Problem of Ethnicity - The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

ETHNICITY

The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Jasvir Sinqh

.„.;

PROBLEM OF ETHNICITY

The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

PROBLEM OF ETHNICITY

The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Jasvir Singh

U N I STAR

Ethnicity / Ethnic Conflicts / Ethnic Violence Politics / Nationalism / Identity /
International Relations / UN / Kosovo / Contemporary World Issues

PROBLEM OF ETHNICITY

The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

by

JASVIR SINGH

V.P.O. Damounda
Distt. Jalandhar
M.: 9815118812

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Contents

Preface vii

Introduction ix

Chapter 1

Problem of Ethnicity: Theoretical Framework 1

Part-I : Ethnicity : Meaning, Nature and Evolution
Part-II : Ethnicity and Ethnic Violence

Chapter 2

Issue of Kosovo as an Ethnic Problem 65

Chapter 3

United Nations Role in Kosovo Crisis 90

Chapter 4

Limitations and Constraints on United Nations 118
for Action in Kosovo

Part I : Role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Part II : Role of United States

Chapter 5

Role of United Nations Aftermath of 173

Kosovo War

Conclusion 203

Appendix-I 217

Appendix-II 225

Bibliography 228

Abbreviations

ACABQ : Advisory Committee on Administrative and

Budgetary Questions.

CHR : Commission on Human Rights

CSCE : Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

EC : European Community

ECOSOC : Economic and Social Council

ESDI : European Security and Defense Identity

FRY : Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

FYROM : Federal Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

ICFY : International Conference on Yugoslavia

IMF : International Monetary Fund

JIAS : Joint Interim Administrative Structure

KFOR : Kosovo Force

KLA : Kosovo Liberation Army

KTC : Kosovo Traditional Council

KVM : Kosovo Verification Mission

LDK : Democratic League of Kosovo

NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OCSE : Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe

OHCHR : Office of High Commissions for Human Rights

OIC : Organization of Islamic Conference

SNCK&M : Serb National Council of Kosovo and Metohija

SNCM : Serb National Council of Mitrovica

SPSG : Special Representative of UN Secretary-General

UNHCR : United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNMIK : United Nations Mission in Kosovo

WB : World Bank

WMD : Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTO : World Trade Organization

Preface

Kosovo is a watershed in the World Politics. As an ethnic
phenomenon, it not only prompted a reexamination of some of the
central issues of ethnicity but also raised an important question about
the role of United Nations in international politics. This study, by
discussing the theoretical issues involved in ethnic phenomena,
analyse various questions raised by NATO's attack on the former
Yugoslavia. These questions involved the issues of humanitarian
intervention, the diminished relevance of the United Nations in the
sphere of the use of force in world affairs, changed peace-keeping
role of the United Nations in intra-state conflicts, the United States'
role as a sole super power conflicts and its impact on the United
Nations system. Due to these central questions Kosovo would
always remain important in world politics. Even after 9/11 attack on
world Trade Centre the following issues would also linked with
Kosovo such as,

1 . What happens if states behave as gangsters toward their own
people and use sovereignty as a license to kill?

2. Should such states forfeit their sovereign rights or be
recognized as legitimate members of international society?

3. What responsibilities does international community have to
enforce humanitarian laws on non-compliant states?

As a tyro in the field of research, it was difficult for me to deal
with such complex issues of international importance. But my deep
interest in ethnic phenomenon took the shape of this work with
generous support of various people in the Department of Political
Science, Punjabi University. A number of people contributed to the
evolution of my ideas during my stay in the department. My guide
Prof. Manju Verma gave me an important vision through which I
finally came to understand the complex theoretical aspects of

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis vii

ethnicity in the world politics. Other faculty members of department
Prof. Narinder Kumar Dogra, Prof. Inderjit Singh Sethi, Prof. S.K
Sharma and Prof. Jagroop Kaur especially gave their deep insights
on my study.

My friends Dr. Jatinder Singh, Dr. Subhash Kumar and my wife
Dr. Rinka were generous enough to read and criticize various
chapters and immensely helped me from the very beginning of this
study. A Sincere thanks also goes to S. Sewak Singh who read the
entire manuscript and gave invaluable insights and suggestions for
revision.

I consider it my duty to make a special mention of Ms. Kusum
Verma (Principal, Kamla Nehru College for Women, Phagwara)
and my colleagues in the department of Political Science (K.N.
College for Women Phagwara) Sh. D.K. Sood, Ms Chander Rekha,
Dr. Rinka and Dr. Kanwaljit Singh for providing me encouragement
and guidance to make this work more meaningful.

I am also thankful to Mr. Pankaj who efficiently typed the
manuscript. I extend my sincere thanks to "Unistar Publishers" who
have brought their professionalism and expertise to shape this work
into a form of book.

viii Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Introduction

International relations in the last decade of twentieth century
underwent several dramatic changes. The cascade of events occurred
in this decade resulted in a revolutionary restructuring of world
politics. The countries of the world drew closer in communications,
ideas and trade. The integration of national economies has produced
a globalized market and formed interdependent bonds between
countries and cultures. Likewise, the disintegrative trends shook the
globe and turned the way it easier operated. The stability imposed by
the bipolar distribution of power between United States and Soviet
Union and their respective allies ended. The proliferation of
conventional and unconventional weapons, global environmental
deterioration and the resurgence of nationalism and ethnic conflict
portend a restructuring marked by disorder. The opposing forces of
integration and disintegration point toward a transformation in world
politics as extensive as the system-disrupting convulsions following
World War I and II. The eruption of widespread ethnic conflicts in
various parts of the world proved the assumptions of world cycle
theory 1 that the phenomenon of violence is a feature of the end of all
empires and unions. The demise of USSR and its military alliance
(Warsaw Pact) had created a powerful wave of global localism which
breaks over the cliffs of the system. Consequently, various
independent states have been challenged by constituent tribal, national
and ethnic entities seeking secession. 2

'The ethnic nationalism, ethnic conflicts are definitely not new
phenomenon. Although the communities organized on putative
common descent, culture and destiny, have coexisted, competed and
clashed since the dawn of history. Yet what is new today is not the
existence of competition and conflict among ethnic groups, but their
global manifestation. 3 It has been estimated that more than ten million
lives were lost between 1945 and 1975 alone as a result of ethnic
violence. More than two-third of all armed combat in the world since

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis ix

1945 has taken the form of civil wars, wars of state against nation,
war of secession, and major armed uprisings to oust governments.
Even many of the interstate wars and large armed interventions
originated as civil disturbances and wars. Most threats to the states
have been internal not external. The adversaries in these conflicts
represent many different kinds of identity groups i.e. ethnic, racial,
religious etc.

It is confirmed from the types and nature of the armed conflicts
occurred since 1945 that the 77 percent of the total wars were ethnic
or internal where armed combat was not against another state but
against the authorities within the state or between armed communities.
The SIPRI yearbook of 2000 identifies 27 major armed conflicts in 25
countries in 1999 and interestingly only two were of inter-state nature
and rest were intra-state. Ethnic identity remained a strong defining
characteristic in one half of the major conflicts in 1999. It no doubt
resulted in unimaginable loss of human life. 4

The end of cold war witnessed a massive proliferation in the
number of states. Although historically, the dissolution of countries
has been primarily a consequence of wars between states, but, during
the last half of the twentieth century, the governments have more to
fear from internal conflicts. Groups within states are asserting their
ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional or national identities and
questioning the integrity and legitimacy of existing countries which
lead to abrupt border changes. 5 The ethnic assertions led to the
unparalleled explosion of number of states from 51 to 194. The
increase in cultural politics since mid 1970s demonstrates a general
shift from a modernist polities based on universal progress and
development within the capitalist order. The cultural politics has taken
the form of a proliferation of new identities, new social categories and
often new political groups. The nation has fragmented into its
component or entirely new ethnicities and even the nation state itself
become ethnified. The "struggle for recognition" has fast become the
paradigmatic form of political conflict, demands for "recognition of
difference" fuel struggles of groups mobilized under the banner of
nationality, ethnicity, race, etc. In the "post socialist" conflicts, group
identity supplants class interests as the chief medium of political
mobilization. Cultural domination supplants exploitation as the
fundamental injustice. And cultural recognition displaces

x Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

socioeconomic redistribution as the remedy for injustice and the goal
of political struggle. The new identities have been of the following
types : Ethnic, Nationalist, Religious/Fundamentalist and indigenous.
With the breakup of the Soviet empire the process of ethnic
fragmentation has become a process of Balkanization in which armed
nationalist conflict is dominant. 6

The challenge of ethnic armed conflict and ethnic political
mobilization is being equally felt by developed and developing states.
In the developed states of Europe and North America, the challenge
of ethnic conflicts has been manifested in form of ethnic revival and
growing political assertiveness (often ranging in demand from
regional autonomy to outright independence and sovereign statehood)
of minority ethnic groups (i.e. the Basques and Catalan in Spain, the
Bretons and the Corsicans in France, the Walloons and the Flemish
in Belgium, The Scots, Welsh and Irish in the United Kingdom, and
the French speaking Quebecois in Canada). Since the disintegration of
USSR in December 1991, several ethnic conflicts within and between
the USSR successor states have emerged. 7 The legacy of Western
Colonisation and decolonisation process was mainly responsible for
rise of ethnic nationalism and formation of ethnic political movements
in developing state. The decolonization process handed over political
power recognizing some ethnic groups at the cost of ignoring existing
ethnic and cultural divisions and popular political aspirations. Ethnic
plurality was manageable until the decolonization process was not
complete. The nationalist movements that existed in these states could
generate a common political agenda of achieving independence from
the colonial rule. However this ethnic and cultural plurality during
colonial era remained on surface. Once the colonial master departed,
different ethnic groups found little in common to bind them together.
Consequently, in their post-colonial political history, many of these
states have had to deal with increased nationalist assertiveness on the
part of ethnic or subordinate minorities. These groups felt cheated and
blamed the dominant ethnic and cultural groups as new colonisers and
responsible for their maltreatment. 8 The developing states in South
Asia were born with lack of internal cohesion and after the
independence faced ethnic polarization between majorities and
minorities, social fragmentation, civil discord, institutional decay and
regime instability. This made the tasks of political nation-building and

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis xi

governing rather too difficult. In the past 50 years, every South Asian
country has experienced intermittent ethnic fragmentation and conflict
of different scope, magnitude and aim.

In the post-cold war period, ethno-nationalism has assumed
prominence because some new countries that constituted on the basis
of ethnicity raised the expectations of many ethnic groups to be able
to achieve their cherished goal of establishing a new country on the
basis of ethnicity. With the termination of east- west ideological battle,
ethnic politics and conflict is likely to become even more pervasive
because 90 per cent of the current 190 states in the world are
ethnically plural in character. Political protest and rebellion by 227
ethnic minorities, religious sects and ethnonationalist groups has
become a major impetus to domestic and international political
change. 9 National politics in most states, old and new, have
experienced divisive conflicts over the terms of incorporation of these
groups based on ethnicity.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia is also the result of the failure
of Yugoslav state to incorporate various ethnic groups (i.e. Serbian,
Croatian, Slovenian and Kosovar Albanians) into single political
community. The Serbian and Albanian sides in Kosovo were divided
by deep cultural, linguistic and historic differences. The ethno-
historic hatreds, ethnocide, ethnogenesis and ethno-nationalism
changed the Kosovo's ethnically fragile society into the process of
pseudospeciation. This turned the territory of Kosovo into a symbolic
space which contained memories of both communities history, sacred
shrines, holy places, battlefields and specific geographical features
endowed with a highly emotional charge. 10 In 1999, the ethnic
conflict in Kosovo, reached on highest temperature and exploded in
the form of attacks and counter-attacks by Albanian Kosovars and
Serbian forces. Despite various United Nations resolutions, Serbians
as a dominant ethnic group committed severe atrocities in Kosovo
which resulted in genocide and ethnic cleansing of Kosovar
Albanians.

The spill-over effect of genocide and ethnic cleansing provided a
basis for intervention by United States, European powers and NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) in Kosovo crisis. NATO's
seventy eight-day bombing attacks in Yugoslavia (which was not
authorised by United Nations Security Council) has made Kosovo

xii Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

crisis a flashpoint whose gravity far exceeds the direct geopolitical
significance of Kosovo itself.

NATO's attack on Yugoslavia raised various important issues in
world politics. It undermines the relevance of United Nations as a sole
authority which legitimizes the use of force in international affairs.
Kosovo crisis also highlights the changed role of United Nations in
intra-state conflicts. NATO justified its intervention in Yugoslavia on
the basis of humanitarian grounds. The United Nations charter does
not allow intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of any sovereign
country. On the other hand Kosovo crisis raised another issue which
challenged the rules of domestic jurisdiction and political
independence of nation-state. The United Nations faced an important
question i.e. should the conscience-shattering mass murders of
civilian people in Rwanda, Liberia, East Timor, Kosovo and various
other countries be allowed under the guise of state sovereignty.

Although, NATO attacks diminished the authority of United
Nations but the after-war role of United Nations in Kosovo is eloquent
testimony of continuous importance of world organization in world
affairs. The United Nations acts as an interim government in Kosovo.
It showed that United Nations should be a great role in process of
peacekeeping and peacebuilding in war-torn societies.

Objectives of the Study

1. To study the problem of ethnicity.

2. To study the United Nations role in ethnic conflict of Kosovo.

3. To analyse the impact of the role played by the United States and
NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis on the working of the
United Nations system.

4. To analyse the role of United Nations in Kosovo aftermath of
Kosovo war.

Hypotheses

1. Ethnicity, deep-rooted hatreds, ethnocentrism and ethno-
nationalism lead Yugoslavian society towards the process of
pseudospeciation.

2. Intra-state conflicts based on ethnicity changed the role of United
Nations in international politics.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis xiii

3. The United States role and NATO's intervention in Kosovo
undermined the position of the United Nations.

4. The United Nations role in reconstruction of Kosovo after
NATO's attack given eloquent testimony that the United Nations
is indispensable for world peace.

Review of Literature

Fredrik Barth in his book "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries" ,
described the concept of 'ethnic boundary'. He maintained "ethnic
identities do not derive from intrinsic features but emerge from and
are reasserted in encounters, transactions, and opposition between
groups. He also elaborated that the boundaries are crucibles of ethnic
identities which are particular aggregates of people establish for
different purposes".

Donald G. Baker in his book "Race, Ethnicity and Power"
analyses the role of power as a determinant of race and ethnic
relations. His study is focused on tracing the role of group power and
capabilities which shaped ethnic and race relations by analysing group
power relations between six countries with common English or Anglo
cultural heritage.

Geoff Dench, in his book "Minorities in the Open Society :
Prisoners of Ambivalence" analyses ethnic and race relations in the
context of majority-minority relations. He challenged the prevailing
view that the "equal participation of ethnic minorities will be achieved
because it is a "public good" from which citizens will benefit." He
suggests that these views neglect to explore the web of real interests
behind public affirmations of commitment to integration. In his view,
the liberal creeds rests on nationalist foundations and the 'progressive
nations' dedicated to human rights, is a protective guise adopted by
national majorities in a world which is suspicious of nations.

H.M. Blalock's books, "Toward a Theory of Minority Relations"
attempts to present general theoretical propositions based on the
empirical data in the field of minority-group relations. He focuses
primarily on competition, status and economic factors that relate to
discrimination by using power relationships as the integrating
theoretical framework. The empirical data cited in the book refers to
the case of the 'Negro' in the United States but the propositions have
stated in such a way that they may be tested in connection with other
minority groups.

xiv Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Kalevi J. Holsti's book, "The State, War and the State of War",
describes that the strategic doctrines, arms control agreements, and
the foundations of international organizations such as the United
Nations are designed to prevent wars between states. But since 1945,
the incidence of interstate war has actually been declining, while the
incidence of internal wars has been increasing. This book surveys
some of the foundations of state legitimacy and demonstrates why
many weak states are the locales of civil wars. Finally, the author
analyses the United Nations role in the management of civil wars in
weak and failed states.

Anthony D. Smith in his book, "Theories of Nationalism"
examines critically the principal theories that have been advanced to
explain the rise of nationalist movements both in the Europe and the
developing countries. The author creates a new typology of nationalist
movements which described a definition of nationalism and its
varieties. The author also described nationalism in the context of
'reaction to modernization or form of anticolonialism. Finally, he
produced an original theory of 'ethnic nationalism".

Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel in their edited book,
"United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Adhoc Missions,
Permanent Engagement" , critically examined the peacekeeping role
of the United Nations during the last decade of twentieth century. The
authors in this book concluded that an expanded role of the UN did
not get success in these years because the lack of consensus among its
most powerful members, clash between the UN Charter's own
principles on the virtual inviolability of the state borders, the
underestimation of the complexity and danger of post-Cold War crisis
situations and overestimation of international community's
willingness to match broad mandates with necessary resources.

Miron Rezun in his book, "Europe's Nightmare : The Struggle
for Kosovo" , examines Serbia's and Kosovo's cultural antecedents in
the Kosovo and the ambiguities of the Western position both prior to
and after Russia's slow decline in Europe. This book also presents a
history of factors those exacerbated nationalist aspirations which led
to the rise of leader like Milosevic. The author also critically
examined the deliberately or accidently missed opportunities those
might have prevented bloodshed and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

Peter Wallensteen's book, "Understanding Conflict Resolution :
Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis XV

War, Peace and the Global System", provides a comprehensive guide
to understanding conflict resolution in global world. The first part of
the book introduced the field of conflict resolution and demonstrates
various approaches to conflict analysis and resolution. The core of the
book explores the settlement of three major types of international
conflict i.e. inter-state, internal and state formation conflict. The final
part reviews regional and international approaches to peaceful conflict
resolution i.e. the United Nations, the concerns of major powers in
the conflict and the role of regional organizations or adhoc structures
in conflict resolution.

Alexandras Yannis in his book, "Kosovo Under International
Administration : An Unfinished Conflict" , review the role of the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Kosovo Force
(KFOR) in the light of the experience of the first phase of the
international administration. The first part of the book provides a
critical analysis of the period during June 1999 to October 2000 that
culminated in the Municipal Elections of 28 October 2000. The
second part provides a policy-oriented analysis of the role of
international administration and the prospects for stability in Kosovo
after the democratic changes in Belgrade in October 2000. The third
part contains key and rare documents of the political process in
Kosovo which provides useful background information about the
international administration's role in its first phase in Kosovo.

Monstserrat Guibernau's book, "Nation Without States : Political
Communities in a Global Age", describes the profound
transformations which the nation-state is currently undergoing. The
author examined the elements which are forcing radical changes
affecting the nation-state system. These elements also contributed to
the generation of new economic and socio-political environment
which favours the emergence of new political actors. In this book, the
author argued that if nation without states are able to instill a strong
sense of identity among their members and prove economically
viable, then they would likely be come onto the scene as political
actors in the twenty-first century.

Ted Robert Gurr in his article, "Why Minorities Rebel : A Global
Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945",
published in International Political Science Review (April, 1993)
provides highly important information regarding political protest and

xvi Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

rebellion by communal groups which became a major impetus to
domestic and international political change. In this study, the author
used new coded data on 227 communal groups throughout the world
to assess a general model of how and why these ethnic groups
mobilize to defend and promote their collective interests.

Stephen Ray an' s article, "Ethnic Conflict and the United
Nations", published in Ethnic and Racial Studies (January 1990),
describes that the United Nations is an organization of states and it
can be expected to represent the interests of its members. For this
reason, it has been suggested that the world organization cannot
respond positively to ethnic conflicts within states or across the
borders. But the author stated that "because the ethnic conflicts can
be a threat to international peace and security, the UN cannot always
remain indifferent." Thus, it has become involved in ethnic conflicts
in several ways. These ways are, the Genocide Convention, the work
of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the
Protection of Minorities, and the issue of the right of National self-
determination.

R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong in their paper, "Ethnic
Mobilization and the Seeds of Warfare : An Evolutionary Model",
published in International Studies Quarterly (1987) develops the idea
that a coherent theory of humanity's propensity for warfare can be
constructed from the evolutionary model of man. It proposes that kin
selection has interacted with environmental forces over evolutionary
time to predispose genetically related individuals to band together in
groups, oriented for conflicts. It also advances a model of inclusive
fitness with principles of individual cost/benefit analysis.

Tim Judah in his article, "Kosovo's Road To War", published in
Survival (Summer 1999) historically analyses the reasons behind the
eruption of the Kosovo crisis. The author, on the basis of the study of
historical relations between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians,
proposes that the Kosovo was a catastrophe waiting to happen.
According to the author, President Milosevic exploited the situation
for his interests to reach on the top.

Terry McNeil in his article, "Humanitarian Intervention and
Peacekeeping in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe",
published in International Political Science Review (January 1997)
analyses the attempts of international community to maintain peace and

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis xvii

provide humanitarian succour in the case of former Yugoslavia and
former Soviet Union. The author suggested that the very vagueness of
the concepts of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention creates
serious ambiguities which can be exploited to cover hegemonic
ambitions. The article concludes that the international community was
not ready to face up to its humanitarian responsibilities in this region
which led to the adverse experience of Yugoslavia.

Espen Barth in his article, "Peacekeeping Past and Present",
published in NATO Review (Summer 2001), examines the way in
which peacekeeping has been evolved since the end of Cold War. The
author proposes that the actors, practices and concepts related with
the United Nations peacekeeping have been transformed. The author
described that due to the rise of intra-state conflicts, the peacekeeping
become a more complex, comprehensive and dangerous activity. The
author further analyses that the experience in the Balkans has shown
the primary task of the Security Council is to assist in the long-term
and complex political and social transformations of war-shattered
societies.

Mats R. Berdal in his article, "Fateful Encounter : The United
States and UN Peacekeeping", published in Survival (Spring 1994),
examines the relationship between the United States and the United
Nations in the light of American policy towards the UN since
President Clinton assumed office in January 1993. The article
explored the functioning of the Clinton administration's initial
idealism about the UN and its modification by the events in Bosnia
and Somalia.

Michael Cox's article, "Empire by Denial? Debating US Power",
published in Security Dialogue (2004) examines that the American
Empire, inspite of its difficulties in Iraq, still has a very long way to
go. He suggests that these views do not mean the American power
would be unchallenged for ever. The author viewed that the new
imperialists in Washington might have fashioned a dubious set of
policies. Their strategies have done much to make the United States
internationally unpopular. Finally, the author suggests that the end of
the neo-conservative moment does not mean the empire is about to
crumble. In his view, the Presidents may come and grand strategies
may go, but the American empire still has a good deal of life left in it.

Michael Matheson in his article, "United Nations Governance of
xviii Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Postconflict Societies", published in American Journal of
International Law (January 2001) critically examines the United
Nations peacebuilding role in war-torn societies. The author gave
some suggestions in this article for the governance of postconflict
societies i.e. firstly, the Security Council might reasonably find that
a change in the boundaries of a state is necessary to give its
neighbours better security against a repetition of armed attack.
Secondly, the Security Council gave a guarantee of autonomy to a
particular part of state's territory or the region. Thirdly, the Security
Council nullified permanently the discriminatory restrictions on
victim group is necessary to bring such a conflict to an end.

Samuel H. Barnes in his article, "The Contribution of Democracy
to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies", published in American Journal
of International Law (2001) suggested "the development of
democratic set-up in war-torn society can be utilized for managing
postconflict ethnic and factional violence." In his view, the
experience of Bosnia and elsewhere described that if the democracy
can succeed as a cooperative form of government and the power can
be shared in a mutually constructive arrangement then the democracy
becomes the political keystone of resolving bitter conflicts.

Methodology

The valuable research depends upon the proper and particular
methodology, which is used for its completion. In this study,
historical and analytical methods have been used for making the
problem interpretable by analysing historical facts. Numbers of inter-
subject theories have been used for examining the historical
experiences of people to find why they act as ethnic groups. The
purpose of theory is to catch and specify general tendencies and to
provide a sensible and an applicable starting-point for discussion of
any particular situation. For analysis of Kosovo as an ethnic conflict,
the theoretical approaches provide important tools for analysing
Yugoslavia's political system, political behaviour and institutions in
context to Servo- Albanian conflict in Kosovo. The study has based on
various primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include
various United Nations resolutions, UNMIK regulations,
communiques of NATO and agreements between Serbs, Kosovo
Albanians, NATO and UNMIK authorities in Kosovo. The secondary
sources include books, journals and periodicals, etc.

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis xix

References:

1 . The insights of long cycle and realist theories predicted pessimistically that
prevailing trends in the diffusion of any economic and political power
would lead to renewed competition, conflict and perhaps even warfare
among the great powers and that range of new problems and potential
threats get multiplied. As Robert Jervis observed, cyclical thinking
suggests that, freed from the constraints of Cold War, world politics will
return to earlier patterns. Many specific causes of conflict also remain,
including desire for greater prestige, economic rivalries, hostile
nationalism, divergent animostic and territorial ambitions. See Charles W.
Kegley, Jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "World Politics; Trend and
Transformation" (Boston, 1999), PP. 97-98. See also Mircea Malitza, Ten
Thousand Cultures: A Single Civilization, International Political Science
Review, vol. 21, Jan 2001, P. 75.

2. Thomas M. Frank, clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity And Community
in Law and Practice, American Journal of International Law, vol. 90,
April 1996, P.360.

3. Urmila Phadnis and Raj at Ganguly, "Ethnicity and Nation-Building in
South Asia" (ND: Sage Publications 2001) P. 15.

4. James G. Kellas, "The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity" (London:
Mac Millan Press ltd., 1998) P.l. See Also K.J.Holsti, War, Peace and
The State of the State, International Political Science Review, vol. 16, Oct
1995, PP. 321-322. See also Taylor B. Seybolt, Major Armed conflicts,
SiPRi year Book 2000, PP. 15, 48.

5. Juan Enriquez, Too Many Flags, Foreign Policy no. 16, Fall 1999,
PP. 30, 31 See also Mark Weber, "States and Statehood" in Brian White,
et. al, Issues in World Politics (NY: Palgrave, 2001), PP. 25, 26

6. Nancy Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice
in a Post Socialist Age" in Cynthia Willet, ed., Theorizing Multiculturalism
(Massachusetts: Blackwell Pub. Ltd, 1998) P. 19 See Also Jonathan
Friedman, "Transnationalization, Socio-Political Disorder, and Ethnification
as expressions of Declining Global Hegemony, " International Political
Science Review, vol. 19, July 1998, P. 243.

7. Phadnis and Ganguly, no. 3, PP. 15-16

8. Ibid, P. 17

9. Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of
Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945," International Political
Science Review, vol. 14, April 1993, P 161.

10. Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (ND:
Sage Publication, 1991), P. 19.

XX Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Chapter 1

Problem of Ethnicity : Theoretical Framework

PART-I : ETHNICITY : MEANING, NATURE
AND EVOLUTION

The end of cold war dramatically transformed the world
politics. The acknowledgement of the importance of ethnic
nationalism in world affairs reduced the relevance of unitary state.
The explosion of ethnic conflicts ushered the post-cold war world
into an era of ethnic pandemonium. The United States President
George Bush lamenting and describing the specter of new kinds of
global instability commented "The collapse of communism has
thrown open a pandora's box of ancient ethnic hatreds, resentment,
even revenge." 1

Ethnicity, a sense of ethnic identity is the subjective, symbolic
or emblematic use by a group of people.... of any aspect of culture,
in order to differentiate themselves from other groups. 2 Cultural
construct and situational construct are its two important conceptions.
Ethnicity, as a cultural construct signifies a composite of symbolic
markers, real or putative, used by the members of an ethnic group
who define themselves and are defined by others as having a
distinctive identity. These characteristics may include combination
of cultural attributes such as language, religion and values and
territorial attributes like region or locality or biological attributes
like descent and kinship. Ethnicity, as a situational construct
signifies the emergence of ethnic consciousness from a situation of
multi-ethnic competitiveness, serving as an effective mode of
mobilization. 3 Ethnicity, a phenomenon associated with contact
between cultural-linguistic communal groups within societies linked
directly or indirectly to forms of affiliation and identification, built
around ties of real or putative kinship. It is also characterised by
cultural prejudice and social discrimination. These characteristics

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1

lead to the feeling of pride in-group's, common consciousness,
identity and exclusiveness of not only the group but group members
as well.

Ethnicity, being a complex phenomenon, like other social
phenomenon, is subject to change and keeps on altering its form,
place and role in society. It is normally closely associated with
political, juridical, religious and other social views and forms of
interaction, which constitute important ingredients of the ethnic
phenomenon. Hence, ethnicity sometimes finds expression in
political domination, economic exploitation and psychological
oppression. The nature, intensity and forms of expression of
ethnicity are determined by the size and location of the various
linguistic cultural groups in the society, the strength and cohesion of
their leadership, the courage, determination and nature of the
underprivileged classes. It further includes the degree of foreign
influences on the society, the nature, persuasiveness and power of
the dominant ideology, the prevailing social customs, tradition and
culture of the various linguistic groups and the form of government
of society. Historical relations between different cultural groups, the
level of development of the groups, the socio-economic context in
which the groups make contact, and the place of group migration to
the place of contact also play an important role. 4 The intensity of
ethnicity depend on the existence and combination of the above
mentioned factors.

Ethnicity is found in both developed and underdeveloped
countries, in societies with different ideologies and historical-
cultural backgrounds. The positive aspect of ethnicity serves as an
adaptive mechanism to enable the individual to adjust successfully to
the increasing alienation of mass societies resulted by divisive
competition in market oriented society. Thus, ethnicity binds
individuals together, gives them internal cohesion and promotes
their sense of identity. 5 Ethnicity involves an appreciation of one's
own social roots in a community and cultural group without
disparaging others. It helps in providing a material as well as an
emotional support network for individuals in society. This function
is particularly important as the societies become more complex,
massified, bureaucratized and alienating. Ethnicity fosters a sense of

2 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

belonging as part of an intermediate level of social relations between
individual and society.

The negative aspect of ethnicity makes it problematic for social
harmony in multi-ethnic societies. It embodies passionate, symbolic
and apprehensive aspects which promotes violent conflicts. The
genocide in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Croatia and
Kosovo underline a unique and ugly character of ethnicity. Thus,
ethnicity causes adverse effects on the peace, harmony and
integration of national societies. These negative effects are reflected
in the political instability which has plagued a number of multi-
ethnic societies around the world. The dramatic effect of this
political instability resulted in the breakup of the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the disintegration of Somali state,
the protracted bloodletting in Lebanon, continued bloodshed in
Palestine and endemic political tensions in countries, such as
Northern Ireland, Uganda, Spain, Cameron, Congo, India, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Canada, Nigeria and Belgium etc.

EVOLUTION OF IDENTITY POLITICS

It is becoming clear that ethnicity emerges as a result of
pervasive anxiety associated with rapid changes and structural
transformations. The forcible transformation and the oppressive
homogenization of cultures result in the emergence of a pervasive
sense of losing control of one's affairs even in the case of most
powerful actors. In reaction to the threat thus posed, ethnicity
emerges and intensified as individuals embrace primary identities
such as ethnic and gets cultural identity. The conditions for the
establishment and maintenance of cultural and ethnic identity are
closely tied to the way in which personal identity is constituted.
Certain kinds of identity are marked on or carried by the human
body. Some kinds of identity are internal to the person and others
are external and marked in the forms of social practice or symbols
employed by a population. Cultural identity is the generic concept,
referring to the attribution of set of qualities of a given people. It
can be said that cultural identity carried by the individual in the
blood is commonly known as ethnicity. It is not practiced but
inherent, not achieved but ascribed. In the strong sense this is
expressed in the concept of race or biological decent. In a weaker

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 3

sense it is expressed as a heritage or a cultural decent, learned by
each and every individual precisely at the level of individual
behaviour. 6 This phenomenon is described by the variations on the
cultural identity.

Cultural Identity

Race

Western

(modern)

ethnicity

Traditional
ethnicity

Life style

The level of individual behaviour is the most general western
notion of ethnicity. The weakest form of such attribution is referred
to in terms of 'life style' or way of life, which may or may not have
a basis in traditional ethnicity. 7

Traditional ethnicity is different from modern ethnicity. In
traditional context, ethnic diversity 8 was ubiquitous and rarely
became a focus for ethno-political movements. The traditional multi-
ethnic societies have been the rule rather than the exception in
history because the history of the world has been the history of
empires and segmentary states. Such social organizations however
were multi-ethnic but were also 'ethnic hierarchies.' This aspect of
such societies is the secret of their relative ethnic peace. Under
traditional hierarchic forms of governance, everyone even the
sovereign was subject and the subjects different among themselves
in their sense of fealty. They counted on nature and supernatural
forces for their welfare and survival. Citizenship, if existed was a
privilege rather than a right and it scarcely provided the basis for
legitimizing the exercise of sovereignty by a state. 9 They neither
expected to be treated as equals nor did they count on government
for their survival.

The process of traditional ethnicity and modern ethnicity is
also defined by "world system development theory", which
describes that the world system has gone through three major
interlocking phases of development. Table 1.1 provides a schematic

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

view of these three phases with respect to the changing structures of
state and economy as well as their associated ideological and identity
configurations. 10

Agrarian imperialism
500 BC to AD 1648

Industrial
imperialism

Informatic imperialism

State

Multinational
empires + city
states + tribes

National
empires + colonies

Superstates + national
states + transnational regimes
(IMF,IBRD,WTO)

Economy

Tribalism + Feudalism +
commercial capitalism

Fordist industrial
national capitalism

Post-fordist informatic
transnational capitalism

Ideology

Imperialism + religious
or ethno-nationalism

Pan-nationalism +
liberalism

globalism + resistance :
regionalism, nationalism,
localism.

Identity

Imperial + local

National-Imperial +
national-liberation

Global + resistance :
pluralizing sites of identity.

Table 1.1 : World System Development

Source : Majid Tehranian, International Political Science Review (July 1998), 294.

However, with the emergence of modern state system the
ethnicity assumed a new phenomenon and taking the varied and
overlapping forms of ethnic nationalism, 11 civic ethnicity 12 and
ethnic plurality. 13 These three forms of ethnicity are affected by the
three entwined strands of modernity i.e. industrialization,
democracy and nationalism.

The sense of nationalism arises when a philosophical myth
called "popular sovereignty" replaces the supernatural monarchic
authority of state. The concept of popular sovereignty makes the link
of state and nation a crucial factor because it is not possible to
legitimize the claim of ruling themselves by any set of humans living
with in an arbitrary set of boundaries. This seems to be a major
reason for a nation (a kind of mythical and even sacred entity) to
attaining the basis of legitimacy. Therefore, modern ethnicity rests
on the foundation that members of every ethnic or cultural
community need to be identified with a nation for assuring the status
and rights of citizenship for themselves. When at any given time
ethnic or cultural communities cannot accept or support the state
under whose jurisdiction they happen to live, they became alienated

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

and hunt for better options. 14 This process fosters the "identity
politics in modern states."

The concept of identity politics challenges the state's character,
its role and very existence. It is argued that democracy assumes a
demos when its foundations are based less on justice and pragmatic
considerations (though both are necessary) and more on various
contingent historical and geographic factors such as a common
language, traditions and territory. The emerging national identity
from the value based foundations provides the members of a political
community 15 with a sense of responsibility, and shared public
culture through which appropriate collective decisions of public
interest can be made in a proper manner. 16 A political community
requires a sense of common belonging (a widely shared feeling
among its citizens that they all are the members of a single
community) to form a more or less cohesive "we" and share a
collective identity. They are bound together by a common
commitment to its integrity, well being and the consequent ties of
sentiments and mutual obligations. 17

Such political identity or feeling is not a matter of pre-existing
fact or a priori principle but it is related to human practices and the
ways certain groups of people have come to relate to each other.
Though encouraging a sense of inclusion among its members such
political identities naturally exclude others and can do so in ways
that are either sources of injustice. It also diminishes the allegiance
felt by other groups, e.g. workers, ethnic, religious and national
minorities. They have all been treated either outside the political
community or inferior members of it. In response, they seek to alter
it in various ways, redefining the forms of identification, prevalent
both in polity and regime. At the polity level, they seek to broaden
the definition of the 'subjects' and 'spheres' it covers. And at the
regime level the 'styles' and 'scope' of politics can be influenced.
For example when national minorities seek recognition as 'subjects'
of distinctive 'sphere' (either a separate polity or a sub-polity), they
start demanding and suggesting the ways to change the then regime
(such as new political 'styles' like enhanced or asymmetrical
federation or the public use of minority languages and the extension
of the 'scope' to include cultural rights). 18 Each of these demands

6 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

involve the introduction of greater polity and regime diversity in
order to incorporate more complex identities.

Two schools of thought carefully analyse ethnic identity i.e.
Primordialist and constructivist. Primordialist school describes
ethnic identity as a biologically 'given' or 'natural' phenomenon.
Ethnic groups, according to this school constitute the kinship
network into which human individuals are born and become
members of. It also refers to both seeing oneself and being seen by
others as part of group on the basis of presumed ancestry and
sharing a common destiny on the basis of common features i.e.
racial (colour), religious, linguistic, occupational, regional etc. 19
Along with objective cultural markers, some primordialists also
stress the psychological aspect of self and group related feelings of
identity distinctiveness and its recognition by others as crucial
determinants of ethnic identity selection and persistence. Ethnic
identity from primordialist perspective, therefore, is a subjectively
held sense of shared identity based on objective cultural or regional
criteria. Anthony Smith gave six bases or foundations of ethnic
identity i.e.

distinct group name in order to be recognised as a distinct community
by both group members and outsiders, a shared belief by group
members in the myth of common ancestry and decent, the presence of
historical memories among group members (as interpreted and diffused
over generations), a shared culture (including dress, food, music,
crafts and architecture, laws, customs and institutions, religion and
language), an attachment with specific territory or homeland, and a
sense of common solidarity. 20

The Constructivist School, on the other hand categorically
rejects the primordialist perspective that ethnic identity is a
biologically natural phenomenon. Constructivists contend that ethnic
or national identity is socially constructed, and is the product of
processes which are embedded in human actions and choices, rather
than biologically given ideas whose meaning gets dictated by nature.
Max Weber, one of the earlier influential writers, stresses the social
construction of ethnic identity and ethnic group, viewed ethnic
groups as "human groups" whose belief in a common ancestry, in
spite of its largely fictitious origins, is so strong that it leads to the

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 7

creation of a community. Weber thus regards ethnic groups based
more on a set of beliefs (about ancestry), not any objective features
of group membership such as shared language, religion, and
especially biological traits associated with everyday understanding
of race. 21 He further argues that unlike kinship groups, ethnic
membership per se does not necessarily result in ethnic group
formation but only provides the resources that may under the right
circumstances, be mobilized into a group by appropriate political
action. 22 The third major strand in recent thinking about ethnicity is
referred as Instrumentalism. It describes that the ethnicity is not just
a sentimental association (i.e. Primordialism) but a framework for
rational and goal-oriented mobilization of group consciousness. It
regards ethnic communities as the natural organs for articulating
protest and resistance. Paul Brass also rejects the notion that ethnic
identity is a 'natural' or 'given' phenomenon and argues that
ethnicity should be viewed as the social and political creation of
elites. They draw upon, distort and sometimes fabricate materials
from the cultures of the groups which they wish to represent in order
to protect their well being or existence or to gain political and
economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves. 23

The most contentious issue between the Primordialists and the
Constructivists concerns the role of culture in the formation of ethnic
identity. For the Primordialists, culture is usually conceived to be
more integrally connected with the process and being of ethnic
identity, although they recognise that some behaviours and emblems
may change independently of basic identity. Fredrik Barth argued
that the culture-bearing aspect, the classification of persons and local
groups as members of an ethnic group must depend on their
exhibiting traits of culture. Difference between groups become
difference in traits. 24 Social constructivists however, have taken this
particular viewpoint to an extreme form, where culture is relegated
to a very secondary position in ethnic scheme of things, as a series
of symbols that justify the existence of particular ethnic groups.

Some cultural markers can even be manipulated to rationalize
the identity and organization of the ethnic group. Taj f el's "Social
Identity Theory" defines that "one's social identity is that part of an

8 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his
membership in a social group (or groups), together with the value
and emotional significance attached to that membership." 25 Further,
social identity theory postulates that people strive for a positively
valued social identity by comparing themselves to members of other
groups and they attempt to categorize and differentiate themselves
from these others in a positive direction. Tajfel describes two aspects
of categorization i.e. criterial attributes that split the population into
discrete categories with definite boundaries and correlated attributes
that are continuous qualities varying across individuals within a
category e.g. an individual may form categories (Christian/Muslim/
Hindu) and then assign varying degrees of a quality (Smart, lazy and
so on) to all members of the category. 25a Both category and quality
measures need to be taken in order to fully understand an
individual's ethnic or group identity.

EVOLUTIONARY PHENOMENON OF ETHNIC GROUPS

The term 'ethnic group' is generally used to designate a
population which is largely biologically self-perpetuating, shares
fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural
forms, makes up a field of communication and interaction. It has a
membership which identifies itself and is identified by others, as
constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of same
order. Thus, ethnic group is a distinct category of the population in
a larger society whose culture is usually different from others. The
members of such a group feel themselves or are thought to be bound
together by common ties of race, nationality and culture. The
existence of distinct ethnic and cultural groups within societies is
widespread and ancient. It occurs at most levels of culture, ranging
from the "Bushmen of the Kalahari", who live within the framework
of Tswana society, to modern Europe, America and Asia. 26

Evolutionary model of man proposes that "kin selection" has
interacted with environmental forces since evolutionary time to
predispose genetically related individuals to bind together in groups,
oriented for conflict. Kinship dictates organizational structure of
extended families to the extent that it prescribes who marries whom

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

(incest avoidance), who cares for whom, who is entitled to inherit
from whom and who governs (males in patrilineal societies). Thus,
group members happen to be those who interact enough to transmit
culture to one another. But evolutionary model of man prescribes
that the fundamental commonality of interest among kin is to
maximize "inclusive fitness". 27 The theories of "kin selection" and
"inclusive fitness", most obviously appropriate to animal behaviour
can be brought to bear on human behaviour too. "Inclusive Fitness"
is theory in genetics first propounded by W.D. Hamilton in 1964. It
has been summarised that genes will spread if their carriers act to
increase not only their own fitness or reproductive success but also
that of other individuals carrying the same genes. A person's
inclusive fitness is his or her personal fitness plus the increased
fitness of relatives that he or she has in some way caused by his or
her actions. 28

The principle of "kin selection" submits that related individuals
are not only maximize their own individual or "classic fitness" 29 but
also predisposes to maximise the "inclusive fitness" of those who
share in their common gene pool. Moreover, it implies that all
individuals will be subject to care who are sufficiently genetically
related to give the common gene pool greater survival advantage.
Genetic relatedness would thus be greatest with members of one's
own lineage and one's own kin or "ethnic" group. It would be less
between members of neighbouring groups, less again between
members of groups even further removed from each other, and so
on. Kin selection theory and its pivotal axiom of inclusive fitness
have marked a turning point in evolutionary theory. Most
importantly, it provides a biological basis for the evolution of
altruism, reciprocity and sociality among kin. Furthermore, as the
degree of genetic relationship declines in the scheme of things, so
would the advantages of any kind of altruistic or socially cooperative
action between individuals too decline. Thus, zero cooperation or
blatant aggression could be expected toward strangers. This
phenomenon is schematized through Fig. 1.1.

10 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Effectiveness of kin selection

Generalised Balanced
reciprocity reciprocity Ne ? a ,

ive

reciprocity

Fig. 1.1 : Altruism and Genetic Relatedness. Information in the left
quadrant suggests how kin selection and evolutionary principals accord
with reciprocity. "Generalized reciprocity" involves mostly one-way flows
of benefits because it is largely nepotism. "Negative reciprocity" involves
one-way flows because it consists of one time interactions accompanied by
a great deal of social change. "Balanced Reciprocity" tends to occur
between distant relatives or non-relatives who are likely to interact
repeatedly, and therefore involves balanced flows of benefits.

Source : R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, International Studies Quarterly (1987), p. 7.

The inclusive fitness differs from traditional notions of "survival
of the fittest" in two respects. First, natural selection favours the
ability of individual to transmit their genes to posterity (rather than
their fitness in terms of health, power, beauty or other physical
traits). Second, an organism's inclusive fitness can be furthered by
assisting others who are genetically related (nepotism). In other
terms, the evolutionary model of man predicts that sexual
organisms, such as humans, have evolved not only to be egoistic but

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

11

to be fundamentally nepotistically altruistic. In doing so, it provides
an ultimate raison d'etre for membership in ethnic groups. "Nucleas
ethnicity" 30 probably reinforced inclusive fitness to benefits group
members and promotes in-group amity and out-group enmity. A
characteristic of nucleus ethnic group is that they serve as
organizational vehicle in which individuals can monitor and if
necessary protect the fitness of related members which subsequently
bears on their own inclusive fitness. The more cohesive the group,
the more each member is in a position to effectively assess his/her
inclusive fitness. In this respect, inclusive fitness would have
predisposed genetically related individuals to band together in
groups.

In early hominid evolution, it is likely that membership in an
expanded group would have increased each individual's access to
scarce resources and ability to manage others e.g. Hunting in
numbers would have helped primitive man to overcome large game.
Numbers would also have reduced the susceptibility of individuals to
attack by predators. To facilitate hunting and to prevent attack,
groups would almost certainly have served as information centers
concerning the nature and location of resources as well as predators.
The more of these features of group membership enhance the
inclusive fitness (the rate of reproduction, quality of offspring,
survival), the more group members would have been deterred from
splintering off. But, turning to more recent periods of human
evolution, the main function of kin-related groups and their
significance for their individual members shifted from protection
against predatory effects of non-humans to protection against other
human groups. The necessary and sufficient forces that explain the
every kind and size of human groups throughout the earliest portions
of human history were, first, war or intergroup competition, and
aggression and second, the maintenance of balance of power
between such groups called "balance of power hypothesis". 31 The
failure to maintain a balance of power (initially in terms of numbers
only), would inevitably mean the domination of one group by a
larger group and consequently, unequal access to fitness enhancing
resources. From this perspective, large scale agriculture and an
increasingly elaborate division of labour follow as concomitant
developments. The underlying momentum of such developments is

12 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

"group selection" (to maintain balance of power) which, in turn is a
consequence of "genetic selection". Thus "group selection", on the
other hand, would appear to relate more directly to ethnicity and
nationalism, if ethnic groups and nations are the groups involved. 32

But the evolution of weapons had made unrelated individuals far
more dangerous to one another and that this in turn reduces
intergroup transfer of individuals and made nucleus ethnic groups
more closed. Weapons would have altered the costs and benefits of
aggressive behavoiur as they could be developed faster than
physiological protection against them. Thus, weapons would have
lowered the cost of attacking while increasing the cost of being
attacked. In doing this they probably increase xenophobia, fear and
antagonism toward strangers. This would reduce intergroup transfer
of individuals, where fighting was necessary initiation because the
cost of injury would be so much higher and one group might have
better or unknown weapons than others. 33 Thus, weapon
development severely restricted individuals form changing groups.
This resulted in two beneficial effects from the point of inclusive
fitness. First, because of the increased tendency of males to remain
in their natal group, the genetic relatedness among the adult males
and in the whole group would increase. This would have increased
solidarity among group members and thus cohesion of the group per
se. It would also work to reduce within group aggression and thus
genetic loss or death from fighting. However, contrary to this
hypothesis, the Scots and English closely genetically related fought
bitter wars. The nature of their hostility was political, thus the threat
to personal and groups (national) security remained unexplained by
the genetic differences. Political disputes and struggle for power
were successful in cutting across genetic distinctions.

Secondly, the emerging high costs of overt aggression changed
the character of the dominance system. The dominant individuals
could no longer afford to be injured in rank order fighting. They
would combine to produce a more effective internal ordering of
power relations to the extent that groups could be more quickly
mobilized to meet the challenges from outsiders. In the process,
intergroup conflict would select for greatly increased human
capacity to recognize enemies versus relatives and friends. 34

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 13

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF POWER CONTESTS
BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS

Thus, the evolutionary model draws on population genetics,
behavioural ecology and theories of reproductive strategy to explain
group formation. On the other hand, the structuralist analysis includes
political and social structures as system of power significantly shape
the character of group relations. Under structural analysis, race and
ethnic relations are types of group power contests. Groups be they
racial, ethnic, class-religious, constantly compete for control of
resources, power and privileges in society. Demographic, situational
and cultural bases of group relations and the role of power as
determinant of these relations are analysed through three major
aspects of group awareness and identity (i.e. the character, the genesis
of group identity and the situational bases of group identity). Firstly,
the ethnic groups are seen as a form of social organization. 35 The
more complex a society, the greater the number and possible
combination of attributes which help to identify individuals. An
individual gets identified by himself and others by various attributes
or markers such as racial, ethnic, class, tribal, communal, corporate,
nationalist or religious etc. The individuals and groups define
themselves and by others in terms of real or imagined characteristics
which are physical characteristics such as colour or physical features
defined as somatic, biological or genetic. The cultural factors such as
language, religious values, political beliefs and modes of behaviour
such as class or income also form the identity of individual and group.
The above mentioned factors play a role to the extent that individuals
use these identities to categorize themselves and others for purpose of
interaction. They also become significant determinants of individual
and group perceptions and behaviour.

Secondly, group consciousness or identity occurs when a group
recognizes itself as possessing unique attributes that distinguishes it
from others. The awareness may be, self-induced, emerge
consciously as a consequence of the group's treatment by others or
when a group is defined analytically e.g. by designation of class.
Group consciousness assumes dangerous proportion when groups
compete not only for scarce resources, power or other desired
goods, but also when they perceive their valued attributes (e.g.

14 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

culture, religion, language, identity) threatened by the actions of
others, be that threat real or imagined. 36 Ethnic awareness is
described as the awareness with an ethnic background while ethnic
consciousness is a stronger identification with the ethnic group. This
difference can be defined by Mckay and Le win's fourfold typology.

Ethnic Identification and Structuration

Ethnic Structuration

Ethnic Category

Ethnic Group

(Low)

(High)

Ethnic

(i) Minimal Cell

(ii) Moderate Cell

Awareness

(Low)

(iii) Marginal Cell

(iv) Maximum Cell

Ethnic

Consciousness

(High)

Fig. 1.2 : McKay and Lewin's Typology.

Source : Phylis Martinelli, Ethnic and Racial Studies (1986), p. 198.

In this typology, the first cell label as minimal ethnicity includes
an ethnic category of people with low ethnic awareness. They have
few or no ethnic contacts and close to being or are assimilated. The
second cell, moderate ethnicity includes individuals whose ethnic
identity is not strong enough to be considered ethnic consciousness.
They use their ethnic contacts for instrumental or exploitative
reasons and have no strong feeling of personal attachment to the
group. The third cell, marginal ethnicity implies individuals with
strong ethnic consciousness but geographically isolated from
members of their group. Such individuals may have an abstract pride
in their ethnic culture while rejecting contact with fellow ethnics.
The fourth cell labeled maximum ethnicity contains people who are
involved in the pursuit of political and economic interests or
ideological differences. They strongly differentiate them from other
ethnic groups. 37

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

15

Thirdly, not all group contact or encounters result in
competition or conflict, some groups live together harmoniously.
However, when resources or valued goods are scarce and groups
compete for them, group differentiation usually results. Competition
exacerbates the attributes by which groups differentiate 'we' from
'they' and generally impute positive values or attributes to
themselves and negative ones to the opposing group. Greater the
perceived threat of the other group, greater the probability that this
process of polarization would occur. A dominant group, whether
threatened or not by the subordinate group(s), may impute negative
qualities to the latter. This is often simply a rationalization for
domination and exploitation, but elsewhere it might derive from
historical encounters where groups competed for power or situations
where the dominant group fears a subordinate group may threaten its
power in the future. If the genesis of group identity is viewed from
this perspective, it indicates that group consciousness is basically a
psychological phenomenon.

...It is obvious that group identity is situationally based,
psychologically determined and the result of specific events or
situations where groups become mobilized when their identity or
interests are threatened and this prompt new or ongoing power
contests. There is three specific type of situations that precipitate group
awareness and consciousness. First is a group power contests, where
threats to group interests or identity awaken or heighten group
consciousness. Second is development situations, where
industrialization, urbanization and related forces alter circumstances,
create changes in the relative power capabilities of groups and by doing
so generate new group power contests. Third, crisis is prompted by
wars, depressions or major cultural changes which generate fears and
prod groups into preserving or seeking changes in their position or
status. Group power contest occur, where groups compete for power
and scarce resources and respond defensively because they believe
their identity or culture is threatened. 38

Developmental factor play a crucial role in altering group power
capabilities, thereby influencing the character of group contests.
Among the major development factors are industrialization,
urbanization and secularization of society and culture. 39 Under the
influence of these factors, the groups can choose the following
strategies for participation in wider social systems.

1 6 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

First, they may attempt to incorporate in the pre-established industrial
society or cultural group. Second, they may accept a 'minority' status.
Third, they may choose to emphasize ethnic identity, using it to
develop new positions and patterns to organize activities in those
sectors formerly not found in their society. 40

If the cultural innovators are successful in the first strategy, their
ethnic group will probably remain as culturally conservative, low-
articulating ethnic group with low rank in the larger social system.
A general acceptance of the second strategy will prevent the
emergence of a clearly dichotomizing polyethnic organization, and
(in view of the diversity of industrial society and consequent
variation and multiplicity of fields of articulation) probably lead to
an eventual assimilation of the minority. The third strategy generates
many of the interesting movements that can be observed presently,
from nativism to new state. It is in these terms, French, Canadian
and African nationalism and more poignantly the Iranian revolution
can be explained.

Demographic factors also influence group relations and
consciousness. The most striking examples of this occurred where
sharp differentials between settlers and indigenous groups shaped
group perceptions, e.g. white settlers in North American (USA,
Canada) and pacific (Australia, New Zealand) fragments early
outnumbered indigenous groups which latter only briefly constituted
a threat to settlers and white power. In the African fragments (South
Africa, Rhodesia) Whites remained a small minority of total
population vastly outnumbered by indigenous groups. Whites held
tightly to power and manipulated the political system to prevent
Africans from gaining power. Thus, Africans remained in
subordinate positions. The result of blacks' reaction in both
countries was the victory of national parties. In Yugoslavia (Now
Serbia and Montenegro), the demographic or population factor
significantly influenced the group relations. In the Kosovo conflict,
the main reason of Serbian fear was based on increased population
of Albanian Muslims in province. In two million total population of
Kosovo, Serbian Minority reduced increasingly and reached mere
200,000 of total population. 41

Where the uneven development (e.g. of industrialization) took

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 17

place, one group believes its unique attributes (e.g. religion, race,
ethnicity) are the cause of its unequal treatment. It will seek to
mobilize its members to break out of that subordinate position. This
process called "Relative Deprivation" 42 precipitate various groups in
South Asia (e.g. Tamils, Sikhs, Bodos Gurkhas etc.) and in various
parts of Africa and North America (Quebecs in Canada) and Europe
(Flanders, Catalans, Albanian Muslims etc.). Economic crisis
precipitated by depressions or economic deprivation may prompt the
emergence of separatist movements, particularly when
disadvantaged groups (e.g. Welsh, Scots, Bretons etc.) believe that
the dominant group is discriminating against them. 43 Similar fears
for the cultural identity can affect a dominant group. The countries
of Western Europe try to sort out the problem of migration through
multi-culturalism can face another alarming problem. The massive
influx of refugees from Eastern European ex-communist countries
would place a heavy burden on European Union countries. 44

Power is another primary determinant of group relations.
Racial and ethnic groups whether in dominant, subordinate or equal
positions mobilize their group resources and strive for control over
the major political, economic and social structures of society. Most
of the policy decisions including the allocation or reallocation of
power, privilege and resources are determined within these
structures. Group power contests occur within these structures,
when the group prohibited from pursuing its goals. It may resort to
other means (e.g. riots, rebellion, revolution, or warfare) and to
controlling the structures and institutions by and through which
society allocate power, privilege and resources becomes its ultimate
goals. 45

In group power contest, two types of policy decisions are made
i.e. structural decisions and cultural policy decisions. Structural
decisions determine the degree of access of a given group to its
resources and power. Within structures, cultural policy decisions fall
between two poles i.e. policy that leads toward the elimination of
group cultures and loyalties through imposition of more embracing
'national' culture. Other is a policy of multi-culturalism wherein
society accepts the legitimacy of cultural diversity and give right to
their own cultural beliefs and practices. The power factor in

1 8 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

comparative analysis of ethnic and race relations can be applied
through three types,

...first, the analysis of race and ethnic relations as types of power
contests and the outcome of each contest dependent upon such factors
as group resources, capabilities and differential rates of group power.
Second, the analysis of specific types of dominance systems, be they
racial or ethnic. Third, the analysis of racial and ethnic dominance
system from a historical and comparative perspective. 46

In the first type, the determinants of group power contests are
the role of group resources, resource mobilization capabilities and
the strategies of actors. The division of society into broad strata
which form a hierarchy of prestige, wealth and power, is a feature
common to most societies. 47 The differential group power is a basic
determinant of this stratification system. The group power includes
its total numbers, physical and financial assets, social organisation,
culture, belief system, education and skills. Other less tangible, but
nevertheless significant resources include a group's prestige,
authority and any natural or supernatural resources, ability to bear
arms, voting rights, rights achieved by formal education,
membership in various organisations.

