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THE 

SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST 



C 3 3] 

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Ronton 

HENRY FROWDE 

Oxford University Press Warehouse 
Amen Corner, E.C 




(TU» Sort 

MACMILLAN & CO., 66 FIFTH AVENUE 



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THE 



SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST 



TRANSLATED 



BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS 



AND EDITED BY 



F. MAX M0LLER 



VOL. XXXVIII 




#jrforti 

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
1896 

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THE 



VEDANTA-SOTRAS 



WITH THE COMMENTARY BY 



sankarA^Arya 



TRANSLATED BY 



GEORGE THIBAUT 



PART II 




AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
1896 

[All rights reserved] 



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R: r SE 



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G>2>S 

/V\.94fc 



CONTENTS. 

vedanta-sCttras with the commentary 

BY .SANKARAffARYA. 



Adhyaya II. 



PACE 



PSdam 3 

*PadaIV . 74 

Adhyaya III. 

Pada I 101 

Pada II 133 

Pada III 184 

Pada IV 285 

AdhyAya IV. 

Pada I 331 

Pada II 364 

Pada HI 382 

PadalV 405 

Indexes by Dr. M. Wintkrnitz : — 

Index of Quotations to Volumes XXXIV (i) and 

XXXVIII (ii) 421 

Index of Sanskrit Words to Volumes XXXIV (i) and 

XXXVIH(ii) 431 

General Index to Volumes XXXIV (i) and XXXVIII (ii) 441 

Corrigenda 503 



Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Trans- 
lations of the Sacred Books of the East . . . 505 



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vedAnta-sOtras 



WITH 



SANKARA BHASHYA. 



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SECOND ADHYAYA^ 
THIRD PADA. 

Reverence to the highest Self ! 

i. Ether 1 (does) not (originate), on account of 
the absence of scriptural statement. 

In the Vedanta-texts we meet in different places with 
different statements concerning the origination of various 
things. Some of those passages declare that ether origi- 
nated ; some do not. Some record the origination of air ; 
others do not. Other passages again make analogous 
statements concerning the individual soul and the vital 
airs. — Similarly we observe that other scriptural texts con- 
tradict one another concerning order of succession and the 
like. — Now, as we ourselves have inferred the worthless- 
ness of other philosophical doctrines from their mutual 
contradictions, a suspicion might arise that our doctrine 
is equally worthless, owing to its intrinsic contradictions. 
Hence a new discussion is begun in order to clear from all 
doubt the sense of all those Vedanta-texts which refer to 
creation, and thus to remove the suspicion alluded to. 

Here we have to consider in the first place the question 

1 Here, as generally in the preceding parts of this translation, 
aklra is rendered by ' ether.' There is no doubt that occasionally 
the appropriate — and in some cases the only possible — rendering is 
not ' ether ' but ' space ; ' but the former rendering, after all, best 
agrees with the general VedSntic view of aklra. The Vedantins 
do not clearly distinguish between empty space and an exceedingly 
fine matter filling all space, and thus it happens that in many 
cases where we speak of the former they speak of aklra, i.e. the 
all-pervading substratum of sound; which howsoever attenuated 
is yet one of the material elements, and as such belongs to the same 
category as air, fire, water, and earth. 

B 2 



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vedAnta-sOtras. 



whether ether has an origin or not. — The purvapakshin 
maintains that ether does not originate, since there is no 
scriptural statement to that effect. For in the chapter 
which treats of the origin (of the world) ether is not 
mentioned at all. In the passage ' In the beginning there 
was that only which is, one only, without a second' the 
A'Aandogya at first introduces Brahman as the general 
subject-matter, by means of the clause ' that which is,' and 
thereupon (in the passages * It thought,' • It sent forth fire,' 
&c.) records the origin of three elements, viz. fire, water, 
and earth ; giving the first place to fire which (ordinarily) 
occupies the middle place among the five elements 1 . 
Now, as scriptural statement is our (only) authority in the 
origination of the knowledge of supersensuous things, and 
as there is no scriptural statement declaring the origin of 
ether, ether must be considered to have no origin. 

2. But there is (a scriptural statement of the 
origination of ether). 

The conjunction ' but ' indicates the adoption of another 
alternative. — The origin of ether may not be stated in the 
.Oandogya ; but it is stated in other scriptural passages. 
For the text of the Taittirlyakas, after having introduced 
Brahman as the general subject-matter, — in the words, ' The 
true, knowledge, without end is Brahman,' — goes on to say, 
'From that Self sprang ether' (Taitt. Up. II, i). — Hence 
there arises a conflict of scriptural passages, the creation 
sometimes being said to begin with fire, sometimes with 
ether. — But may we not appropriately assume the two 
scriptural passages to form one syntactical whole? — It 
would be well indeed if we could do so, but a unity of the 
kind desired cannot be admitted, because the creator who 
is mentioned only once — in the passage 'he sent forth fire' 
— cannot be connected with two things to be created, as 
if the construction were ' He sent forth fire, he sent forth 
ether.' — But — an objection may be raised — we see that 
sometimes an agent, although mentioned once only, is yet 

1 The usual order being ether, air, fire, water, earth. 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 3. 



connected with two objects ; as when we say ' after having 
cooked broth he now cooks rice.' We therefore may 
combine the two scriptural sentences into one, ' Brahman 
having created ether created fire.' — Such a combination of 
sentences, we reply, is not admissible here, because the 
A'Aandogya intimates that fire was created first, while the 
Taittiriyaka assigns the same position to ether, and be- 
cause it is impossible that both should have been created 
first. — The same remarks apply to a further contradiction 
involved in the other scriptural passage, * From that Self 
sprang ether,' &c. ; for there also the material cause and 
the fact of origination, being mentioned only once, cannot 
be connected with fire as well as ether, so as to effect a 
sentence of the following kind, 'from that there sprang 
ether, from that there sprang fire.' Moreover the Taittiri- 
yaka states separately that ' fire (sprang) from air V — With 
regard to this conflict of statements somebody now main- 
tains the following view. 

3. (The Vedic statement concerning the origination 
of ether) has a secondary sense, on account of the 
impossibility (of the origination of ether). 

The ether does not originate on account of the absence 
of scriptural statement. — That other passage which (ap- 
parently) declares the origination of the ether must be 
taken as having a secondary (figurative) meaning. — Why ? 
— On account of the impossibility. The origination of 
ether cannot be shown to be possible as long as there 
exist followers of the opinion of the reverend Kawabhu^ 
(Kanada). For the latter deny the origination of ether 
on the ground that it is impossible to demonstrate the 
existence of the required apparatus of causes. Whatever 
is originated, they say, is originated from inherent causes, 
non-inherent causes, and operative causes. Of a substance 
the inherent causes are substances belonging to the same 
class and more than one in number. But for ether there 
are no such originating substances, belonging to the same 

1 While the KAtiaid. says that fire sprang from the Self. 



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vedAnta-sO±ras. 



class and more than one in number, from which, as its 
inherent cause, it could originate, and consequently there 
also exists no non-inherent cause of ether ; for the latter 
would have to be looked for in the conjunction of the 
primary substances. And as thus there exist no inherent 
cause and no non-inherent cause, there is absolutely no 
room for an operative cause ; for the only function of the 
latter is to assist the two other causes. Those elements 
moreover which have an origin, as fire and the like, we 
may conceive to exist in different conditions at an earlier 
and a later time; we may conceive e.g. that fire, pre- 
viously to its origination, did not give light or produce 
any other effects, while it does do so subsequently to its 
origination. Of the ether, on the other hand, no such 
difference between an earlier and a later period can be 
conceived ; for, we ask, would it be possible to maintain 
that before its alleged origination there were no large, 
minute, and atomic spaces ? — That ether is without an 
origin further follows from its characteristic qualities, such 
as all-pervadingness and so on, which altogether distinguish 
it from earth and the other elements. — Hence, as the word 
' ether ' (aklra) is used in a secondary sense in such phrases 
as 'make room' (aklra), 'there is room,' and as space 
although one only is designated as being of different kinds 
when we speak of the space of a jar, the space of a house, 
&c. — a form of expression met with even in Vedic passages 
such as 'he is to place the wild animals in the spaces' 
(akajeshu)' — we conclude that those Vedic passages also 
which speak of its origination must be supposed to have a 
secondary meaning. 

4. And on account of the word (of the Veda). 

The word of the Veda also proclaims the non-originated- 
ness of ether; for it declares that 'air and ether (antariksha) 
are immortal' (Br/. Up. II, 3, 3), and what is immortal 
cannot have an origin. Another scriptural passage (' omni- 
present and eternal like ether'), by comparing two attri- 
butes of Brahman, viz. omnipresence and eternity with the 
other, intimates that those qualities belong to the ether 



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n adhyAya, 3 pAda, 5. 



also ; in which case no beginning can be attributed to it 
Other passages to be quoted in this connexion are, • As 
this ether is infinite, so the Self is to be known as infinite ; ' 
and 'Brahman has the ether for its body, the ether is the 
Self.' For if the ether had a beginning, it could not be 
predicated of Brahman (as is done in the last passage), as 
we predicate blueness of a lotus (' the lotus is blue '). 
Hence we understand that the eternal Brahman is of the 
same nature as ether. 

5. The one (word ' sprang ') may be (taken In its 
secondary as well as in its primary sense), like the 
word ' Brahman.' 

This Sfitra contains the reply to a doubt. — If we admit 
the opinion maintained hitherto, how can one and the same 
word * sprang ' (' from that Self sprang the ether ') be used, 
in the same chapter, in its primary (real) meaning with 
regard to Are and so on, and in a secondary meaning with 
regard to ether ? — The answer to this objection is that the 
one word 'sprang' may, according to the nature of the 
things to which it refers, be used in its primary as well as 
its secondary sense, just as the word ' Brahman ' is used. 
For the one word • Brahman ' is, in the passage Taitt. Up. 
Ill, 2-6 (' Try to know Brahman by penance, for penance 
is Brahman '), used in a secondary sense with regard to 
food, &c, and in its primary sense with regard to bliss ; 
and the same word Brahman is, in the way of figurative 
identification (bhakti), applied to penance, which is merely 
the means of knowing Brahman, and again directly to 
Brahman as the object of knowledge. — But how — to raise 
another question — can we, on the supposition of ether 
having no beginning, uphold the validity of the statement 
made in the clause ' one only, without a second ? ' For if 
ether is a second entity (co-existing with Brahman from 
eternity), it follows that Brahman has a second. And if so, 
how can it be said that when Brahman is known everything 
is known ? {Kh, Up. VI, 1). — The word ' one,' the ptirva- 
pakshin replies, may be used with reference to (the absence 
of) effects. As in ordinary life a person, who on a certain 



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8 vedAnta-sOtras. 



day sees in a potter's house a lump of clay, a staff, a wheel 
and so on, and on the following day a number of finished 
vessels, might say, ' Yesterday there was only clay,' mean- 
ing thereby only that on the preceding day there were no 
things made of clay, not that there were no staff, wheel and 
the like; so the passage under discussion also is to be 
understood. — The term ' without a second ' (does not ex- 
clude the existence from eternity of ether, but) excludes 
the existence of any other superintending being (but 
Brahman). While there is a superintending potter in addi- 
tion to the material cause of the vessels, i. e. the clay, there 
is no other superintendent in addition to Brahman, the 
material cause of the world. Nor does the existence of 
ether as a second entity involve Brahman's being associated 
with a second (and therefore not being of a simple nature). 
For diversity is founded on difference of characteristic 
attributes, and before the origin (of the creation) no differ- 
ence of attributes separating Brahman and ether exists ; 
the two being mixed like water and milk, and having the 
common attributes of all-pervadingness, immateriality and 
so on. At the time of creation however a certain diver- 
sity of the two determines itself, Brahman putting forth 
energy in order to produce the world, while the ether re- 
mains immoveable. — And also from the passages quoted 
above — such as ' Brahman has the ether for its body ' — it 
follows that the two are identical. Thence again it follows 
that through the knowledge of Brahman everything is 
known. — Moreover every effect, which is produced, is pro- 
duced in such a way as not to be separated from ether in 
place as well as in time, and ether itself is non-separated in 
place and time from Brahman ; hence, if there are known 
Brahman and its effects, the ether also is known. The 
case is similar to that of a few drops of water poured 
into a jug full of milk. Those drops are taken when the 
milk is taken ; the taking of the drops does not constitute 
something additional to the taking of the milk. Analo- 
gously the ether, as being non-separate in place and time 
from Brahman and its effects, is comprised within Brahman, 
and consequently we have to understand the passages 



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ii adhyAya, 3 PADA, 6. 



about the origin of the ether in a secondary sense. — To 
this argumentation we make the following reply. 

6. The non-abandonment of the promissory state- 
ments (results only) from the non-difference (of the 
entire world from Brahman), according to the words 
of the Veda. 

In all the Vedanta-texts we meet with 4 promissory 
statements of the following nature : — ' That by which we 
hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived, 
know what is not known* (Kh. Up. VI, i, 3) ; 'When 
the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, 
then all this is known ' (Br/. Up. IV, 5,6); ' Sir, what is 
that through which if it is known everything else becomes 
known? ' (Mu. Up. 1, 1, 3) ; ' Outside that which is there is 
no knowledge.' These promissory statements are not 
abandoned, i. e. not stultified, only if the entire aggregate 
of things is non-different from Brahman, the object of 
knowledge ; for if there were any difference, the affirmation 
that by the knowledge of one thing everything is known, 
would be contradicted thereby. Non-difference again of 
the two is possible only if the whole aggregate of things 
originates from the one Brahman. And we understand 
from the words of the Veda that that affirmation can be 
established only through the theory of the non-difference 
of the material cause and its effects. For the affirmation 
contained in the clause ' That by which we hear what is 
not heard,' &c, is proved by the analogous instances of 
clay, &c, which all aim at showing the identity of effect 
and cause. In order to establish this, the subsequent 
clauses also (' Being only, my dear, this was in the begin- 
ning, one only, without a second ; it thought ; it sent forth 
fire,' &c.) at first state that the aggregate of effects belongs 
to Brahman, and then declare its identity with Brahman, 
viz. from the passage ' In it all that exists has its Self ' 
(VI, 8, 7), up to the end of the prapa/^aka. — If, now, the 
ether were not one of the effects of Brahman, it could not 
be known by Brahman being known, and that would 
involve an abandonment of a (previous) affirmation ; an 



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1 o vedAnta-sAtras. 



alternative which, as invalidating the authoritativeness of 
the Veda, is of course altogether unacceptable. — Similarly 
in all the Vedanta-texts certain passages are to be found 
which, by means of various instances, make the same 
affirmation, so e. g. ' This everything, all is that Self ' (Br*. 
Up. II, 4, 6) ; ' Brahman alone is that Immortal before ' 
(Mu. Up. II, a, xi). — Hence, like fire and the other sub- 
stances, the ether also is a product. — The averment 
made by the purvapakshin that on account of the ab- 
sence of scriptural statements the ether is not a product 
is unfounded, since a scriptural passage referring to the 
origin of ether has already been pointed out, viz. ' from 
that Self sprang ether.' — True, — the purvapakshin may 
reply, — such a statement has indeed been pointed out, but 
it is contradicted by another statement, viz. • It sent forth 
fire,' &c. Should it be alleged that there can be no con- 
tradiction, because all scriptural passages form one whole, 
the reply is that all non -contradictory passages form a 
whole ; in the present case, however, a contradiction has 
been shown to exist, because the creator, who is mentioned 
only once, cannot be connected with two things created ; 
because two things cannot both be created first ; and 
because an option is, in that case, inadmissible 1 . — This 
reply, we rejoin, is without force. It is indeed true that it 
is impossible to explain the passage of the Taittirtyaka in 
any modified sense ; for it -distinctly declares that fire was 
produced in the third place, ' From that Self sprang the 
ether, from ether air, from air fire.' But, on the other 
hand, it is possible to give a different turn to the passage 
from the ATAandogya, which may be explained to mean 
that ' Brahman, after having created ether and air, created 
fire.' For as the purport of this passage is to relate the 
origin of fire, it cannot at the same time impugn the 
account of the origin of ether given in another passage ; 
according to the principle that to one and the same sen- 
tence a double purport must not be ascribed. As, on the 

1 For we cannot maintain that optionally either the one or the 
other was created first. 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 6. n 

other hand, one creator may successively create more than 
one thing, and as on that ground the combination of the 
two passages into one syntactical whole is possible, we 
are not obliged to disregard any scriptural statement on 
account of its meaning being contradicted (by other scrip- 
tural passages). Nor do we mean to say that a creator 
mentioned only once is to be connected with two created 
things ; for the other (second) created thing is supplied 
from another scriptural passage. And, in the same way as 
the fact of the whole aggregate of things being produced 
from Brahman — which is stated directly in the passage 
' Let a man meditate with calm mind on that as begin- 
ning, ending and breathing in it' (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1) — 
does not impugn the order of creation stated elsewhere to 
begin with fire ; so also the statement as to fire being pro- 
duced from Brahman has no force to impugn the order of 
creation which, in another scriptural passage, is said to 
begin with ether. 

But, it may be objected, the passage ' Let a man 
meditate with calm mind,' &c. has the purpose of enjoin- 
ing calmness, and does not state anything with regard 
to creation ; it need not therefore adapt itself to the 
order (of creation) established by another passage 1 . On 
the other hand, the passage ' It sent forth fire ' refers to 
the creation, and we must therefore accept the order 
exactly as stated there. — This objection we refute by the 
remark that it is not legitimate to abandon, from deference 
to the circumstance of fire occupying the first place (in the 
Kh. Up.), the thing, viz. the ether which is known (to 
have been created) from another passage; for order of 
succession is a mere attribute of things (and therefore 
subordinate to the latter). Moreover, in the passage ' It 
sent forth fire ' we meet with no word directly indicating 
the order of succession ; but we merely infer the latter 
from the sense, and this (merely inferred) order is impugned 
by the order established by another direct scriptural state- 

1 YatparaA jabdaA sa jabdartho na k&yam jabdaA sn'sh/iparcuto 
na prasiddham kramam badhitum alara iti. An. Gi. 



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12 vedAnta-sOtras. 



ment, viz. ' From air there sprang fire.' Now with regard 
to the question whether ether or fire were created first, 
neither option nor addition are permissible, because the 
former is impossible in itself, and the latter non-admitted 
by the texts l . Hence the two scriptural passages are not 
contradictory. — Moreover, in order to justify the promise 
made in the A!"Aandogya in the beginning of the chapter 
(' That instruction by which we hear what is not heard '), 
we have to count the ether, although ' not heard ' (i. e. not 
mentioned in the text) among the things produced ; how 
much more impossible then is it for us not to accept the 
statement actually made about the ether in the Taitti- 
riyaka ! — To the assertion, made above by the purvapak- 
shin, that the ether as occupying the same space with 
everything is known together with Brahman and its effects, 
and that thus the assertion (of everything being known 
through Brahman) is not contradicted ; and that moreover 
the scriptural passage ' one only, without a second ' is not 
contradicted, because Brahman and the ether may be con- 
sidered as non-separate, like milk and water, we make the 
following reply. That knowledge of everything through 
the knowledge of one thing (of which scripture speaks) 
cannot be explained through the analogy of milk mixed 
with water, because we understand from the parallel 
instance of a piece of clay being brought forward (Kh. Up. 
VI, i, 4) that the knowledge of everything has to be ex- 
plained through the relation of the material cause and the 
material effect (the knowledge of the cause implying the 
knowledge of the effect). Moreover, the knowledge of every- 
thing, if assumed to be analogous to the case of the know- 
ledge of milk and water, could not be called a perfect 
knowledge (samyag-vj^wana), because the water which is 



1 An optional proceeding, i.e. the doctrine that either ether or 
fire was the first product is impossible because only actions to be 
done, not existing things, fall within the sphere of option ; addition, 
i.e. the fact of fire and ether together being the first creation is not 
admitted by scripture, which teaches a successive creation of the 
elements. 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 7. 13 

apprehended only through the knowledge of the milk (with 
which it is mixed) is not grasped by perfect knowledge l . 
Nor can Vedic affirmations about things be viewed, like 
ordinary human statements, as mixed up with error, un- 
truth, and deceit *. And we should do violence to the 
emphatic assertion made in tbe passage ' one only, without 
a second,' if we explained it according to the analogy of 
milk mixed with water. — Nor must we explain the cog- 
nition of everything (through one thing), and the assertion 
as to the one without a second, as referring only to a part 
of existing things, viz. the avowed effects of Brahman (to 
the exclusion of ether), on the ground that such is the case 
in the parallel instances of clay and the like. For what is 
said about clay and the like is not something altogether 
new and independent ; but has to be understood in con- 
nexion with the previous passage ' Svetaketu, as you are 
so conceited,' &c We therefore must conclude that the 
' knowledge of everything ' has all things whatever for its 
objects, and is here introduced with a view to showing that 
everything is the effect of Brahman. 

The next Sutra replies to the assertion, made by the 
pOrvapakshin, that the passage which speaks of the origin 
of ether is to be understood in a secondary sense, on 
account of the impossibility (of ether having an origin). 

7. But wherever there are effects, there is division; 
as in ordinary life. 

The conjunction ' but ' is meant to exclude the suspicion 
of impossibility. — We must not imagine the origin of ether 
to be impossible, because wherever we observe effects 
(modifications of a substance), such as jars, pots and urns, 
or bracelets, armlets and earrings, or needles, arrows and 
swords, we also observe division ; while, on the other hand, 



1 For the water, although mixed with the milk, yet is different 
from it. 

* But the promise that through the knowledge of one thing every- 
thing becomes known is to be taken in its full literal meaning. 



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14 vedanta-sOtras. 



nothing which is not an effect is seen to be divided K Now, 
we apprehend ether as divided from earth and so on ; hence 
ether also must be an effect. Thereby (i. e. by the circum- 
stance of their being divided) place (dis), time, mind 
(manas) and the atoms also are shown to be effects. 

But — an objection may be raised — the Self also is divided 
from ether and so on, and hence it follows that it is an 
effect like jars and the like. — This objection we refute by 
pointing to the scriptural statement that ' ether sprang from 
the Self (Taitt. Up. II, i). For if the Self also were a mere 
modification (of something else), it would follow that all 
effects such as the ether and so on are without a Self 2 ; for 
scripture mentions nothing beyond the Self, and that Self 
itself would (on the supposition stated) be a mere effect. 
And thus we should be driven to the hypothesis of a general 
void (yunyavada). Just because it is the Self, it is impos- 
sible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable 
of refutation. For the (knowledge of the) Self is not, in any 
person's case, adventitious, not established through the so- 
called means of right knowledge; it rather is self-established. 
The Self does indeed employ perception and the other means 
of right knowledge for the purpose of establishing previously 
non-established objects of knowledge ; for nobody assumes 
such things as ether and so on to be self-established inde- 
pendently of the means of right knowledge. But the Self, 
as being the abode of the energy that acts through the 
means of right knowledge, is itself established previously 
to that energy. And to refute such a self-established entity 
is impossible. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be re- 
futed, but not that which is the essential nature (of him 
who attempts the refutation) ; for it is the essential nature 
of him who refutes. The heat of a fire is not refuted (i. e. 
sublated) by the fire itself. — Let us further consider the 
relation expressed in the following clauses : ' I know at the 
present moment whatever is present ; I knew (at former 
moments) the nearer and the remoter past ; I shall know 

1 Whatever is divided, is an effect, as jars, pots, &c. Whatever 
is not an effect, is not divided, as the Self, 
8 I. e. without a material cause. 



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II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 1 5 

(in the future) the nearer and the remoter future.' Here 
the object of knowledge changes according as it is some- 
thing past or something future or something present ; but 
the knowing agent does not change, since his nature is 
eternal presence. And as the nature of the Self is eternal 
presence, it cannot undergo destruction even when the 
body is reduced to ashes; nay we cannot even conceive 
that it ever should become something different from what 
it is. — It thus follows from the essential irrefutability of its 
nature that the Self is not an effect. The ether, on the 
other hand, falls under the category of effected things. 

To the objection, raised above by the purvapakshin, 
that there is no plurality of homogeneous substances out of 
which the ether could originate, we reply that it is not an 
absolute law that effects should originate only from things 
belonging to the same genus, not from such as belong to 
different genera. Threads for instance and the conjunc- 
tions of threads l do not belong to the same genus, the 
former being admitted to belong to the genus 'substance,' 
the latter to the genus 'quality.' Nor again is there a 
binding rule that the operative causes such as the shuttle, 
the loom and so on should belong to the same genus. — 
Well then let the doctrine that the causes must belong to 
the same genus extend to the inherent causes only, not to 
the other causes 2 . — But here also there is no absolute rule. 
For we see that one and the same rope is made of things 
belonging to different genera, such as threads and cow- 
hair, and several kinds of cloth are woven of vegetable 
thread and wool. — If it were assumed that the postulate of 
the inherent causes belonging to the same genus refers 
only to the genera of essentiality, substantiality, &c, the 
rule would be a superfluous one ; for in that sense every 
inherent cause belongs to the same genus as every other 3 . 

* Threads are the inherent cause of a piece of cloth ; the con- 
junction of the threads constitutes the non-inherent cause; the 
loom, shuttle, Ac. are the operative causes. 

* So much only was in fact insisted upon by the purvapakshin, 

II, 3, 3- 

* An inherent cause is always a substance (dravya), and as such 



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1 6 vedAnta-s^tras. 



— Nor again is there an absolute rule that only a plurality 
of inherent causes, not one such cause, is able to originate 
an effect. For it is admitted that an atom as well as the 
mind (manas) originate their first activity ; i. e. one atom 
by itself, and also the mind by itself, give rise to their 
primary actions, without being in conjunction with other 
substances. — And, should it be said that there is an absolute 
rule as to several causes only having originating power in 
the case of the origination of substances only (not in the 
case of the origination of actions, &c), we again deny that, 
because it is admitted that there is such a thing as change 
(transformation). An absolute rule, such as maintained by 
you, would exist if substances did originate other sub- 
stances, only when assisted by conjunction (a non-inherent 
cause). But, as a matter of fact, one and the same sub- 
stance, when passing over into a different state distin- 
guished by peculiar characteristic marks, is admitted to be 
an effect. In some cases more substances than one undergo 
the change, as when a young plant springs from seed and 
earth ; in other cases one substance only changes, as when 
milk turns into curds. — In short it is none of the Lord's 
laws that only several causes in conjunction should produce 
an effect. We therefore decide, on the authority of scrip- 
ture, that the entire world has sprung from the one Brah- 
man, ether being produced first and later on the other 
elements in due succession. A statement to that effect 
has already been made above (II, i, 24). 

The further assertion made by the purvapakshin, that on 
the assumption of ether having had an origin it is impos- 
sible to conceive a difference between the former and later 
periods (the time before and after the origination of ether) 
is likewise unfounded ; for we have to understand that that 
very specialising difference ', from which we ascertain at 
present that there is a thing such as ether, different from 
earth and the other elements, did not exist before the 

always falls under the notion of essentiality (satti), which constitutes 
the summum genus for substances, qualities, and actions. 
1 Viz. the quality of sound. 



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II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 17 

origination of ether. And just as Brahman's nature does 
not participate in the nature of earth and the other ele- 
ments characterised by grossness and similar qualities, — 
according to such scriptural passages as ' It is not gross, it 
is not subtle,' — so also it does not participate in the nature 
of ether, as we understand from the passage ' it is without 
ether ' (Br*. Up. Ill, 8, 8). It therefore remains a settled 
conclusion that, before ether was produced, Brahman existed 
without ether. 

The inference, drawn by the purvapakshin, that ether 
has no beginning, because it differs in nature from those 
substances which avowedly have a beginning, such as earth 
and so on, is without any value ; for, as it is contradicted 
by scripture, it must be considered fallacious. We, on our 
part, have brought forward arguments showing that ether 
is an originated thing; and we may moreover reason as 
follows : Ether is non-eternal, because it is the substratum 
of a non-eternal quality, viz. sound, just as jars and other 
things, which are the substrata of non-eternal qualities, 
are themselves non-eternal. — Nor is there any danger of 
this latter reasoning being extended to the Self also, for the 
philosopher who takes his stand on the Upanishads does 
not admit that the Self is the substratum of non-eternal 
qualities. Moreover, those who teach ether to have an 
origin do not consider it proved that it is all-pervading 
and so on; 

In reply to the remarks made under II, 3, 4 we point 
out that those scriptural passages which speak of the 
' immortality of ether ' are to be understood in the same 
way as the analogous statements about the immortality of 
the gods \ since the origin and destruction of the ether have 
been shown to be possible. And if it is said of Brahman 
that ' it is omnipresent and eternal like ether,' Brahman is 
there compared to ether, whose greatness is well known, 
merely in order to indicate its supereminent greatness, not 
in order to maintain its being equal to ether. Similarly, 
when we say that the sun moves with the speed of an 

1 I.e. as referring to a relative immortality only. 
[38J C 



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1 8 vedAnta-sOtras. 



arrow, we merely mean that he moves fast, not that he 
moves at the same rate as an arrow. This remark explains 
that scriptural passage also in which Brahman is declared 
to be infinite like ether. — On the other hand, such passages 
as ' It is greater than ether ' prove that the extent of ether 
is less than that of Brahman ; passages like ' there is no 
image of him ' (5ve. Up. IV, 19) show that there is nothing 
to compare Brahman to ; and passages like ' Everything 
else is of evil ' (Br*'. Up. Ill, 4, 2) show that everything 
different from Brahman such as ether, &c. is of evil. — All 
which serves to refute the assertion that the passage which 
declares ether to have originated has to be taken in a 
secondary sense, as the word Brahman actually has to be 
taken in some passages. Scripture and reasoning in com- 
bination rather show that ether has an origin, and the final 
conclusion therefore is that ether is an effect of Brahman. 

8. Hereby air (also) is explained. 

The present Sutra extends the reasoning concerning ether 
to the air of which the ether is the abode. — The different 
views about air also are to be arranged in an analogous 
manner. The purvapakshin maintains that the air is not a 
product, because it is not mentioned in that chapter of the 
AT/*andogya which treats of the origination of things. — 
The opposite opinion is, that the air is mentioned in the 
parallel chapter of the Taittiriyaka (' from the ether sprang 
the air '). — The two scriptural passages being of a conflict- 
ing nature, the purvapakshin maintains that the passage 
which declares the air to have originated must be taken in 
a secondary sense ; firstly on account of the impossibility 
(of the literal sense being adopted), as shown (in the adhi- 
karana treating of the ether) ; secondly on account of that 
passage "which denies that it ever sets, ' Vayu (the air) is the 
deity that never sets ' (Br/. Up. I, 5, 22) ; and thirdly on 
account of those passages which declare it to be immortal. 
The final opinion on the other hand is, that air is a pro- 
duct ; in the first place because this conclusion is conform- 
able to the general tendency of scripture ; and, in the 
second place, because it is generally admitted that whatever 



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n adhyAya, 3 pAda, 9. 19 

is divided is an effect. — The denial of its ever setting refers 
to the lower knowledge (apara vidya 1 ) and is merely a 
relative one, Vayu not setting in the same way as fire, 
&c. The statement as to the immortality, &c. of air has 
already received its reply (in the adhikara«a treating of 
the ether). — Here it may be asked why, ether and air being 
equally mentioned and not mentioned in the chapters 
treating of the origin of the world, one adhikarawa is not 
considered to suffice for both, and why instead of that there 
is made a formal extension of the former reasoning to the 
latter case, although there is no difference between the two 
cases. — To this we reply that there is indeed some reason 
for the question ; that, however, the formal extension is 
made for the purpose of removing any doubts which might 
possibly be engendered in the minds of slow-witted people 
by mere words *. For as, in the Sazwvargavidya and other 
passages, the glory of Vayu is referred to as an object of 
worship ; and as scripture says that he never sets, &c, 
some men might think that he is eternal. 

9. But there is no origin of that which is (i.e. of 
Brahman), on account of the impossibility (of such 
an origin). 

Somebody, who has learned from scripture that ether 
and air, although not in themselves likely to have originated, 
yet actually are things with a beginning, might feel inclined 
to suspect that Brahman itself has sprung from something 
else. — And further somebody, who has learned from scripture 
that from ether and the other elements which are themselves 
mere effects further effects are produced, might think that 
also Brahman, from which ether has sprung, is a mere effect. 
— In order to remove this doubt the Stitra declares that Brah- 
man, whose Self is Being, must not be suspected to have 
sprung from anything else 'on account of the impossibility.' 
Brahman which is mere Being cannot spring from mere 

1 In which Brahman is spoken of as to be meditated upon under 
the form of Vayu. 
* Sabd&mirodhiny eva janki na vastvanurodhiniti. An. G». 

C 2 



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so vedAnta-sOtras. 



being, since the relation of cause and effect cannot exist 
without a certain superiority (on the part of the cause). 
Nor again can Brahman spring from that which is some- 
thing particular, since this would be contrary to experience. 
For we observe that particular forms of existence are pro- 
duced from what is general, as, for instance, jars and pots 
from clay, but not that what is general is produced from 
particulars. Nor again can Brahman spring from that which 
is not (asat), for that which is not is without a Self 1 , and 
moreover scripture expressly rejects that view, in the pas- 
sage ' How could that which is spring from that which is 
not?' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 2). Another passage, moreover, 
expressly denies that Brahman has any progenitor, ' He is 
the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is 
of him neither progenitor nor lord' (Sve. Up. VI, 9). — With 
regard to ether and air the possibility of an origin has been 
shown ; but in Brahman's case there is no such possibility ; 
hence the cases are not parallel. Nor does the fact of other 
effects springing from effects imply that Brahman also must 
be an effect ; for the non-admission of a fundamental causal 
substance would drive us to a retrogressus in infinitum. And 
that fundamental causal substance which as a matter of 
fact is generally acknowledged to exist, just that is our 
Brahman. — Thus there is not any contradiction. 

10. Fire (is produced) thence (i.e. from air); for 
thus (the text) declares. 

In the AT/iandogya it is said that fire has for its source 
that which is (Brahman), in the Taittiriyaka that it has the 
air for its source. There being thus a conflict of scriptural 
passages with regard to the origin of fire, the pur- 
vapakshin maintains that fire has Brahman for its source. 
— Why?— Because the text, after having stated at the outset 
that there existed only that which is, teaches that it sent 
forth fire ; and because the assertion of everything being 
known through Brahman is possible only in case of every- 

1 And cannot therefore constitute a cause; for a cause is the 
Self of its effects. 



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II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, IO. 2t 

thing being produced from Brahman; and because the 
scriptural statement as to the 'Taggalan' (KA. Up. Ill, 
14, 1) specifies no difference 1 ; and because another scrip- 
tural passage (Mu. Up. II, I, 3) teaches that everything 
without exception is born from Brahman. The Taittiriyaka 
also makes a statement about the entire world without any 
exception, 'after having brooded he sent forth all whatever 
there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). Hence the statement that 
'fire was produced from air' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) must be 
considered to teach the order of succession only ' fire was 
produced subsequently to air.' 

To this the Sutra replies that fire was produced thence, 
i. e. from air, because the text declares it to be so — ' from 
air sprang fire.' For if fire had sprung directly from Brah- 
man and not from air, the scriptural statement that ' fire 
sprang from air ' would be contradicted thereby. That 
that statement should intimate the order of succession 
merely, as maintained by the purvapakshin, we cannot admit. 
For as in the preceding sentence ('from that Self sprang 
ether ') the fifth case (atmana/*) denotes the Self as that 
from which the origination proceeds, and as the same verb 
(' sprang ') governs our sentence also, and as in the following 
sentences also — such as ' from earth the herbs ' — the fifth 
case (prz'thivyaA) denotes that from which something pro- 
ceeds, we understand that in our sentence also the fifth case 
(vayoA) denotes that from which fire proceeds. Moreover, 
if we should explain our sentence to mean ' after air fire was 
produced,' we should have to supply some preposition 
(or adverb as 'after,' 'subsequently '), while that construction 
which rests on the proper sense of the fifth case-affix is 
ready made at hand and does not require anything to be 
supplied. The passage therefore intimates that fire springs 
from air. — But, it may be said, the other scriptural passage 
('it sent forth fire') intimates that fire springs from Brahman. 
— Not so, we reply ; for this latter passage remains uncon- 
tradicted, even if we assume that fire sprang from Brahman 
only through intermediate links (not directly). 

1 But implies the whole world to have sprung from Brahman. 

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22 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Even the supposition that Brahman, after having created 
ether and air, assumed the form of air and thus created fire 
would not be opposed to fire having sprung from Brahman ; 
for we may say equally that milk comes from the cow, that 
curds come from the cow, that cheese comes from the cow. 
There is, moreover, a scriptural passage declaring that Brah- 
man abides as the Self of its effects, viz. Taitt. Up. II, 7, 
' That made itself its Self.' And analogously Sm«*ti — in 
the passage beginning ' Cognition, knowledge, steadiness of 
mind ' (Bha. Gt. X, 4) — says about the Lord, ' From me 
only spring the manifold states of the beings.' For 
although cognition and so on are observed to spring 
directly from their immediate causes, yet (the assertion 
made in the passage quoted holds good), since the entire 
aggregate of beings is, directly or indirectly, derived from 
the Lord. — Thereby those scriptural passages are accounted 
for which speak of the creation (on the whole) without 
specifying the order of succession 1 ; for they may be ex- 
plained anyhow, while on the other hand the passages 
specifying the order of creation cannot be turned in any 
other way (i.e. not away from their direct sense). The 
general assertion, moreover, of everything springing from 
Brahman requires only that all things should ultimately 
proceed from that which is, not that they should be its 
immediate effects. — Thus there remains no difficulty. 

1 1 . Water (is produced from fire). 

We have to supply from the preceding Sutra the words 
' thence ' and ' for thus the text declares.' — Water is pro- 
duced from fire; for the text says, 'it sent forth water' 
(Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3), and « from fire (sprang) water ' (Taitt. 
Up. II, 1). These explicit statements allow no room for 
doubt 2 . The Sutrakara, however, having explained the 
creation of fire, and being about to explain the creation of 

1 I.e. it appears from the preceding discussion that those passages 
have to be explained in such a way as to agree with those other 
passages which state the order of the created beings. 

1 So that the Sutra might possibly be looked upon as not 
called for. 



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II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 12. 23 

earth, propounds this Sutra in order to insert water (and 
thus to point out its position in the srtsh/ikrama). 

12. The earth (is meant by the word 'anna'), on 
account of the subject-matter, the colour, and other 
passages. 

We read, ' Water thought, may I be many, may I grow 
forth. It sent forth food (anna) ' (Kh. Up. VI, a, 4).— 
Here a doubt arises, whether the word 'anna' denotes 
things fit to be used as food, such as rice, barley and the 
like ; or cooked food ; or else the earth. 

The purvapakshin maintains that the word is to be 
understood in the former sense; for, he says, the word 
' anna ' means ' food ' in ordinary language, and is moreover 
confirmed in that sense by the complementary passage, 
' Therefore whenever it rains anywhere, most food is then 
produced ; ' for when it rains, rice, barley and the like, but 
not earth, are produced in abundance. 

To this we reply that by the word ' anna ' we have to 
understand earth as being produced from water. — Why ? — 
On account of the subject-matter, on account of the colour, 
and on account of other passages. — The subject-matter, in 
the first place, is clearly connected with the elements, as we 
see from the preceding passages, ' it sent forth fire, it sent 
forth water.' It would therefore be improper to pass over 
a further element, viz. earth, when its turn has come, and 
to assume without reason that rice and the like are meant 
by the word ' anna.' — In the second place, we find that in a 
complementary passage there is mentioned a colour which 
agrees with earth, ' the black colour (of fire) is the colour 
of anna.' Eatable things on the other hand, such as cooked 
dishes, and rice, barley and the like, are not necessarily 
black. — But earth too is not necessarily black ; for the soil 
of some fields has a whitish colour like milk, and that of 
others looks red like glowing coals ! — True, but that does 
not affect our argument, since what we have to look to is 
the predominant colour. Now the predominant colour of 
earth is black, not either white or red. The Pauramkas also 
designate the colour of the earth by the term 'night' 



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24 vedAnta-sOtras. 



(jarvar!) ; now the night is black, and we therefore conclude 
that black is the colour of earth also. — In the third 
place other scriptural passages also, which refer to the same 
subject, declare that ' from water (sprang) earth ' (Taitt. Up. 
II, i), and that ' what was there as the froth of the water, 
that was hardened and became the earth ' (Br*. Up. 1, 2, 2). 
On the other hand the text declares that rice and the like 
were produced from the earth, ' From earth sprang herbs, 
from herbs food ' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). — As, thus, the general 
subject-matter as well as other arguments clearly proves 
that the word ' anna ' here denotes earth, we can in no way 
accept the view that rice and the like are referred to. The 
common use of language to which the purvapakshin appeals 
is of no avail against the arguments favouring our interpre- 
tation. The complementary passage also (' whenever it 
rains,' &c.) is to be viewed as pointing out that, owing to 
the earthy nature of food (rice, &c), earth itself mediately 
springs from water. — For all these reasons the word ' anna ' 
denotes this earth. 

1 3. But on account of the indicatory mark supplied 
by their reflecting (i.e. by the reflection attributed 
to the elements), he (i.e. the Lord is the creative 
principle abiding within the elements). 

A doubt here arises whether ether and the other elements 
do themselves send forth their effects, or if the highest 
Lord abiding within certain Selfs produces, after reflection, 
certain effects. 

Here the purvapakshin maintains that the elements them- 
selves send forth, because the texts speak of them as acting 
independently; compare, for instance, ' from ether sprang air, 
from air fire,' &c. The objection that non-intelligent beings 
cannot enter on independent activity is invalidated by the 
fact that the elements also are spoken of in the sacred texts 
as endowed with intelligence, cf. for instance, * fire thought,' 
« water thought ' (KA. Up. VI, 2, 3 ; 4). 

To this we reply that the highest Lord himself abiding 
within certain Selfs sends forth, after reflection, certain 
effects. — Why ? — On account of the indicatory marks. For 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 14. 25 

texts such as ' he who dwells in the earth, and within the 
earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth 
is and who rules the earth within ' show that the elements 
enter on their activity only if presided over by an intelligent 
principle. Texts such as ' He became sat and tyat ' (which 
occurs in the passage, ' he wished may I be many, may I 
grow forth,' Taitt. Up. II, 6) and ' It made itself its Self (i. e. 
the Self of everything which exists ; II, 7) show that he 
(the highest Lord) is the Self of everything. The thinking 
and hearing which the texts attribute to water and fire must 
be viewed as due to the fact of the highest Lord having 
entered them ; for the passage, ' there is no other seer but 
he,' denies there being any other seer (thinker), and that 
which is (i. e. Brahman), in the character of seer (or thinker), 
constitutes the subject-matter of the whole chapter ; as we 
conclude from the introductory passage, ' It thought, may I 
be many, may I grow forth ' {Kh. Up. VI, a, 3). 

14. The order (in which the elements are retracted 
into Brahman) is the reverse of that (i.e. the order 
in which they are created); this is proved (by its 
agreement with observation). 

Having considered the order of the creation of the 
elements we now proceed to consider the order of their 
retractation. — The question here is whether their retracta- 
tion takes place in an indefinite order, or in the order of 
the creation, or in the inverse order. That the origin, the 
subsistence and the retractation of the elements all depend 
on Brahman, scripture declares ' That from whence these 
beings are born, that by which when born they live, that 
into which they enter at their death.' 

The purvapakshin maintains that the retractation of the 
elements is not bound to any definite order, because scrip- 
ture contains no specific information on the point. Or else, 
he says, let him who wishes to know the order of the re- 
tractation accept the order of creation, since the latter is 
expressly mentioned in the texts. 

To this we reply that the order of retractation must be 
viewed as the reverse of the order of creation. For we see 



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26 vedAnta-sOtras. 



in ordinary life that a man who has ascended a stair has, in 
descending, to take the steps in the reverse order. More- 
over we observe that things made of clay, such as jars, 
dishes, &c, on being destroyed pass back into clay, and that 
things which have originated from water, such as snow and 
hailstones, again dissolve into water. Hence we rightly 
assume that earth which has (according to scripture) sprung 
from water passes back into water when the period of its 
subsistence comes to an end, and that water which has 
sprung from fire passes back into fire. In this way each 
particular effect passes back into its immediately antece- 
dent cause — each cause being of a subtler nature than its 
effect — until in the end the last cause is refunded into 
Brahman, the ultimate and most subtle of all causes. It 
certainly would be irrational to assume that an effect, pass- 
ing over its immediate cause, should at once refund itself 
into the cause of the cause. Sriviti also declares that the 
order of retractation is the order of origination inverted, 
' The earth, the basis of the world, is dissolved into water, 
O divine Rishi, the water into fire, the fire into air.' The 
order of creation is indeed stated in the sacred texts, but 
that statement refers to creation only, and can therefore 
not be extended to retractation. We, moreover, cannot 
even desire to apply the order in which the elements are 
created to their retractation also since it is clearly unsuit- 
able in the latter case. For, as long as an effect subsists, it 
is impossible to assume the dissolution of the cause, since 
on the dissolution of the latter the effect also cannot exist. 
On the other hand, we may assume a continued existence 
of the cause although the effect be destroyed ; for that is 
actually observed in the case of clay (and the things made 
of it). 

15. If it be said that between (Brahman and the 
elements) the intellect and mind (are mentioned ; 
and that therefore their origination and retractation 
are to be placed) somewhere in the series, on 
account of there being inferential signs (whereby the 
order of the creation of the elements is broken) ; we 



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n adhyAya, 3 pAda, 15. 27 

deny that, on account of the non-difference (of the 
organs and the elements). 

In what precedes we have said that the creation and the 
retractation of the elements take place in direct and reverse 
order; further that the creation proceeds from the Self, 
and that the retractation terminates in the Self. — Now 
•S'ruti as well as Smrrti enlightens us concerning the exist- 
ence of the mind (manas) together with the senses, and of 
the intellect (buddhi) ; compare, for instance, the indicatory 
marks contained in the passage, Ka. Up. 1,3, 3.4, ' Know the 
intellect to be the charioteer and the mind the reins ; the 
senses they call the horses,' &c. And as the whole aggre- 
gate of beings avowedly springs from Brahman, we must 
assume that the mind, the intellect and the senses also 
originate from it and are again merged in it in due order, 
occupying a definite place among the things created and 
retracted. Moreover the Atharvawa (Muwrfaka), in the 
chapter treating of the creation, mentions the organs 
between the Self and the elements, « From him is born 
breath, mind and all organs of sense, ether, air, light, 
water and the earth the support of all ' (II, 1, 3). And 
from this there results a break in the previously stated 
order of the creation and the retractation of the elements. 

This we deny, on account of the non-difference (of the 
organs from the elements). If the organs themselves are of 
the nature of the elements, their origination and retracta- 
tion are the same as those of the elements, and we therefore 
have not to look out in their case for a different order. 
And that the organs are of the nature of the elements, for 
that we have inferential marks, in passages such as the 
following, ' for mind, my child, consists of earth, breath of 
water, speech of fire ' (KA. Up. VI, 6, 5). That the organs 
(although in reality belonging to the elements) are some- 
times mentioned separately from them, is to be understood 
in the same way as when the Parivra^akas (mendicant 
Brahmanas) are spoken of separately from the Brahmawas. 
And supposing even that the organs are not of the nature 
of the elements, still the order of the origin of the elements 



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28 vedAnta-sOtras. 



would not be interfered with by the organs ; for we might 
assume either that the organs are produced first and the 
elements last ; or else that the elements are produced first 
and the organs last. In the Atharva/ta-upanishad quoted 
above we have merely a serial enumeration of the organs 
and the elements, not a statement as to the order of their 
origination. Similarly in other places also the series of the 
organs is recorded apart from the series of the elements ; so, 
for instance, in the following passage, ' Pra^lpati indeed was 
all this in the beginning, he reflected on himself; he sent 
forth mind ; there was mind only ; mind reflected on itself ; it 
sent forth speech,' &c. — Hence the origination of the organs 
does not cause a break in the order of the origination of the 
elements. 

1 6. But the designation (as being born and dying) 
abides in the (bodies of beings) moving and non- 
moving ; it is secondary (metaphorical) if applied to 
the soul, as the existence (of those terms) depends 
on the existence of that (i. e. the body). 

On account of certain popular modes of expression such 
as ' Devadatta is born,' ' Devadatta has died,' and the like, 
and on account of certain ceremonies such as the Gataka- 
karman, some people might fall into the error of thinking 
that the individual soul has a beginning, and in the end 
undergoes destruction. This error we are going to dispel. 
— The individual soul has no beginning and is not subject 
to dissolution, since thus only it can be connected with the 
results of actions, as the 6'astra teaches. If the individual 
soul perished after the body, there would be no sense 
in the religious injunctions and prohibitions referring to 
the enjoyment and avoidance of pleasant and unpleasant 
things in another body (another birth). And scripture says, 
' This body indeed dies when the living soul has left it, the 
living soul does not die' (Kh. Up. VI, n, 3). — But it has 
been pointed out above that ordinary language speaks of 
the birth and the death of the individual soul ! — True ; but 
the terms ' birth ' and * death,' if applied to the soul, have to 



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ii adhvAya, 3 pAda, 17. 29 

be taken in a secondary sense. — What then is that thing to 
which those words apply in their primary sense, and with 
reference to which we can speak of a secondary sense ? — 
They apply, we answer, to whatever moves and whatever 
does not move. The words ' birth ' and ' death ' have refer- 
ence to the bodies of moving and non-moving beings ; for 
such beings are born (produced) and die. To them the 
terms ' birth ' and ' death ' apply in their primary sense ; 
while they are used metaphorically only with reference to 
the soul dwelling in them. For their existence (i. e. their 
being used) depends on the existence of the body ; i. e. 
the words ' birth ' and ' death ' are used where there take 
place the manifestation and disappearance of bodies, not 
where they are absent. For nobody ever observes a soul 
being born or dying, apart from its connexion with a body. 
That the words ' birth ' and ' death ' have reference to the 
conjunction with — and separation from — a body merely, is 
also shown by the following passage : ' On being born that 
person assuming his body, &c. ; when he passes out (of the 
body) and dies,' &c. (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 8). The ^ata-ceremony 
also is to be viewed as having reference to the manifestation 
of the body only ; for the soul is not manifested. — Whether 
the individual soul is produced from the highest Self like 
ether, &c. or not, will be discussed in the next Sutra ; the 
present Sfltra merely states that the gross origination and 
dissolution which belong to the body do not affect the 
soul. 

1 7. The (living) Self is not (produced) as there is 
no scriptural statement, and as it is eternal according 
to them (i. e. scriptural passages). 

There is a Self called the living one (the individual soul), 
which rules the body and the senses, and is connected with 
the fruits of actions. With regard to that Self the con- 
flict of scriptural passages suggests the doubt, whether it is 
produced from Brahman like ether and the other elements, 
or if, like Brahman itself, it is unproduced. Some scrip- 
tural passages, by comparing it to sparks proceeding from 
a Are and so on, intimate that the living soul is produced 



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30 vedAnta-sOtras. 



from Brahman; from others again we learn that the 
highest Brahman, without undergoing any modification, 
passes, by entering into its effects (the elements), into the 
condition of the individual soul. These latter passages do 
not thus record an origination of the individual soul. 

The purvapakshin maintains that the individual soul is 
produced, because on that view the general promissory 
statement is not contradicted. For the general assertion 
that ' by one thing being known all this is known ' is not 
contradicted, only if the entire aggregate of things springs 
from Brahman ; while it would be contradicted by the 
assumption of the individual soul being a thing of a dif- 
ferent kind. Nor can the individual soul be conceived as 
mere unmodified highest Self, on account of the difference 
of their respective characteristics. For the highest Self is 
characterised by freedom from sin and so on, while the 
individual soul possesses the opposite attributes. That it 
is an effect, follows moreover from its being divided. For 
ether and all other things, in so far as divided, are effects, 
and we have concluded therefrom that they have an origin. 
Hence the soul also, which is distributed through all the 
bodies, doing good and evil and experiencing pleasure and 
pain, must be considered to originate at the time when 
the entire world is produced. We have moreover the fol- 
lowing scriptural passage, 'As small sparks come forth 
from fire, thus from that Self all vital airs,' &c. (Br*. Up. 
II, i, ao). This text teaches first the creation of the 
aggregate of objects of fruition, beginning with the vital 
airs, and then (in the words, 'all the Selfs') separately 
teaches the creation of all the enjoying souls. Again we 
have the passage, 'As from a blazing fire sparks, being of 
the same nature as fire, fly forth a thousandfold, thus are 
various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, my 
friend, and return hither also ' (Mu. Up. II, i, 1) ; a passage 
descriptive of the origin and the retractation of the souls, as 
we infer from the statement about the sameness of nature 1 . 

1 That the word bhdvaA ' beings ' here means ' individual souls,' 
we conclude from their being said to have the same nature as the 
Imperishable. 



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II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7. 3 1 

For the individual souls are of the same nature as Brahman, 
because they are endowed with intelligence. Nor can the 
fact that in some places (as, for instance, in the accounts of 
the creation of the elements) the creation of the soul is 
not mentioned, invalidate what is stated about it in other 
places ; it being a general principle of interpretation that 
whatever new, and at the same time non-contradictory, 
matter is taught in some scriptural passage has to be com- 
bined with the teaching of all other passages. Hence that 
passage also which speaks of the Self entering (into its 
effects and thus becoming giv&) must be explained as 
stating the Self's passing over into an effect (viz. the soul), 
analogously to such passages as ' that made itself its Self,' 
&c. (Taitt. Up. II, 7). — From all which it follows that the 
individual soul is a product. 

To all this we reply, that the individual soul is not a 
product. — Why ? — On account of the absence of scriptural 
statement. For in the chapters which treat of the creation, 
the production of the soul is, in most cases, not mentioned, 
— But, it was admitted above that the circumstance of some- 
thing not being stated in some places does not invalidate 
the statements made about it elsewhere. — True, that was 
admitted ; but we now declare that the production of the 
soul is not possible. — Why ? — ' On account of the eternity, 
&c, resulting from them' (i.e. the scriptural passages). 
The word '&c.' implies non-originatedness and similar 
attributes. For we know from scriptural passages that the 
soul is eternal, that it has no origin, that it is unchanging, 
that what constitutes the soul is the unmodified Brahman, 
and that the soul has its Self in Brahman. A being of 
such a nature cannot be a product. The scriptural 
passages to which we are alluding are the following : — 
'The living Self dies not' (KA. Up. VI, ij, 3); 'This great 
unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is 
indeed Brahman ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 25) ; ' The knowing Self 
is not born, it dies not' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18) ; 'The Ancient 
is unborn, eternal, everlasting' (Ka. Up. I, a, 18) ; ' Having 
sent forth that he entered into it ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6) ; ' Let 
me now enter those with this living Self and let me then 



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32 vedAnta-sOtras. 



evolve names and forms ' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, a) ; ' He entered 
thither to the very tips of the finger-nails ' (Br*. Up. 1, 4, 7) ; 
' Thou art that ' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; ' I am Brahman ' (Bri. 
Up.I,4,io); 'This Self is Brahman knowing all' (Bri.Up. 
II, 5, 19). — All these texts declare the eternity of the soul, 
and thus militate against the view of its having been pro- 
duced. — But it has been argued above that the soul must 
be a modification because it is divided, and must have an 
origin because it is a modification ! — It is not, we reply, in 
itself divided ; for scripture declares that ' there is one God 
hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all 
beings ' (Sve. Up. VI, 11); it only appears divided owing 
to its limiting adjuncts, such as the mind and so on, just 
as the ether appears divided by its connexion with jars 
and the like. Scripture (viz. Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5, 'that Self 
is indeed Brahman, made up of knowledge, mind, life, sight, 
hearing,' &c.) also declares that the one unmodified Brah- 
man is made up of a plurality of intellects (buddhi), &c. By 
Brahman being made up of mind and so on is meant, that its 
nature is coloured thereby, while the fact of its being entirely 
separate from it is non-apparent. Analogously we say that 
a mean, cowardly fellow is made up of womanishness. — 
The casual passages which speak of the soul's production 
and dissolution must therefore be interpreted on the ground 
of the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts ; when the 
adjunct is produced or dissolved, the soul also is said to be 
produced or dissolved. Thus scripture also declares, ' Being 
altogether a mass of knowledge, having risen from out of 
these elements it again perishes after them. When he has 
departed there is no more knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13). 
What is meant there, is only the dissolution of the limiting 
adjuncts of the Self, not the dissolution of the Self itself 1 . 
The text itself explains this, in reply to Maitreyt's ques- 



1 Hence the phrase, ' there is no more knowledge,' — which seems 
to contradict the term ' a mass of knowledge,'— only means that, 
on the limiting adjuncts being dissolved, there is no longer any 
knowledge of distinctions. 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, i 8. 33 

tion ('Here, Sir, thou hast landed me in utter bewilder- 
ment. Indeed I do not understand him, that when he has 
departed there is no more knowledge'), in the words, ' I say 
nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is 
imperishable and of an indestructible nature. But it enters 
into contact with the sense organs.' — Non-contradiction 
moreover of the general assertion (about everything being 
known through one) results only from the acknowledgment 
that Brahman is the individual soul. The difference of the 
attributes of both is also owing to the limiting adjuncts 
only. Moreover the words ' Speak on for the sake of final 
deliverance ' (uttered by Canaka with reference to the in^ 
struction he receives from Yi^wavalkya about the vj^wana- 
niaya atman) implicitly deny that the Self consisting of 
knowledge (i.e. the individual soul) possesses any of the 
attributes of transitory existence, and thus show it to be 
one with the highest Self. — From all this it follows that 
the individual soul does not either originate or undergo 
destruction. 

18. For this very reason (the individual soul is) 
intelligent 

Owing to the conflicting views of the philosophical 
schools there arises a doubt whether, as the followers 
of Ka»ada think, the soul is in itself non-intelligent, so 
that its intelligence is merely adventitious; or if, as the 
Sankhyas think, eternal intelligence constitutes its very 
nature. 

The purvapakshin maintains that the intelligence of the 
Self is adventitious, and is produced by the conjunction of the 
Self with the mind (manas), just as, for instance, the quality' 
of redness is produced in a jar by the conjunction of the jar 
with Are. For if the soul were of eternal (essential) intel- 
ligence, it would remain intelligent in the states of deep 
sleep, swoon, and possession, while as a matter of fact, men 
when waking from sleep and so on declare in reply to 
questions addressed to them that they were not conscious 
of anything. Men in their ordinary state, on the other hand, 
are seen to be (actively) intelligent. Hence, as intelli- 

[38] r> 



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34 vedAnta-sOtras. 



gence is clearly intermittent, we conclude that the Self's 
intelligence is adventitious only. 

To this we reply that the soul is of eternal intelligence, 
for that very reason that it is not a product but nothing 
else but the unmodified highest Brahman which, owing to 
the contact with its limiting adjuncts, appears as individual 
soul. That intelligence constitutes the essential nature of 
the highest Brahman, we know from scriptural passages 
such as 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss' (Bri. Up. Ill, 
9, 28, 7) ; ' Brahman is true, knowledge, infinite ' (Taitt. 
Up. II, i); 'Having neither inside nor outside, but being 
altogether a mass of knowledge' (Br/. Up. IV, 5, 13). 
Now, if the individual soul is nothing but that highest 
Brahman, then eternal intelligence constitutes the soul's 
essential nature also, just as light and heat constitute the 
nature of fire. In the chapter treating of that which con- 
sists of knowledge, there are, moreover, passages (directly 
declaring that the individual soul is of the nature of self- 
luminous intelligence), ' He not asleep himself looks down 
upon the sleeping (senses)' {Bri. Up. IV, 3, 11); 'That 
person is self-illuminated ' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14) ; ' For there 
is no intermission of the knowing of the knower ' {Bri. Up. 
IV, 3, 30). That the soul's nature is intelligence, follows 
moreover from the passage {Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 4) where 
it is represented as connected with knowledge through all 
sense-organs, ' He who knows, let me smell this, he is the 
Self/ &c. &c. — From the soul's essential nature being 
intelligence it does not follow that the senses are useless ; 
for they serve the purpose of determining the special object 
of each sense, such as smell and so on. This is expressly 
declared by scripture, 'Smell is for the purpose of per- 
ceiving odour' {Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 4). — The objection that 
sleeping persons are not conscious of anything is refuted 
by scripture, where we read concerning a man lying in 
deep sleep, 'And when there he does not see, yet he is 
seeing though he does not see. For there is no inter- 
mission of the seeing of the seer, because it cannot perish. 
But there is then no second, nothing else different from 
him that he could see ' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 23). That means : 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 19. 35 

The absence of actual intelligising is due to the absence of 
objects, not to the absence of intelligence ; just as the light 
pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of 
things to be illuminated, not to the absence of its own nature. 
— The reasoning of the Vaueshikas and others is, as contra- 
dicting scripture, merely fallacious, and we therefore decide 
that eternal intelligence is the essential nature of the soul. 

19. (On account of the scriptural declarations) of 
(the soul's) passing out, going and returning, (the 
soul is of atomic size). 

We now have to consider of what size the soul is, 
whether of atomic size or of a medium size, or of great 
(infinite) size. — But, it has been shown above that the soul 
is not a product and that eternal intelligence constitutes 
its nature, whence it follows that it is identical with the 
highest Self. Now the infinity of the highest Self is clearly 
stated in scripture ; what need then is there of a discussion 
of the soul's size ? — True, we reply ; but certain scriptural 
passages which speak of the soul's passing out, going and 
returning, establish the prima facie view that the soul is 
of limited size, and moreover in some places scripture 
expressly declares it to be of atomic size. The present 
discussion is therefore begun for the purpose of clearing up 
this doubtful point. 

The purvapakshin maintains that, on account of its being 
said to pass out, go and return, the soul must be held to 
be of limited, atomic size. Its passing out is mentioned 
(Kau. Up. Ill, 3), * And when he passes out of this body 
he passes out together with all these;' its going (Kau, 
Up. I, a), 'All who depart from this world go to the 
moon ;' its returning (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 6), ' From that world 
he returns again to this world of action.' From these 
statements as to the soul's passing out, going and re- 
turning it follows that it is of limited size. For motion 
is impossible in the case of an all-pervading being. And 
a limited size being once admitted, we have to conclude 
more especially that the size is atomic, since the hypothesis 

D 2 



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36 vedAnta-sOtras. 



of the soul being of the same size as the body has already 
been refuted in our examination of the Arhata-system. 

20. And on account of the two latter (i.e. going 
and returning) being connected with their Self (i. e. 
the agent), (the soul is of atomic size). 

We admit that 'passing out' might possibly be at- 
tributed to the soul even if it does not move, viz. if that 
expression be taken to mean the soul's ceasing to be the"; 
ruler of the body, in consequence of the results of its/ 
former actions having become exhausted ; just as some- 
body when ceasing to be the ruler of a village may be said 
to ' go out.' But the two latter activities, viz. going and 
returning, are not possible in the case of something which 
does not move ; for they are both connected with the own 
Self (of the agent), going (and coming back) being activi- 
ties abiding in the agent 1 . Now going and coming are 
possible for a being that is not of medium size, only if it 
is of atomic size. And as going and coming must be taken 
in their literal sense, we conclude that the passing out also 
means nothing but the soul's actual moving out of the. 
body. For the soul cannot go and return without first 
having moved out of the body. Moreover certain parts 
of the body are mentioned as the points from which the 
soul starts in passing out, viz. in the following passage, 
'Either from the eye or from the skull or from other 
places of the body (the Self passes out) ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, a). 
Other passages mention that the embodied soul goes and 
comes within the body also ; so, for instance, ' He taking 
with him those elements of light descends into the heart ' 
(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 1); ' Having assumed light he again goes to 
his place' (Br?. Up. IV, 3, 11). — Thereby the atomic size/ 
of the soul is established as well. 

21. If it be said that (the soul is) not atomic, on 
account of scriptural statements about what is not 
that (i.e. what is opposed to atomic size); we deny 

1 Going is known to be an activity inherent in the agent, from 
the fact of its producing effects inherent in him, such as his con- 
junction with— or disjunction from — other things. 



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II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 22. 37 

that, on account of the other one (the highest Self) 
being the subject-matter (of those passages). 

Nevertheless, it may be objected, the soul cannot be of 
atomic size, because there are scriptural statements of what 
is not that, i.e. because there are scriptural statements of 
its size being the opposite of atomic size. So that by 
accepting the alternative of atomic size we should place 
ourselves in opposition to scriptural passages such as the 
following, * He is that great unborn Self who consists of 
knowledge, is surrounded by the Pra«as, the ether within 
the heart ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, aa) ; ' Like the ether he is omni- 
present, eternal ; ' ' Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' 
(Taitt. Up. II. 1). 

This objection, the purvapakshin replies, is not valid 
' on account of the other one forming the subject of dis- 
cussion.' For those statements about a size different (from 
the atomic one) occur under the heading of the highest 
Self which on account of its pre-eminence constitutes ( the 
general object of knowledge in all Vedanta-texts ; and 
moreover the passage, ' It is spotless, beyond the ether ' 
(Br*. Up. IV, 4, ao), specially proves that the highest 
Self constitutes the subject-matter (in the passage quoted 
above from the Br*. Up.). "Thus with regard to the other 
passages also. — But from the expressions, 'consisting of 
knowledge, surrounded by the prawas,' it appears that 
the embodied Self only (not the highest Self) is designated 
as connected with greatness. — That designation, the purva- 
pakshin replies, is founded on an intuition, vouched for by 
scripture, as in the case of Vamadeva l . — As therefore the,' 
statements of a different size refer to the highest Self\ 
(pr&£-«a), they do not militate against the view of the in- 
dividual soul being of atomic size. 

22. And also on account of direct statement, and 
of inference. 

The soul is of atomic size for that reason also that 
scripture contains a direct statement to that effect, ' By 

1 Who ' param&rthadr/sh/va '• identifies himself with everything 
in the universe. (i?tg-veda Sawhita IV, 36. 1 ff.). 



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38 vedAnta-sOtras. 



thought is to be known that atomic Self into which 
breath has entered fivefold' (Mu. Up. Ill, i, 9). That the 
Self spoken of there as atomic is the living Self, i.e. the 
I individual soul, we see from its connexion with breath. — 
Inference also favours the conclusion that the soul is of 
atomic size ; i.e. we infer that from such passages as 'That 
living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part 
of the point of a hair divided a hundred times ' (Sve. Up, 
V, 9), and, ' That lower one also is seen small even like the 
point of a goad.' — But, an objection may here be raised, 
if the soul is assumed to be of atomic size, and therefore 
to occupy one point of the body only, the fact of sensation 
extending over the whole body would appear contrary to 
reason. And yet it is a matter of experience that men 
bathing in the Ganges or in a pond experience the sen- 
sation of cold over their whole bodies, and again that in 
summer people feel hot all over the body. — To this ob- 
jection the following Sutra replies. 

23. There is no contradiction, as in the case of 
sandal-ointment. 

Just as a drop of sandal-ointment, although in actual 
contact with one spot of the body only, yet produces a 
refreshing sensation extending over the whole body ; so the 
soul, although abiding in one point of the body only, may 
be the cause of a perception extending over the entire body. 
And as the soul is connected with the skin (which is the seat 
of feeling), the assumption that the soul's sensations should 
extend over the whole body is by no means contrary to 
reason. For the connexion of the soul and the skin abides 
in the entire skin, and the skin extends over the whole 
body. 

24. If it be said (that the two cases are not 
parallel), on account of the specialisation of abode 
(present in the case of the sandal-ointment, absent in 
the case of the soul); we deny that, on account of 
the acknowledgment (by scripture, of a special place 
of the soul), viz. within the heart. 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 25. 39 

Here it may be objected that the argumentation relied 
upon in the last Sutra is not admissible, because the two 
cases compared are not parallel. If it were a settled 
matter that the soul dwells in one point of the body, the 
drop of sandal-ointment might be adduced as a parallel 
instance. But, as a matter of fact, we know from per- 
ception that the drop of sandal-ointment is in contact with 
one spot of the body only, just as we know that it refreshes 
the whole body ; while in the case of the soul observation 
tells us only that it is percipient all over the body, but 
not that it abides in one spot. — Should it be said that the 
latter point must be settled by inference, we reply that 
inference is here of no use, because it is not capable of 
removing the doubt whether the perception extending over 
the whole body belongs to a soul which extends over the 
whole body like the skin and the sense of touch inhering 
in it, or to a soul which is all-pervading like ether, or to 
a soul which, like a drop of ointment, is minute and abides 
in one spot only 1 . 

This objection, the purvapakshin replies, is unfounded *on 
account of the acknowledgment of a speciality of abode,' 
an abiding in one spot of the body being admitted in the 
case of the soul no less than in the case of a drop of 
ointment. For we read in the Vedanta-texts that the soul 
abides within the heart; cp. for instance, the information 
given (in Pr. Up. Ill, 6), ' The Self is in the heart ;' (Kh. Up. 
VIII, 3, 3), 'That Self abides in the heart ; ' (Bri. Up. IV, 
3, 7), 'Who is that Self? — He who is within the heart, 
surrounded by the Prawas, the person of light, consisting 
of knowledge.' — As therefore the two cases compared are 
not devoid of parallelism, the argumentation resorted to 
in Sutra 23 is unobjectionable. 

25. Or on account of (its) quality (viz. intelligence), 
as in cases of ordinary experience. 

1 We cannot reason as follows, ' The soul is atomic because it 
produces effects extending (over the whole body), like a drop of 
sandal-ointment ; ' for that reasoning would apply to the sense of 
touch (the skin) also, which we know not to be of atomic size. 



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40 vedanta-sOtras. 



That the soul although atomic produces effects extend- 
ing over the whole body, is not contrary to reason, on 
account of the pervadingness of intellect which is its 
quality. From ordinary experience we know that luminous 
things, such as lamps or gems, although occupying only 
one spot of a chamber, produce, by means of their light 
which fills the chamber, an effect in every part of the 
chamber. — This Sutra has the purpose of removing the 
doubts of those who might object that sandal-ointment, 
because consisting of parts, may perhaps refresh the entire 
body by the diffusion of imperceptible particles; that, 
however, the soul as a mere atom does not possess any 
parts by means of which it could diffuse itself through the 
whole body. — But how can a quality extend beyond that 
in which it inheres, and abide elsewhere? We certainly 
do not see that the whiteness which is the quality of a 
piece of cloth extends beyond that piece of cloth to other 
places. Nor must you say that the case of the soul is 
analogous to that of the light diffused from a lamp ; for 
that light itself is admitted to be (not a quality but) a sub- 
stance. The flame of a lamp is substantial light with its 
particles crowded close to one another; the light diffused 
from that flame is substantial light whose particles are thin 
and scattered. — The reply to this objection is given in the 
next Sutra. 

26. The extending beyond is as in the case of 
odour. 

Just as odour, although a quality, extends beyond the 
odorous substance — as appears from the fact of our per- 
ceiving odour even without actually grasping flowers which 
are the seat of odour — so the quality of intelligence also 
may extend beyond the soul although the latter be atomic. 
It therefore is an undue stretch of inference to maintain 
that a quality, such as colour and the like, cannot separate 
itself from the substratum in which it inheres, because it 
is a quality ; for we see that odour although a mere 
quality does separate itself from its substratum. — The ob- 
jection that odour also separates itself from its substance 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 27. 41 

only with the substance (i. e. parts of the substance) we do 
not admit, because that would involve the dwindling away 
of the fundamental substance from which the separation of 
parts takes place. But that it does not so dwindle away, 
we conclude from its remaining in its former condition ; 
otherwise it would lose the heaviness and other qualities 
belonging to it in its former state. — Well, but perhaps the 
separation of the particles in which odour resides is not 
noticed on account of their minuteness. Nevertheless the 
fact may be that minute odorous atoms spreading in all 
directions enter the cavity of the nose and there produce 
the sensation of smell. — This we cannot admit, because the 
atoms are suprasensible, and because in some cases, as, for 
instance, from the blossoms of the nagake^ara-tree, a very 
strong odour is perceived \ According to the generally pre- 
vailing idea, moreover, it is not the odorous substance which 
is smelled, but ordinary people rather think that they smell 
the odour only. — The objection that, because we do not 
perceive colour and so on to extend beyond their sub- 
stratum, we have no right to assume that odour does 
so, we cannot admit, because there is no room for that 
conclusion 2 , on account of the (actually existing) per- 
ception (of the smell apart from the odorous substance). 
Logicians .must shape their inferences in such a way as to 
make them agree with ordinary observation, not in any 
other way. For, to quote another instance, the circum- 
stance that one of the qualities, viz. taste, is perceived by 
the tongue, certainly does not entitle us to draw the general 
inference that colour and the other qualities alsq are per- 
ceived by means of the tongue. 

27. And thus (scripture also) declares. 
Scripture also, after having signified the soul's abiding 
in the heart and its atomic size, declares by means of such 

1 Single atoms could 'not produce any sensations; trasarewus, 
i.e. combinations of three atoms even could not produce lively 
sensations. 

1 Viz. that smell cannot exist apart from the odorous substance, 
because it is a quality like colour. 



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42 vedAnta-sAtras. 



passages as' Up to the hairs, up to the tips of the nails' 
(Kau. Up. IV, ao ; Br*. Up. I. 4, 7), that the soul pervades 
the entire body by means of intelligence which is its 
quality. 

28. On account of the separate statement (of soul 
and intelligence). 

From the passage ' Having by knowledge taken possession 
of the body ' which represents the soul and intelligence as 
separate, viz. as respectively the agent and the instrument 
of action, we understand that the soul pervades the body 
only by means of intelligence, its quality. Again the pas- 
sage 'Then (the intelligent person) having through the 
intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all 
intelligence' (Br*. Up. II, 1, 17) shows intelligence to be 
different from the agent, i.e. the embodied soul, and so 
likewise confirms our view. — The reply to all this is as 
follows. 

29. But it is designated thus (i.e. as atomic), on 
account of its having for its essence the qualities of 
that (i.e. the buddhi); as in the case of the intelli- 
gent Self (i.e. Brahman). 

The word ' but ' is meant to set aside the opinion main- 
tained hitherto. — The soul is not of atomic size, since 
scripture does not declare it to have had an origin. On 
the contrary, as scripture speaks of the highest Brahman 
entering into the elements and teaches that it is their Self, 
the soul is nothing else but the highest Brahman. And if 
the soul is the highest Brahman, it must be of the same 
extent as Brahman. Now scripture states Brahman to be 
all-pervading. Therefore the soul also is all-pervading. — 
On that view all the statements about the all-pervadingness 
of the soul made in Sruti and Smr*'ti are justified, so, for in- 
stance, the passage, ' He is that great unborn Self who consists 
of knowledge, is surrounded by the pr$»as &c.' (Br/. Up. IV, 
4, 23). Nor again could the soul, if it were of atomic size, 
experience sensations extending over the whole body. If 
it be said that that is possible owing to the soul's connexion 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 29. 43 

with the sense of touch (the skin), we deny that assertion. 
For from that it would follow that, when we tread on a 
thorn, the sensation extends over the whole body, since the 
connexion of the thorn and the skin abides in the entire 
skin, and the skin extends over the whole body. While 
as a matter of fact, when treading on a thorn we experience 
a sensation in the sole of the foot only. — Nor again is it 
possible that a quality of an atom should diffuse itself beyond 
the atom. For qualities occupy the same place with the} 
substances of which they are qualities, and a quality not 
abiding in its substance would no longer be a quality. 
Concerning the light emitted from a lamp we have already 
shown that it is, not a quality, but rather a different kind 
of substance. Hence odour also, being avowedly a quality, 
can exist in so far only as it inheres in its substance ; other- 
wise it would cease to be odour. Thus the reverend Dvai- 
payana also says, ' Having perceived odour in water some 
unthinking people ascribe it to the latter ; but know that it 
is in the earth only, and (merely) passes over into air and 
water.' If the intelligence of the soul pervades the whole 
body, the soul cannot be atomic ; for intelligence consti- 
tutes the soul's proper nature, just as heat and light con- 
stitute that of fire. A separation of the two as quality 
and that which is qualified does not exist. Now it has 
already been shown (II, 2, 34) that the soul is not 
of the same size as the body ; the only remaining alternative 
therefore is that it is all-pervading (infinite). But why 
then, our opponent asks, is the soul designated (in some 
scriptural passages) as being of atomic size, &c? — It is 
designated as such ' on account of being of the nature of 
the essence of that (i. e. the buddhi).' — The Self is here said 
to be of the nature of the essence of the mind's (buddhi) 
qualities, because those qualities, such as desire, aversion, 
pleasure, pain and so on, constitute the essence, i.e. the 
principal characteristics of the Self as long as it is impli- 
cated in transmigratory existence. Apart from the quali- 
ties of the mind the mere Self does not exist in the samsara 
state ; for the latter, owing to which the Self appears as an 
agent and enjoyer, is altogether due to the circumstance of 



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44 vedAnta-sOtras. 



the qualities of the buddhi and the other limiting adjuncts 
being wrongly superimposed upon the Self. That the 
non-transmigrating eternally free Self which neither acts nor 
enjoys is declared to be of the same size as the buddhi, is] 
thus due only to its having the qualities of the buddhi fori 
its essence (viz. as long as it is in fictitious connexion with 1 
the buddhi). Moreover we have the scriptural passage, 
' That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth 
part of the point of a hair, divided a hundred times, and 
yet.it is to be infinite ' («Sve. Up. V, 9), which at first states! 
the soul to be atomic and then teaches it to be infinite.' 
Now this is appropriate only in the case of the atomicity of 
the soul being metaphorical while its infinity is real ; for 
both statements cannot be taken in their primary sense at 
the same time. And the infinity certainly cannot be under- 
stood in a metaphorical sense, since all the Upanishads aim 
at showing that Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul. 
— The other passage also (Sve. Up. V, 8) which treats of 
the measure of the soul, ' The lower one, endowed with the 
quality of mind and the quality of body, is seen small even 
like the point of a goad,' teaches the soul's small size to 
depend on its connexion with the qualities of the buddhi, 
not upon its own Self. The following passage again, ' That 
small (a«u) Self is to be known by thought ' (Mu. Up. Ill* 
1, 9), does not teach that the soul is of atomic size, since the 
subject of the chapter is Brahman in so far as not to be 
fathomed by the eye, &c, but to be apprehended by the 
serene light of knowledge, and since moreover the soul 
cannot be of atomic size in the primary sense of the word. 
Hence the statement about a«utva (smallness, subtlety) has 
to be understood as referring either to the difficulty of 
knowing the soul, or else to its limiting adjuncts. Similarly 
such passages as ' Having by knowledge taken possession 
of the whole body ' (Kau. Up. Ill, 6), which mention a 
difference (between the soul and knowledge), must be under- 
stood to mean that the soul takes possession of the whole 
body through the buddhi, its limiting adjunct ; or el se they 
must be considered as mere modes of expression, as when 
we speak of the body of a stone statue. For we have 



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II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 30. 45 

already shown that the distinction of quality and thing] 
qualified does not exist in the case of the soul — The state-, 
ments as to the soul abiding in the heart are likewise to 
be explained on the ground of the buddhi abiding there. — ' 
That also the soul's passing out and so on depend on! 
the limiting adjuncts, is shown by the passage, 'What 
is it by whose passing out I shall pass out, and by whose 
staying I shall stay ? He sent forth prawa,' &c. (Pr. Up. VI, 
3, 4). For where there is no passing out, no going and 
returning are known ; for what has not left the body cannot 
go and return \ — As thus the soul (as long as involved in 
the samsara) has for its essence the qualities of its limiting 
adjuncts, it is spoken of as minute. The case is analogous 
to that of Brahman (pra^na). Just as in those chapters 
whose topic is the meditation on the qualified Brahman, the 
highest Self is spoken of as possessing relative minuteness 
and so on, because it has the qualities of its limiting adjuncts 
for its essence (cp. ' Smaller than a grain of rice or barley ;' 
' He who consists of mind, whose body is prawa,' &c, Kh. 
Up. HI, 14, a ; 3) ; so it is also with the individual soul — 
Very well, let us then assume that the transmigratory con-* 
dition of the soul is due to the qualities of the buddhi form-) 
ing its essence. From this, however, it will follow that, as 
the conjunction of buddhi and soul — which are different 
entities — must necessarily come to an end, the soul when; 
disjoined from the buddhi will be altogether undefinable and 
thence non-existing or rather non-existing in the sawzsara 
state 8 . — To this objection the next Sutra replies. 

30. The objection (raised above) is not valid, since ' 
(the connexion of the soul with the buddhi) exists as 
long as the soul ; it being thus observed (in scripture). 

We need not fear that the objection formulated above 
can be proved. — Why ? — ' On account of the existence of 
the connexion of the soul with the buddhi, as long as the 

1 So that the distinction insisted on in Sutra 20 is not valid. 
* Katham asattvam svarupena sattvad ity asankhyaha samsaritvam 
veti. An. Gi. 



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46 vedAnta-sGtras. 



soul exists.' That means : as long as this Self is in the 
samsara-state, as long as the samsara-state is not brought 
to an end by means of perfect knowledge, so long the con-\ 
nexion of the soul with the buddhi does not cease. And 
as long as its connexion with the buddhi, its limiting 
adjunct, lasts, so long the individual soul remains indi- 
vidual soul, implicated in transmigratory existence. In 
reality, however, there is no individual soul but in so far 
as it is fictitiously hypostatized by the buddhi, its limiting 
adjunct. For in attempting to determine the object of the 
Vedanta-texts we meet with no other intelligent substance 
but the one omniscient Lord whose nature is eternal .free- 
dom. This appears from innumerable texts, such as the 
following: — 'There is no other seer but he, there is no 
other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he, 
there is no other knower but he' (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, atf); 
(' There is nothing that sees, hears, perceives, knows but it ' 
(Br*. Up. Ill, 8, 1 1) ; « Thou art that * {Kk. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; 
•I am Brahman' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). — How again is it 
known that the soul is connected with the buddhi as long 
as it exists? — We reply: because that is seen (viz. in 
scripture). For scripture makes the following declaration : 
• He who is within the heart, consisting qf knowledge, sur- 
rounded by the prawas, the person of light, he remaining 
the same wanders along the two worlds as if thinking, as 
if moving' (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the term 'consisting 
of knowledge ' means ' consisting of buddhi,' as we infer 
from another passage, viz. ' The Self consisting of know- 
ledge, mind, life, sight, hearing' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 5), where 
knowledge is enumerated among mind and so on 1 . By 
'being made up of buddhi' is meant 'having for one's 
essence the qualities of buddhi.' Similarly a phrase like 
' Devadatta is made up of womanishness,' which may be 
made use of in ordinary language, means that in Devadatta 
feminine attributes such as softness of voice and the like 
prevail. Moreover, the passage, ' He remaining the same 
wanders along the two worlds,' declares that the Self, even 

1 And therefore has to be understood in the sense of buddhi. 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 31. 47 

when going to another world, is not separated from the 
buddhi, &c For if we ask whereby it does remain the 
same, the answer, based on proximity 1 , is 'by means of 
the buddhi* — Further, such modes of expression, * as if 
thinking,' ' as if moving,' lead us to the same conclusion ; 
for they mean that the Self does not think and move on its 
own account, but thinks as it were and moves as it were, 
because the buddhi to which it is joined really moves and 
thinks. — Moreover, the connexion of the Self with the 
buddhi, its limiting adjunct, depends on wrong knowledge, 
and wrong knowledge cannot cease except through perfect 
knowledge ; hence as long as there does not rise the cog- 
nition of Brahman being the universal Self, so long the 
connexion of the soul with the buddhi and its other limit- 
ing adjuncts does not come to an end. Thus scripture 
also says, 'I know that great person of sunlike lustre 
beyond the darkness. A man who knows him passes over 
death ; there is no other path to go' (Sve. Up. Ill, 8). 

But, an objection is raised, in the states of deep sleep 
and retractation (pralaya) no connexion of the Self with 
the buddhi can be acknowledged, since scripture declares 
that ' then he becomes united with the True, he is gone to 
his own ' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1), and as then all modifications 
have avowedly passed away. How then can it be said 
that the connexion with the buddhi exists as long as the 
Self? — To this objection the following Sutra replies. 

31. On account of the appropriateness of the 
manifestation of that (connexion) which exists 
(potentially); like virile power. 

As in ordinary life virile power and so on, existing 
potentially only in young children, and being then looked 
upon as non-existing, become manifest at the time of 
puberty — and do not originate at that time from previous 
non-existence, because in that case they might originate in 
eunuchs also — ; so the connexion of the soul with the 

1 Le. on the proximity of terms clearly indicating the buddhi, viz. 
vjg8ana-mayaA prSweshu. 



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48 vedAnta-sOtras. 



buddhi exists potentially merely during deep sleep and 
the period of general retractation, and again becomes 
manifest at the time of waking and the time of creation. — 
This explanation is appropriate, because nothing can be 
assumed to spring up unless from something else ; other- 
wise we should have to suppose that effects spring up 
without causes. That the rising from deep sleep is due to 
the existence of potential avidya, scripture also declares, 
' Having become merged m tne True they know not that 
they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures 
are here, whether a lion or a wolf/ &c. {Kh. Up. VI, 9, 2 ; 
3). — It is therefore a proved matter that the connexion of 
the soul with the buddhi and the other adjuncts lasts as 
long as the soul (in its sawsara-state). 

32. Otherwise (if no manas existed) there would 
result either constant perception or constant non- 
perception, or else a limitation of either of the two 
(i.e. of the soul or of the senses). 

The internal organ which constitutes the limiting ad- 
junct of the soul is called in different places by different 
names, such as manas (mind), buddhi (intelligence), vignkna. 
(knowledge), £itta (thought). This difference of nomen- 
clature is sometimes made dependent on the difference of 
the modifications of the internal organ which is called 
manas when it is in the state of doubt, &c, buddhi when it 
is in the state of determination and the like. — Now we must 
necessarily acknowledge the existence of such an internal 
organ ; because otherwise there would result either per- 
petual perception or perpetual non-perception. There 
would result perpetual perception whenever there is a con- 
junction of the soul, the senses and the objects of sense — the 
three together constituting the instruments of perception ; 
or else, if on the conjunction of the three causes the effect 
did not follow, there would take place perpetual non- 
perception. But neither of these two alternatives is actually 
observed. — Or else we should have to assume that there 
are obstacles in the way of the energy either of the Self or 
the sense-organs. But the former is not possible, as the. 



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ti adhyAya, 3 pAda, 34. 49 

Self is not capable of any modification ; nor the latter, as 
we cannot assume that the energy of the sense-organ which 
is non-obstructed in the preceding and the following mo- 
ment should, without any cause, be obstructed (in the 
intervening moment). Hence we have to acknowledge > 
the existence of an internal organ through whose attention! 
and non-attention perception and non-perception take! 
place. Thus scripture declares, ' My mind was elsewhere, 
I did not see ; my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear ; for 
a man sees with his mind and hears with his mind ' (Br*. 
Up. I, 5, 3). Scripture moreover shows that desire and 
similar states are modifications of the mind, ' Desire, repre- 
sentation, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness, 
shame, reflection, fear, all this is mind.' The explanation 
given in Sutra 29 is therefore an appropriate one. 

33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of scripture 
having a purport (thereby). 

In connexion with the doctrine that the soul possesses / 
for its essence the qualities of the buddhi, another attributej 
of the soul is set forth. — The individual soul is an agent, 
because thus scripture has a purport. For only on that 
assumption scriptural injunctions (such as ' He is to sacrifice,' 
' He is to make an oblation into the fire,' ' He is to give,' 
&c.) acquire a purport ; otherwise they would be purport- 
less. For they all teach special acts to be done by agents ; 
which would not be possible if the soul did not possess the 
quality of being an agent. — On that supposition a meaning 
belongs to the following passage also, ' For it is he who 
sees, hears, perceives, conceives, acts, he the person whose 
Self is knowledge ' (Pr. Up. IV, 9). 

34. And on account of (the text) teaching its 
wandering about 

The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the 

soul for that reason also, that, in a chapter treating of the 

soul, the text declares it to wander about in the state of 

sleep, ' The immortal one goes wherever he likes ' (Br*. Up. 

[38] F. 



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50 vedAnta-sOtras. 



IV, 3, 12); and again, ' He moves about, according to his 
pleasure, within his own body' (Br/. Up. II, 1, 18). 

35. On account of its taking. 

The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the 
soul for that reason also that in the same chapter treating 
of the soul the text speaks of the soul taking its instru- 
ments, ' Having taken, through the intelligence of the 
senses, intelligence,' and ' having taken the senses ' (Br/. Up. 
II,i,i8; 17). 

36. (The soul is an agent) also because it is 
designated as such with regard to actions ; if it were 
not such, there would be a change of designation. 

The quality of being an agent belongs to the soul for 
that reason also that the sacred texts speak of its agency 
in sacred and secular actions, ' Understanding performs 
the sacrifice, it performs all acts ' (Taitt. Up. II, 5). — But, 
an objection may here be raised, we have seen that the 
word ' understanding ' applies to the buddhi ; how then 
can it indicate the circumstance of the soul being an agent? 
— The soul only, we reply, is designated there, not the 
buddhi. If the soul were not meant to be designated, 
there would be a change in the designation, i. e. the passage 
would run, ' through understanding it performs,' &c. For 
we see that in another passage where the buddhi is meant 
the word ' understanding ' is exhibited in the instrumental 
form, ' Having through the understanding (intelligence) of 
these senses taken all understanding' (Br;. Up. II, 1, 17). 
In the passage under discussion, on the other hand, the 
word ' understanding ' is given in the case characteristic of 
the agent (viz. the nominative), and therefore indicates the 
Self which is distinct from the buddhi. Hence your ob- 
jection is not valid. — Another objection is raised. If the 
soul in so far as distinct from the buddhi were the agent, 
it would, because it is independent, bring about exclusively 
what is pleasant and useful to itself, not the opposite. We, 
however, observe that it does bring about the opposite 
also. But such an unrestricted proceeding does not become 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 38. 51 

the independent Self. — To this objection the following 
Sutra replies. 

37. The absence of restriction is as in the case of 
perception. 

Just as this Self, although free with regard to perception, 
yet perceives unrestrictedly what is unpleasant as well as 
what is pleasant, so we assume that it also brings about 
what is unpleasant as well as what is pleasant. — The 
objection that in the act of perception also the soul is hot 
free because it depends on the employment of the causes 
of perception (i. e. the sense-organs), we invalidate by the 
remark that the use of the causes of perception is merely 
to present the objects of perception, that however in the 
act of perception the soul because endowed with intelli- 
gence does not depend on anything else 1 . — Moreover in 
actions also the soul is not absolutely free, as it depends 
on differences of place, time, and efficient causes. But an 
agent does not cease to be so because he requires assistance. 
A cook remains the agent in the action of cooking although 
he requires fuel, water, and so on. The presence of a 
plurality of co-operating factors is therefore not opposed 
to the activity of the soul unrestrictedly extending to 
actions productive of pleasant as well as unpleasant 
results. 

38. On account of the reversal of power. 

The soul distinct from * understanding ' has to be viewed 
as an agent for the following reason also. If the buddhi 
which is denoted by the term 'understanding' were the 
agent, there would take place a reversal of power, L e. the 
instrumental power which appertains to the buddhi would 
have to be set aside, and to be replaced by the power of an 
agent. But if the buddhi has the power of an agent, it 
must be admitted that it is also the object of self-conscious- 



1 A r akshurSdfnS« vishayopanayakatvat tadupalabdhau £atmanaj 
tetanatvena svatantryad udaharanasiddhir ity aha neti. An. Gi. 

E 2 



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52 VEDANTA -SUTRAS. 



ness (ahampratyaya) 1 , since we see that everywhere activity 
is preceded by self-consciousness,' /go, /come, /eat, /drink,' 
&c. But if the buddhi is endowed with the power of an 
agent and effects all things, we have to assume for it 
another instrument by means of which it effects everything. 
For we see that agents although themselves capable of 
acting yet become really active only through making use 
of instruments. — Hence the whole dispute is about a name 
only, and there is no real difference, since in either case that 
which is different from the instrument of action is admitted 
to be the agent. 

39. And on account of the impossibility of medi- 
tation (samadhi). 

Moreover the meditation taught in the Vedanta-texts, 
whose aim is the realisation of the Self as represented by 
the Upanishads, is possible only if the Self is the agent *. 
Compare the following passages, ' Verily, the Self is to be 
seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked ' (Br*. Up. 
II, 4, 5) ; ' The Self we must seek out, we must try to 
understand' (Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Meditate on the Self 
as Om' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 6). — Therefrom also it follows that 
the Self is an agent. 

40. And as the carpenter, in double fashion. 

That the embodied Self is an agent, has been proved by 
the reasons set forth in Sutra 33, &c. We now have to 
consider whether this agency depends on the fundamental 
nature of the Self, or is due to its limiting adjuncts. — If here 
it be maintained that for the same reasons which were 
employed to prove the Self's being an agent its agency 
must be held to be natural, there being no reasons to the 
contrary, we reply as follows. 

1 And that would virtually identify the buddhi wiih the givz, the 
individual soul. 

* The Self which enjoys the fruit of final release must be the 
agent in the meditation which is instrumental in bringing about 
final release. 



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II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40. 53 

The Self's being an agent cannot be founded on its real 
nature, because (if it were so) the impossibility of final 
release would follow. For if being an agent belongs to 
the soul's nature, it can never free itself from it — no more 
than fire can divest itself of heat, — and as long as man has 
not freed himself from activity he cannot obtain his highest 
end, since activity is essentially painful. — But, an objection 
will be raised, the end of man may be obtained, even as long 
as the potentiality of activity remains, viz. by man avoiding 
the effects of activity, and this he may accomplish by avoid- 
ing its occasions, just as fire, for instance, although endowed 
with the potentiality of burning, does, if fuel is withheld 
from it, not produce its natural effect, i. e. burning. — This 
objection we invalidate by the remark that the occasions, 
because connected (with the soul) by means of the peculiar 
connexion called ' potentiality ' (power), cannot be avoided 
absolutely 1 . — Nor can it be said that release will be 
obtained through the means effecting it being employed, 
because whatever depends on means to be employed is 
non-eternal. Scripture moreover declares that release 
results from the instruction about the eternally pure, intel- 
ligent, free Self. Now instruction of this nature would not 
be possible, if the agentship of the Self formed part of its 
nature. The agentship of the Self is therefore due to the 
attributes of its adjuncts being ascribed to it, and does not 
form part of its nature. Hence scripture says of the Self, ' As 
if thinking, as if moving ' (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 7), and ' He (the 
Self) when in union with the body, the senses, and the 
mind, is called the enjoyer by wise people* (Ka. Up. I, 
3, 4) ; which passages show that the Self passes into the 
special condition of being an enjoyer, &c, only through its 



1 Kartrrtvasya dharmadini nimittani teshaw £#ananivartyatve 
muktav api sambhavat kartrrtvaw syat gti&nena. tannivnttau tesham 
a££anakaryatvat kritam kartrztvam api tatha sy&t, saktcs in jakta- 
jakyasapekshataya sanimittakriyalakshanaxakyipekshakatvad anir- 
mokshas tasman nimittapariharasya duranushManatvan na xaktivade 
muktir iti. An. Gi. 

•Sakt&fakyirraya sakliA svasattay&vaxyam rakyam akshipati. Bha. 



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54 vedAnta-sOtras. 



connexion with the limiting adjuncts. For to the discern- 
ing there is no Self called the living Self and being either 
agent or enjoyer, apart from the highest Self ; according to 
the scriptural passage ' There is no other seer but he,' &c. 
(Br*. Up. III. 7, 23). Nor must we suppose that, if there 
were no intelligent individual Soul, different from the 
highest Self and distinct from the aggregate consisting of 
buddhi, &c, it would follow that the highest Self is involved 
in the sawsara-state as agent and enjoyer. For the condi- 
tions of being agent and enjoyer are presented by Nescience 
merely. Scripture also, after having declared (in the passage, 
' For where there is duality, as it were, there one sees the 
other,' &c, Br*. Up. IV, 5, 15) that the conditions of being 
an agent and an enj oyer belong to the state of Nescience only, 
excludes them from the state of knowledge, ' But where the 
Self only is all this, how should he see another?' And again, 
after having declared that the Self, in the states of waking 
and of dreaming, suffers weariness owing to the contact with 
its limiting adjuncts, like a falcon flying about in the air, 
scripture teaches that that fatigue ceases in deep sleep when 
the soul is embraced by the intelligent (highest) Self. ' This 
indeed is his true form in which his wishes are fulfilled, in 
which the Self only is his wish, in which no wish is left, — 
free from any sorrow ' — up to ' This is his highest goal, this 
is his highest success, this is his highest world, this is his 
highest bliss' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, ai-32). — This the teacher 
intimates in the Sutra, ' and as the carpenter in both ways.' 
' And ' is here used in the sense of ' but.' It is not to be 
supposed that the agentship of the Self belongs to its true 
nature, as heat belongs to the nature of Are. But just as in 
ordinary life a carpenter as long as working with his axe and 
other tools undergoes pain, while on the other hand he enjoys 
ease and leisure after having finished his work, laid his tools 
aside and returned to his home ; so the Self also, as long as 
it is joined with duality presented by Nescience and is an 
agent in the states of waking and dreaming, undergoes pain ; 
but as soon as, for the purpose of shaking off its weariness, 
it enters into its own highest Self, it frees itself from the 
complex of effects and instruments, and enjoys full ease in 



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II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40. 55 

the state of deep sleep. And in the state of final release 
also, the Self, having dispelled the darkness of ignorance 
by the light of knowledge, and having reached the state 
of absolute isolation and rest, enjoys full ease. — The case 
of the carpenter must be considered as being parallel to 
the following extent. The carpenter is, in certain kinds 
of work, such as cutting wood, &c, an agent with regard to 
certain definite tools, such as the axe and so on, but a non- 
agent with his mere body ; so this Self also is an agent in 
all its functions with regard to its instruments, such as the 
mind, &c, but is a non-agent by its own Self. On the 
other hand, the Self has no parts corresponding to the 
hands and other limbs of the carpenter, by means of which 
it could take up or put aside its instruments, as the car- 
penter takes up and puts aside his tools. 

In reply to the reasons brought forward in favour of the 
soul's agentship being natural, as, for instance, the reason 
based on scripture having a purport, we remark that the 
scriptural injunctions in prescribing certain acts presuppose 
an agentship established somehow, but do not themselves 
aim at establishing the (direct) agentship of the Self. Now 
we have shown that the agentship of the Self does not consti- 
tute part of its real nature because scripture teaches that its 
true Self is Brahman ; we therefore conclude that the 
Vedic injunctions are operative with reference to that agent- 
ship of the soul which is due to Nescience. Such scrip- 
tural passages also as ' The agent, the person whose Self is 
understanding ' (Pr. Up. IV, 9), must be assumed, because 
being of the nature of anuvadas l , to refer to an agentship 
already established elsewhere, and being the product of 
Nescience. 

The preceding remarks refute also the reasons founded 
on ' the wandering about ' and the ' taking ' (Sutras 34, 35), as 
the statements about them also are mere anuvadas. — But, 
an objection may be raised, the passage which teaches that 
the soul while its instruments are asleep, 'moves about, 

1 I.e. being only incidental remarks about matters established or 
taught elsewhere. 



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56 vedAnta-sOtras. 

according to its pleasure, within its own body* (Br*. Up. II. 
i, 1 8), clearly implies that the pure Self is an agent. And 
in the passage relative to the taking (' (the purusha) having 
through the intelligence of the senses absorbed all intel- 
ligence'), the fact of the instruments appearing in the 
objective and instrumental cases likewise intimates that 
the pure Self is the agent — To this we reply that even in 
the state of dream the instruments of the Self are not 
altogether at rest ; for scripture states that even then it is 
connected with the buddhi, 'Having become a dream, 
together with buddhi it passes beyond this world.' Smrrti 
also says, 'When, the senses being at rest, the mind not 
being at rest is occupied with the objects, that state know 
to be a dream.' And scripture says that desire, &c, are 
modifications of the mind (cp. Br*. Up. 1, 5, 3). Now these 
are observed in dreams ; therefore the Self wanders about 
in dreams together with the mind only. That wandering 
about moreover is founded on the mental impressions 
(vasana) only, is not real. Thus scripture also in describ- 
ing our doings in dreams qualifies them by an 'as it were:' 
' As it were rejoicing together with women, or laughing as 
it were, or seeing terrible sights' (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 13). 
Ordinary people also describe their dreams in the same 
manner, 'I ascended as it were the summit of a moun- 
tain,' 'I saw a tree as it were.' — And although it is true 
that, in the statement about the taking, the instruments are 
exhibited in the objective and instrumental cases, still the 
agentship of the Self must be considered as connected 
with those instruments, since we have shown that the pure 
Self cannot be an agent. 

In ordinary language also we meet with similar variations 
of expression ; the two sentences, for instance, ' the warriors 
fight ' and ' the king fights by means of his warriors,' really 
have the same meaning. Moreover, the statement about 
the taking means to express only the cessation of activity 
on the part of the instruments, not the independent activity 
of any one. — The passage referred to above, ' understanding 
performs the sacrifice,' establishes the agentship of the 
buddhi merely, as the word 'understanding' is known to 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 40. 57 

have that sense, and as the mind is mentioned close by, 
and as in the passage, ' Faith is its head,' &c, faith and so 
on are declared to be the members of the Self which con- 
sists of understanding, and as faith, &c, are known to be 
attributes of the buddhi. Another reason is furnished by 
the complementary sentence, 'AH gods worship under- 
standing as the oldest, as Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 5), for 
buddhi is known to be the oldest, i. e. the first produced 1 . 
Another scriptural passage also avers that that sacrifice is 
accomplished by means of speech and buddhi, 'The 
sacrifice is what results from speech and mind.' Nor can 
it rightly be maintained (cp. Sutra 38) that to view the 
instruments as agents would lead to an exchange of power 
on the part of the buddhi ; for all instruments must neces- 
sarily be considered as agents in regard of their special 
functions*. But with reference to perception (upalabdhi) 
those instruments are (not agents, but) mere instruments, 
and perception belongs to the Self. Nor can agentship 
be ascribed to the Self on account of perception, since 
permanent perception constitutes its nature (and hence can- 
not be viewed as a mere transitory activity). Nor can the 
agentship which has self-consciousness for its antecedent 
belong to the perceiving principle (upalabdhr*) ; for self- 
consciousness itself is an object of perception (on the part 
of the upalabdhrt, i. e. the pure, isolated, intelligent Self). 
And on this doctrine there is no occasion for assuming a 
further instrument, as we maintain the buddhi itself to be 
the instrument. 

The objection founded on the impossibility of meditation 
(Sutra 39) is already refuted by the fact, pointed out above, 
of scripture having a purport, meditation being enjoined by 
scripture with reference to such agentship as is already 
established by other passages. — The result of all this is 

' According to the jruti : mahad yaksham prathamaga/a veda yo 
ha vai gytshthzm k& sxtshlh&m £a veda. 

1 Wood, for instance, is an ' agent ' in regard of the function of 
burning, while it is a mere instrument with reference to the 
action of cooking. 



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53 vedAnta-sOtras. 



that the agentship of the Self is due to its limiting adjuncts 
only. 

41. But from the highest (Lord there result 
sawsara and moksha), because scripture teaches 
that. 

We now enter on the discussion whether the agentship, 
characterising the individual soul in the state of Nescience 
and founded on its limiting adjuncts, is independent of the 
Lord or dependent on him. 

The purvapakshin maintains that the soul as far as it 
is an agent does not depend on the Lord, because the 
assumption of such a dependence would serve no purpose. 
For as the individual soul has motives in its own im- 
perfections, such as passion, aversion, and so on, and is 
furnished with the whole apparatus of the other con- 
stituents of action 1 , it is able to occupy on its own account 
the position of an agent ; and what then should the Lord 
do for it? Nor does ordinary experience show that in 
addition to the oxen which are required for such actions 
as ploughing and the like the Lord also is to be depended 
upon. Moreover (if all activity depended on the Lord) it 
would follow that the Lord is cruel because imposing on 
his creatures activity which is essentially painful, and at 
the same time unjust because allotting to their activities 
unequal results. — But it has already been shown (II, 1, 
34) that the Lord cannot be taxed with cruelty and in- 
justice, on account of his dependence. — True, that has 
been shown, but only on the condition of the dependence 
on the Lord being possible. Now such dependence is 
possible only if there exist religious merit and demerit on 
the part of the creatures, and these again exist if the 
soul is an agent ; if then the agentship of the soul 
again depends on the Lord, whereupon will the Lord's 
dependence depend ? And (if we should assume the Lord 
to determine the souls without reference to their merits and 
demerits) it would follow that the souls have to undergo 

1 I.e. the constituents of action such as instrument, object, &c, 
exclusive of the agent. 



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II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 59 

consequences not due to their actions. — Hence the soul's 
activity is independent. 

Setting aside this prima facie view by means of the word 
'but,' the Sutrakara asserts 'from the highest.' For the 
soul which in the state of Nescience is blinded by the 
darkness of ignorance and hence unable to distinguish 
itself from the complex of effects and instruments, the 
sawsara-state in which it appears as agent and enjoyer is 
brought about through the permission of the Lord who 
is the highest Self, the superintendent of all actions, the 
witness residing in all beings, the cause of all intelligence ; 
and we must therefore assume that final release also is 
effected through knowledge caused by the grace of the 
Lord. 

Why so ? — ' Because scripture teaches that.' For al- 
though the soul has its own imperfections, such as passion 
and so on, for motives, and is furnished with the whole 
apparatus of action, and although ordinary experience does 
not show that the Lord is a cause in occupations such as 
ploughing and the like, yet we ascertain . from scripture 
that the Lord is a causal agent in all activity. For scrip- 
ture says, ' He makes him whom he wishes to lead up 
from these worlds do a good deed ; and the same makes 
him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do 
a bad deed' (Kau. Up. Ill, 8); and again, 'He who 
dwelling within the Self pulls the Self within ' (6at. Br. 
XIV, 6, 7 , 30). 

But if causal agency thus belongs to the Lord, it follows 
that he must be cruel and unjust, and that the soul has 
to undergo consequences of what it has not done. — This 
objection the following Sutra refutes. 

42. But with a view to the efforts made (by the 
soul) (the Lord makes it act), on account of the 
(otherwise resulting) purportlessness of the injunc- 
tions and prohibitions, &c. 

The word 'but' removes the objections started. — The 
Lord makes the soul act, having regard to the efforts made 
by it, whether meritorious or non-meritorious. Hence 



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6o vedAnta-sOtras. 



there is no room for the objections raised. Having regard 
to the inequality of the virtuous and vicious actions of the 
souls, the Lord, acting as a mere occasional cause, allots 
to them corresponding unequal results. An analogous case 
is furnished by rain. As rain constitutes the common 
occasional cause for shrubs, bushes, corn, and so on, which 
belong to different species and spring each from its par- 
ticular seed — for the inequality of their sap, flowers, fruits, 
and leaves results neither when rain is absent nor when 
the special seeds are absent — ; so we also must assume 
that the Lord arranges favourable or unfavourable circum- 
stances for the souls with a view to their former efforts. — 
But if the activity of the soul is dependent on something 
else, this having regard (on the part of the Lord) to 
former effort is inappropriate. — By no means, we reply; 
for although the activity of the soul is not independent, 
yet the soul does act. The Lord indeed causes it to act, 
but it acts itself. Moreover, the Lord in causing it to act 
now has regard to its former efforts, and he caused it to 
act in a former existence, having regard to its efforts 
previous to that existence ; a regressus against which, con- 
sidering the eternity of the sawsara, no objections can be 
raised. — But how is it known that the Lord has regard 
to the efforts made (in former existences)? — The Sutra 
replies: from the purportlessness, &c, of injunctions and 
prohibitions. For thus (i. e. if the Lord has regard to 
former actions) injunctions such as ' he who is desirous of 
the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' and prohibitions such as 
' a Brahmana must not be killed,' are not devoid of purport. 
On the other alternative they would be without purport, 
and the Lord would in fact be enjoined in the place of 
injunctions and prohibitions 1 , since the soul would be 
absolutely dependent. And then the Lord might requite 
with good those who act according to the injunctions, and 
with evil men doing what is forbidden; which would 

1 Irvara eva vidhinishedhayoA sthane niyujyeta yad vidhinishedha- 
yoh phalam tad favarewa tatpratipaditadharmadharmanirapekshewa 
kn'tam iti. Bhl 



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II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 43. 6 1 

subvert the authoritativeness of the Veda. Moreover, if 
the Lord were absolutely without any regard, it would 
follow that also the ordinary efforts of men are without 
any purport; and so likewise the special conditions of 
place, time, and cause. And also the difficulty mentioned 
above 1 would present itself.— All these latter difficulties the 
Sutrakara comprises in his ' &c.' 

43. (The soul is) a part of the Lord, on account of 
the declarations of difference, and (because) in a 
different way also some record that (Brahman) is of 
the nature of slaves, fishers, and so on. 

We have shown that the individual soul and the Lord 
stand to each other in the relation of what is being acted 
upon and what is acting upon. This relation is observed in 
ordinary life to exist only between things connected, such 
as a master and a servant, or a fire and its sparks. Now 
as the soul and the Lord also are acknowledged to stand 
in the relation of what is acted upon and what is acting, 
a doubt arises whether their connexion is analogous to 
that of a master and a servant, or to that of a fire and 
its sparks. 

The purvapakshin maintains that either the matter is 
to be considered as undetermined, or that the connexion 
is like that of master and servant, because that connexion 
only is well known to be the relation of ruler (Lord) and 
subject ruled. 

To this the Sutra replies that the soul must be con- 
sidered a part of the Lord, just as a spark is a part of 
the fire. By 'part' we mean 'a part as it were,' since a 
being not composed of parts cannot have parts in the 
literal sense. — Why, then, do we not view the Lord, who 
is not composed of parts, as identical with the soul ? — ' On 
account of the declarations of difference.' For such scrip- 
tural passages as * That (self) it is which we must search 
out, that it is which we must try to understand ' (Kh. Up. 

1 I.e. the objectionable assumption that men have to undergo 
consequences not resulting from their own former actions. 



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62 vedanta-sOtras. 



VIII, 7) ; 'He who knows him becomes a muni ' (Br*. Up. 
IV, 4, 22) ; ' He who dwelling within the Self pulls the 
Self within ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 23) ; which all of them refer 
to a difference (between the highest and the individual 
Self) would be inappropriate, if there were no difference. — 
But, it may be said, these statements of difference would 
agree better with a relation similar to that of master 
and servant. — Hence the sutrakara adds, 'and otherwise 
also.' That the soul is a part (of the Lord) we learn not 
only from the passages declaring their difference, but there 
are other statements also which teach their non-difference. 
The members of a certain .rakha of the Atharva-veda 
record in a Brahma-sukta that 'Brahman are the fisher- 
men, Brahman the slaves, Brahman these gamblers,' &c. 
Here low creatures such as fishermen, and slaves de- 
pending on their masters, and gamblers are called Brah- 
man ; whence it appears that all individual souls which 
have entered into aggregates of effects and instruments 
(i.e. bodies) depending on name and form are Brah- 
man. The same view is set forth in other passages such 
as ' Thou art woman, thou art man ; thou art youth, thou 
art maiden ; thou as an old man totterest along on thy 
staff, thou art bora with thy face turned everywhere' 
(5Ve. Up. IV, 3), and ' The wise one who, having produced 
all forms and made all names, sits calling (the things by 
their names)' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 1 2, 7). Passages such as ' There 
is no other seer but he ' and other similar ones establish 
the same truth. — Non-differenced intelligence belongs to 
the soul and the Lord alike, as heat belongs to the sparks 
as well as the fire. — From these two views of difference 
and non-difference there results the comprehensive view 
of the soul being a part of the Lord. — The following Sutra 
supplies a further reason. 

44. And on account of the mantra, 

A mantra also intimates the same view. ' Such is the 
greatness of it ; greater than it is the Person. One foot 
of it are all beings, three feet of it are the Immortal in 
heaven* (Kk. Up. Ill, 12, 6). Here the word 'beings' 



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n adhyAya, 3 pAda, 46. 63 

denotes all moving and non-moving things, among which 
the souls occupy the first place ; in accordance with the 
use of the word in the following passage, ' Not giving pain to 
any being (bhuta) except at the tirthas' {Kk. Up. VIII, 
15). Herefrom also we conclude that the individual soul 
is a part of the Lord. — And again from the following 
reason. 

45. Moreover it is so stated in Smn'ti. 

In the l-rvaragftas (Bhagavad-gita) also it is said that the 
soul is a part of the Lord, ' an eternal part of me becomes 
the individual soul in the world of life ' (Bha. Gi. XV, 7). 
With regard to the assertion made above, viz. that in ordi- 
nary life the relation of ruler and ruled is known to hold 
good in the case of master and servant &c. only, we remark 
that, although that may be the case in ordinary life, we 
ascertain from scripture that the relation of part and whole 
and that of ruler and ruled may go together. Nor is there 
anything contradictory in assuming that the Lord who is 
provided with superexcellent limiting adjuncts rules the 
souls which are connected with inferior adjuncts only. 

