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Full text of "Problem of Ethnicity - The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis"

ETHNICITY 

The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Jasvir Sinqh 





.„.; 




PROBLEM OF ETHNICITY 

The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



PROBLEM OF ETHNICITY 

The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Jasvir Singh 



U N I STAR 



Ethnicity / Ethnic Conflicts / Ethnic Violence Politics / Nationalism / Identity / 
International Relations / UN / Kosovo / Contemporary World Issues 



PROBLEM OF ETHNICITY 

The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 

by 

JASVIR SINGH 

V.P.O. Damounda 
Distt. Jalandhar 
M.: 9815118812 

Published by Unistar Books Pvt. Ltd. 

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Produced and Bound in India 

©2008 

All rights reserved 
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without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the above-mentioned 
publisher of this book. 



Contents 

Preface vii 

Introduction ix 

Chapter 1 

Problem of Ethnicity: Theoretical Framework 1 

Part-I : Ethnicity : Meaning, Nature and Evolution 
Part-II : Ethnicity and Ethnic Violence 

Chapter 2 

Issue of Kosovo as an Ethnic Problem 65 

Chapter 3 

United Nations Role in Kosovo Crisis 90 

Chapter 4 

Limitations and Constraints on United Nations 118 
for Action in Kosovo 

Part I : Role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Part II : Role of United States 

Chapter 5 

Role of United Nations Aftermath of 173 

Kosovo War 

Conclusion 203 

Appendix-I 217 

Appendix-II 225 

Bibliography 228 



Abbreviations 



ACABQ : Advisory Committee on Administrative and 

Budgetary Questions. 

CHR : Commission on Human Rights 

CSCE : Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

EC : European Community 

ECOSOC : Economic and Social Council 

ESDI : European Security and Defense Identity 

FRY : Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

FYROM : Federal Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 

ICFY : International Conference on Yugoslavia 

IMF : International Monetary Fund 

JIAS : Joint Interim Administrative Structure 

KFOR : Kosovo Force 

KLA : Kosovo Liberation Army 

KTC : Kosovo Traditional Council 

KVM : Kosovo Verification Mission 

LDK : Democratic League of Kosovo 

NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

OCSE : Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe 

OHCHR : Office of High Commissions for Human Rights 

OIC : Organization of Islamic Conference 

SNCK&M : Serb National Council of Kosovo and Metohija 

SNCM : Serb National Council of Mitrovica 

SPSG : Special Representative of UN Secretary-General 

UNHCR : United Nations High Commission for Refugees 

UNMIK : United Nations Mission in Kosovo 

WB : World Bank 

WMD : Weapons of Mass Destruction 

WTO : World Trade Organization 



Preface 

Kosovo is a watershed in the World Politics. As an ethnic 
phenomenon, it not only prompted a reexamination of some of the 
central issues of ethnicity but also raised an important question about 
the role of United Nations in international politics. This study, by 
discussing the theoretical issues involved in ethnic phenomena, 
analyse various questions raised by NATO's attack on the former 
Yugoslavia. These questions involved the issues of humanitarian 
intervention, the diminished relevance of the United Nations in the 
sphere of the use of force in world affairs, changed peace-keeping 
role of the United Nations in intra-state conflicts, the United States' 
role as a sole super power conflicts and its impact on the United 
Nations system. Due to these central questions Kosovo would 
always remain important in world politics. Even after 9/11 attack on 
world Trade Centre the following issues would also linked with 
Kosovo such as, 

1 . What happens if states behave as gangsters toward their own 
people and use sovereignty as a license to kill? 

2. Should such states forfeit their sovereign rights or be 
recognized as legitimate members of international society? 

3. What responsibilities does international community have to 
enforce humanitarian laws on non-compliant states? 

As a tyro in the field of research, it was difficult for me to deal 
with such complex issues of international importance. But my deep 
interest in ethnic phenomenon took the shape of this work with 
generous support of various people in the Department of Political 
Science, Punjabi University. A number of people contributed to the 
evolution of my ideas during my stay in the department. My guide 
Prof. Manju Verma gave me an important vision through which I 
finally came to understand the complex theoretical aspects of 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis vii 



ethnicity in the world politics. Other faculty members of department 
Prof. Narinder Kumar Dogra, Prof. Inderjit Singh Sethi, Prof. S.K 
Sharma and Prof. Jagroop Kaur especially gave their deep insights 
on my study. 

My friends Dr. Jatinder Singh, Dr. Subhash Kumar and my wife 
Dr. Rinka were generous enough to read and criticize various 
chapters and immensely helped me from the very beginning of this 
study. A Sincere thanks also goes to S. Sewak Singh who read the 
entire manuscript and gave invaluable insights and suggestions for 
revision. 

I consider it my duty to make a special mention of Ms. Kusum 
Verma (Principal, Kamla Nehru College for Women, Phagwara) 
and my colleagues in the department of Political Science (K.N. 
College for Women Phagwara) Sh. D.K. Sood, Ms Chander Rekha, 
Dr. Rinka and Dr. Kanwaljit Singh for providing me encouragement 
and guidance to make this work more meaningful. 

I am also thankful to Mr. Pankaj who efficiently typed the 
manuscript. I extend my sincere thanks to "Unistar Publishers" who 
have brought their professionalism and expertise to shape this work 
into a form of book. 



viii Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Introduction 

International relations in the last decade of twentieth century 
underwent several dramatic changes. The cascade of events occurred 
in this decade resulted in a revolutionary restructuring of world 
politics. The countries of the world drew closer in communications, 
ideas and trade. The integration of national economies has produced 
a globalized market and formed interdependent bonds between 
countries and cultures. Likewise, the disintegrative trends shook the 
globe and turned the way it easier operated. The stability imposed by 
the bipolar distribution of power between United States and Soviet 
Union and their respective allies ended. The proliferation of 
conventional and unconventional weapons, global environmental 
deterioration and the resurgence of nationalism and ethnic conflict 
portend a restructuring marked by disorder. The opposing forces of 
integration and disintegration point toward a transformation in world 
politics as extensive as the system-disrupting convulsions following 
World War I and II. The eruption of widespread ethnic conflicts in 
various parts of the world proved the assumptions of world cycle 
theory 1 that the phenomenon of violence is a feature of the end of all 
empires and unions. The demise of USSR and its military alliance 
(Warsaw Pact) had created a powerful wave of global localism which 
breaks over the cliffs of the system. Consequently, various 
independent states have been challenged by constituent tribal, national 
and ethnic entities seeking secession. 2 

'The ethnic nationalism, ethnic conflicts are definitely not new 
phenomenon. Although the communities organized on putative 
common descent, culture and destiny, have coexisted, competed and 
clashed since the dawn of history. Yet what is new today is not the 
existence of competition and conflict among ethnic groups, but their 
global manifestation. 3 It has been estimated that more than ten million 
lives were lost between 1945 and 1975 alone as a result of ethnic 
violence. More than two-third of all armed combat in the world since 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis ix 



1945 has taken the form of civil wars, wars of state against nation, 
war of secession, and major armed uprisings to oust governments. 
Even many of the interstate wars and large armed interventions 
originated as civil disturbances and wars. Most threats to the states 
have been internal not external. The adversaries in these conflicts 
represent many different kinds of identity groups i.e. ethnic, racial, 
religious etc. 

It is confirmed from the types and nature of the armed conflicts 
occurred since 1945 that the 77 percent of the total wars were ethnic 
or internal where armed combat was not against another state but 
against the authorities within the state or between armed communities. 
The SIPRI yearbook of 2000 identifies 27 major armed conflicts in 25 
countries in 1999 and interestingly only two were of inter-state nature 
and rest were intra-state. Ethnic identity remained a strong defining 
characteristic in one half of the major conflicts in 1999. It no doubt 
resulted in unimaginable loss of human life. 4 

The end of cold war witnessed a massive proliferation in the 
number of states. Although historically, the dissolution of countries 
has been primarily a consequence of wars between states, but, during 
the last half of the twentieth century, the governments have more to 
fear from internal conflicts. Groups within states are asserting their 
ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional or national identities and 
questioning the integrity and legitimacy of existing countries which 
lead to abrupt border changes. 5 The ethnic assertions led to the 
unparalleled explosion of number of states from 51 to 194. The 
increase in cultural politics since mid 1970s demonstrates a general 
shift from a modernist polities based on universal progress and 
development within the capitalist order. The cultural politics has taken 
the form of a proliferation of new identities, new social categories and 
often new political groups. The nation has fragmented into its 
component or entirely new ethnicities and even the nation state itself 
become ethnified. The "struggle for recognition" has fast become the 
paradigmatic form of political conflict, demands for "recognition of 
difference" fuel struggles of groups mobilized under the banner of 
nationality, ethnicity, race, etc. In the "post socialist" conflicts, group 
identity supplants class interests as the chief medium of political 
mobilization. Cultural domination supplants exploitation as the 
fundamental injustice. And cultural recognition displaces 

x Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



socioeconomic redistribution as the remedy for injustice and the goal 
of political struggle. The new identities have been of the following 
types : Ethnic, Nationalist, Religious/Fundamentalist and indigenous. 
With the breakup of the Soviet empire the process of ethnic 
fragmentation has become a process of Balkanization in which armed 
nationalist conflict is dominant. 6 

The challenge of ethnic armed conflict and ethnic political 
mobilization is being equally felt by developed and developing states. 
In the developed states of Europe and North America, the challenge 
of ethnic conflicts has been manifested in form of ethnic revival and 
growing political assertiveness (often ranging in demand from 
regional autonomy to outright independence and sovereign statehood) 
of minority ethnic groups (i.e. the Basques and Catalan in Spain, the 
Bretons and the Corsicans in France, the Walloons and the Flemish 
in Belgium, The Scots, Welsh and Irish in the United Kingdom, and 
the French speaking Quebecois in Canada). Since the disintegration of 
USSR in December 1991, several ethnic conflicts within and between 
the USSR successor states have emerged. 7 The legacy of Western 
Colonisation and decolonisation process was mainly responsible for 
rise of ethnic nationalism and formation of ethnic political movements 
in developing state. The decolonization process handed over political 
power recognizing some ethnic groups at the cost of ignoring existing 
ethnic and cultural divisions and popular political aspirations. Ethnic 
plurality was manageable until the decolonization process was not 
complete. The nationalist movements that existed in these states could 
generate a common political agenda of achieving independence from 
the colonial rule. However this ethnic and cultural plurality during 
colonial era remained on surface. Once the colonial master departed, 
different ethnic groups found little in common to bind them together. 
Consequently, in their post-colonial political history, many of these 
states have had to deal with increased nationalist assertiveness on the 
part of ethnic or subordinate minorities. These groups felt cheated and 
blamed the dominant ethnic and cultural groups as new colonisers and 
responsible for their maltreatment. 8 The developing states in South 
Asia were born with lack of internal cohesion and after the 
independence faced ethnic polarization between majorities and 
minorities, social fragmentation, civil discord, institutional decay and 
regime instability. This made the tasks of political nation-building and 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis xi 



governing rather too difficult. In the past 50 years, every South Asian 
country has experienced intermittent ethnic fragmentation and conflict 
of different scope, magnitude and aim. 

In the post-cold war period, ethno-nationalism has assumed 
prominence because some new countries that constituted on the basis 
of ethnicity raised the expectations of many ethnic groups to be able 
to achieve their cherished goal of establishing a new country on the 
basis of ethnicity. With the termination of east- west ideological battle, 
ethnic politics and conflict is likely to become even more pervasive 
because 90 per cent of the current 190 states in the world are 
ethnically plural in character. Political protest and rebellion by 227 
ethnic minorities, religious sects and ethnonationalist groups has 
become a major impetus to domestic and international political 
change. 9 National politics in most states, old and new, have 
experienced divisive conflicts over the terms of incorporation of these 
groups based on ethnicity. 

The disintegration of Yugoslavia is also the result of the failure 
of Yugoslav state to incorporate various ethnic groups (i.e. Serbian, 
Croatian, Slovenian and Kosovar Albanians) into single political 
community. The Serbian and Albanian sides in Kosovo were divided 
by deep cultural, linguistic and historic differences. The ethno- 
historic hatreds, ethnocide, ethnogenesis and ethno-nationalism 
changed the Kosovo's ethnically fragile society into the process of 
pseudospeciation. This turned the territory of Kosovo into a symbolic 
space which contained memories of both communities history, sacred 
shrines, holy places, battlefields and specific geographical features 
endowed with a highly emotional charge. 10 In 1999, the ethnic 
conflict in Kosovo, reached on highest temperature and exploded in 
the form of attacks and counter-attacks by Albanian Kosovars and 
Serbian forces. Despite various United Nations resolutions, Serbians 
as a dominant ethnic group committed severe atrocities in Kosovo 
which resulted in genocide and ethnic cleansing of Kosovar 
Albanians. 

The spill-over effect of genocide and ethnic cleansing provided a 
basis for intervention by United States, European powers and NATO 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) in Kosovo crisis. NATO's 
seventy eight-day bombing attacks in Yugoslavia (which was not 
authorised by United Nations Security Council) has made Kosovo 

xii Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



crisis a flashpoint whose gravity far exceeds the direct geopolitical 
significance of Kosovo itself. 

NATO's attack on Yugoslavia raised various important issues in 
world politics. It undermines the relevance of United Nations as a sole 
authority which legitimizes the use of force in international affairs. 
Kosovo crisis also highlights the changed role of United Nations in 
intra-state conflicts. NATO justified its intervention in Yugoslavia on 
the basis of humanitarian grounds. The United Nations charter does 
not allow intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of any sovereign 
country. On the other hand Kosovo crisis raised another issue which 
challenged the rules of domestic jurisdiction and political 
independence of nation-state. The United Nations faced an important 
question i.e. should the conscience-shattering mass murders of 
civilian people in Rwanda, Liberia, East Timor, Kosovo and various 
other countries be allowed under the guise of state sovereignty. 

Although, NATO attacks diminished the authority of United 
Nations but the after-war role of United Nations in Kosovo is eloquent 
testimony of continuous importance of world organization in world 
affairs. The United Nations acts as an interim government in Kosovo. 
It showed that United Nations should be a great role in process of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding in war-torn societies. 

Objectives of the Study 

1. To study the problem of ethnicity. 

2. To study the United Nations role in ethnic conflict of Kosovo. 

3. To analyse the impact of the role played by the United States and 
NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis on the working of the 
United Nations system. 

4. To analyse the role of United Nations in Kosovo aftermath of 
Kosovo war. 

Hypotheses 

1. Ethnicity, deep-rooted hatreds, ethnocentrism and ethno- 
nationalism lead Yugoslavian society towards the process of 
pseudospeciation. 

2. Intra-state conflicts based on ethnicity changed the role of United 
Nations in international politics. 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis xiii 



3. The United States role and NATO's intervention in Kosovo 
undermined the position of the United Nations. 

4. The United Nations role in reconstruction of Kosovo after 
NATO's attack given eloquent testimony that the United Nations 
is indispensable for world peace. 

Review of Literature 

Fredrik Barth in his book "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries" , 
described the concept of 'ethnic boundary'. He maintained "ethnic 
identities do not derive from intrinsic features but emerge from and 
are reasserted in encounters, transactions, and opposition between 
groups. He also elaborated that the boundaries are crucibles of ethnic 
identities which are particular aggregates of people establish for 
different purposes". 

Donald G. Baker in his book "Race, Ethnicity and Power" 
analyses the role of power as a determinant of race and ethnic 
relations. His study is focused on tracing the role of group power and 
capabilities which shaped ethnic and race relations by analysing group 
power relations between six countries with common English or Anglo 
cultural heritage. 

Geoff Dench, in his book "Minorities in the Open Society : 
Prisoners of Ambivalence" analyses ethnic and race relations in the 
context of majority-minority relations. He challenged the prevailing 
view that the "equal participation of ethnic minorities will be achieved 
because it is a "public good" from which citizens will benefit." He 
suggests that these views neglect to explore the web of real interests 
behind public affirmations of commitment to integration. In his view, 
the liberal creeds rests on nationalist foundations and the 'progressive 
nations' dedicated to human rights, is a protective guise adopted by 
national majorities in a world which is suspicious of nations. 

H.M. Blalock's books, "Toward a Theory of Minority Relations" 
attempts to present general theoretical propositions based on the 
empirical data in the field of minority-group relations. He focuses 
primarily on competition, status and economic factors that relate to 
discrimination by using power relationships as the integrating 
theoretical framework. The empirical data cited in the book refers to 
the case of the 'Negro' in the United States but the propositions have 
stated in such a way that they may be tested in connection with other 
minority groups. 

xiv Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Kalevi J. Holsti's book, "The State, War and the State of War", 
describes that the strategic doctrines, arms control agreements, and 
the foundations of international organizations such as the United 
Nations are designed to prevent wars between states. But since 1945, 
the incidence of interstate war has actually been declining, while the 
incidence of internal wars has been increasing. This book surveys 
some of the foundations of state legitimacy and demonstrates why 
many weak states are the locales of civil wars. Finally, the author 
analyses the United Nations role in the management of civil wars in 
weak and failed states. 

Anthony D. Smith in his book, "Theories of Nationalism" 
examines critically the principal theories that have been advanced to 
explain the rise of nationalist movements both in the Europe and the 
developing countries. The author creates a new typology of nationalist 
movements which described a definition of nationalism and its 
varieties. The author also described nationalism in the context of 
'reaction to modernization or form of anticolonialism. Finally, he 
produced an original theory of 'ethnic nationalism". 

Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel in their edited book, 
"United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Adhoc Missions, 
Permanent Engagement" , critically examined the peacekeeping role 
of the United Nations during the last decade of twentieth century. The 
authors in this book concluded that an expanded role of the UN did 
not get success in these years because the lack of consensus among its 
most powerful members, clash between the UN Charter's own 
principles on the virtual inviolability of the state borders, the 
underestimation of the complexity and danger of post-Cold War crisis 
situations and overestimation of international community's 
willingness to match broad mandates with necessary resources. 

Miron Rezun in his book, "Europe's Nightmare : The Struggle 
for Kosovo" , examines Serbia's and Kosovo's cultural antecedents in 
the Kosovo and the ambiguities of the Western position both prior to 
and after Russia's slow decline in Europe. This book also presents a 
history of factors those exacerbated nationalist aspirations which led 
to the rise of leader like Milosevic. The author also critically 
examined the deliberately or accidently missed opportunities those 
might have prevented bloodshed and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. 

Peter Wallensteen's book, "Understanding Conflict Resolution : 
Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis XV 



War, Peace and the Global System", provides a comprehensive guide 
to understanding conflict resolution in global world. The first part of 
the book introduced the field of conflict resolution and demonstrates 
various approaches to conflict analysis and resolution. The core of the 
book explores the settlement of three major types of international 
conflict i.e. inter-state, internal and state formation conflict. The final 
part reviews regional and international approaches to peaceful conflict 
resolution i.e. the United Nations, the concerns of major powers in 
the conflict and the role of regional organizations or adhoc structures 
in conflict resolution. 

Alexandras Yannis in his book, "Kosovo Under International 
Administration : An Unfinished Conflict" , review the role of the 
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) in the light of the experience of the first phase of the 
international administration. The first part of the book provides a 
critical analysis of the period during June 1999 to October 2000 that 
culminated in the Municipal Elections of 28 October 2000. The 
second part provides a policy-oriented analysis of the role of 
international administration and the prospects for stability in Kosovo 
after the democratic changes in Belgrade in October 2000. The third 
part contains key and rare documents of the political process in 
Kosovo which provides useful background information about the 
international administration's role in its first phase in Kosovo. 

Monstserrat Guibernau's book, "Nation Without States : Political 
Communities in a Global Age", describes the profound 
transformations which the nation-state is currently undergoing. The 
author examined the elements which are forcing radical changes 
affecting the nation-state system. These elements also contributed to 
the generation of new economic and socio-political environment 
which favours the emergence of new political actors. In this book, the 
author argued that if nation without states are able to instill a strong 
sense of identity among their members and prove economically 
viable, then they would likely be come onto the scene as political 
actors in the twenty-first century. 

Ted Robert Gurr in his article, "Why Minorities Rebel : A Global 
Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945", 
published in International Political Science Review (April, 1993) 
provides highly important information regarding political protest and 

xvi Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



rebellion by communal groups which became a major impetus to 
domestic and international political change. In this study, the author 
used new coded data on 227 communal groups throughout the world 
to assess a general model of how and why these ethnic groups 
mobilize to defend and promote their collective interests. 

Stephen Ray an' s article, "Ethnic Conflict and the United 
Nations", published in Ethnic and Racial Studies (January 1990), 
describes that the United Nations is an organization of states and it 
can be expected to represent the interests of its members. For this 
reason, it has been suggested that the world organization cannot 
respond positively to ethnic conflicts within states or across the 
borders. But the author stated that "because the ethnic conflicts can 
be a threat to international peace and security, the UN cannot always 
remain indifferent." Thus, it has become involved in ethnic conflicts 
in several ways. These ways are, the Genocide Convention, the work 
of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the 
Protection of Minorities, and the issue of the right of National self- 
determination. 

R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong in their paper, "Ethnic 
Mobilization and the Seeds of Warfare : An Evolutionary Model", 
published in International Studies Quarterly (1987) develops the idea 
that a coherent theory of humanity's propensity for warfare can be 
constructed from the evolutionary model of man. It proposes that kin 
selection has interacted with environmental forces over evolutionary 
time to predispose genetically related individuals to band together in 
groups, oriented for conflicts. It also advances a model of inclusive 
fitness with principles of individual cost/benefit analysis. 

Tim Judah in his article, "Kosovo's Road To War", published in 
Survival (Summer 1999) historically analyses the reasons behind the 
eruption of the Kosovo crisis. The author, on the basis of the study of 
historical relations between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, 
proposes that the Kosovo was a catastrophe waiting to happen. 
According to the author, President Milosevic exploited the situation 
for his interests to reach on the top. 

Terry McNeil in his article, "Humanitarian Intervention and 
Peacekeeping in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe", 
published in International Political Science Review (January 1997) 
analyses the attempts of international community to maintain peace and 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis xvii 



provide humanitarian succour in the case of former Yugoslavia and 
former Soviet Union. The author suggested that the very vagueness of 
the concepts of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention creates 
serious ambiguities which can be exploited to cover hegemonic 
ambitions. The article concludes that the international community was 
not ready to face up to its humanitarian responsibilities in this region 
which led to the adverse experience of Yugoslavia. 

Espen Barth in his article, "Peacekeeping Past and Present", 
published in NATO Review (Summer 2001), examines the way in 
which peacekeeping has been evolved since the end of Cold War. The 
author proposes that the actors, practices and concepts related with 
the United Nations peacekeeping have been transformed. The author 
described that due to the rise of intra-state conflicts, the peacekeeping 
become a more complex, comprehensive and dangerous activity. The 
author further analyses that the experience in the Balkans has shown 
the primary task of the Security Council is to assist in the long-term 
and complex political and social transformations of war-shattered 
societies. 

Mats R. Berdal in his article, "Fateful Encounter : The United 
States and UN Peacekeeping", published in Survival (Spring 1994), 
examines the relationship between the United States and the United 
Nations in the light of American policy towards the UN since 
President Clinton assumed office in January 1993. The article 
explored the functioning of the Clinton administration's initial 
idealism about the UN and its modification by the events in Bosnia 
and Somalia. 

Michael Cox's article, "Empire by Denial? Debating US Power", 
published in Security Dialogue (2004) examines that the American 
Empire, inspite of its difficulties in Iraq, still has a very long way to 
go. He suggests that these views do not mean the American power 
would be unchallenged for ever. The author viewed that the new 
imperialists in Washington might have fashioned a dubious set of 
policies. Their strategies have done much to make the United States 
internationally unpopular. Finally, the author suggests that the end of 
the neo-conservative moment does not mean the empire is about to 
crumble. In his view, the Presidents may come and grand strategies 
may go, but the American empire still has a good deal of life left in it. 

Michael Matheson in his article, "United Nations Governance of 
xviii Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Postconflict Societies", published in American Journal of 
International Law (January 2001) critically examines the United 
Nations peacebuilding role in war-torn societies. The author gave 
some suggestions in this article for the governance of postconflict 
societies i.e. firstly, the Security Council might reasonably find that 
a change in the boundaries of a state is necessary to give its 
neighbours better security against a repetition of armed attack. 
Secondly, the Security Council gave a guarantee of autonomy to a 
particular part of state's territory or the region. Thirdly, the Security 
Council nullified permanently the discriminatory restrictions on 
victim group is necessary to bring such a conflict to an end. 

Samuel H. Barnes in his article, "The Contribution of Democracy 
to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies", published in American Journal 
of International Law (2001) suggested "the development of 
democratic set-up in war-torn society can be utilized for managing 
postconflict ethnic and factional violence." In his view, the 
experience of Bosnia and elsewhere described that if the democracy 
can succeed as a cooperative form of government and the power can 
be shared in a mutually constructive arrangement then the democracy 
becomes the political keystone of resolving bitter conflicts. 

Methodology 

The valuable research depends upon the proper and particular 
methodology, which is used for its completion. In this study, 
historical and analytical methods have been used for making the 
problem interpretable by analysing historical facts. Numbers of inter- 
subject theories have been used for examining the historical 
experiences of people to find why they act as ethnic groups. The 
purpose of theory is to catch and specify general tendencies and to 
provide a sensible and an applicable starting-point for discussion of 
any particular situation. For analysis of Kosovo as an ethnic conflict, 
the theoretical approaches provide important tools for analysing 
Yugoslavia's political system, political behaviour and institutions in 
context to Servo- Albanian conflict in Kosovo. The study has based on 
various primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include 
various United Nations resolutions, UNMIK regulations, 
communiques of NATO and agreements between Serbs, Kosovo 
Albanians, NATO and UNMIK authorities in Kosovo. The secondary 
sources include books, journals and periodicals, etc. 

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis xix 



References: 

1 . The insights of long cycle and realist theories predicted pessimistically that 
prevailing trends in the diffusion of any economic and political power 
would lead to renewed competition, conflict and perhaps even warfare 
among the great powers and that range of new problems and potential 
threats get multiplied. As Robert Jervis observed, cyclical thinking 
suggests that, freed from the constraints of Cold War, world politics will 
return to earlier patterns. Many specific causes of conflict also remain, 
including desire for greater prestige, economic rivalries, hostile 
nationalism, divergent animostic and territorial ambitions. See Charles W. 
Kegley, Jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "World Politics; Trend and 
Transformation" (Boston, 1999), PP. 97-98. See also Mircea Malitza, Ten 
Thousand Cultures: A Single Civilization, International Political Science 
Review, vol. 21, Jan 2001, P. 75. 

2. Thomas M. Frank, clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity And Community 
in Law and Practice, American Journal of International Law, vol. 90, 
April 1996, P.360. 

3. Urmila Phadnis and Raj at Ganguly, "Ethnicity and Nation-Building in 
South Asia" (ND: Sage Publications 2001) P. 15. 

4. James G. Kellas, "The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity" (London: 
Mac Millan Press ltd., 1998) P.l. See Also K.J.Holsti, War, Peace and 
The State of the State, International Political Science Review, vol. 16, Oct 
1995, PP. 321-322. See also Taylor B. Seybolt, Major Armed conflicts, 
SiPRi year Book 2000, PP. 15, 48. 

5. Juan Enriquez, Too Many Flags, Foreign Policy no. 16, Fall 1999, 
PP. 30, 31 See also Mark Weber, "States and Statehood" in Brian White, 
et. al, Issues in World Politics (NY: Palgrave, 2001), PP. 25, 26 

6. Nancy Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice 
in a Post Socialist Age" in Cynthia Willet, ed., Theorizing Multiculturalism 
(Massachusetts: Blackwell Pub. Ltd, 1998) P. 19 See Also Jonathan 
Friedman, "Transnationalization, Socio-Political Disorder, and Ethnification 
as expressions of Declining Global Hegemony, " International Political 
Science Review, vol. 19, July 1998, P. 243. 

7. Phadnis and Ganguly, no. 3, PP. 15-16 

8. Ibid, P. 17 

9. Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of 
Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945," International Political 
Science Review, vol. 14, April 1993, P 161. 

10. Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (ND: 
Sage Publication, 1991), P. 19. 



XX Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Chapter 1 



Problem of Ethnicity : Theoretical Framework 

PART-I : ETHNICITY : MEANING, NATURE 
AND EVOLUTION 



The end of cold war dramatically transformed the world 
politics. The acknowledgement of the importance of ethnic 
nationalism in world affairs reduced the relevance of unitary state. 
The explosion of ethnic conflicts ushered the post-cold war world 
into an era of ethnic pandemonium. The United States President 
George Bush lamenting and describing the specter of new kinds of 
global instability commented "The collapse of communism has 
thrown open a pandora's box of ancient ethnic hatreds, resentment, 
even revenge." 1 

Ethnicity, a sense of ethnic identity is the subjective, symbolic 
or emblematic use by a group of people.... of any aspect of culture, 
in order to differentiate themselves from other groups. 2 Cultural 
construct and situational construct are its two important conceptions. 
Ethnicity, as a cultural construct signifies a composite of symbolic 
markers, real or putative, used by the members of an ethnic group 
who define themselves and are defined by others as having a 
distinctive identity. These characteristics may include combination 
of cultural attributes such as language, religion and values and 
territorial attributes like region or locality or biological attributes 
like descent and kinship. Ethnicity, as a situational construct 
signifies the emergence of ethnic consciousness from a situation of 
multi-ethnic competitiveness, serving as an effective mode of 
mobilization. 3 Ethnicity, a phenomenon associated with contact 
between cultural-linguistic communal groups within societies linked 
directly or indirectly to forms of affiliation and identification, built 
around ties of real or putative kinship. It is also characterised by 
cultural prejudice and social discrimination. These characteristics 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 



lead to the feeling of pride in-group's, common consciousness, 
identity and exclusiveness of not only the group but group members 
as well. 

Ethnicity, being a complex phenomenon, like other social 
phenomenon, is subject to change and keeps on altering its form, 
place and role in society. It is normally closely associated with 
political, juridical, religious and other social views and forms of 
interaction, which constitute important ingredients of the ethnic 
phenomenon. Hence, ethnicity sometimes finds expression in 
political domination, economic exploitation and psychological 
oppression. The nature, intensity and forms of expression of 
ethnicity are determined by the size and location of the various 
linguistic cultural groups in the society, the strength and cohesion of 
their leadership, the courage, determination and nature of the 
underprivileged classes. It further includes the degree of foreign 
influences on the society, the nature, persuasiveness and power of 
the dominant ideology, the prevailing social customs, tradition and 
culture of the various linguistic groups and the form of government 
of society. Historical relations between different cultural groups, the 
level of development of the groups, the socio-economic context in 
which the groups make contact, and the place of group migration to 
the place of contact also play an important role. 4 The intensity of 
ethnicity depend on the existence and combination of the above 
mentioned factors. 

Ethnicity is found in both developed and underdeveloped 
countries, in societies with different ideologies and historical- 
cultural backgrounds. The positive aspect of ethnicity serves as an 
adaptive mechanism to enable the individual to adjust successfully to 
the increasing alienation of mass societies resulted by divisive 
competition in market oriented society. Thus, ethnicity binds 
individuals together, gives them internal cohesion and promotes 
their sense of identity. 5 Ethnicity involves an appreciation of one's 
own social roots in a community and cultural group without 
disparaging others. It helps in providing a material as well as an 
emotional support network for individuals in society. This function 
is particularly important as the societies become more complex, 
massified, bureaucratized and alienating. Ethnicity fosters a sense of 

2 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



belonging as part of an intermediate level of social relations between 
individual and society. 

The negative aspect of ethnicity makes it problematic for social 
harmony in multi-ethnic societies. It embodies passionate, symbolic 
and apprehensive aspects which promotes violent conflicts. The 
genocide in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Croatia and 
Kosovo underline a unique and ugly character of ethnicity. Thus, 
ethnicity causes adverse effects on the peace, harmony and 
integration of national societies. These negative effects are reflected 
in the political instability which has plagued a number of multi- 
ethnic societies around the world. The dramatic effect of this 
political instability resulted in the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the disintegration of Somali state, 
the protracted bloodletting in Lebanon, continued bloodshed in 
Palestine and endemic political tensions in countries, such as 
Northern Ireland, Uganda, Spain, Cameron, Congo, India, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Canada, Nigeria and Belgium etc. 

EVOLUTION OF IDENTITY POLITICS 

It is becoming clear that ethnicity emerges as a result of 
pervasive anxiety associated with rapid changes and structural 
transformations. The forcible transformation and the oppressive 
homogenization of cultures result in the emergence of a pervasive 
sense of losing control of one's affairs even in the case of most 
powerful actors. In reaction to the threat thus posed, ethnicity 
emerges and intensified as individuals embrace primary identities 
such as ethnic and gets cultural identity. The conditions for the 
establishment and maintenance of cultural and ethnic identity are 
closely tied to the way in which personal identity is constituted. 
Certain kinds of identity are marked on or carried by the human 
body. Some kinds of identity are internal to the person and others 
are external and marked in the forms of social practice or symbols 
employed by a population. Cultural identity is the generic concept, 
referring to the attribution of set of qualities of a given people. It 
can be said that cultural identity carried by the individual in the 
blood is commonly known as ethnicity. It is not practiced but 
inherent, not achieved but ascribed. In the strong sense this is 
expressed in the concept of race or biological decent. In a weaker 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 3 



sense it is expressed as a heritage or a cultural decent, learned by 
each and every individual precisely at the level of individual 
behaviour. 6 This phenomenon is described by the variations on the 
cultural identity. 

Cultural Identity 



Race 



Western 

(modern) 

ethnicity 



Traditional 
ethnicity 



Life style 



The level of individual behaviour is the most general western 
notion of ethnicity. The weakest form of such attribution is referred 
to in terms of 'life style' or way of life, which may or may not have 
a basis in traditional ethnicity. 7 

Traditional ethnicity is different from modern ethnicity. In 
traditional context, ethnic diversity 8 was ubiquitous and rarely 
became a focus for ethno-political movements. The traditional multi- 
ethnic societies have been the rule rather than the exception in 
history because the history of the world has been the history of 
empires and segmentary states. Such social organizations however 
were multi-ethnic but were also 'ethnic hierarchies.' This aspect of 
such societies is the secret of their relative ethnic peace. Under 
traditional hierarchic forms of governance, everyone even the 
sovereign was subject and the subjects different among themselves 
in their sense of fealty. They counted on nature and supernatural 
forces for their welfare and survival. Citizenship, if existed was a 
privilege rather than a right and it scarcely provided the basis for 
legitimizing the exercise of sovereignty by a state. 9 They neither 
expected to be treated as equals nor did they count on government 
for their survival. 

The process of traditional ethnicity and modern ethnicity is 
also defined by "world system development theory", which 
describes that the world system has gone through three major 
interlocking phases of development. Table 1.1 provides a schematic 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



view of these three phases with respect to the changing structures of 
state and economy as well as their associated ideological and identity 
configurations. 10 





Agrarian imperialism 
500 BC to AD 1648 


Industrial 
imperialism 


Informatic imperialism 


State 


Multinational 
empires + city 
states + tribes 


National 
empires + colonies 


Superstates + national 
states + transnational regimes 
(IMF,IBRD,WTO) 


Economy 


Tribalism + Feudalism + 
commercial capitalism 


Fordist industrial 
national capitalism 


Post-fordist informatic 
transnational capitalism 


Ideology 


Imperialism + religious 
or ethno-nationalism 


Pan-nationalism + 
liberalism 


globalism + resistance : 
regionalism, nationalism, 
localism. 


Identity 


Imperial + local 


National-Imperial + 
national-liberation 


Global + resistance : 
pluralizing sites of identity. 



Table 1.1 : World System Development 

Source : Majid Tehranian, International Political Science Review (July 1998), 294. 

However, with the emergence of modern state system the 
ethnicity assumed a new phenomenon and taking the varied and 
overlapping forms of ethnic nationalism, 11 civic ethnicity 12 and 
ethnic plurality. 13 These three forms of ethnicity are affected by the 
three entwined strands of modernity i.e. industrialization, 
democracy and nationalism. 

The sense of nationalism arises when a philosophical myth 
called "popular sovereignty" replaces the supernatural monarchic 
authority of state. The concept of popular sovereignty makes the link 
of state and nation a crucial factor because it is not possible to 
legitimize the claim of ruling themselves by any set of humans living 
with in an arbitrary set of boundaries. This seems to be a major 
reason for a nation (a kind of mythical and even sacred entity) to 
attaining the basis of legitimacy. Therefore, modern ethnicity rests 
on the foundation that members of every ethnic or cultural 
community need to be identified with a nation for assuring the status 
and rights of citizenship for themselves. When at any given time 
ethnic or cultural communities cannot accept or support the state 
under whose jurisdiction they happen to live, they became alienated 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



and hunt for better options. 14 This process fosters the "identity 
politics in modern states." 

The concept of identity politics challenges the state's character, 
its role and very existence. It is argued that democracy assumes a 
demos when its foundations are based less on justice and pragmatic 
considerations (though both are necessary) and more on various 
contingent historical and geographic factors such as a common 
language, traditions and territory. The emerging national identity 
from the value based foundations provides the members of a political 
community 15 with a sense of responsibility, and shared public 
culture through which appropriate collective decisions of public 
interest can be made in a proper manner. 16 A political community 
requires a sense of common belonging (a widely shared feeling 
among its citizens that they all are the members of a single 
community) to form a more or less cohesive "we" and share a 
collective identity. They are bound together by a common 
commitment to its integrity, well being and the consequent ties of 
sentiments and mutual obligations. 17 

Such political identity or feeling is not a matter of pre-existing 
fact or a priori principle but it is related to human practices and the 
ways certain groups of people have come to relate to each other. 
Though encouraging a sense of inclusion among its members such 
political identities naturally exclude others and can do so in ways 
that are either sources of injustice. It also diminishes the allegiance 
felt by other groups, e.g. workers, ethnic, religious and national 
minorities. They have all been treated either outside the political 
community or inferior members of it. In response, they seek to alter 
it in various ways, redefining the forms of identification, prevalent 
both in polity and regime. At the polity level, they seek to broaden 
the definition of the 'subjects' and 'spheres' it covers. And at the 
regime level the 'styles' and 'scope' of politics can be influenced. 
For example when national minorities seek recognition as 'subjects' 
of distinctive 'sphere' (either a separate polity or a sub-polity), they 
start demanding and suggesting the ways to change the then regime 
(such as new political 'styles' like enhanced or asymmetrical 
federation or the public use of minority languages and the extension 
of the 'scope' to include cultural rights). 18 Each of these demands 

6 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



involve the introduction of greater polity and regime diversity in 
order to incorporate more complex identities. 

Two schools of thought carefully analyse ethnic identity i.e. 
Primordialist and constructivist. Primordialist school describes 
ethnic identity as a biologically 'given' or 'natural' phenomenon. 
Ethnic groups, according to this school constitute the kinship 
network into which human individuals are born and become 
members of. It also refers to both seeing oneself and being seen by 
others as part of group on the basis of presumed ancestry and 
sharing a common destiny on the basis of common features i.e. 
racial (colour), religious, linguistic, occupational, regional etc. 19 
Along with objective cultural markers, some primordialists also 
stress the psychological aspect of self and group related feelings of 
identity distinctiveness and its recognition by others as crucial 
determinants of ethnic identity selection and persistence. Ethnic 
identity from primordialist perspective, therefore, is a subjectively 
held sense of shared identity based on objective cultural or regional 
criteria. Anthony Smith gave six bases or foundations of ethnic 
identity i.e. 

distinct group name in order to be recognised as a distinct community 
by both group members and outsiders, a shared belief by group 
members in the myth of common ancestry and decent, the presence of 
historical memories among group members (as interpreted and diffused 
over generations), a shared culture (including dress, food, music, 
crafts and architecture, laws, customs and institutions, religion and 
language), an attachment with specific territory or homeland, and a 
sense of common solidarity. 20 

The Constructivist School, on the other hand categorically 
rejects the primordialist perspective that ethnic identity is a 
biologically natural phenomenon. Constructivists contend that ethnic 
or national identity is socially constructed, and is the product of 
processes which are embedded in human actions and choices, rather 
than biologically given ideas whose meaning gets dictated by nature. 
Max Weber, one of the earlier influential writers, stresses the social 
construction of ethnic identity and ethnic group, viewed ethnic 
groups as "human groups" whose belief in a common ancestry, in 
spite of its largely fictitious origins, is so strong that it leads to the 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 7 



creation of a community. Weber thus regards ethnic groups based 
more on a set of beliefs (about ancestry), not any objective features 
of group membership such as shared language, religion, and 
especially biological traits associated with everyday understanding 
of race. 21 He further argues that unlike kinship groups, ethnic 
membership per se does not necessarily result in ethnic group 
formation but only provides the resources that may under the right 
circumstances, be mobilized into a group by appropriate political 
action. 22 The third major strand in recent thinking about ethnicity is 
referred as Instrumentalism. It describes that the ethnicity is not just 
a sentimental association (i.e. Primordialism) but a framework for 
rational and goal-oriented mobilization of group consciousness. It 
regards ethnic communities as the natural organs for articulating 
protest and resistance. Paul Brass also rejects the notion that ethnic 
identity is a 'natural' or 'given' phenomenon and argues that 
ethnicity should be viewed as the social and political creation of 
elites. They draw upon, distort and sometimes fabricate materials 
from the cultures of the groups which they wish to represent in order 
to protect their well being or existence or to gain political and 
economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves. 23 

The most contentious issue between the Primordialists and the 
Constructivists concerns the role of culture in the formation of ethnic 
identity. For the Primordialists, culture is usually conceived to be 
more integrally connected with the process and being of ethnic 
identity, although they recognise that some behaviours and emblems 
may change independently of basic identity. Fredrik Barth argued 
that the culture-bearing aspect, the classification of persons and local 
groups as members of an ethnic group must depend on their 
exhibiting traits of culture. Difference between groups become 
difference in traits. 24 Social constructivists however, have taken this 
particular viewpoint to an extreme form, where culture is relegated 
to a very secondary position in ethnic scheme of things, as a series 
of symbols that justify the existence of particular ethnic groups. 

Some cultural markers can even be manipulated to rationalize 
the identity and organization of the ethnic group. Taj f el's "Social 
Identity Theory" defines that "one's social identity is that part of an 

8 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his 
membership in a social group (or groups), together with the value 
and emotional significance attached to that membership." 25 Further, 
social identity theory postulates that people strive for a positively 
valued social identity by comparing themselves to members of other 
groups and they attempt to categorize and differentiate themselves 
from these others in a positive direction. Tajfel describes two aspects 
of categorization i.e. criterial attributes that split the population into 
discrete categories with definite boundaries and correlated attributes 
that are continuous qualities varying across individuals within a 
category e.g. an individual may form categories (Christian/Muslim/ 
Hindu) and then assign varying degrees of a quality (Smart, lazy and 
so on) to all members of the category. 25a Both category and quality 
measures need to be taken in order to fully understand an 
individual's ethnic or group identity. 

EVOLUTIONARY PHENOMENON OF ETHNIC GROUPS 

The term 'ethnic group' is generally used to designate a 
population which is largely biologically self-perpetuating, shares 
fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural 
forms, makes up a field of communication and interaction. It has a 
membership which identifies itself and is identified by others, as 
constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of same 
order. Thus, ethnic group is a distinct category of the population in 
a larger society whose culture is usually different from others. The 
members of such a group feel themselves or are thought to be bound 
together by common ties of race, nationality and culture. The 
existence of distinct ethnic and cultural groups within societies is 
widespread and ancient. It occurs at most levels of culture, ranging 
from the "Bushmen of the Kalahari", who live within the framework 
of Tswana society, to modern Europe, America and Asia. 26 

Evolutionary model of man proposes that "kin selection" has 
interacted with environmental forces since evolutionary time to 
predispose genetically related individuals to bind together in groups, 
oriented for conflict. Kinship dictates organizational structure of 
extended families to the extent that it prescribes who marries whom 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



(incest avoidance), who cares for whom, who is entitled to inherit 
from whom and who governs (males in patrilineal societies). Thus, 
group members happen to be those who interact enough to transmit 
culture to one another. But evolutionary model of man prescribes 
that the fundamental commonality of interest among kin is to 
maximize "inclusive fitness". 27 The theories of "kin selection" and 
"inclusive fitness", most obviously appropriate to animal behaviour 
can be brought to bear on human behaviour too. "Inclusive Fitness" 
is theory in genetics first propounded by W.D. Hamilton in 1964. It 
has been summarised that genes will spread if their carriers act to 
increase not only their own fitness or reproductive success but also 
that of other individuals carrying the same genes. A person's 
inclusive fitness is his or her personal fitness plus the increased 
fitness of relatives that he or she has in some way caused by his or 
her actions. 28 

The principle of "kin selection" submits that related individuals 
are not only maximize their own individual or "classic fitness" 29 but 
also predisposes to maximise the "inclusive fitness" of those who 
share in their common gene pool. Moreover, it implies that all 
individuals will be subject to care who are sufficiently genetically 
related to give the common gene pool greater survival advantage. 
Genetic relatedness would thus be greatest with members of one's 
own lineage and one's own kin or "ethnic" group. It would be less 
between members of neighbouring groups, less again between 
members of groups even further removed from each other, and so 
on. Kin selection theory and its pivotal axiom of inclusive fitness 
have marked a turning point in evolutionary theory. Most 
importantly, it provides a biological basis for the evolution of 
altruism, reciprocity and sociality among kin. Furthermore, as the 
degree of genetic relationship declines in the scheme of things, so 
would the advantages of any kind of altruistic or socially cooperative 
action between individuals too decline. Thus, zero cooperation or 
blatant aggression could be expected toward strangers. This 
phenomenon is schematized through Fig. 1.1. 



10 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 




Effectiveness of kin selection 



Generalised Balanced 
reciprocity reciprocity Ne ? a , 




ive 



reciprocity 



Fig. 1.1 : Altruism and Genetic Relatedness. Information in the left 
quadrant suggests how kin selection and evolutionary principals accord 
with reciprocity. "Generalized reciprocity" involves mostly one-way flows 
of benefits because it is largely nepotism. "Negative reciprocity" involves 
one-way flows because it consists of one time interactions accompanied by 
a great deal of social change. "Balanced Reciprocity" tends to occur 
between distant relatives or non-relatives who are likely to interact 
repeatedly, and therefore involves balanced flows of benefits. 

Source : R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, International Studies Quarterly (1987), p. 7. 

The inclusive fitness differs from traditional notions of "survival 
of the fittest" in two respects. First, natural selection favours the 
ability of individual to transmit their genes to posterity (rather than 
their fitness in terms of health, power, beauty or other physical 
traits). Second, an organism's inclusive fitness can be furthered by 
assisting others who are genetically related (nepotism). In other 
terms, the evolutionary model of man predicts that sexual 
organisms, such as humans, have evolved not only to be egoistic but 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



11 



to be fundamentally nepotistically altruistic. In doing so, it provides 
an ultimate raison d'etre for membership in ethnic groups. "Nucleas 
ethnicity" 30 probably reinforced inclusive fitness to benefits group 
members and promotes in-group amity and out-group enmity. A 
characteristic of nucleus ethnic group is that they serve as 
organizational vehicle in which individuals can monitor and if 
necessary protect the fitness of related members which subsequently 
bears on their own inclusive fitness. The more cohesive the group, 
the more each member is in a position to effectively assess his/her 
inclusive fitness. In this respect, inclusive fitness would have 
predisposed genetically related individuals to band together in 
groups. 

In early hominid evolution, it is likely that membership in an 
expanded group would have increased each individual's access to 
scarce resources and ability to manage others e.g. Hunting in 
numbers would have helped primitive man to overcome large game. 
Numbers would also have reduced the susceptibility of individuals to 
attack by predators. To facilitate hunting and to prevent attack, 
groups would almost certainly have served as information centers 
concerning the nature and location of resources as well as predators. 
The more of these features of group membership enhance the 
inclusive fitness (the rate of reproduction, quality of offspring, 
survival), the more group members would have been deterred from 
splintering off. But, turning to more recent periods of human 
evolution, the main function of kin-related groups and their 
significance for their individual members shifted from protection 
against predatory effects of non-humans to protection against other 
human groups. The necessary and sufficient forces that explain the 
every kind and size of human groups throughout the earliest portions 
of human history were, first, war or intergroup competition, and 
aggression and second, the maintenance of balance of power 
between such groups called "balance of power hypothesis". 31 The 
failure to maintain a balance of power (initially in terms of numbers 
only), would inevitably mean the domination of one group by a 
larger group and consequently, unequal access to fitness enhancing 
resources. From this perspective, large scale agriculture and an 
increasingly elaborate division of labour follow as concomitant 
developments. The underlying momentum of such developments is 

12 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



"group selection" (to maintain balance of power) which, in turn is a 
consequence of "genetic selection". Thus "group selection", on the 
other hand, would appear to relate more directly to ethnicity and 
nationalism, if ethnic groups and nations are the groups involved. 32 

But the evolution of weapons had made unrelated individuals far 
more dangerous to one another and that this in turn reduces 
intergroup transfer of individuals and made nucleus ethnic groups 
more closed. Weapons would have altered the costs and benefits of 
aggressive behavoiur as they could be developed faster than 
physiological protection against them. Thus, weapons would have 
lowered the cost of attacking while increasing the cost of being 
attacked. In doing this they probably increase xenophobia, fear and 
antagonism toward strangers. This would reduce intergroup transfer 
of individuals, where fighting was necessary initiation because the 
cost of injury would be so much higher and one group might have 
better or unknown weapons than others. 33 Thus, weapon 
development severely restricted individuals form changing groups. 
This resulted in two beneficial effects from the point of inclusive 
fitness. First, because of the increased tendency of males to remain 
in their natal group, the genetic relatedness among the adult males 
and in the whole group would increase. This would have increased 
solidarity among group members and thus cohesion of the group per 
se. It would also work to reduce within group aggression and thus 
genetic loss or death from fighting. However, contrary to this 
hypothesis, the Scots and English closely genetically related fought 
bitter wars. The nature of their hostility was political, thus the threat 
to personal and groups (national) security remained unexplained by 
the genetic differences. Political disputes and struggle for power 
were successful in cutting across genetic distinctions. 

Secondly, the emerging high costs of overt aggression changed 
the character of the dominance system. The dominant individuals 
could no longer afford to be injured in rank order fighting. They 
would combine to produce a more effective internal ordering of 
power relations to the extent that groups could be more quickly 
mobilized to meet the challenges from outsiders. In the process, 
intergroup conflict would select for greatly increased human 
capacity to recognize enemies versus relatives and friends. 34 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 13 



STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF POWER CONTESTS 
BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS 

Thus, the evolutionary model draws on population genetics, 
behavioural ecology and theories of reproductive strategy to explain 
group formation. On the other hand, the structuralist analysis includes 
political and social structures as system of power significantly shape 
the character of group relations. Under structural analysis, race and 
ethnic relations are types of group power contests. Groups be they 
racial, ethnic, class-religious, constantly compete for control of 
resources, power and privileges in society. Demographic, situational 
and cultural bases of group relations and the role of power as 
determinant of these relations are analysed through three major 
aspects of group awareness and identity (i.e. the character, the genesis 
of group identity and the situational bases of group identity). Firstly, 
the ethnic groups are seen as a form of social organization. 35 The 
more complex a society, the greater the number and possible 
combination of attributes which help to identify individuals. An 
individual gets identified by himself and others by various attributes 
or markers such as racial, ethnic, class, tribal, communal, corporate, 
nationalist or religious etc. The individuals and groups define 
themselves and by others in terms of real or imagined characteristics 
which are physical characteristics such as colour or physical features 
defined as somatic, biological or genetic. The cultural factors such as 
language, religious values, political beliefs and modes of behaviour 
such as class or income also form the identity of individual and group. 
The above mentioned factors play a role to the extent that individuals 
use these identities to categorize themselves and others for purpose of 
interaction. They also become significant determinants of individual 
and group perceptions and behaviour. 

Secondly, group consciousness or identity occurs when a group 
recognizes itself as possessing unique attributes that distinguishes it 
from others. The awareness may be, self-induced, emerge 
consciously as a consequence of the group's treatment by others or 
when a group is defined analytically e.g. by designation of class. 
Group consciousness assumes dangerous proportion when groups 
compete not only for scarce resources, power or other desired 
goods, but also when they perceive their valued attributes (e.g. 

14 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



culture, religion, language, identity) threatened by the actions of 
others, be that threat real or imagined. 36 Ethnic awareness is 
described as the awareness with an ethnic background while ethnic 
consciousness is a stronger identification with the ethnic group. This 
difference can be defined by Mckay and Le win's fourfold typology. 



Ethnic Identification and Structuration 


Ethnic Structuration 




Ethnic Category 


Ethnic Group 




(Low) 


(High) 


Ethnic 


(i) Minimal Cell 


(ii) Moderate Cell 


Awareness 






(Low) 














(iii) Marginal Cell 


(iv) Maximum Cell 


Ethnic 






Consciousness 




(High) 







Fig. 1.2 : McKay and Lewin's Typology. 

Source : Phylis Martinelli, Ethnic and Racial Studies (1986), p. 198. 

In this typology, the first cell label as minimal ethnicity includes 
an ethnic category of people with low ethnic awareness. They have 
few or no ethnic contacts and close to being or are assimilated. The 
second cell, moderate ethnicity includes individuals whose ethnic 
identity is not strong enough to be considered ethnic consciousness. 
They use their ethnic contacts for instrumental or exploitative 
reasons and have no strong feeling of personal attachment to the 
group. The third cell, marginal ethnicity implies individuals with 
strong ethnic consciousness but geographically isolated from 
members of their group. Such individuals may have an abstract pride 
in their ethnic culture while rejecting contact with fellow ethnics. 
The fourth cell labeled maximum ethnicity contains people who are 
involved in the pursuit of political and economic interests or 
ideological differences. They strongly differentiate them from other 
ethnic groups. 37 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



15 



Thirdly, not all group contact or encounters result in 
competition or conflict, some groups live together harmoniously. 
However, when resources or valued goods are scarce and groups 
compete for them, group differentiation usually results. Competition 
exacerbates the attributes by which groups differentiate 'we' from 
'they' and generally impute positive values or attributes to 
themselves and negative ones to the opposing group. Greater the 
perceived threat of the other group, greater the probability that this 
process of polarization would occur. A dominant group, whether 
threatened or not by the subordinate group(s), may impute negative 
qualities to the latter. This is often simply a rationalization for 
domination and exploitation, but elsewhere it might derive from 
historical encounters where groups competed for power or situations 
where the dominant group fears a subordinate group may threaten its 
power in the future. If the genesis of group identity is viewed from 
this perspective, it indicates that group consciousness is basically a 
psychological phenomenon. 

...It is obvious that group identity is situationally based, 
psychologically determined and the result of specific events or 
situations where groups become mobilized when their identity or 
interests are threatened and this prompt new or ongoing power 
contests. There is three specific type of situations that precipitate group 
awareness and consciousness. First is a group power contests, where 
threats to group interests or identity awaken or heighten group 
consciousness. Second is development situations, where 
industrialization, urbanization and related forces alter circumstances, 
create changes in the relative power capabilities of groups and by doing 
so generate new group power contests. Third, crisis is prompted by 
wars, depressions or major cultural changes which generate fears and 
prod groups into preserving or seeking changes in their position or 
status. Group power contest occur, where groups compete for power 
and scarce resources and respond defensively because they believe 
their identity or culture is threatened. 38 

Developmental factor play a crucial role in altering group power 
capabilities, thereby influencing the character of group contests. 
Among the major development factors are industrialization, 
urbanization and secularization of society and culture. 39 Under the 
influence of these factors, the groups can choose the following 
strategies for participation in wider social systems. 

1 6 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



First, they may attempt to incorporate in the pre-established industrial 
society or cultural group. Second, they may accept a 'minority' status. 
Third, they may choose to emphasize ethnic identity, using it to 
develop new positions and patterns to organize activities in those 
sectors formerly not found in their society. 40 

If the cultural innovators are successful in the first strategy, their 
ethnic group will probably remain as culturally conservative, low- 
articulating ethnic group with low rank in the larger social system. 
A general acceptance of the second strategy will prevent the 
emergence of a clearly dichotomizing polyethnic organization, and 
(in view of the diversity of industrial society and consequent 
variation and multiplicity of fields of articulation) probably lead to 
an eventual assimilation of the minority. The third strategy generates 
many of the interesting movements that can be observed presently, 
from nativism to new state. It is in these terms, French, Canadian 
and African nationalism and more poignantly the Iranian revolution 
can be explained. 

Demographic factors also influence group relations and 
consciousness. The most striking examples of this occurred where 
sharp differentials between settlers and indigenous groups shaped 
group perceptions, e.g. white settlers in North American (USA, 
Canada) and pacific (Australia, New Zealand) fragments early 
outnumbered indigenous groups which latter only briefly constituted 
a threat to settlers and white power. In the African fragments (South 
Africa, Rhodesia) Whites remained a small minority of total 
population vastly outnumbered by indigenous groups. Whites held 
tightly to power and manipulated the political system to prevent 
Africans from gaining power. Thus, Africans remained in 
subordinate positions. The result of blacks' reaction in both 
countries was the victory of national parties. In Yugoslavia (Now 
Serbia and Montenegro), the demographic or population factor 
significantly influenced the group relations. In the Kosovo conflict, 
the main reason of Serbian fear was based on increased population 
of Albanian Muslims in province. In two million total population of 
Kosovo, Serbian Minority reduced increasingly and reached mere 
200,000 of total population. 41 

Where the uneven development (e.g. of industrialization) took 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 17 



place, one group believes its unique attributes (e.g. religion, race, 
ethnicity) are the cause of its unequal treatment. It will seek to 
mobilize its members to break out of that subordinate position. This 
process called "Relative Deprivation" 42 precipitate various groups in 
South Asia (e.g. Tamils, Sikhs, Bodos Gurkhas etc.) and in various 
parts of Africa and North America (Quebecs in Canada) and Europe 
(Flanders, Catalans, Albanian Muslims etc.). Economic crisis 
precipitated by depressions or economic deprivation may prompt the 
emergence of separatist movements, particularly when 
disadvantaged groups (e.g. Welsh, Scots, Bretons etc.) believe that 
the dominant group is discriminating against them. 43 Similar fears 
for the cultural identity can affect a dominant group. The countries 
of Western Europe try to sort out the problem of migration through 
multi-culturalism can face another alarming problem. The massive 
influx of refugees from Eastern European ex-communist countries 
would place a heavy burden on European Union countries. 44 

Power is another primary determinant of group relations. 
Racial and ethnic groups whether in dominant, subordinate or equal 
positions mobilize their group resources and strive for control over 
the major political, economic and social structures of society. Most 
of the policy decisions including the allocation or reallocation of 
power, privilege and resources are determined within these 
structures. Group power contests occur within these structures, 
when the group prohibited from pursuing its goals. It may resort to 
other means (e.g. riots, rebellion, revolution, or warfare) and to 
controlling the structures and institutions by and through which 
society allocate power, privilege and resources becomes its ultimate 
goals. 45 

In group power contest, two types of policy decisions are made 
i.e. structural decisions and cultural policy decisions. Structural 
decisions determine the degree of access of a given group to its 
resources and power. Within structures, cultural policy decisions fall 
between two poles i.e. policy that leads toward the elimination of 
group cultures and loyalties through imposition of more embracing 
'national' culture. Other is a policy of multi-culturalism wherein 
society accepts the legitimacy of cultural diversity and give right to 
their own cultural beliefs and practices. The power factor in 

1 8 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



comparative analysis of ethnic and race relations can be applied 
through three types, 

...first, the analysis of race and ethnic relations as types of power 
contests and the outcome of each contest dependent upon such factors 
as group resources, capabilities and differential rates of group power. 
Second, the analysis of specific types of dominance systems, be they 
racial or ethnic. Third, the analysis of racial and ethnic dominance 
system from a historical and comparative perspective. 46 

In the first type, the determinants of group power contests are 
the role of group resources, resource mobilization capabilities and 
the strategies of actors. The division of society into broad strata 
which form a hierarchy of prestige, wealth and power, is a feature 
common to most societies. 47 The differential group power is a basic 
determinant of this stratification system. The group power includes 
its total numbers, physical and financial assets, social organisation, 
culture, belief system, education and skills. Other less tangible, but 
nevertheless significant resources include a group's prestige, 
authority and any natural or supernatural resources, ability to bear 
arms, voting rights, rights achieved by formal education, 
membership in various organisations. 

