly and
which the entire world knew to bean integral part of World War 1 1 .

At the outset of this book, we offered an analysis of why the Nazis required secrecy
in waging this war. We noted that the World Zionist Organization, which had not
hesitated to issue a declaration of war in the nameof thej ewish people, set up neither a
command post nor an intelligence service of its own. Having no choice, it was forced to
resort to

foreign information services. Given the world situation, two such services were
particularly active-that of the Nazis and that of their opponents-and each side
disseminated its information through its own propaganda machinery. Generally
speaking, it could be assumed that each side would wish to publish and emphasize
reports serving its own ends in the war and, concomitantly, to conceal or play down
reports which might disrupt its war effort. Obviously, neither side was particularly
scrupulous about ascertaining the reliability of each and every report which it fed the
public, nor was this always possible given the circumstances and the short time
available. However, when itcametothej ews, Goebbels' propaganda personnel were not
satisfied with underscoring or concealing information they received from their own
sources; they actually concocted numerous "reports" designed to hide the truth.
Unfortunately, the Nazi demon found unexpected help in the Yishuv and its press.

9 See, for example, his article in Davar , July 30, 1942. There may have been additional manifestations that escaped our attention.
However, the fact that we came across no reactions to such phenomena shows that they had no public impact.

10 Davar , August 28, 1942.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

And it was the semi-official moutinpiece of tine World Zionist Organization, the
newspaper Davar, that excelled in proffering this indefatigable help.

There is one key factor which is sufficiently noteworthy to bear reiteration at this
point. In the eyes of the non-J ewish world, the J ews were considered a definite side to
the conflict—and rightly so. Moreover, many regarded the J ews as an important source
of information. The attitude toward reports emanating from J ewish sources, and toward
J ewish reactions to the acts of murder, was commensurate with this belief. When the
Jews put out grave reports, the non-Jews were divided in their opinions. Some
questioned the credibility of such reports because they originated with an interested
party; others viewed them as reinforcing information precisely because they
emanated from a source supposed to be intimately familiar with events. By contrast,
J ewish reactions which tended to be dismissive of reports from the countries of the
destruction were treated with all due seriousness and were uniformly esteemed. In
these cases, friends and enemies, absolute doubters and potential believers
demonstrated a rare unanimity: if this is the response of the Jews themselves, who
have a vested interest, it stands to reason that the reports are exaggerated or, simply,
made up.

Given these circumstances, more than a symbolic link may exist between the
dates framing the period of Davar 's sophistries with respect to the reports about the
annihilation of the J ews in the Ukraine, and the onset of the first deportation action
from the Lublin Ghetto, an operation which launched the next wave of the destruction:
the liquidation of the majority of the J ewish communities in rural Poland and
Lithuania.

Yet another stimulant in the operation of disavowing the Holocaust was provided
in the form of a public statement published by the editorial board of IHatzofeii. This
paper, which had responded enthusiastically to the initiative of Davar, now decided to
take the initiative itself and put forward its own proposals. Three months later it
emulated DP's demurrer with an energy and a dogmatism that might have seemed
amusing if it did not involve such sorry matters.

The episode occurred in J une ]S42. The latter part of that month saw the
publication of numerous reports in the Hebrew press concerning mass murders in
Poland and the Baltic countries. On J une IS Hatzof&i ran the report on the murder of
60,000 J ews from Vilna, which was attributed to an eye-witness from Stockholm. The
report was framed with a black border and run on the front page; on J une 26 the paper
carried a follow-up, and four days after that came a detailed story from the London
Daily Tdegrapii about the Ziegelboim Report. Although this more extensive item was
shunted from the front page to page four, it might still have evoked terror in the
readers had not the paper's editors intervened with words of reproach -and of
reassurance.

The editorial in that day's edition of the paper, entitled 'The High Price of Blood,"
opened with praise for the British news agency Reuters:

"for the owners and correspondents of Reuters were particular about every detail
and were meticulous about ensuring that their reports reflected concrete reality, the
truth taken from life and not rumors flowering from the air."

The paper then went on to settle some accounts with the J ewish news agencies:

We regret that we cannot mete out the same praise to our own news agencies.
Neither they nor their correspondents or informants insist on accuracy and on truth
in their reporting. They chase after the amazing tale, the sensation, and they often
stumble by running reports which are remote from evidence and with informants
whose evidence is remote.... A J ewish news agency has a redoubled responsibility to be
accurate about every detail where reports concerning the Jewish people are concerned,
relating to the nation's body and soul. Reports of this kind must never be based on
voices and rumors, on hearsay evidence, on what one reporter told another; news and
reports must be accurate and based on genuine solid and verified facts. And if
accuracy and

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

authentication sinould prove impossible, it is better not to carry tine report. It is
better not to report anything at all than to report uncertain and doubtful items, or
false stories. Indeed, in these cases it is not just t)etta---/t is one's duty not to report.

The paper goes on to conclude:

Therefore our news agencies are doing a disservice by carrying these urgent and
frequent reports about the murder and slaughter of J ews in the countries of Nazi
occupation. It is not that these reports are lies. There is no doubt that the despicable
Nazis are doing to the Jews as their foul and impure will dictates, killing and
annihilating them. However, when these reports arrive in the form of rumors plucked
from the air, from one informant to another, one correspondent to another, they create
the very opposite impression. For these reports repeat one another. What was published
yesterday by a paper in Stockholm is today published by a paper in London. The result
is that the killings and massacres assume dreadful dimensions, terrifying numbers,
and the readers, be they in the world at large or in our own small world, grow
habituated to these reports and read them with their morning meal and with their
evening meal as normal, routine matters. But were the reports to be run accurately,
backed by the responsibility of the correspondent and the responsibility of the
informant, they might cause a sensation. After all, the slaughter in a small town in
Czechsolovakia generated a worldwide uproar and brought sharp protests. Whereas the
massacres and slaughters in Poland and Lithuania are failing to make an impression.
Not because these slaughters are againsty ews but because the reports about them are
conveyed faultily, without the accuracy of truth or the responsibility of speakers and
writers of the truth.

"So [the paper continues] our news agencies would do well to give the matter some
thought and find the correct way to handled these reports which deal with the entire
Jewish people. And until they find the correct and proper way, let them uphold the
precept: Sit and do nothing, sit and report nothing..." (Emphases in the original.) The
editorial is signed "L"-Mordechai Lipson, the paper's editor-in-chief.

This constitutes a continuation of the Davar argument though with far-reaching
conclusions. It was indicated to the reader unmistakably that

the appalling reports published in that same edition of the paper were incorrect
because they originated once in Stockholm and once in London. It was due to their
lengthy journey-and for no other reason-that these reports about the slaughter
assumed such horrific forms and such awesome dimensions. The paper complains
that the reports about the murders reach the reader day in and day out, morning and
evening. By this logic, the reader's reaction to the fearful news was liable to be numbed
due to habituation. After November 23 /-/atzof^ of course forgot all about its objections
to the abundance of reports, and together with other papers sought to ensure that the
horrors of the Holocaust became the daily fare of every J ew. But in the meantime, at the
end of June, the paper, angry and outraged, fulminated against the news agencies. If
they were incapable of providing accurate reports from first-hand sources, let them
report nothing. "Indeed, in these cases it is not just t)ette---/t is one's c/uty not to report."

The following day, as though obsessed with the need to reinforce disbelief in the
frightening numbers, the paper returned to the Holocaust theme in another editorial:
"Whether or not the appalling numbers reported in connection with the slaughters
and murders are accurate... it cannot be doubted... that the blood of our brothers is
flowing like water, the blood of myr/acfs of J ews, men, women and children, our spilled
blood... But we here... have not awakened."

We have emphasized the word "myriads" because it is of special interest in this
context. That same edition of the paper carried a report from London about a press
conference with the Jewish MP Silverman and with Schwarzbart, a member of the
Polish Council in London. Thetwo of them told the assembled reporters that according
to the information in their possession, no fewer than one million Jews had been
murdered in Europe. Uneasy about this figure, Hatzofeh again objected: not one
million, not hundreds of thousands, but myriads.

It stands to reason that the pressure exerted on the Jewish news agencies by the
Hebrew press in Palestine had an impact, particularly when the supreme institutions
of the Zionist movement were behind that pressure. For the JTA the Palestine papers
were important clients whose opinions needed to betaken under advisement, while for
Palcor, they were actually providers of work. Yet it is unlikely that their influence was

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

all-embracing, si nee foreign news agencies also operated in the country. Reuters, too,
which had been lauded by Hatzofeh, had a Palestine office which disseminated its
reports among the local press on a daily basis.

However, instances undoubtedly occurred in which the Jewish news agencies
tried to bend themselves to the wishes of their clients in both style and content. We
have already seen how Palcor supplied the report from the Soviet legation in London
which was meant to deny the note of the Soviet foreign minister. On another occasion, a
report was edited in a manner calculated to be less upsetting to Jewish readers. The
report in question concerned the onset of the major deportation from Warsaw in J uly
1942. The entire Hebrew press in Palestine carried the item, with the exception of
Davar. Three papers— Ha'aretz, Haboker and Hatzofeh--ran the report on July 28 using
the Reuters version. Hamashkif published it the following day in the JTA version. As
we found various mistakes and deviations from the original in all the Hebrew versions
of the Reuters dispatch, we have compared the original Reuters report, as it appeared
in the Palestine Post, with the JTA version as carried by Hamashkif (emphases have
been added:)

1. The Reuters version in the Palestine Post:

J EWS OF WARSAW IN DANGER

London, Monday [271(R).

The Germans have begun a mass deportation of J ews from the Warsaw Ghetto with
the intention of e>derminating them, according to reports reaching the Polish
Government in London.

Notices appeared in the streets ordering the deportation of 6,800 Jews to an
unknown destination in the East. Two trains packed with deportees have already left
Warsaw.

It is feared that when they reach their destination, they will be executed, as
happened to thej ews who were deported from other cities in Poland.

Near Wlodimicz in eastern Poland there is a mass grave which is about a mile in
length, containing the bodies of many thousands of murdered J ews.

2. The J TA version in Hamashkif

POGROM I N WARSAW GH ETTO
London 28 (JTA).

The Gestapo has launched a pogrom in the Warsaw Ghetto--this is a report which
was received by official Polish circles. Last week notices were posted in the streets of

Warsaw "heralding" the deportation and transport of the ghetto's residents to the
East. The first convoy of 6,000 persons is to depart within a few days. Two trains packed
and crowded withy ewish men have in fact already left Warsaw.

Following a demand for an investigation, it turned out that after the Gestapo had
posted its notices to the ghetto's residents to remain indoors, the Gestapo burst into
flats one night, selected from among the tenants the healthy males v\i\r\o are fit for work,
and after this action the elderly among the men were executed.

This was, evidently, an unusual instance in which a J ewish news agency tried to
adapt its service to the taste of its client. At the same time, this instance affords
additional confirmation that the Palestine press was not necessarily dependent on the
J ewish news agencies.

Hatzofeh's vigorous demand for "solid and verified" reports was hardly the
epitome of intelligence or judiciousness. Moreover, it would soon be forgotten
altogether once the Jewish Agency Executive ordered that the incoming reports be
taken at their face value. However, at the time, in J une 1942, when the editorial
appeared, until the end of November, this selectivity in believing information was
typical of the entire Palestine press of all shades and opinions. The question that
arises, is: what confirmation did the papers' editorial boards require, besides that of
the J ewish Agency, beforethey were willing to place their trust in the reports reaching

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

them? We have seen how a report which was attributed to a J DC representative was
invalidated; how an official statement from the Soviet Government was rejected; how
Soviet representatives at the "V League" conference who reiterated the Molotov
statement were disregarded; how a number of reports on behalf of and with the
confirmation of the Polish Government were ignored; how Shmuel Ziegelboim, the
direct representative of the J ews who were being butchered, who spoke with his heart's
blood and related numbers taken straight from the Vale of Slaughter, failed to make
an impression; how the World J ewish Congress issued a report about the murder of one
million J ews, also without any impact; how London and U.S. radio networks broadcast
reports about millions of slaughtered Jews, and the Hebrew press in Palestine would
not be budged: we do not believe, we are not impressed.

Whose confirmation, then, were the papers awaiting in order to accord the reports
recognition and belief? This question, which may seem rhetorical, has actually been
given a melancholy answer above, though one not without its own inner logic. The
answer is: they wanted the confirmation of the Germans. Every report about the
destruction emanating from a German source and bearing the confirmation of the
Nazi authorities was received without question. Every murder admitted to by the
Nazis was given prominent coverage, an emotional reaction, and extensive
commentary. Before a report concerning the annihilation of J ews could be absorbed in
the country and thereby become a public factor in theYishuv, it required confirmation
by the information apparatus of theThird Reich.

To see how one transgression leads to another, and just how far things
deteriorated, we shall return to Davar. Following months of proffering no little help to
Goebbels' machinery of deception by resisting "atrocity propaganda" and refusing to
countenance large numbers, the paper now offered open support for the Nazi
propaganda machinery itself. As was the case with the article by DP discussed above,
this overt support appeared at a critical juncture in the Nazis' campaign of
destruction.

J uly 22, 1942--the fast day of the Ninth of Av in the Hebrew calendar-saw the
onset of the "Big Action" in Warsaw, which launched a crucial stage in the
annihilation of the J ews of Poland and Lithuania. On that day announcements were
posted in the ghetto stating that 6,000 Jews a day would be "resettled in the East." In
the fifty days of the operation, over 300,000 J ews were removed from the Warsaw
Ghetto. About three-quarters of them were transported to Treblinka where they were
murdered immediately upon their arrival. The rest were sent to Majdanek, Trawniki,
Minsk and eslewhere [elsewhere], and were also subsequently murdered. Unlike past
operations, the Germans could no longer execute an action of this scale in the center of
Poland without the world learning about it in short order. Indeed, the report published
in the Palestine press on J uly 28 (which we quoted above in comparing the Reuters and
JTA versions), shows that within five days, or even less, circles of the Polish
Government in London already knew about this development and assessed correctly
that the objective of the new deportation was total annihilation. At the same time, at
Ziegelboim's initiative, a vigorous information campaign in London gained intensity
with the aim of informing the public about current and expected future developments.

The worldwide reverberations of the information campaign compelled the
Germans to adopt measures of their own in reaction.

Censorship was tightened, postal ties with the occupied countries were cut. 11 The
German propaganda apparatus floated a series of denials, false accounts and distorted
descriptions. For the first time since the beginning of the destruction, a two-sided
propaganda war erupted between the Jews and their friends on the one side, and the
annihilators of the J ews on the other side. In this campaign, the Jewish side was in
possession of reliable and up-to-date information and had the support of leading
figures among the elite of the British public.

I n this duel the Yishuv in Palestine initially adopted a "neutral" stance, which
was tantamount to supporting the German side. Those papers that ran the Reuters
report (or the JTA version) carried no follow-ups. Davar, it will be recalled, found no
room at all for this report. By its behavior, the Hebrew press seemed to be signalling
that it was pointless to become overexcited.

1 1 For a report on this, see Hatzofeh , September 25, 1942.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

About two weeks after the commencement of the Big Action, Davar abandoned its
posture of neutrality and moved openly to the side of Nazi propaganda. On August 7
the paper ran the versions of both sides: on the one hand the statement issued by the
World Jewish Congress about the murder of one million Jews, on the other hand a
communique issued by Radio Berlin denying the inordinate figure. The German
denial was carried under the headline, 'The Germans Deny But Admit A Little." The
report said: "In the Nazi denial over Radio Berlin the announcer admitted that Jews
had been executed as punishment for acts of sabotage, though no details were provided
concerning the scale or scope of the killing." As usual, the two reports appeared
without any comment by the paper.

Three days later, on August 10, 1942, a reaction finally appeared. In an editorial,
Davar repeated the German denial and then proceeded to reveal its opinion thereof:

Some of the numbers concerning the slaughter of tens of thousands which were
published recently seemed to be exaggerated, and they may well have contained some
exaggeration. From this point of view, the Nazi denial may be trustworthy. [Emphasis
added.]

The reader will undoubtedly take note of the refined style employed by the paper.
It takes issue with reports relating to the slaughter of "tens of thousands," while
exaggerations of the order of hundreds of thousands, or one million, are simply too
outlandish to merit even a mention. Indeed, no such heady stuff had been seen since
the superb piece

By DP.

Anyone wishing to excoriate the act committed by Davar will have good reason,
and the right words will not be lacking either. It behooves us to examine how the
J ewish public, together with its institutions and newspapers, reacted to these terrible
words. With that end in mind, we checked both Davar itself and the other papers
beginning August 11 We found no reaction whatsoever: not in Davar itself, not in
H a 'a retz. Ha boker or Hatzofeh.y\le found no article, statement, letter to the editor, not
one line and not one word expressing shock, objection, or at least reservation. The
various papers, institutions and organizations simply disregarded these two or three
lines in an editorial, lines which, objectively speaking, it is difficult not to categorize
as a knife in the back of the J ews facing annihilation (and a knife in the back of
Shmuel Ziegelboim, in both the figurative and literal senses).

We turned to Hamashkif in a final hope of finding a respectable reaction; as we
noted, this paper conducted a continual ideological battle with the papers of the "old"
Zionist Organization. It ran several departments which were devoted exclusively to
monitoring--and issuing furious responses to--comments of other papers and of
functionaries. One such column, scathingly entitled "Rot in the House of Jacob," was
written by the Revisionist leader Aba Achimeir, using the pen name "A. Shamai."
Davar now seemed to be going out of its way to prepare material which was grist for
Shamai's mill.

At all events, we found no direct response to Davar's deed. Still, Hamashkif did
come up with an unequivocal reaction, albeit one which was indirect. On August 25,
two weeks after the Davar editorial appeared, Hamashkif ran the following editorial
entitled "Let's Examine the Honesty of the Reports":

The Nazi occupation zone is as a closed book to us, no one can leave and no one can
enter, and no authoritative report emanates from there. Everything that is related
about the life of the J ews in Poland and Lithuania and in the German-occupied areas of
Russia, stems from unauthorized sources, and its degree of accuracy calls for careful
consideration. Day in and day out the Palestine press publishes atrocity reports
concerning the mass killing of Jews in the cities and towns of Eastern Europe. The
numbers begin in the thousands and reach tens of thousands and even hundreds of
thousands. We

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

do not doubt for a moment that the Nazi beast of prey is running absolutely wild
or that the Gestapo corps is pouring the full measure of its wrath on the J ewish
population. To our great pain, there is no basis for hoping that Hitler's henchmen will
spare the J ews throughout the occupation zones.

However, expressly because millions of Jews reside in all the countries of the
occupation and have relatives in Palestine who are anxious about their fate and await
news of them with bated breath, greater caution must be exercised with respect to the
reports being published by the [news] agencies.

The impossibility of verifying the accuracy of the information is undoubtedly
leading to the publication of reports not all of which are consistent with reality. One
day, for example, a report was published stating that the Nazis had ordered the
deportation of 100,000 J ews from the Warsaw Ghetto and that the leaders of the J ewish
community there had chosen to take their own lives rather than draw up the lists of
candidates for deportation. The following day saw [a report] that the] ewish population
in the Warsaw Ghetto had increased lately from half a million to 600,000 and that the
Nazis were transferring to Warsaw the J ews of the [outlying] towns, where no ghettos
exist. And just a short time ago, 3,500 Gur Jews were expelled from their town and
thrown into the Warsaw Ghetto. These two reports are contradictory. Which is correct?

Likewise, all the other reports originating in the occupation zones are devoid of
an authorized source. Only yesterday a Russian commander, who escaped from the
Germans, was quoted as saying that in the Lithuanian city of Shabli, a Jewish
metropolitan center, the entire J ewish population was destroyed. This sensational
item greatly confounded former Lithuanians in this country who have relatives in
that city. The question arises: Are we permitted to augment the pain and the grief of
these families without being certain that the dreadful reports are actually true?

We have no complaints against the news agencies, which are fulfilling their
journalistic duty and recording every rumor about the fate of our brethren in the
Nazified diaspora. However, the responsible institutions of thej ewish people are duty-
bound to look for ways to collect information about the

fate of the J ews in the occupied zones from more authoritative sources and not
base themselves on the testi monies of passersby.

Even today, when the world is divided into two warring camps, there are certain
countries which still maintain more accurate channels of information. Would Sweden
refuse a request, for example, to "represent" the interests of the Jewish population in
the occupied territories and to obtain information through more direct means? And
could not the International Reef Cross be of help in such an enterprise? It seems to us
thet even the Vatican could serve as a more accurate source of information about the
fateof theJ ews and the number of killed and slaughtered.

Our fate is miserable and bitter enough without having to heap pain on our pain
and to keep harping on unverified numbers of the dead and the tortured by the Nazi
barbarians. [Emphases in the original.]

To each paper, its own style; to each, its own version of the "booster shot." Like
other papers, Hamashkif was unable to restrain itself, broke its silence and openly
called on its readers to remain calm, not to add more pain. Like other papers,
/-/amas/7fa'f scores the reliability of the reports emanating from the Soviet Government,
the Polish Government, the] DC and Ziegelboim. It is bewildered by the contradictions
between these reports and other reports, and is unable to reconcile them. Like other
papers, Hamashkif learned very quickly after November 23 how to overcome these
contradictions in a simple and natural way: to believe the Allies and not to believe
Goebbels. But on August 25, the paper, together with other papers, duped itself into
believing that objective information concerning a dearcut war topic such as the
destruction of theJ ews could be obtained "through more direct means" via the Swedish
Govern ment--from the Germans. For this is the only possible interpretation of the
proposal to seek information with the help of the Swedes, if we rule out the absurd
possibility that the writer intended for the Swedish Government to appoint special
attaches who would be present at the annihilation operations.l2 J ust as there was
unanimity of opinion that the Germans were a source of objective information, so, too.

12 The proposal to request a neutral country to declare itself the representative of the Jewish people was worthy of attention. The
idea of requesting information through the Vatican and the Red Cross was also sound. But it was naive to believe that these
sources would obtain information by "more direct" means than the Polish or Soviet governments or Zygelboim.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

there was not one word of condemnation or reservation witin respect to Davar's deed of
August 10.

To sum up: Tine campaign of disavowal of information about tine Holocaust of
European] ewry, which was launched in Davar on March 16

and reached its nadir on August 10, 1942, gained the full and active support of
the other four Hebrew- language dailies. Three of them--/-/a'aretz, Hatzofeh and
Hamashkif expressed their approval explicitly in editorials. The fourth, Haboker,
while it ran no special editorials on the subject, backed the disavowal line in practice
through its information policy. To the degree that these papers represented the parties,
organizations and circles which backed them, and to the degree that they reflected the
public life of the country, the supposition is confirmed that the Jewish public in
Palestine was in the grip of a hypnotic trance of tranquility and of disbelief vis-a-vis
the horrific tidings concerning the fate of their brethren in Occupied Europe.

Let us return to Davar. Its overt support for Goebbels in his war against
Ziegelboim left its mark on the paper's style. Even earlier, the paper ran without
reservation reports from German sources-and it is quite discernible that they
preferred these over other sources, since they reinforced mistrust of the
"exaggerations." Now, following the guidelines contained in the editorial of August
10, the paper's correspondents and writers seemed to consider it requisite to note
particularly from time to time that they were basing themselves on communiques
from Berlin and even to stress the praiseworthy reliability of these reports. On
September 1, Moshe Frager gave an enthusiastic account of the high birth rate among
Warsaw's Jews-according to German data. He added at once that "the German
calculations published to date in the field of J ewish demography have been more or
less correct." This on September 1 eleven days before the end of the Big Action about
which Ziegelboim had warned and which had been totally denied by Goebbels and his
henchmen. On November 8 the paper published a report about a meeting of the board of
the United Committee for the Aid of Polish J ewry. This article was full-fledged Nazi
propaganda regarding the ostensible purpose underlying the transport of J ews to
Russia and the Ukraine. 'The direction," it said, "is to make use of the Jews" and put
them to work on behalf of the Reich. Various other details were added, and it was noted
in particular that this information was being supplied "according to German
statistics which are faithful in these instances." Numerous examples could be
provided of how the paper relied on "faithful" sources from Berlin, from Cracow and
from Litzmannstadt [Lodz].

The question that presents itself is: What brought Davar to this state of affairs?
How did the paper of Berl Katznelson become a help and a prop for Nazi propaganda? I n
our view, this was a deterioration which resulted from an unfortunate combination of
circumstances against a

backdrop of political guidance. The paper's standing in the country and in the
Zionist movement, and the fact that it was headed by a prominent figure who was
known as a thinker par excellence and as a upright person--this fact, together with the
ideational-spiritual development of Zionism (which we shall discuss in the chapters
to come) exacerbated the ramifications of the deterioration and transformed it into a
general obstacle of the Yishuv. We have no detailed information about internal
developments in the paper, nor would such information appear to be crucial for the
purposes of this study. We shall make do, then, with one question which we believe is
particularly noteworthy: the role and responsibility of Berl Katznelson himself.

As we noted, the World Zionist Organization entered the war without setting up a
campaign headquarters and without formulating an information policy vis-a-vis the
enemy. As far as is known, this question did not even come up for discussion, and no
one had the patience to pause and consider it even when it became urgent and vital. In
the absence of an authoritative policy, each paper in the country acted as its own
understanding or its editors' feeling dictated. At the same time, it stands to reason that
when it came to being in possession of information, greater consideration was accorded
the large papers, those which were closer to the Yishuv's institutions and the Zionist
movement. We may assume that Davar, whose editor-in-chief was considered reliable
and was known to be well-connected in the political heirarchy [hierarchy], was
particularly trusted.

Two months after the outbreak of the war, on Friday, October 29, 1939, Davar ran a
major article by the respected writer and journalist, Ya'akov Rabinowiz. It was entitled

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

"Rumors Are Blossoming," and its tone was one of absolute sincerity. In a sharply
polemical style, Rabinowitz excoriated journalists and papers that were
disseminating rumors about the death of famous persons and about mass murders.
All the signs are that this was a new round in the writer's war against certain
journalists, a fact which may have contributed to the dogmatic style he adopted.

Earlier, the press had reported the murder of the members of the Religious Court
in Warsaw, of Professor Rabbi Moshe Shur from Warsaw, and of the writers S.Y. Imbar
and Ber Horowitz in Vienna. Subsequently it was learned that Shur was still alive.
Thundered Ya'akov Rabinowitz:

"No, no: I suspect that not only Rabbi Shur is alive, but the Religious Court and
S.Y. I mbar and Ber Howoritz will also undoubtedly be resurrected soon."

Rabinowitz went on the discuss the tendency toward exaggeration:

"Human imagination takes flight and is inclined to ciphers, that is, to volunteer
them to us. Ten become one hundred, one hundred a myriad, and so on. It is so easy to
add a zero or two, and for a deft informant and a well-known type of journalist, that is a
real treasure. Unfortunately, decent journalists also fall into the trap--they fall in and
pull others in with them."

There follow illustrations from the past of exaggerations and rumors that proved
false: "In the period of the 1929 riots our Warsaw papers burned down Tel Aviv and
filled its streets with 30,000 J ews killed..." I n the Spanish Civil War our news agencies
flooded the papers with reports about killings and destruction among the J ewish
communities in Spain... It later emerged that the disseminator of the rumors was the
'rabbi' and 'town councillor' Dihan, a Moroccan Jew who ended up in Tiberias, or a
Tiberian fellow who ended up in Morocco, who was doing errands for Moscow."

The mention of "errands for M oscow" was evidently not accidental, but was meant
as an admonition against slipups in the present and the future. This becomes clear
when the writer lists various sources of information and categorizes them explicitly
and implic[i]tly according to their reliability and unreliability: "Davar is right to
notethesourceof every report. There are reports from the French high command: pure
gold; reports from 'R': very thorough; and there are RR and Radio J erusalem and the
"Ah ram" agency and there is RK and there is the "Hawas" agency which is also very
thorough, and there is RP and there are Russian reports, may heaven protect us from
them."

It was a wretched article and, given the circumstances prevailing at the time of
its publication, an irresponsible one as well. Ya'akov Rabinowitz, the veteran
journalist who was known for his noble traits and his personal and intellectual
integrity, faltered, apparently because of his fervent faith in German culture as he
knew it. He was unable even to imagine that a people possessing a culture of such high
order could be capable of such despicable crimes.

In the meantime, the daring prediction about Imbar and Horowitz came true.
They were "resurrected," and this was learned in the Yishuv. (Both perished in 1942.)
The tough article was bound to influence both the public and the paper's staff. Most
harmfully, confirmation of this stance came from the editor-in-chief, Berl Katznelson.
Wishing to express an idea of his own about the reports concerning the fate of public
figures in the occupied countries, Katznelson published a piece which could be taken
as a continuation of Rabinowitz's article and as unreserved backing for his

opinions. Katznelson entitled his article, "Something About the I nformants Upon
Whose Words We Live Or Die." It opened as follows: 'Ya'akov Rabinowitz wrote
sparklingly about the informants who kill with their inanities." The article was
signed "J erubaal,"B Katznelson's nom deplume. Whether or not the paper's senior
staff discussed the topic, it stands to reason that the remarks of the editor-in-chief
were taken as a guideline-to oppose the dissemination of exaggerated reports about
the murder of J ews.

I n 1940-1941, as along as no mass murders of tens of thousands were perpetrated,
and as long as (in the latter half of 1941) no reports concerning such slaughters
arrived from the occupied areas in the Soviet Union, the line of reliability-at-all-costs
caused no immediate damage. The initial test of this stand came in mid-March 1942,
when the first reports arrived about the mass murders in the Ukraine. How Davar
treated these reports and how it acted following this first test-all this has been

1 3 Davar , November 24, 1 939. See also the Writings of Berl Katznelson, Vol. IX, p. 382.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

described above. Now we may add that formally, DP had the backing of the editor-in-
chief from two years earlier, and that he evidently drew his thesis from the article by
Rabinowitz which was also written two years earlier-under conditions which had in
the meantime changed for the worse. At that time, in 1939, the danger of mass
murders existed; now, actual murders were being committed. Then, when Soviet
Russia was an ally of Hitler's, an attitude of suspiciousness toward reports originating
with Russia was justified; now, with Russia having perforce joined the anti-Nazi
alliance, DP continued to belittle and abuse an official Soviet report concerning the
murder of 100,000 Ukrainian Jews. Then, there was a bad article and a bad stand,
which contained the seed of calamity; now had come the calamity itself.

Throughout the entire period of the disavowal, Berl Katznelson does not appear
openly as an active participant. The item of March 17 was written by Dan Pinnes; the
editorial of August 10 is signed by the paper's "Editorial Board" and it is not known
whether it was written by Katznelson. At all events, the latter nowhere returns to the
question of reliability and exaggerations- neither in Davar nor elsewhere-not before
November 23 and not afterward. But there can be no doubt that as an editor-in-chief
with an energetic and punctilious character, Katznelson was well aware of what was
being done and written. And since, naturally, he had the possibility to react to and
even to change the paper's stand, but did not do so, the unavoidable conclusion is that
he considered that stand to be proper and appropriate. Whether or not this conclusion
is correct, whether he did not react out of assent, out of distraction, or for some other

reason, the public significance of his silence was: unequivocal support for the
line of suppression and sedation.

It cannot be ruled out that, unlike others, Katznelson understood the heavy
responsibility devolving upon him, and agonized over it. This possibility, at all events,
may be of assistance in understanding a remark he made to the Mapai Council not long
before his death:

"And I am not referring now to the rescue efforts, a subject which 1 do not consider
myself fit to tall<about."14 (Emphasis added.)

Two months after this confession, Berl Katznelson passed away, and his
agonizings with him.

Besides the chief editor, Davar employed quite a few other editors and
correspondents, all of them good J ews and loyal Zionists. Virtually none of them found
anything amiss in the campaign to suppress the knowledge of the destruction of
European J ewry. Some of them were personally involved in the campaign, and if any of
them raised objections when the paper deteriorated to the point of openly supporting
Nazi propaganda, no traces of such objections have survived. What is truly
astonishing is that the staff of Davar, even as they were engaged in disseminating
Goebbels' versions of events, actually believed that they were combatting [combating]
and excoriating him. The article of August 10, which condoned the Nazis' denial, was
written in order to., .further the propaganda work against them. 'The [Nazi] denial
proves," the writer states, "that considerable value attaches to a shocked public
opinion, and it is essential to continue with the information activity concerning the
fate of the] ews in Europe." Yet another typical example of self-deception may be found
in a report of October 5:

The Nazis have announced officially the transfer of Jews from Poland to
Germany. Over 150,000 J ews were exiled in J uly alone from Poland to different locales
in Germany and were concentrated there in various kinds of forced labor, according to
the official Nazi paper Kralaower Zeitung. This is the first time the Nazis have
officially ac/m/tteof the transfer of J ews from Poland to occupation zones in Russia and
their employment there in building fortifications and barricades. [Emphasis added.]

Wrong. The Germans admitted nothing, they merely deceived. In response to
condemnations of the deportations and murders of J ews in

14 Berl Katznelson, Writings , Vol. Xll, p. 97.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Warsaw and many other places, Goebbels' staff disseminated a new fabrication to
tineeffect tinat tinej ews were not being sent to deatin camps but to Germany in order to
worl<. In Davar this disinformation became an "admission" and was served up to the
paper's readers together with a reprise of the previous lies about the supposed
transports for work in Russia. The staff of Davar didn't catch Goebbels out, they
themselves were caught once more in his net of falsehoods.

We shall complete our survey with an illustration of a type of journalistic
writing which for reasons of economy we were unable to consider in detail. I refer to
descriptive journalism, or what was called at the time "reportage." It is not
inconceivablethat in the last analysis, given the background of the press reports and
the attendant commentary, it was expressly this type of journalism which was most
instrumental in creating the public's image of the ghettos. When we asked friends of
ours who were in Palestine during the Holocaust period how they could have remained
impassiveaboutthefateof thej ews in the ghettos, they replied, "Well, why not? After
all, we were told that they had all good things there-cafes, delicacies, theaters. Our
impression was that things weren't so terrible."

It is true that in some ghettos there were "all good things," materially speaking
and even more so spiritually. The smugglers who supplied the Warsaw or Vilna ghetto
with flour, potatoes and milk, did not balk at bringing in select wines and other
delicacies, for themselves and for other types of ghetto dwellers who still had money or
who had grown wealthy in the ghetto itself through any one of a number of possible
means (industry, crafts, commerce, extortion, embezzlement, theft). Cafes and bars
sprang up in the wake of these smuggling operations, some of them even boasting
musical entertainment. For the German authorities these establishments represented
a source of bribe money while giving them places to gorge themselves and demonstrate
their capacity for drink. Beyond this, Nazi propaganda used these places
advantageously:

Goebbels knew that world public opinion could be misled and allayed by reports
about the existence of such establishments, even if reports about hunger and death
fi Itered out alongside them.

As for the life of the spirit and public life, it is true that what took place in some
ghettos in certain periods can only be described as a miracle of theJ ewish genius. Nazi
propaganda also seized on these marvelous phenomena to offer false proof of the
"normalcy" of life in the ghetto.

Two descriptive pieces in Davar will illustrate the assistance the Goebbels
propaganda machine received in this area. On Friday, October

16, 1942, P. Heilprin, in an article about the cultural life in the Warsaw ghetto,
wrote that 24 book stores and libraries were operating there; four J ewish theaters and a
special puppet theater for children were functioning; 127 festive events had taken
place to commemorate the 105th anniversary of the birth of the writer Mendele Mocher
Sforim; and meetings and ceremonies had also been held to mark the centenary of the
birth of the writer Goldfaden and the 25th anniversary of the death of Sholem
Aleichem. "Our informants report that all these projects drew packed halls," the writer
notes, and he ends on a heartening and calming note: 'The image of God has not
departed from the ghetto dwellers. The spirit of the ghettoized people has not fallen. In
the face of the destruction and annihilation that the enemy is initiating, the nation
presents the will and the strength to live. The enemy cannot harm one's soul."

The alleged normalcy of ghetto life is particularly played up in a second article
by Heilprin which appeared the following Thursday. This time the focus was on the
material side of life. The persistence of a kind of "class war," or, at least, the existence
of class differences, is emphasized. "The immense difference between the rich and the
poor in the ghetto is flagrantly apparent. The wealthy have their own clubs and their
own places of gathering. They can be seen being carried in rickshaws, eating in
restaurants, dancing in dance hails." By contrast, the writer mentions the thousands
and tens of thousands who are starving and the dead who are lying in the streets. He
also relates how Jewish merchants are doing a brisk trade in water and provides a
lightly ironic description of a "company for the exploitation of pure air" which is
operating in the ghetto. "And the ultra-Orthodox are preoccupied there with the war
for the sanctity of the Sabbath. And the community runs a special office with an army
of policemen in the war against speculation." He concludes with a quasi-sociological
moral: 'The Nazi boot has not proved powerful enough to trample life in the ghetto

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

entirely. Old customs and old ways of life adapt to and maintain themselves within the
revolution."

The articles are written in a lively style and seem to describe things as they were
just the day before yesterday. The writer's repeated mention of so-called "informants"
bolsters the impression of authenticity and freshness. In fact, the pieces were neither
authentic nor fresh. We have no knowledge of persons who arrived from Warsaw at this
time. What we do know is that such persons, had they actually come, would have
certainly confirmed the reports about the slaughter in the course of the major "Action"
which had commenced four months earlier. Moreover a closer examination of the
articles shows that the 105th anniversary of M endele's

birth occurred the previous year, in 1941--which was also the 25th anniversary of
the death of Sholem Aleichem. The Goldfaden centenary was actually marked a year
before that, in 1940. What we find, then, is not fresh reportage but a journalistic
montage accompanied by ready-made conclusions. And those conclusions were, as we
saw: there are troubles, yes, but people are getting along. The spirit of the nation has
not fallen, life goes on as usual.

We do not know what Hell prin's sources of information really were. Perhaps they
were those "experts" who did not believe in the existence of the Holocaust and did not
want others to do so either. Given Davar's manifest admiration in this period for the
reliability of Nazi information, it would come as no great surprise to learn that the
description was simply copied from some German bulletin or lifted from a neutral
paper which had been fed with news items by the Nazis. Whatever the case, there is no
doubt that in the circumstances of October 1942, journalism such as this was a
precious gift for Nazi propaganda. In the fierce war between Goebbels and Zygielbojm
regarding information about events in the Warsaw ghetto, Goebbels had gained a hefty
contribution. Twice within one week the Jews in Palestine read authoritative reports
in a reliable paper and learned that while the situation was not rosy, neither was there
any call for panic.

What P. Heilprin did in Davar, Shalom Gottlieb did in Ha'aretz and other
journalists did in their own papers. The Hebrew reportage did not lag behind the
J ewish news agency reports or the political commentaries. All the forms of publicistic
writing in the entire Hebrew press were engaged in lulling the Yishuv in the face of
the annihilation of European J ewry. Everyone did his share.

There is no need to dwell on the fact that the suppression operation had the
backing of the Zionist hierarchy and effectively constituted the policy of the World
Zionist Organization and the Yishuv leadership in Palestine. The suppression of the
truth went on until the Jewish Agency executive in Jerusalem decided that the time
had come to termi nate it.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Chapter Three

What the Leaders Knew

On Monday, November 23, 1942, the press carried a communique issued by tine
J ewisin Agency for Palestine v\i\r\\c\r\ generated a slnocl< among the public and for the
first time placed the destruction of European Jewry on the agenda of the Yishuv. The
following is the full text of the statement:

The J ewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem has received from authoritative and
reliable sources detailed reports about acts of murder and slaughter perpetrated
against thej ews of Poland and thej ews of Central and Western Europe who have been
deponed to Poland.

According to these reports, following the visit to Poland last spring by the Gestapo
chief, H immler, the Nazi authorities there began the systematic massacre of the Jews
in the towns and villages of Poland. A special government committee for the
extermination of thej ews was established, called the Vernichtungskommission, headed
by the Commissar Feu. This commission is travelling around Poland and overseeing
the destruction operation. Children up to the age of 12 are mass-murdered
unmercifully. Old people have also been executed.

The J ewish men who are fit for work were registered and sent in groups to an
unknown destination, and all trace of them has disappeared. In various places the
J ewish women were also rounded up by the Nazi authorities and were also sent off.

It is also reported by eye-witnesses that 27,000 of the 30,000 J ews from the Kielce
ghetto were removed for deportation about two months ago. Some 1,500 people were
killed on the spot as the deportation was in progress. According to rumors, the
remainder were killed during the journey. In Brest-Litovsk thousands of Jews were
drowned when the Nazi murderers threw them into the River Bug. In Piotrkow, where
20,000 J ews had lived, only 2,600 remain, and among them only 160 women and
children. Of 40,000 J ews in Czestochowa, only 2,000 are left. I n the Radom ghetto 3,500
persons remai n of the 32,500 who had been there. The

same fate has befallen most of the other Jewish ghettos. In Bialystok the Nazis
herded 1,500 Jews into the Great Synagogue and then set it afire, burning the Jews
alive. Most of thej ews in the town of Tiktin were seized by the Nazis and buried alive.

Reports from the Warsaw and Lodz ghettos speak about an appalling reduction in
thej ewish population there in recent months.

According to reports from these sources, the mass deportations of Jews are
continuing from the cities of Central and Western Europe. Only 28,000 Jews remain in
Berlin.

In its meeting yesterday, the Jewish Agency Executive discussed these reports
and decided on a series of actions and appeals abroad regarding the situation of
European J ewry. A special committee was chosen to carry out the actions.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

This very interesting document needs to be considered togetiner witin its sources
and tine causes tinat led to its publication. The "authoritative and reliable sources" on
which the report is based consisted of a group of Jews who arrived in Palestine as part
of an exchange of citizens of Britain and its colonies with German citizens who were in
Allied hands. lOf the 114 persons in the group, 69 were J ews: 30 were from Poland, 18
from Germany, 14 from Holland, four from Belgium and three from France.2 Thirty-
four of the J ews were women, 26 were children, and there were nine men, most of them
elderly.3 They had left their places of residence between October 26 and 28 and had
been gathered in Vienna. From there the group left on November 9 for Constantinople;
they arrived in Palestine on November 16 and were housed temporarily at Atl it.

On the day following their arrival they were visited by Halm Barlas, a senior
official in the Jewish Agency. He met with them for three hours and what he heard
shocked him. 4 During the following two days, November 18 and 19, Barlas returned to
Atl it together with two members of the Jewish Agency Executive, Moshe Shapira and
Eliahu Dobkin. The three questioned the new arrivals and drew up another report to
supplement Barlas's original report. 5

A group of dozens of J ews from different locales in Poland, Germany and Western
Europe undoubtedly constituted a rich and reliable source of authentic information
about events. As it happened, one of them proved capable of acting as a mouthpiece for
the entire group and for the

Polish J ews in particular. Ya'akov Kurtz, a resident of Tel Aviv, happened to be in
the c/ty of his birth, Piotrkow, when the war broke out. Kurtz, who came from a wealthy
family of merchants, was quite familiar with the community in his own town as well
as in the surrounding area and in Warsaw. He was a frequent visitor in the capital and
was in constant telephone contact with relatives of his who lived there. In Piotrkow he
was active in public affairs, from time to time helping various departments of the
Jewish Council (the J udenrat). Because of his social connections and his intense
interest in developments--an interest directly related to his efforts to obtain an exit
permit for Palestine-he came into possession of much up-to-date information
concerning the fate of Polish Jewry. As the book he wrote after arriving in Palestine
shows, he was able to select from the flood of rumors sweeping Poland those reports
which were reliable and to convey with explicit reservations the rumors which
attested not to actual events but to frames of mind among the Jewish and non-Jewish
populations.

1 1 was only natural that Ya'akov Kurtz became the chief witness among the group
of returning J ews. I n Tel Aviv he delivered a lecture about the situation to a meeting of
public functionaries. He drew up a memorandum setting forth the main points of the
lecture, along with numbers and dates, for the J ewish Agency and for the
representatives of Polish J ewry. Kurtz was summoned to meet with a Polish minister.
Professor Kott, who was then in Palestine, and at the latter's request prepared a special
memorandum for the Polish government in London. 6 Spurred by several public
officials, and with the assistance of the writer Bracha Habas, he published his
testi mony i n book form.

The Book of Testimony by Ya'akov Kurtz was one of the first books about the
Holocaust of European Jewry and it remains one of the most reliable. Reading it
decades later, one finds that in Piotrkow the author was in possession of considerable
accurate information which he brought with him to Palestine. A comparison of the
book, which he wrote in 1943, with the memorandum he submitted to the Jewish
Agency in November 1942, upon his arrival in the country, demonstrates that the
reliability and judiciousness with which he appraised events were not the result of
information he had acquired in Palestine, but originated in Poland itself. Indeed, with
respect to one key item, the memorandum actually outdoes the book in scope and
accuracy. The memorandum to the Jewish Agency contains a faithful description of

1 The Rescue Committee's report to the 22nd Zionist Congress, held in December 1946, stated: "At that time—fall 1942--a group
of Jews from Poland arrived in Eretz-lsrael, on the basis of a [population] exchange. It was this group that brought the horrific
news about the death camps at Treblinka, at Belzecz, at Auschwitz, at Sobibor... about the expulsions from Warsaw... about the
annihilation of millions of Polish Jews... A feeling of dread gripped the Yishuv upon hearing these things."

2 Barlas Report, CZA, File S26/1 159.

3 Ha'aretz , November 17, 1942.

4 Barlas Report.
5CZA,FileS26/1159.

6 Ya'akov Kurtz, Book of Testimony , p. 6.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

what was occurring in Treblinl<a, as related by a J ewisin youtin from Czestocinowa wino
\r\ad managed to escape from tine camp and get to Piotrl<ow:

Tine laborers who worked with him told him that the room into which the naked
J ews were herded was then hermetically sealed and the air drawn out, so that the J ews
suffocated. The bodies of thej ews were then burned. Some people claimed that the Jews
were suffocated in that building by means of gas. Precise details are impossible to
come by. One thing is clear:

no one comes out of there alive and heaps of ashes are constantly being removed
from there.

All this was contained in the November 1942 memorandum to the J ewish
Agency.7 A year later, apparently at the influence of the book's editors, or because of
the general atmosphere in the country, the entire passage was omitted "for the sake of
reliability," with the exception of part of the last sentence.8 At all events, when he
arrived in Palestine on November 16, Kunz knew what was going on at Treblinka and
he related what he knew to his interlocutors and interrogators from the J ewish
Agency. He also provided a concise and accurate description of the extermination
fac;7/ty ate helm no, where J ews were murdered in vans by use of exhaust fumes. 9

Thanks to his frequent contacts with the Warsaw ghetto, Kurtz was able to
recount faithfully the course of events there during the "Big Action" and afterward. He
also said, basing himself on a phone conversation with an informant from Warsaw,
that the J ewish survivors there after the deportation had received a quota of bread-
ration cards for 36,000 persons. Kurtz estimated that 420,000 Jews had been deponed
from Warsaw and that, together with those hiding out, another 100,000 remained
there.

In the introduction to his book Kurtz describes the reaction which his vital
information met with on the part of the National I nstitutions in

Palestine:

'They didn't believe me! They told me I was exaggerating. They asked questions
and carried out interrogations as though I were a criminal out to deceive people for
certain reasons, or a libeller fabricating things in order to hurt someone. They asked
me: How do you know what happened in the other places, since you were tapped in your
ghetto? How do you know what was done to the J ews who were transferred, since you
were not there? They worked hard to umdermine [undermine] my

certainty, to get me to doubt the veracity of my reports. To make them believe me, I
was compelled to tell them all my sources and contacts with the other ghettos, and also
to reveal how I had learned what the German murderers did to the J ews who were
transferred. And after all this there were some people who still didn't believe! Even
today [April 1943], people continue to ask: Is what the papers say about the destruction
in Poland really true?10

The skepticism of the interrogators can perhaps be accounted for by their desire to
reach absolute certainty. Thus we should examine what, ultimately, they accepted and
what they rejected from the testimony of Kurtz and the other J ews in his group.

A comparison of the J ewish Agency communique with the protocols of Barlas,
Shapira and Dobkin, the Kurtz memorandum, and Kurtz's book, shows that the J ewish
Agency accepted and published the figures cited by the refugees concerning the Jews
still remaining in the various ghettos, with the exception of Warsaw. They also
accepted and published the report about the "Extermination Commission" headed by
Commissar Feu. However, the Jewish Agency did not accept and did not publish the
important testimony about Chelmno and Treblinka. Four months after the appearance
of theZygelboim-Wedgewood pamphlet and one month after the BBC had broadcast to
the world (October 27) the report about killings by means of poison fumes,llthe J ewish
Agency Executive remained unconvinced that the Germans were truly resorting to the
mass murder of J ews. At all events, the Jewish Agency communique contains not one

7CZA,FileS26/1159.

8 Book of Testimony , pp. 335-336.

9 Ibid., p. 217.

10 Ibid., pp.6-7.
llHa'aretz, October 28, 1942.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

word about the gassing of Jews at Chelmno, which Kurtz related in detail, or at
Treblinka, which Kurtz related from a reliable witness.

Also spurned was the testimony concerning the annihilation of the Jewish
community of Warsaw. On this topic the protocols of Barlas, Shapira and Dobkin are
replete with impressive testimony provided by some of the other refugees who arrived
with Kurtz. According to them, some 25,000 "legal" J ews remained in Warsaw and a
like number of Jews in hiding. Despite this testimony, and despite what was already
known abroad at this time, the Jewish Agency made do with a laconic statement,
referring to Warsaw and Lodz alike, on "an appalling reduction in the J ewish
population there."

The striking fact is that in its announcement of November 23, 1942, the executive
of thej ewish Agency for Palestine had still not

accepted as a fact the Germans' intention to destroy the entire Jewish people. The
statement spoke about "acts of murder and slaughter" and about "systematic
extermination." Yet at the same time it was explained that children up to the age of 12
and old people were being executed. As for the Jews who were neither children nor
elderly, the communique devotes a special section to them which implies that at least
the adult males fit for work "were registered and sent" to unknown places of work. As
compared with the unequivocal assessment contained in the Zygelboim-Wedgewood
pamphlet, the Jewish Agency statement constitutes a serious backtracking from a
viewpoint enabling the denunciation of the Nazis' intentions. 12 We shall return below
to the significance and the consequences that were entailed in this non-recognition of
the Germans' ultimate plans. For now, we shall sum up this part of our survey by
noting the following three points:

1) With the exception of the detail about the Vernichtungskommission, the Jewish
Agency statement added nothing new about the destruction. Indeed, it lagged far
behind what was already known internationally and what had been made public in
London, New York and elsewhere.

2) Not even for the Palestine press did the J ewish Agency statement constitute
any new information. As we have already seen, beginning in March 1942 numerous
reports were published in these papers relating to the destruction of J ewish
communities and the mass murder of J ews.

3) What was new about the Jewish Agency statement was that the ranking
institutions of the Zionist movement and the Yishuv confirmed publicly the reliability
of the reports and urged the public to believe them. It was this confirmation which
brought about the shift in the attitude of the press and jolted public opinion.

There followed a number of public confessions by individual correspondents and
by some newspaper editorial boards. We have already noted the mea culpa of Moshe
Prager in Davar. 13 He was preceded by Dr. Azriel Carlebach, a member of the editorial
board of /-/afzofafi, who appended to the Jewish Agency communique as it appeared in
that paper an ambivalent statement of his own from which it was difficult to
determine whether he actually acknowledged that he was blameworthy. 14 An
editorial in Ha'ardiz (December 9) noted "the most dreadful rumors which we could
not--and almost did not want to--believe (we accused the news agencies that
transmitted them of inordinate exaggerations)."

Actually, there were few such confessions, and even those that did appear tended
to pin the blame on others. In fact, it was at this time that allegations against the
international community began to appear, allegations which became the
underpinnings of what would emerge as the conventional Israeli historical treatment
of the Holocaust. The active pioneer in this realm seems once again to have been Davar.

12 The booklet stated: "These facts prove that the transgressing and criminal German government is determined to fulfill Hitler's
'prophecy' that five minutes before the end of the war— irrespective of who triumphs—all the Jews of Poland will be annihilated
to the last of them" (according to Davar , December 4, 1942).

13 This writer, it turns out, did not make do with Davar , but appeared (under the nom de plume of Moshe Mark) also in
Haderech , an Agudat Israel weekly, where he confessed his guilt: "1 admit and confess before the whole community the sin I
committed in not believing, and in enticing others not to believe, the awful news that reached us lately" ( Haderech . 17th day of
Hebrew month of Kislev, 5703).

14 Azriel Carelbach wrote a column entitled "War Diary" in Hatzofeh .

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

As early as November 26, 1942, just three days after abandoning its campaign of
silence, the paper mustered up the courage to threaten editorially that "we shall
denounce the shame of the world which sees the slaughter of an entire people and
remains silent."

I n this period, the thesis that it was really the goy/m who had been silent and had
suppressed the truth about the Holocaust was grounded in the allegation that the
external sources of information--the foreign- language news agencies, the British
Mandate authorities, the British government and other governments-had been
remiss in supplying information in time or had helped block such reports from
reaching the Yishuv. This allegation was widespread, particularly among the leaders
of the Yizhuv and the Zionist movement. It was repeated in writing and in speeches by
publicists and speakers. The public appearances of two ranking figures in the
National Institutions will serve to illustrate the evolution of this thesis from its
beginnings as a hesitant query tinged with confession and regret, to the status of an
absolutely unequivocal assertion.

The first case is that of Eliahu Golomb, who in a session of the Histadrut Council
in December 1942 (a meeting we mentioned at the start of this section of the book) said:
"The most terrible thing is that for weeks [?] the world has known about the atrocities,
while we learned about them late, and initially the reports met with doubt and
disbelief"15 Five months later, in May 1943, at a meeting of Po'alei Israel, Golda
Meyerson (Meir) declared with her characteristic self confidence and prestige that
someone saw to it that the appalling report did not reach us, for fear that we would
grow anxious and demand the openi ng of the country's gates. "16

Golomb's remark is especially noteworthy. Eliahu Golomb headed the Haganah,
an organization which was known for its expertise in obtaining what it considered to
be pertinent [pertinent] information. The Haganah extracted information from places
that wished to conceal it and was adept at winnowing the reliable from the doubtful. In
the course of their routine work, Golomb or his senior staff must surely have seen all
the reports circulating around the globe concerning the Jews in general and the
destruction of Europe's] ews in particular. Thus, when he complains that

he had not been apprised of the relevant reports at the time, there is no
alternative but to hoist him with his own petard. In fact, numerous grave reports did
arrive, and not only in the course of a few weeks; however, "they were treated with
doubt and disbelief and therefore failed to make an impact. One can only imagine how
deep the Yishuv's insensitivity must have been for even the Haganah hierarchy to
have fallen under the curse of the prophetic rebuke: "Ears have they, yet they hear
not... "17

As for the allegation of Golda Meyerson, which was transparently aimed at the
British authorities in London or Jerusalem, factually it was very short on substance.
We did not come across a single instance in which the British blocked a report about
the Holocaust from reaching the Yishuv as a whole or the World Zionist Organization
in particular. (To the contrary: a case is known in which the British Foreign Office
agreed to convey via its diplomatic mail from Geneva to London important information
about the Holocaust for a Jewish recipient, which American diplomats had refused to
transmit to New York: see below.) But even if we suppose that Mrs. Meyerson knew of
such a case, this would have no bearing on the question of the cause of and
responsibility for the suppression of the truth, and for a very simple reason:
increasing reports about the murder operations in Europe were flowing into Palestine.
The British government was not a source for these reports and could not have
prevented their dissemination even if it had wished to. The J ewish Agency, which had
a special unit to monitor foreign radio broadcasts, and which also had its own news
agency, was hardly dependent on the British government as a source of information
about the Holocaust. There were no wounds for imputing to the British responsibility
for the fact that the Jewish institutions and the press in Palestine refused to
countenance these reports and treated them as they did.

The truth is that a most unfortunate connection existed between the Yishuv's
demand that the gates of Palestine be opened to every Jew escaping from Europe, and
the attitude of the British government toward the reports about the Holocaust and,
indeed, toward the Holocaust itself The terrible consequences of this connection were

15 Davar , December 3, 1942.

16 Davar , May 7, 1943.

17 Jeremiah 5:21.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

visible in Bermuda at tine very time tinat Golda JVleyerson was addressing iner audience.
However, tin is fact bears absolutely no relevance to the explanation which the Zionist
leader adduced for the paucity of reports about the Holocaust.

On December 3 Davar carried an article which under normal social conditions
would have almost certainly generated a public furor and perhaps even brought about
a crisis and a spate of resignations among the

Zionist leadership. David Zakai, in his regular "In Brief" column, pointed to
certain peculiar circumstances and went on to ask the simple and unavoidable
questions. I n an item entitled "What H appened?", he wrote:

Now it is clew: in London everything was already known in August. A pamphlet
in English issued by a not unknown publisher which reached this country yesterday,
attests to this. All the atrocities are described by witnesses: the gas chambers and the
death trains and the systematic annihilation. Both Wedgewood and Zygelboim--the
latter is affiliated with the Polish government-wrote prefaces to the pamphlet. If so-
what happened? The head office of the World Zionist Organization is in London. How
did it happen that they did not know there? For it is inconceivable that they knew and
disregarded [the reports] and did not inform others and did not raise an outcry and did
nothing either in England or in America. How did the news get by them?

It has now been learned that the U.S. State department knew. How did it happen
that the J ewish leadership [in America] was not made privy to that knowledge? For it
is unimaginable that they learned about it and remained silent. The head of the World
Zionist Organization is in America. And Ben-Gurion was there too. How did this
remain unknown to them? What happened?

And if they had known— we would certainly have known how to rally our
strength in order to act and to help and to put a stop to it. Even now, when we here did
everything it was in our power to do the moment the news arrived, and after we sent
our outcry to the whole world and to the leaders of the world-we knew... But still and
even so, how did this remain unknown to the leaders and the heads of the nation, and
as for those who did know-how is it that they did not cry out at once and sound the
alarm? For we shall always be haunted by the thought that perhaps, had we acted
immediately then, three or four months ago, what we are doing today (today, despite
everything, there is hope that it will become known to the world, perhaps and perhaps-

What happened? How did it happen?
[Emphasis and punctuation as in the original.]

We shall not put to David Zakai the awkward question of what happened to him
and to his colleagues on Davar for over half a year, until November 23. We shall note
only that his emotional words remained as solitary orphans in the paper. There was no
followup and no response from either the paper's editors or its staff reporters. These
words of reproach, which cry out to the very heavens, were left hanging in the air,
unanswered. David Zakai himself did not repeat his plaint and the paper forgot about
it. Thus this small item remained an isolated instance of a good intention which
might have proved providential — had it been realized.

However, within less than a week an impressive reply did appear to the questions
which David Zakai had raised, and from a highly authoritative source. On December 7
Haboker ran an item under the dramatic headline: "Sensational Announcement by Y.
Gruenbaum: WeKnew About theMassacres in August But Didn't MakeThem Public. Only
After Rommel's Defeat Did Our Heans Turn to the Destruction of Polish Jewry." What
follows is the entire text of the report as published in the paper, including the
subheadlines supplied by the reporter, which undoubtedly reflect his personal
reaction to Gruenbaum's remarks:

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

I n a meeting of the supreme leaderships and the central committees of the youth
movements in Palestine, held in J erusalem under the sponsorship of the Youth
Affairs Department of the Zionist Executive, one of the speakers was Y. Gruenbaum. He
replied to the grave questions being asked of thej ewish Agency: Howdid it happen that
for months noting was done to rescue the J ews of Poland and the occupied countries
and that the J ewish Agency offices in London, New York and J erusalem were silent
while international centers already knew about the terrible fate of annihilation? Mr.
Gruenbaum said:

We Knew About It...

"We knew about it, but not the details. At a recent meeting of the Union of General
Zionists, I spoke of murder and massacre, but I did not speak about the 'Extermination
Commission,' because that fact was not known, either in London or New York. It is only
now that we learned about

this. I told about the murders at the meeting of the General Zionists. There was a
meeting in New York, to which Roosevelt sent a message, and there was a meeting in
London, to which Churchill sent a message. They promised revenge and retribution--
but this made no impression.

The L egend of J erusalem

"It took place in Europe in August and September, and in those months the
Germans were advancing on Alexandria, In Russia the Nazis advanced as far as the
Caspian Sea and threatened the Caucasian Straits in the direction of Iran. The enemy
threatened, and we were concerned not to be as sheep led to the slaughter.

"At that time I had a talk with one of the senior members of our financial
establishment. I told him: We cannot withstand the Germans. Perhaps we will not
come out alive. But what must remain is the legend of Jerusalem fighting like the
zealots who fought in times past, for it is because of them that we live. People had to be
made aware that here one must die with weapon in hand, and not extend one's throat
for slaughter. And how could we speak then about the events in Poland?

Why Did thej ewish Agency Oppose M agnes?

"We hold a pledge: our own homeland. We must preserve it in the storm and
afterward, so that we will be ready to receive masses of our brethren who will come
here. Because of this, when the /hue/ of Dr. Magnes spoke about Palestine's "absorption
capacity," we asked them. Do you think you will be able to close the gates in the face of
the diaspora? What value does Zionism have if after the war we cannot help our
suffering masses? This is an elementary matter, above and beyond all the public
calculations and doctrines. This was the first reason.

"Now for the second factor: the situation of the democracies was grave. Could we
ask them to stop theslaughter in Poland? [Emphasis here added.]

Only Now Did Our Hearts Turn To This

"The turning point in the situation came in October. Rommel was thrown back in
Egypt. Stalingrad began to be liberated and the Russians burst forward. The
Americans and the British struck in North Africa and Darlan joined the Allies. Now
the possibilities had been created to insist and demand. Now our hearts were also able
to turn to this question.

"Yesterday I met with a delegation of haverim from Poland who spoke on behalf of
the refugees from that country. They were always asking me to sound the alarm and I
would pour cold water on their requests and dampen their fervor. They said: You must
swear in the name of thej ewish Agency that there will be no peace and quiet until we
put a stop to the slaughter and rescue the surviving remnant of our brothers in the
occupied diaspora.

No, I Will Not Swear!

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

"I replied: No, I will not swear! This may be a paramount question, but it is not the
only matter that has to be dealt with. Once again I spoke about the pledge we hold and
the need to extricate ourselves from a situation of 'extraordinary people' and become a
nation like all others. * Two thousand years of exile are enough. We shall be an equal
member in the family of nations on this globe. This is our mission and we are duty-
bound to implement it."

* Yitzhak Gruenbaum was not alone who, to fulfill the precept of being
"like all the nations," insisted on regarding the destruction of European
Jewry an "ordinary" part of the tragedy of the murder of innocent people in
the war, and therefore not something to be especially emphasized. It turns out
that quite a few persons in the Yishuv expressed themselves in this vein.
'There are devotees of the supposedly 'objective' anti-chauvinism, the 'like-
all-nation' types, who know and believe that the J ewish crisis in the diaspora
at this time is not one that deserves any special mention" (Idov Cohen, "If I
Forget Thee, Diaspora," Ha' oved Hatzioni, July 27, 1942). The reader will
find this thesis applied in the Zionist institutions in New York (Ch. 9) and in
Geneva (Ch. 12).

What is most surprising is that this collection of sentences which gives the
impression of being a lackluster parody of the ostensible stand of a Zionist leader is,
according to all indications, is actually faithful to the original and authentic
statement. Gruenbaum evidently really said these things, and at all events there can
be no doubt that they reflect the essence of his position concerning the problems of the
nation, as he was subsequently to give it expression in words and deeds alike.

The reaction of the Palestine press was that Gruenbaum had spoken rashly and
had injudiciously revealed embarrassing circumstances and details. In the
Revisionist Hamashkif, B. Cohen (Binyamin Eliav) cited Gruenbaum's statement to
launch a furious tirade against the World Zionist Organization with which he led off
an article entitled "Faces."18 Moshe Shoenfeld, writing in the Agudat Israel weekly
Haderech, referred to David Zakai's article in Davar and then quoted Gruenbaum to
rest his case that in their negation of the diaspora and their stand that "Eeretz Israel is
only built on the ruins of the diaspora," the leaders of the Jewish Agency had been
remiss in their duty. 19

The confusion of the non-opposition press was manifested by Ha'ardiz in its
editorial of December 9. Without mentioning Gruenbaum by name, the paper wrote: "It
is surprising that a member of the Zionist Executive, in whose name a bizarre and
astonishing account was given to the effect that thej ewish Agency in Jerusalem knew
about the atrocities as early as August but had kept silent because the situation at El
Alamein and Stalingrad was difficult, and so forth-it is surprising that this person
has not yet seen fit to deny or issue a correction of the strange statements that were
quoted in his name."

Neither a denial nor a correction was forthcoming. Instead, the Jewish Agency
resorted to a tried and tested method which had often proved its effectiveness. The
matter was simply suppressed. The papers which had carried the report did not repeat
it (with the exceptions of Hamashkif and Haderech). Other papers, including Davar,
concealed from their readers the entire embarrassing episode. I n time, the whole thing
was forgotten.

For the present study, however, Gruenbaum's statement served as a kind of
catalyst for searching out facts and subsequent developments in a number of
directions. I n the first place, we sought to shed light on the foil owing issues:

1) When, in actual fact, did the Zionist leadership "learn about" the ongoing total
destruction of European J ewry?

18 Hamashkif . December 11, 1942.

19 Haderech . 2nd day of Hebrew month of Teveth, 5703.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

2) When it did "learn about" tinis, did it inide tine facts from tine public, and if so,
what were its reasons for doing so?

3) When Yitzhak Gruenbaum "poured cold water," as he put it, on his comrades
from Poland in order to "dampen their fervor" what, exactly, was he referring to?

The quotation marks around "learn about" are meant to dramatize the fact that
in this case the "report" in question was a purely subjective one-exclusive to the
Zionists. We do not refer to the arrival-in March 1942, as we saw-of the first reliable
reports about the mass murders. Nor do we refer to the period--beginning in J une 1942-
-in which the mass-murder issue was initially broached in the written press and on
radio broadcasts in England and America. The reference in this case is to the date on
which the Zionist leadership decided that henceforth it would bell eve the reports about
the destruction and consider them as truthful and not to be doubted. As we shall see,
this decision was related to a protracted and wearying process which was studded with
obstacles and marked by delays and equivocations across the entire spectrum of the
WZO's communications and information network. To enable an understanding of the
entire process, we made a detailed study of the processes involved in transferring
information from Geneva to J erusalem in the period of August-November 1942-the
period, that is, immediately preceding thej ewish Agency's statement on November 23.
It is the reader who will be the beneficiary of the patience that was required to read
through descriptions and documents which we collected from various archives, since
he will gain a better understanding of the events and the participants in this
melancholy but highly instructive drama.

This chain of information between Geneva and Jerusalem consisted of three
links: transmission, mediation and reception. Resident in Geneva was the official
representative of the Jewish Agency, Dr. Richard Lichtheim. Also in Geneva was the
Palestine Office headed by Dr. Schepps and Dr. Posner, as well as a HeHalutzcenter run
by Natan Schwalb. Geneva was, moreover, the location of a World Jewish Congress
mission whose chief. Dr. Gerhart Riegner, was to play a substantive role in the
incipient stages of the episode under discussion. Working with Dr. Riegner was Dr.
Abraham Silbershein, an institution in his own right, both officially ("Relico"-the
Relief Committee for J ewish War Casualties), and because of his character and
spiritual fortitude.

Sitting at the receiving end of the chain was Yitzhak Gruenbaum. Formally, the
addressee of the letters was the secretary of the Zionist Executive, Dr. A. Lauterbach.
Designated to deal with them was a

"Committee of Four" for Polish Jewry which had been appointed by the Zionist
Actions Committee shortly after the outbreak of the war. Its members were
Gruenbaum, Dr. Emil Schmorak, Moshe Shapira and Eliahu Dobkin. All the
indications are that it was Gruenbaum whose voice was the most influential and
decisive on the committee.

Due to communications problems, the letters from Geneva to J erusalem were
conveyed via the Palestine Office in Istanbul, which was headed by Halm Barlas. As
will be apparent from the content of the correspondence, Istanbul's role went beyond
the technical transmission of the letters to and from J erusalem, but consisted also of
reading and taking note of what the letters contained. This, at least, was the situation
with respect to the exchange of letters which will be described immediately.

The Geneva and Istanbul offices had one thing in common:

extremely limited authority when it came to making decisions and taking any
kind of independent action. Although both offices were headed by senior Jewish
Agency officials, neither of them was staffed by a member of the Zionist Executive or
by anyone with the power to decide and act without awaiting orders from above. Both
offices transmitted information to Jerusalem and received in return instructions
about how to proceed or not to proceed. If we are right, not a single member of the
Zionist hierarchy visited the international information center in Geneva until the end
of the war.

The episode began, just as Gruenbaum told the gathering of youth movements, in
August 1942. On August 15 a report was drawn up in Geneva concerning the situation
of the J ews in Occupied Europe in general and in Poland in particular. The report was
written in German and its author appears to have been the director of the World J ewish

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Congress office in Geneva, Dr. Gerinart Riegner. Tine following is the full text of this
crucially important document (translated from the Hebrew):

15.8.1942.

Not long ago a certain person arrived direct from Poland and gave a report about
the pogroms in Lvov and the incitement of the Polish population, that is, about the
unfriendly behavior towards the local J ews there.

Yesterday, 14.8.1942, another person (of Aryan extraction) arrived, again direct
from Poland, a well-known and very reliable person, and gave us thefollowing reports:

The ghetto in Warsaw is in the process of being liquidated. Jews, irrespective of
age and sex, are taken in groups from the ghetto, shot to death, and fat is manufactured
from the bodies and fertilizer from their bones. [Emphasis in the original]. It is said
that for this purpose, corpses are even removed from theft graves. The mass killings
are not of course being perpetrated in Warsaw itself, but in camps especially built for
the purpose. One such camp is located at Belzec. In Lvov itself about fifty thousand
J ews have been massacred in the past four weeks, and at Warsaw, according to another
report, one hundred thousand. I n the entire area east of Poland, including the occupied
areas of Russia, not a single] ew is left. On the same occasion it was also reported that
the entire non-Jewish population of Sevastopol was murdered. The slaughter of the
J ewish population in Poland is not being perpetrated all at once, in order not to attract
attention abroad. Whereas the Aryan Dutch and French deported to the East are
actually exploited for purposes of labor, the Jews who are deponed from Germany,
Belgium, Holland, France and Slovakia are candidates for murder. Since these
murders are liable to have wide repercussions in the West, the [victims] are first
deported to the East, where foreign countries have few possibilities of discovering what
goes on. Most of the Jews who were exiled to Lithuania and Lublin were already put to
death in the past weeks. This also explains the fact that correspondence with those
deported has been prohibited. A large part of those deported from Germany are at
Theresienstadt. However, this camp serves as an interim station, and a similar fate
awaits the detainees there. As soon as place becomes available following the killings,
more deportations are carried out. Frequently entire trainloads of these deportees can
be seen being transported in cattle cars. About forty people are herded into each such
car. What is especially interesting is that to help transport the candidates for death
from the Warsaw ghetto, non-J ewish Lithuanians have been recruited.

It is a tragic fact that the Polish population is being incited against the Jews by
the Germans and that the relations between the Polish population and the Jews have
deteriorated sharply. This refers particularly to the situation in Lvov. To the question
of what the relations are like with the population

of Warsaw, the reply is that no such relations are even possible because in
Warsaw no Pole ever has the opportunity to see a J ew. The J ewish population,
particularly in Lvov and in the Warsaw ghetto, lives in the single hope that a second
front will be opened [in the West] or that the war will end miraculously before the
onset of winter. TheJ ews in Poland are asking thefollowing question:

Over four million Germans live in America. Two million of them identify with
the National Socialism. Why does America not take repressive action against them? In
this connection the Jews of Poland are very bitter at and disappointed in America.
They understand that England is not taking measures for fear of the fate of its
prisoners of war. But America has nothing to fear. As for the Jewish population in
Poland, things have gone so far that it knows it has nothing more to lose.

Finally, they point out that unoccupied France has promised to hand over
thousands morej ews to the Germans. The stand of the government circles in France is,
in fact, antisemitic. But if they knew the fate that awaits the deportees, the handing
over [process] could perhaps be halted. The above-mentioned American repressive
actions could be of singularly crucial value. This concludes the report of the
'informant.'

We should now give consideration to:

1) How can the matter be thoroughly clarified to circles of the French government
so that, at least, the] ews of France can be spared from being handed over?

2) By what means can this report be conveyed to the knowledge of
American J ewry--without revealing the source of the information? It is true that coded

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

cables were sent to London,20 but only after some time elapses are these reports
publicized through radio broadcasts or by the publication of a "Black Book." Yet
American J ewry must not be kept ignorant of the true situation for a period of this
duration.

3) Since it has been determined with certainty several times that the non-Jewish
population of Poland listens to the Polish-language radio broadcasts from London, it is
essential to persuade the Polish government urgently to use these broadcasts in order
to call on the Polish people not to assist this appalling operation.

Finally, a further report: From statements made by the secretary of the Apostolic
Mission here, Monsignor Martilotti, it emerges that a report has just been received
from the Vatican concerning its intervention in behalf of Slovakian Jewry. The
Vatican dispatched to Slovakia the representative of the Slovakian government at the
Holy See in order to express to [that government] in the name of the Vatican its
displeasure at the deportation of Slovakia's Jews. The Slovakian government replied
that it did not wish the deportation to take place, but the Germans were exerting
indescribable pressure on this matter. "21

The report's contents suggest that it was written and completed on the day
following the arrival of the reliable informant. The J ewish Agency representative,
Lichtheim, dispatched it to the Zionist Executive in J erusalem and to offices in London
and New York. However, he did not do so immediately but only two weeks later, on
August 30. Lichtheim explains the reason for the delay in his covering letter and
afterwards repeats it in letters to Barlas and Gruenbaum. In his covering letter he
writes: "So terrible is the report that I had doubts about whether to forward it to you or
not." But during those two weeks reports had arrived from various sources confirming
several of the facts contained in the report. 'The truth is," Lichtheim sums up, "that I
bell eve the report to be correct and definitely consistent with Hitler's declaration that
by the end of the war no J ews will be left on the continent of Europe."

The fact that a senior J ewish Agency official decided to delay the transmission of
reports about the destruction need come as no surprise. All the indications are that
Jerusalem was not eager to receive these bothersome tidings and was quite
appreciative of service of the opposite kind. In a letter to Halm Barlas,22 Lichtheim
mentions his faithful service along these lines: "In my reports I always scrupulously
refrained from forwarding unconfirmed reports, and in some cases I issued denials of
false news agency reports." But now, at the end of August and early September 1942, he
knew with absolute certainty about the total annihilation being perpetrated in Europe
and he possessed a realiable assessment of its scope. In a letter to Dr. Nahum
Goldmann he takes issue with the latter's optimistic assessment that two to three
million J ews will remain in Europe after the war. According to Lichtheim's estimate,
no more than one to two million Jews will be left, and even this on condition that the
situation in Hungary, Romania and Italy did not worsen.

Otherwise, in his opinion, no more than half a million to one million would
survive. 23

In these circumstances Richard Lichtheim needed two weeks in order to deviate
from his usual custom and transmit the report to J erusalem without a denial, without
qualification, and indeed even with an expression of assent, albeit couched in
ambivalent terms and based on general considerations. Thus on August 30 the report
was dispatched to J erusalem via the Istanbul office.

Some three weeks later a cable dated September 23 arrived in Geneva from
Istanbul. It read as follows: "Re your report 15.8 can inform Nahum and Wise24 stop
despite all friends suggest check whether sources reliabile [reliable] since certain
details seem inconceivable. Cable."

To which Lichtheim cabled back: "No need inform Nahum and Wise they have
full information from here stop did report of August 15 with accompanying letter of

20 The cables were evidently dispatched via British diplomatic post and conveyed to the office of the World Jewish Congress in
London.

21 CZA, File L22/3.

22 Dated September 25, 1942, CZA, File L22/136.

23 Letter to Goldmann, September 9, 1942, CZA, File L22/136.

24 Dr. Nahum Goldmann and Dr. Stephen Wise, Zionist leaders in the U.S., who headed the Zionist Emergency Committee, ibid.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

August 30 only reach you now please cable stop report confirmed from various sources
details in letter. "25

I n a letter to Barlas dated September 25, Lichtheim expresses his amazement that
the report was so long in reaching Istanbul. He also confirms that all the reports on the
situation in Poland and the rest of Europe are being forwarded from Geneva directly to
London and New York. Lichtheim states further that he is cooperating with the World
Jewish Congress office in Geneva in exchanging, comparing and transmitting
information. He also hints that in addition to the normal and telegraphic means, other
possibilities are availablefor forwarding information to the appropriate institutions.

Referring to the August 15 report, Lichtheim writes that, after all, it was
confirmed by a second source which was completely different from the first source. The
second source had provided additional details which he had decided not to pass on this
time. Apparently, these new details had to do with the production of fat and fertilizer
from the corpses of the victims. I n this connection he makes a remark which he repeats
in his letter to Gruenbaum: "According to this second source, in fact there exist
somewhere in the East two factories for the purpose described in the report." Further
confirmation of the report had just been received from sources in Christian welfare
organizations and various church groups.

Finally, Lichtheim requests that a check be made as to whether this letter would
arrive within the normal time. To this end Barlas is asked to confirm receipt of the
letter by cable.

At about the same time another letter from Geneva arrived in Istanbul, one
which Barlas understood as calling into question the

information he had received from Lichtheim. Writing on September 20, Dr.
Abraham Si I bershein, who was in constant postal contact with the Palestine Office in
Istanbul with reference to their joint handing of the Jewish refugees, addressed
himself, along with various business matters, to the reports and rumors arriving from
Poland, resorting to veiled language: "For sometime we have had no information from
our friends. Rumors abound that nearly all of them have changed their places of
residence." And: "Overall, so badly has the situation deteriorated lately that we must,
unfortunately, take into account the possibility that most of our friends and
acquaintances are no longer with us. I am making efforts to obtain a more detailed and
clearer picture before taking any additional steps." One sentence in this sombre letter
was interpreted by Barlas as offering a basis for relative calm. Silbershein writes (in
German):

"Through M r. Shaliah [emissary] we have finally had a report that in the capital
two hundred souls were lacking and that M r. Grushinski [i.e., deportation] had visited
a different city."26 The figure of two hundred, which flatly contradicts everything
that has gone before, seems to have been a typing error. Given the figures which
Silbershein cited elsewhere around this time, it is probable that he meant to write "two
hundred thousand souls," or just "two hundred thousand." For Barlas, however, this
distorted sentence became the dominant element in the entire letter.

In his reply to Silbershein dated October 1, Barlas deals only with the business
aspects of the letter, and makes no reference to the information about the situation in
the ghettos. Then, after receiving Lichtheim's letter of September 25, he fires off an
emotional letter to Silbershein--in Hebrew--on October 3:

Regarding your letter of 1.10, I want to add that in the meantime I have received a
letter from M r. Lichtheim who provides horrific information about the situation in the
Warsaw ghetto, mass murders, the emptying of the city and the deportation of almost
the entire Jewish population, about crematoria of the bones of the martyrs for
industrial uses, and so forth. Even though your own letter of 20.9 is hardly cause for
rejoicing, it does not contain confirmation of these reports, which were also conveyed to
London and New York, as L. informs me. If the Shaliach speaks about two hundred
missing and M r. Gerush [deportation] visited other places, then there is something to
it. Please cable me and inform me, even if by hint, about the true situation if you can.
You could, for

25 Both cables are quoted in Lichtheim's letter of September 25, CZA, File L22/136.

26 YVA, File M20/35.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

example, cable, "Confirm my letter of 20.9" or, heaven forbid, "Confirm
Lichtheim letter," and the information will be passed on to J erusalem27 from here, so
that we will at least know how great is the catastrophe that has afflicted us.

We did not find the requested cable in the archives, nor did we find the
announcement from Istanbul confirming or denying Lichtheim's conjecture that his
letter of August 30 arrived there around the 23rd of September. However, we did find
indirect evidence concerning this conjecture, which casts doubt on its accuracy. The
file of the Rescue Committee in Jerusalem contains a copy of the report and of the
accompanying letter together with a note written by the secretary of the J ewish Agency
Executive, Dr. A. Lauterbach. The latter passes the material on for the attention of the
Executive members; the note is dated September 24. If we take into account the
probable time required for the letter to make its way from Istanbul to Jerusalem, and
add a few days for its handling in the offices of the J ewish Agency, our conclusion will
be that the delay should not be imputed to the postal service between the two non-
belligerent countries, Switzerland and Turkey. As is shown by the mailing and arrival
dates of many other letters, it is likely that the report took a week to ten days to get from
Geneva to Istanbul. As mail was regularly forwarded to Jerusalem, the letter must
have arrived at the J ewish Agency no later than about September 20. As for the two
weeks that passed between the receipt of the material in Istanbul and the sending of
the cable to Lichtheim, this is yet another instance of the same delays and the same
indolence that for two weeks held up the forwarding of the report from Geneva. As we
shall see at once, the same phenomena prevailed in the offices of the J ewish Agency in
J erusalem.

On October 6, Yitzhak Gruenbaum sent off three cables: to Stockholm, Geneva and
Istanbul. The cable to Stockholm was addressed to Rabbi Ehrenpreis and said:
"Information from Geneva reports many Jews deported to Eastern Europe also about
killing of J ews from Polish ghettos please verify stop all here await your cable."

Gruenbaum sent thefollowing cableto Lichtheim in Geneva:

"Shocked your latest report regarding Poland which despite all difficult to
believe stop haven't yet published do everything possible verify cable."

And his cable to Barlas in Istanbul: "Verify if Richard's latest report correct
cable."

Gruenbaum's attempt to verify Lichtheim through Barlas is a repeat of Barlas's
attempt to verify the same Lichtheim through Silbershein. It is not inconceivable that
the underlying the motive for both requests was Lichtheim's political affiliations. A
former Revisionist, he was at the time of these events connected with the State Party
which was close to the Revisionists. This may have led the Zionist apparatus to suspect
him (apparently without any grounds) of a tendency towards dramatization and
exaggeration. We note this possibility because it may help to account for the
astonishing development which followed-namely, that immediately following the
semi-active intervention of Silbershein, the exchange of letters with Lichtheim was
shunted aside and all but forgotten, while Silbershein, who was not even part of the
apparatus of the World Zionist Organization, but was a member of the World Union of
Poalei Zion-Z.S., was everywhere (including in the meetings of the Rescue Committee)
raised to the status of the primary source who had supposedly provided the report
about the deterioration in the situation of European Jewry. However, we shall now
return to the correspondence with Lichthei m.

To Gruenbaum's cable, Lichtheim sent the following reply on October 8: 'Yours
October 6 report of August 15 confirmed by two different sources stop verification
extremely difficult witnesses lacking for understandable reasons numbers also not
known so do not publish letter follows."

I n his letter of the same date Lichtheim repeats what he had written to Barlas two
weeks earlier and supplies additional information which confirms the original report.
A Jew living in the Aryan section of Warsaw had written (in German) to a friend in
Switzerland that "Me' a Bet" (one hundred thousand) had been invited by Mr. X (the

27 Ibid.; Barlas was about to leave for Jerusalem.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Germans) to his country house, "Kever" (grave). In another letter he said that his
uncle and "our brothers" were dead. A third letter hints that the Ort-Oze organization
in Geneva should be informed that all its activity was pointless because the great
majority of the ghetto residents in Warsaw and Lodz were no longer there.

"It is possible," Lichtheim writes, "that this person is exaggerating [sic], but we
hear the same things from other sources, particularly with regard to the large number
of Jews from Warsaw who have been murdered or sent to other places." Lichtheim
points to the stoppage of the exchange of letters and packages with the ghettos, and
recalls in particular his own letter of October 5. In it he had provided a detailed report
of the destruction of thej ews of Latvia, based on the account of one Gabriel

Zivian, who had escaped from Riga on December 18, 1941, but who had been there
on November 30 and December 8 of that year, when the Nazis had massacred the J ews
of Riga.

Lichtheim dwelt especially on the manufacture of fat and fertilizer from the
bodies of the murdered J ews. As was noted above, he repeats the report that two
facilities for this purpose exist somewhere in the East. He stresses that it is impossible
to verify this report at the site; the operation is known only to the 55 men who run it
and to a small number of workers who are actually engaged in the task, apparently
prisoners of war or other slaves. The SS men will certainly not reveal the secret, and
the workers will be murdered before they get an opportunity to tell anyone. The only
feasible testimony would be that of German officers who were stationed in the East and
who saw something or were told something by persons involved in the operation.
Lichtheim adds that the report was confirmed by a military source of this kind who
possessed reliable information.

In the concluding section of his letter, Lichtheim writes that he had long since
foreseen this development. Indeed, he had warned "our friends" in London and New
York and had put forward various proposals, "but I always knew that nothing we or
anyone else would do or say could stop Hitler." Therefore, he was again making the
same suggestion he had made in the past: to try to rescue the Jews in the semi-
independent states of Romania, Hungary, Italy and Bulgaria. To this end he has for
some months been seeking the intercession of the Papal Nuncio in Berne with respect
to theJ ews of Slovakia.

Lichtheim concludes: "We must face the fact that the great majority of the Jewish
communities in Hitler-occupied Europe are doomed. There is no force which can stop
Hitler and his SS men, who are today the absolute rulers of Germany and the occupied
countries."

This marked the end of the correspondence between Geneva, Istanbul and
Jerusalem regarding the August 15 report. It is noteworthy that the strange delays
which manifested themselves in Geneva and Istanbul were replicated in the Jewish
Agency's J erusalem offices. Gruenbaum was "shocked" by the report, but for him this
was a process which took no less than two weeks. After the report was conveyed on
September 24 by the secretary of the J ewish Agency to the members of the Executive,
the three urgent cables were dispatched--on October 6. This may have been due to
technical office reasons. Perhaps several days went by before the report reached the
fileof the Committee for Polish J ewry; another few days until the committee members
got around to reading it; and then more time until the committee convened and decided
what action

to take. The only problem is that this technical explanation is the most
unnatural and perplexing of all. It was to be expected that the secretary of the J ewish
Agency Executive or his assistant, or any other official who chanced to open the
envelope containing the report on September 20 or 21, and then went ahead and read it,
would leap from his place and run in great agitation to the rooms of the Executive
members with the dreadful news. And that the Executive would convene in urgent
session to discuss what action to take.

It emerges that the Zionist leadership and their staff were immune to agitation
and office disorder. After all, the subject was not a new one. And it was a well "known"
fact that similar alarms during the past half-year had been proved to be baseless.
Order must be maintained.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

The matter came up for discussion by tine J ewisin Agency Executive on October
25.28 At tinat meeting Yitzlnal< Gruenbaum told \r\\s colleagues that "all kinds of
rumors are coming in about the murder of J ews by the Nazis. He had cabled to several
places, and all the replies were the same: that the J ews were sent to do forced labor and
then disappeared." He had requested the members of the World Jewish Congress who
were in Palestine to approach the WJ C leadership and the Committee of Community
Emissaries about issuing a manifesto to the democratic nations "not to remain silent
about the murder of the Jews... He would be very pleased if the World Zionist
Organization were to send a cable along these lines. But at this stage he saw no need to
approach the WZO. The [World] J ewish Congress would suffice."

The Jewish Agency Executive was quite cool to this proposal. Moshe Shapira
thought "that all the rumors contained a modicum of well known exaggeration."
MosheShertok expressed doubt about the efficacy of the proposed action. "Jerusalem is
not a source of reports. These reports--and perhaps more than this--reach London and
the United States. It is also odd to propose to the governments of England and the
United States to come out against the Nazis. After all, these governments are already
in a state of war with the Germans."

Finally, the proposal was approved but its operating budget was slashed.
Gruenbaum had requested 100 Palestine pounds to defray the cost of sending cables,
but Eliezer Kaplan would agree to no more than 50. Gruenbaum accepted the decision.

Anshel Reis, who took part in the operation, relates: "So shocking was the cable
[i.e., the report] that the public functionaries in Palestine doubted its veracity and did
not want to publish it. Finally the committee attached to the J ewish Agency agreed
that the report would be sent abroad

together with a manifesto urging protests against the murderers and a campaign
of assistance and rescue. Cables were then sent to Jewish organizations in Europe,
America, Africa, etc. "29

I n other words, in their infinite wisdom these officials decided that the report was
not sufficiently trustworthy to be made known to the Yishuv, but that it was truthful
and reliable enough for J ewish organizations abroad to be apprised of it. And while in
Palestine the line of suppression of and disbelief in the "atrocity propaganda"
continued, thej ews of Europe, America and Africa were being urged to raise a hue and
cry on the basis of the same reports which were being rejected out of hand by the press
and the establishment in Palestine. As for the question of whether J ews were really
being mass-murdered, well, perhaps they were being killed and perhaps not...

At the end of October or the beginning of November 1942, a document arrived in
Palestine which attracted considerable attention and soon overshadowed the
Lichtheim report. This was a circular of October 8 sent by Dr. Abraham Silbershein.
Written in Yiddish, the missive opened with the words, "My Very Dear Sir," and
employed a personal style. It was received by Yitzhak Gruenbaum and other officials,
and was also apparently sent to several other institutions. Circular No. 5 of October 8
was devoted to the mass murders in Poland. The following is the passage dealing
principally with the Warsaw ghetto:

No letters at all from the Warsaw ghetto are received here. The ghetto is evidently
closed and sealed off, like the Lodz ghetto. This fact is causing the spread of terrible
rumors which are more frightening than anything a human being can imagine.
Thus, for example, it is said that in Warsaw alone one hundred thousand J ews have
been murdered. According to another rumor the number of victims stands at two
hundred thousand: and not long afterward there is already talk of half a million.
There are also reports about many transports of Warsaw's Jews, who were put to death
with poison gas; about the exploitation of the bodies of the dead for the manufacture of
various fats, and first and foremost, soap; about the use of the bones to produce

28 Minutes of a meeting of the Jewisli Agency Executive on October 25, 1942; the remarks of the speakers were recorded in the
third person.

29 A. Reiss, Chapters from the Aid and Relief Operations, Studies of the Holocaust and the Revolt (Hebrew), Lohamei Hagettaot,
Vol. 11, pp. 23-24. We believe that Reiss is mistaken in speaking about a cable from Silbershein, rather than the Lichtheim report,
as the initial Zionist source regarding the mass killings. We found no trace of such a cable, and at the Jewish Agency Executive
meeting only the Lichtheim report was referred to.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

artificial fertilizers, and that for this purpose they used not only fresh corpses but
removed the bones of many of the dead from cemeteries.

All these reports are based on one, common source, and were transmitted by the
Polish legation in Bern. The Reuters news agency also disseminated them. We did not
immediately publisti tiiese reports because tiieir details were not confirmed by a second
source and because we did not consider the source we mentioned to be sufficiently
serious. We wished to wait until more detailed information arrived. Only lately have
reports begun to come in, but not directly from the Warsaw ghetto. Much can be
gleaned from them. It can be said with certainty that extremely sinister events are
taking place and that a campaign of destruction against J udaism has begun.

It seems certain that at least one hundred thousand Jews have already been
deported from Warsaw in an unknown direction and that few of them remain alive due
to the attendant agonies. A like number may have perished of diseases, starvation and
the terror of deportation, and a few thousand may have been shot on the spot.
[Emphases added.]

Silbershein goes on to provide a series of reports about Lvov (expressly the women
and children are being deported from there--a sign that they are taken to their death),
Vilna (ten thousand J ews remain), and about Przemysl, Rzeszow and Tarnopol (all the
J ews had been deported). He also reiterated what Lichtheim's report had said about the
hostile attitude of the Poles.

The sentence in italics confirms the error of all those who thought that the initial
report (from the Zionist camp) about the mass murders had come from Silbershein and
not Lichtheim. Yet the very fact that this mistake was so widespread shows how
powerfully Silbershein's circular gripped the interest of the circles dealing with the
topic. The Central Committee of the World Union of Poalei Zion-Z.S. gave it wide
publication in its Bulletin dated November 20 ("from a survey by our comrade A.S.
Magnef). It was also published by Davar after November 23 in the form of a letter dated
October 8 and signed Haver (issue of November 27). The most intense reaction came
from the representatives of Polish J ewry in Tel Aviv. In the month between November
6 and December 7, their organization cabled Silbershein no less than five times,
requesting information and confirmation of reports which had appeared in the
Palestine press (including also the information contained in the Jewish Agency
announcement) .30 The correspondence between J erusalem and

Lichtheim about the credibility of the August 15 report was not renewed.

There is no dearth of reasons to account for the "success" of the Silbershein
circular as compared with the Lichtheim report. The political party factor which we
indicated earlier would seem to be confirmed by the publication of the circular by the
Central Committee of Poalei Zion and by the intense interest evinced in the document
by the representatives of Polish Jewry, whose leadership included members of
Silbershein's party. Another probable reason has to do with Silbershein's style of
writing: being of Polish extraction himself, his style was more detailed and more
readily accessible to persons acquainted with the country which was the scene of the
mass murders. Notwithstanding its sombre contents, the style in which the circular
was couched--in particular the author's manifest hesitancies--left an opening for
doubts and hence for hope; thus the circular was more readily ingested by readers than
was the decisive tone of Lichtheim's report. It is also quite likely that the circular
created the impression it did because it arrived after the initial report had shattered
the prevailing complacency and prepared the ground for its reception.

In addition to these conjectures, another factor also seems to have played a far
from negligible role. We refer once more to the sentence in the circular which we
italicized, this time to its last part. It emerges that the fact that Dr. Silbershein had
initially rejected the reports because they originated with the Polish legation, was
quite consistent with the frame of mind in the circles close to Yitzhak Gruenbaum.
And the fact that the very convincing nature of the evidence had forced Silbershein to
overcome his distrust of the Polish source, inevitably had a great impact on the
officials of thej ewish Agency in J erusalem.

30 An illuminating detail: in a cable dated November 23 the representation of Polish Jewry requested from Silbershein, among
other things, confirmation of a "fresh" report that six thousand Jews were being sent every day from Warsaw "to an unknown
destination." The reader will undoubtedly recall that this report had reached Palestine and appeared in several papers on July 28.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

When, following the arrival of the refugees, the Jewish Agency officials came to
prepare the statement which was eventually published on November 23, they had at
their disposal two additional sources of information: Lichtheim's report and
Silbershein's circular. We examined above what the statement contained and what it
omitted from the testimony of the refugees. It is not difficult to ascertain which
sections of the two documents which had arrived from Geneva were made use of Put
simply, it can be said that nothing was made use of, neither from the facts and the
assessments, nor from the reports and the rumors. The Warsaw ghetto was not
undergoing a process of annihilation, as the report stated, and two hundred thousand
Jews had not perished, according to Silbershein's "moderate" estimate. Nothing is
mentioned about the fact that expressly women and children had been deported from
Lvov, or about

the implications of this development, as spelled out in the circular. And there is
not a word about the fact that no Jews at all remained in certain cities and districts--
as both of the Geneva documents had noted. There is nothing about murder by gas, as
related by Silbershein, and nothing about the manufacture of soap and so forth, as was
emphasized in the report and reiterated in the circular.

This characteristic mode of refusing to trust anyone, not even within the WZO
itself, and of deciding everything through direct impression and solitary judgment, is
something we shall encounter again among the Rescue Committee headed by Yitzhak
Gruenbaum, and particularly in Gruenbaum himself Now, however, we shall
examine a serious manifestation of the "do it yourself syndrome which occurred not in
J erusalem but in Geneva. Although the episode is directly related to the nature of the
August 15 report, it also provides compelling evidence of the existence of a unique
Zionist perception of the Holocaust. Here we shall have to dwell on one of the most
melancholy episodes in the annals of the Zionist movement during the Second World
War, an episode whose settings were Washington and New York.

The role which was designated for the Lichtheim report (or, as we have already
conjectured, the Riegner- Lichtheim report) extended far beyond its being brought to
the notice of senior J ewish Agency officials in Jerusalem. As the report itself said, its
authors intended to bring it to the urgent attention of American Jewry. Further, the
report constituted a major part of the effort to convince the United States government
with all urgency that the Germans were engaged in executing an explicit order issued
by Hitler: to destroy forthwith all the J ews in Europe. Arthur Morse's study31 shows
how the events unfolded.

On August 1, 1942, Gerhart Riegner, director of the World Jewish Congress office
in Geneva, learned from a German industrialist that Hitler had issued an order for the
immediate extermination of all the Jews in Europe. After verifying the report and
being convinced of the informant's credibility, Riegner on August 8 contacted the local
U.S. consulate, requesting that the report be transmitted via American diplomatic
channels to the president of the American Jewish Congress in New York, Rabbi
Stephen S. Wise. The request was only half-fulfilled: the cable was sent to the State
Department in Washington, but officials there kept it from Rabbi Wise because its
contents were deemed to be unbelievable.32

On August 17 the State Department cabled the U.S. embassy in Switzerland that
Riegner's message had not been conveyed to Wise "in view of the apparently
unsubstantiated nature of the information."

However, on that same day the London branch of the WJ C received a copy of the
message from the British Foreign Office which, unlike the Americans, did not block its
transmission. 33 From London the Riegner cable was forwarded to New York by Sydney
Silverman of the British branch of the WJ C via the British War Office, and it reached
Rabbi Wise on August 28. On September 3 the secretary of the WJ C, Dr. A rye

31 Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Died A thoroughly researched study by Walter Laqueur and Richard Breitman— Breaking
the Silence , 1986— revealed that the German industrialist mentioned by Riegner was Eduard Schulte.

32 Morse, pp. 3, 7, 9.

33 Ibid., p. 12.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Tartakower, wrote Silbershein from New York: "Please inform Riegner that his long
cable was received and the necessary measures taken. "34

Those measures were: Rabbi Wise contacted U.S. Undersecretary of State Sumner
Welles and showed him the message from Riegner. Welles appealed to Wise not to make
the report public until the U.S. Government could confirm it; the Zionist leader
acceded to the request.35

Rabbi Wise received the cable despite the opposition of the State Department. He
was not beholden to the State Department for anything, either legally or morally. The
undersecretary of state had no authority to prevent Wise from publishing the cable,
nor could he interfere with an attempt to apprise the public of its contents. Wise's
assent, then, was given of his own volition and with his full responsibility--and that of
the Zionist emergency committee. Even as Washington was instructing its
representative to the Vatican to inquire whether the Pope knew anything about the
"fantastic" order, the Zionist leadership in America decided to conceal the terrible
news from American Jewry, the American people, and indeed from the entire world.
This it did for three months, until in November Undersecretary of State Welles called
in Rabbi Wise and released him from his unfortunate commitment. 36

In the meantime, Geneva was collecting evidence that Hitler's order was in fact
being implemented by the Germans. Lichtheim and Riegner worked together on this
project,37 and they were able to convey to the U.S. legation evidence which they had
obtained. "One of the most dramatic [pieces of evidence]," Arthur Morse writes, "was
[the report] of two non-Jewish escapees, one from Poland, who arrived in Geneva with
details of the German liquidation of the Warsaw ghetto, the death of fifty thousand
Jews of Lvov, and the German utilization of Jewish corpses for the manufacture of
fertilizer. "38 The reader will undoubtedly recall Lichtheim's report of August 15.

If the August 15 report was truly the principal element in the verification efforts
of Riegner- Lichtheim, it is very doubtful whether the material they collected would
have proved capable of breaching the wall of American skepticism. The reports about
Warsaw and Lvov were undoubtedly correct. But it was the addenda which were meant
to render

the report more "dramatic" and lend it credence, that assured its failure in this
regard. Above all, it was the central and most accentuated element in the report: the
section referring to the manufacture of soap and fertilizers from the bodies of the
victims.