Here the purvapakshin raises another objection. If we 
admit that the souls are parts of the Lord, it follows that 
the Lord also, whose part the soul is, will be afflicted by the 
pain caused to the soul by its experience of the sawsara- 
state ; as we see in ordinary life that the entire Devadatta 
suffers from the pain affecting his hand or foot or some 
other limb. Herefrom it would follow that they who obtain 
Brahman obtain a greater pain * ; so that the former sa#z- 
sara-condition would be preferable, and complete knowledge 
be devoid of purpose. — To this the following Sutra replies. 

46. (As the soul is affected by pleasure and pain) 
not so the highest (Lord) ; as in the case of light and 
so on. 

We maintain that the highest Lord does not feel the pain 
of the sa/«sara-state in the same way as the soul does. The 
soul being engrossed by Nescience identifies itself as it were 

1 Viz. by participating in all pain. 



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64 vedAnta-sOtras. 



with the body and so on, and imagines itself to be affected 
by the experience of pain which is due to Nescience, ' I am 
afflicted by the pain due to the body ; ' the highest Lord, on 
the other hand, neither identifies himself with a body, nor 
imagines himself to be afflicted by pain. The pain of the 
individual soul also is not real, but imaginary only, caused 
by the error consisting in the non-discrimination of (the 
Self from) the body.senses, and other limiting adjuncts which 
are due to name and form, the effects of Nescience. And as 
a person feels the pain of a burn or cut which affects his 
body by erroneously identifying himself with the latter, so 
he feels also the pain affecting others, such as sons or friends, 
by erroneously identifying himself with them, entering as it 
were into them through love, and imagining ' I am the son, 
I am the friend.' Wherefrom we infer with certainty that 
the feeling of pain is due merely to the error of false imagi- 
nation. At the same conclusion we arrive on the ground of 
negative instances. Let us consider the case of many men, 
each of whom possesses sons, friends, &c, sitting together, 
some of them erroneously imagining that they are connected 
with their sons, friends, &c, while others do not. If then 
somebody calls out ' the son has died,' ' the friend has died,' 
grief is produced in the minds of those who are under the 
imagination of Being connected with sons and friends, but 
not in the minds of religious mendicants who have freed 
themselves from that imagination. From this it appears 
that perfect knowledge is of use even to an ordinary man ; 
of how much greater use then will it be to him (i.e. the 
Lord) whose nature is eternal pure intelligence, who sees 
nothing beside the Self for which there are no objects. 
Hence it follows that perfect knowledge is not purposeless. 
— To illustrate this view the Sutra introduces a comparison 
' like light,' &c Just as the light of the sun or the moon 
which pervades the entire space becomes straight or bent 
as it were when the limiting adjuncts with which it is in 
contact,such as a finger, for instance, are straight or bent, but 
does not really become so; and just as the ether, although 
imagined to move as it were when jars are being moved, 
does not really move; and as the sun does not tremble, 



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II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 47. 65 

although its image trembles when you shake the cup filled 
with water in which the sun's light is reflected ; thus the 
Lord also is not affected by pain, although pain be felt 
by that part of him which is called the individual soul, 
is presented by Nescience, and limited by the buddhi and 
other adjuncts. That also the soul's undergoing pain is 
due to Nescience only, we have already explained. Accord- 
ingly the Vedanta-texts teach that, when the soul's individual 
state, due to Nescience, is sublated, it becomes Brahman, 
' Thou art that &c* — Thus there is no occasion to conclude 
that the highest Self is affected by the pain of the individual 
soul. 

47. And the Smrztis state (that). 

Vyasa and others state in their smrrtis that the highest 
Self is not afflicted by the pain of the individual soul, 'That 
highest Self is said to be eternal, devoid of qualities, nor is 
it stained by the fruits of actions any more than a lotus 
leaf by water. But that other Self whose essence is action 
is connected with bondage and release ; again and again 
it is joined with the seventeenfold aggregate 1 .' — On the 
ground of the particle 'and' (in the Stitra) we have to supply 
' and scripture also records that' So, for instance, ' One of 
them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating ' 
(Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), and 'The one Self within all things is 
never contaminated by the misery of the world, being him- 
self without ' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 11). 

Here the purvapakshin raises a new objection. — If there 
is only one internal Self of all beings, what room is there 
for permissions and prohibitions, worldly as well as Vedic ? 
You must not reject this objection on the ground of your 
having proved that the individual soul is a part of the Lord, 
and that thus injunctions and prohibitions may, without any 
mutual interference, apply to the soul which is different from 
the Lord. For there are other scriptural passages which teach 
that the soul is not different from the Lord, and therefore 
not a part of him, as, for instance, the following ones : 

1 I. e. the subde body consisting of the ten sense-organs, the five 
prawas, manas, and buddhi. 

[38] F 



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66 vedAnta-sOtras. 



' Having sent forth that he entered into it ' (Taitt. Up. 11,6) ; 
' There is no other seer but he ' (Br*. Up. Ill, 7, 23) ; ' From 
death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity ' 
(Br i. Up. IV, 4, 19) ; « Thou art that ' (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; 
' I am Brahman ' (Br/. Up. I, 4, 10). Should you say that 
just from this concurrence of intimations of difference on the 
one hand and non-difference on the other hand it follows 
that the soul is a part of the Lord, we reply that such might 
be the case if the intention of the texts were to teach differ- 
ence as well as non-difference. But the fact is that the texts 
aim solely at teaching non-difference, because through the 
knowledge of Brahman being the universal Self the highest 
end of man is obtained. About difference on the other 
hand mere occasional statements (anuvada) are made as 
about something already established naturally (i.e. apart 
from scripture). Moreover, we have already maintained 
that Brahman as not composed of parts can have no parts. 
Hence it follows that the one highest Self which is within 
all beings appears as individual soul, and it therefore remains 
to show how injunctions and prohibitions are possible. 

48. (The possibility of) injunctions and prohibi- 
tions (results) from the connexion (of the Self) with 
bodies ; as in the case of light and so on. 

Passages such as ' He is to approach his wife at the 
proper time,' and ' he is not to approach the wife of his 
guru,' are examples of permissions (or injunctions) and 
prohibitions ; or again passages such as ' He is to kill the 
animal devoted to Agnishomau,' and ' He is not to hurt any 
being.' Corresponding examples from ordinary life are : 
' A friend is to be served,' and ' Enemies are to be shunned.' 
Permissions and prohibitions of this kind are possible, be- 
cause the Self although one only is connected with various 
bodies. — Of what kind then is that connexion ? — It consists 
in the origination in the Self of the erroneous notion that 
the Self is the aggregate consisting of the body and so on. 
This erroneous notion is seen to prevail in all living beings, 
and finds its expression in thoughts such as the following : 
; / go,' ' / come,' ' / am blind,' ' / am not blind,' '/ am con- 



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ii adhyaya, 3 pAda, 48. 67 

fused,' ' / am not confused.' That erroneous notion cannot 
be removed by anything but perfect knowledge, and before 
the latter supervenes, it remains spread among all living 
beings. And thus, although the Self must be admitted to 
be one only, injunctions and prohibitions are possible owing 
to the difference effected by its connexion with bodies and 
other limiting adjuncts, the products of Nescience. — It then 
follows that for him who has obtained perfect knowledge, 
injunctions and prohibitions are purportless. — No, we reply, 
(they are not purportless for him, but they do not refer to 
him), since to him who has obtained the highest aim no 
obligation can apply. For obligations are imposed with 
reference to things to be avoided or desired ; how then 
should he, who sees nothing, either to be wished or avoided, 
beyond the universal Self, stand under any obligation? 
The Self certainly cannot be enjoined on the Self. — Should 
it be said that injunctions and prohibitions apply to all 
those who discern that the soul is something different from 
the body (and therefore also to him who possesses perfect 
knowledge), we reply that (such an assertion is too wide, 
since) obligation depends on a man's imagining his Self to 
be (actually) connected with the body. It is true that 
obligation exists for him only who views the soul as some- 
thing different from the body ; but fundamentally all obli- 
gation is an erroneous imagination existing in the case of 
him only who does not see that his Self is no more con- 
nected with a body than the ether is with jars and the 
like. For him, on the other hand, who does not see that 
connexion no obligation exists, much less, therefore, for him 
who discerns the unity of the Self. — Nor does it result from 
the absence of obligation, that he who has arrived at perfect 
knowledge can act as he likes ; for in all cases it is only the 
wrong imagination (as to the Self's connexion with a body) 
that impels to action, and that imagination is absent in the 
case of him who has reached perfect knowledge. — From all 
this it follows that injunctions and prohibitions are based on 
the Self s connexion with the body ; ' as in the case of 
light.' The case under discussion is analogous to cases 
such as the following : Light is one only, and yet we shun 

F 2 



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68 vedAnta-sOtras. 



a fire which has consumed dead bodies, not any other fire. 
The sun is one only ; yet we shun only that part of his 
light which shines on unholy places, not that part which 
falls on pure ground. Some things consisting of earth are 
desired, e.g. diamonds and beryls; other things likewise 
consisting of earth are shunned, e.g. dead bodies. The 
urine and dung of cows are considered pure and used as 
such ; those of other animals are shunned. And many 
similar cases. 

49. And on account of the non-extension (of the 
individual soul), there is no confusion (of the results 
of actions). 

Well, let it be granted that injunctions and prohibitions 
are valid, because the Self although one is joined with 
particular bodies. — From the admission, however, of the 
unity of the Self it follows that there must be a con- 
fusion of the fruits of actions, there being only one master 
(i.e. one soul to enjoy the fruits of action). — This is not so, 
we reply, because there is no extension of the acting and 
enjoying Self, i.e. no connexion on its part with all bodies. 
For, as we have shown, the individual soul depends on its 
adjuncts, and owing to the non-extension of those adjuncts 
there is also non-extension of the soul. Hence there is no 
confusion of actions or fruits of actions. 

50. And (the individual soul is) an appearance 
(reflection) only. 

And that individual soul is to be considered a mere 
appearance of the highest Self, like the reflection of the 
sun in the water ; it is neither directly that (i. e. the highest 
Self), nor a different thing. Hence just as, when one re- 
flected image of the sun trembles, another reflected image 
does not on that account tremble also ; so, when one soul 
is connected with actions and results of actions, another 
soul is not on that account connected likewise. There is 
therefore no confusion of actions and results. And as that 
' appearance ' is the effect of Nescience, it follows that the 
sawsara which is based on it (the appearance) is also the 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 50. 69 

effect of Nescience, so that from the removal of the latter 
there results the cognition of the soul being in reality 
nothing but Brahman. 

For those, on the other hand, who maintain that there 
are many Selfs and all of them all-pervading, it follows 
that there must be a confusion of actions and results. — In 
what way? — According to the opinion of the Sankhyas 
there exist many all-pervading Selfs, whose nature is pure 
intelligence, devoid of qualities and of unsurpassable ex- 
cellence. For the common purpose of all of them there 
exists the pradhana, through which the souls obtain enjoy- 
ment and release. — According to the followers of Ka«ada 
there exist many all-pervading Selfs, but they are, like so 
many jars or stools, mere substances and unintelligent in 
themselves. With those Selfs there co-operate the internal 
organs (manas), atomic and also unintelligent. From the 
conjunction of these two classes of substances, viz. the 
Selfs and the internal organs, there spring the nine special 
qualities of the Selfs, viz. desire, &C 1 These qualities 
inhere in the individual Selfs separately, without any 
confusion, and that constitutes the sawzsara-state. Final 
release, on the other hand, consists in the absolute non- 
origination of those nine qualities. 

With regard to these opinions we remark that, as far as 
the Sankhyas are concerned, their doctrine that all Selfs 
are of the nature of intelligence, and that there is no 
difference between them in the point of proximity (to the 
pradhana), &c. 2 , implies that, if one Self is connected with 
pleasure and pain, all Selfs will be so connected. — Well but, 
the Sankhya might reply, a difference (in the connexion 
of the individual Selfs with pleasure and pain) may result 
from the circumstance that the activity of the pradhana 
aims at the isolation (emancipation) of the Selfs 3 . Other- 



1 Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, endeavour, merit, 
demerit, and bh&vanS. 

' The &c. implies the non-activity (audasinya) of the Selfs. 

9 And therefore proceeds in a special definite direction capable 
of effecting in the end the emancipation of some particular Self. 



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70 vedAnta-sOtras. 



wise the activity of the pradhana would serve no other 
end but to manifest the pradhana's power, in consequence 
whereof no final release would ever take place. — This argu- 
mentation, we reply, is not sound. For we have no right 
to assume a difference which has for its only motive the 
accomplishment of an end desirable (to us, viz. the emanci- 
pation of the Selfs), but we must rather bring forward 
some proof for that difference. If no such proof can be 
brought forward, the desired end, i.e. the emancipation 
of the soul, must be supposed not to take place ; while 
at the same time the absence of any cause of difference 
establishes the confusion of actions and their results. — 
Against the Ka«adas we urge that if, on their theory, the 
internal organ is connected with one soul, it must in the 
same way be connected with all other souls as well, as 
there is no difference in the point of proximity, &0 1 
Hence, there being no difference of cause and consequently 
no difference of effect, it follows that, when one soul is 
connected with pleasure and pain, all souls are thus con- 
nected. — But may not the limitation (of actions and their 
results) be caused by the unseen principle (adrj'sh/a) ? By 
no means, the following Sutra replies. 

51. On account of the unseen principle being non- 
limitative. 

While there are many souls, all-pervading like ether, 
and in equal proximity to all bodies from within as well 
as without, the so-called unseen principle (adrah/a), which 
is of the nature of religious merit or demerit, is acquired 
through mind, speech, and body (i. e. thoughts, words, and 
actions). — Now, according to the Sankhyas, that principle 
inheres not in the Self, but abides in the pradhana and 
cannot, on account of the pradhana being the same (for 
all souls), be the limitative cause of the enjoyment of 
pleasure and pain for each individual Self. — And according 
to the Kawadas also the unseen principle is due to the 
non-particular conjunction of the Selfs with the internal 

1 The ' &c.' implies substantiality and so on. 

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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 53. 71 

organs, and as thus there is no limitative reason for any 
particular adrrsh/a belonging to any particular soul, the 
doctrine is open to the same objection. — Well, but there 
are at work in every particular Self resolutions, &c, such 
as, ' I wish to obtain that result,' ' I wish to avoid that 
other result,' ' I am striving for that purpose,' ' I wish to 
act in that way,' &c. &c, and these may, we assume, 
define the relation of ownership in which particular Selfs 
stand to particular adr/sh/as. — This objection is negatived 
in the following Sutra. 

52. And this is also the case in resolutions, &c. 

The objection pointed out before applies also to resolu- 
tions, &c, for they also are made through the non- 
particular conjunction of the internal organ and the Self, 
in proximity to all Selfs. Hence they also cannot furnish 
a reason for limitation. 

53. (Should it be said that distinction of pleasure, 
pain, &c, results) from (difference of) place ; we say 
no, on account of the (Selfs) being within (all 
things). 

Here it might be objected that, although all Selfs are 
all-pervading, yet their conjunction with the internal organ 
which is seated in the body must take place in that part 
of each Self which is limited by the body ; and that thus 
there may result from difference of locality a limitative 
distinction of resolutions, &c, of the adrtsh/a, and of 
pleasure and pain. — This also, we reply, is not possible 
' on account of the being within.' For, as being equally 
infinite, all Selfs are within all bodies. Thus the VaLre- 
shikas have no right whatever to assume any part of the 
Self to be limited by the body. And if they do assume 
such a part of the Self which in reality is without any 
parts, that part because merely assumptive will be in- 
capable of limiting a real effect. Moreover, it is impossible 
to limit the body which originates in proximity to all 
(omnipresent) Selfs to one particular Self to the exclusion 
of all others. Moreover, on the doctrine of limitation due 



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•j 2 vedAnta-sOtras. 



to difference of place, it would follow that sometimes two 
Selfs enjoying the same pleasure or pain might effect their 
fruition by one and the same body, since it may happen 
that the unseen principle of two Selfs occupies the same 
place. For we may observe, e. g. that after Devadatta's 
body has moved away from a certain spot in which Deva- 
datta had enjoyed a certain amount of pleasure or pain, 
and the body of Ya^tfadatta has moved into that very same 
place, Ya£-»adatta enjoys an equal amount of pleasure or 
pain ; a thing which (on the theory discussed) could not 
happen if the unseen principles of the two men did not 
occupy the same place. From the doctrine that the unseen 
principles occupy fixed places it would, moreover, follow 
that no enjoyment of the heavenly world, &c. can take 
place ; for the adrtsh/a is effected in definite places such 
as e. g. the body of a Brahmawa, and the enjoyment of the 
heavenly world is bound to a definite different place. — It 
further 1 is impossible to maintain that there exist many 
all-pervading Selfs 2 , as there are no parallel instances. 
Mention if you can a plurality of other things occupying 
the same place! — You will perhaps bring forward colour 
and so on 3 . But we refuse to accept that instance as 
parallel, because colour, &c, although non-different in so 
far as they are attributes of one substance, yet differ 
through their essential characteristics. On the other hand 
there is no difference of characteristics between your 
(alleged) many Selfs. If you say that a difference of 
characteristics can be established on the ground of the 
ultimate special differences (of all substances), we point 
out that you implicate yourself in a logical circle as the 
assumption of difference of characteristics and the as- 
sumption of ultimate differences presuppose each other. 



1 And this is an attack on the basis of the position of the Sankhyas 
as well as of the Vaueshikas. 

9 Which being equally omnipresent would all occupy the same 
space. 

* Many attributes such as colour, smell, touch, &c. reside in one 
place as belonging to one material object. 



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ii adhyAya, 3 pAda, 53. 73 

Should you adduce as parallel instances the all-pervading- 
ness of ether, &c. (the ' &c.' implying place and time), we 
reply that their all-pervadingness is not proved for him 
who holds the doctrine of Brahman and looks upon ether 
and so on as mere effects. 

All which establishes the conclusion that the only doc- 
trine not open to any objections is the doctrine of the unity 
of the Self. 



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74 vedAnta-sOtras. 



FOURTH PADA. 
Reverence to the highest Self! 

i. Thus the vital airs. 

In the third pada it has been shown that a conflict of 
Vedic passages as to ether, &c, does not exist. The same 
is now done in this fourth pada with regard to the vital 
airs. On the one hand the chapters treating of the origin of 
things do not record an origin of the vital airs ; so e.g. 
(Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3) ' It sent forth fire,' &c. ; and (Taitt. Up. 
II, 1) 'From that Self sprang ether,' &c. On the other 
hand it is said expressly in some places that the vital airs 
were not produced. The following passage, e.g. 'Non- 
being indeed was this in the beginning ; they say : what 
was that non-being? those rishis indeed were the non-being 
in the beginning ; they say : who are those r*'shis ? the 
vital airs indeed are the mhis ' (Sat. Br. VI, 1, 1, 1), states 
that the vital airs existed before the origin of things. — In 
other passages again we read of the origin of the vital 
airs also, so e.g. 'As small sparks come forth from fire, 
thus do all vital airs come forth from that Self (Br*'. Up. 
II, 1, 20); 'From that is born the vital air, mind, and all 
organs of sense' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) ; 'The seven vital airs 
also spring from him ' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8) ; ' He sent forth 
the vital air ; from the vital air jraddha, ether, air, light, 
water, earth, sense, mind, food ' (Pr. Up. VI, 4). Hence 
as there is a conflict of scriptural passages, and as no 
reason can be made out for deciding in favour of either 
alternative, the purvapakshin thinks that either no opinion 
can be formed, or that the passages relative to the origin 
of the vital airs must be taken in a metaphorical sense, since 
scripture expressly states the prawas to have existed before 
the creation. 

In reply to this the author of the Sutras says, ' thus the 



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ii adhyAya, 4 pAda, i. 75 

pra«as.' — What then, it will be asked, is the fitness of the 
word ' thus,' as there is no point of comparison with the 
matter under discussion ? The matter under discussion at 
the conclusion of the preceding pada was the refutation 
of those who maintain a plurality of omnipresent Selfs, and 
with this no comparison can be instituted because there is 
no similarity. For a comparison is possible only where 
there is similarity ; as when we say, e.g. ' as a lion so is Bala- 
varman.' Possibly it might be said that the comparison is 
meant to intimate similarity with the admh/a ; the meaning 
being that as the adr/sh/a is not limited because it is pro- 
duced in proximity to all Selfs, so the prawas also are not 
limited with regard to all the different Selfs. But, on that 
explanation, the Sutra would be an idle repetition, as it has 
already been explained that that absence of limitation is due 
to the non-limitation of bodies. — Nor can the pra«as be com- 
pared with the individual soul, because that would be con- 
trary to the conclusion about to be established. For it has 
been shown that the individual soul is without an origin, 
while the intention is to declare that the pranas have an 
origin. Hence it appears that the word ' so ' is devoid of 
connexion. — Not so, we reply. A connexion may be 
established by means of a comparison based on the exem- 
plifying passages. Under that category fall those passages 
which state the origin of the priwas, as e. g. ' From that 
Self come forth all prawas, all worlds, all gods, all beings' 
(Br*. Up. II, i, 20) ; which passage means that as the worlds 
and so on are produced from the highest Brahman so the 
pranas also. Such passages also as (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) 
' From him are born pra«a, mind and all organs of sense, 
ether, air, light, water, and the earth the support of all/ are 
to be considered as intimating that the origin of the pra»as 
is analogous to that of the ether, &c. — Or else, as a con- 
nexion with a somewhat remote object of comparison is 
resorted to in such cases as the one treated of in Pu. Mi. 
Su. Ill, 4, 32 (' and the accident in drinking Soma, in the 
same manner') 1 , we may construe our Sutra in the following 

1 The ' tadvat ' in the quoted Sutra refers not to the immediately 
preceding adhikarawa but to Sutra III, 4, 28. 



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j6 vedAnta-sCtras. 



way : in the same way as ether and so on, which are men- 
tioned in the beginning of the preceding pada, are under- 
stood to be effects of the highest Brahman, so the prawas 
also are effects of the highest Brahman. And if it be 
asked what reason we have for assuming the prawas to be 
so, we reply : the fact of this being stated by scripture. — 
But it has been shown above that in some places the 
origin of the prawas is not mentioned. — That is of no 
weight, we reply, as it is mentioned in other places. For 
the circumstance of a thing not being stated in some 
places has no power to invalidate what is stated about it 
in other places. Hence, on account of equality of scrip- 
tural statement, it is proper to maintain that the prawas 
also are produced in the same way as ether and so on. 

2. On account of the impossibility of a secondary 
(origin of the pra#as). 

Against the objection that the origin of the pra«as must 
be understood in a secondary sense because the text states 
that they existed before the origin of the world, the Sutra- 
kara declares ' on account of the impossibility of a 
secondary origin.' The statement as to the origin of the 
prawas cannot be taken in a secondary sense because 
therefrom would result the abandonment of a general 
assertion. For after the text has asserted that the know- 
ledge of everything depends on the knowledge of one 
(' What is that through which when it is known everything 
else becomes known? ' Mu. Up. I, i, 3), it goes on to say, 
in order to prove that assertion, that ' From him is born 
pra«a,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3). Now the assertion is made 
good only if the whole world including the prawas is an 
effect of Brahman, because then there is no effect in- 
dependent of the material cause ; if on the other hand the 
statement as to the origin of the prawas were taken in a 
secondary sense, the assertion would thereby be stultified. 
The text, moreover, makes some concluding statements 
about the matter asserted, • The Person is all this, sacrifice, 
penance, Brahman, the highest Immortal' (II, 1, 10), and 
' Brahman alone is all this ; it is the Best.' — That same 



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ii adhyAya, 4 pAda, 3. 77 

assertion is to be connected with such passages as the 
following, ' When we see, hear, perceive, and know the Self, 
then all this is known' (Br*. Up. II, 4, 5). — How then 
have we to account for the statement that the pra«as 
existed before the creation ? — That statement, we reply, 
does not refer to the fundamental causal substance ; for we 
ascertain from scriptural passages, such as Mu. Up. II, 1, 2 
(' That heavenly Person is without breath and without mind, 
pure, higher than the high Imperishable'), that the funda- 
mental causal substance is devoid of all distinctions such 
as breath and the like. We must rather view the statement 
about the existence of the prawas before the creation as 
having for its object a subordinate causal substance l , and 
being made with reference to the effects of the latter only. 
For it is known from .Sruti and Smrrti that even in the 
universe of evolved things many states of being may stand 
to each other in the relation of causal substance and effect. 
— In the adhikarawa treating of the ether there occurred a 
Sutra (composed of the same syllables) ' gauwyasambhavat,' 
which as being the purvapaksha-sutra had to be explained 
as ' gaunt asambhavat,' ' the statement about the origin 
of ether must be taken in a secondary sense on account of 
the impossibility (of the primary sense).' There the final 
conclusion was established by means of the abandonment 
of the general assertion. Here on the other hand the Sutra 
is the Siddh&nta Sutra and we have therefore explained 
it as meaning ' on account of the impossibility of a secondary 
meaning.' — Those who explain the present Sutra in the 
same way as the previous Sutra overlook the fact of the 
general assertion being abandoned (viz. if the passages 
referring to the origin of the pri«as were taken in a 
secondary sense). 

3. On account of that (word which indicates origin) 
being enunciated at first (in connexion with the 
pra»as). 

That the scriptural statement about the origin of the 
1 Such as Hira»yagarbha. 

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78 vedAnta-sOtras. 



pra»as is to be taken in its literal sense just as the state- 
ments about the ether, &c, appears from that circumstance 
also that the one word which (in the passage from the Mu. 
Up.) indicates origination, viz. ' is born ' (g&yate), is in the 
first place connected with the prawas and has afterwards to 
be joined with ether, &c, also (' from him is born breath, 
mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air,' &c). Now as it is 
a settled matter that the phrase ' is born ' must be taken in 
its primary sense with reference to ether and so on, it 
follows that the origin of the pra#as also to which the same 
word is applied must be understood as a real origin. For 
it would be impossible to decide that a word enunciated 
once only in one chapter and one sentence, and connected 
with many other words, has in some cases to be taken in its 
primary sense, and in others in a secondary sense ; for such 
a decision would imply want of uniformity. — So likewise in 
the passage, ' He sent forth prawa, from prawa .rraddha,' &c. 
(Pr. Up. VI, 4), the phrase 'he sent forth' which the text 
exhibits in conjunction with the prlwas has to be carried 
on to .rraddha and the other things which have an origin. — 
The same reasoning holds good in those cases where the 
word expressing origination occurs at the end and has to be 
connected with the preceding words ; as e.g. in the passage 
ending 'all beings come forth from the Self,' where the 
word ' come forth ' must be connected with the pra»as, &c, 
mentioned in the earlier part of the sentence. 

4. Because speech is preceded by that (viz. fire 
and the other elements). 

Although in the chapter, ' That sent forth fire/ &c, the 
origin of the prawas is not mentioned, the origin of the 
three elements, fire, water, and earth only being stated, 
nevertheless, the fact of the text declaring that speech, 
prana, and mind presuppose fire, water, and earth — which in 
their turn have Brahman for their causal substance — proves 
that they — and, by parity of reasoning, all pra«as — have 
sprung from Brahman. That speech, pra«a, and mind 
presuppose fire, water, and earth is told in the same chapter, 
* For truly, my child, mind consists of earth, breath of water, 



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ii adhvAya, 4 pAda, 5. 79 

speech of fire ' (Kh. Up. VI, 5, 4). If their consisting of 
earth and so on is taken literally, it follows at once that 
they have sprung from Brahman. And if it be taken in a 
metaphorical sense only, yet, as the sentence forms part of 
the chapter which treats of the evolution of names and 
forms effected by Brahman ; and as the introductory phrase 
runs, • That by which we hear what is not heard ' (Kh. Up. 
VI, 1,3); and as the concluding passage is ' In it all that 
exists has its Self (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); and as the matter is 
moreover known from other scriptural passages ; we under- 
stand that also the statement about mind and so on 
consisting of earth, &c, is meant to teach that they are 
products of Brahman. — It is therefore an established con- 
clusion that the pranas also are effects of Brahman. 

5. (The pra#as are) seven, on account of this 
being understood (from scriptural passages) and of 
the specification (of those seven). 

So far we have shown that there is in reality no conflict 
of scriptural passages regarding the origin of the pra«as. 
It will now be shown that there is also no conflict regarding 
their number. The chief vital air (mukhya pra«a) will be 
discussed later on. For the present the SAtrakara defines 
the number of the other prawas. A doubt arises here 
owing to the conflicting nature of the scriptural passages. 
In one place seven pra«as are mentioned, ' The seven pra«as 
spring from him' (Mu. Up. II, J, 8). In another place 
eight prawas are mentioned as being grahas, ' Eight grahas 
there are and eight atigrahas' (Br*. Up. Ill, 2, 1). In 
another place nine, ' Seven are the pra«as of the head, two 
the lower ones ' (Taitt. Samh. V, 3, a, 5). Sometimes ten, 
'Nine pra«as indeed are in men, the navel is the tenth' 
(Taitt. Samh. V, 3, 2, 3). Sometimes eleven, ' Ten are these 
praxtas in man, and Atman is the eleventh' (Br*. Up. Ill, 
9, 4). Sometimes twelve, ' All touches have their centre in 
the skin,' &c. (Br*. Up. II, 4, 11). Sometimes thirteen, 
• The eye and what can be seen,' &c. (Pr. Up. IV, 8). — Thus 
the scriptural passages disagree about the number of the 
prawas. 



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8o vedAnta-sCtras. 



Here the purvapakshin maintains that the pra«as are in 
reality seven in number, on account of understanding, i. e. 
because they are understood to be so many, from passages 
such as ' The seven pra«as spring from him,' &c. These 
seven prawas are moreover specified in the other passage 
quoted above, ' Seven indeed are the pr£«as of the head.' 
— But in the same passage we meet with the following 
reiteration, ' Resting in the cave they are placed there seven 
and seven,' which intimates that there are pra«as in addition 
to the seven. — No matter, we reply ; that reiteration is 
made with reference to the plurality of men, and means 
that each man has seven pra«as ; it does not mean that 
there are two sets of seven pra«as each of different nature. 
— But, another objection will be raised, other scriptural 
passages speak of the prawas as eight in number ; how then 
should they be seven ? — True, we reply, the number of eight 
also is stated ; but on account of the contradictory nature 
of the statements we have to decide in favour of either of 
the two numbers ; hence we decide in favour of the number 
seven, in deference to the (simpler) assumption of a low 
number, and consider the statements of other numbers to 
refer to the difference of modifications (of the fundamental 
seven priwas). — To this argumentation the next Sutra replies. 

6. But (there are also, in addition to the seven 
pra»as mentioned,) the hands and so on. This being 
a settled matter, therefore (we must) not (conclude) 
thus (viz. that there are seven pra«as only). 

In addition to the seven pra»as scripture mentions other 
pra«as also, such as the hands, &c, ' The hand is one graha 
and that is seized by work as the atigraha ; for with the 
hands one does work ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 2, 8), and similar pas- 
sages. And as it is settled that there are more than seven, 
the number seven may be explained as being contained 
within the greater number. For wherever there is a conflict 
between a higher and a lower number, the higher number 
has to be accepted because the lower one is contained within 
it ; while the higher is not contained within the lower. We 
therefore must not conclude that, in deference to the lower 



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ii adhyAya, 4 pAda, 6. 81 

number, seven pra«as have to be assumed, but rather that 
there are eleven prawas, in deference to the higher number. 
This conclusion is confirmed by one of the passages quoted, 
* Ten are these prawas in man, and Atman is the eleventh.' 
By the word Atman we have to understand the internal 
organ, on account of its ruling over the organs. Should it 
be objected that scripture also mentions numbers higher 
than eleven, viz. twelve and thirteen, we admit that, but 
remark that there are no objective effects in addition to the 
eleven (well-known) objective effects on account of which 
additional organs would have to be assumed. There are five 
distinctions of buddhi having for their respective objects 
sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, and on their account 
there are the five intellectual organs ; again there are five 
classes of action, viz. speaking, taking, going, evacuation, 
and begetting, and on their account there are the five organs 
of action ; finally there is the manas which has all things 
for its objects and extends to the past, the present, and the 
future ; it is one only but has various functions. On account 
of the plurality of its functions we find it designated by 
different terms ii\ different places, as manas or buddhi or 
ahamkara or £itta. Thus scripture also after having enu- 
merated the various functions such as desire, &c, says at 
the end, 'All this is manas only.' — That passage again which 
speaks of the prawas of the head as seven means four prawas 
only, which on account of the plurality of their places may 
be counted as seven ; viz. the two ears, the two eyes, the 
two nostrils, and speech. — Nor can it be maintained that 
there are in reality only so many (i.e. seven), the other 
prawas being mere functions of the seven ; for the functions 
of the hands and so on are absolutely different (from the 
functions of the seven senses admitted by the purvapakshin). 
— Again, in the passage ' Nine pranas indeed are in man, the 
navel is the tenth,' the expression ' ten pra«as ' is used to 
denote the different openings of the human body, not the 
difference of nature of the pranas, as we conclude from the 
navel being mentioned as the eleventh. For no pra«a is 
known that bears the name of navel ; but the navel as being 
one of the special abodes of the chief pra«a is here enu- 

[38] G 



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82 vedAnta-sOtras. 



merated as a tenth prawa. — In some places so and so many 
are counted for the purpose of meditation ; in other places 
so and so many for the purpose of illustration l . As the 
statements concerning the number of the pra«as are of so 
varying a nature we must therefore distinguish in each case 
what the object of the statement is. Meanwhile it remains 
a settled conclusion that that statement which makes the 
pra«as to be eleven is authoritative, on account of the 
objective effects (being eleven also). 

The two Sutras (referring to the number of the pranas) 

may be construed in the following manner also. The 

prawas are seven because scripture mentions the going 

(gati) of seven only, ' When he thus departs life departs 

after him, and when life thus departs all the other pra»as 8 

depart after it ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 2). — But, it may be objected, 

this passage says 'all the other prawas ; ' how then does it 

declare the going of seven only ? — The Sutra replies, ' on 

account of their being specified.' Seven senses only, from 

seeing up to feeling, are specified there because so many 

only are under discussion ; as we see from the enumeration 

given in the passage, ' When that person in the eye turns 

away then he ceases to know any forms. He has become 

one they say, he does not see ' &c. The word ' all ' refers 

here only to what is under discussion, i.e. only to the seven 

prawas mentioned before, not to any other. Analogously 

when we say ' all the Brahmawas have been fed,' we mean 

only those Brahmawas who have been invited and concern 

us at the time, not any other. — If it be objected that the 

passage quoted mentions understanding (v^wana) as the 

eighth thing departing, and that we therefore have no right 

to speak of the departing of seven only, we reply that 

manas and understanding differ not in essential nature but 

only in function, and that on this account we are entitled 

to speak of seven pra»as only. — The answer to this 

1 Sapta prini/t prabhavantfty ader gatitn aha kvatid iti, ash/au 
graha ityader gatiw su/tayati gatim iti. An. Gi. 

* I.e. seeing, smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, feeling, and 
the manas. 



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ii adhyAya, 4 pAda, 6. 83 

purvapaksha is as follows. — In addition to the seven 
senses, other pra«as also, such as the hands, are known 
to exist, as we see from such passages as ' The hands are 
one graha,' &c. (Bri. Up. Ill, a, 8). By their being a graha 
(seizer) is meant that they are bonds by which the indivi- 
dual soul (kshetra£-£a) is tied. Now the individual soul is 
tied not in one body only, but is equally tied in other bodies 
also. Hence it follows that that bond called graha (i.e. 
among other things the hands) moves over into other bodies 
also. Smr/ti also (' He — the Self— is joined with the aggre- 
gate of eight, comprising breath, &c. 1 , as his mark ; his 
bondage consists in being bound by it, his release in being 
freed from it') shows that the Self is, previous to final 
release, not freed from the bonds called grahas. And also 
in the enumeration of the senses and their objects given 
by the Atharvawa Upanishad (' The eye and what can be 
seen,' &c, Pr. Up. IV, 8), the organs of action such as the 
hands and so on, together with their objects, are specified 
as well, 'the hands and what can be grasped ; the member and 
what can be delighted ; the anus and what can be evacuated ; 
the feet and what can be walked.' Moreover the passage, 
' These ten vital breaths and atman as the eleventh ; when 
they depart from this mortal body they make us cry' (Bri. 
Up. Ill, 9,4), shows that eleven prawas depart from the body. 
— Moreover the word ' all ' (which occurs in the passage, Bri. 
Up. IV, 4, 2) must, because connected with the word 'pra«as,' 
denote all prawas, and cannot, on the ground of general sub- 
ject-matter, be limited to the seven prawas ; for a direct state- 
ment has greater force than the subject-matter. Even in the 
analogous sentence, 'all Brahmawas have been fed,' we have, 
on the ground of the words, to understand all Brahmawas 
living on the earth ; but because it is impossible to feed all 
Brahma«as in the latter sense, we accept that meaning of 

1 The eightfold aggregate of which the Self is freed in final 
release only comprises the five prawas (vital airs), the pentad of the 
five subtle elements, the pentad of the organs of intellect, the pentad 
of the organs of action, the tetrad of internal organs (manas, &c), 
avidvi, desire (kama), and karman. 

G 2 



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84 VEbANTA-stiTRAS. 



' all,' according to which it denotes all invited Brahmawas. 
In our case on the other hand there is no reason whatever 
for narrowing the meaning of ' all.' — Hence the word 'all ' 
includes all prawas without exception. Nothing on the 
other hand prevents the enumeration of seven pra«as being 
taken as illustrative only. It is therefore an established 
conclusion, resting on the number of the effects as well 
as on Vedic statement, that there are eleven pra«as. 

7. And (they are) minute. 

The author of the Sutras adds another characteristic 
quality of the pranas. The prawas under discussion must 
be viewed as minute. By their minuteness we have to 
understand subtilty and limited size ; but not atomic size, 
as otherwise they would be incapable of producing effects 
which extend over the whole body. They must be subtle ; 
for if they were big the persons surrounding a dying man 
would see them coming out from the body at the moment 
of death, as a snake comes out of its hole. They must be 
limited ; for if they were all-pervading the scriptural 
statements as to their passing out of the body, going and 
coming, would be contradicted thereby, and it could not 
be established that the individual soul is ' the essence of 
the qualities of that ' (i. e. the manas ; cp. II, 3, 29). 
Should it be said that they may be all-pervading, but at 
the same time appear as functions (vritti) in the body only, 
we rejoin that only a function can constitute an instru- 
ment. Whatever effects perception, may it be a function 
or something else, just that is an instrument for us. The 
disagreement is therefore about a name only, and the 
assumption of the instruments (prawas) being all-pervading 
is thus purposeless. — Hence we decide that the prawas are 
subtle and of limited size. 

8. And the best (i.e. the chief vital air). 

" The Sutra extends to the chief vital air (mukhya pra«a) 
a quality already asserted of the other pranas, viz. being an 
effect of Brahman. — But, an objection may be raised, it has 
already been stated of all pra»as without difference that 
they are effects of Brahman ; e.g. the passage, ' From him 



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ii adhyAya, 4 pAda, 9. 85 

is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense* (Mu. Up. II, 
1, 3), states the origin of pra«a separately from the senses 
and the manas; and there are other passages also such 
as « He sent forth pra«a ' (Pr. Up. VI, 4). Why then the 
formal extension? — We reply: For the purpose of re- 
moving further doubt. For in the Nasadiya-sukta whose 
subject is Brahman there occurs the following mantra : 
' There was neither death nor the Immortal ; nor mani- 
festation of either night or day. By its own law the One 
was breathing without wind ; there was nothing differ- 
ent from that or higher than it ' (J?i. Sa«th. X, 1 29, 2). 
Here the words, 'was breathing,' which denote the 
proper function of breath, intimate that breath existed as 
it were before the creation. And therefrom it might be 
concluded that prana is not produced ; an idea which the 
Sutrakara discards by the formal extension (to pra«a of 
the quality of having originated from Brahman). — Moreover 
the word ' breathed ' does not intimate that pra«a existed 
before the creation ; for in the first place it is qualified by 
the addition 'without wind,' and in the second place 
scriptural passages — such as ' He is without breath, without 
mind, pure ' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2) — declare expressly that the 
causal substance is without any qualifications such as 
prawa and so on. Hence the word ' breathed ' has merely 
the purpose of setting forth the existence of the cause. — 
The term 'the best' (employed in the Sutra) denotes the 
chief vital air, according to the declaration of scripture, 
' Breath indeed is the oldest and the best ' (Kh. Up. V, 1, 1). 
The breath is the oldest because it begins its function from 
the moment when the child is conceived ; the senses of 
hearing, &c, on the other hand, begin to act only when 
their special seats, viz. the ears, &c, are formed, and they 
are thus not 'the oldest' The designation 'the best' 
belongs to the pra«a on account of its superior qualities 
and on account of the passage, ' We shall not be able to 
live without thee' (Br/. Up. VI, 1, 13). 

9. (The chief pri#a is) neither air nor function, 
on account of its being mentioned separately. 



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86 vedAnta-sCtras. 



An inquiry is now started concerning the nature of that 
chief pra«a. — The purvapakshin maintains that the pra«a 
is, according to StuVi, nothing but air. For .Sruti says, 
' Breath is air ; that air assuming five forms is pra«a, 
apana, vyana, udana, samana.' — Or else the purvapaksha 
may be formulated according to the view of another 
philosophical doctrine, and pra«a may be considered as 
the combined function of all organs. For so the followers 
of another doctrine (viz. the Sankhyas) teach, 'The five 
airs, pra«a,&c, are the common function of the instruments 1 .' 

To this we reply that the pra«a is neither air nor the 
function of an organ ; for it is mentioned separately. 
From air prawa is distinguished in the following passage, 
' Breath indeed is the fourth foot of Brahman. That foot 
shines as Agni with its light and warms.' If prawa were 
mere air, it would not be mentioned separately from air. — 
Thus it is also mentioned separately from the functions of 
the organs ; for the texts enumerate speech and the other 
organs and mention pra»a separately from them, and the 
function and that to which the function belongs (the organ) 
are identical. If it were a mere function of an organ, it 
would not be mentioned separately from the organs. 
Other passages also in which the pra«a is mentioned 
separately from air and the organs are here to be con- 
sidered so, e. g. ' From him is born breath, mind, and all 
organs of sense, ether, air,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, i, 3). Nor is 
it possible that all the organs together should have one func- 
tion (and that that function should be the prana) ; for each 
organ has its own special function and the aggregate of 
them has no active power of its own. — But— an objection 
may be raised — the thing may take place in the manner of 
the moving bird-cage. Just as eleven birds shut up in one 
cage may, although each makes a separate effort, move the 
cage by the combination of their efforts ; so the eleven 

1 Sankhya Sfl. II, 31 ; where, however, the reading is 'samanya- 
karanavr/'ttiA,' explained by the Comm.as sadHrani karawasya antaA- 
karawatrayasya vrtluA parinamabheda id. .Sankara, on the other 
hand, understands by karana the eleven prawas discussed previously. 



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ii adhyAya, 4 pAda, 9. 87 

pra»as which abide in one body may, although each has 
its own special function, by the combination of these 
functions, produce one common function called prana. — 
This objection, we reply, is without force. The birds 
indeed may, by means of their separate subordinate efforts, 
which all favour the movement of the cage, move the 
cage by combination ; that is a matter of observation. 
But we have no right to assume that the different prawas 
with their subordinate functions such as hearing &c. can, 
by combination, produce the function of vital breath ; for 
there is no means to prove this, and the vital breath is in 
kind absolutely different from hearing and so on. — More- 
over, if the vital breath were the mere function of an organ 
(or the organs) it could not be glorified as the ' best,' and 
speech and so on could not be represented as subordinate 
to it. Hence the vital breath is different from air and the 
functions (of the organs). — How then have we to under- 
stand the scriptural passage, 'The pra»a is air/ &c? — 
The air, we reply, passing into the adhyat ma-state, dividing 
itself fivefold and thus abiding in a specialized condition is 
called pra«a. It therefore is neither a different being nor 
is it mere air. Hence there is room for those passages as 
well which identify it with air as those which do not. — 
Well, let this be granted. The prawa then also must be 
considered to be independent in this body like the 
individual soul, as scripture declares it to be the 'best' 
and the organs such as speech, &c, to be subordinate to it. 
For various powers are ascribed to it in scriptural passages. 
It is said, for instance, that when speech and the other 
(organs) are asleep the prawa alone is awake; that the 
pra«a alone is not reached by death ; that the prana is the 
absorber, it absorbs speech, &c. ; that the prawa guards 
the other senses (prawas) as a mother her sons \ Hence 
it follows that the pra«a is independent in the same way 
as the individual soul. — This view is impugned in the next 
Sutra. 

» Cp. Ka. Up. II, 5, 8; Br*. Up. I, 5, 21 ; Kh. Up. IV, 3, 3 ; Pr. 
Up. II, 13- 



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88 vedAnta-sOtras. 



10. But (the pra»a is subordinate to the soul) like 
the eye, &c, on account of being taught with them 
(the eye, &c), and for other reasons. 

The word ' but ' sets aside the independence of the prawa. 
As the eye and so on stand, like the subjects of a king, in 
mere subordinate relation to the acting and enjoying of the 
soul and are not independent, so the chief vital air also, 
occupying a position analogous to that of a king's minister, 
stands in an entirely subordinate relation to the soul and 
is not independent. — Why ? — Because it is taught (spoken 
of) together with them, i. e. the eye and the other organs, 
in such passages as the colloquy of the prawas, &c. For 
to be mentioned together is appropriate only in the case 
of things with the same attributes, as e. g. the Brmat- 
saman and the Rathantara-saman 1 . The words 'and so 
on' (in the Sutra) indicate other reasons refuting the 
independence of the pra«a, such as its being composed of 
parts, its being of a non-intelligent nature and the like. — 
Well, but if it be admitted that the pra«a stands to the 
soul in the relation of an instrument as the eye and so on, 
it will follow that we must assume another sense-object 
analogous to colour and so on. For the eyes, &c, occupy 
their specific subordinate position with regard to the soul 
through their functions which consist in the seeing of 
colour and so on. Now we can enumerate only eleven 
classes of functions, viz. the seeing of colour and so on, 
on whose account we assume eleven different pra«as, and 
there is no twelfth class of effects on account of which a 
twelfth prawa could be assumed. — To this objection the 
following Sutra replies. 

ii. And on account of (its) not being an instru- 
ment the objection is not (valid) ; for thus (scripture) 
declares. 

The objection urged, viz. that there would result another 
sense-object, is not valid ; because the prav»a is not an 

1 Which go together because they are both samans. 



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ii adhyAya, 4 pAda, 12. 89 

instrument. For we do not assume that the prawa is, like 
the eye, an organ because it determines a special sense- 
object. Nor is it on that account devoid of an effect; 
since scripture declares that the chief vital air has a specific 
effect which cannot belong to the other pranas. For in 
the so-called colloquies of the prawas we read in the be- 
ginning, 'The prawas quarrelled together who was best;' 
after that we read, ' He by whose departure the body seems 
worse than worst, he is the best of you ; ' thereupon the 
text, after showing how, on the successive departure of 
speech and so on, the life of the body, although deprived 
of one particular function, went on as before, finally relates 
that as soon as the chief pra«a was about to depart all 
other pranas became loosened and the body was about to 
perish ; which shows that the body and all the senses sub- 
sist by means of the chief pra»a. The same thing is de- 
clared by another passage, ' Then prawa as the best said to 
them : Be not deceived ; I alone dividing myself fivefold 
support this body and keep it' (Pr. Up. II, 3). Another 
passage, viz. ' With pra«a guarding the lower nest ' (Br*. Up. 
IV, 3, 1 2), shows that the guarding of the body depends on 
pra«a. Again, two other passages show that the nourish- 
ing of the body depends on pra«a, ' From whatever limb 
prawa goes away that limb withers ' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 1 9), and 
' What we eat and drink with it supports the other vital 
breaths.' And another passage declares that the soul's 
departing and staying depend on prawa, ' What is it by 
whose departure I shall depart, and by whose staying 
I shall stay ?— The created pra«a ' (Pr. Up. VI, 3 ; 4). 

12. It is designated as having five functions like 
mind. 

The chief vital air has its specific effect for that reason 
also that in scripture it is designated as having five 
functions, pra«a, apana, vyana, udana, samana. This dis- 
tinction of functions is based on a distinction of effects. 
Pra«a is the forward-function whose work is aspiration, &c; 
apana is the backward-function whose work is inspiration, 
&c; vyana is that which, abiding in the junction of the two, 



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9Q vedAnta-sOtras. 



is the cause of works of strength 1 ; udana is the ascending 
function and is the cause of the passing out (of the soul) ; 
samana is the function which conveys the juices of the 
food equally through all the limbs of the body. Thus the 
pra«a has five functions just as the mind (manas) has. 
The five functions of the mind are the five well-known 
ones caused by the ear, &c, and having sound and so on 
for their objects. By the functions of the mind we cannot 
here understand those enumerated (in Bri. Up. I, 5, 3), 
'desire, representation,' &c, because those are more than 
five. — But on the former explanation also there exists yet 
another function of the mind which does not depend on 
the ear, &c, but has for its object the past, the future, and 
so on ; so that on that explanation also the number five 
is exceeded. — Well, let us then follow the principle that 
the opinions of other (systems) if unobjectionable may be 
adopted, and let us assume that the five functions of the 
manas are those five which are known from the Yogarastra, 
viz. right knowledge, error, imagination, slumber, and re- 
membrance. Or else let us assume that the Sutra quotes 
the manas as an analogous instance merely with reference 
to the plurality (not the fivefoldness) of its functions. — 
In any case the Sutra must be construed to mean that the 
prawa's subordinate position with regard to the soul follows 
from its having five functions like the manas. 

13. And it is minute. 

And the chief vital air is to be considered as minute like 
the other pra«as. — Here also we have to understand by 
minuteness that the chief vital air is subtle and of limited 
size, not that is of atomic size ; for by means of its five 
functions it pervades the entire body. It must be viewed 
as subtle because when passing out of the body it is not 
perceived by a bystander, and as limited because scripture 
speaks of its passing out, going and coming. — But, it may 
be said, scripture speaks also of its all-pervadingness ; so, 



Viz. the holding in of the breath ; cp. Kh. Up. I, 3, 3-5. 

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ii adhyAya, 4 pAda, 14. 91 

e. g. ' He is equal to a grub, equal to a gnat, equal to an 
elephant, equal to these three worlds, equal to this 
Universe' (Br*. Up. I, 3, 32). — To this we reply that the 
all-pervadingness of which this text speaks belongs to the 
Self of the prawa in its adhidaivata relation, according to 
which it appears as Hiranyagarbha in his double — universal 
and individual — form, not in its adhyatma relation. More- 
over the statements of equality 'equal to a grub,' &c, 
just declare the limited size of the pra»a which abides 
within every living being. — Thus there remains no difficulty. 

14. But there is guidance (of the pra»as) by fire, 
&c, on account of that being declared by scripture. 

Here there arises a discussion whether the pra«as of 
which we have been treating are able to produce their 
effects by their own power or only in so far as guided by 
divinities. — The purvapakshin maintains that the prawas 
being endowed with the capacity of producing their effects 
act from their own power. If we, moreover, admitted that 
the pranas act only in so far as guided by divinities, it 
would follow that those guiding divinities are the enjoyers 
(of the fruits of the actions), and the individual soul would 
thus cease to be an enjoyer. Hence the pra«as act from 
their own power. — To this we reply as follows. ' But there 
takes place guidance by fire,' &c. — The word ' but ' excludes 
the purvapaksha. The different classes of organs, speech, 
&c, the Sutra says, enter on their peculiar activities, guided 
by the divinities animating fire, and so on. The words, 
' on account of that being declared by scripture,' state the 
reason. For different passages declare this, cp. Ait. Ar. II, 
4, a, 4, ' Agni having become speech entered the mouth.' 
This statement about Agni (fire) becoming speech and 
entering the mouth is made on the assumption of Agni 
acting as a ruler with his divine Self (not as a mere 
element). For if we abstract from the connexion with the 
divinity we do not see that there is any special con- 
nexion of fire either with speech or the mouth. The sub- 
sequent passages, 'Vayu having become breath entered 
into the nostrils,' &c, are to be explained in the same way. 



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92 vedAnta-sOtras. 



— This conclusion is confirmed by other passages also, such 
as ' Speech is indeed the fourth foot of Brahman ; that foot 
shines with Agni as its light and warms' (KA. Up. IV, 
J 8, 3), which passage declares that speech is made of the 
light of Agni. Other passages intimate the same thing by 
declaring that speech, &c, pass over into Agni, &c, cp. 
Bri. Up. I, 3, 12, 'He carried speech across first ; when 
speech had become freed from death it became Agni.' 
Everywhere the enumeration of speech and so on on the 
one side and Agni and so on on the other side — wherein is 
implied a distinction of the personal and the divine element 
— proceeds on the ground of the same relation (viz. of that 
which is guided and that which guides). Smrzti-passages 
also declare at length that speech, &c, are guided by 
Agni and the other divinities, cp. for instance, ' Brahmawas 
knowing the truth call speech the personal element, that 
which is spoken the natural element and fire (Agni) the 
divine element.' — The assertion that the prawas being 
endowed with the capability of producing their effects act 
from their own power is unfounded, as we see that some 
things which possess the capability of motion, e. g. cars, 
actually move only if dragged by bulls and the like. 
Hence, as both alternatives are possible l , we decide on the 
ground of scripture that the prawas act under the guidance 
of the divinities. — The next Sutra refutes the assertion that 
from the fact of the divinities guiding the prawas it would 
follow that they — and not the embodied soul — are the 
enjoyers. 

15. (It is not so) (because the pra»as are con- 
nected) with that to which the pra«as belong (i.e. 
the individual soul), (a thing we know) from scrip- 
ture. 

Although there are divinities guiding the prawas, yet we 
learn from scripture that those prawas are connected with 
the embodied soul which is the Lord of the aggregate of 

1 Viz. that something should act by itself, and that it should act 
under guidance only. 



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TI ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 7. 93 

instruments of action. The following passage, e.g. 'where 
the sight has entered into the void there is the person of 
the eye ; the eye itself is the instrument of seeing. He 
who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self ; the nose is 
the instrument of smelling,' declares that the prawas are 
connected with the embodied soul only. Moreover the 
plurality of the divinities guiding the organs renders it 
impossible that they should be the enjoyers in this body. 
For that there is in this body only one embodied enjoyer 
is understood from the possibility of the recognition of 
identity and so on '. 

16. And on account of the permanence of this 
(viz. the embodied soul). 

This embodied soul abides permanently in this body as 
the enjoyer, since it can be affected by good and evil 
and can experience pleasure and pain. Not so the gods ; 
for they exist in the state of highest power and glory and 
cannot possibly enter, in this wretched body, into the con- 
dition of enjoyers. So scripture also says, * Only what is 
good approaches him ; verily evil does not approach the 
devas ' (Br*. Up. 1, 5, ao). — And only with the embodied 
soul the prattas are permanently connected, as it is seen 
that when the soul passes out &c. the pra«as follow it. 
This we see from passages such as the following : ' When 
it passes out the pra«a passes out after it, and when the 
pra«a thus passes out all the other pra«as pass after it' 
(Br». Up. IV, 4, 2). Hence although there are ruling divi- 
nities of the organs, the embodied soul does not cease to be 
the enjoyer ; for the divinities are connected with the organs 
only, not with the state of the soul as enjoyer. 

17. They (the prawas) are senses, on account of 
being so designated, with the exception of the best 
(the mukhya pra#a). 

We have treated of the mukhya prawa and the other 

1 Yo*ha/R rflpam adraksham so* ham srinotatty ekasyaiva praty- 
abhi£#anam pratisamdhanam. Go. An. 



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94 vedAnta-sOtras. 



eleven priwas in due order. — Now there arises another 
doubt, viz. whether the other prawas are functions of the 
mukhya prawa or different beings. — The ptirvapakshin main- 
tains that they are mere functions, on account of scriptural 
statement. For scripture, after having spoken of the chief 
prawa and the other prawas in proximity, declares that those 
other prawas have their Self in the chief prawa, ' Well, let us 
all assume his form. Thereupon they all assumed his form ' 
(Bri. Up. I, 5, ai). — Their unity is moreover ascertained 
from the unity of the term applied to them, viz. prawa. 
Otherwise there either would result the objectionable cir- 
cumstance of one word having different senses, or else the 
word would in some places have to be taken in its primary 
sense, in others in a derived sense. Hence, as prawa, apana, 
&c. are the five functions of the one chief prawa, so the eleven 
prawas also which begin with speech are mere functions of 
the chief prawa. — To this we reply as follows. Speech and 
so on are beings different from the chief prawa, on account 
of the difference of designation. — Which is that difference 
of designation ? — The eleven prawas remaining if we abstract 
from the best one, i.e. the chief prawa, are called the sense- 
organs (indriya), as we see them designated in .Sruti, ' from 
him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense ' (Mu. 
Up. II, I, 3). In this and other passages prawa and the 
sense-organs are mentioned separately. — But in that case 
the mind also would have to be excluded from the class of 
sense-organs, like the prawa ; as we see that like the latter 
it is separately mentioned in the passage, ' The mind and all 
organs of sense.' True ; but in Smriti eleven sense-organs 
are mentioned, and on that account the mind must, like the 
ear, and so on, be comprised in the sense-organs. That the 
prawa on the other hand is a sense-organ is known neither 
from Smn'ti nor .Sruti. — Now this difference of designation 
is appropriate only if there is difference of being. If there 
were unity of being it would be contradictory that the prima 
although one should sometimes be designated as sense- 
organ and sometimes not Consequently the other prawas 
are different in being from the chief prawa. — For this con- 
clusion the following Sutra states an additional reason, 



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II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 9. 95 

18. On account of the scriptural statement of 
difference. 

The prawa is everywhere spoken of as different from 
speech, &c. The passage, e.g. beginning with ' They said 
to speech ' (Br*. Up. I, 3, a), enumerates speech, &c.,. which 
were overwhelmed by the evil of the Asuras, concludes 
thereupon the section treating of speech, &c, and then 
specially mentions the mukhya prawa as overcoming the 
Asuras, in the paragraph beginning ' Then they said to the 
breath in the mouth.' — Other passages also referring to that 
difference maybe quoted, so, for instance, ' He made mind, 
speech, and breath for himself (Bri. Up. I, 5, 3). — For this 
reason also the other prawas are different in being from the 
chief prawa. — Another reason follows. 

19. And on account of the difference of character- 
istics. 

There is moreover a difference of characteristics between 
the chief prawa and the other prawas. When speech &c. are 
asleep, the chief prawa alone is awake. The chief prawa 
alone is not reached by death, while the other prawas are. 
The staying and departing of the chief prawa — not that of 
the sense-organs — is the cause of the maintenance and the 
destruction of the body. The sense-organs, on the other 
hand, are the cause of the perception of the sense-objects, 
not the chief prawa. Thus there are manifold differences 
distinguishing the prawa from the senses, and this also shows 
the latter to be different in being from the prawa. — To infer 
from the passage, ' thereupon they all assumed his form,' 
that the sense-organs are nothing but prawa is wrong, 
because there also an examination of the context makes us 
understand their difference. For there the sense-organs are 
enumerated first ('Voice held, I shall speak/ &c); after 
that it is said that speech, &c. were seized by death in the 
form of weariness (' Death having become weariness held 
them back ; therefore speech grows weary ') ; finally prawa 
is mentioned separately as not having been overcome by 
death (' but death did not seize the central breath '), and is 



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g6 vedAnta-sAtras. 



asserted to be the best (' he is the best of us '). The assum- 
ing of the form of pra«a has therefore, in accordance with 
the quoted passages, to be understood to mean that 
the energizing of speech and so on depends on the 
prawa, but not that they are identical with it. — Hence it 
follows that the word 'prawa' is applied to the sense-organs 
in a secondary sense. Thus .Sruti also says, ' Thereupon 
they all assumed his form, and therefore they are called 
after him pra«as;' a passage declaring that the word prawa, 
which properly refers to the chief prd«a, is secondarily 
applied to the sense-organs also. Speech and the other 
sense-organs are therefore different in being from the prawa. 

20. But the fashioning of names and forms belongs 
to him who renders tripartite, on account of the 
teaching (of scripture). 

In the chapter treating of the Being (sat), subsequently 
to the account of the creation of fire, water, and food (earth), 
the following statement is made, ' That divinity thought, 
let me now enter those three beings with this living Self 
(g iva atma), and let me then evolve names and forms ' ; — 
let me make each of these three tripartite ' {Kh. Up. VI, 
3, 2 ; 3). — Here the doubt arises whether the agent in that 
evolution of names and forms is the^iva (the living, i.e. the 
individual Self or soul) or the highest Lord. — The purva- 
pakshin maintains the former alternative, on account of the 
qualification contained in the words ' with this living Self.' 
The use of ordinary language does, in such phrases as 
' Having entered the army of the enemy by means of a spy 
I count it,' attribute the counting of the army in which the 
spy is the real agent to the Self of the king who is the 
causal agent; which attribution is effected by means of the 
use of the first person, • I count.' So here the sacred text 
attributes the evolving of names and forms — in which the 
giva. is the real agent — to the Self of the divinity which is 
the causal agent ; the attribution being effected by means 

1 Literally, with this living Self having entered let me evolve, &c. 



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ii adhyAya, 4 pAda, 20. 97 

of the use of the first person, ' let me evolve.' — Moreover 
we see in the case of names such as Z>ittha, Z?avittha, &c, 
and in the case of forms such as jars, dishes and the like 
that the individual soul only is the evolving agent *. Hence 
the evolution of names and forms is the work of the^lva. 

To this the Sutra replies : ' But the fashioning of names and 
forms belongs to him who renders tripartite.' The particle 
' but ' discards the purvapaksha. Fashioning means evolv- 
ing. The term 'he who renders tripartite' denotes the 
highest Lord, his agency being designated as beyond con- 
tradiction in the case of the rendering tripartite (of fire, &c). 
The entire evolution of names and forms which is seen, e.g. 
in fire, sun, moon, lightning, or in different plants such as 
kma-grass, kaja-grass, pallra-trees, or in various living 
beings such as cattle, deer, men, all this manifold evolution 
according to species and individuals can surely be the 
work of the highest Lord only, who fashioned fire, water, 
and earth. — Why? — On account of the teaching of the 
sacred text. — For the text says at first ' that divinity,' &c, 
and then goes on in the first person ' let me evolve ; ' which 
implies the statement that the highest Brahman only is the 
evolving agent — But we ascertain from the qualification 
contained in the words ' with this living Self,' that the agent 
in the evolution is the living Self! — No, we reply. The 
words 'with this living Self are connected with the words 
* having entered,' in proximity to which they stand ; not 
with the clause ' let me evolve.' If they were connected 
with the former words, we should have to assume that the 
first person, which refers to the divinity — viz. 'let me 
evolve ' — is used in a metaphorical sense. And with regard 
to all the manifold names and forms such as mountains, 
rivers, oceans, &c, no soul, apart from the Lord, possesses 
the power of evolution ; and if any have such power, it is 
dependent on the highest Lord. Nor is the so-called 
' living Self absolutely different from the highest Lord, as 
the spy is from the king ; as we see from its being qualified 

1 Names being given and vessels being shaped by a class of 
jtvas, viz. men. 

[38] H 



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98 vedAnta-sOtras. 



as the living Self, and as its being the^iva (i. e. an individual 
soul apparently differing from the universal Self) is due to 
the limiting adjuncts only. Hence the evolution of names 
and forms which is effected by it is in reality effected by 
the highest Lord. And that the highest Lord i s he who 
evolves the names and forms is a principle acknowledged 
by all the Upanishads ; as we see from such passages as 'He 
who is called ether is the evolver of all forms and names ' 
(Kh. Up. VIII, 14). The evolution of names and forms, 
therefore, is exclusively the work of the highest Lord, who 
is also the author of the tripartite arrangement. — The 
meaning of the text is that the evolution of names and 
forms was preceded by the tripartition, the evolution of 
each particular name and form being already explained by 
the account of the origin of fire, water, and earth. The act 
of tripartition is expressly described by .Sruti in the cases 
of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, ' The red colour of burning 
fire is the colour of fire, the white colour of fire is the colour 
of water, the black colour of fire the colour of earth,' &c. 
In this way there is evolved the distinctive form of fire, and 
in connexion therewith the distinctive name ' fire,' the name 
depending on the thing. The same remarks apply to the 
cases of the sun, the moon, and lightning. The instance 
(given by the text) of the tripartition of fire implies the 
statement that the three substances, viz. earth, water, fire, 
were rendered tripartite in the same manner ; as the begin- 
ning as well as the concluding clause of the passage equally 
refers to all three. For the beginning clause says, ' These 
three beings became each of them tripartite ; ' and the con- 
cluding clause says, 'Whatever they thought looked red 
they knew was the colour of fire,' &c. &c, up to ' Whatever 
they thought was altogether unknown they knew was some 
combination of these three beings.' Having thus described 
the external tripartition of the three elements the text goes 
on to describe another tripartition with reference to man, 
' those three beings when they reach man become each of 
them tripartite.' This tripartition in man the teacher sets 
forth (in the following Sutra) according to scripture, with a 
view to the refutation of some foreseen objection. 



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II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 22. 99 

21. The flesh, &c, originates from earth, accord- 
ing to the scriptural statement ; and (so also) in the 
case of the two other (elements). 

From tripartite earth when assimilated by man there are 
produced as its effects flesh, &c, according to scripture. 
For the text says, ' Food (earth) when eaten becomes three- 
fold ; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion 
flesh, its subtlest portion mind.' The meaning is that the 
tripartite earth is eaten in the shape of food such as rice, 
barley, &c. ; that its grossest parts are discharged in the 
form of feces, that its middle parts nourish the flesh of the 
body, and its subtlest parts feed the mind. Analogously 
we have to learn from the text the effects of the two other 
elements, viz. fire and water ; viz. that urine, blood, and 
breath are the effects of water ; bone, marrow, and speech 
those of fire. — Here now an objection is raised. If all 
material things are tripartite (i.e. contain parts of the three 
elements alike) — according to the indifferent statement, ' He 
made each of these tripartite' — for what reason then has 
there been made the distinction of names, ' this is fire, this 
is water, this is earth?' And again, why is it said that 
among the elements of the human body, flesh, &c, is the 
effect of the eaten earth only ; blood, &c, the effect of the 
water drunk ; bone, &c, the effect of the fire eaten ? — To 
this objection the next Sutra replies. 

22. But on account of their distinctive nature 
there is a (distinctive) designation of them. 

The word 'but' repels the objection raised. By 'dis- 
tinctive nature' we have to understand preponderance. 
Although all things are tripartite, yet we observe in 
different places a preponderance of different elements ; 
heat preponderates in fire, water in all that is liquid, food 
in earth. This special tripartition aims at rendering possible 
the distinctions and terms of ordinary life. For if the 
tripartition resulted in sameness, comparable to that of the 
three strands of a tripartite rope, we could not distinguish — 
and speak of as distinguished— the three elements. — Hence, 

H 2 



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ioo vedAnta-sGtras. 



although there is a tripartition, we are enabled • on account 
of distinctive nature* to give special designations to the 
three elements, viz. fire, water, and earth and their pro- 
ducts. — The repetition (of ' designation of them ') indicates 
the termination of the adhyaya. 



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THIRD ADHYAYA. 

FIRST PADA. 

Reverence to the highest Self! 

i. In obtaining a different (body) (the soul) goes 
enveloped (by subtle parts of the elements), (as 
appears from) question and explanation. 

In the second adhyaya we have refuted the objections 
raised against the Vedantic view of Brahman on the ground 
of SnWti and reasoning ; we have shown that all other 
opinions are devoid of foundation, and that the alleged 
mutual contradictions of Vedic texts do not exist Further 
we have demonstrated that the entities different from — but 
subordinate to — the individual soul (such as pra«a, &c.) 
spring from Brahman. — Now in the third adhyaya we shall 
discuss the following subjects: the manner in which the 
soul together with its subordinate adjuncts passes through 
the sawsara (III, i); the different states of the soul and 
the nature of Brahman (III, a) ; the separateness or non- 
scparateness of the vidyas and the question whether the 
qualities (of Brahman) have to be cumulated or not (III, 3); 
the accomplishment of man's highest end by means of per- 
fect knowledge (sawyagdanrana), the different injunctions 
as to the means of perfect knowledge and the absence of 
certain rules as to release which is the fruit (of perfect 
knowledge *) (III, 4). As occasion leads some other matters 
also will be explained. — Thefirst padaexplains,on the ground 
of the so-called vidya of the five fires {Kh. Up. V, 3-10), the 
different modes of the soul's passing through the samsara ; 
the reason of that doctrine being (the inculcation of) absence 

1 I.e. the absence of a rule laying down that release consequent 
on knowledge takes place in the same existence in which the means 
of reaching perfect knowledge are employed. 



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102 vedAnta-sOtras. 



of all desire (vairagya), in accordance with the scriptural 
remark at the end (of the vidya), ' hence let a man take care 
to himself.' — The soul accompanied by the chief vital air, 
the sense-organs and the mind, and taking with itself 
nescience (avidya), moral good or ill-desert (karman), and 
the impressions left by its previous existences \ leaves its 
former body and obtains a new body ; this is known from 
the scriptural passage extending from Bri. Up. IV, 4, 1 
(' Then those prawas gather around him ') up to IV, 4, 4 
('It makes to itself another newer and more beautiful 
shape'); which passage forms part of a chapter treating of 
the sa*«sara-state. And it moreover follows from the pos- 
sibility (thus resulting) of the soul enjoying the fruits of 
good and evil actions. — Here the question arises whether 
the soul when going to the new body is enveloped or not by 
subtle parts of the elements constituting the seeds of the 
body. — It is not so enveloped, the purvapakshin says. — 
Why? — Because scripture, while stating that the soul takes 
the organs with itself, does not state the same with regard 
to the elements. For the expression ' those parts of light ' 
(tqg-omatraA) which occurs in the passage ' He taking with 
him those parts of light,' &c, intimates that the organs only 
are taken (and not the elements), since in the complement- 
ary portion of the passage the eye, &c, are spoken of, and 
not the subtle parts of the elements. The subtle parts of 
the elements can moreover easily be procured anywhere ; 
for wherever a new body is to be originated they are pre- 
sent, and the soul's taking them with itself would, therefore, 
be useless. Hence we conclude that the soul when going 
is not enveloped by them. 

To this the teacher replies, ' in obtaining another it goes 
enveloped.' That means : we must understand that the soul 
when passing from one body to another is enveloped by the 
subtle parts of the elements which are the seeds of the new 

1 I read avidya with the commentators (Go. An., however, mentions 
the reading ' vidya ' also) ; although vidyS appears preferable. Cp. 
Max Muller's note 2, p. 175, Upan. II; Deussen, p. 405. — Purva- 
pragHi fanmintariya-sawskaraA. An. Gi. 



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in adhyAya, i pAda, i. 103 

body. — How do we know this ? — ' From the question and 
the explanation.' The question is, ' Do you know why in 
the fifth libation water is called man?' (V, 3, 3.) The 
explanation, i.e. answer, is given in the entire passage which, 
after having explained how the five libations in the form of 
jraddha. Soma, rain, food, seed are offered in the five fires, 
viz. the heavenly world, Paiganya, the earth, man and 
woman, concludes, ' For this reason is water in the fifth obla- 
tion called man.' Hence we understand that the soul goes 
enveloped by water. — But — an objection will be raised — 
another scriptural passage declares that like a caterpillar 
the soul does not abandon the old body before it makes an 
approach to another body *. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 3, ' And as a 
caterpillar.') — We reply that what there is compared to the 
(action of the) caterpillar is (not the non-abandonment of 
the old body but) merely the lengthening out of the crea- 
tive effort whose object is the new body to be obtained, 
which (new body) is presented by the karman of the soul 2 . 
Hence there is no contradiction. — As the mode of obtaining 
a new body is thus declared by .Sruti, all hypotheses 
which owe their origin to the mind of man only are to be 
set aside because they are contradicted by scripture. So 
e.g. the opinion (of the Sankhyas) that the Self and the 
organs are both all-pervading 8 , and when obtaining a new 
body only begin to function in it in consequence of the kar- 
man ; or the opinion (of the Bauddhas) that the Self alone 

1 Evara hi sukshmadehaparishvakto ra/nhet yady asya sthulam 
jartram ramhato na bhavet, asti tv asya vartamanasthul&rarirayogaA 
adehantarapriptes trtna^aldyukSnidaranena, tasman nidarsawa- 
mitivirodhan na sukshmadehaparishvakto ra/rchatiti. Bh&. 

1 PratipattavyaA priptavyo yo dehas tadvishaySyd bhSvanayi 
utpadanaya dfrghlbhSvamStraw ^alukayopamtyate. Bha\ — An. Gi. 
explains: priptavyo yo dehas tadvishayabhdvanaya devo«ham 
ityadikiya" dtrghibhivo vyavahitirthdlambanatvaw tavanmatram 
ityadi. 

* Kara»&nim ihamkankatv&t tasya vyipitvSt teshim apitadit- 
makiniw vySpitvam. Go. An. — The organs are, according to the 
Saftkhya, the immediate effects of the ahawMra, but why all- 
pervading on that account? 



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io4 vedAnta-sOtras. 



(without the organs) begins to function in a new body, and 
that as the body itself, so new sense-organs also are pro- 
duced in the new abode of fruition 1 ; or the opinion (of the 
Vaireshikas) that the mind only proceeds to the new abode 
of fruition 2 ; or the opinion (of the Digambara Cainas) that 
the individual soul only flying away from the old body 
alights in the new one as a parrot flies from one tree to 
another. — But — an objection will be raised — from the 
quoted question and answer it follows that the soul goes 
enveloped by water only, according to the meaning of the 
word made use of by scripture, viz. water. How then can 
the general statement be maintained that the soul goes 
enveloped by subtle parts of all elements ? — To this doubt 
the next Sutra replies. 

2. But on account of (water) consisting of three 
(elements) (the soul is enveloped not by water 
merely; the latter alone is, however, mentioned) 
on account of preponderance. 

The word • but ' disposes of the objection raised. — Water 
consists of three elements, as we know from the scriptural 
statement regarding tripartition. If, therefore, water is 
admitted to originate (the new body) the other two elements 
also have necessarily to be admitted (as taking part in the 
origination). The body moreover consists of three elements, 
as the effects of the three, i.e. fire, water, and earth, are 
observed in it, and further as it contains three materials, 
viz. wind, bile, and phlegm 3 . Being such it cannot originate 
from mere water, the other elements being left aside. 
Hence the term water made use of in the scriptural ques- 
tion and answer refers to the fact of water preponderating, 

1 Atma khalv alaya^dnasamtSnas tasya vrrttayaA jabdax%ffanani 
tallabhaA jartr&ntare bhavati,kevalarabdas tu kara»asahityam atmano 
varayati. Go. An. 

9 Kevalaw karawair atmana £a rahitam iti yivat, karanani nutan- 
any eva tatrarabhyante atma tu vibhutvad akriyo«pi tatra vrt'ttima- 
tram apnoti. An. Gi. 

3 The last of which only is of prevailingly watery character. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 105 

not to its being the only element. As a matter of fact we 
see that in all animated bodies liquid substances such as 
juices, blood, and the like preponderate. — But we likewise 
observe in bodies a large amount of earthy matter ! — True, 
but the amount of water is larger than that of any other 
matter. Moreover, liquid matter prevails in that which is 
the seed of the body. Further, we know that works (kar- 
man) constitute the efficient cause for the origination of a 
new body, and (sacrificial) works such as the agnihotra, &c, 
consist in the offering of liquid substances such as Soma, 
butter, milk and the like. Thereby also the preponder- 
ance of water is established. And on account of that 
preponderance the word ' water ' implies the subtle parts of 
all the elements which constitute the seed of the body. 

3. And on account of the going of the pra#as. 

Scripture states that, when a new body is obtained, the 
prawas also go (from the old body to the new one). Cp. 
' When he thus departs the (chief) pra«a departs after him, 
and when the pra»a thus departs all the other prawas 
depart after it ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, a), and similar passages. 
Now this going of the prawas is not possible without a base ; 
hence we infer that water also — mixed with parts of the 
other elements — goes (from the old body to the new one), 
serving the purpose of supplying a base for the moving 
pra«as. For the pra/zas cannot, without such a base, either 
move or abide anywhere ; as we observe in living beings. 

4. If it be said (that the pra«as do not go) on 
account of the scriptural statement as to entering 
into Agni, &c, we deny this on account of the 
metaphorical nature (of those statements). 

Well, the purvapakshin resumes, we deny that at the 
time when a new body is obtained the pra»as go with the 
soul, because scripture speaks of their going to Agni, &c 
For that at the time of death speech and the other pra«as 
go to Agni and the other gods the following passage ex- 
pressly declares: 'When the speech of the dead person 



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io6 vedanta-sAtras. 



enters into the fire, breath into the air,' &c. (Bri. Up. Ill, a, 
13). — To this we reply that the objection is of no force on 
account of the metaphorical character of those statements. 
The entering of speech, &c, into Agni is metaphorical, 
because we observe no such entering in the case of the 
hairs of the head and body. For although the text says 
that ' the hairs of the body enter into the shrubs and the 
hairs of the head into the trees ; ' still we cannot under- 
stand this to mean that the hairs actually fly away from the 
body and enter into trees and shrubs. On the other hand, 
the soul could not go at all if we denied to it the limiting 
adjunct formed by the prawas, and without the latter it 
could not, in the new body, enter into the state of fruition. 
Besides, other passages distinctly declare that the prawas 
go with the soul. — From all this we conclude that the 
passage about speech, &c. entering into Agni, metaphoric- 
ally expresses that Agni and the other divinities who act as 
guides of the pra«as and co-operate with them stop their 
co-operation at the time of death. 

5. If an objection be raised on the ground of 
(water) not being mentioned in the first fire, we 
refute it by remarking that just it (viz. water) (is 
meant), on the ground of fitness. 

Well, the purvapakshin resumes, but how can it be 
ascertained that ' in the fifth oblation water is called man,' 
considering that water is not mentioned by scripture with 
reference to the first fire (altar) ? For the text enumerates 
five fires — the first of which is the heavenly world — as the 
abodes of the five oblations. With reference to the first of 
those fires — introduced by the words 'The fire is that 
world, O Gautama,' it is stated that jraddha (faith) is the 
material constituting the oblation (' on that altar the devas 
offer .rraddha'); while nothing is said about water being 
the offered material. If, with reference to the four follow- 
ing fires, viz. Par^anya, &c, water is assumed to constitute 
the offering, we have no objection because in the substances 
stated there as forming the oblations, viz. Soma, and so on, 
water may preponderate. But to set aside, in the case of 



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Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5. 107 

the first fire, .rraddha (i.e. faith) which is directly mentioned 
in the text, and to substitute in its place the assumption of 
water, about which the text says nothing, is an arbitrary 
proceeding. In reality .rraddha must be explained, in con- 
formity with its ordinary meaning, as a kind of mental 
state, viz. faith. Hence it is objectionable to maintain that 
water, in the fifth oblation, becomes man. 

To this view of the purvapakshin we demur, because, in 
the case of the first fire, the word .rraddha is to be taken in 
the sense of 'water.' — On what ground ? — On the ground of 
fitness. For on that explanation only beginning, middle, 
and end of the passage harmonise so that the syntactical 
unity of the whole remains undisturbed. On the other 
explanation (i. e. .rraddha being taken in the sense of 
' faith '), if the question were asked how water, in the fifth 
oblation, can be called man, and if, in way of reply, the 
text could point only to faith, i.e. something which is not 
water, as constituting the material of the oblation ; then 
question and answer would not agree, and so the unity of 
the whole passage would be destroyed. The text, moreover, 
by concluding * For this reason is water in the fifth oblation 
called man,' indicates the same interpretation 1 . — Further, 
the text points out, as effects of .rraddha, substances in 
which water in its gross form preponderates, viz. Soma, 
rain, &c. And this again furnishes a reason for interpreting 
.rraddha as water, because the effect generally is cognate in 
nature to the cause. Nor again can the mental conception 
called faith be taken out from the mind or soul, whose 
attribute it is, and be employed as an offering, as the heart 
can be cut out of the sacrificial animal. For this reason 
also the word .rraddha must be taken to mean 'water.' 
Water can, moreover, be fitly called by that name, on the 
ground of Vedic usage, cp. ' .rraddha indeed is water ' (Taitt. 
Samh. I, 6, 8, 1). Moreover, water when forming the seed 
of the body enters into the state of thinness, subtilty, and 
herein again resembles faith, so that its being called .rraddha 

1 Upasamh&rllo&n&y&m api .rraddhirabdatvam apam evety iha 
tv iti. An. Gi. 



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io8 vedAnta-sAtras. 



is analogous to the case of a man who is as valiant as a lion 
being himself called a lion. — Again, the word jraddha may 
fitly be applied to water, because water is intimately con- 
nected with religious works (sacrifices, &c.) which depend 
on faith; just as the word 'platform' is applied to men 
(standing on the platform). And finally the waters may 
fitly be called .rraddha, on account of their being the cause 
of faith, according to the scriptural passage, ' Water indeed 
produces faith in him for holy works V 

6. (Should it be said that the souls are not en- 
veloped by water) on account of this not being 
stated by scripture, we refute the objection on the 
ground of those who perform ish/is, &c, being 
understood. 

Well, let it be granted that, on account of question and 
answer, water, passing through the forms of .rraddha, &c, 
may in the fifth oblation obtain the shape of man. But 
still we cannot allow that the souls when moving from one 
body into another are enveloped by water. For this is not 
directly stated by scripture, there being in the whole 
passage no word referring to the souls, while there are 
words referring to water. Hence the assertion that the 
soul goes enveloped by water is unfounded. — This objection 
is invalid, we reply, ' on account of those who perform ish/is, 
&c, being understood.' For in the passage beginning 'But 
they who living in a village practise sacrifices, works of 
public utility and alms, they go to the smoke ' (V, 3, 10), it 
is said that those who perform ish/is reach, on the road of 
the fathers leading through smoke, &c, the moon, ' From 
ether they go to the moon ; that is Soma, the king.' Now 
these same persons are meant in the passage about the five 
fires also, as we conclude from the equality of scriptural 
statement in the passage, ' In that fire the devas offer 



1 Apo hcti, asmai pu«se*dhikari«e sawnamante ^anayanti 
dar,ranamatre»a snanadipiwyakarmasiddhyarthaw jraddham ity 
arthaA. An. Gi. 



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in adhyAya, i pAda, 6. 109 

.rraddha. From that oblation rises Soma the king 1 .' To 
those 2 (persons who have performed ishris, &c.) water is 
supplied in the shape of the materials employed to perform 
the agnihotra, the dattapurnamasa and other sacrifices, 
viz. sour milk, milk, &c, which substances, as consisting 
mostly of water, may directly be considered as water. Of 
these, when offered in the ahavanlya, the subtle parts 
assume the form of an apurva resulting from the oblation 8 , 
and attach themselves to the performer of the sacrifice. 
Then (when the sacrificer dies) the priests offer his body, 
with the funeral ceremonies 4 , into the crematory fire, with 
the mantra, '(may) he (go) to the heavenly world, svaha.' 
Then the water forming the oblation — which was connected 
with deeds resulting from faith 6 — having assumed the form 
of an apurva envelops the souls of those who had performed 
the sacrifices, and leads them up to the heavenly world to 
receive their reward. — In accordance with the preceding 
interpretation scripture says in the agnihotra chapter also — 
in the complementary passage constituting the reply to the 
six questions — that the two agnihotra-oblations go up to 
the other world in order to originate the fruit (of the work 
of the sacrificer), 'Those two oblations when offered go up, 
&c.' (Sat. Br. XI, 6, a, 6). — Hence we conclude that the 

1 Both passages speak of something reaching, i.e. becoming 
the moon. Now, as that something is, in the passage about the road 
of the fathers, the glvas of those who have performed ish/is, &c, we 
conclude that by the .rraddha also, from which in the other passage 
the moon is said to rise, those ^fvas are meant, or, properly speak- 
ing, the subde body of water which envelops those ^ivas. — Dhu m&di- 
vikye pawiagnivakye ka, somar4#atvaprapturava»avweshad ish/adi- 
HrimA jraddh&abditadbhir veshtfita dyulokaw yantiti bhittty 
arthaA. An. Gi. 

* An. Gi. introduces this clause by: nanu mahad iha jrutyor vaila- 
kshanyawi, jraddh&abditlnam apam kvaiid dyuloke houaA smtah 
kva/Kd ish/adikariwam dhum£dikrame»aka\rapriptir na 6a. teshim 
ipaA santi yena tadvesh/Aidnaw gatis tatraha teshim *eti. 

* I read, with a MS. of An. Gi., ihutyapurvarupaA. 
4 The so-called antyesh/i. 

* And is on that account properly called jraddhi. 



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no vedAnta-sAtras. 



souls, when going to the enjoyment of the fruits of their 
works, are enveloped by the water of which the oblations 
consist l . 

But how can it be maintained that those who perform 
sacrifices, &c, go to the enjoyment of the fruit of their 
works, considering that scripture declares them when having 
reached the moon — by the path leading through smoke, 
&c. — to become food, ' That is Soma the king ; that is the 
food of the gods; the gods do eat it' (K/i. Up. V, 10, 4); 
and the corresponding passage, ' Having reached the moon 
they become food, and then the Devas feed on them there 
as sacrificers feed on Soma as it increases and decreases' 
(Br*. Up. VI, 2, 1 6) ? If, in accordance with these passages, 
they are eaten by the gods as by tigers, &c, it is not 
possible that they should enjoy the fruit of their deeds. — 
To this the following Sutra replies. 

7. Or (the souls' being the food of the gods is) 
metaphorical, on account of their not knowing the 
Self. For thus (scripture) declares. 

The word ' or ' is meant to set aside the started objection. 
The souls' being food has to be understood in a metaphorical, 
not a literal, sense, as otherwise all scriptural statements of 
claims (adhikara) — such as ' He who is desirous of the 
heavenly world is to sacrifice' — would be contradicted. If 

1 Ankara's attempts to render plausible the interpretation of 
jraddha by ' water,' and to base thereon the doctrine of the souls 
when going to a new body being enveloped by a subtle involucrum 
of water (and the other elements contained therein) are, of course, 
altogether artificial. I do not, however, see that he can be taxed 
with inconsistency (as he is by Deussen, p. 408). Sraddha is to him 
in the first place the gross water which constitutes the chief material 
employed in the sacrifices ; in the second place the apurva which 
results from the sacrifice, and which is imagined to consist of the 
subtle parts of the water whose gross parts have been consumed by 
the sacrificial fire. These subtle parts attach themselves to the soul, 
accompany it as an involucrum when it goes to another world, and 
form the base of any new body which the soul may have to assume 
in accordance with its previous deeds. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 7. Ill 

the performers of sacrifices, &c, did not, in the sphere of 
the moon, enjoy the fruits of their works, why should they 
undertake works such as sacrifices, which are to him who 
performs them the cause of great trouble ? We see, more- 
over, that the word ' food,' as denoting in general whatever 
is the cause of enjoyment, is metaphorically used of that 
also which is not food (in the narrower sense), as, for in- 
stance, in such phrases as 'the Vairyas are the food of 
kings, the animals are the food of the Vauyas.' Hence 
what is meant there by the term ' eating ' is the rejoicing 
of the gods with the performers of sacrifices, &c, who 
stand in a subordinate (instrumental) relation to that rejoic- 
ing — a rejoicing analogous to that of an ordinary man with 
beloved persons such as wife, children, friends, and so on — 
not actual eating like the chewing and swallowing of sweet- 
meats. For that the gods eat in the ordinary way a 
scriptural passage expressly denies (Kh. Up. Ill, 6, i), 
' The gods do not eat or drink ; by seeing the nectar they 
are satisfied.' At the same time the performers of sacrifices, 
although standing in a subordinate relation to the gods, 
may themselves be in a state of enjoyment, like servants 
who (although subordinate to the king) themselves live on 
the king. — That the performers of sacrifices are objects of 
enjoyment for the gods follows, moreover, from their quality 
of not knowing the Self. For that those who do not know 
the Self are objects of enjoyment for the gods the following 
scriptural passage shows, ' Now, if a man worships another 
deity, thinking the deity is one and he is another, he does 
not know. He is like a beast for the Devas ' (Bri. Up. 1, 4, 
10). That means: he, in this life, propitiating the gods by 
means of oblations and other works, serves them like a beast, 
and does so in the other world also, depending on them like 
a beast and enjoying the fruits of his works as assigned by 
them. — The latter part of the Sutra can be explained in 
another manner also 1 . Those who do not know the Self 
are those who perform works only, such as sacrifices, &c, 

1 Anatmajrabdajruter mukhyarthatvanurodhena sfitrS»wasy4rtham 
uktva prakara«anurodhen&rthantaram aha. An. Gi. 



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ii2 vedAnta-sAtras. 



and do not join knowledge to works. We then take the 
expression, ' the knowledge of the Self,' as indirectly denot- 
ing the knowledge of the five fires ; an explanation which 
rests on the general subject-matter. And on account of the 
performers of sacrifices being destitute of the knowledge of 
the five fires the circumstance of their serving as food is 
brought forward as a mere gu«av£da x for the purpose of 
glorifying the knowledge of the five fires. For the latter is 
what the text aims at enjoining, as we infer from the 
general purport of the passage. — ' For thus ' another scrip- 
tural passage ' declares,' viz. that enjoyment (on the part of 
the ^iva) takes place in the sphere of the moon, ' Having 
enjoyed greatness in the Soma world he returns again ' (Pr. 
Up. V, 4). Another scriptural passage also declares that 
the performers of sacrifices dwelling together with the gods 
obtain enjoyment, ' A hundred blessings of the fathers who 
have conquered this world make one blessing of the work- 
gods, who obtain their godhead by work ' (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 
33). — As thus the statement about the performers of sacri- 
fices becoming food is metaphorical only, we understand 
that it is their souls which go, and hence there is no longer 
any objection to the doctrine that they go enveloped by 
water. 

8. On the passing away of the works (the soul 
redescends) with a remainder, according to scripture 
and Smriti, as it went (i.e. passing through the same 
stations) and not thus (i. e. in the inverse order). 

Scripture states that the souls of those who perform 
sacrifices, and the like, rise on the road leading through 
smoke, and so on, to the sphere of the moon, and when 
they have done with the enjoyment (of the fruits of their 
works) again descend, 'Having dwelt there.yavatsampatam 2 , 
they return again that way as they came,' &c, up to ' Those 
whose conduct has been good obtain some good birth, the 



1 See part i, p. 221. 

* About which term see further on. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. 113 

birth of a Brahmawa, &c. — Those whose conduct has been 
evil obtain the birth of a dog, &c.' (Kh. Up. V, 10, 5-7). 
Here it must be considered whether the souls, after having 
enjoyed the fruits of all their works, descend without a 
remainder (anuxaya, of their works), or with such a re- 
mainder (of unrequited works). — The purvapakshin says : 
without such a remainder. — Why? — On account of the 
specification 'yavat sampatam.' The word sampata here 
denotes the aggregate of works (karmlraya) 1 , which is so 
called because by it the souls pass from this world to that 
world for the purpose of enjoying the fruits of the works. 
So that the entire clause ' Having dwelt there as far as the 
aggregate of the works extends ' indicates their works being 
completely requited there. The same thing is indicated by 
another scriptural passage, 'But when in their case that 
(i.e. the effect of their works) ceases' {Bri. Up. VI, a, 16). — 
Well, but why should we not assume that these passages 
(do not mean that all works are requited there but) only 
indicate that the soul enjoys in the other world so long as 
there are works to be enjoyed there ? — It is impossible to 
assume this, because elsewhere a reference is made to the 
totality of works. For the passage, Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6, ' Having 
obtained the end of whatever deed he does here on earth, 
he again returns from that world to this world to action,' 
intimates, by means of the comprehensive term ' whatever,' 
that all works done here are exhausted there. — Moreover, 
death has the power of manifesting those works whose fruit 
has not yet begun * ; the manifestation of those works not 
being possible previously to death because then they are ob- 
structed by those works whose fruits have already begun. 
Now death must manifest alike all works whose fruits had 
not begun previously, because the cause being the same the 
effects cannot be different Analogously a lamp which is 
placed at the same distance from a jar and a piece of cloth 



1 The Comffi. on Kh. Up. V, 10, 5, explains it by ' sampatanti 
yeneti samp&taA karmawaA kshayaA, yavat sampatam yavat 
karmawaA kshayaA.' 

2 Abhivyaktu £a karmawaw phalad&nayonmukhatvam. An. Gi. 

[38] I 



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H4 vedAnta-s^tras. 



illuminates the latter as well as the former. — Hence it 
follows that the souls descend without a remainder of 
unrequited works. 

To this we reply as follows : ' On the passing away of the 
works with a remainder.' That means : when the aggregate 
of works with which the souls had risen to the moon for the 
purpose of the enjoyment of their fruits is, by such enjoy- 
ment, exhausted, then the body, consisting of water, which 
had originated in the moon for the purpose of such enjoy- 
ment, is dissolved by contact with the fire of the grief 
springing from the observation that the enjoyment comes to 
an end ; just as snow and hail are melted by contact with 
the rays of the sun, or the hardness of ghee by contact with 
the heat of fire. Then, at the passing away of the works, 
i.e. when the works performed, such as sacrifices, &c, are, 
by the enjoyment of their fruits, exhausted, the souls 
descend with a remainder yet left. — But on what grounds 
is that remainder assumed ? — On the ground of what is seen 
(.Sruti) and Smrfti. For scripture declares manifestly that 
the souls descend joined with such a remainder, 'Those 
whose conduct (Parana) has been good will quickly attain 
some good birth, the birth of a Brahmana, or a Kshattriya, 
or a VaLrya. But those whose conduct has been evil will 
quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, or a hog, or 
a K&nd&la..' That the word Tarawa here means the re- 
mainder (of the works) will be shown later on. Moreover, 
the different degrees of enjoyment which are implied in the 
difference of birth on the part of the living beings point, as 
they cannot be accidental, to the existence of such a 
remainder of works. For we know from scripture that 
good fortune as well as misfortune is caused by good and 
evil works. Smrfti also teaches that the members of the 
different castes and ajramas do, in accordance with their 
works, at first enjoy the fruit of their works and then enter 
into new existences, in which they are distinguished from 
each other by locality, caste, family, shape, length of life, 
knowledge, conduct, property, pleasure, and intelligence; 
which doctrine implies that they descend with a remainder 
,of their works. — Of what kind then is that so-called re- 



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in adhyAya, i pAda, 8. 115 

mainder ? — Some say that thereby we have to understand 
a remainder of the works which had been performed (in the 
previous existence) for the sake of the heavenly world, and 
whose fruits have (for the greater part) been enjoyed. 
That remainder might then be compared to the remainder 
of oil which sticks to the inside of a vessel previously filled 
with oil even after it has been emptied. — But you have no 
right to assume a remainder in the case of works, the fruits 
of which have been enjoyed already, since the admh/a 
(which springs from works) is opposed to the works (so as 
to destroy them completely *). — This objection, we reply, is 
not valid, as we do not maintain that the works are com- 
pletely requited (previously to the new existence). — But the 
souls do ascend to the sphere of the moon for the express 
purpose of finding there a complete requital of their works ! 
—True ; but when only a little of the effects of their works 
is left, they can no longer stay there. For as some courtier 
who has joined the king's court with all the requisites 
which the king's service demands is unable to remain at 
court any longer, when in consequence of his long stay most 
of his things are worn out, so that he is perhaps left with a 
pair of shoes and an umbrella only; so the soul, when 
possessing only a small particle of the effects of its works, 
can no longer remain in the sphere of the moon. — But all 
this reasoning is in fact altogether unfounded 2 . For it has 
already been stated that, on account of (the admh/a) being 
opposed to the work, the continued existence of a remainder 
cannot be admitted in the case of works which had been 
performed with a view to the heavenly world, and which 
have been requited in the moon. — But has it not also been 
said above that not all the work whose fruit the heavenly 
world is meets with requital there ? — Yes, but that state- 
ment is not defensible. For works which are performed for 

1 BhaWanusarinaJi snehasyavirodhid yuktaA jeshaA, karma tu 
phalodayavirodhitvat phalaw teg g&lam nash/am eveti na tasya 
jeshasiddhir iti faftkate nanv iti. An. Gi. 

1 Ivakaro madhuroktyS prayukto vastutas tv evakaro vivakshitaA. 
An. Gi. 

1 2 



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n6 vedAnta-sCtras. 



the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world produce their 
entire heavenly fruit for the soul only as long as it stays in 
heaven, and if we take our stand on scripture we have no 
right to assume that they produce even a particle of fruit 
for the souls after those have again descended from heaven. 
That some part of the oil continues to remain in the vessel 
is unobjectionable because we see it, and we likewise see 
that some part of the courtier's equipment continues to 
remain with him ; but that some part of those works which 
led the soul to heaven continues to exist, that we neither 
see nor are able to surmise, because it would contradict the 
texts declaring that the heavenly world (alone) is the fruit 
of the works. — That of works whose fruit is heaven, such as 
sacrifices and the like, no remainder continues to exist, we 
must necessarily acknowledge for the following reason also. 
If some part of those good works, such as sacrifices, &c, on 
account of which the agents enjoyed the heavenly world, 
were surmised to continue in existence as a remainder, that 
remainder would in all cases be itself a good one, would never 
be of a contrary nature. But then our supposition would be 
in conflict with the scriptural passage which distinguishes 
remainders of a different kind, viz. ' Those whose conduct 
has been good ; — those whose conduct has been evil,' &c. 
Hence after the fruits of that set of works which is requited 
in the other world have been (completely) enjoyed, the 
remaining other set of works whose fruits are to be enjoyed 
in this world constitutes the so-called anujaya with which 
the souls re-descend. — It was said above that we must assume 
the souls to descend without any such remainder, after 
having reached, by the enjoyment of the fruits, the end of 
all the works done here below, on account of the compre- 
hensive statement implied in the expression 'whatever.' 
But that assertion cannot be upheld as the existence of 
such a remainder has been proved. Hence we have to 
understand that the souls re-descend after having exhausted, 
by the enjoyment of its fruits, only that entire part of the 
works done here below whose fruit belongs to the other, 
world and is begun to be enjoyed there. — The proof given 
by us of the existence of the remainder refutes at the same 



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in adhyAya, i pAda, 8. 117 

time the other assertion made above, viz. that death mani- 
fests equally all works the enjoyment of whose fruits was 
not begun here below, and that on that account we are not 
entitled to draw a line between works whose fruits begin in 
the other world and works whose fruits begin in this world 
only (i.e. in a new existence on earth). — We, moreover, have 
to ask for what reason it is maintained that death manifests 
(i.e. lays open and makes ready for requital) those works 
whose fruits have not begun here below. The answer will 
be that in this life the operation of certain works cannot 
begin because it is obstructed by other works whose fruits 
already begin here below, that, however, that operation does 
begin as soon as, at the moment of death, the obstruction 
ceases. Well, then, if previously to death those actions 
whose fruits have already begun prevent other actions from 
beginning their operation, at the time of death also certain 
works of less force will be obstructed in their operation by 
other works of greater force, it being impossible that the 
fruits of works of opposite tendency should begin at the 
same time. For it is impossible to maintain that different 
deeds whose fruits must be experienced in different exist- 
ences should, merely because they have this in common 
that their fruits have not begun (previously to death), be- 
come manifest on the occasion of one and the same death, 
and originate one new existence only; against this militates 
the fact of the definite fruits (attached to each particular 
work) being of contrary natures 1 . Nor, on the other hand, 
can we maintain that at the time of death some works 
manifest themselves while others are altogether extin- 
guished ; for that would contradict the fact that absolutely 
all works have their fruits. No work in fact can be 
extinguished except by means of expiatory actions, &c. a 
Smriti also declares that works whose operation is ob- 

1 On which account they cannot be experienced in one and the 
same existence. 

8 Works are extinguished either by expiatory ceremonies or by 
the knowledge of Brahman or by the full fruition of their conse- 
quences. 



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n8 vedAnta-sOtras. 



structed by other works leading to fruits of a contrary 
nature last for a long time, 'Sometimes a good deed 
persists immovable as it were, the doer meanwhile remain- 
ing immerged in the sawsara, until at last he is released 
from pain.' 

Moreover, if all unrequited works becoming manifest on 
the occasion of one and the same death were to begin one 
new existence only, the consequence would be that those 
who are born again in the heavenly world, or in hell, or as 
animals, could, as not entitled thereto, perform no religious 
works, and being thus excluded from all chance of acquiring 
religious merit and demerit could not enter on any new 
forms of existence, as all reason for the latter would be 
absent K And that would further contradict Smrj'ti, which 
declares that some single actions, such as the murder of a 
Brahmawa, are the causes of more than one new existence. 
Nor can we assume, for the knowledge of the particular 
results springing from religious merit and demerit, any 
other cause than the sacred texts 2 . Nor, again, does death 
manifest (bring about the requital of) those works whose 
fruit is observed to be enjoyed already here below, as, for 
instance, the karireshri, &c. 3 How then can we allow the 
assumption that death manifests all actions ? The instance 
of the lamp (made use of by the purvapakshin) is already 
refuted by our having shown the relative strength of 
actions 4 . Or else we may look on the matter as analogous 
to the manifestation (by a lamp) of bigger and smaller 
objects. For as a lamp, although equally distant from a 
big and a very small thing, may manifest the former only 

1 And in consequence of this they could never obtain final 
release. 

* We have the sacred texts only to teach us what the effects of 
particular good or evil actions may be. 

* The kariresh/i is a sacrifice offered by those who are desirous 
of rain. 

4 I.e. by our having shown that death does not equally manifest 
all works, but that, after death has taken place, the stronger works 
bring about their requital while the operation of the weaker ones is 
retarded thereby. 



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in adhyAya, i pAda, 9. 119 

and not the latter, so death provokes the operation of the 
stronger works only, not of the weaker ones, although an equal 
opportunity presents itself for both sets of works as hitherto 
unrequited. — Hence the doctrine that all works are mani- 
fested by death cannot be maintained, as it is contradicted 
by .Sruti, Smrrti, and reason alike. That the existence 
of a remainder of works should stand in the way of final 
release is a misplaced fear, as we know from .Sruti that all 
works whatever are destroyed by perfect knowledge. It 
therefore is a settled conclusion that the souls re-descend 
with a remainder of works. They descend ' as they came ' 
(mounted up); 'not thus,' i.e. in inverted order. We con- 
clude that they descend 'as they came' from the fact of 
ether and smoke, which the text includes in the road of the 
fathers, being mentioned in the description of the descent 
also, and from the expression ' as they came.' That they 
follow the inverted order we conclude from night, &c, not 
being mentioned, and from the cloud, &c, being added. 

9. Should it be objected that on account of con- 
duct (the assumption of a remainder is not needed), 
we deny this because (the scriptural expression 
' conduct ') is meant to connote (the remainder) ; so 
K£rsh«&£ini thinks. 

But — an objection may be raised — the scriptural passage, 
which has been quoted for the purpose of proving that the 
existence of a remainder of works (' those whose conduct 
has been good,' &c), declares that the quality of the new 
birth depends on Tarawa, not on anuraya. Now Tarawa and 
anusaya are different things; for Tarawa is the same as 
£aritra, a£ara, sila, all of which mean conduct 1 , while 
anuraya denotes work remaining from requited work. 
Scripture also speaks of actions and conduct as different 
things, 'According as he acts and according as he conducts 
himself so will he be ' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5); and 'Whatever 



' itla also means here 'conduct' only, as we see from its being 
co-ordinated with Parana, £aritra, &c. ; not character. 



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120 vedAnta-sOtras. 



works are blameless those should be regarded, not others ; 
whatever our good conduct was that should be observed by 
thee ' (Taitt. Up. I, 1 1, a). From the passage which pro- 
claims the dependence of the quality of birth on conduct 
the existence of an unrequited remainder of works cannot 
therefore be proved. — This objection is without force, we 
reply, because the scriptural term 'conduct* is meant to 
connote the remainder of the works. This is the opinion of 
the teacher Karsh«£k£ini. 

10. If it be said that purposelessness (of conduct 
would result therefrom), we deny this on account of 
the dependence (of work) on that (conduct). 

That may be ; but for what reason should we abandon 
that meaning which the term 'Tarawa' directly conveys, 
viz. the meaning ' conduct,' and accept the merely connota- 
tive meaning ' remainder of the works ? ' Conduct, which the 
text directly mentions, may be supposed to have for its 
fruit either a good or an evil birth, according as it is 
enjoined or prohibited, good or evil. Some fruit will have 
to be allowed to it in any case ; for otherwise it would 
follow that it is purposeless. — This objection is without 
force ' on account of the dependence on it.' Such works as 
sacrifices, and the like, depend on conduct in so far as 
somebody whose conduct is not good is not entitled to 
perform them. This we know from Smr«'ti-passages, such 
as the following, ' Him who is devoid of good conduct the 
Vedas do not purify.' — And also if conduct is considered as 
subservient to man 1 it will not be purposeless. For when 
the aggregate of works such as sacrifices, &c, begins to 
originate its fruit, the conduct which has reference to the 
sacrifice will originate there (i.e. in the fruit) some addition. 

1 I.e. as something which produces in man a samsk&ra analogous 
to that produced by other preparatory or purificatory rites such as 
bathing, &c. — In the preceding sentences conduct had been spoken 
of not as purushartha but as karmanga. In that case it produces 
no separate result; while if considered as purushartha it has a 
special result of its own. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 12. 121 

And it is known from 5ruti as well as Smr*ti that work 
effects everything \ It is, therefore, the opinion of Karsh- 
«4^ini that the remainder of works only — which is connoted 
by the term ' conduct ' — is the cause of the souls entering 
on new births. For as work may be the cause of new 
births, it is not proper to assume that conduct is the cause. 
If a man is able to run away by means of his feet he will 
surely not creep on his knees. 

ii. But (Tarawa means) nothing but good and 
evil works ; thus Badari opines. 

The teacher Badari, however, thinks that the word 
'Tarawa' denotes nothing else but good works and evil 
works. It means the same as anush/^ana (performance) or 
karman (work). For we see that the root £ar (to walk, to 
conduct oneself) is used in the general sense of acting. Of 
a man who performs holy works such as sacrifices, &c, 
people say in ordinary language, ' that excellent man walks 
in righteousness.' The word a£ara also denotes only a kind 
of religious duty. That works and Tarawa (conduct) are 
sometimes spoken of as different things is analogous to the 
distinction sometimes made between Brahmawas and Pari- 
vra^akas 2 . We, therefore, decide that by men of good 
Tarawa are meant those whose works are worthy of praise, 
by men of evil Tarawa those whose works are worthy of 
blame. 

1 2. Of those also who do not perform sacrifices 
(the ascent to the moon) is stated by scripture. 

It has been said that those who perform sacrifices, &c, go 
to the moon. The question now arises whether those also 
who do not perform sacrifices go to the moon or not — The 
purvapakshin maintains that it cannot be asserted that 
men belonging to the former class only go to the moon, 

1 A clause added to guard against the assumption — which might 
be based on the preceding remarks — that conduct is, after all, 
the cause of the quality of the new birth. 

1 Although the latter are a mere sub-class of the former. 



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1 2 2 vedAnta-sOtras. 



because scripture speaks of the moon as being resorted to 
by those also who have not performed sacrifices. For the 
Kaushitakins make the following general statement, 'All 
who depart from this world go to the moon ' (Kau. Up. I, a). 
Moreover, the origination of a new body in the case of those 
who are born again is not possible without their having 
(previously) reached the moon, on account of the precise 
definition of number contained in the statement, ' In the 
fifth oblation' (KA. Up. V, 9, i) 1 . Hence all men must be 
supposed to resort to the moon. If it be objected that it 
does not appear proper that those who perform sacrifices 
and those who do not should go to the same place, we reply 
that there is no real objection, because those who do not 
perform sacrifices do not enjoy anything in the moon. 

13. But of the others, after having enjoyed the 
fruits of their actions in Sawzyamana, ascent and 
descent take place ; as such a course is declared (by 
scripture). 

' But ' discards the purvapaksha. It is not true that all men 
go to the moon. For the ascent to the moon is for the purpose 
of enjoyment only ; it is neither without a special purpose nor 
for the mere purpose of subsequent re-descent Just as a man 
climbs on a tree for the purpose of breaking fruit or 
blossoms, not either without any aim or for the mere 
purpose of coming down again. Now it has been admitted 
already that for those who do not offer sacrifices there is 
not any enjoyment in the moon ; hence those only who 
perform sacrifices rise to the moon, not any other persons. 
The latter descend to Sawyamana, the abode of Yama, 
suffer there the torments of Yama corresponding to their 
evil deeds, and then again re-ascend to this world. Such is 
their ascent and descent ; as we maintain on the ground of 
such a course being declared by scripture. For a scriptural 
passage embodying Yama's own words declares that those 
who die without having offered sacrifices fall into Yama's 

1 Which statement presupposes four other oblations, the first of 
which is the one from which ' Soma the king rises.' 



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in adhyAya, i pAda, 17. 123 

power. ' The other world never rises before the eyes of the 
careless child deluded by the delusion of wealth. This is 
the world, he thinks, there is no other ; thus he falls again 
and again under my sway' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 6). Scripture con- 
tains many other passages likewise leading us to infer that 
men fall into Yama's power ; cp. e.g. ' Yama, the gathering- 
place of men ' (Ri. Sa»*h. X, 14, 1 ). 

14. The SnWtis also declare this. 

Moreover, authorities like Manu, Vyasa, &c, declare that 
in the city Sawyamana evil works are requited under 
Yama's rule ; cp. the legend of Na&keta and others. 

15. Moreover there are seven (hells). 
Moreover, the purawa- writers record that there are seven 

hells, Raurava, &c, by name, which serve as abodes of 
enjoyment of the fruits of evil deeds. As those who do not 
sacrifice, &c. go there, how should they reach the moon ? 
— But, an objection is raised, the assertion that evil doers 
suffer punishments allotted by Yama is contradicted by the 
circumstance that SnWti mentions different other beings, 
such as ATitragupta, &c, who act as superintendents in Rau- 
rava and the other hells. — This objection the next Sutra 
refutes. 

16. On account of his activity there also no 
contradiction exists. 

There is no contradiction, as the same Yama is admitted 
to act as chief ruler in those seven hells. Of ^Titragupta 
and others Smrtti merely speaks as superintendents em- 
ployed by Yama. 

17. But on (the two roads) of knowledge and 
works, those two being under discussion. 

In that place of the knowledge of the five fires, where the 
answer is expected to the question, ' Do you know why that 
world never becomes full ? ' the text runs as follows : ' On 
neither of these two ways are those small creatures continu- 
ally returning, of whom it may be said, Live and die. Theirs 
is a third place. Therefore that world never becomes full.' 



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1 24 vedAnta-s^tras. 



By the two ways mentioned in this passage we have to 
understand knowledge and works. — Why ? — On account of 
their being the subjects under discussion. That means : 
knowledge and works are under discussion as the means for 
entering on the road of the gods and the road of the fathers. 
The clause, 'those who know this,' proclaims knowledge to 
be the means whereby to obtain the road of the gods ; the 
clause, ' sacrifices, works of public utility, and alms,' proclaims 
works to be that by which we obtain the road of the 
fathers. Under the heading of these two paths there stands 
the subsequent passage, ' on neither of these two ways, &c.' 
To explain. Those who are neither entitled, through 
knowledge, to follow the road of the gods, nor, by works, 
to follow the road of the fathers, for those there is a third 
path on which they repeatedly return to the existence of 
small animals. For this reason also those who do not 
perform sacrifices, &c. do not reach the moon. — But why 
should they not first mount to the sphere of the moon and 
thence descending enter on the existence of small animals ? 
— No, that would imply entire purposelessness of their 
mounting. — Moreover, if all men when dying would reach 
the sphere of the moon, that world would be filled by the 
departed, and from that would result an answer contrary to 
the question (viz. « why does not that world become full ? '). 
For an answer is expected showing that that world does 
not become full. — Nor can we admit the explanation that 
the other world possibly does not become full because 
re-descent is admitted ; since this is not stated by scripture. 
For it is true, indeed, that the not becoming full might be 
explained from their re-descending ; but scripture actually 
explains it from the existence of a third place, ' Theirs is 
a third place ; therefore that world never becomes full.' 
Hence the fact of the other world not becoming full must 
be explained from their not-ascending only. For, other- 
wise, the descent equally taking place in the case of those 
who do perform sacrifices, &c, it would follow that the 
statement of a third place is devoid of purpose. — The word 
• but ' (in the Sutra) is meant to preclude the idea — arising 
from the passage of another jakha (i.e. the Kaush. Up.) 