The mobilizational capabilities of any group is a multiplicative
function of the strength of its goals and perceived probability of
achieving these goals. 48 One group may possess superior resources,
but lack ineffective leadership, group cohesion or difficulty in
coping with stress situations cannot effectively mobilize its resources
against other group that possesses fewer resources but superior
mobilization capabilities. Two other significant variables are
"additive resources" and "the strategies" employed by a given
group. An example of an additive resource is the intrusion or
incorporation of third party on the side of either A or B, and this will
significantly alter the outcome of their power contest. The situation
of the Russian Minorities in the former Soviet Union is the most
salient illustration of this triangular relationship. 49 Strategies too, are
important in group power contests. Contesting groups basing their
evaluation of situations adopt strategies they believe will strengthen
their power capabilities and neutralize or weaken their opponents.

Whatever the power relationship (Symmetrical where both

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 19

groups are equal, asymmetrical where one is dominant), each group
may initiate or respond to the acts or anticipated acts of others. In
asymmetrical relations, a subordinate group pursues options that
range from opposition (extending from war or rebellion to more
subtle forms of resistance or subversion) to compliance (extending
from withdrawal or grudging acquiescence to "emanation").
Emanation is a situation where the group discards its own identity
and culture for that of the dominant group. The whole process of
emanation occurs through the reproduction of national culture by
dominant group across the state's territory through range of state
institutions. These institutions can effectively enforce the rules and
norms of national culture and shape the identity of the citizens.
These institutional structures include education system, language
regimes, legal systems, cultural institutions and welfare regimes.
The highly centralized incorporation of these institutions into the
structures of state create the conditions for consolidation of national
culture. 50 The low level of institutional incorporation lead to the
emergence of sub-state nationalism and loosen centralised control of
state.

In this type of situation the dominant group control structures
and enable it to destroy, restrict or preclude subordinate group's
acquisition of resources and mobilization capabilities. But a
subordinate group is not totally devoid of resources of mobilization
capabilities.

Subordinate groups possess two types of possible power resources,
pressure and competitive resources, both of which are important for
opposing domination. Pressure resources refers to a group's ability to
employ such disruptive tactics as strikes, boycotts, violence, even
warfare for forcing changes on dominant group. Subordinates may also
possess competitive resources, including skills i.e. appraisal of the
situation and the resources and mobilization capabilities available to
itself and its adversary. 51

The subordinate group may opt for strategies those will break
the prevailing pattern of dominance. The dominant group will in turn
respond.

The second approach to analyse the group relations focuses on
specific types of dominance systems such as military and coercive

20 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

dominance, structural dominance, psychosocial dominance. Settler-
indigenous conflicts persisted for prolonged periods marked by
wars, rebellions and uprisings, analysed through the military and
coercive dominance factor of group relations. Settlers efforts during
and following these conflicts aimed at the systematic destruction or
curtailment of indigenous power resources, be they political,
economic or social. Once dominance was achieved, white groups
employed numerous techniques of coercive, structural and
psychosocial means for control on indigenous groups. Defeated
groups were deprived of their weapons, their leaders or potential
leaders were removed or imprisoned (imprisonment of Nelson
Mandela and Kurd Leaders by South Africa and Turkey are
examples of this technique). Their economic and political systems
were destroyed by dispossessing the people of their land or by
isolating them on reserves where close military surveillance
curtailed organizational efforts and possible uprisings (China used
this technique on Tibetians). 52

Social structures can also be used for preserving the dominance
through the modes of cultural integration and the social relations of
the groups. The impact of dominance on subordinate group's social
organization and education including socialization process helps in
perpetuating dominance. Every group embraces "a cultural norm
image" (CNI) i.e. belief system based on what it consider acceptable
or unacceptable in terms of values, beliefs, behaviour norms and
physical or somatic characteristics. Likewise, each group embraces
a Somatic Norm Image (SNI) i.e. a set of beliefs of what it consider
acceptable or repugnant physical or racial features. Where one
group is dominant, it can determine cultural policy for the society
and its cultural/somatic norm images are thereby important. Cultural
policy falls somewhere between two poles of mono-culturalism or
multi-culturalism. 53 With mono-culturism the dominant group seeks
to eliminate subordinate group cultures and loyalties through the
imposition of national culture which is normally of the dominant
culture. The process is also called "ethnocide". 54

The dominant group used education system and social
organizations for dominance. Education system is used for
indoctrination i.e. to create inferiority complex in subordinate

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 21

group. For dominance on social organizations of society, the
dominant group 'buy of or co-opt subordinate group leaders to
maintain status quo. Alternatively, the co-opted ethnic leaders may
function as agents to pressure ethnic minorities to tone down their
particular demands. 55 But, the desire to cling to power may
transform a politician who is a member of an ethnic minority from
an opponent to a proponent of ethnic cultural or political claims.

Although Stalin as Georgian and Tito as Croat, respectively promoted
their Russian and Yugoslavian nationalism, but a number of communist
politicians, having failed to stamp out ethno-nationalism (a task for
which they had recruited originally), transformed themselves into
ethno-national spokesmen when the "transethnic" communist system
collapsed. 56

The dominant group, elsewhere, will isolate a subordinate
group, then negotiate with the latter 's leaders used as device for
maintaining control by indirect means.

There are three categories of psychosocial dominance i.e.
compliance, dependency and thought control. In terms of
'compliance', the dominant group uses its coercive/reward powers
in the form of 'carrot and stick' methods to gain obedience from the
subordinate group. Psychologically, the subordinate group responds
in terms of pleasure/pain principle. Its perceptual field and the
meaning it attaches to dominant group actions construed in terms of
deprivations, denial, punishment and relief, opportunities and the
absence of pain and deprivation. The pleasure/pain principle serves
as significant determinant of subordinate group behaviour. The
subordinate group's isolation from and vulnerability to a
surrounding entity with superior numbers and resources is conducive
to psychologically paranoid reactions. A great proportion in power
capabilities provides a good breeding ground for hatred and
distrust. 57

The second category dependency has three distinct types. The
first is structural type in which dominant group deprives the
subordinate group's resources (e.g. land, food, job) and the latter
must rely on the dominant group for its survival and this leaves it
psychologically vulnerable to the dominant group's use of
coercive/reward powers. Second, the subordinate group says in

22 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

effect to dominant group "we cannot cope, we are confused and
uncertain and rely upon you to tell us what to do." Within this type,
three subtype are evident i.e. expertise, symbiotic and authoritarian.
Under first, the subordinate group defers to the dominant group
because the latter is seen as having an expertise the former does not
possess. Symbiotic subtype based on a group's inferiority feelings as
a behaviour of dependency. The third subtype is the authoritarian
submissive form in which the subordinate group says, "we do not
know what to do, we are incapable, we need a leader and please
lead us." 58

The third category of 'dependency' includes two subtypes.
These psychological states develop because of a group's almost total
inability in coping with situations, be due to the result of conquest
or other factors. First is psychosocial disorganization and its
characteristics including within groups/individuals high level of
alienation, mental illness, alcoholism, drug addiction and other types
of family disorganization. All of these usually result from when
individuals and groups experience in coping with high stress
situations. Second subtype, 'anomie' 59 has even greater
disintegrative effects, sometime resulting in psychological or
physical suicide. Unable to cope with uncertainty and stress,
individuals commit suicide. This then result in a rapid decline in the
group's population.

The third major category of psychosocial dominance is 'thought
control' and is referred to as cultural imperialism, de-culturation,
brain- washing and emanation, based on principle that 'the culture
and identity of the subordinate group must be destroyed and be
replaced by that of the dominant group.' This imposition results
from two factors, dominant group efforts to impose these changes
and more importantly subordinate group accept new identity. De-
culturation is followed by the implanting of new culture, the
subordinate group sheds his own identity and adopts the given
identity. It can also be termed as emanation and 'cultural
imposition'. This thesis can well be applied on the colonized people,
as they were readily colonized because they had a dependency need,
which was fulfilled by the colonizers. The colonial masters
destroyed the language and culture of the subordinate and instilled in

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 23

the latter an inferiority complex. The result of this process was three
fold, the denial of subordinate's separate identity, the inculcation
within the subordinate that his own culture and identity is inferior
and the acceptance by the subordinate of the identity of the
dominant. 60

The wide theoretical analysis of ethnicity clearly shows that it is
not a new phenomenon. It has developed from traditional societies
to modern societies through various processes. It is a composite of
symbolic cultural markers used for organization of ethnic group and
rationalization of its identity. In modern states, ethnicity becomes
the basis for the power contests between the ethnic groups. The
power contests between dominate and subordinate groups creates
conflict between them. The last decade of twentieth century
manifests the conscience-shattering ethnic violence in many states.
Millions of people died and become refugees as a result of this
violence. The second part of chapter is related with the theoretical
analysis of transformation of ethnic conflict into a bloody ethnic
violence in various states.

24 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

PART-II :
ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE

The ethnic conflicts spread and intensified the process of
disintegration in various countries in the last decade of twentieth
century. The Russian foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev
apprehending the coming era of global anarchy warned the United
Nations in September 1993 "the threat of ethnic violence today is no
less serious than the threat of nuclear war was yesterday." The
United States President Bill Clinton also observed in his June 7,
1994 speech before the French National Assembly,

the Militant ethnic nationalism is on the rise, transforming the healthy
pride of nations, tribes, religious and ethnic groups into cancerous
prejudice, eating away all states and leaving their people addicted to
the political painkillers of violence and demagoguery. 61

The contemporary conflict between ethnic groups has been
primarily restricted to sub-national groups within the state that has
not achieved the status of 'nation' and the 'majority group'
organized under a state. The rise of 'nations without states' bring a
radical transformation in the functioning of nation-state. 62 The
nation-state become a bordered power-container of the modern era
characterised by an unprecedented relationships between power and
territory. The state exercise power over its entire territorial extent
and every single individual that lives or transit, regardless of actual
citizenship. The very concept sovereignty is based on this preclusive
relationship. The sovereignty, territoriality and the rise of modern
nation-state are all intrinsically related to the establishment of
boundaries and stressed the emergence of 'territorial trap' in
international relations. 63 A stress on uniforming and homogenisation
in the state boundaries is the root cause of the rise of ethnic violence
in various countries. At present out of 191 states in the international
system, roughly 90 percent (about 160) are ethnically heterogeneous
in the sense that minorities constitute more than five percent of total

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 25

population. In other words, the overwhelming majority of states in
the world today are multi-national or multi-ethnic i.e. incorporating
two or more ethnic nations or groups. Additionally, many ethnic
groups (e.g. Kurds) extend beyond boundaries of single state. As the
Kurds demonstrate, transnational ethnic groups, by preventing a fit
between the nation and the state, can be a source of international
conflict.

ETHNIC GROUPS AS THE SOURCE OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

For the analysis of international conflict, it is necessary to
analyse the variety of groups in multi-ethnic societies. Five kinds of
groups are arranged through three dimensions i.e. mobility,
voluntariness of contact, and performance. Fig. 1.3 illustrates the
interaction of these five groups in multiethnic society.

Mobility
Sedentary

Migrant

Voluntary

Involuntary

Immigrants

(Relatively/

Permanent)

Sojourners

(Temporary)

Fig. 1.3 : Kinds of groups in plural societies as defined by mobility,
voluntariness and performance.

Source : John W. Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology : Research and Applications, p. 294.

Some groups change their location with some degree of
performance when they come in contact (e.g. immigrants and
refugees) while sojourners usually do so on a temporary basis.
Others stay in their own place and have contacts with native and
indigenous people. The established ethnic groups usually have
contact with others in their daily lives. The second dimension
distinguishes ethnic groups, immigrants and sojourners from those
groups who usually have not in voluntary contact with native people

26

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

and refugees. 64 The ways in which these groups wishes to dominate
society have been termed "acculturation strategies". These strategies
are the result of an interaction between groups on the basis of cultural
change and intergroup relations. In the 'cultural change' the central
issue is the degree to which one group wishes to remain culturally as
one (e.g. in terms of identity, language, way of life) or opposed to
become part of larger society. 65 This process is resulted in the four
varieties of acculturation. Fig. 1.4 is described this process.

Issue I

Is it considered to be maintain
cultural identity and characteristics?

"Yes" "No"

Issue II

Is it considered to be of "yes"
value to maintain relationship
with other groups? "no"

Integration Assimilation
Separation Marginalization

Fig. 1.4 : Four varieties of acculturation, based upon orientations to two
basic issues.

Source : John W. Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology : Research and Applications, p. 278.

First variety or strategy i.e. 'assimilation' occurs when an
acculturating individual does not wish to maintain culture and
identity and seeks daily interaction with the dominant society. In
contrast, when there is a value placed on holding onto one's original
culture and a wish to avoid interaction with others, then the
'separation' or dissociative alternative is defined. The integration
occurs where the individual interested to maintain his original
culture and at the same time inclined in his daily interactions and
relations with others. In this process, some degree of cultural
integrity is maintained while moving to participate as an integral part
of the larger social network. Finally, marginalization takes place
when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance
(often for reason of enforced cultural loss) and little possibility or
interest in relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

27

place, one group believes its unique attributes (e.g. religion, race,
ethnicity) are the cause of its unequal treatment. It will seek to
mobilize its members to break out of that subordinate position. This
process called "Relative Deprivation" 42 precipitate various groups in
South Asia (e.g. Tamils, Sikhs, Bodos Gurkhas etc.) and in various
parts of Africa and North America (Quebecs in Canada) and Europe
(Flanders, Catalans, Albanian Muslims etc.). Economic crisis
precipitated by depressions or economic deprivation may prompt the
emergence of separatist movements, particularly when
disadvantaged groups (e.g. Welsh, Scots, Bretons etc.) believe that
the dominant group is discriminating against them. 43 Similar fears
for the cultural identity can affect a dominant group. The countries
of Western Europe try to sort out the problem of migration through
multi-culturalism can face another alarming problem. The massive
influx of refugees from Eastern European ex-communist countries
would place a heavy burden on European Union countries. 44

Power is another primary determinant of group relations.
Racial and ethnic groups whether in dominant, subordinate or equal
positions mobilize their group resources and strive for control over
the major political, economic and social structures of society. Most
of the policy decisions including the allocation or reallocation of
power, privilege and resources are determined within these
structures. Group power contests occur within these structures,
when the group prohibited from pursuing its goals. It may resort to
other means (e.g. riots, rebellion, revolution, or warfare) and to
controlling the structures and institutions by and through which
society allocate power, privilege and resources becomes its ultimate
goals. 45

In group power contest, two types of policy decisions are made
i.e. structural decisions and cultural policy decisions. Structural
decisions determine the degree of access of a given group to its
resources and power. Within structures, cultural policy decisions fall
between two poles i.e. policy that leads toward the elimination of
group cultures and loyalties through imposition of more embracing
'national' culture. Other is a policy of multi-culturalism wherein
society accepts the legitimacy of cultural diversity and give right to
their own cultural beliefs and practices. The power factor in

1 8 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

comparative analysis of ethnic and race relations can be applied
through three types,

...first, the analysis of race and ethnic relations as types of power
contests and the outcome of each contest dependent upon such factors
as group resources, capabilities and differential rates of group power.
Second, the analysis of specific types of dominance systems, be they
racial or ethnic. Third, the analysis of racial and ethnic dominance
system from a historical and comparative perspective. 46

In the first type, the determinants of group power contests are
the role of group resources, resource mobilization capabilities and
the strategies of actors. The division of society into broad strata
which form a hierarchy of prestige, wealth and power, is a feature
common to most societies. 47 The differential group power is a basic
determinant of this stratification system. The group power includes
its total numbers, physical and financial assets, social organisation,
culture, belief system, education and skills. Other less tangible, but
nevertheless significant resources include a group's prestige,
authority and any natural or supernatural resources, ability to bear
arms, voting rights, rights achieved by formal education,
membership in various organisations.

The mobilizational capabilities of any group is a multiplicative
function of the strength of its goals and perceived probability of
achieving these goals. 48 One group may possess superior resources,
but lack ineffective leadership, group cohesion or difficulty in
coping with stress situations cannot effectively mobilize its resources
against other group that possesses fewer resources but superior
mobilization capabilities. Two other significant variables are
"additive resources" and "the strategies" employed by a given
group. An example of an additive resource is the intrusion or
incorporation of third party on the side of either A or B, and this will
significantly alter the outcome of their power contest. The situation
of the Russian Minorities in the former Soviet Union is the most
salient illustration of this triangular relationship. 49 Strategies too, are
important in group power contests. Contesting groups basing their
evaluation of situations adopt strategies they believe will strengthen
their power capabilities and neutralize or weaken their opponents.

Whatever the power relationship (Symmetrical where both

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 19

groups are equal, asymmetrical where one is dominant), each group
may initiate or respond to the acts or anticipated acts of others. In
asymmetrical relations, a subordinate group pursues options that
range from opposition (extending from war or rebellion to more
subtle forms of resistance or subversion) to compliance (extending
from withdrawal or grudging acquiescence to "emanation").
Emanation is a situation where the group discards its own identity
and culture for that of the dominant group. The whole process of
emanation occurs through the reproduction of national culture by
dominant group across the state's territory through range of state
institutions. These institutions can effectively enforce the rules and
norms of national culture and shape the identity of the citizens.
These institutional structures include education system, language
regimes, legal systems, cultural institutions and welfare regimes.
The highly centralized incorporation of these institutions into the
structures of state create the conditions for consolidation of national
culture. 50 The low level of institutional incorporation lead to the
emergence of sub-state nationalism and loosen centralised control of
state.

In this type of situation the dominant group control structures
and enable it to destroy, restrict or preclude subordinate group's
acquisition of resources and mobilization capabilities. But a
subordinate group is not totally devoid of resources of mobilization
capabilities.

Subordinate groups possess two types of possible power resources,
pressure and competitive resources, both of which are important for
opposing domination. Pressure resources refers to a group's ability to
employ such disruptive tactics as strikes, boycotts, violence, even
warfare for forcing changes on dominant group. Subordinates may also
possess competitive resources, including skills i.e. appraisal of the
situation and the resources and mobilization capabilities available to
itself and its adversary. 51

The subordinate group may opt for strategies those will break
the prevailing pattern of dominance. The dominant group will in turn
respond.

The second approach to analyse the group relations focuses on
specific types of dominance systems such as military and coercive

20 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

dominance, structural dominance, psychosocial dominance. Settler-
indigenous conflicts persisted for prolonged periods marked by
wars, rebellions and uprisings, analysed through the military and
coercive dominance factor of group relations. Settlers efforts during
and following these conflicts aimed at the systematic destruction or
curtailment of indigenous power resources, be they political,
economic or social. Once dominance was achieved, white groups
employed numerous techniques of coercive, structural and
psychosocial means for control on indigenous groups. Defeated
groups were deprived of their weapons, their leaders or potential
leaders were removed or imprisoned (imprisonment of Nelson
Mandela and Kurd Leaders by South Africa and Turkey are
examples of this technique). Their economic and political systems
were destroyed by dispossessing the people of their land or by
isolating them on reserves where close military surveillance
curtailed organizational efforts and possible uprisings (China used
this technique on Tibetians). 52

Social structures can also be used for preserving the dominance
through the modes of cultural integration and the social relations of
the groups. The impact of dominance on subordinate group's social
organization and education including socialization process helps in
perpetuating dominance. Every group embraces "a cultural norm
image" (CNI) i.e. belief system based on what it consider acceptable
or unacceptable in terms of values, beliefs, behaviour norms and
physical or somatic characteristics. Likewise, each group embraces
a Somatic Norm Image (SNI) i.e. a set of beliefs of what it consider
acceptable or repugnant physical or racial features. Where one
group is dominant, it can determine cultural policy for the society
and its cultural/somatic norm images are thereby important. Cultural
policy falls somewhere between two poles of mono-culturalism or
multi-culturalism. 53 With mono-culturism the dominant group seeks
to eliminate subordinate group cultures and loyalties through the
imposition of national culture which is normally of the dominant
culture. The process is also called "ethnocide". 54

The dominant group used education system and social
organizations for dominance. Education system is used for
indoctrination i.e. to create inferiority complex in subordinate

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 21

group. For dominance on social organizations of society, the
dominant group 'buy of or co-opt subordinate group leaders to
maintain status quo. Alternatively, the co-opted ethnic leaders may
function as agents to pressure ethnic minorities to tone down their
particular demands. 55 But, the desire to cling to power may
transform a politician who is a member of an ethnic minority from
an opponent to a proponent of ethnic cultural or political claims.

Although Stalin as Georgian and Tito as Croat, respectively promoted
their Russian and Yugoslavian nationalism, but a number of communist
politicians, having failed to stamp out ethno-nationalism (a task for
which they had recruited originally), transformed themselves into
ethno-national spokesmen when the "transethnic" communist system
collapsed. 56

The dominant group, elsewhere, will isolate a subordinate
group, then negotiate with the latter 's leaders used as device for
maintaining control by indirect means.

There are three categories of psychosocial dominance i.e.
compliance, dependency and thought control. In terms of
'compliance', the dominant group uses its coercive/reward powers
in the form of 'carrot and stick' methods to gain obedience from the
subordinate group. Psychologically, the subordinate group responds
in terms of pleasure/pain principle. Its perceptual field and the
meaning it attaches to dominant group actions construed in terms of
deprivations, denial, punishment and relief, opportunities and the
absence of pain and deprivation. The pleasure/pain principle serves
as significant determinant of subordinate group behaviour. The
subordinate group's isolation from and vulnerability to a
surrounding entity with superior numbers and resources is conducive
to psychologically paranoid reactions. A great proportion in power
capabilities provides a good breeding ground for hatred and
distrust. 57

The second category dependency has three distinct types. The
first is structural type in which dominant group deprives the
subordinate group's resources (e.g. land, food, job) and the latter
must rely on the dominant group for its survival and this leaves it
psychologically vulnerable to the dominant group's use of
coercive/reward powers. Second, the subordinate group says in

22 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

effect to dominant group "we cannot cope, we are confused and
uncertain and rely upon you to tell us what to do." Within this type,
three subtype are evident i.e. expertise, symbiotic and authoritarian.
Under first, the subordinate group defers to the dominant group
because the latter is seen as having an expertise the former does not
possess. Symbiotic subtype based on a group's inferiority feelings as
a behaviour of dependency. The third subtype is the authoritarian
submissive form in which the subordinate group says, "we do not
know what to do, we are incapable, we need a leader and please
lead us." 58

The third category of 'dependency' includes two subtypes.
These psychological states develop because of a group's almost total
inability in coping with situations, be due to the result of conquest
or other factors. First is psychosocial disorganization and its
characteristics including within groups/individuals high level of
alienation, mental illness, alcoholism, drug addiction and other types
of family disorganization. All of these usually result from when
individuals and groups experience in coping with high stress
situations. Second subtype, 'anomie' 59 has even greater
disintegrative effects, sometime resulting in psychological or
physical suicide. Unable to cope with uncertainty and stress,
individuals commit suicide. This then result in a rapid decline in the
group's population.

The third major category of psychosocial dominance is 'thought
control' and is referred to as cultural imperialism, de-culturation,
brain- washing and emanation, based on principle that 'the culture
and identity of the subordinate group must be destroyed and be
replaced by that of the dominant group.' This imposition results
from two factors, dominant group efforts to impose these changes
and more importantly subordinate group accept new identity. De-
culturation is followed by the implanting of new culture, the
subordinate group sheds his own identity and adopts the given
identity. It can also be termed as emanation and 'cultural
imposition'. This thesis can well be applied on the colonized people,
as they were readily colonized because they had a dependency need,
which was fulfilled by the colonizers. The colonial masters
destroyed the language and culture of the subordinate and instilled in

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 23

the latter an inferiority complex. The result of this process was three
fold, the denial of subordinate's separate identity, the inculcation
within the subordinate that his own culture and identity is inferior
and the acceptance by the subordinate of the identity of the
dominant. 60

The wide theoretical analysis of ethnicity clearly shows that it is
not a new phenomenon. It has developed from traditional societies
to modern societies through various processes. It is a composite of
symbolic cultural markers used for organization of ethnic group and
rationalization of its identity. In modern states, ethnicity becomes
the basis for the power contests between the ethnic groups. The
power contests between dominate and subordinate groups creates
conflict between them. The last decade of twentieth century
manifests the conscience-shattering ethnic violence in many states.
Millions of people died and become refugees as a result of this
violence. The second part of chapter is related with the theoretical
analysis of transformation of ethnic conflict into a bloody ethnic
violence in various states.

24 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

PART-II :
ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE

The ethnic conflicts spread and intensified the process of
disintegration in various countries in the last decade of twentieth
century. The Russian foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev
apprehending the coming era of global anarchy warned the United
Nations in September 1993 "the threat of ethnic violence today is no
less serious than the threat of nuclear war was yesterday." The
United States President Bill Clinton also observed in his June 7,
1994 speech before the French National Assembly,

the Militant ethnic nationalism is on the rise, transforming the healthy
pride of nations, tribes, religious and ethnic groups into cancerous
prejudice, eating away all states and leaving their people addicted to
the political painkillers of violence and demagoguery. 61

The contemporary conflict between ethnic groups has been
primarily restricted to sub-national groups within the state that has
not achieved the status of 'nation' and the 'majority group'
organized under a state. The rise of 'nations without states' bring a
radical transformation in the functioning of nation-state. 62 The
nation-state become a bordered power-container of the modern era
characterised by an unprecedented relationships between power and
territory. The state exercise power over its entire territorial extent
and every single individual that lives or transit, regardless of actual
citizenship. The very concept sovereignty is based on this preclusive
relationship. The sovereignty, territoriality and the rise of modern
nation-state are all intrinsically related to the establishment of
boundaries and stressed the emergence of 'territorial trap' in
international relations. 63 A stress on uniforming and homogenisation
in the state boundaries is the root cause of the rise of ethnic violence
in various countries. At present out of 191 states in the international
system, roughly 90 percent (about 160) are ethnically heterogeneous
in the sense that minorities constitute more than five percent of total

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 25

population. In other words, the overwhelming majority of states in
the world today are multi-national or multi-ethnic i.e. incorporating
two or more ethnic nations or groups. Additionally, many ethnic
groups (e.g. Kurds) extend beyond boundaries of single state. As the
Kurds demonstrate, transnational ethnic groups, by preventing a fit
between the nation and the state, can be a source of international
conflict.

ETHNIC GROUPS AS THE SOURCE OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

For the analysis of international conflict, it is necessary to
analyse the variety of groups in multi-ethnic societies. Five kinds of
groups are arranged through three dimensions i.e. mobility,
voluntariness of contact, and performance. Fig. 1.3 illustrates the
interaction of these five groups in multiethnic society.

Mobility
Sedentary

Migrant

Voluntary

Involuntary

Immigrants

(Relatively/

Permanent)

Sojourners

(Temporary)

Fig. 1.3 : Kinds of groups in plural societies as defined by mobility,
voluntariness and performance.

Source : John W. Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology : Research and Applications, p. 294.

Some groups change their location with some degree of
performance when they come in contact (e.g. immigrants and
refugees) while sojourners usually do so on a temporary basis.
Others stay in their own place and have contacts with native and
indigenous people. The established ethnic groups usually have
contact with others in their daily lives. The second dimension
distinguishes ethnic groups, immigrants and sojourners from those
groups who usually have not in voluntary contact with native people

26

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

and refugees. 64 The ways in which these groups wishes to dominate
society have been termed "acculturation strategies". These strategies
are the result of an interaction between groups on the basis of cultural
change and intergroup relations. In the 'cultural change' the central
issue is the degree to which one group wishes to remain culturally as
one (e.g. in terms of identity, language, way of life) or opposed to
become part of larger society. 65 This process is resulted in the four
varieties of acculturation. Fig. 1.4 is described this process.

Issue I

Is it considered to be maintain
cultural identity and characteristics?

"Yes" "No"

Issue II

Is it considered to be of "yes"
value to maintain relationship
with other groups? "no"

Integration Assimilation
Separation Marginalization

Fig. 1.4 : Four varieties of acculturation, based upon orientations to two
basic issues.

Source : John W. Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology : Research and Applications, p. 278.

First variety or strategy i.e. 'assimilation' occurs when an
acculturating individual does not wish to maintain culture and
identity and seeks daily interaction with the dominant society. In
contrast, when there is a value placed on holding onto one's original
culture and a wish to avoid interaction with others, then the
'separation' or dissociative alternative is defined. The integration
occurs where the individual interested to maintain his original
culture and at the same time inclined in his daily interactions and
relations with others. In this process, some degree of cultural
integrity is maintained while moving to participate as an integral part
of the larger social network. Finally, marginalization takes place
when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance
(often for reason of enforced cultural loss) and little possibility or
interest in relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

27

discrimination). The term 'integration' is distinct from the term
'assimilation' because the cultural maintenance is sought in former
case while there is no interest in such continuity in the latter. The
policies and practices of dominant society can place important
constraints on the choices made by acculturating groups. There may
also be 'flux' over time in which different strategies are employed
e.g. one may begin with a preference for assimilation, switch to
separation and finally settle on integration. 66

However, the policies adopted by a multinational state are
always at least partly determined by the interests of ethnic groups.
"Realistic group conflict theory" proposes that the discrimination
between groups are often based on conflicts of interests between
groups or based on real competition for scarce goods. The most
relevant premises of this theory are,

1. It has been proposed that intergroup threat and conflict
increase as the perceived competition for resources increase
between groups.

2. It has been suggested that greater the intergroup threat and
conflict, the more hostility is expressed towards the source
of the threat.

3. It has been proposed that when competition over resources
is present, proximity and contact increase intergroup
hostility rather than decreasing it. It is important to note
that the basic premise of this theory does not require that
actual competition over resources exist. Rather, it is
perception of competition that leads to conflict and
intergroup hostility. It is also important to note that group
conflict is assumed to occur at the group level rather than
at the individual level. It means that the group's interests
are at stake and being protected, rather than solely the
interests of individual members of the group. 67

The political efforts of every ethnic group to obtain
preferential treatment for itself tends to threaten the interests of other
groups who would be eligible for preferential treatment in
multinational states The former attempt to maximize their gains, the
latter to minimize their loses. The ethnic conflicts thereby
engendered may be peaceful, as in well functioning democracies

28 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

where groups lobby in legislatures for particular favours or may be
violent in countries in which governments functions poorly or have
been captured by one ethnic group and used to exploit other e.g.
Yugoslavia, South Africa. 68

Realistic group conflict theory can be contrasted with 'social
identity theory' which proposes that conflict occurs when positive
group identity and self-esteem are at stake, rather than resources
such as money and power. The 'scapegoat' theory of prejudice
suggests that, although threats to tangible resources may cause
hostility, but this hostility is redirected to a safe-to-target, weak
outgroup, rather than necessarily to the source of the threat. 69

An instrumental model of realistic group conflict suggests that
the combination of resource stress and salience of a potentially
competitive outgroup leads to perceived group competition for
resources. The term resource stress refers to any perception of
access to resources limited for certain groups within a society. The
resources involved may include economic resources such as money,
power, jobs etc. As Fig. 1.5 indicate that several factors may
determine the degree of perceived resource stress.

Resource Stress

• Scarcity

• Unequal distribution

• Desire for unequal
distribution

Relevant outgroup

• salience and
distinctiveness

• likelihood of
taking resources

Group competition

• Zero-sum beliefs

• anxiety, fear

Attempts to removed
competition

• decrease competitiveness
of outgroup.

• increase competitiveness of
ingroup

avoidance

Fig. 1.5 : An instrumental model of group conflict.

Source : Victoria M. Esses et al., Journal of Social Issues (1998), p. 703.

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

29

1. The scarcity of resources, whether real or perceived, will
increase the chances that group will perceive that access to
resources is limited.

2. Due to the unequal distribution of resources among groups in
society will likely lead to the perception that at least for some
groups, access to these resources is limited e.g. lower status
group will feel that they now have limited access to resources
and higher status group may perceive that if hierarchy changes,
they could move down the ladder and no longer have access to
the resources they now possess.

3. The desire for unequal distribution of resources among groups,
which is an individual difference variable, will be related to the
perception that there is not enough to go around. Individuals
who desire a hierarchical structure in society believe that limited
resources are most worth and greatest value. 70

In all three cases what is crucial is the perception that resources
are under stress and potentially not available to all groups in
sufficient quantities. Resource stress may precipitate competition for
resources among groups. Some out-groups that are salient and
distinct from one's own group are more likely to stand out as
potential competitors. Salience and distinctiveness may be
determined by factors, i.e. large or increasing size of the group and
novel appearance and behaviour. The potential competition between
similar or dissimilar out-groups depends on the dimension in
question. The groups similar to in-group are likely to be completing
for dimension relevant to obtain resources e.g. skills. On the other
hand, the distinct groups from in-group are more likely to be seen
as competitors if the dimensions in question are ethnicity or national
origin. Thus, the perceived competition with particular outgroup
may be function of similarity and dissimilarity of different
dimensions in question as well as interaction between them. 71 In
addition, groups who are very skilled in the domain in question, who
have external support for obtaining resources are more likely to be
seen as potential competitors because of their enhanced ability to
take resources.

The perceived group competition has both cognitive and

30 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

affective underpinnings. The cognitions associated with group
competition involve zero-sum beliefs, that more the other group
obtains, the less is available for one's own group. The emotions
accompanying these beliefs may include anxiety and fear. The
model suggests three strategies which remove the sources of
competition. First, a group may attempt to decrease the other
group's competitiveness, second, to increase the competitiveness of
one's own group. Finally, competition with other group is to
reduced with the avoidance by decreasing approximity (a group
may deny immigration) or may replace itself to a different
location. 72

ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND REFERENCE STATES

The most modern ethnic conflicts (e.g. between ex-Soviet
States) can be understood by model of ethnic relations in the
presence of reference state. It features a strategic interaction
between a 'minority' (m), a 'majority' (M) and the reference state
of minority (R). The chronological structure of model is that the
minority moves first. It decides either to fight (F) in an attempt to
get certain thing it values e.g. secession or certain rights or to
acquiesce (A) and than enter the new state run by the majority. If
the minority decides to fight, the reference state must decide
whether to intervene in the war (i) or not (Ni). If the minority
decide to acquiesce, the game goes to a second period, in which
the majority makes a proposal about a policy packet (x) that is
relevant for the minority which can consist of such things as
individual rights (e.g. citizenship status) and collective rights (e.g.
education in the language of the minority). This packet is
summarized as a point in the interval (0,1). The minority prefers
(x) to be as high as possible while the majority will try to set it as
low as possible. Not all components of such a policy packet will
have this zero-sum character, but many will make any packet
contested. 73

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 3 1

m A My\ x m

WARREF

NO WAR

WARREF,

WAR,

WARREF,

WAR,

Fig. 1.6 : A Model of Ethnic Relations in the Presence of a Reference State.

Source : Pieter Van Houten, Archives European Journal of Sociology (1998), p. 116.

In principle, the value that the minority and majority attach to
the proposed packet can depend on historical memories and
anticipation of future actions by the other group. After the proposal,
the minority group decides again whether to fight or acquiesce.
When it decides to fight, the reference state faces the same decision
as in the first period (I or NI). The game is not necessarily over, if
the minority decides to accept the proposal of the majority. It is
assumed that the reference state does not necessarily just react to
actions of the minority, but that it also has certain ideas and
preferences itself about an acceptable treatment of the minority.
Reference state really cares about the well-being of the minority or
it cares it for other political reasons (e.g. because of pressure on the
government of the reference state by nationalistic opposition
parties). This aspect is modelled by giving the reference state a
choice to intervene after the minority has acquiesced in both
periods.

Fig. 1.6 shows the extensive form of game. There are six
outcomes, which consist of three distinct events i.e. war with the
intervention of the reference state (WARREF), war without such
intervention (WAR) and a non-violent outcome (NOWAR). 74 These
three implications of the model applied on the conflict between
Serbian minority and Croats in Croatia where Serbia provides an
insistence as a reference state that result in war. Hungry was weak
(though highly irredentist) and not able to influence the relations

32

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

between Hungarian Minority in Romania. Finally, the perception of
Russia's position seems to be such that the violence was avoided
(e.g. Estonia, Crimea).

VARIOUS FACETS OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN
THE WORLD POLITICS

Modern conflicts are also analysed through the process of
ethnocide and ethnogenesis. Ethnogenesis is the complementary
dimension of ethnocide, which is the conscious effort by power
wielders within a nation-state to obliterate a people's life ways. The
complementary feature of ethnocide and the ethnogenesis reflect the
historio and contemporary struggle between hegemony and
resistance to hegemony. 75 This process marked the collision of
nation-state's nationalism and ethnic-block ethnogenesis.

The idea of nationalism and ideal of the 'nation state' are not
necessarily based on ethnicity. Rather they stress the voluntary
coming together of people in a state with a shared culture. Yet in
modern times, especially in the twentieth century, ethnicity has
come to be more important in politics and ethnic-nationalism (or
ethnonationalism) has been the distinguishing characteristic of
nationalism. It may be defined as doctrine of autonomy, unity and
identity for a group whose members conceive it to be an actual or
potential nation. This may be because ethnicity gives a higher status
to citizenship and therefore provides people a heightened sense of
dignity than individualistic civic or social nationalism. 76 In essence
this exclusive nationalism excludes those people who do not share a
common ethnicity which usually means common decent. On the
other hand, the principle of national self-determination confers a
right to nations and their members to determine the sovereign state
to which they would belong and the form of government of state
which they would live. In a state based on concept of civic
nationalism, every citizen irrespective of linage and ethnic
background is a member of the nation. 77

Nationalism results from the changes in the character of politics,
economy and culture. The Table 1.2 shows the relationship between
ethnic nationalism and 'post industrial society' and 'consumerism'.
In third world countries, the intensity of ethnic conflict can be

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 33

explained through the direction of politics towards the features of
model, such as democratic politics rather than 'empire' and rising
political consumer choice rather than monopoly. The model
indicates a universal linkage between particular forms of politics,
economy and culture.

Power expectations Politics

Economy

Culture

Power expectations
Capabilities

Material interests

Psychic Income

Democracy (self rule)
opposing to domination,
discrimination and exclusion

Uneven development
and cultural division
of labour

Search for identity and
status increased literacy

Nation-State

Consociational
democracy

Nation-building

(V. imperialism, internal

colonialism)

Increased cultural
homogeneity

consumerism

cultures

(v. centralisation)

Decline of class
divisions

Revival of ethnic
and /or

Post-industrial politics
(e.g. Green parties and
national parties)

Growth of state
divisions

Post-materialist values

State power v. divided nations

Post-industrial society

Table 1.2 : Ethnic and social nationalism

Source : James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, p. 68.

In politics the focus is on power which expressed in terms of
authority and the challenge to authority. Those who achieve political
power command political structures, most typically the state. Those
who are not in power but challengers of that power, operate in some
political systems through political parties and through movements
and terrorist organizations. In politics of nationalism, there have
ruling national parties, opposition nationalist parties, nationalist
movements, national liberation armies and so on. Each of these
relates to the nature of the state and their focus is on political power.
Some nationalists seek to defend the state, others to overthrow it.

34

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

This can be explained through ethnic nature of state. If one ethnic
group controls the state, then its nationalism is expressed as official
nationalism or patriotism. 78 e.g. Ruling National Parties in South
Africa and Sri Lanka were White Africaners and Sinhalese
respectively. Other ethnic group, which does not control the state,
expressed its nationalism in opposition to the state. Hence, the
African National Congress and The Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) respectively opposed the structure of the state. The
main reason of rise of ethnic-nationalism in politics is due to the
change in the expectations and capabilities of the people. The ratio
of expectations to capabilities provides the dynamic in politics
generally and nationalism is one result of this changed ratio
(Paradoxically, so is internationalism or supranationalism). 79

The government by the people is expected by the inhibitions of
the states. This expectation has been encouraged over a long period
since eighteenth century "national self-determination" to twentieth
century "ethno-national self determination" . After World War I, the
political capabilities of people have continuously changed. The
multinational empires in Europe broke up after World War I and in
Africa and Asia after the World War II. In twentieth century, the
rise of democratic expectations and capability to achieve these
through overthrow of multinational empires was matched by the rise
of ethnic nationalism within multiethnic states. This process
involved a nationalist reaction to domination, discrimination and
exclusion. One aspect of this has been called 'internal colonialism'
which means the colonisation of subordinate ethnic group within the
state by the core ethnic group giving rise to 'cultural division of
labour'. In this situation many 'internal' ethnicities become
mobilized politically against the state of which they were a part,
even that state proclaim itself a 'nation state'. Thus, old-established
states were threatened and break-up in twentieth century, e.g. the
USSR, Yugoslavia etc.

Another modern desire for democracy is consumerism. In
political terms, consumerism seeks the availability of right of self-
government, local democracy and cultural autonomy. But
consumerism usually means the demand by individuals/groups for
material gain. This will decide, the rational choice for them in

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 35

politics. It means that pursuing ethnic aims will appear rational in
the prospect of material or some other gain. In the most advanced
post-industrial societies, the demands may go beyond economic gain
to the satisfaction of post materialist values, such as ethnic identity
(e.g. in language, religion, respect for community). Rational choice
theory also predicts that when ethnic identity results in political
conflict and then it would take an ideological form in post-
industrialist society. 80

While consumerism has been encouraged by the modern
democratic state, it can also turn against it. Demand for
decentralization and home rule for ethnic groups and nations can be
seen as consumer reactions against the modern centralized state. In
this situation, when the state seeks to satisfy dissatisfied ethnic
groups, through economic planning to redress regional inequalities
or establishment of regional government. It raises further ethnic
expectations further and demands for stronger home rule. e.g. in
Gorbachev's USSR, the policies of Perestroika and 'Glasnost'
opened the floodgates to ethnic demands and capabilities to a point
where many nationalities demand independence and later resulted in
the demise of the USSR. 81

The relationship between the economy and nationalism is not
static but dynamic. The technological changes which have occurred
in the late twentieth century have altered the types of employment
and the classes in the labour force in advanced industrial countries.
The division of interest between the 'working class' and the 'middle
class' which has reflected in class politics is no longer so obvious,
as people see their interests in terms of post industrial materialisms.
The people of states and regions of states who feel 'relatively
deprived' because of their economic situation can become politically
restless and may demand change to redress their perceived
deprivation. 82

The culture differs from economy as 'psychic income' differs
from financial income or material interests. 'Psychic income' refers
to those things which satisfy mental and spiritual needs of human
beings. Nationality and culture are almost synonymous. This is
because both include a sense of social identity, language, education,
religion, arts and science etc. Thus, in the formula,

36 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

' Politics + Economy + culture = nationalism' has contained a special
weight for culture. Presently, in the field of culture, two
contradictory though intertwined historical processes are operating
simultaneously, i.e. a globalizing tendency where the economics and
cultures around the world are being embedded increasingly in more
and more pervasive global webs. Secondly, a localizing tendency,
expresses in its extreme form by a number of insurgencies on the
basis of ethnic religions and local identities. These various cleavages
of cultural built-up across the world provide potential fault lines for
acrimony based on new cultural assertions. 83 Gellner's theory
pointed out that in the industrial state, homogeneous national
cultures within one state would go hand in hand with industrial
economies. Thus, a social and cultural identity would flow from the
needs of economy and would get promoted by the state. His theory
postulated that as the state economy predominate over local and
regional economies, so too state identity, culture and official
nationalism would predominate over ethnic and social identity
culture and nationalism. 84

As Gellner's theory postulated, the process of globalization
internationalize economy to some extent but this process not fade the
national cultures. It seems as powerful as politics and economy and
that in the conditions of sudden change in the modern world people
turn to their ethnic and social culture as a defence against deprivation
in politics and material interests. This is not a throw back to ancient
ways, but a very up-to-date way of defending personal and group
interests. For defending their interests, ethnic groups can retain their
separate languages and senses of identity, but that would be
expressed primarily in the realm of culture rather than politics. 85

There are many contemporary developments which have led to
renewed cultural nationalism, i.e. there has been a big increase in
literacy, through the spread of education to all people. The
opportunities to promote national culture have steadily increased
with the spread of mass publications and these are often accessible
to nationalists unless the state exercises censorship and monopolies
printing. At least, 200,000,000 books had been printed from 1600
A.D. and this 'print-capitalism' proved Francis Bacon's belief that
"print had changed the appearance and the state of the world".

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 37

There has been immense spread of the broadcast media. It combined
with the huge migrations (created by the present world economic
system) created a virulent new form of nationalism. This type of
nationalism is no longer depends on territorial location in home
country and developed new type of virtual ethnic communities.
Some of the most vehement 'virtual communities' are found in
diaspora communities e.g. Sikh, Croatian and Algerian nationalists.
The internet, electronic banking and cheap international travel are
allowing such people to have a powerful influence on the politics of
the country of origin. 86 The linguistic questions are likely to be
rallying points for ethnic nationalism and will get exposure in the
press and broadcast media if a national language has been suppressed
or discouraged by the state. A separate Welsh language TV channel
was granted in 1982, after a hunger strike by Welsh nationalist
president, Gwynfar Evans.

The 'cultural nationalist' leaders also articulate to the widest
possible audience regarding the claims of the nation, cultural
autonomy and survival. This gives confidence to those disposed
toward nationalism and they become able to share their national
identity with leaders and to learn from them what their national
culture is, and how it should be defended. Most of minorities feel
that their culture is under attack from the state. This leads to a sense
of cultural deprivation among these minority groups. Cultural
deprivation in the context of nationalism is experienced when
discrimination or insult takes place on account of a person's national
identity including accent, religion, habits, tastes and so on. 87 This
occurs most frequently when face-to-face contact takes place
between dominant and dominated nationals. It is also experienced
collectively when linguistic or educational usages are imposed
officially on all citizens by the state, e.g. Scotland's nationalist
leader Jim Sillars writes,

"When I served in the British Navy, I could understand them but they
either could not or refused to understand me. In Portsmouth (naval
base) people delighted in taking the mickey by refusing to understand
a single word I said, and years later, my first speech in "house of
common" after my election in 1988 was greeted with taunts from
English Tory MPs, 'speak English', which no doubt strengthened my
cultural nationalism. 88

38 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

There are nationalists who point to personal cultural deprivation
to explain their nationalism. Collective cultural deprivation also
leads to nationalism and is present when cultural organisations and
educational bodies fight for the national culture against assimilation
with other cultures and education systems. Now, 'the search for
identity', intellectual freedom and the pursuit of 'psychic income'
are the features of 'post-materialist society.' 89 But, both Marxist and
Western liberals tended to view ethnic nationalism and religious
fundamentalism as part of a larger set of phenomenon subject of
transformation by the forces of economic modernization. 90 The
functionalist view civic nationalism and its growth as a consequence
of the breakdown of traditional society undergoing modernization,
but it fails to explain the rise of ethnic nationalism in many
developing as well as developed states. Hence, in its place many
theories arose that linked the modernization process with the
emergence and rapid diffusion of ethno-nationalist and religious
sentiments and thereby accounted for political fragmentation,
instability and anti-democratic developments. 91

MODERNIZATION PROCESS AND EMERGENCE
OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS

The modernization theories those linked modernization with
ethnic nationalism have two shortcomings firstly, most of them have
failed to explain adequately the persistence and proliferation of
ethnic nationalism all over the world. Secondly, most of these
theories view ethnic nationalism as undemocratic and extremist.
Consequently, the developmental approach and the reactive ethnicity
approach have developed. These theories do not discard the salience
of the modernization process behind the rise of ethnic nationalism
and deal with the ethnic political mobilization directly. The
developmental perspective treats' the persistence of ethnic
attachments as 'residual' phenomenon. 92 The 'residual' treatment of
ethnic attachments means that the developmental theory cannot be
give an independent role to those attachments in the dynamics of
political mobilization. These dynamics must be based on the
occupational (i.e. class) cleavages, while the ethnic cleavages must
serve only as a 'facade' for the more fundamental class-based
mechanics. In contrast to the residual status of ethnic attachments in

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 39

developmental perspective, the 'reactive ethnicity model' contends
that developmental theorists misunderstood both the process of
economic development and its effects. The process of modernization
and increased contact between ethnic groups within a state would not
necessarily bring about ethnic unity, rather would likely to lead to
ethnic conflict. This is because the inequalities between the regions
in a country would relegate peripheral regions to an inferior
position, leaving the core region dominant. The reaction to this, in
the pheripheral regions will be hostility towards the core. Hechter's
'Cultural Division of Labor' (CDL) theory states that in a situation
of internal colonialism, there would be a social stratification of
ethnic or cultural groups, with the core group occupying the best
class positions and the peripheral groups the inferior positions. This
corresponds to a 'colonising' nation and 'colonised' nations. 93 If the
stratification system links ethnic identity with economic status, it
confers a meaning to identity and cannot be detached from one's
economic and political interests within the system. Thus, it should
not be expected that ethnic attachments will recede in highly
developed countries, if it is understood that economic development
can produce a CDL. The profusion of 'ethno-regionalist' movements
in Quebec, Catalonia, Basque regions of Spain, Scots in Britain and
Flemings in Belgium are examples of this process.

In the reactive ethnicity model, two components are necessary
for political mobilization. First, the individuals must share same
interests. Second, suitable conditions must exist for mobilization.
The first component alone is insufficient for concerted political
mobilization. The aggregation of individual perceptions of economic
inequality alone is insufficient for the development of collective
solidarity. Beside conditions that generate common interests,
conditions that facilitate group formation are also necessary. It is
here that ethnicity plays a crucial role. Ethnic ties among
economically disadvantaged individuals (i.e. CDL) play an
independent role as facilitating conditions for the group formation
essential to political mobilization. Ethnic linkages are a facilitating
condition because they define a common discourse (language, beliefs
etc.) which is required for any form of concerted action. The
interests that facilitate political mobilization, embedded in the social
context. This context is distinguished by ethnic commonalities, the

40 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

ability to pursue common interests (whatever they may be) would be
greatly enhanced. Thus, in the reactive ethnicity model ethnic
attachments retain their salience through the working of the
stratification system and serve as a condition which facilitates
concerted efforts to alter the stratification system.

A schematic summary of differences between these two models
is contained in Fig. 1.7.

Traditional Society

Traditional
Society

No Economic
Development

Economic
Development

/ /

NoCDL

CDL

*

7P

Functional
Society

\

Interactive
Society

— Reactive Ethnicity Model

— Developmental Model

Fig. 1.7 : A Schematic Summary of the Developmental and Reactive
Ethnicity Models.

Source : Eric M. Leifer, American Journal of Sociology (July 1981/82), p. 30.

In a development model, economic development produces
"functional societies". Cleavages in functional societies are class
based and group formation around class interests is not taken to be
problematic. Ethnic identities may persist and a CDL should exist,
but these identities should have no significant role separate from
class interests in the process of political mobilization. In contrast,
reactive ethnicity model takes group formation to be problematic.
Both models concur that economic development would result in a
functional society where no CDL exist. The reactive ethnicity model
posit that ethnic attachments (made salient by stratification system)
would play an independent role in facilitating group formation

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

41

around the pursuit of political interests when CDL exists in the
society. Thus, an "interactive" society is predicted, in which the
conjunction of economic and ethnic subordination is required to
produce concerted political mobilization. 94

Parsons 'action theory' provides the logical frameworks of both
models. This theory is constructed upon conditions, means and
interests (ends), which are defined not absolutely but relatively to
each other. In both models, interests (political) and conditions
(salient ethnic ties) are central concepts with different meanings but
both models used 'political mobilization' as a 'means' in support of
national party. The missing factor in this context must be linked to
the "leadership component" that determines the alternative direction
available. Each possible mobilization alternative is distinguished by
a different type of leadership component.

ROLE OF ETHNIC ENTREPRENEURS IN
ETHNIC CONFLICTS

Rabuska and Shepsle in their theory of ethnic mobilization argue
that the cultural diversity in a given society is necessary but not
sufficient cause of polarization along ethnic lines. In plural societies,
the political entrepreneurs play a critical role in making ethnic
cleavages politically salient. They further argue that ethnic
preferences would be intense because, firstly, they are shared by all
members of ethnic group, secondly, opposed to the preferences of
other ethnic groups on all issues and thirdly understood accordingly
to a frame of reference shared by all actors in society. And a change
in the mode of production in a state with a cultural division of
labour, leads to the deskilling of the subordinate group. It replaces
old elite with a new one. The new elite take more extremist stance
on the same issues. In doing so the new political leader represents
himself/herself as the only authentic representative of the group. The
ethnic group invariably backs the new politician because group
preferences are uniform and maximalist. The new politician easily
politicize ethnicity and outbid moderate or old leader by appealing
to group preferences that are always somehow present in society and
always odds with each other. 95 Consequently, upwardly mobile
members of the subordinate ethnic group lead to radical nationalist
movement if they have not been assimilated by the dominant group.

42 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

This is the most prevalent form of nationalism in the last fifty years
of twentieth century, appeared in Nazi Germany, Quebec, Scotland,
India, and Africa etc. Conversely, upward mobility among the
subordinates may result in a reactive nationalism among the elites of
dominant culture. White nationalism in Rhodesia, Protestants in
Northern Ireland are examples of this process.

The rational choice analysis describes that the existence of an
ethnic political movement depends on a sufficiently large ethnic elite
with the requisite skills and resources to mobilize political support
and sustain a movement. They act decisively and mobilize an ethnic
movement if they feel that a change in economic conditions open a
window of opportunity to expand their political power. The ethnic
elites appeal to 'prescriptive altruism' in an extended form for
mobilizing ethnic groups. The rule of prescriptive altruism implies
that man is a communal animal and cannot develop his or her
potentialities without the supports that come from socialization within
a family group. Within the family, every individual learns the
recognition of binding mutual interdependence and willingness to
forego selfish gratification for the sake of others. The sense of
obligation learned within the family and its necessity to survive as an
economic unit is extended to kin group. It further extended to people
who are defined as fellow members of the same ethnic group. The
range of persons to whom an obligation of cooperation extends
creates a group with inclusive boundary. The recognition that other
people are competitors and not within that boundary create an
exclusive boundary. This process is also described by interpreting the
behaviour; and 'act utilitarianism', which further envisage two step
process. Firstly, it sees rules as so formulated as to maximize net
advantages for those bound by them. Secondly, the individual
members of groups are expected to observe group rules but they may
calculate their individual costs and benefits of observance and comply
with them only to the extent that maximize their individual net
advantages. 96 Although, this approach provides ethnic ideologies as
resources for mobilization by manipulative elites but it is fraught with
free-rider problem because some members of ethnic group simply do
not agree with the form of appeal made by ethnic leadership.

A leadership component that directs mobilization toward the
national political arena is generally developed within the educational

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 43

institutions of the dominant ethnic group. Members of the
subordinate group trained in these institutions have a tendency to
direct their political energies back toward the national 'centre' in
seeking political change. Anthony D. Smith contributed the concept
of "careerism of ethnic actors" for explaining intellectuals' role in
the rise of ethnonationalism. He argues that the ethnic revival
becomes the basis for a new form of political radicalism. This
radicalism has been channeled towards the ethnic historicism of the
educators by a crisis of legitimacy experienced by the old order and
the absolutist state. The professionals, too, require a viable social
identity supported by an historical legitimation and they find it in the
'ethnic solution' proposed by their intellectuals. Besides providing a
new bureaucratic arena for their career and status aspirations, the
historic or ethnic community, suitably transformed into the active
'nation', resolves the cultural crisis of identity of the intelligentsia,
places them at the head of an alliance with other aspirant strata and
breaks down their social isolation from the 'people' with potentially
revolutionary results. 97

The Fig. 1.8 illustrates the leadership component as a means for
political mobilization in concerned society.