The mobilizational capabilities of any group is a multiplicative 
function of the strength of its goals and perceived probability of 
achieving these goals. 48 One group may possess superior resources, 
but lack ineffective leadership, group cohesion or difficulty in 
coping with stress situations cannot effectively mobilize its resources 
against other group that possesses fewer resources but superior 
mobilization capabilities. Two other significant variables are 
"additive resources" and "the strategies" employed by a given 
group. An example of an additive resource is the intrusion or 
incorporation of third party on the side of either A or B, and this will 
significantly alter the outcome of their power contest. The situation 
of the Russian Minorities in the former Soviet Union is the most 
salient illustration of this triangular relationship. 49 Strategies too, are 
important in group power contests. Contesting groups basing their 
evaluation of situations adopt strategies they believe will strengthen 
their power capabilities and neutralize or weaken their opponents. 

Whatever the power relationship (Symmetrical where both 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 19 



groups are equal, asymmetrical where one is dominant), each group 
may initiate or respond to the acts or anticipated acts of others. In 
asymmetrical relations, a subordinate group pursues options that 
range from opposition (extending from war or rebellion to more 
subtle forms of resistance or subversion) to compliance (extending 
from withdrawal or grudging acquiescence to "emanation"). 
Emanation is a situation where the group discards its own identity 
and culture for that of the dominant group. The whole process of 
emanation occurs through the reproduction of national culture by 
dominant group across the state's territory through range of state 
institutions. These institutions can effectively enforce the rules and 
norms of national culture and shape the identity of the citizens. 
These institutional structures include education system, language 
regimes, legal systems, cultural institutions and welfare regimes. 
The highly centralized incorporation of these institutions into the 
structures of state create the conditions for consolidation of national 
culture. 50 The low level of institutional incorporation lead to the 
emergence of sub-state nationalism and loosen centralised control of 
state. 

In this type of situation the dominant group control structures 
and enable it to destroy, restrict or preclude subordinate group's 
acquisition of resources and mobilization capabilities. But a 
subordinate group is not totally devoid of resources of mobilization 
capabilities. 

Subordinate groups possess two types of possible power resources, 
pressure and competitive resources, both of which are important for 
opposing domination. Pressure resources refers to a group's ability to 
employ such disruptive tactics as strikes, boycotts, violence, even 
warfare for forcing changes on dominant group. Subordinates may also 
possess competitive resources, including skills i.e. appraisal of the 
situation and the resources and mobilization capabilities available to 
itself and its adversary. 51 

The subordinate group may opt for strategies those will break 
the prevailing pattern of dominance. The dominant group will in turn 
respond. 

The second approach to analyse the group relations focuses on 
specific types of dominance systems such as military and coercive 

20 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



dominance, structural dominance, psychosocial dominance. Settler- 
indigenous conflicts persisted for prolonged periods marked by 
wars, rebellions and uprisings, analysed through the military and 
coercive dominance factor of group relations. Settlers efforts during 
and following these conflicts aimed at the systematic destruction or 
curtailment of indigenous power resources, be they political, 
economic or social. Once dominance was achieved, white groups 
employed numerous techniques of coercive, structural and 
psychosocial means for control on indigenous groups. Defeated 
groups were deprived of their weapons, their leaders or potential 
leaders were removed or imprisoned (imprisonment of Nelson 
Mandela and Kurd Leaders by South Africa and Turkey are 
examples of this technique). Their economic and political systems 
were destroyed by dispossessing the people of their land or by 
isolating them on reserves where close military surveillance 
curtailed organizational efforts and possible uprisings (China used 
this technique on Tibetians). 52 

Social structures can also be used for preserving the dominance 
through the modes of cultural integration and the social relations of 
the groups. The impact of dominance on subordinate group's social 
organization and education including socialization process helps in 
perpetuating dominance. Every group embraces "a cultural norm 
image" (CNI) i.e. belief system based on what it consider acceptable 
or unacceptable in terms of values, beliefs, behaviour norms and 
physical or somatic characteristics. Likewise, each group embraces 
a Somatic Norm Image (SNI) i.e. a set of beliefs of what it consider 
acceptable or repugnant physical or racial features. Where one 
group is dominant, it can determine cultural policy for the society 
and its cultural/somatic norm images are thereby important. Cultural 
policy falls somewhere between two poles of mono-culturalism or 
multi-culturalism. 53 With mono-culturism the dominant group seeks 
to eliminate subordinate group cultures and loyalties through the 
imposition of national culture which is normally of the dominant 
culture. The process is also called "ethnocide". 54 

The dominant group used education system and social 
organizations for dominance. Education system is used for 
indoctrination i.e. to create inferiority complex in subordinate 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 21 



group. For dominance on social organizations of society, the 
dominant group 'buy of or co-opt subordinate group leaders to 
maintain status quo. Alternatively, the co-opted ethnic leaders may 
function as agents to pressure ethnic minorities to tone down their 
particular demands. 55 But, the desire to cling to power may 
transform a politician who is a member of an ethnic minority from 
an opponent to a proponent of ethnic cultural or political claims. 

Although Stalin as Georgian and Tito as Croat, respectively promoted 
their Russian and Yugoslavian nationalism, but a number of communist 
politicians, having failed to stamp out ethno-nationalism (a task for 
which they had recruited originally), transformed themselves into 
ethno-national spokesmen when the "transethnic" communist system 
collapsed. 56 

The dominant group, elsewhere, will isolate a subordinate 
group, then negotiate with the latter 's leaders used as device for 
maintaining control by indirect means. 

There are three categories of psychosocial dominance i.e. 
compliance, dependency and thought control. In terms of 
'compliance', the dominant group uses its coercive/reward powers 
in the form of 'carrot and stick' methods to gain obedience from the 
subordinate group. Psychologically, the subordinate group responds 
in terms of pleasure/pain principle. Its perceptual field and the 
meaning it attaches to dominant group actions construed in terms of 
deprivations, denial, punishment and relief, opportunities and the 
absence of pain and deprivation. The pleasure/pain principle serves 
as significant determinant of subordinate group behaviour. The 
subordinate group's isolation from and vulnerability to a 
surrounding entity with superior numbers and resources is conducive 
to psychologically paranoid reactions. A great proportion in power 
capabilities provides a good breeding ground for hatred and 
distrust. 57 

The second category dependency has three distinct types. The 
first is structural type in which dominant group deprives the 
subordinate group's resources (e.g. land, food, job) and the latter 
must rely on the dominant group for its survival and this leaves it 
psychologically vulnerable to the dominant group's use of 
coercive/reward powers. Second, the subordinate group says in 

22 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



effect to dominant group "we cannot cope, we are confused and 
uncertain and rely upon you to tell us what to do." Within this type, 
three subtype are evident i.e. expertise, symbiotic and authoritarian. 
Under first, the subordinate group defers to the dominant group 
because the latter is seen as having an expertise the former does not 
possess. Symbiotic subtype based on a group's inferiority feelings as 
a behaviour of dependency. The third subtype is the authoritarian 
submissive form in which the subordinate group says, "we do not 
know what to do, we are incapable, we need a leader and please 
lead us." 58 

The third category of 'dependency' includes two subtypes. 
These psychological states develop because of a group's almost total 
inability in coping with situations, be due to the result of conquest 
or other factors. First is psychosocial disorganization and its 
characteristics including within groups/individuals high level of 
alienation, mental illness, alcoholism, drug addiction and other types 
of family disorganization. All of these usually result from when 
individuals and groups experience in coping with high stress 
situations. Second subtype, 'anomie' 59 has even greater 
disintegrative effects, sometime resulting in psychological or 
physical suicide. Unable to cope with uncertainty and stress, 
individuals commit suicide. This then result in a rapid decline in the 
group's population. 

The third major category of psychosocial dominance is 'thought 
control' and is referred to as cultural imperialism, de-culturation, 
brain- washing and emanation, based on principle that 'the culture 
and identity of the subordinate group must be destroyed and be 
replaced by that of the dominant group.' This imposition results 
from two factors, dominant group efforts to impose these changes 
and more importantly subordinate group accept new identity. De- 
culturation is followed by the implanting of new culture, the 
subordinate group sheds his own identity and adopts the given 
identity. It can also be termed as emanation and 'cultural 
imposition'. This thesis can well be applied on the colonized people, 
as they were readily colonized because they had a dependency need, 
which was fulfilled by the colonizers. The colonial masters 
destroyed the language and culture of the subordinate and instilled in 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 23 



the latter an inferiority complex. The result of this process was three 
fold, the denial of subordinate's separate identity, the inculcation 
within the subordinate that his own culture and identity is inferior 
and the acceptance by the subordinate of the identity of the 
dominant. 60 

The wide theoretical analysis of ethnicity clearly shows that it is 
not a new phenomenon. It has developed from traditional societies 
to modern societies through various processes. It is a composite of 
symbolic cultural markers used for organization of ethnic group and 
rationalization of its identity. In modern states, ethnicity becomes 
the basis for the power contests between the ethnic groups. The 
power contests between dominate and subordinate groups creates 
conflict between them. The last decade of twentieth century 
manifests the conscience-shattering ethnic violence in many states. 
Millions of people died and become refugees as a result of this 
violence. The second part of chapter is related with the theoretical 
analysis of transformation of ethnic conflict into a bloody ethnic 
violence in various states. 



24 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



PART-II : 
ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE 

The ethnic conflicts spread and intensified the process of 
disintegration in various countries in the last decade of twentieth 
century. The Russian foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev 
apprehending the coming era of global anarchy warned the United 
Nations in September 1993 "the threat of ethnic violence today is no 
less serious than the threat of nuclear war was yesterday." The 
United States President Bill Clinton also observed in his June 7, 
1994 speech before the French National Assembly, 

the Militant ethnic nationalism is on the rise, transforming the healthy 
pride of nations, tribes, religious and ethnic groups into cancerous 
prejudice, eating away all states and leaving their people addicted to 
the political painkillers of violence and demagoguery. 61 

The contemporary conflict between ethnic groups has been 
primarily restricted to sub-national groups within the state that has 
not achieved the status of 'nation' and the 'majority group' 
organized under a state. The rise of 'nations without states' bring a 
radical transformation in the functioning of nation-state. 62 The 
nation-state become a bordered power-container of the modern era 
characterised by an unprecedented relationships between power and 
territory. The state exercise power over its entire territorial extent 
and every single individual that lives or transit, regardless of actual 
citizenship. The very concept sovereignty is based on this preclusive 
relationship. The sovereignty, territoriality and the rise of modern 
nation-state are all intrinsically related to the establishment of 
boundaries and stressed the emergence of 'territorial trap' in 
international relations. 63 A stress on uniforming and homogenisation 
in the state boundaries is the root cause of the rise of ethnic violence 
in various countries. At present out of 191 states in the international 
system, roughly 90 percent (about 160) are ethnically heterogeneous 
in the sense that minorities constitute more than five percent of total 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 25 



population. In other words, the overwhelming majority of states in 
the world today are multi-national or multi-ethnic i.e. incorporating 
two or more ethnic nations or groups. Additionally, many ethnic 
groups (e.g. Kurds) extend beyond boundaries of single state. As the 
Kurds demonstrate, transnational ethnic groups, by preventing a fit 
between the nation and the state, can be a source of international 
conflict. 

ETHNIC GROUPS AS THE SOURCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 

For the analysis of international conflict, it is necessary to 
analyse the variety of groups in multi-ethnic societies. Five kinds of 
groups are arranged through three dimensions i.e. mobility, 
voluntariness of contact, and performance. Fig. 1.3 illustrates the 
interaction of these five groups in multiethnic society. 



Mobility 
Sedentary 



Migrant 



Voluntary 



Involuntary 




Immigrants 

(Relatively/ 

Permanent) 

Sojourners 

(Temporary) 




Fig. 1.3 : Kinds of groups in plural societies as defined by mobility, 
voluntariness and performance. 

Source : John W. Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology : Research and Applications, p. 294. 

Some groups change their location with some degree of 
performance when they come in contact (e.g. immigrants and 
refugees) while sojourners usually do so on a temporary basis. 
Others stay in their own place and have contacts with native and 
indigenous people. The established ethnic groups usually have 
contact with others in their daily lives. The second dimension 
distinguishes ethnic groups, immigrants and sojourners from those 
groups who usually have not in voluntary contact with native people 



26 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



and refugees. 64 The ways in which these groups wishes to dominate 
society have been termed "acculturation strategies". These strategies 
are the result of an interaction between groups on the basis of cultural 
change and intergroup relations. In the 'cultural change' the central 
issue is the degree to which one group wishes to remain culturally as 
one (e.g. in terms of identity, language, way of life) or opposed to 
become part of larger society. 65 This process is resulted in the four 
varieties of acculturation. Fig. 1.4 is described this process. 

Issue I 





Is it considered to be maintain 
cultural identity and characteristics? 

"Yes" "No" 


Issue II 












Is it considered to be of "yes" 
value to maintain relationship 
with other groups? "no" 




Integration Assimilation 
Separation Marginalization 



Fig. 1.4 : Four varieties of acculturation, based upon orientations to two 
basic issues. 

Source : John W. Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology : Research and Applications, p. 278. 

First variety or strategy i.e. 'assimilation' occurs when an 
acculturating individual does not wish to maintain culture and 
identity and seeks daily interaction with the dominant society. In 
contrast, when there is a value placed on holding onto one's original 
culture and a wish to avoid interaction with others, then the 
'separation' or dissociative alternative is defined. The integration 
occurs where the individual interested to maintain his original 
culture and at the same time inclined in his daily interactions and 
relations with others. In this process, some degree of cultural 
integrity is maintained while moving to participate as an integral part 
of the larger social network. Finally, marginalization takes place 
when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance 
(often for reason of enforced cultural loss) and little possibility or 
interest in relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



27 



place, one group believes its unique attributes (e.g. religion, race, 
ethnicity) are the cause of its unequal treatment. It will seek to 
mobilize its members to break out of that subordinate position. This 
process called "Relative Deprivation" 42 precipitate various groups in 
South Asia (e.g. Tamils, Sikhs, Bodos Gurkhas etc.) and in various 
parts of Africa and North America (Quebecs in Canada) and Europe 
(Flanders, Catalans, Albanian Muslims etc.). Economic crisis 
precipitated by depressions or economic deprivation may prompt the 
emergence of separatist movements, particularly when 
disadvantaged groups (e.g. Welsh, Scots, Bretons etc.) believe that 
the dominant group is discriminating against them. 43 Similar fears 
for the cultural identity can affect a dominant group. The countries 
of Western Europe try to sort out the problem of migration through 
multi-culturalism can face another alarming problem. The massive 
influx of refugees from Eastern European ex-communist countries 
would place a heavy burden on European Union countries. 44 

Power is another primary determinant of group relations. 
Racial and ethnic groups whether in dominant, subordinate or equal 
positions mobilize their group resources and strive for control over 
the major political, economic and social structures of society. Most 
of the policy decisions including the allocation or reallocation of 
power, privilege and resources are determined within these 
structures. Group power contests occur within these structures, 
when the group prohibited from pursuing its goals. It may resort to 
other means (e.g. riots, rebellion, revolution, or warfare) and to 
controlling the structures and institutions by and through which 
society allocate power, privilege and resources becomes its ultimate 
goals. 45 

In group power contest, two types of policy decisions are made 
i.e. structural decisions and cultural policy decisions. Structural 
decisions determine the degree of access of a given group to its 
resources and power. Within structures, cultural policy decisions fall 
between two poles i.e. policy that leads toward the elimination of 
group cultures and loyalties through imposition of more embracing 
'national' culture. Other is a policy of multi-culturalism wherein 
society accepts the legitimacy of cultural diversity and give right to 
their own cultural beliefs and practices. The power factor in 

1 8 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



comparative analysis of ethnic and race relations can be applied 
through three types, 

...first, the analysis of race and ethnic relations as types of power 
contests and the outcome of each contest dependent upon such factors 
as group resources, capabilities and differential rates of group power. 
Second, the analysis of specific types of dominance systems, be they 
racial or ethnic. Third, the analysis of racial and ethnic dominance 
system from a historical and comparative perspective. 46 

In the first type, the determinants of group power contests are 
the role of group resources, resource mobilization capabilities and 
the strategies of actors. The division of society into broad strata 
which form a hierarchy of prestige, wealth and power, is a feature 
common to most societies. 47 The differential group power is a basic 
determinant of this stratification system. The group power includes 
its total numbers, physical and financial assets, social organisation, 
culture, belief system, education and skills. Other less tangible, but 
nevertheless significant resources include a group's prestige, 
authority and any natural or supernatural resources, ability to bear 
arms, voting rights, rights achieved by formal education, 
membership in various organisations. 

The mobilizational capabilities of any group is a multiplicative 
function of the strength of its goals and perceived probability of 
achieving these goals. 48 One group may possess superior resources, 
but lack ineffective leadership, group cohesion or difficulty in 
coping with stress situations cannot effectively mobilize its resources 
against other group that possesses fewer resources but superior 
mobilization capabilities. Two other significant variables are 
"additive resources" and "the strategies" employed by a given 
group. An example of an additive resource is the intrusion or 
incorporation of third party on the side of either A or B, and this will 
significantly alter the outcome of their power contest. The situation 
of the Russian Minorities in the former Soviet Union is the most 
salient illustration of this triangular relationship. 49 Strategies too, are 
important in group power contests. Contesting groups basing their 
evaluation of situations adopt strategies they believe will strengthen 
their power capabilities and neutralize or weaken their opponents. 

Whatever the power relationship (Symmetrical where both 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 19 



groups are equal, asymmetrical where one is dominant), each group 
may initiate or respond to the acts or anticipated acts of others. In 
asymmetrical relations, a subordinate group pursues options that 
range from opposition (extending from war or rebellion to more 
subtle forms of resistance or subversion) to compliance (extending 
from withdrawal or grudging acquiescence to "emanation"). 
Emanation is a situation where the group discards its own identity 
and culture for that of the dominant group. The whole process of 
emanation occurs through the reproduction of national culture by 
dominant group across the state's territory through range of state 
institutions. These institutions can effectively enforce the rules and 
norms of national culture and shape the identity of the citizens. 
These institutional structures include education system, language 
regimes, legal systems, cultural institutions and welfare regimes. 
The highly centralized incorporation of these institutions into the 
structures of state create the conditions for consolidation of national 
culture. 50 The low level of institutional incorporation lead to the 
emergence of sub-state nationalism and loosen centralised control of 
state. 

In this type of situation the dominant group control structures 
and enable it to destroy, restrict or preclude subordinate group's 
acquisition of resources and mobilization capabilities. But a 
subordinate group is not totally devoid of resources of mobilization 
capabilities. 

Subordinate groups possess two types of possible power resources, 
pressure and competitive resources, both of which are important for 
opposing domination. Pressure resources refers to a group's ability to 
employ such disruptive tactics as strikes, boycotts, violence, even 
warfare for forcing changes on dominant group. Subordinates may also 
possess competitive resources, including skills i.e. appraisal of the 
situation and the resources and mobilization capabilities available to 
itself and its adversary. 51 

The subordinate group may opt for strategies those will break 
the prevailing pattern of dominance. The dominant group will in turn 
respond. 

The second approach to analyse the group relations focuses on 
specific types of dominance systems such as military and coercive 

20 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



dominance, structural dominance, psychosocial dominance. Settler- 
indigenous conflicts persisted for prolonged periods marked by 
wars, rebellions and uprisings, analysed through the military and 
coercive dominance factor of group relations. Settlers efforts during 
and following these conflicts aimed at the systematic destruction or 
curtailment of indigenous power resources, be they political, 
economic or social. Once dominance was achieved, white groups 
employed numerous techniques of coercive, structural and 
psychosocial means for control on indigenous groups. Defeated 
groups were deprived of their weapons, their leaders or potential 
leaders were removed or imprisoned (imprisonment of Nelson 
Mandela and Kurd Leaders by South Africa and Turkey are 
examples of this technique). Their economic and political systems 
were destroyed by dispossessing the people of their land or by 
isolating them on reserves where close military surveillance 
curtailed organizational efforts and possible uprisings (China used 
this technique on Tibetians). 52 

Social structures can also be used for preserving the dominance 
through the modes of cultural integration and the social relations of 
the groups. The impact of dominance on subordinate group's social 
organization and education including socialization process helps in 
perpetuating dominance. Every group embraces "a cultural norm 
image" (CNI) i.e. belief system based on what it consider acceptable 
or unacceptable in terms of values, beliefs, behaviour norms and 
physical or somatic characteristics. Likewise, each group embraces 
a Somatic Norm Image (SNI) i.e. a set of beliefs of what it consider 
acceptable or repugnant physical or racial features. Where one 
group is dominant, it can determine cultural policy for the society 
and its cultural/somatic norm images are thereby important. Cultural 
policy falls somewhere between two poles of mono-culturalism or 
multi-culturalism. 53 With mono-culturism the dominant group seeks 
to eliminate subordinate group cultures and loyalties through the 
imposition of national culture which is normally of the dominant 
culture. The process is also called "ethnocide". 54 

The dominant group used education system and social 
organizations for dominance. Education system is used for 
indoctrination i.e. to create inferiority complex in subordinate 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 21 



group. For dominance on social organizations of society, the 
dominant group 'buy of or co-opt subordinate group leaders to 
maintain status quo. Alternatively, the co-opted ethnic leaders may 
function as agents to pressure ethnic minorities to tone down their 
particular demands. 55 But, the desire to cling to power may 
transform a politician who is a member of an ethnic minority from 
an opponent to a proponent of ethnic cultural or political claims. 

Although Stalin as Georgian and Tito as Croat, respectively promoted 
their Russian and Yugoslavian nationalism, but a number of communist 
politicians, having failed to stamp out ethno-nationalism (a task for 
which they had recruited originally), transformed themselves into 
ethno-national spokesmen when the "transethnic" communist system 
collapsed. 56 

The dominant group, elsewhere, will isolate a subordinate 
group, then negotiate with the latter 's leaders used as device for 
maintaining control by indirect means. 

There are three categories of psychosocial dominance i.e. 
compliance, dependency and thought control. In terms of 
'compliance', the dominant group uses its coercive/reward powers 
in the form of 'carrot and stick' methods to gain obedience from the 
subordinate group. Psychologically, the subordinate group responds 
in terms of pleasure/pain principle. Its perceptual field and the 
meaning it attaches to dominant group actions construed in terms of 
deprivations, denial, punishment and relief, opportunities and the 
absence of pain and deprivation. The pleasure/pain principle serves 
as significant determinant of subordinate group behaviour. The 
subordinate group's isolation from and vulnerability to a 
surrounding entity with superior numbers and resources is conducive 
to psychologically paranoid reactions. A great proportion in power 
capabilities provides a good breeding ground for hatred and 
distrust. 57 

The second category dependency has three distinct types. The 
first is structural type in which dominant group deprives the 
subordinate group's resources (e.g. land, food, job) and the latter 
must rely on the dominant group for its survival and this leaves it 
psychologically vulnerable to the dominant group's use of 
coercive/reward powers. Second, the subordinate group says in 

22 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



effect to dominant group "we cannot cope, we are confused and 
uncertain and rely upon you to tell us what to do." Within this type, 
three subtype are evident i.e. expertise, symbiotic and authoritarian. 
Under first, the subordinate group defers to the dominant group 
because the latter is seen as having an expertise the former does not 
possess. Symbiotic subtype based on a group's inferiority feelings as 
a behaviour of dependency. The third subtype is the authoritarian 
submissive form in which the subordinate group says, "we do not 
know what to do, we are incapable, we need a leader and please 
lead us." 58 

The third category of 'dependency' includes two subtypes. 
These psychological states develop because of a group's almost total 
inability in coping with situations, be due to the result of conquest 
or other factors. First is psychosocial disorganization and its 
characteristics including within groups/individuals high level of 
alienation, mental illness, alcoholism, drug addiction and other types 
of family disorganization. All of these usually result from when 
individuals and groups experience in coping with high stress 
situations. Second subtype, 'anomie' 59 has even greater 
disintegrative effects, sometime resulting in psychological or 
physical suicide. Unable to cope with uncertainty and stress, 
individuals commit suicide. This then result in a rapid decline in the 
group's population. 

The third major category of psychosocial dominance is 'thought 
control' and is referred to as cultural imperialism, de-culturation, 
brain- washing and emanation, based on principle that 'the culture 
and identity of the subordinate group must be destroyed and be 
replaced by that of the dominant group.' This imposition results 
from two factors, dominant group efforts to impose these changes 
and more importantly subordinate group accept new identity. De- 
culturation is followed by the implanting of new culture, the 
subordinate group sheds his own identity and adopts the given 
identity. It can also be termed as emanation and 'cultural 
imposition'. This thesis can well be applied on the colonized people, 
as they were readily colonized because they had a dependency need, 
which was fulfilled by the colonizers. The colonial masters 
destroyed the language and culture of the subordinate and instilled in 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 23 



the latter an inferiority complex. The result of this process was three 
fold, the denial of subordinate's separate identity, the inculcation 
within the subordinate that his own culture and identity is inferior 
and the acceptance by the subordinate of the identity of the 
dominant. 60 

The wide theoretical analysis of ethnicity clearly shows that it is 
not a new phenomenon. It has developed from traditional societies 
to modern societies through various processes. It is a composite of 
symbolic cultural markers used for organization of ethnic group and 
rationalization of its identity. In modern states, ethnicity becomes 
the basis for the power contests between the ethnic groups. The 
power contests between dominate and subordinate groups creates 
conflict between them. The last decade of twentieth century 
manifests the conscience-shattering ethnic violence in many states. 
Millions of people died and become refugees as a result of this 
violence. The second part of chapter is related with the theoretical 
analysis of transformation of ethnic conflict into a bloody ethnic 
violence in various states. 



24 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



PART-II : 
ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE 

The ethnic conflicts spread and intensified the process of 
disintegration in various countries in the last decade of twentieth 
century. The Russian foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev 
apprehending the coming era of global anarchy warned the United 
Nations in September 1993 "the threat of ethnic violence today is no 
less serious than the threat of nuclear war was yesterday." The 
United States President Bill Clinton also observed in his June 7, 
1994 speech before the French National Assembly, 

the Militant ethnic nationalism is on the rise, transforming the healthy 
pride of nations, tribes, religious and ethnic groups into cancerous 
prejudice, eating away all states and leaving their people addicted to 
the political painkillers of violence and demagoguery. 61 

The contemporary conflict between ethnic groups has been 
primarily restricted to sub-national groups within the state that has 
not achieved the status of 'nation' and the 'majority group' 
organized under a state. The rise of 'nations without states' bring a 
radical transformation in the functioning of nation-state. 62 The 
nation-state become a bordered power-container of the modern era 
characterised by an unprecedented relationships between power and 
territory. The state exercise power over its entire territorial extent 
and every single individual that lives or transit, regardless of actual 
citizenship. The very concept sovereignty is based on this preclusive 
relationship. The sovereignty, territoriality and the rise of modern 
nation-state are all intrinsically related to the establishment of 
boundaries and stressed the emergence of 'territorial trap' in 
international relations. 63 A stress on uniforming and homogenisation 
in the state boundaries is the root cause of the rise of ethnic violence 
in various countries. At present out of 191 states in the international 
system, roughly 90 percent (about 160) are ethnically heterogeneous 
in the sense that minorities constitute more than five percent of total 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 25 



population. In other words, the overwhelming majority of states in 
the world today are multi-national or multi-ethnic i.e. incorporating 
two or more ethnic nations or groups. Additionally, many ethnic 
groups (e.g. Kurds) extend beyond boundaries of single state. As the 
Kurds demonstrate, transnational ethnic groups, by preventing a fit 
between the nation and the state, can be a source of international 
conflict. 

ETHNIC GROUPS AS THE SOURCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 

For the analysis of international conflict, it is necessary to 
analyse the variety of groups in multi-ethnic societies. Five kinds of 
groups are arranged through three dimensions i.e. mobility, 
voluntariness of contact, and performance. Fig. 1.3 illustrates the 
interaction of these five groups in multiethnic society. 



Mobility 
Sedentary 



Migrant 



Voluntary 



Involuntary 




Immigrants 

(Relatively/ 

Permanent) 

Sojourners 

(Temporary) 




Fig. 1.3 : Kinds of groups in plural societies as defined by mobility, 
voluntariness and performance. 

Source : John W. Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology : Research and Applications, p. 294. 

Some groups change their location with some degree of 
performance when they come in contact (e.g. immigrants and 
refugees) while sojourners usually do so on a temporary basis. 
Others stay in their own place and have contacts with native and 
indigenous people. The established ethnic groups usually have 
contact with others in their daily lives. The second dimension 
distinguishes ethnic groups, immigrants and sojourners from those 
groups who usually have not in voluntary contact with native people 



26 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



and refugees. 64 The ways in which these groups wishes to dominate 
society have been termed "acculturation strategies". These strategies 
are the result of an interaction between groups on the basis of cultural 
change and intergroup relations. In the 'cultural change' the central 
issue is the degree to which one group wishes to remain culturally as 
one (e.g. in terms of identity, language, way of life) or opposed to 
become part of larger society. 65 This process is resulted in the four 
varieties of acculturation. Fig. 1.4 is described this process. 

Issue I 





Is it considered to be maintain 
cultural identity and characteristics? 

"Yes" "No" 


Issue II 












Is it considered to be of "yes" 
value to maintain relationship 
with other groups? "no" 




Integration Assimilation 
Separation Marginalization 



Fig. 1.4 : Four varieties of acculturation, based upon orientations to two 
basic issues. 

Source : John W. Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology : Research and Applications, p. 278. 

First variety or strategy i.e. 'assimilation' occurs when an 
acculturating individual does not wish to maintain culture and 
identity and seeks daily interaction with the dominant society. In 
contrast, when there is a value placed on holding onto one's original 
culture and a wish to avoid interaction with others, then the 
'separation' or dissociative alternative is defined. The integration 
occurs where the individual interested to maintain his original 
culture and at the same time inclined in his daily interactions and 
relations with others. In this process, some degree of cultural 
integrity is maintained while moving to participate as an integral part 
of the larger social network. Finally, marginalization takes place 
when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance 
(often for reason of enforced cultural loss) and little possibility or 
interest in relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



27 



discrimination). The term 'integration' is distinct from the term 
'assimilation' because the cultural maintenance is sought in former 
case while there is no interest in such continuity in the latter. The 
policies and practices of dominant society can place important 
constraints on the choices made by acculturating groups. There may 
also be 'flux' over time in which different strategies are employed 
e.g. one may begin with a preference for assimilation, switch to 
separation and finally settle on integration. 66 

However, the policies adopted by a multinational state are 
always at least partly determined by the interests of ethnic groups. 
"Realistic group conflict theory" proposes that the discrimination 
between groups are often based on conflicts of interests between 
groups or based on real competition for scarce goods. The most 
relevant premises of this theory are, 

1. It has been proposed that intergroup threat and conflict 
increase as the perceived competition for resources increase 
between groups. 

2. It has been suggested that greater the intergroup threat and 
conflict, the more hostility is expressed towards the source 
of the threat. 

3. It has been proposed that when competition over resources 
is present, proximity and contact increase intergroup 
hostility rather than decreasing it. It is important to note 
that the basic premise of this theory does not require that 
actual competition over resources exist. Rather, it is 
perception of competition that leads to conflict and 
intergroup hostility. It is also important to note that group 
conflict is assumed to occur at the group level rather than 
at the individual level. It means that the group's interests 
are at stake and being protected, rather than solely the 
interests of individual members of the group. 67 

The political efforts of every ethnic group to obtain 
preferential treatment for itself tends to threaten the interests of other 
groups who would be eligible for preferential treatment in 
multinational states The former attempt to maximize their gains, the 
latter to minimize their loses. The ethnic conflicts thereby 
engendered may be peaceful, as in well functioning democracies 

28 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



where groups lobby in legislatures for particular favours or may be 
violent in countries in which governments functions poorly or have 
been captured by one ethnic group and used to exploit other e.g. 
Yugoslavia, South Africa. 68 

Realistic group conflict theory can be contrasted with 'social 
identity theory' which proposes that conflict occurs when positive 
group identity and self-esteem are at stake, rather than resources 
such as money and power. The 'scapegoat' theory of prejudice 
suggests that, although threats to tangible resources may cause 
hostility, but this hostility is redirected to a safe-to-target, weak 
outgroup, rather than necessarily to the source of the threat. 69 

An instrumental model of realistic group conflict suggests that 
the combination of resource stress and salience of a potentially 
competitive outgroup leads to perceived group competition for 
resources. The term resource stress refers to any perception of 
access to resources limited for certain groups within a society. The 
resources involved may include economic resources such as money, 
power, jobs etc. As Fig. 1.5 indicate that several factors may 
determine the degree of perceived resource stress. 



Resource Stress 

• Scarcity 

• Unequal distribution 

• Desire for unequal 
distribution 



Relevant outgroup 

• salience and 
distinctiveness 

• likelihood of 
taking resources 



Group competition 

• Zero-sum beliefs 

• anxiety, fear 



Attempts to removed 
competition 

• decrease competitiveness 
of outgroup. 

• increase competitiveness of 
ingroup 

avoidance 



Fig. 1.5 : An instrumental model of group conflict. 

Source : Victoria M. Esses et al., Journal of Social Issues (1998), p. 703. 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



29 



1. The scarcity of resources, whether real or perceived, will 
increase the chances that group will perceive that access to 
resources is limited. 

2. Due to the unequal distribution of resources among groups in 
society will likely lead to the perception that at least for some 
groups, access to these resources is limited e.g. lower status 
group will feel that they now have limited access to resources 
and higher status group may perceive that if hierarchy changes, 
they could move down the ladder and no longer have access to 
the resources they now possess. 

3. The desire for unequal distribution of resources among groups, 
which is an individual difference variable, will be related to the 
perception that there is not enough to go around. Individuals 
who desire a hierarchical structure in society believe that limited 
resources are most worth and greatest value. 70 

In all three cases what is crucial is the perception that resources 
are under stress and potentially not available to all groups in 
sufficient quantities. Resource stress may precipitate competition for 
resources among groups. Some out-groups that are salient and 
distinct from one's own group are more likely to stand out as 
potential competitors. Salience and distinctiveness may be 
determined by factors, i.e. large or increasing size of the group and 
novel appearance and behaviour. The potential competition between 
similar or dissimilar out-groups depends on the dimension in 
question. The groups similar to in-group are likely to be completing 
for dimension relevant to obtain resources e.g. skills. On the other 
hand, the distinct groups from in-group are more likely to be seen 
as competitors if the dimensions in question are ethnicity or national 
origin. Thus, the perceived competition with particular outgroup 
may be function of similarity and dissimilarity of different 
dimensions in question as well as interaction between them. 71 In 
addition, groups who are very skilled in the domain in question, who 
have external support for obtaining resources are more likely to be 
seen as potential competitors because of their enhanced ability to 
take resources. 

The perceived group competition has both cognitive and 



30 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



affective underpinnings. The cognitions associated with group 
competition involve zero-sum beliefs, that more the other group 
obtains, the less is available for one's own group. The emotions 
accompanying these beliefs may include anxiety and fear. The 
model suggests three strategies which remove the sources of 
competition. First, a group may attempt to decrease the other 
group's competitiveness, second, to increase the competitiveness of 
one's own group. Finally, competition with other group is to 
reduced with the avoidance by decreasing approximity (a group 
may deny immigration) or may replace itself to a different 
location. 72 

ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND REFERENCE STATES 

The most modern ethnic conflicts (e.g. between ex-Soviet 
States) can be understood by model of ethnic relations in the 
presence of reference state. It features a strategic interaction 
between a 'minority' (m), a 'majority' (M) and the reference state 
of minority (R). The chronological structure of model is that the 
minority moves first. It decides either to fight (F) in an attempt to 
get certain thing it values e.g. secession or certain rights or to 
acquiesce (A) and than enter the new state run by the majority. If 
the minority decides to fight, the reference state must decide 
whether to intervene in the war (i) or not (Ni). If the minority 
decide to acquiesce, the game goes to a second period, in which 
the majority makes a proposal about a policy packet (x) that is 
relevant for the minority which can consist of such things as 
individual rights (e.g. citizenship status) and collective rights (e.g. 
education in the language of the minority). This packet is 
summarized as a point in the interval (0,1). The minority prefers 
(x) to be as high as possible while the majority will try to set it as 
low as possible. Not all components of such a policy packet will 
have this zero-sum character, but many will make any packet 
contested. 73 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 3 1 



m A My\ x m 






WARREF 



NO WAR 



WARREF, 



WAR, 



WARREF, 



WAR, 



Fig. 1.6 : A Model of Ethnic Relations in the Presence of a Reference State. 

Source : Pieter Van Houten, Archives European Journal of Sociology (1998), p. 116. 

In principle, the value that the minority and majority attach to 
the proposed packet can depend on historical memories and 
anticipation of future actions by the other group. After the proposal, 
the minority group decides again whether to fight or acquiesce. 
When it decides to fight, the reference state faces the same decision 
as in the first period (I or NI). The game is not necessarily over, if 
the minority decides to accept the proposal of the majority. It is 
assumed that the reference state does not necessarily just react to 
actions of the minority, but that it also has certain ideas and 
preferences itself about an acceptable treatment of the minority. 
Reference state really cares about the well-being of the minority or 
it cares it for other political reasons (e.g. because of pressure on the 
government of the reference state by nationalistic opposition 
parties). This aspect is modelled by giving the reference state a 
choice to intervene after the minority has acquiesced in both 
periods. 

Fig. 1.6 shows the extensive form of game. There are six 
outcomes, which consist of three distinct events i.e. war with the 
intervention of the reference state (WARREF), war without such 
intervention (WAR) and a non-violent outcome (NOWAR). 74 These 
three implications of the model applied on the conflict between 
Serbian minority and Croats in Croatia where Serbia provides an 
insistence as a reference state that result in war. Hungry was weak 
(though highly irredentist) and not able to influence the relations 



32 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



between Hungarian Minority in Romania. Finally, the perception of 
Russia's position seems to be such that the violence was avoided 
(e.g. Estonia, Crimea). 

VARIOUS FACETS OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN 
THE WORLD POLITICS 

Modern conflicts are also analysed through the process of 
ethnocide and ethnogenesis. Ethnogenesis is the complementary 
dimension of ethnocide, which is the conscious effort by power 
wielders within a nation-state to obliterate a people's life ways. The 
complementary feature of ethnocide and the ethnogenesis reflect the 
historio and contemporary struggle between hegemony and 
resistance to hegemony. 75 This process marked the collision of 
nation-state's nationalism and ethnic-block ethnogenesis. 

The idea of nationalism and ideal of the 'nation state' are not 
necessarily based on ethnicity. Rather they stress the voluntary 
coming together of people in a state with a shared culture. Yet in 
modern times, especially in the twentieth century, ethnicity has 
come to be more important in politics and ethnic-nationalism (or 
ethnonationalism) has been the distinguishing characteristic of 
nationalism. It may be defined as doctrine of autonomy, unity and 
identity for a group whose members conceive it to be an actual or 
potential nation. This may be because ethnicity gives a higher status 
to citizenship and therefore provides people a heightened sense of 
dignity than individualistic civic or social nationalism. 76 In essence 
this exclusive nationalism excludes those people who do not share a 
common ethnicity which usually means common decent. On the 
other hand, the principle of national self-determination confers a 
right to nations and their members to determine the sovereign state 
to which they would belong and the form of government of state 
which they would live. In a state based on concept of civic 
nationalism, every citizen irrespective of linage and ethnic 
background is a member of the nation. 77 

Nationalism results from the changes in the character of politics, 
economy and culture. The Table 1.2 shows the relationship between 
ethnic nationalism and 'post industrial society' and 'consumerism'. 
In third world countries, the intensity of ethnic conflict can be 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 33 



explained through the direction of politics towards the features of 
model, such as democratic politics rather than 'empire' and rising 
political consumer choice rather than monopoly. The model 
indicates a universal linkage between particular forms of politics, 
economy and culture. 



Power expectations Politics 


Economy 


Culture 


Power expectations 
Capabilities 


Material interests 


Psychic Income 


Democracy (self rule) 
opposing to domination, 
discrimination and exclusion 


Uneven development 
and cultural division 
of labour 


Search for identity and 
status increased literacy 


Nation-State 


Consociational 
democracy 




Nation-building 

(V. imperialism, internal 

colonialism) 




Increased cultural 
homogeneity 


consumerism 

cultures 

(v. centralisation) 


Decline of class 
divisions 


Revival of ethnic 
and /or 


Post-industrial politics 
(e.g. Green parties and 
national parties) 


Growth of state 
divisions 


Post-materialist values 


State power v. divided nations 


Post-industrial society 





Table 1.2 : Ethnic and social nationalism 

Source : James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, p. 68. 

In politics the focus is on power which expressed in terms of 
authority and the challenge to authority. Those who achieve political 
power command political structures, most typically the state. Those 
who are not in power but challengers of that power, operate in some 
political systems through political parties and through movements 
and terrorist organizations. In politics of nationalism, there have 
ruling national parties, opposition nationalist parties, nationalist 
movements, national liberation armies and so on. Each of these 
relates to the nature of the state and their focus is on political power. 
Some nationalists seek to defend the state, others to overthrow it. 



34 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



This can be explained through ethnic nature of state. If one ethnic 
group controls the state, then its nationalism is expressed as official 
nationalism or patriotism. 78 e.g. Ruling National Parties in South 
Africa and Sri Lanka were White Africaners and Sinhalese 
respectively. Other ethnic group, which does not control the state, 
expressed its nationalism in opposition to the state. Hence, the 
African National Congress and The Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) respectively opposed the structure of the state. The 
main reason of rise of ethnic-nationalism in politics is due to the 
change in the expectations and capabilities of the people. The ratio 
of expectations to capabilities provides the dynamic in politics 
generally and nationalism is one result of this changed ratio 
(Paradoxically, so is internationalism or supranationalism). 79 

The government by the people is expected by the inhibitions of 
the states. This expectation has been encouraged over a long period 
since eighteenth century "national self-determination" to twentieth 
century "ethno-national self determination" . After World War I, the 
political capabilities of people have continuously changed. The 
multinational empires in Europe broke up after World War I and in 
Africa and Asia after the World War II. In twentieth century, the 
rise of democratic expectations and capability to achieve these 
through overthrow of multinational empires was matched by the rise 
of ethnic nationalism within multiethnic states. This process 
involved a nationalist reaction to domination, discrimination and 
exclusion. One aspect of this has been called 'internal colonialism' 
which means the colonisation of subordinate ethnic group within the 
state by the core ethnic group giving rise to 'cultural division of 
labour'. In this situation many 'internal' ethnicities become 
mobilized politically against the state of which they were a part, 
even that state proclaim itself a 'nation state'. Thus, old-established 
states were threatened and break-up in twentieth century, e.g. the 
USSR, Yugoslavia etc. 

Another modern desire for democracy is consumerism. In 
political terms, consumerism seeks the availability of right of self- 
government, local democracy and cultural autonomy. But 
consumerism usually means the demand by individuals/groups for 
material gain. This will decide, the rational choice for them in 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 35 



politics. It means that pursuing ethnic aims will appear rational in 
the prospect of material or some other gain. In the most advanced 
post-industrial societies, the demands may go beyond economic gain 
to the satisfaction of post materialist values, such as ethnic identity 
(e.g. in language, religion, respect for community). Rational choice 
theory also predicts that when ethnic identity results in political 
conflict and then it would take an ideological form in post- 
industrialist society. 80 

While consumerism has been encouraged by the modern 
democratic state, it can also turn against it. Demand for 
decentralization and home rule for ethnic groups and nations can be 
seen as consumer reactions against the modern centralized state. In 
this situation, when the state seeks to satisfy dissatisfied ethnic 
groups, through economic planning to redress regional inequalities 
or establishment of regional government. It raises further ethnic 
expectations further and demands for stronger home rule. e.g. in 
Gorbachev's USSR, the policies of Perestroika and 'Glasnost' 
opened the floodgates to ethnic demands and capabilities to a point 
where many nationalities demand independence and later resulted in 
the demise of the USSR. 81 

The relationship between the economy and nationalism is not 
static but dynamic. The technological changes which have occurred 
in the late twentieth century have altered the types of employment 
and the classes in the labour force in advanced industrial countries. 
The division of interest between the 'working class' and the 'middle 
class' which has reflected in class politics is no longer so obvious, 
as people see their interests in terms of post industrial materialisms. 
The people of states and regions of states who feel 'relatively 
deprived' because of their economic situation can become politically 
restless and may demand change to redress their perceived 
deprivation. 82 

The culture differs from economy as 'psychic income' differs 
from financial income or material interests. 'Psychic income' refers 
to those things which satisfy mental and spiritual needs of human 
beings. Nationality and culture are almost synonymous. This is 
because both include a sense of social identity, language, education, 
religion, arts and science etc. Thus, in the formula, 

36 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



' Politics + Economy + culture = nationalism' has contained a special 
weight for culture. Presently, in the field of culture, two 
contradictory though intertwined historical processes are operating 
simultaneously, i.e. a globalizing tendency where the economics and 
cultures around the world are being embedded increasingly in more 
and more pervasive global webs. Secondly, a localizing tendency, 
expresses in its extreme form by a number of insurgencies on the 
basis of ethnic religions and local identities. These various cleavages 
of cultural built-up across the world provide potential fault lines for 
acrimony based on new cultural assertions. 83 Gellner's theory 
pointed out that in the industrial state, homogeneous national 
cultures within one state would go hand in hand with industrial 
economies. Thus, a social and cultural identity would flow from the 
needs of economy and would get promoted by the state. His theory 
postulated that as the state economy predominate over local and 
regional economies, so too state identity, culture and official 
nationalism would predominate over ethnic and social identity 
culture and nationalism. 84 

As Gellner's theory postulated, the process of globalization 
internationalize economy to some extent but this process not fade the 
national cultures. It seems as powerful as politics and economy and 
that in the conditions of sudden change in the modern world people 
turn to their ethnic and social culture as a defence against deprivation 
in politics and material interests. This is not a throw back to ancient 
ways, but a very up-to-date way of defending personal and group 
interests. For defending their interests, ethnic groups can retain their 
separate languages and senses of identity, but that would be 
expressed primarily in the realm of culture rather than politics. 85 

There are many contemporary developments which have led to 
renewed cultural nationalism, i.e. there has been a big increase in 
literacy, through the spread of education to all people. The 
opportunities to promote national culture have steadily increased 
with the spread of mass publications and these are often accessible 
to nationalists unless the state exercises censorship and monopolies 
printing. At least, 200,000,000 books had been printed from 1600 
A.D. and this 'print-capitalism' proved Francis Bacon's belief that 
"print had changed the appearance and the state of the world". 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 37 



There has been immense spread of the broadcast media. It combined 
with the huge migrations (created by the present world economic 
system) created a virulent new form of nationalism. This type of 
nationalism is no longer depends on territorial location in home 
country and developed new type of virtual ethnic communities. 
Some of the most vehement 'virtual communities' are found in 
diaspora communities e.g. Sikh, Croatian and Algerian nationalists. 
The internet, electronic banking and cheap international travel are 
allowing such people to have a powerful influence on the politics of 
the country of origin. 86 The linguistic questions are likely to be 
rallying points for ethnic nationalism and will get exposure in the 
press and broadcast media if a national language has been suppressed 
or discouraged by the state. A separate Welsh language TV channel 
was granted in 1982, after a hunger strike by Welsh nationalist 
president, Gwynfar Evans. 

The 'cultural nationalist' leaders also articulate to the widest 
possible audience regarding the claims of the nation, cultural 
autonomy and survival. This gives confidence to those disposed 
toward nationalism and they become able to share their national 
identity with leaders and to learn from them what their national 
culture is, and how it should be defended. Most of minorities feel 
that their culture is under attack from the state. This leads to a sense 
of cultural deprivation among these minority groups. Cultural 
deprivation in the context of nationalism is experienced when 
discrimination or insult takes place on account of a person's national 
identity including accent, religion, habits, tastes and so on. 87 This 
occurs most frequently when face-to-face contact takes place 
between dominant and dominated nationals. It is also experienced 
collectively when linguistic or educational usages are imposed 
officially on all citizens by the state, e.g. Scotland's nationalist 
leader Jim Sillars writes, 

"When I served in the British Navy, I could understand them but they 
either could not or refused to understand me. In Portsmouth (naval 
base) people delighted in taking the mickey by refusing to understand 
a single word I said, and years later, my first speech in "house of 
common" after my election in 1988 was greeted with taunts from 
English Tory MPs, 'speak English', which no doubt strengthened my 
cultural nationalism. 88 

38 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



There are nationalists who point to personal cultural deprivation 
to explain their nationalism. Collective cultural deprivation also 
leads to nationalism and is present when cultural organisations and 
educational bodies fight for the national culture against assimilation 
with other cultures and education systems. Now, 'the search for 
identity', intellectual freedom and the pursuit of 'psychic income' 
are the features of 'post-materialist society.' 89 But, both Marxist and 
Western liberals tended to view ethnic nationalism and religious 
fundamentalism as part of a larger set of phenomenon subject of 
transformation by the forces of economic modernization. 90 The 
functionalist view civic nationalism and its growth as a consequence 
of the breakdown of traditional society undergoing modernization, 
but it fails to explain the rise of ethnic nationalism in many 
developing as well as developed states. Hence, in its place many 
theories arose that linked the modernization process with the 
emergence and rapid diffusion of ethno-nationalist and religious 
sentiments and thereby accounted for political fragmentation, 
instability and anti-democratic developments. 91 

MODERNIZATION PROCESS AND EMERGENCE 
OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS 

The modernization theories those linked modernization with 
ethnic nationalism have two shortcomings firstly, most of them have 
failed to explain adequately the persistence and proliferation of 
ethnic nationalism all over the world. Secondly, most of these 
theories view ethnic nationalism as undemocratic and extremist. 
Consequently, the developmental approach and the reactive ethnicity 
approach have developed. These theories do not discard the salience 
of the modernization process behind the rise of ethnic nationalism 
and deal with the ethnic political mobilization directly. The 
developmental perspective treats' the persistence of ethnic 
attachments as 'residual' phenomenon. 92 The 'residual' treatment of 
ethnic attachments means that the developmental theory cannot be 
give an independent role to those attachments in the dynamics of 
political mobilization. These dynamics must be based on the 
occupational (i.e. class) cleavages, while the ethnic cleavages must 
serve only as a 'facade' for the more fundamental class-based 
mechanics. In contrast to the residual status of ethnic attachments in 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 39 



developmental perspective, the 'reactive ethnicity model' contends 
that developmental theorists misunderstood both the process of 
economic development and its effects. The process of modernization 
and increased contact between ethnic groups within a state would not 
necessarily bring about ethnic unity, rather would likely to lead to 
ethnic conflict. This is because the inequalities between the regions 
in a country would relegate peripheral regions to an inferior 
position, leaving the core region dominant. The reaction to this, in 
the pheripheral regions will be hostility towards the core. Hechter's 
'Cultural Division of Labor' (CDL) theory states that in a situation 
of internal colonialism, there would be a social stratification of 
ethnic or cultural groups, with the core group occupying the best 
class positions and the peripheral groups the inferior positions. This 
corresponds to a 'colonising' nation and 'colonised' nations. 93 If the 
stratification system links ethnic identity with economic status, it 
confers a meaning to identity and cannot be detached from one's 
economic and political interests within the system. Thus, it should 
not be expected that ethnic attachments will recede in highly 
developed countries, if it is understood that economic development 
can produce a CDL. The profusion of 'ethno-regionalist' movements 
in Quebec, Catalonia, Basque regions of Spain, Scots in Britain and 
Flemings in Belgium are examples of this process. 

In the reactive ethnicity model, two components are necessary 
for political mobilization. First, the individuals must share same 
interests. Second, suitable conditions must exist for mobilization. 
The first component alone is insufficient for concerted political 
mobilization. The aggregation of individual perceptions of economic 
inequality alone is insufficient for the development of collective 
solidarity. Beside conditions that generate common interests, 
conditions that facilitate group formation are also necessary. It is 
here that ethnicity plays a crucial role. Ethnic ties among 
economically disadvantaged individuals (i.e. CDL) play an 
independent role as facilitating conditions for the group formation 
essential to political mobilization. Ethnic linkages are a facilitating 
condition because they define a common discourse (language, beliefs 
etc.) which is required for any form of concerted action. The 
interests that facilitate political mobilization, embedded in the social 
context. This context is distinguished by ethnic commonalities, the 

40 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



ability to pursue common interests (whatever they may be) would be 
greatly enhanced. Thus, in the reactive ethnicity model ethnic 
attachments retain their salience through the working of the 
stratification system and serve as a condition which facilitates 
concerted efforts to alter the stratification system. 

A schematic summary of differences between these two models 
is contained in Fig. 1.7. 

Traditional Society 




Traditional 
Society 



No Economic 
Development 


Economic 
Development 


/ / 


NoCDL 


CDL 


* 


7P 

Functional 
Society 


\ 

Interactive 
Society 



— Reactive Ethnicity Model 

— Developmental Model 

Fig. 1.7 : A Schematic Summary of the Developmental and Reactive 
Ethnicity Models. 

Source : Eric M. Leifer, American Journal of Sociology (July 1981/82), p. 30. 

In a development model, economic development produces 
"functional societies". Cleavages in functional societies are class 
based and group formation around class interests is not taken to be 
problematic. Ethnic identities may persist and a CDL should exist, 
but these identities should have no significant role separate from 
class interests in the process of political mobilization. In contrast, 
reactive ethnicity model takes group formation to be problematic. 
Both models concur that economic development would result in a 
functional society where no CDL exist. The reactive ethnicity model 
posit that ethnic attachments (made salient by stratification system) 
would play an independent role in facilitating group formation 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



41 



around the pursuit of political interests when CDL exists in the 
society. Thus, an "interactive" society is predicted, in which the 
conjunction of economic and ethnic subordination is required to 
produce concerted political mobilization. 94 

Parsons 'action theory' provides the logical frameworks of both 
models. This theory is constructed upon conditions, means and 
interests (ends), which are defined not absolutely but relatively to 
each other. In both models, interests (political) and conditions 
(salient ethnic ties) are central concepts with different meanings but 
both models used 'political mobilization' as a 'means' in support of 
national party. The missing factor in this context must be linked to 
the "leadership component" that determines the alternative direction 
available. Each possible mobilization alternative is distinguished by 
a different type of leadership component. 

ROLE OF ETHNIC ENTREPRENEURS IN 
ETHNIC CONFLICTS 

Rabuska and Shepsle in their theory of ethnic mobilization argue 
that the cultural diversity in a given society is necessary but not 
sufficient cause of polarization along ethnic lines. In plural societies, 
the political entrepreneurs play a critical role in making ethnic 
cleavages politically salient. They further argue that ethnic 
preferences would be intense because, firstly, they are shared by all 
members of ethnic group, secondly, opposed to the preferences of 
other ethnic groups on all issues and thirdly understood accordingly 
to a frame of reference shared by all actors in society. And a change 
in the mode of production in a state with a cultural division of 
labour, leads to the deskilling of the subordinate group. It replaces 
old elite with a new one. The new elite take more extremist stance 
on the same issues. In doing so the new political leader represents 
himself/herself as the only authentic representative of the group. The 
ethnic group invariably backs the new politician because group 
preferences are uniform and maximalist. The new politician easily 
politicize ethnicity and outbid moderate or old leader by appealing 
to group preferences that are always somehow present in society and 
always odds with each other. 95 Consequently, upwardly mobile 
members of the subordinate ethnic group lead to radical nationalist 
movement if they have not been assimilated by the dominant group. 

42 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



This is the most prevalent form of nationalism in the last fifty years 
of twentieth century, appeared in Nazi Germany, Quebec, Scotland, 
India, and Africa etc. Conversely, upward mobility among the 
subordinates may result in a reactive nationalism among the elites of 
dominant culture. White nationalism in Rhodesia, Protestants in 
Northern Ireland are examples of this process. 

The rational choice analysis describes that the existence of an 
ethnic political movement depends on a sufficiently large ethnic elite 
with the requisite skills and resources to mobilize political support 
and sustain a movement. They act decisively and mobilize an ethnic 
movement if they feel that a change in economic conditions open a 
window of opportunity to expand their political power. The ethnic 
elites appeal to 'prescriptive altruism' in an extended form for 
mobilizing ethnic groups. The rule of prescriptive altruism implies 
that man is a communal animal and cannot develop his or her 
potentialities without the supports that come from socialization within 
a family group. Within the family, every individual learns the 
recognition of binding mutual interdependence and willingness to 
forego selfish gratification for the sake of others. The sense of 
obligation learned within the family and its necessity to survive as an 
economic unit is extended to kin group. It further extended to people 
who are defined as fellow members of the same ethnic group. The 
range of persons to whom an obligation of cooperation extends 
creates a group with inclusive boundary. The recognition that other 
people are competitors and not within that boundary create an 
exclusive boundary. This process is also described by interpreting the 
behaviour; and 'act utilitarianism', which further envisage two step 
process. Firstly, it sees rules as so formulated as to maximize net 
advantages for those bound by them. Secondly, the individual 
members of groups are expected to observe group rules but they may 
calculate their individual costs and benefits of observance and comply 
with them only to the extent that maximize their individual net 
advantages. 96 Although, this approach provides ethnic ideologies as 
resources for mobilization by manipulative elites but it is fraught with 
free-rider problem because some members of ethnic group simply do 
not agree with the form of appeal made by ethnic leadership. 