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in adhyAya, i pAda, 19. 125 

— that all departed go to the moon. Under the circum- 
stances the word ' all ' which occurs in that passage has 
to be taken as referring only to those qualified, so that 
the sense is 'all those who depart from this world properly 
qualified go to the moon.' — The next Sutra is directed 
against the averment that all must go to the moon for 
the purpose of obtaining a new body, in accordance with 
the definite statement of number ('in the fifth oblation &c.'). 

18. Not in (the case of) the third place, as it is 
thus perceived. 

With regard to the third place, the rule of the oblations 
being five in number need not be attended to for the 
purpose of obtaining a new body. — Why? — On account 
of it being perceived thus. That means: because it is 
seen that the third place is reached in the manner de- 
scribed without any reference to the oblations being 
limited to the number five, ' Live and die. That is the 
third place.' — Moreover, in the passage, ' In the fifth obla- 
tion water is called man,' the number of the oblations is 
stated to be the cause of the water becoming the body of 
a man, not of an insect or moth, &c. ; the word ' man ' 
applying to the human species only. — And, further, the 
text merely teaches that in the fifth oblation the waters 
are called man, and does not at the same time deny that, 
where there is no fifth oblation, they are not called man ; 
for if it did the latter, the sentence would have the imper- 
fection of having a double sense. We therefore have to 
understand that the body of those men who are capable of 
ascending and descending originates in connexion with 
the fifth oblation, that in the case of other men, however, 
a body forms itself from water mixed with the other ele- 
ments even without a settled number of oblations. 

19. It is, moreover, recorded in the (ordinary) 
world. 

There are, moreover, traditions, apart from the Veda, 
that certain persons like Drowa, Dhrcsh/adyumna, Sita, 
Draupadi, &c, were not born in the ordinary way from 



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126 vedAnta-sAtras. 



mothers. In the case of Dro«a and others there was 
absent the oblation which is made into the woman ; while 
in the case of Dhrtsh/adyumna and others, even two of 
the oblations, viz. the one offered into woman and the one 
offered into man, were absent. Hence in other cases also 
birth may be supposed to take place independently of the 
number of oblations. — It is, moreover, commonly known 
that the female crane conceives without a male. 

20. And on account of observation. 

It is, moreover, observed that out of the four classes of 
organic beings — viviparous animals, oviparous animals, ani- 
mals springing from heat, and beings springing from germs 
(plants) — the two latter classes are produced without sexual 
intercourse, so that in their case no regard is had to the 
number of oblations. The same may therefore take place 
in other cases also. — But, an objection may here be raised, 
scripture speaks of those beings as belonging to three 
classes only, because there are three modes of origin only ; 
f That which springs from an egg, that which springs from 
a living being, that which springs from a germ ' {Kh. Up. 
VI, 3, 1). How then can it be maintained that there 
are four classes? — To this objection the next Sutra 
replies. 

21. The third term comprises that which springs 
from heat. 

The third term in the scriptural passage quoted, i.e. 
' that which springs from a germ,' must be understood as 
implying those beings also which spring from heat ; the 
two classes having in common that they spring from earth 
or water, i.e. from something stable. Different from their 
origin is the origin of those beings which spring from moving 
things (viz. animals). — In other places the beings springing 
from heat and those springing from germs are spoken of as 
constituting separate classes. — Hence there is no contra- 
diction. 

22. (On the part of the soul's descending from the 

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in adhyAya, i pAda, 22. 127 

moon) there is entering into similarity of being (with 
ether and so on); as this (only) is possible. 

It has been explained that the souls of those who perform 
sacrifices, &c\, after having reached the moon dwell there as 
long as their works last and then re-descend with a remain- 
der of their works. We now have to inquire into the mode 
of that descent. On this point scripture makes the follow- 
ing statement : * They return again the way they came, to 
the ether, from the ether to the air. Then the sacrificer 
having become air becomes smoke, having become smoke 
he becomes mist, having become mist he becomes a cloud, 
having become a cloud he rains down.' — Here a doubt arises 
whether the descending souls pass over into a state of 
identity with ether, &c> or into a state of similarity. — The 
purvapakshin maintains that the state is one of identity, 
because this is directly stated by the text. Otherwise there 
would take place so-called indication (lakshawa). Now 
whenever the doubt lies between a directly expressed and 
a merely indicated meaning the former is to be preferred. 
Thus the following words also, ' Having become air he be- 
comes smoke,' &c, are appropriate only if the soul be under- 
stood to identify itself with them. — Hence it follows that 
the souls become identical with ether, &c. — To this we reply 
that they only pass into a state of similarity to ether, &c. 
When the body, consisting of water which the soul had 
assumed in the sphere of the moon for the purpose of en- 
joyment, dissolves at the time when that enjoyment comes 
to an end, then it becomes subtle like ether, passes there- 
upon into the power of the air, and then gets mixed with 
smoke, &c. This is the meaning of the clauses, * They return 
as they came to the ether, from the ether to the air, &c.' — 
How is this known to be the meaning ? — Because thus only 
it is possible. For it is not possible that one thing should 
become another in the literal sense of the word. If, more- 
over, the souls became identified with ether they could no 
longer descend through air, &c. And as connexion with 
the ether is, on account of its all-pervadingness, eternal, no 
other connexion (of the souls) with it can here be meant 



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1 28 vedAnta-sAtras. 



but their entering into a state of similarity to it 1 . And in 
cases where it is impossible to accept the literal meaning of 
the text it is quite proper to assume the meaning which is 
merely indicated. — For these reasons the souls' becoming 
ether, &c, has to be taken in the secondary sense of their 
passing into a state of similarity to ether, and so on. 

23. (The soul passes through the stages of its 
descent) in a not very long time ; on account of the 
special statement. 

A doubt arises with reference to the period beginning 
with the soul's becoming ether and extending up to its 
entering into rice, &c, viz. whether the soul remains a long 
time in the state of similarity to each of the stages of its 
way before it enters into similarity to the next one, or only 
a short time. — The purvapakshin maintains that, on ac- 
count of the absence of a definite text, no binding rule 
exists. — To this we reply that the souls remain in the state 
of similarity to ether, &c, for a short period only before they 
fall to the earth in raindrops. We infer this from the 
circumstance of the text making a special statement. For 
after having said that the souls enter into rice, &c, it adds, 
' From thence the escape is beset with more pain ; ' a state- 
ment implying that the escape from the previous states was 
comparatively easy and pleasant. Now this difference in 
point of pleasantness must be based on the comparative 
shortness or length of the escape ; for as, at that time, the 
body is not yet formed, enjoyment (in the ordinary sense) 
is not possible. Hence we conclude that, up to the 
moment when the souls enter into rice, &c, their descent 
is accomplished in a short time. 



1 It might be said that the relation to ether, &c, into which the 
souls enter, is the relation of conjunction (sawyoga), not the relation 
of similarity. But as nothing can enter into the relation of sawyoga 
with ether (everything being in eternal samyoga with it) we must 
assume that ' becoming ether ' means ' becoming like ether,' and by 
parity of reasoning, that ' becoming air, &c.,' means ' becoming like 
air.' 



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Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 24. 129 

24. (The descending souls enter) into (plants) 
animated by other (souls), as in the previous cases, 
on account of scriptural declaration. 

In the description of the souls' descent we read, after their 
coming down in raindrops has been mentioned, ' Then they 
are born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and 
beans.' — Here a doubt arises whether, at this stage of their 
descent, the souls to which a remainder of their works con- 
tinues to cling really pass over into the different species of 
those immoveable things (plants) and enjoy their pleasures 
and pains, or if they enter merely into a state of conjunction 
with the bodies of those plants which are animated by 
different souls. — The purvapakshin maintains that they pass 
over into those species and enjoy their pleasures and pains, 
on account of the remainder of works still attaching to 
them ; firstly, because that enables us to take the verb ' to 
be born ' in its literal sense ; secondly, because we know from 
Sruti and Smriti that the condition of a plant may be a 
place of enjoyment (of the fruits of actions) ; and thirdly, 
because sacrifices and similar actions, being connected 
with harm done to animals, &c, may lead to unpleasant 
results. We therefore take the 'being born as rice,' &c, 
of those to whom a remainder of their works attaches, in its 
literal sense, and consider the case to be analogous to that of 
a man who is born either as a dog or a hog or a K&nd&la, 
where we have to understand that the man really becomes 
a dog, and so on, and experiences the pleasures and pains 
connected with that condition. 

To this reasoning we reply as follows: — The souls to which 
a remainder attaches enter merely into conjunction with rice 
plants, &c, which are already animated by other souls ; and 
do not enjoy their pleasures and pains ; ' as in the previous 
cases.' As the souls' becoming air, smoke, &c, was decided 
to mean only that they become connected with them 1 , so 
here too their becoming rice, &c. merely means that they 

1 This does not agree well with what had been said above about 
the souls becoming similar to ether, air, &c. 
[38] K 



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1 30 vedAnta-sCtras. 



become connected with those plants. — How is this known ? 
— From the fact of the statement here also being of the 
same nature. — Of what nature ? — Here, also, as in the case 
of the souls becoming ether, &c, down to rain, the text does 
not refer to any operation of the works ; hence we conclude 
that the souls do not enjoy pleasure and pain. Where, on 
the other hand, the text wants to intimate that the souls 
undergo pleasure and pain, there it refers to the operation 
of the former works ; so, e. g. in the passage which treats of 
men of good or evil conduct. Moreover, if we should take 
the souls' being born as rice, &c, in its literal sense, it would 
follow that when the rice plants are reaped, unhusked, split, 
cooked and eaten, the souls which have descended into them 
and are animating them would have to leave them ; it being 
generally known that when a body is destroyed the soul 
animating it abandons it. And then (if the souls left the 
plants) the text could not state (as it does state, V, 10, 6) 
that the souls which had entered into the plants are trans- 
mitted by animal generation (on the part of those who eat 
the plants). Hence it follows that the souls which have 
descended are merely outwardly connected with the plants 
animated by other souls. This suffices to refute the asser- 
tions that ' to be born ' must be taken in its literal sense ; 
and that the state of vegetable existence affords a place 
for enjoyment. We do not entirely deny that vegetable 
existence may afford a place for enjoyment ; it may do so 
in the case of other beings which, in consequence of their 
unholy deeds, have become plants. We only maintain that 
those souls which descend from the moon with an un- 
requited remainder of works do not experience the enjoy- 
ment connected with plant life. 

25. Should it be said that (sacrificial work is) 
unholy ; we deny this on the ground of scripture. 

We proceed to refute the remark made by the purva- 
pakshin that sacrificial works are unholy because involving 
harm done to animals, &c, that they may therefore lead 
to unpleasant results, and that hence the statement as to 
the souls being born as plants, &c, may be taken in its 



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m adhyAya, i pAda, 26. 131 

literal sense ; in consequence of which it would be uncalled- 
for to assume a derived sense. — This reasoning is not valid, 
because our knowledge of what is duty and the contrary of 
duty depends entirely on scripture. The knowledge of 
one action being right and another wrong is based on 
scripture only; for it lies out of the cognizance of the 
senses, and there moreover is, in the case of right and wrong, 
an entire want of binding rules as to place, time, and occa- 
sion. What in one place, at one time, on one occasion 
is performed as a right action, is a wrong action in 
another place, at another time, on another occasion ; none 
therefore can know, without scripture, what is either right 
or wrong. Now from scripture we derive the certain know- 
ledge that the ^yotish/bma-sacrifice, which involves harm 
done to animals (i.e. the animal sacrifice), &c, is an act of 
duty ; how then can it be called unholy ? — But does not 
the scriptural precept, ' Do not harm any creature,' intimate 
that to do harm to any being is an act contrary to duty ?— 
True, but that is a general rule, while the precept, ' Let him 
offer an animal to Agnlshomau,' embodies an exception ; 
and general rule and exception have different spheres of 
application. The work (i.e. sacrifice) enjoined by the Veda 
is therefore holy, being performed by authoritative men and 
considered blameless ; and to be born as a plant cannot be 
its fruit. Nor can to be born as rice and other plants be 
considered analogous to being born as dogs, &c. For the 
latter birth scripture teaches with reference to men of evil 
conduct only ; while no such specific qualification is stated 
in the case of vegetable existence. Hence we conclude that 
when scripture states that the souls descending from the 
moon become plants, it only means that they become en- 
closed in plants. 

26. After that (there takes place) conjunction (of 
the soul) with him who performs the act of genera- 
tion. 

The conclusion arrived at under the preceding Stitra is 
confirmed also by scripture stating that the souls, after 
having entered into plants, ' become ' beings performing the 

K 2 



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132 vedAnta-sCtras. 



act of generation, ' for whoever eats the food, whoever per- 
forms the act of generation, that again he (the soul) 
becomes.' Here again the soul's 'becoming ' he who performs 
the act of generation cannot be taken in its literal sense ; 
for a person becomes capable of generation a long time 
after his birth only, viz. when he reaches puberty. How 
then should the soul contained in the food eaten enter into 
that condition in its true sense ? Hence we must interpret 
the passage to mean only that the soul enters into conjunc- 
tion with one who performs the act of generation ; and 
from this we again infer that the soul's becoming a plant 
merely means its entering into conjunction with a plant 

27. From the yoni a (new) body (springs). 

Then, subsequently to the soul having been in conjunc- 
tion with a person of generative power, generation takes 
place, and a body is produced in which the soul can enjoy 
the fruits of that remainder of works which still attaches to 
it. This scripture declares in the passage, ' Those whose 
conduct has been good,' &c. From this, also, it appears that 
the souls to which a remainder clings, when descending and 
becoming rice plants, and so on, do not enter into the state 
of forming the body of those plants with its attendant 
pleasure and pain, but are ' born as plants ' in so far only 
as they enter into conjunction with them. 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 2. 133 



SECOND PADA. 
Reverence to the highest Self! 

1. In the intermediate place there is (a real) 
creation ; for (scripture) says (that). 

In the preceding pada we have set forth, with reference 
to the knowledge of the five fires, the various stages of 
the soul's passing through the samsara. We shall now 
set forth the soul's different states (waking, dreaming, &c.) 
— Scripture says (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 9 ; 10), ' When he falls 
asleep — ; there are no chariots in that state, no horses, no 
roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads,' 
&c. — Here a doubt arises whether the creation thus taking 
place in dreams is a real one (paramarthika) like the crea- 
tion seen in the waking state, or whether it consists of 
illusion (maya). — The purvapakshin maintains that * in the 
intermediate place (or state) there is (a real) creation.' By 
intermediate place we have to understand the place of 
dreams, in which latter sense the word is used in the Veda, 

* There is a third intermediate state, the state of dreams ' 
(Br*. Up. IV, 3, 9). That place is called the intermediate 
place because it lies there where the two worlds, or else the 
place of waking and the place of bliss (deep sleep), join. 
In that intermediate place the creation must be real ; be- 
cause scripture, which is authoritative, declares it to be so, 
'He creates chariots, horses, roads,' &c. We, moreover, 
infer this from the concluding clause, 'He indeed is the 
maker' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). 

2. And some (state the Self to be) the shaper 
(creator); sons and so on (being the lovely things 
which he shapes). 

Moreover the members of one jakha state that the Self 
is, in that intermediate state, the shaper of lovely things, 

• He, the person who is awake in us while we are asleep, 
shaping one lovely thing after another ' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8). 



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j 34 vedanta-sGtras. 



Kama (lovely things) in this passage means sons, &c, 
that are so called because they are beloved. — But may 
not the term 'k&maA' denote desires merely? — No, we reply; 
the word kama is here used with reference to sons, &c. ; 
for those form the general subject of discussion, as we see 
from some preceding passages, ' Choose sons and grand- 
sons,' &c, and ' I make thee the enjoyer of all kamas ' 
(Ka. Up. I, i, 23 ; 24). — And that that shaper is the highest 
Self (pra^-«a) we infer from the general subject-matter and 
from the complementary sentence. That the highest Self 
is the general subject-matter appears from II, 14, 'That 
which thou seest as neither this nor that.' And to that 
highest Self there also refers the complementary sentence 
II, 5, 8, 'That indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that 
alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained 
in it, and no one goes beyond.' — Now it is admitted that 
the world (creation) of our waking state of which the highest 
Self (pra^wa) is the maker is real ; hence the world of our 
dreaming state must likewise be real. That the same reason- 
ing applies to the waking and the sleeping state a scriptural 
passage also declares, ' Here they say: No, this is the same 
as the place of waking, for what he sees while awake the 
same he sees while asleep' (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 14). — Hence the 
world of dreams is real. — To this we reply as follows. 

3. But it (viz. the dream world) is mere illusion 
(maya), on account of its nature not manifesting 
itself with the totality (of the attributes of reality). 

The word 'but* discards the purvapaksha. It is not true 
that the world of dreams is real ; it is mere illusion and 
there is not a particle of reality in it — Why? — 'On account 
of its nature not manifesting itself with the totality,' i.e. 
because the nature of the dream world does not manifest 
itself with the totality of the attributes of real things. — 
What then do you mean by the * totality ' ? — The fulfilment 
of the conditions of place, time, and cause, and the circum- 
stance of non-refutation. All these have their sphere in real 
things, but cannot be applied to dreams. In the first place 
there is, in a dream, no space for chariots and the like ; for 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 3. 135 

those cannot possibly find room in the limited confines of 
the body. — Well, but why should not the dreaming person 
see the objects of his dream outside of his body ? He does 
as a matter of fact perceive things as separated from him- 
self by space; and.Sruti, moreover, declares that the dream 
is outside the bod)/,' Away from the nest thelmmortal moves; 
that immortal one goes wherever he likes ' (Bri. Up. IV, 
3, 13). And this distinction of the conceptions of staying 
and going would have no good sense if the being (the soul) 
did not really go out — What you maintain is inadmissible, 
we reply. A sleeping being cannot possibly possess the 
power to go and return in a moment the distance of a 
hundred yqganas. Sometimes, moreover, a person recounts 
a dream in which he went to some place without returning 
from it, ' Lying on my bed in the land of the Kurus I was 
overcome by sleep and went in my dream to the country 
of the Paȣalas, and being there I awoke.' If, now, that 
person had really gone out of his country, he would on 
waking find himself in the country of the Pa££alas to which 
he had gone in his dream ; but as a matter of fact he awakes 
in the country of the Kurus. — Moreover, while a man 
imagines himself in his dream going, in his body, to another 
place, the bystanders see that very same body lying on the 
couch. Further, a dreaming person does not see, in his 
dream, other places such as they really are. But if he in 
seeing them did actually go about, they would appear to 
him like the things he sees in his waking state. Sruti, 
moreover, declares that the dream is within the body, cp. 
the passage beginning ' But when he moves about in dream,' 
and terminating ' He moves about, according to his plea- 
sure, within his own body' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 18). Hence the 
passage about the dreamer moving away from his nest 
must be taken in a metaphorical sense, as otherwise we 
should contradict scripture as well as reason ; he who while 
remaining within his own body does not use it for any pur- 
pose may be said to be outside the body as it were. The 
difference of the ideas of staying within the body and going 
outside must, therefore, be viewed as a mere deception. — 
In the second place we see that dreams are in conflict with 



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136 vedAnta-s6tras. 



the conditions of time. One person lying asleep at night 
dreams that it is day in the Bharata Varsha ; another lives, 
during a dream which lasts one muhtirta only, through many 
crowds of years. — In the third place there do not exist in 
the state of dreaming the requisite efficient causes for either 
thought or action ; for as, in sleep, the organs are drawn 
inward, the dreaming person has no eyes, &c. for perceiving 
chariots and other things; and whence should he, in the 
space of the twinkling of an eye, have the power of — or 
procure the material for — making chariots and the like ? — 
In the fourth place the chariots, horses, &c, which the 
dream creates, are refuted, i. e. shown not to exist by the 
waking state. And apart from this, the dream itself refutes 
what it creates, as its end often contradicts its beginning ; 
what at first was considered to be a chariot turns, in a 
moment, into a man, and what was conceived to be a man 
has all at once become a tree. — Scripture itself, moreover, 
clearly declares the chariots, &c, of a dream to have no 
real existence, 'There are no chariots in that state, no 
horses, no roads, &c' — Hence the visions of a dream are 
mere illusion. 

4. (Not altogether) for it (the dream) is indicative 
(of the future), according to .Sruti ; the experts also 
declare this. 

Well then, as dreams are mere illusion, they do not 
contain a particle of reality? — Not so, we reply; for 
dreams are prophetic of future good and bad fortune. For 
scripture teaches as follows, 'When a man engaged in 
some work undertaken for a special wish sees in his dreams 
a woman, he may infer success from that dream-vision.' 
Other scriptural passages declare that certain dreams 
indicate speedy death, so, e.g. ' If he sees a black man 
with black teeth, that man will kill him.' — Those also who 
understand the science of dreams hold the opinion that to 
dream of riding on an elephant and the like is lucky; while 
it is unlucky to dream of riding on a donkey, &c. ; and that 
certain other dreams also caused by special mantras or 
devatas or substances contain a particle of truth. — In all 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 4. 137 

these cases the thing indicated may be real ; the indicating 
dream, however, remains unreal as it is refuted by the 
waking state. The doctrine that the dream itself is mere 
illusion thus remains uncontradicted. — On this account the 
Vedic passage to which the first Sutra of this pada refers is 
to be explained metaphorically. When we say ' the plough 
bears, i.e. supports the bullocks,' we say so because the 
plough is the indirect cause of the bullocks being kept ', 
not because we mean that the plough directly supports 
the bullocks. Analogously scripture says that the dream- 
ing person creates chariots, &c, and is their maker, not 
because he creates them directly but because he is the 
cause of their creation. By his being their cause we have 
to understand that he is that one who performs the good 
and evil deeds which are the cause of "the delight and 
fear produced by the apparition, in his dream, of chariots 
and other things 2 . — Moreover, as in the waking state, 
owing to the contact of the senses and their objects and 
the resulting interference of the light of the sun, &c, the 
self-luminousness of the Self is, for the beholder, difficult 
to discriminate, scripture gives the description of the 
dreaming state for the purpose of that discrimination. If 
then the statements about the creation of chariots, &c, 
were taken as they stand (i.e. literally) we could not 
ascertain that the Self is self-luminous 8 . Hence we have 
to explain the passage relative to the creation of chariots, 
&c, in a metaphorical sense, so as to make it agree with 
the statement about the non-existence of chariots, &c. 
This explains also the scriptural passage about the 
shaping (III, 2, a). The statement made above that in 
the Kanaka the highest Self is spoken of as the shaper 

1 Bullocks have to be kept because the fields must be tilled. 

* The dreams have the purpose of either cheering or saddening 
and frightening the sleeper ; so as to requite him for his good and 
evil works. His ad/Ysh/a thus furnishes the efficient cause of the 
dreams. 

* Because then there would be no difference between the dream- 
ing and the waking state. 



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1 38 vedAnta-sCtras. 



of dreams is untrue; for another scriptural passage 
ascribes that activity to the individual soul, ' He him- 
self destroying, he himself shaping dreams with his 
own splendour, with his own light' (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 9) \ 
And in the Kanaka Upanishad itself also we infer from 
the form of the sentence, ' That one who wakes in us 
while we are asleep,' — which is an anuvada, i.e. an 
additional statement about something well known — that 
he who is there proclaimed as the shaper of lovely things 
is nobody else than the (well-known) individual soul. The 
other passage which forms the complementary continuation 
of the one just quoted (' That indeed is the Bright, that is 
Brahman ') discards the notion of the separate existence of 
the individual soul and teaches that it is nothing but Brah- 
man, analogously to the passage ' That art thou.' And this 
interpretation does not conflict with Brahman being the 
general subject-matter. — Nor do we thereby deny altogether 
that the highest (pra^wa) Self is active in dreams ; for as 
being the Lord of all it may be considered as the guide 
and ruler of the soul in all its states. We only maintain 
that the world connected with the intermediate state (i.e. 
the world of dreams) is not real in the same sense as the 
world consisting of ether and so on is real. On the other 
hand we must remember that also the so-called real crea- 
tion with its ether, air, &c, is not absolutely real ; for as 
we have proved before (II, 1, 14) the entire expanse of 
things is mere illusion. The world consisting of ether, &c, 
remains fixed and distinct up to the moment when the soul 
cognizes that Brahman is the Self of all ; the world of 
dreams on the other hand is daily sublated by the waking 
state. That the latter is mere illusion has, therefore, to be 
understood with a distinction. 

5. But by the meditation on the highest that 
which is hidden (viz. the equality of the Lord and 

1 Svayaw yihatya purvadeha/w nisieshfam kntva svayaw nirmS- 
yapurvaw vasanamayaai deham sampSdya svena bhdsi svakiyabu- 
ddhivrjuya" svena ^yotisha' svarupa&uianyenety arthaA. An. Gi. 



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m adhyAya, 2 pAda, 6. 139 

the soul, becomes manifest); for from him (the 
Lord) are its (the soul's) bondage and release. 

Well, but the Individual soul is a part of the highest Self 
as the spark is a part of the fire. And as fire and spark 
have in common the powers of burning and giving light, so 
the individual soul and the Lord have in common the 
powers of knowledge and rulership ; hence the individual 
soul may, by means of its lordship, effect in th e dream ing 
state a creation of chariots and the like, springing from Its 
wishes (sawkalpa). — To this we reply that although the 
Lord and the individual soul stand to each other in the 
relation of whole and part, yet it is manifest to perception 
that the attributes of the two are of a different nature. — 
Do you then mean to say that the individual soul has 
no common attributes with the Lord ? — We do not maintain 
that ; but we say that the equality of attributes, although 
existing, is hidden by the veil of Nescience. In the case 
of some persons indeed who strenuously meditate on the 
Lord and who, their ignorance being dispelled at last, 
obtain through the favour of the Lord extraordinary 
powers and insight, that hidden equality becomes mani- 
fest—just as through the action of strong medicines the 
power of sight of a blind man becomes manifest ; but it 
does not on its own account reveal itself to all men. — Why 
not? — Because 'from him,' i.e. from the Lord there are 
bondage and release of it, viz. the individual soul. That 
means : bondage is due to the absence of knowledge of 
the Lord's true nature ; release is due to the presence of 
such knowledge. 'Thus .Sruti declares, ' When that god is 
known all fetters fall off ; sufferings are destroyed and 
birth and death cease.; From meditating on him there 
arises, on the dissolution of the body, a third state, that 
of universal Lordship ; he who is alone is satisfied ' (Svet 
Up. I, 11), and similar passages. 

6. Or that (viz. the concealment of the soul's 
powers springs) from its connexion with the body. 

But if the soul is a part of the highest Self, why should 
its knowledge and lordship be hidden ? We should rather 



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140 vedanta-sOtras. 



expect them to be as manifest as the light and the heat of 
the spark. — True, we reply ; but the state of concealment 
of the soul's knowledge and lordship is due to its being 
joined to a body, i.e. to a body, sense-organs, mind, 
buddhi, sense-objects, sensations, &c. And to this state 
,of things there applies the simile : As the heat and light of 
the fire are hidden as long as the fire is still hidden in the 
wood from which it will be produced by friction, or as long 
as it is covered by ashes ; so, in consequence of the soul 
being connected with limiting adjuncts in the form of a 
body, &c, founded on name and form as presented by 
Nescience, its knowledge and lordship remain hidden as 
long as it is possessed by the erroneous notion of not being 
distinct from those adjuncts. — The word * or ' in the Sutra 
is meant to discard the suspicion that the Lord and the 
soul might be separate entities. — But why should not the 
soul be separate from the Lord, considering the state of 
concealment of its knowledge and power ? If we allow the 
two to be fundamentally separate, we need not assume 
that their separateness is due to the soul's connexion with 
the body. — It is impossible, we reply, to assume the soul 
to be separate from the Lord. For in the scriptural pas- 
sage beginning with ' That divinity thought ' &c. (Kh. Up. 
VI, 3, 2) we meet with the clause, ' It entered into those 
beings with this living Self (^iva atman) ; where the 
individual soul is referred to as the Self. And then we 
have the other passage, ' It is the True ; it is the Self ; 
that art thou, O .Svetaketu/ which again teaches that the 
Lord is the Self of the soul. Hence the soul is non- 
different from the Lord, but its knowledge and power are 
obscured by its connexion with the body. From this it 
follows that the dreaming soul is not able to create, from 
its mere wishes, chariots and other things. If the soul 
possessed that power, nobody would ever have an un- 
pleasant dream ; for nobody ever wishes for something 
unpleasant to himself. — We finally deny that the scriptural 
passage about the waking state (' dream is the same as the 
place of waking ' &c.) indicates the reality of dreams. The 
statement made there about the equality of the two states 



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m adhyAya, 2 pAda, 7. 141 

is not meant to indicate that dreams are real, for that would 
conflict with the soul's self-luminousness (referred to above), 
and scripture, moreover, expressly declares that the chariots, 
&c, of a dream have no real existence ; *it merely means 
that dreams, because due to mental impressions (vasana) 
received in the waking state, are equal to the latter in ap- 
pearance.-r^From all this it follows that dreams are mere 

illusion. ) 

J 

7. The absence of that (i.e. of dreams, i.e. dream- 
less sleep) takes place in the naafts and in the Self; 
according to scriptural statement. 

The state of dream has been discussed; we are now 
going to enquire into the state of deep sleep. A number 
of scriptural passages refer to that state. In one place we 
read, ' When a man is asleep, reposing and at perfect rest 
so that he sees no dream, then he has entered into those 
narfs' (Kh. Up. VIII,' 6, 3). In another place it is said 
with reference to the n&fts, ' Through them he moves forth 
and rests in the surrounding body' (Br*. Up. II, 1, 19). So 
also in another place, ' In these the person is when sleeping 
he sees no dream. Then he becomes one with the prawa 
alone ' (Kau. Up. IV, 20) . Again in another place, ' That 
ether which is within the heart in that he reposes ' (Br*. 
Up. TV, 4, az). Again, ' Then he becomes united with that 
which is ; he is gone to his Self (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1). And, 
1 Embraced by the highest Self (pra^wa) he knows nothing 
that is without, nothing that is within' (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 21). 
Here the doubt arises whether the n&rfs, &c, mentioned in 
the above passages are independent from each other and 
constitute various places for the soul in the state of deep 
sleep, or if they stand in mutual relation so as to constitute 
one such place only. The purvapakshin takes the former 
view on account of the various places mentioned serving one 
and the same purpose. Things serving the same purpose, 
as, e.g. rice and barley 1 , are never seen to be dependent 

1 Either of which may be employed for making the sacrificial 
cake. 



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142 vedAnta-sOtras. 

on each other. That the n&fts, &c, actually serve the 
same purpose appears from the circumstance of their being 
all of them exhibited equally in the locative case, ' he has 
entered into the n&dis' ' he rests in the pericardium,' fix. 1 
— But in some of the passages quoted the locative case is 
not employed, so, e.g. in • He becomes united with that 
which is' (sata, instrumental case)! — That makes no differ- 
ence, we reply, because there also the locative case is 
meant. For in the complementary passage the text states 
that the soul desirous of rest enters into the Self, ' Finding 
no rest elsewhere it settles down on breath ' {Kh. Up. VI, 
8, 2) ; a passage in which the word ' breath ' refers to that 
which is (the sat). A place of rest of course implies the 
idea of the locative case. The latter case is, moreover, 
actually exhibited in a further complementary passage, 

• When they have become merged in that which is (sati), 
they know not that they are merged in it.' — In all these 
passages one and the same state is referred to, viz. the 
state of deep sleep which is characterised by the suspension 
of all special cognition. Hence we conclude that in the 
state of deep sleep the soul optionally goes to any one of 
those places, either the naafts, or that which is, &c. 

To this we make the following reply — 'The absence of 
that,'. i.e. the absence of dreams — which absence constitutes 
the essence of deep sleep — takes place ' in the narfis and in 
the Self;' i.e. in deep sleep the soul goes into both to- 
gether, not optionally into either. — How is this known ? — 

• From scripture.' — Scripture says of all those things, the 
n&fis, &c, that they are the place of deep sleep ; and those 
statements we must combine into one, as the hypothesis of 
option would involve partial refutation 2 . The assertion 

1 The argument of the purvapakshin is that the different places 
in which the soul is said to abide in the state of deep sleep are all 
exhibited by the text in the same case and are on that account 
co-ordinate. Mutual relation implying subordination would require 
them to be exhibited in different cases enabling us to infer the 
exact manner and degree of relation. 

* By allowing option between two Vedic statements we lessen the 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 7. 143 

made above that we are compelled to allow option because 
the narfis, &c, serve one and the same purpose, is without 
foundation ; for from the mere fact of two things being 
exhibited in the same case it does not follow by any means 
that they serve the same purpose, and that for that reason 
we have to choose between them. We on the contrary see 
that one and the same case is employed even where things 
serve different purposes and have to be combined ; we say, 
e.g. • he sleeps in the palace, he sleeps on the couch \ ' So 
in the present case also the different statements can be 
combined into one, ' He sleeps in the nSufts, in the sur- 
rounding body, in Brahman.' Moreover, the scriptural 
passage, ' In these the person is when sleeping he sees no 
dream; then he becomes one with the pra«a alone,' de- 
clares, by mentioning them together in one sentence, that 
the n&dis and the pra«a are to be combined in the state of 
deep sleep. That by prawa Brahman is meant we have 
already shown (I, 1, 28). Although in another text the 
narf!s are spoken of as an independent place of deep sleep 
as it were (' then he has entered into those n&dis '), yet, in 
order not to contradict other passages in which Brahman is 
spoken of as the place of deep sleep, we must explain that 
text to mean that the soul abides in Brahman through the 
nSuiis. Nor is this interpretation opposed to the employ- 
ment of the locative case (' into — or in — those narfis ') ; for 
if the soul enters into Brahman by means of the naifts it is 
at the same time in the na</is ; just as a man who descends 
to the sea by means of the river Ganga is at the same time 
on the Gahga. — Moreover that passage about the n&dis, 
because its purpose is to describe the road, consisting of 
the rays and narfte, to the Brahma world, mentions the 
entering of the soul into the n&dls in order to glorify the 
latter (not in order to describe the state of deep sleep) ; for 
the clause following upon the one which refers to the enter- 
authority of the Veda; for the adoption of either alternative 
sublates, for the time, the other alternative. 

1 Where the two locatives are to be combined into one statement, 
' he sleeps on the couch in the palace.' 



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144 vedAnta-sOtras. 



ing praises the nidis, 'There no evil touches him.' The 
text, moreover, adds a reason for the absence of all evil, in 
the words, ' For then he has become united with the light.' 
That means that on account of the light contained in the 
n&dis (which is called bile) having overpowered the organs 
the person no longer sees the sense-objects. Or else Brah- 
man may be meant by the ' light ; ' which term is applied 
to Brahman in another passage also, ' It is Brahman only, 
light only ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 7). The passage would then 
mean that the soul becomes, by means of the n&dis, united 
with Brahman, and that hence no evil touches it. That the 
union with Brahman is the reason for the absence of all 
contact with evil, is known from other scriptural passages, 
such as, ' All evils turn back from it ; for the world of 
Brahman is free from all evil ' {Kh. Up. VIII, 4, 1). On 
that account we have to combine the n&dls with Brahman, 
which from other passages is known to be the place of deep 
sleep. — Analogously we conclude that the pericardium also, 
because it is mentioned in a passage treating of Brahman, 
is a place of deep sleep only in subordination to Brahman. 
For the ether within the heart is at first spoken of as the 
place of sleep (' He lies in the ether which is in the heart,' 
Br*. Up. II, 1, 17), and with reference thereto it is said 
later on, ' He rests in the pericardium ' (II, 1, 19). Peri- 
cardium (puritat) is a name of that which envelops the 
heart ; hence that which rests within the ether of the heart 
— which is contained in the pericardium — can itself be said 
to rest within the pericardium ; just as a man living in a 
town surrounded by walls is said to live within the walls. 
That the ether within the heart is Brahman has already 
been shown (I, 3, 14). — That again the a&dls and the peri- 
cardium have to be combined as places of deep sleep appears 
from their being mentioned together in one sentence 
(' Through them he moves forth and rests in the puritat). 
That that which is (sat) and the intelligent Self (pra^wa) 
are only names of Brahman is well known; hence scripture 
mentions only three places of deep sleep, viz. the nadts, 
the pericardium, and Brahman. Among these three again 
Brahman alone is the lasting place of deep sleep ; the 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 7. 145 

naafis and the pericardium are mere roads leading to it. 
Moreover (to explain further the difference of the manner 
in which the soul, in deep sleep, enters into the n&dis, the 
pericardium and Brahman respectively), the n&dls and the 
pericardium are (in deep sleep) merely the abode of the 
limiting adjuncts of the soul ; in them the soul's organs 
abide 1 . For apart from* its connexion with the limiting 
adjuncts it is impossible for the soul in itself to abide any- 
where, because being non-different from Brahman it rests 
in its own glory. And if we say that, in deep sleep, it 
abides in Brahman we do not mean thereby that there is a 
difference between the abode and that which abides, but 
that there is absolute identity of the two. For the text 
says, ' With that which is he becomes united, he is gone to 
his Self; ' which means that the sleeping person has entered 
into his true nature. — It cannot, moreover, be said that the 
soul is at any time not united with Brahman — for its true 
nature can never pass away — ; but considering that in the 
state of waking and that of dreaming it passes, owing to 
the contact with its limiting adjuncts, into something else, 
as it were, it may be said that when those adjuncts cease 
in deep sleep it passes back into its true nature. Hence it 
would be entirely wrong to assume that, in deep sleep, it 
sometimes becomes united with Brahman and sometimes 
not 2 . Moreover, even if we admit that there are different 
places for the soul in deep sleep, still there does not result, 
from that difference of place, any difference in the quality 
of deep sleep which is in all cases characterised by the ces- 
sation of special cognition ; it is, therefore, more appro- 
priate to say that the soul does (in deep sleep) not cognize 
on account of its oneness, having become united with Brah- 
man ; according to the .Sruti, ' How should he know an- 
other ? ' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). — If, further, the sleeping soul 
did rest in the na^is and the puritat, it would be impossible 

1 An. Gi. explains karanani by karmam : n&ftshu puritati £a 
£ivasyopadhyantarbhutani karawani karmam tish/Aantity upadhya- 
dharatvam, ^ivasya tv adharo brahmaiva. 

2 But with the na<fis or the pericardium only. 

[38] L 



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146 vedAnta-sAtras. 



to assign any reason for its not cognizing, because in that 
case it would continue to have diversity for its object; 
according to the .Sruti, ' When there is, as it were, duality, 
then one sees the other,' &c. — But in the case of him also 
who has diversity for his object, great distance and the like 
may be reasons for absence of cognition ! — What you say 
might indeed apply to our case if the soul were acknow- 
ledged to be limited in itself; then its case would be 
analogous to that of Vishwumitra, who, when staying in 
a foreign land, cannot see his home. But, apart from its 
adjuncts, the soul knows no limitation. — Well, then, great 
distance, &c, residing in the adjuncts may be the reason 
of non-cognition ! — Yes, but that leads us to the conclu- 
sion already arrived at, viz. that the soul does not cognize 
when, the limiting adjuncts having ceased, it has become 
one with Brahman. 

Nor do we finally maintain that the nadis, the pericar- 
dium, and Brahman are to be added to each other as 
being equally places of deep sleep. For by the knowledge 
that the na</is and the pericardium are places of sleep, 
nothing is gained, as scripture teaches neither that some 
special fruit is connected with that knowledge nor that it is 
the subordinate member of some work, &c, connected with 
certain results. We, on the other hand, do want to prove 
that that Brahman is the lasting abode of the soul in the state 
of deep sleep ; that is a knowledge which has its own 
uses, viz. the ascertainment of Brahman being the Self of 
the soul, and the ascertainment of the soul being essentially 
non-connected with the worlds that appear in the waking 
and in the dreaming state. Hence the Self alone is the 
place of deep sleep. 

8. Hence the awaking from that (viz. Brahman). 

And because the Self only is the place of deep sleep, on 
that account the scriptural chapters treating of sleep inva- 
riably teach that the awaking takes place from that Self. 
In the Bri. Up. when the time comes for the answer to the 
question, 'Whence did he come back?' (II, 1, 16), the text 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 9. 147 

says, 'As small sparks come forth from fire, thus all pra«as 
come forth from that Self' (II, 1, 20). And Kh. Up. VI, 
10, 2, we read : 'When they have come back from the True 
they do not know that they have come back from the True.' 
If there were optional places to which the soul might resort 
in deep sleep, scripture would teach us that it awakes some- 
times from the n&fis, sometimes from the pericardium, 
sometimes from the Self.— For that reason also the Self is 
the place of deep sleep. 

9. But the same (soul returns from Brahman) ; on 
account of work, remembrance, text, and precept. 

Here we have to enquire whether the soul when awaking 
from the union with Brahman is the same which entered 
into union with Brahman, or another one. — The purvapak- 
shin maintains that there is no fixed rule on that point. 
For just as a drop of water, when poured into a large quan- 
tity of water, becomes one with the latter, so that when we 
again take out a drop it would be hard to manage that it 
should be the very same drop; thus the sleeping soul, when 
it has become united with Brahman, is merged in bliss and 
not able again to rise from it the same. Hence what 
actually awakes is either the Lord or some other soul. — To 
this we reply that the same soul which in the state of sleep 
entered into bliss again arises from it, not any other. We 
assert this on the ground of work, remembrance, sacred 
text, and precept ; which four reasons we will treat sepa- 
rately. In the first place the person who wakes from sleep 
must be the same, because it is seen to finish work left un- 
finished before. Men finish in the morning what they had 
left incomplete on the day before. Now it is not possible 
that one man should proceed to complete work half done 
by another man, because this would imply too much 1 . 

1 There would follow from it, e. g. that in the case of sacrifices 
occupying more than one day, there would be several sacrificers, 
and that consequently it would be doubtful to whom the fruit 
of the sacrifice, as promised by the Veda, belongs. And this 
would imply a stultification of the sacred text. 

L 2 



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1 48 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Hence we conclude that it is one and the same man who 
finishes on the latter day the work begun on the former. — 
In the second place the person rising from sleep is the 
same who went to sleep, for the reason that otherwise he 
could not remember what he had seen, &c, on the day 
before ; for what one man sees another cannot remember. 
And if another Self rose from sleep, the consciousness of 
personal identity (atmanusmarawa) expressed in the words, 
• I am the same I was before,' would not be possible. — In 
the third place we understand from Vedic texts that the 
same person rises again, ' He hastens back again as he 
came, to the place from which he started, to be awake* 
(Br*. Up. IV, 3, 16) ; ' All these creatures go day after day 
into the Brahma-world and yet do not discover it ' (KA. Up. 
VIII, 3, a) ; ' Whatever these creatures are here, whether a 
lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, 
or a musquito, that they become again and again' (Kk. 
Up. VI, io, a). These and similar passages met with in 
the chapters treating of sleeping and waking have a proper 
sense only if the same soul rises again. — In the fourth place 
we arrive at the same conclusion on the ground of the in- 
junctions of works and knowledge, which, on a different 
theory, would be meaningless. For if another person did 
rise, it would follow that a person might obtain final 
release by sleep merely, and what then, we ask, would be 
the use of all those works which bear fruit at a later period, 
and of knowledge ? — Moreover on the hypothesis of another 
person rising from sleep, that other person would either be 
a soul which had up to that time carried on its phenomenal 
life in another body; in that case it would follow that the 
practical existence carried on by means of that body would 
be cut short. If it be said that the soul which went to 
sleep may, in its turn, rise in that other body (so that B 
would rise in A's body and A in B's body), we reply that 
that would be an altogether useless hypothesis ; for what ad- 
vantage do we derive from assuming that each soul rises 
from sleep not in the same body in which it had gone to 
sleep, but that it goes to sleep in one body and rises in 
another? — Or else the soul rising (in A's body) would be 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, io. 149 

one which had obtained final release, and that would imply 
that final release can have an end. But it is impossible 
that a soul which has once freed itself from Nescience 
should again rise (enter into phenomenal life). Hereby 
it is also shown that the soul which rises cannot be the 
Lord, who is everlastingly free from Nescience. — Further, 
on the hypothesis of another soul rising, it would be diffi- 
cult to escape the conclusion that souls reap the fruits of 
deeds not their own, and, on the other hand, are not requited 
for what they have done. — From all this it follows that the 
person rising from sleep is the same that went to sleep. — 
Nor is it difficult to refute the analogical reasoning that the 
soul, if once united with Brahman, can no more emerge 
from it than a drop of water can again be taken out from 
the mass of water into which it had been poured. We 
admit the impossibility of taking out the same drop of 
water, because there is no means of distinguishing it from all 
the other drops. In the case of the soul, however, there 
are reasons of distinction, viz. the work and the knowledge 
(of each individual soul). Hence the two cases are not 
analogous. — Further, we point out that the flamingo, e. g. 
is able to distinguish and separate milk and water when 
mixed, things which we men are altogether incapable of 
distinguishing. — Moreover, what is called individual soul is 
not really different from the highest Self, so that it might 
be distinguished from the latter in the same way as a drop 
of water from the mass of water ; but, as we have explained 
repeatedly, Brahman itself is on account of its connexion 
with limiting adjuncts metaphorically called individual 
soul. Hence the phenomenal existence of one soul lasts as 
long as it continues to be bound by one set of adjuncts, and 
the phenomenal existence of another soul again lasts as 
long as it continues to be bound by another set of adjuncts. 
Each set of adjuncts continues through the states of sleep 
as well as of waking ; in the former it is like a seed, in the 
latter like the fully developed plant. Hence the proper 
inference is that the same soul awakes from sleep. 

10. In him who is senseless (in a swoon, &c.) 

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1 50 vedAnta-sOtras. 



there is half-union ; on account of this remaining (as 
the only possible hypothesis). 

There now arises the question of what kind that state 
is which ordinarily is called a swoon or being stunned. 
Here the pfirvapakshin maintains that we know only of 
three states of the soul as long as it abides in a body, 
viz. the waking state, dreaming, and deep dreamless sleep ; 
to which may be added, as a fourth state, the soul's passing 
out of the body. A fifth state is known neither from Sruti 
nor Smr/ti ; hence what is called fainting must be one of 
the four states mentioned. — To this we make the following 
reply. In the first place a man lying in a swoon cannot be 
said to be awake ; for he does not perceive external objects 
by means of his senses. — But, it might be objected, may 
not his case be analogous to that of the arrow-maker? 
Just as the man working at an arrow, although awake, is 
so intent on his arrow that he sees nothing else; so the 
man also who is stunned, e.g. by a blow, may be awake, 
but as his mind is concentrated on the sensation of pain 
caused by the blow of the club, he may not at the time 
perceive anything else. — No, we reply, the case is different, on 
account of the absence of consciousness. The arrow-maker 
says, * For such a length of time I was aware of nothing but 
the arrow ; ' the man, on the other hand, who returns to con- 
sciousness from a swoon, says, ' For such a length of time 
I was shut up in blind darkness ; I was conscious of nothing.' 
— A waking man, moreover, however much his mind may 
be concentrated on one object, keeps his body upright ; 
while the body of a swooning person falls prostrate on 
the ground. Hence a man in a swoon is not awake. — Nor, 
in the second place, is he dreaming; because he is alto- 
gether unconscious. — Nor, in the third place, is he dead ; 
for he continues to breathe and to be warm. When a man 
has become senseless and people are in doubt whether he 
be alive or dead, they touch the region of his heart, in 
order to ascertain whether warmth continues in his body 
or not, and put their hands to his nostrils to ascertain 
whether breathing goes on or not. If, then, they perceive 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, io. 151 

neither warmth nor breath, they conclude that he is dead, 
and carry off his body into the forest in order to burn it ; 
if, on the other hand, they do perceive warmth and breath, 
they decide that he is not dead, and begin to sprinkle him 
with cold water so that he may recover consciousness. — 
That a man who has swooned away is not dead follows, 
moreover, from the fact of his rising again (to conscious 
life); for from Yama's realm none ever return. — Let us then 
say that a man who has swooned lies in deep sleep, as he 
is unconscious, and, at the same time, not dead ! — No, we 
reply ; this also is impossible, on account of the different 
characteristics of the two states. A man who has become 
senseless does sometimes not breathe for a long time ; his 
body trembles ; his face has a frightful expression ; his 
eyes are staring wide open. The countenance of a sleeping 
person, on the other hand, is peaceful, he draws his breath 
at regular intervals; his eyes are closed, his body does 
not tremble. A sleeping person again may be waked by 
a gentle stroking with the hand ; a person lying in a swoon 
not even by a blow with a club. Moreover, senselessness 
and sleep have different causes; the former is produced 
by a blow on the head with a club or the like, the latter 
by weariness. Nor, finally, is it the common opinion that 
stunned or swooning people are asleep. — It thus remains 
for us to assume that the state of senselessness (in swoon- 
ing, &c.) is a half-union (or half-coincidence) \ as it coin- 
cides in so far as it is an unconscious state and does not 
coincide in so far as it has different characteristics. — But 
how can absence of consciousness in a swoon, &c, be called 
half-coincidence (with deep sleep)? With regard to deep 
sleep scripture says, ' He becomes united with the True ' 
(Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1) ; 'Then a thief is not a thief (Br*. Up. 
IV, 3, 22) ; ' Day and night do not pass that bank, nor old 
age, death, and grief, neither good nor evil deeds ' {KA. Up. 
VIII, 4, 1). For the good and evil deeds reach the soul in 
that way that there arise in it the ideas of being affected by 
pleasure or pain. Those ideas are absent in deep sleep, but 

1 Viz. with deep sleep, as will be explained below. 

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152 vedAnta-sOtras. 



they are likewise absent in the case of a person lying in a 
swoon ; hence we must maintain that, on account of the 
cessation of the limiting adjuncts, in the case of a senseless 
person as well as of one asleep, complete union takes place, 
not only half-union. — To this we make the following reply. 
— We do not mean to say that in the case of a man who 
lies in a swoon the soul becomes half united with Brahman ; 
but rather that senselessness belongs with one half to the 
side of deep sleep, with the other half to the side of the 
other state (i.e. death). In how far it is equal and not 
equal to sleep has already been shown. It belongs to death 
in so far as it is the door of death. If there remains (un- 
requited) work of the soul, speech and mind return (to the 
senseless person); if no work remains, breath and warmth 
depart from him. Therefore those who know Brahman 
declare a swoon and the like to be a half-union. — The ob- 
jection that no fifth state is commonly acknowledged, is 
without much weight ; for as that state occurs occasionally 
only it may not be generally known. All the same it is 
known from ordinary experience as well as from the ayur- 
veda (medicine). That it is not considered a separate fifth 
state is due to its being avowedly compounded of other 
states. 

11. Not on account of (difference of) place also 
twofold characteristics can belong to the highest; 
for everywhere (scripture teaches it to be without 
any difference). 

We now attempt to ascertain, on the ground of .Sruti, the 
nature of that Brahman with which the individual soul 
becomes united in the state of deep sleep and so on, in 
consequence of the cessation of the limiting adjuncts. — The 
scriptural passages which refer to Brahman are of a double 
character ; some indicate that Brahman is affected by dif- 
ference, so, e. g. ' He to whom belong all works, all desires, 
all sweet odours and tastes' (Kh. Up. Ill, 14,2); others, 
that it is without difference, so, e.g. ' It is neither coarse nor 
fine, neither short nor long,' &c. (Br*. Up. Ill, 8, 8). Have 
we, on the ground of these passages, to assume that Brah- 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12. 1 53 

man has a double nature, or either nature, and, if either, 
that it is affected with difference, or without difference ? 
This is the point to be discussed. 

The purvapakshin maintains that, in conformity with the 
scriptural passages which indicate a double nature, a double 
nature is to be ascribed to Brahman. 

To this we reply as follows. — At any rate the highest 
Brahman cannot, by itself, possess double characteristics ; 
for on account of the contradiction implied therein, it is im- 
possible to admit that one and the same thing should by 
itself possess certain qualities, such as colour, &c, and should 
not possess them. — Nor is it possible that Brahman should 
possess double characteristics ' on account of place,' i.e. on 
account of its conjunction with its limiting adjuncts, such as 
earth, &c. For the connexion with limiting adjuncts is 
unavailing to impart to a thing of a certain nature an alto- 
gether different nature. The crystal, e.g. which is in itself 
clear, does not become dim through its conjunction with a 
limiting adjunct in the form of red colour; for that it is 
pervaded by the quality of dimness is an altogether erro- 
neous notion. In the case of Brahman the limiting adjuncts 
are, moreover, presented by Nescience merely 1 . Hence (as 
the upadhis are the product of Nescience) if we embrace 
either of the two alternatives, we must decide in favour of 
that according to which Brahma is absolutely devoid of all 
difference, not in favour of the opposite one. For all pas- 
sages whose aim it is to represent the nature of Brahman 
(such as, ' It is without sound, without touch, without form, 
without decay,' Ka. Up. I, 3, 15) teach that it is free from 
all difference. 

12. If it be objected that it is not so, on account of 
the difference (taught by the Veda) ; we reply that it 
is not so on account of the declaration of (Brahman) 

1 The limiting adjunct of the crystal, i.e. the red colour of a thing, 
e.g. a flower with which the crystal is in contact, is as real as the 
crystal itself; only the effect is an illusion. — But the limiting 
adjuncts of Brahman are in themselves illusion. 



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1 54 vedAnta-sAtras. 



being not such, with reference to each (declaration of 
difference). 

Let this be, but nevertheless it cannot be maintained 
that Brahman is devoid of difference and attributes, and 
does not possess double attributes either in itself or on 
account of difference of station. — Why not ? — ' On account 
of difference.' The various vidyas teach different forms of 
Brahman ; it is said to have four feet {Kh. Up. Ill, 18, 1) ; 
to consist of sixteen parts (Pr. Up. VI, 1) ; to be charac- 
terised by dwarfishness (Ka Up. V, 3) ; to have the three 
worlds for its body (Br*. Up. I, 3, 22) ; to be named Vai- 
jvanara {Kh. Up. V, 11, 2), &c. Hence we must admit 
that Brahman is qualified by differences also. — But above 
it has been shown that Brahman cannot possess twofold 
characteristics! — That also does not contradict our doctrine; 
for the difference of Brahman's forms is due to its limiting 
adjuncts. Otherwise all those scriptural passages which 
refer to those differences would be objectless. 

All this reasoning, we say, is without force 'on account of 
the declaration of its being not such, with reference to each,' 
i.e. because scripture declares, with reference to all the 
differences produced by the limiting adjuncts, that there is 
no difference in Brahman. Cp. such passages as the follow- 
ing: 'This bright immortal person in this earth, and that 
bright immortal person incorporated in the body; he indeed 
is the same as that Self (Br/. Up. II, 5, 1). It, therefore, 
cannot be maintained that the connexion of Brahman 
with various forms is taught by the Veda. 

1 3. Some also (teach) thus. 

The members of one jakha also make a statement 
about the cognition of non-difference which is preceded by 
a censure of the perception of difference, 'By the mind 
alone it is to be perceived, there is in it no diversity. He 
who perceives therein any diversity goes from death to 
death ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 19). Others also (' By knowing the 
enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the ruler, everything has been de- 
clared to be threefold, and this is Brahman,' S vet. Up. 1, 12) 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 14. 155 

record in their text that the entire world, characterised 
by enjoyers, things to be enjoyed, and a ruler, has Brahman 
for its true nature. — But as among the scriptural passages 
referring to Brahman, there are some which represent it as 
having a form, and others teaching that it is devoid of form, 
how can it be asserted that Brahman is devoid of form, and not 
also the contrary? — To this question the next Sutra replies. 

14. For (Brahman) is merely devoid of form, on 
account of this being the main purport of scripture. 

Brahman, we must definitively assert, is devoid of all form, 
colour, and so on, and does not in any way possess form, 
and so on. — Why ? — ' On account of this being the main 
purport (of scripture).' — ' It is neither coarse nor fine, 
neither short nor long' (Br*. Up. Ill, 8, 8) j ' That which is 
without sound, without touch, without form, without decay ' 
(Ka. Up. I, 3, 15) ; ' He who is called ether is the revealer 
of all forms and names. That within which forms and 
names are, that is Brahman' (Kk. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'That 
heavenly person is without body, he is both without and* 
within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2) ; ' That Brahman 
is without cause and without effect, without anything inside 
or outside, this Self is Brahman, omnipresent and om- 
niscient' (Br/. Up. II, 5, 19). These and similar passages 
have for their purport the true nature of Brahman as non- 
connected with any world, and have not any other purport, 
as we have proved under I, 1, 4. On the ground of such 
passages we therefore must definitively conclude that Brah- 
man is devoid of form. Those other passages, on the 
other hand, which refer to a Brahman qualified by form 
do not aim at setting forth the nature of Brahman, but 
rather at enjoining the worship of Brahman. As long as 
those latter texts do not contradict those of the former class, 
they are to be accepted as they stand ; where, however, 
contradictions occur, the passages whose main subject is 
Brahman must be viewed as having greater force than those 
of the other kind. — This is the reason for our deciding that 
although there are two different classes of scriptural texts, 
Brahman must be held to be altogether without form, not 



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1 56 vedAnta-sCtras. 



at the same time of an opposite nature. — But what then is 
the position of those passages which refer to Brahman as 
possessing form ? — To this question the next Sutra replies. 

1 5. And as light (assumes forms as it were by its 
contact with things possessing form, so does Brah- 
man ;) since (the texts ascribing form to Brahman) 
are not devoid of meaning. 

Just as the light of the sun or the moon after having 
passed through space enters into contact with a finger or 
some other limiting adjunct, and, according as the latter is 
straight or bent, itself becomes straight or bent as it were ; 
so Brahman also assumes, as it were, the form of the earth 
and the other limiting adjuncts with which it enters into 
connexion. Hence there is no reason why certain texts 
should not teach, with a view to meditative worship, that 
Brahman has that and that form. We thus escape the 
conclusion that those Vedic passages which ascribe form to 
Brahman are devoid of sense ; a conclusion altogether un- 
acceptable since all parts of the Veda are equally authori- 
tative, and hence must all be assumed to have a meaning. 
— But does this not imply a contradiction of the tenet main- 
tained above, viz. that Brahman does not possess double 
characteristics although it is connected with- limiting ad- 
juncts ? — By no means, we reply. What is merely due to a 
limiting adjunct cannot constitute an attribute of a sub- 
stance, and the limiting adjuncts are, moreover, presented 
by Nescience only. That the primeval natural Nescience 
leaves room for all practical life and activity — whether or- 
dinary or based on the Veda — we have explained more 
than once. 

16. And (scripture) declares (Brahman) to consist 
of that (i.e. intelligence). 

And scripture declares that Brahman consists of intelli- 
gence, is devoid of any other characteristics, and is alto- 
gether without difference; 'As a mass of salt has neither 
inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus, 
indeed, has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is alto- 



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in adhvAva, 2 pAda, i 8. 1 57 

gether a mass of knowledge ' (Br*. Up. IV, 5, 13). That 
means : That Self has neither inside nor outside any cha- 
racteristic form but intelligence ; simple non-differentiated 
intelligence constitutes its nature ; just as a lump of salt 
has inside as well as outside one and the same saltish taste, 
not any other taste. 

1 7. (This scripture) also shows, and it is likewise 
stated in Smrz'ti. 

That Brahman is without any difference is proved by 
those scriptural passages also which expressly deny that it 
possesses any other characteristics; so, e.g. 'Next follows 
the teaching by No, no' (Br*. Up. II, 3, 6) ; ' It is different 
from the known, it is also above the unknown ' (Ke. Up. I, 
4) ; ' From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away 
unable to reach it ' (Taitt. Up. II, 9). Of a similar purport 
is that scriptural passage which relates how Bahva, being 
questioned about Brahman by Vashkalin, explained it to 
him by silence, 'He said to him, " Learn Brahman, O friend," 
and became silent. Then, on a second and third question, 
he replied, "I am teaching you indeed, but you do not 
understand. Silent is that Self.'" The same teaching 
is conveyed by those Smrfti-texts which deny of Brah- 
man all other characteristics; so, e.g. 'I will proclaim 
that which is the object of knowledge, knowing which 
one reaches immortality ; the highest Brahman without 
either beginning or end, which cannot be said either to 
be or not to be' (Bha. Gita XIII, 12). Of a similar pur- 
port is another Snv*ti-passage, according to which the 
omniform Naraya'wa instructed Narada, ' The cause, O Na- 
rada, of your seeing me endowed with the qualities of all 
beings is the Maya emitted by me ; do not cognize me as 
being such (in reality).' 

18. For this very reason (there are applied to 
Brahman) comparisons such as that of the images of 
the sun and the like. 

Because that Self is of the nature of intelligence, devoid 
of all difference, transcending speech and mind, to be 



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158 vedAnta-sAtras. 



described only by denying of it all other characteristics, 
therefore the Moksha 5astras compare it to the images 
of the sun reflected in the water and the like, meaning 
thereby that all difference in Brahman is unreal, only due 
to its limiting conditions. Compare, e.g. out of many, the 
two following passages : « As the one luminous sun when 
entering into relation to many different waters is himself 
rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts ; so also the 
one divine unborn Self ; ' and ' The one Self of all beings 
separately abides in all the individual beings ; hence it 
appears one and many at the same time, just as the one 
moon is multiplied by its reflections in the water.' 
The next Sutra raises an objection. 

19. But there is no parallelism (of the two things 
compared), since (in the case of Brahman) there is 
not apprehended (any separate substance) compar- 
able to the water. 

Since no substance comparable to the water is appre- 
hended in the case of Brahman, a parallelism between Brah- 
man and the reflected images of the sun cannot be 
established. In the case of the sun and other material 
luminous bodies, there exists a separate material substance 
occupying a different place, viz. water ; hence the light of 
the sun, &c., may be reflected. The Self, on the other 
hand, is not a material thing, and, as it is present everywhere 
and all is identical with it, there are no limiting adjuncts 
different from it and occupying a different place.— There- 
fore the instances are not parallel. 

The next Sutra disposes of this objection. 

20. Since (the highest Brahman) is inside (of the 
limiting adjuncts), it participates in their increase 
and decrease ; owing to the appropriateness (thus 
resulting) of the two (things compared) it is thus 
(i.e. the comparison holds good). 

The parallel instance (of the sun's reflection in the water) 
is unobjectionable, since a common feature — with reference 
to which alone the comparison is instituted — does exist. 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 2i. 159 

Whenever two things are compared, they are so only with 
reference to some particular point they have in common. 
Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated ; 
indeed if it could be demonstrated there would be an end 
of that particular relation which gives rise to the comparison. 
Nor does the sutrakara institute the comparison objected 
to on his own account ; he merely sets forth the purport of 
a comparison actually met with in scripture. — Now, the 
special feature on which the comparison rests is ' the par- 
ticipation in increase and decrease.' The reflected image 
of the sun dilates when the surface of the water expands ; 
it contracts when the water shrinks ; it trembles when the 
water is agitated ; it divides itself when the water is divided. 
It thus participates in all the attributes and conditions of 
the water ; while the real sun remains all the time the same. 
— Similarly Brahman, although in reality uniform and never 
changing, participates as it were in the attributes and states 
of the body and the other limiting adjuncts within which it 
abides ; it grows with them as it were, decreases with them 
as it were, and so on. As thus the two things compared 
possess certain common features no objection can be made 
to the comparison. 

21. And on account of the declaration (of 
scripture). 

Scripture moreover declares that the highest Brahman 
enters into the body and the other limiting adjuncts, 'He 
made bodies with two feet, he made bodies with four feet- 
Having first become a bird he entered the bodies as 
purusha' (Br/. Up. II, 5, 18); and 'Having entered into 
them with this living (individual) Self (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2). 
— For all these reasons the comparison set forth in Sutra 
18 is unobjectionable. 

Some teachers assume that the preceding discussion 
(beginning from Sutra 11) comprises two adhikaranas, of 
which the former discusses the question whether Brahman is 
an absolutely uniform being in which all the plurality of the 
apparent world vanishes, or a being multiform as the 
apparent world is; while the latter tries to determine 



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j 60 vedAnta-sOtras. 



whether Brahman — whose absolute uniformity was es- 
tablished in the former adhikarana — is to be denned as 
that which is (sat), or as thought (intelligence ; bodha), or as 
both. — Against this we remark that in no case there is a 
valid reason for beginning a second adhikarawa. For what 
should be the subject of a special second adhikara«a? Sutra 
15 and foil, cannot be meant to disprove that Brahman 
possesses a plurality of characteristics; for that hypothesis 
is already sufficiently disposed of in Sutras 1 1-14. Nor can 
they be meant to show that Brahman is to be denned only 
as ' that which is,' not also as ' thought ; ' for that would 
imply that the scriptural passage, 'consisting of nothing 
but knowledge' (Br*. Up. II, 4, 12), is devoid of meaning. 
How moreover could Brahman, if devoid of intelligence, be 
said to be the Self of the intelligent individual soul ? 
Nor again can the hypothetical second adhikarawa be 
assumed to prove that Brahman must be defined as 
'thought' only, not at the same time as 'that which is;' 
for if it were so, certain scriptural passages — as e.g. Ka. 
Up. II, 6, 13, * He is to be conceived by the words, He is ' — 
would lose their meaning. And how, moreover, could we 
admit thought apart from existence ? — Nor can it be said 
that Brahman has both those characteristics, since that 
would contradict something already admitted. For he who 
would maintain that Brahman is characterised by thought 
different from existence, and at the same time by existence 
different from thought, would virtually maintain that there 
is a plurality in Brahman, and that view has already been 
disproved in the preceding adhikarawa. — But as scripture 
teaches both (viz. that Brahman is one only and that it 
possesses more than one characteristic) there can be no 
objection to such a doctrine ! — There is, we reply, for one 
being cannot possibly possess more than one nature. — And 
if it finally should be said that existence is thought and 
thought existence and that the two do not exclude each 
other ; we remark that in that case there is no reason for 
the doubt 1 whether Brahman is that which is, or intelligence, 

1 And hence no reason for a separate adhikarawa. 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 21. i6r 

or both. — On the other hand we have shown that the Sutras 
can be explained as constituting one adhikara/za only. More- 
over, as the scriptural texts concerning Brahman disagree in 
so far as representing Brahman as qualified by form and 
again as devoid of form we, when embracing the alternative 
of a Brahman devoid of form, must necessarily explain the 
position of the other texts, and if taken in th^t sense the 
Sutras (15-21) acquire a more appropriate meaning. And 
if it is maintained that those scriptural passages also which 
jBpeak of Brahman as qualified by form have no separate 
meaning of their own, but likewise teach that Brahman is 
devoid of all form, viz. by intimating that the plurality 
referred to has to be annihilated; we reply that this 
opinion also appears objectionable. In those cases, indeed, 
where elements of plurality are referred to in chapters 
treating of the highest knowledge, we may assume them 
to be mentioned merely to be abstracted from; so e.g. in 
the passage, Bn*. Up. II, 5, 19, ' His horses are yoked 
hundreds and ten. This is the horses, this is the ten and 
the thousands, many and endless,' which passage is 
immediately followed by the words, ' This is the Brahman 
without cause and without effect, without anything inside 
or outside.' But where elements of plurality are referred 
to in chapters treating of devout meditation, we have no 
right to assume that they are mentioned only to be set 
aside. This is the case e.g. in the passage, 'He who con- 
sists of mind, whose body is prawa, whose form is light ' 
{Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 2), which is connected with an injunction 
of devout meditation contained in the preceding passage, 
' Let him have this will and belief.' In passages of the 
latter kind, where the determinations attributed to Brahman 
may be taken as they stand and viewed as subserving the 
purposes of devout meditation, we have no right to assume 
that they are mentioned with the indirect purpose of being 
discarded. Moreover, if all texts concerning Brahman 
equally aimed at discarding all thought of plurality, there 
would be no opportunity for stating the determinative 
reason (why Brahman is to be viewed as devoid of all 
form) as was done in Sutra 14.' And further scripture 
[38] M 



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1 62 vedAnta-sOtras. 

informs us that devout meditations on Brahman as charac- 
terised by form have results of their own, viz. either the 
warding off of calamities, or the gaining of power, or else 
release by successive steps. All these reasons determine 
us to view the passages concerning devout meditation on 
the one hand and the passages concerning Brahman on the 
other hand as constituting separate classes, not as forming 
one whole. In what way moreover, we ask, could the two 
classes of texts be looked upon as constituting one whole ? 
— Our opponent will perhaps reply, 'Because we apprehend 
them to form parts of one injunction, just as we do in the 
case of the dar$apftr«amasa-sacrifice and the oblations 
called praya^as.' — But this reply we are unable to admit, 
since the texts about Brahman, as shown at length under 
I, i, 4, merely determine an existing substance (viz. 
Brahman), and do not enjoin any performances. What 
kind of activity, we moreover ask, are those texts, accord- 
ing to our opponent's view, meant to enjoin ? For whenever 
an injunction is laid upon a person, it has reference to 
some kind of work to be undertaken by him. — Our oppo- 
neht will perhaps make the following reply. The object 
of the injunction is, in the present case, the annihilation of 
the appearance of duality. As long as the latter is not 
destroyed, the true nature of Brahman is not known ; hence 
the appearance of duality which stands in the way of true 
knowledge must be dissolved. Just as the Veda prescribes 
the performance of certain sacrifices to him who is desirous 
of the heavenly world, so it prescribes the dissolution of 
the apparent world to him who is desirous of final release. 
Whoever wants to know the true nature of Brahman must 
first annihilate the appearance of plurality that obstructs 
true knowledge, just as a man wishing to ascertain the 
true nature of some jar or similar object placed in a dark 
room must at first remove the darkness. For the apparent 
world has Brahman for its true nature, not vice versa; 
therefore the cognition of Brahman is effected through the 
previous annihilation of the apparent world of names and 
forms. 

This argumentation we meet by asking our opponent 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 21. 163 

of what nature that so-called annihilation of the ap- 
parent world is. Is it analogous to the annihilation of 
hardness in butter which is effected by bringing it into 
contact with fire ? or is the apparent world of names and 
forms which is superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience 
to be dissolved by knowledge, just as the phenomenon of a 
double moon which is due to a disease of the eyes is 
removed by the application of medicine 1 ? If the former, 
the Vedic injunctions bid us to do something impossible ; 
for no man can actually annihilate this whole existing 
world with all its animated bodies and all its elementary 
substances such as earth and so on. And if it actually 
could be done, the first released person would have done it 
once for all, so that at present the whole world would be 
empty, earth and all other substances having been finally 
annihilated. — If the latter, i.e. if our opponent maintains 
that the phenomenal world is superimposed upon Brahman 
by Nescience and annihilated by knowledge, we point out 
that the only thing needed is that the knowledge of 
Brahman should be conveyed by Vedic passages sublating 
the apparent plurality superimposed upon Brahman by 
Nescience, such as 'Brahman is one, without a second;' 
' That is the true, it is the Self and thou art it.' (Kh. Up. 
VI, 2, 1 ; 8, 7.) As soon as Brahman is indicated in this 
way, knowledge arising of itself discards Nescience, and 
this whole world of names and forms, which had been 
hiding Brahman from us, melts away like the imagery of a 
dream. As long, on the other hand, as Brahman is not 
so indicated, you may say a hundred times, 'Cognize 
Brahman ! Dissolve this world ! ' and yet we shall be 
unable to do either the one or the other. 

But, our opponent may object, even after Brahman has 
been indicated by means of the passages quoted, there is room 
for injunctions bidding us either to cognize Brahman or to 
dissolve the world. — Not so, we reply; for both these 



1 1, e. does the injunction bidding us to annihilate the phenomenal 
world look on it as real or as fictitious, due to Nescience only ? 

M 2 



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1 64 vedAnta-sOtras. 

things are already effected by the indication of the true 
nature of Brahman as devoid of all plurality ; just as the 
pointing out of the true nature of the rope has for its 
immediate result the cognition of the true nature of the 
rope, and the dissolution of the appearance of a snake or 
the like. And what is done once need not be done again 1 . 
— We moreover ask the following question : Does the 
individual soul on which the injunction is laid belong to 
the unreal element of the phenomenal world or to the real 
element, i.e. Brahman, which underlies the phenomenal 
world? If the former, the soul itself is dissolved just as 
earth and the other elements are, as soon as the knowledge 
of Brahman's true nature has arisen, and on whom then 
should the dissolution of the world "be enjoined, or who 
should, by acting on that injunction, obtain release? — If 
the latter, we are led to the same result. For as soon as 
there arises the knowledge that. Brahman, which never can 
become the subject of an injunction, is the true being of the 
soul while the soul as such is due to Nescience, there 
remains no being on which injunctions could be laid, and 
hence there is no room for injunctions at all. 

What then, it may be asked, is the meaning of those 
Vedic passages which speak of the highest Brahman as 
something to be seen, to be heard, and so on ? — They aim, 
we reply, not at enjoining the knowledge of truth, but 
merely at directing our attention to it. Similarly in 
ordinary life imperative phrases such as ' Listen to this ! ' 
' Look at this ! ' are frequently meant to express not that we 
are immediately to cognize this or that, but only that we 
are to direct our attention to it. Even when a person is 
face to face with some object of knowledge, knowledge 
may either arise or not ; all that another person wishing 
to inform him about the object can do is to point it out to 
him ; knowledge will thereupon spring up in his mind of 
itself, according to the object of knowledge and according 

1 I.e. after the true nature of Brahman has been once known, 
there is no longer room for a special injunction to annihilate this 
apparent world. 



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m adhyAya, 2 pAda, 21. 165 

to the means of knowledge employed.— Nor must it be 
said that an injunction may have the purpose of modifying 
the knowledge of a thing which was originally obtained by 
some other means of knowledge *. For the modified 
knowledge due to such injunctions is not knowledge in the 
true sense of the word, but merely a mental energy (i.e. the 
product, not of an object of knowledge presented to us 
through one of the means of true knowledge, but of an 
arbitrary mental activity), and if such modification of 
knowledge springs up in the mind of itself (i. e. without a 
deliberate mental act) it is mere error. True knowledge 
on the other hand, which is produced by the means of true 
knowledge and is conformable to its object, can neither be 
brought about by hundreds of injunctions nor be checked 
by hundreds of prohibitions. For it does not depend on 
the will of man, but merely on what really and unalterably 
exists. — For this reason also injunctions of the knowledge 
of Brahman cannot be admitted. 

A further point has to be considered here. If we 
admitted that injunctions constitute the sole end and aim 
of the entire Veda, there would remain no authority for the, 
after all, generally acknowledged truth that Brahman — 
which is not subject to any injunction — is the Self of all. 
— Nor would it be of avail to maintain that the Veda may 
both proclaim the truth stated just now and enjoin on man 
the cognition of that truth; for that would involve the 
conclusion that the one Brahma-^astra has two — and more- 
over conflicting — meanings. — The theory combated by us 
gives moreover rise to a number of other objections which 
nobody can refute ; it compels us to set aside the text as it 
stands and to make assumptions not guaranteed by the 
text ; it implies the doctrine that final release is, like the 
results of sacrificial works, (not the direct result of true 
knowledge but) the mediate result of the so-called unseen 

1 The pfirvapakshin might refer e.g. to the Vedic injunction, ' he 
is to meditate upon woman as fire,' and maintain that the object of 
this injunction is to modify our knowledge of woman derived from 
perception &c, according to which a woman is not fire. 



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1 66 vedanta-sCtras. 

principle (adr*sh/a), and non-permanent &c. &c. — We 
therefore again assert that the texts concerning Brahman 
aim at cognition, not at injunction, and that hence the 
pretended reason of ' their being apprehended as parts of 
one injunction ' cannot induce us to look upon the entire 
Veda as one whole. 

And finally, even if we admitted that the texts concern- 
ing Brahman are of an injunctive character, we should be 
unable to prove that the texts denying plurality, and the 
texts setting forth plurality enjoin one and the same thing ; 
for this latter conclusion cannot be accepted in the face of 
the several means of proof such as difference of terms 1 , and 
so on, which intimate that there is a plurality of injunctions. 
The passages respectively enjoining the darcapuroamasa- 
sacrifice and the offerings termed praya^as may indeed be 
considered to form one whole, as the qualification on the 
part of the sacrificer furnishes an element common to the 
two 2 . But the statements about the Brahman devoid of 
qualities and those about the qualified Brahman have not 
any element in common ; for qualities such as 'having light 
for one's body* contribute in no way towards the dissolution 
of the world, nor again does the latter help in any way the 
former. For the dissolution of the entire phenomenal world 
on the one hand, and regard for a part of that world on 
the other hand do not allow themselves to be combined 
in one and the same subject. — The preferable theory, there- 
fore, is to distinguish with us two classes of texts, accord- 
ing as Brahman is represented as possessing form or as 
devoid of it. 

22. For (the clause 'Not so, not so') denies (of 
Brahman) the suchness which forms the topic of 

1 'Difference of terms' (.rabdSntaram) is according to the Ptirva 
Mfmamsi the first of the six means of proof showing karmabheda 
or niyogabheda. Cp. .Sahara bhashya on II, i, i. 

9 For the sacrifice as well as its subordinate part — the offering of 
the praya^as — has to be performed by a sacrificer acting for one 
end, viz. the obtainment of the heavenly world. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 22. 1 67 

discussion ; and (the text) enounces something more 
than that. 

We read, Br*. Up. II, 3, * Two forms of Brahman there 
are indeed, the material and the immaterial, the mortal and 
the immortal, the solid and the fluid, sat and tya.' The 
text thereupon divides the five elements into two classes, 
predicates of the essence of that which is immaterial — which 
it calls purusha — saffron-colour, and so on, and then goes on 
to say, ' Now then the teaching by Not so, not so ! For 
there is nothing else higher than this (if one says) : It is 
not so.' Here we have to enquire what the object of the 
negative statement is. We do not observe any definite 
thing indicated by words such as 'this' or 'that;' we 
merely have the word ' so ' in ' Not so, not so ! ' to which 
the word ' not ' refers, and which on that account indicates 
something meant to be denied. Now we know that the 
word 'so' (iti) is used with reference to approximate things, 
in the same way as the particle ' evam ' is used ; compare, 
e. g. the sentence ' so (iti) indeed the teacher said ' (where the 
' so ' refers to his immediately preceding speech). And, in 
our passage, the context points out what has to be con- 
sidered as proximate, viz. the two cosmic forms of Brah- 
man, and that Brahman itself to which the two forms 
belong. Hence there arises a doubt whether the phrase, 
' Not so, not so ! ' negatives both Brahman and its two 
forms, or only either; and if the latter, whether it negatives 
Brahman and leaves its two forms, or if it negatives the two 
forms and leaves Brahman. — We' suppose, the purvapakshin 
says, that the negative statement negatives Brahman as well 
as its two forms; both being suggested by the context. As- 
the word ' not ' is repeated twice, there are really two nega- 
tive statements, of which the one negatives the cosmic form 
of Brahman, the other that which has form, i.e. Brahman 
itself. Or else we may suppose that Brahman alone is 
negatived. For as Brahman transcends all speech and 
thought, its existence is doubtful, and admits of being nega- 
tived ; the plurality of cosmic forms on the other hand falls 
within the sphere of perception and the other means of right 



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168 vedAnta-sOtras. 

knowledge, and can, therefore, not be negatived. — On this 
latter interpretation the repetition of ' not ' must be con- 
sidered as due to emphasis only. 

To this we make the following reply. It is impossible that 
the phrase, ' Not so, not so ! ' should negative both, since 
that would imply the doctrine of a general Void. When- 
ever we deny something unreal, we do so with reference to 
something real ; the unreal snake, e.g. is negatived with 
reference to the real rope. But .this (denial of something 
unreal with reference to something real) is possible only if 
some entity is left. If everything is denied, no entity is left, 
and if no entity is left, the denial of some other entity which 
we may wish to undertake, becomes impossible, i.e. that 
latter entity becomes real and as such cannot be negatived. 
— Nor, in the second place, can Brahman be denied ; for 
that would contradict the introductory phrase of the chapter, 
4 Shall I tell you Brahman ? ' (Br/. Up. II, i, i) ; would show 
disregard of the threat conveyed in Taitt. Up. II, 6, 'He who 
knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non- 
existing ; ' would be opposed to definitive assertions such 
as * By the words " He is " is he to be apprehended ' (Ka. 
Up. II, 6, 13) ; and would involve a stultification of the 
entire Vedanta. — The phrase that Brahman transcends all 
speech and thought does certainly not mean to say that 
Brahman does not exist ; for after the Vedanta-part of 
scripture has established at length the existence of Brahman 
— in such passages as ' He who knows Brahman obtains the 
highest ;' 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' — it cannot 
be supposed all at once to teach its non-existence. For, as 
the common saying is, ' Better than bathing it is not to touch 
dirt at all.' The passage, ' from whence all speech with the. 
mind turns away unable to reach it ' (Taitt. Up. II, 4), must, 
therefore, rather be viewed as intimating Brahman. 

The passage of the Br*. Up. under discussion has, there- 
fore, to be understood as follows. Brahman is that whose 
nature is permanent purity, intelligence, and freedom ; it 
transcends speech and mind, does not fall within the cate- 
gory of 'object,' and constitutes the inward Self of all. Of 
this Brahman our text denies all plurality of forms ; but 



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HI ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 22. 1 69 

Brahman itself it leaves untouched. This the Sutra expresses 
in the words, ' for it denies the suchness which forms the 
topic of discussion.' That means : The passage * Not so,' 
&c, denies of Brahman the limited form, material as well 
as- immaterial, which in the preceding part of the chapter is 
described at length with reference to the gods as well as the 
body, and also the second form which is produced by the 
first, is characterised by mental impressions, forms the 
essence of that which is immaterial, is denoted by the term 
purusha, rests on the subtle Self (lingatman) and is described 
by means of comparisons with saffron-colour, &c, since the 
purusha, which is the essence of what is immaterial, does 
not itself possess colour perceivable by the eye. Now these 
forms of Brahman are by means of the word ' so ' (iti), which 
always refers to something approximate brought into con- 
nexion with the negative particle ' not.' Brahman itself, on 
the other hand (apart from its forms), is,. in the previous 
part of the chapter, mentioned not as in itself constituting 
the chief topic, but only in so far as it is qualified by its 
forms ; this appears from the circumstance of Brahman 
being exhibited in the genitive case only ('These are two 
forms of BraJitnan '). Now, after the two forms have been 
set forth, there arises the desire of knowing that to which 
the two forms belong, and hence the text continues, ' Now 
then the teaching by means of "Not so, not so."' This pas- 
sage, we conclude, conveys information regarding the nature 
of Brahman by denying the reality of the forms fictitiously 
attributed to it ; for the phrase, ' Not so, not so ! ' negatives 
the whole aggregate of effects superimposed on Brahman. 
Effects we know to have no real existence, and they can 
therefore be negatived ; not so, however, Brahman, which 
constitutes the necessary basis for all fictitious "superimpo- 
sition. — Nor must the question be asked here, how the 
sacred text, after having itself set forth the two forms of 
Brahman, can negative them in the end, contrary to the 
principle that not to touch dirt is better than bathing after 
having done so. For the text does not set forth the two 
forms of Brahman as something the truth of which is to be 
established, but merely mentions those two forms, which in 



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1 70 vedanta-sOtras. 



the sphere of ordinary thought are fictitiously attributed to 
Brahman, in order finally to negative them and establish 
thereby the true nature of the formless Brahman. 

The double repetition of the negation may either serve 
the purpose of furnishing a special denial of the material as 
well as the immaterial form of Brahman ; or the first ' Not 
so ' may negative the aggregate of material elements, while 
the second denies the aggregate of mental impressions. Or 
else the repetition may be an emphatic one, intimating that 
whatever can be thought is not Brahman. This is, perhaps, 
the better explanation. For if a limited number of things 
are denied each individually, there still remains the desire 
to know whether something else may not be Brahman ; an 
emphatic repetition of the denial on the other hand shows 
that the entire aggregate of objects is denied and that 
Brahman is the inward Self; whereby all further enquiry 
is checked. — The final conclusion, therefore, is, that the text 
negatives only the cosmic plurality fictitiously superimposed 
on Brahman, but leaves Brahman itself untouched. 

The Sutra gives another argument establishing the same 
conclusion, 'and the text enounces something more than 
that,' i.e. more than the preceding negation. The words 
of the text meant are ' (not) is there anything beyond.' — 
If the negation, ' Not so, not so ! ' were meant to negative 
all things whatever, and this terminated in absolute non- 
existence, the text could not even allude to 'anything 
beyond.' — The words of the text are to be connected as 
follows. After the clause, ' Not so, not So ! ' has given infor- 
mation about Brahman, the clause next following illustrates 
this teaching by saying : There is nothing beyond or sepa- 
rate from this Brahman ; therefore Brahman is expressed 
by ' Not so, not so ! ' which latter words do not mean that 
Brahman itself does not exist. The implied meaning rather 
is that different from everything else there exists the ' non- 
negatived ' Brahman. — The words of the text admit, how- 
ever, of another interpretation also ; for they may mean 
that there is no teaching of Brahman higher than that 
teaching which is implied in the negation of plurality ex- 
pressed by ' Not so, not so ! ' On this latter interpretation 



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hi adhyAva, 2 pAda, 24. 171 

the words of the Sutra, ' and the text enounces something 
more than that,' must be taken to refer to the name men- 
tioned in the text, ' Then comes the name, the True of the 
True ; the senses being the True and he the True of them.' 
— This again has a sense only if the previous negative 
clause denies everything but Brahman, not everything but 
absolute non-existence. For, if the latter were the case, 
what then could be called the True of the True ? — We there- 
fore decide that the clause, ' Not so, not so ! ' negatives not 
absolutely everything, but only everything but Brahman. 

• 23. That (Brahman) is unevolved ; for (thus 
scripture) says. 

If that highest Brahman which is different from the world 
that is negatived in the passage discussed above really 
exists, why then is it not apprehended ? — Because, the 
Sutrakara replies, it is unevolved, not to be apprehended by 
the senses ; for it is the witness of whatever is apprehended 
(i.e. the subject in all apprehension). Thus Sruti says, 
' He is not apprehended by the eye, nor by speech, nor by 
the other senses, not by penance or good works' (Mu. Up. 
Ill, 1, 8) ; 'That Self is to be described by No, no ! He is 
incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended' (Br*. 
Up. Ill, 9, 36); 'That which cannot be seen nor appre- 
hended' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6); 'When in that which is invis- 
ible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported ' &c. (Taitt. Up. 
II, 7). Similar statements are made in SmWti-passages ; 
so e. g. ' He is called unevolved, not to be fathomed by 
thought, unchangeable.' 

24. And in the state of perfect conciliation also 
(the Yogins apprehend the highest Brahman), 
according to ^SVuti and Smriti. 

At the time of perfect conciliation the Yogins see the 
unevolved Self free from all plurality. By 'perfect con- 
ciliation ' we understand the presentation before the mind 
(of the highest Self), which is effected through meditation 
and devotion. — This is vouched for by .Sruti as well as 



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1 72 vedAnta-sOtras. 



SrnMi. So, e.g. Ka. Up. IV, 1, 'The Self-existent pierced the 
openings of the senses so that they turn outward ; there- 
fore man looks without, not within himself. Some wise 
man, however, with his eyes closed and wishing for 
immortality, saw the Self within.' And Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 8, 
' When a man's mind has become purified by the serene 
light of knowledge then he sees him, meditating on him 
as without parts.' SnWti-passages of the same tendency 
are the following ones, 'He who is seen as light by the 
Yogins meditating on him sleepless, with suspended breath, 
with contented minds, with subdued senses ; reverence be 
to him x ! ' and ' The Yogins see him, the august, eternal one.' 
But if in the state of perfect conciliation there is a being 
to be conciliated and a being conciliating, does not this 
involve the distinction of a higher and a lower Self? — No, 
the next Sutra replies. 

25. And as in the case of (physical) light and the 
like, there is non-distinction (of the two Selfs), the 
light (i.e. the intelligent Self) (being divided) by 
its activity ; according to the repeated declarations 
of scripture. 

As light, ether, the sun and so on appear differentiated 
as it were through their objects such as fingers, vessels, 
water and so on which constitute limiting adjuncts 2 , while 
in reality they preserve their essential non-differentiated- 
ness ; so the distinction of different Selfs is due to limiting 
adjuncts only, while the unity of all Selfs is natural and 
original. For on the doctrine of the non-difference of the 
individual soul and the highest Self the Vedanta-texts 
insist again and again 8 . 

1 Whose Self is Yoga. 

* Light is differentiated as it were by the various objects on 
which it shines ; the all-pervading ether is divided into parts as it 
were by hollow bodies ; the sun is multiplied as it were by its 
reflections in the water. 

* It certainly looks here as if the Bhashyakara did not know 
what to do with the words of the Sutra. The ' karmam/ which is 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 27. 173 

26. Hence (the soul enters into unity) with the 
infinite (i.e. the highest Self); for this scripture 
indicates. 

Hence i.e. because the non-difference of all Selfs is 
essential and their difference due to Nescience only, the 
individual soul after having dispelled Nescience by true 
knowledge passes over into unity with the highest Self. For 
this is indicated by scripture, cp. e.g. Mu. Up. HI, 2, 9, 
'He who knows that highest Brahman becomes even 
Brahman ; ' Br*. Up. IV, 4, 6, ' Being Brahman he goes to 
Brahman.' 

27. But on account of twofold designation, (the 
relation of the highest Self to the individual soul 
has to be viewed) like that of the snake to its coils. 

In order to justify his own view as to the relation of the 
conciliating individual soul and the conciliated highest Self, 
the Sutrakara mentions a different view of the same matter. 
— Some scriptural passages refer to the highest Self and 
the individual soul as distinct entities, cp. e.g. Mu. Up. Ill, 
1, 8, ' Then he sees him meditating on him as without parts,' 
where the highest Self appears as the object of the soul's 
vision and meditation ; Mu. Up. Ill, 3, 8, ' He goes to the 
divine Person who is greater than the great ; ' and Bri. Up. 
Ill, 7, 15, ' Who rules all beings within ;' in which passages 
the highest Self is represented as the object of approach 
and as the ruler of the individual soul. In other places 
again the two are spoken of as non-different, so e. g. Kh. 
Up. VI, 8, 7, 'Thou art that;' Bri. Up. I, 4, 10, ' I am 
Brahman;' Bri. Up. HI, 4, 1, 'This is thy Self who is 
within all ;' Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 15, ' He is thy Self, the ruler 
within, the immortal.' — As thus difference and non-differ- 
ence are equally vouched for by scripture, the acceptation 
of absolute non-difference would render futile all those 

as good as passed over by him, is explained by Go. An. as 
' dhyanidikarmawy upadhau.' An. Gi. says, ' Stmaprakirafabdi- 
to'^danatatkirye karmany upadhau savLreshas ' &c. 



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1 74 vedAnta-sOtras. 



texts which speak of difference. We therefore look on the 
relation of the highest Self and the soul as analogous to 
that of the snake and its coils. Viewed as a whole the 
snake is one, non-different, while an element of difference 
appears if we view it with regard to its coils, hood, erect 
posture and so on. 

28. Or else like that of light to its substratum, 
both being fire. 

Or else the relation of the two may be viewed as follows. 
Just as the light of the sun and its substratum, i.e. the sun 
himself, are not absolutely different — for they both consist 
of fire — and yet are spoken of as different, so also the soul 
and the highest Self. 

29. Or else (the relation of the two is to be 
conceived) in the manner stated above. 

Or else the relation of the two has to be conceived in 
the manner suggested by Sutra 25. For if the bondage of 
the soul is due to Nescience only, final release is possible. 
But if the soul is really and truly bound — whether the soul 
be considered as a certain condition or state of the highest 
Self as suggested in Sutra 27, or as a part of the highest 
Self as suggested in Sutra 28 — its real bondage cannot be 
done away with, and thus the scriptural doctrine of final 
release becomes absurd. — Nor, finally, can it be said that 
vSruti equally teaches difference and non-difference. For 
non-difference only is what it aims at establishing ; while, 
when engaged in setting forth something else, it merely 
refers to difference as something known from other sources 
of knowledge (viz. perception, &c). — Hence the conclusion 
stands that the soul is not different from the highest Self, 
as explained in Sutra 25. 

30. And on account of the denial. 

The conclusion arrived at above is confirmed by the fact 
of scripture expressly denying that there exists any intel- 
ligent being apart from the highest Self. Cp. ' There is no 
other seer but he' (Br*. Up. Ill, 7, 23). And the same 



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in adhyAya, 2 pada, 3 1. 1 75 

conclusion follows from those passages which deny the 
existence of a world apart from Brahman and thus leave 
Brahman alone remaining, viz. ' Now then the teaching, 
Not so, not so ! ' (Br*. Up. II, 3, 6) ; 'That Brahman is 
without cause and without effect, without anything inside 
or outside' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19). 

31. Beyond (Brahman, there is something) further, 
on account of the designations of bank, measure, 
connexion, separation. 

With reference to this Brahman which we have ascer- 
tained to be free from all plurality there now arises the 
doubt — due to the conflicting nature of various scriptural 
statements — whether something exists beyond it or not. 
We therefore enter on the task of explaining the true 
meaning of those scriptural passages which seem to indicate 
that there is some entity beyond, i.e. apart from Brahman. 

The purvapakshin maintains that some entity must be 
admitted apart from Brahman, because Brahman is spoken 
of as being a bank ; as having size ; as being connected ; 
as being separated. — As a bank it is spoken of in the 
passage, Kh. Up. VIII, 4, i, 'That Self is a bank, a 
boundary.' The word 'bank' (setu) ordinarily denotes 
a structure of earth, wood and the like, serving the purpose 
of checking the flow of water. Here, being applied to the 
Self, it intimates that there exists something apart from 
the Self, just as there exists something different from an 
ordinary bank. The same conclusion is confirmed by the 
words, 'Having passed the bank' (VIII, 4, 2). For as in 
ordinary life a man after having crossed a bank reaches 
some place which is not a bank, let us say a forest ; so, 
we must understand, a man after having crossed, i. e. passed 
beyond the Self reaches something which is not the Self. — 
As having size Brahman is spoken of in the following 
passages, 'This Brahman has four feet (quarters), eight 
hoofs, sixteen parts.' Now it is well known from ordinary 
experience that wherever an object, a coin, e.g. has a 
definite limited size, there exists something different from 
that object; we therefore must assume that there also 



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1 76 vedAnta-sOtras. 



exists something different from Brahman. — Brahman is 
declared to be connected in the following passages, ' Then 
he is united with the True' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1), and 'The 
embodied Self is embraced by the highest Self (Bri. 
Up.- IV, 3, 21). Now we observe that non-measured 
things are connected with things measured, men, e.g. 
with a town. And scripture declares that the individual 
souls are, in the state of deep sleep, connected with 
Brahman. Hence we conclude that beyond Brahman 
there is something unmeasured. — The same conclusion 
is finally confirmed by those texts which proclaim 
difference, so e.g. the passage, I, 6, 6 ff. ('Now that 
golden person who is seen within the sun' &c), which at 
first refers to a Lord residing in the sun and then mentions 
a Lord residing in the eye, distinct from the former (' Now 
the person who is seen within the eye '). The text dis- 
tinctly transfers to the latter the form &c. of the former * 
('The form of that person is the same as the form of the 
other' &c), and moreover declares that the lordly power of 
both is limited, ' He obtains through the one the worlds 
beyond that and the wishes of the devas ' &c. ; which is 
very much as if one should say, ' This is the reign of the 
king of Magadha and that the reign of the king of Videha.' 
From all this it follows that there exists something 
different from Brahman. 

32. But (Brahman is called a bank &c.) on account 
of (a certain) equality. 

The word 'but' is meant to set aside the previously 
established conclusion. — There can exist nothing different 
from Brahman, since we are unable to observe a proof for 
such existence. That all existences which have a beginning 
spring from, subsist through, and return into Brahman 
we have already ascertained, and have shown that the 
effect is non-different from the cause. — Nor can there 
exist, apart from Brahman, something which has no 
beginning, since scripture affirms that ' Being only this was 

1 Which would be unnecessary if the two were not distinct 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda>v£$. 177 



in the beginning, one, without a second.' The promise 
moreover that through the cognition of one thing every- 
thing will be known, renders it impossible that there 
should exist anything different from Brahman. — But does 
not the fact that the Self is called a bank, &c. indicate 
that there exists something beyond the Self? — No, we 
reply ; the passages quoted by the purvapakshin have no 
power to prove his conclusion. For the text only says 
that the Self is a bank, not that there is something beyond 
it. Nor are we entitled to assume the existence of some 
such thing, merely to the end of accounting for the Self 
being called a bank ; for the simple assumption of some- 
thing unknown is a mere piece of arbitrariness. If, more- 
over, the mere fact of the Self being called a bank implied 
the existence of something beyond it, as in the case of an 
ordinary bank, we should also be compelled to conclude 
that the Self is made of earth and stones; which would 
run counter to the scriptural doctrine that the Self is not 
something produced. — The proper explanation is that the 
Self is called a bank because it resembles a bank in a 
certain respect ; as a bank dams back the water and 
marks the boundary of contiguous fields, so the Self 
supports the world and its boundaries. The Self is thus 
glorified by the name of bank because it resembles one. — 
In the clause quoted above, 'having passed that bank,' 
the verb ' to pass ' cannot be taken in the sense of ' going 
beyond,' but must rather mean 'to reach fully.' In the 
same way we say of a student, 'he has passed the 
science of grammar,' meaning thereby that he has fully 
mastered it. 

33. (The statement as to Brahman having size) 
subserves the purpose of the mind ; in the manner 
of the four feet (quarters). 

In reply to the purvapakshin's contention that the state- 
ments as to Brahman's size, prove that there exists some' 
thing different from Brahman, we remark that those state- 
ments merely serve the purposes of the mind, i.e. of devout 
meditation. — But how can the cognition of something con- 

[38] N 



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178 vedAnta-s6tras. 



sisting of four, or eight, or sixteen parts be referred to 
Brahman? — Through its modifications (effects), we reply, 
Brahman is assumed to be subject to measure. For as some 
men are of inferior, others of middling, others again of 
superior intelligence, not all are capable of fixing their mind 
on the infinite Brahman, devoid of all effects. ' In the 
manner of the four feet,' i.e. in the same way as (Kk. Up. 
Ill, 18), for the purpose of pious meditation, speech and 
three other feet are ascribed to mind viewed as the personal 
manifestation of Brahman, and fire and three other feet to 
the ether viewed as the cosmic manifestation of Brahman. 
— Or else the phrase, ' in the manner of the four quarters,' 
may be explained as follows. In the same way as to facili- 
tate commerce, a karshapawa is assumed to be divided into 
four parts — for there being no fixed rule as to the value of 
bargains, people cannot always carry on their transactions 
with whole karshapawas only — , (so, in order to facilitate 
pious meditation on the part of less intelligent people, four 
feet, &c, are ascribed to Brahman). 

34. (The statements concerning connexion and 
difference) are due to difference of place; in the 
manner of light and so on. 

The present Sutra refutes the allegation that something 
different from Brahman exists, firstly, because things are 
said to be connected with Brahman, and secondly, because 
things are said to be separate from it. The fact is, that all 
those statements regarding connexion and difference are 
made with a view to difference of place. When the cog- 
nition of difference which is produced by the Selfs con- 
nexion with different places, i.e. with the buddhi and the 
other limiting adjuncts, ceases on account of the cessation 
of those limiting adjuncts themselves, connexion with the 
highest Self is metaphorically said to take place ; but that 
is done with a view to the limiting adjuncts only, not with 
a view to any limitation on the part of the Self. — In the 
same way, all statements regarding difference have reference 
to the difference of Brahman's limiting adjuncts only, not 
to any difference affecting Brahman's own nature. — All this 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 36. 179 

is analogous to the case of light and the like. For the light of 
the sun or the moon also is differentiated by its connexion 
with limiting adjuncts, and is, on account of these adjuncts, 
spoken of as divided, and, when the adjuncts are removed, it 
is said to enter into connexion (union). Other instances of 
the effect of limiting adjuncts are furnished by the ether 
entering into connexion with the eyes of needles and the 
like. 

35. And because (only such a connexion) is 
possible. 

Moreover, only such a connexion as described above is 
possible. For scriptural passages, such as ' He is gone to 
his Self (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1), declare that the connexion of 
the soul with the highest Self is one of essential nature. 
But as the essential nature of a thing is imperishable, the 
connexion cannot be analogous to that of the inhabitants 
with the town, but can only be explained with reference 
to an obscuration, owing to Nescience, of the soul's true 
nature. — Similarly the difference spoken of by scripture 
cannot be real, but only such as is due to Nescience ; for 
many texts declare that there exists only one Lord. Ana- 
logously, scripture teaches that the one ether is made 
manifold as it were by its connexion with different places 
'The ether which is outside man is the ether which is 
inside man, and the ether within the heart' (Kh. Up. 
Ill, ia, 7 ff.). 

36. (The same thing follows) from the express 
denial of other (existences). 

Having thus refuted the arguments of the purvapakshin, 
the Sutrakara in conclusion strengthens his view by a 
further reason. A great number of Vedic passages — which, 
considering the context in which they stand, cannot be 
explained otherwise — distinctly deny that there exists any- 
thing apart from Brahman; 'He indeed is below; I am 
below ; the Self is below' (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 1 ; a) ; ' Who- 
soever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self was 
abandoned by everything' (Br*. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman 

N 2 



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180 vedAnta-sOtras. 



alone is all this* (Mu. Up. II, a, n) ; 'The Self is all this' 
(Kh. Up. VII, 35, a) ; 'In it there is no diversity' (Br/. Up. 
IV, 4, 19) ; 'He to whom there is nothing superior, from 
whom there is nothing different' (Svet. Up. Ill, 9); 'This 
is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without 
anything inside or outside' (Br*. Up. II, 5, 19). — And that 
there is no other Self within the highest Self, follows from 
that scriptural passage which teaches Brahman to be within 
everything (Br**. Up. II, 5, 19). 

37. Thereby the omnipresence (of Brahman is 
established), in accordance with the statements about 
(Brahman's) extent. 

The preceding demonstration that the texts calling 
Brahman a bank, and so on, are not to be taken literally, 
and that, on the other hand, the texts denying all plurality 
must be accepted as they stand, moreover, serves to prove 
that the Self is omnipresent. If the former texts were taken 
literally, banks and the like would have to be looked upon 
as belonging to the Self, and thence it would follow that the 
Self is limited. And if the texts of the latter class were 
not accepted as valid, there would be substances exclusive 
of each other, and thus the Self would again be limited. — 
That the Self is omnipresent follows from the texts pro- 
claiming its extent, &c, cp. Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 3, ' As large 
as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart ; ' 
' Like the ether, he is omnipresent and eternal ; ' ' He is 
greater than the sky, greater than the ether ' (Sat. Br. X, 
6, 3, a) ; ' He is eternal, omnipresent, firm, immoveable ' 
(Bha. Gita II, 24) ; and other similar passages from Sruti and 
Smn'ti. 

38. From him (i.e. the Lord, there comes) the 
fruit (of works) ; for (that only) is possible. 

We now turn to another characteristic belonging to 
Brahman, in so far as it is connected with the every-day 
world in which we distinguish a ruler and the objects of 
his rule. — There arises the question whether the threefold 
fruits of action which are enjoyed by the creatures in their 



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in adhyAya, 2 pAda, 39. 181 

sawsara-state — viz. pain, pleasure, and a mixture of the 
two — spring from the actions themselves or come from the 
Lord. — The Sutrakara embraces the latter alternative, 
on the ground that it is the only possible one. The ruler 
of all who by turns provides for the creation, the subsist- 
ence and the reabsorption of the world, and who knows all 
the differences of place and time, he alone is capable of 
effecting all those modes of requital which are in accord- 
ance with the merit of the agents; actions, on the other 
hand, which pass away as soon as done, have no power of 
bringing about results at some future time, since nothing 
can spring from nothing. Nor can the latter difficulty be 
overcome by the assumption that an action passes away 
only after having produced some result according to its 
nature, and that the agent will at some future time enjoy 
that fruit of his action. For the fruit of an action is such 
only through being enjoyed by the agent ; only at the 
moment when some pleasure or some pain — the result of 
some deed — is enjoyed by the doer of the deed people 
understand it to be a ' fruit.' — Nor, in the second place, 
have we the right to assume that the fruit will, at some 
future time, spring from the so-called supersensuous 
principle (apurva), which itself is supposed to be a direct 
result of the deed; for that so-called supersensuous 
principle is something of non-intelligent nature, compar- 
able to a piece of wood or metal, and as such cannot act 
unless moved by some intelligent being. And moreover 
there is no proof whatever for the existence of such an 
apurva. — But is it not proved by the fact that deeds are 
actually requited ? — By no means, we reply ; for the fact of 
requital may be accounted for by the action of the Lord. 

39. And because it is declared by scripture. 

We assume the Lord to bring about the fruits- of actions, 
not only because no other assumption appears plausible, but 
also because we have direct scriptural statement on our 
side. Cp. e.g. the passage, ' This indeed is the great, unborn 
Self, the giver of food, the giver of wealth ' (Br*. Up. IV, 
4,24). 



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1 8 2 vedAnta-sOtras. 



40. ^aimini (thinks) for the same reasons that 
religious merit (is what brings about the fruits of 
actions). 

Caimini bases a contrary opinion on the reasons specified 
in the last two Sutras. Scripture, he argues, proclaims 
injunctions such as the following one, ' He who is desirous 
of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.' Now as it is ad- 
mitted that such scriptural injunctions must have an object, 
we conclude that the sacrifice itself brings about the result, 
i. e. the obtainment of the heavenly world ; for if this were 
not so, nobody would perform sacrifices and thereby 
scriptural injunctions would be rendered purposeless. — 
But has not this view of the matter already been aban- 
doned, on the ground that an action which passes away as 
soon as done can have no fruit ? — We must, the reply is, 
follow the authority of scripture and assume such a con- 
nexion of action and fruit as agrees with scriptural state- 
ment. Now it is clear that a deed cannot effect a result 
at some future time, unless, before passing away, it gives 
birth to some unseen result ; we therefore assume that 
there exists some result which we call apurva, and which 
may be viewed either as an imperceptible after-state of the 
deed or as an imperceptible antecedent state of the result. 
This hypothesis removes all difficulties, while on the other 
hand it is impossible that the Lord should effect the results 
of actions. For in the first place, one uniform cause 
cannot be made to account for a great variety of effects ; 
in the second place, the Lord would have to be taxed with 
partiality and cruelty ; and in the third place, if the deed 
itself did not bring about its own fruit, it would be useless 
to perform it at all. — For all these reasons the result 
springs from the deed only, whether meritorious or non- 
meritorious. 

41. Badaraya«a, however, thinks the former (i. e. 
the Lord, to be the cause of the fruits of action), 
since he is designated as the cause (of the actions 
themselves). 



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in adhyay'a, 2 pAda, 41. 183 

The teacher Badarayawa thinks that the previously- 
mentioned Lord is the cause of the fruits of action. The 
word ' however ' sets aside the view of the fruit being pro- 
duced either by the mere deed or the mere apurva. — The 
final conclusion then is that the fruits come from the Lord 
acting with a view to the deeds done by the souls, or, if it 
be so preferred, with a view to the apurva springing from 
the deeds. This view is proved by the circumstance of 
scripture representing the Lord not only as the giver of 
fruits but also as the causal agent with reference to all 
actions whether good or evil. Compare the passage, Kau. 
Up. Ill, 8, * He makes him whom he wishes to lead up 
from these worlds do a good deed ; and the same makes 
him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a 
bad deed.' The same is said in the Bhagavadgita (VII, 
21), 'Whichever divine form a devotee wishes to worship 
with faith, to that form I render his faith steady. Holding 
that faith he strives to propitiate the deity and obtains 
from it the benefits he desires, as ordained by me.' 

All Vedanta-texts moreover declare that the Lord is the 
only cause of all creation. And his creating all creatures 
in forms and conditions corresponding to — and retributive 
of — their former deeds, is just what entitles us to call the 
Lord the cause of all fruits of actions. And as the Lord 
has regard to the merit and demerit of the souls, the 
objections raised above — as to one uniform cause being 
inadequate to the production of various effects, &c. — are 
without any foundation. 



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184 vedAnta-sOtras. 



THIRD PADA. 

Reverence to the highest Self! 

1. (The cognitions) intimated by all the Vedanta- 
texts (are identical), on account of the non-difference 
of injunction and so on. 

In the preceding part of this work we have explained 
the nature of the object of cognition, i. e. Brahman. We 
now enter on the discussion of the question whether the 
cognitions of Brahman, which form the subject of the 
different Vedanta-texts, are separate cognitions or not. 

But, an objection may here be raised, so far we have 
determined that Brahman is free from all distinctions 
whatever, one, of absolutely uniform nature like a lump of 
salt ; hence there appears to be no reason for even raising 
the question whether the cognitions of Brahman are 
separate cognitions or constitute only one cognition. For 
as Brahman is one and of uniform nature, it certainly cannot 
be maintained that the Vedanta-texts aim at establishing 
a plurality in Brahman comparable to the plurality of 
works (inculcated by the karmak&Wa of the Veda). Nor 
can it be said that although Brahman is uniform, yet it 
may be the object of divers cognitions ; for any difference 
in nature between the cognition and the object known 
points to a mistake committed. If, on the other hand, 
it should be assumed that the different Vedanta-texts aim 
at teaching different cognitions of Brahman, it would 
follow that only one cognition can be the right one while 
all others are mistaken, and that would lead to a general 
distrust of all Vedanta. — Hence the question whether each 
individual Vedanta-text teaches a separate cognition of 
Brahman or not cannot even be raised. — Nor, supposing 
that question were raised after all, can the non-difference of 
the cognition of Brahman be demonstrated (as the Sutra 
attempts) on the ground that all Vedanta-texts are equally 
injunctions, since the cognition of Brahman is not of the 
nature of an injunction. For the teacher has proved at 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, I. 1 85 

length (I, 1, 4) that the knowledge of Brahman is pro- 
duced by passages which treat of Brahman as an existing 
accomplished thing and thus do not aim at enjoining any- 
thing. — Why then begin at all this discussion about the 
difference or non-difference of the cognitions of Brahman ? 

To all this we reply that no objection can be raised 
against a discussion of that kind, since the latter has for its 
object only the qualified Brahman and prawa and the like. 
For devout meditations on the qualified Brahman may, like 
acts, be either identical or different. Scripture moreover 
teaches that, like acts, they have various results ; some of 
them have visible results, others unseen results, and others 
again — as conducive to the springing up of perfect know- 
ledge — have for their result release by successive steps. 
With a view to those meditations, therefore, we may raise 
the question whether the individual Vedanta-texts teach 
different cognitions of Brahman or not. 

The arguments which may here be set forth by the 
purvapakshin are as follows. In the first place it is known 
that difference may be proved by names, as e.g. in the case 
of the sacrificial performance called ' light ' (gyotis) 1 . And 
the cognitions of Brahman which are enjoined in the 
different Vedanta-texts are connected with different names 
such as the Taittiriyaka, the Va^asaneyaka, the Kauthum- 
aka, the Kaushitaka, the .Sa/yayanaka, &c. — In the second 
place the separateness of actions is proved by the difference 
of form (characteristics; rupa). So e.g. with reference to 
the passage, ' the milk is for the VLrvedevas, the water for 
the va^ins V 



1 See the sam^4krAakarmabhedidhikara»a, Pu. Mi. Su. II, 2, 
22, where the decision is that the word^yotis (in ' athaisha ^yotir ' 
&c.) denotes not the gyotish/oma. but a separate sacrificial per- 
formance. 

* See Pfi. Mf. SO. II, 2, 23. The offering of water made to the 
divinities called vSgin is separate from the offering of milk to the 
Vixvedevas; for the material offered as well as the divinity to 
which the offering is made (i.e. the two rupa of the sacrifice) 
differs in the two cases. 



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1 8 6 vedAnta-sAtras. 



Now similar differences of form are met with in the 
Vedanta-texts ; the followers of one Sakha, e. g. mention, 
in the chapter called ' the knowledge of the five fires,' a 
sixth fire, while other Sakhas mention five only ; and in 
the colloquy of the pra«as some texts mention a lesser, 
others a greater number of organs and powers of the body. 
— In the third place differences in qualifying particulars 
(dharma) are supposed to prove difference of acts, and such 
differences also are met with in the Vedanta-texts ; only in 
the Mu«</aka-Upanishad, e. g. it is said that the science of 
Brahman must be imparted to those only who have per- 
formed the rite of carrying fire on the head (Mu. Up. Ill, 
a, 10). — In the same way the other reasons which are 
admitted to prove the separateness of actions, such as repe- 
tition and so on, are to be applied in a suitable manner to 
the different Vedanta-texts also. — We therefore maintain 
that each separate Vedanta-text teaches a different cogni- 
tion of Brahman. 