Economically

Disadvantaged

Regions

Disadvantaged
Ethnic Regions

Present
Prediction

Refined
Prediction

Regions where
concerted political
mobilization is
predicted

Regions with high concentration
of mean-specific "leadership"
component

Fig. 1.8 : Leadership Component as a Means for Political Mobilization.

Source : Eric M. Leifer, American Journal of Sociology (July 1981/82), p. 45.

It is clear that the mobilization and strategies of politically active
ethnic groups are based on interaction of two kinds of factors.
Firstly, grievances about differential treatment and group status.

44

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Secondly, the situationally determined pursuit of political interests
and the sense of group cultural identity, as formulated by group
leaders and political entrepreneurs. The "general model of
communal mobilization for political action" in Fig. 1.9 showed three
interdependent core variables i.e. active grievances, mobilization
and communal political action.

State Characteristics
Shaping the Context
of Political Action

Group

History,

Status,

And

Traits

Collective
disadvantages

State expansion

Group cohesion
identity
— T

Repressive
control

Persisting
grievances

Active
grievances

Potential for
mobilization

Group size,
concentration

Mobilization

, State power

Institutional
democracy

Democratization

-»| Communal
Protest

Communal
Rebellion

Contagion of
communal conflict

Diffusion of conflict

International
support

International Factors
Facilitating
Group Mobilization
and Political Action

Fig. 1.9 : A General Model of Communal Mobilization for Political Action.

Source : Ted Robert Gurr, International Political Science Review (April, 1993), p. 167.

This model also consist three blocs of exogenous variables i.e.
predisposing conditions which determine the intervening variables of
persisting grievances and potential for mobilization, international
diffusion and contagion of communal conflict, state characteristics
that shape the costs and benefits of political action.

The grievances about differential treatment and the sense of
group cultural identity provide the essential bases for mobilization
and shape the kinds of claims made by the group's leaders. There is
little prospect of mobilization by any political entrepreneurs in
response to any external threat or opportunity if grievances and
group identity are both weak. On the other hand, deep grievances
and a strong sense of group identity and common interests provide

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

45

highly combustible material that fuels spontaneous violent nationalist
action whenever external control weakens. 98 And whenever these
sentiments can be organized and focused by group leaders who give
plausible expression to members grievances and aspirations, they
animate powerful political movements and protracted conflicts.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS

In recent years, various ethno-nationalistic, secessionistic
movements rise due to the effects of globalization i.e. global
economic integration and competition for trade." The economic
success enjoyed by small states had a powerful 'demonstration
effect' on ethnic nationalist and seccessionists in many parts of the
world. After its split from Slovakia, Czech Republic's economic
growth has been rapidly grown, unemployment has been
significantly lowered and exports have been reoriented toward
western states, Catalan in Spain, Scots in Britain, Northern League
in Italy demand greater autonomy, Quebec's secession bid from
Canada was also for obtaining more benefits by trading with
Canada, the United States, Mexico and the rest of Latin America.
As President Boris Yeltsin wrote in 1991 that, "The economy
follows politics, after all", there are powerful forces promoting
smallness have affected politics through several ways. 100

Entrenched ethno-nationalist movements weaken states common
identity, which had controlled the centrifugal action of different
identities. Consequently, a cultural conflict is erupted because
culture is considered to be the totality of the values, beliefs,
traditions and heritage that confer an identity on each individual. In
its potential for explosive violence, culture could be compared to a
nuclear reactor. A chain reaction would be started when a
moderating influence of heavy water (a common project or
authority) is removed. When the conflict reaches on certain
intensity, a certain temperature, then violence is erupted. Violence
can quickly destroy relationship between groups. Violence has
generally been conceptualized as a degree of conflict rather than as
a form of conflict. It is not a quantitative degree of conflict but a
qualitative form with its own dynamics. 101 The shift from non-
violent to violent modes of conflict is a phase shift.

46 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Recent explosion of ethnic violence, intra-state armed combats
change the state-centered realist view. The neo-realist view is not
enough to accommodate many processes, events and structures that
appear largely outside the strategic interactions of nation-states. It is
argued that, the dynamics of contemporary world politics can be
built on idea of bifurcation and related ideas of complexity, chaos
and turbulence in complex systems i.e. the multicentric system and
the statecentric system. He further argues that the structures and
processes in today's polities are artifacts of the turbulent interplay of
these two bifurcated systems, each of which affects the others in
multiple ways, at multiple levels and in ways that make events
enormously hard to predict. He replaces the idea of events with the
image of "cascades" action sequences in the multicentric world. The
cascade concept defines how one particular act of religious
desecration, one particular terrorist killing, or particular
inflammatory speech ignites large-scale ethnic violence. 102

Various inductive, rational action and culturalist approaches
applied for describing ethnic violence. Ted Robert Gurr outlined an
"integrated theory of political violence" as the product of the
politicization and activation of discontent arising from relative
deprivation. His work has been built on a large-scale data set
surveying 233 "minorities at risk", that have suffered (or benefited
from) economic or political discrimination, mobilized politically in
defense of collective interests since 1945. These nonstate communal
groups "classified as ethnonationalists, indigenous peoples, ethno-
classes, militant sects and communal contenders. He explains forms
and magnitude of non-violent protest, violent protest and rebellion
through an electric synthesis of grievances and mobilization
variables. 103

International relation approach posits that existence of a
"security dilemma" under conditions of anarchy in which even
nonaggressive moves to enhance one's security perceived as
threatening by others, trigger countermoves that ultimately reduce
one's own security. While formulated to explain interstate wars, the
security dilemma has been also applied to intrastate ethnic violence.
In a presence of historical record of serious intergroup hostilities

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 47

(amplified and distorted), groups are likely to view one another's
nationalist mobilization as threatening. 104 These perceived threats
may create incentives for preemptive attack (or at least for
countermobilization that will in turn be perceived as threaten by the
other group, engendering a mobilization spiral that can lead to
violence, especially since violent action can be undertaken by small
bonds of radicals outside the control of weak state).

Although, there is no unitary or complete game theory of ethnic
violence, but certain general mechanisms are identified that helps to
define some particular aspects of problem of ethnic violence.
Fearon's model of the problem of credible commitments and ethnic
violence described that the problem arise when a newly independent
state dominated by one ethnic group and containing at least one
powerful minority group as well. The model focuses on the inability
of an ethnicized state leadership to 'credibly commit itself to protect
lives and property of subordinate ethnic groups, who, as a result,
start fighting for independence immediately rather than waiting to
see if the leadership honors its commitment to protect them. Once a
war breaks out, the settlement is extremely difficult because neither
side would want to disarm without full confidence that the agreement
would be adhered to, but no one would have such confidence unless
one side disarms. The individuals, who are told by their leaders that
they are targets of enemy nation, would take up arms even if there
is probability that their leader's prognostication is accurate. Then a
low probability event with drastic consequences has a high expected
utility. Therefore ethnic war can emerge from a commitment
problem even if vague suggestions of repression exist or if only a
maniacal wing of the ruling group has genocidal intentions. This
model is sensitive to the importance of institutions that enhance the
credibility of commitments. In the absence of such institutions,
ethnic violence is more likely to occur. 105

The Sociopsychological theory of "frustration-aggression-
displacement" also describes the origin of aggressive behaviour in
members of ethnic groups. It emphasizes the social context in which
cooperation and coordination required the frustration of short-term
desires in favour of long-term objectives. Frustration tends to give

48 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

rise to aggressive tendencies towards the perceived causes. These
are generally inhibited sometimes because of the painful
consequences of being aggressive towards one need to cooperate
(e.g. parents, teachers, peers, workmates and colleagues etc.). On
the other hand, the in-group endorsed individuals' role if its
frustrations are perceived as against out-group. They become the
targets of aggressive tendencies which are displaced on to them
without disturbing the co-operation and co-ordination of the in-
group. Thus, the gratification of the release of aggression may
follow an enhancement of in-group consolidation. 106

The ethnic groups are often characterized by relatively dense
social networks and low-cost access to information about the past
history of individual's behaviour. It has an important consequence
for intra versus inter group relations. Within groups, people who
exploit the trust of others can be identified as individuals sanctioned
with relative ease by the response of the ethnic community. In game
theoretic terms, cooperation and trust can be supported within an
ethnic group by punishment strategies that are conditioned on
individual behaviour because the cost of obtaining information about
an individual's past is low. By contrast, individual identification is
harder in interaction across groups.

Relatively dense social networks and interactions within an
ethnic group thus give rise to an asymmetry of information because
identifying and getting information about individuals from other
groups is more difficult. However the inter ethnic relations are
characterized by low level of information and the past conduct of the
member of other group as individual is not known. In game-theoretic
model, two types of equilibria support these conceptions. Firstly,
each group may hold all members of the other group liable for the
actions of its individual members. Under this regime, the members
of group A indiscriminately punish all members of group B for nasty
behaviour by an individual B. Thus, the "spiral regime" occurs in
which individual defections trigger an escalation and complete
breakdown of intergroup relations, non-cooperation spreads
immediately to all interactions between members of the groups. The
Israeli retaliation of suicide attacks by Palestinian extremists by

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 49

destroying and killing large number of Palestinian people is example
of this spiral regime. 107 Second, the members of one group may
simply ignore violations of trust by members of the other group,
relying instead on the other group to identify and sanction the
appropriate individual. Under this regime, in group policing,
individual defections do not trigger such a spiral and total
breakdown. If a B exploits an A, members of group A continue
cooperating with members of group B as though nothing had
happened while members of group B identify and sanction the
individual who acted badly.

The major focus of cultural approach of ethnic violence has been
of the cultural construction of fear with the help of rhetorical
processes, symbolic resources and representational forms and a
demonized, dehumanized or threatening, ethnically defined 'other'
has been constructed. Culturalist approach specifies the manner in
which fears and threats are constructed through, narratives, myth,
rituals, commemorations and other cultural representations. Ethnic
elites play crucial role in engendering ethnic insecurity through
highly selective and often distorted narratives and representations,
the deliberate planting of rumors. The success of such entrepreneurs
of fear is seen as contingent on the historically conditioned cultural
resonance of their inflammatory appeals. 108 Cultural 'materials' are
seen as having an inner logic or connectedness that makes them at
least moderately refractory to willful manipulation by cynical
politicians. The construction of fearful Hindu beliefs about Muslims
and in opposition the emergence of Muslims ethno-religious idioms
and practices, religiously justify social segregation and the rise of
Hindu nationalism in India, Sinhalese beliefs about Tamil in Sri
Lanka (in the context of ethnocratic Sinhalese State, Tamil
Terrorism), and of Serbian beliefs about Croats and Kosovars in
disintegrating Yugoslavia are examples of this phenomenon. Once
such ethnically focused fear is constructed, the ethnic violence no
longer seems random or meaningless but all too horrify.

Some recent theories of ethnic conflicts explained that the ethnic
violence is a direct consequence of primordial antipathies among
groups. Huntington's civilizational thesis not only applies to inter-

50 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

state exchanges but can also be described as theory of culturally
defined groups. This theory claims that state behaviour in the post-
Cold War period will no longer reflect primarily power calculations
or ideology but rather, civilizational affiliations. It is along the 'fault
lines' between the world religions that conflict will be most prone to
erupt. The "Kin-group Syndrome" prompts intervention by distant
cultural relatives e.g. Russian and Greek nationalists aligning with
Serbs. 109 Huntington's thesis has come in for fervent criticism
because of its attempt to reefy civilizations as large-scale ethnic
categories. 110 Primordialist or 'ancient hatred' view of ethnic
conflict is also come under serious criticism.

The important aspect of present ethnonationalist violence is use
of ABO (agent of biological origin) weapon, called
pseudospeciation. Pseudospeciation is that phenomenon by which
individuals and groups protect their sense of identity by viewing
other groups as "less than human", less worthy of consideration and
more able to be disregarded and destroyed. Pseudospeciation as a
weapon of modern strategy and a tool of psychological warfare is the
planned and deliberate re-structuring of the image of a subject
individual or group/nation of people in the minds of selected target
audience. And the target audience views the subject less than human,
as an alien person or race and unworthy of human justice, kindness,
consideration or treatment. 111 Recently, Yugoslavia was driven by
an intra-national pseudospeciation which has led to the creation of
variety of cultural groups (Croats, Serbs and Muslims). Croatian
Tennis superstar, Goren Ivanisevic's interview with the New York
Times in his home town is the example of this process in destroyed
Yugoslav society. In this interview he asked,

In Adelaide (Australia) policemen assigned as bodyguards after a death
threat, showed me (just for fun) how a machine gun works. He further
said, they let me shoot a machine gun. It was tough to control but oh,
it was a nice feeling, all the bullets coming out. I was thinking it would
be nice to have some Serbs standing in front of me. 112

This example shows that how various cultural groups have
reduced each other to less-than-human status in their collective
dealings.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 5 1

The most extreme form of ethnic violence is 'genocide' 113 which
resulted in mass scale killings and "ethnic cleansing". 114 It led to
forceful migration and refugee problem. The spill-over effect of
refugee problem and genocide resulted in foreign intervention by
neighbouring country/countries and by regional/international
organizations. The Kosovo crisis as an ethnic issue can be used for
the analysis of the process of ethnicity and its impact on the
functioning of the United Nations in the world politics after the end
of Cold War.

References :

1. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trends and
Transformations (Boston, 1993), p. 3.

2. Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism : Theory and Comparison (N.D.,
1991), p. 19.

3. S.L. Sharma, "The Saliance of Ethnicity in Modernization : Evidence from
India", Sociological Bulletin, no. 1&2 (March-Sept., 1990), p. 37.

4. Joce Kriger, Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (NY, 2001), Vol. 2,
p. 265.

5. David Robertson, Dictionary of Politics (London, 1993), p. 169. For study of
positive effects of ethnicity of immigrant groups. See, Ivan Light et ah,
"International ethnicity in the ethnic economy", Ethnic and Racial Studies,
Vol. 16 (October 1993), pp. 581-594.

6. Jonathan Friedman, Cultural Identity and Global Process (N.D., 1995), pp.
29-30.

7. Ibid., p. 30.

8. The term 'ethnic diversity' represent a normal condition and problematic for
the majority of citizens and subjects who see themselves as members of a
modern state. Actually, "diversity" refers to intercultural relationship in which
conflicts are minimal or non-existent. See Fred W. Riggs, "Glossery",
International Political Science Review, Vol. 19 (July 1998), p. 314.

9. For more detail about traditional ethnicity see Fred W. Rigs, "The Modernity
of Ethnic Identity and Conflict", International Political Science Review, Vol.
19 (July 1998), p. 277. See also, Orland Fals Borda ed., The Challenge of
Social Change (N.D., 1985), pp. 39-41. See Thomas D. Hall, "The Effects of
Incorporation into World System on Ethnic Process", International Political
Science Review, Vol. 19 (July 1998), pp. 36-37.

10. Majid Tehranian, "Pancapitalism and migration in historical perspective",
International Political Science Review, Vol. 19 (July 1998), p. 294.

1 1 . Ethnic nationalism prevails among marginalized communities in modern states

52 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

whose members reject citizenship and demand sovereignty. They normally
have a territorial base or 'homeland' which in fact or fantasy, can anchor the
state they wish to establish by liberation or secession. However, population
mobility intensified by industrialism has led to a widespread mingling of
peoples, not only in cities but also in rural areas, seriously hampering efforts
to carve independent states out of the enclaves which ethnonational movements
claim for themselves. Ethnic cleavage is defined as to characterize the
relationship between subjects and citizens (ethnic nationalists and patriots) in
such situations. {Ibid.)

12. Civic ethnicity involves members of marginalized communities who wish to
become integrated as citizens of the country where they live, but it also affects
all nationals of a dominant community whose attitudes and relationships with
members of marginalized communities seriously affect their behaviour and
reciprocate their own comfort and well-being. The term "ethnic diversity" has
come increasingly, to represent a normal condition and problematic for all the
citizens and subjects in any modern state who see themselves as members of a
nation. See Riggs, n. 9, p. 278.

13. Ethnic plurality applies to situations in which citizenship is not available to the
subjects of a modern state who also lack any historical or territorial basis for
claiming sovereignty. But pluralism is widely used for ethnic diversity and
interest group democracy. 'Plurality' and 'Pluralness' is often used to
characterize societies in which this third form of ethnicity prevails. (Ibid.)

14. T.K. Ommen, Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity (Cambridge, 1997), p. 19.

15. For more study of Political Community and Changes in Concept of Community
see Peter Juviler and Sherril Stroschen, "Missing Boundaries of Comparison :
The Political Community", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114 (Fall 1999),
pp. 437-439. See Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities:
Cognitive Regions in International Relations", Millennium Journal of
International Studies, Vol. 26 (1997), pp. 255-267.

16. Richard Bellamy, "Identity Politics : Introduction to a New Series",
Government and Opposition, Vol. 37 (Summer 2002), pp. 296-297.

17. Bhikhu Parekh, "Being British", Government and Opposition, Vol. 37
(Summer 2002), p. 302.

18. Bellamy, n. 16, pp. 297-298.

19. Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology (ed.), David Levinson and Melvin
Ember, Henry Holt & Company, New York, 1996, p. 393. See also Daniel
Patric Moynihan, Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (NY,
1993), pp. 22-28.

20. Urmila Phadnis and Rajat Ganguly, Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia
(ND, 2001), pp. 23-24.

21 . G. Roth and C. Wittich, Max Weber : Economy and Society (New York, 1986),
Vol. 18, p. 389.

22. Phadnis and Ganguly, n. 20, p. 26.

23. Brass, n. 2, pp. 25-36, Geoff Dench, Minorities in the Open Society: Prisoners
of Ambivalence (London, 1986), p. 25.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 53

24. Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (London, 1969), p. 12. See
Danielle Conversi, "Nationalism, Boundaries and Violence", Millennium
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 28 (1999), pp. 562-563.

25. John W. Berry et ah, Cross-Cultural Psychology : Research and Application
(N.Y., 1992), pp. 303-304. See also, Louk Hagendoorn, "Ethnic
categorization and outgroup exclusion: Cultural values and social stereotypes in
the construction of ethnic hierarchies", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 16
(January 1993), p. 35. For criticism of Primordialism and theories of emotional
attachment thesis see, Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, "The Poverty
of Primordialism: The mystification of ethnic attachment, Ethnic and Racial
Studies, Vol. 16 (April 1993), pp. 183-201.

25a. Ibid.

26. Anthony D. Smith, "The Origins of Nations", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.
12 (July 1989), pp. 344-45. See International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences
(ed.), David L. Sills, MacMillan Company and The Free Press, USA, 1986,
p. 167. See also, Barth, no. 24, p. 10-11.

27. R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, "Ethnic Mobilization and the Seed of Warfare
: An Evolutionary Perspective", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31
(1987), pp. 3-8.

28. James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (London, 1998), p.
13.

29. Classical Fitness is a property of an individual organism, usually expressed as
the product of survival and fecundity (or net reproductive performance). See
Shaw and Wong, n. 27, p. 6.

30. The Nucleus ethnicity refers to immediate relatives who shares a high degree
of genetic relatedness (Grandfathers, Sons, Cousins etc.). A nucleus group thus
comprises one's offspring, one's siblings' offspring, one's parents and their
siblings and one's parents offspring. It would number a few hundred
individuals at most.

31. Shaw and Wong, n. 27, p. 9.

32. Kellas, n. 28, p. 14.

33. Shaw and Wong, n. 27, p. 10.

34. Kellas, n. 28, p.. 17.

35. Barth, n. 24, p. 13.

36. Donald G. Baker, Race, Ethnicity and Power (London, 1983), pp. 10-11.

37. Phylis Martinelli, "A test of the McKay and Lewins ethnic typology", Ethnic
and Racial Studies, Vol. 9 (April 1986), p. 199.

38. Ted Robert Gurr, "On the Political Consequences of Scarcity and Economic
Decline", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29 (1985), p. 60, Ibid., p. 14.

39. Ibid., p. 15, for more study of the effects of development factors on ethnic
conflict see Bjorn Hettne, "Ethnicity and development: an elusive relationship"
in Denis Dwyer and David Drakara's Smith, Ethnicity and development:
Geographical perspective (Toronot, 1996), pp. 15-44.

40. Barth, n. 24, p. 33.

54 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

41. Baker, n. 36, p. 15. Juviler and Stroschen, n. 15, p. 448.

42. Relative deprivation means the inequality between the wealth and status of
individuals and groups, and outrage of those at the bottom about their perceived
exploitation by those at top. People's perception that they are unfairly deprived
of the wealth and status that deserve in comparison with advantage others.
When people's expectations of what they deserve, rise more rapidly then their
material rewards, the probability of conflict grows.

43. Baker, n. 36, p. 16.

44. Myron Weiner, "Peoples and State in New Ethnic Order? In Steven C. Spiegal
and David J. Pervin, At Issue : Politics in the World Arena (N.Y., 1994), p.
271. See also, Jim Mac Laughlin, "Racism, ethnicity and multiculturalism in
contemporary Europe: A review essay", Political Geography, Vol. 17 (1998),
pp. 1013-1024.

45. Baker, n. 36, p. 25.

46. Ibid., p. 26.

47. Sills, n. 26, p. 168.

48. Motivation theory is useful for delineating a general set of variables accounting
for degree of mobilization. Motivation is taken as a multiplicative function of
three variables i.e. motives (M) (internal states), expectancies E (Perceived
probabilities of achieving objectives) and incentives I (objective rewards or
punishments). The actual behaviour of group is resultant of these components.
It implies that minority mobilization will be near zero whenever there is either
complete acceptance of the system or complete resignation i.e. no expectation
of change. Hubert Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations
(NY, 1967), p. 127. See Ramond Tainter and Manus Midlarsky, "Theory of
Revolution", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XI (Sep. 1967), pp. 270-
77.

49. Russia as a powerful reference state, may have deterred the ruling majorities of
other states from seriously oppressing their Russian minority populations. At
the same time, it is acknowledged that the presence of such a powerful state can
lead to serious problems for the new states. If Russia becomes more irredentist,
i.e. more interested in recovering former territories, it is likely to use the cause
of its minorities abroad to undermine the security and sovereignty of these
states. Another example of this type of situation is "Sudeten Syndrome". The
"Sudeten Syndrome" refers to Hitler's policies with respect to the Sudeten
Germans in Czechoslovakia in 1930s. He used this minority as an instrument
for his territorial ambitions in Central Europe. Pieter Van Houten, "The Role
of A Minority's Reference State in Ethnic Relations", Archives European
Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXXIX (1998), p. 111.

50. For detailed study of institutional incorporation in state structures and effects
of group relations see Siobhan Harty , "The institutional foundations of Substate
National Movements", Comparative Politics, Vol. 33 (January 2001), pp. 191-
197.

51. Baker, n. 36, p. 29.

52. John Coakley, "Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The Strategy

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 55

of Non-Territorial Autonomy", International Political Science Review, Vol. 15
(July 1994), p. 309.

53. William Safaran, "Non-Separatist Policies regarding Ethnic Minorities :
Positive Approaches and Ambiguous Consequences", International Political
Science Review, Vol. 15 (Jan. 1994), p. 69.

54. The Word "Ethnocide Derived from Latin word Caedere (to kill) and the Greek
Ethnos (nation). It described the process of deliberate and systematic
destruction of the culture of an ethnic group, especially within a larger
community. Levinson and Ember, n. 19, p. 405. See also, The Oxford English
Dictionary, ed. 2, Vol. V.

55. Safran, n. 53, p. 98-99.

56. I.T. Kreindler, "A Second Missed Opportunity : Russian in Retreat as a Global
Language", International Political Science Review, Vol. 14 (1993), p. 265.

57. Donald Rothchild and Alexander J. Growth, "Pathological Dimensions of
Domestic and International Ethnicity", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 110
(Spring 1995), p. 76, see Baker, n. 36, p. 35.

58. Ibid., p. 36

59. Anomie is the absence of cultural restraints on human aspirations and denotes
a conflict in a society. Anomie also describes the imbalance between cultural
goals and institutional means at either social or individual level or a
psychological condition of self-to-other alienation. See Marco Orru, Anomie :
History and Meaning (Boston, 1987), p. 2.

60. Baker, n. 36, p. 37. For detailed study of the effects of Colonial Policies on
Third World Countries, see Frantz Fanon, "The Wretched of the Earth" (N.Y.,
1968).

61. Kegley and Wittkopf, n. 1, pp. 184, 371.

62. Nation- states are the subjects and creators of a global network which for the
most part disregards regions and national or ethnic minorities as political
actors. There are two overlapping concepts of the nation i.e. civic or territorial
and ethnic or genealogical. The civic conception treats nations as units of
population which inhibit a demarcated territory, possess a common economy
with mobility in a single territory wide occupational and production system. It
further includes the common laws with identical legal rights and duties for
everyone and a public, mass education system with a single civic ideology.
Thus, territory, economy, law and education constitute the four spheres in and
through which nations are formed. The ethnic concept of nation includes human
populations claiming a common ancestry, a demotic solidarity, common
customs and vernaculars and native history. These features define the
'ethnicity' and 'ethnic identity' of a community. The true nation-state would
consist of those people who belonged to it by birth and fully subject to its
sovereign legal authority. By this criterion, it is unlikely that there is a single
nation-state in the world at present and has ever existed. The modern crisis of
nation-state can be comprehended through the interaction of the components of
civic and ethnic concepts of nation. The most important civic components are,
the extension of legal rights and duties to all strata which culminating in the

56 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

ideal of citizenship for all classes. In modern nation-state, it holds an honoured
place. A second vital element of 'civic' nation is the acquisition of a 'home-
land', a duly recognized historic territory for nation. The ethnic components
include historical memories and myth of descent. The lack of unifying
memories, myths, symbols and values and the presence of a multiplicity of
'myth-symbol' complexes among several communities impede the chances of
creating territorial nations on the civic model. In other words, the 'civic'
concept of modern nation often lacks or omits the solidarity and homogeneity
stressed by ethnic concept. Thus, the civic or modern nation, unit of population
requires not merely a territory, economy, education system and legal code but
also needs an ethnic foundation in order to mobilise and integrate diverse
cultural and social elements. The ethnic conflict arise when the nation-state
ignore the emotional bonds of myths, symbols and memories which unite
citizens of particular ethnic communities living in its territory. Anthony D.
Smith, Theories of Nationalism (London, 1983), pp. 186-187. See also
Montserrat Guibernau, "Nationalism and Intellectuals in Nations without
States: The Catalan Case", Political Studies, Vol. 48 (Dec. 2000), pp. 989-
900. See, Anthony D. Smith, "The Myth of the 'Modern Nation' and the Myth
of Nations", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 11 (January 1988), p. 9, see John
Dunn, "Introduction: Crisis of the Nation State", Political Studies", Vol. XIII,
1994, p. 3. See Montserrat Guibernau, Nation without States: Political
Communities in a Global Age (Maiden, 1999), p. 153.

63. Conversi, n. 24, p. 568.

64. Berry et al., n. 25, p. 295.

65. Ibid., p. 39.

66. Nimmi Hutnik, "Patterns of ethnic minority identification and modes of social
adaptation", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 9, (April 1986), p. 154.

67. Victoria M. Esses et al., "Intergroup Competition and Attitudes Toward
Immigration and Immigrants: An Instrumental Model of Group Conflict,"
Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 54 (1998), p. 701.

68. Roger D. Congleton, "Ethnic Clubs, Ethnic Conflict, and the rise of Ethnic
Nationalism", in Albert Briton et al., Nationality and Nationalism (N.Y.,
1995), p. 85.

69. Esses, n. 67, p. 702.

70. Ibid., p. 704.

71. For more details about resource competition approach see Charles C. Ragin,
"Class, status and reactive ethnic cleavages: The social bases of political
regionalism", American Political Science Review, Vol. 42, 1977, pp. 438-450.

72. Esses, n. 67, p. 704, Russel Hardin, "Self-Interest, Group Identity", in Breton
et al., n. 68, p. 25.

73. Houten, n. 49, p. 115. For detailed study of ethnic kin state intervention in
ethnic conflict see, Rajat Ganguly, Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts :
Lessons from South Asia (ND, 1998), pp. 9-37.

74. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in France and England
(also in US) the nation came to be understood in a political or civic sense

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 57

(staatsnation) i.e. a community of politically aware citizens equal before the law
irrespective of their social, economic status, origin and religious beliefs. The
ethnic homogeneity in these nation-states with a long history of centralized
governments are achieved precisely by the political processes that facilitated
centralization. In these states, the exercise of the right of self-determination not
only created the political nation-state but also altered the locus of sovereignty
within the state. Under the treaty of Westphalia of 1648, the established legal
principle of sovereignty to govern inter-state relations leaves intact the right of
dynastic principle of political legitimacy i.e. the right of rulers to determine the
sovereignty and form of government of their territories. But under the impact
of self-determination, the dynastic principle of sovereignty was replaced by that
of popular sovereignty based on the will of the people and not on the monarch.
Only with this concept, the idea be born that the government must be
legitimized by the consent of the people and people not content with the
government of the country to which they belong should be able to secede and
organize themselves as they wish. Ibid.

75. Levinson and Ember, n. 19, p. 407.

76. Anthony D. Smith, "Chosen peoples: Why ethnic groups survive", Ethnic and
Racial Studies, Vol. 15 (July 1992), pp. 450-51.

77. Kellas, n. 28, p. 65. Anthony D. Smith, "The ethnic source of nationalism",
Survival, Vol. 35, no 1, Spring 1993, pp. 58-61. See Phadnis and Ganguly, n.
20, p. 31. See Stefan Oeter, "The Right of Self-Determination in Transition",
Law and State, Vol. 49/50, 1994, p 150. See Sami Zubaida, "Nations: old and
new comments on Anthony D. Smith's 'The Myth of the "Modern Nation" and
the Myth of nations", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 12 (July 1989), p. 336.
B.K. Roy Burman, "On Self-Determination of Peoples in the Present
Scenario", Mainstream, 14 December 2002, p. 12.

78. For analysis of ethno-nationalism on the basis of Psychological differentiation
between nationalism and patriotism. See, Walker Connor, "Beyond Reason:
The Nature of Ethnonational Bond", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 16 (July
1993), pp. 373-388.

79. Kellas, n. 28, p. 70.

80. Saul Newman, "Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict", World
Politics, Vol. 43 (April 1991), p. 461.

81. Kellas, n. 28, p. 73.

82. In this situations, people think of themselves in ethnic or social nationalism and
inhabit a territory which is differentiated on economic grounds from other such
groups, nationalism in Scotland is of this kind. It is not just the poorer regions
that develop nationalism, however, the rich regions may also perceive relative
deprivation within the state on political and cultural matters e.g. Catalonia and
Basque land are nationalist because of what they see as their political and
cultural deprivation in Spain. Anthony Mughan defined this process of
economic disparity through dividing power resources in two categories, de jure
and de facto. De jure, derive from the constitution of state (e.g. the right of
vote) while the de facto concern with the qualitative differences of people (e.g.
their wealth, education etc.). It is when these two types of power resources do

58 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

not correspond for any one ethnic group then conflict develops. Thus, a rich
ethnic group which is not strong in political power will rebel and try to change
its political position. If the changes in the economy serve to reinforce an ethnic
group's existing share of political power, then conflict is unlikely to occur.
However, where ethnic group gain or loss economic power while their political
power stay constant or moves in the opposite direction, nationalism will
develop e.g. Flemings in Belgium demanded reconstruction of the Belgium
state because of their rising economic power. But, French speaking Walloons,
also become nationalists when their primacy in 'de jure' constitutional and
cultural power was shown to be out of step with their declining economic 'de
facto' power. For study of effect of economic ties on the interregional group
relations see Michael Hechter, "Nationalism as group solidarity", Ethnic and
Racial Studies, Vol. 10 (London), October 1987, pp. 415-425.

83. This particularistic current is amplified by mantras about waging "war on
totality", "celebrating difference" and embracing "local knowledge". The
cultural politics are ascendent over class or the redistributional politics of
welfare-state liberalism, social democracy and Marxism and have shifted
politically oriented collective action from a primarily universal plane to a
discursive local one. The search for identity in the conditions of the modern
world has led to increased ethnic nationalism in some cases and official
nationalism and cosmopolitanism in other. This dialectic has been described as
"politics of the soil" verses the "politics of the satellite". See Susantha
Goonatilake, "The Self Wandering between Cultural Localization and
Globalization", in Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bikhu Parekh, ed., The
Decolonization of Imagination and Cultural Knowledge (Calcutta, 1997), pp.
225-26. Robert J. Antonio, "After Postmodernism : Reactionary Tribalism",
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 106 (July 2000), p. 51. See, J.E. Spence,
"Ethnicity and International Relations", International Affairs, Vol. 72 (1996),
p. 440.

84. Kellas, n. 28, p. 84.

85. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (N.Y., 1992), p.
271.

86. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflection on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism (N.Y., 1991), p. 37. See also, David J. Elkins,
"Globalization, Telecommunication, and Virtual Ethnic Communities",
International Political Science Review, Vol. 18 (1997), p. 145. See Benedict
Anderson, "Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationality", new Left Review,
Vol. 9 (May /June 2001), p. 42. For study of informal nationalism identified in
collective events such as ritual celebrations, international sports and impact of
communication revolution on these events see Thomas Hylland Eriksen,
"Formal and informal nationalism", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 16
(January 1993), pp. 1-23.

87. Kellas, n. 28, p. 86. For study of the impact of religion on eruption of ethnic
conflicts see, Jonathan Fox, "Religion as an Overlooked element of
International Relations", International Studies Association, Vol. 3 (2001), pp.
53-73. Robert Wuthmnow, "Understanding Religion and Politics", Daedalus,

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 59

Vol. 120 (Summer 1991), pp. 1-20, see also, N.J. Demerath, "Religious
Capital and Capital Religious : Cross-Cultural and Non-Legal Factors in the
Separation of Church and State" , Daedalus, Vol. 120 (Summer, 1991), pp. 21-
40.

88. Ibid.

89. J. Milton Yinger, Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict? (ND,
1997), p. 13.

90. For Marx, ethnic nationalism and religion were both integral parts of the
superstructure created by the dominant economic and political classes... to
legitimize their rule. The process of modernization was expected to culminate
in the victory of 'proletariat', meaning that ethnic nationalism would ultimately
disappear as would other social manifestations of class domination. The
Marxist scholarly legacy, analyze the rule of ethnicity in politics as
comparatively ephemeral phenomenon, to be shaped and eventually destroyed
by the forces of modernization. The liberals, on the other hand, assumed that
increasing advancement in communications, transportation, industrialisation
and urbanisation would create a common political identity uniting all
inhabitants of the state and eliminate the sources of ethnic conflicts. To the
liberals, these processes, which the newly independent and multi-ethnic states
of developing world were attempting to realise, required the unifying quality of
civic nationalism. Hence, political nation-building was seen as a logical
corollary of modernisation. It is argued that the process of economic
modernization leads to a division of labour, which has the potential to replace
a mechanically integrated society with an organically integrated society. A
mechanically integrated society is united by a collective conscience created by
a series of "primordial" identifications. These remarkably enduring primordial
identifications contain the sacred symbols that reproduce the social structure of
a society. Consequently, the collective conscience plays an indispensable role
in the maintenance of social unity. With to change in a society based on division
of labor, every citizen becomes dependent on every other citizen because no
one person can be self sufficient. Each person is a small piece in a huge puzzle
that can only be completed when each performs his or her particular role. In
this organically integrated society (the product of economic modernization), the
primordial collective conscience is no longer relevant to the integration and
survival of society. Hence, functional bonds between people replace the ethnic
bonds of the past and society becomes organically integrated. Thus, ethnic
identification loses its importance. Phadnis and Ganguly, n. 20, p. 35.

91. Modernization refers to a culture of high technology, formal organizations,
civic value system and vigorous social mobilization. There are four stems of
modernization, viz., technological, institutional, valuational and behavioural.
The version of modernization which stresses technological progress is indeed
so popular that even a socialist nation such as 'China' adopts it is a legitimate
goal. The institutional stem of modernization implies the emergence or
preponderance of market economy, bureaucracy, professions and democracy
and all of which are based on the central principles or features of modern
organisations. The third stem i.e. emergence of civic values, signifies a

60 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

transition from the sacred to secular value system. Prevalence of a sacred
order, ascription, particularism and subordination of the individual to the
group are believed to be some of the values, characteristics of pre-modern
societies while secularism, achievement-orientation, universalism and
individual autonomy are regarded as modern, rational values. Finally, the
behavioural stem of modernization manifests itself in the form of increased
psychic, physical and social mobility as a result of an enhanced sense of
individual efficacy. This sense of individual efficacy is believed to be derived
from the rational presupposition about man's ability to conquer nature and
shape his own destiny. In his conflictual Modernization approach, Joseph
Rothchild argued that the ethnic groups and state as actors possess economic
and political resources and the form or existence of ethnic political activity is
dependent on the balance among ethnic groups within a given state. The
political, economic and demographic balance among ethnic groups determines
the resources and opportunities available to ethnic groups in their political
battles. He further argued that economic modernization and political
development do not provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
politicization of ethnic identifications. Instead the sufficient conditions for the
rise of ethnic political movements are dependent on the economic political and
ideological resources available to ethnic groups. Ronald Rogowski also
emphasizes that modernization may create the necessary conditions for ethnic
political activity but the actual development of this conflict depends upon the
balance of resources available to the various ethnic groups within a state. The
modernizatrion process determines the economic and political resources
available to specific ethnic group and the relative levels of these resources in
turn structure ethnic groups ideologies, strategies and political organization. He
focuses on both 'plural states' in which one ethnic group dominates other in
hierarchical cultural division of labour and on pillarized societies in which each
ethnic group retains necessary skills for the creation of complete independent
state. A rational choice theory can explain, how individuals from each type of
ethnic group within a state react to other ethnic groups dominance, whether by
assimilation, isolation, apathy, resistance or minority nationalism and it can
also be used to explain the invention of a new ethnic identity or the option of
non-ethnic resistance to subordination. It is clear from the analysis of
conflictual modernization and rational choice theories that the dominant
interpretation of ethnic political activity remained firmly rooted in the
modernization perspective. The process of economic modernization does not
undermine ethnic divisions but invigorates them by bringing together
previously isolated ethnic groups that suddenly find themselves competing for
the same economic niches. The modernization process also provides the
underlying conditions for the rise of many social and political movements. It
also helps to sculpt the institutional structure and ideological character of these
movements. This process also forms and politicizes social and political
identities in new ways. The resurgence of religious political movements has
been took place since late 1970 in the Middle East and North Africa encourage
a greater role in state structures and institutions for clergy, theology and
practice. In the last decades of twentieth century, religio-political groups

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 61

endeavour sometimes to achieve their objectives by extending their fields of
operations from the domestic to the international field of action. Sharma, n. 3,
pp. 35-36. Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States : The Quest for
Modernity in Asia and Africa (N.Y., 1963). See also, Walker Conner, "The
Politics of Ethnonationalism" , Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 27 (Jan.
1973), pp. 1-2. Jeff Haynes, "Religion" in Brian White et al., Issues in World
Politics (NY, 2001), p. 158.

92. In this perspective, extensions in the scope and centrality of the market,
unequivocally undermine ethnic attachments, with the extension of the market,
the dominant orientation becomes one of economic rationality. Ethnic
attachments recede as the universalistic (achievement) criteria that demarcate
this rationality, replace the previously dominant particularistic (ascriptive)
criteria. So, the ethnic identities have no role in the mechanics of the market
and they should lose their meaning in the orientation of individuals. Thus, the
developmental model predicts that the ethnic attachments will diminish with the
progress of economic development. But, ethnic attachments that do exist in
developed countries are thought to be sentiments that have so far escaped from
the inevitable consequences of economic development. Eric M. Leifer,
"Competing Models of Political Mobilization : The Role of Ethnic Ties",
American Journal of Sociology , Vol. 87 (July 1981/1982), pp. 24-25.

93. Kellas, n. 28, pp. 49-50.

94. Leifer, n. 92, pp. 29-30.

95. Elise Giuliano, "Who Determines the Self in the Politics of Self-
Determination?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 32 (April 2000), p. 297.

96. Michael Banton, "Mixed motives and the process of rationalization, Ethnic and
Racial Studies, Vol. 8 (October 1985), pp. 534, 535, 537. For detailed study
of rational choice theory, see also, Elinor Ostrom, "A Behavioural Approach
to the Rational Theory of Collective Action", American Political Science
Review, Vol. 92 (March 1998), pp. 1-9. See Catherine McArdle Kelleher,
"Indicators, Implications and Policy Choices", in Leokadia Drobizheva, Ethnic
Conflict in the Post-Soviet World (NY, 1998), pp. 342-43. See Shirley Dex,
"The use of Economists models in Sociology", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.
8 (October 1985), p. 517. For Free-rider Problem of Ethnic elites see Hudosn
Meadwell, "Cultural and Instrumental approaches to ethnic nationalism, Ethnic
and Racial Studies, Vol. 12 (July 1989), pp. 309-325.

97. William A. Douglass, "A critique of recent trends in the analysis of
ethnonationlism", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 11 (April 1988), p. 195.

98. Saul Newman, "Nationalism in Postindustrial Societies: Why states still
matter", Comparative Politics, Vol. 33 (October 2000), p. 28.

99. The international economic integration offered economic incentives to ethnic
nations and regions in existing states to seek secession. In the early years of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), when trade barriers between
countries were high, it made economic sense for ethnic nations and regions to
remain in a large state with large market. But with the World Trade
Organization (WTO) regime created in 1995, provides free trade, small ethnic
nations and smaller regions can hope to become both politically independent

62 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

and economically viable. The goal of wars that took place in various regions is
to make countries smaller rather than larger. One reason of this development is
that most contemporary goliath states are singularly unsuccessful. For example,
Brazil, China, India and Indonesia has not become developed country despite
extraordinary human and natural resources. Small countries are among the
fastest-growing and most effective traders in the World War II era
Luxembourg, Singapore and Switzerland may all be geographically isolated and
have almost no natural resources. But according to World Economic Forum
report on global competitiveness, these small countries are almost twice as
competitiveness in terms of quality of infrastructure, technology and business
management as Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, the United States and United
Kingdom. Four times more than Asia's manufacturing states, six times more
than the European union and seven times more than Latin American states. Juan
Enriquez, "Too Many Flags", Foreign Policy, (Fall 1999), p. 36.

100. Jeffrey Herbst, "Global Change and the Future of Existing Nation-State", in
Wolfgong Danspeckuber, ed., The Self Determination of Peoples
Community, Nation, and State in Independent World (USA, 2002), p. 24. See
also, Phadnis and Ganguly, n. 20, pp. 49-50.

101. Mircea Malitza, "Ten Thousand Cultures, A Single Civilization", International
Political Science Review, Vol. 21 (Jan. 2001), p. 77. See also, International
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (ed.) Frank N. Magill (London, 1995), Vol.
5, p. 527.

102. Arjun Appardurai, Modernity at Large : Cultural Dimensions of Globalization
(Delhi, 1997), p. 150.

103. Ted Robert Gur, Why minorities rebel: A global analysis of communal
mobilization and conflict since 1945, International Political Science Review,
Vol. 14 (April 1994), pp. 161-201.

104. For study of ethnic conflicts on the basis of "Security dilemma" See, Barry,
R., Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", Survival, Vol. 35
(Spring 1993), pp. 27-47.

105. Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence",
Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 24, 1998, p. 438, 439. See also, Houten, n.
49, pp. 110-114.

106. Peter Weinreich, "Rattionality and irrationality in racial and ethnic relations: A
metatheoretical framework", Ehnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 8 (October 1985),
p. 502.

107. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation",
American Political Science Review, Vol. 90 (Dec. 1996), p. 719. For analysis
of 'fear' and antipathy's role in eruption of ethnic violence see Donald L.
Horowitz, The deadly ethnic riot (ND: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.
548-553.

108. Brubaker and Laitin, n. 105, pp. 442-443.

109. Lars-Erik Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity" in Walter Carlsnaes et al.,
ed., Handbook of International Relations (London, 2002), p. 441. See also,
Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", Foreign Affairs (Summer
1993), pp. 22-23.

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 63

110. For rebuttals of Huntington's thesis see Foud Azmi. "The Summoning",
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (Sep/Oct 1993), pp. 2-9. See also, Kanti Bajpai,
"Samuel P. Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Reconsidered", International
Studies, Vol. 3 (Mach 1999), pp. 165-166.

111. Gregory R. Copley, "Pseudospeciation : A Principal Weapon in Waging War,
It also Threatens Peace", Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Vol.
XXIII (Nov. /Dec. 1995), p. 17. See also, Gregory R. Copley, "The New
Rome and The New Religious Wars", Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic
Policy, Vol. XXVII (1999), p. 4.

112. Cvijeto Job, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furries", Foreign Policy (Fall 1993), p. 67.

113. The concept of 'Genocide' was invented in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin to analyse
certain Nazi war crimes, the deliberate destruction of nations or ethnic groups,
that were so extreme that international law did not have a name for them.
Although Lemkin constructed the concept for this historically specific purpose,
he believed that genocide was an ancient practice that had re-appeared in the
midst of modern civilization. In 1948 United Nations adopted a convention on
Genocide declaring that "at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great
losses on humanity. The belief that genocide has a long history. Leo Kuper
declared that "the world is new, the crime ancient. For more details see
Michael Ereman, "Religion, Nationalism and Genocide; Ancient Judaism
Revisited", Archives European Journal of Sociology, Tome XXXV (1994), p.
260. See also, William Safire, Safire's New Political Dictionary (NY, 1993),
pp. 247-331. See also, Gregory Copley, "Hiding Genocide", Defense and
Foreign Strategic Policy, Vol. xx (Dec. 31, 1992), pp. 4-9.

114. For more details about ethnic cleansing see Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, "A Brief
History of Ethnic Cleansing", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (Summer 1993), pp.
110-121. See also, Nicholas Comfort, "Brewer's Politics: A Phrase and Fable
Dictionary (London, 1995), p. 188. For more details about ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo see www.state.govt/www/regions/eur/rpt_990604 ksvo_ethnic.html

64 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Chapter 2

Issue of Kosovo as an Ethnic Problem

The artificial construction of Yugoslavia collapsed when the
Soviet Union disintegrated. It led to the eruption of violent ethnic
conflict in Yugoslavia's republics i.e. Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Kosovo. 1 The roots of the ethnic violence and
atomization of Yugoslavia must be sought in the ethno-history,
economy and culture of the region. Extreme ethnic heterogeneity,
intractable religious and group rivalries and conflict of deeper socio-
historical interests between various Yugoslav nations tore apart the
artificial composition of country. Thus, the Kosovo crisis is also the
product of these ethnic, religious and socio-historic rivalries
between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in Yugoslavia.

The analogy of "tectonic motion" can aptly be applied on the
events that occurred in Yugoslavia. It describes that the current
reshaping of world is that of the giant plates that make up the earth's
rocky crust, because this movement can reshape continents and alter
climates, sometimes cataclysmically through the earthquakes and
volcanoes it produces. 2 This geological metaphor conveys the scale
of changes occurred in Yugoslavia and illustrates how surface events
are the product of the forces of ethnicity, ethnocide, ethnogenesis,
ethnocentrism, ethnonationalism and historical hatreds. These forces
not only torn apart the Yugoslav society but led it towards the
process of 'pseudospeciation'. 3 This resulted in the most bloodiest
massacres of Serbs, Croates, Bosnians and Albanian Muslims and
created the worst 'refugee problem in the post- World War II
European history. Consequently, this humanitarian crisis provided
chance to NATO forces and the United States to intervene in
Yugoslavia. Later, this intervention in Kosovo (which was not
authorised by the United Nations Security Council) raised various
legal questions in world politics. Therefore, the Kosovo crisis
cannot be understood without the analysis of these forces.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 65

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SERBIA-KOSVO CONFLICT

Kosovo crisis is also complicated one and any attempt to
understand it requires a brief review of Yugoslavia's historical
background. Kosovo, sometimes called Southern Serbia, is a part of
Yugoslavia (Now Serbia and Montenegro). Yugoslavia, the land of
south (Jug) Slavs, came into existence after World War I as the
kingdom of the Serbs, Croates and Slovenes. 4 The national character
of each unit has been deeply coloured by the relationship in which it
has lived for so long with the stronger alien powers. This
relationship was basically of opposition, but at the same time one of
developing cultural, psychological and religious affinities.
Although, this meant that, in their urge to absorb or unite with each
other, the components of the Yugoslav state have found themselves
marked by differences of outlook and tradition. 5

A similar pattern of external intervention influenced even the
formation of cultural identities of the South Slavs. These
interventions not only tended to deprive the South Slavs from
indigenous development but intensified their ethno-historic
memories and sharpen their sense of identities. They remained
largely unaffected by the world religions until they encountered
imperialism which introduced world religions in the area. The South
Slavs living within the Austro-Hungarian empire (i.e. most Slovenes
and Croates) tended to adopt Roman Catholicism while the South
Slav living within Ottoman empire tended to adopt eastern Orthodox
religion (most Serbs) or Islam. If the cultural and political fallout of
imperialism largely defined most of the identities and boundaries in
the Balkans, ethnic struggle against such imperialism tended to
crystalise and solidify their identities. This was particularly true for
Serbs who dominated the South Slav's chequered history up to the
modern period. 6

Since beginning Yugoslavia under the rule of Serbia's royal
dynasty, was a problem child. The crux of the problem was the
relationship between the two largest ethnic groups (Serb and
Croates). Although at the end of World War I, most Croat leaders
opted to join a common state with Serbs provided they were
accepted as equal partners and allowed to manage their own affairs. 7
The Croats began to feel betrayed after sometime and the Serbian

66 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

historical tendency to dominate the Balkan politics and their implicit
claim to South Slavic leadership has been challenged by this most
organised and assertive group. The Serbs looked upon this country
as an extension of their former territory, the fruit of their struggles
up to World War I.

After the failure of the first attempt of South Slav unification
through a multi-party Parliamentary democracy (1918-28), the
kingdom of Yugoslavia was established in 1929. It lasted until
1941. 8 After World War II the Soviet Union had exercised her
influence on Yugoslavia to counter the Western challenge in the
region. This global polarization also hindered the process of
emergence of nation-state structure in Balkan region. The
communist party in Yugoslavia, which was reasonably
multinational, especially during Marshal Tito's reign could neither
undo the process of regional imbalances nor could harmonize the
cultural and social relationships among the communities. After the
downfall of communist regime in 1989-90, the region seemed to
have thrown back into more or less Pre- 19 14 environment in which
old age rivalries among different communities were being revived.
For nearly forty years, from 1943 to 1980, Yugoslavia was guided
by firm hand of Josip Broz Tito. 9 Soon after the death of President
Tito in 1980, social conflict in Kosovo witnessed the ethnic strife of
unprecedented level. Political decay after Tito's death has given rise
to two processes, first, the process of political decay contributed to
genuine democratization, as communist party elders lost both the
capacity and will to assert firm control. In the context of political
weaknesses and increasing fluidity, new associations and groupings
emerged with clear political programs resulted in second process
called ethnic polarization.

This process of ethnic Polarization resulted in ethnic antagonism
between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in 1981. Here the ethnicity
played the crucial role. As a cultural construct ethnicity signify a
composite of symbolic markers, real or putative used by the
members of an ethnic group who define themselves and are defined
by others as having a distinctive identity. These characteristics may
include combination of cultural attributes (like language, religion
and values), territorial attributes (i.e. region or locality) and

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 67

biological attributes (i.e. decent and kinship). As a situational
construct, ethnicity signifies the emergence of ethnic consciousness
from a situation of multi-ethnic competitiveness, and serves as an
effective mode of mobilization. 10 In Kosovo, religious, regional and
biological attributes of ethnicity creates antagonism between two
ethnic groups i.e. Albanians and Serbs. The Albanians demanded
cultural rights such as equality of their Albanian language with
Serbo-Croat language. The Serbs and Kosovo Albanians are
orthodox Christians and Muslims respectively. Both groups clashed
upon religious values because of historical reasons. The Kosovo
region is bordered with Albania and Kosovar Albanians has kinship
ties with Albanians. This relationship threatened the Serbs and they
always feared from Albanian nationalism. They felt that the
Albanian nationalists' success inevitably resulted in the secession of
Kosovo from Yugoslavia. This antagonism between both groups
increased severely after President Tito's death and changed in
international conflict after the end of Cold War.

ETHNIC RELATIONS AS BOOSTER OF ETHNIC
ANTAGONISM IN KOSVO

International conflict is an inevitable aspect of international
relations. Various types of international relations can be presented as
a continuum representing two tendencies, one toward association or
cooperation and other toward dissociation or antagonism. The
middle point called neutrality or indifference. Different classes of
association or dissociation present various types of intensity of
international relations. With a change in intensity, the relations
move from one class to another i.e. from cooperative relations to
differences, opposition and antagonism. In times of antagonism
some cooperation survives, permitting subsequent adjustment and
negotiation.

In the context of ethnic groups, the position of indifference : a
medial point on a theoretical model is an ideal situation. In an
extreme case, indifference means no relations whatsoever between
ethnic groups. Under usual conditions, it suggests the existence of
two ethnic groups in the same territory, having very limited relations
of antagonism or association. Total indifference seldom occurs, in
reality there is a pattern of group separation with limited process of

68 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

association. 11 In some cases, it may operate as a device for the
avoidance of antagonism. The process of dissociation between ethnic
groups is also of various levels of intensity.

Process of association

Process of dissociation

Antagonism
Integration Indifference Conflict

Fig. 2.1 : Model of Inter-ethnic Relations and Processes

Source : Feliks Gross, World Politics and Tension Areas, p. 79.

Some kinds of difference or competition are not necessarily
synonymous with antagonism. Not all members of antagonistic
group engage in this process, nor are all relations. There are many
casual factors of ethnic antagonism. First are the differences in
political status and uneven distribution of political power between
different racial ethnic or religious groups leading in ethnic
tensions. 12 In former Yugoslavia the political position of Serbs was
highly hegemonic and from this Albanian Muslims in Kosovo have
developed fear of repression. Albanian Muslim's fear proved true
when Serbian dominated State Security Service (SDB) under
Alexander Rankovich used various repressive measures against
Albanian dissidents. Second, differences in political status,
institutions and ideologies create ethnic tensions in society. However
the most frequent incompatibility was in religious values. Albanian
Muslims embraced Islam under Turkish-Rule and Serbians were
Orthodox Christians. However backward, Kosovo's Albanian
Muslim peasants would not wish to give up their land or their
religion. Anti-Serbianism and anti-communism mixed in the
previous round of demonstration in 1968 and since than the
resurgence of Islam in Yugoslavia has come as an additional
booster. 13 Another cause of antagonism was, Kosovar Muslim's
dissatisfaction with their institutional position in Yugoslavia. They
wanted to be a full-fledged republic for attaining benefits directly
from outside resources. 14

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 69

Thirdly, economic factors are also one of the major causes of
ethnic tensions. Economic tensions reinforce ethnic tensions when
ethnic divisions coincide with economic subordination. Kosovo
possessed big quantities of natural resources. Beside this, it
remained the less developed region of Yugoslavia. 15 The Kosovo
Albanians claimed that Serbs were responsible for their dismal
economic position but Serbs counterclaimed that Albanians
increased population was responsible for their economic
degradation. Complementary migration of Serbs and Albanians in
province also antagonised the relations of both communities.