A leadership component that directs mobilization toward the 
national political arena is generally developed within the educational 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 43 



institutions of the dominant ethnic group. Members of the 
subordinate group trained in these institutions have a tendency to 
direct their political energies back toward the national 'centre' in 
seeking political change. Anthony D. Smith contributed the concept 
of "careerism of ethnic actors" for explaining intellectuals' role in 
the rise of ethnonationalism. He argues that the ethnic revival 
becomes the basis for a new form of political radicalism. This 
radicalism has been channeled towards the ethnic historicism of the 
educators by a crisis of legitimacy experienced by the old order and 
the absolutist state. The professionals, too, require a viable social 
identity supported by an historical legitimation and they find it in the 
'ethnic solution' proposed by their intellectuals. Besides providing a 
new bureaucratic arena for their career and status aspirations, the 
historic or ethnic community, suitably transformed into the active 
'nation', resolves the cultural crisis of identity of the intelligentsia, 
places them at the head of an alliance with other aspirant strata and 
breaks down their social isolation from the 'people' with potentially 
revolutionary results. 97 

The Fig. 1.8 illustrates the leadership component as a means for 
political mobilization in concerned society. 



Economically 

Disadvantaged 

Regions 




Disadvantaged 
Ethnic Regions 



Present 
Prediction 

Refined 
Prediction 



Regions where 
concerted political 
mobilization is 
predicted 



Regions with high concentration 
of mean-specific "leadership" 
component 

Fig. 1.8 : Leadership Component as a Means for Political Mobilization. 

Source : Eric M. Leifer, American Journal of Sociology (July 1981/82), p. 45. 

It is clear that the mobilization and strategies of politically active 
ethnic groups are based on interaction of two kinds of factors. 
Firstly, grievances about differential treatment and group status. 



44 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Secondly, the situationally determined pursuit of political interests 
and the sense of group cultural identity, as formulated by group 
leaders and political entrepreneurs. The "general model of 
communal mobilization for political action" in Fig. 1.9 showed three 
interdependent core variables i.e. active grievances, mobilization 
and communal political action. 



State Characteristics 
Shaping the Context 
of Political Action 



Group 

History, 

Status, 

And 

Traits 



Collective 
disadvantages 



State expansion 



Group cohesion 
identity 
— T 



Repressive 
control 



Persisting 
grievances 



Active 
grievances 



Potential for 
mobilization 



Group size, 
concentration 



Mobilization 



, State power 



Institutional 
democracy 



Democratization 



-»| Communal 
Protest 



Communal 
Rebellion 



Contagion of 
communal conflict 



Diffusion of conflict 



International 
support 



International Factors 
Facilitating 
Group Mobilization 
and Political Action 

Fig. 1.9 : A General Model of Communal Mobilization for Political Action. 

Source : Ted Robert Gurr, International Political Science Review (April, 1993), p. 167. 

This model also consist three blocs of exogenous variables i.e. 
predisposing conditions which determine the intervening variables of 
persisting grievances and potential for mobilization, international 
diffusion and contagion of communal conflict, state characteristics 
that shape the costs and benefits of political action. 

The grievances about differential treatment and the sense of 
group cultural identity provide the essential bases for mobilization 
and shape the kinds of claims made by the group's leaders. There is 
little prospect of mobilization by any political entrepreneurs in 
response to any external threat or opportunity if grievances and 
group identity are both weak. On the other hand, deep grievances 
and a strong sense of group identity and common interests provide 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



45 



highly combustible material that fuels spontaneous violent nationalist 
action whenever external control weakens. 98 And whenever these 
sentiments can be organized and focused by group leaders who give 
plausible expression to members grievances and aspirations, they 
animate powerful political movements and protracted conflicts. 

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS 

In recent years, various ethno-nationalistic, secessionistic 
movements rise due to the effects of globalization i.e. global 
economic integration and competition for trade." The economic 
success enjoyed by small states had a powerful 'demonstration 
effect' on ethnic nationalist and seccessionists in many parts of the 
world. After its split from Slovakia, Czech Republic's economic 
growth has been rapidly grown, unemployment has been 
significantly lowered and exports have been reoriented toward 
western states, Catalan in Spain, Scots in Britain, Northern League 
in Italy demand greater autonomy, Quebec's secession bid from 
Canada was also for obtaining more benefits by trading with 
Canada, the United States, Mexico and the rest of Latin America. 
As President Boris Yeltsin wrote in 1991 that, "The economy 
follows politics, after all", there are powerful forces promoting 
smallness have affected politics through several ways. 100 

Entrenched ethno-nationalist movements weaken states common 
identity, which had controlled the centrifugal action of different 
identities. Consequently, a cultural conflict is erupted because 
culture is considered to be the totality of the values, beliefs, 
traditions and heritage that confer an identity on each individual. In 
its potential for explosive violence, culture could be compared to a 
nuclear reactor. A chain reaction would be started when a 
moderating influence of heavy water (a common project or 
authority) is removed. When the conflict reaches on certain 
intensity, a certain temperature, then violence is erupted. Violence 
can quickly destroy relationship between groups. Violence has 
generally been conceptualized as a degree of conflict rather than as 
a form of conflict. It is not a quantitative degree of conflict but a 
qualitative form with its own dynamics. 101 The shift from non- 
violent to violent modes of conflict is a phase shift. 

46 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Recent explosion of ethnic violence, intra-state armed combats 
change the state-centered realist view. The neo-realist view is not 
enough to accommodate many processes, events and structures that 
appear largely outside the strategic interactions of nation-states. It is 
argued that, the dynamics of contemporary world politics can be 
built on idea of bifurcation and related ideas of complexity, chaos 
and turbulence in complex systems i.e. the multicentric system and 
the statecentric system. He further argues that the structures and 
processes in today's polities are artifacts of the turbulent interplay of 
these two bifurcated systems, each of which affects the others in 
multiple ways, at multiple levels and in ways that make events 
enormously hard to predict. He replaces the idea of events with the 
image of "cascades" action sequences in the multicentric world. The 
cascade concept defines how one particular act of religious 
desecration, one particular terrorist killing, or particular 
inflammatory speech ignites large-scale ethnic violence. 102 

Various inductive, rational action and culturalist approaches 
applied for describing ethnic violence. Ted Robert Gurr outlined an 
"integrated theory of political violence" as the product of the 
politicization and activation of discontent arising from relative 
deprivation. His work has been built on a large-scale data set 
surveying 233 "minorities at risk", that have suffered (or benefited 
from) economic or political discrimination, mobilized politically in 
defense of collective interests since 1945. These nonstate communal 
groups "classified as ethnonationalists, indigenous peoples, ethno- 
classes, militant sects and communal contenders. He explains forms 
and magnitude of non-violent protest, violent protest and rebellion 
through an electric synthesis of grievances and mobilization 
variables. 103 

International relation approach posits that existence of a 
"security dilemma" under conditions of anarchy in which even 
nonaggressive moves to enhance one's security perceived as 
threatening by others, trigger countermoves that ultimately reduce 
one's own security. While formulated to explain interstate wars, the 
security dilemma has been also applied to intrastate ethnic violence. 
In a presence of historical record of serious intergroup hostilities 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 47 



(amplified and distorted), groups are likely to view one another's 
nationalist mobilization as threatening. 104 These perceived threats 
may create incentives for preemptive attack (or at least for 
countermobilization that will in turn be perceived as threaten by the 
other group, engendering a mobilization spiral that can lead to 
violence, especially since violent action can be undertaken by small 
bonds of radicals outside the control of weak state). 

Although, there is no unitary or complete game theory of ethnic 
violence, but certain general mechanisms are identified that helps to 
define some particular aspects of problem of ethnic violence. 
Fearon's model of the problem of credible commitments and ethnic 
violence described that the problem arise when a newly independent 
state dominated by one ethnic group and containing at least one 
powerful minority group as well. The model focuses on the inability 
of an ethnicized state leadership to 'credibly commit itself to protect 
lives and property of subordinate ethnic groups, who, as a result, 
start fighting for independence immediately rather than waiting to 
see if the leadership honors its commitment to protect them. Once a 
war breaks out, the settlement is extremely difficult because neither 
side would want to disarm without full confidence that the agreement 
would be adhered to, but no one would have such confidence unless 
one side disarms. The individuals, who are told by their leaders that 
they are targets of enemy nation, would take up arms even if there 
is probability that their leader's prognostication is accurate. Then a 
low probability event with drastic consequences has a high expected 
utility. Therefore ethnic war can emerge from a commitment 
problem even if vague suggestions of repression exist or if only a 
maniacal wing of the ruling group has genocidal intentions. This 
model is sensitive to the importance of institutions that enhance the 
credibility of commitments. In the absence of such institutions, 
ethnic violence is more likely to occur. 105 

The Sociopsychological theory of "frustration-aggression- 
displacement" also describes the origin of aggressive behaviour in 
members of ethnic groups. It emphasizes the social context in which 
cooperation and coordination required the frustration of short-term 
desires in favour of long-term objectives. Frustration tends to give 

48 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



rise to aggressive tendencies towards the perceived causes. These 
are generally inhibited sometimes because of the painful 
consequences of being aggressive towards one need to cooperate 
(e.g. parents, teachers, peers, workmates and colleagues etc.). On 
the other hand, the in-group endorsed individuals' role if its 
frustrations are perceived as against out-group. They become the 
targets of aggressive tendencies which are displaced on to them 
without disturbing the co-operation and co-ordination of the in- 
group. Thus, the gratification of the release of aggression may 
follow an enhancement of in-group consolidation. 106 

The ethnic groups are often characterized by relatively dense 
social networks and low-cost access to information about the past 
history of individual's behaviour. It has an important consequence 
for intra versus inter group relations. Within groups, people who 
exploit the trust of others can be identified as individuals sanctioned 
with relative ease by the response of the ethnic community. In game 
theoretic terms, cooperation and trust can be supported within an 
ethnic group by punishment strategies that are conditioned on 
individual behaviour because the cost of obtaining information about 
an individual's past is low. By contrast, individual identification is 
harder in interaction across groups. 

Relatively dense social networks and interactions within an 
ethnic group thus give rise to an asymmetry of information because 
identifying and getting information about individuals from other 
groups is more difficult. However the inter ethnic relations are 
characterized by low level of information and the past conduct of the 
member of other group as individual is not known. In game-theoretic 
model, two types of equilibria support these conceptions. Firstly, 
each group may hold all members of the other group liable for the 
actions of its individual members. Under this regime, the members 
of group A indiscriminately punish all members of group B for nasty 
behaviour by an individual B. Thus, the "spiral regime" occurs in 
which individual defections trigger an escalation and complete 
breakdown of intergroup relations, non-cooperation spreads 
immediately to all interactions between members of the groups. The 
Israeli retaliation of suicide attacks by Palestinian extremists by 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 49 



destroying and killing large number of Palestinian people is example 
of this spiral regime. 107 Second, the members of one group may 
simply ignore violations of trust by members of the other group, 
relying instead on the other group to identify and sanction the 
appropriate individual. Under this regime, in group policing, 
individual defections do not trigger such a spiral and total 
breakdown. If a B exploits an A, members of group A continue 
cooperating with members of group B as though nothing had 
happened while members of group B identify and sanction the 
individual who acted badly. 

The major focus of cultural approach of ethnic violence has been 
of the cultural construction of fear with the help of rhetorical 
processes, symbolic resources and representational forms and a 
demonized, dehumanized or threatening, ethnically defined 'other' 
has been constructed. Culturalist approach specifies the manner in 
which fears and threats are constructed through, narratives, myth, 
rituals, commemorations and other cultural representations. Ethnic 
elites play crucial role in engendering ethnic insecurity through 
highly selective and often distorted narratives and representations, 
the deliberate planting of rumors. The success of such entrepreneurs 
of fear is seen as contingent on the historically conditioned cultural 
resonance of their inflammatory appeals. 108 Cultural 'materials' are 
seen as having an inner logic or connectedness that makes them at 
least moderately refractory to willful manipulation by cynical 
politicians. The construction of fearful Hindu beliefs about Muslims 
and in opposition the emergence of Muslims ethno-religious idioms 
and practices, religiously justify social segregation and the rise of 
Hindu nationalism in India, Sinhalese beliefs about Tamil in Sri 
Lanka (in the context of ethnocratic Sinhalese State, Tamil 
Terrorism), and of Serbian beliefs about Croats and Kosovars in 
disintegrating Yugoslavia are examples of this phenomenon. Once 
such ethnically focused fear is constructed, the ethnic violence no 
longer seems random or meaningless but all too horrify. 

Some recent theories of ethnic conflicts explained that the ethnic 
violence is a direct consequence of primordial antipathies among 
groups. Huntington's civilizational thesis not only applies to inter- 

50 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



state exchanges but can also be described as theory of culturally 
defined groups. This theory claims that state behaviour in the post- 
Cold War period will no longer reflect primarily power calculations 
or ideology but rather, civilizational affiliations. It is along the 'fault 
lines' between the world religions that conflict will be most prone to 
erupt. The "Kin-group Syndrome" prompts intervention by distant 
cultural relatives e.g. Russian and Greek nationalists aligning with 
Serbs. 109 Huntington's thesis has come in for fervent criticism 
because of its attempt to reefy civilizations as large-scale ethnic 
categories. 110 Primordialist or 'ancient hatred' view of ethnic 
conflict is also come under serious criticism. 

The important aspect of present ethnonationalist violence is use 
of ABO (agent of biological origin) weapon, called 
pseudospeciation. Pseudospeciation is that phenomenon by which 
individuals and groups protect their sense of identity by viewing 
other groups as "less than human", less worthy of consideration and 
more able to be disregarded and destroyed. Pseudospeciation as a 
weapon of modern strategy and a tool of psychological warfare is the 
planned and deliberate re-structuring of the image of a subject 
individual or group/nation of people in the minds of selected target 
audience. And the target audience views the subject less than human, 
as an alien person or race and unworthy of human justice, kindness, 
consideration or treatment. 111 Recently, Yugoslavia was driven by 
an intra-national pseudospeciation which has led to the creation of 
variety of cultural groups (Croats, Serbs and Muslims). Croatian 
Tennis superstar, Goren Ivanisevic's interview with the New York 
Times in his home town is the example of this process in destroyed 
Yugoslav society. In this interview he asked, 

In Adelaide (Australia) policemen assigned as bodyguards after a death 
threat, showed me (just for fun) how a machine gun works. He further 
said, they let me shoot a machine gun. It was tough to control but oh, 
it was a nice feeling, all the bullets coming out. I was thinking it would 
be nice to have some Serbs standing in front of me. 112 

This example shows that how various cultural groups have 
reduced each other to less-than-human status in their collective 
dealings. 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 5 1 



The most extreme form of ethnic violence is 'genocide' 113 which 
resulted in mass scale killings and "ethnic cleansing". 114 It led to 
forceful migration and refugee problem. The spill-over effect of 
refugee problem and genocide resulted in foreign intervention by 
neighbouring country/countries and by regional/international 
organizations. The Kosovo crisis as an ethnic issue can be used for 
the analysis of the process of ethnicity and its impact on the 
functioning of the United Nations in the world politics after the end 
of Cold War. 



References : 

1. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trends and 
Transformations (Boston, 1993), p. 3. 

2. Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism : Theory and Comparison (N.D., 
1991), p. 19. 

3. S.L. Sharma, "The Saliance of Ethnicity in Modernization : Evidence from 
India", Sociological Bulletin, no. 1&2 (March-Sept., 1990), p. 37. 

4. Joce Kriger, Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (NY, 2001), Vol. 2, 
p. 265. 

5. David Robertson, Dictionary of Politics (London, 1993), p. 169. For study of 
positive effects of ethnicity of immigrant groups. See, Ivan Light et ah, 
"International ethnicity in the ethnic economy", Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
Vol. 16 (October 1993), pp. 581-594. 

6. Jonathan Friedman, Cultural Identity and Global Process (N.D., 1995), pp. 
29-30. 

7. Ibid., p. 30. 

8. The term 'ethnic diversity' represent a normal condition and problematic for 
the majority of citizens and subjects who see themselves as members of a 
modern state. Actually, "diversity" refers to intercultural relationship in which 
conflicts are minimal or non-existent. See Fred W. Riggs, "Glossery", 
International Political Science Review, Vol. 19 (July 1998), p. 314. 

9. For more detail about traditional ethnicity see Fred W. Rigs, "The Modernity 
of Ethnic Identity and Conflict", International Political Science Review, Vol. 
19 (July 1998), p. 277. See also, Orland Fals Borda ed., The Challenge of 
Social Change (N.D., 1985), pp. 39-41. See Thomas D. Hall, "The Effects of 
Incorporation into World System on Ethnic Process", International Political 
Science Review, Vol. 19 (July 1998), pp. 36-37. 

10. Majid Tehranian, "Pancapitalism and migration in historical perspective", 
International Political Science Review, Vol. 19 (July 1998), p. 294. 

1 1 . Ethnic nationalism prevails among marginalized communities in modern states 

52 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



whose members reject citizenship and demand sovereignty. They normally 
have a territorial base or 'homeland' which in fact or fantasy, can anchor the 
state they wish to establish by liberation or secession. However, population 
mobility intensified by industrialism has led to a widespread mingling of 
peoples, not only in cities but also in rural areas, seriously hampering efforts 
to carve independent states out of the enclaves which ethnonational movements 
claim for themselves. Ethnic cleavage is defined as to characterize the 
relationship between subjects and citizens (ethnic nationalists and patriots) in 
such situations. {Ibid.) 

12. Civic ethnicity involves members of marginalized communities who wish to 
become integrated as citizens of the country where they live, but it also affects 
all nationals of a dominant community whose attitudes and relationships with 
members of marginalized communities seriously affect their behaviour and 
reciprocate their own comfort and well-being. The term "ethnic diversity" has 
come increasingly, to represent a normal condition and problematic for all the 
citizens and subjects in any modern state who see themselves as members of a 
nation. See Riggs, n. 9, p. 278. 

13. Ethnic plurality applies to situations in which citizenship is not available to the 
subjects of a modern state who also lack any historical or territorial basis for 
claiming sovereignty. But pluralism is widely used for ethnic diversity and 
interest group democracy. 'Plurality' and 'Pluralness' is often used to 
characterize societies in which this third form of ethnicity prevails. (Ibid.) 

14. T.K. Ommen, Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity (Cambridge, 1997), p. 19. 

15. For more study of Political Community and Changes in Concept of Community 
see Peter Juviler and Sherril Stroschen, "Missing Boundaries of Comparison : 
The Political Community", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114 (Fall 1999), 
pp. 437-439. See Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: 
Cognitive Regions in International Relations", Millennium Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 26 (1997), pp. 255-267. 

16. Richard Bellamy, "Identity Politics : Introduction to a New Series", 
Government and Opposition, Vol. 37 (Summer 2002), pp. 296-297. 

17. Bhikhu Parekh, "Being British", Government and Opposition, Vol. 37 
(Summer 2002), p. 302. 

18. Bellamy, n. 16, pp. 297-298. 

19. Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology (ed.), David Levinson and Melvin 
Ember, Henry Holt & Company, New York, 1996, p. 393. See also Daniel 
Patric Moynihan, Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (NY, 
1993), pp. 22-28. 

20. Urmila Phadnis and Rajat Ganguly, Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia 
(ND, 2001), pp. 23-24. 

21 . G. Roth and C. Wittich, Max Weber : Economy and Society (New York, 1986), 
Vol. 18, p. 389. 

22. Phadnis and Ganguly, n. 20, p. 26. 

23. Brass, n. 2, pp. 25-36, Geoff Dench, Minorities in the Open Society: Prisoners 
of Ambivalence (London, 1986), p. 25. 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 53 



24. Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (London, 1969), p. 12. See 
Danielle Conversi, "Nationalism, Boundaries and Violence", Millennium 
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 28 (1999), pp. 562-563. 

25. John W. Berry et ah, Cross-Cultural Psychology : Research and Application 
(N.Y., 1992), pp. 303-304. See also, Louk Hagendoorn, "Ethnic 
categorization and outgroup exclusion: Cultural values and social stereotypes in 
the construction of ethnic hierarchies", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 16 
(January 1993), p. 35. For criticism of Primordialism and theories of emotional 
attachment thesis see, Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, "The Poverty 
of Primordialism: The mystification of ethnic attachment, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, Vol. 16 (April 1993), pp. 183-201. 

25a. Ibid. 

26. Anthony D. Smith, "The Origins of Nations", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 
12 (July 1989), pp. 344-45. See International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 
(ed.), David L. Sills, MacMillan Company and The Free Press, USA, 1986, 
p. 167. See also, Barth, no. 24, p. 10-11. 

27. R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, "Ethnic Mobilization and the Seed of Warfare 
: An Evolutionary Perspective", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31 
(1987), pp. 3-8. 

28. James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (London, 1998), p. 
13. 

29. Classical Fitness is a property of an individual organism, usually expressed as 
the product of survival and fecundity (or net reproductive performance). See 
Shaw and Wong, n. 27, p. 6. 

30. The Nucleus ethnicity refers to immediate relatives who shares a high degree 
of genetic relatedness (Grandfathers, Sons, Cousins etc.). A nucleus group thus 
comprises one's offspring, one's siblings' offspring, one's parents and their 
siblings and one's parents offspring. It would number a few hundred 
individuals at most. 

31. Shaw and Wong, n. 27, p. 9. 

32. Kellas, n. 28, p. 14. 

33. Shaw and Wong, n. 27, p. 10. 

34. Kellas, n. 28, p.. 17. 

35. Barth, n. 24, p. 13. 

36. Donald G. Baker, Race, Ethnicity and Power (London, 1983), pp. 10-11. 

37. Phylis Martinelli, "A test of the McKay and Lewins ethnic typology", Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, Vol. 9 (April 1986), p. 199. 

38. Ted Robert Gurr, "On the Political Consequences of Scarcity and Economic 
Decline", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29 (1985), p. 60, Ibid., p. 14. 

39. Ibid., p. 15, for more study of the effects of development factors on ethnic 
conflict see Bjorn Hettne, "Ethnicity and development: an elusive relationship" 
in Denis Dwyer and David Drakara's Smith, Ethnicity and development: 
Geographical perspective (Toronot, 1996), pp. 15-44. 

40. Barth, n. 24, p. 33. 



54 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



41. Baker, n. 36, p. 15. Juviler and Stroschen, n. 15, p. 448. 

42. Relative deprivation means the inequality between the wealth and status of 
individuals and groups, and outrage of those at the bottom about their perceived 
exploitation by those at top. People's perception that they are unfairly deprived 
of the wealth and status that deserve in comparison with advantage others. 
When people's expectations of what they deserve, rise more rapidly then their 
material rewards, the probability of conflict grows. 

43. Baker, n. 36, p. 16. 

44. Myron Weiner, "Peoples and State in New Ethnic Order? In Steven C. Spiegal 
and David J. Pervin, At Issue : Politics in the World Arena (N.Y., 1994), p. 
271. See also, Jim Mac Laughlin, "Racism, ethnicity and multiculturalism in 
contemporary Europe: A review essay", Political Geography, Vol. 17 (1998), 
pp. 1013-1024. 

45. Baker, n. 36, p. 25. 

46. Ibid., p. 26. 

47. Sills, n. 26, p. 168. 

48. Motivation theory is useful for delineating a general set of variables accounting 
for degree of mobilization. Motivation is taken as a multiplicative function of 
three variables i.e. motives (M) (internal states), expectancies E (Perceived 
probabilities of achieving objectives) and incentives I (objective rewards or 
punishments). The actual behaviour of group is resultant of these components. 
It implies that minority mobilization will be near zero whenever there is either 
complete acceptance of the system or complete resignation i.e. no expectation 
of change. Hubert Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations 
(NY, 1967), p. 127. See Ramond Tainter and Manus Midlarsky, "Theory of 
Revolution", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XI (Sep. 1967), pp. 270- 
77. 

49. Russia as a powerful reference state, may have deterred the ruling majorities of 
other states from seriously oppressing their Russian minority populations. At 
the same time, it is acknowledged that the presence of such a powerful state can 
lead to serious problems for the new states. If Russia becomes more irredentist, 
i.e. more interested in recovering former territories, it is likely to use the cause 
of its minorities abroad to undermine the security and sovereignty of these 
states. Another example of this type of situation is "Sudeten Syndrome". The 
"Sudeten Syndrome" refers to Hitler's policies with respect to the Sudeten 
Germans in Czechoslovakia in 1930s. He used this minority as an instrument 
for his territorial ambitions in Central Europe. Pieter Van Houten, "The Role 
of A Minority's Reference State in Ethnic Relations", Archives European 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXXIX (1998), p. 111. 

50. For detailed study of institutional incorporation in state structures and effects 
of group relations see Siobhan Harty , "The institutional foundations of Substate 
National Movements", Comparative Politics, Vol. 33 (January 2001), pp. 191- 
197. 

51. Baker, n. 36, p. 29. 

52. John Coakley, "Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The Strategy 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 55 



of Non-Territorial Autonomy", International Political Science Review, Vol. 15 
(July 1994), p. 309. 

53. William Safaran, "Non-Separatist Policies regarding Ethnic Minorities : 
Positive Approaches and Ambiguous Consequences", International Political 
Science Review, Vol. 15 (Jan. 1994), p. 69. 

54. The Word "Ethnocide Derived from Latin word Caedere (to kill) and the Greek 
Ethnos (nation). It described the process of deliberate and systematic 
destruction of the culture of an ethnic group, especially within a larger 
community. Levinson and Ember, n. 19, p. 405. See also, The Oxford English 
Dictionary, ed. 2, Vol. V. 

55. Safran, n. 53, p. 98-99. 

56. I.T. Kreindler, "A Second Missed Opportunity : Russian in Retreat as a Global 
Language", International Political Science Review, Vol. 14 (1993), p. 265. 

57. Donald Rothchild and Alexander J. Growth, "Pathological Dimensions of 
Domestic and International Ethnicity", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 110 
(Spring 1995), p. 76, see Baker, n. 36, p. 35. 

58. Ibid., p. 36 

59. Anomie is the absence of cultural restraints on human aspirations and denotes 
a conflict in a society. Anomie also describes the imbalance between cultural 
goals and institutional means at either social or individual level or a 
psychological condition of self-to-other alienation. See Marco Orru, Anomie : 
History and Meaning (Boston, 1987), p. 2. 

60. Baker, n. 36, p. 37. For detailed study of the effects of Colonial Policies on 
Third World Countries, see Frantz Fanon, "The Wretched of the Earth" (N.Y., 
1968). 

61. Kegley and Wittkopf, n. 1, pp. 184, 371. 

62. Nation- states are the subjects and creators of a global network which for the 
most part disregards regions and national or ethnic minorities as political 
actors. There are two overlapping concepts of the nation i.e. civic or territorial 
and ethnic or genealogical. The civic conception treats nations as units of 
population which inhibit a demarcated territory, possess a common economy 
with mobility in a single territory wide occupational and production system. It 
further includes the common laws with identical legal rights and duties for 
everyone and a public, mass education system with a single civic ideology. 
Thus, territory, economy, law and education constitute the four spheres in and 
through which nations are formed. The ethnic concept of nation includes human 
populations claiming a common ancestry, a demotic solidarity, common 
customs and vernaculars and native history. These features define the 
'ethnicity' and 'ethnic identity' of a community. The true nation-state would 
consist of those people who belonged to it by birth and fully subject to its 
sovereign legal authority. By this criterion, it is unlikely that there is a single 
nation-state in the world at present and has ever existed. The modern crisis of 
nation-state can be comprehended through the interaction of the components of 
civic and ethnic concepts of nation. The most important civic components are, 
the extension of legal rights and duties to all strata which culminating in the 



56 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



ideal of citizenship for all classes. In modern nation-state, it holds an honoured 
place. A second vital element of 'civic' nation is the acquisition of a 'home- 
land', a duly recognized historic territory for nation. The ethnic components 
include historical memories and myth of descent. The lack of unifying 
memories, myths, symbols and values and the presence of a multiplicity of 
'myth-symbol' complexes among several communities impede the chances of 
creating territorial nations on the civic model. In other words, the 'civic' 
concept of modern nation often lacks or omits the solidarity and homogeneity 
stressed by ethnic concept. Thus, the civic or modern nation, unit of population 
requires not merely a territory, economy, education system and legal code but 
also needs an ethnic foundation in order to mobilise and integrate diverse 
cultural and social elements. The ethnic conflict arise when the nation-state 
ignore the emotional bonds of myths, symbols and memories which unite 
citizens of particular ethnic communities living in its territory. Anthony D. 
Smith, Theories of Nationalism (London, 1983), pp. 186-187. See also 
Montserrat Guibernau, "Nationalism and Intellectuals in Nations without 
States: The Catalan Case", Political Studies, Vol. 48 (Dec. 2000), pp. 989- 
900. See, Anthony D. Smith, "The Myth of the 'Modern Nation' and the Myth 
of Nations", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 11 (January 1988), p. 9, see John 
Dunn, "Introduction: Crisis of the Nation State", Political Studies", Vol. XIII, 
1994, p. 3. See Montserrat Guibernau, Nation without States: Political 
Communities in a Global Age (Maiden, 1999), p. 153. 

63. Conversi, n. 24, p. 568. 

64. Berry et al., n. 25, p. 295. 

65. Ibid., p. 39. 

66. Nimmi Hutnik, "Patterns of ethnic minority identification and modes of social 
adaptation", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 9, (April 1986), p. 154. 

67. Victoria M. Esses et al., "Intergroup Competition and Attitudes Toward 
Immigration and Immigrants: An Instrumental Model of Group Conflict," 
Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 54 (1998), p. 701. 

68. Roger D. Congleton, "Ethnic Clubs, Ethnic Conflict, and the rise of Ethnic 
Nationalism", in Albert Briton et al., Nationality and Nationalism (N.Y., 
1995), p. 85. 

69. Esses, n. 67, p. 702. 

70. Ibid., p. 704. 

71. For more details about resource competition approach see Charles C. Ragin, 
"Class, status and reactive ethnic cleavages: The social bases of political 
regionalism", American Political Science Review, Vol. 42, 1977, pp. 438-450. 

72. Esses, n. 67, p. 704, Russel Hardin, "Self-Interest, Group Identity", in Breton 
et al., n. 68, p. 25. 

73. Houten, n. 49, p. 115. For detailed study of ethnic kin state intervention in 
ethnic conflict see, Rajat Ganguly, Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts : 
Lessons from South Asia (ND, 1998), pp. 9-37. 

74. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in France and England 
(also in US) the nation came to be understood in a political or civic sense 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 57 



(staatsnation) i.e. a community of politically aware citizens equal before the law 
irrespective of their social, economic status, origin and religious beliefs. The 
ethnic homogeneity in these nation-states with a long history of centralized 
governments are achieved precisely by the political processes that facilitated 
centralization. In these states, the exercise of the right of self-determination not 
only created the political nation-state but also altered the locus of sovereignty 
within the state. Under the treaty of Westphalia of 1648, the established legal 
principle of sovereignty to govern inter-state relations leaves intact the right of 
dynastic principle of political legitimacy i.e. the right of rulers to determine the 
sovereignty and form of government of their territories. But under the impact 
of self-determination, the dynastic principle of sovereignty was replaced by that 
of popular sovereignty based on the will of the people and not on the monarch. 
Only with this concept, the idea be born that the government must be 
legitimized by the consent of the people and people not content with the 
government of the country to which they belong should be able to secede and 
organize themselves as they wish. Ibid. 

75. Levinson and Ember, n. 19, p. 407. 

76. Anthony D. Smith, "Chosen peoples: Why ethnic groups survive", Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, Vol. 15 (July 1992), pp. 450-51. 

77. Kellas, n. 28, p. 65. Anthony D. Smith, "The ethnic source of nationalism", 
Survival, Vol. 35, no 1, Spring 1993, pp. 58-61. See Phadnis and Ganguly, n. 
20, p. 31. See Stefan Oeter, "The Right of Self-Determination in Transition", 
Law and State, Vol. 49/50, 1994, p 150. See Sami Zubaida, "Nations: old and 
new comments on Anthony D. Smith's 'The Myth of the "Modern Nation" and 
the Myth of nations", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 12 (July 1989), p. 336. 
B.K. Roy Burman, "On Self-Determination of Peoples in the Present 
Scenario", Mainstream, 14 December 2002, p. 12. 

78. For analysis of ethno-nationalism on the basis of Psychological differentiation 
between nationalism and patriotism. See, Walker Connor, "Beyond Reason: 
The Nature of Ethnonational Bond", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 16 (July 
1993), pp. 373-388. 

79. Kellas, n. 28, p. 70. 

80. Saul Newman, "Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict", World 
Politics, Vol. 43 (April 1991), p. 461. 

81. Kellas, n. 28, p. 73. 

82. In this situations, people think of themselves in ethnic or social nationalism and 
inhabit a territory which is differentiated on economic grounds from other such 
groups, nationalism in Scotland is of this kind. It is not just the poorer regions 
that develop nationalism, however, the rich regions may also perceive relative 
deprivation within the state on political and cultural matters e.g. Catalonia and 
Basque land are nationalist because of what they see as their political and 
cultural deprivation in Spain. Anthony Mughan defined this process of 
economic disparity through dividing power resources in two categories, de jure 
and de facto. De jure, derive from the constitution of state (e.g. the right of 
vote) while the de facto concern with the qualitative differences of people (e.g. 
their wealth, education etc.). It is when these two types of power resources do 

58 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



not correspond for any one ethnic group then conflict develops. Thus, a rich 
ethnic group which is not strong in political power will rebel and try to change 
its political position. If the changes in the economy serve to reinforce an ethnic 
group's existing share of political power, then conflict is unlikely to occur. 
However, where ethnic group gain or loss economic power while their political 
power stay constant or moves in the opposite direction, nationalism will 
develop e.g. Flemings in Belgium demanded reconstruction of the Belgium 
state because of their rising economic power. But, French speaking Walloons, 
also become nationalists when their primacy in 'de jure' constitutional and 
cultural power was shown to be out of step with their declining economic 'de 
facto' power. For study of effect of economic ties on the interregional group 
relations see Michael Hechter, "Nationalism as group solidarity", Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, Vol. 10 (London), October 1987, pp. 415-425. 

83. This particularistic current is amplified by mantras about waging "war on 
totality", "celebrating difference" and embracing "local knowledge". The 
cultural politics are ascendent over class or the redistributional politics of 
welfare-state liberalism, social democracy and Marxism and have shifted 
politically oriented collective action from a primarily universal plane to a 
discursive local one. The search for identity in the conditions of the modern 
world has led to increased ethnic nationalism in some cases and official 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism in other. This dialectic has been described as 
"politics of the soil" verses the "politics of the satellite". See Susantha 
Goonatilake, "The Self Wandering between Cultural Localization and 
Globalization", in Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bikhu Parekh, ed., The 
Decolonization of Imagination and Cultural Knowledge (Calcutta, 1997), pp. 
225-26. Robert J. Antonio, "After Postmodernism : Reactionary Tribalism", 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 106 (July 2000), p. 51. See, J.E. Spence, 
"Ethnicity and International Relations", International Affairs, Vol. 72 (1996), 
p. 440. 

84. Kellas, n. 28, p. 84. 

85. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (N.Y., 1992), p. 
271. 

86. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflection on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (N.Y., 1991), p. 37. See also, David J. Elkins, 
"Globalization, Telecommunication, and Virtual Ethnic Communities", 
International Political Science Review, Vol. 18 (1997), p. 145. See Benedict 
Anderson, "Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationality", new Left Review, 
Vol. 9 (May /June 2001), p. 42. For study of informal nationalism identified in 
collective events such as ritual celebrations, international sports and impact of 
communication revolution on these events see Thomas Hylland Eriksen, 
"Formal and informal nationalism", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 16 
(January 1993), pp. 1-23. 

87. Kellas, n. 28, p. 86. For study of the impact of religion on eruption of ethnic 
conflicts see, Jonathan Fox, "Religion as an Overlooked element of 
International Relations", International Studies Association, Vol. 3 (2001), pp. 
53-73. Robert Wuthmnow, "Understanding Religion and Politics", Daedalus, 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 59 



Vol. 120 (Summer 1991), pp. 1-20, see also, N.J. Demerath, "Religious 
Capital and Capital Religious : Cross-Cultural and Non-Legal Factors in the 
Separation of Church and State" , Daedalus, Vol. 120 (Summer, 1991), pp. 21- 
40. 

88. Ibid. 

89. J. Milton Yinger, Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict? (ND, 
1997), p. 13. 

90. For Marx, ethnic nationalism and religion were both integral parts of the 
superstructure created by the dominant economic and political classes... to 
legitimize their rule. The process of modernization was expected to culminate 
in the victory of 'proletariat', meaning that ethnic nationalism would ultimately 
disappear as would other social manifestations of class domination. The 
Marxist scholarly legacy, analyze the rule of ethnicity in politics as 
comparatively ephemeral phenomenon, to be shaped and eventually destroyed 
by the forces of modernization. The liberals, on the other hand, assumed that 
increasing advancement in communications, transportation, industrialisation 
and urbanisation would create a common political identity uniting all 
inhabitants of the state and eliminate the sources of ethnic conflicts. To the 
liberals, these processes, which the newly independent and multi-ethnic states 
of developing world were attempting to realise, required the unifying quality of 
civic nationalism. Hence, political nation-building was seen as a logical 
corollary of modernisation. It is argued that the process of economic 
modernization leads to a division of labour, which has the potential to replace 
a mechanically integrated society with an organically integrated society. A 
mechanically integrated society is united by a collective conscience created by 
a series of "primordial" identifications. These remarkably enduring primordial 
identifications contain the sacred symbols that reproduce the social structure of 
a society. Consequently, the collective conscience plays an indispensable role 
in the maintenance of social unity. With to change in a society based on division 
of labor, every citizen becomes dependent on every other citizen because no 
one person can be self sufficient. Each person is a small piece in a huge puzzle 
that can only be completed when each performs his or her particular role. In 
this organically integrated society (the product of economic modernization), the 
primordial collective conscience is no longer relevant to the integration and 
survival of society. Hence, functional bonds between people replace the ethnic 
bonds of the past and society becomes organically integrated. Thus, ethnic 
identification loses its importance. Phadnis and Ganguly, n. 20, p. 35. 

91. Modernization refers to a culture of high technology, formal organizations, 
civic value system and vigorous social mobilization. There are four stems of 
modernization, viz., technological, institutional, valuational and behavioural. 
The version of modernization which stresses technological progress is indeed 
so popular that even a socialist nation such as 'China' adopts it is a legitimate 
goal. The institutional stem of modernization implies the emergence or 
preponderance of market economy, bureaucracy, professions and democracy 
and all of which are based on the central principles or features of modern 
organisations. The third stem i.e. emergence of civic values, signifies a 



60 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



transition from the sacred to secular value system. Prevalence of a sacred 
order, ascription, particularism and subordination of the individual to the 
group are believed to be some of the values, characteristics of pre-modern 
societies while secularism, achievement-orientation, universalism and 
individual autonomy are regarded as modern, rational values. Finally, the 
behavioural stem of modernization manifests itself in the form of increased 
psychic, physical and social mobility as a result of an enhanced sense of 
individual efficacy. This sense of individual efficacy is believed to be derived 
from the rational presupposition about man's ability to conquer nature and 
shape his own destiny. In his conflictual Modernization approach, Joseph 
Rothchild argued that the ethnic groups and state as actors possess economic 
and political resources and the form or existence of ethnic political activity is 
dependent on the balance among ethnic groups within a given state. The 
political, economic and demographic balance among ethnic groups determines 
the resources and opportunities available to ethnic groups in their political 
battles. He further argued that economic modernization and political 
development do not provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
politicization of ethnic identifications. Instead the sufficient conditions for the 
rise of ethnic political movements are dependent on the economic political and 
ideological resources available to ethnic groups. Ronald Rogowski also 
emphasizes that modernization may create the necessary conditions for ethnic 
political activity but the actual development of this conflict depends upon the 
balance of resources available to the various ethnic groups within a state. The 
modernizatrion process determines the economic and political resources 
available to specific ethnic group and the relative levels of these resources in 
turn structure ethnic groups ideologies, strategies and political organization. He 
focuses on both 'plural states' in which one ethnic group dominates other in 
hierarchical cultural division of labour and on pillarized societies in which each 
ethnic group retains necessary skills for the creation of complete independent 
state. A rational choice theory can explain, how individuals from each type of 
ethnic group within a state react to other ethnic groups dominance, whether by 
assimilation, isolation, apathy, resistance or minority nationalism and it can 
also be used to explain the invention of a new ethnic identity or the option of 
non-ethnic resistance to subordination. It is clear from the analysis of 
conflictual modernization and rational choice theories that the dominant 
interpretation of ethnic political activity remained firmly rooted in the 
modernization perspective. The process of economic modernization does not 
undermine ethnic divisions but invigorates them by bringing together 
previously isolated ethnic groups that suddenly find themselves competing for 
the same economic niches. The modernization process also provides the 
underlying conditions for the rise of many social and political movements. It 
also helps to sculpt the institutional structure and ideological character of these 
movements. This process also forms and politicizes social and political 
identities in new ways. The resurgence of religious political movements has 
been took place since late 1970 in the Middle East and North Africa encourage 
a greater role in state structures and institutions for clergy, theology and 
practice. In the last decades of twentieth century, religio-political groups 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 61 



endeavour sometimes to achieve their objectives by extending their fields of 
operations from the domestic to the international field of action. Sharma, n. 3, 
pp. 35-36. Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States : The Quest for 
Modernity in Asia and Africa (N.Y., 1963). See also, Walker Conner, "The 
Politics of Ethnonationalism" , Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 27 (Jan. 
1973), pp. 1-2. Jeff Haynes, "Religion" in Brian White et al., Issues in World 
Politics (NY, 2001), p. 158. 

92. In this perspective, extensions in the scope and centrality of the market, 
unequivocally undermine ethnic attachments, with the extension of the market, 
the dominant orientation becomes one of economic rationality. Ethnic 
attachments recede as the universalistic (achievement) criteria that demarcate 
this rationality, replace the previously dominant particularistic (ascriptive) 
criteria. So, the ethnic identities have no role in the mechanics of the market 
and they should lose their meaning in the orientation of individuals. Thus, the 
developmental model predicts that the ethnic attachments will diminish with the 
progress of economic development. But, ethnic attachments that do exist in 
developed countries are thought to be sentiments that have so far escaped from 
the inevitable consequences of economic development. Eric M. Leifer, 
"Competing Models of Political Mobilization : The Role of Ethnic Ties", 
American Journal of Sociology , Vol. 87 (July 1981/1982), pp. 24-25. 

93. Kellas, n. 28, pp. 49-50. 

94. Leifer, n. 92, pp. 29-30. 

95. Elise Giuliano, "Who Determines the Self in the Politics of Self- 
Determination?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 32 (April 2000), p. 297. 

96. Michael Banton, "Mixed motives and the process of rationalization, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, Vol. 8 (October 1985), pp. 534, 535, 537. For detailed study 
of rational choice theory, see also, Elinor Ostrom, "A Behavioural Approach 
to the Rational Theory of Collective Action", American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 92 (March 1998), pp. 1-9. See Catherine McArdle Kelleher, 
"Indicators, Implications and Policy Choices", in Leokadia Drobizheva, Ethnic 
Conflict in the Post-Soviet World (NY, 1998), pp. 342-43. See Shirley Dex, 
"The use of Economists models in Sociology", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 
8 (October 1985), p. 517. For Free-rider Problem of Ethnic elites see Hudosn 
Meadwell, "Cultural and Instrumental approaches to ethnic nationalism, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, Vol. 12 (July 1989), pp. 309-325. 

97. William A. Douglass, "A critique of recent trends in the analysis of 
ethnonationlism", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 11 (April 1988), p. 195. 

98. Saul Newman, "Nationalism in Postindustrial Societies: Why states still 
matter", Comparative Politics, Vol. 33 (October 2000), p. 28. 

99. The international economic integration offered economic incentives to ethnic 
nations and regions in existing states to seek secession. In the early years of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), when trade barriers between 
countries were high, it made economic sense for ethnic nations and regions to 
remain in a large state with large market. But with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) regime created in 1995, provides free trade, small ethnic 
nations and smaller regions can hope to become both politically independent 

62 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



and economically viable. The goal of wars that took place in various regions is 
to make countries smaller rather than larger. One reason of this development is 
that most contemporary goliath states are singularly unsuccessful. For example, 
Brazil, China, India and Indonesia has not become developed country despite 
extraordinary human and natural resources. Small countries are among the 
fastest-growing and most effective traders in the World War II era 
Luxembourg, Singapore and Switzerland may all be geographically isolated and 
have almost no natural resources. But according to World Economic Forum 
report on global competitiveness, these small countries are almost twice as 
competitiveness in terms of quality of infrastructure, technology and business 
management as Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, the United States and United 
Kingdom. Four times more than Asia's manufacturing states, six times more 
than the European union and seven times more than Latin American states. Juan 
Enriquez, "Too Many Flags", Foreign Policy, (Fall 1999), p. 36. 

100. Jeffrey Herbst, "Global Change and the Future of Existing Nation-State", in 
Wolfgong Danspeckuber, ed., The Self Determination of Peoples 
Community, Nation, and State in Independent World (USA, 2002), p. 24. See 
also, Phadnis and Ganguly, n. 20, pp. 49-50. 

101. Mircea Malitza, "Ten Thousand Cultures, A Single Civilization", International 
Political Science Review, Vol. 21 (Jan. 2001), p. 77. See also, International 
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (ed.) Frank N. Magill (London, 1995), Vol. 
5, p. 527. 

102. Arjun Appardurai, Modernity at Large : Cultural Dimensions of Globalization 
(Delhi, 1997), p. 150. 

103. Ted Robert Gur, Why minorities rebel: A global analysis of communal 
mobilization and conflict since 1945, International Political Science Review, 
Vol. 14 (April 1994), pp. 161-201. 

104. For study of ethnic conflicts on the basis of "Security dilemma" See, Barry, 
R., Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", Survival, Vol. 35 
(Spring 1993), pp. 27-47. 

105. Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence", 
Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 24, 1998, p. 438, 439. See also, Houten, n. 
49, pp. 110-114. 

106. Peter Weinreich, "Rattionality and irrationality in racial and ethnic relations: A 
metatheoretical framework", Ehnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 8 (October 1985), 
p. 502. 

107. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation", 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 90 (Dec. 1996), p. 719. For analysis 
of 'fear' and antipathy's role in eruption of ethnic violence see Donald L. 
Horowitz, The deadly ethnic riot (ND: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 
548-553. 

108. Brubaker and Laitin, n. 105, pp. 442-443. 

109. Lars-Erik Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity" in Walter Carlsnaes et al., 
ed., Handbook of International Relations (London, 2002), p. 441. See also, 
Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", Foreign Affairs (Summer 
1993), pp. 22-23. 

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 63 



110. For rebuttals of Huntington's thesis see Foud Azmi. "The Summoning", 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (Sep/Oct 1993), pp. 2-9. See also, Kanti Bajpai, 
"Samuel P. Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Reconsidered", International 
Studies, Vol. 3 (Mach 1999), pp. 165-166. 

111. Gregory R. Copley, "Pseudospeciation : A Principal Weapon in Waging War, 
It also Threatens Peace", Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Vol. 
XXIII (Nov. /Dec. 1995), p. 17. See also, Gregory R. Copley, "The New 
Rome and The New Religious Wars", Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic 
Policy, Vol. XXVII (1999), p. 4. 

112. Cvijeto Job, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furries", Foreign Policy (Fall 1993), p. 67. 

113. The concept of 'Genocide' was invented in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin to analyse 
certain Nazi war crimes, the deliberate destruction of nations or ethnic groups, 
that were so extreme that international law did not have a name for them. 
Although Lemkin constructed the concept for this historically specific purpose, 
he believed that genocide was an ancient practice that had re-appeared in the 
midst of modern civilization. In 1948 United Nations adopted a convention on 
Genocide declaring that "at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great 
losses on humanity. The belief that genocide has a long history. Leo Kuper 
declared that "the world is new, the crime ancient. For more details see 
Michael Ereman, "Religion, Nationalism and Genocide; Ancient Judaism 
Revisited", Archives European Journal of Sociology, Tome XXXV (1994), p. 
260. See also, William Safire, Safire's New Political Dictionary (NY, 1993), 
pp. 247-331. See also, Gregory Copley, "Hiding Genocide", Defense and 
Foreign Strategic Policy, Vol. xx (Dec. 31, 1992), pp. 4-9. 

114. For more details about ethnic cleansing see Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, "A Brief 
History of Ethnic Cleansing", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (Summer 1993), pp. 
110-121. See also, Nicholas Comfort, "Brewer's Politics: A Phrase and Fable 
Dictionary (London, 1995), p. 188. For more details about ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo see www.state.govt/www/regions/eur/rpt_990604 ksvo_ethnic.html 



64 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Chapter 2 



Issue of Kosovo as an Ethnic Problem 

The artificial construction of Yugoslavia collapsed when the 
Soviet Union disintegrated. It led to the eruption of violent ethnic 
conflict in Yugoslavia's republics i.e. Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo. 1 The roots of the ethnic violence and 
atomization of Yugoslavia must be sought in the ethno-history, 
economy and culture of the region. Extreme ethnic heterogeneity, 
intractable religious and group rivalries and conflict of deeper socio- 
historical interests between various Yugoslav nations tore apart the 
artificial composition of country. Thus, the Kosovo crisis is also the 
product of these ethnic, religious and socio-historic rivalries 
between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in Yugoslavia. 

The analogy of "tectonic motion" can aptly be applied on the 
events that occurred in Yugoslavia. It describes that the current 
reshaping of world is that of the giant plates that make up the earth's 
rocky crust, because this movement can reshape continents and alter 
climates, sometimes cataclysmically through the earthquakes and 
volcanoes it produces. 2 This geological metaphor conveys the scale 
of changes occurred in Yugoslavia and illustrates how surface events 
are the product of the forces of ethnicity, ethnocide, ethnogenesis, 
ethnocentrism, ethnonationalism and historical hatreds. These forces 
not only torn apart the Yugoslav society but led it towards the 
process of 'pseudospeciation'. 3 This resulted in the most bloodiest 
massacres of Serbs, Croates, Bosnians and Albanian Muslims and 
created the worst 'refugee problem in the post- World War II 
European history. Consequently, this humanitarian crisis provided 
chance to NATO forces and the United States to intervene in 
Yugoslavia. Later, this intervention in Kosovo (which was not 
authorised by the United Nations Security Council) raised various 
legal questions in world politics. Therefore, the Kosovo crisis 
cannot be understood without the analysis of these forces. 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 65 



HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SERBIA-KOSVO CONFLICT 

Kosovo crisis is also complicated one and any attempt to 
understand it requires a brief review of Yugoslavia's historical 
background. Kosovo, sometimes called Southern Serbia, is a part of 
Yugoslavia (Now Serbia and Montenegro). Yugoslavia, the land of 
south (Jug) Slavs, came into existence after World War I as the 
kingdom of the Serbs, Croates and Slovenes. 4 The national character 
of each unit has been deeply coloured by the relationship in which it 
has lived for so long with the stronger alien powers. This 
relationship was basically of opposition, but at the same time one of 
developing cultural, psychological and religious affinities. 
Although, this meant that, in their urge to absorb or unite with each 
other, the components of the Yugoslav state have found themselves 
marked by differences of outlook and tradition. 5 

A similar pattern of external intervention influenced even the 
formation of cultural identities of the South Slavs. These 
interventions not only tended to deprive the South Slavs from 
indigenous development but intensified their ethno-historic 
memories and sharpen their sense of identities. They remained 
largely unaffected by the world religions until they encountered 
imperialism which introduced world religions in the area. The South 
Slavs living within the Austro-Hungarian empire (i.e. most Slovenes 
and Croates) tended to adopt Roman Catholicism while the South 
Slav living within Ottoman empire tended to adopt eastern Orthodox 
religion (most Serbs) or Islam. If the cultural and political fallout of 
imperialism largely defined most of the identities and boundaries in 
the Balkans, ethnic struggle against such imperialism tended to 
crystalise and solidify their identities. This was particularly true for 
Serbs who dominated the South Slav's chequered history up to the 
modern period. 6 

Since beginning Yugoslavia under the rule of Serbia's royal 
dynasty, was a problem child. The crux of the problem was the 
relationship between the two largest ethnic groups (Serb and 
Croates). Although at the end of World War I, most Croat leaders 
opted to join a common state with Serbs provided they were 
accepted as equal partners and allowed to manage their own affairs. 7 
The Croats began to feel betrayed after sometime and the Serbian 

66 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



historical tendency to dominate the Balkan politics and their implicit 
claim to South Slavic leadership has been challenged by this most 
organised and assertive group. The Serbs looked upon this country 
as an extension of their former territory, the fruit of their struggles 
up to World War I. 

After the failure of the first attempt of South Slav unification 
through a multi-party Parliamentary democracy (1918-28), the 
kingdom of Yugoslavia was established in 1929. It lasted until 
1941. 8 After World War II the Soviet Union had exercised her 
influence on Yugoslavia to counter the Western challenge in the 
region. This global polarization also hindered the process of 
emergence of nation-state structure in Balkan region. The 
communist party in Yugoslavia, which was reasonably 
multinational, especially during Marshal Tito's reign could neither 
undo the process of regional imbalances nor could harmonize the 
cultural and social relationships among the communities. After the 
downfall of communist regime in 1989-90, the region seemed to 
have thrown back into more or less Pre- 19 14 environment in which 
old age rivalries among different communities were being revived. 
For nearly forty years, from 1943 to 1980, Yugoslavia was guided 
by firm hand of Josip Broz Tito. 9 Soon after the death of President 
Tito in 1980, social conflict in Kosovo witnessed the ethnic strife of 
unprecedented level. Political decay after Tito's death has given rise 
to two processes, first, the process of political decay contributed to 
genuine democratization, as communist party elders lost both the 
capacity and will to assert firm control. In the context of political 
weaknesses and increasing fluidity, new associations and groupings 
emerged with clear political programs resulted in second process 
called ethnic polarization. 

This process of ethnic Polarization resulted in ethnic antagonism 
between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in 1981. Here the ethnicity 
played the crucial role. As a cultural construct ethnicity signify a 
composite of symbolic markers, real or putative used by the 
members of an ethnic group who define themselves and are defined 
by others as having a distinctive identity. These characteristics may 
include combination of cultural attributes (like language, religion 
and values), territorial attributes (i.e. region or locality) and 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 67 



biological attributes (i.e. decent and kinship). As a situational 
construct, ethnicity signifies the emergence of ethnic consciousness 
from a situation of multi-ethnic competitiveness, and serves as an 
effective mode of mobilization. 10 In Kosovo, religious, regional and 
biological attributes of ethnicity creates antagonism between two 
ethnic groups i.e. Albanians and Serbs. The Albanians demanded 
cultural rights such as equality of their Albanian language with 
Serbo-Croat language. The Serbs and Kosovo Albanians are 
orthodox Christians and Muslims respectively. Both groups clashed 
upon religious values because of historical reasons. The Kosovo 
region is bordered with Albania and Kosovar Albanians has kinship 
ties with Albanians. This relationship threatened the Serbs and they 
always feared from Albanian nationalism. They felt that the 
Albanian nationalists' success inevitably resulted in the secession of 
Kosovo from Yugoslavia. This antagonism between both groups 
increased severely after President Tito's death and changed in 
international conflict after the end of Cold War. 

ETHNIC RELATIONS AS BOOSTER OF ETHNIC 
ANTAGONISM IN KOSVO 

International conflict is an inevitable aspect of international 
relations. Various types of international relations can be presented as 
a continuum representing two tendencies, one toward association or 
cooperation and other toward dissociation or antagonism. The 
middle point called neutrality or indifference. Different classes of 
association or dissociation present various types of intensity of 
international relations. With a change in intensity, the relations 
move from one class to another i.e. from cooperative relations to 
differences, opposition and antagonism. In times of antagonism 
some cooperation survives, permitting subsequent adjustment and 
negotiation. 

In the context of ethnic groups, the position of indifference : a 
medial point on a theoretical model is an ideal situation. In an 
extreme case, indifference means no relations whatsoever between 
ethnic groups. Under usual conditions, it suggests the existence of 
two ethnic groups in the same territory, having very limited relations 
of antagonism or association. Total indifference seldom occurs, in 
reality there is a pattern of group separation with limited process of 

68 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



association. 11 In some cases, it may operate as a device for the 
avoidance of antagonism. The process of dissociation between ethnic 
groups is also of various levels of intensity. 



Process of association 



Process of dissociation 



Antagonism 
Integration Indifference Conflict 



Fig. 2.1 : Model of Inter-ethnic Relations and Processes 

Source : Feliks Gross, World Politics and Tension Areas, p. 79. 

Some kinds of difference or competition are not necessarily 
synonymous with antagonism. Not all members of antagonistic 
group engage in this process, nor are all relations. There are many 
casual factors of ethnic antagonism. First are the differences in 
political status and uneven distribution of political power between 
different racial ethnic or religious groups leading in ethnic 
tensions. 12 In former Yugoslavia the political position of Serbs was 
highly hegemonic and from this Albanian Muslims in Kosovo have 
developed fear of repression. Albanian Muslim's fear proved true 
when Serbian dominated State Security Service (SDB) under 
Alexander Rankovich used various repressive measures against 
Albanian dissidents. Second, differences in political status, 
institutions and ideologies create ethnic tensions in society. However 
the most frequent incompatibility was in religious values. Albanian 
Muslims embraced Islam under Turkish-Rule and Serbians were 
Orthodox Christians. However backward, Kosovo's Albanian 
Muslim peasants would not wish to give up their land or their 
religion. Anti-Serbianism and anti-communism mixed in the 
previous round of demonstration in 1968 and since than the 
resurgence of Islam in Yugoslavia has come as an additional 
booster. 13 Another cause of antagonism was, Kosovar Muslim's 
dissatisfaction with their institutional position in Yugoslavia. They 
wanted to be a full-fledged republic for attaining benefits directly 
from outside resources. 14 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 69 



Thirdly, economic factors are also one of the major causes of 
ethnic tensions. Economic tensions reinforce ethnic tensions when 
ethnic divisions coincide with economic subordination. Kosovo 
possessed big quantities of natural resources. Beside this, it 
remained the less developed region of Yugoslavia. 15 The Kosovo 
Albanians claimed that Serbs were responsible for their dismal 
economic position but Serbs counterclaimed that Albanians 
increased population was responsible for their economic 
degradation. Complementary migration of Serbs and Albanians in 
province also antagonised the relations of both communities. 