To this argumentation of the purvapakshin we make the 
following reply. — The cognitions enjoined by all the 
Vedanta-texts are the same, owing to the non-difference 
of injunction and so on. The ' and so on ' refers to the 
other reasons proving non-difference of acts which are 
enumerated in the Siddhanta-sutra of the adhikarawa 
treating of the different Sakhas (Pu. Ml. II, 4, 9, ' (the act) is 
one on account of the non-difference of connexion of form, 
of injunction, and of name'). Thus, as tbe agnihotra 
though described in different Sakhas is yet one, the same 
kind of human activity being enjoined in all by means of 
the words, ' He is to offer ; ' so the injunction met with in 
the text of the Va^asaneyins (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 1), ' He who 
knows the oldest and the best,' &c, is the same as that 
which occurs in the text of the A'Aandogas, 'He who knows 
the first and the best' (Kk. Up. V, 1, 1). The connexion 
of the meditation enjoined with its aim is likewise the 
same in both texts, ' He becomes the first and best among 
his people.' In both texts again the cognition enjoined 
has the same form. For in both the object of knowledge 
is the true nature of the pra«a which is characterised by 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 2. 187 

certain qualities such as being the first and best, and just 
as the material and the divinity constitute the form of the 
sacrifice, so the object known constitutes the form of the 
cognition. And finally both cognitions have the same name, 
viz. the knowledge of the pra«a. — For these reasons we 
declare that the different Vedanta-texts enjoin identical 
cognitions. — A similar line of reasoning applies to other 
cognitions which are met with in more than one Vedanta- 
text, so e. g. to the knowledge of the five fires, the know- 
ledge of VaLrvanara, the knowledge of SkndiXya. and so on. 
— Of the apparent reasons on the ground of which the 
purvapakshin above tried to show that the meditations are 
not identical but separate a refutation is to be found in the 
Purva Mimawsa-sutras II, 4, 10 ff. 

The next Sutra disposes of a doubt which may remain 
even after the preceding discussion. 

2. (If it be said that the vidyis are separate) on 
account of the difference (of secondary matters), 
we deny that, since even in one and the same vidy& 
(different secondary matters may find place). 

In spite of the preceding argumentation we cannot admit 
that the different cognitions of Brahman are equally 
intimated by all Vedanta-texts, because we meet with 
differences in secondary matters (gu»a). Thus the VI- 
^asaneyins mention in their text of the knowledge of the 
five fires a sixth fire ('And then the fire is indeed fire,' 
Br*. Up. VI, a, 14), while the A'Aandogas mention no sixth 
fire but conclude their text of the pa«£agnividya with 
the express mention of five fires (' But he who thus knows 
the five fires,' Kh. Up. V, 10, 10). 

Now it is impossible to admit that the cognition of those 
who admit that particular qualification (i. e. the sixth fire) 
and of those who do not should be one and the same. Nor 
may we attempt to evade the difficulty by saying that the 
sixth fire may be tacitly included in the vidya of the 
K Aandogas ; for that would contradict the number ' five ' 
expressly stated by them. — In the colloquy of the prawas 



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1 88 vedAnta-sOtras. 



again the Kkandogas mention, in addition to the most 
important pra#a, four other pranas, viz. speech, the eye, the 
ear, and the mind ; while the Va^asaneyins mention a fifth 
one also, ' Seed indeed is generation. He who knows that 
becomes rich in offspring and cattle' (Br/. Up. VI, i, 6). — 
Now a difference of procedure in the point of addition and 
omission effects a difference in the object known, and the 
latter again effects a difference in the vidya, just as a 
difference in the point of material and divinity distinguishes 
one sacrifice from another. 

To this we make the following reply. — Your objection 
is without force, since such differences of qualification 
as are met with in the above instances are possible 
even in one and the same vidya. In the ATAandogya- 
text a sixth fire is indeed not included ; yet, as five fires, 
beginning with the heavenly world, are recognised as 
the same in both texts the mentioned difference cannot 
effect a split of the vidya; not any more than the 
atiratra-sacrifice is differentiated by the shorfarin-rite 
being either used or not-used. Moreover, the ATAandogya- 
text also actually mentions a sixth fire, viz. in the passage, 
V, 9, 3, • When he has departed, his friends carry him, as 
appointed, to the fire.' — The Va^asaneyins, on the other 
hand, mention their sixth fire (' and then the fire is indeed 
fire, the fuel fuel,' &c.) for the purpose of cutting short the 
fanciful assumption regarding fuel, smoke, and so on, which 
runs through the description of the five fires with which the 
heavenly world and so on are imaginatively identified. 
Their statement regarding the sixth fire (has therefore not 
the purpose of enjoining it as an object of meditation but) 
is merely a remark about something already established 
(known) 1 . And even if we assume that the statement 
about the sixth fire has the purpose of representing that 
fire as an object of devout meditation, yet the fire may be 
inserted in the vidya of the A"Aandogas without any fear of 
its being in conflict with the number five mentioned there ; 

1 Viz. the real fire in which the dead body is burned and which 
is known from perception. 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 3. 189 

for that number is not an essential part of the injunction \ 
but merely makes an additional statement regarding some- 
thing known already from the text, viz. the five fires with 
which the heavenly world and so on are identified a . Simi- 
larly nothing stands in the way of some additional quali- 
fication being included in the vidya concerning the colloquy 
of the pra»as and so on. The addition or omission of 
some particular qualification is unable to introduce differ- 
ence into the object of knowledge and thereby into the 
knowledge itself; for although the objects of knowledge 
may differ partly, yet their greater part and at the same 
time the knowing person are understood to be the same. 
Hence the vidy4 also remains the same. 

3. (The rite of carrying fire on the head is. an 
attribute) of the study of the Veda (of the Athar- 
va»ikas) ; because in the Sama^ara (it is mentioned) 
as being such. (This also follows) from the general 
subject-matter, and the limitation (of the rite to the 
Atharva#ikas) is analogous to that of the libations. 

With reference to the purvapakshin's averment that the 
rite of carrying fire on the head is connected with the vidy4 
of the followers of the Atharva-veda only, not with any 
other vidya, and that thereby the vidya of the Atharvawikas 
is separated from all other vidyas, the following remarks 
have to be made. — The rite of carrying fire on the head is 
an attribute not of the vidya, but merely of the study of the 
Veda on the part of the Atharvawikas. This we infer from 
the circumstance that the Atharvawikas, in the book called 
' Sama£ara ' which treats of Vedic observances, record the 
above rite also as being of such a nature, i.e. as constituting 
an attribute of the study of the Veda. At the close of the 
Upanishad moreover we have the following sentence, • A 

1 I.e. the ^Mndogya-text contains no injunction that five fires 
only are to be meditated upon. 

1 So that there stands nothing in the way of our amplifying our 
meditation by the addition of a sixth fire. 



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ioo vedanta-sAtras. 



man who has not performed the rites does not read this;' 
here we conclude from the word • this ' which refers to the 
subject previously treated, and from the fact of ' reading ' 
being mentioned, that the rite is an attribute of the study of 
the Upanishad of the Atharvawikas (but has nothing to do 
with the Upanishad itself). — But what about the immediately 
preceding passage, ' Let a man tell this science of Brahman 
to those only by whom the rite of carrying fire on the head 
has been performed according to rule ? ' Here the rite in 
question is connected with the science of Brahman, and as 
all science of Brahman is one only, it follows that the rite 
has to be connected with all science of Brahman ! — Not so, 
we reply; for in the above passage also the word 'this* 
refers back to what forms the subject of the antecedent part 
of the Upanishad, and that subject is constituted by the 
science of Brahman only in so far as depending on a par- 
ticular book (viz. the Muwrfaka-Upanishad) ; hence the rite 
also is connected with that particular book only. — The 
Sutra adds another illustrative instance in the words ' and as 
in the case of the libations there is limitation of that' As 
the seven libations — from the saurya libation up to the 
jataudana libation — since they are not connected with the 
triad of fires taught in the other Vedas, but only with the 
one fire which is taught in the Atharvan, are thereby en- 
joined exclusively on the followers of the Atharvan ; so the 
rite of carrying fire on the head also is limited to the study 
of that particular Veda with which scriptural statements 
connect it. — The doctrine of the unity of the vidyas thus 
remains unshaken. 

4. (Scripture) also declares this. 

The Veda also declares the identity of the vidyas ; for all 
Vedanta-texts represent the object of knowledge as one ; 
cp. e.g. Ka. Up. I, a, 15, 'That word which all the Vedas 
record ;' Ait. Ar. Ill, a, 3, ia, 'Him only the Bahvr^as con- 
sider in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial 
fire, the ATAandogas in the Mahavrata ceremony.' — To quote 
some other instances proving the unity of the vidyas : Ka. 
Up. I, 6, 2, mentions as one of the Lord's qualities that he 



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HI ADHVAYA, 3 PADA, 5. 19I 

causes fear; now this very same quality is referred to in 
the Taitt. Up. II, 7, in order to intimate disapprobation of 
those who are opposed to the absolute unity of that which 
is, ' For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it (the 
Self), there is fear for him. But that fear is only for him 
who knows (a difference) and does not know (the oneness).' 
— Similarly the Vai-yvanara, who in the Va^asaneyaka is 
imaginatively represented as a span long, is referred to in 
the ATAandogya as something well known, ' But he who 
worships that Vauvanara Self which is a span long,' &c. 
{Kk. Up. V, 18, 1). 

And as, on the ground of all Vedanta-texts intimating 
the same matters, hymns and the like which are enjoined in 
one place are employed in other places (where they are not 
expressly enjoined) for the purposes of devout meditation, it 
follows that all Vedanta-texts intimate also(identical) devout 
meditations. 

5. In the case of (a devout meditation) common 
(to several £akhas) (the particulars mentioned in 
each .Sakha) have to be combined, since there is no 
difference of essential matter ; just as in the case of 
what is complementary to injunctions. 

[This Sutra states the practical outcome of the discussion 
carried on in the first four Sutras.] It having been deter- 
mined that the cognitions of Brahman are equally intimated 
by all Vedanta-texts, it follows that as long as the cognition 
is one and the same its specific determinations mentioned in 
one text are to be introduced into other texts also where 
they are not mentioned. For if the matter of these deter- 
minations subserves some particular cognition in one place, 
it subserves it in another place also, since in both places 
we have to do with one and the same cognition. The 
case is analogous to that of the things subordinate to 
some sacrificial performance, as, e. g. the agnihotra. The 
agnihotra also is one performance, and therefore its 
subordinate members, although they may be mentioned in 
different texts, have to be combined into one whole. — If the 



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192 vedAnta-sOtras. 



cognitions were separate, the particulars mentioned in 
different texts could not be combined ; for they would be 
confined each to its own cognition and would not stand to 
each other in that relation in which the typical form of a 
sacrifice stands to its modifications 1 . But as the cognitions 
are one, things lie differently. — The above Sutra will be 
explained and applied at length further on, in Sutra 10 ff. 

6. If it be said that (the udgltha vidya of the Bri. 
Up. and that of the A'/fcand. Up.) are separate on 
account (of the difference) of the texts ; we deny this 
on the ground of their (essential) non-difference. 

We read in the Va^asaneyaka I, 3, 1, ' The Devas said, 
well, let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means 
of the Udgltha. They said to speech : Do thou sing out for 
us. — Yes, said speech,' &c. The text thereupon relates how 
speech and the other prawas were pierced by the Asuras 
with evil, and therefore unable to effect what was expected 
from them, and how in the end recourse was had to the 
chief vital air, * Then they said to the breath in the mouth : 
Do thou sing for us. — Yes, said the breath, and sang.' — A 
similar story is met with in the KA&ndogya. I, a. There we 
read at first that ' the devas took the udgitha, thinking they 
would vanquish the Asuras with it ; ' the text then relates 
how the other pra«as were pierced with evil and thus foiled 
by the Asuras, and how the Devas in the end had recourse 
to the chief vital air, ' Then comes this chief vital air ; on 
that they meditated as udgltha.' — As both these passages 
glorify the chief vital air, it follows that they both are in- 
junctions of a meditation on the vital air. A doubt, how- 
ever, arises whether the two vidyas are separate vidyas or 
one vidya only. 

Here the purvapakshin maintains that for the reasons 
specified in the first adhikarawa of the present pada the two 

I - — ■ ■ I ■ ■ I' " - ■■—■ — — . ■ llll.l ,. I ■ I M, 

1 The Purva Mim&wsa teaches that all subordinate things which 
the Veda prescribes for some typical sacrifice are eo ipso prescribed 
for the modified forms of the sacrifice also. 



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in adhvAya, 3 pAda, 7. 193 

vidyas have to be considered as one. — But, an objection is 
raised, there is a difference of procedure which contradicts 
the assumption of unity. The Va^asaneyins represent the 
chief vital air as the producer of the udgitha (' Do thou sing 
out for us'), while the ATAandogas speak of it as itself being 
the udgitha ('on that they meditated as udgitha'). How 
can this divergence be reconciled with the assumption of the 
unity of the vidyas ? — The difference pointed out, the purva- 
pakshin replies, is not important enough to bring about 
a separation of the two vidyas, since we observe that 
the two both agree in a plurality of points. Both texts 
relate that the Devas and the Asuras were fighting ; 
both at first glorify speech and the other prawas in their 
relation to the udgitha, and thereupon, finding fault with 
them, pass on to the chief vital air ; both tell how through 
the strength of the latter the Asuras were scattered as 
a ball of earth is scattered when hitting a solid stone. 
And, moreover, the text of the Va^asaneyaka also co- 
ordinates the chief vital air and the udgitha in the clause, 
' He is udgitha ' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 33). We therefore have to 
assume that in the KMndogya. also the chief pra«a has 
secondarily to be looked upon as the producer of the udgitha. 
— The two texts thus constitute one vidya only. 

7. Or rather there is no (unity of the vidyas), 
owing to the difference of subject-matter. 

Setting aside the view maintained by the purvapakshin, 
we have rather to say that, owing to the difference of sub- 
ject-matter, the two vidyas are separate. — In the A'Aandogya 
the introductory sentence (1, 1, 1), ' Let a man meditate on 
the syllable Om (as) the udgitha,' represents as the object 
of meditation the syllable Om which is a part of the 
udgitha ; thereupon proceeds to give an account of its 
qualities such as being the inmost essence of all (' The full 
account, however, of Om is this,' &c.) ; and later on tells, 
with reference to the same syllable Om which is a part of 
the udgitha, a story about the Gods and Asuras in which 
there occurs the statement, 'They meditated on the udgitha 
[38] O 



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194 vedAnta-sCtras. 



as that breath V If now we should assume 2 that the term 
' udgitha ' denotes here the whole act of worship (not only 
the syllable Om which is a part of the udgitha), and that 
(in the passage, ' they meditated on the udgitha as that 
breath ') the performer of that worship, i. e. the Udg&tri- 
priest, is said to be meditated upon as breath ; our inter- 
pretation would be open to two objections : in the first 
place it would be opposed to the introductory sentence 
(which directly declares the syllable Om to be the object 
of devotion) ; and in the second place it would oblige us 
to take the word udgitha (in ' they meditated on the ud- 
githa '), not in its direct sense, but as denoting by impli- 
cation the udgatr*. But the rule is that in one and the 
same connected passage the interpretation of later pas- 
sages has to adapt itself to the earlier passages. We 
therefore conclude the passage last quoted to teach that 
the syllable Om which is a part of the udgitha is to be 
meditated upon as pra«a. — In the Va^asaneyaka on the 
other hand there is no reason for taking the word udgitha 
to denote a part of the udgitha only, and we therefore 
must interpret it to denote the whole; and in the 
passage, 'Do thou sing out for us,' the performer of the 
worship, i.e. the Udgatrf'-priest, is described as pra«a. 
In reply to the purvapakshin's remark that in the Va^asa- 
neyaka also the udgitha and the prawa occur in co-ordi- 
nation (in the passage, • He is udgitha '), we point out that 
that statement merely aims at showing that the Self of all 
is that prd«a which the text wishes to represent as udgatr*'. 
The statement, therefore, does not imply the unity of the 
two vidyas. Moreover, there also the term udgitha denotes 
the whole act of worship (while in the AT^andogya it denotes 
the omkara only). Nor must it be said that the prawa can 

1 From which it appears that the JTMndogya enjoins throughout 
a meditation on the syllable Om which is only a part of the 
udgitha ; while the object of meditation enjoined in the Br/had~ 
aranyaka is the whole udgttha. 

* Viz. for the purpose of making out that the object of medita- 
tion is the same in the iO&ndogya and the Brthad-iranyaka. 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 7. 195 

impossibly be an udgatr*, and that on that account our inter- 
pretation of the Brzhad-arawyaka passage is erroneous ; for 
with a view to pious meditation scripture may represent 
the pra«a as udgatr* as well as udgitha. And, moreover, 
the Udgatr* actually performs his work by the strength of 
his breath ; hence the pra«a may be called udgatr*. In 
accordance with this the text says (I, 3, 24), 'He sang it 
indeed as speech and breath.' — And if we understand that 
the text clearly intends to convey a difference of matter we 
have no right to conclude from merely apparent similarities 
of expression that only one matter is intended to be ex- 
pressed. To quote an analogous instance from the karma- 
k&nda. : In the section relative to the unexpected rising of 
the moon during the dawa-Sacrifice, as well as in the section 
about the offering to be made by him who is desirous of 
cattle, we meet with identical injunctions such as the follow- 
ing one, ' He is to divide the grains into three portions, 
and to make those of medium size into a cake offered on 
eight potsherds to Agni the Giver,' &c. ; nevertheless it 
follows from the difference of the introductory passages of 
the two sections that the offerings to be made on account 
of the moon's rising are indeed not connected with the 
divinities of the darra-sacrifice (but do not constitute a new 
sacrifice separate from the darca), while the section about 
him who is desirous of cattle enjoins a separate sacrificial 
performance 1 . — Analogously a difference in the nature of 
the introductory clauses effects a difference of the vidyas, 
'As in the case of that which is greater than great.' That 
means : Just as the meditation on the udgitha enjoined in 
the passage, 'Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest; 
he is indeed the udgitha, greater than great, he is without 
end ' {Kh. Up. 1, 9, 1), and the other meditation on the ud- 
githa as possessing the qualities of abiding within the eye 
and the sun, &c. {Kk. Up. I, 6), are separate meditations, 
although in both the udgitha is identified with the highest 
Self; so it is with vidyas in general. The special features 
of different vidyas are not to be combined even when the 

1 Cp. Taitt. Sawh. II, 5, 5, 2 ; PA. Mi. Sfl. VI, 5, 1. 
O 2 



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196 vedAnta-sAtras. 



vidyas belong to one and the same .Sakha ; much less then 
when they belong to different Sakhas. 

8. If it be said (that the vidyas are one) on account 
of (the identity of) name; (we reply that) that is 
explained (already); moreover that (identity of name) 
is (found in the case of admittedly separate vidyis). 

Here it might be said that after all the unity of the two 
vidyas discussed must be admitted, since they are called by 
one and the same name, viz. ' the science of the udgitha.' 
— But this argument is of no avail against what has been 
said under the preceding Sutra. The decision there advo- 
cated has the advantage of following the letter of the 
revealed text ; the name * udgttha-vidya ' on the other 
hand is not a part of the revealed text, but given to the 
vidyas for convenience sake by ordinary men for the reason 
that the word ' udgitha ' is met with in the text. — More- 
over, we observe that admittedly separate meditations such 
as the two mentioned under the last Sutra have one and 
the same name. Similarly altogether separate sacrificial 
performances, such as the agnihotra, the dar.rapur«amasa, 
and so on, are all comprised under the one name Kanaka, 
merely because they are recorded in the one book called 
Kanaka. — Where, on the other hand, there is no special 
reason for assuming the difference of vidyas, their unity may 
be declared on the ground of identity of name ; as, e.g. in 
the case of the Sawvargavidyas. 

9. And on account of the (omk&ra) extending over 
the whole (Veda), (the view that the term udgitha 
expresses a specialisation) is appropriate. 

In the passage, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om 
(as) the udgitha,' the two words ' omkara ' and * udgitha ' 
are placed in co-ordination 1 . The question then arises 

1 SaminSdhikarawya, i.e. literally, 'the relation of abiding in a 
common substratum.' — The two words are shown to stand in that 
relation by their being exhibited in the same case. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 9. 1 97 

whether the relation in which the ideas conveyed by these 
two words stand to each other is the relation of super- 
imposition (adhyasa) or sublation (apavada) or unity 
(ekatva) or specification (vlreshawa) ; for prima facie each 
of these relations may present itself to the mind. — Adhyasa 
takes place when the idea of one of two things not being 
dismissed from the mind, the idea of the second thing is 
superimposed on that of the first thing ; so that together 
with the superimposed idea the former idea remains 
attached to the thing on which the second idea is super- 
imposed. When e.g. the idea of (the entity) Brahman 
superimposes itself upon the idea of the name, the 
latter idea continues in the mind and is not driven out 
by the former. A similar instance is furnished by the 
superimposition of the idea of the god Vish«u on a statue 
of Vishnu. So, in the case under discussion also, the idea 
of the udgitha may be superimposed on the omkara or the 
idea of the omkara on the udgitha. — We, in the second 
place, have apavada when an idea previously attached to 
some object is recognised as false and driven out by the 
true idea springing up after the false one. So e.g. when 
the false idea of the body, the senses, and so on being the 
Self is driven out by the true idea springing up later — and 
expressed by judgments such as ' Thou art that ' — that the 
idea of the Self is to be attached to the Self only. Or, to 
quote another example, when a previous mistaken notion 
as to the direction of the points of the compass is replaced 
by the true notion. So here also the idea of the udgitha 
may drive out the idea of the omkara or vice versa. — The 
relation would, in the third place, be that of ' unity ' if the 
terms ' omkara ' and ' udgitha ' were co-extensive in mean- 
ing ; just as the terms, ' the Best of the Twice-born,' ' the 
Brahmawa,' ' the god among men,' all denote an individual 
of the noblest caste. — The relation will, finally, be that of 
specification if, there being a possibility of our understand- 
ing the omkara in so far as co-extensive with all the Vedas, 
the term ' udgitha' calls up the idea of the sphere of action 
of the udgatrs. The passage would then mean, 'Let a man 
meditate on that omkara which is the udgitha,' and would 



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198 vedAnta-sCtras. 



be analogous to an injunction such as ' Let him bring that 
lotus-flower which is blue.' 

All these alterations present themselves to the mind, and 
as there is no reason for deciding in favour of any one, the 
question must remain an unsettled one. 

To this purvapaksha-view the Sutra replies, 'And on 
account of extending over the whole, it is appropriate.' 

The word ' and ' stands here in place of * but,' and is 
meant to discard the three other alternatives. Three out 
of the four alternatives are to be set aside as objectionable ; 
the fourth, against which nothing can be urged,, is to be 
adopted. — The objections lying against the first three 
alternatives are as follows. In the case of adhylsa we 
should have to admit that the word which expresses the 
idea superimposed is not to be taken in its direct sense, 
but in an implied sense 1 ; and we should moreover have to 
imagine some fruit for a meditation of that kind 2 . Nor 
can it be said that we need not imagine such a fruit, as 
scripture itself mentions it in the passage, 'He becomes 
indeed a fulfiller of desires' (I, 1, 7); for this passage 
indicates the fruit, not of the ideal superimposition of the 
udgitha on the omkara, but of the meditation in which the 
omkara is viewed as the fulfilment of desires. — Against the 
hypothesis of an apavada there likewise lies the objection 
that no fruit is to be seen. The cessation of wrong know- 
ledge can certainly not be alleged as such ; for we see no 
reason why the cessation of the idea that the omkara 
is udgitha and not omkara or vice versa should be bene- 
ficial to man. Sublation of the one idea by the other 
is moreover not even possible in our case; for to the 
omkara the idea of the omkara remains always attached, 
and so to the udgitha the idea of the udgitha. The 
passage, moreover, does not aim at teaching the true 

1 I.e. in the present case we should have to assume that the word 
udgitha means, by implication, the omkara. — Recourse may be had 
to implied meanings only when the direct meaning is clearly 
impossible. 

* For a special adhyasa-meditation must be attended with a 
special result. 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 9. 199 

nature of something, but at enjoining a meditation of a 
certain kind. — The hypothesis of unity again is precluded 
by the consideration that as in that case one term would 
suffice to convey the intended meaning, the employment of 
two terms would be purposeless. And moreover the term 
' udgitha ' is never used to denote the omkara in its 
connexion with the i?*g-veda and Ya^ur-veda ; nor is the 
word 'omkara* used to denote that entire second sub- 
division of a saman which is denoted by the word ' udgitha.' 
Hence it cannot be said that we have to do with different 
words only denoting one and the same thing. — There thus 
remains the fourth alternative, 'On account of its compris- 
ing all the Vedas.' That means : In order that the omkara 
may not be understood here as that one which comprises 
all the Vedas, it is specified by means of the word ' udgitha,' 
in order that that omkara which constitutes a part of the 
udgitha may be apprehended. — But does not this inter- 
pretation also involve the admission of implication, as 
according to it the word ' udgitha ' denotes not the whole 
udgitha but only a part of it, viz. the omkara ? — True, but 
we have to distinguish those cases in which the implied 
meaning is not far remote from the direct meaning 
and those in which it is remote. If, in the present case, 
we embrace the alternative of adhyasa, we have to 
assume an altogether remote implication, the idea of one 
matter being superimposed on the idea of an altogether 
different matter. If, on the other hand, we adopt the 
alternative of specification, the implication connected there- 
with is an easy one, the word which in its direct sense 
denotes the whole being understood to denote the part. 
And that words denoting the whole do duty for words 
denoting the part is a matter of common occurrence ; the 
words 'cloth,' 'village,' and many others are used in this 
fashion 1 . — For all these reasons we declare that the appro- 
priate view of the .Oandogya-passage is to take the word 
' udgitha ' as specialising the term ' omkara V 

1 We say, e.g. ' the cloth is burned,' even if only a part of the 
cloth is burned. 

2 We therefore, according to 5ankara, have to render the passage 



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200 vedAnta-sCtras. 



io. Those (qualities which are attributed to the 
subject of a vidya in one 6akha only) (are to be 
inserted) in other places (also), since (the vidyas) are 
non-different on the whole. 

In the colloquy of the prawas recorded by the Va^asane- 
yins and the .Oandogas the prawa, endowed with various 
qualities such as being the best and so on, is represented as 
the object of meditation, and various qualities such as being 
the richest and the like are ascribed to speech and the other 
organs. And these latter qualities are in the end attributed 
to the prawa also, ' If I am the richest thou art the richest,' 
&c. Now in other Sakhas also, as e.g. that of the Kaushi- 
takins, the former set of qualities such as being the best and 
so on is ascribed to the prawa (cp. Kau. Up. II, 14, 'Now 
follows the NiArreyasadana,' &c), but at the same time the 
latter set of attributes, viz. being the richest and so on, is 
not mentioned. — The question then is whether those quali- 
ties which are mentioned in some places only are, for the 
purposes of meditation, to be inserted there also where 
nothing is said about them. 

They are not so to be inserted, the purvapakshin main- 
tains, on account of the employment of the word ' thus.' In 
the Kaushitakin-text we meet with the clause, 'He who 
knows thus, having recognised the pre-eminence in prawa.' 
Now the word 'thus' which here indicates the object of 
knowledge always refers to something mentioned not far off, 
and cannot therefore denote a set of qualities mentioned in 
other Sakhas only. We therefore maintain that each of 
the colloquies of the prawas must be considered complete 
with the qualities stated in itself. 

To this we make the following reply. The qualities 
mentioned in one text are to be inserted in the other cor- 
responding texts also, ' Since on the whole they are non- 
different,' i.e. because the prana-vidyas are recognised to be 
the same in all essential points. And if they are the same, 

under discussion as follows, ' Let a man meditate on the syllable 
Om which is (i.e. which is a part of) the udgttha.' 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, ii. 20 1 

why should the qualities stated in one not be inserted in the 
others also? — But how about the objection founded by the 
purvapakshin on the employment of the word ' thus ? ' — 
Although it is true, we reply, that the word ' thus ' in the 
Kaushitakin-brahmatta does not denote the set of qualities 
mentioned in the Va^asaneyin-brahmawa, yet that set of 
qualities is denoted by the 'thus' met with in the Va^a- 
saneyin-brahmawa, while the vidya is, as proved by us, one 
and the same ; hence no difference has to be made between 
qualities mentioned in one's own .Sakha and qualities men- 
tioned in another Sakha, as long as the vidya is one and the 
same. Nor does this by any means imply a disregard of the 
text of scripture, and the assumption of things not warranted 
by the text. The qualities declared in one Sakha are valid 
for all scripture as long as the thing to which the qualities 
belong is the same. Devadatta, who in his own country is 
known to possess valour and certain other qualities, does 
not lose those qualities by going to a foreign land, although 
the inhabitants of that land may know nothing about them. 
And through better acquaintance his qualities will become 
manifest to the people of the foreign country also. Similarly 
the qualities stated in one Sakha may, through special 
application, be inserted in another Sakha. — Hence the attri- 
butes belonging to one and the same subject have to be 
combined wherever that subject is referred to, although 
they may be expressly stated in one place only. 

11. Bliss and other (qualities) as belonging to the 
subject of the qualities (have to be attributed to 
Brahman everywhere). 

Those scriptural texts which aim at intimating the 
characteristics of Brahman separately ascribe to it various 
qualities, such as having bliss for its nature, being one mass 
of knowledge, being omnipresent, being the Self of all and 
so on. Now the doubt here presents itself whether in each 
place where Brahman is spoken of we have to understand 
only those qualities which actually are mentioned there, 
or whether we have to combine all qualities of Brahman 
mentioned anywhere. 



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202 vedAnta-sOtras. 



The purvapakshin maintains that only the attributes 
actually stated are to be understood as referred to in each 
particular scriptural text. — But this view the Sutrakara dis- 
cards by declaring that delight and all the other qualities 
which belong to the subject, i.e. Brahman, are all of them 
to be understood in each place. The reason for this conclu- 
sion is the one given in Sutra 10. In all the passages treat- 
ing of Brahman the subject to which the qualities belong is 
one, non-different ; hence, as explained at length under the 
preceding Sutra, the qualities attributed to Brahman in 
any one place have to be combined wherever Brahman is 
spoken of. 

But in that case also such qualities as having joy for its 
head, &c, would have to be ascribed to Brahman every- 
where ; for we read in the Taittirtyaka with reference to the 
Self consisting of Bliss, ' Joy is its head, satisfaction is its 
right arm, great satisfaction its left arm, bliss is its trunk, 
Brahman is its tail, its support' (II, 5). 

To this objection the next Sutra replies. 

12. (Such qualities as) joy being its head and so 
on have no force (for other passages) ; for increase 
and decrease belong to plurality (only). 

Attributes such as having joy for its head and so on, 
which are recorded in the Taittirtyaka, are not to be viewed 
as having force with regard to other passages treating of 
Brahman, because the successive terms, 'Joy,' ' Satisfaction,' 
' Great Satisfaction,' ' Bliss,' indicate qualities possessing 
lower and higher degrees with regard to each other and to 
other enjoyers. Now for higher and lower degrees there is 
room only where there is plurality ; and Brahman is without 
all plurality, as we know from many scriptural passages 
('One only, without a Second'). — Moreover, we have already 
demonstrated under I, 1, 12, that having joy for one's head 
and so on are qualities not of Brahman, but of the so-called 
involucrum of delight. And further, those qualities are 
attributed to the highest Brahman merely as means of 
fixing one's mind on it, not as themselves being objects of 



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in adhyaya, 3 pAda, 13. 203 

contemplation, and from this also it follows that they are 
not valid everywhere 1 . — That the A^arya refers to them, in 
the Sutra, as attributes of Brahman (while in reality they are 
attributes of the anandamaya kora) is merely done for the 
purpose of establishing a general principle to be extended 
to all attributes of Brahman — also the undoubted ones — 
which are stated with a view to a special form of meditation 
only ; such as the quality of being that towards which all 
blessings go (Kk. Up. IV, 15, a), or he whose desires are true 
(Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1). For those passages may all indeed 
have to do with the one Brahman as the object of medi- 
tation, but as owing to the different nature of the opening 
sentences the meditations are different ones, the attributes 
mentioned in any one are not valid for the others. The 
case is analogous to that of two wives ministering to one 
king, one with a fly-flap, the other with an umbrella ; there 
also the object of their ministrations is one, but the acts of 
ministration themselves are distinct and have each their 
own particular attributes. So in the case under discussion 
also. Qualities in which lower and higher degrees can be 
distinguished belong to the qualified Brahman only in which 
plurality is admitted, not to the highest Brahman raised 
above all qualification. Such attributes therefore as having 
true desires and the like which are mentioned in some 
particular place only have no validity for other meditations 
on Brahman. 

1 3. But other (attributes are valid for all passages 
relative to Brahman), the purport being the same. 

Other attributes, however, such as bliss and so on which 
scripture sets forth for the purpose of teaching the true 
nature of Brahman are to be viewed as valid for all passages 
referring to Brahman ; for their purport, i.e. the Brahman 



1 For if they are not real attributes of Brahman there is all the 
less reason to maintain them to be universally valid. The mere 
means of fixing the mind, moreover, are special to each separate 
upasana. 



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204 vedAnta-sOtras. 



whose nature is to be taught, is one. Those attributes are 
mentioned with a view to knowledge only, not to meditation. 

14. (The passage, Kanaka I, 3, 10, gives informa- 
tion about the person) for the purpose of pious 
meditation, as there is no use (of the knowledge of 
the objects being higher than the senses and so on). 

We read in the Ka//4aka (1, 3, 10), * Higher than the senses 
are the objects, higher than the objects there is the mind, 
&c. &c. ; higher than the person there is nothing — this is 
the goal, the highest road.' — Here the doubt arises whether 
the purport of the passage is to intimate that each of the 
things successively enumerated is higher than the preceding 
one, or only that the person is higher than all of them. 

The purvapakshin maintains the former alternative, for 
the reason that the text expressly declares the objects to be 
higher than the senses, the mind higher than the objects 
and so on. 

The objection that the assumption of the passage intend- 
ing to represent many things as successively superior to 
their antecedents would involve a so-called split of the 
sentence, he meets by the remark that the passage may be 
viewed as containing a plurality of sentences. Many sen- 
tences may represent many things as superior to their 
antecedents, and hence each clause of the passage must be 
viewed as containing a separate statement of the superiority 
of something to other things. 

To this we reply as follows. 

We must assume that the whole passage aims at intimat- 
ing only that the person is higher than everything. Any 
information as to the relative superiority of the preceding 
members of the series would be devoid of all purpose ; for 
of the knowledge derived from such observation a use is 
neither to be seen nor declared by scripture. Of the know- 
ledge, on the other hand, of the person being higher than 
the senses and everything else, raised above all evil, we do 
see a purpose, viz. the accomplishment of final release. And 
so scripture also says, ' He who has perceived that is freed 



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in adhyAva, 3 pAda, i 6. 205 

from the jaws of death ' (I, 3, 15). Moreover, the text by 
declaring that nothing is higher than the person and that he 
is the highest goal intimates reverence for the person, and 
thereby shows that the whole series of objects is enumerated 
only to the end of giving information about the person. — 
'For the purpose of pious meditation,' i.e. for the purpose 
of perfect knowledge which has pious meditation for its 
antecedent For the passage under consideration does not 
teach pious meditation by itself. 

1 5. And on account of the word ' Self.' 

The above conclusion is confirmed by the circumstance 
that the person under discussion is called the Self in I, 
3, 1 a, 'That Self is hidden in all beings and does not 
shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their 
sharp and subtle intellect.' From this we conclude that 
the text wishes to represent the other beings enumerated 
as the Non-Self. The passage quoted, moreover, indicates 
that the person is hard to know, and to be reached by sharp 
minds only. — Again, the passage (I, 3, 13), 'A wise man 
should keep down speech and mind,' enjoins pious medi- 
tation as a means of the knowledge of the highest person, 
as we have explained under I, 4, 1. — It thus follows that 
scripture indicates various excellences in the case of the 
purusha only, and not in that of the other beings enu- 
merated. — The passage, moreover, ' He reaches the end of 
his journey and that is the highest place of Vishmi,' sug- 
gests the question as to who is the end of the journey 
and so on, and we therefore conclude that the enumera- 
tion of the senses, objects, &c, has merely the purpose of 
teaching the highest place of Vish«u (not of teaching any- 
thing about the relation of the senses, objects, and so on). 

16. The (highest) Self has to be understood (in 
Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1), as in other places; on account of 
the subsequent (qualification). 

We read in the Aitareyaka (II, 4, 1), 'Verily, in the 
beginning all this was Self, one only ; there was nothing 



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2o6 vedAnta-sOtras. 



else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth 
worlds ? He sent forth these worlds, the (heavenly) waters, 
the rays, the mortal (earth), and water.' — Here the doubt 
presents itself whether the term ' Self ' denotes the highest 
Self or some other being. 

The purvapakshin maintains the latter view, which is 
borne out, he says, by an examination of the connected 
sense of the whole passage. — But, an objection is raised, an 
examination of that kind rather leads to the conclusion that 
the highest Self is meant ; for the passage says that before 
the creation the Self only existed and that the creation was 
preceded by thought — No such conclusion is possible, the 
purvapakshin replies, since the passage relates the creation 
of the worlds. If it aimed at representing the highest Self 
as the creator, it would speak of the creation of the elements, 
of which the worlds are only certain combinations. That 
the worlds are meant by the terms ' water,' &c, appears 
from the subsequent clause (4), ' That water is above the 
heaven,' &c. — Now Sruti and Smr/ti teach that the creation 
of the worlds is accomplished by some inferior Lord dif- 
ferent from — and superintended by — the highest Self; cp. 
e.g. Br*. Up. 1, 4, 1, ' In the beginning this was Self alone, in 
the shape of a person,' and the Smrtti-passage, * He is the 
first embodied soul, he is called the person ; he the prime 
creator of the beings was in the beginning evolved from 
Brahman.' And the Aitareyins themselves record in a pre- 
vious prakarawa (II, i, 3, 1, ' Next follows the origin of 
seed. The seed of Pra^apati are the Devas') that this 
manifold creation was accomplished by Pra^apati. That 
to the latter being the word 'Self is sometimes applied 
appears from the passage quoted above from the Br*'. Up. 
And Pra^apati also may be spoken of as being before the 
creation one only, if we consider that then his products did 
not yet exist ; and thought also may be ascribed to him as 
he, of course, is of an intelligent nature. Moreover, the 
passages, 'He led a cow towards them; he led a horse 
towards them ; he led man towards them ; then they said,' 
&c. (11,4, 2 > a), which are in agreement with what is known 
about the various activities of particular qualified Selfs be- 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7. 207 

longing to the apparent world, show that in the Aitareyaka 
also some such qualified Self is meant. 

To this we reply that the highest Self is meant in the Aita- 
reyaka 'as in other places.' As in other accounts of the 
creation (* From that Self ether was produced,' Taitt Up. II, 
1, &c.) the highest Self has to be understood, and, as in other 
cases where the term ' Self is applied to particular Selfs, the 
• Self within ' (i.e. the highest Self) has to be understood in 
the first place ; so it is here also. — In those passages, on the 
other hand, where the Self is qualified by some other attri- 
bute, such as ' having the shape of a person,' we must un- 
derstand that some particular Self is meant — In the Aitare- 
yaka, however, we meet with a qualification, subsequent to 
the first reference to the Self, which agrees only with the 
highest Self; we mean the one implied in the passage, ' He 
thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these 
worlds.' — Hence we maintain that the highest Self is 
meant 

1 7. Should it be said that on account of the con- 
nected meaning (of the whole passage) (the highest 
Self cannot be meant) ; (we reply that) it is so, on 
account of the assertion. 

We now have to refute the objection, made above by the 
purvapakshin, that the highest Self cannot be meant ' on 
account of the connected meaning of the passage.' — The 
Sutrakara remarks, ' It is so, on account of the assertion.' 
That means : It is appropriate to understand the passage 
as referring to the highest Self, because thus the assertion 
that the Self, previously to the creation, was one only, gives 
a fully satisfactory sense, while on the other interpretation 
it would be far from doing so. The creation of the worlds 
recorded in the Aitareyaka we connect with the creation of 
the elements recorded in other Vedic texts, in that way that 
we understand the worlds to have been created subsequently 
to the elements ; just as we showed above (II, 4, 1) that 
the passage, ' It sent forth fire,' must be understood to say 
that the creation of fire followed on the creation of ether 



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2o8 vedAnta-sOtras. 



and air as known from other texts. For, as proved by us 
before, particulars mentioned in one scriptural text have to 
be combined with particulars mentioned in other texts, if 
only the chief subject of the passages is the same. — The 
details about the activity of the Self referred to by the pur- 
vapakshin have likewise to be understood in such a way as 
to agree with the general matter about which the text de- 
sires to make assertions. For we must by no means assume 
that the text is interested in setting forth all the details of 
the story on their own account ; the knowledge of them 
would be in no way beneficial to man. The only thing the 
text really means to teach is the truth that Brahman is the 
Self of everything. Hence it first relates how the different 
worlds and the guardians of the worlds, viz. Agni and so 
on, were created ; explains thereupon the origination of the 
organs and the body, their abode; and shows how the 
creator having thought, ' How can all this be without me ? ' 
(II, 4, 3, 4), entered into this body, ' Opening the suture of 
the skull he got in by that door ' (7). Then again the text 
relates how the Self after having considered the activities 
of all the organs (' if speech names/ &c ; 6) asked himself 
the question, 'What am I?' and thereupon 'saw this person 
as the widely spread Brahman' (10). The aim of all which 
is to declare that Brahman is the universal Self. The same 
truth is inculcated in a subsequent passage also, viz. II, 6, 
I >5> 6, where the text at first enumerates the whole aggre- 
gate of individual existences together with the elements, 
and then continues, 'All this is led by knowledge (i.e. the 
highest Self) ; it rests on knowledge. The world is led by 
knowledge, knowledge is its rest, knowledge is Brahman.' 
— For all these reasons the view that the highest Brahman 
is meant in the Aitareyaka is not open to any objections. 

The two preceding Sutras may also be explained with 
reference to some other Vedic passages. We read in the 
Va^asaneyaka (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 7), 'Who is that Self?— 
He who is within the heart, surrounded by the praaas, 
consisting of knowledge, the person of light.' Of the Self 
here first mentioned the text goes on to show that it is 
free from all contact and thus proves it to have Brahman 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7. 2O9 

for its Self, the concluding statement being, 'This great 
unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is 
indeed Brahman' (IV, 4, 25).— In the ATAandogya again 
we have a chapter in which the introductory statement 
does not use the term 'Self ('Being only this was in the 
beginning, one, without a second '), while at the conclusion 
the term 'Self is used in the declaration of identity ('That 
is the Self. Thou art that'). — A doubt here arises whether 
these two scriptural texts treat of the same matter or not. 

They do not, the purvapakshin maintains, since they are 
not equal. Since the determination of the sense depends 
on the letter of the text, we have no right to maintain 
equality of sense where the texts differ. In the Va^asa- 
neyaka the initial statement about the Self shows that the 
whole passage conveys instruction about the true nature of 
the Self. In the /TAandogya, on the other hand, the initial 
clause is of a different kind, and we therefore must assume 
that the whole passage imparts instruction differing in nature 
from that of the Va^asaneyaka. — But has it not been said 
that the iTAandogya-passage also teaches in the end the 
doctrine of universal identity with the Self? — That has been 
said indeed (but wrongly) ; for as the concluding passage 
must be made to agree with the initial passage (which latter 
does not say anything about the identity of the Self and 
Brahman), we assume that the concluding passage merely 
enjoins an imaginative combination (sampatti) of the Self 
and Brahman. 

To this we reply that also the passage, ' Being only this 
was in the beginning,' has to be understood as referring 
to the Self; 'as other places,' i.e. in the same way as 
the passage quoted from the Va.gasaneyaka. For what 
reason? — 'On account of the subsequent (statement),' viz. 
the statement as to identity. And if it be said that ' on 
account of the connected meaning' of the initial passage 
in which no mention is made of the Self, the chapter 
cannot be understood to refer to the Self; we reply 'that 
it may be so understood on account of the assertion ' made 
in the passage about that ' by which we hear what is not 
heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not 

[38] P 



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2 1 o vedanta-sOtras. 



known.' For this passage asserts that through the know- 
ledge of one thing all things become known, and to make 
good this assertion the text later on declares that ' Being 
only this was,' &c. Now this knowledge of all things 
through one thing is possible only if we understand the pas- 
sage last quoted to refer to the Self; for if the principal 
Self were not known, how could all things be known? 
Moreover the assertion that, before creation, there existed 
one thing only, and the reference to the individual soul 
by means of the word ' Self,' and the statement that in 
deep sleep the soul becomes united with the True, and the 
repeated inquiries on the part of .Svetaketu, and the 
repeated assertions, ' Thou art that,' — all this is appropriate 
only if the aim of the whole section is not to enjoin an 
imaginative meditation on all things as identical with the 
Self, but to teach that the Self really is everything. — Nor 
must it be said that, in the section under discussion, the 
concluding passage must be interpreted so as to agree 
with the introductory clause (and cannot on that account 
teach anything about the Self) ; for the introductory 
passage declares neither that the Self is everything, nor 
that the Non-self is everything (but merely makes a 
statement regarding what is in general), and such an 
altogether general statement cannot be in conflict with 
any particular statement made in a supplementary passage, 
but rather is in want of some such particular statement 
whereby to define itself 1 . — And moreover (to view the 
matter from a different point of view), the word ' Being ' 
if looked into closely can denote nothing else but the 
principal Self, since we have proved, under II, i, 14, the 
unreality of the whole aggregate of being different from 
the Self. — Nor, finally, does a difference of expression 
necessarily imply a difference of sense ; not any more than 
in ordinary language the two phrases, ' Bring that vessel 

1 I.e. the definite statement about the Self in the concluding 
passage may be used for defining the sense of the indefinite initial 
statement about that which is. 'That which is' comprises the 
Self as well as the Not-Self. 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, i 8. 211 

over there,' and, 'That vessel over there, bring it,' have 
different meanings. — It therefore remains a settled con- 
clusion that in texts such as discussed above, the matter 
of instruction is the same, however much the mode may 
vary in which the instruction is conveyed. 

18. As (scripture where speaking of the rinsing of 
the mouth with water) makes a reference to an act 
(established by Smnti), (that act is not enjoined by 
■Sruti, but rather) the new (act of meditation on the 
water viewed as the dress of pra«a). 

The /sf&mdogas as well as the V4fasaneyins record, in 
the colloquy of the prawas, that the food of Breath com- 
prizes everything even unto dogs and birds, and that water 
is its dress. To this the JsT^andogas add, ' Therefore when 
going to eat food they surround it before and after with 
water' (Kk. Up. V, 2, a). And the Va,gasaneyins add 
(Br*. Up. VI, 1, 14), 'Srotriyas who know this rinse the 
mouth with water when they are going to eat and rinse 
the mouth with water after they have eaten, thinking that 
thereby they make the breath dressed. Therefore a man 
knowing this is to rinse the mouth with water when going 
to eat and after having eaten ; he thereby makes that 
breath dressed.' — These texts intimate two things, rinsing 
of the mouth and meditation on the breath as dressed. 
The doubt then arises whether the texts enjoin both these 
matters, or only the rinsing of the mouth, or only the 
meditation on breath as dressed. 

The purvapakshin maintains that the text enjoins both, 
since the one as well as the other is intimated by the text, 
and since both matters not being settled by any other 
means of knowledge are worthy of being enjoined by the 
Veda. — Or else, he says, the rinsing of the mouth only is 
enjoined, since with reference to the latter only the text 
exhibits the particular injunctive verbal form ('he is to 
rinse '). In this latter case the mention made in the text 
of the meditation on breath as dressed has merely the 
purpose of glorifying the act of rinsing. 

P 2 



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2i2 vedAnta-sOtras. 



To this we make the following reply. — The rinsing of 
the mouth cannot possibly be enjoined by the quoted 
passages ' since they merely contain references to an act,' 
i.e. since they merely contain remarks concerning the 
purificatory act of rinsing the mouth which is known from 
and settled by Smr/ti. — But are not the very .Sruti-passages 
under discussion to be looked upon as the fundamental texts 
on which the Smr/ti-injunctions regarding the rinsing of 
the mouth are based ? — This is not possible, we reply, since 
the .Sruti and Smr/ti-passages refer to different matters. 
All the Smr/ti-passages enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth 
only in so far as it purifies man ; while the quoted .Sruti 
texts which occur in pr&«a-vidyas, if enjoining the rinsing of 
the mouth at all, enjoin it with reference to the knowledge 
of pr&fta. And a .Sruti-passage cannot constitute the basis 
of a SnWti-passage referring to an altogether different 
matter. Nor can it be maintained that the .Sruti-passage 
enjoins some altogether new rinsing of the mouth connected 
with the pra«a-vidy&, as we recognise the rinsing mentioned 
in .Sruti as the ordinary rinsing performed by men for the 
sake of purification. — The preceding argumentation already 
precludes the alternative of two matters being enjoined, 
which would moreover lead to a so-called split of the sen- 
tence. — We therefore conclude that the text — with reference 
to the rinsing of the mouth before and after eating which is 
enjoined by Smrj'ti — enjoins (by means of the passage, 
* thinking that thereby they make the breath dressed ') a 
new mental resolve with regard to the water used for rinsing 
purposes, viz. that that water should act as a means for 
clothing the prawa. The statement about the clothing of the 
prawa cannot (as suggested by the purvapakshin) be taken 
as a glorification of the act of rinsing the mouth ; for in the 
first place the act of rinsing is not enjoined in the Vedic 
passage ', and in the second place we apprehend that the 
passage itself conveys an injunction, viz. of the mental 

1 A glorifying arthavdda-passage would be in its place only if 
it were preceded by some injunction; for the glorification of 
certain acts is meant to induce men to comply with the injunctions 
concerning those acts. 



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in adhyAya, 3 pada, 1 8. 213 

resolve to provide clothing for the pra«a. Nor must the 
objection be raised that in that case two purposes are 
admitted for the one act of rinsing the mouth, viz. the 
purpose of purification and the purpose of providing the 
pra«a with clothing. For we have actually to do not with 
one action, but with two separate actions. For one action 
is the rinsing of the mouth which serves the purpose of 
purifying man, and another action is the mental resolve 
that that water should serve the purpose of clothing the 
prawa. Similarly the preceding passage, * Whatever there 
is, even unto dogs, &c, that is thy food,' does not enjoin 
the promiscuous use of food of all kinds — for that would be 
contrary to scripture and impossible in itself — but merely 
enjoins the meditation on all food as food of the prawa. We 
therefore conclude that also the passage, ' Water is thy dress,' 
which forms the immediate continuation of the passage last 
quoted does not enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth but 
merely the act of meditating on the rinsing-water as con- 
stituting the dress of the pra«a. 

Moreover the mere present-form, ' they rinse the mouth 
with water,' has no enjoining force. — But also in the passage, 
'They think that thereby they make the breath dressed,' we 
have a mere present-form without injunctive power (and yet 
you maintain that that passage conveys an injunction)! — 
True ; but as necessarily one of the two must be enjoined 1 , 
we assume, on the ground of what the text says about the 
making of a dress, that what is enjoined is the meditation 
on water being the dress of prawa; for this is something 
'new,' i.e. not established by other means of knowledge 2 . 
The rinsing of the mouth with water, on the other hand, is 
already established by other means (i.e. Smrz'ti), and there- 
fore need not be enjoined again. — The argument founded 

1 Because otherwise we should have only arthavadas. But 
arthavadas have a meaning only in so far as connected with an 
injunction. 

1 The above argumentation avails itself of the Sutra, putting a 
new construction on it. — Tarhi dvayor avidheyatvam ily IrankySnu- 
vadam&trasya«ki#£itkaratvad anyataravidher ava-ryakatve samkalpa- 
nam eva vidheyam iti vidhantarena sutram yo^ayati. An. Gi. 



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2 1 4 vedanta-sOtras. 



by the purvapakshin on the circumstance that, in the Bri. 
Up., the verb 'to rinse' is found in the injunctive form 
(' therefore a man, &c, is to rinse '), is already refuted by 
our showing that the act of rinsing the mouth is not a new 
one (and therefore requires no Vedic injunction). 

For the very reason that the text does not aim at enjoin- 
ing the rinsing of the mouth, the Ka«vas (in their recension 
of the Bri. Up.) conclude the chapter with the clause, * They 
think,' &c, and do not add the concluding clause of the 
Madhyandinas, ' Therefore a man,' &c. From this we have 
to conclude that what is enjoined in the text of the Madhy- 
andinas also is ' the knowledge of that,' i. e. the knowledge 
of the water being the dress of the previously mentioned 
prawa. — Nor finally can it be maintained that in one place 
(i.e. the Madhyandina-jakha) the rinsing of the mouth 
is enjoined, and in other places the knowledge of water 
as the dress of prawa ; for the introductory passage, ' Water 
is the dress,' is the same everywhere. — We are therefore 
entitled to conclude that what is enjoined in all Sakhas is 
the cognition of water being the dress of the prawa. 

19. In the same (.Sakha also) it is thus (i.e. there 
is unity of vidya), on account of the non-difference 
(of the object of meditation). 

In the Agnirahasya forming part of the Va^asaneyi-jakha 
there is a vidya called the Sawrfilya- vidya, in which we 
meet with the following statement of particulars, ' Let him 
meditate on the Self which consists of mind, which has the 
prawa for its body and light for its form,' &c. — In the Bri- 
had-ara«yaka again, which belongs to the same Sakha, we 
read (V, 10, 6), ' That person consisting of mind, whose being 
is light, is within the heart, small like a grain of rice or 
barley. He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all — he rules all 
this whatsoever exists.' — A doubt here presents itself 
whether these two passages are to be taken as one vidya in 
which the particulars mentioned in either text are to be 
combined or not. 

The purvapakshin maintains that we have to do with two 
separate vidyas whose particulars cannot be combined. For 



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hi adhyAya, 3 pAda, 19. 215 

otherwise, he argues, the text could not be cleared from the 
reproach of useless repetition. As long as we have to do 
with texts belonging to different Sakhas we can rebut the 
charge of useless repetition by pointing to the fact that the 
texts are read and known by separate classes of men ; we 
can then ascertain the unity of the vidyas and combine the 
particulars mentioned in one text only with those mentioned 
in the others ; so e.g. in the colloquy of the prawas. On the 
other hand, texts belonging to one and the same Sakha 
cannot be freed from the reproach of tautology as the same 
persons study and know them, and passages occurring in 
different places cannot therefore be combined into one vidya. 
Nor can we make out a separate position for each of the 
texts of the latter kind by saying that it is the task of one 
text to enjoin the vidya and that of the other to enjoin the 
particulars of the vidya. For in that case each of the 
two passages would mention only such particulars as are 
not mentioned in the other one ; while as a matter of 
fact particulars common to both as well as not common to 
both are mentioned in each. Hence the particulars of the 
one passage are not to be combined with those of the other. 
To this we make the following reply. Just as passages 
met with in different Sakhas form one vidya in which the 
different particulars are to be combined, so the two passages 
under discussion also, although belonging to one and the 
same Sakha, constitute one vidya only, since the object of 
meditation is the same in both. For as such we recognise 
Brahman possessing certain qualities such as consisting of 
mind and so on. Now we know that the object constitutes 
the character of a meditation ; as long as there is no differ- 
ence of character we cannot determine difference of vidya ; 
and if there is no difference of vidya the particulars men- 
tioned in different places cannot be held apart. — But has it 
not been demonstrated above that the vidyas have to be 
held apart, as otherwise tautology would arise ? — Tautology 
does not result, we reply, because the two passages may be 
understood to have each its particular meaning, one of them 
enjoining the vidya, and the other the particulars of the 
vidya. — But in that case the Br/had-ara«yaka ought to 



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2 1 6 vedAnta-sOtras. 



mention only those points which are not mentioned in the 
Agnirahasya, as e.g. ' he is the Lord of all ; ' while it ought 
not to mention what is already mentioned in the Agni- 
rahasya, as e.g. the Selfs consisting of mind ! — Not so, we 
reply. Only the repetition, in one passage, of what is 
already mentioned in the other passage enables us to 
recognise the vidya. The Br*had-ara«yaka-passage, by 
mentioning some common qualities, first enables us to 
recognise the Sa«d?ilya-vidya, and then teaches certain 
particulars with reference to the latter; how otherwise 
should we know that the Br/.-passage is meant to enjoin 
particulars for the SSjtdilya- vidya ? Moreover, as in a 
passage which has a purpose of its own in so far as it 
teaches something not yet established, a reference to some- 
thing already established is justified on the ground of its 
being a (so-called) nityanuvada, we cannot overlook the 
recognition (of the identity of the passage with another one) 
which is rendered possible through that anuvada. Hence, 
although the two passages belong to one and the same 
Sakha, they yet constitute one vidya only, and their particu- 
lars have to be combined into one whole. 

20. Thus in other cases also, on account of the con- 
nexion (of particulars with one and the same vidya). 

We read in the Brmad-arawyaka (V, 5), 'The true is 
Brahman,' and, further on, ' Now what is the true, that is the 
Aditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person 
in the right eye.' Having thus declared the different abodes 
of that true Brahman with reference to the gods and with 
reference to the body, and having, in what follows, identified 
its body with the sacred syllables (bhb/t, &c), the text 
teaches its two secret names (upanishad), * Its secret name 
is ahar ' with reference to the gods ; and ' its secret name is 
aham' with reference to the body. — A doubt here arises 
whether these two secret names are both to be applied to 
the deva-abode of Brahman as well as to its bodily abode, 
or only one name to each. 

The above Sutra maintains the purvapaksha view. Just 
as certain particulars though recorded elsewhere are yet 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 2f. 217 

to be combined with the .Sawdfilya-vidya, so we have to 
proceed in other cases also, as e. g. the one under discus- 
sion, because the particulars mentioned are all connected 
with one vidya. The vidya of the True with its double 
reference to the Devas and to the body is one only, as we 
infer from the fact of its having one exordium only (' The 
true is Brahman'), and from the way in which the text 
interconnects Aditya and the person in the eye. Why 
then should an attribute belonging to one of the latter 
not belong to the other also ? For, to quote an analogous 
case, certain rules of life which are prescribed for a teacher 
— as e. g. having a following of pupils — remain equally valid 
whether the teacher be in a village or in a wood. For 
these reasons both secret names equally belong to the 
Aditya as well as to the person within the eye. This view 
the next Sutra refutes. 

21. Or this is not so, on account of the difference 
(of place). 

The two secret names do not apply quite equally to 
the two persons mentioned, because they are connected 
with different places in the vidya. For the clause, ' Its 
secret name is ahar,' the text exhibits in connexion with 
the person in the solar orb, while the clause, ' Its secret 
name is aham,' occurs in connexion with the person in the 
eye. Now the pronoun 'its' always refers to something 
mentioned close by; we therefore conclude that the text 
teaches each secret name as belonging to one special abode 
of Brahman only. How then can both names be valid for 
both ? — But, an objection is raised, the person within the 
orb of the sun and the person within the eye are one only ; 
for the text teaches them both to be abodes of the one 
true Brahman ! — True, we reply ; but as each secret name 
is taught only with reference to the one Brahman as con- 
ditioned by a particular state, the name applies to Brahman 
only in so far as it is in that state. We on our part also 
illustrate the case by a comparison. The teacher always 
remains the teacher ; yet those kinds of services which the 
pupil has to do to the teacher when sitting have not to be 



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2 1 8 vedanta-sOtras. 



done when he stands ; and vice versa. — The comparison, 
on the other hand, instituted by the purvapakshin is ill 
chosen, since the duties of the disciple towards his teacher 
depend on the latter's character as teacher, and that is not 
changed by his being either in the village or the forest. — 
Hence the two secret names have to be held apart. 

22. (Scripture) also declares that. 

Scripture moreover contains a distinct intimation that 
the attributes under discussion are to be held apart. We 
read, Kh. Up. I, 8, 5, ' The form of that person is the same 
as the form of the other person, the joints of the one are 
the joints of the other, the name of the one is the name of 
the other.' — But how does this passage convey the desired 
intimation? — By expressly transferring the attributes of 
the person within the sun to the person within the eye ; 
for this express transfer shows that the text looks upon 
the attributes of the two as separated by the difference 
of abode and therefore not to be combined (unless specially 
enjoined to be so combined). — The conclusion therefore 
is that the two secret names are to be held apart. 

23. And for the same reason the holding together 
and the pervading the sky (attributed to Brahman 
in the Rarcayaniya-khila) (are not to be inserted in 
other vidyas). 

In the khilas (supplementary writings) of the Ra«a- 
yaniyas we meet with a passage, ' Held together are the 
powers among which Brahman is the best ; the best 
Brahman in the beginning stretched out the sky V which 
mentions certain energies of Brahman, such as holding 
together its powers, entering into the sky, &c. And in the 

1 Virya' viryawi parikramabheda^, anye hi purush&A sahayin 
apekshya vikraman bibhrati tena tatpar&kram£»&m na ta eva niyat- 
apflrvatvarfipaMrawatvena gyesh/M. bhavanti ki»» tu tatsahakarirto 
*pi, brahmavfrya»a»» tu brahmaiva gyts\tfham brahma gyesh/Aam 
yeshiim tani tathd brahma khalv ananyapeksham ^aga^anmidi 
karoti. Kim JUnyesh&m paraltramSwdm balavadbhir madhye 
bhanga^ sambhavati tena te svaviryiwi na bibhrati, brahmavirySwi 
tu brahmafla' sambhrj't&ni avighnena sambhrMny ity artha/5. An. Gi. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 23. 219 

Upanishad of the same (i.e. the Rawayaniyas) we meet 
with vidyas of Brahman among which the .Sawrfilya-vidya 
is the first. — The question then arises whether the energies 
of Brahman just mentioned are to be inserted in those 
Brahma-vidyas or not. To the purvapaksha view that 
they are to be so inserted because they are connected with 
Brahman, the Stitrakara replies that the holding together 
and pervading the sky are not to be inserted in the 
•SaWilya-vidya and other vidyas, for the same reason, 
i. e. on account of their being connected with different 
abodes. In the 5a«afilya-vidya, Brahman is said to have 
its abode in the heart, ' He is the Self within the heart ' 
(KA. Up. Ill, 14, 3); the same statement is made in the 
dahara-vidya, ' There is the palace, the small lotus (of the 
heart), and in it that small ether' (VIII, 1, 1). In the 
Upakojala-vidya again, Brahman is said to reside within 
the eye, 'That person that is seen in the eye' (IV, 15, 1). 
In all these vidyas Brahman is described as residing within 
the body; it is therefore impossible to insert into them 
the energies of Brahman which the khila of the Ra«a- 
yaniyas mentions, and which are connected with the Devas 
(i. e. external nature). — But the vidyas of the .Oandogya 
likewise mention such powers of Brahman as are connected 
with the Devas ; cp. e.g. Ill, 14, 3, ' He is greater than the 
heaven, greater than these worlds;' IV, 15, 4, 'He is also 
Bhamanl, for he shines in all worlds ; ' VIII, 1, 3, ' As large 
as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart. 
Both heaven and earth are contained within it' And again 
there are other vidyas of Brahman, such as the one which 
represents Brahman as comprising sixteen parts, in which 
not any special abode is mentioned. — True ; but there is a 
special reason why the attributes stated in the Ra«ayaniya- 
khila cannot be introduced into the other vidyas. Par- 
ticulars mentioned in one place can indeed be inserted in 
vidyas met with in another place if the latter are suggested 
to the mind by containing some reference to agreeing par- 
ticulars ; the qualities of holding together, however, on one 
side and those mentioned in the 5a«rfilya-vidya, &c, on 
the other side are of such a nature as to exclude each 



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220 VEDANTA-sOtRAS. 



other, and therefore do not mutually suggest each other. 
The mere circumstance of all the particulars being con- 
nected with Brahman does not suffice to suggest vidyas 
occurring in other places; for even in vidyas which are 
avowedly separate, all the particulars may be connected 
with Brahman. And it is an established fact that Brahman, 
although one only, is, owing to the plurality of its powers, 
meditated upon in more than one way, as shown under 
Sutra 7. — The conclusion therefore is that the attributes 
of holding together its powers and so on are not to be 
inserted in the S&tidilya. and similar vidyas. 

24. And as the record of others (viz. the Taittiri- 
yaka) is not such as in the purusha-vidya (of the 
A^andogya), (the two purusha-vidyas are not to be 
combined). 

In the Rahasya-brahma«a of the Tawrfins and the 
Paingins (the Kft&ndogya.) there is a vidya treating of 
man, in which man is fancifully identified with the sacrifice, 
the three periods of his life with the three libations, his 
hunger and so on, with the diksha, &c. And other par- 
ticulars also are mentioned there, such as formulas of 
prayer, use of mantras and so on. — A similar fanciful 
assimilation of the sacrifice and man the Taittiriyakas 
exhibit, ' For him who knows thus the Self of the sacrifice 
is the sacrificer, Faith is the wife of the sacrificer,' and so 
on (Taitt. Ar. X, 64). — The doubt here arises whether the 
particulars of the man-sacrifice given in the K/i&ndogya. 
are to be inserted in the Taittiriyaka or not. 

Against the view of the purvapakshin that they are so 
to be inserted because in both places we have a purusha- 
ya^«a, we maintain that they are not to be inserted because 
the characteristics of the purusha-ya^wa of the KAandogas 
are not recognised in the Taittiriya-text. This the Sutra- 
kara expresses by saying, ' As (the record of the followers 
of some .Sakhas, viz. the T&nd'ms and Paingins, is) in the 
purusha-vidya, not such is the record of others,' viz. the 
Taittiriyakas. For the latter exhibit an identification of 
man with the sacrifice, in which the wife, the sacrificer, the 



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HI ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 24. 221 

Veda, the vedi, the sacrificial grass, the post, the butter, 
the sacrificial animal, the priest, &c, are mentioned in 
succession ; none of which particulars are mentioned in the 
ATAandogya. The use also to which the Taittiriyaka turns 
the three libations is different from the AT^andogya. And 
the few points in which the two texts agree, such as the iden- 
tification of the Avabro'tha-ceremony with death, lose their 
significance side by side with the greater number of dis- 
similarities, and are therefore not able to effect the recog- 
nition of the vidya. — Moreover the Taittiriyaka does not 
represent man as the sacrifice (as the A*Aandogya does) ; 
for the two genitives ('of him who thus knows' and 'of 
the sacrifice ') are not co-ordinate, and the passage there- 
fore cannot be construed to mean, ' The knowing one who 
is the sacrifice, of him the Self is,' &c. For it cannot be 
said that man is the sacrifice, in the literal sense of the 
word 1 . The two genitives are rather to be taken in that 
way, that one qualifies the other, 'The sacrifice of him 
who thus knows, of that sacrifice,' &c. For the connexion 
of the sacrifice with man (which is expressed by the geni- 
tive, ' the sacrifice of him ') is really and literally true ; 
and to take a passage in its literal meaning, if possible at 
all, is always preferable to having recourse to a secondary 
metaphorical meaning 8 . Moreover the words next follow- 
ing in the Taittiriyaka-passage, ' the Self is the sacrificer,' 
declare that man (man's Self) is the sacrificer, and this 
again shows that man's relation to the sacrifice is not that 
of co-ordination s . Moreover as the section beginning with 
' Of him who thus knows ' forms an anuvada of something 
previously established (and as such forms one vakya to 
which one sense only must be ascribed), we must not 
bring about ' a split of the sentence ' by interpreting it as 

1 And therefore we are not warranted in taking the two genitives 
as co-ordinate, as otherwise they might be taken. 

8 Which latter would be the case if we should take the two 
genitives as co-ordinate and therefore expressing an imaginative 
identiGcation of the man and the sacrifice. 

' If man is the sacrificer he cannot be identified with the 
sacrifice ; he is rather the Lord of the sacrifice. 



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222 VEDANTA-sOtRAS. 



teaching in the first place that man is the sacrifice, and 
in the second place that the Self and the other beings 
enumerated are the sacrificer and so on. And as we see 
that the passage, 'Of him who thus knows,' &c, follows 
upon some instruction about the knowledge of the Self 
coupled with sawmyasa, we apprehend that the Taittiri- 
yaka-chapter is not an independent vidya but merely 
supplementary to the instruction previously given. In 
agreement with this conclusion we observe that the Tait- 
tirtyaka promises only one result for both chapters, viz. 
the one stated in the passage, ' He obtains the greatness 
of Brahman.' — On the other hand the text embodying the 
purusha-vidya in the A^andogya is an independent text ; 
for we see that an independent result is attached to it, 
viz. an increase of length of life, ' He who knows this lives 
on to a hundred and sixteen years.' — Hence the particulars 
mentioned in the purusha-vidya of another .Sakha, such as 
formulas of prayer, mantras and so on, are not to be com- 
bined with the Taittiriya-text of the vidya. 

25. Because the matter (of certain mantras) such 
as piercing and so on is different (from the matter 
of the approximate vidyas) (the former have not to 
be combined with the latter). 

At the beginning of an Upanishad of the Atharvawikas 
the following mantra is recorded, ' Pierce him (the enemy) 
whole, pierce his heart : crush his veins, crush his head ; 
thrice crushed,' &c. At the beginning of the Upanishad 
of the T&nd'ms we have the mantra, ' O God Savitar, pro- 
duce the sacrifice.' At the beginning of that of the SktyiL- 
yanins, * Thou hast a white horse and art green as grass/ 
&c. ; at the beginning of that of the KaA&as and the Taitti- 
riyakas, ' May Mitra be propitious to us and Varu«a,' &c. 
At the beginning of the Upanishad of the Va,gasaneyins we 
have a Brahmaaa-passage about the pravargya-ceremony, 
' The gods indeed sat down to a sattra ; ' and at the begin- 
ning of that of the Kaushitakins there is a Brahmawa- passage 
about the agnishtoma, 'Brahman indeed is the Agnish/oma, 
Brahman is that day ; through Brahman they pass into 



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Ill ADHVAYA, 3 PADA, 25. 223 

Brahman, immortality those reach who observe that day.' — 
The point to be inquired into with reference to all these 
mantras and the sacrifices referred to in the Brahma«a-pas- 
sages is whether they are to be combined with the vidyas 
(contained in the Upanishads) or not. 

The purvapakshin maintains that they are so to be 
combined, because the text exhibits them in proximity to 
the Upanishad-portions of the Brahma«as whose chief 
contents are formed by the vidyds. — But we do not observe 
those mantras and sacrifices to be actually enjoined as sub- 
ordinate members of the vidyis ! — True, but in spite of this 
we, on the ground of proximity, infer them to be connected 
with the vidy&s. For we have no right to set aside the 
fact of proximity as irrelevant as long as an inference can 
be established on it. — But we are unable to see that the 
mantras have anything to do with the vidyas, and how can 
it be assumed that ceremonies, such as the pravargya which 
scripture enjoins with reference to other occasions, sacrifices, 
and so on, stand in any relation to the vidy&s ! — Never mind, 
the purvapakshin replies. In the case of mantras we can 
always imagine some meaning which connects them with 
the vidy&s; the first mantra quoted, e.g. may be viewed as 
glorifying the heart. For the heart and other parts of the 
body are often represented, in the vidyas, as abodes of 
meditation, and hence mantras glorifying the heart, &c, 
may appropriately form subordinate members of those 
vidyas. Some mantras, moreover, we clearly see to be 
enjoined with reference to vidyas, so, e.g. the mantra, ' I 
turn to BhuA with such and such ' (Kk. Up. Ill, 15, 3). 
Sacrificial acts again may indeed be enjoined in connexion 
with other occasions; yet there is no reason why they 
should not also be applied to the vidy&s, just as the 
offering called Bnhaspatisava is a subordinate part of the 
Va^apeya-sacrifice 1 . 

To this we make the following reply. The mantras and 

1 The Br/haspatisava, although enjoined with special reference to 
him who is desirous of Brahmavanias, is yet at the same time a 
subordinate part of the Va^apeya-sacrifice. Cp. Pu. Mt. Sft. IV, 
3.29- 



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224 vedAnta-sOtras. 



ceremonies mentioned cannot be drawn into connexion 
with the vidyas, ' because their matter, such as piercing the 
heart, &c, is different (from the matter of the vidyas),' and 
therefore cannot be connected with the latter. — But has 
it not been said above that the mantras may be connected 
with the meditations enjoined in the vidyas, on the ground 
of their coming of use in meditations on the heart, &c ? — 
The mantras, we reply, might be so employed, if their 
entire contents were glorification of the heart, and the like ; 
but this is by no means the case. The mantra first quoted, 
e. g. clearly expresses hostility to somebody, and is there- 
fore to be connected, not with the vidyas of the Upanishads, 
but with some ceremony meant to hurt an enemy. The 
mantra of the Tawrfins again, ' O God Savitar, produce the 
sacrifice,' indicates by its very words that it is connected 
with some sacrifice; with what particular sacrifice it is 
connected has to be established by other means of proof. 
Similarly other mantras also— which, either by ' indica- 
tion' (linga), or 'syntactical connexion' (vakya), or some 
other means of proof, are shown to be subordinate to 
certain sacrificial actions — cannot, because they occur in 
the Upanishads also, be connected with the vidyas on the 
ground of mere proximity. For that ' proximity,' as a 
means of proof regarding the connexion of subordinate 
matters with principal matters, is weaker than direct enun- 
ciation (.Sruti), and so on, is demonstrated in the former 
science (i.e. in the Purva Mima#*sa) under III, 3, 14. Of 
sacrificial works also, such as the pravargya, which are pri- 
marily enjoined with reference to other occasions, it cannot 
be demonstrated that they are supplementary to vidyas 
with which they have nothing in common. The case of 
the Br/haspatisava, quoted by the purvapakshin, is of an 
altogether different kind, as there we have an injunction 
clearly showing that that oblation is a subordinate member 
of the Va^apeya, viz. ' Having offered the Va^apeya he 
offers the Brzhaspatisava.' And, moreover, if the one 
pravargya-ceremony has once been enjoined for a definite 
purpose by a means of proof of superior strength, we must 
not, on the strength of an inferior means of proof, assume 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 26. 225 

it to be enjoined for some different purpose. A proceeding 
of that kind would be possible only if the difference of the 
means of proof were not apprehended ; but in our case this 
latter possibility is excluded since the relative strength 
and weakness of the various means of proof is fully appre- 
hended (on the ground of the conclusions arrived at in the 
Purva Mima*«sa). — For these reasons the mentioned man- 
tras and acts are not, on the ground of mere textual collo- 
cation, to be viewed as supplementary to the vidyas of the 
Upanishads. To account for the fact of their textual colloca- 
tion with the latter we must keep in view that the mantras, &c. 
as well as the vidyas have to be studied, &c. in the woods. 

26. Where the getting rid (of good and evil) is 
mentioned (the obtaining of this good and evil by 
others has to be added) because the statement about 
the obtaining is supplementary (to the statement 
about the getting rid of), as in the case of the ku$as, 
the metres, the praise and the singing. This (i.e. 
the reason for this) has been stated (in the Purva 
Mima*»sa). 

In the text of the Tawrfins we meet with the following 
passage : ' Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair, 
and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from 
the mouth of Rahu, I obtain self made and satisfied the 
uncreated world of Brahman' (Kh. Up. VIII, 13). Again, 
in the text of the Atharvawikas, we read, ' Then knowing, 
shaking off good and evil he reaches the highest oneness, 
free from passion' (Mu. Up. III. 1, 3). The .Sa/yayanins 
read, 'His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the 
good, his enemies the evil he has done.' And the 
Kaushitakins, ' He shakes off his good and his evil deeds. 
His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved 
relatives the evil he has done ' (Kau. Up. I, 4). — Of these 
texts two state that the man who has reached true know- 
ledge rids himself of his good and evil deeds ; one, that his 
friends and enemies obtain his good and evil deeds respec- 
tively ; and one finally declares that both things take place. 

[38] Q 



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226 vedAnta-sCtras. 



This latter text calls for no remark ; nor again that one which 
refers only to his friends and enemies obtaining his good 
and evil deeds ; for in order that they may obtain those 
he must necessarily first have got rid of them, and the act 
of getting rid of them has therefore to be supplied in the 
text. Those passages, however, which merely mention a 
man's shaking off his deeds, give rise to a discussion 
whether those deeds, when shaken off, are obtained by 
his friends and enemies, or not. Here the purvapakshin 
maintains that the latter circumstance is not to be supplied 
in the two passages mentioned — firstly because the text 
does not state it ; secondly because what other .Sakhas 
say about it falls within the sphere of a different vidyi ; 
and thirdly because the getting rid of the evil and good 
deeds is something done by the man himself, while the 
obtaining of them is the work of others. As thus there 
is no necessary connexion between the two, we have no 
right to supply the latter on the basis of the former. 

To this we make the following reply. Although the 
text mentions only the getting rid of the deeds, yet the 
obtaining of them by others must necessarily be added, 
because the statement concerning the latter is merely 
supplementary to the statement about the former, as 
appears from the text of the Kaushitakins, — In reply to 
the arguments brought forward by the purvapakshin we 
offer the following remarks. 

The separation of the different passages would indeed 
have to be insisted upon, if anybody intended to introduce 
an injunction about something to be done, which is con- 
tained in one text only, into some other text also. But 
in the passages under discussion the act of getting rid of — 
and the act of obtaining — the good and evil deeds are 
not mentioned as something to be performed, but merely 
as implying a glorification of knowledge; the intended 
sense being, ' Glorious indeed is that knowledge through 
whose power the good and evil deeds, the causes of the 
sawsara, are shaken off by him who knows, and are trans- 
ferred to his friends and enemies.' The passage thus 
being glorificatory only, the teacher is of opinion that, 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 26. 22 7 

to the end of strengthening the glorification, the obtaining 
of the good and evil deeds by the friends and enemies — 
which in some passages is represented as the consequence 
of their being shaken off by the man who knows — must 
be supplied in those passages also which mention only the 
shaking off. That one arthavada-passage often depends 
on another arthavada-passage is a well-known fact ; the 
following passage, e.g. ' The twenty-first indeed from this 
world is that sun,' would be unintelligible if no regard 
were paid to the other passage, ' Twelve are the months, 
five the seasons, three these worlds ; that sun is the twenty- 
first.' Similarly the passage, 'The two TrishAibh verses 
are for strengthening,' necessarily requires to be taken in 
connexion with the other passage, ' Strength of the senses 
indeed is TrishAibh.' And as the statement about the 
obtaining of the good and evil deeds has only the purpose 
of glorifying knowledge (and is not made on its own 
account), we need not insist too much on the question how 
the results of actions done by one man can be obtained 
by others. That the obtaining of the deeds by others is 
connected with their being got rid of by the man who 
knows, merely for the purpose of glorifying knowledge, 
the Sutrakara moreover indicates by making use of the 
expression, 'because the statement about obtaining is 
supplementary to,' &c. ; for if he wished to intimate that 
the actual circumstance of other persons obtaining a man's 
good and evil deeds is to be inserted in those vidyas where 
it is not mentioned he would say, 'because the fact of 
obtaining,' &c. The Sutra therefore, availing itself of the 
opportunity offered by the discussion of the combination of 
particular qualities, shows how mere glorificatory passages 
have to be inserted in texts where they are wanting. 

The remaining part of the Sutra, ' Like the kujas, the 
metres, the praise and the singing,' introduces some analo- 
gous instances. — The case under discussion is analogous 
to the case of the kujas 1 . Those, a mantra of the Bhal- 

1 I.e. according to the commentators, small wooden rods used 
by the Udgatrss in counting the stotras. 

Q 2 



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228 vedAnta-sCtras. 



lavins ('You kuras are the children of the tree, do you 
protect me 1 ') represents as coming from trees in general, 
without any specification. The corresponding mantra of 
the .Sa/yayanins on the other hand is, 'You karas are 
the children of the Udumbara-tree ; ' a particularizing 
statement which must be considered as valid for the karas 
in general. — Another analogous case is that of the metres. 
In some places no special statement is made about their 
order of succession ; but the text of the Paingins, ' The metres 
of the Devas come first,' determines the general priority 
of the metres of the Devas to those of the Asuras 1 . — 
Similarly the time of the stotra accompanying the perform- 
ance of the Sho</arin-rite which in some texts is left 
undefined is settled by the text of the i?*g-vedins (&rkSJt), 
' when the Sun has half risen.' — And similarly a particu- 
larizing text of the Bhallavins defines what priests have 
to join in the singing ; a point left unsettled in other 
.Srutis 2 . — As in these parallel cases, so we have to proceed 
in the case under discussion also. For if we refused to 
define a general text by another more particular one, 
we should be driven to assume optional procedure (vikalpa), 
and that the latter is if possible to be avoided is a well- 
known principle. This is stated in the Pdrva Mtma*«sa- 
sfitras X, 8, 15. 

The passages about the shaking (off) can be viewed as 
giving rise to a different discussion also, and the Sutra 
can accordingly be explained in a different manner. The 
question can be raised whether the 'shaking' means the 
getting rid of one's good and evil deeds or something else. — 
The pCirvapaksha will in that case have to be established 
in the following manner. Shaking (dhu) here does not 
mean 'getting rid of,' since the root 'dhfi' according to 
grammar means shaking in an intransitive sense or 
trembling; of flags streaming in the wind we say, for 

1 Metres of less than ten syllables belong to the Asuras, those of 
ten and more to the Devas. 

* The general text is, according to the commentators, 'The 
priests join in the singing;' the defining text of the Bhallavins, 'The 
adhvaryu does not join in the singing.' 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 27. 229 

instance, ' the flags are shaking ' (dodhuyante). We there- 
fore take the word in the same sense in the passages under 
discussion and understand by the ' trembling ' of the good 
and evil deeds the fact of their not meeting, for a certain 
time, with their results. 

To this purvapaksha we make the following reply. The 
word ' shaking ' has to be taken in the sense of ' getting 
rid of,' because it is supplemented by the statement of 
others obtaining the good and evil deeds. For those 
deeds cannot be obtained by others unless they are got 
rid of by their former owner. Hence although it is not 
easily imaginable that the deeds got rid of by one man 
should be obtained by others, we yet, on the ground of 
its being mentioned, may determine accordingly that 
'shaking' means 'getting rid of.' And although only in 
some passages the statement about the obtaining is 
actually found in proximity to the statement about the 
shaking, it yet has, on the ground of the latter, to be 
supplied everywhere and thus becomes a general reason 
of decision (viz. that 'shaking' means 'getting rid of). 
Against the pQrvapakshin's view we further remark that 
good and evil deeds cannot be said to 'tremble* in the 
literal sense of the word, like flags in the wind, since 
they are not of substantial nature. — (Nor must it be 
said that of the horse which exemplifies the shaking ) 
the text only says that it shakes its hair, not that it 
casts anything oft", for) the horse when shaking itself 
shakes off dust and also old hairs. And with that shaking 
(which at the same time is a shaking off) the text expressly 
compares the shaking (off) of evil. — Nor do we when 
assigning different meanings to one and the same root 
enter thereby into conflict with Smnti (grammar). The 
clause ' this has been stated ' we have already explained. 

27. At the (moment of) departing (he frees him- 
self from his works), there being nothing to be 
reached (by him, on the way to Brahman, through 
those works); for thus others (declare, in their sacred 
texts). 



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23O VEDANTA-SUTRAS. 



The Kaushitakins record in the paryanka-vidya how the 
man (who possesses true knowledge) when approaching 
Brahman seated on the couch frees himself on the way 
from his good and evil deeds, ' He having reached the path 
of the gods comes to the world of Agni,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3), 
and later on (1, 4), ' He comes to the river Vj^ara and crosses 
it by the mind alone and there shakes off his good and evil 
deeds.' — The question here arises whether in strict agree- 
ment with the text we have to understand that the deceased 
man frees himself from his good and evil deeds on the way 
to Brahman, or rather that he does so at the outset when he 
departs from his body. 

The letter of the text favouring the former alternative, 
the SGtrak&ra rebuts it by declaring 'at the going,' i.e. at 
the time of departing from the body the man frees himself, 
through the strength of his knowledge, from his good and 
evil deeds. The reason for this averment is assigned in the 
words, 'On account of the absence of anything to be reached.' 
For when the man possessing true knowledge has departed 
from the body and is, through his knowledge, about to reach 
Brahman, there exists nothing to be reached by him on the 
way through his good and evil works, and we therefore 
have no reason to assume the latter to remain uneffaced 
during a certain number of moments. We rather have to 
conclude that as the results of his good and evil works are 
contrary to the result of knowledge, they are destroyed by 
the power of the latter ; and that hence the moment of their 
destruction is that moment in which he sets out toward the 
fruit of his knowledge (Le. the world of Brahman). — The 
conclusion thus is that the deliverance of the man from his 
works takes place early, and is only mentioned later on in 
the text of the Kaushitakins. — Thus other Sakhas also, as 
that of the Tkndins and Sa/yayanins, declare that he frees 
himself from his deeds at an earlier stage ; cp. the passages, 
• Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair,' and ' His 
sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies 
the evil he has done.' 

28. And because (on the above interpretation) 



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Ill ADHVAYA, 3 PADA, 29. 



there is no contradiction to both (i.e. man's making 
an effort to free himself from his deeds and actually 
freeing himself) according to his liking. 

Moreover if we assumed that the man frees himself from 
his good and evil deeds on the way — after having departed 
from the body and having entered on the path of the gods 
— we should implicate ourselves in impossibilities ; for after 
the body has been left behind, man can no longer accomplish, 
according to his liking, that effort which consists in self- 
restraint and pursuit of knowledge, and which is the cause 
of the obliteration of all his good and evil deeds, and con- 
sequently that obliteration also cannot take place. We 
therefore must assume that the requisite effort is made — 
and its result takes place— at an earlier moment, viz. in the 
state in which man is able to effect it, and that in conse- 
quence thereof man rids himself of his good and evil deeds. 

Nothing then stands in the way of the conditioning and 
the conditioned events taking place, and the assumption 
moreover agrees with the statements of the T&ndins and 
.Sa/yayanins. 

29. A purpose has to be attributed to the going 
(on the path of the gods) in a twofold manner; 
otherwise there would be contradiction of scripture. 

In some scriptural texts the (dead man's) going on the 
path of the gods is mentioned in connexion with his freeing 
himself from good and evil ; in other texts it is not men- 
tioned. The doubt then arises whether the two things go 
together in all cases or only in certain cases. — The purva- 
pakshin maintains that the two are to be connected in all 
cases, just as the man's freeing himself from his good and 
evil deeds is always followed by their passing over to his 
friends and enemies. 

To this we make the following reply. That a man's 
going on the path of the gods has a purpose is to be 
admitted in a twofold manner, i.e. with a distinction only. 
His going on that path has a sense in certain cases, in 
others not. For otherwise, i.e. if we admitted that men, 



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232 vedanta-sCtras. 



in all cases, proceed on that path, we should have to 
assume that even the passage, Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 3, ' Shaking 
off good and evil, free from passions, he reaches the highest 
unity,' refers to actual going through which another place 
is reached, and that would clearly be contrary to reason. 
For a person free from all desire and therefore non-moving 
does not go to another place, and the highest unity is not 
to be reached by a man transporting himself to another 
locality. 

30. (The twofold view taken above) is justified 
because we observe a purpose characterised thereby 
(i.e. a purpose of the going); as in ordinary life. 

Our view of the matter, viz. that a man's proceeding on 
the path of the gods has a meaning in certain cases but not 
in others, is justified by the following consideration. In 
meditations on the qualified Brahman such as the paryanka- 
vidya we see a reason for the man's proceeding on the path 
of the gods ; for the text mentions certain results which can 
be reached only by the man going to different places, such as 
his mounting a couch, his holding a colloquy with Brahman 
seated on the couch, his perceiving various odours and so 
on. On the other hand we do not see that going on the 
path of the gods has anything to do with perfect know- 
ledge. For those who have risen to the intuition of the 
Selfs unity, whose every wish is fulfilled, in whom the 
potentiality of all suffering is already destroyed here below, 
have nothing further to look for but the dissolution of the 
abode of activity and enjoyment of former deeds, i.e. the 
body ; in their case therefore to proceed on the road of the 
gods would be purposeless. — The distinction is analogous 
to what is observed in ordinary life. If we want to reach 
some village we have to proceed on a path leading there ; 
but no moving on a path is required when we wish to attain 
freedom from sickness. — The distinction made here will be 
established more carefully in the fourth adhyaya. 

3 1 . There is no restriction (as to the going on the 
path of the gods) for any vidya; nor any contra- 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 3 1. 233 

diction (of the general subject-matter), according to 
scripture and inference (i. e. Smrzti). 

We have shown that the going on the path of the gods 
is valid only for the vidyas of the qualified Brahman, not for 
the knowledge of the highest Brahman which is destitute of 
all qualities. — Now we observe that the going on the path 
of the gods is mentioned only in some of the qualified 
vidyas, such as the paryanka-vidya, the paȣagni-vidya, the 
upakorala-vidya, the dahara-vidya ; while it is not men- 
tioned in others, such as the madhu-vidya,the jaw^/ilya-vidya, 
the sho</ajakala-vidya, the vaijvanara-vidyl — The doubt 
then arises whether the going on the path of the gods is to 
be connected with those vidyas only in which it is actually 
mentioned or generally with all vidyas of that kind. 

The purvapakshin maintains the former view ; for, he 
says, the limitative force of the general subject-matter of 
each particular section compels us to connect the going on 
the path of the gods with those vidyas only which actually 
mention it If we transferred it to other vidyas also, the 
authoritativeness of scripture would suffer ; for then any- 
thing might be the sense of anything. Moreover, the 
details about the path of the gods beginning with light and 
so on are given equally in the upakojala-vidya and the 
pa«£agni-vidya, which would be a useless repetition if as a 
matter of course the going on the path of the gods were 
connected with all vidyas. 

To this we make the following reply. The going on the 
path of the gods is not to be restricted but to be connected 
equally with all those qualified vidyas which have exaltation 
(abhyudaya) for their result. The objection above raised 
by the purvapakshin that thereby we contradict the general 
subject-matter, we refute by appealing to scripture and 
Smri'ti. Scripture in the first place declares that not only 
those ' who know this,' i. e. the paȣagni-vidya (Kh. Up. V, 
10, 1), proceed on the path of the gods, but also those who 
understand other vidyas, * and also those who in the forest 
follow faith and austerities.' — But how do we know that the 
latter passage refers to those who are conversant with other 



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234 vedanta-sOtras. 



vidyas ? The text certainly speaks of those only who are 
intent on faith and austerities ! — Not by faith and austerities 
alone, we reply, unaided by knowledge, can that path be 
attained ; for another scriptural passage says, ' Through 
knowledge they mount to that place from which all wishes 
have passed away ; those who are skilled in works only do 
not go there, nor penitents devoid of knowledge' (Sat. Bra. 
X,5, 4, 1 6). We therefore conclude that faith and austerities 
denote at the same time other vidyas.— The Va^asaneyins 
again read in the Pa«£agni-vidya, ' Those who thus know 
this and those who in the forest worship faith and the True.' 
The latter part of this passage we must explain to mean, 
' Those who in the forest with faith worship the True, i.e. 
Brahman ; ' the term ' the True ' being often employed to 
denote Brahman. And as those who know the paȣagni- 
vidya are in the above passage referred to as ' those who 
thus know this,' we must understand the clause, ' and those 
who in the forest,' &c, as referring to men in the possession 
of other vidyas. And, moreover, also the passage, ' Those, 
however, who know neither of these two paths become 
worms, birds, and creeping things ' (VI, a, 16), which teaches 
that those who miss the two paths have to go downwards, 
intimates that those who possess other vidyas have to pro- 
ceed either on the path of the gods or that of the fathers, 
and as their vidyas are as such not different from the 
paȣagni-vidya, we conclude that they proceed on the path 
of the gods (not on that of the fathers) 1 . 

In the second place Smr*ti also confirms the same 
doctrine, 'These two, the white and the black path, are 
known as the eternal paths of the world ; on the one man 
goes not to return, on the other he again returns ' (Bha. Gt. 
VIII, 26). 

With regard, finally, to the circumstance that the details 
about the path of the gods are given in the Upakojala- 



1 Itax £a vidyantar&rflinlm gatir iti lihgadananam samu£Ainoti 
atheti, etin iti vidyantarapara gr/hyante, tathSpi katham deva- 
yanayogas tesham ity Irahkya yogyatayety aha tatrSptti. An. Gi. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 32. 235 

vidya as well as the Paȣagni-vidya, we remark that the 
repetition is meant to assist reflection. 

For all these reasons the going on the path of the gods 
is not limited to those vidyas in which it is actually 
mentioned. 

32. Of those who have a certain office there is 
subsistence (of the body) as long as the office lasts. 

The question here is whether for him who has reached 
true knowledge a new body originates after he has parted 
with the old one or not. — But, an objection is here raised 
at the outset, there is really no occasion for inquiring 
whether knowledge when reaching its perfection brings 
about its due effect, viz. complete isolation of the Self 
from all bodies or not ; not any more than there is room 
for an inquiry whether there is cooked rice or not, after 
the process of cooking has reached its due termination ; 
or, for an inquiry whether a man is satisfied by eating or 
not. — Not so, we reply. There is indeed room for the 
inquiry proposed, as we know from itihasa and pura«a that 
some persons although knowing Brahman yet obtained new 
bodies. Tradition informs us, e. g. that Apantaratamas, 
an ancient rishi and teacher of the Vedas, was, by the 
order of Vishwu, born on this earth as Kn'sh«a Dvaipayana 
at the time when the Dvaparayuga was succeeded by the 
Kaliyuga. Similarly Vasish/#a, the son of Brahman's 
mind, having parted from his former body in consequence 
of the curse of Nimi, was, on the order of Brahman, again 
procreated by Mitra and Varu«a. Smrz'ti further relates 
that Bhr/gu and other sons of Brahman's mind were again 
born at the sacrifice of Varu«a. Sanatkumara also, who 
likewise was a son of Brahman's mind, was, in consequence 
of a boon being granted to Rudra, born again as Skanda. 
And there are similar tales about Daksha, Narada, and 
others having, for various reasons, assumed new bodies. 
Stories of the same kind are met with in the mantras and 
arthavadas of Sruti. Of some of the persons mentioned 
it is said that they assumed a new body after the old body 
had perished ; of others that they assumed, through their 



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236 vedAnta-sOtras. 



supernatural powers, various new bodies, while the old 
body remained intact all the while. And all of them are 
known to have completely mastered the contents of the 
Vedas. 

On the ground of all this the pftrvapakshin maintains 
that the knowledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either 
be or not be the cause of final release. 

This we deny, for the reason that the continuance of 
the bodily existence of Aparantamas and others — who 
are entrusted with offices conducive to the subsistence 
of the worlds, such as the promulgation of the Vedas and 
the like — depends on those their offices. As Savitar (the 
sun), who after having for thousands of yugas performed the 
office of watching over these worlds, at the end of that period 
enjoys the condition of release in which he neither rises 
nor sets, according to Kh. Up. Ill, II, 1, 'When from 
thence he has risen upwards, he neither rises nor sets. He 
is alone, standing in the centre;' and as the present knowers 
of Brahman reach the state of isolation after the enjoyment 
of those results of action, which have begun to operate, 
has come to an end, according to Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2, ' For 
him there is only delay so long as he is not delivered from 
the body ; ' so Aparantamas and other Lords to whom the 
highest Lord has entrusted certain offices, last — although 
they possess complete knowledge, the cause of release — as 
long as their office lasts, their works not yet being ex- 
hausted, and obtain release only when their office comes 
to an end. For gradually exhausting the aggregate of 
works the consequences of which have once begun, so as to 
enable them to discharge their offices ; passing according 
to their free will from one body into another, as if from 
one house into another, in order to accomplish the duties 
of their offices ; preserving all the time the memory of their 
identity ; they create for themselves through their power 
over the material of the body and the sense organs new 
bodies, and occupy them either all at once or in succession. 
Nor can it be said that when passing into new bodies they 
remember only the fact of their former existence (not their 
individuality) ; for it is known that they preserve the sense 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 32. 237 

of their individuality *. Smrj'ti tells us, eg. that Sulabha, a 
woman conversant with Brahman, wishing to dispute with 
(kanaka, left her own body, entered into that of 6'anaka, 
carried on a discussion with him, and again returned into her 
own body. If in addition to the works the consequences of 
which are already in operation, other works manifested them- 
selves, constituting the cause of further embodiments, the 
result would be that in the same way further works also, 
whose potentiality would in that case not be destroyed, would 
take place, and then it might be suspected that the know- 
ledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either be or not be the 
cause of final release. But such a suspicion is inadmissible 
since it is known from .Sruti and Smrz'ti that knowledge 
completely destroys the potentiality of action. For .Sruti 
says, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are 
solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld 
who is high and low ' (Mu. Up. II, %, 8) ; and, ' When the 
memory remains firm, then all the ties are loosened ' {Kh. 
Up. VII, %6, a). And Smriti similarly says, 'As a fire 
well kindled, O Aig-una, reduces fuel to ashes, so the fire 
of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes ; ' and, ' As seeds 
burned by fire do not sprout again, so the Self is not again 
touched by the afflictions which knowledge has burned.' 
Nor is it possible that when the afflictions such as ignor- 
ance and the like are burned, the aggregate of works 
which is the seed of affliction should be partly burned, 
but partly keep the power of again springing up ; not any 
more than the seed of the Sali, when burned, preserves 
the power of sprouting again with some part The 
aggregate of works, however, whose fruits have once 
begun to develop themselves comes to rest through 
effecting a delay which terminates with the death of the 
body, just as an arrow discharged stops in the end owing to 
the gradual cessation of its impetus; this in agreement 
with Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2, ' For him there is only delay,' &c. 
We have thus shown that persons to whom an office is 

1 Utpadyamananam aparimushitasmaratve»pi ^atismaratvam eva 
na vasish/Aadinanatvam ity Itankyaha na £eti. An. Gi. 



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238 vedAnta-sOtras. 



entrusted last as long as their office lasts, and that never- 
theless there is absolutely only one result of true know- 
ledge. — In accordance with this, scripture declares that 
the result of knowledge on the part of all beings is 
equally final release, cp. ' So whatever Deva was awakened 
he indeed became that, and the same with i?/shis and 
men' (Br*. Up. I, 4, 10). Moreover 1 it may be the case 
that (some) great .n'shis had attached their minds to other 
cognitions whose result is lordly power and the like, and 
that later on only when they became aware of the tran- 
sitory nature of those results they turned from them and 
fixed their minds on the highest Self, whereby they 
obtained final release. As Smr/'ti says, ' When the maha- 
pralaya has arrived and the highest (i.e. Hira«yagarbha) 
himself comes to an end, then they all, with well-prepared 
minds, reach together with Brahman the highest place.' — 
Another reason precluding the suspicion that true know- 
ledge may be destitute of its result is that that result is 
the object of immediate intuition. In the case of such 
results of action as the heavenly world and the like which 
are not present to intuitional knowledge, there may be a 
doubt ; but not so in the case of the fruit of true know- 
ledge, with regard to which scripture says, ' The Brahman 
which is present to intuition, not hidden' (Bri. Up. Ill, 
4, 1), and which in the passage, ' That art thou,' is referred 
to as something already accomplished. This latter passage 
cannot be interpreted to mean, 'Thou wilt be that after 
thou hast died ; ' for another Vedic passage declares that 
the fruit of complete knowledge, viz. union with the 
universal Self, springs up at the moment when complete 
knowledge is attained, 'The Rishi Vamadeva saw and 
understood it, singing, " I was Manu, I was the sun." ' 

For all these reasons we maintain that those who possess 
true knowledge reach in all cases final release. 

33. But the (denials of) conceptions concerning the 

1 Api £a nadhikaravataw sarvesham rrshfaim atmatattva£-«ana/» 
tenavyapakoipy ayam purvapaksha ity aha^tfranantareshu /feti. Bha. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33. 239 

akshara are to be comprehended (in all meditations 
on the akshara), on account of the equality and of 
the object being the same, as in the case of the 
upasad ; this has been explained (in the Purva Mi- 
maawsa). 

We read in the Va^asaneyaka, 'O Gargi, the Brahmawas 
call this the Akshara. It is neither coarse, nor fine, nor 
short, nor long,' &c. (Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 8). Similarly the 
Atharvawa says, ' The higher knowledge is that by which 
the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be 
seen nor seized, which has no family and no caste,' &c. 
(Mu. Up. I, 1, 5 ; 6). In other places also the highest 
Brahman, under the name of Akshara, is described as 
that of which all qualities are to be denied. Now in some 
places qualities are denied of Brahman which are not 
denied in other places, and hence a doubt arises whether 
the mental conception of these particular denials is to 
form part of all those passages or not. 

To the assertion of the purvapakshin that each denial 
is valid only for that passage in which the text actually 
exhibits it, we make the following reply. — The concep- 
tions of the akshara, i.e. the conceptions of the particular 
denials concerning the akshara, are to be included in all 
those passages, ' on account of the equality and on account 
of the same object being referred to.' The equality con- 
sists therein that all the texts alluded to convey an idea 
of Brahman in the same way, viz. by denying of it all 
attributes ; and we recognise in all of them the same ob- 
ject of instruction, viz. the one undivided Brahman. Why 
then should the conceptions stated in one passage not be 
valid for all others also ? To the present case the same 
argumentation applies which had been made use of under 
III, 3, 11. There positive attributes were discussed ; here 
we are concerned with negative ones. The division of the 
discussion into two (instead of disposing of positive and 
negative attributes in one adhikara«a) is due to the wish 
of explaining the differences in detail. — The clause, * as in 
the case of the upasads,' introduces a parallel case. For 



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240 vedAnta-sCtras. 



the 6&madagnya-ahina-sacrifice 1 the text enjoins that the 
upasad offerings are to consist of puroda^as. Now although 
the mantras accompanying the offering of the purodksas are 
originally enjoined in the Veda of the Udgatrxs (Ta«</ya 
Bra. XXI, 10, n, ' Agni, promote the hotra,' &c), yet they 
are to be enounced by the adhvaryu ; for the offering of 
the purod&sas is the work of the adhvaryu, and subordinate 
matters (i.e. here, the mantras) are governed by the prin- 
cipal matter (i.e. the offering of the purorflra). Similarly, 
in the case under discussion, the attributes of the akshara 
have, because they are subordinate to the akshara itself, 
to be connected with the latter everywhere, in whatever 
places the text may originally state them. — The principle 
of decision employed is explained in the Purva Mimawsa- 
sutras III, 3, 9. 

34. On account of (the same) number being re- 
corded. 

The Atharvawikas exhibit, with reference to the Self, 
the following mantra, ' Two birds, inseparable friends, cling 
to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the 
other looks on without eating* (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1). The 
same mantra is found in the text of the Svetajvataras 
(IV, 6). The Kansas again read, ' There are the two 
drinking their reward in the world of their own works, 
entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. 
Those who know Brahman call them shade and light, like- 
wise those householders who perform the Tri»a£iketa-sacri- 
fice.' — The doubt here arises whether the two sections in- 
troduced by these mantras constitute one vidya or two 
vidyas. Here the purvapakshin maintains that we have to 
do with two separate vidyas, because the texts exhibit certain 
differences. For the mantra of the Mandaka. and Sveta- 
.rvatara Upanishads represents one bird as enjoying and the 
other as not enjoying ; while in the mantra of the KaAfcas 

1 I.e. a sacrifice lasting four days, called Gamadagnya, because 
first offered by Gamadagni. Cp. Taitt. Sawn. VII, 1, 9. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34. 24 1 

both are said to enjoy. — As thus the objects of knowledge 
differ in character, the vidyas themselves must be looked 
upon as separate. 

To this we make the following reply. The vidya is one 
only because both mantras exhibit the character of the 
objects of knowledge as one and the same, viz. as defined 
by the number two. — But has not the purvapakshin shown 
that there exists a certain difference of character ? — By no 
means, we reply. Both texts intimate one and the same 
matter, viz. the Lord together with the individual soul. In 
the Mu«</aka-text the clause, ' The other looks on without 
eating,' intimates the highest Self which is raised above all 
desire ; the same highest Self forms also the subject of the 
complementary passage, ' But when he sees the other Lord 
contented.' And the Ka^a-text intimates the same highest 
Self which is raised above all desire ; only, as it is mentioned 
together with the enjoying individual soul, it is itself meta- 
phorically spoken of as enjoying ; just as we speak of the 
' men with the umbrella,' although only one out of several 
carries an umbrella. For that in the Ka/#a-text also the 
highest Self forms the general subject-matter we have to 
conclude from the preceding passage, 'That which thou 
seest as neither this nor that ' (I, a, 14), and from the com- 
plementary passage referring to the same Self, 'Which is 
a bridge for sacrificers, which is the highest imperishable 
Brahman ' (I, 3, a). All this has been explained at length 
under I, 2, 11. As therefore there is one object of know- 
ledge only, the vidya also is one. — Moreover, if we carefully 
examine the context of the three mantras quoted.we observe 
that they are concerned merely with the knowledge of the 
highest Self, and that they mention the individual soul not 
as a new object of instruction but merely to show its identity 
with the highest Self. And that, as far as the knowledge of 
the highest Self is concerned, the question as to the oneness 
or separateness of vidyas cannot be even raised, we have 
already shown above. The present Sutra therefore merely 
aims at a fuller discussion of the matter, the practical out- 
come of which is that any particulars stated in one of the 
texts only have to be supplied in the others also. 

[38] R 



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242 vedAnta-sOtras. 



35. As the Self is within all, as in the case of the 
aggregate of the elements, (there is oneness of 
vidya). 

The Va^-asaneyins record, in the questions asked by 
Ushastaand by Kahola, the same passage twice in succession, 
'Tell me the Brahman which is present to intuition, not 
hidden ; the Self who is within all ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 4, 1 ; 5, 1). 
— The question here presents itself whether the two sections 
introduced by the questions constitute one vidya only or 
two separate vidy&s. 

Two separate vidyas, the purvapakshin maintains ; owing 
to the force of repetition. For if the second passage added 
nothing to — or took nothing away from — the contents of 
the first, the repetition would be altogether meaningless. 
We therefore conclude that the repetition intimates the 
separateness of the two vidyas, just as in the Ptirva 
Mima/«sa repetition shows two sacrificial actions to be 
separate. 

To this we make the following reply. As both texts 
equally declare the Self to be within all, they must be 
taken as constituting one vidya only. In both passages 
question and answer equally refer to a Self which is 
within everything. For in one body there cannot be 
two Selfs, each of which is inside everything else. One 
Self indeed may without difficulty be within everything, 
but of a second one this could not be predicated, not any 
mbre than of the aggregate of the elements; i.e. the case 
of that second Self is analogous to that of the aggregate of 
the five elements, i.e. the body. In the body the element 
of water is indeed within the element of earth, and the 
element of fire within the element of water ; but each of 
these elements is ' within all ' in a relative sense only, not 
in the literal sense of the phrase. — Or else the ' like the 
aggregate of the elements (or beings) ' of the Sutra has to 
be taken as pointing to another scriptural passage, viz. Sve. 
Up. VI, 11, ' He is the one god, hidden in all beings, all- 
pervading, the Self within all beings.' As this mantra re- 
cords that one Self lives within the aggregate of all beings, 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 36. 243 

the same holds good with regard to the two Brahmawa- 
passages. And the object of knowledge being one, the 
vidya also is one only. 

36. If it be said that otherwise the separation (of 
the statements) cannot be accounted for ; we reply 
that it is (here) as in the case of other instructions. 

We yet have to refute the remark made by the purva- 
pakshin that, unless the separateness of the two vidyas be 
admitted, the separation of the two statements cannot be 
accounted for. We do this by pointing to analogous cases. 
In the sixth prapaMaka of the upanishad of the Ta«d?ins 
the instruction conveyed in the words, 'That is the Self, 
thou art that, O .Svetaketu,' is repeated nine times, and 
yet the one vidya is not thereby split into many. Simi- 
larly in our case. — But how do you know that the vidya 
remains one and the same in spite of the ninefold repeti- 
tion ? — Because, we reply, the introductory and concluding 
clauses show that all those passages have the same sense. 
For the repeated request on the part of .Svetaketu, ' Please, 
Sir, inform me still more,' shows that one and the same 
matter is again and again proposed for further discussion, 
and further instruction regarding it is repeatedly given by 
means of new doubts being removed. Similarly, in the 
case under discussion, the sameness of form of the two 
introductory questions and the equality of the concluding 
clauses, ' Everything else is of evil,' show that both sections 
refer to one and the same matter. — Moreover, in the second 
question the text adds the word ' just ' (eva), ' Tell me just 
that Brahman,' &c, which shows that the second question 
refers to the same matter as the first one. That the 
matter of the two sections is really the same, we establish 
by pointing out that the former section declares the 
existence of the highest Self which is neither cause nor 
effect, while the latter qualifies it as that which transcends 
all the attributes of the Sazwsara state, such as hunger, 
thirst, and so on. — The two sections, therefore, form one 
vidya only. 

R 2 



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244 vedanta-sAtras. 



37. There is exchange (of meditation), for the 
texts distinguish (two meditations); as in other 
cases. 

The Aitareyins declare with reference to the person in 
the sun, ' What I am, that is he ; what he is, that am I ' 
(Ait. Ar. II, a, 4, 6). And the Gabalas say, ' I am thou 
indeed, O reverend divinity, and thou art I indeed.' — The 
doubt here arises whether the reflection founded upon this 
text is to be a double one 'by means of exchange' (i.e. 
whether the soul is to be meditated upon as aditya and 
aditya as the soul), or a simple one (the soul only being 
meditated upon as aditya). 

The purvapakshin maintains the latter view; for, he says, 
the text cannot possibly propose as matter of meditation 
anything but the oneness of the individual soul with the 
Lord. For if we assumed that two different forms of 
meditation are intended, viz. firstly the soul's being the 
Self of the Lord, and, secondly, the Lord's being the Self 
of the soul, the soul indeed would be exalted by the former 
meditation, but the Lord, at the same time, be lowered by 
the latter one. We therefore conclude that the meditation 
is to be of one kind only, and that the double form, in which 
the text exhibits it, merely aims at confirming the oneness 
of the Self. 

To this we make the following reply. 'Exchange' is 
expressly recorded in the text for the purposes of medita- 
tion, just as other qualities (of the Self), such as its being 
the Self of all, &c, are recorded for the same purpose. 
For both texts make the distinctive double enunciation, 
' I am thou,' and ' Thou art I.' Now this double enunci- 
ation has a sense only if a twofold meditation is to be 
based upon it ; otherwise it would be devoid of meaning, 
since one statement would be all that is required. — But 
has not the purvapakshin urged above that this your ex- 
planation involves a lowering of the Lord, who is thereby 
represented as having the transmigrating soul for his Self? 
— Never mind, we reply ; even in that way only the unity 
of the Self is meditated upon. — But does your explanation 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 38. 245 

then not come to that of the purvapakshin, viz. that the 
double statement is merely meant to confirm the oneness 
of the Self? — We do not, our reply is, deny that the text 
confirms the oneness of the Self; we only want to prove 
that, on the ground of the text as it stands, a twofold me- 
ditation has to be admitted, not a simple one. That this 
virtually confirms the unity of the Self we admit ; just as 
the instruction about (the Lord's) possessing such qualities 
as having only true wishes, and so on— which instruction is 
given for the purpose of meditation — at the same time 
proves the existence of a Lord endowed with such qualities. 
— Hence the double relation enounced in the text has to be 
meditated upon, and is to be transferred to other vidyas also 
which treat of the same subject. 

38. For the True and so on are one and the same 
(vidya). 

The text of the Va^asaneyaka, after having enjoined the 
knowledge of the True, together with a meditation on the 
syllables of its name (' Whosoever knows this great glorious 
first-born as the true Brahman/ &c, Br*. Up. V, 4, 1), con- 
tinues, ' Now what is the True, that is the Aditya, the person 
that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye ' 
(V, 5, 2). — The doubt here arises whether the text enjoins 
two vidyas of the True or one only. 

Two, the purvapakshin maintains. For the text declares 
two different results, one in the earlier passage, ' He con- 
quers these worlds' (V, 4, 1) ; the other one later on, 'He 
destroys evil and leaves it ' (V, 5, 3). And what our oppo- 
nent may call a reference to the subject-matter under dis- 
cussion l , is merely due to the circumstance of the object of 
meditation being the same (in the two vidyas). 

To this we make the following reply. — There is only 
one vidya of the True, because the clause, ' That which is 
the True,' &c, refers back to that True which is treated 

1 Viz. the clause in V, 5, 2, 'That which is the true,' which 
apparently — or really — connects the vidya of V, 5 with that of 
V,4. 



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246 vedanta-sCtras. 



of in V, 4. — But has not the purvapakshin shown that the 
clause alluded to can be accounted for even on the sup- 
position of there being two vidyas ? — The reasoning of 
the purvapakshin, we reply, would be admissible only if 
the separateness of the two vidyas were established by 
some other clear and undoubted reason ; in our case, how- 
ever, there is a general possibility of both (viz. of the 
vidyas being separate or not), and the very circumstance 
that the mentioned clause contains a back reference to the 
True spoken of in V, 4, determines us to conclude that 
there is only one vidya of the True. — To the remark that 
there must be two vidyas because the text states two 
different results, we reply that the statement of a second 
result merely has the purpose of glorifying the new in- 
struction given about the True, viz. that its secret names 
are ahar and aham. Moreover, as in the case under dis- 
cussion, the fruit of the vidya has really to be supplied 
from its arthavada part 1 , and as there is unity of vidya, 
all those fruits which the text states in connexion with 
the single parts of the vidya are to be combined and put 
in connexion with the vidya taken as a whole. — The con- 
clusion therefore is that the text records only one vidya 
of the True, distinguished by such and such details, and 
that hence all the qualities mentioned, such as Truth and 
so on, are to be comprehended in one act of meditation. 