Fourthly, psychological and general sociological
incompatibilities are also responsible for creating ethnic tensions.
Some cultures develop or favour the development of certain
behavioural patterns and personality types that may differ
substantially from those of other cultures. Difficulties in integration
or in the adjustment or reconciliation of different behaviours may
lead to antagonistic feelings. Ethnic or racial hostilities may reflect
deep psychological problems, sometimes resulting in pathological
needs and urges of destruction and aggression. In any society when
ethnic hostilities, pathological needs and urges of destruction start
complementing each other, frustration of wishes of ethnic groups
may take the shape of outburst of aggression. Ethnic and religious
differences intensified with cumulative effect in Kosovo, where the
diversity of the population was strong and antagonism sharp. The
majority in Kosovo population was champion of Turkish and Islamic
causes and was in continuous and mutual antagonism with native
Orthodox Serbian population. Both groups had different behaviour
patterns and Serbians as a dominant group wanted to integrate
Kosovo into Serbia. This process resulted into cycles of massacres.
Step by step these struggles, massacres and raids shaped the social
image, values and attitudes of Serbs towards the Muslim Albanians 16 .
Antagonism has a cumulative tendency. One type of antagonism
reinforces the other in a continuous interaction. The ethnic
antagonism reinforces economic antagonism and vice versa. The
religious tensions were projected into ethnic and economic terms.

The relationship between Albanians and Serbs underwent a
tremendous change (from out-groups to anti-groups) during the

70 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

times of antagonism. The change in relationship between ethnic
groups is very well perceived by the model of ethnic distance.

A

BCD

1A

In Group

2B

Friends

3C

Neighbours

4D

Friendly outgroup

Line of Indifference

5E

Unfriendly outgroup

6F

Adversaries

7G

Enemies

8H

Archenemies

Fig. 2.2 : Model of Ethnic Distance

Source : Felik Gross, World Politics and Tension Areas, p. 84.

In this model ethnic actor is the person, who plays an ethnic role
at a given movement and identifies himself with an ethnic religious
group. The model represents ethnic proximity as a continuum
parallel to the two tendencies of association or dissociation. In the
middle the dividing line is drawn through point and this represents
neutrality or indifference. Actor is put at the extreme point of the
line (on left side) within his own in-group. In multiethnic area, the
actor sees following groups according to social proximity or distance
i.e. no. 1, his own in-group, no. 2, associated group, no. 3,
neighbours, no. 4, friendly out-groups. The last are somewhat
distant groups with no special relationship with actor's in-group. 17
The first three categories belong to a large class of "pro-groups" but
fourth lies between the pro-group and the dividing line of
indifference.

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

71

From the indifference line to the right, the social distance
increases rapidly and the antagonistic relationships are represented
by various ranks of antagonisms. An actor may identify no. 5, an
unfriendly out-group (not necessarily an active enemy or an
antagonist but nonethless passive and unfriendly). Then comes anti-
groups (antagonists) with variety of ranks. No. 6 is adversaries,
antagonists without a tendency toward the destruction or total
subordination of actor's in-group. After that leaning more toward
no. 7, enemies and no. 8, archenemies. The enemy represents a
temporary hostility by a group whose antagonistic role changes in
history. But the 'hereditary' or archenemy represents a group toward
which the hostility is transmitted by traditional lore and history from
generation to generation. The younger generation learns about past
hostilities with this group, so that the continuation of the quarrel in
time and space is regarded as a historical duty, a matter of national
honour and obligation. 18

The tension between Albanians and Serbs eased, whenever,
hostilities subsided, resulting in former anti-group becoming again
an out-group. On the contrary the increase in differences in the ranks
of groups become antagonistic and turned enemies towards each
other. The traditional image of arch-enemy reappeared resulting in
intesifying of hostility and aggression. The massacres, genocides
became a tragic part of ethnic relations in Balkans, particularly in
Kosovo.

GROWTH OF ETHNIC TENSION IN KOSOVO AND RISE
OF PRESIDENT SLOVODAN MILOSEVIC

Kosovo passed through three major stages of ethnic tensions

(i) a growth of inter-ethnic tensions,

(ii) the intensification of interethnic rivalry into an
intrapolitical tension in which the state take part usually
supporting one ethnic group against other.

(iii) an inter-political and inter-ethnic tension (complex tension)
in which at least two states and governments were
involved.

The analysis of the growth of inter-ethnic tensions in Kosovo
requires examining of some elements of ethnicity i.e.

72 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

(i) The vital importance of past.

(ii) The awareness of the history of a country to understand the
complexities of the present. 19

Analyses of ethnic tensions are often made in terms of historical
legacies in which language, culture and religion are often regarded
as essential factors. Ethnic identities carry with them centuries old
tensions, hostilities and historical grievances. Ethnicity and
nationalism would merge together when attempts are made to
redress the grievances of different ethnic groups. It is also argued
that ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe was caused not only by inter-
group differences, ancient hatred and ethnic passion (long bottled up
by the repressive communist regimes, uncorked by the end of Cold
War) but also collective fear for future played an important role in
aggravating the situation there.

The perception of threat also played major role in ethnic
conflicts and Kosovo is no exception. These conflicts erupt in
reaction to a perceived threat to one's own or one's group's physical
or psychological survival and well being at the present and in the
future. Historical memories of past, unjust deeds including "ancient
hatreds" and centuries old feuds, may be used with passion in
pursuit of attaining freedom from the perceived source of threat,
which may be one human being or a group of whatever type. 20 The
ethnic conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo are indeed
based on perception of threat to common future and ancient hatreds
and historical memories used passionately by both groups.

The bone of contention in Kosovo crisis was the conflict
between Serbs and Albanians. The Serbs wanted to preserve their
dominant position to maintain Kosovo with in the jurisdiction of
Serbia. The Albanians, in the other hand, perceived it as unjust
political arrangements of the past. Both the communities had their
own point of view in claiming the province of Kosovo on historical
grounds. 21 In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, events occurred
which hardened the Modern Serb- Albanian enmity. Various
massacres that often occasioned by the interference of the great
powers further poisoned relation between the two peoples. 22

Other main discontent of Kosovar Albanians was that they were
not given the status of republic in Yugoslavia while they constituted

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 73

largest minority of the country. On the other hand, Serbian source
of anger was Kosovo's constitutional situation in Serbia. 23 Since
1960, ethnic Albanians had become victims of repressive policies
carried to an extreme by Alexander Rankovich, the then head of the
secret police and Vice-President of Yugoslavia. 24 They were also
discriminated against in the economic sphere. 25 The dismissal of
Alexander Rankovic at the Brioni Plenum of the Leage of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1966 and the dissolution of the
Serbian led secret police in Kosovo, marked a turning point in the
ethnic Albanians struggle for equality.

The Albanians took advantage of the Post-Rankovich euphoria
to demand full recognition of their national rights, greater autonomy
and policy-making rights and responsibilities for Kosovo. At a
session of the socialist Alliance of working people of Serbia in April
1968 Mehmet Hoxha, a distinguished partisan hero from Kosovo,
raised very legitimate question that why do 370,000 Montenegrins
have their own republic, while 1.2 million Albanians do not even
have total autonomy. In November 1968, demonstrations broke out
in Pristina and other Kosovo cities, which called for the
improvement of ethnic Albanians status, economic and cultural
opportunities and the recognition of their human and national
rights. 26 Under the impact of these demonstrations President Tito
decided to loosen the centralized control that was provoking
resistance in other regions as well. 27

Under 1974 Constitution, President Tito gave Kosovo Albanians
a right of an equal voice within the collective federal presidency and
a right to enter into bilateral cooperation Agreements with other
countries. But the ethnic conflict between Albanians and Serbs
became more pronounced during the seventies. The concessions
granted by 1974 Constitution to Kosovo Albanians did not address
two major problems which increased the sense of antagonism in
Serbs. One was demographic, a higher birth rate of Albanians and
exodus of Serbs (Serbian Population decreased from 30 per cent in
1948 to less than 15 per cent in 1981). The second was economic.
Although Kosovo was rich in mineral resources (such as lignite,
lead, coal, zinc, ferronickel ore, silver, bauxite, and magnesite), but
it lagged behind the rest of Yugoslavia. Kosovo Albanian resentment

74 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

was constantly simmering because of their awareness of the fact that
inspite of their ostensible autonomy economic and social problems
were still growing.

The demand of ethnic Albanians for political autonomy reached
its climax in spring 1981. Though the demonstrations were
controlled with the help of federal armed forces, thousand of
Albanians arrested. These incidents further widened ethnic schism in
Kosovo and strengthened the nationalist aspirations amongst
Kosovar Albanians. The Serbs and Montenegrins continue to
emigrate from Kosovo complaining systematic harassment involving
rape, murder and attacks on their property by Albanians. 28 The
Serbian Fear of Kosovo Albanians motive to secede from Yugoslav
federation increased after President Tito's death who allowed the
"Albaniansation" of Kosovo.

Although, President Tito provides virtual veto to all the
republics in federal Parliament but the principle of self-
determination, including right of secession for constituent Yugoslav
peoples was also engraved in constitution. These rights were
considered as the safety valves for managing the pressures of
national rivalries. But, President Tito's communism, however
'reformed' could not escape from the 'iron law' of its being a dead
end system. Yugoslav communism produced a society of
diminishing returns, increase malaise and popular rejection. The
growing degeneration in the last decades of Tito's rule weakened the
system and with his death in 1980, Yugoslav society lost its revered
charisma as well as his feared dictatorship. The communist party's
monopoly on power had never really smothered ethnic furies and
these furies dominated the institutions of state, despite their
communist labels. It resulted in the ethno-nationalist feelings
amongst various nationalities in Yugoslavia and emergence of
Slovodan Milosevic as popular leader of Serbs. 29

Milosevic's nationalistic policies and economic brinkmanship 30
resulted in the disintegration of Yugoslav society. He badly inflamed
nationalist passions and readily resorted war in order to advance his
goals. Milosevic began down this path in 1987, when he openly and
chauvinistically embraced the cause of Kosovo Serbs and issuing a
challenge not just to Albanians but to all the Serb enemies. Slobodan

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 75

Milosevic become President of Serbia in 1989. He exploited the
hatred between Serbs and Albanians and started practising the age
old politics of ehtnocide more vigorously. 31

MILOSEVIC'S VERSION OF ETHNOCIDE WHICH
PSEUDO-SPECIATED KOSVOS SOCIETY

The process of the rise of Slobodan Milosevic was related with
the clash of reality with a myth in Kosovo. The Serbs regarded
Kosovo as the birthplace of Serbian culture because most of
important monasteries of Serbian Orthodox church were located
there. The national myth of Serbia as the tragic sentinel of Western
civilization stems from the Ottoman victory over the Serbs at the
'Battle of Kosovo in 1389. According to the Myth, Serbian blood
has consecrated the soil of Kosovo and the integrity of Serbian
nation would be inconceivable without Kosovo. It was this
calculated reshaping of that Myth into a political justification for
dictatorship, aggression and genocide that defined and fuelled the
rise of Slobodan Milosevic. Myth however collides with
inconvenient reality in Kosovo i.e. of the province's approximately
two million population, over 90 per cent were ethnic Albanians. 32
The Serbs constituted only the largest of several tiny minorities.
Historical reality that various nationalities fought in 1389 war has
largely been abandoned to make way for a mythic interpretation of
the battle's significance.

In 1989, on the anniversary of the 'Battle of Kosovo', President
Milosevic removed Kosovo's autonomy, established direct Serbian
rule over province, expelled the Albanians from the Kosovo
Parliament, the state bureaucracy and state owned industries. He
closed the state-run schools which gave instructions in Albanian
language and also closed most of the medical system for them. 33 It
was a Serbian version of apartheid, which enabled President
Milosevic to use power of the state to enforce the rule of the small
Serbian minority over ethnic Albanians. The policies of President
Milosevic provided fertile ground for development of ethno-genesis
and ethno-centrism. Ethno-genesis may emerge during a social
movement, when people consciously forge (or try to forge) their
futures by making specific reference to their common heritage, in
order to create or enforce a particular desirable or undesirable

76 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

destiny. A desirable destiny may be a 'land without evil' and
undesirable destiny may be potential or perceived genocide at the
hands of power wielders. Ethno-genesis is complimentary dimension
of ethnocide, which is the conscious effort by power wielders within
a nation state to obliterate a people's lifeways. 34

The complimentary feature of ethnocide and ethnogenesis reflect
the historio and contemporary struggle between hegemony and
resistance to hegemony. The collision of nation-state nationalist
ethnogenesis and ethnic-block ethnogenesis mark critical junctures
of cultural histories. The strongest ethnic reaction against nation-
state nationalism becomes manifest at the very moment of the
consolidation of nation-state power. This is in part because of
ethnocidal policies enacted in order to enforce cultural hegemony
during the consolidation of such nation-state power. It is also
because, at that moment people who did not entirely share nation-
state ideologies of culture, consciously began to enact
counterhegemonic strategies increasing their own sense of distinct
history and altered destiny. Serbian xenophobia 35 exploded in
Kosovo in 1989 when Serbian nationalists had taken control of the
Yugoslav military and federal police. The remnants of self-rule had
gradually stamped out between 1989-1991 when Milosevic
suppressed the Kosovo assembly and tried to arrest its deputies.
Serbian hegemony was maintained by widespread dismissals of
Albanians from jobs, general dis-enfranchisement of local Albanian
Majority. The tough policing in the province resulted in blockade of
Albanian villages. In spite of the fact that less than ten percent of
Kosovo's population was Serbian, the Serbo-Croat became the
official language of Kosovo.

President Milosevic terminated all secondary schooling in Albanian
language and dismissed 6000 ethnic Albanian secondary school
teachers. In July 1991, the Serbian assembly passed a law authorizing
the distribution of 6000 hectares of land among Serbs wishing to settle
in Kosovo. To carry out this plan authorities have confiscated the
property of Albanians and turned it over to "colonists" and granted
them Albanian land at bargain prices. Even Serbians destroyed
ecological resources in Kosovo. The Dense forests in Kosovo had
changed in bared stones. This provides the proof of old-Serb adage that
"no grass grows where the Turk trod." 36

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 11

Kosovar Albanians successfully resisted Serbian hegemonic
designs to consolidate their power on Kosovo. The strongest
reaction manifested in 1992 when Kosovo Albanians boycotted
federal elections and elected their own 130 member Assembly
(which was declared illegal by the Serbian Assembly). A writer
turned politician Ibrahim Rugova leader of Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK) was elected President of self-proclaimed "Republic
of Kosovo". 37 The parallel government administered by the LDK
had sought to sustain an Albanian civil society 38 that had been
excluded from all formal interactions with the Serbian administration
by establishing and managing clinics, schools and legal services.

Yugoslavia was never a genuine socialist society in the truest
sense of the term. Being one of the most favoured states of Stalin
among other East European states, it modeled its own federation
according to the Soviet pattern. Following the Soviet example, 39
"socialist" Yugoslavia did not liberate its non-Slav minorities and
incorporated them into a South Slav political scheme called federal
Yugoslavia. At some time in the Yugoslavia's Jerky development,
President Tito sought to prevent a resurgence of Serbia's hegemony
by granting autonomy to two of its provinces Kosovo and
Vojvodina. An inter-balance achieved did not last long and the
Kosovar nationalist upsurge made it totter. 40 Yugoslavia's consensus
on identity, rights and obligations and peaceful conflict resolution
had broken when President Milosevic applied ultranationalist
policies in Kosovo. Once the purpose of maintaining a multi-ethnic
Yugoslav identity was no longer shared by the Slovenian and
Croatian republics, they declared independence in 1991. Yugoslav
regime and its constitutional framework lacked the consensus that
was required to bind its political community. Serbia's emphasis on
ethnic purity leads toward conflict, war and destruction of economic
basis of power that threatened community maintenance by
undercutting the legitimacy of rules for the peaceful resolution of
conflict.

A multi-ethnic shared identity of Yugoslavia ceased to exist
when Serbia deliberately and discriminatory violated the human
rights of minority groups such as Kosovar Albanians. The
application of rules which violated human rights, aggravated

78 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

tensions between the dominant decision-makers and aggrieved out-
groups. Similarly, governmental policies that require integration in
the form of the acceptance of a particular language or religion in the
name of a single national community ironically could destroy
political community. And the groups those perceived themselves to
be placed outside the community and denied equal rights, were
likely to separate themselves into de facto nation-states to form
political communities of their own and to seek full independence. 41

The official government brands such rebellious communities as
criminally deviant. But their leadership may maintain considerable
legitimacy and support among followers. The Serbian rules which
allowed forced settlement of Serbian peasants in Kosovo, recognised
of Serbo-Croat language as official language and other repressive
policies could destroy Serbian political community. Initially Kosovar
Albanians demanded republican status for Kosovo in Yugoslavia.
They separated themselves as a de facto nation state and demanded
independence from Yugoslavia. The authorities branded Albanian
community as criminally deviant and subjected it to brutal violations
of their human rights and driving some 380,000 into exile. 42 The
Albanians formed an underground community, a parallel Albanian
society complete with their own political institutions, education and
health care systems, cultural and sports leagues and a tax collection
mechanism. This process created the sense of ethno-centrism and
ethno-nationalism in Kosovo Albanians.

The elements of ethnicity i.e. common ancestry, language,
religion and culture may forge a sufficiently close 'psychological
bond' of shared ethnic identity to form a nation. Nations are
imagined communities because the members of even the smallest
nation will never meet most of their fellow members or even hear of
them, yet in the minds of each member lives the image of their own
community. Nationalism is the extension of this psychological bond
into the political goal of forming a separate, autonomous or
independent political community. Ethnic nationalism provides the
cultural foundation for the identity and legitimate authority at the
core of an ethnically homogenous political community. 43

Ethnic identity or ethnic consciousness is the essential
independent variable that leads to political assertiveness and militant

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 79

separatism regardless of the existence of equality and dominance.
Social and economic discrepancies per se create discontent and may
incite revolution but the discontent founded on ethnic symbols, such
as language, religion, culture and origin lead to separation. 44 The
Albanian language, ancestry, Islamic values forged a psychological
bond of shared ethnic identity in Albanian Muslims in Kosovo. The
Serbian repression gave extension to this psychological bond and
created discontent between Kosovo Albanians. Their discontents
which were founded on ethnic symbols (i.e. religion, culture,
language, region etc.) leaded to Kosovo Albanian's demand of
separatism from Yugoslavia. This process created and developed
ethno-centric and ethno-nationalistic sentiments in Kosovo
Albanians.

Ethno-centrism is a rational choice made by members of ethnic
groups that is competing for scarce resources, such as political
power or territory. The tendency of ethno-centrism usually
contributes to tension and hostility whenever groups conflict. 45
President Tito provided autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina in
Serbia with a view to reduce Serbian desire of hegemony. This act
created ethnocentric sentiments in Serbs. Serbs for the sake of
obtaining political power and territorial integration under President
Milosevic applied pressure cooker (i.e. forced Assimilation)
approach upon Kosovar Albanians. Serbian policies in Kosovo
resulted in the development of ethno-nationalism in Kosovar
Albanians and latter pseudospeciate the Yugoslav society.

Ethnonationalism refers to the sentiments of belonging to a group
identified by ties of ethnicity as well of preference to those of the
nation-state. Most states are in fact multinational or multiethnic and
in this way ethnic-nationalism may simply be recognized as a fact of
political life. It may lead to secession as political goal and can result
in a violent movement and political tendency. 46 President Milosevic
exploited Serbian's ethno-centric political discontent and changed it a
populist mobilization through mass rallies (called street democracy).
He provoked sharp ethno-nationalist backlash not only in Albanian
Muslims but also in other republics and ethnic groups. Slovenia,
Croatia, Macedonia declared independence. The Kosovo Albanians
in a reaction of Serbian repression developed a violent and

80 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

secessionist movement. The ethno-nationalists started insurgency for
liberation of Kosovo which was operating in the hills of Drenica. 47

The failure of the international community to manage Kosovo
crisis further aggravated the situation in Kosovo. It led to the
transformation of non-violent resistance in favour of armed
struggle. 48

The United Nations Security Council adopted three resolutions
for the management of Kosovo Crisis through diplomatic efforts in
1998. On the other hand, President Milosevic started exploiting
post-Rambouillet drift, confusion and indecision of NATO
governments about military offensive in Kosovo. A Last straw came
in when NATO started bombing of Serb targets on 24 March 1999.
The seventy eight day Kosovo war reflected a cruel and rigorous
nature of ethnic conflicts and their impact on international politics.
It severely undermined the United Nations authority on the use of
force in world affairs. On the contrast, the Kosovo war has further
developed the major role of the United Nations in the field of
humanitarian and human rights issues.

References:

1. Adam Przeworski, "The 'East' becomes the 'South'? The 'Autumn of the
People' and the Future of Eastern Europe". PS, Vol. 24, (March 1991), p. 21.

2. Michael T. Clare, "The New Challenges to Global Security", Current History,
Vol. 92 (April 1993), p. 155.

3. Pseudospeciation is that phenomenon by which individuals and groups protect
their sense of identity by viewing other groups as less than human and more
able to be disregarded and destroyed. See also, Geogory R. Copley, "The New
Rome and The New Religious Wars", Defence and Foreign Affairs Strategic,
Vol. XXVII (March 1999), p. 8.

4. The Axis power had invaded and dismembered Yugoslavia after World War II.
It re-emerged as a socialist Republic under Marshal Tito's communist- led
National Liberation Movement (Partisans). The South Slavs delay in nation
formation may be primarily due to their geo-strategic location within the
European international system. They were situated at the crossroads of
empires, international politics and war, which distorted the politico-cultural
patterns of nation-formation in the Balkans. During 395-1453 AD, they were
under Roman Empire, during 1389-1918 under Ottoman Empire and during
1815-1918, under the Austro-Hungarian empire. With the collapse of Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman Empires in the course of the first World War, the allies

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 8 1

at the Versailles decided on the creation of an independent south Slav State. In
other worlds, it was not so much of the will of the South Slaves but an
international political intervention that created the first Yugoslav state in 1918
although it was first proposed as a South Slavs in 1866 by a congress of Slavic
nationalists in Austro-Hungaria empire. For all 1500 years (395-1918 AD), the
history of Yugoslavia is not only the history of stronger powers (which have at
one or other controlled the component parts of present state) but also the story
of the resistance offered by these component parts against on their
independence and individuality. See, Dawa Norbu, "The Serbian Hegemony,
Ethnic Heterogeneity and Yugoslav Break-up", Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. XXXIV (April 3, 1999), p. 833. See, Sasmita Sinha, "NATO
Intervention in Former Yugoslavia : Lessons from the Past", International
Studies, Vol. 38 (April 2000), p. 5.

5. H.C. Darby et ah, A Short History of Yugoslavia (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 41-
42.

6. Harriet Gitchley, "The Failure of Federalism in Yugoslavia", International
Journal, Vol. XLVIII, (Summer 1993), p. 436.

7. Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia : New War, Old Hatreds", Foreign Policy
(Summer 1993), p. 9. For more details about the Croat nationalism and Croat-
Serb Feud, see Stephen Clissold, "Croat Separatism : National, Dissidence and
Terrorism", Conflict Studies (January 1979), pp. 3-19.

8. Again a Serbian king ruled and attempted to foster a 'Yugoslav nationality' in
place of ethnic identities that had so much undermined the previous
constitutional order. On the process, the core institutions of the pre-war Serbian
state such as the monarchy, army, bureaucracy, Church were extended to and
imposed upon other republics and provinces. The objective of assimilation of
different nationalities into one reasonably homogeneous society was
unsuccessfully pursued by the Marxists in communist Yugoslavia. This
rendered the issue of nationalism and ethnicity as always contested. See,
Norbu, n. 4, p. 883.

9. The Titoist system had been founded on three core principles i.e. self
management (embodied in its well known worker's councils) Brotherhood and
unity (the doctrine of ethnic harmony through one party rule), non-alignment
in foreign policy. All these principles began to decay in years following Tito's
death in 1980. Thus, in former Yugoslavia the dimensions of social
transformation were influenced by two processes, first, struggle to control state
institutions among different ethnic groups led to origin of claims and counter
claims. Second, attempts made by different alien ethnicities to forge the local
solidarity led to growth of national consciousness from below. For saving
federal institutions, President Tito formed a new constitution in 1974. A more
pluralistic and decentralized administration was enshrined in this constitution.
With a view to keeping Serbia relatively weak, Tito intended to gradually
increase autonomy of the six constituent republics, including two autonomous
Serbian provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. But the 1974 Yugoslav
constitution marked the climax of Tito's decentralization. Although, this latest
constitution seemed like a technique to balance domestic politics by ensuring a

82 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

parity of rights as well as grievances but Serbs were resented from these
constitutional arrangements. See, Sabrina Patra Ramet, "War in Balkans",
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71 (Fall 1992), p. 82. See, Gopal Singh and Prem R.
Bhardwaj, "Ethnicities and Ethnic Conflict in Kosovo : Humanitarianism or
New Imperialism" (Unpublished Research Paper, Punjabi University, Patiala),
pp. 2-3. See, Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia : Balkan Miracle or Balkan
Disaster" Current History, Vol. 95, (March 1996), p. 114. See, Narasingha P.
Sil, "House of Cards : The Disintegration of Yugoslaiva", India Quarterly,
Vol. 6, (Jan-June 1994), p. 40.

10. S.L. Sharma, "The Salience of Ethnicity in Modernization : Evidence from
India", Sociological Bulletin (March-September 1990), p. 37.

11. Feliks Gross, World Politics and Tension Areas (NY, 1966), p. 78.

12. Ibid., p. 79.

13. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, "Kosovo : An Analysis of Yugoslavia's Albanian
Problem", Conflict Studies (December 1982), p. 13.

14. Cyril D'Souza, "The Break up of Yugoslavia", Economic and Political
Weekly, 26 Nov. 1999, p. 3029.

15. Kosovo's per capita income in 1988 was 40 percent of the average per capita
income of Yugoslavia as a whole. After 1988, it decreased to 30 percent. In
1995, GNP per capita of Kosovo was $1520 in comparison to Serbia's $4950
and Slovenia's $12500. See, Bogomil Ferfila, "Yugoslavia : Confederation or
Disintegration", Problems of Communism, Vol. XL (July-August 1991), p. 23.
See World Geographic Encyclopedia, Sybil P. Parkar, McGraw Hill, New
York, 1995, p. 245. See Tara Karath, "Yugoslavia : The Rise of Nationalism
and the European Response", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XV (August 1992), pp.
451-452.

16. Gross, n. 11, pp. 110-111.

17. Ibid., p. 83.

18. Ibid., p. 84.

19. Ibid., p. 103.

20. R.N. Desilva, "Ethnicity and Conflict in South Asia", International Studies,
Vol. 38 (January-March 2001), pp. 55-56. Dov Ronen, "Ethnicity in Central
Europe : Minorities along Borders (Unpublished Research Paper, Punjabi
University, Patiala).

21. The Serbs based their claims on the fact that Kosovo was part of the Medieval
Serbian state and that they were forced to emigrate from Kosovo and Albanians
moved into the region during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Both
Albanians and Serbs claim to be the original inhabitants of Kosovo. Time is the
strongest argument of the Western legitimacy. Those who arrive first claim the
territory. The late comer is considered to have weakest claim. In continental
Europe, the historians and the statesmen were and are constantly lookout for
the 'autochthonic argument' to prove that the nation they represent, was the
earliest occupant of a given territory. Once the historical evidence, true or false
is found, it is usually processed into official memoranda, symbols or rituals and
slowly channeled into textbooks. Theories of early arrival becomes arguments

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 83

in diplomatic negotiations and are used to reinforce nationalism. When the
government wishes to escalate tension, it can manipulate the social myth of
autochthonism to intensify emotions. The Albanians claims on the fact that their
ancestors, Tllyrians' inhabited Kosovo long before the Slavs and despite waves
of different foreign invasions, they managed to preserve their ethnic identity.
Modern Albanian historiography rejects the Serbian argument that the
Albanians first settled in Kosovo in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and
claim that the Albanians represents an autochthonous ethnic group, which
constituted the majority of Kosovo's population even before the seventeenth
century. But Serbs claimed that Albanians settled in Serbian lands vacated by
Serbs after the defeat of their two insurrections, in 1690 and 1737. Serbians
claim that Albanians invaded and conquered the Kosovo province is not proved
true according to Yugoslav history. But, it was the Serbs who first conquered
Kosovo toward the end of 12th century. Stefan Nemanja, belonging to Rascian
Dynasty of Serbia conquered Kosovo in 1189. Later Stefan Nemanja had
founded his own dynasty called Nemanja dynasty. Albanians life under the
Serbs was hard. Albanians were subjected to heavy taxes, their leaders and
Priests were badly treated. While the Orthodox Serbs built Churches and
Monasteries in the region but the religion did not become a central feature of
the Serb- Albanian rivalry in Kosovo until the rise of Ottoman Empire. Many
more Albanians than converted to Islam for the privileges this brought. In the
end of 14th century, the Serbs were defeated by the Turks in the Battle of
Kosovo in 1389. Consequently, the occupying Turkish forces forcibly settled
Muslim Albanians in Kosovo. But real pressure on Kosovo Serbs increased
during the Ottoman centuries, particularly after their support of an Austrian
offensive that followed the Turks defeat at Vienna in 1683 and their subsequent
victory at the second Battle of Kosovo in 1689. After this, Serbs had suffered
the broad reprisals and they fled from the region together with their orthodox
patriarch. Albanians suffered reprisals in those areas where Serb power grew
but as yet the Albanians lacked a national movement or a national Church to
unite them. See, Gross, n. 14, p. 105; Elez Biberaj, "Kosovo : The Struggle
for Recognition", Conflict Studies (December 1982), p. 24; Miron Rezun,
Europe's Nightmare (London : Praeger, 2001), pp. 26-27; Vladimir Dedijer et
al., History of Yugoslavia (NY, 1974), p. 60; O.N. Mehrotra, "The Kosovo
Crisis : Perception and Problem", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXII (October
1996), p. 1084.
22. The rise of nationalist ideologies, particularly Serb intellectual's canonization
of Kosovo legend of 1389 and demonization of Albanians considered Kosovo
as the cradle of their nationalism. The first organised Albanian nationalist
movements i.e. the Albanian League of Prizren (1878) and The Leage of Peje
(1899) were founded in Kosovo. But, after Ottoman's defeat in the first Balkan
war in 1911, Serbia Swiftly conquered Kosovo and took horrific revenge
against the Albanians. The 1913 London conference of Ambassadors, which
recognised Albania's independence, assigned more than one-third of Albanian
nation to Serbia and Montenegro. The Albanian's waged a long, but
unsuccessful armed struggle against inclusion in what later become Yugoslavia.
The tide turned in World War I, with the defeat of central powers, Serbia

84 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

remained successful in the recovery of Kosovo. In just a decade tens of
thousands had died on both sides and hundreds of thousands had been
displaced. The New Yugoslav state while pledging to observe minority rights
forcefully encouraged Albanians to leave Kosovo and launching a program of
Serb 'recolonization'. In order to improve agriculture and try to redress the
ethnic balance of population, land hungry Orthodox Serbian peasants from the
barren mountainous regions began to pour in. It is estimated that prior to 1941,
over half a million Albanians were forced to emigrate from Yugoslavia and that
about 40,000 Slav colonists were settled in Kosovo. In 1941, with the collapse
and partition of Yugoslavia, Kosovo and other Yugoslav and Greek territories
which contained ethnic Albanians was annexed to the Italy run kingdom of
Albania. Albanians were thankful to Italy and Germany for having brought
about the realisation of national union. Once again, numerous Serbian refugees
left the area incorporated with Albania. During World War II years, 10,000
Serbs were killed in Pogroms, 100,000 fled their homes while 100,000
Albanians moved into Kosovo from Albania. This pattern would be repeated in
World War II, with massacres, expulsions and reimposition of Serbian
hegemony following the Axis defeat. Communist party of Yugoslavia, at its
fourth Congress held in Dresden in 1928, denounced the harsh persecution of
the Albanians and endorsed the return of Kosovo to Albania. But it reversed its
previous policy after the fall of Yugoslavia in 1941. In its dealings with
Kosovar communists and Communist Party of Albania (CPA), CPY avoided
taking a clear stand on the issue of future of Kosovo. Kosovo's union with
Albania was also endorsed by the first conference of Provincial People's
Council of Kosovo, which was held from 31 December 1943 to 2 January 1944
in Albania. The central committee of the CPY in a letter of 28 March 1944
rejected this resolution of the highest organ of the partisan movement in
Kosovo. In late 1944, under the pretext of destroying "enemy" remnants, the
Yugoslav army undertook a massive campaign in the Albanian regions. As a
result the open revolt broke out in Kosovo. During late 1944, 10,000 Albanians
were arrested and thousands executed. Two thousand Albanian recruits, mainly
from Macedonia were reportedly killed by poisonous gas near Trieste.
Albanian resistance grew with the coming of the Serb-dominated partisan led
by Josip Broz Tito because Kosovars fearing that a communist victory would
lead to Kosovo's reincorporation into Yugoslavia. An uprising that began in
1944 was not fully suppressed until 1952. And again, the Serb dominated
Yugoslavia (Now Socialist) that emerged from World War II began with a
vicious crackdown on its Albanian Population because of their alleged
cooperation with the invaders and nationalist forces against the partisan
movement. The communist authorities perceived the Albanians as politically
unreliable and as a possible threat to the stability and territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia. See, Ibid. , p. 25; Vanita Singh, "Bloodshed in Kosovo",
Mainstream, Vol. XXXVI (October 31, 1988), p. 18; Joce Kriger, Oxford
Companion to Politics of the World (NY, 2001), p. 476; Reginald Hibert,
Albania's National Liberation Struggle : The Bitter Victory (London, 1991),
p. 8.
23. The constitutional arrangements concerning Albanian territories were decided

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 85

arbitrarily. Kosovo was renamed Kosovo-Metohija (Kosmet) and was
proclaimed autonomous region (oblast) within the republic of Serbia. Kosovo
did not even have the same status and rights as Vojvodina, the other
autonomous unit of Serbia. Vojvodina's governmental structure was similar to
republics, it had a Supreme Court, highest governmental body (the people's
assembly). In contrast, the governmental structure of autonomous region of
Kosovo resembled that of local administrative units. It has no Supreme Court
and its highest governmental body was people's council. Belgrade was in
charge of all decisions, including those of purely local concern. Kosovo's
autonomy was thus restricted primarily to the field of policy-execution rather
than policy-making. On the other hand, Serbs argued that it was unfair that
Kosovo and Vojvodina had a say in the running of Serbia but Serbia had no say
in the running of two provinces. Kosovo and Vojvodina could and generally did
vote against Serbia on the federal Presidency. Serbia was powerless to remedy
the parlous situation of the Serbs in Kosovo. These emotive issues of Kosovo
Albanians and Serbs later sparked a cycle of competitive nationalism which
leads to the demise of Yugoslavia and severe ethnic war. See, S. Rajen Singh,
"The Kosovo Crisis an the Quest for Diplomatic Solution", Indian Quarterly,
Vol. LVI, (January-June 2000), p. 3. See, Tim Judah, "Kosovo's Road To
War", Survival, Vol. 41 (Summer 1999), pp. 10-11.

24. Under the pretext of fighting Albanian nationalism and irredentism, the secret
police officials pursued a campaign of intimidation against the Albanians and
also put pressure on them to emigrate. Between 1953 and 1957 some 195,000
Albanians emigrated, most of them from Kosovo and Macedonia. By 1966, the
number of ethnic Albanians forced to leave Yugoslavia reached 230,000. See,
Biberaj, n. 21, p. 29.

25. Following the break with the Soviet block and the exacerbation on relation
between Albania and Belgrade, areas bordering on Albania were considered too
vulnerable as a site for the construction of industrial projects. Investment per
capita in Kosovo was considerably below the Yugoslav average. Thus, during
the period 1947-56 Kosovo's gross investment per-capita were 36 per cent of
Yugoslavia's average and during 1957-65, 59. 1 per cent. Decision on Kosovo's
economic policy made in Belgrade, were politically motivated and as a result
the region did not develop a diversified economy. Since the region was
relatively rich in mineral resources but investments were primarily
concentrated into the extractive industry, making Kosovo essentially a raw
material supplier for the richer regions of Yugoslavia. Economic problems
were compounded by the high birth rate among ethnic Albanians further
impeded the already slow-climbing per-capita national income. See, Ibid.,
p. 30.

26. The demonstrators demanded the creation of Kosovo republic, establishment of
Albanian university, equal status for Serbo-Croatian and Albanian languages.
But in February 1969, the twelfth plenum of CC of LCY Rejected the demand
that Kosovo be granted republican status. Such a demand produced
apprehensions in Serbia where the Albanians were suspected of harbouring
their cherished dream of merging with neighbouring Albania and thus
establishing a "greater Albania." See, Ibid.

86 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

27. In 1968, a series of concessions were granted i.e. real administrative autonomy
for Kosovo, provincial Supreme Court was established, the equality of
Albanian, Serbo-Croatian and Turkish languages was recognised and for the
elevation of Albanian culture and a new university in Pristina was established.
See, Kriger, n. 22, p. 476.

28. Keesing Records of World Events, Vol. 34 (March 1988), p. 35795.

29. In 1984, Milosevic appointed as the head of the Belgrade Party Committee and
in 1986, he succeeded as chief of the Serbian Communist Party. Milosevic
reinvigorated the party by forcing it to embrace nationalism. His entry into
Yugoslav politics put events on the fast tracks as it were. Yet other leading
communists were interested in resolving the Kosovo problem. But from this
problem Milosevic found the strength to overcome the fear of the masses. From
this problem he understood the power of fear and knew how to use it for his
own purpose. The mass movement of Kosovo Serbs developed spontaneously
and with the help of party controlled media and the party machinery, he soon
dominated the movement. Milosevic seem to have allied himself with the
politics of fear. He thrives on it and is always on the lookout for the hostility
and conflict that produce it. This is one of the deeper causes of Yugoslav civil
war. Milosevic counted on war, the ultimate condition of fear to unite Serbs
around him. That is why he refused to look for political solutions to the
persecution of Serbs in Croatia after President Tudjman came to power and in
Bosnia Herzigovina after Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic became its president
in 1990. Milosevic welcomed the Serb's increased sense of insecurity and was
only too glad to plunge them into a war in which they would see him for
protection. He organized mass demonstration in Vojvodina, Kosovo and
Montenegro, overthrow the regimes there and replace them with his own
followers. He thus inspired fear in the leadership of other republics and gave
arms to the Serb nationalists in other republics, other republics cite Serbia's
rising nationalism as threat to their own people. See, Cvijeto Job,
"Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furries", Foreign Policy (Fall 1993), p. 58; Aleksa
Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (Summer
1993), pp. 87-88. See Robert M. Hayden, "Yugoslavia's Collapse : National
Suicide with Foreign Assistance", Economic and Political Weekly, 4 July 1992,
p. 1380; Dusko Doder, "Reflections on a Schizophrenic Peace" in Robert L.
Rothstein, After The Peace : Resistance and Reconciliation (London, 1994),
p. 173.

30. This term describes the condition of a society in which the nationalist policies
and demands of an ethnic or religious group become destructive not only for
the society it is a part of, but also for the group itself. It describes a situation
in which mushrooming demands by ethnic groups paralyze the functioning of
economic and political system. Economic and political conflicts with Serbia
particularly with Milosevic and his supporter have also pushed Slovenes and
Croats toward independence. Serbia effectively used its dominance of federal
institutions to thwart economic reform initiatives. In eight member Yugoslav
Presidency, Serbia controls the votes of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo
and Vojvodina and can generally count on the support of Montenegro and

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 87

Macedonia as well. Serbia has also sabotaged those economic policies it deems
unfavourable to its interests. One example of Serbia's egregious economic act
was the "Great Serbian Bank Robbery" of late 1990. Without the knowledge
or approval of the federal government, Serbia's Parliament Printed US $ 1.8
billion worth of diners to honor election promises made by Milosevic. This
action convinced Slovenes and others that Serbia was not to be trusted. See,
Milica Zarkovic bookman, Economic Decline and Nationalism in Balkans
(London, 1994), p. 4; Carole Rogel, "Slovenia's Independence : A Reversal of
History", Problems of Communism, Vol. XL (July-August 1991), p. 35.

31. Ethnocide is the systematic and deliberatic destruction of one people's culture
by other ethnic group especially by powerful group. Ethnocide is distinguished
from genocide (Greek genos mean race) which is used to denote the physical
destruction of a human group. Although ethnocide has been going on through
history and several terms (such as deculturalization, integration, assimilation
and cultural genocide) have been used to describe its different aspects. In pre-
war Yugoslavia, Albanian Muslims were recognised as a separate ethnic group
subjected to deliberate policy of ethnocide. They had expelled from their native
lands subjected to persecution and their human rights were systematically
violated. The Albanians were denied the right to use their native language and
although they inhabited a compact territory. This territory was divided into four
administrative sectors. The government followed a policy of 'Serbianisation'
designed to assimilate Albanians and to change predominantly the Albanian
character of Kosovo and other Albanian territories. Albanians were forced to
change their names by adding Serb suffixes such as - vie, -ic and -c. Land were
forcefully taken from Albanian farmers and given to Serbian and Montenegerin
settlers. See, Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology (ed.), David Levinson
and Melvin Ember, Henry Holt & Company, New York, 1996, p. 405, See
The Oxford English Dictionary, Edn. 2, Vol. V; John M. Fraser, "Lessons
from Yugoslavia", International Journal, Vol. LVII, (Autumn 2002), p. 645;
Biberaj, n. 21, pp. 24-25.

32. James Hooper, "Kosovo : America's Balkan Problem", Current History, Vol.
627 (April 1999), p. 159.

33. Mark Almond, Europe's Backyard War : The War in Balkans (London, 1994),
p. 190.

34. Levinson and Ember, n. 31, pp. 405-406.

35. The meaning of Xenophobia is fear of foreigners verging on paranoia. It
originated from Greek words Xenos (foreigner) and Phobos (fear). It is also
also related with a person excessively devoted to his/her race, and showing
unreasoning hostility and disdain for others. See Nicholas comfort, "Brewer's
Politics : A Phrase and Fable Dictionary (London, 1995, pp. 88, 686.

36. Ramet, n. 9, pp. 88-89. See also, Richard West, Tito and the Rise and Fall of
Yugoslavia (London, 2001), pp. 354-355.

37. Aleksander Pavkovic, "Recursive Secessions in Former Yugoslavia: To Hard
a Case for Theories of Secession?" Political Studies, Vol. 48 (2000), p. 491.
Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 38 (September 1992), p. 39103.

38. For detailed study of civil society in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe see Isa

88 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Blumi, "Kosova : From the Brink and Back Again", Current History, Vol. 100
(Nov. 2001), p. 370. Ramashray Roy, Politics and Beyond (ND, 2002), pp.
25-26. Larry Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation", Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 5 (July 1994), p. 5. See also, Michael W. Foley and Bob
Edwards, "The Paradoxes of Civil Society", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7
(July 1996), pp. 38, 39, 48, 49. Francis Fukuyama, "The Primacy of Culture",
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6 (Jan. 1996), p. 8. Peter Juviler and Sherrill
Stroschein, "Missing boundaries of Comparison : The Political Community",
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 14 (Fall 1999), pp. 438-439.

39. For analysis of failure of communism and role of ethnic factors in collapse of
the USSR see Patrick Cockburn, "Dateline USSR : Ethnic Tremors", Foreign
Policy, no. 74 (Spring 1989), pp. 169-170. See Arthur H. Miller et al.,
"Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: A Further
Commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz", American Political Science Review,
Vol. 90 (March 1991), p. 153.

40. Arshi Pipa, "Serbian Apologetics : Markovic on Kosovo", Telos (Spring
1990), p. 176.

41. Juviler and Stroshein, n. 38, p. 448.

42. Tihomir Loza, "Kosovo Albanians : Closing the Ranks, Transitions, Vol. 5
(May 1998), pp. 16-17.

43. Juviler and Stroshein, n. 38, p. 449.

44. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism (NY, 1991 ed.), p. 6. See Juviler and Stroschien, n. 38,
p. 440. See also, Alexis Heraclides, The Self Determination of Minorities in
International Politics (London, 1994), p. 8.

45. Ethnocentrism means to give one's own race or ethnic group a supreme
importance. Evolutionary explanations suggest that ethnocentrism is a
biologically determined response to external threats against the group.
Sociobiology points to the kin group basis of cultures and ethnocentrism aided
the reproductive success of group members when they are in competition with
other group for limited resources. These attitudes can undoubtedly be
manipulated by elites and political leaders. Encyclopedia of Cultural
Anthropology, n. 41, pp. 404-405.

46. See John W. Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology : Research and
Applications (NY, 1992), p. 293.

47. Graham Evans and Jeferey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International
Relations (London, 1998), p. 154. See, Lenard J. Cohen, "The Disintegration
of Yugoslavia", Current History , Vol. 91 (Nov. 1992), p., 371.

48. For more details about the efforts of international community for management
of Kosovo crisis see Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 40 (February
1989), p. 39872. Mark Weller, "The Rambouilet Conference on Kosovo",
International Affairs, Vol. 75 (1999), p. 219; Richard Caplan, "International
Diplomacy and The Crisis in Kosovo", International Affairs, Vol. 74 (1998),
p. 747.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 89

Chapter 3

United Nations Role in Kosovo Crisis

The Kosovo crisis showed the severity of ethnic conflicts in
international relations. Its escalation, in 1998, created new challenges
for the United Nations. As described in the second chapter, the
Kosovo crisis was the result of zero-sum ethnic conflict between the
Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians. The Serbian Management of
Kosovo conflict through the process of pseudospeciation resulted in
serious human rights violations of Kosovo Albanians. These
violations contained the extensive loss of life, destruction of property
and mass exodus of refugees in Kosovo. The potential of
humanitarian disaster in Kosovo was so strong that the Western
powers attacked Yugoslavia without the mandate of Security Council.

On the other hand, it is argued that the United Nations was silent
spectator to the events in Kosovo. The paralysis of the United
Nations system was the result of the failure of permanent members
of the Security Council to have consensus on the course of action.
On the contrary, the United Nations role was more complex in this
crisis. It was focused on the humanitarian and human rights issues.
The United Nations human rights system is a reflection of the
contested status of human rights around the world. Human rights
promotion through the charter system has been evolved
considerably. Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration,
human rights institutions in the United Nations system have both
increased in numbers and often evolved beyond a declaratory and
promotional status. The human rights system was moving from the
1947 assertion that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) had
"no power to take any action concerning human rights" (ECOSOC
Resolution 75, 1947) to the authoritative Security Council's
decisions declaring gross human rights violations as threat to
international peace and security. The 1998 Rome compromise on the
establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court indicates
growing innovation and strengthening of the United Nations human

90 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

rights treaty-based system and focus on crimes against humanity.
The establishment of individual responsibility for such crimes
represents a major step towards the direct enforcement of specific set
of international human rights norms. The UN role in Kosovo
indicate dilemma faced by the states i.e. to follow human rights
conventions or to contest these norms. Both the reactions indicate an
evolutionary process whereby the human rights issues gain growing
recognition in the international politics. Thus, for analysing the role
of the United Nations in Kosovo crisis, it is necessary to discuss
about its evolution, principles, purposes and changes in peace-
keeping activities after the end of Cold War which changed its role
in international politics.

EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS

The idea for creating the United Nations did not happen all of a
sudden at the end of World War II. Some of the most important
origins of the idea can be found in the early part of the twentieth
century, when many world leaders were heavily influenced by
political idealism. 2 International society approach can be used to
describe the creation of the United Nations system. According to this
approach, the three concepts i.e. realism, rationalism and
revolutionism defined the relations between states. 3 This relationship
is illustrated in the following Fig. 3.1:

Rationalism

Moderate Soft

Realism Revolutionism

Realism Hard

Revolutionism

'Extre me Rea lism'

Fig. 3.1 : Proximity of the Realist, Rationalist and Revolutionist Traditions.

Source : Jackson & Sorenson, p. 149.

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 9 1

The Realist and the rationalist ideas are embedded in the United
Nations. The United Nations charter gives commanding authority on
the questions of peace and security to five great powers. The United
Nations Security Council is the example of theoretical concept of
moderate realism which holds that international law is based on the
interests and responsibilities of the great powers. The states have no
right to refuse the commands of the Security Council (which is
controlled by five great powers possessing veto power).

The principles of the United Nations i.e. state sovereignty,
territorial integrity, political independence and non intervention etc.
constitute a substantial body of basic norms on which the United
Nations structure and functions are superimposed. The United
Nations geographic scope and diverse activities are unmatched by
any other international organization. The United Nations is
remarkable for two reasons i.e. promotion of cooperation in vast
realm of economic, social and ecological interdependence. This may
be the most valuable part of the United Nations activities. Its second
function is of the highest importance i.e. the production of norms of
legitimacy. This task has been carried out through large number of
treaties and declarations. 4 On the other hand, the United Nations was
basically designed to prevent and to resolve armed conflicts between
states. The delegates at San Francisco sought to create a particular
kind of international organization which could contain the immense
human misery resulted from World War I and II. They were looking
backward rather than the future and defined its main tasks in the
light of the events of previous decade.

The United Nations charter is an extension of Westphalian logic
par excellence. 5 The most fundamental principle of the United
Nations system is "sovereignty". During the cold war, sovereignty
was usually interpreted by the United Nations members in the
manner of traditional hard-line realists. 6 The intra-state conflicts and
forms of diffused violence (i.e. slaughter of civilians, terrorism,
genocide) confound international relations after 1989. These
'decomposing', degenerate or anarchical conflicts (manifesting
themselves as scattered violence) are subject to no rules, thrown up
the dilemma of respecting national sovereignty and ensuring respect
for human rights. 7

92 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

A cursory glance around the post-cold war world illustrates that
the system of the United Nations law, the Hague and Geneva bodies
of law is in ruins. 8 It was not that the state was challenged but its
claim as a moral absolute was challenged. This view pointed out that
a commitment to applying international human rights law to the right
of self-determination reinforces the acknowledgement that the state
sovereignty is not absolute at least as far as the treatment of persons
and groups on their territory is concerned. 9 The Kosovo crisis was
the apex of this problem in which the United Nations faced dilemma
of state sovereignty and intervention, based on the humanitarian
issues. The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan obviously
described,

State sovereignty, in its most basic sense is being redefined-not least
by the forces of globalization and international co-operation. States are
now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their
peoples, and not vice- versa. At the same time individual sovereignty,
by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual,
enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties
has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of
individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than
ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not
to protect those who abuse them. 10

The views of Secretary-General highlighted the fact that
international relations involve not only states but also human beings
who possess human rights. It represents a transition of human rights
issues from purely domestic jurisdiction to increasing international
concern. This transition could be complicated by the differences in
ideology and standards of human rights with international
enforcement and implementation instruments and models of human
rights. 11 Kosovo pointed out this conflict of basic values of
international relations which changed the role of the United Nations
in world politics. This conflict challenges the principles of Article
2(4) and Article 2(7) of "territorial integrity", "political
independence" and domestic jurisdiction" of the United Nations. It
also shows that the massive killings of civilian people and mass scale
violation of their human rights in intra-state conflicts changed the
form of the United Nations peace-keeping and peace-enforcement
powers vested in chapter VII of the charter. 12 The growing salience

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 93

of intra-state conflicts as a threat to world peace has reflected in the
United Nations peace-keeping activities. The cascading generations
of peace-keeping also reflect the changed role of United Nations in
world politics. There are six generations of peace-keeping which
differentiate the inter-state peace-keeping from intra-state peace-
keeping and its changed structures, tasks and components. 13

THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING ROLE
IN KOSVO CRISIS

NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis also proved as
watershed in the United Nations peacekeeping system. NATO states
could not seek the United Nations endorsement for the air strikes
launched against FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) on 24
March 1999. This circumvention was directly related to divisions
among the five permanent members of the council on the use of
force to resolve the Kosovo crisis. The Secretary-General Kofi
Annan described the failure of preventive diplomacy in Kosovo in
his annual report,

Early warning is now universally agreed to be a necessary condition
for effective preventive diplomacy. It is not, unfortunately, a sufficient
condition, as the tragedy in Kosovo has demonstrated. As the crisis
unfolded, I twice addressed the Security Council in the hope that
consensus could be achieved for effective preventive action.
Regrettably, diplomatic efforts failed and the destructive logic of
developments on the ground prevailed. 14

Structural and low-level violence before 1998 was also the
important reason of failure of preventive diplomacy in Kosovo.
Structural violence may take the form of discriminatory judicial
systems or partisan security structures. It may include systemic
human rights abuses which are key indicators of the potential for
violent conflict. Low-level violence involved hate speeches,
protests, intermittent rioting or assassinations of selected
individuals. The routine and low-profile nature of this violence may
contribute to its invisibility. 15 Since 1981 Kosovo was smouldering.
Serbia used its security structures brutally for quelling and prevented
Albanians in Kosovo from gaining autonomy. 16 International
community had not taken these developments seriously. It is

94 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

conceivable that NATO powers which were dealing with the
developments in Balkans could have failed to recognize that Kosovo
was a "Tinder box". 17

Since 1992, the United Nations had paid close attention to the
situation, particularly the human right situation in Kosovo. The
United Nations role in the Kosovo crisis can be divided into two
parts i.e.

1. Pre-NATO attack preventive diplomacy for hampering
mass scale human rights violations.

2. Post-NATO attack role of peace-building.

The United Nations peace-keeping efforts in Kosovo can be
analysed through three peace-keeping categories i.e. patching-up,
prophylaxis and proselytism.

United Nations Peace-Keeping

Patching-up

Investigation
Mediation
Supervision
Administration

Prophylactic

Accusation
Sedation
Obstruction
Refrigeration

Proselytism

Invalidation
Coercion

Patching-up consists of activity which intends to bring disputants
to an agreement or to assist in the execution of a settlement. Peace-
keeping efforts of this kind is often like the nature of surgery
because the long-term success of which is in some doubt. Any
United Nations peace-keeping act comes within patching-up
category which encourage and associate with an agreed resolution of
tension.

The United Nations often faced conditions which are potentially
threatening and failed to offer a realistic prospect of a negotiated
settlement. It may therefore adopt a second "prophylactic" approach
which is designed to prevent the situation from deteriorating. It may
hope that this will provide the basis for a subsequent improvement

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

95

in relations between the parties. Its immediate aim in these
circumstances is to maintain calm or prevent violence.

The third and final peace-keeping category comprises those UN
operations which are neither conciliatory not preventive but which
are instituted for changing certain aspects of the established order of
things. In this category called "proselytism" , the United Nations
seek to act as an instrument of change in order to enforce the
concerned parties or regimes to obey international standards of
behaviour. 18

The United Nations various peace-keeping activities do not
always contain neatly into this threefold framework. Sometimes the
organization has engaged, at the same time and at the same situation,
in both patching-up and prophylactic endeavours. The mandate
which is given to a mission is usually a good guide of the role of
United Nations. The four methods of patching-up, four of
prophylaxis and two of proselytism illustrate different ways in which
the same goal may be sought. First patching-up route to an
agreement lies through an impartial investigation of the facts of the
case. The second procedure is mediation and the United Nations
used it in number of cases. The United Nations can also help to
repair quarrels by assisting in the implementation of an agreement.
For this purpose, the United Nations supervises the parties for
execution of their promises. The United Nations may go beyond this
activity when it plays an administrative role in territorial dispute by
enabling the area in question to spend an interim period in
international hands.