Fourthly, psychological and general sociological 
incompatibilities are also responsible for creating ethnic tensions. 
Some cultures develop or favour the development of certain 
behavioural patterns and personality types that may differ 
substantially from those of other cultures. Difficulties in integration 
or in the adjustment or reconciliation of different behaviours may 
lead to antagonistic feelings. Ethnic or racial hostilities may reflect 
deep psychological problems, sometimes resulting in pathological 
needs and urges of destruction and aggression. In any society when 
ethnic hostilities, pathological needs and urges of destruction start 
complementing each other, frustration of wishes of ethnic groups 
may take the shape of outburst of aggression. Ethnic and religious 
differences intensified with cumulative effect in Kosovo, where the 
diversity of the population was strong and antagonism sharp. The 
majority in Kosovo population was champion of Turkish and Islamic 
causes and was in continuous and mutual antagonism with native 
Orthodox Serbian population. Both groups had different behaviour 
patterns and Serbians as a dominant group wanted to integrate 
Kosovo into Serbia. This process resulted into cycles of massacres. 
Step by step these struggles, massacres and raids shaped the social 
image, values and attitudes of Serbs towards the Muslim Albanians 16 . 
Antagonism has a cumulative tendency. One type of antagonism 
reinforces the other in a continuous interaction. The ethnic 
antagonism reinforces economic antagonism and vice versa. The 
religious tensions were projected into ethnic and economic terms. 

The relationship between Albanians and Serbs underwent a 
tremendous change (from out-groups to anti-groups) during the 

70 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



times of antagonism. The change in relationship between ethnic 
groups is very well perceived by the model of ethnic distance. 





A 


BCD 


1A 


In Group 


2B 


Friends 


3C 


Neighbours 


4D 


Friendly outgroup 





Line of Indifference 


5E 


Unfriendly outgroup 


6F 


Adversaries 


7G 


Enemies 


8H 


Archenemies 




Fig. 2.2 : Model of Ethnic Distance 

Source : Felik Gross, World Politics and Tension Areas, p. 84. 

In this model ethnic actor is the person, who plays an ethnic role 
at a given movement and identifies himself with an ethnic religious 
group. The model represents ethnic proximity as a continuum 
parallel to the two tendencies of association or dissociation. In the 
middle the dividing line is drawn through point and this represents 
neutrality or indifference. Actor is put at the extreme point of the 
line (on left side) within his own in-group. In multiethnic area, the 
actor sees following groups according to social proximity or distance 
i.e. no. 1, his own in-group, no. 2, associated group, no. 3, 
neighbours, no. 4, friendly out-groups. The last are somewhat 
distant groups with no special relationship with actor's in-group. 17 
The first three categories belong to a large class of "pro-groups" but 
fourth lies between the pro-group and the dividing line of 
indifference. 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



71 



From the indifference line to the right, the social distance 
increases rapidly and the antagonistic relationships are represented 
by various ranks of antagonisms. An actor may identify no. 5, an 
unfriendly out-group (not necessarily an active enemy or an 
antagonist but nonethless passive and unfriendly). Then comes anti- 
groups (antagonists) with variety of ranks. No. 6 is adversaries, 
antagonists without a tendency toward the destruction or total 
subordination of actor's in-group. After that leaning more toward 
no. 7, enemies and no. 8, archenemies. The enemy represents a 
temporary hostility by a group whose antagonistic role changes in 
history. But the 'hereditary' or archenemy represents a group toward 
which the hostility is transmitted by traditional lore and history from 
generation to generation. The younger generation learns about past 
hostilities with this group, so that the continuation of the quarrel in 
time and space is regarded as a historical duty, a matter of national 
honour and obligation. 18 

The tension between Albanians and Serbs eased, whenever, 
hostilities subsided, resulting in former anti-group becoming again 
an out-group. On the contrary the increase in differences in the ranks 
of groups become antagonistic and turned enemies towards each 
other. The traditional image of arch-enemy reappeared resulting in 
intesifying of hostility and aggression. The massacres, genocides 
became a tragic part of ethnic relations in Balkans, particularly in 
Kosovo. 

GROWTH OF ETHNIC TENSION IN KOSOVO AND RISE 
OF PRESIDENT SLOVODAN MILOSEVIC 

Kosovo passed through three major stages of ethnic tensions 

(i) a growth of inter-ethnic tensions, 

(ii) the intensification of interethnic rivalry into an 
intrapolitical tension in which the state take part usually 
supporting one ethnic group against other. 

(iii) an inter-political and inter-ethnic tension (complex tension) 
in which at least two states and governments were 
involved. 

The analysis of the growth of inter-ethnic tensions in Kosovo 
requires examining of some elements of ethnicity i.e. 

72 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



(i) The vital importance of past. 

(ii) The awareness of the history of a country to understand the 
complexities of the present. 19 

Analyses of ethnic tensions are often made in terms of historical 
legacies in which language, culture and religion are often regarded 
as essential factors. Ethnic identities carry with them centuries old 
tensions, hostilities and historical grievances. Ethnicity and 
nationalism would merge together when attempts are made to 
redress the grievances of different ethnic groups. It is also argued 
that ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe was caused not only by inter- 
group differences, ancient hatred and ethnic passion (long bottled up 
by the repressive communist regimes, uncorked by the end of Cold 
War) but also collective fear for future played an important role in 
aggravating the situation there. 

The perception of threat also played major role in ethnic 
conflicts and Kosovo is no exception. These conflicts erupt in 
reaction to a perceived threat to one's own or one's group's physical 
or psychological survival and well being at the present and in the 
future. Historical memories of past, unjust deeds including "ancient 
hatreds" and centuries old feuds, may be used with passion in 
pursuit of attaining freedom from the perceived source of threat, 
which may be one human being or a group of whatever type. 20 The 
ethnic conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo are indeed 
based on perception of threat to common future and ancient hatreds 
and historical memories used passionately by both groups. 

The bone of contention in Kosovo crisis was the conflict 
between Serbs and Albanians. The Serbs wanted to preserve their 
dominant position to maintain Kosovo with in the jurisdiction of 
Serbia. The Albanians, in the other hand, perceived it as unjust 
political arrangements of the past. Both the communities had their 
own point of view in claiming the province of Kosovo on historical 
grounds. 21 In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, events occurred 
which hardened the Modern Serb- Albanian enmity. Various 
massacres that often occasioned by the interference of the great 
powers further poisoned relation between the two peoples. 22 

Other main discontent of Kosovar Albanians was that they were 
not given the status of republic in Yugoslavia while they constituted 

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 73 



largest minority of the country. On the other hand, Serbian source 
of anger was Kosovo's constitutional situation in Serbia. 23 Since 
1960, ethnic Albanians had become victims of repressive policies 
carried to an extreme by Alexander Rankovich, the then head of the 
secret police and Vice-President of Yugoslavia. 24 They were also 
discriminated against in the economic sphere. 25 The dismissal of 
Alexander Rankovic at the Brioni Plenum of the Leage of 
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1966 and the dissolution of the 
Serbian led secret police in Kosovo, marked a turning point in the 
ethnic Albanians struggle for equality. 

The Albanians took advantage of the Post-Rankovich euphoria 
to demand full recognition of their national rights, greater autonomy 
and policy-making rights and responsibilities for Kosovo. At a 
session of the socialist Alliance of working people of Serbia in April 
1968 Mehmet Hoxha, a distinguished partisan hero from Kosovo, 
raised very legitimate question that why do 370,000 Montenegrins 
have their own republic, while 1.2 million Albanians do not even 
have total autonomy. In November 1968, demonstrations broke out 
in Pristina and other Kosovo cities, which called for the 
improvement of ethnic Albanians status, economic and cultural 
opportunities and the recognition of their human and national 
rights. 26 Under the impact of these demonstrations President Tito 
decided to loosen the centralized control that was provoking 
resistance in other regions as well. 27 

Under 1974 Constitution, President Tito gave Kosovo Albanians 
a right of an equal voice within the collective federal presidency and 
a right to enter into bilateral cooperation Agreements with other 
countries. But the ethnic conflict between Albanians and Serbs 
became more pronounced during the seventies. The concessions 
granted by 1974 Constitution to Kosovo Albanians did not address 
two major problems which increased the sense of antagonism in 
Serbs. One was demographic, a higher birth rate of Albanians and 
exodus of Serbs (Serbian Population decreased from 30 per cent in 
1948 to less than 15 per cent in 1981). The second was economic. 
Although Kosovo was rich in mineral resources (such as lignite, 
lead, coal, zinc, ferronickel ore, silver, bauxite, and magnesite), but 
it lagged behind the rest of Yugoslavia. Kosovo Albanian resentment 

74 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



was constantly simmering because of their awareness of the fact that 
inspite of their ostensible autonomy economic and social problems 
were still growing. 

The demand of ethnic Albanians for political autonomy reached 
its climax in spring 1981. Though the demonstrations were 
controlled with the help of federal armed forces, thousand of 
Albanians arrested. These incidents further widened ethnic schism in 
Kosovo and strengthened the nationalist aspirations amongst 
Kosovar Albanians. The Serbs and Montenegrins continue to 
emigrate from Kosovo complaining systematic harassment involving 
rape, murder and attacks on their property by Albanians. 28 The 
Serbian Fear of Kosovo Albanians motive to secede from Yugoslav 
federation increased after President Tito's death who allowed the 
"Albaniansation" of Kosovo. 

Although, President Tito provides virtual veto to all the 
republics in federal Parliament but the principle of self- 
determination, including right of secession for constituent Yugoslav 
peoples was also engraved in constitution. These rights were 
considered as the safety valves for managing the pressures of 
national rivalries. But, President Tito's communism, however 
'reformed' could not escape from the 'iron law' of its being a dead 
end system. Yugoslav communism produced a society of 
diminishing returns, increase malaise and popular rejection. The 
growing degeneration in the last decades of Tito's rule weakened the 
system and with his death in 1980, Yugoslav society lost its revered 
charisma as well as his feared dictatorship. The communist party's 
monopoly on power had never really smothered ethnic furies and 
these furies dominated the institutions of state, despite their 
communist labels. It resulted in the ethno-nationalist feelings 
amongst various nationalities in Yugoslavia and emergence of 
Slovodan Milosevic as popular leader of Serbs. 29 

Milosevic's nationalistic policies and economic brinkmanship 30 
resulted in the disintegration of Yugoslav society. He badly inflamed 
nationalist passions and readily resorted war in order to advance his 
goals. Milosevic began down this path in 1987, when he openly and 
chauvinistically embraced the cause of Kosovo Serbs and issuing a 
challenge not just to Albanians but to all the Serb enemies. Slobodan 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 75 



Milosevic become President of Serbia in 1989. He exploited the 
hatred between Serbs and Albanians and started practising the age 
old politics of ehtnocide more vigorously. 31 

MILOSEVIC'S VERSION OF ETHNOCIDE WHICH 
PSEUDO-SPECIATED KOSVOS SOCIETY 

The process of the rise of Slobodan Milosevic was related with 
the clash of reality with a myth in Kosovo. The Serbs regarded 
Kosovo as the birthplace of Serbian culture because most of 
important monasteries of Serbian Orthodox church were located 
there. The national myth of Serbia as the tragic sentinel of Western 
civilization stems from the Ottoman victory over the Serbs at the 
'Battle of Kosovo in 1389. According to the Myth, Serbian blood 
has consecrated the soil of Kosovo and the integrity of Serbian 
nation would be inconceivable without Kosovo. It was this 
calculated reshaping of that Myth into a political justification for 
dictatorship, aggression and genocide that defined and fuelled the 
rise of Slobodan Milosevic. Myth however collides with 
inconvenient reality in Kosovo i.e. of the province's approximately 
two million population, over 90 per cent were ethnic Albanians. 32 
The Serbs constituted only the largest of several tiny minorities. 
Historical reality that various nationalities fought in 1389 war has 
largely been abandoned to make way for a mythic interpretation of 
the battle's significance. 

In 1989, on the anniversary of the 'Battle of Kosovo', President 
Milosevic removed Kosovo's autonomy, established direct Serbian 
rule over province, expelled the Albanians from the Kosovo 
Parliament, the state bureaucracy and state owned industries. He 
closed the state-run schools which gave instructions in Albanian 
language and also closed most of the medical system for them. 33 It 
was a Serbian version of apartheid, which enabled President 
Milosevic to use power of the state to enforce the rule of the small 
Serbian minority over ethnic Albanians. The policies of President 
Milosevic provided fertile ground for development of ethno-genesis 
and ethno-centrism. Ethno-genesis may emerge during a social 
movement, when people consciously forge (or try to forge) their 
futures by making specific reference to their common heritage, in 
order to create or enforce a particular desirable or undesirable 

76 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



destiny. A desirable destiny may be a 'land without evil' and 
undesirable destiny may be potential or perceived genocide at the 
hands of power wielders. Ethno-genesis is complimentary dimension 
of ethnocide, which is the conscious effort by power wielders within 
a nation state to obliterate a people's lifeways. 34 

The complimentary feature of ethnocide and ethnogenesis reflect 
the historio and contemporary struggle between hegemony and 
resistance to hegemony. The collision of nation-state nationalist 
ethnogenesis and ethnic-block ethnogenesis mark critical junctures 
of cultural histories. The strongest ethnic reaction against nation- 
state nationalism becomes manifest at the very moment of the 
consolidation of nation-state power. This is in part because of 
ethnocidal policies enacted in order to enforce cultural hegemony 
during the consolidation of such nation-state power. It is also 
because, at that moment people who did not entirely share nation- 
state ideologies of culture, consciously began to enact 
counterhegemonic strategies increasing their own sense of distinct 
history and altered destiny. Serbian xenophobia 35 exploded in 
Kosovo in 1989 when Serbian nationalists had taken control of the 
Yugoslav military and federal police. The remnants of self-rule had 
gradually stamped out between 1989-1991 when Milosevic 
suppressed the Kosovo assembly and tried to arrest its deputies. 
Serbian hegemony was maintained by widespread dismissals of 
Albanians from jobs, general dis-enfranchisement of local Albanian 
Majority. The tough policing in the province resulted in blockade of 
Albanian villages. In spite of the fact that less than ten percent of 
Kosovo's population was Serbian, the Serbo-Croat became the 
official language of Kosovo. 

President Milosevic terminated all secondary schooling in Albanian 
language and dismissed 6000 ethnic Albanian secondary school 
teachers. In July 1991, the Serbian assembly passed a law authorizing 
the distribution of 6000 hectares of land among Serbs wishing to settle 
in Kosovo. To carry out this plan authorities have confiscated the 
property of Albanians and turned it over to "colonists" and granted 
them Albanian land at bargain prices. Even Serbians destroyed 
ecological resources in Kosovo. The Dense forests in Kosovo had 
changed in bared stones. This provides the proof of old-Serb adage that 
"no grass grows where the Turk trod." 36 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 11 



Kosovar Albanians successfully resisted Serbian hegemonic 
designs to consolidate their power on Kosovo. The strongest 
reaction manifested in 1992 when Kosovo Albanians boycotted 
federal elections and elected their own 130 member Assembly 
(which was declared illegal by the Serbian Assembly). A writer 
turned politician Ibrahim Rugova leader of Democratic League of 
Kosovo (LDK) was elected President of self-proclaimed "Republic 
of Kosovo". 37 The parallel government administered by the LDK 
had sought to sustain an Albanian civil society 38 that had been 
excluded from all formal interactions with the Serbian administration 
by establishing and managing clinics, schools and legal services. 

Yugoslavia was never a genuine socialist society in the truest 
sense of the term. Being one of the most favoured states of Stalin 
among other East European states, it modeled its own federation 
according to the Soviet pattern. Following the Soviet example, 39 
"socialist" Yugoslavia did not liberate its non-Slav minorities and 
incorporated them into a South Slav political scheme called federal 
Yugoslavia. At some time in the Yugoslavia's Jerky development, 
President Tito sought to prevent a resurgence of Serbia's hegemony 
by granting autonomy to two of its provinces Kosovo and 
Vojvodina. An inter-balance achieved did not last long and the 
Kosovar nationalist upsurge made it totter. 40 Yugoslavia's consensus 
on identity, rights and obligations and peaceful conflict resolution 
had broken when President Milosevic applied ultranationalist 
policies in Kosovo. Once the purpose of maintaining a multi-ethnic 
Yugoslav identity was no longer shared by the Slovenian and 
Croatian republics, they declared independence in 1991. Yugoslav 
regime and its constitutional framework lacked the consensus that 
was required to bind its political community. Serbia's emphasis on 
ethnic purity leads toward conflict, war and destruction of economic 
basis of power that threatened community maintenance by 
undercutting the legitimacy of rules for the peaceful resolution of 
conflict. 

A multi-ethnic shared identity of Yugoslavia ceased to exist 
when Serbia deliberately and discriminatory violated the human 
rights of minority groups such as Kosovar Albanians. The 
application of rules which violated human rights, aggravated 

78 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



tensions between the dominant decision-makers and aggrieved out- 
groups. Similarly, governmental policies that require integration in 
the form of the acceptance of a particular language or religion in the 
name of a single national community ironically could destroy 
political community. And the groups those perceived themselves to 
be placed outside the community and denied equal rights, were 
likely to separate themselves into de facto nation-states to form 
political communities of their own and to seek full independence. 41 

The official government brands such rebellious communities as 
criminally deviant. But their leadership may maintain considerable 
legitimacy and support among followers. The Serbian rules which 
allowed forced settlement of Serbian peasants in Kosovo, recognised 
of Serbo-Croat language as official language and other repressive 
policies could destroy Serbian political community. Initially Kosovar 
Albanians demanded republican status for Kosovo in Yugoslavia. 
They separated themselves as a de facto nation state and demanded 
independence from Yugoslavia. The authorities branded Albanian 
community as criminally deviant and subjected it to brutal violations 
of their human rights and driving some 380,000 into exile. 42 The 
Albanians formed an underground community, a parallel Albanian 
society complete with their own political institutions, education and 
health care systems, cultural and sports leagues and a tax collection 
mechanism. This process created the sense of ethno-centrism and 
ethno-nationalism in Kosovo Albanians. 

The elements of ethnicity i.e. common ancestry, language, 
religion and culture may forge a sufficiently close 'psychological 
bond' of shared ethnic identity to form a nation. Nations are 
imagined communities because the members of even the smallest 
nation will never meet most of their fellow members or even hear of 
them, yet in the minds of each member lives the image of their own 
community. Nationalism is the extension of this psychological bond 
into the political goal of forming a separate, autonomous or 
independent political community. Ethnic nationalism provides the 
cultural foundation for the identity and legitimate authority at the 
core of an ethnically homogenous political community. 43 

Ethnic identity or ethnic consciousness is the essential 
independent variable that leads to political assertiveness and militant 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 79 



separatism regardless of the existence of equality and dominance. 
Social and economic discrepancies per se create discontent and may 
incite revolution but the discontent founded on ethnic symbols, such 
as language, religion, culture and origin lead to separation. 44 The 
Albanian language, ancestry, Islamic values forged a psychological 
bond of shared ethnic identity in Albanian Muslims in Kosovo. The 
Serbian repression gave extension to this psychological bond and 
created discontent between Kosovo Albanians. Their discontents 
which were founded on ethnic symbols (i.e. religion, culture, 
language, region etc.) leaded to Kosovo Albanian's demand of 
separatism from Yugoslavia. This process created and developed 
ethno-centric and ethno-nationalistic sentiments in Kosovo 
Albanians. 

Ethno-centrism is a rational choice made by members of ethnic 
groups that is competing for scarce resources, such as political 
power or territory. The tendency of ethno-centrism usually 
contributes to tension and hostility whenever groups conflict. 45 
President Tito provided autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina in 
Serbia with a view to reduce Serbian desire of hegemony. This act 
created ethnocentric sentiments in Serbs. Serbs for the sake of 
obtaining political power and territorial integration under President 
Milosevic applied pressure cooker (i.e. forced Assimilation) 
approach upon Kosovar Albanians. Serbian policies in Kosovo 
resulted in the development of ethno-nationalism in Kosovar 
Albanians and latter pseudospeciate the Yugoslav society. 

Ethnonationalism refers to the sentiments of belonging to a group 
identified by ties of ethnicity as well of preference to those of the 
nation-state. Most states are in fact multinational or multiethnic and 
in this way ethnic-nationalism may simply be recognized as a fact of 
political life. It may lead to secession as political goal and can result 
in a violent movement and political tendency. 46 President Milosevic 
exploited Serbian's ethno-centric political discontent and changed it a 
populist mobilization through mass rallies (called street democracy). 
He provoked sharp ethno-nationalist backlash not only in Albanian 
Muslims but also in other republics and ethnic groups. Slovenia, 
Croatia, Macedonia declared independence. The Kosovo Albanians 
in a reaction of Serbian repression developed a violent and 

80 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



secessionist movement. The ethno-nationalists started insurgency for 
liberation of Kosovo which was operating in the hills of Drenica. 47 

The failure of the international community to manage Kosovo 
crisis further aggravated the situation in Kosovo. It led to the 
transformation of non-violent resistance in favour of armed 
struggle. 48 

The United Nations Security Council adopted three resolutions 
for the management of Kosovo Crisis through diplomatic efforts in 
1998. On the other hand, President Milosevic started exploiting 
post-Rambouillet drift, confusion and indecision of NATO 
governments about military offensive in Kosovo. A Last straw came 
in when NATO started bombing of Serb targets on 24 March 1999. 
The seventy eight day Kosovo war reflected a cruel and rigorous 
nature of ethnic conflicts and their impact on international politics. 
It severely undermined the United Nations authority on the use of 
force in world affairs. On the contrast, the Kosovo war has further 
developed the major role of the United Nations in the field of 
humanitarian and human rights issues. 



References: 

1. Adam Przeworski, "The 'East' becomes the 'South'? The 'Autumn of the 
People' and the Future of Eastern Europe". PS, Vol. 24, (March 1991), p. 21. 

2. Michael T. Clare, "The New Challenges to Global Security", Current History, 
Vol. 92 (April 1993), p. 155. 

3. Pseudospeciation is that phenomenon by which individuals and groups protect 
their sense of identity by viewing other groups as less than human and more 
able to be disregarded and destroyed. See also, Geogory R. Copley, "The New 
Rome and The New Religious Wars", Defence and Foreign Affairs Strategic, 
Vol. XXVII (March 1999), p. 8. 

4. The Axis power had invaded and dismembered Yugoslavia after World War II. 
It re-emerged as a socialist Republic under Marshal Tito's communist- led 
National Liberation Movement (Partisans). The South Slavs delay in nation 
formation may be primarily due to their geo-strategic location within the 
European international system. They were situated at the crossroads of 
empires, international politics and war, which distorted the politico-cultural 
patterns of nation-formation in the Balkans. During 395-1453 AD, they were 
under Roman Empire, during 1389-1918 under Ottoman Empire and during 
1815-1918, under the Austro-Hungarian empire. With the collapse of Austro- 
Hungarian and Ottoman Empires in the course of the first World War, the allies 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 8 1 



at the Versailles decided on the creation of an independent south Slav State. In 
other worlds, it was not so much of the will of the South Slaves but an 
international political intervention that created the first Yugoslav state in 1918 
although it was first proposed as a South Slavs in 1866 by a congress of Slavic 
nationalists in Austro-Hungaria empire. For all 1500 years (395-1918 AD), the 
history of Yugoslavia is not only the history of stronger powers (which have at 
one or other controlled the component parts of present state) but also the story 
of the resistance offered by these component parts against on their 
independence and individuality. See, Dawa Norbu, "The Serbian Hegemony, 
Ethnic Heterogeneity and Yugoslav Break-up", Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. XXXIV (April 3, 1999), p. 833. See, Sasmita Sinha, "NATO 
Intervention in Former Yugoslavia : Lessons from the Past", International 
Studies, Vol. 38 (April 2000), p. 5. 

5. H.C. Darby et ah, A Short History of Yugoslavia (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 41- 
42. 

6. Harriet Gitchley, "The Failure of Federalism in Yugoslavia", International 
Journal, Vol. XLVIII, (Summer 1993), p. 436. 

7. Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia : New War, Old Hatreds", Foreign Policy 
(Summer 1993), p. 9. For more details about the Croat nationalism and Croat- 
Serb Feud, see Stephen Clissold, "Croat Separatism : National, Dissidence and 
Terrorism", Conflict Studies (January 1979), pp. 3-19. 

8. Again a Serbian king ruled and attempted to foster a 'Yugoslav nationality' in 
place of ethnic identities that had so much undermined the previous 
constitutional order. On the process, the core institutions of the pre-war Serbian 
state such as the monarchy, army, bureaucracy, Church were extended to and 
imposed upon other republics and provinces. The objective of assimilation of 
different nationalities into one reasonably homogeneous society was 
unsuccessfully pursued by the Marxists in communist Yugoslavia. This 
rendered the issue of nationalism and ethnicity as always contested. See, 
Norbu, n. 4, p. 883. 

9. The Titoist system had been founded on three core principles i.e. self 
management (embodied in its well known worker's councils) Brotherhood and 
unity (the doctrine of ethnic harmony through one party rule), non-alignment 
in foreign policy. All these principles began to decay in years following Tito's 
death in 1980. Thus, in former Yugoslavia the dimensions of social 
transformation were influenced by two processes, first, struggle to control state 
institutions among different ethnic groups led to origin of claims and counter 
claims. Second, attempts made by different alien ethnicities to forge the local 
solidarity led to growth of national consciousness from below. For saving 
federal institutions, President Tito formed a new constitution in 1974. A more 
pluralistic and decentralized administration was enshrined in this constitution. 
With a view to keeping Serbia relatively weak, Tito intended to gradually 
increase autonomy of the six constituent republics, including two autonomous 
Serbian provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. But the 1974 Yugoslav 
constitution marked the climax of Tito's decentralization. Although, this latest 
constitution seemed like a technique to balance domestic politics by ensuring a 

82 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



parity of rights as well as grievances but Serbs were resented from these 
constitutional arrangements. See, Sabrina Patra Ramet, "War in Balkans", 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71 (Fall 1992), p. 82. See, Gopal Singh and Prem R. 
Bhardwaj, "Ethnicities and Ethnic Conflict in Kosovo : Humanitarianism or 
New Imperialism" (Unpublished Research Paper, Punjabi University, Patiala), 
pp. 2-3. See, Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia : Balkan Miracle or Balkan 
Disaster" Current History, Vol. 95, (March 1996), p. 114. See, Narasingha P. 
Sil, "House of Cards : The Disintegration of Yugoslaiva", India Quarterly, 
Vol. 6, (Jan-June 1994), p. 40. 

10. S.L. Sharma, "The Salience of Ethnicity in Modernization : Evidence from 
India", Sociological Bulletin (March-September 1990), p. 37. 

11. Feliks Gross, World Politics and Tension Areas (NY, 1966), p. 78. 

12. Ibid., p. 79. 

13. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, "Kosovo : An Analysis of Yugoslavia's Albanian 
Problem", Conflict Studies (December 1982), p. 13. 

14. Cyril D'Souza, "The Break up of Yugoslavia", Economic and Political 
Weekly, 26 Nov. 1999, p. 3029. 

15. Kosovo's per capita income in 1988 was 40 percent of the average per capita 
income of Yugoslavia as a whole. After 1988, it decreased to 30 percent. In 
1995, GNP per capita of Kosovo was $1520 in comparison to Serbia's $4950 
and Slovenia's $12500. See, Bogomil Ferfila, "Yugoslavia : Confederation or 
Disintegration", Problems of Communism, Vol. XL (July-August 1991), p. 23. 
See World Geographic Encyclopedia, Sybil P. Parkar, McGraw Hill, New 
York, 1995, p. 245. See Tara Karath, "Yugoslavia : The Rise of Nationalism 
and the European Response", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XV (August 1992), pp. 
451-452. 

16. Gross, n. 11, pp. 110-111. 

17. Ibid., p. 83. 

18. Ibid., p. 84. 

19. Ibid., p. 103. 

20. R.N. Desilva, "Ethnicity and Conflict in South Asia", International Studies, 
Vol. 38 (January-March 2001), pp. 55-56. Dov Ronen, "Ethnicity in Central 
Europe : Minorities along Borders (Unpublished Research Paper, Punjabi 
University, Patiala). 

21. The Serbs based their claims on the fact that Kosovo was part of the Medieval 
Serbian state and that they were forced to emigrate from Kosovo and Albanians 
moved into the region during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Both 
Albanians and Serbs claim to be the original inhabitants of Kosovo. Time is the 
strongest argument of the Western legitimacy. Those who arrive first claim the 
territory. The late comer is considered to have weakest claim. In continental 
Europe, the historians and the statesmen were and are constantly lookout for 
the 'autochthonic argument' to prove that the nation they represent, was the 
earliest occupant of a given territory. Once the historical evidence, true or false 
is found, it is usually processed into official memoranda, symbols or rituals and 
slowly channeled into textbooks. Theories of early arrival becomes arguments 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 83 



in diplomatic negotiations and are used to reinforce nationalism. When the 
government wishes to escalate tension, it can manipulate the social myth of 
autochthonism to intensify emotions. The Albanians claims on the fact that their 
ancestors, Tllyrians' inhabited Kosovo long before the Slavs and despite waves 
of different foreign invasions, they managed to preserve their ethnic identity. 
Modern Albanian historiography rejects the Serbian argument that the 
Albanians first settled in Kosovo in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and 
claim that the Albanians represents an autochthonous ethnic group, which 
constituted the majority of Kosovo's population even before the seventeenth 
century. But Serbs claimed that Albanians settled in Serbian lands vacated by 
Serbs after the defeat of their two insurrections, in 1690 and 1737. Serbians 
claim that Albanians invaded and conquered the Kosovo province is not proved 
true according to Yugoslav history. But, it was the Serbs who first conquered 
Kosovo toward the end of 12th century. Stefan Nemanja, belonging to Rascian 
Dynasty of Serbia conquered Kosovo in 1189. Later Stefan Nemanja had 
founded his own dynasty called Nemanja dynasty. Albanians life under the 
Serbs was hard. Albanians were subjected to heavy taxes, their leaders and 
Priests were badly treated. While the Orthodox Serbs built Churches and 
Monasteries in the region but the religion did not become a central feature of 
the Serb- Albanian rivalry in Kosovo until the rise of Ottoman Empire. Many 
more Albanians than converted to Islam for the privileges this brought. In the 
end of 14th century, the Serbs were defeated by the Turks in the Battle of 
Kosovo in 1389. Consequently, the occupying Turkish forces forcibly settled 
Muslim Albanians in Kosovo. But real pressure on Kosovo Serbs increased 
during the Ottoman centuries, particularly after their support of an Austrian 
offensive that followed the Turks defeat at Vienna in 1683 and their subsequent 
victory at the second Battle of Kosovo in 1689. After this, Serbs had suffered 
the broad reprisals and they fled from the region together with their orthodox 
patriarch. Albanians suffered reprisals in those areas where Serb power grew 
but as yet the Albanians lacked a national movement or a national Church to 
unite them. See, Gross, n. 14, p. 105; Elez Biberaj, "Kosovo : The Struggle 
for Recognition", Conflict Studies (December 1982), p. 24; Miron Rezun, 
Europe's Nightmare (London : Praeger, 2001), pp. 26-27; Vladimir Dedijer et 
al., History of Yugoslavia (NY, 1974), p. 60; O.N. Mehrotra, "The Kosovo 
Crisis : Perception and Problem", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXII (October 
1996), p. 1084. 
22. The rise of nationalist ideologies, particularly Serb intellectual's canonization 
of Kosovo legend of 1389 and demonization of Albanians considered Kosovo 
as the cradle of their nationalism. The first organised Albanian nationalist 
movements i.e. the Albanian League of Prizren (1878) and The Leage of Peje 
(1899) were founded in Kosovo. But, after Ottoman's defeat in the first Balkan 
war in 1911, Serbia Swiftly conquered Kosovo and took horrific revenge 
against the Albanians. The 1913 London conference of Ambassadors, which 
recognised Albania's independence, assigned more than one-third of Albanian 
nation to Serbia and Montenegro. The Albanian's waged a long, but 
unsuccessful armed struggle against inclusion in what later become Yugoslavia. 
The tide turned in World War I, with the defeat of central powers, Serbia 

84 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



remained successful in the recovery of Kosovo. In just a decade tens of 
thousands had died on both sides and hundreds of thousands had been 
displaced. The New Yugoslav state while pledging to observe minority rights 
forcefully encouraged Albanians to leave Kosovo and launching a program of 
Serb 'recolonization'. In order to improve agriculture and try to redress the 
ethnic balance of population, land hungry Orthodox Serbian peasants from the 
barren mountainous regions began to pour in. It is estimated that prior to 1941, 
over half a million Albanians were forced to emigrate from Yugoslavia and that 
about 40,000 Slav colonists were settled in Kosovo. In 1941, with the collapse 
and partition of Yugoslavia, Kosovo and other Yugoslav and Greek territories 
which contained ethnic Albanians was annexed to the Italy run kingdom of 
Albania. Albanians were thankful to Italy and Germany for having brought 
about the realisation of national union. Once again, numerous Serbian refugees 
left the area incorporated with Albania. During World War II years, 10,000 
Serbs were killed in Pogroms, 100,000 fled their homes while 100,000 
Albanians moved into Kosovo from Albania. This pattern would be repeated in 
World War II, with massacres, expulsions and reimposition of Serbian 
hegemony following the Axis defeat. Communist party of Yugoslavia, at its 
fourth Congress held in Dresden in 1928, denounced the harsh persecution of 
the Albanians and endorsed the return of Kosovo to Albania. But it reversed its 
previous policy after the fall of Yugoslavia in 1941. In its dealings with 
Kosovar communists and Communist Party of Albania (CPA), CPY avoided 
taking a clear stand on the issue of future of Kosovo. Kosovo's union with 
Albania was also endorsed by the first conference of Provincial People's 
Council of Kosovo, which was held from 31 December 1943 to 2 January 1944 
in Albania. The central committee of the CPY in a letter of 28 March 1944 
rejected this resolution of the highest organ of the partisan movement in 
Kosovo. In late 1944, under the pretext of destroying "enemy" remnants, the 
Yugoslav army undertook a massive campaign in the Albanian regions. As a 
result the open revolt broke out in Kosovo. During late 1944, 10,000 Albanians 
were arrested and thousands executed. Two thousand Albanian recruits, mainly 
from Macedonia were reportedly killed by poisonous gas near Trieste. 
Albanian resistance grew with the coming of the Serb-dominated partisan led 
by Josip Broz Tito because Kosovars fearing that a communist victory would 
lead to Kosovo's reincorporation into Yugoslavia. An uprising that began in 
1944 was not fully suppressed until 1952. And again, the Serb dominated 
Yugoslavia (Now Socialist) that emerged from World War II began with a 
vicious crackdown on its Albanian Population because of their alleged 
cooperation with the invaders and nationalist forces against the partisan 
movement. The communist authorities perceived the Albanians as politically 
unreliable and as a possible threat to the stability and territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia. See, Ibid. , p. 25; Vanita Singh, "Bloodshed in Kosovo", 
Mainstream, Vol. XXXVI (October 31, 1988), p. 18; Joce Kriger, Oxford 
Companion to Politics of the World (NY, 2001), p. 476; Reginald Hibert, 
Albania's National Liberation Struggle : The Bitter Victory (London, 1991), 
p. 8. 
23. The constitutional arrangements concerning Albanian territories were decided 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 85 



arbitrarily. Kosovo was renamed Kosovo-Metohija (Kosmet) and was 
proclaimed autonomous region (oblast) within the republic of Serbia. Kosovo 
did not even have the same status and rights as Vojvodina, the other 
autonomous unit of Serbia. Vojvodina's governmental structure was similar to 
republics, it had a Supreme Court, highest governmental body (the people's 
assembly). In contrast, the governmental structure of autonomous region of 
Kosovo resembled that of local administrative units. It has no Supreme Court 
and its highest governmental body was people's council. Belgrade was in 
charge of all decisions, including those of purely local concern. Kosovo's 
autonomy was thus restricted primarily to the field of policy-execution rather 
than policy-making. On the other hand, Serbs argued that it was unfair that 
Kosovo and Vojvodina had a say in the running of Serbia but Serbia had no say 
in the running of two provinces. Kosovo and Vojvodina could and generally did 
vote against Serbia on the federal Presidency. Serbia was powerless to remedy 
the parlous situation of the Serbs in Kosovo. These emotive issues of Kosovo 
Albanians and Serbs later sparked a cycle of competitive nationalism which 
leads to the demise of Yugoslavia and severe ethnic war. See, S. Rajen Singh, 
"The Kosovo Crisis an the Quest for Diplomatic Solution", Indian Quarterly, 
Vol. LVI, (January-June 2000), p. 3. See, Tim Judah, "Kosovo's Road To 
War", Survival, Vol. 41 (Summer 1999), pp. 10-11. 

24. Under the pretext of fighting Albanian nationalism and irredentism, the secret 
police officials pursued a campaign of intimidation against the Albanians and 
also put pressure on them to emigrate. Between 1953 and 1957 some 195,000 
Albanians emigrated, most of them from Kosovo and Macedonia. By 1966, the 
number of ethnic Albanians forced to leave Yugoslavia reached 230,000. See, 
Biberaj, n. 21, p. 29. 

25. Following the break with the Soviet block and the exacerbation on relation 
between Albania and Belgrade, areas bordering on Albania were considered too 
vulnerable as a site for the construction of industrial projects. Investment per 
capita in Kosovo was considerably below the Yugoslav average. Thus, during 
the period 1947-56 Kosovo's gross investment per-capita were 36 per cent of 
Yugoslavia's average and during 1957-65, 59. 1 per cent. Decision on Kosovo's 
economic policy made in Belgrade, were politically motivated and as a result 
the region did not develop a diversified economy. Since the region was 
relatively rich in mineral resources but investments were primarily 
concentrated into the extractive industry, making Kosovo essentially a raw 
material supplier for the richer regions of Yugoslavia. Economic problems 
were compounded by the high birth rate among ethnic Albanians further 
impeded the already slow-climbing per-capita national income. See, Ibid., 
p. 30. 

26. The demonstrators demanded the creation of Kosovo republic, establishment of 
Albanian university, equal status for Serbo-Croatian and Albanian languages. 
But in February 1969, the twelfth plenum of CC of LCY Rejected the demand 
that Kosovo be granted republican status. Such a demand produced 
apprehensions in Serbia where the Albanians were suspected of harbouring 
their cherished dream of merging with neighbouring Albania and thus 
establishing a "greater Albania." See, Ibid. 

86 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



27. In 1968, a series of concessions were granted i.e. real administrative autonomy 
for Kosovo, provincial Supreme Court was established, the equality of 
Albanian, Serbo-Croatian and Turkish languages was recognised and for the 
elevation of Albanian culture and a new university in Pristina was established. 
See, Kriger, n. 22, p. 476. 

28. Keesing Records of World Events, Vol. 34 (March 1988), p. 35795. 

29. In 1984, Milosevic appointed as the head of the Belgrade Party Committee and 
in 1986, he succeeded as chief of the Serbian Communist Party. Milosevic 
reinvigorated the party by forcing it to embrace nationalism. His entry into 
Yugoslav politics put events on the fast tracks as it were. Yet other leading 
communists were interested in resolving the Kosovo problem. But from this 
problem Milosevic found the strength to overcome the fear of the masses. From 
this problem he understood the power of fear and knew how to use it for his 
own purpose. The mass movement of Kosovo Serbs developed spontaneously 
and with the help of party controlled media and the party machinery, he soon 
dominated the movement. Milosevic seem to have allied himself with the 
politics of fear. He thrives on it and is always on the lookout for the hostility 
and conflict that produce it. This is one of the deeper causes of Yugoslav civil 
war. Milosevic counted on war, the ultimate condition of fear to unite Serbs 
around him. That is why he refused to look for political solutions to the 
persecution of Serbs in Croatia after President Tudjman came to power and in 
Bosnia Herzigovina after Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic became its president 
in 1990. Milosevic welcomed the Serb's increased sense of insecurity and was 
only too glad to plunge them into a war in which they would see him for 
protection. He organized mass demonstration in Vojvodina, Kosovo and 
Montenegro, overthrow the regimes there and replace them with his own 
followers. He thus inspired fear in the leadership of other republics and gave 
arms to the Serb nationalists in other republics, other republics cite Serbia's 
rising nationalism as threat to their own people. See, Cvijeto Job, 
"Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furries", Foreign Policy (Fall 1993), p. 58; Aleksa 
Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (Summer 
1993), pp. 87-88. See Robert M. Hayden, "Yugoslavia's Collapse : National 
Suicide with Foreign Assistance", Economic and Political Weekly, 4 July 1992, 
p. 1380; Dusko Doder, "Reflections on a Schizophrenic Peace" in Robert L. 
Rothstein, After The Peace : Resistance and Reconciliation (London, 1994), 
p. 173. 

30. This term describes the condition of a society in which the nationalist policies 
and demands of an ethnic or religious group become destructive not only for 
the society it is a part of, but also for the group itself. It describes a situation 
in which mushrooming demands by ethnic groups paralyze the functioning of 
economic and political system. Economic and political conflicts with Serbia 
particularly with Milosevic and his supporter have also pushed Slovenes and 
Croats toward independence. Serbia effectively used its dominance of federal 
institutions to thwart economic reform initiatives. In eight member Yugoslav 
Presidency, Serbia controls the votes of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo 
and Vojvodina and can generally count on the support of Montenegro and 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 87 



Macedonia as well. Serbia has also sabotaged those economic policies it deems 
unfavourable to its interests. One example of Serbia's egregious economic act 
was the "Great Serbian Bank Robbery" of late 1990. Without the knowledge 
or approval of the federal government, Serbia's Parliament Printed US $ 1.8 
billion worth of diners to honor election promises made by Milosevic. This 
action convinced Slovenes and others that Serbia was not to be trusted. See, 
Milica Zarkovic bookman, Economic Decline and Nationalism in Balkans 
(London, 1994), p. 4; Carole Rogel, "Slovenia's Independence : A Reversal of 
History", Problems of Communism, Vol. XL (July-August 1991), p. 35. 

31. Ethnocide is the systematic and deliberatic destruction of one people's culture 
by other ethnic group especially by powerful group. Ethnocide is distinguished 
from genocide (Greek genos mean race) which is used to denote the physical 
destruction of a human group. Although ethnocide has been going on through 
history and several terms (such as deculturalization, integration, assimilation 
and cultural genocide) have been used to describe its different aspects. In pre- 
war Yugoslavia, Albanian Muslims were recognised as a separate ethnic group 
subjected to deliberate policy of ethnocide. They had expelled from their native 
lands subjected to persecution and their human rights were systematically 
violated. The Albanians were denied the right to use their native language and 
although they inhabited a compact territory. This territory was divided into four 
administrative sectors. The government followed a policy of 'Serbianisation' 
designed to assimilate Albanians and to change predominantly the Albanian 
character of Kosovo and other Albanian territories. Albanians were forced to 
change their names by adding Serb suffixes such as - vie, -ic and -c. Land were 
forcefully taken from Albanian farmers and given to Serbian and Montenegerin 
settlers. See, Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology (ed.), David Levinson 
and Melvin Ember, Henry Holt & Company, New York, 1996, p. 405, See 
The Oxford English Dictionary, Edn. 2, Vol. V; John M. Fraser, "Lessons 
from Yugoslavia", International Journal, Vol. LVII, (Autumn 2002), p. 645; 
Biberaj, n. 21, pp. 24-25. 

32. James Hooper, "Kosovo : America's Balkan Problem", Current History, Vol. 
627 (April 1999), p. 159. 

33. Mark Almond, Europe's Backyard War : The War in Balkans (London, 1994), 
p. 190. 

34. Levinson and Ember, n. 31, pp. 405-406. 

35. The meaning of Xenophobia is fear of foreigners verging on paranoia. It 
originated from Greek words Xenos (foreigner) and Phobos (fear). It is also 
also related with a person excessively devoted to his/her race, and showing 
unreasoning hostility and disdain for others. See Nicholas comfort, "Brewer's 
Politics : A Phrase and Fable Dictionary (London, 1995, pp. 88, 686. 

36. Ramet, n. 9, pp. 88-89. See also, Richard West, Tito and the Rise and Fall of 
Yugoslavia (London, 2001), pp. 354-355. 

37. Aleksander Pavkovic, "Recursive Secessions in Former Yugoslavia: To Hard 
a Case for Theories of Secession?" Political Studies, Vol. 48 (2000), p. 491. 
Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 38 (September 1992), p. 39103. 

38. For detailed study of civil society in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe see Isa 

88 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Blumi, "Kosova : From the Brink and Back Again", Current History, Vol. 100 
(Nov. 2001), p. 370. Ramashray Roy, Politics and Beyond (ND, 2002), pp. 
25-26. Larry Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation", Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 5 (July 1994), p. 5. See also, Michael W. Foley and Bob 
Edwards, "The Paradoxes of Civil Society", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7 
(July 1996), pp. 38, 39, 48, 49. Francis Fukuyama, "The Primacy of Culture", 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6 (Jan. 1996), p. 8. Peter Juviler and Sherrill 
Stroschein, "Missing boundaries of Comparison : The Political Community", 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 14 (Fall 1999), pp. 438-439. 

39. For analysis of failure of communism and role of ethnic factors in collapse of 
the USSR see Patrick Cockburn, "Dateline USSR : Ethnic Tremors", Foreign 
Policy, no. 74 (Spring 1989), pp. 169-170. See Arthur H. Miller et al., 
"Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: A Further 
Commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz", American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 90 (March 1991), p. 153. 

40. Arshi Pipa, "Serbian Apologetics : Markovic on Kosovo", Telos (Spring 
1990), p. 176. 

41. Juviler and Stroshein, n. 38, p. 448. 

42. Tihomir Loza, "Kosovo Albanians : Closing the Ranks, Transitions, Vol. 5 
(May 1998), pp. 16-17. 

43. Juviler and Stroshein, n. 38, p. 449. 

44. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (NY, 1991 ed.), p. 6. See Juviler and Stroschien, n. 38, 
p. 440. See also, Alexis Heraclides, The Self Determination of Minorities in 
International Politics (London, 1994), p. 8. 

45. Ethnocentrism means to give one's own race or ethnic group a supreme 
importance. Evolutionary explanations suggest that ethnocentrism is a 
biologically determined response to external threats against the group. 
Sociobiology points to the kin group basis of cultures and ethnocentrism aided 
the reproductive success of group members when they are in competition with 
other group for limited resources. These attitudes can undoubtedly be 
manipulated by elites and political leaders. Encyclopedia of Cultural 
Anthropology, n. 41, pp. 404-405. 

46. See John W. Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology : Research and 
Applications (NY, 1992), p. 293. 

47. Graham Evans and Jeferey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International 
Relations (London, 1998), p. 154. See, Lenard J. Cohen, "The Disintegration 
of Yugoslavia", Current History , Vol. 91 (Nov. 1992), p., 371. 

48. For more details about the efforts of international community for management 
of Kosovo crisis see Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 40 (February 
1989), p. 39872. Mark Weller, "The Rambouilet Conference on Kosovo", 
International Affairs, Vol. 75 (1999), p. 219; Richard Caplan, "International 
Diplomacy and The Crisis in Kosovo", International Affairs, Vol. 74 (1998), 
p. 747. 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 89 



Chapter 3 



United Nations Role in Kosovo Crisis 

The Kosovo crisis showed the severity of ethnic conflicts in 
international relations. Its escalation, in 1998, created new challenges 
for the United Nations. As described in the second chapter, the 
Kosovo crisis was the result of zero-sum ethnic conflict between the 
Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians. The Serbian Management of 
Kosovo conflict through the process of pseudospeciation resulted in 
serious human rights violations of Kosovo Albanians. These 
violations contained the extensive loss of life, destruction of property 
and mass exodus of refugees in Kosovo. The potential of 
humanitarian disaster in Kosovo was so strong that the Western 
powers attacked Yugoslavia without the mandate of Security Council. 

On the other hand, it is argued that the United Nations was silent 
spectator to the events in Kosovo. The paralysis of the United 
Nations system was the result of the failure of permanent members 
of the Security Council to have consensus on the course of action. 
On the contrary, the United Nations role was more complex in this 
crisis. It was focused on the humanitarian and human rights issues. 
The United Nations human rights system is a reflection of the 
contested status of human rights around the world. Human rights 
promotion through the charter system has been evolved 
considerably. Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration, 
human rights institutions in the United Nations system have both 
increased in numbers and often evolved beyond a declaratory and 
promotional status. The human rights system was moving from the 
1947 assertion that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) had 
"no power to take any action concerning human rights" (ECOSOC 
Resolution 75, 1947) to the authoritative Security Council's 
decisions declaring gross human rights violations as threat to 
international peace and security. The 1998 Rome compromise on the 
establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court indicates 
growing innovation and strengthening of the United Nations human 

90 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



rights treaty-based system and focus on crimes against humanity. 
The establishment of individual responsibility for such crimes 
represents a major step towards the direct enforcement of specific set 
of international human rights norms. The UN role in Kosovo 
indicate dilemma faced by the states i.e. to follow human rights 
conventions or to contest these norms. Both the reactions indicate an 
evolutionary process whereby the human rights issues gain growing 
recognition in the international politics. Thus, for analysing the role 
of the United Nations in Kosovo crisis, it is necessary to discuss 
about its evolution, principles, purposes and changes in peace- 
keeping activities after the end of Cold War which changed its role 
in international politics. 

EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS 

The idea for creating the United Nations did not happen all of a 
sudden at the end of World War II. Some of the most important 
origins of the idea can be found in the early part of the twentieth 
century, when many world leaders were heavily influenced by 
political idealism. 2 International society approach can be used to 
describe the creation of the United Nations system. According to this 
approach, the three concepts i.e. realism, rationalism and 
revolutionism defined the relations between states. 3 This relationship 
is illustrated in the following Fig. 3.1: 

Rationalism 



Moderate Soft 

Realism Revolutionism 



Realism Hard 

Revolutionism 



'Extre me Rea lism' 

Fig. 3.1 : Proximity of the Realist, Rationalist and Revolutionist Traditions. 

Source : Jackson & Sorenson, p. 149. 

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 9 1 



The Realist and the rationalist ideas are embedded in the United 
Nations. The United Nations charter gives commanding authority on 
the questions of peace and security to five great powers. The United 
Nations Security Council is the example of theoretical concept of 
moderate realism which holds that international law is based on the 
interests and responsibilities of the great powers. The states have no 
right to refuse the commands of the Security Council (which is 
controlled by five great powers possessing veto power). 

The principles of the United Nations i.e. state sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, political independence and non intervention etc. 
constitute a substantial body of basic norms on which the United 
Nations structure and functions are superimposed. The United 
Nations geographic scope and diverse activities are unmatched by 
any other international organization. The United Nations is 
remarkable for two reasons i.e. promotion of cooperation in vast 
realm of economic, social and ecological interdependence. This may 
be the most valuable part of the United Nations activities. Its second 
function is of the highest importance i.e. the production of norms of 
legitimacy. This task has been carried out through large number of 
treaties and declarations. 4 On the other hand, the United Nations was 
basically designed to prevent and to resolve armed conflicts between 
states. The delegates at San Francisco sought to create a particular 
kind of international organization which could contain the immense 
human misery resulted from World War I and II. They were looking 
backward rather than the future and defined its main tasks in the 
light of the events of previous decade. 

The United Nations charter is an extension of Westphalian logic 
par excellence. 5 The most fundamental principle of the United 
Nations system is "sovereignty". During the cold war, sovereignty 
was usually interpreted by the United Nations members in the 
manner of traditional hard-line realists. 6 The intra-state conflicts and 
forms of diffused violence (i.e. slaughter of civilians, terrorism, 
genocide) confound international relations after 1989. These 
'decomposing', degenerate or anarchical conflicts (manifesting 
themselves as scattered violence) are subject to no rules, thrown up 
the dilemma of respecting national sovereignty and ensuring respect 
for human rights. 7 

92 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



A cursory glance around the post-cold war world illustrates that 
the system of the United Nations law, the Hague and Geneva bodies 
of law is in ruins. 8 It was not that the state was challenged but its 
claim as a moral absolute was challenged. This view pointed out that 
a commitment to applying international human rights law to the right 
of self-determination reinforces the acknowledgement that the state 
sovereignty is not absolute at least as far as the treatment of persons 
and groups on their territory is concerned. 9 The Kosovo crisis was 
the apex of this problem in which the United Nations faced dilemma 
of state sovereignty and intervention, based on the humanitarian 
issues. The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan obviously 
described, 

State sovereignty, in its most basic sense is being redefined-not least 
by the forces of globalization and international co-operation. States are 
now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their 
peoples, and not vice- versa. At the same time individual sovereignty, 
by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, 
enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties 
has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of 
individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than 
ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not 
to protect those who abuse them. 10 

The views of Secretary-General highlighted the fact that 
international relations involve not only states but also human beings 
who possess human rights. It represents a transition of human rights 
issues from purely domestic jurisdiction to increasing international 
concern. This transition could be complicated by the differences in 
ideology and standards of human rights with international 
enforcement and implementation instruments and models of human 
rights. 11 Kosovo pointed out this conflict of basic values of 
international relations which changed the role of the United Nations 
in world politics. This conflict challenges the principles of Article 
2(4) and Article 2(7) of "territorial integrity", "political 
independence" and domestic jurisdiction" of the United Nations. It 
also shows that the massive killings of civilian people and mass scale 
violation of their human rights in intra-state conflicts changed the 
form of the United Nations peace-keeping and peace-enforcement 
powers vested in chapter VII of the charter. 12 The growing salience 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 93 



of intra-state conflicts as a threat to world peace has reflected in the 
United Nations peace-keeping activities. The cascading generations 
of peace-keeping also reflect the changed role of United Nations in 
world politics. There are six generations of peace-keeping which 
differentiate the inter-state peace-keeping from intra-state peace- 
keeping and its changed structures, tasks and components. 13 

THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING ROLE 
IN KOSVO CRISIS 

NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis also proved as 
watershed in the United Nations peacekeeping system. NATO states 
could not seek the United Nations endorsement for the air strikes 
launched against FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) on 24 
March 1999. This circumvention was directly related to divisions 
among the five permanent members of the council on the use of 
force to resolve the Kosovo crisis. The Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan described the failure of preventive diplomacy in Kosovo in 
his annual report, 

Early warning is now universally agreed to be a necessary condition 
for effective preventive diplomacy. It is not, unfortunately, a sufficient 
condition, as the tragedy in Kosovo has demonstrated. As the crisis 
unfolded, I twice addressed the Security Council in the hope that 
consensus could be achieved for effective preventive action. 
Regrettably, diplomatic efforts failed and the destructive logic of 
developments on the ground prevailed. 14 

Structural and low-level violence before 1998 was also the 
important reason of failure of preventive diplomacy in Kosovo. 
Structural violence may take the form of discriminatory judicial 
systems or partisan security structures. It may include systemic 
human rights abuses which are key indicators of the potential for 
violent conflict. Low-level violence involved hate speeches, 
protests, intermittent rioting or assassinations of selected 
individuals. The routine and low-profile nature of this violence may 
contribute to its invisibility. 15 Since 1981 Kosovo was smouldering. 
Serbia used its security structures brutally for quelling and prevented 
Albanians in Kosovo from gaining autonomy. 16 International 
community had not taken these developments seriously. It is 

94 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



conceivable that NATO powers which were dealing with the 
developments in Balkans could have failed to recognize that Kosovo 
was a "Tinder box". 17 

Since 1992, the United Nations had paid close attention to the 
situation, particularly the human right situation in Kosovo. The 
United Nations role in the Kosovo crisis can be divided into two 
parts i.e. 

1. Pre-NATO attack preventive diplomacy for hampering 
mass scale human rights violations. 

2. Post-NATO attack role of peace-building. 

The United Nations peace-keeping efforts in Kosovo can be 
analysed through three peace-keeping categories i.e. patching-up, 
prophylaxis and proselytism. 



United Nations Peace-Keeping 



Patching-up 



Investigation 
Mediation 
Supervision 
Administration 



Prophylactic 



Accusation 
Sedation 
Obstruction 
Refrigeration 



Proselytism 



Invalidation 
Coercion 



Patching-up consists of activity which intends to bring disputants 
to an agreement or to assist in the execution of a settlement. Peace- 
keeping efforts of this kind is often like the nature of surgery 
because the long-term success of which is in some doubt. Any 
United Nations peace-keeping act comes within patching-up 
category which encourage and associate with an agreed resolution of 
tension. 

The United Nations often faced conditions which are potentially 
threatening and failed to offer a realistic prospect of a negotiated 
settlement. It may therefore adopt a second "prophylactic" approach 
which is designed to prevent the situation from deteriorating. It may 
hope that this will provide the basis for a subsequent improvement 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



95 



in relations between the parties. Its immediate aim in these 
circumstances is to maintain calm or prevent violence. 

The third and final peace-keeping category comprises those UN 
operations which are neither conciliatory not preventive but which 
are instituted for changing certain aspects of the established order of 
things. In this category called "proselytism" , the United Nations 
seek to act as an instrument of change in order to enforce the 
concerned parties or regimes to obey international standards of 
behaviour. 18 

The United Nations various peace-keeping activities do not 
always contain neatly into this threefold framework. Sometimes the 
organization has engaged, at the same time and at the same situation, 
in both patching-up and prophylactic endeavours. The mandate 
which is given to a mission is usually a good guide of the role of 
United Nations. The four methods of patching-up, four of 
prophylaxis and two of proselytism illustrate different ways in which 
the same goal may be sought. First patching-up route to an 
agreement lies through an impartial investigation of the facts of the 
case. The second procedure is mediation and the United Nations 
used it in number of cases. The United Nations can also help to 
repair quarrels by assisting in the implementation of an agreement. 
For this purpose, the United Nations supervises the parties for 
execution of their promises. The United Nations may go beyond this 
activity when it plays an administrative role in territorial dispute by 
enabling the area in question to spend an interim period in 
international hands. 