Some commentators are of opinion that the above Sutra 
refers (not to the question whether Bri. Up. V, 4 and V, 5 
constitute one vidya but) to the question whether the 
Va^asaneyaka-passage about the persons in the sun and in 
the eye, and the similar ATAandogya-passage (I, 6, 6, ' Now 
that golden person who is seen within the sun,' &c.) form 
one vidya or not. They conclude that they do so, and 
that hence truth and the other qualities mentioned in 

1 For the vidya contains no explicit statement that a man 
desirous of such and such a fruit is to meditate on the True in such 
and such a way. — That in cases where the fruit is not stated in a 
vidhi-passage it must be supplied from the arthavada-passages, is 
taught in the Pu. Mi. Su. IV, 3, eighth adhikarawa. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, $ PADA, 39. 247 

the Va^asaneyaka are to be combined with the Khkn- 
dogya-text also. — But this interpretation of the Sutra 
appears objectionable. For the ^TAandogya-vidya refers 
to the udgitha and is thus connected with sacrificial acts, 
marks of which connexion are exhibited in the beginning, 
the middle, and the end of the vidya. Thus we read at 
the beginning, ' The Rik is the earth, the Saman is fire ; ' 
in the middle, ' Rik and Saman are his joints and there- 
fore he is udgitha ; ' and in the end, ' He who knowing 
this sings a Saman ' {Kh. Up. I, 6, 1 ; 8 ; I, 7, 7). In the 
Va^asaneyaka, on the other hand, there is nothing to 
connect the vidya with sacrificial acts. As therefore the 
subject-matter is different, the vidyas are separate and the 
details of the two are to be held apart. 

39. (Having true) wishes and other (qualities) 
(have to be combined) there and here, on account of 
the abode and so on. 

In the chapter of the ATAandogya which begins with the 
passage, ' There is this city of Brahman and in it the palace, 
the small lotus, and in it that small ether' (VIII, 1, 1), we 
read, 'That is the Self free from sin, free from old age, 
from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires 
are true, whose imaginations are true.' A similar passage 
is found in the text of the Va^asaneyins, ' He is that great 
unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by 
the Pr4«as, the ether within the heart. In it there reposes 
the ruler of all' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 22). 

A doubt here arises whether these two passages con- 
stitute one vidya, and whether the particulars stated in one 
text are to be comprehended within the other text also. 

There is oneness of vidya '. — Here (the Sutrakara) says, 
• Wishes and so on,' i. e. ' The quality of having true wishes 
and so on' (the word kama standing for satyakama, just 

1 This clause must apparently be taken as stating the siddhanta- 
view, although later on it is said that the two vidyis are distinct (that, 
however, in spite of their distinctness, their details have to be com- 
bined). 



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248 vedAnta-sOtras. 



as people occasionally say Datta for Devadatta and Bhama 
for Satyabhama). This quality and the other qualities, which 
the KAindogya attributes to the ether within the heart, 
have to be combined with the Va^asaneyaka-passage, and 
vice versa the qualities stated in the Va.gasaneyaka, such as 
being the ruler of all, have also to be ascribed to the Self 
free from sin, proclaimed in the ^TAandogya. The reason 
for this is that the two passages display a number of 
common features. Common to both is the heart viewed 
as abode, common again is the Lord as object of know- 
ledge, common also is the Lord being viewed as a bank 
preventing these worlds from being confounded ; and 
several other points. — But, an objection is raised, there 
are also differences. In the A'Aandogya the qualities are 
attributed to the ether within the heart, while in the 
Va^asaneyaka they are ascribed to Brahman abiding in 
that ether. — This objection, we reply, is unfounded, for we 
have shown under I, 3, 14 that the term 'ether' in the 
A^andogya designates Brahman. 

There is, however, the following difference between the 
two passages. The ATMndogya-vidya has for its object 
the qualified Brahman, as we see from the passage VIII, 1, 
6, ' But those who depart from hence after having dis- 
covered the Self and those true desires,' in which certain 
desires are represented as objects of knowledge equally as 
the Self. In the Va^asaneyaka, on the other hand, the 
highest Brahman devoid of all qualities forms the object 
of instruction, as we conclude from the consideration of the 
request made by kanaka, ' Speak on for the sake of eman- 
cipation,' and the reply given by Ya^wavalkya, ' For that 
person is not attached to anything ' (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 14 ; 
15). That the text ascribes to the Self such qualities as 
being the Lord of all and the like is (not for the purpose 
of teaching that the Self really possesses those qualities, 
but is) merely meant to glorify the Self. Later on also 
(IV, 5> 1 5) tn e chapter winds up with a passage clearly 
referring to the Self devoid of all qualities, ' That Self is 
to be described by No, no ! ' But as the qualified Brahman 
is (fundamentally) one (with the unqualified Brahman), we 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40. 249 

must conclude that the Sutra teaches the combination of 
the qualities to the end of setting forth the glory of 
Brahman, not for the purpose of devout meditation. 

40. On account of (the passage showing) respect, 
there is non-omission (of the pra#agnihotra) (even 
when the eating of food is omitted). 

We read in the Kkkndogya. under the heading of the 
Vaijvanara-vidya, ' Therefore the first food which comes is 
in the place of Homa. And he who offers that first oblation 
should offer it to Prawa, saying Svaha' (Kh. Up. V, 19, 1). 
The text thereupon enjoins five oblations, and later on 
applies to them the term ' Agnihotra ; ' ' He who thus 
knowing this offers the agnihotra,' and 'As hungry children 
here on earth sit round their mother, so do all beings sit 
round the agnihotra ' (V, 24, 2 ; 4). 

Here the doubt arises whether the agnihotra offered to 
the pra«as is to be omitted when the eating itself is omitted 
or not. — As, according to the clause, ' The first food which 
comes,' &c, the oblation is connected with the coming of 
food, and as the coming of food subserves the eating, the 
agnihotra offered to the prawas is omitted when the eating 
is omitted. — Against this conclusion the Stitra (embodying 
the ptirvapaksha) declares, 'It is not omitted.' — Why? — 
' On account of the respect.' This means : In their version 
of the Vaijvanara-vidya the Gabalas read as follows : ' He 
(i. e. the host) is to eat before his guests ; for (if he would 
make them eat first) it would be as if he without having 
himself offered the agnihotra offered that of another 
person.' This passage, which objects to the priority of the 
eating on the part of the guests and establishes priority 
on the part of the host, thereby intimates respect for the 
agnihotra offered to the prawas. For a3 it does not allow 
the omission of priority it will allow all the less the 
omission of that which is characterised by priority, viz. 
the agnihotra offered to the prdwas. — But (as mentioned 
above) the connexion — established by the ATAandogya- 
passage — of the oblation with the coming of food — which 
subserves the eating— establishes the omission of the ob- 



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250 vedAnta-sOtras. 



lation in the case of the eating being omitted ! — Not so, 
the purvapakshin replies. The purpose of that passage is 
to enjoin some particular material (to be offered). For the 
fundamental agnihotra certain materials, such as milk and 
so on, are exclusively prescribed. Now, as through the 
term 'agnihotra' (which the text applies to the offering 
to the prawas) all the particulars belonging to the funda- 
mental agnihotra are already established for the secondary 
agnihotra also (viz. the oblation made to the prawas), just 
as in the case of the ayana of the Kuwrfapayins 1 ; the 
clause, ' the first food which comes,' &c, is meant to enjoin, 
for the prawagnihotra, some particular secondary matter, 
viz. the circumstance of food constituting the material of 
the oblation 2 . Hence, considering the Mima/«sa principle 
that the omission of a secondary matter does not involve 
the omission of the principal matter, we conclude that even 
in the case of the omission of eating, the agnihotra offered 
to the pra«as has to be performed by means of water or 
some other not altogether unsuitable material, according 
to the Mimawzsa principle that in the absence of the 
prescribed material some other suitable material may be 
substituted. 

To this purvapaksha the next Sutra replies. 

41. When (eating) is taking place, (the pra«agni- 
hotra has to be performed) from that (i.e. the food 
first eaten) ; on the ground of the passage declaring 
this. 

When eating is actually taking place, ' from that,' i. e. with 
that material of food which first presents itself, the agni- 
hotra offered to the pranas is to be effected. — On what 

1 For one of the great sacrifices lasting a whole year — called the 
ayana of the Kuwrfapayins — the texts enjoin the offering of the 
' agnihotra ' during a full month (cp. e.g. Ta«</ya Mahabrahmawa 
XXV, 4). Now from the term 'agnihotra' we conclude that all the 
details of the ordinary agnihotra are valid for the agnihotra of the 
ayana also. 

8 Whereby the materials offered in the ordinary agnihotra are 
superseded. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 41. 251 

ground ? — ' On the ground of the passage declaring this.' 
For the clause, ' The first food which a man may take is in 
the place of a homa,' enjoins the circumstance of the obla- 
tions to the pra«as being effected by means of a material 
(primarily) subserving another purpose (viz. eating), as 
appears from its referring to the presentation of food as 
something accomplished (i. e. accomplished independently 
of the oblations ; not tending to accomplish the oblations). 
How then should these oblations — which are characterised 
as not having any motive power with regard to the employ- 
ment of the food — be capable of causing us to substitute, in 
the absence of eating, some other material (than food) ? — 
Nor is it true that there are already established, for the 
prattagnihotra, all the details belonging to the fundamental 
agnihotra. In the case of the ayana of the Ku/ft/apayins, 
the term 'agnihotra' forms part of the injunctive pas- 
sage, 'They offer the agnihotra during a month,' and 
therefore may have the force of enjoining a general 
character of the sacrifice identical with that of the funda- 
mental agnihotra ; and it is therefore appropriate to con- 
sider the details of the latter as valid for the agnihotra of 
the Ku«</apayins also. In the case of the so-called 
prawagnihotra, on the other hand, the term 'agnihotra' 
occurs in an arthavada-passage only, and does not therefore 
possess an analogous injunctive force. If, again, we admitted 
that the details of the fundamental agnihotra are valid for 
the prawagnihotra also, such details as the transference of the 
fire (from the garhapatya fire to the two other fires) would be 
likewise valid. But this is impossible, as the transference 
of the fire is made for the purpose of establishing a fire- 
place in which the oblations are made ; in our case, on the 
other hand, the oblations are not made in the fire at all — 
because that would interfere with their being used as food, 
and because they are connected with a material procured 
for the purpose of eating, — but are made in the mouth (of 
the eater). Thus the text of the 6'abalas also, ' He is to 
eat before the guests,' shows that the accomplishment of the 
oblation has the mouth for its abode. For the same reason 
(i. e. because the details of the fundamental agnihotra are 



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252 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. 



not valid for the prawagnihotra) the text declares the sub- 
ordinate members of the agnihotra to be present here (i.e. 
in the pranagnihotra) in the way of fanciful combination 
only, ' the chest is the vedi, the hairs the sacrificial grass, 
the heart the Garhapatya fire, the mind the Anvaharya- 
pa£ana fire, the mouth the Ahavaniya fire.' By the vedi 
mentioned in this passage we have to understand a levelled 
spot, as in the fundamental agnihotra there is no vedi, and 
as the intention of the passage is to effect a fanciful combi- 
nation of the members of the fundamental agnihotra (with 
members of the prawagnihotra). — And as the pra«agnihotra 
is connected with eating which has its definite times, it is 
also not possible that it should be restricted to the time 
enjoined for the fundamental agnihotra. In the same way 
other particulars also of the fundamental agnihotra, such as 
the so-called upasthana, cannot be reconciled with the re- 
quirements of the prawagnihotra. From all this it follows 
that the five oblations, as connected with their respective 
mantras, materials, and divinities, have to be performed only 
in the case of food being eaten. — With reference to the pas- 
sage showing ' respect,' we remark that it is meant to inti- 
mate priority (of the host), in the case of food being actually 
eaten. But the passage has no power to declare that the 
offering of the pranagnihotra is of permanent obligation. — 
It therefore is a settled conclusion that the pra/zagnihotra 
is omitted when the eating of food is omitted. 

42. There is non-restriction of the assertions 
concerning them (i.e. the assertions made concerning 
certain sacrificial acts are not permanently connected 
with those acts), because this is seen (in scripture); 
for a separate fruit, viz. non-obstruction (of the 
success of the sacrifice), (belongs to them). 

We meet in the Vedanta-texts with certain vidyas which 
are founded on matters subordinate to sacrificial acts. To 
this class belongs, e. g. the first vidya of the A"Aandogya 
Upanishad, ' Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as 
udgitha.' — We now enter on an inquiry whether those 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 253 

vidyas are permanently connected with the acts in the 
same way as the circumstance of being made of par«a-wood 
is permanently connected with all sacrifices in which the 
£tihu (the sacrificial ladle) is used ; or if they are non- 
permanent like the vessel called godohana x . The purva- 
pakshin maintains that the meditations are permanently 
connected with the sacrificial acts, because they also are 
comprised within the scriptural enouncements concerning 
performances. For they also do not stand under some 
special heading 2 , and as they are connected with the sacrifice 
through the udgitha and so on, they combine themselves, 
like other subordinate members, with the scriptural state- 
ments as to the performance of the sacrifice. 

If against the doctrine of the meditations forming per- 
manent parts of the sacrificial performances it should be 
urged, that in the chapters containing them special results 
are mentioned (which seem to constitute the meditations 
into independent acts), as e. g. in the passage, ' he indeed 
becomes a fulfiller of desires' (KA. Up. I, 1, 7); we reply 
that those statements of results being given in the text in 
the present form only (not in an injunctional form), are mere 

1 The question is raised whether the meditations, enjoined in the 
Upanishads, on certain parts or elements of sacrificial acts, are per- 
manently connected with the latter, i.e. are to be undertaken when- 
ever the sacrificial act is performed, or not. — In the former case 
they would stand to the sacrifice in the same relation as the 
parwamayitva, i.e. the quality of being made of par«a-wood, does. 
Just as the latter is connected with the sacrifice by means of the 
£Tihu — the sacrificial ladle, — so the meditation on the syllable Om, 
e.g. would be connected with the sacrifice by means of that syllable. 
— In the latter case, i.e. in the case of being connected with the 
sacrifice on certain occasions only, the up&sana is analogous to the 
godohana-vessel which is used in the darrapurcam&sa-sacrifice 
instead of the usual fomasa, only if the sacrificer specially wishes for 
cattle.— See Pfl. Mi. Sfl. Ill, 6, 1 ; IV, r, 2. 

* Like the statement about the parwamayitva of the guhb which 
the sacred text does not exhibit under some particular prakarawa, 
but ex abrupto as it were ; on which account it is to be connected 
with the sacrifice in general. 



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254 vedAnta-sOtras. 



arthavada-passages — like the statement about him whose 
£~uhu is made of par«a-wood hearing no evil sound — and 
thus do not aim at enjoining certain results. — Hence, just 
as the statement about being made of parwa-wood — which 
does not occur under a definite prakarawa— connects itself, 
by means of the sacrificial ladle, with the sacrifice, and thus 
forms a permanent element of the latter no less than if it 
were actually made under the heading of the sacrifice ; so 
the meditations on the udgitha, &c, also form permanent 
parts of the sacrifices. 

To this we make the following reply. 'There is non- 
restriction of the assertions concerning them.' That means : 
the assertions which the text makes concerning the nature 
of certain subordinate members of sacrificial acts such as 
the udgitha and so on — as e. g. that the udgitha is the best 
of all essences {Kh. Up. I, i, 3), the fulfiller of desires 
(I, 1, 7), a gratifier of desires (I, 1, 8), the chief prawa 
(I, a, 7), Aditya (I, 3, 1) — cannot be permanently connected 
with the sacrificial acts in the same way as other permanent 
members are, 'because that is seen,' i.e. because scripture 
shows that they are not so permanently connected. For 
scripture allows also such as are not acquainted with the 
details mentioned above to perform the sacrificial actions 
(cp. the passage I, 1, 10, ' Therefore both he who knows 
this, and he who does not, perform the sacrifice'), and declares 
that even those priests, PrastotW and so on, who are devoid 
of the knowledge of the divinities of the prastava and the 
like, do perform the sacrifices ' Prastotr*, if you without 
knowing the deity which belongs to the prastava are going 
to sing it,' &c. (I, 10, 9 and ff.). — The sacred text moreover 
declares that the vidyas founded on certain elements of 
sacrificial acts have results of their own, apart from those 
acts, viz. ' non-obstruction ' in the accomplishment of the 
fruit of the sacrifice, i. e. a certain additional success of the 
sacrifice, cp. the passage I, 1, 10, 'Therefore he who knows 
this and he who does not perform the sacrifice. But 
knowledge and ignorance are separate. The sacrifice which 
a man performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad 
is more powerful.' The declaration made in this passage 



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HI ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 255 

that the performances of him who knows and of him who 
does not know are separate, and the employment of the 
comparative form ('more powerful') show that even the 
sacrifice destitute of the vidya is powerful. But how would 
that be possible if the vidya formed a permanent necessary 
part of the sacrifice ? In the latter case a sacrifice devoid 
of that vidya could never be admitted to be powerful ; for 
it is an established principle that only those sacrifices are 
effective which comprise all subordinate members. Thus 
the text also teaches definite results for each meditation, in 
the section treating of the meditation on the Saman as the 
worlds and others : ' The worlds in an ascending and in a 
descending line belong to him,' &c. (K/i. Up. II, *, 3). — 
Nor must we understand those declarations of results to be 
mere arthavadas ; for in that case they would have to be 
taken as stating a secondary matter only, while if under- 
stood to teach certain results they may be taken in their 
principal (i. e. direct, literal) sense *. The case of the results 
which scripture declares to be connected with the praya^as 
e. g. is of a different nature. For the pray4fas are en- 
joined with reference to a sacrifice (viz. the darcapurcamasa) 
which requires certain definite modes of procedure (such as 
the offering of the praya^as and the like), and hence sub- 
serve that sacrifice ; so that the passage stating a fruit for 
the praya^as has to be considered as a mere arthavada-pas- 
sage 2 . In the case again of the quality of consisting of 
par«a-wood — which quality is stated ex abrupto, not under 
a definite heading — no special result can be assumed ; for 
as a quality is not an act it cannot be connected with any 
result unless it be joined to something to abide in. The 
use of the godohana indeed may have its own injunction of 

1 The statement as to the result of an action is a 'statement of 
a principal matter' if it is really meant to inform us that a certain 
result will attend a certain action. It is a statement of a 'secondary 
matter' if it is only meant to glorify the action. 

* Not as a passage enjoining a special result for the praya^as; 
for the latter merely help to bring about the general result of the 
darrapurnamasa and have no special result of their own. 



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2^6 vedAnta-sOtras. 



result, for it does possess such an abode — viz. the act of 
water being carried (in it) — with reference to which it is 
enjoined. So again a special fruit may be enjoined for the 
case of the sacrificial post being made of bilva-wood ; for 
this latter quality likewise has an abode, viz. the sacrificial 
post with reference to which it is enjoined. But in the case 
of the quality of consisting of par«a-wood there is no such 
established abode under the heading of which that quality 
is enjoined ; and if we assumed that the sentence (' He 
whose ^uhu is made of parwa-wood hears no evil sound ') 
after intimating that the quality of consisting of par«a-wood 
resides in the^fuhu is also meant to enjoin the fruit thereof, 
we should impute to the text the imperfection called ' split 
of the sentence.' — The meditations on the other hand are 
themselves acts, and as such capable of a special injunc- 
tion ; hence there is no reason why a special result should 
not be enjoined for those meditations which are based on 
sacrificial acts. The conclusion therefore is that the medi- 
tations on the udgitha, &c, although based on sacrifices, are 
yet not necessary members of the latter, because they have 
results of their own like the use of the godohana-vessel. 
For this reason the authors of the Kalpa-sutras have not 
represented such meditations as belonging to the sacrificial 
performances. 

43. As in the case of the offerings, (Vayu and 
Prawa must be held apart). This has been ex- 
plained (in the Purva Mlmawsa-sutra). 

The section of the Va^asaneyaka which begins, ' Voice 
held, I shall speak' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 21), determines Prawa 
to be the best among the organs of the body, viz. speech 
and so on, and Vayu to be the best among the Devas, 
viz. Agni and so on. — Similarly in the" KMndogya., Vayu is 
affirmed to be the general absorber of the Devas, 'Vayu in- 
deed is the absorber ' (IV, 3, 1), while Pra«a is said to be the 
general absorber of the organs of the body, ' Breath indeed 
is the absorber' (IV, 3, 3). — The doubt here arises whether 
Vayu and Pra«a are to be conceived as separate or not. 

As non-separate, the purvapakshin maintains; because in 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 43. 257 

their true nature they do not differ. And as their true 
nature does not differ they must not be meditated upon 
separately. Another scriptural passage also declares that 
the organs of the body and the divinities are non-different 
in their true nature, ' Agni having become speech entered 
the mouth,' &c. (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4). Moreover, the passage 
Bri. Up. I, 5, 13, ' These are all alike, all endless,' declares 
that the powers of the Devas constitute the Self of the 
organs of the body. And various other passages also 
testify to the fundamental non-difference of the two. In 
some places we have even a direct identification of the 
two, 'What Pra«a is, that is Vayu.' And in the jloka 
concluding the Va^asaneyaka-chapter to which the passage 
under discussion belongs, the text refers to prana only (' He 
verily rises from the breath and sets in the breath '), and 
thus shows the breath to be one with the previously men- 
tioned Vayu. This conclusion is moreover confirmed by the 
fact that the observance enjoined in the end refers to praaa 
only, ' Therefore let a man perform one observance only, 
let him breathe up and let him breathe down ' (Br* 1 . Up. I, 
5, 23). Similarly, the .Oandogya-passage, IV, 3, 6, ' One 
god swallowed the four great ones,' intimates that there 
is one absorber only, and does not say that one god is the 
absorber of the one set of four, and another the absorber of 
the other set of four. — From all this it follows that Vayu 
and Prawa are to be conceived as one. 

To this we make the following reply. Vayu and Prawa 
are to be conceived separately, because the text teaches 
them in separation. The separate instruction given by the 
text with reference to the organs and the Devas for the 
purposes of meditation would be meaningless if the medi- 
tations were not held apart. — But the purvapakshin main- 
tains that owing to the essential non-difference of Vayu and 
Pra«a the meditations are not to be separated ! — Although, 
we reply, there may be non-difference of true nature, yet 
there may be difference of condition giving rise to dif- 
ference of instruction, and, through the latter, to difference 
of meditation. And although the introduction of the con- 
cluding jloka may be accounted for on the ground of its 
[38J S 



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258 vedAnta-sCtras. 



showing the fundamental non-difference of the two, it 
yet has no power to sublate the previously declared dif- 
ference of the objects of meditation. Moreover, the text 
institutes a comparison between Vayu and Pra«a, which 
again shows that the two are different, ' And as it was with 
the central breath among the breaths, so it was with Vayu, 
the wind among those deities ' (Br/. Up. I, 5, 22). — This 
explains also the mention made of the observance (1, 5, 23). 
The word * only ' (in ' Let a man perform one observance 
only ') has the purpose of establishing the observance with 
regard to Pra«a, by sublating the observances with regard 
to speech and so on, regarding which the text had re- 
marked previously that they were disturbed by Death 
(' Death having become weariness took them '), and does 
not by any means aim at sublating the observance with 
regard to Vayu ; for the section beginning ' Next follows 
the consideration of the observances' distinctly asserts 
that the observances of Vayu and Pra«a were equally 
unbroken. — Moreover, the text, after having said, ' Let a 
man perform one observance only,' declares in the end 
that the fruit of that observance is the obtaining of (union 
with) Vayu (' Then he obtains through it union and one- 
ness with that deity '), and thus shows that the observance 
with regard to Vayu is not to be considered as sublated. 
That by that 'deity' we have to understand Vayu, we 
conclude from the circumstance that what the worshipper 
wishes to obtain is non-limitation of his Self 1 , and that 
previously the term ' deity ' had been applied to Vayu, 
' Vayu is the deity that never sets.' — Analogously in the 
ATAandogya-passage the text represents Vayu and Prawa 
as different, ' These are the two absorbers, Vayu among the 
Devas, Prana among the prawas,' and in the concluding para- 
graph also (IV, 3, 8) refers to them as distinct/ These five and 
the other five make ten, and that is the Kn'ta.' — For these 
reasons Vayu and Pra«a are to be conceived as different. 
The Stitra compares the case under discussion to a 

1 AgnySdin apekshyinavaAMino devo vayus te tu tenaiviva- 
iihiimi iti samvargaguno vSyur anavaiMinni devati. An. Gi. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 44. 259 

parallel one from the karmaka«*/a, by means of the clause, 
' as in the case of the offerings.' With regard to the ishri 
comprising three sacrificial cakes, which is enjoined in the 
passage, Taitt. Sawh. II, 3, 6, ' A purodiksa. on eleven 
potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the over-ruler, to 
Indra the self-ruler,' it might be supposed that the three 
cakes are to be offered together because they are offered 
to one and the same Indra, and because the concluding 
sentence says, ' conveying to all (gods) he cuts off to pre- 
clude purposelessness.' But as the attributes (viz. ' ruler ' 
and so on) differ, and as scripture enjoins that the ya^ya 
and anuvakyamantras are to exchange places with regard 
to the different cakes \ the divinity is each time a different 
one according to the address, and from this it follows that 
the three offerings also are separate. — Thus, in the case 
under discussion, Vayu and Prawa, although fundamentally 
non-different, are to be held apart as objects of meditation, 
and we have therefore to do with two separate medita- 
tions. — This is explained in the Sankarsha-ka«</a, 'The 
divinities are separate on account of their being cognized 
thus.' 

But while in the case of the three purot/aras the dif- 
ference of material and divinity involves a difference on the 
part of the oblations, we have in the case under discussion 
to do with one vidya only ; for that the text enjoins one 
vidya only we conclude from the introductory and con- 
cluding statements. There is contained, however, in this 
one vidya a double meditative activity with regard to the 
bodily organs and the divinities, just as the agnihotra which 
is offered in the morning as well as in the evening requires 
a double activity. In this sense the Sutra says, ' as in the 
case of the offerings.' 

44. On account of the majority of indicatory marks 
(the fire-altars built of mind, &c do not form 
elements of any act) ; for this (i. e. the indicatory 

1 The yagya-mantra of the first offering being used as anuvakyi 
in the second one and so on. 

S 2 



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260 vedAnta-sCtras. 



mark) is stronger (than the general subject-matter) ; 
this also (has been explained in the Pu. Mi. Sutras). 

In the Agnirahasya of the Va^asaneyins, in the Brahma«a 
beginning ' for in the beginning indeed this was not exis- 
tent,' we read with reference to mind (manas), ' It saw thirty- 
six thousand shining fire-altars, belonging to itself, made of 
mind, built of mind.' And, further on, the text makes similar 
statements about other fanciful fire-altars built of speech, 
built of breath, built of sight, built of hearing, built of 
work, built of fire. — A doubt here arises whether these 
fire-altars built of mind and so on are connected with the 
act (i. e. the construction of the fire-altar made of bricks), 
and supplementary to it, or whether they are independent, 
constituting a mere vidya. 

Against the prima facie view that those agnis are con- 
nected with the sacrificial act under whose heading the 
text records them, the Sutra maintains their independence, 
' on account of the majority of indicatory marks.' For we 
meet in that Brahmawa with a number of indicatory marks 
confirming that those agnis constitute a mere vidya ; cp. 
e. g. the following passages : ' Whatever these beings con- 
ceive in their minds, that is a means for those fire-altars,' 
and 'All beings always pile up those fire-altars for him 
who thus knows, even when he sleeps,' and so on 1 . — And 
that indicatory marks (linga) are of greater force than the 
leading subject-matter (prakarawa) has been explained in 
the Purva Mimawsa (III, 3, 14). 

45. (The agni built of mind, &c) is a particular 
form of the preceding one (i.e. the agni built of 
bricks), on account of the leading subject-matter; it 
is (part of) the act; as in the case of the manasa cup. 

Your supposition, the purvapakshin objects, as to those 
fire-altars being not supplementary to the sacrificial act, 

1 For something which forms part of an act cannot be brought 
about by something so indefinite as ' whatever these beings conceive 
in their minds,' nor can it be accomplished indifferently at any 
time by any beings. 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 46. 261 

but altogether independent of it, is untenable. The in- 
fluence of the leading subject-matter rather compels us to 
conclude that the instruction given by the text about the 
agni made of mind and so on, enjoins some particular mode 
of the same agni which the preceding sections describe as 
the outcome of a real act 1 . — But are not indicatory marks 
stronger than the leading subject-matter? — True in general; 
but indicatory marks such as those contained in the pas- 
sages quoted above are by no means stronger than the 
general subject-matter. For as those passages are of the 
nature of glorifications of the fanciful fire-altars, the lingas 
(have no proving power in themselves but) merely illustrate 
some other matter (viz. the injunction to which those 
passages are arthavadas) ; and as they are of that nature 
they may, there being no other proof, be taken as mere 
gunavadas, and as such are not able to sublate the influence 
of the prakarawa. On the ground of the latter, therefore, 
all those fanciful agnis must be viewed as forming parts of 
the sacrificial action. 

The case is analogous to that of the ' mental ' (cup). On 
the tenth day of the Soma sacrifices occupying twelve days 
— which day is termed avivakya — a soma cup is offered 
mentally, the earth being viewed as the cup, the sea as the 
Soma and Pra^apati as the divinity to which the offering is 
made. All rites connected with that cup, viz. taking it up, 
putting it down in its place, offering the liquid in it, taking 
up the remaining liquid, the priests inviting one another to 
drink the remainder, and the drinking, all these rites the 
text declares to be mental only, i.e. to be done in thought 
only 2 . Yet this mental quasi-cup, as standing under the 
heading of a sacrificial act, forms part of that act. — The 
same then holds good with regard to the quasi-agnis made 
of mind and so on. 

46. And on account of the transfer (of particulars). 
That those agnis enter into the sacrificial action follows 

1 I.e. of the agni made of bricks which is the outcome of ihe 
agnifeyana. — An. Gi. explains vikalpavuesha by prakarabheda. 
4 Cp. T&ndyz Brah. IV, 9; Taitt. Samh. VII, 3, 1. 



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262 vedAnta-sOtras. 



moreover from the fact that the text extends to them (the 
injunctions given about the agni made of bricks). Com- 
pare the passage, 'Thirty-six thousand shining Agnis; each 
one of them is as large as the previously mentioned Agni.' 
Such extension of injunctions is possible only where there 
is general equality. The text therefore by extending the 
determinations relative to the previous agni, i.e. the agni 
built of bricks, which forms a constituent element of the 
sacrificial action, to the fanciful agnis, intimates thereby 
that they also form part of the sacrificial performance. 

47. But (the agnis rather constitute) a vidya, on 
account of the assertion (made by the text). 

The word * but ' sets aside the purvapaksha. — The agnis 
built of mind and so on are to be viewed not as comple- 
mentary to a sacrificial action, but as independent and con- 
stituting a vidya of their own. For the text expressly 
asserts that ' they are built of knowledge (vidya) only,' and 
that • by knowledge they are built for him who thus knows.' 

48. And because (indicatory marks of that) are 
seen (in the text). 

And that there are to be observed indicatory marks 
leading to the same conclusion, has already been declared 
in SAtra 44. — But, under Sutra 45, it was shown that 
indicatory marks unaided by other reasons cannot be 
admitted as proving anything, and it was consequently 
determined that, owing to the influence of the leading 
subject-matter, the Agnis form part of the sacrificial 
action ! — To this objection the next Sutra replies. 

49. (The view that the agnis constitute an inde- 
pendent vidya) cannot be refuted, owing to the 
greater force of direct enunciation and so on. 

Our opponent has no right to determine, on the ground 
of prakarawa, that the agnis are subordinate to the sacri- 
ficial action, and so to set aside our view according to which 
they are independent. For we know from the Purva 
Mima/Ksa that direct enunciation (Sruti), indicatory mark 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 49. 263 

(linga), and syntactical connexion (vakya) are of greater 
force than leading subject-matter (prakarawa), and all those 
three means of proof are seen to confirm our view of the agnis 
being independent. In the first place we have the direct 
enunciation, ' These agnis are indeed knowledge-piled only.' 
In the second place we have the indicatory mark supplied 
by the passage, ' All beings ever pile for him sleeping,' &c. 
And in the third place we have the sentence, ' By know- 
ledge indeed those (agnis) are piled for him who thus 
knows.' 

In the first of these passages the emphatical expression, 
'built by knowledge only,' would be contradicted if we ad- 
mitted that the agnis form part of the sacrificial actioa — 
But may this emphatical phrase not merely have the pur- 
pose of indicating that those agnis are not to be accom- 
plished by external means ? — No, we reply, for if that were 
intended, it would be sufficient to glorify the fact of know- 
ledge constituting the character of the agnis by means of 
the word 'knowledge-piled,' and the emphatical assertion 
(implied in the addition of the word 'only') would be 
useless. For it is the nature of such agnis to be accom- 
plished without any external means. But, although the 
agnis are clearly to be accomplished without external 
means, yet it might be supposed that, like the mental cup, 
they form part of the sacrificial action, and the object of 
the emphatical assertion implied in ' only ' is to discard 
that suspicion. — So likewise (to pass over to linga) the 
continuity of action implied in the passage, ' For him who 
thus knows whether sleeping or waking all beings always 
pile these agnis,' is possible only on the supposition of 
those agnis being independent. The case is analogous to 
that of the imaginary agnihotra consisting of speech and 
breath, with reference to which the text says at first, ' He 
offers his breath in his speech, he offers his speech in his 
breath,' and then adds, ' These two endless and immortal 
oblations he offers always whether waking or sleeping' 
(Kau. Up. II, 6). — If, on the other hand, the imaginary 
agnis were parts of the sacrificial action it would be 
impossible for them to be accomplished continually, since 



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264 vedAnta-sOtras. 



the accomplishment of the sacrificial action itself occupies 
only a short time. — Nor may we suppose the passage 
(which contains the linga) to be a mere arthavada-passage 
(in which case, as the purvapakshin avers, the linga would 
be unable to refute prakarawa). For in those cases where 
we meet with an unmistakeable injunctory passage — 
marked out as such by the use of the optative or imperative 
form — there indeed we may assume a glorificatory passage 
(met with in connexion with that injunctory passage) to 
be an arthavada. In the present case, however, we observe 
no clear injunctory passage, and should therefore be obliged 
to construct one enjoining the knowledge of the various 
fanciful agnis, merely on the basis of the arthavada- 
passage. But in that case the injunction can be framed 
only in accordance with the arthavada, and as the arthavada 
speaks of the continual building of the agnis, the latter item 
would have to appear in the injunction also. But, if so, it 
follows (as shown above) that the mental construction of 
those agnis constitutes an independent vidyi (and does not 
form part of the actual agni^ayana). — The same argument- 
ation applies to the second lihga-passage quoted above, 
'Whatever those beings conceive in their minds,' &c. — And 
the sentence finally shows, by means of the clause, ' For 
him who thus knows,' that those agnis are connected with 
a special class of men (viz. those who thus know), and are 
therefore not to be connected with the sacrificial action. — 
For all these reasons the view of those agnis constituting an 
independent vidya is preferable. 

50. On account of the connexion and so on (the 
agnis built of mind, &c. are independent); in the 
same way as other cognitions are separate. And 
there is seen (another case of something having to 
be withdrawn from the leading subject-matter) ; this 
has been explained (in the Purva Mtmawsl-sutras). 

Independence has, against the general subject-matter, to 
be assumed for the fire-altars built of mind and so on, for 
that reason also that the text connects the constituent 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 50. 265 

members of the sacrificial action with activities of the 
mind, &c. ; viz. in the passage, ' With mind only they 
are established, with mind only they are piled, with 
mind only the cups were taken, with mind the udgatfis 
praised, with mind the hotr*s recited ; whatever work is 
done at the sacrifice, whatever sacrificial work, was done as 
consisting of mind, by mind only, at those fire-altars made 
of mind, piled by mind,' &c. For that connexion has for 
its result an imaginative combination (of certain mental en- 
ergies with the parts of the sacrifice), and the obtainment 
of the parts of the sacrifice which are objects of actual 
perception cannot be made dependent on such imaginative 
combination \ Nor must it be supposed that, because here 
also, as in the case of the meditation on the udgitha, the 
vidya is connected with members of the sacrificial action, 
it enters into that action as a constituent part; for the state- 
ments of the text differ in the two cases. For in our case 
scripture does not say that we are to take some member of 
a sacrificial action and then to superimpose upon it such 
and such a name ; but rather takes six and thirty thousand 
different energies of the mind and identifies them with the 
fire-altars, the cups, and so on, just as in some other place 
it teaches a meditation on man viewed as the sacrifice. 
The number given by the text is originally observed as 
belonging to the days of a man's life, and is then transferred 
to the mental energies connected therewith. — From the con- 
nexion (referred to in the Sutra) it therefore follows that 
the agnis piled of mind, &c. are independent. — The clause 
' and so on ' (met with in the Sutra) must be explained as 
comprehending 'transference' and the like as far as possi- 
ble. For if the text says, ' Each of those Agnis is as great 
as that prior one,' it transfers the glory of the fire-altar 
consisting of the work (i. e. the real altar piled of bricks) to 
the altars consisting of knowledge and so on, and thereby 

1 Kimartham idam anubandhakarawaw tad aha, sampad iti, upa- 
styartho hy anubandhas tathapi manarfidadlnam akriy&ngatve 
kim ayataw tad aha, na £eti, teshim kriyangatve sakshad evadha- 
n&diprasiddher anarthika sampad ity arthaA. An. Gi. 



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266 vedAnta-sOtras. 



expresses want of regard for the work. Nor can it be said 
that if there is connexion (of all the agnis) with the sacri- 
ficial action, the later ones (i.e. those made of mind) may 
optionally be used instead of the original agnis made of 
bricks (as was asserted by the purvapakshin in Sutra 45). 
For the later agnis are incapable of assisting the sacrificial 
action by means of those energies with which the original 
agni assists it, viz. by bearing theahavanlya fire and so on. — 
The assertion, again, made by the purvapakshin (Sutra 46) 
that ' transference ' strengthens h i s view in so far as transfer- 
ence is possible only where there is equality, is already refuted 
by the remark that also on our view transference is possible, 
since the fanciful fire-altars are equal to the real fire-altar in so 
far as both are fire-altars. — And that direct enunciation and 
so on favour our conclusion has been shown. — From con- 
nexion and so on it therefore follows that the agnis piled 
of mind, &c. are independent. — ' As in the case of the 
separateness of other cognitions.' As other cognitions, such 
as e. g. the .SawdTilya-vidya, which have each their own parti- 
cular connexion, separate themselves from works and other 
cognitions and are independent ; so it is in our case also. — 
Moreover 'there is seen' an analogous case of independence 
from the leading subject-matter. The offering called avesh/i 
which is mentioned in the sacred texts under the heading of 
the ra^asflya-sacrifice, is to be taken out from that heading 
because it is connected with the three higher castes, while the 
ra^asuya can be offered by a member of the warrior caste 
only. This has been explained in the first section (i.e. in 
the Purva Mlmawsa-sutras). 

51. Not also on account of its resembling (the 
manasa cup) (can the fires constitute parts of an 
action); for it is observed (on the ground of 6ruti, 
&c, that they are independent); as in the case of 
death ; for the world does not become (a fire) 
(because it resembles a fire in some points). 

Against the allegation made by the purvapakshin that 
the present case is analogous to that of the manasa cup, we 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 52. 267 

remark that the fire-altars made of mind and so on cannot be 
assumed to supplement a sacrificial action although they 
may resemble the manasa cup, since on the ground of direct 
enunciation &c. they are seen to subserve the purpose of 
man only (not the purpose of some sacrificial action). 
Anything indeed may resemble anything in some point or 
other; but in spite of that there remains the individual 
dissimilarity of each thing from all other things. The case 
is analogous to that of death. In the passages, ' The man 
in that orb is death indeed' (Sat. Bra. X,5, 2, 3), and 'Agni 
indeed is death ' (Taitt. Sawm. V, 1, io, 3), the term 'death ' 
is applied equally to Agni and the man in the sun ; all the 
same the two are by no means absolutely equal. And if 
the text says in another place, ' This world is a fire indeed, 
O Gotama; the sun is its fuel,' &c. (Kk. Up. V, 4, 1), it 
does not follow from the similarity of fuel and so on that 
the world really is a fire. Thus also in our case. 

52. And from the subsequent (Brahma»a) it 
follows that being of that kind (i.e. injunction of a 
mere vidya) (is the aim) of the text. The connexion 
(of the fanciful agnis with the real one) is due to the 
plurality (of details of the real agni which are 
imaginatively connected with the vidya). 

With regard to a subsequent Brahma«a also, viz. the one 
beginning, ' That piled agni is this world indeed,' we appre- 
hend that what is the purpose of the text is ' being of that 
kind,' i.e. injunction of a mere vidya, not injunction of the 
member of a mere action. For we meet there with the fol- 
lowing jloka, ' By knowledge they ascend there where all 
wishes are attained. Those skilled in works do not go there, 
nor those who destitute of knowledge do penance.' This 
verse blames mere works and praises knowledge. A former 
Brahmana also, viz. the one beginning, 'What that orb 
leads' (5at. Bra. X, 5, a, 23), concludes with a statement of 
the fruit of knowledge ('Immortal becomes he whose Self is 
death '), and thereby indicates that works are not the chief 
thing. — The text connects the vidya (of the agnis built of 



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268 vedAnta-sCtras. 



mind) with the real agni built of bricks, not because those 
agnis are members of the act of building the real agni, 
but because many of the elements of the real agni are 
imaginatively combined with the vidya. 

All this establishes the conclusion that the fire-altars 
built of mind and so on constitute a mere vidya. 

53. Some (maintain the non-existence) of a 
(separate) Self, on account of the existence (of the 
Self) where a body is (only). 

At present we will prove the existence of a Self different 
from the body in order to establish thereby the qualifica- 
tion (of the Self) for bondage and release. For if there were 
no Self different from the body, there would be no room for 
injunctions that have the other world for their result ; nor 
could it be tadght of anybody that Brahman is his Self. — 
But, an objection is raised, already in the first pada which 
stands at the head of this Sastra (i. e. the first pada of the 
Purva Mima/wsa-sutras) there has been declared the exist- 
ence of a Self which is different from the body and hence 
capable of enjoying the fruits taught by the Sastra. — True, 
this has been declared there by the author of the bhashya, 
but there is in that place no Sutra about the existence of 
the Self. Here, on the other hand, the Sutrakara himself 
establishes the existence of the Self after having disposed 
of a preliminary objection. And from hence the teacher 
Sahara Svamin has taken the matter for his discussion of 
the point in the chapter treating of the means of right 
knowledge. For the same reason the reverend Upavarsha 
remarks in the first tantra — where an opportunity offers 
itself for the discussion of the existence of the Self — * We 
will discuss this in the Sariraka,' and allows the matter to 
rest there. Here, where we are engaged in an inquiry into 
the pious meditations which are matter of injunction, a 
discussion of the existence of the Self is introduced in order 
to show that the whole Sastra depends thereon. 

Moreover, in the preceding adhikarawa we have shown 
that passages may be exempted from the influence of the 
leading subject-matter, and that for that reason the fire- 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 54. 269 

altars built of mind and so on subserve the purpose of man 
(not of the sacrifice). In consequence thereof there naturally 
arises the question who that man is whose purposes the 
different fire-altars subserve, and in reply to it the existence 
of a Self which is separate from the body is affirmed. — The 
first Sutra embodies an objection against that doctrine ; 
according to the principle that a final refutation of objec- 
tions stated in the beginning effects a stronger conviction 
of the truth of the doctrine whose establishment is aimed at. 
Here now some materialists (lokayatika), who see the 
Self in the body only, are of opinion that a Self separate 
from the body does not exist ; assume that consciousness 
(£aitanya), although not observed in earth and the other 
external elements — either single or combined — may yet 
appear in them when transformed into the shape of a 
body, so that consciousness springs from them ; and thus 
maintain that knowledge is analogous to intoxicating 
quality (which arises when certain materials are mixed in 
certain proportions), and that man is only a body qualified 
by consciousness. There is thus, according to them, no 
Self separate from the body and capable of going to the 
heavenly world or obtaining release, through which con- 
sciousness is in the body; but the body alone is what is 
conscious, is the Self. For this assertion they allege the 
reason stated in the Sutra, 'On account of its existence 
where a body is.' For wherever something exists if some 
other thing exists, and does not exist if that other thing 
does not exist, we determine the former thing to be a mere 
quality of the latter ; light and heat, e. g. we determine to 
be qualities of fire. And as life, movement, consciousness, 
remembrance and so on — which by the upholders of an 
independent Self are considered qualities of that Self — are 
observed only within bodies and not outside bodies, and as 
an abode of those qualities, different from the body, cannot 
be proved, it follows that they must be qualities of the body 
only. The Self therefore is not different from the body. — 
To this conclusion the next Sutra replies. 

54. There is separation (of the Self from the 

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2 yo vedAnta-sOtras. 



body) because its existence does not depend on the 
existence of that (viz. the body), but there is not 
(non-separation) ; as in the case of perceptive con- 
sciousness. 

The assertion that the Self is not separate from the body 
cannot be maintained. The Self rather must be something 
separate from the body, ' because the existence (of the Self) 
does not depend on the existence of that (i. e. the body).' 
For if from the circumstance that they are where the body 
is you conclude that the qualities of the Self are qualities 
of the body, you also must conclude from the fact that 
they are not where the body is that they are not qualities 
of the body, because thereby they show themselves to be 
different in character from the qualities of the body. Now 
the (real) qualities of the body, such as form and so on, may 
be viewed as existing as long as the body exists ; life, 
movement, &c, on the other hand, do not exist even when 
the body exists, viz. in the state of death. The qualities of 
the body, again, such as form and so on, are perceived by 
others ; not so the qualities of the Self, such as conscious- 
ness, remembrance, and so on. Moreover, we can indeed 
ascertain the presence of those latter qualities as long as 
the body exists in the state of life, but we cannot ascertain 
their non-existence when the body does not exist ; for it is 
possible that even after this body has died the qualities of 
the Self should continue to exist by passing over into 
another body. The opposite opinion is thus precluded 
also for the reason of its being a mere hypothesis. — We 
further must question our opponent as to the nature of 
that consciousness which he assumes to spring from the 
elements ; for the materialists do not admit the existence 
of anything but the four elements. Should he say that 
consciousness is the perception of the elements and what 
springs from the elements, we remark that in that case the 
elements and their products are objects of consciousness 
and that hence the latter cannot be a quality of them, as it 
is contradictory that anything should act on itself. Fire 
is hot indeed but does not burn itself, and the acrobat, well 



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in adhyAva, 3 pAda, 54. 271 

trained as he may be, cannot mount on his own shoulders. 
As little could consciousness, if it were a mere quality of 
the elements and their products, render them objects of 
itself. For form and other (undoubted) qualities do not 
make their own colour or the colour of something else their 
objects ; the elements and their products, on the other 
hand, whether external or belonging to the Self (the 
organism) are rendered objects by consciousness. Hence 
in the same way as we admit the existence of that per- 
ceptive consciousness which has the material elements and 
their products for its objects, we also must admit the 
separateness of that consciousness from the elements. And 
as consciousness constitutes the character of our Self, the 
Self must be distinct from the body. That consciousness 
is permanent, follows from the uniformity of its character 
(and we therefore may conclude that the conscious Self is 
permanent also ; as also follows) from the fact that the 
Self, although connected with a different state, recognises 
itself as the conscious agent — a recognition expressed in 
judgments such as 'I saw this,' — and from the fact of 
remembrance and so on being possible 1 . 

The argumentation that consciousness is an attribute of 
the body because it is where a body is, is already refuted 
by the reasons stated above. Moreover, perceptive con- 
sciousness takes place where there are certain auxiliaries 
such as lamps and the like, and does not take place where 
those are absent, without its following therefrom that per- 
ception is an attribute of the lamp or the like. Analogously 

1 The 'nityatvaw ia,' of the text might perhaps be connected 
directly with 'Stmano.' Ananda Giri on the entire passage: 
Bhavatu tarhi bhutebhyo<tiriktSsvdtantryopalabdhistathSpi katham 
itmasiddhis tatrSha upalabdhtti, ksha«ikatvat tasya nityitmarfi- 
patvam ayuktam ity Irahkya^anatas tadbhedabhav&d vishayoparagat 
tadbhSnad asav eva nityopalabdhir ity Sha nityatvawz £eti, ki« ka. 
sthuladehabhimanahlnasya svapne pratyabhi^rcanid atiriktitma- 
siddhir ity aha aham iti, svapne sthuladehintarasyaivopalabdhr?- 
tvam ity ajankyaha smrz'tyaditi, upalabdhrtsmartror bhede saty 
anyopalabdhe*nyasya smr/tir ikkk&d&yas ka. neti na tayor anyatety 
arthaA. 



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272 vedAnta-sOtras. 



the fact that perception takes place where there is a body, 
and does not take place where there is none, does not imply 
that it is an attribute of the body ; for like lamps and so 
on the body may be used (by the Self) as a mere auxiliary. 
Nor is it even true that the body is absolutely required as 
an auxiliary of perception ; for in the state of dream we 
have manifold perceptions while the body lies motionless. — 
The view of the Self being something separate from the 
body is therefore free from all objections. 

55. But the (meditations) connected with members 
(of sacrificial acts are) not (restricted) to (particular) 
.Sakhas, according to the Veda (to which they 
belong). 

The above occasional discussion being terminated, we 
return to the discussion of the matter in hand..— We meet 
in the different Sakhas of each Veda with injunctions of 
vidyas connected with certain members of sacrificial acts, 
such as the udgitha and the like. Cp. e.g. 'Let a man 
meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgitha ' (Kh. Up. I, 
1, 1) ; 'Let a man meditate on the fivefold Saman as the 
five worlds' (Kh. Up. II, a, 1) ; 'People say: "Hymns, 
hymns I " the hymn is truly this earth ' (Ait. Ar. II, 1, a, 1) ; 
' The piled up fire-altar truly is this world ' (.Sat. Bra. X, 5, 
4. 1). A doubt here arises whether the vidyas are enjoined 
with reference to the udgitha and so on as belonging to a 
certain .Sakha only or as belonging to all Sakhas. The 
doubt is raised on the supposition that the udgitha and so 
on differ in the different Sakhas because the accents, &c. 
differ. 

Here the purvapakshin maintains that the vidyas are 
enjoined only with reference to the udgitha and so on which 
belong to the particular Sakha (to which the vidya belongs). 
— Why ? — On account of proximity. For as such general 
injunctions as ' Let a man meditate on the udgitha ' are in 
need of a specification, and as this need is satisfied by the 
specifications given in the same Sakha which stand in 
immediate proximity, there is no reason for passing over 
that Sakha and having recourse to specifications enjoined 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 56. 273 

in other Sakhas. Hence the vidyas are to be held apart, 
according to the Sakhas to which they belong. 

To this the Sutra replies 'but those connected with 
members/ &c. — The word 'but' discards the prima facie 
view. The meditations are not restricted to their own 
.Sakhas according to the Veda to which they belong, but 
are valid for all .Sakhas. — Why? — Because the direct state- 
ments of the texts about the udgitha and so on enounce 
no specification. For to such general injunctions as ' Let a 
man meditate on the udgitha' — which say nothing about 
specifications — violence would be done, if on the ground of 
proximity we restricted them to something special belong- 
ing to its own Sakha, and that would be objectionable 
because direct statement has greater weight than proximity. 
There is, on the other hand, no reason why the vidya 
should not be of general reference. We therefore conclude 
that, although the Sakhas differ as to accents and the like, 
the vidyas mentioned refer to the udgitha and so on belong- 
ing to all Sakhas, because the text speaks only of the 
udgitha and so on in general. 

56. Or else there is no contradiction (implied in 
our opinion) ; as in the case of mantras and the like. 

Or else we may put the matter as follows. There is no 
reason whatever to suspect a contradiction if we declare 
certain vidyas enjoined in one Sakha to be valid for the 
udgitha and so on belonging to other Sakhas also ; for 
there is no more room for contradiction than in the case of 
mantras. We observe that mantras, acts, and qualities of 
acts which are enjoined in one Sakha are taken over by 
other Sakhas also. So e. g. the members of certain Ya^ur- 
veda Sakhas do not exhibit in their text the mantra, ' Thou 
art the ku/aru V which accompanies the taking of the stone 
(with which the rice-grains are ground) ; all the same we 
meet in their text with the following injunction of applica- 
tion, 'Thou art the cock, with this mantra he takes the 
stone ; or else with the mantra, Thou art the ku/aru.' 

1 Maitraya»tya Sawhiti I, 1, 6. 
[38] T 



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274 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Again, the text of some .Sakha does not contain a direct 
injunction of the five offerings called praya^as which are 
made to the fuel and so on, but it contains the injunction 
of secondary matters connected with the praya^as, viz. in 
the passage, ' the seasons indeed are the praya^as ; they 
are to be offered in one and the same spot V — Again, the 
text of some 5akha does not contain an injunction as to 
the species of the animal to be sacrificed to Agntshomau — 
such as would be ' a he-goat is sacrificed to Agntshomau 2 ;' 
— but in the same Sakha we meet with a mantra which 
contains the required specification, 'Hotri, recite the 
anuvakya, for the fat of the omentum of the he-goat 3 .' 
Similarly mantras enjoined in one Veda only, such as 
'O Agni, promote the hautra, promote the sacrifice,' are 
seen to be taken over into other Vedas also. Another 
example (of the transference of mantras) is supplied by the 
hymn, ' He who as soon as born showed himself intelligent,' 
&c. (Rik. Sawn. II, la), which although read in the text of 
the Bahvrt£as is employed in the Taittirlya Veda also, 
according to Taitt. Sa*«h. VII, 5, 5, a, ' The Sa^aniya hymn 
is to be recited.' — Just as, therefore, the members of sacri- 
ficial actions on which certain vidyas rest are valid every- 
where, so the vidyas themselves also which rest on those 
members are valid for all 5akhas and Vedas. 

57. There is pre-eminence of the (meditation on) 
plenitude (i.e. Agni VaLrvanara in his aggregate 
form), as in the case of sacrifices ; for thus scripture 
shows. 

In the legend beginning ' PrAitnajala Aupamanyava,' 
the text speaks of meditations on Vairvanara in his dis- 

1 As this passage states the number of the praya^as (viz. five, 
which is the number of the seasons) and other secondary points, we 
conclude that the injunction of the offering of the prayS^as, which is 
given in other .SakhSs, is valid also for the .Sakha referred to in the 
text (the Maitrayant yas, according to the commentators). 

* But only says 'they offer an animal to Agntshomau.' 

* Wherefrom we infer that not any animal may be offered to 
Agntshomau, but only a he-goat. 



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m adhyAya, 3 pAda, 57. 275 

tributed as well as his aggregate condition. References 
to him in his distributed state are made in the passage, 
' Aupamanyava, whom do you meditate on as the Self? 
He replied : Heaven only, venerable king. He said : The 
Self which you meditate on is the Vairvanara Self called 
Sute^as ; ' and in the following passages [Kh, Up. V, 
12-17). A meditation on him in his aggregate state, on 
the other hand, is referred to in the passage (V, 18), ' Of 
that VaLrvanara Self the head is Sutqfas, the eye VLrva- 
rupa, the breath Prtthagvartman, the trunk Bahula, the 
bladder Rayi, the feet the earth,' &c. — A doubt here arises 
whether the text intimates a meditation on Vatrvanara in 
both his forms or only in his aggregate form. 

The purvapakshin maintains that we have to do with 
meditations on Vaijvanara in his distributed form, firstly , 
because the text exhibits a special verb, viz. ' you meditate 
on,' with reference to each of the limbs, Sute^as and so on ; 
and secondly because the text states special fruits (con- 
nected with each special meditation) in the passage, 
'Therefore every kind of Soma libation is seen in your 
house,' and the later similar passages. 

To this we make the following reply. We must sup- 
pose that the entire section aims at intimating ' the pre- 
eminence,' i. e. at intimating as its pre-eminent subject, a 
meditation on ' plenitude,' i. e. on Vauvanara in his aggre- 
gate state, who comprises within himself a plurality of 
things ; not a number of special meditations on the limbs 
of VaLrvanara. ' As in the case of sacrifices.' In the same 
way as the Vedic texts referring to sacrifices such as the 
darcapurcamasa aim at enjoining the performance of the 
entire sacrifice only, i. e. of the chief sacrificial action to- 
gether with its members — and not in addition the perform- 
ance of single subordinate members such as the praya^as, 
nor again the performance of the chief action together with 
some of its subordinate members; so it is here also. — 
But whence do you know that 'plenitude' is the pre- 
eminent topic of the passage? — It is shown by scripture, 
we reply, since we apprehend that the entire section forms 
a connected whole. For on examining the connexion of 

T 2 



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276 vedAnta-sOtras. 



the parts we find that the entire section has for its subject 
the knowledge of VaLrvanara. The text at first informs 
us that six Rishis — Pra£inarala, &c, up to Uddalaka — 
being unable to reach a firm foundation in the knowledge 
of VaLrvanara, went to the king Ajvapati Kaikeya ; goes 
on to mention the object of each ^j'shi's meditation, viz. 
the sky and so on ; determines that the sky and so on are 
only the head and so on of VaLrvanara — in the passage 
' he said : that is but the head of the Self/ and the later 
similar passages ; — and thereupon rejects all meditations 
on Vaijvanara in his distributed form, in the passage, 'Your 
head would have fallen if you had not come to me,' and 
so on. Finally having discarded all distributed meditation 
it turns to the meditation on the aggregate VaLrvanara and 
declares that all results rest on him only, ' he eats food in 
all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs.' — That the text 
mentions special fruits for the special meditations on 
Sute,fas and so on we have, in accordance with our view, 
to explain as meaning that the results of the subordinate 
meditations are to be connected in their aggregate with 
the principal meditation. And that the text exhibits a 
special verb — ' you do meditate ' — in connexion with each 
member is not meant to enjoin special meditations on those 
members, but merely to make additional remarks about 
something which has another purpose (i. e. about the medi- 
tation on the aggregate VaLrvanara). — For all these reasons 
the view according to which the text enjoins a meditation 
on the aggregate VaLrvanara only is preferable. 

Some commentators here establish the conclusion that 
the meditation on the aggregate VaLrvanara is the prefer- 
able alternative, but assume, on the ground of the Sutra 
employing the term ' pre-eminence ' only, that the Siltra- 
kara allows also the alternative of distributed meditation. 
But this is inadmissible, since it is improper to assume 
a 'split of the sentence' (i.e. to ascribe to a passage a 
double meaning), as long as the passage may be under- 
stood as having one meaning only. Their interpretation, 
moreover, contradicts those passages which expressly blame 
distributed meditations; such as 'Thy head would have 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 58. 277 

fallen.' And as the conclusion of the section clearly in- 
timates a meditation on the aggregate Vatrvanara, the 
negation of such meditation could not be maintained as 
ptirvapaksha 1 . The term ' pre-eminence ' which the Sutra 
employs may moreover be explained as meaning (not mere 
preferability, but exclusive) authoritativeness. 

58. (The vidyas are) separate, on account of the 
difference of words and the like. 

In the preceding adhikarawa we have arrived at the con- 
clusion that a meditation on Vairvanara as a whole is the 
pre-eminent meaning of the text, although special results 
are stated for meditations on Sute^as and so on. On the 
ground of this it may be presumed that other medita- 
tions also which are enjoined by separate scriptural 
texts have to be combined into more general medita- 
tions. Moreover, we cannot acknowledge a separation of 
vidyas (acts of cognition ; meditations) as long as the 
object of cognition is the same ; for the object constitutes 
the character of a cognition in the same way as the 
material offered and the divinity to which the offering is 
made constitute the character of a sacrifice. Now we 
understand that the Lord forms the only object of cog- 
nition in a number of scriptural passages, although the 
latter are separate in enunciation; cp. e.g. 'He con- 
sisting of mind, whose body is prawa' (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, a); 
' Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha ' (Kh. Up. IV, to, 5) ; 
' He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true ' (Kh. 
Up. VIII, 7, 3). Analogously one and the same Pra«a is 
referred to in different texts ; cp. ' Prawa indeed is the 
end of all ' (Kh. Up. IV, 3, 3) ; ' Prawa indeed is the oldest 
and the best ' (Kh. Up. V, 1, 1) ; ' Pra«a is father, Prawa is 
mother' (Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1). And from the unity of the 
object of cognition there follows unity of cognition. Nor 

1 YadobhayatropSstisiddhSiitas tada" vyastop&stir evdtra satna- 
stopastir eva va purvapaksha/l syan nadya ity aba, spash/e £eti, 
dvitfy&r ka. tatrayukto vakyopakramasthavyastopastidhfvirodhat. 
An. Gi. 



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278 vedanta-sOtras. 



can it be said that, on this view, the separateness of the 
different scriptural statements would be purposeless, since 
each text serves to set forth other qualities (of the one 
pradhana which is their common subject). Hence the 
different qualities which are enjoined in one's own and in 
other Sakhas, and which all belong to one object of know- 
ledge, must be combined so that a totality of cognition 
may be effected. 

To this conclusion we reply, ' Separate/ &c. Although 
the object of cognition is one, such cognitions must be 
considered as separate 'on account of the difference of 
words and the like.' — For the text exhibits a difference of 
words such as 'he knows,' 'let him meditate,' 'let him 
form the idea' (cp. Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1). And difference of 
terms is acknowledged as a reason of difference of acts, 
according to Purva Mimawsa-sutras II, a, 1. — The clause 
'and the like' in the Sutra intimates that also qualities 
and so on may be employed, according to circumstances, 
as reasons for the separateness of acts. — But, an objection 
is raised, from passages such as ' he knows ' and so on we 
indeed apprehend a difference of words, but not a difference 
of sense such as we apprehend when meeting with such 
clauses as 'he sacrifices' and the like (ya^ate, ^nhoti, 
dadati). For all these words (viz. veda, uplsita, &c) 
denote one thing only, viz. a certain activity of the mind, 
and another meaning is not possible in their case 1 . How 
then does difference of vidya follow from difference of 
words? — This objection is without force, we reply; for 
although all those words equally denote a certain activity 
of the mind only, yet a difference of vidya may result from 
a difference of connexion. The Lord indeed is the only 
object of meditation in the passages quoted, but according 
to its general purport each passage teaches different 
qualities of the Lord ; and similarly, although one and the 
same Prawa is the object of meditation in the other series 

1 Vedop4sitety£duabdanai» kvsuiig gt&nzm kvaiid dhyanam ity 
arthabhedam Irankya ^Sanasy&vidheyatvad vidhtyamanam upasa- 
nam evety aha arthantareti. An. Gi. 



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in adhyAya, 3 pAda, 58. 279 

of passages, yet one of his qualities has to be meditated 
upon in one place and another in another place. From 
difference of connexion there thus follows difference of 
injunction, and from the latter we apprehend the separate- 
ness of the vidyas. Nor can it be maintained (as the purva- 
pakshin did) that one of those injunctions is the injunction 
of the vidya itself, while the others enjoin mere qualities ; 
for there is no determining reason (as to which is the vidyd- 
vidhi and which the guwavidhis), and as in each passage 
more than one quality are mentioned it is impossible that 
those passages should enjoin qualities with reference to a 
vidya established elsewhere \ Nor should, in the case of 
the purvapakshin's view being the true one, the qualities 
which are common to several passages, such as 'having 
true wishes,' be repeated more than once. Nor can the 
different sections be combined into one syntactical whole, 
because in each one a certain kind of meditation is en- 
joined on those who have a certain wish, whence we 
understand that the passage is complete in itself 2 . Nor 
is there in the present case an additional injunction of a 
meditation on something whole — such as there is in the 
case of the cognition of the Vauvanara — owing to the 
force of which the meditations on the single parts which 
are contained in each section would combine themselves 
into a whole. And if on the ground of the object of cog- 
nition being one we should admit unity of vidya without 
any restriction, we should thereby admit an altogether im- 
possible combination of all qualities (mentioned anywhere 
in the Upanishads). The Sutra therefore rightly declares 
the separateness of the vidyas. — The present adhikara/za 
being thus settled, the first Sutra of the pada has now to 
be considered 8 . 

1 For to enjoin in one passage several qualities — none of which is 
established already — would involve an objectionable vakyabheda. 

* A sentence is to be combined with another one into a larger 
whole only if the sentences are not complete in themselves but 
evince an akahksbl, a desire of complementation. 

* I.e. the present adhikarawa ought in reality to head the entire 
pada. 



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280 vedAnta-sOtras. 



59. There is (restriction to) option (between the 
vidyas), on account of their having non-differing 
results. 

The difference of the vidyas having been determined, we 
now enter on an inquiry whether, according to one's liking, 
there should be cumulation of the different vidyas or option 
between them ; or else restriction to an optional proceed- 
ing (to the exclusion of cumulation). For restriction to 
cumulation (which might be mentioned as a third alterna- 
tive) there is no reason, because the separation of the 
vidyas has been established.— But we observe that in the 
case of the sacrifices, agnihotra, dar.rapur«amasa and so on, 
there is restriction to cumulation (i. e. that those sacrifices 
have all of them to be performed, not optionally one or the 
other) although they are different from each other. — True ; 
but the reason for the obligatory cumulation of those 
sacrifices lies therein that scripture teaches them to be of 
absolute obligation. No scriptural passage, on the other 
hand, teaches the absolute obligatoriness of the vidyas, and 
it cannot therefore be a rule that they must be cumulated. 
— Nor can it be a rule that there must be option between 
them, because a person entitled to one vidya cannot be 
excluded from another vidya. It therefore only remains to 
conclude that one may proceed as one likes. — But — an 
objection is raised — we must rather conclude that option 
between them is the rule, because their fruits are non- 
different. For vidyas such as ' He who consists of mind, 
whose body is praaa ; ' ' Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha;' 
' He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true,' have 
all of them equally the obtaining of the Lord for their fruit. 
— This does not affect our conclusion ; for we see that it is 
allowed to proceed as one likes also with regard to certain 
sacrificial acts which are the means of obtaining the 
heavenly world, and thus have all of them the same result. 
It therefore remains a settled conclusion that in the case of 
vidyas one may proceed as one likes. 

To this we reply as follows. There must be option 
between the vidyas, not cumulation, because they have the 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 6l. 28 1 

same fruit For the fruit of all of them is the intuition of 
the object meditated upon, and when this object, e. g. the 
Lord, has once been intuited through one meditation a 
second meditation would be purposeless. It would, more- 
over, be impossible even to effect an intuition through the 
cumulation of several meditations, since that would cause 
distraction of attention. And that the fruit of a vidya is 
to be effected through intuition various scriptural passages 
declare ; cp. Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 4, ' He who has this faith 
and no doubt ; ' Br*. Up. IV, 1,3,' Having become a god 
he goes to the gods,' and others. Also Smrz'ti-passages 
such as Bha Gita VIII, 6, and others. — One therefore has to 
select one of those vidyas the fruit of which is the same, 
and to remain intent on it until, through the intuition of 
the object to be meditated upon, the fruit of the vidya is 
obtained. 

60. But (vidyas) connected with wishes may, 
according to one's liking, be cumulated or not ; on 
account of the absence of the former reason. 

The above Sutra supplies a counter-instance to the 
preceding Sutra. — We have, on the other hand, vidyas 
connected with definite wishes ; as e. g. Kh. Up. Ill, 15, 2, 
' He who knows that the wind is the child of the regions 
never weeps for his sons;' Kh. Up. VII, 1, 5, ' He who 
meditates on name as Brahman, walks at will as far as 
name reaches.' In these vidyas which, like actions, effect 
their own special results by means of their ' unseen ' Self, 
there is no reference to any intuition, and one therefore 
may, according to one's liking, either cumulate them or 
not cumulate them ; ' on account of the absence of the 
former reason,' i. e. because there is not the reason for 
option which was stated in the preceding Sutra. 

61. With the (meditations on) members (of sacri- 
ficial acts) it is as with their abodes. 

Are those meditations — enjoined in the three Vedas — 
which rest on members of sacrificial actions such as the 



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282 vedAnta-sOtras. 



udgitha to be superadded to each other, or may we proceed 
with regard to them as we like ? — To this doubt the Sutra 
replies, ' it is according to the abodes.' As the abiding- 
places of those meditations, viz. the Stotra and so on, are 
combined (for the performance of the sacrifice), so those 
meditations also. For a meditation is subject to what it 
rests on. 

62. And on account of the teaching. 

As the Stotra and the other members of the sacrifice on 
which the meditations under discussion rest are taught in 
the three Vedas, so also the meditations resting on them. 
The meaning of this remark is that also as far as the mode 
of information is concerned there is no difference between 
the members of a sacrificial act and the meditations refer- 
ring to them. 

63. On account of the rectification. 

The passage, 'From the seat of the Hotri he sets right 
any mistake committed in the udgitha ' (Kh. Up. I, $, 5), 
declares that, owing to the might of the meditation on the 
unity of prawava and udgitha, the Hotr* sets right any 
mistake he may commit in his work, by means of the work 
of the Hotri. 

Now, as a meditation mentioned in one Veda is con- 
nected (with what is mentioned in another Veda) in the 
same way as a thing mentioned in another Veda, the 
above passage suggests the conclusion that all meditations 
on members of sacrificial acts — in whatever Veda they may 
be mentioned — have to be combined 1 . 

64. And because the text states a quality (of the 
vidya) to be common (to the three Vedas). 

The text states that the syllable Om which is a quality, 

1 A ' thing' belonging to the i?/'g-veda, viz. the prawava, is, accord- 
ing to the A'Mndogya-passage, connected with the SSma-veda 
meditation on the udgitha. Hence meditations also which belong 
to different Vedas may be combined; for there is no difference 
between them and things as far as connexion is concerned. 



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in adhvAya, 3 pAda, 65. 283 

i. e. the abode of a meditation, is common to the three 
Vedas, ' By that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds. 
With Om the Adhvaryu gives orders, with Om the Hotri 
recites, with Om the UdgarW sings.' This suggests that, 
as the abode of the vidya (viz. the Owzkara) is common, 
the vidyas which abide in it are common also. — Or else 
the Sutra may be explained as follows. If the udgitha 
and so on, which are matters qualifying the sacrificial 
action, were not all of them common to all sacrificial 
performances, the vidyas resting on them would not go 
together. But the scriptural passages which teach the 
sacrificial performances and extend over all subordinate 
matters, state that the udgitha and so on are common to 
all performances. As thus the abodes of the vidyas go 
together, the vidyas abiding in them go together likewise. 

65. (The meditations on members of sacrificial 
actions are) rather not (to be combined), as the text 
does not state their going together. 

The words ' rather not ' discard the purvapaksha. The 
meditations resting on members of actions are not to be 
treated like what they rest on, because scripture does not 
state their going together. Scripture actually states the 
going together of the Stotras and other subordinate 
members of sacrificial action which are enjoined in the 
three Vedas; cp. passages such as 'After the taking of 
the graha or the raising of the £amasa he performs the 
Stotra ; ' ' After the Stotra he recites ; ' ' Prastotri sing the 
Saman;' 'Hotr* recite the Ya^ya for this;' and so on. 
But, on the other hand, there are no analogous texts 
expressly teaching the going together of the meditations. — 
But the going together of the meditations is established 
by those texts which intimate the successive performance 
of the different constituent members of a sacrifice ! — By 
no means, we reply. The meditations subserve the end 
of man, while the texts referred to by you establish only 
the going together of the udgitha and the like which 
subserve the purpose of the sacrifice. That the medita- 
tions on the udgitha and so on — although resting on 



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284 vedAnta-sOtras. 



members of sacrificial acts — yet subserve the end of man 
only in the same way as the godohana vessel does, we 
have already explained under III, 3, 4a. — And this very 
difference between members of sacrificial action and the 
meditations resting on them, viz. that the former subserve 
the purpose of the sacrifice while the latter subserve the 
end of man, is founded on the express teaching of 
scripture 1 . — And the further two indicatory marks (pointed 
out by the purvapakshin in Sutras 6$ and 64) supply no 
reason for the going together of the meditations, because 
no direct scriptural statement may be constructed from 
them. Nor * does the fact that in each sacrificial perform- 
ance all foundations of meditations are comprised, enable 
us to conclude that the meditations founded on them are 
to be combined also ; for the meditations are not caused 
by what they rest on. The meditations, as resting on 
their foundations, would, it may be admitted, not exist 
if those foundations did not exist But therefrom it does 
not follow that the going together of the foundations 
implies a necessary going together of the meditations ; for 
as to this we have no direct scriptural statement — From 
all this it results that the meditations may be performed 
according to one's liking. 

66. And because (scripture) shows it. 

Scripture moreover shows that the meditations do not 
go together, viz. in the following passage, 'A Brahman 
priest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer, 
and all the priests' (Kh. Up. IV, 17, 10). For if all 
meditations were to be combined, all priests would know 
them all, and the text could not specially announce that 
the Brahman priest possessing a certain knowledge 
thereby saves the others. — The meditations may there- 
fore, according to one's liking, be either combined or 
optionally employed. 

1 A remark refuting the averment made in Sutra 62. 
* And this is meant to refute the second interpretation given of 
Sutra 64. 



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in adhyAya, 4 pAda, 2. 285 

FOURTH PADA. 
Reverence to the highest Self ! 

1. The purpose of man (is effected) thence (i. e. 
through the mere knowledge of Brahman), thus 
Badaraya#a opines. 

The Sdtrakara at present enters on an inquiry whether 
the knowledge of the Self which is derived from the 
Upanishads, is connected with works through him who is 
entitled to perform the works 1 , or is an independent means 
to accomplish the purpose of man. He begins by stating 
the final view in the above Sutra, 'Thence' &c. The 
teacher Badarayana is of opinion that thence, i. e. through 
the independent knowledge of Brahman enjoined in the 
Vedanta-texts, the purpose of man is effected. — Whence 
is this known ? — ' From scripture,' which exhibits passages 
such as the following : 'He who knows the Self overcomes 
grief (Kh. Up. Ill, 4, 1); 'He who knows that highest 
Brahman becomes even Brahman ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9) ; 
' He who knows Brahman attains the Highest ' (Taitt. Up. 
II, 1) ; ' For him who has a teacher there is delay only so 
long as he is not delivered ; then he will be perfect ' (Kh. 
Up. VI, 14, 2) ; ' He who has searched out and under- 
stands the Self which is free from sin, &c. &c, obtains 
all worlds and all desires' (Kh. Up. VIJJ, 7, 1); 'The Self 
is to be seen ' &c. up to ' Thus far goes immortality ' (Br/. 
Up. IV, 5, 6-15). These and similar texts declare that 
mere knowledge effects the purpose of man. — Against this 
the opponent raises his voice as follows. 

2. On account of (the Self) standing in a supple- 
mentary relation (to action), (the statements as to 

1 The purvapakshin (see next Sutra) maintains that the know- 
ledge of the Self is subordinate to (sacrificial) action through the 
mediation of the agent, i. e. in so far as it imparts to the agent a 
certain qualification. 



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286 vedanta-sCtras. 



the fruits of the knowledge of the Self) are artha- 
vadas, as in other cases, thus Gaimini opines. 

As the Self, in consequence of its being the agent, stands 
in a supplementary relation to action, the knowledge of the 
Self also is connected with action through the mediation of 
its object, analogously to the case of the sprinkling of the 
rice-grains with water ; hence as the purpose of the know- 
ledge of the Self is understood thereby, the statements of 
the text about the fruits of that knowledge are mere artha- 
vadas. Such is the opinion of the teacher G'aimini \ The 
case is analogous to that of other textual statements as to 
the fruits of certain materials, sawzskaras and works ; which 
statements have likewise to be understood as arthavadas. 
Cp. the passage, 'He whose sacrificial ladle is made of 
parwa-wood hears no evil sound ; ' ' By anointing his eye 
he wards off the eye of the enemy ; ' ' By making the 
praya^a and anuya^a-oblations he makes an armour for 
the sacrifice, an armour for the sacrificer so that he over- 
comes his enemies 2 .' — But how can it be supposed that 

1 The contention of the purvapakshin — Gaimini — is that the 
knowledge of the Self has no independent fruit of its own, because 
it stands in a subordinate relation to sacrificial action. This rela- 
tion is mediated by the Self — the object of knowledge — which is 
the agent in all action, and therefore itself stands in a subordinate 
relation to action. By learning that his Self will outlive the body 
the agent becomes qualified for actions, the fruit of which will 
only appear after death. The qualification the Self thus acquires 
is analogous to that which the rice-grains acquire by being sprinkled 
with water ; for only through this latter act of ceremonial modifica- 
tion (or purification, sawskara) they become fit to be used in the 
sacrifice. — As the knowledge of the Self thus has no independent 
position, it cannot have an independent fruit of its own, and con- 
sequently the passages which state such fruits cannot be taken as 
'injunctions of fruits,' but merely as arthavadas, making some 
additional statement about the fruit of the sacrificial actions to 
which the knowledge of the Self is auxiliary. 

' The material, i. e. the ladle made of par«a-wood, is auxiliary 
to the sacrifice, and the fruit which the text ascribes to it (viz. 
hearing no evil sound) therefore has to be viewed as a fruit of 



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in adhyAya, 4 pAda, 2. 287 

the knowledge of the Self which the text does not exhibit 
under any special heading can enter into sacrificial action 
as a subordinate member, without the presence of any of 
the means of proof — general subject-matter and so on — 
which determine such subordinate relation? — The purva- 
pakshin may reply that the knowledge of the Self enters 
into sacrificial action through the mediation of the agent, 
on the ground of the means of proof called vakya 
(sentence ; syntactical unity) 1 . But this we deny because 
in the present case 'sentence' has no force to teach the 
application (of the knowledge of the Self to the sacri- 
fices, as a subordinate member of the latter). Things 
which the text states under no particular heading may 
indeed be connected with the sacrifice on the ground of 
'sentence,' through some intermediate link which is not 
of too wide an application 2 ; but the agent is an inter- 
mediate link of too wide an application, since it is common 
to all action whether worldly or based on the Veda. The 
agent cannot therefore be used as a mediating link to 
establish the connexion of the knowledge of the Self with 
the sacrifice. — Your objection is not valid, the purva- 
pakshin replies, since the knowledge of a Self different 
from the body is of no use anywhere but in works based 
on the Veda. For such knowledge is of no use in worldly 
works, in all of which the activity may be shown to be 
guided by visible purposes ; with reference to Vedic works, 
on the other hand, whose fruits manifest themselves only 
after the death of this body no activity would be possible 

the entire sacrifice. Analogously in the case of the saaisk&ra — 
the anointing — which fits the sacrificer for performing the sacrifice, 
and in the case of the prayi^as and anuya^as which are merely 
subordinate members of the darjrapurwamasa. 

1 The entire Veda constituting an extended syntactical whole, 
in which the agent is the same. 

* Thus the quality of being made of parwa-wood is connected 
with the sacrifices on the ground of the vakya implied in 'yasya 
parwamayt guhfir bhavati,' because here we have as an intermediate 
link the guhu, i. e. a special implement which is used at sacrifices 
only, and therefore is not of too wide an application. 



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288 vedAnta-sAtras. 



were it not for the knowledge of a Self separate from the 
body, and such knowledge therefore has its uses there. — 
But, another objection is raised, from attributes given to 
the Self, such as ' free from sin,' and the like, it appears 
that the doctrine of the Upanishads refers to that Self 
which stands outside the sawsara and cannot therefore 
be subordinate to activity. — This objection too is without 
force ; for what the Upanishads teach as the object of 
cognition is just the transmigrating Self, which is clearly 
referred to in such terms as 'dear' (Br*. Up. II, 4, 5). 
Attributes such as being free from sin, on the other hand, 
may be viewed as aiming merely at the glorification of 
that Self. — tBut in more than one place Brahman, the 
cause of the world, which is additional to the trans- 
migrating Self and itself not subject to transmigration 
has been established, and the Upanishads teach that this 
very Brahman constitutes the real nature of the trans- 
migrating Self! — True, that has been established; but 
in order to confirm that doctrine, objections and their 
refutation are again set forth with reference to the question 
as to the fruit (of the knowledge of the Self). 

3. On account of scripture showing (certain lines 
of) conduct. 

' kanaka the king of the Videhas sacrificed with a sacri- 
fice at which many presents were given to the priests' (Br*. 
Up. Ill, 1, 1); 'Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice' 
(Kh. Up. V, 11, 5); these and similar passages — which 
occur in sections that have another purport — show that 
those who know Brahman are connected with sacrificial 
action also. And similarly we apprehend from the fact 
that according to scripture Uddalaka and others taught 
their sons and so on, that they were connected with the 
condition of life of householders. If mere knowledge could 
effect the purpose of man, why should the persons men- 
tioned have performed works troublesome in many respects? 
' If a man would find honey in the Arka tree why should 
he go to the forest ? ' 



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in adhyAya, 4 pAda, 7. 289 

4. Because scripture directly states that. 
'What a man does with knowledge, faith and the 

Upanishad is more powerful' (Kh. Up. I, i, 10); this 
passage directly states that knowledge is subordinate to 
work 1 , and from this it follows that mere knowledge 
cannot effect the purpose of man. 

5. On account of the taking hold together. 
'Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of 

him' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 2); as this passage shows that 
knowledge and work begin together to manifest their 
fruits, it follows that knowledge is not independent. 

6. And because scripture enjoins (works) for such 
(only as understand the purport of the Veda). 

' He who has learnt (lit. " read ") the Veda from a family 
of teachers, according to the sacred injunction, in the 
leisure time left from the duties to be performed for the 
Guru ; who after having received his discharge has settled 
in his own house, studying his sacred texts in some sacred 
spot' (Kh. Up. VIII, 15); such passages also show that 
those who know the purport of the whole Veda are qualified 
for sacrificial action, and that hence knowledge does not 
independently bring about a result. — But the expression 
' who has read ' directly states only that the Veda is read, 
not that its purport is understood ! — Not so, we reply. The 
reading of the Veda extends up to the comprehension of 
its purport, as thus the reading has a visible purpose 2 . 

7. And on account of definite rules. 

' Performing works here (i. e. in this life) let a man wish 
to live a hundred years ; thus work will not cling to thee, 
man ; there is no other way than that' (Ira. Up. a) ; ' The 

1 For the instrumental case ' vidyaya" ' directly represents know- 
ledge as a means of work. 

1 According to the Mfmazas& principle that, wherever possible, 
actions enjoined must be understood to have a visible purpose 
(a supersensuous result being admitted only where no visible result 
can be made out). 

[38] u 



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290 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Agnihotra is a sattra lasting up to old age and death ; for 
through old age one is freed from it or through death' 
(Sat. Bra. XII, 4, 1, 1) ; from such definite rules also it 
follows that knowledge is merely supplementary to works. 
Against all these objections the Sutrakara upholds his 
view in the following Stitra. 

8. But on account of (scripture teaching) the 
additional one (i.e. the Lord), (the view) of Badara- 
ya«a (is valid) ; as that is seen thus (in scriptural 
passages). 

The word ' but ' discards the purvapaksha. — The assertion 
made in Sutra 2 cannot be maintained ' on account of the 
text teaching the additional one.' If the Vedanta-texts 
taught that the transmigrating embodied Self which is an 
agent and enjoyer is something different from the mere 
body, the statements as to the fruit of the knowledge of 
the Self would, for the reasons indicated above, be mere 
arthavadas. But what the Vedanta-texts really teach as 
the object of knowledge is something different from the 
embodied Self, viz. the non-transmigrating Lord who is 
free from all attributes of transmigratory existence such as 
agency and the like and distinguished by freedom from sin 
and so on, the highest Self. And the knowledge of that Self 
does not only not promote action but rather cuts all action 
short, as will be declared in Sutra 16. . Hence the view 
of the reverend Badarayawa which was stated in Sfltra 1 
remains valid and cannot be shaken by fallacious reasoning 
about the subordination of knowledge to action and the 
like. That the Lord who is superior to the embodied 
Self is the Self many scriptural texts declare ; compare 
' He who perceives all and knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) ; 
' From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun 
rises' (Taitt. Up. II, 8); 'It is a great terror, a raised 
thunderbolt' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 3); 'By the command of that 
imperishable one, O Gargt' (Br*. Up. Ill, 8, 9); 'It 
thought, may I be many, may I grow forth: It sent forth 
fire' (KA. Up. VI, a, 3). There are indeed passages in 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 9. 29 1 

which the transmigrating Self— hinted at by such terms as 
' dear ' — is referred to as the object of knowledge, such as 
* But for the love of the Self everything is dear. Verily 
the Self is to be seen' (Br*. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He who 
breathes in the up-breathing he is thy Self and within all ' 
(Br*. Up. Ill, 4, 1); 'The person that is seen in the eye 
that is thy Self,' up to ' But I shall explain him further to 
you' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7 ff.). But as there are at the same 
time complementary passages connected with the passages 
quoted above — viz. 'There has been breathed forth from 
this great Being the ff*'g-veda, Ya^ur-veda,' &c. (Br*. Up. 
II, 4, 10) ; * He who overcomes hunger and thirst, sorrow, 
passion, old age and death ' (Br*. Up. Ill, 5, 1) ; ' Having 
approached the highest light he appears in his own form. 
That is the highest person' (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3) — which 
aim at giving instruction about the superior Self; it follows 
that the two sets of passages do not mean to* teach an 
absolute difference of the two Selfs and that thus con- 
tradiction is avoided. For the Self of the highest Lord is 
the real nature of the embodied Self, while the state of 
being embodied is due to the limiting adjuncts, as appears 
from scriptural passages such as ' Thou art that ; ' ' There 
is no other seer but he.' All which has been demonstrated 
by us at length in the earlier parts of this commentary in 
more than one place. 

9. But the declarations (of scripture) are equal 
(on the other side). 

In reply to the averment made in Sutra 3, we point out 
that there are declarations of scripture, of equal weight, 
in favour of the view that knowledge is not complementary 
to action. For there are scriptural passages such as, 
' Knowing this the rishis descended from Kavasha said : 
For what purpose should we study the Veda? for what 
purpose should we sacrifice? Knowing this indeed the 
Ancient ones did not offer the Agnihotra ; ' and ' When 
Brahma»as know that Self and have risen above the desire 
for sons, wealth, and worlds, they wander about as men- 
dicants' (Br*. Up. Ill, 5). Scripture moreover shows that 

U 2 



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292 vedAnta-sCtras. 



Y^fwavalkya and others who knew Brahman did not take 
their stand on works. 'Thus far goes immortality. Having 
said so Ya.fwavalkya went away into the forest ' (Bri. Up. 
IV, 5, 15). With reference to the indicatory sign (as to 
the dependence of knowledge to work) which is implied 
in the passage, ' Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice,' we 
remark that it belongs to a section which treats of Vai^va- 
nara. Now, the text may declare that a vidya of Brahman 
as limited by adjuncts is accompanied by works ; but all 
the same the vidya does not stand in a subordinate relation 
to works since 'leading subject-matter' and the other 
means of proof are absent. 
We now reply to the averment made in Sutra 4. 

10. (The direct statement is) non-comprehensive. 

The direct scriptural statement implied in ' What a man 
does with knowledge ' &c. does not refer to all knowledge, 
as it is connected with the knowledge forming the subject- 
matter of the section. And the latter is the knowledge of 
the udgttha only, ' Let a man meditate on the syllable Om 
(as) the udgttha.' 

11. There is distribution (of the work and know- 
ledge) as in the case of the hundred. 

In reply to the averment (Sutra 5) that the passage, 
' Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of him,' 
indicates the non-independence of knowledge, we point out 
that the passage must be understood in a distributed sense, 
knowledge taking hold of one man and work of another. 
The case is analogous to that of the ' hundred.' When it 
is said, ' Let a hundred be given to these two men,' the 
hundred are divided in that way that fifty are given to one 
man and fifty to the other. — Moreover what the text says 
about the laying hold does not refer to him who is about 
to obtain final release ; for the concluding passage, ' So 
much for the man who desires,' indicates that the whole 
section refers to the soul implicated in the sawzsara, and 
a new beginning is made for him who is about to be 
released, in the clause, ' But as to the man who does not 



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in adhyAya, 4 pAda, 13. 293 

desire.' The clause about the laying hold thus comprises 
all knowledge which falls within the sphere of the trans- 
migrating soul whether it be enjoined or prohibited \ since 
there is no reason for distinction, and to all action whether 
enjoined or prohibited, the clause embodying a reference 
to knowledge and work as established elsewhere. And on 
this interpretation there is room for the clause even without 
our having recourse to the distribution of knowledge and 
work. 
The next Sutra replies to the averment made in Sutra 6. 

12. Of him who has merely read the Veda (there 
is qualification for works). 

As the clause, ' Having learnt (read) the Veda from 
a family of teachers,' speaks only of the reading, we de- 
termine that acts are there enjoined for him who has 
only read the Veda. — But from this it would follow that 
on account of being destitute of knowledge such a person 
would not be qualified for works ! — Never mind ; we do 
not mean to deny that the understanding of sacrificial acts 
which springs from the reading of the texts is the cause 
of qualification for their performance; we only wish to 
establish that the knowledge of the Self derived from the 
Upanishads is seen to have an independent purpose of its 
own and therefore does not supply a reason of qualification 
for acts. Analogously a person who is qualified for one 
act does not require the knowledge of another act. 

Against the reasoning of Sutra 7 we make the following 
remark. 

1 3. There being no specification (the rule does) 
not (specially apply to him who knows). 

In passages such as ' Performing works here let a man 
live ' &c, which state definite rules, there is no specification 



1 Pratishiddhi kz nagnastrfdawanddirupS. An. Gi. — Pratishid- 
dhi £a yathtsaiMistradhigamanalakshawa (not ' yatha saiMsUtra ' 
as in the Biblioth. Indica edition). Bh&matt. 



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294 vedAnta-sAtras. 



of him who knows, since the definite rule is enjoined with- 
out any such specification. 

14. Or else the permission (of works) is for the 
glorification (of knowledge). 

The passage 'Performing works here' may be treated 
in another way also. Even if, owing to the influence of 
the general subject-matter, only he who knows is to be 
viewed as he who performs works, yet the permission to 
perform works must be viewed as aiming at the glorifica- 
tion of knowledge ; as appears from the subsequent clause, 
' no work clings to the man.' The meaning of the entire 
passage thus is : To a man who knows no work will cling, 
should he perform works during his whole life even, owing 
to the power of knowledge. And this clearly glorifies 
knowledge. 

15. Some also by proceeding according to their 
liking (evince their disregard of anything but know- 
ledge). 

Moreover some who know, having obtained the intuition 
of the fruit of knowledge, express, in reliance thereon, the 
purposelessness of the means of all other results, viz. by 
proceeding according to their liking (and abandoning those 
means). A scriptural text of the Va#asaneyins runs as 
follows : * Knowing this the people of old did not wish for 
offspring. What shall we do with offspring, they said, we 
who have this Self and this world ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, aa). 
And that the fruit of knowledge, being present to intuition, 
does not manifest itself at a later time only as the fruits 
of actions do, we have explained more than once. From 
this also it follows that knowledge is not subordinate to 
action, and that the scriptural statements as to the fruit of 
knowledge cannot be taken in any but their true sense. 

16. And (scripture teaches) the destruction (of 
the qualification for works, by knowledge). 

Moreover scripture teaches that this whole apparent 
world — which springs from Nescience, is characterised by 



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in adhyAya, 4 pAda, i 8. 295 

actions, agents and results of actions and is the cause of 
all qualification for works — is essentially destroyed by the 
power of knowledge. Compare such passages as 'But 
when all has become the Self of him, wherewith should 
he see another, wherewith should he smell another ? ' (Bri. 
Up. IV, 5, 15). For him now who should teach that the 
qualification for works has for its necessary antecedent the 
knowledge of the Self which the Vedanta-texts teach, it 
would follow that the qualification for works is cut short 
altogether. From this also it follows that knowledge is 
independent. 

17. And (knowledge belongs) to those who are 
bound to chastity ; for in scripture (that condition of 
life is mentioned). 

Scripture shows that knowledge is valid also for those 
stages of life for which chastity is prescribed. Now in 
their case knowledge cannot be subordinate to work 
because work is absent ; for the works prescribed by the 
Veda such as the Agnihotra are no longer performed by 
men who have reached those stages. — But, an objection is 
raised, those stages of life are not even mentioned in the 
Veda ! — This is not so, we reply. Certain Vedic passages 
clearly intimate them ; so e. g. ' There are three branches 
of the law ' (Kh. Up. II, 23, 1) ; ' Those who in the forest 
practise faith and austerity' (Kh. Up. V, 10, 1); 'Those 
who practise penance and faith in the forest ' (Mu. Up. I, 
10, 11); 'Wishing for that world only mendicants wander 
forth ' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23) ; ' Let him wander forth at once 
from the state of studentship.' — That the stages requiring 
chastity are open to men whether they have reached house- 
holdership or not, and whether they have paid the debts (of 
procreating a son, &c.) or not, is known from scripture 
and Smn'ti. Herefrom also follows the independence of 
knowledge. 

18. <7aimini (considers that scriptural passages 
mentioning those stages of life in which chastity is 
obligatory, contain) a reference (only to those stages) ; 



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296 vedAnta-sAtras. 



they are not injunctions ; for (other scriptural pas- 
sages) forbid (those stages). 

The Vedic texts which have been quoted to the end of 
showing the existence of the stages of life on which chastity 
is binding — such as ' There are three branches of the law ' 
and so on — have no power to establish those stages. For 
the teacher Gaimini is of opinion that those passages 
contain only a reference to the other stages of life, not an 
injunction (of them). — Why? — Because they contain no 
words expressive of injunction such as imperative verbal 
forms, and because each of them is seen to have some 
other purport. In the passage, ' There are three ' &c, the 
text at first refers to three stages of life (' Sacrifice, study, 
and charity are the first ' &c. &c), thereupon declares them 
not to have unbounded results (' All these obtain the world 
of the blessed '), and finally glorifies ' the state of being 
grounded on Brahman ' as having unbounded results 
('the Brahmasa#*stha obtains immortality'). — But is not 
a mere reference even sufficient to intimate the existence 
of those stages of life ? — True ; but they are established 
(enjoined) not by direct scriptural statements, but only by 
Snv«ti and custom, and therefore when contradicted by 
direct scriptural statement * are either to be disregarded or 
else to be viewed as concerning those who (for some reason 
or other) are disqualified (for active worship, sacrifices and 
the like). — But together with the stages demanding chastity 
the text refers to the condition of the householder also *. 
(' Sacrifice, study, and charity are the first.') — True ; but the 
existence of the state of the householder is established (not 
by that passage but) by other scriptural passages, viz. those 
which enjoin on the householder certain works such as the 
Agnihotra. Hence the reference in the passage under 
discussion aims at glorification only, not at injunction. 

1 Such as that concerning the permanent obligation of the Agni- 
hotra and so on. 

1 And we therefore may conclude that those stages are as valid 
as the — notoriously valid — state of householdership. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 9. 297 

Moreover, direct scriptural enunciations forbid other stages 
of life j cp. ' A murderer of the gods is he who removes 
the fire ; ' ' After having brought to thy teacher his proper 
reward do not cut off the line of children ' (Taitt. Up. I, 
11, 1) ; « To him who is without a son the world does not 
belong ; all beasts even know that' — Similarly the passages, 
'Those who in the forest practise faith and austerity' 
{Kh. Up. V, 10, i), and the analogous passage (from the 
Muttdaka), contain instruction not about the other stages 
of life but about the going on the path of the gods. And 
of clauses such as ' austerity is the second ' it is doubtful 
whether they speak of a stage of life at all. And a 
passage like ' Wishing for that world only mendicants 
wander forth,' does not enjoin the wandering forth but 
merely glorifies that world. — But there is at any rate one 
scriptural text which directly and unambiguously enjoins 
the condition of life of the wandering mendicant, viz. the 
one of the Cabalas, ' Let him wander forth at once from 
the state of studentship.' — True, but our discussion is 
carried on without reference to that passage. 

19. (The other stage of life) is to be accom- 
plished, (according to) Badaraya«a ; on account of 
the scriptural statement of equality. 

The teacher Badarayawa is of opinion that that other 
stage of life is something to be accomplished. The view 
that there is a contradiction because the other stage of 
life is stated in the Veda and, on the other hand, works 
such as the Agnihotra must necessarily be performed, and 
that, in order to remove this contradiction, that other 
stage of life must be entered upon by those only who are 
not qualified for active worship, he rejects; being of opinion 
that that other stage is to be entered upon, in the same 
way as the state of the householder, even by him who 
does not wish to do so. — On what ground ? — ' On account 
of the scriptural statement of equality.' For we have 
a passage (viz. 'There are three branches of the law/ &c.) 
which refers equally to that other stage as to the state 
of the householder. As the state of the householder which 



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298 vedanta-sOtras. 



is enjoined in other passages only is here referred to, so 
also that other stage of life. The case is analogous to 
the reference made to the wearing of the sacrificial thread 
round the neck or on the right shoulder — which two modes 
are established in other scriptural passages — in a passage 
the purpose of which it is to enjoin the wearing of the thread 
on the left shoulder. The other stage must therefore be 
entered upon in the same way as the state of the house- 
holder. — Analogously in the passage, ' Wishing for that 
world only mendicants leave their homes,' the last stage 
of life is mentioned together with the study of the Veda, 
sacrifice and so on, and in the passage, ' Those who in the 
forest,' &c, with the knowledge of the five fires. — The 
remark, made above by the purvapakshin, that in such 
passages as ' austerity is the second ' there is unambiguous 
reference to a further stage of life, is without force, since 
there is a reason enabling us to determine what is meant. 
The text proclaims in the beginning that there are three 
subdivisions (' There are three branches of the law '). Now 
the sacrifice and the other duties (which the text enumerates 
subsequently to the introductory clause) can, because they 
are more than three, and rest on separate originative 
injunctions, be comprised within the three branches only 
if they are connected with one of the stages of life. Now 
the terms ' sacrifice ' and so on indicate that the stage 
of householdership constitutes one branch of the law, and 
the term ' Brahma£arin ' clearly denotes another stage ; 
what then remains but to assume that the term ' austerity ' 
also denotes a stage of life, viz. the one in which austerity 
is the chief thing? Analogously the reference to the 
forest — in the passage, 'Those who in the forest,' — indicates 
that by the austerity and faith mentioned there we have to 
understand that stage of life in which austerity and faith 
are the chief thing. — From all this it follows that the 
further stage of life has to be gone through, even if the 
passage under discussion should do nothing but refer to it. 

20. Or (the passage rather is) an injunction, as in 
the case of the carrying (of the firewood). 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20. 299 



Or the passage is rather to be understood as containing 
an injunction, not a mere reference. — But, an objection is 
raised, if we assume it to be an injunction we thereby 
oppose the conception of the entire passage as a coherent 
whole, while yet the passage has clearly to be conceived 
as constituting such a whole, viz. as meaning that while 
the three branches of the law have for their result the 
world of the blessed, the condition of being grounded in 
Brahman has immortality for its result. — True, but all the 
same we must set aside the conception of the passage as 
a whole — well founded as it is — and assume it to be an 
injunction. For it is a new injunction because no other 
injunction is observed, and as the conception of the other 
stage of life clearly arises from the passage it is impossible 
to interpret it as a coherent whole by means of the 
assumption that it is a mere guwavada 1 . 

The case is analogous to that of the ' carrying.' There 
is a scriptural text (relating to the Agnihotra which forms 
part of the mahapitr*ya£-«a), ' Let him approach carrying 
the firewood below (the ladle holding the offering); for 
above he carries it for the gods.' Now this passage may 
be conceived as an unbroken whole if we view it as 
referring to the carrying below only ; nevertheless we 
determine that it enjoins the carrying above because that 



1 In the clause ' vidhyantar4dar.ra.nat ' I can see nothing more 
than an explanation of — or reason for — the ' apftrvatvat.' If we 
viewed the passage as glorifying the brahmasawsthatd compared to 
the three branches of the law through the statement of its super- 
sensuous results (so that it would constitute an arthavada of the 
kind called guwavada), we should indeed preserve the unity of the 
passage — which is destroyed if we view it as enjoining the different 
stages of life. But all the same the latter explanation is the true 
one ; for a glorifkatory passage presupposes an injunctive one, and 
as no such injunctive passage is met with elsewhere, it is simpler 
to assume that the present passage is itself injunctive than to con- 
strue (on the basis of it if viewed as a guwavada) another injunctive 
passage. (In Ananda Giri's gloss on this passage — Biblioth. Indica 
edition — read'vihitatvopagamaprasaktya' and 'stutilaksha«ayaika°.') 



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300 vedanta-sOtras. 



is not enjoined anywhere else 1 . This is explained in the 
chapter treating of ' complement,' in the Sfltra, ' But it is 
an injunction,' &c. (Pu. Mim. Su.). In the same way we 
assume that our passage referring to the different ajramas 
is an injunctory passage only. 

Even if (to state an alternative conclusion) the passage 
contains references only to the other cLrramas, it must be 
viewed as enjoining at any rate the condition of being 
grounded in Brahman, owing to the glorification of that 
condition. The question here arises whether that state 
belongs to any one comprised within the four Irramas, 
or only to the wandering mendicant. If now a reference 
to the mendicant also is contained within the references 
to the Irramas up to the Brahma£arin (i.e. the three 
ajramas the text refers to before the passage about the 
brahmasawstha) ; then, as all four Irramas are referred 
to equally and as somebody not belonging to any Irrama 
could not possibly be called brahmasamstha, it follows that 
the term ' brahmasamstha ' denotes any one standing 
within one of the four axramas. If, on the other hand, 
the mendicant is not comprised within the references to 
the three Irramas, he alone remains, and this establishes 
the conclusion that the brahmasawstha is the mendicant 
only. (We therefore have to inquire which of the two 
alternatives stated has to be adopted.) — Here some 
maintain that the term ' austerity ' which denotes the 
hermit in the woods implies a reference to the mendi- 
cant also. But this is wrong. For as long as any other 
explanation is possible, we must not assume that a term 
which expresses a distinctive attribute of the hermits 
living in the forest comprises the wandering mendicants 
also. Both the Brahma£arin and the householder are 

1 The ekavakyata is preserved if we take the clause from 'above' 
as an arthavada meant to give the reason why in sacrifices offered 
to the Fathers the firewood has to be carried below. Nevertheless 
the clause must be taken as a vidhi enjoining the carrying above in 
all sacrifices offered to the gods, because this particular is not 
enjoined elsewhere. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20. 30I 

referred to by distinctive terms applying to them only, 
and we therefore expect that the mendicant and the 
hermit also should be referred to by analogous terms. 
Now 'austerity' is a distinctive attribute of the hermits 
living in the woods ; for the principal conventional 
meaning of the word 'austerity' is mortification of the 
body. The distinctive attribute of the mendicant, on the 
other hand, viz. restraint of the senses and so on, cannot 
be denoted by the term 'austerity.' Moreover it would 
be an illegitimate assumption that the ajramas which are 
known to be four should here be referred to as three. 
And further the text notifies a distinction, viz. by saying 
that those three reach the world of the blessed, while one 
enjoys immortality. Now there is room for such a distinc- 
tion if the hermits and the mendicants are separate ; for 
we do not say ' Devadatta and Yag wadatta are stupid, but 
one of them is clever,' but we say ' Devadatta and Ya^wa- 
datta are stupid, but Vish«umitra is clever.' The passage 
therefore has to be understood in that sense, that those 
belonging to the three former Irramas obtain the world 
of the blessed, while the remaining one, i. e. the wandering 
mendicant, enjoys immortality. — But how can the term 
' brahmasa/ttstha,' which according to its etymological 
meaning may be applied to members of all Irramas, be 
restricted to the mendicant? and, if we agree to take it 
in its conventional meaning, it follows that immortality 
may be reached by merely belonging to an Irrama, and 
hence that knowledge is useless ! — To these objections we 
make the following reply. The term ' brahmasawstha ' 
denotes fulfilment in Brahman, a state of being grounded 
in Brahman to the exclusion of all other activity. Now 
such a state is impossible for persons belonging to the 
three former Isramas, as scripture declares that they suffer 
loss through the non-performance of the works enjoined 
on their ajxama. The mendicant, on the other hand, who 
has discarded all works can suffer no loss owing to non- 
performance. Such duties as are incumbent on him, viz. 
restraint of the senses and the like, are not opposed to 
the state of being grounded in Brahman, but rather helpful 



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302 vedAnta-sAtras. 



to it. For the only work enjoined on him by his Irrama 
is the state of being firmly grounded in Brahman, wherein 
he is strengthened by restraint of the senses and so on — 
just as sacrifices and the like are prescribed for the other 
ajramas — and loss he incurs only by neglecting that work. 
In agreement herewith texts from scripture and Smrrti 
declare that for him who is grounded in Brahman there 
are no works. Compare ' Renunciation is Brahman ; for 
Brahman is the highest ; for the highest is Brahman ; 
above those lower penances, indeed, there rises renuncia- 
tion ; ' ' Those anchorites who have well ascertained the 
object of the knowledge of the Vedanta and have purified 
their nature by the Yoga of renunciation ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 
2, 6) ; and similar scriptural passages. And Smrzti-texts 
to the same effect, such as * They whose minds are fixed 
on him, who have their Self in him, their stand on him, 
their end in him' (Bha. Gita V, 17). All these passages 
teach that for him who is founded on Brahman there are 
no works. From this there also follows the non-validity of 
the second objection raised above, viz. that the mendicant's 
reaching immortality through the mere stage of life in 
which he stands would imply the uselessness of knowledge. 
— In this way we understand that, although there is a 
reference to the other stages of life, that which is indicated 
by the quality of being grounded in Brahman is the state 
of the wandering mendicant. 

This whole discussion has been carried on by the teacher 
without taking into account the text of the Cabalas, which 
enjoins the other stage of life. But there exists that text 
which directly enjoins the other stage, ' Having completed 
his studentship he is to become a householder; having 
been a householder he is to become a dweller in the forest ; 
having been a dweller in the forest he is to wander forth ; 
or else he may wander forth from the student's state; 
or from the house; or from the forest.' Nor can this 
text be interpreted as referring to those who are not 
qualified for works ; for it states no difference, and there 
is a separate injunction (of the parivra^ya-state) for those 
who are not qualified, viz. in the passage, ' May he have 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 21. 303 

taken vows upon himself or not, may he be a snataka or 
not, may he be one whose fire has gone out or one who 
has no fire,' &c. That the text does not refer to such 
only as are not qualified for works, further follows from 
the fact that the state of the mendicant is meant to 
subserve the development of the knowledge of Brahman *, 
as scripture declares, 'The wandering mendicant, with 
colourless dress, shaven, wifeless, pure, guileless, living on 
alms, qualifies himself for the intuition of Brahman.' — From 
all this it follows that the stages of life for which chastity 
is obligatory are established by scripture, and that know- 
ledge — because enjoined on persons who have entered on 
those stages — is independent of works. 

21. If it be said that (texts such as the one about 
the udgitha are) mere glorification, on account of 
their reference (to parts of sacrifices) ; we deny that, 
on account of the newness (of what they teach, if 
viewed as injunctions). 

'That udgitha is the best of all essences, the highest, 
holding the highest place, the eighth ' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 3) ; 
'This earth is the Rik, the fire is Saman' (Kh. Up. I, 
6, 1); 'This world in truth is that piled-up fire-altar' 
(.Sat. Bra. X, 1, a, a); 'That hymn is truly that earth' 
(Ait. Ar. II, 1, a, 1) ; with reference to these and other 
similar passages a doubt arises whether they are meant 
to glorify the udgitha and so on, or to enjoin devout 
meditations. 

The purvapakshin maintains that their aim is glorifica- 
tion, because the text exhibits them with reference to 
subordinate members of sacrificial actions, such as the 
udgitha and so on. They are, he says, analogous to 
passages such as ' This earth is the ladle ; ' ' the sun is the 
tortoise;' 'the heavenly world is the Ahavaniya,' whose 



1 Which has to be acquired in the regular prescribed way of 
Brahmanical studentship. 



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304 vedAnta-sOtras. 



aim it is to glorify the ladle and so on. To this the Sutra- 
kara replies as follows. We have no right to consider the 
purpose of those passages to be mere glorification, on 
account of the newness. If they aim at injunction, a new 
matter is enjoined by them ; if, on the other hand, they 
aimed at glorification they would be devoid of meaning. 
For, as explained in the Pu. Mim. Su., glorificatory 
passages are of use in so far as entering into a comple- 
mentary relation to injunctive passages ; but the passages 
under discussion are incapable of entering into such a 
relation to the udgitha and so on which are enjoined in 
altogether different places of the Veda, and would there- 
fore be purposeless as far as glorification is concerned. 
Passages such as 'This earth is the ladle' are not 
analogous because they stand in proximity to injunctive 
passages. — Therefore texts such as those under discussion 
have an injunctive purpose. 

22. And on account of the words expressive of 
becoming. 

Moreover the text exhibits words of clearly injunctive 
meaning, in connexion with the passages quoted above, 
viz. 'Let him meditate on the udgitha' (Kh. Up. I, 
i, i); 'Let him meditate on the Siman'(ATA. Up. II, 
3, i); 'Let him think: I am the hymn' (Ait. Ar. II, 
i, 6). Now these injunctive forms would be rendered 
futile by the assumption of the texts under discussion 
aiming at glorification only. Compare the following 
saying of those who know Nyaya, ' Let him do, let it be 
done, it is to be done, let it become, let it be ; these forms 
are in all Vedas the settled signs of injunction.' What 
they mean thereby is that injunction is the sense of all 
potential, imperative, &c, verbal forms. — Moreover in each 
of the sections to which the passages under discussion 
belong the text states special fruits, ' He becomes indeed 
a fulfiller of desires' (Kh. Up. I, i, 7); 'He is able to 
obtain wishes through his song ' (Kh. Up. I, 7, 9) ; ' The 
worlds in an ascending and a descending line belong to 
him* (Kh. Up. II, 2, 3). For this reason also the texts 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 24. 305 

about the udgltha and so on are meant to enjoin devout 
meditations. 

23. (The stories told in the Upanishads) are for 
the purpose of the pariplava ; we deny this on 
account of (certain stories only) being specified. 

' Ya^wavalkya had two wives, Maitrey! and Katyayani ' 
(Br*. Up. IV, 5, 1) ; ' Pratardana, forsooth, the son of 
Divodasa came to the beloved abode of Indra ' (Kau. Up. 
Ill, 1); 'There lived once upon a time Canarruti Pautra- 
ya«a, who was a pious giver, giving much and keeping 
open house' (Kk. Up. IV, 1,1); with regard to these and 
similar stories met with in the Vedanta portions of 
scripture there arises a doubt whether they are meant to 
subserve the performance of the pariplava 1 , or to introduce 
the vidyas standing in proximity to them. 

The purvapakshin maintains that those scriptural stories 
subserve the pariplava because they are stories like others, 
and because the telling of stories is enjoined for the pari- 
plava. And from this it follows that the Vedanta-texts 
do not chiefly aim at knowledge, because like mantras 
they stand in a complementary relation to sacrificial per- 
formances. 

This conclusion we deny ' on account of the specifica- 
tion.' Under the heading 'he is to recite the pariplava,' 
scripture specifies certain definite stories such as that of 
'Manu Vivasvat's son the king.' If, now, for the reason 
that all tales as such are alike, all tales were admitted for 
the pariplava, the mentioned specification would be devoid 
of meaning. We therefore conclude that those scriptural 
stories are not meant to be told at the pariplava. 

24. This follows also from the connexion (of the 
stories with the vidyas) in one coherent whole. 

And as thus the stories do not subserve the pariplava it 



1 I.e. have to be recited at stated intervals during the year 
occupied by the arvamedha sacrifice. 

[38] x 



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306 vedAnta-sOtras. 



is appropriate to assume that they are meant to bring 
nearer to our understanding the approximate vidyas with 
which they are seen to form connected wholes ; for they 
serve to render the latter more acceptable and facilitate 
their comprehension. 

In the Maitreyi-brahmawa we see that the story forms 
a whole with the vidya beginning, ' The Self indeed is to 
be seen,' &c. ; in the account of Pratardana with the vidya, 
'I am prana, the conscious Self;' in the legend of (7an&miti 
with the vidya, ' Air indeed is the end of all.' The case 
of all these stories is analogous to that of stories met with 
in scriptural texts referring to works, whose purpose is the 
glorification of injunctions standing in proximity ; as e.g. 
' He cut out his own omentum.' — The stories under discus- 
sion therefore do not subserve the pariplava. 