There are four forms of prophylactic activity. First is the device
of accusation. This is based on the assumption that the garnering of
facts will expose and so may check the unpopular behaviour of
offender states. The United Nations have been using this device in
Kosovo since the inception of the crisis. Another way of trying to
reach the same end is to make private representations in favour of
restraint. Such operations may take place in two ways, firstly by
negotiations with the government concerned and secondly through
cooling activity at the military level. Such activities may be termed
'sedation'. A more ambitious task for the United Nations is
'obstruction'. It means the placing of the United Nations force

96 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

between two disputing countries or communities in the hope that it
may serve as something of a barrier to the outbreak of violence. It
is also open to the United Nations to 'refrigerate' the areas which
give rise to tension by taking them over formally or informally. The
United Nations take over these areas until tempers have cooled or a
settlement can be reached. There are two types of proselytism i.e.
'invalidation' and 'coercion'. The device of invalidation is used as
fact-finding mission. It is used in the expectation that its report
would be so damaging as to suggest that the regime in question is
morally unfit for continued rule. However, the non-responsiveness
of the criticized government or party to the United Nations hints that
they should give up unacceptable behaviour or make way for more
acceptable regimes. It has turned some thoughts toward, 'coercion'.
The device of Coercion is a most effective expression of the United
Nations proselytizing zeal. 19 Regime change in Haiti is the recent
example of this method.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE KEEPING CATEGORIES
BY UNITED NATIONS IN KOSOV CRISIS

The United Nations has been using the mix of patching-up and
prophylactic methods in Kosovo. Its role in Kosovo could focus on
humanitarian and the human rights. The humanitarian role of the
United Nations in Kosovo illustrates the dichotomy between the state
sovereignty and human rights. The Kosovo crisis sharpens and
highlighted this incompatibility between both fundamental values.
Sovereignty is enshrined in Articles 2(1), 2(4) and 2(7) of Charter.
It provides internal exclusive jurisdiction within a territory and
external freedom from outside interference. On the other hand, the
Preamble, Article 1(3) and various declarations, conventions
describes that individual rights are inalienable or transcend
sovereign frontiers. 20

The ascendence of human rights issue in the intra-state wars
after the end of cold war offers a paradigmatic challenge to
Hobbesian stand of the Westphalian legacy. This legacy is based on
horizontal inter-state system which provides equality of states. But
the human rights instruments concerned with the matters between
states and its populations (vertical approach) rather than inter-state

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 97

relations. 21 The Secretary-General Boutras B. Ghali declared
categorically,

It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the
essential domestic jurisdiction of states cannot be regarded as
protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or
systematically violated with impunity. . . . The case for not impinging on
the Sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of state
is by itself indubitably strong. But it would only be weakened if it were
to carry the implication that Sovereignty, even in this day and age,
includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic
campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the
name of controlling civil strife or insurrection. 22

The political unrest in Kosovo was simmering from 1981 when
the Kosovo Albanian students openly clashed with government
authorities in the capital Pristina. This resulted in the severe
suppression of Kosovo Albanians by Serbs in the province. But, the
tide of nationalism that began to rise in 1989 led to the disintegration
of the USSR and collapse of communism in the Eastern Europe. The
four of the six republics comprising the Yugoslavia i.e. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia unilaterally declared
independence between June and October 1991. The declarations
resulted in armed conflict with the Republic of Serbia and ethnic
strife within the four republics. The escalating violence was brought
to the attention of the Security Council in September 1991. The
Australia informed the Secretary-General that the situation in
Yugoslavia deteriorated to the point where it needed urgent attention
of the United Nations. Latter, the Security Council convened a
meeting on 25 September, 1991 in response to consider the requests
of Austria, Canada and Hungry about dangerous situation in
Yugoslavia. The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution
713 sponsored by Austria, Belgium, France, USSR and United
Kingdom in the same meeting. The Security Council acting under
chapter VII of the United Nations charter imposed arms embargo
upon Yugoslavia. 23

The Security Council adopted two other resolutions 721 and 724
and sent mission to Yugoslavia to bring about all parties to accept
cease-fire so that a peace-keeping operation might be deployed for
creating the necessary conditions for negotiations on Yugoslavia's

98 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

future. The United Nations continued to monitor human rights
violations in Yugoslavia including Kosovo through the Office of
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Special
Rapporteur for Former Yugoslavia. It used European powers and
regional organizations for investigation, mediation and accusatory
purposes. The United Nations intensified its efforts in 1992 to
resolve the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The United
Nations Security Council and General Assembly adopted number of
resolutions related to the conflict in the Yugoslavia in 1992. The
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was
organised in 1992 to combine the efforts of the United Nations,
European Community (EC), Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Organisation of Islamic
Conference (OIC). 24 The ICFY engaged in extensive diplomatic
activities to promote peaceful resolution of humanitarian problems in
Yugoslavia including Kosovo.

The Serbian and Kosovar Albanian groups in Kosovo were not
in direct and open conflict until the last month of 1998. Hence an
enquiry may appear to be the most obvious step in this situation. The
observers can be sent to an area where potential explosion of
violence is likely to occur. This enables the world institution to
receive an immediate report about the deteriorating situation. The
CSCE sent missions to Yugoslavia in September 1992 to promote
dialogue and collect information on human rights violations. At the
end of June 1992, Yugoslavia withdrew its acceptance of CSCE
missions in Kosovo and other two areas. The Security Council
adopted resolution 855 sponsored by France, Hungry, Spain, United
Kingdom and United States in August 1993 and called upon
Yugoslav authorities to reconsider their refusal to allow the CSCE
mission's activities in Kosovo and other two areas. 25

The General Assembly in resolution 49/13 (1994) also called for
the full implementation of resolution 855 (1993). On 28 April, 1994,
Italy for the first time transmitted to the Secretary-General a
statement and expressed the CSCE community's deep concern about
the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. It urged the Government of
Yugoslavia to respect its commitment to the CSCE principles and to
facilitate the early and unconditional return of the CSCE missions to

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 99

Kosovo. The Hungary as a chairman-in-office of the CSCE
transmitted to the Secretary-General a statement and expressed deep
concern over suppression of Albanians in Kosovo. It called on the
Yugoslav authorities to end the flagrant violations of human rights
and respect fundamental freedoms in Kosovo. 26

The United Nations used the CSCE mission's reports as
'accusation' method. This method is not embarked upon the
immediate hope of putting an end to the dispute but intends to
produce a quietening effect. The parent body made an authoritative
call for the cessation of hostile acts on the basis of reports received.
The assumption was that any such decision emanating from world
institution would carry a good deal of weight, by virtue both of its
authorship and of the fact that it is the product of an independent
enquiry. This causing the states and groups directly involved in the
conflict to reconsider their policies. In this way the United Nations
place some obstacles in the way of the beginning or continuation of
aggressive policies and contribute towards the reduction of
tension. 27 The United Nations Security Council and the General
Assembly adopted various resolutions related with deteriorating
situation in Kosovo. These resolutions reflect prophylactic
'accusation' approach, designed to prevent the situation from
deteriorating." The Security Council Resolution 855 (1993) stressed
Yugoslavia to reconsider its policy toward the CSCE missions. The
General Assembly had condemned Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's
violations of human rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and urged
it to end these violations, re-established democratic institutions and
resume dialogue in resolution 48/153 adopted in 1993. In 1995, the
Assembly requested the Secretary-General and relevant regional
organizations to establish international monitoring presence in
Kosovo through resolution 50/190. This request was repeated time
and again in resolutions 51/111 in 1996 and 52/139 in 1997. 28

On the other hand, the criticized state has different anticipations
about report. First, a report will be called by those who are already
clear about the fundamental character of the dispute in their mind
and support pre-existing views. This leads to second point that the
criticized state is most unlikely to welcome the idea of a report being
made on its activities. It may not go so far as to refuse entry to the

100 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

investigation because it could be more damaging than a critical first
hand report. It may even agree with apparent willingness to the
proposal that an enquiry should be made. 29 But the government of
the target state carry on its secret policies unabatedly. The role of
the CSCE Mission in Kosovo is the best example of this phenomena.
Despite the CSCE missions in Yugoslavia and other regional
organizations' activities, the scope and intensity of the conflict in
Kosovo grew dramatically in 1998. It resulted in extensive loss of
life, destruction of property, a massive exodus of refugees, serious
human rights violations and potential humanitarian catastrophes. In
this situation, the institution's role which is called upon to secure a
report can become more important. During 1998, United Nations
with the support of contact group on the former Yugoslavia 30 and
OSCE directed the parties to solve dispute through mediatory or
accusatory methods. The Contact Group's foreign ministers meeting
in London on 9 March 1998, declared that the violent repression of
non- violent expression of political views in Kosovo was completely
indefensible. They called on Belgrade authorities to invite
independent forensic experts to investigate allegations.

The OSCE permanent council, in its 11 March, 1998 decision,
authorised operational measures to allow adequate observation of
borders with Kosovo and the prevention of possible spillover effects
of Kosovo conflict. 31 On 31st March 1998, the Security Council met
to consider the situation in Kosovo and the reports of contact group.
The Security Council adopted resolution 1160 and imposed arms
embargo on Yugoslavia. 32 In his first report on implementation of
the Security Council resolution 1160 (1998), the Secretary-General
stated that a sanctions committee had been established to monitor the
implementation of the arms embargo on Yugoslavia. The Secretary-
General transmitted the reports of the OSCE and EU on the situation
in Kosovo. In June and July respectively, the Secretary-General
reported that the situation in Kosovo remained tense and the security
conditions steadily deteriorating. On 5 August, the Secretary-
General also reported that the situation in Kosovo continued to
deteriorate with heavy fighting in several areas. According to
UNHCR, more than 100,000 people had been driven from their
homes and between 70,000 and 80,000 were internally displaced in

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 101

Kosovo by the end of July. Kosovo had the potential to becoming a
humanitarian disaster with the increasing number of displaced
persons. On 24 August, the Security Council President made call for
ceasefire in Kosovo. On 4 September, the Secretary-General
reported that the human rights situation in Kosovo was marked by
widespread violations. The Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) was receiving lot of reports regarding
human rights violations. 33

The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1199
on 23 September 1998 and repeated that the deterioration of situation
in Kosovo constitute a threat to peace and security in the region. The
Security Council demanded the effective and continuous
international monitoring in Kosovo by the European Community
Monitoring Mission and diplomatic mission accredited to the FRY. 34
In October 1998, the Secretary-General reported that the fighting in
Kosovo continued unabated. Here, the United Nations used the
second prophylactic method called 'sedation'. Sedation consists of
direct endeavours to exert a calming influence on inflammable
situations. It requires the direct dealings of United Nations
representatives with the officials of the involved states. The main
hope of this method is that the on-the-spot exhortations in the name
of world organisation would prevent the dispute from getting out of
hand. Such operations take place in two ways, firstly, by
negotiations with the governments concerned and secondly, through
cooling activity at the military level. The sedation at the diplomatic
level does not necessarily require that an agent of the United Nations
visit the country concerned. It can be attempted by means of
resolutions of the United Nations political organs, through the
Secretary-General's private representations to the heads of the
disputant's United Nations missions. The prophylactic measures of
this kind used at periods of considerable tension. These are not only
used for avoiding loss of time but also designed to maximise the
effects of the United Nations intervention. 35

The United Nations Secretary-General, in his October 1998
report endorsed the efforts of the Contact Group and Christopher
Hill's (United State Ambassador to FYROM and peace envoy)
agreement with the Belgrade authorities and Kosovo Albanians on

102 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

the future of Kosovo. The United States special envoy Richard
Holbrooke, negotiated with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic
and reached on accord. This effort of sedation resulted in an
agreement that all the problems in Kosovo and Metohija could be
solved through dialogue and peaceful means. 36

As a way of keeping peace, the mobilization of world opinion
or the issue of cooling injunctions has obvious limitations. Thus, the
third prophylactic possibility called 'obstruction' may be open to the
United Nations where a dispute finds expression in a dangerous
flashpoint. The obstruction is the placing of non-combatant force or
verifiers with the consent of host state for preventing the situation
from deterioration. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and the Yugoslavia signed Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) on
15 October 1998. The agreement provided for an air surveillance
system. The Yugoslavia and OSCE signed another agreement which
allowed the OSCE mission to verify maintenance of the ceasefire by
all elements. The mission comprised 2000 unarmed verifiers from
the OSCE member countries and was intended to be headquartered
in Pristina, capital of Kosovo. 37 The United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1203 (1998) endorsed the establishment of these
verification missions. This resolution called for prompt and
complete investigation, international supervision of atrocities
committed against civilians since 1991 and full cooperation with
International Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law. 38

The Secretary-General sent an interdepartmental mission,
headed by 'Staffan de Mistura' to Yugoslaiva. The members of
mission met governmental and local officials, representatives of the
Kosovo Albanian Community, international organizations,
international and local NGO's and members of diplomatic
community. The mission also assessed the modalities for
coordination of activities between the OSCE and the United Nations
agencies on the ground. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and OHCHR had established close coordination
with Kosovo verification mission in field and close liaison with the
OSCE in Vienna. These efforts had some positive effects on the
situation and the Secretary-General reported in November that the

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 103

crisis situation in Kosovo were diffusing. It had created more
favourable conditions for political settlement. In December report,
the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that no major
combat between military forces occurred in Kosovo but the situation
on the ground was far from peaceful. 39

According to the Secretary-General report to Security Council
in January 1999 that the humanitarian and human right situation in
Kosovo remained grave and the violence including the violations of
October 1998 ceasefire continued. The human rights situation had
further deteriorated and culminated in the massacre of the Kosovo
Albanians in Racak village. The Security Council President
condemned the Racak Massacre in Kosovo. 40 In March, the OSCE
reported that the situation in Kosovo remained grave with localized
clashes between Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serbian
forces. The NATO Secretary-General informed the United Nations
Secretary-General that its senior military authorities visited
President Milosevic on 19 January and reinforced the need for him
to honour his obligations but he had failed to do so. On 23 March,
the NATO Secretary-General reported that following the withdrawal
of KVM on 20 March, Yugoslavia had increased its military
activities and using excessive and disproportionate force in
Kosovo. 41 Under the auspices of the Contact Group on former
Yugoslavia, the representatives of the Federal Yugoslav and the
Serbian Government and Kosovo Albanians met in Rambouillet,
France, on 6 February. On 18 March, the Kosovo Albanian
representatives signed the Rambouillet accords. This accord
provided three year interim self-government in Kosovo and peace
and security for everyone living in Kosovo. 42 However, the
delegation of the Republic of Serbia refused to sign the accord. It
signed its own text, "Agreement for Self-Government in Kosmet."
The talks were adjourned on 19 March, on that day, the OSCE
withdrew KVM. On 23 March, Yugoslavia declared a state of
imminent danger of war. The European council on 25 March
expressed that the last ditch mediation mission of US Ambassador
Holbrooke and three other Rambouillet negotiators to persuade
President Milosevic to accept ceasefire failed. 43

The above mentioned process showed that the states are

104 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

certainly sensitive to criticism but it does not follow that they would
alter their policies just to accommodate world opinion. Governments
generally do not regard it as consonant with their dignity or perhaps
with their domestic stability. International body's demands may
increase the state's determination to stand firm and receive comfort
and support from its friends. The successful outcome of international
opinion is based on two factors. Firstly, if the criticized state knows
that certain powerful friends would stand by it then it could afford
to take little notice of decisions taken by organized international
community. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia knew that Russia
and China, two permanent Security Council members could veto any
Western resolution regarding use of force on its territory. The main
driver behind Belgrade's expectations about Russian support led
Milosevic to bet that NATO would strike weakly. He was almost
certainly encouraged the gambit by the prospect that Russia would
"hold the ring". It deflected or minimized NATO air-strikes by
threatening to severe many important aspects of its relations with the
United States and NATO. The Yugoslavia misperceived Russia's
influence with the United States and its ability to cushion it from
NATO's wrath. 44 Thus, President Milosevic refused to sign
Rambouillet accords and did not accept the ceasefire in Kosovo.

Secondly, in this situation, the efficacy of international action
would largely turn on the attitude of major powers. If they are
agreed on the desirability of preventing violent change and
maintaining a peaceful international atmosphere then it would be
possible for the United Nations to have prophylactic effects on
troubled situation. NATO's air campaign started on 24 March 1999
is the example of this situation. NATO started its air campaign
without the United Nations endorsement against Yugoslavia. This
circumvention was directly stated to the divisions among the five
permanent members of Security Council on the use of force to
resolve the Kosovo crisis and the commitment of China and Russia
to veto military intervention in Kosovo.

The Russia and China strongly reacted against NATO action.
The Russia convened meetings on 24 and 26 March to discuss the
action, at which NATO members defended their position by pointing
to Yugoslavia's violation of Security Council Resolutions 1199 and

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 105

1203. A Russian-sponsored resolution identifying the NATO action
as a threat to international peace and security and calling for an
immediate end to the use of force, which garnered support only from
Namibia and China. Following the bombing of its Belgrade embassy
on 7 May, China requested that Security Council meeting be
convened to issue a formal protest to the NATO action. 45 On 14
May, the Security Council Condemned NATO's attack on Chinese
diplomatic property. 46 The United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1239 for averting the humanitarian catastrophe in the
region particularly in Kosovo. The Security Council instructed the
UNHCR and other relief organizations to provide assistance to
refugees. 47 Latter, the United Nations Secretary-General with
Yugoslavia's agreement, dispatched the United Nations inter-agency
Needs Assessment Mission to Yugoslavia from 16 to 27 May 1998.
This mission provided an initial assessment of the emergency needs
of civilian populations and the rehabilitation requirements in
Kosovo.

The United Nations Secretary-General appointed Carl Bildt
(Sweden) and Edward Kukan (Slovakia) as special envoys for
Balkans to assist in restoring peace and security and establishing
conditions conducive to the voluntary return of refugees and
displaced persons. On 6 May, the G-8 Foreign Ministers, met in
Bonn (Germany) and adopted general principles on the political
solution of the Kosovo crisis. The Yugoslavia conveyed to the
Secretary-General, on 4 June, that it accepted the G-8 peace plan
(principles). On 10 June, the Security Council adopted the resolution
1244, which marked the end of conflict and the establishment of the
United Nations interim administration in Kosovo. NATO military
authorities and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concluded the
Military-Technical Agreement (Kumanovo agreement) on the
procedures and modalities of the withdrawal of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia's (FRY) Security Forces from Kosovo. By that
agreement, it agreed to the deployment of the international security
force called KFOR in Kosovo. With the confirmation of
Yugoslavia's withdrawal of its forces from Kosovo, NATO
suspended its air campaign.

The final way in which the United Nations can help to patch-up

106 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

situations is by engaging in an administrative activity. In this set up,
a disputed area may be handed over to the United Nations to permit
the opening of negotiations regarding its future. The United Nations
acting as its government until the conflicting parties may agree that
the question at issue should be decided at a latter date by the
inhabitants of the region concerned. A further possibility is that the
international rule may be the means of transferring an area from one
authority to another. 48 The United Nations finally tried to solve the
Kosovo crisis through the implementation of resolution 1244 and
established an Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) in Kosovo.

CAUSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS FAILURE TO HALT
GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN PRE-UNMIK
CONTROLLED KOSOVO

The analysis of humanitarian role of the United Nations in the
Kosovo crisis showed that the world body inspite of its efforts failed
to avert and halt upsurge of violence in Kosovo and this failure led
to the NATO attack without prior authorization of the Security
Council. There are several factors which accounts for the initial
hesitancy of the Security Council Permanent Members i.e.

Firstly, there were divisions among the major powers e.g.
Russia refused to support many sanctions. Russia opposed not only
the use of military power but also the economic sanctions that were
imposed by the EU and the United States. Russia tried to preserve
its controlling role in the further administration of the Kosovo
Crisis. Russia retained this role by having involvement in the crisis
of collective bodies which it was representing and was able to block
decisions requiring consensus. These bodies were Contact Group,
OSCE and the United Nations Security Council where Russia
enjoyed Veto Power. France too was trying to preserve its role as a
leading international power. It also attempted to undermine the
United States attempt to locate further decision-making on Kosovo
away from the Security Council and towards NATO, which the
United States dominated. Italy also played similar role to protect its
influence on events through the Contact Group. The EU's role in the
Kosovo crisis made the matter more difficult because it was intended
to symbolize the ability of the Europeans to sort out their own
backyard problems without the need to rely on the decisive United

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 107

States action. The attempt to achieve a settlement for Kosovo also
reopened the struggle for pre-eminence between the OSCE (Russia
consider it principal focus of authority in relation to peace and
security in Europe), The EU and the United States and the United
Kingdom which wanted to preserve the dominant role of NATO. 49

Some states were wishing to temper punitive measures imposed
by the Security Council with positive incentives. That's why, the one
consequence of international diplomacy over the past decade was to
radicalize the Kosovo Albanians and another to embolden President
Milosevic's actions in Kosovo. Since November 1995, the United
Nations has maintained an 'outer wall' of sanctions against
Belgrade. But, through the Security Council Resolution 1022 (22
November 1995) suspended some sanctions against Yugoslavia for
inducing President Milosevic to assume more conciliatory stance
towards Kosovo. The United Nations Security Council, on the other
hand, barred Yugoslavia's membership in major international
organizations including International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank (WB). But President Milosevic successfully managed to
offset many of the effects of these measures. The sale of 49 percent
of Telecom Serbia to Telecom Italia and Greece in 1997 brought
enormous relief to Belgrade's strained treasury. While the European
Commission decided not to renew trade preferences for Yugoslavia
in December 1997 but Britain and Italy were engaged in efforts to
finance the setting up a stock exchange in Belgrade. The British
embassy was using the services of an investment Bank to promote
business. Italy opened a trade office in Belgrade and German,
French and Greek companies were busy to negotiate business
deals. 50

Secondly, the United States unwillingness to follow through its
threat of air strikes against the Serbian Military targets conveyed the
impression of softness towards Yugoslavia. The United States
President George Bush delivered a warning to Milosevic in
December 1992 during Bosnian war. President Bush feared that the
spillover effect of Bosnian genocide reached Kosovo if President
Milosevic cracked down on Albanians. President Clinton also
reaffirmed this threat after took office in 1993. These threats helped
to keep peace in Kosovo for five years but did not relieve the

108 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

apartheid-like repression endured by the ethnic Albanians. On
February 1998, the US envoy Gelbard Praised Milosevic for his
constructive attitude towards Dayton process and signalled
America's readiness to several sanction against Yugoslavia. Envoy
Gelbard declared Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) a terrorist
organization for pressurising Belgrade to adopt a more constructive
and positive approach towards Kosovo. 51 It was shortly thereafter
that President Milosevic launched large scale attacks against local
population and killed 2000 people, displaced 500,000 from their
homes, collapsed number of villages. 52

The third factor which inhibited the major powers to act
decisively in the Kosovo crisis was Serbian sovereignty. Although,
the Serbian behaviour in Kosovo was not, as Belgrade claimed,
strictly its internal affair. The grave breaches of international
humanitarian law in Yugoslavia were a legitimate concern of
international community as established by various international
covenants to which Yugoslavia was also a signatory and the statute
of the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia. But, the major powers could not reach on consensus to
intervene or use forcible measures in defence of humanitarian
principles (which were lawful or desirable in Kosovo) due to the
violation of Serbian sovereignty and its possible ramifications for
world order.

Fourthly, the failure of the international community to lend
effective support to the Kosovar Albanians in their struggle for self-
determination (notwithstanding evidents concern for their plight) has
led growing numbers of the latter to abandon non-violent resistance
in favour of armed struggle. 53

In addition, the federal republics were entitled to claim
statehood on the basis of a right to self determination which was not
located in general international law but in Yugoslavia's constitution
law. The Yugoslavia's Constitution of 1974 had provided the
possibility of secession of its constituent republics. The legal
management of the creation of the new states within the Former
Yugoslavia made clear that the concept of self-determination based
in the constitutional status of a republic within a federation was not
free from danger. This was made evident by the example of

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 109

Chechnya. Chechnya was an autonomous territory within Russia
which was a federal unit of USSR. Russia achieved statehood after
USSR's demise in 1991. The new Russian constitution in turn
promoted Chechnya to the status of a republic within the Russian
Federation. Chechnya engaged in an armed struggle for
independence when it found that the Russian Federation was not
accorded it the legal protection available under doctrine of self-
determination. The Russian state used brutal repressive force against
rebel Chechnya and changed it into a rubble. But international
community, instead of insisting on a cessation of repressive
measures, withdrawal of Russian troops and the maintenance of
territorial integrity of Chechnya, merely demanded compliance by
Russia with human rights and humanitarian law for management of
the crisis. The Kosovo fell between the precedent of the Yugoslav
republics and of the Chechnya. 54

A fifth factor was related with some fundamental but
paradoxical aims shared by major powers and President Milosevic.
The major powers adamantly opposed the Kosovo's independence
like President Milosevic but for very different reasons. The United
States and the West European states were concerned that the
establishment of independent Kosovo would shatter the fragile peace
in Bosnia and stimulate the Kosovo Albanian minority in
neighbouring Macedonia to join Kosovar state. The major powers
also feared that an independent Kosovo would seek to unite with
Albania. The major concern of international community was that an
independent Kosovo would serve as a positive example for the
numerous self-determination movements bent on separation
elsewhere in the Europe. 55 Although, the major powers and
President Milosevic had common interests to defeat separatism in
Kosovo but they have disagreed about the means to be employed and
the framework of the possible solution. Due to these reasons, the
major powers and the Contact Group were no longer insisted on the
withdrawal of Yugoslavia's special forces from Kosovo but
modestly demanded to halt Belgrade's attacks against the civilian
people.

The United Nations Mission in Kosovo successfully worked
with comprehensive authority in all aspects of Kosovar society until

110 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

the final settlement of Kosvo's status in international relations.
While the Kosovo crisis reflected the sound and strong peace-
building role of the United Nations in the post-Cold War intrastate
conflicts but it also shows the impact of changed world power
relations on the United Nations system. Even the political solution
of Kosovo war did not take place in the Security Council but rather
in the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized countries forum. 56 This
further undermined the Security Council's position as the principal
actor in the management of international peace and security. Before
analysis of the United Nations role in building of Kosovo's shattered
society, the analysis of the role of the United States and NATO in
the Kosovo crisis is necessary because both powerful actors strongly
effected the working of the United Nations system in world affairs.

References :

1. Hans Peter Schmitz and Kathryn Sikkinic, "International Human Rights" in
Walter Carlsnaes et ah, Handbook of International Relations (London, 2002),
pp. 528-529.

2. The deeper roots actually go back much further e.g. Jean-Jacques Rousseau
argued that the principle of state sovereignty (as recognized by the treaty of
westphalia) was partially responsible for wars. These influences generated the
idea that there needed to be curbs on sovereignty for increased international
cooperation. At the start of the twentieth century, many political leaders sought
to create a cooperative community of nation-states that would ensure the
collective security of member states. The notion of collective security,
combined with the harsh lessons of World War I, led to the formation of the
League of Nations in 1918. The League of Nations was almost completely
ineffective and did not prevent the outbreak of World War II. The United
Nations is the world's second attempt at creating an intergovernmental
organization (IGO) to ensure world peace and to establish the economic, social
and political foundations through which this can be realized. Chapter - 1 of the
United Nations Charter lists purposes and Principles of the organization. The
Preamble makes a logical distinction between ends and means while chapter I
distinguished between purposes and principles. Article I formulates four
purposes of the United Nations which cover both ends and means. Article 2
defines the seven principles which guide the actions of the members of the
United Nations. The logical relationship between Articles 1 and 2 seems to be
that Article 1 defines ends and means while Article 2 lays down the general
standards of action which observed with regard to those ends means. For more
details of Historical evolution of the United Nations. See W. Raymond Duncan
et ah, Power Politics in 21st Century (NY, 2002), p. 213. See, Graham Evans

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 111

and Jeffry Newnhem, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations
(London, 1998), p. 552. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. & Eugene R. Wittkopf, World
Politics : Trends and Transformation (NY, 1999), edn. VIII, p. 750. Yearbook
of United Nations, 1994-95 (NY : United Nations Publications, 1994-95), p.
15. See Hans J. Morganthau, The Impasse of American Foreign Policy
(Chicago, 1962), p. 113. A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations :
Principles and Issues (New Jersey, 1991), p. 55. See Chapter VII of United
Nations Charter related to regional arrangements.

3. These three concepts are represented the views of Machiavalli, Hugo Grotius
and immanual kant respectively. The first concept views states as power
agencies that pursue their own interests. It can be distinguished between
extreme realism and moderate realism. Extreme realists deny the existence of
an international society. The society is possible within states but not between
states. No sovereign state has a authority to command any other sovereign
state. No sovereign state has obligation to obey any other state. Moderate
realists are closer to rationalists in international law. But they see international
law as based on the interests and responsibilities of the great powers.
Rationalists views states as legal organizations that operate in accordance with
international law and diplomatic practice. It thus conceives of international
relations as rule governed activities based on the mutually recognized authority
of sovereign states. The third concept downplays the importance of states and
places the emphasis on human beings. There are two 'hard' and soft versions
of revolutionism. Duncan, n. 2, p. 215.

4. Stanley Hoffman, World Disorders : Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era
(NY, 1998), p. 180.

5. Only states can become members of the organization. Membership
requirements are, a commitment to the principles of the charter which sustains
the territorial sovereignty principle and a declaration of being peace loving.
There are no entrance requirements that refer to the internal arrangements of
states. The charter prohibits actions dealing with member's domestic politics
and concern with the conditions of populations within states is secondary,
perhaps only negligible. The only constraint on sovereignty is the prohibition
against the threat or use of force except for self-defense or when ordered by the
Security Council. The civil and intra-state wars erupted after end of cold war
had not been anticipated by the drafters of the charter. The Kosovo crisis is the
extreme which presented new intellectual challenges to almost every principle
of the United Nations. See Richard A. Falk, "Democratizing,
Internationalizing, and Globalizing" in Yosirkazu Sakamoto, ed., Global
Transformation : Challenges to the State System (NY, 1994), p. See, Kalevi J.
Holsti, The State, War and the State of the War (NY, 1996), p. 189.

6. The rule of non-intervention was to be rigidly applied in international relations
and what happened within states was no concern of outsiders. The predominant
view of governments was that the sovereignty was a private world into which
the outside world was not permitted to enter. The only exception was
operations under the charter rules. The principle of domestic jurisdiction shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under VII. The security

112 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

council justified intervention within a state only when there was a threat to
international peace and security (Article 2 para 7), and when there are gross
infringements of human rights. Subsequent secessions and irredentist
enlargements were ruled out. This meant that criteria for state creation and
recognition (other than in context of decolonisation) were never examined.
Authoritarian regimes replaced democratically elected ones without affecting in
any way their membership of international society. Article 2 (7) of the charter
did not discriminate in the protection it provided to regimes from interference
in their domestic affairs. See Robert Jackson and Georg Sorenson, Introduction
to International Relations (Oxford, 1999), pp. 143, 148, 150, 151. James
Mayall (ed.), The New Internationalism : 1991-1994 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 6.

7. This phenomenon reflect the 'postinternational' relations in which the world
system can no longer be solely or primarily categorized as consisting of
relations between nations. 'Fragmagration' is the speciality of this phenomenon
because it is marked by various structures of systemic cooperation and
subsystemic conflicts. In subsystemic conflicts, there are no declarations of
wars, classical-type campaigns, and organized armies. This create dilemma for
the United Nations Security Council because there are not threat to peace,
breach of peace and act of aggression occur. The victims are civil population,
minority groups and indigenous people etc. This phenomenon referred to the
fractious relations between distinct ethno-cultural groups that undermined
national and regional stability. Rwanda, Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor
and various other problems represented this phenomenon. See Alexandra
Novosseloff, "Revitalizing the United Nations : Anticipation and Prevention as
Primary Goal", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXV (Nov. 2001), p. 947. See,
William F. Felice, "The Viability of the United Nations Approach to Economic
and Social Human Right in Globalized Economy", International Affairs, Vol.
75 (1999), p. 586. For detailed study of post-cold war world order see James
N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier : Exploring Governance in
a Turbulent World (Cambridge, 1997), p. 35-39. For detailed study of Minority
Protection System see Liann Thio, "Battling Balkanization : Regional
Approaches Toward Minority Protection Beyond Europe", Harvard
International Law Journal, Vol. 43 (Summer 2002), pp. 409-468.

8. Christopher Lord, Prague to Pretoria (Prague, 2000), p. 18.

9. Paul Taylor, "The United Nations in the 1990s : Positive Cosmopolitanism and
the Issue of Sovereignty", Political Studies, Vol. XLVII (1999), p. 545.

10. Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty", The Economist, 18th Sep. 1999,
p. 49.

11. Bennett, n. 2, p. 380.

12. The post-cold war peace-keeping used for the prevention, containment,
moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states through the
medium of peaceful third party intervention organised and directed
internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to
restore and maintain peace. It also include the tasks of assisting humanitarian
agencies to deliver aid and protect displaced persons, stabilized failed or
collapsed states, developing democratic institutions that respect monitor human

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 113

rights and ultimately administrating territories and their entire populations. The
operations in this category are not differ substantially from which fall in first
category in their make-up and activity. The distinction between two is not based
on the specific mandates which the United Nations gives to its missions, but on
the wider purposes which their establishment is intended to serve. The
allocation of operations to first and second categories is based on the majority
member states, particularly on their interests in keeping the disputant quit or in
preventing the weaker party from being overrun. For detail study of Meaning,
Legal System and Transformation of UN Peacekeeping, see, Espen Barth,
"Peacekeeping Past and Present", NATO Review, Vol. 49 (Summer 2001), p.
6. See, Secretary-General's report on the Work of Organization, 1993 (NY :
United Nations, 1993), para 278. See, Michael Pugh, "Peacekeeping and
Humanitarian International", in Brain White et ah, See Article 40, 41, 42 of
United Nations Charter. See also Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, Legal
assessment of United Nations peacekeeping see A. Cassesse (ed.), United
Nations Peace-keeping : Legal Essays (Netherland, 1978). For more
information about Peacekeeping in Africa : Capabilities and Culpabilities (NY,
2000), pp. 26, 29.

13. For detailed study of Changed Structures, Tasks and Components of Post-Cold
War Peacekeeping, see, C.S.R. Murthy, "United Nations Peacekeeping in
Intrastate Conflicts: Emerging Trends, International Studies, Vol. 38 (July-
Sep. 2001), p. 214. See, Boutros B. Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations",
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, Winter 1992/1993, p. 89. See also Boutras B. Ghali,
"An Agenda for Peace : One Year later", Orbis, Vol. 37 (Summer 1993), p.
323. See, Michael T. Klare, Peace and World Security Studies (London, 1994),
p. 21. See, Mark Thomson and Monroe E. Price, "International, Media and
Human Rights", Survival, Vol. 45 (Spring 2003), p. 183. See Gregory Copley,
"Keeping the Peace or Postponing Resolution", Defense and Foreign Affairs
Strategic Policy, Vol. XXV (Oct. 1997), p. 9. See, David M. Malone and
Karin Wermester, "Boom and Bust : The Changing Nature of UN
Peacekeeping" in Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Bokha Sriram (ed.),
Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century (London, 2001), p. 37-53. See,
Ramesh Thakur ad Albrecht Schnabel, United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations : Adhoc Missions Permanent Engagement (NY, 2001), p. 9. See,
Abiodum Alau et ah, Peacekeeping Politicians and Warlords (NY, 1999), pp.
5-6. See, M.W. Doyle et al. (ed.) Keeping the Peace : Multidimensional UN
Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge, 1991), p. 2. Philip
Wilkinson, "The Doctrinal Basis of Peace Support Operations" in Christopher
Lord, n. 8, p. 203.

14. Report of the Work of Organization, 1999 (NY : United Nations, 1999), para
68.

15. Roger MacGinty and Gillian Robinson, "Peacekeeping and the Violence in
Ethnic Conflict", in Thakur and Schnabel, n. 13, pp. 31-32.

16. Terry McNeill, "Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping in the Former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe", International Political Science Review,
Vol. 18 (Jan. 1997), p. 9.

114 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

17. Satish Nambiar, "UN Peacekeeping Operations i the Former Yugoslavia-from
UNPROFOR to Kosovo", in Thakur and Schnabel, n. 13, p. 178.

18. The Model is taken from Alan James, The Politics of Peacekeeping (London,
1969), pp. 7, 8, 9.

19. Ibid., p. 260.

20. Jennifer Welsh et ah, "The responsibility to protect", International Journal,
Vol. LVII (Autumn 2002), pp. 489-90. See, Nial MacDermot, "Violations of
Human Rights as Threat to Peace", International Commission of Jurists (Dec.
1996), p. 91.

21. Allan Rossas, "State Sovereignty and Human Rights : Towards a Global
Constitutional Project, Political Studies, Vol. XLIIII (1995), p. 62.

22. Secretary-General's Report on the Work of Organization, 1991, Published in
Yearbook of United Nations, 1991 (NY : United Nations, 1991), p. 7.

23. UN Security Council Resolution 713, UN DOCS/RES/713, September 25,
1991.

24. Yearbook of United Nations, 1992 (NY : United Nations Pub., 1992), p. 327.

25. UN Security Council Resolution 855, UN DOCS/RES/855, August 9, 1993.

26. Yearbook of United Nations, 1994 (NY : United Nations Pub., 1994), p. 573.

27. James, n. 18, pp. 178-9.

28. See Texts of UN Security Council Resolution, 855, 9 August 1993, UN
General Assembly Resolution 48/153, 1993, UN General Assembly Resolution
50/190, 1995, UN General Assembly Resolution 51/111, 1996, UN General
Assembly Resolution 52/139, 1997.

29. James, n. 18, pp. 179-180.

30. The Contact Group established in 1994 by the Steering Committee of the
International Conference on Yugoslavia on Former Yugoslavia, comprised
France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the
United States.

31. Yearbook of United Nations, 1998 (NY : United Nations Pub., 1998), pp. 367,
368.

32. See UN Security Council Resolution 1160, UN DOCS/RES/1160, March 31,
1998.

33. Yearbook of United Nations, 1998, n. 31, pp. 371-377.

34. See UN Security Council Resolution 1199, UN DOCS/RES/1199, September
23, 1998.

35. James, n. 18, pp. 260, 261.

36. Yearbook of United Nations 1998, n. 31, pp. 379, 380.

37. Ibid., p. 381.

38. UN Security Resolution 1203, UN DOCS/RES/ 1203, October 24, 1998.

39. Yearbook of United Nations 1998, n. 64, p. 384, 385.

40. Yearbook of United Nations 1999 (NY : United Nations Pub., 1999), p. 334-
336.

41. Ibid., p. 337.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 115

42. For detailed analysis of Rambouillet Process See March Weller, "The
Rambouillet Conference Kosovo", International Affairs, Vol. 75 (1999), p.
211-251.

43. Yearbook of United Nations 1999, n. 73, p. 342.

44. Timothy W. Crawford, "Pivotel Deterrence and The Kosovo War: Why the
Halbrook Agreement Failed", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116 (Winter
2001), pp. 521-22.

45. Renata Dwan, "Armed Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution",
Sipri Yearbook 2000, p. 84.

46. Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Document
S/PRST/1999/2.

47. UN Security Council Resolution 1239, 14 May 1999.

48. James, n. 18, p. 130.

49. Weller, n. 42, p. 212.

50. Ricard Caplan, "International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo",
International Affairs, Vol 75 (1998), p. 753.

51. James Hooper, "Kosovo : America's Balkan Problem", Current History, Vol
627 (April 1999), p. 161.

52. Kessing's Record of World Events, Vol. 44 (June 1998), p. 42157.

53. The Kosovar Albanian's desire to break free from Serbia has deep roots which
predates Yugoslavia's collapse in 1991. The international community generally
took little interest in Kosovo affair because minority rights were until fairly
recently regarded as the province of domestic politics and the interference in a
state's domestic affairs is prohibited under international law. But, Yugoslavia's
disintegration forced the question of self-determination of all Yugoslav nations
on the international agenda. However, several actions by international
community (European community in particular) ensured that the question of
Kosovo would be effectively removed from that agenda. The Badinter
Commission, which was established by European community in September
1991, issued a number of important opinions concerning the legal status of
Yugoslavia and its constituent units. Although these were non-binding opinions
but they provided rationalization for subsequent state practice which had
important ramifications for Kosovo. In November 1991, the Commission
concluded that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution and that the
republics seeking independence were not rebel entities but new states created
on the territory of the former SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
This opinion is important because the "dissolution of Yugoslavia" meant that
international support for the former republics would not be tantamount to
support for secession, which is an act arguably in the contravention of the UN
charter. See, Weller, n. 42, p. 215.

54. The Kosovo Albanians were clearly one of the target populations whose status
the EC was seeking to enhance. Indeed, the version of Carrington draft
convention contained the further requirement that the republics shall apply
fully and in good faith the provisions existing prior to 1990 for autonomous
provinces. This was obvious reference to the autonomy of Kosovo and

116 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Vojvodina which Serbia had revoked. Yet in an effort to gain Serbian President
Milosevic's acceptance of the convention, Carrington's team made an
extraordinary concessions and eliminated this requirement from the subsequent
version of the convention. When EC in April 1996 (Now European Union)
decided finally to extend recognition to the federal republic of Yugoslavia
consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, it dispensed with the weaker requirement
of a special status for the Kosovar Albanians altogether. The EU merely
observed at the time that it 'consider' the improved relations between the
Yugoslavia and the international community would depend inter alia on a
'constructive approach' by the Yugoslavia to the granting of autonomy for
Kosovo. These concessions were a profound disappointment for the Kosovar
Albanians. But the gravest disappointment came with the 'Dayton negotiations
which formally settled the Bosnian conflict in 1996. Nevertheless, the
conclusion many Albanians drew from Dayton proceedings was that the ethnic
territories have legitimacy and the international attention can only be obtained
through war. In a manner reminiscent of the commencement of the 'intifada' in
1987 when the Palestinians in the 'occupied territories' perceived that they, too,
were slipping from the agenda of regional and international concerns. The
Kosovo's Albanians increasingly lost faith in the patient ways of their
leadership and gravitated toward armed struggle. It was this reservoir of
disillusionment and sense of betrayal that explained the growing support among
Albanians for the militant separatist Kosovo Liberation Army or UCK (Usthria
Clirimtare Kosoves). The KLA has become such a prominent feature of the
Kosovo landscape that it is easy to forget that only one year ago it was a tiny
force with little public visibility. The Islamic fundamentalism and Jihad factor
gave it further strength through weapons and moral help. Caplan, n. 50, p. 149;
Hooper, n. 51, p. 160; Yossef Bodansky, "Italy becomes Iran's New Base for
Terrorist Operations", Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Vol.
XXVI (April/May 1998), p. 5-9.

55. Caplan, n. 50, p. 753.

56. For more detail about the General Principles adopted by G-8 Foreign Ministers
at Bonn and the Final Principles accepted by FRY. See Annex I and Annex II
of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, UN DOCS/RES/ 1244, June 10,

1999.

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 117

Chapter 4

Limitations and Constraints on
United Nations for Action in Kosovo

PART I : ROLE OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATO's intervention in Kosovo crisis has put the United
Nations ability to maintain international order to a real test. The
Kosovo crisis highlighted the dilemma of legitimacy for a group of
states to act in order to prevent or halt humanitarian emergency
where the Security Council is deadlocked in disagreement. NATO's
role in Kosovo highly affected the relevance of the United Nations
in the world affairs. The analysis of political, legal and philosophical
issues raised by the Kosovo crisis is necessary for understanding the
diminished United Nations position regarding use of force.

NATO was the result of the outbreak of the Cold War. It
marginalized the security role of the United Nations and thwarted
President Roosevelt's strategy based on the policy of securing
sustained the United States involvement in world affairs through
universal security organization. President Harry Truman soon
discovered that the cold war provided an even more effective
substitute. By invoking the communist menace, the Truman doctrine
had clearly put the United States into power politics. It facilitated its
institutionalized involvement in Europe. At the same time, the
European involvement took on a peculiarly American form. It was
neither based on the old-fashioned system of bilateral alliances with
several West European countries nor only based on "dumb-bell
model" with the United States and Canada on one side and Western
Europe on other and the Great Britain linking the two. Instead, it
assumed the form of imagined yet indivisible North Atlantic
Community in which attack on one would be considered attack on
all. NATO founded in 1949, played a collective defence role for its

118 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

member allied states. It became an essential part of a new European
security order that aimed to contain the Soviet Union and curb its
expansionist tendencies. It is an arc which symbolized the West's
political strength and supported by two pillars i.e. North America
and Western Europe.

Since the signing of North Atlantic Treaty, it has faced a number
of storms which put its resolve, cohesion and even the ground of its
existence to the test. It also faced the possibility of gradual,
spontaneous disintegration after period of incoherence. 1 With the
end of cold war, it was expected that NATO's demise would soon
follow and even if it did not disappear altogether, it would become
empty shell, no longer performing any useful function. NATO in
contrast to these pessimistic expectations has not become moribund.
It has not only survived but elaborated its organizational bodies and
undertook new activities. The allies have updated their common
strategic concept. They have developed new policies and fora for
promoting dialogue and security cooperation with the former
communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. 2

NATO's highly institutionalized character facilitated its ability
to survive after the disappearance of the Soviet Union. The new
strategic concept (adopted in 1991 and further expanded in 1999) has
shifted its primary mission from deterrence or defense from external
attack towards potential source of instability. These sources include
ethnic conflicts, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction etc. 3
NATO as a defensive alliance was obliged to take action only if
foreign power attacked one of its member directly. Problems arising
beyond its territory were not its responsibility. But the new strategic
concept makes it impossible for NATO to not ignore events in
neighbouring area even if they lie outside its formal boundaries. 4
NATO's attack on Serbia in 1999 was the example of its outside
functioning from North Atlantic areas. NATO's war in Kosovo
illustrated its claim to be the main guarantor of regional stability and
its relevance in European Security Paradigm.

IMPACT OF NATO'S ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA ON
THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE UN CHARTER'S
USE OF FORCE IN WORLD POLITICS

NATO's Kosovo intervention, on the other hand, has raised

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 119

large number of issues. This may sound to consider that the United
Nations was virtually sidelined by NATO in the management of the
Kosovo crisis. NATO action in Serbia represents an obvious erosion
of the United Nations authority on use of force in international
affairs. NATO justified its intervention on humanitarian grounds.
This raised, philosophical, legal and political debates about
humanitarian intervention, the role of powerful states and regional
organizations in internal crises. For understanding NATO's
intervention in Kosovo crisis, it is necessary to analyse the
international law regarding use of force under the United Nations
Charter. The attempt to control the use of force falls broadly into
two categories i.e. jus ad bellum (the circumstances in which force
may properly be used). Second is jus ad bella (the manner in which
hostilities are conducted). With regard to jus ad bellum, various
international treaties prescribed limitations on conduct of hostilities. 5
The league of Nations Covenant attempted further modest
limitations on the unilateral use of force. But it has been the United
Nations Charter that provides a comprehensive set of prescriptions
on conflict resolution and use of force. The structure of the UN
Charter is complex so far as the use of force is concerned. The
interesting Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of a state. The only
unilateral use of force permitted to a state is that of individual or
collective self-defence under Article 51. This too has been
commonly accepted that the prohibition of intervention applies
regardless of the political ideology or the moral virtue of
government of target state. There was general agreement that the
charter prohibits intervention by any state even for humanitarian
purposes. 6

The Article 2(7) is forbidding intervention within the "domestic
jurisdiction" of a member state except by the decision of the Security
Council under chapter VII. The strict limitation on the use of force
in the Charter is dependent upon the provision of the Collective
Security. The UN Charter's collective security system is constructed
in chapter VII (Articles 39 to 51) which authorizes Security Council
to use force under the Collective Security system. The functions of
the Security Council are described in Article 24-26 of the Charter.

120 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

The specific powers for the discharge of these functions are laid
down in chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII of the UN Charter. The
chapter VI of the charter provides some functions to the Security
Council which are related to the pacific settlement of disputes those
likely to endanger international peace and security. The chapter VII
provides the means for fulfilment of the Security Council's functions
other than those under chapter VI relating to the pacific settlement
of disputes. 7 The Table 4.1 provides a "threshold ladder of
intervention" which corresponds to the three authorising Article i.e.
Articles 40-42 found in the United Nations Charter.

Levels of Enforcement Response Options

1 . Preventive/Humanitarian
(UN Charter, Article 40

2. Non-forcible

(UN Charter, Article 41)

3. Direct-forcible

(UN Charter, Article 42)

a) Preventive Diplomacy.

b) Withdrawal of diplomatic
recognition.

c) Provision of medical and food
relief supplies to non-combatants,
as well as troups necessary to
ensure proper distribution of
supplies.

a) Economic sanctions.

b) Suspensions of foreign aid.

c) Arms embargo.

d) UN Peacekeeping Missions (use
of troups to guarantee cease-fire
or mutually agreed truce).

a) Threat of Military force to
restore

internationally acceptable level of
standards.

b) Establishment and enforcement of
no-fly zones.

c) Direct intervention.

Table4.1 : Threshold Ladder of intervention into situations of Human
Rights violations by states. 8

Source : Christopher M. Ryan, Millennium Journal of International Studies, p. 98.

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

121

The important function of the Security Council under Article 39
is to decide or recommend measures in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Any action taken by the Security
Council is contingent on the adoption of an enabling resolution. This
resolution can only be carried by an affirmative vote of at least nine
of the Security Council's fifteen members. Moreover, a resolution
must obtain the concurring votes of five permanent members and
one negative vote of one of the permanent member (i.e. China,
France, Russia, United Kingdom United States) would prevent
adoption of the proposed resolution. A permanent member may bar
the adoption of any resolution even under Chapter VII or which
pointed at itself and its closely associated state. Thus, the collective
security system of the UN Charter is only geared to handle minor
disturbers of peace. 9 The internal conflicts (Kosovo, Chechnya,
Tibet etc.) are practically excluded from the reach of charter's
collective security system.

In the post-cold war scenario, the dangerous and
organizationally challenging nature of interventions in internal
conflicts led the United Nations Security Council to subcontract the
military requirements with coalition forces. The 1990 Gulf war,
operation Restore Hope in Somalia and the Implementation Force in
Bosina were examples of these subcontracted operations. The
political leadership and determination of intervention had largely
provided by the United States in these interventions. The powerful
element of the military forces was drawn from NATO countries.
The serious humanitarian crises during civil conflicts after the end
of cold war also provided important role to regional organizations.
The United Nations Charter envisaged that regional organizations
would have a role to play in maintenance of peace and security
during complex emergencies. This role is reflected in chapter VIII
of the UN Charter. The charter provided that the regional
arrangements act only under individual or collection security or
where the United Nations Security Council had authorised a regional
organization to use force in dealing with a threat to international
peace and security. 10 NATO, on the other hand, attacked Serbia
without prior authorization of the Security Council in 1999 to
compel it to accept a settlement of the Kosovo crisis. The analysis
of legal issues regarding NATO's action in the Kosovo is necessary

122 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

to understand the consequent erosion of the United Nations authority
on the use of force in world politics.

The prohibition of the threat or use of force under Article 2(4)
of the UN Charter forms the very basis for the maintenance of
international peace and security. The only two exceptions are the
right of self-defence codified in Article 51 11 and Collective Security
measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is
important to note that NATO did justify its attack on Serbia on the
ground of self-defence. Article 51 permits the exercise of right of
self-defense only "if an armed attack occurs against a member
state." The phrase "armed attack" included within its ambit, the
action by regular forces across on international border, action by
armed bands or groups on behalf of state which amount to actual
armed attack. 12 These categories indicate that only physical act of
aggression will qualify as "armed attack". NATO cannot allege that
Yugoslavia had launched an "armed attack" against another state.

NATO justified its threat and subsequent use of force against
Serbia on two broad grounds. Firstly, that the Security Council had
determined by Resolution 1199 that the situation in Kosovo
constituted a threat to peace and security in the region. Secondly,
that there was large scale human suffering in the region (Specifically
the repression of Albanians in Kosovo and consequent spillover
effect of exodus of thousands of refugees threaten the region). The
important issues arise from this justification i.e. whether the mere
determination by the Security Council (that a situation constitutes a
threat to peace and security) gives member state a right to use force
to deal with it. The other main important issue is about the
recognition of the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention in
international law. 13 The Security Council adopted three resolutions
under chapter VII of Charter prior to NATO bombing campaign.
The Resolution 1199 concluded by stating "if Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) did not implement the measures optioned in
Resolutions 1160 and 1199, the Security Council will consider
further action." And it would take further additional measures to
maintain or restore peace and stability in the region. It is evident
from Resolution 1199 that the Security Council gave an opportunity
to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to comply with its wishes. It

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 123

reserved the right to determine further "action and additional
measures" to be taken in the evidence of the fact that Yugoslavia
comply with the resolutions 1160 and 1190. It was not left to other
states to determine what further actions and additional measure
could be taken. 14 This Resolution did not even remotely imply that
any state or regional organization could apply the use of force to deal
with the situation.

The Articles 41-42 of the United Nations Charter provides that
the Security Council may be authorized the use of force only after
determining that the non-lethal measures under Article 41 would be
exhausted. Article 33 of the UN Charter provides that the parties to
any dispute must first seek a resolution by peaceful means. Article
42 only allowed use of force as a last resort. It means that the
Security Council must determine the use of military means. 15 The
Security Council in Resolution 1199 could not determine that non-
lethal measures had failed to deal with the threat posed by the
Kosovo crisis. On the other hand, the Resolution 1199 merely
imposed certain demands on Yugoslavia and warned it that non-
compliance with same would necessitate a consideration of further
action. NATO's justification of use of force in Kosovo was further
weakened by Resolution 1203. This Resolution emphasized that the
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security is conferred on the Security Council. The Resolution
also called upon the Yugoslavia, Kosovo Liberation Force (KLA)
and all other states and organizations to stop using force and called
for a halt to the violations of human rights. Both resolutions 1199,
1203 did not authorize the use of force by any outside entity. Rather,
they reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Yugoslavia. 16 In this situation, outside entity i.e. NATO had no right
to take forcible action. It is evident that no state or group of states
is entitled to the use of force in response to mere threat to
international peace and security. The use of forcible measures by
NATO is also illegal because it had not the specific authorisation of
the Security Council to take enforcement action. The legal state of
affairs would have been entirely different if the Security Council
decided that there was a breach of peace. NATO could then have
exercised the right of self-defence. 17 But in the Resolutions 1199,

124 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

1203, the Security Council could not use the word "breach of
peace". Thus, NATO's interpretation to construe it as an
authorization for the use of force is to conflate the two steps
described by the Article 41-42 of the UN Charter.

In a letter to the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic
Council, dated 9 October 1998, the Secretary-General of NATO,
Javier Solana sought to justify the threat of the force against
Yugoslavia. He referred the Security Council's view through
Resolution 1 199 that the conflict in Kosovo constituted a threat to the
peace and security in the region. But the Yugoslavia had not yet
complied with Resolutions 1160 and 1199. He concluded by saying;

Because of the unfolding crisis in Kosovo and the impossibility of
obtaining a Security Coucil authorisation for the use of force to end the
same due to Russian opposition, the NATO Allies believe that in the
particular circumstances with respect to the present crisis in Kosovo as
described in UNSC Resolution 1199, there are legitimate grounds for
Alliance to threaten, and if necessary, to use force. 18

The above quoted lines of NATO's Secretary-General Solana's
letter mentions the improbability of obtaining a Security Council's
resolution containing an explicit mandate for enforcement action. He
admitted that such a resolution was necessary. NATO proceeded to
threaten and use force knowing fully well that it was doing so
without authorisation of the Security Council. 19 It makes the
violation of the UN Charter all the more flagrant.

NATO ATTACK AND AN INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN
TWO PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS OF UN SYSTEM

The other most important justification given by NATO was
"Humanitarian intervention" for the use of force in Kosovo. It is
important to examine that whether such a right existed in
international law. The "treaty of Westphalia" inl648 divided the
powers of Church and State. It lent to the state the characters of
immutability and inviolability and reserved "perfection" and
transcendence to the Church. Thus, from the initiation of the nation-
state system, the independent states enjoy sovereignty over a given
territory. They pursue their interests free from outside interference

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 125

in their internal affairs. This customary principle of sovereign
equality of states survived from three centuries. 20 This right is also
incorporated in Article 2(1) in the United Nations Charter.