There are four forms of prophylactic activity. First is the device 
of accusation. This is based on the assumption that the garnering of 
facts will expose and so may check the unpopular behaviour of 
offender states. The United Nations have been using this device in 
Kosovo since the inception of the crisis. Another way of trying to 
reach the same end is to make private representations in favour of 
restraint. Such operations may take place in two ways, firstly by 
negotiations with the government concerned and secondly through 
cooling activity at the military level. Such activities may be termed 
'sedation'. A more ambitious task for the United Nations is 
'obstruction'. It means the placing of the United Nations force 

96 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



between two disputing countries or communities in the hope that it 
may serve as something of a barrier to the outbreak of violence. It 
is also open to the United Nations to 'refrigerate' the areas which 
give rise to tension by taking them over formally or informally. The 
United Nations take over these areas until tempers have cooled or a 
settlement can be reached. There are two types of proselytism i.e. 
'invalidation' and 'coercion'. The device of invalidation is used as 
fact-finding mission. It is used in the expectation that its report 
would be so damaging as to suggest that the regime in question is 
morally unfit for continued rule. However, the non-responsiveness 
of the criticized government or party to the United Nations hints that 
they should give up unacceptable behaviour or make way for more 
acceptable regimes. It has turned some thoughts toward, 'coercion'. 
The device of Coercion is a most effective expression of the United 
Nations proselytizing zeal. 19 Regime change in Haiti is the recent 
example of this method. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE KEEPING CATEGORIES 
BY UNITED NATIONS IN KOSOV CRISIS 

The United Nations has been using the mix of patching-up and 
prophylactic methods in Kosovo. Its role in Kosovo could focus on 
humanitarian and the human rights. The humanitarian role of the 
United Nations in Kosovo illustrates the dichotomy between the state 
sovereignty and human rights. The Kosovo crisis sharpens and 
highlighted this incompatibility between both fundamental values. 
Sovereignty is enshrined in Articles 2(1), 2(4) and 2(7) of Charter. 
It provides internal exclusive jurisdiction within a territory and 
external freedom from outside interference. On the other hand, the 
Preamble, Article 1(3) and various declarations, conventions 
describes that individual rights are inalienable or transcend 
sovereign frontiers. 20 

The ascendence of human rights issue in the intra-state wars 
after the end of cold war offers a paradigmatic challenge to 
Hobbesian stand of the Westphalian legacy. This legacy is based on 
horizontal inter-state system which provides equality of states. But 
the human rights instruments concerned with the matters between 
states and its populations (vertical approach) rather than inter-state 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 97 



relations. 21 The Secretary-General Boutras B. Ghali declared 
categorically, 

It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the 
essential domestic jurisdiction of states cannot be regarded as 
protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or 
systematically violated with impunity. . . . The case for not impinging on 
the Sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of state 
is by itself indubitably strong. But it would only be weakened if it were 
to carry the implication that Sovereignty, even in this day and age, 
includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic 
campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the 
name of controlling civil strife or insurrection. 22 

The political unrest in Kosovo was simmering from 1981 when 
the Kosovo Albanian students openly clashed with government 
authorities in the capital Pristina. This resulted in the severe 
suppression of Kosovo Albanians by Serbs in the province. But, the 
tide of nationalism that began to rise in 1989 led to the disintegration 
of the USSR and collapse of communism in the Eastern Europe. The 
four of the six republics comprising the Yugoslavia i.e. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia unilaterally declared 
independence between June and October 1991. The declarations 
resulted in armed conflict with the Republic of Serbia and ethnic 
strife within the four republics. The escalating violence was brought 
to the attention of the Security Council in September 1991. The 
Australia informed the Secretary-General that the situation in 
Yugoslavia deteriorated to the point where it needed urgent attention 
of the United Nations. Latter, the Security Council convened a 
meeting on 25 September, 1991 in response to consider the requests 
of Austria, Canada and Hungry about dangerous situation in 
Yugoslavia. The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 
713 sponsored by Austria, Belgium, France, USSR and United 
Kingdom in the same meeting. The Security Council acting under 
chapter VII of the United Nations charter imposed arms embargo 
upon Yugoslavia. 23 

The Security Council adopted two other resolutions 721 and 724 
and sent mission to Yugoslavia to bring about all parties to accept 
cease-fire so that a peace-keeping operation might be deployed for 
creating the necessary conditions for negotiations on Yugoslavia's 

98 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



future. The United Nations continued to monitor human rights 
violations in Yugoslavia including Kosovo through the Office of 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Special 
Rapporteur for Former Yugoslavia. It used European powers and 
regional organizations for investigation, mediation and accusatory 
purposes. The United Nations intensified its efforts in 1992 to 
resolve the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The United 
Nations Security Council and General Assembly adopted number of 
resolutions related to the conflict in the Yugoslavia in 1992. The 
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was 
organised in 1992 to combine the efforts of the United Nations, 
European Community (EC), Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC). 24 The ICFY engaged in extensive diplomatic 
activities to promote peaceful resolution of humanitarian problems in 
Yugoslavia including Kosovo. 

The Serbian and Kosovar Albanian groups in Kosovo were not 
in direct and open conflict until the last month of 1998. Hence an 
enquiry may appear to be the most obvious step in this situation. The 
observers can be sent to an area where potential explosion of 
violence is likely to occur. This enables the world institution to 
receive an immediate report about the deteriorating situation. The 
CSCE sent missions to Yugoslavia in September 1992 to promote 
dialogue and collect information on human rights violations. At the 
end of June 1992, Yugoslavia withdrew its acceptance of CSCE 
missions in Kosovo and other two areas. The Security Council 
adopted resolution 855 sponsored by France, Hungry, Spain, United 
Kingdom and United States in August 1993 and called upon 
Yugoslav authorities to reconsider their refusal to allow the CSCE 
mission's activities in Kosovo and other two areas. 25 

The General Assembly in resolution 49/13 (1994) also called for 
the full implementation of resolution 855 (1993). On 28 April, 1994, 
Italy for the first time transmitted to the Secretary-General a 
statement and expressed the CSCE community's deep concern about 
the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. It urged the Government of 
Yugoslavia to respect its commitment to the CSCE principles and to 
facilitate the early and unconditional return of the CSCE missions to 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 99 



Kosovo. The Hungary as a chairman-in-office of the CSCE 
transmitted to the Secretary-General a statement and expressed deep 
concern over suppression of Albanians in Kosovo. It called on the 
Yugoslav authorities to end the flagrant violations of human rights 
and respect fundamental freedoms in Kosovo. 26 

The United Nations used the CSCE mission's reports as 
'accusation' method. This method is not embarked upon the 
immediate hope of putting an end to the dispute but intends to 
produce a quietening effect. The parent body made an authoritative 
call for the cessation of hostile acts on the basis of reports received. 
The assumption was that any such decision emanating from world 
institution would carry a good deal of weight, by virtue both of its 
authorship and of the fact that it is the product of an independent 
enquiry. This causing the states and groups directly involved in the 
conflict to reconsider their policies. In this way the United Nations 
place some obstacles in the way of the beginning or continuation of 
aggressive policies and contribute towards the reduction of 
tension. 27 The United Nations Security Council and the General 
Assembly adopted various resolutions related with deteriorating 
situation in Kosovo. These resolutions reflect prophylactic 
'accusation' approach, designed to prevent the situation from 
deteriorating." The Security Council Resolution 855 (1993) stressed 
Yugoslavia to reconsider its policy toward the CSCE missions. The 
General Assembly had condemned Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's 
violations of human rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and urged 
it to end these violations, re-established democratic institutions and 
resume dialogue in resolution 48/153 adopted in 1993. In 1995, the 
Assembly requested the Secretary-General and relevant regional 
organizations to establish international monitoring presence in 
Kosovo through resolution 50/190. This request was repeated time 
and again in resolutions 51/111 in 1996 and 52/139 in 1997. 28 

On the other hand, the criticized state has different anticipations 
about report. First, a report will be called by those who are already 
clear about the fundamental character of the dispute in their mind 
and support pre-existing views. This leads to second point that the 
criticized state is most unlikely to welcome the idea of a report being 
made on its activities. It may not go so far as to refuse entry to the 

100 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



investigation because it could be more damaging than a critical first 
hand report. It may even agree with apparent willingness to the 
proposal that an enquiry should be made. 29 But the government of 
the target state carry on its secret policies unabatedly. The role of 
the CSCE Mission in Kosovo is the best example of this phenomena. 
Despite the CSCE missions in Yugoslavia and other regional 
organizations' activities, the scope and intensity of the conflict in 
Kosovo grew dramatically in 1998. It resulted in extensive loss of 
life, destruction of property, a massive exodus of refugees, serious 
human rights violations and potential humanitarian catastrophes. In 
this situation, the institution's role which is called upon to secure a 
report can become more important. During 1998, United Nations 
with the support of contact group on the former Yugoslavia 30 and 
OSCE directed the parties to solve dispute through mediatory or 
accusatory methods. The Contact Group's foreign ministers meeting 
in London on 9 March 1998, declared that the violent repression of 
non- violent expression of political views in Kosovo was completely 
indefensible. They called on Belgrade authorities to invite 
independent forensic experts to investigate allegations. 

The OSCE permanent council, in its 11 March, 1998 decision, 
authorised operational measures to allow adequate observation of 
borders with Kosovo and the prevention of possible spillover effects 
of Kosovo conflict. 31 On 31st March 1998, the Security Council met 
to consider the situation in Kosovo and the reports of contact group. 
The Security Council adopted resolution 1160 and imposed arms 
embargo on Yugoslavia. 32 In his first report on implementation of 
the Security Council resolution 1160 (1998), the Secretary-General 
stated that a sanctions committee had been established to monitor the 
implementation of the arms embargo on Yugoslavia. The Secretary- 
General transmitted the reports of the OSCE and EU on the situation 
in Kosovo. In June and July respectively, the Secretary-General 
reported that the situation in Kosovo remained tense and the security 
conditions steadily deteriorating. On 5 August, the Secretary- 
General also reported that the situation in Kosovo continued to 
deteriorate with heavy fighting in several areas. According to 
UNHCR, more than 100,000 people had been driven from their 
homes and between 70,000 and 80,000 were internally displaced in 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 101 



Kosovo by the end of July. Kosovo had the potential to becoming a 
humanitarian disaster with the increasing number of displaced 
persons. On 24 August, the Security Council President made call for 
ceasefire in Kosovo. On 4 September, the Secretary-General 
reported that the human rights situation in Kosovo was marked by 
widespread violations. The Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) was receiving lot of reports regarding 
human rights violations. 33 

The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1199 
on 23 September 1998 and repeated that the deterioration of situation 
in Kosovo constitute a threat to peace and security in the region. The 
Security Council demanded the effective and continuous 
international monitoring in Kosovo by the European Community 
Monitoring Mission and diplomatic mission accredited to the FRY. 34 
In October 1998, the Secretary-General reported that the fighting in 
Kosovo continued unabated. Here, the United Nations used the 
second prophylactic method called 'sedation'. Sedation consists of 
direct endeavours to exert a calming influence on inflammable 
situations. It requires the direct dealings of United Nations 
representatives with the officials of the involved states. The main 
hope of this method is that the on-the-spot exhortations in the name 
of world organisation would prevent the dispute from getting out of 
hand. Such operations take place in two ways, firstly, by 
negotiations with the governments concerned and secondly, through 
cooling activity at the military level. The sedation at the diplomatic 
level does not necessarily require that an agent of the United Nations 
visit the country concerned. It can be attempted by means of 
resolutions of the United Nations political organs, through the 
Secretary-General's private representations to the heads of the 
disputant's United Nations missions. The prophylactic measures of 
this kind used at periods of considerable tension. These are not only 
used for avoiding loss of time but also designed to maximise the 
effects of the United Nations intervention. 35 

The United Nations Secretary-General, in his October 1998 
report endorsed the efforts of the Contact Group and Christopher 
Hill's (United State Ambassador to FYROM and peace envoy) 
agreement with the Belgrade authorities and Kosovo Albanians on 

102 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



the future of Kosovo. The United States special envoy Richard 
Holbrooke, negotiated with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic 
and reached on accord. This effort of sedation resulted in an 
agreement that all the problems in Kosovo and Metohija could be 
solved through dialogue and peaceful means. 36 

As a way of keeping peace, the mobilization of world opinion 
or the issue of cooling injunctions has obvious limitations. Thus, the 
third prophylactic possibility called 'obstruction' may be open to the 
United Nations where a dispute finds expression in a dangerous 
flashpoint. The obstruction is the placing of non-combatant force or 
verifiers with the consent of host state for preventing the situation 
from deterioration. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the Yugoslavia signed Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) on 
15 October 1998. The agreement provided for an air surveillance 
system. The Yugoslavia and OSCE signed another agreement which 
allowed the OSCE mission to verify maintenance of the ceasefire by 
all elements. The mission comprised 2000 unarmed verifiers from 
the OSCE member countries and was intended to be headquartered 
in Pristina, capital of Kosovo. 37 The United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1203 (1998) endorsed the establishment of these 
verification missions. This resolution called for prompt and 
complete investigation, international supervision of atrocities 
committed against civilians since 1991 and full cooperation with 
International Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. 38 

The Secretary-General sent an interdepartmental mission, 
headed by 'Staffan de Mistura' to Yugoslaiva. The members of 
mission met governmental and local officials, representatives of the 
Kosovo Albanian Community, international organizations, 
international and local NGO's and members of diplomatic 
community. The mission also assessed the modalities for 
coordination of activities between the OSCE and the United Nations 
agencies on the ground. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and OHCHR had established close coordination 
with Kosovo verification mission in field and close liaison with the 
OSCE in Vienna. These efforts had some positive effects on the 
situation and the Secretary-General reported in November that the 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 103 



crisis situation in Kosovo were diffusing. It had created more 
favourable conditions for political settlement. In December report, 
the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that no major 
combat between military forces occurred in Kosovo but the situation 
on the ground was far from peaceful. 39 

According to the Secretary-General report to Security Council 
in January 1999 that the humanitarian and human right situation in 
Kosovo remained grave and the violence including the violations of 
October 1998 ceasefire continued. The human rights situation had 
further deteriorated and culminated in the massacre of the Kosovo 
Albanians in Racak village. The Security Council President 
condemned the Racak Massacre in Kosovo. 40 In March, the OSCE 
reported that the situation in Kosovo remained grave with localized 
clashes between Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serbian 
forces. The NATO Secretary-General informed the United Nations 
Secretary-General that its senior military authorities visited 
President Milosevic on 19 January and reinforced the need for him 
to honour his obligations but he had failed to do so. On 23 March, 
the NATO Secretary-General reported that following the withdrawal 
of KVM on 20 March, Yugoslavia had increased its military 
activities and using excessive and disproportionate force in 
Kosovo. 41 Under the auspices of the Contact Group on former 
Yugoslavia, the representatives of the Federal Yugoslav and the 
Serbian Government and Kosovo Albanians met in Rambouillet, 
France, on 6 February. On 18 March, the Kosovo Albanian 
representatives signed the Rambouillet accords. This accord 
provided three year interim self-government in Kosovo and peace 
and security for everyone living in Kosovo. 42 However, the 
delegation of the Republic of Serbia refused to sign the accord. It 
signed its own text, "Agreement for Self-Government in Kosmet." 
The talks were adjourned on 19 March, on that day, the OSCE 
withdrew KVM. On 23 March, Yugoslavia declared a state of 
imminent danger of war. The European council on 25 March 
expressed that the last ditch mediation mission of US Ambassador 
Holbrooke and three other Rambouillet negotiators to persuade 
President Milosevic to accept ceasefire failed. 43 

The above mentioned process showed that the states are 

104 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



certainly sensitive to criticism but it does not follow that they would 
alter their policies just to accommodate world opinion. Governments 
generally do not regard it as consonant with their dignity or perhaps 
with their domestic stability. International body's demands may 
increase the state's determination to stand firm and receive comfort 
and support from its friends. The successful outcome of international 
opinion is based on two factors. Firstly, if the criticized state knows 
that certain powerful friends would stand by it then it could afford 
to take little notice of decisions taken by organized international 
community. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia knew that Russia 
and China, two permanent Security Council members could veto any 
Western resolution regarding use of force on its territory. The main 
driver behind Belgrade's expectations about Russian support led 
Milosevic to bet that NATO would strike weakly. He was almost 
certainly encouraged the gambit by the prospect that Russia would 
"hold the ring". It deflected or minimized NATO air-strikes by 
threatening to severe many important aspects of its relations with the 
United States and NATO. The Yugoslavia misperceived Russia's 
influence with the United States and its ability to cushion it from 
NATO's wrath. 44 Thus, President Milosevic refused to sign 
Rambouillet accords and did not accept the ceasefire in Kosovo. 

Secondly, in this situation, the efficacy of international action 
would largely turn on the attitude of major powers. If they are 
agreed on the desirability of preventing violent change and 
maintaining a peaceful international atmosphere then it would be 
possible for the United Nations to have prophylactic effects on 
troubled situation. NATO's air campaign started on 24 March 1999 
is the example of this situation. NATO started its air campaign 
without the United Nations endorsement against Yugoslavia. This 
circumvention was directly stated to the divisions among the five 
permanent members of Security Council on the use of force to 
resolve the Kosovo crisis and the commitment of China and Russia 
to veto military intervention in Kosovo. 

The Russia and China strongly reacted against NATO action. 
The Russia convened meetings on 24 and 26 March to discuss the 
action, at which NATO members defended their position by pointing 
to Yugoslavia's violation of Security Council Resolutions 1199 and 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 105 



1203. A Russian-sponsored resolution identifying the NATO action 
as a threat to international peace and security and calling for an 
immediate end to the use of force, which garnered support only from 
Namibia and China. Following the bombing of its Belgrade embassy 
on 7 May, China requested that Security Council meeting be 
convened to issue a formal protest to the NATO action. 45 On 14 
May, the Security Council Condemned NATO's attack on Chinese 
diplomatic property. 46 The United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1239 for averting the humanitarian catastrophe in the 
region particularly in Kosovo. The Security Council instructed the 
UNHCR and other relief organizations to provide assistance to 
refugees. 47 Latter, the United Nations Secretary-General with 
Yugoslavia's agreement, dispatched the United Nations inter-agency 
Needs Assessment Mission to Yugoslavia from 16 to 27 May 1998. 
This mission provided an initial assessment of the emergency needs 
of civilian populations and the rehabilitation requirements in 
Kosovo. 

The United Nations Secretary-General appointed Carl Bildt 
(Sweden) and Edward Kukan (Slovakia) as special envoys for 
Balkans to assist in restoring peace and security and establishing 
conditions conducive to the voluntary return of refugees and 
displaced persons. On 6 May, the G-8 Foreign Ministers, met in 
Bonn (Germany) and adopted general principles on the political 
solution of the Kosovo crisis. The Yugoslavia conveyed to the 
Secretary-General, on 4 June, that it accepted the G-8 peace plan 
(principles). On 10 June, the Security Council adopted the resolution 
1244, which marked the end of conflict and the establishment of the 
United Nations interim administration in Kosovo. NATO military 
authorities and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concluded the 
Military-Technical Agreement (Kumanovo agreement) on the 
procedures and modalities of the withdrawal of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia's (FRY) Security Forces from Kosovo. By that 
agreement, it agreed to the deployment of the international security 
force called KFOR in Kosovo. With the confirmation of 
Yugoslavia's withdrawal of its forces from Kosovo, NATO 
suspended its air campaign. 

The final way in which the United Nations can help to patch-up 

106 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



situations is by engaging in an administrative activity. In this set up, 
a disputed area may be handed over to the United Nations to permit 
the opening of negotiations regarding its future. The United Nations 
acting as its government until the conflicting parties may agree that 
the question at issue should be decided at a latter date by the 
inhabitants of the region concerned. A further possibility is that the 
international rule may be the means of transferring an area from one 
authority to another. 48 The United Nations finally tried to solve the 
Kosovo crisis through the implementation of resolution 1244 and 
established an Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) in Kosovo. 

CAUSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS FAILURE TO HALT 
GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN PRE-UNMIK 
CONTROLLED KOSOVO 

The analysis of humanitarian role of the United Nations in the 
Kosovo crisis showed that the world body inspite of its efforts failed 
to avert and halt upsurge of violence in Kosovo and this failure led 
to the NATO attack without prior authorization of the Security 
Council. There are several factors which accounts for the initial 
hesitancy of the Security Council Permanent Members i.e. 

Firstly, there were divisions among the major powers e.g. 
Russia refused to support many sanctions. Russia opposed not only 
the use of military power but also the economic sanctions that were 
imposed by the EU and the United States. Russia tried to preserve 
its controlling role in the further administration of the Kosovo 
Crisis. Russia retained this role by having involvement in the crisis 
of collective bodies which it was representing and was able to block 
decisions requiring consensus. These bodies were Contact Group, 
OSCE and the United Nations Security Council where Russia 
enjoyed Veto Power. France too was trying to preserve its role as a 
leading international power. It also attempted to undermine the 
United States attempt to locate further decision-making on Kosovo 
away from the Security Council and towards NATO, which the 
United States dominated. Italy also played similar role to protect its 
influence on events through the Contact Group. The EU's role in the 
Kosovo crisis made the matter more difficult because it was intended 
to symbolize the ability of the Europeans to sort out their own 
backyard problems without the need to rely on the decisive United 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 107 



States action. The attempt to achieve a settlement for Kosovo also 
reopened the struggle for pre-eminence between the OSCE (Russia 
consider it principal focus of authority in relation to peace and 
security in Europe), The EU and the United States and the United 
Kingdom which wanted to preserve the dominant role of NATO. 49 

Some states were wishing to temper punitive measures imposed 
by the Security Council with positive incentives. That's why, the one 
consequence of international diplomacy over the past decade was to 
radicalize the Kosovo Albanians and another to embolden President 
Milosevic's actions in Kosovo. Since November 1995, the United 
Nations has maintained an 'outer wall' of sanctions against 
Belgrade. But, through the Security Council Resolution 1022 (22 
November 1995) suspended some sanctions against Yugoslavia for 
inducing President Milosevic to assume more conciliatory stance 
towards Kosovo. The United Nations Security Council, on the other 
hand, barred Yugoslavia's membership in major international 
organizations including International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank (WB). But President Milosevic successfully managed to 
offset many of the effects of these measures. The sale of 49 percent 
of Telecom Serbia to Telecom Italia and Greece in 1997 brought 
enormous relief to Belgrade's strained treasury. While the European 
Commission decided not to renew trade preferences for Yugoslavia 
in December 1997 but Britain and Italy were engaged in efforts to 
finance the setting up a stock exchange in Belgrade. The British 
embassy was using the services of an investment Bank to promote 
business. Italy opened a trade office in Belgrade and German, 
French and Greek companies were busy to negotiate business 
deals. 50 

Secondly, the United States unwillingness to follow through its 
threat of air strikes against the Serbian Military targets conveyed the 
impression of softness towards Yugoslavia. The United States 
President George Bush delivered a warning to Milosevic in 
December 1992 during Bosnian war. President Bush feared that the 
spillover effect of Bosnian genocide reached Kosovo if President 
Milosevic cracked down on Albanians. President Clinton also 
reaffirmed this threat after took office in 1993. These threats helped 
to keep peace in Kosovo for five years but did not relieve the 

108 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



apartheid-like repression endured by the ethnic Albanians. On 
February 1998, the US envoy Gelbard Praised Milosevic for his 
constructive attitude towards Dayton process and signalled 
America's readiness to several sanction against Yugoslavia. Envoy 
Gelbard declared Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) a terrorist 
organization for pressurising Belgrade to adopt a more constructive 
and positive approach towards Kosovo. 51 It was shortly thereafter 
that President Milosevic launched large scale attacks against local 
population and killed 2000 people, displaced 500,000 from their 
homes, collapsed number of villages. 52 

The third factor which inhibited the major powers to act 
decisively in the Kosovo crisis was Serbian sovereignty. Although, 
the Serbian behaviour in Kosovo was not, as Belgrade claimed, 
strictly its internal affair. The grave breaches of international 
humanitarian law in Yugoslavia were a legitimate concern of 
international community as established by various international 
covenants to which Yugoslavia was also a signatory and the statute 
of the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia. But, the major powers could not reach on consensus to 
intervene or use forcible measures in defence of humanitarian 
principles (which were lawful or desirable in Kosovo) due to the 
violation of Serbian sovereignty and its possible ramifications for 
world order. 

Fourthly, the failure of the international community to lend 
effective support to the Kosovar Albanians in their struggle for self- 
determination (notwithstanding evidents concern for their plight) has 
led growing numbers of the latter to abandon non-violent resistance 
in favour of armed struggle. 53 

In addition, the federal republics were entitled to claim 
statehood on the basis of a right to self determination which was not 
located in general international law but in Yugoslavia's constitution 
law. The Yugoslavia's Constitution of 1974 had provided the 
possibility of secession of its constituent republics. The legal 
management of the creation of the new states within the Former 
Yugoslavia made clear that the concept of self-determination based 
in the constitutional status of a republic within a federation was not 
free from danger. This was made evident by the example of 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 109 



Chechnya. Chechnya was an autonomous territory within Russia 
which was a federal unit of USSR. Russia achieved statehood after 
USSR's demise in 1991. The new Russian constitution in turn 
promoted Chechnya to the status of a republic within the Russian 
Federation. Chechnya engaged in an armed struggle for 
independence when it found that the Russian Federation was not 
accorded it the legal protection available under doctrine of self- 
determination. The Russian state used brutal repressive force against 
rebel Chechnya and changed it into a rubble. But international 
community, instead of insisting on a cessation of repressive 
measures, withdrawal of Russian troops and the maintenance of 
territorial integrity of Chechnya, merely demanded compliance by 
Russia with human rights and humanitarian law for management of 
the crisis. The Kosovo fell between the precedent of the Yugoslav 
republics and of the Chechnya. 54 

A fifth factor was related with some fundamental but 
paradoxical aims shared by major powers and President Milosevic. 
The major powers adamantly opposed the Kosovo's independence 
like President Milosevic but for very different reasons. The United 
States and the West European states were concerned that the 
establishment of independent Kosovo would shatter the fragile peace 
in Bosnia and stimulate the Kosovo Albanian minority in 
neighbouring Macedonia to join Kosovar state. The major powers 
also feared that an independent Kosovo would seek to unite with 
Albania. The major concern of international community was that an 
independent Kosovo would serve as a positive example for the 
numerous self-determination movements bent on separation 
elsewhere in the Europe. 55 Although, the major powers and 
President Milosevic had common interests to defeat separatism in 
Kosovo but they have disagreed about the means to be employed and 
the framework of the possible solution. Due to these reasons, the 
major powers and the Contact Group were no longer insisted on the 
withdrawal of Yugoslavia's special forces from Kosovo but 
modestly demanded to halt Belgrade's attacks against the civilian 
people. 

The United Nations Mission in Kosovo successfully worked 
with comprehensive authority in all aspects of Kosovar society until 

110 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



the final settlement of Kosvo's status in international relations. 
While the Kosovo crisis reflected the sound and strong peace- 
building role of the United Nations in the post-Cold War intrastate 
conflicts but it also shows the impact of changed world power 
relations on the United Nations system. Even the political solution 
of Kosovo war did not take place in the Security Council but rather 
in the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized countries forum. 56 This 
further undermined the Security Council's position as the principal 
actor in the management of international peace and security. Before 
analysis of the United Nations role in building of Kosovo's shattered 
society, the analysis of the role of the United States and NATO in 
the Kosovo crisis is necessary because both powerful actors strongly 
effected the working of the United Nations system in world affairs. 



References : 

1. Hans Peter Schmitz and Kathryn Sikkinic, "International Human Rights" in 
Walter Carlsnaes et ah, Handbook of International Relations (London, 2002), 
pp. 528-529. 

2. The deeper roots actually go back much further e.g. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
argued that the principle of state sovereignty (as recognized by the treaty of 
westphalia) was partially responsible for wars. These influences generated the 
idea that there needed to be curbs on sovereignty for increased international 
cooperation. At the start of the twentieth century, many political leaders sought 
to create a cooperative community of nation-states that would ensure the 
collective security of member states. The notion of collective security, 
combined with the harsh lessons of World War I, led to the formation of the 
League of Nations in 1918. The League of Nations was almost completely 
ineffective and did not prevent the outbreak of World War II. The United 
Nations is the world's second attempt at creating an intergovernmental 
organization (IGO) to ensure world peace and to establish the economic, social 
and political foundations through which this can be realized. Chapter - 1 of the 
United Nations Charter lists purposes and Principles of the organization. The 
Preamble makes a logical distinction between ends and means while chapter I 
distinguished between purposes and principles. Article I formulates four 
purposes of the United Nations which cover both ends and means. Article 2 
defines the seven principles which guide the actions of the members of the 
United Nations. The logical relationship between Articles 1 and 2 seems to be 
that Article 1 defines ends and means while Article 2 lays down the general 
standards of action which observed with regard to those ends means. For more 
details of Historical evolution of the United Nations. See W. Raymond Duncan 
et ah, Power Politics in 21st Century (NY, 2002), p. 213. See, Graham Evans 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 111 



and Jeffry Newnhem, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations 
(London, 1998), p. 552. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. & Eugene R. Wittkopf, World 
Politics : Trends and Transformation (NY, 1999), edn. VIII, p. 750. Yearbook 
of United Nations, 1994-95 (NY : United Nations Publications, 1994-95), p. 
15. See Hans J. Morganthau, The Impasse of American Foreign Policy 
(Chicago, 1962), p. 113. A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations : 
Principles and Issues (New Jersey, 1991), p. 55. See Chapter VII of United 
Nations Charter related to regional arrangements. 

3. These three concepts are represented the views of Machiavalli, Hugo Grotius 
and immanual kant respectively. The first concept views states as power 
agencies that pursue their own interests. It can be distinguished between 
extreme realism and moderate realism. Extreme realists deny the existence of 
an international society. The society is possible within states but not between 
states. No sovereign state has a authority to command any other sovereign 
state. No sovereign state has obligation to obey any other state. Moderate 
realists are closer to rationalists in international law. But they see international 
law as based on the interests and responsibilities of the great powers. 
Rationalists views states as legal organizations that operate in accordance with 
international law and diplomatic practice. It thus conceives of international 
relations as rule governed activities based on the mutually recognized authority 
of sovereign states. The third concept downplays the importance of states and 
places the emphasis on human beings. There are two 'hard' and soft versions 
of revolutionism. Duncan, n. 2, p. 215. 

4. Stanley Hoffman, World Disorders : Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era 
(NY, 1998), p. 180. 

5. Only states can become members of the organization. Membership 
requirements are, a commitment to the principles of the charter which sustains 
the territorial sovereignty principle and a declaration of being peace loving. 
There are no entrance requirements that refer to the internal arrangements of 
states. The charter prohibits actions dealing with member's domestic politics 
and concern with the conditions of populations within states is secondary, 
perhaps only negligible. The only constraint on sovereignty is the prohibition 
against the threat or use of force except for self-defense or when ordered by the 
Security Council. The civil and intra-state wars erupted after end of cold war 
had not been anticipated by the drafters of the charter. The Kosovo crisis is the 
extreme which presented new intellectual challenges to almost every principle 
of the United Nations. See Richard A. Falk, "Democratizing, 
Internationalizing, and Globalizing" in Yosirkazu Sakamoto, ed., Global 
Transformation : Challenges to the State System (NY, 1994), p. See, Kalevi J. 
Holsti, The State, War and the State of the War (NY, 1996), p. 189. 

6. The rule of non-intervention was to be rigidly applied in international relations 
and what happened within states was no concern of outsiders. The predominant 
view of governments was that the sovereignty was a private world into which 
the outside world was not permitted to enter. The only exception was 
operations under the charter rules. The principle of domestic jurisdiction shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under VII. The security 



112 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



council justified intervention within a state only when there was a threat to 
international peace and security (Article 2 para 7), and when there are gross 
infringements of human rights. Subsequent secessions and irredentist 
enlargements were ruled out. This meant that criteria for state creation and 
recognition (other than in context of decolonisation) were never examined. 
Authoritarian regimes replaced democratically elected ones without affecting in 
any way their membership of international society. Article 2 (7) of the charter 
did not discriminate in the protection it provided to regimes from interference 
in their domestic affairs. See Robert Jackson and Georg Sorenson, Introduction 
to International Relations (Oxford, 1999), pp. 143, 148, 150, 151. James 
Mayall (ed.), The New Internationalism : 1991-1994 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 6. 

7. This phenomenon reflect the 'postinternational' relations in which the world 
system can no longer be solely or primarily categorized as consisting of 
relations between nations. 'Fragmagration' is the speciality of this phenomenon 
because it is marked by various structures of systemic cooperation and 
subsystemic conflicts. In subsystemic conflicts, there are no declarations of 
wars, classical-type campaigns, and organized armies. This create dilemma for 
the United Nations Security Council because there are not threat to peace, 
breach of peace and act of aggression occur. The victims are civil population, 
minority groups and indigenous people etc. This phenomenon referred to the 
fractious relations between distinct ethno-cultural groups that undermined 
national and regional stability. Rwanda, Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor 
and various other problems represented this phenomenon. See Alexandra 
Novosseloff, "Revitalizing the United Nations : Anticipation and Prevention as 
Primary Goal", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXV (Nov. 2001), p. 947. See, 
William F. Felice, "The Viability of the United Nations Approach to Economic 
and Social Human Right in Globalized Economy", International Affairs, Vol. 
75 (1999), p. 586. For detailed study of post-cold war world order see James 
N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier : Exploring Governance in 
a Turbulent World (Cambridge, 1997), p. 35-39. For detailed study of Minority 
Protection System see Liann Thio, "Battling Balkanization : Regional 
Approaches Toward Minority Protection Beyond Europe", Harvard 
International Law Journal, Vol. 43 (Summer 2002), pp. 409-468. 

8. Christopher Lord, Prague to Pretoria (Prague, 2000), p. 18. 

9. Paul Taylor, "The United Nations in the 1990s : Positive Cosmopolitanism and 
the Issue of Sovereignty", Political Studies, Vol. XLVII (1999), p. 545. 

10. Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty", The Economist, 18th Sep. 1999, 
p. 49. 

11. Bennett, n. 2, p. 380. 

12. The post-cold war peace-keeping used for the prevention, containment, 
moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states through the 
medium of peaceful third party intervention organised and directed 
internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to 
restore and maintain peace. It also include the tasks of assisting humanitarian 
agencies to deliver aid and protect displaced persons, stabilized failed or 
collapsed states, developing democratic institutions that respect monitor human 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 113 



rights and ultimately administrating territories and their entire populations. The 
operations in this category are not differ substantially from which fall in first 
category in their make-up and activity. The distinction between two is not based 
on the specific mandates which the United Nations gives to its missions, but on 
the wider purposes which their establishment is intended to serve. The 
allocation of operations to first and second categories is based on the majority 
member states, particularly on their interests in keeping the disputant quit or in 
preventing the weaker party from being overrun. For detail study of Meaning, 
Legal System and Transformation of UN Peacekeeping, see, Espen Barth, 
"Peacekeeping Past and Present", NATO Review, Vol. 49 (Summer 2001), p. 
6. See, Secretary-General's report on the Work of Organization, 1993 (NY : 
United Nations, 1993), para 278. See, Michael Pugh, "Peacekeeping and 
Humanitarian International", in Brain White et ah, See Article 40, 41, 42 of 
United Nations Charter. See also Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, Legal 
assessment of United Nations peacekeeping see A. Cassesse (ed.), United 
Nations Peace-keeping : Legal Essays (Netherland, 1978). For more 
information about Peacekeeping in Africa : Capabilities and Culpabilities (NY, 
2000), pp. 26, 29. 

13. For detailed study of Changed Structures, Tasks and Components of Post-Cold 
War Peacekeeping, see, C.S.R. Murthy, "United Nations Peacekeeping in 
Intrastate Conflicts: Emerging Trends, International Studies, Vol. 38 (July- 
Sep. 2001), p. 214. See, Boutros B. Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations", 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, Winter 1992/1993, p. 89. See also Boutras B. Ghali, 
"An Agenda for Peace : One Year later", Orbis, Vol. 37 (Summer 1993), p. 
323. See, Michael T. Klare, Peace and World Security Studies (London, 1994), 
p. 21. See, Mark Thomson and Monroe E. Price, "International, Media and 
Human Rights", Survival, Vol. 45 (Spring 2003), p. 183. See Gregory Copley, 
"Keeping the Peace or Postponing Resolution", Defense and Foreign Affairs 
Strategic Policy, Vol. XXV (Oct. 1997), p. 9. See, David M. Malone and 
Karin Wermester, "Boom and Bust : The Changing Nature of UN 
Peacekeeping" in Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Bokha Sriram (ed.), 
Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century (London, 2001), p. 37-53. See, 
Ramesh Thakur ad Albrecht Schnabel, United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations : Adhoc Missions Permanent Engagement (NY, 2001), p. 9. See, 
Abiodum Alau et ah, Peacekeeping Politicians and Warlords (NY, 1999), pp. 
5-6. See, M.W. Doyle et al. (ed.) Keeping the Peace : Multidimensional UN 
Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge, 1991), p. 2. Philip 
Wilkinson, "The Doctrinal Basis of Peace Support Operations" in Christopher 
Lord, n. 8, p. 203. 

14. Report of the Work of Organization, 1999 (NY : United Nations, 1999), para 
68. 

15. Roger MacGinty and Gillian Robinson, "Peacekeeping and the Violence in 
Ethnic Conflict", in Thakur and Schnabel, n. 13, pp. 31-32. 

16. Terry McNeill, "Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping in the Former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe", International Political Science Review, 
Vol. 18 (Jan. 1997), p. 9. 



114 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



17. Satish Nambiar, "UN Peacekeeping Operations i the Former Yugoslavia-from 
UNPROFOR to Kosovo", in Thakur and Schnabel, n. 13, p. 178. 

18. The Model is taken from Alan James, The Politics of Peacekeeping (London, 
1969), pp. 7, 8, 9. 

19. Ibid., p. 260. 

20. Jennifer Welsh et ah, "The responsibility to protect", International Journal, 
Vol. LVII (Autumn 2002), pp. 489-90. See, Nial MacDermot, "Violations of 
Human Rights as Threat to Peace", International Commission of Jurists (Dec. 
1996), p. 91. 

21. Allan Rossas, "State Sovereignty and Human Rights : Towards a Global 
Constitutional Project, Political Studies, Vol. XLIIII (1995), p. 62. 

22. Secretary-General's Report on the Work of Organization, 1991, Published in 
Yearbook of United Nations, 1991 (NY : United Nations, 1991), p. 7. 

23. UN Security Council Resolution 713, UN DOCS/RES/713, September 25, 
1991. 

24. Yearbook of United Nations, 1992 (NY : United Nations Pub., 1992), p. 327. 

25. UN Security Council Resolution 855, UN DOCS/RES/855, August 9, 1993. 

26. Yearbook of United Nations, 1994 (NY : United Nations Pub., 1994), p. 573. 

27. James, n. 18, pp. 178-9. 

28. See Texts of UN Security Council Resolution, 855, 9 August 1993, UN 
General Assembly Resolution 48/153, 1993, UN General Assembly Resolution 
50/190, 1995, UN General Assembly Resolution 51/111, 1996, UN General 
Assembly Resolution 52/139, 1997. 

29. James, n. 18, pp. 179-180. 

30. The Contact Group established in 1994 by the Steering Committee of the 
International Conference on Yugoslavia on Former Yugoslavia, comprised 
France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. 

31. Yearbook of United Nations, 1998 (NY : United Nations Pub., 1998), pp. 367, 
368. 

32. See UN Security Council Resolution 1160, UN DOCS/RES/1160, March 31, 
1998. 

33. Yearbook of United Nations, 1998, n. 31, pp. 371-377. 

34. See UN Security Council Resolution 1199, UN DOCS/RES/1199, September 
23, 1998. 

35. James, n. 18, pp. 260, 261. 

36. Yearbook of United Nations 1998, n. 31, pp. 379, 380. 

37. Ibid., p. 381. 

38. UN Security Resolution 1203, UN DOCS/RES/ 1203, October 24, 1998. 

39. Yearbook of United Nations 1998, n. 64, p. 384, 385. 

40. Yearbook of United Nations 1999 (NY : United Nations Pub., 1999), p. 334- 
336. 

41. Ibid., p. 337. 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 115 



42. For detailed analysis of Rambouillet Process See March Weller, "The 
Rambouillet Conference Kosovo", International Affairs, Vol. 75 (1999), p. 
211-251. 

43. Yearbook of United Nations 1999, n. 73, p. 342. 

44. Timothy W. Crawford, "Pivotel Deterrence and The Kosovo War: Why the 
Halbrook Agreement Failed", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116 (Winter 
2001), pp. 521-22. 

45. Renata Dwan, "Armed Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution", 
Sipri Yearbook 2000, p. 84. 

46. Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Document 
S/PRST/1999/2. 

47. UN Security Council Resolution 1239, 14 May 1999. 

48. James, n. 18, p. 130. 

49. Weller, n. 42, p. 212. 

50. Ricard Caplan, "International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo", 
International Affairs, Vol 75 (1998), p. 753. 

51. James Hooper, "Kosovo : America's Balkan Problem", Current History, Vol 
627 (April 1999), p. 161. 

52. Kessing's Record of World Events, Vol. 44 (June 1998), p. 42157. 

53. The Kosovar Albanian's desire to break free from Serbia has deep roots which 
predates Yugoslavia's collapse in 1991. The international community generally 
took little interest in Kosovo affair because minority rights were until fairly 
recently regarded as the province of domestic politics and the interference in a 
state's domestic affairs is prohibited under international law. But, Yugoslavia's 
disintegration forced the question of self-determination of all Yugoslav nations 
on the international agenda. However, several actions by international 
community (European community in particular) ensured that the question of 
Kosovo would be effectively removed from that agenda. The Badinter 
Commission, which was established by European community in September 
1991, issued a number of important opinions concerning the legal status of 
Yugoslavia and its constituent units. Although these were non-binding opinions 
but they provided rationalization for subsequent state practice which had 
important ramifications for Kosovo. In November 1991, the Commission 
concluded that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution and that the 
republics seeking independence were not rebel entities but new states created 
on the territory of the former SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). 
This opinion is important because the "dissolution of Yugoslavia" meant that 
international support for the former republics would not be tantamount to 
support for secession, which is an act arguably in the contravention of the UN 
charter. See, Weller, n. 42, p. 215. 

54. The Kosovo Albanians were clearly one of the target populations whose status 
the EC was seeking to enhance. Indeed, the version of Carrington draft 
convention contained the further requirement that the republics shall apply 
fully and in good faith the provisions existing prior to 1990 for autonomous 
provinces. This was obvious reference to the autonomy of Kosovo and 

116 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Vojvodina which Serbia had revoked. Yet in an effort to gain Serbian President 
Milosevic's acceptance of the convention, Carrington's team made an 
extraordinary concessions and eliminated this requirement from the subsequent 
version of the convention. When EC in April 1996 (Now European Union) 
decided finally to extend recognition to the federal republic of Yugoslavia 
consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, it dispensed with the weaker requirement 
of a special status for the Kosovar Albanians altogether. The EU merely 
observed at the time that it 'consider' the improved relations between the 
Yugoslavia and the international community would depend inter alia on a 
'constructive approach' by the Yugoslavia to the granting of autonomy for 
Kosovo. These concessions were a profound disappointment for the Kosovar 
Albanians. But the gravest disappointment came with the 'Dayton negotiations 
which formally settled the Bosnian conflict in 1996. Nevertheless, the 
conclusion many Albanians drew from Dayton proceedings was that the ethnic 
territories have legitimacy and the international attention can only be obtained 
through war. In a manner reminiscent of the commencement of the 'intifada' in 
1987 when the Palestinians in the 'occupied territories' perceived that they, too, 
were slipping from the agenda of regional and international concerns. The 
Kosovo's Albanians increasingly lost faith in the patient ways of their 
leadership and gravitated toward armed struggle. It was this reservoir of 
disillusionment and sense of betrayal that explained the growing support among 
Albanians for the militant separatist Kosovo Liberation Army or UCK (Usthria 
Clirimtare Kosoves). The KLA has become such a prominent feature of the 
Kosovo landscape that it is easy to forget that only one year ago it was a tiny 
force with little public visibility. The Islamic fundamentalism and Jihad factor 
gave it further strength through weapons and moral help. Caplan, n. 50, p. 149; 
Hooper, n. 51, p. 160; Yossef Bodansky, "Italy becomes Iran's New Base for 
Terrorist Operations", Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Vol. 
XXVI (April/May 1998), p. 5-9. 

55. Caplan, n. 50, p. 753. 

56. For more detail about the General Principles adopted by G-8 Foreign Ministers 
at Bonn and the Final Principles accepted by FRY. See Annex I and Annex II 
of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, UN DOCS/RES/ 1244, June 10, 

1999. 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 117 



Chapter 4 



Limitations and Constraints on 
United Nations for Action in Kosovo 

PART I : ROLE OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
ORGANIZATION (NATO) 

NATO's intervention in Kosovo crisis has put the United 
Nations ability to maintain international order to a real test. The 
Kosovo crisis highlighted the dilemma of legitimacy for a group of 
states to act in order to prevent or halt humanitarian emergency 
where the Security Council is deadlocked in disagreement. NATO's 
role in Kosovo highly affected the relevance of the United Nations 
in the world affairs. The analysis of political, legal and philosophical 
issues raised by the Kosovo crisis is necessary for understanding the 
diminished United Nations position regarding use of force. 

NATO was the result of the outbreak of the Cold War. It 
marginalized the security role of the United Nations and thwarted 
President Roosevelt's strategy based on the policy of securing 
sustained the United States involvement in world affairs through 
universal security organization. President Harry Truman soon 
discovered that the cold war provided an even more effective 
substitute. By invoking the communist menace, the Truman doctrine 
had clearly put the United States into power politics. It facilitated its 
institutionalized involvement in Europe. At the same time, the 
European involvement took on a peculiarly American form. It was 
neither based on the old-fashioned system of bilateral alliances with 
several West European countries nor only based on "dumb-bell 
model" with the United States and Canada on one side and Western 
Europe on other and the Great Britain linking the two. Instead, it 
assumed the form of imagined yet indivisible North Atlantic 
Community in which attack on one would be considered attack on 
all. NATO founded in 1949, played a collective defence role for its 

118 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



member allied states. It became an essential part of a new European 
security order that aimed to contain the Soviet Union and curb its 
expansionist tendencies. It is an arc which symbolized the West's 
political strength and supported by two pillars i.e. North America 
and Western Europe. 

Since the signing of North Atlantic Treaty, it has faced a number 
of storms which put its resolve, cohesion and even the ground of its 
existence to the test. It also faced the possibility of gradual, 
spontaneous disintegration after period of incoherence. 1 With the 
end of cold war, it was expected that NATO's demise would soon 
follow and even if it did not disappear altogether, it would become 
empty shell, no longer performing any useful function. NATO in 
contrast to these pessimistic expectations has not become moribund. 
It has not only survived but elaborated its organizational bodies and 
undertook new activities. The allies have updated their common 
strategic concept. They have developed new policies and fora for 
promoting dialogue and security cooperation with the former 
communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. 2 

NATO's highly institutionalized character facilitated its ability 
to survive after the disappearance of the Soviet Union. The new 
strategic concept (adopted in 1991 and further expanded in 1999) has 
shifted its primary mission from deterrence or defense from external 
attack towards potential source of instability. These sources include 
ethnic conflicts, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction etc. 3 
NATO as a defensive alliance was obliged to take action only if 
foreign power attacked one of its member directly. Problems arising 
beyond its territory were not its responsibility. But the new strategic 
concept makes it impossible for NATO to not ignore events in 
neighbouring area even if they lie outside its formal boundaries. 4 
NATO's attack on Serbia in 1999 was the example of its outside 
functioning from North Atlantic areas. NATO's war in Kosovo 
illustrated its claim to be the main guarantor of regional stability and 
its relevance in European Security Paradigm. 

IMPACT OF NATO'S ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA ON 
THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE UN CHARTER'S 
USE OF FORCE IN WORLD POLITICS 

NATO's Kosovo intervention, on the other hand, has raised 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 119 



large number of issues. This may sound to consider that the United 
Nations was virtually sidelined by NATO in the management of the 
Kosovo crisis. NATO action in Serbia represents an obvious erosion 
of the United Nations authority on use of force in international 
affairs. NATO justified its intervention on humanitarian grounds. 
This raised, philosophical, legal and political debates about 
humanitarian intervention, the role of powerful states and regional 
organizations in internal crises. For understanding NATO's 
intervention in Kosovo crisis, it is necessary to analyse the 
international law regarding use of force under the United Nations 
Charter. The attempt to control the use of force falls broadly into 
two categories i.e. jus ad bellum (the circumstances in which force 
may properly be used). Second is jus ad bella (the manner in which 
hostilities are conducted). With regard to jus ad bellum, various 
international treaties prescribed limitations on conduct of hostilities. 5 
The league of Nations Covenant attempted further modest 
limitations on the unilateral use of force. But it has been the United 
Nations Charter that provides a comprehensive set of prescriptions 
on conflict resolution and use of force. The structure of the UN 
Charter is complex so far as the use of force is concerned. The 
interesting Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of a state. The only 
unilateral use of force permitted to a state is that of individual or 
collective self-defence under Article 51. This too has been 
commonly accepted that the prohibition of intervention applies 
regardless of the political ideology or the moral virtue of 
government of target state. There was general agreement that the 
charter prohibits intervention by any state even for humanitarian 
purposes. 6 

The Article 2(7) is forbidding intervention within the "domestic 
jurisdiction" of a member state except by the decision of the Security 
Council under chapter VII. The strict limitation on the use of force 
in the Charter is dependent upon the provision of the Collective 
Security. The UN Charter's collective security system is constructed 
in chapter VII (Articles 39 to 51) which authorizes Security Council 
to use force under the Collective Security system. The functions of 
the Security Council are described in Article 24-26 of the Charter. 



120 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



The specific powers for the discharge of these functions are laid 
down in chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII of the UN Charter. The 
chapter VI of the charter provides some functions to the Security 
Council which are related to the pacific settlement of disputes those 
likely to endanger international peace and security. The chapter VII 
provides the means for fulfilment of the Security Council's functions 
other than those under chapter VI relating to the pacific settlement 
of disputes. 7 The Table 4.1 provides a "threshold ladder of 
intervention" which corresponds to the three authorising Article i.e. 
Articles 40-42 found in the United Nations Charter. 

Levels of Enforcement Response Options 



1 . Preventive/Humanitarian 
(UN Charter, Article 40 



2. Non-forcible 

(UN Charter, Article 41) 



3. Direct-forcible 

(UN Charter, Article 42) 



a) Preventive Diplomacy. 

b) Withdrawal of diplomatic 
recognition. 

c) Provision of medical and food 
relief supplies to non-combatants, 
as well as troups necessary to 
ensure proper distribution of 
supplies. 

a) Economic sanctions. 

b) Suspensions of foreign aid. 

c) Arms embargo. 

d) UN Peacekeeping Missions (use 
of troups to guarantee cease-fire 
or mutually agreed truce). 

a) Threat of Military force to 
restore 

internationally acceptable level of 
standards. 

b) Establishment and enforcement of 
no-fly zones. 

c) Direct intervention. 



Table4.1 : Threshold Ladder of intervention into situations of Human 
Rights violations by states. 8 

Source : Christopher M. Ryan, Millennium Journal of International Studies, p. 98. 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



121 



The important function of the Security Council under Article 39 
is to decide or recommend measures in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Any action taken by the Security 
Council is contingent on the adoption of an enabling resolution. This 
resolution can only be carried by an affirmative vote of at least nine 
of the Security Council's fifteen members. Moreover, a resolution 
must obtain the concurring votes of five permanent members and 
one negative vote of one of the permanent member (i.e. China, 
France, Russia, United Kingdom United States) would prevent 
adoption of the proposed resolution. A permanent member may bar 
the adoption of any resolution even under Chapter VII or which 
pointed at itself and its closely associated state. Thus, the collective 
security system of the UN Charter is only geared to handle minor 
disturbers of peace. 9 The internal conflicts (Kosovo, Chechnya, 
Tibet etc.) are practically excluded from the reach of charter's 
collective security system. 

In the post-cold war scenario, the dangerous and 
organizationally challenging nature of interventions in internal 
conflicts led the United Nations Security Council to subcontract the 
military requirements with coalition forces. The 1990 Gulf war, 
operation Restore Hope in Somalia and the Implementation Force in 
Bosina were examples of these subcontracted operations. The 
political leadership and determination of intervention had largely 
provided by the United States in these interventions. The powerful 
element of the military forces was drawn from NATO countries. 
The serious humanitarian crises during civil conflicts after the end 
of cold war also provided important role to regional organizations. 
The United Nations Charter envisaged that regional organizations 
would have a role to play in maintenance of peace and security 
during complex emergencies. This role is reflected in chapter VIII 
of the UN Charter. The charter provided that the regional 
arrangements act only under individual or collection security or 
where the United Nations Security Council had authorised a regional 
organization to use force in dealing with a threat to international 
peace and security. 10 NATO, on the other hand, attacked Serbia 
without prior authorization of the Security Council in 1999 to 
compel it to accept a settlement of the Kosovo crisis. The analysis 
of legal issues regarding NATO's action in the Kosovo is necessary 

122 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



to understand the consequent erosion of the United Nations authority 
on the use of force in world politics. 

The prohibition of the threat or use of force under Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter forms the very basis for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The only two exceptions are the 
right of self-defence codified in Article 51 11 and Collective Security 
measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is 
important to note that NATO did justify its attack on Serbia on the 
ground of self-defence. Article 51 permits the exercise of right of 
self-defense only "if an armed attack occurs against a member 
state." The phrase "armed attack" included within its ambit, the 
action by regular forces across on international border, action by 
armed bands or groups on behalf of state which amount to actual 
armed attack. 12 These categories indicate that only physical act of 
aggression will qualify as "armed attack". NATO cannot allege that 
Yugoslavia had launched an "armed attack" against another state. 

NATO justified its threat and subsequent use of force against 
Serbia on two broad grounds. Firstly, that the Security Council had 
determined by Resolution 1199 that the situation in Kosovo 
constituted a threat to peace and security in the region. Secondly, 
that there was large scale human suffering in the region (Specifically 
the repression of Albanians in Kosovo and consequent spillover 
effect of exodus of thousands of refugees threaten the region). The 
important issues arise from this justification i.e. whether the mere 
determination by the Security Council (that a situation constitutes a 
threat to peace and security) gives member state a right to use force 
to deal with it. The other main important issue is about the 
recognition of the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention in 
international law. 13 The Security Council adopted three resolutions 
under chapter VII of Charter prior to NATO bombing campaign. 
The Resolution 1199 concluded by stating "if Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) did not implement the measures optioned in 
Resolutions 1160 and 1199, the Security Council will consider 
further action." And it would take further additional measures to 
maintain or restore peace and stability in the region. It is evident 
from Resolution 1199 that the Security Council gave an opportunity 
to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to comply with its wishes. It 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 123 



reserved the right to determine further "action and additional 
measures" to be taken in the evidence of the fact that Yugoslavia 
comply with the resolutions 1160 and 1190. It was not left to other 
states to determine what further actions and additional measure 
could be taken. 14 This Resolution did not even remotely imply that 
any state or regional organization could apply the use of force to deal 
with the situation. 

The Articles 41-42 of the United Nations Charter provides that 
the Security Council may be authorized the use of force only after 
determining that the non-lethal measures under Article 41 would be 
exhausted. Article 33 of the UN Charter provides that the parties to 
any dispute must first seek a resolution by peaceful means. Article 
42 only allowed use of force as a last resort. It means that the 
Security Council must determine the use of military means. 15 The 
Security Council in Resolution 1199 could not determine that non- 
lethal measures had failed to deal with the threat posed by the 
Kosovo crisis. On the other hand, the Resolution 1199 merely 
imposed certain demands on Yugoslavia and warned it that non- 
compliance with same would necessitate a consideration of further 
action. NATO's justification of use of force in Kosovo was further 
weakened by Resolution 1203. This Resolution emphasized that the 
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security is conferred on the Security Council. The Resolution 
also called upon the Yugoslavia, Kosovo Liberation Force (KLA) 
and all other states and organizations to stop using force and called 
for a halt to the violations of human rights. Both resolutions 1199, 
1203 did not authorize the use of force by any outside entity. Rather, 
they reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Yugoslavia. 16 In this situation, outside entity i.e. NATO had no right 
to take forcible action. It is evident that no state or group of states 
is entitled to the use of force in response to mere threat to 
international peace and security. The use of forcible measures by 
NATO is also illegal because it had not the specific authorisation of 
the Security Council to take enforcement action. The legal state of 
affairs would have been entirely different if the Security Council 
decided that there was a breach of peace. NATO could then have 
exercised the right of self-defence. 17 But in the Resolutions 1199, 



124 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



1203, the Security Council could not use the word "breach of 
peace". Thus, NATO's interpretation to construe it as an 
authorization for the use of force is to conflate the two steps 
described by the Article 41-42 of the UN Charter. 

In a letter to the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic 
Council, dated 9 October 1998, the Secretary-General of NATO, 
Javier Solana sought to justify the threat of the force against 
Yugoslavia. He referred the Security Council's view through 
Resolution 1 199 that the conflict in Kosovo constituted a threat to the 
peace and security in the region. But the Yugoslavia had not yet 
complied with Resolutions 1160 and 1199. He concluded by saying; 

Because of the unfolding crisis in Kosovo and the impossibility of 
obtaining a Security Coucil authorisation for the use of force to end the 
same due to Russian opposition, the NATO Allies believe that in the 
particular circumstances with respect to the present crisis in Kosovo as 
described in UNSC Resolution 1199, there are legitimate grounds for 
Alliance to threaten, and if necessary, to use force. 18 

The above quoted lines of NATO's Secretary-General Solana's 
letter mentions the improbability of obtaining a Security Council's 
resolution containing an explicit mandate for enforcement action. He 
admitted that such a resolution was necessary. NATO proceeded to 
threaten and use force knowing fully well that it was doing so 
without authorisation of the Security Council. 19 It makes the 
violation of the UN Charter all the more flagrant. 

NATO ATTACK AND AN INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN 
TWO PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF UN SYSTEM 

The other most important justification given by NATO was 
"Humanitarian intervention" for the use of force in Kosovo. It is 
important to examine that whether such a right existed in 
international law. The "treaty of Westphalia" inl648 divided the 
powers of Church and State. It lent to the state the characters of 
immutability and inviolability and reserved "perfection" and 
transcendence to the Church. Thus, from the initiation of the nation- 
state system, the independent states enjoy sovereignty over a given 
territory. They pursue their interests free from outside interference 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 125 



in their internal affairs. This customary principle of sovereign 
equality of states survived from three centuries. 20 This right is also 
incorporated in Article 2(1) in the United Nations Charter. 

Since 1945, the debate has been focused on the alleged 
incompatibility of two principles of the United Nations system i.e. 
sovereign equality and human rights. The former is enshrined in 
Articles 2(1), 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter. Under these Articles, 
the states enjoy sovereign equality defined internally as exclusive 
jurisdiction within a territory and externally as freedom from outside 
intervention. The human rights identified in preamble Article 1(3) of 
the UN Charter. This right is further elaborated in subsequent 
declarations and conventions. 21 As the UN Charter is firmly 
upholding the sovereignty and integrity of states, a parallel but 
contradictory trend developed in international law since 1945. This 
trend is giving priority to human rights. Human rights instruments 
got multiplied and 'states' have undertaken legal commitments to 
uphold these rights. The process has reached even more advanced 
legal stage in the Europe. All members of Organization of Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have accepted that "the 
commitments in the field of human dimensions are matter of direct 
and legitimate concern to all members and do not belong exclusively 
to the internal affairs of the state concerned." Although such a far- 
reaching recognition of human-rights obligations does not exist at 
the universal level but the trend goes in same direction. The 
international human rights law is considered as entailing erga omnes 
obligation (i.e. obligations that states respect in all circumstances 
without any contractual exception or requirement of reciprocity). 22 

From a legal point of view, it is essential to distinguish between 
international human-rights law and humanitarian law. International 
human-rights law is an offshoot of UN's Declaration of Human 
Rights and consists of a body of rules adopted at the universal level. 
It includes, the 1966 covenants on international civil, political, 
economic and social rights, the 1984 convention on human rights 
and 1999 European convention on human rights. These provide a set 
of political and judicial procedures to monitor respect for the rights 
involved. Some of these rights such as the prohibition of torture have 
been confirmed as erga omnes quality. 