If the Vatican acceded to the U.S. request and queried its emissaries and its
agents in Poland as to what they knew about this subject, they certainly received a
reply to the effect that Poland was rife with rumors about the use of J ewish corpses to
make soap. J ews and Poles alike talked about this. Among both groups the rumors had
given rise to a macabre folklore. The Poles took advantage of the rumors to curse, vilify
and tease the J ews; among the J ews the subject produced desperate expressions and
bitter humor. In one locale it was said that the Germans demanded "soap fees" for
transporting the Jews to the killing sites. Elsewhere family members and friends
would wish one another: "Here's hoping we meet in the same piece of soap." This kind of
talk certainly abounded.

Still, it is most improbable that the Pope's agents would have been able to point to
even one solid fact which could authenticate the plethora of rumors. The reason,
simply, is that they could not have discovered what has not yet been discovered in the
course of the numerous judicial investigations against Nazi war criminals or by
historical studies of the Holocaust, If we are not mistaken, throughout all the decades
of intense focus on the Holocaust at both of these levels, the judicial and the historical,
not a single facility, not one site, has yet been pinpointed about which it could be said
with certainty that soap was manufactured there from human bodies; nor have we
ever heard of a German being charged with this crime. Cases are known of the use of
corpses of murdered victims to manufacture skeletons, of brutal mass experiments
performed on living and dead prisoners, of the making of a lampshade from human
skin, and of other abhorrent and perverse acts. It is possible that there were isolated

34 YVA, File M20/32.

35 Morse, p. 10.

36 lbid.,p. 23.

37 Ibid., pp. 17, 18,20.

38 Ibid., p. 12.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

attempts to manufacture soap from corpses. But to date nothing has come to light
about the continuous mass production of soap or fertilizer using such methods. 39

Persons who were close to the events were able already then to distinguish
between rumor and fact. From Istanbul, Halm Berlas reports that he has been in touch
with the Polish ambassador there, and that "the report about the exploitation of the
bodies to manufacture fat seems to him unlikely. "40 The search for "two factories for
the manufacture of soap" proved fruitless, and this "dramatic" element inevitably led
to the veracity of both the report and the informants being called into question.

And if all this were not enough, the report also contained another item,
apparently inserted to make the document more palatable. This was the incidental
"fact" that the entire non-Jewish population of Sevastopol had been murdered by the
Germans. On this matter, the State Department did not need the help of the Pope. The
Allies' intelligence-gathering services could undoubtedly ascertain that this was a
baseless rumor. So the Sevastopol item, too, could hardly add credence or credibility to
the document and its authors.

These hitches were the result of misjudgments and unfamiliarity with the
subject at hand. Naturally, one can maintain that it is easier to be critical with a few
decades of hindsight than it was to avoid such errors during the difficult period itself,
when urgency and the rush of events were often bad counselors. However, the problem
goes beyond this. In fact, the independent activity of Riegner, Lichtheim and their
assistants which was designed to collect supporting evidence for the report about
Hitler's order was not only amateurish and rash but, in a word, superfluous. For
plentiful material existed, material that was substantive and credible, concrete and
detailed. This material took the form of the information which flowed incessantly to
the Polish government in London and to Shmuel Zygelboim from a network of
experienced and expert informants throughout Poland and from reliable Jewish
institutions. These reports had been publicized far and wide for months in a
responsible and authoritative manner-and had been rejected by the Zionist
organizations just as they were rejected by the Palestine press. Now that the officials
in Geneva had received a report, which they trusted, concerning an order for the total
destruction of the Jews, logic dictated that they do what they themselves were urging
State Department officials to do. They should have gone back to the information which
they had previously spurned, extracted from it evidence aplenty, and served it up to
the Americans as incontrovertible authentication of the report about Hitler's order.

The refusal of the Geneva offices to accept the information supplied by the Polish
government and by Zygelboim admits of several possible explanations, both personal
and social. The officials involved may have felt uncomfortable making use of
information which they had just recently rejected and denounced as false. They may
have harbored unfriendly sentiments towards the Polish government, or perhaps
party rivalries were at work v/s-a-v/s the Bundist Zygelboim.41 It is possible that they
were mistaken in their assessment concerning the possibility of obtaining urgently
trustworthy information from reliable sources. Or it may have been an accidental
combination of these or other circumstances.

Actually, however, more than an "accidental" set of circumstances was at work;
the entire episode signified and symbolized the existence of a far more entrenched
mind-set. Ever since it "recognized" the events in Europe as entailing the total
annihilation of European J ewry, from the initial appearances of its representatives in
Geneva until the end of the war and afterward, Zionism had been training its sights on
a Holocaust of its own, one which was not identical with that perceived by non-
Zionists. The principal dangers discerned by the two sides were not identical; the major
manifestations of the Holocaust were different; and so were the possibilities of rescue,
the modes of rescue, and, not least, the goals of rescue.

The damage wrought by the amateur behavior of the Zionist representatives in
Geneva i n the case of getti ng thei r story across to the State Department was serious and

39 In 1945 a facility was discovered in Gdansk which led to the conjecture that soap or other materials were manufactured there
from the bodies of the women prisoners at the Stutthoff camp (see From the Holocaust 3-4: The Extermination Camps in Poland ,
p. 267). However, this conjecture evidently proved false, and we know of no further investigation of this subject. Hilberg. who
mentions the incident in his book, nevertheless believes that the Germans did not engage in the manufacture of soap (p. 624).

40 CZA. File S26/1 161.

41 With good intentions, in order to spur his colleagues to take up the work of rescue, Rabbi Sheinfeld declared at a meeting of
the Zionist Actions Committee: "1 do not want Zygielboim from the Bund to be the rescuer— let the Aguda people be the rescuers"
(minutes of the meeting on January 18. 1943).

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

fraught with harmful consequences. Yet it appears almost inconsequential when
pitted against the harm--and the victims-caused to European Jewry until the end of
the war by the unique perception harbored by the Zionist movement.

How did the Jewish public in Palestine react to the announcement of November
23? It stands to reason that after months of being immunized and desensitized vis-a-
vis "atrocity propaganda," the J ewish Agency statement was received with a large
measure of inner recoil and mistrust. Even if the implication of the statement was
absorbed, the hope certainly prevailed that this was surely another instance of
exaggeration. People went to protest rallies, took part in strikes and demonstrations.
I nwardly, though, they were not convinced that the situation was as serious was being
suggested. A kind of quasi-concern was generated, a muted shock, a reaction lacking in
psychological integrity and devoid of sincerity. The result was depicted, with overtones
of anger and vexation, by "Shin" (Shabtal Don Yihyie) in f-iarzofeti:

A black frame in the paper. Horrendous numbers of the murdered. Dreary
chronicles. J ews read, sigh, and go about their usual business. In the city I did not see
the effects of the news which is coming in from the European diaspora. The speaker
who bemoaned the situation in the meeting of journalists was right: he thought that
J ews would close their shops of their own initiative, without being ordered to do so, that
masses would stream into the synagogues and pour out their distress to our Father in
Heaven. That the two hundred

thousand Jews of Tel Aviv would gather in the streets, remove the Torah scrolls
from their arks, tear their clothing, sit themselves on the sidewalks and send forth a
heaven- and earth-shaking lament at the destruction of our people.

We did not do this. We did not respond with a primal, natural reaction to the
slaughter of tens of thousands of J ews:

the shopkeeper went to his shop, the worker to his factory, the teacher to his
classroom, the speculator to the black market, and the idlers to the coffee houses and
places of entertainment. The love of Israel has been diminished. Those with family in
the countries of the slaughter emit a groan from time to time, while the ostensibly
happy people whose families saved themselves in the lands of tranquility, are
indifferent to the greatest calamity in our history.

What is the explanation for this criminal complacency?42

Yet even as the outraged journalist was castigating his readers for having been
influenced by his own and his colleagues' deeds during the previous half year, it is
noteworthy that even after November 23 the "optimistic" and heartening hints and
signs did not disappear from the press altogether. Quantitatively, they were as a drop
in a sea of dreadful news items. But in a public which had grown accustomed to
untrustworthy exercises of the kind depicted above, there must have been quite a few
who were ready to interpret sign as substance. Thus, for example, Davar, in its edition
of November 30, 1942, carried on its front page a photograph captioned, 'The J ewish
police in the city of K. in Poland." The photograph showed a German officer reviewing
lines of Jewish policemen. This prima fade evidence of Jewish-German collaboration
which was almost certainly photographed and disseminated by the Germans
themselves, found its way into the paper at the very height of the period of
"awakening," when the public was being called on to rend its clothing and sit on the
sidewalks chanting dirges. Four months later, on March 23, 1943, Davar was
reprimanded by Yosef Gravitzky, the managing editor of the J ewish Agency's Palcor
news agency, for copying from a Nazi paper, Ostland, a "report" that two million Jews
remained in Poland, after the paper had reported one day earlier on the same page that
no more than two hundred thousand Jews were still alive in all of Poland. 'The
Germans' objective is clear," Gravitzky wrote. 'They themselves announce the
liquidation of the Warsaw ghetto but at the same time circulate reports that

42 Hatzofeh, November 26, 1942.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

two million J ews are Still alive in Poland. But why should we assist them in this
work?"43

The distrust and confusion that prevailed in the Yishuv regarding reports about
the Holocaust almost until after the war had ended, is well illustrated by an item
published in Ha'aretz on J une 4, 1944. A resident of Bendin, who had arrived four
months earlier, "also encountered the question, which revolts him, about whether the
reports concerning the events in Poland are exaggerated." Certainly the man was right
when he maintained that "it was because of lack of knowledge that few escaped."

On December 27, 1942, the Yishuv was informed that the mass destruction of
Polish J ewry had ceased. This news was contained in a statement issued on behalf of
the Rescue Committee by Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, chairman of the National Council. The
whole statement was couched in a tone of concern and alarm. It spoke about mass
murders at Belzec and Treblinka. It expressed apprehension that half of Polish Jewry
had already been annihilated. Moreover, the report that the destruction had been
stopped was accompanied by a warning that this cessation was, according to all the
signs, temporary, and that preparations were underway for the perpetration of a
renewed butchery which was liable to begin within a few weeks or months. At the same
time, it was stated explicitly that the mass destruction had been halted. 44

What was the origin of this report? Did J ewish Agency emissaries traverse the
length and breadth of Poland, visiting its cities and villages, its ghettos and
concentration camps, and discover that the mass murders had stopped? Or was the
report received from agents of the Polish government or the J ewish organizations on
the scene? Naturally, neither the one nor the other. Contact with Poland was extremely
limited, if it existed at all. The informants of the Polish government and of the J ewish
organizations in Poland certainly did not pass on such patently incorrect information.
What happened was that the Rescue Committee had the good fortune to receive from
the offices in Istanbul and Geneva copies of a certain Nazi document--and from it they
gleaned what they wished to glean.

The editions of the "Official Gazette" of the General Government in Occupied
Poland in Cracow from November 1-10, 1942, published the names of 53 (according to
Gruenbaum, 55^ places which were designated for J ewish residence. A date was set for
concentrating the Jews in these places and for the uprooting of their non-Jewish
residents. The orders said nothing either about the destruction or about its cessation.
However, the interpretation of the J ewish Agency was that so long as the concentration
process went on, no destruction would be carried out It was decided to

inform the public of this development, citing the key details. It was especially
noted "that the German orders even allow every J ew to choose which of the 53 locales he
wishes to live in, the condition being that he will not be able to change his mind
afterward. "45

Yitzhak Ben-Zvi was right in noting that according to past experience, the
concentration of Jews was a prelude to theft annihilation. Yet that same experience
taught that the very process of concentration itself was accompanied by massacres
among those being transported. Moreover, the sole reference in the Nazi paper was to
the "General Government." Nothing was said about Latvia or Lithuania, or about the
eastern districts, or about the cities that had been annexed to the Reich (Lodz,
Bialystok, etc.) Not a word was said about the fate of thej ews who were being sent from
the countries of the West to the destruction centers in Poland. But most crucial: since
when did public Nazi orders serve as a basis for allaying fears?

It is difficult to say what impact this wretched statement had on public opinion
in the Yishuv. Perhaps not very much. Given the atmosphere of bewilderment and
confusion that prevailed among the public, it is possible that one more twist in the
J ewish Agency's information policy passed without much notice. Especially since the
calming statement was, as we said, formulated in a pessimistic style and accompanied
by a warning that the murders were liable to be resumed.

What is certain is that the matter of the 53 ghettos had a considerable impact on
the Zionist hierarchy in Jerusalem, in terms of information and action alike. At a
meeting of the Zionist Executive Committee on January IS, 1943, Yitzhak Gruenbaum
made this report the center of the informative section of his remarks, and spoke about
the cessation of the destruction without so much as a hint of qualification. "It seems

43 CZA, File S26/1200.

44 Davar , December 27, 1942.

45 Hatzofeh, December 28, 1942.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

that the general and systematic slaughter was halted at the end of October. No day
passes without the murder of a J ew, but the mass slaughter has stopped. Apparently
the Extermination Commissions (Vernichtungskommissionen), as the J ews called
them, have completed their operations and are no longer moving from city to city and
are no longer selecting thej ews to be destroyed and deported. "46

Gruenbaum went on to address the issue of the order concerning the J ewish
concentration sites. Expressing concern about the uprooting of non-Jews from theft
places of residence, he asked those present to imagine "what kind of feeling this will
arouse in the hearts of the Poles and the Ukrainians who will be forced to leave theft
homes for the J ews." Gruenbaum added that he did not know whether the Poles and
Ukrainians

would be removed with the help of the police or would leave of their own volition.
He concluded, in reference to this aspect of the matter, by expressing the fear that the
concentration process would be accompanied by acts of atrocity.

In the course of his remarks, Gruenbaum revealed, in passing one highly
significant fact: "We do not know what happened in Poland in November and
December. There are no reports from Istanbul and no reports from Geneva. The last
reports are from October." What happened next was quite interesting. Present in the
board room of the Zionist Executive Committee was the entire Palestine leadership of
the Zionist movement. Nearly all of the dozen or so participants in the debate were
highly critical of Gruenbaum's remarks and of the commissions and omissions of the
Rescue Committee. Yet not one of the speakers or any of those present asked
Gruenbaum the simple and unavoidable question:

"Si nee you have no contact with Poland and you have no idea what has happened
there in the past two months, how in heaven's name do you have the audacity to inform
us, on the basis of a public Nazi document, that the mass destruction has been halted?
And what led the Rescue Committee to assume responsibility for making public the
same notion in theform of a supposedly authoritative and unassailable report?"

Present were quite a number of clear minds, possessing judiciousness,
perceptiveness and analytical ability; it is not because of the absence of these qualities
that the requisite question was not forthcoming. Our study indicates that the answer is
to be sought in two areas, one relatively unimportant but the other extremely
meaningful and highly consequential.

The less important factor was that, consciously or unconsciously, those present
treated the German document with surpassing respect. Emulating Gruenbaum and
his aides, they did not think to cast doubt on what the official German paper spelled out
explicitly and precisely. If it was stated that the J ews would be concentrated in fifty or
so ghettos, then naturally this is just what would occur. It was inconceivable that they
would publish statements cut out of whole cloth...

This is not the first time we have come across this element of respect for the
German word. We saw it in the items carried by Davar from March 1942 until
November 23, 1942. I n this instance it seems to us to bear relatively minor importance.
We are ready to suppose that among the leaders and the functionaries present at the
meeting were also some who were not blind believers in German trustworthiness.
Besides, inordinate esteem for German precision does not explain why not a single

oneof those present failed to notice that Gruenbaum had expanded the area of the
conjectured cessation of the destruction to encompass the entire Vale of Slaughter,
whereas the Cracow report referred solely to the General Government in Poland.

The second and more important factor has to do with the personal attitude of the
members of the Zionist hierarchy toward information concerning the Holocaust. For
the sake of clarity, we shall divide this topic into two separate subsections:

1) During the period under discussion--theend of 1942 and the beginning of 1943-
-there was not a single Zionist leader who knew for certain what was happening in the
countries of the H olocaust.

2) In this period, and afterward as well, not one of these leaders attached any
great importance to ensuring that the leadership receive detailed and up-to-date
information on the events.

This is not to say that the Zionist leaders evinced no interest in what was going
on, or were indifferent to the unfolding tragedy. To the contrary: they were full of grief

46 Minutes of the meeting, CZA, File S25/1851.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

at the calamity. They interested themselves in the reports which arrived from
Occupied Europe, and many of them actively sought more and more information.
Assistance and rescue were the order of the day--to which end a Rescue Committee had
been established. The committee members are in possession of the required details,
just as every person is familiar with the details relevant to his own area of activity.
And if, let us say, their information proves unreliable at times-well, who would
expect otherwise under conditions such as these? This is no reason to complain and to
hamper them further in their already difficult work...

At the end of this chapter we shall return to our two postulates and attempt to
demonstrate their accuracy by grounding them in facts and in the activity of certain
persons. In the meantime, these two postulates would appear to offer a full and
complete explanation for the abundantly forgiving attitude with which the members
of the Zionist Executive Committee viewed the credulous statement of the Rescue
Committee.

At a meeting of the Zionist Executive Committee on February 2, 1943, which was
devoted to a discussion of the WZO budget, Gruenbaum spoke briefly about the
Holocaust and again mentioned the 55 concentration sites.47 Ten days later, at a
meeting of the Rescue Committee on February 12, the imaginary cessation of the
destruction campaign was finally acknowledged for what it was. This followed the
arrival in Palestine of several women from Poland who reported on what they knew. In
the wake of their testimony, Gruenbaum stated: "It now

seems likely that the liquidation of these two ghettos [Radomsko and Sosnowiec]
means that the Germans have begun to root out Jews in the 55 places in which Jews
were permitted to reside under the order of November 15, 1942. "48 Another ten days
would pass before the head of the Rescue Committee would sum up the "cessation"
issue at a session of AseFar HaNivharim (the 'parliament' of the Yishuv). It was now
clear that "the stoppage lasted no more than two or three months, and came to an end
in mid-January." In that same speech Gruenbaum announced with absolute
certainty, citing "trustworthy witnesses," that the Warsaw ghetto had been liquidated.
"Theforty thousand J ews who remained there following the large-scale killing of last
August, September and October [emphasis added] have been deponed to an unknown
location... Warsaw is now J udenrein... The streets of Warsaw, even those where Jews
once thronged, are empty, barren, no J ew is seen there any longer. "49

That the women refugees provided incorrect information about Warsaw, is
hardly surprising. There was no contact between the ghettos in Poland, and their
residents fed on rumors which were not always accurate. That Gruenbaum placed too
much trust in the personal impressions of these refugees and preferred to believe their
testimony above the reliable information which was constantly coming in from
Poland and London-this is consistent with the pattern we have already seen. What is
surprising, nevertheless, is that Gruenbaum specified the months of August,
September and October, 1942, as a period of 'large-scale killing' in Warsaw. What this
demonstrates is that as late as February 1943, the head of the Rescue Committee in
Jerusalem had not yet absorbed and digested the main facts concerning the "Big
Action" in Warsaw which, it is commonly agreed, was the single most tragic event in
the series of afflictions which befell the nation. As we have seen (in Ch. II) this
operation began on J uly 22 and was completed on September 12. Stretching things, we
may perhaps say that it extended into the final two weeks of September as well. But
under no circumstances could it be said to have lasted into October, which was a month
of relative quiet after the vast slaughter. Gruenbaum's faulty expertise about this
episode shows that even after November 23 he did not take the trouble to get a thorough
grasp of the subject for which he bore responsibility in the Yishuv.

As for the halt in the destruction--there was no such respite: not of three months,
not of two months, and not of any other period. For a few weeks in October and early
November there was, it is true, a slowdown in the pace of the destruction in the small
towns due to weather conditions at this time of the year and the resultant poor
condition of the roads. This,

however, was totally unrelated to the concentration orders. During this
"slowdown" 16,000 J ews of Pi nsk were murdered; several thousand Lvov J ews were put

47CZA,FileS26/1852.

48 CZA, File S26/1240.

49 Destruction and Holocaust , pp. 71-72.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

to death in an operation which commenced on November IS; and on November 25, the
J ews of Bergen, in Norway, were sent to Auschwitz. During and after this period, mass
murders of J ews were perpetrated in Lublin, Piotrl<ow, Rzeszow, Przemysl, and among
the remnants of thej ewish population of the cities and towns of Eastern Galicia.50 The
J erusalem-based invention about the stoppage was a precious gift presented
unthinkingly to Nazi propaganda.

Yet this was not the end of the "cessation" episode. But so astonishing is its
continuation that even though we have become accustomed to surprising and even
shocking occurrences, we would not have believed the story had it not been related by
the person who was actually involved. We shall present it, then, in the original words
of the teller, who recounted it in the periodical Knesset in 1945.

The time was April 1943. In Bermuda an Anglo-American conference was
convening to discuss the measures required to rescue European J ewry. I n a cable to the
conference, the Rescue Committee in Jerusalem set forth its proposals and requests.
The story is picked up by Yitzhak Gruenbaum:

I n a telegram of April 17, the Committee summed up its requests in seven points:
1) To demand that the German government permit the departure of the J ews from their
country and from the occupied countries; 2) to arrange exchanges of J ews from the
occupied countries being held by the Germans with subjects being held by the Allied
countries; 3) to open the gates of Palestine to the refugees; 4) to ensure Jewish entry
into neutral states on the basis of a pledge that they will leave those countries once the
war is over; 5) to ensure transportation and provisions for the refugees during their
departure and transfer; 6) to facilitate the shipment of foodstuffs, medicines and
necessary goods for the J ews in enemy lands, as was done for the residents of Greece; 7)
to set up machinery which will ensure that all this is implemented and to invite
J ewish representatives to serve on it.

The reader will immediately note the absence of one key item from this list: a
demand that measures be taken to force the Germans to put a stop to the destruction.
Gruenbaum himself explains this omission:

It will be wondered why these requests did not include, as the first and principal
demand: to force the Nazi executioners to halt the massacre and the deportations to the
death camps in

Poland. There were many reasons for this. It was thought then that the slaughter
that took place in 1942 would not be resumed. It is true that doubts were expressed
whether the concentration of the Jews in 55 places of residence did not attest to
preparations for continuing the destruction. But people did not want to believe this, just
as they did not want to understand that we must concentrate first and foremost on
rescuing children out of the hope that this request would be accepted by the entire
world and would not run up against various insurmountable political and economic
obstacles. Against this contention we argued. ..51 [Emphases added.]

The author would appear to beoverlymodestin twiceavoidingtheuseofthefirst-
person plural or even singular ("it was thought...", and "people did not want to
believe...'). N or does his attem pt to link the issue of the "stoppage" with the debate over
the rescueofchildren, help to bringthetruth to light. Thefileof the Rescue Committee
contains the minutes of a meeting of a special subcommittee which was entrusted with
formulating the requests to be forwarded to the Bermuda Conference. Present at the
meeting were A. Reiss, A. H artglass, B. M intz, Dr. M. Landau and Y. Kleinbaum. The
proposal which this committee submitted for the approval of the "narrow committee'
(apparently the presidium of the Rescue Committee) included the following clear and
explicit demand: "To take vigorous steps for reprisal measures which could force the
oppressor to halt the slaughter of the j ews. "52

50 Reitlinger, The Final Solutioa p- 266 (Ch. 10) and the book's chronological table.

5 1 Destruction and Holocaust , p. 206.

52 CZA, File S26/1241. This demand appears also in the cable of the representation of Polish Jewry that was sent from Tel Aviv
to Bermuda on April 18, 1943. See In Those Days , World Federation of Polish Jewry (Hebrew, English, Yiddish), p. 13 (Yiddish),
p. 15 (English).

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Hence, the omission of tinis demand was tine result of a decision by tine Rescue
Committee's presidium winicin included, besides Gruenbaum, Eliahu Dobkin, Bernard
Joseph (Dov Yosef), Moshe Shapira and Dr. Emil Schmorak. It is difficult, indeed all
but impossible, to believe that these of all persons compelled the head of the committee
to omit the demand in question against his will. To the contrary, it is far more probable
that the members of the presidium evinced no substantial objection to Gruenbaum's
pressing suggestion that the demand be dropped--a suggestion made on the basis of the
mirage of the "55 places of residence." And this, two months after he had agreed to
"terminate" the imaginary stoppage. Whatever the case, the cable emerged from the
authorized Zionist body without a demand for measures to be taken to stop the
destruction. We shall have occasion to examine (in Ch. XI) how this cable from
Jerusalem dovetailed well with the arguments adduced in memoranda submitted by
other J ewish organizations.

We shall return now to the two questions that remained open concerning the
remarks by Yitzhak Gruenbaum at the meeting of the youth movements' leadership.

Thefirst question was whether Gruenbaum actually said, or implied, that so long
as Rommel had not been defeated in North Africa, his heart (according to a different
version, the heart of the Yishuv) would not be free to deal with the rescue of European
Jewry. The answer to this is positive. All the signs are that the head of the Rescue
Committee did in fact say what Haboker attributed to him. At all events, such a
remark would be consistent with Gruenbaum's feeling as he gave it frank expression
four years later. In December 1946 the official report of the Rescue Committee of the
Jewish Agency for Palestine was submitted to the 22nd Zionist Congress. The report
stated, black-on-white: "At that time [Autumn 1942] the threat of an invasion of
Palestine had already been lifted and the war front was distanced from the country
following the victory at El Alamein. The Yishuv was then able to turn its heart to
concern for its brothers in the grief-stricken diaspora of Europe." The same idea, the
samefeeling, the identical wording.

The second question, it will be recalled, was: What was the actual nature of the
"cold water" which Gruenbaum would, as he put it, pour on his Polish associates in
order to "dampen their fervor'? A clear and unequivocal answer to this question was
forthcoming from one of the leaders of Polish Jewry's representation at that time. It
emerges that whenever they would urge Gruenbaum to launch rescue operations, he
would remi nd them that the reports about the mass murders were atrocity propaganda
disseminated by the Polish government for its own political needs. The effect of this
reply on the representatives of Polish Jewry was apparent from the very conversation
we had with the functionary in question. Although he was in fierce opposition to
Gruenbaum at the time, and was highly critical of him during our talk, he
maintained that where the Polish propaganda was concerned, the head of the Rescue
Committee was substantially correct. To convince us, he pointed out that the Polish
government for months concealed from the world the report about the J ewish uprising
in the Warsaw ghetto. He desisted from this line only after we reminded him that it
was expressly the Polish government radio station which had been the first to
broadcast the news of the revolt.

Thus we come to one of the blackest points of the entire Holocaust period. To
dramatize it, we shall focus on deeds and reactions in the span of three or four days in
three cities: J erusalem, London and Warsaw.

The time was five months before the November 23 announcement.

In Palestine and in the Zionist movement, according to the conventional
formulas, they still "did not know" and had 'not heard' anything. On J une29, 1942, the
following telegram was dispatched from J erusalem to Rabbi Ehrenpreis in Stockholm:
'Please cable immediately truth about report of 700 thousand J ews murdered in
Poland especially truth of report about 300 thousand killed in Vilna and Kovno areas.
Gruenbaum."

No reply to this cable arrived, and nothing further took place in Jerusalem until
November 23, as we saw.

We have already described, citing reports in Davar and Ha'ardiz, the
developments in London in this period (Ch. II). We shall not repeat that description
here, but will look at the course of events from the perspective of the Warsaw ghetto.
Before this, a few preliminary remarks are necessary.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

The Polish government received the estimate of 700,000 J ews murdered in Poland
and 300,000 in the Vilna and Kovno regions from a May 1942 report of the Bund
Central Committee in Poland. 53 At the same time considerable factual material came
into the possession of the Polish government from a second Jewish group. This was a
group code-named Oneg Shabbat ("J ay of the Sabbath"), or O.S., which set itself the
goal of recording and perpetuating the events in the Warsaw ghetto and, where
possible, other communities as well. At the same time, O.S. tried to get information to
the outside world in order to enlist help. Heading the project was the historian
Emanuel Ringelblum, who did the lion's share of the work and kept a running diary of
events beginning in September 1939. Excitement can be felt in every word of
Ringelblum's diary entry for J une 26, 1942:

J une 26, 1942 -- Friday, J une 26, 1942, is for O.S. a day of a great event. This
morning British radio broadcast to thej ews of Poland. Everything we knew so well was
reported: about Slonim and Vilna, Lvov and Chelmno, and so on. For months we grieved
that the world was deaf and dumb to our tragedy, which is unparalleled in history. We
were furious at the Polish public, at those who are in contact with the Polish
government: why is there no announcement about the slaughter of Polish Jewry; why
does the world know nothing of all this? We blamed the Poles for deliberately
suppressing our tragedy so that it will not cause their own tragedy to pale in
comparison. 1 1 appears that at last our demands have

achieved their goal. In the past weeks British radio has broadcast a series of
reports about the acts of cruelty being perpetrated against the Jews of Poland:
Chelmno, Vilna, Belzec, and the rest. Today there was a broadcast summarizing the
situation: seven hundred thousand Jews, the number of Jews killed in Poland, was
mentioned. At the same time, the broadcast vowed revenge, a final accounting for all
these deeds of violence.

The O.S. group has thereby fulfilled a great historical mission. It alerted the
world to our fate and thus perhaps saved from destruction hundreds of thousands of
Polish J ews. Whether this is really so, the near future will, of course, tell. I do not know
who among the group will remain alive, who will be privileged by fate to work on the
material we have collected. But one thing is already clear to us all: we have fulfilled
our duty. We have overcome every obstacle to achieve our end. Our deaths will not be
meaningless like the deaths of tens of thousands of Jews. We have struck the enemy a
hard blow. We have revealed his satanic plan to annihilate Polish Jewry, a plan he
wished to complete in silence. We have run a line through his calculations and have
exposed his cards. And if England keeps its word and takes immediate measures, then
perhaps we shall be saved.

But no such immediate measures were forthcoming, neither by England nor by
America. Nor were they called on to take such measures by those who naturally should
have had the greatest interest in this. For some time to come, the BBC continued to
broadcast reports about the destruction. The Polish government and Shmuel
Zygelboim continued to make public the considerable information they were receiving
from the areas of the slaughter. Detailed lists were published specifying the number of
those saved according to cities and districts in Poland. Intellectuals, statesmen and
religious figures in England began to evince interest and anxiety. A concerned and
active public opinion began to form. But the process of this coalescence of public
opinion could not keep pace with the rate of the destruction. Public opinion was unable
to become a constant source of pressure on the government and thereby force it to take
urgent measures before it was too late. In the absence of a strong central force capable
of guiding the public, such activities as did take place were

sporadic and fragmentary. Precious months were wasted on organizing and
acquiring strength.

At the same time there were islands of composure and salient disbelief. These
were located in the offices and branches of the World Zionist Organization. They were
able to take the measure of the Polish atrocity propaganda; they knew that no drastic
action was called for. We have seen how Lichtheim chalked up to his credit his

53 In the Years of the Jewish Destruction, Voice of the Bund from the Underground (Yiddish), Unser Zeit, New Yorli, 1948, pp.
20-23.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

disbelief and \r\\s non-transmission of "unreliable" reports. Even Silbershein placed
no credence in them. Had the Zionist movement offices in London and New York
believed the reports, they would have undoubtedly convinced Geneva and J erusalem as
well.

Sincethey did not believe, they could not conceal, even had they wished to, their
reserved attitude and their self-control in a situation where this reaction went against
nature. Cold water was poured not only in J erusalem, and had a dampening effect not
only on Jews. The appalling information which was collected with such agony by the
Oneg Shabbat group and which overcame so many obstacles and barriers, ran up
helplessly against a wall of entrenched alienation.

In what bad dream, in what nightmare-within-a-nightmare could Ringelblum
imagine that there were places, that there were people-not Poles, not British, but
J ewish Zionists--who were preoccupied for months on end in undoing the fruits of the
heroic labors of the martyrs in Warsaw...

The enemy's calculations were not erased, his plans were not exposed and were
not interfered with. Three weeks after Ringelblum recorded his emotional diary entry,
the "Big Action" was launched in Warsaw. It would be a great relief to us and to our
readers if someone could say in all sincerity and with a clear conscience that there was
no connection whatsoever between that development and the cold water in J erusalem.

Following the publication of the November 23 announcement, the head of the
Jewish Agency's Political Department, Moshe Shertok (Sharett) left on a mission to
England and America. On May IS, 1943, he reported on that mission to the Zionist
Executive Committee.54 This report, part of which was devoted to the Holocaust, is a
treasure trove of the concepts and outlooks which prevailed among the Zionist
leadership at that time. It illustrates how distorted perceptions led to wrong moves and
reveals the kinds of self-deceptions, exaggerations, and blurring of facts and dates
which the Zionist hierarchy resorted to in order to adapt reality

to their own concepts. The personality and standing of the author lend this
document particular value. His knowledge of and accuracy in using the Hebrew
language reinforce the content of what he had to say by eliminating the possibility of a
careless or imprecise comment.

It was an intelligent and seemingly substantive survey, presented by a person
who knew a fact when he saw one and could describe it properly. Particularly
noteworthy is the plastic depiction of the pressure exerted by British public opinion on
the British government with the aim of forcing it to take action to rescue Jews. There
werethree waves of public opinion directed atthegovernment, and each wave brought
about certain government action which was followed by a temporary respite in the
pressure as the public awaited the results of the government's moves while
anticipating that it would persist with the required activities. The third and most
energetic wave followed the reports about the latest massacres, and it achieved the
final result: the British government decided to initiate a meeting with representatives
of the American government in order to plan and implement concrete measures to
rescue European J ewry. This initiative engendered the Bermuda Conference.

Considerations of space preclude our quoting more than the opening of the
Shertok report. For the sake of convenience, we shall divide this into three sections and
consider each section separately. All the emphases have been added. The first passage:

Gentlemen, it is my duty to give you a report of my visit to England and America.
When I left Palestine at the end of November, I took with me the first concrdie news of
the atrocity which reached Palestine via witnesses, namely, the Palestine refugees
whom we managed to liberate from the Nazi hell and bring to Palestine as part of an
exchange. I had thought that the shocking picture which was revealed to us would
come as something of a surprisetothehaverim in London. This was not so. I found there
not only among our comrades but among the public a far more extensive and more
detailed view of the events in Europe.

54 Minutes of a meeting of the Smaller Zionist Actions Committee, May 18, 1943, CZA, File S25/1853.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Patently, if Sharett learned a good deal about the Holocaust, he learned nothing
about himself or his associates in Jerusalem. Fully half a year after November 1942,
he still thought that the information which had been received from the refugees
constituted the first concrete reports. The implication is that the whole flood of
information which inundated the

Yishuv beforehand was non-existent, or at least non-substantive. And if his
expectation of surprising London with his late and fragmentary reports was naive, his
inability to admit to himself and to his colleagues their collective failure to absorb for
months on end the reliable reports which reached them, attests to a psychological-
public defect.

The distorted picture is evident also in the final section of the passage quoted
above, which implies that the London Zionists were the pioneers of information about
the Holocaust. The truth is that they were consistently a delaying factor in the British
public's awareness of what was being perpetrated against Europe's Jews. Like their
colleagues in Geneva, New York and J erusalem, they heard but "did not hear," knew
but did not know.' Where Sharett could have surprised this audience was in
announcing that J erusalem had finally acknowledged the substantiveness of the
reports from Europe.

We turn now to the second excerpt from Sharett's report:

In those very days the press of the great city of London and the papers in the
provinces were flooded with reports and articles about the atrocity in Europe, and this
subject was at the center of public interest. This was not something gradual, but
seemed to come all at once. It is true that reports had arrived gradually in the course of
weeks or perhaps months beforehand, but they were unable to get [the reports] into the
press, at least not on a large scale. It proved impossible to attract the public's attention
to this topic. There was a kind of conspiracy of concealment. There was a lack of desire to
bring the matter to the public's knowledge and to underscore the J ewish people's
distress.

At a certain burning point in the war, things reached a pass where a body which
was set up to sound the alarm about these troubles and to consult on what to do about
rescue, a body which was headed by the leaders of the various faiths and whose
president was the Archbishop of Canterbury-where this body, a few weeks prior to the
surging wave of reports was for the first time unable to secure the participation of a
government representative in a meeting; the government did not even send a message
of sympathy to this meeting, and it was only following special efforts by the
Archbishop that matters were sorted out. The reason given by government circles for
this first refusal was that it would not be helpful if

this card were placed in the hands of the antisemites in England, thus allowing
them to intensify their propaganda to the effect that this war is a J ewish war.

The focal point of the distortion in this passage lies in the words 'weeks or perhaps
months." Sharett was well aware how many weeks there are in a month and how
valuable 30-day months could be in rescuing Jews from mass destruction which was
being perpetrated at a furious pace. The blurring of months and weeks and the
emphasis on the idea that the public awakening had supposedly occurred "all at once"
covered up the fact that for months the Zionist office in London had not taken part in
rescue moves, even when these were initiated by others. It did not support the public
awakening which began in J une-J uly, did not lend a hand to the efforts to enlist public
opinion during August- September and which found their expression, among other
ways, in theZygelboim-Wedgewood pamphlet.

Since it is inconceivable that Sharett's serious deception was undertaken in order
to mislead his colleagues, the conclusion must be that his perception of reality was
gravely flawed. He absorbed the facts in a uniquely subjective manner. Reversing the
well-known aphorism of Ben Katznelson, be adapted the "constellation [of events]" to
the "ideology." Not only in the present but in the past as well, he saw what he wanted to
see, what "deserved" to be seen, in order not to destroy or shake received opinions and
ingrained attitudes.

The allegation of "a kind of conspiracy of concealment and the story that this
allegation needed to be verified, illustrate an unusual mode of perceiving reality. An
unbiased researcher would accept that at th/st/me in England there was no conspiracy

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

or "quasi-conspiracy" of concealing the Holocaust, at all events, not by the British
government. And if certain circles felt that the distress of the Jews should not be
played up in order not to bolster the contentions of the antisemites (a tendency which
was considerably stronger in government circles in America), then the government
behaved at this time contrary to such apprehensions. Attesting to this are the BBC
broadcasts we have mentioned, as well as the "successful outcome" of the meeting
referred to by Sharett. In that assembly, which was held on October 29, a message of
sympathy from Churchill was read out. This was a few weeks before the last wave of
reports, and the government did not hesitate to give the event the imprimatur of the
prime minister himself.

It is difficult to imagine that Sharett did not hear about another assembly which
had taken place two months earlier, on September 2. This was a protest rally sponsored
by the Labor Party. Present were the foreign ministers of Belgium, Czechoslovakia and
Norway, and senior representatives of other states. The keynote speaker was Shmuel
Zygelboim, who according to press reports "gave a harrowing description of the
methods of the destruction of the J ews." Representing the British government was a
senior minister, Herbert Monison, the Home Secretary.55

Had Sharett interested himself further in events in England prior to his visit
there, he would have discovered that two months before the Labor rally, the British
Minister of I nformation, Brendan Bracken, had confirmed to reporters in the name of
the British government the murder of 700,000 Polish Jews. At that press conference
Bracken was quoted as saying: "When all the atrocities committed by the Germans in
Poland are known, the world will hear a nightmarish account unexampled in
history."56 It is difficult to reconcile these facts with the thesis of a "conspiracy of
concealment," but they were not made known to the members of the Zionist Executive
Committee.

Moreover, Moshe Sharett, who was well acquainted with the British political
system, surely knew that even if the British government had wished to conceal from
the public the truth about the Holocaust, its means for doing so were extremely
limited. It could not impose silence on the Polish government-in-exile which was
based in London and was the principal source of the information. Nor could it foist
censorship on the press with respect to a non-military matter such as the murder of
Jews. If Sharett had desired an objective view of the actual state of affairs, he would
easily have discovered the cause of the disastrous failure-that the grim news of June
and J uly did not capture the attention of the public and the press in Britain soon
enough.

We turn now to the third and last passage:

Theconsp/racy of concea/ment was broken by the pressure of the reports. In this a
crucial role was played by the Polish message to the Allied countries. In this closed
forum I will not venture an analysis of the reasons that led the Polish government to
raise this question, to place it on the international stage. But to its credit is its great
deed in dispatching the message which compelled all the Allied states

to pay special heed and enabled the entire matter to gain greater publicity.

Notwithstanding that the "kind of conspiracy of concealment" has now become
an unqualified conspiracy, the fact related in this passage is correct. On December 10
the content of a Polish government message to the Allied governments concerning the
slaughter of Polish J ewry was made public in London. 57 This led to the publication. On
December 17, of a joint declaration by the Allies denouncing the murders and pledging
that "all those responsible for the extermination of the Jews will be punished." The
BBC broadcast the declaration in 23 languages.58 In England public reaction was
intense; Parliament rose in silent memory of the murdered Jews. The public

55 Davar , September 4, 1942.

56 Davar , July 10, 1942.

57 Davar , December 11, 1942.

58 Davar, December 28, 1942.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

movement for action against tine destruction assumed dimensions \Nh\dn compelled
both Parliament and the government to take note of it.

At the same time, it is somewhat surprising to read Sharett's hint concerning
"the reasons that led the Polish government to raise this question"-- reasons which
deserved special mention and which it was impossible to cite openly, as the meeting
was a closed one. Logically, one would think that a closed session would be more
amenable to a thorough clarification than an open meeting. Thus Sharett's reference
to "this closed forum" would seem to be a startling rhetorical blunder on the part of a
person known for his cautious formulations. The hint implies that the Polish
government's action was an unusual one on its part, and hence required a special
explanation. The truth is that the Polish message was the continuation of an
information policy concerning the destruction of the J ews which the Polish
government had embarked upon nearly a year earlier. Had Sharett been as informed
as he should have been, he would surely have been able to relate to his colleagues that
the new Polish action, together with the latest wave of public arousal, had been
triggered mainly by the receipt of another report from the Oneg Shabbat group dated
November 15.59 This report rounded out the information brought in October by a
special emissary of the Polish government, Jan Karski, who had returned to England
after spending a year in Occupied Poland. At all events, there were no extraordinary
factors involved which required special mention or which had to be concealed in a fog
of silence and suspicion.

If there was something different about the public furor of December 1942, it lay in
the fact that for the first time since the commencement of the Holocaust, the entire
J ewish spectrum took part in it

unreservedly, including the Zionist movement under one of its best known
leaders, Moshe Shertok.

The reader who thinks that we have been unwarrantedly harsh regarding the
Shertok report must take into account the unique status of this document. In fact, this
is the sole 'authorized" description of the Holocaust drawn up during the actual period
of its occurrence by a figure with the standing and repute accruing to the head of the
Political Department of the Jewish Agency. For his audience in the board room of the
Zionist Executive Committee and for his colleagues in the Zionist hierarchy whose
knowledge of events was meager and whose study of the subject was far from thorough,
Sharett's remarks and hints were authoritative signposts. The hints became facts, the
assumptions were transformed into solid truths and tenets of faith. From the board
room these tenets spread via the press, books, lectures and personal contacts, to become
the underpinnings for the chronicles of the Holocaust, accepted by the Yishuv and the
Zionist movement.

Sharett's standing and personality undoubtedly helped the report to be accepted
without question. That this is more than an assumption is shown by the following
episode. I n a previous session of the Zionist Executive Committee, held on January IS,
Eliahu Dobkin, a member of the Rescue Committee, announced that a slight
possibility existed of sending food packages to certain locales in the countries of the
Holocaust. Dobkin phrased this statement in a way which implied that this possibility
had only now arisen and had not existed previously. He was corrected on the spot by
Executive Committee member Melech Neustadt: "Dobkin said today that a crack has
been opened, that we received a report that a crack has been opened for sending food
packages. I want to state: no crack has been opened, it was always there; we did not
know because we did not want to know; previously it was wider, now it is narrower, but
it was there all along. "60

By his correction, Melech Neustadt, one of the few who objected to the minimal-
action line of the Rescue Committee, prevented a distortion of reality which could have
covered up a serious blunder in the past. Yet neither Neustadt nor any of his
colleagues had a single word to say in contravention of Sharett's report, which
contained distortions far graver than anything Dobkin had said, and which bore
profound ramifications for past and future alike.

It seems likely that the virtue of Sharett's report lay not only in the standing of its
author, but perhaps principally in the convenient character of the report itself. It was,
as we have said, consistent with ingrained

59 Ringelblum, Vol. I, p. 17 (Introduction of Aharon Eisenbach).
60CZA, FileS25/1851.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

attitudes. It ruffled no feathers and generated no feelings of guilt and contrition.
For the Zionist leaders it was convenient to note that an authoritative official had
made a thorough study of the matter, and had discovered persons guilty of a
conspiracy of silence and other sins. And the guilty parties were them--not us, not the
Zionists. A version of official credibility had been served up, one which could be
digested with absolute confidence. Moshe Sharett could be trusted and so could his
report.

It would come as no surprise to learn that the categorical statement made by
Golda Meir which we cited above, and which was made two weeks before Sharett's report
to the Zionist Executive Committee, had its source in information she received from
Sharett upon his return to Palestine. Her statement goes beyond Sharett's "kind of
conspiracy of concealment." If this was the case when everything was still fresh and
the "truths" were in a process of formation, it is no wonder that two years later, when
solid and sacrosanct patterns had already formed, the chairman of the Zionist
Executive, David Ben-Gurion, did not hesitate to declare that "the reports about the
slaughter in Poland reached us late, and even after they arrived, it was a long time
beforeotliers would believe us"61 (emphasis added). Those were his exact words: they
would not believe us, the Zionists. For a long time they refused to believe...

It is possible that despite everything known to the reader, Ben-Gurion had his
own truth. He was in America when Riegner's cable arrived concerning Hitler's
decision to carry out the destruction of thej ews forthwith. He undoubtedly heard from
Rabbi Wise about the stubbornness of the State Department officials who refused to
accept the veracity of the report or to be convinced by the evidence submitted to them.
This may have underlain his rash statement.

If so, we shall not be exaggerating by much if we suppose that the report about the
German Fuehrer's decision exhausted the sum total of the expertise which Ben-Gurion
brought back with him from his mission abroad. At all events, this is the only item of
information he talks about with any confidence in his one and only public appearance
devoted to the Holocaust. That this is so is confirmed by a review of his appearances
following his return to Palestine on October 2, 1942, after an absence of several
months.

On October 8 Ben-Gurion met with reporters for the first time since his return.
The meeting took place in the large hall of the Jewish Agency building. Present were
local and foreign journalists as well as officials of various ranks. The encounter lasted
for over an hour.

I n the press conference Ben-Gurion dwelt at length and replied to questions on the
following topics: America in general and American J ewry in particular, antisemitism
in America, the Biltmore Plan, a J ewish army, the Hadassah organization, the Magnes
group, and the proposal of the Peter Bergson group to establish "a free J ewish
government-in-exile." As for the Holocaust-not a word. Nothing was said, nothing
was asked; the subject was simply not on the agenda. 62

On October 15 a meeting was held of the Zionist Executive Committee. The
principal speaker was David Ben-Gurion. In his lengthy and detailed address, on the
subject of "A Zionist Plan of Action and American Jewry," the Holocaust of European
J ewry is referred to in just one sentence: "In view of the calamity which befell Polish
J ewry, many Bund leaders came to America." Beyond this, not one word about the
Holocaust. 63

On November 10 the Zionist Executive Committee convened once more to continue
the discussion begun at the previous session. Ben-Gurion took an active part in the
proceedings. Again, not a word about the Holocaust. 64

On November 30 an extraordinary meeting of Asefat HaNivharim was held in
J erusalem, to protest the destruction of the J ews in Occupied Europe. At this assembly.

61 David Ben-Gurion, In the Campaign (Hebrew), Vol. Ill, p. 175.

62 Ha'aretz , October 9, 1942.

63 In the Campaign , Vol. IV, pp. 43-56.
64CZA, FileS25/1848.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

at the height of the wave of detailed information which was flooding the world, Ben-
Gurion was ableto provide the following information:

We do not know exactly what is occurring in the Nazi Vale of Slaughter; how
many J ews have already been butchered, murdered, burned alive, and over how many
the sword of destruction still hangs. The Nazi scaffold is surrounded by a wall of
machineguns and expert hangmen, and no one enters or leaves. But we know what
Hitler is plotting for our peop/eand what he wrote in his book, Mein Kampf.

A few sentences in the speech were devoted to listing the means required for
rescue (principally, bringing out the children and opening the gates of Palestine),
Ben-Gurion used most of the speech to press his case for his chief demand, the creation
of a Jewish army. He concluded with an appeal to the Jews in the ghettos of Europe:
"And our final words are addressed to our dear brothers and sisters who are being
martyred in the Nazi ghettos: Your calamity is our calamity, your blood is our blood.
We will do what we can to exact retribution and we shall not be silent until we

have redeemed you from the Nazi hell and from the degenerate diaspora and until
webringyou all to us, to our land which is being built up and redeemed. "65 (Emphases
in the original.)

As the reader can see, there is one thing that Ben-Gurion knows with certainty:
that Hitler is plotting to destroy the Jews. On the other hand, he is far from certain
about the credibility of the reports which speak of millions dead. The optimistic note at
the end with its promise to redeem and bring to Palestine all those in the ghettos only
underscores the negation of urgency.

A further reference to information about the Holocaust is found in Ben-Gurion's
speech at the annual Tel-Hai assembly, held in 1943 on March IS. A month and a half
earlier, the world press had reported that the number of Jews massacred stood at
several millions and that three-quarters of European Jewry had already been
decimated. Ben-Gurion dissociates himself unequivocally from these figures,
asserting: "For we know days of great slaughter of \&NS—tens and hundreds of
thousands, women, children and infants--and we do not even know their numbers. "66

Ben-Gurion truly did not know. He knew even less than others. He did now know
because he did not wish to know, because he took no interest in "details."

Since the chairman of the Jewish Agency made relatively frequent public
appearances, and since many of those appearances were chronicled in the press, in
books and in various protocols, his lack of expertise concerning events during the
Holocaust and his surprising acquiescence in this paucity of information is more
apparent than it is with respect to other Zionist leaders of the period. A lack of interest
in these events and his overt unwillingness to occupy himself with Holocaust- related
matters is more conspicuous in Ben-Gurion than in others. With the exception of his
speech, quoted above, at the special meeting of Asefat H aN ivharim v\i\r\\c\r\ was devoted to
the Holocaust, we found not a single instance in his public appearances in which he
dwelt on the destruction of thej ews as a subject of dread on its own account. In the rare
cases when he mentions the Holocaust, he is fearful that the total destruction of the
European J ews will have a deleterious effect on the Zionist enterprise, or he expresses
the hope that the survivors of the slaughter will contribute to the realization of the
Zionist goal.

We shall examine these and related matters in the next chapter. We shall
conclude the present chapter by citing an example of gross ignorance and a regrettable
contempt for facts, a testimony which was given a quarter of a century after the events
occurred. I n his book. The State of

Israel Restored , Ben-Gurion provides what could be a substitute description of the
Big Action in the Warsaw ghetto: 'The head of the ghetto council, Adam Czerniakov,
committed suicide together with his wife as early as J uly 1942, when the Germans
demanded that he come up with additional J ews for 'transport.' I n September 1942 over
one hundred thousand Jews were collected. Thirty thousand were sent to do labor and
the rest were sent to death camps. The revolt in the ghetto then broke out." (P. 666,
Hebrew edition.)

65 In the Campaign , Vol.111, pp. 114-119.

66 Ibid., p. 120.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

That Czerniakov's wife was "put to death" eight years before she actually passed
away67 is not an irrevocable historical error. But the reduction of the Action from two
months to one and from 310,000 to one hundred thousand, as well as the entire manner
in which the Action is presented, show that Ben-Gurion's vaunted meticulousness and
diligence failed him in a sphere which he suppressed consistently during years of
difficult decisions. If he had read at least one of the numerous books which treat of the
entire Holocaust, he would have spared himself this public presentation of his
astounding ignorance. However, although Ben-Gurion immersed himself in books and
documents which enabled him to deepen his knowledge of subjects which interested
him, the Holocaust was not one of these. On this subject he made do with what he
himself knew, as he did during the Holocaust period itself. 68

Ben-Gurion towered above his contemporaries. What they had, stood out in him;
and what he had, served others as a model for emulation. Not all the Zionist leaders
abstained from learning about the Holocaust as Ben-Gurion did. But the
overwhelming majority were characterized by defective knowledge of events and a
stubborn refusal to delve into the subject.

67 She died on February 24, 1950. Adam Cziernakow, Warsaw Ghetto Diary (Hebrew), p. 344.

68 We will return to Ben-Gurion's inadvertent "contribution" to the history of the Holocaust in Ch. 14.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Part Two

THE WAR ON TERRITORIALISM

Preface

In the previous chapters we accumulated almost as many questions as revealed
facts. The thrust of all the questions and puzzlements is the same, and we may
encapsulate them in the terms employed by David Zakai in the article already cited:
What happened? How did it happen? How could it have happened? As we advanced in
our examination, amazement grew and the questions became more acute. Perplexedly,
we asked ourself what possessed the journalist "D.P." to treat as he did the
authoritative reports about the mass destruction which reached Palestine in March
1942. Subsequently it turned out that he was hardly the only one at fault--the entire
Davar editorial board was implicated. So we asked. What happened to Davar?

A detailed analysis left no room for doubt that Davar was hardly alone in
suppressing the truth about the Holocaust. It became clear that the whole spectrum of
the Zionist press in Palestine-encompassing all wings and branches of opinion-was
engaged, from March to November 1942, in lulling public opinion through the use of
means and methods which could have been specially conjured up and ordered by the
Nazi propaganda machine. And again we asked ourself. What happened to the Zionist
press?

A further clarification revealed that the source of the alienation regarding the
information about the Holocaust lay in the Zionist leadership in Jerusalem, which
until the arrival of a group of refugees in November 1942 consistently rejected all the
grave reports that had arrived by various routes. At this point our question was
divided into two: besides the initial puzzle— what happened to the Zionist leadership— a
second query had to be posed: How did it happen that no one in the Palestine press corps
showed even an iota of independence and non-conformism in this fateful period? We
were especially surprised by the behavior of the Revisionist paper Hamashkif which
was at odds with the Zionist leadership and the establishment press on virtually every
possible question-with the exception of one subject: suppressing information about
the Holocaust. On this one topic, it conformed well with the chorus of deniers and
calmers. And this brought us to the concluding question: What happened to the Zionist
Yishuv in Palestine?

Subsequently it became clear that the suppression syndrome was not confined
exclusively to Palestine, In London and New York, too, the

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Zionists emulated tine beinavior of tineir colleagues in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.
The British Zionists, who were close to the principal sources of information, failed to
ingest that information any better than the Jewish Agency officials in Jerusalem. As
for the Zionist leaders in America, it was they who did the terrible deed of concealing
for three months the report about Hitler's extermination order--a report which was
unavailable to the public from any other source. The official representative of the
Histadrut in Geneva chalked up to his credit the fact that for lengthy periods he did not
transmit to J erusalem "false" reports--which later turned out to be true. The letter of
the J ewish Agency representative in Istanbul which we quoted shows that he sincerely
did not believe the "atrocity propaganda" and that he, like his colleagues, was living
on a unique Zionist planet. Even Abraham Silbershein, who more than any other
Zionist leader maintained contact with European J ewry during the Holocaust, failed to
take in at an early stage the descriptions of the actual situation which were conveyed
by Oneg Shabbat and the Bund, and were given wide publicity by the Polish
government-in-exile and by Shmuel Zygelboim.

Manifestly, something had happened to the Zionist tribe of the people of Israel.
Something powerfully malignant. Something that suppressed natural feelings and
overrid plain common sense. Something highly tangible, whose existence is not in
doubt.

In the previous chapters we touched on several aspects of this "something."
Besides the original sin of suppressing the bad news, we found a surprising measure of
forgiveness among the Zionist leaders toward themselves and toward those of them
who directly handled Holocaust- related matters; we noted the striking restraint
evinced by the majority of the Zionist leaders when it came to delving into the ongoing
events; we saw how several of them, spurred by their ambition to adapt reality to their
own perceptions, became entangled in twisting and distorting the past and the present
alike. We hinted that Zionism in fact perceived its own Holocaust with its own
attendant dangers, its own problems, and also its own prospects. We shall continue to
address these questions in the chapters which follow. And as additional aspects of the
malignancy which gripped Zionism during the Holocaust are revealed, we shall
attempt to further confirm the explanation we are adducing for this phenomenon.
That explanation holds that the trouble with the Zionists lay not in their possessing a
superfluity of Zionism, but--in their gross absence of that concrete Zionism which was
placed on the stage of J ewish history in the first Zionist Congresses.

Si nee the roots of the phenomena under discussion are social in nature, it will not
prove beneficial to train our sights on the "bad guys" as bearing sole responsibility for
the direction taken by events. The truth is that such persons were not lacking, and to
the degree that matters were placed in their hands we are obligated to elucidate what
occurred without regard to place or personal affiliation. It is also true that the
responsibility of these bearers of evil is not diminished because they represented an
entire sector of the public which followed them. But any attempt to limit the
explanation of the events exclusively to the behavior of specific leaders, functionaries
or institutions is, we believe, following a barren approach which is incapable of
produci ng true fruits of research.

Yet the opposite method-to disregard the at times crucial impact of leaders or
functionaries on the course of events-is just as worthless. Instances of this kind of
impact may be gleaned from the events we have already discussed. Thus, for example,
we believe that the conspiracy of suppression engaged in by the Hebrew- language
press for the eight months leading up to November 23, 1942, could not have taken the
ruinous form it did had it not been for the personal "contribution" of the journalist
"D.P." writing in Davar on March 16 and 17 of that year. Given the situation as it
existed on March 16, when the Palestine press gave prominent coverage to the initial
reports about the mass destruction, their retractions two days later were not
inevitable-were it not for the highly authoritative guidance they received from Berl
Katnelson's paper I n our view, to disregard this fact is as harmful to the search for the
truth as is the method of looking for "material" with which to excoriate the leadership.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Chapter Four

Friendship Only

Two months after the publication of the November 23rd statement, the issue of
the Holocaust came up for discussion by the Zionist Executive Committee. This session,
which took place on J anuary 18, 1943, was the fifth since Ben-Gurion's return from the
United States and the third since the November 23rd announcement. The sole item on
the agenda was "Diaspora Affairs." The principal speaker was Yitzhak Gruenbaum,
and the following are the main points he made:

He opened his speech by describing the course of the destruction since 1941 and
recalled the reports which had arrived and had been published in Palestine. At the
same time he castigated the Yishuv for having evinced apathy and disbelief. "The
public did not quake... the public did not quake and it did not shake... And when I asked
myself then, and still ask myself today why this happened, why did the Yishuv not
quake and shake then--the same Yishuv that is now hurling so many serious
accusations that the bloody events were concealed from it--l have an answer to this. In
that period the Yishuv was anxious about its own fate, fear gripped the Yishuv in the
face of the German attacks in Libya and Greece."l

Gruenbaum did not mention anything about having "poured cold water."

After relating how the vast numbers which were cited in connection with the
destruction had been met with disbelief, and how he had tried to verify them through
Rabbi Ehrenpreis in Stockholm, the speaker moved to a fierce attack against none
other than the J ews of

Poland:

There is one thing in this whole picture which I cannot separate from the feeling
of grief and burning pain it causes me... that the Jews went to the slaughter without
any zeal arising in any of them to defend himself. 2

[The behavior of the Jews generates in him] a sense of shame and disgrace...
people became doormats and not human beings. This is our education--our education
dating back to the pogroms in Russia. ..the Zionist education, the socialist education,
the Communist education. None of this stood the Jews in good stead in this horrific
hour. 3

1 Gruenbaum, Destruction and Holocaust , p. 63.

2 Ibid., p. 65.

3 Minutes of tlie meeting of tlie 28tli Zionist Actions Committee, CZA, File S25/1851. These lines were omitted in the collection
Destruction and Holocaust.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

...I did not think that the J ews of Poland would fail to defend themselves in such
cases, that not one leader would emerge who could arouse them to defend themselves
even if it meant death. 4

In the course of these harsh words, Gruenbaum notes the "cessation of the
destruction" and the 55 places of concentration, discussed in the previous chapter. He
then goes on to the question of what to do--and what not to do.

He prefaces this topic by rejecting again the public's allegations and by
appealing to his fellow leaders' sense of collective solidarity.

After all, we have one medicine, a universal medicine, for every calamity, every
holocaust. First of all the leaders come under attack. Naturally, it is they who are to
blame: thej ewish Agency is to blame, the Zionist Executive is to blame, the National
Council--for it is perfectly clear that if we had wished to, if we had cried out... if we had
shouted, if we had demanded, then everything needed for rescue, for help, would have
been done immediately...!

I do not want to shatter this illusion. It makes these Jews contented, for who will
they shout to? They can demand that I resign because of what happened. But can they
demand the same of Roosevelt, of Churchill?

When it comes to tangible possibilities of rescue, Gruenbaum is skeptical to the
point of despair. He proposes that the Yishuv raise its voice in outcry. "We must
demand reprisal operations, to add our forces and our influence to their forces and to
the influence of the Poles, who are demanding this. We must demand [population]
exchanges, we must demand an opening of the gates, we must exploit every possibility,
every crack and every hole in order to come to the aid of those in agony. Even with all
this, I very much doubt whether through our demands and outcries it will be possible
to halt the slaughter, to effect a rescue. If the slaughter stops it will be thanks to the
victory of the Russians, the English and the Americans." Gruenbaum is pleased with
the Allied declaration concerning the punishment to be meted out to the Nazi
murderers, "but it is clear that this will not be able to stop the slaughter, and is
incapable of saving even onej ewish life."

On the question of financing the rescue operations, Gruenbaum dwells at length
on what must not be done. He lashes out at his colleagues in the Zionist leadership who
left him in the lurch in his battle against heavy public pressure. Since money had not
yet been raised from other sources, a proposal emanating from the community had
been made to use the various Zionist funds for this purpose. Gruenbaum is vehemently
opposed to this idea. I n the meantime," he says, "a frame of mind which I consider very
dangerous for Zionism has begun to assert itself in Palestine."

I cannot comprehend... how it could happen that in an assembly in Jerusalem,
people should call out to me: "If you don't have enough money, take from Keren
Hayesod, take money from the bank--after all, money is at your disposal."

I considered it my duty to withstand this wave... And when I was asked, "Surely
you can give from the funds of Keren Hayesod to save J ews?", I replied: No. And I say
again: No. I know that peoplefind it surprising that I sawfit to say this. Fr/eicfs tdl me
that&/en if the reports are true, they should not be made public at a time of sorrow and
concern such as this. I cannot agree. In my view, we must stand up to this wave, which
is pushing Zionist activities into second place... And the haverim should not have
abandoned me in this battle. (Emphasis added. )5

And he declares: "Of course they [the means] will suffice if we take the funds of
Keren Hayesod. But we will not take the funds of Keren Hayesod, and with those means
pursue our war of redemption. "6

"War of redemption" meaning activities related to the realization of Zionism.

I n the concluding passage of his remarks Gruenbaum states his credo:

4 Destruction and Holocaust , p. 66.

5 Destruction and Holocaust , pp. 68. 69.

6 Minutes of Zionist Actions Committee meeting. These lines were also omitted in Destruction and Holocaust .

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Zionism above all else--this must be asserted every time a great calamity diverts
us from thecourseof the war of our redemption in Zion. Our war of redemption does not
derive directly from, and is not integrated directly into, activities for the benefit of the
diaspora--that is our tragedy. Nothing like this exists in any other nation or language.
There are two areas of activity, and they are areas which in theory are perhaps

intertwined but in practice are distinct. And we must, in my opinion, maintain-
especially in times such as these--the precedence of the war of redemption. 7

Fourteen members of the Zionist Executive Committee took part in the discussion
following the speech. One supported Gruenbaum, one said he would not involve
himself in the argument, and a third did not refer to the issues in contention. The
remaining eleven all opposed Gruenbaum in varying degrees of vehemence and
expressed their opposition in differing degrees of frankness. The following are
passages from their remarks (all emphases have been added):

Dr. Rufeisen: Regrets that the question did not come up for discussion until now.
"I do not know who is to blame for this-the Zionist Executive or the presidium of the
Zionist Executive Committee; but finally thediaspora is being discussed by the Zionist
Executive Committee too."

Melech Neustadt: "I do not blame anyone in particular, I blame all of us-
myself." He proposes that the rescue activities be set apart, that they be engaged in by
people who are not occupied with other matters. 'There should be a limited committee
of seven people at most, and not an Actions Committee of three or four people who do
nothing. "

Y. Suparsky: "It is very bad that there was an Actions Committee but no
secretary." As for those engaged in the rescue activity: 'These people should resign
from their current positions for threeor four months, and their positions should be given
to others." H e is outraged at Gruenbaum's refusal to take money for the rescue from the
various Zionist funds: 'That is anti-Zionism, Mr. Gruenbaum? A budget of 1,150,000
Palestine pounds now exists. Is it not possible to take from that budget hundreds of
thousands of pounds for rescue activity? That is anti-Zionism? That is Zionism!"

Yosef Sprinzak came to the defense of the Jews who were demanding that the
Zionist institutions act. "J ews are besieging this House and insisting on action. What's
wrong with that? Where is the injustice in that? Why should this not be understood?"
"Of course the World Zionist Organization is the address. Where will they direct their
outcries? To whom will they put their demands? Naturally, to this House." He urges "a
warim Iddishe hertz" (a warm Jewish heart). His proposal: 'To mobilize a group of
respected, important and active people who would, in respect of the diaspora, fulfill the
precept. And you shall study it day and night... and on/ytrt/s."

Y. Zerubavel: 'This is a bankrupt attitude, Gruenbaum's whole attitude today."
"If nothing can be done, if you do not see a way—then it is not that anyone is demanding
your resignation... but..." He argues that Gruenbaum "is now in the grip of that
exaggeration which holds that Eretz-lsrael will be built on the ruins of the diaspora."

Rabbi Neufeld takes issue with Gruenbaum: "But what is Zionism for if not for
the Jews? And what is the Yishuv, what is the path of Eretzlsrael when it is cut off
from the affairs of those masses?" On the money issue he maintains that money is
available, not only from Keren Hayesod but also from the Zionist Bank. There is money
aplenty belonging to Polish J ews in bank deposits, and no one knows what will finally
become of this money, or whether these people will return to claim it. (Dobkin:

You would take expressly the money of thesej ews?) And what is the function of a
Zionist bank in a period like the present? His proposal: a fund of 50,000 pounds to be set
up, at least for the initial period.

Moshe Kolodny points to the contradiction between Gruenbaum's situation
appraisal and the actions he is proposing. "Between the proposals you put forward in
the name of the Executive, and the grounds you cited before making the proposals-

7 Minutes of Zionist Actions Committee.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

some kind of abyss has opened up. You spoke out of desperation but you still proposed
taking these actions. "

Ya'akov Hazan takes Gruenbaum to task: "It is clear to me that without a diaspora
Zionism will have no point, there will be no Zionism. And it is clear to me that the
question we are discussing here today takes precedence over every issue of political
Zionism." He proposes the establishment of a large fund to save the diaspora.

A. Reis also comes out against Gruenbaum: "And what is above Zionism if not
J ews? What is Zionism without J ews? How will we realize Zionism?"

I. Idelson (Bar-Yehuda) delivers a sharp and emotional statement.

With us, "judiciousness" often becomes "injudiciousness." We are now ashamed
of what happened to Polish J ewry. I don't know whether we shouldn't first of all be
ashamed of what happened to us. I say to you that / am ashamed of myself of my
kibbutz, of my Histadrut, of my World Zionist Organization Executive. I am ashamed of
each and &/ery one of you. Because what did we do? Doubt was expressed here about
whether the Polish J ews defended themselves. Did anyone address them, make contact
with them?

Today the J ewish Agency has already dispatched its emissaries, far too late, to a
few places from which letters can be sent to various places in Europe. Is there a
representation of the World Zionist Organization in any of these places, one who could
also consider things and act on them, and not just write letters that will take months
getting here before a reply can be received, if one is received at all? Does anything like
this exist today?

For the author of the present book, the following words of Idelson bore special
significance: "I do not say of you alone, Gruenbaum, but I also, we also, abandoned
them. We had a little training for this from years past with regards to our comrades in
Russia. For the World Zionist Organization it was 'good' training."

Dr. Stoup: "After all, when all is said and done, we are the 'supreme' command of
the J ewish people. There is no one else to deal with these matters in concentrated
fashion. How is it possible to wage a war so cruelly and not to see to it that there are
accurate reports about the millions who are on this front?"

Shmuel Dayan complains that action has been late in coming. He proposes "to
send emissaries who will be authorized to make decisions by themselves. I would
disperse a good many of the members of the Zionist Committee Executive and the
J ewish Agency Executive to serve as representatives in the places of danger."

Against the eleven who criticized and objected to Gruenbaum's ideas, one person
spoke in favor of Gruenbaum's version of "Zionism" and also justified, albeit
indirectly, his refusal to provide money for rescue work from the various Zionist
funds. This was S. Zokhovitsky (Zakif), who argued: "Obviously, without a nation there
is no Zionism, but without Zionism there will be no nation." As for the refusal to
provide money: 'The fact is," he maintained, "that there were no activities related to
concrete possibilities of rescue to justify using this money. Was there really anyone
that could have been saved and was not? Tell me! I will be the first to protest."
(Neustadt: "When you have to save your son, do you ask whether a possibility of rescue
exists?")

Last to speak in the discussion was thej ewish Agency Treasurer, Eliezer Kaplan.
He saw fit to preface his remarks with the declaration that "I have no wish to get
involved in this whole debate, but I do consider it my duty to make a few remarks."
Firstly, he was against the idea of placing the rescue activities within the purview of
theJ ewish Agency, nor

should they be "attached" to theJ ewish Agency. Secondly, he pledged: "As long as
no other money is available, if we are presented with some essential activity, we shall
undertake it."

Thirdly, Kaplan argues that "the trouble lay in our not finding a few people who
would devotetheir time exclusively to this." He reiterates: "If a few people had shown the
way, the question of the means would never have arisen, either here or abroad."

In this manner Kaplan sought to "amend" what Gruenbaum had said and to
allay the bitterness of the Zionist Committee Executive by supporting Zokhovitsky's
idea, namely: We will give money if we are shown concrete actions to take. As the
official responsible for the funds, Kaplan's words carried considerable weight. As we

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

shall see, in his statement of summation Gruenbaum adopted (verbatim) the
Zokhovitsky-Kaplan amendment.

To sum up the discussion: eleven of the fourteen speakers were critical of
Gruenbaum, his doctrine of Zionism, and his mode of operation. Overwhelmingly they
rejected his concept of the "precedence of Zionism" over rescue operations. Some of
them pointed to the contradiction between Gruenbaum's pessimistic assessment of
rescue possibilities, and the tasks confronting the rescue campaign. Not one of the
fourteen backed Gruenbaum in his refusal to make available money from the Zionist
funds for rescue work. It could be inferred from the comments of the majority that in
their view Gruenbaum was unsuited to head the rescue organization. Virtually all the
speakers, Kaplan included, insisted that those engaged in rescue work devote
themselves exclusively to that task and divest themselves of all other responsibilities.

In his reply Gruenbaum employed a sharp tone, which at least once slid into
rudeness. Reargued with everyone and stuck to his guns on every point at issue, with
the exception of a verbal concession on the money question. He even rejected Sprinzak's
call for "a warm J ewish heart," saying: "I remember you, Sprinzak, when you went as
an emissary to Poland and faced a wave of people with a warim Iddishe hertz, and you
said, as I do, as every Zionist does, that there are times when one must overcome a
warim Iddishe hertz." At this point the chairman of the meeting, S. Z. Robashov,
intervened and asked the speaker: "I want to understand--what is it that you are
referring to?" Gruenbaum cut him off rudely: "Why are you all jumping up? I am not
speaking in half-sentences. I cannot jump ahead in my explanation."

Gruenbaum did not backtrack one iota from his version of Zionism. He dwells on
it at some length and reformulates it: "What does

Zionism mean--the precedence of the war of redemption over all other wars."

On the money issue he adopts Kaplan's approach, and on the spot translates it
into practical terms. It now turns out that this is precisely how he had acted in the
past. An illuminating exchange followed between Gruenbaum and Anshel Reis: "I ask
you, Neustadt, I ask you, Reis: Whenever you had some concrete or nearly concrete
proposal, did you ever meet with rejection or refusal? (Reis: I have to say that that was
the case.) From me? (Reis: That was the case.) You did not propose anything concrete.
(Reis: What does concrete mean? There is a war, [there are] borders.) You did not
propose that this had to be done. 1 1 was always known what 'this' referred to. When 'this'
was known there were no rejections, not even from Kaplan. But what was the problem?
The 'this' was vague and incomprehensible."

On the question of whether he would continue to head the rescue organization,
Gruenbaum's response seemed to be clear enough: 'You talk about new people who are
not burdened with other matters, who could devote themselves fully to those affairs.
Good, have it your way. For my part I will not interfere. / am stepping aside. Do what
you please about this. I jumped into this matter because I felt that I had to do it. If you
think that more strength, more energy and more time now have to be devoted to it,
maybe you are right. Please, go ahead and do this thing."

Seemingly the issue concluded with this. Gruenbaum "stepped aside." New
people would be placed on the Actions Committee who would devote themselves fully to
this question and give it more strength, more energy and more time. The rescue work
would enter a new period. But no, far from it...

Following Gruenbaum's concluding remarks, the floor was taken by David Remez
in order to inform those present about the conclusions reached by a joint meeting of the
J ewish Agency and a committee of Asefat IHanivharim.

Like Kaplan, Remez opened his remarks by declaring: "For a number of reasons /
did not wish to becomeinvolved in theactual discussion." Again like Kaplan, he pledged
financing for rescue operations "if an opening were to emerge," but then immediately
qualified this in a statement formulated in polished Hebrew: "But there is as yet no
opening even as wide as the eye of a needle. The paths of help are still doubtful,
unlikely and potholed."

Remez then went on to state, on behalf of the joint meeting, that "we decided to
build on what already exists." He explained: "The Actions

Committee will be composed [as before] of members of the J ewish Agency
Executive and members of the National Council Executive, together with two more
members: one from the National Council and one from the Political Department of the

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

J ewish Agency. An expanded Actions Committee will also be set up to meet at regular
intervals, let us say once a month."

Remez suggested that the composition of the committee should be entrusted to the
Jewish Agency Executive and the National Council Executive. Concerning the
controversy over who should head the committee, he promised that "the committee wi 1 1
have a coordinator--a public figure who will volunteer wholly for this work during a
specific period, as far as needs will dictate."

The Zionist Executive Committee made no objection to the decision of the Jewish
Agency Executive, and the status quo was retained. Five places on the Rescue
Committee were allotted to the Jewish Agency Executive (Gruenbaum, Dobkin, B.
J ospeh, M. Shapira, E. Schmorack). A volunteer was found for the position of
coordinator. True, this volunteer would not consent to forgo his numerous tasks on the
Jewish Agency Executive, either "during a specific period" or at any other time.
However the Jewish Agency Executive accepted this. As the reader has undoubtedly
surmised, the "volunteer" was none other than Yitzhak Gruenbaum.

The discussion at the 28th session of the Zionist Executive Committee
demonstrated that Gruenbaum was unfit to head the rescue work for the following
reasons:

1) He did not regard the rescue work as overriding in urgency and importance
every other endeavor at that time.

2) He objected to the idea of supplying the requisite financing for the rescue
operations from the various Zionist funds, as long as no special rescue funds had been
established.

3) He refused to forgo his many tasks in the J ewish Agency and devote himself
exclusively to rescue matters.

4) He did not believe in the real possibility of rescue on a mass scale.

With respect to the first three points, he was opposed by nearly all the
participants in the discussion, and on the fourth point by a few of the discussants. On
the second point, the question of financing, his fellow members on the Jewish Agency
Executive were able to temper his extreme statements and force him to make a verbal
concession. We shall see to what degree Gruenbaum changed his stand and his actions
regarding the other three points.

The factual evidence concerning the third point is quite straightforward. Did
Gruenbaum consent to devote himself wholly to the rescue activities at the expense of
his tasks on the Jewish Agency Executive? He came under heavy pressure on this
matter from the hierarchy of the Zionist movement, including some of the front-rank
leadership. Four months later, in an Executive Committee meeting held in May 1943,
Melech Neustadt complained that "because of the heavy burden of work imposed on the
key people, this matter [the rescue activity] does not come up for serious discussion or
serious action." In that same forum Anshel Reis stated that "a month and a half has
gone by without a meeting of the plenum of the Aid and Rescue Committee." In
contrast to these polite comments, David Remez spoke forthrightly and addressed
himself directly to Gruenbaum: "What right do you have to make demands of the
goyim if we could not get one of our own people to deal henceforth with rescue
[exclusively]? The Jewish Agency Executive should have a Minister for Rescue, who
would devote himself to this day and night. It is essential that someone go to London. It
wi 1 1 be the person the Executive appoi nts to present the case."

To Remez, Gruenbaum retorted: "We have no objection at all to such a resolution
being passed--on the contrary." And added immediately:

"I think the chances are that this will not be necessary."

The "chances" proved to be as predicted. To forgo his other tasks in the J ewish
Agency would "not be necessary." Gruenbaum did not buckle under the pressure and
his colleagues gave in to his stubbornness. Thus he continued to head the Rescue
Committee until the end of the war, at the same time having his hands full as head of
the Works Department, as one of the heads of the J ewish Agency's Organization
Department, and also as director of the Bialik I nstitute.

No "Ministry for Rescue" was established in the Jewish Agency. The Rescue
Committee, in accordance with the wish expressed by Eliezer Kaplan, was not within
the purview of the J ewish Agency and was not attached to it, but existed as a separate
entity devoid of any organizational base, and lacking its own bureaucratic machinery
and budget. For a long time it lacked even an official permanent name (Rescue
Committee, Committee for the J ews of Occupied Europe, Actions Committee, Committee

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

for the J ews of the Diaspora, Rescue Committee). Externally, it came across as a public
body composed of representatives of various organizations: the J ewish Agency
Executive, the National Council, Agudat Israel, and others. Its internal relation of
forces made its activity dependent

on the Jewish Agency Executive, and that body placed the responsibility in the
hands of Yitzhak Gruenbaum--along with all his many other tasks.

Gruenbaum did not backtrack one iota from his opinion regarding the
subordinate place of the rescue enterprise as compared with the "war of redemption."
Following the detailed discussion in the Zionist Executive Committee and
Gruenbaum's concluding remarks, the Zionist leadership was confronted with a
choice: to disqualify Gruenbaum as a candidate for the head of the Rescue Committee
because of this abhorrent outlook, or to accept his ideological deficiency and let him
remain as chairman. As we know, the latter option won the day. Let us now see whether
changes occurred in the fourth shortcoming we noted--Gruenbaum's disbelief in the
concrete possibilities of rescue.

His pessimistic approach was based on the underlying assumption that the
Allied governments--the U.S., the U.K., and others-were not ready to aid in rescue
efforts. This assumption, which from certain standpoints and at certain periods
contained truthful elements, Gruenbaum regarded as a fixed and unalterable truth,
one which could not be annulled or moderated by means of appropriate activity, and
one which was in no danger of being aggravated through harmful actions or blunders.
Hence, the constant despair of the head of the Rescue Committee regarding the
possibility of rescue on anything approaching a large scale. This despair, which was
given its keenest expression in Gruenbaum's non-public appearances- in the closed
meetings of the Zionist institutions-was not absent, whether openly or tacitly, in his
public appearances as well.

As we have just seen, in the 28th session of the Zionist Executive Committee,
Gruenbaum shrugged off the substantiality of the joint declaration of the Allied
Powers against the destruction of the Jews as "incapable of saving even one Jewish
life." Elsewhere in the same speech, Gruenbaum spoke of the Allies' unwillingness to
work for the rescue of J ews.

"I do not wish to enter into a clarification of the programs, the demands and all
manner of ploys suggested to us orally and in writing. Among them are some things
which should be given due consideration. There are also things which do not merit
even a moment's consideration. They all have one thing in common: we do not ask
ourselves what the true attitude of the Allies is." To instance this "true attitude" he
related the story of how the Allied governments rejected the suggestion of the Poles to
bomb Germany in reprisal for the Germans' acts of cruelty in Poland.

In the next session of the Zionist Executive Committee, in February 1943,
Gruenbaum again raises the subject of the Allies' rejection of the Polish suggestion,
and sums up: "We are at an impasse. Most unfortunately, I must say once more that /
donotbdievethatwewillbeableto accomplish anything concrete. I do not believe that
the [Allied] governments will do anything substantive, and I find it difficult to believe
that the German government, or Hitler, will permit the J ews to leave. We are obligated
to clarify and to try everything that is suggested to us. But the hopes arenegligible."8

As an example of Gruenbaum's remarks in his public appearances, we quote from
his speech to Asefat Hanivharim, as reported in Ha'aretz on January B, 1944.
According to the paper, he stated: "I envy those who still harbor some shred of faith in
the 'englightened' world. I call out to the Yishuv— w/7at we ourse/vesofo not rescue, will
not be rescued ." (Emphases in the original.)

"We ourselves" means bringing refugees by sea and land from the Balkans. This
activity was directed from Istanbul by a team of emissaries who managed to bring
about 6,000 J ews to Palestine by the end of the war. In addition to this "do-it-yourself
method," Gruenbaum was aware of only one other rescue mode, namely, exchanging
J ews in Europefor Germans held by the Allies. The option of mobilizing various forces

iCZA, File S26/1 852.

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in the world seems not to have existed for him. From time to time he paid lip service to
actions that should be undertaken, "despite everything" or he speaks of some "crack"
that has been opened, or an "opportunity" that has presented itself for possible rescue
work. But as Moshe Kolodny summed up accurately in the discussion quoted above, an
"abyss" existed between the proposals for action and the declarations of despair of the
head of the Rescue Committee. Moreover, the remarks about "cracks" or
"opportunities" were often made without anything substantial to back them up, or
they referred to the rescue via I stanbul .

Since the "we ourselves" route combined with the exchange of nationals could
produce no more than a few thousand survivors at most, there were solid wounds for
Gruenbaum's despairing posture. And since he held out no expectations for positive
results from activities in the international arena, the lack of importance he attached
to the mobilization of public opinion is also understandable. When the American
Zionists rejected a proposal to stage a mass demonstration in Washington ending at
the White House, Gruenbaum duly reported the development to his colleagues without
any anger or outage. Once he declared his intention of going to the United States "to
exchange information" on rescue matters.

But when Dr. Goldmann told him politely that he must not let himself in for
wartime travelling difficulties "due to his age" (Gruenbaum was then 63 or 64), he
accepted this and did not make the trip. 9 In any case, what would he do there? Ships
from the Balkans did not go via New York.

Gruenbaum was unmistakably reserved regarding manifestations of public
protest in the Yishuv. It is true that as a public figure he was compelled to attend and
speak at public protest assemblies, in extraordinary sessions of As^at Hanivharim,
and the like. Nevertheless, he made no secret of his opinion that "cries and outcries"
would be of no avail. On several occasions he spoke mockingly of the J ews' fealty to the
concept "the voice is the voice of J acob"--a feeling he did not share in the least.lO He
understood, and assented readily to rallies aimed at raising money for rescue
operations. But rallies for their own sake, protest for the sake of protest--this he
himself did not advocate and was unwilling to bother the public with such matters.

One of his public statements on this topic triggered a furious riposte on the part of
ranking members of the Zionist hierarchy. At the 18th session of the Zionist Executive
Committee in May 1943, it was suggested that the Yishuv mount an impressive
reaction to the negative results of the Bermuda Conference. Different possibilities were
mentioned, such as circulating a mass petition, and mass stoppages at places of work
for a few minutes each day. In his summation speech, Gruenbaum spurned all such
suggestions:

"I am not narrow-minded or narrow- hearted, and I do not think it is our mission to
ca// a str/fce/n norma/ //fe in one corner of the world on the Old Continent where normal
life exists. And I am not so narrow-minded or narrow- hearted that I cannot see that the
J ews area little happy with their lives. It is good that there is one corner in the world
where thej ew feels himself free as well as a little happy in life. And I do not know wliy
I sliould call a strike against his happiness with his life. What will we gain from it?
Nothing except self-satisfaction for those who will say: Look, we cried for five minutes
and thus something will change." (Emphases added.)

This was too much for Golda Myerson. Taking the floor immediately after
Gruenbaum had concluded, she said:

"I, like Mr. Gruenbaum, am not sorry that there is a large Jewish population
living in peace. But I must say that what I do not understand-and I think it will also
not be understood by anyone else in the world-is how this Yishuv went on living
through the week or ten days of Bermuda as though nothing had happened. I do not
know how valid it is to demand of other Jews and of the goyim to help, if nothing
happened in the Yishuv when the gentlemen met there."

9 Etgar , No. 8, June 29, 1961.
lOCZA, FileS25/1853.

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We may conjecture that Gruenbaum was more than a little taken aback by Golda
Myerson's tirade. From his point of view, his stand was not devoid of logic. Whether
"anyone else in the world" grasped the matter was for him of little importance. "From
goyim and others" he expected nothing, having long since concluded that salvation
would not come from that quarter. On the other hand, to enable the rescue machinery
in Istanbul to function smoothly, there was hardly any need for disquiet in Tel Aviv
and J erusalem. Indeed, perhaps the reverse was true and all the noise and fuss would
attract attention to the activity of the emissaries, best performed clandestinely. Then
why bother people and upset thei r contentment with I ife?

This was the logic of a frame of mind divorced from reality, of a mood totally
liberated from "a warm Jewish heart." The remarks that outraged Golda Myerson
should have shown the Zionist leadership once again that if there was one person who
absolutely should not head the rescue committee, that person was Yitzhak
Gruenbaum.

In practice they did nothing, although Gruenbaum was forced to compromise
with Golda Myerson. The normal life of the Yishuv was brought to a standstill once
more a month later, on J une 15, when a protest strike was held. On that same day a
petition was circulated which contained the signatures of 250,000 adults and 60,000
children when it was handed to the British High Commissioner. This was the last time
the public was "bothered for no good reason." The next appeal to the public was made
three months later, but this time for a clear practical purpose: fund-raising.

The revelation of Yitzhak Gruenbaum's negative qualities as head of the Rescue
Committee had no effect on his position as its chairman. The reasons for this were both
personal and social. Gruenbaum's stubborn refusal to budge undoubtedly played a
considerable part, as did the tradition in the National Institutions not to remove
people from top

positions unless they resigned voluntarily. Other factors may have been at work
as well, but these are unknown to the present writer, who was unable to delve deeply
into the course of events and the personal relations within the Jewish Agency
Executive. We turn now to two other factors which we believe were in themselves
capable of preventing Gruenbaum's dismissal.

The first, visible, factor lay in the fact that not one of Gruenbaum's senior
colleagues on the Zionist Executive wished to succeed him as head of the Rescue
Committee. Some among the lower-ranking functionaries might have been willing to
assume the position, but they certainly had no chance of budging him. As for the high-
ranking echelon of the Zionist movement, not a single person among those possessing
the requisite political standing, ability and ideological prowess showed an interest in
the rescue operation to the point of devoting himself to it as the primary component of
his tasks, to say nothing of concentrating on it exclusively. Most striking in this
regard were the two leaders of the Yishuv from the ideological and practical
standpoints, Berl Katznelson and David Ben-Gurion.

Berl Katznelson, it will be recalled (Ch. 2) declared in J une 1944 that he did not
consider himself worthy of speaking about the topic of rescue. Whether this was a
modest pose of self-righteousness or a tacit admission of blame and responsibility for
what he had wrought in Davar under his editorship, the fact is that for five years, from
the onset of the Second World War until his death, Berl Katznelson maintained a
persistent silence concerning rescue work. With the exception of editorials, some of
which he may have written, and the unfortunate article (cited above), "On the
I nformants Who Kill With Their Empty Vanities," not a single article, essay or speech
of Katznelson's is known which was devoted explicitly to the destruction of Europe's
Jews. The entry for "Holocaust" is absent from the index to the twelve volumes of his
collected writings and speeches. All told, we were able to find seven instances in which
the Holocaust is mentioned, in passing, in just a few lines. I n the three meetings of the
Zionist Executive Committee described above, Berl did not say a word-if, indeed, he
even attended the meetings.

We noted Ben-Gurion's phenomenal abstention from dealing with rescue matters
at the end of the previous chapter. Here we shall point out that like Berl Katznelson, he
took no part in the debate in any of the three Zionist Executive Committee sessions
referred to above. The questions at issue were urgent and substantive, and it was to be

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expected that the chairman of thej ewish Agency would take a stand on them. But Ben-
Gurion, who was generally alert and active in similar situations, remained

absolutely silent in these meetings and did not commit himself to any position
whatsoever. Manifestly, he was no candidate for chairman of the Rescue Committee.

It is difficult to resist the temptation to conjecture that the silence of "the two
great ones" sparked a kind of fashion which was emulated by their colleagues in the
Zionist leadership. Moreover, this speculation is seemingly confirmed in the form of a
bizarre phenomenon which occurred twice during the Zionist Executive Committee
session of J anuary IS, 1943. Eliezer Kaplan and David Remez were called on to speak
about matters close to their areas of responsibility (Kaplan on financial matters,
Remez about the joint meeting with the National Council). Each saw fit to declare, one
after the other, that they were "not intervening in the debate." These were
demonstrative reservations which were not germane to their remarks. It was as
though a curtain had been drawn regarding their behavior as leaders who do not get
involved in the game which "the young men were playing before them."

The two of them, Kaplan and Remez, were each close to the rescue enterprise by
virtue of the positions they held. Eliezer Kaplan was responsible for financing and
even visited Istanbul and Egypt in this connection. At one point he also ruled in favor
of sending money "into the fog" of the Holocaust countries for rescue purposes whose
outcome was far from certain. 11 Yet he was unwilling to "take part in the debate," to
delve into the issue of the Holocaust overall. Certainly there was no chance that he
would consent to abandon the Treasury to chair the Rescue Committee.

David Remez was involved in rescue affairs in the final phases. As head of the
National Council, he was responsiblefor the refugees who managed to get to Palestine
or close to the country. He experienced the nightmare of the Struma and the failure of
the Patria. There were some matters which he grasped far better than his colleagues
did. He demanded the establishment of a "Ministry for Rescue" to be headed by a
minister who would devote himself exclusively to this one topic. But he seems not to
have considered the possibility that he himself might be a candidate for this
ministerial post. He was too busy with other matters which he considered to be of
greater importance.

It was the same with others as well. Moshe Sharett, it will be recalled, visited
London on a special mission. There he looked into rescue- related affairs as well as
dealing with a number of other subjects. When he returned to Palestine in mid-April
bearing a wealth of reports and personal impressions concerning commissions and
omissions over a period of

weeks and months, he did not consider it a calamity that his report was made to
the Zionist Executive Committee a full month after his return. As part of his duties as
head of theJ ewish Agency's Political Department, he had occasion from time to time to
intervene in Holocaust- related matters. Like Kaplan, Sharett also visited Istanbul and
from there sent a letter 'To the Faithful of Zion in Nazi Europe." In this letter he
emulates Berl Katznelson in saying that where the Holocaust is concerned, "I am
unworthy of the very responsibility which devolves upon me" 12-and also like
Katznelson, in the light of this serious assertion he does not devote himself to rescue
activity in the scope and depth which would match the extent of his responsibility. He
too would not compete for the post of chairman of the Rescue Committee with a person
who was not overly exercised by the problem of responsibility.

The third person, Israel Idelson, was quite close to the front rank of the Zionist
hierarchy, and both his standing and character made him a natural candidate to
succeed Yitzhak Gruenbaum. However, even had he wished to, he could not have
devoted himself to rescue affairs because he was deeply involved in a serious rift that
was afflicting Mapai, and which within a year would generate a split in the party.

The list of rejecters and the unwilling could be extended. Suffice it to say that in
the archives and newspapers of the time we found no indications that anyone among
the leaders of the Yishuv and the Zionist movement made any effort to take over from
Gruenbaum as head of the Rescue Committee.

The second, and more important reason which accounts for Gruenbaum's
retaining the position, is that beyond the dispute about dropping his other tasks.

1 1 Menahem Bader, Melancholy Missions (Hebrew), Sifriat Hapoalim, p. 60.

12 Secret Shield (Hebrew), Jewish Agency, 1952, p. 250.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Gruenbaum's Stands, both practical and ideological, did not seem to his colleagues in
the Zionist leadership to be negative to the point where they would interfere with the
execution of his duties. They were embarrassed by his frank and unrestrained style of
speaking. They objected to his sharply worded and, in their perception, exaggerated
comments, and his sometimes tactless public behavior. However it emerges that the
reason for their unwillingness was the fact that they saw in him an unattractive
reflection of themselves. When it came to the central questions relating to the
Holocaust, Yitzhak Gruenbaum represented the stands of the Zionist establishment
faithfully, albeit too emphatically.

The exposure of and stress placed on the embarrassing aspects of the Zionist
stand sparked anger and controversy. Thus, for example, we saw that in the matter of
his refusal to allocate money from the Zionist

funds, his colleagues cautioned him that even if he was right he should not talk
about it so bluntly. It stands to reason that his admission in the speech he delivered to
the youth movements leadership in December 1942 (Ch. 3) generated much anger and
caused quite a problem within the J ewish Agency Executive. It can also be assumed
that they were not pleased with the anti- religious outburst he permitted himself in a
public meeting devoted to the rescue of European J ewry.B On the major question,
however-priority for the "war of redemption" over rescue tasks-evidence abounds
that despite the verbal resistance he encountered from some of his colleagues, Yitzhak
Gruenbaum gave expression to theft true innermost feelings and, more importantly, to
what guided them in their actions. We will now examine this matter in some detail.

In fact, the great majority of those present in the meeting hail of the Zionist
Executive Committee and outside it as well, would have given their assent to the
feeling of helplessness and would have been ready to accept and adopt the contention
that "there is nothing that can be done." Acceptance of the idea that in any event
nothing of any import would result from the rescue efforts, constituted the emotional
underpinning of all the clarifications. This feeling was almost always concealed not
only from others but even from the speakers themselves. To admit it would be
tantamount to acknowledging the blood that was being spilled while they avoided
taking practical action. The "abyss" Kolodny saw between Gruenbaum's pessimistic
assessment and his proposals for action existed also in all but a very few of
Gruenbaum's critics- between what they said and what they felt inside. They did not
dare admit this to others or even to themselves.

That such a feeling did actually characterize the Yishuv leadership is evidenced
by direct and indirect testimonies alike.

The most convincing indirect evidence is that without the premise that a frame of
mind was created of helplessness and inaction born of despair, the events of that period
are inexplicable— most particularly the fact that Gruenbaum was permitted to remain
at the head of the Rescue Committee. We have noted some of the direct reasons for the
profuse forgiveness by the members of the Zionist Executive Committee of the mistakes
and blunders of those engaged in the rescue work. These reasons in themselves gain
reinforcement against a psychological background of despair and powerlessness. Yet
they can be said to exist and have validity only until the moment of the reappointment
of a person who declares in

the most open and most vehement manner that he does not believe in the success
of the mission that has been entrusted to him.

It stands to reason that the decision to retain Gruenbaum derived from the
feeling that it would be pointless to replace him, since no one else would be able to
accomplish "the impossible" either.

As for the direct evidence, we shall begin with the clear admission of Pinhas
Rosenblitt (Rosen) at a session of the Zionist Executive Committee. Of himself
Rosenblitt says: "I have to admit that I am at a loss, I have no counsel to offer." And of
the general atmosphere: "A mood of pessimism has been generated which brings in its

13 On June 5, 1944, Gruenbaum refused to put on a head covering at a public meeting in which the cantor was about to recite a
memorial prayer ( Ha'aretz , June 6, 1944).

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

wake a state of despair, and this state of despair gives rise to all kinds of dangerous
frames of mind. "14

Yitzhak Tabenkin, in a speech defending Gruenbaum, speaks of "appalling
hel plessness. "15 I n that speech Tabenkin argued that "nothing will save us except for
the Zionist enterprise, and that enterprise will be realized in combination with the
change that will be wrought in the world as part of the global revolution."

If Tabenkin's comment is not sufficiently clear--what kind of salvation did he
have i n m/nc/?--Davar preached a self-despair which was absolutely unequivocal. The
paper began with an editorial on November 24, 1942--the day following the J ewish
Agency statement—which asserted:

"Tongue-tied and at a loss we bend under the burden of the frightful news... And
who should we cry out to? Where is the ear that will hear? Where is the hand that will
offer help?"

This is perhaps understandable as a first emotional reaction, prior to recovery
from the "unexpected" information. Yet three months later, following careful
consideration and clarification, Davar declares that this is in fact the true situation,
one devoid of reasonable hope. The paper's editorial on February 16, 1943 (devoted to the
rescue operations) opened as follows: "Can any of us guarantee with certainty that if
we arise and mobilize all the possibilities.., that we will then succeed in reducing the
continuing slaughter there?" (Emphasis added.) Despite the qualifying "with
certainty"-this is an absolutely fatal judgment. If mobilization of "all possibilities"
does not ensure a diminution of the slaughter-not to mention its cessation- what is
the point of seeking such possibilities altogether?

1 1 was the defeatism at the top that brought about a surprising ploy on the part of
Melech Neustadt (Noy), Secretary of the World Union of Poalei Zion-Hitahdut, and one
of the few leaders who strove with all his

might to activate the rescue. The story is as follows. The excuses for the do-
nothing approach initially revolved around two main arguments: 1) nothing was
known of possible rescue modes; and 2) nothing can prevail against Hitler and his
murderous henchmen. Following publication of the Jewish Agency statement on
November 23, 1942, a third argument was added: everything is lost, the Jews are
already annihilated, there is nothing left to do. This frame of mind spread despite
Gruenbaum's optimism about the "55 ghettos" and the simultaneous existence of two
diametrically opposed viewpoints was made possible by the indolent information
service. I n February 1943 Gruenbaum offered Asefat H anivharim a colorful description
of Warsaw's "deserted and abandoned" streets following the "liquidation" of theghetto-
-three months after its actual liquidation. According to all the indications, there was
no dearth of reports and rumors at that time which preceded the reality. I n a desperate
attempt to overcome the new pretext, Neustadt resorted to a ploy which reveals the
plight that was the lot of everyone who sought to swim against the tide of do-
nothingness. Neustadt, who according to the testimony of informed persons among our
interlocutors, was among those who at the time helped terminate suppression of the
truth and helped bring about the watershed of November 23. He suddenly shifted gears
in the meeting hall of the Zionist Executive Committee and tried to persuade the
Zionist leadership that the reports about the mass murders were exaggerated and that
the situation was less desperate than it was being made out to be. Bolstering his
resistance "to the psychosis that all is lost and there is nothing left to do," he protested
against the dissemination of exaggerated reports. Like "Daf" before him he reminded
those present of the rumors which had been disseminated in the past about the
destruction of J ews but had been exposed as unreliable. This time he pointed out that
in 1918-1919 a protest rally had been held against the murder of two thousand J ews by
the Polish army under General Heller. Subsequently it emerged that the actual
number of J ews killed was (only...) two hundred.

Citing this doubtful example, Neustadt sought to draw a moral:

14CZA, FileS25/1853.

15 "Bitter Loneliness," from remarks made at the Kibbutz Hameuhad Council, January 2, 1943, "Cluster of Letters" No. 131

(Hebrew). The passage will be quoted in full later.

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"Our point of reference now should not be to count the dead. We should not accept
this idea and tell the world that two million Jews have been murdered. Our reference
point now should be who is still alive, not who has been killed and what to do about
those who remain alive."

Neustadt goes on to provide "heartening" details culled from letters received
from there: "I tell you altogether, if we were dealing with individuals, with the living,
what strange things would be revealed to us. Those who remain alive want to live. A
young man from Bratsilava [Bratislava]

writes: 'I ncidentally, I got married.' A second young man, who was deported from
Berlin to Lodz, informs his acquaintances that he has married. This shows us, in the
first place, that a connection exists between Lodz and Berlin. There are J ews alive who
cherish life. This is what we should be talking about."