Since 1945, the debate has been focused on the alleged
incompatibility of two principles of the United Nations system i.e.
sovereign equality and human rights. The former is enshrined in
Articles 2(1), 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter. Under these Articles,
the states enjoy sovereign equality defined internally as exclusive
jurisdiction within a territory and externally as freedom from outside
intervention. The human rights identified in preamble Article 1(3) of
the UN Charter. This right is further elaborated in subsequent
declarations and conventions. 21 As the UN Charter is firmly
upholding the sovereignty and integrity of states, a parallel but
contradictory trend developed in international law since 1945. This
trend is giving priority to human rights. Human rights instruments
got multiplied and 'states' have undertaken legal commitments to
uphold these rights. The process has reached even more advanced
legal stage in the Europe. All members of Organization of Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have accepted that "the
commitments in the field of human dimensions are matter of direct
and legitimate concern to all members and do not belong exclusively
to the internal affairs of the state concerned." Although such a far-
reaching recognition of human-rights obligations does not exist at
the universal level but the trend goes in same direction. The
international human rights law is considered as entailing erga omnes
obligation (i.e. obligations that states respect in all circumstances
without any contractual exception or requirement of reciprocity). 22

From a legal point of view, it is essential to distinguish between
international human-rights law and humanitarian law. International
human-rights law is an offshoot of UN's Declaration of Human
Rights and consists of a body of rules adopted at the universal level.
It includes, the 1966 covenants on international civil, political,
economic and social rights, the 1984 convention on human rights
and 1999 European convention on human rights. These provide a set
of political and judicial procedures to monitor respect for the rights
involved. Some of these rights such as the prohibition of torture have
been confirmed as erga omnes quality.

126 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

International humanitarian law is much more ancient and
evolved from incremental efforts by theologians, lawyers and
politicians to humanise war by defining rules for jus in bello. Its
fullest expression can be found in the Geneva Conventions (1949)
and their additional protocols (1977). International humanitarian law
set the rules for prosecution of war crimes. The post-second World
War tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, Law Lords ruling in
Pinochet case in England and the adhoc tribunals for Rwanda and
Yugoslavia constitute a quite remarkable challenge to the norms of
Westphalian system. Yugoslavia's former President Milosevic held
during the course of his trial held at the Hague for the indictment of
offences, allegedly committed by him in Kosovo. This eventual trial
is a turning point in the development of international human rights
norms and also changed the notion of the Sovereign immunity.
Under this principle, the individuals who happen to be the head of a
particular state or members of its government cannot be held
personally responsible for the conduct of its official duty. 23 But the
decision of the Law Lords in Pinochet case and President
Milosevic's indictment consciously undermined this principle. It set
the ground that individuals could be held to account for their actions
in accordance with international standards. They are not immune
from actions perceived by them to be necessary for the exercise of
their official functions.

There is a major difference between international human rights
law and humanitarian law. The respect for the former is considered
the responsibility of states whereas violations of latter entailed the
criminal prosecution of individuals. Both laws tend more and more to
intersect conditions which combines civil war with massive violations
of human rights or genocide. These two bodies of rules provide
precise sanctions for their violation. These are slowly but surely
accepted universally. The creation of international tribunals of
Former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994) and the International
Criminal Court (1998) are cases in point. All these courts based their
work on a combination of the material law laid out in the Geneva
Conventions, the Conventions against genocide and the codification
of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 24 However, these are
becoming sophisticated sanctions but silent on preventive measures.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 127

Yet, it is precisely the prevention of massive human rights violations
or humanitarian catastrophes which have become the basis of
"humanitarian intervention" practice in recent years.

The United Nations Charter and other human rights instruments
do not provide the right of "humanitarian intervention". The
intervention is defined as,

The activity undertaken by a state, a group of states or an international
organizations which interferes collectively in the domestic affairs of
another state. . .it is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break
conventional pattern of international relations. 25

Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter prohibits intervention
in matters relating to "domestic jurisdiction". This article shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under chapter
VII. Various General Assembly Resolutions reiterated the principles
of non-intervention in international affairs. 26

Non-intervention is a logical corollary of territorial sovereignty.
It has traditionally underpinned interstate relations and the United
Nations charter. It is a sort of arrangement that was supposed to
protect weaker states from the powerful. On the other hand, it also
serves frequently as a last line of defense for autocratic
governments. The dictator and totalitarian regimes used it to fend off
outside criticism and intrusion in their domestic repression. 27
Although the non-intervention principle was breached frequently in
practice, but the states seemed markedly reluctant to cite the
protection of human rights as their reason for invading other
country. There are three familiar examples of this reluctance to rely
on humanitarian case for intervention. First, the Indian invasion of
East Pakistan in 1971, second, Vietnamese invasion of Combodia in
1978 and third is the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1979. The
hideous repression within the target state and consequent refugee
flows would have seemed to provide a ready-made justification for
doing so. In all above discussed cases, the intervening governments
could not used "humanitarian intervention" as a reason for their
invasion. 28 They used the principle of self-defence under Article 51
as an easier and better means to relate their claim to the United
Nations Charter. Thus, the right of "humanitarian intervention" has
found little support in international relations.

128 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Yet after the end of Cold War, the attitude toward the aberrant
interpretation of "domestic jurisdiction" has changed. From 1945 to
until the end of Cold War, human rights remained subordinate to
state sovereignty within the framework of the United Nations
Charter. The states are encouraged to promote human rights but not
commanded to do so. The United Nations bias against intervention
reflected in the European history. The drafting powers had been
under the dramatic effects of World War II in 1945. The drafters
were preoccupied by Hitler as a warmonger not as a architect of
European extermination. For them, the aggressive war across
national frontiers was more salient risk then the extermination of
people within states. 29 This fact illuminated by the conspiratorial
silence of states about the "Holocaust" and the "Red Terror" existed
in 1970s.

The demise of the Soviet Union resulted in the end of bipolarity
in 1990s. It had changed several features of contemporary
international relations. The end of East- West conflict changed the
form of war. It led to a fragmentation of societies undergoing civil
wars. The weakness or complete failures of state structures in many
conflict-ridden societies provide opportunity for mass scale violence
and terrorism. This increased the vulnerability of civilians in the
context of civil conflict. 30 The "CNN effect" in which global and
instantaneous access to information heightens the popular awareness
of human suffering and the fear of refugee flows strengthened the
human rights norms, led to the proliferation of human rights
organizations. In this scenario, the "interventionism" on the basis of
humanitarian ground becomes the new form of "political
legitimacy" for Western powers. The use of force for humanitarian
purposes has become a familiar pattern in the post-Cold War
international politics. 31 NATO's war in Kosovo has provoked
extremely divergent interpretations of "humanitarian intervention.
The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Anan stated,

if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an acceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should be respond to Rwanda, to Serbrenica-to gross
and systematic violations of human rights that offend every percept of
our common humanity? In essence the problem is one of responsibility,
in circumstances in which universally accepted human rights are being
violated on a massive scale we have a responsibility to act. 32

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 129

The United States and NATO leaders repeatedly explained that
the political objective of NATO's air campaign in Kosovo was to
avert a humanitarian disaster. They acted to prevent this crisis from
becoming a catastrophe. 33 The United States Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright pointed,

NATO was forged in the aftermath of "holocaust" and war by the
survivors of war to prevent war. It reflected our predecessor's
determination to defend hard-won freedoms and their understanding
that while weakness invites aggression, strength is parent to peace. By
acting on behalf of justice and peace in Kosovo, we are reaffirming
NATO's core purpose as a defender of democracy, stability and basic
human decency on European soil. 34

Czech Republic's President also stated, this is probably the first
war that has not been waged in the name of "national interests", but
rather in the name of principles and values. . .Kosovo has no oil fields
to be coveted, no member nation in the alliance has any territorial
demands on Kosovo. Milosevic does not threaten the territorial
integrity of any member of alliance. And yet the alliance is at
war... it is fighting because no decent person can stand by and watch
the systematic, state directed murder of other people. 35

Italian Foreign Minister noted that the Kosovo crisis
demonstrated the primacy of human rights in international politics.
NATO Secretary General Solana also stated, "for the first time,
NATO a defensive alliance, launched a military campaign to avoid
a humanitarian tragedy outside its borders. It fought in Kosovo not
to conquer or preserve territory, but to protect the values on which
the alliance was founded." The pro-interventionists argued that the
defects of international law were responsible for Kosovo action.
This action did not happen in isolation but after the United Nations
failures in Rwanda and Bosnia. The failures of the United Nations
in Civil Conflicts were the result of the veto of the Security
Council's permanent members. They often threw a monkey wrench
on the machinery of collective security. The expected vetoes by
Russia and China in Kosovo case compelled NATO leaders to avoid
explicit authorisation of the Security Council. This created
legitimacy crisis for the Kosovo action. The pro-interventionists
further argued that the legitimacy no doubt enhanced the legal

130 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

credibility of actions which involved use of force. But the legitimacy
and legality represent a complex process that is not confined to the
Security Council chambers. 36 The state practice on the international
level remained key to the shaping of legal norms. The majority of
states are likely to shape a legal justification for political actions that
deemed morally urgent even involving the use of force. NATO's
invoking of legal justification of humanitarian intervention for
legitimising Kosovo's action helped international law's proceeding
towards mere progressive direction.

The anti-interventionists, on the other hand, take the
fundamental view that NATO's recourse to war was legally
unacceptable without explicit authorisation of the Security Council.
The Security Council controlled all uses of force in international
relations and to bypass its authority on the basis of prospective
vetoes is illegal. Indeed, the function of the veto is precisely to
prevent use of force in the absence of a consensus among permanent
members. Thus, NATO's bypassing of the United Nations authority
is seen as a devastating constitutional blow to the authority of the
organization. 37 It also blurred the most basic prohibition inscribed in
the international law governing recourse to force, Secretary-General
Kofi Annan clearly stated in his 1999 report,

Earliar this year, the Security Council was precluded from intervening
in the Kosovo crisis by profound disagreements between council
members over whether such an intervention was legitimate.
Differences within the council reflected the lack of consensus in the
wider international community. Defenders of interpretations of
international law stressed the inviolability of state sovereignty, other
stressed the moral imperatives to act forcefully in the face of gross
violations of human rights... but what is clear is that enforcement
actions without Security Council authorization threaten the very core
of the international security system founded on the charter of the
United Nations. Only the charter provides a universally accepted legal
basis for the use of force. 38

It is clear that international law has not yet recognized the right
of humanitarian intervention. On the other hand, some jurists argued
that such a right may exist or is at least evolving. It can only be
justified in a extreme and very particular circumstances. The first
thing to note is that despite the proliferation of the use of word

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 131

'humanitarian' there is little clarity about its meaning. It is linked to
activities as diverse as the pursuit of universal human rights, the
prosecution of those guilty of offending the 'conscience of
mankind.' It also includes the delivery of emergency aid for human
subsistence and the use of military force in a variety of
circumstances.

It is argued that intervention in 'extreme humanitarian
emergency' can be justified the notion of 'supreme emergency' first
coined by Michael Walzer. It has two components. The first is
immediacy of the danger and second is its nature. A supreme
emergency occurs where the danger is very close and it must be of
an unusual and horrifying kind. But the crucial considerations
regarding 'supreme emergency' are,

(i) whether an urgent and compelling situation of extreme and
large scale humanitarian distress occurs which demand
immediate relief.

(ii) whether the territorial state is itself capable of meeting the
needs of the situation unwilling to do so or perhaps itself
the cause of it. 39

This legal opinion gave NATO's action a measure of legitimacy.
But this legal opinion concludes that the "intervention would have to
be peaceful action (which need not exclude it being carried out by
military personal) in a compelling emergency. It is clear that the
nature contemplated by this expanded consideration of the right of
humanitarian intervention is very different from that undertaken by
NATO. It is also argued that the prohibition on the use of force
codified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is "Jus Cogens" norm.
This norm is related with emergence of new peremptory norm of
general international law. Article 64 of the Vienna convention
described that "if a new peremptory norm of general international
law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm
becomes void and terminates." 40 The right of "humanitarian
intervention" has not attained the status of "Jus Cogens" norm. It
cannot be eroded the UN Charter norm of use of force under Article
2(4). Thus, the use of force cannot be justified on the basis of
humanitarian intervention.

132 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

NATO's intervention in Kosovo also raised political and
philosophical debate about the concept of humanitarian intervention.
The horrors of Rwanda and other various ethnic wars changed the
form and meaning of this concept. In current and new form, it means
external interference in the internal affairs of a country with a view
to ending or at least reducing the suffering caused by such events as
civil war, genocide and starvation. It respects the integrity of state
and committed to preserve its territorial boundaries. Paradoxically,
it also insists on common humanity and concomitant duty under
certain circumstances to disregard state's autonomy. 41 The present
actions particularly NATO's intervention in Kosovo has effectively
abandoned the old charter rules. These rules strictly limit
international intervention in local conflicts. These actions have been
undertaken in favour of a vague new system that is much more
tolerant of military intervention. This phenomenon has few hard and
fast rules. The end of cold war starkly shows that the anti-
intervention regimes has fallen out of sync with modern notion of
justice. 42

PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE ABOUT NATO ATTACK ON
YUGOSLAVIA ON THE BASIS OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION

In international politics, there are two most fundamental values
i.e. international order and international justice. The international
order is a pattern or disposition of international activity i.e. state
sovereignty. International justice contains moral rules which confer
rights and duties upon the states and nations. These rules are the
right of self-determination, the right of non-intervention and the
right of all sovereign states to be treated as equal entities. The state
sovereignty and human rights are closely related to order and justice
in international relations. On the one hand, the states respect each
other's independence i.e. value of sovereignty and non-intervention.
On the other hand, international relations not only involve states but
also human beings. These human beings possess human rights
regardless of state which they happen to be a citizen. 43 After the end
of Cold War, there is a conflict between these two values.
Consequently, it raised various issues i.e. if human rights are
massively violated within the state then that state retain its right of

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 133

non-intervention? Is the sovereignty sacrosanct in Rwanda and
Somalia like situations? In such circumstances, Is there a right of
humanitarian intervention to rescue people? How should the two
rights be balanced?

The international society approach presents two views for
balancing the issue of human rights and non-intervention in
international politics. First is "Pluralist" view which stresses that the
rights and duties in international society are conferred upon the
sovereign states. The individuals have only rights given to them by
their own states. Therefore, the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention are sacrosanct. The states have no right to intervene in
other state's for humanitarian reasons. Second is "Solidarist" view
which stressed the importance of individuals as the ultimate
members of international society. Thus, the states have both right
and duty to conduct intervention in order to mitigate extreme cases
of human sufferings. The statists, on the other hand, distinguished
two accounts of international relations. First is purposive association
in which international relations promote specific goals like global
principles of justice. Second is 'practical association' in which states
tolerate each other and refrain from trying to impose their own
particular ends on others. In this association, justice requires the
independence and legal equality of states, right of self-defense, the
duty of non-intervention. The obligation to observe treaties and
restrictions on the conduct of war is also part of practical
association's justice. Thus, the "practical conception" of
international relations is corollary of the right of non-intervention.
The norm of non-intervention protect the right of states to govern as
they please and no longer provides protection to cultural, religious,
ethnic or national communities which do not possess statehood. 44
This notion rejects the 'purposive' conception.

The pluralists further contend that heterogeneity and difference
be respected and tolerated in international politics. The reason of this
conception is based on profound disagreements throughout the world
on religious, moral, economic and political issues. The states should
allow people to go their own different ways and not suppress cultural
diversity. The theory of cosmopolitanism describes that states have
authority only insofar as they respect interests and rights of citizens

134 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

or non-citizens. The states have only instrumental value as a way of
furthering the interests of human beings. 45 This theory further raises
debate about humanitarian intervention in post-structuralist,
foundationalist and pragmatist views. The post-structuralist views
involve a repoliticisation of humanitarianism so that its relationship
with sovereignty can be problematized. The repoliticization has to be
aimed at both the role played by sovereignty in the technologies of
humanitarianism and the pivotal place occupied by sovereignty of
human beings (victims of ethnic violence). The first involves
understanding of humanitarianism as an instrument and rationality of
statecraft rather than challenge to it. The second is based on an
account of subjectivity constituted as 'victims', 'devastated
populations' and 'populations in distress' through representational
media and administrative practices. 46 Michael Foucault's views
reflects this repoliticization which describe,

There exist an 'international citizenry' which has its rights, which has
its duties, and which promise to raise itself up against every abuse of
power, no matter who the author or victims. After all, we are all
governed and, to that extent, in solidarity... people's misfortune must
never be the silent remainder of politics. It founds an absolute right to
rise up and to address those who hold power... Amenesty international,
Terre des Hommes, Medecins du Monde are initiatives which have
created a new right that is the right of private individuals to intervene
in the order of politics and international strategies. This will of
individuals must inscribe itself in a reality over which governments
have wanted to reserve a monopoly for themselves - a monopoly which
we must uproot little by little everyday. 47

Foucault's argument speaks to the idea of a political bond
enabled by governments continuing power and the practices of
governmentality that traverse human life. This political bond is
similar to Jacques Derrida's 'new international' which describes,

There is today an aspiration towards a bond between singularities (not
'political subjects' nor even 'human beings') all over the world. This
bond not only extends beyond nations and states, such as they are
composed today or such as they are in the process of decomposition,
but extends beyond the every concepts of nation state. For example I
feel in solidarity with this particular Algerian... Croat, Serbian or
Bosnian... it's not a feeling of one citizen toward another, it's not a
feeling peculiar to a citizen of the world, as if we were all potentially

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 135

or imaginary citizens of a great state. . .what binds me to them - and this
is a point, there is a bond, but this bond cannot be contained within
traditional concepts of community, obligation or responsibility - is a
protest against citizenship, a protest against membership of a political
configuration as such. This bond is, for example a form of political
solidarity opposed to the political qua a politics tied to the nation-
state. 48

These views might offer a more productive predicate for
'humanitarianism', articulate dimensions of ethico-political
character of post structuralist attitude and their connection to
international politics. Foundationalists justified humanitarian
intervention on the notion of "human solidarity". This predicates the
idea that there is a 'core self which is transhistorical and
transcultural. The self is like Hegel's 'concrete' universal whose
humanity is articulated in and realised through its social relations.
Individuals are constituted by their social identities and interactions.
But they have a unique capacity for self reflection which
differentiates them from animals. The historical experiences, cultural
norms, and social interactions in multiplicity of social life shaped the
moral principles and beliefs of individuals. It is argued that moral
reality is depending upon the reflection of complex duality between
universalism and particularism in any society. Any human society is
'universal' due to its human composition and 'particular' because it
is a society. Particular moral communities create shared way of life
which gives meaning to individuals in their daily lives. By contrast,
the humanity has members but no memory, no history, culture and
customary practices. It has no familiar life way, festivals and shared
understanding of social goods. 49 Thus, all humans can acknowledge
each other's different ways and respond to each other's cries for help.
According to foundationalists, the moral solidarity of human beings
provides support to humanitarian intervention.

This view creates dilemma in post-cold war international
relations. NATO states argued that massive human rights abuses
created a legitimacy exception to the non-intervention rule in the
case of Kosovo. In other similar case of East Timor, the same states
argued that sovereign prerogatives deny the possibility of armed
intervention. The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan
raised this issue and noted,

136 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

It has cast in stark relief the dilemma of so called "humanitarian
intervention." On the one hand, is it legitimate for a regional
organization to use force without a UN mandate? On the other, is it
permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with
grave humanitarian consequences continues unchecked? The inability
of the international community to reconcile these two compelling in the
case of Kosovo can be viewed only as a tragedy. 50

This shows the weakness of foundationalist claims of human
solidarity. It raised most important issue i.e. if the human agency or
public opinion forced the Western leaders to use force in Kosovo,
why not in Rwanda, Sudan or various other civil wars? Pragmatism
provided important considerations about this issue. A solidarism
rooted in "pragmatism" holds that human solidarity is based on
sentimentality rather than "common humanity". Pragmatists contend
that humanitarian intervention ought to be seen not in terms of
upholding of universal moral principles. On the other hand, it is
theory informed practice based upon the extension of values created
within particular communities. 51

Pragmatism must respect the fallibility of past decisions and
dominant forms of knowledge. It is based on the observable
outcomes of particular action. The inquiry and observation produce
knowledge which in turn construct the beliefs about reality. The key
problem with the use of force for humanitarian purposes is that it is
blunt and unpredictable instrument. The observable outcome of
NATO's air strikes in Kosovo was that it could not accomplish the
declared aim of preventing humanitarian catastrophe. Then NATO
leaders changed their objective towards "halting and reversing" the
catastrophe. 52 Pragmatism addressed this unpredicted
instrumentality of use of force through the concept of "pragmatic
solidarism. "

The pragmatic solidarism provide three aspects for establishing
legitimacy criteria for the use of force. These aspects are, an anti-
representationalist epistemology, the concept of fallibilism and the
notion of the priority of democracy to philosophy. The anti-
representationalism opposed the representationalism logic. The latter
described that 'knowledge claims' are evaluated according to their
reality. The accuracy of representation of reality is judged by

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 137

cognitive processes. The aim of representationalism is to discover
the world by establishing languages and practices that accurately
represent the world as it actually is. Anti-representationalism sees
knowledge as a web of constructed beliefs that helps to make sense
of the world. It argues that there is no independent test of accuracy
of representation. This raises a question that what type of competing
'knowledge claims' make sense of humanitarian intervention? The
claims and counter-claims about humanitarian intervention are or
should not be evaluated according to their correspondence with
reality of international society. These claims and counter-claims are
bounded and given value by "regimes of truth". The "regimes of
truth" delimit the boundaries and legitimized the types of knowledge
claims, subject matters and system of validation. 53 The very term
"humanitarian intervention" is made possible by an international
'regime of truth' that the intervention in terms of human rights
violations is a useful way of protecting the international order.

The knowledge claims about intervention are evaluated
according to their representation of reality. All individuals within a
community perceive knowledge claims through their own
prejudices. Thus, anti-representationalism permits to think in terms
of justifications for intervention and human rights. The critical
assessment of this justification takes place within a community based
on the perceived or expected consequences of particular action. The
communities construct knowledge about international norms in order
to facilitate the achievement of what they perceive useful purposes.
This knowledge between communities creates overlap between their
communal beliefs and desires. This view clarifies the divergent
views about intervention in world politics. The pragmatic solidarism
provides the solution of this problem through 'communicative
ethics'. It is based on the view that the communal beliefs cannot be
justified by comparison with other beliefs. The communicative
ethics insists that moral knowledge can only claim to be valid if it is
approved of and has a potential to be approved of by all affected by
this knowledge or norm. 54 The more approval such claims have,
more valid and legitimate they are.

For the justification and validity of 'humanitarian intervention' ,
it is necessary for those using force to persuade others about its

138 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

instrumental necessity to achieve an ethical end. This persuasion
needs to be developed through 'Socratic dialogue' and critical
intelligence. The Socratic dialogue means a situation where agents
construct knowledge through free and open dialogue based on
critical intelligence. Agents reach better forms of knowledge by
assuming different positions as a result of this dialogue. This means
that the veracity of knowledge claim is dependent upon the
possibility of dialogic consensus. But the problem with this position
is that what practical steps should agents take when confronted with
supreme humanitarian emergency and an absence of such
consensus? 55 The NATO intervention in Kosovo without
authorisation of the Security Council was also the result of absence
of dialogic consensus between permanent members.

The pragmatic ideas of fallibility and the priority of democracy
to philosophy are used for validating knowledge claims. Fallibalism
based on the idea that there is no necessary correspondence between
knowledge and reality. There is no guarantee that the most firmly
held beliefs would never needs revision. Fallibalism does not require
to doubt everything instead it demands to doubt anything when given
good reason to do so by dialogic encounters. This concept is wedded
to the idea that to know is not to enjoy a 'god's eye view' of the
thing in itself. Rather, it comes to agreement with others about the
nature of things through discursive practice. This concept is based
on two views. First is to prepare to accept that the beliefs ones hold
are malleable. Second view relates to the awareness that the frames
that validate knowledge can themselves be changed through
discourse or practice. 56 For instance, if one believes that there is no
legitimate practice of humanitarian intervention in international
society at present one must also accept the possibility of such
practice emerging. The emerging notion of 'sovereignty as
responsibility' describes this view. This notion may reshape
international discourse in such a way that states are legitimising
human rights norms.

The idea of the priority of democracy to philosophy viewed that
the pragmatists do not justify beliefs by arguing that they correspond
to something approximating human nature. Instead it offers
justification on the basis of comparison with alternative views.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 139

These views based on pragmatic idea that "human intellectual and
spiritual growth arrived by considering and contrasting constantly
new or alternative ways of describing reality. 57 For instance, there
are good grounds to believe that genocide is imminent. The beliefs
that an early and decisive use of force or using force against
imminent perpetrators of genocide is effective strategies for
overcoming this problem are validated on the basis of widespread
intersubjective agreement. But this knowledge is not infallible
because there may be grounds for revision within this discourse e.g.
the use of force by NATO in Kosovo prompt genocidal type
practices. The validation of knowledge in this way depends upon the
priority of democracy. It means that agents are free to justify their
actions in way that appear appropriate to them as well as others are
free to interrogate those claims and participate in the process of
reconstituting methods of validations. Thus, it is argued that the
values such as humanitarian intervention may be legitimate if their
revision takes place through Socratic dialogue between as many
individuals and groups as possible. It may also be legitimate by an
appreciation that even the most dearly held values may be revised
and by a commitment of preserving the priority of democracy.

While there is no doubt that NATO's attack on Yugoslavia
violated International Law but it justified this intervention on the
basis of supreme humanitarian emergency. On the one hand, "when
the Kosovo conflict is studied in context of human rights violations
the NATO's violations of international law appears somewhat less
egregious. On the other hand, if NATO's action can be seen as in
the context of evolving relationship with the United Nations, it poses
a grave threat to its authority and relevance in world politics. This
point can be described through the analyses of relationship between
the United Nations and NATO.

POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UN AND NATO
AND IMPACTS OF NON-ARTICLES NATO MISSIONS ON
THE UN SYSTEM

The NATO was established by North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 as
carefully circumscribed uni-dimensioned security organization
which complements the multi-dimensional security framework of the
United Nations. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty expressly

140 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

based itself on Article 51 of The United Nations Charter and
conceived it to remain subordinate to the United Nations. 58 The
Article 51 of UN Charter recognize the inherent right of member
states to act in individual or collective self-defence in response to an
armed attack until the Security Council has taken measures to
maintain international peace and security. 59 The subordination of
NATO to the UN also acknowledged by Preamble of North Atlantic
Treaty. Article 1 of this Treaty accepts that NATO refrain from use
of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.
Article 7 of Treaty clarify that it does not affect the right and
obligations (under the Charter) of the parties which are members of
the United Nations. This reiterates Article 103 of the UN Charter
which provides that in the event of conflict between member's
obligations under Charter and its obligations under any other treaty,
the former will prevail. 60 NATO's subordination to the UN was also
acknowledged by its architects from its inception. The US Secretary
of State Dean Acheson tactfully said,

The Pact is carefully and conscientiously designed to conform in every
particular with the Charter of United Nations. It is an essential measure
for strengthening the United Nations. It is the firm intention of the
parties to carry out the Pact in accordance with the provisions of the
United Nations Charter and in manner which will advance its purposes
and provisions. 61

This subordinate relation of NATO with the UN has flawed on
two occasions when NATO enforced heavy weapons exclusion
zones without the Security Council authorization in Bosnia. The key
officials in NATO governments particularly the US Government
have asserted unambiguously that they do not consider the point of
view that the NATO is subordinate to the UN. The US Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said,

We believe NATO's missions and tasks must always be consistent with
the purposes and principles of the UN and OSCE.... At the same time
we must be careful not to subordinate NATO to any other international
body or compromise the integrity of its command structure. We will
try to act in concert with other organizations and with respect for their
principles and purposes. But the alliance must reserve the right and the
freedom to act when its member, by consensus, deem it necessary. 62

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 141

In this statement the UN is equated with and given no more
importance than regional organization such as OSCE. In a similar
vein, Senator William Roth, the Chairman of the North Atlantic
Assembly said, "Even Though all NATO member states would
prefer to act with the UN mandate, they must not limit themselves
to acting only when such a mandate can be agreed." This statement
imply that the Security Council authorization for the use of force
would be politically desirable. 63 Kosovo crisis is illustration of this
evolving relation between NATO, the US and the UN.

NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia raises another issue of the
delegation of UN authority over use of force to regional
arrangements. The UN Charter gives distinct sphere of activity to
collective self-defence organizations and regional arrangements.
Article 5 1 of the UN Charter gives the right to use force to collective
self-defence organizations established under this Article. It gives this
right in response to an armed attack against one or more members
of collective self-defence organization without securing the Security
Council authorization. 64 The scope of activities of a regional
organization envisaged under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
Article 52 provides that regional arrangements or agencies cannot be
precluded if they deal with matters relating with international peace
and security provided that these are consistent with the purposes and
principles of the UN. Article 53 provided that the Security Council
utilizes these regional agencies for enforcement action under its
authority but no regional enforcement action shall be taken without
authorization of the Security Council. Article 54 provides that the
Security Council is to be kept fully informed at all times of activities
undertaken or under contemplation by regional organization. 65 It is
proved by the plain reading of the UN Charter that only the Security
Council may authorize enforcement action.

The reporting requirement under Article 54 significantly
distinguishes the collective defence organization and regional
organization. An organization established under Article 51 may use
force without the Security Council authorization and is not obliged
to report its actions to the Security Council before such action is
taken. An organization established under Chapter VIII use force
even when not acting in collective self-defense but only with prior

142 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

authorisation of the Security Council. It is not obliged to report its
actions to the Council under Article 54 even those actions are under
contemplation of the Security Council. Thus it is clear that even
inaction of Security Council does not prevent collective self-defense
organization to act in self-defence but precludes regional
organization from initiating any action involving the use of force. 66

The North Atlantic Treaty expressly basing itself on Article 51
and makes no reference to Chapter VIII. This confined scope of
NATO's actions to collective self-defence and barred from other
kind of operations. Even the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson
and British Foreign Secretary Bevin Categorically described that
The North Atlantic Treaty is not a regional arrangement under
Chapter VIII of The UN Charter. 67 Thus, if NATO wants to evade
authorization and reporting requirements of the Security Council, it
must limit its use of force to self-defense in response to an armed
attack. But NATO used force in Kosovo when it was not acting in
self-defence. The Yugoslavia did not attack NATO member state.
Under Article 5 1 , NATO cannot use force when it is not acting in
self-defence and evade the scrutiny of the Security Council. The
distinction between collective self-defense organization and regional
organization has blurred in practice. The Security Council used
NATO for enforcement of its resolutions in Bosnia as regional
organization under Chapter VIII. By authorising NATO to enforce
resolutions 770(1992), 781(1992), 816, 819, 824, 836, 844 in 1993
and 1031 (1995), the Security Council recognized NATO as regional
arrangement under Article 53. 68

Even recognised as regional organization under Chapter VIII,
NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia was illegal because it was not
authorised by the Security Council under Article 53.. This action
further raises the issue of inconsistency and incompatibility between
regional organization and universal organization. Compatibility is
defined as the relationship between international and regional
organizations by which the activities of one do not undermine those
of other or vice-versa. The antagonism between regionalism and
universalism occurs only when the jurisdiction and functions of
organizations at the two levels are incompatible. The basis for a
compatible relationship exists (in case of conflict) if universal

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 143

obligation prevail over regional obligation and the regional agencies
submit to supervision by global agencies or respond positively to
their request for supportive action. 69 In case of Kosovo, NATO acts
without the authorisation of the Security Council and undermine the
jurisdiction and functions of the United Nations.

It is argued that NATO bombed Serbia because it wanted to
justify its relevance in post-cold war scenario. The demise of USSR
had receded the fear of external attack on Europe. It made collective
self-defence commitment of NATO redundant. Thus, NATO
adopted new strategic concept in 1991 and further expand it in 1999.
The principal challenges highlighted by NATO in its strategic
concept are, ethnic conflicts, terrorism and Weapons of Mass
destruction (WMD). 70 Although the eruption of ethnic conflicts,
proliferation of WMD and terrorism has created dangerous security
concerns in the world but NATO's decision to deal with these issues
raise serious problems of jurisdiction. The proliferation of WMD is
global problem and all international treaty regimes which controlling
WMD created under the UN and the Security Council is responsible
for their enforcement. NATO's assessment of the nature of security
challenges is not clear. It's intervention in ethnic conflicts in Eastern
Europe is more or less justified but how the possession of WMD by
Asian or African country threaten and invite its action?. Thus, the
Kosovo action indicate that NATO need not always act in self-
defence but it may take remedial action even it does not threatened.
The Resolution on Recasting Euro-Atlantic Security adopted by
North Atlantic Assembly in 1998 justifies the Missions undertaking
outside the scope of Article 5 of Atlantic Treaty. The Paragraph (d)
of this resolution enjoined member states,

to seek to ensure the widest international legitimacy for non-Article 5
missions and also to stand ready to act should the UN Security Council
be prevented from discharging its purpose of maintaining international
peace and security. 71

NATO's Kosovo action was non- Article 5 Mission which
violated the UN Charter and international law. The UN Charter
recognize and gives scope for initiatives by regional organization for
maintenance of international peace and security. It does not permit
these organizations to act in place of the Security Council even if it

144 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

prevented from discharging its function of maintaining international
peace and security. However, it may be desirable in a given
context. 72 NATO bombed Serbia according the codification of
Paragraph (d) of North Atlantic Assembly Resolution. But the UN
Charter and international law do not permit it to act without the
Security Council's authorization. Although, this action demonstrated
Security Council weariness to act decisively in intra-state conflicts
but it also eroded its monopoly on the use of force. Simultaneously,
it undermined the United Nations efficiency as an international
organization.

NATO's action in Kosovo has myriad effects on international
politics. It raises legal, political and philosophical debate about
humanitarian intervention in world politics. This action seriously
affected the authority of the United Nations Security Council
regarding use of force. Although, NATO successfully regain its
important the place in post-Cold War European security paradigm
but it eroded the United Nations relevance in world affairs. But the
post-war peace-building role of the United Nations in Kosovo
indicates that it has a continuous relevance in international politics.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 145

PART II : ROLE OF UNITED STATES

The Kosovo crisis was a watershed in international relations and
exhibited the severity of ethnic conflicts in world politics. The crisis
was a result of zero-sum ethnic conflict between the Serbs and
Kosovo Albanians. 73 The Kosovo Albanians demanded
independence of Kosovo from Yugoslavia. The Serbian management
of this conflict through violent means resulted in serious human
rights violations of the Kosovo Albanians. The spill-over effect of
humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo compelled international
community to intervene in this crisis. The lack of consensus between
permanent members of the United Nations further complicated the
situation. Consequently, NATO attacked Yugoslavia without the
mandate of the Security Council. NATO's intervention in Kosovo
not only diminished the United Nations effectiveness and prestige in
world politics but also pointed towards the role and impact of the
United States as world power on the functioning of the United
Nations system.

POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The United States Complex relations with the United Nations
are best understood in terms of four international roles played by it
in world politics. These are,

1 . Prophetic and reformist role

2. Infra-organizational role

3. Custodial role

4. Domestic-Pressure role

Since the late nineteenth century, the focus of the United States
reformist foreign policy has been shifted from the choice of a role
within an existing system to a role of innovative architect and

146 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

redesigner of that system. The distinctive characteristics of the
United States participation in international politics in the past
century has been to engage in major social engineering, to design
and create new institutions which transform the essential nature and
procedures of international politics. Although the content of these
restructuring policies varied from time to time but the common
objective has been to change the world politics so that it could take
on the character of American political beliefs. The multi-lateral
international institutions in the world necessarily incorporate the
values and demands of the most politically relevant actors. These
institutions also reflect the relative power positions of actors (that
formed them) in their constitutions and prescribed procedures. 74 The
birth of United Nations by an international act on American soil was
the result of its reformist role. The United States like other states
always has been defending, its rights and position within the United
Nations decision-making procedures since the establishment of
world body. Although the United States behaviour gets magnified by
the virtue of its preponderant power, but there are many instances
when even at the cost of its specific interests it acted in consistent
with the United Nations aims and objectives.

This pro and infra organisational role of the United States is
based on its wish to use the authority of the United Nations rather
than "go it alone" in international relations. The "uniting for peace"
resolution was an example of the United States infra-organisational
role. This resolution authorised the General Assembly to exercise
some powers of the Security Council with regard to international
peace and security when the Security Council gets blocked by the
use of the Veto power of any of the permanent member. The United
States always used this resolution for its own convenience. It could
have easily used this resolution for obtaining authority for military
action in Kosovo if the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution
because of the expected veto of Russia and China. But, it eschewed
this option because of the presumable and precedential implications
of constitutional change which could have enhanced the power of the
General Assembly vis-a-vis the Security Council. Thus, the United
States did not use this alternative in Kosovo and used NATO for
military attack on Yugoslavia. 75

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 147

The United States, as the strongest power in the world
community, functions as the ultimate custodian of world order. It is
the actor of last resort in matters of fundamental importance to
contemporary international politics. The custodian role may involve
the usurping of ordinary decision-making procedures of the United
Nations in order to vouchsafe the fundamental goals of larger
system. The United States, sometimes, acts extra-legally or supra-
legally with respect to the United Nations when an urgent issue of
international order is at stake. This role may generate acute conflicts
with other members of the United Nations when military action is
required to stop severe human rights violations. The domestic
pressures widely affected the United States roles in international
relations. The transfer of foreign affairs power from a specialist
professional class to much wider slice of community is characteristic
of modern democracies. The United States as a robustly effective
democracy must respond to the demands of its domestic pressures
which are generated, refracted and amplified by the Mass Media. 76

The above mentioned roles collectively reflect the United States
grand strategy in world politics. The United States grand strategy
has been continuously developing and evolving since two centuries.
The new grand strategy of each period build on the strategy it
supersedes. The United States revised or expanded it to fit the
altered realities and opportunities created by its victories in
successive wars. The United States grand strategy included security
objectives and economic objectives as well as particular approaches
to achieve these ends at particular times. It also supported the
development of rather sophisticated international institutions
according to its reformist role. During Cold War, it developed
sophisticated ideology that gained wide international appeal and
comprised both political and economic ideals. This was liberal
internationalism whose political and economic ideals were liberal
democracy and free markets. Other important elements of this
strategy were containment, nuclear deterrence and promotion of
open economic society.

The United States modified, revised and expanded the elements
from its earlier grand strategy after the end of Cold War and
collapse of the Soviet Union. It showed not only the new realities

148 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

and opportunities created by the United States victory in the Cold
War but also reflected particular transformations occurred in the last
decade of twentieth century. The United States economic and social
realities in this decade were no longer centered on industrial power
and classic liberalism like the Cold War years. The process of
globalization, communication revolution and diminished power of
nation-state changed old strategy of the United States. These
transformations have been most pronounced in the United States but
their impact has been global in scope. The United States policy
makers, redesigned their grand strategy to fit it in new global era. 77
The Kosovo war was the first fruit of that revised strategy and a
prototype of twenty first century way of war.

THE UNITED STATES CONDUCT IN THE POST-COLD
WAR WORLD AND NATURE OF ITS INVOLVEMENT
IN KOSVO CRISIS

The United States involvement in Kosovo began in December
1992 when President George W. Bush warned President Milosevic
to employ United States military force in Kosovo against Serbian
repressive policies. Beside realist strategies, humanitarian concerns
in Kosovo dominated foreign policy agenda of the United States
through media in a global information Age. The United States
claimed that the humanitarian concerns regarding the fate of the
Kosovo Albanians could have motivated it to initiate the Kosovo
war. In President Clinton's words, the reasons of Kosovo war were

to save the lives of innocent civilians in Kosovo from a brutal military
offensive, to diffuse a power keg at the heart of Europe that has
exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results, to
prevent a wider war we would have to confront later only at far greater
risk and cost, to stand with our NATO allies for peace. 78

Kosovo and Iraq war 2003 pose the question mark on
international law governing the use of force. It dangerously affected
the future of the United Nations Security Council. The American
Commentators also proclaimed that the military interventions led by
the United States in both places amounted to the "death" of the
United Nations Charter. They further pointed out that the grand
attempt to use force in Kosovo resulted in substituting the rule of law

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 149

to the use of force. 79 Michael J. Glennon claimed :

At this point it was easy to conclude, as President Bush, that the UN's
failure to confront Iraq would cause the world body to "fade into
history as an ineffective, irrelevant debating society." In reality,
however, the council's fate had long since been sealed. The problem
was not the second Persian Gulf War but rather an earlier shift in world
power toward a configuration that was simply incompatible with the
way UN was meant to function. It was the rise in American
unipolarity-not the Iraq Crisis-that along with cultural clashes and
different attitudes toward the use of force, gradually eroded the
council's credibility. Although the body had managed to limp along
and function adequately in more tranquil times, it proved incapable of
performing under periods of great stress. 80

The Kosovo crisis and Iraq war compelled many scholars of
international law to proclaim that the charter norm of non-use of
force might be dead or at least mortally wounded. If humanitarian
factors were insufficient to explain the United States conduct in the
Kosovo war then what were the reasons behind the involvement of
the United States in the war? The theories of "liberal
internationalism" and "neoliberal cosmopolitanism" explained the
United States conduct in world affairs. Liberal internationalism is
based on vision of a single human race peacefully united by free
trade and common legal norms, led by states featuring civic liberties
and representative institutions. It sought to create a global order that
could enforce a code of conduct on the external relations between
states. But it still essentially accepted the Westphallian system that
granted states jurisdiction over their own territories.

The neoliberal cosmopolitanism in contrast seeks to overcome
the limits of national sovereignty by constructing a global order.
This global order would govern important political and economic
aspects of both the internal and external behaviour of states. This is
not a conception which advocating any world government
empowered to decide the great international issues of the day.
Rather, it proposes a set of disciplinary regimes characteristically
dubbed as "global governance." In this system, sovereignty is
reconceived as a partial and conditional licence granted by the
"international community" . It can be withdrawn if any state failed to
meet the domestic or foreign standards laid down by the

150 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

requirements of liberal governance. This theory, on the other hand,
provides justification of intervention in internal affairs of states. It
has also projected a new world order that requires the subordination
of all states to some form of supra-state planetary authority. This
argument of neoliberal cosmopolitan theory misrepresent the
relationship between the United States and the various institutions of
"global governance". 81 There is no evidence in the post-Cold War
period that these institutions have strengthened their jurisdiction
over the dominant power in the international system. The basic
argument is that the United States has grown accustomed to its
position as the world's dominant power. 82 The Kosovo war reflected
that the United States strategy in world politics no longer adhered to
classic liberalism. The great economic and social transformations
after the end of Cold War have displaced the old realities and
resulted in the birth of the 'global era.' These great transformations
were :

1. The emergence of global economy which replaced
international economy.

2. The development of an information economy i.e.
communication revolution.

3. The development of postmodern society.

4. The decline of the nation-state which superseded by a
multicultural society. 83

These four transformations had changed the major ideas,
ideology and identity of the United States. The global economy and
information economy favours openness. The ideology of openness
(most American elites endorse it) challenged the traditional
conceptions of international relations. The development of
postmodern society eroded the great pillars of modern society i.e.
government bureaucracies, military services and business
corporations. These are replaced by the ideas of expressive
individualism and universal human rights. The development of
multi-cultural society also promotes the idea of human rights. The
ideology of human rights further pointed toward the limitations of
state sovereignty and decline of the nation-state. The traditional
American ideology advocated liberal democracy and free markets.
The above discussed transformation expanded traditional ideology

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 151

with more emphasis on promoting human rights. 84 The modified
version of "liberal globalism" (recently propagated by President Bil
Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright) provides the
justification to a new kind of the United States military
interventionism. The military interventions in Somalia, Haiti and
Bosnia were the examples of this phenomenon. The United States
led war against Serbia over Kosovo also represented the culmination
of this trend.

The United States role in Kosovo crisis is also described
through four categories of military intervention. These are,

1 . Intervention for security

2. Intervention to influence events i.e. Realpolitic

3. Ideological intervention

4. Moral intervention. 85

Every country applied above categories to obtain political and
military objectives through intervention. Although the Kosovo crisis
presented no direct threat to the United States national security but
the failure to contain this conflict could have eroded its credibility as
sole superpower in the world. The United States, on the other hand,
used military force in Kosovo for shaping political events in the
Europe. It not only preserved its influence in the region but also
strengthened long-term economic and political relationship with
NATO powers. The United States interventions in Nicaragua, El
Salvador and Afghanistan were examples of military interventions
for ideological reasons i.e. to contain communism and defending
democracy. The United States policy to spread democracy 86 through
promoting free markets was another ideological reason to intervene
in Kosovo. The post-Kosovo war policies of the United Nations
Mission (UNMIK) to consolidate democracy in Kosovo are also a
reflection of the United States ideological position.

The United States role in Kosovo can also be defined through
category of 'moral intervention'. The moral intervention in another
state's affairs occurred because of its actions which "shocked the
conscience of mankind" or violated "community standards". There
are two objectives of moral intervention i.e. peace and justice. The
peace in this context can be defined as to avoid death and destruction

1 52 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

that wreaked on weak or unprotected people. It becomes morally
imperative for all those who can take steps to maintain peace. The
United States role in Kosovo symbolized that it must be a main
enforcer of global peace as the world's sole super power. The other
pursuit of moral intervention is 'Justice'. In post-Cold War ethnic
conflicts, justice means to punish war criminals and perpetrators of
genocide. There are three military objectives of justice i.e.
retribution, specific deterrence and general deterrence. The policy of
retribution would not just be required for the defeat of an offending
nation's armed forces or recovery of any territory and wealth but for
some additional punitive measures. The specific deterrence is
required not only for reversing any gain by any offending state but
also for damaging its personnel and equipment so badly that it
would not repeat its crime. The general deterrence has same
elements as specific deterrence except that the offending nations
punishment must be so obvious that other potentially errant nations
would be contained from such type of aggressions. 87 The United
States led NATO attack on Serbia not only reversed its gains in
Kosovo but heavily damaged Serbia's military and economic power.
The United States policy of specific deterrence in Kosovo got
significant success with the arrest of the Serbian President Solobodan
Milosevic by war crime tribunal authorities in June 2001.

THE UNITED STATES' INVOLVEMENT IN KOSVO
CRISIS AS A REFLECTION OF ITS HEGEMONY IN
WORLD POLITICS

The Kosovo war also exhibited the hegemonic design of the
United States in world politics. The United States has acquired
absolute military dominance over every other state or combination
of states on the entire planet. It has sought to preserve this status
which provides major political and economic benefits for the United
States. Concomitantly, the United States has sought to contain rival
capitalist states that threaten its predominance. During the Cold
War, the threat of communism served to legitimate United States
hegemony over other capitalist states. 87 With the end of cold war,
the United States has sought to use humanitarian intervention as one
of the principal means to reassert its hegemony. An American
commentator argued,

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 153

"Someday in the next we will acknowledge that there can be no global
human rights without global laws and no way to write and enforce the
laws without a global congress, courts and cops... as the lion in the
jungle of nations, the United States is obviously not ready to yield to a
higher authority. ... the time will come when Americans recognize that
anarchy among nations, constitute a threat to our interests and welfare.
We would then take the lead in creating a canopy of law across the
globe. 89

The ascendance of ethnic conflicts in international scenario
provides a context in which the most striking advantage of the
United States (i.e. its overwhelming military superiority) can be
emphasized. The last decade of twentieth century is evidence of the
assertive United States hegemony. In this decade, most of
international organizations are able to function effectively only in so
far as they correspond to the perceived policy priorities of the United
States or at least do not contradict them. In many instances they
should rather be viewed as lightly disguised instruments of the
United States policy. The United Nations is a striking case in point.
It may sound brutal but is unfortunately true that the utility of the
United Nations to the United States is based on its ability to sanction
the United States sponsored policies. The United States always
showed extreme flexibility in dealing with the United Nations. It will
either control the system and find ways to use it or ignore it. 90
During the last fifty years of the United Nations existence, the three
pillars of the United Nations i.e. the Security Council, the General
Assembly and the Secretary General have fallen to its onslaught one
after the other.

The United States became the foremost nation among the
victorious of the World War II. The United Nations Charter adopted
in San Francisco, and at that time most Americans felt that they were
showing new path to the new global system. Senator John Foster
Dulles praised the UN Charter as "a great Magna Carta".
Americans treated it as an extension of their own constitutional
framework. President Harry Truman Commended that this charter,
like our own Bill of Rights is a part of our constitution. Even the
former secretary of state during President Reagan years noted, "the
ideals of the United Nations are also American ideals. The Charter
embodies American Principles. It will always be a major objective

1 54 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

of our statecraft to make the United Nations an instrument of
peace." The institutional infrastructure of the United Nations is
heavily influenced by the United States model of federal democracy.
The General Assembly is a kind of House of Representatives while
the Security Council is a kind of Senate and Presidency rolled into
one. Each body operates by free exchanges of views leading to vote.
Each represents different interests and different responsibilities.
Both the General Assembly and the Security Council represent
equality of sovereign states and political hierarchy of power
respectively. The Presidency is collective and a veto of any one of
its permanent members is sufficient to stop an international action. 91

The United States exercised control over the United Nations
through its military strength, dollar diplomacy and overwhelming
support in the General Assembly. The United States tackled the
General Assembly by two ways, Firstly, to influence the voting
behaviour of member states by financial threats and inducements,
Secondly, to starve the United Nations by not paying its dues. The
United states used financial blackmail to discipline economically
weaker states of third world to vote the American way in the General
Assembly. It also used money power, Americans controlled
markets, terms of trade, CIA influenced politicians, economists,
academics, and media men and women for offsetting the loss of
control in the General Assembly. 92

The United States also curbed and controlled the United Nations
through withholding its dues assigned to it. The Article 19 of the
United Nations Charter (deprives any state not paying arrears of its
voting right) could never deter the United States. Peacekeeping has
become an extremely sensitive and delicate responsibility of the
United Nations after collapse of the USSR. This has tremendously
increased expenditure of the organization and given a handle to rich
states like the United States to tighten control over the United
Nations. There was a striking convergence of the goals of the United
States and the United Nations during initial years of Clinton's
Presidency. The adverse course of Somalia and Haiti affected the
perfect harmony between the United States and the World
Organization. It badly affected Presidential Decision Directive- 13
policy formulations and reserved the active participation of the
United States in the peacekeeping operations. 93

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 155

The Clinton Administration adopted an increasingly hostile view
towards the United Nations. The new Presidential Decision
Directive 25 (PDD-25) laid down changed criteria for the United
States involvement in the United Nations operations. The PDD-25
was designed to provide greater possible flexibility to address
international crises. It included the need for the clear United States
interests to be at stake in a situation and a limited period for each
engagement. The United States also decided unilaterally to reduce its
assessed share of the peacekeeping costs from just over 30 per cent
to 25 per cent of the global cost with this decision. Although the cost
of the United Nations peacekeeping has less than the annual
expenditure of the New York fire department, the United States
deliberately weakened the United Nations ability to continue with
existing tasks. 94 Thus, the United States exercised a quadruple veto
i.e. its Security Council veto for denying political leadership,
intelligence and material assistance for operations. The United States
used its financial veto through refusal to pay contributions. The
chairman of the foreign relations committee of senate, Jesse Helms
envisaged that the United Nations is just one aspect of America's
diplomatic arsenal. It provides a forum with channels of
communication in times of crisis and render services such as
peacekeeping, weapons inspections and humanitarian relief. He
further warned,

The American people will not countenance if the United Nations
attempts to establish itself as the central authority and power over
nation states. If the United Nations was to survive into the twenty-first
century, it must recognise its limitations and stop trying to impose
Utopian vision on America and the world, failing which it begs for
confrontation and... eventual US withdrawal. 95

The major powers used the United Nations Secretary-Generals
for their own interests. The United States could never tolerate a
Secretary-General who will stand for the United Nations as a whole
and "embody the principles of charter." The charter enjoins the
Secretary-General to function independently of the "instruction from
any government. " The United States as supreme power after World
War II naturally considered United Nations as its preserve. The
Secretary-General was considered as pliable chief executive who
should acknowledge the real masters. 96

156 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

The Kosovo war led to the emergence of debate between the
unilateralist and multilateralist views in the United States.
Unilaterlism based on realism shaped the United States policy
toward the world organization. Realism's primary objection to the
multilateralist world order vision is precisely the latter' s more
principled and aspirational basis for organizing international
relations. Thus, unilateralists dislike the United States participation
in multilateral arrangements. They consider them to be unnecessary
constraints on the United States degree of freedom. Such
arrangements could make impossible for the United States to act
when it should. They could, on the other hand, compel the United
States to act when its cost-benefit calculus dictates that it should
not. 97 The neo-conservatives are committed above all to the United
States global leadership. They are ready to make common cause with
the United Nations when doing so will serve the US interests. 98
Condoleezza Rice argued,

'Multilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in
themselves. US Interests are served by having strong alliances and can
be promoted within the UN and other multilateral organization, as well
as through well crafted international agreements.... Neither is it
isolationist to suggest that the United States has a special role in the
world and should not adhere to every international convention and
agreement that someone think to propose."

After September 11, the United States articulated a new concept
of preventive self-defence that is designed to preclude emerging
threats. This document flatly contradicts the perceptions of the
United Nations Charter. Article 51 of the UN Charter permits the
use of force only in self defence and only "if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations. On the other hand, the
United States policy proceeds from the premise that "United States
cannot let enemies strike first." In his National Security strategy,
President Bush promised to,

Disrupt and destroy terrorist organisations by defending the United
States, the American people, and interests at home and abroad by
identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While
the United States strive to enlist the support of the international
community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our
right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists. 100

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 157

The preventive approach of the United States national security
is intended to respond to new threats posed by mega-terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction. The goal of this policy is to prevent
more generalised threats from materializing rather than trying to
pre-empt specific, eminent threats. 101 The Bush administration has
acted on the basis of doctrine of preventive war in Iraq. Indeed, the
concept provided the main political justification for its decision to
resort to war.

The Kosovo and Iraq war represented a circumvention of the
collective procedures of the UN Charter system. In both cases the
United States and NATO could violate the procedure related to use
of force under the United Nations Charter. The Bush administration
insisted that the traditional interpretation of international law can be
reexamined in the face of new dangers of catastrophic terrorism.
Both situations of Kosovo and Iraq raised the United States views
about the United Nations that the world body turn out to be
irrelevant. It fails to endorse recourse to war against the dictators of
Serbia and Iraq. Even President George W. Bush justified this view
when he historically challenged the United Nations Security Council
in September 12, 2002 through memorable words "will the United
Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be
irrelevant." 102

KOSOVO CRISIS SHOWS THE TENDENCY OF UNITED
STATES TO USE THE UN AS ITS INSTRUMENT OF
FOREIGN POLICY

Kosovo and Iraq are illustrations and not an aberration in the
United States foreign policy. The United States history reveals two
dominant traits in its national character. First is liberty and utter
hostility to interference by any other nation in its domestic affairs
and other is expansionism. Presidents Washington, Jefferson,
Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt felt deeply about human freedom and
spread it across oceans and frontiers. They resisted all the efforts of
bullies, tyrants and fascists. 103 On the other hand, the trait of empire
building is also a part of American psyche. President Lyndon
Johnson pursued Vietnam war and wished to proliferate it. President
Clinton maintained that the United States has aggressive foreign

158 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

policy because of its great power status. This trend showed that Pax
Americana did not need physical occupation of foreign territories
like its predecessor Pax Britannica. It is a high-tech behind-the-
scenes pulling of strings which makes puppets of and pushing out of
regimes those unwilling to join the band-wagon. 104 Kosovo and Iraq
simply pointed that the United States temptation to work outside the
United Nations is obviously difficult to resist. The United States
capabilities are too great to be counter balanced and it enjoys a
preponderance of power that is historically unprecedented. Its
hegemony in world affairs is intact because it has world's largest and
most productive economy. Its Military power has no peers and it
spends more on defense than the next five powers combined. It
possesses a clear lead in the advanced technologies on which power
is likely to rest in future. 105

The Kosovo war also reflects the United States hegemonic
foreign policy goals in Europe. The United States hegemony in
Europe has been maintained through forceful behaviour. This policy
had entailed a measure of "double containment." During the Cold
War, the United States contained communism and its capitalist allies
simultaneously. The common ideological enemy of 'Communism'
served to unite the capitalist European powers during the Cold War.
The agent that facilitated cooperation among these states was of
course the United States hegemony. The main objective of the
United States policy, during this time, was to establish a liberal
international order led by itself. During the Cold War, the emerging
United States hegemon faced opposition in the Europe from two
principal sources, firstly, from the political left parties, which
enjoyed unprecedented popularity and were major forces in the
political systems of Italy and France (in Japan as well). A second
major impediment to the United States aspirations in Europe was the
political right which had a long tradition of protectionist measures,
state regulation and colonial sphere of influence. 106 This generated a
significant degree of friction between the United States and its
European allies e.g. French President Charles De Gaulle criticized
the United States domination of NATO which led to French
departure from the Joint Military Command and permanent removal
of NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 159

The international role of the dollar and the alleged United States
abuse of its privileged monetary position also raised objects in the
European countries. Not a single European country, openly support
the United States war in Vietnam. The Nixon-Kissinger's tendency
to undertake unilateralist actions e.g. devaluation of the dollar in
1971 become additional source of resentment. The United States
unilateralist actions during energy crisis in 1973 -1975 also
generalised recriminations. But, the United States contained these
frictions through three factors,

1. The United States presented free security against the
possibility of Soviet invasion.

2. The United States was reliable bulwark against the
possibility of radical social change in Europe. This aspect
of cold war represented a tacit alliance between European
elites and the United States foreign policy.

