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NYPL RESEARCH UBRARIES 



3 3433 08185312 3 




tf 



— ■ 

lib 



The New York Public library 

Astor, Lenox & Tilden Foundations 

* ; * \: 

The R. Heber Newton 
Collection 

Presented by His Children 



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THE 

SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST 






[48] 

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HENRY FROWDE, M.A. 

PUBLISHER TO THB UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 

LONDON, EDINBURGH 

NEW YORK 



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THE 



SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST 



TRANSLATED 



BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS 



AND EDITED BY 



F. MAX MCLLER 



VOL. XLVIII 



©rfotD 

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
1904 

[All rights reserved] - *• * - " - 



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THE NEW YORK 
PUELIC LIBRARY 

537831 & 

A.-.TCP, L^NOX At r- 

T1LDEN FOJ JOA.T10NS 

R 1931 L 



OXFORD 

PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 

BY HORACE HART, M.A. 
FRINTEE TO THE UNIVERSITY 



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THE 



VEDANTA-SOTRAS 



WITH THE COMMENTARY OF 



RAMANUGA 



TRANSLATED BY 



GEORGE THIBAUT 



PART III 



©rfotu 

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
1904 

[All rights reserv«f\ 



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CONTENTS. 

vedanta-sOtras with the commentary 
of ramAnuga. 

T FACE 

Iktroduction j x 

AdhyAya I. 

PSdal , 

PSdaI1 .255 

Padalll 2g6 

PadaIV 354 

AdhyAya II. 

Padal 40 8 

Padall 48o 

P4daHl 532 

PadalV 5 68 

AdhyAya III. 

Padal 5 8 4 

PadaH 6oi 

PadaHI 629 

PadalV 686 

AdhyAya IV. 

P&dal 715 

Pitdall ?2 8 

Padalll 744 

PadalV 755 

Indexes by Dr. M. Winternitz : — 

Index of Quotations 773 

Index of Sanskrit Words 782 

Index of Names and Subjects 789 

Corrigenda 796 



Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the 

Translations of the Sacred Books of the East . . 797 



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INTRODUCTION. 

In the Introduction to the first volume of the translation 
of the * Vedanta-Sutras with Ankara's Commentary ' (vol. 
xxxiv of this Series) I have dwelt at some length on the 
interest which Ramdnufa's Commentary may claim — as 
being, on the one hand, the fullest exposition of what may 
be called the Theistic Vedanta, and as supplying us, on 
the other, with means of penetrating to the true meaning 
of Badarayawa's Aphorisms. I do not wish to enter here 
into a fuller discussion of Ramanu^a's work in either of 
these aspects ; an adequate treatment of them would, more- 
over, require considerably more space than is at my 
disposal Some very useful material for the right under- 
standing of Ramanu^a's work is to be found in the 
'Analytical Outline of Contents' which Messrs. M. Ran- 
ga£arya and M. B. Varadara^a Aiyangar have prefixed to 
the first volume of their scholarly translation of the 
.Sribhashya (Madras, 1899). 

The question as to what the Sutras really teach is a 
critical, not a philosophical one. This distinction seems 
to have been imperfectly realised by several of those 
critics, writing in India, who have examined the views ex- 
pressed in my Introduction to the translation of Sankara's 
Commentary. A writer should not be taxed with ' philo- 
sophic incompetency,' ' hopeless theistic bias due to early 
training,' and the like, simply because he, on the basis of 
a purely critical investigation, considers himself entitled to 
maintain that a certain ancient document sets forth one 
philosophical view rather than another. I have nowhere 
expressed an opinion as to the comparative philosophical 
value of the systems of .Sankara and Ramam\£a; not 
because I have no definite opinions on this point, but 
because to introduce them into a critical enquiry would 
be purposeless if not objectionable. 
The question as to the true meaning of the Sutras is 



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INTRODUCTION. 



no doubt of some interest ; although the interest of 
problems of this kind may easily be over-estimated. 
Among the remarks of critics on my treatment of this 
problem I have found little of solid value. The main argu- 
ments which I have set forth, not so much in favour of 
the adequacy of Ramanqga's interpretation, as against the 
validity of .Sahkara&lrya's understanding of the Sutras, 
appear to me not to have been touched. I do not by any 
means consider the problem a hopeless one ; but its solution 
will not be advanced, in any direction, but by those who 
will be at the trouble of submitting the entire body of the 
Sutras to a new and detailed investigation, availing them- 
selves to the full of the help that is to be derived from the 
study of all the existing Commentaries. 

The present translation of the .Sribhashya claims to be 
faithful on the whole, although I must acknowledge that 
I have aimed rather at making it intelligible and, in a 
certain sense, readable than scrupulously accurate. If 
I had to rewrite it, I should feel inclined to go even further 
in the same direction. Indian Philosophy would, in my 
opinion, be more readily and widely appreciated than it is 
at present, if the translators of philosophical works had been 
somewhat more concerned to throw their versions into a form 
less strange and repellent to the western reader than literal 
renderings from technical Sanskrit must needs be in many 
passages. I am not unaware of the peculiar dangers of 
the plan now advocated-r-among which the most obvious 
is the temptation it offers to the translator of deviating 
from the text more widely than regard for clearness would 
absolutely require. And I am conscious of having failed 
in this respect in more than one instance. In other 
cases I have no doubt gone astray through an imperfect 
understanding of the author's meaning. The fact is, that 
as yet the time has hardly come for fully adequate 
translations of comprehensive works of the type of the 
Sribhashya, the authors of which wrote with reference-^ 
in many cases tacit — to an immense and highly technical 
philosophical literature which is only just beginning to be 
studied, and comprehended in part, by European scholars. 



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INTRODUCTION. XI 



It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the help 

which I have received from various quarters in preparing this 

translation. Pa«<fit Gangidhara .Sastrin, C. I. E., of the 

Benares Sanskrit College, has, with unwearying kindness 

and patience, supplied me throughout with comments of 

his own on difficult sections of the text Vandit Svamin 

Rama MLrra Sastrin has rendered me frequent assistance 

in the earlier portion of my task. And to Mr. A. Venis, the 

learned Principal of the Benares Sanskrit College, I am 

indebted for most instructive notes on some passages of 

a peculiarly technical and abstruse character. Nor can 

/ conclude without expressing my sense of obligation to 

Colonel G. A. Jacob, whose invaluable ' Concordance to 

the Principal Upanishads' lightens to an incalculable 

degree the task of any scholar who is engaged in work 

bearing on the VedAnta. 



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vedanta-sOtras 

WITH 

RlMANUGA'S SRlBHASHYA. 



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FIRST ADHYAYA. 

FIRST PADA. 

May my mind be filled with devotion towards the 
highest Brahman, the abode of Lakshml ; who is luminously 
revealed in the Upanishads ; who in sport produces, sus- 
tains, and reabsorbs the entire Universe ; whose only aim 
is to foster the manifold classes of beings that humbly 
worship him. 

The nectar of the teaching of Parlrara's son (Vyasa), — 
which was brought up from the middle of the milk-ocean 
of the Upanishads — which restores to life the souls whose 
vital strength had departed owing to the heat of the fire 
of transmigratory existence — which was well guarded by 
the teachers of old — which was obscured by the mutual 
conflict of manifold opinions, — may intelligent men daily 
enjoy that as it is now presented to them in my words. 

The lengthy explanation (vritti) of the Brahma-sutras 
which was composed by the Reverend Bodhayana has 
been abridged by former teachers; according to their 
views the words of the Sutras will be explained in this 
present work. 

i. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman. 

In this Sutra the word 'then' expresses immediate 
sequence; the word 'therefore' intimates that what has 
taken place (viz. the study of the karmaka»</a of the Veda) 
constitutes the reason (of the enquiry into Brahman). For 
the fact is that the enquiry into (lit. ' the desire to know ') 
Brahman — the fruit of which enquiry is infinite in nature 
and permanent — follows immediately in the case of him 
who, having read the Veda together with its auxiliary 

B 2 



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4 vedAnta-sOtras. 



disciplines, has reached the knowledge that the fruit of 
mere works is limited and non-permanent, and hence has 
conceived the desire of final release. 

The compound * brahma.gT^wasa ' is to be explained as 
' the enquiry of Brahman,' the genitive case ' of Brahman * 
being understood to denote the object ; in agreement with 
the special rule as to the meaning of the genitive case, 
Pawini II, 3, 65. It might be said that even if we accepted 
the general meaning of the genitive case — which is that 
of connexion in general — Brahman's position (in the above 
compound) as an object would be established by the 
circumstance that the ' enquiry ' demands an object ; but 
in agreement with the principle that the direct denota- 
tion of a word is to be preferred to a meaning inferred 
we take the genitive case 'of Brahman' as denoting the 
object. 

The word * Brahman ' denotes the highest Person (puru- 
shottama), who is essentially free from all imperfections 
and possesses numberless classes of auspicious qualities of 
unsurpassable excellence. The term ' Brahman ' is applied 
to any things which possess the quality of greatness 
(brthattva, from the root 'br*h'); but primarily denotes 
that which possesses greatness, of essential nature as well 
as of qualities, in unlimited fulness ; and such is only the 
Lord of all. Hence the word ' Brahman ' primarily denotes 
him alone, and in a secondary derivative sense only those 
things which possess some small part of the Lord's quali- 
ties ; for it would be improper to assume several meanings 
for the word (so that it would denote primarily or directly 
more than one thing). The case is analogous to that of 
the term 'bhagavat 1 .' The Lord only is enquired into, 
for the sake of immortality, by all those who are afflicted 
with the triad of pain. Hence the Lord of all is that 
Brahman which, according to the Sutra, constitutes the 
object of enquiry. The word ( gigH&s(L' is a desiderative 
formation meaning 'desire to know.' And as in the 

1 'Bhagavat' denotes primarily the Lord, the Divinity; second- 
arily any holy person. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 



case of any desire the desired object is the chief thing, 
the Sutra means to enjoin knowledge — which is the 
object of the desire of knowledge. The purport of the 
entire Sutra then is as follows: 'Since the fruit of 
works known through the earlier part of the Mfmawsa 
is limited and non-permanent, and since the fruit of the 
knowledge of Brahman — which knowledge is to be reached 
through the latter part of the Mlmawtsa — is unlimited and 
permanent ; for this reason Brahman is to be known, after 
the knowledge of works has previously taken place.' — The 
same meaning is expressed by the Vrrttikara when saying 
' after the comprehension of works has taken place there 
follows the enquiry into Brahman.' And that the enquiry 
into works and that into Brahman constitute one body 
of doctrine, he (the VWttikara) will declare later on ' this 
.Sariraka-doctrine is connected with £aimini's doctrine as 
contained in sixteen adhyayas; this proves the two to 
constitute one body of doctrine.' Hence the earlier and 
the later Mimamsa are separate only in so far as there 
is a difference of matter to be taught by each ; in the same 
way as the two halves of the Purva Mtmawsa-sutras, con- 
sisting of six adhyayas each, are separate 1 ; and as each 
adhyaya is separate. The entire Mtmawisa-jastra — which 
begins with the Sutra 'Now therefore the enquiry into 
religious duty ' and concludes with the Sutra ' (From there 
is) no return on account of scriptural statement' — has, 
owing to the special character of the contents, a definite 
order of internal succession. This is as follows. At first 
the precept 'one is to learn one's own text (svadhyaya)' 
enjoins the apprehension of that aggregate of syllables 
which is called ' Veda,' and is here referred to as * sva- 
dhyaya.' Next there arises the desire to know of what 
nature the ' Learning ' enjoined is to be, and how it is to 
be done. Here there come in certain injunctions such as 

1 The first six books of the Pftrva M!mS»»sa-sutras give rules 
for the fundamental forms of the sacrifice ; while the last six books 
teach how these rules are to be applied to the so-called modified 
forms. 



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vedAnta-sAtras. 



' Let a Brahmawa be initiated in his eighth year ' and ' The 
teacher is to make him recite the Veda ' ; and certain rules 
about special observances and restrictions — such as ' having 
performed the upakarman on the full moon of Sr&vana. 
or Praush/Aapada according to prescription, he is to study 
the sacred verses for four months and a half — which enjoin 
all the required details. 

From all these it is understood that the study en- 
joined has for its result the apprehension of the aggregate 
of syllables called Veda, on the part of a pupil who has 
been initiated by a teacher sprung from a good family, 
leading a virtuous life, and possessing purity of soul ; 
who practises certain special observances and restric- 
tions ; and who learns by repeating what is recited by the 
teacher. 

And this study of the Veda is of the nature of a samskara 
of the text, since the form of the injunction ' the Veda is to 
be studied ' shows that the Veda is the object (of the 
action of studying). By a samskara is understood an action 
whereby something is fitted to produce some other effect ; 
and that the Veda should be the object of such a samskara 
is quite appropriate, since it gives rise to the knowledge 
of the four chief ends of human action — viz. religious duty, 
wealth, pleasure, and final release — and of the means to 
effect them; and since it helps to effect those ends by 
itself also, viz. by mere mechanical repetition (apart from 
any knowledge to which it may give rise). 

The injunction as to the study of the Veda thus aims 
only at the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables 
(constituting the Veda) according to certain rules; it is 
in this way analogous to the recital of mantras. 

It is further observed that the Veda thus apprehended 
through reading spontaneously gives rise to the ideas of 
certain things subserving certain purposes. A person, 
therefore, who has formed notions of those things imme- 
diately, i.e. on the mere apprehension of the text of the 
Veda through reading, thereupon naturally applies himself 
to the study of the Mimawsa, which consists in a methodical 
discussion of the sentences constituting the text of the 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 



Veda, and has for its result the accurate determination of 
the nature of those things and their different modes. 
Through this study the student ascertains the character 
of the injunctions of work which form part of the Veda, 
and observes that all work leads only to non-permanent 
results ; and as, on the other hand, he immediately becomes 
aware that the Upanishad sections — which form part of 
the Veda which he has apprehended through reading — 
refer to an infinite and permanent result, viz. immortality, 
he applies himself to the study of the Sariraka-Mima»»sa, 
which consists in a systematic discussion of the Vedanta- 
texts, and has for its result the accurate determination 
of their sense. That the fruit of mere works is transitory, 
while the result of the knowledge of Brahman is something 
permanent, the Vedanta-texts declare in many places — 
'And as here the world acquired by work perishes, so 
there the world acquired by merit perishes* (Kk. Up. VIII, 
1,6); « That work of his has an end ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 10) ; 
' By non-permanent works the Permanent is not obtained ' 
(Ka. Up. I, 2, io) ; ' Frail indeed are those boats, the 
sacrifices' (Mu. Up. I, 2, 7); 'Let a Brahmawa, after he 
has examined all these worlds that are gained by works, 
acquire freedom from all desires. What is not made can- 
not be gained by what is made. To understand this, let 
the pupil, with fuel in his hand, go to a teacher who is 
learned and dwells entirely in Brahman. To that pupil 
who has approached him respectfully, whose mind is alto- 
gether calm, the wise teacher truly told that knowledge 
of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable 
true Person' (Mu. Up. I, 2, 12, 13). — 'Told' here means 
' he is to tell.' — On the other hand, * He who knows Brah- 
man attains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who 
sees this does not see death' (Kk. Up. VII, 26, 2) ; 'He 
becomes a self-ruler' (Kk. Up. VII, 25, 2) ; ' Knowing him 
he becomes immortal here ' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 7) ; ' Having 
known him he passes over death ; there is no other path to 
go ' (Svtt. Up. VI, 15) ; ' Having known as separate his Self 
and the Mover, pleased thereby he goes to immortality' 
(Svet Up. I, 6). 



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8 vedAnta-sAtras. 



But — an objection here is raised — the mere learning of the 
Veda with its auxiliary disciplines gives rise to the know- 
ledge that the heavenly world and the like are the results 
of works, and that all such results are transitory, while 
immortality is the fruit of meditation on Brahman. Pos- 
sessing such knowledge, a person desirous of final release 
may at once proceed to the enquiry into Brahman ; and 
what need is there of a systematic consideration of religious 
duty (i. e. of the study of the Purva Mim&iwsft) ? — If this 
reasoning were valid, we reply, the person desirous of 
release need not even apply himself to the study of the 
Sarlraka Mimawsa, since Brahman is known from the mere 
reading of the Veda with its auxiliary disciplines. — True. 
Such knowledge arises indeed immediately (without deeper 
enquiry). But a matter apprehended in this immediate 
way is not raised above doubt and mistake. Hence a sys- 
tematic discussion of the Vedanta-texts must be under- 
taken in order that their sense may be fully ascertained. — 
We agree. But you will have to admit that for the very 
same reason we must undertake a systematic enquiry into 
religious duty ! 



THE SMALL pORVAPAKSHA. 

But — a further objection is urged— as that which has to 
precede the systematic enquiry into Brahman we should 
assign something which that enquiry necessarily presup- 
poses. The enquiry into the nature of duty, however, does 
not form such a prerequisite, since a consideration of the 
Vedanta-texts may be undertaken by any one who has 
read those texts, even if he is not acquainted with works. 
— But in the Vedanta-texts there are enjoined medita- 
tions on the Udgitha and the like which are matters 
auxiliary to works ; and such meditations are not possible 
for him who is not acquainted with those works! — You 
who raise this objection clearly are ignorant of what kind 
of knowledge the .Sarlraka Mtmawrsa is concerned with! 
What that jrastra aims at is to destroy completely that 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 



wrong knowledge which is the root of all pain, for man, 
liable to birth, old age, and death, and all the numberless 
other evils connected with transmigratory existence — evils 
that spring from the view, due to beginningless Nescience, 
that there is plurality of existence ; and to that end the 
j&stra endeavours to establish the knowledge of the unity 
of the Self. Now to this knowledge, the knowledge of 
works — which is based on the assumption of plurality of 
existence — is not only useless but even opposed. The 
consideration of the Udgitha and the like, which is sup- 
plementary to works only, finds a place in the Vedanta- 
texts, only because like them it is of the nature of know- 
ledge ; but it has no direct connexion with the true topic 
of those texts. Hence some prerequisite must be indicated 
which has reference to the principal topic of the jistra. — 
Quite so ; and this prerequisite is just the knowledge of 
works ; for scripture declares that final release results from 
knowledge with works added. The Sutra-writer himself 
says further on 'And there is need of all works, on account 
of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like ' (Ve. 
Su. Ill, 4, 26). And if the required works were not known, 
one could not determine which works have to be combined 
with knowledge and which not. Hence the knowledge 
of works is just the necessary prerequisite. — Not so, we 
reply. That which puts an end to Nescience is exclu- 
sively the knowledge of Brahman, which is pure intelligence 
and antagonistic to all plurality. For final release consists 
just in the cessation of Nescience ; how then can works — to 
which there attach endless differences connected with caste, 
inama, object to be accomplished, means and mode of 
accomplishment, &c. — ever supply a means for the cessation 
of ignorance, which is essentially the cessation of the view 
that difference exists? That works, the results of which 
are transitory, are contrary to final release, and that such 
release can be effected through knowledge only, scripture 
declares in many places ; compare all the passages quoted 
above (p. 7). 

As to the assertion that knowledge requires sacrifices 
and other works, we remark that — as follows from the 



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io vedAnta-sOtras. 



essential contrariety of knowledge and works, and as further 
appears from an accurate consideration of the words of 
scripture — pious works can contribute only towards the. 
rise of the desire of knowledge, in so far namely as they 
clear the internal organ (of knowledge), but can have no 
influence on the production of the fruit, i. e. knowledge 
itself. For the scriptural passage concerned runs as fol- 
lows : ' Brahmanas desire to know him by the study of the 
Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts,' &c. (Br*. Up. XI, 4, 22). 

According to this passage, the desire only of knowledge 
springs up through works ; while another text teaches that 
calmness, self-restraint, and so on, are the direct means for 
the origination of knowledge itself. (Having become tran- 
quil, calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, he is 
to see the Self within the Self (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 23).) 

The process thus is as follows. After the mind of a man 
has been cleaned of all impurities through works per- 
formed in many preceding states of existence, without a 
view to special forms of reward, there arises in him the 
desire of knowledge, and thereupon — through knowledge 
itself originated by certain scriptural texts — ' Being only, 
this was in the beginning, one only without a second' 
(Kh. Up. VI, 1, a); 'Truth, Knowledge, the Infinite, is 
Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ; ' Without parts, without actions, 
calm, without fault, without taint ' (Svet. Up. VI, 19) ; ' This 
Self is Brahman ' (Br*. Up. II, 5, 19) ; « Thou art that ' (Kk. 
Up. VI, 9, 7), Nescience comes to an end. Now, ' hear- 
ing,' * reflection,' and ' meditation,' are helpful towards 
cognising the sense of these Vedic texts. 'Hearing' 
(jxavawa) means the apprehension of the sense of scripture, 
together with collateral arguments, from a teacher who 
possesses the true insight, viz. that the Vedanta-texts 
establish the doctrine of the unity of the Self. ' Reflec- 
tion ' (mananam) means the confirmation within oneself of 
the sense taught by the teacher, by means of arguments 
showing it alone to be suitable. ' Meditation ' (nididhyasa- 
nam) finally means the constant holding of that sense before 
one's mind, so as to dispel thereby the antagonistic begin- 
ningless imagination of plurality. In the case of him who 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. n 

through ' hearing,' * reflection,' and meditation,' has dis- 
dispelled the entire imagination of plurality, the knowledge 
of the sense of Vedanta-texts puts an end to Nescience ; 
and what we therefore require is a statement of the indis- 
pensable prerequisites of such ' hearing,' ' reflection,' and so 
on. Now of such prerequisites there are four, viz. dis- 
crimination of what is permanent and what is non-perma- 
nent ; the full possession of calmness of mind, self-restraint 
and similar means ; the renunciation of all enjoyment of 
fruits here below as well as in the next world ; and the 
desire of final release. 

Without these the desire of knowledge cannot arise; 
and they are therefore known, from the very nature of the 
matter, to be necessary prerequisites. To sum up: The 
root of bondage is the unreal view of plurality which itself 
has its root in Nescience that conceals the true being of 
Brahman. Bondage itself thus is unreal, and is on that 
account cut short, together with its root, by mere know- 
ledge. Such knowledge is originated by texts such as 
' That art thou ' ; and work is of no help either towards its 
nature, or its origination, or its fruit (i. e. release). It is 
on the other hand helpful towards the desire of knowledge, 
which arises owing to an increase of the element of good- 
ness (sattva) in the soul, due to the destruction of the 
elements of passion (ra^as) and darkness (tamas) which are 
the root of all moral evil. This use is referred to in the 
text quoted above, ' Brahmawas wish to know him,' &c. 
As, therefore, the knowledge of works is of no use towards 
the knowledge of Brahman, we must acknowledge as the 
prerequisite of the latter knowledge the four means men- 
tioned above. 

THE SMALL SIDDHANTA. 

To this argumentation we make the following reply. 
We admit that release consists only in the cessation of 
Nescience, and that this cessation results entirely from 
the knowledge of Brahman. But a distinction has here 
to be made regarding the nature of this knowledge which 



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1 2 vedAnta-sOtras. 



the Vedanta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of 
putting an end to Nescience. Is it merely the know- 
ledge of the sense of sentences which originates from the 
sentences? or is it knowledge in the form of meditation 
(upasana) which has the knowledge just referred to as its 
antecedent ? It cannot be knowledge of the former kind ; 
for such knowledge springs from the mere apprehension of 
the sentence, apart from any special injunction, and more- 
over we do not observe that the cessation of Nescience is 
effected by such knowledge merely. Our adversary will 
perhaps attempt to explain things in the following way. 
The Vedanta-texts do not, he will say, produce that know- 
ledge which makes an end of Nescience, so long as the 
imagination of plurality is not dispelled. And the fact that 
such knowledge, even when produced, does not at once and 
for every one put a stop to the view of plurality by no means 
subverts my opinion ; for, to mention an analogous in- 
stance, the double appearance of the moon — presenting itself 
to a person affected with a certain weakness of vision — does 
not come to an end as soon as the oneness of the moon 
has been apprehended by reason. Moreover, even without 
having come to an end, the view of plurality is powerless to 
effect further bondage, as soon as the root, i. e. Nescience, 
has once been cut But this defence we are unable to 
admit. It is impossible that knowledge should not arise 
when its means, i. e. the texts conveying knowledge, are once 
present. And we observe that even when there exists an 
antagonistic imagination (interfering with the rise of know- 
ledge), information given by competent persons, the pres- 
ence of characteristic marks (on which a correct inference 
may be based), and the like give rise to knowledge which 
sublates the erroneous imagination. Nor can we admit 
that even after the sense of texts has been apprehended, 
the view of plurality may continue owing to some small 
remainder of beginningless imagination. For as this ima- 
gination which constitutes the means for the view of 
plurality is itself false, it is necessarily put an end to by 
the rise of true knowledge. If this did not take place, that 
imagination would never come to an end, since there is no 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 13 

other means but knowledge to effect its cessation. To say 
that the view of plurality, which is the effect of that imagi- 
nation, continues even after its root has been cut, is mere 
nonsense. The instance of some one seeing the moon 
double is not analogous. For in his case the non-cessation 
of wrong knowledge explains itself from the circumstance 
that the cause of wrong knowledge, viz. the real defect of 
the eye which does not admit of being sublated by know- 
ledge, is not removed, although that which would sublate 
wrong knowledge is near. On the other hand, effects, 
such as fear and the like, may come to an end because they 
can be sublated by means of knowledge of superior force. 
Moreover, if it were true that knowledge arises through the 
dispelling of the imagination of plurality, the rise of know- 
ledge would really never be brought about. For the 
imagination of plurality has through gradual growth in the 
course of beginningless time acquired an infinite strength, 
and does not therefore admit of being dispelled by the 
comparatively weak conception of non-duality. Hence 
we conclude that the knowledge which the Vedanta-texts 
aim at inculcating is a knowledge other than the mere 
knowledge of the sense of sentences, and denoted by 
'dhyana,' 'upasana' (i.e. meditation), and similar terms. 

With this agree scriptural texts such as 'Having known 
it, let him practise meditation' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, ai); 'He 
who, having searched out the Self, knows it' (Kh. Up. 
VIII, 7, 1); 'Meditate on the Self as Om* (Mu. .Up. 
II, a, 6); 'Having known that, he is freed from the jaws 
of death ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15) ; ' Let a man meditate on the 
Self only as his world' (Br/. Up. I, 4, 15); 'The Self 
is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be medi- 
tated on ' (Br/. Up. IV, 5, 6) ; ' That we must search out, 
that we must try to understand ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1). 

(According to the principle of the oneness of purport 
of the different jakhas) all these texts must be viewed as 
agreeing in meaning with the injunction of meditation 
contained in the passage quoted from the Br/. Up. ; and 
what they enjoin is therefore meditation. In the first 
and second passages quoted, the words 'having known' and 



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14 vedAnta-sOtras. 



' having searched out ' (vjgtfaya ; anuvidya) contain a mere 
reference to (not injunction of) the apprehension of the 
meaning of texts, such apprehension subserving medi- 
tation; while the injunction of meditation (which is the 
true purport of the passages) is conveyed by the clauses 
' let him practise meditation ' (pragn&m kurvita) and ' he 
knows it' In the same way the clause ' the Self is to be 
heard' is a mere anuvada, i.e. a mere reference to what 
is already established by other means ; for a person who 
has read the Veda observes that it contains instruction 
about matters connected with certain definite purposes, and 
then on his own account applies himself to methodical 
'hearing,' in order definitely to ascertain these matters; 
'hearing' thus is established already. In the same way 
the clause 'the Self is to be reflected upon' is a mere 
anuvada of reflection which is known as a means of con- 
firming what one has 'heard.' It is therefore meditation 
only which all those texts enjoin. In agreement with 
this a later Sutra also says, ' Repetition more than once, 
on account of instruction ' (Ve. Su. IV, i, i). That the 
knowledge intended to be enjoined as the means of final 
release is of the nature of meditation, we conclude from the 
circumstance that the terms 'knowing' and 'meditating' 
are seen to be used in place of each other in the earlier 
and later parts of Vedic texts. Compare the following 
passages : ' Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,' 
and 'he who knows this shines and warms through his 
celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance' (Kh. Up. 
Ill, 1 8, i ; 6). And ' He does not know him, for he is not 
complete,' and 'Let men meditate on him as the Self 
(Br*. Up. I, 4, 7). And ' He who knows what he knows,' 
and 'Teach me the deity on which you meditate' {Kk. 
Up. IV, i, 6; 2,a). 

'Meditation' means steady remembrance, i.e. a con- 
tinuity of steady remembrance, uninterrupted like the flow 
of oil; in agreement with the scriptural passage which 
declares steady remembrance to be the means of release, 
'on the attainment of remembrance all the ties are 
loosened ' (Kk. Up. VII, 26, 2). Such remembrance is of 



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iadhyAya, i pada, i. 15 

the same character (form) as seeing (intuition); for the 
passage quoted has the same purport as the following one, 
' The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, 
and all the works of that man perish when he has been 
seen who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). And this 
being so, we conclude that the passage ' the Self is to be 
seen ' teaches that ' Meditation ' has the character of ' see- 
ing' or 'intuition.' And that remembrance has the 
character of ' seeing ' is due to the element of imagination 
(representation) which prevails in it. All this has been set 
forth at length by the Vakyakara. * Knowledge (vedana) 
means meditation (upisana), scripture using the word in 
that sense' ; i. e. in all Upanishads that knowledge which is 
enjoined as the means of final release is Meditation. The 
Vakyakara then propounds a purvapaksha (prima fade 
view), 'Once he is to make the meditation, the matter 
enjoined by scripture being accomplished thereby, as in the 
case of the praya^as and the like ' ; and then sums up 
against this in the words ' but (meditation) is established 
on account of the term meditation' ; that means — know- 
ledge repeated more than once (i.e. meditation) is deter- 
mined to be the means of Release. — The Vakyakara then 
goes on ' Meditation is steady remembrance, on the ground 
of observation and statement.' That means — this know- 
ledge, of the form of meditation, and repeated more than 
once, is of the nature of steady remembrance 

Such remembrance has been declared to be of the 
character of ' seeing,' and this character of seeing consists 
in its possessing the character of immediate presentation 
(pratyakshata). With reference to remembrance, which thus 
acquires the character of immediate presentation and is the 
means of final release, scripture makes a further determina- 
tion, viz. in the passage Ka. Up. II, 23, ' That Self cannot 
be gained by the study of the Veda (" reflection "), nor by 
thought (" meditation "), nor by much hearing. Whom the 
Self chooses, by him it may be gained ; to him the Self 
reveals its being.' This text says at first that mere hear- 
ing, reflection, and meditation do not suffice to gain the 
Self, and then declares, ' Whom the Self chooses, by him 



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1 6 vedAnta-sOtras. 



it may be gained.' Now a 'chosen' one means a most 
beloved person ; the relation being that he by whom that 
Self is held most dear is most dear to the Self. That the 
Lord (bhagavan) himself endeavours that this most beloved 
person should gain the Self, he himself declares in the 
following words, ' To those who are constantly devoted and 
worship with love I give that knowledge by which they 
reach me ' (Bha. Gt. X, 10), and ' To him who has know- 
ledge I am dear above all things, and he is dear to me ' 
(VII, 17). Hence, he who possesses remembrance, marked 
by the character of immediate presentation (sakshatkara), 
and which itself is dear above all things since the object 
remembered is such ; he, we say, is chosen by the highest 
Self, and by him the highest Self is gained. Steady 
remembrance of this kind is designated by the word 
' devotion ' (bhakti) ; for this term has the same meaning 
as upasana (meditation). For this reason scripture and 
smrzti agree in making the following declarations, ' A man 
knowing him passes over death ' (5vet. Up. Ill, 8) ; ' Know- 
ing him thus he here becomes immortal' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 
12,7) ; 'Neither by theVedas, nor by austerities, nor by gifts, 
nor by sacrifice can I be so seen as thou hast seen me. But 
by devotion exclusive I may in this form be known and 
seen in truth, O Ar^una, and also be entered into ' (Bha. 
Gt. XI, 53, 54); 'That highest Person, O Partha, may be 
obtained by exclusive devotion ' (VIII, 22). 

That of such steady remembrance sacrifices and so on 
are means will be declared later on (Ve. Su. Ill, 4, 26). 
Although sacrifices and the like are enjoined with a view 
to the origination of knowledge (in accordance with the 
passage ' They desire to know,' Br*. Up. IV, 4, a 2), it is 
only knowledge in the form of meditation which — being 
daily practised, constantly improved by repetition, and 
continued up to death — is the means of reaching Brahman, 
and hence all the works connected with the different 
conditions of life are to be performed throughout life only 
for the purpose of originating such knowledge. This the 
Sutrakara declares in Ve. Su. IV, 1, ia; 16; III, 4,33, 
and other places. The Vakyakara also declares that 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 17 

steady remembrance results only from abstention, and so 
on; his words being 'This (viz. steady remembrance =n 
meditation) is obtained through abstention (viveka), freeness 
of mind (vimoka), repetition (abhyasa), works (kriya), 
virtuous conduct (kalyawa), freedom from dejection (ana- 
vasada), absence of exultation (anuddharsha) ; according to 
feasibility and scriptural statement.' The Vakyakara also 
gives definitions of all these terms. Abstention (viveka) 
means keeping the body clean from all food, impure either 
owing to species (such as the flesh of certain animals), or 
abode (such as food belonging to a Kindd-la. or the like), 
or accidental cause (such as food into which a hair or the 
like has fallen). The scriptural passage authorising this 
point is Kh. Up. VII, 26, 'The food being pure, the mind 
becomes pure ; the mind being pure, there results steady 
remembrance.' Freeness of mind (vimoka) means absence 
of attachment to desires. The authoritative passage here 
is ' Let him meditate with a calm mind ' (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1). 
Repetition means continued practice. For this point the 
Bhashya-kara quotes an authoritative text from Smrtti, 
viz. : * Having constantly been absorbed in the thought of 
that being' (sada tadbhavabhavitaA ; Bha. Gi. VIII, 6).— By 
'works' (kriya) is understood the performance, according 
to one's ability, of the five great sacrifices. The authori- 
tative passages here are ' This person who performs works 
is the best of those who know Brahman ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 
1,4); and 'Him Brahma»as seek to know by recitation 
of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting ' 
(Bn. Up. IV, 4, 32). — By virtuous conduct (kalya«ani) are 
meant truthfulness, honesty, kindness, liberality, gentleness, 
absence of covetousness. Confirmatory texts are ' By truth 
he is to be obtained' (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 5), and 'to them 
belongs that pure Brahman-world ' (Pr. Up. I, 1 6). — That 
lowness of spirit or want of cheerfulness which results from 
unfavourable conditions of place or time and the remem- 
brance of causes of sorrow, is denoted by the term ' dejec- 
tion'; the contrary of this is 'freedom from dejection.' 
The relevant scriptural passage is 'This Self cannot be 
obtained by one lacking in strength' (Mu. Up. Ill, a, 4). 
[48] C 



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1 8 vedAnta-sOtras. 



— ' Exultation ' is that satisfaction of mind which springs 
from circumstances opposite to those just mentioned ; the 
contrary is ' absence of exultation.' Overgreat satisfaction 
also stands in the way (of meditation). The scriptural 
passage for this is ' Calm, subdued,' &c. (Br». Up. IV, 4, 
23). — What the V&kyakara means to say is therefore that 
knowledge is realised only through the performance of the 
duly prescribed works, on the part of a person fulfilling all 
the enumerated conditions. 

Analogously another scriptural passage says ' He who 
knows both knowledge and non-knowledge together, over- 
coming death by non-knowledge reaches the Immortal 
through knowledge' (ts. Up. 11). Here the term 'non- 
knowledge' denotes the works enjoined on the different 
castes and Irramas ; and the meaning of the text is that, 
having discarded by such works death, i.e. the previous 
works antagonistic to the origination of knowledge, a man 
reaches the Immortal, i.e. Brahman, through knowledge. 
The non-knowledge of which this passage speaks as being 
the means of overcoming death can only mean that which 
is other than knowledge, viz. prescribed works. The word 
has the same sense in the following passage : ' Firm in 
traditional knowledge he offered many sacrifices, leaning 
on the knowledge of Brahman, so as to pass beyond death 
by non-knowledge' (Vi. Pu. VI, 6, 13). — Antagonistic to 
knowledge (as said above) are all good and evil actions, and 
hence — as equally giving rise to an undesirable result — they 
may both be designated as evil. They stand in the way of 
the origination of knowledge in so far as they strengthen the 
elements of passion and darkness which are antagonistic to 
the element of goodness which is the cause of the rise of 
knowledge. That evil works stand in the way of such 
origination, the following scriptural text declares : * H e 
makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these 
worlds do an evil deed ' (Ka. Up. Ill, 8). That passion 
and darkness veil the knowledge of truth while goodness 
on the other hand gives rise to it, the Divine one has 
declared himself, in the passage 'From goodness springs 
knowledge' (Bha. Gl. XIV, 17). Hence, in order that 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 19 



knowledge may arise, evil works have to be got rid of, 
and this is effected by the performance of acts of religious 
duty not aiming at some immediate result (such as the 
heavenly world and the like) ; according to the text ' by 
works of religious duty he discards all evil.' Knowledge 
which is the means of reaching Brahman, thus requires the 
works prescribed for the different Irramas; and hence 
the systematic enquiry into works (i. e. the Purva Mimamsa) 
— from which we ascertain the nature of the works required 
and also the transitoriness and limitation of the fruits of 
mere works — forms a necessary antecedent to the systematic 
enquiry into Brahman. Moreover the discrimination of 
permanent and non-permanent things, &c. (i. e. the tetrad 
of ' means ' mentioned above, p. 1 1) cannot be accom- 
plished without the study of the M! mawsa ; for unless we 
ascertain all the distinctions of fruits of works, means, 
modes of procedure and qualification (on the part of the 
agent) we can hardly understand the true nature of works, 
their fruits, the transitoriness or non-transitoriness of the 
latter, the permanence of the Self, and similar matters. 
That those conditions (viz. nityanityavastuviveka, xama, 
dama, &c.) are ' means ' must be determined on the basis 
of viniyoga (' application ' which determines the relation 
of principal and subordinate matters — angin and anga) ; 
and this viniyoga which depends on direct scriptural state- 
ment (miti), inferential signs (linga), and so on, is treated 
of in the third book of the Purva Mtmaw/sa-sutras. And 
further we must, in this connexion, consider also the 
meditations on the Udgttha and similar things — which, 
although aiming at the success of works, are of the nature 
of reflections on Brahman (which is viewed in them under 
various forms) — and as such have reference to knowledge of 
Brahman. Those works also (with which these meditations 
are connected) aim at no special results of their own, and 
produce and help to perfect the knowledge of Brahman : 
they are therefore particularly connected with the enquiry 
into Brahman. And that these meditations presuppose 
an understanding of the nature of works is admitted by 
everyone. 

C 2 



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20 vedAnta-sOtras. 



THE GREAT PURVAPAKSHA. 
The only Reality is Brahman. 

Brahman, which is pure intelligence and opposed to all 
difference, constitutes the only reality ; and everything else, 
i. e. the plurality of manifold knowing subjects, objects of 
knowledge, and acts of knowledge depending on those 
two, is only imagined on (or 'in') that Brahman, and is 
essentially false. 

' In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which 
is, one only without a second' (Kh. Up. VI, a, i) ; ' The 
higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is 
apprehended ' (Mu. Up. I, i, 5) ; ' That which cannot be 
seen nor seized, which has no eyes nor ears, no hands nor 
feet, the permanent, the all-pervading, the most subtle, the 
imperishable which the wise regard as the source of all 
beings' (Mu. Up. 1, 1, 6) ; ' The True, knowledge, the Infinite 
is Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ; 'He who is without parts, 
without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint ' (Svet 
Up. VI, 19) ; 'By whom it is not thought, by him it is 
thought; he by whom it is thought knows it not It 
is not known by those who know it, known by those who 
do not know it ' (Ke. Up. II, 3) ; ' Thou mayest not see 
the seer of sight ; thou mayest not think the thinker of 
thought ' (Br*. Up. Ill, 4, a) ; ' Bliss is Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. 

III, 6, 1); 'All this is that Self (Br*. Up. IV, 5, 7); 
' There is here no diversity whatever' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 19) ; 
'From death to death goes he who sees any difference 
here ' (Ka. Up. II, 4, 10) ; ' For where there is duality as 
it were, there one sees the other ' ; ' but where the Self has 
become all of him, by what means, and whom, should he 
see ? by what means, and whom, should he know ? ' (Br*. Up. 

IV, 5, 15) ; ' the effect is a name merely which has its 
origin in speech ; the truth is that (the thing made of clay) 
is clay merely' (Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4); 'for if he makes but 
the smallest distinction in it there is fear for him ' (Taitt. 
Up. II, 7) ; — the two following Vedanta-sOtras : III, a, 1 1 ; 
III, a, 3 — the following passages from the Vish»u-pura«a : 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, I. 21 

'In which all difference vanishes, which is pure Being, 
which is not the object of words, which is known by the 
Self only — that knowledge is called Brahman' (VI, 7, 53) ; 
' Him whose essential nature is knowledge, who is stain- 
less in reality ' ; ' Him who, owing to erroneous view, 
abides in the form of things' (I, a, 6); 'the Reality thou 
art alone, there is no other, O Lord of the world! — 
whatever matter is seen belongs to thee whose being is 
knowledge ; but owing to their erroneous opinion the non- 
devout look on it as the form of the world. This whole 
world has knowledge for its essential nature, but the 
Unwise viewing it as being of the nature of material 
things are driven round on the ocean of delusion. Those 
however who possess true knowledge and pure minds see 
this whole world as having knowledge for its Self, as thy 
form, O highest Lord ! ' (Vi. Pu. 1, 4, 38 ff.).— ' Of that Self, 
although it exists in one's own and in other bodies, the 
knowledge is of one kind, and that is Reality ; those who 
maintain duality hold a false view' (II, 14, 31) ; ' If there 
is some other one, different from me, then it can be said, 
"I am this and that one is another"' (II, 13, 86); 'As 
owing to the difference of the holes of the flute the air 
equally passing through them all is called by the names 
of the different notes of the musical scale ; so it is with the 
universal Self (II, 14, 3a) ; 'He is I ; he is thou ; he is 
all : this Universe is his form. Abandon the error of 
difference. The king being thus instructed, abandoned 
the view of difference, having gained an intuition of Reality ! 
(II, 16, 24). 'When that view which gives rise to differ- 
ence is absolutely destroyed, who then will make the 
untrue distinction between the individual Self and Brah- 
man?' (VI, 7, 94). — The following passages from the 
Bhagavad-Gtta : 'lam the Self dwelling within all beings ' 
(X, ao) ; ' Know me to be the soul within all bodies ' (XIII, 
2) ; ' Being there is none, movable or immovable, which is 
without me' (X, 39). — All these and other texts, the purport 
of which clearly is instruction as to the essential nature of 
things, declare that Brahman only, i. e. non-differenced pure 
intelligence is real, while everything else is false. 



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22 VEDANTA-sfJTRAS. 



The appearance of plurality is due to avidya. 

' Falsehood ' (mithyatva) belongs to what admits of being 
terminated by the cognition of the real thing — such cogni- 
tion being preceded by conscious activity (not by mere 
absence of consciousness or knowledge). The snake, e. g. 
which has for its substrate a rope or the like is false ; for 
it is due to an imperfection (dosha) that the snake is 
imagined in (or 'on') the rope. In the same way this 
entire world, with its distinctions of gods, men, animals, 
inanimate matter, and so on, is, owing to an imperfection, 
wrongly imagined in the highest Brahman whose substance 
is mere intelligence, and therefore is false in so far as it 
may be sublated by the cognition of the nature of the real 
Brahman. What constitutes that imperfection is beginning- 
less Nescience (avidya), which, hiding the truth of things, 
gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot be denned either 
as something that is or as something that is not. — ' By the 
Untrue they are hidden; of them which are true the 
Untrue is the covering' {Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 1) ; 'Know 
Maya to be Prakrt'ti, and the great Lord him who is 
associated with Maya ' (.Svet. Up. IV, 10) ; ' Indra appears 
manifold through the Mayas ' (Br/. Up. II, 5, 19) ; ' My 
Maya is hard to overcome ' (Bha. Gf. VII, 14) ; ' When the 
soul slumbering in beginningless Maya awakes* (Gau. Ka. 
I, 16). — These and similar texts teach that it is through 
beginningless Maya that to Brahman which truly is pure 
non-differenced intelligence its own nature hides itself, 
and that it sees diversity within itself. As has been said, 
'Because the Holy One is essentially of the nature of 
intelligence, the form of all, but not material; therefore 
know that all particular things like rocks, oceans, hills and 
so on, have proceeded from intelligence *. But when, on 



1 In agreement with the use made of this passage by the Purva- 
pakshin, v^flina must here be understood in the sense of avidya. 
Vi^a&nasabdena vividha/n £#ayate«neneti kara»avyutpattya«vidya 
.bhidhtyate. Sru. Pra. 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 2$ 

the cessation of all work, everything is only pure intelli- 
gence in its own proper form, without any imperfections ; 
then no differences — the fruit of the tree of wishes — any 
longer exist between things. Therefore nothing whatever, 
at any place or any time, exists apart from intelligence : 
intelligence, which is one only, is viewed as manifold by 
those whose minds are distracted by the effects of their 
own works. Intelligence pure, free from stain, free from 
grief, free from all contact with desire and other affections, 
everlastingly one is the highest Lord — Vasudeva apart 
from whom nothing exists. I have thus declared to you 
the lasting truth of things — that intelligence only is true 
and everything else untrue. And that also which is the 
cause of ordinary worldly existence has been declared to 
you ' (Vi. Pu. II, i a, 39, 40, 43"45)- 

Avidyft is put an end to by true Knowledge. 

Other texts declare that this Nescience comes to an end 
through the cognition of the essential unity of the Self 
with Brahman which is nothing but non-differenced intelli- 
gence. ' He does not again go to death ; ' ' He sees this 
as one ; ' ' He who sees this does not see death ' (Kh. Up. 
VI, 27); 'When he finds freedom from fear and rest in 
that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, ' 
then he has obtained the fearless ' (Taitt. Up. II, 7) ; * The 
fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved and all 
his works perish when he has been beheld who is high and 
low ' (Mu. Up. II, a, 8) ; ' He knows Brahman, he becomes 
Brahman only' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9); 'Knowing him only 
a man passes over death; there is no other path to go' 
(Svet. Up. Ill, 8). In these and similar passages, the term 
'death ' denotes Nescience ; analogously to the use of the 
term in the following words of Sanatsu^ata, ' Delusion 
I call death ; and freedom from delusion I call immortality ' 
(Sanatsig*. II, 5). The knowledge again of the essential 
unity and non-difference of Brahman — which is ascertained 
from decisive texts such as 'The True, knowledge, the 
Infinite is Brahman ' (Taitt Up. II, 1); ' Knowledge, bliss is 



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24 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Brahman' (Br*. Up. Ill, 9, 28) — is confirmed by other 
passages, such as 'Now if a man meditates on another 
deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does 
not know ' (Br*. Up. I, 4, 10) ; * Let men meditate upon 
him as the Self (Br*. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Thou art that' {Kh. 
Up. VI, 8, 7); * Am I thou, O holy deity? and art thou 
me, O holy deity ?'; ' What I am that is he ; what he is 
that am I.'— This the Sutrakara himself will declare ' But 
as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us 
apprehend (the Lord)' (Ve. SO. IV, i, 3). Thus the Vakya- 
kara also, ' It is the Self — thus one should apprehend (every- 
thing), for everything is effected by that.' And to hold 
that by such cognition of the oneness of Brahman essentially 
false bondage, together with its cause, comes to an end, is 
only reasonable. 

Scripture is of greater force than Perception. 

But, an objection is raised — how can knowledge, spring- 
ing from the sacred texts, bring about a cessation of the 
view of difference, in manifest opposition to the evidence 
of Perception? — How then, we rejoin, can the knowledge 
that this thing is a rope and not a snake bring about, in 
opposition to actual perception, the cessation of the (idea 
of the) snake ? — You will perhaps reply that in this latter 
case there is a conflict between two forms of perception, 
while in the case under discussion the conflict is between 
direct perception and Scripture which is based on percep- 
tion. But against this we would ask the question how, in 
the case of a conflict between two equal cognitions, we 
decide as to which of the two is refuted (sublated) by the 
other. If — as is to be expected — you reply that what 
makes the difference between the two is that one of them 
is due to a defective cause while the other is not : we point 
out that this distinction holds good also in the case of 
Scripture and perception being in conflict It is not con- 
siderations as to the equality of conflicting cognitions, as 
to their being dependent or independent, and so on, that 
determine which of the two sublates the other ; if that were 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 25 

the case, the perception which presents to us the flame of 
the lamp as one only would not be sublated by the cogni- 
tion arrived at by inference that there is a succession of 
different flames. Wherever there is a conflict between 
cognitions based on two different means of knowledge we 
assign the position of the 'sublated one' to that which 
admits of being accounted for in some other way ; while 
that cognition which affords no opening for being held 
unauthoritative and cannot be accounted for in another 
way, is the ' sublating one V This is the principle on which 
the relation between ' what sublates ' and ' what is sublated ' 
is decided everywhere. Now apprehension of Brahman — 
which is mere intelligence, eternal, pure, free, self-luminous 
— is effected by Scripture which rests on endless unbroken 
tradition, cannot therefore be suspected of any, even the 
least, imperfection, and hence cannot be non-authoritative ; 
the state of bondage, on the other hand, with its manifold 
distinctions is proved by Perception, Inference, and so on, 
which are capable of imperfections and therefore may be 
non-authoritative. It is therefore reasonable to conclude 
that the state of bondage is put an end to by the appre- 
hension of Brahman. And that imperfection of which 
Perception — through which we apprehend a world of mani- 
fold distinctions — may be assumed to be capable, is so- 
called Nescience, which consists in the beginningless wrong 
imagination of difference. — Well then — a further objection 
is raised — let us admit that Scripture is perfect because 

1 The distinction is illustrated by the different views Perception 
and Inference cause us to take of the nature of the flame of the 
lamp. To Perception the flame, as long as it burns, seems one 
and the same: but on the ground of the observation that the 
different particles of the wick and the oil are consumed in succes- 
sion, we infer that there are many distinct flames succeeding one 
another. And we accept the Inference as valid, and as sublating 
or refuting the immediate perception, because the perceived oneness 
of the flame admits of being accounted for * otherwise,' viz. on the 
ground of the many distinct flames originating in such rapid suc- 
cession that the eye mistakes them for one. The inference on the 
other hand does not admit of being explained in another way. 



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26 vedAnta-sOtras. 



resting on an endless unbroken tradition ; but must we 
then not admit that texts evidently presupposing the view 
of duality, as e. g. 'Let him who desires the heavenly 
world offer the £yotish/bma-sacrifice ' — are liable to refuta- 
tion ? — True, we reply. As in the case of the Udgatr* and 
Pratihartr* breaking the chain (not at the same time, but) 
in succession 1 , so here also the earlier texts (which refer 
to duality and transitory rewards) are sublated by the later 
texts which teach final release, and are not themselves 
sublated by anything else. 

The texts which represent Brahman as devoid of 
qualities have greater force. 

The same reasoning applies to those passages in the 
Vedanta-texts which inculcate meditation on the qualified 
Brahman, since the highest Brahman is without any quali- 
ties. — But consider such passages as ' He who cognises all, 
who knows all ' (Mu. Up. I, i, 9) ; ' His high power is 
revealed as manifold, as essential, acting as force and 
knowledge ' (.Svet. Up. VI, 8) ; ' He whose wishes are true, 
whose purposes are true' (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5) ; how can 
these passages, which clearly aim at denning the nature 
of Brahman, be liable to refutation ? — Owing to the greater 
weight, we reply, of those texts which set forth Brahman 
as devoid of qualities. ' It is not coarse, not fine, not short, 
not long' (Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 8); 'The True, knowledge, 
infinite is Brahman ' (Taitt Up. II, 1) ; ' That which is free 
from qualities,' 'that which is free from stain' — these and 
similar texts convey the notion of Brahman being change- 
less, eternal intelligence devoid of all difference ; while the 
other texts — quoted before — teach the qualified Brahman. 
And there being a conflict between the two sets of passages, 
we — according to the Mlmawsa principle referred to above 
— decide that the texts referring to Brahman as devoid 
of qualities are of greater force, because they are later in 

1 The reference is to the point discussed Pft. Ml. Su. VI, 5, 54 
(Gaim. Nya. Mali Vistara, p. 285). 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 2^ 

order 1 than those which speak of Brahman as having quali- 
ties. Thus everything is settled. 



The text Taitt. Up. II, 1 refers to Brahman as 
devoid of qualities. 

But — an objection is raised — even the passage ' The True, 
knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' intimates certain qualities 
of Brahman, viz. true being, knowledge, infinity ! — Not so, 
we reply. From the circumstance that all the terms of the 
sentence stand in co-ordination, it follows that they convey 
the idea of one matter (sense) only. If against this you urge 
that the sentence may convey the idea of one matter only, 
even if directly expressing a thing distinguished by several 
qualities ; we must remark that you display an ignorance 
of the meaning of language which appears to point to some 
weakmindedness on your part. A sentence conveys the 
idea of one matter (sense) only when all its constitutive 
words denote one and the same thing; if, on the other 
hand, it expresses a thing possessing several attributes, 
the difference of these attributes necessarily leads to a 
difference in meaning on the part of the individual words, 
and then the oneness of meaning of the sentence is lost — 
But from your view of the passage it would follow that 
the several words are mere synonyms ! — Give us your 
attention, we reply, and learn that several words may 
convey one meaning without being idle synonyms. From 
the determination of the unity of purport of the whole 
sentence s we conclude that the several words, applied to 
one thing, aim at expressing what is opposite in nature 
to whatever is contrary to the meanings of the several 
words, and that thus they have meaning and unity of 
meaning and yet are not mere synonyms. The details 



1 The texts which deny all qualities of Brahman are later in 
order than the texts which refer to Brahman as qualified, because 
denial presupposes that which is to be denied. 

* The unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from its con- 
stituent words having the same case-ending. 



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28 vedAnta-sOtras. 



are as follows. Brahman is to be defined as what is con- 
trary in nature to all other things. Now whatever is 
opposed to Brahman is virtually set aside by the three 
words (constituting the definition of Brahman in the 
Taittiriya-text). The word ' true ' (or ' truly being ') has 
the purport of distinguishing Brahman from whatever 
things have no truth, as being the abodes of change; 
the word 'knowledge' distinguishes Brahman from all 
non-sentient things whose light depends on something 
else (which are not self-luminous) ; and the word ' infinite ' 
distinguishes it from whatever is limited in time or space 
or nature. Nor is this 'distinction' some positive or 
negative attribute of Brahman, it rather is just Brahman 
itself as opposed to everything else ; just as the distinction 
of white colour from black and other colours is just the 
true nature of white, not an attribute of it. The three 
words constituting the text thus have a meaning, have 
one meaning, and are non-synonymous, in so far as they 
convey the essential distinction of one thing, viz. Brahman 
from everything else. The text thus declares the one 
Brahman which is self-luminous and free from all differ- 
ence. On this interpretation of the text we discern its 
oneness in purport with other texts, such as * Being only 
this was in the beginning, one only, without a second' 
Texts such as ' That from whence these beings are bom ' 
(Taitt. Up. Ill, i) ; ' Being only this was in the beginning' 
(Kh. Up. VI, 2, i); 'Self alone was this in the beginning' 
(Br*. Up. I, 4, i), &c, describe Brahman as the cause of 
the world; and of this Brahman the Taittirtya passage 
' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' gives the strict 
definition. 

In agreement with the principle that all jakh&s teach 
the same doctrine we have to understand that, in all the 
texts which speak of Brahman as cause, Brahman must 
be taken as being 'without a second,' i.e. without any 
other being of the same or a different kind ; and the text 
which aims at defining Brahman has then to be interpreted 
in accordance with this characteristic of Brahman, viz. its 
being without a second. The statement of the Kh&adogya. 



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I ADHYAyA, I PADA, I. 29 

as to Brahman being without a second must also be taken 
to imply that Brahman is noa-dual as far as qualities are 
concerned ; otherwise it would conflict with those passages 
which speak of Brahman as being without qualities and 
without stain. We therefore conclude that the defining 
Taittirtya-text teaches Brahman to be an absolutely 
homogeneous substance. 

But, the above explanation of the passage being accepted, 
it follows that the words 'true being,' 'knowledge,' &c, 
have to be viewed as abandoning their direct sense, and 
merely suggesting a thing distinct in nature from all that 
is opposite (to what the three words directly denote), and 
this means that we resort to so-called implication (implied 
meaning, lakshawa)! — What objection is there to such 
a proceeding? we reply. The force of the general purport 
of a sentence is greater than that of the direct denotative 
power of the simple terms, and it is generally admitted 
that the purport of grammatical co-ordination is oneness 
(of the matter denoted by the terms co-ordinated). — But 
we never observe that all words of a sentence are to be 
understood in an implied sense I — Is it then not observed, 
we reply, that one word is to be taken in its implied mean- 
ing if otherwise it would contradict the purport of the 
whole sentence ? And if the purport of the sentence, which 
is nothing but an aggregate of words employed together, 
has once been ascertained, why should we not take two 
or three or all words in an implied sense — just as we had 
taken one — and thus make them fit in with the general 
purport? In agreement herewith those scholars who 
explain to us the sense of imperative sentences, teach that 
in imperative sentences belonging to ordinary speech all 
words have an implied meaning only (not their directly 
denotative meaning). For, they maintain, imperative forms 
have their primary meaning only in (Vedic) sentences 
which enjoin something not established by other means; 
and hence in ordinary speech the effect of the action is 
conveyed by implication only. The other words also, which 
form part of those imperative sentences and denote matters 
connected with the action, have their primary meaning 



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30 vedAnta-sOtras. 



only if connected with an action not established by other 
means; while if connected with an ordinary action they 
have a secondary, implied, meaning only 1 . 

Perception reveals to us non-differenced 
substance only. 

We have so far shown that in the case of a conflict 
between Scripture and Perception and the other instru- 
ments of knowledge, Scripture is of greater force. The 
fact, however, is that no such conflict is observed to exist, 
since Perception itself gives rise to the apprehension of 
a non-differenced Brahman whose nature is pure Being. — 
But how can it be said that Perception, which has for its 
object things of various kinds — and accordingly expresses 
itself in judgments such as ' Here is a jar/ 'There is a piece 
of cloth ' — causes the apprehension of mere Being ? If 
there were no apprehension of difference, all cognitions 
would have one and the same object, and therefore would 
give rise to one judgment only — as takes place when one 
unbroken perceptional cognition is continued for some 
time. — True. We therefore have to enquire in what way, 

1 The theory here referred to is held by some of the Mimam- 
sakas. The imperative forms of the verb have their primary 
meaning, i.e. the power of originating action, only in Vedic 
sentences which enjoin the performance of certain actions for the 
bringing about of certain ends : no other means of knowledge but 
the Veda informing us that such ends can be accomplished by 
such actions. Nobody, e. g. would offer a soma sacrifice in order 
to obtain the heavenly world, were he not told by the Veda to do 
so. In ordinary life, on the other hand, no imperative possesses 
this entirely unique originative force, since any action which may 
be performed in consequence of a command may be prompted 
by other motives as well: it is, in technical Indian language, 
established already, apart from the command, by other means of 
knowledge. The man who, e. g. is told to milk a cow might have 
proceeded to do so, apart from the command, for reasons of his 
own. Imperatives in ordinary speech are therefore held not to 
have their primary meaning, and this conclusion is extended, 
somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all the words entering 
into an imperative clause. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 31 

in the judgment • here is a jar,' an assertion is made about 
being as well as some special form of being These implied 
judgments cannot both be founded on perception, for they 
are the results of acts of cognition occupying different 
moments of time, while the perceptional cognition takes 
place in one moment (is instantaneous). We therefore 
must decide whether it is the essential nature of the jar, 
or its difference from other things, that is the object of 
perception. And we must adopt the former alternative, 
because the apprehension of difference presupposes the 
apprehension of the essential nature of the thing, and, in 
addition, the remembrance of its counterentities (i.e. the 
things from which the given thing diners). Hence differ- 
ence is not apprehended by Perception ; and all judgments 
and propositions relative to difference are founded on 
error only. 

Difference — bheda — does not admit of logical definition. 
The Logicians, moreover, are unable to give a definition 
of such a thing as ' difference.' Difference cannot in the 
first place be the essential nature (of that which differs) ; 
for from that it would follow that on the apprehension 
of the essential nature of a thing there would at once arise 
not only the judgment as to that essential nature but also 
judgments as to its difference from everything else — But, 
it may be objected to this, even when the essential nature 
of a thing is apprehended, the judgment 'this thing is 
different from other things' depends on the remembrance 
of its counterentities, and as long as this remembrance does 
not take place so long the judgment of difference is not 
formed ! — Such reasoning, we reply, is inadmissible. He who 
maintains that 'difference' is nothing but 'essential nature' 
has no right to assume a dependence on counterentities 
since, according to him, essential nature and difference are 
the same, i. e. nothing but essential nature : the judgment 
of difference can, on his view, depend on counterentities 
no more than the judgment of essential nature does. His 
view really implies that the two words 'the jar' and 
'different' (in the judgment 'the jar is different') are 



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32 vedanta-sAtras. 



synonymous, just as the words ' hasta ' and ' kara ' are (both 
of which mean ' hand '). 

Nor, in the second place, can 'difference' be held to 
be an attribute (dharma). For if it were that, we should 
have to assume that 'difference' possesses difference (i.e. 
is different) from essential nature; for otherwise it would 
be the same as the latter. And this latter difference 
would have to be viewed as an attribute of the first 
difference, and this would lead us on to a third difference, 
and so in infinitum. And the view of 'difference' being 
an attribute would further imply that difference is appre- 
hended on the apprehension of a thing distinguished by 
attributes such as generic character and so on, and at the 
same time that the thing thus distinguished is apprehended 
on the apprehension of difference ; and this would consti- 
tute a logical seesaw. — 'Difference' thus showing itself 
incapable of logical definition, we are confirmed in our 
view that perception reveals mere ' Being ' only. 