126 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



International humanitarian law is much more ancient and 
evolved from incremental efforts by theologians, lawyers and 
politicians to humanise war by defining rules for jus in bello. Its 
fullest expression can be found in the Geneva Conventions (1949) 
and their additional protocols (1977). International humanitarian law 
set the rules for prosecution of war crimes. The post-second World 
War tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, Law Lords ruling in 
Pinochet case in England and the adhoc tribunals for Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia constitute a quite remarkable challenge to the norms of 
Westphalian system. Yugoslavia's former President Milosevic held 
during the course of his trial held at the Hague for the indictment of 
offences, allegedly committed by him in Kosovo. This eventual trial 
is a turning point in the development of international human rights 
norms and also changed the notion of the Sovereign immunity. 
Under this principle, the individuals who happen to be the head of a 
particular state or members of its government cannot be held 
personally responsible for the conduct of its official duty. 23 But the 
decision of the Law Lords in Pinochet case and President 
Milosevic's indictment consciously undermined this principle. It set 
the ground that individuals could be held to account for their actions 
in accordance with international standards. They are not immune 
from actions perceived by them to be necessary for the exercise of 
their official functions. 

There is a major difference between international human rights 
law and humanitarian law. The respect for the former is considered 
the responsibility of states whereas violations of latter entailed the 
criminal prosecution of individuals. Both laws tend more and more to 
intersect conditions which combines civil war with massive violations 
of human rights or genocide. These two bodies of rules provide 
precise sanctions for their violation. These are slowly but surely 
accepted universally. The creation of international tribunals of 
Former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994) and the International 
Criminal Court (1998) are cases in point. All these courts based their 
work on a combination of the material law laid out in the Geneva 
Conventions, the Conventions against genocide and the codification 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 24 However, these are 
becoming sophisticated sanctions but silent on preventive measures. 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 127 



Yet, it is precisely the prevention of massive human rights violations 
or humanitarian catastrophes which have become the basis of 
"humanitarian intervention" practice in recent years. 

The United Nations Charter and other human rights instruments 
do not provide the right of "humanitarian intervention". The 
intervention is defined as, 

The activity undertaken by a state, a group of states or an international 
organizations which interferes collectively in the domestic affairs of 
another state. . .it is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break 
conventional pattern of international relations. 25 

Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter prohibits intervention 
in matters relating to "domestic jurisdiction". This article shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under chapter 
VII. Various General Assembly Resolutions reiterated the principles 
of non-intervention in international affairs. 26 

Non-intervention is a logical corollary of territorial sovereignty. 
It has traditionally underpinned interstate relations and the United 
Nations charter. It is a sort of arrangement that was supposed to 
protect weaker states from the powerful. On the other hand, it also 
serves frequently as a last line of defense for autocratic 
governments. The dictator and totalitarian regimes used it to fend off 
outside criticism and intrusion in their domestic repression. 27 
Although the non-intervention principle was breached frequently in 
practice, but the states seemed markedly reluctant to cite the 
protection of human rights as their reason for invading other 
country. There are three familiar examples of this reluctance to rely 
on humanitarian case for intervention. First, the Indian invasion of 
East Pakistan in 1971, second, Vietnamese invasion of Combodia in 
1978 and third is the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1979. The 
hideous repression within the target state and consequent refugee 
flows would have seemed to provide a ready-made justification for 
doing so. In all above discussed cases, the intervening governments 
could not used "humanitarian intervention" as a reason for their 
invasion. 28 They used the principle of self-defence under Article 51 
as an easier and better means to relate their claim to the United 
Nations Charter. Thus, the right of "humanitarian intervention" has 
found little support in international relations. 

128 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Yet after the end of Cold War, the attitude toward the aberrant 
interpretation of "domestic jurisdiction" has changed. From 1945 to 
until the end of Cold War, human rights remained subordinate to 
state sovereignty within the framework of the United Nations 
Charter. The states are encouraged to promote human rights but not 
commanded to do so. The United Nations bias against intervention 
reflected in the European history. The drafting powers had been 
under the dramatic effects of World War II in 1945. The drafters 
were preoccupied by Hitler as a warmonger not as a architect of 
European extermination. For them, the aggressive war across 
national frontiers was more salient risk then the extermination of 
people within states. 29 This fact illuminated by the conspiratorial 
silence of states about the "Holocaust" and the "Red Terror" existed 
in 1970s. 

The demise of the Soviet Union resulted in the end of bipolarity 
in 1990s. It had changed several features of contemporary 
international relations. The end of East- West conflict changed the 
form of war. It led to a fragmentation of societies undergoing civil 
wars. The weakness or complete failures of state structures in many 
conflict-ridden societies provide opportunity for mass scale violence 
and terrorism. This increased the vulnerability of civilians in the 
context of civil conflict. 30 The "CNN effect" in which global and 
instantaneous access to information heightens the popular awareness 
of human suffering and the fear of refugee flows strengthened the 
human rights norms, led to the proliferation of human rights 
organizations. In this scenario, the "interventionism" on the basis of 
humanitarian ground becomes the new form of "political 
legitimacy" for Western powers. The use of force for humanitarian 
purposes has become a familiar pattern in the post-Cold War 
international politics. 31 NATO's war in Kosovo has provoked 
extremely divergent interpretations of "humanitarian intervention. 
The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Anan stated, 

if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an acceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should be respond to Rwanda, to Serbrenica-to gross 
and systematic violations of human rights that offend every percept of 
our common humanity? In essence the problem is one of responsibility, 
in circumstances in which universally accepted human rights are being 
violated on a massive scale we have a responsibility to act. 32 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 129 



The United States and NATO leaders repeatedly explained that 
the political objective of NATO's air campaign in Kosovo was to 
avert a humanitarian disaster. They acted to prevent this crisis from 
becoming a catastrophe. 33 The United States Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright pointed, 

NATO was forged in the aftermath of "holocaust" and war by the 
survivors of war to prevent war. It reflected our predecessor's 
determination to defend hard-won freedoms and their understanding 
that while weakness invites aggression, strength is parent to peace. By 
acting on behalf of justice and peace in Kosovo, we are reaffirming 
NATO's core purpose as a defender of democracy, stability and basic 
human decency on European soil. 34 

Czech Republic's President also stated, this is probably the first 
war that has not been waged in the name of "national interests", but 
rather in the name of principles and values. . .Kosovo has no oil fields 
to be coveted, no member nation in the alliance has any territorial 
demands on Kosovo. Milosevic does not threaten the territorial 
integrity of any member of alliance. And yet the alliance is at 
war... it is fighting because no decent person can stand by and watch 
the systematic, state directed murder of other people. 35 

Italian Foreign Minister noted that the Kosovo crisis 
demonstrated the primacy of human rights in international politics. 
NATO Secretary General Solana also stated, "for the first time, 
NATO a defensive alliance, launched a military campaign to avoid 
a humanitarian tragedy outside its borders. It fought in Kosovo not 
to conquer or preserve territory, but to protect the values on which 
the alliance was founded." The pro-interventionists argued that the 
defects of international law were responsible for Kosovo action. 
This action did not happen in isolation but after the United Nations 
failures in Rwanda and Bosnia. The failures of the United Nations 
in Civil Conflicts were the result of the veto of the Security 
Council's permanent members. They often threw a monkey wrench 
on the machinery of collective security. The expected vetoes by 
Russia and China in Kosovo case compelled NATO leaders to avoid 
explicit authorisation of the Security Council. This created 
legitimacy crisis for the Kosovo action. The pro-interventionists 
further argued that the legitimacy no doubt enhanced the legal 



130 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



credibility of actions which involved use of force. But the legitimacy 
and legality represent a complex process that is not confined to the 
Security Council chambers. 36 The state practice on the international 
level remained key to the shaping of legal norms. The majority of 
states are likely to shape a legal justification for political actions that 
deemed morally urgent even involving the use of force. NATO's 
invoking of legal justification of humanitarian intervention for 
legitimising Kosovo's action helped international law's proceeding 
towards mere progressive direction. 

The anti-interventionists, on the other hand, take the 
fundamental view that NATO's recourse to war was legally 
unacceptable without explicit authorisation of the Security Council. 
The Security Council controlled all uses of force in international 
relations and to bypass its authority on the basis of prospective 
vetoes is illegal. Indeed, the function of the veto is precisely to 
prevent use of force in the absence of a consensus among permanent 
members. Thus, NATO's bypassing of the United Nations authority 
is seen as a devastating constitutional blow to the authority of the 
organization. 37 It also blurred the most basic prohibition inscribed in 
the international law governing recourse to force, Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan clearly stated in his 1999 report, 

Earliar this year, the Security Council was precluded from intervening 
in the Kosovo crisis by profound disagreements between council 
members over whether such an intervention was legitimate. 
Differences within the council reflected the lack of consensus in the 
wider international community. Defenders of interpretations of 
international law stressed the inviolability of state sovereignty, other 
stressed the moral imperatives to act forcefully in the face of gross 
violations of human rights... but what is clear is that enforcement 
actions without Security Council authorization threaten the very core 
of the international security system founded on the charter of the 
United Nations. Only the charter provides a universally accepted legal 
basis for the use of force. 38 

It is clear that international law has not yet recognized the right 
of humanitarian intervention. On the other hand, some jurists argued 
that such a right may exist or is at least evolving. It can only be 
justified in a extreme and very particular circumstances. The first 
thing to note is that despite the proliferation of the use of word 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 131 



'humanitarian' there is little clarity about its meaning. It is linked to 
activities as diverse as the pursuit of universal human rights, the 
prosecution of those guilty of offending the 'conscience of 
mankind.' It also includes the delivery of emergency aid for human 
subsistence and the use of military force in a variety of 
circumstances. 

It is argued that intervention in 'extreme humanitarian 
emergency' can be justified the notion of 'supreme emergency' first 
coined by Michael Walzer. It has two components. The first is 
immediacy of the danger and second is its nature. A supreme 
emergency occurs where the danger is very close and it must be of 
an unusual and horrifying kind. But the crucial considerations 
regarding 'supreme emergency' are, 

(i) whether an urgent and compelling situation of extreme and 
large scale humanitarian distress occurs which demand 
immediate relief. 

(ii) whether the territorial state is itself capable of meeting the 
needs of the situation unwilling to do so or perhaps itself 
the cause of it. 39 

This legal opinion gave NATO's action a measure of legitimacy. 
But this legal opinion concludes that the "intervention would have to 
be peaceful action (which need not exclude it being carried out by 
military personal) in a compelling emergency. It is clear that the 
nature contemplated by this expanded consideration of the right of 
humanitarian intervention is very different from that undertaken by 
NATO. It is also argued that the prohibition on the use of force 
codified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is "Jus Cogens" norm. 
This norm is related with emergence of new peremptory norm of 
general international law. Article 64 of the Vienna convention 
described that "if a new peremptory norm of general international 
law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm 
becomes void and terminates." 40 The right of "humanitarian 
intervention" has not attained the status of "Jus Cogens" norm. It 
cannot be eroded the UN Charter norm of use of force under Article 
2(4). Thus, the use of force cannot be justified on the basis of 
humanitarian intervention. 



132 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



NATO's intervention in Kosovo also raised political and 
philosophical debate about the concept of humanitarian intervention. 
The horrors of Rwanda and other various ethnic wars changed the 
form and meaning of this concept. In current and new form, it means 
external interference in the internal affairs of a country with a view 
to ending or at least reducing the suffering caused by such events as 
civil war, genocide and starvation. It respects the integrity of state 
and committed to preserve its territorial boundaries. Paradoxically, 
it also insists on common humanity and concomitant duty under 
certain circumstances to disregard state's autonomy. 41 The present 
actions particularly NATO's intervention in Kosovo has effectively 
abandoned the old charter rules. These rules strictly limit 
international intervention in local conflicts. These actions have been 
undertaken in favour of a vague new system that is much more 
tolerant of military intervention. This phenomenon has few hard and 
fast rules. The end of cold war starkly shows that the anti- 
intervention regimes has fallen out of sync with modern notion of 
justice. 42 

PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE ABOUT NATO ATTACK ON 
YUGOSLAVIA ON THE BASIS OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 

In international politics, there are two most fundamental values 
i.e. international order and international justice. The international 
order is a pattern or disposition of international activity i.e. state 
sovereignty. International justice contains moral rules which confer 
rights and duties upon the states and nations. These rules are the 
right of self-determination, the right of non-intervention and the 
right of all sovereign states to be treated as equal entities. The state 
sovereignty and human rights are closely related to order and justice 
in international relations. On the one hand, the states respect each 
other's independence i.e. value of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
On the other hand, international relations not only involve states but 
also human beings. These human beings possess human rights 
regardless of state which they happen to be a citizen. 43 After the end 
of Cold War, there is a conflict between these two values. 
Consequently, it raised various issues i.e. if human rights are 
massively violated within the state then that state retain its right of 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 133 



non-intervention? Is the sovereignty sacrosanct in Rwanda and 
Somalia like situations? In such circumstances, Is there a right of 
humanitarian intervention to rescue people? How should the two 
rights be balanced? 

The international society approach presents two views for 
balancing the issue of human rights and non-intervention in 
international politics. First is "Pluralist" view which stresses that the 
rights and duties in international society are conferred upon the 
sovereign states. The individuals have only rights given to them by 
their own states. Therefore, the principles of sovereignty and non- 
intervention are sacrosanct. The states have no right to intervene in 
other state's for humanitarian reasons. Second is "Solidarist" view 
which stressed the importance of individuals as the ultimate 
members of international society. Thus, the states have both right 
and duty to conduct intervention in order to mitigate extreme cases 
of human sufferings. The statists, on the other hand, distinguished 
two accounts of international relations. First is purposive association 
in which international relations promote specific goals like global 
principles of justice. Second is 'practical association' in which states 
tolerate each other and refrain from trying to impose their own 
particular ends on others. In this association, justice requires the 
independence and legal equality of states, right of self-defense, the 
duty of non-intervention. The obligation to observe treaties and 
restrictions on the conduct of war is also part of practical 
association's justice. Thus, the "practical conception" of 
international relations is corollary of the right of non-intervention. 
The norm of non-intervention protect the right of states to govern as 
they please and no longer provides protection to cultural, religious, 
ethnic or national communities which do not possess statehood. 44 
This notion rejects the 'purposive' conception. 

The pluralists further contend that heterogeneity and difference 
be respected and tolerated in international politics. The reason of this 
conception is based on profound disagreements throughout the world 
on religious, moral, economic and political issues. The states should 
allow people to go their own different ways and not suppress cultural 
diversity. The theory of cosmopolitanism describes that states have 
authority only insofar as they respect interests and rights of citizens 

134 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



or non-citizens. The states have only instrumental value as a way of 
furthering the interests of human beings. 45 This theory further raises 
debate about humanitarian intervention in post-structuralist, 
foundationalist and pragmatist views. The post-structuralist views 
involve a repoliticisation of humanitarianism so that its relationship 
with sovereignty can be problematized. The repoliticization has to be 
aimed at both the role played by sovereignty in the technologies of 
humanitarianism and the pivotal place occupied by sovereignty of 
human beings (victims of ethnic violence). The first involves 
understanding of humanitarianism as an instrument and rationality of 
statecraft rather than challenge to it. The second is based on an 
account of subjectivity constituted as 'victims', 'devastated 
populations' and 'populations in distress' through representational 
media and administrative practices. 46 Michael Foucault's views 
reflects this repoliticization which describe, 

There exist an 'international citizenry' which has its rights, which has 
its duties, and which promise to raise itself up against every abuse of 
power, no matter who the author or victims. After all, we are all 
governed and, to that extent, in solidarity... people's misfortune must 
never be the silent remainder of politics. It founds an absolute right to 
rise up and to address those who hold power... Amenesty international, 
Terre des Hommes, Medecins du Monde are initiatives which have 
created a new right that is the right of private individuals to intervene 
in the order of politics and international strategies. This will of 
individuals must inscribe itself in a reality over which governments 
have wanted to reserve a monopoly for themselves - a monopoly which 
we must uproot little by little everyday. 47 

Foucault's argument speaks to the idea of a political bond 
enabled by governments continuing power and the practices of 
governmentality that traverse human life. This political bond is 
similar to Jacques Derrida's 'new international' which describes, 

There is today an aspiration towards a bond between singularities (not 
'political subjects' nor even 'human beings') all over the world. This 
bond not only extends beyond nations and states, such as they are 
composed today or such as they are in the process of decomposition, 
but extends beyond the every concepts of nation state. For example I 
feel in solidarity with this particular Algerian... Croat, Serbian or 
Bosnian... it's not a feeling of one citizen toward another, it's not a 
feeling peculiar to a citizen of the world, as if we were all potentially 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 135 



or imaginary citizens of a great state. . .what binds me to them - and this 
is a point, there is a bond, but this bond cannot be contained within 
traditional concepts of community, obligation or responsibility - is a 
protest against citizenship, a protest against membership of a political 
configuration as such. This bond is, for example a form of political 
solidarity opposed to the political qua a politics tied to the nation- 
state. 48 

These views might offer a more productive predicate for 
'humanitarianism', articulate dimensions of ethico-political 
character of post structuralist attitude and their connection to 
international politics. Foundationalists justified humanitarian 
intervention on the notion of "human solidarity". This predicates the 
idea that there is a 'core self which is transhistorical and 
transcultural. The self is like Hegel's 'concrete' universal whose 
humanity is articulated in and realised through its social relations. 
Individuals are constituted by their social identities and interactions. 
But they have a unique capacity for self reflection which 
differentiates them from animals. The historical experiences, cultural 
norms, and social interactions in multiplicity of social life shaped the 
moral principles and beliefs of individuals. It is argued that moral 
reality is depending upon the reflection of complex duality between 
universalism and particularism in any society. Any human society is 
'universal' due to its human composition and 'particular' because it 
is a society. Particular moral communities create shared way of life 
which gives meaning to individuals in their daily lives. By contrast, 
the humanity has members but no memory, no history, culture and 
customary practices. It has no familiar life way, festivals and shared 
understanding of social goods. 49 Thus, all humans can acknowledge 
each other's different ways and respond to each other's cries for help. 
According to foundationalists, the moral solidarity of human beings 
provides support to humanitarian intervention. 

This view creates dilemma in post-cold war international 
relations. NATO states argued that massive human rights abuses 
created a legitimacy exception to the non-intervention rule in the 
case of Kosovo. In other similar case of East Timor, the same states 
argued that sovereign prerogatives deny the possibility of armed 
intervention. The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
raised this issue and noted, 

136 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



It has cast in stark relief the dilemma of so called "humanitarian 
intervention." On the one hand, is it legitimate for a regional 
organization to use force without a UN mandate? On the other, is it 
permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with 
grave humanitarian consequences continues unchecked? The inability 
of the international community to reconcile these two compelling in the 
case of Kosovo can be viewed only as a tragedy. 50 

This shows the weakness of foundationalist claims of human 
solidarity. It raised most important issue i.e. if the human agency or 
public opinion forced the Western leaders to use force in Kosovo, 
why not in Rwanda, Sudan or various other civil wars? Pragmatism 
provided important considerations about this issue. A solidarism 
rooted in "pragmatism" holds that human solidarity is based on 
sentimentality rather than "common humanity". Pragmatists contend 
that humanitarian intervention ought to be seen not in terms of 
upholding of universal moral principles. On the other hand, it is 
theory informed practice based upon the extension of values created 
within particular communities. 51 

Pragmatism must respect the fallibility of past decisions and 
dominant forms of knowledge. It is based on the observable 
outcomes of particular action. The inquiry and observation produce 
knowledge which in turn construct the beliefs about reality. The key 
problem with the use of force for humanitarian purposes is that it is 
blunt and unpredictable instrument. The observable outcome of 
NATO's air strikes in Kosovo was that it could not accomplish the 
declared aim of preventing humanitarian catastrophe. Then NATO 
leaders changed their objective towards "halting and reversing" the 
catastrophe. 52 Pragmatism addressed this unpredicted 
instrumentality of use of force through the concept of "pragmatic 
solidarism. " 

The pragmatic solidarism provide three aspects for establishing 
legitimacy criteria for the use of force. These aspects are, an anti- 
representationalist epistemology, the concept of fallibilism and the 
notion of the priority of democracy to philosophy. The anti- 
representationalism opposed the representationalism logic. The latter 
described that 'knowledge claims' are evaluated according to their 
reality. The accuracy of representation of reality is judged by 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 137 



cognitive processes. The aim of representationalism is to discover 
the world by establishing languages and practices that accurately 
represent the world as it actually is. Anti-representationalism sees 
knowledge as a web of constructed beliefs that helps to make sense 
of the world. It argues that there is no independent test of accuracy 
of representation. This raises a question that what type of competing 
'knowledge claims' make sense of humanitarian intervention? The 
claims and counter-claims about humanitarian intervention are or 
should not be evaluated according to their correspondence with 
reality of international society. These claims and counter-claims are 
bounded and given value by "regimes of truth". The "regimes of 
truth" delimit the boundaries and legitimized the types of knowledge 
claims, subject matters and system of validation. 53 The very term 
"humanitarian intervention" is made possible by an international 
'regime of truth' that the intervention in terms of human rights 
violations is a useful way of protecting the international order. 

The knowledge claims about intervention are evaluated 
according to their representation of reality. All individuals within a 
community perceive knowledge claims through their own 
prejudices. Thus, anti-representationalism permits to think in terms 
of justifications for intervention and human rights. The critical 
assessment of this justification takes place within a community based 
on the perceived or expected consequences of particular action. The 
communities construct knowledge about international norms in order 
to facilitate the achievement of what they perceive useful purposes. 
This knowledge between communities creates overlap between their 
communal beliefs and desires. This view clarifies the divergent 
views about intervention in world politics. The pragmatic solidarism 
provides the solution of this problem through 'communicative 
ethics'. It is based on the view that the communal beliefs cannot be 
justified by comparison with other beliefs. The communicative 
ethics insists that moral knowledge can only claim to be valid if it is 
approved of and has a potential to be approved of by all affected by 
this knowledge or norm. 54 The more approval such claims have, 
more valid and legitimate they are. 

For the justification and validity of 'humanitarian intervention' , 
it is necessary for those using force to persuade others about its 

138 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



instrumental necessity to achieve an ethical end. This persuasion 
needs to be developed through 'Socratic dialogue' and critical 
intelligence. The Socratic dialogue means a situation where agents 
construct knowledge through free and open dialogue based on 
critical intelligence. Agents reach better forms of knowledge by 
assuming different positions as a result of this dialogue. This means 
that the veracity of knowledge claim is dependent upon the 
possibility of dialogic consensus. But the problem with this position 
is that what practical steps should agents take when confronted with 
supreme humanitarian emergency and an absence of such 
consensus? 55 The NATO intervention in Kosovo without 
authorisation of the Security Council was also the result of absence 
of dialogic consensus between permanent members. 

The pragmatic ideas of fallibility and the priority of democracy 
to philosophy are used for validating knowledge claims. Fallibalism 
based on the idea that there is no necessary correspondence between 
knowledge and reality. There is no guarantee that the most firmly 
held beliefs would never needs revision. Fallibalism does not require 
to doubt everything instead it demands to doubt anything when given 
good reason to do so by dialogic encounters. This concept is wedded 
to the idea that to know is not to enjoy a 'god's eye view' of the 
thing in itself. Rather, it comes to agreement with others about the 
nature of things through discursive practice. This concept is based 
on two views. First is to prepare to accept that the beliefs ones hold 
are malleable. Second view relates to the awareness that the frames 
that validate knowledge can themselves be changed through 
discourse or practice. 56 For instance, if one believes that there is no 
legitimate practice of humanitarian intervention in international 
society at present one must also accept the possibility of such 
practice emerging. The emerging notion of 'sovereignty as 
responsibility' describes this view. This notion may reshape 
international discourse in such a way that states are legitimising 
human rights norms. 

The idea of the priority of democracy to philosophy viewed that 
the pragmatists do not justify beliefs by arguing that they correspond 
to something approximating human nature. Instead it offers 
justification on the basis of comparison with alternative views. 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 139 



These views based on pragmatic idea that "human intellectual and 
spiritual growth arrived by considering and contrasting constantly 
new or alternative ways of describing reality. 57 For instance, there 
are good grounds to believe that genocide is imminent. The beliefs 
that an early and decisive use of force or using force against 
imminent perpetrators of genocide is effective strategies for 
overcoming this problem are validated on the basis of widespread 
intersubjective agreement. But this knowledge is not infallible 
because there may be grounds for revision within this discourse e.g. 
the use of force by NATO in Kosovo prompt genocidal type 
practices. The validation of knowledge in this way depends upon the 
priority of democracy. It means that agents are free to justify their 
actions in way that appear appropriate to them as well as others are 
free to interrogate those claims and participate in the process of 
reconstituting methods of validations. Thus, it is argued that the 
values such as humanitarian intervention may be legitimate if their 
revision takes place through Socratic dialogue between as many 
individuals and groups as possible. It may also be legitimate by an 
appreciation that even the most dearly held values may be revised 
and by a commitment of preserving the priority of democracy. 

While there is no doubt that NATO's attack on Yugoslavia 
violated International Law but it justified this intervention on the 
basis of supreme humanitarian emergency. On the one hand, "when 
the Kosovo conflict is studied in context of human rights violations 
the NATO's violations of international law appears somewhat less 
egregious. On the other hand, if NATO's action can be seen as in 
the context of evolving relationship with the United Nations, it poses 
a grave threat to its authority and relevance in world politics. This 
point can be described through the analyses of relationship between 
the United Nations and NATO. 

POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UN AND NATO 
AND IMPACTS OF NON-ARTICLES NATO MISSIONS ON 
THE UN SYSTEM 

The NATO was established by North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 as 
carefully circumscribed uni-dimensioned security organization 
which complements the multi-dimensional security framework of the 
United Nations. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty expressly 

140 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



based itself on Article 51 of The United Nations Charter and 
conceived it to remain subordinate to the United Nations. 58 The 
Article 51 of UN Charter recognize the inherent right of member 
states to act in individual or collective self-defence in response to an 
armed attack until the Security Council has taken measures to 
maintain international peace and security. 59 The subordination of 
NATO to the UN also acknowledged by Preamble of North Atlantic 
Treaty. Article 1 of this Treaty accepts that NATO refrain from use 
of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. 
Article 7 of Treaty clarify that it does not affect the right and 
obligations (under the Charter) of the parties which are members of 
the United Nations. This reiterates Article 103 of the UN Charter 
which provides that in the event of conflict between member's 
obligations under Charter and its obligations under any other treaty, 
the former will prevail. 60 NATO's subordination to the UN was also 
acknowledged by its architects from its inception. The US Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson tactfully said, 

The Pact is carefully and conscientiously designed to conform in every 
particular with the Charter of United Nations. It is an essential measure 
for strengthening the United Nations. It is the firm intention of the 
parties to carry out the Pact in accordance with the provisions of the 
United Nations Charter and in manner which will advance its purposes 
and provisions. 61 

This subordinate relation of NATO with the UN has flawed on 
two occasions when NATO enforced heavy weapons exclusion 
zones without the Security Council authorization in Bosnia. The key 
officials in NATO governments particularly the US Government 
have asserted unambiguously that they do not consider the point of 
view that the NATO is subordinate to the UN. The US Deputy 
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said, 

We believe NATO's missions and tasks must always be consistent with 
the purposes and principles of the UN and OSCE.... At the same time 
we must be careful not to subordinate NATO to any other international 
body or compromise the integrity of its command structure. We will 
try to act in concert with other organizations and with respect for their 
principles and purposes. But the alliance must reserve the right and the 
freedom to act when its member, by consensus, deem it necessary. 62 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 141 



In this statement the UN is equated with and given no more 
importance than regional organization such as OSCE. In a similar 
vein, Senator William Roth, the Chairman of the North Atlantic 
Assembly said, "Even Though all NATO member states would 
prefer to act with the UN mandate, they must not limit themselves 
to acting only when such a mandate can be agreed." This statement 
imply that the Security Council authorization for the use of force 
would be politically desirable. 63 Kosovo crisis is illustration of this 
evolving relation between NATO, the US and the UN. 

NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia raises another issue of the 
delegation of UN authority over use of force to regional 
arrangements. The UN Charter gives distinct sphere of activity to 
collective self-defence organizations and regional arrangements. 
Article 5 1 of the UN Charter gives the right to use force to collective 
self-defence organizations established under this Article. It gives this 
right in response to an armed attack against one or more members 
of collective self-defence organization without securing the Security 
Council authorization. 64 The scope of activities of a regional 
organization envisaged under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
Article 52 provides that regional arrangements or agencies cannot be 
precluded if they deal with matters relating with international peace 
and security provided that these are consistent with the purposes and 
principles of the UN. Article 53 provided that the Security Council 
utilizes these regional agencies for enforcement action under its 
authority but no regional enforcement action shall be taken without 
authorization of the Security Council. Article 54 provides that the 
Security Council is to be kept fully informed at all times of activities 
undertaken or under contemplation by regional organization. 65 It is 
proved by the plain reading of the UN Charter that only the Security 
Council may authorize enforcement action. 

The reporting requirement under Article 54 significantly 
distinguishes the collective defence organization and regional 
organization. An organization established under Article 51 may use 
force without the Security Council authorization and is not obliged 
to report its actions to the Security Council before such action is 
taken. An organization established under Chapter VIII use force 
even when not acting in collective self-defense but only with prior 

142 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



authorisation of the Security Council. It is not obliged to report its 
actions to the Council under Article 54 even those actions are under 
contemplation of the Security Council. Thus it is clear that even 
inaction of Security Council does not prevent collective self-defense 
organization to act in self-defence but precludes regional 
organization from initiating any action involving the use of force. 66 

The North Atlantic Treaty expressly basing itself on Article 51 
and makes no reference to Chapter VIII. This confined scope of 
NATO's actions to collective self-defence and barred from other 
kind of operations. Even the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
and British Foreign Secretary Bevin Categorically described that 
The North Atlantic Treaty is not a regional arrangement under 
Chapter VIII of The UN Charter. 67 Thus, if NATO wants to evade 
authorization and reporting requirements of the Security Council, it 
must limit its use of force to self-defense in response to an armed 
attack. But NATO used force in Kosovo when it was not acting in 
self-defence. The Yugoslavia did not attack NATO member state. 
Under Article 5 1 , NATO cannot use force when it is not acting in 
self-defence and evade the scrutiny of the Security Council. The 
distinction between collective self-defense organization and regional 
organization has blurred in practice. The Security Council used 
NATO for enforcement of its resolutions in Bosnia as regional 
organization under Chapter VIII. By authorising NATO to enforce 
resolutions 770(1992), 781(1992), 816, 819, 824, 836, 844 in 1993 
and 1031 (1995), the Security Council recognized NATO as regional 
arrangement under Article 53. 68 

Even recognised as regional organization under Chapter VIII, 
NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia was illegal because it was not 
authorised by the Security Council under Article 53.. This action 
further raises the issue of inconsistency and incompatibility between 
regional organization and universal organization. Compatibility is 
defined as the relationship between international and regional 
organizations by which the activities of one do not undermine those 
of other or vice-versa. The antagonism between regionalism and 
universalism occurs only when the jurisdiction and functions of 
organizations at the two levels are incompatible. The basis for a 
compatible relationship exists (in case of conflict) if universal 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 143 



obligation prevail over regional obligation and the regional agencies 
submit to supervision by global agencies or respond positively to 
their request for supportive action. 69 In case of Kosovo, NATO acts 
without the authorisation of the Security Council and undermine the 
jurisdiction and functions of the United Nations. 

It is argued that NATO bombed Serbia because it wanted to 
justify its relevance in post-cold war scenario. The demise of USSR 
had receded the fear of external attack on Europe. It made collective 
self-defence commitment of NATO redundant. Thus, NATO 
adopted new strategic concept in 1991 and further expand it in 1999. 
The principal challenges highlighted by NATO in its strategic 
concept are, ethnic conflicts, terrorism and Weapons of Mass 
destruction (WMD). 70 Although the eruption of ethnic conflicts, 
proliferation of WMD and terrorism has created dangerous security 
concerns in the world but NATO's decision to deal with these issues 
raise serious problems of jurisdiction. The proliferation of WMD is 
global problem and all international treaty regimes which controlling 
WMD created under the UN and the Security Council is responsible 
for their enforcement. NATO's assessment of the nature of security 
challenges is not clear. It's intervention in ethnic conflicts in Eastern 
Europe is more or less justified but how the possession of WMD by 
Asian or African country threaten and invite its action?. Thus, the 
Kosovo action indicate that NATO need not always act in self- 
defence but it may take remedial action even it does not threatened. 
The Resolution on Recasting Euro-Atlantic Security adopted by 
North Atlantic Assembly in 1998 justifies the Missions undertaking 
outside the scope of Article 5 of Atlantic Treaty. The Paragraph (d) 
of this resolution enjoined member states, 

to seek to ensure the widest international legitimacy for non-Article 5 
missions and also to stand ready to act should the UN Security Council 
be prevented from discharging its purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security. 71 

NATO's Kosovo action was non- Article 5 Mission which 
violated the UN Charter and international law. The UN Charter 
recognize and gives scope for initiatives by regional organization for 
maintenance of international peace and security. It does not permit 
these organizations to act in place of the Security Council even if it 

144 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



prevented from discharging its function of maintaining international 
peace and security. However, it may be desirable in a given 
context. 72 NATO bombed Serbia according the codification of 
Paragraph (d) of North Atlantic Assembly Resolution. But the UN 
Charter and international law do not permit it to act without the 
Security Council's authorization. Although, this action demonstrated 
Security Council weariness to act decisively in intra-state conflicts 
but it also eroded its monopoly on the use of force. Simultaneously, 
it undermined the United Nations efficiency as an international 
organization. 

NATO's action in Kosovo has myriad effects on international 
politics. It raises legal, political and philosophical debate about 
humanitarian intervention in world politics. This action seriously 
affected the authority of the United Nations Security Council 
regarding use of force. Although, NATO successfully regain its 
important the place in post-Cold War European security paradigm 
but it eroded the United Nations relevance in world affairs. But the 
post-war peace-building role of the United Nations in Kosovo 
indicates that it has a continuous relevance in international politics. 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 145 



PART II : ROLE OF UNITED STATES 

The Kosovo crisis was a watershed in international relations and 
exhibited the severity of ethnic conflicts in world politics. The crisis 
was a result of zero-sum ethnic conflict between the Serbs and 
Kosovo Albanians. 73 The Kosovo Albanians demanded 
independence of Kosovo from Yugoslavia. The Serbian management 
of this conflict through violent means resulted in serious human 
rights violations of the Kosovo Albanians. The spill-over effect of 
humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo compelled international 
community to intervene in this crisis. The lack of consensus between 
permanent members of the United Nations further complicated the 
situation. Consequently, NATO attacked Yugoslavia without the 
mandate of the Security Council. NATO's intervention in Kosovo 
not only diminished the United Nations effectiveness and prestige in 
world politics but also pointed towards the role and impact of the 
United States as world power on the functioning of the United 
Nations system. 

POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 

The United States Complex relations with the United Nations 
are best understood in terms of four international roles played by it 
in world politics. These are, 

1 . Prophetic and reformist role 

2. Infra-organizational role 

3. Custodial role 

4. Domestic-Pressure role 

Since the late nineteenth century, the focus of the United States 
reformist foreign policy has been shifted from the choice of a role 
within an existing system to a role of innovative architect and 

146 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



redesigner of that system. The distinctive characteristics of the 
United States participation in international politics in the past 
century has been to engage in major social engineering, to design 
and create new institutions which transform the essential nature and 
procedures of international politics. Although the content of these 
restructuring policies varied from time to time but the common 
objective has been to change the world politics so that it could take 
on the character of American political beliefs. The multi-lateral 
international institutions in the world necessarily incorporate the 
values and demands of the most politically relevant actors. These 
institutions also reflect the relative power positions of actors (that 
formed them) in their constitutions and prescribed procedures. 74 The 
birth of United Nations by an international act on American soil was 
the result of its reformist role. The United States like other states 
always has been defending, its rights and position within the United 
Nations decision-making procedures since the establishment of 
world body. Although the United States behaviour gets magnified by 
the virtue of its preponderant power, but there are many instances 
when even at the cost of its specific interests it acted in consistent 
with the United Nations aims and objectives. 

This pro and infra organisational role of the United States is 
based on its wish to use the authority of the United Nations rather 
than "go it alone" in international relations. The "uniting for peace" 
resolution was an example of the United States infra-organisational 
role. This resolution authorised the General Assembly to exercise 
some powers of the Security Council with regard to international 
peace and security when the Security Council gets blocked by the 
use of the Veto power of any of the permanent member. The United 
States always used this resolution for its own convenience. It could 
have easily used this resolution for obtaining authority for military 
action in Kosovo if the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution 
because of the expected veto of Russia and China. But, it eschewed 
this option because of the presumable and precedential implications 
of constitutional change which could have enhanced the power of the 
General Assembly vis-a-vis the Security Council. Thus, the United 
States did not use this alternative in Kosovo and used NATO for 
military attack on Yugoslavia. 75 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 147 



The United States, as the strongest power in the world 
community, functions as the ultimate custodian of world order. It is 
the actor of last resort in matters of fundamental importance to 
contemporary international politics. The custodian role may involve 
the usurping of ordinary decision-making procedures of the United 
Nations in order to vouchsafe the fundamental goals of larger 
system. The United States, sometimes, acts extra-legally or supra- 
legally with respect to the United Nations when an urgent issue of 
international order is at stake. This role may generate acute conflicts 
with other members of the United Nations when military action is 
required to stop severe human rights violations. The domestic 
pressures widely affected the United States roles in international 
relations. The transfer of foreign affairs power from a specialist 
professional class to much wider slice of community is characteristic 
of modern democracies. The United States as a robustly effective 
democracy must respond to the demands of its domestic pressures 
which are generated, refracted and amplified by the Mass Media. 76 

The above mentioned roles collectively reflect the United States 
grand strategy in world politics. The United States grand strategy 
has been continuously developing and evolving since two centuries. 
The new grand strategy of each period build on the strategy it 
supersedes. The United States revised or expanded it to fit the 
altered realities and opportunities created by its victories in 
successive wars. The United States grand strategy included security 
objectives and economic objectives as well as particular approaches 
to achieve these ends at particular times. It also supported the 
development of rather sophisticated international institutions 
according to its reformist role. During Cold War, it developed 
sophisticated ideology that gained wide international appeal and 
comprised both political and economic ideals. This was liberal 
internationalism whose political and economic ideals were liberal 
democracy and free markets. Other important elements of this 
strategy were containment, nuclear deterrence and promotion of 
open economic society. 

The United States modified, revised and expanded the elements 
from its earlier grand strategy after the end of Cold War and 
collapse of the Soviet Union. It showed not only the new realities 



148 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



and opportunities created by the United States victory in the Cold 
War but also reflected particular transformations occurred in the last 
decade of twentieth century. The United States economic and social 
realities in this decade were no longer centered on industrial power 
and classic liberalism like the Cold War years. The process of 
globalization, communication revolution and diminished power of 
nation-state changed old strategy of the United States. These 
transformations have been most pronounced in the United States but 
their impact has been global in scope. The United States policy 
makers, redesigned their grand strategy to fit it in new global era. 77 
The Kosovo war was the first fruit of that revised strategy and a 
prototype of twenty first century way of war. 

THE UNITED STATES CONDUCT IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR WORLD AND NATURE OF ITS INVOLVEMENT 
IN KOSVO CRISIS 

The United States involvement in Kosovo began in December 
1992 when President George W. Bush warned President Milosevic 
to employ United States military force in Kosovo against Serbian 
repressive policies. Beside realist strategies, humanitarian concerns 
in Kosovo dominated foreign policy agenda of the United States 
through media in a global information Age. The United States 
claimed that the humanitarian concerns regarding the fate of the 
Kosovo Albanians could have motivated it to initiate the Kosovo 
war. In President Clinton's words, the reasons of Kosovo war were 

to save the lives of innocent civilians in Kosovo from a brutal military 
offensive, to diffuse a power keg at the heart of Europe that has 
exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results, to 
prevent a wider war we would have to confront later only at far greater 
risk and cost, to stand with our NATO allies for peace. 78 

Kosovo and Iraq war 2003 pose the question mark on 
international law governing the use of force. It dangerously affected 
the future of the United Nations Security Council. The American 
Commentators also proclaimed that the military interventions led by 
the United States in both places amounted to the "death" of the 
United Nations Charter. They further pointed out that the grand 
attempt to use force in Kosovo resulted in substituting the rule of law 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 149 



to the use of force. 79 Michael J. Glennon claimed : 

At this point it was easy to conclude, as President Bush, that the UN's 
failure to confront Iraq would cause the world body to "fade into 
history as an ineffective, irrelevant debating society." In reality, 
however, the council's fate had long since been sealed. The problem 
was not the second Persian Gulf War but rather an earlier shift in world 
power toward a configuration that was simply incompatible with the 
way UN was meant to function. It was the rise in American 
unipolarity-not the Iraq Crisis-that along with cultural clashes and 
different attitudes toward the use of force, gradually eroded the 
council's credibility. Although the body had managed to limp along 
and function adequately in more tranquil times, it proved incapable of 
performing under periods of great stress. 80 

The Kosovo crisis and Iraq war compelled many scholars of 
international law to proclaim that the charter norm of non-use of 
force might be dead or at least mortally wounded. If humanitarian 
factors were insufficient to explain the United States conduct in the 
Kosovo war then what were the reasons behind the involvement of 
the United States in the war? The theories of "liberal 
internationalism" and "neoliberal cosmopolitanism" explained the 
United States conduct in world affairs. Liberal internationalism is 
based on vision of a single human race peacefully united by free 
trade and common legal norms, led by states featuring civic liberties 
and representative institutions. It sought to create a global order that 
could enforce a code of conduct on the external relations between 
states. But it still essentially accepted the Westphallian system that 
granted states jurisdiction over their own territories. 

The neoliberal cosmopolitanism in contrast seeks to overcome 
the limits of national sovereignty by constructing a global order. 
This global order would govern important political and economic 
aspects of both the internal and external behaviour of states. This is 
not a conception which advocating any world government 
empowered to decide the great international issues of the day. 
Rather, it proposes a set of disciplinary regimes characteristically 
dubbed as "global governance." In this system, sovereignty is 
reconceived as a partial and conditional licence granted by the 
"international community" . It can be withdrawn if any state failed to 
meet the domestic or foreign standards laid down by the 

150 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



requirements of liberal governance. This theory, on the other hand, 
provides justification of intervention in internal affairs of states. It 
has also projected a new world order that requires the subordination 
of all states to some form of supra-state planetary authority. This 
argument of neoliberal cosmopolitan theory misrepresent the 
relationship between the United States and the various institutions of 
"global governance". 81 There is no evidence in the post-Cold War 
period that these institutions have strengthened their jurisdiction 
over the dominant power in the international system. The basic 
argument is that the United States has grown accustomed to its 
position as the world's dominant power. 82 The Kosovo war reflected 
that the United States strategy in world politics no longer adhered to 
classic liberalism. The great economic and social transformations 
after the end of Cold War have displaced the old realities and 
resulted in the birth of the 'global era.' These great transformations 
were : 

1. The emergence of global economy which replaced 
international economy. 

2. The development of an information economy i.e. 
communication revolution. 

3. The development of postmodern society. 

4. The decline of the nation-state which superseded by a 
multicultural society. 83 

These four transformations had changed the major ideas, 
ideology and identity of the United States. The global economy and 
information economy favours openness. The ideology of openness 
(most American elites endorse it) challenged the traditional 
conceptions of international relations. The development of 
postmodern society eroded the great pillars of modern society i.e. 
government bureaucracies, military services and business 
corporations. These are replaced by the ideas of expressive 
individualism and universal human rights. The development of 
multi-cultural society also promotes the idea of human rights. The 
ideology of human rights further pointed toward the limitations of 
state sovereignty and decline of the nation-state. The traditional 
American ideology advocated liberal democracy and free markets. 
The above discussed transformation expanded traditional ideology 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 151 



with more emphasis on promoting human rights. 84 The modified 
version of "liberal globalism" (recently propagated by President Bil 
Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright) provides the 
justification to a new kind of the United States military 
interventionism. The military interventions in Somalia, Haiti and 
Bosnia were the examples of this phenomenon. The United States 
led war against Serbia over Kosovo also represented the culmination 
of this trend. 

The United States role in Kosovo crisis is also described 
through four categories of military intervention. These are, 

1 . Intervention for security 

2. Intervention to influence events i.e. Realpolitic 

3. Ideological intervention 

4. Moral intervention. 85 

Every country applied above categories to obtain political and 
military objectives through intervention. Although the Kosovo crisis 
presented no direct threat to the United States national security but 
the failure to contain this conflict could have eroded its credibility as 
sole superpower in the world. The United States, on the other hand, 
used military force in Kosovo for shaping political events in the 
Europe. It not only preserved its influence in the region but also 
strengthened long-term economic and political relationship with 
NATO powers. The United States interventions in Nicaragua, El 
Salvador and Afghanistan were examples of military interventions 
for ideological reasons i.e. to contain communism and defending 
democracy. The United States policy to spread democracy 86 through 
promoting free markets was another ideological reason to intervene 
in Kosovo. The post-Kosovo war policies of the United Nations 
Mission (UNMIK) to consolidate democracy in Kosovo are also a 
reflection of the United States ideological position. 

The United States role in Kosovo can also be defined through 
category of 'moral intervention'. The moral intervention in another 
state's affairs occurred because of its actions which "shocked the 
conscience of mankind" or violated "community standards". There 
are two objectives of moral intervention i.e. peace and justice. The 
peace in this context can be defined as to avoid death and destruction 

1 52 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



that wreaked on weak or unprotected people. It becomes morally 
imperative for all those who can take steps to maintain peace. The 
United States role in Kosovo symbolized that it must be a main 
enforcer of global peace as the world's sole super power. The other 
pursuit of moral intervention is 'Justice'. In post-Cold War ethnic 
conflicts, justice means to punish war criminals and perpetrators of 
genocide. There are three military objectives of justice i.e. 
retribution, specific deterrence and general deterrence. The policy of 
retribution would not just be required for the defeat of an offending 
nation's armed forces or recovery of any territory and wealth but for 
some additional punitive measures. The specific deterrence is 
required not only for reversing any gain by any offending state but 
also for damaging its personnel and equipment so badly that it 
would not repeat its crime. The general deterrence has same 
elements as specific deterrence except that the offending nations 
punishment must be so obvious that other potentially errant nations 
would be contained from such type of aggressions. 87 The United 
States led NATO attack on Serbia not only reversed its gains in 
Kosovo but heavily damaged Serbia's military and economic power. 
The United States policy of specific deterrence in Kosovo got 
significant success with the arrest of the Serbian President Solobodan 
Milosevic by war crime tribunal authorities in June 2001. 

THE UNITED STATES' INVOLVEMENT IN KOSVO 
CRISIS AS A REFLECTION OF ITS HEGEMONY IN 
WORLD POLITICS 

The Kosovo war also exhibited the hegemonic design of the 
United States in world politics. The United States has acquired 
absolute military dominance over every other state or combination 
of states on the entire planet. It has sought to preserve this status 
which provides major political and economic benefits for the United 
States. Concomitantly, the United States has sought to contain rival 
capitalist states that threaten its predominance. During the Cold 
War, the threat of communism served to legitimate United States 
hegemony over other capitalist states. 87 With the end of cold war, 
the United States has sought to use humanitarian intervention as one 
of the principal means to reassert its hegemony. An American 
commentator argued, 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 153 



"Someday in the next we will acknowledge that there can be no global 
human rights without global laws and no way to write and enforce the 
laws without a global congress, courts and cops... as the lion in the 
jungle of nations, the United States is obviously not ready to yield to a 
higher authority. ... the time will come when Americans recognize that 
anarchy among nations, constitute a threat to our interests and welfare. 
We would then take the lead in creating a canopy of law across the 
globe. 89 

The ascendance of ethnic conflicts in international scenario 
provides a context in which the most striking advantage of the 
United States (i.e. its overwhelming military superiority) can be 
emphasized. The last decade of twentieth century is evidence of the 
assertive United States hegemony. In this decade, most of 
international organizations are able to function effectively only in so 
far as they correspond to the perceived policy priorities of the United 
States or at least do not contradict them. In many instances they 
should rather be viewed as lightly disguised instruments of the 
United States policy. The United Nations is a striking case in point. 
It may sound brutal but is unfortunately true that the utility of the 
United Nations to the United States is based on its ability to sanction 
the United States sponsored policies. The United States always 
showed extreme flexibility in dealing with the United Nations. It will 
either control the system and find ways to use it or ignore it. 90 
During the last fifty years of the United Nations existence, the three 
pillars of the United Nations i.e. the Security Council, the General 
Assembly and the Secretary General have fallen to its onslaught one 
after the other. 

The United States became the foremost nation among the 
victorious of the World War II. The United Nations Charter adopted 
in San Francisco, and at that time most Americans felt that they were 
showing new path to the new global system. Senator John Foster 
Dulles praised the UN Charter as "a great Magna Carta". 
Americans treated it as an extension of their own constitutional 
framework. President Harry Truman Commended that this charter, 
like our own Bill of Rights is a part of our constitution. Even the 
former secretary of state during President Reagan years noted, "the 
ideals of the United Nations are also American ideals. The Charter 
embodies American Principles. It will always be a major objective 

1 54 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



of our statecraft to make the United Nations an instrument of 
peace." The institutional infrastructure of the United Nations is 
heavily influenced by the United States model of federal democracy. 
The General Assembly is a kind of House of Representatives while 
the Security Council is a kind of Senate and Presidency rolled into 
one. Each body operates by free exchanges of views leading to vote. 
Each represents different interests and different responsibilities. 
Both the General Assembly and the Security Council represent 
equality of sovereign states and political hierarchy of power 
respectively. The Presidency is collective and a veto of any one of 
its permanent members is sufficient to stop an international action. 91 

The United States exercised control over the United Nations 
through its military strength, dollar diplomacy and overwhelming 
support in the General Assembly. The United States tackled the 
General Assembly by two ways, Firstly, to influence the voting 
behaviour of member states by financial threats and inducements, 
Secondly, to starve the United Nations by not paying its dues. The 
United states used financial blackmail to discipline economically 
weaker states of third world to vote the American way in the General 
Assembly. It also used money power, Americans controlled 
markets, terms of trade, CIA influenced politicians, economists, 
academics, and media men and women for offsetting the loss of 
control in the General Assembly. 92 

The United States also curbed and controlled the United Nations 
through withholding its dues assigned to it. The Article 19 of the 
United Nations Charter (deprives any state not paying arrears of its 
voting right) could never deter the United States. Peacekeeping has 
become an extremely sensitive and delicate responsibility of the 
United Nations after collapse of the USSR. This has tremendously 
increased expenditure of the organization and given a handle to rich 
states like the United States to tighten control over the United 
Nations. There was a striking convergence of the goals of the United 
States and the United Nations during initial years of Clinton's 
Presidency. The adverse course of Somalia and Haiti affected the 
perfect harmony between the United States and the World 
Organization. It badly affected Presidential Decision Directive- 13 
policy formulations and reserved the active participation of the 
United States in the peacekeeping operations. 93 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 155 



The Clinton Administration adopted an increasingly hostile view 
towards the United Nations. The new Presidential Decision 
Directive 25 (PDD-25) laid down changed criteria for the United 
States involvement in the United Nations operations. The PDD-25 
was designed to provide greater possible flexibility to address 
international crises. It included the need for the clear United States 
interests to be at stake in a situation and a limited period for each 
engagement. The United States also decided unilaterally to reduce its 
assessed share of the peacekeeping costs from just over 30 per cent 
to 25 per cent of the global cost with this decision. Although the cost 
of the United Nations peacekeeping has less than the annual 
expenditure of the New York fire department, the United States 
deliberately weakened the United Nations ability to continue with 
existing tasks. 94 Thus, the United States exercised a quadruple veto 
i.e. its Security Council veto for denying political leadership, 
intelligence and material assistance for operations. The United States 
used its financial veto through refusal to pay contributions. The 
chairman of the foreign relations committee of senate, Jesse Helms 
envisaged that the United Nations is just one aspect of America's 
diplomatic arsenal. It provides a forum with channels of 
communication in times of crisis and render services such as 
peacekeeping, weapons inspections and humanitarian relief. He 
further warned, 

The American people will not countenance if the United Nations 
attempts to establish itself as the central authority and power over 
nation states. If the United Nations was to survive into the twenty-first 
century, it must recognise its limitations and stop trying to impose 
Utopian vision on America and the world, failing which it begs for 
confrontation and... eventual US withdrawal. 95 

The major powers used the United Nations Secretary-Generals 
for their own interests. The United States could never tolerate a 
Secretary-General who will stand for the United Nations as a whole 
and "embody the principles of charter." The charter enjoins the 
Secretary-General to function independently of the "instruction from 
any government. " The United States as supreme power after World 
War II naturally considered United Nations as its preserve. The 
Secretary-General was considered as pliable chief executive who 
should acknowledge the real masters. 96 

156 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



The Kosovo war led to the emergence of debate between the 
unilateralist and multilateralist views in the United States. 
Unilaterlism based on realism shaped the United States policy 
toward the world organization. Realism's primary objection to the 
multilateralist world order vision is precisely the latter' s more 
principled and aspirational basis for organizing international 
relations. Thus, unilateralists dislike the United States participation 
in multilateral arrangements. They consider them to be unnecessary 
constraints on the United States degree of freedom. Such 
arrangements could make impossible for the United States to act 
when it should. They could, on the other hand, compel the United 
States to act when its cost-benefit calculus dictates that it should 
not. 97 The neo-conservatives are committed above all to the United 
States global leadership. They are ready to make common cause with 
the United Nations when doing so will serve the US interests. 98 
Condoleezza Rice argued, 

'Multilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in 
themselves. US Interests are served by having strong alliances and can 
be promoted within the UN and other multilateral organization, as well 
as through well crafted international agreements.... Neither is it 
isolationist to suggest that the United States has a special role in the 
world and should not adhere to every international convention and 
agreement that someone think to propose." 

After September 11, the United States articulated a new concept 
of preventive self-defence that is designed to preclude emerging 
threats. This document flatly contradicts the perceptions of the 
United Nations Charter. Article 51 of the UN Charter permits the 
use of force only in self defence and only "if an armed attack occurs 
against a member of the United Nations. On the other hand, the 
United States policy proceeds from the premise that "United States 
cannot let enemies strike first." In his National Security strategy, 
President Bush promised to, 

Disrupt and destroy terrorist organisations by defending the United 
States, the American people, and interests at home and abroad by 
identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While 
the United States strive to enlist the support of the international 
community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our 
right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists. 100 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 157 



The preventive approach of the United States national security 
is intended to respond to new threats posed by mega-terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction. The goal of this policy is to prevent 
more generalised threats from materializing rather than trying to 
pre-empt specific, eminent threats. 101 The Bush administration has 
acted on the basis of doctrine of preventive war in Iraq. Indeed, the 
concept provided the main political justification for its decision to 
resort to war. 

The Kosovo and Iraq war represented a circumvention of the 
collective procedures of the UN Charter system. In both cases the 
United States and NATO could violate the procedure related to use 
of force under the United Nations Charter. The Bush administration 
insisted that the traditional interpretation of international law can be 
reexamined in the face of new dangers of catastrophic terrorism. 
Both situations of Kosovo and Iraq raised the United States views 
about the United Nations that the world body turn out to be 
irrelevant. It fails to endorse recourse to war against the dictators of 
Serbia and Iraq. Even President George W. Bush justified this view 
when he historically challenged the United Nations Security Council 
in September 12, 2002 through memorable words "will the United 
Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be 
irrelevant." 102 

KOSOVO CRISIS SHOWS THE TENDENCY OF UNITED 
STATES TO USE THE UN AS ITS INSTRUMENT OF 
FOREIGN POLICY 

Kosovo and Iraq are illustrations and not an aberration in the 
United States foreign policy. The United States history reveals two 
dominant traits in its national character. First is liberty and utter 
hostility to interference by any other nation in its domestic affairs 
and other is expansionism. Presidents Washington, Jefferson, 
Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt felt deeply about human freedom and 
spread it across oceans and frontiers. They resisted all the efforts of 
bullies, tyrants and fascists. 103 On the other hand, the trait of empire 
building is also a part of American psyche. President Lyndon 
Johnson pursued Vietnam war and wished to proliferate it. President 
Clinton maintained that the United States has aggressive foreign 

158 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



policy because of its great power status. This trend showed that Pax 
Americana did not need physical occupation of foreign territories 
like its predecessor Pax Britannica. It is a high-tech behind-the- 
scenes pulling of strings which makes puppets of and pushing out of 
regimes those unwilling to join the band-wagon. 104 Kosovo and Iraq 
simply pointed that the United States temptation to work outside the 
United Nations is obviously difficult to resist. The United States 
capabilities are too great to be counter balanced and it enjoys a 
preponderance of power that is historically unprecedented. Its 
hegemony in world affairs is intact because it has world's largest and 
most productive economy. Its Military power has no peers and it 
spends more on defense than the next five powers combined. It 
possesses a clear lead in the advanced technologies on which power 
is likely to rest in future. 105 

The Kosovo war also reflects the United States hegemonic 
foreign policy goals in Europe. The United States hegemony in 
Europe has been maintained through forceful behaviour. This policy 
had entailed a measure of "double containment." During the Cold 
War, the United States contained communism and its capitalist allies 
simultaneously. The common ideological enemy of 'Communism' 
served to unite the capitalist European powers during the Cold War. 
The agent that facilitated cooperation among these states was of 
course the United States hegemony. The main objective of the 
United States policy, during this time, was to establish a liberal 
international order led by itself. During the Cold War, the emerging 
United States hegemon faced opposition in the Europe from two 
principal sources, firstly, from the political left parties, which 
enjoyed unprecedented popularity and were major forces in the 
political systems of Italy and France (in Japan as well). A second 
major impediment to the United States aspirations in Europe was the 
political right which had a long tradition of protectionist measures, 
state regulation and colonial sphere of influence. 106 This generated a 
significant degree of friction between the United States and its 
European allies e.g. French President Charles De Gaulle criticized 
the United States domination of NATO which led to French 
departure from the Joint Military Command and permanent removal 
of NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels. 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 159 



The international role of the dollar and the alleged United States 
abuse of its privileged monetary position also raised objects in the 
European countries. Not a single European country, openly support 
the United States war in Vietnam. The Nixon-Kissinger's tendency 
to undertake unilateralist actions e.g. devaluation of the dollar in 
1971 become additional source of resentment. The United States 
unilateralist actions during energy crisis in 1973 -1975 also 
generalised recriminations. But, the United States contained these 
frictions through three factors, 

1. The United States presented free security against the 
possibility of Soviet invasion. 

2. The United States was reliable bulwark against the 
possibility of radical social change in Europe. This aspect 
of cold war represented a tacit alliance between European 
elites and the United States foreign policy. 