25. For this very reason there is no need of the 
lighting of the fire and so on. 

The expression ' For this very same reason ' must be 
viewed as taking up Sutra III, 4, 1, because thus a satis- 
factory sense is established. For this very same reason, 
i. e. because knowledge subserves the purpose of man, the 
lighting of the sacrificial fire and similar works which are 
enjoined on the different a^ramas are not to be observed, 
since man's purpose is effected through knowledge. 

The Sutrakara thus sums up the result of the first 
adhikarawa, intending to make some further remarks. 

26. And there is need of all (works), on account 
of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like ; 
as in the case of the horse. 

We now consider whether knowledge has absolutely no 
need of the works enjoined on the different Isramas, or 
whether it has some need of them. Under the preceding 
Sutra we have arrived at the conclusion that as knowledge 
effects its own end the works enjoined on the Irramas 
are absolutely not required. With reference to this point 
the present Sutra now remarks that knowledge has regard 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 27. 307 

for all works enjoined on the ajrramas, and that there is 
not absolute non-regard. — But do not the two Sutras thus 
contradict each other? — By no means, we reply. Know- 
ledge having once sprung up requires no help towards the 
accomplishment of its fruit, but it does stand in need of 
something else with a view to its own origination. — Why 
so ? — On account of the scriptural statements of sacrifices 
and so on. For the passage, ' Him Brahmawas seek to 
know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by 
penance, by fasting' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22), declares that 
sacrifices and so on are means of knowledge, and as the 
text connects them with the 'seeking to know,' we conclude 
that they are, more especially, means of the origination of 
knowledge. Similarly the passage, 'What people call 
sacrifice that is really brahma^arya ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 5, 1), 
by connecting sacrifices and so on with brahma£arya 
which is a means of knowledge, intimates that sacrifices 
&c. also are means of knowledge. Again the passage, 
' That word which all the Vedas record, which all penances 
proclaim, desiring which men live as religious students, 
that word I tell thee briefly, it is Om ' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 15), 
likewise intimates that the works enjoined on the ajramas 
are means of knowledge. Similarly Smrz'ti says, ' Works 
are the washing away of uncleanliness, but knowledge is 
the highest way. When the impurity has been removed, 
then knowledge begins to act.' 

The phrase, 'as in the case of the horse,' supplies an 
illustration on the ground of suitability. As the horse, 
owing to its specific suitability, is not employed for 
dragging ploughs but is harnessed to chariots; so the 
works enjoined on the Irramas are not required by know- 
ledge for bringing about its results, but with a view to its 
own origination. 

27. But all the same he (who is desirous of know- 
ledge) must be possessed of calmness, subjection of 
the senses, &c, since those (states) are enjoined as 
auxiliaries to that (viz. knowledge), and must (on 
that account) necessarily be accomplished. 

x 2 



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308 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Perhaps somebody might think that we have no right 
to look upon sacrifices and the like as means of knowledge 
because there is no injunction to that effect. For a passage 
like ' By sacrifice they seek to know ' is of the. nature of an 
anuvada, and therefore does not aim at enjoining sacrifices 
but rather at glorifying knowledge, ' so glorious is know- 
ledge that they seek to obtain it through sacrifices and the 
like.' 

But even should this be so the seeker for knowledge 
must possess calmness of mind, must subdue his senses 
and so on ; for all this is enjoined as a means of knowledge 
in the following scriptural passage, 'Therefore he who knows 
this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and 
collected, sees self in Self (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 23). And what 
is enjoined must necessarily be carried out. — But in the 
above passage also we observe only a statement as to 
something actually going on — ' Having become calm, &c, 
he sees,' not an injunction ! — Not so, we reply. The 
introductory word 'therefore' which expresses praise of 
the subject under discussion makes us understand that the 
passage has an injunctive character 1 . 

Moreover the text of the Madhyandinas directly reads 
' let him see ' (not ' he sees '). Hence calmness of mind 
and so on are required even if sacrifices, &c„ should not 
be required. — Sacrifices and so on, however, are required 
likewise, because (as said in Sutra 36) scripture teaches 
them. — But it has been said that in the passage, ' Him they 
seek to know by sacrifices,' no injunction is observed! — 
True; but nevertheless we must assume the passage to 
be an injunction, because the connexion of the search for 
knowledge with sacrifices and so on is something new; 
i.e. is not established by another text, and therefore the 

1 For if there were no injunction, the praise would be without 
meaning. The 'therefore' connects the passage with the pre- 
ceding clause, 'he is not sullied by any evil deed.' The sense 
then is, 'Because he who knows the Self as described before is 
not sullied by any evil deed, therefore let him, after having become 
calm, &c, see the Self, and so on.' 



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in adhyAya, 4 pAda, 28. 309 

passage under discussion cannot be an anuvada referring 
to it. The case is analogous to that of passages such as 
'therefore Pushan 1 receives a well-crushed share of food, 
for he is toothless.' There also no injunction is directly 
stated ; but as the matter of the passage is new we assume 
an injunction and understand that the grains for Pushan 
are to be crushed at all vikrftis of the darjapur»amasa ; as 
was explained in the Purva Mimamsa. 

An analogous conclusion was arrived at under Sutra 
ao. — SnWtis also such as the Bhagavadgtta explain that 
sacrifices and the like if undertaken without a view to their 
special results become for him who is desirous of final 
release a means of knowledge. Hence sacrifices and the 
like, on the one hand, and calmness of mind and so on, on 
the other hand, according to the asramas, i.e. all works 
enjoined on the ajramas must be had regard to with a 
view to the springing up of knowledge. Calmness of mind, 
&c, are, on account of the expression ' he who knows this ' 
connecting them with knowledge, to be viewed as approxi- 
mate — direct — means of knowledge, while sacrifices and so 
on which scripture connects with the search of knowledge 
are to be looked upon as remote — indirect — means. 

28. And there is permission of all food, (only) in 
the case of danger of life ; on account of this being 
shown (by scripture). 

In the colloquy of the prawas the A^andogas record, ' To 
him who knows this there is nothing which is not food' 
(Kh. Up. V, 1, a) ; and the Va^asaneyins, ' By him nothing is 
eaten that is not food, nothing is received that is not food ' 
(Bri. Up. VI, 1, 14). The sense of the two passages is 
that anything may be eaten by him. — A doubt here arises 
whether the texts enjoin the permission of eating anything 

1 The passage quoted occurs in the Veda under the heading of 
the daaapurwamasa. But as Pushan has no share in the funda- 
mental form of that sacrifice, we conclude that the injunction 
implied in the passage is valid for those vikrttis of the dam- 
purwamasa in which offerings are made to Pushan. 



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^io vedanta-sOtras. 



as an auxiliary to knowledge — as calmness of mind, &c, 
are— or mention them for the purpose of glorification. — 
The purvapakshin maintains that the passages are injunc- 
tions because thus we gain an instruction which causes 
a special kind of activity. What, therefore, the text teaches 
is the non-operation of a definite rule, in so far as auxiliary 
to the knowledge of the prawas in proximity to which it is 
taught. — But this interpretation implies the sublation of the 
scriptural rules as to the distinction of lawful and unlawful 
food ! — Such sublation, we reply, is possible, because the 
present case is one of general rule and special exception. 
The prohibition of doing harm to any living creature is 
sublated by the injunction of the killing of the sacrificial 
animal ; the general rule which distinguishes between such 
women as may be approached and such as may not, is 
sublated by the text prescribing, with reference to the 
knowledge of the Vamadevya, that no woman is to be 
avoided (' Let him avoid no woman, that is the vow,' Kh. 
Up. II, 13, 2) ; analogously the passage which enjoins, with 
reference to the knowledge of the prawas, the eating of all 
food may sublate the general rule as to the distinction of 
lawful and unlawful food. 

To this we reply as follows. The permission to eat any 
food whatever is not enjoined, since the passages do not 
contain any word of injunctive power ; for the clause, ' To 
him who knows this there is nothing,' &c, expresses only 
something actually going on. And where the conception 
of an injunction does not naturally arise we may not 
assume one from the mere wish of something causing 
a special line of activity. Moreover the text says that 
' for him who knows this there is nothing that is not food,' 
only after having said that everything even unto dogs and 
the like is food for the Prawa. Now food such as dogs 
and the like cannot be enjoyed by the human body ; but 
all this can be thought of as food of the Pra«a. From 
this it follows that the passage is an arthavada meant to 
glorify the knowledge of the food of the Pra«a, not an 
injunction of the permission of all food. — This the Sutra 
indicates in the words, ' and there is permission of all food 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 4 FADA, 30. 3II 

in danger of life.' That means : Only in danger of life, in 
cases of highest need, food of any kind is permitted to 
be eaten. ' On account of scripture showing this.' For 
scripture shows that the rishl ATakraya/ta when in evil 
plight proceeded to eat unlawful food. In the brahmana 
beginning, ' when the Kurus had been destroyed by hail- 
stones,' it is told how the rt'shi A'akrayana having fallen 
into great wretchedness ate the beans half eaten by a chief, 
but refused to drink what had been offered on the ground 
of its being a mere leaving ; and explained his proceeding 
as follows : ' I should not have lived if I had not eaten 
them ; but water I can drink wherever I like.' And again 
on the following day he ate the stale beans left by himself 
and another person. Scripture, in thus showing how the 
stale leaving of a leaving was eaten, intimates as its 
principle that in order to preserve one's life when in 
danger one may eat even unlawful food. That, on the 
other hand, in normal circumstances not even a man 
possessing knowledge must do this, appears from ATakra- 
yawa's refusing to drink. — From this it follows that the 
passage, ' For to him who knows this/ &c, is an arthavada. 

29. And on account of the non-sublation. 

And thus those scriptural passages which distinguish 
lawful and unlawful food, — such as Kh. Up. VII, 26, 3, 
' When the food is pure the whole nature becomes pure,' — 
are non-sublated. 

30. And this is said in SmWti also. 

That in cases of need both he who knows and he who 
does not know may eat any food SnWti also states ; 
compare e. g. ' He who being in danger of his life eats 
food from anywhere is stained by sin no more than the 
lotus leaf by water.' — On the other hand, many passages 
teach that unlawful food is to be avoided. * Intoxicating 
liquor the Brahmawa must permanently forego ; ' ' Let 
them pour boiling spirits down the throat of the Brahmawa 
who drinks spirits ; ' ' Spirit-drinking worms grow in the 



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312 vedAnta-sOtras. 



mouth of the spirit-drinking man, because he enjoys what 
is unlawful.' 

31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to 
non-proceeding according to liking. 

There is also a scriptural passage prohibiting unlawful 
food, the purpose of which it is to stop procedure therein 
according to one's liking, viz. in the Sazwhita of the Kat/taa, 
' Therefore a Brahmawa is not to drink spirits.' This text 
also is more appropriate if we take the passage, ' To him 
who knows this,' as an arthavada. — Hence passages of that 
kind are arthavadas, not injunctions. 

32. The works of the Isramas (are incumbent on 
him) also (who does not desire release) ; because 
they are enjoined. 

Under Sutra 26 it has been proved that the works 
enjoined on the Irramas are means of knowledge. Now 
we will consider whether those works have to be performed 
also by him who does not desire final release and therefore 
takes his stand on his Irrama merely without wishing for 
knowledge. — Here the purvapakshin maintains that as the 
works incumbent on the In-amas are enjoined as means of 
knowledge by the passage, ' Him the Brahma«as seek to 
know by the study of the Veda' &c, the works of per- 
manent obligation are not to be performed by him who, 
not desirous of knowledge, wishes for some other fruit. 
Or else they are to be performed by him also ; but then 
they cannot be means of knowledge, since it would be 
contradictory to attribute to them a permanent and a non- 
permanent connexion '. 

Against this conclusion the Sutrakara remarks that the 
works of permanent obligation are to be performed by 



1 I.e. we must not think that because they enjoin the 'nityatfi' 
of certain works, other passages may not enjoin the same works 
as mere means of knowledge. 



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in adhyAya, 4 pAda, 33. 313 

him only who, not desirous of release, takes his stand on 
the ajramas merely, because they are enjoined by texts 
such ' as long as his life lasts he is to offer the agnihotra.' 
For to such texts no excessive weight must be ascribed. — 
The next Sutra replies to the objection raised above in the 
words, ' but then they cannot be means of knowledge.' 

33. And through the co-operativeness (of the 
works towards the origination of knowledge). 

Those works are also co-operative with knowledge just 
because they are enjoined as such, viz. in passages such as 
' Him the Brahmawas seek to know by the study of the 
Veda,' &c. This has been explained under Sutra 2,6. Nor 
must you think that the texts stating the co-operation of 
the works of the ajramas towards knowledge refer to the 
fruit of knowledge, as e. g. the offerings called prayi^as 
co-operate towards the fruit of the darjapflrwamasa of which 
they are auxiliary members ; for knowledge is not charac- 
terised by injunction, and the fruit of knowledge is not 
to be effected by means. Means characterised by injunctions 
such as the darjapurwamasa-sacrifice which aim at bringing 
about certain fruits such as the heavenly world require 
other (subordinate) means co-operating towards the fruit 
(such as the praya^as). But not so knowledge. Compare 
on this point Sutra 25. Therefore texts stating the co- 
operation of works (with knowledge) have to be interpreted 
as stating that works are means for the origination of 
knowledge. — Nor need we fear that thus there arises a 
contradiction of permanent and non-permanent connexion. 
For there may be difference of connexion even where there 
is no difference of work. One connexion is permanent, 
resting on the texts about the life-long performance of the 
agnihotra and so on ; of this knowledge is not the result. 
The other connexion is non-permanent, resting on texts 
such as ' Him the Brahmawas seek to know,' &c. ; of this 
knowledge is the result. The case is analogous to that 
of the one khadira, which through a permanent connexion 
serves the purpose of the sacrifice, and through a non- 
permanent connexion the purpose of man. 



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3 1 4 vedAnta-sOtras. 



34. In any case the same (duties have to be per- 
formed) on account of the twofold indicatory marks. 

In any case, i. e. whether viewed as duties incumbent 
on the ajramas or as co-operating with knowledge, the very 
same agnihotra and other duties have to be performed. — 
What, it may be asked, does the teacher wish to preclude 
by the emphatic expression 'the very same?' — The sus- 
picion, we reply, that those works might be separate 
works \ In the ayana of the Kuwafepayins indeed the 
injunctive statement, ' They offer the agnihotra for a month 2 ,' 
enjoins a sacrifice different from the permanent (ordinary) 
agnihotra ; but in our present case there is no analogous 
separation of works. — Why? — On account of the twofold 
indicatory mark ; i. e. on account of both scripture and 
Smrz'ti supplying indicatory marks. In the first place, the 
scriptural passage, ' Him the Brahma»as seek to know 
through the study of the Veda,' &c, directs that sacrifices 
and the like — as things already established and the form of 
which is already in existence (viz. through previous in- 
junctions) — are to be employed as means in the search for 
knowledge ; and does not originate a new form of those 
works, while the passage quoted above, ' They offer the 
agnihotra for a month,' does originate a new separate 
sacrifice. — In the second place the Smr/ti-passage, ' He 
who performs the work to be done without aiming at the 
fruit of the work,' shows that the very same work which is 
already known as something to be performed subserves the 
origination of knowledge. Moreover the Smrz'ti-passage, 
' He who is qualified by those forty-eight purifications,' &c, 
refers to the purifications required for Vedic works, with 
a view to the origination of knowledge in him who has 
undergone those purifications. — The Sutrakara therefore 
rightly emphasizes the non-difference of the works. 

1 That the works referred to in the Upanishads as means of 
knowledge, might be works altogether different from those enjoined 
in the karmakaWa as means of bringing about certain special 
results such as the heavenly world. 

1 See above, p. 250. 



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Ill ADHVAYA, 4 PADA, 37. 315 

35. And scripture also declares that (those per- 
forming works) are not overpowered (by passion 
and the like). 

This Stitra points out a further indicatory mark fortifying 
the conclusion that works co-operate towards knowledge. 
Scripture also shows that he who is furnished with such 
means as Brahma£arya, &c, is not overpowered by such 
afflictions as passion and the like. Compare the passage, 
' That Self does not perish which they find out by Brahma- 
£arya' (Kh. Up. VIII, 5, 3). — It is thus a settled conclusion 
that sacrifices and so on are works incumbent on the 
iuramas as well as co-operative towards knowledge. 

36. But also (persons standing) between (are 
qualified for knowledge) ; for that is seen (in scrip- 
ture). 

A doubt arises whether persons in want who do not 
possess means, &c, and therefore are not able to enter 
one or the other of the ajramas, standing between as it 
were, are qualified for knowledge or not. — They are not 
qualified, the purvapakshin maintains. For we have ascer- 
tained that the works incumbent on the .Irramas are the 
cause of knowledge, and those persons have no opportunity 
to perform those works. — To this the Sutrakara replies, 
' But also between.' Even a person who because he does 
not belong to an Irrama stands between, as it were, is 
qualified for knowledge. ' For that is seen.' For we meet 
with scriptural passages declaring that persons of that 
class — such as Raikva and the daughter of Va^aknu — 
possessed the knowledge of Brahman (Kh. Up. IV, 1 ; 
Br*. Up. Ill, 6, 8). 

37. This is stated in Smn'ti also. 

It is recorded in itihasas also how Sawvarta and others 
who paid no regard to the duties incumbent on the 
ajramas, in going naked and so on, became great Yogins 
all the same. — But the instances quoted from scripture 
and Smr*ti furnish merely indicatory marks ; what then is 



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3 1 6 vedAnta-sOtras. 



the final conclusion ? — That conclusion is stated in the next 
Sutra. 

38. And the promotion (of knowledge is bestowed 
on them) through special acts. 

Also for widowers, &c, the favour of knowledge is 
possible through special acts of duty, such as praying, 
fasting, propitiation of divinities, &c, which are not opposed 
to their ajrama-less condition and may be performed by 
any man as such. Thus Smr/ti says, ' By mere prayer no 
doubt the Brahma«a perfects himself. May he perform 
other works or not, the kindhearted one is called Brah- 
ma«a' (Manu Sawzh. II, 87), which passage shows that 
where the works of the ajrarnas are not possible prayer 
qualifies for knowledge. Moreover knowledge may be 
promoted by ajrama works performed in previous births. 
Thus Smrt'ti also declares, ' Perfected by many births he 
finally goes the highest way' (Bha. Gita VI, 45); which 
passage shows that the aggregate of the different purifi- 
catory ceremonies performed in former births promotes 
knowledge. — Moreover knowledge — as having a seen 
result (viz. the removal of ignorance) — qualifies any one 
who is desirous of it for learning and so on, through the 
mere absence of obstacles 1 . Hence there is no contra- 
diction in admitting qualification for knowledge on the 
part of widowers and the like. 

39. Better than this is the other (state of be- 
longing to an lyrama), on account of the indicatory 
marks. 

• Than this,' i. e. ' than standing between,' a better means 
of knowledge it is to stand within one of the Irramas, 
since this is confirmed by 5ruti and Sm«'ti. For scripture 
supplies an indicatory mark in the passage, ' On that path 
goes whoever knows Brahman and who has done holy 

1 I.e. any one who wishes to learn may do so, if only there 
is no obstacle in the way. No special injunction is wanted. 



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ur." 
in adhyAya, 4 pAD^^vac^^^^, - 317 

works (as prescribed for the ajramas) and obtained splen- 
dour ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 9) ; and Smriti in the passage, ' Let 
a Brahmana stay not one day even outside the ajrama; 
having stayed outside for a year he goes to utter ruin.' 

40. But of him who has become that (i. e. entered 
on a higher asrama) there is no becoming not that 
(i.e. descending to a lower one), according to (7ai- 
mini also, on account of restrictive rule, absence of 
such like (i.e. statements of descent), and non- 
existence (of good custom). 

It has been established that there are stages of life 
for which chastity is obligatory. A doubt here arises 
whether one who has entered them may for some reason 
or other fall from them or not. — The pdrvapakshin main- 
tains that as there is no difference a person may descend 
to a lower stage, either from the wish of well performing 
the duties of that stage, or influenced by passion and the 
like. — To this we reply as follows, 'Of him who has 
become that,' i. e. of him who has reached the stages for 
which chastity is obligatory, there is no 'becoming not 
that,' i.e. descending thence. — Why? — 'On account of 
restrictive rule, absence of such like, and non-existence.' 
That means : there are, in the first place, restrictive rules 
declaring that a descent may not take place. Compare 
' for life mortifying the body in the house of a tutor ' 
(Kh. Up. II, 23, 2) ; ' He is to go into the forest, that is 
he is not to return thence, that is the Upanishad ; ' ' Having 
been dismissed by the teacher he is to follow one of the 
four ajramas, according to rule, up to release from the 
body.' — In the second place there are texts teaching the 
ascent to higher lyramas (' Having completed the Brahma- 
yfcarya state he is to become a householder ; he may wander 
forth from the Brahma£arya state'); but there are none 
teaching the descent to lower Irramas. — And in the third 
place there exists no good custom of that kind. — The 
descent to a lower Irrama can in no way be based on the 
wish of well performing the duties of that Irrama; for 



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3 1 8 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Smn'ti says, 'One's own duty, however badly performed, is 
better than another duty well carried out ' (Bha. Gita III, 35). 
And the principle is that whatever is enjoined on a certain 
person constitutes his duty, not what a person is able to 
perform well ; for all duty is characterised by injunction. 
Nor is a descent allowed owing to the influence of passion, 
&c. ; for restrictive rules are weightier than passion. — By 
the word 'also' the Sutrakara indicates the consensus of 
Gaimini and Badarayawa on this point, in order to confirm 
thereby the view adopted. 

41. And not also (can the expiation take place) 
prescribed in the chapter treating of qualification, 
because on account of the inference of his lapse 
from Smnti he (the Naish^ika) is not capable 
of it. 

If a Brahma£arin for life breaks from inattention the 
vow of chastity, is he to perform the expiatory sacrifice 
enjoined by the text, ' A student who has broken the vow 
of chastity shall sacrifice an ass to Nimti 1 ' or not? — He 
is not, the purvapakshin says. For although in the chapter 
which treats of qualification (Pu. Mim. Su. VI, 8, 22) that 
expiatory ceremony has been settled (for Brahma£arins in 
general), it does not yet hold good for the professed 
Brahma£arin. For Smrz'ti declares that such sins can- 
not be expiated by him any more than a head once 
cut off can again be healed on to the body, 'He who 
having once entered on the duties of a Naish/Aika again 
lapses from them, for him — a slayer of the Self — I see 
no expiation which might make him clean again.' The 
Upakurvawa (i.e. he who is a Brahma^arin for a certain 
time only, not for life) on the other hand, about whose sin 
Smr/ti makes no similar declaration, may purify himself 
by the ceremony mentioned. 

42. But some (consider the sin) a minor one, (and 

1 Cp. e.g. Apastamba Dharma-sutra I, 9, 26, 8. The passage 
quoted in the text is, however, a scriptural one. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 42. 319 

hence claim) the existence (of expiation for the 
Naish/^ika also) ; as in the case of the eating (of 
unlawful food). This has been explained (in the 
Purva Mlmamsa). 

Some teachers, however, are of opinion that the trans- 
gression of the vow of chastity, even on the part of 
a professed Brahma£arin, is a minor sin, not a mortal one, 
excepting cases where the wife of the teacher and so on are 
concerned. For they plead that that sin is not anywhere 
enumerated among the deadly ones such as violating 
a teacher's bed and so on. Accordingly they claim the 
expiatory ceremony to be valid for the Naish/Aika as well 
as the Upakurva«a ; both being alike Brahma£arins and 
having committed the same offence. The case is analogous 
to that of eating. Just as Brahma^arins (in general) who 
have broken their vow by eating honey, flesh, and the like 
may again purify themselves by a ceremony, so here also. — 
The reason for this decision is that for those who assume 
the absence of all expiation on the part of the Naish^ikas 
no scriptural passage supporting their view is met with; 
while those who admit expiation can base their view on 
the passage quoted above (' A student who has broken the 
vow' &c), which makes no distinction between Upakur- 
vawas and Naish/Aikas. It therefore is more appropriate 
to assume the validity of the ceremony for Naish/Aikas 
also. The principle guiding the decision has been explained 
in the chapter treating of the means of right knowledge 
(Pu. Mi. Su. I, 3, 8). — On this view the Smr*'ti-passage 
which declares that there is no expiation for the Naish/Aika 
must be explained as aiming at the origination of weighty 
effort on the Naish/Aika's part. — Similarly in the case of 
the mendicant and the hermit. The hermit, when he has 
broken his vows, undergoes the Kri££^ra penance for twelve 
nights and then cultivates a place rich in plants. The 
mendicant proceeds like the hermit, with the exception of 
cultivating the Soma-plant, and undergoes the purifications 
prescribed for his state. The rules given by Snrn'ti for 
those cases have to be followed. 



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?20 vedAnta-sCtras. 



43. But (they are to be kept outside) in either 
case, on account of Smmi and custom. 

But whether lapses from the duties of one's order, com- 
mitted by those who are bound to chastity, be mortal sins 
or minor sins, in either case such persons are to be excluded 
by honourable men (.rish/as). For Smrrti refers to them 
in terms of the highest reproach ; cp. passages such as the 
one quoted under Sutra 41 ; and the following one, ' He who 
touches a Brahmawa that has broken his vow and fallen 
from his order, or a hanged man or one gnawed by worms 
must undergo the ATandrayawa penance.' And good custom 
also condemns them ; for good men do not sacrifice, study, 
or attend weddings with such persons. 

44. To the lord (of the sacrifice) only (the agent- 
ship in meditations belongs), because scripture de- 
clares a fruit ; this is the view of Atreya. 

With regard to meditations on subordinate members of 
sacrificial actions there arises a doubt whether they are to 
be carried out by the sacrificer (i.e. him for whom the sacri- 
fice is performed) or by the officiating priests. — By the 
sacrificer, the purvapakshin maintains, because scripture 
declares fruits. For a fruit is declared in such texts as the 
following one, ' There is rain for him, and he brings rain 
for others who thus knowing meditates on the fivefold 
Saman as rain' {Kh. Up. II, 3, 2); and we must conclude 
that that fruit goes to the Lord of the sacrifice, because it 
is he who is entitled to the sacrificial performance together 
with its subordinate members, and because such meditations 
fall within the sphere of that to which he is entitled. And 
that the fruit belongs to him who carries out the medita- 
tions scripture states when saying, ' There is rain for him 
who meditates.' — But scripture declares a fruit for the 
priest also, viz. in the passage, 'Whatever desire he may 
desire either for himself or for the sacrificer he obtains by 
his singing.' — That passage, we reply, is of no force because 
it expressly declares the fruit (as belonging to the priest in 
a special case only). Hence the lord of the sacrifice only 



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in adhyAya, 4 pAda, 46. 321 

is the agent in those meditations which have a fruit ; this 
is the opinion of the teacher Atreya. 

45. (They are) the work of the priest, this is the 
view of Aiu/ulomi; since for that (i.e. the entire 
sacrificial work) he is feed. 

The assertion that the meditations on subordinate 
members of the sacrifice are the work of the sacrificer is 
unfounded. They rather are the work of the priest, as the 
teacher Aiu/ulomi thinks. For the priest is rewarded for 
the work together with its subordinate members ; and the 
meditations on the udgitha and so on fall within the per- 
formance of the work since they belong to the sphere of 
that to which the person entitled (viz. the lord of the 
sacrifice) is entitled. Hence they are to be carried out by 
the priests only, the case being analogous to that of the 
restrictive rule as to the work to be performed by means 
of the godohana vessel. In agreement herewith scripture 
declares the udgatr* to be the agent in knowledge, in 
the following passage, 'Him Vaka Dalbhya knew. He 
was the udgatrz of the Naimishiya-sacrificers ' (Kh. Up. I, 
2, 13). With reference to the circumstance noted by the 
purvapakshin that scripture states the fruit to belong to 
the agent, we remark that this makes no difference; for 
with the exception of cases expressly stated the priest can- 
not be connected with the sacrifice since he subserves the 
purposes (acts for) another (viz. the lord of the sacrifice). 

46. And on account of scriptural statement. 

' Whatever blessing the priests pray for at the sacrifice, 
they pray for the good of the sacrificer; thus he said' 
(.Sat. Bra. I, 3, 1, 26) ; ' Therefore an udgktrt who knows 
this may say: what wish shall I obtain for you by my 
singing?' (Kh. Up. I, 7, 8). These scriptural passages 
also declare that the fruit of meditations in which the priest 
is the agent goes to the sacrificer. — All this establishes the 
conclusion that the meditations on subordinate parts of 
the sacrifice are the work of the priest. 
[38] Y 



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322 vedanta-sOtras. 



47. There is the injunction of something else co- 
operating (towards knowledge) (which is) a third 
thing (with regard to balya and pawdltya), (which 
injunction is given) for the case (of perfect know- 
ledge not yet having arisen) to him who is such 
(i. e. the Sawnyasin possessing knowledge) ; as in 
the case of injunctions and the like. 

' Therefore let a Brahmawa after he has done with learning 
wish to stand by a childlike state ; and after he has done 
with the childlike state and learning (he is, or, may be) 
a Muni ; and after he has done with what constitutes Muni- 
ship and non-Muniship (he is, or, may be) a Brahmawa' 
(Bri. Up. Ill, 5). With reference to this passage a doubt 
arises whether it enjoins the state of a Muni or not. — The 
purvapakshin maintains that it does not enjoin it, since the 
injunction is completed with the clause, ' Let him wish to 
stand by a childlike state.' The following clause 'then 
a Muni' contains no verbal form of injunctive force and there- 
fore must be viewed as a mere anuvada (making a remark 
concerning the state of a Muni which is already established). 
Should it be asked how this conclusion is reached, we reply 
that Muniship is established by the clause 'having done with 
learning ' (which forms part of the injunctive portion of the 
passage), as ' Muni ' and ' learned man ' both denote know- 
ledge 1 . It is, moreover, clear also that the last clause, ' and 
after he has done with what constitutes Muniship and non- 
Muniship (he is) a Brahmawa,' does not enjoin the condition 
of a Brahmana, as that state is previously established 
(independently of that clause) ; but the words ' then a 
Brahmawa' are a mere glorificatory anuvada. Now as 
the words 'then a Muni' show an analogous form of 
enunciation (to the clause ' then a Brahmawa '), they also 
can embody a glorificatory anuvada only. 

1 The state of a Muni is already enjoined by the clause ' pa«</i- 
tyam nirvidya;' the clause 'atha munW,' therefore, may be viewed 
as an anuvada (as which it could not be viewed, if there were no 
previous injunction of mauna). 



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Ill ADHYAVA, 4 PADA, 47. 323 

To all this we reply as follows. ' There is an injunction 
of something else which co-operates.' The passage must 
be understood as enjoining the state of a Muni — which 
co-operates towards knowledge — in the same way as it 
enjoins learning and a childlike state, because that state is 
something new (not enjoined before). — But it has been said 
above that the word 'learning' already intimates Muni- 
ship! — This, we reply, does not invalidate our case since 
the word ' muni ' denotes (not only knowledge as the term 
* learned man ' does, but) pre-eminence of knowledge, on 
the ground as well of its etymology from 'manana,' i.e. 
thinking, as of common use, shown in such phrases as ' I 
am the Vy«isa of Munis also.' — But the term ' Muni ' is also 
seen to denote the last order of life ; cp. passages such 
as ' Householdership, studentship, the order of Munis, the 
order of hermits in the woods.' — Yes, but it has not that 
meaning exclusively, as we see that it does not apply to 
phrases such as * Valmlki is the foremost among Munis.' 
In the passage quoted (about the four orders) the last order 
is referred to, by the term ' Muni,' because there it stands 
in proximity to the other orders of life, and, as the state of 
the Ascetic is the only one which remains (after we have 
assigned the three other terms to the stages of life clearly 
denoted by them), the last order may be denoted ' mauna ' 
because knowledge is its principal requirement. — We there- 
fore conclude that in the passage under discussion the state 
of the Muni — whose characteristic mark is pre-eminence of 
knowledge — is enjoined as something third — with regard 
to the childlike state and learning. — Against the objection 
that the injunction terminates with the childlike state, we 
remark that all the same we must view the Muniship also 
as something enjoined, as it is something new, so that we 
have to supplement the clause as follows : * then he is to be 
a Muni.' That the state of a Muni is something to be 
enjoined, in the same way as the childlike state and learning, 
also follows from its being referred to as something to 
be done with (like balya and pa«<fitya). It is enjoined 
' on htm who is such,' i. e. on the Sawnyasin possessing 
knowledge. — How do we know this latter point ? — Because 

V 2 



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324 vedAnta-sOtras. 

the Sawmyasin who possesses knowledge forms the topic, 
as we see from the preceding passage, ' Having cognized 
the Self and risen above the desire for sons, &c, they 
wander about as mendicants.' — But if the Sawnyasin 
possesses knowledge, pre-eminence of knowledge is already 
established thereby ; what then is the use of the injunction 
of Muniship? — To this the Sutra replies 'in the case of.' 
That means : in the case of pre-eminence of knowledge 
not being established owing to the prevailing force of the 
(erroneous) idea of multiplicity; for that case the injunction 
(of Muniship, i. e. of pre-eminence of knowledge) is given. 
'As in the case of injunctions and the like.' With reference 
to sacrifices such as are enjoined in the passage, ' He who 
is desirous of the heavenly world is to offer the darcapurca- 
masa-sacrifice,' the aggregate of subordinate members, 
such as the establishment of the sacred fires, is enjoined as 
something helpful; similarly in this text whose topic is 
knowledge and which therefore does not chiefly aim at 
injunction, Muniship is enjoined as something helpful to 
knowledge. 

As thus the order of the ascetic, as distinguished by 
a childlike state and so on, is actually established by 
scripture, for what reason does the 7T Aandogya Upanishad 
wind up with the householder, viz. in the passage, ' After 
having received his discharge from his teacher he settles 
in his own house,' &c. ? For by concluding with the 
householder, scripture manifests special regard for him. — 
To this doubt the next Sutra replies. 

48. On account of his being all, however, there 
is winding up with the householder. 

The word ' however ' is meant to lay stress on the house- 
holder's being everything. For the performance of many 
works belonging to his own Irrama, such as sacrifices and the 
like, which involve not a little trouble, is enjoined on him 
by scripture ; and at the same time the duties of the other 
ajramas — such as tenderness for all living creatures, restraint 
of the senses and so on — are incumbent on him also as far 
as circumstances allow. There is therefore nothing con- 



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in adhyAya, 4 pAda, 50. 325 

tradictory in the A"Aandogya winding up with the house- 
holder. 

49. On account of there being injunction of the 
others also, in the same way as of the state of a 
Muni. 

As the state of the Muni (Sawmyasin) and the state of the 
householder are enjoined in scripture, so also the two other 
orders, viz. that of the hermit and that of the student. For 
we have already pointed above to passages such as 
' Austerity is the second, and to dwell as a student in the 
house of a teacher is the third.' As thus the four Isramas 
are equally taught by scripture, they are to be gone through 
equally, either in the way of option (between them) or in 
the way of comprehension (of all of them). — That the 
Sutra uses a plural form (of ' the others ') when speaking 
of two orders only, is due to its having regard either to 
the different sub-classes of those two, or to their different 
duties. 

50. (The passage enjoining balya means that the 
ascetic is to live) not manifesting himself; on 
account of the connexion (thus gained for the 
passage). 

The passage, 'Therefore let a Brahmawa after he has 
done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state,' 
speaks of the childlike state as something to be under- 
taken. Now by the ' childlike state ' we have to understand 
either the nature or the actions of a child. Childhood in 
so far as it means a period of life cannot be brought about 
at will, and we therefore must take the ' childlike state ' to 
mean either the behaviour of a child — such as attending 
to the calls of nature without any respect of place, &c. — 
or inward purity, i. e. absence of cunning, arrogance, force 
of the sensual passions, and so on 1 . — With regard to the 

1 I am doubtful as to the true reading in this place. The ' va ' 
of the Calcutta edition (p. 1039, last line) has certainly to be struck 



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326 vedAnta-sAtras. 



doubt thus arising the purvapakshin maintains that by 
'childlike being* people more commonly understand be- 
having, talking, and eating according to one's liking, freely 
attending to the calls of nature and so on, and that there- 
fore the word is to be understood here also in that sense. — 
But such free conduct is improper, because sinfulness and 
so on would follow from it! — Not so, the purvapakshin 
replies ; for the Saomyasin possessing knowledge is, through 
express scriptural statements, free from all sinfulness thus 
incurred ; just as the sacrificer is declared to be free from 
the sin he might incur in slaying the sacrificial animal. 

To this we reply that it is not so because the statement 
of the text may be understood in a different sense. For as 
long as another rational interpretation of the word ' balya ' 
is possible we have no right to adopt an interpretation 
which involves the assumption of another injunction being 
rendered futile. Moreover subordinate matters are enjoined 
with a view to the furtherance of the principal matter, and 
what here is the principal matter is the endeavour after 
knowledge which ascetics have to take upon themselves. 
Now if we accepted the entire conduct of a child as what 
is enjoined here we could in no way show that the en- 
deavour of knowledge is furthered thereby. We therefore 
understand by ' balya ' the special inward state of a child, 
i. e. absence of strong sensual passions and the like. This 
the Sutra expresses by saying 'Not manifesting.' The 
meaning of the clause under discussion thus is : Let him 
be free from guile, pride, and so on, not manifesting himself 
by a display of knowledge, learning, and virtuousness, just 
as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed 
themselves does not strive to make a display of himself 
before others. For thus the passage gains a connexion 
with the entire chapter on the ground of co-operating 
towards the principal matter. In agreement herewith 
Smrt'ti-writers have said, ' He whom nobody knows either 

out. Some good MSS. read : — balaiaritam antargata bhavavlrud- 
dhir aprard(ttendriyatva»» dambhadirahitatvam va. — The 'antar- 
l ' seems to mean the same as the ' SntaraA,' p. 1041, 11. 1-2. 



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Ill ADHYAVA, 4 PADA, 51. 327 

as noble or ignoble, as ignorant or learned, as well- 
conducted or ill-conducted, he is a Brahmawa. Quietly 
devoted to his duty, let the wise man pass through life 
unknown ; let him step on this earth as if he were blind, 
unconscious, deaf.' Another similar passage is, 'With 
hidden nature, hidden conduct,' and so on. 

51. In this life also (the origination of know- 
ledge takes place) if there is no obstruction of what 
is ready at hand ; on account of this being seen (in 
scripture). 

Beginning from Sutra 26 of the present pada we have 
discussed the various means of knowledge. We are now 
to consider whether knowledge — the fruit of those means — 
when accomplishing itself accomplishes itself only here in 
this life, or sometimes in the next life only. — The purva- 
pakshin maintains that it accomplishes itself here in this 
life only. For, he argues, knowledge has for its antecedent 
the learning of scripture and so on, and nobody applies 
himself to learning, &c, with the intention that knowledge 
should result therefrom in the next life only ; we rather 
observe that men begin to learn with a view to knowledge 
already springing up in this life. And also sacrifices and 
the like produce knowledge only mediately through 
learning and so on ; for knowledge can be produced 
(directly) through the means of right knowledge only 1 . 
Hence the origination of knowledge takes place in this 
life only. — To this we reply, • The origination of knowledge 
takes place in this life if there is no obstruction of that 
which is ready at hand.' That means : When the means 
of knowledge which is operative is not obstructed by some 
other work the results of which are just then reaching 
maturity, knowledge already reaches maturity in this life. 

1 Of which study is one. — Sacrifices indeed may bear their 
special fruits in the next life only ; but in so far as they co-operate 
towards knowledge they are effective in this life. For their only 
action in that line is to purify the mind and thus to render it fitter 
to receive knowledge. 



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328 vedAnta-sCtras. 



But when such an obstruction takes place, then in the next 
life. And a work's reaching maturity depends on place, time, 
and operative cause presenting themselves. Nor is there 
any binding rule according to which the same time, place, 
and operative cause which ripen one work should ripen 
another work also ; for there are works the fruits of which 
are opposed to each other. And scripture also goes only 
so far as to teach what the fruit of each work is, without 
teaching the special conditions of place, time, and operative 
cause. And owing to the specific strength of the means 
employed the supersensuous power of one work manifests 
itself (i. e. the fruit of that work realizes itself), while that 
of another is obstructed thereby and comes to a standstill. 

Nor is there any reason why a man should not form, 
with regard to knowledge, an unspecified intention J ; for 
we may freely form the intention that knowledge should 
spring up from us either in this life or in some subsequent 
life. And knowledge although springing up through the 
mediation of learning and so on, springs up only in so far 
as learning destroys the obstacles in the way of knowledge. 
Thus scripture also declares the difficulty of knowing the 
Self, * He of whom many are not even able to hear, whom 
many even when they hear of him do not comprehend; 
wonderful is a man when found who is able to teach him ; 
wonderful is he who comprehends him when taught by an 
able teacher ' (Ka. Up. I, a, 7). — Moreover scripture relates 
that Vamadeva already became Brahman in his mother's 
womb, and thus shows that knowledge may spring up in 
a later form of existence through means procured in 
a former one; for a child in the womb cannot possibly 
procure such means in its present state. 

The same is shown by Smr*ti. Vasudeva being asked 
by Aignna, ' What will be the fate of him, O Krishna., who 
has not reached perfection ? ' replies, ' None who performs 
good works undergoes an evil fate ; ' declares thereupon 

1 I.e. there is no reason for the assertion made by the pflrva- 
pakshin that men form a specified intention only, viz. that know- 
ledge should spring up in this life only. 



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Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 52. 329 

that 9uch a man reaches the world of the blessed and is, 
later on, born again in a good family ; and finally states 
just what we at present maintain in the passage beginning, 
'There he obtains that knowledge which corresponds to 
his former bodily existence,' and closing, 'Perfected by 
many states of existence he then goes the highest way.' — 
It therefore is an established conclusion that knowledge 
originates, either in the present or in a future life, in 
dependence on the evanescence of obstacles. 

52. No such definite rule (exists) as to the fruit 
which is release, on account of the assertions as to 
that condition, on account of the assertions as to 
that condition. 

We have seen that in the case of persons desirous of 
release who rely upon the means of knowledge there exists 
a definite difference of result, in so far as the knowledge 
resulting springs up either in this life or a future life 
according to the degree of strength of the means employed. 
It might now be supposed that there exists a similar 
definite difference with regard to the fruit characterised as 
final release, owing to the superior or inferior qualification 
of the persons knowing. 

With reference to this possible doubt the Sutra now 
says, ' No such definite rule as to that fruit which is release.' 
That means : We must not suppose that in the case of that 
fruit which is release there exists an analogous definite rule 
of difference. — Why? — 'On account of the assertions (by 
scripture) about that condition.' For all Vedanta-texts 
assert the state of final release to be of one kind only. 
The state of final release is nothing but Brahman, and 
Brahman cannot be connected with different forms since 
many scriptural passages assert it to have one nature only. 
Compare e.g. 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (Br*. Up. Ill, 
8, 8); 'That Self is to be described by No, no' (Br*. Up. 
Ill, 9, 36); 'Where one sees nothing else' (Kk. Up. VII, 
34, 1); 'That immortal Brahman is before' (Mu. Up. II, 
a, 11); 'This everything is that Self (Br*. Up. II, 4, 6); 



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330 vedAnta-sOtras. 



'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, 
fearless, is indeed Brahman ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 35) ; ' When 
the Self only is all this how should he see another ? ' (Bri. 
Up. IV, 5, 15). — Moreover the means of knowledge might 
perhaps, according to their individual strength, impart 
a higher (or lower) degree to their result, viz. knowledge, 
but not to the result of knowledge, viz. release ; for, as we 
have explained more than once, release is not something 
which is to be brought about, but something whose nature 
is permanently established, and is reached through know- 
ledge. Nor does, in reality, knowledge admit of lower or 
higher degree ; for it is, in its own nature, high only, and 
would not be knowledge at all if it were low. Although 
therefore knowledge may differ in so far as it originates 
after a long or short time, it is impossible that release 
should be distinguished by a higher or lower degree. And 
from the absence of difference of knowledge also there 
follows absence of definite distinction on the part of the 
result of knowledge (viz. release). The whole case is 
analogous to that of the results of works. In that know- 
ledge which is the means of release there is no difference 
as there is between works. In those cognitions, on the 
other hand, which have the qualified Brahman for its 
object — such as ' he who consists of mind, whose body is 
pra»a ' — a difference is possible according to the addition 
or omission of qualities, and hence there may be a definite 
distinction of results, just as there is between the results 
of actions. This is also indicated by the passage, 
•according as they meditate on him they become.' But 
in meditations on Brahman devoid of qualities it is other- 
wise. Thus Smrt'ti also says, ' No higher road is possible 
for any one ; for they speak of inequality only where there 
are qualities.' — The repetition of the clause ' on account of 
the assertions as to that condition ' indicates the termina- 
tion of the adhyaya. 



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FOURTH ADHYAYA. 

FIRST PADA. 

Reverence to the highest Self! 

i. Repetition (of the mental functions of know- 
ing, meditating, &c, is required) on account of the 
text giving instruction more than once. 

The third adhyaya was taken up chiefly with a discussion 
of the means of knowledge as related to the higher and 
lower vidyas. In the fourth adhyaya we shall now discuss 
the fruits of knowledge, and as occasion suggests some 
other topics also. — In the beginning, however, we shall 
carry on, in a few adhikarawas, a special discussion connected 
with the means of knowledge. * Verily the Self is to be 
seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on ' (Bri. 
Up. II, 4, 5) ; ' Let a wise Brahmawa after he has discovered 
him practise wisdom ' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21) ; ' That it is 
which we must search out, that it is which we must try to 
understand ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1). 

Concerning these and similar passages a doubt arises 
whether the mental action referred to in them is to be 
performed once only or repeatedly. — Once only, the pur- 
vapakshin says ; as in the case of the praya^a-offerings 
and the like. For thereby the purpose of scripture is 
accomplished ; while to practise repetitions not demanded 
by scripture would be to accomplish what is not the pur- 
pose of scripture. — But passages have been quoted which 
teach repetition ' it is to be heard, to be thought, to be 
reflected on,' &c. ! — Let us then repeat exactly as scripture 
says, i. e. let us hear the Self once, let us think it once, let 
us reflect on it once, and nothing more. But where 
scripture teaches something once only — viz. in such 
passages as ' He knows,' * Let him meditate,' &c. — no 
repetition has to be practised. — To this we reply as 



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vedAnta-sCtras. 



follows. Repetition is to be performed because scripture 
gives repeated instruction. For the repeated instruction 
contained in passages such as ' He is to be heard, to be 
thought, to be reflected on ' intimates the repetition of the 
required mental acts. — But the purvapakshin has said 
above that the repetition is to extend exactly to what 
scripture says and not to go further !— This is wrong, we 
reply, because all those mental activities have for their end 
intuition. For hearing and so on when repeated terminate 
in intuition, and thus subserve a seen purpose, just as the 
action of beating, &c, terminates in freeing the rice grains 
from their husks. Moreover also such terms as ' medi- 
tating,' ' being devoted to,' and ' reflecting ' denote actions 
in which repetition is implied as a quality. Thus we say 
in ordinary life that a person ' is devoted ' to a teacher or 
a king if he follows him with a mind steadily set on him ; 
and of a wife whose husband has gone on a journey we say 
that she thinks of him, only if she steadily remembers him 
with longing. And (that also ' knowing ' implies repetition, 
follows from the fact that) in the Vedanta-texts the terms 
' knowing ' and ' meditating ' are seen to be used one in 
the place of the other. In some passages the term * know- 
ing ' is used in the beginning and the term ' meditating ' in 
the end ; thus e. g. ' He who knows what he knows is thus 
spoken of by me,' and ' Teach me, sir, the deity which you 
meditate on ' (Kh. Up. IV, i, 4 ; 2, 2). In other places 
the text at first speaks of ' meditating ' and later on of 
'knowing;' thus e.g. 'Let a man meditate on mind as 
Brahman,' and ' He who knows this shines and warms 
through his celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance ' (ATA. 
Up. Ill, 18, 1 ; 6). — From this it follows that repetition 
has to be practised there also, where the text gives in- 
struction once only. Where, again, the text gives repeated 
instruction, repeated performance of the mental acts is 
directly intimated. 

2. And on account of an indicatory mark. 

An indicatory mark also gives to understand that repe- 
tition is required. For, in the section treating of meditation 



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IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. 333 

on the udgitha, the text rejects the meditation on the 
udgitha viewed as the sun, because its result is one sun only, 
and (in the clause ' Do thou resolve his rays,' &c.) enjoins 
a meditation on his manifold rays as leading to the pos- 
session of many suns {Kh. Up. I, 5, 1 ; a) ; which shows that 
the repetition of meditations is something well known. 
Now as other meditations are meditations no less than the 
one referred to, it follows that repetition holds good for all 
of them. 

Here the following objection may be raised. With 
regard to those meditations whose fruit is something to 
be effected repetition may hold good, because thereby 
superior strength may be imparted to them. But of what 
use can repetition be with regard to the meditations having 
for their object the highest Brahman, which present to us 
Brahman as the universal Self characterised by eternal 
purity, thought, and freedom? Should it be said that 
repetition has to be allowed because the knowledge of 
Brahman being the Self cannot spring up on hearing 
a text once only, we reply that in that case it will not 
spring up even when it is heard repeatedly. For if a text 
such as ' Thou art that ' does not originate the true notion 
of Brahman if heard once, what hope is there that the 
desired effect should be produced by its repetition? — 
Perhaps it will be said that a sentence alone is not able 
to lead to the intuition of a thing; but that a sentence 
assisted by reasoning may enable us to intuite Brahman 
as the universal Self. But even in that case repetition 
would be useless ; for the reasoning will lead to the desired 
intuition even if gone through once only. — Again it will 
perhaps be said that the sentence and reasoning together 
effect only a cognition of the generic nature of the object 
known, not of its specific individual character. When, to 
exemplify this, a man says that he feels a pain in his heart 
another person can infer from this statement — and certain 
accompanying symptoms such as trembling of the limbs — 
only that there exists a pain in general but is unable to 
intuite its specific character; all he knows is 'This man 
suffers a pain.' But what removes ignorance is (not 



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334 vedAnta-sOtras. 



a general knowledge but) the intuitive knowledge of the 
specific character of something. And repetition serves to 
produce such knowledge. — This also is not so. For if so 
much only is done repeatedly even, no specific knowledge 
can spring up. When a specific character is not cognized 
through scripture and reasoning being applied once, it will 
not be cognized through them if applied a hundred times 
even. Hence whether scripture and reasoning produce 
specific knowledge or general knowledge, in either case 
they will do so even if acting once only ; and repetition 
therefore is of no use. Nor can it be laid down as a bind- 
ing rule that scripture and reasoning, applied once, in no 
case produce intuitive knowledge ; for their effect will after 
all depend on the various degrees of intelligence of those 
who wish to learn. Moreover a certain use of repetition 
may be admitted in the case of worldly things which 
consist of several parts and possess generic character as well 
as individual difference; for there the student may grasp 
by one act of attention one part of the object, and by 
another act another part ; so e. g. in the case of long 
chapters to be studied. But in order to reach a true 
knowledge of Brahman whose Self is mere intelligence and 
which therefore is destitute of generic character as well as 
specific difference there clearly is no need of repetition. 

To this we make the following reply. Repetition would 
indeed be useless for him who is able to cognize the true 
nature of Brahman even if enounced once only in the 
sentence 'Thou art that.' But he who is not able to do 
that, for him repetition is of use. For this reason the 
teacher in the Ktendogya., having given instruction in the 
sentence ' Thou art that, O 5vetaketu,' and being again and 
again asked by his pupil — ' Please, sir, inform me still 
more' — removes his pupil's reasons for doubt, and again 
and again repeats the instruction 'Thou art that.' We 
have already given an analogous explanation of the passage 
' The Self is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected 
upon.' — But has not the purvapakshin declared that if the 
first enunciation of the sentence ' Thou art that ' is not 
able to effect an intuition of its sense, repetition will like- 



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IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. 335 

wise fail of the desired effect ? — This objection, we reply, is 
without force, because the alleged impossibility is not con- 
firmed by observation. For we observe that men by again 
and again repeating a sentence which they, on the first 
hearing, had understood imperfectly only, gradually rid 
themselves of all misconceptions and arrive at a full under- 
standing of the true sense. — Moreover the sentence ' Thou 
art that ' teaches that what is denoted by the term ' thou ' 
is identical with what is denoted by ' that.' Now the latter 
term denotes the subject of the entire section, viz. the think- 
ing Brahman which is the cause of the origin and so on of 
the world ; which is known from other passages such as 
' Brahman which is true knowledge, infinite ' (Taitt. Up. II , 1 ) ; 
' Brahman that is knowledge and bliss ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 9, 28) ; 
' That Brahman is unseen, but seeing ; unknown, but know- 
ing' (Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 11); 'not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 
1,2); * not subject to old age, not subject to death ' (Bri. 
Up. IV, 4, 25) ; ' not coarse, not fine ; not short, not long ' 
(Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 8). In these passages terms such as 'not 
produced ' deny the different phases of existence such as 
origination ; such terms as ' not coarse * deny of it the 
qualities of substances such as coarseness ; and such terms 
as ' knowledge' declare that the luminousness of intelligence 
constitutes its nature. The entity thus described — which is 
free from all the qualities of transmigratory existence, has 
consciousness for its Self and is called Brahman — is known, 
by all students of the Vedanta, as what is denoted by the 
term ' that.' They likewise know that what is denoted by 
the term ' thou ' is the inward Self (pratyagatman) ; which 
is the agent in seeing and hearing, is (successively) appre- 
hended as the inward Self of all the outward involucra 
beginning with the gross body (cp. Taitt. Up.), and finally 
ascertained as of the nature of intelligence. Now in the 
case of those persons for whom the meaning of these two 
terms is obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, 
the sentence ' Thou art that ' cannot produce a right know- 
ledge of its sense, since the knowledge of the sense of 
a sentence presupposes the knowledge of the sense of the 
words ; for them therefore the repetition of the scriptural 



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336 vedAnta-sOtras. 



text and of reasoning must be assumed to have a purpose, 
viz. the discernment of the true sense of the words. — And 
although the object to be known, viz. the Self, does not 
consist of parts, yet men wrongly superimpose upon it the 
attribute of being made up of many parts, such as the body, 
the senses, the manas, the buddhi, the objects of the senses, 
the sensations, and so on. Now by one act of attention we 
may discard one of these parts, and by another act of 
attention another part ; so that a successively progressing 
cognition may very well take place. This however is 
merely an antecedent of the (true) knowledge of the Self 
(in which there can be no successive stages). 

Those quick-witted persons, on the other hand, in whose 
mind the sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance, 
doubt, and misconception, are able to intuite the sense of 
the sentence ' Thou art that ' on its first enunciation even, 
and for them therefore repetition is not required. For the 
knowledge of the Self having once sprung up discards all 
ignorance ; so that in this case no progressive process of 
cognition can be acknowledged. — All this might be so — an 
objection is raised — if cognition did spring up in any mind 
in the way described. (But this is not the case) ; for the 
cognition of the Self being subject to pain and so on has 
such strength that nobody ever reaches the cognition of all 
absence of pain and so on. — This objection, we reply, is 
without force ; for it can be shown that the conceit of the 
Self being subject to pain, &c, is a wrong conceit, no less 
than the conceit of the body being the Self. For we clearly 
observe that when the body is cut or burned a wrong 
notion springs up, ' I am being cut,' ' I am being burned ;' 
and similarly we observe that when sons, friends, &c. — who 
are even more external to the Self than one's own body — 
suffer affliction, that affliction is wrongly attributed to the 
Self. Analogous to these cases is the conceit of the Self 
being subject to pain, &c ; for like the body and so on, the 
condition of being subject to pain is observed as something 
external to intelligence. This moreover follows from its 
not being continued in such states as dreamless sleep and 
the like ; while scripture expressly declares that in deep 



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IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 337 

sleep intelligence suffers no interruption, ' And when there 
he does not see, yet he is seeing,' &c. (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 22). 
Hence the intuition of the Self consists in the knowledge, 
' My Self is pure intelligence free from all pain.' For him 
who possesses that knowledge there remains no other work. 
Thus scripture says, ' What shall we do with offspring, we 
who have this Self and this world ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 22). 
And Smr/ti also says, ' But that man who loves the Self, is 
satisfied by the Self and has all his longings stilled by the 
Self only, for him there is no further work' (Bha. Gita III, 
12). — For him, on the other band, who does not reach 
that intuition all at once, we admit repetition, in order 
that the desired intuition may be brought about. He 
also, however, must not be moved towards repetition in 
such a way as to make him lose the true sense of the 
teaching, ' Thou art that.' In the mind of one on whom 
repetition is enjoined as a duty, there arise infallibly notions 
opposed to the true notion of Brahman, such as ' I have 
a claim on this (knowledge of the Self) as an agent ; this is 
to be done by me 1 .' But if a learner, naturally slow- 
minded, is about altogether to dismiss from his mind 
the purport of the sentence, because it does not reveal 
itself to him, it is permissible to fortify him in the under- 
standing of that sense by means of reasoning on the texts 
relative to repetition and so on. — All this establishes the 
conclusion that, also in the case of cognitions of the 
highest Brahman, the instruction leading to such cognition 
may be repeated. 

3. But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge 
and make us comprehend (the Lord). 

The Sutrakara now considers the question whether the 
highest Self whose characteristics scripture declares is 



1 Care must be taken not to engender in the mind of such a 
learner the notion that the repeated acts of reflection are incumbent 
on him as a duty; for such notions would only obstruct the end 
aimed at, i. e. the intuition that the Self of the meditating man is 
identical with Brahman's Self, to which no notions of duty or action 
apply. 

[38] Z 



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338 vedAnta-sOtras. 



to be understood as the ' I ' or as different from me. — But 
how can a doubt arise, considering that scripture exhibits 
the term 'Self whose sphere is the inward Self? — This 
term 'Self — a reply may be given — may be taken in its 
primaiy sense, provided it be possible to view the individual 
soul and the Lord as non-different ; but in the other case 
the term has to be taken in a secondary (metaphorical) 
sense only 1 . 

The purvapakshin maintains that the term ' Self is not 
to be taken as meaning the ' I.' For that which possesses 
the qualities of being free from all evil, &c, cannot be under- 
stood as possessing qualities of a contrary nature, nor can 
that which possesses those contrary qualities be understood 
as being free from all evil and so on. But the highest 
Lord possesses the qualities of being free from all evil, &c, 
and the embodied Self is characterised by qualities of 
a contrary nature. — Moreover, if the transmigrating soul 
constituted the Self of the Lord, it would follow that he 
is no Lord, and thus scripture would lose its meaning; 
while, if the Lord constituted the Self of the individual 
soul, the latter would not be entitled (to works and know- 
ledge), and scripture would thus also lose its meaning. 
The latter assumption would moreover run counter to 
perception and the other means of proof. — Should it 
be said that, although the Lord and the soul are different, 
they yet must be contemplated as identical, on the basis 
of scripture, just as Vishwu and other divinities are con- 
templated in images and so on; the answer is that this 
contemplation may take place, but that therefrom we must 
not conclude that the Lord is the real Self of the trans- 
migrating soul. 

To all this we make the following reply. The highest 
Lord must be understood as the Self. For in a chapter 
treating of the highest Lord the Cabalas acknowledge 
him to be the Self, ' Thou indeed I am, O holy divinity ; 
I indeed thou art, O divinity ! ' — In the same light other 

1 And in that case the identity of the highest Self and the ' I ' 
would not follow from the term ' Self.' 



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rv adhyAya, i pAda, 3. 339 

texts bave to be viewed, which also acknowledge the Lord 
as the Self, such as ' I am Brahman ' (Br*. Up. I, 4, 10). 
Moreover certain Vedanta-texts make us comprehend the 
Lord as the Self, 'Thy Self is this which is within all' 
(Br/. Up. Ill, 4, 1) ; 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the 
immortal' (Br*. Up. Ill, 7, 3); 'That is the True, that is 
the Self, thou art that ' (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 7).— Nor can we 
admit the truth of the assertion, made by the purvapakshin, 
that all these passages teach merely a contemplation (of 
the Lord) in certain symbols, analogous to the contem- 
plation of Vishwu in an image. For that would firstly 
involve that the texts have not to be understood in their 
primary sense 1 ; and in the second place there is a difference 
of syntactical form. For where scripture intends the con- 
templation of something in a symbol, it conveys its meaning 
through a single enunciation such as ' Brahman is Mind ' 
(Kh. Up. Ill, 18, 1), or ' Brahman is Aditya' (Kh. Up. Ill, 
19, 1). But in the passage quoted above, scripture says, 
'I am Thou and thou art I.' As here the form of ex- 
pression differs from that of texts teaching the contem- 
plation of symbols, the passage must be understood as 
teaching non-difference. This moreover follows from the 
express prohibition of the view of difference which a 
number of scriptural texts convey. Compare e. g. ' Now 
if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one 
and he another, he does not know' (Br*. Up. I, 4, 10); 
' From death to death goes he who here perceives any 
diversity' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'Whosoever looks for any- 
thing elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything ' 
(Br*. Up. II, 4, 6). — Nor is there any force in the objection 
that things with contrary qualities cannot be identical ; for 
this opposition of qualities can be shown to be false. — Nor 
is it true that from our doctrine it would follow that the 
Lord is not a Lord. For in these matters scripture alone 
is authoritative, and we, moreover, do not at all admit that 
scripture teaches the Lord to be the Self of the transmi- 

1 And this is objectionable as long as it has not been demon- 
strated that the primary meaning is altogether inadmissible. 

Z 2 



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34o vedAnta-sOtras. 



grating soul, but maintain that by denying the transmi- 
grating character of the soul it aims at teaching that the 
soul is the Self of the Lord. From this it follows that the 
non-dual Lord is free from all evil qualities, and that to 
ascribe to him contrary qualities is an error. — Nor is it 
true that the doctrine of identity would imply that nobody 
is entitled to works, &c, and is contrary to perception and 
so on. For we admit that before true knowledge springs 
up, the soul is implicated in the transmigratory state, and 
that this state constitutes the sphere of the operation of 
perception and so on. On the other hand texts such as ' But 
when the Self only has become all this, how should he see 
another ? ' &c, teach that as soon as true knowledge springs 
up, perception, &c, are no longer valid. — Nor do we mind 
your objecting that if perception, &c, cease to be valid, scrip- 
ture itself ceases to be so ; for this conclusion is just what we 
assume. For on the ground of the text, * Then a father is 
not a father' up to 'Then the Vedas are not Vedas' (Br/. 
Up. IV, 3, 22), we ourselves assume that when knowledge 
springs up scripture ceases to be valid. — And should you 
ask who then is characterised by the absence of true know- 
ledge, we reply : You . yourself who ask this question ! — 
And if you retort, 'But I am the Lord as declared by 
scripture,' we reply, ' Very well, if you have arrived at that 
knowledge, then there is nobody who does not possess 
such knowledge.' — This also disposes of the objection, urged 
by some, that a system of non-duality cannot be established 
because the Self is affected with duality by Nescience. 

Hence we must fix our minds on the Lord as being the 
Self. 

4. Not in the symbol (is the Self to be contem- 
plated); for he (the meditating person) (may) not 
(view symbols as being the Self). 

' Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman ; this is said 
with reference to the body. Let a man meditate on ether 
as Brahman ; this is said with reference to the Devas ' {Kk 
Up. Ill, 18, 1); 'Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' 



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IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 34 1 

{Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1); 'He who meditates on name as 
Brahman ' (Kh. Up. VI I, 1, 5). With regard to these and 
similar meditations on symbols a doubt arises whether the 
Self is to be apprehended in them also, or not. 

The purvapakshin maintains that it is right to apprehend 
the Self in them also because Brahman is known from 
scriptural passages as the (universal) Self. For those symbols 
also are of the nature of Brahman in so far as they are effects 
of it, and therefore are of the nature of the Self as well. 

We must not, our reply runs, attach to symbols the idea 
of Brahman. For he, i.e. the meditating person, cannot 
comprehend the heterogeneous symbols as being of the 
nature of the Self. — Nor is it true that the symbols are 
of the nature of the Self, because as being effects of Brahman 
they are of the nature of Brahman ; for (from their being of 
the nature of Brahman) there results the non-existence of 
(them as) symbols. For the aggregate of names and so on 
can be viewed as of the nature of Brahman only in so far 
as the individual character of those effects of Brahman 
is sublated ; and when that character is sublated how then 
can they be viewed as symbols, and how can the Self be 
apprehended in them ? Nor does it follow from the fact of 
Brahman being the Self that a contemplation of the Self 
can be established on the ground of texts teaching a con- 
templation on Brahman (in certain symbols), since a 
contemplation of the latter kind does not do away with 
agentship and the like. For the instruction that Brahman 
is the Self depends on the doing away with agentship and 
all other characteristics of transmigratory existence; the 
injunction of meditations, on the other hand, depends on the 
non-removal of those characteristics. Hence we cannot 
establish the apprehension of the Self (in the symbols) on 
the ground of the meditating person being the same as the 
symbols. For golden ornaments and figures made of gold 
are not identical with each other, but only in so far as gold 
constitutes the Self of both. And that from that oneness 
(of symbol and meditating person) which depends on 
Brahman being the Self of all there results non-existence 
of the symbols (and hence impossibility of the meditations 



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342 vedanta-sOtras. 



enjoined), we have explained above. — For these reasons the 
Self is not contemplated in symbols. 

5. A contemplation of Brahman (is to be super- 
induced on symbols of Brahman), on account of the 
exaltation (thereby bestowed on the symbols). 

With regard to the texts quoted above there arises 
another doubt, viz. whether the contemplation of Aditya 
and so on is to be superimposed on Brahman, or the 
contemplation of Brahman on Aditya and so on 1 . — But 
whence does this doubt arise? — From the absence of 
a decisive reason, owing to the grammatical co-ordination. 
For we observe in the sentences quoted a co-ordination of 
the term ' Brahman ' with the terms ' Aditya,' &c. Aditya 
is Brahman,' ' Prawa is Brahman,' ' Lightning is Brahman ; ' 
the text exhibiting the two members of each clause in the 
same case. And here there is no obvious occasion for 
co-ordination because the words ' Brahman ' on the one 
hand, and 'Aditya' and so on on the other hand, denote 
different things ; not any more than there exists a relation 
of co-ordination which could be expressed by the sentence 
•The ox is a horse.' — But cannot Brahman and Aditya 
and so on be viewed as co-ordinated on the basis of the 
relation connecting a causal substance and its effects, 
analogously to the case of clay and earthen vessels ? — By 
no means, we reply. For in that case dissolution of the 
effect would result from its co-ordination with the causal 
substance, and that — as we have already explained — would 
imply non-existence of the symbol. Moreover, the scrip- 
tural passages would then be statements about the highest 
Self, and thereby the qualification for meditations would 
be sublated 2 ; and further the mention of a limited effect 
would be purposeless 3 . It follows herefrom that we have 



* I. e. whether Brahman is to be meditated upon as Aditya, or 
Aditya as Brahman. 

* While, as a matter of fact, scripture enjoins the meditations. 

3 It would serve no purpose to refer to limited things, such as 



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IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5. 343 

to do here with the superimposition of the contemplation 
of one thing on another thing — just as in the case of the 
text, ' The Brahma«a is Agni Vaijvanara,' — and the doubt 
therefore arises the contemplation of which of the two 
things is to be superimposed on the other. 

The purvapakshin maintains that there exists no fixed 
rule for this case, because we have no scriptural text 
establishing such a rule. — Or else, he says, contemplations 
on Aditya and so on are exclusively to be superimposed 
on Brahman. For in this way Brahman is meditated upon 
by means of contemplations on Aditya, and scripture 
decides that meditations on Brahman are what is pro- 
ductive of fruits. Hence contemplations on Brahman are 
not to be superimposed on Aditya and so on. 

To this we make the following reply. The contemplation 
on Brahman is exclusively to be superimposed on Aditya 
and so on. — Why ? — ' On account of exaltation.' For thus 
Aditya and so on are viewed in an exalted way, the con- 
templation of something higher than they being super- 
imposed on them. Thereby we also comply with a secular 
rule, viz. the one enjoining that the idea of something 
higher is to be superimposed upon something lower, as 
when we view— and speak of — the king's charioteer as 
a king. This rule must be observed in worldly matters, 
because to act contrary to it would be disadvantageous ; 
for should we view a king as a charioteer, we should thereby 
lower him, and that would be no ways beneficial. — But, an 
objection is raised, as the whole matter rests on scriptural 
authority, the suspicion of any disadvantage cannot arise ; 
and it is, further, not appropriate to define contemplations 
based on scripture by secular rules ! — That might be so, we 
reply, if the sense of scripture were fully ascertained ; but 
as it is liable to doubt, there is no objection to our having 
recourse to a secular rule whereby to ascertain it. And as 
by means of that rule we decide that what scripture means 

the sun and so on, as being resolved into their causal substance, 
i.e. Brahman. True knowledge is concerned only with the 
resolution of the entire world of effects into Brahman. 



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344 vedAnta-sCtras. 



is the superimposition of a higher contemplation on some- 
thing lower, we should incur loss by superimposing a lower 
contemplation upon something higher. — As moreover in 
the passages under discussion the words' Aditya' and so on 
stand first, they must, this being not contradictory, be 
taken in their primary sense. But, as our thought is thus 
defined by these words taken in their true literal sense, the 
word ' Brahman,' which supervenes later on, cannot be 
co-ordinated with them if it also be taken in its true literal 
sense, and from this it follows that the purport of the 
passages can only be to enjoin contemplations on Brahman 
(superinduced on Aditya and so on). — The same sense 
follows from the circumstance that the word ' Brahman ' is, 
in all the passages under discussion, followed by the word 
'iti,' 'thus 1 .' 'He is to meditate (on Aditya, &c.) as 
Brahman.' The words 'Aditya' and so on, on the other 
hand, the text exhibits without any such addition. The 
passages therefore are clearly analogous to such sentences 
as ' He views the mother o' pearl as silver,' in which the 
word • mother o' pearl ' denotes mother o' pearl pure and 
simple, while the word ' silver ' denotes, by implication, the 
idea of silver ; for the person in question merely thinks 
'this is silver' while there is no real silver. Thus our 
passages also mean, ' He is to view Aditya and so on as 
Brahman.' — The complementary clauses, moreover, which 
belong to the passages under discussion (' He who knowing 
this meditates (upon) Aditya as Brahman ; ' ' Who meditates 
(on) speech as Brahman ; ' ' Who meditates (on) will as 
Brahman"), exhibit the words ' Aditya ' and so on in the 
accusative case, and thereby show them to be the direct 
objects of the action of meditation 2 . — Against the remark 
that in all the mentioned cases Brahman only has to be 
meditated upon in order that a fruit may result from the 
meditation, we point out that from the mode of proof used 

1 Which in the translations given above of the texts under dis- 
cussion is mostly rendered by 'as' before the words concerned. 

* While the word ' Brahman ' does not stand in the accusative 
case. 



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iv adhyAya, i pAda, 6. 345 

above we infer that (not Brahman but) only Aditya and so 
on have to be meditated upon. But as in the case of 
hospitality shown to guests, Brahman, that is the supreme 
ruler of all, will give the fruit of meditations on Aditya and 
so on as well. This we have already shown under III, 2, 28. 
And, after all, Brahman also is meditated upon (in the cases 
under discussion) in so far as a contemplation on Brahman 
is superinduced on its symbols, analogously as a contem- 
plation on Vish«u is superinduced on his images. 

6. And the ideas of Aditya and so on (are to be 
superimposed) on the members (of the sacrificial 
action); owing to the effectuation (of the result of 
the sacrifice). 

' He who burns up these, let a man meditate upon him as 
udgitha' (Kh. Up. I, 3, 1) ; 'Let a man meditate on the 
fivefold Saman in the worlds' (Kh. Up. II, 2, 1) ; 'Let 
a man meditate on the sevenfold Saman in speech ' (Kh. Up. 
II, 8, 1); 'This earth is the Rik, fire is Saman' (Kh. Up. 
I, 6, 1). — With regard to these and similar meditations 
limited to members of sacrificial action, there arises a doubt 
whether the text enjoins contemplations on the udgitha and 
so on superinduced on Aditya and so on, or else contem- 
plations on Aditya, &c, superinduced on the udgitha and 
so on. 

No definite rule can here be established, the purvapakshin 
maintains, since there is no basis for such a rule. For in 
the present case we are unable to ascertain any special 
pre-eminence, while we were able to do so in the case of 
Brahman. Of Brahman, which is the cause of the whole 
world and free from all evil and so on, we can assert 
definitively that it is superior to Aditya and so on ; the 
udgitha and so on, on the other hand, are equally mere 
effects, and we cannot therefore with certainty ascribe to 
any of them any pre-eminence. — Or else we may decide 
that the ideas of the udgitha and so on are to be superin- 
duced exclusively on Aditya and so on. For the udgitha 
and so on are of the nature of sacrificial work, and as it is 
known that the fruit is attained through the work, Aditya 



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346 vedAnta-sCtras. 



and so on if meditated upon as udgttha and so on will 
themselves become of the nature of work and thereby be 
causes of fruit. — Moreover, the text, ' This earth is the Rik, 
the fire is the Saman,' is followed by the complementary 
passage, ' this Saman is placed upon this Rik,' where the 
word ' Rik ' denotes the earth and the word ' Saman ' the 
fire. Now this (viz. this calling the earth 'Rik ' and calling 
the fire ' Saman ') is possible only if the meaning of the 
passage is that the earth and the fire have to be viewed as 
Rik and Saman ; not if the Rik and the Saman were to be 
contemplated as earth and fire. For the term 'king' is 
metaphorically applied to the charioteer — and not the term 
' charioteer' to the king — the reason being that the charioteer 
may be viewed as a king. — Again in the text, * Let a man 
meditate upon the fivefold Saman in the worlds,' the use of 
the locative case ' in the worlds ' intimates that the medi- 
tation on the Saman is to be superimposed on the worlds as 
its locus. This is also proved by the analogous passage, 
' This Gayatra Saman is woven on the vital airs ' (Kh. Up. 
II, 11, 1). — Moreover (as proved before), in passages such 
as ' Aditya is Brahman, this is the instruction,' Brahman, 
which is mentioned last, is superimposed on Aditya, which 
is mentioned first. In the same way the earth, &c, are 
mentioned first, and the hinkara, &c, mentioned last in 
passages such as 'The earth is the hinkara' {Kk. Up. II, a, i). 
— For all these reasons the idea of members of sacrificial 
action has to be transferred to Aditya and so on, which are 
not such members. 

To this we make the following reply. The ideas of 
Aditya and so on are exclusively to be transferred to mem- 
bers of sacrificial action, such as the udgitha and so on. 
For what reason? — 'On account of effectuation' — that 
means : Because thus, through their connexion with the 
supersensuous result (of the sacrificial work under dis- 
cussion), when the udgitha and so on are ceremonially 
qualified by being viewed as Aditya and so on, the sacri- 
ficial work is successful 1 . A scriptural passage — viz. Kh. 

1 Certain constituent members of the sacrificial action — such as 



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iv adhyAva, i pAda, 6. 347 

Up. I, i, 10, * Whatever one performs with knowledge, faith, 
and the Upanishad is more powerful ' — moreover expressly 
declares that knowledge causes the success of sacrificial 
work. — Well then, an objection is raised, let this be admitted 
with regard to those meditations which have for their result 
the success of certain works ; but how is it with meditations 
that have independent fruits of their own ? Of this latter 
nature is e.g. the meditation referred to in Kh. Up. II, a, 3, 
' He who knowing this meditates on the fivefold Saman in 
the worlds (to him belong the worlds in an ascending and 
a descending scale).' — In those cases also, we reply, the 
meditation falls within the sphere of a person entitled to 
the performance of a certain work, and therefore it is proper 
to assume that it has a fruit only through its connexion 
with the supersensuous result of the work under the heading 
of which it is mentioned ; the case being analogous to that 
of the godohana-vessel 1 . — And as Aditya and so on are of 
the nature of fruits of action, they may be viewed as superior 
to the udgitha and so on which are of the nature of action 
only. Scriptural texts expressly teach that the reaching of 
Aditya (the sun) and so on constitutes the fruit of certain 
works. — Moreover the initial passages, ' Let a man meditate 
on the syllable Om as the udgitha,' and ' Of this syllable the 
full account is this' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 1), represent the udgitha 
only as the object of meditation, and only after that the 

the udgitha — undergo a certain ceremonial purification (saiw- 
skara) by being meditated upon as Aditya and so on. The 
meditations therefore contribute, through the mediation of the 
constituent members, towards the apflrva, the supersensuous result 
of the entire sacrifice. 

1 The sacred text promises a special fruit for the employment 
of the milking-pail (instead of the ordinary £amasa), viz. the 
obtainment of cattle; nevertheless that fruit is obtained only 
in so far as the godohana subserves the accomplishment of the 
apurva of the sacrifice. Analogously those meditations on mem- 
bers of sacrificial works for which the text promises a separate 
fruit obtain that fruit only in so far as they effect a mysterious 
samskara in those members, and thereby subserve the apurva of 
the sacrifice. 



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348 vedAnta-sOtras. 



text enjoins the contemplations on Aditya and so on. — Nor 
can we accept the remark that Aditya and so on being 
meditated upon as udgitha, &c, assume thereby the nature 
of work and thus will be productive of fruit. For pious 
meditation is in itself of the nature of work, and thus capable 
of producing a result. And if the udgitha and so on are 
meditated upon as Aditya, &c, they do not therefore cease 
to be of the nature Of work. — In the passage, ' This Saman 
is placed upon this Rik,' the words ' Rik ' and ' Saman ' are 
employed to denote the earth and Agni by means of impli- 
cation (laksha/ra), and implication may be based, according 
to opportunity, either on a less or more remote connexion 
of sense. Although, therefore, the intention of the passage 
is to enjoin the contemplation of the Rik and the Saman as 
earth and Agni, yet — as the Rik and the Saman are 
mentioned separately and as the earth and Agni are men- 
tioned close by — we decide that, on the ground of their 
connexion with the Rik and Saman, the words ' Rik ' and 
' Saman ' are employed to denote them (i. e. earth and 
Agni) only. For we also cannot altogether deny that the 
word 'charioteer' may, for some reason or other, meta- 
phorically denote a king. — Moreover the position of the 
words in the clause, ' Just this (earth) is Rik,' declares that 
the Rik is of the nature of earth ; while if the text wanted 
to declare that the earth is of the nature of Rik, the words 
would be arranged as follows, ' this earth is just Rik.' — 
Moreover the concluding clause, 'He who knowing this 
sings the Saman,' refers only to a cognition based on 
a subordinate member (of sacrificial action), not to one 
based on the earth and so on. — Analogously in the passage, 
' Let a man meditate (on) the fivefold Saman in the worlds,' 
the worlds — although enounced in the locative case — have 
to be superimposed on the Saman, as the circumstance of 
the ' Saman ' being exhibited in the objective case indicates 
it to be the object of meditation. For if the worlds are 
superimposed on the Saman, the Saman is meditated upon 
as the Self of the worlds ; while in the opposite case the 
worlds would be meditated upon as the Self of the Saman. 
— The same remark applies to the passage, ' This Gayatra 



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IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, "J. 349 

Saman is woven on the prawas' {Kh. Up. II, 11, 1). — 
Where again both members of the sentence are equally- 
exhibited in the objective case, viz. in the passage, ' Let a man 
meditate on the sevenfold Saman (as) the sun' (Kh. Up. II, 
9, 1), we observe that the introductory passages — viz. 
' Meditation on the whole Saman is good ; ' ' Thus for the 
fivefold Saman ; ' ' Next for the sevenfold Saman ' (Kh. Up. 
II, i, j ; 7, a; 8, 1) — represent the Saman only as the 
object of meditation, and therefrom conclude that Aditya 
has to be superinduced on it, and not the reverse.— From 
this very circumstance of the Saman being the object of 
meditation, it follows that even in cases where the two 
members of the sentence have a reverse position — such as 
' The earth (is) the htnkara,' &c. — the hinkara, &c, have to 
be viewed as earth and so on ; and not the reverse. — From 
all this it follows that reflections based on things not 
forming constituent members of the sacrifice, such as Aditya 
and so on, are to be superimposed on the udgitha and the 
like which are such constituent members. 

7. Sitting (a man is to meditate), on account of 
the possibility. 

As meditations connected with members of sacrificial 
action depend on action, we need not raise the question 
whether they are to be carried on in a sitting, or any other 
posture. The same holds good in the case of perfect 
intuition, since knowledge depends on its object only. 
With regard to all other meditations, on the other hand, 
the author of the Sfitras raises the question whether they 
may be undertaken indifferently by a person standing, 
sitting, or lying down ; or only by a person sitting. 

The purvapakshin here maintains that as meditation is 
something mental there can be no restriction as to the 
attitude of the body. — No, the author of the Stitras rejoins; 
' Sitting' only a man is to meditate. — Why ? — ' On account 
of the possibility.' By meditation we understand the length- 
ened carrying on of an identical train of thought ; and of 
this a man is capable neither when going nor when running, 
since the act of going and so on tends to distract the mind. 



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350 vedAnta-sOtras. 



The mind of a standing man, again, is directed on main- 
taining the body in an erect position, and therefore incapable 
of reflection on any subtle matter. A man lying down, 
finally, is unawares overcome by slumber. A sitting person, 
on the other hand, may easily avoid these several untoward 
occurrences, and is therefore in a position to carry on 
meditations. 

8. And on account of thoughtfulness. 

Moreover also the word 'thoughtfulness' denotes a 
lengthened carrying on of the same train of ideas. Now 
* thoughtfulness ' we ascribe to those whose mind is concen- 
trated on one and the same object, while their look is fixed 
and their limbs move only very slightly. We say e.g. that 
the crane is thoughtful, or that a wife whose husband has 
gone on a journey is thoughtful. Now such thoughtfulness 
is easy for those who sit ; and we therefore conclude here- 
from also that meditation is the occupation of a sitting 
person. 

9. And with reference to immobility (scripture 
ascribes thought to the earth, &c). 

Moreover, in the passage * The earth thinks as it were ' 
scripture ascribes thought to the earth, with regard to its 
immobility. This also helps us to infer that meditation is 
the occupation of one who is sitting. 

10. And Smrzti-passages say the same. 

Authoritative authors also teach in their Smr/tis that 
a sitting posture subserves the act of meditation : cp. e.g. 
Bha. Gita VI, 11, ' Having made a firm seat for one's self 
on a pure spot.' For the same reason the Yogajastra 
teaches different sitting postures, viz. the so-called lotus 
position and so on. 

11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), 
there (meditation may be carried on), on account of 
there being no difference. 

A doubt here arises with regard to direction, place, and 



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iv adhyAya, i pAda, 12. 351 

time, viz. whether any restrictive rules exist or not. — Against 
the view of those who maintain that such rules exist because 
we have analogous rules concerning the locality, &c, of 
Vedic works, the Sutrakara remarks that all rules concerning 
direction, place, and time depend on the aim merely ; that 
is to say : Let a man meditate at whatever time, in whatever 
place and facing whatever region, he may with ease manage 
to concentrate his mind. For while scripture prescribes an 
easterly direction, the time of forenoon, and a spot sloping 
towards the east for certain sacrifices, no such specific rules 
are recorded for meditation, since the requisite concentra- 
tion may be managed indifferently anywhere. — But, an 
objection is raised, some passages record such specific rules, 
as e.g. the following one, 'Let a man apply himself (to 
meditation) in a level and clean place, free from pebbles, 
fire and dust, noises, standing water, and the like, favourable 
to the mind, not infested by what hurts the eyes, full of 
caves and shelters' (Svet. Up. II, 10). — Such particular 
rules are met with indeed ; but the teacher being friendly- 
minded says that there is no binding rule as to the particulars 
mentioned therein. The clause 'favourable to the mind' 
moreover shows that meditation may be carried on wherever 
concentration of the mind may be attained. 

12. Up to death (meditations have to be repeated) ; 
for then also it is thus seen in scripture. 

The first adhikarawa (of the present adhyaya) has estab- 
lished that repetition is to be observed with regard to all 
meditations. But now a distinction is made. Those 
meditations which aim at complete knowledge, terminate — 
in the same way as the beating of the rice grains is 
terminated by the husks becoming detached from the 
grains — with their effect being accomplished ; for as soon 
as the effect, i. e. perfect knowledge, has been obtained, no 
further effort can be commanded, since scriptural instruction 
does not apply to him who knows that Brahman — which 
is not the object of injunction — constitutes his Self. On 
the other hand a doubt arises whether the devotee is to 
repeat those meditations which aim at certain forms of 



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352 vedAnta-sOtras. 



exaltation for a certain time only and then may stop ; or 
whether he is to repeat them again and again as long as 
he lives. 

Here the purvapakshin maintains that such meditations 
are to be carried on for some time only and then to be 
given up, since this satisfies the demands of those scriptural 
passages which teach meditations distinguished by repetition. 

To this we make the following reply. The devotee is 
to reiterate those meditations up to his death, since the 
supersensuous result (of such meditations) is reached 
by means of the extreme meditation. For such works 
also as originate a fruit to be enjoyed in a future state 
of existence presuppose, at the time of death, a creative 
cognition analogous to the fruit to be produced ; as appears 
from such passages as, ' Endowed with knowledge (i.e. the 
conception of the fruit to be obtained) he (i.e. the individual 
soul) goes after that (viz. the fruit) which is connected with 
that knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, a) ; ' Whatever his thought 
(at the time of death), with that he goes into Prawa, and 
the Prawa united with light, together with the individual 
Self, leads on to the world as conceived (at the moment of 
death)' (Pr. Up. IV, a, 10). This also follows from the 
comparison to the caterpillar (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 3). But the 
meditations under discussion do not, at the time of death, 
require any other creative cognition but a repetition of 
themselves. Such meditations therefore as consist in the 
creative conception of a fruit to be obtained must be 
repeated up to the moment of death. Analogously the 
scriptural text, Sat. Bra. X, 6, 3, 1 — 'With whatever thought 
he passes away from this world ' — declares that the medita- 
tion extends up to the time of death. Similarly Snvrti 
says, ' Remembering whatever form of being he in the end 
leaves this body, into that same form he ever passes, 
assimilated to its being' (Bha. Git4 VIII, 6) ; and 'At the 
time of death with unmoved mind' (Bha. Gita VIII, 10). 
And that at the moment of death also there remains some- 
thing to be done, the scriptural passage (Kh. Up. Ill, 17, 6) 
also proves. ' Let a man, at the time of death, take refuge 
with this triad.' 



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IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3. 353 

13. On the attainment of this (viz. Brahman) (there 
take place) the non-clinging and the destruction of 
later and earliersins; this being declared (by scripture). 

The supplement to the third adhyaya is finished here- 
with, and an inquiry now begins concerning the fruit of 
the knowledge of Brahman. — The doubt here presents 
itself whether, on the attainment of Brahman, sins the 
results of which are opposed in nature to such attainment 
are extinguished or not. They cannot possibly be extin- 
guished, the purvapakshin maintains, before they have 
given their results, because the purpose of all works is their 
result. For we understand from scripture that work 
possesses the power of producing results ; if, therefore, 
the work would perish without the enjoyment of its result, 
scripture would thereby be rendered nugatory. Smrz'ti 
also declares that 'works do not perish.' — But from this 
it would follow that all scriptural instruction regarding 
expiatory ceremonies is meaningless I — This objection is 
without force, we reply, because expiatory ceremonies may 
be viewed as merely due to certain special occurrences ; 
as is the case with the offering enjoined on the occasion 
of the house (of one who has established the sacred fire- 
place)being burned 1 . — Let us moreover admit that expiatory 
ceremonies, because enjoined on account of a person being 
afflicted by some mischief, may be meant to extinguish 
that mischief. But there is no analogous injunction of the 
knowledge of Brahman. — But if we do not admit that the 
works of him who knows Brahman are extinguished, it 
follows that he must necessarily enjoy the fruits of his 
works and thus cannot obtain release ! — This follows by no 
means ; but in the same way as the results of works, release 
will take place in due dependence on place, time, and special 
causes. — For these reasons the obtain ment of Brahman 
does not imply the cessation of (the consequences of) mis- 
deeds. 

1 Scripture enjoins the ish/i in question merely on the occasion 
of the house being burned, not as annulling the mischief done. 
[38] A a 



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354 vedAnta-sOtras. 



To this we make the following reply. On the obtain- 
ment of Brahman there take place the non-clinging (to the 
agent) of the posterior sins and the annihilation of anterior 
ones. — ' On account of this being declared.' For in 
a chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman scrip- 
ture expressly declares that future sins which might be 
presumed to cling to the agent do not cling to him 
who knows : ' As water does not cling to a lotus-leaf, 
so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' (Kh. Up. 

IV, 14, 3). Similarly scripture declares the destruction 
of previously accumulated evil deeds : ' As the fibres of 
the Ishika reed when thrown into the fire are burned, 
thus all his sins are burned ' (Kh. Up. V, 24, 3). The 
extinction of works the following passage also declares, 
' The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, 
extinguished are all his works when He has been beheld 
who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). — Nor is there 
any force in the averment that the assumption of works 
being extinguished without their fruits having been enjoyed 
would render scripture futile. For we by no means deny 
the fruit-producing power of works ; this power actually 
exists ; but we maintain that it is counteracted by other 
causes such as knowledge. Scripture is concerned only 
with the existence of this power in general, not with its 
obstruction and non-obstruction. Thus also the Smrz'ti 
passage, 'For work is not extinguished,' expresses the 
general rule ; for as fruition of the result is the purpose of 
work, work is not extinguished without such fruition. But 
it is assumed that evil deeds are extinguished through 
expiatory ceremonies and the like, on account of scriptural 
and Smrzti passages such as 'All sins transcends he, the 
murder of a Brahmawa transcends he who offers the 
arvamedha-sacrifice and who knows it thus' (Tai. Saw/h. 

V, 3, 1 2, 1 ). — Nor is there any truth in the assertion that 
expiatory ceremonies are due to certain special occurrences 
(without possessing the power of extinguishing the evil 
inherent in such occurrences). For as these expiatory acts 
are enjoined in connexion with evil events, we may assume 
that they have for their fruit the destruction of such evil, 



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IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13. 355 

and are therefore not entitled to assume any other fruit. 
— Against the objection that knowledge is not actually 
enjoined with reference to the destruction of evil while 
expiatory acts are so enjoined, we make the following 
remark. In the case of the meditations on the qualified 
Brahman there exists such injunction, and the corresponding 
complementary passages declare that he who possesses such 
knowledge obtains lordly power and cessation of all sin. 
Now there is no reason why the passages should not 
expressly aim at declaring these two things ', and we 
therefore conclude that the fruit of those vidyas is the 
acquisition of lordly power, preceded by the annulment 
of all sin. In the case of vidyas referring to Brahman 
devoid of qualities we indeed have no corresponding in- 
junction ; nevertheless the destruction of all works follows 
from the cognition that our true Self is not an agent. 
(With relation to these vidyas about Brahman as devoid 
of qualities) the term ' non-clinging' shows that, as far as 
future works are concerned, he who knows Brahman does 
not enter at all into the state of agency. And as to works 
past, although he has entered as it were into that state 
owing to wrong knowledge, yet those works also are 
dissolved when, through the power of knowledge, wrong 
cognition comes to an end ; this is conveyed by the term 
' destruction.' ' That Brahman whose nature it is to be 
at all times neither agent nor enjoyer, and which is thus 
opposed in being to the (soul's) previously established state 
of agency and enjoyment, that Brahman am I ; hence 
I neither was an agent nor an enjoyer at any previous time, 
nor am I such at the present time, nor shall I be such 
at any future time ; ' this is the cognition of the man who 
knows Brahman. And in this way only final release is 
possible ; for otherwise, i. e. if the chain of works which have 
been running on from eternity could not be cut short, release 

1 I. e. there is no reason to assume that those passages mention 
the acquisition of lordly power and the cessation of sin merely for 
the purpose of glorifying the injunction, and not for the purpose of 
stating the result of our compliance with the injunction. 

Aa 2 



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356 vedanta-sCtras. 



could never take place. — Nor can final release be dependent 
on locality, time, and special causes, as the fruit of works is ; 
for therefrom it would follow that the fruit of knowledge is 
non-permanent and cannot be. 

It therefore is an established conclusion that on attaining 
Brahman there results the extinction of all sin. 

14. Of the other (i.e. good works) also there is, 
in the same way, non-clinging ; but at death. 

In the preceding adhikarawa it has been shown that, 
according to scriptural statements, all natural sin — which 
is the cause of the soul's bondage — does, owing to the 
power of knowledge, either not cling to the soul or undergo 
destruction. One might now think that works of religious 
duty which are enjoined by scripture are not opposed to 
knowledge also founded on scripture. In order to dispel 
this notion the reasoning of the last adhikarana is formally 
extended to the case under discussion. For him who 
knows there is ' in the same way,' i. e. as in the case of 
sin, 'non-clinging' and destruction ' of the other also,' i.e. of 
good works also ; because such works also, as productive 
of their own results, would be apt to obstruct thereby the 
result of knowledge. • Scripture also — in passages such as 
* He overcomes both ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 22) — declares that 
good works are extinguished no less than evil ones, and 
the extinction of works which depends on the cognition 
of the Self not being an agent is the same in the case 
of good and of evil works, and moreover there is a passage 
making a general statement without any distinction, viz. 
'And his works are extinguished' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). 
And even there where the text mentions evil works only, 
we must consider good works also to be implied therein, 
because the results of the latter also are inferior to the 
result of knowledge. Moreover scripture directly applies the 
term ' evil works ' to good works also, viz. in the passage, 
Kh. Up. VIII, 4, i, ' Day and night do not pass that bank,' 
where good works are mentioned together with evil works, 
and finally the term 'evil' is without any distinction 
applied to all things mentioned before, 'AH evil things 



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iv adhyAya, i pAda, 15. 357 

turn back from it.' — * But at death.' The word ' but ' is 
meant for emphatical assertion. As it is established that 
good as well as evil works — which are both causes of 
bondage — do, owing to the strength of knowledge, on the 
one hand not cling and on the other hand undergo de- 
struction, there necessarily results final release of him who 
knows as soon as death takes place. 

15. But only those former (works) whose effects 
have not yet begun (are destroyed by knowledge) ; 
because (scripture states) that (i. e. the death of the 
body) to be the term. 

In the two preceding adhikarawas it has been proved 
that good as well as evil works are annihilated through 
knowledge. We now have to consider the question whether 
this annihilation extends, without distinction, to those 
works whose effects have already begun to operate as well 
as to those whose effects have not yet begun; or only 
to works of the latter kind. 

Here the purvapakshin maintains that on the ground of 
scriptural passages such as 'He thereby overcomes both,' 
which refer to all works without any distinction, all works 
whatever must be considered to undergo destruction. 

To this we reply, * But only those whose effects have 
not begun.' Former works, i.e. works, whether good or 
evil, which have been accumulated in previous forms of 
existence as well as in the current form of existence before 
the origination of knowledge, are destroyed by the attain- 
ment of knowledge only if their fruit has not yet begun 
to operate. Those works, on the other hand, whose effects 
have begun and whose results have been half enjoyed — 
i.e. those very works to which there is due the present state 
of existence in which the knowledge of Brahman arises — 
are not destroyed by that knowledge. This opinion is 
founded on the scriptural passage, ' For him there is delay 
only as long as he is not delivered (from the body) ' (KA. 
Up. VI, 14, 2), which fixes the death of the body as the 
term of the attainment of final release. Were it otherwise, 



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358 vedanta-sOtras. 



i.e. were all works whatever extinguished by knowledge, 
there would be no reason for the continuance of the current 
form of existence, and the rise of knowledge would there- 
fore be immediately followed by the state of final release ; 
in which case scripture would not teach that one has to 
wait for the death of the body. — But, an objection is raised, 
the knowledge of the Self being essentially non-active 
does by its intrinsic power destroy (all) works ; how then 
should it destroy some only and leave others unaffected ? 
We certainly have no right to assume that when fire and 
seeds come into contact the germinative power of some 
seeds only is destroyed while that of others remains un- 
impaired ! — The origination of knowledge, we reply, can- 
not take place without dependence on an aggregate of 
works whose effects have already begun to operate, and 
when this dependence has once been entered into, we must 
— as in the case of the potter's wheel — wait until the 
motion of that which once has begun to move comes to 
an end, there being nothing to obstruct it in the interim. 
The knowledge of our Self being essentially non-active 
destroys all works by means of refuting wrong knowledge ; 
but wrong knowledge — comparable to the appearance of 
a double moon — lasts for some time even after it has been 
refuted, owing to the impression it has made. — Moreover 
it is not a matter for dispute at all whether the body of 
him who knows Brahman continues to exist for some time 
or not. For how can one man contest the fact of another 
possessing the knowledge of Brahman — vouched for by his 
heart's conviction — and at the same time continuing to 
enjoy bodily existence ? This same point is explained in 
scripture and Smrtti, where they describe him who stands 
firm in the highest knowledge. — The final decision therefore 
is that knowledge effects the destruction of those works 
only — whether good or evil — whose effects have not yet 
begun to operate. 

1 6. But the Agnihotra and the like (tend) towards 
the same effect ; scripture showing this. 

The reasoning as to evil deeds has been extended to the 



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iv adhyAya, i pada, 1 6. 359 

non-clinging and destruction of good deeds also. Against 
a notion which now might present itself, viz. that this 
extension comprehends all good works alike, the Sutrakara 
remarks, 'But the Agnihotra and so on.' — The word 'but' 
is meant to set that notion aside. Works of permanent 
obligation enjoined by the Veda, such as the Agnihotra, 
tend 'towards the same effect,' i.e. have the same effect as 
knowledge. For this is declared by texts such as the 
following one, ' Brahmawas seek to know him by the study 
of the Veda, by sacrifices, by gifts' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 22). — 
But, an objection is raised, as knowledge and works have 
different effects, it is impossible that they should have one 
and the same effect ! — It is observed, we reply, that sour 
milk and poison whose ordinary effects are fever and death 
have for their effects satisfaction and a flourishing state of 
the body, if the sour milk is mixed with sugar and the 
poison taken while certain mantras are recited ; in the 
same way works if joined with knowledge may effect final 
release. — But final release is something not to be effected 
at all ; how then can you declare it to be the effect of 
works? — Works, we reply, may subserve final release 
mediately. For in so far as furthering knowledge, work 
may be spoken of as an indirect cause of final release. 
For the same reason the equality of effect spoken of above 
extends only to works past (at the time when knowledge 
springs up). Because for him who knows Brahman no future 
Agnihotras and the like are possible, since the attainment 
of the Self of Brahman — which Brahman is not subject to 
injunction — lies outside the sphere of sacred precept. In 
those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to 
the qualified Brahman, the Self does not cease to be an 
agent, and consequently future Agnihotras and the like are 
not excluded. Such works also — because they have no 
other effect if undertaken without a view to reward — may 
be brought into connexion with knowledge. 

To what works then, it may be asked, does the statement 
refer made above about the non-clinging and the destruction, 
and to what works the following statement made in some 
.Sakha about the application of works,' His sons enter upon 



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360 vedanta-sAtras. 



his inheritance, his friends on his good works, his enemies 
upon his evil works?' — To this question the next Sutra 
replies. 

17. For (there is) also (a class of good works) 
other than this, according to some. (There is agree- 
ment) of both (teachers) (as to the fate of those 
works.) 

' For also one other than this,' i. e. there is also a class of 
good works different from works of permanent obligation, 
viz. those good works which are performed with a view to 
a fruit. Of those latter works the passage quoted above 
from some Sakha (' His friends enter on his good works') 
teaches the application. And first of those works Sutra 14 
teaches that, in the same way as evil deeds, they do not 
cling to the doer or else are destroyed. Both teachers, 
Gaimini as well as Badarayawa, are agreed that such works, 
undertaken for the fulfilment of some special wish, do not 
contribute towards the origination of true knowledge. 

18. For (the text) ' whatever he does with know- 
ledge ' (intimates that). 

In the preceding adhikarawa the following conclusion 
has been established : — Works of permanent obligation 
such as the Agnihotra, if performed by a person desirous 
of release with a view to release, lead to the extinction of 
evil deeds committed, thus become a means of the purifi- 
cation of the mind, and thereby cause the attainment of 
Brahman, which leads to final release ; they therefore 
operate towards the same effect as the knowledge of 
Brahman. Now the Agnihotra and similar works are 
either connected with a special knowledge based on the 
constituent members of the sacrificial work, or absolute 
(non-connected with such knowledge). This appears from 
scriptural texts such as ' He who knowing this sacrifices ; 
he who knowing this makes an offering ; he who knowing 
this recites ; he who knowing this sings ; therefore let 
a man make him who knows this his Brahman-priest 



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iv adhyAya, i pAda, 18. 361 

(Kk. Up. IV, 17, 1) ; therefore both perform the work, he 
who knows this and he who does not know it ' {Kh. Up. I, 
1, 10). — We have now to consider the question whether 
only such Agnihotras and so on as are connected with 
knowledge cause knowledge on the part of him who desires 
release and thus operate towards the same effect as 
knowledge ; or whether both kinds of works — those con- 
nected with knowledge and those not so connected — equally 
act in that way. The doubt concerning this point arises on 
the one hand from scriptural passages such as ' That Self 
they seek to know by sacrifice ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 22), which 
represent sacrifices and the like, without difference, as 
auxiliary to the knowledge of the Self; and on the other 
hand from our observing that a superiority is conceded to 
Agnihotras, &c, if connected with knowledge. 

Here the purvapakshin maintains that only such sacri- 
ficial works as are connected with knowledge are helpful 
towards the cognition of the Self, since we understand from 
various scriptural and Smrzti passages that works connected 
with knowledge are superior to those destitute of know- 
ledge ; cp. e. g. ' On the very day on which he sacrifices on 
that day he overcomes death again, he who knows this ' 
(Br*. Up. I, 5, a) ; and ' Possesser of this knowledge thou 
wilt cast off the bonds of action ; ' ' Action is far inferior 
to concentration of mind ' (Bha. Git& II, 39 ; 49). 

To this the Sutrakara replies, ' For what with knowledge 
only.' It is true that works such as the Agnihotra if joined 
with knowledge are superior to works destitute of knowledge, 
in the same way as a Brihmawa possessed of knowledge is 
superior to one devoid of knowledge. Nevertheless works 
such as the Agnihotra even if not connected with know- 
ledge are not altogether ineffective ; for certain scriptural 
texts declare that such works are, all of them without any 
difference, causes of knowledge ; so e. g. the passage, ' That 
Self they seek to know through sacrifices.' — But, as we 
understand from scripture that works connected with 
knowledge are superior to those destitute of knowledge, 
we must suppose that the Agnihotra and the like if un- 
accompanied by knowledge are inoperative towards the 



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362 vedAnta-sOtras. 



cognition of the Self! — By no means, we reply. The 
proper assumption is that the Agnihotra and so on, if 
accompanied by knowledge, possess a greater capability of 
originating knowledge and therefore are of superior causal 
efficiency with regard to the cognition of the Self ; while 
the same works if devoid of knowledge possess no such 
superiority. We cannot, however, admit that the Agni- 
hotra and similar works which scripture, without making 
any distinction, declares to subserve knowledge (cp. ' they 
seek to know through sacrifices') should not subserve it. 
With this our conclusion agrees the scriptural text, ' What- 
ever he performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad 
that is more powerful' (Kk. Up. I, 1, to); for this text — 
in speaking of the greater power of work joined with 
knowledge and thus proclaiming the superiority of such 
work with regard to its effect — intimates thereby that 
work destitute of knowledge possesses some power towards 
the same effect. By the ' power ' of work we understand 
its capacity of effecting its purpose. We therefore accept 
as settled the following conclusion : All works of perma- 
nent obligation, such as the Agnihotra — whether joined 
with or devoid of knowledge — which have been performed 
before the rise of true knowledge, either in the present 
state of existence or a former one, by a person desirous 
of release with a view to release ; all such works act, 
according to their several capacities, as means of the 
extinction of evil desert which obstructs the attainment of 
Brahman, and thus become causes of such attainment, 
subserving the more immediate causes such as the hearing 
of and reflecting on the sacred texts, faith, meditation, devo- 
tion, &c. They therefore operate towards the same effect 
as the knowledge of Brahman. 

19. But having destroyed by fruition the two 
other (sets of work) he becomes one with Brahman. 

It has been shown that all good and evil deeds whose 
effects have not yet begun are extinguished by the power 
of knowledge. ' The two others,' on the other hand, i. e. 
those good and evil works whose effects have begun, a man 



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IV ADHYAYA, I pAda, 1 9. 363 

has at first to exhaust by the fruition of their consequences, 
and then he becomes one with Brahman. This appears 
from scriptural passages such as ' For him there is delay so 
long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will 
become one with Brahman' (Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2); and 
' Being Brahman he goes to Brahman ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 6). 
— But, an objection is raised, even when perfect intuition 
has risen the practical intuition of multiplicity may continue 
after the death of the body, just as it continued before 
death ; analogously to the visual appearance of a double 
moon (which may continue even after it has been cognized 
as false). — Not so, we reply. After the death of the body 
there no longer exists any cause for such continuance; 
while up to death there is such a cause, viz. the extinction 
of the remainder of works to be enjoyed. — But a new 
aggregate of works will originate a new fruition ! — Not so, 
we reply; since the seed of all such fruition is destroyed. 
What, on the death of the body, could originate a new 
period of fruition, is only a new set of works, and works 
depend on false knowledge ; but such false knowledge is 
completely destroyed by perfect intuition. When therefore 
the works whose effects have begun are destroyed, the 
man who knows necessarily enters into the state of perfect 
isolation. 



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364 vedAnta-sOtras. 



SECOND PADA. 

Reverence to the highest Self! 

1. Speech (is merged) in mind, on account of this 
being seen, and of the scriptural statement 

Being about to describe the path of the gods which leads 
those who possess the lower kind of knowledge towards 
the attainment of their reward, the Sutrakara begins by 
explaining, on the basis of scriptural statements, the 
successive steps by which the soul passes out of the body ; 
for, as will be stated later on, the departure of the soul 
is the same in the case of him who possesses the (lower) 
knowledge and of him who is devoid of all knowledge. 

About the process of dying we have the following passage, 
' When a man departs from hence his speech merges in his 
mind, his mind in his breath, his breath in fire, fire in the 
highest deity' (Kh. Up. VI, 6, 1). A doubt here arises 
whether the passage means to say that speech itself, together 
with its function, is merged in the mind, or only the 
function of speech. 

The purvapakshin maintains that speech itself is merged 
in the mind. For this explanation only is in agreement 
with the direct statement of the sacred text, while the other 
alternative compels us to have recourse to an implied 
meaning ; now wherever direct enunciation and implied 
meaning are in conflict the preference has to be given to 
the former, and we therefore maintain that speech itself is 
merged in the mind. 

To this we reply that only the function of speech is 
merged in the mind. — But how can this interpretation be 
maintained, considering that the teacher (in the Sutra) 
expressly says ' Speech in the mind ? ' — True, we reply ; 
but later on he says ' There is non-division, according to 
scriptural statement' (Sfttra 16), and we therefrom conclude 
that what is meant in the present Sutra is merely cessation 
of the function of speech. For if the intention were to 



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iv adhyAya, 2 pAda, 2. 365 

express absorption of the thing (i.e. the organ of speech) 
itself, there would be 'non-division' in all cases, and for 
what reason then should ' non-division ' be specially stated 
in another case (i.e. in the case of which Sutra 16 treats)? 
The meaning therefore is that the different functions are 
retracted, and that while the function of the mind continues 
to go on the function of speech is retracted first. — Why 
so ? — ' Because this is seen.' It is a matter of observation 
that while the mind continues to act the function of speech 
comes to an end; nobody, on the other hand, is able to 
see that the organ of speech itself, together with its function, 
is merged in the mind. — But are we not justified in assuming 
such a merging of speech in the mind, on the ground of 
scriptural statement? — This is impossible, we reply, since 
mind is not the causal substance of speech. We are entitled 
to assume only that a thing is merged in what is its causal 
substance ; a pot e. g. (when destroyed) is merged in clay. 
But there is no proof whatever for speech originating from 
mind. On the other hand we observe that functions originate 
and are retracted even where they do not inhere in causal 
substances. The function of fire, e.g. which is of the nature 
of heat, springs from fuel which is of the nature of earth, 
and it is extinguished in water. — But how do you, on this 
interpretation, account for the scriptural statement that 
•speech is merged in the mind?' — 'And on account of the 
scriptural statement,' the Sutrakara replies. The scriptural 
statement also may be reconciled with our interpretation, 
in so far as the function and the thing to which the function 
belongs are viewed as non-difierent. 

2. And for the same reason all (sense-organs) 
(follow) after (mind). 

• Therefore he whose light has gone out comes to a new 
birth with his senses merged in the mind ' (Pr. Up. Ill, 9) ; 
this passage states that all senses without difference are 
merged in the mind. 'For the same reason,' i.e. because 
there also as in the case of speech, it is observed that the 
eye and so on discontinue their functions, while the mind 
together with its functions persists, and because the organs 



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366 vedAnta-sCtras. 



themselves cannot be absorbed, and because the text 
admits of that interpretation ; we conclude that the different 
organs follow after, i.e. are merged in, the mind only as far 
as their functions are concerned. — As all organs 1 without 
difference are merged in the mind, the special mention 
made of speech (in Sutra i) must be viewed as made in 
agreement with the special example referred to by scripture, 
' Speech is merged in mind.' 

3. That mind (is merged) in breath, owing to the 
subsequent clause. 

It has been shown that the passage, ' Speech is merged 
in mind,' means a merging of the function only. — A doubt 
here arises whether the subsequent clause, ' mind in breath,' 
also means to intimate a merging of the function only or 
of that to which the function belongs. — The purvapakshin 
maintains the latter alternative. For that, he says, agrees 
with scripture, and moreover breath may be viewed as the 
causal substance of mind. For scripture — ' Mind is made 
of earth, breath of water ' {Kh. Up. VI, 6, 5)— states that 
mind comes from earth and breath from water, and scripture 
further states that ' Water sent forth earth ' {Kh. Up. VI, 
2, 4). When mind therefore is merged in breath, it is the 
same as earth being merged in water ; for mind is earth 
and breath is water, causal substance and effect being non- 
different. 

To this we reply as follows. ' The subsequent clause ' 
intimates that the mind, after having absorbed within itself 
the functions of the outer senses, is merged in breath only 
in the way of its function being so merged. For we 
observe in the case of persons lying in deep sleep or about to 
die that, while the function of breath persists, the functions 
of the mind are stopped. Nor is the mind capable of being 
itself merged in breath, since breath does not constitute 
its causal substance. — But it has been shown above that 
breath is the causal substance of mind! — This is not valid, 

1 I. e. the functions of all organs. 



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iv adhyAya, 2 pAda, 4. 367 

we reply. For the relation of causality, made out in such 
an indirect way, does not suffice to show that mind is really 
merged in breath. Were it so, then mind would also be 
merged in earth, earth in water, breath in water. Nor 
is there, on the alternative contemplated, any proof of mind 
having originated from that water which had passed over 
into breath. — Mind cannot therefore, in itself, be merged 
in breath. And that the scriptural statement is satisfied 
by a mere merging of the function — the function and that 
to which the function belongs being viewed as identical — 
has been shown already under the preceding Sutra. 

4. That (viz. breath) (is merged) in the ruler 
(i. e. the individual soul), on account of the (state- 
ments as to the pra«as) coming to it and so on. 

We have ascertained that a thing which has not originated 
from another is not itself merged in the latter, but only 
through its functions. A doubt now arises whether, accord- 
ing to the word of scripture, the function of breath_is merged 
in heat, or in the individual soul which is the ruler of the 
body and senses. — According to the purvapakshin we must 
conclude that the breath is merged in heat only, since the 
scriptural statement allows no room for doubt and we are 
not entitled to assume something not declared by scripture. 
The breath under discussion persists 'in the ruler,' i.e. 
the intelligent Self (the individual soul) which possesses 
nescience, work, and former knowledge as limiting adjuncts; 
i.e. the function of breath has that soul for its substratum. 
— Why so? — 'On account of (the pra«as) going towards 
him,' &c. — Another scriptural passage declares that all 
prawas without any difference go to the soul, ' All the prawas 
go to the Self at the time of death when a man is thus 
going to expire' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 38). Another passage 
again specially declares that the prawa with its five functions 
follows the individual soul, 'After him thus departing the 
prawa departs,' and that the other prawas follow that pra«a, 
'And after the prawa thus departing all the other pra«as 
depart' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, a). And the text, ' He is furnished 
with intelligence' (ibid.), by declaring the individual soul to 



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368 vedAnta-sOtras. 



be of intimately intelligent nature, suggests that in it, viz. 
the soul, the pra«a — into which the different organs of 
knowledge have been merged — has taken its abode. — But 
scripture also says, ' The pri«a (is merged) in heat ; ' why 
then make the addition implied in the doctrine — that breath 
is merged in the individual soul? — We must make that 
addition, we reply, because in the process of departure &c 
the soul is the chief agent, and because we must pay regard 
to specifications contained in other scriptural passages 
also. — How then do you explain the statement, ' Breath is 
merged in heat ? ' — To this question the next Sutra replies. 