Moreover, it appears that in states of consciousness such 
as ' Here is a jar,' ' There is a piece of cloth,' ' The jar is 
perceived,' 'The piece of cloth is perceived,' that which 
constitutes the things is Being (existence ; satta) and per- 
ception (or ' consciousness ' ; anubhuti). And we observe 
that it is pure Being only which persists in all states of 
cognition : this pure Being alone, therefore, is real. The 
differences, on the other hand, which do not persist, are 
unreal The case is analogous to that of the snake-rope. 
The rope which persists as a substrate is real, while the 
non-continuous things (which by wrong imagination are 
superimposed on the rope) such as a snake, a cleft in the 
ground, a watercourse, and so on, are unreal 

But — our adversary objects — the instance is not truly 
analogous. In the case of the snake-rope the non-reality 
of the snake results from the snake's being sublated 
(badhita) by the cognition of the true nature of the sub- 
strate 'This is a rope, not a snake'; it does not result 
from the non-continuousness of the snake. In the same 
way the reality of the rope does not follow from its persist- 
ence, but from the fact of its being not sublated (by another 



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i adhyAya, i pada, i. 33 

cognition). But what, we ask, establishes the non-reality 
of jars and pieces of cloth? — All are agreed, we reply, that 
we observe, in jars and similar things, individual difference 
(vyavrrtti, literally ' separation,' ' distinction '). The point 
to decide is of what nature such difference is. Does it not 
mean that the judgment 'This is a jar' implies the negation 
of pieces of cloth and other things? But this means that 
by this judgment pieces of cloth and other things are 
sublated (badbita). Individual difference (vyavrttti) thus 
means the cessation (or absence), due to sublation, of certain 
objects of cognition, and it proves the non-reality of what- 
ever has non-continuous existence; while on the other 
hand, pure Being, like the rope, persists non-sublated. 
Hence everything that is additional to pure Being is 
non-real. — This admits of being expressed in technical 
form. 'Being' is real because it persists, as proved by 
the case of the rope in the snake-rope ; jars and similar 
things are non-real because they are non-continuous, as 
proved by the case of the snake that has the rope for its 
substrate. 

From all this it follows that persisting consciousness only 
has real being ; it alone is. 

Being and Consciousness are one. Consciousness is 
svayamprakflw. 

But, our adversary objects, as mere Being is the object 
of consciousness, it is different therefrom (and thus there 
exists after all 'difference' or 'plurality'). — Not so, we 
reply. That there is no such thing as ' difference,' we have 
already shown above on the grounds that it is not the 
object of perception, and moreover incapable of definition. 
It cannot therefore be proved that 'Being' is the object 
of consciousness. Hence Consciousness itself is ' Being ' 
— that which is. — This consciousness is self-proved, just 
because it is consciousness. Were it proved through some- 
thing else, it would follow that like jars and similar things 
it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for 
consciousness, the need of another act of consciousness 
(through which its knowledge would be established) ; for 
[ 4 8] D 



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34 vedAnta-sOtras. 



it shines forth (prakarate) through its own being. While 
it exists, consciousness — differing therein from jars and the 
like — is never observed not to shine forth, and it cannot 
therefore be held to depend, in its shining forth, on some- 
thing else.— You (who object to the above reasoning) 
perhaps hold the following view : — even when conscious- 
ness has arisen, it is the object only which shines forth — 
a fact expressed in sentences such as : the jar is perceived. 
When a person forms the judgment 'This is a jar,' he is 
not at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not 
an object and is not of a definite character. Hence the 
existence of consciousness is the reason which brings about 
the * shining forth ' of jars and other objects, and thus has 
a similar office as the approximation of the object to the 
eye or the other organs of sense (which is another condition 
of perceptive consciousness). After this the existence of 
consciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining 
forth of the object is (not permanent, but) occasional only *. 
And should this argumentation be objected to on the 
ground of its implying that consciousness — which is essen- 
tially of the nature of intelligence— is something non- 
intelligent like material things, we ask you to define this 
negation of non-intelligence (which you declare to be cha- 
racteristic of consciousness). Have we, perhaps, to under- 
stand by it the invariable concomitance of existence and 
shining forth? If so, we point out that this invariable 
concomitance is also found in the case of pleasure and 
similar affections; for when pleasure and so on exist at 
all, they never are non-perceived (i. e. they exist in so far 
only as we are conscious of them). It is thus clear that 
we have no consciousness of consciousness itself — just as the 
tip of a finger, although touching other things, is incapable 
of touching itself. 

All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your 
own fancy, without any due consideration of the power of 
consciousness. The fact is, that in perceiving colour and 

' Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only, and 
as such must have a cause. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 35 

other qualities of things, we are not aware of a ' shining 
forth * as an attribute of those things, and as something 
different from consciousness; nor can the assumption of 
an attribute of things called ' light,' or ' shining forth,' be 
proved in any way, since the entire empirical world itself 
can be proved only through consciousness, the existence 
of which we both admit. Consciousness, therefore, is not 
something which is inferred or proved through some other 
act of knowledge; but while proving everything else it 
is proved by itself. This may be expressed in technical 
form as follows — Consciousness is, with regard to its attri- 
butes and to the empirical judgments concerning it, inde- 
pendent of any other thing, because through its connexion 
with other things it is the cause of their attributes and 
the empirical judgments concerning them. For it is a 
general principle that of two things that which through 
its connexion with the other is the cause of the attributes 
of — and the empirical judgments about — the latter, is itself 
independent of that other as to those two points. We see 
e. g. that colour, through its conjunction with earth and the 
like, produces in them the quality of visibility, but does 
not itself depend for its visibility on conjunction with colour. 
Hence consciousness is itself the cause of its own ' shining 
forth,' as well as of the empirically observed shining forth 
of objects such as jars and the like. 

Consciousness is eternal and incapable of change. 
This self-luminous consciousness, further, is eternal, for 
it is not capable of any form of non-existence — whether 
so-called antecedent non-existence or any other form. 
This follows from its being self-established. For the 
antecedent non-existence of self-established consciousness 
cannot be apprehended either through consciousness or 
anything else If consciousness itself gave rise to the 
apprehension of its own non-existence, it could not do so 
in so far as ' being,' for that would contradict its being : 
if it is, i. e. if its non-existence is not, how can it give rise 
to the idea of its non-existence ? Nor can it do so if not 
being; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish 

D 2 



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36 vedanta-sOtras. 



a proof for its own non-existence? Nor can the non- 
existence of consciousness be apprehended through any- 
thing else; for consciousness cannot be the object of 
anything else. Any instrument of knowledge proving the 
non-existence of consciousness, could do so only by making 
consciousness its object — ' this is consciousness ' ; but con- 
sciousness, as being self-established, does not admit of that 
objectivation which is implied in the word 'this/ and hence 
its previous non-existence cannot be proved by anything 
lying outside itself. 

As consciousness thus does not admit of antecedent 
non-existence, it further cannot be held to originate, and 
hence also all those other states of being which depend 
on origination cannot be predicated of it. 

As consciousness is beginningless, it further does not 
admit of any plurality within itself; for we observe in this 
case the presence of something which is contrary to what 
invariably accompanies plurality (this something being 
' beginninglessness ' which is contrary to the quality of 
having a beginning — which quality invariably accompanies 
plurality). For we never observe a thing characterised by 
plurality to be without a beginning. — And moreover differ- 
ence, origination, &c, are objects of consciousness, like 
colour and other qualities, and hence cannot be attributes 
of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness being essentially 
consciousness only, nothing else that is an object of con- 
sciousness can be its attribute. The conclusion is that 
consciousness is free from difference of any kind. 

The apparent difference between Consciousness and the 
conscious subject is due to the unreal ahamkara. 

From this it further follows that there is no substrate of 
consciousness — different from consciousness itself — such as 
people ordinarily mean when speaking of a ' knower.' It 
is self-luminous consciousness itself which constitutes the 
so-called ' knower.' This follows therefrom also that con- 
sciousness is not non-intelligent (gada) ; for non-intelligence 
invariably accompanies absence of Selfhood (anatmatva) ; 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 37 

hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness, con- 
sciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self. 

But, our adversary again objects, the consciousness which 
expresses itself in the judgment '/ know,' proves that the 
quality of being a • knower ' belongs to consciousness ! — By 
no means, we reply. The attribution to consciousness of 
this quality rests on error, no less than the attribution, to 
the shell, of the quality of being silver. Consciousness 
cannot stand in the relation of an agent toward itself: the 
attribute of being a knowing agent is erroneously imputed 
to it — an error analogous to that expressed in the judg- 
ment « I am a man,' which identifies the Self of a person 
with the outward aggregate of matter that bears the 
external characteristics of humanity. To be a 'knower' 
means to be the agent in the action of knowing ; and this 
is something essentially changeful and non-intelligent (gxufe), 
having its abode in the ahawkara, which is itself a thing 
subject to change. How, on the other hand, could such 
agency possibly belong to the changeless ' witness ' (of all 
change, i.e. consciousness) whose nature is pure Being? 
That agency cannot be an attribute of the Self follows 
therefrom also that, like colour and other qualities, agency 
depends, for its own proof, on seeing, i. e. consciousness. 

That the Self does not fall within the sphere (is not an 
object of), the idea of ' I ' is proved thereby also that in 
deep sleep, swoon, and similar states, the idea of the ' I ' 
is absent, while the consciousness of the Self persists. 
Moreover, if the Self were admitted to be an agent and 
an object of the idea of ' I,' it would be difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that like the body it is non-intelligent, 
something merely outward (' being for others only, not for 
itself) and destitute of Selfhood. That from the body, 
which is the object of the idea of « I,' and known to be an 
agent, there is different that Self which enjoys the results 
of the body's actions, viz. the heavenly word, and so on, is 
acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instru- 
ments of knowledge; analogously, therefore, we must 
admit that different from the knower whom we understand 
by the term ' I,' is the * witnessing ' inward Self. The non- 



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38 'vedAnta-sAtras. 



intelligent ahawkara thus merely serves to manifest the 
nature of non-changing consciousness, and it effects this 
by being its abode ; for it is the proper quality of manifest- 
ing agents to manifest the objects manifested, in so far as 
the latter abide in them. A mirror, e. g., or a sheet of 
water, or a certain mass of matter, manifests a face or the 
disc of the moon (reflected in the mirror or water) or 
the generic character of a cow (impressed on the mass of 
matter) in so far as all those things abide in them. — In 
this way, then, there arises the erroneous view that finds 
expression in the judgment ' I know.' — Nor must you, in 
the way of objection, raise the question how self-luminous 
consciousness is to be manifested by the non-intelligent 
ahawikara, which rather is itself manifested by conscious- 
ness ; for we observe that the surface of the hand, which 
itself is manifested by the rays of sunlight falling on it, 
at the same time manifests those rays. This is clearly seen 
in the case of rays passing through the interstices of net- 
work: the light of those rays is intensified by the hand 
on which they fall, and which at the same time is itself 
manifested by the rays. 

It thus appears that the ' knowing agent,' who is denoted 
by the ' I,' in the judgment ' I know,' constitutes no real 
attribute of the Self, the nature of which is pure intelligence. 
This is also the reason why the consciousness of Egoity 
does not persist in the states of deep sleep and final release : 
in those states this special form of consciousness passes 
away, and the Self appears in its true nature, i. e. as pure 
consciousness. Hence a person who has risen from deep, 
dreamless sleep reflects, 'Just now I was unconscious of 
myself.' 

Summing up of the pnrvapaksha view. 

As the outcome of all this, we sum up our view as 
follows. — Eternal, absolutely non-changing consciousness, 
whose nature is pure non-differenced intelligence, free from 
all distinction whatever, owing to error illusorily manifests 
itself (vivarttate) as broken up into manifold distinctions — 
knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, acts of knowledge. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 39 

And the purpose for which we enter on the consideration 
of the Vedanta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root 
of that error, i.e. Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm 
knowledge of the oneness of Brahman, whose nature is 
mere intelligence — free, pure, eternal. 

THE GREAT SIDDHANTA. 

This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of 
altogether hollow and vicious arguments, incapable of 
'being stated in definite logical alternatives, and devised 
by men who are destitute of those particular qualities 
which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme 
Person revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are 
darkened by the impression of beginningless evil ; and who 
thus have no insight into the nature of words and sentences, 
into the real purport conveyed by them, and into the 
procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods 
depending on perception and the other instruments of right 
knowledge. The theory therefore must needs be rejected 
by all those who, through texts, perception and the other 
means of knowledge — assisted by sound reasoning — have 
an insight into the true nature of things. 

There is no proof of non-differenced substance. 

To enter into details. — Those who maintain the doctrine 
of a substance devoid of' all difference have no right to 
assert that this or that is a proof of such a substance ; for 
all means of right knowledge have for their object things 
affected with difference. — Should any one, taking his stand 
on the received views of his sect, assert that the theory of 
a substance free from all difference (does not require any 
further means of proof but) is immediately established by 
one's own consciousness ; we reply that he also is refuted 
by the fact, warranted by the witness of the Self, that all 
consciousness implies difference : all states of consciousness 
have for their object something that is marked by some dif- 
ference, as appears in the case of judgments like ' I saw this.' 
And should a state of consciousness — although directly 



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40 vedanta-sOtras. 



apprehended as implying difference — be determined by some 
fallacious reasoning to be devoid of difference, this determi- 
nation could be effected only by means of some special at- 
tributes additional to the quality of mere Being ; and owing to 
these special qualities on which the determination depends, 
that state of consciousness would clearly again be character- 
ised by difference. The meaning of the mentioned deter- 
mination could thus only be that of a thing affected with 
certain differences some other differences are denied ; but 
manifestly this would not prove the existence of a thing free 
from all difference. To thought there at any rate belongs 
the quality of being thought and self-illuminatedness, for 
the knowing principle is observed to have for its essential 
nature the illumining (making to shine forth) of objects. 
And that also in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c, con- 
sciousness is affected with difference we shall prove, in its 
proper place, in greater detail. Moreover you yourself 
admit that to consciousness there actually belong different 
attributes such as permanency (oneness, self-luminousness, 
&c), and of these it cannot be shown that they are only 
Being in general. And even if the latter point were 
admitted, we observe that there takes place a discussion of 
different views, and you yourself attempt to prove your 
theory by means of the differences between those views 
and your own. It therefore must be admitted that reality 
is affected with difference well established by valid means 
of proof. 

Sabda proves difference. 
As to sound (speech ; jabda) it is specially apparent that 
it possesses the power of denoting only such things as are 
affected with difference. Speech operates with words and 
sentences. Now a word (pada) originates from the com- 
bination of a radical element and a suffix, and as these two 
elements have different meanings it necessarily follows that 
the word itself can convey only a sense affected with 
difference. And further, the plurality of words is based on 
plurality of meanings ; the sentence therefore which is an 
aggregate of words expresses some special combination of 
things (meanings of words), and hence has no power to 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 41 

denote a thing devoid of all difference. — The conclusion is 
that sound cannot be a means of knowledge for a thing 
devoid of all difference. 

Fratyakaha — even of the nirvikalpaka kind — proves 
difference. 

Perception in the next place — with its two subdivisions 
of non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savi- 
kalpaka) perception — also cannot be a means of knowledge 
for things devoid of difference. Determinate perception 
clearly has for its object things affected with difference ; for 
it relates to that which is distinguished by generic differ- 
ence and so on. But also non-determinate perception has 
for its object only what is marked with difference ; for it is 
on the basis of non-determinate perception that the object 
distinguished by generic character and so on is recognised 
in the act of determinate perception. Non-determinate 
perception is the apprehension of the object in so far as 
destitute of some differences but not of all difference. 
Apprehension of the latter kind is in the first place not 
observed ever to take place, and is in the second place 
impossible: for all apprehension by consciousness takes 
place by means of some distinction ' This is such and such.' 
Nothing can be apprehended apart from some special feature 
of make or structure, as e.g. the triangularly shaped dewlap 
in the case of cows. The true distinction between non- 
determinate and determinate perception is that the former 
is the apprehension of the first individual among a number 
of things belonging to the same class, while the latter is the 
apprehension of the second, third, and so on, individuals. 
On the apprehension of the first individual cow the per- 
ceiving person is not conscious of the fact that the special 
shape which constitutes the generic character of the class 
'cows 'extends to the present individual also; while this 
special consciousness arises in the case of the perception of 
the second and third cow. The perception of the second 
individual thus is ' determinate ' in so far as it is determined 
by a special attribute, viz. the extension, to the perception, 
of the generic character of a class — manifested in a certain 



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42 vedanta-sGtras. 



outward shape — which connects this act of perception with 
the earlier perception (of the first individual) ; such deter- 
mination being ascertained only on the apprehension of the 
second individual. Such extension or continuance of a 
certain generic character is, on the other hand, not appre- 
hended on the apprehension of the first individual, and 
perception of the latter kind thence is ' non-determinate.' 
That it is such is not due to non-apprehension of struc- 
ture, colour, generic character and so on, for all these 
attributes are equally objects of sensuous perception 
(and hence perceived as belonging to the first individual 
also). Moreover that which possesses structure cannot be 
perceived apart from the structure, and hence in the case 
of the apprehension of the first individual there is already 
perception of structure, giving rise to the judgment ' The 
thing is such and such.' In the case of the second, third, 
&c, individuals, on the other hand, we apprehend, in 
addition to the thing possessing structure' and to the 
structure itself, the special attribute of the persistence of 
the generic character, and hence the perception is ' deter- 
minate.' From all this it follows that perception never has 
for its object that which is devoid of all difference. 

The bhedabheda view is untenable. 

The same arguments tend to refute the view that there 
is difference and absence of difference at the same time (the 
so-called bhedabheda view). Take the judgment ' This is 
such and such ' ; how can we realise here the non-difference 
of ' being this ' and ' being such and such ' ? The ' such and 
such' denotes a peculiar make characterised, e.g. by a 
dewlap, the ' this ' denotes the thing distinguished by that 
peculiar make; the non-difference of these two is thus 
contradicted by immediate consciousness. At the outset 
the thing perceived is perceived as separate from all other 
things, and this separation is founded on the fact that the 
thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us say 
the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term 
'such and such.' In general, wherever we cognise the 
relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished 



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I adhyAya, i pAda, i. 43 

thereby, the two clearly present themselves to our mind as 
absolutely different Some things— e.g. staffs and bracelets 
— appear sometimes as having a separate, independent 
existence of their own ; at other times they present them- 
selves as distinguishing attributes of other things or beings 
(i.e. of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets). 
Other entities— e. g. the generic character of cows — have a 
being only in so far as they constitute the form of substances, 
and thus always present themselves as distinguishing attri- 
butes of those substances. In both cases there is the same 
relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished 
thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely 
different The difference between the two classes of entities 
is only that staffs, bracelets, and similar things are capable 
of being apprehended in separation from other things, 
while the generic characteristics of a species are absolutely 
incapable thereof. The assertion, therefore, that the differ- 
ence of things is refuted by immediate consciousness, is 
based on the plain denial of a certain form of consciousness, 
the one namely — admitted by every one — which is expressed 
in the judgment • This thing is such and such.' — This same 
point is clearly expounded by the Sutrakara in II, a, 33. 

Inference also teaches difference. 

Perception thus having for its object only what is marked 
by difference, inference also is in the same case ; for its 
object is only what is distinguished by connexion with 
things known through perception and other means of know- 
ledge And thus, even in the case of disagreement as to the 
number of the different instruments of knowledge, a thing 
devoid of difference could not be established by any of them 
since the instruments of knowledge acknowledged by all 
have only one and the same object, viz. what is marked by 
difference. And a person who maintains the existence of 
a thing devoid of difference on the ground of differences 
affecting that very thing simply contradicts himself without 
knowing what he does ; he is in fact no better than a man 
who asserts that his own mother never had any children. 



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44 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Perception does not reveal mere Being. 

In reply to the assertion that perception causes the 
apprehension of pure Being .only, and therefore cannot have 
difference for its object ; and that ' difference ' cannot be 
denned because it does not admit of being set forth in 
definite alternatives ; we point out that these charges are 
completely refuted by the fact that the only objects of 
perception are things distinguished by generic character 
and so on, and that generic character and so on — as being 
relative things — give at once rise to the judgment as to the 
distinction between themselves and the things in which they 
inhere. You yourself admit that in the case of knowledge 
and in that of colour and other qualities this relation holds 
good, viz. that something which gives rise to a judgment 
about another thing at the same time gives rise to a judg- 
ment about itself; the same may therefore be admitted 
with regard to difference \ 

For this reason the charge of a regressus in infinitum 
and a logical seesaw (see above, p. 32) cannot be upheld. 
For even if perceptive cognition takes place within one 
moment, we apprehend within that moment the generic 
character which constitutes on the one hand the difference 
of the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar 
character of the thing itself; and thus there remains 
nothing to be apprehended in a second moment. 

Moreover, if perception made us apprehend only pure 
Being, judgments clearly referring to different objects — such 
as * Here is a jar,' ' There is a piece of cloth ' — would be 
devoid of all meaning. And if through perception we did 
not apprehend difference — as marked by generic character, 
&c, constituting the structure or make of a thing — why 
should a man searching for a horse not be satisfied with 
finding a buffalo? And if mere Being only were the 
object of all our cognitions, why should we not remember, 

1 Colour reveals itself as well as the thing that has colour; 
knowledge reveals itself as well as the object known ; so difference 
manifests itself as well as the things that differ. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 45 

in the case of each particular cognition, all the words which 
are connected with all our cognitions ? And further, if the 
cognition of a horse and that of an elephant had one object 
only, the later cognition would cause us to apprehend only 
what was apprehended before, and there being thus no 
difference (of object of cognition) there would be nothing 
to distinguish the later state of cognition from remembrance. 
If on the other hand a difference is admitted for each state 
of consciousness, we admit thereby that perception has for 
its objects things affected with difference. 

If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, 
everything would be apprehended by one act of cognition ; 
and from this it would follow that there are no persons 
either deaf or blind ! 

Nor does, as a matter of fact, the eye apprehend mere 
Being only ; for what it does apprehend is colour and the 
coloured thing, and those other qualities (viz. extension, 
&c), which inhere in the thing together with colour. Nor 
does feeling do so ; for it has for its objects things palp- 
able. Nor have the ear and the other senses mere Being 
for their object ; but they relate to what is distinguished by 
a special sound or taste or smell. Hence there is not any 
source of knowledge causing us to apprehend mere Being. 
If moreover the senses had for their object mere Being free 
from all difference, it would follow that Scripture which 
has the same object would (not be originative of knowledge 
but) perform the function of a mere anuvada, i. e. it would 
merely make statements about something, the knowledge 
of which is already established by some other means. And 
further, according to your own doctrine, mere Being, i. e. 
Brahman, would hold the position of an object with regard 
to the instruments of knowledge; and thus there would 
cling to it all the imperfections indicated by yourself — non- 
intelligent nature, perishableness and so on. — From all this 
we conclude that perception has for its object only what is 
distinguished by difference manifesting itself in generic 
character and so on, which constitute the make or structure 
of a thing. (That the generic character of a thing is 
nothing else but its particular structure follows) from the 



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46 vedAnta-sOtras. 



fact that we do not perceive anything, different from 
structure, which could be claimed as constituting the object 
of the cognition 'that several individuals possess one and 
the same general form. And as our theory sufficiently 
accounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character, 
and as moreover even those who hold generic character to 
be something different from structure admit that there is 
such a thing as (common) structure, we adhere to the 
conclusion that generic character is nothing but structure. 
By ' structure ' we understand special or distinctive form ; 
and we acknowledge different forms of that kind according 
to the different classes of things. And as the current 
judgments as to things being different from one another 
can be explained on the basis of the apprehension of generic 
character, and as no additional entity is observed to exist, 
and as even those who maintain the existence of such an 
additional thing admit the existence of generic character, 
we further conclude that difference (bheda) is nothing but 
generic character (fati). — But if this were so, the judgment as 
to difference would immediately follow from the judgment as 
to generic character, as soon as the latter is apprehended ! — 
Quite true, we reply. As a matter of fact the judgment of 
difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the 
judgment as to generic character. For 'the generic character ' 
of a cow, e. g., means just the exclusion of everything else : as 
soon as that character is apprehended all thought and speech 
referring to other creatures belonging to the same wider 
genus (which includes buffaloes and so on also) come to an 
end. It is through the apprehension of difference only that 
the idea of non-difference comes to an end. 

Plurality is not unreal. 
Next as to the assertion that all difference presented in 
our cognition— as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like— is 
unreal because such difference does not persist. This view, 
we maintain, is altogether erroneous, springs in fact from 
the neglect of distinguishing between persistence and non- 
persistence on the one hand, and the relation between what 
sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 47 

two cognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter 
relation holds good, and there is non-persistence of what is 
sublated. But jars, pieces of cloth and the like, do not 
contradict one another, since they are separate in place and 
time. If on the other hand the non-existence of a thing is 
cognised at the same time and the same place where and 
when its existence is cognised, we have a mutual contra- 
diction of two cognitions, and then the stronger one 
sublates the other cognition which thus comes to an end. 
But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion 
with some place and time, the non-existence is perceived 
in connexion with some other place and time, there arises 
no contradiction ; how then should the one cognition 
sublate the other ? or how can it be said that of a thing 
absent at one time and place there is absence at other 
times and places also? In the case of the snake-rope, 
there arises a cognition of non-existence in connexion with 
the given place and time ; hence there is contradiction, one 
judgment sublates the other and the sublated cognition 
comes to an end. But the circumstance of something 
which is seen at one time and in one place not persisting at 
another time and in another place is not observed to be 
invariably accompanied by falsehood, and hence mere non- 
persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason for 
unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real 
because it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and 
requires no further proof. 

Being and Consciousness are not one. 
Hence mere Being does not alone constitute reality. 
And as the distinction between consciousness and its objects 
— which rests just on this relation of object and that for 
which the object is — is proved by perception, the assertion 
that only consciousness has real existence is also dis- 
posed of. 

The true meaning of Svayamprakasatva. 
We next take up the point as to the self-luminousness of 
consciousness (above, p. 33). The contention that conscious- 
ness is not an object holds good for the knowing Self at the 



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48 vedAnta-sCtras. 



time when it illumines (i. e. constitutes as its objects) other 
things ; but there is no absolute rule as to all consciousness 
never being anything but self-luminous. For common 
observation shows that the consciousness of one person 
may become the object of the cognition of another, viz. of 
an inference founded on the person's friendly or unfriendly 
appearance and the like, and again that a person's own past 
states of consciousness become the object of his own 
cognition — as appears from judgments such as 'At one 
time I knew.' It cannot therefore be said ' If it is con- 
sciousness it is self-proved ' (above, p. 33), nor that con- 
sciousness if becoming an object of consciousness would no 
longer be consciousness ; for from this it would follow that 
one's own past states, and the conscious states of others — 
because being objects of consciousness — are not themselves 
consciousness. Moreover, unless it were admitted that there 
is inferential knowledge of the thoughts of others, there 
would be no apprehension of the connexion of words and 
meaning, and this would imply the absolute termination of all 
human intercourse depending on speech. Nor also would it 
be possible for pupils to attach themselves to a teacher of 
sacred lore, for the reason that they had become aware of 
his wisdom and learning. The general proposition that 
consciousness does not admit of being an object is in fact 
quite untenable. The essential nature of consciousness — 
or knowledge — consists therein that it shines forth, or 
manifests itself, through its own being to its own substrate 
at the present moment ; or (to give another definition) that 
it is instrumental in proving its own object by its own 
being 1 . 

' The comment of the .Sru. Pra. on the above definitions runs, 
with a few additional explanations, as follows : The term ' ana- 
bhuti ' here denotes knowledge in general, not only such know- 
ledge as is not remembrance (which limited meaning the term has 
sometimes). With reference to the * shining forth ' it might be said 
that in this way jars also and similar things know or are conscious 
because they also 'shine forth' (viz. in so far as they are known) ; 
to exclude jars and the like the text therefore adds 'to its 
own substrate' (the jar 'shines forth,' not to itself, but to the 



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i adhvAya, i pAda, i. 49 

Now these two characteristics are established by a 
person's own state of consciousness and do not vanish 
when that consciousness becomes the object of another 
state of consciousness ; consciousness remains also in the 
latter case what it is. Jars and similar things, on the other 
hand, do not possess consciousness, not because they are 
objects of consciousness but because they lack the two 
characteristics stated above. If we made the presence of 
consciousness dependent on the absence of its being an 
object of consciousness, we should arrive at the conclusion 

knowing person). There are other attributes of the Self, such 
as atomic extension, eternity, and so on, which are revealed (not 
through themselves) but through an act of knowledge different 
from them; to exclude those the text adds 'through its own 
being.' In order to exclude past states of consciousness or acts 
of knowledge, the text adds 'at the present moment.' A past state 
of consciousness is indeed not revealed without another act of 
knowledge (representing it), and would thus by itself be excluded ; 
but the text adds this specification (viz. 'at the present moment') 
on purpose, in order to intimate that a past state of consciousness 
can be represented by another state — a point denied by the oppo- 
nent 'At the present moment' means 'the connexion with the 
object of knowledge belonging to the present time.' Without the 
addition of ' to its own substrate ' the definition might imply that 
a state of consciousness is manifest to another person also; to 
exclude this the clause is added. This first definition might be 
objected to as acceptable only to those who maintain the svayara- 
prakifatva-theory (which need not be discussed here); hence a 
second definition is given. The two clauses ' to its own substrate ' 
and ' at the present moment ' have to be supplied in this second 
definition also. 'Instrumental in bringing about' would apply to 
staffs, wheels, and such like implements also ; hence the text adds 
'its own object' (Staffs, wheels, Sec. have no 'objects.*) Know- 
ledge depending on sight does not bring about an object depending 
on hearing ; to exclude this notion of universal instrumentality the 
text specifies the object by the words 'its own.' The clause 
'through its own being' excludes the sense organs, which reveal 
objects not by their own being, but in so far as they give rise to 
knowledge. The two clauses 'at the present moment' and 'to 
its own substrate ' have the same office in the second definition as 
in the first. 

m E 



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50 vedAnta-s6tras. 



that consciousness is not consciousness ; for there are things 
— e.g. sky-flowers — which are not objects of consciousness 
and at the same time are not consciousness. You will 
perhaps reply to this that a sky-flower's not being con- 
sciousness is due not to its not being an object of conscious- 
ness, but to its non-existence ! — Well then, we rejoin, let us 
say analogously that the reason of jars and the like not 
being contradictory to Nescience (i. e. of their being g&dd), 
is their not being of the nature of consciousness, and let us 
not have recourse to their being objects of consciousness! — 
But if consciousness is an object of consciousness, we con- 
clude that it also is non-contradictory of Nescience, like 
a jar ! — At this conclusion, we rejoin, you may arrive even 
on the opposite assumption, reasoning as follows: 'Con- 
sciousness is non-contradictory of Nescience, because it is 
not an object of consciousness, like a sky-flower! All 
which shows that to maintain as a general principle that 
something which is an object of consciousness cannot 
itself be consciousness is simply ridiculous.' 

Consciousness is not eternal. 

It was further maintained by the purvapakshin that as 
consciousness is self-established it has no antecedent non- 
existence and so on, and that this disproves its having an 
origin. But this is an attempt to prove something not 
proved by something else that is equally unproved ; com- 
parable to a man blind from birth undertaking to guide 
another blind man! You have no right to maintain the 
non-existence of the antecedent non-existence of conscious- 
ness on the ground that there is nothing to make us 
apprehend that non-existence; for there is something to 
make us apprehend it, viz. consciousness itself ! — But how 
can consciousness at the time when it is, make us apprehend 
its own previous non-existence which is contradictorily 
opposed to it ? — Consciousness, we rejoin, does not neces- 
sarily constitute as its objects only what occupies the same 
time with itself; were it so it would follow that neither 
the past nor the future can be the object of consciousness. 
Or do you mean that there is an absolute rule that the 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 51 

antecedent non-existence of consciousness, if proved, must 
be contemporaneous with consciousness? Have you then, 
we ask, ever observed this so as to be able to assert an 
absolute rule? And if it were observed, that would prove 
the existence of previous non-existence, not its negation ! — 
The fact, however, is that no person in his senses will 
maintain the contemporaneous existence of consciousness 
and its own antecedent non-existence. In the case of per- 
ceptive knowledge originating from sensation, there is indeed 
this limitation, that it causes the apprehension of such 
things only as are actually present at the same time. But 
this limitation does not extend to cognitions of all kinds, 
nor to all instruments of knowledge; for we observe that 
remembrance, inference, and the magical perception of 
Yogis apprehend such things also as are not present at the 
time of apprehension. On this very point there rests the 
relation connecting the means of knowledge with their 
objects, viz. that the former are not without the latter. 
This does not mean that the instrument of knowledge is 
connected with its object in that way that it is not without 
something that is present at the time of cognition ; but 
rather that the instrument of knowledge is opposed to the 
falsehood of that special form in which the object presents 
itself as connected with some place and time. — This dis- 
poses also of the contention that remembrance has no 
external object ; for it is observed that remembrance is 
related to such things also as have perished. — Possibly you 
will now argue as follows. The antecedent non-existence 
of consciousness cannot be ascertained by perception, for it 
is not something present at the time of perception. It 
further cannot be ascertained by the other means of know- 
ledge, since there is no characteristic mark (linga) on which 
an inference could be based : for we do not observe any 
characteristic mark invariably accompanied by the ante- 
cedent non-existence of consciousness. Nor do we meet 
with any scriptural text referring to this antecedent non- 
existence. Hence, in the absence of any valid instrument 
of knowledge, the antecedent non-existence of consciousness 
cannot be established at all.— If, we reply, you thus, 

E 2 



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52 vedAnta-sAtras. 



altogether setting aside the force of self-provedness (on 
which you had relied hitherto), take your stand on the 
absence of valid means of knowledge, we again must 
request you to give in; for there is a valid means of 
knowledge whereby to prove the antecedent non-existence 
of consciousness, viz. valid non-perception (anupalabdhi). 

Moreover, we observe that perceptional knowledge proves 
its object, be it a jar or something else, to exist only as 
long as it exists itself, not at all times ; we do not, through 
it, apprehend the antecedent or subsequent existence of 
the jar. Now this absence of apprehension is due to the 
fact that consciousness itself is limited in time. If that 
consciousness which has ajar for its object were itself appre- 
hended as non-limited in time, the object also — the jar — 
would be apprehended under the same form, i. e. it would 
be eternal. And if self-established consciousness were 
eternal, it would be immediately cognised as eternal ; but 
this is not the case. Analogously, if inferential conscious- 
ness and other forms of consciousness were apprehended as 
non-limited in time, they would all of them reveal their 
objects also as non-limited, and these objects would thus be 
eternal ; for the objects are conform in nature to their 
respective forms of consciousness. 

There is no Consciousness without object. 

Nor is there any consciousness devoid of objects ; for 
nothing of this kind is ever known. Moreover, the self- 
luminousness of consciousness has, by our opponent him- 
self, been proved on the ground that its essential nature 
consists in illumining (revealing) objects ; the self-luminous- 
ness of consciousness not admitting of proof apart from its 
essential nature which consists in the lighting up of objects. 
And as moreover, according to our opponent, consciousness 
cannot be the object of another consciousness, it would 
follow that (having neither an object nor itself being an 
object) it is something altogether unreal, imaginary. 

Nor are you justified in maintaining that in deep sleep, 
swoon, senselessness and similar states, pure consciousness, 
devoid of any object, manifests itself. This view is nega- 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, T. 53 

tived by 'valid non-perception' (see above, p. 53). If 
consciousness were present in those states also, there would 
be remembrance of it at the time of waking from sleep or 
recovery from swoon ; but as a matter of fact there is no 
such remembrance. — But it is not an absolute rule that 
something of which we were conscious must be remem- 
bered ; how then can the absence of remembrance prove 
the absence of previous consciousness ? — Unless, we reply, 
there be some cause of overpowering strength which quite 
obliterates all impressions — as e.g. the dissolution of the 
body — the absence of remembrance does necessarily prove 
the absence of previous consciousness. And, moreover, in 
the present case the absence of consciousness does not only 
follow from absence of remembrance ; it is also proved by 
the thought presenting itself to the person risen from sleep, 
'For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.' — Nor 
may it be said that even if there was consciousness, absence 
of remembrance would necessarily follow from the absence 
(during deep sleep) of the distinction of objects, and from 
the extinction of the consciousness of the ' I ' ; for the non- 
consciousness of some one thing, and the absence of some 
one thing cannot be the cause of the non-remembrance of 
some other thing, of which there had been consciousness. 
And that in the states in question the consciousness of the 
' I ' does persist, will moreover be shown further on. 

But, our opponent urges, have you not said yourself that 
even in deep sleep and similar states there is consciousness 
marked by difference ? — True, we have said so. But that 
consciousness is consciousness of the Self, and that this is 
affected by difference will be proved further on. At present 
we are only interested in denying the existence of your 
pure consciousness, devoid of all objects and without a 
substrate. Nor can we admit that your pure consciousness 
could constitute what we call the consciousness of the Self; 
for we shall prove that the latter has a substrate. 

It thus cannot be maintained that the antecedent non- 
existence of consciousness does not admit of being proved, 
because consciousness itself does not prove it. And as we 
have shown that consciousness itself may be an object of 



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54 vedAnta-sOtras. 



consciousness, we have thereby disproved the alleged 
impossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by 
other means. Herewith falls the assertion that the non- 
origination of consciousness can be proved. 

Consciousness is capable of change. 

Against the assertion that the alleged non-origination of 
consciousness at the same time proves that consciousness 
is not capable of any other changes (p. 36), we remark 
that the general proposition on which this conclusion rests 
is too wide : it would extend to antecedent non-existence 
itself, of which it is evident that it comes to an end, 
although it does not originate. In qualifying the changes 
as changes of ' Being,' you manifest great logical acumen 
indeed ! For according to your own view Nescience also 
(which is not ' Being ') does not originate, is the substrate of 
manifold changes, and comes to an end through the rise 
of knowledge ! Perhaps you will say that the changes of 
Nescience are all unreal. But, do you then, we ask in 
reply, admit that any change is real ? You do not ; and 
yet it is only this admission which would give a sense to 
the distinction expressed by the word ' Being V 

Nor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any 
division within itself, because it has no beginning (p. 36). 
For the non-originated Self is divided from the body, the 
senses, &c, and Nescience also, which is avowedly without 
a beginning, must needs be admitted to be divided from 
the Self. And if you say that the latter division is unreal, 
we ask whether you have ever observed a real division 
invariably connected with origination I Moreover, if the 
distinction of Nescience from the Self is not real, it follows 
that Nescience and the Self are essentially one. You 
further have yourself proved the difference of views by 
means of the difference of the objects of knowledge as 
established by non-refuted knowledge ; an analogous case 

1 The Ankara is not entitled to refer to a distinction of real 
and unreal division, because according to his theory all distinction 
is unreal. 



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i adhyaya, i pAda, i. 55 

being furnished by the difference of acts of cleaving, which 
results from the difference of objects to be cleft. And if 
you assert that of this knowing — which is essentially 
knowing only — nothing that is an object of knowledge can 
be an attribute, and that these objects — just because they 
are objects of knowledge — cannot be attributes of knowing ; 
we point out that both these remarks would apply also to 
eternity, self-luminousness, and the other attributes of 
' knowing,' which are acknowledged by yourself, and esta- 
blished by valid means of proof. Nor may you urge 
against this that all these alleged attributes are in reality 
mere 'consciousness' or 'knowing'; for they are essentially 
distinct. By 'being conscious' or 'knowing,' we under- 
stand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its 
own substrate (i. e. the substrate of knowledge), by its own 
existence (i. e. the existence of knowledge) merely ; by self- 
luminousness (or ' self-illuminatedness ') we understand the 
shining forth or being manifest by its own existence merely 
to its own substrate ; the terms ' shining forth,' ' illumining,' 
'being manifest' in both these definitions meaning the 
capability of becoming an object of thought and speech 
which is common to all things, whether intelligent or non- 
intelligent. Eternity again means 'being present in all 
time ' ; oneness means ' being defined by the number one.' 
Even if you say that these attributes are only negative 
ones, i. e. equal to the absence of non-intelligence and so 
on, you still cannot avoid the admission that they are 
attributes of consciousness. If, on the other hand, being of 
a nature opposite to non-intelligence and so on, be not 
admitted as attributes of consciousness — whether of a 
positive or a negative kind — in addition to its essential 
nature ; it is an altogether unmeaning proceeding to deny 
to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the like. 

We moreover must admit the following alternative: 
consciousness is either proved (established) or not. If it is 
proved it follows that it possesses attributes ; if it is not, it 
is something absolutely nugatory, like a sky-flower, and 
similar purely imaginary things. 



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56 vedAnta-s^tras. 



Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent 
Conscious Self. 

Let it then be said that consciousness is proof (siddhiA) 
itself. Proof of what, we ask in reply, and to whom ? If 
no definite answer can be given to these two questions, 
consciousness cannot be defined as ' proof ; for 'proof' is 
a relative notion, like ' son.' You will perhaps reply ' Proof 
to the Self ' ; and if we go on asking ' But what is that 
Self ' ? you will say, 'Just consciousness as already said by us 
before.' True, we reply, you said so ; but it certainly was 
not well said. For if it is the nature of consciousness to be 
'proof ('light,' 'enlightenment') on the part of a person 
with regard to something, how can this consciousness 
which is thus connected with the person and the thing 
be itself conscious of itself? To explain : the essential 
character of consciousness or knowledge is that by its very 
existence it renders things capable of becoming objects, to 
its own substrate, of thought and speech. This conscious- 
ness (anubhuti), which is also termed gn&aa, avagati, 
sawvid, is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious 
Self and related to an object : as such it is known to every 
one on the testimony of his own Self — as appears from 
ordinary judgments such as ' I know the jar,' ' I understand 
this matter,' ' I am conscious of (the presence of) this piece 
of cloth.' That such is the essential nature of conscious- 
ness you yourself admit ; for you have proved thereby its 
self-luminousness. Of this consciousness which thus clearly 
presents itself as the attribute of an agent and as related to 
an object, it would be difficult indeed to prove that at the 
same time it is itself the agent ; as difficult as it would be 
to prove that the object of action is the agent 

For we clearly see that this agent (the subject of con- 
sciousness) is permanent (constant), while its attribute, i. e. 
consciousness, not differing herein from joy, grief, and the 
like, rises, persists for some time, and then comes to an end. 
The permanency of the conscious subject is proved by the 
fact of recognition, 'This very same thing was formerly 
apprehended by me.' The non-permanency of conscious- 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 57 

ness, oa the other hand, is proved by thought expressing 
itself in the following forms, ' I know at present,' ' I knew 
at a time,' ' I, the knowing subject, no longer have know- 
ledge of this thing.' How then should consciousness and 
the conscious subject be one? If consciousness which 
changes every moment were admitted to constitute the 
conscious subject, it would be impossible for us to recognise 
the thing seen to-day as the one we saw yesterday ; for 
what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by 
another. And even if consciousness were identified with 
the conscious subject and acknowledged as permanent, this 
would no better account for the fact of recognition. For 
recognition implies a conscious subject persisting from the 
earlier to the later moment, and not merely consciousness. 
Its expression is '/ myself perceived this thing on a former 
occasion.' According to your view the quality of being 
a conscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness ; 
for consciousness, you say, is just consciousness and nothing 
more. And that there exists a pure consciousness devoid 
of substrate and objects alike, we have already refuted on 
the ground that of a thing of this kind we have absolutely 
no knowledge. And that the consciousness admitted by 
both of us should be the Self is refuted by immediate 
consciousness itself. And we have also refuted the falla- 
cious arguments brought forward to prove that mere 
consciousness is the only reality. — But, another objection 
is raised, should the relation of the Self and the ' I ' not 
rather be conceived as follows: — In self-consciousness 
which expresses itself in the judgment ' I know,' that intel- 
ligent something which constitutes the absolutely non- 
objective element, and is pure homogeneous light, is the 
Self ; the objective element (yushmad-artha) on the other 
hand, which is established through its being illumined 
(revealed) by the Self is the /—in ' I know ' — and this is 
something different from pure intelligence, something 
objective or external? 

By no means, we reply; for this view contradicts the 
relation of attribute and substrate of attribute of which we 
are directly conscious, as implied in the thought ' I know.' 



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58 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Consider also what follows. — * If the /were not the Self, the 
inwardness of the Self would not exist ; for it is just the 
consciousness of the / which separates the inward from 
the outward. 

'"May I, freeing myself from all pain, enter on free 
possession of endless delight ? " This is the thought which 
prompts the man desirous of release to apply himself to 
the study of the sacred texts. Were it a settled matter 
that release consists in the annihilation of the I, the same 
man would move away as soon as release were only hinted 
at. "When I myself have perished, there still persists 
some consciousness different from me;" to bring this about 
nobody truly will exert himself. 

' Moreover the very existence of consciousness, its being 
a consciousness at all, and its being self-luminous, depend 
on its connexion with a Self; when that connexion is dis- 
solved, consciousness itself cannot be established, not any 
more than the act of cutting can take place when there is no 
person to cut and nothing to be cut. Hence it is certain 
that the I, i. e. the knowing subject, is the inward Self.' 

This scripture confirms when saying 'By what should 
he know the knower?' (Br*. Up. II, 4, 15); and Smn'ti 
also, ' Him who knows this they call the knower of the 
body ' (Bha. G'l. XIII, 1). And the Sutrakara also, in the 
section beginning with ' Not the Self on account of scriptural 
statement ' (II, 3, 1 7), will say ' For this very reason (it is) 
a knower' (II, 3, 18); and from this it follows that the 
Self is not mere consciousness. 

What is established by consciousness of the ' I ' is the 
I itself, while the not-I is given in the consciousness of the 
not-I ; hence to say that the knowing subject, which is 
established by the state of consciousness, ' I know,' is the 
not-I, is no better than to maintain that one's own mother 
is a barren woman. Nor can it be said that this ' I,' the 
knowing subject, is dependent on its light for something 
else. It rather is self-luminous; for to be self-luminous 
means to have consciousness for one's essential nature. 
And that which has light for its essential nature does not 
depend for its light on something else. The case is 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 59 

analogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle. From 
the circumstance that the lamp illumines with its light 
other things, it does not follow either that it is not 
luminous, or that its luminousness depends on something 
else ; the fact rather is that the lamp being of luminous 
nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things 
also. To explain. — The one substance te^as, i.e. fire or 
heat, subsists in a double form, viz. as light (prabha), and 
as luminous matter. Although light is a quality of luminous 
substantial things, it is in itself nothing but the substance 
tejfas, not a mere quality like e. g. whiteness ; for it exists 
also apart from its substrates, and possesses colour (which 
is a quality). Having thus attributes different from those 
of qualities such as whiteness and so on, and possessing 
illumining power, it is the substance te^as, not anything 
else (e. g. a quality). Illumining power belongs to it, 
because it lights up itself and other things. At the same 
time it is practically treated as a quality because it always 
has the substance te^as for its substrate, and depends on 
it This must not be objected to on the ground that what 
is called light is really nothing but dissolving particles 
of matter which proceed from the substance te^as; for 
if this were so, shining gems and the sun would in the 
end consume themselves completely. Moreover, if the 
flame of a lamp consisted of dissolving particles of matter, 
it would never be apprehended as a whole ; for no reason 
can be stated why those particles should regularly rise 
in an agglomerated form to the height of four fingers' 
breadth, and after that simultaneously disperse themselves 
uniformly in all directions — upwards, sideways, and down- 
wards. The fact is that the flame of the lamp together 
with its light is produced anew every moment and again 
vanishes every moment ; as we may infer from the succes- 
sive combination of sufficient causes (viz. particles of oil 
and wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes 
are completely consumed. 

Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelli- 
gent (iKd-rupa), and has intelligence (£aitanya) for its 
quality. And to be essentially intelligent means to be 



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6o vedAnta-sOtras. 



self-luminous. There are many scriptural texts declaring 
this, compare e. g. ' As a mass of salt has neither inside nor 
outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed that 
Self has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass 
of knowledge' (Br*. Up. IV, 6, 12); 'There that person 
becomes self-luminous, there is no destruction of the know- 
ing of the knower' (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 14; 30); 'He who 
knows, let me smell this, he is the Self (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 
4) ; ' Who is that Self ? That one who is made of know- 
ledge, among the pra«as, within the heart, the light, the 
person ' (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 7) ; ' For it is he who sees, hears, 
smells, tastes, thinks, considers, acts, the person whose Self 
is knowledge' (Pr. Up. IV, 9); 'Whereby should one 
know the knower' (Br*. Up. IV, 5, 15). 'This person 
knows,' ' The seer does not see death nor illness nor pain' 
(Kh. Up. VIII, 26, 2); 'That highest person not remem- 
bering this body into which he was born ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 
12, 3) ; ' Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go 
towards the person ; when they have reached the person, sink 
into him ' (Pr. Up. VI, 5) ; ' From this consisting of mind, 
there is different an interior Self consisting of knowledge ' 
(Taitt. Up. II, 4). And the Sfitrakara also will refer to the 
Self as a ' knower' in II, 3, 18. All which shows that the 
self-luminous Self is a knower, i. e. a knowing subject, and 
not pure light (non-personal intelligence). In general we 
may say that where there is light it must belong to some- 
thing, as shown by the light of a lamp. The Self thus 
cannot be mere consciousness. The grammarians moreover 
tell us that words such as ' consciousness,' ' knowledge,' &c, 
are relative; neither ordinary nor Vedic language uses 
expressions such as ' he knows ' without reference to an 
object known and an agent who knows. 

With reference to the assertion that consciousness con- 
stitutes the Self, because it (consciousness) is not non- 
intelligent (gada), we ask what you understand by this 
' absence of non-intelligence.' If you reply ' luminousness 
due to the being of the thing itself (i. e. of the thing which 
is agdida.) ' ; we point out that this definition would wrongly 
include lamps also, and similar things ; and it would more- 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 6 1 



over give rise to a contradiction, since you do not admit 
light as an attribute, different from consciousness itself. 
Nor can we allow you to define agadatva. as ' being of that 
nature that light is always present, without any exception,' 
for this definition would extend also to pleasure, pain, and 
similar states. Should you maintain that pleasure and so 
on, although being throughout of the nature of light, are non- 
intelligent for the reason that, like jars, &c, they shine forth 
(appear) to something else and hence belong to the sphere 
of the not-Self; we ask in reply: Do you mean then to 
say that knowledge appears to itself ? Knowledge no less 
than pleasure appears to some one else, viz. the ' I ' : there 
is, in that respect, no difference between the judgment 
• I know/ and the judgment ' I am pleased.' Non-intelli- 
gence in the sense of appearingness-to-itself is thus not 
proved for consciousness ; and hence it follows that what 
constitutes the Self is the non-gada. ' I ' which is proved to 

• itself by its very Being. That knowledge is of the nature 
of light depends altogether on its connexion with the 
knowing ' I ' : it is due to the latter, that knowledge, like 
pleasure, manifests itself to that conscious person who is its 
substrate, and not to anybody else. The Self is thus not 
mere knowledge, but is the knowing ' I.' 

The view that the conscious subject is something unreal, 
due to the ahamkara, cannot be maintained. 

We turn to a further point. You maintain that con- 
sciousness which is in reality devoid alike of objects and 
substrate presents itself, owing to error, in the form of 
a knowing subject, just as mother o' pearl appears as silver ; 
(consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an 
erroneous imputation), because an erroneous imputation 
cannot take place apart from a substrate But this theory 
is indefensible. If things were as you describe them, the 
conscious ' I ' would be cognised as co-ordinate with the 
state of consciousness 'I am consciousness,' just as the 
shining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be 
silver. But die fact is that the state of consciousness 
presents itself as something apart, constituting a distin- 



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62 vedAnta-sOtras. 



guishing attribute of the I, just as the stick is an attribute 
of Devadatta who carries it The judgment ' I am con- 
scious ' reveals an ' I ' distinguished by consciousness ; and 
to declare that it refers only to a state of consciousness — 
which is a mere attribute — is no better than to say that the 
judgment 'Devadatta carries a stick' is about the stick 
only. Nor are you right in saying that the idea of the 
Self being a knowing agent, presents itself to the mind of 
him only who erroneously identifies the Self and the body, 
an error expressing itself in judgments such as ' I am stout,' 
and is on that account false ; for from this it would follow 
that the consciousness which is erroneously imagined as 
a Self is also false ; for it presents itself to the mind of the 
same person. You will perhaps rejoin that consciousness 
is not false because it (alone) is not sublated by that 
cognition which sublates everything else. Well, we reply, 
then the knowership of the Self also is not false; for that 
also is not sublated. You further maintain that the 
character of being a knower, i. e. the agent in the action of 
knowing, does not become the non-changing Self; that 
being a knower is something implying change, of a non- 
intelligent kind (ga//a), and residing in the ahamkara which 
is the abode of change and a mere effect of the Unevolved 
(the Prakrt'ti) ; that being an agent and so on is like colour 
and other qualities, an attribute of what is objective ; and 
that if we admit the Self to be an agent and the object 
of the notion of the ' I,' it also follows that the Self is, like 
the body, not a real Self but something external and non- 
intelligent. But all this is unfounded, since the internal 
organ is, like the body, non-intelligent, an effect of Pra- 
kri'ti, an object of knowledge, something outward and for 
the sake of others merely ; while being a knowing subject 
constitutes the special essential nature of intelligent beings. 
To explain. Just as the body, through its objectiveness, 
outwardness, and similar causes, is distinguished from what 
possesses the opposite attributes of subjectiveness, inward- 
ness, and so on ; for the same reason the ahawkara also — 
which is of the same substantial nature as the body — is 
similarly distinguished. Hence the ahamkara is no more 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 63 

a knower than it is something subjective ; otherwise there 
would be an evident contradiction. As knowing cannot be 
attributed to the ahamkara, which is an object of know- 
ledge, so knowership also cannot be ascribed to it ; for of 
that also it is the object Nor can it be maintained that 
to be a knower is something essentially changing. For to 
be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of know- 
ledge, and as the knowing Self is eternal, knowledge which 
is an essential quality of the Self is also eternal. That the 
Self is eternal will be declared in the Sutra, II, 3, 17 ; and 
in II, 3, 18 the term 'gna.' (knower) will show that it is an 
essential quality of the Self to be the abode of knowledge. 
That a Self whose essential nature is knowledge should be 
the substrate of the (quality of) knowledge — just as gems 
and the like are the substrate of light — gives rise to no 
contradiction whatever. 

Knowledge (the quality) which is in itself unlimited, is 
capable of contraction and expansion, as we shall show 
later on. In the so-called kshetra^wa-condition of the 
Self, knowledge is, owing to the influence of work (karman), 
of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts itself to 
work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the 
different senses. With reference to this various flow of 
knowledge as due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising 
and setting, and the Self possesses the quality of an agent. 
As this quality is not, however, essential, but originated by 
action, the Self is essentially unchanging. This changeful 
quality of being a knower can belong only to the Self 
whose essential nature is knowledge ; not possibly to the 
non-intelligent ahaw/kara. But, you will perhaps say, the 
ahamkara, although of non-intelligent nature, may become 
a knower in so far as by approximation to intelligence it 
becomes a reflection of the latter. How, we ask in return, 
is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take 
place? Does consciousness become a reflection of the 
ahamtkara, or does the aha/wkara become a reflection of 
consciousness? The former alternative is inadmissible, 
since you will not allow to consciousness the quality of 
being a knower ; and so is the latter since, as explained 



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64 vedAnta-sAtras. 

above, the non- intelligent ahawkara can never become a 
knower. Moreover, neither consciousness nor the ahamkara 
are objects of visual perception. Only things seen by the 
eye have reflections. — Let it then be said that as an iron 
ball is heated by contact with fire, so the consciousness of 
being a knower is imparted to the ahamkara through its 
contact with Intelligence. — This view too is inadmissible ; 
for as you do not allow real knowership to Intelligence, 
knowership or the consciousness of knowership cannot be 
imparted to the ahawkara by contact with Intelligence ; 
and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of 
it be imparted to Intelligence by contact with the essen- 
tially non-intelligent ahawdcara. Nor can we accept what 
you say about ' manifestation.' Neither the ahawkara, you 
say, nor Intelligence is really a knowing subject, but the 
ahamkara manifests consciousness abiding within itself 
(within the ahamkara), as the mirror manifests the image 
abiding within it. But the essentially non-intelligent 
aha*«kara evidently cannot ' manifest ' the self-luminous 
Self. As has been said ' That the non-intelligent ahamkara 
should manifest the self-luminous Self, has no more sense 
than to say that a spent coal manifests the Sun.' The 
truth is that all things depend for their proof on self- 
luminous consciousness ; and now you maintain that one 
of these things, viz. the non-intelligent ahamkara — which 
itself depends for its light on consciousness — manifests con- 
sciousness, whose essential light never rises or sets, and 
which is the cause that proves everything ! Whoever knows 
the nature of the Self will justly deride such a view I The 
relation of 'manifestation' cannot hold good between 
consciousness and the ahamkara for the further reason also 
that there is a contradiction in nature between the two, and 
because it would imply consciousness not to be conscious- 
ness. As has been said, ' One cannot manifest the other, 
owing to contradictoriness ; and if the Self were something 
to be manifested, that would imply its being non-intelligent 
like a jar.' Nor is the matter improved by your intro- 
ducing the hand and the sunbeams (above, p. 38), and to say 
that as the sunbeams, while manifesting the hand, are at the 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, T. 65 

same time manifested by the hand, so consciousness, while 
manifesting the ahawkara, is at the same time itself mani- 
fested by the latter. The sunbeams are in reality not 
manifested by the hand at all. What takes place is that 
the motion of the sunbeams is reversed (reflected) by the 
opposed hand ; they thus become more numerous, and 
hence are perceived more clearly; but this is due alto- 
gether to the multitude of beams, not to any manifesting 
power on the part of the hand. 

What could, moreover, be the nature of that ' manifes- 
tation ' of the Self consisting of Intelligence, which would 
be effected through the aha#tkara ? It cannot be origin- 
ation; for you acknowledge that what is self-established 
cannot be originated by anything else. Nor can it be 
' illumination ' (making to shine forth), since consciousness 
cannot — according to you — be the object of another con- 
sciousness. For the same reason it cannot be any action 
assisting the means of being conscious of consciousness. 
For such helpful action could be of two kinds only. It 
would either be such as to cause the connexion of the 
object to be known with the sense-organs; as e.g. any 
action which, in the case of the apprehension of a species or 
of one's own face, causes connexion between the organ of 
sight and an individual of the species, or a looking-glass. 
Or it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity 
in the mind of the knowing person ; of this kind is the 
action of calmness and self-restraint with reference to scrip- 
ture which is the means of apprehending the highest reality. 
Moreover, even if it were admitted that consciousness may 
be an object of consciousness, it could not be maintained 
that the ' I ' assists the means whereby that consciousness 
is effected. For if it did so, it could only be in the way of 
removing any obstacles impeding the origination of such 
consciousness ; analogous to the way in which a lamp 
assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which impedes 
the origination of the apprehension of colour. But in the 
case under discussion we are unable to imagine such 
obstacles. There is nothing pertaining to consciousness 
which obstructs the origination of the knowledge of con- 

[48} F 



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66 vedAnta-sOtras. 



sciousness and which could be removed by the ahamkara. — 
There is something, you will perhaps reply, viz. Nescience 1 
Not so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the 
ahawkara cannot be admitted; knowledge alone can put 
an end to Nescience. Nor can consciousness be the 
abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience 
would have the same abode and the same object as 
knowledge 

In pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject 
and no object of knowledge — the so-called 'witnessing' 
principle (sakshin) — Nescience cannot exist Jars and 
similar things cannot be the abode of Nescience because 
there is no possibility of their being the abode of know- 
ledge, and for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot 
be the abode of Nescience. And even if consciousness 
were admitted to be the abode of Nescience, it could 
not be the object of knowledge ; for consciousness being 
viewed as the Self cannot be the object of knowledge, and 
hence knowledge cannot terminate the Nescience abiding 
within consciousness. For knowledge puts an end to 
Nescience only with regard to its own objects, as in the 
case of the snake-rope. And the consequence of this would 
be that the Nescience attached to consciousness could 
never be destroyed by any one. — If Nescience, we further 
remark, is viewed as that which can be defined neither as 
Being nor non-Being, we shall show later on that such 
Nescience is something quite incomprehensible. — On the 
other hand, Nescience, if understood to be the antecedent 
non-existence of knowledge, is not opposed in nature to 
the origination of knowledge, and hence the dispelling of 
Nescience cannot be viewed as promoting the means of 
the knowledge of the Self. — From all this it follows that 
the ahawkara cannot effect in any way 'manifestation of 
consciousness.' 

Nor (to finish up this point) can it be said that it is the 
essential nature of manifesting agents to manifest things in 
so far as the latter have their abode in the former; for 
such a relation is not observed in the case of lamps and the 
like (which manifest what lies outside them). The essen- 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 67 

tial nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that 
they promote the knowledge of things as they really are, 
and this is also the nature of whatever promotes knowledge 
and the means thereof. Nor is it even true that the mirror 
manifests the face. The mirror is only the cause of a 
certain irregularity, viz. the reversion of the ocular rays of 
light, and to this irregularity there is due the appearance 
of the face within the mirror ; but the manifesting agent is 
the light only. And it is evident that the ahamkara is 
not capable of producing an irregularity (analogous to that 
produced by the mirror) in consciousness which is self- 
luminous. — And — with regard to the .second analogous 
instance alleged by you — the fact is that the species is 
known through the individual because the latter is its 
substrate (as expressed in the general principle, 'the species 
is the form of the individual '), but not because the indi- 
vidual 'manifests' the species. Thus there is no reason, 
either real or springing from some imperfection, why the 
consciousness of consciousness should be brought about by 
its abiding in the ahawkara, and the attribute of being the 
knowing agent or the consciousness of that cannot therefore 
belong to the ahamkara. Hence, what constitutes the 
inward Self is not pure consciousness but the 'I' which 
proves itself as the knowing subject. In the absence of 
egoity, 'inwardness' could not be established for con- 
sciousness. 

The conscious subject persists in deep sleep. 