3. The United States hegemony was associated with economic 
prosperity and full employment. The economic growth in 
Europe during the early period of the Cold War was far 
above historical overage and was beneficial to every 
segment of society with major improvements in the 
material conditions of the working classes. 107 

But after the Cold War, the United States could not face any 
imminent threat to its vital interests. During this time, the United 
States faced two options i.e. to become the global policeman, 
enforced sufficient world order to protect its long-term political, 
economic and security interests. The other option would have been 
to withdraw to an isolationist posture but various stress and strains 
upon its economic and military policies due to globalization limited 
this option. The United States Congress and administration alike 
accepted that economically, politically and militarily interdependent 
world is a global reality and the United States policies must be 
related with it. The Bosnian debacle, on the other hand, emphasized 
that no organization of the sovereign states can function effectively 
without the consensus among its members. The United States and its 
European allies took lesson from this debacle that no bureaucratic 
arrangements would produce concerted action without the 
knowledge of collective values or interests, which they are willing 

1 60 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



to defend. This community security approach gave rationale to 
NATO in the post-Cold War Europe. NATO's wide arrangements 
for political consultations, the integrated Military Command 
Structure, US troop deployments in Europe, and common defence 
infrastructure also enhanced its importance for both the United 
States and European countries. 108 The United States, through 
Kosovo's experience, found that without the NATO framework, it 
would have no legal or practical infrastructure for its continued 
military interaction with NATO members. 

It is argued that the continued dominance of NATO is vital for 
the United States dominance in Europe but increased importance of 
the European union's structures effected the US hegemony, in the 
region. The EU's threat was fourfold, 

1 . The EU is one of the largest single economic unit in the 
world equal to the United States. 

2. The dominant powers within the EU i.e. Germany and 
France openly advocate European independence. Due to 
their close cooperation, they became an advocate for 
increased European autonomy. 

3. The European powers adopted specific policy officially 
termed as the European Security and Defense Identity 
(ESDI). This offered the European a chance to establish an 
independent world role, commensurate with the size and 
economic weight of the Combined European Nations. The 
Western European Union (WEU) became the official 
military arm of the EU. In addition, France and Germany 
form a France- German Army "The Euro-Corps" and it 
became a fully operational in 1995. 

4. The financial integration of Europe also create contention 
in the US-European integration. The single European 
Currency 'Euro' was advanced as a technical means to 
achieve an integrated European Market. Various US 
analysists argued that the 'Euro' would have political 
implications and it would pose a threat to the US dollar's 
status as the international reserve currency. 109 

The United State, as a reaction of the EU's policies, aimed to 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 161 



protect NATO by its expansion towards the Eastern Europe. 
Although Secretary of State Madeleine Albright implied that this 
extension reflected shared political and cultural values but it also 
contained element of realpolitik. It also served four purposes : 

1. It gave NATO a new function of preserving order in 
Eastern Europe. 

2. It is argued that this expansion has been reinforce the 
dominant role of the United States and precluded the 
prospects of independent Europe. 

3 . The expansion of NATO also enhanced the United States 
business interests in Eastern Europe. The Military- 
Industrial Complex remains a significant economic actor 
which favours the continuous United States hegemony in 
Europe. 

4. The eastward expansion of NATO consolidated the United 
States position in a new spheres of influence. It diluted the 
influence of Germany on various East-European 
Countries. 110 

Thus, the United States successfully obtained its central 
objective of the containment of its European allies after the demise 
of the USSR. It overwhelmingly reasserted its power in Europe 
through revitalization of the Cold War institutional structures. The 
NATO could be used for this purpose in Kosovo. 

The Kosovo crisis was a turning point in international relations. 
The United States claimed that the humanitarian issues compelled it 
to fight this war. The Kosovo war, on the other hand, fought for the 
new ideology of cultural diversity and global society. It was also 
fought for the enlargement of NATO in Europe. The United States 
and NATO bypassed the United Nations Security Council and 
attacked Serbia without the Security Council mandate. NATO 
bombing of Serbia severely affected the United Nations position in 
the world affairs. The Kosovo war demonstrated that the United 
States used the United Nations for its own purposes and interests. 
The United States bypasses or restricts the functioning of the United 
Nations if latter does not serve its interests in world politics. 



1 62 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



References. 



1. Louis Henkin et al., Right v Might : International Law and Use of Force (NY, 
1991), p. 67. Sir Geoffrey Howe, "The European Pillar", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
63 (Winter 1984/85), p. 330. Francois Heisbourg, "Can the Atlantic Alliance 
Last out the Century?" International Affairs, Vol. 63 (Summer 1982), p. 413. 

2. John S. Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War", Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 109 (1994-5), pp. 763-765. See also, Michael G. Roskin and 
Nicholas O. Berry, The New World of International Relations (New Jersey, 
1993), p. 263, see Clay Clemens, ed., NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War 
Security (NY, 1997), pp. 1-2. 

3. NATO "Strategic Concept" (November 7-8, 1991) and NATO "Strategic 
Concept" (April 23-24, 1999), For detailed text see http://www.nato.int/docu/ 
comm/49-95/C911107.a.htm. and http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99- 
065e.htm. 

4. Stephen M. Walt, "NATO's Future (in Theory), in Pierre Martin and Mark R. 
Brawley, Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced 
Allies (NY, 2000), p. 16. 

5. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907, 
General Convention Related to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1945, 
Protocols I and II additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Kellog-Briand 
Pact of 1928 Stipulated that war was no longer acceptable as instrument of 
national policy. 

6. Rosalyn Higgins, "The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia", 
International Affairs, Vol. 69 (1993), pp. 465-466. Louis Henkin, "Kosovo and 
the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention", American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 93 (1999), p. 824. 

7. Charter of the United Nations, 1945. For detailed study of legal process about 
the United Nations authority on use of Force in international relations. See 
D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces : A Legal Study (NY, 1964), p. 281. 

8. Christopher M. Ray an, "Sovereignty, Intervention and the Law : A Tenuous 
Relationship of Competing Principles", Millennium Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 26 (1997), p. 98. 

9. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Selfdefense (Cambrige, 2001), pp. 249, 
250. 

10. Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, "Symposium on Humanitarian Action and 
Peacekeeping Operations", Report of International Committee of Red Cross, 
Geneva, 1995, p. 40. For detailed study of increased role of regional 
organizations in peacekeeping after end of Cold War. See, Boutras Boutras- 
Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (NY, 1992), p. 37. Abiodun Alan, et al., 
Peacekeepers, Politicians and Warlords (NY, 1999), pp. 7-8. 

11. United Nations Charter, 1945, Article 51. 

12. While attempts have been made in the past to construct the phrase "armed 
attack" in variety of ways but International Court of Justice in Nicaragua vs. 
United States Clarifies its Meaning. Although the Court did not give exhaustive 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 63 



meaning but it included within the ambit of this phrase interalia, action by 
regular armed forces across an international border, the sending of armed band 
or groups by or on behalf of a state and they carry out acts of such gravity that 
amount to an actual armed attack etc. See Herbert W. Briggs, "The 
International Court of Justice Lives up to its Name", American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 81 (January 1987), p. 84. 

13. Rahul Rao, "The UN and NATO in the New World Order : Legal Issues", 
International Studies, Vol. 37 (2000), p. 161. 

14. Ibid., p. 162. 

15. Jule Lobel and Michael Ratner, "Bypassing the Security Council: Ambigous 
Authorizations to use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime", 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93 (1999), p. 128. 

16. Jonathan I. Charney, "Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo", 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93 (1999), p. 835. See Marc 
Weller, "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo", International Affairs, Vol. 
75 (1999), p. 224. See Rao, n. 13, p. 162. 

17. Dinstein, n. 9, p. 272. 

18. Quoted in Rao, n. 13, p. 162. 

19. Ibid., p. 163. 

20. Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, "National Perspective on International Intervention: 
From the Outside Looking in" in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, 
Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (London, 1995), p. 21. 

21. Jannifer Welsh et ah, "The Responsibility to Protect", International Journal 
(Toronto), Vol. LVII (Autumn 2002), pp 489-90. 

22. Catherine Guichered, "International Law and the War in Kosovo, Survival, 
Vol. 41 (Summer 1999), p. 20. 

23. Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice : International Political Theory 
Today (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 218, 219. 

24. Guichered, n. 22, pp. 21-22. See Theodor Meron, "The Case for War Crimes 
Trials in Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (Summer 1993), pp. 122-135. 

25. R.J. Vincent, Non-intervention and International Order (New Jersey, 1974), p. 
vii. 

26. The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with the charter of United Nations, Approved by General 
Assembly in Resolution 2625 of 24 Oct. 1970 said in Preamble, "The practice 
of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the charter, 
but also leads to the creations of situations which threaten international peace 
and security... 

There was a similar general condemnation of intervention in a 1974 United 
Nations document which classified the "aggression" as, "The invasion or attack 
by the armed forces a state of the territory of another state, or any military 
occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack... This 
definition of aggression is approved by UN General Assembly by Resolution 
3314 (XXIX) of 14 Dec. 1974. However this document gave the Security 
Council some discretion in particular cases. 

1 64 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



The Declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention passed by the General 
Assembly on 21 December 1956 states that an "armed intervention is 
synonymous with aggression and a violation of the charter of United Nations." 
See Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human 
Rights", International Affairs, Vol. 69 (July 1993), pp. 433-34. See also Rao, 
n. 13, p. 163. 

27. Thomas G. Weiss, "On the Brink of New Era? Humanitarian Interventions, 
1991-94" in Danieal and Hayes, n. 20, p. 5. 

28. In the United Nation Security Council, India initially justify its military action 
in 1971 on the grounds of humanitarian intervention these statements were 
deleted from final record of the Security Council. Instead India alleged that 
Pakistan had attacked first and it act in self-defense. See, Roberts, n. 26, p. 
434. 

29. Michael Ignatieff, "Intervention and the State Failure", Dissent (New Jersey), 
(Winter 2003), p. 115. 

30. Tobias Debiel, "Complex Emergencies and Humanitarian Intervention: 
Imperatives and Pitfalls in a Turbulant World", Law and State, Vol. 55 (1997), 
pp. 53-55. For detailed study of refugee situation in world see Dirk Fronhofer, 
"Internally Displaced Persons: The Problem of "internally displaced persons" 
in the context of Human Rights, International Refugee Law and International 
Humanitarian Law", Law and State, Vol. 55 (1997), pp. 7-24. 

31. For study of the pre-Cold War patterns of interventions see Hans J. 
Morganthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45 
(April 1967), pp. 425-436. 

For Marxian Criticism of United State interventionist policy in post-cold war 
see Ellen Meiksins wood, "Kosovo and the New Imperialism", Monthly 
Review, Vol. 51 (June 1999), pp. 1-8, see also Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim 
Dune, "East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism", International 
Affairs, Vol. 77 (2000), p. 808. 

32. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of organization, 1999 (NY : 
United Nations, 1999), para 37. 

33. Michael Mccgwire, "Why did we bomb Belgrade?" International Affairs, Vol. 
76 (2000), p. 1. See G. Gerardong, "Credibility Over Courage : NATO's 
Miss-Intervention in Kosovo", The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26 
(March 2003), p. 74. See US and NATO objective interests in Kosovo, Fact 
sheet released by US Department of State, Whasington DC, 14 June 2001, 
www . state . gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990326_ksvobjectives .html . 

34. Quoted in Roland Paris, "Kosovo and the Metaphor War", Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 117 (2002), p. 437. 

35. Quoted in Richard A. Falk, "Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of 
International Law", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93 (October 
1999), p. 848. 

36. Alex J. Bellamy, "Humanitarian responsibilities and interventionist claims in 
international societies", Review of International Studies, Vol. 29 (July 2003), 
p. 335. For more information about the failure of international community in 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 65 



extreme humanitarian crises, see David Rieff, "Humanitarianism in Crisis", 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81 (Nov/Dec. 2002), pp. 111-121. Lamberto Dini, 
"Taking Responsibility for Balkan Security", NATO Review (Autumn 1999), p. 
4. See also Javier Solana, "NATO's Success in Kosovo", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
78/9 (Nov/Dec. 1999), p. 114. See also Hideaki Shinoda, "The Politics of 
Legitimacy in International Relations : A Critical Examination of NATO's 
Intervention in Kosovo", Alternatives, Vol. 25 (2000), p. 525. 

37. Ruth Wedgwood, "NATO's Compaign in Yugoslavia", American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 93 (1999), p. 834. 

38. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (1999), n. 72, 
para 66. 

39. Falk, n. 35, p. 850. 

40. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, UNTS Regis. No. 
18232, UN Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969) reprinted in American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 63 (1969), p. 875. See also Gordan A.Christenson, 
"The World Court and Jus Cogens", American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 81 (1987), p. 95. 

41. Bhikhu Parekh, "The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention : Introduction", 
International Political Science Review, Vol. 18 (1997), pp. 5. 

42. M.S. Rajan, "The New Interventionism?" International Studies, Vol. 37 
(2000), p. 31. 

43. Robert Jackson and Georg Sorenson, Introduction to International Relations 
(Oxford, 1999), pp. 143-144. Simon Caney, "Human Rights and the Right of 
States : Terry Nardin or Nonintervention", International Political Science 
Review, Vol. 18 (1997), pp. 28-29. 

44. James Mayall, The New Interventionism (Cambridge, 1996), p. 3-4. Ibid., pp. 
144-145. 

45. For broad study of Cosmopolitanism in international relations see David Held, 
"Cosmopolitanism : Globalization tamed?" Review of International Studies, 
Vol. 29 (2003), pp. 465-80. See David Ingram, "Between Political Liberalism 
and Postnational Cosmopolitanism: Toward an Alternative Theory of Human 
Rights", Political Theory, Vol. 31 (June 2003), pp. 359-391, see Alessandro 
Ferrara, "Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgement Argument for Human 
Rights", Political Theory, Vol. 31 (June 2003), pp. 431-415. See Fred 
Dallmayar, "Cosmopolitanism : Moral and Political", Political Theory, Vol. 
31 (June 2003), pp. 421-442. For superb explanation of developing global civil 
society and cosmopolitan view see Peter Merden, "Geographies of Dissent : 
Globalization, Identity and the Nation", Political Geography, Vol. 16 (1997), 
pp. 37-64. 

46. David Campbell, "Why Fight : Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post- 
Structuralism", Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 27 (1998), p. 
519. 

47. Quoted in Tom Keenan, "The Paradox of Knowledge and Power : Reading 
Foucault on a Bias," Political Theory, Vol. 15 (1987), pp. 20-21. 

48. Quoted in Campbell, n. 46, pp. 516-517. 



1 66 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



49. Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Agency, Humanitarianism and Intervention", 
International Political Science Review, Vol. 18 (1997), pp. 11-12. See Bhikhu 
Parekh, "Cosmopolitanism and global citizenship", Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 29 (Jan. 2003), pp. 16-17. 

50. Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, Economist, 18 September 1999, p. 
49. 

51. Alex J. Bellamy, "Pragmatic Solidarism and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian 
Intervention", Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31 (London, 
2000), pp. 483, 489. 

52. Ibid., p. 484. Wheeler, n. 49, p. 17. 

53. Ibid., p. 486. 

54. Andrew Linklater, "The Problem of Community in International Relations", 
Alternatives, Vol. 15 (1990), p. 135. 

55. Bellamy, n. 51, p. 483. 

56. Ibid., pp. 488. 

57. Donald J. Puchala, "Making a Weberian Moment : Our Discipline Look 
Ahead," International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 1 (2000), p. 142. 

58. North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Article 5. 

59. United Nations Charter 1945, Article 51. 

60. Rao, n. 13, p. 168. 

61. High Guesterson, "Presenting the Creation: Dean Acheson and the Rhetorical 
Legitimation of NATO", Alternatives, Vol. 24 (1999), p. 47. 

62. Quoted in Rao, n. 13, pp. 177-78. 

63. Ibid., p. 178. 

64. United Nations Charter, 1945, Article 51. 

65. Ibid., Articles 52, 53, 54. 

66. Gerhard Bebr, "Regional Organizations : A United Nations Problem", 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 49 (1995), p. 74. 

67. Ibid., p. 80. 

68. Rao, n. 13, p. 171. 

69. A Leroy Bennet, International Organizations : Principles and Issues (New 
Jersey, 1999), pp. 217-218. 

70. S. Neil MacFarlane, "Challenges to Euro- Atlantic Security" in Martin and 
Browley, n. 4, p. 30. 

71. Quoted in Rao, n. 13, p. 176. 

72. Ibid. 

73. Tim Judah, "Kosovo's Road To War", Survival, Vol 41 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-17. 

74. W. Michael Reisman, "The United States and International Institutions", 
Survival (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 63, 64, 68. 

75. Ibid. 

76. Ibid. 

11. James Kurth, "First War of the Global Era : Kosovo and US grand strategy" 
in Andrew J. Bacevic and Eliot A. Cohen, War over Kosovo : Politics and 
Strategy in Global Age (NY, 2001), pp. 66-69. 

Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 67 



78. Radio Addresses of the President to the Nation, March 27, 1999, Published in 
Gregory M. Scott et ah, 21 Debated Issues in World Politics (New Jersey, 
2001), pp. 301-303. See Henry Kissinger, Does America needs a Foreign 
Policy (NY, 2001), p. 269. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American 
Power : Why the world's only super power Can't Go it alone (Oxford, 2002) 
p. 149. 

79. Jane Stromseth, "Law And Force After Iraq : A Transitional Moment," 
American Journal of International Law , Vol. 97 (July 2003), p. 628. 

80. Micheal J. Glenon, "Why the Security Council Failed," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
82 (May/June 2003), p. 18. 

81. Peter Gowan, "Neoloberal Cosmopolitanism", New Left Review (Sep. /Oct. 
2001), pp. 79-80. For more elaborate study of neoliberal cosmopolitanism and 
its impact on the United Nations System. See Paul Taylor, "The United Nations 
in the 1990 : Proactive Cosmopolitanism and the issue of Sovereignty", 
Political Studies Vol. XLVII (1999), pp. 557-563. 

82. Geoffrey Lee Williams and Barkley Jared Jones, NATO And The Transatlantic 
Alliance in the 21st Century : The Twenty year crisis (NY, 2001), pp. 102-103. 

83. Kurth, n. 77, pp. 66-89. 

84. For detailed study of American Human Rights Policy in the postcommunist era, 
see Robert Cullen, "Human Rights Quandary", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 
(Winter 1992/93), pp. 79-88. 

85. Brett D. Barkey , "Bosnia : A Question of Intervention" , Strategic Review, Vol. 
XXI (Fall 1993), p. 51. 

86. For study of US foreign policy which espoused the principle of democracy see 
Eric L. Chase, "Where Policy, Grand Strategy and Justice Meet : A War 
Crimes Court for the New World Order", Strategic Review, Vol. XXI (Spring 
1993), pp. 30-40. 

87. Barkey, n. 85, p. 52. 

88. David N. Gibbs, "Washington's New Interventionism : US Hegemony and 
inter-imperialist Rivalries", Monthly Review, Vol. 53 (Sep. 2001), p. 14, For 
More information about American Hegemony See G. John Ikenberry, 
"America's Liberal Hegemony", Current History, Vol. 98 (Jan 1999), pp. 23- 
28. 

89. Quoted in Miron Rezun, Europe's Nightmare : The Struggle For Kosovo 
(London, 2001), p. 7. 

90. S.C. Parasher, "US, UN And.... Peace!," India Quarterly, Vol. LIII (Jan- June 
1997), p. 36. 

91. Ibid., p. 23, James Mayall, "Democracy and International Society", 
International Affairs, Vol. 76 (2000) p. 64. 

92. Within less than two years of the United Nations charter being signed and then 
ratified by the United States in August 1945, President Harry Truman has 
invoked the principles of the charter. He deliberately and explicitly ruled out a 
role for the United Nations in the Balkans and Near East. The Marshall Plan 
was proposed and adopted in Western Europe despite the work of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The creation of "interim 

168 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



committee" in the General Assembly in late 1947 was also an American 
initiative to bypassing Soviet veto on the Security Council. Thus, the American 
process of working within and without the United Nations continued whether 
in establishment of OAU in 1948 and NATO in 1949. The classic case of the 
use of the United Nations to pursue the United States interests came with the 
Korean war. During the Korean crisis, the Security Council was the hurdle 
because of USSR. State Department in collusion with the United Nations 
Secretary General empowered the General Assembly to side-step the Security 
Council by famous resolution called "uniting for peace". The United Nations 
Secretary General Trygve Lie described it as the "Acheson Plan" because the 
United States Secretary of States Mooted it. He had advocated that the 
Assembly should not allow Soviet veto to paralyse the United Nations action. 
It had equal responsibility with the Security Council in Matters related to 
international peace and security. The State Department considered it a personal 
triumph to circumvent Soviet veto. The Clever British diplomats warned the 
state department of this resolution's future damage. Once the Assembly added 
members from the third world, west could in that case no longer take for 
granted two-third majority in Assembly. The State Department remained 
perturbed. See Michael Dunn, "The United States, United Nations and Iraq : 
Multicultralism of a kind", International Affairs, Vol. 79 (2003) p. 272. 
Prashar, n. 90, p. 31. 
93. In 1993, President Clinton sought policy review about the United Nations 
Peacekeeping under Presidential Decison Directive- 13 (PDD-13). The basic 
elements of policy review were, the objectives of an operation must be clearly 
defined in the United States "National interests" and assurance of continuing 
public and congress support. The commitment of the United States troops 
cannot be open-ended and an exist strategy must be necessary part of operation. 
The operations involving the United States forces must have effective command 
and control arrangements. Ultimately this policy review addressed the central 
dilemma of the United States foreign policy after cold war. This dilemma was 
that in the absence of direct threat to the United States strategic interests, how 
a moral foundation for policy can be maintain and articulate interests. The 
convergence of goals between the United States and the United Nations in this 
period seen from the identical phrases used by both President Clinton and 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In his address to the United Nations 
General Assembly in September 1993, President Clinton indicated the United 
States national interests and stated, "In a new era of Peril and opportunity, our 
overriding purpose in use to expand and strengthen the world's community of 
market-based democracies... And we seek to foster the practices of good 
government that distribute the benefits of democracy and economic growth 
fairly to all people... Let us ensure that the tide of freedom and democracy is 
not pushed back by the fierce winds of ethnic hatred. Let us ensure that the 
world's most dangerous weapons are safely reduced and denied to dangerous 
hands." Boutras Ghali also stated, "without development... societies will fall 
into conflict, without democracy, no sustainable development can occur and 
peace cannot long be maintained." Thus, it appeared that there was emergence 
of an alliance between the world organization and world's sole superpower. See 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 69 



Mats R. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter : The United States and United Nations 
Peace Keeping", Survival, Vol. 36 (Spring 1994), p. 35. Anirudh Gupta, "Way 
to World Disorder", Economic And Political Weekly, Vol. 11 (Dec. 1993), p. 
2713. 

94. Chirstopher S. Raj, "United States and United Nations Peacekeeping in Post 
Cold war era", In Lalima Verma, United Nations in The Changing World, ed. 
(ND, 1997), p. 57. Micheal Pugh, "Peacekeeping and Humanitarian 
Intervention" in Brain White, et al, ed. (NY, 2001). pp. 126-127. See Fareed 
Zakaria, "The Challenges for American Hegemony", International Journal, 
Vol. LIV (Winter 1998-9), p. 22. 

95 . Quoted in C . S . R. Murthy , " US and The Third World at the UN " , International 
Studies,No\. 40 (2003), pp. 3-4 See also. James M. Lindray, "The New Apathy 
: How an uninterested Public is Reshaping Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 79 (Sep/Oct. 2000), p. 12. 

96. The first Secretary-General Trygve Lie was understanding the United States 
policies but his successor Dag Hammarskjold offended the United States over 
Congo. The Next Secretary-General U Thant has earned extreme displeasure of 
the United States regarding policies over Middle East and Vietnam. Secretary- 
General Kurt Waldheim refrained from speaking since he felt that what he says 
may be easily distorted. The non-aligned strength in the General Assembly 
neutralized the United States influence over it. The United States administration 
felt sore on the Secretary-Generals Kurt Waldheim and Perez de Cuellar 
because of their positive policies toward third-world. Boutras Boutras Ghali 
took over when the only superpower bestrode the world. He saw the United 
States concerns through the United Nations eye. He tried to act as an 
independent chief executive which reflected his position as an international 
official responsible only to the United Nations. But the United States did not 
tolerate him. Bosnia and Somalia fuelled the United States anger against him. 
The enactment of Kofi Annan as the United Nations Secretary-General by the 
United States exhibited the power of other states i.e. Russia, China and France 
in new world order. Fourteen out of fifteen members of the Security Council 
had voted for Ghali 's second term. The United States coolly vetoed it. This was 
in total contrast to what had happened for the second term of the Pro-United 
States first Secretary-General Trygve Lie. Beside USSR's open opposition, the 
United States successfully extend his term through the General Assembly 
resolution. Trygve Lie was awarded for Pro-United States stand but in case of 
Ghali, the United States did not have bother. No other member dared to take 
the matter to the General Assembly. This showed Russia, France and China 
their place in "New World Order". The present Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
emerged as the choice of the United States. But he merely represents a trend. 
After collpase of USSR, Russia has no voice in international affairs. France and 
China are too weak to compete United States as economically and militarily. 
The United States with a largest single share in major international financial 
institutions (i.e. IMF and World Bank) controls the whole world economy. 
Even the World Trade Organization (WTO) is under the United States 
influence. See Prashar, n. 90, p. 45. 



170 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



97. The unilateralists claimed that American military power is so overwhelming 
that there is no need for the assistance of others. Equally important, they see 
the United States purposes as so noble and the perspectives of other 
governments so narrow. Thus, it is not only possible but necessary for the 
United States to ignore their views. The involvement of other nations in 
decision-making about the United States use of force is unwise. It risks diluting 
the clarity of American purposes. The involvement of other nations in 
operations is pointless because they can add nothing significant to the United 
States capabilities. Unilateralists condemn multilateral world views and the 
promise of the United Nations as guarantor of a new post-Cold War order. In 
their view, the United Nations is guarantor of nothing and it can hardly be 
existing except in a formal sense. The events of 11 September and aftermath 
linked indirectly with the domestic debacle regarding Iraq in March 2003 and 
the continuing uncertainty surrounding the UN-US relations. This raised the 
salience and influence of a group of officials inside and outside the Bush 
administration commonly referred as 'Neo-Conservatives.' They can share two 
broad views. The first is that the United States has been "too timid in its 
exercise of global leadership. Secondly, neo-conservatives are instinctively 
sceptical of multilateral institutions including the UN. They are deeply 
suspicious of the United Nations which they fear is animated by Anti- 
Americanism. See John Gerard Ruggie, "Third Try at World Order? America 
and Multilateralism After the cold war", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 109 
(1994), p. 561. See Walter B. Solocombe, "Force, Pre-emption and 
Legitimacy", Survival, Vol. 45 (Spring 2003), p. 119. 

98 . Charles Krauthamer , " The Unipolar Moment " , Foreign Affairs , Vol . 70 ( 1 990- 
91), p. 25 See Mats Berdal, "The UN Security Council : Ineffective but 
Indispensable, Survival, Vol. 45 (Summer 2003), p. 16. See also Max Boot, 
"NeoCons", Foreign Policy (Jan/Feb 2004), p. 26. 

99. Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National interest", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79 
(January /February 2000), p. 48. 

100. The national security strategy of the United States of America (Sep. 17, 2002) 
available at <http ://www.whitehouse. gov/nsc/nss.pdf> . 

101. Miriam Sapiro, "Iraq : The Shifting sand of Preemptive Self-Defense", 
American Journal of International Law, Vol.97 (July 2003), p. 599. 

102. Quoted in Richard A Falk, "What Future For The UN Charter System of War 
Prevention?", American Journal of International Law , Vol. 97 (July 2003). p. 
590. 

103. Parashar, n. 90, p. 54. 

104. Ibid. p. 55. 

105. Stephen M. Walt, "NATO's Future (in Theory) in Pierre Martin and Mark R. 
Brawley, Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO's War : Allied Force or Forced 
Allies? (NY, 2000), p. 14. See IVO H. Dalder, "The end of Atlantcism", 
Survival, Vol. 45 (Summer 2003), p. 151. See Henery Kissinger, American 
Foreign Policy (NY, 1968), edn. 3 p. 71. See also Gazmen Xhudo, Diplomacy 
and Crisis Management in the Balkans : A US Foreign Policy Perspective 
(London, 1996), p. 5. See Richard N. Hass, The Reluctant Sharrif : The 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 171 



United States After The Cold War (NY, 1997), p. 52. For contradictory views 
about United States Power in the world affairs See. Michael Cox, "The Empire 
back in Town : or America's Empirical Temptation again", Millennium Journal 
of International Studies, Vol. 32 (2003), pp. 1-27. See Immanuel Wallerstein, 
"The Eagle has crash Landed," Foreign Policy (July /August 2002), pp. 60-68. 

106. Gibbs, n.88, pp. 16, 17. See Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs The 
United States And NATO", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. Ill (1996), pp. 
10-13. See also Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The US and Europe: Continental drift?", 
International Affairs, Vol. 76 (2000), p. 54. 

107. Ibid., p. 18. 

108. For detailed Study of Continuous relevance of NATO for US See Stanley R. 
Solan, "US Perspectives on NATO's Future," International Affairs, Vol. 73 
(1997), pp. 216-231. For the Changing US-Europe Relations See. Christina M. 
Schwiss, "Sharing Hegemony : The Future of Transatlantic Security", 
Cooperation and Conflict (London) Vol. 38 (2003), pp. 211-234. See Henery 
Kissinger, Diplomacy (NY, 1994), pp. 818-826. 

109. Gibbs, n. 88, p. 22. 
\\0. Ibid., p. 26. 



172 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Chapter 5 



Role of United Nations Aftermath 
of Kosovo War 

The United Nations has exercised authority in significant new 
ways to address various aspects of resolving conflicts and dealing 
with their consequences after the end of Cold War. 1 The role of 
United Nations has substantially expanded during this period so far 
as governance of societies affected by conflicts are concerned. This 
new role has included the use of force to end internal violence and 
the prosecution of violations of international humanitarian law. The 
growing focus on intrastate conflicts which considered within the 
domestic jurisdiction of states have brought humanitarian and human 
rights law closer to the modern conflict resolution process. 2 The 
analysis of United Nations role in Kosovo described this 
development of law and practice concerning the United Nations 
governance of post conflict societies. 

THE UN RESOLUTION 1244 AS A ROADMAP FOR THE 
GOVERNANCE OF POST-CONFLICT KOSOVO 

The United Nations actions in Kosovo illustrate its vastly 
expanded responsibilities regarding the new purpose of state 
restoration. In addition to the usual peacekeeping functions, the 
United Nations took on a vast programme of state reconstruction. 
This included police activities, engineering (road and bridge 
building), health and sanitation, organizing and monitoring 
elections. It acts as de facto government and maintained some 
semblance of authority until the warring factions negotiated an 
arrangement that approximated Western concepts of popular 
government. 3 On 6 May 1999, the G-8 (group of rich countries i.e. 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, 
The United Kingdom and The United States) met in Germany and 
adopted general principles for the political solution of the Kosovo 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 173 



crisis. They instructed their Political Directorate to prepare elements 
of a UN resolution which drew up a roadmap for solution of Kosovo 
conflict. The Russian Federation and the United States ensured the 
cooperation for implementation of the international community's 
conditions to end the Kosovo conflict. On 31 May, 1999, the EU 
announced a mission to Belgrade which was led by Finnish President 
Martti Ahtisaari in close cooperation with the United States, the 
Russian Federation and the United Nations. On 4 June, Yugoslavia 
conveyed to the Secretary-General about its and Serbia's acceptance 
of the G-8 peace plan presented by President Ahtisaari and Victor 
Chernomyrdin, the Russian Federation President's personal envoy. 4 

On 10 June 1999, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
resolution 1244 by Vote (14-0-1). Although the Russian Federation 
generally supports this resolution because it was based on the G-8 
principles but China abstained from voting on resolution 1244. China 
stated that it had great difficulty with draft resolution but because 
Yugoslavia had accepted the peace plan and NATO had suspended its 
bombing, it would not block the resolution's adoption. On 28 July, 
the General Assembly adopted resolution 53/241 and authorized the 
Secretary-General for financing of the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo. The General Assembly granted 
$200 million inclusive of the amount of $50 million granted by the 
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 
(ACABQ) for the operation of the Mission under the terms of section 
IV of the General Assembly resolution 49/233 A of 23 December 
1994. 5 The important paras of resolution 1244 which described the 
formation and functioning of international civil and security presence 
are, (see whole text of resolution 1244 in Appendix I) 

....demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put 
an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, 
and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of 
all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid 
timetable, with which the deployment of the international security 
presence in Kosovo will be synchronized; 

....decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nation 
auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate 
equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences; 

174 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



....requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the 
Security Council, a Special Representative to control the 
implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests 
the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to 
coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure 
that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually 
supportive manner. 

....authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations 
to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in 
point 4 of annex II with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities 
under paragraph 9 below; 

....decides that the responsibilities of the international security 
presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include: 

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary 
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing 
the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police 
and para-military forces, except as provided for in point 6 of 
annex II; 

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army and other armed 
Kosovo Albanian groups, as required in paragraph 15 below; 

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and 
displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil 
presence can operate, a transitional administration can be 
established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; 

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil 
presence can take responsibility for this task; 

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as 
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task; 

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the 
work of the international civil presence; 

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required. 

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the 
international civil presence, and other international organizations; 

....authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant 
international organizations, to establish an international civil presence 
in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo 
under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy 
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and which will provide 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 175 



transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the 
development of provisional democratic self-government institutions to 
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of 
Kosovo; 

....decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil 
presence will include: 

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of 
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full 
account of annex II and of the Rambouillet Accords; 

(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as 
long as required. 

(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional 
institution for democratic and autonomous self-government 
pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections. 

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its 
administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting 
the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and 
other peace-building activities; 

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine the future 
status of Kosovo, taking into account the Rambouillet Accords; 

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from 
Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under 
a political settlement; 

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other 
economic reconstruction; 

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian 
organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid; 

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local 
police forces and in the meantime through the deployment of 
international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; 

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights; 

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and 
displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo. 

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are 
established for an initial period of twelve months, to continue 
thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise. 6 

The Security Council envisaged the withdrawal of all 
Yugoslavia Military, Police and Paramilitary forces from Kosovo. It 

176 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



further authorized NATO Military deployment called Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) and created a UN Civil administration called the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to develop provisional 
institutions for democratic and autonomous self government 
including holding of elections. It also envisaged the appointment of 
a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) to 
administer Kosovo. He was asked to coordinate closely with KFOR 
to ensure that both UNMIK and KFOR worked towards the 
attainment of same goals in a mutually supportive manner. The 
Resolution 1244 was the product of unique geopolitical 
circumstances. It involved the military intervention of NATO in 
Yugoslavia and an extraordinary international consensus on a way 
out of an increasingly unpredictable military confrontation with 
destabilising consequences. The important objectives of the 
agreement that produced Resolution 1244 were, to end the NATO 
air campaign against Yugoslavia, to reverse the effects of ethnic 
cleansing against Kosovo Albanians, to end the surging humanitarian 
disaster in the region, to lay the ground work for a political 
settlement of the Kosovo crisis. The peace plan given by G-8 foreign 
ministers for resolution of the Kosovo crisis and latter incorporated 
in Annex 2 of resolution 1244 clearly showed these objectives. 

Although the Resolution 1244 finished an open conflict in 
Kosovo but was neither a product of an agreement between Serbs 
and Kosovo Albanians with clear road map for political settlement 
and nor an agreement between exhausted opponents rocking 
compromise and end to their conflict. It did not foresee any 
definitive political solution and determine the future status of 
Kosovo but imposed a peace treaty on Yugoslavia because it was 
mandatory under Chapter VII of the Charter. It was yet another 
case-by-case response to crisis produced by the unfinished process 
of disintegration of Yugoslavia that had begun a decade ago. 7 The 
Resolution 1244 imposed a regime on Kosovo for a period of twelve 
months and indefinitely thereafter until a Majority of the Council 
Members agreed to terminate it. 

While Resolution 1244 ritually reaffirmed the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia but it 
significantly revised and diminished the traditional attribute of 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis \11 



statehood. The Resolution 1244 vested the United Nations with a 
comprehensive mandate empowering it to exercise all legislative, 
executive, and judicial authority in Kosovo. The United Nations 
which traditionally promotes international law actually mandated in 
Kosovo to create new laws in areas that normally fell within the 
competence of Yugoslav legislature. The United Nations Interim 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established by resolution 1244 (1999) 
acting pursuant to the authority given to it under the above 
mentioned resolution, and for the purpose of establishing and 
maintaining the interim administration in Kosovo promulgated the 
Regulation No. 1999/1 in July 1999. This regulation is also known 
as the Mother of all Regulations promulgated the following, 

Section 1 

Authority of the interim administration 

....all legislative and executive with respect to Kosovo, including the 
administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised 
by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. 

....the Special Representative of the Secretary-General may appoint 
any person to perform functions in the civil administration in Kosovo, 
including the judiciary, or remove such person. Such functions shall be 
exercised in accordance with the existing laws, as specified in section 
3, and any regulations issued by UNMIK. 

Section 2 

Observance of international recognized standards 

....in exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties 
or holding public office in Kosovo shall observe internationally 
recognized human rights standards and shall not discriminate against 
any person on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
association with a national community, property, birth or other status. 

Section 3 

Applicable law in kosovo 

....the laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 
1999 shall continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as they do not conflict 
with standards referred to in section 2, the fulfillment of the mandate 
given to UNMIK under United Nations Security Council resolution 
1244 (1999), or the present or any other regulation issued by UNMIK. 

178 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Section 4 

Regulations issued by UNMIK 

....in the performance of the duties entrusted to the interim 
administration under United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 
(1999), UNMIK will, as necessary, issue legislative acts in the form of 
regulations. Such regulations will remain in force until repealed by 
UNMIK or superseded by such rules as are subsequently issued to by 
the institutions established under a political settlement, as provided for 
in United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). 8 

The head of the UNMIK becomes the exclusive legislator of 
Kosovo by promulgating UNMIK Regulations that had the status of 
laws. It superseded any other law on the regulated matter at issue. 
In addition the UN mission in Kosovo had to rebuild the entire 
public sector including the reconstruction and operation of public 
utilities, ports, airports and public transport system. It established 
the functioning Civil Services, created a network of Social Services 
including rehabilitation and employment offices. It ensures the 
provision of primary, secondary and higher education. It created the 
necessary conditions for economic development which included the 
establishment of banking system, formulation of budgetary and 
currency policies. The UN mission also worked for attraction of 
foreign investment and the establishment of a comprehensive tax, 
customs and levies scheme and developed Public-broadcasting and 
Mass-Media Capabilities in Kosovo. The United Nations needed to 
create a legal framework within which these activities could be 
carried out. The legislative powers granted by the Security Council 
could not be exercised until each mission took steps to draft, 
promulgate and enforce a range of the United Nations Regulations. 
These Regulations would have the force of law in an administrated 
territory. 

The powers of international administration and the SRSG to 
fulfil these tasks emanating from resolution 1244 and various 
UNMIK Regulations virtually led to suspending Yugoslavia's 
sovereignty over Kosovo. The term "Suspended Sovereignty" has 
been employed in legal and political discourse on sovereignty in 
order to describe different situations in which internal sovereignty 
can be perceived to be an empty legal proposition and not matching 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 179 



political realities. In such situations sovereignty is no longer an 
applicable legal concept. The NATO intervention in Kosovo led to 
the withdrawal of the Political and administrative cadres in entirety 
that had previously governed its territory including the security and 
law enforcement apparatus. 9 The only presence of Yugoslav 
authorities in Kosovo was the establishment of Committee for Co- 
operation with the United Nations in Pristina in accordance with 
Resolution 1244. 10 Its Mandate was limited merely to liaison with 
the international presence. In reality it ended up as resembling a 
diplomatic mission inside its own state. 

The Legal status of UNMIK and KFOR created an additional 
exceptional situation in Kosovo. The international administration 
had full administrative authority over Kosovo. The assets, property, 
funds of UNMIK and KFOR were immune from any form of Legal 
process. It was the first time the United Nations was entrusted with 
such a broad mandate to assume full responsibility for the 
administration of a territory. East Timor followed only few months 
later. 11 The organisational, and juridical status and the legal powers 
of the SRSG in Kosovo were equally comparable with a pre- 
constitutional monarch in sovereign kingdom. The United Nations 
not only undertook the unprecedented responsibility of plenary 
authority over Kosovo but it had also given the exceptional task to 
administer it without a clear road map for its final status. 12 The 
conceptual fiction of sovereignty as an absolute and invisible 
condition inhibited the solution of thorny issue of authority in 
Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanians were unlikely to accept Serbian 
sovereignty because of the fears of future exploitation. Independence 
for Kosovo remained unacceptable to Serbia which regard Kosovo 
its ethnic homeland. Neither side was likely to settle the issue if full 
sovereignty was the only conceptual category on the negotiation 
table. 13 Thus, on the ground the hard realities of the Kosovo conflict 
were even more demanding and frustrating. 

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING IN KOSOVO 

Kosovo posed another important challenge for the international 
community regarding the rebuilding of unstable polities in the 

1 80 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



aftermath of war. The United Nations had accepted the 
responsibility for post-conflict peace building. Peace-building was 
an attempt after a peace had been negotiated or imposed to address 
the sources of current hostility and build local capacities for conflicts 
resolution. Conflict Resolution has a task for achieving a change in 
the direction of the flow of events so that escalation is turned into 
de-escalation and polarisation into positive interaction. This process 
can be explained through Fig. 5.1. 

A 



100 


V 


A 
A Wins 
B Loses 




D 
A Wins 
B Wins 












50 




C 

Compromise 




















E 

A Loses 

B Loses 

C Win 








B 
B Wins 
A Loses 















4 > 







50 



100 



B 



Fig. 5.1 : Analysis of Incompatibility. 

Source : Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution, p. 7. 

This shows two actors A and B with contradictory goals. These 
goals are related with piece of territory, government posts or other 
valuables. If A gets 100 per cent of the available resources, there is 
nothing left for B or vice versa. If either one wins the situation finds 
itself at point A or B respectively and it means complete victory for 
one actor and complete defeat for other. This outcome is not likely 
abide by easily and voluntarily by any actor. Anything beyond these 
points be more acceptable and possible. The point C marks a 
classical point where the parties divide the resources half-half 
equally much or little for each side. The Parties may also agree on 
going to point E in which none of them take anything but instead 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



181 



valuables are handed over to actor C. 14 In Kosovo conflict, The use 
of force by NATO led to the withdrawal of Yugoslavia's forces from 
Kosovo. Both conflict parties i.e. Serbs and Kosovar Albanian 
agreed to deploy NATO force under the UN auspices. The UNMIK 
control the organizational, legal and judicial authority in Kosovo. 

There is a point at the right and above the line D where both 
parties get what they want at the same time. The conflicts 
transformed through transcendence where goals are met fully for 
conflict parties. This outcome indicates the challenge of finding 
solutions beyond established rules and thinking. The need for such 
type of outcome becomes problematic for the United Nations. The 
political battle reduces the options perceived by the actors. The 
atrocities committed by Serbs in Kosovo created fears in Kosovar 
Albanians. This fear barred the transcendence and restricted the 
amicable solutions of Kosovo conflict. 

Kosovo's problems and hatreds were so endemic that the 
international mission shifted to a large scale, long term efforts. 
Given the continuing presence of distrust, bitterness and 
demonization of the other, the need for reconciliation was greatest. 15 
For this purpose, the United Nations has been negotiated or imposed 
peacebuilding efforts to address the sources of current hostility and 
build local capacities for conflict resolution. The political strategy of 
a peacebuilding mandate is the concept of operations embodied in its 
design. It can defuse potential and actual hostilities and assist 
societies in conditions and processes. It can occur at the micro level 
through aid to rebuild links between communities to restore 
authority structures and local decision making capacities. It 
encourages municipal authorities to allow displaced persons to 
return. At the macro-level the conditionalities on delivery of 
assistance can be used to encourage the parties to negotiate their 
differences seriously. 16 But in many civil wars, the contest is over 
who or what ideology controls a single polity. In some ethnic wars 
the costs of 'cleansing' seems too high that combatants in these 
circumstances still have continuing disputes over material interest, 
sovereignty and disputed territory. Each has experienced devastating 
destruction in varying degrees and both leaders and followers are 
likely to harbour deep resentment for losses sustained particularly to 

1 82 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



family and funds. They also experience the costs of war and may 
come to a "hurting stalemate" in which no faction see that it can win 
and perceives the high costs of continuing strife. In these 
circumstances, sustainable peace needs state authority as a starting 
point to overcome security concerns. 

The increased hostility due to the experience of war makes 
reconciliation more difficult. To achieve peace and reconciliation, 
four types of efforts are required.. Firstly, is to reconcentrate central 
power (The powerful must be recognised be legitimate). Second is 
to increase state legitimacy through participation i.e. elections, 
powersharing. Third is to raise and allocate economic resources in 
support of peace. Given the devastation of civil war, all three 
require, the fourth-one i.e. external, international assistance or 
authority in a transitional period (Although not every country would 
benefit from external intervention). 17 In sum there should be a 
relation between the depth of hostility, the number and character of 
the factions and the level of economic development with external 
assistance or authority needed to build peace. This observation can 
be applied on the post war situation in Kosovo. 

The main tasks of UNMIK according to Resolution 1244 were, 
to establish a functioning interim civil administration including the 
maintenance of law and order. Second task was to promote the 
establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government 
including holding of election. Third was to facilitate political process 
to determine Kosovo's future status and all these three efforts took 
the support of the fourth-one i.e. external assistance from the United 
Nations. The initial strategic framework of the international 
administration outlined in the report of the UN Secretary General on 
UNMIK is divided into five integrated phases. 18 The first phase 
focused on the establishment and consolidation of UNMIK' s 
authority, the creation of interim UNMIK administrative structures 
including a phased plan for economic recovery and development for 
maintenance of a viable self sustaining economy. The Second Phase 
would be directed towards the administration of social services, 
utilities and consolidation of rule of law. The Third Phase would 
emphasize the finalization of preparations for election for Kosovo's 
Transitional Authority. During the fourth Phase, UNMIK would 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 83 



oversee and assist elected Kosovo representatives to organize and 
establish the provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous 
self government. A concluding fifth phase would depend on a final 
settlement during which UNMIK would oversee the transfer of 
authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to those established 
under a political settlement. 

The structure of UNMIK was created to provide the necessary 
instruments to fulfil its vast tasks. It has divided into four pillars run 
by different international organizations presided over by the SRSG. 
The two from the four pillars of UNMIK are the Humanitarian 
Assistance Component led by UNHCR and the Civil Administration 
Component led by the United Nations itself . The other two are 
Democratisation and Institution building components led by the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and 
the Reconstruction and Economic Development Component led by 
the European Union. 

The real task of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo was to preserve 
the peace by skillfully navigating between the immediate objectives 
of Resolution 1244 that established a civil administration and the 
adverse political realties on the ground that favoured continuous 
conflict. The challenge was to use the former to address the latter. 
The international administration had addressed three inter-related 
priorities to tackle the challenges and realities of Kosovo. These 
priorities were to establish not only the law and order, security and 
freedom of Movement throughout Kosovo but also to establish a 
functioning administration involving the local population particularly 
the Kosovo Albanians who formed majority population, protect and 
build the confidence of the serbs in their future in Kosovo. The 
common denominator of these political priorities was to preserve 
peace and build confidence of both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs and 
other communities in the international administration. The main 
objective of these priorities was to help to build new Kosovo in 
which all communities could coexist peacefully. In summer 1999 
this seemed to be a battle against all odds. 19 

The International administration in Kosovo had completed its 
four phases. From the beginning the uncertainty over the final status 
of Kosovo has been a Major handicap for UNMIK and KFOR. It 

1 84 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



exacerbated the inherent difficulties of a conflict in which both the 
Albanian Kosovars and Serbs sought exclusively zero-sum solutions. 
Any policy or decision by the international administration was 
interpreted by Serbs as promoting independence or the Kosovo 
Albanians as the return to Serb rule. This shows the complexities of 
ethnic conflict resolution. These difficulties occurred because the 
participants in ethnic conflict fight about the details of history, the 
rules that applied to them, the laws from which they were deprived 
of, demanded special status and future guarantees from the past 
injustices. 20 In this situation, the approaches to end conflict should 
be sensitized the needs of the systematically excluded community. It 
should enable communities in conflict to progress from an 
exclusionary position to a universal position. This universal position 
does not depend on social engineering and assimilation on which the 
political, social and economic framework of mutual coexistence is 
built. This position needs to be democratically arrived at and 
requires a level of democracy in the international system. Despite all 
their procedural messiness and sluggishness democracies 
nevertheless protect the integrity, freedom of conscience and 
expression of the person. 21 Such Protection is essential to end the 
threat felt by individuals in situations of intergroup conflict and 
establishing interethnic peace. 

The UNMIK and KFOR made significant progress toward 
developing provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous 
self government in Kosovo for implementation of the Security 
Council resolution, 1244. Throughout the first phase of international 
administration, the UNMIK managed to shift the focus of the 
attention of the Kosovo Albanians to additional issues. These issues 
included the establishment of a functioning civil administration with 
the participation of local representatives and the establishment of 
local structures of governance with the external holding of municipal 
elections in October 2000. The international administration's 
commitment for general elections sometime soon after municipal 
elections becomes additional issue for the beginning of development 
of democratic institutions of self-government and substantial 
autonomy, economic reconstruction and development. The Kosovo 
Albanians swiftly emerged as constructive interlocutors for the 
international administration. 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 185 



The first critical initiative of UNMIK that build the confidence 
of the Kosovo Albanians was the early establishment of Kosovo 
Traditional Council (KTC) as supreme local consultative body of 
UNMIK. A Major achievement of KTC was that it provided the 
forum for the reconciliation and beginning of cooperation between 
two main Kosovo Albanian leaders i.e. Ibrahim Rugova and Hashim 
Thaci. This paved the way between UNMIK and the key Kosovo 
Albanian leaders. The agreement for the demilitarisation of the 
Kosovo liberation Army and its transformation into Kosovo 
protection corps in September 1999 was another landmark in the 
process of building confidence. The establishment of the joint 
Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) was another cardinal 
success of UNMIK in December 1999. 22 This agreement ensured the 
representation of Kosovo Albanians in some of the key policy 
making mechanisms of UNMIK. It consolidated the cooperation 
between UNMIK and the overwhelming Majority of local 
population. This agreement was criticized because it provided the 
means for transformation of existing parallel governments 
competing with the UNMIK. The agreement stipulated, 

"current Kosovo structures, be they executive, legislative, or judicial 
(Such as, "Provisional Governments of Kosovo' led by Hashim Thaci, 
"Presidency of the Republic of Kosovo" led by Ibrahim Rugova) shall 
be transformed and Progressively integrated, to the extent possible and 
in conformity with this agreement, into the joint interim administrative 
structure. 23 

The UNMIK adopted the regulation on self-government of 
municipalities of Kosovo in August 2000. 24 It was the first step 
towards establishment of a legal framework for substantial autonomy 
in Kosovo and beginning of the transfer of administrative 
responsibilities to local population. This important regulation was 
adopted by the long and constructive contributions by 
representatives. The UNMIK eventually organized the first ever free 
and fair municipal elections in Kosovo on 28 October 2000 under the 
operational responsibility of the OSCE. The peaceful atmosphere of 
elections and victory of the moderate leader Ibrahim Rugova 
strengthened the democratic forces in Kosovo. The catalyst of 
international opinion ensured the constructive engagement of the 

186 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Kosovo Albanians in the policies of UNMIK. Throughout this 
period, they had a conviction that Kosovo was on an irreversible 
path towards independence or at least would never fall under Serb 
rule. With these elections, they declared that choosing the path of 
confrontation against international presence in Kosovo was neither a 
popular opinion nor a pragmatic policy in any case for the Kosovo 
Albanians. 25 In fact, it could have resulted in a self-inflicted injury 
because the international community had demonstrated that they 
were their major ally. 

Throughout this period, the conflict between the Kosovar 
Albanians and Serbs was not over. Continuing animosity and rivalry 
between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs was compounded by 
collective memories of war and revenge deeply shrouded in the mists 
of history. The psychological traumas of the past were still 
powerful. The cycle of insult, humiliation and revenge destroys 
human bonds and causes the escalation of conflict and a renewed 
cycle of anger, insults and aggression. 26 The withdrawal of 
Yugoslavia's forces from Kosovo altered drastically the balance of 
power on the ground and made a space for cycle of revenge by 
Albanians from Serbs in Kosovo. It created the ground for victim to 
turn oppressor. The years of systematic discrimination and 
oppression coupled with fresh memories of terrible atrocities had 
generated deep hatred and an un-controllable spirit of revenge 
among Alabanian population. This phenomena show that the conflict 
is a dynamic process in which structures, attitudes and behaviours 
are shifting constantly in the context of each other. The disputant's 
interests come into conflict and their relationship becomes 
oppressive. They develop conflictual behavior which leads to 
escalation. Resolving conflict involved a new architecture for 
transforming the disputant's relationships and the clash of interests 
that lie at the core of conflict structure. 27 The UNMIK progressively 
established relative security throughout Kosovo at the cost of the 
inter-ethnic divisions and segregation. The Serbs regrouped in rural 
enclaves in Kosovo under around the clock effective protection of 
the KFOR and UNMIK Police. In Pristina (Capital of Kosovo), 
Soldiers even moved to live in apartments together with remaining 
Serbs. 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 87 



The UNMIK addressed the underlying courses of inter-ethnic 
violence to improve its preventive and policing capacity. It also 
improved the judiciary and the prison system. The judicial system 
remained paralysed for several months in the beginning due to 
controversy over the applicable law. A major flare-up of violence in 
Mitrovica in February 2000 created the critical mass needed for the 
UNMIK to secure wide local and international support to appoint 
international judges and prosecutors in Kosovo. The UNMIK 
attempted to address the Serb problems through increased security. 
The international administration also initiated the process of 
organized returns of Serbs to their homes in Kosovo. The SRSG 
launched the Agenda for coexistence in November 1999 for ensuring 
rule of law and enhancing the delivery of public services to the Serbs 
and other vulnerable communities. This initiative was eventually 
boosted by the agreement between the UNMIK and the Serb 
National Council of Kosovo and Metohija (SNC K &M). This 
agreement led to the SNCK&M's decision to participate and 
represent Serbs in the joint administrative structure in Kosovo. 28 
Another Serb political entity the Serb National council of Mitrovica 
(SNC Mitrovica) that pursued policy of non-cooperation with the 
UNMIK accepted in late July 2000 to participate in joint committee 
for returns of the Kosovo Serbs. The dramatic changes in Belgrade 
in October 2000 could give new impetus to the process of 
cooperation between Serbs and the UNMIK in Kosovo. 

INDICTMENT OF SERBIAN PRESIDENT SLOBODAN 
MILOSEVIC AND STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRATIC 
FORCES IN SERBIA AND KOSOVO 

The historic democratic changes of October 2000 in Belgrade 
prompted a widespread optimism for a new era of reconciliation and 
cooperation in Balkans. President Milosevic survived the break up 
of Yugoslavia and then four debilitating wars, faced political crisis 
during the elections of September 2000. The disparate opposition 
groups put up a single candidate Vojislav Kostunica for President. 
The Western governments especially those opposed to Milsoveic 
become over active a few weeks before the elections. Vojislav 
Kostunica, democratic opposition leader got elected as the President 
of Serbia. The Western powers achieved their most sought after aim 

188 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



of ousting of President Milosevic. Western governments interfered 
blatantly in the election process and helped democratic leadership in 
Serbia. The United States administration pumped $77 Million to 
influence the outcome of election. 29 Milosevic's ultranationalist 
policies turned Serbia bankrupt with fifty per cent unemployment 
rate. The United States, on the other hand, demanded Milosevic's 
hand over to the International Court of Justice in lieu of getting 
foreign aid. The United Nations already established adhoc 
International War Crime Tribunal to investigate crimes and 
prosecute perpetrators of atrocities in Yugoslavia. Milosevic has 
arrested by tribunal authorities after nine months of his ouster. He 
faced charges in this Court for genocide and crimes against humanity 
which he committed while in office. 30 He was the first former head 
of state indicted by International War Crime Tribunal ((ICTY). 

The Kosovo conflict resulted from the deliberate incitement of 
ethnic hatred and violence by which ruthless demagogues and 
warlords elevated themselves to position of absolute power. The 
calculated manipulation of fears and tensions unleashed a spiral of 
violence in which thousand of citizens became unwitting instruments 
of unscrupulous political elites questing for supremacy. The arrest 
of Milosevic showed that the removal of leaders with criminal 
dispositions made a positive construction of post-conflict 
peacebuilding. The establishment of international criminal tribunals 
can play a significant role in discrediting and containing 
destabilizing political forces. The stigmatization of delinquent 
leaders through indictment, apprehension and prosecution 
undermine their influence. A post-conflict culture of justice also 
makes moral credibility for victim groups and renders vengeance 
less tempting and more costly. The prosecution and related political 
demise of Milosevic sent a message that the cost of ethnic hatred and 
violence as an instrument of power outweighs its benefits. This 
helped to marginalize nationalist political leaders and other forces 
allied to ethnic war and genocide. It discourages vengeance by 
victim groups and to transform criminal justice into an important 
element of contemporary international agenda. The threat of 
punishment may persuade potential perpetrators to adjust their 
behavior. Thus cost-benefit calculation has implications for 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 1 89 



preventing conflicts. 31 The indictment of Milosevic sent a message 
that in post conflict scenarios, leaders may be incapacitated 
outrightly by arrests. It also conveyed the message that further 
incitement and violence would incur a high political cost. 