Of the J ews of Warsaw, most of whom had already been murdered by this time,
Neustadt is able to say, "Who did not know that the J ews of Warsaw are dying of
hunger? They have been dying of hunger for the past two or three years." This is what
he had to say about thej ews of Warsaw in mid-J anuary 1943.

Four months later, on May IS, at another meeting of the Zionist Executive
Committee, Neustadt reiterated his reservations concerning terrifying reports about
the Warsaw ghetto-although by then the entire world knew of its final liquidation.
Neustadt: "The Warsaw ghetto may have been liquidated, or perhaps not. Nothing can
be said with certainty." He continues: "How many times did you read in the press that
there are no morej ews in Lublin? It [the Lublin ghetto] was liquidated once, liquidated
twice, [but] suddenly a letter arrives from there saying that there are Jews there."
Neustadt believes that the Nazis are "disseminating rumors: this has been liquidated,
that has been liquidated—and they want to see what impression we will form about all
this."

It is most unlikely that Neustadt's remarks influenced his audience in the
direction he wished. There can be almost no doubt that this was a ploy on his part,
adopted out of despair, and that he himself did not believe the descriptions he served
up. Evidence of this is furnished by an article he wrote in the period between the two
sessions of the Zionist Executive Committee. I n the article, entitled "Beyond the Wall,"
published in two parts in the February IS and February 25, 1943 issues of the Mapai
weekly, Hapod Hatsa'ir, Neustadt provided a detailed and substantive survey of the
situation of the J ews in Occupied Europe, based on the information in his possession.
As head of the World Union of Poalei Zion, he was the recipient of letters from members
of the movement in various countries. In addition, he regularly exchanged
information with the Kibbutz Hameuhad and Kibbutz Ha'artzi movements.l6
Evidently, then, Neustadt had more current information than most, and had plenty to
tell. 17

In the first part of the article, which focuses on Poland, Neustadt reiterates his
demand for increased aid to theJ ews there, and deplores the excuses cited by those who
are holding up such assistance. As he did in the speeches already mentioned, Neustadt
quotes a figure of 40,000 Jews still alive in Lvov and, in two other places, 19,000 and
17,000 J ews,

respectively. "In Poland," he writes, "there is no doubt that many hundreds of
thousands of Jews remain, and hundreds of thousands of our haverim." Here, too, he
warns that "we have no right to count them and to make the scale of the help
conditional on 'the results of the count'." Yet the tone of the articles differs from his
styleof speech at the Zionist Executive Committee meetings. Now there is no place for
questioning "exaggerated" numbers or appalling reports. Certainly there is no
repetition of the optimism and the "heartening" evidence about the situation that were
gleaned from the stories about the weddings. To the contrary: "Surely we will not be
relieved to hear that in Warsaw, for example, not 300,000 but 200,000 Jews were
murdered." Neustadt adds:

The intention here is not to calm anyone or to diminish in the least our anxiety
concerning the fate of our brethren. As is known, the tragedy in Warsaw is hardly the
only one. Eyewitnesses tell about terrible and perhaps even cruder atrocities--if
greater cruelty is possible-elsewhere. We shall not repeat the descriptions already

16 From testimony of Mr. Azriel Begun to the writer, October 29, 1970.

17 The survey "Beyond the Wall" was published as a special booklet by the Mapai Central Committee, 1943.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

published in the press. But we do wish to emphasize and re-emphasize that the feeling
that all is lost is causing a great setback for the Jewish survivors in the ghettos of
Poland. Since the initial conclusion is liable to be that if all is lost and there is no way
to help, then we are, as a result, exempt from every effort in this direction. It was the
same a year ago and a year and a half ago, when good and faithful haverim asked: Is
there still any way to help?... But these same things come up year after year and we
forget that we are caught in a vicious circle. There is no smooth way to render
assistance, but in the given conditions it is the means themselves that pavethe way and
create possibilities. (Emphasis added.)

Neustadt devotes the entire second part of the article to a demand for increased
help. He points out that Zionist movement activists in the countries of the Holocaust
are angry and embittered that no help is forthcoming. He reveals the full content of a
letter from Tussia Altman, written in April 1942 and published--with numerous
omissions--in /-/as/?omer /-/atsa'/r in December of that year. One of the deleted passages
was the letter's conclusion, which Neustadt now quotes: "Send regards to no one. I don't
want to know about them." Neustadt admits: "Do not think that this is characteristic of
just one movement. This is the opinion of all

thertava-/m in all the movements." To reinforce this assertion, he quotes similar
letters written, by activists in a number of movements, and concludes with a
crushingly unequivocal statement: "If I knew they were not right, I would think--they
are bitter, their situation is hard, they have the right to write these things; but when I
am convinced in my heart that they are right, and the help that was forthcoming from
us and from the entire Zionist movement was so miniscule, how is it possible to read
these letters and find consolation and expiation?"

The two concluding paragraphs of Neustadt's article show clearly the kind of help
he was urging and reveal how deeply moved he is by the entire episode:

Nor should we mix this task of [providing] speedy help with other tasks, this is
not a matter of political efforts, of talks with consuls. Confronting us is a very
straightforward matter:

immediate help for ongoing life. If we do this, we shall be renowned everywhere.
We have no conception of how great will be the reverberations and the rejoicing there,
across the walls. For these are our own /?aver/m, the members of our own family. After
all, it is pure chance that we are here and they are there. It might have been the other
way around.

And let us no longer hear what we have already heard:

let us help when the possibility arises. This was said two years ago, the matter
was checked, examined—and no progress was made. A year ago--again they waited. Let
us not forget that the possibility is created together with the means that are placed at
its disposal.

Certain passages in "Across the Walls" shed light on an important phenomenon
which we have not yet dealt with. It emerges that Mel ech Neustadt's initial and urgent
demand was relatively limited in both goal and scope. Unlike Silbershein, Zygelboim
and several others, who sought rescue for yews, Neustadt called on his comrades to
extend help in the first place for "ongoing life" for Zionists. In itself, this approach
would be justified psychologically and organizationally if the generous and vigorous
aid extended to the Zionists had served as a preface and an instrument for assisting
the whole House of Israel. I n fact, a rigid demarcation existed between the two types of
help, though this was concealed under a fog of double-talk and undarity of thought A
closer examination of the discussion at the January IS, 1943, meeting of the Zionist
Executive

Committee reveals that all the expressions of regret, shame and general emotion
uttered there referred, above all, or exclusively, to the blunders made in extending
help to members of the Zionist movement. It was also in this respect that Kaplan made
his tight-fisted concessions on funding. Moreover, it was in line with this limited goal
that the machinery of practical help had been built in Istanbul in the form of a

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representation staffed according to a party l<ey. To proffer inelp, to save members of the
Zionist movement- -tin is was considered a sacred and unassailable duty. Failure to
fulfill this duty generated bitterness. I nvolved here were, as Nuestadt put it, "our own
haverim, members of our family." As for the whole House of Israel --that was a different
matter.

It was Melech Neustadt who in an interjection (already quoted) during a session
of the Zionist Executive Committee put his finger on the very essence of the problem of
the behavior of the Zionist movement during the Holocaust. To Zokhovitzk/s qualified
comments regarding rescue possibilities, Neustadt retorted, as will be recalled: "When
you have to saveyour son, do you ask whether a possibility of rescue exi sts?"

Indeed, there is an immense difference between a son and a non-son, between a
father and a non-father. When a son's life is in danger (seriously injured, mortally ill,
held captives by murderers, etc.) his father does not cease to act. When the people
helping him (doctors, policemen) tell him that the situation is hopeless, the father
does not acceptthis. Hetries to enlist more help and looks for additional sources of aid.
To save his son he is ready to set aside all else and he does not let up until the danger
has passed or, in the worst case, until the final moment. He is fearful for his son's life
but he is incapable of imagining coolly what it will be like when, heaven forbid, the
dreadful end comes. And he is certainly not ready to make accounts and to plan in
advance arrangements which will be required when the tragedy strikes.

When it comes to someone who is not one's own son-a neighbor's son, say, or the
son of a friend or even of a close relative-the situation is different. A loyal friend will
proffer help to the best of his ability, he may even drop everything else for a time in
order to render more intense help. But if he is engaged in urgent affairs, he cannot
neglect them. And if he has worries of his own, these will probably push to second place
someone else's troubles.

The good friend, with all his loyalty and devotion, does not cease thinking about
the tangibility of the fatal result. He is capable of regarding it as an inevitability
which must be accepted in advance, with all the pain and grief that this entails. He
does not avoid thi nki ng i n terms of the post-
tragedy period, and if necessary, he is capable of planning in advance things
which will have to be done when the bitter end comes.

The World Zionist Organization was always a good and faithful friend of the
J ewish people. For the J ewish people it drew up a great plan which assured it of
redemption from the diaspora and its travails. To realize this plan it worked devotedly
and persistently for many decades. It forged and educated generations of fighters and
fulfillers who were ready to make every effort and every sacrifice to achieve the Zionist
ideal. I n Palestine the WZO created a new J ewish society on the foundations laid by its
pioneers and its loyal adherents.

With all this, however, the WZO was a friend and not a father. This fact was
revealed unequivocally during the Uganda crisis. I n that period the J ewish people was
in distress- there was no holocaust, but the distress was quite genuine. Its life in
Eastern Europe had become insupportable and large numbers of its people wandered
about the globe seeking shelter and refuge. The founders of Zionism, Herzl and
Nordau, who initially conceived of their movement as the "administator" (negotiorum
geseor) of the Jewish people could not remain indifferent to the "plight of the Jews"
which was being played out before their very eyes, and they proposed acceptance of the
Uganda Plan in order to set up in that land a temporary "night haven" until the time
became propitious for the realization of Zionism in Palestine. Their proposal was
passed by the Zionist Congress but was overturned at the last minute under the
vigorous pressure exerted by the Russian Zionei Zion group. For the purposes of our
discussion, it is quite immaterial whether the concern of Herzl and Nordau was as
sincere as they made it out to be, or whether the "plight of the Jews" was merely a
pretext to cover up the failure of their policy and to cast aside Palestine-centered
Zionism, as was alleged by the extremists among Zionei Zion (one of whose members
was the young Yitzhak GruenbaumlS). I n itself, the plight of the J ews was certainly no
fabrication, and the Zionists were compelled to cope with it in practical terms. Yet the
Zionist movement emerged from the enormous jolt of the Uganda crisis different from
what it had been at its inception. After the wandering Jewish masses were left in the
lurch and the territorial elements were plucked out of the movement, it was

18 Yitzhak Gruenbaum, Test of a Generation (Hebrew), pp. 32-57.

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determined once and for all that fulfillment of the Zionist program in Palestine was
the sole objective and could not be derailed by other problems, no matter how serious
these might be. From its status as the general custodian of the Jewish people,
responsi ble for the well being of J ews wherever they might be, as Heal had conceived of
it, the Zionist movement metamorphosed into an

organization for the fulfillment of a Zionist "project," a kind of limited
company. 19

In the meantime the standing of the World Zionist Organization within the
Jewish people underwent a sea-change. It became the strongest and most ramified of
the organizations, and because of this it was, during the Holocaust, the natural place
for expectations of rescue to be addressed-- rescue pure and simple, not necessarily in
connection with the realization of Zionism. The intensity with which the Zionists
sought to spurn this task is attested to in the remarks of Eliezer Kaplan and Yosef
Sprinzak at thej anuary 18, 1943 Zionist Executive Committee session already referred
to above.

Sprinzak, it will be recalled, offered justification for the Jewish public's turning
to the Zionist institutions with a demand for rescue. This, however, he did not do like
his colleagues who expressed their shame and regret. Since the matter involved the
whole House of Israel, there was no place for moralizing or citing one's duty. Instead,
Sprinzak called for "showing understanding" for persons who had no place to turn to
"other than this House." The ground cited by Sprinzak for responding to the
peremptory demands is not unassailable responsibility but a "warm J ewish heart,"
that same heart which had so riled Gruenbaum. Sprinzak speaks explicitly about the
observance of a "precept" and not about the fulfillment of an obligation. I mplicit in his
words is that the act in question is one of mercy beyond what is strictly required, and
due to extraordinary circumstances.

The unmistakable unwillingness of the Zionist leadership to assume
responsibility for the rescue operation was evinced at that meeting by Eliezer Kaplan
when he urged that the operation be done not "within the Jewish Agency framework
and not [through a body] attached to the J ewish Agency." This insistent refusal to
accept organizational responsibility indicates quite clearly a desire on the part of
ranking leaders to distance themselves as far as possiblefrom a matter which was not
within the purview of Zionism. This desire was manifestly unfulfi liable. Unlike the
Uganda crisis forty years earlier, this time the plight of the Jews who were pounding
on the doors of the Zionist offices could not be disregarded. The aim of drawing an
absolute separation between Zionism and rescue was unachievable. Involved was the
rescue of Zionist functionaries and of bringing pioneer-oriented youth to Palestine;
involved was a "warm Jewish heart;" involved was instructing those in the ghettos
how to behave so as not to shame Zionism; and involved were other direct and indirect
interests concerning events in the ghettos and developments in the rescue

sphere. Reality forced on the Zionist movement close and active participation in
Holocaust- related matters. But even that reality could not force on it the attitude of a
"father" when it was only a friend, and a friend, moreover, burdened with worries and
troubles of his own.

The Zionist movement's dissociation from responsibility for rescue work took
several forms. The most glaring and overriding phenomenon was the failure of the
movement's leaders to stand at the head of the rescue operation, or even to engage in
such work, with the exception of isolated passing instances. We examined above in
considerable detail the circumstances surrounding the activity of the sole exception to
the rule where a leader was concerned-Yitzhak Gruenbaum, who did occupy himself
with rescue work. It was Joel Brand, in his testimony given from the other side of the
wall, who strikingly dramatized the gross mismatch between the scope of the task and
the standing of the persons who were placed at its head. When functionaries in
Budapest informed the delegation in Istanbul of a forthcoming visit by Brand, they
received a cable in reply: "Let J oel come, Chaim is waiting for him." Brand relates:

19 For details, see Ch. 6.

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"It was clear to us that this referred to none other than Chaim Weizmann,
President of the World Zionist Organization. In other words, those in Istanbul
understood what was afoot. "20

However, expectations notwithstanding and despite the fateful ness of the hour, it
was not Chaim Weizmann who awaited Brand but Haim Barlas, a senior J ewish
Agency official in Istanbul. With him were other officials, emissaries and
functionaries, representatives of departments, parties and organizations. Not one of
them possessed the standing of a leader or decision- making and representational
authority exceeding those of a low-ranking agent. This deficiency was the subject of
public criticism in the Yishuv which at least on two occasions assumed the
dimensions of a scandal.

I n J une 1944 the head of the Al Dami group. Rabbi Binyamin (Yehoshua Radler-
Feldman) caused a furor during a public assembly devoted to the rescue operation (the
"Rescue Conference of the J ews of Palestine") by provocatively demanding the floor "at
the wrong time" (i.e., before the resolutions were read out). After he was persuaded to
speak following the reading out of the resolutions, he delivered an invective- laced
speech and called on those present to "Stop your Bermuda." Rabbi Binyamin lashed
out particularly at Chief Rabbi Herzog who had recently visited Turkey. Rabbi
Binyamin told him: "Your place is not here, but there [in Ankara, Istanbul]. "21

Two months later a public storm erupted in the wake of an article published in
Haboker by the journalist Dr. Herzl Rosenblum.22 The author was apparently in
possession of information concerning improper actions with respect to the Zionist
leader in Romania, A. L. Zissu, and about the neglect of Hungarian Jewry. Rosenblum
employed a highly abrasive style and we may take it that the article contained
exaggerations and inaccuracies. Thus, for example, we find exaggerated the allegation
that the J ewish Agency representatives in Istanbul led "lives of waste and profligacy"
in terms of their mission. And when the writer maintains that the officials there were
"of the most modest caliber" as regards quality, we may doubt whether he was
acquainted with all of them and whether he measured their "quality" according to the
criteria of the tasks assigned them by their superiors. It is not clear whether
Rosenblum's assertion that "our officials in Turkey have no access to any place-least
of all to Ankara," was actually based on substantive information. Or whether the
author took into account the special "approaches" which the Istanbul staff developed
for their task, which was essentially organizational -practical. It cannot be said
whether the article also contains other facts which are open to challenge.

However, what interests us in the article is described with absolute accuracy. The
following passage contains not one word of exaggeration:

Is it these technical officials who should be representing the J ewish people in this
place and at ttiis liour? Must it be they who are obligated to influence, make contacts,
overcome difficulties and win friends at the most painful and most dramatic juncture
in the annals of thej ewish people? Is it they who are entrusted with evaluating events
and giving advice and making decisions on matters affecting tens of thousands of
living people?

A concrete illustration of the justness of the complaint sounded by Rabbi
Binyamin and Dr. Rosenblum is the story of how Menahem Bader, emissary of the
Hashomer Hatsa'ir movement in Istanbul, sought to exercise his influence with the
Papal Nuncio in Turkey, Angelo Roncal 11.23 The visit was undertaken while Barlas
was absent from Istanbul and triggered his displeasure. Bader relates: "He [Barlas]
reacted as he did and viewed my visit as 'an act of trespass imperilling the prestige of
thej ewish Agency.' I begged his pardon."

That Bader begged Barlas's pardon may have set things right between the two
officials, but it is doubtful whether it could have righted the principal fault of the
entire episode: that it was expressly the representative of a party advocating militant
atheism who sought to wield his influence with a representative of the Catholic
Church. And with all due respect to the Jewish Agency official and his aides, it is
highly doubtful whether any of them was a suitable choice to conduct this talk in the

20 Yoel Brand, Mission for the Condemned (Hebrew), Ainot, 1957, p. 94.

21 Ha'aretz . June 6, 1944.

22 Haboker . August 18, 1944.

23 Bader, Melancholy Missions , pp. 51-53.

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first place. The fact that the Nuncio was a distinguished personality, one of the
Righteous Among the Nations-he was the future Pope John XXI 1 1 -reinforces the
likelihood of the deep inner reverberation which could have been generated between
Catholic and J ew had the latter been, let us say. Rabbi Herzog, whom Rabbi Binyamin
castigated for not remaining in Turkey as long as the current situation lasted.

This is one of any number of examples. It may be conjectured that had it been
Chaim Weizmann and not Halm Barlas who awaited J oel Brand's arrival, events would
have developed differently. Had Ben-Gurion or Weizmann been in Turkey when the
Struma dropped anchor in the port of Istanbul, who can say whether the Turks would
have dared send the ship on its way? And had Eliezer Kaplan or Moshe Sharett, or even
Yitzhak Gruenbaum for that matter, been based permanently in Istanbul, numerous
missed opportunities, along with various mistakes and blunders, might have been
avoided.

It is noteworthy that the situation in Istanbul was "ideal" as compared with the
other center for contact with the Holocaust countries, Geneva. Istanbul, at least, saw
occasional visits by leaders from Jerusalem. The delegation staff there were specially
picked for the missions assigned them, and brief contact, at least, was maintained
with them. Some of them were even replaced.

Geneva lacked even this. There were plenty of emissaries there, and more than
enough Zionist and Jewish institutions. These were emissaries who happened to find
themselves in Switzerland when the war broke out, and for the most part remained
there until it ended. All of them engaged in rescue work, each within the framework of
his office. There was an alarming lack of coordination between the activities of
institutions and of various emissaries. The tensions and quarrels among officials and
between offices were routine affairs. This important site, perhaps the principal nerve-
center in neutral Europe, did not see the visit of a single Zionist leader throughout the
entire period of the Holocaust

The truth is that neither Rabbi Binyamin nor Dr. Rosenblum said anything that
the Zionist hierarchy did not already know. Everyone knew

and many spoke about the need to place leaders of stature at the head of the rescue
organization. Some of the Zionist leaders said as much in the Zionist Executive
Committee meeting we have already referred to. Shmuel Dayan even suggested
"dispersing" to the places of danger a large part of the Zionist Executive Committee,
including the members of the Zionist Executive itself. No one objected to this idea.
Everyone seemed to grasp the need for it. Yet. ..nothing came of it.

The situation of friendly interest in the Holocaust and inability to come to the aid
of its victims is illustrated by a case related by Rabbi Binyamin in his journal
M/srtor.24 On one occasion he approached Ben-Gurion with a certain proposal relating
to rescue. Ben-Gurion heard him out and replied: "Do it, I am busy, but do it, and I will
help you." He also advised Rabbi Binyamin to visit American J ewry, and added: "If you
call a meeting, I will come. You may say so in the invitation."

Rabbi Binyamin did not go to America, and not because he did not wish to. Nor
could we find any trace of a meeting which Rabbi Binyamin organized and which Ben-
Gurion attended-this, too, it seems probable, not because a lack of desire on Rabbi
Binyamin's part. Despite the generous assurances, no help was forthcoming from Ben-
Gurion, because Ben-Gurion was "very busy." Once again we see where a road paved
with good--but unrealized--intentions leads.

A clearcut expression of the friendship-only approach to the problems raised by
the Holocaust was visible in the failure of Zionism's principal leaders to incorporate
rescue work into the operative program of the Zionist movement. The occasional public
declarations made by the leaders concerning "the tasks of Zionism at this time" never
included an assertion that the main task at that hour, or one of the main tasks, was to
savej ews who were in distress. Appeals were made to the nations of the world for help,
there was a feeling of bitterness when no help was forthcoming. There were statements
of encouragement for and commiseration with the Jews in the ghettos. But we did not
find a single direct call to the Zionists themselves to look on rescue work as an integral

24 Bamishor , April 6, 1944.

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part of the Zionist agenda. Tinis surprising pinenomenon bears even greater
ramifications if we tal<e into account tliat declarations by the leaders in various
countries were often delivered spontaneously, without coordination between them. The
contents of these declarations often differed from one another, but the absence of
rescue work as a Zionist task was common to all of them.

Upon the outbreak of the war, following Weizmann's pledge that the Jewish
people would take part in the war against Nazi Germany, Ben-Gurion declared that
Zionism would fight Hitler as though there were no White Paper, and would fight the
White Paper as though there were no war. This statement, including both of its
sections, became the banner and program of the Zionist movement throughout the
entirecourseof the war. When reports about the destruction began coming in, no third
section was added to round out the statement, to the effect that Zionism would fight to
save J ews as though there were no other problems.

In May 1942, two months after the receipt of the first reliable reports about the
mass murder of Jews in Occupied Russia, Abba Hillel Silver, leader of the American
Zionists, asserted that two principal tasks devolved upon the Zionists in the United
States: 1) to step up the pace of our people's national education; and 2) to make it clear to
non-J ews that the tragic lack of a homeland for the J ewish people was a major world
problem. 25 As for rescue--not a word.

At the beginning of 1942 Emanuel Neumann explained to a conference of
American Zionists the tasks of the Zionist Emergency Committee which was formed in
the U.S. upon the outbreak of the war. This committee helped bring Zionist leaders
from Europe to America. It worked for the immigration to Palestine of members of
pioneer-oriented groups in Europe, and helped arrange the importation to Palestine of
needed raw materials for industry. However, the committee's paramount mission was
to assist thej ewish Agency Executive in matters related to policy. 26

I n May 1942 another Zionist leader. Rabbi Stephen Wise, addressed himself to the
tasks of the American Jewish Congress, a branch of the World Jewish Congress which
was under saliently Zionist leadership. Again, not a word about rescue. 27

Rescue activity was placed beyond the pale of the Zionist activity of David Ben-
Gurion in the clearest and most concrete manner at a session of the Zionist Executive
Committee on October 15, 1942. In a lecture he delivered at this meeting, which was
devoted to the Biltmore Program, Ben-Gurion discussed the tasks of Zionism in that
period, as he saw them.

"I based it [the plan] on three elements," he said:

1) Opposition to the White Paper.

2) Establishment of a J ewish army.

3) Establishment of Palestine as a J ewish Commonwealth after the war as part of
the solution to theJ ewish plight in this period.

About rescue--not a word. This, in October 1942, when the destruction of Europe's
J ews was at its most intense.

In fact, as we saw, it was impossible to avoid dealing with rescue work, and not
only "outside theJ ewish Agency sphere" and not only in a manner not "attached to the
J ewish Agency." It was dealt with by the Zionist Executive in Jerusalem, as well as in
New York and London. It was dealt with by the Zionist Emergency Committee in
America and by the World J ewish Congress. But because rescue activity was not
considered to be among the direct tasks of the Zionist operations, it did not occupy its
appropriate place in the thoughts of the leaders and functionaries of the Zionist
movement. Not once did these leaders, whether of the front rank or lower rank, find the
time to hold a thorough discussion of the question of what, despite everything, could be
done in order to save as many J ews as possible. These persons, who for decades excelled
in their intellectual and mental ability to weary their brains, to engage in hair-
splitting analyses, and to search for ways out of the desperate situations in which
Zionism sometimes found itself, were this time not ready to sit down and think about
how to prevent the annihilation of millions of their brethren.

Nor was this all. It turns out that not only the search for modes of rescue
hampered them. Those leaders and functionaries who were entrusted with rescue
affairs did not evince sufficient forbearance to examine proposals made by persons

25 According to Davar . May 28, 1942.

26 Davar , January 8, 1942.

27 Ha'aretz . May 19, 1942.

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who had devoted thought, study and sensitivity to their ideas. They were particularly
bothered by "non-concrete" proposals--those which did not assure immediate results
in the form of rescued refugees. These proposals, which called for persistent and
widespread propaganda activities, were rejected out of hand as "insubstantial." This is
related in a powerful moral tone and with pent-up bitterness by Professor Fischel
Schneerson of the/4/ Dami group.

Writing in Davar on November 8, 1943, Schneerson describes the reaction of
Zionist leaders and functionaries to the proposals put forward by his group. These
officials, he says, are "men of action" and possess "common sense" which is a
"nihilistic sense," and they are gripped by a despair complex "which results in
negative viewpoints and opinions concerning the prospects for a war of rescue, and
from the outset defers any idea which pushes for bold and tremendous actions at any
price and under any conditions."

Professor Schneerson's chief complaint against the Zionist functionaries is their
refusal to hold consultations with people who are ready to give the matter thought. He
notes that President Roosevelt formed

a "brains trust" in order to solve the problems posed by the economic crisis in
America in the early 1930s. He points out that every doctor who despairs of curing a
patient accepts with willing understanding the suggestion of the patient's relatives to
convene a consilium of doctors "nonetheless," or to call in a famous specialist.

Then why should the Rescue Committee, for example, not enlist the best minds in
theYishuv, writers and scientists, to serve as a permanent advisory committee to work
out plans for modes of rescue though arousing [public opinion] which, while
seemingly small in scale, will as a whole and by persistence assume great scope? And
why should we not found a special institute for rescue propaganda, so that this vital
work of propaganda, which in our time is becoming a serious profession, will here, too,
not be carried out by chance improvisation, but systematically and professionally?
But these and other similar proposals find no response in the hearts of the leaders and
the circles of functionaries. The men of action who represent "nihilistic" common
sense examine every means on its own and do not consider them "substantial, " and
with a sweep of the hand they brush away all the [proposed] modes of activity together
as the fantasies of "idlers"... And if one of the idlers should try to prove that "it is
nevertheless feasible"... the men of action immediately get upset and drop the whole
discussion... Our men of action have no time or patience to enter into debates and
discussions because they are truly more than ever burdened with much work, and
especially now, when they are "also" dealing with the war of rescue.

We shall return to Professor Schneerson's illuminating essay in the next
chapter, and note that with all his with and his professional perspicacity, he short-
changed his own study of the subject by confining himself to normal psychology and
stopped short of delving deep into the special psychology of Zionism. Otherwise, he
would surely have paid heed to the semantic disparity which existed between him and
the Zionist leaders and functionaries with whom he discussed rescue work. Whereas
his intention was to engage in simple, ordinary rescue work, his interlocutors were
referring to special, Zionist rescue--i.e., aliyah (immigration to Palestine). The truth is
that for the sake of this special rescue activity they spared no effort or thought-not in
J erusalem, not in

Tel Aviv, not in Istanbul and not anywhere else. However, as we are putting the
cart before the horse here, we shall make do with this remark, which we shall try to
prove i n the comi ng chapters.

An emphatic indication of the nature of the mental attitude of Zionist leaders
toward the Holocaust is evidenced by the freedom with which they spoke about its
conjectured results. Even as they were disregarding the "exaggerated" reports about
the mass destruction, they were soberly assessi ng the scope of the slaughter which was
to be expected in the war's final phases. At the Biltmore Conference in July 1942, when
the number of murdered stood at between 700,000 and one million according to non-
Zionist estimates, and when the Zionist offices were rejecting these figures completely,
Chaim Weizmann presented to his colleagues a forecast that twenty-five percent of the
J ews of Eastern Europe will undergo physical destruction. "28 This percentage, which

28 Davar , July 14, 1942.

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was one and a half to two times the actual figure at that time, was cited by Weizmann
without any signs of recoil or reservation.

Three months later, at a Mapai conference held at Kfar Vitkin, Ben-Gurion,
basing himself on a British politician, stated that "when the war ends... it will be
necessary to find a haven for over three million [J ews]."29 The context of this remark
shows that Ben-Gurion was referring to the survivors of the destruction campaign and
that he drew encouragement from the forecast that millions would remain alive and
not less.

Outdoing both of these leaders in sobriety was Dr. Nahum Goldmann. As early as
May 10, 1942, he was able to predict that only two to three million of Europe's Jews
would survive the war,30 whereas George Lichtheim, the J ewish Agency
representative in Geneva, who for a long period refrained from conveying to J erusalem
exaggerated reports about the destruction, thought (as we saw) that Goldmann's
assessment was overly optimistic and that in fact fewer J ews would survive. 31

What made these forecasts so terrifying was that even as they were being uttered,
many of the objects of these prophecies were still alive and clinging desperately to the
hope that help would arrive. Whereas as those whom fate had ordained as providers of
help and as rescuers decreed in advance that salvation would not come. The
meaningful psychological explanation is that the doom-laden forecasts were given not
within the framework of discussions about the Holocaust but as a highly significant
factor in the discussion on the future of Zionism. Goldmann, for example, issued his
appraisal of the scope of the destruction in order to demonstrate how gloomy were
Zionism's post-war prospects. Lichtheim went so far as

to congratulate him for his courage and expressed a mocking hope that the
"mandarins" (Zionism's leaders) would forgive him for placing the item on the
agenda. Weizmann cited his 25-percent figure in a discussion on the Biltmore
Program, and Ben-Gurion occasionally brought up the issue of the survivors in his
appearances on Zionist issues. This fact hints at something of an explanation for the
contradiction between the cloudy disregard of the subject and the sober-eyed view
which coexisted in the same people at the same time. When it came to the fate of the
J ews one could shudder at the horror of it yet not believe in its existence. But when it
came to the prospects of Zionism, there was no place for evading reality: things had to
be seen for what they were, developments had to be assessed with cold logic. The
Holocaust as the annihilation of Jews was for the Zionists a tragic problem of good
J ews. The Holocaust as a factor liable to affect the realization of Zionism was for them
the fateful problem of existence or nullity.

The essence of the problem and the response to it by Ben-Gurion may be gleaned
from a perusal of his speeches from this period. The first and most crucial question was
whether enough J ews would survive to enable the realization of Zionism. Ben-Gurion's
formulation of the issue is nothing short of pellucid:

No one knows how many more will be annihilated before this war ends once and
for all. This is dreadful propaganda, atrocity propaganda which is difficult to
imagine, but what shall it profit us if we disregard it. If, heaven forbid, there is no
remnant besides thej ews of America and Soviet Russia, it is possible that there will be
no J ewish a//yah after this war, and our own future here in this country will resemble
the future of Yemen's Jews and the Assyrians in Iraq and Germany's Jews before
Hitler. 32

And again:

Hitler is liable to do away with the "bothersome problem" by destroying the Jews
of Europe. This is the only real danger, the most horrific danger now facing Zionism.
Without large-scale a//yart--who can know whether sooner or later the fate of the Jews
of Palestine will not beas the fate of the J ews of Poland. 33

Activists in the World Union of Poalei Zion-Hitahdut wrote tremblingly to a
conference of their party in March 1943: "All our post-

29 Ben-Gurion, In the Campaign , Vol. IV, p. 90, emphases in the original.
30CZA, FileL22/136.

31 Ibid.

32 In the Campaign , Vol. IV, p. 90. Emphases here and in all subsequent passages added unless otherwise specified.

33 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 255.

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war achievements depend on whether we will succeed in preventing the
destruction of our people during the war!"34 This was the problem that troubled the
sleep of Zionism's leaders, whether they were engaged in rescue work or not. It is these
fits of anxiety which can account for the spontaneous cry which escaped the lips of
Eliahu Golomb not long before the end of the war--that "more Jews than we thought
survived in Europe. "35

Ben-Gurion was optimistic.

At the Biltmore Conference he declared: "We believe in our victory. The arm of
Nazism will be lopped off and the remnant of Israel will rise up. "36

AttheKfar Vitkin conference he reiterated: "But let us hope that there will be a
remnant, that not all of them will be decimated. What will be the fate of the survivors?
They may number millions, let us hope that they will be millions. "37

At the annual Tel-Hai assembly that year he pursues the same line:

"We hope that the hand of the Nazi executioners will not reach the ent/re J ewish
people and that a remnant will survive for a diaspora. "38

He addressed the problem again that Passover, and once more offered an
optimistic appraisal: 'There is one mystery which no one could have conceived of
several years ago, and that is: How many J ews v\i\\\ remain in Europe... We have not
written off European Jewry, a remnant will arise-and for this remnant there will be
only one salvation: Palestine. "39

At the Zionist Committee Executive session in July 1943 Ben-Gurion once again
gives expression to his hope and dwells on the prospects these developments hold out
for Zionism. "However, if there is a remnant of European Jewry, and we hope despite
everything that there will be, and perhaps not a small one, at the end of the war the
victorious nations will face an acute and tragic Jewish question such as never existed
in the past. "40

In almost every one of his speeches, Ben-Gurion speaks about the prospects the
Holocaust may open up for Zionism. As early as 1941 he reminds the participants in a
Histadrut seminar in Rehovot how important the distress of J ews is for the realization
of Zionism: "If you examine the history of Zionism, you will find that all the
significant steps in the progress of Zionism were always related to the intensification
of J ewish distress. "41 He took up this question several times in his Kfar Vitkin speech.
At one point he pledges: "There will be a shortage of workers? The ghettos will fill this
shortage."42 At another poi nt he explai ns that

after the war the Jewish question will, in addition to its historical background,
finds its place "also against the backdrop of the new reality-as a question of millions
of destitute refugees who were uprooted and ruined to the very foundations in the
course of the war. "43 Later he urges a "speedy transfer of the masses of J ews to the
homeland" after the war.44 Concluding his speech, Ben-Gurion enunciates a clear
plan with a view to the end of the war:

And if it be asked: What is different now? Why will we succeed this time in
something which we did not even imagine in the last war?

This is the answer: We have two things now which we did not have then-a great
Yishuv in this land and a great calamity in the diaspora.

...And with the force of a redemptive idea the great tragedy of our nation in the
diaspora can be transformed into a tremendous lever for deliverance. The tragedy of
millions is also the redemptive power of millions. And it is the word of Zionism... to
cast the great J ewish tragedy in prodigious moulds of redemption. 45

This program was implemented after the war and brought about the
establishment of the State of Israel. Its wonderful success did much to make people

34 Iddisher Kempfer . April 2, 1943.

35 Haboker . October 19, 1944.

36 In the Campaign . Vol. IV, p. 30.

37 Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 90.

38 Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 123.

39 Ibid., Vol. Ill, pp. 134-183.

40 Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 255.

41 Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 68.

42 Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 95.

43 Ibid., p. 99.

44 Ibid., p. 88.

45 Ibid., p. 102. Emphases in the original.

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forget the mistakes and blunders which preceded it. At the same time the ostensibly
profound thesis that the Holocaust was a necessary precursor of the State-though
expressed in embarrassed whispers--gained credence.

Since the greater part of the anxiety about the lives of the Jews stemmed from
concern about the realization of Zionism, it is no wonder that at the height of the
destruction, in the midst of hope and apprehension, Ben-Gurion presented the current
task of Zionism as follows:

/And t/?e/yrsttrt/ng wearecalled upon to do isto pay heed to those groups which the
Hitler danger did not reach, and they are the few, those who have already been spared
the danger-these are the Jewish groups in the East... There is in the East a series of
J ewish groups which are not very big, neighbors of ours: in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Egypt,
Tripoli, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Perhaps in another few months-in the Balkans
as well. We are obligated to show special concern and urgent

and vigorous treatment for these groups--in order to save them in time and bring
them to this country.46

These words were spoken at Passover 1943, when the Warsaw ghetto was in
flames. Ben-Gurion seems to have expected that the Balkans would be liberated within
a few months. I n the countries of North Africa the expulsion of the Germans was about
to becompleted with the surrender of their forces in Tunisia within a matter of days.
Nor were there any Germans in Iraq, Syria or Egypt. In some of these countries the
situation of thej ews was insupportable, although the danger of total annihilation had
passed. These Jews were available for rescue, meaning for aliyah. It was toward them
that the Zionist movement directed its energies.

As for theJ ews of Occupied Europe--what could be done? Gruenbaum was dealing
with them. And the boys in Istanbul would save as many as they could. Let us wait and
let us hope that a remnant survives, perhaps a large remnant...

The Zionist movement, whose standing and strength within the Jewish people
thrust upon it the task of rescuer and savior, took a friendship-only attitude toward the
pi ight of E urope's J ews.

46 Ibid., Vol. Ill, pp. 133-134.

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Chapter Five

Interim Summaries, Psychology and Ideology

In his letter to the present writer (see Introduction), Moshe Sharett takes him to
task by hinting transparently that he (the author) has only now come out with his
criticism, "when we all have the wisdom of hindsight and can allow ourselves the
luxury of prophesying the past." Similarly, David Ben-Gurion, in his letter, suggests,
albeit with polite reservation, that he does not "hold with accusations after the fact."
In the author's reply to Sharett of August 15, 1962, an initial, general response was
adduced to his and to Ben-Gurion's argument. Its gist was that prior ignorance of what
is liable to occur is not only an unacceptable argument for national leaders, but in fact
constitutes a serious accusation. This is particularly true with respect to the Zionist
leaders whose duty it was, as S.Z. Rubashov said, to have been aware of the dangers
lurking for the nation and did not have the prerogative of being taken by surprise. One
cannot but be apprehensive lest the same line of reasoning put forward separately and,
in their own eyes, convincingly, by each of the two leaders mentioned, will occur also to
at least some readers and will become an intellectual barrier against their grasping
the thesis being propounded by the author. This apprehension in itself would justify
devoting a special chapter to a clarification of one major question: What should and
what could the Zionist movement have done during the Holocaust years to rescue] ews?

In addition to constituting an attempt to overcome this baffler, where it exists,
this chapter will serve also to deal with what we believe to be the "easy" answers out
forward in the face of the problems of rescue from two opposite directions. On the one
hand, there are those who view the failure of the Holocaust years as a "conspiracy of
betrayal," and so forth; while on the other hand, efforts are made to resolve the grave
questions through recourse to objective factors such as psychology, war conditions, and
the like. Nor shall we refrain from putting forward our own answer which, we believe,
can contribute to understanding the Zionist failure in the Holocaust.

One introductory remark: since we are dealing expressly with the Zionist
movement, and not with merely one morej ewish rescue organization, we wish to spell
out clearly that this movement did not have to forgo either Zionism or the aims of
Zionism, nor to relinquish the immediate objectives created by the situation and by the
prospects which were opened up to the movement. To the contrary, as we have already

indicated several times, in order to fulfill its duty to the Jewish people in that
terrible period, the movement should have been more Zionist and not less so. With this
premise as our point of departure, we shall rephrase our original question thus: What
needed to have been done (and by whom?) for the Zionist movement to fulfill its
obligation of rescuing J ews during the Holocaust years? For the sake of completeness,
we shall take the liberty of recalling some of the points we have already made in
earlier chapters.

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Outrage at "prophesying the past" is a legitimate stance when it refers to
criticism which castigates people for faults of commission or omission stemming from
a failure to foresee events which were difficult to forecast, or from an ignorance of
certain facts which should have been known. But outrage is inadmissible when the
criticism is directed above all at the ignorance itself; and when that ignorance,
moreover, was the result of an unwillingness to know and to believe information
which others, who were concerned parties, knew and believed. We have seen how the
WZO, its newspapers and its institutions, worked for at least nine months in an effort
to void the credibility of the reports about the destruction. We saw how the American
Zionists consented to conceal from world knowledge for three months the report--which
was in their exclusive possession-concerning Hitler's decision to annihilate
forthwith all of Europe's J ews; how, even after November 23, the Zionist institutions
continued to base themselves on and support Nazi information, of all sources (e.g., the
issue of the 55 ghettos). One can try to explain these and other acts and blunders: but to
try to erase the "original mark of shame" by delegitimizing the criticism as
"prophesying the past"--this is not to betaken seriously.

A second element of outrage against prophesying the past could stem from the
well-known syndrome by which the researcher of past events finds it relatively easy to
say what was "right" and what was "wrong" in the behavior of the actors in the events.
Thus, one argument holds, the researcher should not hasten to judge mistakes which
were made under intense pressures and in the rush of events, basing himself on
criteria which he evokes in a state of tranquility, sitting in his easy chair at his desk,
and in full knowledge of the outcome of the decisions. Manifestly, this rule is useful for
every historical study, and naturally for the study of the Holocaust as well. Below (Ch.
15) we shall have occasion to consider the perversion of history and of justice being
wrought by researchers who set themselves up as moral izers and judges ws-a-v/s those

who were trapped in the ghettos and imprisoned in the concentration camps. At
the same time, we believe that as regards the persons and organizations who were
supposed to act as rescuers from the Holocaust, the "wisdom of hindsight" is not only
justified, it is absolutely essential.

A post factum examination of this issue is justified because second only to the
obligation of knowing what was occurring, which we put to the appointed rescuers, was
the obligation of judiciousness and of a search for ways and means to perform the task
assigned them. In other words, the heads of the movement, its leaders and thinkers,
should have thought the matter out and launched their own search, and not dump the
rescue mission in the laps of a few functionaries. Yet the very opposite process
occurred. The debate at thej anuary IS, 1943, session of the Zionist Actions Committee
dramatizes how the task of thinking about what to do fell on Yitzhak Gruenbaum and
half a dozen second- and third-rank functionaries, while the likes of Ben-Gurion, Berl
Katznelson, Chaim Weizmann and others with proven powers of conceptualization
"did not intervene in the discussion." At a time when the emergency situation and the
scope of the calamity demanded unequivocally a deviation from normalcy and from
routine, the behavior of the appointed rescuers continued to conform to the thought
and speech patterns of priority for the "war of redemption" over anything that was not
a war of redemption. Because they made no effort to breach the walls of normalcy,
nothing innovative was attempted, and indeed nothing substantive was
accomplished.

It is right and proper to "come with complaints" to the Zionist movement and to
cast a powerful light on their mistakes-and not only for the sake of doing historic
justice to the annals of the Holocaust. This clarification is required because the history
of our people in exile has not yet run its course. The dangers lurking for the J ewish
people in certain situations in various lands still exist. No guarantee has been given
that what happened to the J ews of Europe in the early 1940s will not threaten some
J ewish community sometime in the future with some form and degree of disaster The
successors of the original Zionist movement-the State of Israel and the World Zionist
Organization--continueto be the rescuers in posse of Jews everywhere. As long as the
causes of the blunders during the Holocaust have not been exposed and expunged, they
are liable to generate new versions of estrangement from the distress of the Jews,

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

whether out of a frivolous attitude, or because priority is given to a "war of
redemption" in new incarnations.

Because the Zionist movement was unable to come up with and implement
appropriate means of rescue, Holocaust researchers, who have before them the full
story of this unfortunate experience, have the duty to avail themselves--explicitly--of
the wisdom of hindsight in order to familiarize themselves thoroughly with the
events, grasp their significance, and draw the lessons from what took place, lest the
experience of the past be lost for future generations.

Those wishing to adduce a psychological explanation for the behavior of the
Zionists during the Holocaust, will arrive at no productive conclusions unless and
until they pinpoint the one special factor which exerted a crucial influence on that
behavior. Without taking this factor into account--and in our opinion, it does not lie in
the realm of psychology itself--no substantive results are possible. At best,
psychological explanations have been able to put forward a description of what
happened, but not an exhaustive explanation. They discovered indirect psychological
reasons for certain behavior, but not its root cause. In this way they provided an
answer to the question of "how" but did not reach the "why." I n any case, a clarification
of this kind would be incapable of offering a sufficient answer to the question of what
should have been done in order to remove the causes of the blunders and failures. This
assumption is equally applicable to the major blunder in the sphere of information,
and to the many failures of commission and omission. From this point of view, it is
immaterial whether the purpose of the clarification is justification, accusation, or
objective elucidation. Nor is it germane whether the clarification was carried out after
the fact or at the hei ght of the H ol ocaust.

I n the previous chapter we referred to the psychological essay of Professor Fischel
Schneerson. In it he describes most illuminatingly the inability of the Zionist
leadership to cope with the problems that confronted it. Schneerson depicts the
psychological backdrop to this gross impotence, and he offers convincing proposals for
a change of approach and for dealing with current events. Yet the author seems not to
have considered that, above and beyond this, he should have searched for and found a
way to ensure that the points he makes would in fact exert an influence on his readers
and that his proposals would in fact be accepted by the decision makers. Had he set
himself this task, he would very likely have posed the question: Why was it that all
these people suffered from the psychological affliction which he describes in his
article? The quest for an answer to this question might have revealed the prop and the
lever

which were required to get things done. But Prof Schneerson did nor set himself
this additional task and therefore did not pose the critical question or find the answer.

Prof. Schneerson's essay focussed on the failures of commission and was written
from a critical perspective. For the sake of completeness, we shall turn to another
attempt at a psychological explanation, this one devoted to the information blunder,
and written from a clearly apologetic stance. We refer to the short and trenchant
replies of Yitzhak Tabenkin and Yitzhak Gruenbaum to an attack by Meir Yaari. The
story of the tripartite polemic between them is instructive.

On January 6, 1943, the weekly f-iastiomer Hatzair published an article by MeW
Yaari entitled "I n the Face of the Calamity." In the concluding section Yaari set forth
his reaction to the report describing Gruenbaum's appearance at the youth movement
meeting, writing:

\Ne confront a mystery which disturbs our rest. According to some newspapers,
Gruenbaum related on one occasion that thej ewish Agency Executive received reports
about the atrocities some months ago, when the Germans had advanced to El Alamein.
It is reported in his name that the Jewish Agency suppressed these atrocity reports to
sparetheYishuv additional consternation in the period of the siege of Egypt. Knowing
Gruenbaum as we do, we find it difficult to accept the proposition that he was capable
of arguing with us about the Biltmore Plan and about political perspectives without
revealing something of these dreadful reports. Yet even if I assume that the J ewish

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Agency was not fully apprised about the situation in Poland, I will now face a dilemma
in trying to determine which of the two accusations is the graver: that it knew, or that
it did not know? If it knew, we are confronted with a virtually unexampled act of public
fraud; and if it did not know, that is an act of criminal negligence which also is
probably unexampled. Two months ago the pamphlet of the Bundist Zygelboim, with
an introduction by Lord Wedgewood, was published in London, containing a detailed
description of the destruction campaign. Residing in London was Berl Locker. The
pamphlet was widely disseminated, and only the J ewish Agency's news service,
Palcor, seems to have missed it completely. This pamphlet was published by a Bundist
and not by Dr. Schwartzbart and not by Berl Locker,

and in the meantime Ben-Gurion sat in Washington discussing a Jewish army
and the Biltmore Plan. You ask yourself in astonishment: Wliat iiappened to ttie Zionist
movement? Have we lost all proportion and direction? (Emphasis added.)

Forthright words. Yaari reiterates the charges voiced a month earlier by David
Zakal, Anshel Reis and Moshe Aram, but aims them directly and deliberately at the
Jewish Agency and the Zionist leadership. From our perspective, the authenticity of
his argument seems to be somewhat undercut by the fact that he does not hesitate to
vent his moral wrath in the midst of the war against the establishment of a Jewish
army and a J ewish state; at the time, however, when these two issues--army and state-
were still under debate, this stance did not detract from the force of the attack, and in
some quarters undoubtedly even strengthened it. At all events, in this case serious
allegations were levelled not by private individuals and not from outside the Zionist
camp. The harsh critique by the head of a major land-settlement movement and the
leader of an important political trend obligated a clear and convincing reply. The reply
came--quite convincingly.

Two weeks after the appearance of Yawl's article, the journal of the Kibbutz
Hame'uehad movement published a speech delivered by Yitzhak Tabenkin at a
meeting of the kibbutz movement council held at Ramat Hakovesh.l In this speech
Tabenkin sets out to explain--and defend- -the information failure, and to account for
the attacks on Gruenbaum. Like Rubashov a month earlier, Tabenkin bemoans the fact
that the destruction of the J ews had been perceived as a surprise despite Zionism's
doctrine of catastrophe: "After all, we knew, we warned and we were warned. The
disciples of Borochov, the disciples of Syrkin, the disciples of prophecy and the
disciples of the movement of world revolution, who knew that one effect of the
revolution would be the collapse of J ewish existence in the world-how was it that they
did not raise the banner of catastrophe Zionism day in and day out!" Unlike Rubashov,
however, Tabenkin does not speak about an "original mark of shame" but seeks to
explain, to understand, to justify.

It is not true that we did not know what the J ews of Europe were undergoing. We
knew everything! And now we seek out the blame amongst ourselves! But ttiis is an
expression of appalling helplessness: we know who is to blame, but it is difficult to
punish him. So we look for the blameworthy

amongst ourselves. What did Gruenbaum do that we should blame him? Look at
Davar for the past half year and you will see that we knew everything: gas, electricity,
hangings, massacres. Everything was known. But when we encountered the people
who came from there, from the Vale of Slaughter, we underwent a powerful experience.
And we felt the full terror of the horror. (Emphasis in the original.)

Tabenkin's comments were not aimed directly at Yaari; indeed, the speech was
delivered a few days before Yaari's article appeared. 2 Yet in retrospect, they do
constitute a reply to the latter's attack. Then, in a meeting of the Zionist Actions
Committee, Yitzhak Gruenbaum quoted Tabenkin in order to castigate Yaari in no
uncertain terms: 'Yaari wrote, if I am not mistaken, that if these things were known
and not made public, this was a sin which cannot be atoned for. If these things were not
known and therefore were not made public, this was a sin of negligence. And I say to

1 "Bitter Loneliness," "Cluster of Letters" No. 131, January 22, 1943.

2 Tabenkin spoke at the Kibbutz Hameuhad Council on January 2.

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you, Yaari, you read but you paid no heed [to what you read]. You heard[?] that these
were merely fine but empty phrases. "3

This is exactly what he said: you paid no heed... empty phrases...

We came across no documentation to the effect that Yaari accepted the rebuffs of
Tabenkin and Gruenbaum, but it stands to reason that he was quite impressed by
them. Certainly it was made clear to him that if there was something amiss, he, too,
was an accomplice. Like Tabenkin, Gruenbaum and others, he had known what was
taking place. Like them, he "paid no heed," gave no warning. What gave him the right
to be critical of others?

Yaari concluded his J anuary 6 article by noting that it was "to be concluded" in a
future issue. But there was neither conclusion not continuation. Not in Hashomer
Harzair and not, as far as we have been able to ascertain, anywhere else. The very
serious question of deceiving the public and of losing all proportion and direction,
remained pending. (Interestingly, when Yaari's article was reprinted in two
collections, one of his own writings [1947] and the other in a Hashomer Hatzair
anthology [1956], the passage quoted above was omitted.)

By assailing Yaari's fight to act as a moralizer, Tabenkin and Gruenbaum did not
lighten their own responsibility or their joint blame with him. Tabenkin's reference to
the powerful experience which accompanied the encounter with the refugees is barely
a description, and certainly cannot constitute an explanation. Thus, the question
which is implicit in the criticisms levelled at that time remains unanswered: Why

did the intensity of the experience not suffice for the Zionists, in a place and
under circumstances which offered a surfeit of experiences for non-Zionists? The case
of Zygelboim-Schwartzbart is a striking illustration. Both were in London; both were
members of the Polish National Council (the parliament-in-exile); both were close to
the Polish government and had access to its sources of information. For the Bundist
Zygelboim, the "experiences" were sufficient to spur him to set in motion feverish
rescue efforts, and ultimately, when these efforts proved unavailing, to impel him to
take his own life. For Schwarzbart, the Zionist, the experience proved not sufficiently
intense for him to take part in disseminating authenticated and reliable information,
like his Bundist colleague.

As for Tabenkin's attempt to adduce a psychological explanation for the
criticisms levelled at Gruenbaum, no clarification of this is required because no
special explanation is required either. Gruenbaum was blamed because he was a clear
and palpable bearer of blame. It was only natural for the criticism and rage to be laid
at his door. What was not natural, and what therefore does require an explanation, is
why, despite everything, Gruenbaum continued to fulfill this particular task
throughout the years of the Holocaust.

As unconvincing as the psychological explanations are, the psychological-
circumstantial, or purely circumstantial, explanations are even less credible.
Essentially, this refers to various versions of the argument that the information
blunder resulted from the fact that in 1942 the Yishuv, faced with the danger of
occupation by Rommel, was mentally incapable of absorbing the reports about the
destruction in Europe. All the indications are that the copyright for this theory is held
by Yitzhak Gruenbaum, who first propounded it at a meeting of youth movement
leaders in early December 1942 (see Chapter 3), a few days after the November 23
announcement. So great a public success did the theory enjoy, that four years later, in
December 1946, its conceiver did not hesitate to serve it up to the 22nd Zionist Congress
in Basle. I n the report of the Rescue Committee to the supreme institution of the Zionist
movement, Gruenbaum explained: "At that time (fall 1942), when the tenor of an
invasion of Eretz- Israel had already been lifted, and the war front had become remote
following the victory at El Alamein, it was possible for ttie Yistiuv to turn its tieart to
concern for itsbretliren in tiiedying diaspora of Europe. "4 (Emphasis added.)

Nor is this all. If the report of his speech at that meeting, as published in
Habolaer, is accurate, Gruenbaum also adduced a

3CZA, File L25/1 851.

4 Report of the Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to the 22nd Zionist Congress, December 1946.

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psychological-circumstantial explanation for the failure to take action in that
period. It emerges from his remarks that in the severe military situation in which the
Allies found themselves, it was inconvenient to bother them with the troubles of J ews.

The situation of the democratic powers was difficult! Could we request that they
put a stop to the slaughter in Poland? Jhe turning point came in October. Rommel was
beaten back in Egypt. The liberation of Stalingrad began and the Russians burst
forward. The Americans and the British assaulted North Africa and Darlan joined the
Allies. Now the possibilities were forged for requesting and demanding. Now our hearts
were also freeto turn to this matter. (Emphases added.)

During our years of work on this study we also encountered other versions of the
hearts-that-were-not-free theory, both verbally and in written material. One of our
interlocutors, a person who at the time engaged in an impressive effort to ask questions
and arouse people's conscience, came up with a somewhat far-reaching notion. The
whole episode, he said, was an act of divine mercy for the Yishuv: the Yishuv was
encased in the armor of insensitivity in a period of great mental distress, in the face of
the enemy approaching via North Africa, and in this way it was saved from a total
collapse. However, we found it impossible to accept this idea, which would make the
Lord of the Universe a partner to the sin of (p. 142 in book, end of 3rd paragraph).

Given the detailed description in previous chapters of the information blunders,
no herculean efforts seem called for in order to reject the hearts-that-were-not-free
argument as unproductive, inconsistent with the facts, and, indeed, as explaining
nothing. Suffice /tto recall that the denial and suppression of the reports about the
destruction began in March 1942--three months before Rommel's offensive. Moreover,
the suppression extended not only to the papers and institutions in Palestine, but to
the Zionist offices and institutions throughout the free world, including areas that
were in no danger of German occupation. Furthermore, even after the Rommel threat
no longer existed, and even after November 23, there were striking instances of close
recourse to Nazi propaganda. Manifestly, then, this generally accepted argument is
refuted in terms of both time and place.

I n passing, it bears noting that even from the standpoint of psychological theory,
it is far from certain that apprehension about the fate

of the Yishuv would have been a disruptive factor in absorbing the truth
concerning the events in Europe. True, it is probable that the concern and
preoccupation regarding the immediate future of the Yishuv could have diverted
attention and energy from actual operations to rescue J ews from the countries of the
Holocaust. But we can find no logical basis for the argument that the looming troubles
from the direction of Egypt would necessarily blunt the sense of belief and
understanding for the troubles occurring in Europe. In fact, it seems to us that if the
opposite development had occurred, and instead of denial and suppression a wave of
awakening and solidarity would have surged up, this would admit of a dearcut
psychological explanation--how the approaching calamity from Egypt opened people's
eyes and hearts to the distress of others. To illustrate the point, we will note that
serious accusations of indifference and failure to help which were voiced against
American Jewry both during and after the war, were usually accompanied by the
contention that the geographical remoteness of these J ews from the actual scene of the
troubles sealed their hearts to the distress of their European brethren.

As for Gruenbaum's argument that the Zionist leadership could not request help
from the Allied powers out of consideration for their dire military straits, this is triply
refuted by reality. First, the help required was not military as such but political-
military, with the political aspect clearly dominant. No one was about to demand the
immediate liberation of Warsaw or Bialystok in order to rescue the J ews imprisoned
there. Indeed, in this period the idea of bombing the concentration camps had not yet
been put forward, and not enough was yet known about the sophisticated destruction
installations located in the camps.

Second, it bears recalling that precisely the period of J une-August 1942 saw the
first wave of public awakening in London regarding the destruction of European
Jewry. As we saw, it was then that the detailed reports arrived from the Bund in
Poland, the On6gS/7at)t)at group in Warsaw, and from Polish government sources. The
awakening encompassed enlightened and influential groups in the J ewish and non-
J ewish populations alike, who issued calls for help to the British and American

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governments. The reverberations of this arousal reached New Yorl< and other major
centers of the free world. Yet at this very time the Zionist institutions everywhere stood
out by their reserved and moderate attitude. They demanded nothing from others, or
from themselves.

Third, when it came to matters of genuine substance, the Zionist leaders were not
exactly known for their hesitation or faint- hearted ness in their relations with
political elements of all kinds, at any time and under

any circumstances. The war years saw no backtracking from the principle of
Zionism's precedence over absolutely everything else. The very fact that Gruenbaum
could put forward this concessionary argument, shows once more just how far the
rescue mission was from being a Zionist mission in his eyes.

The argument of pure circumstance, without the element of psychology, relates to
the poor communications facilities. Postal and telegraph services, it was said, were
faulty everywhere. No regular contact was possible with the countries of the
Holocaust. Under these circumstances, then, it was only natural that people did not
know what to believe or what to do. This version of events is in fact implicit in Sharett's
wisdom-of-hindsight argument and in Tabenkin's story about the experience which
was not intense enough. Like the hearts-that- were- not-free descriptions, it bases itself
on one part of reality but disregards the second and more crucial part. It is true that
communications were poor. It is true that regular contact with the Occupied Europe
could not be maintained. Worse: Nazi propaganda added a deceiving and confusing
element. All this is true and well-known. However, also well known is the fact that,
despite everything, numerous reports arrived from reliable and authoritative sources,
and why these reports were rejected is quite incomprehensible. Why did the
information received from Ringelblum in Warsaw or from Zygelboim in London have
to be cross-checked with Rabbi Ehrenpreis in Stockholm? Why were the Poles and the
Russians not believed-while the Germans, of all people, were believed? Why, instead
of becoming a faithful source of information and an inspirational center for activity,
did the WZO become instead an obstacle to the reception of the truth about the events in
Europe and to the proffering of aid and rescue? These and similar facts, as related
above (and more are yet to come) refute the poor-communications argument, just as
they refute other apologetic explanations. Facts are stubborn: an attitude of forgiving
justification does not annul them, just as a furious attack, as such, does not relegate
them to their proper place. Facts, after they have been determined and authenticated,
need to be explained.

No great perspicacity is required to answer the question of what the Zionist
movement should have done during the years of the Holocaust. The answer can even be
formulated in varying styles of speech, in accordance with differences in habits of
thought and with the manner in which different people absorb such statements. It can
be said that it was Zionism's duty to place rescue at the head of its concerns; that to this
end

it should have mobilized all the human, material and intellectual resources at
its disposal; that modes of rescue should have been sought by means of relentless
activity in various directions and by means of intense thought day and night. In
negative terms, it can be said that non-action based on pretexts of any kind, such as
"There is nothing that can be done," should have been studiously avoided; that noting,
no matter how important, should have been allowed to divert attention from the goal of
rescue. Using a "traditional" style, it can be said that such activity should have been
carried out with absolute dedication. And, again in negative terms, it can be recalled
that "A precept for which thej ewish people did not lay down their lives, is as tough not
carried out by them."

But the fact is that these things, and others like them, were said, and not only by
"prophesiers in hindsight." In the very period of the Holocaust they were voiced by
persons inside and outside the Zionist camp: they were uttered byMelech Neustadtand
Anshel Reis within the rescue establishment; pleas came from Prof. Schneerson and
his colleagues in the "El-Dami" group; excoriation was heard from the "Baderech"
group in Agudat Israel; and contrition was expressed by Zaiman Rubashov and Israel

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I delson. I n London Shmuel Zygelboim cried out from the depths of his heart. And from
the countries of the Holocaust were heard the agonized voices of Rabbi Weissmandel, of
Tussiah Altman, and of others. Some of these people were highly articulate and spared
no effort to get their message through to the public at large and to the Zionist
leadership. But they managed to change nothing, neither in deed nor in thought. The
dislocated mind of the Zionist society, encompassing all its levels and all its ranks,
simply did not ingest these simple and logical remontrances. The leaders and the
functionaries disregarded them or rejected them as exaggerated and absurd. The
sources of these descriptions were treated, at best, forgivingly, and in many instances
with disbelief and suspiciousness. This attitude persisted throughout the entire
Holocaust period, before November 23 and thereafter as well--until the end of the war
and the cessation of the destruction.

We return, then, to the question which, we believe, should have been posed at the
time by Prof. Schneerson, namely: What should, and what could, have been done in
order to imbue the Zionists with the capacity to absorb his contentions? Following the
image we posited in the previous chapter, we shall rephrase the question as follows:
How could the Zionist movement have been transformed from a friend of Europe's] ews,

a friend busy and preoccupied with his own affairs, into a 'father" who would
know no rest in looking for ways to rescue his sons?

Two conjectures present themselves concerning the essence of the task. First, it
may be taken for granted that the answer to the question would entail imbuing
Zionism with new qualities of character which it had always lacked. Second, we can
investigate whether the alienation, as described in Chapter 4, is not actually an
inherent quality of Zionism but an acquired trait, a kind of deformity caused by a
serious illness. The first conjecture, if correct, would all but rule out any great hopes.
While the second assumption, if verified, would suggest that the task was in fact a very
formidable one, but not without prospects of success. As we indicated earlier, we
believe thesecond conjecture to bethevalid one: the illness that afflicted Zionism was
the Uganda Crisis. The Zionist movement emerged from that fateful episode wanting
and deformed--a deformity the movement retains to this day. The next chapter, then, is
devoted to an examination of the Uganda Crisis and its consequences for the behavior
of the Zionists during the Holocaust.

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Chapter Six

The Uganda Episode

In his opening speecin to the 6th Zionist Congress, on August 23, 1903, the
president of tine Zionist Organization, Dr. Tineodor Heal, took the delegates by surprise
with a bombshell announcement: the British government had offered the Zionists a
region for autonomous J ewish setflement.l The area in question, it later turned out,
was located in East Africa, between Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, and a place known as
the Mau Escarpment2--an expansive area in which thej ews could carve out a suitable
territory.

The Congress was overwhelmed at the news, and the hail and galleries resounded
with waves of applause. "Three cheers for England!" the delegate Israel Zangwill cried
out. And the Congress responded fervently. Everyone present rose. Hats and hankies
were thrown into the air. The crescendo of applause lasted for several minutes. 3

Thus began the fateful crisis which struck the Zionist movement and changed it
irrevocably. Although the proposed territory was located in Kenya, it was referred to,
apparently mistakenly, as Uganda--the neighboring territory--and the dispute over
England's offer entered history as the Uganda Crisis. 4

There was plenty to be overwhelmed about. Great Britain, which ruled seas and
continents, the world empire on which the sun never set--this great power had
generously responded to the distress of the J ews by placing at their disposal an
extensive territory, sparsely populated and boasting a comfortable climate. The
British had recognized Dr. Herzl and his organization as the representative of the
J ewish people for the purpose of this settlement. The Zionist Organization thereby
reached a new zenith of prestige and representation, immeasurably exceeding its
actual numerical size and its organizational strength. Following a series of failures
and disappointments in diplomatic negotiations with the mighty of the world. Heal
had finally achieved a palpable success.

In his opening address Herzl several times pledged that the East African
territory was not intended to supersede Palestine and would not detract from the
aspiration of the Zionist movement for "the land of our forefathers." On the other hand,
"Naturally this is not Zion and it cannot become Zion. "5 The movement would not call
on the Jewish people to leave their homes and come in their masses to this place. The

1 Stenographic minutes of tlie 6tli Zionist Congress (German), pp. 8-9 (liereafter: 6tli Con.,).
2Ibid., p. 215.

3 Ibid., p. 9.

4 In the 6th and 7th Congresses the speakers generally referred not to "Uganda" but about "East Africa.'

5 6th Con., p. 9.

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importance of the proposed territory lay in its ability to serve the urgent needs of the
emergency afflicting thej ewish people. Nor was Herzl asking the

Congress to accept the British offer immediately. He proposed that a special
commission be set up to visit the site and investigate the matter thoroughly. It was
over this proposal--the selection of a commission and the determination of its powers--
that the first act of the Uganda Crisis was played out.

The preliminary discussion took place within the framework of the
Landsmanschaften, delegates grouped in accordance with countries of origin, which
made up the Congress. Within two hours of Herzl's speech, all the groups with the
exception of the Russians had given their assent to the establishment of the
commission. 6 However, when the question was raised in the plenum a vituperative
debate ensued which was destined to rage for two full years after the 6th Congress and
not to be concluded until the 7th Congress.

According to all indications, Herzl's close associates were under heavy pressure
from the leaders of the movement. His distinguished friend. Max Nordau, supported
him in a manner redolent more of loyalty than of sincerity.7 Nordau, in his major
speech on the second day of the Congress, devoted only a few concluding sentences to
"Uganda" while coining the term which instantly caught on as the watchword for the
scheme: the East Africa territory could serve as a Nachtasyl, a "nightsheller," for the
masses of Jews who were wandering about the world seeking a roof over their heads.8
In a second speech, shortly before the vote, Nordau put forward two additional
arguments. One was that the Jews could use Uganda as a site for training in good
citizenship; and the final reason, " which no one had thought of," was that a yes vote
(for the establishment of the commission) would express the Congress's confidence in
its leader and enable /tto give a courteous reply to Britain's generous offer. 9 Following
this Nordau took almost no part in the debate over Uganda, although he would be the
target of an assassination attempt by a crazed zealot. At the 7th Congress Nordau, who
served as president, fulfilled his duties in administering the debate and the voting on
the Uganda question, but once more did not participate in the debate.

The explanation for Nordau's unusual behavior apparently lies in the fact that
out of loyalty to his friend Heal heforced himself to defend an idea with which he was
not in wholehearted agreement. In contrast to Nordau, however, the great majority of
the participants in the debate evinced profound mental and intellectual sincerity. The
Uganda Episode bared the deep-lying roots of the opinions and feelings which
prevailed in the Zionist movement, and as such provides a key for understanding
events which occurred decades later.

At the outset of the debate, in the 6th Congress, both sides had a common point of
departure. Both held as self-evident the proposition that the Zionist movement was the
solerepresentativeofthej ewish people, t\r\es\ng\e authorized guardian, whose task it
was to administer the affairs of the nation in all matters. This assumption was given
explicit expression by several of the speakers on both sides of the question, 10 and is
implicit in the speeches of others. It was on this underlying premise that the
supporters of the Uganda proposal based their argument: The Jewish masses are in
distress; they are wandering about the earth in search of a place to live; they cannot
wait until Zionism is realized in Palestine; the Zionist movement now has an
opportunity to create for these Jews a night-shelter in East Africa; its obligation is to
seize that opportunity.

This argument, when combined with the constantly reiterated pledge that
Uganda would have no adverse effect on the affinity for Palestine, made a powerful
impression. Indeed, it threw the opponents of the Uganda scheme into confusion, as
they were unable to counter it clearly and convincingly. The urgent need for a night-
shelter was obvious, and the situation made it difficult to spurn the tempting offer.
When Dr. Bernstein-Kohan, the avowed dissenter to the policy of the leadership, first
herd about the Uganda offer in a session of the Zionist Actions Committee, his response
was that in their present straits the Jews of Russia would go anywhere, "even to

6 Ibid., p. 154, speech by Dr. Wordsman.

7 Yitzhak Gruenbaum, Development of the Zionist Movement (Hebrew), Part 11, Reuven Mass, 1953, p. 65.

8 6thCon., p. 71.
91bid., p. 213.

10 Max Nordau, pp. 64, 69; Shimon Rosenbaum, p. 179; Nahman Syrkin, p. 178.

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hell, "11 and his words were taken as signalling his assent to the plan. Dr. Chaim
Weizmann, who would eventually vote against the plan, had stated two days earlier
that he took a "positive attitude" towards Herzl's proposal. 12 Dr. Heinrich Loewe, later
a firm opponent of Uganda, originally registered for the debate among the plan's
backers. 13

The replies to the plea of an urgent need for a night-shelter--asfar as such replies
were forthcoming from the plan's opponents-did not excel in persuasiveness or in
fidelity to the actual situation. Dr. Bernstein- Kohan, as an experienced physician,
argued in favor of "treating by starvation:" the troubles afflicting the Jewish people
"strengthen the J ewish ideal." Compromise plans must not be accepted from a position
of distress. Hence, the Uganda plan should not be raised for discussion. 14 However, the
courageous healer by the "hunger method" bore no message for the myriads of J ews
who were wandering across the continents and the oceans. Nor did the other advocates
of this stance (with one exception) argue cogently for it. The gist of their case was that
Uganda would harm the Zionism of Eretz-lsrael. In this domain they did present a
solid case, and some of their arguments were grounded in reality.

Among the plan's detractors were some "extremists" who suspected Herzl and his
colleagues of noting less than betrayal. They hinted that the Zionist Executive was
leading the Congress astray and that its intention was, simply, to destroy the affinity
for Palestine. The leading spokesman of this group was Menachem Shenkin. Delegate
Shenkin pointed to a surprising, and in his eyes suspicious, phenomenon: DieWdt, the
organ of the Zionist Executive, carried alongside its main headline the text of the Basle
Program. Yet during the Congress itself, when the paper appeared on a daily basis, the
words "Eretz-lsrael,, were omitted from the text. Shenkin drew Herzl's attention to the
fact that Eretz-lsrael was not only "the land of our fathers" but "our land" as well. In
fact, Shenkin, said, he wished to hear an explicit statement from the Executive
concerning its attitude towards Eretz-lsrael. "We were told what the Sultan's attitude
is towards Palestine, but not what the attitude is of the Zionist Actions Committee."15

Other delegates, while not so inordinately suspicious, were nevertheless quite
concerned. Dr. Yehiel Tshlenov, who was in the forefront of the opposition to Uganda,
was moderate, cordial, and... shocked. He declared that he did not fear the movement
would abandon Palestine, but he was apprehensive about a development which would
bring about a dangerous enfeeblement of the Zionist enterprise. The realization of
Zionism was a formidable task, and in order to advance towards the goal it was
necessary to mobilize all the means and resources at the disposal of the J ewish people.
Oneobstacleto this mobilization of forces was, in his view, the illusions concerning a
solution of the J ewish question by means of equality of fights, emancipation, and so
forth. The territory in Africa would only bolster that illusion and would become yet
another obstacle because it would divert energies from Palestine. Tshlenov was also
against having the Jewish welfare organizations, such as the Jewish Colonization
Association (ICA) and others, occupy themselves with Uganda, because the means at
their disposal were also needed to develop Palestine.

As for the distress of the homeless J ews, Tshlenov asserted that there was nothing
new in this. The Jews had always known troubles. The solution to all the problems
would be effected via the first clause of his program-the Basle Program. 16 But
Tshlenov gave no answer to the question of where the homeless J ews were in fact to go.

A clear answer to this question came from a M insk attorney, Shimon Rosenbaum,
whose two speeches to the Congressl? will repay study by those who wish, decades later,
to "take a stand" on the Uganda Episode. Rosenbaum pointed to the simple fact that the
African territory in

question, in its present state, could not serve as a land of mass immigration. It
was barren and undeveloped. It contained no industrial plants, no infrastructure of
crafts or commerce such as could supply employment to the masses in search of a
night- shelter. To prepare the region for large-scale immigration would require time

1 1 Minutes of Zionist Actions Committee meeting, August 2 1-22, 1903, Michael Hayman, ed.. The Uganda Dispute , Vol. I, p.
102. Confirmation of this reaction is found in his speech at the 6th Congress, 6th Con., p. 165.

12 6th Con., p. 101.

13 Ibid., p. 175.

14 Ibid., pp. 165-166.

15 Ibid., pp. 106-107.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., pp. 73-75, 147-150.

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and massive funding. In its present state, Uganda was incapable of constituting an
immediate haven for hundreds of thousands of Jews who could wait no longer. And
since Palestine in its present state could not serve the Jews as a shelter either, "it
would be best to send them to America or to London. "18

According to the minutes, Rosenbaum's remarks drew an angry response from
thedelegates. Unlike the majority of the cases in this deeply divided Congress, nothing
is said in the minutes concerning expressions of agreement alongside the cries of
protest. Indeed, not only the proponents of Uganda were outraged by Rosenbaum's
presentation, but so were those who agreed with him. At all events, if anyone saw fit to
defend him against the cries from the floor to end his speech immediately and leave
the podium, the minutes are silent about it. And even though he spoke beFore the
special debate about Uganda, the plan's disparagers (with the exception, again, of
Rosenbaum himself) showed no inclination to make use of his realistic argument in
that debate. His words seemed to be heresy, beyond the pale.

In fact, this was a perfect expression of the complete Zionism which Heal had
written about in Der J udenstaat (The Jewish State), in the name of which he was now
seeking a temporary shelter for the immediate needs of the Jews. Rosenbaum was
among those who insisted that the Zionist movement was the sole custodian of the
Jewish people. Basing himself on this premise, he believed, like the Ugandists, that
the Zionists could not simply disregard the current crisis of mass emigration. Unlike
the Ugandists, however, he viewed the temporary haven as it was in reality, and did
not seek to transform it into a national goal. Like Tshelnov and others, Rosenbaum
opposed the "transferral" of Uganda to the hands of the philanthropic organizations,
but in contrast to Tshelnov he did not stress the practical aspect (mobilization of all
resources for Palestine)--which was valid in itself--but concentrated on the principle:

what the Jews genuinely needs will be done by us, the Zionists, and we will not
entrust others with carrying it out.

Tshlenov's assumption, that the Zionist movement would remain faithful to Zion
even if it preoccupied itself with Uganda, was overly

optimistic. This was apparent already in the 6th Congress. The case was
convincingly put by the Berlin delegate Heinrich Loewe who, it will be recalled,
originally registered on the list of speakers in favor of the Uganda commission, but
then joined the opponents. When his turn to speak arrived, near the end of the debate.
Dr. Loewe explained that his change of heart had not been influenced by the speakers
who opposed the plan, but had been caused expressly by the speakers who advocated the
plan. 'The later a delegate spoke, the more he outdid his predecessor in advocating
Africanism. With every speaker Zion receded farther and farther into the
background... The issue in question is not a port of distress and not a station for
accumulating strength, but a substitute for Zion. "19

The metamorphosis undergone by the Ugandist camp must have been an
impressive process. Although they paid lip-service to their fidelity to Palestine, the
Uganda advocates began to voice remarks and hints about "exaggerated idealism,"
"excessive sentimentality," and the "detachment from reality" of the Zionist idea.
Some among this group, such as Dr. Fink, from the Mizrahi leadership, were more
forthright:

On the one hand we see the millions of wretched [Jews] in Romania, Galicia and
Russia fighting against death by starvation, and on the other hand we are fearful lest
the acceptance of this project will bring about the dilution of our idealism. I n that case,
I ask what we can tolerate more easily:

that thousands and thousands, perhaps millions of J ews, will descend to the
netherworld, or that we witness, let us say, the death of some pair of ideals?"20

When the results of the roll-call vote were made known (295 in favor of setting up
the Uganda commission, 178 against, 100 abstentions), pandemonium broke out.

18 Ibid., p. 75.

19 Ibid., pp. 201-202.

20 Ibid., p. 63.

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Yehiel Tshlenov, the most senior and the most moderate of the plan's opponents, who
had been sitting on the platform, walked out of the meeting. He was followed by all the
"Negatives." A fifteen- minute break was announced which lasted a full hour. Herzl
went out to speak with the secessionists. He found them in an adjacent room, some of
them seated on the floor, in the traditional mourning posture. A few of them were
weeping openly. 21

Eye-witnesses and historians alike point out that both sides were frightened. The
fear of a split and of the movement's disintegration led to an atmosphere of self-
restraint and mutual conciliation. The following day the nay-sayers returned to the
Congress hail, declaring that their spontaneous walkout was not to be interpreted as a
demonstration against

the Congress itself. Herzl for his part, at the insistence of the minority, agreed to
an additional limitation on himself in the form of a commitment not to make use of
Zionist funds to finance the investigative commission to East Africa. I n addition to the
prohibition on using funds of the Keren Kayemet and of the Zionist Bank-which had
already been declared before the vote-Heal now also undertook not to use the Shekel
funds for this purpose. It was also agreed that where the dispatch of the expedition and
the handling of its report were concerned, the powers of the Smaller Actions Committee
(the Zionist Executive) would be narrowed to the benefit of the Greater Actions
Committee. Following a further day of general discussion on various questions the
Congress dispersed in an atmosphere of puzzlement and uncertainty.

Herzl did not send a delegation to Uganda. He died at a young age of illness and
heartbreak. At the conclusion of the Congress it soon became apparent that the
organizational reconciliation with the minority at Basle had not led to their
acceptance of the Uganda plan. The "Negatives" began calling themselves Zione-Zion
(Zionists of Zion). Menahem Ussishkin published an "Open Letter" against Uganda
and against Herzl. The Zionist leaders in Russia convened at Kharkov and fired off a
string of ultimatums to Herzl. The sin of Uganda was co-joined to the accusation of
neglect of settlement activity in Palestine and to the charge of an undemocratic
administration of the affairs of Zionism. Heal was called upon to undertake in writing
that he would never again put before the Zionist movement proposals of settlement
outside Palestine or the neighboring areas (Syria, El Arish). The prestige of Zionism's
leader was seriously undermined, conciliation efforts on the part of his admirers
notwithstanding. I n the meantime it was learned that the white settlers in East Africa
were adamantly opposed to the entire plan and were bringing pressure to bear on the
British government. According to one testimony, whose reliability is far from clear to
the present writer, Herzl at a certain stage wanted to drop the entire Uganda project
and asked his representative in London, Leopold Greenberg, to announce this at a
public assembly in the British capital. 22 But it soon turned out that this course of
action was also problematic. For in the meantime a powerful group had arisen within
the Zionist movement which supported the idea of East African settlement and was
engaged in intense lobbying to that end. The group maintained centers in every
country where the Zionist movement maintained a base of operations. In Russia the
Uganda project enjoyed the spirited backing of the Zionist socialists headed by
Nahman Syrkin. I n the

West, Zangwill drew mass support. Indeed, such fervent Ugandists did the
Zionists of England become, that non-support for Uganda was considered a betrayal of
Zionism's ideals.23 Most members of Mizrahi, at that time the only international
party in the Zionist movement, were advocates of the Uganda plan. Surprisingly-and
shockingly-a strong center of Ugandism developed among the J ewish settlers in
Palestine itself Farmers in Rishon LeZion and other agricultural settlements united
in support of the "redeeming" idea of a territory in East Africa, following the lead of
the Hebrew- language paper Hashkafa edited by Eliezer Ben-Yehuda. 24 The Zionist

21 Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (Hebrew ed.), Shocken, 1949, p. 93.

22 Gruenbaum, Development of the Zionist Movement , p. 85. Greenberg's story at the 7th Congress contradicts this testimony.

23 Weizmann, Trial and Error , p. 100.

24 Shlomo Tzemach, First Year (Hebrew), Ch. 7, "Debacle."

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movement split into two increasingly warring factions. "The road splits, and that split
passes through the heart of the leader. "25

This was the situation when Herzl passed away. He had not revoked the Uganda
plan, but neither had he hastened to act in its behalf-and not only because of the state
of his health. A striking example of his inactivity on the subject was the fact that he
did not engage in fund-raising in order to finance the expedition, even though the
Congress had launched such a drive with vigorous determination. According to
Greenberg, Herzl, acting "under the influence of Kharkov," did something which
seriously undercut the value and the prospects of the Uganda plan. Instead of
dispatching a delegation to select appropriate sites in the vast territory offered by the
British government, he asked London to determine on its own the final location within
its final, narrow borders. As a result, the British proposed a limited area of 5,000
square miles, which could not be replaced by a more suitable region.

Following Heal's death the struggle between Zione-Zion and the Ugandists
intensified. But now the conditions had changed radically. The power of the Eastern
European Zionists had grown immeasurably. Zionist diplomacy virtually ground to a
halt with the passing of the movement's master-diplomat. In Palestine the "little
colonization" was resumed--the practical labor which had been relegated to the status
of a mere stepdaughter of Zionism in the period of Herzl's political Zionism. In London
there was growing dissent from the Uganda plan on the part of the British society in
general and the British government in particular. Herzl's coterie of supporters from
the Western countries, deprived of their leader, found themselves having to show
increasing deference to the leaders of the Ostjuden, the representatives of millions of
deeply rooted J ews and who evinced the virtues of persistence and capability. Rampant
insincerity marked the handling of the Uganda plan.

The expedition to East Africa set out at the end of 1904, financed by a British
Christian philanthropist. Of the expedition's three members, only one, Nahum
Wilbusch, was a J ew. After a six-week sojourn in the

area, two of the members, Wilbusch and Professor Alfred Kaiser, concluded that
the country was unsuited to Jewish settlement. The most negative report was drafted
by Wilbusch, whereas the expedition's leader. Major A. St. Hill Gibbons, saw fit to
emphasize the comfortable climate, adding that even though it was true that the
territory would not be amenable to mass agricultural settlement, it was fit for the
settlement of several thousand persons. Gibbons also published a separate opinion in
which he took Wilbusch to task for his pessimistic report. 26

The 7th Zionist Congress, which convened in Basle in July 1905, voted by a large
majority to reject the Uganda plan and to put an end, once and for all, to territorial
compromises within Zionism. 27 This decision generated a split at the Congress and
within the Zionist Organization. Nachman Syrkin declared on the spot that he and his
comrades from the Zionist- Socialist Workers' Party were seceding from the Congress
and calling on all the "truly democratic" elements to follow their lead. 28 Israel
Zangwill, the great friend of Herzl and Nordau, asserted that Heal had once told him
that the seventh Congress would also be the last one. "I hope it will be so," he added. 29
Others also withdrew, including some who had been close associates of Herzl's such as
Dr. Max Mandelstamm from Kiev and Isidore Yassinovsky from Warsaw. The
dissidents established "territorialist" parties and organizations in various countries,
and formed a World Territorialist Association. These groups competed with Zionism
and hampered its progress in the coming years.

We shall begin by clarifying an inaccurate but widely accepted notion about the
Uganda crisis. It is generally thought that the 7th Congress rejected the Uganda plan
on the basis of the report submitted by the expedition which visited the territory. This
is not the case. The resolution, as passed by the Congress, was directed against
territorial ism as such and did not concern itself with Uganda specifically. A draft
resolution was proposed by Ussishkin on the first day of the Congress and was adopted
by the Zionist Actions Committee, which then submitted it to the Congress in its name.
The resolution's second clause, which refers to the British government, does make

25 B.Z. Herzl, "Letter to the Jewish People."

26 Stenographic minutes of the 7th Zionist Congress, pp. 65-66 (hereafter: 7th Con.).

27 Ibid., p. 133.

28 Ibid., p. 135.

29 Ibid., p. 134. Syrkin returned to the Zionist fold in 1909, Zangwill in 1917.

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courteous mention of the Uganda Commission's report, but nowinere says tinat tine
decision was tal<en as a result of tinat report. Tine l<ey clauses are the following:

L The 7th Zionist Congress declares that the Zionist Organization is
unswervingly faithful to the basic principle of the Basle Program, which aspires to
secure by public law a National Home for thej ewish people in Palestine, and rejects,

both as an end and as a means, all settlement activity outside Palestine and the
neighboring lands.

3. The 7th Zionist Congress reiterates that in accordance with Article 1 of its
regulations, the Zionist Organization encompasses thosej ews who declare their assent
to the Basle Program.

The words which we have emphasized in the first clause may be construed as the
absolute rejection of the "night-shelter" doctrine and of the unequivocal adoption of
the stand espoused by Zione-Zion regarding Palestine's exclusivity as the object of
Zionist activity. It is self-evident that this resolution is totally divorced from both the
overall quality and the specific contents of the Uganda commission's report. It would
probably be more correct to assume, without suspecting anyone of deliberate deception,
that the composition of the expedition, the manner in which it was dispatched, and the
report it submitted, were influenced by a desire to do what was obligated by the
resolution of the 6th Congress and to be rid of the Uganda Episode as honorably as
possible. Professor Otto Warburg, who headed the committee which dealt with sending
out the expedition, was accused by a Ugandist from the Congress podium of having
said to someone, "Let us first of all be rid of the Uganda bluff."30 The charge was not
denied, and seems to have had some basis in fact.

The cleavage in the Zionist movement actually occurred not at the 7th Congress
but at the sixth. The vote at the 7th Congress caused a parting ofttieways between the
two rival sides, which had spent the previous two years locked in bitter warfare within
a single organizational framework. But the war began in the meeting hail of the 6th
Congress, and the dispute there intensified as the debate over whether to dispatch a
delegation dragged on. We have seen how the Uganda advocates became increasingly
estranged from Zionism as the debate progressed. At the same time the sustained
shock experienced by the opponents of the East Africa enterprise finally peaked with
their unceremonious departure from the hail.

From the 6th Congress the shock waves reverberated throughout the entire
Jewish world. An abyss of alienation and betrayal opened up before the eyes of the
horrified Zionists. Herzl, Nordau and Zangwill, the three pillars of Zionism, were
advocating a substitute for Eretz-lsrael. Comrades and friends became hostile
adversaries. The propaganda for the new ideal of Uganda swept the J ewish street like a
flood carrying everything before it. Despair gripped loyal Zionists. Ardent young
people translated the despair into the language of decision: to realize Zionism

physically at once. Shiomo Zemah, who was among the leaders of the Second
Aliyah, related 65 years later that the crucial factor in his decision to immigrate to
Palestine was "the despair over Uganda. "31 On the same occasion he also told how he
and his friends in Plonsk, Poland, had read in Hatzofeh Herzl's opening speech at the
Congress, "and our eyes filled with tears." David Ben-Gurion describes how this group
of young people from Plonsk swam in the Plonka River and discussed how they could
fight the Uganda trouble. "Our conclusion was that the most effective way to combat
the Ugandists was by immigrating to Eretz-lsrael. "32

The signs of shock from the "despair at Uganda" were quite discernible at the 7th
Zionist Congress. Menahem Ussishkin, leader of the Zione-Zion "extremists,"
represented the Russian Zionists in putting before the Congress the draft resolution
which they had formulated in their Freiberg meeting and which was passed by the
Congress, as mentioned above. Ussishkin demanded that no special debate be held on
the subject but that the Ugandists be expelled forthwith from the hail. 33 Ussishkin's
behavior reflected the dominant frame of mind among the Congress delegates.
Whereas the presidium treated the Ugandists with great liberality, showed

30 7th Con., p. 94, speech of the delegate Chazan.

31 Radio talk, Israeli Army Radio, August 15, 1971.

32 David Ben-Gurion, Memoirs , Am Oved, p. 1 1.

33 7th Con., p. 46.

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forbearance at their outbursts, and allowed them to defend their position by allotting
them time in excess of their numerical strength, the delegates in the hail found their
presence insufferable. The bitterness of the harsh debates in Warsaw and Minsk
actually found their most acute expression in the remarks of Dr. Tshlenov, previously
known as a man of peace and compromise. In the 6th Congress, as we noted, Tshlenov
had believed the assurance of the Ugandists that they would not abandon Palestine as
a central goal of Zionism. Now he spoke out of the experience of the two strife-filled
years that had just gone by. With a wholly characteristic thoroughness, Tshlenov
dramatized the danger of Ugandism by citing the change which had occurred between
the two Congresses in the behavior of the delegate Chaim Hazan.

In the minutes of the 6th Congress Hazan appears as an above-average orthodox
Zionist. This trait was well reflected in his appearance at the conclusion of the debate
between Herzl and the oppositionist groups of Davis Trietsch and Alfred Nossig. Herzl,
who handled the debate with patience and forbearance, gained considerable support
from delegates in various parts of the hail. Hazan apparently thought that the leader's
parliamentary victory was insufficient. Because the oppositionist delegates had, in
his view, spurned the elements of the Basle Program, with one of them even stating in
writing that the attainment of a "charter" for Palestine was impossible, they deserved
to be expel led from the Congress. 34 I n the

6th Congress Hazan supported Herzl's proposal and like him pledged faithfully
that Uganda would not adversely affect Palestine. Tshlenov quoted what Hazan had
said at the time: 'The aspiration of thej ewish people for a state in Palestine will exist
eternally, and therefore the apprehension that the East Africa plan will dilute the
importance of the Zionist idea is incorrect. "35

Hazan came to the 7th Congress in a combative and uncompromising mood.
Along with Syrkin and Zangwill he was very active in the efforts to thwart by any
means possible the passage of a resolution against territorialism, but he outdid them
in his estrangement from Zionism. He referred to Palestine in a tone of outspoken
hostility. I n principle, he was not opposed to Palestine; it was a country I ike others. But
"not a single person sitting here can maintain that Palestine is the most appropriate
location for a new J ewish center... a land whose size does not exceed 10,000 square
miles, a land housing a population of over 600,000 inhabitants, a land without
water. "36

Tshlenov commented: "In Mr. Flazan we see the ripened fruit of Uganda and
Ugandisin. Weseethe direct transition from Ugandism to territorialism. If we do not
free our movement of this, we can expect many more fruits of this type."37

I n what was form him an unusually invective tone, he warned: Do not think that
it was only here that the Hazans blackened and slandered our land, to the point where
considerable efforts were necessary in order to hear these things out calmly. The
Hazans also did this energetically in a great many cities in Russia. 38

I ndeed, there were many "Hazans" and they were "energetic" wherever there were
Zionists. And everywhere they caused cleavage and frustration. I n the cities and towns
of Eastern Europe, in student assemblies in the West, Syrkin and his colleagues
explained Uganda "from a class viewpoint;" the religious Mizrahi organization
supported Uganda; the majority in Poalei Zion followed ZangwilL's lead. And in the
Bi I u settlement of Rishon LeZion the farmers were pleased at the news that at long last
the Uganda investigative expedition had finally set out "despite all the scheming and
subversions of the opponents." "On the same occasion the 'slanderous words' (as
Shiomo Zeniah termed them) of Israel Zangwill in a speech he delivered in
Philadelphia are translated into Hebrew, and strong agreement is expressed for the
quip that Zionism without Zion is better than Zion without Zionism. "39 In Russia
especially, although not only there, the Ugandists became territorialists, former
Zionists were transmogrified into haters of Zion, adversaries became full-fledged
enemies. The flood assumed the dimensions of a tidal wave.

Now, on theeveof the vote which could put an end to Ugandism within the Zionist
movement, Tshlenov was well aware that the external problems were far from being

34 6th Con., p. 98.

35 7th Con., p. 116.

36 Ibid., p. 92.

37 Ibid., p. 116.

38 Ibid.

39 Tzemach, Ch. 7.

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resolved. A rough contest could be expected with the territorial ists--vigorous in battle
and convinced of their righteousness. For the fact was that the dissidents counted
among their number the young and revolutionary element of the Congress and of the
entire Zionist movement. 40

So there was place for concern, and there was justification for using unusually
harsh language.

It was this same Dr. Yehiel Tshlenov, whose sincerity, sensitivity and sense of
responsibility are still palpable across a baffler of decades, who pinpointed the
phenomenon which few at the time took notice of, and which has led us to incorporate a
detailed account of the Uganda Episode into the present study. We refer to the immunity
of the Zionist movement against territorialism. Tshlenov, a physician by profession,
likened the Uganda crisis to a two-year illness. "We who have gone through this
illness, are immune to further contagion. This is perhaps the only comfort which I as a
physician can derive from the Uganda Episode. "41

Tshlenov touched on this phenomenon only in passing and for a reason which is
the opposite of our own. He appealed to the Congress to adopt Ussishkin's unbending
resolution in order to protect from contagion those who in the future would affiliate
themselves with Zionism but who had not been immunized against the "disease" It is
immaterial whether the experienced physician perhaps underestimated the resilience
of the immunization. For the passage of the proposed resolution served as a booster
shot, as it were, which activated additional powerful antibodies. These did their work
in those persons who had themselves undergone the painful crisis, and were passed on
to the coming generations via the mother-milk of the movement. Ever since, the
Zionists have been absolutely determined that a Uganda affair, in any version
whatsoever, will not recur. Territorialism became danger number one and enemy
number one. Opposition to foreign territory became the very linchpin of Zionist
ideology. Every organized settlement of Jews outside Eretz-lsrael, in any form and
under any circumstances, was impure to the touch and required suspicion- laden
ideological isolation.

This immunity did its work faithfully for decades. It acted as a protective shield
preserving Zionism from possible deviations and harmful influences. It helped focus
the movement's energies and resources on a single goal. In this way it served Zionism
and thej ewish people alike.

Until the advent of the Holocaust, when its longstanding benefit quickly became
a bane.

While the Zionist movement was undergoing this deep immunization, it also
experienced a fundamental change in terms of its standing among the Jewish people.
It was now tacitly agreed, beyond any possibility of challenge, that the movement no
longer constituted the people's one and only custodian. The role of "manager of the
interests" of the J ewish people which Herzl refers to in Der J udenstaat, was at the time
considered the principal element in the infrastructure of the movement which he
founded in 1897. I n the 6th Congress numerous delegates were still acting on the basis
of this principle; Herzl and Nordau cited it in explaining the need to seek a night-
shelter for a people in distress. Nor did the opponents of Uganda question the
underlying premise that the Zionist movement constituted the sole authorized
representative of the J ewish people. In contrast to their rivals, however, they found it
difficult to reconcile this basic premise with the rejection of the temporary haven in
East Africa. Bernstein- Kohan's notion of "healing by starvation" was, of course,
rhetoric pure and simple, which solved nothing. And Shimon Rosenbaum's forthright
proposal--to tell the Jews simply that for the time being, until Palestine was ready to
absorb them, they should go to America or London-was shouted down. Beyond this
realistic proposal and beyond accepting the night-shelter concept, the Zionists could
offer no answer to the distress of the masses.

At the 7th Zionist Congress the victorious majority no longer spoke in terms of the
"sole authorized representative"--neither Nordau nor Tshlenov nor others. In vain did
Zangwill argue that "The British government has recognized us as the representatives

40 7th Con., pp. 118-119, speech by A. Stend.

41 lbid.,p.ll6.

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of the J ewish people. Are we going to value ourselves less than the British government
values US?"42 But the majority was under no obligation to respond to this charge,
because it had voluntarily withdrawn from the role of "manager of the J ewish people's
interests."

This was far more than a mere verbal shift. It was a substantive change which
was to determine the character and the road of the Zionist movement for the long term
and leave its mark on its day-to-day activity. I n the fi rst place the change was reflected
in Zionism's attitude towards J ewish welfare organizations which were active in
various countries.

Until this time that attitude had been negative in the extreme. Herzl and his
colleagues had frequently lashed out at the operations of philanthropic societies and of
Jewish philanthropists, whose money was expended wrongly on goals which were not
useful . The thrust of the

criticism was that philanthropic activity made no contribution to the resolution
of the J ewish question and diverted attention from the proper way to achieve that
resolution. As late as the 6th Congress a brilliant speech to this effect could still be
delivered by Israel Zangwill (and then re-delivered by Max Nordau in German
translation). According to all the indications, the Congress organizers had meant this
lecture to serve as the high point of the proceedings, and their plan would have
succeeded but for the storm which erupted over the Uganda issue.

But with a view to the 7th Congress, when the Zionist Actions Committee decided
to recommend that the Uganda plan be abandoned, a second resolution was added: 'To
ask other organizations, which interest themselves in Jewish problems, whether they
would wish to take on themselves this proposal of East Africa. "43 In fact, the Actions
Committee, without even awaiting the decision of the Congress, directed the proposal to
various philanthropic organizations. 44

This sensational appeal was tantamount to the following message:

We, as Zionists, find Uganda unsuitable. But perhaps you will find it suitable?
Please, gentlemen, take it up and act on it. If it relieves the distress of the J ews, no one
will be more pleased than we.

It was a major turning point, hinting at numerous intentions and amenable to
various interpretations. The most durable of these-those that met the test of reality-
were two in number and were mutually complementary. First, legitimation was
accorded, from the Zionist standpoint, to the existence and activity of the welfare
organizations. Second, and more important, the Zionist movement declared to the
entire world that it was no longer to be regarded as an all-embracing organization
tending to all things relating to the Jewish people. Henceforth it was one more
organization with its own specific goal: to establish a national home for the Jewish
people in Palestine. It would direct all its strength towards this goal and would not let
itself be diverted therefrom, either by its own doing or by the actions of others. In the
future it would extend help to Jews only on condition that such activity was
commensurate with its activities towards the attainment of Zionism's goal. In other
words, the Zionist movement did not bear overall responsibility for the vicissitudes
experienced bythej ewish people, and certainly not exclusive responsibility.

Nevertheless, the World Zionist Organization did not become "just another
organization." In the tiny-five years that elapsed between the Uganda Crisis and the
Holocaust, it expanded, strengthened itself, and became a dominant force in the life of
the nation. Twelve years after the

end of the Uganda Crisis the Zionist movement received from Great Britain a
second offer to establish a national home--this time not in East Africa but in Palestine
itself Si nee then theYishuv in Palestine had developed and had become a faithful and
forceful partner to the movement. The Zionist movement was active everywhere that
J ews were to be found. Had it so wished, its strength and its standing enabled it to
assume the role of leader of the J ewish people. But this task it spurned. Circumstances
forced it at times to engage in what was called "current work" (gegenwarts-arbiten) —
dealingwith the immediate needs of the Jews where they happened to reside. Nor did
the Zionists abstain from getting involved in local politics in their countries of
residence. But these matters were explicitly and expressly subordinate to the central

42 7th Con., p. 70.

43 Ibid., p. 68, in Greenberg's speech.

44 Ibid.

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and exclusive mission of tine movement. Tine Zionist leadersinip, \Nh\dn in its youtin
experienced the slnocl< of Uganda, instinctively recoiled from dealing with "side"
issues and from assuming responsibility for such matters. In the eyes of the
generation which came to maturity in the post-Uganda years, the tenets and
principles of Zione-Zion became unassailable articles of faith: the Zionists would
engage exclusively in Zionism; energies would not be expended on matters which were
not Zionism. And above all, especially and particularly-great care must be exercised
in the face of anything that smacks of territorialism!