We now come to the question as to the nature of deep 
sleep. In deep sleep the quality of darkness prevails in 
the mind and there is no consciousness of outward things, 
and thus there is no distinct and clear presentation of the 
* I ' ; but all the same the Self somehow presents itself up 
to the time of waking in the one form of the * I,' and the 
latter cannot therefore be said to be absent. Pure con- 
sciousness assumed by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) 
is really in no better case ; for a person risen from deep sleep 
never represents to himself his state of consciousness during 

F 2 



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68 vedAnta-sCtras. 



sleep in the form, ' I was pure consciousness free from all 
egoity and opposed in nature to everything else, witnessing 
Nescience'; what he thinks is only 'I slept well.' From 
this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep 
the Self, i. e. the ' I,' was a knowing subject and perceptive 
of pleasure. Nor must you urge against this that the reflec- 
tion has the following form : ' As now I feel pleasure, so I 
slept then also ' ; for the reflection is distinctly not of that 
kind 1 . Nor must you say that owing to the non-perma- 
nency of the ' I ' its perception of pleasure during sleep 
cannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the ' I ' 
is permanent as appears from the fact that) the person who 
has risen from sleep recalls things of which he was conscious 
before his sleep, ' I did such and such a thing,' ' I observed 
this or that,' ' I said so or so.' — But, you will perhaps 
say, he also reflects, ' For such and such a time I was con- 
scious of nothing ! ' — • And what does this imply ? ' we ask. 
— ' It implies a negation of everything ! ' — By no means, we 
rejoin. The words ' I was conscious ' show that the know- 
ing ' I ' persisted, and that hence what is negated is only 
the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in ' of 
nothing' included everything, it would also negative the 
pure consciousness which you hold to persist in deep sleep. 
In the judgment * I was conscious of nothing,' the word 
' I ' clearly refers to the • I,' i. e. the knowing Self which 
persists even during deep sleep, while the words ' was con- 
scious of nothing' negative all knowledge on the part of 
that ' I ' ; if, now, in the face of this, you undertake to prove 
by means of this very judgment that knowledge — which is 
expressly denied — existed at the time, and that the per- 
sisting knowing Self did not exist, you may address your 
proof to the patient gods who give no reply 1 — But — our 
opponent goes on to urge — I form the following judgment 
also : ' I then was not conscious of myself,' and from this 
I understand that the • I ' did not persist during deep sleep ! 
— You do not know, we rejoin, that this denial of the per- 

1 I. e. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure refers to the 
past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of reflection. 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 69 

sistence of the ' I ' flatly contradicts the state of conscious- 
ness expressed in the judgment 'I was not conscious of 
myself and the verbal form of the judgment itself! — But 
what then is denied by the words ' of myself ? — This, we 
admit, is a reasonable question. Let us consider the 
point. What is negatived in that judgment is not the 
knowing ' I ' itself, but merely the distinctions of caste, 
condition of life, &c which belong to the ' I ' at the time 
of waking. We must distinguish the objects of the several 
parts of the judgment under discussion. The object of the 
' (me) myself is the ' I ' distinguished by class characteris- 
tics as it presents itself in the waking state ; the object of 
the word ' I ' (in the judgment) is that ' I ' which consists of 
a uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep 
also, but is then not quite distinct. The judgment ' I did 
not know myself therefore means that the sleeper was not 
conscious of the place where he slept, of his special charac- 
teristics, and to on. — It is, moreover, your own view that 
in deep sleep the Self occupies the position of a witnessing 
principle with regard to Nescience. But by a witness 
(sakshin) we understand some one who knows about some- 
thing by personal observation (sakshat) ; a person who does 
not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly, in scripture as 
well as in ordinary language a knowing subject only, not 
mere knowledge, is spoken of as a witness ; and with this 
the Reverend Pacini also agrees when teaching that the 
word 'sakshin' means one who knows in person (PI. Su. 
V, 2, 91). Now this witness is nothing else but the ' I ' 
which is apprehended in the judgment ' I know ' ; and how 
then should this ' I ' not be apprehended in the state of 
sleep? That which itself appears to the Self appears as 
the ' I,' and it thus follows that also in deep sleep and 
similar states the Self which then shines forth appears 
as the « I.' 

The conscious subject persists In the state of release. 

To maintain that the consciousness of the ' I ' does not 
persist in the state of final release is again altogether inap- 



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70 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. 



propriate. It in fact amounts to the doctrine — only ex- 
pressed in somewhat different words — that final release is 
the annihilation of the Self. The ' I ' is not a mere attri- 
bute of the Self so that even after its destruction the essen- 
tial nature of the Self might persist — as it persists on the 
cessation of ignorance ; but it constitutes the very nature 
of the Self. Such judgments as * I know,' ' Knowledge has 
arisen in me,' show, on the other hand, that we are con- 
scious of knowledge as a mere attribute of the Self. — 
Moreover, a man who suffering pain, mental or of other 
kind — whether such pain be real or due to error only 
— puts himself in relation to pain — ' I am suffering pain ' — 
naturally begins to reflect how he may once for all free 
himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy a state 
of untroubled ease ; the desire of final release thus having 
arisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it If, 
on the other hand, he were to realise that the effect of such 
activity would be the loss of personal existence, he surely 
would turn away as soon as somebody began to tell him 
about ' release.' And the result of this would be that, in 
the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole scrip- 
tural teaching as to final release would lose its authorita- 
tive character. — Nor must you maintain against this that 
even in the state of release there persists pure conscious- 
ness ; for this by no means improves your case. No 
sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the 
idea that after he himself has perished there will remain 
some entity termed 'pure light!' — What constitutes the 
' inward ' Self thus is the ' I,' the knowing subject. 

This ' inward ' Self shines forth in the state of final release 
also as an ' I ' ; for it appears to itself. The general principle 
is that whatever being appears to itself appears as an ' I ' ; 
both parties in the present dispute establish the existence 
of the transmigrating Self on such appearance. On the 
contrary, whatever does not appear as an 'I,' does not 
appear to itself; as jars and the like. Now the emanci- 
pated Self does thus appear to itself, and therefore it 
appears as an ' I.' Nor does this appearance as an ' I ' 
imply in any way that the released Self is subject to 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 71 

Nescience and implicated in the Samsara ; for this would 
contradict the nature of final release, and moreover the 
consciousness of the ' I ' cannot be the cause of Nescience 
and so on. Nescience (ignorance) is either ignorance as to 
essential nature, or the cognition of something under an 
aspect different from the real one (as when a person suffer- 
ing from jaundice sees all things yellow) ; or cognition of 
what is altogether opposite in nature (as when mother o' 
pearl is mistaken for silver). Now the ' I ' constitutes the 
essential nature of the Self; how then can the conscious- 
ness of the ' I,' i. e. the consciousness of its own true nature, 
implicate the released Self in Nescience, or, in the Sawzsara ? 
The fact rather is that such consciousness destroys Nes- 
cience, and so on, because it is essentially opposed to them. 
In agreement with this we observe that persons like the 
rrshi Vamadeva, in whom the intuition of their identity 
with Brahman had totally destroyed all Nescience, en- 
joyed the consciousness of the personal ' I ' ; for scripture 
says, ' Seeing this the rtshi Vamadeva understood, / was 
Manu and the Sun ' (Brj. Up. I, 4, 10). And the highest 
Brahman also, which is opposed to all other forms of 
Nescience and denoted and conceived as pure Being, is 
spoken of in an analogous way ; cp. ' Let me make each of 
these three deities,' &c. (KA. Up. VI, 3, 3) ; ' May I be many, 
may I grow forth ' (Kk Up. VI, 2, 3) ; ' He thought, shall I 
send forth worlds? ' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1) j and again, ' Since 
I transcend the Destructible, and am higher also than the 
Indestructible, therefore I am proclaimed in the world and 
in the Veda as the highest Person' (Bha. Gi. XV, 18) ; 
* I am the Self, O Gfo/akera' (Bha Gt. X, 20) ; « Never was 
I not' (Bha. G!. II, 12) ; • I am the source and the destruc- 
tion of the whole world ' (Bha. Gi. VII, 6) ; 'lam the 
source of all ; from me proceeds everything ' (Bha. Gt. X, 
8) ; * I am he who raises them from the ocean of the world 
of death' (Bha. Gi. XII, 7) ; 'I am the giver of seed, the 
father ' (Bha. GI. XIV, 4) ; « I know the things past ' (Bha. 
Gi. VII, 26).— But if the ' I' (aham) constitutes the essen- 
tial nature of the Self, how is it that the Holy One teaches 
the principle of egoity (ahamkara) to belong to the sphere 



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72 vedAnta-sAtras. 

of objects, ' The great elements, the ahamkara, the under- 
standing (buddhi), and the Unevolved' (Bha. Gt. XIII, 5)? 
— As in all passages, we reply, which give information about 
the true nature of the Self it is spoken of as the ' I,' we con- 
clude that the ' I ' constitutes the essential nature of the in- 
ward Self. Where, on the other hand, the Holy One declares 
the ahamkara — a special effect of the Unevolved — to be 
comprised within the sphere of the Objective, he means 
that principle which is called ahamkara, because it causes 
the assumption of Egoity on the part of the body which 
belongs to the Not-self. Such egoity constitutes the aham- 
kara also designated as pride or arrogance, which causes 
men to slight persons superior to themselves, and is referred 
to by scripture in many places as something evil. Such 
consciousness of the ' I ' therefore as is not sublated by 
anything else has the Self for its object; while, on the 
other hand, such consciousness of the ' I ' as has the body 
for its object is mere Nescience. In agreement with this 
the Reverend Parlrara has said, ' Hear from me the essen- 
tial nature of Nescience ; it is the attribution of Selfhood to 
what is not the Self.' If the Self were pure consciousness 
then pure consciousness only, and not the quality of being 
a knowing subject, would present itself in the body also, 
which is a Not-self wrongly imagined to be a Self. The 
conclusion therefore remains that the Self is nothing but 
the knowing 'I.' Thus it has been said, 'As is proved 
by perception, and as also results from reasoning and 
tradition, and from its connexion with ignorance, the Self 
presents itself as a knowing ' I.' And again, ' That which is 
different from body, senses, mind, and vital airs ; which 
does not depend on other means; which is permanent, 
pervading, divided according to bodies — that is the Self 
blessed in itself.' Here 'not dependent on other means' 
means 'self-luminous'; and 'pervading' means 'being of 
such a nature as to enter, owing to excessive minuteness, 
into all non-sentient things.' 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 73 



In cases of Scripture conflicting with Perception, Scrip- 
tare is not stronger. The True cannot be known 
through the Untrue. 

With reference to the assertion (p. 24 ff.) that Perception, 
which depends on the view of plurality, is based on some 
defect and hence admits of being otherwise accounted for 
— whence it follows that it is sublated by Scripture ; we 
ask you to point out what defect it is on which Perception 
is based and may hence be accounted for otherwise. — ' The 
beginningless imagination of difference ' we expect you to 
reply. — But, we ask in return; have you then come to know 
by some other means that this beginningless imagination 
of difference, acting in a manner analogous to that of certain 
defects of vision, is really the cause of an altogether perverse 
view of things ? — If you reply that this is known just from 
the fact that Perception is in conflict with Scripture, we 
point out that you are reasoning in a circle: you prove 
the defectiveness of the imagination of plurality through 
the fact that Scripture tells us about a substance devoid 
of all difference ; and at the same time you prove the latter 
point through the former. Moreover, if Perception gives rise 
to perverse cognition because it is based on the imagination 
of plurality, Scripture also is in no better case — for it is 
based on the very same view. — If against this you urge that 
Scripture, although based on a defect, yet sublates Perception 
in so far as it is the cause of a cognition which dispels all 
plurality apprehended through Perception, and thus is later 
in order than Perception ; we rejoin that the defectiveness 
of the foundation of Scripture having once been recognised, 
the circumstance of its being later is of no avail. For if 
a man is afraid of a rope which he mistakes for a snake 
his fear does not come to an end because another man, 
whom he considers to be in error himself, tells him ' This is 
no snake, do not be afraid.' And that Scripture is founded 
on something defective is known at the very time of hearing 
Scripture, for the reflection (which follows on hearing) con- 
sists in repeated attempts to cognise the oneness of Brahman 
—a cognition which is destructive of all the plurality appre- 



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74 vedAnta-sAtras. 



headed through the first hearing of the Veda. — We further 
ask, 'By what means do you arrive at the conclusion that 
Scripture cannot possibly be assumed to be defective in any 
way, while defects may be ascribed to Perception ' ? It is 
certainly not Consciousness — self-proved and absolutely 
devoid of all difference — which enlightens you on this point ; 
for such Consciousness is unrelated to any objects whatever, 
and incapable of partiality to Scripture. Nor can sense- 
perception be the source of your conviction ; for as it is 
founded on what is defective it gives perverse information. 
Nor again the other sources of knowledge ; for they are all 
based on sense-perception. As thus there are no acknow- 
ledged means of knowledge to prove your view, you must 
give it up. — But, you will perhaps say, we proceed by means 
of the ordinary empirical means and objects of knowledge! — 
What, we ask in reply, do you understand by * empirical ' ? 
— What rests on immediate unreflective knowledge, but is 
found not to hold good when tested by logical reasoning ! — 
But what is the use, we ask, of knowledge of this kind ? If 
logical reasoning refutes something known through some 
means of knowledge, that means of knowledge is no longer 
authoritative ! — Now you will possibly argue as follows : 
' Scripture as well as Perception is founded on Nescience ; 
but all the same Perception is sublated by Scripture. For 
as the object of Scripture, i. e. Brahman, which is one and 
without a second, is not seen to be sublated by any ulterior 
cognition, Brahman, i.e. pure non-differenced Consciousness, 
remains as the sole Reality.' — But here too you are wrong, 
since we must decide that something which rests on a defect 
is unreal, although it may remain unrefuted. We will illus- 
trate this point by an analogous instance. Let us imagine 
a race of men afflicted with a certain special defect of vision, 
without being aware of this their defect, dwelling in some 
remote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men pro- 
vided with sound eyes. As we assume all of these cave 
dwellers to be afflicted with the same defect of vision, they, 
all of them, will equally see and judge bright things, e.g. the 
moon, to be double. Now in the case of these people there 
never arises a subsequent cognition sublating their primitive 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 75 

cognition ; but the latter is false all the same, and its object, 
viz. the doubleness of the moon, is false likewise ; the defect 
of vision being the cause of a cognition not corresponding 
to reality. — And so it is with the cognition of Brahman also. 
This cognition is based on Nescience, and therefore is false, 
together with its object, viz. Brahman, although no sublating 
cognition presents itself. — This conclusion admits of various 
expressions in logical form. ' The Brahman under dispute 
is false because it is the object of knowledge which has 
sprung from what is affected with Nescience ; as the phe- 
nomenal world is.' 'Brahman is false because it is the 
object of knowledge ; as the world is.' ' Brahman is false 
because it is the object of knowledge, the rise of which has 
the Untrue for its cause ; as the world is.' 

You will now perhaps set forth the following analogy. 
States of dreaming consciousness — such as the perception 
of elephants and the like in one's dreams — are unreal, and 
yet they are the cause of the knowledge of real things, viz. 
good or ill fortune (portended by those dreams). Hence 
there is no reason why Scripture — although unreal in so far 
as based on Nescience — should not likewise be the cause 
of the cognition of what is real, viz. Brahman. — The two 
cases are not parallel, we reply. The conscious states ex- 
perienced in dreams are not unreal ; it is only their objects 
that are false ; these objects only, not the conscious states, 
are sublated by the waking consciousness. Nobody thinks 
'the cognitions of which I was conscious in my dream are 
unreal ' ; what men actually think is ' the cognitions are real, 
but the things are not real.' In the same way the illusive 
state of consciousness which the magician produces in the 
minds of other men by means of mantras, drugs, &c, is true, 
and hence the cause of love and fear ; for such states of 
consciousness also are not sublated. The cognition which, 
owing to some defect in the object, the sense organ, &c, 
apprehends a rope as a snake is real, and hence the cause 
of fear and other emotions. True also is the imagination 
which, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind 
of a man though not actually bitten, viz. that he has been 
bitten; true also is the representation of the imagined 



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j6 vedAnta-sCtras. 



poison, for it may be the cause of actual death. In the 
same way the reflection of the face in the water is real, 
and hence enables us to ascertain details belonging to the 
real face. All these states of consciousness are real, as 
we conclude from their having a beginning and actual 
effects. — Nor would it avail you to object that in the 
absence of real elephants, and so on, the ideas of them 
cannot be real. For ideas require only some substrate 
in general ; the mere appearance of a thing is a sufficient 
substrate, and such an appearance is present in the case in 
question, owing to a certain defect. The thing we deter- 
mine to be unreal because it is sublated ; the idea is non- 
sublated, and therefore real. 

Nor can you quote in favour of your view — of the real 
being known through the unreal — the instance of the stroke 
and the letter. The letter being apprehended through the 
stroke (i.e. the written character) does not furnish a case 
of the real being apprehended through the unreal ; for the 
stroke itself is real. — But the stroke causes the idea of the 
letter only in so far as it is apprehended as being a letter, 
and this * being a letter ' is untrue 1 — Not so, we rejoin. If 
this ' being a letter ' were unreal it could not be a means of 
the apprehension of the letter ; for we neither observe nor 
can prove that what is non-existent and indefinable con- 
stitutes a means. — Let then the idea of the letter constitute 
the means ! — In that case, we rejoin, the apprehension of 
the real does not spring from the unreal ; and besides, it 
would follow therefrom that the means and what is to be 
effected thereby would be one, Le. both would be, without 
any distinction, the idea of the letter only. Moreover, if the 
means were constituted by the stroke in so far as it is not 
the letter, the apprehension of all letters would result from 
the sight of one stroke ; for one stroke may easily be con- 
ceived as not being any letter. — But, in the same way as the 
word ' Devadatta ' conventionally denotes some particular 
man, so some particular stroke apprehended by the eye 
may conventionally symbolise some particular letter to be 
apprehended by the ear, and thus a particular stroke may 
be the cause of the idea of a particular letter J — Quite so, 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 77 

we reply, but on this explanation the real is known through 
the real ; for both stroke and conventional power of sym- 
bolisation are real. The case is analogous to that of the 
idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a buffalo ; 
that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing depicted, 
and that similarity is something real. Nor can it be said 
(with a view to proving the purvapaksha by another analo- 
gous instance) that we meet with a cognition of the real by 
means of the unreal in the case of sound (sabda) which is 
essentially uniform, but causes the apprehension of different 
things by means of difference of tone (nada). For sound 
is the cause of the apprehension of different things in so 
far only as we apprehend the eormexion of sound manifest- 
ing itself in various tones, with the different things indicated 
•by those various tones *. And, moreover, it is not correct 
to argue on the ground of the uniformity of sound ; for 
only particular significant sounds such as 'ga,' which can 
be apprehended by the ear, are really ' sound.' — All this 
proves that it is difficult indeed to show that the know- 
ledge of a true thing, viz. Brahman, can be derived from 
Scripture, if Scripture — as based on Nescience — is itself 
untrue. 

Our opponent may finally argue as follows : — Scripture 
is not unreal in the same sense as a sky-flower is unreal ; 
for antecedently to the cognition of universal non-duality 
Scripture is viewed as something that is, and only on the 
rise of that knowledge it is seen to be unreal. At this 
latter time Scripture no longer is a means of cognising 
Brahman, devoid of all difference, consisting of pure Intel- 
ligence ; as long on the other hand as it is such a means, 
Scripture is; for then we judge 'Scripture is.' — But to 
this we reply that if Scripture is not (true), the judgment 
' Scripture is ' is false, and hence the knowledge resting on 
false Scripture being false likewise, the object of that know- 
ledge, i.e. Brahman itself, is false. If the cognition of fire 
which rests on mist being mistaken for smoke is false, it 

1 And those manifestations of sound by means of various tones 
are themselves something real. 



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78 vedAnta-sOtras. 



follows that the object of that cognition, viz. fire itself, is 
likewise unreal. Nor can it be shown that (in the case 
of Brahman) there is no possibility of ulterior sublative 
cognition ; for there may be such sublative cognition, viz. 
the one expressed in the judgment ' the Reality is a Void.' 
And if you say that this latter judgment rests on error, 
we point out that according to yourself the knowledge of 
Brahman is also based on error. And of our judgment 
(viz. • the Reality is a Void ') it may truly be said that all 
further negation is impossible. — But there is no need to 
continue this demolition of an altogether baseless theory. 

No scriptural texts teach a Brahman devoid of all 
difference. 

We now turn to the assertion that certain scriptural 
texts, as e. g. ' Being only was this in the beginning,' are 
meant to teach that there truly exists only one homo- 
geneous substance, viz. Intelligence free from all difference. — 
This we cannot allow. For the section in which the quoted 
text occurs, in order to make good the initial declaration 
that by the knowledge of one thing all things are known, 
shows that the highest Brahman which is denoted by the 
term 'Being' is the substantial and also the operative 
cause of the world ; that it is all-knowing, endowed with all 
powers ; that its purposes come true ; that it is the inward 
principle, the support and the ruler of everything; and 
that distinguished by these and other good qualities it 
constitutes the Self of the entire world ; and then finally 
proceeds to instruct .SVetaketu that this Brahman consti- 
tutes his Self also (' Thou art that '). We have fully set 
forth this point in the Vedartha-samgraha, and shall estab- 
lish it in greater detail in the present work also, in the 
so-called arambha«a-adhikara«a. — In the same way the 
passage ' the higher knowledge is that by which the Inde- 
structible is apprehended, &c.' (Mu. Up. I, i, 5) first denies 
of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Praknli, 
and then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-per- 
vadingness, subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperish- 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 79 

ableness, creativeness with regard to all beings, and other 
auspicious qualities. Now we maintain that also the text 
'True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' does not prove a 
substance devoid of all difference, for the reason that the 
co-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains 
itself in so far only as denoting one thing distinguished by 
several attributes. For 'co-ordination ' (samanadhikaranya, 
lit. ' the abiding of several things in a common substrate ') 
means the reference (of several terms) to one thing, there 
being a difference of reason for the application (of several 
terms to one thing). Now whether we take the several 
terms, * True,' ' Knowledge/ ' Infinite,' in their primary sense, 
i. e. as denoting qualities, or as denoting modes of being 
opposed to whatever is contrary to those qualities ; in either 
case we must needs admit a plurality of causes for the 
application of those several terms to one thing. There is 
however that difference between the two alternatives that 
in the former case the terms preserve their primary mean- 
ing, while in the latter case their denotative power depends 
on so-called ' implication ' (laksha»a). Nor can it be said 
that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge, &c. (which 
is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of lakshana), 
constitutes nothing more than the essential nature (of one 
non-differenced substance; the three terms thus having 
one purport only) ; for as such essential nature would be 
sufficiently apprehended through one term, the employ- 
ment of further terms would be purposeless. This view 
would moreover be in conflict with co-ordination, as it 
would not allow of difference of motive for several terms 
applied to one thing. On the other hand it cannot be 
urged against the former alternative that the distinction of 
several attributes predicated of one thing implies a dis- 
tinction in the thing to which the attributes belong, and 
that from this it follows that the several terms denote 
several things — a result which also could not be recon- 
ciled with ' co-ordination ' ; for what ' co-ordination * aims 
at is just to convey the idea of one thing being qualified 
hy several attributes. For the grammarians define 'co- 
ordination ' as the application, to one thing, of several words, 



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8o vedanta-sCtras. 



for the application of each of which there is a different 
motive. 

You have further maintained the following view : — In the 
text 'one only without a second,' the phrase 'without a 
second ' negatives all duality on Brahman's part even in so 
far as qualities are concerned. We must therefore, accord- 
ing to the principle that all £akhas convey the same doc- 
trine, assume that all texts which speak of Brahman 
as cause, aim at setting forth an absolutely non-dual sub- 
stance. Of Brahman thus indirectly defined as a cause, the 
text 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' contains 
a direct definition ; the Brahman here meant to be defined 
must thus be devoid of all qualities. Otherwise, moreover, 
the text would be in conflict with those other texts which 
declare Brahman to be without qualities and blemish. — But 
this also cannot be admitted. What the phrase 'without a 
second ' really aims at intimating is that Brahman possesses 
manifold powers, and this it does by denying the existence 
of another ruling principle different from Brahman. That 
Brahman actually possesses manifold powers the text shows 
further on, ' It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' 
and ' it sent forth fire,' and so on. — But how are we to 
know that the mere phrase ' without a second ' is meant to 
negative the existence of all other causes in general ? — As 
follows, we reply. The clause ' Being only this was in the 
beginning, one only,' teaches that Brahman when about to 
create constitutes the substantial cause of the world. Here 
the idea of some further operative cause capable of giving 
rise to the effect naturally presents itself to the mind, and 
hence we understand that the added clause 'without a 
second ' is meant to negative such an additional cause. If 
it were meant absolutely to deny all duality, it would deny 
also the eternity and other attributes of Brahman which 
you yourself assume. You in this case make just the 
wrong use of the principle of all the .Sakhas containing the 
same doctrine; what this principle demands is that the 
qualities attributed in all Sakhas to Brahman as cause 
should be taken over into the passage under discussion 
also. The same consideration teaches us that also the 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 8r 

text 'True, knowledge,' &c, teaches Brahman to possess 
attributes ; for this passage has to be interpreted in agree- 
ment with the texts referring to Brahman as a cause. Nor 
does this imply a conflict with the texts which declare 
Brahman to be without qualities ; for those texts are 
meant to negative the evil qualities depending on Prakn'ti. 
— Those texts again which refer to mere knowledge declare 
indeed that knowledge is the. essential nature of Brahman, 
but this does not mean that mere knowledge constitutes 
the fundamental reality. For knowledge constitutes the 
essential nature of a knowing subject only which is the 
substrate of knowledge, in the same way as the sun, lamps, 
and gems are the substrate of Light. That Brahman is 
a knowing subject all scriptural texts declare ; cp. ' He 
who is all knowing ' (Mu. Up. I, 1,9); ' It thought ' {Kh. 
Up. VI, 2, 3); 'This divine being thought' {Kh. Up. VI, 
3, 2) ; 'He thought, let me send forth the worlds ' (Ait. 
Ar. II, 4, I, 2) ; ' He who arranges the wishes — as eternal 
of those who are not eternal, as thinker of (other) thinkers, 
as one of many' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); 'There are two 
unborn one* — one who knows, one who does not know — 
one strong, the other weak ' (Svet. Up. 1, 9) ; ' Let us know 
Him, the highest of Lords, the great Lord, the highest 
deity of deities, the master of masters, the highest above 
the god, the lord of the world, the adorable one ' (SVet. Up. 
VI, 7) ; 'Of him there is known no effect (body) or instru- 
ment; no one is seen like unto him or better; his high 
power is revealed as manifold, forming his essential nature, 
as knowledge, strength, and action ' (5Vet. Up. VI, 8) ; 
' That is the Self, free from sin, ageless, deathless, griefless, 
free from hunger and thirst, whose wishes are true, whose 
purposes are true ' {Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5). These and other 
texts declare that to Brahman, whose essential nature is 
knowledge, there belong many excellent qualities — among 
which that of being a knowing subject stands first, and 
that Brahman is free from all evil qualities. That the 
texts referring to Brahman as free from qualities, and those 
which speak of it as possessing qualities, have really one 
and the same object may be inferred from the last of the 
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82 vedAnta-sOtras. 



passages quoted above ; the earlier part of which — ' free 
from sin,' up to ' free from thirst ' — denies of Brahman all 
evil qualities, while its latter part — ' whose wishes are true,* 
and so on — asserts of its certain excellent qualities. As 
thus there is no contradiction between the two classes of 
texts, there is no reason whatever to assume that either of 
them has for its object something that is false. — With 
regard to the concluding passage of the Taittiriya-text, 
'from whence all speech, together with the mind, turns 
away, unable to reach it V we point out that with the 
passage ' From terror of it the wind blows,' there begins 
a declaration of the qualities of Brahman, and that the 
next section ' one hundred times that human bliss,' &c, 
makes statements as to the relative bliss enjoyed by the 
different classes of embodied souls ; the concluding passage 
' He who knows the bliss of that Brahman from whence all 
speech, together with the mind, turns away unable to reach 
it,' hence must be taken as proclaiming with emphasis the 
infinite nature of Brahman's auspicious qualities. More- 
over, a clause in the chapter under discussion — viz. 'he 
obtains all desires, together with Brahman the all-wise' 
(II, 1) — which gives information as to the fruit of the know- 
ledge of Brahman clearly declares the infinite nature of the 
qualities of the highest all-wise Brahman. The desires are 
the auspicious qualities of Brahman which are the objects 
of desire ; the man who knows Brahman obtains, together 
with Brahman, all qualities of it. The expression ' together 
with ' is meant to bring out the primary importance of the 
qualities; as also described in the so-called dahara-vldya 
(KA, Up. VIII, 1). And that fruit and meditation are of 
the same character (i.e. that in meditations on Brahman 
its qualities are the chief matter of meditation, just as these 
qualities are the principal point in Brahman reached by 
the Devotee) is proved by the text 'According to what 
a man's thought is in this world, so will he be after he has 

1 Which passage appears to refer to a nirguna brahman, whence 
it might be inferred that the connected initial passage — ' Sat) am 
gfl&nam,' &c. — has a similar purport. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 83 

departed this life' {Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1). If it be said that 
the passage ' By whom it is not thought by him it is 
thought,' ' not understood by those who understand ' (Ke. 
Up. II, 3), declares Brahman not to be an object of know- 
ledge; we deny this, because were it so, certain other 
texts would not teach that final Release results from 
knowledge ; cp. ' He who knows Brahman obtains the 
Highest ' (Taitt. Up. II, i, 1) ; ' He knows Brahman, he 
becomes Brahman.' And, moreover, the text ' He who 
knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non- 
existing; he who knows Brahman as existing, him we 
know himself as existing ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1), makes the 
existence and non-existence of the Self dependent on the 
existence and non-existence of knowledge which has Brah- 
man for its object. We thus conclude that all scriptural 
texts enjoin just the knowledge of Brahman for the sake of 
final Release. This knowledge is, as we already know, 
of the nature of meditation, and what is to be meditated 
on is Brahman as possessing qualities. (The text from 
the Ke. Up. then explains itself as follows: — ) We are 
informed by the passage ' from whence speech together 
with mind turns away, being unable to reach it,' that the 
infinite Brahman with its unlimited excellences cannot be 
defined either by mind or speech as being so or so much, 
and from this we conclude the Kena text to mean that 
Brahman is not thought and not understood by those who 
understand it to be of a definitely limited nature ; Brahman 
in truth being unlimited. If the text did not mean this, it 
would be self-contradictory, parts of it saying that Brah- 
man is not thought and not understood, and other parts, 
that it is thought and is understood. 

Now as regards the assertion that the text ' Thou mayest 
not see the seer of seeing ; thou mayest not think the 
thinker of thinking' (Br*. Up. Ill, 5, 2), denies the exis- 
tence of a seeing and thinking subject different from mere 
seeing and thinking. — This view is refuted by the following 
interpretation. The text addresses itself to a person who 
has formed the erroneous opinion that the quality of con- 
sciousness or knowledge does not constitute the essential 

G 2 



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84 vedanta-sCtras. 



nature of the knower, but belongs to it only as an adventi- 
tious attribute, and tells him ' Do not view or think the 
Self to be such, but consider the seeing and thinking Self 
to have seeing and thinking for its essential nature.' — Or else 
this text may mean that the embodied Self which is the seer 
of seeing and the thinker of thinking should be set aside, and 
that only the highest Self — the inner Self of all beings — 
should be meditated upon. — Otherwise a conflict would 
arise with texts declaring the knowership of the Self, such as 
' whereby should he know the knower ? ' (Br*. Up. IV, 5, 15). 

Your assertion that the text ' Bliss is Brahman ' (Taitt. 
Up. Ill, 6, 1) proves pure Bliss to constitute the essential 
nature of Brahman is already disposed of by the refutation 
of the view that knowledge (consciousness) constitutes the 
essential nature of Brahman; Brahman being in reality 
the substrate only of knowledge. For by bliss we under- 
stand a pleasing state of consciousness. Such passages as 
' consciousness, bliss is Brahman,' therefore mean ' con- 
sciousness — the essential character of which is bliss — is 
Brahman.' On this identity of the two things there rests 
that homogeneous character of Brahman, so much insisted 
upon by yourself. And in the same way as numerous 
passages teach that Brahman, while having knowledge for 
its essential nature, is at the same time a knowing subject ; 
so other passages, speaking of Brahman as something 
separate from mere bliss, show it to be not mere bliss but 
a subject enjoying bliss ; cp. 'That is one bliss of Brahman' 
(Taitt. Up. II, 8,4); 'he knowing the bliss of Brahman' 
(Taitt. Up. II, 9, 1). To be a subject enjoying bliss is in 
fact the same as to be a conscious subject. 

We now turn to the numerous texts which, according to 
the view of our opponent, negative the existence of plurality. 
— ' Where there is duality as it were ' (Br*. Up. IV, 5, 15) ; 
' There is not any plurality here ; from death to death goes 
he who sees here any plurality ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 19) ; ' But 
when for him the Self alone has become all, by what means, 
and whom, should he see?' (Br*. Up. IV, 5, 15) &c. — But 
what all these texts deny is only plurality in so far as con- 
tradicting that unity of the world which depends on its 



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I ADHVAYA, 1 PA&A, I. 8$ 

being in its entirety an effect of Brahman, and having 
Brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true Self. 
They do not, on the other hand, deny that plurality on 
Brahman's part which depends on its intention to become 
manifold — a plurality proved by the text ' May I be many, 
may I grow forth ' (Kit. Up. VI, 2, 3). Nor can our op- 
ponent urge against this that, owing to the denial of 
plurality contained in other passages this last text refers to 
something not real ; for it is an altogether laughable 
assertion that Scripture should at first teach the doctrine, 
difficult to comprehend, that plurality as suggested by 
Perception and the other means of Knowledge belongs to 
Brahman also, and should afterwards negative this very 
doctrine ! 

Nor is it true that the text ' If he makes but the smallest 
"antaram" (i.e. difference, interval, break) in it there is 
fear for him ' (Taitt. Up. II, 7) implies that he who sees 
plurality within Brahman encounters fear. For the other 
text 'All this is Brahman ; let a man meditate with calm 
mind on all this as beginning, ending and breathing in it, 
i.e. Brahman' (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1) teaches directly that 
reflection on the plurality of Brahman is the cause of peace 
of mind. For this passage declares that peace of mind is 
produced by a reflection on the entire world as springing 
from, abiding within, and being absorbed into Brahman, 
and thus having Brahman for its Self; and as thus the 
view of Brahman constituting the Self of the world with 
all its manifold distinctions of gods, men, animals, inanimate 
matter and so on, is said to be the cause of peace of mind, 
and, consequently, of absence of fear, that same view surely 
cannot be a cause of fear 1 — But how then is it that the 
Taitt. text declares that ' there is fear for him ' ? — That text, 
we reply, declares in its earlier part that rest in Brahman 
is the cause of fearlessness (' when he finds freedom from 
fear, rest, in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, 
unsupported ; then he has obtained fearlessness ') ; its 
latter part therefore means that fear takes place when there 
is an interval, a break, in this resting in Brahman. As the 
great Ris\d says ' When Vasudeva is not meditated on for 



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86 VEDANTA-SfjTRAS. 



an hour or even a moment only ; that is loss, that is great 
calamity, that is error, that is change.' 

The Sutra III, 2, 11 does not, as our opponent alleges, 
refer to a Brahman free from all difference, but to Brahman 
as possessing attributes — as we shall show in its place. 
And the Sutra IV, 2, 3 declares that the things seen in 
dreams are mere ' Maya ' because they differ in character 
from the things perceived in the waking state ; from which 
it follows that the latter things are real. 

Nor do Smriti and Pura«a teach such a doctrine. 

Nor is it true that also according to Smr/ti and Purawas 
only non-differenced consciousness is real and everything 
else unreal. — ' He who knows me as unborn and without 
a beginning, the supreme Lord of the worlds ' (Bha. GI. 
X, 3) ; ' All beings abide in me, I abide not in them. Nay, 
the beings abide not in me — behold my lordly power. My 
Self bringing forth the beings supports them but does not 
abide in them ' (Bha. GI. IX, 4, 5) ; 'I am the origin and 
the dissolution of the entire world ; higher than I there is 
nothing else : on me all this is strung as pearls on a thread ' 
(Bha. Gi. VII, 6, 7) ; 'Pervading this entire Universe by 
a portion (of mine) I abide ' (Bha. Gi. X, 42) ; * But another, 
the highest Person, is called the highest Self who, per- 
vading the three worlds supports them, the eternal Lord. 
Because I transcend the Perishable and am higher than the 
Imperishable even, I am among the people and in the Veda 
celebrated as the supreme Person' (Bha. GI. XV, 17, 18). 

' He transcends the fundamental matter of all beings, its 
modifications, properties and imperfections ; he transcends 
all investing (obscuring) influences, he who is the Self of 
all. Whatever (room) there is in the interstices of the 
world is filled by him ; all auspicious qualities constitute 
his nature. The whole creation of beings is taken out of 
a small part of his power. Assuming at will whatever form 
he desires he bestows benefits on the whole world effected 
by him. Glory, strength, dominion, wisdom, energy, power 
and other attributes are collected in him, Supreme of the 
supreme in whom no troubles abide, ruler over high and 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 87 

low, lord in collective and distributive form, non-manifest 
and manifest, universal lord, all-seeing, all-knowing, all- 
powerful, highest Lord. The knowledge by which that 
perfect, pure, highest, stainless homogeneous (Brahman) is 
known or perceived or comprehended — that is knowledge : 
all else is ignorance' (Vishwu Pura«a VI, 5, 82-87). — ' To that 
pure one of mighty power, the highest Brahman to which 
no term is applicable, the cause of all causes, the name 
"Bhagavat " is suitable. The letter bha implies both the 
cherisher and supporter ; the letter ga the leader, mover 
and creator. The two syllables bhaga indicate the six 
attributes — dominion, strength, glory, splendour, wisdom, 
dispassion. That in him — the universal Self, the Self of 
the beings — all beings dwell and that he dwells in all, this 
is the meaning of the letter va. Wisdom, might, strength, 
dominion, glory, without any evil qualities, are all denoted 
by the word bhagavat. This great word bhagavat is the 
name of Vasudeva who is the highest Brahman — and of no 
one else. This word which denotes persons worthy of rever- 
ence in general is used in its primary sense with reference 
to Vasudeva only ; in a derived sense with regard to other 
persons ' (Vi. Pu. VI, 5, jz ff.) ; • ' Where all these powers 
abide, that is the form of him who is the universal form : 
that is the great, form of Hari. That form produces in its 
sport forms endowed with all powers, whether of gods or 
men or animals. For the purpose of benefitting the worlds, 
not springing from work (karman) is this action of the 
unfathomable one ; all-pervading, irresistible ' ( Vi. Pu. VI, 
7, 69-71) ; * Him who is of this kind, stainless, eternal, all- 
pervading, imperishable, free from all evil, named Vishwu, 
the highest abode ' (Vi. Pu. I, 22, 53) ; ' He who is the 
highest of the high, the Person, the highest Self, founded 
on himself; who is devoid of all the distinguishing character- 
istics of colour, caste and the like ; who is exempt from 
birth, change, increase, decay and death ; of whom it can 
only be said that he ever is. He is everywhere and in him 
everything abides ; hence he is called Vasudeva by those 
who know. He is Brahman, eternal, supreme, imperish- 
able, undccaying ; of one essential nature and ever pure, 



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88 vedAnta-s6tras. 



as free from all defects. This whole world is Brahman, 
comprising within its nature the Evolved and the Un- 
evolved ; and also existing in the form of the Person and 
in that of time * (Vi. Pu. I, a, 10-14) ; ' The Prakr*'ti about 
which I told and which is Evolved as well as Unevolved, 
and the Person — both these are merged in the highest Self. 
The highest Self is the support of all, the highest Lord ; as 
Vishwu he is praised in the Vedas and the Vedanta-texts ' 
(Vi. Pu. VI, 4, 38, 39). ' Two forms are there of that Brah- 
man, one materia], the other immaterial. These two forms, 
perishable and imperishable, are within all things: the 
imperishable one is the highest Brahman, the perishable 
one this whole world. As the light of a fire burning in 
one place spreads all around, so the energy of the highest 
Brahman constitutes this entire world ' (Vi. Pu. 1, 23, 53-55). 
' The energy of Vishwu is the highest, that which is called the 
embodied soul is inferior ; and there is another third energy 
called karman or Nescience, actuated by which the omni- 
present energy of the embodied soul perpetually undergoes 
the afflictions of worldly existence. Obscured by Nescience 
the energy of the embodied soul is characterised in the 
different beings by different degrees of perfection ' (Vi. Pu. 
VI, 7, 61-63). 

These and other texts teach that the highest Brahman is 
essentially free from all imperfection whatsoever, comprises 
within itself all auspicious qualities, and finds its pastime in 
originating, preserving, reabsorbing, pervading, and ruling 
the universe ; that the entire complex of intelligent and non- 
intelligent beings (souls and matter) in all their different 
estates is real, and constitutes the form, i.e. the body of 
the highest Brahman, as appears from those passages which 
co-ordinate it with Brahman by means of terms such as jarira 
(body), rflpa (form), tanu (body), awwa (part), jakti (power), 
vibhuti (manifestation of power), and so on ; — that the souls 
which are a manifestation of Brahman's power exist in their 
own essential nature, and also, through their connexion 
with matter, in the form of embodied souls (kshetra£*a); — 
and that the embodied souls, being engrossed by Nescience 
in the form of good and evil works, do not recognise their 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA; I. • So. 

essential nature, which is knowledge, but view themselves 
as having the character of material things. — The outcome 
of all this is that we have to cognise Brahman as carrying 
plurality within itself, and the world, which is the manifes- 
tation of his power, as something real. 

When now the text, in the sloka. ' where all difference has 
vanished * (VL Pu. VI, 7, 53), declares that the Self, although 
connected with the different effects of Prakrz'ti, such as 
divine, human bodies, and so on, yet is essentially free from 
all such distinctions, and therefore not the object of the words 
denoting those different classes of beings, but to be defined 
as mere knowledge and Being ; to be known by the Self 
and not to be reached by the mind of the practitioner of 
Yoga (yogayu^ ) ; this must in no way be understood as 
denying the reality of the world. — But how is this known ? — ■ 
As follows, we reply. The chapter of the Purawa in which 
that jloka occurs at first declares concentration (Yoga) to be 
the remedy of all the afflictions of the Sawsara ; thereupon 
explains the different stages of Yoga up to the so-called 
pratyahara (complete restraining of the senses from re- 
ceiving external impressions) ; then, in order to teach the 
attainment of the 'perfect object' (jubhlrraya) required 
for dharaxra, declares that the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu, 
possesses two forms, called powers (jakti), viz. a defined 
one (mflrta) and an undefined one (amtirta); and then 
teaches that a portion of the ' defined ' form, viz. the 
embodied soul (kshetra^wa), which is distinguished by its 
connexion with matter and involved in Nescience — that is 
termed 'action,' and constitutes a third power — is not perfect. 
The chapter further teaches that a portion of the undefined 
form which is free from Nescience called action, separated 
from all matter, and possessing the character of pure 
knowledge, is also not the 'perfect object,' since it is 
destitute of essential purity;- and, finally, declares that the 
' perfect object ' is to be found in that defined form which 
is special to Bhagavat, and which is the abode of the three 
powers, viz. that non-defined form which is the highest 
power, that non-defined form which is termed embodied 
soul, and constitutes the secondary (apara) power, and 



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90 vedanta-sOtras. 



Nescience in the form of work — which is called the third 
power, and is the cause of the Self, which is of the essence of 
the highest power, passing into the state of embodied soul. 
This defined form (which is the ' perfect object ') is proved 
by certain Vedanta-texts, such as 'that great person of 
sun-like lustre' (Svet. Up. Ill, 8). We hence must take the 
jloka, ' in which all differences vanish,' &c, to mean that 
the pure Self (the Self in so far as knowledge only) is not 
capable of constituting the * perfect object.' Analogously 
two other passages declare * Because this cannot be reflected 
upon by the beginner in Yoga, the second (form) of Vish«u 
is to be meditated upon by Yogins — the highest abode.' 
' That in which all these powers have their abode, that is 
the other great form of Hari, different from the (material) 
Virva form.' 

In an analogous manner, Parlrara declares that BrahmA, 
A'aturmukha, Sanaka, and similar mighty beings which 
dwell within this world, cannot constitute the ' perfect 
object ' because they are involved in Nescience ; after that 
goes on to say that the beings found in the Sawsara are in 
the same condition — for they are essentially devoid of 
purity since they reach their true nature only later on, 
when through Yoga knowledge has arisen in them — ; and 
finally teaches that the essential individual nature of the 
highest Brahman, i.e. Vish«u, constitutes the 'perfect 
object' * From Brahma down to a blade of grass, all living 
beings that dwell within this world are in the power of the 
Samsara due to works, and hence no profit can be derived 
by the devout from making them objects of their meditation. 
They are all implicated in Nescience, and stand within the 
sphere of the Samsara ; knowledge arises in them only later 
on, and they are thus of no use in meditation. Their 
knowledge does not belong to them by essential nature, for 
it comes to them through something else. Therefore the 
stainless Brahman which possesses essential knowledge,' 
&c &c. — All this proves that the passage 'in which all 
difference vanishes ' does not mean to deny the reality of 
the world. 

Nor, again, does the passage 'that which has knowledge 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 91 

for its essential nature ' (Vi. Pu. 1, 2, 6) imply that the whole 
complex of things different from knowledge is false ; for it 
declares only that the appearance of the Self— the essential 
nature of which is knowledge — as gods, men, and so on, is 
erroneous. A declaration that the appearance of mother 
o' pearl as silver is founded on error surely does not imply 
that all the silver in the world is unreal ! — But if, on the 
ground of an insight into the oneness of Brahman and the 
world — as expressed in texts where the two appear in 
co-ordination — a text declares that it is an error to view 
Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, under the 
form of material things, this after all implies that the whole 
aggregate of things is false! — By no means, we rejoin. 
As our jastra distinctly teaches that the highest Brahman, 
i. e. Vish«u, is free from all imperfections whatsoever, com- 
prises within himself all auspicious qualities, and reveals 
his power in mighty manifestations, the view of the world's 
reality cannot possibly be erroneous. That information as 
to the oneness of two things by means of co-ordination does 
not allow of sublation (of either of the two), and is non-con- 
tradictory, we shall prove further on. Hence also the jloka 
last referred to does not sublate the reality of the world. 

• That from whence these beings are born, by which, when 
born, they live, into which they enter when they die, 
endeavour to know that ; that is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. 
Ill, 1). From this scriptural text we ascertain that 
Brahman is the cause of the origination, and so on, of 
the world. After this we learn from a Purawa text (' He 
should make the Veda grow by means of Itihasa and 
Purana ; the Veda fears that a man of little reading 
may do it harm ') that the Veda should be made to grow 
by Itihasa and Purina. By this 'making to grow' we 
have to understand the elucidation of the sense of the 
Vedic texts studied by means of other texts, promul- 
gated by men who had mastered the entire Veda and 
its contents, and by the strength of their devotion had 
gained full intuition of Vedic truth. Such 'making to 
grow' must needs be undertaken, since the purport of the 
entire Veda with all its Sakhas cannot be fathomed by one 



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92 • vedanta-sCtras. 



who has studied a small part only, and since without 
knowing that purport we cannot arrive at any certitude. 

The Vishwu Purawa relates how Maitreya, wishing to 
have his knowledge of Vedic matters strengthened by the 
holy Parlrara, who through the favour of Pulastya and 
Vasish/Aa had obtained an insight into the true nature of 
the highest divinity, began to question Parlrara, 'I am 
desirous to hear from thee how this world originated, and 
how it will again originate in future, and of what it consists, 
and whence proceed animate and inanimate things ; how 
and into what it has been resolved, and into what it will in 
future be resolved?' &c. (VL Pu. I, 1). The questions 
asked refer to the essential nature of Brahman, the different 
modes of the manifestation of its power, and the different 
results of propitiating it Among the questions belonging 
to the first category, the question ' whence proceed animate 
and inanimate things?' relates to the efficient and the 
material cause of the world, and hence the clause ' of what 
the world consists ' is to be taken as implying a question 
as to what constitutes the Self of this world, which is the 
object of creation, sustentation, and dissolution. The reply 
to this question is given in the words ' and the world is 
He.' Now the identity expressed by this clause is founded 
thereon that he (i.e. Brahman or Vishnu) pervades the 
world as its Self in the character of its inward Ruler ; and 
is not founded on unity of substance of the pervading 
principle and the world pervaded. The phrase 'consists 
of ' (-maya) does not refer to an effect (so that the question 
asked would be as to the causal substance of which this 
world is an effect), for a separate question on this point 
would be needless. Nor does the -maya express, as it 
sometimes does — e. g. in the case of prawa-maya l , the own 
sense of the word to which it is attached ; for in that case 
the form of the reply ' and the world is He ' (which implies 
a distinction between the world and Vishwu) would be 
inappropriate ; the reply would in that case rather be 
' Vish«u only.' What ' maya ' actually denotes here is 

1 ' Prawamaya ' is explained as meaning ' pr&ra ' only. 

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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 93 

abundance, prevailingness, in agreement with Pamni, V, 4, 
21, and the meaning is that Brahman prevails in the world 
in so far as the entire world constitutes its body. The 
co-ordination of the two words ' the world ' and ' He ' thus 
rests on that relation between the two, owing to which the 
world is the body of Brahman, and Brahman the Self of the 
world. If, on the other hand, we maintained that the jastra 
aims only at inculcating the doctrine of one substance free 
from all difference, there would be no sense in all those 
questions and answers, and no sense in an entire jastra 
devoted to the explanation of that one thing. In that case 
there would be room for one question only, viz. ' what is 
the substrate of the erroneous imagination of a world ? ' and 
for one answer to this question, viz. ' pure consciousness 
devoid of all distinction!' — And if the co-ordination 
expressed in the clause ' and the world is he ' was meant 
to set forth the absolute oneness of the world and Brahman, 
then it could not be held that Brahman possesses all kinds 
of auspicious qualities, and is opposed to all evil ; Brahman 
would rather become the abode of all that is impure. All 
this confirms the conclusion that the co-ordination expressed 
in that clause is to be understood as directly teaching the 
relation between a Self and its body. — The .rloka, ' From 
Vishnu the world has sprung : in him he exists : he is the 
cause of the subsistence and dissolution of this world : and 
the world is he' (Vi. Pu. I, i, 35), states succinctly what 
a subsequent passage — beginning with ' the highest of the 
high ' (Vi. Pu. I, a, 10) — sets forth in detail. Now there the 
floka, ' to the unchangeable one ' (I, 2, 1), renders homage 
to the holy Vishwu, who is the highest Brahman in so far 
as abiding within his own nature, and then the text pro- 
ceeds to glorify him in his threefold form as Hiranyagarbha, 
Hari, and .Sankara, as Pradhana, Time, and as the totality 
of embodied souls in their combined and distributed form. 
Here the .rloka, ' Him whose essential nature is know- 
ledge ' (I, a, 6), describes the aspect of the highest Self in 
so far as abiding in the state of discrete embodied souls ; 
the passage cannot therefore be understood as referring to 
a substance free from all difference. If the jastra aimed 



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94 vedanta-sCtras. 



at teaching that the erroneous conception of a manifold 
world has for its substrate a Brahman consisting of non- 
differenced intelligence, there would be room neither for 
the objection raised in I, 3, 1 ('How can we attribute 
agency creative and otherwise to Brahman which is without 
qualities, unlimited, pure, stainless? ') nor for the refutation 
of that objection, ' Because the powers of all things are the 
objects of (true) knowledge excluding all (bad) reasoning, 
therefore there belong to Brahman also such essential 
powers as the power of creating, preserving, and so on, the 
world ; just as heat essentially belongs to fire V In that 
case the objection would rather be made in the following 
form : ' How can Brahman, which is without qualities, be 
the agent in the creation, preservation, and so on, of the 
world ? ' and the answer would be, ' Creation by Brahman 
is not something real, but something erroneously imagined.' 
— The purport of the objection as it stands in the text is as 
follows : ' We observe that action creative and otherwise 
belongs to beings endowed with qualities such as goodness, 
and so on, not perfect, and subject to the influence of 
karman ; how then can agency creative, and so on, be 
attributed to Brahman which is devoid of qualities, perfect, 
not under the influence of karman, and incapable of any 
connexion with action?' And the reply is, 'There is 
nothing unreasonable in holding that Brahman as being of 
the nature described above, and different in kind from all 
things perceived, should possess manifold powers ; just as 
fire, which is different in kind from water and all other 
material substances, possesses the quality of heat and other 
qualities.' The flokas also, which begin with the words 
' Thou alone art real ' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.), do not assert 
that the whole world is unreal, but only that, as Brahman 
is the Self of the world, the latter viewed apart from 
Brahman is not real. This the text proceeds to confirm, 

1 The sense in which this xloka has to be taken is 'As in 
ordinary life we ascribe to certain things (e.g. gems, mantras) 
certain special powers because otherwise the effects they produce 
could not be accounted for ; so to Brahman also,' &c. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 95 

• thy greatness it is by which all movable and immovable 
things are pervaded.' This means — because all things 
movable and immovable are pervaded by thee, therefore 
all this world has thee for its Self, and hence ' there is none 
other than thee,' and thus thou being the Self of all art 
alone real. Such being the doctrine intended to be set 
forth, the text rightly says, ' this all-pervasiveness of thine 
is thy greatness ' ; otherwise it would have to say, ' it is 
thy error.' Were this latter view intended, words such as 

• Lord of the world,' ' thou,' &c, could not, moreover, be 
taken in their direct sense, and there would arise a con- 
tradiction with the subject-matter of the entire chapter, 
viz. the praise of the Holy one who in the form of a mighty 
boar had uplifted in play the entire earth. — Because this 
entire world is thy form in so far as it is pervaded as its 
Self by thee whose true nature is knowledge ; therefore 
those who do not possess that devotion which enables men 
to view thee as the Self of all, erroneously view this world 
as consisting only of gods, men, and other beings ; this is 
the purport of the next jloka» ' this which is seen.' — And 
it is an error not only to view the world which has its real 
Self in thee as consisting of gods, men, and so on, but also 
to consider the Selfs whose 'true nature is knowledge as 
being of the nature of material beings such as gods, men, 
and the like ; this is the meaning of the next jloka, ' this 
world whose true nature is knowledge.' — Those wise men, 
on the other hand, who have an insight into the essentially 
intelligent Self, and whose minds are cleared by devotion — ■ 
the means of apprehending the Holy one as the universal 
Self— , they view this entire world with all its manifold 
bodies — the effects of primeval matter — as thy body — . 
a body the Self of which is constituted by knowledge 
abiding apart from its world-body; this is the meaning 
of the following jloka : ' But those who possess knowledge,' 
&c. — If the different jlokas were not interpreted in this 
way, they would be mere unmeaning reiterations ; their 
constitutive words could not be taken in their primary 
sense ; and we should come into conflict with the sense of 
the passages, the subject-matter of the chapter, and the 



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96 " Vedanta-sCtras. 



purport of the entire jastra. The passage, further, 'Of 
that Self although it exists in one's own and in other 
bodies, the knowledge is of one kind ' (Vi. Pu. II, 14, 31 ft), 
refers to that view of duality according to which the 
different Selfs — although equal in so far as they are all of 
the essence of knowledge — are constituted into separate 
beings, gods, men, &c, by their connexion with different 
portions of matter all of which are modifications of primary 
matter, and declares that view to be false. But this does 
not imply a denial of the duality which holds good between 
matter on the one hand and Self on the other : what the 
passage means is that the Self which dwells in the different 
material bodies of gods, men, and so on, is of one and the 
same kind. So the Holy one himself has said, ' In the dog 
and the low man eating dog's flesh the wise see the same ' ; 
'Brahman, without any imperfection, is the same' (Bha. 
Gt. V, 18, 19). And, moreover, the clause 'Of the Self 
although existing in one's own and in other bodies ' directly 
declares that a thing different from the body is distributed 
among one's own and other bodies. 

Nor does the passage ' If there is some other (para) 
different (anya) from me,' &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 86) intimate 
the oneness of the Self; for in that case the two words 
' para ' and ' anya ' would express one meaning only (viz. 
' other ' in the sense of ' distinct from '). The word ' para ' 
there denotes a Self distinct from that of one's own Self, 
and the word ' anya ' is introduced to negative a character 
different from that of pure intelligence : the sense of the 
passage thus is ' If there is some Self distinct from mine, 
and of a character different from mine which is pure know- 
ledge, then it can be said that I am of such a character 
and he of a different character'; but this is not the case, 
because all Selfs are equal in as far as their nature consists 
of pure knowledge. — Also the jloka beginning 'Owing to 
the difference of the holes of the flute ' (Vi. Pu. II, 14, 3a) 
only declares that the inequality of the different Selfs is 
owing not to their essential nature, but to their dwelling in 
different material bodies ; and does not teach the oneness 
of all Selfs. The different portions, of air, again, passing 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 97 

through the different holes of the flute — to which the many 
Selfs are compared — are not said to be one but only to be 
equal in character; they are one in character in so far 
as all of them are of the nature of air, while the different 
names of the successive notes of the musical scale are 
applied to them because they pass out by the different 
holes of the instrument. For an analogous reason the 
several Selfs are denominated by different names, viz. 
gods and so on. Those material things also which are parts 
of the substance fire, or water, or earth, are one in so far 
only as they consist of one kind of substance ; but are not 
absolutely one ; those different portions of air, therefore, 
which constitute the notes of the scale are likewise not 
absolutely one Where the Purawa further says ' He (or 
" that ") I am and thou art He (or " that ") ; all this universe 
that has Self for its true nature is He (or " that ") ; abandon 
the error of distinction ' (Vi. Pu. II, 16, 23) ; the word 
'that' refers to the intelligent character mentioned pre- 
viously which is common to all Selfs, and the co-ordination 
stated in the two clauses therefore intimates that intelli- 
gence is the character of the beings denoted ' I ' and 
' Thou ' ; * abandon therefore,' the text goes on to say, 
' the illusion that the difference of outward form, divine and 
so on, causes a corresponding difference in the Selfs.' If this 
explanation were not accepted (but absolute non-difference 
insisted upon) there would be no room for the references to 
difference which the passages quoted manifestly contain. 

Accordingly the text goes on to say that the king acted 
on the instruction he had received, ' he abandoned the view 
of difference, having recognised the Real.' — But on what 
ground do we arrive at this decision (viz. that the passage 
under discussion is not meant to teach absolute non- 
duality) ? — On the ground, we reply, that the proper topic 
of the whole section is to teach the distinction of the Self 
and the body — for this is evident from what is said in an 
early part of the section, ' as the body of man, characterised 
by hands, feet, and the like,' &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 85).— For 
analogous reasons the doka ' When that knowledge which 
gives rise to distinction" &c. (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 94) teaches 
[48] H 



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98 vedanta-sOtras. 



neither the essential unity of all Selfs nor the oneness of 
the individual Self and the highest Self. And that the 
embodied soul and the highest Self should be essentially 
one, is no more possible than that the body and the Self 
should be one. In agreement herewith Scripture says, 
'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. 
One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without 
eating' (Mu. Up. Ill, i, i). 'There are two drinking 
their reward in the world of their own works, entered into 
the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know 
Brahman call them shade and light,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 3, 1). 
And in this .rastra also (i. e. the Vishwu Pur4«a) there are 
passages of analogous import ; cp. the stanzas quoted above, 
' He transcends the causal matter, all effects, all imperfec- 
tions such as the gu«as ' &c. 

The Sutras also maintain the same doctrine, cp. I, 1, 17; 
I, 2, ai ; II, 1, 22 ; and others. They therein follow Scrip- 
ture, which in several places refers to the highest and the 
individual soul as standing over against each other, cp. e. g. 
' He who dwells in the Self and within the Self, whom the 
Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules 
the Self from within ' (Br*. Up. Ill, 7, 22) ; ' Embraced by 
the intelligent Self (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 21) ; ' Mounted by the 
intelligent Self (IV, 3,35). Nor can the individual Self 
become one with the highest Self by freeing itself from 
Nescience, with the help of the means of final Release; 
for that which admits of being the abode of Nescience can 
never become quite incapable of it. So the Puri«a says, 
' It is false to maintain that the individual Self and the 
highest Self enter into real union ; for one substance can- 
not pass over into the nature of another substance.' 
Accordingly the Bhagavad Gita declares that the released 
soul attains only the same attributes as the highest Self. 
' Abiding by this knowledge, they, attaining to an equality 
of attributes with me, do neither come forth at the time 
of creation, nor are troubled at the time of general destruc- 
tion ' (XIV, 2). Similarly our Purina says, ' That Brahman 
leads him who meditates on it, and who is capable of 
change, towards its own being (atmabhava), in the same 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 99 

way as the magnet attracts the iron ' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 30). 
Here the phrase ' leads him towards his own being ' means 
' imparts to him a nature like his own ' (not ' completely 
identifies him with itself ') ; for the attracted body does not 
become essentially one with the body attracting. 

The same view will be set forth by the Sutrakara in 
IV, 4, 17 ; ai, and I, 3, a. The Vrjtti also says (with 
reference to Su. IV, 4, 17) 'with the exception of the 
business of the world (the individual soul in the state of 
release) is equal (to the highest Self) through light ' ; and 
the author of the Dramu&bhashya says, 'Owing to its 
equality (sayu^ya) with the divinity the disembodied soul 
effects all things, like the divinity.' The following scrip- 
tural texts establish the same view, 'Those who depart 
from hence, after having known the Self and those true 
desires, for them there is freedom in all the worlds' {Kh. 
Up. VIII, 1, 6); 'He who knows Brahman reaches the 
Highest ' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ; ' He obtains all desires together 
with the intelligent Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1) ; ' Having 
reached the Self which consists of bliss, he wanders about 
in these worlds having as much food and assuming as many 
forms as he likes ' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 10, 5) ; 'There he moves 
about ' (Kk. Up. VIII, 1 a, 3) ; ' For he is flavour ; for only 
after having perceived a flavour can any one perceive 
pleasure ' (Taitt. Up. II, 7) ; ' As the flowing rivers go to 
their setting in the sea, losing name and form ; thus he 
who knows, freed from name and form, goes to the divine 
Person who is higher than the high' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 8) ; 
' He who knows, shaking off good and evil, reaches the 
highest oneness, free from stain' (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 3). 