The arrest and trial of Milosevic dramatically increased atrocity 
regime's deterrence power. The United Nations established ad hoc 
international war crimes tribunals to investigate crimes and 
prosecute perpetrators of atrocities in Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo. 
The United Nations expanded this atrocity regime by forming a 
permanent tribunal, the International Criminal Court (ICC). This 
process culminated in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court created in June and July 1998. This atrocities regime not only 
held perpetrators of atrocities responsible but act also as a 
mechanism of peace by establishing justice and promoting 
reconciliation in war-torn societies. It remains to be seen whether 
the arrest of Milosevic will serve to disclose the truth of events that 
occurred during the conflicts and promote national healing or further 
calcify animosities in the war-torn regions. The ability of 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
to extradite Milosevic is a crucial point in the development of a more 
viable atrocities regime. 32 It also strengthen the reconciliation 
process in Kosovo. The UN special envoy in Kosovo, Bernard 
Kouchner argued in this regard, "There could be no peace and 
reconciliation in Kosovo until those indicted with human rights 
violations are brought to justice." 33 

Bernard Kouchner 's comments reflected the views that 
accountability for past crimes must remain an important part of 
equation for Kosovo to become a viable multi-ethnic entity. It also 
accepted that the attainment of this objective depends on deterring 
violent campaign against ethnic Serbs. By announcement of ICTY in 
June 2000 that it investigates alleged KLA atrocities against Serbs 
increased the cost of organized anti-Serb vengeance by Kosovo 
political elements. The democratic changes in Belgrade could not 
have directly effected the Kosovo conflict. This conflict was not a 
dispute over power or form of government. It was about secessionist 
movement in Kosovo and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. 
Ibrahim Rugova's refusal of new President Vojislav Kostunica's 

190 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



proposal for starting a dialogue in December 2000 illustrated this 
dilemma of independence and sovereignty. Almost all the Albanian 
political elements in Kosovo whether extreme or moderate supported 
independence for Kosovo but the new democratic leadership in 
Serbia i.e. President Vojislav Kostunica and Prime Minister Zoran 
Djindjic regarded Kosovo as an integral and inalienable part of 
Serbia and Yugoslavia. 34 In this scenario, the international 
administration applied a strategy for implementation of Resolution 
1244 that met the minimum objective of both Kosovo Albanians and 
Serbs and maximum of neither. The bounded rationality and the 
strategy, based on long term political commitment demanded the 
minimum requirement for the Kosovo Albanians, their constructive 
engagement with international administration in implanting 
Resolution 1244. It further required the continued building of Self- 
government, substantial autonomy and increased opportunity for 
Kosovo to become full partner in the process of regional integration 
in Europe. The greater Self-Government and substantial autonomy 
required the creation of political and administrative institutions that 
empowered local population and enhance the credibility of Kosovo 
leadership. The UNMIK under the new SRSG Han Hackkerp 
announced elections for legislative assembly for the purpose of 
attaining the goal of self-government in Kosovo. On November 17, 
2001 UNMIK unveiled a constitutional framework for provisional 
self-government in Kosovo. The assembly would have powers in the 
fields of health, education and environment. It would have left 
ultimate executive authority with head of UNMIK. The UNMIK also 
retained control over province's taxes, budget, judiciary, and 
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). It also envisaged that the Kosovo 
Legislative Assembly would have 120 seats in which 100 elected 
directly. The 10 Seats were reserved for Serbs (7 percent of total 
population) and 10 for other ethnic groups (4 per cent of 
population). The assembly would elect president who would in turn 
appoint Prime Minister. 35 

The elections for Kosovo Assembly were held on November 
17, 2001 and resulted in a victory for moderate Democratic League 
of Kosovo (LDK) led by Ibrahim Rugova. LDK won 47 seats. The 
ethnic Albanian Democratic Party of Kosovo led by former 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 191 



guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci won 26 seats. The coalition 
Returning (KP) won 11 per cent of vote and won 22 seats. 
Approximately 63 per cent of Province's 1.25 million registered 
voters cast their votes. The 70 percent Albanians and 50 per cent 
Serbs casted their votes in this elections. 36 These elections were 
widely regarded as the most important step to devolve power to the 
local Kosovers since the province was placed under international 
administration after 1999 war. The Table 5.1 shows the results of 
Kosovo Assembly elections. 



Party 


% of votes 


Seats 


Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) 


46.3 


47 


Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) 


25.5 


26 


Coalition Returning 


11.0 


22 


Alliance for the future of Kosovo (AAK) 


7.8 


8 


Motherland National Movement for 


1.2 


4 


Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK) 






Christian - Democratic Albanian Party 


1.0 


1 


of Kosovo (PSHDK) 






Kosovo Democratic Turkish Party (KDTP) 


0.9 


3 


People's movement of Kosovo (LPK) 


0.6 


1 


Ashkali Albanian Democratic party 


0.4 


2 


(PDASHK) 






New Initiative for a Democratic 


0.a5 


2 


Kosovo (IRDK) 






Bosniak Democratic Action Party of 


0.4 


1 


Kosovo (BSDAK). 






United Roma Party of Kosovo (PRBK) 


0.3 


1 


Others 


2.4 


1 


Total 


100.0 


120 


Turnout : 




63.2 



Table 5.1 : Results of Kosovo Assembly 

Source : Keesing's Records of world Events, November 2001, p. 444463. 



192 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



The general elections in Kosovo could consolidate the political 
landscape and strengthen the democratic forces among Kosovo 
Albanians. Like Municipal elections, the moderate party of Ibrahim 
Rugova had swept the overwhelming majority in assembly elections 
with 46.3 per cent of the overall vote. The political competition in 
Kosovo is essentially an intra-Albanian affair and thereby the task of 
moderate forces was easier. These elections also deepened the 
transformation of radical forces of the former KLA leader Hashim 
Thaci and his group towards a modern Political Party prepared to 
play the game of democracy. This process also showed that the 
spread of democratic procedures goes hand-in-hand with changing 
conflict resolution norms. 

The process further described the nature of external diplomatic 
involvement and its impact on people's perceptions about leaders in 
that particular region. The involvement of external actor if indicates 
the support of one of the leaders then people would more likely to 
be persuaded by that leader whether his ideas are more inclusive or 
exclusive. In this context, the inclusive means a leader that has toned 
down nationalistic rhetoric. He might speak a future society in which 
grievances could be redressed through cooperative negotiations with 
others and the political majority and minority have same degree of 
common identity. The exclusive leader has more nationalistic 
inclinations about others. The explicit support would give legitimacy 
to leaders in international circles which could ultimately be helpful 
in addressing the group's grievances. On the other hand, if the 
external actor's involvement would be neutral with regard to the 
competing nationalist leaders, then the potential followers of those 
leaders would more likely to think that external actor would support 
negotiations and would help to enforce any agreement. Here 
'neutral' could be used to devote involvement that would pays little 
or no attention to one leader or another but simply would assert the 
need for resolution. 37 The Table 5.2 shows this relationship 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 193 



Perceived Recognition of 
injustice by external actors 



Perception that external actor will 
support negotiations and will help 
enforce agreement. 



Yes 

Most Likely when there 
is neutral external 
involvement 



No 

Most likely 
when there is 
no external 
involvement 



Yes 

Most likely when situation 
defined as international 



No 

Moste likely with situation 
defined as internal 



1 . Support leader 


2. Support leader 


with more inclu- 


with more 


sive ideas 


exclusive ideas 


3. Prediction 


4. Support leader 


indeterminate 


with more 


domestic variables 


exclusive ideas 


in this situation 





Table 5.2 : Relationship between international dimension, follower 
perceptions, and resulting support for more inclusive/exclusive leaders. 

Source : Andrea Grove, International Studies Quarterly (2001), p. 65. 

The first cell of the above model represents a relationship in 
which the political minority is most likely to feel that actors outside 
conflict society recognize their claims of injustice and support 
negotiations or enforce a peace agreement. This process occurred 
when the situation was defined as an international issue and external 
actors were diplomatically involved in supporting talks. The more 
involved they were in talks in the 'neutral' way defined above the 
more likely people have these perceptions. In such a situation leader 
with more inclusive views were more likely to be persuasive. 38 The 
triumph of moderate leader Ibrahim Rugova in Municipal and 
Assembly elections in Kosovo showed the neutral involvement of 
international administration in Kosovo. The international 
administration's efforts to spread democratic procedures in Kosovo 
successfully transformed the more radical forces led by terrorist 
leader Hashim Thaci in a democratic party. 

The UNMIK through democratic procedures and neutral 



194 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



involvement shifted the "Security dilemma" situation in Kosovo. 
Both ethnic groups i.e. Albanian Kosovars and Serbs in Kosovo 
lived in a anarchical situation because of the lack of common 
institutions for governing with perceived legitimacy. A key to 
mediating the security dilemma is confidence building where ethnic 
groups possess effective safeguards, share pacific expectations and 
feel secure in their relationship with the state and each other. 
Confidence building measures give people a sense that they can 
pursue their interests within institutions. The involvement of 
external actors as in cell 1 of above model is a first step to having a 
"neutral arbiter" to provide a sense of security. This means the 
involvement on behalf of external actor may serve as proxy to begin 
promoting transparency of behaviour. It also overturn pattern of 
political discrimination even in the absence of pre-existing 
democratic institutions to redress grievances. This also promoted 
economic development, opportunities, justice and address cultural 
and perceptual problems. 39 The four phases of the international 
administration assist peacebuilding process through the deterrence of 
new hostilities in Kosovo. During the first phase, the UNMIK 
promoted human rights and deploy international personnel with the 
aim to restore public services. It further provided humanitarian 
assistance and facilitated the safe and unimpeded return of all 
refugees and displaced persons to their homes. It established 
functioning administrative structures to develop phased economic 
recovery plan. 

THE UNMIKs IN THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION 
OF KOSVO'S SOCIETY AND AN IMPORTANCE OF UNITED 
NATIONS PEACE BUILDING IN WORLD POLITICS. 

The UNMIK during the second phase focussed on the 
administration of social services and utilities and consolidated the 
rule of law through various regulations. The process of rehabilitation 
began with the UNMIK' s establishment of Deutsh Mark as Kosovo's 
currency with responsibility of European Union. The UNMIK 
increased sense of security in Kosovo with turned its attention to the 
development of judiciary. The UNMIK established pre-1989 law as 
the applicable law in Kosovo for redressing local grievances. In 
practice this significantly limits the use of federal laws. By the end 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 195 



of 1999, the UNMIK had established comprehensive authority in all 
aspects of Kosovo's society with an annual budget of over $427 
Million. 

The first two phases of the UNMIK lasted from July 1999 to 
October 2000. The third and fourth phase were completed by 
municipal and Kosovo assembly elections. Although the inherited 
weakness and ambiguities posed serious problems but the UNMIK 
succeeded in active as neutral arbiter for the conflict resolution in 
Kosovo. 

The German diplomat Michael Steiner replaced Han Haekkerup 
during the election process and appointed as head of the UNMIK on 
January 21, 2002. Ibrhaim Rugova elected as President of Kosovo 
after two failed attempts of its election. The assembly also elected 
the former Mayor of Mitrovica Bajram Rexphie (PDK) as Prime 
Minister. Rugova' s moderate party LDK received four portfolios 
includes finance and education while PDK received two and 
premiership. 40 President Rugova repeated his demand and 
commitment to independence for Kosovo which was supported by all 
political parties. 

The demand of independence by Kosovo Albanian leaders again 
exacerbated with the replacement of Yugoslavia with loose union 
between its two constituent republics i.e. Serbia and Montenegro in 
February 2003 . Enraged by inclusion of Kosovo in new union, the 
Kosovo Legislative members demanded an emergency session of 
assembly with the purpose of adopting a declaration of Kosovo as an 
independent and Sovereign country. The UNMIK head Michael 
Steiner dismissed their demand for independence. The assassination 
of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and the replacement of President 
Vojislav Kostunica by Svetozar Marovic as President of new union 
in March 2003 also loosened the process of the solution of Kosovo's 
final status. 41 Until the emergence of Kosvo as an independent 
country in January 2008 it seems that the Resolution 1244 left it in 
limbo. But it is clear that without some minor incidents of violence, 
resolution 1244 could prevent Kosovo from sliding back into an 
open conflict. It provided long-term commitment by the international 
community to create the conditions for a regional settlement of 
Kosovo dispute sometime in the future. On the other hand, The 

196 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



United Nations future in international crises is going to be 
determined in very large part by what it achieves in Kosovo. 42 The 
United Nations successfully restored its credibility by solving the 
problems regarding Kosovo's final status amicably with the 
cooperation of the United States and European Union. 

Kosovo further described that the United Nations proclamation 
of multilateral security and universal principles of peace and 
democracy provides fantasy space for contemporary sovereign 
states. It means that the presence of the United Nations at the centre 
of world politics is a fictional guarantee. Under this guarantee, every 
post-cold war event could be reinterpreted or revisualized through 
the filtering presence of the United Nations that is much more 
classical and comfortable for states. This explains the proliferation 
of global conferences in the recent years on environment (Rio 
Summit) world population (Cairo Summit), world poverty 
(Copenhagen Summit), human rights (Vienna Summit) organized by 
United Nations. The new world opened up by the United Nations 
through these conferences, reports of UN special envoys, UN 
special declarations and work of UN agencies simulate the vision 
that world is the hospitable place for states and its people. More 
importantly it shows the need for states to work together and build 
long-standing principles to arrive at such a fictional construction that 
could be called "UN-iversal world order". 43 Thus, sovereign states 
are not left out of the global picture of/by the United Nations. The 
United Nations fictionally "brings states back in the world order 
which were disempowered by transnational phenomenon that no 
longer abides state boundaries and principle of action. Beside 
failures in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and various other parts of 
world, the United Nations exalted all of the realist values of modern 
nation-states i.e. autonomy, sovereignty, legitimacy and power. 

In other words, sovereign states are re-empowered by the vast 
simulating arsenal of the United Nations activities. The States are 
represented as sovereign with the authority in the Security Council 
decisions and their populations through environment summits. They 
care about their borders with condemnation of international 
terrorism through the United Nations declarations and resolutions. 
They take part in the resolution of ethnic conflicts and charges 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 197 



against unfriendly states e.g. plethora of UN resolutions passed 
against Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Haiti and so on. Thus, the United 
Nations becomes an imaginary world government which is tied to no 
real world nation or state but it constantly rejuvenates the realist 
fiction of national governments through imaginary powers of 
simulation. 44 Responding the rhetoric of irrelevance of the United 
Nations during Bush administration's decision to use force 
unilaterally in Iraq, Madeleine Albright argued, 

Beyond the council itself, The United Nations ongoing relevance is 
evident in the work of the more than two dozen organizations 
comprising the UN system. In 2003 alone, The International Atomic 
Energy Agency reported that Iran had processed nuclear materials in 
violations of its nuclear nonproliferation treaty obligation. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia tried deposed 
Yugoslav Leader Slobodan Milosevic for genocide. The World Health 
Organization successfully coordinated the global response to Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), meanwhile The World Food 
Programme has fed more than 70 million people annually for the last 
five years. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees maintains a 
lifeline to the international homeless. The UN children's fund has 
launched a campaign to end forced childhood marriage. The Joint UN 
Programme on HIV/AIDS remains a focal point for global efforts to 
defeat HIV/ AIDS. The UN Population Fund help families plan, 
mothers' service, and children grow up healthy in the most 
impoverished places on earth. The United Nations may seen useless to 
the self-satisfied, narrow minded, and microhearted minority, but to 
most of the world's populations, it remains highly relevant indeed. 45 

The United Nations come under severe criticism in recent years 
over its inability to perform its collective security functions. Many 
consider it increasingly irrelevant entity and do not feel the need for 
its continued existence. But the failure of the Security Council with 
regard to its collective security functions is the result of collective 
failure of its Permanent members. This collective failure stems 
largely from their unwillingness to give up their veto power. 
However, the Collective Security is only one aspect albeit an 
important one of the multifaced role played by the United Nations in 
world affairs. 46 The Kosovo illustrated this view obviously. After 
the termination of NATO bombing, the United Nations oversee the 
return of refugee's provided them with food and shelter. It assisted 

198 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



in the rebuilding of Kosovo's shattered economy, institutions of law 
and order and democratic governance. 

The reconstruction of Civil Society, Judiciary, police and other 
public institutions in Kosovo torn apart by ethnic hatred and strife is 
one of the most sensitive and important elements in Kosovo peace 
settlement. It created an unprecedented role for the United Nations 
and extremely challenging test of the ability of International 
Community to take the place of government. Kosovo puts a new 
type of international responsibility on trial. 47 The United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) successfully reconstructed civil 
society despite the inherent weaknesses and ambiguities of its 
mandate. Such reconstruction could be the foremost priority for 
international administration because it was crucial for lasting peace 
in the region. NATO was neither equipped or nor willing to perform 
these functions. Although the United States and European Union 
played an important and leading role in the process to decide the 
final status of Kosovo but the peacebuilding role of United Nations 
in Kosovo given eloquent testimony to its continuous relevance. 



References : 

1 . The United Nations had frequently been involved in the monitoring of borders 
and cease-fires, monitoring or conduct of elections. It had little experience in 
the actual governance of territories. Under Article 77 of the UN charter, the 
International trusteeship system applied to territories previously placed under 
League of Nations Mandate. These territories included island groups in the 
south pacific that had been heavily affected by Combat operations in World 
War II. The UN role with respect to such territories was prescribed by 
agreement with the state involved, amounted to very general supervision. The 
actual governance was carried out by the state granted the trusteeship. The UN 
had been prepared to assume administrative function in city Trieste in 1947, 
The city of Jerusalem in 1950, west Iran in 1962, Congo in 1960-1964. 
Recently, The UN administer Namibia in 1989-1990, Combodia in 1996-1998, 
El Salvador in 1991-1995, Croatia-Eastern Slavonia in 1996-1998. The Dayton 
Peace Accords on Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) devised a special system of 
International administration see. Micheal J. Matheron, United Nations 
Governance of Post Conflict Socities," American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 95 (Jan 2001), pp. 76-78. 

2. Christopher M. Ryan, "Sovereignty, Intervention, and the Law : A Tenuous 
Relationship of Competing Principles," Millennium Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 26 (1997), p. 77. 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 199 



3. Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of war (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 
1991-192. 

4. United Nations Year Book, 1999 (NY, 1999), pp. 352-353. 

5. UN General Assembly Resolution 53/241, 28 July 1999. 

6. UN Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999. 

7. Alexandras yannis, "Kosovo under International Administration : An 
Unfinished Conflict (Greece, 2001), p. 32. 

8. UNMIK Regulation No. 1991/1, 25 July 1999, on the Authority of the Interim 
Administration in Kosovo, Section 1, Article 1. 

9. Hansjorg strohmeyer, "Collapse And Reconstruction of a Judicial System : The 
United Nations Missions Kosovo And East Timor," American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 95 (January 2001), p. 47. 

10. See Annex 2, Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999). 

11. For the study of Legal powers of UN in East Timor see Jarat Chopra, "The 
UN's Kingdom of East Timor", Survival, Vol. 42, 43 (Autumn 2000), pp. 27- 
39. 

12. Yannis, n. 7, pp. 18-19. 

13. David A. Lake, "The New Sovereignty in International Relations", 
International Studies Review, (N.Y.) Vol. 5 (2003), p. 318. 

14. Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution : War, Peace and The 
Global System (ND, 2002), p. 36. 

15. David Rohde, "Kosovo Seething, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79 (May /June 2000), 
p. 66. 

16. S. Neil Macfarlance, "Humanitarian action and Conflict," International 
Journal, Vol. Liv (Autumn 1999), p. 541. 

17. Richard K. Belts, "The Delusion of Impartial Interventions", Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 73 (Nov. /Dec. 1994), p. 21. Sec. Micheal w. Doyle and Nicholas 
Sambani, "International Peacebuilding : A Theoratical and Quantitative 
Analysis", American Political Science Review (Whasington), Vol. 94 
(December 2000), pp. 780-781. 

18. Report of the UN Secretary General on The United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999. Paragraphs 110- 
116. 

19. Yannis, n. 7, pp. 34-35. 

20. John Chipman, "Managing The Politics of Parochialism," Survival, Vol. 35 
(Spring 1993), p. 167. 

21. Oliver P. Richmond, "A Genealogy of Peacemaking : The Creation and Re- 
creation order", Alternatives, Vol. 26 (2001), p. 340. See Steven L. Burg, 
"Nationalism Redux : Through The Glass of The Post-Communist States 
Darkly, Current History, Vol. 92 (April 1993), p. 163, See also. Samuel H. 
Barnes, "The contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Post conflict societies", 
American Journals of International Law, Vol. 95 (Jan 2001), pp. 86-101. 

22. Yannis, n. 7, p. 41. 

23. UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/1 of 14 January 2000, on The Kosovo Joint 
Interim Administrative Structure. 

200 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



24. UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/45 of August 2000, on Self-Government of 
Municipalities in Kosovo. 

25. Yannis, n. 7, p. 45. 

26. Robert L. Rofhstein, " Fragile Peace and Its Aftermath" in Robert L. 
Rothstein, ed. After The peace : Resistance of Reconciliation (London, 1999), 
p. 239. 

27. Johan Gaining, Peace by Peaceful Means : Peace and Conflict, Development 
and Civilization (London, 1996), p. viii. 

28. Yannis, n. 7, p. 48. 

29. John Cherian, "Milosevice's Many Battles", Frontline (October 27, 2000), p. 
44. 

30. Gary J. Bass, "Milosevic in The Hauge", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82 (May /June 
2003), p. 83, See Andrew Purvis, "Long Walk to Justice", Time (July 9, 
2001), p. 30. 

31. Payam Akhavan, "Beyond Impunity : Can International Criminal Justice 
Prevent Future Atrocities?" American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95 
(Jan. 2001), pp. 7, 9, 11. 

32. Christopher Rudolph, "Constructing an Atrocities Regime : The Politics of 
War Crimes Tribunals," International Organization, Vol. 55 (Summer 2001), 
p. 675. 

33. Quoted in Akhavan, n. 31, p. 19. 

34. Lenard J. Cohen, "Post-Milosevic Serbia," Current History, Vol. 100 (March 
2001), p. 104. 

35. Keesing's Records of World events (May 2001), p. 44167. 

36. Ibid., Nov. 2001, p. 44463. 

37. Andrea Grove, "The intra-national struggle to define "us" : External 
Involvement as a two-way street", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45 
(2001), pp. 364-65. 

38. Ibid. 

39. Cell 2 of Model represent a situation in which international actor May 
recognize political Minority's claims of injustice by defining the situation as an 
international issue. This situation "fired up" the people about their problem but 
lack of encouragement of talks, economic help or other diplomatic involvement 
beyond the rhetoric result in frustration of people. It resulted in the population's 
support of more exclusive leader. Cell 4 is the more extreme version of this 
situation. In this situation in which even their plight can not recognized may 
make people think that their only option is the more exclusive definition of 
situation argued by one of the leader. To most a leader calling for talks with 
neighbours make little sense. In cell 3, The situation is defined as internal but 
diplomatic involvement is present. It produce the perception that external actors 
support negotiation and agreement but do not adequately recognize the claims 
of the injustice by political minority. In this case, it may appear that 
negotiations favor the political majority. Involvement occur because external 
actor wish to end instability and not redress grievances of minority. The 
reaction of the public in this situation depends more on the domestic variables 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 201 



than on external context. For example in a situation of high repression the more 
exclusive leader makes more sense. If the repression is lessening, a more 
inclusive leader's rhetoric would be more likely to resonate. See Ibid. , p. 366. 

40. Renata Dwan", "Armed Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution", 
Sipri Yearbook, 2000, pp. 87-88. Keesing's Records of world Events Jan. 
2002, p. 44578. See also Keesing's Records of world Events, March 2002, p. 
44684. 

41. Keesing's Records of World Events, March 2003, p. 45299. 

42. Yannis, n. 7, p. 72. 

43. Francois Debrix, "Deploying vision, Simulation Action : The United Nations 
and its Visualizing Strategies in a New World Order", Alternatives, Vol. 21 
(1996), p. 82. Ibid., pp. 82-83. 

44. Ibid., pp. 82-83. 

45. Madeline K. Albright, "United Nations", Foreign Policy (October 2003), p. 
17. 

46. Rahul Rao, "The UN and NATO in the New World Order : Legal issues," 
International Studies, Vol. 37 (2000), p. 180. 

47. Hideaki Shinoda, "The Politics of Legitimacy in International Relations : A 
Critical examination of NATO's Intervention in Kosovo", Alternatives, Vol. 25 
(2000), p. 531. 



202 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Conclusion 

The cascade of events occurred in the last decade of twentieth 
century resulted in a revolutionary restructuring of world politics. 
The stability imposed by the bipolar distribution of power between 
the United States and the Soviet Union ended with the demise of 
USSR. The trends of disintegration shook the globe and the 
resurgence of ethnic-nationalism and conflict resulted in the ethno- 
chaos in the world politics. 

Ethnicity is a sense of identity and being a complex phenomenon 
like other social phenomenon is the subject of change. It is normally 
closely associated with political, juridical, religious and other social 
views and forms of interaction which constitute important 
ingredients of ethnic phenomenon. Ethnicity also finds expression in 
political domination, economic exploitation and psychological 
oppression. 

The nature, intensity and forms of expression of ethnicity are 
determined by the size and location of the various linguistic cultural 
groups in the society, the strength and coherence of their leadership, 
the courage, determination and nature of under-privileged classes. 
Historical relations between different cultural groups, the level of 
development of the group, the socio-economic content in which the 
groups make contact, prevailing social customs, tradition and culture 
of various linguistic groups and the form of government also play an 
important role. 

Ethnicity is found in both developed and underdeveloped 
countries, in societies with different ideologies and historical- 
cultural backgrounds. The positive aspect of ethnicity provides a 
material as well as emotional support network for individual in 
society. The negative aspects of ethnicity make it problematic for 
social harmony in multi-ethnic societies. It embodies those 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 203 



passionate, symbolic and apprehensive aspects, which provide 
violent conflicts. 

Ethnicity is not a new phenomenon. The process of traditional 
ethnicity and modern ethnicity as defined by world system 
development theory had gone through three major interlocking 
phases of development in the world system. The three phases are the 
changing structures of the state and economy as well as their 
associated ideological and identity configurations. However, with 
the emergence of modern state system the ethnicity assumed a new 
phenomenon taking the varied and overlapping forms of ethnic 
nationalism, civil ethnicity and ethnic plurality. Thus, the modern 
ethnicity rests on the foundation that member of every ethnic or 
cultural community need to be identified with a nation for assuring 
the status and rights of citizenship for themselves. When any time 
ethnic or cultural communities can not accept or support the state 
under whose jurisdiction they happen to live, they became alienated 
and hunt for better options. 

The contemporary conflict between ethnic groups has been 
primarily restricted to sub-national groups with in the state that has 
not achieved the status of 'Nation' and the 'Majority group' 
organized under a state. The rise of ' Nation- without-states' bring a 
radical transformation in the functioning of nation-state. The ethnic 
conflict arise when the nation-state ignore the emotional bonds of 
myths, symbols and memories which unite citizens of particular 
ethnic communities living in its territory. A stress on informing and 
homogenization in the state boundaries are the root cause of the rise 
of ethnic violence in various countries. These factors were also 
responsible for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 

The roots of ethnic violence in Yugoslavia must be sought in the 
ethno-history, economy and culture of the region. Extreme ethnic 
heterogeneity, intractable religious and group rivalries and conflict 
of deeper socio-historical interests between various Yugoslav 
nations torn apart the artificial composition of country. The Kosovo 
crisis was also the product of these ethnic, religious and socio- 
historic rivalries between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in 
Yugoslavia. The forces of ethnicity, ethnocide, ethnogenesis, ethno- 
nationalism and historical hatreds not only torn apart the Yugoslav 

204 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



society but led it towards the process of pseudospeciation. It is a tool 
of modern psychological warfare through which the image of the 
target group or nation can be bedeviled. The Serbian President used 
this tool in Yugoslavia which resulted in the bloodiest massacres of 
Serbs, Croates, Bosnians and Albanian Muslims and created worst 
refugee problem in post- World War II European history. 

The Serbian atrocities in Kosovo led to the severe humanitarian 
crisis that provided chance to NATO forces and sole super power the 
United States to intervene in Yugoslavia. Latter, this intervention in 
Kosovo (which was not authorised by the United Nations Security 
Council) raised various severe legal questions in world politics. 

It is argued that the United Nations was silent spectator to the 
events in Kosovo. The paralysis of the United Nations was the result 
of the failure of permanent members of the Security Council to forge 
a consensus on the course of action. The United Nations role, on the 
contrary, was more complex and focused on the humanitarian and 
human rights issues. The United Nations role in Kosovo can be 
divided into two parts i.e. Pre-NATO attack preventive diplomacy 
for hampering mass scale human rights violations and second was 
post-NATO attack role of peace building. The Pre-NATO attack 
peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in Kosovo could be 
analyses through three peace-keeping categories i.e. patching-up, 
prophylaxis and proselytism. The United Nations peace-keeping 
activities do not always contain neatly into this threefold framework. 
Sometimes the organization has engaged (at the same time and same 
situation) in both patching-up and prophylactic endeavours. The 
Mandate which is given to the mission is usually a good guide of the 
role of the United Nations. The four methods of patching-up, four 
of prophylaxis and two of proselytism illustrate different ways in 
which the same goal may be sought. 

Patching-up consists of activity which intended to bring 
disputants to an agreement or to assist in the execution of a 
settlement. The first patching-up route to an agreement lies through 
impartial investigation of the facts of the case. In Kosovo, the 
Serbian and Kosovar Albanian groups were not in direct and open 
conflict until the last month of 1998. Hence, an investigation was the 
most obvious step in this situation. The observers can be sent to an 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 205 



area where potential explosion of violence is likely to occur. This 
enables the world institution to receive an important report about 
deteriorating situation. The United Nations used Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Mission's to promote 
dialogue and collect information on human rights violations in 
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia withdrew its acceptance of CSCE missions 
in Kosovo and other two areas in September 1992. The Security 
Council adopted resolution 855 (sponsored by France, Hungary, 
Spain, United Kingdom and United States) in 1993 and called upon 
Yugoslav authorities to reconsider their refusal to allow the CSCE 
mission's activities in Kosovo and other areas. The General 
Assembly in resolution 49/13 (1994) also called for the full 
implementation of resolution 855 (1993). Second procedure of 
patching-up is 'mediation' and the United Nations used it in number 
of times in Kosovo. The United Nations can also help to repair 
quarrels by assisting in the implementation of an agreement. For this 
purpose, the United Nations supervise the parties for execution of 
their promises. The United Nations may go beyond this activity 
when it played an administrative role in territorial disputes. The 
world body time-to-time used these patching-up procedures in the 
Kosovo crisis. 

The four forms of the United Nations 'prophylactic' activity are, 
the devices of accusation, sedation, obstruction and refrigeration. 
The device of accusation is based on the assumption that the 
garnering of facts will expose and so may check the unpopular 
behaviour of offender states. The United Nations used CSCE 
mission's reports as 'accusation' method. This method is not 
embarked upon the immediate hope of putting an end to the dispute 
but intends to produce a quietening effect. The world body makes 
authoritative call for the cessation of hostile acts on the base of 
reports. In this way, the United Nations place some obstacles in the 
way of the beginning or continuation of aggressive policies. The 
Security Council resolution 855 (1993) which stressed Yugoslavia to 
reconsider its policy toward CSCE missions and the General 
Assembly Resolutions 48/153 (1993), 50/190 (1995), 51/111 (1996) 
and 52/139 (1997) which condemned Yugoslavia for violation of 
Kosovo Albanian's human rights, demanded reestablishment of 
democratic institutions, establishment of international monitoring 

206 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



presence in Kosovo and resumption of dialogue reflected the 
prophylactic accusation approach used by world body in the Kosovo 
crisis. 

The scope and intensity of the conflict in Kosovo grew 
dramatically in 1998 despite the CSCE missions and other regional 
organizations activities. The United Nations with the support of 
contact group and OSCE were directed towards bringing the parties 
together through mediatory or accusatory methods. The Security 
Council adopted resolutions 1160 and 1190 on the basis of the 
reports of contact group, OSCE, the Secretary-General and the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) about 
potential humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. Here, the United Nations 
used second prophylactic method called 'sedation' in Kosovo. 
Sedation consists of direct endeavours to exert a calming influence 
on inflammable situations. It requires the direct dealings of the 
United Nations representatives with the officials of the involved 
states. Such operations take place in two ways i.e. by negotiations 
with government concerned and through cooling activity at military 
level. These measures are not only used for avoiding loss of time but 
also designed to maximise the effects of the United Nations 
intervention. The sedative efforts of contact group, Christopher 
Hills (the United States Ambassador to Federal Republic of 
Macedonia) and the United States special envoy Richard Holbrooke 
resulted in an agreement for solution of Kosovo's problems through 
dialogue and peaceful means. 

The United Nations used third prophylactic possibility called 
'obstruction' for keeping peace and dialogue, the mobilization of 
world opinion regarding Kosovo's deteriorating situation. The 
obstruction is the placing of non-combatant force or verifiers with 
consent of host state for preventing the situation from deterioration. 
NATO and Yugoslavia signed Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) 
on 15 October 1998 for air surveillance system. Yugoslavia and 
OSCE signed another agreement which allow OSCE mission to 
verify maintenance of ceasefire by all elements. This mission 
comprised 2000 unarmed verifiers from OSCE member countries 
and would be headquartered in Pristina, capital of Kosovo. On 
humanitarian front, the UNHCR and OHCHR had established close 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 207 



coordination with Kosovo verification mission in the field and close 
liaison with OSCE in Vienna. 

The United Nations peace-keeping activities in Kosovo received 
a shock when Yugoslavia had increased its military activities and 
used excessive and disproportionate force in Kosovo. The contact 
group also failed at diplomatic front when Serbian delegation refused 
to sign Rambouillet accords. The last ditch mediation mission of US 
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and three other Rambouillet 
negotiators to persuade President Milosevic to accept ceasefire 
failed. This process showed that the states are certainly sensitive to 
criticism but it does not follow that they would alter their policies 
just to accommodate world opinion. The governments generally do 
not regard it as consonant with their dignity or domestic stability. 
The world body's demands, on the other hand, increase the state's 
determination to stand firm and receive support from its friends. The 
successful outcome of international opinion is based on two factors. 
Firstly, if the criticized states know that certain powerful friends will 
stand by it then it can afford to take little notice of decisions taken 
by organized international community. Yugoslavia knew that Russia 
and China, two Permanent Security Council members could veto 
any Western resolution regarding use of force on its territory. Thus, 
President Milosevic refused to sign Rambouillet accords and did not 
accept the ceasefire in Kosovo. 

Secondly, in this situation, the efficacy of international action is 
based on the United Nations third peacekeeping method called 
proselytism. In this category, the United Nations seeking to act as 
an instrument of change in order to enforce concerned parties or 
regimes to obey international standards of behaviour. There are two 
types of proselytism i.e. 'invalidation and coercion'. The device of 
invalidation is used as fact-finding mission. It is used in the 
expectation that its report will be so damaging as to suggest that the 
regime in question is morally unfit for continued rule. However, the 
unresponsiveness of the criticized government or party to the United 
Nations hints that they should give up unacceptable behaviour or 
make way for more acceptable regimes. It has turned some thoughts 
toward coercion. The device of coercion is used for forceful regime 
change. NATO and OSCE's verification missions in Kosovo acted 



208 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



as fact-finding missions for the United Nations. Both missions 
reported about the rigidity and blatant use of force by Serbian 
government against Kosovo Albanians. In this situation, the 
efficiency of international coercive action was largely turn on the 
attitude of major powers. The consensus between major powers 
about preventing violent change and maintaining peaceful 
international atmosphere is necessary for the United Nations to have 
a prophylactic effect on troubled situation. NATO's unauthorised 
use of force on Serbia directly stated to the divisions among the five 
permanent members of the Security Council on the use of force to 
resolve Kosovo crisis and the commitment of Russia and China to 
veto military intervention in Kosovo. 

Kosovo showed that the human rights promotion through the 
UN Charter system has been evolved considerably. Since the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration, human rights institutions in 
the United Nations system have both increased in numbers and often 
evolved beyond a declaratory and promotional status. The 1998 
Rome Compromise on the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court indicated the growing innovation and 
strengthening of the United Nations human rights treaty-based 
system which focused on crimes against humanity. The indictment 
of Serbian President Milosevic by international war Crime Tribunal 
(ICTY) for atrocities committed on Kosovo Albanians showed that 
the establishment of individual responsibility for such crimes 
represent a major step towards the direct enforcement of specific set 
of international human rights norms. The United Nations role in 
Kosovo indicates dilemma faced by the states i.e. to follow 
humanitarian conventions or to contest these norms. Both reactions 
indicate an evolutionary process where by the human rights issues 
gain growing recognition in international politics. Kosovo also 
highlighted that the United Nations was created for the world peace 
and alleviation of inter-state wars in the world but intra-state ethnic 
conflict changed its peacekeeping role into peacebuilding variety for 
reconstruction of war-torn societies. 

NATO's role in Kosovo highly affected the relevance of the 
United Nations in the world affairs. It highlighted the dilemma of 
legitimacy for a group of states to act in order to prevent or halt 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 209 



humanitarian emergency where the Security Council is deadlocked 
in disagreement. NATO action in Kosovo represents an obvious 
erosion of the United Nations authority on use of force in 
international affairs. The structure of the charter is complex so far 
as the use of force is concerned. Article 2(4) prohibits the threat and 
use of force. The only unilateral use of force permitted to a state is 
that of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51. It has 
too been accepted that the prohibition of intervention applies 
regardless of the political ideology or the moral virtue of the 
government of the target state. There was general agreement that the 
charter prohibits intervention by any state even for humanitarian 
purposes. NATO justified its threat and subsequent use of force 
against Serbia on two grounds i.e. firstly, the Security Council had 
determined by Resolution 1199 that the situation in Kosovo 
constituted a threat to peace and security in the region, secondly, 
that there was large scale human suffering in the region. 

The Security Council adopted three resolutions under chapter 
VII of the UN Charter prior to NATO bombing campaign. The 
resolution 1199 concluded that the Security Council would take 
further additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability 
if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not implement the 
measures optioned in Resolutions 1160 and 1199. It is evident from 
Resolution 1199 that the Security Council gave an opportunity to 
FRY to comply with its wishes. It reserved the right to determine 
"further action" and "additional measures" to taken in the evidence 
of the fact that Yugoslavia did not comply with the resolutions 1 160, 
1199, it was not left to other states to determine what further actions 
and additional measures could be taken. This Resolution did not 
even remotely imply that any state or regional organization could 
apply the use of force to deal with the situation. Thus, NATO's 
intervention in Kosovo is blatant violation of Articles 2(4), 2(7), 51 
of the United Nations Charter. 

The other most important justification given by NATO was 
"humanitarian intervention" for the use of force in Kosovo. It raised 
a debate which has focused on the alleged incompatibility of two 
principles of the United Nations system i.e. Sovereign equality and 
human rights. The former is enshrined in Articles 2(1), 2(4), 2(7) of 



210 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



the UN Charter. Under these Articles states enjoy sovereign equality 
defined internally as exclusive jurisdiction with in a territory and 
externally as freedom from outside intervention. The human rights 
are identified in preamble of the UN Charter and Article 1(3). This 
right is further elaborated in subsequent declarations and 
conventions. Thus, the Kosovo crisis showed the clash between the 
principles of non-intervention, sovereign equality enshrined in the 
United Nations Charter with human right norms. Although the 
United Nations Charter and other human rights instruments are not 
provided the right of "humanitarian intervention" but the creation of 
International Tribunals of Rwanda (1994) and Former Yugoslavia, 
indictment of President Milosevic and other war criminals showed 
that the prevention of massive human rights violations or 
humanitarian catastrophes has become the basis of "humanitarian 
intervention" practice in recent years. 

The Kosovo intervention showed that the West continuous to 
script international law although it ignore the constitutional 
safeguards provided by the United Nations Charter. The Western 
interventions in non- Western states i.e. Iraq, Somalia, Haiti etc. 
cited as evidence that the UN Charter's original, narrow notion that 
constituted a threat to the peace is broadened. The threats which 
provide the basis for collective decisions on the use of force 
increasingly recognize and include the internal disorders that 
generate regionally destabilizing refugee streams or ethnic conflicts 
as in Kosovo and the development of the weapons of mass 
destruction by states with aggressive tendencies. Recently, the 
United States sought the United Nations authorisation on the use of 
force in Iraq on the basis of this broadened definition of threat to 
international peace and security. But NATO and the United States' 
failure to obtain the Security Council legitimacy for their actions in 
Kosovo and Iraq respectively described that the use of force is still 
be confined to essentially order promoting and security-preserving 
purposes and could not extend to humanitarian purposes as such. 

The humanitarian intervention entails the commitment to human 
rights. But it does not mean the worldwide equality of human rights. 
The human rights of some people are more worth protecting than 
others. International community has double standards on 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 211 



humanitarian intervention. Military intervention on behalf of the 
victims of human rights abuses has not occurred in Sudan, 
Afghanistan or Ethiopia. It was woefully inadequate and delayed in 
Rwanda. The agreement between Indonesia, Portugal and the United 
Nations on May 5, 1999 affirmed that the security of East Timorese 
was the responsibility of Indonesia and United Nations. It is evident 
that the outcome of the proposed referendum regarding East Timor's 
independence inevitably resulted in mass scale violence but the 
Security Council delayed authorising intervention until Indonesia's 
consent was not obtained. It is better to be a refugee in Europe than 
in Africa. UNHCR spent 1 1 cents a day on per refugee in Africa but 
$1.23 in Balkans which is 11 times greater then Africa. International 
Community's double standards also reflected in "Money for Peace". 
The United Nations' consolidated humanitarian appeal for Kosovo 
was $690 billion of which 58 per cent has been met while $2.1 
billion has pledged for regional construction. On the other hand, 
United Nations appeal for $25 million for Sierra Leone met 
profound international indifference and a mere 32 percent of the 
appeal has covered. 

NATO's intervention in Kosovo not only diminished the United 
Nations effectiveness and prestige in world politics but also pointed 
towards the role and impact of the United States as sole world power 
on the functioning of the United Nations system. The United States 
role in the Kosovo crisis reflected its grand strategy in world 
politics. The United States grand strategy included security and 
economic objectives as well as particular approaches to achieve 
these ends at particular times. It also supported the development of 
international institutions and sophisticated ideology that gained wide 
international appeal and comprised both political and economic 
ideals. During cold war years, the United States ideology was liberal 
internationalism who's political and economic ideals were liberal 
democracy and free markets. Other important elements of this 
strategy were containment, nuclear deterrence and promotion of 
open economic society. The United States modified, ranged and 
expanded the elements of its grand strategy after the end of Cold 
War. Its economic and social realities in this decade were no longer 
centered on industrial power and liberalism. 



212 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



The process of globalization, communication revolution and 
diminished power of nation-state changed its old strategy. The 
process of globalization led to the emergence of global economy, 
which favours openness. The development of postmodern society 
eroded the great pillars of modern society i.e. government 
bureaucracies, military services and business corporations. These 
are replaced by the ideas of expressive individualism and human 
rights. The communication revolution also promotes the idea of 
human rights. The traditional American ideology advocated liberal 
democracy and free markets. The global transformation also 
expanded traditional ideology of the United States with more 
emphasis on promoting human rights. The modified version of 
"global liberalism" (which was propagated by President Bill Clinton 
and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright) provided the justification 
to a new kind of the United States Military Interventionism. The 
Military Interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia were the examples 
of this phenomenon. The United States led war against Serbia over 
Kosovo also represented the culmination of the United States new 
strategy of "Global Liberalism." On the other hand, Kosovo showed 
the dilemma of the United States policy of opposition of the concept 
of international accountability formulated in the Rome Statute for an 
International Criminal Court. The Kosovo highlighted the United 
States irony that it is prepared to bomb in the name of human rights 
but not to join institutions to enforce them. Kosovo war against 
Orthodox Serbia showed the resistance and resentment of Russia, 
China and other Orthodox countries towards the United States and 
its promotion of global economy, open society and humanitarian 
intervention. It is argued that Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, 
Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia have been unsuccessful in making the 
transition from communism to liberal-democratic free-market 
structures and global economy. In contrast, most of Roman Catholic 
countries such as, Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia have made this transition 
successfully. Even Protestant Nations Estonia and Latvia also have 
made this transition. The dichotomy among ex-communist countries 
i.e. more western and more eastern or Roman Catholic or Protestant 
and the Eastern Orthodox revived and reinforced an ancient 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 213 



historical divides. This resulted in the great schism between Western 
and Eastern Christianity. 

The Kosovo war has sharpened the opposition of the United 
States global project by Russia, China and Some other countries. 
The United States support of humanitarian intervention present a 
serious threat to the norm of national sovereignty. And most of the 
opposition states saw the Kosovo war as a prime example of the 
United States grand strategy that aims to impose globalization. They 
worried that they may be the next targets of humanitarian 
interventionist policy of the United States. This was the case with the 
Kosovo war where Russia and China saw analogies between 
Chechnya and Tibet, Taiwan, respectively. 

The Kosovo crisis also reflects the United States hegemonic 
foreign policy goals in Europe. During Cold War, the United States 
controlled communism and its capitalist allies simultaneously. But 
after the demise of Soviet Block, the central objective of the United 
States in Europe was containment of European allies. Thus, it has 
overwhelmingly reasserted her power in Europe through 
revitalization of the Cold War institutional structure. Thus, the 
United States successfully revitalized NATO, contain European 
allies and Russian power in Eastern Europe respectively. 

It is argued that the paralysing tensions over Bosnia in 1994-95, 
the inaction over Rwanda in 1994 and the insurmountable divisions 
emerged over Kosovo in 1999 were life-threatening for the United 
Nations. But the United Nations survived with repeated "crisis of 
credibility" due to its unacknowledged functions. These functions 
include that the permanent members of the United Nations used its 
shortcomings as cheap and convenient cover for the failure of their 
own policies. Another vital function of the Security Council is to 
serve as an instrument for collective legitimization of state action. 
This instrument acts as a dispenser of politically significant approval 
and disapproval of the claims, policies and actions of states. The 
Security Council provides another mechanism to permanent 
members through which they advance their interests and secure 
themselves from international criticism. The Post-Cold War 
examples illustrated this fact e.g. Russia successfully soften the 
United States position on Georgia and Tajikistan in exchange for 

214 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



supporting US sponsored resolution on Haiti in 1993. China 
repeatedly used its permanent Security Council membership to 
restate its interests about Taiwan. France also used its permanent 
membership to deflect its criticism of its policies in Rwanda by 
receiving the Security Council endorsement of 'Operation Turquoise 
in 1994. The intense diplomatic exercise by the United States and 
Britain to secure the Security Council authorization for use of force 
in Iraq, however unsuccessful, is testimony of the importance of 
near-universal legitimising role of the Security Council. Thus, due 
to permanent members' vested interests in world politics, the 
Security Council's role, status and authority in international affairs 
is not irreparably weakened and fatally undermined. 

Due to NATO's (unauthorised) attack on Serbia, the United 
Nations came under severe criticism over its inability to perform its 
collective security functions. Many consider it increasingly 
irrelevant entity and do not feel its continued existence. But the 
failure of Security Council with regard to its collective security 
functions is the result of collective failure of its permanent members 
and their unwillingness to give up their veto power. However, 
collective security is only one aspect albeit an important one of 
multifaceted role played by the United Nations in world affairs. 
Kosovo illustrated this view obviously. After the termination of 
NATO bombing, the United Nations oversaw the return of 
refugee's, provided them with food and shelter. It assisted in the 
rebuilding of Kosovo's shattered economy, institutions of law and 
order and democratic governance. The reconstruction of civil 
society, judiciary, police and other public institutions in Kosovo torn 
apart by ethnic hatred and strife is one of the most sensitive and 
important elements in Kosovo peace settlement. It created an 
unprecedented role for the United Nations. 

It also faced extremely challenging test of the ability of 
international responsibility to take the place of government. Kosovo 
put a new type of responsibility on trial. The United Nations Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIC) successfully reconstructed civil society despite 
inherent weaknesses and ambiguities of its Mandate. The Resolution 
1244 gave the United Nations not only the unprecedented 
responsibility of plenary authority over Kosovo but it had also given 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 215 



the exceptional task to administer it without roadmap for its final 
status. Although, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo did not have 
any authority to decide the final status of Kosovo but the successful 
reconstruction of Kosovo's society could be the foremost priority for 
international administration because it was crucial for lasting peace 
in the region. NATO was neither equipped or nor willing to perform 
these functions. Although, the final status of Kosovo is decided 
under the dominant role of the United States and European Union 
but the peace building role of the United Nations in Kosovo given 
eloquent testimony to its continuous relevance. 

NATO's action in Kosovo is also seen as an exception from 
which some important lesson can be derived. Firstly, the mass 
slaughter of civilians and egregious repression of minorities is not a 
risk-free venture particularly for small states. Secondly, the United 
Nations post-NATO war peace-building role in Kosovo showed that 
if the world community takes responsibility to protect oppressed 
people then it must be given the means promptly necessary for the 
civil reconstruction of destroyed civil societies. It requires a 
dedicated, rapidly deployable reserve of police, judges, magistrates, 
health care providers and administrators. Kosovo, to some extent, 
manifest the United Nations adhockery in peace building efforts. 
Thirdly, Kosovo and Iraq illustrated that the United Nations, despite 
disdained and circumvented, became an essential facilitator in 
ending the conflict. It not only provides a grand platform and forum 
for multilateral diplomacy but also remains resilient and 
irreplaceable one for world peace. 



216 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Appendix-I 



RESOLUTION 1244 UN DOCS/RES/1244 

10 JUNE 1999 

The Security Council 

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. 

Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) 
of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 
(1999) of 14 May 1999. 

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the 
requirements of those resolutions. 

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free 
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes. 

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well 
as terrorist acts by any party. 

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 
1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in 
Kosovo. 

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to 
their homes in safety. 

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991. 

• Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo 
crisis adopted on 6 May 1999, contained in annex I to the presence 
resolution, and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia of the principles set for in points 1 to 9 of the paper 
presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999, contained in annex II to the 
present resolution, and the agreement of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to that paper. 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 217 



• Reaffirming the commitment of all Member-States to the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
other States of the region, as set out in the Final Act of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki 1 August 
1975, and in annex II to the present resolution. 

• Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy 
and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo. 

• Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a 
threat to international peace and security. 

• Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel 
and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under 
the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 

1 . Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on 
the general principles in annex I to the present resolution and as further 
elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex II. 

2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the 
principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 
above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation. 

3 . Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an 
immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, 
and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of 
all military, police and paramilitary forces according to rapid 
timetable, with which the deployment of the international security 
presence in Kosovo will be synchronized. 

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal,, an agreed number of Yugoslav 
and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to 
Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex II. 

5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, 
of international civil and security presences, with appropriate 
equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences. 

6. Requests Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the 
Security Council, a Special Representative to control the 
implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests 
the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to 
coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure 
that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually 
supportive manner. 

218 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to 
establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in 
point 4 of annex II with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities 
under paragraph 9 below. 

8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective 
international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that 
the parties cooperate fully in their deployment. 

9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence 
to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include: 

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary 
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing 
the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police 
and paramilitary forces, except as provided for in point 6 of 
annex II. 

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army and other armed 
Kosovo Albanian groups, as required in paragraph 15 below: 

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and 
displaced persons can return home in safety, the international 
civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be 
established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered. 

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil 
presence can take responsibility for this task. 

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as 
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task. 

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the 
work of the international civil presence. 

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required. 

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the 
international civil presence, and other international organizations. 

10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant 
international organizations, to establish an international civil presence 
in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo 
under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy 
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and which will provide 
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the 
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to 
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of 
Kosovo. 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 219 



1 1 . Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence 
will include : 

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of 
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full 
account of annex II and of the Rambouillet Accords. 

(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as 
long as required. 

(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional 
institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government 
pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections. 

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its 
administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting 
the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and 
other peace-building activities. 

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine the future 
status of Kosovo, taking into account the Rambouillet Accords. 

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from 
Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under 
a political settlement. 

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other 
economic reconstruction. 

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian 
organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid. 

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local 
police forces and in the meantime through the deployment of 
international police personnel to serve in Kosovo. 

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights. 

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and 
displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo. 

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, 
and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access 
to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with 
such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of 
international aid. 

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to 
contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe 
return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this 
context the importance of convening an international donors 

220 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11(g) 
above, at the earliest possible date. 

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international 
security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991. 

15. Demands that the Kosovo Liberation Army and other armed Kosovo 
Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with 
the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the 
international security presence in consultation with the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General. 

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 
1160(1998) shall not apply to arms and related material for the use of 
the international civil and security presences. 

17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other 
international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the 
economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the 
Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a stability pact for 
South-Eastern Europe, with broad international participation, in order 
to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability 
and regional cooperation. 

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the 
implementation of all aspects of the present resolution. 

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are 
established for an initial period of twelve months, to continue 
thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise. 

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular 
intervals on the implementation of the present resolution, including 
reports from the leadership of the international civil and security 
presences, the first reports to be submitted within thirty days of the 
adoption of this resolution. 

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 



Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 22 1 



ANNEX I 

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the 
G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999 

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the 
political solution to the Kosovo crisis: 

• Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; 

• Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; 

• Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security 
presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of 
guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives; 

• Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by 
the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a 
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; 

• The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and 
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; 

• A political process towards the establishment of an interim political 
framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for 
Kosovo, tasking full account of the Rambouillet Accords and the 
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the 
demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army; 

• Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilizing 
of the crisis region. 

ANNEX II 

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move 
towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis : 

1 . An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. 

2. A verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and 
paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable. 

3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective 
international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, capable of 
guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives. 

4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified 
command and control and authorised to establish a safe environment 

222 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes 
of all displaced persons and refugees. 

5. The establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of 
the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can 
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The 
interim administration while establishing and overseeing the 
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to 
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in 
Kosovo. 

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian 
personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following 
functions : 

Liaising with the international civil mission and the international 
security presence; 

Marking/clearing minefields; 

Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; 

Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 

7. The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the 
supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid 
organizations. 

8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political 
framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for 
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet Accords and the 
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the 
demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Negotiations between 
the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the 
establishment of democratic self-governing institutions. 

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and 
stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation 
of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international 
participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic 
prosperity, stability and regional cooperation. 

10. The suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the 
principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously 
identified, required elements, which are specified in the note below. A 
military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 223 



among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles 
and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo: 

Withdrawal 

Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule 
and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be 
withdrawal. 

Returning personnel 

Equipment associated with returning personnel; 

Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities; 

Timetable for their return; 

Delineation of their geographical areas of operation; 

Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence 
and the international civil mission. 

Note : 

Other required elements 

A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, for example, 
seven days to complete withdrawal, and air defence weapons outside a 
25 kilometer mutual safety zone to be withdrawal within 48 hours. 

The return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be 
under the supervision of the international security presence and will be 
limited to a small, agreed number (hundreds, not thousands). 

The suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of 
verifiable withdrawals; 

The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall 
not extend the previously determined time for completion of 
withdrawals. 



224 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Appendix-II 



REGUALTION NO. 1999/1 

UNMIK/REG/ 1999/1 
25 JULY 1999 

ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN 
KOSOVO 

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 

• Recalling resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, whereby the United 
Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations, authorized the Secretary-General, with the 
assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an 
international civil presence in Kosovo, known as the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), in order to 
provide an interim administration in Kosovo with the mandate as 
described in the resolution; 

• Acting pursuant to the authority given to him under United Nations 
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, and for the 
purpose of establishing and maintaining the interim administration in 
the territory of Kosovo; 

• Hereby promulgates the following : 

Section 1 

AUTHORITY OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION 

1.11.1. All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, 
including the administration of the Judiciary, is vested in UNMIK 
and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary- 
General. 

1.2 1.2 The Special Representative of the Secretary-General may 
appointed any person to perform functions in the civil 
administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, or remove 

Problem of Ethnicity : The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 225 



such person. Such functions shall be exercised in accordance with 
the existing laws, as specified in section 3, and any regulations 
issued by UNMIK. 

Section 2 

OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED 
STANDARDS 

In exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or 
holding public office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized 
human rights standards and shall not discriminate against any person on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, association with a national 
community, property, birth or other status. 

Section 3 

APPLICABLE LAW IN KOSOVO 

The laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999 shall 
continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as they do not conflict with standards 
referred to in section 2, the fulfillment of the mandate given to UNMIK 
under United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), or the 
presence or any other regulation issued by UNMIK. 

Section 4 

REGULATIONS ISSUED BY UNMIK 

In the performance of the duties entrusted to the interim administration 
under United Nations Security Council resolution 1244(1999), UNMIK 
will, as necessary, issue legislative acts in the form of regulations. Such 
regulations will remain in force until repealed by UNMIK or superseded by 
such rules as are subsequently issued by the institutions established under a 
political settlement, as provided for in United Nations Security Council 
resolution 1244 (1999). 

Section 5 

ENTRY INTO FORCE AND PROMULGATION ON REGULATIONS 
ISSUED BY UNMIK 

5.1 UNMIK regulations shall be approved and signed by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General. They shall enter into force 
upon the date specified therein. 

226 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



5.2 UNMIK regulations shall be issued in Albanian, Serbian and English. 
In case of divergence, the English text shall prevail. The regulations 
shall be published in a manner that ensures their wide dissemination 
by public announcement and publication. 

5.3. UNMIK regulations shall bear the symbol UNMIK/REG/, followed by 
the year of issuance and the issuance number of that year. A register 
of the regulations shall indicate the date of promulgation, the subject 
matter and amendments or changes thereto or the repeal or suspension 
thereof. 

Section 6 

STATE PROPERTY 

UNMIK shall administer movable or immovable property, including 
monies, bank accounts, and other property of, or registered in the name of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia or any of its 
organs, which is in the territory of Kosovo. 

Section 7 

ENTRY INTO FORCE 

The present regulation shall be deemed to have entered into force as of 10 
June 1999, the date of adoption by the United Nations Security of resolution 
1244 (1999). 

Dr. Bernard Kouchner 

Special Representative of the Secretary-General 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 111 



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250 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 



Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 251 



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250 Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis 




„.:■■:■.: 



' 



The powerful passions aroused by ethnicity in human being have 
resulted in -countless- wars, revolts and conflicts. The communities 
organized on putative common descent culture and religion have co- 
existed, competed and clashed since the dawn of history. It has been 
estimated that more than ten million people lost their lives during 1 945 to 
1999. The end of cold war also witnessed that the groups' within states 
assert their ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional or national identities and 



question the 
this period, e 
newcountrie 
many ethnic 









legitimacy of various countries in the world. In 
ilism has assumed prominence because some 
le bases of ethnicity raised the expectations of 
be able to achieve their cherished goal of 
/ on the bases of ethnicity. 

as an independent country on February 2008 
e of the phenomenon of ethnicity and Its 
;h as ethnocide, ethno-genests ethno historic 
thno-nationalism and pseudo-speciation In the 
jes related with Kosovo such as genocide ami 
3ovo Muslims by Serbs, Nato's attack on 
impacts on relevance of United Nations ai id its 
world affairs and the United States, role In the 
»wer have made Kosovo a flash point, whose 
ological significance. This study by theoretical 
functioning of United Nation system in the 
:ts and the issue of humanitarian intervention in 
t important question i.e. should the conti ill H i< ;< i 
rs of civilian people be allowed under Iho guise 
Finally this study elaborates that the United 
itarian and peace building spheres has no peer 
}rld body in Kosovo is an eloquent testimony < >[ 
i the world politics. 



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