5. To the elements (the soul, with pra«a, goes), 
on account of the subsequent scriptural clause. 

The soul joined by the priwa takes up its abode within 
the subtle elements which accompany heat and form the 
seed of the (gross) body. This we conclude from the clause, 
'Breath in heat.' — But this passage declares, not that the 
soul together with the pra«a takes up its abode in heat, 
but only that the pra«a takes up its abode ! — No matter, 
we reply; since the preceding Sutra intercalates the soul 
in the interval (between pra«a and te^as). Of a man who 
first travels from Srughna to Mathura and then from 
Mathura to Pa/aliputra, we may say shortly that he travels 
from .Srughna to Pafaliputra. The passage under discussion 
therefore means that the soul together with the prawa 
abides in the elements associated with heat. — But how are 
you entitled to draw in the other elements also, while the 
text only speaks of heat ? — To this question the next Sutra 
replies. 

6. Not to one (element) (the soul goes) ; for both 
(i. e. scripture and Smnti) declare this. 

At the time of passing over into another body the 
individual soul does not abide in the one element of heat 
only; for we see that the new body consists of various 
elements. This matter is declared in the question and 
answer about the waters called man (Kh. Up. V, 3, 3); 
as explained by us in III, 1, a. — Scripture and SnWti alike 



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iv adhyAya, 2 pAda, 7. 369 

teach this doctrine ; compare e. g. ' Consisting of earth, 
water, wind, ether, heat' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 5); and ' The 
subtle perishable parts of the five (elements) from them all 
this is produced in due succession' (Manu I, 27). — But is 
there not another scriptural text — beginning ' Where then 
is that person?' — which teaches that at the time of the 
soul attaining a new body, after speech and the other 
organs have been withdrawn within the soul, work 
constitutes the soul's abode, ' What those two said, as work 
they said it ; what they praised, as work they praised it ' 
(Br:. Up. Ill, a, 13)? — That passage, we reply, describes 
the operation of bondage consisting of the senses and their 
objects — there called grahas and atigrahas — and therefore 
work is spoken of as the abode ; here on the other hand 
the elements are said to be the abode because we have 
to do with the origination of a new body out of the matter 
of the elements. The expression ' they prayed ' moreover 
intimates only that work occupies the chief place in the 
process, and does not exclude another abode. The two 
passages therefore do not contradict each other. 

7. And common (to him who knows and him who 
does not know) (is the departure) up to the beginning 
of the way ; and the immortality (of him who knows) 
(is relative only) without having burned (nescience 
and so on). 

The question here arises whether the departure of the 
soul, as described hitherto, is the same in the case of bim 
who knows and him who is destitute of knowledge; or 
whether there is any difference. — There is a difference, the 
purvapakshin maintains. For the departure as described 
has for its abode the elements, and this abiding in the 
elements is for the purpose of a new birth. But he who 
possesses true knowledge cannot be born again, since 
scripture declares that 'He who knows reaches immor- 
tality.' Hence only he who is devoid of knowledge departs 
in the way described. — But as that departure is described 
in chapters treating of knowledge it can belong only to him 
[38] B b 



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3 7° vedAnta-sCtras. 

who knows ! — Not so, the purvapakshin replies. In the 
same way as sleep and the like, the departure of the soul 
is only referred to in the texts as something established 
elsewhere (not as something to be taught as part of true 
knowledge). Passages such as 'When a man sleeps, — is 
hungry, — is thirsty ' (Kh. Up. VI, 8), although forming 
part of chapters concerned with true knowledge, mention 
sleep and so on which are common to all living beings, 
because they assist the comprehension of the matter to be 
taught, but do not aim at enjoining them specially for those 
who know. Analogously the texts about the soul's 
departure refer to that departure only in order to teach 
that 'that highest deity in which the heat of the dying 
man is merged, that is the Self, that art thou.' Now that 
departure is (in other scriptural passages) specially denied 
of him who knows ; it therefore belongs to him only who 
does not know. 

To this we make the following reply. That departure 
which is described in the passage, 'speech is merged in 
mind,' &c, must be ' common ' to him who knows and him 
who does not know 'up to the beginning of the way;' 
because scripture records no distinction. The soul des- 
titute of true knowledge having taken its abode in the 
subtle elements which constitute the seed of the body and 
being impelled by its works, migrates into a new body ; 
while the soul of him who knows passes into the vein, 
revealed by true knowledge, which is the door of release. 
In this sense the Sutra says 'up to the beginning of the 
way.' — But he who knows reaches immortality, and im- 
mortality does not depend on a change of place ; why then 
should the soul take its abode in the elements or set out 
on a journey? — That immortality, we reply, is 'without 
having burned,' i. e. for him who, without having altogether 
burned nescience and the other afflictions, is about to 
obtain, through the power of the lower knowledge, a relative 
immortality only, there take place the entering on the 
way and the abiding in the elements. For without a sub- 
stratum the pra«as could not move. There is thus no 
difficulty. 



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IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 9. 371 

8. This (aggregate of the elements) (continues to 
exist) up to the (final absolute) union (with Brah- 
man) ; on account of the declarations of the sawsara 
state (made by scripture). 

With regard to the final clause, 'Heat in the highest 
deity,' the force of its connexion with what precedes shows 
that the meaning is 'the heat of the dying man is — together 
with the individual soul, the pra«a, the aggregate of the 
organs and the other elements — merged in Brahman.' — We 
now have to consider of what kind that merging is. — The 
purvapakshin maintains that it is an absolute absorption 
of the things merged, since it is proved that those things 
have the highest deity for their causal matter. For it has 
been established that the deity is the causal substance of 
all things that have an origin. Hence that passing into 
the state of non-separation is an absolute one. 

To this we reply as follows. Those subtle elements — 
heat and so on — which constitute the abode of hearing and 
the other organs persist up to the ' union,' i. e. up to final 
release from the samsara, which is caused by perfect 
knowledge. 'On account of the declarations of the sa/wsara 
state ' made in passages such as ' Some enter the womb, 
for embodied existence as organic beings ; others go into 
inorganic matter, according to their work and according to 
their knowledge' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 7). Otherwise the limiting 
adjuncts of every soul would, at the time of death, be 
absorbed and the soul would enter into absolute union 
with Brahman; which would render all scriptural injunction 
and scriptural doctrine equally purportless. Moreover 
bondage, which is due to wrong knowledge, cannot be 
dissolved but through perfect knowledge. Hence, although 
Brahman is the causal substance of those elements, they 
are at the time of death — as in the case of deep sleep and 
a pralaya of the world — merged in it only in such a way 
as to continue to exist in a seminal condition. 

9. And (heat is) subtle in measure ; as this is thus 
observed. 

The elementary matter of heat and the other elements 

B b 2 



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37 2 vedAnta-sCtras. 



which form the substratum for the soul when passing out 
of this body, must be subtle in its nature and extent. This 
follows from the scriptural passages, which declare that it 
passes out by the veins and so on. Their thinness renders 
them capable of passing out, and their transparency (per- 
meability) is the cause of their not being stopped by any 
gross substance. For these reasons they, when passing out 
of the body, are not perceived by bystanders. 

10. For this reason (it is) not (destroyed) by the 
destruction (of the gross body). 

On account of this very subtlety the subtle body is not 
destroyed by what destroys the gross body, viz. burning 
and the like. 

ii. And to that same (subtle body) that warmth 
(belongs), on account of the proof (which observation 
furnishes). 

To that same subtle body belongs the warmth which we 
perceive in the living body by means of touch. That 
warmth is not felt in the body after death, while such 
qualities as form, colour and so on continue to be perceived ; 
it is. on the other hand, observed as long as there is life. 
From this it follows that the warmth resides in something 
different from the body as ordinarily known. Scripture 
also says, ' He is warm if going to live, cold if going 
to die.' 

1 2. Should you say that on account of the denial 
(made by scripture) (the soul of him who knows 
Brahman does not depart) ; we deny this, (because 
scripture means to say that the pritfas do not 
depart) from the embodied soul. 

From the distinction conveyed by the clause, 'and 
(relative) immortality without having burned ' (Sutra 7), it 
follows that in the case of absolute immortality being 
reached there is no going and no departure of the soul 
from the body. — The idea that for some reason or other 



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IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 3. 373 

a departure of the soul might take place in this latter case 
also, is precluded by the following scriptural passage, ' But 
as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring, freed 
from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self 
only, of him the vital spirits do not depart, — being Brahman, 
he goes to Brahman ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 6). From this 
express denial — forming part of the higher knowledge — it 
follows that the pra«as do not pass out of the body of him 
who knows Brahman. 

This conclusion the purvapakshin denies. For, he says, 
the passage quoted does not deny the departure of the 
pranas from the body, but from the embodied (individual) 
soul. — How is this known ? — From the fact that in another 
.Sakha we have (not the sixth, genitive, case * of him,' but) 
the fifth, ablative, case ' from him ' — * From him the vital 
spirits do not depart' (Madhyandina Sakha). For the 
sixth case which expresses only relation in general is 
determined towards some special relation by the fifth case 
met with in another .Sakha. And as the embodied soul 
which has a claim on exaltation and bliss is the chief topic 
of the chapter, we construe the words ' from him ' to mean 
not the body but the embodied soul. The sense therefore 
is ' from that soul when about to depart the prawas do not 
depart, but remain with it.' The soul of him who dies 
therefore passes out of the body, together with the pra«as. 
This view the next SQtra refutes. 

1 3. For (in the text) of some (the denial of the 
soul's departure) is clear. 

The assertion that also the soul of him who knows 
Brahman departs from the body, because the denial states 
the soul (not the body) to be the point of departure, cannot 
be upheld. For we observe that in the sacred text of some 
there is a clear denial of a departure, the starting-point of 
which is the body. — The text meant at first records the 
question asked by Artabhaga, ' When this man dies, do 
the vital spirits depart from him or not ? ' then embraces 
the alternative of non-departure, in the words, No, replied 
Ya^wavalkya ; thereupon — anticipating the objection that 



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374 vedAnta-sOtras. 



a man cannot be dead as long as his vital spirits have not 
departed — teaches the resolution of the prawas in the body 
• in that very same place they are merged ; ' and finally, in 
confirmation thereof, remarks, ' he swells, he is inflated, 
inflated the dead man lies.' This last clause states that 
swelling, &c, affect the subject under discussion, viz. that 
from which the departure takes place (the ' tasmat ' of the 
former clause), which subject is, in this last clause, referred 
to by means of the word ' He.' Now swelling and so on 
can belong to the body only, not to the embodied soul. 
And owing to its equality thereto * also the passages, ' from 
him the vital spirits do not depart ; ' ' in that very same 
place they are resolved,' have to be taken as denying 
a departure starting from the body, although the chief 
subject of the passage is the embodied soul. This may be 
done by the embodied soul and the body being viewed as 
non-different *. In this way we have to explain the passage 
if read with the fifth case. — If again the passage is read 
with the sixth case ('of him the vital spirits do not depart'), 
it must be understood as denying the departure of him who 
knows, as its purport manifestly is to deny a departure 
established elsewhere. But what it denies can only be 
a departure from the body ; for what is established (viz. 
for ordinary men not possessing the highest knowledge) is 
only the departure (of the soul, &c.) from the body, not the 
departure (of the pranas, &c.) from the embodied soul. — 
Moreover, after the passage, ' Either through the eye or 
through the skull or through other places of the body, him 
thus departing the prima departs after, and after the de- 
parting prawa all prawas depart,' &c, has at length described 
the departure and transmigration of the soul as belonging 
to him who does not know, and after the account of him 



1 I. e. its belonging to the same chapter and treating of the same 
subject. 

' The two being viewed as non-different, the pronoun (tasmat), 
which properly denotes the soul, the person, may be used to denote 
the body. — Abhedopa£are»a dehadehinor dehiparamamn& sarva- 
nimni deha eva par&mrtsh/a iti. Bha. 



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IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 4. 375 

who does not know has been concluded with the words, 
' So much for the man who has desires,' the text designates 
him who knows as ' he who has no desires ; ' a designation 
which would be altogether inappropriate if the text wanted 
to establish departure, &c, for that person also. The 
passage therefore has to be explained as denying of him 
who knows the going and departing which are established 
for him who does not know. For thus only the designation 
employed by the text has a sense. — And for him who 
knowing Brahman has become the Self of that omnipresent 
Brahman, and in whom all desires and works have become 
extinct, departing and going are not even possible, as 
there is not any occasion for them. And such texts as 
'there he reaches Brahman ' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7) indicate the 
absence of all going and departing. 

14. And Smmi also says that. 

In the Mahabharata also it is said that those who know 
do not go or depart, ' He who has become the Self of all 
beings and has a complete intuition of all, at his way the 
gods themselves are perplexed, seeking for the path of him 
who has no path.' — But, an objection is raised, other 
passages speak of men knowing Brahman as going, so e.g. 
' Suka the son of Vyasa being desirous of release travelled 
to the sphere of the sun ; being called by his father who 
had followed him, he gave an answering shout' — That 
passage, we reply, describes (not the effects of the highest 
knowledge but only) how an embodied person, through the 
power of Yoga (which is of the nature of the lower know- 
ledge), reached some special place and freed himself from the 
body. This appears from it being mentioned that he was 
seen by all beings ; for the beings could not see a person 
moving without a body. The conclusion of the story 
makes all this clear, ' Suka having moved through the 
air more rapidly than wind, and having shown his power, 
was known by all beings.' — It thus follows that he who 
knows Brahman neither moves nor departs. To what 
sphere the scriptural texts about going and so on refer we 
shall explain later on. 



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376 VEDANTA-s(lTRAS. 



15. Those (elements, &c.) (are merged) in the 
highest Brahman ; for thus (scripture) says. 

Those, i.e. the sense organs — denoted by the term'prawa' 
— and the elements of him who knows the highest Brahman, 
are merged in that same highest Brahman. — Why ? — 
Because scripture declares that ' Thus these sixteen parts 
of the spectator that go towards the person, when they 
have reached the person, sink into him ' (Pr. Up. VI, 5). — 
But another text which refers to him who knows teaches 
that the parts also are merged in something different from 
the highest Self, ' The fifteen parts enter into their elements' 
(Mu. Up. Ill, a, 7). — No, we reply. This latter passage is 
concerned with the ordinary view of the matter, according 
to which the parts of the body which consist of earth and 
so on are merged in their causal substances, earth and so 
on. The former passage, on the other hand, expresses the 
view of him who knows ; according to which the whole 
aggregate of the parts of him who knows the highest 
Brahman is merged in Brahman only. — There is thus no 
contradiction. 

16. (There is absolute) non-division (from Brah- 
man, of the parts merged in it); according to 
scriptural declaration. 

When the parts of him who knows are merged in 
Brahman, is there a remainder (which is not so merged), 
as in the case of other men ; or is there no such remainder? 
As the merging of him also who knows falls under the 
general heading of merging, it might be assumed that of 
him also there remains a potential body, and the Sutra- 
kara therefore teaches expressly that the elements, &c, of 
him who knows enter into the relation of (absolute) non- 
division from Brahman. — On what ground? — Because 
scripture declares this. For after having taught the 
dissolution of the parts, the text continues, ' Their name 
and form are broken, and people speak of the person only ; 
and he becomes without parts and immortal ' (Pr. Up. VI, 
5). And when parts that are due to nescience are dissolved 



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iv adhyAya, 2 pada, 17. 377 

through knowledge it is not possible that a remainder 
should be left. The parts therefore enter into absolute 
non-division from Brahman. 

1 7. (There takes place) a lighting up of the point 
of its (the soul's) abode (viz. the heart) ; the door 
(of its egress) being illuminated thereby ; owing to 
the power of knowledge and the application of 
meditation to the way which is part of that (know- 
ledge) ; (the soul) favoured by him in the heart 
(viz. Brahman) (passes upwards) by the one that 
exceeds a hundred (i. e. by the hundred and first 
vein). 

Having absolved the inquiry into a point of the higher 
knowledge into which we were led by a special occasion, 
we now continue the discussion connected with the lower 
knowledge. — It has been stated that up to the beginning 
of the way the departure of him who knows and him who 
does not know is the same. The present Sutra now 
describes the soul's entering on the way. The abode of 
the soul, when — having taken within itself speech and the 
other powers — it is about to depart, is the heart, according 
to the text, ' He taking with him those elements of light 
descends into the heart' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 1). Of the heart 
the point becomes lighted up, and subsequent to that is 
the departure of the soul, starting from the eye or some 
other place, according to the passage, ' The point of his 
heart becomes lighted up, and by that light the Self 
departs, either through the eye or through the skull or 
through other places of the body' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 2). 
The question here arises whether that departure is the 
same for him who knows and him who does not know, or 
if there is a special limitation in the case of the former ; 
and the prima facie view might be upheld that there is 
no such limitation since scripture records no difference. 
Against this the teacher states that although, equally for 
him who does know and him who does not know, the point 
of the heart becomes shining and the door of egress thereby 



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378 vedAnta-sOtras. 



is lighted up, yet he who knows departs through the skull 
only, while the others depart from other places. — Why so ? 
— ' On account of the power of knowledge.' If also he who 
knows departed, like all others, from any place of the body, 
he would be unable to reach an exalted sphere ; and then 
all knowledge would be purportless. ' And on account of 
the application of meditation on the way forming a part of 
that.' That means : in different vidyas there is enjoined 
meditation on the soul's travelling on the way connected 
with the vein that passes through the skull ; — which way 
forms a part of those vidyas. Now it is proper to conclude 
that he who meditates on that way should after death 
proceed on it *. Hence he who knows, being favoured by 
Brahman abiding in the heart on which he had meditated, 
and thus becoming like it in nature departs by the vein 
which passes through the skull and ' exceeds the hundred,' 
i. e. is the hundred and first. The souls of other men pass 
out by other veins. For thus scripture says, in a chapter 
treating of the knowledge of Brahman dwelling in the 
heart, ' There are a hundred and one veins of the heart ; 
one of them penetrates the crown of the head ; by that 
moving upwards a man reaches immortality ; the others 
serve for departing in different directions' (Kk. Up. VIII, 
6,5)- 

1 8. (The soul after having passed forth from the 
body) follows the rays. 

There is the vidya of him within the heart, which begins, 
' There is this city of Brahman and in it the palace, the 
small lotus, and in it that small ether ' (Kh. Up. VIII, i, i). 
A subsequent section of that chapter — beginning with the 
words, ' Now these veins of the heart ' — describes at length 
the connexion of the veins and the rays, and the text then 
continues, ' When he departs from this body, he departs 
upwards by those very rays,' and further on, 'By that 

1 For otherwise the meditation enjoined would be ' adr/sh/artha ' 
only; an alternative not to be admitted anywhere as long as a 
' seen ' purpose can be demonstrated. 



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IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 9. 379 

moving upwards he reaches immortality.' From this we 
understand that the soul passing out by the hundred and 
first vein follows the rays. — A doubt here arises as to 
whether the soul of him who dies by night as well as of 
him who dies by day follows the rays, or the soul of the 
latter only. — Since scripture mentions no difference, the 
Sutra teaches that the souls follow the rays in both cases. 

19. (Should it be said that the soul does) not 
(follow the rays) by night ; (we reply) not so, 
because the connexion (of veins and rays) exists 
as long as the body; and (scripture) also declares 
this. 

It might perhaps be said that the veins and rays are 
connected during the day, so that the soul of a person who 
dies during the day may follow those rays ; but not the soul 
of one who dies by night when the connexion of the veins 
and rays is broken. — But this is a mistaken assumption, 
because the connexion of rays and veins lasts as long as 
the body exists. This scripture also declares, ' They (the 
rays) stretch out from yonder sun and slip into these veins ; 
they stretch from these veins and slip into yonder sun ' 
{Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 2). We moreover observe that the rays 
of the sun continue to exist in the nights of the summer 
season ; for we feel their warmth and other effects. During 
the nights of the other seasons they are difficult to perceive 
because then few only continue to exist; just as during 
the cloudy days of the cold season. — This the following 
scriptural passage also shows, ' Day he makes in the night.' 
— If, moreover, he who dies at night mounted upwards 
without following the rays, the following of the rays would 
be generally meaningless. For the text gives no special 
direction to the effect that he who dies by day mounts 
upwards by means of the rays, while he who dies by night 
mounts without them. — Should, on the other hand, even 
he who knows be prevented from mounting upwards, by 
the mere mischance of dying by night, knowledge would 
in that case produce its fruit eventually only, and the 
consequence would be that — as the time of death is not 



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380 vedAnta-sOtras. 



fixed — nobody would apply himself to knowledge. — If, 
again, a man dying at night should wait for the dawn (to 
mount upwards), it might happen that, owing to the action 
of the funeral fire, &c, his body would, at the time of 
daybreak, not be capable of entering into connexion with 
the rays. Scripture moreover expressly says that he does 
not wait, ' As quickly as he sends off the mind he goes to 
the sun ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5). — For all these reasons the 
soul follows the rays by night as well as by day. 

20. And for the same reason (the departed soul 
follows the rays) also during the southern progress 
of the sun. 

For the same reason, viz. because waiting is impossible, 
and because the fruit of knowledge is not a merely eventual 
one, and because the time of death is not fixed, also that 
possessor of true knowledge who dies during the southern 
progress of the sun obtains the fruit of his knowledge. 
Because dying during the northern progress of the sun is 
more excellent, and because Bhishma is known to have 
waited for that period, and because scripture says, ' From 
the light half of the month (they go) to the six months 
when the sun goes to the north,' it might be thought that 
the northern progress of the sun is needful for dying. 
This notion the Sutra refutes. The greater excellence of 
the sun's northern progress applies to those only who do 
not possess the highest knowledge. — Bhishma's waiting for 
the sun's northern progress was due to his wish of upholding 
good customs and of showing that by the favour of his 
father he could choose the time of his death. — And the 
sense of the scriptural passage quoted will be explained 
under IV, 3, 4. — But we have the following Smrzti-text, 
' At what times the Yogins depart either not to return or 
to return, those times I will declare to thee' (Bha. Gita VIII, 
33), which determines specially that to die by day and so 
on causes the soul not to return. How then can he who 
dies by night or during the sun's southern progress depart 
not to return? Concerning this point the next Sutra 
remarks : 



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iv adhyAya, 2 pAda, 2i. 381 

21. (These details) are recorded by Smroti with 
reference to the Yogins; and both (Sankhya and 
Yoga) are Smriti (only). 

The rules as to dying by day and so on in order not to 
return are given by Smrz'ti for the Yogins only. And 
those two, viz. Yoga and Sankhya are mere Smrtti, not of 
scriptural character. As thus it has a different sphere of 
application and is based on a special kind of authority, the 
Smrz'ti rule as to the time of dying has no influence on 
knowledge based on scripture. — But, an objection is raised, 
we have such passages as the following one, 'Fire, 
light, the day, the light half of the month, the six months 
of the northern progress ; smoke, night, the dark half of 
the month, the six months of the southern progress ' (Bha. 
Gita VIII, 24; 25) ; in which though belonging to SnWti 
we recognise the path of the gods and the path of the 
fathers just as determined by scripture! — Our refutation, 
we reply, of the claims of Smr/ti applies only to the 
contradiction which may arise from the teaching of Smriti 
regarding the legitimate time of dying. ' I will tell you the 
time,' &c. In so far as Smr/ti also mentions Agni and the 
other divinities which lead on the departed soul, there is no 
contradiction whatever. 



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382 vedanta-sOtras. 

THIRD PADA. 

Reverence to the highest Self ! 

i. On the road beginning with light (the departed 
soul proceeds), on account of that being widely 
known. 

It has been explained that up to the beginning of the 
way, the departure is the same. About the way itself, 
however, different texts make different declarations. One 
passage describes it as constituted by the junction of the 
veins and rays, 'Then he mounts upwards by just those rays' 
(Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5). Another passage describes it as 
beginning with light, ' They go to the light, from light to 
day' (K/t. Up. V, 10, 1). Another way is described, Kau. 
Up. 1, 3, 'Having reached the path of the gods, he comes to 
the world of AgnL' Another, Bri. Up. V, 10, 1, 'When 
the person goes away from this world, he comes to the 
wind.' Another again, Mu. Up. I, 2, 1 1, 'Free from passions 
they depart through the gate of the sun.' A doubt here 
arises whether these ways are different from each other, 
or whether there is only one road of which the different 
texts mention different particulars. — The purvapakshin 
embraces the former alternative, for the reason that those 
roads are referred to in different chapters and form parts 
of different meditations. If, moreover, we regarded the 
statements about light and so on, the emphatical assertion 1 
made in the first of the passages quoted above would be 
contradicted ; and the statement about the quickness of 
mounting, ' As quickly as he sends off the mind he goes 
to the sun,' would also be interfered with. We therefore 
conclude that the roads described are different roads. 
To this we reply, ' On the road beginning with light ; ' 



1 The emphasis lies in the word ' eva,' i.e. ' just ' or ' only,' 
which seems to exclude any stages of the way but those rays. 



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iv adhyAya, 3 pAda, i. 383 

i.e. we maintain that every one who desires to reach 
Brahman moves on the road beginning with light. — Why 
so ? — ' On account of its being widely known.' That road 
is known to all who possess knowledge. Thus the chapter 
of the vidya of the five fires (' And those also who in the 
forest meditate on the True as faith,' &c, Br*. Up. VI, a, 15) 
expressly states that the road beginning with the light 
belongs to those also who practise other meditations. — 
That road, an objection is raised, may present itself to the 
mind in the case of those meditations which do not mention 
any road of their own ; but why should it be accepted for 
such meditations as mention different roads of their own ? 
— This objection would be valid, we reply, if the various 
roads mentioned were entirely different ; but as a matter 
of fact there is only one road leading to the world of 
Brahman and possessing different attributes ; and this road 
is designated in one place by one attribute and in another 
place by another attribute. For this relation of attributes 
and what possesses attributes is established by the circum- 
stance that we recognise, in all the passages quoted, some 
part of the road 1 . And if the chapters which mention the 
roads are different, we, as long as the meditation is one, 
have to combine the different attributes of the road (men- 
tioned separately in the different chapters), in the same way 
as (in general) the different particulars of one meditation 
(which are stated in different chapters) have to be combined. 
And even if the meditations (in which the particulars of the 
road are mentioned) are different, the road must be viewed 
as one and the same, because we recognise everywhere 
some part of the road and because the goal is everywhere 
the same. For all the following passages declare one and 
the same result, viz. the obtainment of the world of Brahman : 
' In these worlds of Brahman they dwell for ever and ever ' 
(Br*. Up. VI, 2, 15) ; ' There he dwells eternal years ' (Br*'. 

1 Each passage mentions at least one of the stages of the road 
leading to the world of Brahman, and we thus conclude that the 
same road — of which the stations are the attributes — is meant 
everywhere. 



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584 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Up. V, 10, 1); 'Whatever victory, whatever greatness 
belongs to Brahman, that victory he gives, that greatness 
he reaches ' (Kau. Up. I, a) ; ' Those who find the world of 
Brahman by Brahmaiarya' (Kk. Up. VIII, 4, 3). — To the 
remark that the emphatical assertion (made in the passage, 
'Just by those rays,' &c.) would be contradicted by our 
admitting light and so on as stages of the road, we reply 
that no such difficulty exists, because that passage aims 
only at establishing the rays (as part of the road). For the 
one word 'just ' cannot at the same time establish the rays 
and discard light and so on. The passage therefore must 
be understood as only emphasising the connexion with the 
rays. — Nor does the regard paid by us to the statements 
about light and so on being stages of the way contradict 
what one passage says about speed ; for that passage means 
to say that one goes (to the world of Brahman) more 
quickly than anywhere else, so that its sense is, ' In the 
twinkling of an eye one goes there 1 .' — Moreover the passage, 
' On neither of these two ways ' (Kk. Up. V, 10, 8) — in 
teaching that there is a third inferior road for those who have 
missed the other two roads — shows that besides the road of 
the fathers there is only one further road, viz. the road of the 
gods, of which light and so on are stages. The text about 
light and so on mentioning a greater number of stages 
while other texts mention a smaller number, it stands to 
reason that the less numerous should be explained in 
conformity with the more numerous. For this reason also 
the Sutra says, 'On the road beginning with light, on account 
of its being widely known.' 

2. From the year to Vayu; on account of the 
absence and presence of specification. 

But by what special combination can we establish between 

1 Read in the text — tvarava£anam tv ar£ir£dyapekshayam api 
gantavyantarapekshaya' kshaipryartha". — Anandagiri comments — 
tvareti, ar£iradimargasyaikye*pi kutarftd anyato gantavyad aneno- 
payena satyalokam gM iti gaiMantid gantavyabheddpekshaya 
va£ana»> yuktam fry arthai. 



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iv adhyAya, 3 pAda, 2. 385 

the different attributes of the road the relation of what is 
determined by attributes and of determining attributes ? The 
teacher out of kindness to us connects them as follows. — 
The Kaushitakins describe the road of the gods as follows, 
'Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the 
world of Agni, to the world of Vayu, to the world of 
Varu»a, to the world of Indra, to the world of Pra^apati, 
to the world of Brahman ' (Kau. Up. I, 3). Now the world 
of Agni means the same as light, since both terms denote 
burning, and we therefore need not, with regard to them, 
search for the order in which they are to be combined. 
Vayu, on the other hand, is not mentioned in the road 
beginning with light ; in what place then is he to be 
inserted? — We read, Kh. Up. V, 10, 1, 'They go to the 
light, from light to day, from day to the waxing half of 
the moon, from the waxing half of the moon to the six 
months when the sun goes to the north, from those months 
to the year, from the year to Aditya.' Here they reach 
Vayu after the year and before Aditya. — Why so ? — ' On 
account of the absence and presence of specification.' About 
Vayu — concerning whom the passage, 'He goes to the 
world of Viyu,' contains no specification — another passage 
does state such a specification, viz. Bri. Up. V, 10, 1, 'When 
the person goes away from this world he comes to Vayu. 
Then Vayu makes room for him like the hole of a wheel, 
and through it he mounts higher, he comes to Aditya.' 
On account of this specification which shows Vayu to come 
before Aditya, Vayu must be inserted between the year 
and Aditya. — But as there is a specification showing that 
Vayu comes after Agni, why is he not inserted after the 
light? — There is no such specification, we reply. — But 
a scriptural passage has been quoted which runs as follows, 
' Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the 
world of Agni, to the world of Vayu.' — In that passage, 
we reply, we have only two clauses, of which the text 
exhibits one before the other, but there is no word express- 
ing order of succession. We have there only a simple 
statement of facts, ' He goes to this and to that.' But in 
the other text we perceive a regular order of succession ; 
[38] CC 



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386 vedanta-sOtras. 



for it intimates that after having mounted on high through 
an opening as large as the wheel of a chariot, granted by 
Vayu, he approaches the sun. The Sutra therefore rightly 
says, ' On account of the absence and presence of specifica- 
tion.' — The Va^asaneyins in their text record that he 
proceeds ' from the months to the world of the gods, from 
the world of the gods to the sun' (Br/. Up. VI, a, 15). 
Here, in order to maintain the immediate succession of 
Vayu and Aditya, we must suppose the souls to go from 
the world of the gods to Vayu. What the Sfltra says 
about the soul going to Vayu from the year has reference 
to the text of the .Oindogya. As between the Va^asane- 
yaka and the AT^andogya, the world of the gods is absent 
from one, the year from the other. As both texts are 
authoritative, both stages have to be inserted in each, and 
the distinction has to be made that, owing to its connexion 
with the months, the year has the first place (i. e. after the 
months and before the world of the gods), and the world of 
the gods the second place. 

3. Beyond lightning (there is) Varu«a, on account 
of the connexion (of the two). 

The KA&ndogya. continues, ' From Aditya to the moon, 
from the moon to lightning.' Here Varu/za (mentioned in 
the Kaushitaki-upan.) has to be brought in so that above 
that lightning he goes to the world of Varuwa. For there 
is a connexion between lightning and Varu«a; the broad 
lightnings dance forth from the womb of the clouds with the 
sound of deep thunder, and then water falls down. And 
a Brahmawa also says, 'It lightens, it thunders, it will rain' 
{Kh. Up. VII, 11, 1). But the lord of all water is Varuwa, 
as known from 5ruti and Sm«'ti. — And above Varuwa 
there come Indra and Pra^apati, as there is no other place 
for them, and according to the force of the text, as it stands. 
Varu«a and so on should be inserted at the end, for that 
reason also that they are merely additional, no particular 
place being assigned to them. And lightning is the end of 
the road beginning with light \ 

1 So that Varuwa and so on are to be placed after lightning. 



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IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 4. 387 

4. (They are) conductors, this being indicated. 

With regard to those beginning with light a doubt arises 
whether they are marks of the road, or places of enjoyment, 
or leaders of the travelling souls. — The first possible view 
of the question is that light and so on are marks of the 
road, because the instruction has that character. For as in 
ordinary life a man wishing to go to a village or a town is 
told, ' Go from here to that hill, from there to a fig-tree, 
from that to a river, from that to a village ; after that you 
will reach the town;' so here the text also says, 'from light 
to day, from day to the waxing half of the month,' &c. — 
Or else light and so on may be viewed as places of enjoy- 
ment. For the text connects Agni and so on with the 
word 'world' ; ' He comes to the world of Agni,' &c. Now 
the term ' world ' is used to denote places of enjoyment of 
living beings, as when we say, ' The world of men ; the 
world of the Fathers ; the world of the gods.' A Brahmawa 
passage also says, ' They remain attached to the worlds 
which consist of day and night' (Sat. Bra. X, 2, 6, 8). 
Therefore light and the rest are not conductors. Moreover, 
they cannot be conductors because they are without intelli- 
gence. For in ordinary life intelligent men only are 
appointed by the king to conduct travellers over difficult 
roads. 

To all this we reply as follows. They must be con- 
ductors, because the text indicates this. For we read, 
' From the moon to the lightning ; there a person that is 
not a man leads them to Brahman ; ' which shows their 
conductorship to be something settled. Should it be 
objected that this last sentence exhausts itself in conveying 
its own purport l ; we say No ; for the attribute (' that is 
not a man ') has only the meaning of excluding his 
previously established humanity. Only if in the case of 
the light and the rest personal conductors are settled, and 
those of human nature, it is appropriate to use the attribute 

1 And has not the additional power of indicating, i. e. enabling 
us to infer that also the beings previously mentioned are ' leaders ' 
of the soul. 

C C 2 



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388 vedAnta-sCtras. 



' amanava,' to the end of excluding this (previously estab- 
lished) humanity 1 . 

But mere indication has no force, as there is nothing 
to prove (that there must be such personal conductors). — 
To this objection the next Sutra replies. 

5. (There are personal conductors) because that 
is established on the ground of both (i. e. road and 
travellers) being bewildered (i. e. unconscious). 

As, owing to their separation from a body, the organs of 
those who go on the road beginning with light are wrapped 
up, they are incapable of ruling themselves ; and the light 
&c, as they are without intelligence, are equally incapable. 
Hence it follows that the particular intelligent deities who 
represent light and the rest are appointed to the conductor- 
ship. For in ordinary life also drunken or senseless people 
whose sense-organs are wrapped up follow a road as com- 
manded by others. — Again light and the rest cannot be 
taken for marks of the road because they are not always 
present. A man who dies in the night cannot come to day 
in its true (physical) nature ; and he cannot wait (for the 
break of day), as we have already explained above (IV, 2, 
19). But this objection does not apply to gods who are 
permanent. And gods may be called light and so on, 
because they represent light and so on. Nor is the ex- 
pression, ' From light to day,' &c. objectionable, even if we 
adopt the sense of conductorship ; for it means, through 
the light as cause they come to the day ; through the day 
as cause, to the waxing half of the moon. And such 
instruction is seen also in the case of conductors known in 
ordinary life, for they say, Go hence to Balavarman, thence 
(i. e. Balavarman conducting you) to £ayasi;«ha, thence to 

1 Why should it be specially stated that this last ' conducting 
person ' is amdnava ? Only, because it is a settled matter that the 
previously mentioned beings are also ' conducting persons,' and at 
the same time ' minava.' The last clause therefore does not only 
directly teach that a person conducts the souls to Brahman, but at 
the same time ' indicates ' that the beings mentioned before in 
connexion with the road are also ' personal conductors.' 



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IV ADHYAYA, 3 TADA, "]. 389 

Kmhwagupta. Moreover, in the beginning where the text 
says that they go to the light, a relation in general only 
is expressed, not a special relation ; at the end, however, 
where it is said he leads them to Brahman, a special 
relation is expressed, viz. that between conducted and 
conductor. Therefore this is accepted for the beginning 
also. — And as the organs of the wandering souls are wrapped 
up together there is no possibility of their enjoying any- 
thing. Although, however, the wanderers do not enjoy 
anything, the word 'world' may be explained on the 
ground that those worlds are places of enjoyment for other 
beings dwelling there. — The conclusion therefore is that 
he who has reached the world of Agni is led on by Agni, 
and he who has reached the world ruled by Vayu, by Vayu. 
But how, if we adopt the view of conductorship, can this 
apply to Varuwa and the rest ? Varuwa and the rest were 
inserted above the lightning ; but scripture states that 
after the lightning until Brahman is reached a person leads 
who is not a man. — To this doubt the next Sutra replies. 

6. From thence (the souls are led) by him only 
who belongs to the lightning ; the sacred text 
stating that. 

From thence, i. e. after they have come to the lightning 
they go to the world of Brahman, being led through the 
worlds of Varuwa and the rest by the person, not a man, 
who follows immediately after the lightning. For that 
that person leads them is stated in the following passage, 
' When they have reached the place of lightning a person, 
not a man, leads them to the world of Brahman' (Bri. 
Up. VI, 2, 15). Varu«a and the rest, we must understand, 
favour them either by not hindering or somehow assisting 
them. — Therefore it is well said that light and so on are 
the gods who act as conductors. 

7. To the effected (Brahman) (the souls are led) ; 
(thus opines) Badari ; because going to him is 
possible. 

With regard to the passage, ' He leads them to Brahman,' 



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39Q vedanta-sOtras. 



the doubt arises whether that person leads the souls to the 
effected, lower, Brahman, or to the highest, non-modified, 
chief Brahman. — Whence the doubt ?— Because the (am- 
biguous) word Brahman is used, and because scripture 
speaks of going. — The opinion of the teacher Badari is that 
the person, who is not a man, leads them to the lower, 
qualified, effected Brahman ; because it is possible to go to 
that. For the effected Brahman which occupies a definite 
place can be the goal of a journey. With the highest 
Brahman, on the other hand, we cannot connect the ideas 
of one who goes, or object of going, or act of going ; for 
that Brahman is present everywhere and is the inner Self 
of all. 

8. And on account of (the Brahman to which the 
souls are led) being qualified (in another passage). 

That the soul's going has for its object the effected 
Brahman, we conclude from another scriptural passage 
also which qualifies Brahman in a certain way, ' He leads 
them to the worlds of Brahman ; in these worlds of Brahman 
they live for ever and ever' (Br*. Up. VI, 2, 15). For it 
would be impossible to qualify the highest Brahman by 
means of the plural number (' worlds ') ; while the plural 
number may be applied to the lower Brahman which may 
abide in different conditions. — The term ' world ' also can 
directly denote only some place of enjoyment falling 
within the sphere of effects and possessing the quality of 
being entered into, while it must be understood in a meta- 
phorical sense in passages 1 such as 'Brahman is that 
world ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 23). — And also what the text 
says concerning an abode and some one abiding within 
it ('in these worlds of Brahman,' &c), cannot be directly 
understood of the highest Brahman. — For all these reasons 
the leading of the souls has the lower Brahman for 
its goal. 

But even on this interpretation the word ' Brahman ' is 
inappropriate, as it has been proved that Brahman is the 

J Where the term ' world ' is applied to the highest Brahman. 

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IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, IO. 39 1 

cause of the origination and so on of the entire world. — 
To this objection the next Sutra replies. 

9. But on account of its proximity (to the higher 
Brahman) there is designation (of the lower Brahman) 
as that 

The word 'but' indicates the setting aside of the doubt. — 
As the lower Brahman is in proximity to the higher one, 
there is nothing unreasonable in the word 'Brahman' being 
applied to the former also. For when the higher Brahman 
is, for the purposes of pious meditation, described as 
possessing certain effected qualities — such as consisting of 
mind and the rest — which qualities depend on its connexion 
with certain pure limiting adjuncts ; then it is what we call 
the lower Brahman. — But with the assumption of the lower 
Brahman there does not agree what scripture says about 
the souls not returning ; for there is no permanence any- 
where apart from the highest Brahman. And scripture 
declares that those who have set out on the road of the 
gods do not return, ' They who proceed on that path do not 
return to the life of man ' (Kh. Up. IV, 15, 6) ; 'For them 
there is no return here ' (Br*'. Up. VI, 2, 15) ; ' Moving 
upwards by that a man reaches immortality' (Kh. Up. 
VIII, 6, 5). 

To this objection we make the following reply. 

10. On the passing away of the effected (world of 
Brahman) (the souls go) together with the ruler of 
that (world) to what is higher than that ; on account 
of scriptural declaration. 

When the reabsorption of the effected Brahman world 
draws near, the souls in which meanwhile perfect knowledge 
has sprung up proceed, together with Hira«yagarbha the 
ruler of that world, to 'what is higher than that,' i.e. to the 
pure highest place of Vish«u. This is the release by 
successive steps which we have to accept on the basis of 
the scriptural declarations about the non-return of the 
souls. For we have shown that the Highest cannot be 
directly reached by the act of going. 



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392 vedAnta-sOtras. 



ii. And on account of Smrrti. 

Smriti also agrees with this view; cp. the following 
passage, ' When the pralaya has come and the end of the 
highest (i.e. Hirawyagarbha), then they all, together with 
Brahman, with purified minds enter the highest place.' — 
The final conclusion (siddhanta) therefore is that the going 
of the souls, of which scripture speaks, has for its goal the 
effected Brahman. — But what is the prima facie view, with 
regard to which this final conclusion has been established 
in Sutras 7-1 1 ? — This required prima facie view is now set 
forth in the following Sutras. 

1 2. To the highest (Brahman) (the souls are led) ; 
Caimini (opines) ; owing to this being the principal 
sense (of the word ' Brahman '). 

The teacher Caimini is of opinion that the passage, 
' He leads them to Brahman,' refers to the highest 
Brahman. For the highest Brahman constitutes the prin- 
cipal, primary sense, of the word ' Brahman,' which denotes 
the lower Brahman only in a secondary, metaphorical way. 
And where both senses are possible, the primary sense has 
to be preferred. 

1 3. And because scripture declares that. 

The text, 'Going upwards by that he reaches immortality,' 
declares that immortality is reached by going. But im- 
mortality is possible only in the highest Brahman, not in 
the effected one, because the latter is transitory. So 
scripture says, ' Where one sees something else, that is 
little, that is mortal' {Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1). According to 
the text of the Ka/^a-upanishad also the going of the soul 
is towards the highest Brahman ; for after the highest 
Brahman has been introduced there as general subject- 
matter — in the passage, ' That which thou seest,' &c, I, 2, 
14, no other kind of knowledge is taken up later on. 

14. And the intention of entering (can) not (be 
referred) to the effected (Brahman). 

Moreover the intention of entering into which is expressed 



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IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 14. 393 

in the passage, ' I enter the hall of Pra^apati, the house ' 
(Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1), cannot have the lower Brahman for 
its object. For the immediately preceding passage, ' That 
within which these forms and names are contained is the 
Brahman,' shows that the highest Brahman, different in 
nature from the effected one, is the general subject-matter ; 
and the subsequent passage, 'I am the glory of the 
Brahmans,' represents the soul as the Self of all ; it being 
known from another scriptural passage that ' Glory ' is 
a name of the highest Brahman, 'There is no likeness of 
him whose name is great glory ' (Va,f. Sa;«h. XXXII, 3). 
And in the vidya of Brahman within the heart it is said of 
this same entering the house that it is preceded by going 1 , 
' There is the city of Brahman Apara^ita, and the golden 
hall built by Prabhu' (Kh. Up. VIII, 5, 3). And that 
the performing of a journey is intended follows also from 
the use of the verb ' pad,' which denotes going (prapadye, 
I enter). — The other (prima facie) view therefore is that all 
the passages about the soul's going refer to the highest 
Brahman. 

These two views have been embodied by the teacher in 
the Sutras ; one in the Sutras 7-1 1, the other in the Stitras 
12-14. Now the arguments contained in the former set 
are capable of proving the fallaciousness of the arguments 
in the latter set, but not vice versa ; from which it follows 
that the former set states the final view and the latter 
set the prima facie view only. — For nobody can compel 
us to accept the primary sense of a word (such as Brahman) 
even where it is impossible to do so. — And although met 
with in a chapter that treats of the highest knowledge, the 
reference to the going to Brahman — which belongs to 
another kind of knowledge — may be explained as aiming 
merely at the glorification of the highest knowledge (not at 
teaching that the going to Brahman is the result of higher 

1 I am not quite sure which passage in the daharavidyS. is 
supposed to prove that the entering of Brahman's house is preceded 
by going. Probably VIII, 6, 5, ' He departs upwards ; he is going 
to the sun.' 



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394 vedAnta-sCtras. 



knowledge). — And with reference to the passage, ' I enter 
the hall of Pra^pati, the house,' there is no reason why we 
should not separate that passage from what precedes and 
refer the intention of entering to the effected Brahman. 
And the qualified Brahman also may be spoken of as being 
the Self of all, as shown by other passages such as 'He 
to whom all works, all desires belong,' &c. {Kh. Up. Ill, 
14, 2). The texts about the going therefore all belong to 
the lower knowledge. — Others again, in accordance with 
the general principle that the earlier Sutras set forth the 
prima facie view, while the later ones contain the siddhanta 
view, maintain that the passages about the soul's going fall 
within the sphere of the higher knowledge. But this is 
impossible, because nothing may go to the highest Brahman. 
' Omnipresent and eternal like the ether;' 'The Brahman 
which is visible, not invisible, the Self that is within all ' 
(BW. Up. Ill, 4, 1) ; 'Self only is all this' {Kh. Up. VII, 
25, 2) ; ' Brahman only is all this, it is the best ' (Mu. Up. 
II, 2, 11): from all these passages we ascertain that the 
highest Brahman is present everywhere, within everything, 
the Self of everything, and of such a Brahman it is altogether 
impossible that it ever should be the goal of going. For 
we do not go to what is already reached ; ordinary ex- 
perience rather tells us that a person goes to something 
different from him. — But we observe in ordinary experience 
also that something already reached may become an object 
of going, in so far as qualified by a different place ; a man 
living on the earth, e. g. goes to the earth, in so far as he 
goes to another place on the earth. In the same way we 
see that a child reaches the adult state which in reality 
belongs to the child's identical Self, but is qualified by 
a difference of time. Analogously Brahman also may be 
an object of going in so far as it is possessed of all kinds 
of powers. — This may not be, we reply, because scripture 
expressly negatives Brahman's possessing any distinctive 
qualities. — ' Without parts, without actions, tranquil, without 
fault, without taint' (Svet Up. VI, 19); 'Neither coarse 
nor fine, neither short nor long' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8) ; ' He 
who is without and within, unproduced ' (Mu. Up. II, 1,2); 



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IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4. 395 

' This great, unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, 
fearless, is indeed Brahman' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 25) ; 'He is to 
be described by No, no!' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 26); from all 
these scriptural texts, as well as from Smr/ti and reasoning, 
it follows that the highest Self cannot be assumed to possess 
any differences depending on time or space or anything 
else, and cannot therefore become the object of going. 
The cases of places on the earth and of the different ages 
of man are by no means analogous ; for they are affected 
by differences of locality and so on, and therefore can be 
gone to or reached. — Nor will it avail our opponent to say 
that Brahman possesses manifold powers, because scripture 
declares it to be the cause of the world's origination, 
sustentation, and final retractation ; for those passages 
which deny difference have no other sense (but just the 
absolute denial of all difference). — But in the same way 
also those passages which state the origination and so on 
of the world have no other sense ! (i. e. cannot be under- 
stood to teach anything but just the origination and so on 
of the world). — This is not so, we reply ; for what they 
aim at teaching is the absolute oneness of Brahman. For 
texts which by means of the simile of the lump of clay, 
&c, teach that only that which is, viz. Brahman, is true, 
while everything effected is untrue, cannot aim at teaching 
the origination, &c. of the world. — But why should the 
passages about the origination, &c. of the world be sub- 
ordinate to those which deny all difference, and not vice 
versa? — Because, we reply, the texts which negative all 
difference effect the cessation of all desire. For when the 
absolute oneness, permanence, and purity of the Self have 
once been apprehended, we cognize that the highest aim 
of man has been attained, and therefore conceive no further 
desires. Compare the following texts : ' What trouble, what 
sorrow can there be to him who beholds that unity ?' (lja-up. 
7); 'Thou hast reached fearlessness, O kanaka '(Br/. Up. IV, 
2, 4) ; ' He who knows does not fear anything ; he does not 
distress himself with the thought, Why did I not do what is 
good ? Why did I do what is bad ? ' (Taitt. Up. II, 9.) This 
also follows from our observing that those who know realise 



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396 vedAnta-sOtras. 



contentment of mind ; and from the fact that scripture 
blames the false notion of (the reality of) effects, 'From 
death to death goes he who sees here any difference' 
(Ka. Up. II, 4, 10). The texts negativing all difference 
cannot therefore be understood as subordinate to other 
texts. Those texts, on the other hand, which speak of the 
origination of the world and so on have no similar power 
of conveying a sense which effects cessation of all desire. 
At the same time it is manifest that they have another 
(than their literal) meaning. For the text, after having 
said at first, ' Of this shoot sprung up know that it cannot 
be without a root ' (KA. Up. VI, 8, 3), declares in the end 
that Being which is the root of the world is the only 
object of cognition. Similarly Taitt. Up. Ill, 1, ' That from 
which these beings are born, that by which when born they 
live, that into which they enter at their death, seek to know 
that ; that is Brahman.' As thus the passages about 
origination and so on aim at teaching the unity of the Self, 
Brahman cannot be viewed as possessing manifold powers, 
and cannot therefore be the object of the action of going. — 
And, as already explained under IV, 2, 13, also the text 
Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6 (' Of him the pra«as do not depart ; being 
Brahman he goes to Brahman '), denies any going to the 
highest Brahman. 

Moreover, on the hypothesis of going, that which goes, 
i.e. the individual soul, must be either a part of Brahman to 
which it goes, or an effect of Brahman, or different from 
Brahman ; for if the two were absolutely identical no going 
could take place. — Well, what then ? — We reply as follows. 
If, in the first place, the soul is a part of Brahman, it cannot 
go to it, since the whole is permanently reached by the 
part. Besides, the hypothesis of whole and parts cannot 
be applied to Brahman, which is acknowledged to be 
without parts. — The same objection lies against the hypo- 
thesis of the soul being an effect of Brahman ; for also that 
which passes over into an effect is permanently reached by 
the effect. A jar made of clay does not exist apart from 
the clay which constitutes its Self; were it so apart it 
would cease to be. And on both hypotheses, as that to 



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IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4. 397 

which the parts or the effects would belong, i. e. Brahman 
is altogether unchanging, its entering into the Sa/«sara 
state could not be accounted for. — Let then, in the third 
place, the soul be different from Brahman. In that case 
it must be either of atomic size, or infinite, or of some 
intervening extent. If it is omnipresent, it cannot go 
anywhere. If it is of some middling extent, it cannot be 
permanent. If it is of atomic size, the fact of sensation 
extending over the whole body cannot be accounted for. 
The two hypotheses of atomic and middling extent have 
moreover been refuted at length in a former part of this 
work (II, 3, 19 ff.). And from the soul's being different 
from the highest Brahman it also would follow that such 
texts as ' Thou art that' are futile. This latter objection 
also lies against the theories of the soul being a part or an 
effect of Brahman. Nor can the difficulty be got over by it 
being pleaded that a part and an effect are not different 
from the whole and the causal substance ; for that kind 
of oneness is not oneness in the true literal sense. — From 
all those three theories it moreover equally follows that the 
soul cannot obtain final release, because its Sawsara con- 
dition could never come to an end. Or else, if that 
condition should come to an end, it would follow that the 
very essence of the soul perishes ; for those theories do not 
admit that the (imperishable) Brahman constitutes the Self 
of the soul. 

Here now some come forward with the following con- 
tention. Works of permanent obligation and works to be 
performed on special occasions are undertaken to the end 
that harm may not spring up ; such works as are due to 
special desires, and such as are forbidden, are eschewed, in 
order that neither the heavenly world nor hell may be 
obtained, and those works whose fruits are to be enjoyed 
in the current bodily existence are exhausted by just that 
fruition. Hence, as after the death of the present body, 
there is no cause for the origination of a new body, that 
blessed isolation which consists in the soul's abiding within 
its own nature will accomplish itself for a man acting in 
the way described above, even without the cognition of his 



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398 vedanta-sOtras. 



Self being identical with Brahman's Self. — All this is 
inadmissible, we reply, because there is no proof of it. 
For scripture nowhere teaches that he who desires release 
should conduct himself in the way described. To say that 
because the Sawsara state depends on works, it will cease 
when works are absent, is an altogether arbitrary style of 
reasoning. And (whether arbitrary or not) this reasoning 
falls to the ground, because the absence of the cause is 
something that cannot be ascertained. It may be supposed 
that each living being has, in its former states of existence, 
accumulated many works which have part of them pleasant, 
part of them unpleasant results. As these works are such 
as to lead to contrary results, which cannot be enjoyed all 
of them at the same time, some works whose opportunity 
has come, build up the present state of existence ; others 
sit inactive waiting for a place, a time, and operative causes 
(favourable to them). As these latter works cannot thus 
be exhausted in the present state of existence, we cannot 
definitely assert, even in the case of a man who conducts 
himself as described above, that at the end of his present 
bodily existence all cause for a new bodily existence will 
be absent. The existence of a remainder of works is, 
moreover, established by scriptural and Smr*'ti passages, 
such as, ' Those whose conduct has been good ' (Kh. Up. 
V, 10, 7); 'Then with the remainder.' — But may not, 
an objection is raised, those remaining works be wiped 
out (even in the present existence) by the performance of 
works of permanent obligation and such works as are due 
to special occasions ? — This may not be, we reply, because 
the two sets of works are not of contrary nature. Where 
there is contrariety of nature, one thing may be wiped out 
by another ; but good deeds performed in previous states 
of existence, and works of permanent obligation and so on 
(performed in the present life), are both of them equally 
pure and therefore not of opposite nature. Bad works 
indeed, as being of impure nature, are opposed to works 
of permanent obligation, &c, and therefore may be extin- 
guished by the latter. But even from this admission it 
does not follow that the causes for a new embodied existence 



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IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4. 399 

are altogether absent ; for those causes may be supplied by 
good deeds, and we do not know that the evil works have 
been extinguished without a remainder. Nor is there 
anything to prove that the performance of works of per- 
manent obligation, &c, leads only to the non-origination of 
harm, and not at the same time to the origination of new 
results (to be extinguished in future states of existence) ; 
for it may happen that such new results spring up collater- 
ally. Thus Apastamba says, 'When a mango tree is planted 
for the sake of its fruits, it in addition gives shade and 
fragrance ; thus additional advantages spring from the 
performance of religious duty.' — Nor can anybody who has 
not reached perfect knowledge promise to refrain altogether, 
from birth to death, from all actions either forbidden or 
aiming at the fulfilment of special wishes ; for we observe 
that even the most perfect men commit faults, however 
minute. This may be a matter of doubt ; all the same it 
remains true that the absence of causes for a new existence 
cannot be known with certainty. — If, further, the soul's 
unity with Brahman's Self — which is to be realised through 
knowledge — is not acknowledged, the soul whose essential 
nature it is to be an agent and enjoyer cannot even desire 
the state of blissful isolation ; for a being cannot divorce 
itself from its true essence, not any more than fire can cease 
to be hot. — But, an objection is raised, what is of disad- 
vantage to the soul is the state of agentship and fruition in 
so far as actually produced, not its mere potentiality. 
Release of the soul may, therefore, take place if only that 
actual condition is avoided while its potentiality remains. 
— This also, we reply, is not true; for as long as the 
potentiality exists it will inevitably produce the actuality. 
— But, our opponent resumes, potentiality alone, without 
other co-operative causes, does not produce its effect ; as 
long therefore as it is alone it cannot, though continuing 
to exist, do any harm ! — This also, we reply, is not valid ; 
for the co-operative causes also are, potentially, permanently 
connected (with the acting and enjoying soul). If, therefore, 
the soul whose essence is acting and enjoying is not 
considered to possess fundamental identity with Brahman 



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400 vedanta-sCtras. 



— an identity to be realised by knowledge — there is not 
any chance of its obtaining final release. Scripture, more- 
over (in the passage, 'There is no other way to go,' Svet Up. 

III, 8), denies that there is any other way to release but 
knowledge. — But if the soul is non-different from the highest 
Brahman, all practical existence comes to an end, because 
then perception and the other means of right knowledge 
no longer act ! — Not so, we reply. Practical life will hold 
its place even then, just as dreamlife holds its place up to 
the moment of waking. Scripture, after having said that 
perception and the rest are operative in the sphere of those 
who have not reached true knowledge (' For where there is 
duality, as it were, there one sees the other,' &c. ; Br/. Up. 

IV, 5, 15), goes on to show that those means of knowledge 
do not exist for those who possess that knowledge (' But 
when the whole of him has become the Self, whereby 
should he see another,' &c). As thus for him who knows 
the highest Brahman all cognition of something to be gone 
to, &c. is sublated, his going cannot in any way be shown to 
be possible. 

To what sphere then belong the scriptural texts about 
the soul's going? — To the sphere of qualified knowledge, 
we reply. Accordingly the soul's going is mentioned in 
the chapter treating of the knowledge of the five fires, 
in the chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman's 
couch, in the chapter treating of the knowledge of Agni 
VaLyvanara (Kh. Up. V, 3-10 ; Kau. Up. I ; Kh. Up. V, 
11-24). And where the soul's going is spoken of in 
a chapter treating of Brahman — (as e.g. in the passages, 
' He leads them to Brahman,' &c, Kh. Up. IV, 15, 6, in 
a chapter treating of Brahman, as shown by ' Breath is 
Brahman,' &c., IV, 10, 5 ; and ' He departs upward,' &c, 
Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5, in the chapter beginning ' There is this 
city of Brahman,' VIII, 1, 1) — such attributes as 'vamani,' 
i.e. Leader of blessings (Kh. Up. IV, 15, 3), and 'satyakama,' 
i.e. having true wishes, show that there the qualified Brahman 
has to be meditated upon, and to that Brahman the soul 
can go. No passage, on the other hand, speaks of the soul's 
going to the highest Brahman ; while such going is specially 



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IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4. 4OI 

denied in the passage, ' Of him the pra«as do not depart.' 
In passages, again, such as ' He who knows Brahman obtains 
the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), we indeed meet with the verb 
'to reach,' which has the sense of going; but because, as 
explained before, the reaching of another place is out of 
question, 'reaching' there denotes only the obtainment 
(realisation) of one's own nature, in so far as (through true 
knowledge) the expanse of names and forms which Nescience 
superimposes (on Brahman) is dissolved. Such passages 
are to be understood analogously to the text, ' Being 
Brahman he enters into Brahman' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 6). — 
Besides, if the going were understood as connected with 
the highest Brahman, it could only subserve the purpose 
either of satisfying (the mind of him who knows) or of 
reflection. Now, a statement of the soul's going cannot 
produce any satisfaction in him who knows Brahman, since 
satisfaction is already fully accomplished through his perfect 
condition, bestowed on him by knowledge, of which he is 
immediately conscious. Nor, on the other hand, can it be 
shown that reflection on the soul's going in any way 
subserves knowledge, which is conscious of eternally perfect 
blessedness, and has not for its fruit something to be 
accomplished. — For all these reasons the soul's going falls 
within the sphere of the lower knowledge. And only in 
consequence of the distinction of the higher and lower 
Brahman not being ascertained, statements about the soul's 
going which apply to the lower Brahman are wrongly put 
in connexion with the higher Brahman. 

But are there really two Brahmans, a higher one and a lower 
one? — Certainly there are two I For scripture declares this, 
as e.g. in the passage, ' O Satyakama, the syllable Om is the 
higher and also the lower Brahman ' (Pr. Up. V, 2). — What 
then is the higher Brahman, and what the lower ? — Listen 1 
Where the texts, negativing all distinctions founded on name, 
form, and the like, designate Brahman by such terms as that 
which is not coarse and so on, the higher Brahman is spoken 
of. Where, again, for the purpose of pious meditation, the 
texts teach Brahman as qualified by some distinction 
depending on name, form, and so on, using terms such as 
[38] D d 



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402 vedAnta-sOtras. 



' He who consists of mind, whose body is pra«a, whose 
shape is light' (Kk. Up. Ill, 14, 2), that is the lower Brah- 
man. — But is there not room here for the objection that 
this distinction of a higher and a lower Brahman stultifies 
the scriptural texts asserting aduality ? — Not so, we reply. 
That objection is removed by the consideration that name 
and form, the adjuncts (of the one real Brahman), are due to 
Nescience. Passages such as ' If he desires the world of 
the fathers ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 2, 1), which the text exhibits in 
proximity to a meditation on the lower Brahman, show that 
the fruit of such meditation is lordship over the worlds ; 
a fruit falling within the sphere of the Sawsara, Nescience 
having not as yet been discarded. And as that fruit is 
bound to a special locality, there is nothing contradictory 
in the soul's going there in order to reach it. That the soul, 
although all-pervading, is viewed as going because it enters 
into connexion with the buddhi and the rest of its adjuncts, 
just as general space enters into connexion with jars and 
the like, we have explained under II, 3, 29. 

For all these reasons the view of Badari as set forth in 
Sutra 7 is the final one; while Sutra 12, which states 
6'aimini's opinion, merely sets forth another view, to the 
end of the illumination of the learner's understanding. 

1 5. Those who do not take their stand on symbols 
he leads, thus Badaraya«a (opines); there being no 
fault in the twofold relation (resulting from this 
opinion) ; and the meditation on that (i. e. Brahman) 
(is the reason of this twofold relation). 

It is a settled conclusion that all going has reference 
to the effected Brahman, not to the highest Brahman. 
Another doubt now arises here. Does that person who is 
not a man lead to the world of Brahman all those who take 
their stand on the effected Brahman, without any difference ; 
or only some of them ? 

The purvapakshin maintains that all those who possess 
knowledge — provided that knowledge be not of the highest 
Brahman — go to the world of Brahman. For in Sutra III, 



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iv adhyAya, 3 pAda, 16. 403 

3, 31 that going was put in connexion with all the dif- 
ferent vidyas (of the qualified Brahmans), without any 
distinction. 

To this the Sutrakara replies, ' Those who do not take 
their stand on symbols.' That means: Excepting those 
who take their stand on symbols (i.e. who meditate on 
certain things as symbolically representing Brahman), that 
person who is not a man leads all others who take their 
stand (i. e. who meditate) on the effected Brahman, to the 
world of Brahman ; this is the opinion of the teacher 
Badarayawa. For in acknowledging in this way a twofold 
relation there is no fault ; since the argumentation as to 
the non-restriction of going (Sutra III, 3, 31) may be under- 
stood as referring to all meditations with the exception of 
those on symbols. The words, 'and the meditation on 
that,' state the reason for this twofold relation. For he 
whose meditation is fixed on Brahman reaches lordship 
like that of Brahman, according to the scriptural relation, 
'In whatever form they meditate on him, that they 
become themselves.' In the case of symbols, on the 
other hand, the meditation is not fixed on Brahman, the 
symbol being the chief element in the meditation. — But 
scripture says also that persons whose mind is not fixed 
on Brahman go to it ; so in the knowledge of the five fires, 
'He leads them to Brahman' (Kh. Up. V, 10, a).— This 
may be so where we observe a direct scriptural declaration. 
We only mean to say that where there is no such declar- 
ation the general rule is that those only whose purpose is 
Brahman go to it, not any others. 

16. And scripture declares a difference (in the 
case of meditations on symbols). 

With reference to the meditations on symbols, such as 
name and so on, scripture declares that each following 
meditation has a different result from the preceding one, 
' As far as name reaches he is lord and master : — speech is 
greater than name ; — as far as speech reaches he is lord and 
master ; — mind is greater than speech ' (KA. Up. VII, I , X.). 

D d 2 



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404 vedAnta-sCtras. 



Now this distinction of rewards is possible because the 
meditations depend on symbols, while there could be no 
such distinction if they depended on the one non-different 
Brahman. — Hence those who take their stand on symbols 
cannot have the same reward as others. 



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IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I. 405 

FOURTH PADA. 

Reverence to the highest Self! 

1. (On the soul's) having entered (into the highest 
light), there is manifestation (of its own nature) ; (as 
we infer) from the word ' own.' 

' Thus does that serene being, having risen out of this 
body and entered into the highest light, manifest itself by 
its own nature ' {Kh. Up. VII, 1 a, 3). Regarding this text 
a doubt arises whether the Self 1 manifests itself through 
some adventitious distinction — as the Self (of him who 
possesses the lower knowledge only) does in the world of 
the gods and other abodes of enjoyment — or only through 
its own Self. — The purvapakshin maintains that, as in 
other places, here also the manifestation takes place 
through some adventitious characteristic ; because release 
also is a fruit (like other fruits, e. g. svarga), and because 
'manifestation* means as much as origination. If the 
manifestation took place only through the Selfs own 
nature, it would already appear in the Selfs former states ; 
for a thing's own nature is never absent from it. The Self 
therefore manifests itself by means of some adventitious 
distinction. 

To this we make the following reply. It manifests itself 
through its Self only, not through any other attribute. — 
Why so ? — On account of the word ' own ' in the clause 
' by its own nature.' For on the other view the qualification 
conveyed by ' own ' would be unmeaning. — But may not 
the term ' own ' merely indicate that that form belongs to 
that which manifests itself? — Not so, we reply. This is 
a point which would not require to be stated. For as in 

1 Sawprati foturthe pSde paravidy&phalaikadefo brahmabhSva- 
virbhavaA, sagunavidy&phalam h. sarvejvaratulyabhogatvam ava- 
dharayishyate, tatraparavidyaprapyam uktva paravidyaprapyam aha 
sampadyeti. An. Gi. 



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406 vedAnta-s6tras. 



whatever form a thing manifests itself that form necessarily 
belongs to it, the qualification ' own ' would be devoid of 
purport. It has a meaning, on the other hand, if it denotes 
the Self, the sense conveyed then being that the manifesta- 
tion takes place only through the nature of the Self, not 
through any other, adventitious, nature. — But, as a thing 
cannot be without its own nature, what difference is there 
between the Self s former states and its present state (after 
the manifestation)? — To this question the next Sfltra 
replies. 

2. (The Self whose true nature has manifested 
itself is) released ; according to the promise (made 
by scripture). 

That soul, of which the text says that it manifests itself, 
is released from its former bondage and abides in its own 
pure Self; while previously its Self was stained by the 
three states (i. e the state of waking, dreaming, and dream- 
less sleep), according to Kh. Up. VIII, 9-1 1, ' It is blind ;' 
— 'it weeps as it were;' — 'it goes to utter annihilation.' 
This is the difference. — But how is it known that in its 
present condition the soul is released?— 'On account of the 
promise,' the Sutra says. For after the teacher has 
promised to give further instruction about the Self as free 
from the imperfections of the three states (' I shall explain 
him further to you/ Kh. Up. VIII, 11, 3), he introduces 
the topic (of the released Self) in the words, ' Him being 
free from the body neither pleasure nor pain touches,' and 
concludes, ' By his own nature he manifests himself; that 
is the highest Person.' The words at the beginning of the 
tale also, 'The Self which is free from sin' (VIII, 7, 1), 
make a promise regarding the released Self. And release 
is a fruit in so far only as it is a cessation of all bondage, 
not as implying the accession of something new. And with 
reference to the assertion that manifestation is the origi- 
nation of something new we remark that it is so only with 
regard to a former condition (which ceases to be), as when 
we say of a convalescent person that he now manifests 



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IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 4. 407 

himself free from sickness. Hence there is no room for 
objections. 

3. (The light into which the soul enters is) the 
Self ; owing to the subject-matter of the chapter. 

But how can the soul be called ' released,' considering 
that the clause 'having entered into the highest light' 
speaks of it as within the sphere of what is a mere effect ? 
For the word ' light,' according to general usage, denotes 
physical light. And none who has not passed beyond the 
sphere of what is effected can be released, it being known 
that whatever is an effect is tainted with evil. — This objection 
is without force, we reply ; because in the passage referred 
to the word ' light ' denotes the Self, in accordance with the 
subject-matter of the chapter. For as such the highest 
Self is introduced in the words, ' The Self which is free from 
sin, old age, death,' &c, and we therefore may not all at 
once pass over to physical light ; incurring thereby the fault 
of abandoning the topic under discussion and introducing 
a new one. Besides, the word ' light ' sometimes denotes 
the Self, as e. g. in the passage, ' That the gods meditate 
on as the light of lights' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 16). We have 
discussed this at length under I, 3, 40. 

4. (The released soul abides) in non-division 
(from the highest Self) ; because that is seen from 
scripture. 

A doubt here arises whether that soul of which the text 
says, ' Having entered the highest light it manifests itself by 
its true nature,' remains separate from the highest Self, or 
abides in the state of non-division from it. — Somebody 
might be inclined to think that — because in the passage, ' He 
moves about there,' a distinction is made between the abode 
and him who abides ; and because the clause, ' Having entered 
the highest light,' mentions an agent and an object (of the 
agent's activity) — the soul remains distinct from the highest 
Self. — This view the Sutra sets aside. The released soul is 
non-separate from the highest Self. — Why so? — Because 



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408 vedAnta-sutras. 



that is seen from scripture.J For passages such as ' Thou 
art that' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; 'I am Brahman' (Br/. Up. I, 
4, 10) ; 'Where he sees nothing else' (Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1) ; 
'But there is then nothing second, nothing else different 
that he could see ' (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 23), show that the highest 
Self abides in the state of non-division. And the fruit 
must be assumed to correspond to the cognition, according 
to what was explained under IV, 3, 15. And also such 
passages as 'Just as pure water poured into pure water 
remains the same, thus, O Gautama, is the Self of a thinker 
who knows ' (Ka. Up. II, 4, 15), whose object it is to describe 
the nature of the released soul, declare that there is non- 
separation only. The same follows from the comparisons 
(of the soiil entering Brahman) to rivers falling into the 
sea. Passages where separation (of abode and abiding 
thing, &c.) is expressed, may be explained as, in a secondary 
sense, expressing non-separation ; so e. g. Kh. Up. VII, 
24, 1, ' In what does the Infinite rest? — In its own great- 
ness;' and Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2, 'Loving the Self, playing 
with the Self.' 

5. By (a nature) like that of Brahman (the soul 
manifests itself) ; (thus) Gaimini (opines); on account 
of reference and the rest. 

It has been concluded that the clause, ' by its own nature,' 
means that the soul manifests itself by its own Self only, 
not by some other adventitious character. What has now 
to be inquired into is the specific qualities of that nature. 
Here the Sutra at first states the opinion of the teacher 
Cairnini. According to him the soul's own nature is ' like 
that of Brahman,' i.e. it comprises all the qualities beginning 
with freeness from sin and concluding with truthfulness of 
conception (i. e. the qualities enumerated in Kh. Up. VIII, 
7, 1), and also omniscience and omnipotence ; and in this 
nature the soul manifests itself. — Why so ? — Because this is 
known from reference 1 and the rest. For the reference 

1 The commentators say mat the ' and the rest ' of the Sutra 
comprises vidhi and vyapadera, and give the following definitions. 



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iv adhyAya, 4 pAda, 6. 409 

to certain qualities made in VIII, 7, 1, teaches that the 
Selfhood of the Self is such (i.e. such as made up of those 
qualities). — Again, the passage, ' He there moves about 
eating, playing, rejoicing,' shows that the Self possesses 
lordly power ; so also the passage, ' For him there is free 
movement in all worlds ' (Kk. Up. VIII, 1, 6). — And thus 
also there is justification for such designations as 'All- 
knowing ; all-powerful.' 

6. By the sole nature of intelligence (the soul 
manifests itself), as that is its Self; thus Audulomi 
(opines). 

Although the text enumerates different qualities, such as 
freeness from sin, &c, these qualities rest only on fanciful 
conceptions due to difference of words ; for what the text 
intimates is only absence in general of all qualities such as 
sin and the rest. Intelligence alone constitutes the nature 
of the Self, and hence it is proper to conclude that it mani- 
fests itself in a nature consisting of that only. This con- 
clusion will also agree with other scriptural texts, such as 
Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13, 'Thus this Self has neither inside nor 
outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge.' — Qualities, 
on the other hand, such as having true wishes, are indeed 
mentioned by the text as real (positive) attributes, the 
meaning being that his wishes are true, i.e. truly existent ; 
but all the same they, as depending on the connexion with 
limiting adjuncts, cannot constitute the true nature of the 



UpanySsa is the reference to something known (established else- 
where), which reference is made with a view to a vidhi, i. e. the 
establishing of something not yet known (upanyaso n&moddesaJi sa 
/fcUnyatra ^«atasy&*nyavidhanSyanuvadaA). Thus here the qualities 
— freeness from sin — are referred to as known, for the purpose of 
establishing the vidhi, ' That it is which we must search out.' — The 
passage, ' He there wanders about,' &c, is a vidhi ; for it teaches 
what is not already known from elsewhere. — The mentioning of 
such qualities as omniscience and omnipotence is vyapadera, i.e. 
simple expression of something known without reference to a 
vidhi. 



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4io vedAnta-sOtras. 



Self, as intelligence does. For all manifoldness of character 
has to be denied of Brahman, as we have shown under 
III, 2, ii. For the same reason the mention made of 
eating and so on, means only the absence of all pain in 
general, and aims at glorification, just as the passage about 
' loving the Self (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2). For love, play, and 
the like cannot in their literal sense be ascribed to the action 
of the Self, because they presuppose something second 
(beyond the Self). Hence the soul manifests itself in the 
nature of pure intelligence, free from all manifoldness, calm, 
not capable of being expressed by any terms. This is the 
view of the teacher Au</ulomi. 

7. Thus also, on account of the existence of the 
former (qualities), (admitted) owing to reference and 
so on, there is absence of contradiction, (as) Badara- 
ya«a (thinks). 

Thus also, i. e. although it be admitted that intelligence 
only constitutes the true nature of the Self, also the former 
nature, i.e. lordly power like that of Brahman, which is 
intimated by reference and the rest, is — with a view to the 
world of appearances — not rejected ; and hence there is no 
contradiction. This is the opinion of the teacher Badara- 
ya«a. 

8. But by mere will (the released effect their 
purposes) ; because scripture states that. 

In the meditation on Brahman within the heart we read 
as follows : ' If he desires the world of the fathers, by his 
mere will the fathers rise,' &c. (KA. Up. VIII, 2, 1). — A doubt 
here presents itself whether the will alone is the cause of the 
rising of the fathers, or the will joined with some other 
operative cause. — The pflrvapakshin maintains that although 
scripture says ' by his mere will,' some other cause must be 
supposed to co-operate, as in ordinary life. For as in our 
ordinary experience the meeting with one's father is caused 
by one's will, and, in addition, by the act of going and so 
on, so it will be in the case of the released soul also ; and 



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IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, IO. 411 

thus we do not assume something contrary to observation. 
When the text says ' by his mere will,' it implies, as in the 
case of a king, the whole apparatus of other easily pro- 
curable instrumental causes by which the desired object is 
obtained. Besides, if the fathers and so on rose owing to 
a mere wish, they would be of unstable nature, like the 
imaginary representation of some desired object, and thus 
not be able to procure any solid enjoyment. — To this we 
reply that the rising of the fathers and so on is due to the 
will only. — Why so ? — Because scripture declares this. If 
any other cause were required, the direct scriptural state- 
ment 'by his will only' would thereby be contradicted. 
And even if we admit some other cause accompanying the 
act of will, it cannot be a cause to be realised by an effort ; 
for therefrom it would follow that before the realisation of 
that cause the will would be barren. Nor can the analogies 
of ordinary experience be applied to something to be learned 
from scripture. For as the will of the released differs in 
nature from the will of ordinary men, it may have the 
power of effecting something that possesses as much 
stability as the special purpose requires. 

9. And for this very same reason (the released 
soul is) without another lord. 

For this very same reason, i. e. owing to the fact of the will 
of the released person not being barren, he who knows has 
no other lord over himself. For not even an ordinary person 
when forming wishes will, if he can help it, wish himself to 
be subject to another master. And scripture also declares 
this when saying, 'Those who depart from hence, after 
having discovered the Self and those true desires, for them 
there is freedom in all worlds' (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 6). 

10. The absence (of a body and sense-organs, on 
the part of the released) Badari (asserts) ; for thus 
scripture says. 

The passage, ' By his mere wish the fathers rise,' shows 
that the released possesses a mind (internal organ, manas) 
whereby he wills. A question however arises whether he 



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4 1 2 vedAnta-s6tras. 



who knows, after having reached lordly power, possesses 
a body and senses, or not. Here the teacher Badari is of 
opinion that the glorified possessor of knowledge is without 
body and sense-organs. — Why so ? — Because scripture de- 
clares this, ' With the mind seeing those wishes he rejoices ' 
{Kh. Up. VIII, 13, 5). If he rejoiced with the mind, the 
body, and the senses, scripture would not specially say 
' with the mind.' Hence there are neither body nor sense- 
organs in the state of release. 

n. The presence (of a body and senses) Caimini 
(asserts); because the text records option (of the 
released person multiplying himself). 

The teacher Gaimini is of opinion that the released 
person possesses a body and sense-organs as well as a mind. 
For passages like ' He is onefold, he is threefold ' {Kk. Up. 
VII, 36, a) declare that the Self has the option of manifold 
existence which cannot be brought about without manifold- 
ness of body. — The capability of optionally multiplying one's 
self is, indeed, mentioned in the knowledge of plenitude 
(bhuman) which refers to Brahman as devoid of qualities, 
but this lordly power which is valid only for the qualified 
state is there mentioned only in order to glorify the know- 
ledge of the (unqualified) plenitude ; and it therefore presents 
itself as constituting the fruit of qualified knowledge 1 . 

12. For this reason Badaraya»a (opines that the 
released person is) of both kinds ; as in the case of 
the twelve days' sacrifice. 

The teacher Badarayawa, again, thinks that for this reason, 
i.e. because scripture contains indications of both kinds, the 
proper conclusion is that the released person exists in both 

1 Manifoldness of the Self is mentioned in a vidyd referring to 
the highest Brahman ; but its introduction there is not due to the 
wish of teaching something about that state, but merely of, rhe- 
torically, glorifying it. We, therefore, are entitled to view that 
passage as teaching something about him who possesses the lower 
knowledge. 



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IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 5. 413 

conditions. When he wishes to have a body, he appears 
with one ; when he wishes to be disembodied, he is without 
one. For he has various wishes, and all his wishes are 
realised. — 'As in the case of the twelve days' sacrifice.' 
As the soma sacrifice extending over twelve days may be 
viewed either as a sattra or as an ahtna sacrifice, because 
both alternatives are indicated by scriptural passages * ; so 
it is here also. 

13. When there is no body, (the process) may 
take place as in the dreaming state. 

When there is no body and no sense-organs, the process 
in the state of release may be viewed as analogous to that 
in the state of dream, when objects wished, such as a father 
and so on, have a perceptional existence only while body, 
senses, and objects do not really exist. 

14. When there is (a body), (it may be) as in the 
waking state. 

When, on the other hand, the released person has a body, 
then the objects of his wishes — fathers and so on — may have 
real existence, as in the waking state. 

15. The entering (of one soul into several bodies) 
is like (the multiplication of) the flame of a lamp ; 
for thus scripture declares. 

Under Sutra 1 1 it has been shown that the released person 
is embodied. The question now arises whether the bodies 
which the released create for themselves when rendering 
themselves threefold and so on are soulless like wooden 
figures, or animated by souls like the bodies of us men. — 
The purvapakshin maintains that as neither the soul nor 
the manas can be divided they are joined with one body 
only, while the other bodies are soulless. — To this the 
Sutrakara replies,' Like the flame of a lamp is their entering,' 
i. e. just as the one flame of a lamp can pass over into several 
flames (lighted at the original flame), because it possesses 

1 See Pfirva MimawsS-suiras II, 3, 5th adhikarawa. 



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414 vedanta-sOtras. 



the power of modifying itself, thus the soul of him who 
knows, although one only, multiplying itself through its 
lordly power, enters into all those bodies. For scripture 
declares that in this way one may become many, ' He is 
onefold, he is threefold, fivefold, sevenfold' {Kh. Up. VII, 
26, a). And this is not possible, if we should accept the 
simile of the wooden puppets, or the entering of other 
souls into those additional bodies 1 . Nor again can there 
be any motion on the part of bodies destitute of souls. — 
Nor is there any force in the objection that, because the 
Self and the Manas cannot be divided, they cannot be in 
connexion with more than one body. For the Self, because 
possessing the quality of having true wishes (i. e. wishes 
which become real), may be supposed to create other bodies 
with internal organs, conformable to the original one organ ; 
and, the Self dividing itself through the division of its 
limiting adjuncts, it may be possible to give a soul to each 
created body. This is the topic which the books on Yoga 
treat, in the chapters explaining the connexion of one soul 
with several bodies. — But how can lordly power, enabling 
the released soul to enter into several bodies, be admitted, 
if we consider that different scriptural texts declare that 
the soul in that state has not any specific cognition? so e.g. 
' Whereby should he know another ? ' ' For there is then 
no second, nothing else different from him that he could 
know ; ' ' An ocean is that one seer, without any duality ' 
(Bri. Up. II, 4, 14 ; IV, 3, 30 ; 32). 

To this objection the next Sutra replies. 

16. (What scripture says about absence of all 
specific cognition) refers either to deep sleep or 
union (release) ; for this is manifested (by the texts). 

By ' entering into one's own Self is meant dreamless 

1 I. e. the scriptural statement about one Self rendering itself 
manifold can neither be reconciled with the hypothesis of the other 
bodies being moved by the one soul as puppets are moved by one 
person through strings, nor with the hypothesis of a new separate 
soul entering each new body. 



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IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 7. 415 

sleep ; according to the text, ' He is gone to his own Self, 
he sleeps they say' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1). 'Union' means 
blissful isolation (final release), according to the text, 'Being 
Brahman he goes to Brahman ' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6). What 
the texts say about absence of specific cognition is said 
with reference to either of those two states, dreamless sleep 
or final release. — How do we know this ? — Because this is 
' manifest,' owing to the fact that those two states form the 
topic there (where absence of all cognition is mentioned). 
Compare the passages,' Having risen from out of these ele- 
ments it perishes again after them. Having departed there 
is no more knowledge ;' ' But where the Self only is all this ; ' 
' Where when asleep he desires no more desires, and dreams 
no more dreams' (Bri. Up. II, 4, ia ; IV, 5, 15 ; IV, 3, 19). 
— Those passages, on the other hand, which describe lordly 
power refer to an altogether different condition, which — 
like the heavenly world and so on — is an abode where 
qualified knowledge produces its results. — Thus there is no 
contradiction. 

17. With the exception of world-business (the 
released possess all lordly power), (the Lord) being 
the topic (where world-business is referred to), and 
(the souls) not being near (to such business). 

The following doubt here presents itself. Do those who 
through meditations on the qualified Brahman enter, 
together with their manas, into a condition of equality with 
the Lord, possess unlimited lordly power, or power limited 
to some extent? — The purvapakshin maintains that their 
power must be unlimited, because we meet with texts such 
as ' He obtains Self-lordship ' (Taitt. Samh. I, 6, a) ; ' All 
the gods bring an offering for him ' (Taitt. Sawm. I, 5, 3) ; 
' For them there is freedom in all worlds ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 
1, 6). — To this the Sutra replies, 'Excepting the world- 
business.' With the exception of the origination and so on 
of the world all other lordly powers, as e. g. rendering one's 
self of atomic size, must belong to the released. The world- 
business, on the other hand, can belong to the everlastingly 



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416 vedAnta-sOtras. 



perfect Lord only. — Why so ? — Because there (where the 
origination and so on of the world are referred to) the 
Lord forms the general topic, and because the other (souls) 
do not stand near (to the world-business). The highest 
Lord only is appointed to do all work referring to the 
entire world ; for the world's origination and so on are 
taught only where he constitutes the general subject-matter, 
and moreover he (only) is eternal, and described in scripture 
(as the creator, &c. of the world) 1 . The lordly power of 
the other souls, on the contrary, scripture shows to have 
a beginning, because it depends on their searching for and 
striving to know the Lord. They are therefore remote 
from all world-business. And just because they have 
minds, they might be of different minds, and one might 
have the intention of preserving the world while another 
might wish to destroy it. Such conflicts can only be 
avoided by assuming that the wishes of one should conform 
to those of another, and from this it follows that all other 
souls (but the Lord) depend on the highest Lord. 

1 8. (Should it be said that the souls must possess 
unlimited power) on account of manifest teaching ; 
we reply No, because scripture states him who, 
entrusted with office, abides in the spheres (of the 
sun and so on), (to be that one on whom the soul's 
obtaining lordly power depends). 

It remains to refute the remark, made by the purvapa- 
kshin, that absolute power on the part of those who know 
must be inferred from texts directly asserting such power, 
as e. g. ' He obtains self-lordship.' — This refutation the 
above Sutra undertakes. Scripture declares that the ob- 
tainment of rulership on the soul's part, depends on the 

1 Kim ka. paraisyaiva nityatvena svahetvanapekshawasya kA'pta- 
faktitva^^agatsar^anaw prati kalpyas£marthya£ kz. vidusham fovara- 
vishayaiva ^agatsri'sh/ir esh/avyS, kim ka. paurvSparySlo/JanSyam 
ixvarasyaiva .^agatsargaA jabdad gamyate ^anmadisutram 4rabhya 
taitad upapaditam. An. Gi. 



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iv adhyAya, 4 pAda, 20. 417 

highest Lord who, as entrusted with definite offices, abides 
in certain definite abodes, such as the sphere of the sun, &c. 
This is shown by the text going on to say (after the clause 
quoted above), ' He obtains the lord of Mind.' For that 
means that he obtains the lord known to be the lord of all 
minds. In accordance herewith the text later on says that 
he becomes lord of speech, lord of the eye, lord of the ear, 
lord of understanding. — Similarly in other passages also the 
lordly power of the other souls has to be viewed, according 
to circumstances, as depending on the eternally perfect 
Lord. 

19. And (there is also a form of the highest Lord) 
not abiding in effected things ; for thus scripture 
declares his abiding. 

Moreover, according to scripture, there is also an eternal 
form of the highest Lord which does not abide in effects ; 
he is not only the ruling soul of the spheres of the sun and 
so on which lie within the sphere of what is effected. For 
the text declares his abiding in a twofold form, as follows : 
' Such is the greatness of it ; greater than it is the Person. 
One foot of him are all beings ; three feet of him is what is 
immortal in heaven' (KA. Up. Ill, ia, 6). And it cannot 
be maintained that that form of him which is divorced from 
all effects is reached by those who put their trust on his 
other form ; for their minds are not set on the former. 
Hence as he who does not reach that form of the double- 
natured highest Lord which is divorced from all qualities 
stops at that form which is distinguished by qualities, so 
also, unable to reach unlimited power within the latter 
form, he stops at limited lordly power. 

20. And thus perception and inference show. 
Scripture and Smrrti both declare that the highest light 

does not abide within effected things, ' The sun does not 
shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, 
and much less this fire' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10). 'The sun 
does not illume it, nor the moon, nor fire* (Bha. Gtt4 XV, 6). 
— The Sutra is meant to show that the non-abiding of the 
[38] E e 



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4 1 8 vedAnta-sOtras. 



highest light within effected things is a well-known cir- 
cumstance. 

21. And on account of the indications of equality 
of enjoyment only. 

The lordly power of those who take their stand on the 
effected Brahman is not absolute, for that reason also that 
scripture teaches that their enjoyment only is equal to that 
of the eternally perfect Lord. For scripture contains state- 
ments and indications of the difference (of the Lord and the 
released soul) ; compare ' To him he says, Water indeed is 
enjoyed 1 (by me); that world (is to be enjoyed by thee 
also) ' (Kau. Up. I, 7) ; ' As all beings honour that deity, so 
do all beings honour him who knows that' (Br*. Up. I, 
5, 20); 'He obtains through it equality (in body) and 
sameness of abode with that deity ' (Br*. Up. 1, 5, 23). But 
from the circumstance of the lordly power of the released 
souls not being absolute it follows that it comes to an end, 
and then they will have to return from the world of 
Brahman ! — To this objection the reverend Badarayawa 
replies in the following Sutra. 

22. (Of them) there is non-return, according to 
scripture ; non-return, according to scripture. 

Those who, in following the road of the gods, to which 
the vein and the ray are leading, and on which light is the 
first stage, reach the world of Brahman as described by 
scripture — where ' there are the two lakes Ara and iVya in 
the world of Brahman, in the third heaven from hence,' and 
where ' there is the lake Airammadiya and the Ajvattha 
tree showering down Soma, and the city of Brahman 
Apara^ita and the golden hall built by Prabhu' (Kk. 
Up. VIII, 5, 3) — and set forth at length in mantras, 

1 All the commentators explain the reading ' mtyante.' — An. Gi. 
says — tarn brahmalokagatam upasakam hira/zyagarbhaA svasamipam 
upSgataw sanunayam aha maya khalv apa evamr?lamayyo mtyante 
drwyante bhu^yante tavapy asav am/Ytarupodakalaksha»o loko 
bhogyo yathSsukhaw bhu^yatam. 



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IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 22. 419 

arthavadas, and so on ; those, we say, who reach that world 
do not return from there after having finished the enjoyment 
of their deeds ; as those do who have gone to the world of 
the moon and other places. — Why so ? — Because scriptural 
passages teach that they do not so return. Compare 
- Moving upwards by it he reaches the immortal ' (K h. 
Up. VIII, 6, 6) ; ' For them there is no return ' (Br*. 
Up. VI, 2, 15) ; ' Those who proceed on that path do not 
return to the life of man' (Kh. Up. IV, 15, 6) ; 'He 
reaches the world of Brahman and does not return' 
[Kh. Up. VIII, 15, 1). That the finality of their lordly 
power does not imply their return to the life of man, we 
have shown under IV, 3, 10. It is a settled matter that 
those who through perfect knowledge have dispelled all 
mental darkness and are devoted to the eternally perfect 
Nirvawa do not return. And as those also who rely on the 
knowledge of the qualified Brahman in the end have 
recourse to that (Nirva«a), it follows that they also do not 
return] — The repetition of the words, ' Non-return, accord- 
ing to scripture,' indicates the conclusion of this body of 
doctrine. 



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INDEX OF QUOTATIONS 

TO 

VOLUMES XXXIV (i) AND XXXVIII (ii). 



Aitareya- 




IV, n 






i, 359 


aranyaka 




V, 14; 15 




• >i 330 


II, i, a, i . 


ii, 373, 303 


17 






• «, 3<>a 


i, a, 6 . 


i, 56 ; ii, 304 


VI, 11 






ii, 350 


i,3i' • 


ii, 306 


45 






ii, 316 


a, 4,« • 


i, p. bucii ; ii, 344 


VII, 6 






i, a93 


3. *, i • 


. i, «3 


19 






i, 383 
if, 183 


4, i . . 


. ii, 305-308 


31 






4» *, i • 


. i, p. Ixix,33,333 


VIII, 6 






i, 63; ii, 381, 353 


4» »f i ; » 


• i,**5 


10 






ii, 35a 


4, *> a • 


i, 4 8 


»3 






ii, 380 


4, I, « ; 3 


i,a63 


»4 






. i, 138 


4, a, a • 


. ii, 306 


34; 3 


5 




. ii, 381 


4, a, 4 • 


. i,3<>4;»>9i»*57 


36 






. ii, 334 


4» 3» 4; «' 




X, 3 . 






• i»307 


7; 10. 


. ii, 308 


4 • 






. ii, 33 


6 > ', s ; 6 


ii, 308 


41 






i, 63, 80 


III, a, J, la . 


. «»94; a, 190 


4» 

XIII, 3 






• i,9« 

. i, 113, 133, 383 


Aitareya- 




13 






. ii, 157 


brihmana 




»7 






. i, 383 


III, 8, 1 . . 


• i, 35, aas 


31 

XIV, ,7 






• >, i«7 
i, 4 6 


Apastamba- 




XV, 3 . 






. i, 361 


dharma-sfitra 




6 . 






", 4i7 


I. 7, ao, 3 • 


• ", 399 


6; 13 






i, 195 


8, 33, a . 


• i» *93 


7 






H.«3 


9> a*>, 8 • 


. ii, 318 n. 


30 






i.3« 






XVIII, 61 . 




i, "3> 330 


Arsheya- 






brabmana 




BWhad-anwyaka- 




. i, »I4 


upanisbad 

I, 1, 4 . . i, p. cv 


Bhagavad-gita 




3,3 . 




• ", a4 


11,34. • • 


ii, 180 


a, 4 • 




• i, ao3 


39! 49 • 


ii, 361 


3»» • 




• ii, »9* . 


54 • • 


'; 43. a8a 


3, a • 




• i, 303 5 ", 95 


III, 1a . . . 


i>, 337 


3, 13 . 




. ii, 9* 


13 • • . 


i, in 


3i>9 • 




■ ",89 


35 • • • 


ii, 318 


3,3a 






ii, 91, 154 



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INDEX OF QUOTATIONS 

TO 

VOLUMES XXXIV (i) AND XXXVIII (ii). 



Aitareya- 

tnuiyaka 

II, i, a, i . 

i, a, 6 . 

>, 3, « • 

a, 4,« • 

3, », i • 

4, i . . 

4, i» i • 
4> ', « ; » 
4, «, a • 
4» i, « J 3 
4, », a . 
4i a, 4 . 
4» 3» 4*. 6 
7; 10. 

ill *' '' 5 ' ' 
III, a, j, la . 

Aitareya- 

brahmana 
III, 8, 1 . . 

Apastamba- 
dharma-sfitra 
I, 7, ao, J . 

8, 33, a . 

9, a6, 8 . 

Arsheya- 
brahmana 
I 

Bhagavad-gtti 
II, a 4 . 
39! 

13 

35 



49 



ii, 27a, 303 
i, 56 5 ii, 304 
ii, ao6 
i, p. lxxu ; ii, 344 

i,«3 

ii, 305-308 

i, p. Ixix, aa, 33a 

1,265 

«, 4« 

i,a6 3 

ii, 206 

i, 304 ; ii, 91, 257 

ii, jo8 
ii, 308 
", 94 ; a, 190 



h 35, aaa 



", 399 
», *93 
ii, 318 n. 



i, ai4 

ii, 180 
ii, 361 
i, 43, a8a 
•i, 337 
i, in 
ii, 318 



IV, 11 . 
V,i4 5 »5 
17 

VI, 11 

45 

VII, 6 

19 
at 

VIII, 6 
10 
a3 
a4 
a4J 
36 

X, a . 
4 • 
41 
4« 

XIII, a 
la 
a7 
31 

XIV, ,7 

XV, 3 . 
6 . 
6; 13 

7 

30 
XVIII, 61 

BWhad-iraayaka- 
upanishad 

I, i,4 
a, a 
a, 4 
3, « 
3, a 
3, ia 
3, «9 
3,33 



i, 359 
i, 33o 
ii, 303 
ii, 350 
ii,3i6 

•, a93 

i, 383 

ii, 183 

1,63; ii, 381,353 

ii, 35a 

ii, 380 

i, 138 

ii, 381 

", a34 

i, 307 

ii, 33 

i, 63, 80 

i, 9 6 

!, 113, 133, 383 

ii, i57 
i, 383 
i, 187 

i,4« 
i, 361 

ii, 4i7 
i, 195 
ii, 63 

i,3« 

i, "3, 33© 



1, p. cv 
ii, 34 
i, ao3 
ii, 19a . 
i, 3<>3 J >i, 95 
ii, 93 
ii, 89 
ii, 91, 154 



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422 



vedAnta-sOtras. 



I, 3, »3 • 


. ii, 193 


III, 3,11 . 


. i, pp. lxxxi, 


3,34 • 


• H, »95 




lxxxix 


4,' 


. ii, ao6 


3,13 . 


• i, 359? ii, 105 


4,6 . 


• i, "7 




seq., 369 


4,7 • 


• • », »S, *4», 364, 


4 • • 


. i, p. Ixxii, 331 




a«7 ; «, 3», 4* 


4, « 


• ii, 173,338,343, 


4,i<> . 


• ', *9» 3i, «9, 




39', 339, 394 




38s; 11,33,46, 


4,3 . . 


• •, 33, 133, 169; 




66, ioi, in, 




ii, 18 




173, »38, 339, 


5 ■ • • 


. i, p. Ixxii; ii, 




408 




391, 333 


4,«5 • 


• • !l»5 


5,i • 


. i, p. lxxvi ; ii, 


5,3 


. . 11,361 




343, 391 


5, 3 • 


• «, 49, 56, 90, 95 


6,8 . 


• «, 3«5 


5, '3 • 


• ",357 


7 • • 


. i, p. xxviii 


5, ao . 


• ",93,4i8 


7, 1 seqq. 


. i, 130 


5,ai • 


. ii,87n., 94, 356 


7,3 . 


• i, »54 


5, « • • 


. ii, 18, as8 


7,3 • 


. i, p. xxxv, 135; 


5, »3 • 


• ", 357, 358, 418 




", 339 


II, i, i . . 


. ii, 168 


7,4 • 


• i, 37o 


i, 16 . 


. i, 373 ; ii, 146 


7,9 • 


. . i, 81 


1,17 • 


• "> 43, 50, 144 


7,i5 • 


• «, '73 


i, 18 . 


• M, 50, 56, 135 


7,33 . 


• i, 134 


1,19 • 


. ii, 141 


7,33 • 


. i, 51, 70, 113, 


i, ao . 


• «, 3o, 74,75, »47 




115, i33,38a; 


», 3 • 


• i, 354 




ii, 46, 54, 6a, 


a, 4 • 


. i, 317 




66, 174 


3 • • • 


. ii, 167 


8,758 


. i, 169 


3, 3 • 


. ii, 6 


8,8 . 


. . i, 6a, 99, 171, 


3,« • 


. i,6a;ii,i57,i75 




337,349,355; 


4,5 • 


• i, P- *1, «7, 35, 




ii, 17, 153,155, 




36, 397, 344, 




339, 339, 335, 




356; », 53, 77, 




394 




388,391,331 


8,9 • 


. i, 170, 181, 355, 


4,6 . 


. i, 36, a8s, 309, 




370 ; 11, 390 




3ii, 331; ii, 


8, 11 . 


. . 1,171,343,383; 




10, 179, 339, 




. ", 46, 335 




339 


9, »; 3 


i, 300 


4, io . 


• •> 3o;ii,39i 


9,4 • 


• • ",79,83 


4, «» • 


• ",79 


9,9 • 


. . i, 369 


4,1a . 


• i, «54, 349; », 


9,16 . 


• • i, 131 




160, 415 


9,36 . 


• • >, 37, 399, 337, 


4, '3 • 


• i, 33, 31, 333, 




349? ii, 171, 




339 




339, 395 


4, >4 • 


• ii, 4*4 


9,38 . 


• • i, «5, 75, 83; ", 


5, i 


• ii, 154 




34,335 


5, 18 . 


• *, 178 ; ii, 159 


IV, 1, 3 . 


. ii, 381 


5, >9 • 


• i, 3a, 31, 36, 


3,4 • 


• • i, 39, 194, 337, 




100; ii, 3a, 




353 ; ii, 395 




155, 161, 175, 


3,5 • 


• • i, 9i 




180 


3,6 . 


• • i, »94 


III, i, i . 


. ii, 388 


3,7 • 


. . i,p.xxxviii,334; 


1,9 . 


. i, 30 




", 39, 46, 53, 


a . . 


• i, 339 




308 


a, i . 


• i», 79 


3,8 . 


• • ",39 


a, 8 . 


. ii, 80, 83 


3,9 • 


• • ii,>33,i38 



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INDEX OF QUOTATIONS. 



423 



IV, J, 9; 


10 . 


• ", '33 


IV, 4, »4 • 


. i, 93,38a; ii, 181 


3, 10 


• • 


• >, 353 5 ",I33 


4,*5 • • 


• >, 3» 1, 3*7; ii, 


3. « 


• • 


• "» 34, 36 




31, 309, 330, 


3, " 


. • 


• «i, 49 seq., 89, 




335, 395 






»35 


5, 1 • 


. ii, 305 


3>»3 


• • 


• ",5« 


5,6 . 


• i, 374, 385; ii, » 


3, M 


• . 


• ", 34, 134 


5,6-15 . 


. ii, 385 


3, »4 


»5 


. ii, 348 


5,8 . 


• i,»85 


3, »4" 


16 . 


• «,»35 


5, 13 • • 


• ',156; ii, 3a,34, 


3,15 


. . 


. i,a8 




156 seq., 409 


3,i« 


. • 


• «, »98 ; ii, 148 


5,15 • 


• i, 36, 63j 133, 


3, »9 


. . 


• ", 4i5 




168; ii, 54, 


3. ai 


• ■ 


. i,6o;ii,i 4 i,i76 




>45, a48, 393, 


J, 31- 


3* • 


• >i, 54 




»95, 330, 400, 


3,33 


. . 


• >, 335 ; ", 151, 




4»5 






337, 340 


V, . . . 


• i,8 4 


3, »3 


. . 


• ",34,4o8 


4 &V,5 


• ii, a45-»47 


3,3" 


. . 


• ", 188; ii, 34,414 


4,1 • 


. ii, 345 


3,3a 


• . 


• i,74, 168; ii, 414 


4,5 




. i, p. Ixxii 


3.33 


. . 


. ii, 11a 


5 . 




. i, p. Ixx ; ii, a 1 6 


3.35 


. . 


• •, 345 


5, » 




• i, "4 ; », a45 


3, 38 


. . 


• ", 3«7 


5,3 




• >, 89 J ii, a45 


4i 1 


. . 


• »i, 36, 377 


6 . 




. i, p. lxvii 


4,«-4 




. ii, 10a 


8 . 




• i, *57 


4, a 


. ■ 


. ii, 36, 8a, 83, 93, 


9 • 




• »,«44 






105, 389, 35a, 


10 . 




. i, p. cvii 






367, 377 


10, 1 




• ",38a, 383 seq., 


4,3 


. . 


• », 103, 35a 






385 


4,5 


. . 


. i, pp. lxxx, Ixxxi, 


10, 6 




• ii, a 14 






lxxxix; ii, 33, 


VI, 1, 1 . 




. ii, 186 






46,119, 369 


1,6 




. ii, 188 


4,6 


. • 


. i, p. cxii ; ii, 35, 


i,7 




• • i,3<>3 






"3, 173, 363, 


1, '3 




• • ij 304; ",85 






373, 396, 4°', 


», M 




• • i>, an, 309 






415 


*, 9 




• • i, »57 


4,6; 


7 • 


. i,p.cix 


a, 14 




. ii, 187 


4,7 


. • 


• i, 43, 157; ii, 


a, 15 




. i, p.cix; ii, 383, 






144, 375 




386, 389, 390, 


4,8; 


9 • 


. i, pp. cvii, cviii 




39i,4"9 


4,9 


• • 


• ii, 3i7 


a, 15 »eqq 


. . i, pp. cvii, cviii 


4, n 


■ • 


• i, J6 


a, 16 . 


. . 11,110,113,334 


4, 16 


• • 


• i,9'» 193; ii,4°7 






4, »7 
4, 18 


• • 


• i, P- xl, *57 
. i, 84, 87, 330 


Gabala-upanisl 


tad 


4, 19 


• 


i, 66, a6a, 383, 

3«3J «, 154, 
180, 339 


? . . 


• M, a44, a49, *5h 
a95, a97, 3<>a 
seq., 338 


4, ao 


• • 


• », 37 

• «, 157 ; ", 331 


IV . . . 




4," 






4, aa 


• • 


. i, p. lxxiii, 79, 
«83, 334, 330; 
«>» 37, 4», 6a, 


Gaimini-(pfirv< 


1- 






mTmamsa-)s 


hra 






141, »47, »94, 


I, 1, 1 . 


• i, »4, a6, 44 






»95, 3<>7, 337, 


1,3 . 


• i, a4, 391 n. 






356, 359, 361 


»,5 • 


. . i, 34 


4, *3 


• • 


. ii, 308, 390 


i,a 5 • 




. i, a 4 



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424 



vedAnta-sOtras. 



I, a, i 


. 1, 20 seq., 34 


I, 3, « . . 


. ii, 341 


a, 7 


• • 


. 1,21 


3,3 • • 


. i, lai 


3, 3 


• • 


• >. *93 


3, 3 seqq- 


. i, 339 


II 3 '* 

II, 3, I 

2, aa 


• • 


• >», 319 
. ii,a78 
. ii, 18s n. 


3, 3 ; 4 < 
3, 4 . • 

3,9 • • 


• ", a7 

• i, 34 ! ", 53 
. i, 121 


a, a3 
3.5 


• • 


. ii, 185 n. 
. ii, 41311. 


3, 10 . . 


• ',,P- <*«, »5»J 
ii, 304 


4.9 


• • 


. ii, 186 


3, 105 n 


. i. pp. xxxix, lxix 

• 1,37, »37 seq. 

• ii, 3 °5 


4, io» 
"I, 3, 9 


eqq. 


. ii, 187 
. ii, 340 


3, 11 • • 
3, 12 . . 


3, 14 


• • 


. ii, 224, 360 


3. 13 • • 


. Ii, 305 


. 4, 3* 
IV, ,, , 

3,8 


• • 


• ", 75 

• i. 44 

ii, 346 n. 


3, 15 . • 
II, 4, 1 • • 


. i, 346; ii, 153, 

155, 205 
. ii, 173 


VI,,*'? 


. 


ii, 223 n. 
>, 197 


4,4 • . 
4, 10 . . 


. i, 350 

• i, aso;ii, 396 


5, ' 


• 


ii, 195 n. 


4,11 . . 


• j, 15$ 


8, aa 
X, 8, is . 


. . 


ii, 318 
ii, 228 


4, » • • 


. i, pp. xxxvii, 
xxxviii, xliv 


Gau/apada-karik! 


I 


4, ia; 1 J 
4, 15 • • 


• i, 195 
. ii, 408 


1, 16 . . . 


i,3ta 


5,3 • • 


• ii, 154 


Ill, IS . . . . 


i, 266 


5,5 . • 


• i, '04, 330 


Ira-upanishad 




5, « 5 7 • 
5, 7 . . 


• >, a 4 8 

• ", 371 


a . . . 


ii, a 89 


5, 8 . . 


• ", 87 n., 133, 


7 • . • 


i, 29, a8a, 295; 




'34 




", 395 


5, »I • • 


• »i, 65 


8 . . . . 


», 34 


5, IS . • 


. 1, pp. xxxvi, 


Ka/£a-upanishad 




6,1 . . 


xxxviii, 192 
. i, p. xxxvii, 229; 


I, I, 13 • • • 


i, 248 




ii, 190, 390 


i, 13; ao; a, 




6, * ; 3 . 


i, p. xxxviii 


14 • . . 


i, 116 n. 


6, 11 . . 


i, a97 


1, 15 . . . 


1,248 


*, 13 • • 


. ii, 160, 168 


1, ao . . . 


i, 118, 248, 249, 


«, 17 . • 


i, p. xxxviii, 198 




251,352 


«, 18 . . 


i, 397 


»> »3 5 *4 • 


>>, '34 






a, 4 . . . 


i}»5o 
fa, ia 3 


Kaushttakl-brah- 




a, 6 . 




mam-upanishac 


1 


a, 7 • 




ii, 328 


I 


i, p. cxxi seq.; 


a, 9 • 




1,307 




ii, 400 


a, la . 




i, 120, 121, 251 


2 . . . . 


", 35, ia», 384 


a, 14 . 




i, a8, 118, 196, 


a seqq. . . 


i, pp. cvii, cviii 




331, a 4 8, 351, 


3 . • . . 


", a3o, 383, 385 




*5»; n, 134, 


3, 15 • • • 


1,78 




241, 392 


4 • . . . 


H, aa5, 330 


a, 15 . . . 


11, 190, 307 


7 . . . . 


ii, 418 


a, 18 . . . 


1, 118, 248; ii, 


II, 5, 15 • • • 


i, 91 




3» 


6 . . . . 


ii, 363 


2,22. . . 


i, 28, 187, 252 


... ' 4 • • • • 


i, 304 ; M, 300 


2, 25 . • • 


i, p. xxxv, 1 16 


III, 1 . . . . 


ii, 305 


3, i ... 


i, pp. zxxv, xlii, 1 
lxxii, 118; ii, 


1-3; 8 . . 


j, 97 




3 . . . . 


i, p. xxxiv, 100 






240 




11, 164 



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INDEX OF QUOTATIONS. 



425 



111,3 • • • 


. i, 6o, 86, aia ; 


II, ',3 • 


• • ", a55, 3<>4, 347 




m, 35 


3, a . 


. . 11, 330 


6 . . . 


• ", 44 


7, a . 


• • ii, 349 


8 . . . 


• «, 99, 359? ", 


8,1 . 


• • 'i, 345, 349 




59, 183 


9, 1 


• • ii, 349 


IV, 19 . . . 


. i,p. xl,a6 9 


ii, 1 . 


• • !', 346, 349 


ao . . . 


. i, 370; ii, 4a, 


13, a . 


• ", 3io 




Mi 


a3, 1 • 


• »,*95 


Kena-upanishad 




33,3 . 


• ", 3i7 
. i, 169 


1,3 •• • 


• «, 3i 


III, 1 . . 


• i, a57 


4 . . . 


• ", 157 


», 1 • 


. i, 316 


„ 5 • • • 


. i, 31 seq., 105 


4, 1 • 


. ii, 385 


H, 3 ... 


. i, 3a 


6,1 . 


. ii, in 






6,4 • • 


. i, 317 n. 


£6indogya- 
upanishad 

I, 1, 1 . . 


. i, p. Ixviii; ii, 


10,4 . 
11, 1 . 
U,3 • 

13 . . . 


. i, p. xxii 
. ii, 336 

• i, 94 

• i, 90 




'93, 37a, 304, 


13, 6 . 


. i,35ojii,6s,4i7 




347 


», 7 . 


• i, 96 


1, 3 . • 


• ", *54, 3°3 


ia, 7 seqq 


• • ii, 179 


i,7 • • 


• «, 198, 353, 354, 


13, 6 . . 


. i, 96, 361 




304 


13, 7 • • 


. i, p. xxxiv, 87 


1,8 . . 


• «, *54 


13, 7? 8 . 


• 1,89 


1, 10 . . 


• ", "54, 389,347, 


14 . . . 


. i, pp. xxxiv, 




361, 363 


Ixvii, cxiv, 91, 


a . . . 


. ii, 193 


107 


a, 7 . . 


ii, »54 


14, 1 . . . i, 6j, 94, 311 ; 


a, 13 • • 


ii, 331 


ii, 11, a 1, 378 


3, 1 . . 


• '•, *54, 345 


14, 3 . . . i, 80, 106, 147, 


5, * J a • 


", 333 


193; «, 153, 


5,5 • • 
6 . . . 


. ii, 383 


161, 377, 394, 


. i, p. xxxiv; ii, 


403 




195 


14, a ; 3 • 


• ",45 


6, 1 . . 


. ii, 347, 303, 345 


14, 3 • • 


• i, 835 ii, 319 


6, 6 . . 


. i, p. xxxiii; ii, 


M, 4 • • 


. i, 109, na, 355; 




346 




ii, 381 


6, 6 seqq. . 


i, 77 seq.; ii, 176 


15, a . . 


. ii, 381 


6, 7 } 6 . . 


i, 135 


15, 3 • • 


• ", "3 


6,8 . . 


>i, *47 


17, 6 . . 


• ", 35* 


7,7 . . 


ii, 347 


18 . . . 


. ii, 178 


7, 8 . . 


", 3*i 


18, 1 . . 


• i, 30, »47J ii, 


7,9 • • 


ii, 304 




154, 339, 340 


8,5 • . . 


ii, 318 


18, 1; 6 . 


• ", 33a 


8,8 . . 


i,8 3 


18, 3 . . 


. if ai6 

. 1, 30, 363, 367, 


9 . . . . 


i, p. xxxiv, 81 


19, 1 . . 


9, * . • . 


i, 183, 387; ii, 


333; i>, 339, 




195 


341 


10, 9 . . . 


i, 84 


IV, 1 ... 


. ii, 315 


10, 9 seqq. . 


ii, *54 


1,1 . . 


• ii, 3<>5 


«, 4; 5 • • 


i,8 4 


1,3 • • 


• i, *»5 


11, S • • • 
II, 1, 1 . . . 


i, p. xxxiv 


1,4 . . 