We shall conclude this chapter by noting an event the timing and direct causes of
which were not related to the Uganda Crisis, but which was made possible by the
change that occurred in Zionism in 1903-1905. At the 6th Congress, when Zionism's
role as the sole representative of the Jewish people was not yet in doubt, Shimon
Rosenbaum opposed the idea of convening a general J ewish congress which would
decide in the matter of Uganda. 'The moment we differentiate between a Jewish
congress and the Zionist congress, we shall thereby acknowledge that we are not the
leaders of the J ewish people and that we are incapable of deciding on practical
questions which are of importance for thej ewish people."45

At the 7th and subsequent Zionist Congresses, the underlying premise on which
Rosenbaum had based his remarks no longer existed. To the contrary: the tendency to
make a distinction between Zionism and non-Zionism had intensified. Thirty years
later, when the skies darkened with the looming Holocaust, and when many practical
questions of major import had to be dealt with, the exact type of J ewish congress
against which the veteran Zionist Shimon Rosenbaum had inveigled, was established.
I n August 1936 the World Jewish Congress came into being, separate from the Zionist
movement. I n striking contrast to the period of

Herzl, the Zionist leadership not only expressed no resistance to the creation of a
parallel institution, it actually dispatched a series of Zionist functionaries to serve as
/ts founders and leaders. Thus was it assured that the WJ C's principles and actions
would be consistent with those of Zionism, thereby precluding the danger that anti-
Zionist tends would develop in the new body. During the Holocaust years the leaders of
the new organization displayed loyalty to their wellsprings in everything, but
especially in their unceasing alertness to the danger of territorialism.

45 6th Con., p. 150.

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Chapter Seven

The Evian Conference: An Ideology Incarnate

The Encyclopaedia Hebraica d^'mes "ideology" as "a systematic and coinesive set
of ideas, concepts, principles and imperatives through which the unique worldview of
a sect, party or social class is given expression." The very terms of this definition
obviate the need to discourse at length on the power of ideology as a motivating factor
in history or its impact on human behavior. If for the purposes of the present study we
confine ourselves solely to well-known manifestations from the Holocaust period, we
can adduce a wealth of factual evidence to illustrate concretely how ideology
influenced the behavior of those who were caught up in this horrific tragedy. Such
phenomena could be discerned among J ews on both sides of the wall: the victims of the
Holocaust, and their would-be rescuers (not to mention the German side, which is not
our concern here). Public activity in the ghettos took place largely along party lines or
within youth-movement frameworks, and was based on pre-war political affiliations.
It was only natural and human for welfare activities and rescue efforts to be directed
in the first place towards like-minded colleagues whose experiential world was
similar, and for party frameworks and affinities to be exploited for this purpose. The
"ideas, concepts, principles and imperatives" cited in the definition above played a
preponderant role in determining the behavior of people who were caught up in the
Holocaust, both as organized bodies and, to a large degree, as individuals. This mind-
set was particularly noticeable in cases where decisions concerning a certain mode of
behavior interacted with political assessments. Such questions as whether to operate
from the forests, or whether to organize armed resistance and under what
circumstances to use it, were for the most part decided by public bodies which were
guided by ideological-party lines.

As for the would-be rescuers, Meir Yaari, in a moment of truth, was right to
contrast the activity of the Bundist Zygelboim with the inaction of the Zionists on his
sideof the great divide. A more unequivocal stance was taken by the American Zionist
leader Halm Greenberg, who lauded Agudat Israel as the only group to adopt a decent
stand and undertake concrete action in the episode of rendering assistance to the
ghettoes (see Chapter 12). If we rule out the possibility that the only decent and devoted
Jews in America were members of Agudat Israel, it would seem to follow that
something in the organization's ideology made its members deserving of Greenberg's
encomi ums. As for Zygel boi m's

"Bundism" as the fount of his activity and supreme courage, his own
spontaneous sincerity generated shocking testimony about this connection. Before

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sacrificing inimself on tine altar of faitinfulness to inis people, Zygelboim sent a detailed
farewell cable to the Polish Bund delegation in the U.S. explaining the motivations
underlying his suicide. No fewer than three times he reiterates that he was fearful for
the fate of Po//s/? J ewry, without so much as mentioning the Jews of any other county.
Anyone acquainted with the ideological conceptions of the Polish Bund will readily
grasp the significance of this surprising lacuna in the love of the J ewish people in one
who demonstrated that love unsurpassably and who ended his parting message with
the words, "Long live the Bundl"!

An even more revealing example of what ideology can do to people is provided by
the split in Mapai in May 1944. While the destruction of the Jewish people in Europe
was at its height, a large group, largely from kibbutzim, though some also from the
cities left the Party of Eretz-lsrael Workers. Heading them were Yitzhak Tabenkin,
Israel Idelson (Bar-Yehuda) and others; their principal adversaries among the party
majority were Berl Katznelson and David Ben-Gurion. A rather odd collection of issues,
ranging from complaints about an absence of democracy in the party, to the ban on
forming separate factions, served as the immediate pretexts for the resignation.
However, the root cause of the rift was disagreement concerning the "world of
tomorrow," meaning Communism and the Soviet Union.

The split which was set in motion in May 1944 did not come out of the blue. It was
preceded by several years of intensive polemics and energetic debates in the press, at
public assemblies, and in various smaller forums. I ndeed, in the very period when the
leading party of the Yishuv should have been devoting itself to rescuing Jews, the
party's hierarchy, activists and rank-and-file were preoccupied with clarifying the
burning question of whether the Soviet Union was a true light unto the nations, or
perhaps not so much. Some years later this trenchant issue would resurface and
consume the Kibbutz Hameuhad movement like a fire out of control, splitting
kibbutzim, destroying families, and in some instances producing appalling
manifestations of extreme fanaticism to the point where people found it impossible to
live together (temporarily) or to part honorably.

It can be said that the impact exercised by the heritage of the Uganda crisis on the
behavior of the Zionists was immeasurably more logical than that of the ideological
caprices which generated the split in Mapai and Hakibbutz Hameuhad. Whereas
Communism and the Soviet Union were external factors, as remote from the Yishuv
reality as the

Volga is from the Jordan, the ideological conclusions drawn from the Uganda
episode were based on concrete experience and at the time seemed inescapable. The
opposition to territorial ism withstood the test of years of public struggle against
deviationists and other rivals. The alienation from all things not Zionist led to the
consolidation of the authorized thesis as a virtual axiom: what's good for Zionism is
good for the J ews.

That thesis is a/most correct. I n "normal" times, with their ordinary troubles, the
narrow brand of post 7th-Congress Zionism could be followed, in the expectation that
ultimately it would bring redemption to the entire Jewish people. But when the crisis
exceeded its normal bounds and became a genuine calamity, Zionist doctrine required
a thorough revision before it could incorporate the Holocaust. What was needed was a
return to the Zionism of Herzl---all-encompassing, pan-J ewish-so that the movement
could fulfill its task as the "managing director" of thej ewish people. No such revision
was undertaken, and if any efforts were made in this direction, they have left no
traces. An endeavor of this kind seems to have been beyond the capacity of Zionism's
leaders, and the party lacked the vitality to produce new leaders who could face up to
the truth of the overwhelming crisis. Neither Weizmann nor Ben-Gurion, both of
whom had been scathed by the Uganda episode, were likely candidates to foment the
necessary radical shift of direction. On the face of it, there was one person among the
movement's doctrinal leadership whose entire life seemed to have fitted him for this
task. As a young man, Berl Katznelson had for some years espoused the territorial ist
(not the Ugandist) approach, and anti-territorial ist zealotry seemed foreign to him.
His writings and memoirs show that he took an interest in everything Jewish, even
matters unrelated to the Zionist program. But Berl did nothing and made no effort to do
anything. Who can tell whether he had this terrible failure in mind as well in his
pathetic confession that he was unworthy to talk about the Holocaust?

1 Zygelboim Book (Yiddish), Unser Zeit, New York, 1947, p. 366.

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I n fact, we can conceive of a course of events which would have brought about a
pragmatic watershed in the rescue efforts, even without ideological clarifications or a
doctrinal revision of Zionism. We refer to a hypothetical situation in which persons of
the likes of Mordechai Tenenbaum, Tosia Altman, Yitzhak Katznelson, Frumka
Plotnicka and Chaika KM nger would have escaped from the countries of the Holocaust,
reached Palestine, and stated their case publicly and vigorously. A much later
episode--the shift in the attitude towards the plight of Russian Jewry in 1969--shows
that a large number of such refugees is required to effect a

genuine turnabout. Fired by their inner fervor and driven by their faithfulness
to the mission, these persons would have exposed the intellectual perfidy of the Yishuv
and the Zionist movement, and effected an abrupt and crushing turnabout in that
attitude. Had this occurred at a fairly early stage, the history of the Holocaust and of
the rescue efforts would very likely have been different. But events took another
course. The testimonies of the few survivors who did manage to make their way to
Palestine bore little impact. Their efforts were easily subdued by the ideology and the
movement apparatus. Because no "little" miracle occurred, no big miracle was
possible.

The decision by the Zionists early in the century to turn their backs on all things
unrelated to Zionism had little if any effect on thecourseof events. The furious cries of
objection to Shimon Rosenbaum's proposal—that J ews should go to America as long as
Palestine was unable to absorb them--did not deter Jewish immigration to the land of
opportunity. Large-scale migration to the United States continued unabated, and after
the Holocaust the Jewish community which had been established there remained as
the largest in the world. Looked at from a historical perspective of decades, America
served millions of J ews as a haven from certain destruction; in a broader perspective,
it perhaps constitutes a "recuperative" station for European Jewry en route to Eretz-
Israel. These developments occurred against the will of the Zionists, in the very teeth of
their ideological opposition. The Zionists were unable-nor did they even consider the
possibility--to take practical measures against thej ewish migration to America.

By the time the 1940s loomed on the horizon, this state of affairs had been altered
radically. Pioneering activity had made Palestine a possible mass haven. The Zionist
movement saw it as an urgent mission to bring Jews there as rapidly as possible.
Unrelenting propaganda urged Jews everywhere to settle in Eretz-lsrael. Every
potential emigrant, every J ewish refugee was yet another candidate for all yah. Every
Jewish community which was in more tan the usual distress, was an object of
strenuous Zionist activity. And no longer did Zionism refrain from opposing in
practice everyj ewish migration movement which was not directed towards Palestine.

At the sane time, the efficacy of this Zionist opposition increased as the
movement's strength and relative influence grew among theJ ewish public. Nor was it
always necessary to launch a desperate campaign to thwart a non-Zionist
immigration or settlement program. I n some cases, all

the Zionist movement had to do was raise verbal objections, whether publicly or
behind the scenes, or simply fold its hands and offer nothing in the way of public
support, in order to abort such plans or to ensure that they would be tripped up as soon
as they got off the ground.

An enlightening instance of Zionism's ambivalent stance towards the plight of
J ews, and its crucial influence in determining the course events took, is provided by an
effort to extricate German J ewry which was undertaken on the very eve of the
Holocaust and which is known, on the basis of its initial stage, as theEv/an Conference.
To judge by the reports and the reactions of the Zionist papers and their editors during
and after the conference, that event was destined to serve as convincing proof of the
indifference and hypocrisy of the world towards the fate of the J ews. A summary of the
reports published in the Zionist press during the conference evokes the following
picture: Representatives of the international community met in the French town of
Evian in July 1938 in order to draft a plan for extricating 500,000 Jews-actual and
potential refugees-from Germany and Austria. Yet no sooner did the deliberations
begin than it became apparent that everyone at the conference was ready for his fellow

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delegates, but not himself, to obey this imperative. Every speaker began by expressing
his sympathy for the refugees, and nearly all of them offered elegantly worded
explanations of why his own country could not absorb them. Hypocritical, uncaring
addresses followed one another in rapid succession. Following ten days of meetings
and consultations, the conference ended in abject failure. A few resolutions were
passed, a committee was formed. The conference disbanded without accomplishing
anything substantial, leaving in its wake a residue of disappointment and frustration
among thej ews of the world who had expected concrete actions.

This was the standard version of events as reflected in the articles and dispatches
published in the Palestine press in J uly 1938 and afterwards. A (very) few reports and
some isolated reactions which went against the general line were lost in the flood of
negation and disappointment, and have since been shrouded in oblivion. The official
Zionist version entered the history books and the memoirs of the actors, and in time
became the universally authorized, unassailable truth. The degree of uniformity and
general concurrence can be illustrated by several examples.

Dr. A/artumGo/cfmann, who together with Dr. Arthur Ruppin was a member of the
Zionist delegation to the conference (as well as leading the World J ewish Congress
delegation) declared in 1972 that the Evian

Conference was "a shame and a scandal for the entire progressive world. "2 In his
memoirs, published in Hebrew in that same year, Goldmann writes:

M uch can be told about that wretched and tragicomic spectacle which has entered
history as the "Evian Conference." From the outset there was no place to doubt the
unreadiness of the family of nations to provide substantial help to the downtrodden
refugees... Having experienced five years of bitter activity in this area, I came to Evian
without any great expectations. Yet my blood still boiled at the sight of immensely
powerful governments which were ready to abandon the J ews of Europe and ease their
conscience by empty gestures and illusory actions. This, they thought, was sufficient
to enable them to say that they had discharged their obligation. 3

The editors of the diary of Arthur Ruppin, published in 1968, add the following to
the descriptions of the conference by the person who served as head of the Zionist
delegation: "At the conference it became obvious to everyone that no country was
willing to accept a substantial number of refugees. "4

Professor AryeTartakower, a sociologist and historian who was a senior figure in
the World J ewish Congress and was at Evian as the representative of a J ewish
emigration society in Poland, testifies: "It is known that overall the Evian Conference
ended in dismal failure."5 Elsewhere he remarks of the conference: 'The insulting
episode of the civilized world's reaction to the Nazi regime's criminal atrocities left a
lasting imprint on the memory of the generations. "6

Dr. Yosef Tanenbaum, author of books and articles on the Third Reich and the
Holocaust, speaks at one point about the "gloomy failure of the Evian Conference,"?
asserting also that "there the simple truth emerged that no country wanted to open its
gates to the J ews. "8

The author of the standard history of the Haganah, Dr. Yehuda Slutsky, refers to
the "failure of the Evian Conference" and relates: "High-sounding, emotional
declarations were voiced by the participants, but when it came down to practical plans
they became evasive, and the results were, in the words of C. Weizmann, that 'for the
J ews the world is divided into two types of countries: those from which we are expelled
and those which will not allow us to enter'. "9

2 Program broadcast on Israeli Army Radio, January 16, 1972: "Friends Talk About Arthur Ruppin." Dr. Goldmann confirmed
his earlier evaluation in a recorded interview with the author on May 15, 1972.

3 Nahum Goldmann, Memoirs (Hebrew), Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Jerusalem, 1972, p. 158.

4 A. Ruppin, Chapters of My Life (Hebrew), Am Oved, 1968, p. 301 (hereafter: Ruppin).

5 Recorded interview with Dr. Tartakower. Department for Oral Documentation, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Tape No. 1820.

6 A. Tartakower, Jewish Settlement in the Diaspora (Hebrew), M. Newman, p. 268.

7 Joseph Tenenbaum, "The Crucial Year 1938," Yad Vashem Studies II, p. 46 (Hebrew).

8 Joseph Tenenbaum, Race and Reich (Hebrew), Yad Vashem, 1961.

9 History of the Haganah , Vol. II, p. 783. It is noteworthy that Weizmann's words (which were not quoted accurately) were
spoken to the Peel Commission, i.e., before the Evian Conference. See Weizmann, Trial and Error , p. 375.

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Shaul Esh, a prodigious researciner of the Holocaust, wino was tragically killed
before making a study of the Evian Conference, throws out a passing comment about
"the well-known Evian Conference which reflected all the impotence and inaction of
the world's nations. "10

The most impressive testimony (and, it should be added immediately, the most
enlightening) is that of S. Adler-Roddl in his substantive article on the Evian
Conference. 11 Adier-Rudel, as the delegate of the "representation of German J ewry"
affiliated with large J ewish organizations in London, took an active part in the
preparations for the Evian Conference on the Jewish side. His ramified connections
made him privy to the behind-the-scenes actions of both the J ewish and the non-
J ewish sides. Moreover, as the representative of German Jewry, he embodied the
fervent desire of his dispatchers for the success of conference. Important material
concerning his quest and his efforts towards this end is contained in an exchange of
letters between Adier-Rudel and Hans SchaeFer, the J ewish manager of the Swedish
match concern, with whom Adier-Rudel consulted and to whom he reported on the
plans and preparations for Evian. Adier-Rudel published the exchange of letters in
1967,12 and thefollowing year his article on Evian appeared, in which he sums up his
description of the conference as follows: 'The unanimous decision-to establish a
permanent bureau-was the one positive result of the conference. It offered small
confort to the refugees, the potential refugees and the J ews in general, and was a cruel
disappointment to thej ewish representatives who came to Evian. "B

If to all these pronouncements we add the reserved appraisal of Mark Wishnitzer
("it emerges that in general the stand of the conference proved extremely
disappointing"), 14 the description provided by Arthur Morse in his book,15 and other,
similar assessments scattered throughout the relevant literature, it is glaringly
apparent that in the J ewish collective memory the Evian Conference became a symbol
of the gentiles' indifference towards the J ewish people.

However, a close analysis of the episode undermines the ostensible verities
underlying these assessments, as well as the credibility of the descriptions cited to
shore them up. In fact, what we are dealing with is a "general assent" to a salient
distortion of history. This is not the place to present a detailed description of how this
distortion came about and why it continues to flourish despite a wealth of unequivocal
historical documents which refute it completely. It seems to us that the events which
followed Evian have cast their dark shadow over the conference and deter scholars
from reexamining an episode about which everything is in any case "clear

and known." For some authors this distorted version of events may even be
advantageous, as it affirms their thesis of the gentiles' hated of the Jews or conforms
with thefashion of disparaging Roosevelt. Other factors which we did not discern may
also beat work.

One thing seems certain: the principal and primary cause, if not the sole one,
which from the outset underlay the historical perversion of the Evian Conference, is
rooted in the tendentious manner in which Zionism perceived the events as they were
unfolding. An examination of the contemporary reports and commentaries in the
Zionist press during and after the conference, reveals that the compilation of the facts
was selective and the attendant commentary appallingly subjective. Manifestly, the
deficiencies of the Zionists' information during the Holocaust, as described in the
preceding chapters, had actually appeared some years earlier-under conditions of a
wide-open world of information. Already then reality was depicted as it "should be"
according to Zionist doctrine (the narrow version). What did not fit was excluded from
the field of vision and omitted from the reports and the commentaries. Even as the
events were still unfolding, a distorted picture was created on the spot which in turn
became the source and basis for a historical rendering detached from what actually
happened. Unfortunately, the conference was also marked by numerous external
phenomena which caused much resentment among the participants and the
observers, and provided a convenient pretext for disparaging the proceedings. As we

10 Shaul Esh, "Between Discrimination and Extermination," Yad Vashem Studies 11, p. 81 (Hebrew).

lis. Adler-Rudell, "The Evian Conference on the Refugee Problem," Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook Xlll, London, 1968

(hereafter: Adler-Rudell).

12 S. Adler-Rudell, "The Emigration Problem in 1938," Correspondence with Hans Schaefer (German), Bulletin of the Leo
Baeck Institute, 38-39, Tel Aviv, 1967 (hereafter: AdlerRudell/Correspondence).

13 Adler-Rudell, p. 259.

14 Mark Wischnitzer, To Dwell in Safety , p. 202.

15 Morse, While Six Million Died Ch. 9.

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shall see, these phenomena were the result of organizational negligence and mistaken
judgments by the conference organizers.

At the initiative of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the representatives of 32
countries convened at Evian; there were nine from Western Europe (excluding
Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal), 21 from the Americas, and Australia and New
Zealand. A few countries (Poland, Romania, Hungary, South Africa) sent observers.
Also participating was the League of Nations' high commissioner for German
refugees. The purpose of the conference was to seek means and places for the absorption
of the refugees who had left or were about to leave Germany and Austria. Although
officially the conference was meant to deal with refugees as such, it was clear to all
concerned that virtually all of the refugees in question were Jewish, and that in fact
the conference sought a solution to the plight of German Jewry. Evian marked the one
and only instance in human history in which representatives of the gentiles from
around the world met for the sole purpose of rescuing J ews.

Roosevelt's initiative generated worldwide reverberations. Besides the official
government delegations,, about 20 Christian, liberal and socialist humanitarian
organizations sent representatives. 16 Distinguished practitioners of the arts, sciences
and politics attended. The news agencies and the press of the free world were
represented by some 100 journalists. This impressive gathering, notfarfrom Germany
itself, acquired importance by the very fact of its occurrence: as a demonstration
against the acts of the Nazis and as testimony to the fact that the world was aware of
the persecution of the J ews and was sympathetic to its victims. The free countries, led
by the three great powers of that time-America, Britain and France-evinced for all
the world to see their opposition to J ew-hatred and their readiness to work for the relief
of Jewish suffering. How substantial this demonstration of international solidarity
was, became evident several months later, as we shall see in the next chapter.

A letter sent by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull in March 1938 to the
conference invitees stated that the U.S. neither requested nor expected them to accept
refugees in numbers in excess of the limits determined by their existing immigration
laws.17 A more detailed position on this and the other central issues of the conference
was contained in a resolution of the United States Government of June 14. This paper,
which was the result of considered judgment and of negotiations with the
participating governments, served as an agreed proposal for the conference agenda.
According to this official document, the conference was to take up the following
questions:

1. To clarify what measures can be taken in order to facilitate the settlement in
the United States of political refugees from Germany (including Austria). For the
purposes of this conference, the term 'political refugee' shall refer to persons seeking to
leave Germany, and those who have already done so. It is taken for granted that the
conference will take into account, as merited, the work being done by other agencies
operating in this area, and will seek measures to supplement their work.

2. To clarify what immediate steps can be taken within the framework of the
immigration laws and immigration regulations of the receiving countries in order to
solve the most urgent cases. It is assumed that to this end each government will
submit, for the absolutely secret knowledge of the committee [i.e., the conference], 18 a
declaration of the

laws and immigration procedures for their country and their current policy
regarding the acceptance of immigrants. It would be desirable for the committee to
receive a general statement from each participating government on the number and
typeof the immigrants it is ready to accept at this lime, or whose acceptance it is ready
to consider. (Emphases added.)

16 Adler-Rudell, pp. 253-254.

17 FRUS 1938, Vol. 1, pp. 740-741.

18 In this and in other contemporary documents, the conference is variously called the "Evian Conference," the
"Intergovernmental Committee," or the "Intergovernmental Assembly."

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3. To clarify the documentation system winicin will be acceptable to the
participating governments for those refugees who are unable to obtain the appropriate
papers from other sources.

4. To discuss the establishment of a permanent body of government
representatives whose seat will be in one of the European capitals and which will draw
up and execute, in cooperation with the existing agencies, a long-term program for the
solution and relief of the problem in its broad sense.

5. To prepare a resolution which will incorporate recommendations to the
participating governments concerning the subjects specified above and concerning
other subjects which will be brought for discussion before this intergovernmental
meeting. 19 [Translated from the Hebrew.]

This document was intended to determine both the agenda and the results of the
conference. The conference was to accomplish two principal tasks: (1) carry out a
preliminary examination of the possibilities of immediate refugee absorption, in line
with the existing immigration laws in various countries (Par. 2); and (2) create a
standing international body which would deal with the situation in the longer
perspective, in accordance with the guidelines in Pars. 1 and 3 and in the wake of the
resolutions to be passed at the conference. Incidentally, it bears noting that a
comparison of the first two clauses implies that the regular, non-immediate activity of
the new organization would no longer be restricted by the existing immigration laws,
as had been the case in Cordell Hull's letter of invitation.

For obvious reasons, a third task of the conference was left unmentioned. The
meeting at Evian was to be an impressive demonstration of sympathy for the
persecuted J ews and readiness to help them. Because of an organizational mistake by
the conference directors, this objective suffered somewhat. Although this affected
mainly those who were aware of the matter, the damage done was still considerable.

Ttiat the preparations for the conference were marked by irregularities and
deficiencies was known long before the proceedings actually opened. A committee
headed by J ames McDonald which was appointed by Roosevelt to advise and assist him
in planning the conference, evinced a good deal more good will than good judgment
and organizational ability. On J une 3 Adier-Rudel complained in a letter to Schaeffer
that "unfortunately this conference is a total improvisation. "20 At that stage Adler-
Rudel was referring to the absence of a working plan for the proceedings. Surprisingly,
not much improvement was discernible when the American program was published.
On June 27, at a meeting of the Council for German Jewry held in London, a
representative of the American Joint Distribution Committee, Harold Ginsburg,
related that following a conversation he had held with the members of the American
delegation, it was his impression that they wished to allow the conference itself to
decide on its agenda and working procedures.21 The previous day, Eliahu Dobkin,
speaking at a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem, declared that in
his view the conference was doomed to failure because it was not being prepared
properly.22 A member of the Zionist delegation who travelled with McDonald from
Lausanne to the conference at Evian found that even he, the head of the President's
advisory committee, had no clear conception of how the proceedings would be
conducted, the duration of the sessions, or the results expected from the conference.23

The effects of the negligent preparations were immediately apparent on the
opening day of the conference: a titanic struggle was waged over who was to serve as
president of the meeting. The Americans proposed a French representative, the French
supported an American delegate. Finally, the French "won" and the head of the
American delegation, l^yron Taylor, took up the gavel. 24

19 FRUS 1938, Vol. 1, p. 748.

20 Adler-Rudell/Correspondence, p. 171.

21 Adler-Rudell, p. 240.

22 Minutes of Jewish Agency Executive meeting, June 26, 1938.

23 Adler-Rudell, p. 240.

24 Morse (p. 212) provides a highly sarcastic account of the debate, complaining that it took up two days of the conference.

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This wrangle was foil owed almost at once by a hitch in the proceedings which was
to prove extremely detrimental to the image of the conference as it became an
inexhaustible source of accusations and demagogy. In total contradiction to the
declared program, a public discussion was held during four full plenum sessions in
the course of which representatives from the overwhelming majority of the delegations
(25 of the 32 countries present) addressed the conference.

According to the American plan (Par. 2) the conference participants were to
submit preliminary declarations concerning their countries' immigration laws and
procedures and to indicate the number of refugees they would be prepared to accept
immediately. However, it was

stated explicitly that this information was to be made available "for the
absolutely secret knowledge" of the conference. The need for secrecy was
understandable, particularly in the light of what happened after it was violated. At all
events, these declarations were not intended to become the result of the conference but
to serve as preliminary material for its functioning and as an immediate instrument
with which to solve extremely urgent cases which did not admit of delay.

Roosevelt, who was acquainted with the international situation concerning
emigration and the possibilities of immigrant absorption, knew that intensive and
patient work was needed in order to achieve concrete results. His personal experience
as a head of state had brought home to hi m forceful ly that the desi re for restrictions on
immigration laws, and public opinion opposing the entry of foreigners were very
palpable matters, especially in democracies, and could not be undone by a few
speeches. This approach dictated that the proceedings of the Evian Conference, which
was intended as the first stage in an ongoing campaign, be held in camera, with the
exception of the opening session, which would be devoted to public declarations of a
general character, and the closing session, at which the conference resolutions would
be made public. 25 This procedural framework was published as part of a statement to
the press issued a few days before the opening of the conference, in which President
Roosevelt was quoted as saying he wanted "deeds and not speeches" and that as far as
he was concerned, the primary result of the conference should be the establishment of
an intergovernmental body with broad powers which could implement the resolutions
to be adopted. 26

A special 'Technical Subcommittee" was appointed in order to receive the secret
information from the various delegations. However, this committee found itself made
redundant by the actual proceedings: after the delegates addressed the plenum
publicly, they had nothing more to add for the committee's secret sessions. Speaking
from the rostrum at the fourth public session of the plenum, the chairman requested
some 20 delegations (whose names he read out) to send representatives to the second
meeting of the Technical Subcommittee in order to submit their declarations, or,
alternatively, to inform the committee that they had nothing to add to their public
statements. Finally, it was decided that the material in question would not be
considered secret and that the Technical Subcommittee would publish a survey of the
information made available.

The origin of the delegates' speeches, as related above, also sheds light on their
quality and their moral value. At all events, we find no reason to follow the
conventional history of Evian and view speeches of

this kind as being inevitably hypocritical and alienated. No hypocrisy is
necessarily involved if a person expresses his identification with homeless people and
his readiness to help them, but is unwilling to put them up in his own home. To
exemplify, we will make reference to a current event in the realm of international
relations. When these lines werefirst being written (late 1971) the number of refugees
who crossed into India from East Pakistan (which subsequently became Bangladesh)
as a result of the I ndia-Pakistan war totalled approximately ten million. They were in
severe distress and experiencing great suffering. Had a special ten-day international
conference been convened to seek ways to help the refugees, it is very probable that
Israel would have attended this major humanitarian gathering, with its delegate
expressing, on behalf of his government and his nation, sincere identification with
the suffering of the refugees. He would likely have offered aid in the form of food.

25Adler-Rudell,p. 251.
26 Davar , July 3, 1938.

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clothing, medicines, medical teams, and so forth. But if the Israeli delegate had been
called on to declare then and there that his country was ready to absorb, even on a
temporary basis only, let us say one-tenth of one percent of the refugees, i.e., 10,000
persons, it is extremely doubtful whether he would have complied with this request,
had he then asked his government to approve this plan, it is unlikely that such
approval would have been forthcoming while the conference was still in session. And
if it had been suggested that he address this issue in public, he would have
undoubtedly tried to explain the difficulties which this matter posed for the
Government of Israel. However, whether his remarks had been convincing or had
sounded evasive, we in Israel would have known that his stance did not derive from an
absence of sympathy for the refugees or from an unwillingness to help. It is also
possible that despite everything, the constraints of the situation and Israel's
international ties might have led it to offer a temporary haven to a certain number of
refugees. But clearly, this would have been preceded by detailed negotiations with key
bodies directly involved in the matter.

The Evian delegates were for the most part embassy staff or senior foreign
ministry officials; not a single prime minister or head of state was present. To expect a
gathering of this nature to give immediate and binding responses at the preliminary
stage of clarifications was both unreasonable and unj ust. To say this is not to deny that
the uniform style of the speeches left a bad taste at the time-and one which lingers to
this day. Along with expressions of sympathy for the refugees, each and every speaker
went into immense detail about his country's immigration laws and about the
rigorous regulations in force to prevent the entry of

undesirable foreigners. We know now that this section of the speeches was
requested by the conference organizers for the discreet use of the Technical
Subcommittee as factually informative material. Because of the organizational
foul up, this material became part of the conference's external facade, and was seized
on by al I those who were seeki ng j ust such an outcome.

The J ewish world responded with surprised delight to the Roosevelt initiative.
Expressions of gratitude and appreciation poured into the White House from
numerous Jewish communities. The Jewish federations in Poland issued a joint
proclamation expressing Polish Jewry's deep esteem for President Roosevelt in the
wake of his welcome initiative.27 The editor of Ha'aretz, Moshe Glickson, wrote that
"the initiative of President Roosevelt... has generated immense esteem and
admiration throughout the Jewish dispersions."28 A highly expressive statement
reflecting the emotions and the expectations which were aroused by the initiative is
found in the memoirs of Dr. Mordechai Ehrenpreis, Chief Rabbi of Sweden, who
attended the conference as an observer:

On my way from Stockholm to Evian, I could not overcome a sense of growing
optimism, although this was hardly consistent with the spirit of the time-evil omens
seemed to crop up everywhere, every newspaper reported some new calamity. Yet from
afar there shone the thought of Evian as a star of hope. I thought to myself: this
conference at Evian is no ordinary meeting. It could become the conference of the
world's conscience.. Now it seemed that the conscience of the world had awakened.
Finally the voice of humanity was raised aloud, at long last downtrodden and
oppressed J ewry would hear words of compensation. President Roosevelt deserved our
thanks! The very fact of the meeting at Evian was a resonant act which heartened
many people who were desperate for living faith in a better future."29 (Emphasis in
the original.)

Together with the entire J ewish people, the Zionist organizations were also
overwhelmed with enthusiasm. The national conference of the Zionist Organization of
America announced a special volume of the Golden Book of the J ewish National Fund
in which President Roosevelt's name would be inscribed. The citation stated that "his

27 Ha'aretz . July 7, 1938.

28 Ibid.. July 8. 1938.

29 Dr. Mordechai Ehrenpreis, Between East and West , Am Oved, 1957, pp. 223-224.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

activities and efforts on beinalf of Eretz-lsrael and Jews everywinere deserve to be
engraved in

the hearts of tine J ewisin people."30 Tine speal<ers at tine conference, among tinem
Dr. Stepinen Wise, Louis Lipsl<y and otiners, expressed tineir inope and request tinat
Palestine occupy prime place in every plan for the solution of the J ewish refugee
problem. BlTheJ ewish Agency was engaged in drafting a special memorandum on the
possibilities of Jewish settlement in Palestine and Trans-Jordan. On behalf of the
World J ewish Congress, Dr. Nahum Goldmann submitted to the American delegation a
detailed paper setting forth the political and financial potential which existed for
expanding the absorptive capacity of Palestine for large-scale Jewish immigration. 32
Britain's Zionists urged their government to declare at Evian its readiness to admit to
Palestine a large number of German and Austrian Jews in the immediate future.33
Every speaker, every article in the press, exuded hope and expectation that the
conference would open wide the gates of Eretz-lsrael.

Theseexpectations were not to befulfilled. At theopening session, the head of the
British delegation. Lord Winterton, whose speech was awaited by the Zionists "in great
tension, "34 detailed the actions which his government had taken and intended to take
with the aim of absorbing refugees at home and in the overseas colonies-but without
so much as mentioning Palestine. Britain's chief allies, America and France, each
spoke about itself but refrained from exerting pressure on the British in this regard.
Similarly, the other delegates also spoke about their own countries and did not
mention Palestine.

Some history books aver that Britain made its attendance at Evian conditional on
there being no discussion of Palestine as a place of haven for the refugees.35 We were
unable to locate a reliable source which could confirm this notion. It stands to reason,
however, that Britain could only have put forward a condition of this kind to America
and perhaps to France as well, the two other senior participants at Evian. It is highly
doubtful that Britain could have prevented the other 29 delegations from talking
about Palestine had they wished to do so.

Nevertheless, we do not rule out the possibility that we are mistaken on this
point, and that Britain, with U.S. support, did in fact manage to convince all the
conference participants not to raise the subject of Palestine and that so secretly was
this was done that it left no traces whatsoever. The unfortunate truth is that no such
lobbying was needed. While the conference was in session, Palestine was being
wracked by bloody unrest. Arab terrorism outdid itself in ferocity. A large number of
Jews were murdered throughout the country. Three days before the opening of the
conference, the underground Irgun Zva'i Leumi (National

Military Organization), which was in opposition to the official Yishuv
institutions, carried out reprisal operations against Arabs in Jerusalem and Jaffa.
Theopening day of the conference saw a harsh reprisal raid in Haifa. Day after day the
headlines around the world reported dozens of dead in Palestine-J ews and Arabs
alike. As is inevitable in circumstances of this kind, true accounts were augmented by
a rash of false rumors and fabricated tales. Thus, for example, the French news
agency, Havas, reported that a Jewish settlement had been totally overrun by Arabs
and its 60 inhabitants butchered. 36 Against a backdrop of this kind, no special
pressure was required in order to ensue that Palestine would not be cited among the
potential ports of haven for the refugees.

The claim which was later voiced-that the WZO was insufficiently involved in
the conference preparations- may be justified with respect to information activity
among the minor delegations.37 However, the charge that the WZO took a passive

30 Davar , July 5, 1938, special evening edition.

31 Ibid., morning edition.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., July 4, 1938.

34 Letter from Evian, Hapoel Hatza'ir , July 22, 1938.

35 History of the Haganah (Vol. 11, p. 782) does not note the source of this report. Adler-Rudell (p. 237) relates that Britain set
three conditions for its participation in the conference: (1) that invitations be sent to countries of immigration only; (2) that the
conference deal solely with refugees and not with persons threatened by persecution; and (3) that Palestine not be a subject for
discussion at the conference. He bases himself on Wischnitzer's book cited above. Wischnitzer does in fact put forward the
same version, basing himself on an article by B. Akzin, "The Great-Power Game with Our Refugees," in the Yiddish paper Per
Tag , April 13, 1947.

36 Ruppin,p. 333.

37 Yitzhak Lufben in Hapoel Hatza'ir , July 22, 1938.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

posture vis-a-vis tine leading states-tine U.S. in particuiar-seems unwarranted. Tine
contemporary reports indicate tinat in addition to its public efforts, President
Roosevelt's close advisers were the targets of vigorous behind-the-scenes lobbying. As
a result, Rabbi Stephen Wise was able to inform the ZOA conference in J uly 1938 that
President Roosevelt's advisory committee on refugees (of which Wise himself was a
member) had agreed to an appearance by Chaim Weizmann "in the name of the J ewish
people."38 It is conceivable that pledges made by these circles account for the report
published in the press on the eve of the conference to the effect that at Evian a program
would be adopted for the settlement of 400,000 refugees within four years: 100,000 per
year, 50,000 of tern in Palestine, 30,000 in the U.S., and the remainder in other
countries. 39

In fact, no such program was adopted, or, indeed, even raised for discussion.
Britain, the Mandatory power in Palestine, did not propose that land for refugee
settlement, and, as we saw, no one tried to bend its arm in this regard. Lord Winterton's
speech at the opening session put a swift end to the expectation that Evian would
herald the opening of the gates to Palestine.

The upshot was that the attitude of the Zionists towards the conference swung to
the other end of the pendulum. Admiration yielded to anger, hopes to bitter
disappointment. Besides the criticism levelled at Britain for disavowing the content
and purpose of the mandate entrusted to it, convenient grounds for bitterness were also
found in the delegates' speeches. The reports from Evian played up the reservations
contained in the speeches, and the commentaries could be summed up in Weizmann's

famous remark, quoted above. Moreover, if the contemporary analyses still
contained sporadic half-hearted acknowledgements of the importance of the event per
se, the passage of time consigned this approach to oblivion. What remained for
"eternal memory" was a picture of hypocrisy, disavowal and treachery on the one
hand, and bitter frustration on the other.

Outward manifestations of the disappointment and outrage were not lacking. The
Zionists' contemptuous attitude towards the conference was reflected in the most
demonstrative manner imaginable by the cancellation of the scheduled appearance of
Chaim Weizmann, the president of the Zionist movement. Weizmann's participation
at Evian had been the centerpiece of the pre-conference activity by the Zionists, and it
was attended by great publicity in the Yishuv and in Jewish communities overseas.
On J uly 5 the front page of Davar's evening edition carried a two-column photograph of
Weizmann, captioned "Ch. Weizmann, looking forward to his appearance at the
Governmental Commission for Refugee Affairs at Evian." Three days later Ha'aretz
carried a "special" cabled report from London to the effect that Weizmann had been
officially invited to Evian and was about to depart for the conference. However, no such
special invitation was forwarded to Weizmann, and he did not attend the conference.
The J ewish Agency's memorandum to the Technical Subcommittee was submitted by
the expert economist Dr. Arthur Ruppin. It spoke of the exit of 200,000 Jews from
Germany and 100,000 from Austria, while stressing the vital necessity for
negotiations to be held with the German government on the transfer of capital in the
sum required to enable their absorption. According to the press reports, the
subcommittee members heard him out attentively, and thanked him politely for the
information and for his important proposals.40 But Britain did not agree to open the
gates of Palestine. The Jewish Agency memorandum was left hanging in the air, and
Weizmann did not depart for Evian.

To prevent any possible misunderstanding about the meaning to be read into the
cancellation of Weizmann's appearance, the Zionist representation at Evian issued a
special statement: 'The Zionist delegation decided that it would not be worthwhile to
trouble Dr. Weizmann to appear before the subcommittee of the refugee conference as
one of 50 representatives of other private organizations. "41

This communique is more revealing than its authors intended. The Evian
Conference attracted dozens of well-known personalities: the Spanish cellist Casals,
the Italian historian Ferrero, the exiled Italian statesmen Nenni and Sporza, the
chairman of the Pan-European Alliance,

38 Davar , July 5. 1938.

39 Ha'aretz . July 3, 1938.

40 Davar , July 10, 1938.

41 Davar , July 14, 1938, and other papers of the same date.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Count Condenhove-Kalergi; distinguished welfare officials who were numbered
among the "righteous gentiles"; and heads of humanitarian, political and religious
organizations. It is doubtful whether arty of them received a special invitation--or any
invitation at all. For many of them, the chances of actually addressing the conference
were negligible. All of them sought by their presence to encourage and hearten the
conference participants, and to imbue the proceedings with an aura of luster and
prestige. All of them wished to help persecuted J ews, and they viewed their
participation, where this was possible, as a privilege and not a bother. Not SO Dr.
Weizmann. His attendance would not be in order to be of help like the others, but with
the aim of solving once and for all the Jewish problem by channeling the Jews to
Palestine. Since this proved unrealistic, it was not worthwhile to trouble him. After
all, he would not be dealing there with territorialist solutions. To denounce the closed
world which had no use for J ews it was not necessary to goto Evian, of all places.

The wounds which were supposed to serve as justification for Weizmann's non-
attendance reflect well the anger of the statement's authors but do not constitute a very
convincing case. If it had been thought that Weizmann's presence could serve the
cause of Zionism, it is unlikely that his attendance would have been passed over
because an appearance before a subcommittee was allegedly beneath his dignity. The
truth is that by the time the statement was issued, on J uly 12, the need no longer
existed for his appearance before the subcommittee, Ruppin having fulfilled that task
four days earlier. For formal reasons, Weizmann could not address the plenum, which
had been declared an inter-governmental meeting and was confined to the
participation of representatives of governments only. Nevertheless, if Weizmann had
wished to plead the J ewish people's case before the entire world, he could have done so
successfully at Evian by making a public appeal at a press conference or in some
similar fashion--provided he had something to say and something to propose.

The Zionist statement's mention of the "50 representatives" among whom
Weizmann considered it imprudent to appear is related to a noteworthy element in the
Zionist version of the history of the Evian Conference. It is in fact an element
characterized by partial veracity and by a far-reaching distortion of the truth in its
broadest sense. We refer to yet another fault in the conference arrangements, caused i n
part and indirectly by the representatives of the Jewish organizations, but for which
direct responsibility was borne by the conference organizers.

Thirty-nine delegations of "private" (i.e., non-governmental) organizations,
among them 20 J ewish delegations, were registered with the conference secretariat. A
specialsubcommitteewassetupjusttodealwiththesegroups.lt was agreed that each
organization would submit to the conference a memorandum containing its comments
and declarations, and that the representative submitting the memorandum would be
able to address the Technical Subcommittee for a limited time.

The plethora of J ewish organizations, each espousing its own separate ideas and
proposals, was a source of discomfort and embarrassment among the Jewish public.
The contemporary J ewish press carried numerous expressions of outrage by
journalists and functionaries over the rifts among the representatives of the J ewish
organizations and their refusal to enter into constructive dialogue. A later Zionist
historical work evaluates the behavior of the Jewish emissaries at Evian as follows:
'The appearance of the Jews at the Evian Conference was that of paupers. Numerous
associations and federations came separately and presented their claims before the
nations of the world. It was not a united nation but a homeless group of lobbyists that
appeared before the conference representatives. "42

Notwithstanding the „anti-exilic" style, redolent with disparagement of those
homeless lobbyists, this assessment does contain a partial truth; but, as we said, it is
hardly the whole truth. It is known that the Jewish Agency leadership in London
proposed to the British Council for German Jews, and perhaps to other groups as well,
that all the J ewish organizations meet together prior to the conference in order to
consolidate a coordinated plan of action and dispatch a joint delegation to Evian. The
Council rejected the idea and the Jewish Agency made no further efforts in this

42 History of the Haganah . ibid., p. 783.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

direction.43 The reason adduced for this refusal to cooperate was that a joint
representation of the J ewish organizations was liable to confirm the existence of "an
international J ewry."44 This rationale certainly does not attest to the intellectual
resilience of the non-Zionist groups, whose behavior, indeed, shows that they had
fallen into the trap of Nazi demagogy and been pushed into a defensive posture of
denyimg their "terrible crime." This same ludicrous reasoning was to be voiced by the
leaders of these organizations again at a later stage, as a pretext to justify their failure
to act on urgent and vital matters. Overall, this episode reinforces the assessment that
the relative weight of the WZO at this time was so great as to preclude the possibility
that without it--and certainly not in an adversarial stance to it--J ewry was capable of
implementing any large-scale programs. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.

What the writers of history have ignored is the attempt that was made to forge
unity at Evian. The dialogue between the various organizations, which the J ewish
Agency had sought to bring about in London, took place at Evian and produced
substantive results. The delegations of five major affluent and influential
organizations reached agreement on a joint memorandum and on its joint submission
to the conference. A typed copy of the memorandum, which we found in the Central
Zionist Archives, bears the representative signatures of these organizations: (1) The
Council for German J ews; (2) the I CA; (3) the emigration society HICEM, run jointly by
HIAS and ICA; (4) the joint external affairs committee of the Board of Deputies of
British J ewry and the Anglo-J ewish Association; and (5) the World Center of Agudat
Israel.

The text of the memorandum, which was drawn up by S. Adier-Rudel, a member
of the Zionist Actions Committee, was not exclusively Zionist in character, nor was it
purely territorialist or assimiliationist. It addressed itself to organizational and
monetary questions relating to emigration without espousing a specific ideological
orientation. A special clause (XII) was devoted to "Palestine as a land of immigrant
absorption." The memorandum cited statistical data on the role of Palestine in the
absorption of J ews in the past, and put forward two demands with respect to that
country. The first was of a general nature: 'That full advantage be taken of the
contribution Palestine can make towards the solution of the refugee problem." The
second demand, which was highly concrete and should be seen against the backdrop of
a dispute which existed between the Zionist movement and the British government,
urged "restoration of the principle that the determining factor with regard to the entry
of J ews into Palestine be [solely] its economic absorptive capacity." These two demands
were satisfactory to the Zionist delegation headed by Arthur Ruppin. As a result, a
note was appended to the memorandum below the signatures of the submitters. It read:
'The J ewish Agency for Palestine, which is submitting a separate memorandum,
devoted to Palestine, expresses its concurrence with this memorandum" The U.S.-
based J oint Distribution Committee also affiliated itself with the memorandum. 45

The joint memorandum radically changed the atmosphere among the J ewish
delegations at Evian. A document had been adopted with the assent of all the non-
Zionist representative organizations at the conference (with the exception of the
Alliance Israelite) and which had received the formal consent of the Zionist
movement. Besides the vocational aid organizations Ort and OSE, only a number of
small baffles, whose impact among the Jewish populafion was minimal, remained
unrepresented on the

memorandum. The situation which emerged need not have created an
impression of rift and separation, and certainly the depressing and humiliating
experience which was the lot of the J ewish representatives would have been avoided,
had it not been for the (second) hitch in the conference procedures.

I n order to lend added weight to their presentations, and perhaps also to augment
the impression of unity and cohesiveness, the representatives of the large federations
sought to prevent the appearance of the small organizations before the conference.
However, the objections of these groups to this move were accepted by the organizers,
and the conference chairman announced that the second subcommittee would hear
presentations by a// the organizations wishing to appear before it. This liberal decision
would undoubtedly have proved propitious had sufficient time been allotted for its

43 Second report of N. Goldmann from Evian, CZA, File S25/978, and Rosenblitt's letter to Ruppin, CZA, File S7/693.

44 Ibid.

45 Adler-Rudell, p. 239.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

proper implementation. Tinis, inowever, was not the case. Of the ten days of tine
conference, only one session of a few hours was devoted to hearing the various
representatives. So that all 24 organizations which turned up for the session could
present their case, the committee gave each just a few minutes. The result was chaos.

We have a vivid description of what happened, written while the events were still
fresh in the author's mind:

The reception of the delegation representatives was a truly melancholy affair.
The delegation spokesmen stood by the door of the meeti ng room. Everyone who entered
was given 3-4 minutes to make his presentation. No questions were asked. The first few
had their remarks translated into English or French; for those who followed even this
gesture of courtesy was omitted. Spokesmen found themselves back in the waiting
room before they even grasped that they had already appeared before the committee.46

Numerous similar descriptions can be found in the contemporary press.

Thirty-four years later. Professor Benjamin Akzin, who represented the
Revisionist Zionists (the New Zionist Organization, or NZO) at Evian, recalled from
memory the course of events:

Now there is another dimension, that of representation. These four or five
associations, which were headed by Bentwich, saw themselves, by themselves, as the
representatives of the J ewish people, and they were extremely displeased that all

kinds of other associations had arrived, of which we in the NZO were one. For
them, we were "minor-leaguers," trespassers, and they wanted to be rid of us. First
they proposed that only one representative, or two or three representatives, appear
before the Evian Conference in the name of all the J ewish federations. I was somewhat
active in organizing the opposition to this plan, and in the name of democracy and of
other considerations I insisted, as did others, that others also be allowed to
participate... A struggle ensued, and finally we succeeded in convincing the Evian
Conference that a representative of each J ewish organization be permitted to speak.
But the truth is that here was here, that what took place was a tragicomedy, with
plenty of the comedy element. I do not remember how many associations- twenty, you
say? perhaps--each of us was given five or ten minutes, I don't recollect, and the entire
thing was not serious. It was clear that the committee did not take it seriously.47

From the perspective of the decades that have elapsed, S. Adier-Rudel surveys
once more what happened at the conference:

The hearing was a humiliating procedure. Nobody was prepared for it, neither
the members of the Committee, nor the representatives of the various organisations
who had to queue up at the door of the meeting room to be called in, one after the other,
and to face the eleven members of the Sub-Committee whom they were supposed to tell
their tale within ten minutes at the most. There were very distinguished public
figures amongst the petitioners-scientists, authors, politicians etc.-none of them
accustomed to any kind of interrogation procedure in front of a Committee, before
which they felt rather as though they were on trial, without time to bring forward
their plea, as they had soon to make room for the next of the invited spokesmen. All left
the room disheartened and disillusioned.

This effect was certainly not intended. But the Committee members had little
knowledge of the complicated details of the problems. They were pressed for time and
had not anticipated so many memoranda and so many speakers who all started their
addresses with the same remarks. TheJ ewish

organizations are notfree from blame for the lack of method and preparedness.
Accustomed to the traditions of their own organisations, their spokesmen found
themselves stranded on unfamiliar ground and were not given time to adapt to the new
surroundings and to a diplomatic atmosphere. It would have been far better if, by some
sort of agreement reached beforehand, a limited number of delegates had been
empowered to represent all the organizations concerned before the Committee and had

46 Adler-Rudell/Correspondence, p. 194.

47 Recorded interview of the author with Prof. Benjamin Al^zin, September 7, 1972.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

submitted a joint plan for tine practical solution of the problems under discussion. This
opportunity, alas, was missed. 48

In the last paragraph, Adier-Rudel seems to be inadvertently continuing the
debate which raged at the time over the joint memorandum, of which he was the
author. Taking into account the actual conditions that prevailed, it would appear that
the centralization of the J ewish representation had reached a level beyond which few
possibilities remained. In particular we find it difficult to see how the partnership
between the Zionist and non-Zionist organizations could have been expanded and
tightened on the basis of a joint plan for a practical solution.

Buttheattempt to pin the blame for the hitch on the Jewish organizations seems
wholly absurd. Simple logic shows that since the number of delegates could not be
reduced--and in any case, with respect to the non-J ewish humanitarian

organizations, this would have been undesirable-the pressure should have been
avoided by allotting sufficient time. If we multiply 24 organizations by five to ten
minutes, we find that the committee sat for between three and four hours. Had the
number of sessions been doubled and the total hours tripled, each representative
would have been allotted 20 to 25 minutes. The representatives would not have had to
wait in line by the door in expectation of being summoned at any moment; the
committee members would not have hurried the speakers and would not have limited
them in subject matter; 49 and the speakers would have had ample time to accustom
and adapt themselves to the atmosphere and surroundings without being pressured by
the time factor or prodded by the committee. I n other words, the event would have been
an honorable one, conducted to the satisfaction of all the participants, and beneficial
to the cause at hand.

It was an organ/zat/ona/ flaw that caused the hitch with the committee, just as it
was another organizational defect that brought about the superfluous series of
speeches and turned the public sessions into a

harmful episode. Indeed, the two blunders were probably not unrelated. Two of
the conference's ten days could easily have been given over to the committee sessions,
had the proceedings been conducted as originally planned. But after four public
sessions were added, the available time was diminished and the temptation grew to
"lighten the burden" of the committee members by slashing their working hours.

We have dwelt on this episode not because it was important pa- se. No great harm
was caused. We will not be off the mark if we assert that, in contrast to the failure
which produced the superfluous speeches, the hitch in the proceedings of the
subcommittee did not exercise a substantial influence over the conference and its
outcome. There are clear indications that those who were affected--the representatives
of the delegations who were interested in the success of the conference-were able to
overcome the transitory impression left by the episode, viewing the matter as a
regrettable bureaucratic incident which did not reflect the spirit of the conference.

Not so the writers of history. In their eyes the incident took on the dimensions of a
full-fledged historical event. From being an ephemeral impression, the sense of insult
and the feeling of disappointment became the melancholy symbol of everything that
happened at Evian. The hitch in the subcommittee became additional evidence of and
testi mony to the ,,fai I ure" of the enti re conference.*

* The degree to which the incident in the subcommittee had become
identified with the "failure of the conference is attested to by the spontaneous
reaction of Dr. Nahum Goldmann in a conversation with the author. At the
time, Goldmann wrote from Evian that the reception of the representatives by
the committee "bordered on farce" (CZA, File S25/9778). Asked about Evian 34
years later, and after confirming his evaluation regarding "the shame and
scandal for the progressive world," he added immediately: "We were also a bit
to blame [for the failure], because too many organizations applied and wanted
to be heard, so there was no united front, and the goy/m said. To hell with all of
them!"'

48 Adler-Rudell, p. 255.

49 Arthur Ruppin, who was allotted ten minutes and was listened to attentively, was stopped by the members of the committee
when he wanted to discus the transfer of the refugees' capital assets. Ruppin, p. 302.

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A second, equally characteristic example is the following description,
which encapsulates the memory of the Evian Conference:

'The course which the Evian Conference took, the undue haste with
which the J ewish representatives presented their comments on their
memoranda to the president of the conference. Lord Winterton-everything
within just a few minutes (since it was impossible to hear 30 delegations at
length)--all of this brought home to us the tragedy which was nearing its
clear peak, the annihilation. The gates had already been closed before us."
(Ernst Marcus, "The German Foreign Office and the Palestine Question, 1933-
1939," Yad Vashem Studies 1 1 , p. 177 [translated from the H ebrew].

The first indication calling into question the credibility of the reporting and the
Zionist history of the conference is found in a JTA wire report which appeared in the
Palestine press following the conclusion of the conference. In Davar it ran as follows
(emphasis added): 'The majority of tliej ewisii delegations left Evian in a good frame of
mind and full of hopes for the future (? -ed.). "50 T\r\e editor's question mark is readily
understandable. The report flatly contradicted everything that had been published
during the ten days of the conference. Reversing the well-known quip, one could ask. If
everything is so bad, how can it be good? The researcher of the episode in our own day
adds his own puzzlement to that of the Davar editor. Like him, he places a question
mark of doubt over the accuracy of the information. However, his doubts are directed
also at the other side of the testimonies: if we reject the possibility that the JTA report
was falsified-which is inconceivable-it is difficult to reconcile it with universally
accepted verities. Where are the disappointment and the frustration? Where is the
sense of insult at the reaction of the civilized world? How do the great hopes fit'm with
the lament of despair, "no pity,"51 with which the Zionist press summed up the
conference?

A second report which widens the breach in the credibility of the Zionist version
of events appeared in /-/ao/am, a J erusalem weekly edited by Moshe Kleimnan which
was the central organ of the WZO. Where the Evian affair was concerned, it stood out
from other papers in the Yishuv by virtue of the relatively objective information it
provided. According to Haolam, the World Jewish Congress was also satisfied and
hoping for the best. A column entitled "Evian Echo" relates that the statement issued
by the WJ C executive stood "in contrast to the despairing opinion." The WJ C expressed
the hope "tat the Inter-Governmental Committee [which was established by the
conference] will fulfill its task at an accelerated pace. The circles represented by the
WJ C are certain that one of the principal tasks of this committee must be [to bring
about] cooperation between governments and private organizations in order to resolve
the refugee problem. "52

Thus we find neither disappointment, despair, nor a sense of insult, but good
hopes and a call for speedy action and cooperation. And this from the World J ewish
Congress, an offspring of the WZO, whose leaders were well-known Zionist
functionaries.

The WJ C's head of delegation at Evian, Dr. Nahum (Goldmann, who worked
together with Dr. Ruppin on the Zionist representation, also

expressed himself in the spirit of the WJ C's statement In his second report to the
J ewish Agency Executive, on J uly 20, Goldmann wrote: 'The conference undoubtedly
marks progress in the effort to solve the problem of the J ewish refugees in Germany."
Moreover, he added, the new organization might prove helpful when conditions permit
increased immigration to Palestine. "Therefore," he concludes, "it is our task to ensure
that we maintain constant contact with it. "53

50 Davar , July 17, 1938.

51 Yitzhak Lufben, Hapoel Hatza'ir , July 22, 1938.

52 Haolam , July 28, 1938. We received a copy of this optimistic declaration of the World Jewish Congress courtesy of Mr.
Adler-Rudell, from his personal archive.

53 CZA, File S25/9778.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Nor did Dr. Ruppin, the head of the Zionist delegation, fall prey to bitterness and
despair. "Despite everything," he wrote in his diary, "I believe that something positive
may come out of this conferecne, if the permanent committee, to be established in
London, is blessed with a gifted director. "54 He reiterated this thought about the
desirable personality of the director in a letter to the J ewish Agency Executive.55 Like
Goldmann, Ruppin also appreciated the importance of continued contacts with the
Evian participants. Following a post-conference meeting in Paris with the U.S.
representative, Myron Taylor, Ruppin recorded in his diary his favorable impression
of the man and of his attitude towards the refugee problem. 56 Thus, Ruppin, too,
expressed no disappointment, only concern for the effective implementation of the
resolutions.

Neither Goldmann nor Ruppin held decision- making positions in the WZO at
that fi me. Their impressions of the conference did not determine the stand taken by the
Zionist movement v/s-a-v/sthe resolutions adopted at Evian, or regarding cooperation
with the body set up to carry them out. Their letters were not made public, and neither
of them raised an outcry when their views did not become the official stance of
Zionism. But both of them had formed their impressions and opinions-and these were
definitely not negative. As far as is known, the two men differed in character and in
outlook. Both of them went through the Evian Conference from the inside,
experiencing first-hand both its successes and its failures. And both of them emerged
in a frame of mind which was at least not pessimistic, and with hopeful plans for the
future.

Also at Evian was a member of Zionism's intellectual elite, Zaiman Rubashov
(who, as Zaiman Shazar, would become Israel's third President), who covered the
conference for Davar and as such was privy to its inner workings. Rubashov's personal
qualities lend his direct reactions to what he witnessed unsurpassed documentary,
moral and historical worth. In his concluding article,57 he describes the new
organization to be created as a "third side" which will mediate between the persecutors
(the Germans) and the persecuted (the Jews). He commends both America and France
for their actions and intimates that

Zionism will also be able to benefit from the new organization. In his view,
Zionist policy is crucially important for American Jewry, which will be able to steer
the organization "both towards rescue [exiting German] and towards redemption
[immigration to Palestine]." Rubashov concludes with an emotional appeal to the
Zionist movement: 'The J ewish question was revealed to this international forum in
all its layers of tragedy, both externally and internally, but not without a way out.
Only the tasks facing the struggling people have multiplied. It is our obligation not to
buckle under them and not to neglect the mission with which we have been entrusted.
Wemust not betheneglecters." (Evr\p\r\as\s added.)

Symbolically, Rubashov, to reinforce his words, quotes Herzl's words to his son
concerning the need to be able to meet every test in life. But Heal was long since dead.
And with him expired his brand of integrative Zionism.

Rubashov's public call had no more impact than the substantive
recommendations of Goldmann and Ruppin. J ust as their ideas were filed away never
again to see the light of day, so the appeal to the Zionist movement published in the
paper was ignored. It elicited no reaction, either positive or negative. The call
generated neither debate nor support. In short order the fervent words became
forgotten lines in yesterday's newspaper. The Zionist leadership had no wish to
shoulder new tasks. It had no desire to take part in the enterprise of rescuing German
J ewry if this did not dovetail with bringing Jews to Palestine. Zionism went to Evian
with faint hopes and heavy fears, and when the hopes remained unrealized, all
Zionism wanted was to shrug off the entire matter with all possible speed.

/-/ao/am's ambivalent attitude towards the conference was already evident on its
opening day. Its editorial (written by Moshe Kleinman) welcomed the expected

54 Ruppin, p. 303.

55 CZA, File S25/9778.

56 Ruppin.p. 303.

57 Davar , July 22, 1938, signed "Listener."

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

appearance of Weizmann and praised the conference and its organizers. "We are all
grateful to that good man, President Roosevelt," and "we appreciate the historic
importanceof this conference," he wrote. At the same time, he was apprehensive about
"the further dispersion instead of the ingattiering we are striving for." His greatest
concern was that Palestine would be unable to absorb the refugees. "It will be able to
absorb them only conditionally: if this is accompanied by a radical and total solution
of the question of the 'national home' in Palestine. How will Eretz- Israel be able to
sustain a large-scale immigration if this is intended in advance to enlarge only the
urban population? How will we be able to acquire land for agricultural

settlement in the face of the harsh laws which tie our hands, the high cost of
land, the absence of protection for our produce, etc. etc., not to mention the constant
opposition of the Arabs?"58 (Emphases in the original.)

It is highly unlikely that the editor on his own could publish a public pessimistic
evaluation in the official organ of the Zionist movement without the support or
inspiration of the movement leadership. That an objection was raised specifically to
urban aliyaii suggests that the source of the inspiration was the President of the
movement, who was known for his consistent opposition to mass urban settlement and
had not hesitated to speak his mind on the subject with regard to the immigration of
Polish J ewry in the 1920s59 and the immigration of German J ewry in the following
decade.60 Indeed, our research turned up a preliminary paper written at Weizmann's
directive which explains quite a few matters described above and others which will be
recounted below. This was a letter from Dr. Georg Landauer to Dr. Stephen Wise who, it
will be recalled, was active in preparing the conference in America. The ktter is dated
J une B, 1938 and its full text follows (translated from the Hebrew; emphases added):

Dear Dr. Wise,

I have discussed at some length with Dr. Weizmann the subject of the Conference
which it is proposed to hold at Evian at the beginning of J uly in connection with the
J ewish refugee problem. Dr. Weizmann knows that you are associated with the
preparations that are being made in America for this Conference, and I presume that
you yourself are informed of the preparations that are going on in Gt. Russell Street
[the office of the Zionist Executive in London], as well as by the Council for German
Jewry. Dr. Ruppin is taking a deep interest in the forthcoming Conference and is
preparing a memorandum on the role of Palestine vis-a-vis the refugee problem.

I am writing this letter to you at the request of Dr. Weizmann as wearevery mucli
concerned in case ttie issue is presented at tlie Conference in a manner wliicli may tiarm
tlie world for Palestine Even if the Conference will not place countries other than
Palestine in the front for Jewish immigration, there will certainly be public appeals
which will tend to overshadow the importance of Palestine. Si nee our aim is to turn the
Conference into a force which would influence

the J ews as well as the British Government to do something real for the Jewish
people, we must do our utmost to bring Palestine to the fore and stress its importance
and its capacity to absorb large numbers of J ewish refugees.

We feel all the more concern as it may bind J ewish organizations to collect large
sumsof money for assisting] ewish refugees, and thesecollections are likely to interfere
with our own campaigns. It may be that the British delegation to the Conference will
receive instructions not to give specific assurances as regards Palestine. Such an
eventuality makes it all the more imperative for us to stress the importance of
Palestine both during the period of preparation and at the Conference itself.

We are convinced that Palestine offers possibilities for the immigration of tens of
thousands of J ewish refugees who can be absorbed in agriculture, in new industrial
enterprises, and in various public works, provided the necessary number of
certificates [entry permits] will be obtained and funds are placed at our disposal.

We know that you are watching the situation and would be much obliged to you if
you could inform us of the attitude of our American friends towards the Conference,
and whether you and any other of our friends from America will be there.

Yours sincerely.

58 Haolara, July 7, 1938.

59 Weizmann, Trial and Error , p. 296.

60 lbid.,p. 352.

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Dr. Georg Landauer61

The letter reflects the confusion and hesitations that were rampant in the Zionist
hierarchy and found their public expression in the Haolam article cited above. From
what the letter says directly, what it intimates transparently, and from the
conclusions that follow inevitably from both what was stated and what was implied, a
picture emerges of the Zionist movement's stand vis-a-vis the Evian Conference
according to Dr. Weizmann. That stand is encapsulated in the sentences we have
emphasized. First, there was serious concern that the conference would have an
adverse propaganda effect on Zionism. Against this danger, Weizmann held, vigorous
steps must betaken to bring home the Zionist message to the nations of the world and
to transform the conference into a positive element for Zionism's realization.
Weizmann indicated the principal argument to be adduced--that Palestine was
capable of absorbi ng

tens of thousands of refugees--so that it would not be rejected in favor of other
lands of absorption. It is difficult to know what hopes Weizmann entertained that he
could succeed in the propaganda war; what is known is that he himself was ready to
take pan in it personally by appearing before the conference.

If the sphere of propaganda and politics offered a mixture of both fears and hopes,
Weizmann's apprehension in the practical realm seemed devoid of all hope: What if
the conference participants should agree to offer the Jews shelter in their own
countries? The transfer and absorption of these J ews would required immense funds. If
the J ewish organizations sought to abet this enterprise by raising large sums of
money, this could well be detrimental to the Zionist fund-raising campaigns...

Weizmann has no counsel to offer in the face of this possible adverse
development. He is content to note that he is "especially" concerned at this possibility.
The only solution implicit in the letter is the hope that this will not happen.

It is not difficult to understand the mental anguish which engendered this letter.
The addressee. Dr. Wise, was an adviser and aide to President Roosevelt, serving on the
special commission which had been set up to prepare the conference. While he is still
engaged in planning the enterprise which would evoke the sympathy and admiration
of the progressive world, a letter is dispatched to him by the President of the World
Zionist Organization. The letter is not written by Weizmann himself and contains
neither greetings nor wishes for success. It is written on behalf of the President by
Georg Landauer, Dr. Ruppin's assistant in the Zionist movement's Central Office for
the Settlement of German J ews, and it contains a dire warning. It turns out that if the
conference succeeds in achieving the objectives set for it by the organizers,
incalculable damage will be done to Zionism. In contradistinction to a Roosevelt-style
success, a Zionist goal is now posited: to transform the conference into a force that will
impel the Jews and the British government alike to do "something concrete " for the
J ewish people. There can be no mistaking both what is needed for the accomplishment
of this purpose, and what would detract from it. First, the conference participants
must exert pressure on the British government to issue a large number of Palestine
entry permits. And second, under no circumstances whatsoever must the
representatives of the participating governments demonstrate generosity and invite
the Jews of Germany to settle in their countries-for in that event Palestine could be
shunted aside by other lands, thej ews would not contribute sufficient funds to enable
its development, and the British

might well grant even fewer certificates. On the other hand, if the Zionist goal
were to be achieved, the participants would all go their own way, the nightmare of
other territories would be expunged, the Jews would give more money and the British
more certificates, and theJ ews of Germany and Austria would immigrate to Palestine-
-as far as they had the means to do so.

Landauer's letter was not made public, but its dissemination was not confined to
the addressee alone. A copy was sent to the American Zionist leader Louis Lipsky62 and
perhaps to other American Zionist leaders. I n J erusalem its contents were made known
to a number of ranking Jewish Agency officials-and to Dr. Moshe Kreutzberger, a
J ewish Agency official who was slated to be a member of the Zionist delegation to
Evian. The letter provided important food for thought and was a useful guideline.

61 CZA, File S53/1 552a.

62 CZA, File S&/693.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

The J ewish Agency Executive discussed the Evian Conference at its meeting of
J une 26, ]938.63 Tine first speal<er was Artinur Ruppin, wino presented a tinree-point
plan winicin was recorded in tine minutes as follows:

(1) Properly organized emigration from Germany and Austria, and perhaps also
from Poland and Romania; in other words, the countries participating at Evian will
reach an agreement with Germany that during the coming ten years, let us say, a
[certain] number of J ews per year will be permitted to leave Germany and take part of
their possessions. (2) That the [various] countries will absorb the Jewish emigration.
In 1933, when Hitler assumed power. Dr. Ruppin had said'" that

Palestine could absorb 50 percent of the Jewish emigration from Germany. Now
heseesfit to request that only one-third of the emigration go to Palestine, one-third to
the United States, and the remainder to other countries. (3) To highlight the
[development of the] J ewish problem and to demonstrate that because of Germany's
deeds this problem has become a global problem.

Dr. Landauer put forward a proposal of his own: In order to occupy the refugees
who will, presumably, arrive in Palestine, "We will have to propose organizing in
Palestine huge work camps, in which the

** The remarks of the speakers in this and other Jewish Agency sessions
are set down in the third person.

residents will engage in public works, private jobs, and so forth. Naturally, vast
sums will be required to this end."

Eliahu Dobkin: Based on the experience of the past five years, of the 10-B,000 J ews
who will come to Palestine from among the 40,000 who will leave Germany (according
to Ruppin's plan), 40 percent will be well-to-do. "Efforts should be made to let them
take with their capital, because otherwise they will not be able to immigrate here."

The floor was taken next by two veteran fighters against territorial ism, Yitzhak
Gruenbaum and Menahem Ussishkin. Both of them rejected Ruppin's plan out of hand.

Gruenbaum:

"I mmense dangers loom from the Evian Conference: (1) It could mark the end of
Palestine as a land of immigration. In 1933 Palestine headed the list of countries to
which the German emigration went, and he greatly fears that at this conference it is
liable to find itself at the bottom of the list... (4) A danger exists, namely, that in the
course of their search for a way out, they will find some new territory to which they
will want to direct Jewish emigration. We must defend our principle- that Jewish
settlement can succeed only in Eretz-lsrael, and therefore no other [place of]
settlement can be considered."

Although Gruenbaum vigorously opposes the diversion of two-thirds of the
refugee flow to locations other than Palestine, he does not ignore the situation in the
country--and this leads him to reject the mode of absorption proposed by Landauer. "He
only wants to point out that he finds Dr. Landauer's proposal unacceptable. What kind
of work will we give these people? After all, there are [already] people here who are out
of work and we do not have even a day of work to offer them. And what will we do with
huge camps of additional workers?"

Ussishkin:

63 Minutes of a meeting of tlie Jewisli Agency Executive held in Jerusalem on June 26, 1938, No. 55 (hereafter: Minutes No. 55).

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

He is very much concerned by the Evian Conference... He supports
wholeheartedly the majority of Gruenbaum's remarks. Mr. Gruenbaum is right in
saying that there is a danger that Eretz-lsrael will be dropped from the agenda of

thej ewish people, and we must view this as a terrible danger for us. He thought to
hear at Evian that Eretz-lsrael will remain the central land of immigration for Jews;
none of the other countries of immigration interest him... Dr. Ruppin told us that he
was ready to propose to the conference that one-third of the emigrants from Germany
should go to Palestine, In his (Ussishkin's) opinion, that proposal should be left to
others. It is possible that after we propose one-third, others will come up with a
proposal of only 10 percent. The greatest danger is that they will try to find a territory
for J ewish immigration...

He [Ussishkin] does not place much value in making a speech to the conference...
It is therefore very important that our representatives there wield some influence and
explain to ttie representatives of ttie states tliat ttiere is no country in ttie world which
accepts immigrants enthusiastically. And as for Eretz-lsrael, Britain and all the
countries in the world have a certain commitment to facilitatej ewish immigration.

Eliezer Kaplan:

"He doubts whether the government of the United States will agree to exert
pressure on Britain at Evian. Naturally we must ensure our presence at the
conference. But it is our duty to cut down the number of those going there."

David Ben-Gurion, who spoke after the others, took Ruppin's plan apart piece by
piece and also poured cold water on the hopes held by some of his colleagues, that some
way could be found to benefit from the conference. Like Kaplan, he did not anticipate
that at Evian the United States government, or any other government, would press
Britain with respect to Palestine. No information efforts could transform the
conference from being harmful into being useful. What could and must be done, was to
keep the damage to a minimum. "He does not know whether the Evian Conference will
open the gates of other countries to J ewish immigration, but his fear, like Gruenbaum
and Ussishkin, is that at this time the conference is liable to cause immense harm to
Eretz-lsrael and to Zionism."

It seems to Ben-Gurion, [the minutes of the session continue,] that our main task
is to reduce the damage, the danger and the disaster that can be expected from the Evian
Conference... From a Zionist perspective, the Evian Conference is liable to be the
opposite of San Remo. It could remove Palestine from the international agenda as a
factor in the solution of the Jewish question. Because at this time Palestine is not
serving as a haven for masses of immigrants. The haverim who propose to highlight at
Evian the question of theJ ewish people are making a mistake. That question needs no
more "highlighting." The entire world is aware of the issue and its acuteness. What
needs to be highlighted is the so/ut/on [emphasis in the original] to the question. And
this is not a propitious hour for a solution. Because in the eyes of the world at large,
Palestine now resembles Spain [where a civil war was raging]. In a country where
there are riots and where every day bombs are thrown, people are murdered, and
unemployment and economic stagnation are rife-political questions cannot be
resolved. The more we highlight the terrible distress of the] ewish masses in Germany,
Poland and Romania, the moredamage we will do at this time to the negotiations [with
Britain]... No government will come out against Britain for us...

In my opinion, we should play down the image of the conference. As far as it
depends on us, it is desirable that the conference not make decisions on its own but
establish a commission to discuss matters... It is doubtful whether President Roosevelt,
who convened this conference, had Palestine in mind. Some time ago, Roosevelt told
one of our friends that Palestine could not solve the J ewish question and that a
different way had to besought. We must see to it that this dangerous tendency does not
find expression at the conference. Therefore our best people must go to Evian. In his
view, it was essential that Dr. Weizmann be there. It is also important that Ruppin and
Ussishkin go there, because we must be on our guard."

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

The meeting ended with a verbal clash between Ben-Gurion and Dr. David Sentor,
the only non-Zionist member of thej ewish Agency Executive. His exchange with Ben-
Gurion can be read as a symbolic

encapsulation of the divergence of outlook between the Zionist movement
leadership and the J ewish people as a whole at this fateful hour. The minutes of the
meeting have perpetuated this brief dialogue:

Dr. Sentor: We are all agreed that matters relating to Palestine should be given
prominence at Evian. However, he warns that there must be no dissociation from
another J ewish representation, which would also propose different partial solutions.
He would regard such dissociation as disastrous.

David Ben-Gurion: The Zionist movement never dissociates itself from any
J ewish activity. The Zionists are fighting no less than others for equal rights and also
for the right of Jewish immigration to all countries. It only insists on the special
Zionist task which befalls us at this moment.

That "special Zionist task... at this moment" was, then, to play down as far as
possible the image of the conference and to bring about a situation in which it would
make no decisions at all.

The J ewish Agency Executive did not pass a formal resolution; thus it would be
i naccurate to say that it adopted Ben-Gurion's plan of action. A second and supremely
important fact in this connection, is that it proved impossible to put together a
delegation which would assume responsibility for executing the directives of the
Jewish Agency chairman. The chief cause of this situation was the stance of Dr.
Ruppin.

Arthur Ruppin, a member of theJ ewish Agency Executive and the longtime head
of its Settlement Department, was a highly unorthodox Zionist, and because of
ideological differences he often found himself a conditional partner in the leadership.
(A typical instance: at the 20th Zionist Congress, Ruppin was co-opted to the Zionist
Executive in a slot earmarked for the non-Zionists. Ruppin, p. 283.) Since Hitler's
assumption of power, Ruppin had headed the Central Office for the Settlement of
German Jews, which was attached to the Jewish Agency, and at this time he was
wholly preoccupied with the refugee problem. For years he held negotiations on this
issue with various personalities and organizations on behalf of the J ewish Agency.64
His views on the solution of the problem were undoubtedly well known to those who
dealt with the question at the international level.

In all of Ruppin's plans and calculations-which were subject to occasional
changes in line with the shifting circumstances-Palestine occupied an honorable
place in the absorption of the refugees: it would take in up to half of the total number.
The other half was earmarked for three principal countries: the United States,
Argentina and Brazil. 65 Perhaps because he was not an orthodox Zionist, Ruppin was
not prey to the nightmare of territorialism, and he presented his calculations without
worrying that they could prove harmful to the Zionist enterprise. When Germany
annexed Austria, thereby increasing by 200,000 the number of J ews who needed to be
extricated, Ruppin did not hesitate to reduce the share of Palestine in absorbing the
refugees to one-third of the total, based on the assumption that the exodus from
Germany would be a ten-year process. Ruppin submitted his new plan to the J ewish
Agency Executive not long before the Evian Conference.

Ruppin's standing and his position as head of the Office for the Settlement of
German J ews, ruled out the possibility of his non-inclusion in the Zionist delegation to
Evian--notwithstanding that the Executive had rejected his plan. Since at the session
described above it turned out that none of those who outranked him in the leadership
hierarchy were willing to "stand on guard" as Ben-Gurion had requested, it was
immediately evident that Ruppin would serve as head of the delegation. It is not

64Ruppin, pp. 233, 251.
65 Ibid.,p. 229.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

known when and how Ben-Gurion spoke with him about a compromise regarding the
plans, but it is clear that as the session drew to a close, Ben-Gurion did not want any
further clarifications to be held on the topic without his personal participation. When
Kaplan and Gruenbaum proposed setting up a special committee to deal with the
subject, Ben-Gurion dismissed the idea in his concluding remarks: "When the
Executive receives additional information, it will reconsider this question," or, even
better, "Prior to the departure [for Evian] Dr. Ruppin will hold a meeting on the plan of
action, and all the members of the Executive who so desire will be able to participate."
With the support of several members of the Executive, Ben-Gurion tried to get Ruppin's
assistant. Dr. Landauer (who, it will be recalled, wrote the letter to Wise on behalf of
Weizmann), to accompany him but Landauer refused and Ruppin did not press the
issue.

A few days after Ussishkin changed his mind about attending the conference, it
was learned that Stephen Wise also did not intend to participate. 66 The two were not
replaced by other leading personalities likely to attract international interest. The
Hadassah Women's Organization proposed that the celebrated Zionist activist
Henrietta Szold be asked to go to Evian. She expressed her readiness to attend the

conference "if the Executive decides that her [participation] is necessary."67 But
the Executive somehow did not decide, and Henrietta Szold stayed home. The
delegation that was finally put together was quite modest in stature. Joining Arthur
Ruppin was Nahum Goldmann, who would be in Evian in any case representing the
World Jewish Congress. The third delegation member was Martin Rosenblitt.68
Several advisers and other staff69 were also dispatched, and while they may have
helped make the delegation's work more efficient, there were no well-known figures
among them. From this point of view David Ben-Gurion's wish was indeed realized: to
play down the image of the conference as much as possible. Shortly before the
conference opened it was still not known whether Weizmann would change his mind
about appearing at Evian in order to highlight the Jewish problem; but that question
was also soon resolved.

The memorandum (signed by Weizmann) that Ruppin submitted to the
conference on behalf of the J ewish Agency made no mention of the original one-
third/ two-thirds refugee absorption plan. It referred to the plight of the Jews, the
Zionist enterprise, and Palestine as a land of refugee absorption. The memorandum
contained not a word against the sending of refugees to other countries. The
concluding paragraph stated explicitly:

The J ewish Agency for Palestine seriously hopes that this conference will find
ways and means to ease the fate of the suffering Jews in Central and Eastern Europe,
find productive prospects of entry into various countries, and pay special heed to the
great possibilities offered by Palestine for the solution of thej ewish question. 70

No one who recalls Weizmann's fear at the idea of settlement in countries other
than Palestine, and Ben-Gurion's fervent desire to ensure that the conference would
not find concrete ways and means to that end, could doubt the seriousness and
sincerity of those hopes.

Another mention of countries other than Palestine in this document also bears
noting. Ussishkin's proposal at the J ewish Agency Executive session, "to explain" to
the conference participants that emigrants are not wanted anywhere, evidently did
not fall on deaf ears. The authors of the memorandum, as though apprehensive that its
concluding paragraph would generate an overabundance of liberalism among the
conference delegates, decided to precede it with a dose of toughness wrapped in
righteous rhetoric. Thus, Par. 5 of the memorandum stated: "Likewise, it is

also our hope that states which are capable of continuing to accept refugees,
without adversely affecting ther own citizens, will adopt a more courageous method of
absorption. By doing so, they will immediately help a larger number of victims of the

66 See Stephen Wise's cable to Ben-Gurion on June 27, CZA, File S25/9778.

67 Minutes No. 55.

68 Report to the 21st Zionist Congress by the Central Office for the Settlement of German Jewry, CZA.

69 Kreuzberg's letter, CZA, File S7/693.

70 According to Davar , July 12, 1938.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

persecutions and will also bring a blessing to those countries in which the emigrants
will settle."

This was "lobbying" which came across as a harsh warning to governments
which were hesitant and chary about entering into injudicious commitments.

In his speech while submitting the memorandum to the conference reception
committee, Ruppin also failed to mention his proposal to direct two-thirds of the
refugees to countries other than Palestine. He cited a round figure of potential
emigrants: 300,000, of whom 200,000 would leave Germany and the rest from Austria.
He surveyed the history of Jewish immigration to Palestine and submitted to the
committee a pamphlet he had written containing statistical tables on the Jews. He
dwelt on the need for negotiations with the German authorities concerning
arrangements for the large-scale "transfer" of capital in order to ensure the economic
absorption of the refugees. He also noted that the J ews of Eastern Europe should not be
dropped entirely from the conference agenda, even if they were not explicitly part of
it. 71

There were three striking omissions in the explanatory remarks of the noted
economist and statistician. Not a thing was said about annual emigration quotas in
Germany, no estimated distribution was mentioned for the absorption of the refugees
in various countries (nor was it stated unequivocally that Palestine would be the sole
or chief country of absorption), and no general timetable was offered for executing the
emigration plan. This triple omission, the inevitable result of Ruppin's hands being
tied by the J ewish Agency Executive, robbed his appearance of any substantive
content. I ndeed, this posture was characteristic of the situation and standing of anti-
territorial ist Zionism at Evian. The conditions then prevailing in Palestine meant
that it could contribute nothing to the solution of the problem to discuss which had
drawn the international community to Evian. As Ben-Gurion said openly and lucidly,
Zionism had nothing to offer in terms of absorbing the half a million Jews who were
compelled to leave Germany urgently. The Zionists were well aware that even if the
British were to accede to their demand to open the gates of Palestine, the problem could
not be solved under the conditions existing there. In a press conference held by the
Zionist delegation a few days later (see below), Ruppin was forced to spell out the
number of refugees Palestine was capable of absorbing per annum--and the figure he

cited was ten thousand. 72 The fear of territorialism obviated Zionist
participation in attempts to effect an immediate solution outside Palestine. All that
remained for them to do-in addition to pressuring Britain-was to talk, to engage in
"politicking," and to maneuver as best they could, in order to try to delay the intended
actions until conditions in Palestine changed.

Dr. Ruppin's activity as head of the Zionist delegation provided no satisfaction to
his dispatchers. His Zionism turned out to be insufficient to enable him to overcome
his territorial ist deviations. True, he carried out faithfully the mission entrusted to
him, and in public did not advocate the immigration of German Jews to the U.S. and
Latin America. Privately, however, he made no secret of his views and even carried out
certain activities with a view towards their materialization. He signed his assent to
the joint memorandum with the non-Zionist organizations. *** He rushed delightedly
to a meeting with the head of the Brazilian delegation, Hdio Lobo, who expressed
himself positively with respect to the entry of large numbers of refugees into his
country. (In his speech to the conference Lobo suggested that under "certain
conditions" Brazil could take in 44,000 refugees a year). With satisfaction, he assured
his colleagues on the Zionist Executive that in addition to Palestine and the U.S.,
Brazil could well prove to be a country that would absorb large numbers of J ewish
refugees.73 Congruent with this "harmful" activity, he was busily engaged in
lobbying for a doubtful cause which sparked controversy within the Zionist delegation
and among some of the other J ewish groups represented at Evian. Together with the
representatives of four other large organizations, Ruppin approached Lord Winterton,
the head of the British delegation, with a request that the conference also include the
J ews of Eastern Europe within its frame of reference. Ruppin acted as the spokesmen of
this group, but the attempt failed abysmally.****

71 Ruppin, p. 302: Ha'aretz , July 10, 1938.

72 Haolam , July 14, 1938.

73 Ruppin's letter of July 18, CZA, File S25/9778.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

*** This signature represented, at most, the Zionist delegation on the
spot and not its dispatchers. It seems probable that Ruppin signed the
document on his own, without consulting anyone. At all events, we found no
further traces of this act in the commentaries written while the conference
was in progress or in the delegation's reports and correspondence.

**** Ruppin, p. 302. I ncidentally, the fact that it was Ruppin who spoke
on behalf of this group casts doubt on one version we heard, to the effect that
the proposal made at the J ewish Agency Executive session to send Dr.
Landauer with Ruppin stemmed from concern that the latter's deafness
would prevent him from being able to handle the negotiations on his own.

In the meantime, an important Zionist matter had arisen which brooked no
delay. Following Lord Winterton's failure to cite Palestine as a possible haven for the
refugees, it soon turned out that not a single one of the other delegates had done so,
either. The conference was drawing to a close, and there were growing fears that this
major international forum would disperse without mentioning the Zionist enterprise.
We may conjecture that in order to prevent this outcome, the Zionist leadership decided
to try to compel Lord Winterton to bring up this subject no matter what, although the
character his remarks would bear was an unknown factor. A substantial
reinforcement to the delegation was rushed in for this urgent operation. Golda
Meyerson (Meir) arrived in Evian and on J uly 11, together with Ruppin and Goldmann,
held a press conference devoted to a frontal attack on the British delegation and its
chief representative. Lord Winterton.

The results exceeded all expectations. In his concluding speech Lord Winterton
gave considerable time to Palestine, and what he had to say was satisfactory to the
Zionists. "A listener" (Zaiman Rubashov) in Davar reported that

the general papers took the speech as a pro-Zionist declaration, because he spoke
with pride about the J ewish enterprise; because he made no mention of the Arabs'
terrorist resistance as a factor limiting a//ya/?; because he stated explicitly that it was
solely due to the inquiry currently underway in Palestine that he could not speak more
clearly, but with the conclusion of the inquiry the enterprise would regain its original
footing; (and] because he differentiated between the Palestine enterprise and the
possibility of its solving immediately the whole question of Jewish emigration in its
entirety—but about the enterprise itself he spoke firmly and confidently. 74

Others were more reserved, but did not conceal their satisfaction. Dr. Goldmann
wrote that the Winterton statement "could have been better, of course, but in the
existing conditions it is impossible to say that it was bad." He also related how he had
expressed his satisfaction to Winterton personally. Following the session he
approached Winterton and said, "I want to tell you. Lord Winterton, that I am
extremely pleased." To which the latter replied, "I am pleased that you are pleased
now. "75 MosheShertok (Sharett), head of thej ewish Agency's Political Department,

chastised Goldmann: "I was a little surprised to see that you commended Lord
Winterton for having mentioned Palestine in his final speech, without adding a
critical remark concerning the contents of what he said." At the same lime, he added
with satisfaction, "And I can imagine that Lord Winterton will hear no praises from
the colonial secretary for having let the cat out of the bag."76 In the same spirit
Ruppin wrote: "Lord Winterton based himself on the instructions of his government,
but the spirit of his declaration was far more his own spirit than that of [the British
colonial secretary] Malcolm MacDonald."77

The weekly London- based Jewish Chronicle of July 22 reported that a feeling of
satisfaction and optimism prevailed among the states which had sent delegations to
Evian. I n an article entitled "A Spirit of Optimism," the paper's special correspondent
to Evian wrote: 'The agreed view among the participants at the Evian Conference is
that the conference marks an important step forward. Several of the leading

74 Davar , July 22, 1938.

75 CZA, File S25/9778.

76 CZA, File S25/9779.

77 CZA, File S25/9778.

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participants expressed to me tineir satisfaction witin tine results aclnieved." Tine
practicality and sincerity of the remarks made by the Norwegian delegate Dr. Hansson
left a particularly convincing impression. Hansson was also president of the
International Nansen Office for Refugees and at Evian served as the chairman of the
Technical Subcommittee which, it will be recalled, was responsible for collecting the
information concerning the readiness of the various governments to absorb refugees
immediately. The representative of a small nation, he was less suspect of partiality
because of vested interests of his country. Dr. Hansson told they ewish Chronicle:

The results are encouraging, especially if we take into account that the
conference was convened hastily and that not all the governments had sufficient time
to study the material closely... But already now I can say that certain governments told
us (the Technical Committee) that they are ready to accept a considerable number of
refugees. It is still too early to name the countries or state the number of refugees.
[Translated from the Hebrew.]

One of the principal sources of optimism was Myron Taylor, the U.S.
representative, who served as conference president. His closing speech exuded
satisfaction and confidence. He noted the "serious spirit of cooperation which breathed
life into this first intergovernmental meeting" and had enabled the establishment of
the Inter-Governmental Commission--"and if the wheels of this machine can be kept
turning, it

will improve the lives and prospects of millions of our fellow human beings."
This, indeed, is precisely what he pledged:

Our work must continue untiringly and unceasingly, and it will... This
intergovernmental meeting is only a beginning. Henceforth the Inter-Governmental
Commission will be in constant session. I expect that the participating governments
will remain in close contact with the chairman in the period of the break between the
closing of today's session and its reopening in London. 78

Taylor made additional remarks in the same spirit to the press upon the
conclusion of the conference.

The declarations of the American delegate were more than a conjecture or wishful
thinking. Coming from Roosevelt's personal representative, they constituted a
commitment by the President of the United States to continue his active support for the
success of the cause. It was not for nothing that Henry Berenger, the head of the French
delegation, pointed out with satisfaction that this was the first time the U.S. had
affiliated itself with a permanent body dealing with non-American problems.79 In
this lay the uniqueness and the strength of Evian, as distinguished from similar
international organizations dealing with refugee problems.

On the J ewish side, the results of the conference actually provided sufficient
cause for satisfaction in both camps--of the Zionist leadership and of the non-Zionists.
The Zionists could welcome the fact that it was all over, that nothing adverse had
befallen Zionism, that no territorial ist actions had been undertaken. Lower-ranking
Zionist functionaries bemoaned the fact that this important international forum had
not been exploited to strengthen Zionist information efforts and to step up the pressure
on Britain. But the officials of the Jewish Agency, having, as we saw, harbored no
exaggerated expectations in this regard, were not disappointed at the results, either.
For them it sufficed that Ben-Gurion's scenario of "damage, danger and disaster" had
proved unfounded. All Zionists, irrespective of standing, saw in the reserved speeches
of the government representatives further evidence to justify anti -territorial ist
Zionism and demanded of themselves and others "to learn a lesson."

The non-Zionists, including salient sympathizers of Zionism, left the conference,
as was mentioned, "in a good frame of mind and with

78 Minutes of the Evian Conference.

79 JewisliClironicle , July 22, 1938.

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many hopes for the future." The events of the conference which the Zionists
perceived as gloomy and despairing, were regarded by the non-Zionists as an opening
for important rescue activity. There were varying degrees of expectation among them,
ranging from solid confidence to cautious optimism. 80 As we saw above, at least three
of the Zionist leaders who had been first-hand witnesses to the events at Evian were
also numbered among the optimists. As far as we have been able to ascertain, two of
them, Zaiman Rubashov and Arthur Ruppin, never recanted the views they expressed
at Evian, whereas the third, Nahum Goldmann, underwent a polar shift of opinion.

An interesting illustration of radical differences of perception between orthodox
Zionists and non-orthodox sympathizers with Zionism is found in the Hebrew-
language American weekly Hadoar of July 29, 1938. In an article entitled
"Magnanimity of Nations," I .Z. Frishberg sets forth his disappointment at the
conference. I n a sardonic style he writes: "Based on its spirit and its deeds, the Evian
Conference should be called the 'Evyon' [Hebrew for beggar, wretched] Conference"-
and so forth, in the same vein. The paper's editors comment:

It seems to us that the distinguished writer is unduly pessimistic in his
evaluation of this important conference. At Evian a beginning was made and the
cornerstone was laid for work. But the words of Myron Taylor, Roosevelt's faithful
emissary, indicate that America will not be satisfied with words and will impose the
pressure of deeds on the entire conference. And there are favorable signs that this is so.

What remains is the need to clarify one important testimony which on the face of
it contradicts the conclusion we are about to reach. At the time of the conference, S.
Adier-Rudel was an active Zionist, a member of the Zionist Actions Committee. But he
was certainly not afraid of territorialism, as is evidenced by his work with the the non-
Zionist organizations, described above. We quoted his article about Evian as a credible
and reliable source. Yet in it he refers to the "cruel disappointment for the Jewish
representatives who came to Evian." How so?

This quandary is unequivocally resolved in another Adier-Rudel source, which
we also mentioned. His exchange of correspondence with Hans Schaeffer during the
conference is an authentic document of prime importance. In a letter to Schaeffer
dated J uly26, his first following

the conclusion of the conference, Adier-Rudel writes: "First, I want to say that I
am definitely pleased [absolut zufrieden] at the results of the conference; they are
consistent, approximately, with what I had expected from the conference, and I think
that no intelligent thinking could have expected more." He goes on to explain why he is
satisfied and offers his forecast concerning the permanent institution which was
established in order to succeed. 811 n reply, Hans Schaeffer writes that he has met with
Otto H irsch, one of the heads of the "representation of German J ewry, and with Natahn
Katz of the Joint. Both of them had attended the conference and had conveyed to him
their impressions. He had also read the stenographic reports of the conference
proceedings. "My general impression," he writes, "as far as this can be formed at
second-hand, is perfectly consistent with your own... Everything that could be
expected in the existing conditions was achieved. "82

Adler-Rudel's 1938 testimony is vital and enlightening. It attests not only to
what happened thirty years ago, but what the course of time and the "general assent"
wrought to highly reliable witnesses. It is not surprising that in the post-war sources
we found not a trace of the situation which actually existed, as emerges without a
shadow of doubt from all the testimonies dating from the period of the conference itself
and immediately afterward: from all the testimonies we turned up, without exception.

And this was the situation: All thej ewish organizations that truly and sincerely
wanted the conference to succeed in its goal--the speedy and ordely rescue of Germany's
J ews-were pleased with the results of the conference, as were the conference
organizers and the official delegations of the various participating governments. All
of them regarded the conference as a major step forward and hoped for further

80 One example of cautious optimism was tlie assessment of Rabbi Jonah Wise, who represented the Joint Distribution Committee
at Evian: "The Evian Conference which opened in an atmosphere of pessimism and gloom, closed with a dawning ray of hope."
Record, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 40.

81 Adler-Rudell/Correspondence, pp. 192-193. Emphases added.

82 Ibid. p. 196.

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developments towards the solution of the problem. All of them expressed their
unequivocal satisfaction and their favorable expectations.

The Zionists, who did not share in the general sentiments, were also not
interested in the attainment of the goal the conference had set itself The overwhelming
majority of them, with the exception of the leaders at the very top of the movement,
hoped for a side-effect--pressure on Britain--which would promote the cause of
Zionism and direct to Palestine a flow of refugees which, because of the conditions
prevailing in the country, could not possibly assume the dimensions enabling a
solution of the problem. Their bitter complaints well reflected their sincere
disappointment at an unrealized hope. But their laments concerning the "insult" and
the "pain" they felt because the nations of the world were not

allowing the J ews into their countries, were remote from truth and from
sincerity. It is not difficult to imagine their reaction had those reserved speeches
concluded with a call to Britain to open the gates of ally ah to Palestine. In that event
the speakers and their governments would have been instantly transformed from
indifferent evil-doers into the righteous of the earth.

To adduce the Zionist complaints as the reaction of the J ewish people to the Evian
Conference is, of course, a complete distortion which perverts reality and rules out any
possibility of genuine historical study. As we remarked above, this distortion was
abetted in no small measure by the calamitous chain of events which brought about
the destruction of German J ewry and which thereby constituted psychological "proof--
a view of the past refracted through the prism of the present. It is a view which is
willingly accepted by the preachers of the "all the world is against us" school of
thought. Its root source Lies in the territorial ist fears of post-Ugandan Zionism.

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Chapter Eight

From Evian to the War

Concerning two of the active figures at Evian,l we noted tinat a contradiction
exists between tineir current testimony and the opinions tiney expressed in the
immediate aftermatin of tine conference. Tine excuse cited by botin of tinem to reconcile
tine contradiction was tinat only over a long span of time inad they been able to evaluate
the conference accurately. Indeed, one of them said it had been a mistake to believe
Roosevelt, who had pledged to allow the full quota of 27,000 refugees to enter the United
States but then had reneged on his promise. *

In our opinion, both personalities were wrong, for it is not a question of an
evaluation, but testimony concerning the reactions and assessments these persons
offered at the conclusion of the conference—and these are irrefutable facts.

At all events, the responses and the specific arguments put forward by these
personalities reinforced our feeling that in order to round out the picture we should try
to determine whether objective justification existed for the sense of satisfaction and
optimism evinced by the participants at Evian and by others who followed the meeting
closely. Our analysis shed light on several facts, concepts, and circumstances which
enabled us to answer a second, and even more significant question for our study: Is
there any political-moral justification for the behavior of the Zionist movement in this
affair?

I twill be useful to preface our discussion with a comment about the title of this
chapter. We place the commencement of the Holocaust of European Jewry in summer
1941, when the E/nsatzgruppe? (special-duty groups) whose explicit assignment was to
destroy J ews only because they were J ews, and to provide statistical reports on their
operations, entered the Soviet Union together with the invading German army. These
units were engaged not in persecutions, pogroms or murders but in annihilation—total,
systematic, planned slaughter.

This distinction, simple and straightforward though it may be, was initially not
perceived by the would— be rescuers due to the Germans' deception policy and due to
inadequate information--topics discussed in the opening chapters. The horrific reports
about the destruction were grasped in the conventional terms of persecutions and
pogroms. 1 1 was those concepts, almost a commonplace in Jewish history, that formed
the

* I n fact, as we will show, Roosevelt up/?^cf his pledge in the period

between Evian and the U.S. entry into the war.

1 Dr. Nahum Goldraann and Mr. Shalom Adler-Rudell: see the tape-recordings of the author's conversations with them.

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point of departure for the negligent and impotent reactions winicin followed.

Nowadays Holocaust researchers sometimes display faulty perception in the
opposite direction. By projecting images belonging unmistakably to the Holocaust on
pre-Holocaust events, they forge a distorted background which can lead to hasty
judgment. A few examples will show what we mean.

In January (or early February) 1940 Shmuel Zygelboim tried to enter Holland
from Germany. He was told by the Dutch border official who examined his papers that
his transit permit did not grant the bearer the right to enter Holland and he must
therefore return immediately to Germany. Zygelboim asked but was refused
permission to remain at the border crossing for a few hours in order to clarify the
matter and obtain the missing permit. Further pleas fell on deaf ears, and when he
tried passive resistance he was dragged to the train, put aboard forcefully, and sent
back to the German side.2 Such incidents were fairly common along Germany's
borders. But those sent back were not always solitary adult males, as in Zygelboim' s
case, nor was the final outcome always so fortunate (following a series of adventures
and much wandering about, Zygelboim finally managed to leave Germany and enter
Belgium). Women, children, the elderly and the ill were often denied entry. Their
forced return to Germany exposed them to immeasurable suffering-- mental, material,
and bodily-in some cases arrest or even murder. This was the situation in the years
preceding the Holocaust.