The objects of meditation in all the vidyAs which refer to 
the highest Brahman, are Brahman viewed as having 
qualities, and the fruit of all those meditations. For this 
reason the author of the Sutras declares that there is 
option among the different vidyas — cp. Ve. SO. Ill, 3, 11 ; 
III, 3, 59. In the same way the Vakyakara teaches that 
the qualified Brahman only is the object of meditation, and 
that there is option of vidyas ; where he says ' (Brahman) 
connected (with qualities), since the meditation refers to its 

537831A , 

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too vedAnta-s6tras. 



qualities.' The same view is expressed by the Bhashya- 
kara in the passage beginning 'Although he who bases 
himself on the knowledge of Being.' — Texts such as ' He 
knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman ' (Mu. Up. Ill, a, 9) 
have the same purport, for they must be taken in con- 
nexion with the other texts (referring to the fate of him 
who knows) such as 'Freed from name and form he 
goes to the divine Person who is higher than the high ' ; 
' Free from stain he reaches the highest oneness ' (Mu. Up. 
Ill, a, 8 ; III, 1,3);' Having approached the highest light 
he manifests himself in his own shape' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4). 
Of him who has freed himself from his ordinary name and 
form, and all the distinctions founded thereon, and has 
assumed the uniform character of intelligence, it may be 
said that he is of the character of Brahman. — Our Purawa 
also propounds the same view. The jloka (VI, 7, 91), 
' Knowledge is the means to obtain what is to be obtained, 
viz. the highest Brahman : the Self is to be obtained, freed 
from all kinds of imagination,' states that that Self which 
through meditation on Brahman, is freed from all imagina- 
tion so as to be like Brahman, is the object to be attained. 
(The three forms of imagination to be got rid of are so- 
called karma-bhavana, brahma-bhavana and a combination 
of the two. See Vi. Pu. VI, 7.) The text then goes on, 
' The embodied Self is the user of the instrument, know- 
ledge is its instrument; having accomplished Release — 
whereby his object is attained — he may leave off.' This 
means that the Devotee is to practise meditation on the 
highest Brahman until it has accomplished its end, viz. 
the attainment of the Self free from all imagination. — The 
text continues, ' Having attained the being of its being, 
then he is non-different from the highest Self ; his differ- 
ence is founded on Nescience only.' This sloka. describes 
the state of the released soul. ' Its being ' is the being, viz. 
the character or nature, of Brahman ; but this does not 
mean absolute oneness of nature; because in this latter 
case the second ' being ' would be out of place and the 
jloka would contradict what had been said before. The 
meaning is : when the soul has attained the nature of 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, I. IOI 

Brahman, i. e. when it has freed itself from all false imagina- 
tion, then it is non-different from the highest Self. This 
non-difference is due to the soul, as well as the highest Self, 
having the essential nature of uniform intelligence. The 
difference of the soul — presenting itself as the soul of a god, 
a man, &c. — from the highest Self is not due to its essential 
nature, but rests on the basis of Nescience in the form of 
work : when through meditation on Brahman this basis is 
destroyed, the difference due to it comes to an end, and the 
soul no longer differs from the highest Self. So another 
text says, ' The difference of things of one nature is due to 
the investing agency of outward works ; when the difference 
of gods, men, &c, is destroyed, it has no longer any invest- 
ing power* (Vi. Pu. II, 14, 33). — The text then adds 
a further explanation, 'when the knowledge which gives 
rise to manifold difference is completely destroyed, who 
then will produce difference that has no real existence?' 
The manifold difference is the distinction of gods, men, 
animals, and inanimate things: compare the saying of 
Saunaka: ' this fourfold distinction is founded on false know- 
ledge.' The Self has knowledge for its essential nature ; 
when Nescience called work — which is the cause of the 
manifold distinctions of gods, men, &c. — has been com- 
pletely destroyed through meditation on the highest 
Brahman, who then will bring about the distinction of 
gods, &c, from the highest Self — a distinction which in the 
absence of a cause cannot truly exist. — That Nescience is 
called karman (work) is stated in the same chapter of the 
Purawa (st. 61 — avidya karmasa»^f»a). 

The passage in the Bhagavad Gita, ' Know me to 
be the kshetnuj«a' (XIII, a), teaches the oneness of all in 
so far as the highest Self is the inward ruler of all ; taken 
in any other sense it would be in conflict with other texts, 
such as 'All creatures are the Perishable, the unchanging 
soul is the Imperishable ; but another is the highest 
Person ' (Bha. GI. XV, 16). In other places the Divine one 
declares that as inward Ruler he is the Self of all : ' The 
Lord dwells in the heart of all creatures' (XVIII, 61), and 
'I dwell within the heart of all ' (XV, 15). and 'I am the 



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io2 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Self which has its abode within all creatures' (X, 20). 
The term ' creature ' in these passages denotes the entire 
aggregate of body, &c, up to the Self. — Because he is the 
Self of all, the text expressly denies that among all the 
things constituting his body there is any one separate from 
him,' There is not anything which is without me' (X, 39). 
The place where this text occurs is the winding up of 
a glorification of the Divine one, and the text has to be 
understood accordingly. The passage immediately follow- 
ing is ' Whatever being there is, powerful, beautiful, or 
glorious, even that know thou to have sprung from a 
portion of my glory; pervading this entire Universe by 
a portion of mine I do abide ' (X, 41 ; 42). 

All this clearly proves that the authoritative books do 
not teach the doctrine of one non-differenced substance ; 
that they do not teach that the universe of things is false ; 
and that they do not deny the essential distinction of in- 
telligent beings, non-intelligent things, and the Lord. 

The theory of Nescience cannot be proved. 
We now proceed to the consideration of Nescience. — 
According to the view of our opponent, this entire world, 
with all its endless distinctions of Ruler, creatures ruled, 
and so on, is, owing to a certain defect, fictitiously super- 
imposed upon the non-differenced, self-luminous Reality; 
and what constitutes that defect is beginningless Nescience, 
which invests the Reality, gives rise to manifold illusions, 
and cannot be defined either as being or non-being. Such 
Nescience, he says, must necessarily be admitted, firstly on 
the ground of scriptural texts, such as ' Hidden by what is 
untrue' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2), and secondly because other- 
wise the oneness of the individual souls with Brahman — 
which is taught by texts such as 'Thou are that ' — cannot 
be established. This Nescience is neither ' being,' because 
in that case it could not be the object of erroneous cogni- 
tion (bhrama) and sublation (badha) ; nor is it ' non-being,* 
because in that case it could not be the object of apprehen- 
sion and sublation 1 . Hence orthodox Philosophers declare 

1 ' Nescience' is sublated (refuted) by the cognition of Brahman, 

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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 103 

that this Nescience falls under neither of these two opposite 
categories. 

Now this theory of Nescience is altogether untenable. 
In the first place we ask, ' What is the substrate of this 
Nescience which gives rise to the great error of plurality 
of existence ? ' You cannot reply ' the individual soul ' ; 
for the individual soul itself exists in so far only as it is 
fictitiously imagined through Nescience. Nor can you say 
' Brahman ' ; for Brahman is nothing but self-luminous 
intelligence, and hence contradictory in nature to Nescience, 
which is avowedly sublated by knowledge. 

'The highest Brahman has knowledge for its essential 
nature : if Nescience, which is essentially false and to be 
terminated by knowledge, invests Brahman, who then will 
be strong enough to put an end to it ? ' 

' What puts an end to Nescience is the knowledge that 
Brahman is pure knowledge ! ' — ' Not so, for that knowledge 
also is, like Brahman, of the nature of light, and hence has 
no power to put an end to Nescience. — And if there exists 
the knowledge that Brahman is knowledge, then Brahman 
is an object of knowledge, and that, according to your own 
teaching, implies that Brahman is not of the nature of 
consciousness.' 

To explain the second of these jlokas. — If you maintain 
that what sublates Nescience is not that knowledge which 
constitutes Brahman's essential nature, but rather that 
knowledge which has for its object the truth of Brahman 
being of such a nature, we demur ; for as both these kinds 
of knowledge are of the same nature, viz. the nature of 
light, which is just that which constitutes Brahman's nature, 
there is no reason for making a distinction and saying that 
one knowledge is contradictory of Nescience, and the other 
is not. Or, to put it otherwise — that essential nature 
of Brahman which is apprehended through the cognition 

and thereby shown to have been the object of erroneous cognition : 
it thus cannot be 'being,' i.e. real. Nor can it be altogether 
unreal, ' non-being,' because in that case it could not be the object 
either of mental apprehension or of sublation. 



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104 vedAnta-sAtras. 



that Brahman is knowledge, itself shines forth in con- 
sequence of the self-luminous nature of Brahman, and hence 
we have no right to make a distinction between that 
knowledge which constitutes Brahman's nature, and that of 
which that nature is the object, and to maintain that the 
latter only is antagonistic to Nescience. — Moreover (and 
this explains the third jloka), according to your own view 
Brahman, which is mere consciousness, cannot be the object 
of another consciousness, and hence there is no knowledge 
which has Brahman for its object. If, therefore, knowledge 
is contradictory to non-knowledge (Nescience), Brahman 
itself must be contradictory to it, and hence cannot be its 
substrate. Shells (mistaken for silver) and the like which 
by themselves are incapable of throwing light upon their 
own true nature are not contradictory to non-knowledge of 
themselves, and depend, for the termination of that non- 
knowledge, on another knowledge (viz. on the knowledge 
of an intelligent being); Brahman, on the other hand, 
whose essential nature is established by its own conscious- 
ness, is contradictorily opposed to non-knowledge of itself, 
and hence does not depend, for the termination of that non- 
knowledge, on some other knowledge. — If our opponent 
should argue that the knowledge of the falsity of whatever 
is other than Brahman is contradictory to non-know- 
ledge, we ask whether this knowledge of the falsity of 
what is other than Brahman is contradictory to the non- 
knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, or to that non- 
knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the 
apparent world. The former alternative is inadmissible ; 
because the cognition of the falsity of what is other than 
Brahman has a different object (from the non-knowledge 
of Brahman's true nature) and therefore cannot be con- 
tradictory to it ; for knowledge and non-knowledge are 
contradictory in so far only as they refer to one and the 
same object. And with regard to the latter alternative we 
point out that the knowledge of the falsity of the world is 
contradictory to the non-knowledge which consists in the 
view of the reality of the world ; the former knowledge 
therefore sublates the latter non-knowledge only, while 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. j 05 

the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is not 
touched by it — Against this it will perhaps be urged that 
what is here called the non-knowledge of the true nature of 
Brahman, really is the view of Brahman being dual in 
nature, and that this view is put an end to by the cognition 
of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman ; while 
the true nature of Brahman itself is established by its own 
consciousness. — But this too we refuse to admit. If non- 
duality constitutes the true nature of Brahman, and is 
proved by Brahman's own consciousness, there is room 
neither for what is contradictory to it, viz. that non-know- 
ledge which consists in the view of duality, nor for the 
sublation of that non-knowledge. — Let then non-duality be 
taken for an attribute (not the essential nature) of Brahman ! 
— This too we refuse to admit ; for you yourself have 
proved that Brahman, which is pure Consciousness, is free 
from attributes which are objects of Consciousness. — From 
all this it follows that Brahman, whose essential nature is 
knowledge, cannot be the substrate of Nescience: the 
theory, in fact, involves a flat contradiction. 

When, in the next place, you maintain that Brahman, 
whose nature is homogeneous intelligence, is invested and 
hidden by Nescience, you thereby assert the destruction of 
Brahman's essential nature. Causing light to disappear 
means either obstructing die origination of light, or else 
destroying light that exists. And as you teach that light 
(consciousness) cannot originate, the ' hiding ' or ' making 
to disappear' of light can only mean its destruction. — 
Consider the following point also. Your theory is that 
self-luminous consciousness, which is without object and 
without substrate, becomes, through the influence of an 
imperfection residing within itself, conscious of itself as 
connected with innumerous substrata and innumerous 
objects. — Is then, we ask, that imperfection residing within 
consciousness something real or something unreal? — The 
former alternative is excluded, as not being admitted by 
yourself. Nor can we accept the latter alternative ; for 
if we did we should have to view that imperfection as 
being either a knowing subject, or an object of knowledge, 



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io6 vedAnta-sOtras. 



or Knowing itself. Now it cannot be ' Knowing,' as you 
deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing ; 
and that ' Knowing,' which is the substrate of the imper- 
fection, cannot be held to be unreal, because that would 
involve the acceptance of the Madhyamika doctrine, viz. 
of a general void '. 

And if knowers, objects of knowledge and knowing as 
determined by those two are fictitious, i. e. unreal, we have 
to assume another fundamental imperfection, and are thus 
driven into a regressus in infinitum. — To avoid this diffi- 
culty, it might now be said that real consciousness itself, 
which constitutes Brahman's nature, is that imperfection. — 
But if Brahman itself constitutes the imperfection, then 
Brahman is the basis of the appearance of a world, and it 
is gratuitous to assume an additional avidya to account 
for the world. Moreover, as Brahman is eternal, it would 
follow from this hypothesis that no release could ever take 
place. Unless, therefore, you admit a real imperfection 
apart from Brahman, you are unable to account for the 
great world-error. 

What, to come to the next point, do you understand by 
the inexplicability (anirva/fcaniyata) of Nescience ? — Its dif- 
ference in nature from that which is, as well as that which 
is not! — A thing of such kind would be inexplicable 
indeed ; for none of the means of knowledge apply to it. 
That is to say — the whole world of objects must be ordered 
according to our states of consciousness, and every state 
of consciousness presents itself in the form, either of some- 
thing existing or of something non-existing. If, therefore, 
we should assume that of states of consciousness which are 
limited to this double form, the object can be something 
which is neither existing nor non-existing, then anything 

1 If the imperfection inhering in Consciousness is itself of the 
nature of consciousness, and at the same time unreal, we should 
have to distinguish two kinds of Consciousness — which is contrary 
to the fundamental doctrine of the oneness of Consciousness. And 
if, on the other hand, we should say that the Consciousness in 
which the imperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter, 
i. e. unreal, we are landed in the view of universal unreality. 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I07 

whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness 
whatever. 

Against this our opponent may now argue as follows : — 
There is, after all, something, called avidya, or a^wana, or 
by some other name, which is a positive entity (bhava), 
different from the antecedent non-existence of knowledge ; 
which effects the obscuration of the Real ; which is the 
material cause of the erroneous superimposition on the 
Real, of manifold external and internal things ; and which 
is terminated by the cognition of the true nature of the 
one substance which constitutes Reality. For this avidya 
is apprehended through Perception as well as Inference. 
Brahman, in so far as limited by this avidya, is the material 
cause of the erroneous superimposition — upon the inward 
Self, which in itself is changeless pure intelligence, but has 
its true nature obscured by this superimposition — of that 
plurality which comprises the ahawkara, all acts of know- 
ledge and all objects of knowledge. Through special forms 
of this defect (i. e. avidya) there are produced, in this world 
superimposed upon Reality, the manifold special superim- 
positions presenting themselves in the form of things and 
cognitions of things — such as snakes (superimposed upon 
ropes), silver (superimposed on shells), and the like. Avidya 
constitutes the material cause of this entire false world ; 
since for a false thing we must needs infer a false cause. 
That this avidya or a^wana (non-knowledge) is an object 
of internal Perception, follows from the fact that judgments 
such as ' I do not know,' ' I do not know either myself or 
others,' directly present themselves to the mind. A mental 
state of this kind has for its object not that non-knowledge 
which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge — for 
such absence of knowledge is ascertained by the sixth 
means of proof (anupalabdhi) ; it rather is a state which 
presents its object directly, and thus is of the same kind 
as the state expressed in the judgment ' I am experiencing 
pleasure.' Even if we admit that ' absence of something ' 
(abhava) can be the object of perception, the state of con- 
sciousness under discussion cannot have absence of know- 
ledge in the Self for its object. For at the very moment 



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io8 vedAnta-sCtras. 



of such consciousness knowledge exists ; or if it does not 
exist there can be no consciousness of the absence of 
knowledge. To explain. When I am conscious that I am 
non-knowing, is there or is there not apprehension of the Self 
as having non-existence of knowledge for its attribute, and 
of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge ? In 
the former case there can be no consciousness of the absence 
of knowledge, for that would imply a contradiction. In 
the latter case, such consciousness can all the less exist, 
for it presupposes knowledge of that to which absence of 
knowledge belongs as an attribute (viz. the Self) and of its 
own counterentity, viz. knowledge. The same difficulty 
arises if we view the absence of knowledge as either the 
object of Inference, or as the object of the special means of 
proof called ' abhava ' (i. e. anupalabdhi). If, on the other 
hand, non-knowledge is viewed (not as a merely negative, 
but) as a positive entity, there arises no contradiction even 
if there is (as there is in fact) at the same time knowledge 
of the Self as qualified by non-knowledge, and of know- 
ledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge ; and we 
therefore must accept the conclusion that the state of 
consciousness expressed by ' I am non-knowing,' has for 
its object a non-knowledge which is a positive entity. — 
But, a Nescience which is a positive entity, contradicts the 
witnessing consciousness, whose nature consists in the 
lighting up of the truth of things! — Not so, we reply. 
Witnessing consciousness has for its object not the true 
nature of things, but Nescience ; for otherwise the lighting 
up (i.e. the consciousness) of false things could not take place. 
Knowledge which has for its object non-knowledge (Nesci- 
ence), does not put an end to that non-knowledge. Hence 
there is no contradiction (between £aitanya and a^tfana). — 
But, a new objection is raised, this positive entity, Nescience, 
becomes an object of witnessing Consciousness, only in so 
far as it (Nescience) is denned by some particular object 
(viz. the particular thing which is not known), and such 
objects depend for their proof on the different means of 
knowledge. How then can that Nescience, which is defined 
by the ' I ' (as expressed e. g. in the judgment, ' I do not 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 109 

know myself), become the object of witnessing Conscious- 
ness? — There is no difficulty here, we reply. All things 
whatsoever are objects of Consciousness, either as things 
known or as things not known. But while the mediation 
of the means of knowledge is required in the case of all 
those things which, as being non-intelligent (gada), can be 
proved only in so far as being objects known (through 
some means of knowledge), such mediation is not required 
in the case of the intelligent (agada) inner Self which proves 
itself. Consciousness of Nescience is thus possible in all 
cases (including the case ' I do not know myself), since 
witnessing Consciousness always gives definition to Nes- 
cience. — From all this it follows that, through Perception 
confirmed by Reasoning, we apprehend Nescience as a 
positive entity. This Nescience, viewed as a positive entity, 
is also proved by Inference — viz. in the following form: 
All knowledge established by one of the different means 
of proof is preceded by something else, which is different 
from the mere antecedent non-existence of knowledge; 
which hides the object of knowledge; which is terminated 
by knowledge; and which exists in the same place as 
knowledge ; — because knowledge possesses the property of 
illumining things not illumined before ; — just as the light 
of a lamp lit in the dark illumines things. — Nor must you 
object to this inference on the ground that darkness is not 
a substance, but rather the mere absence of light, or else 
the absence of visual perception of form and colour, and 
that hence darkness cannot be brought forward as a similar 
instance proving Nescience to be a positive entity. For 
that Darkness must be considered a positive substance 
follows, firstly, from its being more or less dense, and 
secondly, from its being perceived as having colour. 

To all this we make the following reply. Neither 
Perception alone, nor Perception aided by Reasoning, reveals 
to us a positive entity, Nescience, as implied in judgments 
such as ' I am non-knowing,' ' I know neither myself nor 
others.' The contradiction which was urged above against 
the view of non-knowledge being the antecedent non- 
existence of knowledge, presents itself equally in connexion 



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no vedAnta-sOtras. 



with non-knowledge viewed as a positive entity. For here 
the following alternative presents itself — the inner Reality 
is either known or not known as that which gives definition 
to Nescience by being either its object or its substrate. 
If it be thus known, then there is in it no room for 
Nescience which is said to be that which is put an end 
to by the cognition of the true nature of the Inner Reality. 
If, on the other hand, it be not thus known, how should 
there be a consciousness of Nescience in the absence of 
that which defines it, viz. knowledge of the substrate or 
of the object of Nescience ? — Let it then be said that what 
is contradictory to non-knowledge is the clear presentation 
of the nature of the inner Self, and that (while there is 
consciousness of a£?/ana) we have only an obscure presenta- 
tion of the nature of the Self ; things being thus, there is 
no contradiction between the cognition of the substrate 
and object of Nescience on the one side, and the conscious- 
ness of agnana on the other. — Well, we reply, all this' 
holds good on our side also. Even if agnana means ante- 
cedent non-existence of knowledge, we can say that know- 
ledge of the substrate and object of non-knowledge has 
for its object the Self presented obscurely only ; and 
thus there is no difference between our views — unless you 
choose to be obstinate ! 

Whether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or 
as the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, in either 
case it comes out as what the word indicates, viz. non- 
knowledge. Non-knowledge means either absence of 
knowledge, or that which is other than knowledge, or 
that which is contradictory to knowledge ; and in any of 
these cases we have to admit that non-knowledge pre- 
supposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge. Even 
though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not 
require the knowledge of the nature of light, yet when 
darkness is considered under the aspect of being contrary 
to light, this presupposes the cognition of light. And the 
non-knowledge held by you is never known in its own 
nature but merely as 'non-knowledge,' and it therefore 
presupposes the cognition of knowledge no less than our 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. in 

view does, according to which non-knowledge is simply 
the negation of knowledge. Now antecedent non-existence 
of knowledge is admitted by you also, and is an undoubted 
object of consciousness ; the right conclusion therefore is 
that what we are conscious of in such judgments as ' I am 
non-knowing,' &c, is this very antecedent non-existence of 
knowledge which we both admit. 

It, moreover, is impossible to ascribe to Brahman, whose 
nature is constituted by eternal free self-luminous in- 
telligence, the consciousness of Nescience ; for what con- 
stitutes its essence is consciousness of itself. If against this 
you urge that Brahman, although having consciousness of 
Self for its essential nature, yet is conscious of non-know- 
ledge in so far as its (Brahman's) nature is hidden ; we ask 
in return what we have to understand by Brahman's nature 
being hidden. You will perhaps say 'the fact of its not 
being illumined.' But how, we ask, can there be absence 
of illumination of the nature of that whose very nature con- 
sists in consciousness of Self, i. e. self-illumination ? If you 
reply that even that whose nature is consciousness of Self 
may be in the state of its nature not being illumined by an 
outside agency, we point out that as according to you 
light cannot be considered as an attribute, but constitutes 
the very nature of Brahman, it would — illumination coming 
from an external agency — follow that the very nature of 
Brahman can be destroyed from the outside. This we 
have already remarked. — Further, your view implies on the 
one hand that this non-knowledge which is the cause of 
the concealment of Brahman's nature hides Brahman in 
so far as Brahman is conscious of it, and on the other 
hand that having hidden Brahman, it becomes the object 
of consciousness on the part of Brahman ; and this evidently 
constitutes a logical see-saw. You will perhaps say 1 that 
it hides Brahman in so far only as Brahman is conscious of 
it. But, we point out, if the consciousness of a^tfana takes 
place on the part of a Brahman whose nature is not hidden, 
the whole hypothesis of the ' hiding ' of Brahman's nature 

1 Allowing the former view of the question only. 

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ii2 vedAnta-sOtras. 



loses its purport, and with it the fundamental hypothesis 
as to the nature of agn&na. ; for if Brahman may be 
conscious of a^rifana (without a previous obscuration of 
its nature by agt&aa) it may as well be held to be in the 
same way conscious of the world, which, by you, is considered 
to be an effect of a^wana. 

How, further, do you conceive this consciousness of 
agn&na. on Brahman's part ? Is it due to Brahman itself, 
or to something else ? In the former case this conscious- 
ness would result from Brahman's essential nature, and 
hence there would never be any Release. Or else, con- 
sciousness of a^wana constituting the nature of Brahman, 
which is admittedly pure consciousness, in the same way 
as the consciousness of false silver is terminated by that 
cognition which sublates the silver, so some terminating act 
of cognition would eventually put an end to Brahman's 
essential nature itself. — On the second alternative we ask 
what that something else should be. If you reply ' another 
aj-wana,' we are led into a regressus in infinitum. — Let it 
then be said 1 that a^wana having first hidden Brahman 
then becomes the object of its consciousness. — This, we 
rejoin, would imply that a^wana — acting like a defect of 
the eye — by its very essential being hides Brahman, and 
then a^wana could not be sublated by knowledge. — Let 
us then put the case as follows: — Agn&na, which is by 
itself beginningless, atjthe very same time effects Brahman's 
witnessing it (being conscious of it), and Brahman's nature 
being hidden ; in this way the regressus in infinitum and 
other difficulties will be avoided. — But this also we cannot 
admit ; for Brahman is essentially consciousness of Self, 
and cannot become a witnessing principle unless its nature 
be previously hidden. — Let then Brahman be hidden by 
some other cause ! — This, we rejoin, would take away from 
a^wana its alleged beginninglessness, and further would 
also lead to an infinite regress. And if Brahman were 
assumed to become a witness, without its essential nature 
being hidden, it could not possess — what yet it is main- 

1 Adopting the latter view only ; see preceding note. 



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i adhyAya, i pada, i. 113 

tained to possess — the uniform character of consciousness 
of Self. — If, moreover, Brahman is hidden by avidya, does 
St then not shine forth at all, or does it shine forth to some 
extent ? On the former alternative the not shining forth of 
Brahman — whose nature is mere light — reduces it to an 
absolute non-entity. Regarding the latter alternative we 
ask, ' of Brahman, which is of an absolutely homogeneous 
nature, which part do you consider to be concealed, and 
which to shine forth?' To that substance which is pure 
light, free from all division and distinction, there cannot 
belong two modes of being, and hence obscuration and 
light cannot abide in it together. — Let us then say that 
Brahman, which is homogeneous being, intelligence, bliss, 
has its nature obscured by avidya, and hence is seen 
indistinctly as it were. — But how, we ask, are we to 
conceive the distinctness or indistinctness of that whose 
nature is pure light ? When an object of light which has 
parts and distinguishing attributes appears in its totality, 
we say that it appears distinctly; while we say that its 
appearance is indistinct when some of its attributes do not 
appear. Now in those aspects of the thing which do not 
appear, light (illumination) is absent altogether, and hence 
we cannot there speak of indistinctness of light ; in those 
parts on the other hand which do appear, the light of which 
they are the object is distinct. Indistinctness is thus not 
possible at all where there is light In the case of such 
things as are apprehended as objects, indistinctness may 
take place, viz. in so far as some of their distinguishing 
attributes are not apprehended. But in Brahman, which is 
not an object, without any distinguishing attributes, pure 
light, the essential nature of which it is to shine forth, 
indistinctness which consists in the non-apprehension of 
certain attributes can in no way be conceived, and hence 
not be explained as the effect of avidya. 

We, moreover, must ask the following question : ' Is this 
indistinctness which you consider an effect of avidya put an 
end to by the rise of true knowledge or not ? ' On the latter 
alternative there would be no final release. In the former 
ease we have to ask of what nature Reality is. ' It is of 
[48] - I 



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H4 vedAnta-sCtras. 



an essentially clear and distinct nature.' Does this nature 
then exist previously (to the cessation of indistinctness), or 
not? If it does, there is no room whatever either for 
indistinctness the effect of avidya, or for its cessation. If 
it does not previously exist, then Release discloses itself 
as something to be effected, and therefore non-eternal. — 
And that such non-knowledge is impossible because there 
is no definable substrate for it we have shown above. 
— He, moreover, who holds the theory of error resting 
on a non-real defect, will find it difficult to prove the 
impossibility of error being without any substrate ; for, if 
the cause of error may be unreal, error may be supposed 
to take place even in case of its substrate being unreal. 
And the consequence of this would be the theory of a 
general Void. 

The assertion, again, that non-knowledge as a positive 
entity is proved by Inference, also is groundless. But the 
inference was actually set forth 1 — True; but it was set 
forth badly. For the reason you employed for proving 
a^«ana is a so-called contradictory one (L e. it proves the 
contrary of what it is meant to prove), in so far as it proves 
what is not desired and what is different from a^wana (for 
what it proves is that there is a certain knowledge, viz. 
that all knowledge resting on valid means of proof has 
non -knowledge for its antecedent). (And with regard to 
this knowledge again we must ask whether it also has non- 
knowledge for its antecedent.) If the reason (relied on in 
all this argumentation) does not prove, in this case also, 
the antecedent existence of positive non-knowledge, it is 
too general (and hence not to be trusted in any case). 
If, on the other hand, it does prove antecedent non- 
knowledge, then this latter non-knowledge stands in the 
way of the non-knowledge (which you try to prove by 
inference) being an object of consciousness, and thus 
the whole supposition of a^wana as an entity becomes 
useless. 

The proving instance, moreover, adduced by our oppo- 
nent, has no proving power ; for the light of a lamp does 
not possess the property of illumining things not illumined 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 115 

before. Everywhere illumining power belongs to know- 
ledge only ; there may be light, but if there is not also 
knowledge there is no lighting up of objects. The senses 
also are only causes of the origination of knowledge, and 
possess no illumining power. The function of the light of 
the lamp on the other hand is a merely auxiliary one, in so 
far as it dispels the darkness antagonistic to the organ of 
sight which gives rise to knowledge ; and it is only with 
a view to this auxiliary action that illumining power is 
conventionally ascribed to the lamp. — But in using the 
light of the lamp as a proving instance, we did not mean 
to maintain that it possesses illumining power equal to 
that of light ; we introduced it merely with reference to 
the illumining power of knowledge, in so far as preceded 
by the removal of what obscures its object ! — We refuse 
to accept this explanation. Illumining power does not 
only mean the dispelling of what is antagonistic to it, but 
also the defining of things, i. e. the rendering them capable 
of being objects of empirical thought and speech ; and this 
belongs to knowledge only (not to the light of the lamp). 
If you allow the power of illumining what was not illumined, 
to auxiliary factors also, you must first of all allow it to the 
senses which are the most eminent factors of that kind ; 
and as in their case there exists no different thing to be 
terminated by their activity, (i. e. nothing analogous to the 
agnina. to be terminated by knowledge), this whole argu- 
mentation is beside the point. 

There are also formal inferences, opposed to the conclu- 
sion of the purvapakshin. — Of the zg £ana under discussion, 
Brahman, which is mere knowledge, is not the substrate, 
just because it is agnina. ; as shown by the case of the non- 
knowledge of the shell (mistaken for silver) and similar 
cases ; for such non-knowledge abides within the knowing 
subject. — The a^wana under discussion does not obscure 
knowledge, just because it is a^«ana ; as shown by the 
cases of the shell, &c. ; for such non-knowledge hides the 
object — Agfidna. is not terminated by knowledge, because 
it does not hide the object of knowledge ; whatever non- 
knowledge is terminated by knowledge, is such as to hide 

I 2 



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1 1 6 \tedAnta-s6tras. 



the object of knowledge ; as e. g. the non-knowledge of the 
shell. — Brahman is not the substrate of a^Sana, because it is 
devoid of the character of knowing subject ; like jars and 
similar things. — Brahman is not hidden by agnkna, because 
it is not the object of knowledge ; whatever is hidden by 
non-knowledge is the object of knowledge ; so e. g. shells 
and similar things. — Brahman is not connected with non- 
knowledge to be terminated by knowledge, because it is 
not the object of knowledge ; whatever is connected with 
non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge is an object 
of knowledge ; as e. g. shells and the like. — Knowledge 
based on valid means of proof, has not for its antecedent, 
non- knowledge other than the antecedent non-existence of 
knowledge ; just because it is knowledge based on valid 
proof; like that valid knowledge which proves the a^w&na 
maintained by you. — Knowledge does not destroy a real 
thing, because it is knowledge in the absence of some 
specific power strengthening it; whatever is capable of 
destroying things is — whether it be knowledge or a^wana — 
strengthened by some specific power ; as e. g. the know- 
ledge of the Lord and of Yogins; and as the a^wina 
consisting in a pestle (the blow of which destroys the pot). 
— A^-wana which has the character of a positive entity cannot 
be destroyed by knowledge ; just because it is a positive 
entity, like jars and similar things. 

But, it now may be said, we observe that fear and other 
affections, which are positive entities and produced by 
previous cognitions, are destroyed by sublative acts of 
cognition! — Not so, we reply. Those affections are not 
destroyed by knowledge ; they rather pass away by them- 
selves, being of a momentary (temporary) nature only, and 
on the cessation of their cause they do not arise again. 
That they are of a momentary nature only, follows from 
their being observed only in immediate connexion with the 
causes of their origination, and not otherwise. If they were 
not of a temporary nature, each element of the stream of 
cognitions, which are the cause of fear and the like, would 
give rise to a separate feeling of fear, and the result would 
be that there would be consciousness of many distinct 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 117 



feelings of fear (and this we know not to be the case). — In 
conclusion we remark ^hat in denning right knowledge as 
' that which has for its antecedent another entity, different 
from its own antecedent non-existence,' you do not give 
proof of very eminent logical acuteness; for what sense has 
it to predicate of an entity that it is different from non- 
entity? — For all these reasons Inference also does not 
prove an qgn&na. which is a positive entity. And that it is 
not proved by Scripture and arthapatti, will be shown later 
on. And the reasoning under SO. II, 1, 4, will dispose of 
the argument which maintains that of a false thing the 
substantial cause also must be false. 

We thus see that there is no cognition of any kind which 
has for its object a Nescience of 'inexplicable' nature.— 
Nor can such an inexplicable entity be admitted on the 
ground of apprehension, erroneous apprehension and subla- 
tion (cp. above, p. 102). For that only which is actually 
apprehended, can be the object of apprehension, error and 
sublation, and we have no right to assume, as an object of 
these states of consciousness, something which is appre- 
hended neither by them nor any other state of consciousness. 
— ' But in the case of the shell, &c, silver is actually appre- 
hended, and at the same time there arises the sublating 
consciousness " this silver is not real," and it is not possible 
that one thing should appear as another ; we therefore are 
driven to the hypothesis that owing to some defect, we 
actually apprehend silver of an altogether peculiar kind, viz. 
such as can be defined neither as real nor as unreal.' — This 
also we cannot allow, since this very assumption necessarily 
implies that one thing appears as another. For appre- 
hension, activity, sublation, and erroneous cognition, all 
result only from one thing appearing as another, and it 
is not reasonable to assume something altogether non- 
perceived and groundless. The silver, when apprehended, 
is not apprehended as something ' inexplicable,' but as 
something real ; were it apprehended under the former 
aspect it could be the object neither of erroneous nor of 
sublative cognition, nor would the apprehending person 
endeavour to seize it. For these reasons you (the anirva- 



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1 1 8 vedanta-sOtras. 



£aniyatva-vidin) also must admit that the actual process 
is that of one thing appearing as another. 

Those also who hold other theories as to the kind of 
cognition under discussion (of which the shell, mistaken for 
silver, is an instance) must — whatsoever effort they may 
make to avoid it — admit that their theory finally implies 
the appearing of one thing as another. The so-called 
asatkhyati-view implies that the non-existing appears 
as existing ; the atmakhyati-view, that the Self — which 
here means ' cognition ' — appears as a thing ; and the 
akhyati-view, that the attribute of one thing appears as 
that of another, that two acts of cognition appear as one, 
and — on the view of the non-existence of the object — that 
the non-existing appears as existing *. 

Moreover, if you say that there is originated silver of 
a totally new inexplicable kind, you are bound to assign 
the cause of this origination. This cause cannot be the 
perception of the silver ; for the perception has the silver 
for its object, and hence has no existence before the 
origination of the silver. And should you say that the 
perception, having arisen without an object, produces 
the silver and thereupon makes it its object, we truly do 
not know what to say to such excellent reasoning ! — Let it 
then be said that the cause is some defect in the sense- 
organ. — This, too, is inadmissible ; for a defect abiding in 
the percipient person cannot produce an objective effect — 
Nor can the organs of sense (apart from defects) give rise 
to the silver ; for they are causes of cognitions only (not of 
things cognised). Nor, again, the sense-organs in so far as 
modified by some defect ; for they also can only produce 
modifications in what is effected by them, i. e. cognition. — 
And the hypothesis of a beginningless, false a^wana consti- 
tuting the general material cause of all erroneous cognitions 
has been refuted above. 

How is it, moreover, that this new and inexplicable thing 

* For a full explanation of the nature of these ' khy&tis,' see 
A.Venis' translation of the Vedanta Siddhanta Muktavali (Reprint 
from the Pandit, p. 130 ff.). 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 119 

(which you assume to account for the silver perceived on 
the shell) becomes to us the object of the idea and word 
'silver,' and not of some other idea and term, e.g. of 
a jar? — If you reply that this is due to its similarity to 
silver, we point out that in that case the idea and the word 
presenting themselves to our mind should be that of 
' something resembling silver.' Should you, on the other 
hand, say that we apprehend the thing as silver because it 
possesses the generic characteristics of silver, we ask whether 
these generic characteristics are real or unreal. The former 
alternative is impossible, because something real cannot 
belong to what is unreal; and the latter is impossible 
because something unreal cannot belong to what is 
real. 

But we need not extend any further this refutation of an 
altogether ill-founded theory. 

All knowledge is of the Beal. 

' Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition 
has for its object what is real ; for JSruti and Smrzti alike 
teach that everything participates in the nature of every- 
thing else. In the scriptural account of creation preceded 
by intention on the part of the Creator it is said that each 
of these elements was made tripartite ; and this tripartite 
constitution of all things is apprehended by Perception as 
well. The red colour in burning fire comes from (primal 
elementary) fire, the white colour from water, the black 
colour from earth — in this way Scripture explains the 
threefold nature of burning fire. In the same way all 
things are composed of elements of all things. The 
Vishnu Purana, in its account of creation, makes a similar 
statement : " The elements possessing various powers 
and being unconnected could not, without combination, 
produce living beings, not having mingled in any way. 
Having combined, therefore, with one another, and enter- 
ing into mutual associations — beginning with the principle 
called Mahat, and extending down to the gross elements 
—they formed an egg," &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 50 ; 53). This 
tripartiteness of the elements the Sutrakara also de- 



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1 20 vedanta-sOtras. 

clares (Ve. Sft. Ill, 1, 3). For the same reason Sruti 
enjoins the use of Putika sprouts when no Soma can be 
procured ; for, as the Mimawsakas explain, there are in the 
Putika plant some parts of the Soma plant (Pu. ML Su.) ; 
and for the same reason nivara grains may be used as 
a substitute for rice grains. That thing is similar to 
another which contains within itself some part of that 
other thing; and Scripture itself has thus stated that in 
shells, &c, there is contained some silver, and so on. 
That one thing is called " silver" and another " shell " has 
its reason in the relative preponderance of one or the other 
element. We observe that shells are similar to silver ; thus 
perception itself informs us that some elements of the latter 
actually exist in the former. Sometimes it happens that 
owing to a defect of the eye the silver-element only is 
apprehended, not the shell-element, and then the percipient 
person, desirous of silver, moves to pick up the shell. If, 
on the other hand, his eye is free from such defect, he 
apprehends the shell-element and then refrains from action. 
Hence the cognition of silver in the shell is a true one. 
In the same way the relation of one cognition being sublated 
by another explains itself through the preponderant 
element, according as the preponderance of the shell- 
element is apprehended partially or in its totality, and 
does not therefore depend on one cognition having for its 
object the false thing and another the true thing. The 
distinctions made in the practical thought and business 
of life thus explain themselves on the basis of everything 
participating in the nature of everything else.' 

In dreams, again, the divinity creates, in accordance with 
the merit or demerit of living beings, things of a special 
nature, subsisting for a certain time only, and perceived 
only by the individual soul for which they are meant. In 
agreement herewith Scripture says, with reference to the 
state of dreaming, ' There are no chariots in that state, no 
horses, no roads; then he creates chariots, horses, and 
roads. There are no delights, no joys, no bliss ; then he 
creates delights, joys, and bliss. There are no tanks, no 
lakes, no rivers; then he creates tanks, lakes, and rivers. 



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i adhyAya, i pAua, I. 121 

For he is the maker' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). The meaning 
of this is, that although there are then no chariots, &c, to 
be perceived by other persons, the Lord creates such 
things to be perceived by the • dreaming person only. 
' For he is the maker ' ; for such creative agency belongs 
to him who possesses the wonderful power of making all 
his wishes and plans to come true. Similarly another 
passage, 'That person who is awake in those who are 
asleep, shaping one lovely sight after another, that indeed 
is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is called the 
Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no One goes 
beyond it' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8). — The Sutrakara also, after 
having in two Sutras (III, a, 1 ; 3) stated the hypothesis of 
the individual soul creating the objects appearing in dreams, 
finally decides that that wonderful creation is produced by 
the Lord for the benefit of the individual dreamer ; for the 
reason that as long as the individual soul is in the sawtsara 
state, its true nature — comprising the power of making its 
wishes to come true — is not fully manifested, and hence it 
cannot practically exercise that power. The last clause 
of the Ka/v4a text (' all worlds are contained in it,' &c.) 
clearly shows that the highest Self only is the creator 
meant. That the dreaming person who lies in his chamber 
should go in his body to other countries and experience 
various results of his merit or demerit — being at one time 
crowned a king, having at another time his head cut off, 
and so on — is possible in so far as there is created for 
him another body in every way resembling the body 
resting on the bed. 

The case of the white shell being seen as yellow, explains 
itself as follows. The visual rays issuing from the eye are 
in contact with the bile contained in the eye, and thereupon 
enter into conjunction with the shell ; the result is that the 
whiteness belonging to the shell is overpowered by the 
yellowness of the bile, and hence not apprehended ; 
the shell thus appears yellow, just as if it were gilt 
The bile and its yellowness is, owing to its exceeding 
tenuity, not perceived by the bystanders ; but thin though 
jt be it is apprehended by the person suffering from jaundice, 



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122 vedAnta-sCtras. 



to whom it is very near, in so far as it issues from his own 
eye, and through the mediation of the visual rays, aided by 
the action of the impression produced on the mind by that 
apprehension, it is apprehended even in the distant object, 
viz. the shell. — In an analogous way the crystal which is 
placed near the rose is apprehended as red, for it is over- 
powered by the brilliant colour of the rose ; the brilliancy 
of the rose is perceived in a more distinct way owing to its 
close conjunction with the transparent substance of the 
crystal. — In the same way the cognition of water in the 
mirage is true. There always exists water in connexion 
with light and earth ; but owing to some defect of the 
eye of the perceiving person, and to the mysterious in- 
fluence of merit and demerit, the light and the earth are 
not apprehended, while the water is apprehended. — In 
the case again of the firebrand swung round rapidly, its 
appearance as a fiery wheel explains itself through the 
circumstance that moving very rapidly it is in conjunction 
with all points of the circle described without our being 
able to apprehend the intervals. The case is analogous to 
that of the perception of a real wheel ; but there is the 
difference that in the case of the wheel no intervals are 
apprehended, because there are none ; while in the case of 
the firebrand none are apprehended owing to the rapidity 
of the movement. But in the latter case also the cognition 
is true. — Again, in the case of mirrors and similar reflecting 
surfaces the perception of one's own face is likewise true 
The fact is that the motion of the visual rays (proceeding 
from the eye towards the mirror) is reversed (reflected) by 
the mirror, and that thus those rays apprehend the person's 
own face, subsequently to the apprehension of the surface 
of the mirror ; and as in this case also, owing to the 
rapidity of the process, there is no apprehension of any 
interval (between the mirror and the face), the face presents 
itself as being in the mirror. — In the case of one direction 
being mistaken for another (as when a person thinks the 
south to be where the north is), the fact is that, owing to 
the unseen principle (i. e. merit or demerit), the direction 
which actually exists in the other direction (for a point 



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IADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 23 

which is to the north of me is to the south of another 
point) is apprehended by itself, apart from the other elements 
of direction ; the apprehension which actually takes place 
is thus likewise true. — Similar is the case of the double 
moon. Here, either through pressure of the finger upon 
the eye, or owing to some abnormal affection of the eye, 
the visual rays are divided (split), and the double, mutually 
independent apparatus of vision thus originating, becomes 
the cause of a double apprehension of the moon. One 
apparatus apprehends the moon in her proper place ; the # 
other which moves somewhat obliquely, apprehends at first 
a place close by the moon, and then the moon herself, which 
thus appears somewhat removed from her proper place. 
Although, therefore, what is apprehended is the one moon 
distinguished by connexion with two places at the same 
time — an apprehension due to the double apparatus of 
vision — yet, owiiig to the difference of apprehensions, there 
is a difference in the character of the object apprehended, 
and an absence of the apprehension of unity, and thus 
a double moon presents itself to perception. That the 
second spot is viewed as qualifying the moon, is due to the 
circumstance that the apprehension of that spot, and that 
of the moon which is not apprehended in her proper place, 
are simultaneous. Now here the doubleness of the 
apparatus is real, and hence the apprehension of the 
moon distinguished by connexion with two places is real 
also, and owing to this doubleness of apprehension, the 
doubleness of aspect of the object apprehended, i.e. the moon, 
is likewise real. That there is only one moon constituting 
the true object of the double apprehension, this is a matter 
for which ocular perception by itself does not suffice, and 
hence what is actually seen is a double moon. That, 
although the two eyes together constitute one visual 
apparatus only, the visual rays being divided through 
some defect of the eyes, give rise to a double apparatus — 
this we infer from the effect actually observed. When that 
defect is removed there takes place only one apprehension 
of the moon as connected with her proper place, and thus 
the idea of one moon only arises. It is at the same time 



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1 24 vedAnta-sOtras. 



quite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double 
visual apparatus, the latter to a double apprehension, 
and the latter again to a doubleness of the object of 
apprehension. 

We have thus proved that all cognition is true. The 
shortcomings of other views as to the nature of cognition 
have been set forth at length by other philosophers, and 
we therefore do not enter on that topic What need is 
there, in fact, of lengthy proofs ? Those who acknowledge the 
validity of the different means of knowledge, perception, and 
so on, and — what is vouched for by sacred tradition — the 
existence of a highest Brahman — free from all shadow of 
imperfection, of measureless excellence, comprising within 
itself numberless auspicious qualities, all-knowing, immedi- 
ately realising all its purposes—, what should they not be 
able to prove? That holy highest Brahman — while producing 
the entire world as an object of fruition for the individual 
souls, in agreement with their respective good and ill deserts 
— creates certain things of such a nature as to become 
common objects of consciousness, either pleasant or un- 
pleasant, to all souls together, while certain other things 
are created in such a way as to be perceived only by 
particular persons, and to persist for a limited time only. 
And it is this distinction — viz. of things that are objects of 
general consciousness, and of things that are not so — which 
makes the difference between what is called 'things sublat- 
ing ' and 'things sublated.' — Everything is explained hereby. 

Neither Scripture nor Smriti and Parana teach 
nescience. 

The assertion that Nescience — to be defined neither as 
that which is nor as that which is not — rests on the 
authority of Scripture is untrue. In passages such as 
'hidden by the untrue' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, a), the word 
' untrue ' does not denote the Undefinable ; it rather means 
that which is different from 'rrta,' and this latter word — 
as we see from the passage 'enjoying the rtta' (Ka. Up. 
Ill, 1)— denotes such actions as aim at no worldly end, but 
only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and thus 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 125 

enable the devotee to reach him. The word 'annta' 
therefore denotes actions of a different kind, i. e. such as 
aim at worldly results and thus stand in the way of the soul 
reaching Brahman ; in agreement with the passage ' they do 
not find that Brahma-world, for they are carried away by 
anrrta' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2). — Again, in the text 'Then 
there was neither non- Being nor Being' (Ri. Sawh. X, 
129, 1), the terms 'being' and 'non-being' denote intelligent 
and non-intelligent beings in their distributive state.- What 
that text aims at stating is that intelligent and non-intelli- 
gent beings, which at the time of the origination of the 
world are called ' sat ' and ' tyat ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), are, 
during the period of reabsorption, merged in the collective 
totality of non-intelligent matter which the text denotes 
by the term ' darkness' (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 3). There is 
thus no reference whatever to something 'not definable 
either as being or non-being ' : the terms ' being ' and ' non- 
being ' are applied to different modes of being at different 
times. That the term 'darkness' denotes the collective 
totality of non-intelligent matter appears from another 
scriptural passage, viz. 'The Non-evolved (avyaktam) is 
merged in the Imperishable (akshara), the Imperishable in 
darkness (tamas), darkness becomes one with the highest 
divinity .' — True, the word ' darkness ' denotes the subtle 
condition of primeval matter (prakrzti), which forms the 
totality of non-intelligent things ; but this very Prakn'ti 
is called Maya— in the text 'Know Prakn'ti to be Maya,' 
and this proves it be something ' undefinable ' ! — Not so, 
we reply; we meet with no passages where the word 
* Maya ' denotes that which is undefinable ! — But the word 
' Maya ' is synonymous with ' mithya,' i. e. falsehood, and 
hence denotes the Undefinable also ! — This, too, we cannot 
admit ; for the word ' Maya ' does not in all places refer to 
what is false ; we see it applied e.g. to such things as the 
weapons of Asuras and Rakshasas, which are not 'false' but 
real. ' Maya,' in such passages, really denotes that which 
produces various wonderful effects, and it is in this sense 
that Prakrtti is called Maya. This appears from the 
passage (Svet Up. IV, 9) ' From that the " mayin " creates. 



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1 26 vedanta-sOtras. 



all this, and in that the other one is bound up by maya.' 
For this text declares that Prakriti — there called Maya — 
produces manifold wonderful creations, and the highest 
Person is there called 'may in' because he possesses that 
power of maya ; not on account of any ignorance or nescience 
on his part. The latter part of the text expressly says that 
(not the Lord but) another one, i. e. the individual soul is 
bound up by maya ; and therewith agrees another text, 
viz. 'When the soul slumbering in beginningless Maya 
awakes* (Gau</. Ka.). Again, in the text 'Indra goes 
multiform through the Mayas ' (Ri. Sawh. VI, 47, 18), the 
manifold powers of Indra are spoken of, and with this 
agrees what the next verse says, 'he shines greatly as 
Tvash/r* ' : for an unreal being does not shine. And where 
the text says ' my Maya is hard to overcome ' (Bha. Gt. VII, 
14), the qualification given there to Maya, viz. ' consisting of 
the gu«as,' shows that what is meant is Praknti consisting 
of the three gu«as. — All this shows that Scripture does not 
teach the existence of a ' principle called Nescience, not to 
be defined either as that which is or that which is not.' 

Nor again is such Nescience to be assumed for the reason 
that otherwise the scriptural statements of the unity of all 
being would be unmeaning. For if the text * Thou art 
that,' be viewed as teaching the unity of the individual soul 
and the highest Self, there is certainly no reason, founded 
on unmeaningness, to ascribe to Brahman, intimated by 
the word 'that'— which is all-knowing, &c. — Nescience, 
which is contradictory to Brahman's nature. — Itihasa and 
Pura«a also do not anywhere teach that to Brahman there 
belongs Nescience. 

But, an objection is raised, the Vish«u Purl*a, in the 
jloka, ' The stars are Vishwu,' &c. (II, ia, 38), first refers to 
Brahman as one only, and comprising all -things within 
itself ; thereupon states in the next jloka that this entire 
world, with all its distinctions of hills, oceans, &c, is sprung 
out of the ' a^ftana ' of Brahman, which in itself is pure 
'^«ana,' i. e. knowledge; thereupon confirms the view of 
the world having sprung from a^wana by referring to the 
fact that Brahman, while abiding in its own nature, is free 



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I ADHYAVA, I PADA, I. 1 27 

from all difference (si. 40) ; proves in the next two riokas 
the non-reality of plurality by a consideration of the things 
of this world ; sums up, in the following jrloka, the un- 
reality of all that is different from Brahman ; then (43) 
explains that action is the root of that a^-»ana which causes 
us to view the one uniform Brahman as manifold ; there- 
upon declares the intelligence constituting Brahman's 
nature to be free from all distinction and imperfection (44) ; 
and finally teaches (45) that Brahman so constituted, alone 
is truly real, while the so-called reality of the world is 
merely conventional. — This is not, we reply, a true repre- 
sentation of the drift of the passage. The passage at the 
outset states that, in addition to the detailed description of 
the world given before, there will now be given a succinct 
account of another aspect of the world not yet touched 
upon. This account has to be understood as follows. Of 
this universe, comprising intelligent and non-intelligent 
beings, the intelligent part — which is not to be reached by 
mind and speech, to be known in its essential nature by the 
Self only, and, owing to its purely intelligential character, 
not touched by the differences due to Prakr/ti — is, owing to 
its imperishable nature, denoted as that which is ; while the 
non-intelligent, material, part which, in consequence of 
the actions of the intelligent beings undergoes manifold 
changes, and thus is perishable, is denoted as that which 
is not. Both parts, however, form the body of Vasudeva, 
Le. Brahman, and hence have Brahman for their Self. 
The text therefore says (37), ' From the waters which form 
the body of Vishwu was produced the lotus-shaped earth, 
with its seas and mountains ' : what is meant is that the 
entire Brahma-egg which has arisen from water consti- 
tutes the body of which Vish«u is the soul. This relation 
of soul and body forms the basis of the statements of 
co-ordination made in the next sloka. (38), ' The stars are 
Vishnu,' &c ; the same relation had been already declared in 
numerous previous passages of the Purana (' all this is the 
body of Hari,' &c). All things in the world, whether they 
are or are not, are Vishwu's body, and he is their soul. Of 
the next jloka, * Because the Lord has knowledge for his 



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128 vedAnta-sOtras. 

essential nature,' the meaning is ' Because of the Lord who 
abides as the Self of all individual souls, the essential 
nature is knowledge only — while bodies divine, human, &c, 
have no part in it — , therefore all non-intelligent things, 
bodies human and divine, hills, oceans, &c, spring from his 
knowledge, i.e. have their root in the actions springing 
from the volitions of men, gods, &c, in whose various 
forms the fundamental intelligence manifests itself. And 
since non-intelligent matter is subject to changes corres- 
ponding to the actions of the individual souls, it may be 
called ' non-being,' while the souls are ' being.' — This the 
next jloka further explains ' when knowledge is pure,' &c 
The meaning is ' when the works which are the cause of 
the distinction of things are destroyed, then all the dis- 
tinctions of bodies, human or divine, hills, oceans, &c. — 
all which are objects of fruition for the different individual 
souls — pass away.' Non-intelligent matter, as entering 
into various states of a non-permanent nature, is called 
' non-being ' ; while souls, the nature of which consists in 
permanent knowledge, are called ' being.' On this differ- 
ence the next .rloka insists (41). We say 'it is' of that 
thing which is of a permanently uniform nature, not con- 
nected with the idea of beginning, middle and end, and 
which hence never becomes the object of the notion of 
non-existence ; while we say ' it is not ' of non-intelligent 
matter which constantly passes over into different states, 
each later state being out of connexion with the earlier 
state. The constant changes to which non- intelligent matter 
is liable are illustrated in the next .rloka, ' Earth is made 
into a jar,' &c. And for this reason, the subsequent .rloka 
goes on to say that there is nothing but knowledge. This 
fundamental knowledge or intelligence is, however, variously 
connected with manifold individual forms of being due to 
karman, and hence the text adds : ' The one intelligence is 
in many ways connected with beings -whose minds differ, 
owing to the difference of their own acts ' (s\. 43, second 
half). Intelligence, pure, free from stain and grief, &c, 
which constitutes the intelligent element of the world, and 
unintelligent matter — these two together constitute the 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, t. 129 

world, and the world is the body of Vasudeva ; such is 
the purport of xloka 44. — The next sldka. sums up the 
whole doctrine ; the words ' true and untrue ' there denote 
what in the preceding verses had been called 'being' and 
' non-being ' ; the second half of the doka refers to the 
practical plurality of the world as due to karman. 

Now all these jlokas do not contain a single word sup- 
porting the doctrine of a Brahman free from all difference ; 
of a principle called Nescience abiding within Brahman 
and to be defined neither as that which is nor as that 
which is not ; and of the world being wrongly imagined, 
owing to Nescience. The expressions • that which is ' and 
' that which is not ' (si. 35), and ' satya ' (true) and ' asatya ' 
(untrue ; jl. 45), can in no way denote something not to be 
defined either as being or non-being. By ' that which is 
not ' or ' which is untrue,' we have to understand not what 
is undefinable, but that which Has no true being, in so far 
as it is changeable and perishable. Of this character is 
all non-intelligent matter. This also appears from the 
instance adduced in si. 42 : the jar is something perishable, 
but not a thing devoid of proof or to be sublated by true 
knowledge. * Non-being ' we may call it, in so far as while 
it is observed at a certain moment in a certain form it is at 
some other moment observed in a different condition. But 
there is no contradiction between two different conditions 
of a thing which are perceived at different times ; and hence 
there is no reason to call it something futile (tukAkfa) or 
false (mithya), &c. 

Scripture does not teach that Release is due to the know- 
ledge of a non-qualified Brahman.— The meaning of 
'tat tvam asi.' 

Nor can we admit the assertion that Scripture teaches 
the cessation of avidya to spring only from the cognition 
of a Brahman devoid of all difference. Such a view is 
clearly negatived by passages such as the following: 'I 
know that great person of sun-like lustre beyond darkness ; 
knowing him a man becomes immortal, there is no other 
[48] K 



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1 30 vedAnta-sOtras. 



path to go ' (Svet. Up. Ill, 8) ; ' All moments sprang from 
lightning, the Person — none is lord over him, his name 
is great glory — they who know him become immortal ' 
(Mahana. Up. I, 8-1 1). For the reason that Brahman is 
characterised by difference all Vedic texts declare that 
final release results from the cognition of a qualified 
Brahman. And that even those texts which describe 
Brahman by means of negations really aim at setting 
forth a Brahman possessing attributes, we have already 
shown above. 

In texts, again, such as ' Thou art that,' the co-ordination, 
of the constituent parts is not meant to convey the idea 
of the absolute unity of a non-differenced substance: orr 
the contrary, the words 'that' and 'thou ' denote a Brahman 
distinguished by difference. The word 'that' refers to 
Brahman omniscient, &c, which had been introduced as 
the general topic of consideration in previous passages of 
the same section, such as ' It thought, may I be many ' ; 
the word 'thou,' which stands in co-ordination to 'that,' 
conveys the idea of Brahman in so far as having for its 
body the individual souls connected with non-intelligent 
matter. This is in accordance with the general principle 
that co-ordination is meant to express one thing subsisting 
in a twofold form. If such doubleness of form (or cha- 
racter) were abandoned, there could be no difference of 
aspects giving rise to the application of different terms, 
and the entire principle of co-ordination would thus be 
given up. And it would further follow that the two words 
co-ordinated would have to be taken in an implied sense 
(instead of their primary direct meaning). Nor is there any 
need of our assuming implication (lakshawa) in sentences " 
such as ' this person is that Devadatta (known to me from 
former occasions) ' ; for there is no contradiction in the 
cognition of the oneness of a thing connected with the past 
on the one hand, and the present on the other, the contra- 
diction that arises from difference of place being removed 

' Which are alleged to prove that samdn£dhikara»ya is to be 
explained on the basis of laksha»4\ 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 131 

by the accompanying difference of time. If the text ' Thou 
art that ' were meant to express absolute oneness, it would, 
moreover, conflict with a previous statement in the same 
section, viz. * It thought, may I be many ' ; and, further, the 
promise (also made in the same section) that by the know- 
ledge of one thing all things are to be known could not be 
considered as fulfilled. It, moreover, is not possible (while, 
however, it would result from the absolute oneness of ' tat ' 
and 'tvam') that to Brahman, whose essential nature is 
knowledge, which is free from all imperfections, omniscient, 
comprising within itself all auspicious qualities, there should 
belong Nescience ; and that it should be the substrate of 
all those defects and afflictions which spring from Nescience. 
If, further, the statement. of co-ordination (' thou art that ') 
were meant to sublate (the previously existing wrong notion 
of plurality), we should have to admit that the two terms 
' that ' and ' thou ' have an implied meaning, viz. in so far 
as denoting, on the one hand, one substrate only, and, 
on the other, the cessation of the different attributes 
(directly expressed by the two terms) ; and thus implica- 
tion and the other shortcomings mentioned above would 
cling to this interpretation as well. And there would be 
even further difficulties. When we form the sublative 
judgment ' this is not silver,' the sublation is founded on 
an independent positive judgment, via ' this is a shell ' ; 
in the case under discussion, however,, the sublation would 
not be known (through an independent positive judgment), 
but would be assumed merely on the ground that it cannot 
be helped. And, further, there is really no possibility of 
sublation, since the word ' that ' does not convey the idea 
of an attribute in addition to the mere substrate. To this 
it must not be objected that the substrate was previously 
concealed, and that hence it is the special function of the 
word ' that ' to present the substrate in its non-concealed 
aspect; for if, previously to the sublative judgment, the 
substrate was not evident (as an object of consciousness), 
there is no possibility of its becoming the object either 
of an error or its sublation. — Nor can we allow you to say 
that, previously to sublation, the substrate was non-con- 
ic 2 



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132 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS. 



cealed in so far as (i.e. was known as) the object of error, 
for in its ' non-concealed ' aspect the substrate is opposed 
to all error, and when that aspect shines forth there is no 
room either for error or sublation. — The outcome of this is 
that as long as you do not admit that there is a real attri- 
bute in addition to the mere substrate, and that this attribute 
is for a time hidden, you cannot show the possibility either 
of error or sublation. We add an illustrative instance. 
That with regard to a man there should arise the error 
that he is a mere low-caste hunter is only possible on 
condition of a real additional attribute — e.g. the man's 
princely birth — being hidden at the time ; and the cessa- 
tion of that error is brought about by the declaration of 
this attribute of princely birth, not by a mere declaration 
of the person being a man : this latter fact being evident 
need not be declared at all, and if it is declared it sublates 
no error. — If, on the other hand, the text is understood to 
refer to Brahman as having the individual souls for its body, 
both words (' that ' and ' thou ') keep their primary denota- 
tion ; and, the text thus making a declaration about one 
substance distinguished by two aspects, the fundamental 
principle of ' co-ordination ' is preserved. On this interpre- 
tation the text further intimates that Brahman — free from 
all imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious 
qualities — is the internal ruler of the individual souls and 
possesses lordly power. It moreover satisfies the demand 
of agreement with the teaching of the previous part of the 
section, and it also fulfils the promise as to all things being 
known through one thing, viz. in so far as Brahman having 
for its body all intelligent and non-intelligent beings in 
their gross state is the effect of Brahman having for its 
body the same things in their subtle state. And this inter- 
pretation finally avoids all conflict with other scriptural 
passages, such as 'Him the great Lord, the highest of 
Lords ' (.SVet. Up. VI, 7) ; ' His high power is revealed as 
manifold ' (ibid. VI, 8) ; ' He that is free from sin, whose 
wishes are true, whose purposes are true* (KA, Up. VIII, 
7, 1), and so on. 
But how, a question may be asked, can we decide, on 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 133 

your interpretation of the text, which of the two terms 
is meant to make an original assertion with regard to the 
other? — The question does not arise, we reply; for the 
text does not mean to make an original assertion at all, 
the truth which it states having already been established 
by the preceding clause, 'In that all this world has its 
Self.' This clause does make an original statement — in 
agreement with the principle that ' Scripture has a purport 
with regard to what is not established by other means ' — 
that is, it predicates of 'all this,' i.e. this entire world 
together with all individual souls, that ' that/ i. e. Brahman 
is the Self of it. The reason of this the text states in 
a previous passage, 'All these creatures have their root 
in that which is, their dwelling and their rest in that which 
is ' ; a statement which is illustrated by an earlier one 
(belonging to a different section), viz. ' All this is Brahman ; 
let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as begin- 
ning, ending, and breathing in Brahman' {Kh. Up. Ill, 
14, 1). Similarly other texts also teach that the world 
has its Self in Brahman, in so far as the whole aggregate 
of intelligent and non-intelligent beings constitutes Brah- 
man's body. Compare ' Abiding within, the ruler of beings, 
the Self of all ' ; ' He who dwells in the earth, different 
from the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose 
body the earth is, who rules the earth within — he is thy 
Self, the ruler within, the immortal.— He who dwells in 
the Self,' &c. (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 3 ; 22) ; ' He who moving 
within the earth, and so on — whose body is death, whom 
death does not know, he is the Self of all beings, free from 
sin, divine, the one God, Narayawa* (Subal. Up. VII, 1); 
' Having created that he entered into it ; having entered 
it he became sat and tyat ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And also 
in the section under discussion the passage 'Having en- 
tered into them with this living Self let me evolve names 
and forms,' shows that it is only through the entering into 
them -of the living soul whose Self is Brahman, that all 
things possess their substantiality and their connexion with 
the words denoting them. And as this passage must be 
understood m connexion with Taitt. Up. II, 6 (where the 



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134 vedAnta-sOtras. 