• ", 33* 


ii, 349 


3,3 . . 


. ii, 33* 


a, 1 . . . 


ii, 373, 304, 345, 


3,3 . . 


. i, 334 




346 


3,1 • • 


. i, 316 ; ii, 356 



Digitized by 



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426 



vedAnta-sOtras. 



IV, j, i ; 3 • • 


i, 30 


V, 3 4>J . 


• • «,i45; ", 354 


3, 3 • • • 


ii, 8711., 356,377 


VI, 1 . . 


. . ii, 7 


3.5 • • • 


i, aa6 


1, 3 • 


• • i, »85, 341 seq., 


3,6 . . . 


ii, 357 




343 ! ", 9, 79 


3,8 . . . 


i, 95 5 », as8 


',4 • 


. . i, a66, 385, 330; 


4.5 • • • 


i, 328 




ii, 13 


ioseqq. . . 


i, ia6 n. 


a . . 


• • >» 47 seq., 53 n. 


io, 5 . . . 


i, 84; ii, 377, 


a seqq. 


• • i, 53, 55 




400 


a, 1 


. . i, 33, 367, 383, 


M, 3 • • • 


», 354 




33a, 341; », 


15 ... . 


i, pp. cvii, cviii 




163 


15, i . . . 


i, p. xxxv, 124; 


a, 1; a 


. . 1, 364 




ii, 219 


a, 1; 3 


• • i, a65 


15, a . ■ . 


i, 135 ; ii, 303 


3,3 . 


. . ii, ao 


15, 3 • • • 


ii, 400 


a, 3 • 


• • i, a63;ii,aa,25, 


15, 4 • • • 


ii, 319 




74, a9<> 


15,5 • • 


i, 138 


a, 3; 4 


• • i, 5i, 303 ; ii, a4 


15, 6 . . . 


ii, 391, 400, 419 


a, 4 • 


• • ", a 3, 366 


17, i . . 


ii, 361 


3, 1 • 


. . ii, 136 


17, io . . 


ii, 384 


3, a . 


• • i, a33, a68, 339, 


18, 3 . . 


ii,93 




343, 361; >i, 


V,i, i . . . 


ii, 85, 186, 377 




3a, 140,159 


i, a . . 


ii, 309 


3, a; 3 


. . ii, 96 


1,7 . . 


",304 


3, 3 


. . i, 88 n. 


a, a . . 


ii, 311 


4 • 


• • i, 33a 


3-10 . . . 


ii, 101-132, 400 


4, » 


• • ', 3ai 


3,3 • • 


ii, 103, 368 


5,4 


• • ", 79 


3, io . . 


ii, 108 


6,1 


• • ii, 3«4 


4, i . . 


ii, 267 


6,5 


• • ii, a7, 3W 


7, i ; 8, i 


i.35 


8 . 


• • i», 370 


9,1 . . 


ii, 122 


8,1 


• • i, 59, «8o, 345; 


9, a . . 


. ii, 188 




", 47, 141, 


10 . . . 


i, pp. cvii, cviii 




151, 176, 179, 


IO, I . . 


• ', »7! ", «33, 




4i5 




a95, a97, 38a, 


8, 3 


• • i, 59 n., 84, 87, 




385 




37a; ii, 14a 


io, a . . 


• », 4<>3 


8,3 


. . ii, 396 


10,4 . • 


, ii, no 


8, 3j 5 


• • », 59 


io, 5-7 • 


ii, us seq. 


8,4 


. . i, 155, a66 


io, 6 . . 


■ ii, 130 


8,7 


• • i, a3, 31, 54, 


10,7 • • 


• ",398 




3ai, 343; '«, 


io, 8 . . 


• ",384 




9, 33, 46, 66, 


IO, 10 . . 


. ii, 187 




79, 163, »73, 


1 1 seqq. . 


i, pp. lxxiii, Ixxv, 




339, 408 




M3 


8,7&C 


-16, 3 «i, 843 


11-24 . . 


. ii, 400 


9, »; 3 


• • i, 3«3J ",48 


11, a . . 


• ", »54 


10, a 


. . . ii, 147, 148 


11, 5 • • 


. ii, 388 


", 3 


. . . ii, a8, 31 


11,6 . . 


. i, p. uxv 


»4,a 


• • • i, »7 5 ii, 836, 


11, 7 . • 


. i, 337 




a37, a85, 357, 


ia-17 . . 


• », a75 




3«3 


18 . . . 


• i, >43 ! «, a75 


16 . 


. . . 1,56,313 


18, 1 . . 


. ii, 191 


VII, 1 . 


. . . i, 189 


18, a . . 


• i, 146 


1 seqq 


• • ",403 


19, 1 . . 


• i, M6 ; i«, a49 • 


1, « 


. . . i, 337 


a*, a; 4 . 


. ii, 2149 


i,3 


. . . i, 39, 167, 266 



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INDEX OF QUOTATIONS. 



427 



VII, 1,5 . . 


• ", 381, 341 


VIII, 7, 3 . . 


1,319 


II, I . . 


. ii, 386 


7,3 • • 


i, 184 ; ii, 377 


13, 3 . . 


• ii,4°5 


9-11 . . 


ii, 406 


15, i • • 


. i, 163, 164, 261; 


9,1 • • 


i, 139 




ii, 377 


9,3 • • 


i, 184 


16 . . . 


i, 166 


9, 3 seqq. 


i, 333 


18, 2 . . 


• i, 3*6 


10, 1 . . 


• >, 184 


23 . . . 


. i, p. xxxv, 163 


10, 4 . . 


i, 184 


aj;»4 • 


. i, 163 


11, 1 . . 


• i, 184 


24 . . . 


• i, 74 


n, a . 


• i, '84 


34, 1 • • 


. i, 63, 78, 163, 


n, 3 . • 


i»'99; ",4*6 




168, 339; ii, 


13, 1 . . 


• i, »7, 41, »3» 




339, 393, 4°8 


13,3 • • 


. i, pp. xxxvi, 


35, 1 ; 2 . 


• i', 179 




xxxviii, Ixxxv, 


*5, » • • 


. i, 383, 311, 331; 




331,333,377; 




ii, 180, 394, 




», »9* 




408, 410 


13, 4 . . 


• "', 34 


36, 1 . . 


i, 60,167 


13, 5 • • 


ii, 413 


36, 2 . . 


• >, *9, 167, 440 ; 


13 . . . 


• ", "5 




ii, 337, 311, 


14 . . . 


i, p. xxxviii, 83, 




414 




183; ii, 98 


VIII, 1 . . . 


. i,pp.xxxvi, lxxiii 


14, 1 . . 


• >, *33, 3*9; ». 


1, 1 . . 


• ', »74, 374; », 




155, 393 




319, 347, 378, 


15 . . . 


• ii, 63, 389 




400 


15, 1 • • 


• ii,4»9 


1, 3 . . 


. ii, 180, 319 






1,6 . . 


. i, 13, 178; ii, 


Mahabhirata 






348, 409, 411, 

415 

. i,pp.lxxiii,lxxxv 


111,16763. . . 


i, 195 


3 . . . 


Maitrayaniya- 




3, 1 


• ", 403, 410 


samhiti 




J,3 . . 


. i, 180; ii, 148 


I, 1, 6 . . 


ii, 373 n. 


3,3 • • 


• ', 59 ; ", 39 






3,4 • • 


i, p. xxxvi, 183, 


Maitrlyanfya- 






191 


upanishad 




4, 1 . . 


• ", 144, 151, «75, 
356 


VI, 30 ... . 


i, pp. cvii, cviii, 
seq. 


4,3 

4, 3 • • 


• ", >75 
. ii,384 


Manu 




5, 1 . . 


• ", 3<>7 


1,5 ... • 


i, »33 


5,3 • • 


• «, 3i5, 393, 4'8 


31 . . . 


i, 304 


6,3 . . 


• »i» 379 


37 . . . 


ii, 369 


6, 3 • • 


. ii, 141 


11,87 • • • 


ii, 316 


6,5 • • 


. i, pp. cvii, cviii, 


X, 4 . . . 


i, 337 




333; ii, 378, 


136 . . 


1,337 




380, 383, 391, 


XII, 91 . . 


i, 394 seq. 




393 >»-, 400 


105, 106 . 


• i, 3«5 


6,6 . . 
7 . . . 
7 seqq. . 


• >i,4i9 

. ii, 61 seq. 

• ",391 


MiWaka- 
upanishad 




7,i • • 


. i, p. lxxxiv, 35, 


I, 1, 1 . . 


i, 138 




79, no, '84, 


1, 3 . . 


i, p. xxxv, 138, 




333, 344, 355; 




159,385; ii, 9, 




ii, 53, 303, 




76 




385, 330, 406, 


1,4 • • 


i, p. cxvi 




408, 409 


I, 55 6 • 


i, *35J H, *39 



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428 



vedAnta-sOtras. 



I,i,6 

», 7 
>, 9 



3,7 . . 
3, 9 seqq. 

3, II . . 

3, 13 . . 

s, 13 . . 
II, i, i 

1,3 . . 



', 3 





», 4 

1,4-9 

1,8 

I, IO 




a, 5 




3,6 
3,8 




3, IO 




3, II 


III 


I 




I, » 



i, 3 

1,8 
',9 

3,6 

a, 7 

3,8 

3 , 9 



Nirukta 
I, » • 



i, p. xliii, 388; 

ii, 171 
i,a8 5 
i, 48, 136, 137, 

158, 355? ", 

390 
i, 138 seq. 
i, pp. cvii, cviii 
ii, *95. 383 
i, '39 
», 137 
ii, 30 
i, p. cxix, a8, 

107 seq., 139, 

«43, 349? ii, 

77, 85, 155, 

335, 394 
", ai, »7,74-7«, 

85, 86, 94 
i, '4° 
i, 143, 143 n. 

", 74, 79 

i, 143, 143 a-, 

155 ; ii, 76 
i, p. xxxv, 154, 

'94 
ii, 53 
i, »9, 3', 98, 

157; ", 337, 

354, 35« 
i, p. xliii, 19a; 

", 4>7 
>, »*> '55, a83, 
311, 331; ii, 
10, 180, 339, 

394 
1, p. lxxii 

i, 34, "7, 119, 

I3i, 159; ii, 

65, 340 
i, 388; ii, 335, 

333 
ii, 171-173 
", 38,44 
i, 383 ; ii, 303 
ii, 376 
i, 157, a78j ii, 

»73 
", as, 39, 31, 

186; ii, 173, 

385 
ii, 186 



i, 16 



Nyiya-sfitra 

I, 1, a . 

1, 18 . 



1,30 
i,435 



PQrva-mtmamsa-sfitra, see 
Gaimini-sfltra 



1, p. xcti 



PaAtadajt 






I, 7 ... . 

na * * 


Panim 

I, 4,3<> • • • 
II, 1, 50 . . . 
VI, 4, 158 . . . 


Praina- 
upanishad 
I,i . . . . 


9 seqq. 

10 . 
", 3 • 

13 • 

"1,3 • 

6 . 






9 • 

10 . 

IV, 3 . 






a; 3 
6 . 
8 . 






9 • 

V,3 . 






4 • • 

5 • 

7 • 
VI,, . 






3 • 
3; 4 

4 • 






5 • 

8 . 






Rig-veda-sawihiti 


I, 98, 1 
104,1 
»64, 39 

11,13 . 

IV, 36, 1 se 

VIII, 53, 7 

IX, 46, 4 
X, 14, 1 

71,3 

88,3 
88,13 


■qq 





1,385 

i, 360 
i, 163 



i, 337 
i, p. cvii 
i, p. cviii, 138 
i, 103 ; ii, 89 
ii, 87 n. 
i, 60 

", 39 
ii, 365 

>i, 35a 

i, 168 

i, 163 

1,163 

ii, 79, 83 

", 49, 55 

i, 171 ; ii, 4«« 

ii, 113 

i, p. xxxv, 178 

i, «73 

", '54 

'.«• .. 

i, 384 ; u, 45, 89 

i, 363; ii, 74, 

78,85 

«, 376 

i,39 



», M4 
i, 388 
i, 83 seq. 

ii, a74 
ii, 37 n. 
i, 363 
i, 343 
ii,i33 
i, 311 
i, »47 
i, '44 



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INDEX OF QUOTATIONS. 



429 



X, 90 . . . 


• >, 95 seq. 


IV, 3 ... 


. i, in ; ii, 6a 


131, I . . 


• ', 14a 


5 • • • 


. i, p. xxxix, 353 


"9, a. • 


• ",85 


6 . . . 


• ii, a4<> 


149,6- • 


• '. 307 


10 . . . 


• i, a43 


190, j . . 


• ', «i5, 3*« 


10; 11 . 


• i, a55 


SSnkhya-karika 




19 . . . 
V,3 ... 


. ii, 18 
i, 393 


3 • • • 


• >> » 57, 3«4 «• 


8 . . . 


• i, 175 J ii, 44 


12,13. • 


. i, 364 n. 


9 . . . 


• ",38,44 


15 . . . 


• ', 3*4 n., 3*7 n. 


VI, 8 ... 


i, 5i, 347 






9 . . . 


. i, 61 ; ii, 30 


Siftkhya-sfitras 




11 . . . 


• i, 34, 74 J ii, 3a, 


I, 119 seqq. 


. i, 364 n. 




34a 


II, |i . . . 


. ii, 86 n. 


13 . . . 


• ', 3»9 






13 . . . 


• i, a98 


Shat/vimsa- 




15 • . • 


. i, 167, 331 


brahmana 




18 . . . 


• i, ai3, 840 


I, 1 ... 


• ', ai9 


19 • • . 


• i, 6 »> a8 4 , 349 ; 
ii, 394 


Satapatha- 




Taittirtya- 




brahmana 




iranyaka 




I, 3, 1, 26 . 


ii, 331 


III, 13, 7 . . 


. i, 63, 378, 329; 


VI, 1, 1, 1 . . 


",74 




ii, 63 


hi,*; 4 


«, 3<>3 


X,6 4 . . . 


ii, 330 


X, 1, 2, 2 . . 


ii, 303 






a, 6, 8 . 


ii, 387 


Taittirtya- 




3, 3, « • 


i.85 


brahmana 




5, a, 3 • 


ii, 367 


II, a, 4, a . . 


1,304 


5i a, a3 . 


ii, 367 


Ill, 1, 4, i 


i, 215 


5, 4. > • 


ii, 37a 


»a, 9, 7 • 


i, 91, »99 


5. 4. * 6 • 


>>. a 34 






6, 1, 11 . . 


i, 146, 148 


Taittirtya- 




6,3 . . 


i, p. lxvii 


samhiti 




6, 3, 1 • 


«, 35a 


1,5,3 • • 


", 415 


6 , 3, a • 


«, "a, 177; ii, 


6,3 . . 


", 415 




180 


6, 3, 3 . 


i, 358 


XI, 5, 3, 13 • 


i, 337 


6, 3, 3 • 


i, 91 


6, a, 6 . 


ii, 109 


6,8,1 . 


ii, 107 


XII, 4, 1, 1 . 


ii, 390 


II, 3, 10, a . . 


i, a94 


XIV, 6, 7, 30 . 


• ", 59 


3,6 . . . 


", a 59 






5, 5, a . . 


ii, 195 n. 


Svetibvatara- 




V, 1, 10, 3 . . 


ii, 367 


upanisbad 




3, a, 3 • • 


", 79 


I,i . . . 


>', a55 


3, a, 5 • • 


", 79 


11 . 




ii, 139 


3,ia,i . . 


", 354 


13 . 




", 154 


VII, 1, 1, 6 . . 


1,234 


11,8 . 




i, a97 


1,9 • • • 


ii, 340 n. 


10 . 




", 35i 


3, 1 • • • 


ii, 361 n. 


13 . 




i, 333 


5, 5, a 


", a74 


111,1 . 

8 . 




i, 9 8 

i, 98, 353, 366, 
a9«; ii, 47, 


Taittiriya- 
upanisbad 






400 


1,6 ... . 


i, p. cvii 


9 . . . . 


ii, 180 


11, 1 . . 


ii, 397 


19 . . 


• • 


i, 5', 355 


11,3 . . 


ii, 120 



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vedAnta-sOtras. 



ii, i 



i seqq. 
"-5 ■ 

4 • • 

5 • • 



7; 8; 9 

8 . 

9 • • 



III, I 



i, 12, 6o, 68, 72, 
76, 82, 120, 
167, 263, 264, 
266, 283, 328; 

*4, 34, 37. 74. 
*o7, 285, 335, 
401 
i, 264 

",64 
ii, 168 

i, p. xxxiti ; ii, 
50, 57, 202 

i, «5, 77. a«4» 
264 n., 283, 
»87, 303. 319; 
ii, 21, 25, 31, 
66, 168 

>, 67, 69, 7i, 82, 
263, 364 n., 
266, 287; ii, 

«>35,3t»»7i, 
191 

i,65 

i. 67. 75 ; i», 290 

', 39,745 «i, *57, 

395 
i, 13,16,19,199; 

ii, 396 



III, a-6 . . . 
6 . . . . 

10, 6 . . . 

TaWya-mahi- 
brlhmana 

IV, 9 . . . . 

XX, 12,5. . . 

XXI, 10, 11 . . 
XXV, 4 . . . 

Vaueshika-sQtras 

1, 1, 10 . . . 

IV, 1, 1 

i,4 

», 5 

2,2 
VII, ,, 9 

1, to 

','7 
1, 20 

Va^asaneyi- 

samhiti 
XXXII, 3 . 

Yoga-sCtra 
11,44 • • 



",7 

1, 19, 65, 68, 70, 

84 
i, 141 



ii, 261 n. 
i, 226 
ii, 240 
ii, 250 n. 



,396 
392 

39* 
39a seq. 

385 
384 
384 
384 

382 D. 



", 393 



223 



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INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS 



TO 



VOLUMES XXXIV (i) AND XXXVIII (ii). 



a»ija, part, Part i, pages lvii, lviii, Ixv, 

xcvii seq. 
akshara, the Imperishable, i, 169- 

171,143; ",239 seq. 

— syllable, i, 169. 
akhyativadin, i, 5 n. 
Agni = agrant, i, 150. 

— fire, i, 255. 

— fire-altar, ii, 260-368. 
agniiayana, the building of the fire- 
altar, ii, 261 n., 264. 

agnihotra, ii, 313. 

anga, subordinate member (of a sacri- 
ficial act), i, 199. 

angush/Aamitra, of the size of a 
thumb, i, pp. xxxvii, xxxviii, 
xliv. 

angush/tamltrati, the being of the 
size of a thumb, i, 196 n. 

aiid vastu, non-sentient matter, i, 
p. Ixv. 

agi, its meaning discussed, i, 252- 

*57- 

— unborn, i, 253. 

— she-goat, i, 253, 256 n. 

— = miya, i, 256 n. 
agfaa, non-soul, i, 428. 

ami, of very minute size, i, pp. liv, 

lvi, lvii, lix, 384 n. ; ii, 44. 
amitva, minuteness, i, 382. 

— smallness, subtlety, ii, 44. 
atigraha, objects of the senses, i, 

p. cxiseq., 239; ii, 369. 
atirltra, i, 351. 
ativadin, i, 163, 165 seqq. 
atisaya, reaching beyond itself, i, 334, 

341. 
adrish/a, the unseen principle, i, p. Ii, 

382, 406 ; ii, 70 seqq., 75> "5, 

137 n., 166. 
adrjshifartha, ii, 378 n. 



adresya, that which is not seen, i, 

p. xlii. 
advaita, non-duality, monism, i, pp. 

xxx, cxxv. 
adharma, demerit, i, 26, 429. 
adhika, additional to, i, p. xcviii. 
adhikara, statement of claim, ii, 

no. 
adhidaivata, relating to the gods, ii, 

91. 
adhipatipratyaya, the defining cause 

(Bauddha), i, 409 n. 
adhish/££na, superintendence, guid- 
ance, i, 7 n. 
adhyitma, relating to the Self, ii, 91. 
adhytropita, fictitiously ascribed, i, 

130. 
adhyasa, superimposition, i, 3 n., 4 n. ; 

ii, 197, 198. 
anartha, object of aversion, i, 378. 
anarthin, the non-desiring person, 

i, 378. 
anlrabdhakarya, works which have 

not yet begun to produce their 

effects, i, p. lxxviii. 
anlrrama, not belonging to any one 

of the four stages of life, i, 

p. Ixxvi. 
anua, impotence, i, 122. 
anubhava, perception, i, 300 n. 
anuya^a, ii, 287 n. 
anuvakya, ii, 259, 259 n. 
anuvada, a statement referring to 

something already known, i, 

22t; ii, 55, 66, 138, 216, 221, 

308, 309, 322, 322 n. 
amuaya, remainder of works, i, p. lix ; 

ii, 113, 116, 119. 
anush/iana, performance, ii, 121. 
antariksha, ether, ii, 6. 
antaryamana, ruling within, i, 131. 



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432 



vedAnta-sOtras. 



antaryamin, the ruler within, i, pp. 

xxviii, xxxv, xlii, lxii seqq., 

xcviii, c, cxiii, 131. 
antyeshri, funeral ceremony, ii, 109 n. 
anna, food, earth, ii, 23 seq. 
anyathakhyativtdin, i, 4 n., 5 n. 
aparam brahma, lower Brahman, i, 

pp. xxx, xxxiii n. 
apara vidya, lower knowledge, i, 

pp. lxxx, lxxxi, lxxxiv, cix, cxvi ; 

ii, 19. 
aparokshatva, immediate presenta- 
tion, i, 6 n. 
apavada, sublation, ii, 197. 
apahatapapmatva, i, p. lxxxiv. 
apahatapapman, free from all evil, 

i, p. lxii. 
apana, the descending vital air, i, 

34a ; ii, 86, 89. 
apflrva, supersensuous principle, i, 

p. lxv; ii, 109, no n., 181, 182, 

183, 347 n. 
apratisamkhyavirodha, cessation not 

dependent on a sublative act of 

the mind, i, 412. 
abhavamitra, of a merely negative 

character, i, 410. 
abhigamana, approach to the temple, 

>» 440. 
abhi^-valana, kindling, i, 403. 
abhidhayaka, i, 204 n. 
abhivimana, i, 143, 153. 
abhyudaya, exaltation, i, p. lxxvi ; ii, 

«33- 

amanava, not a man, ii, 388, 388 n. 

ayana, ii, 250, 250 n., 251, 314. 

ayutasiddha, incapable of separate 
existence, i, 396, 397. 

ayutasiddhatva, i, 396. 

ayutasiddhi, i, 395. 

artha, an object of desire, i, 377 n. 

arthadhihetu, i, 204 n. 

arthavattva, i, p. lxxi. 

arthavada, glorifying passage, i, p. 
lxxv, 218, 220 seqq.; ii, 212 n., 
213 n, 227, 235, 246, 246 n., 
*5»» *54» *55» »6i, 264, 286, 
290, 299 n., 310, 311, 312. 

alpajruti, i, p. xliv. 

ava£4£edav£da, the doctrine that the 
soul is the highest Self in so far 
as limited by its adjuncts, i, 
pp. lviii, xcviii. 

avabhasa, consciousness, i, 418 n. 

avasthiti, permanent abiding, i, p. c. 

avantaraprakriti, i, 256 n. 



avidya, Nescience, i, pp. Ixxix, xcvii, 
xcviii, 6, 357 n., 393 n. ; ii, 48, 
83 n., 102. 

— ignorance as to Brahman, i, p. 

cxv. 
avid van, destitute of knowledge of 

Brahman, i, pp. Ixxix, lxxxii. 
avibhaga, non-separation, i, p. lxxxiv. 
avimukta, the non-released soul, i, 

«53- 
avimoksha, i, 316. 
avivakya, ii, 261. 
aveshri, an offering mentioned under 

the heading of the ra^asfiya- 

sacrifice, ii, 266. 
avyakta, unevolved (matter), i,.p. 

xxviii. 

— the Undeveloped, i, p. xxxix, 

237-242, 238 n., 245, 252. 
avyakr/ta, the Undeveloped, i, p. 

cxix. 
ajanlya, hunger, i, 59. 
asvakarna, horse-ear, a certain plant, 

i, 261 n. 
ajvamedha, horse sacrifice, ii, 305 n. 
asamyagdarjin, a person who has not 

risen to perfect knowledge, i, 

p. cxiii. 
asat, that which is not, non-existent, 

*i, 333 n. See also General 

Index, 
asatkaryavadin, i, 334, 339. 
astikaya, category, i, 429. 
ahankartW, principle of egoity, i, 34. 
ahahkara, the principle of egoity, i, 

p. xxiii, 364 n., 376 n., 440, 441 ; 

ii, 81. 
aham, secret name of Brahman, ii, 

216 seq., 246. 
ahampratyaya, self-consciousness, ii, 

ahar, secret name of Brahman, ii, 
216 seq., 246. 

akankshl, a desire of complementa- 
tion, ii, 279 n. 
akiba, ether, or space, i, 81-84, *75> 

A *3*.a43, 4«»4»9; »»» 3^6- 
akrfti, iliot, i, 202 n. 
aiara, conduct, ii, 119. 

— religious duty, ii, 121. 
atmakhyltivadin, i, 4 n. 

at man inandamaya, the Self consist- 
ing of bliss, i, p. lxix seq. 

— purushavidha, the Self in the 

shape of a person, i, p. cv seq. 



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INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS. 



433 



Itman prlnamaya, i, p. lxix seq. 

— vabvanara, i, p. xxxv. 
atmanusmarana, consciousness of 

personal identity, ii, 148. 
Sditya, sun, ii, 344. 
idravana, the rushing on, i, 335. 
Inanda, bliss, i, 74. 
anandamaya, consisting of bliss, i, 

pp. xxxiii, xlii, lxix seq., 66-71. 

— its true meaning, i, 71-76. 

— koja, involucrum or delight, ii, 303. 
abhasa, reflection, i, pp. lviii, xcviii. 

— = hetvabhasa, a fallacious argu- 

ment, i, pp. lviii seq., xcviii. 
Ayurveda, medicine, ii, 15a. 
Srabdhakarya, works which have 

begun to produce their effects, 

i, p. lxxviii. 
irkkb, Rigvedins, ii, 328. 
Ilambanapratyaya, the substantial 

cause, i, 409 n. 
ilayavig-Alna, internal cognition, i, 

436 seq., 426 n. 
aiayavi?3ana-pravaha, the train of 

self-cognitions, i, 403. 
ivaranibhiva, absence of any cover- 
ing, i, 41a n. 
avirbhiva, i, p. xxxvi. 
Svirbhfitasvarfipa, i, 185 n. 
Ibrama, stage of life, ii, 300-303, 

306 seq., 309, 315 seq., 317, 

324 seq. 
ajramakarmam, duties of the four 

stages of life, i, p. lxxv. 
Ssrava, the issuing outward, i, 428, 

428 n. 

igyi, oblation, i, 440. 

itara, the other one, i.e. the indi- 
vidual soul, i, p. xcviii 

iti, so, ii, 167, 169, 344. 

indriya, sense-organ, ii, 94. 

iva, i, p. exx seq. 

ishfi, sacrificial oblation, ii, 108-1 10, 
«59> 353 n. 

tra, Lord, i, laa. 

If vara, the Lords, i, 313. 

— divine being, i, 307. 

utkrlnti, departure (of the soul 
from the body), i, p. lxxxi. 

udanya, thirst, i, 59. 

udlna, the ascending function of 
the chief vital air, ii, 86, 89 seq. 

udgttha. See General Index. 

[38] I 



udgttha-vidyi. See General Index, 
udbhid, name of a sacrifice, i, 361, 

261 n. 
upakurvlna, a Brahmaiarin for a 

certain time only, not for life, 

ii, 318 seq. 
upanishad, secret name, ii, a 16. 
upanyasa, reference to something 

known, ii, 409 n. 
uparati, discontinuance of religious 

ceremonies, i, 1 a n. 
upalabdhi, perception, ii, 57. 
upalabdhr/, the perceiving person, 

'» 4*3- 

— perceiving principle, ii, 57. 
upasad, ii, 339 seq. 
upasthana, ii, 353. 

upidina, the material cause of the 
world, i, pp. xxv, xciii, xciv. 

— activity, i, 405 n. 

— procuring of things to be offered, 

i, 440- 

upadhi, limiting adjunct, i, pp. xxvi, 
lvii, lxii, lxiv, xcv, exxi ; ii, 153. 

up&sanl and upasana, devout medi- 
tation, i, pp. lxxviii, cxiv, 3a; 
ii, 303 n., 353 n. 

ubhayalihjjatva, i, pp. Ixiii, lxiv. 

urdhvaretas, ascetic, i, p. lxxv seq. 

ekatva, unity, ii, 197. 
evam, so, ii, 167. 

omkara, the syllable Om, i, p. Ixviii ; 
ii, 194, 196-199. 883. 

auvarya, lordly power, i, p. lxxxiv, 
130. 

audistnya, non-activity, ii, 69 n. 

ka, pleasure, i, 136 seq. 
kapila, i, 393 n. 

karmakaWa. See General Index. 
karman, work, action, i, p. lxxi, 370, 
357 n., 390 n. ; ii, 83 n., 103, 

103, 105, 131. 

— motion, i, 387. 
karmabheda, ii, 166 n. 
karmanga, ii, 120 n. 
karma/aya, aggregate of works, ii, 

113. 
kama, desire, ii, 83 n. 

— desire, lovely thing, ii, 134. 

— wish, for satyakama, ii, 347. 

f 



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434 



vedanta-sOtras. 



kara»avastha, causal condition, i, 

p. xxix. 
kariresh/i, a sacrifice offered to bring 

about rain, ii, 118, 118 n. 
karyam brabma, effected Brahman, 

i, p. lxxxii. 
karyivastha, condition of an effect, 

i, p. xxix. 
kSrshapana, ii, 178. 
kuj3, small wooden rod, ii, 225, 227 

seq., 227 n. 
kfi/astha, absolutely changeless, i, 

3»7- 

kfi/asthanitya, eternal without un- 
dergoing any changes, i, 38. 

kaivalya = sampatti, i, p. lxxxv. 

kratu, determination, i, 107. 

kratrartha, subordinate to action, 
i, p. Ixxv, 291 n. 

kshanikatva, momentariness, i, 403 n. 

kshetra^tfa, individual soul, i, 122; 
ii, 83. 

kha, ether, i, ia6 seq. 
khadira, ii, 313. 

gana, troop, i, p. lxxxiii. 

guna, the three constituent elements 

of the pradhana, i, 46, 48 seq., 

364 n. 

— the three qualities (Sankhya), i, 

»54, 353- 

— quality, i, 336 n., 390. 

— secondary matter, ii, 1 87. 
gunavada, a statement of a quality, 

i, 221 ; ii, 112, 261, 299, 199 n. 
gunavidhi, enjoining some secondary 

matter, i, 108 n. ; ii, 279. 
godohana, a certain sacrificial vessel, 

», 353, 253 n., 255 seq.,284, 331, 

347, 347 n. 
gaunyasambhavat, ii, 77. 
graha, seizers, i. e. senses and organs, 

i, p. cxi seq., 239; ii, 79, 83> 

369- 

ghana = sanghata, i, 173. 

— = mfirtta, shape, i, 173 n. 

jiamasa, a sacrificial vessel, ii, 253 n., 

347 n. 
Parana, conduct, ii, 114, 119 seq. 

— ' remainder of works,' ii, 120 seq. 

— 'good and evil works,' ii, 121. 
Jaritra, conduct, ii, 119. 

tit, intelligence, i, 3 n. 



£itta, mind, thought, i, 402 ; ii, 48, 81. 
Jaitanya, pure intelligence, i, pp. 
xxiv, liv, lxxxiv. 

— consciousness, ii, 269. 
£aitta, mental, i, 402. 

^agadvyapara, world-business, i, p. 

xxxix. 
gain, i, 261 n. 
^ara, decay, i, 405 n. 
giti, species, i, 405 n. 
jjiva, individual soul, i, p. xxxii and 

often. 

— intelligent principle, i, 53. 
£ivaghana, of the shape of the indi- 
vidual soul, i, 173. 

g\ vapura, city of the individual soul, 

i, 178. 
£ivatman, the living Self, i, p. cxxii, 

62 n., 233; ii, 96, 140. 

— the object of self-consciousness, 

», 37. 
gahu, sacrificial ladle, ii, 253, 253 n., 

»54, »56, 287 n. 
gga, intelligent, intelligence, i, pp. 

liv, xcvii. 

— individual soul, i, 122. 

gfi&tri, knowing agent, i, pp. lv, Ivii. 
g tfana, pure intelligence or thought, 
i, pp. xxv, Ixv. 

— knowledge, i, pp. lv, cxiv. 
^■yotish/oma. See jyotis. 

#yotis, light, also =^yotish/oma, a 
certain sacrificial performance, 
i, pp. xxxviii, xliv, 54 seq., 57, 
87, 88-93; ji, 185, 185 n. 

tajyalin, i, 108; ii, 21. 

tat tvam asi, that art thou, i, p. 

lxxxiv. 
tattva, category, i, 428. 
tadatmya, identity, i, 436. 
titiksha, patience in suffering, i, 

t2 n. 
tr«shna, desire, i, 405 n. 
te,gas, elementary fire, heat, i, 255 ; 

ii, 368. 
te,jomatrai>, parts of light, ii, 102. 
tyat, that, ii, 25, 167. 
trasarenu, a combination of three 

atoms, lit. a speck of dust, ii, 

41 n., 392 n. 
tritva, the being three, i, 384 n. 

dakshiniyana, southern progress of 
the sun, i, p. lxxxii. 



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INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS. 



435 



Datta for Devadatta, ii, 248. 

dama, self-restraint, i, 12 n. 

daivapQrnamasa, the full and new 
moon sacrifice, ii, 255, 275, 
287 n., 309, 309 n., 313, 324. 

daharavidyi. See General Index. 

du, place, ii, 1 4. 

duAkha, pain, i, 405 n. 

durmanas, mental affliction, i, 405 n. 

devayana, path of the gods, i, p. cvii. 

dehin, the embodied Self, the indi- 
vidual soul, i, 33. 

dravya, substance, ii, 15 n. 

dvitva, the being two, i, 384 n. 

dharma, religious duty, i, 26, 299, 
300. 

— merit, i, 429. 

— qualifying particulars, ii, 186. 
dhfi, to shake, ii, 228 seq. 
dhvani, tone, i, 208. 

naVi, vein. See General Index, 
nimarupavyakarana, evolution of 

names and forms, i, p. lix. 
Nisi, i, 153. 

nitya, permanent, i, p. lxxviii. 
nityata, permanency, ii, 312 n. 
nityanuvada, ii, 216. 
nididhyasa, mental concentration, 

i, 297 n. 
nimitta, operative cause, i, p. xl, 

33m. 
niyogabheda, ii, 166 n. 
nirguna, non-qualified, i, pp. xxxiii, 

cxvi, cxxiv. 
nirgwiam brahma, i, pp. xxx, lxxi, 

lxxii. 
nir^ara, destruction, i, 428, 428 n. 
nirvueshatva, absence of distinctive 

attributes, i, p. lxi. 
neti neti, ' not so, not so,' i, pp. lxiii, 

lxiv. 
naimittika, i, 331 n. 
naish/£ika, a Brahm&tarin for life, 

ii, 318 seq. 

pa.ffi2.g3na/}, five-people, i, p. xl, 257- 

262, 258 n. 
pa&f-apfili, one bundle made of five 

bundles, i, 259. 
paft&gnividya, knowledge of the 

five fires, i, pp. lxxxiii, cviii ; ii, 

187. 
pad, to go, ii, 393. 
para, higher, highest, i, 173. 

F 



paramarthadrish/i, intuition, ii, 37 n. 
param brahma, higher Brahman, i, 

pp. xxx, xxxiii n. 
parigrupatva, externality, i, 1 30. 
para vidyl, highest knowledge, i, 

pp. lxxxiii, cix, ex, cxvi. 
parinama, change, modification, i, 

pp. xxix, xl, xcv, cxviii, 393 n. 
parinamavida, i, p. xcv. 
parinaminitya, eternal, although 

changing, i, 28. 
parimaa^/ala, spherical, i, 382 n. 
parivedana, lament, i, 405 n. 
parnamayitva, the quality of being 

made of parna-wood, ii, 253 n. 
paWitya, learning, i, p. lxxvi ; ii, 

322, 323. 
piramirthika, real, i, p. Ixxiii ; ii, 

JJ3- 

pariplava, recitation of certain stories 
at stated intervals during the 
year occupied by the at vamedha 
sacrifice, ii, 305 seq., 305 n. 

parivra^ya, the state of the wander- 
ing mendicant, ii, 302. 

pudgala, body, i, 429. 

— atom (Gaina), i, 431. 
purisaya, dwelling in the city, i, 172, 

178. 
puritat, pericardium, ii, 144. 
purusha, the Person, i, pp. cxix, 

exxiii seq., 298 ; ii, 205. 

— purisaya, the person dwelling in 

the castle (of the body), i, 172, 
178. 

— soul, i, 36 ; ii, 167, 169. 

— individual soul (in the Sihkhya 

sense), i, pp. xl, xlvi, 45, 238 n., 

370. 
purushaya^tfa, man-sacrifice, ii, 220. 
purushartha, beneficial to man (soul), 

i, 291 n.; ii, 120 n. 
puro^aja, cake, ii, 240, 259. 
pfirva-paksha, the prima facie 

view, i, 22, 316 and often. 
pWthagbhfita, separate, i, p. lxxxiv. 
prakarana, subject-matter, i, 68 n., 

166, 256 n. ; ii, 253 n., 254, 260- 

264. 
prakara, mode, i, pp. xxviii, liii, lxiv. 
praka/a, luminousness, i, p. lxv. 
prakajarGpata, i, p. lxiii. 
prakr/ti, i, p. lxxxiii, 329. 

— «= pradhana of the Sankhyas, i, 

p. xciii, 16 n., 238 n., 253. 
prakr/taitivattva, i, pp. lxiv, xcvi. 

f2 



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436 



vedAnta-sAtras. 



pralaya, accumulation, i, 384 n. 
prag-tfa, intelligence, i, ioo, 103, 

i°5- 
pra,j£atman, the intelligent Self, i, 

97- 
pranava, the syllable Om, ii, 282, 

283 n. 
pratibimbavada, the doctrine that 

the soul is a reflection of the 

Self in the buddhi, i, pp. lviii, 

xcvii seq. 
pratisawikhyavirodha, cessation de- 
pendent on a sublative act of 

the mind, i, 412. 
pratika, symbol, i, pp. lxxvii, lxxxii, 

lxxxiii, 147 n. 
pratikopasana, meditation in which 

Brahman is viewed under a 

symbol, i, p. lxxvii. 
pratyaksha, intuition, i, 266. 
pratyagitman, the interior Self, i, 

5n., 32; ii, 335. 
pratvaAt, internal, i, 133. 
prathamag-atva, i, p. lxxxiii. 
pradeja, part, i, 388. 
pradhana, principal element, i, pp. 

lxiii, xcviii ; ii, 278. 

— as a Sankhya term. See General 

Index, 
prapa&iavuishfatd, the quality of 

being differentiated by the 

world, i, p. lxv. 
prabalakarmlntara, another very 

strong work, i, p. lxxvi. 
pramana, means of proof, i, p. xli. 
pramatr*', knowing subject, i, 418 n. 
prayig-a, five offerings made to the 

fuel, &c, ii, 255, 274, 274 "•» 

»75, ?87, 313, 331. 
praycgana, final end, i, 38. 
pralaya. See General Index, 
pravrittivi^ SSna, quasi-external cog- 
nition, i, 426 n., 427. 
pravra^in, mendicant, i, p. lxxv. 
prastava, i, 84, 86, 87 ; ii, 254. 
pratarya, abundance, i, 77. 
pragUa, intelligent, i, 60, 234. 

— (atman), the highest Self, i, 192 

seqq., 195 5 "'» 45, »34, 138, 
141, 144. 
prana, vital air, a generic name de- 
noting the sense-organs, and 
the manas, i, p. lix, 261, 269 
seqq.; ii, 65 n., 94, 96. See 
also Prinas in the General 
Index. 



prana, (chief) vital air, breath, i, 
p. lxxix, 84-87, 97-106, 162 
seqq., 172, 229-231. See also 
General Index. 

— the forward-function of the chief 

vital air, i, 342 ; ii, 86, 89. 

— air, i, 229. 

prinabhrit, individual soul, i, 158. 
pranamaya (atman), ii, p. lxix seq. 
prana-vidyi, i, p. lxviii ; ii, 300 seq., 

212. 
pribi&rartratva, i, p. lxvii. 
pranasamvida, the colloquy of the 

vital airs, i, p. Ixx. 
prlde/amatra, measured by a span, 

i, 151. 
priyasirastva, i, p. lxix. 

bandha, bondage, i, 428. 

bahutva, plurality, i, 384 n. 

balya, childlike state, i, p. lxxvi ; ii, 
32a, 323, 325 seq. 

bahy&rthavadin, i, p. Ii. 

buddhi, intelligence, i, p.lv seqq., 239 
seq.; ii, 27, 42-48, 50,51. 5*5, 
57, *5, 65 n., 81, 178, 336, 402. 

— mind, i, 104, 118 seqq., 418. 

— the apprehending agent, i, 206, 

209, 210. 

— ' the great one ' (technical SJn- 

khya term), i, 238 n. 

— internal organ, i, 331. 

— the generic name for buddhi, 

ahankara, and manas, i, 376 n. 

bodha, thought, intelligence, ii, 160. 

brahma bhrintam, i, p. exxii. 

brahma mayopadhikam, i, p. exxii. 

brahmaiarya, ii, 307. 

brahmapura, city of Brahman, i, 178. 

brahmaloka, world of Brahman, i, 
180. 

brahmavidya, knowledge of Brah- 
man, i, pp. xxxvii, Ixx, 216 seq. 

brahmasamstha, grounded on Brah- 
man, ii, 296, 300, 301. 

brahmasamsthata, ii, 299 n. 

bhakti, figurative identification, ii, 7. 
bhagavat, holy, i, 440. 
Bhainani, name of the Lord, i, 1 25. 
Bhfima for Satyabhama, ii, 248. 
bhSrfipatva, i, p. lxvii. 
bhava, being, individual soul, ii, 30 n. 
bh3vana, ii, 69 n. 

bhavavik JraA, six forms of existence, 
i, 16 n. 



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INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS. 



437 



bbflta, element, i, 403. 

— beings, moving and non-moving 

things, ii, 63. 

bhGtasukshma, subtle material ele- 
ments, i, p. lix. 

bhflman. See General Index. 

bheda, individual existences, i,p.xxv. 

bhedabhedavada, i, 177 n. 

bhoga, fruition, i, p. lxxviii. 

bhautika, elementary, i, 402. 

madhu-vidya, 'knowledge of the 
(sun as) honey,' i, 216 seq. ; ii, 

233- 

manana, thinking, ii, 323. 

manas, internal organ, mind, i, pp. 
xxiii, xxvi, li, lxxix, cxxi, 175, 
239, 376 n., 398 n., 440 ; ii, 14, 
•6, 27, 33, 48, 65 n., 69, 81, 82, 
84, 89, 90, 260, 336, 411, 413 
seq., 415. 

mano-buddhi, mind, i, 113, 277. 

manomaya, consisting of mind, i, 
in. 

manomayatva, i, p. Ixvii. 

-maya, the affix, 'abounding in,' 
1,67. 

maranam, death, i, 405 n. 

mahat, great, i, 252. 

— the great principle (of the San- 

khyas), i, 252, 364 n., 370. 

— big, i, 384 n. 

mahattva, bigness, i, 383, 384 n. 
mahapitrrya^Xa, ii, 299. 
mahapralaya, general annihilation of 

the world, i, 212 seqq.; ii, 238. 
matra, the elements and the sense 

organs, i, 281. 
mana, knowledge, i, 418 n. 
inanava, human being, ii, 388 n. 
manasa, mental, ii, 260, 266 seq. 
may!, illusion, i, pp. Ix, xcvi seq., 

243, 256 n., 329, 371; ii, 133. 

134- 

— wonderful nature (Ramlnuja), i, 

p. Ixi. 

— creative power, i, p. cxvii n. 
mayavada, theory of illusion, i, p. 

xcviii. 

mayavldin, i, p. cxx. 

mukti, final release, i, pp. Ixxv, 
lxxvii, lxxxix. 

mukhya prina, the chief vital air, i, 
p. lix; ii, 791 «4» 93 seq., 95. 

muni, derived from manana, ' think- 
ing,' ii, 323. 



muni. See General Index, 
muhflrta, moment, ii, 136. 
mfirta rflpa, i, p. cxx. 
mflrti, solid size, i, 394. 
moksha, final release, i, 27, 28, 283, 

428 ; ii, 58. 
mauna, muni-ship, i, p. lxxvi; ii, 

322 n., 323. 

ya^-amana, sacrificer, i, p. lxxvi. 
ya^ya, ii, 259, 259 n. 
yavatsampatam, ii, 112, 113. 
yflpa, a wooden post, i, 261, 261 n. 
yoga, devout meditation, i, 440. 
yoni, source, i, 136, 288. 

— place, i, 288. 

— womb, ii, 132. 

yaugika, etymological (meaning), 
i, 261 n. 

rasas = avidya, i, 123 n. 

rakshasa = rakshas, i, 150. 

ruVAi, conventional meaning,i,256 n., 

261 n. 
rQpa, form, ii, 185. 
rtpaskandha, the group of sensation, 

i, 402, 402 n. 
rfipopanyasat, i, 142 n. 

lakshanS, indication, i, 258 n., 261 n. ; 
ii, 127. 

— implication, ii, 348. 
laya, merging, i, p. lxxix. 

linga, indicatory or inferential mark, 
i, p. lxv, 68 n., 196 n., 225 n. ; ii, 
224, 260, 361, 263, 264. 

lingatman, the subtle Self, ii, 169. 

lokayatika, materialist, ii, 269. 

Varana, 'that which wards off,' i, 

153- 
vasitva, i, p. lxxiii. 
vakya, syntactical unity, i, 196 n. ; 

ii, 221, 224, 263, 287, 287 n. 
vakyabheda, split of the sentence, 

i, 108 n., 177 n. ; ii, 279 n. 
viUaka, i, 204 n. 
vamanl, leader of blessings, i, 125; 

ii, 400. 
vayasa = vayas, i, 150. 
visana, mental impression, i, 420 n. ; 

ii, 56, 141. 
vikalpa, optional procedure, ii, 228. 
vikara, modification, i, p. cxviii. 
vikjua, expansion, i, pp. xxix, liii. 
vikWti, ii, 309, 309 n. 



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438 



vedanta-sCtras. 



vjgara, free from old age, i, p. lxii. 
vi^ana, individual soul, i, p. Ivi. 

— knowledge (Bauddha), i, 404 n. 

— cognition, idea, i, 418. 

— knowledge, internal organ, ii, 48, 

83. 
vy-Mnakoja, i, 66. 
vi^ri&namaya, be who consists of 

knowledge, i, p. xxxviii, 273; ii, 

vi^flanavadin, an idealist, i, p. Ii, 401, 
418 n. 

vi£#anaskandha, the group of know- 
ledge, i, 402, 402 n., 426 n. 

vij-fianatman, cognitional Self, soul, 
i, 70, 1*0, 124, 174, 329. 

vidya, knowledge, cognition, medi- 
tation, i, pp. lxvii-lxxvi, 6, 
152; ii, 101, 187-284, 355, 
378. 

vidyamahatmya, i, p. lxxi. 

vidyavidhi, ii, 379. 

vidvan, he who knows, i, pp. lxxvii- 
lxxxiv. 

vidhi, the establishing of something 
not yet known, ii, 408 seq. n. 

vidhriti, a limitary support, i, 181. 

vimrityu, frge from death, i, p. 
lxii. 

vivakshita, desired to be expressed, 
i, 1 to n. 

vivarta, illusory manifestation of 
Brahman, i, pp. xcv, xcviii. 

vivartavada, i, p. xcv. 

vuish/a advaita, qualified non- 
duality, i, p. xxx. 

viseshana, specification, ii, 197. 

vijvanara, i, 150. 

vr/'tti, function, ii, 84. 

vedana, feeling, i, 405 n. 

vedanaskandha, the group of feeling, 
i, 402, 402 n. 

vedi, a levelled spot, i, 261 ; ii, 
252. 

vairagya, absence of all desire, ii, 

103. 

vailakshanya, difference of charac- 
ter, i, 308 n. 

vyakta, developed, manifested, i, 
242, 245. 

vyapadeja, expression of something 
known without reference to a 
vidhi, ii, 408 seq. n. 

vyavahara, the phenomenal world, 
i, p. xxvi, 326 n. 

vyavahlrapekshaya, with a view to 



the world of appearances, i, 

pp. lxxxiv, xc. 
vyikriyata, it became developed, i, 

268. 
vyana, the cause of works of strength, 

ii, 86, 89 seq. 
vyapin, all-pervading, i, p. liv, 

in n. 
vyuha, the four forms of Vasudcva, 

i, p. xxiii, 440. 
vyoman, ether, i, 84. 

jakti, potentiality, i, 214. 

— power, i, 329. 

jabda, word, i, p. xxxvii, 196 n., 201. 

jabdantaram, difference of terms, ii, 

166 n. 
jama, tranquillity, i, 12 n. 
jarvari, ' night '— earth, ii, 34. 
jirira, embodied, i, p. xcviii, 111. 
jish/a, honourable man, ii, 330. 
jila, conduct, ii, 119, 119 n. 
mi, grief, i, 225. 
jfinyavida, hypothesis of a general 

void, ii, 14. 
jflnyavadin, a nihilist, i, 401. 
joka, grief, i, 405 n. 
jraddha, faith, also explained as 

water, ii, 12 n., 103, 106-108, 

109 n., no n. 
jruti, direct enunciation, i, 196 n. ; 

ii, 262. 

sharfayatana, the abode of the six 

(senses), i, 405 n. 
shod&jin, i, 351. 

samyagdamna, complete intuition, 
perfect knowledge, i, p. txxvii, 
172 n. ; ii, 101. 

samyag-v^iana, perfect knowledge, 
ii, 12. 

Samyadvama, a name of the Lord, 
i, 125, 128, 130. 

samyoga, conjunction, i, pp. lxxix, 
lxxxi, 335 seq., 336 n., 385, 390, 
396 seq., 436; ii, 128 n. 

samradhana, worship, i, p. lxv. 

samvara, restraint, i, 428, 428 n. 

saiwvargavidyS, i, 224-226. 

samvid svayamprabha, the self-lumi- 
nous principle of thought, i, 
p. xcii. 

sawijlesha, intimate connexion, i, 

399. 
samsara. See General Index. 



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INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS. 



439 



samsarin, the transmigrating soul, i, 

51, 66. 
samskara, ceremonial purification, i, 

33; ii,i2on.,z86, 386 n., 287 n., 

347 n. 

— impression, affection (Bauddha), 

i, 404 n. 

samskaraskandha, the group of im- 
pressions, i, 403, 402 n. 

samskr/ta, produced, i, 410. 

sawxsthanavuesha, special arrange- 
ment, i, p. lxv. 

saguna, qualified, i, pp. xxxiii, lxxxii, 
ci, cxvi, 330. 

sagunam brahma, the qualified 
(lower) Brahman, i, pp. xxx, 
lxvii, Ixxi, lxxii. 

saguna-vidya, qualified knowledge, i, 
pp. lxxii, lxxvi. 

sankalpa, determination, wish, i, 
p. lxxxv ; ii, 1 39. 

sankota, contraction or non-mani- 
festation (of intelligence), i, 
pp. xxix, liii seq. 

sanghata = ghana, i, 173. 

sajt-£id-ananda, i, p. xcii. 

samg-tfaskandha, the group of verbal 
knowledge, i, 402, 402 n. 

sat. See General Index. 

satta, the quality of being, i, 63 n., 
306. 

— essentiality, ii, 16 n. 
sattva, goodness, i, 49 n. 

— internal organ, i, 122 seq., 161. 

— being, that which is, i, 333. 
sattva-guna, the quality of goodness, 

«. 379- 
satyakama, having true wishes, I, 

pp. lxiii, Ixxiii ; ii, 247, 400. 
satyakamatva, i, p. Ixxiii. 
satyabhedavada, i, 278 n. 
satyaloka, the world of the True, i, 

181. 
satyasamkalpa, of truthful concep- 
tion, i, pp. lxiii, lxxxv. 
satyasamkalpatva, truthfulness of 

conception, i, pp. lxvii, lxxxiv. 
samnyisa, ii, 222. 
samnyisin, an ascetic, a man in the 

fourth stage of life, ii, 323-324, 

325. 3*6. 
sanmatra, 'only that which is,' i, 

p. lxiv. 
saptabhangfnaya, i, 429. 
samanantarapratyaya,the immediate 

cause (Bauddha), i, 409 n. 



samavaya, inherence, i, 335 seq., 
335 n., 336 n, 341, 389 seq., 
396 seq. 

samadhana, concentration of the 
mind, i, 1 2 n. 

samadhi, meditation, ii, 52. 

samana, the function of the chief 
vital air which conveys food 
equally through all the limbs of 
the body, ii, 86, 89 seq. 

sampatti, combination, i, p. lxxix; 
ii, 209. 

— = maranam, dying, i, p. lxxxv. 

— = kaivalya, i, p. lxxxv. 
sampata, aggregate of works, ii, 

113. 
samprasada, serene being, i, p. 
xxxvi. 

— bliss, i, 164. 

sarvagata, omnipresent, i, p. liv. 
sarvavasitva, i, p. lxvii. 
sarvastitvavadin, realist, i, p. Ii, 401. 
savuesha, distinguished by qualities, 

. i, 74. 76, 78 n. 
savLreshatva, presence of distinctive 

attributes, i, p. lxi. 
sahakaripratyaya, the auxiliarycause 

(Bauddha), i. 409 n. 
sikshatkara, intuition, i, p. lxv, r8n., 

300. 
sikshin, a witnessing principle, i, 49, 

. 150. 
samanadhikaranya, co-ordination, ii, 

196 n. 
siddhanta, the final conclusion, i, 

pp. liv, lvi, 316; ii, 392. 
sushupti, deep sleep, i, p. lxxxv. 
sushumna, the vein passing through 

the crown of the head, i, pp. 

lxxxii, cvii, cix, ex. 
sfikshmasarira, the subtle body, i, 

p. xxxix. 
sfltratman, the lower Brahman, i, 

p. Ixix, 172 n. 
srish/ikrama, the order of creation, 

ii, 23. 
setu, bridge, i, 156. 

— bank, ii, 175. 
skandha, group, i, 402 seq. 
stuti, glorification, i, p. lxxv. 
spam, touch, i, 405 n. 

spho/a, manifestor, i, p. xxxvii, 204 

seqq., 204 n., 209, 210. 
syadvada, sceptical doctrine, i, 431. 
svapiti, to sleep, i, 59. 
svabhava, nature, i, 357 n. 



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44° vedAnta-sOtras. 



svayamprakaja, self-luminous, i, 5 n. svidhylya, recitation, i, 440. 

svara, accent, i, p. lxxiv. svipyaya — sushupti, deep sleep, i, 

svarflpa, true nature, i, 186. p. lxxxv. 

svarflpanyathSbhava, change of es- 
sential nature, i, p. liv. hiranyagarbha. See General Index. 

svarga, heaven, ii, 405. hridaya, heart, i, 59. 

svargaloka, heavenly world, i, pp. hetvibhasa, fallacious argument, i, 

cviii, ex. p. xcviii. 



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GENERAL INDEX 



TO 



VOLUMES XXXIV (i) AND XXXVIII (ii). 



Abhipratarin. See ATaitraratha. 
Accents, uditta, anudatta, svarita, 

depend on the tone, Part i, page 

308. 
Action, five classes of, and five 

organs of, ii, 8 1 . 
Actions (karman) : birth, a. and 

death, i, p. xxvii. 

— there is no confusion of a., or 

fruits of a., because there is no 
extension of the acting and en- 
joying Self, ii, 68. 

— the soul takes with itself the 

results of good and evil a., when 
leaving the body, ii, ioa. 

— some single a. are the causes of 

more than one new existence, 
ii, 1 1 8. 

— not the fruits of all a. are brought 

about • by death, the fruits of 
some a. being enjoyed in this 
life already, ii, ti8, 119. 

— the fruits of, according to 

Caimini, are brought about by 
the a. themselves, ii, 182. 

— see also Works. 
Adhikaranas, 'heads of discussion,' 

i, p. xxxi. 
Adhvaryu priest, ii, 240. 
Aditya, the sun, i, 316, 217. 

— the ideas of A. &c. are to be 

superimposed on the members 
of the sacrificial action, i, p. 
lxxvii ; ii, 345-349. 

— is A. to be meditated upon as 

Brahman, or Brahman as A.? 

i>, 341-345. 

— the reaching of A. constitutes 

the fruit of certain works, 

«, 347- , 

— Vayu comes before A. (on the 

path of the gods), ii, 385. 



Adityas, class of gods, i, 202, 216. 
Adrssh/a. See Unseen principle. 
Advaita, non-duality or monism 

taught both by Sankara and 

RimSnqga, i, p. xxx. 
Ag& does not mean pradhana, i, 

p. xxxix, 252-257. 

— the elements beginning with light 

are meant by, i, 254 seq. 

— denotes the causal matter meta- 

phorically, i, 356 seq. 
A^itajatru, i, p. cv. 

— dialogue of Baliki and A., i, 368- 

274. 
Agent, every action requires an, i, 

337 seqq. 
Aggregate, the seventeenfold, ji, 

65, 65 note. 
Aggregates, the dyad of, assumed 

by the Bauddhas with its two 

causes, cannot be established, 

i, 400-409. 

— the Gaina doctrine that a. are 

formed from the atoms, i, 430 
seq. 
Agni, the eater of food, i, 116, 

"7. 

— the highest Self, from the etymo- 

logy agni - agranf, i, 150. 

— offers to Agni, i, 215. 

— fire, i, 217. 

— having become speech entered 

the mouth, ii, 91 seq. 

— speech enters into, at the time 

of death, ii, 105 seq. 

— and the man in the sun are not 

equal, though the term ' death ' 
is applied to both, ii, 267. 

— means light, when mentioned on 

the path of the gods, ii, 385. 

— Vaiivanara. See Vauvanara. 

— see also Fire. 



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442 



vedAnta-sOtras. 



Agnihotra, ii, 191. 

— the permanent obligation of the, 

ii, 296, 296 n., 397. 

— a text relating to the, which 

forms part of the mahapitW- 
yagtia, ii, 299 seq. 

— offered to the prinas, ii, 249- 

252. 

— offered during a whole month at 

the ayana of the KuWapayins, 
ii, 250^,251, 314. 

— transference of the fire from the 

Garhapatya-fire to the two other 
fires, at the, ii, 251. 

— the details of the fundamental A. 

are not valid for the Prinagni- 
hotra, ii, 251 seq. 

— the imaginary A. consisting of 

speech and breath, ii, 263. 

— the A. and other works of per- 

manent obligation enjoined by 
the Veda, tend towards the 
same effect as knowledge, 
i, p. lxxviii; ii, 358-360. 

— and similar works are either con- 

nected with a special knowledge 
based on the constituent mem- 
bers of the sacrifice, or not, 
ii, 360 seq. 
Agnirahasya, i, p. lxxiv. 

— the 5an</ilya-vidya part of the, ii, 
* 214, 216. 

— of the Va^asaneyins, ii, 260. 
Agnishomau, a he-goat sacrificed to, 

ii, 274, 274 n- 
Air, springs from ether, i, p. lii ; ii, 
18 seq. 

— is it ' the abode of heaven, earth, 

and soon'? i, 154, 158. 

— in the a., when it manifests itself 

in the form of Paryanya, 
lightning, thunder, rain, and 
thunderbolts manifest them- 
selves, i, 229. 

— with its five forms, i, 229. 

— is founded on space (ether), 

i, 4»3- 

— origination of, ii, 3, 18 seq. 

— is a product, ii, 18 seq. 

— fire is produced from, ii, 20-22. 

— fire is dissolved into, ii, 26. 

— is dissolved into Ether, ii, 26. 

— passing into the adhyatma-state, 

dividing itself fivefold and thus 
abiding in a specialised con- 
dition is called pribia, ii, 87. 



Akira. See Ether. 
Akshara. See Imperishable. 
Alms, less meritorious than sacrifices, 
i, 27. 

— lead to the road of the fathers, 

ii, 124. 
Anandagiri mentions DravWJiarya, 

i, p. xxii. 
Anandamaya. See Self consisting of 

bliss. 
Animal sacrifice is an act of duty, 

as we know from Scripture, 

ii, 131. 
and the prohibition of doing 

harm to any living creature, 

ii, 310. 
Animals and men compared, i, 7 seq. 

— gods, and rehis excluded from 

the study of the Veda, i, 197 n. 
Aniruddha, a manifestation of the 
highest being, i, p. xxiii. 

— a form of Vasudeva, denotes the 

principle of egoity, i, 440. 

— cannot spring from Pradyumna, 

>, 44«, 44»- 

— taken as a Lord, i, 441 seq. 
Antaryamin brahmana (i.e. Brth. 

Up. Ill, 7), i, p. xxviii. 
Anudatta. See Accents. 
Apantaratamas was born on this 

earth as Krishna Dvaipiyana, 

ii, 235. 

— the bodily existence of A. and 

others who are entrusted with 
offices conducive to the sub- 
sistence of the worlds lasts as 
long as the office lasts, ii, 235- 
238. 

Arhat=Gina, i, 430, 434. 

Artabhaga, instructed by Yayflaval- 
kya, i, pp. lxxxi, cxii ; ii, 373 seq. 

Arthavadas, i, 219 seq., 304, 348, 

355- 

— the corporeality of the gods ap- 

pears from, i, 198, 217, 223. 

— as means of knowledge, i, 218, 

220 seq. 

— are either anuvada or guwavada, 

i, 221. 

— possess authoritative power, i, 

222. 

— have no authority if not con- 

nected with a corresponding 
injunctive passage, i, 225 n. 

— have occasionally to be taken in 

a secondary sense, i, 318, 318 n. 



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GENERAL INDEX. 



443 



Arthavldas, the non-return of the 
released soul is set forth in 
Mantras and A., ii, 418 seq. 

Asat (non-being, non-existent, non- 
entity, that which is not), the 
origin &c. of the world cannot 
proceed from it, i, 17 seq. 

— the passages speaking of the A. 

do not intimate absolute non- 
existence, i, 366-368. 

— denotes 'Being' previous to the 

differentiation of names and 
forms, », 367. 

— the term a. denotes another 

quality only, i, 33*-334- 

— compared with 'the son of a bar- 

ren woman,' i, 338 seq. 

— the cause of the world, 1, 341. 

— entity does not spring from a. or 

non-entity, i, 415-418. 

— Brahman cannot spring from it, 

for the a. is without a self, ii, 

30. 

Ascetic who has broken his vow 
of chastity, i, p. Ixxvi ; ii. 317- 
330. 

— the passage enjoining a childlike 

state means that the a. is to 
live not manifesting himself, ii, 
325-327. 

— see Muni. 

— see Sawnyisin. 
Ash/akHs, i, 297 n. 
Atmarathya, i, pp. xix, xcix, 150 seq., 

376 seq., 279, 280. 
Arramas. See Stages of life. 
Asuras among the paX&janLfr, i, 

262. 

— metres of the A., i.e. metres of 

less than ten syllables, ii, 338, 

228 n. 
Asuri, a Smriti writer, i, 291. 
Arvapati Kaikeya, i, 227 n. ; ii, 

376. 
Atharvanikas, their rite of carrying 

fire on the head before the study 

of the Veda, ii, 186, 189 seq. 

— the seven libations (from the sau- 

rya libation up to the jataudana 

libation) are limited to the A., 

ii, 189, 190. 
Atiratra-sacrifice, Sho</ajin-cup at 

the, i, 262 seq.; ii, 188. 
Atman means the internal organ, 

ii, 81. 

— see Self. 



Atomistic doctrine refuted, i,p.xlviii, 
289, 317 seq., 354, 381,394-400. 

Atoms, refutation of the Vaijeshika 
'tenet that the world originates 
from a. set in motion by the 
admh/a, i, p. 1 seq., 16, 381- 
400. 

— conjunction of a. the material 

cause of the world, i, 46, 382, 
382 n., 387 n. 

— conjunction cannot take place 

between the a., the soul, and 
the internal organ, because 
they have no parts, i, 398. 

— conjunction of the soul with the 

a. cannot be the cause of the 
motion of the a., i, 398 n. 

— during the period of each pralaya 

they are isolated and motion- 
less, i, 382 n. 

— subsist during a certain period 

without producing any elfect, 
i, 382. 

— possess the qualities of colour, 

&c, according as they are a. of 
earth, water, fire, or air, i, 383, 
382 n., 386, 402. 

— are of spherical form, i, 382, 

382 n. 

— the form of extension of an effect 

depends on the number of, not 
on their form of extension, i, 
382 seq., 383 n. 

— cannot be divided themselves, i, 

386 seq. 

— action of the a. is impossible, 

whether the adr jshf a is assumed 
to adhere in the a. or in the 
soul, i, 386-389. 

— Kanada's reasons for the perman- 

ence of, i, 392 seq. 

— difficulties in the relation of the 

a. and the four elements, i, 393 
seq. 

— maybe decomposed by their pass- 

ing back into the indifferenced 
condition of the highest cause, 
i, 400. 

— the cause of the aggregate of 

the elements and elementary 
things (Bauddha), i, 403. 

— external things can neither be a. 

nor aggregates of, i, 419. 

— the Gaina doctrine that aggregates 

are formed from the a., refuted, 
i, 430 seq. 



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444 



vedAnta-sutras. 



Atreya, i, p. xix ; ii, 320. 
Au^ulomi, i, pp. xix, lxxxiv, xcix, 
377 seq., 278 n., 279, 280. 

— thinks that the meditations on 

subordinate members of the 
sacrifice are the work of the 
priest, ii, 321. 

— thinks that the released soul mani- 

fests itself by the sole nature of 
intelligence, ii, 409 seq. 

Aupanishadas or Vedantins, i, p. xx 
seq. 

Austerity, the path of the gods can- 
not be attained by faith and a., 
unaided by knowledge, ii, 234. 

— the stage of life, in which a. is the 

chief thing, ii, 298. 

— the term a. denotes the hermit 

in the woods, and not the men- 
dicant, ii, 300 seq. 

Avabhr/tha-ceremony, identification 
of the A. with death, ii, 221. 

Avidya. See Maya. 

— see Nescience. 
Avyakta. See Undeveloped. 

Badarayana, i, p. xi, 198, 218; ii, 
182 seq., 285, 290, 297 seq., 318, 
360, 402 seq., 410, 41a seq. 

— and the chief distinguishing doc- 

trines of Sankara and Rama- 
nugz, i, pp. lxxxvii-ci. 

— the system of B. had greater af- 

finities with that of the Bhaga- 
vatas and Raman uja than with 
that of Sahkara, i, p. c. 

— quotes the Bhagavadgltfi as an 

authority, i, p. cxxvi. 
Badari, i, pp. xix, lxxxii seq., xc seq. 

— on the highest Lord as ' measured 

by a span,' i, 151. 

— on the meaning of Parana, ii, 12 1. 

— thinks that the souls are led to 

the lower Brahman, ii, 389-392, 
393-402. 

— asserts the absence of a body and 

sense-organs on the part of the 

released, ii, 411 seq. 
Bihva, questioned about Brahman 

by Vashkalin, explained it to 

him by silence, ii, 157. 
Baliki and A^atajatru, dialogue of, 

i, 268-274. 
Bauddha doctrines refuted, i, p. Ii, 

340, 400-428. 
three principal, i, 401. 



Bauddha philosophers, i, 15 n. 

— schools, their idealistic doctrine 

rejected, i, p. xxvi. 

— sects, teach the eternal flux of 

everything that exists, i, 403 n. 
Bauddhas deny the authoritativeness 
of Scripture, i, 412. 

— the opinion of the B. that the Self 

alone begins to function in a 
new body, and that new sense- 
organs are produced in a new 
body, ii, 103 seq. 

Beatitude, highest, not to be at- 
tained by the knowledge of the 
Sankhya-smr/'ti irrespective of 
the Veda, nor by the road of 
Yoga-practice, i, 298. 

there is no other means of 

obtaining it but the knowledge 
of the unity of the Self which 
is conveyed by the Veda, i, 298. 

Being. See Sat. 

Bhagavadgita, as an authority for 
Badarayaoa, i, p. cxxvi. 

— the doctrine of the Bh. a fusion 

of the Brahman theory of y»e 
Upanishads with the belief ifi 
a personal highest being, j, 
p. cxxvi. 
Bhagavatas, or PaMaratras, the fore- 
runners of the Ramanu^as, i, 
p. xxii seq. 

— their views refuted according to 

Sahkara, approved of accord- 
ing to Ramanu^a, i, p. Ii seq., 

439-443- 

— their system nearer to Badari- 

yana than that of Sahkara, i, p. c. 
and the Bhagavadgita, i, p. 

cxxvi. 
and the Mah&bharata, i, p. 

cxxvii. 
contradictions in, i, 442 seq. 

— the theory of the Bh. that Brah- 

man carries within its own 
nature an element from which 
the material universe originates, 
i, p. cxvii. 

— the doctrine of the Bh. stated, 

i, 440. 
Bhallavins, a mantra of the, ii, 2 27 seq. 
Bharu/ri quoted by Ramaniya, i, 

p. xxi. 
Bhashika-sGtra for the accentuation 

of the ■Satapatha-brahmaaa, 

i, 258 note. 



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GENERAL INDEX. 



445 



Bhashyaklra, i. e. DramUa, i, p. xxii. 
BhedSbheda relation of the soul to 

Brahman, i, p. xix. 
Bhishma chooses the time of his 

death, ii, 380. 
Bhr/gu Varuai, disciple of Varuna, 

i, 199. 

— and other sons of Brahman's mind 

were again born at the sacrifice 

of Varuaa, ii, 235. 
Bhuj-yu Slhyiyani, i, p. cv. 
Bhflman (that which is much) is 

Brahman, i, p. xxxv, 162-169. 

— is it the vital air? i, 162-168. 

— is bliss, i, 163. 

— is immortality, i, 163, 168. 

— in it the ordinary activities of 

seeing, &c, are absent, i, 168 
seq. 

— knowledge of, ii, 412. 
Birth, action, death, i, p. xxvii. 

— when applied to the sprout, i, 

340. 

— the terms 'b.' and 'death,' if 

applied to the soul, have a meta- 
phorical meaning, ii, 28 seq. 

— may take place without the ' five 

oblations,' i. e. not in the ordi- 
nary way, ii, 125 seq. 

Blind man who had caught hold of 
the ox's tail, i, 55. 

Bliss is Brahman, i, 65, 75. 

— of Brahman is absolutely supreme, 
L67. 

— Brahman is the cause of b., 

i, 67. 

— absolute b. the result of higher 

knowledge, i, 138. 

— (Brahman as) the bhflman is b., 

i, 163, 168. 

— attaches to the state of deep 

sleep, i, 163, 164, 168. 

— constitutes the nature of the Self, 

i, 168. 

— and other qualities ascribed to 

Brahman in different scriptural 
texts, have to be attributed to 
Brahman everywhere, ii, 201- 
204. 

— see also Self consisting of b. 
Bodhayana, author of a Vr/tti on the 

Vedinta-sfltras, i, p. xxi. 



Bodhayana quoted by Ramaniya, 

i, p. xxi. 
Body, the product of Nescience, 

>»*44. 

— the Undeveloped, i, 246. 

— is the b. the sufferer, or the soul ? 

— the Sankhya cannot admit a real 

connexion of the soul and the 
b., i, 379. 

— consists of three elements, fire, 

water, and earth, ii, 104. 

— water (liquid matter) prepon- 

derates in the b., ii, 104 seq. 

— Brahman's secret names with 

reference to the Devas and to 
the b., ii, 216 seq. 

— embodied soul and b. viewed as 

non-different, ii, 374. 

— subtle, due to the soul's higher 

knowledge, not due to Karman 
or works, i, p. lxxi. 

is beyond the soul, i, 244. 

is meant by the term avyakta, 

i, 241 seq., 244. 

and the gross b., i, 244, 245. 

consisting of the ten sense- 
organs, the five pranas, manas, 
and buddhi, ii, 65 note. 

is not destroyed by what 

destroys the gross b., ii, 372. 

the warmth which we per- 
ceive in the living b. belongs to 
the & b., ii, 372. 

Brahmaiarin, ii, 298, 300. 

— who breaks the vow of chastity, 

ii, 318 seq., 320. 
Brahmaiarya, ii, 315. 
Brahman ', according to Sankara and 

Rlmtnuja, i, p. xxviii. 

— a certain vague knowledge of B. 

common to all the Upanishads, 
i, p. civ seq. 

— of Sankara is impersonal, i, p. xxx. 

— becomes a personal God through 

Maya, i, p. xxx. 

— with Ramanuga is a personal 

God, i, pp. xxx, cxxiii, cxxiv n. 

— only exists, i, p. xxvii. 

— is ' that which is,' and cannot have 

originated from anything else, 
i, p. lii, 266 seq., 332 ; ii, 19 seq. 



■ Arranged in the fallowing order :— <0 names, definitions, and symbols of B.; (a I nature, 
qualities, powers, forms, parts, abodes of B.; (3) higher and lower B. ; (4) unity of, and oneness 
with B. ; (5) B. is everything; (6) B. and the world; (?) B. and the soul; (8) B. and Scripture ; 
(9) knowledge of B. ; (10) meditation on B. ; (11) B. and final release ; (xa) world of B. 



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446 



vedAnta-sOtras. 



Brahman is 'thought' and 'that 
which is,' ii, 160. 

— cannot spring from that which is 

not, ii, 30. 

— is called Non-being, previously to 

the origination of the world, 
i, *6 7 . 

— unborn, i, 349. 

— the highest Self is B., i, 79. 

— derivation of the word from brih, 

i, 14. 

— identified with Vishmi or Nara- 

yana, i, p. xxxi note. 

— defined as that From which the 

origin, subsistence, and disso- 
lution of this world proceed, 
i, pp. xxxii, xcii seq., 15-19, 
107, 109, 117, 283. 

— in its causal condition, i, p. xxix. 

— in the condition of an effect, i, 

p. xxix. 

— later definitions of B., e.g. as 

sai-/tid-ananda, i, p. xcii. 

— is anandamaya, or, the Self con- 

sisting of bliss, i, 65, 66-68, 75. 

— only is bliss as bhflman, i.e. in its 

plenitude, i, 169. 

— is called the tail, i.e. a member of 

the Self consisting of bliss, 
i, 7« seq., 75, 76 seq. 

— not a member, but the support 

or abode, the one nest of all 
worldly bliss, i, 73. 

— the bliss of B. is absolutely 

supreme, i, 67. 

— is declared to be the cause of 

bliss, i, 67. 

— neuter, can it be designated by 

a masculine noun ? i, 76. 

— that which consists of mind, is 

B., i, 1 07-1 12. 

— whose Self is pleasure intimated 

by Ka and Kha, i, 126 seq. 

— that which is much (bhflman) is 

B., i, 162-169. 

— is the source of all beings, i, 

'35-139. 288. 

— the Imperishable is B., i, 169-17 1. 

— Bahva explained B. by silence, 

ii, 157. 

— why it is called a bank, ii, 1 76 seq. 

— the two secret names of B. with 

reference to the gods and to 
the body, ii, 216-218. 

— is the True, i, 167, 267; ii, 216 

seq., 234. 



Brahman, breath (prawa) is, i, 84-87, 
97-106, 229-231, 272. 

— ether is, i, 81-84, M4> i74 - «9 a » 

232 seq. ; ii, 8, 12, 248. 

— is like the ether, i, no, 114; ii, 

6 seq., 17 seq. 

— is the Self of the ether, i, no. 

— before ether was produced, B. 

existed without ether, ii, 17. 

— ether is an effect of, ii, 18. 

— ether is dissolved into, ii, 26. 

— light is, i, 87-93, 96, 97, 185, 191, 

194, 231 seq. 

— the gastric fire a symbol of, i, 92. 

— B.'s name a symbol of, i, 92. 

— denoted by the metre Gayatrt, 

>, 93-95, 95 seq. 

— why it is compared to the images 

of the sun and the like, ii, 157- 

159- 

— nature of, i, pp. Ixiv seq., xcv seq. ; 

ii, 101, 133-183. 

uniformity of it, i, 156. 

does not resemble the world, 

i, 284. 

the break in it is a mere fig- 
ment of Nescience, i, 352. 

matter and souls are real con- 
stituents of it, i, p. xxviii. 

— the only universal being, of an 

absolutely homogeneous nature, 
i, pp. xxiv, xxx. 

— is of the nature of intelligence, 

i, p. xxiv seq., 68, 264; ii, 156 
seq., 168. 

— is an intelligent principle and 

cannot be identified with the 
non-intelligent pradhana of the 
Sankhyas, i, p. xxxii, 47-64, 300. 

— superior to the gods, i, p. xiv. 

— is incapable of receiving any ac- 

cretion and eternally pure, i, 34. 

— is all-knowing, i, 19, 25, 47, 49, 

362. 

— is the internal ruler over the 

Devas and so on, i, 130-132. 

— that which possesses the attri- 

butes of invisibility and so on is 

B, i,i35-i39- 

— is the bridge of the Immortal, i, 

154, 156. 

— a cause of fear, i, 230 seq. 

— eternal and changeless, i, 25, 337. 

— is all-knowing, all-powerful, and 

possessing the great power of 
Maya, i, 362. 



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GENERAL INDEX. 



447 



Brahman is not apprehended, because 
it is unevolved, it, 171. 

— is omnipresent, i, 91, 120, 125, 

172 ; ii, 180. 

— is altogether unchanging, ii, 397. 

— there is nothing either beneficial 

to be done by it or non-bene- 
ficial to be avoided by it, i, 

344- 

— qualities of, i, 107, 328 ; ii, 101, 

201-204. 

— without any distinctive qualities, 

i, p. xxv ; ii, 239, 394 seq. 

— endowed with auspicious qualities, 

i, p. xxviii. 

— the limiting adjuncts of B. are 

presented by Nescience merely, 
ii, 153- 

— is endowed with various powers, 

i, 354 seq. 

— is not devoid of powers though 

it is devoid of organs of action, 
i, 355 seq. 

— powers of B. which are connected 

with the Devas, ii, 219. 

— is devoid of form, i, pp. lxiii, lxiv, 

306 seq. ; ii, 154-166, 166-175. 

— is different from name and form, 

i, 232 seq. 

— is devoid of parts, i, 349-352 ; 

ii, 396. 

— represented as comprising sixteen 

parts, ii, 219. 

— has four feet (quarters), i, 90, 95. 

— the idea of place does not apply 

to B., i, 89. 

— a special locality may be ascribed 

to the omnipresent B., i, 91, 1 20, 
125. 

— a multiplicity of abodes ascribed 

to B., i, 92. 

— spoken of as in heaven and 

beyond heaven, i, 96 seq. 

— its abode in the heart, i, 1 1 3 seq., 

350- 
the smallness of, i, 1 1 3 seq. 

— as abiding within the sun, and 

within the eye, i, p. lxx, 123- 
128; ii, 216-218. 
— ' city of B.' may mean the body, 
or the city of the highest B., 

', '74, i75» 178. 

— described as residing within the 

body, ii, 219. 

— statements as to B. being con- 

nected or separated are only 



made with a view to difference 
of place, ii, 178 seq. 

Brahman, highest and lower B. dis- 
tinguished, i, pp. xix, xx, xxxii 
seq., xxxvi (masc. and neut), 
61-64, m-174 ; >'» 7i 166, 202 
seq., 401 seq. 

Ankara's distinction be- 
tween, not valid, i, pp. xci-xciv. 

not distinguished by Ra- 

manu^a, i, p. xxxi. 

not distinguished by Bada- 

rlyana, i, p. c. 

not distinguished in the 

Upanishads, i, pp. cxiii, cxv seq. 

— to which B. does the soul of the 

worshipper repair on death? 
i, p. xc seq. 

— the highest, all beings spring from 

it, i, 83, 85. 

is a place of rest, i, 83. 

endlessness a characteristic 

mark of it, i, 83. 

the highest Person is nothing 

but the h. B., i, 174. 

the vital airs are the effects 

of it, ii, 76. 

is the agent in the evolution 

of names and forms, ii, 97. 

is inside of the limiting ad- 
juncts, ii, 158 seq. 

the Yogins, in the state of 

perfect conciliation, apprehend 
it, ii, 171 seq. 

the sense-organs and the 

elements of him who knows the 
h. B. are merged in that same 
h. B., ii, 376 seq. 

with it we cannot connect 

the idea of going, or of one 
who goes ; for that B. is present 
everywhere and is the inner self 
of all, ii, 390, 391, 394, 396. 

immortality is possible only in 

the h. B., not in the effected one, 
ii, 39*- 

to it the souls are led, Gai- 

mini opines, ii, 392 seq.; refu- 
tation of this view, ii, 393- 
403. 

glory is a name of it, ii, 

393- 

— the lower, associated with Miyl, 

i, p. xxv. 

called Ijvara, the Lord, i, pp. 

xxv, xxvii. 



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448 



vedAnta-sOtras. 



Brahman, the lower, to it the de- 
parted soul is led by the guar- 
dians of the path of the gods, 
i, p. lxxxii ; ii, 389-402. 

is the vital principle in all 

creatures, i, 173 n. 

the world of the L B. is called 

Satyaloka, i, 181. 

is fundamentally one with the 

unqualified B., ii, 348. 

for the purpose of worship or 

meditation, i, 330; ii, 155, 156, 
161 seq., 391. 

— — is the object of the discussion 

on the difference or non-differ- 
ence of the cognitions of B., 
ii, 185. 

worlds of B. can only refer 

to the 1. B., ii, 390. 

on account of its proximity 

to the higher B., can be desig- 
nated by the word 'B.,' ii, 391. 

also may be spoken of as being 

the Self of all, ii, 394. 

— sons of B.'s mind, ii, 235. 

— is one and undivided, i, p. 1, 349- 

354. 395 seq. 

— one only without a second, i, p. 

xxviii, 386; ii, 13, 13. 

— has in itself elements of mani- 

foldness, so that unity and mani- 
foldness are both true of him, 
i, 331 seqq., 345 seq. 

— although one only, is, owing to 

the plurality of its powers, 
meditated upon in more than 
one way, ii, 330. 

— there cannot be any plurality in 

B., ii, 158, 160, 303, 337 seq., 
339, 410. 

— comprises elements of plurality, 

i, p. xxviii. 

— is free from ail difference, and two- 

fold characteristics cannot be- 
long to him, ii, 1 52-154, 1 56 seq. 

— oneness with B., i, 319 seq. ; ii, 

355. 3«2 seq. 

— I am B., i, 31, 44, 104, 115, 185, 

336; ii, 33, 46, 66, 173, 339, 408. 

— is the real giver of the gifts be- 

stowed by princes on poets and 
singers, i, 80 n. 

— Indra declares that he is one 

with B., !, 101 seq. 

— the fishermen, the slaves, the 

gamblers are B., ii, 61, 62. 



Brahman, union with B. is the reason 
for the absence of all contact 
with evil, ii, 144. 

— there is absolute non-division 

from B., of the parts merged in 
it, ii, 376 seq. 

— whatever is, is B., i, p. xxx, 94. 

— all things are effects of B., or 

are B. itself, i, p. cxis seq. 

— all this indeed is B., beginning, 

ending, and breathing in it, i, 
107, 109, 156. 

— is the Self of everything, i, 33, 

noseq., 367, 357; ii, 138, 165, 
308, 341. 

— is the abode of heaven, earth, 

&c, i, 154-163, 330. 

— the ten objects and the ten sub- 

jects cannot rest on anything 
but B., i, 104. 

— some metaphorical expressions, 

seemingly implying that there 
is something different from B., 
explained, i, p. lxv; ii, 175- 
180. 

— the existence of anything apart 

from B. distinctly denied by 
Scripture, i, 331; ii, 168-171, 
179 seq. 

— there is nothing further beyond 

B., ii, 175-179- 

— subsists apart from its effects, 

i, 350. 

— not only the operative but also 

the material cause of the world, 
i, pp. xl, xciv seq., 49, 60 seq., 
364 seq., 383-288, 3i7,3»o-33°t 
346 seq., 361 seq. 

— creates the world without instru- 

ments, i, p. xlix seq., 346-349, 

354-356- 

from a mere sportive im- 
pulse, i, p. 1, 356 seq. 

by means of a modification 

of itself, i, p. xcv. 

— creative power of, i, p.l, 233, 344, 

361 seq. 

— as a creator and dispenser, acts 

with a view to the merit and 
demerit of the individual souls, 
and has so acted from all 
eternity, i, p. 1, 357-361- 

— the origin of the world from B. 

proved on the ground of the 
system of the VaLreshikas, i, 
381-386. 



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GENERAL INDEX. 



449 



Brahman, the world originates from, 
i, p. xl, 202, 267,268-274; ii, 13, 
16, 21, 22. 

objections against this view 

refuted, i, p. xlvii seq., 299- 
317, 35» seq., 381-386. 

— and the world, i, pp. xxx, lii, 50 ; 

«, 3-73. 39i seq. 
see also Cause and effect. 

— compared to a magician, i, p. 

XXV. 

— relation of the non-sentient mat- 

ter to, i, p. lxv. 

— the source of Fire, ii, 20-22. 

— the order in which the elements 

are retracted into B. is the re- 
verse of that in which they are 
created, ii, 25 seq. 

— relation of the individual soul to, 

i, pp. xix, Ivii seqq. ; ii, 61- 

73- 

according to Sankara 

and Badarayana, i, pp. xcvii-c. 

— broken up, as it were, into indi- 

vidual souls, i, p. xxv. 

— only is real in each #lva, i, p. xxv. 

— discussions as to whether certain 

passages refer to B. or to the 
individual soul, i, p. xxxii seq., 
64-289. 

— the souls are parts of B., accord- 

ing to Raman ugn, i, p. lviii. 

— the identity of the individual soul 

with it, i, pp. xx, xxvii, 104, 
114-116, 322, 343 seq.; ii, 30, 
3i| 33, 34, 42 seqq., 138, 146, 
149. 

— Sankara's individual soul is B. 

through May3, i, p. xxx. 

— Ramanu^a's individual soul has 

sprung from B. and is never 
outside B., i, p. xxxi. 

— the Self is B., i, 14, 30 seq., 36, 

45, 105, 241, 264 seq.; ii, 209, 
288. 

— is ' that,* the inward Self is ' thou,' 

»', 335- 

— the soul cannot be a part of B., 

nor an effect of B., nor different 
from B., ii, 396 seq. 

— and the individual soul, difference 

of nature between, i, 114-116. 
both different and non- 
different, i, 277 n., 345. 

— the individual souls go to, i, 178, 

180 seq., 191. 

[38] 



Brahman, separate from the indi- 
vidual souls, is the creator, i, 344 
seq. 

— is superior to the individual soul, 

', 345- 

— and the released soul, i, p. xxx ; 

ii, 408 seq. 

— in which the individual soul is 

merged in the state of deep 
sleep, i, p. lxi seq., 180, 273; 
ii, i44-'49, 152-166, 176. 

— the only real topic of Scripture, 

i, p. xxxii, 22-47, 265 seq. 

— is the source of the Veda, i, p. 

xxxii, 19-22. 

— Scripture does not contradict 

itself on the all-important point 
of B., i, p. xl, 263-268. 

— is not the object of any other 

means of proof but Scripture, 
i, p. lxiv seq., 22-47, 307, 350- 

352, 355- 

— the Veda intimates B. only as the 

object of certain injunctions, 
i, 23 seqq. 

— not the subject of injunctions, 

ii, 162-166, 185. 

— the attainment of the Self of B. 

lies outside the sphere of sacred 
precept, ii, 359. 

— knowledge of, i, pp. x, lxxviii 

seq., 9-15, 19, 31, 73, 138, 157, 
159, 324; "", 8, 162 seqq., 378, 
393- 

its fruit or result, i, 11, 14, 

1 8, 2 4 seq., 2 6 seqq., 29,231, 266, 
300, 327; ii, 117 n., 229 seq., 

»3«, 353-363, 372-375, 4'9- 

is not subordinate to action, 

but independent, i, p. Ixxv, 10- 
12, 29; ii, 285-295. 

the purpose of man is effected 

through it, ii, 285, 290-306. 
reading of the Veda an ante- 
cedent for those desirous of it, 
i, 10. 

— he who knows B. becomes B., 

',25,29, 31, 186; ii, 375- 

to be the Self is free 

from his body, i, 41-43. 

— the body is an abode for the per- 

ception of, i, 178. 

— texts exhorting us to strive to see 

B., i, 349. 

— some persons although knowing B. 

yet obtained new bodies, ii, 235. 



Gg 



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vedAnta-sOtras. 



Brahman, thestate of being grounded 
in B. belongs to the wandering 
mendicant, ii, 300-303. 

— meditation on, i, pp. lxvi-Ixxv, 31, 

94, 105 seq., 107-11 1 ; ii, 19 n. 
(as Vayu), 177 seq., 184-284, 

333-337, 34»-345- 
its result, i, p. lxv, 25, 174 ; 

ii, 402. 
see also Meditation. 

— only those who have not wor- 

shipped B. under a symbol, are 
led to B., i, p. lxxxii ; ii, 402- 
404. 

— the state of final release is 

nothing but B., i, 28 seq., 34 ; 
ii, 3*9- 

— the released have to resort to, 

i, 157. 

— has to be inquired into because 

it is the cause of absolute 
beatitude, i, 283. 

— on the attainment of B. there 

take place the non-clinging and 
the destruction of sins, ii, 353— 

35«. 

— world of, i, p. xxix, 173, 174; 

ii, 383. See also Brahma-world. 

— see also Self, highest. 

— see also Lord. 
Brlhmana-accent, i, 258. 
Brahmanical studentship, ii, 303 n. 
Brahmans, he to whom the B. and 

the Kshattriyas are but food is 
the highest Self, i, p. xxxv, 1 16- 
118. 

— are not qualified for the ri^gasflya- 

sacrifice, i, 218. 

— the world with its, i, 275 seq. 
Brahma-sukta of a jlkha of the 

Atharva-veda quoted, ii, 62. 
Brahma-sutras, another name for 

Vedanta-sfltras, i, p. xiv n. 
Brahma - upanishad = Veda - upani- 

shad, i, 94. 
Brahma- vidyS, Gaimini maintains the 

non-qualification of the gods for 

it, i, 216 seq. 

— gods are qualified for, i, 218- 

223. 
Brahmavidytbharana on the three 
Bauddha sects, i, 401 n. 

— on the Bauddha series beginning 

with Nescience, i, 404 seq. n. 
Brahma-world applied to the small 
ether, i, 180. 



Brahma-world, not 'the world of 
Brahman,' but 'the world which 
is Brahman,' i, 1 80 seq. 

— see Brahman, world of. 
Breath (Prana) is the highest Brah- 
man, i, p. xxxiv, 84-87, 97-106. 

— in which everything trembles, is 

Brahman, i, p. xxxvii, 229- 
231. 

— is the deity of the Prastiva, i, 84, 

86. 

— ofb., i, 87. 

— beings enter into and proceed 

from it, i, 85, 86. 

— is most beneficial for man, i, 98. 

— strength is, i, 99. 

— denotes either the individual soul 

or the chief vital air or both, i, 
102 seq. 

— is the abode of the power of 

action, i, 105. 

— is pngnb, i, 105. 

— is the one god, the gods are all 

forms of, i, 200. 

— one of the paftiagai&fo, i, 260- 

262. 

— spoken of as a ' person,' i, 261. 

— speech, b., and mind presuppose 

fire, water, and earth, ii, 78 seq. 

— acts under the guidance of VSyu, 

ii, 91 seq. 

— meditation on all food as food of, 

ii, 211, 213. 

— water is the dress of, ii, 211-214. 

— is water, ii, 366. 

— may be viewed as the causal sub- 

stance of mind, ii, 366. 

— mind is merged in, ii, 366 seq. 

— is merged in the individual soul, 

on the departure of the soul, ii, 
367 seq. 

— is merged in heat, ii, 367, 368. 

— the soul, with the b., goes to the 

elements, ii, 368. 

— see Prana, and Vital air, chief. 
Bnhadlranyaka-upanishad, germs of 

Maya doctrine in the, i,pp.cxvii, 
cxx seq. 

— on the embodied soul, i, 1 34 seq. 

— the Udgitha-vidyl of the, ii, 192- 

199. 

Br/haspatisava, an offering enjoined 
for one who is desirous of Brah- 
mavar/tas, ii, 223, 223 n., 224. 

Buddha, variety of Bauddha doc- 
trines due either to the dif- 



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GENERAL INDEX. 



451 



ference of the views maintained 
by B., or else to the difference 
of capacity on the part of the 
disciples of B., i, 401. 
Buddha, though he propounded the 
doctrine of the reality of the ex- 
ternal world, was himself an 
idealist, i, 418. 

— teaches three mutually contra- 

dictory systems, i, 428. 
Buddhi. See Intelligence. 

Castes, men only of the three higher 
c. entitled to the study of the 
Veda, i, 197. 

— all the four c. are fit for the know- 

ledge of the itihlsas and pu- 
rinas, i, 239. 

— pafttagan3£ = the four c. and the 

Nishadas, i, 262. 
Categories, twenty-five, of the Slh- 
khya system, i, 257-260. 

— difficulties with regard to the six 

c. of the Vaueshikas, i, 394 
seqq. 

— seven, two, or five c. of the 

Cainas, i, 428 seq., 430. 

— five, of the A'aivas, i, 435. 
Caterpillar, soul compared to a, ii, 

103, 352. 

Causal matter is metaphorically re- 
presented as a she-goat, i, 256 
seq. 

Cause, only the one highest c. is 
true, i, 322. 

— and effect are non-different, 

i, pp. xxix, xlix, 300-305, 309, 
311, 3*0-343, 399,436; ii, 9. 

their absolute equality impos- 
sible, i, 305 seq. 

real effects may sometimes 

arise from unreal (imaginary) 
causes, i, 324 seq. 

the internal organ is affected 

by them jointly, i, 331. 

connected by samavaya, i, 335 

seq., 396 n. 

difference of, i, 350. 

the relation of, is no reason 

for assuming that all effects 
whatever have a non-intelli- 
gent principle for their ante- 
cedent, i, 367. 

according to the Vai/e- 

shikas, i, 396 seq. 

impossible on the as- 



sumption of the Bauddha that 
everything has a momentary 
existence only, i, 407 seq., 409. 

Cause and effect, the relation of, 
requires some superiority on 
the part of the cause, i, 442 ; ii, 
20. 

between them conjunction 

and disjunction do no longer 
take place, i, 397. 

chain of causes and effects, be- 
ginning with Nescience (Baud- 
dha), i, 404 seq., 410, 410 n. 

Causes, whatever is originated, the 
Sankhyas say, is originated lrom 
inherent c, non-inherent c, 
and operative c, i, 5 seq. 

— four kinds of, admitted by the 

Bauddha, i, 409, 409 n. 
Cave, the two entered into the c. 

are Brahman and the individual 

soul, i, pp. xxxv, xlii, 118-123. 
Ceremonial purifications, the SQdras 

excluded from them, i, 227. 

referred to in the Vidyas, i, 2 27. 

Cessation, the two kinds of c. which 

the Bauddhas assume cannot be 

proved, i, 410 seq., 413. 
Chariot, the simile of the, i, 121, 

239 seq., 244, 246. 
Chastity, knowledge belongs to 

those who are bound to, ii, 

295 seq. 

— the stages of life for which ch. is 

obligatory, established by Scrip- 
ture, ii, 297-303. 

— he who has entered them cannot 

fall from them, ii, 317 seqq. 

— expiatory sacrifice for a Brahma- 

J&rin who breaks his vow of, 
ii, 3 18 seq. 

— persons bound to ch. who have 

broken their vow condemned, 

ii, 320. 
1 Chief vital air. See Vital air, chief. 
' Childlike state, which is enjoined 

for the ascetic, means absence 

of strong sensual passions, 

absence of guile, pride, and the 

like, ii, 3*5-3*7. 
Cognition, the Self whose nature is 

unchangeable, eternal c, i, 185 

seq. 
Cognitions (vidyas), discussion on 

the separateness or non-sepa- 

rateness of the c. of Brahman, 



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which form the subject of the 
different Vedanta-texts, ii, ioi, 
184-479. 
Cognitions, in the same Sakha also 
there is unity of, ii, 214-216. 

— connected with members of 

sacrificial acts, are not perman- 
ently connected with those acts, 
ii, 252-256. 

are valid for all Sakhis 

andVedas, ii, 274. 

— compared with sacrifices, ii, 280. 

— should there be cumulation of 

the different c. or option be- 
tween them ? ii, 280-284. 

— the fruit of all c. is the intuition 

of the object meditated upon, ii, 
281. 

— which have the qualified Brahman 

for their object, ii, 330. 

Colebrooke, i, p. cxvi. 

Conjunction (samyoga), the distinc- 
tion of the Vaueshilcas between 
c. and inherence, i, 390, 396 seq. 

— the connexion between the Lord 

and the souls and pradhana 

cannot be c, i, 436. 
Consciousness of external things, i, 

418-424. 
Crane, female, conceives without a 

male, i, 348; ii, 126. 

— conceives from hearing the sound 

of thunder, i, 348. 
Creation owing to an act of volition 
on the Lord's part, i, p. xxix. 

— according to Ramanu^a, i, pp. 1, 

liii seq. 

— accounts given in the Upanishads 

of the c, their divergence, i, p. 

cv seq. 
have no mention of 

Maya, i, p. cxviii. 
discussion of, i, 263-266 ; 

ii, 3, «. 

— has thought for its antecedent, i, 

47 seq.; ii, 206. 

— Brahman, before the c, i, 50, 286 ; 

ii, 8. 

— cannot possibly belong to any 

Self different from the highest 
Self, i, 69. 

— Brahman the cause of it, i, 117 ; 

ii, 183. 

— description of it in the MuWaka- 

upanishad alluded to, i, 140- 
142. 



Creation is preceded by the word, 
i, 203 seq. 

— each new c. is the result of the 

religious merit and demerit of 
the animated beings of the pre- 
ceding c, i, 214. 

— the relation of senses and sense- 

objects is the same in different 
creations, i, 214 seq. 

— the world was evolved at the 

beginning of the c. in the same 
way as it is at present seen to 
develop itself by names and 
forms, viz. under the rulership 
of an intelligent creator, i, 268. 

— Scripture when relating the c. of 

the elements, does not mention 
a separate c. of the individual 
soul, i, 279; ii, 31. 

— a multiform c. exists in the indi- 

vidual Self, and in gods, &c, i, 
35a seq. 

— the scriptural doctrine of c. refers 

to the apparent world only, i, 

357- 

— the c. of this world is mere play 

to the Lord, i, 357. 

— in consequence of the Lord's 

conjunction with Maya, the c. 
is unavoidable, i, 357 n. 

— neither c. nor pralaya could take 

place, if the atomic theory were 
adopted, i, 386-389, 391. 

— according to the VaLreshika sys- 

tem, i, 387. 

— order of, ii, 3-24. 

the origination of the organs 

does not cause a break in it, ii, 
26-28. 

— passage on the c. in the Kbln- 

dogya-upanishad, ii, 4. 

— Brahman and ether before and 

after, ii, 8. 

— is the c. taking place in dreams 

a real one, or does it consist of 
illusion? ii, 133-141. 

— the so-called real c. is not abso- 

lutely real, ii, 138. 

— accomplished by Pra;apati,ii, 206. 

— of the worlds is accomplished by 

some inferior Lord different 
from, and superintended by, the 
highest Self, ii, 206. 

— of the elements, different from 

the c. of the worlds, ii, 206, 
207 seq. 



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453 



Creator, the Vedinta-texts differ 
with regard to the order of 
creation, but not with regard to 
the C, i, 264. 

— described as all-knowing, the 

Lord of all, the Self of all, with- 
out a second, i, 264 seq. 

— is non-different from the created 

effects, i, 265. 

— see also Brahman. 

Daharavidya, the knowledge of 
Brahman within the heart, i, 
p. lxxv ; ii, 219, 233, 393 n., 410. 

Daksha, assumed a new body, ii, 235. 

Darkness is called black on account 
of its covering and obscuring 
property, i, 253. 

— Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, 

the three gunas, i, 353. 
the three constituent ele- 
ments of the pradhana, i, 364 n., 
36 seq. 

— the guna D. is eternal, i, 380. 

— see also Gunas. 

Death, the round of birth, action, 
and, i, p. xxvii. 

— the fate after d. of those whom 

their good works do not entitle 
to pass up to the moon, i, p. lx ; 
ii, 1 21-126. 
of him who possesses know- 
ledge, i, p. lxxviiiseq. ; ii, 364- 
419. 

— not necessary for the condition 

of being free from the body, 

«»4'>43- 

— is a condiment, i, 116, 117. 

— release from the jaws of d. by 

knowledge of the highest Self, 

«, 347. 
not by perceiving the pra- 
dhana, i, 247. 

— when applied to the sprout, i, 340. 

— the terms ' birth ' and ' death,' if 

applied to the soul, have a meta- 
phorical meaning, ii, 28 seq. 

— has the power of manifesting 

those works whose fruit has not 
yet begun, ii, 113, 117-119. 

— the state of swoon is the door of, 

ii, 152. 

— identification of the Avabhr/tha- 

ceremony with, ii, 221. 

— the term ' d.' applied to Agni, and 

to the man in the sun, ii, 267. 



Death, the d. of the body is the term 
of the attainment of final release, 
ii, 357 seq., 363. 

— see Departure. 

— see also Yama. 

Debts, the three, ii, 295. 

Deceased, the, on his way to Brah- 
man, shakes off his good and 
evil deeds, ii, 229-231. 

Deeds. See Works. 

Deities, if the elements and the 
sense-organs are spoken of in 
Scripture as of an intellectual 
nature, the superintending d. 
are denoted, i, 303-305. 

— the particular intelligent d. who 

represent light, &c, on the soul's 
journey to Brahman, are ap- 
pointed as personal conductors 
of the soul, ii, 388 seq. 

— see also Devas, Divinities, 
Gods. 

Departure (from the body), the 
highest Self different from the 
individual soul in the state of, 
1,233-236. 

Deussen, ' System des Vedftnta,' i, 
pp. xxiv, xxiv n., xxxiii n., 
xxxiv n., xxxv n., xli, xlv, xlvi, 
lxxxvii. 

Devala, author of a Dharma-sfltra, 
i, 289. 

Devas, the eternal ruler over the, 
&c, is Brahman, i, 130-132. 

— Brahman's secret names with 

reference to the D. and to the 
body, ii, 216 seq. 

— powers of Brahman which are 

connected with the, ii, 219. 

— metres of the D., i. e. metres of 

ten and more syllables, their 
priority to those of the Asuras, 
ii, 228, 228 n. 

— the powers of the D. constitute 

the Self of the organs of the 
body, ii, 257. 

— see also Deities, Divinities, Gods. 
Dhr/sh/adyumna, not born in the 

ordinary way, ii, 125, 126. 

Digambara Cainas, their opinion that 
the individual soul only flying 
away from the old body alights 
in the new one as a parrot flies 
from one tree to another, ii, 
104. 

Divinity, highest. See Brahman. 



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Divinities, in meditations connected 
with constitutive of sacrificial 
works the idea of the d. is to 
be transferred to the sacrificial 
items, not vice versl, i, p. lxxvii ; 

"'» 345-349- 

— intelligent presiding d. are con- 

nected with everything, i, 304. 

— the vital airs act under the 

guidance of, ii, 91 seq. 

— who act as the guides of the vital 

airs and co-operate with them, 
stop their co-operation at the 
time of death, ii, 106. 

— even priests who do not know 

the d. of sacrifices, perform 
them, ii, 254. 

— the organs of the body and the d. 

are non-different, ii, 257. 
DramWa quoted by Rimanqga, i, 
pp. xxi, xxii. 

— preceded Saftkara, i, p. xxii. 
DramWa-bhishya, i, p. xxii. 
DramWabhashyakara quoted by Ra- 

manu^-a, i, p. xlix. 
Draupadt, not born in the ordinary 

way, ii, 125. 
DravWa or Dram Wa, i, p. xxii n. 
DravWIiarya. See DramWa. 
Dreams, Ramanu^a on d. as the 

work, not of the individual soul, 

but of the highest Lord, i, p. 

Ix seq. 

— the unreal phantom of a d. may 

have a real result, i, 325. 

— some d. are auspicious omens, 

others the reverse, i, 325; ii, 
136 seq. 

— variety of d. while the dreaming 

person remains one, i, 346. 

— the idealist's example of the ideas 

in, i, 420. 

— the ideas of the waking state are 

not like those of, i, 424 seq. 

— in the state of d. the instruments 

of the Self are not altogether at 
rest, ii, 56. 

— place of d.= intermediate place, 

ii, 133. 

— the soul in the state of, i, p. Ix ; 

», I33-MI- 
— the Self is the shaper of lovely 
things in, ii, 13 3 seq., 137 seq. 

— the world of d. is mere illusion, 

ii, 134-136, 140 seq. 

— moving about in, ii, 135. 



Dreams are outside the body, ii, 
'35- 

— experts in the science of, ii, 

136. 

— their purpose and cause, ii, 1 37 n. 

— in d. we have perceptions while 

the body lies motionless, ii, 

272. 
Drona, not born in the ordinary way, 

ii, 125, 126. 
Duties. See Works. 
Dvaipayana, ii, 43. 
Dying, certain times for, ii, 379-381. 

Earth, springs from water, i, p. lii ; 
ii, 23 seq. 

— called 'night' (jarvarf) by the 

Pauranikas, ii, 23 seq. 

— is meant by the word 'anna' 

(' food '), ii, 23 seq. 

— (predominant) colour of e. is 

black, ii, 23 seq. 

— is dissolved into water, ii, 26. 

— is the Rik, ii, 345-349. 

Eater, the e. who is the highest Self, 
i, pp. xxxv, xlii, 1 1 6- 11 8. 

Effect. See Cause and effect. 

Ego and Non-Ego, the spheres of 
the object and subject, i, 3. 

Egoity, the principle of, Aniruddha 
identical with it, i, p. xxiii, 440. 

accomplishes all actions and 

enjoys their results, i, 34. 

Elements, the origination of the e. 
is due to Brahman acting in 
them, i, p. Iii ; ii, 24 seq. 

— the reabsorption of the e. into 

Brahman takes place in the 
inverse order of their emission, 
i, p. lii; ii, 25 seq. 

— the subtle e. are completely 

merged in Brahman only when 
final emancipation is reached, 
i, p. Ixxix seq. ; ii, 37 1 seq. 

— the three e., fire, water, earth, 

denoted by the three colours 
red, white, black, i, 254 seq. 

— and the sense-organs, the product 

of Nescience, i, 281. 

— the atoms and their respective, 

i, 393 seq, 402. 

— origin of the three, fire, water, 

earth, according to the Kbxa- 
dogya Upanishad, ii, 4. 

— usual order of the five e. : ether, 

air, fire, water, earth, ii, 4, 4 n. 



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Elements spoken of as endowed 
with intelligence, ii, 24 seq. 

— the origin, the subsistence, and the 

retractation of the e. all depend 
on Brahman, ii, 25 seq. 

— the order of the creation of the 

e. is not broken by the origina- 
tion of the organs, ii, 26-28. 

— in obtaining a different body the 

soul goes enveloped by subtle 
parts of the, ii, 101-104,371 seq. 

— the aggregate of the five e. in the 

body, ii, 242. 

— the soul, with the breath, goes to 

the, ii, 368 seq. 

— the aggregate of the e. continues 

to exist up to the final union 

with Brahman, ii, 371, 376 seq. 
Emancipation, final, i, p. xxix. 
depends on the true nature of 

the cause of the world, i, 316. 
a being desirous of it becomes 

a deva, i, 223 n. 

— by degrees, i, 174, 223. 

— the Sankhya doctrine about the 

e. of the Selfs, ii, 69 seq. 

— see also Release. 

Entity does not spring from non- 
entity, i, 415-418. 

Ether is the highest Brahman, i, 
pp. xxxiv, xxxviii, 81-84, 182, 
232 seq., 273, 287 ; ii, 6 seq., 8, 
12, 248. 

— the small e. within the heart is 

Brahman, i, p. xxxvi, 174-192 ; 

ii, 144. 
cannot mean the individual 

soul, i, 177. 
spoken of as the place of 

sleep, ii, 144. 

— is not co-eternal with Brahman, 

but springs from it as its first 
effect, i, p. lii; ii, 3-18. 

— is the Udgitha, i, 83. 

— although all-pervading, is spoken 

of as limited and minute, if 
considered in its connexion 
with the eye of a needle; so 
Brahman also, i, 114. 

— the highest Lord is greater than, 

i, 177- 

— distinction between the outer 

and the inner, i, 175, 176 seq. 

— origination of, discussion of 

Veddnta-texts concerning it, ii, 
3-18. 



Ether, origination of, the Safikhyas 
deny it, ii, 5 seq. 

— is divided, therefore must be an 

effect, ii, 14, 15. 

— is non-eternal, because it is the 

substratum of a non-eternal 
quality, viz. sound, ii, 17. 

— is the abode of air, ii, 18. 

— is dissolved into Brahman, ii, 26. 

— air is dissolved into, ii, 26. 

— the body consisting of water 

which the soul assumes in the 
moon, becomes subtle like e., 
but not identical with e., ii, 127. 

— the one e. is made manifold, as it 

were, by its connexion with 
different places, ii, 179. 

— see also Space. 

— see also Brahman, above, p. 446. 
Expiation cannot take place, if a 

Brahmaiirin for life breaks 
his vow of chastity, ii, 318; can 
take place, according to some 
teachers, ii, 318 seq. 

Expiatory ceremonies and the 
results of works, ii, 117 n., 353, 
354- 

Eye. See Person in the eye. 

Faith, the path of the gods cannot 
be attained by f. and austerities, 
unaided by knowledge, ii, 234. 

Fathers, among the paniaganii, i, 
262. 

— create many things by their mere 

intention, i, 347 seq. 

— rise owing to their mere will, ii, 

410 seq. 

— see Path of the fathers. 

Fire springs from air, i, p. lii, 20- 
22. 

— has for its source that which is, 

i. e. Brahman, ii, 20-22. 

— water is produced from, ii, 22 

seq. 

— water is dissolved into, ii, 26. 

— is dissolved into air, ii, 26. 

— gastric, within man, i, 89. 
characterised by the noise it 

makes and by heat, i, 90. 
as a symbol of Brahman, i, 

92. 
Vai/vinara is the, i, 143 seq., 

146 seq. 
the perception of the highest 

Lord in the, i, 147. 



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vedanta-sOtras. 



Fire, gastric, either the outward 
manifestation, or the limiting 
condition of the Lord, i, 149. 

— the simile of the sparks and the 

f. (individual souls and Brah- 
man), i, 277 n., 379 ; ii, 29, 30, 
61,62, 139. 

— the rite of carrying f. on the head 

is an attribute of the study of 
the Veda of the Atharvanikas, 
ii, 186, 189 seq. 

— sacrificial, the lighting of it not 

to be observed, since man's 
purpose is effected by know- 
ledge, ii, 306. 

— is Saman, ii, 345-349- 

— see also Agni. 

Fire-altars made of mind, &c, do not 
constitute part of the sacrificial 
action, i, p. lxxiv ; ii, 259- 
268. 

Fires, the fiction concerning the 
three sacred, i, 146. 

— five, viz. the heavenly world, 

Par^anya, the earth, man and 

woman, ii, 103. 
jraddha the oblation in the 

first of them, ii, 106. 
knowledge (vidyi) of the 

(=Kb. Up. V, 3-10), i, pp. 

lxxxiii, cviii; ii, 101-132, 186, 

187 seqq., 233, 234 seq., 298, 

383, 400, 403. 
a sixth fire mentioned by 

the Va^asaneyins in their, ii, 

187-189. 
Fire-sacrifice, individual soul, and 

the highest Self, the three 

points of discussion in the 

colloquy between Yama and 

Naiiketas, i, 247-252. 
Five-people, five, of the Brih. Up. are 

not the twenty-five principles of 

the Sankhyas, i, p. xl, 257-263. 
are the breath and so on, i, 

260-262. 
explained as Gods, Fathers, 

Gandharvas, Asuras, and Rak- 

shas, i, 261 seq. 
as the four castes together 

with the Nishidas, i, 262. 
created beings in general, i, 

262. 
Flamingo, able to distinguish and 

separate milk and water when 

mixed, ii, 149. 



Food, certain relaxations of the 
laws regarding f. are allowed 
only for cases of extreme need, 
i, p. Ixxv; ii, 309-312. 

— A'ruti and Smr/'ti on lawful and 

unlawful, ii, 311 seq. 

— the word ' f.' denotes ' earth,' ii, 

23 seq. 

— meditat