During the Holocaust period things changed. Jews still tried to escape to neutral
or semi-neutral countries--Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, Spain. At certain times their
aim was to get from places where the death machine was operating in full gear, to
locations where the killing was temporarily in abeyance. Thus, different periods saw
Jews flee from Poland to Slovakia, from Slovakia to Hungary, from Hungary to
Romania, and from the German- to the Italian-occupied zones in France, Greece and
Yugoslavia. In these years refugees who were turned back were, to all intents and
purposes, condemned to death, perhaps immediate death. Jews sent back from the
Slovakian border into the hands of German police in Poland were murdered on the spot
or transported to death camps. The same situation prevailed, with different degrees of
immediacy, on other borders.

I n effect, i n the last years before the war the fate of refugees who were turned back
at the border was the same as it would be in the Holocaust itself. The difference lay in
the motivation and moral

responsibility of the officials in charge, lit was one thing to act "according to the
law" or follow the orders of one's superiors and cast helpless refugees to their fate on
the other side of the border; it was something else entirely after it had become clear and
obvious that those sent back faced certain death. In the former case one's motivation
might be a disposition "to go by the book" in performing one's duty, even if this
entailed indifference to the distress of fellow human beings. Although there were
probably some who were spurred by hatred and took a sadistic pleasure in their work,
such traits were not a s/nequa non for thejob. It was enough if one's sense of humanity
was not developed to the point where one was ready to sacrifice one's personal interests
and convenience for another's good. I n other words, an evil nature was not a necessary
qualification for this work: not to be among the righteous, to be impelled by
humanity's primitive egotism--this was sufficient.

The distinction we have drawn regarding border police is equally applicable in
other domains. Manifestly, there is a difference between the turning away of the
famous ship the St. Louis from Havana in June 1939, and the case of the Struma at
Istanbul in March 1942. The difference lay not only in the fact that the St. Louis was a
luxury liner whereas the Struma was a bare hulk of a vessel; and not only in the fact
that, unlike the human cargo on the Struma, the passengers on the St. Louis found
shelter in Europe within a week of being denied entry to Cuba. The paramount
difference lay in the fact that the Struma was forced to enter a region where J ews were
murdered simply for being J ews. Had the St. Louis been forced to return to Hamburg its
passengers would have found themselves in dire straits, but the threat of physical
destruction did not yet hang over them.

2 Zygelboim Book , pp. 278-282.

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The passengers on the St. Louis and their benefactors in the J oint were not
exaggerating in their description of the harsh conditions and the dangers awaiting
them in Germany. They were not misusing words when they pitted extinction against
rescue. This was the situation in both bad times and ordinary times. The advent of the
Holocaust engendered a modification in the criteria of evil, and the old terms were
vested with a different, unmediated content. Extinction now meant extermination,
pure and simple; and rescue meant escape from slaughter. The "old" form of rescue, in
the pre-Holocaust era, had amounted to no more than extrication from certain kinds of
troubles and dangers.

It is only natural that studies of the Holocaust should attach to words the
significance they assumed in that harrowing period. However, when these unique
meanings are overlaid on events and motives that

antedated the Holocaust, the words become charged with meanings inconsonant
with reality and the general picture is perforce distorted.

An assessment of the Jewish Agency's stand vis-a-vis the Evian Conference is
disheartening. To put it bluntly, the Jewish Agency was fearful of a positive outcome;
its wish was for the conference to fail abysmally. That its bark was worse than its bite
does not mitigate its responsibility. If we were to fall into the trap of anachronism, as
explained above, we would accuse the Zionist leadership of preferring to let the J ews
remain in Germany and be destroyed by Hitler rather than generating possible harm
to Zionism by enabling them to immigrate to lands other than Palestine.

Such an outlook, however, would be detached from reality, for the simple reason
that in summer 1938 no one thought that for the Jews to remain in Germany was
tantamount to their destruction. No one, not Zionists or non-Zionists, not J ews or non-
J ews, even imagined this. It was not that they rejected or ignored the idea, or that they
did not want to believe in the possibility--the fact is that idea was not even considered
because rational beings were incapable of conceiving it.

By 1938, the year usually cited by Holocaust researchers as the climacteric, it
was apparent to many that the only way to avoid the plight of Germany's Jews was to
emigrate from areas under the control of the Reich. Clearly, the and-J ewish decrees
were not temporary; the only realistic course was to accept the Nazis' demand and
evacuate the Jews from Germany. Following the massive, country-wide pogrom in
November, the need for urgency was plain. Yet even then, after dozens of J ews were
murdered and tens of thousands thrown into concentration camps, the nightmare of
the Holocaust was beyond the imagination. The American journalist Dorothy
Thompson, well-known for her sensitivity to the anguish of Germany's J ews and her
campaign on their behalf, spoke in February 1939 about the danger of "mass suicides,"
but not about destruction. 3 Fears were voiced of oppression and torture, of murder, of
death by starvation; these travails, it was thought, were liable to set in motion
processes eventuating in the extinction of the community. But no one, not in his worst
nightmares, conjured up systematic mass destruction.

This was the situation among non-J ews and J ews, among non-Zionists, and,
tragically, among Zionists, too. To maintain, in the light of these conditions, that
indifference existed to the possibility of destruction, or that it was preferred over some
other scenario, is an insufferable fabrication.

Nevertheless, even at this stage the Zionist leadership bears culpability for a
lack of foresight. No blame is involved, but a failure of the leadership certainly
occurred. To facilitate an understanding of the phenomenon and place things in
perspective, we will draw a comparison with a similar argument that is often voiced in
certain J ewish circles. One of the allegations hurled by Zionist functionaries at
Agudat Israel and other ultra-Orthodox groups is that in the decades preceding the
Holocaust, rabbis and other spiritual leaders in Europe opposed settlement in Eretz-
Israel by their followers and the members of their communities. Until Hitler came and
murdered them all.

3 New York Herald-Tribune , February 17, 1939.

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If the point here is to accuse the ultra-Orthodox leaders of dereliction of duty
dictated by their Conscience and understanding, then the charge is unjust. These
rabbis functioned entirely according to their Conscience and understanding, and their
decision was made for the good of their communities, as they saw it. They cannot be
faulted for not foreseeing what others also failed to foresee or even imagine. Therefore,
as far as ordinary human criteria go, they are undoubtedly blameless.

On the other hand, if the point being made is that the ultra-Orthodox leadership
was unable to look beyond day-to-day experience and envisage what the future held,
and was therefore deficient in guiding those who relied on them--then the allegation is
not entirely groundless.

Bet that as it may, the argument is highly applicable to the Zionist leadership.
The rabbis of Agudat Israel were perhaps led astray by an arbitrary interpretation of
the J ewish people's eternity; or they may have placed inordinate reliance in the
incantation they recited every year: that in every generation the enemies of the J ewish
people seek to destroy it but the Lord delivers us from their hands. In contrast, the
Zionist leaders were raised and educated according to a philosophy that leaves no room
for complacency. The fathers of catastrophic Zionism taught that the violent
liquidation of the J ews in the diaspora was both possible and feasible. The Zionists'
gut-feeling should have alerted them to the impending event before non-Zionists
sensed it.

The absence of an instinctive Zionist premonition of calamity attests to the
insensitivity of theflawed post-Ugandan Zionism, which was concerned primarily for
the Zionist enterprise and not directly for the fate of the J ewish people. To this must be
added the period of difficulties and dangers which Zionism underwent during and
after Evian; these generated deep unease and could have diverted attention from "side"
dangers. The growing Arab terrorism was followed by difficult negotiations with the
British Mandate government which had just retracted the partition

proposal of the Peel Commission and was bent on hobbling the J ewish Yishuv.
Less than a year after Evian the White Paper of Malcolm MacDonald was issued; its
clear aim was to eradicate the Zionist enterprise.

In this grim situation it was only to be expected that the suspiciousness toward
territorial ism would grow even more intense. Zionism in this period perceived
territorial ist competition not only in the program of mass agricultural settlement
aimed at establishing a Jewish national entity, but in every plan that entailed
emigration outside Eretz-lsrael. From this point of view, the Evian Conference was one
continuous territorialist scheme.

Indeed, the conference had been permeated with genuine, classical territorialism
on the model of the Uganda Plan. Not only Jews, and not necessarily opponents of
Zionism had been involved in it. The urgent need to find a haven for hundreds of
thousands of J ews, at a time when Palestine could absorb tens of thousands at most,
spawned territorialist plans some of which were advocated by good friends of the
Zionist movement. A characteristic example is afforded by a British MP, Captain
Victor Cazalet, an ardent supporter of Zionism before, during and after Evian.
According to Chaim Weizmann, Cazalet was "one of the few who never missed an
opportunity to defend Zionism and who did all he could to present our cause openly to
the public."4 Cazalet was a member of the British delegation to Evian and lent a
friendly ear to the Zionist delegations. At the same time, he gave his enthusiastic
backing to a plan for mass J ewish settlement in northern Rhodesia, whose initiator
and orotund prophet was a well-known Hungarian, Count CandenhoveKalergi.5 An
atmosphere such as this was bound to arouse considerable anti-territorial ist alarm in
a veteran Zionist--unless that Zionist were Zaiman Rubashov or Arthur Ruppin.

To sum up: in the light of subsequent developments, the stand taken by the
Zionist movement was most unfortunate, and the plans hatched by the Zionist
leadership for Evian were little short of outrageous. Still, that leadership cannot be
held accountable for a sin it did not commit. The Zionist leaders did not abandon the
Jews of Germany to destruction. They sincerely believed that the anguish of the
German Jews was a passing thing and that ultimately they would find rescue-and
redemption-- in Eretz-lsrael.

4 Weizmann, Trial and Error , p. 392.

5 Norman Bentwicli, Between Two Worlds , pp. 280-282.

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Another mitigating factor was tinat in J uly 1938 the Zionist position did no
serious inarm to tine conference. Indeed, Ben-Gurion's wish that no immediate and
"substantial" resolutions be adopted was consistent with

Roosevelt's plan and was realized at Evian to the satisfaction of those who were
i nterested i n the success of the conference.

That the possibility of annihilation was so remote as to be beyond the realm of
imagination, is indicated by the programs which were put forward at Evian and in the
subsequent negotiations held with the German government. The number of those
slated to leave Germany in the plan adduced by Dr. Ruppin on behalf of the J ewish
Agency Executive was 300,000. The explanation for why this figure was lower by
200,000 than the total number of Jews then residing in Germany and Austria is to be
found in the calculations Ruppin set down in his diary three months earlier, following
a visit to Germany:6

There are still some 360,000 Jews in Germany (530,000 including Austria).
Among these 530,000 the mortality rate is increasing over the birth rate year by year,
and deaths now exceed births by at least 10,000 per year, or 100,000 in ten years. If
20,000 a year immigrate to the United States, South America, and Palestine, within a
decade no more than 230,000 J ews, most of them elderly, will remain in Germany and
Austria. The government will not bother them; after all, with the exception of a few
tens of thousands, they will all die within another twenty years and their absorption
will no longer constitute a problem.

Today, after these elderly people were murdered and their bodies consumed in the
Satanic conflagration, it is difficult to understand how anyone could have thought to
help solve the problem by leaving them in Germany. At the time, however, in 1938-
1939, this line of thought seemed quite logical. Other plans which were proposed or
mooted during the conference spoke of 400,000 Jews who would leave within three or
five years, but all the plans took as their point of departure that about 200,000 would
remain in the Reich. These same figures, including the 200,000 who were to remain,
appear in the Schacht plan which was later proposed by the Nazi government and
rejected by public opinion in the free world. The numbers also recur in the Wohlthat-
Rublee plan which was accepted by the Intergovernmental Committee: 400,000 to
leave, and 200,000 to live out their lives in Nazi Germany.

In retrospect, with our knowledgeof the gas chambers, the forgoing of the 200,000
old people appears to be a culpable omission

caused by an absence of foresight. Yet in the situation then prevailing this
posture seemed perfectly consistent with the interests of those who would remain, and
an important concession by the Germans, for reasons we will now explain.

The Evian Conference was not confronted with the problem of free departure from
Germany. Not only were the gates open, but the Nazis did what they could to expedite
thej ews' exit: the expulsion of the Jews from Germany was a major plank in the Nazi
platform. But it must be borne in mind that this expulsion was to be implemented by a
country situated in the center of Europe. To round up the J ews and throw them across
the border was out of the question. Other measures were therefore adopted which also
served important Nazi objectives in themselves: theJ ews were placed outside ordinary
law, they were cut off viciously from cultural life and socially ostracized, their day-to-
day life was rendered intolerable and their sensivities [sensitivities] were mercilessly
abused. These restrictions fulfilled an ideological precept of the Nazis' racial doctrine
while generating a powerful impulse for emigration. That the Jews were dispossessed
and deprived of sources of livelihood were major factors in the thrust for emigration.
These measures, which were imposed in stages, had at least three underlying aims:
the starving of the J ews could serve as an effective spur to their emigration; the
expropriation of their property provided material backing for Hitler's rearmament
plans; and the absorption difficulties in the countries admitting the impoverished
J ews would heighten antisemitic feeling.

6 Ruppin, p. 299, entry for April II, 1938. Tlie calculations were made for a plan Ruppin submitted to the adviser to the British
embassy in Berlin, after the two agreed that the British government would propose it to the rulers of the Reich when suitable
political conditions developed.

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Not all of the relevant decrees had been promulgated when the Evian Conference
convened. The latter part of 1938 and the following year would see additional
oppressive measures that would make the life of the Jews in Germany a veritable hell
and motivate them to get out of the country without delay. Prior to these developments,
in the first five years of Nazi rule, the German Jews evinced surprising resistance to
the authorities' expulsion efforts. The emigration of 37,000 Jews in 1933 was followed
by a decline to 20,000-25,000 in each of the next four years- by the end of 1937 the total
number of emigrants stood at BO, 000, or less than 25 percent of the J ewish
population. 7 The vast majority of the German J ews assiduously exhausted every
possible outlet for continuing to live in the country, adapting themselves to the
inhuman conditions created for them by the Nazis.

The Jews were guided by emotional and practical reasons alike Many refused to
leave a country which they regarded as their homeland and to which they were bound
by powerful ties. I ronically, one reason for

the slow pace of their departure was the superb organization of Germany's J ewish
communities, which provided for the J ewish community's wants faithfully and
efficiently. There was also the fear of the unknown in a new country. There were few
countries available for immigration, their absorption infrastructure was primitive,
and transportation was scarce in any case. Some hoped that the current difficulties
would prove to be temporary and believed that the best course was simply to ride out
the storm. There was near universal certainty that the cruel laws promulgated so far
had exhausted the whole dosage of evil intended by the Germans-- the outer limits had
been reached, things could not get worse. 8

In the meantime the Nazis began to show signs of impatience. The slow pace of
the Jews' departure was an intolerable delay in the execution of their anti-J ewish
policy. I n J une 1938 the authorities rounded up 1,500 J ews whose names were on record
as having committed offenses of some kind, including traffic violations. They were
locked up in concentration camps and released only after undertaking to emigrate
immediately.9 Two months earlier, in panic-stricken Vienna, Eichmann had set up
the "Central Office for J ewish Emigration" which soon became a model of efficiency in
the rapid expulsion of tens of thousands of J ews who had been stripped of all their
belongings. In late October of that year 12,000 Jews would be brutally deported to the
town of Zbonszyn in Poland. Two weeks later, on November 10, the massive pogrom was
perpetrated which set in motion a terrified mass flight of J ews.

A major aim of the Evian Conference was to place the Jews' departure from
Germany on a business-like footing. The conference resolutions, denuded of their
diplomatic niceties and translated into ordinary language, conveyed a clear and direct
message to the German authorities: If you have decided to force the J ews out, we,
having no alternative, are willing to pay the costs. We are ready to help you implement
your plan, on condition that needless suffering is avoided beyond the suffering
inherent in the emigration itself. We will guarantee the emigrants places of refuge,
which will encourage them to leave Germany as expeditiously as possible. But you
must cooperate with us by ensuring that the emigration process is an orderly one, with
a reasonable timetable and on an acceptable scale, and you must not embitter the J ews'
lives excessively while they are waiting to leave. You must also allow the emigrants to
leave with their possessions in order to facilitate their absorption in their new homes.

It should be said at once that as regards the last condition few illusions were
brooked. 1 1 was agreed at Evian that part of the German

Jews' property would go toward underwriting the emigration and absorption
processes. But even though the confiscation measures had not yet run their course, no
inordinate expectations were entertained about how much of the J ewish property the
Germans would be willing to release. On J une 3 one of the conference participants
wrote that "in effect, emigration together with property is already now out of the
question. "10 A few days after the conference he wrote: "Even if the Germans agree to
forgo 25 percent of [the J ews'] property in return for legal approval in the eyes of the

7 Shaul Esh, "Between Discrimination and Extermination," p. 75; Adler-Rudell, p. 271.

8 Esli, p. 76.

9 Ibid., p. 78.

10 Adler-Rudell/Correspondence, p. 178.

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world to plunder the remaining 75 percent, the foreign- currency situation is such
that Germany will not be able to do so immediately. "11

The upshot was that the conference was forced to work in two directions. On the
one hand it had to ensure sufficient places for absorption at the appropriate times. But
at the same time it was necessary to curb the sadistic impulses of the German rulers
and obtain their assent for an orderly, agreed departure process including the release
of as much as possible of the emigrants' property and abandonment of the scheme to
flood the countries of destination with destitute Jews. It turned out that the most
realistic element in the anticipated dialogue with the Germans-a condition to which
they agreed without any haggling at the very outset of the negotiations- was that
200,000 elderly Jews whose age precluded their gainful absorption elsewhere, would
remain.

The conference participants, whose primary concern was to evaluate its results
in securing places of refuge for the emigrants, were faced with the need to find 400,000
such places within a period of three to five years-let us say, within four years on the
average. The number was daunting, but the prospects for implementing the project
were deemed realistic. Those at Evian were conscious of the fact that the conference
was largely a preparatory stage leading to the substantive work which would be done
by the permanent Intergovernmental Committee. Intensive behind-the-scenes
lobbying was known to be in progress, backed by American diplomatic pressure. But
even in this preliminary stage, behind the somewhat forbidding exterior of mostly
non-committal speeches, as described in the previous chapter, promising initial
results were achieved.

First, the United States pledged to admit annually the full joint quota of
immigrants from Germany and Austria, a total of 27,370 persons, or about 109,000 in
four years. Reinforcing this pledge was the fact, undoubtedly known at Evian, that the
American consuls in Germany were issuing entry permits to German J ews at twice the
rate of the previous year and four times that of 1936.

The Brazilian delegate at Evian, Hello Lobo, indicated in his speech that his
country could accept over 40,000 emigrants a year Although he gave no explicit
assurance, there was no reason to think that he had voiced this figure solely in order to
impress his audience- Brazil it seemed, genuinely intended to admit refugees on a
scale at least approaching this number, if not the entire figure. As we saw, this was
also the understanding of Ruppin, who met with Lobo and reported to his colleagues on
the Jewish Agency Executive on prospects for substantial Jewish immigration to
Brazil.

The Dominican Republic indicated that it would agree to accept 100,000 refugees,
and submitted an official proposal to this effect two weeks later in London. But it may
be assumed, especially after the highly sympathetic speech of the country's delegate to
Evian, that the conference was aware of this general intention, if not of the details.

These three pledges, if carried out in full, would have provided for three-quarters
of Germany's refugees within four years. To this we can add the more reserved pledges
of Uruguay and Argentina, the probability that Palestine, all the difficulties
notwithstanding, could absorb a few tens of thousands, and the promises of the
Western European countries to go on giving the refugees temporary refuge until they
could find permanent homes. Taking into account that all this was meant to be only
the commencement of the operation, we must conclude that the satisfaction and
optimism expressed by everyone interested in the success of the conference were
grounded in real ity-the reality of J uly 1938.

The turbulent events of the months and years that followed showed that some of
the assessments had been mistaken, and that some of the expectations were not
realized. But a close analysis will demonstrate that the success of Evian was not of an
ephemeral character. The outcome of the effort made by 32 countries that convened in
order to help the J ews held out rescue possibilities on a large scale, and perhaps also
the possibility of averting disaster on a vast scale. But all this was dependent on the
non-interference of organizations whose affiliation could have been expected to make
them the most i nterested of al I in rescue.

11 Ibid., p. 193.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

At this juncture we are compelled to turn to a subject of which our treatment is
liable to conflict with conventionally accepted views-in addition to the many other
controversial stands contained in this study No examination of the Evian episode and
its aftermath-commissions and omissions alike-can be complete without an
assessment of the part played by President Roosevelt. We have already seen that
Roosevelt's initiative

in convening the conference and the probability that he would take an active role
in fulfilling its objectives, were a major spur for the hopes and expectations
entertained for the meeting's success. The editor of Hadoar reflected a widespread
sentiment when he expressed the hope that Roosevelt would "impose the force of deeds
on the entire proceedings." Yet we also saw the excuse given thirty years later by one
person who at the time was "definitely satisfied" with the results of the conference for
changing his mind: Roosevelt, he averred, had not honored his pledges. Now, as then,
Roosevelt's actions are the linchpin without which those fateful days can be neither
understood nor evaluated.

It is no easy task to enumerate the deeds that Roosevelt did and omitted to do.
Much valuable material on this topic has been unearthed in the decades since
Roosevelt's death by both trained scholars and gifted amateurs. Paradoxically,
however, the wealth of material does not facilitate unerring judgment. Some of the
studies in question were conducted with the preconceived goal of besmirching their
subject. This is accomplished through a hostile interpretation of the facts and the
"discovery" of new facts and documents which, these researchers maintain, make a
mockery of the positive assessments which were the rule throughout his lengthy
public career. The prying and the excoriation take place at various levels, from
academic studies conducted under the aegis of distinguished institutions, to frivolous
and flippant newspaper articles. As a result, Roosevelt is often perceived as a
hypocritical, vacillating figure about whom there is nothing good to be said.

The present writer does not claim sufficient expertise concerning Roosevelt's life
and deeds to pass authoritative judgment on most of these matters. We do not know
what the truth is of the allegation that he was a secret Communist or that by his guile
and cunning he induced the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor. Nor does the present
work obligate us to take an interest in these and similar issues. But this is not the case
when it comes to Roosevelt's involvement in and attitude toward the plight of the J ews.
This is a subject which we studied thoroughly-and on which we reached conclusions
vastly different from Roosevelt's detractors. Where the J ews are concerned, Roosevelt
comes across as a personality imbued with a love of humanity and with a deep
empathy for the suffering and the persecuted. These traits, we believe, exercised a
crucial role in his actions on behalf of the Jews, beginning with his initiative for the
Evian Conference in 1938, and ending with the creation of the War Refugee Board six
years later. This opinion is based on thefactual material we perused and on judgments
which we believe are objective. Confirmation

of these findings exists in various testimonies we recorded or that are found in
the literature, and in conclusions reached by several of those who have studied the
actions of the U.S. Administration during the Holocaust years.

To help substantiate our opinion, it is crucial that we adduce cogent motives that
spurred Roosevelt to organize the Evian Conference Like the entire enlightened world,
which at the time welcomed the surprise initiative ardently, we believe, even now, that
the primary motive for this great act was the noble humanitarian feeling of the
"righteous President " as the Zionist weekly /-/ao/am described Roosevelt. This humane
stimulus seems to us the only satisfactory explanation for the President's decision to
cast on himself and on his country the burden and responsibility for a project
unprecedented in human history. Not even the "revelation of the truth" in Arthur
Morse's book WhileSixMillion Died can convince us otherwise.

In his well-known study Morse writes that "The reaction to Roosevelt's proposal
might have been less exuberant had the public known the motives behind it." He then
proceeds to reveal those motives as he dredged them up from the recesses of the
government archives. Morse rests his case on a memorandum written by an official in
the State Department's Division of European Affairs. The paper, undated and
apparently also without any indication of its author's identity, was discovered
attached to another memorandum prepared by the Division of the American

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Republics, from November 1938. Morse describes the content of the memorandum as
follows:

The Nazi absorption of Austria had brought about increased public demand for
State Department action in behalf of refugees. "Dorothy Thompson and certain
Congressmen with metropolitan constituencies were the principal sources of this
pressure," says the memorandum.

To counteract this outcry. Secretary Hull, Undersecretary Welles and two lesser
colleagues had decided that it was preferablefor the department to "get out in front and
attempt to guide the pressure, primarily with a view toward forestalling attempts to
have the immigration laws liberalized."

It was Sumner Welles who had come up with the idea of an international
conference and the President had approved. On this noble note the Evian Conference
was born. It would be

months in planning, would silence the critics of apathy, and if all worked well,
would divert refugees from the United States to the other co-operating nations. 12

Thus does Arthur Morse conclude his story about the memorandum. It is unclear
where his description of its content ends and his own interpretation [interpretation]
begins. I mplicit in his words is, at the least, assent and identification with the author
of the memorandum. The passage's explicit intention is to demonstrate conclusively
how far wrong the enthusiastic public of the day was in attributing to Roosevelet lofty
motives-which he did not have.

Another researcher. Dr. David S. Wyman, who also deals with the memorandum,
is less peremptory in his conclusion and less eager to identify with the author.
Summing up his discussion of the memorandum, he writes: "A humanitarian
motivation on Roosevelt's part may by no means be ruled out. "B

One can accept this conclusion, even if it is couched in the language of
understatement. The memorandum in question-if there really was a memorandum,
and not just an exercise in self-expression by some junior official -tells us nothing
about Roosevelt. It is an attempt to cast Roosevelt in the guise of a clown according to
the taste and understanding of State Department officials. It is a fatuous, not to say
wicked interpretation of the facts, and moreover flagrantly contradicts the
contemporary reality.

It was ludicrous to present Roosevelt as a tool in the hands of State Department
personnel in the perpetration of a plot they had cooked up for their own convenience. It
is absurd to think that the organization of an international conference was less of a
bother and less taxing than "pressure" exerted by Dorothy Thompson and a couple of
Congressmen with large J ewish constituencies. As for the intention to channel the
flow of refugees away from the United States and into other countries, a scheme
imputed to Roosevelt by the memorandum (or by Morse's reading of it), this brings to
mind a comment by another "righteous man," Ernest Bevin, who once said that
Truman was demanding 100,000 entry permits to Palestine so that the J ews would not
come to America.

A survey of the pressures wielded by the U.S. Administration for the
liberalization of the immigration laws will prove instructive. Various circles in
America, Jews and non-Jews alike, were at the time clamoring for the freer entry of
refugees into the country. They set their sights on the annulment of bureaucratic
regulations and other obstacles in the refugees'

path. They urged the complete fulfillment of the existing quotas, but did not even
consider the possibility of demanding their enlargement Maverick efforts by
individuals were doomed to quick failure and retreat. The memorandum we have been
considering alludes to one such attempt.

Following the annexation of Austria, two New York Congressmen Emanuel Celler
and Samuel Dickstein, proposed legislation that would facilitate somewhat the entry
of refugees. The House Immigration Committee scheduled a preliminary public
hearing for April 20, 1938. It never took place. It was scuttled in the wake of a meeting
of Jewish Catholic and Protestant welfare organizations which decided unanimously
that the hearing was liable to prove harmful to the refugees' prospects. A letter to the

12 Morse, pp. 203-204.

13 David S. Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938-1941 , University of Massachusetts Press, 1968, p. 44
(hereafter: Wyman).

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Congressmen drawn up by the representatives of 14 such organizations, requesting
that they abandon their legislative initiative had the desired effect. 14

I n J anuary 1939 Celler came up with an idea for similar legislation. However, he
quickly dropped the plan after being warned by some of his Congressional colleagues
that if his mooted legislation ever reached the floor of the House, they would counter it
with a bill calling for the halving of the quotas, or even a total closing of the gates.
Given the mood in the Congress, Celler's opponents might well succeed. 15

The unresponsiveness of the House of Representatives reflected the frame of mind
of the voters. In June 1938 the magazine Fortune conducted a poll on public attitudes
toward the admission of refugees Two-thirds (67.4 percent) of those who replied said
that "with conditions as they are, we should try to keep them out"; 18.2 percent
expressed the President's view that the entire refugee quota should be exhausted, but
should not be enlarged; 4.9 percent thought that the quota should be enlarged; and 9.5
percent said they had no opinion on the subject.l6 Similar results were obtained in
polls conducted in March and November of that year,17 and in 1939.18 The American
people wanted no part of the refugees.

There were several reasons for this, and one of them was undoubtedly
antisemitism. But this was not the only reason, and was probably not even one of the
main reasons. And not because antisemitism was then lacking in the United States. To
the contrary: the evidence suggests that in the period from 1938-1945 anti-J ewish
sentiments in the U.S. reached new heights.l9 Vigorous antisemitic incitement was
conducted by internal elements that drew encouragement and inspiration from
Germany. Father Charles Coughlin's antisemitic paper Social J ust/ce had a circulation
in the hundreds of thousands and in summer 1938

published extracts from The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Coughlin also
broadcast his virulent ideas in a weekly radio show.20 The German-American Bund
fouled the atmosphere with its propaganda and its storm- trooper tactics. All these
phenomena had a cumulative effect, and the anti-J ewish feelings undoubtedly helped
reinforce America's wish to keep the refugees— most of them J ewish— out.

Yet there is also considerable justification for discerning a reverse influence at
work, in which deeply rooted, more durable traits in the American society abetted
external elements in their antisemitic instigation. Attesting to this is the fact that at
the conclusion of the war, when the events of the Holocaust were fully revealed, the tide
of antisemitism gave way to a wave of sympathy for the Jews, while the general
rejection of refugees went on unabated.

The conjunction of two factors led to the imposition of immigration quotas by the
United States in the 1920s. There was the chauvinistic- racist patriotism which was
predominant among America's WASPs of the time, who feared that the entry of
foreigners would prove "detrimental" to the country's ethnic composition. And there
was the opposition of American workers to the entry of a cheap-labor force that would
compete with them and finally lead to the worsening of their working conditions.
Thesetwo factors led in 1921to the imposition of an entry quota which limited annual
immigration from Europe to 3 percent of the population of the United States. Moreover,
the general quota was divided among the countries of Europe in accordance with the
numerical proportion of the ethnic groups in the U.S. as it had stood in 191D. As
unemployment increased in America, the quota was perceived as overly generous. On
J uly 1 1929, the general quota was cut in half, to stand at 154,000 persons annually.
This time the division was made according to the ethnic makeup of the American
population of 1920. As a result, England and Ireland received a quota of 84,000
persons, over half the total. The quota for Germany was 26,000, for Poland 6,000, and
for Italy 5,500; France, the USSR, Holland and Czechoslovakia were assigned quotas of
3,000 persons each; Norway was entitled to 2,000 entry permits, Denmark and Austria
1,000 each, Romania and Lithuania 400 each, and so forth.

J ust after the law took effect America was hit by the economic depression which
caused unemployment to assume the scale of a national disaster. Every destitute

14 Ibid., pp. 67-68.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., p.45.

17 Ibid., p. 210.

1 8 Henry Feingold, The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust. 1938-1945 , Rutgers University
Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1970, p. 14 (hereafter: Feingold).

19 Wyman, p. 14.

20 Ibid., p. 17.

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immigrant became on onerous public burden. To reduce immigration to a minimum.
President Hoover ordered tine American consuls abroad to place the broadest possible
interpretation on a

clause in the law denying a visa to anyone liable to become a "public charge."
This ploy all but put an end to immigration to the U.S. In 1932, the year Roosevelt was
sworn in as President, only 35,576 immigrants entered the United States. 21

Roosevelt's economic and social policy extricated the U.S. from the economic
crisis. Life returned to normal. But the scars of the hard years did not heal so quickly.
In particular, unemployment remained high. Unfortunately, 1937 saw the onset of a
new economic recession which, even if it did not become a full-fledged depression,
persisted stubbornly until America entered the war. 22

Under these conditions no special propaganda was required for the majority of
Americans on a large scale to oppose the entry of foreigners. Propaganda, nonetheless,
was not lacking. A large and vociferous group of ultra-nationalist "patriotic"
organizations raised high the banner of immigration restrictions, in effect urging a
total halt to immigration. Countering the call for a humanitarian attitude issued by
the refugee aid organizations, was the harsh dictum that "charity begins at home"— let
the unemployed first be tended to before compassion was shown for refugees. The
National Commander of the American Legion, Stephen S. Chadwick, declared that "In
1939, with B million unemployed, the country's responsibility to its citizens requires
that the gates [of immigration] be shut." Similar arguments were voiced in the press,
in public assemblies, and in both Houses of Congress. In the Senate, indeed, a proposal
was madeto terminate immigration altogether. 23

It is no wonder, then, that those who spoke for the refugees proceeded cautiously
and with pronounced moderation. Manifestly, if the immigration regulations were to
be eased, the road lay through the White House and not through the Congress. Fearful
of sparking a confrontation with dissenting public opinion and with a hostile
Congress, the advocates of immigration seized every opportunity to explain that it was
not their intention, heaven forbid, to flood the country with immigrants; and they
constantly declared that they did not seek an enlargement of the entry quotas. Such a
demand would have been "political dynamite," as Dorothy Thompson said. 24 The joint
appeal to Congressmen Celler and Dickstein by 14 welfare organizations, already
mentioned, was typical of the behavior of such groups. 25

For the sake of clarity, an unambiguous answer must be given to the central
question raised by these events: If Roosevelt had so wished, could he have enlarged the
entry quotas for the Jews of Germany and Austria? The unarguable answer is that he
could not. That course of action

was absolutely out of the question. Certainly as long as he was determined to go on
serving as a legally elected President of the United States and not dissolve the Congress
and annul the constitution...

The interpretation of the State Department memorandum cited above
notwithstanding, the international-conference initiative neither assured nor brought
about a lessening of the pressure on Roosevelt. To the contrary. As could have been
anticipated, it caused him both immediate and long-term difficulties. The convening
of the conference and the enlargement of the immigration quotas to their full number,
two actions which the public perceived as interlocked, exposed the President to fierce
domestic criticism. 26 The internal situation was compounded at the international
level, as the Evian Conference was the first time since its withdrawal from the League
of Nations that the United States had entered into undertakings on a matter not
directly affecting its interests.

As an experienced politician, Roosevelt knew which way the wind was blowing,
and he moved energetically to enlist the greatest possible public backing. One of his
major successes in this regard was to secure from the president of the American

21 Morse, p. 136.

22 Wyman, p. 5.

23 Ibid., p. 7.

24 Ibid., p. 70.

25 Other cases: a representative of the Christian humanitarian organization American Friends Service Committee, which was
very active on behalf of the refugees, declared after the November pogrom that they did not intend to propose raising the quota.
Ibid. At the same time Sumner Welles told the British ambassador to the U.S. that "it was my very strong impression that
responsible leaders among American Jews would be the first to urge that no change in the present quota for German Jews
[should] be made." Joseph Tenenbaum, "The Crucial Year 1938," Yad Vashem Studies 11, pp. 68-69 (Hebrew).

26 Wyman,p. 45.

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Federation of Labor, William Green, a declaration of support for the entry of the
refugees, though with one clear, explicit and emphatic proviso: that their number not
exceed the quota determined by law. 27

Dr. Nahum Goldmann wrote of Roosevelt: "President Roosevelt, whose attitude to
Zionism has been the subject of a great deal of controversy in recent years, actually
was not pro-Zionist. Such was my impression. His approach to Jewish problems was
guided first and foremost and above all else by humanitarian motives. "28

What is most striking about this assessment is the contrast between the hesitant
tenor of its opening and the definitive tone of its ending. The conclusion that Roosevelt
was not pro-Zionist is reached on the basis of no more than an "impression," and this
on the part of a person who moved in circles which were in personal contact with
Roosevelt for years. These persons often expressed publicly their admiration for and
gratitude to Roosevelt for his sympathetic attitude toward Zionism-until he made his
famous remark in the wake of his meeting with I bn Saud,** followed by

** In their meeting Roosevelt asked Ibn Saud to support Zionism. The
king refused in no uncertain terms, and revealed to the President the depth of
his opposition to J ewish settlement in Palestine. In his report on the meeting
to the Congress, Roosevelt said that he had learned more about Palestine from
I bn Saud in five minutes than he had in his whole life until then. This was
followed by Roosevelt's public declaration to Stephen Wise that he would
uphold his pledge to support the establishment of a J ewish state in Palestine.
Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Ch. 36; Zelig Adier, "Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Zionism, "7 udaism, 83, 1972, p. 268.

his sudden death a few weeks later. Then it "emerged" that things had not really
been what they seemed.

Roosevelt's attitude toward Zionism, as an important element in the vilification
campaign against him, continues to preoccupy historians. Archives are scoured for
every last scrap of paper. Every letter ever sent or not sent is examined, so is every draft
of every conversation or speech; every passing thought during consultations with
aides or friends is searchingly analyzed; every comment and every statement is the
subject of minute exegesis. The upshot is that Roosevelt's hypocrisy is so convincingly
proved that one is at a loss to decide which is more astonishing: his capacity (and his
motives) for lying to his J ewish friends during his ozen [dozen] years as President; or
the willingness of the J ewish public to be deceived but delighted for such a lengthy
period.

It is difficult to determine to what extent Goldmann's testimony based on his
"impression" constitutes still more documentary evidence about Roosevelt, or is
merely a verbal concession to a fashionable mode of thought. As far as we are
concerned-and in this work we do not intend to be diverted by irrelevant material-it is
sufficient that in the same breath with this testimony, Goldmann expresses himself
unequivocally concerning Roosevelt's humanitarian attitude toward the J ewish
people. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that this positive testimony was
influenced to a certain degree by the witness's personal gratitude. If we are not
mistaken, Goldmann was one of the thousands of public activists, intellectuals and
scientists to whom the President granted emergency visas above and beyond the
official quotas. Nevertheless, in this case the evidence of a beneficiary is valid.

Another witness, also owing a debt of gratitude. Prof. Arye Tartakower, describes
what Roosevelt did for him and his colleagues:

Roosevelt ordered that visas be issued to several thousand J ews in excess of the
quota. This applied principally to important Jews... At that time Roosevelt was
interested in rescuing these people even if this meant bringing them to America, even
in the face of opposition from senior officials in the government. There were

27 Morse, p. 203.

28 Goldmann, Memoirs , p. 18

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difficulties. Tine bureaucracy supported the law. Public opinion was also afraid...
Roosevelt

at that time went against public opinion. He acted as a great humanitarian. 29

If it was our thesis that Roosevelt's attitude toward the plight of the J ews was
dictated exclusively by humanitarian considerations, we should have to delineate the
outer limits of the help that could be expected from him. We noted above (Ch. 4) that the
Zionist movement's approach toward the J ews was that of a friend and not of a father.
The same can be said of Roosevelt. But the two cases are very different. Zionism's
"friends only" attitude toward the J ewish people had catastrophic results, because
there was no other "father" but Zionism to care heart and soul for the people. Whereas
in Roosevelt's case faithful friendship was as far as he could go. In our terms,
Roosevelt was a "father" to the American people and to his country. It was his duty to be
vigilant to ensure that no harm befell them. Where American was concerned, he had to
be fully informed at all times about current events and future prospects. Under no
circumstances could he tell himself or others that he had not known or could not have
known about something that was liable to harm his country's peace and wellbeing. For
he was, as we said, a "father."

But when it came to the J ews, or for that matter any other people besides the
Americans, it was a different story. If he were benevolent and humanitarian, he would
be responsive to their tribulations and their cries for help. He could allow himself to be
loyal and generous in his assistance. What could not be expected of him was to be
constantly on the alert in examining the situation and in searching feverishly for
ways to help. Here he would rely on the Jewish leaders whose duty this was. They were
naturally vigilant and also the most authoritative source of information on the
subject. Their appeals would generally suggest the maximum extent of the help
required; their testimony would be considered to reflect accurately the situation-
al belt, with a natural and understandabletendency to overstate the case.

This, as we said, held true on the assumption that Roosevelt was guided strictly
by humanitarian motives. But that, of course, is an unrealistic proposition. Roosevelt
may have been a faithful friend, but he was also a politician responsible for governing
a vast land democratically. During the periods of the Depression and the Holocaust he
ran for reelection twice, while his supporters in the House and among the state
governors contested no fewer than four elections. His constant dependence on voters
and elected representatives alike was bound to guide his attitude toward public
opinion and the mood in Congress. This situation, together

with the fateful circumstances that dominated the people and the country to
which he was the "father," caused him on several occasions to submit to pressures and
to backtrack from plans that were put forward by his confidants, in the government
and in the public alike. We will briefly survey three such cases.

I n August 1939 the Department of the I nterior proposed a plan for the
development of Alaska, at that time an American "territory" and not a full-fledged
state. Following consultations with Roosevelt, Interior Secretary Harold Ickes
suggested, contrary to the opinion of the State Department, that within the framework
of the plan 10,000 refugees a year be allowed into Alaska; only after five years would
they be permitted to enter the United States, and even then only on account of the quota
for their countries of origin. The plan was ardently welcomed by part of the American
press, but was deplored by the inhabitants of Alaska and in both the House and the
Senate. Faced with opposition of this intensity, Roosevelt deemed it unwise to lay his
prestige on the line openly. Ultimately the plan was buried in a Senate subcommittee.

A second case concerned possible entry to the Virgin Islands, another American
"territory." In an emergency, the governor there was authorized to permit visits
without visas, by administrative fiat. In 1940 the governor was on the brink of
declaring free entry for refugees who had undergone an appropriate selection process.
But unremitting State Department pressure forced Roosevelt to scrap the idea. 30

The third instance, well-known and extremely illuminating, concerns the
Wagner-Rogers Bill. Senator Robert Wagner and Congresswoman Edith Rogers
introduced legislation in both Houses simultaneously according to which a total of
20,000 children from Germany would be permitted to enter the country during 1939
and 1940. The bill had the support of influential J ewish. Catholic and Protestant

29 Recorded interview of tlie autlior with Prof. Arye Tartakower, August 17, 1972.
30Wyman, pp. 100-112.

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humanitarian organizations. Thousands of Americans expressed their willingness to
adopt the children. A leading advocate of the plan was the First Lady, Eleanor
Roosevelt, who sought to exploit her closeness to the President to garner his support.
But in vain. Her exchange of cables with the President while he was on a Caribbean
cruise is well-known. To her request for his go-ahead to tell Secretary of State Sumner
Welles that "we [i.e., she and the President] approve passage" of the bill, he replied: "It
is all right for you to support the Child Refugee Bill, but it is best for me to say nothing
till I get back. "31 Concurrently, Roosevelt's secretary was explaining in a letter to the
popular actor Eddie Cantor why it was advisable to tone down the vigorous
campaigning for the bill: "There is a

very real feeling that if this question is too prominently raised in the Congress
during the present session we might get more restrictive rather than more liberal
immigration laws and practices."32 Sixty anti-alien bills had been submitted to the
Congress.33 Roosevelt had already been forced to veto one bill passed into law which
called for the deportation of several categories of foreigners.34 In these circumstances
even the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees thought it best for Roosevelt to
refrain from giving his overt support to the bill. 35

The protracted deliberations concerning the bill ended with a headlong retreat by
its sponsors. The subcommittee that considered it recommended its adoption with one
"amendment'-that the 20,000 visas for the children be deducted from the overall quota.
Had the bill been passed into law in this form, it would have placed a new restriction
on the quota instead of enlarging it. At all events. Senator Wagner quickly announced
that he was abandoning the bill and the entire matter was soon forgotten.

Referring to backtracking like this, one of the researchers of the period
maintains that the results could have been different had Roosevelt behaved "more like
a lion and less like a fox."36 Where the cases of Alaska and the Virgin Islands are
concerned, this conclusion may not be far off the mark-but the metaphor requires some
elucidation. Roosevelt's "fox-like" behavior stemmed not only from his propensity to
subterfuge but was also dictated by a harsh and cruel reality. From that isolationist
70th Congress of 1939-1940 he had to extract an allocation of half a billion dollars for
the expansion of the air force and the construction of naval bases to ready the United
States for the impending war. 37 This in itself would be sufficient to explain
Roosevelt's reluctance to generate faction with the House and Senate. As for the
President's "lion-like" qualities, these came to the fore during this hostile Congress in
two vigorous operations when Roosevelt was convinced of their necessity and urgency.

Testimony concerning one such action has already been quoted above from the
thankful refugee Prof. AryeTartakower. The event occurred in summer 1940 following
the German occupation of France. Fearful for the fate of statesmen, artists and
scientists who were trapped in unoccupied Europe, Roosevelt ordered that they be
admitted to the U.S. outside the immigration quotas. As a result, some 2,000 political
refugees and scientists entered the U.S. by the end of 1941.38

Two years earlier, after the great pogrom in Germany in November 1938,
Roosevelt had acted on an even broader scale. I n view of the

situation in Germany, he declared then, he was extending by six months the
visas of 15,000 German and Austrian Jews who were in the United States as visitors,
since it would be "cruel and inhuman" to send them back to a place where they faced
certain arrest or incarceration in concentration camps.39 In fact, these persons
remained in America "temporarily" throughout the entire war, eventually finding
ways to become permanent residents.

On the face of it, the assessment that Roosevelt was "treading the outer limits of
Congressional toleration"40 and of American public opinion would seem to be well-
founded. But this is an objective-friendly appraisal, not that of a "father." Had
Roosevelt been more than a friend, he would have restructured his scale of priorities

31 Ibid.,p.97.

32 Morse, p. 255.

33 Ibid.,p. 256.

34 Feingold, p. 137.

35 Wyman.p. 97.

36 Feingold, Foreword.

37 Morse, p. 255.
38Wyman, p. 149.

39 American Jewish Year Book , Vol. 40, p. 379.
40Wyman, p.211.

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and expanded the parameters of the risk he was willing to take in the Congress and
among the public. Perhaps he might have taken the risk of issuing the administrative
fiat regarding the Virgin Islands, and he might even have fought Congress over the
Alaska plan. However, since by definition Roosevelt was not a "father," this fateful
task fell on the shoulders of the J ewish leaders who were in contact with him. By their
words and their deeds, they should have ensured that the President was aware of and
felt palpably how concrete and grave the dangers were; how urgent was the help
required; that this must shunt aside a whole array of considerations; and, not least,
how ready they, the J ewish leaders, were to make whatever sacrifice was needed to help
their brethren in distress. We will have occasion to see how remote was the J ewish
leaders' behavior from this description.

We will also return often to President Roosevelt. In the meantime, we will
conclude this survey with a statistical table showing the fulfillment of the
immigration quotas (in percentages) from Germany and Austria during Roosevelt's
tenure as President:41

1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943
B.3 20.5 24.3 42.1 65.3 119.7 95.3 47.7 17.8 4.7

Two comments are called for concerning this table. Firstly, the surplus of 19.7
percent (5,389 persons) in 1939 is accounted for by the fact that these persons received
visas at the end of 1938 but used them in 1939. Thus the 1939 figure is lowered to 100
percent while that for 1938 rises to 85 percent. 42 Secondly, the figure for 1940 does not
reflect those emigrants who arrived directly from Germany or Austria. The great
majority of the incoming emigrants at that time consisted of German

refugees who were in England or Cuba.43 Since these countries were not
subsequently conquered by the Nazis, the fact that the refugees left them did not
increase the number of those saved from destruction.

The table shows that with respect to what was agreed at Evian concerning
German J ewry, the U.S. lived up to its commitments for three years, when it was still
possible to leave Germany or Europe freely or relatively freely. At the same time, it
constitutes pointed evidence of the possibilities that existed for rescuing tens of
thousands of Jews after 1940 if only in addition to a friend in the White House the
J ewish people had had a "father" in America.

The above lines had already been written and edited when the possibility arose of
our perusing the minutes of thej ewish Agency Executive meetings during the years of
World War II. It was in the minutes to one such meeting that we found David Ben-
Gurion's assessment of Roosevelt in 1941:

To avert any chance of error, I must say a few words about Roosevelt, I have no
doubt that he is one of the righteous of the world, a person free of any taint of
antisemitism, and, moreover, he is sympathetic toward the Jews. He is also ready to
take certain steps for the good of the Jews. Regarding the appointment of Frankfurter
[to the Supreme Court] was a demonstrative act on his part, even though there was
pressure by the J ews against the appointment of a J ew. He has a liking for Zionism but
he does not believe in Eretz-lsrael. He regards the Jewish question as a terrible and
gigantic question of millions of J ews; and in his opinion some tens of thousands of J ews
can be settled in Palestine, no more than that. Therefore another country must be
found. One can fight opponents, but he is a friend, albeit a friend who does not believe
in Zionism. There are some good Zionists among the J ews in his immediate circle-Ben
Cohen, Frankfurter and Brandeis. Whether they have any great influence on him I
don't know... Yet I doubt whether the two of them [Cohen and Frankfurter] can imbue
him with belief in Eretz-lsrael, because I do not know how imbued with this belief they
themselves are. Nor should we overlook the fact that Roosevelt also has non-Zionist
friends and perhaps even opponents [of Zionism], some of them quite influential."

41Ibid.,p.221.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., p. 170.

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It emerges that as early as 1941 there was one person, at least, whom Roosevelt
"did not mislead" about his supposed Zionist proclivities. Yet a clear knowledge about
the stand of the U.S. President did not prevent this person from regarding him as
friend, a righteous person, sympathetic to J ews. We second every word of this clear-
headed and accurate assessment by the chairman of the J ewish Agency.

The Zionists were not the only ones who maintained--and believed--that the
Evian Conference had failed. They were affirmed, as it were, in their view by a group at
the opposite pole. The Nazis were nervous about and somewhat embarrassed by Evian.
They condemned the conference in advance, but remained fearful of its possible
results. Their ambivalent stance was reflected in their decision to permit a delegation
of the "Representation of German J ewry" to attend the conference and submit a
substantive memorandum couched in a spirit of cooperation. However, the Nazis soon
found that they had nothing to fear. They saw only the conference's deceptive external
manifestations, and these seemed to confirm their belief that the J ews were unwanted
everywhere; this point they pressed home in a vociferous propaganda campaign. That
the conference ended without visible results only heightened their delighted
arrogance. Goebbels' paper Der Angriff described the conference as mere verbiage
aimed solely at ensuring Roosevelt the J ewish vote in the next election. The paper
harped on the point that not a single conference participant wanted to admit Jews to
their country-each was waiting for someone else to take the first step.44 This line was
parroted by the entire regimented German press and by every Nazi representative who
could corral someone ready to listen. Thus, for example. Foreign Minister Ribbentropp
told his French counterpart. Bonnet, according to the former's report to Hitler: "I
replied to M. Bonnet that we all wanted to be rid of our J ews. The only trouble is that
there is no country willing to receive them. "45

According to all the signs, the Nazis succeeded in convincing themselves that
their appraisal was correct. Their perception of the conference's outcome became an
additional endorsement of their doctrine and spurred them to find their own
"solutions." Their conclusion from the conference's (supposed) failure was that
nothing would be gained by negotiating with the body that had been established. Thus,
when the newly chosen director of the Intergovernmental Committee sought to visit
Berlin for this purpose, the Nazis refused to receive him.

Assessing that the fate of the J ews was of no concern to anyone, the Nazis
concluded that J ewish blood was expendable and that the most brutal methods could be
employed to expel them from Germany without fear of adverse international reaction.
(From this point of view Holocaust scholars are correct in maintaining that the Nazis'
evaluation of Evian was a contributing factor to the decision to step up the
persecutions and perpetrate the November pogrom. However, in contrast to the Nazis'
themselves, who realized their mistake a few months later, these researchers fail to
point out that the results on which the Nazis based themselves were illusionary and
their assessment faulty.) Having reached this conclusion, they felt free to carry out a
massive and savage expulsion in October followed by the devastating pogrom the next
month.

On November 9, 1938, a young Jew, Herschel Grynszpan, the son of a family
which had been deponed to Zbonszyn, assassinated an official of the German embassy
in Paris, Ernst vom Rath. The report of his death triggered "spontaneous" anti-J ewish
riots across Germany--riots which were well-organized and directed from above to the
last detail. During the night of November 9-10, 1938, at least 36 Jews were murdered
and about the same number injured. One hundred and nineteen synagogues were
torched and 76 others totally destroyed. Some 7,500 shops were pillaged and looted. One
hundred and seventy-one residential dwellings were burned or destroyed. Twenty
thousand Jews were arrested and thrown into concentration camps.46 The Nazis
dubbed their successful operation Kristallnacht, an allusion to the vast amount of
broken crystals and glass from shattered chandeliers and shop windows.

44 According to Haolam . August 4, 1938.

45 Ger. Doc, Fourth Series, Vol. 4, p. 481.
461MT, Doc. Ps-18 16.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

At H itier's order the pogrom became the poi nt of departure for an additional stage
in the systematic persecution of the J ews. On November 12 a meeting was convened of
ministers and senior officials under the chairmanship of Goering and with the
participation of Goebbels and Heydrich. Goering briefed those present on a series of
new decrees issued by the Fuehrer's chancellery. As further punishment for the
murder of vom Rath a collective fine of one billion Reichsmarks would be imposed on
the J ews. Moreover, the J ews themselves would see to repairing the damages caused by
the pogrom; the insurance payments due them would be confiscated. The plans to
transfer J ewish-owned industrial and commercial enterprises to "Aryan" hands
would be executed forthwith. Goebbels proposed additional measures: J ews would be
forbidden to attend the cinema or the theater, to travel together with Germans in the
same train compartments, to walk in the forests, and the like.

I n the meantime the free world began to react to the pogrom It was soon apparent
that the barbaric riots were more than public opinion in the democracies was ready to
tolerate. In these countries the news of the pogrom hit like an earthquake which sent
tremors through Nazi Germany's public relations edifice. The world press was
horrified and revolted. Speakers in numerous forums denounced the event fiercely and
categorically. The free world was outraged by the atrocity. The British ambassador to
Berlin seems to have been on the mark when he said that from the point of view of the
Nazis themselves the pogrom had been an act of unbelievable folly, comparable in its
impact on world public opinion with the sinking of the Lusitania and the execution of
the nurse Edith Cavell in World War 1 .47

Public reaction was strongest in England and America. The feelings and
conscience of the British public-which just a month earlier had acquiesced in its
government's betrayal of Czechoslovakia- were aroused by the anti-J ewish rampage in
Germany. "Here in England" an eye-witness wrote in a letter describing the reactions
and the mood in the country, "the events aroused tremendous resentment on the part of
all decent people. There is great readiness to do something and to help. "48 The British
parliament passed a special resolution deploring the riots Circles generally supportive
of Germany added their voices to the bitter condemnations. The chairman of the Anglo-
German Friendship League Lord Mount-Temple, resigned in protest. Lord Londonderry,
an ardent exponent of friendship with Germany, openly condemned "Germany's
medieval cruelty. 49 The German ambassador to London reported to Foreign Minister
Ribbentrop that the British public's reaction to the pogrom precluded the possibility
that Prime Minister Chamberlain would be able to enter into negotiations based on the
Munich Agreement and that even the advocates of friendship with Germany were
pessimistic on this score.50

A similar report was filed by the German ambassador to Washington. In
America, too, the anger and outrage were widespread encompassing groups which had
previously been indifferent to anti- German propaganda or had even supported an
alliance with Germany What particularly strikes me," the ambassador wrote, "is the
fact that with few exceptions, respectable patriotic circles which are thoroughly anti-
Communist and, for the greater part, anti-Semitic, also begin to turn away from us...
That men like Hoover, Dewey and Hearst are now publicly adopting so violent and
bitter an attitude against Germany is a serious matter. "51

I n contrast to England, the U.S. administration did not have to be pushed to react
by public opinion, but took the lead itself and guided the public's response. American
Jewry noted with satisfaction that their President was the only head of state in the
world who ignored diplomatic niceties and openly gave expression to the pent-up fury
and resentment of the American people at the unbridled Hitlerian vandalism. 52 Of
the pogrom Roosevelt said that he could scarcely believe that such things could occur
in twentieth-century civilization. 53

To drive home the point, Roosevelt ordered the recall of the American ambassador
to Berlin for "consultations'-a form of diplomatic protest second in harshness only to a
severing of relations. A few days later I nterior Secretary Harold Ickes stated in a public

47 Sir Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission , p. 172.

48 Adler-Rudell/Correspondence. p. 211.

49 Joseph Tenenbaura, Race and Reich (Hebrew edition), p. 497.

50 Ger. Doc, Fourth Series, Vol. 4, p. 334.

51 Ibid., pp. 639-640.

52 Jewish Frontier , December 1938.

53 American Jewish Year Boojt , Vol. 41, p. 192.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

speech that "Hitler is a cruel dictator who robs and tortures thousands of people." The
protest lodged by a German representative to the State Department was sharply
rejected, "since these words [of Ickes] express the feelings of the overwhelming
majority of the American people who have been deeply outraged by the riots in
Germany. "54

Germany's foreign trade was hard hit. A boycott of German goods hitherto applied
in several countries largely byj ewish circles and exercising a direct impact-such as it
was-only on consumers, overnight became a crucial international factor, and was
joined by merchants and importers as well as consumers. Contracts with German
firms were cancelled en bloc by companies in France, England, the U.S., Canada,
Yugoslavia and elsewhere.55 Many German firms lost from 20 to 30 percent of their
trade. What the Germans found particularly incomprehensible was that pure "Aryan"
firms were taking part in the boycott; in Holland, for example, a major corporation
cancelled its representation agreements with Krupp and other German industrial
giants. 56

This impressive reaction surely sprang from the groundwork laid at Evian,
which brought the distress of German J ewry to every home, every newspaper reader,
every listener to the radio. I n contrast to the Munich affair, when the ordinary citizen
in most countries was insufficiently informed about the geographic aspects of the
issue, uncertain as to whether the Czechs were right, and had been misled into
thinking that the agreement with Hitler assured peace in Europe, everything about
the November pogrom was as clear as a bell. The detailed reports concerning the Evian
deliberations, even if they were not unanimous about the conference's effectiveness,
left no room for doubt about where the evil lay and who the innocent victim was. Thus,
by the ti me the pogrom was

perpetrated, the public did not need lengthy explanations to grasp the issues.

The global outrage stunned the Nazi leadership. After recovering from their
initial surprise they tried to "explain" matters, as they had previously explained the
imagined indifferenceof the world to the plight of the J ews. Hitler himself maintained
that the reaction demonstrated the scope and power of "thej ewish world conspiracy. "57
Conspiracy or not it was essential to see the situation as it was and proceed within the
parameters of the existing conditions.

Soon afterward the Nazis " discovered " the Intergovernmental Committee which
had been established by the Evian Conference. They now turned to this body, which
they had refused to recognize for five months, with an offer of cooperation for the
orderly departure of theJ ews from Germany-the so-called "Schacht Plan."

For the sake of continuity we will now return briefly to the Evian Conference. As
will be recalled, the conference defined itself as an intergovernmental committee"
which was to be maintained on a permanent basis with the same composition as the
conference The chairman was to be the British representative. Lord Winterton, with
deputy chairmen from America, France. Brazil and Holland Also appointed would be a
special administrator with broad powers who was not officially accredited to any
government. The fi rst plenary session of he I ntergovern mental Committee was held, as
scheduled, on August, 3 in London.

At that meeting it emerged that despite the location of the organization's office
and the nationality of its chairman, the true leadership remained in the hands of the
Americans. The moving spirit continued to be Myron Taylor, who had served as
chairman of the Evian Conference and was now deputy chairman of the
Intergovernmental Committee. George Rublee, an old friend and confidant of
President Roosevelt, was appointed committee director, and his deputy was another
American, Robert Pell. As before, it was the White House that pulled the strings. As
fate would have it. Roosevelt had a highly influential partner on whom depended in

54 Ibid., p. 193.

55 Hilberg, p. 25.

56 Ibid., p. 26.

57 William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Hebrew ed.). Vol. I, p. 352.

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large measure the realization of the intentions and decisions. As Zaiman Shazar had
foreseen at Evian, it was American J ewry which ultimately tipped the scales.

The two paramount tasks facing the I ntergovernmental Committee were to obtain
an agreement with the German government for the orderly departure of the Jews, and
to find sufficient places of haven for them.

Naturally, priority was accorded to reaching an agreement with Germany which
would put a halt to the persecutions and ensure, through the utilization of J ewish
property, funding for thej ews' emigration and for their absorption in other countries.
It was estimated that the project would cost billions of Reichsmarks, and it was clear
that the availability of this money would be a crucial factor in persuading
governments to admit emigrants with means instead of destitute refugees.***

Notwithstanding the logical order of things, negotiations with Germany did not
get underway. The reason was simple: the German government refused to enter into
negotiations with the Intergovernmental Committee. Repeated entreaties by
American, British and French diplomats were of no avail. The Nazis would not allow
Rublee to visit Berlin and would not talk to him. Indeed, in the first days of the Evian
Conference Ribbentrop had informed the British ambassador to Berlin that the
German government would not cooperate with interested countries on the question of
German J ewry. This was an internal German affair, he insisted, and as such was not
subject to discussion with outsiders. 58 The Nazis would not budge from this hard line.

The change was triggered by the international outcry following the November
pogrom. The I ntergovernmental Committee, or the "Evian Committee," as the Germans
called it, suddenly became an aceptable [acceptable] and desirable partner for
negotiations. Hjalmar Schacht, the president of the Reichsbank, was instructed to
draw up a plan on behalf of the German government. After being approved by Hitler,
the Schacht Plan was submitted on December 15 to Rublee and Winterton in London.

The critical fact in the events that followed is that there was not one plan but two
plans, separate in time, different in content, and with totally different histories. The
first plan--the actual Schacht Plan--was submitted by its author on December 15,
1938, and was under consideration until January 19, 1939, the date of Schacht's final
meeting with Rublee. Discussion of the second plan commenced on J anuary 21 with
agreement reached between the sides on February 1 This second plan took its name
from the negotiators—the W/oWthat-RuJb/eeP/an, or as it is more commonly known, the
Rublee Plan.

For reasons that are unclear, the Holocaust literature of the past 30 years has
consistently confused the two plans, with the result that a distorted picture has
emerged of the facts and events. Astonishingly, this

*** Taylor: "Most of the countries are ready to admit involuntary
immigrants with property, but are not ready to admit persons who will
be a burden on society."

mistake even found its way into the most detailed and comprehensive works on
the Holocaust, including the best-known among them-by Reitlinger and Hilberg-and
remained uncorrected until the appearance of David S. Wyman's book in 1968. A major
contribution to this distortion of history was undoubtedly made by Schacht himself,
when he declared in his final statement to the court at Nuremberg, that after his
removal as head of the Reichsbank, "the matter was dropped from the agenda. "59

The German whose name can be linked with both Plans was not Schacht but the
Nazi leader Goering. It was evidently Goering who was responsible for the German's
change of attitude toward the Intergovernmental Committee and Goering who got
Schacht to draw up the plan and negotiate its execution. Goering also renewed the
negotiations immediately after Schacht's dismissal and engineered an agreement
within ten days.

Moreover, direct evidence indicates that the man who was second only to Hitler in
the Nazi hierarchy acted with the energetic encouragement and close cooperation of
the Fuehrer himself. The reason for our hedging in saying that it was "evidently"
Goering who engineered the shift in attitude, is that we are uncertain that it was not

58 From a circular of the German Foreign Office, June 8, 1938. Cer. Doc, Fourth Series, Doc. No. 895.

59 IMT, Vol. 22, p. 395.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Hitler himself who initiated the change of approach and ordered Goeringto implement
it. At all events, it is known that both Nazi leaders were personally involved in the
matter, agreeing on the steps to betaken and maintaining close coordination.

Something of the nature of their contacts and involvement may be gleaned from a
telephone conversation between Schacht and the State Secretary of the German Foreign
Office, von Weizsaecker, as subsequently recorded by the latter. 60

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop first learned about Schacht's London talks from a
report in a Swiss paper, the Boersen Zdtung. Furious, the minister ordered von
Weizsaecker to call Schacht "in order to demand an explanation" (according to
Weizsaecker's notes) about the negotiations the press report, and above all about the
report's concluding sentence, which assailed Ribbentrop's current foreign policy and
offered a dire prediction concerning the future. Weizsaecker relates that the minister
was astonished at the report and by the manner in which such a basic foreign policy
issue was being handled in London. "For six months the subject was under discussion
between the Foreign Office and foreign diplomatic missions, and hitherto it was dealt
with in a totally negative light." Weizsaecker was instructed to inquire of Schacht
whether the Fuehrer had ordered the negotiations without consulting the Foreign
Ministry If so,

Schacht would have to go on conducting negotiations with foreign governments...
Such was the tenor of Ribbentrop's angry remonstrations.

Schacht (Weizsaecker relates) admitted frankly that he was the source of the
report. The Fuehrer had entrusted him with this mission and he was fulfilling it in
accordance with his instructions. He had been ordered to report on the mission's
completion personally to Hitler, and this he hoped to do within a day or two. Following
this he would willingly brief the Foreign Minister. In the meantime, he could say no
more about the talks before reporting to the Fuehrer.

Schacht added that Field Marshal Goering had told him to conduct the talks in
London. Goering and Schacht had discussed the subject at length. Goering wanted to
depoliticize the issue and place it wholly on an economic footing, and he claimed to
have an explicit order to this effect from the Fuehrer. As for who bore authority to deal
with the issue, he, Schacht, knew only what Goering had told him. Therefore he
believed he had acted properly in deliberately refraining from entering into political
questions during his London talks, even though pressed to do so by British officials.
Schacht said he had gone to London at the invitation of the banker Norman. In the talk
between the two bankers the question of J ewish emigration had been no more than a
side issue (sic!). And turning once more to the central issue: despite the explicit orders
he had received from Goering, he had not made do with them, and on his way abroad
had met in M unich with Hitler, who had reaffirmed the instructions.

Finally, in reply to Weizsaecker's query as to why he had not apprised Ribbentrop
of the plan prior to his departure for London, Schacht said that his travel schedule had
precluded this, "even if he had thought that the matter was within the purview of the
Foreign Minister."

Schacht's pretentious attribution to himself of a crucial role in the plan that
bears his name is, we believe, without foundation. Whether or not he spoke to Hitler in
the manner and under the circumstances he describes in his memoirs, **** or
whether he did not dare speak without a prior hint from his superiors, is immaterial.
The attitude toward the J ews was a cardinal element of Nazi policy and the economist
Schacht had absolutely

**** He claims to have told Hitler: "If you won't formulate some legal
basis for the J ews in Germany by which they can live their lives in decent
conditions, you must at least facilitate their departure." Hitler, still shaken
by the worldwide outrage at the atrocities of November 9, asked: "Have you
any suggestion?" Schacht unfolded his plan and to his great astonishment
Hitler declared he did not object to these ideas being tried in practice. Hjalmar
Schacht, 767 ahreme/nesLdbens (German), pp. 481-3.

no authority to involve himself in it, and certainly not to alter it. Decisions of this
level could be made only by the Nazi leaders, and they hardly needed the moralizing of
the president of the Reichsbank. What they expected from Schacht was that in return

60 Ger. Doc, Fourth Series, Vol. V, Doc. No. 655.

183

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

for Germany's agreement to abandon the worst excesses against the J ews, he would

extort from world Jewry the maximum benefits for Goering's policy of military

aggrandizement. So the "financial wizard" put all his skills to work and concocted a
suitable plan.

Schacht explained his plan orally to Rublee and Winterton; he did not provide
them with a written memorandum. The plan and the meeting with Schacht are
described briefly in two letters from Rublee to the U.S. Undersecretary of State,
Sumner Welles,61 and in a detailed British memorandum. 62 According to these
documents, the plan was as follows:

There were in Germany (to which the Sudetenland had been annexed) some
600,000 J ews as defined by the Nuremberg Laws. Of these 200,000 were elderly and
would have to remain in Germany, 150,000 were young and healthy wage earners, and
250,000 were dependents-women and children. The wage earners would emigrate
within three years at the rate of 50,000 per year, and their dependents would join them
once they were fully settled in their new homes.

The backbone of the plan lay in the mode of its financing. To this end one-quarter
of the value of the J ewish property in Germany-estimated at six billion Reichsmarks-
would be utilized. The German government would waive the confiscation of 15 billion
Reichsmarks, out of which each emigrant-provider would be given a loan equal in
value to 10,000 gold marks ($4,000).

But... and here is where Schacht's financial "wizardry" began. Since Germany did
not want to expend such a large amount of foreign currency within three years, the 15
billion marks would be deposited in a special trust fund whose directors would include
one Jewish representative. Against this internal fund, world Jewry would raise an
external loan in the same amount from which the emigrants would receive their
money. The external loan would be defrayed if Germany's foreign trade increased to ttie
point wliere additional foragn currency reserves became ava/VaJb/e. The export monies
would be paid to the borrowers, the internal fund would be used to pay the exporters; as
for the emigrants, in due time they would pay their debt to the J ewish property owners-
and all would be well.

Schacht prefaced his remarks by saying that his plan was acceptable to Goering.
He was putting it forward "for humanitarian reasons." The Jews had no future in
Germany, and if no action were taken to change the situation, they could expect
further trouble. Finally, he assured his interlocutors that if the plan were accepted no
harm would befall the J ews waiting to emigrate. The 200,000 elderly J ews slated to
remain in Germany would be allowed to live out their lives peacefully. A speedy
decision was required, Schacht stressed, becauseof the unstable situation in Germany.

Rublee commented that the plan seemed to hold out certain possibilities. At first
hearing he saw certain difficulties which would have to be discussed. It was essential
to study the plan together with the British and the Americans and submit it to other
interested governments. Should it be decided in principle that the plan merited
further discussion, he, Rublee, would likethe next round of talks to be held in Berlin.
Schacht assured him that this would present no problem.

At the close of the meeting Lord Winterton requested Schacht to inform Goering
that both the Evian Conference and the Intergovernmental Committee had dealt and
would continue to deal with the problem from a strictly practical and business-like
point of view. He and Rublee had refrained at the time from expressing political
assessments concerning the attitude toward the J ews in Germany, even though they
had drawn criticism as a result. Thus ended the meeting.

J ewish and liberal public opinion in the democracies rejected the Schacht Plan
out of hand. Extortion, ransom, slave-trade- these were the commonest reactions. The
plan's ulterior motive-to exploit the plight of the Jews in order to better Germany's
balance of trade-was obvious. The activists behind the economic boycott of Germany
saw the plan as proof positive that the boycott was working, and urged that it be
intensified. Knowledgeable persons said that the 15 billion Reichsmarks ($600
million) that world Jewry was being asked to cough up would not be a loan but an

61 FRUS 1938, Vol. I, pp. 873-874.

62 Br. Doc, Third Series, Vol. Ill, pp. 677-875.

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outright tax: they placed no faith in the Nazis' realizing the German-Jewish property
they held. Experts who were consulted by the relevant bodies in the United States were
unanimous in their opinion that under the proposed terms world Jewry could not
possibly raise the vast sum in question or even a substantial part of it. 63

According to Rublee, once he realized the implications of the plan he was not
eager to ask thej ewish organizations to set up a committee to handle the practicalities.
When he nevertheless did so, at Winterton's behest, his request was flatly rejected.
J ewish community leaders in

London and Paris opposed the creation of the proposed committee for fear it would
be construed as admission of the existence of "international J ewry"...

On December 20 a committee of experts from England, France and Holland, under
Rublee's chairmanship, convened and announced their opposition to the idea of
utilizing confiscated Jewish property as a means to increase German exports. The
committee resolved that the financial terms of the plan, as proposed, were
unacceptable. 64

The Schacht Plan, as the public knew it, was an abysmal failure. It was
unfeasible under the existing conditions and it lacked support among the Jews and
their supporters. Nothing positive, it seemed, would issue from Schacht's cunning.

Rublee thought otherwise. The important thing for him was that the Germans
had initiated the negotiations, and he was interested in pursuing the talks. As we saw,
in his first meeting with Schacht he hinted at certain "difficulties" concerning the
plan. Nevertheless, he said the negotiations should continue and he emphasized his
desi re to be i nvited to Berl i n for that purpose.

On J anuary 10, 1939, Rublee arrived in the German capital and began a series of
meetings with Schacht. Rublee rejected completely the plan's proposed loan of 15
billion Reichsmarks, and Schacht accepted his position. 65 The talks focused on a
substitute for the loan, on the standing of the J ews in Germany once an agreement was
reached, and on other details. According to Rublee the talks progressed satisfactorily
until, in the last session, on J anuary 19, the Nazi stand hardened. Schacht put forward
a plan which, he said, had been approved in inter-ministerial consultations. His style
of speech at this meeting bore unmistakable signs of the influence of Ribbentrop, who
had been brought into the picture a few days earlier. Schacht, Rublee writes, "defended
the German position vigorously," and declared openly that the German government
might carry out the proposed plan unilaterally. That Rublee was being apprised of the
details was purely a gesture of courtesy, so that foreign governments could decide on
how to handle the emigration from Germany. 66

The presentation of this ultimative proposal was Schacht's final act in this
matter. The following day he was dismissed from his post as president of the
Reichsbank and removed from the negotiations about Germany's J ews.

I n his statement at Nuremberg, Schacht sought— evidently with some success-to
usetheepisodeof the plan in his defense. He presented

his own version of the events, one that was at odds with that of the prosecution-
and with the truth. We have already noted his false claim that his removal from the
Reichsbank brought about the abandonment of the plan Of his other claims the most
striking is the concluding--and most insolent— one: "Had the plan been fulfilled, not a
singlej ew would have lost his life."

This was an empty statement, devoid of a convincing basis. Schacht could never
have proved that if the Jews had assented to his extortionate plan. Hitler would have
implemented it in the war years Schacht wanted to take the judges by surprise at the
eleventh hour of the trial, and there was no better way than to make an impressive,
dogmatic statement. Schacht will no longer concern us.

Yet even though we have rejected Schacht's unfounded conjecture, we are not
exempt from positing a reasonable scenario which might have unfolded if the Jews,

63 FRUS 1938, Vol. I, p. 876.

64 Br. Doc, Third Series, Vol. IV, p. 677.

65 Memorandum from Schacht to Ribbentrop, January 16, 1939, Ger. Doc, Fourth Series, Vol. V, p. 921.

66 FRUS 1939, Vol. 11, p. 71.

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despite everything, Inad raised tine required sum and tine Scinacint Plan inad been
executed. For the sal<e of logic and convenience, we will present our hypothetical
version of events following our discussion of the Wohlthat-Rublee Plan. In the
meantime, the following observations will suffice:

The $600 million for the "external loan" was an absolutely prodigious sum. The
potential purchasers of the emissions did not believe that they would see a return on
their investment. And for a philanthropic venture the amount was totally
disproportionate. If we take into account that during the first five years of the Nazis'
rule all the J ewish welfare organizations devoted a total of $50 million to refugee
aid, 67 we will get an idea of how difficult it would have been to raise an amount twelve
ti mes as great i n j ust three years.

Nonetheless, it is improbable that thej ews and their supporters would have been
so disdainful of the Schacht Plan if the alternative had been known to be physical
destruction. The fact that the plan received no backing is additional evidence of how
remote even the very thought of this dreadful possibility was at the time.

Secondly, if under these conditions one can understand the refusal of the J ewish
organizations to lend a hand to the Schacht Plan, the reason they adduced for that
refusal was extremely dubious. Their argument, it will be recalled, was that they did
not want to create the impression that "international J ewry" existed. As we will see,
this fatuous reasoning was later to serve as the pretext for inaction on a truly fateful
occasion.

When Rublee learned of Schacht's dismissal, he asked the German Foreign Office,
through the American and British embassies, whether the Germans intended to
conti nue the negotiations. 68 I n response he was summoned to a meeting with Goering
the next day. The Nazi leader expressed his wish that an agreement be reached with all
due speed, and announced that his representative in the negotiations would be Helmut
Wohlthat, a senior official in one of Goering's ministries.

Unlike Schacht, Wohlthat did not bear the title of minister and left the conduct of
politics to others. He functioned as Goering's personal emissary and served as a direct
go-between with Rublee. As a result, the pace of the discussions and of decision-
making were quickened. Immediately after his meeting with Goering on January 21,
Rublee travelled to Paris for a session of the Intergovernmental Committee. Following
his return to Berlin on January 25 the talks with Wohlthat went into high gear and
culminated in full agreement within a week.69 A few days were required for
translation purposes and for a close reading of the text of the accord. On February 7
Rublee presented the final agreement to the I ntergovern mental Committee.70

The Wohlthat-Rublee Agreement, or the "Rublee Plan" for short, might have
made a genuine contribution had Germany's J ews been luckier. We will now review the
main points of the agreement. In addition to the text itself, which appears in the
exchange of letters between Rublee and Wohlthat, we will enlist the aid of a report and
commentary published in the New YorkTimes on February 14, 1939, and subsequently
incorporated in the Contemporary J ewish Record. 71

Like the Schacht Plan, the new plan also spoke of 150,000 wage earners, 250,000
dependents, and 200,000 persons categorized as elderly and ill. In this definition the
wage earners were between 15 and 45 years of age, while the elderly were those aged 45
and above. The dependents were the close relatives (wives and children) of the wage
earners, as distinct from the elderly and the ill. The wage earners were to leave the
country within "a period of three years, but not to exceed a maximum of five years." The
dependents would emigrate once the wage earners were settled in their new homes and
were able to provide for them.

The emigration was to be organized with the cooperation of the J ewish
organizations in Germany, under the supervision of a German government official.
The organizations would be aided by foreign experts and representatives of private

67Adler-Rudell,p. 241.

68 FRUS 1939, Vol. 11, pp. 71-73.

69 Ibid., pp. 77-81.

70 Feingold, p. 60.

71 Record, March-April 1939, pp. 77-78.

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groups dealing with emigration \Nh\dn would enjoy the trust of the absorbing
countries and be acceptable to the Germans. The emigrants would be provided with
passports, and

appropriate papers would be supplied to stateless persons.

A special clause in the agreement pledged, in classic diplomatese, that upon the
implementation of the plan, "the conditions which brought about the holding of Jews
in concentration camps will automatically disappear." This pledge dovetailed well
with Nazi practice of the period: to release] ewsfrom concentration camps on condition
that they emigrate.

The candidates for emigration were to receive professional training in
agricultural centers and vocational schools. The German government would
encourage the establishment of institutions for vocational training. The elderly and
those awaiting their turn to leave would be allowed a peaceful existence "as long as
nothing abnormal happens" (which was taken to mean: as long as no more Nazis are
assaulted by J ews). The J ews would not have to live apart and would be permitted to
move about freely. Jews able to work would have the opportunity to earn their living.
However, in plants where both J ews and "Aryans" were employed, the two groups would
be segregated.

The elderly and those too weak to work would receive welfare aid derived from
J ewish property in excess of the proportion of the J ewish assets (25 percent) set aside to
finance the emigration. Should this source prove insufficient, they were assured a
decent existence from the sources providing welfare to needy "Aryans." Under no
circumstances would these people find themselves in need of assistance from extra-
German sources.

The principal difference between the Rublee and Schacht plans lay in the means
for financing the emigration. In the Rublee Plan the "external loan" of 15 billion
Reichsmarks was replaced by the Haavarah ("transfer") principle. Both sides to the
negotiations recalled the arrangement which had been worked out some years earlier
with the German government for affluent J ews who had immigrated to Palestine.
Under that agreement the J ews had transferred their assets to Palestine in the form of
German-made goods. Thus the Jews retained their belongings and the Germans'
foreign trade benefited. In the original "transfer" arrangement the Jews who
emigrated at the outset of the program lost 5 percent of the value of their assets, and
those who departed in the latter stages lost 50 to 95 percent. Under the Rublee Plan
three-quarters of the J ewish assets would remain in Nazi hands, with the fourth
quarter earmarked for underwriting the emigration. As in the Schacht Plan, this
property was to form the basis for the creation of a special fund to be administered by
three trustees, two Germans and one foreigner "of recognized standing." In contrast to
the Schacht Plan, however, the fund

was not intended to guarantee an external loan, but would serve as a direct source
of financing for the emigrants' travel and settlement expenses.

The trust fund would provide the money for the purchase of supplies for the
emigrants and for the development of the settlement facilities to be established for
them. These funds would also go toward defraying travel expenses and toward the
transfer of their belongings inside Germany and via German ships. Only goods not
containing a high percentage of imported materials imported would be purchased, or,
alternatively, a high-import content would be compensated for through payment in
imported foreign capital. The German government expressed its readiness to facilitate
the purchase of goods of a suitable quality and in the quantities required
commensurate with the number of emigrants. The price of the items in question would
not exceed that of goods and services current in Germany.

In addition to their purchases via the trust fund, the emigrants would be
permitted to take, without payment of tax, their personal belongings (with the
exception of jewelry, objects of art, and valuables purchased specifically with a view to
emigration), their household articles, and professional equipment and instruments in
their possession or purchased by them, in reasonable quantities. The emigrants would
be exempted from payment of the Reichsfluchtsteuer (a tax imposed on refugees leaving
Germany) and from all other similar payments.

The purchases originating in the trust fund were to be carried out by an "outside
purchasing agency" which would represent the non-German side in the plan. This

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

agency would maintain contact witin tine German government and would handle the
monies of the trust fund and the overall financing of the emigration.

Actually, the "purchasing agency," which was mentioned in passing in the
course of a lengthy clause detailing the financing arrangements, was to play an
immeasurably more important role than might be gleaned from its modest name. This
was due to the deal's character and structure. For formal reasons, stemming largely
from legal considerations of the American government and prestige considerations of
the German government, no bilateral agreement was signed between the
Intergovernmental Committee and the Germans. The document to which Rublee and
Wohlthat affixed their signatures was a "Statement of Agreement" summing up their
negotiations. Officially, there were two parallel but unilateral actions, to be executed
congruently by two unrelated parties. The German government would implement the
plan concerning thej ews' departure, whilethe I ntergovernmental Committee and/or

private organizations would carry out a corresponding plan involving the
emigrants' absorption in their new homes.72 The Statement of Agreement that was
devoted to the German part of the plan made no reference to the role of the other party.
It was of no concern to the Nazis which body would carry out that aspect of the project.
I ts composition and worki ng methods, as we noted, had nothi ng to do with the Germans
But its establishment and the onset of its activity were essential to set in motion the
German part of the plan. In the protracted discussions concerning its establishment
conducted by the Intergovernmental Committee and the Jewish organizations this
body was called the "Coordinating Foundation " the "Refugee Foundation," or, simply,
the "Private Foundation. "

The initial reactions to the plan were surprise, astonishment and
suspiciousness. The press and those in the know were amazed at Rublee's success in
extracting improved conditions out of what seemed to be hopeless circumstances.73
His overflowing optimism and the concessions he extracted from the Germans made a
deep impression. Still, the outrage generated by the Schacht Plan was still fresh in
people's memory, and in Germany itself the situation continued to deteriorate. In this
headlong rush of events and considerations it was difficult to know for certain whether
the new plan marked a positive shift or was actually a carefully laid trap.

The confusion and hesitations among the public were cogently expressed in an
editorial in oneof the two political-literary journals of Chaim Greenberg, the leader of
the Poalei Zion movement in America. 74 The editorial took note of the fact that the
plan "marks an extraordinary event in German politics-a concession on the part of the
Nazis " The Germans' declared readiness to allow the J ews to work and to assure them a
peaceful life was given particular emphasis. At the same time, the writer quoted the
classical phrase, "timeo Danaos et dona ferentes" (\ fear the Greeks even when they are
bringing gifts). It is no coincidence, the editorial asserted, that the tranquil life
promised [to?] the Jews was contingent on an absence of "abnormal" events. The
continuing persecutions offered no place for optimism. "The agreement presents some
gains if carried out," the writer asserted. "The main question is: will it be carried out.
We frankly express our skepticism." The editorial, entitled "A Doubtful Plan " ended on
an inconclusive note.

In contrast, the organizations behind the economic boycott of Germany took an
uncompromisingly negative stance from the outset They saw the Rublee-Wohlthat
Plan as a German stratagem aimed at breaking the boycott by ensuring the export of
German goods through the refugees

and calming world opinion. In the view of these organizations and their
supporters, acceptance of the plan was liable to give the free world's moral sanction to
the Nazis' act of oppression and plunder, constitute acquiescence in the murderous
regime in Germany. The very formulation of the plan, it was argued, attested to the
success of the boycott and the serious economic difficulties it had caused Germany.
Thus the plan must be rejected and the boycott intensified.

72 FRUS 1939, Vol. 11, p. 105.

73 Wyman, p. 54; Feingold, p. 60.

74 Jewish Frontier, March 1939.

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

These arguments were all corre<:t--with the exception of the conclusion. The
Wohlthat-Rublee Plan was far from heartening. At bottom it was a deal entailing the
expulsion of hundreds of thousands of persons from the country in which they were
born and raised and which they regarded as their homeland. The plan cast an aura of
ostensible legality over the expulsion and over the nearly total dispossession of the
emigrants. It was a dearcut ransom deal: the great bulk of the hostages' property in
return for their lives.

There is no doubt that the principal reason (or, let us say, one of the principal
reasons) for both the Schacht and Rublee plans lay in Germany's s economic crisis,
which was caused in part by the boycott. It is true that implementation of the Rublee
Plan would have resulted in a certain expansion of Germany's foreign trade, albeit to a
lesser extent than under the Schacht Plan. But execution of the deal would have
brought with it a calming of public opinion vis-a-vis Germany, and as a result a
weakening of the commercial boycott and its moral foundations. The opponents of the
Nazi regime had to take this into consideration. Moreover, the fact that those behind
the plan on the German side had shown themselves to be devoid of morality and totally
untrustworthy, shows clearly that those who assailed the plan knew whereof they
spoke.

These truths and considerations formed the basis of the arguments adduced by
the opponents of the Rublee Plan and by those looking to justify their unwillingness to
act for its implementation. Nor were the plan's supporters and proponents unaware of
its deficiencies. They however saw other facts and truths which, while not
fundamentally disposing of the negative arguments, seemed to dictate a totally
different course of action. The basic fact which concerned them was the plight of
Germany's] ews and the moral obligation to help them.

Everyone agreed that the ransom deal was both reprehensible and unlawful. But
no one would even think of condemning a person who agreed to pay a ransom in order to
save the life of someone dear who was being held hostage. In such cases, if the
authorities are unable to guarantee the safety of the hostage, they rarely interfere in
the execution of the deal.

They themselves will not officially be privy to anything illegal. But in general
they will not pursue the criminals if by doing so they place the life of the hostage in
even greater danger.

The expulsion of German J ewry was an atrocity that provoked outrage and
condemnation. To aid the Nazis in the implementation of their scheme was not an
attractive proposition. But the true choice for the Jews lay not between being expelled
or remaining; it lay between being extricated from an intolerable situation or
remaining in a situation of which the final outcome was totally unclear. It was
awareness of this fact that six months earlier had brought the representatives of 32
states to Evian, where they had resolved unambiguously that the good of German
J ewry required cooperation with the Nazis to ensure an orderly exodus.

The argument that acceptance of the Rublee Plan constituted acquiescence in the
Nazi regime had also been answered at Evian. The conference's deliberations and
resolutions affirmed implicitly that the interests of German Jewry were not to be
sacrificed on the altar of the struggle to eradicate the Nazi regime. This had been the
guiding principle behind the conference and its resolutions, and it was in accordance
with this principle that the Intergovernmental Committee was obligated to operate.
Whoever questioned this principle was /pso facto calling into question the entire Evian
enterprise.

The Rublee Plan had a vigorous and very influential champion in the journalist
Dorothy Thompson, who earlier had been ardently opposed to the Schacht Plan. To
those who assailed the plan in the name of antifascist principles she replied that "it is
easier to tell people under siege to die for a principle than to accept a compromise." To
the activists of the economic boycott she declared: "It is argued against the plan that it
will aid German exports, but it will also prevent wholesale suicides." The plan, she
insisted, was advantageous for the emigrants because they would be able to remove a
large part of their assets in the form of goods, whereas otherwise they could take no
more than a miniscule part of their property, if anything. ***** "it was precisely in
this manner that the Haavarah

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

***** This fact was well known to those concerned and was confirmed
officially by Schacht. In his London meeting with the Intergovernmental
Committee the Reichsbank president described the details of the highway
robbery to which the departing Jews were subjected: 25% of their assets were
taken as "capital flight tax," another 25% was lost when they sold their
property; of the remainder, 90% went for foreign currency exchange. British
Documents, Thi rd Series, Vol . Ill, p. 657.

managed to get 45,000 persons out of Germany in 1933 and helped build
Palestine."75

The most ardent supporter of the plan was Rublee himself I n his first report to the
U.S. Secretary of State he notes that the agreement was a major departure from the
Nazis' former policy and represented "a totally new position on thej ewish problem."76
He reiterated his optimistic expectations to the press without hesitation. ****** So
impressed by the agreement was Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles that he saw a
basis for recommending to Roosevelt to return ambassador Wilson to Berlin from
where he had been recalled three months earlier as a protest against the November
pogrom. 77

The President, for his part, regarded the agreement as contemptible but
unavoidable.78 The apprehension that from the legal point of view the United States
would find itself party to a ransom deal was alleviated in formal terms when, as will
be recalled, instead of a bilateral contract a Statement of Agreement was signed under
which parallel and congruent unilateral actions would take place. Protected by this
formal ploy, Roosevelt had no hesitation in giving the plan the green light.

The Intergovernmental Committee approved the Wohlthat-Rublee Plan at its
plenary session of February 12, 1939.79 In this meeting the committee also accepted
Rublee's resignation. His replacement was Sir Herbert Emerson, who also served as
representative for refugee affairs on behalf of the League of Nations. The new deputy
director was Rublee's aide Robert Pell, who was entrusted with maintaining contact
with the Germans. Both sides, the Nazis and the I ntergovernmental Committee, agreed
to hold regular meetings in order to coordinate their activities. The operational stage
was at hand.

****** I n the light of Rublee's pronounced and well-known optimism, it
becomes possible to assess properly Yosef Tanenbaum's statement (p. 219)
that "at this time the despairing and beaten Rublee handed back his
mandate." Rublee was not despairing and was hardly saw himself as beaten.
He resigned from his position as director of the I ntergovernmental Committee
in accordance with the condition he had set to Roosevelt and Taylor when, at
the age of 70, he assumed the post for a limited time. In December 1938 he
informed Taylor of his intention to resign after concluding the negotiations
with Germany. By the end of December Roosevelt had already chosen the
persons who would replace him. Foreign Relations of the United States 1938,
Vol.l,pp. 883, 885.

The implementation of the Rublee Plan depended above all on the active
cooperation of thej ewish organizations. Once the Evian governments had arrived at a
satisfactory agreement with the German government, there no alternative remained
but for a dedicated and deeply involved public body to go into action. This body was to

75 Herald Tribune . February 17, 1939.

76 FRUS 1939, Vol. II, pp. 82-84.

77 Feingold, p. 60.

78 Ibid., p. 69.

79 American Jewish Year Book , Vol. 41, pp. 380-381.

190

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

set up the Coordinating Foundation and supply tine people and the means that would
setthe wheels of the non-German side of the plan in motion. The problem was not only
or even mainly financial. Unlike the Schacht Plan, in the new program pan of the
property of German J ewry was to serve as a primary and direct source of financing for
the emigration process. The additional funds that were called for could serve to
supplement the principal source in the organizational stages of various settlement
programs, but mainly in the opening stage of the overall plan. Views differed
concerning the amount required. Late in the discussions there was general agreement
that to set the project in motion a central fund of no more than $1 million would
suffice-an amount that was clearly within the financial capabilities of the Jewish
organizations.

The paramount need was for total identification with and faithful representation
of the cardinal i nterest of German Jewry: to leave the country of the Nazis as speedily
as possible. A body possessing these characteristics would ipso facto become one that
initiated, spurred and determined the actions to be taken. Instead of being a mere
emissary of the I ntergovern mental Committee, this body would very quickly take
center-stage in planning and executing the required activities. It would consider
judiciously the stand of the Nazis and weigh the proposals of help of the Evian
governments. It would assess correctly the supreme importance of the time factor, and
it may well have been able to achieve results exceeding the direct objective of the plan.

No such body existed. To be sure, there was the World Zionist Organization, whose
personnel had the requisite qualities of energy and dedication. But the Zionists were
hostileto Evian's objectives and, as was to be expected, now became full-fledged centers
of resistance. As for the major welfare organizations, their leaders were unaccustomed
to tasks of this kind. It took them a long time-too long-to overcome their own
hesitations and the interference by the plan's detractors.

The Zionist opposition to the Rublee Plan did not immediately assume its
subsequent uncompromising posture. There were weeks of agonized bewilderment,
particularly at the lower levels of the movement. There were even moments of grace
when it seemed that the plan was gaining the support of Zionist organizations. We
have al ready seen the

equivocal reaction of the Jewish Frontier, which regarded the plan as too good to
be realistic. In contrast to the equivocations of that journal, an expression of
provisional support appeared in the weekly of the American J ewish Congress whose
leadership, it will be recalled, was identical with that of the American Zionist
leadership. The issue of February 24, 1939, made several references to the Rublee Plan,
and always of a positive character. The journal quoted Rublee, then in America, as
saying he had "every hope that the plan will be successful and that the Jews of
Germany will be helped." Also noted was the fervent support of Dorothy Thompson,
which we have already mentioned. A report from London quoted Dr. Stephen Wise, who
was in the British capital as a member of the Zionist delegation negotiating with His
Majesty's Government on the Palestine issue. Wise cautioned against prejudging the
plan and promised that "we will consider the plan in America and be sure that the
heads of English J ewry deliberate on this plan as earnestly and impartially as we
mean to do."

Heartened by Wise's remarks, the journal's editors sought to contribute to the
public discussion of the plan by refuting the arguments adduced against it by the
organizers of the economic boycott. An article entitled "Boycott and Refugees" took
exception to the perception of the boycott as overriding every other goal. 'The Sabbath
was created for humanity and not humanity for the Sabbath... The plans now being
considered by the Evian Committee [will enable] the bulk of 150,000 wage earners to
leave Germany within the next five years [and go] to the Philippine Islands, to the
Dominican Republic, to British Guiana (if the report of the survey Commission is
favorable), to Palestine. The very fact that the Jews are being given a chance for a
planned and orderly emigration instead of a panic-stricken flight is regarded by the
Evian Committee as an important accomplishment... It is a matter to be considered."

It was a propitious moment that never again arose. The editorial board soon
concluded its debate with the boycott advocates, in abject surrender. Never again
would the paper have a good word to say about the Rublee Plan. Indeed, it raised
growing objections and condemnations of its own and quoted others to the same effect.

Stephen Wise, who was a member of the President's Advisory Committee on
Refugees, could not openly oppose the plan-which the committee had approved--

191

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

without imperilling his own position. The direct attack on the plan was levelled by
another Zionist leader, Louis Lipsky, Wise's deputy in the American Jewish Congress.
Lipsky, who was also in

London as part of the Zionist delegation, returned with an unequivocal message
concerning his own stand and that of British J ewry. The latter's attitude toward the
plan, he said, was "definitely negative." He himself thought the Rublee Plan would
require an outlay of $100 million and that the Nazis would release no more than 5
percent of the assets of German J ewry. I n return all the Nazis' sins would be condoned
and forgiven. 'The question, then, is whether Jews abroad should contribute $100
million or more to purge the Nazis of all the episodes of blood and murder. So there is
little inclination to enter into a deal of this kind with the Nazis. "80

Lipsk/s comments undoubtedly reflected accurately the stand of the highest
levels of the Zionist movement. There were no hesitations and no agonizing at those
levels. The Zionist leaders were pleased, as we saw in the previous chapter, that the
Evian Conference had ended "in nothing" and did not want to hear any more about it.
When Ruppin returned to J erusalem and asked to deliver a report on the conference, he
was permitted to do so out of courtesy. H is speech was listened to politely and entered in
the minutes. There was no response to his statement that "in the last analysis we
achieved something positive [at the conference]" or to his proposal to make contact
with the I ntergovern mental Committee in London. No discussion followed the speech,
and that was the end of the matter. 81

A month earlier a cable had been received from Abba Hillel Silver regarding an
allocation from the J ewish National Fund for maintaining the President's Advisory
Committee on Refugees. The J oint had already contributed $4,000, and Silver was
apparently requesting a like amount from the J NF's Zionist partner. Although the
sum was a paltry one relative to the scope of the J NF, the J ewish Agency Executive
accepted Ben-Gurion's suggestion to inform Silver that "our view is negative." If
nevertheless the American Zionists wished to go ahead, they were free to do so. 82
Manifestly, it was pointless to expend funds to maintain a body that had been
established in connection with the Evian Conference and was liable to carry out
undesirable actions.

Additional light on the J ewish Agency Executive's attitude toward the plight of
German Jewry is shed by the minutes of a meeting of that body held in London on
November B, 1938. The meeting took place three days after the Nazi pogrom, and
officials and functionaries who dealt with German J ewry were asked to attend.

David Ben-Gurion, chairman: Opens with comments concerning relations
with the Arabs.

Dr. Weizmann: "He had thought that we would discuss only the situation of the
J ews in Germany." [As we have already noted, the minutes were phrased in the third
person. Thus, "he had thought" means "I thought."] In the light of this observation,
the meeting immediately begins to discuss the situation of Germany's J ews.

Dr. JVlartin Rosenblitt: Tells about the request to the British government to
increase by a few thousand the number of entry permits to Palestine in order to save
German J ews.

jvioshe Shertol< (Sharett): 'Tomorrow Dr. Weizmann will take part in an
assembly for German Jewry, and we must determine our stand already now. The
assembly will undoubtedly discuss plans totally unrelated to Eretz- I srael. H e does not
thinkthatthej ewish Agency can participate in activity for emigration to other countries.
But we must take pan in this meeting in order to step up the pressure on the
government to increase immigration to Palestine."

Dr. Sentor: "In his view we must conduct negotiations for the removal of all
German Jews to various countries, including Eretz-lsrael, on condition that we keep
them /n /arge camps and during the coming 7-8 years divide them among the different
counties. Naturally a plan like this will cost 10-12 million Palestine pounds. But he

80 Herald Tribune , March 17, 1939.

81 Minutes of Jewish Agency Executive meeting, August 21, 1938.

82 Minutes, July 17, 1938.

192

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

thinks the money can be obtained. He suggests that an effort [Ndir: be?] made to worl<
through the committee that was set up at the Evian Conference."

Dr. Goldmann: "Is vehemently opposed to Sentor's proposal. These proposals are
not only fantastic, they are also dangerous. Tomorrow other countries will follow
Germany's lead in order to getthej ews removed. Where will we place them?"

Yitzhak Gruenbaum: Agrees with Dr. Goldrnann. "In his opinion we must
cease the 'Haavar ah' and not wait until the Germans do so. We must commence an open
war against Germany without consideration for the fate of the J ews in Germany... Of
course thej ews of Germany will pay for this, but there is no other option. I f we do not do i t
now, tomorrow the J ews in Poland and Romania will suffer the same fate as Germany's
J ews today."

S. Adier-Rudel: "Perhaps we will have to turn to Lord Winterton, too, to activate
the committee that was chosen at the Evian Conference... We should try to get 5,000
young people out of Germany for pioneer training in the neighboring countries,
provided they settle in Eretz-lsrael within 2-3 years."

At Ben-Gurion's suggestion two committees were formed to look into the matter.
Thus ended the discussion.

Some of the views expressed at this meeting of ranking policy-makers bear
stressing as reflecting both personal traits and characteristic trends in Zionism. It
does not occur to David Ben-Gurion that the Jewish Agency Executive, then in London
for talks with the British and the Arabs, should hold a special session wholly devoted
to the distress of Germany's Jews. Two participants, the non-Zionist Sentor and the
experienced functionary Adier-Rudel, propose that contact be made with the Evian
committee. Moshe Sharett reaffirms that even under the aggravated conditions in the
wake of the horrific pogrom, Zionism is determined to resist any activity related to
emigration other than to Palestine-and this at a time when the J ewish Agency was
requesting no more than a few thousand oaliyah certificates for the] ews of Germany.