4 sat ' denotes the individual soul) it follows that the indi- 
vidual soul also has Brahman for its Self, owing to the fact 
of Brahman having entered into it — From all this it follows 
that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent and non- 
intelligent, has its Self in Brahman in so far as it constitutes 
Brahman's body. And as, thus, the whole world different 
from Brahman derives its substantial being only from con- 
stituting Brahman's body, any term denoting the world or 
something in it conveys a meaning which has its proper 
consummation in Brahman only : in other words all terms 
whatsoever denote Brahman in so far as distinguished by 
the different things which we associate with those terms 
on the basis of ordinary use of speech and etymology. — 
The text ' that art thou ' we therefore understand merely as 
a special expression of the truth already propounded in the 
clause ' in that all this has its Self.' 

This being so, it appears that those as well who hold the 
theory of the absolute unity of one non-differenced sub- 
stance, as those who teach the doctrine of bhedabheda 
(co-existing difference and non-difference), and those who 
teach the absolute difference of several substances, give up 
all those scriptural texts which teach that Brahman is the 
universal Self. With regard to the first-mentioned doctrine, 
we ask 'if there is only one substance; to what can the 
doctrine of universal identity refer ? ' — The reply will 
perhaps be ' to that very same substance.' — But, we reply, 
this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature 
of Brahman \ and there is nothing left to be determined 
by the passages declaring the identity of everything with 
Brahman. — But those texts serve to dispel the idea of 
fictitious difference! — This, we reply, cannot, as has been 
shown above, be effected by texts stating universal identity 
in the way of co-ordination ; and statements of co-ordination, 
moreover, introduce into Brahman a doubleness of aspect, 
and thus contradict the theory of absolute oneness. — The 
bhedabheda view implies that owing to Brahman's con- 
nexion with limiting adjuncts (upadhi) all the imperfections 

1 Such as ' The True, knowledge/ &c 

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i admvAya, i fApa, i. 135 



resulting therefrom — and which avowedly belong to the 
individual soul— would manifest themselves in Brahman 
itself; and as this contradicts the doctrine that the Self of 
all is constituted by a Brahman free from all imperfection 
and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities, the 
texts conveying that doctrine would have to be disregarded. 
If, on the other hand, the theory be held in that form that 
' bhedabheda ' belongs to Brahman by its own nature (not 
only owing to an upadhi), the view that Brahman by its 
essential nature appears as individual soul, implies that 
imperfections no less than perfections are essential to 
Brahman, and this is in conflict with the texts teaching 
that everything is identical with Brahman free from all 
imperfections. — For those Anally who maintain absolute 
difference, the doctrine of Brahman being the Self of all 
has no meaning whatsoever — for things absolutely different 
can in no way be one — and this implies the abandonment 
of all Vedanta-texts together. 

Those, on the other hand, who take their stand on the 
doctrine, proclaimed by all Upanishads, that the entire 
world forms the body of Brahman, may accept in their 
fulness all the texts teaching the identity of the world with 
Brahman. For as genus (g£t\) and quality (gu«a), so 
substances (dravya) also may occupy the position of 
determining attributes (vueshawa), in so far namely as they 
constitute the body of something else. Enunciations such 
as ' the Self (soul) is, according to its works, born either 
(as) a god, or a man, or a horse, or a bull,' show that in 
ordinary speech as well as in the Veda co-ordination 
has to be taken in a real primary (not implied) sense. 
In the same way it is also in the case of generic character 
and of qualities the relation of 'mode' only (in which 
generic character and qualities stand to substances) which 
determines statements of co-ordination, such as ' the ox is 
broken-horned,' 'the cloth is white.' And as material 
bodies bearing the generic marks of humanity are definite 
things, in so far only as they are modes of a Self or soul, 
enunciations of co-ordination such as ' the soul has been 
born as a man, or a eunuch, or a woman,' are in every way 



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1 36 vedAnta-sCtras. 



appropriate. What determines statements of co-ordination 
is thus only the relation of ' mode ' in which one thing stands 
to another, not the relation of generic character, quality, 
and so on, which are of an exclusive nature (and cannot 
therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with substances). 
Such words indeed as denote substances capable of sub- 
sisting by themselves occasionally take suffixes, indicating 
that those substances form the distinguishing attributes of 
other substances — as when from datuia., 'staff,' we form 
daWin, ' staff-bearer ' ; in the case, on the other hand, of 
substances not capable of subsisting and being apprehended 
apart from others, the fact of their holding the position of 
attributes is ascertained only from their appearing in 
grammatical co-ordination. — But, an objection is raised, if 
it is supposed that in sentences such as ' the Self is born, 
as god, man, animal,' &c, the body of a man, god, &c, 
stands towards the Self in the relation of a mode, in the 
same way as in sentences such as ' the ox is broken-horned,' 
* the cloth is white,' the generic characteristic and the quality 
stand in the relation of modes to the substances ('cow,' 
' cloth ') to which they are grammatically co-ordinated ; 
then there would necessarily be simultaneous cognition 
of the mode, and that to which the mode belongs, i. e. of 
the body and the Self; just as there is simultaneous 
cognition of the generic character and the individual. 
But as a matter of fact this is not the case ; we do not 
necessarily observe a human, divine, or animal body 
together with the Self. The co-ordination expressed in 
the form ' the Self is a man,' is therefore an ' implied ' one 
only (the statement not admitting of being taken in its 
primary literal sense). — This is not so, we reply. The 
relation of bodies to the Self is strictly analogous to that 
of class characteristics and qualities to the substances in 
which they inhere ; for it is the Self only which is their 
substrate and their final cause (praycguna), and they are 
modes of the Self. That the Self only is their substrate, 
appears from the fact that when the Self separates itself 
from the body the latter perishes ; that the Self alone is 
their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 137 

the end that the fruits of the actions of the Self may be 
enjoyed ; and that they are modes of the Self, appears from 
the fact that they are mere attributes of the Self manifest- 
ing itself as god, man, or the like. These are just the 
circumstances on account of which words like ' cow ' extend 
in their meaning (beyond the class characteristics) so as to 
comprise the individual also. Where those circumstances 
are absent, as in the case of staffs, earrings, and the like, the 
attributive position is expressed (not by co-ordination but) 
by. means of special derivative forms — such as dandin 
(staff-bearer), kuWalin (adorned with earrings). In the 
case of bodies divine, human, &c, on the other hand, the 
essential nature of which it is to be mere modes of the Self 
which constitutes their substrate and final cause, both 
ordinary and Vedic language express the relation sub- 
sisting between the two, in the form of co-ordination, 
' This Self is a god, or a man,' &c. That class charac- 
teristics and individuals are invariably observed together, 
is due to the fact of both being objects of visual perception ; 
the Self, on the other hand, is not such, and hence is not 
apprehended by the eye, while the body is so apprehended. 
Nor must you raise the objection that it is hard to under- 
stand how that which is capable of being apprehended by 
itself can be a mere mode of something else : for that the 
body's essential nature actually consists in being a mere 
mode of the Self is proved — just as in the case of class 
characteristics and so on — by its having the Self only for 
its substrate and final cause, and standing to it in the 
relation of a distinguishing attribute. That two things are 
invariably perceived together, depends, as already observed, 
on their being apprehended by means of the same apparatus, 
visual or otherwise. Earth is naturally connected with 
smell, taste, and so on, and yet these qualities are not 
perceived by the eye; in the same way the eye which 
perceives the body does not perceive that essential charac- 
teristic of the body which consists in its being a mere mode 
of the Self; the reason of the difference being that the 
eye has no capacity to apprehend the Self. But this does 
not imply that the body does not possess that essential 



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1 38 . vedanta-sGtras. 



nature: it rather is just the possession of that essential 
nature on which the judgment of co-ordination (' the Self is 
a man, god,' &c.) is based. And as words have the power 
of denoting the relation of something being a mode of the 
Self, they denote things Together with this relation. — But 
in ordinary speech the word ' body ' is understood to mean 
the mere body ; it does not therefore extend in its denota- 
tion up to the Self t — Not so, we reply. The body is, in 
reality, nothing but a mode of the Self; but, for the purpose 
of showing the distinction of things, the word ' body ' is 
used in a limited sense. Analogously words such as 
' whiteness,' ' generic character of a cow,' ' species,' ' quality,' 
are used in a distinctive sense (although ' whiteness ' is not 
found apart from a white thing, of which it is the prakara, 
and so on). Words such as ' god,' ' man,' &c, therefore do 
extend in their connotation up to the Self. And as the 
individual souls, distinguished by their connexion with 
aggregates of matter bearing the characteristic marks of 
humanity, divine nature, and so on, constitute the body 
of the highest Self, and hence are modes of it, the words 
denoting those individual souls extend in their connotation 
up to the very highest Self. And as all intelligent and 
non-intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest 
Brahman, and have reality thereby only, the words denot- 
ing them are used in co-ordination with the terms denoting 
Brahman. — This point has been demonstrated by me in 
the Vedarthasawgraha. A Sutra also (IV, i, 3) will declare 
the identity of the world and Brahman to consist in the 
relation of body and Self; and the Vakyakara too says 'It is 
the Self — thus everything should be apprehended.' 

Summary statement as to the way in which different 
scriptural texts are to be reconciled. 

The whole matter may be summarily stated as follows. 
Some texts declare a distinction of nature between non- 
intelligent matter, intelligent beings, and Brahman, in so 
far as matter is the object of enjoyment, the souls the enjoy- 
ing subjects, and Brahman the ruling principle. ' From 
that the Lord of Maya creates all this ; in that the other 



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i adhyAya, i pada, i. 139 

one is bound up through that Maya ' (Svet. Up. IV, 9) ; 
* Know Prakr*ti to be Maya, and the great Lord the ruler 
of Maya ' (10) ; * What is perishable is the Pradhana, the 
immortal and imperishable is Hara : the one God rules the 
Perishable and the Self (Svet. Up. I, 10)— In this last 
passage the clause ' the immortal and imperishable is Hara/ 
refers to the enjoying individual soul, which is called ' Hara,' 
because it draws (harati) towards itself the pradhana as the 
object of its enjoyment. — ' He is the cause, the lord of the 
lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor 
lord ' (Svet. Up. VI, 9) ; ' The master of the pradhana and 
of the individual souls' (Svet. Up. VI, 16) ; ' The ruler of all, 
the lord of the Selfs, the eternal, blessed, undecaying one ' 
(Mahanar. Up. XI, 3) ; 'There are two unborn ones, one 
knowing, the other not knowing, one a ruler, the other not 
a ruler ' (Svet. Up. I, 9) ; ' The eternal among the non- 
eternal, the intelligent one among the intelligent, who 
though one fulfils the desires of many ' (Svet. Up. VI, 13) ; 
' Knowing the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the 
Mover' (Svet. Up. J, 12); 'One of them eats the sweet 
. fruit, the other looks on without eating ' (Svet. Up. IV, 6) ; 
' Thinking that the Self is different from the Mover, blessed 
by him he reaches Immortality ' (Svet Up. I, 6) ; ' There is 
one unborn female being, red, white, and black, uniform but 
producing manifold offspring. There is one unborn male 
being who loves her and lies by her ; there is another who 
leaves her after he has enjoyed her ' (Svet. Up. IV, 5). ' On 
the same tree man, immersed, bewildered, grieves on 
account of his impotence; but when he sees the other 
Lord contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes 
away ' (Svet. Up. IV, 9). — Smr/ti expresses itself similarly. 
— 'Thus eightfold is my nature divided. Lower is this 
Nature ; other than this and higher know that Nature of 
mine which constitutes the individual soul, by which this 
world is supported ' (Bha. Gi. VII, 4, 5). ' All beings at 
the end of a Kalpa return into my Nature, and again 
at the beginning of a Kalpa do I send them forth. Resting 
on my own Nature again and again do I send forth this 
entire body of beings, which has no power of its own, 



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140 vedanta-sCtras. 



being subject to the power of nature* (Bha. Gl. IX, 7, 8) ; 
'With me as supervisor Nature brings forth the movable 
and the immovable, and for this reason the world ever 
moves round ' (Bha. Gi. IX, 10) ; ' Know thou both Nature 
and the Soul to be without beginning' (XIII, 19) ; 'The 
great Brahman is my womb, in which I place the embryo, 
and thence there is the origin of all beings' (XIV, 3). 
This last passage means — the womb of the world is the 
great Brahman, i.e. non-intelligent matter in its subtle 
state, commonly called Prakr/ti ; with this I connect the 
embryo, i.e. the intelligent principle. From this contact 
of the non-intelligent and the intelligent, due to my will, 
there ensues the origination of all beings from gods down 
to lifeless things. 

Non-intelligent matter and intelligent beings — holding 
the relative positions of objects of enjoyment and enjoying 
subjects, and appearing in multifarious forms — other scrip- 
tural texts declare to be permanently connected with the 
highest Person in so far as they constitute his body, and 
thus are controlled by him ; the highest Person thus con- 
stituting their Self. Compare the following passages : ' He 
who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the 
earth does not know, whose body the earth is, and who 
rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the im- 
mortal,' &c. (Br*. Up. Ill, 7, 3-23) ; ' He who moves within the 
earth, whose body the earth is, &c. ; he who moves within death, 
whose body death is,' &c. (Subala Up. VII, 1). In this latter 
passage the word ' death ' denotes what is also called * dark- 
ness,' viz. non-intelligent matter in its subtle state ; as appears 
from another passage in the same Upanishad, ' the Imperish- 
able is merged in darkness.' And compare also ' Entered 
within.the ruler of creatures, the Self of all ' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 24). 

Other texts, again, aim at teaching that the highest Self 
to whom non-intelligent and intelligent beings stand in the 
relation of body, and hence of modes, subsists in the form 
of the world, in its causal as well as in its effected aspect, 
and hence speak of the world in this its double aspect as 
that which is (the Real); so e.g. 'Being only this was in 
the beginning, one only without a second — it desired, may 



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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I4I 

I be many, may I grow forth — it sent forth fire,' &c, 
up to ' all these creatures have their root in that which is,' 
&c, up to 'that art thou, O Svetaketu' {Kh. Up. VI, 
2-8) ; * He wished, may I be many,' &c, up to ' it became 
the true and the untrue ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). These sections 
also refer to the essential distinction of nature between 
non-intelligent matter, intelligent beings, and the highest 
Self which is established by other scriptural texts ; so in 
the AV^andogya passage, ' Let me enter those three divine 
beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names 
and forms ' ; and in the Taitt passage, ' Having sent forth 
that he entered into it; having entered it he became sat 
and tyat, knowledge and (what is) without knowledge, the 
true and the untrue,' &c. These two passages evidently 
have the same purport, and hence the soul's having its Self 
in Brahman — which view is implied in the Kh. passage — 
must be understood as resting thereon that the souls 
(together with matter) constitute the body of Brahman as 
asserted in the Taitt. passage (' it became knowledge and 
that which is without knowledge,' i. e. souls and matter). 
The same process of evolution of names and forms is 
described elsewhere also, ' All this was then unevolved ; it 
became evolved by form and name' (Br*. Up. I, 4, 7). 
The fact is that the highest Self is in its causal or in its 
'effected' condition, according as it has for its body 
intelligent and non-intelligent beings either in their subtle 
or their gross state; the effect, then, being non-different 
from the cause, and hence being cognised through the 
cognition of the cause, the result is that the desired 
' cognition of all things through one ' can on our view be well 
established. In the clause ' I will enter into these three 
divine beings with this living Self,' &c, the term 'the 
three divine beings ' denotes the entire aggregate of non- 
sentient matter, and as the text declares that the highest 
Self evolved names and forms by entering into matter 
by means of the living souls of which he is the Self, it 
follows that all terms whatsoever denote the highest Self 
as qualified by individual Selfs, the latter again being 
qualified by non-sentient matter. A term which denotes 



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142 vedAnta-sOtras. 



the highest Self in its causal condition may therefore be 
exhibited in co-ordination with another term denoting 
the highest Self in its * effected ' state, both terms being 
used in their primary senses. Brahman, having for its 
modes intelligent and non-intelligent things in their gross 
and subtle states, thus constitutes effect and cause, 
and the world thus has Brahman for its material cause 
(upadana). Nor does this give rise to any confusion of the 
essential constituent elements of the great aggregate of 
things. Of some parti-coloured piece of cloth the material 
cause is threads white, red, black, &c. ; all the same, each 
definite spot of the cloth is connected with one colour only 
white e.g., and thus there is no confusion of colours even 
in the ' effected ' condition of the cloth. Analogously the 
combination of non-sentient matter, sentient beings, and 
the Lord constitutes the material cause of the world, but 
this does not imply any confusion of the essential charac- 
teristics of enjoying souls, objects of enjoyment, and the 
universal ruler, even in the world's ' effected ' state. There 
is indeed a difference between the two cases, in so far as 
the threads are capable of existing apart from one another, 
and are only occasionally combined according to the 
volition of men, so that the web sometimes exists in its 
causal, sometimes in its effected state ; while non-sentient 
matter and sentient beings in all their states form the body 
of the highest SeH", and thus have a being only as the 
modes of that — on which account the highest Self may, in 
all cases, be denoted by any term whatsoever. But the 
two cases are analogous, in so far as there persists a dis- 
tinction and absence of all confusion, on the part of the" 
constituent elements of the aggregate. This being thus, 
it follows that the highest Brahman, although entering into 
the 'effected ' condition, remains unchanged — for its essential 
nature does not become different — and we also understand 
what constitutes its ' effected ' condition, viz. its abiding as 
the Self of non-intelligent and intelligent beings in their gross 
condition, distinguished by name and form. For becoming 
an effect means entering into another state of being. 

Those texts, again, which speak of Brahman as devoid of 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 143 

qualities, explain themselves on the ground of Brahman 
being free from all touch of evil. For the passage, Kh. 
Up. VIII, 1, 5 — which at first negatives all evil qualities 
' free from sin, from old age, from death, from grief, from 
hunger and thirst,' and after that affirms auspicious qualities 
'whose wishes and purposes come true' — enables us to 
decide that in other places also the general denial of 
qualities really refers to evil qualities only. — Passages 
which declare knowledge to constitute the essential nature 
of Brahman explain themselves on the ground that of 
Brahman — which is all-knowing, all-powerful, antagonistic 
to all evil, a mass of auspicious qualities — the essential 
nature can be defined as knowledge (intelligence) only — 
which also follows from the ' self-luminousness ' predicated 
of it. Texts, on the other hand, such as ' He who is all- 
knowing' (Ma. Up. 1, 1, 9) ; 'His high power is revealed as 
manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge ' (5vet 
Up. VI, 11, 8); 'Whereby should he know the knower' 
(Br/. Up. II, 4, 1 4), teach the highest Self to be a knowing 
subject Other texts, again, such as ' The True, knowledge, 
infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1,1), declare knowledge to 
constitute its nature, as it can be defined through knowledge 
only, and is self-luminous. And texts such as ' He desired, 
may I be many ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6) ; 'It thought, may I be 
many ; it evolved itself through name and form ' {Kit. Up. 
VI, a), teach that Brahman, through its mere wish, appears 
in manifold modes. Other texts, again, negative the opposite 
view, viz. that there is a plurality of things not having 
their Self in Brahman. ' From death to death goes he who 
sees here any plurality ' ; ' There is here not any plurality ' 
(Br/. Up. IV, 4, 19) ; * For where there is duality as it were' 
(Br/. Up. II, 4, 14). But these texts in no way negative 
that plurality of modes— declared in passages such as ' May 
I be many, may I grow forth' — which springs from 
Brahman's will, and appears in the distinction of names 
and forms. This is proved by clauses in those ' negativing' 
texts themselves, ' Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere 
than in the Self,' ' from that great Being there has been 
breathed forth the /e/g-veda,' &c. (Br/. Up. II, 4, 6, io).-r 



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144 vedanta-sAtras. 



On this method of interpretation we find that the texts 
declaring the essential distinction and separation of non- 
sentient matter, sentient beings, and the Lord, and those 
declaring him to be the cause and the world to be the 
effect, and cause and effect to be identical, do not in any 
way conflict with other texts declaring that matter and 
souls form the body of the Lord, and that matter and souls 
in their causal condition are in a subtle state, not admitting 
of the distinction of names and forms while in their 
' effected ' gross state they are subject to that distinction. 
On the other hand, we do not see how there is any opening 
for theories maintaining the connexion of Brahman with 
Nescience, or distinctions in Brahman due to limiting 
adjuncts (upadhi) — such and similar doctrines rest on 
fallacious reasoning, and flatly contradict Scripture. 

There is nothing contradictory in allowing that certain 
texts declare the essential distinction of matter, souls, and 
the Lord, and their mutual relation as modes and that to 
which the modes belong, and that other texts again repre- 
sent them as standing in the relation of cause and effect, 
and teach cause and effect to be one. We may illustrate 
this by an analogous case from the Karmakamia. There 
six separate oblations to Agni, and so on, are enjoined by 
separate so-called originative injunctions ; these are there- 
upon combined into two groups (viz. the new moon and 
the full-moon sacrifices) by a double clause referring to 
those groups, and finally a so-called injunction of quali- 
fication enjoins the entire sacrifice as something to be 
performed by persons entertaining a certain wish. In a 
similar way certain Vedanta-texts give instruction about 
matter, souls, and the Lord as separate entities (' Perishable 
is the pradhana, imperishable and immortal Hara,' &c, 
.Svet. Up. I, 10 ; and others) ; then other texts teach that 
matter and souls in all their different states constitute the 
body of the highest Person, while the latter is their Self 
(' Whose body the earth is,' &c.) ; and finally another group 
of texts teaches — by means of words such as 'Being,' 
* Brahman,' ' Self,' denoting the highest Self to which the 
body belongs — that the one highest Self in its causal and 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 145 

effected states comprises within itself the triad of entities 
which had been taught in separation (' Being only this was 
in the beginning* ; ' In that all this has its Self; 'All this 
is Brahman'). — That the highest Self with matter and souls 
for its body should be simply called the highest Self, is no 
more objectionable than that that particular form of Self 
which is invested with a human body should simply be 
spoken of as Self or soul — as when we say ' This is a happy 
soul.' 



Hescience cannot be terminated by the simple act of 
cognising Brahman as the Universal Self. 

The doctrine, again, that Nescience is put an end to by 
the cognition of Brahman being the Self of all can in no 
way be upheld ; for as bondage is something real it cannot 
be put an end to by knowledge. How, we ask, can any 
one assert that bondage — which consists in the experience 
of pleasure and pain caused by the connexion of souls with 
bodies of various kind, a connexion springing from good 
or evil actions — is something false, unreal ? And that the 
cessation of such bondage is to be obtained only through 
the grace of the highest Self pleased by the devout medi- 
tation of the worshipper, we have already explained. As 
the cognition of universal oneness which you assume 
rests on a view of things directly contrary to reality, and 
therefore is false, the only effect it can have is to strengthen 
the ties of bondage. Moreover, texts such as ' But different 
is the highest Person' (Bha. Gi. XV, 17), and 'Having 
known the Self and the Mover as separate ' (5vet Up. I, 6), 
teach that it is the cognition of Brahman as the inward 
ruler different from the individual soul, that effects the 
highest aim of man, i. e. final release. And, further, as that 
'bondage-terminating' knowledge which you assume is 
itself unreal, we should have to look out for another act 
of cognition to put an end to it. — But may it not be said 
that this terminating cognition, after having put an end 
to the whole aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it, 
immediately passes away itself, because being of a merely 
[48] L 



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I46 vedAnta-sAtras. 



instantaneous nature ? — No, we reply. Since its nature, its 
origination, and its destruction are all alike fictitious, we 
have clearly to search for another agency capable of de- 
stroying that avidya which is the cause of the fiction of its 
destruction ! — Let us then say that the essential nature of 
Brahman itself is the destruction of that cognition ! — From 
this it would follow, we reply, that such ' terminating ' know- 
ledge would not arise at all; for that the destruction of 
what is something permanent can clearly not originate 1 — 
Who moreover should, according to you, be the cognising 
subject in a cognition which has for its object the nega- 
tion of everything that is different from Brahman ? — That 
cognising subject is himself something fictitiously super- 
imposed on Brahman I — This may not be, we reply: he 
himself would in that case be something to be negatived, 
and hence an object of the ' terminating ' cognition ; he 
could not therefore be the subject of cognition ! — Well, then, 
let us assume that the essential nature of Brahman itself is 
the cognising subject 1 — Do you mean, we ask in reply, that 
Brahman's being the knowing subject in that ' terminating ' 
cognition belongs to Brahman's essential nature, or that 
it is something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman ? In 
the latter case that superimposition and the Nescience 
founded on it would persist, because they would not be 
objects of the terminating cognition, and if a further ter- 
minating act of knowledge were assumed, that also would 
possess a triple aspect (viz. knowledge, object known, and 
subject knowing), and we thus should be led to assume an 
infinite series of knowing subjects. If, on the other hand, 
the essential nature of Brahman itself constitutes the 
knowing subject, your view really coincides with the one 
held by us 1 . And if you should say that the terminating 
knowledge itself and the knowing subject in it are things 
separate from Brahman and themselves contained in the 
sphere of what is to be terminated by that knowledge, 
your statement would be no less absurd than if you were 
to say ' everything on the surface of the earth has been cut 

1 According to which Brahman is not gHUnam, but gHiXri. 

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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 147 

down by Devadatta with one stroke' — meaning thereby 
that Devadatta himself and the action of cutting down 
are comprised among the things cut down ! — The second 
alternative, on the other hand — according to which the 
knowing subject is not Brahman itself, but a knower super- 
imposed upon it — would imply that that subject is the 
agent in an act of knowledge resulting in his own de- 
struction; and this is impossible since no person aims at 
destroying himself. And should it be said that the de- 
struction of the knowing agent belongs to the very nature 
of Brahman itself 1 , it would follow that we can assume 
neither plurality nor the erroneous view of plurality, nor 
avidya as the root of that erroneous view. — All this con- 
firms our theory, viz. that since bondage springs from 
agn&na. in the form of an eternal stream of karman, it can 
be destroyed only through knowledge of the kind main- 
tained by us. Such knowledge is to be attained only 
through the due daily performance of religious duties as 
prescribed for a man's caste and Irrama, such performance 
being sanctified by the accompanying thought of the true 
nature of the Self, and having the character of propitiation of 
the highest Person. Now, that mere works produce limited 
and non-permanent results only, and that on the other 
hand works not aiming at an immediate result but meant 
to please the highest Person, bring about knowledge of 
the character of devout meditation, and thereby the un- 
limited and permanent result of the intuition of Brahman 
being the Self of all — these are points not to be known 
without an insight into the nature of works, and hence, 
without this, the attitude described — which is preceded 
by the abandonment of mere works— cannot be reached. 
For these reasons the enquiry into Brahman has to be 
entered upon after the enquiry into the nature of 
works. 

1 And, on that account, belongs to what constitutes man's 
highest aim. 



L 2 

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148 ved!nta-s6tras. 

The Vedantin aiming to ascertain the nature of Brahman 
from Scripture, need not be disconcerted by the Ht- 
m&msa-theory of all speech having informing power 
with regard to actions only. 

Here another prima facie view 1 finally presents itself. 
The power of words to denote things cannot be ascertained 
in any way but by observing the speech and actions of 
experienced people. Now as such speech and action 
always implies the idea of something to be done (kirya), 
words are means of knowledge only with reference to 
things to be done ; and hence the matter inculcated by the 
Veda also is only things to be done. From this it follows 
that the Vedanta-texts cannot claim the position of autho- 
ritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman, 
which is (not a thing to be done but) an accomplished 
fact. — Against this view it must not be urged that in the 
case of sentences expressive of accomplished facts — as e. g. 
that a son is born to somebody — the idea of a particular 
thing may with certainty be inferred as the cause of certain 
outward signs — such as e. g. a pleased expression of coun- 
tenance — which are generally due to the attainment of 
a desired object ; for the possible causes of joy, past, present, 
and future, are infinite in number, and in the given case 
other causes of joy, as e. g. the birth having taken place in 
an auspicious moment, or having been an easy one, &c, 
may easily be imagined. Nor, again, can it be maintained 
that the denotative power of words with regard to accom- 
plished things may be ascertained in the way of our infer- 
ring either the meaning of one word from the known 
meaning of other words, or the meaning of the radical 
part of a word from the known meaning of a formative 
element ; for the fact is that we are only able to infer on 
the basis of a group of words known to denote a certain 
thing to be done, what the meaning of some particular 
constituent of that group may be. — Nor, again, when 
a person, afraid of what he thinks to be a snake, is ob- 

1 This view is held by the Prdbhikara Mtmi/wsakas. 

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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 149 

- _ . . - 

served to dismiss his fear on being told that the thing 
is not a snake but only a rope, can we determine thereby 
that what terminates his fear is the idea of the non- 
existence of a snake. For there are many other ideas 
which may account for the cessation of his fear — he may 
think, e. g, ' this is a thing incapable of moving, devoid of 
poison, without consciousness ' — the particular idea present 
to his mind we are therefore not able to determine. — 
The truth is that from the fact of all activity being in- 
variably dependent on the idea of something to be done, we 
learn that the meaning which words convey is something 
prompting activity. All words thus denoting something 
to be done, the several words of a sentence express only 
some particular action to be performed, and hence it is 
not possible to determine that they possess the power of 
denoting their own meaning only, in connexion with the 
meaning of the other words of the sentence. — (Nor must 
it be said that what moves to action is not the idea of 
the thing to be done, but the idea of the means to do 
it ; for) the idea of the means to bring about the desired 
end causes action only through the idea of the thing to be 
done, not through itself; as is evident from the fact that 
the idea of means past, future, and even present (when 
divorced from the idea of an end to be accomplished), 
does not prompt to action. As long as a man does not 
reflect 'the means towards the desired end are not to be 
accomplished without an effort of mine ; it must therefore 
be accomplished through my activity' ; so long he does 
not begin to act. What causes activity is thus only the 
idea of things to be done; and as hence words denote 
such things only, the Veda also can tell us only about 
things to be done, and is not therefore in a position to give 
information about the attainment of an infinite and per- 
manent result, such result being constituted by Brahman, 
which is (not a thing to be done, but) an accomplished 
entity. The Veda does, on the other hand, actually teach 
that mere works have a permanent result (' Imperish- 
able is the merit of him who offers the £aturmasya-sacri- 
fices,' and so on) ; and hence it follows that to enter on an 



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150 vedAnta-sOtras. 



enquiry into Brahman for the reason that the knowledge 
of Brahman has an infinite and permanent result, while the 
result of works is limited and non-permanent, is an alto- 
gether unjustified proceeding. 

To this we make the following reply. — To set aside 
the universally known mode of ascertaining the connexion 
of words and their meanings, and to assert that all words 
express only one non-worldly meaning (viz. those things to 
be done which the Veda inculcates), is a proceeding for 
which men paying due attention to the means of proof 
can have only a slight regard. A child avowedly learns 
the connexion of words and meanings in the following 
way. The father and mother and other people about him 
point with the finger at the child's mother, father, uncle, 
&c, as well as at various domestic and wild animals, birds, 
snakes, and so on, to the end that the child may at the 
same time pay attention to the terms they use and to the 
beings denoted thereby, and thus again and again make 
him understand that such and such words refer to such 
and such things. The child thus observing in course of 
time that these words of themselves give rise to certain 
ideas in his mind, and at the same time observing neither 
any different connexion of words and things, nor any 
person arbitrarily establishing such connexion, comes to 
the conclusion that the application of such and such words 
to such and such things is based on the denotative power 
of the words. And being taught later on by his elders 
that other words also, in addition to those learned first, 
have their definite meaning, he in the end becomes ac- 
quainted with the meanings of all words, and freely forms 
sentences conveying certain meanings for the purpose of 
imparting those meanings to other persons. 

And there is another way also in which the connexion of 
words and things can easily be ascertained. Some person 
orders another, by means of some expressive gesture, to go 
and inform Devadatta that his father is doing well, and the 
man ordered goes and tells Devadatta ' Your father is 
doing well.' A by-stander who is acquainted with the 
meaning of various gestures, and thus knows on what 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 151 

errand the messenger is sent, follows him and hears the 
words employed by him to deliver his message : he there- 
fore readily infers that such and such words have such and 
such a meaning. — We thus see that the theory of words 
having a meaning only in relation to things to be done is 
baseless. The Vedanta-texts tell us about Brahman, which 
is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on Brahman 
as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to 
undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain 
its nature. 

We further maintain that even on the supposition of the 
Veda relating only to things to be done, an enquiry into 
Brahman must be undertaken. For ' The Self is to be seen, 
to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on ' (Br/. 
Up. II, 4, 5) ; ' He is to be searched out, him we must try to 
understand ' (Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1) ; ' Let a Brahmawa having 
known him practise wisdom' (Bri. Up. XI, 4, 21) ; ' What 
is within that small ether, that is to be sought for, that is 
to be understood ' (Kk. Up. VIII, 1, 1) ; * What is in that 
small ether, that is to be meditated upon' (Mahanar. 
Up. X, 7) — these and similar texts enjoin a certain action, 
viz. meditation on Brahman, and when we then read ' He 
who knows Brahman attains the highest,' we understand that 
the attainment of Brahman is meant as a reward for him 
who is qualified for and enters on such meditation. Brah- 
man itself and its attributes are thus established thereby 
only — that they subserve a certain action, viz. meditation. 
There are analogous instances in the Karmakawafo. of the 
Veda. When an arthavada-passage describes the heavenly 
world as a place where there is no heat, no frost, no grief, 
&c, this is done merely with a view to those texts which 
enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of the 
heavenly world. Where another arthavada says that 'those 
who perform certain sattra-sacrifkes are firmly established,' 
such ' firm establishment ' is referred to only because it is 
meant as the reward for those acting on the text which 
enjoins those sattras, ' Let him perform the ratri-sattras ' 
(Pu. Mt. SO. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a 
person threatening a Brahmawa is to be punished with 



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152 vedAnta-sOtras. 



a fine of one hundred gold pieces, this statement is made 
merely with reference to the prohibitory passage, • Let him 
not threaten a Brahmawa ' (Pu. Mi. Su. Ill, 4, 17). 

We, however, really object to the whole theory of the 
meaning of words depending on their connexion with 
' things to be done,' since this is not even the case in 
imperative clauses such as ' bring the cow.' For you are 
quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your ' thing 
to be done ' (karya). You understand by ' karya ' that which 
follows on the existence of action (krtti) and is aimed at 
by action. Now to be aimed at by action is to be the 
object (karman) of action, and to be the object of action is 
to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action 
(according to the grammarian's definition). But what one 
desires most to obtain is pleasure or the cessation of 
pain. When a person desirous of some pleasure or cessa- 
tion of pain is aware that his object is not to be accom- 
plished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and 
begins to act : in no case we observe an object of desire to 
be aimed at by action in any other sense than that of its 
accomplishment depending on activity. The prompting 
quality (prerakatva) also, which belongs to objects of desire, 
is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment de- 
pending on activity j for it is this which' moves to action. — 
Nor can it be said that • to be aimed at by action ' means 
to be that which is ' agreeable ' (anukula) to man ; for it is 
pleasure only that is agreeable to man. The cessation of 
pain, on the other hand; is not what is ' agreeable ' to man. 
The essential distinction between pleasure and pain is that 
the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable 
(pratikula), and the cessation of pain is desired not because 
it is agreeable, but because pain is disagreeable : absence 
of pain means that a person is in his normal condition, 
affected neither with pain nor pleasure. Apart from pleasure, 
action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor does it become so 
by being subservient to pleasure ; for its essential nature 
is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the 
resolve of undertaking it. — Nor, again, can we define that 
which is aimed at by action as that to which action is 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 153 

auxiliary or supplementary (.resha), while itself it holds the 
position of something principal to be subserved by other 
things (.reshin) ; for of the .resha and .reshin also no proper 
definition can be given. It cannot be said that a .resha is 
that which is invariably accompanied by an activity pro- 
ceeding with a view to something else, and that the corre- 
late of such a .resha is the .reshin ; for on this definition the 
action is not a .resha, and hence that which is to be effected 
by the action cannot be the correlative .reshin. And more- 
over a .reshin may not be defined as what is correlative to 
an action proceeding with a view to — i.e. aiming at — 
something else ; for it is just this ' being aimed at ' of which 
we require a definition, and moreover we observe that also 
the jcshin (or ' pradhana ') is capable of action proceeding 
with a view to the .resha, as when eg. a master does 
something for — let us say, keeps or feeds — his servant. 
This last criticism you must not attempt to ward off by 
maintaining that the master in keeping his servant acts with 
a view to himself (to his own advantage) ; for the servant 
in serving the master likewise acts with a view to himself. 
— And as, further, We have no adequate definition of 
' karya,' it would be inappropriate to define .resha as that 
which is correlative to karya, and .reshin as that which is 
correlative to .resha. — Nor, finally, may we define 'that 
which is aimed at by action ' as that which is the final end 
(prayeg-ana) of action ; for by the final end of an action we ' 
could only understand the end for which the agent under- 
takes the action, and this end is no other than the desired 
object. As thus ' what is aimed at by action ' cannot be 
defined otherwise than what is desired, karya cannot be 
defined as what is to be effected by action and stands to 
action in the relation of principal matter (pradhana or .reshin). 
(Let it then be said that the ' niyoga,' i. e. what is com- 
monly called the apurva — the supersensuous result of an 
action which later on produces the sensible result — con- 
stitutes the prayqguna — the final purpose — of the action. — 
But) the apurva also can, as it is something different from 
the direct objects of desire, viz. pleasure and the cessation 
of pain, be viewed only as a means of bringing about these. 



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154 vedAnta-sOtras. 



direct objects, and as something itself to be effected by the 
action ; it is for this very reason that it is something 
different from the action, otherwise the action itself would 
be that which is effected by the action. The thing to be 
effected by the action — which is expressed by means of 
optative and imperative verbal forms such as ya^eta, ' let 
him sacrifice ' — is, in accordance with the fact of its being 
connected with words such as svargakamaA, 'he who 
is desirous of heaven,' understood to be the means of 
bringing about (the enjoyment of) the heavenly world"; 
and as the (sacrificial) action itself is transitory, there is 
assumed an altogether ' new ' or ' unprecedented ' (apurva) 
effect of it which (later on) is to bring about the enjoyment 
of heaven. This so-called ' apurva ' can therefore be 
understood only with regard to its. capability of bringing 
about the heavenly world. Now it certainly is ludicrous 
to assert that the apurva, which is assumed to the end of 
firmly establishing the independent character of the effect 
of the action first recognised as such (i.e. independent), 
later on becomes the means of realising the heavenly 
world ; for as the word expressing the result of the action 
(ya.gneta) appears in syntactical connexion with 'svarga- 
kamaA' (desirous of heaven), it does not, from the very 
beginning, denote an independent object of action, and 
moreover it is impossible to recognise an independent 
* result of action other than either pleasure or cessation of 
pain, or the means to bring about these two results. — What, 
moreover, do you understand by the apurva being a final 
end (praycgana)? — You will perhaps reply, 'its being 
agreeable like pleasure.' — Is then the apurva a pleasure ? 
It is pleasure alone which is agreeable! — Well, let us then 
define the apurva as a kind of pleasure of a special nature, 
called by that name ! — But what proof, we ask, have you for 
this ? You will, in the first place, admit yourself that you 
do not directly experience any pleasure springing from con- 
sciousness of your apurva, which could in any way be 
compared to the pleasure caused by the consciousness of 
the objects of the senses. — Well, let us say then that as 
authoritative doctrine gives us the notion of an apurva aa 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 155 

something beneficial to man, we conclude that it will be 
enjoyed later on. — But, we ask, what is the authoritative 
doctrine establishing such an apurva beneficial to man? 
Not, in the first place, ordinary, i. e. non-Vedic doctrine ; 
for such has for its object action only which always is 
essentially painful Nor, in the next place, Vedic texts ; 
for those also enjoin action only as the means to bring 
about certain results such as the heavenly world. Nor 
again the Smrrti texts enjoining works of either permanent 
or occasional obligation ; for those texts always convey the 
notion of an apurva only on the basis of an antecedent 
knowledge of the apurva as intimated by Vedic texts 
containing terms such as svargakamaA. And we, more- 
over, do not observe that in the case of works having 
a definite result in this life, there is enjoyment of any 
special pleasure called apurva, in addition to those advan- 
tages which constitute the special result of the work and are 
enjoyed here below, as e. g. abundance of food or freedom 
from sickness. Thus there is not any proof of the apurva 
being a pleasure. The arthavada-passages of the Veda 
also, while glorifying certain pleasurable results of works, 
as e.g. the heavenly world, do not anywhere exhibit a 
similar glorification of a pleasure called apurva. 

From all this we conclude that also in injunctory sen- 
tences that which is expressed by imperative and similar 
forms is only the idea that the meaning of the root — as 
known from grammar — is to be effected by the effort of 
the agent. And that what constitutes the meaning of 
roots, viz. the action of sacrificing and the like, possesses 
the quality of pleasing the highest Person, who is the 
inner ruler of Agni and other divinities (to whom the sacri- 
fices are ostensibly offered), and that through the highest 
Person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is accom- 
plished, we shall show later on, under Su. Ill, a, 37. — It 
is thus finally proved that the Vedanta-texts give informa- 
tion about an accomplished entity, viz. Brahman, and that 
the fruit of meditation on Brahman is something infinite and 
permanent Where, on the other hand, Scripture refers 
to the fruit of mere works, such as the £aturmasya-sacrifices> 



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156 vedanta-sOtras. 



as something imperishable, we have to understand this 
imperishableness in a merely relative sense, for Scripture 
definitely teaches that the fruit of all works is perishable. 

We thus arrive at the settled conclusion that, since the 
fruit of mere works is limited and perishable, while that of 
the cognition of Brahman is infinite and permanent, there 
is good reason for entering on an enquiry into Brahman — 
the result of which enquiry wfll be the accurate determina- 
tion of Brahman's nature. — Here terminates the adhikarawa 
of ' Enquiry.' 

What then is that Brahman which is here said to be an 
object that should be enquired into ? — To this question the 
second Sutra gives a reply. 

2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c, 
of this (world proceed). 

The expression * the origin,' &c, means ' creation, sub- 
sistence, and reabsorption.' The ' this ' (in 'of this ') denotes 
this entire world with its manifold wonderful arrangements, 
not to be fathomed by thought, and comprising within 
itself the aggregate of living souls from Brahma down to 
blades of grass, all of which experience the fruits (of their 
former actions) in definite places and at definite times. 
•That from which,' i. e. that highest Person who is the 
ruler of all ; whose nature is antagonistic to all evil ; whose 
purposes come true; who possesses infinite auspicious 
qualities, such as knowledge, blessedness, and so on ; who 
is omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful ; from 
whom the creation j subsistence, and reabsorption of this 
world proceed— '-he is Brahman: such is the meaning of 
the Sutra. — The definition here given of Brahman is 
founded on the text Taitt. Up. Ill, 1, ' Bhr*gu Varum went 
to his father Varu«a, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c, 
up to 'That from which these beings are born, that by 
which when born they live, that into which they enter at 
their death, try to know that : that is Brahman.' 

A doubt arises here. Is it possible, or not, to gain 
a knowledge of Brahman from the characteristic marks 
stated in this passage? — It is not possible, the Purva- 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 2. 157 

pakshin contends. The attributes stated in that passage — 
viz. being that from which the world originates, and so 
on — do not properly indicate Brahman ; for as the essence 
of an attribute lies in ka separative or distinctive func- 
tion, there would result from the plurality of distinctive 
attributes plurality on the part of Brahman itself. — But 
when we say ' Devadatta is of a dark complexion, is young, 
has reddish eyes,' &c, we also make a statement as to 
several attributes, and yet we are understood to refer 
to one Devadatta only; similarly we understand in the 
case under discussion also that there is one Brahman only t 
— Not so, we reply. In Devadatta's case we connect all 
attributes with one person, because we know his unity 
through other means of knowledge j otherwise the dis- 
tinctive power of several attributes would lead us, in this 
case also, to the assumption of several substances to which 
the several attributes belong. In the case under discussion, 
on the other hand, we do not, apart from the statement as 
to attributes, know anything about the unity of Brahman, 
and the distinctive power of the attributes thus necessarily 
urges upon us the idea of several Brahmans. — But we 
maintain that the unity of the term ' Brahman ' intimates 
the unity of the thing ' Brahman ' ! — By no means, we 
reply. If a man who knows nothing about cows, but 
wishes to know about them, is told ' a cow is that which 
has either entire horns, or mutilated horns, or no horns/ 
the mutally exclusive ideas of the possession of entire 
horns, and so on, raise in his mind the ideas of several 
individual cows, although the term ' cow ' is one only ; and 
in the same way we are led to the idea of several distinct 
Brahmans. For this reason, even the different attributes 
combined are incapable of defining the thing, the definition 
of which is desired. — Nor again are the characteristics 
enumerated in the Taitt. passage (viz. creation of the 
world, &c.) capable of defining Brahman in the way of 
secondary marks (upalakshawa), because the thing to be 
defined by them is not previously known in a different 
aspect. So-called secondary marks are the cause of some- 
thing already known from a certain point of view, being 



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158 vedAnta-s^tras. 



known in a different aspect — as when it is said 'Where 
that crane is standing, that is the irrigated field of Dcva- 
datta.' — But may we not say that from the text '-The True, 
knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' we already have an 
idea of Brahman, and that hence its being the cause of the 
origin, &c, of the world may be taken as collateral indi- 
cations (pointing to something already known in a certain 
way)? — Not so, we reply; either of these two defining 
texts has a meaning only with reference to an aspect of 
Brahman already known from the other one, and this 
mutual dependence deprives both of their force. — Brahman 
cannot therefore be known through the characteristic marks 
mentioned in the text under discussion. 

To this prima facie view we make the following reply. 
Brahman can be known on the basis of the origination, 
subsistence, and reabsorption of the world — these charac- 
teristics occupying the position of collateral marks. No 
objection can be raised against this view, on the ground 
that, apart from what these collateral marks point to, no 
other aspect of Brahman is known ; for as a matter of fact 
they point to that which is known to us as possess- 
ing supreme greatness (brthattva) and power of growth 
(brz/tthana) — this being the meaning of the root brimh 
(from which ' Brahman ' is derived). Of this Brahman, 
thus already known (on the basis of etymology), the 
origination, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world are 
collateral marks. Moreover, in the Taitt. text under dis- 
cussion, the relative pronoun — which appears in three forms, 
(that) ' from whence,' (that) ' by which,' (that) ' into which ' 
— refers to something which is already known as the cause 
of the origin, and so on, of the world. This previous know- 
ledge rests on the Kh. passage, ' Being only this was in the 
beginning,' &c, up to ' it sent forth fire ' — which declares 
that the one principle denoted as ' being ' is the universal 
material, and instrumental cause. There the clause ' Being 
only this was in the beginning, one only,' establishes that 
one being as the general material cause ; the word ' without 
a second ' negatives the existence of a second operative 
cause ; and the clauses ' it thought, may I be many, may 



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i adhyAva, i pAda; 2. 159 

I grow forth,' and 'it sent forth fire,' establish that one 
being (as the cause and substance of everything). If, 
then, it is said that Brahman is that which is the root of 
the world's origination, subsistence, and reabsorption, those 
three processes sufficiently indicate Brahman as that entity 
which is their material and operative cause ; and as being 
the material and the operative cause implies greatness 
(bnhattva) manifesting itself in various powers, such as 
omniscience, and so on, Brahman thus is something already 
known ; and as hence origination, &c, of the world are 
marks of something already known, the objection founded 
above on the absence of knowledge of another aspect of 
Brahman is seen to be invalid. — Nor is there really any 
objection to the origination, &c, of the world being taken 
as characteristic marks of Brahman in so far as they are 
distinctive attributes. For taken as attributes they indi- 
cate Brahman as something different from what is opposed 
to those attributes. Several attributes which do not con- 
tradict each other may serve quite well as characteristic 
marks denning one thing, the nature of which is not other- 
wise known, without the plurality of the attributes in any 
way involving plurality of the thing defined ; for as those 
attributes are at once understood to belong to one substrate, 
we naturally combine them within that one substrate. Such 
attributes, of course, as the possession of mutilated horns 
(mentioned above), which are contradictorily opposed to 
each other, necessarily lead to the assumption of several 
individual cows to which they severally belong ; but the 
origination, &c, of the world are processes separated from 
each other by difference of time only, and may therefore, 
without contradiction, be connected with one Brahman in 
succession. — The text * from whence these beings,' &c, 
teaches us that Brahman is the cause- of the origination, 
&c, of the world, and of this Brahman thus known the 
other text ' The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' 
tells us that its essential nature marks it off from every- 
thing else. The term ' True ' expresses Brahman in so far 
as possessing absolutely non-conditioned existence, and 
thus distinguishes it from non-intelligent matter, the abode 



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160 vedAnta-s^tras. 

of change, and the souls implicated in matter ; for as both 
of these enter into different states of existence called by 
different names, they do not enjoy unconditioned being. 
The term 'knowledge* expresses the characteristic of 
permanently non-contracted intelligence, and thus distin- 
guishes Brahman from the released souls whose intelligence 
is sometimes in a contracted state. And the term ' Infinite' 
denotes that, whose nature is free from all limitation of 
place, time, and particular substantial nature ; and as 
Brahman's essential nature possesses attributes, infinity 
belongs both to the essential nature and to the attributes. 
The qualification of Infinity excludes all those individual 
souls whose essential nature and attributes are not unsur- 
passable, and who are distinct from the two classes of 
beings already excluded by the two former terms (viz. 
' true being ' and * knowledge '). — The entire text therefore 
defines Brahman — which is already known to be the cause 
of the origination, &c, of the world — as that which is in 
kind different from all other things ; and it is therefore not 
true that the two texts under discussion have no force 
because mutually depending on each other. And from this 
it follows that a knowledge of Brahman may be gained 
on the ground of its characteristic marks — such as its being 
the cause of the origination, &c, of the world, free from all 
evil, omniscient, all-powerful, and so on. 

To those, on the other hand, who maintain that the 
object of enquiry is a substance devoid of all difference, 
neither the first nor the second Sutra can be acceptable ; 
for the Brahman, the enquiry into which the first Sutra 
proposes, is, according to authoritative etymology, some- 
thing of supreme greatness ; and according to the second 
Sutra it is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and final 
destruction of the world. The same remark holds good 
with regard to all following Sutras, and the scriptural texts 
on which they are based — none of them confirm the theory 
of a substance devoid of all difference. Nor, again, does 
Reasoning prove such a theory; for Reasoning has for 
its object things possessing a 'proving' attribute which 
constantly goes together with an attribute ' to be proved.' 



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i adhyaya, i pAda, 3. 161 

And even if, in agreement with your view, we explained 
the second Sutra as meaning ' Brahman is that whence 
proceeds the error of the origination, &c, of the world,' we 
should not thereby advance your theory of a substance 
devoid of all difference. For, as you teach, the root of all 
error is Nescience, and Brahman is that which witnesses 
(is conscious of) Nescience, and the essence of witnessing 
consciousness consists in being pure light (intelligence), 
and the essence of pure light or intelligence is that, distin- 
guishing itself from the Non-intelligent, it renders itself, as 
well as what is different from it, capable of becoming the 
object of empiric thought and speech (vyavahara). All this 
implies the presence of difference — if there were no differ- 
ence, light or intelligence could not be what it is, it would 
be something altogether void, without any meaning. — Here 
terminates the adhikarawa of ' origination and so on.' 

An objection to the purport of the preceding Sutras 
here presents itself. — The assertion that Brahman, as the 
cause of the origination, &c, of the world, must be known 
through the Vedanta-texts is unfounded ; for as Brahman 
may be inferred as the cause of the world through ordinary 
reasoning, it is not something requiring to be taught by 
authoritative texts. — To this objection the next Sutra 
replies. 

3. Because Scripture is the source (of the know- 
ledge of Brahman). 

Because Brahman, being raised above all contact with 
the senses, is not an object of perception and the other 
means of proof, but to be known through Scripture only ; 
therefore the text * Whence these creatures are born,' &c, 
has to be accepted as instructing us regarding the true 
nature of Brahman. — But, our opponent points out, Scrip- 
ture cannot be the source of our knowledge of Brahman, 
because Brahman is to be known through other means. 
For it is an acknowledged principle that Scripture has 
a meaning only with regard to what is not established by 
other sources of knowledge. — But what, to raise a prima 
facie counter objection, are those other sources of know- 

[48] M 



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1 6 2 vedAwta-sCtras. 



ledge? It cannot, in the first place, be Perception. 
Perception is twofold, being based either on the sense- 
organs or on extraordinary concentration of mind (yoga). 
Of Perception of the former kind there are again two 
sub-species, according as Perception takes place either 
through the outer sense-organs or the internal organ 
(manas). Now the outer sense-organs produce knowledge 
of their respective objects, in so far as the latter are in 
actual contact with the organs, but are quite unable to 
give rise to the knowledge of the special object constituted 
by a supreme Self that is capable of being conscious of 
and creating the whole aggregate of things. Nor can 
internal perception give rise to such knowledge ; for only 
purely internal things, such as pleasure and pain, fall within 
its cognisance, and it is incapable of relating itself to external 
objects apart from the outer sense-organs. Nor, again, 
perception based on Yoga ; for although such perception 
— which springs from intense imagination — implies a vivid 
presentation of things, it is, after all, nothing more than 
a reproduction of objects perceived previously, and does 
not therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge ; for it 
has no means of applying itself to objects other than those 
perceived previously. And if, after all, it does so, it is 
(not a means of knowledge but) a source of error. — Nor 
also inference either of the kind which proceeds on the 
observation of special cases or of the kind which rests on 
generalizations (cp. Nyaya Su. I, i, 5). Not inference of 
the former kind, because such inference is not known 
to relate to anything lying beyond the reach of the 
senses. Nor inference of the latter kind, because we do 
not observe any characteristic feature that is invariably 
accompanied by the presence of a supreme Self capable 
of being conscious of, and constructing, the universe of 
things. — But there is such a feature, viz. the world's being 
an effected thing ; it being a matter of common experience 
that whatever is an effect or product, is due to an agent 
who possesses a knowledge of the material cause, the instru- 
mental cause, the final end, and the person meant to make 
use of the thing produced. It further is matter of ex- 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 3. 163 

perience that whatever consists of non-sentient matter is 
dependent on, or ruled by, a single intelligent principle. 
The former generalization is exemplified by the case of 
jars and similar things, and the latter by a living body 
in good health, which consists of non-intelligent matter 
dependent on an intelligent principle. And that the body 
is an effected thing follows from its consisting of parts. — 
Against this argumentation also objections may be raised. 
What, it must be asked, do you understand by this depen- 
dence on an intelligent principle? Not, we suppose, that 
the origination and subsistence of the non-intelligent thing 
should be dependent on the intelligent principle; for in 
that case your example would not help to prove your 
contention. Neither the origin nor the subsistence of 
a person's healthy body depends on the intelligent soul 
of that person alone ; they rather are brought about by 
the merit and demerit of all those souls which in any way 
share the fruition of that body — the wife, e. g. of that 
person, and others. Moreover, the existence of a body 
made up of parts means that body's being connected with 
its parts in the way of so-called intimate relation (sama- 
vaya), and this requires a certain combination of the parts 
but not a presiding intelligent principle. The existence 
of animated bodies, moreover, has for its characteristic 
mark the process of breathing, which is absent in the case 
of the earth, sea, mountains, &c. — all of which are included 
in the class of things concerning which you wish to prove 
something — , and we therefore miss a uniform kind of exis- 
tence common to all those things. — Let us then understand 
by the dependence of a non-intelligent thing on an intelli- 
gent principle, the fact of the motion of the former de- 
pending on the latter ! — This definition, we rejoin, would 
comprehend also those cases in which heavy things, such 
as carriages, masses of stone, trees, &c, are set in motion 
by several intelligent beings (while what you want to prove 
is the dependence of a moving thing on one intelligent 
principle). If, on the other hand, you mean to say that 
all motion depends on intelligence in general, you only 
prove what requires no proof.— Another alternative, more- 

M2 



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1 64 vedanta-sOtras. 



over, here presents itself. As we both admit the existence 
of individual souls, it will be the more economical hypo- 
thesis to ascribe to them the agency implied in the con- 
struction of the world. Nor must you object to this view 
on the ground that such agency cannot belong to the 
individual souls because they do not possess the knowledge 
of material causes, &c, as specified above ; for all intelli- 
gent beings are capable of direct knowledge of material 
causes, such as earth and so on, and instrumental causes, 
such as sacrifices and the like. Earth and other material 
substances, as well as sacrifices and the like, are directly 
perceived by individual intelligent beings at the present 
time (and were no doubt equally perceived so at a former 
time when this world had to be planned and constructed). 
Nor does the fact that intelligent beings are not capable of 
direct insight into the unseen principle — called ' apurva,' or 
by similar names — which resides in the form of a power in 
sacrifices and other instrumental causes, in any way pre- 
clude their being agents in the construction of the world. 
Direct insight into powers is nowhere required for under- 
taking work : what is required for that purpose is only 
direct presentative knowledge of the things endowed with 
power, while of power itself it suffices to have some kind 
of knowledge. Potters apply themselves to the task of 
making pots and jars on the strength of the direct know- 
ledge they possess of the implements of their work — the 
wheel, the staff, &c— without troubling about a similar 
knowledge of the powers inherent in those implements ; 
and in the same way intelligent beings may apply them- 
selves to their work (to be effected by means of sacri- 
fices, &c), if only they are assured by sacred tradition of 
the existence of the various powers possessed by sacrifices 
and the like. — Moreover, experience teaches that agents 
having a knowledge of the material and other causes must 
be inferred only in the case of those effects which can be 
produced, and the material and other causes of which can 
be known: such things, on the other hand, as the earth, 
mountains, and oceans, can neither be produced, nor can 
their material and other causes ever be known ; we there- 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 3. 165 

fore have no right to infer for them, intelligent producers. 
Hence the quality of being an effected thing can be used 
as an argument for proving the existence of an intelligent 
causal agent, only where that quality is found in things, the 
production of which, and the knowledge of the causes of 
which, is possible at all. — Experience further teaches that 
earthen pots and similar things are produced by intelligent 
agents possessing material bodies, using implements, not 
endowed with the power of a Supreme Lord, limited in 
knowledge and so on ; the quality of being an effect there- 
fore supplies a reason for inferring an intelligent agent of the 
kind described only, and thus is opposed to the inference 
of attributes of a contrary nature, viz. omniscience, omni- 
potence, and those other attributes that belong to the 
highest Soul, whose existence you wish to establish. — Nor 
does this (as might be objected) imply an abandonment of all 
inference. Where the thing to be inferred is known through 
other means of proof also, any qualities of an opposite nature 
which may be suggested by the inferential mark (linga) are 
opposed by those other means of proof, and therefore must 
be dropped. In the case under discussion, however, the 
thing to be inferred is something not guaranteed by any 
other means of proof, viz. a person capable of constructing 
the entire universe : here there is nothing to interfere with 
the ascription to such a person of all those qualities which, 
on the basis of methodical inference, necessarily belong to it. 
— The conclusion from all this is that, apart from Scripture, 
the existence of a Lord does not admit of proof. 

Against all this the Purvapakshin now restates his case 
as follows : — It cannot be gainsaid that the world is some- 
thing effected, for it is made up of parts. We may state 
this argument in various technical forms. * The earth, 
mountains, &c, are things effected, because they consist of 
parts ; in the same way as jars and similar things.' ' The 
earth, seas, mountains, &c, are effects, because, while being 
big (i. e. non-atomic), they are capable of motion ; just as 
jars and the like.' « Bodies, the world, &c, are effects, 
because, while being big, they are solid (murtta) ; just as 
jars and the like.' — But, an objection is raised, in the case 



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1 66 vedakta-sCtras. 



of things made up of parts we do not, in addition to this 
attribute of consisting of parts, observe any other aspect 
determining that the thing is an effect — so as to enable us 
to say 'this thing is effected, and that thing is not'; and, 
on the other hand, we do observe it as an indispensable 
condition of something being an effect, that there should 
be the possibility of such an effect being brought about, 
and of the existence of such knowledge of material causes, 
&c. (as the bringing about of the effect presupposes). — Not 
so, we reply. In the case of a cause being inferred on the 
ground of an effect, the knowledge and power of the cause 
must be inferred in accordance with the nature of the 
effect. From the circumstance of a thing consisting of 
parts we know it to be an effect, and on this basis we 
judge of the power and knowledge of the cause. A person 
recognises pots, jars and the like, as things produced, 
and therefrom infers the constructive skill and knowledge 
of their maker ; when, after this, he sees for the first 
time a kingly palace with all its various wonderful parts 
and structures, he concludes from the special way in which 
the parts are joined that this also is an effected thing, and 
then makes an inference as to the architect's manifold 
knowledge and skill. Analogously, when a living body and 
the world have once been recognised to be effects, we infer 
— as their maker — some special intelligent being, possessing 
direct insight into their nature and skill to construct them. — 
Pleasure and pain, moreover, by which men are requited for 
their merit and demerit, are themselves of a non-intelligent 
nature, and hence cannot bring about their results unless 
they are controlled by an intelligent principle, and this 
also compels us to assume a being capable of allotting to 
each individual soul a fate corresponding to its deserts. 
For we do not observe that non-intelligent implements, such 
as axes and the like, however much they may be favoured 
by circumstances of time, place, and so on, are capable 
of producing posts and pillars unless they be handled by 
a carpenter. And to quote against the generalization on 
which we rely the instance of the seed and sprout and the 
like can only spring from an ignorance and stupidity which 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 3. 167 

may be called truly demoniac. The same remark would 
apply to pleasure and pain if used as a counter instance. 
(For in all these cases the action which produces an effect 
must necessarily be guided by an intelligent principle.) — 
Nor may we assume, as a * less complicated hypothesis,' 
that the guiding principle in the construction of the world 
is the individual souls, whose existence is acknowledged 
by both parties. For on the testimony of observation we 
must deny to those souls the power of seeing what is 
extremely subtle or remote in time or place (while such 
power must necessarily be ascribed to a world-constructing 
intelligence). On the other hand, we have no ground for 
concluding that the Lord is, like the individual souls, 
destitute of such power ; hence it cannot be said that other 
means of knowledge make it impossible to infer such a Lord. 
The fact rather is that as his existence is proved by the 
argument that any definite effect presupposes a causal 
agent competent to produce that effect, he is proved at the 
same time as possessing the essential power of intuitively 
knowing and ruling all things in the universe. — The 
contention that from the world being an effect it follows 
that its maker does not possess lordly power and so on, 
so that the proving reason would prove something contrary 
to the special attributes (belonging to a supreme agent, viz. 
omnipotence, omniscience, &c), is founded on evident 
ignorance of the nature of the inferential process. For the 
inference clearly does not prove that there exist in the 
thing inferred all the attributes belonging to the proving 
collateral instances, including even those attributes which 
stand in no causal relation to the effect. A certain effect 
which is produced by some agent presupposes just so much 
power and knowledge on the part of that agent as is 
requisite for the production of the effect, but in no way 
presupposes any incapability or ignorance on the part of 
that agent with regard to things other than the particular 
effect ; for such incapability and ignorance do not stand 
towards that effect in any causal relation. If the origina- 
tion of the effect can be accounted for on the basis of the 
agent's capability of bringing it about, and of his knowledge 



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1 68 , vedAnta-sCtras. 



of the special material and instrumental causes, it would be 
unreasonable to ascribe causal agency to his (altogether 
irrelevant) incapabilities and ignorance with regard to other 
things, only because those incapabilities, &c, are observed 
to exist together with his special capability and knowledge. 
The question would arise moreover whether such want of 
capability and knowledge (with regard to things other than 
the one actually effected) would be helpful towards the 
bringing about of that one effect, in so far as extending to 
all other things or to some other things. The former 
alternative is excluded because no agent, a potter e. g., is 
quite ignorant of all other things but his own special work ; 
and the second alternative is inadmissible because there is 
no definite rule indicating that there should be certain 
definite kinds of want of knowledge and skill in the case of 
all agents 1 , and hence exceptions would arise with regard 
to every special case of want of knowledge and skill. From 
this it follows that the absence of lordly power and similar 
qualities which (indeed is observed in the case of ordinary 
agents but) in no way contributes towards the production of 
the effects (to which such agents give rise) is not proved in the 
case of that which we wish to prove (i. e. a Lord, creator 
of the world), and that hence Inference does not establish 
qualities contrary (to the qualities characteristic of a Lord). 
A further objection will perhaps be raised, viz. that as 
experience teaches that potters and so on direct their im- 
plements through the mediation of their own bodies, we 
are not justified in holding that a bodiless Supreme Lord 
directs the material and instrumental causes of the universe. 
— But in reply to this we appeal to the fact of experience, 
that evil demons possessing men's bodies, and also venom, 
are driven or drawn out of those bodies by mere will power. 
Nor must you ask in what way the volition of a bodiless 

1 A certain potter may not possess the skill and knowledge 
required to make chairs and beds; but some other potter may 
possess both, and so on. We cannot therefore point to any 
definite want of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying 
the capability of producing effects of some other kind. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 3. 169 

Lord can put other bodies in motion ; for volition is not 
dependent on a body. The cause of volitions is not the 
body but the internal organ (manas), and such an organ we 
ascribe to the Lord also, since what proves the presence of 
an internal organ endowed with power and knowledge is 
just the presence of effects. — But volitions, even if directly 
springing from the internal organ, can belong to embodied 
beings only, such only possessing internal organs! — This 
objection also is founded on a mistaken generalization : the 
fact rather is that the internal organ is permanent, and 
exists also in separation from the body. The conclusion, 
therefore, is that — as the individual souls with their limited 
capacities and knowledge, and their dependence on merit 
and demerit, are incapable of giving rise to things so 
variously and wonderfully made as worlds and animated 
bodies are — inference directly leads us to the theory that 
there is a supreme intelligent agent, called the Lord, who 
possesses unfathomable, unlimited powers and wisdom, is 
capable of constructing the entire world, is without a body, 
and through his mere volition brings about the infinite 
expanse of this entire universe so variously and wonder- 
fully planned. As Brahman may thus be ascertained by 
means of knowledge other than revelation, the text quoted 
under the preceding Sutra cannot be taken to convey 
instruction as to Brahman. Since, moreover, experience 
demonstrates that material and instrumental causes always 
are things absolutely distinct from each other, as e. g. the 
clay and the potter with his implements; and since, further, 
there are substances not made up of parts, as e. g. ether, 
which therefore cannot be viewed as effects; we must 
object on these grounds also to any attempt to represent the 
one Brahman as the universal material and instrumental 
cause of the entire world. 