3. The United States hegemony was associated with economic
prosperity and full employment. The economic growth in
Europe during the early period of the Cold War was far
above historical overage and was beneficial to every
segment of society with major improvements in the
material conditions of the working classes. 107

But after the Cold War, the United States could not face any
imminent threat to its vital interests. During this time, the United
States faced two options i.e. to become the global policeman,
enforced sufficient world order to protect its long-term political,
economic and security interests. The other option would have been
to withdraw to an isolationist posture but various stress and strains
upon its economic and military policies due to globalization limited
this option. The United States Congress and administration alike
accepted that economically, politically and militarily interdependent
world is a global reality and the United States policies must be
related with it. The Bosnian debacle, on the other hand, emphasized
that no organization of the sovereign states can function effectively
without the consensus among its members. The United States and its
European allies took lesson from this debacle that no bureaucratic
arrangements would produce concerted action without the
knowledge of collective values or interests, which they are willing

1 60 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

to defend. This community security approach gave rationale to
NATO in the post-Cold War Europe. NATO's wide arrangements
for political consultations, the integrated Military Command
Structure, US troop deployments in Europe, and common defence
infrastructure also enhanced its importance for both the United
States and European countries. 108 The United States, through
Kosovo's experience, found that without the NATO framework, it
would have no legal or practical infrastructure for its continued
military interaction with NATO members.

It is argued that the continued dominance of NATO is vital for
the United States dominance in Europe but increased importance of
the European union's structures effected the US hegemony, in the
region. The EU's threat was fourfold,

1 . The EU is one of the largest single economic unit in the
world equal to the United States.

2. The dominant powers within the EU i.e. Germany and
France openly advocate European independence. Due to
their close cooperation, they became an advocate for
increased European autonomy.

3. The European powers adopted specific policy officially
termed as the European Security and Defense Identity
(ESDI). This offered the European a chance to establish an
independent world role, commensurate with the size and
economic weight of the Combined European Nations. The
Western European Union (WEU) became the official
military arm of the EU. In addition, France and Germany
form a France- German Army "The Euro-Corps" and it
became a fully operational in 1995.

4. The financial integration of Europe also create contention
in the US-European integration. The single European
Currency 'Euro' was advanced as a technical means to
achieve an integrated European Market. Various US
analysists argued that the 'Euro' would have political
implications and it would pose a threat to the US dollar's
status as the international reserve currency. 109

The United State, as a reaction of the EU's policies, aimed to

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 161

protect NATO by its expansion towards the Eastern Europe.
Although Secretary of State Madeleine Albright implied that this
extension reflected shared political and cultural values but it also
contained element of realpolitik. It also served four purposes :

1. It gave NATO a new function of preserving order in
Eastern Europe.

2. It is argued that this expansion has been reinforce the
dominant role of the United States and precluded the
prospects of independent Europe.

3 . The expansion of NATO also enhanced the United States
business interests in Eastern Europe. The Military-
Industrial Complex remains a significant economic actor
which favours the continuous United States hegemony in
Europe.

4. The eastward expansion of NATO consolidated the United
States position in a new spheres of influence. It diluted the
influence of Germany on various East-European
Countries. 110

Thus, the United States successfully obtained its central
objective of the containment of its European allies after the demise
of the USSR. It overwhelmingly reasserted its power in Europe
through revitalization of the Cold War institutional structures. The
NATO could be used for this purpose in Kosovo.

The Kosovo crisis was a turning point in international relations.
The United States claimed that the humanitarian issues compelled it
to fight this war. The Kosovo war, on the other hand, fought for the
new ideology of cultural diversity and global society. It was also
fought for the enlargement of NATO in Europe. The United States
and NATO bypassed the United Nations Security Council and
attacked Serbia without the Security Council mandate. NATO
bombing of Serbia severely affected the United Nations position in
the world affairs. The Kosovo war demonstrated that the United
States used the United Nations for its own purposes and interests.
The United States bypasses or restricts the functioning of the United
Nations if latter does not serve its interests in world politics.

1 62 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

References.

1. Louis Henkin et al., Right v Might : International Law and Use of Force (NY,
1991), p. 67. Sir Geoffrey Howe, "The European Pillar", Foreign Affairs, Vol.
63 (Winter 1984/85), p. 330. Francois Heisbourg, "Can the Atlantic Alliance
Last out the Century?" International Affairs, Vol. 63 (Summer 1982), p. 413.

2. John S. Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War", Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 109 (1994-5), pp. 763-765. See also, Michael G. Roskin and
Nicholas O. Berry, The New World of International Relations (New Jersey,
1993), p. 263, see Clay Clemens, ed., NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War
Security (NY, 1997), pp. 1-2.

3. NATO "Strategic Concept" (November 7-8, 1991) and NATO "Strategic
Concept" (April 23-24, 1999), For detailed text see http://www.nato.int/docu/
comm/49-95/C911107.a.htm. and http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-
065e.htm.

4. Stephen M. Walt, "NATO's Future (in Theory), in Pierre Martin and Mark R.
Brawley, Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced
Allies (NY, 2000), p. 16.

5. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907,
General Convention Related to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1945,
Protocols I and II additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Kellog-Briand
Pact of 1928 Stipulated that war was no longer acceptable as instrument of
national policy.

6. Rosalyn Higgins, "The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia",
International Affairs, Vol. 69 (1993), pp. 465-466. Louis Henkin, "Kosovo and
the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention", American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 93 (1999), p. 824.

7. Charter of the United Nations, 1945. For detailed study of legal process about
the United Nations authority on use of Force in international relations. See
D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces : A Legal Study (NY, 1964), p. 281.

8. Christopher M. Ray an, "Sovereignty, Intervention and the Law : A Tenuous
Relationship of Competing Principles", Millennium Journal of International
Studies, Vol. 26 (1997), p. 98.

9. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Selfdefense (Cambrige, 2001), pp. 249,
250.

10. Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, "Symposium on Humanitarian Action and
Peacekeeping Operations", Report of International Committee of Red Cross,
Geneva, 1995, p. 40. For detailed study of increased role of regional
organizations in peacekeeping after end of Cold War. See, Boutras Boutras-
Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (NY, 1992), p. 37. Abiodun Alan, et al.,
Peacekeepers, Politicians and Warlords (NY, 1999), pp. 7-8.

11. United Nations Charter, 1945, Article 51.

12. While attempts have been made in the past to construct the phrase "armed
attack" in variety of ways but International Court of Justice in Nicaragua vs.
United States Clarifies its Meaning. Although the Court did not give exhaustive

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 63

meaning but it included within the ambit of this phrase interalia, action by
regular armed forces across an international border, the sending of armed band
or groups by or on behalf of a state and they carry out acts of such gravity that
amount to an actual armed attack etc. See Herbert W. Briggs, "The
International Court of Justice Lives up to its Name", American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 81 (January 1987), p. 84.

13. Rahul Rao, "The UN and NATO in the New World Order : Legal Issues",
International Studies, Vol. 37 (2000), p. 161.

14. Ibid., p. 162.

15. Jule Lobel and Michael Ratner, "Bypassing the Security Council: Ambigous
Authorizations to use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime",
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93 (1999), p. 128.

16. Jonathan I. Charney, "Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo",
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93 (1999), p. 835. See Marc
Weller, "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo", International Affairs, Vol.
75 (1999), p. 224. See Rao, n. 13, p. 162.

17. Dinstein, n. 9, p. 272.

18. Quoted in Rao, n. 13, p. 162.

19. Ibid., p. 163.

20. Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, "National Perspective on International Intervention:
From the Outside Looking in" in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes,
Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (London, 1995), p. 21.

21. Jannifer Welsh et ah, "The Responsibility to Protect", International Journal
(Toronto), Vol. LVII (Autumn 2002), pp 489-90.

22. Catherine Guichered, "International Law and the War in Kosovo, Survival,
Vol. 41 (Summer 1999), p. 20.

23. Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice : International Political Theory
Today (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 218, 219.

24. Guichered, n. 22, pp. 21-22. See Theodor Meron, "The Case for War Crimes
Trials in Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (Summer 1993), pp. 122-135.

25. R.J. Vincent, Non-intervention and International Order (New Jersey, 1974), p.
vii.

26. The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the charter of United Nations, Approved by General
Assembly in Resolution 2625 of 24 Oct. 1970 said in Preamble, "The practice
of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the charter,
but also leads to the creations of situations which threaten international peace
and security...

There was a similar general condemnation of intervention in a 1974 United
Nations document which classified the "aggression" as, "The invasion or attack
by the armed forces a state of the territory of another state, or any military
occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack... This
definition of aggression is approved by UN General Assembly by Resolution
3314 (XXIX) of 14 Dec. 1974. However this document gave the Security
Council some discretion in particular cases.

1 64 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

The Declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention passed by the General
Assembly on 21 December 1956 states that an "armed intervention is
synonymous with aggression and a violation of the charter of United Nations."
See Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human
Rights", International Affairs, Vol. 69 (July 1993), pp. 433-34. See also Rao,
n. 13, p. 163.

27. Thomas G. Weiss, "On the Brink of New Era? Humanitarian Interventions,
1991-94" in Danieal and Hayes, n. 20, p. 5.

28. In the United Nation Security Council, India initially justify its military action
in 1971 on the grounds of humanitarian intervention these statements were
deleted from final record of the Security Council. Instead India alleged that
Pakistan had attacked first and it act in self-defense. See, Roberts, n. 26, p.
434.

29. Michael Ignatieff, "Intervention and the State Failure", Dissent (New Jersey),
(Winter 2003), p. 115.

30. Tobias Debiel, "Complex Emergencies and Humanitarian Intervention:
Imperatives and Pitfalls in a Turbulant World", Law and State, Vol. 55 (1997),
pp. 53-55. For detailed study of refugee situation in world see Dirk Fronhofer,
"Internally Displaced Persons: The Problem of "internally displaced persons"
in the context of Human Rights, International Refugee Law and International
Humanitarian Law", Law and State, Vol. 55 (1997), pp. 7-24.

31. For study of the pre-Cold War patterns of interventions see Hans J.
Morganthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45
(April 1967), pp. 425-436.

For Marxian Criticism of United State interventionist policy in post-cold war
see Ellen Meiksins wood, "Kosovo and the New Imperialism", Monthly
Review, Vol. 51 (June 1999), pp. 1-8, see also Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim
Dune, "East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism", International
Affairs, Vol. 77 (2000), p. 808.

32. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of organization, 1999 (NY :
United Nations, 1999), para 37.

33. Michael Mccgwire, "Why did we bomb Belgrade?" International Affairs, Vol.
76 (2000), p. 1. See G. Gerardong, "Credibility Over Courage : NATO's
Miss-Intervention in Kosovo", The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26
(March 2003), p. 74. See US and NATO objective interests in Kosovo, Fact
sheet released by US Department of State, Whasington DC, 14 June 2001,
www . state . gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990326_ksvobjectives .html .

34. Quoted in Roland Paris, "Kosovo and the Metaphor War", Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 117 (2002), p. 437.

35. Quoted in Richard A. Falk, "Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of
International Law", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93 (October
1999), p. 848.

36. Alex J. Bellamy, "Humanitarian responsibilities and interventionist claims in
international societies", Review of International Studies, Vol. 29 (July 2003),
p. 335. For more information about the failure of international community in

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 65

extreme humanitarian crises, see David Rieff, "Humanitarianism in Crisis",
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81 (Nov/Dec. 2002), pp. 111-121. Lamberto Dini,
"Taking Responsibility for Balkan Security", NATO Review (Autumn 1999), p.
4. See also Javier Solana, "NATO's Success in Kosovo", Foreign Affairs, Vol.
78/9 (Nov/Dec. 1999), p. 114. See also Hideaki Shinoda, "The Politics of
Legitimacy in International Relations : A Critical Examination of NATO's
Intervention in Kosovo", Alternatives, Vol. 25 (2000), p. 525.

37. Ruth Wedgwood, "NATO's Compaign in Yugoslavia", American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 93 (1999), p. 834.

38. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (1999), n. 72,
para 66.

39. Falk, n. 35, p. 850.

40. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, UNTS Regis. No.
18232, UN Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969) reprinted in American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 63 (1969), p. 875. See also Gordan A.Christenson,
"The World Court and Jus Cogens", American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 81 (1987), p. 95.

41. Bhikhu Parekh, "The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention : Introduction",
International Political Science Review, Vol. 18 (1997), pp. 5.

42. M.S. Rajan, "The New Interventionism?" International Studies, Vol. 37
(2000), p. 31.

43. Robert Jackson and Georg Sorenson, Introduction to International Relations
(Oxford, 1999), pp. 143-144. Simon Caney, "Human Rights and the Right of
States : Terry Nardin or Nonintervention", International Political Science
Review, Vol. 18 (1997), pp. 28-29.

44. James Mayall, The New Interventionism (Cambridge, 1996), p. 3-4. Ibid., pp.
144-145.

45. For broad study of Cosmopolitanism in international relations see David Held,
"Cosmopolitanism : Globalization tamed?" Review of International Studies,
Vol. 29 (2003), pp. 465-80. See David Ingram, "Between Political Liberalism
and Postnational Cosmopolitanism: Toward an Alternative Theory of Human
Rights", Political Theory, Vol. 31 (June 2003), pp. 359-391, see Alessandro
Ferrara, "Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgement Argument for Human
Rights", Political Theory, Vol. 31 (June 2003), pp. 431-415. See Fred
Dallmayar, "Cosmopolitanism : Moral and Political", Political Theory, Vol.
31 (June 2003), pp. 421-442. For superb explanation of developing global civil
society and cosmopolitan view see Peter Merden, "Geographies of Dissent :
Globalization, Identity and the Nation", Political Geography, Vol. 16 (1997),
pp. 37-64.

46. David Campbell, "Why Fight : Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post-
Structuralism", Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 27 (1998), p.
519.

47. Quoted in Tom Keenan, "The Paradox of Knowledge and Power : Reading
Foucault on a Bias," Political Theory, Vol. 15 (1987), pp. 20-21.

48. Quoted in Campbell, n. 46, pp. 516-517.

1 66 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

49. Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Agency, Humanitarianism and Intervention",
International Political Science Review, Vol. 18 (1997), pp. 11-12. See Bhikhu
Parekh, "Cosmopolitanism and global citizenship", Review of International
Studies, Vol. 29 (Jan. 2003), pp. 16-17.

50. Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, Economist, 18 September 1999, p.
49.

51. Alex J. Bellamy, "Pragmatic Solidarism and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian
Intervention", Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31 (London,
2000), pp. 483, 489.

52. Ibid., p. 484. Wheeler, n. 49, p. 17.

53. Ibid., p. 486.

54. Andrew Linklater, "The Problem of Community in International Relations",
Alternatives, Vol. 15 (1990), p. 135.

55. Bellamy, n. 51, p. 483.

56. Ibid., pp. 488.

57. Donald J. Puchala, "Making a Weberian Moment : Our Discipline Look
Ahead," International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 1 (2000), p. 142.

58. North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Article 5.

59. United Nations Charter 1945, Article 51.

60. Rao, n. 13, p. 168.

61. High Guesterson, "Presenting the Creation: Dean Acheson and the Rhetorical
Legitimation of NATO", Alternatives, Vol. 24 (1999), p. 47.

62. Quoted in Rao, n. 13, pp. 177-78.

63. Ibid., p. 178.

64. United Nations Charter, 1945, Article 51.

65. Ibid., Articles 52, 53, 54.

66. Gerhard Bebr, "Regional Organizations : A United Nations Problem",
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 49 (1995), p. 74.

67. Ibid., p. 80.

68. Rao, n. 13, p. 171.

69. A Leroy Bennet, International Organizations : Principles and Issues (New
Jersey, 1999), pp. 217-218.

70. S. Neil MacFarlane, "Challenges to Euro- Atlantic Security" in Martin and
Browley, n. 4, p. 30.

71. Quoted in Rao, n. 13, p. 176.

72. Ibid.

73. Tim Judah, "Kosovo's Road To War", Survival, Vol 41 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-17.

74. W. Michael Reisman, "The United States and International Institutions",
Survival (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 63, 64, 68.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

11. James Kurth, "First War of the Global Era : Kosovo and US grand strategy"
in Andrew J. Bacevic and Eliot A. Cohen, War over Kosovo : Politics and
Strategy in Global Age (NY, 2001), pp. 66-69.

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 67

78. Radio Addresses of the President to the Nation, March 27, 1999, Published in
Gregory M. Scott et ah, 21 Debated Issues in World Politics (New Jersey,
2001), pp. 301-303. See Henry Kissinger, Does America needs a Foreign
Policy (NY, 2001), p. 269. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American
Power : Why the world's only super power Can't Go it alone (Oxford, 2002)
p. 149.

79. Jane Stromseth, "Law And Force After Iraq : A Transitional Moment,"
American Journal of International Law , Vol. 97 (July 2003), p. 628.

80. Micheal J. Glenon, "Why the Security Council Failed," Foreign Affairs, Vol.
82 (May/June 2003), p. 18.

81. Peter Gowan, "Neoloberal Cosmopolitanism", New Left Review (Sep. /Oct.
2001), pp. 79-80. For more elaborate study of neoliberal cosmopolitanism and
its impact on the United Nations System. See Paul Taylor, "The United Nations
in the 1990 : Proactive Cosmopolitanism and the issue of Sovereignty",
Political Studies Vol. XLVII (1999), pp. 557-563.

82. Geoffrey Lee Williams and Barkley Jared Jones, NATO And The Transatlantic
Alliance in the 21st Century : The Twenty year crisis (NY, 2001), pp. 102-103.

83. Kurth, n. 77, pp. 66-89.

84. For detailed study of American Human Rights Policy in the postcommunist era,
see Robert Cullen, "Human Rights Quandary", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72
(Winter 1992/93), pp. 79-88.

85. Brett D. Barkey , "Bosnia : A Question of Intervention" , Strategic Review, Vol.
XXI (Fall 1993), p. 51.

86. For study of US foreign policy which espoused the principle of democracy see
Eric L. Chase, "Where Policy, Grand Strategy and Justice Meet : A War
Crimes Court for the New World Order", Strategic Review, Vol. XXI (Spring
1993), pp. 30-40.

87. Barkey, n. 85, p. 52.

88. David N. Gibbs, "Washington's New Interventionism : US Hegemony and
inter-imperialist Rivalries", Monthly Review, Vol. 53 (Sep. 2001), p. 14, For
More information about American Hegemony See G. John Ikenberry,
"America's Liberal Hegemony", Current History, Vol. 98 (Jan 1999), pp. 23-
28.

89. Quoted in Miron Rezun, Europe's Nightmare : The Struggle For Kosovo
(London, 2001), p. 7.

90. S.C. Parasher, "US, UN And.... Peace!," India Quarterly, Vol. LIII (Jan- June
1997), p. 36.

91. Ibid., p. 23, James Mayall, "Democracy and International Society",
International Affairs, Vol. 76 (2000) p. 64.

92. Within less than two years of the United Nations charter being signed and then
ratified by the United States in August 1945, President Harry Truman has
invoked the principles of the charter. He deliberately and explicitly ruled out a
role for the United Nations in the Balkans and Near East. The Marshall Plan
was proposed and adopted in Western Europe despite the work of the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The creation of "interim

168 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

committee" in the General Assembly in late 1947 was also an American
initiative to bypassing Soviet veto on the Security Council. Thus, the American
process of working within and without the United Nations continued whether
in establishment of OAU in 1948 and NATO in 1949. The classic case of the
use of the United Nations to pursue the United States interests came with the
Korean war. During the Korean crisis, the Security Council was the hurdle
because of USSR. State Department in collusion with the United Nations
Secretary General empowered the General Assembly to side-step the Security
Council by famous resolution called "uniting for peace". The United Nations
Secretary General Trygve Lie described it as the "Acheson Plan" because the
United States Secretary of States Mooted it. He had advocated that the
Assembly should not allow Soviet veto to paralyse the United Nations action.
It had equal responsibility with the Security Council in Matters related to
international peace and security. The State Department considered it a personal
triumph to circumvent Soviet veto. The Clever British diplomats warned the
state department of this resolution's future damage. Once the Assembly added
members from the third world, west could in that case no longer take for
granted two-third majority in Assembly. The State Department remained
perturbed. See Michael Dunn, "The United States, United Nations and Iraq :
Multicultralism of a kind", International Affairs, Vol. 79 (2003) p. 272.
Prashar, n. 90, p. 31.
93. In 1993, President Clinton sought policy review about the United Nations
Peacekeeping under Presidential Decison Directive- 13 (PDD-13). The basic
elements of policy review were, the objectives of an operation must be clearly
defined in the United States "National interests" and assurance of continuing
public and congress support. The commitment of the United States troops
cannot be open-ended and an exist strategy must be necessary part of operation.
The operations involving the United States forces must have effective command
and control arrangements. Ultimately this policy review addressed the central
dilemma of the United States foreign policy after cold war. This dilemma was
that in the absence of direct threat to the United States strategic interests, how
a moral foundation for policy can be maintain and articulate interests. The
convergence of goals between the United States and the United Nations in this
period seen from the identical phrases used by both President Clinton and
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In his address to the United Nations
General Assembly in September 1993, President Clinton indicated the United
States national interests and stated, "In a new era of Peril and opportunity, our
overriding purpose in use to expand and strengthen the world's community of
market-based democracies... And we seek to foster the practices of good
government that distribute the benefits of democracy and economic growth
fairly to all people... Let us ensure that the tide of freedom and democracy is
not pushed back by the fierce winds of ethnic hatred. Let us ensure that the
world's most dangerous weapons are safely reduced and denied to dangerous
hands." Boutras Ghali also stated, "without development... societies will fall
into conflict, without democracy, no sustainable development can occur and
peace cannot long be maintained." Thus, it appeared that there was emergence
of an alliance between the world organization and world's sole superpower. See

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 69

Mats R. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter : The United States and United Nations
Peace Keeping", Survival, Vol. 36 (Spring 1994), p. 35. Anirudh Gupta, "Way
to World Disorder", Economic And Political Weekly, Vol. 11 (Dec. 1993), p.
2713.

94. Chirstopher S. Raj, "United States and United Nations Peacekeeping in Post
Cold war era", In Lalima Verma, United Nations in The Changing World, ed.
(ND, 1997), p. 57. Micheal Pugh, "Peacekeeping and Humanitarian
Intervention" in Brain White, et al, ed. (NY, 2001). pp. 126-127. See Fareed
Zakaria, "The Challenges for American Hegemony", International Journal,
Vol. LIV (Winter 1998-9), p. 22.

95 . Quoted in C . S . R. Murthy , " US and The Third World at the UN " , International
Studies,No\. 40 (2003), pp. 3-4 See also. James M. Lindray, "The New Apathy
: How an uninterested Public is Reshaping Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 79 (Sep/Oct. 2000), p. 12.

96. The first Secretary-General Trygve Lie was understanding the United States
policies but his successor Dag Hammarskjold offended the United States over
Congo. The Next Secretary-General U Thant has earned extreme displeasure of
the United States regarding policies over Middle East and Vietnam. Secretary-
General Kurt Waldheim refrained from speaking since he felt that what he says
may be easily distorted. The non-aligned strength in the General Assembly
neutralized the United States influence over it. The United States administration
felt sore on the Secretary-Generals Kurt Waldheim and Perez de Cuellar
because of their positive policies toward third-world. Boutras Boutras Ghali
took over when the only superpower bestrode the world. He saw the United
States concerns through the United Nations eye. He tried to act as an
independent chief executive which reflected his position as an international
official responsible only to the United Nations. But the United States did not
tolerate him. Bosnia and Somalia fuelled the United States anger against him.
The enactment of Kofi Annan as the United Nations Secretary-General by the
United States exhibited the power of other states i.e. Russia, China and France
in new world order. Fourteen out of fifteen members of the Security Council
had voted for Ghali 's second term. The United States coolly vetoed it. This was
in total contrast to what had happened for the second term of the Pro-United
States first Secretary-General Trygve Lie. Beside USSR's open opposition, the
United States successfully extend his term through the General Assembly
resolution. Trygve Lie was awarded for Pro-United States stand but in case of
Ghali, the United States did not have bother. No other member dared to take
the matter to the General Assembly. This showed Russia, France and China
their place in "New World Order". The present Secretary-General Kofi Annan
emerged as the choice of the United States. But he merely represents a trend.
After collpase of USSR, Russia has no voice in international affairs. France and
China are too weak to compete United States as economically and militarily.
The United States with a largest single share in major international financial
institutions (i.e. IMF and World Bank) controls the whole world economy.
Even the World Trade Organization (WTO) is under the United States
influence. See Prashar, n. 90, p. 45.

170 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

97. The unilateralists claimed that American military power is so overwhelming
that there is no need for the assistance of others. Equally important, they see
the United States purposes as so noble and the perspectives of other
governments so narrow. Thus, it is not only possible but necessary for the
United States to ignore their views. The involvement of other nations in
decision-making about the United States use of force is unwise. It risks diluting
the clarity of American purposes. The involvement of other nations in
operations is pointless because they can add nothing significant to the United
States capabilities. Unilateralists condemn multilateral world views and the
promise of the United Nations as guarantor of a new post-Cold War order. In
their view, the United Nations is guarantor of nothing and it can hardly be
existing except in a formal sense. The events of 11 September and aftermath
linked indirectly with the domestic debacle regarding Iraq in March 2003 and
the continuing uncertainty surrounding the UN-US relations. This raised the
salience and influence of a group of officials inside and outside the Bush
administration commonly referred as 'Neo-Conservatives.' They can share two
broad views. The first is that the United States has been "too timid in its
exercise of global leadership. Secondly, neo-conservatives are instinctively
sceptical of multilateral institutions including the UN. They are deeply
suspicious of the United Nations which they fear is animated by Anti-
Americanism. See John Gerard Ruggie, "Third Try at World Order? America
and Multilateralism After the cold war", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 109
(1994), p. 561. See Walter B. Solocombe, "Force, Pre-emption and
Legitimacy", Survival, Vol. 45 (Spring 2003), p. 119.

98 . Charles Krauthamer , " The Unipolar Moment " , Foreign Affairs , Vol . 70 ( 1 990-
91), p. 25 See Mats Berdal, "The UN Security Council : Ineffective but
Indispensable, Survival, Vol. 45 (Summer 2003), p. 16. See also Max Boot,
"NeoCons", Foreign Policy (Jan/Feb 2004), p. 26.

99. Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National interest", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79
(January /February 2000), p. 48.

100. The national security strategy of the United States of America (Sep. 17, 2002)
available at <http ://www.whitehouse. gov/nsc/nss.pdf> .

101. Miriam Sapiro, "Iraq : The Shifting sand of Preemptive Self-Defense",
American Journal of International Law, Vol.97 (July 2003), p. 599.

102. Quoted in Richard A Falk, "What Future For The UN Charter System of War
Prevention?", American Journal of International Law , Vol. 97 (July 2003). p.
590.

103. Parashar, n. 90, p. 54.

104. Ibid. p. 55.

105. Stephen M. Walt, "NATO's Future (in Theory) in Pierre Martin and Mark R.
Brawley, Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO's War : Allied Force or Forced
Allies? (NY, 2000), p. 14. See IVO H. Dalder, "The end of Atlantcism",
Survival, Vol. 45 (Summer 2003), p. 151. See Henery Kissinger, American
Foreign Policy (NY, 1968), edn. 3 p. 71. See also Gazmen Xhudo, Diplomacy
and Crisis Management in the Balkans : A US Foreign Policy Perspective
(London, 1996), p. 5. See Richard N. Hass, The Reluctant Sharrif : The

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 171

United States After The Cold War (NY, 1997), p. 52. For contradictory views
about United States Power in the world affairs See. Michael Cox, "The Empire
back in Town : or America's Empirical Temptation again", Millennium Journal
of International Studies, Vol. 32 (2003), pp. 1-27. See Immanuel Wallerstein,
"The Eagle has crash Landed," Foreign Policy (July /August 2002), pp. 60-68.

106. Gibbs, n.88, pp. 16, 17. See Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs The
United States And NATO", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. Ill (1996), pp.
10-13. See also Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The US and Europe: Continental drift?",
International Affairs, Vol. 76 (2000), p. 54.

107. Ibid., p. 18.

108. For detailed Study of Continuous relevance of NATO for US See Stanley R.
Solan, "US Perspectives on NATO's Future," International Affairs, Vol. 73
(1997), pp. 216-231. For the Changing US-Europe Relations See. Christina M.
Schwiss, "Sharing Hegemony : The Future of Transatlantic Security",
Cooperation and Conflict (London) Vol. 38 (2003), pp. 211-234. See Henery
Kissinger, Diplomacy (NY, 1994), pp. 818-826.

109. Gibbs, n. 88, p. 22.
\\0. Ibid., p. 26.

172 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Chapter 5

Role of United Nations Aftermath
of Kosovo War

The United Nations has exercised authority in significant new
ways to address various aspects of resolving conflicts and dealing
with their consequences after the end of Cold War. 1 The role of
United Nations has substantially expanded during this period so far
as governance of societies affected by conflicts are concerned. This
new role has included the use of force to end internal violence and
the prosecution of violations of international humanitarian law. The
growing focus on intrastate conflicts which considered within the
domestic jurisdiction of states have brought humanitarian and human
rights law closer to the modern conflict resolution process. 2 The
analysis of United Nations role in Kosovo described this
development of law and practice concerning the United Nations
governance of post conflict societies.

THE UN RESOLUTION 1244 AS A ROADMAP FOR THE
GOVERNANCE OF POST-CONFLICT KOSOVO

The United Nations actions in Kosovo illustrate its vastly
expanded responsibilities regarding the new purpose of state
restoration. In addition to the usual peacekeeping functions, the
United Nations took on a vast programme of state reconstruction.
This included police activities, engineering (road and bridge
building), health and sanitation, organizing and monitoring
elections. It acts as de facto government and maintained some
semblance of authority until the warring factions negotiated an
arrangement that approximated Western concepts of popular
government. 3 On 6 May 1999, the G-8 (group of rich countries i.e.
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation,
The United Kingdom and The United States) met in Germany and
adopted general principles for the political solution of the Kosovo

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 173

crisis. They instructed their Political Directorate to prepare elements
of a UN resolution which drew up a roadmap for solution of Kosovo
conflict. The Russian Federation and the United States ensured the
cooperation for implementation of the international community's
conditions to end the Kosovo conflict. On 31 May, 1999, the EU
announced a mission to Belgrade which was led by Finnish President
Martti Ahtisaari in close cooperation with the United States, the
Russian Federation and the United Nations. On 4 June, Yugoslavia
conveyed to the Secretary-General about its and Serbia's acceptance
of the G-8 peace plan presented by President Ahtisaari and Victor
Chernomyrdin, the Russian Federation President's personal envoy. 4

On 10 June 1999, the United Nations Security Council adopted
resolution 1244 by Vote (14-0-1). Although the Russian Federation
generally supports this resolution because it was based on the G-8
principles but China abstained from voting on resolution 1244. China
stated that it had great difficulty with draft resolution but because
Yugoslavia had accepted the peace plan and NATO had suspended its
bombing, it would not block the resolution's adoption. On 28 July,
the General Assembly adopted resolution 53/241 and authorized the
Secretary-General for financing of the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo. The General Assembly granted
$200 million inclusive of the amount of $50 million granted by the
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
(ACABQ) for the operation of the Mission under the terms of section
IV of the General Assembly resolution 49/233 A of 23 December
1994. 5 The important paras of resolution 1244 which described the
formation and functioning of international civil and security presence
are, (see whole text of resolution 1244 in Appendix I)

....demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put
an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo,
and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of
all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid
timetable, with which the deployment of the international security
presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;

....decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nation
auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate
equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;

174 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

....requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the
Security Council, a Special Representative to control the
implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests
the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to
coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure
that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually
supportive manner.

....authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations
to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in
point 4 of annex II with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities
under paragraph 9 below;

....decides that the responsibilities of the international security
presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing
the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police
and para-military forces, except as provided for in point 6 of
annex II;

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army and other armed
Kosovo Albanian groups, as required in paragraph 15 below;

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and
displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil
presence can operate, a transitional administration can be
established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil
presence can take responsibility for this task;

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the
work of the international civil presence;

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required.

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the
international civil presence, and other international organizations;

....authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant
international organizations, to establish an international civil presence
in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo
under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and which will provide

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 175

transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the
development of provisional democratic self-government institutions to
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of
Kosovo;

....decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil
presence will include:

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full
account of annex II and of the Rambouillet Accords;

(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as
long as required.

(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional
institution for democratic and autonomous self-government
pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections.

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its
administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting
the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and
other peace-building activities;

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine the future
status of Kosovo, taking into account the Rambouillet Accords;

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from
Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under
a political settlement;

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other
economic reconstruction;

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian
organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local
police forces and in the meantime through the deployment of
international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and
displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are
established for an initial period of twelve months, to continue
thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise. 6

The Security Council envisaged the withdrawal of all
Yugoslavia Military, Police and Paramilitary forces from Kosovo. It

176 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

further authorized NATO Military deployment called Kosovo Force
(KFOR) and created a UN Civil administration called the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to develop provisional
institutions for democratic and autonomous self government
including holding of elections. It also envisaged the appointment of
a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) to
administer Kosovo. He was asked to coordinate closely with KFOR
to ensure that both UNMIK and KFOR worked towards the
attainment of same goals in a mutually supportive manner. The
Resolution 1244 was the product of unique geopolitical
circumstances. It involved the military intervention of NATO in
Yugoslavia and an extraordinary international consensus on a way
out of an increasingly unpredictable military confrontation with
destabilising consequences. The important objectives of the
agreement that produced Resolution 1244 were, to end the NATO
air campaign against Yugoslavia, to reverse the effects of ethnic
cleansing against Kosovo Albanians, to end the surging humanitarian
disaster in the region, to lay the ground work for a political
settlement of the Kosovo crisis. The peace plan given by G-8 foreign
ministers for resolution of the Kosovo crisis and latter incorporated
in Annex 2 of resolution 1244 clearly showed these objectives.

Although the Resolution 1244 finished an open conflict in
Kosovo but was neither a product of an agreement between Serbs
and Kosovo Albanians with clear road map for political settlement
and nor an agreement between exhausted opponents rocking
compromise and end to their conflict. It did not foresee any
definitive political solution and determine the future status of
Kosovo but imposed a peace treaty on Yugoslavia because it was
mandatory under Chapter VII of the Charter. It was yet another
case-by-case response to crisis produced by the unfinished process
of disintegration of Yugoslavia that had begun a decade ago. 7 The
Resolution 1244 imposed a regime on Kosovo for a period of twelve
months and indefinitely thereafter until a Majority of the Council
Members agreed to terminate it.

While Resolution 1244 ritually reaffirmed the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia but it
significantly revised and diminished the traditional attribute of

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis \11

statehood. The Resolution 1244 vested the United Nations with a
comprehensive mandate empowering it to exercise all legislative,
executive, and judicial authority in Kosovo. The United Nations
which traditionally promotes international law actually mandated in
Kosovo to create new laws in areas that normally fell within the
competence of Yugoslav legislature. The United Nations Interim
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established by resolution 1244 (1999)
acting pursuant to the authority given to it under the above
mentioned resolution, and for the purpose of establishing and
maintaining the interim administration in Kosovo promulgated the
Regulation No. 1999/1 in July 1999. This regulation is also known
as the Mother of all Regulations promulgated the following,

Section 1

Authority of the interim administration

....all legislative and executive with respect to Kosovo, including the
administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised
by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

....the Special Representative of the Secretary-General may appoint
any person to perform functions in the civil administration in Kosovo,
including the judiciary, or remove such person. Such functions shall be
exercised in accordance with the existing laws, as specified in section
3, and any regulations issued by UNMIK.

Section 2

Observance of international recognized standards

....in exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties
or holding public office in Kosovo shall observe internationally
recognized human rights standards and shall not discriminate against
any person on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
association with a national community, property, birth or other status.

Section 3

Applicable law in kosovo

....the laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March
1999 shall continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as they do not conflict
with standards referred to in section 2, the fulfillment of the mandate
given to UNMIK under United Nations Security Council resolution
1244 (1999), or the present or any other regulation issued by UNMIK.

178 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Section 4

Regulations issued by UNMIK

....in the performance of the duties entrusted to the interim
administration under United Nations Security Council resolution 1244
(1999), UNMIK will, as necessary, issue legislative acts in the form of
regulations. Such regulations will remain in force until repealed by
UNMIK or superseded by such rules as are subsequently issued to by
the institutions established under a political settlement, as provided for
in United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). 8

The head of the UNMIK becomes the exclusive legislator of
Kosovo by promulgating UNMIK Regulations that had the status of
laws. It superseded any other law on the regulated matter at issue.
In addition the UN mission in Kosovo had to rebuild the entire
public sector including the reconstruction and operation of public
utilities, ports, airports and public transport system. It established
the functioning Civil Services, created a network of Social Services
including rehabilitation and employment offices. It ensures the
provision of primary, secondary and higher education. It created the
necessary conditions for economic development which included the
establishment of banking system, formulation of budgetary and
currency policies. The UN mission also worked for attraction of
foreign investment and the establishment of a comprehensive tax,
customs and levies scheme and developed Public-broadcasting and
Mass-Media Capabilities in Kosovo. The United Nations needed to
create a legal framework within which these activities could be
carried out. The legislative powers granted by the Security Council
could not be exercised until each mission took steps to draft,
promulgate and enforce a range of the United Nations Regulations.
These Regulations would have the force of law in an administrated
territory.

The powers of international administration and the SRSG to
fulfil these tasks emanating from resolution 1244 and various
UNMIK Regulations virtually led to suspending Yugoslavia's
sovereignty over Kosovo. The term "Suspended Sovereignty" has
been employed in legal and political discourse on sovereignty in
order to describe different situations in which internal sovereignty
can be perceived to be an empty legal proposition and not matching

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 179

political realities. In such situations sovereignty is no longer an
applicable legal concept. The NATO intervention in Kosovo led to
the withdrawal of the Political and administrative cadres in entirety
that had previously governed its territory including the security and
law enforcement apparatus. 9 The only presence of Yugoslav
authorities in Kosovo was the establishment of Committee for Co-
operation with the United Nations in Pristina in accordance with
Resolution 1244. 10 Its Mandate was limited merely to liaison with
the international presence. In reality it ended up as resembling a
diplomatic mission inside its own state.

The Legal status of UNMIK and KFOR created an additional
exceptional situation in Kosovo. The international administration
had full administrative authority over Kosovo. The assets, property,
funds of UNMIK and KFOR were immune from any form of Legal
process. It was the first time the United Nations was entrusted with
such a broad mandate to assume full responsibility for the
administration of a territory. East Timor followed only few months
later. 11 The organisational, and juridical status and the legal powers
of the SRSG in Kosovo were equally comparable with a pre-
constitutional monarch in sovereign kingdom. The United Nations
not only undertook the unprecedented responsibility of plenary
authority over Kosovo but it had also given the exceptional task to
administer it without a clear road map for its final status. 12 The
conceptual fiction of sovereignty as an absolute and invisible
condition inhibited the solution of thorny issue of authority in
Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanians were unlikely to accept Serbian
sovereignty because of the fears of future exploitation. Independence
for Kosovo remained unacceptable to Serbia which regard Kosovo
its ethnic homeland. Neither side was likely to settle the issue if full
sovereignty was the only conceptual category on the negotiation
table. 13 Thus, on the ground the hard realities of the Kosovo conflict
were even more demanding and frustrating.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING IN KOSOVO

Kosovo posed another important challenge for the international
community regarding the rebuilding of unstable polities in the

1 80 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

aftermath of war. The United Nations had accepted the
responsibility for post-conflict peace building. Peace-building was
an attempt after a peace had been negotiated or imposed to address
the sources of current hostility and build local capacities for conflicts
resolution. Conflict Resolution has a task for achieving a change in
the direction of the flow of events so that escalation is turned into
de-escalation and polarisation into positive interaction. This process
can be explained through Fig. 5.1.

A

100

V

A
A Wins
B Loses

D
A Wins
B Wins

50

C

Compromise

E

A Loses

B Loses

C Win

B
B Wins
A Loses

4 >

50

100

B

Fig. 5.1 : Analysis of Incompatibility.

Source : Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution, p. 7.

This shows two actors A and B with contradictory goals. These
goals are related with piece of territory, government posts or other
valuables. If A gets 100 per cent of the available resources, there is
nothing left for B or vice versa. If either one wins the situation finds
itself at point A or B respectively and it means complete victory for
one actor and complete defeat for other. This outcome is not likely
abide by easily and voluntarily by any actor. Anything beyond these
points be more acceptable and possible. The point C marks a
classical point where the parties divide the resources half-half
equally much or little for each side. The Parties may also agree on
going to point E in which none of them take anything but instead

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

181

valuables are handed over to actor C. 14 In Kosovo conflict, The use
of force by NATO led to the withdrawal of Yugoslavia's forces from
Kosovo. Both conflict parties i.e. Serbs and Kosovar Albanian
agreed to deploy NATO force under the UN auspices. The UNMIK
control the organizational, legal and judicial authority in Kosovo.

There is a point at the right and above the line D where both
parties get what they want at the same time. The conflicts
transformed through transcendence where goals are met fully for
conflict parties. This outcome indicates the challenge of finding
solutions beyond established rules and thinking. The need for such
type of outcome becomes problematic for the United Nations. The
political battle reduces the options perceived by the actors. The
atrocities committed by Serbs in Kosovo created fears in Kosovar
Albanians. This fear barred the transcendence and restricted the
amicable solutions of Kosovo conflict.

Kosovo's problems and hatreds were so endemic that the
international mission shifted to a large scale, long term efforts.
Given the continuing presence of distrust, bitterness and
demonization of the other, the need for reconciliation was greatest. 15
For this purpose, the United Nations has been negotiated or imposed
peacebuilding efforts to address the sources of current hostility and
build local capacities for conflict resolution. The political strategy of
a peacebuilding mandate is the concept of operations embodied in its
design. It can defuse potential and actual hostilities and assist
societies in conditions and processes. It can occur at the micro level
through aid to rebuild links between communities to restore
authority structures and local decision making capacities. It
encourages municipal authorities to allow displaced persons to
return. At the macro-level the conditionalities on delivery of
assistance can be used to encourage the parties to negotiate their
differences seriously. 16 But in many civil wars, the contest is over
who or what ideology controls a single polity. In some ethnic wars
the costs of 'cleansing' seems too high that combatants in these
circumstances still have continuing disputes over material interest,
sovereignty and disputed territory. Each has experienced devastating
destruction in varying degrees and both leaders and followers are
likely to harbour deep resentment for losses sustained particularly to

1 82 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

family and funds. They also experience the costs of war and may
come to a "hurting stalemate" in which no faction see that it can win
and perceives the high costs of continuing strife. In these
circumstances, sustainable peace needs state authority as a starting
point to overcome security concerns.

The increased hostility due to the experience of war makes
reconciliation more difficult. To achieve peace and reconciliation,
four types of efforts are required.. Firstly, is to reconcentrate central
power (The powerful must be recognised be legitimate). Second is
to increase state legitimacy through participation i.e. elections,
powersharing. Third is to raise and allocate economic resources in
support of peace. Given the devastation of civil war, all three
require, the fourth-one i.e. external, international assistance or
authority in a transitional period (Although not every country would
benefit from external intervention). 17 In sum there should be a
relation between the depth of hostility, the number and character of
the factions and the level of economic development with external
assistance or authority needed to build peace. This observation can
be applied on the post war situation in Kosovo.

The main tasks of UNMIK according to Resolution 1244 were,
to establish a functioning interim civil administration including the
maintenance of law and order. Second task was to promote the
establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government
including holding of election. Third was to facilitate political process
to determine Kosovo's future status and all these three efforts took
the support of the fourth-one i.e. external assistance from the United
Nations. The initial strategic framework of the international
administration outlined in the report of the UN Secretary General on
UNMIK is divided into five integrated phases. 18 The first phase
focused on the establishment and consolidation of UNMIK' s
authority, the creation of interim UNMIK administrative structures
including a phased plan for economic recovery and development for
maintenance of a viable self sustaining economy. The Second Phase
would be directed towards the administration of social services,
utilities and consolidation of rule of law. The Third Phase would
emphasize the finalization of preparations for election for Kosovo's
Transitional Authority. During the fourth Phase, UNMIK would

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 83

oversee and assist elected Kosovo representatives to organize and
establish the provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous
self government. A concluding fifth phase would depend on a final
settlement during which UNMIK would oversee the transfer of
authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to those established
under a political settlement.

The structure of UNMIK was created to provide the necessary
instruments to fulfil its vast tasks. It has divided into four pillars run
by different international organizations presided over by the SRSG.
The two from the four pillars of UNMIK are the Humanitarian
Assistance Component led by UNHCR and the Civil Administration
Component led by the United Nations itself . The other two are
Democratisation and Institution building components led by the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and
the Reconstruction and Economic Development Component led by
the European Union.

The real task of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo was to preserve
the peace by skillfully navigating between the immediate objectives
of Resolution 1244 that established a civil administration and the
adverse political realties on the ground that favoured continuous
conflict. The challenge was to use the former to address the latter.
The international administration had addressed three inter-related
priorities to tackle the challenges and realities of Kosovo. These
priorities were to establish not only the law and order, security and
freedom of Movement throughout Kosovo but also to establish a
functioning administration involving the local population particularly
the Kosovo Albanians who formed majority population, protect and
build the confidence of the serbs in their future in Kosovo. The
common denominator of these political priorities was to preserve
peace and build confidence of both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs and
other communities in the international administration. The main
objective of these priorities was to help to build new Kosovo in
which all communities could coexist peacefully. In summer 1999
this seemed to be a battle against all odds. 19

The International administration in Kosovo had completed its
four phases. From the beginning the uncertainty over the final status
of Kosovo has been a Major handicap for UNMIK and KFOR. It

1 84 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

exacerbated the inherent difficulties of a conflict in which both the
Albanian Kosovars and Serbs sought exclusively zero-sum solutions.
Any policy or decision by the international administration was
interpreted by Serbs as promoting independence or the Kosovo
Albanians as the return to Serb rule. This shows the complexities of
ethnic conflict resolution. These difficulties occurred because the
participants in ethnic conflict fight about the details of history, the
rules that applied to them, the laws from which they were deprived
of, demanded special status and future guarantees from the past
injustices. 20 In this situation, the approaches to end conflict should
be sensitized the needs of the systematically excluded community. It
should enable communities in conflict to progress from an
exclusionary position to a universal position. This universal position
does not depend on social engineering and assimilation on which the
political, social and economic framework of mutual coexistence is
built. This position needs to be democratically arrived at and
requires a level of democracy in the international system. Despite all
their procedural messiness and sluggishness democracies
nevertheless protect the integrity, freedom of conscience and
expression of the person. 21 Such Protection is essential to end the
threat felt by individuals in situations of intergroup conflict and
establishing interethnic peace.

The UNMIK and KFOR made significant progress toward
developing provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous
self government in Kosovo for implementation of the Security
Council resolution, 1244. Throughout the first phase of international
administration, the UNMIK managed to shift the focus of the
attention of the Kosovo Albanians to additional issues. These issues
included the establishment of a functioning civil administration with
the participation of local representatives and the establishment of
local structures of governance with the external holding of municipal
elections in October 2000. The international administration's
commitment for general elections sometime soon after municipal
elections becomes additional issue for the beginning of development
of democratic institutions of self-government and substantial
autonomy, economic reconstruction and development. The Kosovo
Albanians swiftly emerged as constructive interlocutors for the
international administration.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 185

The first critical initiative of UNMIK that build the confidence
of the Kosovo Albanians was the early establishment of Kosovo
Traditional Council (KTC) as supreme local consultative body of
UNMIK. A Major achievement of KTC was that it provided the
forum for the reconciliation and beginning of cooperation between
two main Kosovo Albanian leaders i.e. Ibrahim Rugova and Hashim
Thaci. This paved the way between UNMIK and the key Kosovo
Albanian leaders. The agreement for the demilitarisation of the
Kosovo liberation Army and its transformation into Kosovo
protection corps in September 1999 was another landmark in the
process of building confidence. The establishment of the joint
Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) was another cardinal
success of UNMIK in December 1999. 22 This agreement ensured the
representation of Kosovo Albanians in some of the key policy
making mechanisms of UNMIK. It consolidated the cooperation
between UNMIK and the overwhelming Majority of local
population. This agreement was criticized because it provided the
means for transformation of existing parallel governments
competing with the UNMIK. The agreement stipulated,

"current Kosovo structures, be they executive, legislative, or judicial
(Such as, "Provisional Governments of Kosovo' led by Hashim Thaci,
"Presidency of the Republic of Kosovo" led by Ibrahim Rugova) shall
be transformed and Progressively integrated, to the extent possible and
in conformity with this agreement, into the joint interim administrative
structure. 23

The UNMIK adopted the regulation on self-government of
municipalities of Kosovo in August 2000. 24 It was the first step
towards establishment of a legal framework for substantial autonomy
in Kosovo and beginning of the transfer of administrative
responsibilities to local population. This important regulation was
adopted by the long and constructive contributions by
representatives. The UNMIK eventually organized the first ever free
and fair municipal elections in Kosovo on 28 October 2000 under the
operational responsibility of the OSCE. The peaceful atmosphere of
elections and victory of the moderate leader Ibrahim Rugova
strengthened the democratic forces in Kosovo. The catalyst of
international opinion ensured the constructive engagement of the

186 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Kosovo Albanians in the policies of UNMIK. Throughout this
period, they had a conviction that Kosovo was on an irreversible
path towards independence or at least would never fall under Serb
rule. With these elections, they declared that choosing the path of
confrontation against international presence in Kosovo was neither a
popular opinion nor a pragmatic policy in any case for the Kosovo
Albanians. 25 In fact, it could have resulted in a self-inflicted injury
because the international community had demonstrated that they
were their major ally.

Throughout this period, the conflict between the Kosovar
Albanians and Serbs was not over. Continuing animosity and rivalry
between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs was compounded by
collective memories of war and revenge deeply shrouded in the mists
of history. The psychological traumas of the past were still
powerful. The cycle of insult, humiliation and revenge destroys
human bonds and causes the escalation of conflict and a renewed
cycle of anger, insults and aggression. 26 The withdrawal of
Yugoslavia's forces from Kosovo altered drastically the balance of
power on the ground and made a space for cycle of revenge by
Albanians from Serbs in Kosovo. It created the ground for victim to
turn oppressor. The years of systematic discrimination and
oppression coupled with fresh memories of terrible atrocities had
generated deep hatred and an un-controllable spirit of revenge
among Alabanian population. This phenomena show that the conflict
is a dynamic process in which structures, attitudes and behaviours
are shifting constantly in the context of each other. The disputant's
interests come into conflict and their relationship becomes
oppressive. They develop conflictual behavior which leads to
escalation. Resolving conflict involved a new architecture for
transforming the disputant's relationships and the clash of interests
that lie at the core of conflict structure. 27 The UNMIK progressively
established relative security throughout Kosovo at the cost of the
inter-ethnic divisions and segregation. The Serbs regrouped in rural
enclaves in Kosovo under around the clock effective protection of
the KFOR and UNMIK Police. In Pristina (Capital of Kosovo),
Soldiers even moved to live in apartments together with remaining
Serbs.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 87

The UNMIK addressed the underlying courses of inter-ethnic
violence to improve its preventive and policing capacity. It also
improved the judiciary and the prison system. The judicial system
remained paralysed for several months in the beginning due to
controversy over the applicable law. A major flare-up of violence in
Mitrovica in February 2000 created the critical mass needed for the
UNMIK to secure wide local and international support to appoint
international judges and prosecutors in Kosovo. The UNMIK
attempted to address the Serb problems through increased security.
The international administration also initiated the process of
organized returns of Serbs to their homes in Kosovo. The SRSG
launched the Agenda for coexistence in November 1999 for ensuring
rule of law and enhancing the delivery of public services to the Serbs
and other vulnerable communities. This initiative was eventually
boosted by the agreement between the UNMIK and the Serb
National Council of Kosovo and Metohija (SNC K &M). This
agreement led to the SNCK&M's decision to participate and
represent Serbs in the joint administrative structure in Kosovo. 28
Another Serb political entity the Serb National council of Mitrovica
(SNC Mitrovica) that pursued policy of non-cooperation with the
UNMIK accepted in late July 2000 to participate in joint committee
for returns of the Kosovo Serbs. The dramatic changes in Belgrade
in October 2000 could give new impetus to the process of
cooperation between Serbs and the UNMIK in Kosovo.

INDICTMENT OF SERBIAN PRESIDENT SLOBODAN
MILOSEVIC AND STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRATIC
FORCES IN SERBIA AND KOSOVO

The historic democratic changes of October 2000 in Belgrade
prompted a widespread optimism for a new era of reconciliation and
cooperation in Balkans. President Milosevic survived the break up
of Yugoslavia and then four debilitating wars, faced political crisis
during the elections of September 2000. The disparate opposition
groups put up a single candidate Vojislav Kostunica for President.
The Western governments especially those opposed to Milsoveic
become over active a few weeks before the elections. Vojislav
Kostunica, democratic opposition leader got elected as the President
of Serbia. The Western powers achieved their most sought after aim

188 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

of ousting of President Milosevic. Western governments interfered
blatantly in the election process and helped democratic leadership in
Serbia. The United States administration pumped $77 Million to
influence the outcome of election. 29 Milosevic's ultranationalist
policies turned Serbia bankrupt with fifty per cent unemployment
rate. The United States, on the other hand, demanded Milosevic's
hand over to the International Court of Justice in lieu of getting
foreign aid. The United Nations already established adhoc
International War Crime Tribunal to investigate crimes and
prosecute perpetrators of atrocities in Yugoslavia. Milosevic has
arrested by tribunal authorities after nine months of his ouster. He
faced charges in this Court for genocide and crimes against humanity
which he committed while in office. 30 He was the first former head
of state indicted by International War Crime Tribunal ((ICTY).

The Kosovo conflict resulted from the deliberate incitement of
ethnic hatred and violence by which ruthless demagogues and
warlords elevated themselves to position of absolute power. The
calculated manipulation of fears and tensions unleashed a spiral of
violence in which thousand of citizens became unwitting instruments
of unscrupulous political elites questing for supremacy. The arrest
of Milosevic showed that the removal of leaders with criminal
dispositions made a positive construction of post-conflict
peacebuilding. The establishment of international criminal tribunals
can play a significant role in discrediting and containing
destabilizing political forces. The stigmatization of delinquent
leaders through indictment, apprehension and prosecution
undermine their influence. A post-conflict culture of justice also
makes moral credibility for victim groups and renders vengeance
less tempting and more costly. The prosecution and related political
demise of Milosevic sent a message that the cost of ethnic hatred and
violence as an instrument of power outweighs its benefits. This
helped to marginalize nationalist political leaders and other forces
allied to ethnic war and genocide. It discourages vengeance by
victim groups and to transform criminal justice into an important
element of contemporary international agenda. The threat of
punishment may persuade potential perpetrators to adjust their
behavior. Thus cost-benefit calculation has implications for

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 89

preventing conflicts. 31 The indictment of Milosevic sent a message
that in post conflict scenarios, leaders may be incapacitated
outrightly by arrests. It also conveyed the message that further
incitement and violence would incur a high political cost.