Dr. Sentor's "fantastic" proposal was not his own invention. He was preceded by
the expert on refugees Sir John Hope-Simpson, who completed a detailed and
substantive book on the refugee problem about a month before the November pogrom.
Taki ng note of the tense situation in Germany, he proposed the immediate removal of
one-quarter of the J ews to camps that would be established in neighboring countries-
France, England, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Norway and Finland-from where they
would gradually be transferred to permanent absorption sites.83 This proposal, which
Dr. Sentor extended to encompass all the J ews of Germany in the wake of the pogrom,
incorporated important elements which could have produced beneficial results had
they not been ignored by both J ewish and non-J ewish policy- makers.

The principal representative phenomenon at the meeting (with the exception of
Dr. Senior) was Sharett's declaration. Sharett was understating the case when he spoke
about non- participation in activities aimed at emigration to countries other then
Palestine. Non-participation was the most moderate and most dignified expression of
the opposition to this idea. As was unmistakably implicit in the line of action adopted
vis-a-vis Evian, this passive response was liable to be followed or accompanied by
sharper and more active expressions of opposition and preemption. At Evian, as we
saw, actions of this kind were not required because the conference did not spill over
into the realm of immediate activity as the Zionist leadership had feared. However,
now that the situation of the J ews in Germany had deteriorated, the posture of non-
participation was tantamount to indifference to J ewish distress. Weizmann himself
espoused this stance unflinchingly. According to the minutes of his November 17
meeting with British Prime Minister Chamberlain, also attended by the Jewish
members of the H ouse of Lords: 'They spoke about the rescue of

J ews--he spoke about their immigration to Palestine."

Given the political and economic conditions then prevailing in Palestine, this
stand was tantamount to laying a siege on Germany's Jews. Some months later, when
concrete emigration plans were broached, a period began in which what had been
implicit became unequivocally explicit. The policy of non-participation gave way to an
aggressive policy of interference which constantly intensified until its culmination
in unbridled incitement.

83 Sir John Hope Simpson, Tlie Refugee Problem, London, 1939, pp. 548-'

193

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Had the Jewish public alone been involved, Zionist policy need not have gone
beyond non-participation in order to thwart the Rublee Plan. We noted above that the
standing of the Zionist movement in world Jewry, notwithstanding its numerical
minority, was such that without it--and certainly not against its will--it was
impossible to organize a successful Jewish initiative on any reasonable scale. Some
evidence suggests that the leaders of the Jewish organizations also evinced hesitation
and unwillingness prior to the Evian Conference. In a letter of May 26, 1938, marked
"personal and confidential," Adier-Rudel wrote to Georg Landauer that "the official
Jewish circles [in America] are not especially enthusiastic about the President's
activity. However, since public opinion welcomed it so warmly, they feel they are
obligated to cooperate to secure the best possible results."84 Eliezer Kaplan, perhaps
basing himself on the same source, told the J ewish Agency Executive that "for
unknown reasons, prominent J ews in England have decided not to go to Evian. We have
had similar reports from America... Personnel of the Joint say that their government
is represented at the conference and that regarding these matters they will make
direct contact with their government. "85

At the conference itself, things were set fight. The welfare organizations
overcame their reluctance "to engage in politics." The leaders of major London societies
attended the conference and, together with the Joint, acted as representatives of the
private organizations.

Now, where the Rublee Plan was concerned, a great deal more was being asked of
them. It was up to them to supply the means and assume the responsibility for a
gargantuan task which went far beyond their normal sphere of activity. Two months
earlier they had rejected the far harsher Schacht Plan. Some of the grounds for that
rejection seemed to tern valid with regard to the new plan. They reiterated the
ludicrous argument that the creation of the required body was liable to be construed as
confirmation of the Nazis' allegation concerning the existence of "international
J ewry. Two additional reasons were also adduced: (1) the

apprehension that the creation of the body would be interpreted as acquiescence
in the Germans' racial policy and their confiscation of J ewish property; and (2) the
possibility that implementation of the program would have the effect of strengthening
the Nazis. 86

What all three arguments had in common was their total disregard for the fate of
German J ewry. Coming from Jewish leaders these were hollow excuses, behind which
was a desire, whether conscious or not, to avoid action of any kind. Unlike the situation
during the period of preparation for Evian, solid and substantial opposition now
existed, and nothing could be done unless it was overcome.

The work of trying to overcome the indifference and unwillingness of the Jewish
leaders was undertaken assiduously by a group of Christians-personnel of the
I ntergovernmental Committee and members of the President's Advisory Committee on
Refugees. The driving spirit was Myron Taylor, who had served as chairman at Evian
and was now a member of both committees.

The impact wielded by this group becomes clear from a letter which is relevant
even though it refers to a later period, when Taylor had already secured Jewish help.
Henry Montour, the director of the United Fund for Palestine, describes how the mood
changed among the J ewish leaders who participated in meetings convened to establish
the "Private Foundation" called for by the Rublee Plan. Initially, he relates, fierce
opposition was expressed. But subsequently the opponents came round to a positive
view. His explanation: several important Christian personages, Myron Taylor in
particular, showed an interest in the plan. Seeing this, thej ews realized that "it would
be neither fair nor wise to let them fail. "87

Myron Taylor plodded ahead stubbornly. On April 15, following two months of
persuasion, he succeeded in convening about seventy Jewish leaders and extracting
from them a unanimous resolution in favor of creating the private body. Eleven

84 CZA, File S7/693. The name of the addressee, which does not appear on the letter, was supplied to us by the writer of the
letter.

85 Minutes of Jewish Agency Executive meeting, June 26, 1938.

86 FRUS 1939, Vol. 11, p. 105.

87 Henry Montor to Eliezer Kaplan, June 5, 1939, CZA, File G4/17441.

194

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

persons were chosen to serve as the group's coordinating committee, and Taylor tool<
them with to a meeting with Roosevelt on May 4.88 After Roosevelt's personal pep-talk,
things began to move-though terribly slowly, with incessant obstacles and
i nterference of al I ki nds havi ng to be overcome at every stage.

The active J ewish opposition to the Rublee Plan was concentrated at two focal
points: the World Zionist Organization, and the movement for the economic boycott
against Germany. I n the United States, the center of activity of the boycott movement,
there was considerable overlap between the two organizations. The first boycott
committee had been established by the American J ewish Congress in 1933; three years
later it merged with

a likeminded body, the "J ewish Workers Committee," to form the "United Boycott
Counci I ." The counci I was headed by Dr. J oseph Tenenbaum, a Zionist functionary who
was previously chairman of the AJ C's Emergency Committee and chairman of the
J ewish Workers Committee, and who would later serve as vice-president of the Zionist
Organization of America. 89 At the beginning of 1939, as the events described in this
chapter were unfolding, two non-Jewish organizations joined the council and a roof-
organization, the "Committee for Boycott Coordination," was formed. Dr. Tenenbaum
continued in his post of chairman and ideologue of the new body.

The true motive for Zionist opposition-the fear of territorialism-was generally
hidden behind an exterior of arguments borrowed from the anti-Nazi boycott
movement. But whenever it seemed that settlement anywhere other than Palestine
was about to be realized, the anti-territorial ist position emerged in its most fiercely
unadulterated form. Together with the reasons relating to war, another argument was
put forward which gave the impression of showing concern for the fate of Eastern
European] ewry. The exodus of German J ewry, it was argued, was liable to spur certain
governments-Poland, Romania and others-to demand and work for a similar
"solution" for their J ews. And then, it was asked, where would all these millions go?

This was not a new issue. It had been considered by Jewish organizations at
Evian. Yet no one had suggested that this possibility precluded the rescue of the
German Jews. And certainly it did not occur to anyone to imperil them in order to
prevent a speculative development, as Gruenbaum had suggested to thej ewish Agency
Executive. On the contrary: the written memoranda and oral presentations to the
conference's subcommittee contained, as we saw (Ch. 7) proposals to expand the
conference framework to incorporate Eastern European J ewry in the rescue plan.

The militant slogans brandished by the boycott activists were a continuation of
and-Nazi activity which had obtained impressive results. Like others, they regarded
the Germans' accession to the Rublee Plan as deriving from the economic difficulties
caused by the boycott. Since so much had already been achieved, why not press on with
renewed vigor until the whole goal was attained?

What was that goal?

TheJ ewish boycott movement had been launched five years earlier in reaction to
the persecution of the J ews in Germany; its natural purpose was to force the Germans
to desist from the persecutions. I n the meantime

far-reaching changes had occurred, and the free world now accepted the idea of
the Jews' exit from Germany. Did the boycott movement still aspire to prevent the
expulsion and to effect a radical change in the Nazis' attitude toward theJ ews?

I n fact, they wanted far more than this. Heartened by their successes and by the
greatly increased public support following the November pogrom, the boycott
movement now posited as its goal nothing less than the eradication of the Nazi regime.
Speaking at the unification meeting with the non-Jewish organizations. Dr.
Tenenbaum put it in perfectly clear language:

'The boycott will go on until the Nazi Government will collapse out from sheer
economic exhaustion and mankind will be freed from the menace, madness, tyranny
and terror of the Nazi Government... this is the only bloodless road to peace and liberty
of all men irrespective of race, creed or belief. "90

This prospect was hard to resist. The Congress Bulletin, which had once dared
instruct the boycott movement about the Sabbath that was created for man, was

88 FRUS 1939, Vol. II, p. 105.

89 Joseph Tenenbaum, "The Anti-Nazi Boycott Movement in the United States," Yad Vashem Studies III, pp. 129-130
(Hebrew).

90 Congress Bulletin , May 12, 1939.

195

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

impressed: "The plan of the Intergovernmental Committee may not represent the sole
solution for the problem of the J ews under the rule of Nazism. The collapse of the
regime which the boycott movement seeks may constitute a less immediate solution,
but it bespeaks a great deal more."91

The Zionist journal A/av Palestine took a clear and unequivocal stand. It had no
doubt that Myron Taylor and Rublee had done everything in their power to extort
certain concessions from the Nazis. But in the past month conditions had changed.
Any agreement now signed with the Nazis "is not worth the paper it is written on."
With the entire democratic world organizing to stop Hitler, this was not the lime to
enter into a partnership with him "for the sake of a slight advantage for the
refugees. "92

The event alluded to that had occurred in "the past month" was the conquest of
Czechoslovakia. This act of aggression had caused resentment and outrage throughout
the free world, and there was much talk about the need "to stop Hitler." But between
talk and action the way was often long. Certainly between "stopping" Hitler and
"eradicating" the regime. At this time, when Hitler was at the height of his power, a
group of humanistic J ews decided that by implementing the economic boycott they
could bring about the collapse of the Nazi government and liberate the world from the
blight of despotism. All the 600, 000 J ews of Germany needed to do was to wait until this
came about...

A public debate along these lines accompanied the efforts of Myron Taylor and his
aides to set up the Refugee Foundation. Since officially the agreement with Germany
was considered secret until its publication with the agreement of both sides, the
negotiations had to be conducted in camera. This fact produced propaganda advantages
for the plan's opponents. The secret talks were depicted as the weaving of a conspiracy
behind the public's back. The critics did not balk at exploiting unfounded reports or at
ad tiominem attacks bordering on incitement. An example of what we are talking about
appears in an editorial in the Yiddish- language paper Der Tag whose editor was the
well-known Zionist official Shmuel Margushes. The paper was reacting to a report that
a group of Jewish leaders had gone to London in order to negotiate with the Anglo-
Jewish group on the creation of the Refugee Foundation. In this connection the paper
related that not long before, three J ewish "dignitaries" from London had visited
America for the same purpose--to negotiate behind closed doors for the rescue of J ews.

"But they did not rescue a single person, because their public reception was such
that they had to pack their bags and return home."

Now we are informed [the editorial continues] that a group of American leaders
has gone to London for the same purpose. We may well ask: Who are these unknown
leaders of American welfare organizations who have taken it upon themselves to
negotiate the rescue of refugees on their own responsibility? Who empowered these
"leaders"-if such they really re-to make plans without the people's knowledge and
consent? Who permitted these "leaders" to agree that various countries, such as the
Philippine Islands and British Guiana, would become the new home of the refugees?

Not so long ago it was a matter of national honor not to pay Hitler ransom for
granting permission to extricate the Jews from his grip. Even non-Jews understood
this. Now, as the YTA reports, this ransom method has been revived and become the
subject of discussions. Therefore the question becomes even more pressing: Who are
these unknown rescuers?93

I n addition to harassment in the press, attempts were made to thwart the Rublee
Plan in other ways. For example, Shmuel Margushes and Dr. Tenenbaum put forward
a proposal to bar the Refugee Foundation

91 Ibid., March 10, 1939.

92 New Palestine , April 21, 1939.

93 Der Tag , June 7, according to Congress Bulletin , June 9, 1939.

196

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

from making use of its funds to purcinase German goods.94 Tinese obstructions
proved quite embarrassing to tinose engaged in the worl<. Tinus Paul Baerwald,
cinairman of tine Joint Distribution Committee and a prominent advocate of tine plan,
once revealed to Stephen Wise that the heavy pressure being exerted by the plan's
J ewish opponents was causing him to ponder whether he should assume responsibility
for the project, particularly in view of the fact that the support--and money--of non-
J ews was about to be solicited. Baerwald was apprehensive that the ongoing pressure
within thej ewish community would lead to the project's cancellation. 95

Authentic evidence concerning the WZO's attitude toward the Rublee Plan is
provided by the episode of the plan's financing. As was mentioned above, the
organizers had concluded that a fund of no more than $1 million would suffice to get
the project off the ground. Half the amount, it was decided, would be raised among
American J ewry, and half among British J ewry. I n America the plan was to obtain the
$500,000 from the UJ A, to which end its chairman, Abba Hillel Silver, was
approached. Silver objected to the allocation formally and on principle. The principle
was that it was undesirable for the J ewish national funds to express their assent to the
plan through financial support. As for the formal aspect. Silver said that the UJA was
authorized to distribute its monies among three parties only: the Joint, the Palestine
Fund, and the Foundation of American Communities. Funds could not be distributed to
any other organization, and certainly not to the Refugee Foundation, which was not
even a recognized J ewish body.96 Silver revealed the true reason for his opposition to
Stephen Wise when the latter approached him: the allocation was liable to adversely
affect Eretz- Israel. 97

Stephen Wise having failed to win over Silver, additional advocates were
dispatched. The first was J ames McDonald, head of the President's Advisory Committee
on Refugees. Silver reiterated the formal reason and the argument of principle, and
indicated quite transparently that he objected to the Rublee Plan ("without mixing in
my own personal opinion of the plan--either positively or negatively"). Silver said that
only the UJ A's three partners could decide how to allocate the funds, each organization
separately. Would the Palestine Fund agree to divert part of its money? No, he could
not make such an undertaking without a directive from Weizrnann or Ben-Gurion.

The pressure on Silver continued unabated that day. He was invited to a meeting
with Henry Ittleton and two other functionaries--Louis Strauss and Rabbi J onah Wise.
After Silver had repeated his reasons

yet again, Ittleton suggested that perhaps the Joint would provide the necessary
funds and then be reimbursed by the UJ A's Allocations Committee.

Somewhat annoyed. Silver replied that theJ oint had the fight to do so, but in that
case the Palestine Fund would also make demands of its own. Still, Silver seems to
have grasped the significance of the new idea. If the Joint were to provide the money
and then be reimbursed by the UJA, the Palestine Fund would perforce find itself
contributing to the plan, resulting in a loss of prestige and a possible falling out with
the Roosevelt administration.

Silver suggested to his interlocutors that they draft a formal letter to the
Palestine Fund which he would dispatch immediately to J erusalem and London for the
decision of the central Zionist institutions. Would he append to the letter his own
assent and personal recommendation? No, he was not ready to give the plan his
agreement or his recommendation. However, if the authorized leaders in Eretz-lsrael
accepted the idea, he would not stand in the way. Nor would he advise them not to
accept it. 98

The pressure on Silver paid off. I n a memorandum to Eliezer Kaplan he wrote that
there was no choice but to approve the allocation from the Palestine Fund. Kaplan
informed theJ ewish Agency Executive about theJ oint's intention to provide the money
out of its coffers. "But this would mean that the money would come from the
Distribution Committee (of the UJA] and we will be seen as the spoilers... Following
consultations with Mr. Silver it seems to us that we will have to inform them of our
negative grounds and to add that, in consideration of the request emanating from the

94 Feingold, p. 74.

95 Ibid.

96 Memorandum of Abba Hillel Silver, June 2, 1939, CZA, File G4/17441.

97 Feingold, pp. 73-74.

98 Silver memorandum, ibid.

197

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

President's committee, we agree to allocate the funds on condition that when the
money is distributed we also receive a larger percentage. "99

One can imagine how grieved and hurt the Zionist leaders must have been when
they were forced to show generosity for an enterprise they regarded as alien and
fraught with danger. It is not impossible that Yitzhak Gruenbaum remembered this
embarrassing situation three years later, when he shut tight the redemption funds in
the face of the urgent needs of the rescue...

But even in 1939 the gesture of generosity was not translated into the language of
action. Over a month went by between Silver's conversation with the two advocates of
the plan (J une 2) and the decision of the Jewish Agency Executive (J uly 9). We do not
know when, or if, the parties concerned were informed of the generous decision. In the
meantime, the interminable negotiations on the creation of the Private

Foundation dragged on, and at their conclusion it emerged that the entire
million dollars was being provided by the Joint. Certainly it would be reimbursed by
the UJ A, and the Zionist funds would perforce bear part of the expenditures.

On J uly 20 the presidium of the I ntergovernmental Committee met in order to set
up the Coordinating Foundation, as it was finally named. Twenty persons, Jews and
non-J ews, including ten Americans and eight British representatives, were elected to
the foundation's board of directors.lOO A former Prime Minister of Belgium, van
Zeeland, was asked to serve as director. It took the new body about two weeks to organize
itself procedurally and juridically. Four weeks later World War 1 1 broke out.

The unwillingness of the J ews to set up the Refugee Foundation at an early stage
was not the only delaying factor. Disagreement existed between America and England
as to whether the refugees should be settled in large centers (as the U.S. thought) or in
relatively small groups (as the British thought); and whether the governments should
contribute from their own funds to underwrite the settlement plans (Britain) or
impose the funding exclusively on the private organizations (the U.S.). There were
clarifications and uncertainties about the form and size of the initial financing, and
other problems. These clarifications in themselves were liable to cause delays. But the
major delay to the plan stemmed from the J ewish opposition. The truth is that because
of that opposition the establishment of the Refugee Foundation was delayed for five
crucial months and the Rublee Plan was not implemented.

I n assessing what Zionism did to German Jewry in this stage, we will once more
refrain from accusing the Zionists of abandoning the German Jews to a violent death.
Even then, in the spring and summer of 1939, no one was thinking along the lines of
total destruction. Nonetheless, it is no exaggeration to describe what was done as
laying siege to a J ewish group which was in terrible distress. The situation of
Germany's J ews was thoroughly known from the accounts of visitors and of refugees
who managed to get out of the country. TheJ ewish Agency Executive heard an updated
report from Eliahu Dobkin who had just visited Germany and Austria. 101 According to
Dobkin, less than 1 percent of the wage earners were in fact earning a living, and over
half of them were employed in community and Zionist institutions. Two-thirds of
Austrian Jews and one-third of German Jews were living on charity. Many had been
able to manage only by selling jewelry and other valuables. But

the authorities had now ordered the J ews to hand over all the jewelry in their
possession, and he, Dobkin, had witnessed the despair that had seized the J ews at this
decree.

Dobkin also related that officially, every Jewish emigrant could take with him 6
percent of his capital, but in practice not even this was allowed him. Every Jew in
Germany and Austria was thinking about escape. The Nazi authorities were not
talking about the liquidation of the Jews within three years-their intention was that
the majority should leave within one year. Not even Dobkin's shocking account
impelled thej ewish Agency leadership to budge from its position. The chairman of the

99 Minutes of Jewish Agency Executive meeting, July 9, 1939.

100 American Jewish Year Book , Vol. 41, p. 390.

101 Minutes of Jewish Agency, March 19, 1939.

198

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

session, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, thanked Dobkin "for his excellent and exhaustive talk,"
and that was the end of the matter.

Concurrent with its vigorous war against the Rublee Plan, the WZO pursued the
Haavarah deal. 102 Its representatives also made useful deals with the Gestapo in
Berlin and Vienna aimed at bringing about the immigration to Palestine of Zionist
pioneers, the establishment of training facilities for the pioneers, and the liberation of
potential Palestine settlers from concentration camps.103 When it came to aliyah,
deals with the Nazis were not unconscionable and the J ews were not compelled to wait
until the collapse of the regime.

The formula of "what would have happened if..." is not generally conducive to
fruitful reflection. However, when the goal is to learn a lesson, a clarification of this
kind is both essential and justified, provided one's conclusions are not taken as
verified proofs but as reasonable suppositions. With this demurrer in mind, we will
try to answer the question of what the J ewish people lost because of the five-month
delay in organizing for the implementation of the Rublee Plan. In other words, what
prospects did the plan hold out, had the J ews moved to implement it speedily?

A few clarifications will be helpful in our discussion. Firstly, it turns out that
the principal and critical vr\ot\\/e for the Nazis' assent to the Rublee Plan was neither a
desire to extort ransom payments nor even a wish to improve Germany's balance of
trade; the compelling reason was the Nazis' keenness to see the J ews leave the country
as rapidly as possible. Unlike the original Schacht Plan, world Jewry was not called
upon to come up with 15 billion Reichsmarks, and the release of one-quarter of the
Jews' assets was not made contingent on increased revenues from German foreign
trade. It was the economist Schacht who wanted to please his masters by extorting
economic benefits. This line of thought

may have played a certain part in Goering's decision and in the winning over of
Hitler. But confronted with the absolute objection of the Intergovernmental
Committee, Schacht himself was quick to revoke the most blatantly extortionist
elements of the plan, before being dismissed.

To be sure, the Rublee Plan seemed to legitimize the plunder of the greater part of
the Jews' property. The possibility existed that the relatively calm atmosphere of the
talks regarding thej ews' orderly exodus would have an adverse effect on the economic
boycott. Yet these indirect results, important as they were, could never have the same
significance of such a central plank in the Nazis' platform as the expulsion of the J ews
from German soil. When it emerged that the J ews were not leaving at the desired rate
and that actions intended to accelerate their departure, such as the November pogrom,
were causing undesirable international reverberations, Goering took matters into his
own hands and opted for the most effective course of action as he saw it.

The second question that requires clarification relates to the influence of the
forces inside Germany that were behind the Wohlthat-Rublee Plan. In the view of
Rublee himself, Goering represented "conservative elements" which, in contrast to
"radical elements," wished to alter the policy vis-a-vis the Jews because they were
aware of its harmful impact on Germany and the country's foreign trade.104

We need not concur in Rublee's impression that Goering was motivated by
humnaitarian impulses. He could not have known at the time that two years later
Goering would order Heydrich to execute "the desired final solution" and thereby set in
motion the general annihilation of European Jewry. The truth is that his description,
in itself accurate, has to be rounded out in various places in order to prevent the
emergence of a distorted picture. The notion of a social struggle between conservatives
and radicals-or as they are more usually called, "moderates" and ,,extremists"-as
this occurs in a democratic society, can prove quite misleading if applied
indiscriminately to the Nazi society. In that society there was no public contest
between different opinions, and it was not public opinion which tipped the scales. The
German public that read the papers and listened to the radio knew of a single policy
and a single "truth"'-that of the Fuehrer. The struggle between opinions was not

102 Ibid.

103 Jon and David Kimche, Secret Roads , pp. 15-44.

104 FRUS 1939, Vol. 11, p. 83.

199

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

decided by enlisting public support but by obtaining Hitler's consent. The Fuehrer's
support was an irresistible force. An explicit decision made by him and then made
public became the law of the land, a totalitarian substitute for public opinion.

Once Goering had secured Hitler's support, no one could interfere with the process
of attaining an agreement with Rublee. At the conclusion of the talks Wohlthat
announced that the agreement had been approved not only by Goering but also by the
other ministries involved. 105 Some had given their assent reluctantly, but had
submitted to Goering's pressure. Of these the most prominent was undoubtedly Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop, who was revolted by the entire episode. We described above how
Schacht bypassed him in going to London at Goering's behest. Following Ribbentrop's
angry remonstrations a representative of the Foreign Office, Eisenlohr, was added to
the team negotiating with Rublee. This however failed to increase Ribbentrop's
concrete influence. For proof of this it is sufficient to read the virulent circular of
J anuary 25, 1939, disseminated by the Foreign Office among German missions abroad
and frequently quoted in Holocaust studies, and compare it with the text of the
Wohlthat-Rublee agreement. Additional proof derives from the Foreign Office
directive to Eisenlohr "not to make any kind of promises to Mr. Rublee concerning the
handling of Germany's Jews in the future."106 Nevertheless, as we saw, the final
agreement contained explicit pledges and commitments. Ribbentrop was forced to give
his assent.

Another Nazi leader who found himself compelled to submit--officially, at least--
to the pressure exerted by Goering with Hitler's patronage was the Propaganda
Minister, Josef Goebbels. When Rublee's successor, Robert Pell, complained that
antisemitic propaganda was hindering the absorption of refugees in certain countries,
Wohlthat informed him that he had received an "extremely explicit assurance" from
Goebbels that if the Intergovernmental Committee pointed to a country which showed
an inclination to accept refugees in substantial numbers, an order would be issued to
desist from propaganda in that country. 107

A typical example of a Nazi concession toward the attainment of the Rublee Plan
was the verbal retreat demonstrated in the following case In the second half of
February German ships packed with Jews who had no visas for any country appeared
in the Caribbean, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Pacific Ocean. Attempts to
land the J ewish passengers at various ports, especially in Latin America, triggered
negative reactions which were liable to torpedo the prospects of an orderly absorption
of immigrants. A request from the British ambassador to the German Foreign Office to
put a stop to these sailings was rejected out of hand. The German authorities, he was
told, were not willing to assume responsibility for directing the Jews to their target
locales. Si nee they were leaving Germany, their destination was of no further interest
to the

authorities and they could not stop the emigrants from purchasing passage on
German ships. 108

An identical request, this time made by the Intergovernmental Committee, did
produce results, albeit not immediately. At a meeting with Pell in late April, Wohlthat
informed him that the Ministry of Transport had issued strict orders barring the
transport of passengers without visas and imposing heavy fines on ship owners and
travel agents found guilty of abetting this practice. 109

Particularly interesting was the fact that these "wildcat" ships were dispatched
with the encouragement and support, if not at the initiative, of the Gestapo chief
Heydrich. A week before the finalizing of the Wohlthat-Rublee agreement Goering
appointed Heydrich head of the Reich Main Security Office with the task of
"accelerating the emigration of the J ews." Among the ships' passengers were J ews who
had given up hope of a more dignified departure, concentration camp inmates who had
been released on condition that they emigrate, and persons arrested or rounded up in
special Gestapo operations-abduction on the street, "emigration quotas" imposed on
communities, and the like. In the light of the I ntergovern mental Committee's reasoned

105 Ibid.

106 Ger. Doc, Fourth Series, Vol. Ill, p. 925.

107 FRUS 1939, Vol. 11, p. 104.

108 Ibid., pp. 92-94.

109 Ibid., p. 104. It stands to reason that the British request and the firm German reply were related to the problem of illegal
immigration to Palestine, which the Nazis supported in this period. This conjecture does not detract from the significance of the
accession to Pell's request which referred, substantively, primarily to Latin America. See ibid., p. 93.

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opposition, Heydricin made a gesture of baclcpedaling \NW\dn was meant to display tine
good will of the German side provided the other side also fulfilled its obligation. The
sailings of the "wildcat" ships, at all events, were not completely halted. Moreover, to
prevent any misunderstanding of his concession, the Gestapo chief dispatched a
Jewish delegation to London to warn those concerned that if the Intergovernmental
Committee did not take immediate steps to find places of haven for the number of
emigrants that would satisfy it, and if "international Jewry" did not immediately set
up the "Private Foundation," the German authorities would revert to violent methods
of removing the J ews.llO

As long as the secret contacts continued, no signs of "moderation" could be
discerned in the German authorities' attitude toward the Jews. Hitler's support
eliminated the potential obstacles posed by the opposition of the "extremists" in the
negotiations, but was oblivious to the declared ongoing policy. The policy of
persecutions and oppression continued unabated. Goebbels' propaganda apparatus
continued to spew out venom and incitement. The dispossession of the Jews' property
and businesses intensified after the November pogrom and was accompanied by
physical abuse and humiliations. The atmosphere of malice and threats was
consonant with Hitler's famous declaration on "the extermination of the Jewish race
in Europe" in the event of a war--a warning he sounded a few

days prior to the conclusion of the Wohlthat-Rublee Statement of Agreement.

As Wohlthat had promised in Goering's name, everything was apt to change
radically once the arrangement became publicly known and the appropriate edicts
were issued over the Fuehrer's signature or approval. On Saturday, April 29, Wohlthat
was to be received by Hitler in order to report on the negotiations with the
Intergovernmental Committee and to present him with a series of orders for his
approval. These orders, Wohlthat told Pell, had been approved by the relevant
ministries. The orders concerning the organization of the Jews with a view to the
implementation of the arrangement, if approved by Hitler, would take effect the
following week. Those concerning the establishment of the trust fund would be
temporarily delayed until the non-German side carried out concrete actions leading to
the creation of the Private Foundation.

Wohlthat, Pell Later reported, allowed him to read the orders regarding the
organization of thej ews. 'They are very detailed... They accord thej ews legal status in
Germany... If these orders take effect and are properly carried out, thej ews will receive
a totally new status in the Reich. y\lo\r\\t.\r\at assured me with the greatest solemnity that
Goering intends to enforce these orders in their full meaning. "Ill

The prospect that in "the following week" the J ews were to be granted an entirely
new status, and that Goering, with Hitler's backing, would impose the change on the
Nazi state-this was a prospect which even 35 years later cannot leave the J ewish
researcher indifferent. The more so when a few months later everyone saw that an
instantaneous extreme change of attitude toward people and values was easily
implemented in a totalitarian regime. When in August 1939 Hitler and Stalin ordered
their nations to change overnight their attitudes toward Communism and Fascism,
respectively, this was effected without any difficulties or crises on either side. In each
country the propaganda machinery revised its style and no great effort was required to
convince the people of the justness of the new "truth." As one who was then living in
the Soviet Union, the present writer can testify to the fact that the abrupt shift did not
entail any arduous labors of persuasion-- noting beyond the removal of stacks of
posters, leaflets and books espousing the old line and their replacement by propaganda
material reflecting the new line. As far as we know, the same process unfolded itself on
the German side.

Had the change in attitude toward the Jews occurred, as anticipated, in the first
week of May, it would have been less ideologically

fundamental and wielded a more concrete influence on the behavior of the
Germans, than the change that was generated by the sudden flareup of friendship

110 Ibid., pp. 110-114. Details about the delegation's visit below.

111 Ibid., p.l03.

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between the two dictators. The change would not have touched on the roots of the Nazi
doctrine and would not have required the abjuring of declared principles. On the other
hand, it would have encompassed broad circles among the German population. The
scientific institutes of racial doctrine would have continued their activity, and thick
journals would have gone on explicating the diverse aspects of the inferiority of J ewish
blood. Goebbels would have continued to explain why there was no place for the J ews in
German society. Yet at the same time, he would have been compelled to explain why
the leader of the German people had decided to enter into an agreement with
international J ewry, and what every German should do in order to fulfill the Fuehrer's
will. Under Goering's close scrutiny, Goebbels would have had to instruct the citizens
of Germany how to reconcile themselves to the proximity of the 200,000 elderly Jews
whom Hitler had decided to let live out their lives in the Reich. With great
dissimulation, at the least, he would have urged Germans not to over-abuse those Jews
who were awaiting their turn to leave. The Gauleiter Streicher would have been
compelled to tone down \r\\s Stuermer or even discontinue it altogether...

Even if all this had come to pass, Germany's J ews would hardly have found
themselves in an earthly paradise. Their life in Germany would still have been
founded on the premise that they were inferior, subhuman creatures, with their
presence in the country endured on a temporary basis or, in the case of the elderly,
thanks to the Fuehrer's generosity. From the viewpoint of normality, the whole array of
benefits and facilitations would not have revoked the brutal expulsion.

Manifestly, no certainty attaches to Schacht's dogmatic assertion that had the
plan--either his or that of Wohlthat-Rublee-been implemented, not a single German
Jew would have lost his life. As we noted above, there is no proof that Hitler, an
inveterate violator of agreements and undertakings, would have chosen to honor
precisely this agreement in the war years.

Yet all the qualifications notwithstanding, it is difficult to exaggerate the
importance of the benefits that the plan's realization might have brought to
Germany's tormented J ews. The "totally new" status envisaged by Robert Pell was not
lacking in substantive content. It might have found expression in any number of
realms. For the first time since the establishment of the Nazi regime, directives were
to be issued dealing not with [what?] was prohibited for the J ews, but with the rights
being granted [to?]

them by the government--which was also the guarantor of their fulfillment. In
the situation of German J ewry, the most significant of these rights was, surely, the
right to certainty. An explicit legal status would have done away with the constant
expectation of frequent new edicts and curbed the arbitrary behavior of local rulers.
According to the report of Pell, who read the drafts of the orders, this status was to be
determined in accordance with Chapter I of the memorandum signed with Rublee.
Henceforth every J ew, as well as every German, would have known that the Jews of
working age and their families were in Germany on a temporary basis; that during the
waiting period they would be allowed to earn their living; that the government would
assist them to acquire the professions they would require in their new homes; and that
while they remained in Germany no change would accrue in their status and no harm
befall them. Whoever recalls the fear- and surprise-laden situation of Germany's J ews
can appreciate the promised changes.

The new situation would surely have exercised a profound influence on the
200,000 elderly J ews who were to be accorded a new status and would remain in
Germany for the rest of their lives, some of them working and the rest enjoying defined
and agreed social welfare. Two hundred thousand Jews, most of them deeply involved
in the German milieu, would carry on with their regular life, walk about freely, and
maintain daily contacts with their German neighbors. This with the explicit
assurance of the authorities that so things should be and so they should remain, at the
will of the Fuehrer. Even if we take into account all the explanations and
rationalizations likely to attend this sharp shift, it is not difficult to imagine the vast
effect it would have exercised on the mood and behavior of the German population. For
the first time since the establishment of the Nazi regime it would be seen that the
perpetual presence of a large J ewish group inside Germany and its permanent
residence among Germans under tolerable conditions, need not conflict with the rules
of behavior of good Germans. This state of affairs, when applied to hundreds of
thousands of Germans who had personal contact with thej ews, and millions more who
were aware of the surprising development, would inevitably modify the monstrous

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imageof the J ew created over the years by Nazi propaganda and cause breaches in the
wall of loathing and blind revulsion vis-a-vis the] ews.

If any reader wishes to object to the above description on the ground that it
reflects no more than wishful thinking, his objection will not be accepted. We are not
describing a necessary train of developments, but one that was possible and probable.
Nor do we wish to exaggerate the

stabilizing effects of the new atmosphere: we are well aware that four months
after the conjectured change war erupted, and "the Jews' blame for the war" became a
permanent theme in Nazi propaganda. We did not forget that once war broke out
between them the sudden friendship between Hitler and Stalin, which we cited to
demonstrate the probability of the shift, ended as abruptly as it had begun and left no
trace in the Germans' outlook.

The point we wanted to make is that in addition to the immense immediate relief
for Germany's] ews that the implementation of the Rublee Plan under Goering's active
auspices would have brought, it might also have caused a major disruption in the
brainwashing of the German people regarding the supposedly base character of the
J ews and in the rules of behavior toward them.

Furthermore, it is our assumption that an improvement in the attitude toward
the J ews would have struck a chord in various sections of the German society,
particularly the adults. From the abundance of testimonies confirming this
hypothesis we will cite only two, taken from the opposite ends of the Holocaust
chronicles. In his well-known speech at Poznan, at the very height of the destruction,
the arch-butcher Himmler complained that each of the 80 million Germans "has one
decent J ew of his own" whom he praises and wishes to spare.112

The second testimony is to be found in Shmuel Zygelboim's book on his
wanderings across Germany in an effort to get out of the country. After being rebuffed
at the border with Holland, he found himself in the town of Bentheim, exhausted,
hungry and penniless. The ticket-seller at the train station (perhaps not realizing he
was J ewish) gave him, in return for a punched ticket, a sum equal to the cost of the trip
from the border to Amsterdam. After spending most of this amount on a ticket for
Berlin, he did not have enough left for food and a hotel. In his distress he offered the
hotel owner, an old German, his watch in lieu of payment. J ust them a passerby
appeared and the hotel owner barked angrily, "Don't you haggle with me, J ew!" But the
moment the third person went on his way the old man's face became human again, he
said a few words of sympathy, returned the watch, and gave Zygelboim back one
Reichsmark of his payment. "Good luck. One day, if you get the chance, you'll pay me
back." The chapter in Zygelboim's book devoted to this incident is entitled "Man Is
Good. "IB

The interface between the inner mental inclinations and an external factor-the
government-- urging a change in attitude toward the J ews might have wrought in the
German psyche a shift far deeper and more extensive

than either Goering or Hitler had intended. A social factor might have emerged
which the government would have been compelled to address. We saw (Ch. I) that the
Nazi regime was forced to back-pedal in the face of certain frames of mind in German
society and to abandon its plans for "mercy-killing" and for disposing of the members
of mixed-German-J ewish families. We saw how a crowd of Germans outside a J ewish
old-age home in Berlin forced the Nazis to postpone for several weeks the transport of
the inmates to death camps. Would it be exaggerated to think that a dissident, more
active public opinion might have exercised a concrete influence on the entire
operation?

Moreover, no one knows precisely when and under what circumstances Hitler's
depraved mind decided to execute the plan for the total destruction of the Jews. But it
stands to reason that the background to this vicious scheme was the near universal
consensus among the German people that the Jews were not true human beings but
debased and incorrigible subhuman creatures. Is it really far-fetched to think that the
decision might have been postponed or never made at all, had the wall of hatred and
revulsion been breached by broad cracks of human feelings?

112IMT, Ps-1919.

113 Zygelboim Book , pp. 300-306; A. Stein, Comrade Artur . pp. 224-229.

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According to the report of Robert Pell, the Germans intended to delay the
establishment of the J ewish- property fund until the Intergovernmental Committee
took concrete steps toward creating the foundation of private organizations. This delay,
he noted did not apply to the orders regarding the revised status of the J ews in
Germany: these would take effect immediately after being approved by Hitler. It
emerged, however, that before such approval could be obtained. Hitler had to be shown
proof of progress in the establishment of the Private Foundation. Pell said that
Wohlthat was bitterly disappointed when he had nothing substantial to report... He
and Goering were placed in a difficult position vis-a-vis the Fuehrer. Beginning in
February they assured him that something was about to be done, but nothing concrete
was done. In the meantime the elements seeking to destroy Jewish property in
Germany are active. The value of J ewish property decreases from day to day. Those who
derided Goering's program to solve the J ewish problem are beginning to claim: 'We told
you so."'

What response could Pell make? The only sign of progress he could show was a
letter proposing officially that Professor Paul Brin be appointed the third--non-
German--trusteeon the directorship of the trust fund. As for the creation of the private
foundation, no substantive beginning had yet been made. The Jews in America, who
had been

assembled with such great effort by Myron Taylor, had not yet been taken to meet
with the President in order to hear one of his pep-talks. The secret preparations were
being made under the watchful eye of the hostile Jewish press, accompanied by
denunciatory vocal opposition...

Pell did not conceal the situation from Wohlthat. He told him frankly of the fierce
resistance that had to be overcome, and assured him that vigorous efforts were
underway toward the establishment of the foundation. With this general pledge
Wohlthat went to H itier, but it was not enough to secure approval of the orders.

If instead of the gentile Robert Pell, Wohlthat's opposite had been a Jewish
functionary, flesh of the flesh of the troubled J ews, the results might have been
different. Because of the grave dangers and the unique opportunity, a Jewish official
might have decided to embellish things and provide a progress report more optimistic
than was warranted by the facts. If for the sake of the rescue he had used the past tense
to tell Wohlthat about things that would--that must!--be done tomorrow, he would not
have looked on this as a culpable offense. Certainly he would never have allowed
himself to reveal to the Nazi the antagonisms and divisions among the would-be
rescuers. And then, who knows-we saw above that the Nazis had made the
implementation of the orders contingent on less stringent conditions than the
establishment of thej ewish-property fund. Goering's eagerness to advance the plan is
a matter of record. If Wohlthat had gone to Hitler not "disappointed" and downcast but
deeply impressed by an optimistic report from a Jewish representative, the orders
might have been signed and developments might have taken a different course.

For a gentile to have engaged in a stratagem like this was inconceivable. With all
his good will and sympathy toward the innocent victims, he would never allow himself
to exaggerate or, heaven forbid, to deviate from the truth. Nor would his superiors
countenance this. Who ever heard of such a thing?...

These reflections are substantially strengthened by the case of a confrontation
between Jewish functionaries and non-Jewish benefactors not all of whom were
blessed with Robert Pell's integrity. We refer to the German-J ewish delegation that
was dispatched to London by the Gestapo chief, Heydrich. As will be recalled, the
delegation was instructed to hasten the work of the Intergovernmental Committee and
warn it that if it did not fulfill its mandate, the Nazis would revert to their shock-
tactics of removing Jews from Germany. The delegation suggested a timetable for the
departure of all theJ ews within three years and asked the committee to approve this or
a similar program. The head of the delegation, Wilfrid

Israel, emphasized that he did not doubt Goering's sincerity in this matter, but
Goering was fighting a rearguard battle against the plan's opponents. Israel related
that Hitler, after receiving Wohlthat's report on the insufficient progress made by the

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Intergovernmental Committee, had refused to allow publication of the orders until
more substantial results were achieved.

The delegation met twice with the Intergovernmental Committee. The first
meeting (May IS) was attended by the committee's ranking members--Winterton,
Emerson, Pell, and others. The remarks of the senior member. Lord Winterton, came as
a rude shock to the delegation. Winterton explained that neither the British
government nor the Intergovernmental Committee had any intention of allowing the
German police to tell them what to do and what not to do. The committee, he said, had
evinced much good will and patience in its relations with the German authorities. It
had done everything possible to find places of shelter for the refugees. He, Winterton,
believed that the financiers were doing all they could to underwrite the program-but
the committee should not beasked to do the impossible. The violent methods resorted to
by the Germans in expelling the J ews had greatly impeded the work of the committee; a
return to those methods would render that work impossible. He also reminded the
delegation that the German authorities had once declared their intention to do a great
many things, such as introducing vocational training for the emigrants, creating a
Jewish organization, and so forth-but in practice they had done nothing.
Nevertheless, he did not doubt the Germans' good intentions and was ready to
demonstrate mutuality in this matter.

It was this declaration by the British lord, instead of a timetable, that the
delegation would be compelled to take to the impatient chief of police who held in his
hands their fate and thefate of their brethren...

Faced with the visible gloom of the delegation, the committee chairman
nonetheless decided to ask Emerson and Pell to meet again with the German Jews in
order to clarify with them what could be done toward acceding to its request. 114

In the second meeting, held the following day, the already wretched delegation
was subjected to unmerciful chastisement. This time it was Sir Herbert Emerson who
was the ranking and deciding figure, and he taught the J ews a lesson in the meaning
of nobility. Pell's comment that Emerson was "adamant" was really an
understatement.

The delegation said that if they returned to Germany empty-handed, the J ews
would be subjected to cruel methods of deportation,

certainly in the provinces and perhaps throughout the country. They asked for an
emigration timetablefor 1939 only, or, at least, a proposed program with a pledge that
it would be submitted to the governments concerned.

Emerson was firm in his refusal. While he had every sympathy for the Jewish
community in Germany, he would not submit to blackmail. He would not be a party to
a fraudulent statement, and any statement which might lead the Germans to think
that the governments would take a certain line of action in the future, especially
where numbers were concerned, would be dishonest, he read out to the delegation parts
of Pell's April 6 memorandum to Wohlthat, and asserted that the assurances it
contained represented the outer limit of the committee's capabilities.

"The group from Berlin was obviously very distressed," Pell notes. They pleaded
with Emerson to at least write a letter to Lord Reading stating that the committee
would try to bring out a certain number of Jews that year. The delegation would then
take a copy of the letter to Heydrich. Emerson refused.

Finally Wilfrid Israel made one last entreaty: that a letter be sent to Lord Reading
stating that the I ntergovernmental Committee was proceeding in line with the April 6
memorandum and hoped that the plan could be implemented. Openly bitter. Pelt wrote
in his report that "Emerson refused even to consider this minimum plea. "

Indignant as he was, however. Pell did not assail Emerson for his vicious
behavior toward the J ews. Firstly, it is doubtful whether his intervention would have
helped. And secondly, he probably thought that at bottom, Emerson was fight: there
should be no submission to blackmail, and nothing should be said that was liable to
result in duplicitous behavior. After all, he, too. Pell, had followed this rule in his talk
with Wohlthat three weeks earlier: he had spoken frankly about everything, without
deviating from the pure truth. As for Emerson's spurning of the delegation's last
request, that was quite unpleasant. Sir Herbert was not a very congenial person.
Really, it was a pity...

114FRUS 1939, Vol. II, pp. 110-112.

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Absent from this human drama was one of Anglo-J ewr/s devoted and wise
leaders who could have reminded Emerson and his colleagues of a few home truths:
that the German chief of police, Heydrich, was the real and most commanding
authority concerning German Jewry; that in certain circumstances a resolute stand
against blackmail was not the highest moral or even utilitarian imperative; that the
rule forbidding duplicity in negotiations lacked moral validity when the other side
was a gang of cutthroats; and above all, that the refusal to confirm the April 6

memorandum was a case of petty revenge against defenseless and innocent
persons, an act devoid of humanity.

But there was no Anglo-J ewish leader who empathized with the plight of the
wretched delegation to the point of coming to its aid.

A similar incident occurred in the final stage of the Intergovernmental
Committee's pre-war activity. When the Coordinating Foundation was finally
established and had organized itself, the committee's director. Sir Herbert Emerson,
instructed the director of the new Foundation, Paul van Zeeland, to refrain from
making contact with the German government until it demonstrated its readiness to
implement its part of the agreement. This took place on August 1st. Emerson's country
was on the brink of entering the war. Van Zeeland's country was in danger of invasion.
Both men were worried and distraught. For both, the rescue of Jews was an important
precept, but one that bore delay. Perhaps an appeal at such a late hour would have been
ineffectual. But the appeal was not made for the opposite reason: the hour, it was
argued, was too early. And not a single J ew objected to this strange logic.

These events, together with many others, exemplify a bitter and persistent truth
which is deeply interwoven in the episode of the Rublee Plan. That fact-which cannot
be expunged or obliterated from the annals of the J ewish people-is that for nearly a
year a group of American non-J ews headed by Myron Taylor under the active auspices
of President Roosevelt engaged in considerable efforts to extricate the Jews of
Germany. The dedicated activity of the Americans had the vacillating aid of British
representatives and, to a lesser degree, of other countries.

Throughout this entire period the attitude of the J ewish organizations swung
between total opposition on the part of the overwhelming majority, and constrained
and reluctant cooperation on the part of a few functionaries whose true motivation was
opposition to rival J ewish organizations. And on the issue that is of primary concern to
us:

the Zionist movement vigorously opposed the Rublee Plan and did all it could to
thwart its implementation.

We will conclude this chapter with a survey of the situation concerning the
extrication of Germany's Jews on the eve of the war. In a report to the 21st Zionist
Congress in August 1939, the Jewish Agency's Central Office for the Settlement of
German J ewry stated as follows (emphases in the original):

In the past two years the United States of America applied the administrative
immigration procedure so that at least the maximum immigration quota from
Germany and Austria permitted by law was fully utilized... I n the first weeks after the
annexation of Austria and the November riots, Belgium, Holland, France and
Switzerland absorbed thousands of refugees who crossed the border legally or illegally,
and they are trying to overcome the refugee problem which, in the wake of these
developments, was greatly aggravated in their countries, by setting up transit camps
where the refugees will remain until they immigrate overseas.

I n Eng/anof, the events of November prompted the entire public, both Jewish and
non-J ewish, as never before, to demand the absorption of refugees, and with the
explicit assistance of the government, operational means were set up to transfer
thousands of refugees from Germany to England. Thanks to the Lord Samuel's
initiative, a movement was created to transfer children and youth, which so far has
been able to bring 7,000 children and youtti to England. The vast majority were placed
with families that undertook to receive them and see to their education, while the
remaining few were sent to special centers. Temporary- residence permits were
obtained for 1,500 halutzim so that they can receive or complete their agricultural

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training inere. Women and young women wino are willing to do household work
generally receive entry and work permits from the British government, if it can be
proved that they have employment; and finally, every refugee who has a solid prospect
of immigration and who is guaranteed financially during his temporary stay,
generally receives an entry permit. Today there are over 35,000 Jewish refugees [in
England], including children and youth--more than twice as many as before the
events of 1938.

England's sympathetic attitude toward the plight of the refugees was noted also
by Eliahu Dobkin in the report to the Jewish Agency Executive already quoted:
"England is one of the countries most admired by Vienna's Jews... Generally speaking,
it is less difficult to obtain a visa for England than for other countries, and this is
greatly appreciated by the J ews."

England has no land border with Germany, and virtually all the refugees
entering the country did so legally, with the prior assent of the British government.
Germany's neighbors also took in considerable numbers of refugees, even though some
of them had crossed the border illegally. Heading the list was France, where some
45,000 Austrian and German J ewish refugees resided on the eve of the war. 115 Holland
and Belgium each took in 30,000 refugees, Switzerland 8,000.116 All told, upon the
outbreak of the war, there were in Western Europe approximately 150,000 refugees, of
whom a third hoped to settle in their present country of residence while the rest were
intent on immigration overseas. 117

From 1933 until the start of the war some 350,000 J ewish refugees left Germany
and Austria.llS Of these, 143,000 had left by J uly 1 1938.119 Thus, within the
following 14 months--from the Evian Conference until the outbreak of the war--over
200,000 J ews leFt Germany. Even though the Rublee Plan was not implemented,
European countries did not waver in their readiness to take in tens of thousands of
Jews-many times more than had been suggested by the niggardly speeches of their
representatives at Evian.

Not everywhere were the J ews received with the same willingness as in England,
and no government encouraged them to come. Still, they came, and the majority were
not sent back. I n fact, 1938 witnessed the extrication of German Jewry along the lines
put forward by Sir John Hope- Simpson and proposed by Dr. Senator to the Jewish
Agency Executive-but in the reverse order. The transit camps were established not
prior to the planned arrival of the refugees, but afterward, in order to cope with the
growing problem posed by their influx in the thousands and tens of thousands.

As regards Latin America, testimony exists which seems to describe definitively
the behavior of the countries there in the fateful period. The historian and sociologist
Mark Wischnitzer, who had firsthand knowledge of the events when they occurred,
relates: "Of the ten South American republics that were capable of absorbing a
considerable number of refugees- Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela and Uruguay-only Bolivia showed relative
liberalism in its immigration policy in the years 1938-1939."120 This testimony of a
well-informed and reliable source sounds like a final and irrevocable judgment. But it
is not.

I n the first place, Wischnitzer's data are incomplete. Had he extended his period
of scrutiny by another six months, Bolivia, too, would have been listed with the rest of
the non-liberal states. On May 6, 1940,

the Bolivian government issued an order barring the granting of all entry visas
and I aissez- passers "to persons of Semitic origin. "121 Bolivia thus joined the other
countries of South America, which closed their gates after having given shelter to
thousands of J ewish refugees.

Secondly, it emerges that Bolivia is actually a salient example of the Latin
American countries (excluding Argentina and Brazil) which were characterized by
the opening of their gates after J uly 1938. These states had always been known for their

115 Mark Wischnitzer, Visas to Freedom: The History of HIAS . p. 162.

116 American Jewish Year Bool^ , Vol. 42, p. 600.

117 Wischnitzer, To Dwell in Safety , p. 221.

118 Ibid.

119 Werner Rosenstock, "Jewish Emigration from Germany," Leo Baeck Institute, Yearbook 1, 1956, p. 377.

120 Wischnitzer, To Dwell in Safety , p. 205.

121 Dr. Jacob Shatzky, Yiddishe Yishuyim in Latein-Amerike (Yiddish), 1952, p. 89.

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Strict restrictions on tine entry of foreigners, and tineir actions following the Evian
Conference were highly unusual from this point of view. Afterward, once a few
thousand refugees had entered, these countries began to close their gates one after the
other, though subject to vacillations and hesitations due to internal and external
pressures. We turn now to a brief survey of the developments in the various
countries. 122

For hundreds of years there had been no Jewish community in Bolivia, ever
since the Inquisition had forced the assimilation of the remnants of the Spanish and
Portuguese Marranos who had sought refuge in Bolivia. Before 1938, the country's
J ewish population stood at no more than 200. In 1938 the government began to absorb
Jewish refugees--as farmers. Agricultural land was allocated and organizational
arrangements made to establish a J ewish colony. By the end of 1939, over 9,000
refugees had entered the country. In February 1940 (as will be related below) it still
seemed possible to bring in another 4,800 families under certain financial conditions.
Three months later Bolivia's gates were sealed shut.

Two thousand refugees entered Chile in 1938. In May 1939 an order was issued
barring the entry of immigrants for one year. Nevertheless, that year saw the entry of
an additional 8,000 refugees, both before and after the publication of the order. In
February 1940, entry was again temporarily prohibited, and in the following month
entry quotas were proclaimed, with priority to agricultural workers. All told, Chile's
J ewish population doubled within two years--from 10,000 to 20,000.

Paraguay admitted 1,000 refugees before closing its gates in September 1938.

Uruguay allowed 3,000 refugees to enter in 1938, 2,000 of them bearing transit
permits. An additional 2,200 entered in 1939.

Peru admitted 2,000 refugees, the majority on a temporary basis.

Colombia took in 1,200 refugees, at a rate of 50-60 per month.

It is known that 1000 Jewish refugees settled in Guayaquil, one of Ecuador's
main cities. 123 Quito agreed to allow massj ewish

immigration, but the plan came to nothing after the J ewish emigration
organizations in Germany found that climatic and other conditions in Ecuador were
unsuitable for the refugees. 124

Cuba, which was not included in Wishnitzer's list and which had gained some
uncomplementary publicity in the wake of the St. Louis episode, in 1938 admitted
3,000 refugees, and by J uly 1 1939, their number stood at 6,000. Many of the refugees
weretotally destitute and were aided by Jewish welfare agencies in the U.S. Cuba was
in the midst of a severe economic crisis. In May 1939 the immigration laws were
greatly toughened, and stringent controls were introduced in the ranting of visas. All
previously issued visas were cancelled. Ten days after the official order was issued, the
St. Louis set sail from Hamburg with 900 refugees bearing visas that were now invalid.
A worldwide furor erupted when the refugees were not allowed to disembark in
Havana. At the end of 1939, 2,900 refugees remained on the island, following the
departure of some of them for other destinations, principally the United States. In May
1940, Cuba closed its gates to refugees.

Divergent appraisals, some of them highly contradictory, exist concerning the
part played by the two largest Latin American countries, Argentina and Brazil, in
refugee absorption, and regarding the total number of refugees who found shelter in
Latin America. We had no choice but to select two general assessments which, in
addition to the reliability of their sources, are rendered more credible by their
specification by county. According to the first assessment, 125 26,150 refugees were
absorbed in the countries of Latin America as of J uly 1 1938. Another sourcel26
estimates the number of refugees in these same countries at 83,000 toward ttie end of
1939. This sourcel27 provides a table showing the worldwide distribution of J ewish
refugees as of December 31, 1939, and includes also Latin America. The combination of
the two sources yields the following picture:

122 Data based on surveys in various volumes of the American Jewish Year Book and other sources cited individually.

123 J. Cohen, Jewish Life in South America , p. 162.

124 Artur Prinz, "The Role of the Gestapo in Obstructing and Promoting Jewish Emigration," Yad Vashem Studies . 11, p. 193
(Hebrew).

125 Rosenstock, p. 387.

126 American Jewish Year Book , Vol. 42, p. 455.

127 Ibid., p. 600.

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Country J uly 1, 1938 Dec. 31, 1939 Difference

Argentina B,000 25,000 12,000

Bolivia -- 9,000 9,000

Brazil 7,500 15,000 7,500

Chile 1000 10,000 9,000

Cuba -- 2,900 2,900

Paraguay -- 1000 1000

Peru 250 2,000 1,750

Uruguay 1,500 3,500 2,000

Colombia 1,400 --* --*

Others 1,500 14,600 B,100

Total 26,150 83,000 56,850

* Colombia was included under "others. "

The table for December 31 1939, refers explicitly to Jewish refugees, not just
ordinary immigrants. The data in the tablefor Europe, Palestine and Shanghai, show
that it refers solely to German and Austrian refugees. Nevertheless, it may be
assumed that the figures for Latin America include a certain number of refugees from
Czechoslovakia, which Hitler conquered in March 1939, and from Poland, which fell to
the Germans four months before the table's final date. On the other hand, it is possible
that the figures for J uly 1938, which refer exclusively to Germany, should be
augmented by the addition of refugees from Austria. The two corrections could well
reduce the overall difference by a few thousand, but this is immaterial for our
purposes, since not only was the precise origin of the J ewish immigrant of little
importance for the absorbing countries, but even the conjectured decrease will leave
impressive numbers attesting to a concrete readiness among South American
countries to absorb German J ews after Evian.

It is true to say that following the Evian Conference the majority of these
countries closed their gates. But this is not the wrto/e truth, if it is not noted that before
the gates were closed--or even as they were being closed-some 50,000 refugees were
admitted; and if it is not noted that in order to absorb immigrants on this scale, several
countries opened gates which had hitherto always been closed.

Various reasons underlay the stoppage in the admission of immigrants. One
prominent cause, which is invariably mentioned in descriptions of the events, was the
intense antisemitic propaganda conducted largely by the German minorities in these
countries, with the aid and support of Germany and local elements. This propaganda
impacted on the population at large because of the traditional suspiciousness of
foreigners and a generations- long antisemitic tradition dating from the Catholic
Church's persecution of the J ews. Scandals broke out when it was discovered that
forged visas had been purchased, or that visas had been granted in contravention of
government orders. "Wildcat"

ships that tried to land immigrants without visas also elicited outraged
reactions from the authorities.

Yet all these and similar reasons, substantive as they may have been, were
supplements to and catalysts of the root cause, which provides the key to an
understanding of the situation. This lay in thefact that the Latin American countries
(with the possible exception of Argentina) were poor and undeveloped. They were
incapable of absorbing rapidly large populations and providing them with adequate
means of subsistence, unless their arrival was accompanied by the import of capital
and an initiative for the development of adequate sources of livelihood. The situation
was particularly difficult for the non-agricultural immigrants, who sought to pursue
urban businesses which were undeveloped in these countries and consequently
generated no demand. Naturally, most of the German-J ewish immigrants fit this
category.

The events surrounding J ewish immigration to Latin America from 1938-1940
reflect the fluctuations between the response of these countries to the moral pressure of

209

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

the Evian Conference and the lobbying of the big neighbor to the north, as well as the
effect of local socio-economic conditions. The minimum required for success, or at least
to forestall a rapid deterioration, was the provision of money and guidance. Had every
immigrant family arrived with the 10,000 Reichsmarks it would have received under
the Rublee Plan, and had it been given proper guidance in the choice of a profession
according to the local conditions, better results could have been expected, perhaps even
a totally different outcome.

But the Rublee Plan was thwarted, precluding the utilization of the large
reservoir of funds that was to be placed at the immigrants' disposal with the assent of
the Nazi leaders. Nearly all the refugees arrived destitute and without the benefit of
constructive guidance. At most, the J ewish welfare organizations covered travel
expenses and supported a few thousand refugees who were in danger of starvation.
They could do no more because they lacked funds and lacked the readiness to raise the
needed money.

Even at the purely financial level the Rublee Plan was irreplaceable. If we add to
this the negative effects of the disorganized emigration, which was unavoidable under
the circumstances, we reach the conclusion that in the countries of South America, as
distinct from Europe, the failure to adopt the Rublee Plan caused immense immediate
damage by bring about the closing of the gates and by preventing rescue.

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Chapter Nine

Territorialism Vanquished

(The Santo Domingo Affair)

Against the backdrop of the unsavory spectacle of the public discussions at the
Evian Conference, the representative from the Dominican Republic stood out because
of his sympathetic and promising attitude. His country, he told the delegates,
contained "vacant areas of fertile land, excellent roads, and a police force that
maintains law and order." The Ministry of Agriculture, he pledged, would provide
settlers not only with land but also with seeds and technical advice. His government
was ready to offer special conditions to well-known professionals who would undertake
to instruct their Dominican counterparts. He concluded his speech with an orotund
flourish: "I hope that our conference will be as a calm lake whose pure waters can
quench thirst and also render its shores fertile."!

At the inaugural session of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees in
London, the Dominican government proved as good as its word, putting forward a clear
and explicit proposal. On August 5, 1938, the Dominican representative informed the
committee chairman as follows:

M r. Chairman,

I have the honor to inform you that the government of the Dominican Republic is
ready and willing to accept a certain number of refugees, provided these refugees have
sufficient means to be placed both in agriculture, commerce and industry, and in the
free professions. Therefore, under these conditions, and without the government
undertaking any commitment whatsoever for implementing the immigration (in
accordance with subsection (4) of Par. 8 of the resolution adopted at Evian on J uly 14,
1938), the Dominican government can accept between 50,000 and 100,000 refugees.

[Signed by the head of the Dominican delegation]2

Thus began an affair which we will now attempt to recapitulate with the help of
all the details we were able to collect. Of the two figures cited in the Dominican
proposal, the lower (50,000) was quickly shelved. When Alfred Houston, a

1 Minutes of the third public meeting of the Evian Conference, July 9, 1938, CZA, File S7/693.

2 CZA, File S7/693; FRUS 1938, 1.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

representative of President Roosevelt's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees,
visited Santo Domingo in J anuary 1939,

he was told by the country's ruler. General Rafael Trujillo, that the Dominican
government intended to absorb 100,000 refugees, "if not more. " Houston was given a
memorandum outlining the conditions set by the Dominican government for
accepting the refugees:

1. That the majority of the refugees actually engage in agriculture.

2. That the refugees pay the residence tax of $6 per annum.

3. That the settlement Refinanced "on a sound basis" so that the refugees would
not become public wards.

4. That arrangements be made "to prevent these refugees from reclaiming
German citizenship in the event of a change of regime in Germany and thus creating a
minority problem" in the Dominican Republic. 3

As the contacts between the sides progressed, two of these provisos (items 2 and 4)
were dropped and the other two rephrased less stringently.

At the invitation of the Dominican government, a commission was dispatched to
the island to conduct a preliminary survey. The commission went under the joint
auspices of Roosevelt's Advisory Committee and the New York-based Refugee
Economic Corporation of America. Its three experts--in agricultural production,
forestry, and lands--were selected by the president of J ohns Hopkins University.4

The commission arrived in the Dominican Republic on March 7, 1939, and
returned on April 18. Seventeen different sites were examined, of which six were
chosen as suitable for settlement. The commission's positive report evoked the interest
of Agrojoint (the American J ewish J oint Agricultural Corporation), whose top officials,
lames Rosenberg and Dr. Joseph Rosen, undertook to direct the planned project. On
September 22 Agrojoint and the J DC signed an agreement to share responsibility for
financing the project.

A series of meetings with representatives of the State Department and members
of the President's Advisory Committee resulted in the unreserved support of the U.S.
administration. The I ntergovernmental Committee on Refugees gave its ardent assent
to the plan. The proposal of the Dominican government, which was made "with
generosity and foresight," was noted with deep satisfaction at a meeting of the
Intergovernmental Committee held on October 17 at the White House.5 The host.
President Roosevelt, also took note of "the generous stance" of the Santo Domingo
government. 6

I n the meantime, intensive contacts were held with the Dominican ambassador
to Washington and with General Trujillo himself, who was

then in the United States. In a meeting held on October 19, a letter from the
ambassador to James Rosenberg was read out, containing the main points of the
agreement subsequently signed. Trujillo, who addressed the meeting, promised large-
scale assistance for the settlement project.7 In the wake of this meeting, the
"Dominican Republic Settlement Association" (Dorsa) was formed. J ames Rosenberg
was chosen as president and Dr. J oseph Rosen as vice-president. Two hundred shares of
thecompany at $1,000 per share were purchased by Agrojoint, the resulting $200,000
serving as the project's founding capital.

On December 12 President Roosevelt wrote J ames Rosenberg that the Santo
Domingo plan could be seen as a "turning point" in the efforts to assist the refugees. 8

That same month Dr. Rosen, an agronomist by training, along with a fellow
colleague, went to the Dominican Republic in order to choose the plot of land for the
first colony. They decided on an area in the District of Sosua, in the northern part of the
island. The 26,000-acre property was offered as a gift by its owner. President Trujillo.
In response to this generous offer, Dorsa persuaded Trujillo to accept company shares
in the value of $100,000.9

3 FRUS 1939, II, 70.

4 Mark Wischnitzer, "The Historical Background of the Settlement of Jewish Refugees in Santo Domingo," Jewish Social
Studies , Vol. IV, January 1942, p. 46 (hereafter: Wischnitzer, "Historical Background;" Brookings Institution Report on the
Dominican Settlement, p. 281.

5 Record, II, 1939, p. 43.
6Ibid., pp. 49-51.

7 Ibid.

8 Wischnitzer, "Historical Background," p. 47.

9 Ibid.

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On J anuary 16, 1940, a large delegation arrived in the Dominican Republic,
comprised of representatives from Dorsa, the Intergovernmental Committee on
Refugees, and a representative of the State Department. Following detailed
negotiations, an agreement was signed on J anuary 30 between Dorsa and the
Dominican government.

Under the terms of the agreement, the Dominican Republic undertook to grant
the settlers and their offspring "full possibilities to pursue their lives and businesses
without interference, discrimination, or persecution." The Republic assured them
freedom of religion and worship, and guaranteed them absolute equality of civil, legal
and economic rights, "and of other inalienable human rights" (Par. 1). Dorsa was to
select candidates "according to their suitability and their technical qualifications for
agriculture, industry, crafts and commerce." Lists of candidates would be submitted
occasionally to the Dominical I nterior M inistry and Police, which would approve them
within a brief and reasonable time. The Foreign M inistry would then issue them visas
"without requiring any payments from them. The first group will comprise 500
settlers, with the overall number to total 100,000 in stages to be determined jointly by
the Republic and Dorsa" (Par. 2).

In a special clause the Dominican government undertook to submit in the
country's Chamber of Deputies (parliament) a bill annulling the

immigration tax and similar taxes for Dorsa settlers "in the present and future."
The settlers would also be exempted from the financial surety required of other
immigrants for their boat passage. In addition, they could bring with them, tax-free,
their personal belongings, furniture, and the tools, machines and materials they
would need to begin their economic activity in their new home (Par. 3).

In an extraordinary session on February 20-21 both houses of the Dominican
Congress approved the agreement and passed the law exempting the settlers from
customs and tax payments.

The "witnesses" to the signing of the agreement were ranking members of the
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees and a representative of the Coordinating
Foundation headed by Paul van Zeeland, U.S. government representatives did not sign
the agreement, but were present at the ceremony. The Secretary of State sent a cable of
congratulations in the name of President Roosevelt.lO The preamble to the agreement
made special mention of Roosevelt's initiative in convening the Evian Conference and
of General Trujillo's proposal to take in 100,000 refugees. In this manner the
agreement assumed the character of a quasi-dialogue between two senior personalities
and a matter under the personal patronage and protection of President Roosevelt. This
contributed in no small measure to dissipating the atmosphere of mistrust and
reservation that progressive circles in the U.S. harbored toward Trujillo and his
despotic regime.

The first defense of the plan and its Dominican partner was offered by Freda
Kirchwey, the editor-in-chief of the liberal weekly The Nation, who visited the
Dominican Republic and accompanied the three first settlers to the Sosua colony. Her
first-hand experience resulted in positive conclusions which she shared with her
readers.n Kirchwey was favorably impressed by the beauty of the spot, the manifest
fertility of the valleys, the plentiful water and the forests of mahogany trees. She
remarked on the orderly houses, equipped with running water and electricity, that
Trujillo had placed at the settlers' disposal together with his estate at Sosua. Nor did
she have any qualms about lauding the motives of the Dominican ruler.

True, she wrote, Trujillo was a dictator who was answerable to no one, but he was
not a fascist. He had backed the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War, and following
Franco's victory had given shelter to thousands who had fought on the Republican
side.

Kirchwey described Trujillo as a "purely personal" dictator who was not bound by
any particular ideology. Behind him was a lengthy list of arbitrary persecutions of his

10 Berl Locker, "Exit San Domingo," The New Judea , March-April 1943.

11 Freda Kirchway, "Caribbean Refuge," The Nation , April 13, 1940.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

detractors and actions to enrich himself. Behind him also was the massacre his troops
had perpetrated two and a half years earlier against thousands of blacks from Haiti
who were living in the Dominican Republic. On the face of it, this history was liable to
arouse apprehensions concerning the safety of the refugees who were fleeing tyranny
in Europe. "But it is not wise to go merely by the record. Trujillo can be magnanimous
when he happens to feel like it; and he can be a statesman. He has used his power to
build up his country as well as himself." Overall, the editor of The Nation went on to
write.

The country needs settlers; it is rich [in natural resources] and undeveloped.
Above everything else, Trujillo desires to make it a "white" republic. The obsession
with color in Santo Domingo dominates every upper-class mind. White or near-white
workers are held to be vastly superior to the obviously colored ones. And Haitians, in
their country or in Santo Domingo, are looked upon with fear and abhorrence.

Along with Trujillo's paramount motive-his desire for white settlers-Kirchwey
lists a number of secondary considerations: the likelihood that the Dorsa settlers
would generate an influx of capital, enhancement of Trujillo's standing in the U.S.,
and so forth. These motives are no better and no worse than those of most governments,
Kirchwey maintains. Indeed, their very selfishness is a guarantee that Trujillo will
fulfill his promises. Therefore, she concludes, "the refugees, especially those who come
in under the wing of [Dorsa], stand a good chance of peace and happiness-at least as
long as Trujillo holds power."

Then, as though to do her duty, the editor of the liberal journal winds up her case
for the defense with an implicit warning to Trujillo:

"And interested persons in all countries will watch with close attention to see
how the Dominican government carries out the terms of its own agreement."

Trujillo's motives for making his generous offer exercised people's thoughts and
imagination. The efforts to come up with a "satisfactory" explanation went so far as to
conjecture (wrongly, it seems) that the Dominican ruler had a Marrano ancestry and
was prompted by feelings of national solidarity to help his fellow-J ews.l2 Trujillo
himself explained his motives officially twice. The letter of the Dominican
ambassador in

Washington to J ames Rosenberg which was read out in Trujillo's presence on
October 19, 1939, stated:

We wish to make it clear that the government of the Dominican Republic is
acting not only out of humanitarian motives but [also] in the awareness that, just as
the United States became a great nation thanks to the entry of industrious and useful
settlers, so too our own country regards it as desirable and ne-cessary that refugee-
pioneers settle in it and take part in its uninterrupted upbuilding, which was rapid
and substantial in the past decade.

I n J une 1940 Trujillo revealed another of his motives:

Our essential purpose in opening the doors of the country to immigrants is purely
humanitarian. Naturally, we also saw in this policy an opportunity to contribute
toward the solution of one of the fundamental problems of our country-the sparsity of
population in comparison with the extent of our territory. The natural increase of our
population is quite satisfactory, but the size of our country, with a superabundance of
cultivable lands, permits us to look forward to a progressive increase in population
such as would place us on the same level of demographic intensity as other
neighboring countries in the Antilles. 13

According to Freda Kirchwey, this line of thought was not confined exclusively to
Trujillo. Testimonies from other sources indicate that expectation of a large-scale
population increase through the entry of productive elements was shared by the
Dominican authorities and general population alike. James Rosenberg described the
mood among the Dominican population regarding the Dorsa plan at a meeting in New

12 Bitzaron . April 1940, p. 80.

13 New York Times, June 11, 1940.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

York in February 1940: 'The usual questions asl<ed were: winen will the setfiers begin
arriving, and in what numbers? When we said that for the time being we have to act
slowly and begin with a few hundred carefully selected pioneers, there was
disappointment everywhere that we could not begin with large numbers. They need us.
They want us. They tell US so. "14

Additional testimony is contained in the resolution of the extraordinary session
of the Dominican Chamber of Deputies already mentioned. Upon the ratification of the
agreement with Dorsa, the lower

House adopted a resolution congratulating General Trujillo for having
undertaken a step "that constitutes a most effective means toward an intensive
increase of the population and the nation's resources, and at the same time affords
shelter to many families that cannot pursue their way of life in their own
countries. "15

When the parliament in a dictatorship expresses its admiration for the ruler's
actions, one need not be impressed or read anything into it. In this case, however, the
reason for the encomium is noteworthy. As far as the Chamber of Deputies was
concerned, humanitarian considerations and the prospect of enriching the country's
national resources, took second place to the desire for an intensive increase in the
country's population as a task of paramount urgency. Even if this motive was adduced
under the sway of Trujillo himself, it is quite plausible that the idea reflected the
wishes of the general public.

The probability that this was so is reinforced by what Mark Wischnitzer relates
in the article cited above. I n connection with Trujillo's offer, Wischnitzer tells about a
similar proposal made 60 years earlier by a liberal Dominican politician. General
Gregorio Luperon. Luperon, who took part in the political struggle against the dictator
Baiz, served for a time as a Cabinet minister in the Dominican government, and
temporarily held the post of President. I n these capacities, he encouraged immigration
from Cuba and Puerto Rico to the Republic, whose population had become depleted.
While in Paris, Luperon maintained friendly relations with Victor Hugo, Leon
Gambetta, and other noted liberals. Upon learning of the pogroms against Russian
J ewry in 1881, he proposed that the victims settle in the Dominican Republic, holding
negotiations to this end in Paris with the "Alliance Israelite Universelle" (AlU) and
the Rothschild family. Two hundred families were to be the pioneers in this venture.
TheAJ U representative in the talks was Charles Netter, the founder of Mikveh Israel.
When Netter died, in 1882, the talks were broken off.

Wischnitzer points out that the news of the Luperon plan was enthusiastically
received in Santo Domingo, sparking public festivities. Assemblies were held and
committees chosen to receive the refugees and arrange work for them.

The "obsession with color" mentioned by Freda Kirchwey requires an
explanation. In the Dominican Republic, where most the inhabitants were mulattos,
racial discrimination did not exist either by law or by custom, as it did in the United
States in this period. Such discrimination as did exist in various areas of life was
rooted in the fact that the blacks belonged to the lower classes. President Trujillo was a
mulatto, and at

least one member of his family (his brother. Hector) was black. There were some
mulattos and blacks in the government and the parliament.l6 The Republic's desire
for "white or near-white" immigrants was shared by many other countries in Central
and South America. However, there were no laws on the books to prevent the entry of
non-white immigrants, as was the case, for example, in Australia and New Zealand.

Yet a powerful psychological factor was also at work, expressed in what Kirchwey
called the "fear and abhorrence" Dominicans felt for the blacks of Haiti. Throughout
the first half of the 19th century, the Dominican Republic was repeatedly invaded and
conquered by its Haitian neighbors. For 22 years (1822-1844) it was occupied by and
formally annexed to Haiti. Under the conquerors' brutal rule thousands of Dominicans
fled, leaving the country economy in a shambles. During the period of the conquest
attempts were made to "Ethiopize" the country, such as by importing freed blacks from

14 Iddisher Kempfer . April 12, 1940.

15 Wischnitzer, "Historical Bacliground;" Locker, "Exit San Domingo."

16 Rayford W. Logan, Haiti and the Dominican Republic , Oxford University Press, 1968.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

the United States. 17 By 1844, when the invaders were forced out and the "Second
Republic" established, the country lay barren and depleted. The bitter experiences of
the years of terror left a deep imprint in the soul of the Dominican people, as, for
example, the Tatar conquest did in the Russian soul. The fact that Haiti, with a
population density three or four times as great as that of the Republic, lay across the
border, meant that the trauma was permanently evoked and that fears of a renewed
population influx, such as had once caused a national disaster, were never far below
the surface.

Dorsa's settlement project got off to a good start. The first fifty settlers arrived in
Sosua in March and April 1940, and in September Dr. Rosen was able to tell a press
conference that they had successfully adapted to the subtropical conditions and had
begun to earn a living. At Dorsa's recommendation, the Dominican government issued
2,000 visas, and this could be increased. Dr. Rosen reconfirmed the possibility of
settling 100,000 refugees in the Dominican Republic, which needed and wanted them.
Letters from the settlers to their families in Europe, he said, attested to a keen spirit
among them. 18 Dr. Rosen took the opportunity to reemphasize the project's non-
political character. 'The Dominican program makes no attempt to solve the J ewish
question or do anything that conflicts with any ideological conception in J udaism. It
is, simply, one of the lifeboats on which thousands of our brethren who are being
expelled from their country in these dark days and condemned to despair, will perhaps
be able to find the possibility to begin their lives anew. "19

At Sosua, matters continued to progress well. The hundreds of refugees who
arrived were absorbed in work and training programs. I n

J anuary 1941 Trujillo donated another 50,000 acres of his land to the Dorsa
project, in recognition of the settlers' excellent performance. There were approximately
300 settlers at this time, and their success story was the subject of frequent articles in
the world J ewish press. The colony's superb organization and its agricultural
achievements were noted, along with the ardent spirit of the settlers. Special attention
was paid to the successful efforts of the directors and settlers to introduce innovations
and improvements and thereby to advance Dominican agriculture. One such
description found its way into a Yishuv newspaper, either translated or copied. The
author (conjectured to be Shimon Ravidowitz) has reservations about the possibility of
absorbing 100,000 refugees in the Dominican Republic, but overall his report is
substantive and sympathetic. Thefollowing are excerpts, with minor omissions.

On the colony's organizational structure:

The J ewish colony sponsored by the J oint in the Dominican Republic is divided
into two types. The first is organized as a cooperative and the second is based on
individual farms. When a group of settlers arrives at Sosua, they must first work for
six months in the fields of the cooperative, where they learn the work. During these six
months they are observed by an agricultural expert, who determines which branch of
agriculture is most suitable to each person. After the six-month period he leaves the
cooperative, receives a plot of land and a small amount of money, and begins to work on
his own...

The cooperative and the individual farmers have worked the land superbly, and
the local inhabitants are amazed at how within a single year these new farmers have
transformed a wilderness into a blooming garden, growing crops they never imagined
could flourish in the soil of Santo Domingo. The cultivation of the land is being
directed by well-known agronomists who are experimenting with new types of
agriculture, employing all manner of ploys--and successfully.

The author goes on to enumerate some of the innovations and achievements at
Sosua:

Many areas of Santo Domingo are planted with sweet potatoes. But their potatoes
do not resemble those in the United States and Europe. Those from overseas are for
them a luxury item. The J ewish settlers undertook many experiments and obtained
fine results. A potato of this kind, to which the soil of Santo Domingo was thought to be
inhospitable, is now growing in abundance. Not long ago the new J ewish colony held a

17 Ibid., p. 32.

18 American Jewish Year Book . Vol. 43, p. 335.

19 Haolam, December 19, 1941; Davar, December 16, 1941.

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celebration in honor of the victory of the potato. The local inhabitants looked on this as
a miracle of nature whose very essence had been transformed...

There is a bean that grows in the tropical lands, from which oil is made. This
bean grows in Brazil. Until the outbreak of the war, Brazil exported this bean all over
the world, particularly to the United States. Brazil is farther from the United States
than Santo Domingo. Experiments undertaken in Santo Domingo proved successful.
Those in the Agrojoint colony who conducted [the experiments] are satisfied with the
results. An order was received for 7,000 tons of oil beans. Naturally, the colony in its
present state cannot produce a large amount of beans. At most, it can produce 1,000
tons. But there is a whole series of other colonies that are ready to grow beans and
complete the order. Agrojoint takes a very high view of this type of produce. Because of
Santo Domingo's proximity to the United States and Europe, they think they will be
ableto market the oil-bean easier than from Brazil...

The tropical climate affects not only human beings but animals as well. They are
lean here, and live off pasture. To sow fodder for animals is a complex problem for the
Dominican. He thinks to himself: why should I sow when the whole year is one long
summer? The fields are always green and the animals have plenty to eat. Agrojoint
introduced a new culture. In the first place, they began cross-breeding. Studs were
brought from the United States, and a new, healthier generation is being bred. Thus
better and more abundant commodities are produced.

On the number of settlers according to the plan: 'The Republic aspires to bring
100.000 settlers to the country, J ews and non-J ews. This

may be a distant dream, but there is no doubt that 10-15,000 Jews can be brought
in within a few years given J ewish immigration."

Finally, on the settlers' adaptation: "Eighty percent of the settlers have adapted
well to the work, even if they do not have an easy life. Many of them formerly practiced
the free arts in Germany, Czechoslovakia and Austria. But they remember their seven
years under Hitler and are content. Twenty percent are not content and would like to
abandon agriculture. That is definitely normal. Everywhere the proportion of
embittered people is greater."

The explicit dissociation of Dorsa's officials from territorial ist intentions was
confirmed in the conclusions reached in a visit to Sosua by a second American woman
journalist. Marie Syrkin, a Zionist leader, was sent to the Dominican Republic on
behalf of the Poalei Zion monthly y ew/srt Frontier. The visit by Syrkin, whose tone
suggests that she had been influenced considerably by Kirchwey, was meant to grant
the Sosua settlement a Zionist imprimatur, to complement the liberal seal of approval
bestowed by the editor of TheNation.20

In contrast to Kirchwey's voyage to Sosua with the first three settlers, Syrkin in
January 1941 visited the twelve settlers who had already managed to set up their
private farms, including residences. Employing a tone of courteous esteem, she
describes the homes that were built and outfitted for a comfortable life by the settlers
and their wives. "It must be borne in mind.., that these twelve homesteaders represent
the best equipped and most energetic of the immigrants. The fact that within a
comparatively short time they were already on their own small farms is evidence of
this. To what extent these twelve are representative of the remainder is a matter of
conjecture."

Like other visitors, Marie Syrkin is full of praise for the fine planning of the
colony (the barracks and cottages attested to "intelligent planning" and consideration
for climatic conditions, "the maximum of ventilation," and so forth). Syrkin reports on
the initiatives to develop industry in conjunction with the colony- large-scale cheese
production, bamboo for furniture, boat building, and the like. She also notes the
settlers' good spirits and their excellent physical condition. "One cannot transplant
Europeans of various preoccupational origins into a tropical climate without a
struggle of adaptation. Nor will a former lawyer or accountant be transformed [easily]

20 Marie Syrkin, "Rebirtli in Santo Domingo?," Jewishi Frontier , February 1941. A condensed translation appeared in Davar ,
May 30, 1941.

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into an agricultural worker..." The complaints Syrkin heard were of various kinds.
"Some people objected to the type of work assigned... some objected to the communal
fare." And it

was not surprising that "a few of the settlers wished to leave, having found the
life too rigorous. A number of misfits were bound to form part of any group."
Toward the end of the article come the summations and conclusions:

The Sosua project should not be confused with a territorial ist venture... [like]
Zion outside of Palestine. Such is not the case in Sosua. [Dorsa] is avowedly non-
sectarian... The Domincan Government has stressed its desire for refugees who will
become in every sense an integral part of the country, in short, 100% Domincans...

No reasonable prospect of rescue can be dismissed. So far, the grandiose schemes
for 100,000 settlers have boiled down to fewer than 300 souls. However, Dorsa, with the
aid of interested governments, hopes to increase the flow of immigration rapidly.
There can be little question that Truji No is at present anxious for settlers, and that his
professions may now be taken in good faith. His word is law, and his administration
and people will be sympathetic to the precious venture in the precise measure that he
is. Of course, a dictator's policy is subject to caprice, but one can hardly ask for
guarantees in the present world. What will be the future attitude of the ruler or the
native population should a sizable community succeed in establishing itself and
prospering, is not a question of immediate concern to the man who is fleeing death or
torture.

The main point was saved for last:

Assuming that it will be possible to increase the tempo of immigration, Sosua
can in no sense be viewed as a rival of Palestine. It does not pretend to solve the J ewish
problem or to build a J ewish future. If it is successful, it will givesomej ewish refugees
a chance to reestablish their broken lives and to become good Dominicans, far from the
great current of European and American civilization. Such a prospect fails to fill me
with enthusiasm, but then I live in the United States, not in Germany.

Marie Syrkin's somewhat caustic remark about "the grandiose schemes that
boiled down" did not have (at the moment) a basis in reality. When she visited Sosua in
January 1941 the settlement was in the midst of a pre-planned experimental stage,
and the number of settlers, some 260-by year's end they totalled 450--was reasonable
and consistent with the plan. It is conceivable that by making these unjust comments
the journalist paid inadvertent lip service to the hostile attitude prevailing in circles
of her Zionist colleagues. Yet even with this comment and one or two other minor slips,
Syrkin's article was an exceptional humane phenomenon in the Zionist movement, a
voice of reason crying in a wilderness of fears, suspicions and alienation.

In the view of the Zionist movement, its American branch in particular, the
Dominican episode was a continuation of previous territorial ist schemes" in the war
on which it so far had the upper hand. External circumstances had aided the Zionist
movement-both its active and its merely declarative wings-to scuttle three projects
on the eve of the war and in its initial stages. The settlement in British Guiana,
proposed under generous political terms by London, aroused apprehensions, not
wholly unfounded, of an underlying design to cover up and "compensate" for the
breach of trust implicit in the publication of the White Paper. Zionism's vigorous
opposition to this plan contributed to its abandonment when the war's outbreak caused
incipient difficulties in its implementation. Similarly, the plan involving Mindanao,
in the Philippines, was shelved due to the site's great distance and because it now lay
in the midst of a war zone. A third plan, truly territorial ist in character, entailing
settlement at Kimberley, Australia, never reached an advanced stage of practical
discussion because of the weakness of the territorial ist organization ("Freiland")
sponsoring it.

The Santo Domingo plan, in contrast, was free of the flaws that marked the other
schemes and possessed advantages they lacked. It was proposed by a country that was
neutral as regards both the war and Zionism. The country was crucially situated at the
juncture of the waterways between Europe and the Americas. On the Dominican side
the plan was backed by a friendly government and a sympathetic population. The
leaders of the Jewish organization involved enjoyed public credibility as reliable

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officials and experts in agricultural settlement. They spared no effort to explain that
the project was based on humanitarian considerations of saving Jews and was totally
devoid of territorialist intentions. If we add the fact that the U.S. administration and
Roosevelt personally gave the plan their declared and unreserved support, we will
readily understand that

in the initial stages some American Zionists were confused and hesitant. As with
the Rublee Plan, there were some who favored the Dominican project at first, only to
oppose it later, citing various excuses. The Yiddish weekly Yiddisher Kempfer
editorialized on April 12, 1940, that all the possible reservations notwithstanding, "it
is impossible not to wish the Agrojoint officials success in their new venture. For it
involves saving J ews--men, women and children threatened by physical
annihilation." Yet in its very next issue, dated April 19, the paper lashed out at Dorsa's
director for not telling the Jewish public the truth: that Trujillo's agreement to allow
the J ews in originated "in the curse and disgrace of his racist hatred for the Negroes of
Haiti." True, at this stage the paper did not yet reject the plan "which enjoys the
support of the American government and Washington's guarantee." In time, however,
it would willingly and ardently join the ranks of the project's opponents and like them
draw negative conclusions.

The unequivocal support evinced by the Roosevelt government was a major cause
of the restraint the leaders of the anti-Dominican camp showed in their public attacks.
As Stephen Wise was urging Chaim Weizmann to appear before the President's
Advisory Committee on Refugees (see Ch. 10), that same committee, of which Wise was
a member, was engaged in the final stages of drawing up the text of the agreement
with the Dominican government. The public meeting in February 1940 at which J ames
Rosenberg spoke on the prospects of settlement at Sosua, was chaired by James
McDonald, the chairman of the Advisory Committee. As he had during the debate over
the Rublee Plan, Wise moved cautiously. To help discredit the new plan he enlisted the
support of high-ranking figures and other personages who would not jeopardize his
own standing on the blue-ribbon committee. Where no tactical considerations were
required and no bewildered hesitations prevailed, the Zionists' hostility was naked and
uncompromising. A salient illustration of this attitude is provided by the poem "In
Santa Dominga," by the poet I srael Efrat, published in the Hebrew journal Hadoar. The
poem, which in the Hebrew has Ashkenazic intonation, leaves nothing to the
imagination, as the following excerpts show:

In Santa Dominga, in Santa Dominga,
Wliat do J ews do, tliey dance and sing-a

So come all ye wretched, redemption is yours,
A wonderful state opens its doors.

RejoiceReb Nissi, Reb Pinni, Reb Alter,

You can have ten mi nyans if you don't fatlter.

Or in your hearts do Zion and Galilee still suit.

And words of vision, with shepherd and flute?

Dreams and vanities, a dream more beautiful

We took for you from a devil quite dutiful.

With wild hairy savages you'll soon worship

And apes and baboons you'll soon call Your Lordship.

Wretches, what will you do? You'll dance and sing-a Redemption, redemption in
Santa Dominga.

The Holocaust knows a second instance of a similar outbreak of poesy, this time in
Sephardic Hebrew and without devils and baboons. In 1944 the poet Natan Alterman
lent his voice to the chorus of those attacking the War Refugee Board established by
Roosevelt. But that story will be told in due time.

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The World Jewish Congress's official frontal assault on the Dominican plan was
launched in December 1941 It took the form of an article in the Congress Weekly
written by Ida Silverman, a Zionist functionary who was close to Wise and Nahum
Goldmann. 21 A prefatory remark to the article notes explicitly that Silverman visited
Sosua on behalf of the WJ C. The article itself bears an aggressive style, and is studded
with ac/rtom/nem attacks and vulgarities.

Like other visitors to Sosua, the author begins by describing the conditions at the
settlement. But this time the description is tailored to fit the conclusions. The colony's
agricultural activity is boiled down to the statement that in the first six months the
settlers learn how to handle hens, cows, and. ..pigs (other articles make no mention of
this stertorous beast), while in the next six months they prepare the ground on a two-
hectare plot which is to serve as their land for cultivation. (According to Marie Syrkin,
the private plots covered an area of 8-10 acres, or 3.2-4 hectares.) As for other activity
engaged in by the settlers, there is not a word.

For a year, Silverman says, the settlers live in barracks. (Both Freda Kirchwey
and Marie Syrkin had praised the fine housing placed at the settlers' disposal.)
Regarding the economic relations between the settlers and the colony, the article
states that the settler "becomes indebted to the colony immediately on his arrival" and
that he "cannot leave the colony until his indebtedness is fully paid." Moreover, Sosua
is said to be

subject to malaria and other tropical diseases-- "but a start is being made toward
cleaning up the swamps." (According to Marie Syrkin, there had been a few cases of
malaria, though not of yellow fever, but not so many as to constitute a problem. Dr.
Rosen vehemently denied the existence of tropical diseases at Sosua. No other source
mentions the draining of swamps.)

The thrust of the article and its focus of information lie in the project's national
aspect. Formally the Santo Domingo plan, like the Evi an Conference and indeed like all
the activity of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, was non-sectarian in
character. Dorsa's full name made no reference to the settlers' J ewishness, and the
agreement with the Dominican Republic spoke of "Jewish and non-Jewish" refugee-
settlers. The non-sectarian cover fooled no one. It was accepted by Washington and
useful in contacts with Christian charitable and welfare organizations. It was agreed
that at Sosua, along with J ews, a number of non-Jewish refugees, should there be any,
would be able to find a haven. In Marie Syrkin's eyes, this stipulation only enhanced
the non-territorial ist credibility of the project. But for Ida Silverman this was a sure
road to assimilation.

She wrote that "at least ten percent of the settlers are non-J ews" (one's impression
from other sources is that this is an exaggeration) while also noting (correctly) that
women were in the minority among the settlers. Silverman maintains that there were
"many" mixed marriages in the colony (according to the Brookings Report-see below-
two of 20 marriages there were between white settlers and native women). All of the
above lead her to the conclusion that the plan was tantamount to race suicide for
J ews." Her prediction: "It is inevitable that under the conditions that prevail at Sosua,
a generation will see the J ewish settlers lost to J ewish life..."

On the basis of her findings and forecasts, the author raises some rhetorical
"questions" that encapsulate her arguments:

The first question that raises itself is this: how long will American Jewry permit
a few private individual J ews, acting solely for themselves, to undertake schemes and
make contracts with governments, which schemes they subsequently turn over to the
entirej ewish community to honor and to maintain?

The second question is: havej ews a right, in the face of the miserably inadequate
resources at their disposal and the

swelling number of those who need assistance, to appeal for funds to the Jewish
community as such for non-sectarian [emphasis in the original] colonization
enterprises--particularly when what is at stake is the survival of the J ews as a people,
and not merely their existence as individuals?

21 Mrs. Archibald Silverman, "Colonisation in Sosua," Congress Weekly , December 1941. As is customary in America, the
author uses the first name of her husband.

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The third question is: considering the climatic conditions, the special
governmental background and thej ewish problem involved, should thej ewish people-
-and not merely individual Jews-finance this uncertain experiment in Central
America?

The author reiterates these questions several times, in increasingly severe terms.
Reminding the Agrojoint officials of the sin of their participation in the agricultural
settlement project in Crimea and Birobidjan, and accusing them of "cold philanthropy
and feverish anti-Zionism," she sums up this part of her diatribe:

Never before in Jewish life have so-called Jewish leaders so brazenly dared to
appear before thej ewish world-after they personally had made all the commitments
and the promises-to proclaim that now it was the obligation of the Jewish people to
finance a non-sectarian colonization enterprise! Their previous failures as colonizers
are blandly overlooked-no one deems it necessary to explain the why and the
wherefore--we are simply told what we must do!

And another "question": "is it not time that a long-suffering Jewish public
should ask for explanations from those J ews who, without knowledge or experience,
without Jewish consciousness or Jewish responsibility, are always prepared to foist
their pet private schemes of salvation on J ewish givers everywhere?"

Silverman's basic attitude toward the plan is reflected in her sarcastic jibe that
450 people have been "saved" (in quotation marks) by being brought to tropical Sosua.
In contrast, she asserts, "we, as Jews, must take into consideration certain values
which transcend mere statistics."

Toward the end the reader is served up her forecast and ideological evaluation:

Large-scale settlement in the Dominican Republic is, at the best, a matter of
hundreds, not hundreds of thousands as its champions have so irresponsibly claimed.
Its value to the Jews as a people is definitely negative, because it rests on the
assumption that as long as a few J ews can be rescued from present misery their fate as
J ews is unimportant.

And a final conclusion (following a gushing description of the virtues of
settlement in Palestine):

Nothing of the kind can be said with respect to Sosua, except in propaganda
booklets. J ewish strength is too fragmentary, Jewish monetary sources are too limited
to indulge every self-appointed Messiah-regardless of the sincerity animating his
philanthropy-who conceives a new phantom to save the Jewish people. Hell is paved
with good intentions [sic]. There are too many J ews already in that nether world for
more to be added by the good intentions of a few J ews who, exercising their whims first
as private ventures, now transmit them as public responsibilities.

Later references confirm that the public accepted Ida Silverman's article as an
authoritative expression of the American Zionist leadership's position regarding the
Santo Domingo plan. How the readers of the Congress Weekly reacted to the warnings
of spiritual perdition is difficult to say. It cannot be certain that they were convinced
by the argument that Jews were not obligated to finance an enterprise ostensibly
intended to deal with refugees irrespective of religion and race. But more important
than Silverman's persuasiveness was the authoritative assertion of a stand-for the
information of Zionists and non-Zionists alike. That an unequivocal stance was
required for the guidance of non-J ews had become clear, among other occasions, a
month earlier when Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles had appeared before a
pan-American Zionist conference and unwittingly lauded the settlement project in the
Dominican Republic.22 True, the conference delegates had responded fittingly by
unanimously dismissing the plan as worthless and declaring that Jews must not
contribute one cent. Still, it would be best to avoid all such possible

22 Tsivyon in Forwerts . November 29, 1941.

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misunderstandings, at least on tine part of administration officials who were among
Zionism's sympathizers.

The article's appearance was particularly important in terms of bringing order to
the Zionist movement. As Louis Lipsky had done regarding the Rublee Plan, Ida
Silverman, the writer and Zionist functionary, now did with the Santo Domingo
project: with the declared approval of the leadership of the World J ewish Congress
(which, as will be recalled, was largely identical with the American Zionist
hierarchy), she called things by their names and removed all doubts. The Zionist
movement was adamantly opposed to the Santo Domingo plan. However feeble the
ideological rationale might be, the underlying cause of the opposition had a solid and
very concrete basis: Zionists were resistant to anything liable to jeopardize their fund-
raising revenues. Territorialism or notg assimilation or not--if the Jews of America
contributed to the colony in the Dominican Republic they might give less to the J ewish
National Fund or Keren Hayesod. The reader will remember that in 1938 Chaim
Weizmann had been apprehensive that the Evian Conference projects would adversely
affect Zionist fund-raising (Ch. 7). By 1941 such fears had become more tangible than
ever, and the movement was called on to repulse the danger.

It is possible that to view the article as a signal to the Zionist movement does not
exhaust its qualities. Perhaps it can also be regarded as an indicator of vigorous
activity being undertaken at that time in certain key areas. We shall return to this
hypothesis later in order to solve a knotty historical riddle. But more on that in due
course.

For the purposes of the present study, the Silverman article provides unequivocal
evidence of the Zionist stand concerning the rescue of J ews at the end of 1941. The world
was as yet ignorant of the total annihilation of J ews underway in the occupied areas of
the Soviet Union. But everyone knew about the persecutions, the murders, the
concentration camps. Everyone was aware of the terrible danger that loomed for every
Jew who remained in Europe under Nazi rule-the subject was on everyone's lips. At
this very hour the Zionist movement waged all-out war against an attempt to provide a
haven for tends of thousands of Jews in a country that had opened wide its gates. The
reasons and considerations are less important than the basic fact: for the first time in
the history of the Holocaust, Zionism had taken a stand against a rescue program that
was operating in practice. Since no one imagined that all of Europe's Jews could find
immediate shelter in Palestine, the inevitable and manifest alternative to the rescue
of each and every J ew was perdition and extinction. Zionist leaders and the Zionist
rank-and-file could not help but see this, had they given the matter a moment's
consideration. However, in

the atmosphere of alienation then prevailing (see Ch. ID) that perception was not
forthcoming. The moment of grace that follows realization of the truth did not arrive.

Historical justice requires us to point out that some Zionists opposed the cruel
line adopted by their movement and even tried to make their views public. One of them
was Charles J . Rosenbloom, a Pittsburgh businessman and a member of the ZOA
executive. His article to this effect, "Jews Should Be Saved Anywhere," appeared in a
Canadian Jewish journal. 23 His remarks were straightforward and, one would have
thought, self-evident. He pointed out that the settlement project in Santo Domingo was
not in competition with Palestine, and that if J ews could be saved in the United States,
by the same token they could be saved in the Dominican Republic. Responding to Ida
Silverman's argument on the danger to the J ewish people, Rosenbloom said that
rescued J ews meant there would be a J ewish people.

"No responsible Zionist," he wrote, "takes the position that a J ew who wants to
escape the inferno of Europe must go to Palestine to be saved or he cannot be considered
a responsibility of American J ewry."