Against all this we now argue as follows : — The Vedanta- 
text declaring the origination, &c, of the world does teach 
that there is a Brahman possessing the characteristics men- 
tioned ; since Scripture alone is a means for the knowledge 
of Brahman. That the world is an effected thing because 
it consists of parts ; and that, as all effects are observed to 



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1 70 vedanta-sOtras. 



have for their antecedents certain appropriate agents com- 
petent to produce them, we must infer a causal agent 
competent to plan and construct the universe, and stand- 
ing towards it in the relation of material and operative 
cause — this would be a conclusion altogether unjustified. 
There is no proof to show that the earth, oceans, &c, 
although things produced, were created at one time by one 
creator. Nor can it be pleaded in favour of such a con- 
clusion that all those things have one uniform character of 
being effects, and thus are analogous to one single jar; 
for we observe that various effects are distinguished by 
difference of time of production, and difference of producers. 
Nor again may you maintain the oneness of the creator 
on the ground that individual souls are incapable of the 
creation of this wonderful universe, and that if an additional 
principle be assumed to account for the world — which 
manifestly is a product — it would be illegitimate to assume 
more than one such principle. For we observe that in- 
dividual beings acquire more and more extraordinary 
powers in consequence of an increase of religious merit ; 
and as we may assume that through an eventual supreme 
degree of merit they may in the end qualify themselves 
for producing quite extraordinary effects, we have no right 
to assume a highest soul of infinite merit, different from all 
individual souls. Nor also can it be proved that all things 
are destroyed and produced all at once ; for no such thing 
is observed to take place, while it is, on the other hand, 
observed that things are produced and destroyed in suc- 
cession ; and if we infer that all things are produced and 
destroyed because they are effects, there is no reason why 
this production and destruction should not take place in 
a way agreeing with ordinary experience. If, therefore, 
what it is desired to prove is the agency of one intelligent 
being, we are met by the difficulty that the proving reason 
(viz. the circumstance of something being an effect) is not 
invariably connected with what it is desired to prove; 
there, further, is the fault of qualities not met with in 
experience being attributed to the subject about which 
something has to be proved ; and lastly there is the fault 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 3. 171 

of the proving collateral instances being destitute of what 
has to be proved — for experience does not exhibit to us one 
agent capable of producing everything. If, on the other 
hand, what you wish to prove is merely the existence of 
an intelligent creative agent, you prove only what is 
proved already (not contested by any one). — Moreover, 
if you use the attribute of being an effect (which belongs 
to the totality of things) as a means to prove the existence 
of one omniscient and omnipotent creator, do you view 
this attribute as belonging to all things in so far as pro- 
duced together, or in so far as produced in succession ? 
In the former case the attribute of being an effect is not 
established (for experience does not show that all things 
are produced together) ; and in the latter case the attribute 
would really prove what is contrary to the hypothesis 
of one creator (for experience shows that things produced 
in, succession have different causes). In attempting to 
prove the agency of one intelligent creative being only, we 
thus enter into conflict with Perception and Inference, and 
we moreover contradict Scripture, which says that 'the 
potter is born ' and ' the cartwright is born ' (and thus 
declares a plurality of intelligent agents). Moreover, as 
we observe that all effected things, such as living bodies 
and so on, are connected with pleasure and the like, which 
are the effects of sattva (goodness) and the other primary 
constituents of matter, we must conclude that effected 
things have sattva and so on for their causes. Sattva and 
so on — which constitute the distinctive elements of the 
causal substance — are the causes of the various nature of the 
effects. Now those effects can be connected with their 
causes only in so far as the internal organ of a person 
possessing sattva and so on undergoes modifications. And 
that a person possesses those qualities is due to karman. 
Thus, in order to account for the origination of different 
effects we must necessarily assume the connexion of an 
intelligent agent with karman, whereby alone he can become 
the cause of effects ; and moreover the various character 
of knowledge and power (which the various effects pre- 
suppose) has its reason in karman. And if it be said that 



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172 vedAnta-sCtras. 



it is (not the various knowledge, &c, but) the mere wish 
of the agent that causes the origination of effects, we point 
out that the wish, as being specialised by its particular 
object, must be based on sattva and so on, and hence 
is necessarily connected with karman. From all this it 
follows that individual souls only can be causal agents : no 
legitimate inference leads to a Lord different from them in 
nature. — This admits of various expressions in technical 
form. 'Bodies, worlds, &c, are effects due to the causal 
energy of individual souls, just as pots are ' ; ' the Lord is 
not a causal agent, because he has no aims; just as the 
released souls have none ' ; ' the Lord is not an agent, 
because he has no body ; just as the released souls have 
none.' (This last argumentation cannot be objected to on 
the ground that individual souls take possession of bodies ; 
for in their case there exists a beginningless subtle body 
by means of which they enter into gross bodies). — 'Time 
is never devoid of created worlds ; because it is time, just 
like the present time (which has its created world).' 

Consider the following point also. Does the Lord pro- 
duce his effects, with his body or apart from his body ? 
Not the latter ; for we do not observe causal agency on 
the part of any bodiless being : even the activities of the 
internal organ are found only in beings having a body, and 
although the internal organ be eternal we do not know of 
its producing any effects in the case of released disembodied 
souls. Nor again is the former alternative admissible ; for 
in that case the Lord's body would either be permanent or 
non-permanent. The former alternative would imply that 
something made up of parts is eternal ; and if we once 
admit this we may as well admit that the world itself is 
eternal, and then there is no reason to infer a Lord. And 
the latter alternative is inadmissible because in that case 
there would be no cause of the body, different from it 
(which would account for the origination of the body). 
Nor could the Lord himself be assumed as the cause of the 
body, since a bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body. 
Nor could it be maintained that the Lord can be assumed 
to be ' embodied ' by means of some other body ; for this 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 3. 173 

leads us into a regressus in infinitum. — Should we, more- 
over, represent to ourselves the Lord (when productive) as 
engaged in effort or not? — The former is inadmissible, 
because he is without a body. And the latter alternative 
is excluded because a being not making an effort does not 
produce effects. And if it be said that the effect, i. e. the 
world, has for its causal agent one whose activity consists 
in mere desire, this would be to ascribe to the subject of 
the conclusion (i. e. the world) qualities not known from 
experience ; and moreover the attribute to be proved would 
be absent in the case of the proving instances (such as 
jars, &c, which are not the work of agents engaged in mere 
wishing). Thus the inference of a creative Lord which 
claims to be in agreement with observation is refuted 
by reasoning which itself is in agreement with observation, 
and we hence conclude that Scripture is the only source of 
knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the 
Lord of all and constitutes the highest Brahman. What 
Scripture tells us of is a being which comprehends within 
itself infinite, altogether unsurpassable excellences such as 
omnipotence and so on, is antagonistic to all evil, and totally 
different in character from whatever is cognised by the 
other means of knowledge : that to such a being there 
should attach even the slightest imperfection due to its 
similarity in nature to the things known by the ordinary 
means of knowledge, is thus altogether excluded. — The 
Purvapakshin had remarked that the oneness of the in- 
strumental and the material cause is neither matter of 
observation nor capable of proof, and that the same holds 
good with regard to the theory that certain non-composite 
substances such as ether are created things ; that these points 
also are in no way contrary to reason, we shall show later 
on under Su. I, 4, 23, and Su. II, 3, 1. 

The conclusion meanwhile is that, since Brahman does 
not fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge, 
and is the topic of Scripture only, the text ' from whence 
these creatures,' &c, does give authoritative information as to 
a Brahman possessing the characteristic qualities so often 
enumerated. Here terminates the adhikara»a of ' Scripture 
being the source.' 



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1 74 vedAnta-sOtras. 



A new objection here presents itself. — Brahman does not 
indeed fall within the province of the other means of 
knowledge; but all the same Scripture does not give 
authoritative information regarding it : for Brahman is 
not something that has for its purport activity or cessation 
from activity, but is something fully established and ac- 
complished within itself. — To this objection the following 
Sutra replies. 

4. But that (i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture 
with regard to Brahman) exists on account of the con- 
nexion (of Scripture with the highest aim of man). 

The word ' but ' is meant to rebut the objection raised. 
That, i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to 
Brahman, is possible, on account of samanvaya, i. e. con- 
nexion with the highest aim of man — that is to say because 
the scriptural texts are connected with, i. e. have for their 
subject, Brahman, which constitutes the highest aim of man. 
For such is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate 
of words which constitutes the Upanishads — 'That from 
whence these beings are born' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1, 1). ' Being 
only this was in the beginning, one, without a second ' 
(Kh. Up. VI, 2), &c. &c. And of aggregates of words 
which are capable of giving information about accomplished 
things known through the ordinary means of ascertaining 
the meaning of words, and which connectedly refer to 
a Brahman which is the cause of the origination, subsistence, 
and destruction of the entire world, is antagonistic to all 
imperfection and so on, we have no right to say that, owing 
to the absence of a purport in the form of activity or 
cessation of activity, they really refer to something other 
than Brahman. 

For all instruments of knowledge have their end in 
determining the knowledge of their own special objects : 
their action does not adapt itself to a final purpose, but the 
latter rather adapts itself to the means of knowledge. Nor 
is it true that where there is no connexion with activity or 
cessation of activity all aim is absent ; for in such cases we 
observe connexion with what constitutes the general aim, i. e. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 4. 1 75 

the benefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of 
fact — such as ' a son is born to thee.' ' This is no snake ' — 
evidently have an aim, viz. in so far as they either give rise 
to joy or remove pain and fear. 

Against this view the Purvapakshin now argues as follows. 
The Vedanta-texts do not impart knowledge of Brahman ; 
for unless related to activity or the cessation of activity, 
Scripture would be unmeaning, devoid of all purpose. 
Perception and the other means of knowledge indeed have 
their aim and end in supplying knowledge of the nature of 
accomplished things and facts ; Scripture, on the other hand, 
must be supposed to aim at some practical purpose. For 
neither in ordinary speech nor in the Veda do we ever 
observe the employment of sentences devoid of a practical 
purpose: the employment of sentences not having such 
a purpose is in fact impossible. And what constitutes such 
purpose is the attainment of a desired, or the avoidance of a 
non-desired object, to be effected bysome action or abstention 
from action. ' Let a man desirous of wealth attach himself 
to the court of a prince ' ; ' a man with a weak digestion 
must not drink much water ' ; 'let him who is desirous of 
the heavenly world offer sacrifices ' ; and so on. With 
regard to the assertion that such sentences also as refer to 
accomplished things — ' a son is born to thee ' and so on — 
are connected with certain aims of man, viz. joy or the 
cessation of fear, we ask whether in such cases the attain- 
ment of man's purpose results from the thing or fact itself, 
as e. g. the birth of a son, or from the knowledge of that 
thing or fact. — You will reply that as a thing although 
actually existing is of no use to man as long as it is not 
known to him, man's purpose is accomplished by his 
knowledge of the thing. — It then appears, we rejoin, that 
man's purpose is effected through mere knowledge, even if 
there is no actual thing; and from this it follows that 
Scripture, although connected with certain aims, is not 
a means of knowledge for the actual existence of things. 
In all cases, therefore, sentences have a practical purpose ; 
they determine either some form of activity or cessation 
from activity, or else some form of knowledge. No sentence, 



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1 76 vedAnta-sOtras. 



therefore, can have for its purport an accomplished thing, 
and hence the Vedanta-texts do not convey the knowledge 
of Brahman as such an accomplished entity. 

At this point somebody propounds the following view. 
The Vedanta-texts are an authoritative means for the cog- 
nition of Brahman, because as a matter of fact they also aim 
at something to be done. What they really mean to teach 
is that Brahman, which in itself is pure homogeneous know- 
ledge, without a second, not connected with a world, but is, 
owing to beginningless Nescience, viewed as connected 
with a world, should be freed from this connexion. And it 
is through this process of dissolution of the world that 
Brahman becomes the object of an injunction. — But which 
texts embody this injunction, according to which Brahman 
in its pure form is to be realised through the dissolution of 
this apparent world with its distinction of knowing subjects 
and objects of knowledge ? — Texts such as the following : 
' One should not see (i. e. represent to oneself) the seer of 
seeing, one should not think the thinker of thinking' 
(Bri. Up. Ill, 4, 2) ; for this means that we should realise 
Brahman in the form of pure Seeing (knowledge), free from 
the distinction of seeing agents and objects of sight. 
Brahman is indeed accomplished through itself, but all the 
same it may constitute an object to be accomplished, viz. in 
so far as it is being disengaged from the apparent world. 

This view (the Mlmawsaka rejoins) is unfounded. He 
who maintains that injunction constitutes the meaning of 
sentences must be able to assign the injunction itself, the 
qualification of the person to whom the injunction is 
addressed, the object of the injunction, the means to carry 
it out, the special mode of the procedure, and the person 
carrying out the injunction. Among these things the 
qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses 
itself is something not to be enjoined (but existing previously 
to the injunction), and is of the nature either of cause 
(nimitta) or a result aimed at (phala). We then have to 
decide what, in the case under discussion (i. e. the alleged 
injunction set forth by the antagonist), constitutes the 
qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 4. 177 

itself, and whether it be of the nature of a cause or of 
a result. — Let it then be said that what constitutes the 
qualification in our case is the intuition of the true nature 
of Brahman (on the part of the person to whom the 
injunction is addressed). — This, we rejoin, cannot be a 
cause, as it is not something previously established ; while 
in other cases the nimitta is something so established, as 
e.g. 'life' is in the case of a person to whom the following 
injunction is addressed, 'As long as his life lasts he is to 
make the Agnihotra-oblation.' And if, after all, it were 
admitted to be a cause, it would follow that, as the 
intuition of the true nature of Brahman is something 
permanent, the object of the injunction would have to be 
accomplished even subsequently to final release, in the 
same way as the Agnihotra has .to be performed per- 
manently as long as life lasts.— Nor again can, the intuition 
of Brahman's true nature be a result ; for then, being the 
result of an action enjoined, it would be something non- 
permanent, like the heavenly world. — What, in the next 
place, would be the * object to be accomplished ' of the 
injunction? You may not reply 'Brahman'; for as 
Brahman is something permanent it is not something 
that can be realised, and moreover it is not denoted by 
a verbal form (such as denote actions that can be accom- 
plished, as eg. yaga, sacrifice). — -Let it then be said that 
what is to be. realised is Brahman,. in so far as free from the 
world ! — But, we rejoin, even if this be accepted as a thing 
to be realised, it is not the object (vishaya) of the injunc- 
tion — that it cannot be for the second reason just stated— 
but its final result (phala). What moreover is, on this last 
assumption, the thing to be realised — Brahman, or the 
cessation of the apparent world?— Not Brahman; for 
Brahman is something accomplished, and from your 
assumption it would follow that it is not eternal. — .Well 
then, the dissolution of the world 1 — Not so, we reply ; for 
then it would not be Brahman that is realised. — Let it then 
be said that the dissolution of the world only is the object 
of the injunction 1 — This, too, cannot be, we rejoin ; that 
dissolution is the result (phala) and cannot therefore be the 

[48] N 



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1 78 vedAnta-sOtras. 



object of the injunction. For the dissolution of the world 
means Anal release; and that is the result aimed at. 
Moreover, if the dissolution of the world is taken as the 
object of the injunction, that dissolution would follow 
from the injunction, and the injunction would be carried 
out by the dissolution of the world ; and this would be 
a case of vicious mutual dependence. — We further ask — is 
the world, which is to be put an end to, false or real ? — If 
it is false, it is put an end to by knowledge alone, and then 
the injunction is needless. Should you reply to this that 
the injunction puts an end to the world in so far as it gives 
rise to knowledge, we reply that knowledge springs of itself 
from the texts which declare the highest truth: hence 
there is no need of additional injunctions. As knowledge of 
the meaning of those texts sublates the entire false world 
distinct from Brahman, the injunction itself with all its 
adjuncts is seen to be something baseless. — If, on the 
other hand, the world is true, we ask — is the injunction, 
which puts an end to the world, Brahman itself or some- 
thing different from Brahman ? If the former, the world 
cannot exist at all : for what terminates it, viz. Brahman, 
is something eternal ; and the injunction thus being eternal 
itself cannot be accomplished by means of certain actions. — 
Let then the latter alternative be accepted ! — But in that 
case, the niyoga being something which is accomplished 
by a set of performances the function of which it is to put 
an end to the entire world, the performing person himself 
perishes (with the rest of the world), and the niyoga thus 
remains without a substrate. And if everything apart 
from Brahman is put an end to by a performance the 
function of which it is to put an end to the world, there 
remains no result to be effected by the niyoga, consequently 
there is no release. 

Further, the dissolution of the world cannot constitute 
the instrument (karawa) in the action enjoined, because no 
mode of procedure (itikartavyata) can be assigned for the 
instrument of the niyoga, and unless assisted by a mode of 
procedure an instrument cannot operate. — But why is there 
no 'mode of procedure'? — For the following reasons. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 4. 1 79 

A mode of procedure is either of a positive or a negative 
kind. If positive, it may be of two kinds, viz. either such 
as to bring about the instrument or to assist it. Now in 
our case there is no room for either of these alternatives. 
Not for the former; for there exists in our case nothing 
analogous to the stroke of the pestle (which has the 
manifest effect of separating the rice grains from the husks), 
whereby the visible effect of the dissolution of the whole 
world could be brought about. Nor, secondly, is there 
the possibility of anything assisting the instrument, already 
existing independently, to bring about its effect; for 
owing to the existence of such an assisting factor the 
instrument itself, i.e. the cessation of the apparent world, 
cannot be established. Nor must you say that it is the 
cognition of the non-duality of Brahman that brings about 
the means for the dissolution of the world ; for, as we have 
already explained above, this cognition directly brings 
about final Release, which is the same as the dissolution 
of the world, and thus there is nothing left to be effected 
by special means. — And if finally the mode of procedure is 
something purely negative, it can, owing to this its nature, 
neither bring about nor in any way assist the instrumental 
cause. From all this it follows that there is no possibility 
of injunctions having for their object the realisation of 
Brahman, in so far as free from the world. 

Here another prima facie view of the question is set 
forth. — It must be admitted that the Vedanta-texts are 
not means of authoritative knowledge, since they refer to 
Brahman, which is an accomplished thing (not a thing ' to 
be accomplished'); nevertheless Brahman itself is esta- 
blished, viz. by means of those passages which enjoin 
meditation (as something ' to be done '). This is the pur- 
port of texts such as the following: 'The Self is to be 
seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated upon * 
(Br*. Up. II, 4, 5) ; 'The Self which is free from sin must 
be searched out' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man medi- 
tate upon him as the Self (Br*. Up. 1, 4, 7); ' Let a man 
meditate upon the Self as his world' (Br*. Up. 1, 4, 15). — 
These injunctions have meditation for their object, and 

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180 vedAnta-sCtras. 



meditation again is defined by its own object only, so that 
the injunctive word immediately suggests an object of 
meditation ; and as such an object there presents itself, 
the 'Self mentioned in the same sentence. Now there 
arises the question, What are the characteristics of that 
Self? and in reply to it there come in texts such as 'The 
True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'Being only this 
was in the beginning, one without a second.' As these 
texts give the required special information, they stand in 
a supplementary relation to the injunctions, and hence are 
means of right knowledge ; and in this way the purport of 
the Vedanta-texts includes Brahman — as having a definite 
place in meditation which is the object of injunction. Texts 
such as ' One only without a second ' (Kh. Up. VI, a, i) ; 
'That is the true, that is the Self {Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); 
' There is here not any plurality ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 19), teach 
that there is one Reality only, viz. Brahman, and that every- 
thing else is false. And as Perception and the other means 
of proof, as well as that part of Scripture which refers to 
action and is based on the view of plurality, convey the 
notion of plurality, and as there is contradiction between 
plurality and absolute Unity, we form the conclusion that 
the idea of plurality arises through beginningless avidya, 
while absolute Unity alone is real. And thus it is through 
the injunction of meditation on Brahman — which has for 
its result the intuition of Brahman — that man reaches final 
release, i.e. becomes one with Brahman, which consists of 
non-dual intelligence free of all the manifold distinctions 
that spring from Nescience. Nor is this becoming one 
with Brahman to be accomplished by the mere cognition 
of the sense of certain Vedanta-texts ; for this is not observed 
— the fact rather being that the view of plurality persists 
even after the cognition of the sense of those texts — , and, 
moreover, if it were so, the injunction by Scripture of 
hearing, reflecting, &c, would be purposeless. 

To this reasoning the following objection might be raised. 
— We observe that when a man is told that what he is afraid 
of is not a snake, but only a rope, his fear comes to an end ; 
and as bondage is as unreal as the snake imagined in the 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 4. 181 

rope it also admits of being sublated by knowledge, and 
may therefore, apart from all injunction, be put an end to 
by the simple comprehension of the sense of certain texts. 
If final release were to be brought about by injunctions, it 
would follow that it is not eternal — not any more than the 
heavenly world and the like ; while yet its eternity is ad- 
mitted by every one. Acts of religious merit, moreover 
(such as are prescribed by injunctions), can only be the 
causes of certain results in so far as they give rise to a body 
capable of experiencing those results, and thus necessarily 
produce the so-called samsara-state (which is opposed to 
final release, and) which consists in the connexion of the 
soul with some sort of body, high or low. Release, therefore, 
is not something to be brought about by acts of religious 
merit. In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'For the 
soul as long as it is in the body, there is no release from 
pleasure and pain ; when it is free from the body, then 
neither pleasure nor pain touch it' (KA. Up. VIII, ia, 1). 
This passage declares that in the state of release, when 
the soul is freed from the body, it is not touched by either 
pleasure or pain — the effects of acts of religious merit or 
demerit ; and from this it follows- that the disembodied 
state is not to be accomplished by acts of religious merit 
Nor may it be said that, as other special results are accom- 
plished by special injunctions, so the disembodied state is 
to be accomplished by the injunction of meditation ; for 
that state is essentially something not to be effected. Thus 
scriptural texts say, 'The wise man who knows the Self 
as bodiless among the bodies, as persisting among non- 
persisting things, as great and all-pervading ; he does not 
grieve' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 0.2)', 'That person is without breath, 
without internal organ, pure, without contact' (Mu. Up. 
II, 1, a). — Release which is a bodiless state is eternal, and 
cannot therefore be accomplished through meritorious acts. 
In agreement herewith Scripture says, ' That which thou 
seest apart from merit (dharma) and non-merit, from what 
is done and not done, from what exists and what has to be 
accomplished — tell me that ' (Ka. Up. I,% 14)- — Consider 
what follows also. When we speak of something being 



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1 82 vedAnta-s6tras. 



accomplished (effected — sadhya) we mean one of four things, 
viz. its being originated (utpatti), or obtained (prapti), or 
modified (vikriti), or in some way or other (often purely 
ceremonial) made ready or fit (samskriti). Now in neither 
of these four senses can final Release be said to be accom- 
plished. It cannot be originated, for being Brahman itself it 
is eternal. It cannot be attained ; for Brahman, being the 
Self, is something eternally attained. It cannot be modi- 
fied ; for that would imply that like sour milk and similar 
things (which are capable of change) it is non-eternal. 
Nor finally can it be made * ready ' or ' fit.' A thing is 
made ready or fit either by the removal of some imper- 
fection or by the addition of some perfection. Now 
Brahman cannot be freed from any imperfection, for it 
is eternally faultless ; nor can a perfection be added to it, 
for it is absolutely perfect. Nor can it be improved in the 
sense in which we speak of improving a mirror, viz. by 
polishing it ; for as it is absolutely changeless it cannot 
become the object of any action, either of its own or of an 
outside agent. And, again, actions affecting the body, such 
as bathing, do not ' purify ' the Self (as might possibly be 
maintained) but only the organ of Egoity (ahamkartri) 
which is the product of avidya, and connected with the 
body; it is this same aha.mka.rtri also that enjoys the 
fruits springing from any action upon the body. Nor must 
it be said that the Self is the ahamkartri; for the Self 
rather is that which is conscious of the aha.mka.rtri. This 
is the teaching of the mantras : ' One of them eats the sweet 
fruit, the other looks on without eating ' (Mu. Up. Ill, i, i); 
' When he is in union with the body, the senses, and the 
mind, then wise men call him the Enjoyer' (Ka. Up. I, 
3, 4) ; ' The one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, 
the Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling 
in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one, free 
from qualities ' (Svet. Up. VI, 11) ; 'He encircled all, bright, 
bodiless, scatheless, without muscles, pure, untouched by 
evil' (Ira Up. 8), — All these texts distinguish from the 
ahatnkartri due to Nescience, the true Self, absolutely 
perfect and pure, free from all change. Release therefore 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 4. 183 

—which is the Self— cannot be brought about in any 
way. — But, if this is so, what then is the use of the com- 
prehension of the texts ? — It is of use, we reply, in so far as 
it puts an end to the obstacles in the way of Release. This 
scriptural texts declare : ' You indeed are our father, you who 
carry us from our ignorance to the other shore ' (Pra. Up. 
VI, 8); 'I have heard from men like you that he who 
knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, 
help me over this grief of mine' (Kh. Up. VII, 1,3); 'To 
him whose faults had thus been rubbed out Sanatkumara 
showed the other bank of Darkness ' (Kh. Up. VII, 26, a). 
This shows that what is effected by the comprehension of 
the meaning of texts is merely the cessation of impediments 
in the way of Release. This cessation itself, although 
something effected, is of the nature of that kind of non- 
existence which results from the destruction of something 
existent, and as such does not pass away. — Texts such 
as ' He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman ' (Mu. Up. 
Ill, 2, 9); 'Having known him he passes beyond death' 
(Svet. Up. 111,8), declare that Release follows immediately 
on the cognition of Brahman, and thus negative the inter- 
vention of injunctions. — Nor can it be maintained that 
Brahman is related to action in so far as constituting the 
object of the action either of knowledge or of meditation ; 
for scriptural texts deny its being an object in either of 
these senses. Compare 'Different is this from what is 
known, and from what is unknown' (Ke. Up. Ill); 'By 
whom he knows all this, whereby should he know him ? ' 
(Br*. Up. IV, 5, 15) ; ' That do thou know as Brahman, not 
that on which they meditate as being this ' (Ke. Up. IV, 4). 
Nor does this view imply that the sacred texts have no 
object at all ; for it is their object to put an end to the 
view of difference springing from avidya. Scripture does 
not objectivise Brahman in any definite form, but rather 
teaches that its true nature is to be non-object, and thereby 
puts an end to the distinction, fictitiously suggested by 
Nescience, of knowing subjects, acts of knowledge, and 
objects of knowledge. Compare the text ' You should not 
see a seer of seeing, you should not think a thinker of 



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1 84 vedAnta-sAtras. 



thought,' &c. (Bri. Up. Ill, 4, 2). — Nor, again, must it be 
said that, if knowledge alone puts an end to bondage, the 
injunctions of hearing and so on are purposeless ; for their 
function is to cause the origination of the comprehension 
of the texts, in so far as they divert from all other alterna- 
tives the student who is naturally inclined to yield to dis- 
tractions. — Nor, again, can it be maintained that a cessation 
of bondage through mere knowledge is never observed to 
take place; for as bondage is something false (unreal) it 
cannot possibly persist after the rise of knowledge. For 
the same reason it is a mistake to maintain that the cessa- 
tion of bondage takes place only after the death of the 
• body. In order that the fear inspired by the imagined 
snake should come to an end, it is required only that the 
rope should be recognised as what it is, not that a snake 
should be destroyed. If the body were something real, 
its destruction would be necessary ; but being apart from 
Brahman it is unreal. He whose bondage does not come 
to an end, in him true knowledge has not arisen ; this we 
infer from the effect of such knowledge not being observed 
in him; Whether the body persist or not, he who has 
reached true knowledge is released from that very moment. 
— The general conclusion of all this is that, as Release is 
not something to be accomplished by injunctions of medi- 
tation, Brahman is not proved to be something standing in 
a supplementary relation to such injunctions ; but is rather 
proved by (non-injunctory) texts, such as ' Thou art that ' ; 
' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' ; ' This Self is 
Brahman.' 

This view (the holder of the dhyana-vidhi theory rejoins) 
is untenable; since the cessation of bondage cannot possibly 
spring from the mere comprehension of the meaning of 
texts. Even if bondage were something unreal, and there- 
fore capable of sublation by knowledge, yet being some- 
thing direct, immediate, it could not be sublated by the 
indirect comprehension of the sense of texts. When a man 
directly conscious of a snake before him is told by a com- 
petent by-stander that it is not a snake but merely a rope, 
his fear is not dispelled by a mere cognition contrary to 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 4. 185 

that of a snake, and due to the information received ; but 
the information brings about the cessation of his fear in 
that way that it rouses him to an activity aiming at the 
direct perception, by means of his senses, of what the thing 
before him really is. Having at first started back in fear 
of the imagined snake, he now proceeds to ascertain by 
means of ocular perception the true nature of the thing, 
and having accomplished this is freed from fear. It would 
not be correct to say that in this case words (viz. of the 
person informing) produce this perceptional knowledge; 
for words are not a sense-organ, and among the means of 
knowledge it is the sense-organs only that give rise to 
direct knowledge. Nor, again, can it be pleaded that in the 
special case of Vedic texts sentences may give rise to direct 
knowledge, owing to the fact that the person concerned 
has cleansed himself of all imperfection through the per- 
formance of actions not aiming at immediate results, and 
has been withdrawn from all outward objects by hearing, 
reflection, and meditation; for in other cases also, where 
special impediments in the way of knowledge are being 
removed, we never observe that the special means of know- 
ledge, such as the sense-organs and so on, operate outside 
their proper limited sphere.-— Nor, again, can it be main- 
tained that meditation acts as a means helpful towards the 
comprehension of texts ; for this leads to vicious reciprocal 
dependence — when the meaning of the texts has been 
comprehended it becomes the object of meditation ; and 
when meditation has taken place there arises compre- 
hension of the meaning of the texts ! — Nor can it be said 
that meditation and the comprehension of the meaning of 
texts have different objects ; for if this were so the com- 
prehension of the texts could not be a means helpful 
towards meditation: meditation on one thing does not 
give rise to eagerness with regard to another thing! — For 
meditation which consists in uninterrupted remembrance 
of a thing cognised, the cognition of the sense of texts, 
moreover, forms an indispensable prerequisite ; for know- 
ledge of Brahman — the object of meditation — cannot 
originate from any other source. — Nor can it be said that 



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1 86 vedAnta-sOtras. 



that knowledge on which meditation is based is produced 
by one set of texts, while that knowledge which puts an 
end to the world is produced by such texts as 'thou art 
that,' and the like. For, we ask, has the former knowledge 
the same object as the latter, or a different one ? On the 
former alternative we are led to the same vicious reciprocal 
dependence which we noted above ; and on the latter 
alternative it cannot be shown that meditation gives rise 
to eagerness with regard to the latter kind of knowledge. 
Moreover, as meditation presupposes plurality comprising 
an object of meditation, a meditating subject and so on, it 
really cannot in any perceptible way be helpful towards 
the origination of the comprehension of the sense of texts, 
the object of which is the oneness of a Brahman free from 
all plurality : he, therefore, who maintains that Nescience 
comes to an end through the mere comprehension of the 
meaning of texts really implies that the injunctions of 
hearing, reflection, and meditation are purposeless. 

The conclusion that, since direct knowledge cannot spring 
from texts, Nescience is not terminated by the compre- 
hension of the meaning of texts, disposes at the same time 
of the hypothesis of the so-called ' Release in this life ' 
(^-ivanmukti). For what definition, we ask, can be given 
of this * Release in this life ' ? — ' Release of a soul while yet 
joined to a body ' ! — You might as well say, we reply, that 
your mother never had any children ! You have yourself 
proved by scriptural passages that 'bondage' means the 
being joined to a body, and ' release ' being free from a 
body I — Let us then define ^Ivanmukti as the cessation of 
embodiedness, in that sense that a person, while the appear- 
ance of embodiedness persists, is conscious of the unreality 
of that appearance. — But, we rejoin, if the consciousness of 
the unreality of the body puts an end to embodiedness, 
how can you say that ^ivanmukti means release of a soul 
while joined to a body ? On this explanation there remains 
no difference whatsoever between ' Release in this life ' and 
Release after death ; for the latter also can only be defined 
as cessation of the false appearance of embodiedness. — Let 
us then say that a person is '<fivanmukta ' when the appear- 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 4. 187 

ance of embodiedness, although sublated by true know- 
ledge, yet persists in the same way as the appearance of 
the moon being double persists (even after it has been 
recognised as false). — This too we cannot allow. As the 
sublating act of cognition on which Release depends 
extends to everything with the exception of Brahman, it 
sublates the general defect due to causal Nescience, inclusive 
of the particular erroneous appearance of embodiedness : 
the latter being sublated in this way cannot persist. In 
the case of the double moon, on the other hand, the defect 
of vision on which the erroneous appearance depends is 
not the object of the sublatiye art of cognition, i.e. the 
cognition of the oneness of the moon, and it therefore 
remains non-sublated ; hence the false appearance of a 
double moon may persist. — jMoreover, the text ' For him 
there is delay only as long as he is not freed from the 
body; then he will be released ' (KA. Up. VI, 14, 2), teaches 
that he who takes his stand on the knowledge of the Real 
requires for his Release the putting off of the body only : 
the text thus negatives ^ivanmukti. Apastamba also 
rejects the view of ^Jvanmukti, ' Abandoning the Vedas, 
this world and the next, he (the Sawmyasin) is to seek the 
Self. (Some say that) he obtains salvation when he knows 
(the Self). This opinion is contradicted by the .rastras. 
(For) if Salvation were obtained when the Self is known, 
he should not feel any pain even in this world. Hereby 
that which follows is explained' (Dh. Su. II, 9, 13-17). — 
This refutes also the view that Release is obtained through 
mere knowledge. — The conclusion to be drawn from all 
this is that Release, which consists in the cessation of all 
Plurality, cannot take place as long as a man lives. And 
we therefore adhere to our view that Bondage is to be 
terminated only by means of the injunctions of meditation, 
the result of which is direct knowledge of Brahman. Nor 
must this be objected to on the ground that Release, if 
brought about by injunctions, must therefore be something 
non-eternal ; for what is effected is not Release itself, but 
only the cessation of what impedes it. Moreover, the 
injunction does not directly produce the cessation of 



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1 88 vedanta-sOtras. 



Bondage, but only through the mediation of the direct 
cognition of Brahman as consisting of pure knowledge, and 
not connected with a world. It is this knowledge only 
which the injunction' produces. — But how can an injunction 
cause the origination of knowledge? — How, we ask in 
return, can, on your view, works not aiming at some imme- 
diate result cause the origination of knowledge ? — You will 
perhaps reply ' by means of purifying the mind ' (manas) ; 
but this reply may be given by me also. — But (the objector 
resumes) there is a difference. On my view Scripture pro- 
duces knowledge in the mind purified by works ; while on 
your view we must assume that in the purified mind the 
means of knowledge are produced by injunction. — The 
mind itself, we reply, purified by knowledge, constitutes this 
means. — How do you know this ? our opponent questions. 
— How, we ask in return, do you know that the mind is 
purified by works, and that, in the mind so purified of a 
person withdrawn from all other objects by hearing, re- 
flection and meditation, Scripture produces that knowledge 
which destroys bondage? — Through certain texts such as 
the following : ' They seek to know him by sacrifice, by 
gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22) ; ' He is 
to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on ' (Bri. 
Up. II, 4, 5) ; ' He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman' 
(Mu. Up. Ill, a, 9). — Well, we reply, in the same way our 
view — viz. that through the injunction of meditation the 
mind is cleared, and that a clear mind gives rise to direct 
knowledge of Brahman— is confirmed by scriptural texts 
such as 'He is to be heard, to be reflected on, to be 
meditated on ' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5) ; ' He who knows Brahman 
reaches the highest ' (Taitt. Up. II, 1,1); ' He is not appre- 
hended by the eye nor by speech' (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 8) ; 
'But by a pure mind' (?)•; 'He is apprehended by the 
heart, by wisdom, by the mind' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 9). Nor 
can it be said that the text ' not that which they meditate 
upon as this ' (Ke. Up. IV) negatives meditation ; it does 
not forbid meditation on Brahman, but merely declares 
that Brahman is different from the world. The mantra is 
to be explained as follows : ' What men meditate upon as. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 4. 189 

this world, that is not Brahman ; know Brahman to be that 
which is not uttered by speech, but through which speech 
is uttered.' On a different explanation the clause ' know 
that to be Brahman ' would be irrational, and the injunc- 
tions of meditation on the Self would be meaningless. — 
The outcome of all this is that unreal Bondage which 
appears in the form of a plurality of knowing subjects, 
objects of knowledge, &c, is put an end to by the injunc- 
tions of meditation, the fruit of which is direct intuitive 
knowledge of Brahman. 

Nor can we approve of the doctrine held by some that 
there is no contradiction between difference and non- 
difference ; for difference and non-difference cannot co-exist 
in one thing, any more than coldness and heat, or light 
and darkness. — Let us first hear in detail what the holder 
of this so-called bhedabheda view has to say. The 
whole universe of things must be ordered in agreement 
with our cognitions. Now we are conscious of all things 
as different and non-different at the same time : they are 
non-different in their causal and generic aspects, and 
different in so far as viewed as effects and individuals. 
There indeed is a contradiction between light and darkness 
and so on ; for these cannot possibly exist together, and 
they are actually met with in different abodes. Such 
contradictoriness is not, on the other hand, observed in the 
case of cause and effect, and genus and individual ; on the 
contrary we here distinctly apprehend one thing as having 
two aspects — ' this jar is clay,' ' this cow is short-horned.' 
The fact is that experience does not show us anything that 
has one aspect only. Nor can it be said that in these cases 
there is absence of contradiction because as fire consumes 
grass so non-difference absorbs difference; for the same 
thing which exists as clay, or gold, or cow, or horse, &c, 
at the same time exists as jar or diadem, or short-horned 
cow or mare. There is no command of the Lord to the 
effect that one aspect only should belong to each thing, 
non-difference to what is non-different, and difference to 
what is different. — But one aspect only belongs to each 
thing, because it is thus that things are perceived I — On 



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190 vedanta-sOtras. 



the contrary, we reply, things have twofold aspects, just 
because it is thus that they are perceived. No man, how- 
ever wide he may open his eyes, is able to distinguish in 
an object — e. g. a jar or a cow — placed before him which 
part is the clay and which the jar, or which part is the 
generic character of the cow and which the individual cow. 
On the contrary, his thought finds its true expression in the 
following judgments : ' this jar is clay ' ; • this cow is short- 
horned.' Nor can it be maintained that he makes a dis- 
tinction between the cause and genus as objects of the idea 
of persistence, and the effect and individual as objects of 
the idea of discontinuance (difference) ; for as a matter of 
fact there is no perception of these two elements in separa- 
tion. A man may look ever so close at a thing placed 
before him, he will not be able to perceive a difference of 
aspect and to point out 'this is the persisting, general, 
element in the thing, and that the non-persistent, individual, 
element.' Just as an effect and an individual give rise to 
the idea of one thing, so the effect plus cause, and the 
individual plus generic character, also give rise to the idea 
of one thing only. This very circumstance makes it 
possible for us to recognise each individual thing, placed as 
it is among a multitude of things differing in place, time, 
and character. — Each thing thus being cognised as en- 
dowed with a twofold aspect, the theory of cause and 
effect, and generic character and individual, being absolutely 
different, is clearly refuted by perception. 

But, an objection is raised, if on account of grammatical 
co-ordination and the resulting idea of oneness, the judgment 
'this pot is clay' is taken to express the relation of 
difference plus non-difference, we shall have analogously 
to infer from judgments such as ' I am a man,' ' I am 
a divine being ' that the Self and the body also stand in 
the bhedabheda-relation ; the theory of the co-existence of 
difference and non-difference will thus act like a fire which 
a man has lit on his hearth, and which in the end consumes 
the entire house ! — This, we reply, is the baseless idea of 
a person who has not duly considered the true nature of 
co-ordination as establishing the bhedabheda-relation. The 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 4. 191 

correct principle is that all reality is determined by states 
of consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof. 
The imagination, however, of the identity of the Self and 
the body is sublated by all the means of proof which apply 
to the Self : it is in fact no more valid than the imagination 
of the snake in the rope, and does not therefore prove the 
non-difference of the two. The co-ordination, on the other 
hand, which is expressed in the judgment ' the cow is 
short-horned ' is never observed to be refuted in any way, 
and hence establishes the bhedabheda-relation. 

For the same reasons the individual soul (flva) is not 
absolutely different from Brahman, but stands to it in the 
bhedabheda-relation in so far as it is a part (a.msa) of 
Brahman. Its non-difference from Brahman is essential 
(svabhavika) ; its difference is due to limiting adjuncts 
(aupadhika). This we know, in the first place, from those 
scriptural texts which declare non-difference — such as 
' Thou art that ' (Kk. Up. VI) ; * There is no other seer but 
he ' (Br*. Up. Ill, 7, 23) ; ' This Self is Brahman ' (Br*. Up. 
II, 5, 19) ; and the passage from the Brahmasukta in the 
Sawhitopanishad of the Atharya«as which, after having 
said that Brahman is Heaven and Earth, continues, * The 
fishermen are Brahman, the slaves are Brahman, Brahman 
are these gamblers ; man and woman are born from 
Brahman ; women are Brahman and so are men.' And, in 
the second place, from those texts which declare difference : 
'He who, one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of 
many non-eternal intelligent beings' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); 
'There are two unborn, one knowing, the other not- 
knowing; one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9); 
' Being the cause of their connexion with him, through the 
qualities of action and the qualities of the Self, he is seen 
as another ' (Svet. Up. V, 1 2) j ' The Lord of nature and the 
souls, the ruler of the qualities, the cause of the bondage, 
the existence and the release of the sawsara ' (5vet. Up. 
VI, 16) ; 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the 
organs ' (5vet. Up. VI, 9) ; * One of the two eats the sweet 
fruit, without eating the other looks on ' (Svet Up. IV, 6) ; 
'He who dwelling in the Self (Br*. Up. Ill, 7» «) ; 



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192 vedAnta-sOtras. 



' Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows nothing that is 
without, nothing that is within' (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 21); 
' Mounted by the intelligent Self he goes groaning ' (Br*". 
Up. IV, 3, 35); ' Having known him he passes beyond death' 
(.Svet. Up. Ill, 8). — On the ground of these two sets of 
passages the individual and the highest Self must needs be 
assumed to stand in the bhedabheda-relation. And texts 
such as ' He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman ' (Mu. 
Up. Ill, 2, 9), which teach that in the state of Release the 
individual soul enters into Brahman itself ; and again texts 
such as 'But when the Self has become all for him, 
whereby should he see another ' (Br*. Up. II, 4, 13), which 
forbid us to view, in the state of Release, the Lord as 
something different (from the individual soul), show that 
non-difference is essential (while difference is merely 
aupadhika). 

But, an objection is raised, the text 'He reaches all 
desires together in the wise Brahman,' in using the word 
'together' shows that even in the state of Release the 
soul is different from Brahman, and the same view is 
expressed in two of the Sutras, viz. IV, 4, 17 ; 21. — This 
is not so, we reply ; for the text, ' There is no other seer 
but he' (Br*. Up. Ill, 7, 23), and many similar texts 
distinctly negative all plurality in the Self. The Taittirlya- 
text quoted by you means that man reaches Brahman with 
all desires, i.e. Brahman comprising within itself all objects 
of desire ; if it were understood differently, it would follow 
that Brahman holds a subordinate position only. And if 
the Sfltra IV, 4, 17 meant that the released soul is separate 
from Brahman it would follow that it is deficient in lordly 
power ; and if this were so the Sfltra would be in conflict 
with other Sutras such as IV, 4, 1. — For these reasons, 
non-difference is the essential condition ; while the distinc- 
tion of the souls from Brahman and from each other is due 
to their limiting adjuncts, i.e. the internal organ, the sense- 
organs, and the body. Brahman indeed is without parts 
and omnipresent; but through its adjuncts it becomes 
capable of division just as ether is divided by jars and the 
like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a reprehensible 



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I ADHyAvA, I PADA, 4. I93 

mutual dependence — Brahman in so far as divided entering 
into conjunction with its adjuncts, and again the division 
in Brahman being caused by its conjunction with its 
adjuncts; for these adjuncts and Brahman's connexion 
with them are due to action (karman), and the stream of 
action is without a beginning. The limiting adjuncts to 
which a soul is joined spring from the soul as connected 
with previous works, and work again springs from the soul 
as joined to its adjuncts : and as this connexion with works 
and adjuncts is without a beginning in time, no fault can 
be found with our theory. — The non-difference of the souls 
from each other and Brahman is thus essential, while their 
difference is due to the Upadhis. These Upadhis, on the 
other hand, are at the same time essentially non-distinct 
and essentially distinct from each other and Brahman; 
for there are no other Upadhis (to account for their dis- 
tinction if non-essential), and if we admitted such,' we 
should again have to assume further Upadhis, and so on 
in infinitum. We therefore hold that the Upadhis are pro- 
duced, in accordance with the actions of the individual souls, 
as essentially non-different and different from Brahman. 

To this bhedabheda view the Purvapakshin now objects 
on the following grounds: — The whole aggregate of 
Vedanta-texts aims at enjoining meditation on a non- 
dual Brahman whose essence is reality, intelligence, and 
bliss, and thus sets forth the view of non-difference ; while 
on the other hand the karma-section of the Veda, and like- 
wise perception and the other means of knowledge, intimate 
the view of the difference of things. Now, as difference 
and non-difference are contradictory, and as the view of 
difference may be accounted for as resting on beginningless 
Nescience, we conclude that universal non-difference is 
what is real. — The tenet that difference and non-difference 
are not contradictory because both are proved by our con- 
sciousness, cannot be upheld. If one thing has different 
characteristics from another there is distinction (bheda) 
of the two; the contrary condition of things constitutes 
non-distinction (abheda) ; who in his senses then would 
maintain that these two — suchness and non-suchness — can 
[48] o 



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194 vedAnta-sOtras. 



be found together? You have maintained that non- 
difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus, 
and difference to the same viewed as effect and individual ; 
and that, owing to this twofold aspect of things, non- 
difference and difference are not irreconcileable. But that 
this view also is untenable, a presentation of the question 
in definite alternatives will show. Do you mean to say- 
that the difference lies in one aspect of the thing and the 
non-difference in the other? or that difference and non- 
difference belong to the thing possessing two aspects ? — 
On the former alternative the difference belongs to the 
individual and the non-difference to the genus ; and this 
implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect. 
And should you say that the genus and individual together 
constitute one thing only, you abandon the view that it is 
difference of aspect which takes away the contradictoriness 
of difference and non-difference. We have moreover re- 
marked already that difference in characteristics and its 
opposite are absolutely contradictory. — On the second 
alternative we have two aspects of different kind and an 
unknown thing supposed to be the substrate of those 
aspects ; but this assumption of a triad of entities proves 
only their mutual difference of character, not their non- 
difference. Should you say that the non-contradictoriness 
of two aspects constitutes simultaneous difference and non- 
difference in the thing which is their substrate, we ask in 
return — How can two aspects which have a thing for their 
substrate, and thus are different from the thing, introduce 
into that thing a combination of two contradictory attri- 
butes (viz. difference and non-difference)? And much 
less even are they able to do so if they are viewed as 
non-different from the thing which is their substrate. If, 
moreover, the two aspects on the one hand, and the 
thing in which they inhere on the other, be admitted to 
be distinct entities, there will be required a further factor 
to bring about their difference and non-difference, and we 
shall thus be led into a regressus in infinitum. — Nor is it 
a fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of its generic 
character bears the character of unity, in the same way as 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 4. 195 

the admittedly uniform idea of an individual ; for wherever 
a state of consciousness expresses itself in the form ' this is 
such and such ' it implies the distinction of an attribute or 
mode, and that to which the attribute or mode belongs. 
In the case under discussion the genus constitutes the 
mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs : 
the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity. 

For these very reasons the individual soul cannot stand 
to Brahman in the bhedabheda- relation. And as the view 
of non-difference is founded on Scripture, we assume that 
the view of difference rests on beginningless Nescience. — 
But on this view want of knowledge and all the imperfec- 
tions springing therefrom, such as birth, death, &c, would 
cling to Brahman itself, and this would contradict scriptural 
texts such as ' He who is all-knowing ' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) ; 
♦ That Self free from all evil' {Kk. Up. VIII, 1, 5). Not 
so, we reply. For all those imperfections we consider to 
be unreal. On your view on the other hand, which admits 
nothing but Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, all the 
imperfections which spring from contact with those 
adjuncts must really belong to Brahman. For as Brahman 
is without parts, indivisible, the upadhis cannot divide or 
split it so as to connect themselves with a part only ; but 
necessarily connect themselves with Brahman itself and 
produce their effects on it — Here the following explanation 
may possibly be attempted. Brahman determined by an 
upadhi constitutes the individual soul. This soul is of 
atomic size since what determines it, viz. the internal organ, 
is itself of atomic size ; and the limitation itself is without 
beginning. All the imperfections therefore connect them- 
selves only with that special place that is determined by 
the upadhi, and do not affect the highest Brahman which* 
is not limited by the upadhi. — In reply to this we ask — 
Do you mean to say that what constitutes the atomic 
individual soul is a part of Brahman which is limited and 
cut off by the limiting adjunct ; or some particular part of 
Brahman which, without being thereby divided off, is con- 
nected with an atomic upadhi ; or Brahman in its totality 
as connected with an upadhi; or some other intelligent 

O Z 



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196 vedanta-sOtras. 



being connected with an upadhi, or finally the upadhi 
itself? — The first alternative is not possible, because 
Brahman cannot be divided ; it would moreover imply 
that the individual soul has a beginning, for division means 
the making of one thing into two. — On the second alter- 
native it would follow that, as a part of Brahman would be 
connected with the upadhi, all the imperfections due to the 
upadhis would adhere to that part. And further, if the 
upadhi would not possess the power of attracting to itself 
the particular part of Brahman with which it is connected, 
it would follow that when the upadhi moves the part with 
which it is connected would constantly change; in other 
words, bondage and release would take place at every 
moment. If, on the contrary, the upadhi possessed the 
power of attraction, the whole Brahman — as not being 
capable of division — would be attracted and move with the 
upadhi. And should it be said that what is all-pervading 
and without parts cannot be attracted and move, well then 
the upadhi only moves, and we are again met by the 
difficulties stated above. Moreover, if all the upadhis 
were connected with the parts of Brahman viewed as one 
and undivided, all individual souls, being nothing but parts 
of Brahman, would be considered as non-distinct. And 
should it be said that they are not thus cognised as one 
because they are constituted by different parts of Brahman, 
it would follow that as soon as the upadhi of one individual 
soul is moving, the identity of that soul would be lost (for 
it would, in successive moments, be constituted by different 
parts of Brahman). — On the third alternative (the whole 
of) Brahman itself being connected with the upadhi enters 
into the condition of individual soul, and there remains no 
«non-conditioned Brahman. And, moreover, the soul in all 
bodies will then be one only. — On the fourth alternative 
the individual soul is something altogether different from 
Brahman, and the difference of the soul from Brahman 
thus ceases to depend on the upadhis of Brahman. — And 
the fifth alternative means the embracing of the view of 
the ATarvaka (who makes no distinction between soul and 
matter). — The conclusion from all this is that on the 



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i adhyaya, i pAda, 4. 197 

strength of the texts declaring non-difference we must 
admit that all difference is based on Nescience only. 
Hence, Scripture being an authoritative instrument of 
knowledge in so far only as it has for its end action and 
the cessation of action, the Vedanta-texts must be allowed 
to be a valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman's 
nature, in so far as they stand in a supplementary relation 
to the injunctions of meditation. 

This view is finally combated by the Mtmamsaka. Even 
if, he says, we allow the Vedanta-texts to have a purport in so 
far as they are supplementary to injunctions of meditation, 
they cannot be viewed as valid means of knowledge with 
regard to Brahman. Do the texts referring to Brahman, 
we ask, occupy the position of valid means of knowledge 
in so far as they form a syntactic whole with the injunctions 
of meditation, or as independent sentences ? In the former 
case the purport of the syntactic whole is simply to enjoin 
meditation, and it cannot therefore aim at giving instruction 
about Brahman. If, on the other hand, the texts about 
Brahman are separate independent sentences, they cannot 
have the purport of prompting to action and are therefore 
devoid of instructive power. Nor must it be said that 
meditation is a kind of continued remembrance, and as such 
requires to be defined by the object remembered ; and that 
the demand of the injunction of meditation for something 
to be remembered is satisfied by texts such as ' All this is 
that Self,' 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' &c, 
which set forth the nature and attributes of Brahman and — 
forming a syntactic whole with the injunctions — are a valid 
means of knowledge with regard to the existence of the 
matter they convey. For the fact is that the demand on 
the part of an injunction of meditation for an object to be 
remembered may be satisfied even by something unreal (not 
true), as in the case of injunctions such as ' Let him meditate 
upon mind as Brahman '(.O. Up. Ill, 1 8, 1): the real existence 
of the object of meditation is therefore not demanded. — The 
final conclusion arrived at in this purvapaksha is therefore as 
follows. As the Vedanta-texts do not aim at prompting to 
action or the cessation of action ; as, even on the supposition 



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198 vedanta-sCtras. 



of their being supplementary to injunctions of meditation, 
the only thing they effect is to set forth the nature of the 
object of meditation ; and as, even if they are viewed as 
independent sentences, they accomplish the end of man 
(i.e. please, gratify) by knowledge merely — being thus 
comparable to tales with which we soothe children or sick 
persons ; it does not lie within their province to establish 
the reality of an accomplished thing, and hence Scripture 
cannot be viewed as a valid means for the cognition of 
Brahman. 

To this prima facie view the Sutrakara replies, * But this 
on account of connexion.' ' Connexion ' is here to be taken 
in an eminent sense, as ' connexion with the end of man.' 
That Brahman, which is measureless bliss and therefore 
constitutes the highest end of man, is connected with the 
texts as the topic set forth by them, proves Scripture to be 
a valid means for the cognition of Brahman. To maintain 
that the whole body of Vedanta-texts — which teach us that 
Brahman is the highest object to be attained, since it con- 
sists of supreme bliss free of all blemish whatsoever — is 
devoid of all use and purpose merely because it does not 
aim at action or the cessation of action ; is no better than 
to say that a youth of royal descent is of no use because he 
does not belong to a community of low wretches living on 
the flesh of dogs I 

The relation of the different texts is as follows. There 
are individual souls of numberless kinds — gods, Asuras, 
Gandharvas, Siddhas, Vidyadharas, Kinnaras, Kiwpurushas, 
Yakshas, Rakshasas, Pisa£as, men, beasts, birds, creeping 
animals, trees, bushes, creepers, grasses and so on — dis- 
tinguished as male, female, or sexless, and having different 
sources of nourishment and support and different objects of 
enjoyment. Now all these souls are deficient in insight 
into the true nature of the highest reality, their under- 
standings being obscured by Nescience operating in the 
form of beginningless karman ; and hence those texts only 
are fully useful to them which teach that there exists 
a highest Brahman — which the souls in the state of release 
may cognise as non-different from themselves, and which 



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i adhyAya, I pAda, 4- *99 

then, through its own essential nature, qualities, power and 
energies, imparts to those souls bliss infinite and unsur- 
passable. When now the question arises — as it must arise — , 
as to how this Brahman is to be attained, there step in 
certain other Vedanta-texts — such as 'He who knows 
Brahman reaches the highest ' (Br*. Up. II, 1, 1), and ' Let 
a man meditate on the Self as his world ' (Br*. Up. 1, 4, 15) 
— and, by means of terms denoting ' knowing ' and so on, 
enjoin meditation as the means of attaining Brahman. 
(We may illustrate this relation existing between the texts 
setting forth the nature of Brahman and those enjoining 
meditation by two comparisons.) The case is like that of 
a man who has been told • There is a treasure hidden in 
your house.' He learns through this sentence the existence 
of the treasure, is satisfied, and then takes active steps to 
find it and make it his own. — Or take the case of a young 
prince who, intent on some boyish play, leaves his father's 
palace and, losing his way, does not return. The king 
thinks his son is lost ; the boy himself is received by some 
good Brahman who brings him up and teaches him without 
knowing who the boy's father is. When the boy has reached 
his sixteenth year and is accomplished in every way, some 
fully trustworthy person tells him, ' Your father is the ruler 
of all these lands, famous for the possession of all noble 
qualities, wisdom, generosity, kindness, courage, valour and 
so on, and he stays in his capital, longing to see you, his 
lost child. Hearing that his father is alive and a man so 
high and noble, the boy's heart is filled with supreme joy ; 
and the king also, understanding that his son is alive, in 
good health, handsome and well instructed, considers him- 
self to have attained all a man can wish for. He then takes 
steps to recover his son, and finally the two are reunited. 

The assertion again that a statement referring to some 
accomplished thing gratifies men merely by imparting a 
knowledge of the thing, without being a means of knowledge 
with regard to its real existence — so that it would be com- 
parable to the tales we tell to children and sick people—, 
can in no way be upheld. When it is ascertained that 
a thing has no real existence, the mere knowledge or idea 



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200 vedAnta-sOtras. 



of the thing does not gratify. The pleasure which stories 
give to children and sick people is due to the fact that they 
erroneously believe them to be true ; if they were to find 
out that the matter present to their thought is untrue their 
pleasure would come to an end that very moment. And 
thus in the case of the texts of the Upanishads also. If we 
thought that these texts do not mean to intimate the real 
existence of Brahman, the mere idea of Brahman to which 
they give rise would not satisfy us in any way. 

The conclusion therefore is that texts such as * That from 
whence these beings are born ' &c. do convey valid instruc- 
tion as to the existence of Brahman, i. e. that being which is 
the sole cause of the world, is free from all shadow of im- 
perfection, comprises within itself all auspicious qualities, such 
as omniscience and so on, and is of the nature of supreme 
bliss. — Here terminates the adhikaraxa of ' connexion.' 

5. On account of seeing (i. e. thinking) that which 
is not founded on Scripture (i. e. the Pradhana) is 
not (what is taught by the texts referring to the 
origination of the world). 

We have maintained that what is taught by the texts 
relative to the origination of the world is Brahman, om- 
niscient, and so on. The present Sfltra and the following 
Sutras now add that those texts can in no way refer to the 
Pradhana and similar entities which rest on Inference 
only. 

We read in the JTAandogya, ' Being only was this in the 
beginning, one only, without a second. — It thought, may 
I be many, may I grow forth. — It sent forth fire' (VI, a, 
1 ff.) — Here a doubt arises whether the cause of the world 
denoted by the term 'Being' is the Pradhana, assumed by 
others, which rests on Inference, or Brahman as defined 
by us. 