The arrest and trial of Milosevic dramatically increased atrocity
regime's deterrence power. The United Nations established ad hoc
international war crimes tribunals to investigate crimes and
prosecute perpetrators of atrocities in Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo.
The United Nations expanded this atrocity regime by forming a
permanent tribunal, the International Criminal Court (ICC). This
process culminated in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court created in June and July 1998. This atrocities regime not only
held perpetrators of atrocities responsible but act also as a
mechanism of peace by establishing justice and promoting
reconciliation in war-torn societies. It remains to be seen whether
the arrest of Milosevic will serve to disclose the truth of events that
occurred during the conflicts and promote national healing or further
calcify animosities in the war-torn regions. The ability of
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
to extradite Milosevic is a crucial point in the development of a more
viable atrocities regime. 32 It also strengthen the reconciliation
process in Kosovo. The UN special envoy in Kosovo, Bernard
Kouchner argued in this regard, "There could be no peace and
reconciliation in Kosovo until those indicted with human rights
violations are brought to justice." 33

Bernard Kouchner 's comments reflected the views that
accountability for past crimes must remain an important part of
equation for Kosovo to become a viable multi-ethnic entity. It also
accepted that the attainment of this objective depends on deterring
violent campaign against ethnic Serbs. By announcement of ICTY in
June 2000 that it investigates alleged KLA atrocities against Serbs
increased the cost of organized anti-Serb vengeance by Kosovo
political elements. The democratic changes in Belgrade could not
have directly effected the Kosovo conflict. This conflict was not a
dispute over power or form of government. It was about secessionist
movement in Kosovo and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.
Ibrahim Rugova's refusal of new President Vojislav Kostunica's

190 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

proposal for starting a dialogue in December 2000 illustrated this
dilemma of independence and sovereignty. Almost all the Albanian
political elements in Kosovo whether extreme or moderate supported
independence for Kosovo but the new democratic leadership in
Serbia i.e. President Vojislav Kostunica and Prime Minister Zoran
Djindjic regarded Kosovo as an integral and inalienable part of
Serbia and Yugoslavia. 34 In this scenario, the international
administration applied a strategy for implementation of Resolution
1244 that met the minimum objective of both Kosovo Albanians and
Serbs and maximum of neither. The bounded rationality and the
strategy, based on long term political commitment demanded the
minimum requirement for the Kosovo Albanians, their constructive
engagement with international administration in implanting
Resolution 1244. It further required the continued building of Self-
government, substantial autonomy and increased opportunity for
Kosovo to become full partner in the process of regional integration
in Europe. The greater Self-Government and substantial autonomy
required the creation of political and administrative institutions that
empowered local population and enhance the credibility of Kosovo
leadership. The UNMIK under the new SRSG Han Hackkerp
announced elections for legislative assembly for the purpose of
attaining the goal of self-government in Kosovo. On November 17,
2001 UNMIK unveiled a constitutional framework for provisional
self-government in Kosovo. The assembly would have powers in the
fields of health, education and environment. It would have left
ultimate executive authority with head of UNMIK. The UNMIK also
retained control over province's taxes, budget, judiciary, and
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). It also envisaged that the Kosovo
Legislative Assembly would have 120 seats in which 100 elected
directly. The 10 Seats were reserved for Serbs (7 percent of total
population) and 10 for other ethnic groups (4 per cent of
population). The assembly would elect president who would in turn
appoint Prime Minister. 35

The elections for Kosovo Assembly were held on November
17, 2001 and resulted in a victory for moderate Democratic League
of Kosovo (LDK) led by Ibrahim Rugova. LDK won 47 seats. The
ethnic Albanian Democratic Party of Kosovo led by former

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 191

guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci won 26 seats. The coalition
Returning (KP) won 11 per cent of vote and won 22 seats.
Approximately 63 per cent of Province's 1.25 million registered
voters cast their votes. The 70 percent Albanians and 50 per cent
Serbs casted their votes in this elections. 36 These elections were
widely regarded as the most important step to devolve power to the
local Kosovers since the province was placed under international
administration after 1999 war. The Table 5.1 shows the results of
Kosovo Assembly elections.

Party

% of votes

Seats

Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)

46.3

47

Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)

25.5

26

Coalition Returning

11.0

22

Alliance for the future of Kosovo (AAK)

7.8

8

Motherland National Movement for

1.2

4

Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK)

Christian - Democratic Albanian Party

1.0

1

of Kosovo (PSHDK)

Kosovo Democratic Turkish Party (KDTP)

0.9

3

People's movement of Kosovo (LPK)

0.6

1

Ashkali Albanian Democratic party

0.4

2

(PDASHK)

New Initiative for a Democratic

0.a5

2

Kosovo (IRDK)

Bosniak Democratic Action Party of

0.4

1

Kosovo (BSDAK).

United Roma Party of Kosovo (PRBK)

0.3

1

Others

2.4

1

Total

100.0

120

Turnout :

63.2

Table 5.1 : Results of Kosovo Assembly

Source : Keesing's Records of world Events, November 2001, p. 444463.

192

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

The general elections in Kosovo could consolidate the political
landscape and strengthen the democratic forces among Kosovo
Albanians. Like Municipal elections, the moderate party of Ibrahim
Rugova had swept the overwhelming majority in assembly elections
with 46.3 per cent of the overall vote. The political competition in
Kosovo is essentially an intra-Albanian affair and thereby the task of
moderate forces was easier. These elections also deepened the
transformation of radical forces of the former KLA leader Hashim
Thaci and his group towards a modern Political Party prepared to
play the game of democracy. This process also showed that the
spread of democratic procedures goes hand-in-hand with changing
conflict resolution norms.

The process further described the nature of external diplomatic
involvement and its impact on people's perceptions about leaders in
that particular region. The involvement of external actor if indicates
the support of one of the leaders then people would more likely to
be persuaded by that leader whether his ideas are more inclusive or
exclusive. In this context, the inclusive means a leader that has toned
down nationalistic rhetoric. He might speak a future society in which
grievances could be redressed through cooperative negotiations with
others and the political majority and minority have same degree of
common identity. The exclusive leader has more nationalistic
inclinations about others. The explicit support would give legitimacy
to leaders in international circles which could ultimately be helpful
in addressing the group's grievances. On the other hand, if the
external actor's involvement would be neutral with regard to the
competing nationalist leaders, then the potential followers of those
leaders would more likely to think that external actor would support
negotiations and would help to enforce any agreement. Here
'neutral' could be used to devote involvement that would pays little
or no attention to one leader or another but simply would assert the
need for resolution. 37 The Table 5.2 shows this relationship

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 193

Perceived Recognition of
injustice by external actors

Perception that external actor will
support negotiations and will help
enforce agreement.

Yes

Most Likely when there
is neutral external
involvement

No

Most likely
when there is
no external
involvement

Yes

Most likely when situation
defined as international

No

Moste likely with situation
defined as internal

1 . Support leader

2. Support leader

with more inclu-

with more

sive ideas

exclusive ideas

3. Prediction

4. Support leader

indeterminate

with more

domestic variables

exclusive ideas

in this situation

Table 5.2 : Relationship between international dimension, follower
perceptions, and resulting support for more inclusive/exclusive leaders.

Source : Andrea Grove, International Studies Quarterly (2001), p. 65.

The first cell of the above model represents a relationship in
which the political minority is most likely to feel that actors outside
conflict society recognize their claims of injustice and support
negotiations or enforce a peace agreement. This process occurred
when the situation was defined as an international issue and external
actors were diplomatically involved in supporting talks. The more
involved they were in talks in the 'neutral' way defined above the
more likely people have these perceptions. In such a situation leader
with more inclusive views were more likely to be persuasive. 38 The
triumph of moderate leader Ibrahim Rugova in Municipal and
Assembly elections in Kosovo showed the neutral involvement of
international administration in Kosovo. The international
administration's efforts to spread democratic procedures in Kosovo
successfully transformed the more radical forces led by terrorist
leader Hashim Thaci in a democratic party.

The UNMIK through democratic procedures and neutral

194

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

involvement shifted the "Security dilemma" situation in Kosovo.
Both ethnic groups i.e. Albanian Kosovars and Serbs in Kosovo
lived in a anarchical situation because of the lack of common
institutions for governing with perceived legitimacy. A key to
mediating the security dilemma is confidence building where ethnic
groups possess effective safeguards, share pacific expectations and
feel secure in their relationship with the state and each other.
Confidence building measures give people a sense that they can
pursue their interests within institutions. The involvement of
external actors as in cell 1 of above model is a first step to having a
"neutral arbiter" to provide a sense of security. This means the
involvement on behalf of external actor may serve as proxy to begin
promoting transparency of behaviour. It also overturn pattern of
political discrimination even in the absence of pre-existing
democratic institutions to redress grievances. This also promoted
economic development, opportunities, justice and address cultural
and perceptual problems. 39 The four phases of the international
administration assist peacebuilding process through the deterrence of
new hostilities in Kosovo. During the first phase, the UNMIK
promoted human rights and deploy international personnel with the
aim to restore public services. It further provided humanitarian
assistance and facilitated the safe and unimpeded return of all
refugees and displaced persons to their homes. It established
functioning administrative structures to develop phased economic
recovery plan.

THE UNMIKs IN THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION
OF KOSVO'S SOCIETY AND AN IMPORTANCE OF UNITED
NATIONS PEACE BUILDING IN WORLD POLITICS.

The UNMIK during the second phase focussed on the
administration of social services and utilities and consolidated the
rule of law through various regulations. The process of rehabilitation
began with the UNMIK' s establishment of Deutsh Mark as Kosovo's
currency with responsibility of European Union. The UNMIK
increased sense of security in Kosovo with turned its attention to the
development of judiciary. The UNMIK established pre-1989 law as
the applicable law in Kosovo for redressing local grievances. In
practice this significantly limits the use of federal laws. By the end

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 195

of 1999, the UNMIK had established comprehensive authority in all
aspects of Kosovo's society with an annual budget of over $427
Million.

The first two phases of the UNMIK lasted from July 1999 to
October 2000. The third and fourth phase were completed by
municipal and Kosovo assembly elections. Although the inherited
weakness and ambiguities posed serious problems but the UNMIK
succeeded in active as neutral arbiter for the conflict resolution in
Kosovo.

The German diplomat Michael Steiner replaced Han Haekkerup
during the election process and appointed as head of the UNMIK on
January 21, 2002. Ibrhaim Rugova elected as President of Kosovo
after two failed attempts of its election. The assembly also elected
the former Mayor of Mitrovica Bajram Rexphie (PDK) as Prime
Minister. Rugova' s moderate party LDK received four portfolios
includes finance and education while PDK received two and
premiership. 40 President Rugova repeated his demand and
commitment to independence for Kosovo which was supported by all
political parties.

The demand of independence by Kosovo Albanian leaders again
exacerbated with the replacement of Yugoslavia with loose union
between its two constituent republics i.e. Serbia and Montenegro in
February 2003 . Enraged by inclusion of Kosovo in new union, the
Kosovo Legislative members demanded an emergency session of
assembly with the purpose of adopting a declaration of Kosovo as an
independent and Sovereign country. The UNMIK head Michael
Steiner dismissed their demand for independence. The assassination
of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and the replacement of President
Vojislav Kostunica by Svetozar Marovic as President of new union
in March 2003 also loosened the process of the solution of Kosovo's
final status. 41 Until the emergence of Kosvo as an independent
country in January 2008 it seems that the Resolution 1244 left it in
limbo. But it is clear that without some minor incidents of violence,
resolution 1244 could prevent Kosovo from sliding back into an
open conflict. It provided long-term commitment by the international
community to create the conditions for a regional settlement of
Kosovo dispute sometime in the future. On the other hand, The

196 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

United Nations future in international crises is going to be
determined in very large part by what it achieves in Kosovo. 42 The
United Nations successfully restored its credibility by solving the
problems regarding Kosovo's final status amicably with the
cooperation of the United States and European Union.

Kosovo further described that the United Nations proclamation
of multilateral security and universal principles of peace and
democracy provides fantasy space for contemporary sovereign
states. It means that the presence of the United Nations at the centre
of world politics is a fictional guarantee. Under this guarantee, every
post-cold war event could be reinterpreted or revisualized through
the filtering presence of the United Nations that is much more
classical and comfortable for states. This explains the proliferation
of global conferences in the recent years on environment (Rio
Summit) world population (Cairo Summit), world poverty
(Copenhagen Summit), human rights (Vienna Summit) organized by
United Nations. The new world opened up by the United Nations
through these conferences, reports of UN special envoys, UN
special declarations and work of UN agencies simulate the vision
that world is the hospitable place for states and its people. More
importantly it shows the need for states to work together and build
long-standing principles to arrive at such a fictional construction that
could be called "UN-iversal world order". 43 Thus, sovereign states
are not left out of the global picture of/by the United Nations. The
United Nations fictionally "brings states back in the world order
which were disempowered by transnational phenomenon that no
longer abides state boundaries and principle of action. Beside
failures in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and various other parts of
world, the United Nations exalted all of the realist values of modern
nation-states i.e. autonomy, sovereignty, legitimacy and power.

In other words, sovereign states are re-empowered by the vast
simulating arsenal of the United Nations activities. The States are
represented as sovereign with the authority in the Security Council
decisions and their populations through environment summits. They
care about their borders with condemnation of international
terrorism through the United Nations declarations and resolutions.
They take part in the resolution of ethnic conflicts and charges

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 197

against unfriendly states e.g. plethora of UN resolutions passed
against Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Haiti and so on. Thus, the United
Nations becomes an imaginary world government which is tied to no
real world nation or state but it constantly rejuvenates the realist
fiction of national governments through imaginary powers of
simulation. 44 Responding the rhetoric of irrelevance of the United
Nations during Bush administration's decision to use force
unilaterally in Iraq, Madeleine Albright argued,

Beyond the council itself, The United Nations ongoing relevance is
evident in the work of the more than two dozen organizations
comprising the UN system. In 2003 alone, The International Atomic
Energy Agency reported that Iran had processed nuclear materials in
violations of its nuclear nonproliferation treaty obligation. The
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia tried deposed
Yugoslav Leader Slobodan Milosevic for genocide. The World Health
Organization successfully coordinated the global response to Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), meanwhile The World Food
Programme has fed more than 70 million people annually for the last
five years. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees maintains a
lifeline to the international homeless. The UN children's fund has
launched a campaign to end forced childhood marriage. The Joint UN
Programme on HIV/AIDS remains a focal point for global efforts to
defeat HIV/ AIDS. The UN Population Fund help families plan,
mothers' service, and children grow up healthy in the most
impoverished places on earth. The United Nations may seen useless to
the self-satisfied, narrow minded, and microhearted minority, but to
most of the world's populations, it remains highly relevant indeed. 45

The United Nations come under severe criticism in recent years
over its inability to perform its collective security functions. Many
consider it increasingly irrelevant entity and do not feel the need for
its continued existence. But the failure of the Security Council with
regard to its collective security functions is the result of collective
failure of its Permanent members. This collective failure stems
largely from their unwillingness to give up their veto power.
However, the Collective Security is only one aspect albeit an
important one of the multifaced role played by the United Nations in
world affairs. 46 The Kosovo illustrated this view obviously. After
the termination of NATO bombing, the United Nations oversee the
return of refugee's provided them with food and shelter. It assisted

198 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

in the rebuilding of Kosovo's shattered economy, institutions of law
and order and democratic governance.

The reconstruction of Civil Society, Judiciary, police and other
public institutions in Kosovo torn apart by ethnic hatred and strife is
one of the most sensitive and important elements in Kosovo peace
settlement. It created an unprecedented role for the United Nations
and extremely challenging test of the ability of International
Community to take the place of government. Kosovo puts a new
type of international responsibility on trial. 47 The United Nations
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) successfully reconstructed civil
society despite the inherent weaknesses and ambiguities of its
mandate. Such reconstruction could be the foremost priority for
international administration because it was crucial for lasting peace
in the region. NATO was neither equipped or nor willing to perform
these functions. Although the United States and European Union
played an important and leading role in the process to decide the
final status of Kosovo but the peacebuilding role of United Nations
in Kosovo given eloquent testimony to its continuous relevance.

References :

1 . The United Nations had frequently been involved in the monitoring of borders
and cease-fires, monitoring or conduct of elections. It had little experience in
the actual governance of territories. Under Article 77 of the UN charter, the
International trusteeship system applied to territories previously placed under
League of Nations Mandate. These territories included island groups in the
south pacific that had been heavily affected by Combat operations in World
War II. The UN role with respect to such territories was prescribed by
agreement with the state involved, amounted to very general supervision. The
actual governance was carried out by the state granted the trusteeship. The UN
had been prepared to assume administrative function in city Trieste in 1947,
The city of Jerusalem in 1950, west Iran in 1962, Congo in 1960-1964.
Recently, The UN administer Namibia in 1989-1990, Combodia in 1996-1998,
El Salvador in 1991-1995, Croatia-Eastern Slavonia in 1996-1998. The Dayton
Peace Accords on Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) devised a special system of
International administration see. Micheal J. Matheron, United Nations
Governance of Post Conflict Socities," American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 95 (Jan 2001), pp. 76-78.

2. Christopher M. Ryan, "Sovereignty, Intervention, and the Law : A Tenuous
Relationship of Competing Principles," Millennium Journal of International
Studies, Vol. 26 (1997), p. 77.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 199

3. Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of war (Cambridge, 1986), pp.
1991-192.

4. United Nations Year Book, 1999 (NY, 1999), pp. 352-353.

5. UN General Assembly Resolution 53/241, 28 July 1999.

6. UN Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999.

7. Alexandras yannis, "Kosovo under International Administration : An
Unfinished Conflict (Greece, 2001), p. 32.

8. UNMIK Regulation No. 1991/1, 25 July 1999, on the Authority of the Interim
Administration in Kosovo, Section 1, Article 1.

9. Hansjorg strohmeyer, "Collapse And Reconstruction of a Judicial System : The
United Nations Missions Kosovo And East Timor," American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 95 (January 2001), p. 47.

10. See Annex 2, Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999).

11. For the study of Legal powers of UN in East Timor see Jarat Chopra, "The
UN's Kingdom of East Timor", Survival, Vol. 42, 43 (Autumn 2000), pp. 27-
39.

12. Yannis, n. 7, pp. 18-19.

13. David A. Lake, "The New Sovereignty in International Relations",
International Studies Review, (N.Y.) Vol. 5 (2003), p. 318.

14. Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution : War, Peace and The
Global System (ND, 2002), p. 36.

15. David Rohde, "Kosovo Seething, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79 (May /June 2000),
p. 66.

16. S. Neil Macfarlance, "Humanitarian action and Conflict," International
Journal, Vol. Liv (Autumn 1999), p. 541.

17. Richard K. Belts, "The Delusion of Impartial Interventions", Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 73 (Nov. /Dec. 1994), p. 21. Sec. Micheal w. Doyle and Nicholas
Sambani, "International Peacebuilding : A Theoratical and Quantitative
Analysis", American Political Science Review (Whasington), Vol. 94
(December 2000), pp. 780-781.

18. Report of the UN Secretary General on The United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999. Paragraphs 110-
116.

19. Yannis, n. 7, pp. 34-35.

20. John Chipman, "Managing The Politics of Parochialism," Survival, Vol. 35
(Spring 1993), p. 167.

21. Oliver P. Richmond, "A Genealogy of Peacemaking : The Creation and Re-
creation order", Alternatives, Vol. 26 (2001), p. 340. See Steven L. Burg,
"Nationalism Redux : Through The Glass of The Post-Communist States
Darkly, Current History, Vol. 92 (April 1993), p. 163, See also. Samuel H.
Barnes, "The contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Post conflict societies",
American Journals of International Law, Vol. 95 (Jan 2001), pp. 86-101.

22. Yannis, n. 7, p. 41.

23. UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/1 of 14 January 2000, on The Kosovo Joint
Interim Administrative Structure.

200 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

24. UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/45 of August 2000, on Self-Government of
Municipalities in Kosovo.

25. Yannis, n. 7, p. 45.

26. Robert L. Rofhstein, " Fragile Peace and Its Aftermath" in Robert L.
Rothstein, ed. After The peace : Resistance of Reconciliation (London, 1999),
p. 239.

27. Johan Gaining, Peace by Peaceful Means : Peace and Conflict, Development
and Civilization (London, 1996), p. viii.

28. Yannis, n. 7, p. 48.

29. John Cherian, "Milosevice's Many Battles", Frontline (October 27, 2000), p.
44.

30. Gary J. Bass, "Milosevic in The Hauge", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82 (May /June
2003), p. 83, See Andrew Purvis, "Long Walk to Justice", Time (July 9,
2001), p. 30.

31. Payam Akhavan, "Beyond Impunity : Can International Criminal Justice
Prevent Future Atrocities?" American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95
(Jan. 2001), pp. 7, 9, 11.

32. Christopher Rudolph, "Constructing an Atrocities Regime : The Politics of
War Crimes Tribunals," International Organization, Vol. 55 (Summer 2001),
p. 675.

33. Quoted in Akhavan, n. 31, p. 19.

34. Lenard J. Cohen, "Post-Milosevic Serbia," Current History, Vol. 100 (March
2001), p. 104.

35. Keesing's Records of World events (May 2001), p. 44167.

36. Ibid., Nov. 2001, p. 44463.

37. Andrea Grove, "The intra-national struggle to define "us" : External
Involvement as a two-way street", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45
(2001), pp. 364-65.

38. Ibid.

39. Cell 2 of Model represent a situation in which international actor May
recognize political Minority's claims of injustice by defining the situation as an
international issue. This situation "fired up" the people about their problem but
lack of encouragement of talks, economic help or other diplomatic involvement
beyond the rhetoric result in frustration of people. It resulted in the population's
support of more exclusive leader. Cell 4 is the more extreme version of this
situation. In this situation in which even their plight can not recognized may
make people think that their only option is the more exclusive definition of
situation argued by one of the leader. To most a leader calling for talks with
neighbours make little sense. In cell 3, The situation is defined as internal but
diplomatic involvement is present. It produce the perception that external actors
support negotiation and agreement but do not adequately recognize the claims
of the injustice by political minority. In this case, it may appear that
negotiations favor the political majority. Involvement occur because external
actor wish to end instability and not redress grievances of minority. The
reaction of the public in this situation depends more on the domestic variables

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 201

than on external context. For example in a situation of high repression the more
exclusive leader makes more sense. If the repression is lessening, a more
inclusive leader's rhetoric would be more likely to resonate. See Ibid. , p. 366.

40. Renata Dwan", "Armed Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution",
Sipri Yearbook, 2000, pp. 87-88. Keesing's Records of world Events Jan.
2002, p. 44578. See also Keesing's Records of world Events, March 2002, p.
44684.

41. Keesing's Records of World Events, March 2003, p. 45299.

42. Yannis, n. 7, p. 72.

43. Francois Debrix, "Deploying vision, Simulation Action : The United Nations
and its Visualizing Strategies in a New World Order", Alternatives, Vol. 21
(1996), p. 82. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

44. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

45. Madeline K. Albright, "United Nations", Foreign Policy (October 2003), p.
17.

46. Rahul Rao, "The UN and NATO in the New World Order : Legal issues,"
International Studies, Vol. 37 (2000), p. 180.

47. Hideaki Shinoda, "The Politics of Legitimacy in International Relations : A
Critical examination of NATO's Intervention in Kosovo", Alternatives, Vol. 25
(2000), p. 531.

202 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Conclusion

The cascade of events occurred in the last decade of twentieth
century resulted in a revolutionary restructuring of world politics.
The stability imposed by the bipolar distribution of power between
the United States and the Soviet Union ended with the demise of
USSR. The trends of disintegration shook the globe and the
resurgence of ethnic-nationalism and conflict resulted in the ethno-
chaos in the world politics.

Ethnicity is a sense of identity and being a complex phenomenon
like other social phenomenon is the subject of change. It is normally
closely associated with political, juridical, religious and other social
views and forms of interaction which constitute important
ingredients of ethnic phenomenon. Ethnicity also finds expression in
political domination, economic exploitation and psychological
oppression.

The nature, intensity and forms of expression of ethnicity are
determined by the size and location of the various linguistic cultural
groups in the society, the strength and coherence of their leadership,
the courage, determination and nature of under-privileged classes.
Historical relations between different cultural groups, the level of
development of the group, the socio-economic content in which the
groups make contact, prevailing social customs, tradition and culture
of various linguistic groups and the form of government also play an
important role.

Ethnicity is found in both developed and underdeveloped
countries, in societies with different ideologies and historical-
cultural backgrounds. The positive aspect of ethnicity provides a
material as well as emotional support network for individual in
society. The negative aspects of ethnicity make it problematic for
social harmony in multi-ethnic societies. It embodies those

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 203

passionate, symbolic and apprehensive aspects, which provide
violent conflicts.

Ethnicity is not a new phenomenon. The process of traditional
ethnicity and modern ethnicity as defined by world system
development theory had gone through three major interlocking
phases of development in the world system. The three phases are the
changing structures of the state and economy as well as their
associated ideological and identity configurations. However, with
the emergence of modern state system the ethnicity assumed a new
phenomenon taking the varied and overlapping forms of ethnic
nationalism, civil ethnicity and ethnic plurality. Thus, the modern
ethnicity rests on the foundation that member of every ethnic or
cultural community need to be identified with a nation for assuring
the status and rights of citizenship for themselves. When any time
ethnic or cultural communities can not accept or support the state
under whose jurisdiction they happen to live, they became alienated
and hunt for better options.

The contemporary conflict between ethnic groups has been
primarily restricted to sub-national groups with in the state that has
not achieved the status of 'Nation' and the 'Majority group'
organized under a state. The rise of ' Nation- without-states' bring a
radical transformation in the functioning of nation-state. The ethnic
conflict arise when the nation-state ignore the emotional bonds of
myths, symbols and memories which unite citizens of particular
ethnic communities living in its territory. A stress on informing and
homogenization in the state boundaries are the root cause of the rise
of ethnic violence in various countries. These factors were also
responsible for the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The roots of ethnic violence in Yugoslavia must be sought in the
ethno-history, economy and culture of the region. Extreme ethnic
heterogeneity, intractable religious and group rivalries and conflict
of deeper socio-historical interests between various Yugoslav
nations torn apart the artificial composition of country. The Kosovo
crisis was also the product of these ethnic, religious and socio-
historic rivalries between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in
Yugoslavia. The forces of ethnicity, ethnocide, ethnogenesis, ethno-
nationalism and historical hatreds not only torn apart the Yugoslav

204 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

society but led it towards the process of pseudospeciation. It is a tool
of modern psychological warfare through which the image of the
target group or nation can be bedeviled. The Serbian President used
this tool in Yugoslavia which resulted in the bloodiest massacres of
Serbs, Croates, Bosnians and Albanian Muslims and created worst
refugee problem in post- World War II European history.

The Serbian atrocities in Kosovo led to the severe humanitarian
crisis that provided chance to NATO forces and sole super power the
United States to intervene in Yugoslavia. Latter, this intervention in
Kosovo (which was not authorised by the United Nations Security
Council) raised various severe legal questions in world politics.

It is argued that the United Nations was silent spectator to the
events in Kosovo. The paralysis of the United Nations was the result
of the failure of permanent members of the Security Council to forge
a consensus on the course of action. The United Nations role, on the
contrary, was more complex and focused on the humanitarian and
human rights issues. The United Nations role in Kosovo can be
divided into two parts i.e. Pre-NATO attack preventive diplomacy
for hampering mass scale human rights violations and second was
post-NATO attack role of peace building. The Pre-NATO attack
peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in Kosovo could be
analyses through three peace-keeping categories i.e. patching-up,
prophylaxis and proselytism. The United Nations peace-keeping
activities do not always contain neatly into this threefold framework.
Sometimes the organization has engaged (at the same time and same
situation) in both patching-up and prophylactic endeavours. The
Mandate which is given to the mission is usually a good guide of the
role of the United Nations. The four methods of patching-up, four
of prophylaxis and two of proselytism illustrate different ways in
which the same goal may be sought.

Patching-up consists of activity which intended to bring
disputants to an agreement or to assist in the execution of a
settlement. The first patching-up route to an agreement lies through
impartial investigation of the facts of the case. In Kosovo, the
Serbian and Kosovar Albanian groups were not in direct and open
conflict until the last month of 1998. Hence, an investigation was the
most obvious step in this situation. The observers can be sent to an

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 205

area where potential explosion of violence is likely to occur. This
enables the world institution to receive an important report about
deteriorating situation. The United Nations used Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Mission's to promote
dialogue and collect information on human rights violations in
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia withdrew its acceptance of CSCE missions
in Kosovo and other two areas in September 1992. The Security
Council adopted resolution 855 (sponsored by France, Hungary,
Spain, United Kingdom and United States) in 1993 and called upon
Yugoslav authorities to reconsider their refusal to allow the CSCE
mission's activities in Kosovo and other areas. The General
Assembly in resolution 49/13 (1994) also called for the full
implementation of resolution 855 (1993). Second procedure of
patching-up is 'mediation' and the United Nations used it in number
of times in Kosovo. The United Nations can also help to repair
quarrels by assisting in the implementation of an agreement. For this
purpose, the United Nations supervise the parties for execution of
their promises. The United Nations may go beyond this activity
when it played an administrative role in territorial disputes. The
world body time-to-time used these patching-up procedures in the
Kosovo crisis.

The four forms of the United Nations 'prophylactic' activity are,
the devices of accusation, sedation, obstruction and refrigeration.
The device of accusation is based on the assumption that the
garnering of facts will expose and so may check the unpopular
behaviour of offender states. The United Nations used CSCE
mission's reports as 'accusation' method. This method is not
embarked upon the immediate hope of putting an end to the dispute
but intends to produce a quietening effect. The world body makes
authoritative call for the cessation of hostile acts on the base of
reports. In this way, the United Nations place some obstacles in the
way of the beginning or continuation of aggressive policies. The
Security Council resolution 855 (1993) which stressed Yugoslavia to
reconsider its policy toward CSCE missions and the General
Assembly Resolutions 48/153 (1993), 50/190 (1995), 51/111 (1996)
and 52/139 (1997) which condemned Yugoslavia for violation of
Kosovo Albanian's human rights, demanded reestablishment of
democratic institutions, establishment of international monitoring

206 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

presence in Kosovo and resumption of dialogue reflected the
prophylactic accusation approach used by world body in the Kosovo
crisis.

The scope and intensity of the conflict in Kosovo grew
dramatically in 1998 despite the CSCE missions and other regional
organizations activities. The United Nations with the support of
contact group and OSCE were directed towards bringing the parties
together through mediatory or accusatory methods. The Security
Council adopted resolutions 1160 and 1190 on the basis of the
reports of contact group, OSCE, the Secretary-General and the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) about
potential humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. Here, the United Nations
used second prophylactic method called 'sedation' in Kosovo.
Sedation consists of direct endeavours to exert a calming influence
on inflammable situations. It requires the direct dealings of the
United Nations representatives with the officials of the involved
states. Such operations take place in two ways i.e. by negotiations
with government concerned and through cooling activity at military
level. These measures are not only used for avoiding loss of time but
also designed to maximise the effects of the United Nations
intervention. The sedative efforts of contact group, Christopher
Hills (the United States Ambassador to Federal Republic of
Macedonia) and the United States special envoy Richard Holbrooke
resulted in an agreement for solution of Kosovo's problems through
dialogue and peaceful means.

The United Nations used third prophylactic possibility called
'obstruction' for keeping peace and dialogue, the mobilization of
world opinion regarding Kosovo's deteriorating situation. The
obstruction is the placing of non-combatant force or verifiers with
consent of host state for preventing the situation from deterioration.
NATO and Yugoslavia signed Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)
on 15 October 1998 for air surveillance system. Yugoslavia and
OSCE signed another agreement which allow OSCE mission to
verify maintenance of ceasefire by all elements. This mission
comprised 2000 unarmed verifiers from OSCE member countries
and would be headquartered in Pristina, capital of Kosovo. On
humanitarian front, the UNHCR and OHCHR had established close

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 207

coordination with Kosovo verification mission in the field and close
liaison with OSCE in Vienna.

The United Nations peace-keeping activities in Kosovo received
a shock when Yugoslavia had increased its military activities and
used excessive and disproportionate force in Kosovo. The contact
group also failed at diplomatic front when Serbian delegation refused
to sign Rambouillet accords. The last ditch mediation mission of US
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and three other Rambouillet
negotiators to persuade President Milosevic to accept ceasefire
failed. This process showed that the states are certainly sensitive to
criticism but it does not follow that they would alter their policies
just to accommodate world opinion. The governments generally do
not regard it as consonant with their dignity or domestic stability.
The world body's demands, on the other hand, increase the state's
determination to stand firm and receive support from its friends. The
successful outcome of international opinion is based on two factors.
Firstly, if the criticized states know that certain powerful friends will
stand by it then it can afford to take little notice of decisions taken
by organized international community. Yugoslavia knew that Russia
and China, two Permanent Security Council members could veto
any Western resolution regarding use of force on its territory. Thus,
President Milosevic refused to sign Rambouillet accords and did not
accept the ceasefire in Kosovo.

Secondly, in this situation, the efficacy of international action is
based on the United Nations third peacekeeping method called
proselytism. In this category, the United Nations seeking to act as
an instrument of change in order to enforce concerned parties or
regimes to obey international standards of behaviour. There are two
types of proselytism i.e. 'invalidation and coercion'. The device of
invalidation is used as fact-finding mission. It is used in the
expectation that its report will be so damaging as to suggest that the
regime in question is morally unfit for continued rule. However, the
unresponsiveness of the criticized government or party to the United
Nations hints that they should give up unacceptable behaviour or
make way for more acceptable regimes. It has turned some thoughts
toward coercion. The device of coercion is used for forceful regime
change. NATO and OSCE's verification missions in Kosovo acted

208 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

as fact-finding missions for the United Nations. Both missions
reported about the rigidity and blatant use of force by Serbian
government against Kosovo Albanians. In this situation, the
efficiency of international coercive action was largely turn on the
attitude of major powers. The consensus between major powers
about preventing violent change and maintaining peaceful
international atmosphere is necessary for the United Nations to have
a prophylactic effect on troubled situation. NATO's unauthorised
use of force on Serbia directly stated to the divisions among the five
permanent members of the Security Council on the use of force to
resolve Kosovo crisis and the commitment of Russia and China to
veto military intervention in Kosovo.

Kosovo showed that the human rights promotion through the
UN Charter system has been evolved considerably. Since the
adoption of the Universal Declaration, human rights institutions in
the United Nations system have both increased in numbers and often
evolved beyond a declaratory and promotional status. The 1998
Rome Compromise on the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court indicated the growing innovation and
strengthening of the United Nations human rights treaty-based
system which focused on crimes against humanity. The indictment
of Serbian President Milosevic by international war Crime Tribunal
(ICTY) for atrocities committed on Kosovo Albanians showed that
the establishment of individual responsibility for such crimes
represent a major step towards the direct enforcement of specific set
of international human rights norms. The United Nations role in
Kosovo indicates dilemma faced by the states i.e. to follow
humanitarian conventions or to contest these norms. Both reactions
indicate an evolutionary process where by the human rights issues
gain growing recognition in international politics. Kosovo also
highlighted that the United Nations was created for the world peace
and alleviation of inter-state wars in the world but intra-state ethnic
conflict changed its peacekeeping role into peacebuilding variety for
reconstruction of war-torn societies.

NATO's role in Kosovo highly affected the relevance of the
United Nations in the world affairs. It highlighted the dilemma of
legitimacy for a group of states to act in order to prevent or halt

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 209

humanitarian emergency where the Security Council is deadlocked
in disagreement. NATO action in Kosovo represents an obvious
erosion of the United Nations authority on use of force in
international affairs. The structure of the charter is complex so far
as the use of force is concerned. Article 2(4) prohibits the threat and
use of force. The only unilateral use of force permitted to a state is
that of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51. It has
too been accepted that the prohibition of intervention applies
regardless of the political ideology or the moral virtue of the
government of the target state. There was general agreement that the
charter prohibits intervention by any state even for humanitarian
purposes. NATO justified its threat and subsequent use of force
against Serbia on two grounds i.e. firstly, the Security Council had
determined by Resolution 1199 that the situation in Kosovo
constituted a threat to peace and security in the region, secondly,
that there was large scale human suffering in the region.

The Security Council adopted three resolutions under chapter
VII of the UN Charter prior to NATO bombing campaign. The
resolution 1199 concluded that the Security Council would take
further additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability
if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not implement the
measures optioned in Resolutions 1160 and 1199. It is evident from
Resolution 1199 that the Security Council gave an opportunity to
FRY to comply with its wishes. It reserved the right to determine
"further action" and "additional measures" to taken in the evidence
of the fact that Yugoslavia did not comply with the resolutions 1 160,
1199, it was not left to other states to determine what further actions
and additional measures could be taken. This Resolution did not
even remotely imply that any state or regional organization could
apply the use of force to deal with the situation. Thus, NATO's
intervention in Kosovo is blatant violation of Articles 2(4), 2(7), 51
of the United Nations Charter.

The other most important justification given by NATO was
"humanitarian intervention" for the use of force in Kosovo. It raised
a debate which has focused on the alleged incompatibility of two
principles of the United Nations system i.e. Sovereign equality and
human rights. The former is enshrined in Articles 2(1), 2(4), 2(7) of

210 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

the UN Charter. Under these Articles states enjoy sovereign equality
defined internally as exclusive jurisdiction with in a territory and
externally as freedom from outside intervention. The human rights
are identified in preamble of the UN Charter and Article 1(3). This
right is further elaborated in subsequent declarations and
conventions. Thus, the Kosovo crisis showed the clash between the
principles of non-intervention, sovereign equality enshrined in the
United Nations Charter with human right norms. Although the
United Nations Charter and other human rights instruments are not
provided the right of "humanitarian intervention" but the creation of
International Tribunals of Rwanda (1994) and Former Yugoslavia,
indictment of President Milosevic and other war criminals showed
that the prevention of massive human rights violations or
humanitarian catastrophes has become the basis of "humanitarian
intervention" practice in recent years.

The Kosovo intervention showed that the West continuous to
script international law although it ignore the constitutional
safeguards provided by the United Nations Charter. The Western
interventions in non- Western states i.e. Iraq, Somalia, Haiti etc.
cited as evidence that the UN Charter's original, narrow notion that
constituted a threat to the peace is broadened. The threats which
provide the basis for collective decisions on the use of force
increasingly recognize and include the internal disorders that
generate regionally destabilizing refugee streams or ethnic conflicts
as in Kosovo and the development of the weapons of mass
destruction by states with aggressive tendencies. Recently, the
United States sought the United Nations authorisation on the use of
force in Iraq on the basis of this broadened definition of threat to
international peace and security. But NATO and the United States'
failure to obtain the Security Council legitimacy for their actions in
Kosovo and Iraq respectively described that the use of force is still
be confined to essentially order promoting and security-preserving
purposes and could not extend to humanitarian purposes as such.

The humanitarian intervention entails the commitment to human
rights. But it does not mean the worldwide equality of human rights.
The human rights of some people are more worth protecting than
others. International community has double standards on

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 211

humanitarian intervention. Military intervention on behalf of the
victims of human rights abuses has not occurred in Sudan,
Afghanistan or Ethiopia. It was woefully inadequate and delayed in
Rwanda. The agreement between Indonesia, Portugal and the United
Nations on May 5, 1999 affirmed that the security of East Timorese
was the responsibility of Indonesia and United Nations. It is evident
that the outcome of the proposed referendum regarding East Timor's
independence inevitably resulted in mass scale violence but the
Security Council delayed authorising intervention until Indonesia's
consent was not obtained. It is better to be a refugee in Europe than
in Africa. UNHCR spent 1 1 cents a day on per refugee in Africa but
$1.23 in Balkans which is 11 times greater then Africa. International
Community's double standards also reflected in "Money for Peace".
The United Nations' consolidated humanitarian appeal for Kosovo
was $690 billion of which 58 per cent has been met while $2.1
billion has pledged for regional construction. On the other hand,
United Nations appeal for $25 million for Sierra Leone met
profound international indifference and a mere 32 percent of the
appeal has covered.

NATO's intervention in Kosovo not only diminished the United
Nations effectiveness and prestige in world politics but also pointed
towards the role and impact of the United States as sole world power
on the functioning of the United Nations system. The United States
role in the Kosovo crisis reflected its grand strategy in world
politics. The United States grand strategy included security and
economic objectives as well as particular approaches to achieve
these ends at particular times. It also supported the development of
international institutions and sophisticated ideology that gained wide
international appeal and comprised both political and economic
ideals. During cold war years, the United States ideology was liberal
internationalism who's political and economic ideals were liberal
democracy and free markets. Other important elements of this
strategy were containment, nuclear deterrence and promotion of
open economic society. The United States modified, ranged and
expanded the elements of its grand strategy after the end of Cold
War. Its economic and social realities in this decade were no longer
centered on industrial power and liberalism.

212 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

The process of globalization, communication revolution and
diminished power of nation-state changed its old strategy. The
process of globalization led to the emergence of global economy,
which favours openness. The development of postmodern society
eroded the great pillars of modern society i.e. government
bureaucracies, military services and business corporations. These
are replaced by the ideas of expressive individualism and human
rights. The communication revolution also promotes the idea of
human rights. The traditional American ideology advocated liberal
democracy and free markets. The global transformation also
expanded traditional ideology of the United States with more
emphasis on promoting human rights. The modified version of
"global liberalism" (which was propagated by President Bill Clinton
and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright) provided the justification
to a new kind of the United States Military Interventionism. The
Military Interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia were the examples
of this phenomenon. The United States led war against Serbia over
Kosovo also represented the culmination of the United States new
strategy of "Global Liberalism." On the other hand, Kosovo showed
the dilemma of the United States policy of opposition of the concept
of international accountability formulated in the Rome Statute for an
International Criminal Court. The Kosovo highlighted the United
States irony that it is prepared to bomb in the name of human rights
but not to join institutions to enforce them. Kosovo war against
Orthodox Serbia showed the resistance and resentment of Russia,
China and other Orthodox countries towards the United States and
its promotion of global economy, open society and humanitarian
intervention. It is argued that Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova,
Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia have been unsuccessful in making the
transition from communism to liberal-democratic free-market
structures and global economy. In contrast, most of Roman Catholic
countries such as, Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia have made this transition
successfully. Even Protestant Nations Estonia and Latvia also have
made this transition. The dichotomy among ex-communist countries
i.e. more western and more eastern or Roman Catholic or Protestant
and the Eastern Orthodox revived and reinforced an ancient

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 213

historical divides. This resulted in the great schism between Western
and Eastern Christianity.

The Kosovo war has sharpened the opposition of the United
States global project by Russia, China and Some other countries.
The United States support of humanitarian intervention present a
serious threat to the norm of national sovereignty. And most of the
opposition states saw the Kosovo war as a prime example of the
United States grand strategy that aims to impose globalization. They
worried that they may be the next targets of humanitarian
interventionist policy of the United States. This was the case with the
Kosovo war where Russia and China saw analogies between
Chechnya and Tibet, Taiwan, respectively.

The Kosovo crisis also reflects the United States hegemonic
foreign policy goals in Europe. During Cold War, the United States
controlled communism and its capitalist allies simultaneously. But
after the demise of Soviet Block, the central objective of the United
States in Europe was containment of European allies. Thus, it has
overwhelmingly reasserted her power in Europe through
revitalization of the Cold War institutional structure. Thus, the
United States successfully revitalized NATO, contain European
allies and Russian power in Eastern Europe respectively.

It is argued that the paralysing tensions over Bosnia in 1994-95,
the inaction over Rwanda in 1994 and the insurmountable divisions
emerged over Kosovo in 1999 were life-threatening for the United
Nations. But the United Nations survived with repeated "crisis of
credibility" due to its unacknowledged functions. These functions
include that the permanent members of the United Nations used its
shortcomings as cheap and convenient cover for the failure of their
own policies. Another vital function of the Security Council is to
serve as an instrument for collective legitimization of state action.
This instrument acts as a dispenser of politically significant approval
and disapproval of the claims, policies and actions of states. The
Security Council provides another mechanism to permanent
members through which they advance their interests and secure
themselves from international criticism. The Post-Cold War
examples illustrated this fact e.g. Russia successfully soften the
United States position on Georgia and Tajikistan in exchange for

214 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

supporting US sponsored resolution on Haiti in 1993. China
repeatedly used its permanent Security Council membership to
restate its interests about Taiwan. France also used its permanent
membership to deflect its criticism of its policies in Rwanda by
receiving the Security Council endorsement of 'Operation Turquoise
in 1994. The intense diplomatic exercise by the United States and
Britain to secure the Security Council authorization for use of force
in Iraq, however unsuccessful, is testimony of the importance of
near-universal legitimising role of the Security Council. Thus, due
to permanent members' vested interests in world politics, the
Security Council's role, status and authority in international affairs
is not irreparably weakened and fatally undermined.

Due to NATO's (unauthorised) attack on Serbia, the United
Nations came under severe criticism over its inability to perform its
collective security functions. Many consider it increasingly
irrelevant entity and do not feel its continued existence. But the
failure of Security Council with regard to its collective security
functions is the result of collective failure of its permanent members
and their unwillingness to give up their veto power. However,
collective security is only one aspect albeit an important one of
multifaceted role played by the United Nations in world affairs.
Kosovo illustrated this view obviously. After the termination of
NATO bombing, the United Nations oversaw the return of
refugee's, provided them with food and shelter. It assisted in the
rebuilding of Kosovo's shattered economy, institutions of law and
order and democratic governance. The reconstruction of civil
society, judiciary, police and other public institutions in Kosovo torn
apart by ethnic hatred and strife is one of the most sensitive and
important elements in Kosovo peace settlement. It created an
unprecedented role for the United Nations.

It also faced extremely challenging test of the ability of
international responsibility to take the place of government. Kosovo
put a new type of responsibility on trial. The United Nations Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIC) successfully reconstructed civil society despite
inherent weaknesses and ambiguities of its Mandate. The Resolution
1244 gave the United Nations not only the unprecedented
responsibility of plenary authority over Kosovo but it had also given

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 215

the exceptional task to administer it without roadmap for its final
status. Although, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo did not have
any authority to decide the final status of Kosovo but the successful
reconstruction of Kosovo's society could be the foremost priority for
international administration because it was crucial for lasting peace
in the region. NATO was neither equipped or nor willing to perform
these functions. Although, the final status of Kosovo is decided
under the dominant role of the United States and European Union
but the peace building role of the United Nations in Kosovo given
eloquent testimony to its continuous relevance.

NATO's action in Kosovo is also seen as an exception from
which some important lesson can be derived. Firstly, the mass
slaughter of civilians and egregious repression of minorities is not a
risk-free venture particularly for small states. Secondly, the United
Nations post-NATO war peace-building role in Kosovo showed that
if the world community takes responsibility to protect oppressed
people then it must be given the means promptly necessary for the
civil reconstruction of destroyed civil societies. It requires a
dedicated, rapidly deployable reserve of police, judges, magistrates,
health care providers and administrators. Kosovo, to some extent,
manifest the United Nations adhockery in peace building efforts.
Thirdly, Kosovo and Iraq illustrated that the United Nations, despite
disdained and circumvented, became an essential facilitator in
ending the conflict. It not only provides a grand platform and forum
for multilateral diplomacy but also remains resilient and
irreplaceable one for world peace.

216 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Appendix-I

RESOLUTION 1244 UN DOCS/RES/1244

10 JUNE 1999

The Security Council

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council
for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998)
of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239
(1999) of 14 May 1999.

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the
requirements of those resolutions.

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo,
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well
as terrorist acts by any party.

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April
1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in
Kosovo.

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to
their homes in safety.

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991.

• Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo
crisis adopted on 6 May 1999, contained in annex I to the presence
resolution, and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia of the principles set for in points 1 to 9 of the paper
presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999, contained in annex II to the
present resolution, and the agreement of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to that paper.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 217

• Reaffirming the commitment of all Member-States to the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
other States of the region, as set out in the Final Act of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki 1 August
1975, and in annex II to the present resolution.

• Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy
and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo.

• Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a
threat to international peace and security.

• Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel
and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under
the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations.

1 . Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on
the general principles in annex I to the present resolution and as further
elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex II.

2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the
principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1
above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation.

3 . Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an
immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo,
and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of
all military, police and paramilitary forces according to rapid
timetable, with which the deployment of the international security
presence in Kosovo will be synchronized.

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal,, an agreed number of Yugoslav
and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to
Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex II.

5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices,
of international civil and security presences, with appropriate
equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences.

6. Requests Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the
Security Council, a Special Representative to control the
implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests
the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to
coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure
that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually
supportive manner.

218 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to
establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in
point 4 of annex II with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities
under paragraph 9 below.

8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective
international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that
the parties cooperate fully in their deployment.

9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence
to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing
the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police
and paramilitary forces, except as provided for in point 6 of
annex II.

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army and other armed
Kosovo Albanian groups, as required in paragraph 15 below:

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and
displaced persons can return home in safety, the international
civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be
established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered.

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil
presence can take responsibility for this task.

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task.

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the
work of the international civil presence.

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required.

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the
international civil presence, and other international organizations.

10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant
international organizations, to establish an international civil presence
in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo
under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and which will provide
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of
Kosovo.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 219

1 1 . Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence
will include :

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full
account of annex II and of the Rambouillet Accords.

(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as
long as required.

(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional
institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government
pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections.

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its
administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting
the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and
other peace-building activities.

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine the future
status of Kosovo, taking into account the Rambouillet Accords.

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from
Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under
a political settlement.

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other
economic reconstruction.

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian
organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid.

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local
police forces and in the meantime through the deployment of
international police personnel to serve in Kosovo.

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights.

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and
displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations,
and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access
to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with
such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of
international aid.

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to
contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe
return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this
context the importance of convening an international donors

220 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11(g)
above, at the earliest possible date.

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international
security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991.

15. Demands that the Kosovo Liberation Army and other armed Kosovo
Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with
the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the
international security presence in consultation with the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General.

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution
1160(1998) shall not apply to arms and related material for the use of
the international civil and security presences.

17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other
international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the
economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the
Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a stability pact for
South-Eastern Europe, with broad international participation, in order
to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability
and regional cooperation.

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the
implementation of all aspects of the present resolution.

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are
established for an initial period of twelve months, to continue
thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise.

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular
intervals on the implementation of the present resolution, including
reports from the leadership of the international civil and security
presences, the first reports to be submitted within thirty days of the
adoption of this resolution.

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 22 1

ANNEX I

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the
G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the
political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

• Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;

• Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;

• Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security
presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of
guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;

• Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by
the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;

• The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;

• A political process towards the establishment of an interim political
framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for
Kosovo, tasking full account of the Rambouillet Accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army;

• Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilizing
of the crisis region.

ANNEX II

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move
towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis :

1 . An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.

2. A verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and
paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.

3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective
international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, capable of
guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.

4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic
Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified
command and control and authorised to establish a safe environment

222 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes
of all displaced persons and refugees.

5. The establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of
the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The
interim administration while establishing and overseeing the
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in
Kosovo.

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian
personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following
functions :

Liaising with the international civil mission and the international
security presence;

Marking/clearing minefields;

Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;

Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

7. The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the
supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid
organizations.

8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political
framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet Accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Negotiations between
the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the
establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and
stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation
of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international
participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic
prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.

10. The suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the
principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously
identified, required elements, which are specified in the note below. A
military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would,

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 223

among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles
and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

Withdrawal

Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule
and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be
withdrawal.

Returning personnel

Equipment associated with returning personnel;

Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;

Timetable for their return;

Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;

Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence
and the international civil mission.

Note :

Other required elements

A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, for example,
seven days to complete withdrawal, and air defence weapons outside a
25 kilometer mutual safety zone to be withdrawal within 48 hours.

The return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be
under the supervision of the international security presence and will be
limited to a small, agreed number (hundreds, not thousands).

The suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of
verifiable withdrawals;

The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall
not extend the previously determined time for completion of
withdrawals.

224 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

Appendix-II

REGUALTION NO. 1999/1

UNMIK/REG/ 1999/1
25 JULY 1999

ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN
KOSOVO

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General,

• Recalling resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, whereby the United
Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, authorized the Secretary-General, with the
assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an
international civil presence in Kosovo, known as the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), in order to
provide an interim administration in Kosovo with the mandate as
described in the resolution;

• Acting pursuant to the authority given to him under United Nations
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, and for the
purpose of establishing and maintaining the interim administration in
the territory of Kosovo;

• Hereby promulgates the following :

Section 1

AUTHORITY OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION

1.11.1. All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo,
including the administration of the Judiciary, is vested in UNMIK
and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General.

1.2 1.2 The Special Representative of the Secretary-General may
appointed any person to perform functions in the civil
administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, or remove

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 225

such person. Such functions shall be exercised in accordance with
the existing laws, as specified in section 3, and any regulations
issued by UNMIK.

Section 2

OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED
STANDARDS

In exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or
holding public office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized
human rights standards and shall not discriminate against any person on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, association with a national
community, property, birth or other status.

Section 3

APPLICABLE LAW IN KOSOVO

The laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999 shall
continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as they do not conflict with standards
referred to in section 2, the fulfillment of the mandate given to UNMIK
under United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), or the
presence or any other regulation issued by UNMIK.

Section 4

REGULATIONS ISSUED BY UNMIK

In the performance of the duties entrusted to the interim administration
under United Nations Security Council resolution 1244(1999), UNMIK
will, as necessary, issue legislative acts in the form of regulations. Such
regulations will remain in force until repealed by UNMIK or superseded by
such rules as are subsequently issued by the institutions established under a
political settlement, as provided for in United Nations Security Council
resolution 1244 (1999).

Section 5

ENTRY INTO FORCE AND PROMULGATION ON REGULATIONS
ISSUED BY UNMIK

5.1 UNMIK regulations shall be approved and signed by the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General. They shall enter into force
upon the date specified therein.

226 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

5.2 UNMIK regulations shall be issued in Albanian, Serbian and English.
In case of divergence, the English text shall prevail. The regulations
shall be published in a manner that ensures their wide dissemination
by public announcement and publication.

5.3. UNMIK regulations shall bear the symbol UNMIK/REG/, followed by
the year of issuance and the issuance number of that year. A register
of the regulations shall indicate the date of promulgation, the subject
matter and amendments or changes thereto or the repeal or suspension
thereof.

Section 6

STATE PROPERTY

UNMIK shall administer movable or immovable property, including
monies, bank accounts, and other property of, or registered in the name of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia or any of its
organs, which is in the territory of Kosovo.

Section 7

ENTRY INTO FORCE

The present regulation shall be deemed to have entered into force as of 10
June 1999, the date of adoption by the United Nations Security of resolution
1244 (1999).

Dr. Bernard Kouchner

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 111

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250 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis

„.:■■:■.:

'

The powerful passions aroused by ethnicity in human being have
resulted in -countless- wars, revolts and conflicts. The communities
organized on putative common descent culture and religion have co-
existed, competed and clashed since the dawn of history. It has been
estimated that more than ten million people lost their lives during 1 945 to
1999. The end of cold war also witnessed that the groups' within states
assert their ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional or national identities and

question the
this period, e
newcountrie
many ethnic

legitimacy of various countries in the world. In
ilism has assumed prominence because some
le bases of ethnicity raised the expectations of
be able to achieve their cherished goal of
/ on the bases of ethnicity.

as an independent country on February 2008
e of the phenomenon of ethnicity and Its
;h as ethnocide, ethno-genests ethno historic
thno-nationalism and pseudo-speciation In the
jes related with Kosovo such as genocide ami
3ovo Muslims by Serbs, Nato's attack on
impacts on relevance of United Nations ai id its
world affairs and the United States, role In the
»wer have made Kosovo a flash point, whose
ological significance. This study by theoretical
functioning of United Nation system in the
:ts and the issue of humanitarian intervention in
t important question i.e. should the conti ill H i< ;< i
rs of civilian people be allowed under Iho guise
Finally this study elaborates that the United
itarian and peace building spheres has no peer
}rld body in Kosovo is an eloquent testimony < >[
i the world politics.

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