Charles J . Rosenbloom and his few like-minded colleagues were, of course,
mistaken. Zionists whose obligation it was to serve as the embodiment of
responsibility were afflicted with factional blindness, and in the name of (imaginary)
Zionist interests set out to do battle against the "dangerous" nuisance. Rosenbloom
and his colleagues, the just men in Sodom, were unable to alter the course of events.

23 "Charles J. Rosenbloom, "Jews Should Be Saved Anywhere: Another View of Sosua," Canadian Jewish Chronicle , January 2,
1942.

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A year after the publication of Ida Silverman's article, a powerful bombshell
exploded in the form of a report prepared by the Washington- based Brookings
Institution entitled "Refugee Settlement in the Dominican Republic. "24 The
prestigious institute had been commissioned to conduct the survey in fall 1940, and its
voluminous report, couched in objective scientific language, appeared two years later.
According to those who visited the colony immediately after the report's publication--
and their account has never been refuted--the report spelled the end of the Santo
Domingo project by showing beyond any doubt that it was divorced from the reality of
the country and could never be implemented. We turn now to examine the report and
the validity of the standard opinion of its merits.

The study was initiated by a Pittsburgh businessman, Leo Falk, who originally
supported the settlement project. Falk believed that a more extensive survey was
required than had been conducted by both Dorsa and

experts from Johns Hopkins University. To finance the study, Falk drew on a
family fund, the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation. According to Berl Locker,25
Dorsa agreed that further examination was necessary, and this is plausible given the
relations among the plan's advocates. However, Dorsa did not go beyond polite
concurrence. At all events, Dorsa is not mentioned in the foreword to the report as
having commissioned the study, nor for that matter is reference made to any other
public body with the exception of the Falk Foundation, the report's sponsors.

The foreword concludes with the demurrer that although the study was made
possible thanks to funds provided by the Falk Foundation, "the Foundation serves
neither as the author, publisher, nor owner of this publication. Nor should the grant
as such be regarded as its confirmation or rejection of the conclusions and opinions
expressed in it." Nothing is said about the identity of the report's owners, to whom it
was submitted, or who commissioned it.

Particular importance attaches to the social proclivity of the whoever actually
commissioned the report, as he also formulated the questions the researchers were to
answer. Those questions were as follows: 26

(1) What is the attitude of the Dominican plan to the refugee problem as a
whole?

(2) Is the Dominican Republic a suitable place to settle refugees?

(3) How will the refugee- immigrants earn a living?

(4) How many refugees can the Dominican Republic absorb?

(5) What effect will the settlement project have on Dominican society?

The first question was blatantly provocative: Dorsa officials had already said that
the Santo Domingo plan was not in competition with any ideology whatsoever or with
any other programs aimed at sheltering refugees. This question had engaged neither
side, the Jews or the Dominicans. The only group to evince an interest in it were the
Zionists, who saw the entire project as competing with their own program-and with
their fund-raising. The fact that this question was placed at the head of the study
virtually ensured that the treatment of other questions, which were more substantive
and more relevant, would be tilted so as to obtain a satisfactory answer to the first
question--satisfactory, that is, to whoever formulated the questions.

No expense was spared in drawing up the report. Its 20 chapters, covering 410
pages, provide comprehensive data on every aspect of life in the Dominican Republic,
from the country's history to its people's way of

life and culture. There are chapters devoted to climate, agriculture, industry,
commerce, foreign trade, financial system, and so on and so forth. The detailed
descriptions are accompanied by tables, diagrams and photographs. Material that
could not be incorporated into the main body of the book was presented in four special
appendices.

A perusal of this vast compendium reveals that the overwhelming majority of its
abundant information is totally unrelated to the subject and conclusions of the study.
The report is actually composed of two separate, virtually unconnected sections. The
first section, which includes all the report's investigations and conclusions, consists
of the first three chapters (pp. 1-53) and Chapter 19 (pp. 309-332). These chapters.

24 Refugee Settlement in the Dominican Republic , a survey conducted under the auspices of the Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., published August 1942.

25 Locker, "Exit San Domingo."

26 Introduction to the Report, p. 8.

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which for the sake of convenience we will call "Investigative Chapters," were written
by one Harry B. Smith, formerly of Case, Pomeroy and Company.27 All four chapters
are marked by a striking style and unique methods of reasoning. Smith's evidence for
his conclusions is contained inthefour chapters themselves, and he does not draw on
the information furnished in the rest of the report (and the appendices), which we will
call "Descriptive Chapters." With some justice, the entire report may be regarded as the
creation of one person--the author of the I nvestigative Chapters.

Two chapters bear mentioning because they deviate from the norm. Chapter 20,
"General Conclusions," which was apparently written with the participation or under
the guidance of the study's director (Dana Munro of Princeton University), takes a
sympathetic approach to the Sosua colony and refers courteously to Dorsa. The style
here differs markedly from the Investigative Chapters, and in two places at least this
chapter could have fomented a revolution had the appropriate mental background
exi sted .

Chapter 17 is also unusual. It deals with the development of the colony at Sosua
and logically should have been part of the Investigative Chapters, or served them as a
source for evidentiary material. In practice, the Investigative Chapters make very
little reference to Chapter 17, and then without noting the source of the information.
We shall have more to say about this chapter and its author below.

The underlying premise of the study is to be found in the reports' first chapter.
Here the situation of European refugees in the event of a German victory is discussed
twice in unemotional language. And twice the opinion is given that a Germany loss
will make no great difference in terms of the question under discussion. Oneway or the
other, the report says, fewer and fewer people are immigrating from Europe, and the
probability is that immigration will cease completely. The conclusion is

that the resettlement of Europe's "surplus population" has "already become one
of the postkvar problems" (p. 7). This premise, which effectively meant that rescue was
no longer on the agenda, rendered the study irrelevant to the plan it was supposed to
assess--a plan geared to rescue in emergency conditions. However, this striking fact
bothered neither those who drew up the study nor its ardent exegetes.

One of the unique methods employed by the Brookings Institution scientist was
what, for want of a better epithet, we will call the 'Togetherness Approach."
Essentially this meant that the investigation of the conditions in the Dominican
Republic was wrenched together with an examination of other islands in the West
Indies, or indeed tropical countries in general. The overall conclusions were then
perfunctorily projected on to the Dominican Republic. The dextrous use of this method
produced some impressive results. The situation was as follows: there was the
Dominican Republic, situated on the island of Hispanola in the West Indies. With an
areaof 50,000 sq. km. it was larger than Belgium and Holland, yet its population was
only 15 million. The country was situated in the tropics, but thanks to unique
meteorological conditions the climate in most of the country was comfortable for
Europeans. Unlike the majority of its neighbors in the West Indies, the country was
highly fertile and rich in natural resources. As a result of historical circumstances,
its population was sparse and it was desperate to increase the number of its
inhabitants. The country's economic development in recent years had been
satisfactory, but the government hoped greatly to intensify the pace of development by
increasing the population. These facts were known to all concerned. It had to be shown
that the reverse was true.

The execution of the task using the Togetherness Approach produced the
following results (all emphases in quotations from the report added):

"The first [problem] is that all tropical countr/es open to large-scale settlement are
poor" (p. 39).

"Except perhaps for Cuba and very limited areas elsewhere, the soil in none of the
West I ndies is rich " ( p. 48) .

27 In addition to the four "Clarification Cliapters," Smitli wrote a chapter on the financial and banking system in the Dominican
Republic, a subject which was perhaps closer to his field of expertise.

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'The fact is that there is very little additional crop land available in the West
/ncf/esfor the rapidly rising population. /n most of t/?e/s/anc/s the native food supply is
deficient, particularly in fats. The future of export crops is obscure" (pp. 48-49).

"From 1929 to 1939 the combined population of Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad,
Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico increased from about 4,458,000 to about
5,230,000... Taking thef.o.b. Cuba price as the

base value of sugar for the entire area, the per capita value of total sugar
production declined from $10.00 in 1929 to $7.37 in 1938" (p. 50).

Here there appeared a hitch liable to ruin everything. For even as various sources
were being cited to demonstrate how the West I ndies were becoming bankrupt and were
ever more dependent on food imports, one country stood out as the exception. The
Dominican Republic had greatly increased its food crops, resulting in a 75 percent
declineln food imports between 1929 and 1938 (p. 50).

Similarly, the population density table provided by the author to bolster his case
shows clearly that the Dominican Republic was also exceptional in terms of its sparse
population. Its 85 inhabitants per sq. milecompared with 100 in Cuba, 264 in J amaica,
300 in Haiti, 500 in Puerto Rico, and 1,163 in Barbados (p. 47).

However, these embarrassing phenomena did not prevent the "objective"
scientist from concluding his extensive and tortuous investigation with scholarly
comments formulated with Olympian composure and detachment.

"There is a grave question as to whether the future of the European refugee can be
made secure by transfer from one area of population pressure to another; from an area
of political pressure to an area of economic pressure, eacti equally rutliless" (p. 52).

In this context, "political pressure" on a "surplus population" meant the Nazis'
actions against the J ews. In the view of the report's author, this was no more ruthless
than the anticipated economic pressure in the West Indies. Under the Togetherness
Approach, this enlightened conclusion applied also to the Dominican Republic.

The report's consumers were particularly pleased by its reference to a subject that
was raised and discussed in the document as a gesture of good will and
industriousness. The rac^ color problem was not included in the list of questions
submitted to the Brookings Institution. But its appearance in the report was
amazingly consistent with, and even outdid, the fears of Ida Silverman. Where she had
been concerned that J ews would become non-J ews, the report purported to prove that
white settlements in the Dominican Republic were doomed to become colored.

The underlying basis for this argument was a theory concerning white
settlement in tropical regions developed by the well-known geographer Archibald
Grenfeld Price. The difficult conditions prevailing in these regions. Price maintained,
meant that it was principally persons able to function at a low standard of living who
could survive there. I n the

end. Price says, these people "will usually drive out or absorb people of a higher
standard, unless the latter increase their number through immigration or protect
themselves by political supremacy, social barriers or laws."28 Price then goes on to
formulate a kind of demographic Gresham's Law:29 "In most parts of the tropics the
colored people with their lower standards of living and culture are absorbing the
whites. "30

The Brookings researcher needed no more. Using the Togetherness Approach, he
drew up a table incorporating Barbados, J amaica and the Dominican Republic, worked
out the decline of the white population relative to the overall population in
percentages, and served up the results:

"I n the past 150 years the white population of Barbados has fallen from 20% of the
combined white and colored to 8% and in Jamaica from 8% to 175%. But in the
Dominican Republic the population of whites has declined from somewhere between
70-80 per cent to B per cent in 1925."

28 Grenfell Price, White Settlement in the Tropics , p. 178.

29 "Gresham's Law" (named after the I6th century English financier) states that "bad money drives out good.'

30 Price, p.9.

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The word "but" was e/idently intended to draw the reader's attention to the fact
that proportionately the decline in the Dominican Republic (sixfold) exceeded even
that in Barbados (2.5) and J amaica (4.6). Could anyone still doubt that there was no
difference between Santo Domingo and other tropical countries?

A glance at the table reveals a considerable difference. In Barbados and Jamaica
the period in question had seen an absolute declineln the number of whites, whereas in
the Dominican Republic their number had almost doubled (from 103,000 to 192,000).
Moreover, it turned out that the increase in the number of blacks in the country was
largely due to the entry of tens of thousands of Haitians during the period of conquest,
and the entry of non-white workers from neighboring islands-factors totally
unrelated to the absorption of whites. Nevertheless, loyal to his method, the researcher
concludes: "There is a rising tide of color that must inevitably engulf any but the most
carefully prepared and protected white settlement" (p. 46).

As for how to defend against the inevitable, this depended on the whites
maintaining a proper balance between men and women. The author explains:

'There is no assurance that a fairly equal selection of both sexes for white
colonization will of itself defeat racial mixture in areas of high color density, but there
is every reason to expect a mixture unless a reasonable balance is maintained from the
first."

And what is the situation at Sosua?

"The first group of Sosua settlers was composed of 27 men and 10 women. Over a
year later, with a total of some 324 adults in the colony,

only 88 were white women, of whom all but 23 were married. Of the 20 marriages
recorded, two were between native women and white settlers."

(p. 46)

This was a highly innovative study. Somewhat disgruntled, the author asserts
that "modern colonization continues to ignore this aspect of the settlement problem."
But his scientific contribution bore fruit. The Zionist commentators were most
appreciative. The statistical coupling of B vs. 70-80 was quoted enthusiastically. The
data on the mixed marriages dramatized the abyss lying below the settlers. Berl Locker
sums up his commentary on the subject with a sarcastic quip meant to express the
depth of his shock: "What a wonderful prospect of preserving the Jewish people by a
multiplication of Sosuas in San Domingo and similar territories!"

A point of particular interest to the report's eager interpreters was Dorsa's severe
mistake in saying that the cost of establishing a farming unit at Sosua was $1600,
whereas p. 19 of the report showed definitively that the true cost would exceed $3,000.
One commentary after another took as its point of departure this disparity, as proof
positive of the unreliability of the project's managers.

A reading of p. 19 shows that it was far more equivocal than the commentators
would have one believe. The language is not clear, ambiguity abounds. After citing
settlement costs elsewhere (in Palestine, from $2,500 to $6,000), the author asserts
that the Sosua project contemplates a "repayment" of $1600 from each settler,
"although actual costs to date are undoubtedly at a rate considerably in excess of that
figure."

A footnote provides data on calculating the outlays per unit. Until J une 1941
expenditures at Sosua totalled $650,000, including $111000 for transporting the
refugees from Europe which was covered by other organizations. The list of the 352
settlers on J une 30, 1941 included 234 men. If one divides the total expenses by the
number of men, the resulting figure is approximately $3,000. 'This, of course, is a
very rough measure of unit cost," the report adds, "but it is one that tends to understate
rather than overstate the actual cost."

The estimate was "very rough" indeed, and not only because each male was
considered a separate settler. The cutoff date, J une 1941 was chosen arbitrarily and
the data were not corrected for the report's publication a year later. Was there any
justification for including in the Sosua account the entire $63,000 for Dorsa's general
office costs in New

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York (p. 296), or the entire $45,000 in expenses for contacts witin tine Dominican
government (ibid.)? It was totally inconceivable, from the viewpoint of the settlement
association, to include the $111,000 in transportation costs from Europe which were
defrayed byj ewish welfare organizations. Yet all this is of secondary importance. The
report itself does not say clearly that under the Dorsa plan the settlers' repayment was
meant to cover all the costs involved. Elsewhere (p. 289) it is stated explicitly that the
association did not intend to recover from the settlers their travel costs from Europe or
the costs of maintaining them during their first year at Sosua. The report also
expressed concern (p. 329) that the large disparity between expenses and repayments
would devolve on the association and was liable to affect settlement "in other places."
Hence there was no justification for pitting one sum against the other and then to
claim that the difference showed the failure of the projects' planning.

Nevertheless, the hostile commentators seized on the obscure contradiction and
turned it into the focal point of their campaign to discredit Dorsa's directors. And even
if their reliance on this particular finding was doubtful, the report generally
furnished them with plentiful material that undercut the credibility of the settlement
association. Some of this material is to be found in Chapter 17, but most of it lies in
sarcastic comments and transparent hints scattered through the Investigative
Chapters.

Chapter 17, which describes Sosua's development, notes several mistakes some of
which were due to insufficient guidance by the instructors at the settlement. This
chapter, which is thought to have been written with the participation of Atherton Lee,
director of the U.S. Department of Agriculture experimental station in Puerto Rico,
bears a substantive style and refrains from drawing conclusions regarding the future.
Its mistakes are nearly all ephemeral in character and cast no aspersions on the
project's directors.

I n contrast, implicit attacks on Dorsa abound in the Investigative Chapters. They
begin with a declaration of dissent tailored to fit the leaders of Dorsa and the J oint as
they were depicted by their (moderate) opponents in the Zionist movement: "High
purpose, beneficent i ntention and unselfish labor are no substitute for the experienced
direction and technical supervision that every phase of such an operation requires" (p.
28). In addition to this remonstration, which reappears near the end of the report (p.
332), the concluding passages of certain chapters and sections contain explicit
warnings against bad management. These are couched in positive language-for
example, "this is possible provided there is sound

management"--or in a style of reproach ("bad management is liable to ruin the
entire project"). So systematic are these pronouncements recur that the reader may
well think that the deplorable management encountered by the investigator at every
turn was of such magnitude as to all but distract his attention from other issues.

The Zionist commentators willingly assented to the deprecatory comments
against Dorsa, and added plenty of their own. The disparagement of the settlement
association was an accepted means to scuttle the hated project.

The reckoning of the number of refugees the Dominican Republic was capable of
absorbing appears in the course of a few pages in the final Investigative Chapter, and
is totally unrelated to earlier data. The researcher accepts the fact that the country's
population density is lower than that on the neighboring islands, both in the number
of inhabitants per sq. mile (85) and the number of acres per inhabitant (7.5). However,
he says, these figures are "somewhat deceptive."*

The underlying premise of the investigation was that the country's capacity for
absorption would be determined "upon the basis of easting conditions" (p. 326). This
rule of thumb applied to agricultural and industrial development, methods of soil
cultivation, work productivity, expansion of the domestic and external market, and so
forth. Naturally, an analysis based on a freezing of the situation would be at total
variance with reality. As we shall see, even some of the researchers tried to dissent
from this bizarre principle. But for the author of the Investigative Chapters it proved

most helpful.

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As befits a discussion devoted principally to agriculture, the author begins with
a table showing the different types of land in the country. The table (p. 325, note) is
here reproduced in its entirety:

* The author of the report's fifth chapter sought to make his contribution
by trying to prove that the population density of the Dominican Republic was
too high. To that end, he calculated the number of rural inhabitants per
square mile (68) and found that this exceeded the density in certain other
countries. His conclusion: the Dominican Republic "does not suffer severely
from over- population as Haiti and Puerto Rico do, but it cannot be said to have
a great amount of unoccupied land for new immigrants" (p. 85). Two of the
commentators, Berl Locker and J oseph Schechtmann, were delighted with
this finding, but Harry Smith, the author of the Investigative Chapters,
ignored it, preferring his own proof.

Thousands of acres

Now cultivated crop and planted pasture 2,500
Potentially plowable 500

Total arable area 3,000

Suitable for range 1,500

Suitable for tree crops 1,500

Forested or suitable for forest 4,000
Arid, abandoned or unfertile 2,000
Lakes, cities, towns, villages, roads, military areas 370

Total national area 12,370

The investigator asserts that only 25 percent of the total area "is suitable for
cropping" and that the "cultivated land per inhabitant" stands at 15 acres. The
population, which is growing at a rate of 50,000 per year, will, therefore, "require all
idle or unused arable acreage for its own subsistence within the next five to ten years"
(p. 325^. This ambiguous phrasing leaves it unclear whether, as logic dictates,
supplying the needs of the growing population in agricultural produce will, in five to
ten years, require ("under existing conditions") the cultivation of the unused land,
irrespective of the cultivators' identity; or whether it is being hinted that the local
population requires the available land for itself and cannot concede it to foreign
settlers. A further calculation indicates that the author has in mind the latter
version. Refugee-settlers, the report relates, receive five acres of arable land. Thus the
100,000 refugees referred to by the Dominican government were liable to seize all the
fertile land and leave nothing for the needs of the growing population. "It is clear,
then, that the Dominican capacity to absorb permanent settlement is substantially
smaller than this number" (p. 326).

Once again, we find misunderstandings stemming from ambiguous language.
In the first place, nowhere was it said that all 100,000 refugees would be absorbed in
agriculture. Secondly, was every refugee-settler to receive five acres, or every refugee
even if he was a member of the settler's family? We will have occasion to see that the
relationship between the concepts of "settler" (or household) and "refugee" afford our
researcher wide latitude for statistical ploys. We turn now to the Dominican Republic's
capacity to absorb new immigrants as determined by the Brookings report.

I n addition to the five acres currently being allocated to each settlement unit, the
report explained, an area of similar size would be required "for settler training and
experimental and commercial crop purposes." On top of this, ten more acres would be
needed for orchards and forests, and 15 acres for "natural range." All told, then, each
settler would account for 35 acres.

Nor was this all. Since every agricultural settlement must comprise at least 300
farm units, each "settler community" would need a total of 3,000 acres of "good arable

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

land," 3,000 acres for tree-crops and forest, and 4,000-5,000 acres of "natural range."
The aggregate: i 1,000 acres. The report continues:

In the entire Dominican Republic it would be extremely difficult to find more
than 12 such areas where juxtaposition of land types, adequate rainfall, pure water
supply, communication, and healthful climate are combined within the limits of
effective community operation and administration. The colonization capacity of the
Republic may therefore be placed at around 3,600 settler units, or based on current
refugee immigration, a total of about 5,000 refugee immigrants. (P. 327)

The ratio of 5,000 to 3,600 is approximately 1.14:1. As the report explains, this was
arrived at based on the composition of the immigration to Sosua, where women and
children accounted for 30 percent of the total population. Immediately it is remarked
that the ratio of women must be higher "if a sound community life is to be
established." Why, then, was this unsuitable ratio adduced for the "proper" settlement
that was to be established (after the war) according to the Brookings formula? Why not
a ratio of 2:1 with a wife for every settler, or 3:1 with a wife and an average of one
child? One's impression from the calculations that follow is that the low ratio was
required so that it could be corrected without violating the statistics.

The foil owing are the "practical" corrections to the above calculations:

(1) Of the 12 areas designated for settlement, several are too remote and isolated,
and settlement in them could prove prohibitively costly. On the other hand, larger
areas existed enabling the establishment of more farms than mentioned above.

(2) The allocation of ten acres of arable land per settler does not allow for a
sufficient safety reserve. The amount should be increased to 15 acres.

(3) The low ratio between the number of farming units and the number of
dependents could produce an unbalanced community. It should be raised.

Summing up, the researcher proposes a series of changes designed to balance one
another, so that the overall number of refugees absorbed will remain constant. Seven
settlements would be established housing 2,500 heads of families and 2,500
dependents. All told, the Republic would absorb 5,000 refugees. (P. 328)

This was the end of the calculations. In their wake it was not difficult to provide
the desired answer to the leading question of those who commissioned the study. The
Dominican Republic, the report stated in no uncertain terms, would "never be more
than a minor factor in refugee settlement," adding sternly that this "cannot be
ignored with impunity" (p. 331).

The concluding words of the I nvestigative Chapters deserve to be quoted verbatim:

General Trujillo generously offered to receive 100,000 [refugees] into the
Dominican Republic. But allowing for its own increasing population, the capacity of
the Republic to absorb and support refugee colonization is now found not to be in excess
of 5,000 persons, about evenly divided between heads of family and dependents. In two
years of settlement activity only about 400 persons, or less than one tenth of this
capacity, have been moved into the Republic, and at that the colony is overcrowded. On
this record alone, it seems fairly obvious that a successful solution of refugee distress
depends upon something more than the compassion of statesmen, the generosity of
philanthropists, and the unselfish efforts of humanitarians. The war stoppage of
refugee emigration, tragic though it be, at least provides an opportunity for a
reorientation of approach and reorganization of the method.

(P. 332)

Thus end the I nvestigative Chapters of Harry B. Smith.

The report's concluding chapter was written from the heart, not the head. The
tone is positive and respectful, marked by an openly

sympathetic attitude toward the Sosua colony, along with constructive criticism
of certain actions taken there (based on Chapter 17, which describes the situation).

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proposals for improvement, and appreciation for the experienced management of the
settlement association.

According to the author of this chapter, the local climate does not present a
serious obstacle. The average north- European can live comfortably in the climate of
the Dominican Republic. In fact, in the summer the average farmer in the United
States works longer hours in greater heat than the settler at Sosua.

The anticipated influence of refugee settlement on the Dominican society is
deemed positive. The thousands of European immigrants could raise the level of
agriculture in the country. If their farming enterprise succeeds, their Dominican
neighbors will learn from them improved working methods and better farm
management. The considerations cited here in terms of the expected development of
the country's economy are at a polar remove from the thesis propounded in the
I nvestigative Chapters based on a freeze of the existing conditions.

Similarly, Harry Smith's descriptions of the dangers facing white society and the
white man in the tropics are politely dismissed as unconvincing. Indeed, the
concluding chapter argues, "from the standpoint of the individual settler, life in the
tropics will be far better than the conditions which he leaves behind him" (p. 333). In
addition to this transparent hint, the events of the Holocaust are referred to twice in a
manner which should have opened people's eyes, had the hearts not been shut of both
those who commissioned the report and its consumers.

One of these occasions is intertwined with appreciation expressed for the Sosua
enterprise. The Sosua plan could play a crucial role by showing that refugees can be
settled in tropical or subtropical regions and that the establishment of such colonies
contributes to the prosperity of the country involved. Should the plan succeed, the hope
is that other republics in the Americas will follow in the footsteps of the Dominican
Republic and absorb refugees on a large scale. 'The hope that the/ may be induced to do
so, plus the fact that &/ery individual who does find a home in the Republic is a human
being saved from death or degradation, more than justifies the effort and
expenditure that the Sosua project has involved. "

The other reference is contained in the conclusions regarding the country's
capacity for immigrant absorption. Despite the noble qualities manifested by the
author of the concluding chapter, these conclusions were taken en bloc from the
I nvestigative Chapters, albeit phrased more moderately, and additional disheartening
points were added to the list. The

number of refugees likely to be absorbed was estimated at between 3,000 and
5,000. It was "probable" that the Sosua colony could not support additional settlers,
hence it would be "inadvisable" to try to step up settlement activity. "Unless it seems
imperative to bring large numbers of people to the Republic simply to save them from
persecution, it would clearly be better to establish a small successful colony on a sound
basis than to take the chance of failure by over-rapid expansion."

With these highly meaningful reservations, the report of the nonj ewish
institution was submitted to the Jews who were interested in it. They shocked no one,
fomented no revolutions. Because people's hearts were closed.

The first breach in the learned front of the Brookings report appears on page 341,
in connection with the definitive assertion that the Dominican Republic could
"ultimately" absorb 3,000 to 5,000 immigrants in agriculture. A footnote to this
pronouncement states: "In Mr. Lee's opinion the Republic could accommodate around
10,000 settlers." Whoever has fathomed the language of the report understands that
Lee's estimate is not two or three times greater than that of the report but four to six
times. The report speaks about 3,000-5,000 immigrants, while Lee mentions 10,000
sdtlers, meaning households (families). And even the statistical calculations of the
I nvestigative Chapters finally accepted that a settler family is comprised of two people.

The reader discovers Lee's identity in the introduction to the report. As
mentioned, Atherton Lee was the director of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's
experimental station at Puerto Rico. He also headed the agricultural section of the
Brookings study. Patently, his opinion would be worth something. Yet his assessment,
at such variance with that of the report, is cited offhandedly in a footnote and without
an explanation of its underlying reasoning.

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Some light on this is shed by a counter-report drawn up by Dominican experts
and published by the Dominican government in response to the Brookings study.
According to one of the appendices in the Dominican report, the comments by Lee
quoted in the Brookings report are the conclusion of a detailed survey he submitted to
the directors of the study, but which was not incorporated into the final report. The
reason for this is not hard to understand when one reads Lee's findings and opinions.

Leeasserts that the Dominican Republic (at that time) was exploiting less than
half of its good agricultural land, with the remainder available for cultivation (pp.
102-103).

Secondly, according to the agricultural expert, even in the existing situation and
without expanding the cultivated area, the Dominican Republic could support a
population twice the size of its current population by a suitable selection of grains,
improved utilization of irrigation water, and intensified industrialization.

And third, Lee says, the full exploitation of the available soil would, "according to
a modest estimate," enable a population of 5-6 million to be maintained-four times
the current number (pp. 104, 105).

As for the absorption of refugees in the agricultural sector, Lee provided a
detailed table showing where they could be settled in the conditions of 1941 The sites
are listed according to their order of priority and for each location Lee gives the area of
cultivation, the type of agriculture recommended, the estimated price of the land, and
the number of households designated for settlement. The first two places on the list are
Lower Sosua (already in existence) which would accommodate a hundred families
working 800 acres of vegetable gardens, and Upper Sosua, where a thousand families
would earn thei r I i vi ng from 15,000 acres of orchards and forest.

All told, Lee saw room for over 10,000 refugee families, or about 40,000 people (pp.
100-101,107).

In a detailed letter to Dorsa director James Rosenberg (pp. 108-112), Lee refers to
several points on which he dissents from the Brookings report. He rejects out of hand
the report's principal premise that the island's capacity for absorption should be
calculated in terms of a freeze of the "existing conditions." He dismisses the contention
that the absence of a sufficient local market would limit the possibilities of
agricultural development. In addition to the domestic market, which was developing
at a satisfactory pace, the Dominican Republic could, in Lee's view, become an
important supplier of agricultural foodstuffs and raw materials to the United States,
Puerto Rico, and other Caribbean islands.

A note of bitterness and affront is discernible in Lee's claim that he investigated
the question of available land "more than any of my colleagues." He was the only
researcher to visited a certain area, where he found extensive tracts of unused fertile
land and plentiful water. The letter concludes with a somewhat surprising revelation:
"I wish to express my great regret at not having an opportunity to examine the
manuscript of the report prior to its publication, with the exception of the agricultural

chapters... I thought it my duty to write this letter to apprise you and your
colleagues that the report differs considerably from my views."

A year earlier, Atherton had predicted a "brilliant success" for Sosua (while
arguing with the Dorsa experts about the type of produce that was desirable in the
colony) and advocated the immediate expansion of the settlement project by acquiring
and developing new locales. BlThis fact renders doubly significant the rejection of his
contribution regarding the county's capacity for absorption and his effective removal
from the discussion through the shelving of his survey.

The response of the Dominican expert commission to the Brookings report bristles
with indignation and amazement that the well-known scientific institution had
published a book "overflowing with mistakes and wrongheadedness." The authors of
the Brookings report are accused of ignorance, superficiality, and maliciousness. The
bulk of the criticism is directed at the chapter dealing with the island's capacity for

31 Capacity of the Dominican Republic to Absorb Refugees , findings of the commission appointed by the executive power of the
Dominican Republic to appraise the report of the Brookings Institution concerning the colonization of refugees in Santo Domingo.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

absorption. In a report crammed with "departures from common sense," tine
Dominicans say, nowhere are they more flagrant than in this chapter. Of the three
agricultural experts included in the Brookings study team, onlyAtherton Lee actually
conducted a land survey, and none of the three took part in writing the chapter under
discussion. As for the chapter's author, Harry Smith, he is said to have seen
Dominican land "only in the form of city streets and highway paving" (pp. 28, 29).

To illustrate Smith's ignorance in agriculture, the Dominicans note, among
other points, his confused use of terminology relating to types of land. They are
scornful of his use of the term "plowable land" in reference to all agricultural land.
Not all land suitable for agriculture requires plowing, and not all land that is
susceptible to plowing is fit for agricultural cultivation. To prevent confusion, the
authors say, accurate labelling is necessary. Thus, "cultivatable land" refers to soil
that gives yield in the wake of cyclical sowing, a harvest of agricultural value, or
fodder for animals (p. 25^.

(It bears noting, in this connection, that the table showing the different types of
land which, according to Harry Smith, was prepared by the study team's agricultural
experts, does not appear in the chapter devoted to agriculture. Whereas the table that
Atherton Lee submitted to the study's directors was drawn up very differently and is
not marred by the terminological confusion of Smith's chart.)

The Brookings report claim that only 25 percent of the county's land can produce
crops and that no more than 500,000 acres of such land

are still available, is dismissed as absurd and ludicrous. The truth is, the
Dominicans say, that anyone familiar with the local agriculture is aware that with
the exception of La Vega Real, part of the eastern flatlands, and certain areas adjacent
to the main highways, the best land for agriculture is virgin land (p. 26).

The critics base themselves on the published results of studies and surveying
carried out over many years by scientists from various countries, some of which flatly
contradict Smith's findings. One of the appendices in the Dominican document provide
a breakdown of the country's land in terms of agricultural value: First-class land--
45.1 percent; second-class-- 19.1 percent; third-class-26.1 percent; unfit for
cultivation--9.7 percent (p. 54). A vast gulf separates these figures from Smith's data.

In taking issue with the data on refugee absorption, the Dominicans were
objecting not only to the Brookings report, but indirectly also to the vacillating and
narrowminded policy of Dorsa. The Dominican response recalls the simple fact: that
this was a rescue mission. 'The immigration we proposed [at Evian] was, in the
circumstances, a rescue immigration and not a transfer of people who could choose
freely between a good or a better place" (p. 15). In this connection, the Dominicans see
no point in restricting the absorption plan to the settlement of well-to-do farmers
possessing 35 acres of land per household, as planned by the Brookings Institution
scientist. They do not deny that their own internal plans for immigrant absorption
(380,000 persons in 20 years) prefer that the new inhabitants engage primarily in
agriculture. However, they add caustically, "we have all understood that /n the existing
concf/t/ons it is impossible to rea//zethe ideal. In these circumstances, we accepted the
fact that in receiving on our soil human beings expelled by nations for whom science
oven-ides their Christian duty, we will offer these wretched people living conditions
suitablefor ourselves." (P. 19, emphases in the original.)

Refuting the Brookings thesis that the Dominican Republic is incapable of
absorbing more than 5,000 refugees, the Dominicans point out that their country has
already taken in twice that number without any difficulties. These refugees arrived
totally destitute. Efforts were made to settle some of them on the land. But as nearly all
of them were accustomed to non-agricultural pursuits, they had moved to the cities
and integrated themselves into the local economy according to their skills. (P. 16, 17)

The Dominicans angrily refute the Brookings report's false contention that under
the terms of Dorsa's agreement with the Dominican government the settlers are
prohibited from engaging in any activity that competes with local enterprises of the
same type (Brookings report, p. 317). In fact, as regards competition with local
industry, the agreement (Par. 4c) states that materials and equipment imported by
Dorsa for plants of this category will not be duty-free, as distinct from goods imported
for other settler enterprises. The purpose of this codicil, which affirms indirectly that
the settlers may engage in professions that compete with local inhabitants, is to
protect the local industries, which pay full tax when importing goods.

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The Dominican response reiterates tinat tineir country is open to urban
immigration. It is asserted tinat the agreement witin Dorsa speal<s about the entry of
industrial workers, artisans, and (it is stressed) tradesmen. Some 80 percent of the
refugees who had arrived since the war's outbreak had eventually settled in the cities.
The country's economy would benefit from an increase in the percentage of urban
dwellers, and European immigrants were especially welcome.

Both documents, the Brookings report and the Dominican response, although
drawn up by non-J ewish bodies, are essentially J ewish documents. Their publication
was connected with the horrific events thej ewish people was undergoing, and they are
evidence of dereliction on the part of those whose standing made it their duty and
responsibility to provide help and rescue. Circumstantial evidence and considerations
based on openly declared motives leave no doubt that the initiative for the unfortunate
study came from Zionist circles. How it came to pass that the highly prestigious and
reputable Brookings I nstitution produced such a deficient and fallacious document, is
a question beyond the scope of this book. What is not open to question is that the ardent
consumers of that document were Zionists from every faction and every country. We
will consider a few of them.

A wide-ranging response came from the Zionist leader Berl Locker, at that time in
chargeofthej ewish Agency's political activity in London. 32 Locker's article included
a detailed survey of the Santo Domingo affair and extensive quotations from the
Brookings report. There was no nonsense or folly too great for Locker to repeat in the
awe-stricken tones of a true believer revealing lofty truths. Here we find the "rising
tide of color" that will engulf the refugees and the complacent comparison of the
problem of "surplus population" in Europe with the economic pressure

to be expected in the West I ndies. Even the thesis of the allegedly high population
density in the Dominican Republic, rejected by Harry Smith, is found suitable for
serving up to the reader as a surprising truth exposed by the well-known scientific
institution.

Locker's effusive delight at the plan's failure is reflected in the waggish title he
gives his article, drawn from the world of dramaturgy, "Exit San Domingo"-exit from
the stage, that is--and his recounting of the droll tale of a would-be rider whose horse
had "ended." This jocular story frames the article. For the analogy is with the various
forms of territorialism: "And it is to be hoped that benevolent statesmen, J ewish
territory-hunters, dispersed colonization advocates and Palestine- blind

philanthropists will ponder over its [the study's] lessons when they come to consider
the question: Which horse next?"

A similar conclusion was reached by Dr. Arye Tartakower, writing in the New
York weekly of Poalei Zion.33 As a trained sociologist he does not condone Harry
Smith's amazing notions, but he does accept the report's lethal findings as gospel
truth: no more than 5,000 refugees can be settled, in small groups and over a lengthy
period. The reasons: there is not enough available land, the country is poor, its
economic future uncertain. Tartakower is particularly taken with the report's verdict,
as he terms it--that the Dominican Republic is unlikely to play more than a minor role
in solving the refugee problem. Like his London colleague, he too concludes with a call
to arms and a warning. Apprehensive that this will not be the last territorial ist plan,
he declares: "We must imprint in the minds of Jews and others of good will that only
one way exists to solve the refugee problem, that all forces must be concentrated
around this way, and money not wasted on unproductive side programs."

A tone of total refusal to compromise and unswerving belief in the verities of the
report shines through the article by the Revisionist leader J oseph Schechtmann in the
journal of the American J ewish Congress.34 The author launches an ad hominem
attack on Dr. Rosen and, like Locker, loyally parrots Harry Smith's conclusions. At one
point he inadvertently hits upon the truth in speaking about the "crushing blow" the
Brookings Institution delivered to the Dominican plan. Before the report's publication.

32 Locker, "Exit San Domingo."

33 Arye Tartakower, "Asof fun nacli an llusieh," Iddishier Kempfer , January 8, 1943.

34 J. Sclieclitmann, "Failure of the Dominican Scheme: Brookings Report Writes Finis to Colonisation Project," Congress Weekly ,
January 15, 1943.

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he points out, "well-founded doubts" had been voiced concerning the plan, but had
been denounced as Zionist atrocity- propaganda.

Unlike the two critics cited above, Schechtmann does not ignore the references to
the Holocaust in the report's final chapter.

The authors [of the report] do not deny the purely philanthropic value of the
Dominican experiment. They realize that every refugee transferred from the European
inferno is a human being saved from death and degradation. They are, therefore, ready
to consider the effort and expenditure involved in the Sosua project as justified. This
friendly concession does not, however, alter to any extent the factual balance of their
authoritative report: 474 settlers represent the limit of Sosua itself, and the utmost
limit of the whole resettlement work in the Dominican Republic is 3,000 to 5,000
people on the land, with an unspecified additional number scattered in industrial
undertakings. This small J ewish minority is doomed to be engulfed by the "rising tide
of color."

To respond to the hint about the possibility of bringing in Jews in order to save
them--for this the national sentiment of the Zionist functionary was insufficient.

And in distant Tel Aviv, the journalist Dr. Herzl Rosenbloom was summing up
the failure of territorial ism from Uganda to Santo Domingo. 35 He collected various
territori all St schemes until he reached the unlucky number of thirteen. This enabled
him to relate some piquant stories about people's fear of the frightening number and to
hint that when it came to immigration proposals for Jews, there really was something
foreboding in it. Regarding the Dominican plan, Rosenbloom wrote: 'The principal
cause of the failure is apparently the cruel climate of the region, from which the
natives themselves flee... It was thought that the J ews would succeed where the natives
failed. But such thoughts were groundless."

Concluding his article. Dr. Rosenbloom excoriated certain Zionists who had
expressed support for non-Zionist immigration plans. 'That the assimilationists
should believe-that is to be expected! But that Zionists too should be among the
believers... They are a strange tribe, these Zionists: in 1923 they went looking for
immigrants. And now, when there are immigrants, they go looking for territories... B
immigration plans. Whereas I would make do with the 14th plan, which is the first
and the last."

I ndeed, there were Zionists, individuals or groups, who deviated from the line at
every stage of Zionism's war on territorialism. Some of

them were leading figures, such as Ruppin and Rubashov (Shazar) during the
Evian Conference. But never did their stands bring about a change in Zionist policy. In
the case of Ruppin-Rubashov, as we saw, the policy makers simply outflanked the
dissenters without engaging them in debate. I n other cases, when the exponents of the
wrong opinion were liable to take act/on, their superiors did not balk at calling them to
order, discreetly or publicly. We learned of one such case, which occurred parallel to
the onset of the Santo Domingo affair, from a conversation with one of those
involved. 36 Partial documentation was also obtained.

When the idea of bringing J ews to Alaska was raised in the United States, a group
of Poalei Zion activists there organized themselves to help further the plan. A
committee was formed with the participation of Halm Greenberg, Arye Tartakower,
David Wertheim, and others. Editorials appeared in the Poalei Zion press advocating
the Alaska settlement project.37 "And then," our interlocutor related, "we were
reprimanded by the World Zionist Organization leadership-severely reprimanded."
Letters from the Yishuv demanded that they desist from their harmful activity. Berl
Locker in London wrote a blistering article (which, unfortunately, we have not been
able to locate). The case against them went like this: "How can you, Poalei Zion
members, be propagandizing for Jewish settlement in Alaska? As Zionists, you must
surely know that this is simply not done!" Of no avail was the argument that they did

35 Dr. H. Rosenbloom, "13," Haboker , December 11, 1942.

36 Second recorded conversation with Prof. Tartakower, August 15, 1974.

37 Iddisher Kempfer , May 17, 1940; Jewish Frontier , May 1940.

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not intend to send to Alaska people who could be settled in Eretz-lsrael, but only those
who could not otherwise be saved. The annulment of the plan in the depths of
Congressional bureaucracy spared the committee members from having to proclaim
their surrender. But their behavior in the Dominican affair indicates that they
learned well the lesson of their clash with the Zionist establishment.

There were also some who objected to the Zionists' enthusiasm regarding the
Brookings report. The report of the scholarly institution reminded Abraham
Revusky38 of the notorious report issued by Sir John Hope Simpson who in 1939 was
delegated by the British government to examine the absorptive ability of Palestine and
reached the conclusion that there was no room for even one more settler. Revusky saw
in the Brookings report the same narrowminded approach, failure of understanding,
and absence of vision that marked the Simpson document. The same unbending
insistence on the "existing conditions" without consideration for possibilities of
development in agriculture and industry.

All told, Revusky writes, the Dominican survey is not as thorough or as
convincing as most of the other Brookings I nstitution studies he has

seen. The reader's impression was that in the view of the report's authors, a
general acquaintance with the situation in the country was sufficient to make a
judgment on the settlers' prospects for success. The result was a study of which 85
percent could just as well have been written without leaving the Congressional Library
in Washington.

At the same time, Revusky takes note of the immense difference between the fate
of the Simpson report and the probable impact of the Brookings report. Since the
former's publication the Jewish population of Palestine had trebled, and might have
grown even more had it not been for the artificial restrictions imposed by the British
Mandate authorities. The Zionist movement and the Yishuv had utterly rejected and
repudiated the hostile document.

I n contrast, no public force existed capable of standing up against the Brookings
report. Neither the philanthropists of Dorsa nor, certainly, the settlers themselves had
the strength to revolt against the findings. Hence the report was liable to be accepted as
"the death knell of the ambitions project." This would greatly grieve Abraham
Revusky, an unorthodox Zionist. He could find no justification for a Zionist not to look
favorably on any non-Zionist J ewish settlement activity, particularly when supported
by people inherently unable to direct their energies to Eretz-lsrael.

Thus-Abraham Revusky. This time no reprimand was required, there was no
need to argue with him. His article was entitled, "Another Project Fades Out." But the
cover of the issue in which the article appeared called it, unemotionally, "Failure in
Santo Domingo."

Failure how and why? The first part of this two-pronged question is far more
easily and unhesitatingly answered than the second. The plan to absorb 100,000
refugees in the Dominican Republic did, indeed, fail after only 500 refugees had
settled there. The direct expression of this failure was the fact that reFugees ceased
arr/V/ng. The flow of refugees, never more than meager, gradually became even slower
and stopped completely by the second half of 1942. From May 1940 to J une 30, 1941 352
refugees reached Sosua, another 120 arrived between J uly 1941 and J uly 1942, and
until the end of the war their number never totalled much above 500.

The dates show that the writing of the Brookings report and the downturn in the
refugee influx occurred simultaneously. As we saw, Harry Smith pointed to the
cessation of immigration as a fact and saw in it confirmation of his views. It was not
the report's publication that caused

the stoppage in the arrival of refugees. But this is not to say that the Brookings
document did not play a part in the plan's demise. Pursuing Abraham Revusky's
metaphor, it can be said that the report fulfilled the role of a highly reliable mortuary
that gave the plan an ostentatious funeral. This respectable funeral created the
impression that the deceased died a natural death and was not murdered, heaven

38 Avraham Revusky, "Another Project Fades Out," Jewish Frontier . April 1943.

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forbid, by bandits. Not everyone read tine 410-page volume, and very few tool< tine
trouble to master it as Revusl<y did, ** But many heard about the conclusions reached
by the prestigious institution following two years of thorough and detailed research.
The impressive image of the research institute and the manner in which the report
was submitted induced a widespread comfortable feeling that no injustice had been
done to the settlement project. Since immigration there had ceased in any case, what
more could be done? Oneway or the other, it had been demonstrated conclusively that
the plan was unworkable. The upshot was that potential public criticism of the
project's cessation was checked, and no one delved into the reasons for what had
occurred.

Here we come to the second part of our question: why did the plan fail? Since we
have already determined that the symptom of the failure was that the flow of refugees
dried up, it remains to look for the cause.

The report's answer is emphatic and brooks no argument the flow or refugees
ceased due to transportation difficulties caused by the exigencies of the war. Some
historians have repeated this explanation, albeit with reservations. 39

The truth is that the cutback in civilian seaborne traffic on the part of the
belligerents greatly impeded the transportation of refugees.-The Nazis' conquest of
Western Europe in May 1940 and Italy's entry into the war the following month ruled
out departures from many European ports. America's entry into the war in December
1941severely compounded these difficulties. Nevertheless, numerous possibilities for
seaborne transportation still existed, and there were tens of thousands of J ews who
could have been evacuated. Portuguese and Spanish ships regularly called at
Caribbean ports, 40 and refugees from various places in Europe arrived in those two
countries. Nearly 100,000 J ewish refugees passed through Portugal during the war,41
and many of them waited there months or years for the chance to leave. Until
November 1942, and until Germany's

** Incidentally, Revusky too was misled by the report's assertion that
the agreement with Dorsa forbade the settlers to compete with local industry.
He was highly critical of this clause—which was, as mentioned, nonexistent.

conquest of southwestern France, refugees from France and Switzerland could be
taken out via Spain and Portugal.

The entry of additional refugees into these two countries was liable to be a
function of the rate of evacuation of their predecessors. *** Any delay in removing
refugees from there harmed the prospects of saving other refugees. And even though,
fortunately, the haven in Portugal and access thereto via Spain were maintained
throughout the war, there was good reason to fear that the situation would deteriorate
because of the pro-German sentiments in both countries (Spain, it will be recalled,
sent the "Blue Division" to H itier's aid).

It is clear, then, that even without reference to other places and possibilities,
there were in the Iberian Peninsula large numbers of refugees anxiously awaiting
evacuation, there were free ports of departure and neutral shipping lines, and there
was a country ready to absorb the refugees. Yet the refugees did not arrive. Why?

We are compelled to fall back on a con/ecture, based, we believe, on a high degree
of probability and internal logic, but one which is only partially confirmed by the
testimonies we were able to collect. Our conjecture is that the same people and
institutions that sabotaged the American wing of the Santo Domingo project, also
worked to thwart it at its European points of origin. While we lack sufficient evidence,
we believe that the officials of the Zionist movement who were connected or involved
with refugee relief organizations and J ewish immigration societies, worked to prevent
the transfer of refugees to the Dominican Republic. The transportation difficulties
served these officials as a pretext and auxiliary means to limit the number of
candidates and postpone their departure as long as possible. The reply of our

39 "What was extraordinarily difficult was first and foremost the transfer of settlers from European countries to San Domingo"—
Tartalfower, Jewish Settlement in the Diaspora , p. 169; "The inability of the refugees to leave Europe, particularly following the
U.S. entry into the war, worked against the rapid development of the Sosua plan"--Wischnitzer, To Dwell in Safety , p. 236.

40 American Jewish Year Book, Vol. 44, p. 296.

41 Wyman, p.l50.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

interlocutor, a personage quite l<nowledgeable in J ewisin immigration, winen asl<ed
winetiner our conjecture was reasonable, attested to a moral-intellectual effort on his
part to adhere to the truth despite psychological and emotional inhibitions. The
following are excerpts from our conversation: 42

Question: Was there no discrimination against the Dominican Republic among
the organizations involved in evacuating refugees--in the sense that they didn't want
to send people there?

*** This was perceptibly illustrated in Spain when the authorities
refused to permit the entry of a group of Greek Jews bearing Spanish
nationality who were incarcerated in Bergen-Belsen, until the evacuation of
a group of survivors who had arrived previously from France. Halm Avni,
"Spanish Nationals in Greece and their Fate During the Holocaust," Yad
Vashem Studies, Vol. VI 1 1, pp. 52-53 (Hebrew).

Answer: I think not. As regards the Jewish Agency, yes. The Jewish Agency was
interested, and rightly so, in transferring people elsewhere than to Santo Domingo,
and exclusively to Eretz-lsrael.

Question: Yes, but this was not possible. The possibility of getting to Eretz-lsrael
did not always exist.

Answer: As long as the possibility seemed to exist... The Jewish Agency was
inclined against Santo Domingo from the beginning. I already said that Mrs. Ida
Silverman wrote what she wrote as an emissary of the World Zionist Organization.
They opposed the [project]. They saw it as being directed against Eretz-lsrael.

Question: Even without heed to the dangers facing those who remained in
Europe?

Answer: Even without heed. The Zionists were against that settlement [project].

Later in the conversation, my interlocutor said: "Within the WZO there was a
kind of psychosis on this subject. They thought that every Jewish settlement plan was
directed against settlement in Eretz-lsrael."

A second and more concrete testimony came from a personage who was directly
involved in dealing with refugees. This person, at the time a member of the Zionist
Actions Committee, was employed by the Office of the League of Nations' High
Commissioner for Refugees. As an official representative of that body, he arrived in
fall 1941 (in the ten-day period between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur) on the Isle of
Man, where 3,000 refugees from Germany were being held as "citizens of an enemy
state." He was accompanied byj ames Rosenberg's daughter. The purpose of their visit
was to choose candidates for the Dominican project. At the end of our conversation,
after he had endeavored to reconstruct events that had taken place over thirty years
earlier, this was the picture that emerged:

His arrival evoked a good deal of interest among the detainees. Many of them
crowded around his room. Everyone wanted to talk to him and discover the purpose of
his visit. Several hundred people signed up to meet with him.

"And then," he continued, "I called in all those who signed up and I had a
personal talk with each and every one of them separately: Why do you want to go? What
do you know about it? Do you know that once you get there you will not be able to leave?
That you will not be allowed in...

Question: Wasn't your talk intended as a warning: "Jew, why go there?" Was
somethi ng I i ke that goi ng on?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Why?

Answer: What do you mean, "why"?

Question: Why means... A person wants to go, he will get out of Europe... What do
you care if he goes?

Answer: First of all, there were few possibilities to go.
Question: That was because of...
Answer: Because of transportati on .

42 Second recorded conversation with Prof. Tartaliower, August 15, 1947.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Question: Do I understand correctly that you wanted to have the number of
candidates tally with the number of available places on the ships? How should I
understand this?

Answer: We wanted to have the number of candidates tally with the possibilities,
the combination of possibilities: transportation, visas, former profession, and so forth.

Question: What happened after these meetings?

Answer: They were supposed to sign that they would not try to leave [the
Dominican Republic] illegally for America. And they were warned that they could not
obtain exit papers legally.

Question: How many signed?

Answer: About two hundred people.

Question: And these two hundred went to Santo Domingo?

Answer: Some of them.

He also related that he reported on the results of his mission to Berl Locker.
Professor Samuel (Solomon?) Troun, who carried out a similar mission in Switzerland,
also spoke with Locker. "We both held the same opinion [about the Dominican
settlement project]--that it was very bad. "43

At the Sixth Zionist Congress, Dr. Bernstein-Cohen, a fierce opponent of the
Uganda plan, spoke in favor of subjecting the Jewish people to "starvation treatment"
because afflictions steeled its ideals. Even at the beginning of the century this
audacious proposal was marked by a substantial element of cruelty. But surely not
even in his worst nightmares could the energetic physician have imagined how the
Zionist movement would fulfill his recommendation forty years later, when the
afflictions took the form of total destruction and passive posture became active
opposition. When in December 1942 Chaim Weizmann cautioned against "diverting
the energy of the Jewish people from building Eretz-lsrael by dazzling it with the
illusion of other lands, "44 he was repeating verbatim the emotional call of Yehiel
Chelnovat the Uganda Congress. But in the changed circumstances this call took on a
wholly different meaning. Whereas in 1903 Chelnov had feared that the nascent
Zionist movement

would be stifled by territorialist temptations, Weizmann's remark on the eve of
1943 marked the failure of urgent rescue efforts on the part of Zionism. The pretext was
a war on territorial ism, and there were many Zionists who believed that rescue
missions would in fact endanger Zionism. These fears derived from a narrowminded
concept of Zionism and impatience regarding passing difficulties. An inclusive
Zionism, a Zionism that was not fragmented, would not have objected to the rescue of
J ews, since such rescue is the very essence of Zionism. Yet even the truncated Zionism
of the post- Uganda era had nothing to fear in the long term from rescue efforts. Its own
direct self-interest should have prompted the Zionist movement to enlist itself in such
efforts and initiate them wherever possible. By doing so, it would have helped assure
theexistenceof that S/?e'e-/t/-/ap/etah, the surviving remnant, which was vital for the
realization of Zionism, that surviving remnant for which, it will be recalled, Ben-
Gurion prayed, but whose actuality was far from assured in the onrushing events. In
this case, Zionist participation in rescue efforts would not have harmed the movement,
and probably Zionist fund-raising also would not have been the loser. As it turned out
after the Holocaust, and as could have been foreseen, every group of survivors, by
virtue of its collective experience, was a bearer of the Zionist idea. Moreover, the
readiness of Jews in the free countries to contribute capital and energy increased as
the needs and tasks grew.

These considerations, augmented by a simple Love of Israel, could have dictated
to the Zionist movement behavior commensurate with the emergency needs of the
horrific hour. Disastrously, no leaders of stature emerged who were capable of seeing
the full scope of the problems and the possibilities. No one came forward like Herzl,
Syrkin, or Shimon Rosenbaum, who had embodied the pain of thej ewish people during
the Uganda crisis. Zionist fund- raisers in New York were practical enough to

43 Third recorded conversation with Shalom Adler-Rudell, October 6, 1974.

44 Davar, December 10, 1942.

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understand the benefit to be derived from integrating the Palestine Fund witin tine
United J ewisin Appeal. But in tine political realm, no one in New York, in London, or in
J erusalem had the imagination to integrate Zionist activity into the great mission of
saving Jews wherever they were and by every possible means. Individuals such as
Abraham Revusky had no influence in the movement, while Halm Greenberg and his
colleagues, who tried to apply Rosenbaum's doctrine in the Alaska episode, were called
to order.

The Santo Domingo affair in all its stages marks a peak in the Zionist movement's
cruel attitude toward the distress of the J ewish people. It took place in the atmosphere
of alienation that had already engendered

opposition to sending food packages to Jews in Poland and the thwarting of
Avraham Silbershein's efforts to extricate J ews from concentration camps. Yet its
significance is immeasurably more profound than anything that had gone before. The
extenuating circumstances in the earlier cases-lack of knowledge, mistaken
assessment, an absence of foresight -had all fallen by the wayside. As the Santo
Domingo affair progressed, the situation of the Jews in Occupied Europe became
increasingly clearer and better known. And, congruently, whatever might moderate
one's assessment of the Zionists' maltreatment of thosej ews, faded away.

The absolute height of this development was the Zionists' victory cry upon the
publication of the Brookings report. Berl Locker's triumphant article, along with the
articles of Schechtmann, Tartakower and Rosenbloom, appeared in the period from
December 1942-April 1943-in every instance after November 23, 1942. The details of
the Holocaust, the ongoing total annihilation of European Jewry, were known to
anyone who took an interest. The existence of the Holocaust had been officially
recognized by the Zionist movement and by the Yishuv. Work stoppages and mass
meetings of mourning had just been held in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. All over the free
world protest rallies were conducted with the Zionists' active participation. In a huge
rally in New York's Madison Square Garden, Chaim Weizmann and Stephen Wise
accused the nations of the world of showing indifference to the Jewish people's
calamity. Six of the twelve demands raised at the rally concerned the need to find
havens for the survivors. At the very same time Zionist officials were delighted that
they had managed to block one of the most concrete and generous havens in existence.

The Santo Domingo affair, with the Brookings report and the response of the
Dominican republic, represents a spectacle whose historical significance and
underlying ramifications cannot be expunged from the history of the J ewish people. A
small country opening wide its gates to Jewish refugees and remaining steadfast in
the face of outside objections and interference-this is not a phenomenon to reinforce
the thesis of the world's indifference to the Holocaust. Certainly one cannot ignore the
bitter lesson of the behavior manifested by our own liberation movement in this tragic
affair.

We will conclude this chapter with a few remarks about the major actor in our
story: Dorsa (and its sponsor, thej oint).

The behavior of Dorsa and its founder, the Joint, in the Santo Domingo affair
constitutes a salient example of the weakness of the non-Zionist Jewish public during
the Holocaust. These organizations bore a

good deal of the responsibility for the project's failure, notwithstanding the good
will and great devotion of the officials involved. Their original sin, one they shared
with the Zionists, lay in their lack of foresight and absence of a sense of the urgency of
the rescue mission. They, like the Zionists, did not see in 1939 what was about to occur
and did not grasp what was occurring in the first years of the war. Unlike Zionism,
Dorsa and theJ oint had no active public rearguard, ready to fulfill missions and serve
as emissaries, beyond the collection and distribution of money.

In addition, Dorsa inherited from its founder-progenitor a serious organizational
deficiency that hampered it and caused innumerable hitches and blunders. In the
Santo Domingo affair theJ oint behaved like certain generals who always fight the last
war. TheJ DC had years of experience in settling Jews in the Ukraine and the Crimean
Peninsula. To facilitate this, a special subsidiary association, Agrojoint, had been
created which engaged primarily in agricultural settlement. When the Dominican
proposal arose, it was turned over to the currently idle Agrojoint apparatus.

Trujillo's special interest in agricultural settlers was consistent with the
experience and inclinations of the Agrojoint personnel, who were determined to make

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the project a success story of exemplary agricultural settlement. To ensure that
outcome, cautionary measures were adopted that stood in flagrant contradiction to the
required and potential pace of bringing in refugees. When J ames Rosenberg related
with satisfaction how he had explained to the inhabitants of the island, disappointed
at the slow inflow of refugees, that this was a precaution to ensure the project's success,
he could not know that within a few years his words would be testimony to an
unexpiable sin of neglect. True, the Dominican government preferred agricultural
settlement, but under no circumstances did it close the gates to refugees who intended
to engage in other professions, including commerce. This was stated emphatically and
extensively in the Dominican response to the Brookings report, and explicitly in the
agreement with Dorsa (Par. 2b). A special clause (4p) enabled Dorsa to establish in the
Dominican Republic centers for the temporary absorption of refugees lacking a
profession in order to ready them for integration into the local economy. The
Dominican government did not hesitate to issue visas to whoever Dorsa recommended.
At one point Dorsa had in its possession 4,000 visas.45 In these conditions, many
thousands of people could have been brought into the country in 1940 and 1941, too, not
to mention 1939, a year wasted on niceties of negotiation.

But Dorsa was in no hurry. Activity that went beyond exemplary agricultural
settlement was none of its concern. Apprehensive of interference or of harm coming to
its pet project, Dorsa did not bring "superfluous" refugees. There are indications that
the precautions were extreme to the point where the vanguard groups did not even
include the young settlers' parents or their parents' families. 46

With some justice it can be said that if for Zionism rescue was synonymous with
aliyah, for the Joint in the Dominican Republic it meant successful agricultural
settlement. And if Zionism bears responsibility for torpedoing the project deliberately,
the J DC is not exempt from responsibility for not taking advantage of the existing
possibilities due to narrowmindedness and misplaced complacency. It is, moreover,
probable that its deficient conception weakened its ability to defend itself against the
attacks of the Zionists and the rejection scheme of the Brookings Institution. At the
same time, the organization's meager strength was not up to the task of extricating
refugees and bringing them to the available haven. When intensive efforts were
required to overcome the growing difficulties, thej DC lacked the devoted emissaries of
the Zionist movement.

45 Herbert Agar, The Saving Remnant , New York, 1962, p. 82.

46 Chanin, p. 50.

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VOLUME I
NOTES

Abbreviations

CZA -- Central Zionist Archives

YVA -- Yad Vasinem Arcinives

FRUS -- Foreign Relations of tine United States

Br. Doe. -- Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1929'

Ger. Doc. -- Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945

Record -- Contemporary] ewish Record

I MT -- Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the I nternational Military Tribunal

241

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Post-Ugandan Zionism
On Trial

A Study of the Factors that Caused

the M istakes M ade by the Zionist M ovement

during the Holocaust

Volume II

S. B.Beit Zvj

242

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CONTENTS
VOLUME TWO

PARTTHREE: WITHOUT A COMPASS

Preface page 1

Chapter 10: Budding Alienation page 3

War on Agudat Israel and Avraham Silbershein, who sought to aid Polish J ewry--
Nahum Goldmann counsels the Galicians in America

Chapter 11: "Patria, " "Struma" and Bermuda page 2 1

Patria and her scuttlers--The double miracle in Haifa port--Sharett and Lavon on the
Patria disaster-- E I iezer Kaplan cites a proposal from London on a joint Anglo-Zionist
front against Hitler-The mysterious sinking of the Struma--A shameful chapter in
Bermuda--Two presidents meet in the White House

Chapter 12: Sluggistiness page 55

Adier-Rudell tries to rescue 20,000 children via Sweden-The efforts and partial
success of Rabbi Weismandell-Proposal of the Nazi leadership to halt the annihilation
immediately--The Zionist leadership knew about the offer but paid no heed

Chapter B: TotlieEnd... page 85

The American-based Hebrew monthly Bitzaron ridicules the rabbis' march in
Washington with the participation of Peter Bergson-Stephen Wise fights the creation
of the War Refugee Board with help from the poet Natan Alterman-Yoel Brand helps
Eichmann sell the Americans the "goods for blood" deal-Kastner organizes the train
of the privileged

PART FOUR : HI STORY WRITI NG AND LESSONS

Preface: The opinion of my students and the version of Gideon Hausner page 122

Chapter 14: Writing theHistory page 126

The Israeli Holocaust research establishment is erected on the ideological foundations
of the wartime militant minority, from whom they inherited their modes of study and
debate-Censorship and ostracism of those who do not assent or do not fit in exactly:
Tussia Altman, Mordechai TenenbaumTamaroff, Zelig Kalmanovich, Emanuel
Ringelblum-The revolt in the Bialystok Ghetto and in the Warsaw Ghetto (details)-
The versions of Abba Eban, Gideon Hausner and Ben-Gurion-Gruenbaum's demand
that Auschwitz be bombed

Chapter 15; Summations and Lessons page 184

Researchers' pretensions in dishing out marks of "good" or "bad" to Holocaust victims-
-Moral judgment based on normal criteria generally leads to gross injustice-The focus
of the clarification must be to determine the essence of the Jewish people's vital
interests-There was no question of honor between the J ewish people and the Nazis-
TheJ udenrats that passed thetest--A quotation from Yaakov Hazan--Soviet J ewry

243

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Articles: Golda Meir on the Evian Conference: M etamorpheses of a Testimony page
232

Tine Great E rasure page 246

Sensitive JVlatters page 251

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Part Three

WITHOUT A COMPASS

Preface

Most of what is related in tinis section serves to illustrate the premises we have
adduced in the previous chapters. There was no need to collect this material
arbitrarily in order to fit it to preconceived explanations. All the major events of the
Holocaust period involving the Zionist movement and the Yishuv manifest the
egocentrism of truncated post-Ugandan Zionism--which recklessly cast off the role of
"father" to the Jewish people. In this tremendously fateful period, that reckless
behavior bore far-reaching consequences. I ndifference turned into alienation, with all
that this entailed.

Possessed of a fervent ambition to work for the Zionist cause come what may, the
movement lost sight of the boundaries of what was legitimate and what was prohibited
as regards the oJb/ect of Zionism. At one and the same time, in a bizarre mixture, there
were manifestations of selfless devotion toward survivors who were olim, and
disregard of the bitter fate of other J ews. Under the circumstances, the latter infinitely
outnumbered the former. Thesurvivor-o//m in the Holocaust years were hundreds who
finally totaled a few thousand, while the neglected and abandoned were millions.

Before turning to the descriptions that comprise the following chapters, it
behooves us to recapitulate briefly several of the characteristics that typified the
events in Eretz- Israel and in the Zionist movement.

(1) The first trait is s/ncer/ty and /oya/ty among the overwhelming majority of the
officials and activists. Virtually all of them truly believed that they were doing the
right thing, were doing what could and should be done, and even more. The doubters
and objectors, such as Melech Neusdtadt and Anshel Reis, were the odd men out.

(2) One reason for the confidence evinced by the leaders and functionaries in the
rightness of their course lay in the consensus on the part of the Yishuv and the
membership at large of the Zionist movement. Bitter disagreement existed in the
Yishuv and the movement over a whole range of issues, but there was no discord when
it came to the attitude toward events in the European diaspora. On this topic everyone
placed his faith in the leadership. With the exception of a few ephemeral crises
(following the sin king of the Patr/a and after the revelations of November 23, 1942) the
Yishuv showed unreserved trust in the leadership. The Al-Dami group of Rabbi
Binyamim and Prof. Schneerson was unsuccessful

because its activity conflicted with the frame of mind in the Yishuv. For the same
reason the "personal revolt" of Halm Greenberg in America proved abortive (see Ch.
12).

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(3) Following the defeat of the Santo Domingo plan, there was no letup in the war
on territorial ism. The Zionist movement, which grew stronger and more powerful in
the Holocaust years, relentlessly blocked the formation of refugee concentrations
outside Palestine.

(4) Even after November 23, 1942, the Zionist movement and its associated
organizations continued to serve as a source of unreliable information regarding
events in the countries of the Holocaust. I n this manner, too, it influenced the course of
events.

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Chapter Ten

Budding Alienation

On J anuary 15, 1940, Stephen Wise wroteto Chaim Weizmann: "I hope you will
agree with me that it would be worth your while accepting an invitation from the
President's Advisory Committee for Political Refugees in order that you may represent
the case of Palestine. You and I have done it with Myron Taylor and of course with
[James] McDonald in earlier years; but in view of the ceaseless persistence of J .D.C.
people, Baerwald, Rosenberg and the rest, in urging such fata morgana as Santo
Domingo, British Guiana and Mindanao, it would be exceedingly important for these
people at first hand to hear the story of Palestine from you."l

This call for help at the top reflected the all-out campaign against the
allurements of territorial ism that the Zionist movement launched upon the outbreak
of World War II. The following pages relate the Zionists' success in this war and the
mental traits they evinced during their encounter with the plight of European J ewry.

The war's outbreak was accompanied by a drastic change in the situation of
Europe's] ews. To the hundreds of thousands of German, Austrian and Czech Jews were
added millions of Polish J ews who suddenly found themselves in a serious
predicament, fraught with danger, on both sides of the border between the territories
occupied by Germany and Russia. The area of calamity quickly spread to encompass
the Baltic states, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, and additional areas to the east and south.
Tens of thousands of refugees who had fled from Germany to Western Europe found
themselves trapped together with their brethren, the local Jewish inhabitants. The
scope of the problem increased immeasurably, and took on a wholly new dimension.
Troubles became disasters, potential dangers began to be realized.

The growing intractability of the problems was mirrored in the mounting
complexity of the remaining possible solutions. Increasingly, to extricate people
meant, simply, to rescue them. Considerations of immediate economic absorption were
obliged to take second place to the task of saving people from approaching destruction.
The need to remove masses of people from areas where catastrophe was imminent
assumed tremendous urgency. At the same time, it became clear that the scope of the
problem meant that sporadic extrication of J ews could no longer constitute the only
solution. Above all, it was obvious to anyone with eyes in his head that there was a
pressing need for a J ewish rescue policy. Such

a policy, adapted to the changed circumstances of time and place, could be
conducted only by thej ews themselves. The help of various countries and governments
might be required, but the bulk of the work would fall on J ewish shoulders.

As we saw, the WZO did not assume the task of conducting a rescue policy. Ben-
Gurion, it will be recalled, had pledged to fight the White Paper as though there were
no war against Germany, and to fight Hitler as though there were no White Paper. He

1 Herman Foss, ed., Stephen Wise, Servant of the People: Selected Letters , p. 239.

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perceived the war against Hitler in terms of tine Yisinuv's participation, to tine best of
its ability, in the Allies' military efforts against Nazi Germany; he did not see that war
as encompassing an effort by the J ews to forestall the execution of Hitler's special aim:
the annihilation of the J ewish people. Concurrently, the Zionist movement stepped up
its campaign against territorialism.

The fear was that Jewish settlement outside Palestine would divert Jewish
energies and world public opinion away from the Zionist enterprise and hand England
a pretext for not fulfilling its duties as the Mandate power in Palestine. For about a
year, since the establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee, London had been
the scene of activity that to Zionist leaders recalled the dark days of the walkout by
Zangwill and his colleagues. When the Intergovernmental Committee scoured the
earth in search of refuge for Germany's Jews, the Zionists looked on this as a flagrant
act of territorialism. The idea of British Guiana brought to mind the Uganda Plan
which had also been proposed by a British government, forty years earlier. And when
Roosevelt summoned the Intergovernmental Committee to the White House and spoke
to them of the need to find a haven for ten to twenty million people whom the war would
render homeless,2 Zionist leaders grew alarmed.

Utilizing the full range of its branches and organizations, the Zionist movement
demonstrated vigorous and tenacious resistance in the face of such "dangers." The
resistance took various forms, ranging from rejection on principle and harassment of
individuals, to scale organizational subversion using all possible means. We saw how
Shmuel Margushes, writing in Der Tag, dismissed the dispatch of the delegation to
British Guiana by adducing the principle that those involved had no authority to
make a decision. J ust before the delegation's departure, Stephen Wise insisted that the
renowned expert Dr. Joseph Rosen not take part in it because, according to Wise, he
would prefer Guiana over Palestine.3 After the delegation (with Rosen's participation)
returned and submitted a basically positive report with some demurrers, the Zionists
took a hostile stance toward the implementation of its recommendations.

Behind the scenes Stephen Wise spoke with Abba Hillel Silver about the danger
involved—that moneyfor Guiana would betaken from the UJ A at the expense of funds
earmarked for Palestine—and how to prevent it. 4 Zionist opposition was a major factor
in the scrapping of the British Guiana plan.

The same fate awaited the plan for settlement at Mindanao, in the Philippines,
which had been approved by the Philippines government and cited by Roosevelt as a
considerable. 5 A plan for settlement at Kimberly, Australia, was aborted after being
approved by the Australian government and enthusiastically received by leading
representatives of the local residents. 6

Chamberlain's suggestion of possiblej ewish settlement in Tanganyika, a former
German colony, triggered a furious tirade by Stephen Wise: "I would prefer that my
J ewish brethren die in Germany rather than live in countries bearing the imprint of
German rule of yesterday and which tomorrow are liable to be given back.., to
Germany."? This bombastic declaration was uttered at the end of 1938, when the
"death" of German J ews was more a symbolic form of expression than a reference to
any specific event. At the same time, as we saw in earlier chapters, Stephen Wise and
his colleagues differed from non-Zionist functionaries in that the concrete and well-
publicized distress of German Jewry did not impel them to forgo their opposition to
mass immigration to any country but Palestine. Whether consciously or not, this
opposition was based on the expectation that Germany's Jews would somehow survive
for a certain period until conditions changed in Palestine, and would then settle there
in droves.

Not even the immense changes wrought by the war's outbreak could soften the
Zionists' stand. The calamity of the White Paper, together with the vestiges of an
obstinate disputatiousness and twisted thinking, caused a worsening in the attitude
toward the Jews subject to Nazi rule. Temporary cruelty stemming from ostensibly
"good" intentions was replaced by a marked estrangement toward their suffering and
indifference to their fate. Once these J ews became an instrument through which their
would-be rescuers hoped to achieve political goals, there was nothing to prevent the

2 Record, Vol. II, pp. 44-46.

3 Feingold,p. 114.

4 Ibid.

5 Record, ibid.

6 Jewish Chronicle , November 17, 1939.

7 According to Feingold, p. 124.

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broadening of goals for the attainment of \NW\dn tine Jews could be treated
thoughtlessly and arbitrarily.

The arbitrariness was expressed above all in the continuation of the war on
territorial ism. In April 1942, when the first authoritative reports about the
destruction reached the free world, the head of the J ewish Agency's Political
Department instructed the Zionist movement not to

engage in rescue which did not involve aliyah. Speaking at the 5th Histadrut
Conference, MosheShertok (Sharett) declared:

"Let us not concern ourselves about other centers of absorption [besides
Palestine]. Others will do so. Dislocated, drifting Jews will push themselves into
whatever hole or crack they can find, and more luck to them if they save their lives for
a day or find food to sustain them for a bit. But our concern must be: a strong and
forceful emphasis on the Zionist cause, the positing of Zionism as the sole solution. "8

Even more uncompromising was the president of the World Zionist Organization,
who in this period was engaged in settling accounts with the territorial ists. Their
mistake, he maintained, was that during Evian "they were ready to send their Jewish
brethren to any country on earth, as long as it was not Palestine." With a victor's
sarcasm, Weizmann describes the failures of those who sought territories for
settlement:

'There is no reason why these geographical exercises should not continue
indefinitely. But all these countries, as it turned out, were too hot or too cold. Not one
proved to be in a temperate zone."9

Weizmann is unmistakably delighted with thefailure--in J anuary

1942.

The remarks of Weizmann and Shertok at such late dates were but the tip of the
iceberg of the stands adopted and deeds done by the WZO in the war years. In Chapter
Nine we saw a striking example of the thwarting of a territorial ist plot" with far-
reaching consequences. In the rest of this chapter, we will examine two events that
exemplify the arbitrary and alienated attitude toward European J ewry in pursuit of
aims totally unrelated to the realization of Zionism. One event took place on the public
stage, was widely reported, and produced numerous testimonies in the form of
documents and articles. The second occurred in back rooms and we came across it
while sifting through archival files. What both events had in common was that their
fomenters were well-known Zionist leaders.

In July 1941, the anti-German boycott council began picketing the offices of
Agudat Israel in the United States. The reason for this extreme action was the Aguda's
refusal to desist from sending food packages to Jews in occupied Poland. The council
argued that this was a violation of the blockade that England, as a combatant, had
imposed on Nazi Germany. All the other public organizations in the U.S. had acceded
to the council's request, and only Agudat Israel was proving recalcitrant. The
campaign of pressure and persuasion was led by Dr. J oseph Tenenbaum, who, it will be
recalled, was a senior official in the American J ewish

Congress and the Zionist Organization of America. It was an unfortunate
campaign, and its organizers later tried to obliterate it from public memory. We have
details about the course of events from two complementary sources. The first source is
Dr. Tenenbaum himself, who spelled out his version in Der Tag of J uly 22, 1941 He
related:

As early as September 1940 the boycott council had sent a letter to Agudat Israel
demanding a stop to the food packages because this activity contravened the
agreement with the British blockade authorities. That date, Tenenbaum contended,
showed that nearly a year had passed before the council was forced to take the drastic
step of picketing the Aguda's offices. During the year a number of meetings had been
held with representatives of the British government and the J ewish organizations
which had been sending packages.

8 Davar . April 21. 1942.

9 Foreign Affairs . January 1942.

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The Aguda had been invited to all the meetings. But they "could never bring
themselves mentally to sit at the same table with heretics like HI AS, the Polish
Immigrants Association, and the World Jewish Congress." The Joint announced
immediately that it was not sending parcels but was interested in receiving
information about the decisions made at the meetings. The other organizations
decided, following a series of protracted sessions, to submit a memorandum to the
British authorities explaining why Jewish organizations were sending packages to
Poland, and offering a compromise proposal. At the same time, the organizations
solemnly declared that whatever the decision of the British government, they would
abide by it.

The memorandum was drawn up, and a delegation of representatives from three
organizations brought it to the British embassy. HI AS and the WJ C had in the
meantime ceased to send parcels, leaving only Agudat Israel and the Polish
Immigrants Association. Concurrently, reports and paid ads appeared in the press
"about the wonderful things the organizations are doing by sending packages to
Poland." The advertisers forgot, first of all, that their act violated the agreement the
organizations had made amongst themselves to maintain a low profile while they
awaited the British response.

Secondly, "in their great enthusiasm 'to help their brothers and sisters,' the
senders of the packages forgot to mention that many of the packages do not even reach
their destination. Others are emptied of food and filled with paper instead. Moreover,
those who receive the packages are deprived of their food-ration cards. The main
beneficiary is Hitler--hegets either the food or the money."

As a result of the press publicity, Tenenbaum continued, London's reply arrived
in the form of an urgent cable stating that the sending of the food packages conflicted
with the interests of the British blockade. The proposed compromise was rejected. The
British hoped that the J ewish organizations would no longer support the sending of
packages to Poland or other occupied countries.

London was particularly opposed to the sending of food packages from or through
Portugal. On the one hand, clear proof existed that the packages were either not
reaching their destinations or the recipients' ration cards were being reduced by the
equivalent amount. On the other hand, "Portugal itself lacks the means to provide for
its own food supply..."

The British cable induced neither the Aguda nor the Polish Immigrants
Association to stop sending food packages, leading the boycott council to take
additional measures. These were partially successful: "The Polish Association sent an
angry reply to our sharp protest, but in the meantime it closed down the package
business, and I'm sure this will be for its own benefit." The Aguda, however, balked,
bringing about the situation described above.

This, then, was Tenenbaum' s version of events. The tone of the article is sarcastic
and "anti-clerical." The Aguda's refusal to submit to the boycott council's demand is
likened to an attempt by the clericals to impose the will of "a few rebbes who are sitting
and swaying back and forth in the Central Hotel on Broadway." By doing so, they bring
disgrace and harm to the name of thej ewish people.

Dr. Tenenbaum explains: "At a time when the nations of the world are shedding
blood and tears and suffering innumerable casualties, we, the Jews, cannot permit
such disarray. As these lines are being written, reports are coming in that residents of
Amsterdam shouted 'well done' when British bombs landed on their homes. If not more
than this, then the absolute minimum that we Jews must do is not to interfere with
Britain's war needs, even if this comes at the expense of victims in Poland or
elsewhere."

In a second article, on August 10, Tenenbaum replied to his critics. To the fine
story about the Amsterdamers who were pleased at the bombing of their homes, he now
appended a report about similar behavior by the Greeks. And the French, it turned out,
had requested explicitly that no more food packages be sent from America, despite the
hardship this would entail. As for the argument that the sending of the packages did
not violate the blockade, Tenenbaum replied, simply, that since it was the

British government that decided to impose the blockade, it would decide what
constituted a violation. He also took the opportunity to publish the text of a statement
issued by the British following a meeting with representatives of Agudat Israel in

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which they explained Britain's stand. However, the meeting had proved fruitless
"because of Agudat Israel's obstinate stand."

Tenenbaum is at pains to present the argument adduced by an Aguda
representative in a personal conversation: England, the Aguda man maintained, had
no authority to decide what the true J ewish interest was. To which Tenenbaum replied:

In the first place, this is not a matter of Jewish interests only, [but] of global
interests to which J ewish interests must either be adapted or forgone. Whatever
interferes with British war needs conflicts with the vital interests of the Jews. As a
people, or as an organization, we must do nothing that is liable create the suspicion
that we constitute a small world unto ourselves. No, in the existing state of affairs,
British interests arej ewish interests, just as they are American interests. It seems to
me that these are such obvious truths that serious people and good J ews cannot
question them.

The historical truth obliges us to note that after saying all this, and after
rejecting the argument that sending food to thej ews in the ghettos was tantamount to
sending food to prisoners-of-war, the author had a change of heart, did a ISO-degree
turn, and offered his own solution. It emerged that the Aguda was actually sending too
few packages which did not meet the immense needs that had arisen. Tenenbaum
therefore put forward a "constructive proposal" according to which the appropriate
organizations would choose a joint committee to initiate talks with the British
authorities with the aim of dispatching large-scale aid for Polish Jewry. 'This is the
only honorable way for an organized people. I believe we can find the possibility to
work together with the Red Cross. But if not, we, the Jews, must not violate the British
blockade."

Tenenbaum's articles give rise to two questions:

(1) The first request to Agudat Israel to stop sending food packages was made in
September 1940. The war, and with it the blockade, had begun a year earlier, in
September 1939. It was precisely then, according

to Tenenbaum, that the food packages had begun to be sent. Why was the boycott
council so tardy in its intervention?

(2) Was that intervention taken exclusively at the council's initiative, or were
other bodies in America involved?

We received an exhaustive reply to both questions from Professor Arye
Tartakower who in a conversation with the author cited the case of the food packages to
illustrate a phenomenon we had asked him about. Because of the importance of what
he had to say, we will quote the talk verbatim, with a few minor omissions:10

Question: It is known that to date Dr. Goldmann is the only person who has
publicly expressed remorse... I want to ask you. Professor Tartakower, who actually
stood in the way? Who blocked things? Let us say there was a person or a group of people
was m'geit un m'shreit: gewald, ratevet! [who were shouti ng: hel p! ]-- was there someone
who said, rata/etn/t [don't help]?

Answer: There were such people.

Q: W ho were they?

A: They didn't necessarily shout in Yiddish, rat&zet nisht. But there were people
who for the interests of the Allies...

Q: Yes, D r. Goldmann told me that. But who? W ho were these people? After thirty
years, I think it can be revealed.

A: I will give you an exam pie of what happened in that period, at the beginning of
the war. I was in America at the beginning of the war. I was in charge of aid on behalf
of the World Jewish Congress. At that time we organized--not only us, some other
organizations, too--a project of sending food packages to Poland. We sent these
packages to thousands, in the end even to tens of thousands of people... Dr. Tenenbaum
was the chairman of the joint committee of the American Jewish Congress and the
Jewish Labor Committee in America, that dealt with sending the packages. Dr.

10 Recorded conversation with Prof. Tartakower, August 17, 1972.

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Tenenbaum himself sent packages to thousands. But now I come to your question. One
fine day we received a call from the American government, from the State Department,
and they indicated to us that the project of sending packages to Jews in Poland went
against the interests of the combatant nations, especially England and France.
America was not yet in the war.

Q: M aybe you can remember who it was that phoned?

A: I couldn't say. It was one of the officials there. But because the announcement
came from the American State Department, we were not going to check their
credentials. We were all very impressed by the announcement, the first person who
told us to put an im m ed late stop to our

activity was Dr. Wise. After all, he himself was close to the American
government. People in the government were his personal friends. I remember the talk I
had with him. Wise explained things to me. H e said: even though it is true that this is
a great humanitarian enterprise and that help should be given, because the danger
existed that the Germans would exploit the project for their own benefit, we must
abandon it m ainly for the good of England. These comments also had an influence on
Dr. Tenenbaum. Dr. Tenenbaum put a stop to the joint project, and from that day we
sent no more packages. It is true that some organizations were not willing to follow the
orders of the American government. Agudat Israel, for example. And the World
Federation of Polish Jewry, which was then in New York, was also not happy about
doing this. But in the end the project was stopped. This is just one example of how we
were unable to work because of the pressure on us from different sides.

Q: I n other words, your explanation is that there was simply American pressure
and you gave in to that pressure.

A: Yes.

Q: Whileat the same time other J ews...

A: Were not ready [to give in].

The phone call from a State Department official put a stop to American J ewry's
effort to help their brethren in the ghettos of Poland. Whether we accept that the
J ewish organizations did not check the official's credentials, or assume that Stephen
Wise asked his high-ranking friends about the call, is immaterial. What is
illuminating is that this request was sufficient to do away instantly with the
generations- long tradition of not remaining aloof to Jews in distress. The leader of
America's Zionists, Stephen Wise, insisted that there was something more important
than not abandoning Poland's Jews to starvation. The Zionist functionary Joseph
Tenenbaum, who earlier had sent food packages in good faith, now suddenly saw the
light. Recalling his position as head of the economic boycott against Germany, he went
into action. Heavy pressure was exerted on all the organizations engaged in sending
packages. Pressure just short of violence was brought to bear on recalcitrant Agudat
Israel. Measures were taken against the Association of Polish Jews, which also
remained unconvinced, to bring it into line. The World Jewish Congress (headed by
Stephen Wise) was very quickly convinced. The fact that the non-Zionist HI AS also
yielded, and the Joint stressed its readiness to give the request its consideration,
demonstrates the power wielded by those who initiated the abandonment of the J ews.

On the face of it, it seems pointless to "argue" with Tenenbaum across a divide of
thirty years. It is possible that two years after publishing the article, its author was
ready to eat the paper it was printed on so that the entire affair could be consigned to
oblivion. Nonetheless, it seems to us that a few of the remarks in that miserable piece
of moralizing deserve closer examination in order to draw all the relevant lessons.

The Aguda man was undoubtedly correct in saying that the English were not
authorized to decide what constituted the J ewish interest. Tenenbaum's reply was too
simplistic by half. It goes without saying that for the J ews, it was extremely important
that the British defeat the Nazis. However, itdid not follow that everything interfering
(or seeming to interfere) with the British war effort conflicted with vital J ewish
interests. Had Tenenbaum not been engaged in rapid-fire polemical writing, he might
have taken into account that the successful prosecution of war includes also
refraining from actions liable to bring about an inordinate number of casualties

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without absolute necessity. Winen a war is being fougint by two or more allies, each of
them sees to it that his partners do nothing liable to harm his own vital interests
without solid cause. This is the recognized prerogative of an ally. Yet precisely this
prerogative is what deterred Tenenbaum. He was upset at the very thought that the
world's nations were liable to suspect the J ews of being "a small world [a vdtd, in the
derisive Yiddish] unto themselves"-- in other words, that thej ews were not allies. They
would be the beneficiaries of an English victory, and they must simply accept the
burden of their victims. This is particularly simple when the accepters are in America
and the victims in Poland.

The recacitrants in Agudat Israel would not submit either to Tenenbaum or to the
British. Subsequently, they succeeded in convincing the British government that
their cause was a worthy one, and they received permission to send 10,000 packages a
month for a year. 11 As for the help of the Red Cross, it was obtained, with Allied assent,
concretely and effectively, including the dispatch of special food ships for the hungry
people of Greece.l2 To this end, the Agudat Israel weekly related, the King of Greece
betook himself from one office to another, whereas "it was impossible for Mr.
Weizmann or Mr. Ben-Gurion to devote time and energy to obtain a permit for
[sending] food packages to those in the ghettos. "B

Had a special headquarters been established for prosecuting the Jewish war
against the Nazis, the need to supply food to the ghettos would not have been regarded
as a purely humanitarian act, but as an operation

directed against one of Hitler's declared war aims-the destruction of the Jewish
people. I n that event, Stephen Wise would not have been able to maintain that he was
ready to sacrifice his feelings of compassion on the altar of victory over the Germans.
But the actual situation was completely different.

The Zionists were not the only ones who maltreated Poland's J ews. They had
partners in HI AS, the Joint, and other non-Zionist organizations. But these were
passive partners who submitted to the pressure and accepted the verdict. The
initiators, the activists, the wielders of the pressure were the Zionists- Stephen Wise
and his confidants, Joseph Tenenbaum and his aides. It was not Zionism, as a
movement, that did the deed, nor did it have any interest in doing it. The matter was
not bound up with territorialism or with any sort of threat to Zionism. But those
involved were among the leading Zionists in America, and it is not difficult to locate
the mental background to their actions in Zionism's attitude toward diaspora J ewry, as
this was demonstrated in its stand toward the J ews of Germany during and after
Evian. If in 1938-1939, Germany's Jews were destined to go on suffering until place
could be found for them in Palestine, why should Poland's Jews not be abandoned to a
fate of starvation in the service of other political goals? The Jews having become an
object of politics, what was the point in inquiring how that object felt?

There was another stubborn person who was not impressed by the protestations of
the British and did not submit to their pressure. In particular, their special request to
put a stop to the sending of parcels from Portugal had no effect on Avraham
Silbershein, who worked out of his Geneva office. The packages were forwarded by
Yitzhak Weismann, Silbershein's agent in Lisbon, through the Portuguese Red
Cross. 14 For Silbershein there was nothing new in the story that not all the packages
reached their destination or about the malicious treatment sometimes accorded their
recipients. He was also aware that the packages he sent were just a drop in an ocean of
want and distress. But he did not even conceive of desisting from the little he could do.
He may also have taken into account that beyond their direct usefulness, the sending
of the parcels served additional purposes. The confirmations-or their absence-of the
parcels' arrival were a significant means for maintaining contact with the ghettos.
The packages heartened those who received them and showed the Nazis the interest
and vigilance of world J ewry regarding the situation of

1 1 Haderech , Agudat Israel weekly, 27th day of Tishrei, 5703.
12Hilberg,p. 451.

13 Haderech , 20th day of Teveth, 5703.

14 Yitzhak Weissman, In the Face of the Titans of Evil (Hebrew), p. 129.

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their brethren in the ghettos. (And, of course, the reverse, when in summer 1941a
drastic fall off occurred in the arrival of packages from America.)

Silbershein, who acted in concert with the WJ C, was outside the sphere of the
spiritual influence of the organization's leaders in New York, nor did he harbor
unwarranted illusions about the character of their activity. Indeed, Silbershein could
relate his own personal experience at the hands of one of those leaders about a year
before the Wise-Tenenbaum operation.

Dr. Avraham (Adolf) Silbershein, whose activity during the Holocaust years still
awaits its chronicler, was a veteran Zionist, a member of the Zionist Actions
Committee, and a respected representative of his party, Poalei Zion-Hitahdut in
Poland. Following the 21st Zionist Congress he did not return to his home in Galicia
but established in Geneva the "Committee for the Relief of War Stricken J ews," or
"Relico." Silbershein devoted himself heart and soul to this committee, which directed
its activity primarily at Polish Jewry, and thanks to him it became a major center of
help and rescue.l5 According to his own testimony, it was a one-man operation--of
Silbershein himself. Although he was an official of the WJ C and made use of the
technical services provided by the WJ C's Geneva office, he soon discovered that he could
not function as he wished within the organization's framework. Disagreements over
aid to Polish Jewry and about rescue methods in general, had generated tension in
Silbershein's relations with the director of the Geneva office. Dr. Riegner, and with
other Zionist officials in Geneva. Seeking to circumvent these obstacles, Silbershein
turned to the Association of Galician Jews in America, and received an affirmative
response.

Correspondence of over half a yearl6 reveals details of the cooperation between
them. Silbershein won the confidence of the Galicians by sending them lists of Jewish
refugees from Poland who were located in various places, and a list of addresses in
Poland to which letters could be sent. Under the terms of the agreement between them,
the Galician group received the lists before other organizations, thus enhancing their
prestige in the American Jewish community. Against this backdrop, Silbershein told
them about his concerns and apprehensions, and requested their help. In a series of
letters beginning in October 1939, he related that the large and wealthy J DC was not
cooperating; that the a//yah institutions still operating in Berlin were discriminating
against Polish J ews; and that the bureaucratic apparatus of the WJ C in Geneva, which
he was compelled to use to a certain extent, was causing him irksome difficulties. 'The
impression is that they have not yet grasped the

dimensions of the calamity which has befallen Polish J ewry... My feeling is that I
stand by myself, alone." The Galician organization was asked to help by enlisting the
support of the large organizations in America--the Joint and others--and by
forwardi ng funds for activity which brooked no delay.

The Galicians responded warmly and wholeheartedly. The chairman of their
association, Sol Lau, and his deputy, Flashenberg, heaped thanks and praises on
Silbershein for the "good work" he was doing. They sent him $1000 for his personal
needs and suggested that he forward them a budget and plans. Silbershein, who was
not accustomed to living off public assistance, used the money to further his work. If
the Galicians were willing to help him personally, what he wanted was to publish,
through their mediation, letters and articles, and the royalties would cover his own
needs.

In November, Silbershein proposed a joint operation--the ransom from
Sachsenhausen of Polish Jews with relatives in the United States. This was to be
effected through persons in Berlin working together with a committee called "Special
Training." Two hundred dollars was the amount required for the release and removal
from Germany of each detainee. The detainee's relatives would deposit the money with
the Association of Galician J ews in America. Once the person was out of Germany, the
deposit would be transferred to Silbershein's office, which in the meantime would
defray the costs in advance. This arrangement, which would impose a heavy financial
burden on Relico, was proposed by its director because of his faith in the personal
trustworthiness and financial reliability of the Galician group's leaders. The cordial
relations between the two sides gave ground for this optimistic belief.

15 See B. Klibansky, "The Archive of the Late Dr. Avraham Silbershein," Bulletia Yad Vashem, No. 20; Natan Eck,
"Silbershein's Rescue Activities," Galician Chapters collection.

16 Silbershein Archive, Yad Vashem, File M20/1.

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The idea was received entinusiastically. Tine Galician organization devoted itself
to the redemption of prisoners witin a sense of gratitude to the plan's initiator. 'This
letter is to inform you," Sol Lau wrote (November ID), "that we are doing everything
possible. And what is most important, that our Galicians in America have full
confidence in your work and in your ability to carry out this important mission." "We
hope that we will shortly be able to forward you additional funds" (November 17).
'Your letters and cables are creating an excellent impression on our haverim... Your
work is greatly appreciated here. Even those causing difficulties, are forced to
acknowledge that the task you have undertaken is of the utmost importance at this
time" (December 2).

Week by week the cooperation tightened, the scope of the activity increased, and
with it the Galicians' declared readiness to lend a hand to

further projects as well. I n December, Silbershein informed them that in addition
to Sachsenhausen, efforts were also underway to obtain the release of prisoners from
Buchenwald and Dachau. Concurrently, he suggested that attempts be made to raise
funds for the release of detainees w/thout relatives in America. He returned to this idea
in February: "I already wrote you once that it is not appropriate for me and for you to
rest content with the role of middleman for people with wealthy relatives, to save only
them and allow the others to die in the camps." The heads of the association were to act
as Silbershein's spokesmen within the American-Jewish public, try and raise funds,
and make efforts to get thej oint and other large organizations to lend their support.

The Galicians were generous in their response to the monetary needs. With the
funds he received Silbershein was able to hire two assistants, and at their request he
purchased a Yiddish typewriter. On December 25 he forwarded an itemized budget in
the amount of $1,250 per month, for the Galicians to cover.

The height of the Galicians' readiness to help and cooperate was reflected in Sol
Lau's letter of J anuary 20, 1940 (which reached Geneva on February 15). The head of the
association undertook to supply the $1250 requested each month. Since the request
had arrived only the day before the letter was sent, an advance of $500 was enclosed on
account of the first monthly payment. The letter repeated three times the pledge that
"the small budget you have submitted" would be supplied faithfully.

"Your plans are wonderful," Sol Lau wrote, "and we hope they can be carried out...
We hope that things will now advance faster, and the more information we receive
from you, the greater are the results." Lau had spoken with representatives of the WJ C,
but "unfortunately, they are so confused that I cannot expect any help from them.
Especially when people are in need of food and a place to sleep, and have no means of
livelihood. Other organizations support them." Overall, he noted, "the situation is very
complicated, but matters will soon be straightened out. Nahum Goldmann has arrived
here, and I hope that together with Weizmann he will be able to arouse the Jews to
proper activity."

The hoped for intervention came soon enough. The first indication Silbershein
had of it was in a cable that overtook the letter quoted above and preceded it to Geneva.
This was a reply to a cable of his own of February 2 stating: "Opportunities for general
arrangements require in coming days five thousand dollars besides relatives deposits.
Cable if possible. Silbershein."

The reply came on February 10: "Cannot send 5000. Committee will consult with
Goldmann on whole matter. Details in letter. Lau."

It seems unlikely that besides the disappointing refusal to forward the $5000,
Silbershein found anything in the cable to suggest that a change was imminent. Any
misgivings he might have felt were undoubtedly dispelled when the cable was
followed five days later by the enthusiastic letter expressing the hope for a great
improvement that would attend Goldmann' s intercession. A letter describing what
happened between Goldmann and the Galicians was sent from New York on February
19; a second, more detailed letter, was written on March 8 and arrived in Geneva on the
23rd. Silbershein's initial response to both letters came on April 2. At all events, until
the end of February he did not have an inkling that the Galician prop he had built with
such toil was collapsing.

In his letters during February, Silbershein continued to put forward proposals
for expanding the project. While describing difficulties that had emerged and
opportunities that were missed, he could also point to achievements and to new
possibilities that had arisen. The first 250 detainees had been released from

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concentration camps, and some had already left Germany. At the same time, serious
obstacles were impeding his activity. In Germany an order had been issued
prohibiting persons under 40 from travelling to enemy countries-- meaning Palestine
as well. Supervision of the concentration camps had become more stringent ('You
undoubtedly take my meaning.") The illegal immigration to Palestine was
encountering growing transportation problems.

Thedifficulty of quickly finding refugefor those released and getting them out of
Germany before they faced the threat of rearrest, led to the idea of immigration to
Shanghai. Anyone showing that he was in possession of $400 could obtain an entry
visa upon arrival at Shanghai. The cost of the trip was $200. Clearly, large sums would
berequired.

Silbershein was particularly emphatic about the need to raise money in order to
expedite im m igration to 6o//V/a. 'The matter is a serious one, and I have investigated
it thoroughly. True, it is an expensive proposition, costing as much as immigration to
Shanghai. But in return, one arrives in an almost sound economy. The visas are
genuine, not falsified as with Mexico. They do not require the approval of the Bolivian
government. The consul in Switzerland is authorized to issue visas for up to 4,800
families. The matter is urgent, because I am apprehensive that in the spring
everything will be extremely difficult. Everything must be done before the spring."

Silbershein went on to suggest possibilities for extricating people from Poland.
Corruption among German officials was rife. Bribery could bring out people with
papers, visas, and so forth. Young people could be transferred from Poland to Slovakia
in order to prepare them for settlement in Palestine. And there were other possibilities,
all conditional on the availability of funds.

But Silbershein soon found that his efforts at persuasion were a waste of time. By
then, there was no one to listen to his entreaties in the Galician organization. Sol Lau's
letter apprised him of the outcome of the consultation between the association's
committee and Dr. Nahum Goldmann. I n reply to the committee's complaint about the
difficulties entailed in underwriting Silbershein's activities, Goldmann proposed that
they cease supporting him. Instead, he said, the operation would be conducted and
financed by the WJ C. In the wake of Goldmann's promise, the Galicians decided to
cancel the monthly allocation for Silbershein and not provide other financial aid.
Until Goldmann could get to Geneva and arrange things, Silbershein would receive a
final one-time allotment of $500. Thus ended the episode of the Galician association's
aid to Dr. Silbershein.

In his second letter, Lau tried to explain the background to this surprising
decision. The committee members were buckling under the heavy burden they had
assumed, he wrote, and there was general disappointment at the small-scale
immediate results of the ransom project. ("I understand fully that in none of your
letters did you promise that everything would proceed as rapidly as planned. You
always noted that the situation could change at any moment and that nothing was
certain. But please do not forget that the committee members sometimes read the
letters but forget their contents. And some of them do not read them at all.") A highly
influential factor, Lau wrote, was the widespread fear that fund-raising for
Silbershein's project was liable to harm the efforts of the UJA, which had set itself the
target of raising $23 million.