The Pflrvapakshin maintains that the Pradhana is meant 
For he says, the .Oandogya text quoted expresses the 
causal state of what is denoted by the word ' this,' viz. the 
aggregate of things comprising manifold effects, such as 
ether. &c., consisting of the three elements of Goodness, 



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i adhyaya, i pAda, 5. 201 

Passion and Darkness, and forming the sphere of fruition of 
intelligent beings. By the ' effected ' state we understand 
the assuming, on the part of the causal substance, of 
a different condition; whatever therefore constitutes the 
essential nature of a thing in its effected state the same 
constitutes its essential nature in the causal state also. 
Now the effect, in our case, is made up of the three elements 
Goodness, Passion and Darkness ; hence the cause is the 
Pradhana which consists in an equipoise of those three 
elements. And as in this Pradhana all distinctions are 
merged, so that it is pure Being, the ATAandogya text refers 
to it as ' Being, one only, without a second.' This estab- 
lishes the non -difference of effect and cause, and in this 
way the promise that through the knowledge of one thing 
all things are to be known admits of being fulfilled. Other- 
wise, moreover, there would be no analogy between the 
instance of the lump of clay and the things made of it, and 
the matter to be illustrated thereby. The texts speaking 
of the origination of the world therefore intimate the 
Pradhana taught by the great Sage Kapila. And as the 
ATAandogya passage has, owing to the presence of an initial 
statement (pra%»a) and a proving instance, the form of an 
inference, the term * Being ' means just that which rests on 
inference, viz. the Pradhana. . 

This prima facie view is set aside by the words of the 
Sutra. That which does not rest on Scripture, i.e. the 
Pradhana, which rests on Inference only, is not what is 
intimated by the texts referring to the origination of the 
world ; for the text exhibits the root ' Iksh ' — which means 
'to think' — as denoting a special activity on the part of 
what is termed ' Being.' ' It thought, may I be many, may 
I grow forth.' ' Thinking ' cannot possibly belong to the 
non-sentient Pradhana: the term 'Being' can therefore 
denote only the all-knowing highest Person who is capable 
of thought. In agreement with this we find that, in all 
sections which refer to creation, the act of creation is stated 
to be preceded by thought. ' He thought, shall I send 
forth worlds. He sent forth these worlds ' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 
!,»);« He thought he sent forth Prfiwa' (Pr. Up. VI, 3) ; 



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202 VEDANTA-sOtRAS. 



and others. — But it is a rule that as a cause we must 
assume only what corresponds to the effect I — Just so ; 
and what corresponds to the total aggregate of effects is 
the highest Person, all-knowing, all-powerful, whose pur- 
poses realise themselves, who has minds and matter in their 
subtle state for his body. Compare the texts ' His high 
power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force 
and knowledge' (Svet. Up. VI, 8) ; ' He who is all-knowing, 
all-perceiving ' (Mu. Up. I, i, 9); ' He of whom the 
Unevolved is the body, of whom the Imperishable is the 
body, of whom Death is the body, he is the inner Self of all 
things' (Subal.Up.VII). — This point (viz. as to the body of 
the highest Person) will be established under Su. II, 1, 4. 
The present Sutra declares that the texts treating of 
creation cannot refer to the Pradhana; the Sutra just 
mentioned will dispose of objections. Nor is the Purva- 
pakshin right in maintaining that the KAkndogya. passage 
is of the nature of an Inference; for it does not state 
a reason (hetu — which is the essential thing in an Inference). 
The illustrative instance (of the lump of clay) is introduced 
merely in order to convince him who considers it impossible 
that all things should be known through one thing — as 
maintained in the passage ' through which that is heard 
which was not heard,' &c, — that this is possible after all. 
And the mention made in the text of 'seeing' clearly 
shows that there is absolutely no intention of setting forth 
an Inference. 

Let us assume, then, the Purvapakshin resumes, that the 
' seeing ' of the text denotes not ' seeing ' in its primary, 
direct sense — such as belongs to intelligent beings only; 
but ' seeing ' in a secondary, figurative sense which there is 
ascribed to the Pradhana in the same way as in passages 
immediately following it is ascribed to fire and water — 
•the fire saw'; 'the water saw' (Kh. Up. VI, a, 3). The 
transference, to non-existent things, of attributes properly 
belonging to sentient beings is quite common ; as when 
we say * the rice-fields look out for rain ' ; ' the rain 
delighted the seeds.' — This view is set aside by the next 
Sutra. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 7. 203 

6. If it be said that (the word ' seeing ') has a 
secondary (figurative) meaning ; we deny this, on 
account of the word 'Self (being applied to the 
cause of the world). 

The contention that, because, in passages standing close 
by, the word 'seeing' is used in a secondary sense, the 
' seeing ' predicated of the Sat (' Being ') is also to be taken 
in a secondary sense, viz. as denoting (not real thought 
but) a certain condition previous to creation, cannot be 
upheld ; for in other texts met with in the same section 
(viz. « All this has that for its Self; that is the True, that 
is the Self," Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7), that which first had been 
spoken of as Sat is called the 'Self.' The designation 
' Self ' which in this passage is applied to the Sat in 
its relation to the entire world, sentient or non-sentient, is 
in no way appropriate to the Pradhana. We therefore 
conclude that, as the highest Self is the Self of fire, water, 
and earth also, the words fire, &c. (in the passages stating 
that fire, &c. thought) denote the highest Self only. This 
conclusion agrees with the text ' Let me enter into these 
three beings with this living Self, and evolve names and 
forms,' for this text implies that fire, water, &c. possess sub- 
stantial being and definite names only through the highest 
Self having entered into them. The thought ascribed in 
the text to fire, water, &c. hence is thought in the proper 
sense, and the hypothesis that, owing to its connexion with 
these latter texts, the thought predicated of ' Being ' (' it 
thought,' &c.) should be thought in a figurative sense only 
thus lapses altogether. 

The next following Sutra confirms the same view. 

7. Because release is taught of him who takes his 
stand on it. 

.Svetaketu, who is desirous of final release, is at first — 
by means of the clause 'Thou art that' — instructed 
to meditate on himself as having his Self in that 
which truly is ; and thereupon the passage ' for him there is 
delay ' only as long as ' I shall not be released, then I shall 



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204 vedanta-sCtras. 



be united ' teaches that for a man taking his stand upon 
that teaching there will be Release, i.e. union with 
Brahman — which is delayed only until this mortal body 
falls away. If, on the other hand, the text would teach 
that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the general cause, it 
Could not possibly teach that meditation on this Pradhana 
being a man's Self is the means towards his Release. 
A man taking his stand on such meditation rather would 
on death be united with a non-sentient principle, according 
to the scriptural saying, 'According as his thought is in 
this world, so will he be when he has departed this life ' 
(Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1). And Scripture, which is more loving 
than even a thousand parents, cannot possibly teach such 
union with the Non-sentient, which is acknowledged to be 
the cause of all the assaults of suffering in its threefold 
form. Moreover, those who hold the theory of the Pra- 
dhana being the cause of the world do not themselves 
maintain that he who takes his stand upon the Pradhana 
attains final release. 

The Pradhana is not the cause of the world for the 
following reason also: 

8. And because there is no statement of its having 
to be set aside. 

If the word ' Sat ' denoted the Pradhana as the cause of 
the world, we should expect the text to teach that the idea 
of having his Self in that ' Sat ' should be set aside by 
Svetaketu as desirous of Release ; for that idea would be 
contrary to Release. So far from teaching this, the text, 
however, directly inculcates that notion in the words ' Thou 
art that.' — The next Sutra adds a further reason. 

9. And on account of the contradiction of the 
initial statement. 

The Pradhana's being the cause of the world would imply 
a contradiction of the initial statement, viz. that through the 
knowledge of one thing all things are to be known. Now, 
on the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, 
this initial statement can only be fulfilled in that way that 



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I adhyAya, i pAda, io. 205 

through the knowledge of the * Sat,' which is the cause, there 
is known the entire world, whether sentient or non-sentient, 
which constitutes the effect But if the Pradhana were the 
cause, the aggregate of sentient beings could not be known 
through it — for sentient beings are not the effect of a non- 
sentient principle, and there would thus arise a contradic- 
tion. — The next Sutra supplies a further reason. 

10. On account of (the individual soul) going to 
the Self. 

With reference to the ' Sat ' the text says, ' Learn from 
me the true nature of sleep. When a man sleeps here, he 
becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self). 
Therefore they say he sleeps (svapiti), because he is gone 
to his own (sva-apita) ' {Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1). This text desig- 
nates the soul in the state of deep sleep as having entered 
into, or being merged or reabsorbed in, the Self. By 
reabsorption we understand something being merged in 
its cause. Now the non-intelligent Pradhana cannot be 
the cause of the intelligent soul ; hence the soul's going to 
its Self can only mean its going to the, i.e. the universal, 
Self. The term * individual soul' (^iva) denotes Brahman 
in so far as having an intelligent substance for its body, 
Brahman itself constituting the Self; as we learn from the 
text referring to the distinction of names and forms. This 
Brahman, thus called ^iva, is in the state of deep sleep, no 
less than in that of a general pralaya, free from the invest- 
ment of names and forms, and is then designated as mere 
' Being ' (sat) ; as the text says, ' he is then united with the 
Sat.' As the soul is in the state of deep sleep free" from 
the investment of name and form, and invested by the 
intelligent Self only, another text says with reference to 
the same state, * Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows 
nothing that is without, nothing that is within ' (Br*. Up. IV, 
3, 21). Up to the time of final release there arise in the 
soul invested by name and form the cognitions of objects 
different from itself. During deep sleep the souls divest 
themselves of names and forms, and are embraced by the 
' Sat' only ; but in the waking state they again invest them- 



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206 vedanta-sOtras. 



selves with names and forms, and thus bear corresponding 
distinctive names and forms. This, other scriptural texts 
also distinctly declare, ' When a man lying in deep sleep 
sees no dream whatever, he becomes one with that pra«a 
alone; — from that Self the prawas proceed, each towards 
its place* (Ka. Up. Ill, 3); 'Whatever these creatures are 
here, whether a lion or a wolf or a boar or a gnat or a 
mosquito, that they become again ' (KA. Up. VI, 9, 3). — 
Hence the term ' Sat ' denotes the highest Brahman, the 
all-knowing highest Lord, the highest Person. Thus the 
VWttikara also says, 'Then he becomes united with the 
Sat — this is proved by (all creatures) entering into it and 
coming back out of it' And Scripture also says, ' Embraced 
by the intelligent Self.' — The next Sutra gives an additional 
reason. 

1 1 . On account of the uniformity of view. 

' In the beginning the Self was all this ; there was nothing 
else whatsoever thinking. He thought, shall I send forth 
worlds? He sent forth these worlds ' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1) ; 
* From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air fire, 
from fire water, from water earth' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); ' From 
this great Being were breathed forth the Rig-veda.,' &c — 
These and similar texts referring to the creation have all 
the same purport : they all teach us that the Supreme Lord 
is the cause of the world. We therefore conclude that in 
the KA. passage also the Sat, which is said to be the cause 
of the world, is the Supreme Lord. 

12. And because it is directly stated in Scripture, 

The text of the same Upanishad directly declares that the 
being denoted by the word ' Sat ' evolves, as the universal 
Self, names and forms ; is all-knowing, all-powerful, all-, 
embracing ; is free from all evil, &c. ; realises all its wishes 
and purposes. ' Let me, entering those beings with this 
living Self, evolve names and forms ' (KA. Up. VI, 3, a) ; 
' All these creatures have their root in the Sat, they dwell 
in the Sat, they rest in the Sat' (VI, 8, 4) ; 'AH this has 
that for its Self; it is the True, it is the Self (VI, 8, 7) ; 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 12. 207 

4 Whatever there is of him here in the world, and whatever 
is not, all that is contained within it' (VIII, 1, 3); 'In it 
all desires are contained. It is the Self free from sin, 
free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and 
thirst, whose wishes come true, whose purposes come true * 
(VIII, 1, 5). — And analogously other scriptural texts, 'Of 
him there is no master in the world, no ruler ; not even a 
sign of him. He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the 
organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord ' (.Svet. 
Up. VI, 9). • The wise one who, having created all forms 
and having given them names, is calling them by those 
names' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12,7); 'He who entered within is 
the ruler of all beings, the Self of all ' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 24) ; 
' The Self of all, the refuge, the ruler of all, the Lord of 
the souls ' (Mahanar. Up. XI) ; ' Whatsoever is seen or 
heard in this world, inside or outside, pervading that all 
Narayawa abides' (Mahanar. Up. XI); 'He is the inner 
Self of all beings, free from all evil, the divine, the only 
god Narayawa.' — 'These and other texts which declare the 
world to have sprung from the highest Lord, can in no 
way be taken as establishing the Pradhana. Hence it 
remains a settled conclusion that the highest Person, 
Narayawa, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c, is the 
single cause of the whole Universe, and is that Brahman 
which these Sfltras point out as the object of enquiry. 

For the same reasons the theory of a Brahman, which 
is nothing but non-differenced intelligence, must also be 
considered as refuted by the Sutrakara, with the help of 
the scriptural texts quoted ; for those texts prove that the 
Brahman, which forms the object of enquiry, possesses 
attributes such as thinking, and so on, in their real literal 
sense. On the theory, on the other hand, of a Brahman 
that is nothing but distinctionless intelligence even the 
witnessing function of consciousness would be unreal. The 
Sfltras propose as the object of enquiry Brahman as known 
from the Vedanta-texts, and thereupon teach that Brahman 
is intelligent (Su. I, 1, 5 ff.) To be intelligent means to 
possess the quality of intelligence : a being devoid of the 
quality of thought would not differ in nature from the 



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208 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. 



Pradh4na. Further, on the theory of Brahman being mere 
non-differenced light it would be difficult to prove that 
Brahman is self-luminous. For by light we understand 
that particular thing which renders itself, as well as other 
things, capable of becoming the object of ordinary thought 
and speech ; but as a thing devoid of all difference does 
not, of course, possess these two characteristics it follows 
that it is as devoid of intelligence as a pot may be. — Let 
it then be assumed that although a thing devoid of all 
distinction does not actually possess these characteristics, 
yet it has the potentiality of possessing them I — But if it 
possesses the attribute of potentiality, it is clear that you 
abandon your entire theory of a substance devoid of all 
distinction ! — Let us then admit, on the authority of Scrip- 
ture, that the universal substance possesses this one dis- 
tinguishing attribute of self-luminousness. — Well, in that 
case you must of course admit, on the same authority, all 
those other qualities also which Scripture vouches for, such 
as all-knowingness, the possession of all powers, and so 
on. — Moreover, potentiality means capability to produce 
certain special effects, and hence can be determined on the 
ground of those special effects only. But if there are no 
means of knowing these particular effects, there are also no 
means of cognising potentiality. — And those who hold the 
theory of a substance devoid of all difference, have not 
even means of proof for their substance ; for as we have 
shown before, Perception, Inference, Scripture, and one'9 
own consciousness, are all alike in so far as having for 
their objects things marked by difference. — It therefore 
remains a settled conclusion that the Brahman to be 
known is nothing else but the highest Person capable of 
the thought ' of becoming many ' by manifesting himself 
in a world comprising manifold sentient and non-sentient 
creatures. — Here terminates the adhikarawa of ' seeing.' 

So far the Sutras have declared that the Brahman which 
forms the object of enquiry is different from the non- 
intelligent Pradhana, which is merely an object of fruition 
for intelligent beings. They now proceed to show that 
Brahman — which is antagonistic to all evil and constituted 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 13. 209 

by supreme bliss — is different from the individual soul, 
which is subject to karman, whether that soul be in its 
purified state or in the impure state that is due to its 
immersion in the ocean of manifold and endless sufferings, 
springing from the soul's contact with Prakn'ti (Pradhana). 

13. The Self consisting of Bliss (is the highest 
Self) on account of multiplication. 

We read in the text of the Taittirlyas, ' Different from 
this Self, which consists of Understanding, is the other 
inner Self which consists of bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 5). — Here 
the doubt arises whether the Self consisting of bliss be the 
highest Self, which is different from the inner Self subject 
to bondage and release, and termed *^!va ' (i. e. living self 
or individual soul), or whether it be that very inner Self, 
i.e. the giva. — It is that inner Self, the Purvapakshin 
contends. For the text says 'of that this, i. e. the Self 
consisting of bliss, is the jrarira Self; and jarira means 
that which is joined to a body, in other words, the so-called 
giva.. — But, an objection is raised, the text enumerates the 
different Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of bliss, 
to the end that man may obtain the bliss of Brahman, 
which was, at the outset, stated to be the cause of the 
world (II, 1), and in the end teaches that the Self con- 
sisting of bliss is the cause of the world (II, 6). And that 
the cause of the world is the alUknowing Lord, since 
Scripture says of him that ' he thought,' we have already 
explained. — That cause of the world, the Purvapakshin re- 
joins, is not different from the ^iva; for in the text of 
the ATAandogyas that Being which first is described as 
the creator of the world is exhibited, in two passages, in 
co-ordination with the ^Iva (' having entered into them with 
that living Self and « Thou art that, O Svetaketu '). And 
the purport of co-ordination is to express oneness of being, 
as when we say, • This person here is that Devadatta we 
knew before.' And creation preceded by thought can very 
well be ascribed to an intelligent giva. The connexion of 
the whole Taittiriya-text then is as follows. In the intro- 
ductory clause, ' He who knows Brahman attains the 
[48] P 



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2 1 o vedAnta-sOtras. 



Highest,' the true nature of the giva, free from all con- 
nexion with matter, is referred to as something to be 
attained; and of this nature a definition is given m the 
words, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.' 
The attainment of the giv* in this form is what consti- 
tutes Release, in agreement with the text, ' So long as he is 
in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain ; but 
when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor 
pain touches him ' (Kk. Up. VIII, ia, i). This true nature 
of the Self, free from all avidya, which the text begins by 
presenting as an object to be attained, is thereupon declared 
to be the Self consisting of bliss. In order to lead up to 
this — just as a man points out to another the moon by first 
pointing out the branch of a tree near which the moon is to 
be seen —the text at first refers to the body (' Man consists 
of food ') ; next to the vital breath with its five modifica- 
tions which is within the body and supports it ; then to the 
manas within the vital breath ; then to the buddhi within 
the manas — ' the Self consisting of breath ' ; ' the Self con- 
sisting of mind ' (manas) ; ' the Self consisting of under- 
standing ' (vi^wana). Having thus gradually led up to the 
giva, the text finally points out the latter, which is the 
innermost of all ('Different from that is the inner Self 
which consists of bliss '), and thus completes the series of 
Selfs one inside the other. We hence conclude that the Self 
consisting of bliss is that same ^iva-self which was at the 
outset pointed out as the Brahman to be attained. — But the 
clause immediately following, 'Brahman is the tail, the 
support (of the Self of bliss *), indicates that Brahman is 
something different from the Self of bliss ! — By no means 
(the Purvapakshin rejoins). Brahman is, owing to its 
different characteristics, there compared to an animal body, 
and head, wings, and tail are ascribed to it, just as in a pre- 
ceding clause the body consisting of food had also been 
imagined as having head, wings, and tail — these members 
not being something different from the body, but the body 
itself. Joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss, are imagined 
as the members, non-different from it, of Brahman consisting 
•f bliss, and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 13. 211 

Brahman is said to be the tail or support If Brahman 
were something different from the Self consisting of bliss, 
the text would have continued, ' Different from this Self 
consisting of bliss is the other inner Self — Brahman.' But 
there is no such continuation. The connexion of the 
different clauses stands as follows: After Brahman has 
been introduced as the topic of the section (' He who knows 
Brahman attains the Highest '), and defined as different in 
nature from everything else (' The True, knowledge '), the 
text designates it by the term ' Self,' &c. (' From that Self 
sprang ether'), and then, in order to make it clear that 
Brahman is the innermost Self of all, enumerates the prana- 
maya and so on — designating them in succession as more and 
more inward Selfs — , and finally leads up to the anandamaya 
as the innermost Self ('Different from this,&c., is the Self con- 
sisting of bliss '). From all which it appears that the term 
' Self up to the end denotes the Brahman mentioned at the 
beginning. — But, in immediate continuation of the clause, 
' Brahman is the tail, the support,' the text exhibits the fol- 
lowing .rloka : ' Non-existing becomes he who views Brahman 
as non-existing ; who knows Brahman as existing, him we 
know as himself existing.' Here the existence and non-exis- 
tence of the Self are declared to depend on the knowledge 
and non-knowledge of Brahman, not of the Self consisting of 
bliss. Now no doubt can possibly arise as to the existence 
or non-existence of this latter Self, which, in the form of 
joy, satisfaction, &c, is known to every one. Hence the 
sloka cannot refer to that Self, and hence Brahman is 
different from that Self. — This objection, the Purvapakshin 
rejoins, is unfounded. In the earlier parts of the chapter 
we have corresponding jlokas, each of them following on 
a preceding clause that refers to the tail or support of a 
particular Self: in the case, e. g. of the Self consisting of 
food, we read, ' This is the tail, the support,' and then comes 
the jloka, 'From food are produced all creatures,' &c. 
Now it is evident that all these jlokas are meant to set 
forth not only what had been called ' tail,' but the entire 
Self concerned (Self of food, Self of breath, &c.) ; and from 
this it follows that also the doka, ' Non-existing becomes 

P 2 



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212 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. 



he,' does not refer to the ' tail ' only as something other 
than the Self of bliss, but to the entire Self of bliss. 
And there may very well be a doubt with regard to the 
knowledge or non-knowledge of the existence of that Self 
consisting of unlimited bliss. On your view also the 
circumstance of Brahman which forms the tail not being 
known is due to its being of the nature of limitless bliss. 
And should it be said that the Self of bliss cannot be 
Brahman because Brahman does not possess a head 
and other members; the answer is that Brahman also 
does not possess the quality of being a tail or support, 
and that hence Brahman cannot be a tail. — Let it then be 
said that the expression, ' Brahman is the tail,' is merely 
figurative, in so far as Brahman is the substrate of all things 
imagined through avidya I — But, the Purvapakshin rejoins, 
we may as well assume that the ascription to Brahman of 
joy, as its head and so on, is also merely figurative, meant to 
illustrate the nature of Brahman, i.e. the Self of bliss as free 
from all pain. To speak of Brahman or the Self as consisting 
of bliss has thus the purpose of separating from all pain and 
grief that which in a preceding clause ('The True, knowledge, 
the Infinite is Brahman ') had already been separated from 
all changeful material things. As applied to Brahman (or 
the Self), whose nature is nothing but absolute bliss, the term 
' anandamaya ' therefore has to be interpreted as meaning 
nothing more than ' ananda ' ; j ust as praxtamaya means pra»a. 

The outcome of all this is that the term ' anandamaya ' 
denotes the true essential nature — which is nothing but 
absolute uniform bliss — of the gtva. that appears as dis- 
tinguished by all the manifold individualising forms which 
are the figments of Nescience. The Self of bliss is the 
giva. or pratyag-atman, i. e. the individual soul. 

Against this prima facie view the Sutrakara contends 
that the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self 'on 
account of multiplication.' — The section which begins with 
the words, ' This is an examination of bliss,' and terminates 
with the jloka, ' from whence all speech turns back ' (Taitt. 
Up. II, 8), arrives at bliss, supreme and not to be surpassed, 
by successively multiplying inferior stages of bliss by a 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 13. 213 

hundred ; now such supreme bliss cannot possibly belong 
to the individual soul which enjoys only a small share of 
very limited happiness, mixed with endless pain and grief; 
and therefore clearly indicates, as its abode, the highest 
Self, which differs from all other Selfs in so far as being 
radically opposed to all evil and of an unmixed blessed 
nature. The text says, ' Different from this Self consisting 
of understanding (v^wana) there is the inner Self consist- 
ing of bliss.' Now that which consists of understanding 
(vi^iftana) is the individual soul (giva), not the internal 
organ (buddhi) only ; for the formative element, ' maya,' 
('consisting of; in vi^wanamaya) indicates a difference 
(between vigtfana and vi/wanamaya). The term ' prawa- 
maya ' (' consisting of breath *) we explain to mean ' prawa ' 
only, because no other explanation is possible; but as 
vi^anamaya may be explained as giva, we have no right 
to neglect ' maya ' as unmeaning. And this interpretation 
is quite suitable, as the soul in the states of bondage and 
release alike is a ' knowing ' subject. That moreover even 
in ' pranamaya,' and so on, the affix ' maya ' may be taken 
as having a meaning will be shown further on. — But how 
is it then that in the rioka which refers to the v^ianamaya, 
' Understanding (vgwana) performs the sacrifice,' the term 
* vign&na. ' only is used ? — The essential nature, we reply, 
of the knowing subject is suitably called ' knowledge,' and 
this term is transferred to the knowing subject itself which 
is defined as possessing that nature. For we generally 
see that words which denote attributes defining the essen- 
tial nature of a thing also convey the notion of the essential 
nature of the thing itself. This also accounts for the fact 
that the jloka (' Vjjtfana performs the sacrifice, it performs 
all sacred acts ') speaks of vjgri&na as being the agent in 
sacrifices and so on ; the buddhi alone could not be called 
an agent For this reason the text does not ascribe agency 
to the other Selfs (the pranamaya and so on) which are 
mentioned before the vjgtfanamaya; for they are non- 
intelligent instruments of intelligence, and the latter only 
can be an agent With the same view the text further on 
(II, 6), distinguishing the intelligent and the non-intelligent 



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214 vedAmta-sOtras. 



by means of their different characteristic attributes, says in 
the end ' knowledge and non-knowledge,' meaning thereby 
that which possesses the attribute of knowledge and that 
which does not An analogous case is met with in the 
so-called antaryami-brahmawa (Br*. Up. Ill, 7). There the 
Ka/tvas read, ' He who dwells in knowledge ' (v^fwana; III, 
7, 1 6), but instead of this the Mldhyandinas read ' he who 
dwells in the Self/ and so make clear that what the KAxrvas 
designate as ' knowledge ' really is the knowing Self. — 
That the word v^wana, although denoting the knowing 
Self, yet has a neuter termination, is meant to denote it as 
something substantial. We hence conclude that he who is 
different from the Self consisting of knowledge, i.e. the 
individual Self, is the highest Self which consists of bliss. 

It is true indeed that the jloka, ' Knowledge performs the 
sacrifice,' directly mentions knowledge only, not the knowing 
Self; all the same we have to understand that what is 
meant is the latter, who is referred to in the clause, 'different 
from this is the inner Self which consists of knowledge.' 
This conclusion is supported by the sloka referring to the 
Self which consists of food (II, 2); for that jioka refers to 
food only, ' From food are produced all creatures,' &c, 
all the same the preceding clause ' this man consists of the 
essence of food ' does not refer to food, but to an effect of 
it which consists of food. Considering all this the Sutra- 
kara himself in a subsequent Sutra (1, 1, 18) bases his view 
on the declaration, in the scriptural text, of difference. — 
We now turn to the assertion, made by die Purvapakshin, 
that the cause of the world is not different from the indivi- 
dual soul because in two ATAandogya passages it is exhibited 
in co-ordination with the latter (' having entered into them 
with this living Self,' 'Thou art that ') ; and that hence the 
introductory clause of the Taitt passage (' He who knows 
Brahman reaches the Highest') refers to the individual 
soul — which further on is called ' consisting of bliss,' because 
it is free from all that is not pleasure. — This view cannot 
be upheld ; for although the individual soul is intelligent, it 
is incapable of producing through its volition this infinite 
and wonderful Universe — a process described in texts such 



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i adhvAya, i pada, 13. 315 

as * It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. — It sent 
forth fire,' &c That even the released soul is unequal to 
such ' world business ' as creation, two later Sutras will 
expressly declare. But, if you deny that Brahman, the 
cause of the world, is identical with the individual soul, how 
then do you account for the co-ordination in which the two 
appear in the ATiandogya texts ? — How, we ask in return, 
can Brahman, the cause of all, free from all shadow of 
imperfection, omniscient, omnipotent, &c. &c, be one with 
the individual soul, all whose activities— whether it be 
thinking, or winking of an eye, or anything else — depend 
on karman, which implies endless suffering of various kind ? 
— If you reply that this is possible if one of two things 
is unreal, we ask — which then do you mean to be unreal ? 
Brahman'* connexion with what is evil ? — or its essential 
nature, owing to which it is absolutely good and antagonistic 
to all evil ? — You will perhaps reply that, owing to the fact 
of Brahman, which is absolutely good and antagonistic to 
all evil, being the substrate of beginningless Nescience, 
there presents itself the false appearance of its being con- 
nected with evil. But there you maintain what is contra- 
dictory. On the one side there is Brahman's absolute 
perfection and antagonism to all evil; on the other it is 
the substrate of Nescience, and thereby the substrate of 
a false appearance which is involved in endless pain ; for to 
be connected with evil means to be the substrate of Ne- 
science and the appearance of suffering which is produced 
thereby. Now it is a contradiction to say that Brahman 
is connected with all this and at the same time antagonistic 
to it ! — Nor can we allow you to say that there is no real 
contradiction because that appearance is something false. 
For whatever is false belongs to that group of things con- 
trary to man's true interest, for the destruction of which 
the Vedinta-texts are studied. To be connected with what 
is hurtful to man, and to be absolutely perfect and antago- 
nistic to all evil is self-contradictory. — But, our adversary 
now rejoins, what after all are we to do ? The holy text at 
first clearly promises that through the cognition of one 
thing everything will be known (' by which that which is 



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2 1 6 vedAnta-sOtr as. 



not heard is heard,' &c Kh. Up. VI, i, 3) ; thereupon 
declares that Brahman is the sole cause of the world 
('Being only this was in the beginning'), and possesses 
exalted qualities such as the power of realising its inten- 
tions (' it thought, may I be many ') ; and then finally, by 
means of the co-ordination, ' Thou art that,' intimates that 
Brahman is one with the individual soul, which we know to 
be subject to endless suffering ! Nothing therefore is left 
to us but the hypothesis that Brahman is the substrate of 
Nescience and all that springs from it I — Not even for the 
purpose, we reply, of making sense of Scripture may we 
assume what in itself is senseless and contradictory 1 — Let 
us then say that Brahman's connexion with evil is real, 
and its absolute perfection unreal ! — Scripture, we reply, 
aims at comforting the soul afflicted by the assaults of 
threefold pain, and now, according to you, it teaches that the 
assaults of suffering are real, while its essential perfection 
and happiness are unreal figments, due to error ! This is 
excellent comfort indeed t — To avoid these difficulties let us 
then assume that both aspects of Brahman — viz. on the 
one hand its entering into the distressful condition of indi- 
vidual souls other than non-differenced intelligence, and on 
the other its being the cause of the world, endowed with 
all perfections, &c — are alike unreal ! — Well, we reply, 
we do not exactly admire the depth of your insight into 
the connected meaning of texts. The promise that through 
the knowledge of one thing everything will be known can 
certainly not be fulfilled if everything is false, for in that 
case there exists nothing that could be known. In so far 
as the cognition of one thing has something real for its 
object, and the cognition of all things is of the same kind, 
and moreover is comprised in the cognition of one thing ; 
in so far it can be said that everything is known through 
one thing being known. Through the cognition of the real 
shell we do not cognise the unreal silver of which the shell 
is the substrate. — Well, our adversary resumes, let it then 
be said that the meaning of the declaration that through 
the cognition of one thing everything is to be known is 
that only non-differenced Being is real, while everything 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 13. 217 

else is unreal. — If this were so, we rejoin, the text would 
not say, ' by which the non-heard is heard — , the non-known 
is known ' ; for the meaning of this is, 'by which when heard 
and known ' (not ' known as false ') ' the non-heard is heard,' 
&c. Moreover, if the meaning were that only the one non- 
differenced substance understood to be the cause of the 
world is real, the illustrative instance, ' As by one lump of 
clay everything made of clay is known,' would not be suit- 
able ; for what is meant there is that through the cognition 
of the (real) lump of clay its (real) effects are known. Nor 
must you say that in the illustrative instance also the 
unreality of the effect is set forth ; for as the person to be 
informed is not in any way convinced at the outset that 
things made of clay are unreal, like the snake imagined in 
the rope, it is impossible that such unreality should be 
referred to as if it were something well known (and the 
clause, 'as by one lump of clay,' &c, undoubtedly does 
refer to something well known), in order to render the 
initial assertion plausible. And we are not aware of any 
means of knowledge — assisted or non-assisted by ratio- 
cination — that would prove the non-reality of things 
effected, previous to the cognition produced by texts such 
as 'That art thou'; a point which will be discussed at 
length under II, 1. — ' Being only this was in the beginning, 
one, without a second ' ; ' it thought, may I be many, may 
I grow forth ; it sent forth fire ' ; * Let me now enter those 
three beings with this living Self and evolve names and 
forms ' ; 'AH these creatures, my son, have their root in the 
True, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True,' &c. ; 
these passages declare in succession that that which really 
is is the Self of this world ; that previous to creation there 
is no distinction of names and forms ; that for the creation 
of the world Brahman, termed ' the True ' (or ' Real '), 
requires no other operative cause but itself; that at the 
time of creation it forms a resolution, possible to itself 
only, of making itself manifold in the form of endless 
movable and immovable things ; that in accordance with 
this resolution there takes place a creation, proceeding 
in a particular order, of an infinite number of manifold 



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2 1 8 vedAnta-sOtras. 



beings ; that by Brahman entering into all non-intelligent 
beings with the living soul — which has its Self in Brahman 
— there takes place an evolution, infinite in extent, of all 
their particular names and forms ; and that everything 
different from Brahman has its root and abode in that, is 
moved by that, lives by that, rests on that. All the 
different points — to be learned from Scripture only — which 
are here set forth agree with what numerous other scriptural 
texts teach about Brahman, viz. that it is free from all evil, 
devoid of all imperfection, .all-knowing, all-powerful ; that 
all its wishes and purposes realise themselves; that it is 
the cause of all bliss ; that it enjoys bliss not to be sur- 
passed. To maintain then that the word 'that,' which 
refers back to the Brahman mentioned before, i.e. a 
Brahman possessing infinite attributes, should aim at con- 
veying instruction about a substance devoid of all attributes, 
is as unmeaning as the incoherent talk of a madman. 

The word 'thou* again denotes the individual soul as 
distinguished by its implication in the course of transmigra- 
tory existence, and the proper sense of this term also would 
have to be abandoned if it were meant to suggest a sub- 
stance devoid of all distinctions. And that, in the case of 
a being consisting of non-differenced light, obscuration by 
Nescience would be tantamount to complete destruction, 
we have already explained above. — All this being thus, 
your interpretation would involve that the proper meaning 
of the two words ' that ' and ' thou ' — which refer to one 
thing — would have to be abandoned, and both words would 
have to be taken in an implied sense only. 

Against this the Purvapakshin now may argue as follows. 
Several words which are applied to one thing are meant to 
express one sense, and as this is not possible in so far as 
the words connote different attributes, this part of their 
connotation becomes inoperative, and they denote only the 
unity of one substance ; implication (lakshawa), therefore, 
does not take place. When we say ' blue (is) (the) lotus ' 
we employ two words with the intention of expressing the 
unity of one thing, and hence do not aim at expressing 
a duality of attributes, viz. the quality of blueness and the 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 13. 219 

generic character of a lotus. If this latter point was aimed 
at, it would follow that the sentence would convey the 
oneness of the two aspects of the thing, viz. its being blue 
and its being a lotus ; but this is not possible, for the 
thing (denoted by the two terms) is not characterised by 
(the denotation of) the word 'lotus,' in so far as itself 
characterised by blueness ; for this would imply a re- 
ciprocal inherence (samavaya) of class-characteristics and 
quality 1 . What the co-ordination of the two words conveys 
is, therefore, only the oneness of a substance characterised 
by the quality of blueness, and at the same time by the 
class attributes of a lotus. In the same way, when we say 
' this (person is) that Devadatta ' the co-ordination of the 
words cannot possibly mean that Devadatta in so far as 
distinguished by his connexion with a past time and a 
distant place is one with Devadatta in so far as dis- 
tinguished by his connexion with the present time and 
a near place ; what it means to express is only that there 
is oneness on the part of a personal substance — which sub- 
stance is characterised by connexion with both places and 
moments of time. It is true indeed that when we at first 
hear the one word ' blue ' we form the idea of the attribute 
of blueness, while, after having apprehended the relation of 
coordination (expressed in ' blue is the lotus '), this idea 
no longer presents itself, for this would imply a contra- 
diction ; but all the same ' implication ' does not take place. 
The essence of co-ordination consists, in all cases, therein 
that it suppresses the distinguishing elements in the words 
co-ordinated. And as thus our explanation cannot be 
charged with ' implication,' it cannot be objected to. 

All this, we rejoin, is unfounded. What the words in all 
sentences whatsoever aim at conveying is only a particular 
connexion of the things known to be denoted by those 
words. Words such as 'blue/ standing in co-ordination 
with others, express that some matter possessing the attri- 

1 I. e. we should not in that case be able to decide whether the 
quality (i. e., here, the blueness) inheres in the class (i. c, here, the 
), or vice versft. 



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220 vedAnta-sOtras. 



bute of blueness, &c, as known from the ordinary use of 
language, is connected with some other matter. When, e. g., 
somebody says ' bring the blue lotus,' a thing is brought 
which possesses the attribute of blueness. And when we 
are told that 'a herd of elephants excited with passion 
lives in the Vindhya-forest,' we again understand that what 
is meant is something possessing several attributes denoted 
by several words. Analogously we have to understand, as 
the thing intimated by Vedanta-texts in the form of co- 
ordination, Brahman as possessing such and such attributes. 
— It is an error to assume that, where a sentence aims at 
setting forth attributes, one attribute is to be taken as 
qualifying the thing in so far as qualified by another 
attribute ; the case rather is that the thing itself is equally 
qualified by all attributes. For co-ordination means the 
application, to one thing, of several words having different 
reasons of application ; and the effect of co-ordination is 
that one and the same thing, because being connected — 
positively or negatively — with some attribute other than 
that which is conveyed by one word, is also known through 
other words. As e. g. when it is said that * Devadatta (is) 
dark-complexioned, young, reddish-eyed, not stupid, not 
poor, of irreproachable character,' Where two coordinate 
words express two attributes which cannot exist combined 
in one thing, one of the two words is to be taken in a 
secondary sense, while the other retains its primary mean- 
ing, as e. g. in the case of the sentence, 'The Vahlka man is 
an ox.' But in the case of the ' blue lotus ' and the like, 
where there is nothing contradictory in the connexion of 
the two attributes with one thing, co-ordination expresses 
the fact of one thing being characterised by two attributes. 
— Possibly our opponent will here make the following 
remark. A thing in so far as defined by its correlation to 
some one attribute is something different from the thing in 
so far as denned by its correlation to some second attri- 
bute ; hence, even if there is equality of case affixes (as in 
' nilam utpalam'), the words co-ordinated are incapable of 
expressing oneness, and cannot, therefore, express the one- 
ness of a thing qualified by several attributes; not any 



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i adhyAva, ipAda, 13. 221 

more than the juxtaposition of two words such as 'jar ' and 
'cloth' — both having the same case-ending — can prove 
that these two things are one. A statement of co-ordination, 
therefore, rather aims at expressing the oneness of a thing 
in that way that it presents to the mind the essential nature 
of the thing by means of (words denoting) its attributes. — 
This would be so, we reply, if it were only the fact of 
a thing's standing in correlation to two attributes that is 
in the way of its unity. But this is not the case ; for 
what stands in the way of such unity is the fact of there 
being several attributes which are not capable of being 
combined in one thing. Such incapability is, in the case of 
the generic character of a jar and that of a piece of cloth, 
proved by other means of knowledge; but there is no 
contradiction between a thing being blue and its being a 
lotus ; not any more than there is between a man and the 
stick or the earrings he wears, or than there is between the 
colour, taste, smell, &c, of one and the same thing. Not 
only is there no contradiction, but it is this very fact of 
one thing possessing two attributes which makes possible 
co-ordination — the essence of which is that, owing to a 
difference of causes of application, several words express 
one and the same thing. For if there were nothing but 
essential unity of being, what reason would there be for 
the employment of several words ? If the purport of the 
attributes were, not to intimate their connexion with the 
thing, but merely to suggest the thing itself, one attribute 
would suffice for such suggestion, and anything further 
would be meaningless. If, on the other hand, it were 
assumed that the use of a further ' suggestive ' attribute is 
to bring out a difference of aspect in the thing suggested, 
such difference of aspect would imply differentiation in the 
thing (which you maintain to be free from all difference). — . 
Nor is there any shade even of ' implication ' in the judg- 
ment, ' This person is that Devadatta ' ; for there is abso- 
lutely no contradiction between the past Devadatta, who 
was connected with some distant place, and the present 
Devadatta, who is connected with the place before us. For 
this very reason those who maintain the permanency of 



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222 VEdAnTA-sOtRAS. 



things prove the oneness of a thing related to two moments 
of time on the basis of the judgment of recognition (' this 
is that ') ; if there really were a contradiction between the 
two representations it would follow that all things are (not 
permanent but) momentary only- The fact is that the 
contradiction involved in one thing being connected with 
two places is removed by the difference of the correlative 
moments of time. We therefore hold to the conclusion 
that co-ordinated words denote one thing qualified by the 
possession of several attributes. 

For this very reason the Vedic passage, * He buys the 
Soma by means of a cow one year old, of a tawny colour, 
with reddish-brown eyes'(arurtayt,ekahayanya,pingakshya), 
must be understood to enjoin that the purchase is to be 
effected by means of a cow one year old, possessing the 
attributes of tawny colour, &c. This point is discussed 
Pft. Ml Su. Ill, i, i a. — The Purvapakshin there argues as 
follows : We admit that the word ' aru«aya ' (' by means of 
a tawny one ') denotes the quality of tawniness inclusive of 
the thing possessing that quality ; for qualities as well as 
generic character exist only in so far as being modes of 
substances. But it is not possible to restrict tawny colour 
to connexion with a cow one year old, for the injunction of 
two different things (which would result from such restric- 
tion ; and which would necessitate the sentence to be 
construed as — ) 'He buys by means of a cow one year old, 
and that a red one ' is not permissible 1 . We must therefore 
break up the sentence into two, one of which is constituted 
by the one word 'aruwaya' — this word expressing that 
tawny colour extends equally to all the substances enjoined 
in that section (as instrumental towards the end of the 
sacrifice). And the use of the feminine case-termination 
of the word is merely meant to suggest a special instance 
(viz. the cow) of all the things, of whatever gender, which 
are enjoined in that section. Tawniness must not therefore 

1 For it would imply so-called vakyabheda, 'spHt of the 
sentence,' which arises when one injunctory clause is made to 
enjoin two different things. 



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i adhvAya, i pAdia, 13. 223 

be restricted to the cow one year old only. — Of this 
purvapaksha the Sutra disposes in the following words: 
' There being oneness of sense, and hence connexion of sub- 
stance and quality with one action, there is restriction.' — 
The fact that the two words 'aruwaya' and 'ekahayanya' 
— which denote a substance, viz. a cow one year old, distin- 
guished by the quality of possessing tawny colour — stand 
in co-ordination establishes that they have one sense ; and 
as the substance, viz. the cow, and the quality, viz. tawny 
colour — which the word ' aruwaya ' denotes as standing in 
the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distin- 
guished thereby — can thus, without any contradiction, be 
connected with the one action called ' the buying of the 
Soma,' tawny colour is restricted to the cow one year old 
which is instrumental with regard to the purchase. If the 
connexion of tawniness with the action of buying were to 
be determined from syntactical connexion — in the same way 
as there is made out the connexion of the cow one year 
old with that action — then the injunctory sentence would in- 
deed enjoin two matters (and this would be objectionable). 
But such is not the case; for the one word 'aruwaya' 
denotes a substance characterised by the quality of tawni- 
ness, and the co-ordination in which ' aruwaya ' stands to 
'ekahayanya' makes us apprehend merely that the thing 
characterised by tawniness also is one year old, but does 
not make a special statement as to the connexion of that 
quality with the thing. For the purport of co-ordination is 
the unity of a thing distinguished by attributes ; according 
to the definition that the application to one thing of several 
words possessing different reasons of application, constitutes 
co-ordination. For the same reason, the syntactical unity 
(ekavakyatvam) of sentences such as ' the cloth is red ' 
follows from all the words referring to one thing. The 
function of the syntactical collocation is to express the 
connexion of the cloth with the action of being ; the con- 
nexion of the red colour (with the cloth) on the other hand 
is denoted by the word ' red ' only. And what is ascertained 
from co-ordination (samanadhikarawya) is only that the 
doth is a substance to which a certain colour belongs. 



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224 vedAnta-sOtras. 



The whole matter may, without any contradiction, be con- 
ceived as follows. Several words — having either the affixes 
of the oblique cases or that of the nominative case — which 
denote one or two or several qualities, present to the mind 
the idea of that which is characterised by those qualities, 
and their co-ordination intimates that the thing characterised 
by all those attributes is one only ; and the entire sentence 
finally expresses the connexion in which the thing with its 
attributes stands to the action denoted by the verb. This 
may be illustrated by various sentences exhibiting the 
co-ordination of words possessing different case-endings, 
as e.g. ' There stands Devadatta, a young man of a darkish 
complexion, with red eyes, wearing earrings and carrying 
a stick' (where all the words standing in apposition to 
Devadatta have the nominative termination) ; ' Let him 
make a stage curtain by means of a white cloth ' (where 
' white' and ' cloth' have instrumental case-endings), &c. &c. 
We may further illustrate the entire relation of co-ordinated 
words to the action by means of the following two 
examples : ' Let him boil rice in the cooking-pot by means 
of firewood ' : here we take in simultaneously the idea of 
an action distinguished by its connexion with several 
things. If we now consider the following amplified sen- 
tence, ' Let a skilful cook prepare, in a vessel of even shape, 
boiled rice mixed with milk, by means of sticks of dry 
khidira wood,' we find that each thing connected with the 
action is denoted by an aggregate of co-ordinated words ; 
but as soon as each thing is apprehended, it is at one and 
the same moment conceived as something distinguished by 
several attributes, and as such connects itself with the 
action expressed by the verb. In all this there is no con- 
tradiction whatever. — We must further object to the 
assertion that a word denoting a quality which stands in 
a sentence that has already mentioned a substance denotes 
the quality only (exclusive of the substance so qualified), 
and that hence the word 'aru*aya* also denotes a quality 
only. The fact is that neither in ordinary nor in Vedic 
language we ever meet with a word which — denoting 
a quality and at the same time standing in co-ordination 



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I adhyAva, i pAda, 13. 225 

with a word denoting a substance — denotes a mere quality. 
Nor is it correct to say that a quality-word occurring in a 
sentence which has already mentioned a substance denotes 
a mere quality: for in a sentence such as 'the cloth (is) 
white/ where a substance is mentioned in the first place, 
the quality-word clearly denotes (not mere whiteness but) 
something which possesses the quality of whiteness. When, 
on the other hand, we have a collocation of words such as 
* pafesya suklaJt ' (' of the cloth ' — gen. ; ' white ' nom.), the 
idea of a cloth distinguished by whiteness does not arise ; but 
this is due not to the fact of the substance being mentioned 
first, but to the fact of the two words exhibiting different 
case-terminations. As soon as we add to those two words 
an appropriate third one, e. g. ' bhagai ' (so that the whole 
means ' The white part of a cloth'), the co-ordination of two 
words with the same case-termination gives rise to the idea 
of a thing distinguished by the attribute of whiteness. — Nor 
can we agree to the contention that, as the buying of the 
Soma is exclusively concluded by the cow one year old (as 
instrumental in the purchase), the quality of tawniness 
(denoted by the word ' aruwaya ') cannot connect itself with 
the action expressed by the verb ; for a word that denotes 
a quality and stands in co-ordination with a word denoting 
a substance which has no qualities opposed in nature to 
that quality, denotes a quality abiding in that substance, 
and thus naturally connects itself with the action expressed 
by the verb. And since, as shown, the quality of tawniness 
connects itself with its substance (the cow) on the mere 
basis of the form of the words, it is wrong (on the part of 
the Purvapakshin to abandon this natural connexion and) 
to establish their connexion on the ground of their being 
otherwise incapable of serving as means of the purchase. 

All this confirms our contention, viz. that the co-ordi- 
nation of ' thou ' and ' that ' must be understood to express 
oneness, without, at the same time, there being given up 
the different attributes denoted by the two words. This 
however is not feasible for those who do not admit a 
highest Self free from all imperfection and endowed with 
all perfections, and different from that intelligent soul which 

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226 vedAnta-sOtras. 



is conditioned by Nescience, involved in endless suffering 
and undergoing alternate states of purity and impurity. — 
But, an objection is raised, even if such a highest Self be 
acknowledged, it would have to be admitted that the sen- 
tence aims at conveying the oneness of that which is 
distinguished by the different attributes denoted by the 
words co-ordinated, and from this it follows that the highest 
Self participates in all the suffering expressed by the word 
' thou ' ! — This is not so, we reply ; since the word ' thou ' 
also denotes the highest Self, viz. in so far as it is the 
inner Ruler (antaryamin) of all souls. — The connected 
meaning of the text is as follows. That which is denoted 
as 'Being,' i.e. the highest Brahman which is the cause 
of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c, resolved 
'to be many'; it thereupon sent forth the entire world, 
consisting of fire, water, &c. ; introduced, in this world so 
sent forth, the whole mass of individual souls into different 
bodies divine, human, &c, corresponding to the desert of 
each soul — the souls thus constituting the Self of the 
bodies ; and finally, itself entering according to its wish 
into these souls — so as to constitute their inner Self — 
evolved in all these aggregates, names and forms, i.e. 
rendered each aggregate something substantial (vastu) and 
capable of being denoted by a word. ' Let me enter into 
these beings with this living Self (^ivena atmana) means 
* with this living me,' and this shows the living Self, i. e. the 
individual soul to have Brahman for its Self. And that 
this having Brahman for its Self means Brahman's being 
the inner Self of the soul (i. e. the Self inside the soul, but 
not identical with it), Scripture declares by saying that 
Brahman entered into it. This is clearly stated in the 
passage Taitt. Up. II, 6, * He sent forth all this, whatever 
there is. Having sent forth he entered into it. Having 
entered it he became sat and tyat' For here 'all this' 
comprises beings intelligent as well as non-intelligent, which 
afterwards are distinguished as sat and tyat, as knowledge 
(vjfwana) and non-knowledge. Brahman is thus said to enter 
into intelligent beings also. Hence, owing to this evolution 
of names and forms, all words denote the highest Self dis- 



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i adhyAya, i pada, 13. 227 

tinguished by non-intelligent matter and intelligent souls. — 
Another text, viz. Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7, « All this has its Self in 
that,' denotes by ' all this ' the entire world inclusive of in- 
telligent souls, and says that of this world that (i.e. Brahman) 
is the Self. Brahman thus being the Self with regard to the 
whole universe of matter and souls, the universe inclusive of 
intelligent souls is the body of Brahman. — Other scriptural 
texts teach the same doctrine ; cp. * Entered within, the ruler of 
beings, the Self of aH'(Taitt. Ar.III,24) ; * He who dwelling in 
the earth is within the earth — whose body is the earth,' $c, up 
to ' he who dwelling within the Self is within the Self, whom 
the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who 
rules the Self from within, he is thy Self, the Ruler within, 
the Immortal ' (Br*. Up. Ill, 7, 3-22 ; Madhyand. SL) ; 
• He who moves within the earth, of whom the earth is the 
body, &c. — who moves within the Imperishable, of whom 
the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does 
not know ; he the inward ruler of all beings, free from evil, 
the divine, the one god, Naraya«a ' (Suba. Up. VII). All 
these texts declare that the world inclusive of intelligent 
souls is the body of the highest Self, and the latter the 
Self of everything. Hence those words also that denote 
intelligent souls designate the highest Self as having intel- 
ligent souls for his body and constituting the Self of them ; 
in the same way as words denoting non-sentient masses of 
matter, such as the bodies of gods, men, &c, designate the 
individual souls to which those bodies belong. For the 
body stands towards the embodied soul in the relation of 
a mode (prakara); and as words denoting a mode ac- 
complish their full function only in denoting the thing to 
which the mode belongs, we must admit an analogous 
comprehensiveness of meaning for those words which denote 
a body. For, when a thing is apprehended under the form 
' this is such,' the element apprehended as ' such ' is what 
constitutes a mode ; now as this element is relative to the 
thing, the idea of it is also relative to the thing, and finds 
its accomplishment in the thing only ; hence the word also 
which expresses the mode finds its accomplishment in the 
thing. Hence words such as 'cow,' 'horse,' 'man,' which 

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228 vedAnta-sCtras. 



denote a mode, viz. a species, comprise in their meaning 
also that mass of matter which exhibits the characteristics 
of the species, and as that mass of matter constitutes the 
body and therefore is a mode of a soul, and as that soul 
again, so embodied, is a mode of the highest Self; it 
follows that all these words extend in their signification up 
to the highest Self. The meaning of all words then is the 
highest Self, and hence their co-ordination with words 
directly denoting that highest Self is a primary (not 
merely ' implied ') one. 

But, an objection is raised, we indeed observe that words 
denoting species or qualities stand in co-ordination to 
words denoting substances, ' the ox is short-horned,' ' the 
sugar is white ' ; but where substances appear as the modes 
of other substances we find that formative affixes are used, 
' the man is dawrfin, kum/alin ' (bearing a stick ; wearing 
earrings).— This is not so, we reply. There is nothing to 
single out either species, or quality, or substance, as what 
determines co-ordination : co-ordination disregards such 
limitations. Whenever a thing (whether species, or quality, 
or substance) has existence as a mode only— owing to its 
proof, existence and conception being inseparably con- 
nected with something else — the words denoting it, as 
they designate a substance characterised by the attribute 
denoted by them, appropriately enter into co-ordination 
with other words denoting the same substance as charac- 
terised by other attributes. Where, on the other hand, 
a substance which is established in separation from other 
things and rests on itself, is assumed to stand occasionally 
in the relation of mode to another substance, this is appro- 
priately expressed by the use of derived forms such as 
* dandin, kum/alin.' Hence such words as ' I,' ' thou,' &c 
which are different forms of appellation of the individual 
soul, at bottom denote the highest Self only; for the 
individual souls together with non-sentient matter are the 
body — and hence modes — of the highest Self. This entire 
view is condensed in the co-ordination 'Thou art that.' 
The individual soul being thus connected with the highest 
Self as its body, its attributes do not touch the highest 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 13. 229 

Self, not any more than infancy, youth, and other 
attributes of the material body touch the individual soul. 
Hence, in the co-ordination 'Thou art that,' the word 
'that' denotes the highest Brahman which is the cause of 
the world, whose purposes come true, which comprises 
within itself all blessed qualities, which is free from all 
shadow of evil ; while the word ' thou ' denotes the same 
highest Self in so far as having for its body the individual 
souls together with their bodies. The terms co-ordinated 
may thus be taken in their primary senses ; there is no 
contradiction either with the subject-matter of the section, 
or with scripture in general ; and not a shadow of imper- 
fection such as Nescience, and so on, attaches to Brahman, 
the blameless, the absolutely blessed. The co-ordination 
with the individual soul thus proves only the difference of 
Brahman from the soul, which is a mere mode of Brah- 
man ; and hence we hold that different from the Self 
consisting of knowledge, i. e. the individual soul, is the Self 
consisting of bliss, i. e. the highest Self. 

Nor is there any force in the objection that as the 
Self of bliss is said to be ' jarira,' i. e. embodied — viz. in 
the clause ' of him the embodied Self is the same ' (Taitt. 
Up. II, 5, 6) — it cannot be different from the individual 
soul. For throughout this section the recurring clause ' of 
him the embodied Self is the same as of the preceding one,' 
refers to the highest Self, calling that the ' embodied ' one. 
The clause 'From that same Self sprang ether' (II, 1) 
designates the highest Brahman — which is different from 
the individual soul and is introduced as the highest cause 
of all things created — as the ' Self ' ; whence we conclude 
that all things different from it — from ether up to the 
Self of food — constitute its body. The Subala-upanishad 
moreover states quite directly that all beings constitute 
the body of the highest Self: ' He of whom the earth is the 
body, of whom water is the body, of whom fire is the body, 
of whom wind is the body, of whom ether is the body, of 
whom the Imperishable is the body, of whom Death is the 
body, he the inner Self of all, the divine one, the one god 
Narayawa.' From this it follows that what constitutes the 



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230 vedAnta-sAtras. 



embodied Self of the Self of food is nothing else but the 
highest Self referred to in the clause • From that same 
Self sprang ether.' When, then, the text further on says 
with regard to the Self of breath, ' of him the embodied 
Self is the same as of the preceding one ' (II, 3), the meaning 
can only be that what constitutes the embodied Self of the 
'preceding' Self of food, viz. the highest Self which is the uni- 
versal cause, is also the embodied Self of the Self consisting 
of breath. The same reasoning holds good with regard to the 
Self consisting of mind and the Self consisting of knowledge. 
In the case, finally, of the Self consisting of bliss, the expres- 
sion ' the same ' (esha eva) is meant to convey that that Self 
has its Self in nothing different from itself. For when, after 
having understood that the highest Self is the embodied 
Self of the v\g wanamaya also, we are told that the embodied 
Self of that vi,g-»anamaya is also the embodied Self of the 
anandamaya, we understand that of the anandamaya — 
which we know to be the highest Self on the ground of 
' multiplication ' — its own Self is the Self. The final pur- 
port of the whole section thus is that everything different 
from the highest Self, whether of intelligent or non-intel- 
ligent nature, constitutes its body, while that Self alone is 
the non-conditioned embodied Self. For this very reason 
competent persons designate this doctrine which has the 
highest Brahman for its subject-matter as the '.rariraka,' 
i. e. the doctrine of the ' embodied ' Self. — We have thus 
arrived at the conclusion that the Self of bliss is something 
different from the individual Self, viz. the highest Self. 

Here the Pdrvapakshin raises the following objection. — 
The Self consisting of bliss (anandamaya) is not something 
different from the individual soul, because the formative 
element -maya denotes something made, a thing effected. 
That this is the meaning of -maya in anandamaya we know 
from Pawini IV, 3, 144 — But according to P4.V, 4, ai, 
-maya has also the sense of * abounding in ' ; as when we 
say ' the sacrifice is annamaya,' i. e. abounds in food. And 
this may be its sense in ' anandamaya ' also 1 — Not so, the 
Purvapakshin replies. In ' annamaya,' in an earlier part of 
the chapter, -maya has the sense of ' made of/ ' consisting 



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I adhyAya, i pAda, 14. 231 

of ' ; and for the sake of consistency, we must hence ascribe 
the same sense to it in ' anandamaya.' And even if, in 
the latter word, it denoted abundance, this would not 
prove that the anandamaya is other than the individual 
soul. For if we say that a Self ' abounds ' in bliss, this 
implies that with all this bliss there is mixed some small 
part of pain ; and to be ' mixed with pain ' is what consti- 
tutes the character of the individual soul. It is therefore 
proper to assume, in agreement with its previous use, that 
'anandamaya' means 'consisting of bliss.' In ordinary 
speech as well as in Vedic language (cp. common words such 
as * mrthmaya,' ' hirawmaya ' ; and Vedic clauses such as 
' parwamayi guh&A' ) -maya as a rule means 'consisting of,' 
and this meaning hence presents itself to the mind first. 
And the individual soul may be denoted as ' made of bliss ' ; 
for in itself it is of the essence of bliss, and its Sawsara 
state therefore is something ' made of bliss/ The conclu- 
sion therefore is that, owing to the received meaning of 
-maya, the anandamaya is none other than the individual 
soul. — To this prima facie view the next Sutra refers and 
refutes it. 

14. If, on account of its being a word denoting an 
effect, (anandamaya be said) not (to denote the 
highest Self) ; (we say) no, on account of abundance. 

We deny the conclusion of the Purvapakshin, on the 
ground of there being abundance of bliss in the highest 
Brahman, and 'abundance' being one of the possible 
meanings of -maya.— Since bliss such as described in the 
TaittUp. — bliss which is reached by successively multiplying 
by hundred all inferior kinds of bliss— cannot belong to 
the individual soul, we conclude that it belongs to Brahman ; 
and as Brahman cannot be an effect, and as -maya may 
have the sense of ' abounding in,' we conclude that the 
anandamaya is Brahman itself; inner contradiction obliging 
us to set aside that sense of -maya which is recommended 
by regard to ' consequence ' and frequency of usage. The 
regard for consistency, moreover, already has to be set 
aside in the case of the 'prawamaya'; for in that term 



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232 vedAnta-sOtras. 



-maya cannot denote ' made of.' The ' prawamaya ' Self 
can only be called by that name in so far as air with its 
five modifications has (among others) the modification 
called prawa, i. e. breathing- out, or because among the five 
modifications or functions of air prana is the ' abounding,' 
i. e. prevailing one. — Nor can it be truly said that -maya 
is but rarely used in the sense of 'abounding in': expres- 
sions such as 'a sacrifice abounding in food ' (annamaya), 
' a procession with many carriages ' (raka/amayt), are by no 
means uncommon. — Nor can we admit that to call some- 
thing ' abounding in bliss ' implies the presence of some 
pain. For 'abundance' precludes paucity on the part of 
that which is said to abound, but does not imply the 
presence of what is contrary. The presence or absence 
of what is contrary has to be ascertained by other means of 
proof ; and in our case we do ascertain the absence of what 
is contrary to bliss by such means, viz. the clause 'free 
from evil,' &c. Abundance of bliss on the part of Brahman 
certainly implies a relation to paucity on the part of some 
other bliss ; and in accordance with this demand the text 
says 'That is one measure of human bliss,' &c. (II, 8, 1). 
The bliss of Brahman is of measureless abundance, com- 
pared to the bliss of the individual soul. — Nor can it be 
maintained that the individual soul may be viewed as being 
an effect of bliss. For that a soul whose essential nature is 
knowledge and bliss should in any way be changed into 
something else, as a lump of clay is made into a pot, is an 
assumption contradicted by all scripture, sacred tradition, 
and reasoning. That in the Samsara state the soul's bliss 
and knowledge are contracted owing to karman will be 
shown later on. — The Self of bliss therefore is other than 
the individual soul ; it is Brahman itself. 

A further reason for this conclusion is supplied by the 
next Sutra. 

15. And because he is declared to be the cause 
of that. 

' For who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that 
bliss existed not in the ether ? He alone causes bliss ' 



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I ADBYAYA, I PADA, l6. 233 

(Taitt Up. II, 7). This means — He alone is the cause of 
bliss on the part of the individual souls. — Some one is here 
designated as the cause of bliss enjoyed by the souls ; and 
we thus conclude that the causer of bliss, who must be other 
than the souls to which bliss is imparted, is the highest 
Self abounding in bliss. 

In the passage quoted the term ' bliss ' denotes him who 
abounds in bliss, as will be shown later on. — A further 
reason is given in the next Sutra. 

16. And because that (Brahman) which is referred 
to in the mantra is declared (to be the anandamaya). 

That Brahman which is described in the mantra, ' True 
Being, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' is proclaimed as 
the Self abounding in bliss. And that Brahman is the 
highest Brahman, other than the individual soul ; for the 
passage 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest' 
refers to Brahman as something to be obtained by the 
individual soul, and the words ' On this the following verse 
is recorded ' show that the verse is related to that same 
Brahman. The mantra thus is meant to render clear the 
meaning of the Brahmawa passage. Now the Brahman to 
be reached by the meditating Devotee must be something 
different from him. The same point is rendered clear by 
all the following Brahmawa passages and mantras : ' from 
that same Self sprang ether/ and so on. The Self 
abounding in bliss therefore is other than the individual 
soul. 