All these reasons undoubtedly played a part, but none of them was decisive. The
direct reason for the Galicians' decision, as spelled out clearly in Lau's letter, was that
Dr. Goldmann, to whom the committee had turned for advice and guidance in
expectation of help in the fulfillment of their mission, told them to free themselves
from the heavy burden and assured them that things would work out even without
their help. It was with a sense of relief that they accepted the advice of the well-known
Zionist official.

Sol Lau himself dissented from the committee's decision. In his letter he related
that because of differences with his colleagues, he had decided to resign as president of
the association. We do not know whether Lau followed through on this. At all events,
the correspondence was continued by the vice president, Louis Rashenberg, who also
seems to have left his personal imprint on the course of events.

From this point, things fell apart irreversibly. Regarding the ransom of the
prisoners, F I ashen berg stated (April 17) that "we here in America are doubtful about
this entire project." Pursuing this line, the Galicians took unilateral steps to revoke

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their participation and commitments. Deposits were returned to the prisoners'
relatives, in some cases witinout first informing Silbersinein. In at least three cases,
money was returned to relatives of prisoners who had been released through Relico
and had left Germany. I n response to Si Ibershein's protest, Flashenberg informed him
(May 17) that henceforth he would cease to transfer the funds from the deposits. His
reason:

'The spreading of the war in the past few days does not permit us to assume
responsibility for forwarding to countries involved in the war monies that were
desposited [deposited] with us out of the best intentions. We will continue to safeguard
the money for those who gave it to us."

This was 1940, the period of the German offensive in France, Holland and
Belgium--not in Switzerland. Thus it was that the vice president of the Association of
Galician J ews in America joined the economic warfare against thej ews in the camps a
full year before Stephen Wise and Tenenbaum, and he carried out that warfare
unremittingly. Following the exchange of another pair of letters, the two sides broke
off contact in an atmosphere of mutual resentment and disappointment.

When Dr. Nahum Goldmann was asked, in 1972, for his reaction to this episode,
he replied without hesitation that this was the first he had ever heard of the matter.
"But that does not mean it is not true," he added immediately. 17 The apparent
contradiction seems to indicate that Goldmann had forgotten the whole matter, but
while denying knowledge of it recalled that something had occurred, and quickly
corrected himself.lS This conjecture can assist us in looking for his motivations 35
years ago. Manifestly, Goldmann was not opposed to the release of Jews from
concentration camps. Nor, surely, did he object to the extrication of J ews from Poland
and other actions planned by Si I bershein. The fact that some of those rescued would be
forced to settle elsewhere than in Palestine probably would not have bothered him to
the point of interfering with the program. What, then, accounts for his behavior?

An examination of the relations between Dr. Silbershein and the WJ C raises the
possibility that the aim was to humble a person who had rebelled against the
organization with which he was affiliated. Whether the object of the exercise was
simply punitive, or whether the idea was to return the rebel to the fold and force him to
toe the organizational line, is unknown. Nor can we know whether Dr. Goldmann
sincerely intended that the WJ C would provide Silbershein with the means and
contacts of which he was deprived when his relations with the Galicians were severed.

One thing, though, seems certain: whether he thought that his intervention was
liable to have an adverse effect on the fate of the candidates for rescue, or did not
entertain any such idea--the consequences were irrelevant from his point of view. As a
person highly experienced in organizational workings and public ploys, he had
executed a clever maneuver that would totally undercut Silbershein's ability to act
independently. He thereby chalked up one point for the World Jewish Congress. The
matter would now be handled by his assistants, while he moved on to more important
topics. Since concern for the fate of the hundreds and thousands whom Silbershein
wished to get released did not interfere with execution of the tactic, it stands to reason
that in time, the entire affair was simply forgotten.

The Galicians' action did not put a stop to the ransom project. Silbershein's office
was also in direct contact with relatives of prisoners-- indeed these ties were six times
greater than those maintained through the Galicians' association. 19 However, their
decision undoubtedly prevented the implementation of other projects and initiatives,
and seriously set back Silbershein's activity. The revocation of the monthly budget
greatly hampered his work. The WJ C did not supply him with the funds he required.
Having no other alternative, he was compelled to go on making use of the services
provided by the WJ C office in Geneva, a situation accompanied by constant bickering
and much aggravation.

Whether or not we are right in our conjecture about Dr. Goldmann's motives, the
fact remains that he proceeded without giving consideration to the grave consequences
his actions entailed for Jews in distress. His back-room stratagem preceded by a year
the public ruses of Joseph Tenenbaum against the sending of food packages. The
common mental backdrop to the actions of both Zionist leaders was that the

17 Recorded conversation with Dr. Nalium Goldmann, May 14, 1972.

18 Dr. Arye Tartakower, who was also asked about this subject, had a vivid memory of the events, and his comments served as
supporting testimony for the documents in our possession.

19 Silbershein letter. May 25, 1940, Silbershein Archive, Yad Vashem, File M20/1.

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intensification of tine suffering of European J ewry did not prevent tin em from pursuing
tineir own goals. In neither instance were those goals beneficial to Zionism. But the
alienation factor was even more palpable in the holy war against territorialism.

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Chapter Eleven

Patria, Struma~and Bermuda

At the Biltmore Conference in May 1942 Ben-Gurion said: 'Tine meaning of tinese
two sin ips /^Patr/a and Struma] is simple: Erdiz-lsrad or death—and as soon as the war
ends many sinips lil<e tinese will stream to Eretz Israel."! The optimistic conclusion of
this sentence suggests that the speaker did not give sufficient consideration to the
gloomy significance of its opening. By adducing Patria and Struma as a model and
exemplar for future Zionist activity, Ben-Gurion was in effect underscoring the
responsibility he took on himself for the cruel choice facing persecuted Jews: aliyah or
extinction. There is no doubt that Ben-Gurion did not wish for this alternative, and his
comment was intended purely to describe an existing situation. Nevertheless, the
statement encapsulated the siege of European J ewry in which the Zionist movement
was taking part.

In creating a whole series of dams, as it were, to stem the flow of mass
immigration to other places, the Zionist leadership hoped that the stream of refugees
would perforce be channeled to a single destination: Eretz-lsrael. The dams were of
various kinds, ranging from active opposition, such as the thwarting of the Santo
Domingo Plan, to political activity at various levels. Thanks to this activity, the
Zionist movement acquired an undesirable "partner," the British government, which
lent a willing and effective hand in tightening the siege against the J ews facing
annihilation, their chief aim being to Jb/ocfc J ewish immigration to Palestine. The
actions surrounding the sinking of Patria and Struma were salient initial stages in
this calamitous policy, while the Bermuda Conference exemplified all too well its
wretched consequences.

The main details of the Patria affair have been known since one of the direct
participants in the ship's sinking published his testimony.2 In November 1940 over
1,900 J ewish refugees, the majority from Germany and Czechoslovakia, who reached
Eretz-lsrael on three ships (l^ilos, Pacific, and B6from the Atlantic), were placed by the
British authorities aboard a large passenger ship, the Patria, in order to transport
them to the island of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean. The Haganah decided to prevent
the expulsion by sabotaging the ship, thereby delaying its sailing from Haifa. The

1 David Ben-Gurion, In the Campaign (Hebrew), Vol. IV, p. 36. Emphasis added.

2 Patria , by Meir Mardor (Monya), a chapter from his book. Secret Mission (Hebrew), pp. 53-77.

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decision was approved byj ewish Agency Executive member Moshe Slnertol<, and Sinaul
jvieirov (Avigur), inead of the JVlossad le'Aliyain Bet (the "illegal" immigration
program) was charged with implementing the plan. A team of engineers set to work
preparing a mine that would be

planted on the ship and cripple it. The task of determining the form and size of
the mine fell to Yitzhak Sadeh, who had considerable experience in sabotage
operations.3 Meir (Munya) Mardor, of the Hagana's Special Operations Unit, was
entrusted with the task of smuggling the mine aboard and getting it to the
representative of the would-be immigrants.

The mine exploded minutes after 9 a.m. on November 25, 1940. Patria lurched
over and sank to the bottom of the harbor, a depth of 35 feet. Because of the shi p's size, it
remained partially above water, but the great bulk of the vessel, halls, cabins, decks
and all, sank within 10-15 minutes.

Two hundred and sixty-seven people were listed as missing in the disaster. The
number of victims who had drowned became clear as bodies were pulled from the
water. By the end of J anuary 1941 when the report of the commission of inquiry
appointed by the Mandate government was published, 156 bodies had been recovered.
Half a year later the number had risen to 202,4 and in December 1944 212 people were
known to have drowned. 5 In August 1953, during work to dismantle the remnants of
ships that were interfering with traffic in the harbor, more skeletons and bones of
victims were found. 6 This reduced the estimated disparity between the number of
missing and the number of dead to a few dozen people, who were thought to have
slipped by the British authorities and reached shore.

The disaster staggered the Yishuv. The sabotage was kept secret from the public,
but various circles knew about it, and not everyone agreed with the deed. About ten
years after the event Yitzhak Tabenkin recalled the crisis generated by the act, fuelled
by the force of the opposition and the public's condemnation. 'The tragedy of the Patria
did not become known all at once. Day after day for many days bodies were pulled out
and their number kept growing. We wanted to curse this sea. It was as though the
Patria had blown up not just once but day after day. The peaceful Yishuv saw us as
having sinned against it, they held us and our movement as to blame for the
disaster."?

The truth is that not only the "peaceful Yishuv" was outraged. There was no lack
of dissenters and critics within the "movement" itself. It was not by chance that Shaul
Avigur spoke bitterly about what had happened "in the difficult days that afflicted me
and us after Patria, when from all sides (even from those who were 'close') the
perpetrators of the action were vilified, and one publicist did not even balk at warning
in his party's paper--in /-/apoe/ /-/atza'/r--aga/nst the 'criminal hand'. "8

The affair of the "malicious hand" (the actual quotation) and its surprising
fluctuations is typical of the atmosphere that set in after the Patr/a disaster. An article
in the Mapai weekly f-iapod Hatza'ir on December 2, 1940, stated: "On one bitter and
rash day a malicious hand sunk the ship and caused the wounding and death of
people." The article was signed "Alshich" and was written by Israel Cohen. 9 In
reaction two young people walked into the office of the editor, Yitzhak Lufban, and one
of them, Amos Ben-Gurion (David Ben-Gurion's son), slapped him in the face.

According to the description of the affair in these sources, a misunderstanding
had occurred between the two young men and the Haganah chief of staff, Ya'akov
Dostrovsky (Dori). Dori's reaction after reading the article was that the writer deserved
to be punished. The youths heard him, took his words as an order, and did what they
did. Dori said afterward that his remark had not been intended as an order. However,
the act having been done, he assumed responsibility. A special committee headed by
Moshe Sneh meted out a symbolic punishment of one day's house arrest, and Dori
accepted the verdict readily.

Yet this description does not reflect the depth of the crisis that the incident
triggered in the senior party of the Yishuv leadership; nor were the events

3 David Nimri: Testimony recorded in February-March 1962, Haganah Historical Archives, File 4037, hereafter: HHA.

4 Moshe Basolf, ed., " Ma'apilim" Boole (Hebrew), p. 260.

5 Y. Noded (Yitzhali Sadeh), "The Ahdut Ha'avodah Movement," No. 25, December 22, 1944 (Hebrew).

6 Haim Lazar-Litai, Nevertheless: The Book of "Aliyah Bet " (Hebrew), p. 459.

7 Yitzhak Tabenkin, "Remembrance Day, Judgment Day: The Lesson of the Patria, " Al Hamishmar , December 1 , 1 950.

8 Letter to Meir Mardor, January 13, 1950, HHA.

9 History of the Haganah (Hebrew), Vol. Ill, pp. 155, 1633; testimony of Moshe Sneh, HHA, File S 2047.

260

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

surrounding the misunderstanding between Dori and inis two men sufficiently clear.
The following is the story of what actually happened as it emerges from the minutes of
meetings of Mapai's Central Committee and Political Committee.

The meeting of the Political Committee held on December 12, 1940, was intended
to discuss the expulsion of the ma'apilim ("illegal" immigrants) on the Atlantic.
Following opening remarks by Moshe Sharett, and before the discussion began of the
subject on the agenda, Yosef Sprinzak took the floor. Speaking with some emotion, he
stated that just a few hours earlier Lufban had been attacked by Amos Ben-Guriona
and a second youth, "Motke from Hadera." Sprinzak intimated that the attack was
bound up with the incitement being waged in Histadrut and Haganah circles. "As for
myself, I have been walking about with a feeling of personal insecurity for a few days."
He demanded an unequivocal decision and stringent measures against the
"hooligans." "If this act is not unanimously condemned and censured, I will not be
able to sit here."

Sprinzak's demand for condemnation and censure was passed with general
assent. But opinion was divided about who was to blame for the incident. Aharon
Ziesling thought that the Haganah "has no connection with this act... Sprinzak should
remove this assumption from the context

of his remarks. I am not acquainted with one of [the boys] but the other one has no
connection with the [Haganah]." Eliezer Kaplan was less certain: "I am the person to
whom Sprinzak said after the Histadrut Council meeting in Kfar Sava that we may be
entering a period of a war of each against the other... We should investigate whether
someone was behind this deed, and who it was."

According to the testimony of the victim himself, Yitzhak Lufban, certain signs
and circumstances strengthened suspicion of Haganah involvement. 'The act was
thought out in every detail and ploy... The boys left the main door open, and when the
woman working in the office called it to their attention they told her angrily that the
door would remain open. It was Amos who did theslapping, then the two fled, they ran
all the way to the Va'ad Hapoel building, where they split up. Yosef Irlicht [an official
of the Central Committee] caught up with M otke. [Yosef] H arit and Yitzhak Sadeh were
standing next to the Va'ad Hapoel. Harit said to Yosef: 'Let him go, we know him'."

In the midst of the confusion and bewilderment a committee of inquiry was
selected and a resolution was passed: 'To charge haverim I. Baratz, E. Golomb and A.
Ziesling [committee members] with investigating whether anyone was behind this
act."

The reason for the ultimative note of Sprinzak's demand and the basis for the
suspicions harbored by him and his colleagues lay in an event he hinted at and which
was more explicitly noted by Eliezer Kaplan. In a meeting of the Histadrut Council
held on December 9 in Kfar Sava, Berl Katznelson spoke about the expulsion that
morning of the ma' apilim on the Atlantic. The action, executed with appalling
brutality, had encountered no resistance whatsoever from the Yishuv. The decision
not to resist was made by the Yishuv leadership against the advice of Haganah heads
and activistslO and generated disquiet and dissent within the Haganah. The
bitterness was directed particularly against the group of "moderates" in the Mapai
hierarchy-Sprinzak, Kaplan, Lubianker (Lavon), Remez and others--who were
accused of submission to the hostile government.

And now Berl Katznelson openly lent his support to these grave accusations: "I
will not be truthful if I remain silent and do not say this. It is my belief that we could
have blocked this [the expulsion], because it was not beyond our power to prevent this
disgraceful act."!! If by resorting to this rhetoric he meant to declare himself one of
the "accused," the intention was clear and the impression overwhelming. The speech
was not published in the press, but hearsay and reports about it spread among

the circles concerned, causing mounting ferment on the one hand and, as we saw,
strong suspicions on the other hand.

Against the backdrop of the rising tension, when it was suddenly remembered to
punish Lufban ten full days after the article appeared in his paper, and when it
seemed, on the face of it, that the Haganah man Harit, and possibly Yitzhak Sadeh as
well, were involved in the incident, Sprinzak' s apprehensions were well-grounded.

lOMardor, pp. 71-72.

11 Works of Berl Katznelson (Hebrew), Vol. IX, p. 373.

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BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Three days later, in a meeting of the JVlapai Central Committee on December 15,
1940, the committee of inquiry presented its findings. Eliahu Golomb reported:
"I ndeed, the assailants are both active members in the Haganah. Both admitted the act
and both stated that had been ordered to commit it. These haver im understood after the
event that they had done something impermissible, even if they had received an order,
and they expressed their sorrow and regret for the incident, to us and to Lufban. It
turned out that they had been misled into thinking that this was a [Haganah] order.
But it was made clear to us, the committee, that a person--or persons-- used their
position to give this order. We were unable to determine their names... We decided to
request the Institution [Haganah headquarters] to do everything in its power to fully
complete the investigation."

When the Central Committee expressed its displeasure at the committee's
intention to delegate the task to the Haganah, Yosef Baratz came to Golomb's aid: "We
found it to be true that they were misled by an order... We found immediately that the
responsibility devolves not on those who committed the deed but on those who sent
them to do it... We asked these people: Why did you do this? They said: Because were
ordered to do it. Who gave the order? Those who customarily give us orders. Still, who
was it, who customarily gives you orders? That we cannot say."

A letter of apology from Lufban's two young assailants was read out. But the
Central Committee was not appeased. Israel Idelson (BarYehuda) insisted that the
"Institution" announce the results of the clarification. He was supported by Golda
Meyerson (Meir) and others. Objections were voiced to pardoning the two attackers
before the entire matter was cleared up. Finally a compromise was worked out: where
the two youngsters were concerned, the Central Committee would accept their letter of
apology and the committee's conclusions. But the committee was to pursue its
investigation until it came up with the name of the person who gave the order. Golomb
announced that he would no longer be part of the committee.

The clarification within Mapai continued ten days later. 12 Ziesling stated that
the "Institutioin" had already decided on the person who would carry out the
investigation (MosheSineh) and would assign two others if the need to pass judgment
arose. The Central Committee tried to hold its ground. Levy Shkolnik (Eshkol)
demanded that the committee itself pursue the investigation to its conclusion. Shmuel
Yavinieli, backed by David Remez, proposed that whoever gave the order be made "to
come before a public [J udicial] instance and assume responsibility for his deeds. If he
fails to appear within three days he will be considered a person who is not responsible
for his actions." It was resolved to give Haganah headquarters a week to complete the
investigation and to instruct its committee to apprise the Central Committee of their
findings.

To no avail. Golomb reminded those present that at the previous meeting he had
resigned from the committee. Baratz followed suit. Thus ended the Central Committee's
attempt to impose its authority on the Yishuv's military arm. After the Haganah chief
of staff, Ya'akov Dori, revealed to Sneh that it was he who had generated the
youngsters' deed, his account of the incident as originating in a misunderstanding
was accepted and he was given a symbolic punishment, as mentioned. Sneh informed
onlyMoshe Sharett, the chairman of the Security Committee, about the results of the
investigation and the verdict. The matter was not raised again in the Central
Committee.

A close look at the circumstances of the Patria's sinking leads to the conclusion
that what happened was a miracle-within-a-disaster. The surprising thing was not
that one out of every eight passengers aboard drowned, but that the other seven were
saved. Among the factors that contributed to the high percentage of survivors, one was
objective, one can be attributed to the organizers of the sabotage, and a third to the
rescuers. The objective factor was that part of the hull of the large ship did not sink.
The part of the vessel that remained above water and the adjacent cabins in the fore of
the ship acted as a shelter and enabled the rescue work to go on beyond the few minutes
of the sinking.

12 Meeting of Mapai Central Committee, December 25, 1940.

262

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

The organizers of the action must be credited with arranging the explosion for 9
a.m., when all the ma'apilim were scheduled to be on the upper deck during the daily
cleaning of their berths. The previous evening the immigrants' committee had
declared a "thorough cleanup operation" and had urged all passengers to gather on the
deck no later than 8 a.m. and not to return to their cabins until they were instructed to
do so. Early in the morning orderlies were sent from cabin to cabin to ensure that the

ma'ap/7/m were on deck at the appointed time.B Thanks to this sensible measure
nearly all the immigrants were on their feet and the number of those trapped below
decks was kept low.

A major factor in increasing the number of survivors was the rescue effort
organized by the British--policemen, soldiers and sailors-quickly, efficiently and
bravely. Their devotion and self-sacrifice gained them widespread esteem. The
Mandate government's commission of inquiry termed the rescue effort "excellent."
Rabbi Meir Bar-Man wrote in Harzofeh: "With thanks and acknowledgement the
Yishuv will remember the Englishmen who evinced a large measure of pure
humanitarianism and by their labor and selfless devotion succeeded in saving
hundreds from disaster and death. May they be blessed for their great humane act."14
Other papers and public figures also took note of the successful rescue operation, albeit
less effusively. I n a report to the J ewish Agency Executive Eliahu Dobkin stated: 'The
ma'apilim and those who witnessed the rescue operation praise the devoted efforts
demonstrated in particular by the army and navy personnel. The work was performed
speedily and dextrously. "15 The heroic act of a young British officer was particularly
singled out. In the midst of the chaos he made his way into the ship's engine room to
opened the steam valves of the boilers and prevent their explosion. This officer
perished in the bowels of the ship, saving many others at the cost of his own life.

The evidence before us shows that to the positive factors cited above we must add a
number of ostensibly "negative" points that also contributed to the saving of seven-
eighths of the ma'apilim on the Patr; a. Twice, at least, they were saved by the thwarting
of wrongheaded intentions of the planners and organizers- intentions that were the
result of faulty thinking, or of no thinking at all.

The Patria sank so rapidly because the mine damaged the ship's hull far more
severely than the planners had thought. The blast produced a hole of 2x3 metersl6 and
the vast quantities of water that poured in caused the ship to list and sink within
minutes. The planners later claimed that their calculations were mistaken because
the hull was weaker than they had thought. This may have been so. The mine may
have been prepared primarily to achieve a powerful effect and not, as Mardor asked, so
that it could be hidden in a leather briefcase and smuggled aboard. 17 However, before
this "small" mine was devised, containing, it is estimated, no more than 2 kg. of
explosives,18 there was another, far larger mine. It was shaped like a small barrel and
was packed with more than 10 kg. of explosives. 19 The plan was to smuggle it into the
port in a car, get it close

to the target in a boat and then have two swimmers roll it in the water, plant it
under the ship, and detonate it.20 Fortunately for the ship's passengers, this plan did
not come to fruition because it was impossible to smuggle the mine past the tightly
guarded entry to the port. *

Thefact that the barrel-mine was not detonated may have been doubly fortunate.
It was not only its lethal size that rendered it so dangerous, but also the planned
timing of the blast. According to theoriginal plan, the two Haganah men were to get it
under the ship and detonate it at night, with the darkness and the thin traffic in the
port serving as essential conditions for the operation's success.

Had the explosion occurred whilethema'ap;7/m were sleeping in their berths it is
all too easy to imagine what would have become of both the ship and its passengers.

With the second mine, too, a fateful hitch occurred that saved many lives. The
mine was given to Hans Vandel, a volunteer from the ma'apilim, on the morning of

13 Gershon A. Steiner, Patria (Hebrew), Am Oved, pp. 201-205; Margalit Lichtenstein: Testimony, Yad Vashem, File H/976.

14 Hatzofeh , November 28, 1940.
15CZA, FileS25/2631.

16 David Nimri, ibid.

17 Mardor,p. 58.

18 Letter from Yevgeny Ratner, one of the designers of the mine, to the author, January 17, 1975.

19 Ibid.

20 Mardor. p. 55.

263

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

November 21 while Munya Mardor was working on tine sinip, at inis initiative, as a
carpenter's assistant. JVl ardor relates that when he returned to the city and briefed
Shaul Avigur about what he had done, everyone grew extremely tense. They spent a
sleepless night, not knowing exactly when "zero-hour" would come. The following day,
when Mardor was working on the ship, he was told that Vandel had planted the mine
in a suitable place and had pulled out the pin as instructed-- but the mine had not
exploded. To his horror, Mardor heard that Vandel then went back, picked up the mine-
-with its pin removed-and hid it elsewhere. "I warned him again about the risk they
took by moving the mine after the pin was removed, even if it had not gone off. I

* David Nimri gives a different account of the barrel-mine. He
maintains that it was smuggled into the port. 'The prospects for success were
good. But headquarters was apprehensive about the damage liable to be
caused by this very big mine, and ordered it returned." Dr. Yehuda Slutzky,
the author of the history of the Haganah that was edited by Shaul Avigur
(who, it will be recalled, headed the Patria sabotage operation), agrees with
M ardor's version, but adds: "It is possible that the two testimonies do not
conflict. I nitially it became clear that it would be difficult to get the mine in
and afterward the additional consideration came up and it was decided not to
go on trying to get this mine into the port." For our purposes, there is no
difference between the two accounts. Nimri, too, says that a "very big" mine
was going to be exploded but that this was prevented, fortunately, because the
organizers had second thoughts.

explained the dangers in a mine that does not explode after being activated if it is
moved. "21

David Nimri completes the story: "The intention was for the mine to go off in the
evening, and accordingly it was planted in the coal storeroom with the knowledge of
the Actions Committee [of the ma 'a pi I im]. Fortunately for usthe clock, which was set for
9 p.m., did notfunction. We all spent a sleepless night, fearful that the mine would go
off while everyone was asleep. We waited for morning very much on edge."

They were fortunate indeed, because had the mine gone off as planned, it is very
probable that instead of counting the number of those who perished in the tragedy,
they would have counted the survivors, if any.

After a primitive detonation fuse a meter and a half long was supplied, and after
thetimeof the blast was set for 9 a.m., the disaster occurred which cost the lives of 250
ma 'a pi Urn.

Thus, besides the final mistake, for which these 250 persons paid with their lives,
the organizers were at least twice on the brink of a far greater disaster because of
faulty planning. This gives rise to much astonishment and some reflections. The
whole sequence of events is particularly strange when one considers the Haganah's
high operational level and the superb quality of its agents.

M ardor's description of how the mine was smuggled aboard and conveyed to the
ma'apilim demonstrate the fine qualities that were characteristics of many other
Haganah ventures: a detailed consideration of means and obstacles; the precise
preparation of the technical and organizational necessities; the adroit exploitation of
opportunities; an ability to divert the attention of the British and an intelligent use of
their slackened alertness; and above all-a tenacious adherence to the mission and a
readiness for personal sacrifice combined with utmost caution to prevent failure.

This, as regards the transfer of the mine; whereas, with regard to the wellbeing of
the ma'apilim, a chain of mistakes and negligence was apparent. First there was the
big mine which could have blow up the ship and its passengers in the dead of night.
Then came the "small" mine, successfully concealed among the sandwiches in
Meridor's briefcase, but which did not go off as scheduled and remained in the midst of
the ma'apilim for four days, its pin removed, liable to explode at any moment. The
organizers spent a sleepless night in the grip of overwhelming fear when they
realized, after the act, that a night-time explosion was liable to prove disastrous. Then,
when the mine finally exploded at the proper time

21 Ibid.,

264

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

it turned out that the experience of Yitzhak Sadeh and the Haganah engineers in
demolition worl< was of no avail in determining the strength of the blast and that the
necessary "safety factor" in an operation of this kind was not taken into account.

A theory that resolves these contradictory manifestations leaps to mind. For the
planners and organizers, concern for the well being of the ma'apilim was somehow
detached from the main mission, which required steadfastness and faithfulness. Two
parallel lines of events are discernible. One consists of actions taken as part of a
relentless striving for the goal-sabotaging the ship to prevent its departure. The
second is made up of a series of careless oversights stemming from lack of attention to
a subject which was not considered to be essential or crucial on the road to the main
goal. I n the final analysis the goal was achieved and the heavy price paid.

The tragic consequences of the Patr/a action and the dreadful scenes played out in
the port of Haifa deeply affected those who were behind the operation. Shaul Avigur,
who considered himself personally responsible for the affair "from start to finish,"
said of himself ten years later that "the conscience of any person with a heart will
perhaps not be allayed until his last day."22 At the same time he justified the
operation, arguing that "we had no other way to wage the fight for aliyah and liberty."
Seven years after this Moshe Sharett wrote to Mardor in a similar vein. After reading
the story of the Patr/a, he related, "I relived the heroism and the tragedy al ike-as one
whose responsibility for those precious victims has oppressed and will always oppress
his conscience, and as one who never took consolation from the approval given at that
time." Both confessions came in private letters which did not become public knowledge
until years afterward. 23

To this day the public discussion of the affair has been meager and one-sided. As
long as the British ruled in Palestine, the opponents of the operation did not talk about
its details for fear they would become known to the foreign government. The taboo
against airing the subject for reasons of national solidarity was given salient
expression in two editorials in Davar. Two days after the calamity the paper remarked
with feigned innocence: "The investigation will undoubtedly turn up the direct cause
of the disaster, and if anyone was guilty will uncover him as well. "24 The following
day a brief but heady editorial pronounced: "From the dead to the living. We
accompanied the dead. Henceforth our anxiety is directed to the fate of the living." The
other papers followed suit and the entire public took on itself the obligation not to ask
too many questions or talk

too much about the covert topic. (As will be recalled, Hapod Hatza'ir, which broke
the self-imposed discipline, was immediately punished for it in a direct action.) From
hints in descriptions of the event published by persons close to the Yishuv
institutions, it was widely believed that the explosion was set off by the ma'apilim
themselves who in their despair preferred to die at the gates of the country rather than
be sent to their doom. 25 Whoever knew the truth kept it to himself.

Even after the British departed the truth was not revealed. Articles published in
1950 to mark the tenth anniversary of the disaster still resorted to oblique allusions
about the operation. Even after the publication of M ardor's detailed account in 1957
there were some who, unable to break the habit of caution, or not realizing that the cat
was out of the bag, or for other reasons still preferred the language of indirection. The
1964 novel Patria by Gershon Erich Steiner, one of the survivors of the explosion,
speaks about the cause of the disaster in quite transparent hints. Yet the blurb on the
cover of this book, published by Am Oved, insists that the tragedy "remains a riddle to
this day: in a mysterious explosion that rocked the ship..." and so forth.

At first glance, the absence of a public debate, a state of affairs that was hardly
conducive to the raising of objections, gives the impression of general assent to the
Patr/a operation. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the Irgun Zvai Leumi
(National Military Organization), the military arm of the opposition in the Yishuv,
had also planned to sabotage the ship. The Irgun leader, David Raziel, was engaged in

22 Letter to Mardor (Note 8).

23 In 1972, in History of the Haganah . Vol. Ill, pp. 155, 1633.

24 Davar , November 27, 1940.

25 See letter to Ha'aretz from Z. Meribovitz, November 29, 1965.

265

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

preparations for the operation winen he was preempted by tine Haganaln.26 Political
and moral justification for the act seemed to be bolstered by two odious acts done by the
British authorities under High Commissioner MacMichael before and after the
operation. An official statement about the government's decision to deport the
ma'apilim concluded with this declaration: 'Their ultimate disposal will be a matter
for consideration after the war, but it is not proposed that they shall remain in the
colony to which they are sent or that they should go to Palestine.'27 This provocative
"pledge," even though it was thought not to have had London's authorization, 28
seemed deliberately designed to infuriate the Yishuv and drive it to acts of
desperation.

The truth is that the plan had a good many opponents among the public. I n closed
forums, out of hearing of the British, these persons gave voice to their stand in no
uncertain terms. The record has come down to us in those instances when minutes
were taken. In one such debate at a meeting of the Mapai Central Committee, in which
minutes were

recorded, three representatives of the "moderates" in the Mapai leadership
assailed the operation while three others gave it their backing. 29

The most ardent supporter of the operation was Eliahu Golomb:

"Therearethose who regard the Patr/a tragedy as a black day, while for others the
caseof the/4t/ant/cis a black day. For me, Patria is not a black day and is not the black
day... There are purposeful victims and such were the Patria victims. These were
victims for the sake of J ewish immigration." And once more, in a slightly softer vein:
'The day of the /4t/ant/c is for me a far blacker day than the day of the Patria."

Moshe Sharett, who opened the discussion, emphasized his own account in
assessing the event, and it was this version that was adopted by his like-minded
colleagues in the party and which in time became the officially accepted Yishuv
version. In accordance with a word stressed by him and noted particularly by his
opponents, Sharett's account can be called the "retrospective version." The following
are Sharett's remarks in full, his style and emphases retained:

It is essential to distinguish between our attitude toward the Patria tragedy
beForehand and our attitude in retrospect. Had we been asked in advance whether it
was permissible to delay the ship's sailing and leave the ma'apilim in the country at
the price of so many victims-it is clear to me that no one among us would have
responded in the affirmative. But this disaster occurred. It is a fact. It is part of our
history, part of the history of thej ewish people. And the question that should confront
us is how this chapter will be recorded in history. How it will be assessed by Jewish
history. To me it is clear that J ewish history will say the following: I n the process of our
gaining a hold in Eretz-lsrael there was a period in which J ews made their way to the
country in various ways and by different routes, with permission and without
permission, in peacetime and in wartime, as new immigrants and pioneers who were
trained for aliyah and also as refugees from the sword and destruction; so fired were
they with a desire to enter Eretz-lsrael-and there was a fire in the Yishuv to bring
them here--that when the gates were shut before them, there arose such a great storm
and tidal wave of feeling that brought about what happened on the Patina; to such a
pass did things come that such a thing could happen!

It is clear to me that not only J ewish history but the rest of the world too will make
the same evaluation of what happened on the Patria. At all events, it is vital for our
future fight that if such a thing happened-and again: it is something that I am sure
no one wanted to happen--it is of crucial importance that it be assessed thus, crucial for
us and crucial for our future war.

26 Nevertheless , pp. 460-461; testimony of Binyamin Lubotzky (Eliav), Jabotinsky Institute, File XX 6-14.

27 Official announcement on November 20, 1940: " Ma'apilim" Book , p. 247, and contemporary papers.

28 The Atlantic deportees were returned to Palestine by a decision of the British government which was taken no later than
February 1945~that is, before the end of the war. See Aharon Tzvergebaum, "The Mauritius Affair," Yad Vashem Studies . No.
4, p. 244 (Hebrew).

29 Minutes of Mapai Central Committee meeting, December 15,
1940. Labor Party Archives, Beit Berl. Three other dissenters-
David Remez, Avraham Katznelson and Yosef Sprinzak— spoke at
a meeting of the Mapai Political Committee on December 12,
1940, ibid.

266

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Pinhas Lubianker (Lavon), the most trenchant of those who opposed the Patria
operation, replied to Sharett: "I want to say to JVl oshe that if he writes the history of the
Patria, maybe it will be written thus; if I, the little one, write it, it will be written
differently, it will be fundamentally different. All will depend on the historian. We
know how legends are created in the life of a nation. There is not always a necessary
connection between the legend and the actual truth. One can create a legend, and I
want to tell you, Moshe, that if we write the Patria' s history thus it will be, as I
understand it, a legend and not the objective truth."

Lavon saw the Patr/a operation as a political act, part of the efforts to bring about
the annulment of the White Paper. He did not believe this was feasible as long as the
war continued, and for political reasons he disapproved of the action on the ship.

Yitzhak Lufban, the editor of Hapod Hatza'ir, and the most extreme opponent of the
Patria operation, delivered an emotional speech condemning the act. He began by
saying that he was not the author of the passage about the "malicious hand" but had
read it and agreed to print it. Lufban concurred with those of his colleagues who
opposed the action for political reasons; however, he wished to dwell on the moral
aspectof the issue. He felt mortified and morally shamefaced when the act was likened
to Tel Hal or to some other manifestation of courage, self-dedication and martyrdom.
"With what permission," he asked "may one drown in the sea women, men, old people
and youths, none of whom were asked about it, and then say that we are making a
sacrifice?... What kind of self-dedication is it when a person, instead of dedicating his
own life, dedicates another's? (I. Duvdevani: By what right do we mobilize people?) We
do not mobilize by force. Whoever joins up does so because he regards it as his duty and
he is well aware of what awaits him. That is how it was at Tel Hal... This is how self-
defense in Eretz-lsrael was always... That is called self-dedication. The Jews did not
want to convert, did not want to fall into the hands of the enemies that tormented them,
so they slaughtered themselves or were burned at the stake in the knowledge, in

consciousness, out of the inner decision of each individual. That is called
martyrdom. But what does it mean to say that Jews are engaging in martyrdom by
means of killing other Jews? When was there ever such a thing in Jewish history?
Never was there such a crime in J ewish history!"

Responding to Sharett, Lufban said:

It is of the utmost importance how this event will go down in history. But unlike
Moshe, I think that it should be recorded as it actually happened. Our obligation to our
own education, to the education of the present generation, to the education of the youth
demands this of us. If it is recorded as Moshe wants, it will not be history but the
fa/s/ff cat/ on of history. Many falsifications were created in the same way. But it is not
history, it is not the truth! And falsifications are eventually exposed. Anyone who
studies the matter and delves into the circumstances will uncover it...

I am stressing these points because I feel that others have refrained from
touching on them. And I have to admit: for me they outweigh any political
assessment... If for me the day of the /4 t/ant/c was a day of pain and anxiety, the day of
thePatr/a was the blackest day in my thirty-two years in the country, the blackest day
ever since I was old enough to tell good from bad in the phenomena of public life.

Replying directly to Golomb (and to arguments adduced afterward by others)
Lufban said: "Eliahu has said that these were 'purposeful victims.' I want to say to
Eliahu: every person may bring himself as a purposeful victim but he may not bring
me or any other Jew without his knowledge and consent. It is not the person who
sacrifices or intends to sacrifice me who can decide whether there is any point to my
sacrifice- / will make that decision. And there can be no comparison here with
individual or accidental disasters that occurred on other ma'apilim ships that reached
the country. Naturally, ships can sink. Anyone who embarks on a ship nowadays is
liableto hit a mine... Thoseare disasters. But none of us received permission to be the
emissary of the Angel of Death."

Concluding, Lufban seemed to appeal to future historians:

"I must warn against the desire to sanctify the Patria issue. And I know that my
remarks will not reprove those who have committed themselves to an opinion different
from mine or a few who think as I do. But I am speaking for the minutes that are being
recorded here, which will

267

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

undoubtedly serve as material for writing the history of this period in Eretz-
Israel."

In trying to do our part to executing the historical testament of Yitzhak Lufban,
we were rewarded very generously by another of the speakers at that Central
Committee session. Eliezer Kaplan, who also came out against the Patria operation,
illustrated his negative attitude toward the policy of his party's leadership by citing a
fact which may effectively absolve us of the charge of "prophecy after the fact." We will
return to Kaplan's statement later on, after giving our appraisal of the subject under
discussion.

If the Zionist movement perceived the rescue of European J ewry as a prime goal of
its war against Hitler, that goal should have been accorded priority accordingly. On
the one hand, Zionism should not have done things liable to hamper rescue; and, on
the other hand, it should have sought means and partners to further rescue. For the
sake of rescue, everything should have been exploited, including acts originally done
out of hostile intent. At the end of 1940 the movement had the possibility of utilizing
the fact that the British Navy was mobilized in the war against violations of the White
Paper, and, with the help of British public opinion, which was sympathetic to the
rescue efforts, pressuring London to cooperate in transferring refugees to temporary
havens. The great majority of refugees would have been taken to locations outside
Eretz-lsrael, while the minority would have sufficed to fill the White Paper quota
(which, it later turned out, was not filled in the war years). Partnership in rescue, like
partnership in the military effort, would not have prevented the struggle against the
White Paper, with the aid of friendly public opinion in England and the pressure
wielded by the reservoir of refugees, but with one essential condition: that under no
circumstances would rescue efforts be adversely affected.

It seems that a proposal along these lines was put forward at the time, precisely
in non-J ewish circles. According to Eliezer Kaplan:

"And what am I asking concerning our political action? By way of explanation I
will offer an example. Just today I received a telegram from London stating that non-
Jews have come up with the idea that ma'apilim ships--those which have arrived and
any others to come--wi 1 1 be directed not to Eretz-lsrael but to other, more distant parts
of the Empire. Their entry to Eretz-lsrael will be discussed after the war, while at
present children and old people will be given consideration, and they will be alowed to
enter the country. I refer also to the ma'apilim on the Atlantic. I

would I ike to discuss this kind of idea from a Zionist and J ewish point of view. "30

If implemented, that proposal could have wrought a total change in the relations
between the Zionist movement and the British government, to the benefit of both sides.
A truce lasting until the end of the war, based on a separation of rescue from the
campaign against the White Paper, would have prevented the exacerbation of
relations between the Yishuv and the British government and military, and hence
averted London's hostile stance toward rescue. Refugee ships bound for Eretz-lsrael
would have sought out ships of the British Navy instead of trying to avoid them, and
would have pursued their journey under their protection. The old people and the
children and their mothers would have been brought to Eretz-lsrael, with the younger
people finding shelter abroad until the end of the war. There was no need to exile them
to distant Mauritius: they could have been absorbed in Cyprus, Egypt or another
nearby country. Later in this chapter we will see that many tens of thousands, if not
more, could have been saved on the basis of such a dialogue.

We were unable to discover who made the proposal or how close its proponents
were to the British government. As it turned out, this was of little importance because
the proposal itself drew no attention in J erusalem and Tel Aviv. We found no traces
whatsoever of a discussion of the idea or a reaction to it-as though it were part of
another world unrelated to the burning issues of the time. The dialogue between
Britain and Zionism concerning rescue never took place.

ThePatr/a affair brought about a nadir in the relations of the Yishuv leadership
and the Zionist movement with the Mandate government. In a meeting with High

30 Minutes of Mapai Central Committee meeting, December 15,
1940.

268

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Commissioner M acJVl icinael two days after tine disaster, M os\r\e Sinarett was compelled to
listen to some harsh words and even harsher news. The man who perpetrated the act
should be hanged from a high tree, MacMichael asserted. He informed Sharett of the
Palestine government's unshakable determination to deport the Patria survivors and
the Atlantic passengers. No appeal against the decision would be entertained,
MacMichael declared.

So great was the bewilderment within the Yishuv and among the leadership that
Sharett, reporting MacMichael's announcement to the Jewish Agency Executive,
suggested that it be concealed from the public, because "if it becomes known that they
intend to send these people away, the public will be so depressed that they will simply
accept it. "31

At the order of the British government the Patr/a survivors remained in Palestine
(imprisoned in a camp for a year) but the ma 'ap;7/m

on the Atlantic were shipped to Mauritius. Sharett, seeking to account for the
brutality of the British police against the deportees while they were being forcibly
moved from the Atlit camp to the ships, noted, among other points, that the behavior of
the police "came after the Patr/a affair and perhaps as a result of the Patria affair. The
overwhelming fact remains that we were put into a position of helplessness in our own
land and they were able to treat our sisters and brothers with terrible cruelty without
our being able to come to their aid. "32

Not everyone agreed with Sharett. We related above the bitterness of the Haganah
leaders who deplored the "disgraceful" lack of resistance to the deportation of the
/4t/ant/c refugees. According to existing testimony, they did not recoil from the thought
of repeating the Patr/a operation if necessary. When in March 1941 the ma'apilim ship
Darien 2 entered Haifa harbor and waited for the British to decide its fate, Haganah
personnel contacted a group of pioneers who were aboard about the idea of blowing up
the ship if the British decided to deport the refugees. 33 On this occasion things did not
go so far. The ma'ap///m aboard the Dar/e? 2 were not expelled, as it turned out, thanks
to the active intervention of the British embassy in Washington, which feared the
damage a repeat of the Patr/a or /4 t/ant/c episodes would cause Britain's good name in
the U.S. 34 The ship's captain was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment and the
passengers were locked up in a detention camp for 17 months. The British government
and its High Commissioner in J erusalem took note of the concession they were forced to
maketo thej ews. Thenext chapter in the bitter campaign came ten months later: the
Struma affair.

On December 16, 1941 the ma'apilim ship Struma reached the entrance to the
Bosphorus after embarking from Romania. The Struma was actually a ISO-ton cattle
boat built over a hundred years earlier and initially used on the Danube. It was 16
meters long and 6 meters wide.35 An old engine that was fitted on its deck broke down
several times during the journey from Constanza--which took four days instead of the
normal 12 hours.

The Struma was vastly overcrowded. Packed aboard were 769 people, including
250 women and 80 children below the age of 15. The voyage was organized by the
Revisionists, and about a hundred Betar and Tsohar members were on board, among
them the movement's leader in Romania, Dr. Lazerovitz.

For two and a half months the Struma was anchored in the port of Istanbul. The
Turks would not allow anyone to disembark unless he bore

an entry permit for Palestine, and the Mandate government refused to issue the
permits. Toward evening on February 23, 1942, Turkish policemen went on board,
raised the anchor, hooked the ship to a tugboat and towed it into the Black Sea outside

31 Minutes of Jewish Agency Executive meeting, November 28,
1940.

32 Ibid., December 15, 1940.

33 P. Azai, Abba Berdichev (Hebrew), pp. 47-48.

34 Historv of the Haganah , Vol. Ill, p. 158.

35 Haim Barlas, Rescue in the Holocaust (Hebrew), pp. 181-186;
Haim Lazar-Litai, Nevertheless , pp. 472-476; Historv of the
Haganah , Vol. Ill, pp. 159-161; various documents in CZA File
S25/2616.

269

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Turkish territorial waters, abandoning it to its fate. Tine following morning there was
an explosion on board and the ship went down. There was one survivor.

The immediate cause of the disaster has still not been determined to everyone's
satisfaction. Unlike the Patria affair, we will not enter into a discussion of the
probability of the various accounts and speculations that prevailed and continue to
prevail. We were forced into this decision reluctantly, because of the research
conditions we encountered. Finding that our chances of securing the material relating
to the true cause of the sinking were uncertain at best, we saw no point in making
excessive efforts to uncover it. We will therefore make do with a brief survey of the
diverse accounts put forward in this connection.

Among the possibilities of an sdernal attack, the notion of a floating mine
quickly gave way to the idea that a torpedo was fired at the ship from another vessel or
from a static facility. For years it was widely believed that the torpedo had been fired
from a German vessel operating in the vicinity. However, this possibility was finally
discounted in the 1960s when it became known that there were no German submarines
or warships in the Black Sea during the period in question. 36 Since then it has been
generally accepted that the Struma was sunk accidentally by a Russian submarine. It
was also hinted that the fatal torpedo was launched from the Turkish coast, and
testimony was cited from the sole survivor, David Stoliar, that the ship's officer, who
was killed in the blast, had spotted an approaching torpedo on the shore side.37 But
this account was unsupported and was not subjected to public discussion.

Speculations were also adduced concerning /nte-na/ factors that may have caused
the disaster. Lord Cranborne said in the House of Lords:

"It is possible that the wretched passengers themselves blew up [the ship]
deliberately out of despair, although no proof has yet been furnished for this shocking
theory." Indirect confirmation of the suicide theory is contained in a memorandum
submitted by the Association of Romanian Immigrants in Eretz-lsrael to the J ewish
Agency Executive prior to the disaster, stating that "they are all giving the
unmistakable impression of a group of people who have determined on collective
suicide. "38

Circumstances were not lacking indicating deliberate sabotage that "succeeded"
beyond expectations, as in the case of the Patria but more severely. The journalist
Gershon Agronsky (Agron) who happened to be

in Istanbul on the day after the disaster, relates a theory widely circulated there,
to the effect that the passengers tried to steer the ship onto a shoal. 39 It was known, and
confirmed from various sources, that the passengers and/or the captain several times
caused the engine to break down and then prevented its repair. I n this connection some
importance may attach to the testimony of Stoliar, as he heard it from the ship's
officer, that the explosion occurred while mechanics were dealing with the stalled
engine. But as mentioned, we did not make a thorough investigation of the matter.

The High Commissioner for Palestine found in the Struma affair an opportunity
to get back at the J ews for the non-deportation of the Patr/a survivors and the Darien 2
refugees. His hostile attitude was very much in evidence in both his acts and his
statements. With the decision in his hands,40 he rejected a request to allow the
ma'apilim in within the framework of the 3,000 entry certificates allocated to the
J ewish Agency for this period. He cited two reasons, which were actually three. In the
first place, he maintained, it was feared that Nazi agents had infiltrated the refugees.
Secondly, and this was his "brilliant" contribution, there was a food shortage in
Palestine and the 800 ma'apilim were liable to aggravate the situation. But underlying
these grounds was the crucial consideration: it was unthinkable that illegal actions
should create facts that would force London to act against its laws and methods.

MacMichael's vicious cruelty won the day--the ma'apilim did not get to Eretz-
lsrael. Calamitously, his attitude was bolstered by the gross torpor evinced by the
Jewish Agency. We learn about the timing of its activities in this connection from a
communique issued by the Agency's Information Office in early March "in order to
prevent misunderstanding and empty rumors."41 Reports about the ship's arrival in

36 Juergen Ruber, The Sinking of the Jewish refugee Ships "Struma" and "Mafkura" in the Black Sea (German), 1965, pp. 7 1-
72.

37 Conversation with David Stolier in Ma'ariv , April or May 1965; Yediot Ahronot , February 25, 1966.
38CZA, FileS25/2616.

39 Ibid.

40 See Moshe Sharett's clarification at the Jewish Agency Executive meeting on March 1, 1942.

41 Davar, March 6, 1942.

270

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Istanbul, the Statement said, "were received by the J ewish Agency in Jerusalem at the
end of December. " H owever, only i n m\6-\ anuary, when the f i rst refugee who succeeded
in disembarking reached Palestine, did the Agency find out "clear things." On
j anuary 19 a talk was held with the First Secretary of the Palestine government, and on
January 30 the J ewish Agency made a written appeal to the government. On February
lOtheJ ewish Agency again raised the Struma issue in a talk with the First Secretary.
Three days later the Agency sent a detailed letter and on February 15 received a reply:
the British refused to admit adult refugees but would allow the entry of children aged
11-16. On February 18 the Palestine government agreed to allow children under the age
of eleven to enter. Six days later the Struma went down.

From August 1940 a sepcial [special] office, set up by Hal m Barlas, the director of
thej ewish Agency's Aliyah Department, had been operating in Istanbul. 42 TheJ ewish
Agency in Jerusalem claimed that for an entire month the office did not convey
information about the Struma so that it was not until the arrival of the first refugee
that J erusal em came into possession of detailed information. Following this meetings
were held with officials of the High Commissioner's office accompanied by the dispatch
of letters at intervals of ten days or more.

On February 16 the British consulate in Istanbul received confirmation of the
entry visas for the children, and that very day it was approved by the vilayet (Turkish
regional government office). However, for a week Jewish Agency personnel were
unable to overcome obscure difficulties in the Turkish bureaucracy-- nor did we find
evidence of intensive efforts toward this end. A few days before February 23 it was
learned in both Istanbul and J erusalem that the Turks were about to expel the ship. On
the day of the expulsion J ewish Agency officials appealed urgently to the authorities to
at least allow the children to disembark. But it was too late. They were told at the
vilayet that the governor was in Ankara and that there no reply had been received
from that quarter. 43 Barlas later wrote that "the ship was returned [to the high seas]
without any notification, at evening. "44 In other words, despite everything the move
took theJ ewish Agency officials by surprise.

An interesting fact bears noting in connection with the leisurely pace of the
appeals to the authorities. A perusal of the Yishuv press reveals that in every paper
without exception the first report about the Struma appeared on February 10, less than
two weeks before the expulsion. Prior to this not a word was said to the press and the
public about the extraordinary events in Istanbul harbor. As those aboard the ship
moved inexorably toward their terrible fate, two months of precious time were wasted
in mobilizing forces to forestall that fate. A day before the expulsion Jerusalem
learned that Churchill was showing an interest in intervening on behalf of the
Struma. 45 If the prime minister truly intended to help, and thus fly in the face of his
ministers and his representative in J erusalem, he acted too late.

The Struma disaster sparked a vigorous and spontaneous reaction in the Yishuv.
TheConferenceof Women Workers broke off their meeting and staged a demonstration
in the streets of Tel Aviv. A call was sounded for street demonstrations to be held
throughout the country. The Yishuv institutions, however, took a line of restraint. An
"internal curfew" was declared for February 26 from around noontime until 7 p.m.,
the intention

being "that the internal curfew will forestall demonstrations."46 The historian
of the Haganah offers the following explanation for the organization's moderation:
"There is no doubt that what was at work here was the consciousness that, when all was
said and done, the Yishuv stood in a single front with the British in a fateful
campaign against the Nazis. "47 If this sober consideration (which did not prevent the
sabotage of another war asset, the Patria) was the moti vati ng force, it was nevertheless
insufficient to halt the campaign to transform rescue into aliyah. Moshe Sharett fired
off cables to Zionist leaders in London and New York urging them to work vigorously
for the return of the Mauritius exiles, as what he termed compensation for the Struma

42 Barlas, op. cit., p. 102.

43 Agronsky, ibid.

44 Haim Barlas to Moshe Shertok, March 31, 1942, CZA, File S25/2616.

45 Minutes of Jewish Agency Executive meeting, February 22, 1942.

46 Moshe Sharett at Jewish Agency Executive meeting, February 26,
1942.

47 History of the Haganah . ibid.

271

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

disaster and in order to prevent a new disaster. 48 Some of Sinarett's colleagues objected
to the "compensation for the disaster" concept, with one of them (Eliezer Kaplan)
pointing out "that we will not know what to reply if asked what the connection is
between the Struma disaster and the release of the ma'apilim from Mauritius." The
Jewish Agency Executive decided to require Sharett to take under advisement the
comments that were voiced. But in the meantime a new front, sweeping and public,
was developing of which the objective meaning was opposition to saving] ews outside of
Eretz- Israel.

The Va'ad Leumi decided to organize a mass petition in the Yishuv against the
closing of the gates of Eretz-lsrael to the refugees. Addressing Asefat Hanivharm (the
Elected Assembly) Zaiman Rubashov (Shazar) described the content of the petition as
follows: "...And wewill not rest until the gates of the homeland are opened to &/ery J ew
rescued from the Nazis' clutches. That is the resolution. This is the reason for the
petition in the Yishuv. "49

In the context of the stands and actions of the Zionist movement this petition
constituted a flagrant challenge to the British government. Motivated by a lofty desire
to help, thej ews in Eretz-lsrael signed their names to a saliently political declaration.
A sympathetic public opinion, appalled by the Patria and Struma disasters, was
utilized to declare all-out war on any form of rescue that did not entail bringing new
immigrants to Eretz-lsrael.

The British government was not composed only of just men, though neither is
there any proof that it contained absolute scoundrels. All its members, headed by the
avowed "Zionist" Churchill, were firmly determined not to change the immigration
policy of the White Paper as long as the war lasted, and they had sufficient means to
implement that resolve. The government was dependent on Parliament and sensitive
to

public opinion in the country. While neither Parliament nor the public at large
opposed the White Paper policy, they were highly sympathetic to the persecuted J ews
and concerned for their fate. The Struma affair triggered a public furor in England. In
an emotional debate in both Houses of Parliament the government was hard-pressed to
explain why the J ewish refugees had not been treated, at the very least, like nationals
of enemy states--Germans, Italians or J apanese--who, if caught, were taken ashore and
locked in detention camps. Embarrassed government spokesmen mumbled words of
regret. They expressed the hope that a similar tragedy would not recur and in the same
breath announced that the government would not deviate from its policy of restricting
immigration--"a policy approved by Parliament. "50

The British government faced a triple dilemma. It could not afford a repeat of the
Patr/a and Struma disasters (nor did it wish to), but neither was it willing to abandon
the White Paper policy. A compromise solution involving the separation of rescuefrom
a/;yah was precluded by the active opposition of the Zionist movement. We do not know
for certain whether the way out of this tangle of contradictions was found by means of
detailed advance planning or by the more pragmatic route of reacting to events
piecemeal, as they occurred. Whatever the case may be, the results were the logical
ones.

In May 1942 the Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs, Lord Cranborne, wrote to
Berl Locker, the director of theJ ewish Agency's London office, informing him of a new
policy decided on by the British government after the Struma disaster. His Majesty's
Government, Cranborne stated, would continue to adhere to the White Paper
regulations "and will do nothing to facilitate the arrival of Jewish refugees in
Palestine." However, if, despite everything, ships carrying illegal immigrants were to
reach Palestine, the passengers would be taken ashore and imprisoned in detention
camps. Those who passed a security check and were found suitable for the country's
economic absorption capacity would gradually be released as part of the entry quota
stipulated in the White Paper. The statement was being conveyed on the assumption
that it would not be made public and would not constitute a public announcement. 51

On the face of it, this was a welcome declaration. Under pressure of public opinion
the British government was being forced to accept a policy precluding additional
deportations from Palestine; any Jew who succeeded in reaching the shores of Eretz-

48 Minutes of Jewish Agency Executive meeting, March 1, 1942.

49 L. Cooperstein, The "Struma" Scroll (Hebrew), p. 104.

50 Barlas, op. cit., pp. 183-185.

51 Letter from Lord Cranborne to Berl Locker, May 22, 1942; Barlas, op. cit., pp. 235-237.

272

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

Israel would enter the country, albeit temporarily, as a prisoner. The detention camps
would be occupied

by masses of ma 'ap;7/m who would await their turn to be released, without threat
of deportation. Their presence in the country in growing numbers would be a moral-
political factor that would help overturn the White Paper. Rescue and aliyah would be
found to be congruent.

In practice, optimism was unfounded. In this period the sources of "illegal"
immigration dried up. The Struma disaster sounded the death knell for rescue
attempts via the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. A few days after the Struma
went down a report was received in Istanbul that 300 persons had boarded the Michael
in one of the departure ports but had immediately disembarked when news of the
disaster reached them. 52 I n 1942 the British had the opportunity to fulfill their pledge
with regard to just one boat, carrying 15 ma'apilim.53 A year later there were renewed
prospects that a large number of ships carrying refugees would sail the Black Sea and
off the coast of Eretz-lsrael. But then, as we shall see. Lord Cranborne's forced
concession turned into an impassable obstacle. It was not by accident that Cranborne
constantly reiterated his government's tenacious adherence to the White Paper.

The Bermuda Conference is often coupled with the Evian Conference, as though
the two were identical twins. This was not the case. What both meetings did have in
common was that they were convened by non-Jews with the declared aim of helping
Jews. But this is where the similarity begins and ends. Besides this, everything was
different. The Evian Conference met at the personal initiative of President Roosevelt
and over thirty countries attended with great publicity; the British government was
forced into convening the Bermuda Conference by public opinion in England. Only
delegations from the U.S. and England took part and it was held on a remote Atlantic
island. The Evian Conference, its poor organizational administration

notwithstanding, inspired countries in the free world with a readiness to help, and
breathed optimism in the delegations of Jewish organizations (including, it will be
recalled, the three Zionist leaders who were directly involved). It forged the conditions
for the Rublee-Wohlthat and Santo Domingo plans which were pregnant with
prospects and possibilities. The very opposite was true of the Bermuda Conference
which was empty at its outset and barren at its conclusion.

The story of the Bermuda Conference can be traced to a unique demonstration that
we mentioned earlier. On December 17, 1942, when the first declaration of the Allied
Powers was read out that contained a description and condemnation of the destruction
of E uropean J ewry by the

Nazis, a scene unprecedented in the history of the British House of Commons
unfolded: ail the Members suddenly rose to express their outrage at the atrocities and
their sympathy for the victims.

This spontaneous demonstration by the MPs was a faithful reflection of their
constituents' feelings. In Chapter 3 we described the burst of public support in
England for the rescue of J ews, beginning in J uneand peaking in November- December
1942. Moshe Sharett, who was then in the British capital, related a few months later
that "a tidal wave of public opinion is surging and has still not abated. "54 A public
opinion poll conducted by the liberal paper New Chronicle found that 80 percent of the
British public were ready "for great actions" to save the Jews in Europe.55 Various
organizations sprang up seeking to translate the public sympathy into practical
action. The most important of these, a committee of intellectuals and church
representatives headed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, brought relentless pressure
to bear on the government to take urgent and concrete rescue measures. England,
fighting for its life, having just gone through the danger of a Nazi invasion and
occupation, did not forget its humanitarian obligations.

52 Agronsky, ibid.

53 History of the Haganah , ibid., p. 161. Fifty-five passengers on two other vessels, Michai and Mircea , were already in
detention at the Atlit camp, when the letter was written to Locker.

54 Speech at a meeting of the Elected Assembly, Davar , May 4, 1943.

55 A. Broide, Davar , April 24, 1943.

273

BEIT-ZVI : Post-Ugandan Zionism

But the British public, while ready to help and rescue, was divided over the
question of whether it was necessary to link the rescue with the fulfillment of the
Zionists' demands. According to Sharett: "We were told that as long as we were asking
for rescue we had everyone's assent. But the moment we demand that the survivors go to
Eretz-lsrad we split the British public and hamper the government in wartime. We
did not accept this argument, and neither did many of our British friends. "56 Opinion,
it turned out, was divided among Zionism's friends as well. In a meeting of the Zionist
Actions Committee Sharett revealed that "some of our friends urged that we not raise
the question of Eretz-lsrael in connection with this matter [rescue]. "57

The Zionist movement would not budge. It did not agree to separate rescue from
aliyah and refused to consider even compromise proposals such as that adduced by
Eliezer Kaplan in the Mapai Central Committee. Rejecting the advice of well-wishers
and friends, Zionism stuck to the line it had set itself after the Struma disaster: every
J ew rescued from the Nazis was a potential o/^ (immigrant to Eretz-lsrael) and every
means must be used in the fight to ensure his entry to Eretzlsrael. Among other moves,
the Zionists once more demanded the return to Eretz-lsrael of the 1,800 exiles on
Mauritius. 58 The movement was bent on exploiting the surging public sympathy for
rescue in order to break the White Paper policy.

To this the British government was as opposed at the end of 1942 as it had been at
the beginning of that year. Now, as then. Parliament was unwilling to compel the
government to deviate from its policy while the war still raged. In March 1943 Lord
Cranborne could reiterate in Parliament what he had declared a year earlier: that the
government would not "go beyond the terms of the policy approved by Pari lament. "59
Churchill, who had fiercely denounced the publication of the White Paper by the
Chamberlain government, now wrote that he continued to have his reservations about
the document but because of war neecfs this policy was currently being implemented
and it "runs until it is superseded. "60

The confrontation which had previously found its external expression in the
Patria and Struma affairs now became far more acute, with conditions appearing to
have shifted in favor of the Zionist side. The pressure of public opinion, which called
for concrete rescue measures, intensified to the point where it could not be mollified
with mere declarations of support. Parts of the public and a few MPs insisted that
Palestine be designated a major haven for the refugees. Behind the scenes lurked the
pledge made to the Zionists in Lord Cranborne's letter to Berl Locker. In the Black Sea
countries--Romania and Bulgaria--the prospects grew for a J ewish exodus if the Allies
lent a hand.

In this situation the British government tried to maneuver. On the one hand
London announced concessions regarding the entry of refugees into Palestine within
the White Paper frameworl<. On February 3, 1943, the Colonial Secretary, Oliver
Stanley, pledged the following steps: (1^ 4,000 children accompanied by 500 adults
could enter Palestine from Bulgaria; (2) 500 children would be admitted from
Romania and Hungary; and (3) if suitable means of transport were found the
immigration of children with a commensurate accompaniment of adults would
continue until the exhaustion of the White Paper quota for the five-year period ending
in March 1944-a total of about 30,000 people.61

While the public received these assurances (which were not implemented) with
satisfaction, the government was busy preparing an impressive campaign intended to
induce calm and reduce Parliamentary pressure. A memorandum transmitted by the
British ambassador. Lord Halifax, to the U.S. State Department on J anuary20 proposed
the holding of a "private conference" of representatives from the two countries as the
most effective means of responding to the public demands for rescue. The content of the
memorandum, which was couched in amazingly frank language, indicates that at the
time it was drafted London had already come up with its cruel "solution" to preserve
the White Paper policy: as

56 See Note 54.
57CZA, FileS25/1853.

58 Eliahu Dobkin at a meeting of the Zionist Actions Committee, CZA, File S25/1851.

59 Davar , Marcli 26, 1943.

60 Winston Churcliill, Tlie Second World War , Vol. IV, p. 849.

61 Barlas, op. cit., p. 50.

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the Zionists were continuing to insist tinat every refugee be admitted to Palestine,
and tineir supporters in England and America were not relaxing the pressure on the
government toward this end, London had decided to ensure that the number of refugees
would be as small as possible--or that there would be no refugees at all.

Lord Halifax made the holding of the conference contingent on Palestine's not
being considered as a haven for the refugees. No "false hopes" should be raised by the
conference, Halifax wrote, cautioning that Germany and its satellites were liable to
exchange their extermination policy for an expulsion policy and thus embarrass the
Allies by flooding the world with refugees. 62

This was the first inking of what was to become the siege imposed by London on
European J ewry. Two months later, in a meeting with President Roosevelt, the British
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, took the matter up once more, intoning the cautious
language of diplomacy, and citing the shortage of available ships for transporting
refugees. When Secretary of State Cordell Hull proposed the urgent removal from
Bulgaria of 60,000-70,000 Jews who faced annihilation, Eden replied that caution
must be exercised concerning such proposals. "If we do that," he said, "then the J ews of
the world will be wanting us to make similar offers in Poland and Germany. Hitler
might well take us up on any such offer and there are simply not enough ships and
means of transportation i n the world to handle them."

As an experienced diplomat Eden hurried to placate his interlocutor with the
(false) pledge that England was ready to admit 60,000 Jews into Palestine. But
transportation from Bulgaria to Palestine was also very difficult. In addition, he said,
there was a security risk, namely that German agents would penetrate along with the
masses of refugees. Summing up, Eden declared that at Bermuda his country would
not make a lot of far-reaching promises "which cannot be kept due to a shortage of
ships. "63

The siege on European Jewry was carried out against the will of the British
people, and the Bermuda Conference was convened first and foremost to mislead the
British about their government's intentions and actions. The fact that a proposal of
this kind could be sent to and accepted in Washington attests to the nature and
character of the American official who dealt with it. The standing and deeds of
Breckinridge Long in the State Department and in the White House will be related at
the appropriate place. Long, who represented the American government in the
negotiations on the conference and oversaw its organization and

proceedings, was of one mind with the British concerning the true goal of the
meeting.

The preparations for the conference lasted three months, with the British
constantly prodding their partners. When at the end of a month there was still no
official American assent to the meeting, the Parliamentary Undersecretary for
Foreign Affairs complained that "public opinion in Britain had been rising to such a
degree that the British government can no longer remain dead to it."

The two sides argued fiercely about details and procedures, of which the true
meaning was: the division of responsibility between them before public opinion for a

do-nothing posture regarding rescue. Each Side tried to maneuver to ensure that the
other side would bear the greater measure of blame. Endless clashes over these issues
also took up a good deal of tim e at the actual conference, which opened on April 19 and
ended on the 28th. 64

Consistent with its primary goal--misleading public opinion--the conference was
held in strict secrecy. Nothing was made public from the deliberations with the
exception of the opening speeches delivered by the two delegation heads. At the
conclusion of the conference a statement was issued to the effect that the resolutions
would not be published until the delegations consulted with their governments. Three
weeks later an "interim report" was issued stating that the delegations were at work
harm oniously on the final report, of w hich the details could not be revealed "so long as
a knowledge of the recommendations contained therein would be of aid or comfort to
our enemies or might adversely affect the refugees."

62 FRUS, 1943, Vol. 1.

63 Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , Ch. 28, p. 325 in Bantam softcover edition.

64 A documented description of the Bermuda Conference and the preparations made for it appears in Henry L. Feingold, The
Politics of Rescue, which we have drawn on for some of the information.

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It was not until half a year later, on November 19, 1943, that a brief, final
communique was issued. Its evasive formulation could not conceal the fact that
nothing had been decided and nothing had been done--nothing positive, that is.

From start to finish the Bermuda Conference was a shameful chapter in the
attitude of the British and American governments toward the catastrophe of European
Jewry. Not all the participants were as blameworthy as the initiators in London and
their willing respondents in the State Department. But all bore moral responsibility.
Nothing in what follows can mitigate this assertion.

The conference proved a disappointment to all concerned, with the exception of
the Nazis. Those who anticipated concrete rescue efforts were disillusioned. Those who
hoped that the conference would prove beneficial to the cause of aliyah were left
embittered and frustrated. But

the greatest failure was sustained by the conference's organizers. Not only did
they not obtain their objective of placating public opinion by means of imaginary
actions, they achieved the very opposite. The proponents of rescue in England and
America did not fall for the secrecy ploys or the vague promises. The publication of the
opening speeches opened people's eyes to what was about to be perpetrated at Bermuda.
A public furor arose that did not abate until the end of the conference and for many
days thereafter. The Foreign Office, it turned out, and to some extent the State
Department as well, did not rightly gauge the depth of the public's emotional
involvement with the rescue effort.

Paradoxically, the conference's clear and visible failure was its only positive
result. When it became universally apparent, without an iota of doubt, that salvation
would not come from here, additional forces sprang up to advance the rescue cause. In
the United States these forces scored a notable achievement: two months after the
publication of the final report of the Bermuda Conference the institution that was
generally consistent with the needs of rescue was, at long last and terribly late,
established in Washington. (SeeCh. B.)

The conference's failure as a smokescreen for inaction suggests that the defeat of
its organizers could have been more tangible. In an atmosphere of public opinion
sympathetic to rescue, Bermuda became a focal point of interest and expectation. Had
there been a Jewish element with public clout and closely affiliated with the
developments, and able to properly guide those with good will in the international
community, desirable results might well have been achieved during the conference or
in its immediate aftermath.

The stand of principle toward the rescue of Jews was a key question that
determined openly the reserved stance of the conference participants toward the
enterprise they were supposed to advance. The final press release and a number of
earlier statements said explicitly that it had been decided not to adopt any rescue
proposals whose implementation "will interfere with the war efforts or cause their
delay." This was a heartless declaration based in part on the whispered notion that no
pretext should be given to antisemites who maintained that the war was being fought
for the J ews. In practice the J ews found themselves in a position of extraordinary
inferiority as compared with other nations that took part in the war. England, which
had launched the war for the sake of the Poles, and America, which had become
entangled in the conflict when it placed its resources at Europe's disposal, now decided
to make help to the Jews contingent precisely on its not hampering the attainment of
their war

goals. They would never have put forward a proviso of this kind with respect to
helping the Czechs, the Yuogoslavs, or other allies: for in those cases it was self-
evident that proffering help to them was itself an important war goal. To the British
and Americans, the rescue of J ews was not a political-military mission as it was where
an ally was at stake, but a humanitarian problem which, its importance
notwithstanding, must not be allowed to slow down the war machine to the point where
victory might be delayed. It sometimes happens that the senior partners in a military
campaign are reluctant to execute a certain operation for a junior ally, but never
would they dare speak to that ally as the heads of the Bermuda delegations spoke to the
J ews.

One of the prerogatives of an ally is to call on its partners for help and
participation in the form of immediate reprisal if the enemy violates the rules of war.
When the Germans tried to use poison gas on the southern Russian front, Churchill

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wasted not a minute in declaring that the Western allies would pay back the Germans
if they did not desist immediately from their criminal action. No one suggested
informing the Germans that they would get their just punishment--after the war.

Only immediate, vigorous and cruel retaliation had any chance of putting a halt
to the slaughter of J ews. This could have been effected by a massive show-bombing of a
civilian German population, accompanied by an explanation and warning as to what
was being done and why. Alternatively, repressive measures could have been taken
against Germans residing in the free world. Those in the ghettos knew this, and
persons well acquainted with the subject also broached this possibility. In the Warsaw
Ghetto it was said: 'They should have rounded up a few tens of thousands of Germans
from America, jailed them in concentration camps behind barbed wire, without food
and water, and let them die of starvation and total deprivation, as we are being made to
undergo in Poland. "65 Leon Feiner, the leader of the Polish Bund, told the Polish
officer J an Karski: 'They [the Jewish leaders in the free world] know that no political
action, no protests or promises to exact punishment after the war will help. None of
these measures has the slightest influence on the Germans. The only thing that might
have made an impression on them, and might perhaps also save the few J ews who will
still be alive then, is if a certain number of Germans were executed abroad, with a
declaration that if the Germans do not cease slaughtering the Jews, larger groups of
Germans will be publicly shot. That is my opinion and everyone else's. "66

The Germans, for their part, considered reprisals to be reasonable and expected.
They feared them and in some cases acted with restraint in

order to forestall them. It was for fear of reprisal that they did not harm J ewish
prisoners-of-war from Western armies.67 Foreign Minister Ribbentrop agreed to
release American Jews from detention to prevent reprisals against Germans in the
U .S. 68 And in Lublin a German officer said that reprisals were being staged against
Germans in the U .S. because of German persecution of J ews in Poland--many Germans
had been shot to death in America. 69

The Jewish organizations headed by Stephen Wise complained much about the
inaction and unwillingness to help. They emphasized the special situation of the J ews,
who alone had been singled out by the Nazis for total destruction. But not once did they
exceed the bounds of humanitarian demands, never did they speak about reprisals.
Around this time the Polish government suggested to the Zionist movement that it
affiliate itself with the Polish demand for the bombing of non-strategic civilian
targets in Germany accompanied by an announcement that the bombing was in
retaliation for the mass murder in Poland. The proposal was discussed by the Jewish
Agency Executive in Jerusalem and a resolution was passed as ruled by Ben-Gurion:
"The Executive does not concur in the proposal to demand the bombing of cities in
Germany. "70

The date of this resolution was January 1943--after the famous November 23. By
this time the Zionist leaders were supposed to know what was happening in Occupied
Europe and believe the reports emanating from there. Now they were confronted with a
proposal from a fellow sufferer, the Polish government, whose nation was being
annihilated along with thej ews. Poland was an official ally in the war. It could not be
put off with the argument that rescue efforts were liable to hinder the prosecution of
the war. But Poland was widely suspected (for a long time by J ews, too) of deliberately
exaggerating its descriptions of the atrocities, and its voice was not sufficiently heeded
by the senior allies. The addition of the J ews, the representatives of the persecuted, who
were being borne on waves of public sympathy, might have given the Polish demand a
major boost and brought about air raids such as the one carried out against Budapest
18 months later. But the Polish proposal was turned down. The reprisal raids were not
executed.

This is the place to note a fact which is not devoid of interest. We related earlier
(Ch. 3) that in a cable to the Bermuda Conference from the Rescue Committee in
Jerusalem, the passage demanding vigorous steps to put an immediate stop to the
annihilation was omitted. We cited Gruenbaum's explanation: that the demand was

65 Ringelblum, Writings from the Ghetto (Yiddish), Vol. I, p. 372.

66 Melech Neustadt, Destruction and Revolt of Polish Jewry (Hebrew), p. 70.

67 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of European Jewry , p. 401.

68 lbid.,p. 403.

69 lbid.,p. 332.

70 Minutes of Jewish Agency Executiye meeting, January 10, 1943.

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left out because it was thought that the slaughter had ceased and would not be
renewed. We do

not know exactly what the authors of the resolutions and memoranda in New
York thought. But it stands to reason that the considerations guiding them were not
far removed from those of their colleagues in Jerusalem. Jewish organizations in
America put forward three rescue plans with a view to the Bermuda Conference. Two of
them, absolutely identical in content, were submitted to the conference by the World
Jewish Congress and the Joint Emergency Committee for European Jewish Affairs in
which the eight largest organizations in the U.S. were represented. The third plan
(though first chronologically) was incorporated in the mass rally held in Madison
Square Garden in New York on March 1, 1943, at the initiative of the Emergency
Committee. All three plans, for whom the authorized spokesman was Stephen Wise,
were noteworthy for the fact that, like the Gruenbaum cable, they contained no
demand to force the Germans to stop the destruction. The Madison Square Garden
assembly, whose slogan was "Stop Hitler Now!," made do with a call to the United
Nations to set up a "war crimes commission"--in other words, to threaten the Germans
witli punishment after the Allied victory. The two other plans did not even go that far.

One must surmise that the participants in the Bermuda Conference and, in
contrast, people of good will who took an interest in events in Europe, were impressed
by the moderation of the J ewish groups. At this time Nazi propaganda was engaged in
colossal efforts to mislead world public opinion. Parallel to the total denial of the
annihilation, different versions of a "compromise" were floated: True, many Jews are
dying, but not because we are exterminating them. Or: Yes, there was a period of
annihilation, but it was stopped completely. The notion of the "53 settlements" that
was received with such fervent belief in Jerusalem, elsewhere sowed confusion and
doubts. The fact that J ewish organizations were not demanding, above all, the
immediate cessation of the slaughter reinforced the belief that currently, at least,
there was no annihilation. For who better than the J ews know the true state of affairs...

Concrete results in forming an opinion of the unfolding events could have been
obtained by the presentation of an orderly informative description, based as far as
possible on documents and reliable testimonies and formulated in a solid and
judicious style. J ust such a description was submitted to the Bermuda Conference and
also published. It appeared as the first chapter of a memorandum prepared by the
World J ewish Congress. 71This is a document that will repay close study by scholars of
the Holocaust.

The first chapter is entitled "Liquidation of J ewish Life in Europe" and it refers to
annihilation as well. According to the memorandum, the primary cause of Jewish
deaths is forced starvation. About half the chapter is given over to a detailed
description of the restrictions imposed by the Germans on the supply of food to the
Jews; how the Jews are being deprived of vitamin-rich foodstuffs; how small their
bread, jam and sugar rations are, and so on. As a result, the memorandum states, over
47,000 J ews died in Warsaw in 1941, about one-tenth of the ghetto population.

I n Germany, too, the memorandum relates, the situation is serious. A Hungarian
visitor describes the situation of the Jews in Berlin in the following words: 'The Jews
in Berlin are very pale. Their faces are waxen, as though they already wore the mask of
death. As I pass by one of them I can hear a soft rattling of his bones." Moreover: "It is
said that last summer the German Minister of Food, Hermann Backe, proposed the
mass extermination of thej ews in order to save food."

A second and no less effective means of annihilating Jews, the memorandum
states, is their transportation to distant places in freight cars packed to overflowing.
Hitler, it seems, was in the grip of migromania (transportation impulse) "from which
the members of his nation are also not exempt." An expert on transportations on
Himmler's staff, Obersturmfulirer Higge, calculated that 30 percent of the deportees
died during the journey.

71 CZA, File S25/5299. The memorandum was first published in Congress Weekly , No. 30, April 1943, and appears as an
appendix in The Jewish Refugee by Arye Tartakower and Kurt Grossmann.

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The memorandum cites figures (generally correct) on the destruction of J ewish
communities in various locales. A clear answer is furnished to the question of where
the J ews have disappeared to: 'The J ews are constantly transported from Germany,
Austria, and the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia to the concentration at Terezin
Fort, from there to Poland, and from Poland to the Nazi -Soviet front. "

The submitters of the plan surmise that the majority of these people are exploited
by the Nazis for their war effort, as long as they can be utilized for this purpose.
However, there is no doubt that they are murdered when there is no longer any use for
them in the Nazi war machine. In the meantime, their living, housing and work
conditions are such that the process of destruction proceeds automatically.

The WJ C report paints a grim picture, one that arouses fear and concern. But it
was divorced from reality. The report was based on the testimony of the Germans and
i n fact concurred with their accounts in all important details. The notion of the high
mortality rate on the journey as a major cause of Jewish deaths was a Nazi invention.
The poet Yitzhak Katznelson, who read about it in a German paper, quotes it thus: "[The

Germans claim]: We did not kill the J ews. The J ews died en route to the
concentration camps to which we transported them. This was the fate decreed for
them... They died because they are weak. A weak and anemic people. Could we know
that they were lacking in strength to this degree?"72 In particular, confirmation is
given to the Nazi claim that the deported J ews are not murdered but are somewhere "in
the East" where they are made to do forced labor for Germany's war aims.

As for the death camps, the gas chambers and the mass murders throughout
Poland, Lithuania and Soviet Russia, these simply do not appear in the report. They
were unconfirmed by the Germans and a "reliable" WJ C document omitted them. The
fact is that Stephen Wise, Nahum Goldmann and their associates still did not believe,
in April 1943, that all these reports were completely truthful.

An epilogue to the Bermuda Conference throws an unexpected glaring light on
the stand of one the parties concerned.

Six weeks after the Bermuda Conference a meeting took place in the White House
between two presidents. It was to one of them, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a leader of the
vast anti-Nazi alliance, that the J ews directed their appeals for help, as though to a
court of last resort, and it was on him, ultimately, that the response to such appeals
depended. The other. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the president of the World Zionist
Organization, was considered the chief spokesman of world Jewry. Weizmann was one
of the main speakers at the Madison Square Garden rally and his remarks there are to
this day cited as an epitome of the outcry sounded to the world. 73 Now the two men met
face-to-face.

The meeting was arranged by Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, and its
purpose was to enable Weizmann to explain to Roosevelt the Zionist movement's
perception concerning the future of Palestine. However, in the light of the horrific
events in Europe, it was only to be expected that Weizmann would take advantage of
this singular opportunity to make a personal appeal to the President regarding the
catastrophe of his people and the rescue issue, which was of supreme importance and
urgency.

The meeting took place around noon on J une 11 and lasted 53 minutes. Its content
has come down to us from two documents, both written by Dr. Weizmann and preserved
in the Weizmann Archives in Rehovot. The first document was written on the day of
the meeting and contains a 16-point step-by-step description of the encounter. The
second document is a memorandum about the meeting which was submitted the

following day to the Americans and was intended to stamp with an official
character the important matters that were discussed. The memorandum was
published among the documents in Foreign Relations of the United States.! 4

If these two documents faithfully reflect what took place during those invaluable
53 minutes in Roosevelt's office, then there is no avoiding a single unequivocal

72 Yitzhak Katznelson, Last Works . Hakibbutz Hameuhad Publishing House, p. 196.

73 Abba Eban, My People , p. 407.

74 FRUS, 1943, Vol. IV, p. 972.

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conclusion: Not one word was said about tine Holocaust or rescue during the entire
meeting. Literally so: not a word! The (Zionist) president, it turns out, was busy...

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Chapter Twelve

Sluggishness

Weizmann, if asked to explain \r\\s blunder of silence in the meeting with
Roosevelt, would of course readily have cited any number of weighty reasons. A
meeting with the President of the United States is not easily arranged. Its duration is
not unlimited and every minute has to be exploited for the subject at hand. The
meeting, Weizmann believed, was absolutely crucial for the future of Zionism which
then stood at a crossroads. Had he brought up the Holocaust, Roosevelt would
undoubtedly have asked questions and gone into the issue at some length--at the
expense of Zionism.

It was all a matter of the essential and the non-essential. Because of
circumstances, tendencies and twisted thinking, the non-essential became the
unimportant, and in certain instances, an object of active opposition. Earlier in this
book we examined a number of such cases, all deriving from the fear of territorial ism.
In the preceding chapter we took note of another phenomenon: Zionism's consistent
rejection of any rescue effort that did not involve aliyah, and its attempt to secure the
annulment of the White Paper through the pressure of J ewish distress.

Alongside active or semi-active interference generated by an imaginary conflict
between the aims of rescue and the immediate objectives of (fragmented) Zionism,
there was also passive interference, the result of apathy and uncaring. When the
Zionists saw no reason to interfere with a specific rescue operation, they did not hurry
to carry it out because they were busy with more important matters, and the more they
concentrated on their principal enterprise, the more sluggish their rescue activity
grew. In this chapter we will examine several cases in which sluggishness played a
crucial role in the behavior of Zionist would-be rescuers.

We will begin by mentioning a superb literary-journalistic work by a Zionist
thinker who tried to rebel against reality-a composition that is virtually an essay on
sluggishness, /-/a/m Gree?t)a-g, the head of the Poalei Zion party and one of the leading
Zionist intellectuals in America, published in the party's weekly an article whose
content and style were unmistakably meant to shock his readers.l The article was
entitled "Bankruptcy" and opened with these words: "Perhaps the time has come for
other countries, those few left on this planet in which Jewish communities can still
voice their opinions and worship openly, perhaps the time has come for them to declare
a public fast and a day of prayer for

/4me-/can J ewry. This is not a printing error--a public fast and a day of prayer for
the five million Jews in America." This, because of the "calamity of vacuity,
insensitivity and callousness" that has gripped these J ews in the face of the distress of
European J ewry.

1 Haim Greenberg, "Bankrupt," Iddisher Kempfer , February 12,

1943. A Hebrew translation of the original Yiddish, under the title "American Jewry's Failure," appeared in Davar , July 30,

1943.

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In three densely printed pages the author goes on to excoriate the Jewish
organizations in the U.S. for their unconscionable behavior which is totally
unbecoming given the needs of the terrible hour. It is behavior marked by apathy,
disunity, lethargy, indolence, and other phenomena subsumable under the category of
sluggishness. As it begins, so the article also ends on a note of despair: "I must admit
candidly that from all of the above I am unable to draw concrete and practical
conclusions. If objectively there is something that can be done, I do not know who will
do it or how. All I know is that all of us, all five million American J ews with our
organizations, our committees and our leaders, have reached a state of moral and
political bankruptcy. And I refuse to comprehend over what and why we have all
reached this state of nadir and abasement..."

A week later Greenberg published a second piece in the same style. This time he
denounced the cruel struggle that his party and movement were waging against the
sending of food parcels to Jews in the ghettos. This article was entitled "Break the
Siege!, "2 and in it Greenberg pointed out that in the course of nine months of the
previous year 80,000 tons of food had been shipped to occupied Greece for the hungry
population there. Why, he wants to know, not for the J ews?

"We ask that at least now, after such a lengthy delay for which history will never
forgive us, we begin to understand that an economic siege of one hundred percent [on
Germany] is not axiomatic."

Regretfully, he notes: "With the possible exception of Agudat Israel [emphasis in
the original] we do not know of a single J ewish organization that in the course of the
three most difficult years in our history was capable of freeing itself from the fear lest
it be accused of J ewish egocentrism. Everyone was afraid that our patriotism, our
readiness to make sacrifices for the sake of the general victory, would be called into
question, that we would be castigated for seeking excessive privileges for Jews. We
lacked the courage to issue a declaration that would have been so understandable: that
it was not extra privileges we sought but recognition of our right to live."

Thus, according to all the indications, ended the campaign of rebuke launched by
the rebellious Zionist leader. He published no more articles in this spirit. Although he
devoted part of his opening speech at his party's convention in April to the Holocaust,
he no longer spoke in a tone

of chastisement or as a fighter for change. Haim Greenberg was a thinker and a
man of conscience in his party and in the Zionist movement. But when it came to
practical politics, others ran the show. A few years earlier he was reprimanded for
having innocently supported a plan to resettle refugees in Alaska, and he swallowed
the reproof. Now his fighting spirit sufficed for a few weeks, and then faded.

Greenberg's fiery articles in New York, like David Zakai's trenchant piece in Tel
Aviv, demonstrate that there were some righteous men in Sodom but that their
righteousness did not long endure. Yet unlike Zakai's brief contribution, Greenberg's
detailed articles are full of valuable information about developments in the American
J ewish community to which the author was a witness. For our purposes, we will quote
(from his first article) what he had to say about the Zionists:

"But there are among us Zionists who have accepted the idea that it is in any case
impossible to halt the process of destruction and therefore the opportunity should be
exploited to demonstrate to the world the J ewish tragedy of homelessness and reinforce
thedemand for a national home in Eretz-lsrad (a \r\ovr\eforv\i\r\o7 for the millions of dead
in makeshift graveyards in Europe?)." (Emphases added.)

'There are among us Zionists" was a ringing understatement. The entire
movement-institutions, leaders and branches-was at this time engaged in feverish
activity with a view to the future: the post-war future. In the midst of the propaganda
campaign concerning the Bermuda Conference the Zionist leadership published an
appeal 'To the People in Zion and All the Dispersions." It was signed by Chaim
Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, Professor Brodetsky, and others. J ews throughout the
world were called upon to purchase the Zionist Shekel and prepare themselves for the
post-war era. "Victory is on the horizon, and discussions are already beginning about
the peace alliance and plans are being made for the day of judgment after the war. We,
too, must commence these preparations. "3

2 Haim Greenberg, "Brecht di Blockade!," Iddisher Kempfer , February 19, 1943.

3 Ha'aretz, March 10, 1943.

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In 1943 Zionism was lool<ing to the future-to the fulfillment of the Biltmore
Program regarding the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretzlsrael. The conditions
currently prevailing were viewed as a foundation on which the longed-for future
would be built. The catastrophe of European J ewry was part of that foundation and
must be exhaustively exploited to ensure success. Ben-Gurion addressed the prospects
for such success:

'There are two things now which did not exist then: a large Yishuv in Eretz-
lsrael and a large disaster in Europe. "4

This was a propitious moment for Zionism and it was utilized with un-sparing
energy on the internal and external fronts alike. In the decade beginning in 1930 the
membership of the Zionist movement in America grew nearly thirty-fold, from 15,000
to 400,000.5 And it went on growing in the war years. With this numerical increase
came greater strength, more influence-and heightened militancy. The Stephen Wise
group, which at one and the same time controlled the Zionist Organization of America,
the American J ewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress, dominated the Jewish
public's contacts with the White House and the State Department. In Jewish roof-
organizations the Zionists adopted a highhanded attitude and pressured their
partners to accept the Zionist policy that yoked rescue together with aliyah and the
establishment of a J ewish state. TheJ oint Emergency Committee which was created in
January 1943 and operated during the Bermuda Conference collapsed under the
weight of internal differences and quarrels. August saw the formation of the
American J ewish Conference, under the solid control of the Zionists, their chief rivals
having withdrawn.

A similar story played itself out in England. In July 1943 the Zionists took firm
control of the Board of Jewish Deputies. Using their majority, they annulled the
decades-long agreement with the non-Zionist philanthropic organization Hevrat
Ahim under which a joint committee for foreign relations had operated. The Zionist
leader Selig Brodetsky became president of the Board of Deputies and the authoritative
representative of British J ewry, the counterpart of Stephen Wise in America.

Bolstered by their impressive successes on the internal front, the Zionists pushed
ahead with their efforts toward the attainment of their exclusive goal on the external
front. The priority accorded to Zionism over rescue, which received its extreme
expression in the Weizmann-Roosevelt meeting, runs like a thread through all
spheres of the movement's activity. Zionism benefited from unflagging attention, a
judicious approach, and a maximum utilization of resources. Rescue efforts, even if
they did not conflict (fancifully) with the goals of Zionism, got whatever thinking and
doing was left over. Zionism was a vital matter with a dearcut program. As for rescue,
it was doubtful whether anything could be done. Zionism could brook no delay; rescue
could wait until there was time for it, if time could be made.

I n contrast to Hal m Greenberg's emotional articles, written with a broken heart,
the passages from the memoirs we are about to quote seem taken from an entirely
different region on the scale of credibility and

sincerity. Dr. Nahum Goldmann, who on more than occasion after the war
denounced the behavior of Jewish leaders during the Holocaust period, apparently
decided to introduce some order into these revelations. In his memoirs6 he writes that
blame attaches to all the leading spokesmen for the J ewish people in that period, and
he does not exclude himself. But there were "more and less" blameworthy persons, and
Goldmann would certainly have us think he was in the latter category. Once, he
relates, a desperate request was received from Polish J ewry to the leaders of the
American J ewish community to take drastic and dramatic steps, such as a sit-down
strike by a dozen Jewish leaders on the steps of the White House or the State
Department, until the U.S. government declared its readiness to take vigorous action to
save the J ews of Poland. "Today this demand seems somewhat naive, but I nevertheless
believe, thai as now, in the possibility that desperate and extraordinary actions could

4 David Ben-Gurion, In thie Campaign (Hebrew), Vol. IV, p. 102.

5 Henry Feingold, The Politics of Rescue , p. 13.

6 Nahum Goldmann, Memoirs (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1972, p. 186.

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ultimately have brought about some action." The writer does not say with whom he
shared these unusual views and under what circumstances, or what the results were.
Nor does he mention another Jewish leader, Ziegelboim by name, who advocated
desperate measures and when he was unable to find support undertook such a step on
his own, without waiting for others. On the other hand, Goldmann emphasizes the
firm stand he took on another question: "I insisted repeatedly that the Jewish
organizations should undertake negotiations with the Nazis on a ransom and offer
them large sums of money in return for at least some Jews." Goldmann also believes
that President Roosevelt, had he been asked, would have assented to this plan despite
the economic boycott on Germany. "I was unable to convince the leaders of American
Jewry of the rightness of my view, and the fact that they refrained from approaching
the head of the American administration was what doomed my plan to failure."
(Emphases added.)

Amazingly, we could find no traces of a struggle or debate among the American
J ewish leadership for or against any "Goldmann Plan." Dr. Goldmann himself does not
reveal whom he tried to convince and under what circumstances or what action he took
when his efforts proved unavailing. I nstead he gives his account of something that did
happen.

"I n 1943 I received a report that the Gestapo authorities in Romania were ready,
in return for a large sum of money, to permit a group of Jews, mainly children, to
emigrate. We immediately asked the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, J r.,
for permission to transfer the funds. President Roosevelt raised no objections and
Morgenthau gave his agreement then and there. Unfortunately, in this case State
Department approval was also required. The negociations with H ull

and his aides dragged on and on, and when the imposed agreement was finally
received, it was too late."

Against Dr. Goldmann's account, written in very general terms 30 years after the
event, we can pit the fresher version of Stephen Wise, published just a few years after
the war. I n his autobiography Wise devoted a special chapter to what he called "Death
by Bureaucracy,"? and thefollowing story is at its center:

"Early in 1943 we were informed by Riegner [Gerhart Riegner, the WJ C
representative in Switzerland] that nearly 70,000 Jews from France and Romania
could be saved and Jews transferred from Poland to Hungary, where organized
extermination had not yet begun." To this end. Wise wrote, funds had to be deposited in
Switzerland for transfer to certain Nazi officials after the war. Wise took this proposal
to President Roosevelt on J uly 22, stressing to him that the Nazis would not come into
possession of the money before peace was declared. "Our army will see to it that these
Nazi mercenaries will not reap the gains of their extortion."

Roosevelt's reply came as a pleasant surprise: "Stephen, if this is so, why aren't
you going ahead with it?" Wise said he hadn't dared put the proposal to the Treasury
Secretary before getting Roosevelt's approval. Hearing this, the President picked up
the phone and spoke to Morgenthau: "Stephen is making a fair proposal about
ransoming J ewsfrom Poland to Hungary."

Thefollowing day Wise sent Roosevelt a memorandum summing up their talk. It
was later learned, from Morgenthau's diary, that Roosevelt sent him the
memorandum, instructing him to convey it to the Secretary of State together with the
go-ahead for its implementation.

All this took place on J uly 22-23. Yet it was not until December IS that the State
Department issued the license for the transfer of the funds. Wise concludes the story in
sorrow and fury: "Five full months went by from the time this license was approved by
the President of the United States, the Secretary of State and the Secrdiary of the
Treasury. Let history, therefore, record for all time that were it not for the State
Department and Foreign Office bureaucratic bungling and callousness, thousands of
lives might have been saved and the J ewish catastrophe partially averted."

It is difficult not to be impressed by the depth of Wise's bitterness and the justness
of his case. But his words give rise immediately to an unavoidable question: What,
actually, did Stephen Wise himself do in those five precious months? What did his
colleagues and aides do when in their hands was the possibility, in Wise's own words,
to "partially avert"

7 Stephen Wise, Challenging Years , pp. 274-279.

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the Holocaust, and on their side was the support of the President of the United
States and two powerful Cabinet ministers?

It turns out that they did nothing. They did not lobby, did not press for action, and
according to all the signs they did not know what was going on. Wise's formulation
implies that he learned about Roosevelt's relaying of the memorandum to Morgenthau
and his order to the two ministers afterward, from Morgenthau's diary. It was from
that same source that he learned about the delays in the State Department. Neither in
Wise's own writings nor anywhere else did we find a mention or even a hint that
during these five months] ewish leaders tried to intervene, exercise influence, or even
inform themselves about the course of events in such a crucial matter. If we have not
failed by overlooking material, it seems probable that sluggishness concerning the
rescue of J ews was not characteristic of the State Department alone.

I n the following section we consider a story set down in great detail in an orderly
and properly documented report,8 with supplementary points from a recorded
conversation between the author and the compiler of the report.9 The subject of the
story is an attempt to rescue children.

On November 30, 1942, a week after the Zionist movement officially
acknowledged the existence of the Holocaust, the Jewish Agency Executive in London
decided to dispatch two emissaries for a limited time to carry out rescue operations, one
to Spain and Portugal, the other to Sweden. Two refugee-functionaries volunteered for
the mission, Wilfrid Israel and Shalom Adier-Rudell, the author of the report. Wilfrid
Israel, who was sent to Spain and Portugal, was killed when the plane taking him back
to London crashed, and the little that is known about his mission is contained in a
memorandum he left with the British ambassador in Spain and from some incidental
comments by Yitzhak Weissman who was in Portugal as the representative of Dr.
Si I bershein's office and of the World Jewish Congress.lO Adler-Rudell's mission is the
subject of his article.

Regarding the motive that underlay thej ewish Agency's decision to dispatch the
emissaries, Adier-Rudel I writes: "Frustration and disillusionment moved the Jewish
Agency in London to take matters into their hands." I n a conversation with the author
M r. Adier-Rudell was more forthright:

"I think that the Executive in London pressured the Executive in Jerusalem [to
dispatch the emissaries] out of s/iame. They were ashamed that they had done nothing
and wanted to show that they were doi ng

something. They found two 'crazies,' one named Israel and the other Adier-
Rudell. One returned and the other did not. They said they were willing to go. "

TheJ ewish Agency Executive, he says, "was not enthusiastic" about his mission.
His budget was limited to £200 and no specific goal was set. Nor did he himself have
any definite plan when he set out; the plan he came up with was engendered in part en
route and in part after he arrived. That plan was to bring to Sweden 20,000 Jewish
children from German-occupied areas.

After much preparation, Adier-Rudell arrived in Stockholm on February 24,
bearing documentation and letters of recommendation from various institutions and
persons. The story of his exploits in Sweden during two months can serve as an
instructive example of the possibilities open to whoever is bent on seeking them out
with all his might. Adier-Rudell was not a total stranger in Stockholm, having visited
the city on several occasions before the war as the representative of a number of J ewish
organizations. Now he renewed his old contacts and feverishly sought additional
contacts that could be of assistance to him and put him in touch with the Swedish
government. I n the first days after his arrival he met with Rabbi Ehrenpreis, as well
as with the head of the Jewish Community, the leaders of the local Zionist Federation,
and other public figures. He paid several visits to the British and American embassies
and to the missions of Holland, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Well-wishers arranged for
him to meet with writers and journalists and with influential persons from various
public circles.

8 S. Adier-Rudell, "History of the Rescue Efforts," Year Book XI of the Leo Baeck Institute, London, pp. 213-241.

9 Conversation with Mr. S. Adier-Rudell, October 3, 1972.

10 Yitzhak Weissman, In the Face of the Titans of Evil (Hebrew), p. 90.

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Adier-Rudell notes February 27 as a successful day. Quite by chance that day he
met a young Jewish refugee, a social-democrat from Austria who had resided in
Sweden for several years and maintained good contacts with the leaders of the ruling
Social -Democratic party. This refugee, Dr. Bruno Kreisky, offered to set up a meeting
between AdIerRudell and the Swedish minister of welfare, Gustav Mahler, to whom
Adier-Rudell had a letter of recommendation from Mahler's colleague in the Socialist
International, Berl Locker.

The meeting took place on March 5. The minister was pleased to get regards from
his friend Locker and revealed that he had always taken a sympathetic interest in
questions relating to the J ews. The emissary told him about the travails of European
Jewry and explained his plan in some detail. The Swedish government would
announce officially that Sweden was ready to admit 20,000 Jewish children from
Germany and the occupied countries. Adier-Rudell pointed out that on an earlier
occasion,

after World War I, Sweden had opened its gates to German children, and now it
had the right to expect a quid pro quo for that good deed. The timing for the project was
exactly right, Adier-Rudell argued. Sweden had just allowed the Germans to ship iron
ore from Norway via Swedish territory and to move German troops through Sweden to
Denmark. Relations between the two countries were quite friendly.

The minister was deeply moved by the description of the Jewish catastrophe but
saw no chance to implement the emissary's plan. I n his view, the German government
would most probably reject any discussion about the fate of the J ews while his own
government would take no action that was clearly foredoomed.

Adier-Rudell was not to be put off. He reiterated his reasoning from several
points of view. At the end of a lengthy and wearying talk Mahler promised to
reconsider the points raised by the emissary and to exchange words on the plan with
the prime minister. He would inform Adier-Rudell of the results within a few days.

On March 10 Mahler summone