Here an opponent argues as follows : — We indeed must 
acknowledge that the object to be reached is something 
different from the meditating Devotee ; but the fact is that 
the Brahman described in the mantra does not substantially 
differ from the individual soul ; that Brahman is nothing 
but the soul of the Devotee in its pure state, consisting of 
mere non-differenaed intelligence,- free from all shade of 
Nescience. To this pure condition it is reduced in the 
mantra describing it as true Being, knowledge, infinite. 
A subsequent passage, * that from which all speech, with the 
mind, turns away, unable to reach it ' (II, 9), expresses this 



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234 vedAnta-sOtras. 



same state of non-differentiation, describing it as lying 
beyond mind and speech. It is this therefore to which the 
mantra refers, and the Self of bliss is identical with it — To 
this view the next Sutra replies. 

1 7. Not the other, on account of impossibility. 

The other than the highest Self, i. e. the one called ^iva, 
even in the state of release, is not that Self which the 
mantra describes; for this is not possible. For to a Self 
of that kind unconditioned intelligence (such as is, in the 
mantra, ascribed to Brahman; cp. the term 'vipar^ita') 
cannot belong. Unconditioned intelligence is illustrated 
by the power of all one's purposes realising themselves ; as 
expressed in the text ' He desired, may I be many, may 
I grow forth.' Intelligence (vipanHttvam, i,e. power of 
insight into various things) does indeed belong to the soul 
in the state of release ; but as in the Sawsara state the 
same soul is devoid of such insight, we cannot ascribe to it 
non-conditioned intelligence. And if the released soul is 
viewed as being mere non-differenced intelligence, it does 
not possess the capacity of seeing different things, and 
hence cannot of course possess vipar£ittva in the sense 
stated above. That, however, the existence of a substance 
devoid of all difference cannot be proved by any means of 
knowledge, we have already shown before. Again, if the 
clause ' from whence speech returns,' &c, were meant to 
express that speech and mind return from Brahman, this 
could not mean that the Real is devoid of all difference, 
but only that mind and speech are not means for the 
knowledge of Brahman. And from this it would follow 
that Brahman is something altogether empty, futile. 
Let us examine the context The whole section, begin- 
ning with 'He who knows Brahman reaches Brahman,' 
declares that Brahman is all-knowing, the cause of the 
world, consisting of pure bliss, the cause of bliss in others ; 
that through its mere wish it creates the whole universe 
comprising matter and souls; that entering into the uni- 
verse of created things it constitutes their Self ; that it is 
the cause of fear and fearlessness ; that it rules Vayu 



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i adhvAya, i pAda, i 8. 235 

Aditya and other divine beings ; that Its bliss is ever so 
much superior to all other bliss; and many other points. 
Now, all at once, the clause ' from whence speech returns ' 
is said to mean that neither speech nor mind applies to 
Brahman, and that thus there are no means whatever of 
knowing Brahman 1 This is idle talk indeed! In the 
clause ' (that) from which speech returns,' the relative pro- 
noun ' from which ' denotes bliss ; this bliss is again ex- 
plicitly referred to in the clause 'knowing the bliss of 
Brahman ' — the genitive ' of Brahman ' intimating that 
the bliss belongs to Brahman; what then could be the 
meaning of this clause which distinctly speaks of a know- 
ledge of Brahman, if Brahman had at the same time to be 
conceived as transcending all thought and speech ? What 
the clause really means rather is that if one undertakes to 
state the definite amount of the bliss of Brahman — the 
superabundance of which is illustrated by the successive 
multiplications with hundred — mind and speech have to 
turn back powerless, since no such definite amount can be 
assigned. He who knows the bliss of Brahman as not to 
be defined by any definite amount, does not fear anything. 
— That, moreover, the all-wise being referred to in the 
mantra is other than the individual soul in the state of re- 
lease, is rendered perfectly clear by what — in passages such 
as ' it desired,' &c. — is said about its' effecting, through its 
mere volition, the origination and subsistence of the world, 
its being the inner Self of the world, and so on. 

18. And on account of the declaration of differ- 
ence. 

The part of the chapter — beginning with the words 
'From that same Self there sprang ether' — which sets 
forth the nature of the Brahman referred to in the mantra, 
declares its difference from the individual soul, no less than 
from the Selfs consisting of food, breath, and mind, viz. in 
the clause ' different from this which consists of knowledge, 
is the other inner Self which consists of bliss.' — Through 
this declaration of difference from the individual soul we 



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236 vedanta>sOtras. 



know that the Self of bliss referred to in the mantra is 
other than the individual soul. 

19. And on account of desire, there is no regard 
to what is inferred (i. e. matter). 

In order that the individual soul which is enthralled by 
Nescience may operate as the cause of the world, it must 
needs be connected with non-sentient matter, called by such 
names as pradhana, or anumanika (that which is inferred). 
For such is the condition for the creative energy of Brahma 
and similar beings. Our text, on the other hand, teaches 
that the creation of the aggregate of sentient and non- 
sentient things results from the mere wish of a being free 
from all connexion with non-sentient matter, ' He desired, 
may I be many, may I grow forth ; ' ' He sent forth all, 
whatever there is* (Taitt. Up. II, 6). We thus understand 
that that Self of bliss which sends forth the world does 
not require connexion with non-sentient matter called 
anumanika, and hence conclude that it is other than the 
individual soul. — A further reason is stated in the next 
Sutra. 

20. And Scripture teaches the joining of this (i. e. 
the individual soul) with that (L e. bliss) in that (i. e. 
the anandamaya). 

' A flavour he is indeed ; having obtained a flavour this 
one enjoys bliss ' (Taitt Up. II, 7). This text declares that 
this one, i.e. the so-called individual soul, enjoys bliss 
through obtaining the anandamaya, here called 'flavour.' 
Now to say that any one is identical with that by obtain- 
ing which he enjoys bliss, would be madness indeed. — It 
being thus ascertained that the Self of bliss is the highest 
Brahman, we conclude that in passages such as ' if that 
bliss were not in the ether ' (Taitt. Up. II, 7), and ' knowledge, 
bliss is Brahman' (Br*. Up. HI, 9, 28), the word ' ananda' 
denotes the 'anandamaya'; just as vj^tfana means the 
v\gwanamaya. It is for the same reason (viz. of ananda mean- 
ing the same as anandamaya) that the clause ' he who knows 
the bliss of Brahman' exhibits Brahman as being connected 



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I adhyAya, i pAda, 21. 237 

with ananda, and that 'the further clause ' he who knows 
this reaches the Self of bliss,' declares the reaching of the 
Self of bliss to be the fruit of the knowledge of bliss. In 
the subsequent anuvaka also, in the clauses ' he perceived 
that food is Brahman,' ' he perceived that breath is Brah- 
man,' &c (III, 1 ; 2, &c). the words •food,' 'breath,' and 
so on, are meant to suggest the Self made of food, the Self 
made of breath, &c, mentioned in the preceding anuvaka ; 
and hence also in the clause 'he perceived that bliss is 
Brahman,' the word ' bliss ' must be understood to denote 
the Self of bliss. Hence, in. the same anuvaka, the account 
of the fate after death of the man who knows concludes 
with the words ' having reached the Self of bliss ' (III, 10, 5). 
It ia thus finally proved that the highest Brahman — which 
in the previous adhikarawa had to be shown to be other 
than the so-called Pradhana — is also other than the being 
called individual soul. — This concludes the topic of the 
anandamaya. 

A new doubt here presents itself.— It must indeed be 
admitted that such individual souls as possess only a 
moderate degree of merit are unable to accomplish the 
creation of the world by their mere wish, to enjoy supreme 
bliss, to be the cause of fearlessness, and so on ; but why 
should not beings like Aditya and Pra^apati, whose merit 
is extraordinarily great, be capable of all this ? — Of this 
suggestion the next Sutra disposes. 

21. The one within (the sun and the eye); on 
account of his qualities being declared. 

It is said in the AT^andogya : ' Now that person bright as 
gold, who is seen within the sun, with beard bright as gold 
and hair bright as gold, golden altogether to the very tips 
of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus ; his name is Ut, 
for he has risen (udita) above all evil. He also who knows 
this rises above all evil. Rik and Saman are his joints — 
So much with reference to the devas. — Now with reference 
to the body. — 'Now that person who is seen within the eye, 
he is Rik, he is Saman, Uktha, Ysg-us, Brahman. The 
form of this person (in the eye) is the same as of that 
person yonder (in the sun), the joints of the one are the 



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?38 vedAnta-sOtras. 



joints of the other, the name of the one is the name of 
the other' {Kh. Up. I, 7). — Here there arises the doubt 
whether that person dwelling within the eye and the sun 
be the individual soul called Aditya, who through accumu- 
lation of religious merit possesses lordly power, or the 
highest Self other than that soul. 

That individual soul of high merit, the Purvapakshin 
maintains. For the text states that that person has a body, 
and connexion with a body belongs to individual souls 
only, for it is meant to bring the soul into contact with 
pleasure and pain, according to its deserts. It is for this 
reason that Scripture describes final Release where there is 
no connexion with works as a state of disembodiedness. 
'So long as he is in the body he cannot get free from 
pleasure and pain. But when he is free from the body, 
then neither pleasure nor pain touches him ' {Kh, Up. VIII, 
12, 1). And a soul of transcendent merit may possess 
surpassing wisdom and power, and thus be capable of being 
lord of the worlds and the wishes (I, 6, 8). For the same 
reason such a soul may be the object of devout meditation, 
bestow rewards, and by being instrumental in destroying 
evil, be helpful towards final release. Even among men 
some are seen to be of superior knowledge and power, 
owing to superior religious merit ; and this holds good 
with regard to the Siddhas and Gandharvas also; then 
with regard to the devas ; then with regard to the divine 
beings, beginning with Indra. Hence, also, one among the 
divine beings, beginning with Brahma, may in each kalpa 
reach, through a particularly high degree of merit, vast 
lordly power and thus effect the creation of the world, and 
so on. On this supposition the texts about that which 
constitutes the cause of the world and the inward Self of 
the world must also be understood to refer to some such 
soul which, owing to superiority of merit, has become 
all-knowing and all-powerful. A so-called highest Self, 
different from the individual souls, does not therefore exist. 
Where the texts speak of that which is neither coarse nor 
fine nor short, &c, they only mean to characterise the 
individual soul ; and those texts also which refer to final 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 21. 239 

Release aim only at setting forth the essential nature of 
the individual soul and the means of attaining that essential 
nature. 

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sutra. The person 
who is perceived within the sun and within the eye, is some- 
thing different from the individual soul, viz. the highest Self ; 
because there are declared qualities belonging to that. The 
text ascribes to him the quality of having risen above, i. e. 
being free from all evil, and this can belong to the highest 
Self only, not to the individual soul. For to be free from 
all evil means to be free from all influence of karman, and 
this quality can belong to the highest Self only, differing 
from all individual souls which, as is shown by their experi- 
ence of pleasure and pain, are in the bonds of karman. Those 
essential qualities also which presuppose freedom from all 
evil (and which are mentioned in other Vedic passages), 
such as mastery over all worlds and wishes, capability of 
realising one's purposes, being the inner Self of all, &c, 
belong to the highest Self alone. Compare passages such 
as * It Is the Self free from evil, free from old age, from 
death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose wishes come 
true, whose purposes come true ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 1,5); and 
' He is the inner Self of all, free from evil, the divine one, 
the one god Narayawa' (Suba. Up.). Attributes such 
as the attribute of being the creator of the whole 
universe — which presupposes the power of realising one's 
wishes — (cp. the passage 'it desired, may I be many'); 
the attribute of being the cause of fear and fearlessness ; 
the attribute of enjoying transcending bliss not limited by 
the capabilities of thought and speech and the like, are 
essential characteristics of that only which is not touched 
by karman, and they cannot therefore belong to the in- 
dividual soul. — Nor is there any truth in the contention 
that the person within the sun, &c, cannot be a being 
different from individual souls because it possesses a body. 
For since a being which possesses the power of realising 
all its desires can assume a body through its mere wish, it 
is not generally true that embodiedness proves dependence 
on karman. — But, it may be said, by a body we understand 



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240 vedAnta-sAtras. 



a certain combination of matter which springs from the 
primal substance (praknti) with its three constituents. Now 
connexion with such a body cannot possibly be brought 
about by the wish of such souls even as are free from all 
evil and capable of realising their desires ; for such con- 
nexion would not be to the soul's benefit In the case, on 
the other hand, of a soul subject to karman and not know- 
ing its own essential nature, such connexion with a body 
necessarily takes place in order that the soul may enjoy 
the fruit of its actions — quite apart from the soul's desire. — 
Your objection would be well founded, we reply, if the body 
of the highest Self were an effect of Prakrrti with its three 
constituents ; but it is not so, it rather is a body suitable 
to the nature and intentions of that Self. The highest 
Brahman, whose nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all 
evil and essentially composed of infinite knowledge and 
bliss — whereby it differs from all other souls — possesses an 
infinite number of qualities of unimaginable excellence, and, 
analogously, a divine form suitable to its nature and in- 
tentions, i. e. adorned with infinite, supremely excellent and 
wonderful qualities — splendour, beauty, fragrance, tender- 
ness, loveliness, youthfulness, and so on. And in order to 
gratify his devotees he individualises that form so as to 
render it suitable to their apprehension — he who is 
a boundless ocean as it were of compassion, kindness and 
lordly power, whom no shadow of evil may touch — he who 
is the highest Self, the highest Brahman, the supreme soul, 
Naraya«a 1 — Certain texts tell us that the highest Brahman 
is the sole cause of the entire world : ' From which these 
beings originate ' (Taitt. Up.) ; * Being only was this in 
the beginning' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self only was 
this in the beginning' (Ai. Up. I, 1); 'Narayawa alone 
existed, not Brahma nor .Siva.' Other texts define 
his nature: 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' 
(Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'Knowledge, bliss is Brahman' 
(Br*. Up. Ill, 9, 28) ; and others again deny of Brahman 
all connexion with evil qualities and inferior bodies sprung 
from Prakriti, and all dependence on karman, and proclaim 
his glorious qualities and glorious forms : ' Free from 



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i adhvAya, i pAda, 22. 241 

qualities' (?) ; ' Free from taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19) ; ' Free 
from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, 
realising his wishes and purposes' (KA. Up. VIII, 1, 5); 
' There is no effect and no cause known of him, no one is 
seen like to him or superior : his high power is revealed as 
manifold, as inherent action of force and knowledge ' (Svet. 
Up. VI, 8) ; ' That highest great lord of lords, the highest 
deity of deities ' (Svet. Up. VI, 7) ; * He is the cause, the 
lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither 
parent nor lord ' (Svet. Up. VI, 9) ; ' Having created all 
forms and given names to them the wise one goes on calling 
them by those names ' (Taitt Ar. Ill, 12, 7) ; 'I know that 
great Person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness ' (Svet 
Up. Ill, 8); 'All moments originated from the Person 
shining like lightning ' (Mahanar. Up. I, 6). — This essential 
form of his the most compassionate Lord by his mere will 
individualises as a shape human or divine or otherwise, so 
as to render it suitable to the apprehension of the devotee 
and thus satisfy him. This the following scriptural passage 
declares, ' Unborn he is born in many ways ' (Gau. Ka. 
Ill, 24); and likewise Smrz'ti, 'Though unborn I, the im- 
perishable Self, the Lord of the beings, presiding over my 
Nature, manifest myself by my Maya for the protection of 
the Good and the destruction of the evil doers ' (Bha. Gt. IV, 
6, 8). The ' Good ' here are the Devotees ; and by ' Maya ' 
is meant the purpose, the knowledge of the Divine Being ; 
in agreement with the Naighaw/ukas who register ' Maya' 
as a synonym of gn&na. (knowledge). In the Mahabharata 
also the form assumed by the highest Person in his avataras 
is said not to consist of Praknti, ' the body of the highest 
Self does not consist of a combination of material elements.' 
— For these reasons the Person within the Sun and the eye 
is the highest Self which is different from the individual 
soul of the Sun, &c. 

22. And on account of the declaration of difference 
(the highest Self is) other (than the individual souls 
of the sun, &c). 

There are texts which clearly state that the highest 
[48] R 



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242 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Self is different from Aditya and the other individual souls : 
' He who, dwelling within Aditya (the sun), is different from 
Aditya, whom Aditya does not know, of whom Aditya is 
the body, who rules Aditya from within ; who dwelling 
within the Self is different from the Self,' &c. (Br/. Up. Ill, 
7, 9 ff.) 5 ' Of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom 
the Imperishable does not know ; who moves within Death, 
of whom Death is the body, whom Death does not know ; 
he is the inner self of all beings, free from evil, divine, the 
one God Narayawa ' (Sub. Up.VI I). These texts declare all 
individual souls to be the body of the sinless highest Self 
which is said to be the inward principle of all of them. — It 
is thereby completely proved that the highest Self is some- 
thing different from all individual souls such as Aditya, and 
so on. — Here terminates the adhikaraxa of the ' one within.' 
The text, ' That from which these beings are born,' 
teaches that Brahman is the cause of the world ; to the 
question thence arising of what nature that cause of the 
world is, certain other texts give a reply in general terms 
(' Being only this was in the beginning ' ; • It sent forth 
fire ' ; ' The Self only this was in the beginning,' &c.) ; and 
thereupon it is shown on the basis of the special nature of 
that cause as proved by the attributes of ' thought ' and 
'bliss,' that Brahman is different from the pradhana and 
the individual souls. The remaining part of this Pada now 
is devoted to the task of proving that where such special 
terms as Ether and the like are used in sections setting 
forth the creation and government of the world, they 
designate not the thing — sentient or non-sentient — which 
is known from ordinary experience, but Brahman as proved 
so far. 

23. Ether (is Brahman), on account of the charac- 
teristic marks. 

We read in the .Oandogya (1, 9), • What is the origin of 
this world ? ' ' Ether,' he replied. ' For all these beings 
spring from the ether only, and return into the ether. 
Ether is greater than these; ether is their rest.' Here 
there arises the doubt whether the word 'ether' denotes 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 23. 243 

the well-known element or Brahman. — The Purvapakshin 
maintains the former alternative. For, he says, in the case 
of things to be apprehended through words we must accept 
that sense of the word which, proved by etymology, is 
immediately suggested by the word. We therefore conclude 
from the passage that the well-known Ether is the cause 
of the entire aggregate of things, moving or non-moving, 
and that hence Brahman is the same as Ether. — But has it 
not been shown that Brahman is something different from 
non-sentient things because its creative activity is preceded 
by thought? — This has been asserted indeed, but by no 
means proved. For the proper way to combine the dif- 
ferent texts is as follows. Having been told that 'that 
from which these beings are born is Brahman,' we desire to 
know more especially what that source of all beings is, and 
this desire is satisfied by the special information given by 
the text, ' All these things spring from the ether.' It thus 
being ascertained that the ether only is the cause of the 
origin, and so on, of the world, we conclude that also such 
general terms as ' Being ' (' Being only was this In the 
beginning ') denote the particular substance called * ether.' 
And we further conclude that in passages such as 'the 
Self only was all this in the beginning,' the word 'Self 
(atman) also denotes the ether; for that word is by 110 
means limited to non-sentient things — cp., e. g., the phrase, 
' Clay constitutes the Self of the jar' — , and its etymology 
also (atman from ap, to reach) shows that it may very well 
be applied to the ether. It having thus been ascertained 
that the ether is the general cause or Brahman, we must 
interpret such words as ' thinking ' (which we meet with in 
connexion with the creative activity of the general cause) in 
a suitable, i. e. secondary, or metaphorical sense. If the 
texts denoted the general cause by general terms only, 
such as ' Being,' we should, in agreement with the primary 
sense of ' thinking,' and similar terms, decide that that cause 
is an intelligent being ; but since, as a matter of fact, we 
ascertain a particular cause on the basis of the word 
'ether,' our decision cannot be formed on general con- 
siderations of what would suit the sense. — But what then- 

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244 vedAnta-sAtras. 



about the passage, ' From the Self there sprang the ether ' 
(Taitt. Up. II, I, i), from which it appears that the ether 
itself is something created? — All elementary substances, 
we reply, such as ether, air, and so on, have two different 
states, a gross material one, and a subtle one. The ether, 
in its subtle state, is the universal cause ; in its gross state 
it is an effect of the primal cause ; in its gross state it 
thus springs from itself, i. e. ether in the subtle state. The 
text, 'All these beings spring from ether only ' (Kh. Up. I, 
9, 1), declares that the whole world originates from ether 
only, and from this it follows that ether is none other than 
the general cause of the world, i. e. Brahman. This non- 
difference of Brahman from the empirically known ether 
also gives a satisfactory sense to texts such as the follow- 
ing: 'If this ether were not bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1) ; 
' Ether, indeed, is the evolver of names and forms ' (Kk. Up. 
VIII, 14, 1, and so on). — It thus appears that Brahman 
is hone other than the well-known elemental ether. 

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sutra. The 
word 'ether' in the text under discussion denotes the 
highest Self with its previously established characteristics 
— which is something quite different from the non-sentient 
elemental ether. For the qualities which the passage attri- 
butes to ether, viz. its being the one cause of the entire world, 
its being greater than all, and the rest of all, clearly indicate 
the highest Self. The non-intelligent elemental ether can- 
not be called the cause of all, since intelligent beings 
clearly cannot be its effects; nor can it be called the 'rest' 
of intelligent beings, for non-sentient things are evil and 
antagonistic to the true aim of man ; nor can it be called 
'greater' than all, for it is impossible that a non-sentient 
element should possess all excellent qualities whatever and 
thus be absolutely superior to everything else. — Nor is the 
Purvapakshin right when maintaining that, as the word 
' ether ' satisfies the demand for a special cause of the 
world, all other texts are to be interpreted in accordance 
herewith. The words, ' All these beings indeed spring from 
the ether only,' merely give expression to something gener- 
ally known, and statements of this nature presuppose other 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 23. 245 

means of knowledge to prove them. Now these other 
means required are, in our case, supplied by such texts as 
'Being only was this in the beginning,' and these, as we 
have shown, establish the existence of Brahman. To 
Brahman thus established, the text mentioning the ether 
merely refers as to something well known. Brahman may 
suitably be called 'ether' (aklra), because being of the 
nature of light it shines (ak&ate) itself, and makes other 
things shine forth (akarayati). Moreover, the word * ether ' 
is indeed capable of conveying the idea of a special being 
(as cause), but as it denotes a special non-intelligent thing 
which cannot be admitted as the cause of the intelligent 
part of the world we must deny all authoritativeness to 
the attempt to tamper, in the interest of that one word, 
with the sense of other texts which have the power of 
giving instruction as to an entirely new thing (viz. Brah- 
man), distinguished by the possession of omniscience, 
the power of realising its purposes and similar attri- 
butes, which we ascertain from certain complementary 
texts — such as ' it thought, may I be many, may I grow 
forth,' and * it desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.' 
We also point out that the agreement in purport of a 
number of texts capable of establishing the existence of 
a wonderful being possessing infinite wonderful attributes is 
not lightly to be disregarded in favour of one single text 
which moreover (has not the power of intimating something 
not known before, but) only makes a reference to what is 
already established by other texts. — As to the averment 
that the word ' Self is not exclusively limited to sentient 
beings, we remark that that word is indeed applied occa- 
sionally to non-sentient things, but prevailingly to that 
which is the correlative of a body, i.e. the soul or spirit ; 
in texts such as ' the Self only was this in the beginning,' 
and ' from the Self there sprang the ether,' we must there- 
fore understand by the ' Self,' the universal spirit. The 
denotative power of the term ' atman,' which is thus proved 
by itself, is moreover confirmed by the complementary 
passages 'it desired, may I send forth the worlds,' 'it 
desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.'— We thus 



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246 vedAnta-sOtras. 



arrive at the following conclusion : Brahman, which — by 
the passage 'Being only this was in the beginning' — is 
established as the sole cause of the world, possessing all 
those manifold wonderful attributes which are ascertained 
from the complementary passages, is, in the text under 
discussion, referred to as something already known, by 
means of the term ' ether.' — Hare terminates the adhikarana 
of 'ether.' 

24. For the same reason breath (is Brahman). 

We read in the -Oandogya (I, 10 > 11),' Prastotr*, that 
deity which belongs to the Prastava,' &c. ; and further on, 
'which then is that deity? He said — Breath. For all 
these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath they 
arise. This is the deity belonging to the Prastava. If 
without knowing that deity you had sung forth, your head 
would have fallen off.' Here the word 'breath,' analogously 
to the word ' ether,' denotes the highest Brahman, which is 
different from what is commonly called breath ; we infer 
this from the fact that special characteristics of Brahman, 
viz. the whole world's entering into and rising from it, 
are in that text referred to as well-known things. There 
indeed here arises a further doubt ; for as it is a matter of 
observation that the existence, activity, &c, of the whole 
aggregate of creatures depend on breath, breath — in its 
ordinary acceptation — may be called the cause of the world. 
This doubt is, however, disposed of by the consideration 
that breath is not present in things such as stones and 
wood, nor in intelligence itself, and that hence of breath 
in the ordinary sense it cannot be said that 'all beings 
enter into it,' &c. We therefore conclude that Brahman 
is here called ' breath ' in so far as he bestows the breath 
of life on all beings. And the general result of the discus- 
sion carried on in connexion with the last two Sutras thus 
is that the words ' ether ' and ' breath ' denote something 
other than what is ordinarily denoted by those terms, viz. 
the highest Brahman, the sole cause of this entire world, 
free from all evil, &c. &c. — Here terminates the adhikarana 
of * breath.' 



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^^ws» 



i adhyAya, i pAda, 25. 247 

The subsequent Sutras up to the end of the Pada de- 
monstrate that the being which the texts refer to as ' Light 
or ' Indra ' — terms which in ordinary language are applied 
to certain other well-known beings — , and which is repre- 
sented as possessing some one or other supremely exalted 
quality that is invariably connected with world-creative 
power, is no other than the highest Brahman. 

25. The light (is Brahman), on account of the 
mention of feet. 

We read in the /STAandogya (III, 13, 7), ' Now that light 
which shines above this heaven, higher than everything, in 
the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worlds, 
that is the same light which is within man.' — Here a doubt 
arises, viz. whether the brightly shining thing here called 
' light ' is the well-known light of the sun and so on, viewed 
as a causal universal principle (Brahman); or the all- 
knowing, &c., highest Person of infinite splendour, who is 
different in nature from all sentient and non-sentient beings, 
and is the highest cause. — The Purvapakshin maintains 
that the reference is to ordinary light For, he says, the 
passage does not mention a particular characteristic attri- 
bute which can belong to the highest Self only — while 
such attributes were met with in the texts referring to 
Ether and Breath — , and as thus there is no opening for 
a recognition of the highest Self, and as at the same time 
the text identifies ' light ' with the intestinal heat of living 
beings, we conclude that the text represents the well-known 
ordinary light as Brahman, the cause of the world — which 
is possible as causal agency is connected with extreme light 
and heat. — This prima facie view the Sutra sets aside. The 
light which the text states to be connected with heaven and 
possessing supreme splendour can be the highest Person 
only, since a preceding passage in the same section — ' All 
the beings are one foot of it, three feet are the Immortal in 
heaven ' — refers to all beings as being a foot of that same 
being which is connected with heaven. Although the 
passage, 'That light which shines above,' &c, does not 
mention a special attribute of the highest Person, yet the 



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248 vedAnta-sOtras. 



passage previously quoted refers to the highest Person as 
connected with heaven, and we therefore recognise that 
Person as the light connected with heaven, mentioned in 
the subsequent passage. 

Nor does the identification, made in a clause of the text, 
of light with the intestinal heat give rise to any difficulty ; 
for that clause is meant to enjoin meditation on the highest 
Brahman in the form of intestinal heat, such meditation 
having a special result of its own. Moreover, the Lord 
himself declares that he constitutes the Self of the intestinal 
fire, ' Becoming the VaUvanara-fife I abide in the body of 
living creatures ' (Bha. Gi. XV, 14). 

26. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not 
(denoted) on account of the metre being denoted ; 
(we reply) not so, because thus the direction of the 
mind (on Brahman) is declared; for thus it is seen. 

The previous section at first refers to the metre called 
Gayatri, 'The Gayatri indeed is everything' (III, ia, 1), 
and then introduces — with the words ' this is also declared 
by a Rik verse ' — the verse, ' Such is the greatness of it 
(viz. the G4yatri),' &c. Now, as this verse also refers to 
the metre, there is not any reference to the highest Person. 
— To this objection the second part of the Sutra replies. 
The word ' Gayatri ' does not here denote the metre only, 
since this cannot possibly be the Self of all ; but the text 
declares the application of the idea of Gayatri to Brahman, 
i.e. teaches, to the end of a certain result being obtained, 
meditation on Brahman in so far as similar to Gayatri. 
For Brahman having four feet, in the sense indicated by 
the rik, may be compared to the Gayatri with its four 
(metrical) feet The Gayatri (indeed has as a rule three feet, 
but) occasionally a Gayatri with four feet is met with ; so, 
e.g., ' lndras sakipatUi | valena pfaTitaA | duoSyavano vrisha | 
samitsu sasahiA.' We see that in other passages also words 
primarily denoting metres are employed in other senses; 
thus, eg., in the sawrvargavidya (Kh. Up. IV, 3, 8), where 
Vira^- (the name of a metre of ten syllables) denotes a group 
of ten divine beings. 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 28. 249 

For this conclusion the next Sutra supplies a further 
argument. 

27. And thus also, because (thus only) the desig- 
nation of the beings, and so on, being the (four) feet 
is possible. 

. The text, moreover, designates the Gayatrt as having 
four feet, after having referred to the beings, the earth, the 
body, and the heart; now this has a sense only if it is 
Brahman, which here is called Gayatrt. 

28. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (recognised) 
on account of the difference of designation ; (we say) 
not so, on account of there being no contradiction in 
either (designation). 

In the former passage, ' three feet of it are what is im- 
mortal in heaven,' heaven is referred to as the abode of 
the being under, discussion; while in the latter passage, 
' that light which shines above this heaven,' heaven is men- 
tioned as marking its boundary. Owing to this discre- 
pancy, the Brahman referred to in the former text is not 
recognised in the latter. — This objection the Sutra disposes 
of by pointing out that owing to the essential agreement of 
the two statements, nothing stands in the way of the re- 
quired recognition. When we say, ' The hawk is on the 
top of the tree,' and 'the hawk is above the top of the 
tree,' we mean one and the same thing. — The ' light,' there- 
fore, is nothing else but the most glorious and luminous 
highest Person. Him who in the former passage is called 
four-footed, we know to have an extraordinarily beautiful 
shape and colour — (cp., e. g., ' I know that great Person of 
sunlike colour beyond the darkness ' (Svet. Up. Ill, 9) — , and 
as hence his brilliancy also must be extraordinary, he is, 
in the text under discussion, quite appropriately called 
'light.' — Here terminates the adhikarawa of 'light.' 

It has been shown that the being endowed with supreme 
brilliance, called * Light,' which the text mentions as some- 
thing well known, is the highest Person. The Sutrakara 
will now show that the being designated as Indra and 



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250 vedAnta-s<jtras. 



Prawa, which the text enjoins as an object of meditation, 
for the reason that it is the means for attaining immor- 
tality — a power which is inseparable from causal power — , 
is likewise the highest Person. 

29. Pra#a is Brahman, on account of connexion. 

We read in the Pratardana-vidya in the Kaushftaki- 
brahma»a that 'Pratardana, the son of Divodasa, came, 
by fighting and strength, to the beloved abode of Indra.' 
Being asked by Indra to choose a boon he requests 
the God to bestow on him that boon which he himself 
considers most beneficial to man ; whereupon Indra 
says, ' I am prawa (breath), the intelligent Self, meditate 
on me as Life, as Immortality.' Here the doubt arises 
whether the being called Prawa and Indra, and desig- 
nating itself as the object of a meditation most beneficial 
to man, is an individual soul, or the highest Self. — An 
individual soul, the Purvapakshin maintains. For, he 
says, the word ' Indra ' is known to denote an individual 
God, and the word ' Pra«a,' which stands in grammatical 
co-ordination with Indra, also applies to individual souls. 
This individual being, called Indra, instructs Pratardana 
that meditation on himself is most beneficial to man. But 
what is most beneficial to man is only the means to attain 
immortality, and such a means is found in meditation on 
the causal principle of the world, as we know from the 
text, ' For him there is delay only so long as he is not 
delivered; then he will be perfect' (Kh. Up. VI, 14, a). 
We hence conclude that Indra, who is known as an indi- 
vidual soul, is the causal principle, Brahman. 

This view is rejected by the Sutra. The being called 
Indra and Pra«a is not a mere individual soul, but the 
highest Brahman, which is other than all individual souls. 
For on this supposition only it is appropriate that the 
being introduced as Indra and Prina should, in the way of 
grammatical co-ordination, be connected with such terms 
as ' blessed,' ' non-ageing,' ' immortal.' (' That prawa indeed 
is the intelligent Self, blessed, non-ageing, immortal,' Kau. 
Up. Ill, 9.) 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 30. 25 1 

30. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) 
on account of the speaker denoting himself; (we 
say, not so), because the multitude of connexions 
with the inner Self (is possible only) in that (speaker 
if viewed as Brahman). 

An objection is raised. — That the being introduced as 
Indra and Prawa should be the highest Brahman, for the 
reason that it is identical with him who, later on, is called 
' blessed,' ' non-ageing, ' immortal ' — this we cannot admit. 
' Know me only, I am prawa, meditate on me as the 
intelligent Self, as life, as immortality* — the speaker of 
these words is Indra, and this Indra enjoins on Pratardana 
meditation on his own person only, the individual character 
of which is brought out by reference to certain deeds of 
strength such as the slaying of the son of Tvash/r* (' I 
slew the three-headed son of Tvash/ro,' &c). As thus the 
initial part of the section clearly refers to an individual 
being, the terms occurring in the concluding part (' blessed,' 
'non-ageing,' 'immortal') must be interpreted so as. to 
make them agree with what precedes. — This objection the 
Sutra disposes of. ' For the multitude of connexions with 
the Self — i.e. the multitude of things connected with the 
Self as its attributes — is possible only ' in that/ i. e. in that 
speaker viewed as the highest Brahman. ' For, as in 
a car, the circumference of the wheel is placed on the 
spokes, and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects 
placed on the subjects, and the subjects on the pra»a. 
That pra«a indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, non- 
ageing, immortal.' The ' objects ' (bhutamatr&A) here are 
the aggregate of non-sentient things ; the ' subjects ' 
(pra£ttamatra£) are the sentient beings in which the objects 
are said to abide ; when thereupon the texts says that of 
these subjects the being called Indra and Prawa is the 
abode, and that he is blessed, non-ageing, immortal ; this 
qualification of being the abode of this Universe, with all 
its non-sentient and sentient beings, can belong to the 
highest Self only, which is other than all individual 
souls. 



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252 vedAnta-s^tras. 



The Sfttra may also be explained in a somewhat different 
way, viz. ' there is a multitude of connexions belonging to 
the highest Self, i. e. of attributes special to the highest 
Self, in that, viz. section.' The text at first says, ' Choose 
thou that boon for me which thou deemest most beneficial to 
man ' — to which the reply is, * Meditate on me.' Here Indra- 
pra«a is represented as the object of a meditation which 
is to bring about Release ; the object of such meditation 
can be none but the highest Self. — ' He makes him whom 
he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed ; 
and him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds 
he makes do a bad deed.' The causality with regard to 
all actions which is here described is again a special attri- 
bute of the highest Self. — The same has to be said with 
regard to the attribute of being the abode of all, in the 
passage about the wheel and spokes, quoted above; and 
with regard to the attributes of bliss, absence of old age 
and immortality, referred to in another passage quoted 
before. Also the attributes of being 'the ruler of the 
worlds, the lord of all,' can belong to the highest Self 
only. — The conclusion therefore is that the being called 
Indra and Prawa is none other but the highest Self. — But 
how then can Indra, who is known to be an individual 
person only, enjoin meditation on himself? — To this ques- 
tion the next Sfltra replies. 

31. The instruction (given by Indra about him- 
self) (is possible) through insight based on Scripture, 
as in the case of Vamadeva. 

The instruction which, in the passages quoted, Indra 
gives as to the object of meditation, i. e. Brahman consti- 
tuting his Self, is not based on such an insight into his own 
nature as is established by other means of proof, but on an 
intuition of his own Self, mediated by Scripture. ' Having 
entered into them with this living Self let me evolve names 
and forms ' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2) ; ' In it all that exists has its 
Self (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'Entered within, the ruler of 
creatures, the Self of all' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 21); *He who 
dwelling in the Self is different from the Self,' &c. (Br*. Up. 



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I adhyAya, 1 pAda, 32. 253 

III, 7, 22) — from these and similar texts Indra has 
learned that the highest Self has the individual souls 
for its body, and that hence words such as ' I ' and ' thou,' 
which denote individual beings, extend in their connotation 
up to the highest Self; when, therefore, he says, ' Know me 
only,' and ' Meditate on me,' he really means to teach that 
the highest Self, of which his own individual person is the 
body, is the proper object of meditation. ' As in the case 
of Vamadeva.' As the Riahi Vamadeva perceiving that 
Brahman is the inner Self of all, that all things constitute 
its body, and that the meaning of words denoting a body 
extends up to the principle embodied, denotes with the 
word ' I ' the highest Brahman to which he himself stands 
in the relation of a body, and then predicates of this ' I ' 
Manu Surya and other beings — ' Seeing this the JZishi. 
Vamadeva understood, I am Manu, I am Surya ' (Br i. Up. 
I, 4, 10). Similarly Prahlada says, ' As the Infinite one 
abides within all, he constitutes my " I " also ; all is from 
me, I am all, within me is all.' (Vi. Pu. I, 19, 85.) 
The next Sutra states, in reply to an objection, the reason 
why, in the section under discussion, terms denoting the 
individual soul, and others denoting non-sentient things are 
applied to Brahman. 

32. If it be said (that Brahman is not meant) on 
account of characteristic marks of the individual soul 
and the chief vital air ; we say no, on account of the 
threefoldness of meditation ; on account of (such 
threefold meditation) being met (in other texts also) ; 
and on account of (such threefold meditation) being 
appropriate here (also). 

An objection is raised. ' Let none try to find out what 
speech is, let him know the speaker ' ; ' I slew the three- 
headed son of Tvash/ri ; I delivered the Arunmukhas, the 
devotees, to the wolves ' ; these passages state characteristic 
marks of an individual soul (viz. the god Indra). — ' As long 
as Pr£»a dwells in this body, so long there is life' ; ' Pra»a 
alone is the conscious Self, and having laid hold of this 
body, it makes it rise up.' — These passages again mention 



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254 vedAnta-sCtras. 



characteristic attributes of the chief vital air. Hence 
there is here no ' multitude of attributes belonging to the 
Self.' — The latter part of the Sutra refutes this objection. 
The highest Self is called by these different terms id 
order to teach threefoldness of devout meditation ; viz. 
meditation on Brahman in itself as the cause of the entire 
world ; on Brahman as having for its body the totality of 
enjoying (individual) souls; and on Brahman as having 
for its body the objects and means of enjoyment. — This 
threefold meditation on Brahman, moreover, is met with 
also in other chapters of the sacred text Passages such 
as 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' 'Bliss is 
Brahman,' dwell on Brahman in itself. Passages again such 
as ' Having created that he entered into it. Having entered 
it he became sat and tyat, defined and undefined,' &c. (Taitt. 
Up. II, 6), represent Brahman as having for its body the 
individual souls and inanimate nature. Hence, in the 
chapter under discussion also, this threefold view of 
Brahman is quite appropriate. Where to particular indi- 
vidual beings such as Hirawyagarbha, and so on, or to 
particular inanimate things such as prakriti, and so on, 
there are attributed qualities especially belonging to the 
highest Self; or where with words denoting such persons 
and things there are co-ordinated terms denoting the 
highest Self, the intention of the texts is to convey the 
idea of the highest Self being the inner Self of all such 
persons and things. — The settled conclusion, therefore, is 
that the being designated as Indra and Prima is other 
than an individual soul, viz. the highest Self. 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda. 255 



SECOND PADA. 

The contents of the first PAda may be summed up as 
follows : — It has been shown that a person who has read 
the text of the Veda ; who further, through the study of 
the Karma-Mimamsa, has acquired a full knowledge of the 
nature of (sacrificial and similar) works, and has recognised 
that the fruits of such works are limited and non-per- 
manent; in whom there has arisen the desire for the 
highest aim of man, i.e. Release, which, as he has come to 
know in the course of reading the Vedanta portions of 
scripture, is effected by meditation on the nature of Brah- 
man — such meditation having an infinite and permanent 
result ; who has convinced himself that words are capable 
of conveying information about accomplished things (not 
only about things to be done), and has arrived at the con- 
clusion that the Vedanta-texts are an authoritative means 
of knowledge with regard to the highest Brahman ;— that 
such a person, we say, should begin the study of the 
.Sarlraka-Mimawsa which indicates the method how Brah- 
man is to be known through the Vedanta-texts. 

We next have shown that the text 'That from which 
these creatures are born,' &c, conveys the idea of the 
highest Brahman as that being which in sport, as it were, 
creates, sustains, and finally reabsorbs this entire universe, 
comprising within itself infinite numbers of variously con- 
stituted animated beings — moving and non-moving — , of 
objects of enjoyment for those beings, of means of enjoy- 
ment, and of abodes of enjoyment ; and which is the sole 
cause of all bliss. We have established that this highest 
Brahman, which is the sole cause of the world, cannot be 
the object of the other means of knowledge, and hence is 
to be known through scripture only. We have pointed 
out that the position of scripture as an authoritative means 
of knowledge is established by the fact that all the Vedanta- 
texts connectedly refer to the highest Brahman, which, 
although not related to any injunctions of action or absten- 



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256 . vedanta-sOtras. 



tion from action, by its own essential nature constitutes the 
highest end of man. We have proved that Brahman, which 
the Vedanta-texts teach to be the sole cause of the world, 
must be an intelligent principle other than the non-sentient 
pradhana, since Brahman is said to think. We have 
declared that this intelligent principle is other than the 
so-called individual soul, whether in the state of bondage 
or that of release ; since the texts describe it as in the 
enjoyment of supreme bliss, all-wise, the cause of fear or 
fearlessness on the part of intelligent beings, the inner Self 
of all created things, whether intelligent or non-intelligent, 
possessing the power of realising all its purposes, and so 
on. — We have maintained that this highest Being has 
a divine form, peculiar to itself, not made of the stuff of 
Prakrfti, and not due to karman. — We have explained 
that the being which some texts refer to as a well-known 
cause of the world — designating it by terms such as ether 
or breath, which generally denote a special non-sentient 
being — is that same highest Self which is different from all 
beings, sentient or non-sentient — We have declared that, 
owing to its connexion with heaven, this same highest Self 
is to be recognised in what the text calls a ' light,' said to 
possess supreme splendour, such as forms a special charac- 
teristic of the highest Being. We have stated that, as we 
recognise through insight derived from scripture, that same 
highest Person is denoted by terms such as Indra, and so 
on ; as the text ascribes to that ' Indra ' qualities exclu- 
sively belonging to the highest Self, such, e.g., as being 
the cause of the attainment of immortality. — And the 
general result arrived at was that the Vedanta-texts help 
us to the knowledge of one being only, viz. Brahman, or 
the highest Person, or N&raya«a — of whom it is shown 
that he cannot possibly be the object of the other means 
of knowledge, and whom the possession of an unlimited 
number of glorious qualities proves to differ totally from 
all other beings whatsoever. 

Now, although Brahman is the only object of the teach- 
ing of the Vedanta-texts, yet some of these texts might give 
rise to the notion that they aim at setting forth (not 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, i. 2 57 

Brahman), but some particular being comprised within 
either the pradhana or the aggregate of individual souls. 
The remaining Padas of the first Adhyaya therefore apply 
themselves to the task of dispelling this notion and 
proving that what the texts in question aim at is to set 
forth certain glorious qualities of Brahman. The second 
Pada discusses those texts which contain somewhat obscure 
references to the individual soul; the third Pada those 
which contain clear references to the same ; and the fourth 
Pada finally those texts which appear to contain even 
clearer intimations of the individual soul, and so on. 

i. Everywhere ; because there is taught what is 
known. 

We read in the .Oandogya, ' Man is made of thought ; 
according to what his thought is in this world, so will he be 
when he has departed this life. Let him form this thought : 
he who consists of mind, whose body is breath, whose form is 
light,' &c. (Ill, 14). We here understand that of the medita- 
tion enjoined by the clause ' let him form this thought ' the' 
object is the being said to consist of mind, to have breath 
for its body, &c. A doubt, however, arises whether the 
being possessing these attributes be the individual soul or 
the highest Self. — The POrvapakshin maintains the former 
alternative. For, he says, mind and breath are instru- 
ments of the individual soul; while the text 'without 
breath, without mind,' distinctly denies them to the highest 
Self. Nor can the Brahman mentioned in a previous 
clause of the same section ('AH this indeed is Brahman') 
be connected as an object with the meditation enjoined in 
the passage under discussion ; for Brahman is there re- 
ferred to in order to suggest the idea of its being the Self 
of all — which idea constitutes a means for bringing about 
that calmness of mind which is helpful towards the act of 
meditation enjoined in the clause 'Let a man meditate 
with calm mind,' &c. Nor, again, can it be said that as the 
meditation conveyed by the clause 'let him form this, 
thought ' demands an object, Brahman, although mentioned 
in another passage, only admits of being connected with; 
[48] S 



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? 5 8 vedAnta-sOtr AS. 



the passage under discussion ; for the demand for an 
object is fully satisfied by the being made of mind, &c, 
which is mentioned in that very passage itself ; in order to 
supply the object we have merely to change the case- 
terminations of the words ' manomayaA prktiasarlraA,' &c. 
It having thus been determined that the being made of 
mind is the individual soul, we further conclude that the 
Brahman mentioned in the concluding passage of the 
section ('That is Brahman') is also the individual soul, 
there called Brahman in order to glorify it. 

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sutra. The 
being made of mind is the highest Self ; for the text states 
certain qualities, such as being made of mind, &c, which 
are well known to denote, in all Vedanta-texts, Brahman 
only. Passages such as ' He who is made Of mind, the 
guide of the body of breath ' (Mu. Up. II, a, 7) ; ■ There is 
the ether within the heart, and in it there is the Person, 
consisting of mind, immortal, golden ' (Taitt Up. I, 6, 1) ; 
1 He is conceived by the heart, by wisdom, by the mind. 
Those who know him are immortal' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 9); 
' He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech, but by 
a purified mind' (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 8); 'The breath of 
breath ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 18 ?) ; 'Breath alone is the con* 
scious Self, and having laid hold of this body it makes it 
rise up ' (Ka. Up. Ill, 3) ; * All these beings merge into 
breath alone, and from breath they arise ' (KA. Up. I, 1 1, 
5) — these and similar texts refer to Brahman as consisting 
of mind, to be apprehended by a purified mind, having 
breath for its body, and being the abode and ruler of 
breath. This being so, we decide that in the concluding 
passage, ' my Self within the heart, that is Brahman,' the 
word ' Brahman ' has to be taken in its primary sense (and 
does not denote the individual soul). The text which 
declares Brahman to be without mind and breath, merely 
means to deny that the thought of Brahman depends on 
a mind (internal organ), and that its life depends on 
breath. 

Or else we may interpret the Vedic text and the Sutra 
as follows. The passage ' All this is Brahman ; let a man 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, i. 259 

meditate with a calm mind on this world as originating, 
ending, and breathing in Brahman,' conveys the imagina- 
tion of meditation on Brahman as the Self of all. The 
subsequent clause ' Let him form the thought,' &c, forms 
an additional statement to that injunction, the purport of 
which is to suggest certain attributes of Brahman, such as 
being made of mind. So that the meaning of the whole 
section is 'Let a man meditate on Brahman, which is made 
of mind, has breath for its body, &c, as the Self of the 
whole world.' — Here a doubt presents itself. Does the 
term ' Brahman ' in this section denote the individual soul 
or the highest Self? — The individual soul, the Pikrva- 
pakshin maintains, for that only admits of being exhibited 
in co-ordination with the word 'all.' For the word 'all' 
denotes the entire world from Brahma down to a blade of 
grass ; and the existence of Brahma and other individual 
beings is determined by special forms of karman, the root 
of which is the beginningless Nescience of the individual 
soul. The highest Brahman, on the other hand, which is 
all-knowing, all-powerful, free from all evil and all shadow 
of Nescience and similar imperfections, cannot possibly 
exist as the ' All ' which comprises within itself everything 
that is bad. Moreover we find that occasionally the term 
' Brahman ' is applied to the individual soul also ; just as 
the highest Lord (paramervara) may be called ' the highest 
Self ' (paramatman) or ' the highest Brahman.' That 
' greatness ' (brthattva ; which is the essential characteristic 
of ' brahman ') belongs to the individual soul when it has 
freed itself from its limiting conditions, is moreover attested 
by scripture : * That (soul) is fit for infinity' (Svet. Up.V, 9). 
And as the soul's Nescience is due to karman (only), the 
text may very well designate it — as it does by means of 
the term ' ta^alan ' — as the cause of the origin, subsistence, 
and reabsorption of the world. That is to say — the indi- 
vidual soul which, in its essential nature, is non-limited, 
and therefore of the nature of Brahman, owing to the 
influence of Nescience enters into the state of a god, or 
a man, or an animal, or a plant. 

This view is rejected by the Sutra. ' Everywhere,' i. e, 

S 2 



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260 . vedAnta-sCtras. 



in the whole world which is referred to in the clause 'All 
this is Brahman ' we have to understand the highest 
Brahman — which the term ' Brahman ' denotes as the Self 
of the world — , and not the individual soul ; ' because there 
is taught what is known/ i. e. because the clause 'All this is 
Brahman ' — for which clause the term ' tagfalan ' supplies 
the reason — refers to Brahman as something generally 
known. Since the world springs from Brahman, is merged 
in Brahman, and depends on Brahman for its life, therefore 
— as the text says — ' All this has its Self in Brahman ' ; and 
this shows to us that what the text understands by Brah- 
man is that being from which, as generally known from the 
Vedanta-texts, there proceed the creation, and so on, of 
the world. That the highest Brahman only, all-wise and 
supremely blessed, is the cause of the origin, &c, of the 
world, is declared in the section which begins, ' That from 
which these beings are born,' &c, and which says further 
on, ' he knew that Bliss is Brahman, for from bliss these 
beings are born' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 6); and analogously 
the text ' He is the cause, the lord of lords of the organs,' 
&c. (Svet. Up. VI, 9), declares the highest Brahman to be 
the cause of the individual soul. Everywhere, in fact, the 
texts proclaim the causality of the highest Self only. As 
thus the world which springs from Brahman, is merged in 
it, and breathes through it, has its Self in Brahman, the 
identity of the two may properly be asserted ; and hence 
the text — the meaning of which is ' Let a man meditate 
with calm mind on the highest Brahman of which the world 
is a mode, which has the world for its body, and which is 
the Self of the world ' — first proves Brahman's being the 
universal Self, and then enjoins meditation on it. The 
highest Brahman, in its causal condition as well as in its 
so-called ' effected ' state, constitutes the Self of the world, 
for in the former it has for its body all sentient and non- 
sentient beings in their subtle form, and in the latter the 
same beings in their gross condition. Nor is there any 
contradiction between such identity with the world on 
Brahman's part, and the fact that Brahman treasures within 
itself glorious qualities antagonistic to .all evil; for the 



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I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2. 26 1 

imperfections adhering to the bodies, which are mere 
modes of Brahman, do not affect Brahman itself to which 
the modes belong. Such identity rather proves for Brah- 
man supreme lordly power, and thus adds to its excel* 
lences. Nor, again, can it rightly be maintained that of 
the individual soul also identity with the world can be 
predicated ; for the souls being separate according to the 
bodies with which they are joined cannot be identical with 
each other. Even in the state of release, when the indi- 
vidual soul is not in any way limited, it does not possess 
that identity with the world on which there depends 
causality with regard to the world's creation, sustentation, 
and reabsorption ; as will be declared in Sutra IV, 4, 17. 
Nor, finally, does the Purvapakshin improve his case by 
contending that the individual soul may be the cause of the 
creation, &c, of the world because it (viz. the soul) is due 
to karman ; for although the fact given as reason is true, 
all the same the Lord alone is the cause of the Universe. — 
All this proves that the being to which the text refers as 
Brahman is none other than the highest Self. 

This second alternative interpretation of the Sutra is 
preferred by most competent persons. The VWttikara, 
e.g. says, 'That Brahman which the clause "All this is 
Brahman " declares to be the Self of all is the Lord.' 

2. And because the qualities meant to be stated 
are possible (in Brahman). 

The qualities about to be stated can belong to the 
highest Self only. ' Made of mind, having breath for its 
body,' &c. ' Made of mind ' means to be apprehended by 
a purified mind only. The highest Self can be appre- 
hended only by a mind purified by meditation on that 
Self, such meditation being assisted by the seven means, 
viz. abstention, &c. (see above, p. 17). This intimates that 
the highest Self is of pure goodness, precluding all evil, and 
therefore different in nature from everything else ; for by 
the impure minded impure objects only can be appre- 
hended. — ' Having the vital breath for its body ' means — 
being the supporter of all life in the world. To stand in- 



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262 vedAnta-sOtras. 



the relation of a body to something else, means to abide in 
that other thing, to be dependent on it, and to subserve it 
in a subordinate capacity, as we shall fully show later on. 
And all ' vital breath ' or ' life ' stands in that relation to 
the highest Self. 'Whose form is light'; i. e. who is of 
supreme splendour, his form being a divine one of supreme 
excellence peculiar to him, and not consisting of the stuff 
of Prakn'ti. — ' Whose purposes are true ' ; i. e. whose pur- 
poses realise themselves without any obstruction. • Who 
is the (or " of the ") Self of ether ' ; i. e. who is of a delicate 
and transparent nature, like ether ; or who himself is the 
Self of ether, which is the causal substance of everything 
else ; or who shines forth himself and makes other things 
shine forth. — ' To whom all works belong'; i.e. he of whom 
the whole world is the work ; or he to whom all activities 
belong. — ' To whom all wishes belong ' ; L e. he to whom all 
pure objects and means of desire and enjoyment belong. 
' He to whom all odours and tastes belong ' ; i. e. he to 
whom there belong, as objects of enjoyment, all kinds of 
uncommon, special, perfect, supremely excellent odours 
and tastes ; ordinary smells and tastes being negatived by 
another text, viz. 'That which is without sound, without 
touch, without taste,' &c. (Ka. Up. Ill, 15). — 'He who 
embraces all this ' ; i. e. he who makes his own the whole 
group of glorious qualities enumerated. — ' He who does 
not speak,' because, being in possession of all he could 
desire, he ' has no regard for anything ' ; i. e. he who, in full 
possession of lordly power, esteems this whole world with 
all its creatures no higher than a blade of grass, and hence 
abides in silence. — All these qualities stated in the text 
can belong to the highest Self only. 

3. But, on account of impossibility, not the em- 
bodied soul. 

Those who fully consider this infinite multitude of 
exalted qualities will recognise that not even a shadow of 
them can belong to the individual soul — whether in the 
state of bondage or that of release — which is a thing as 
insignificant as a glow-worm and, through its connexion 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, 7. 263 

with a body, liable to the attacks of endless suffering. It 
is not possible therefore to hold that the section under 
discussion should refer to the individual soul. 

4. And because there is (separate) denotation of 
the object and the agent. 

The clause 'When I shall have departed from hence I 
shall obtain him ' denotes the highest Brahman as the 
object to be obtained, and the individual soul as that 
which obtains it. This shows that the soul which obtains 
is the person meditating, and the highest Brahman that is 
to be obtained, the object of meditation : Brahman, there- 
fore, is something different from the attaining soul. 

5. On account of the difference of words. 

The clause ' That is the Self of me, within the heart ' 
designates the embodied soul by means of a genitive form, 
while the object of meditation is exhibited in the nomina- 
tive case. Similarly, a text of the Va^asaneyins, which 
treats of the same topic, applies different terms to the 
embodied and the highest Self, 'Like a rice grain, or a 
barley grain, or a canary seed, or the kernel of a canary 
seed, thus that golden Person is within the Self ' (Sat. Br. 
X, 6, 3, 3). Here the locative form, 'within the Self,' 
denotes the embodied Self, and the nominative, ' that 
golden Person,' the object to be meditated on. — All this 
proves the highest Self to be the object of meditation. 

6. And on account of Smriti. 

' I dwell within the hearts of all, from me come memory 
and knowledge, as well as their loss ' ; ' He who free from 
delusion knows me to be the highest Person ' j ' The Lord, 
O Ar^iina, is seated in the heart of all Beings, driving 
round by his mysterious power all beings as if mounted on 
a machine; to him fly for refuge' (Bha. Gi. XV, 15, 19 ; 
XVIII, 61). These Smrtti-texts show the embodied soul 
to be the meditating subject, and the highest Self the 
object of meditation. 

7. Should it be said that (the passage does) not 



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264 VEDANTA-stifRAS. 



(refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of 
the abode, and on account of the denotation of that 
(viz. minuteness of the being meditated on) ; we 
say no, because (Brahman) has thus to be medi- 
tated upon, and because (in the same passage) it is 
said to be like ether. 

It might be contended that, as the text ' he is my Self 
within the heart ' declares the being meditated on to dwell 
within a minute abode, viz. the heart ; and as moreover 
another text — ' smaller than a grain of rice,' &c, declares it 
to be itself of minute size, that being cannot be the highest 
Self, but only the embodied soul. For other passages 
speak of the highest Self as unlimited, and of the embodied 
soul as having the size of the point of a goad (cp. e.g. 
Mu. Up. I, 1, 6, and Svet. Up. V, 8). — This objection the 
Sutra rebuts by declaring that the highest Self is spoken of 
as such, i. e. minute, on account of its having to be medi- 
tated upon as such. Such minuteness does not, however, 
belong to its true nature; for in the same section it is 
distinctly declared to be infinite like ether — ' greater than 
the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, 
greater than all these worlds ' (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 3). This 
shows that the designation of the highest Self as minute is 
for the purpose of meditation only. — The connexion of the 
whole section then is as follows. The clause ' All this is 
Brahman ; let a man meditate with calm mind on this 
world as beginning, ending, and breathing in Brahman,' 
enjoins meditation on Brahman as being the Self of all, 
in so far as it is the cause of the origin and destruction of 
all, and entering into all beings as their soul gives life to 
them. The next clause, 'Man is made of thought ; accord- 
ing as his thought is in this world, so will he be when he 
has departed this life,' declares the attainment of the 
desired object to depend on the nature of the meditation ; 
and the following clause, ' Let him therefore form the fol- 
lowing thought,' thereupon repeats the injunction with a 
view to the declaration of details. The clause ' He who 
consists of mind,' &c., up to ' who is never surprised,' then 



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I ADHYAVa, 2 PADA, 8. 265 

states the nature and qualities, of the being to be medi- 
tated upon, which are to be comprised in the meditation. 
Next, the clause ' He is my Self,' up to * the kernel of a 
canary seed,' declares that the highest Person, for the 
purpose of meditation, abides in the heart of the medi- 
tating devotee ; representing it as being itself minute, since 
the heart is minute. After this the clause ' He also is my 
Self,' up to ' who is never surprised,' describes those aspects 
of the being meditated upon as within the heart, which are 
to be attained by the devotee. Next, the words ' this my 
Self within the heart is that Brahman ' enjoins the reflection 
that the highest Brahman, as described before, is, owing to 
its supreme kindness, present in our hearts in order thereby 
to refresh and inspirit us. Then the clause * When I shall 
have departed from hence I shall obtain him ' suggests the 
idea that there is a certainty of obtaining him on the basis 
of devout meditation ; and finally the clause ' He who has 
this faith has no doubt ' declares that the devotee who is 
firmly convinced of his aim being attainable in the way 
described, will attain it beyond any doubt.— From all this 
it appears that the ' limitation of abode,' and the ' minute* 
ness ' ascribed to Brahman, are merely for the purpose of 
meditation. 

8. Should it be said that there is attainment of 
fruition (of pleasure and pain) ; we reply, not so, on 
account of difference. 

But, if the highest Brahman is assumed to dwell within 
bodies, like the individual soul, it follows that, like the 
latter, it is subject to the experience of pleasure and pain, 
such experience springing from connexion with bodies! — 
Of this objection the Sutra disposes by remarking ' not so, 
on account of difference (of reason).' For what is the 
cause of experiences, pleasurable or painful, is not the mere 
dwelling within a body, but rather the subjection to the 
influence of good and evil deeds ; and such subjection is 
impossible in the case of the highest Self to which all evil 
is foreign. Compare the scriptural text ' One of the two 
eats the sweet fruit, the other one looks on without eating ' 



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266 vedAnta-sOtras. 



(Mu. Up. Ill, i, i). — Here finishes the adhikarawa of ' what 
is known everywhere.' 

Well then, if the highest Self is not an enjoyer, we 
must conclude that wherever fruition is referred to, the 
embodied soul only is meant ! — Of this view the next adhi- 
karawa disposes. 

9. The eater (is the highest Self) on account of 
there being taken all that is movable and im- 
movable. 

We read in the Ka/Aavalll (I, a, 25), ' Who then knows 
where he is to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are 
but food, and death itself a condiment ? ' A doubt here 
arises whether the ' eater,' suggested by the words ' food ' 
and ' condiment,' is the individual soul or the highest Self. 
— The individual soul, the Purvapakshin maintains ; for 
all enjoyment presupposes works, and works belong to the 
individual soul only. — Of this view the Sutra disposes. 
The ' eater ' can be the highest Self only, because the 
taking, i. e. eating, of the whole aggregate of movable and 
immovable things can be predicated of that Self only. 
' Eating ' does not here mean fruition dependent on work, 
but rather the act of reabsorption of the world on the part 
of the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishmi, who is the cause of 
the origination, subsistence, and final destruction of the 
universe. This appears from the fact that Vishmi is 
mentioned in the same section, ' He reaches the end of his 
journey, and that is the highest place of Vishmi ' (Ka. Up. 
I, 3, 9). Moreover the clause ' to whom death is a condi- 
ment ' shows that by the Brahmans and Kshattriyas, men- 
tioned in the text, we have to understand the whole 
universe of moving and non-moving things, viewed as 
things to be consumed by the highest Self. For a condi- 
ment is a thing which, while itself being eaten, causes other 
things to be eaten ; the meaning of the passage, therefore, 
is that while death itself is consumed, being a condiment 
as it were, there is at the same time eaten whatever is 
flavoured or made palatable by death, and that is the 
entire world of beings in which the Brahmans and Kshat- 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, io. 267 

triyas hold the foremost place. Now such eating of course 
is destruction or rcabsorption, and hence such enjoyment — 
meaning general reabsorption — can belong to the highest 
Self only. 

10. And on account of the topic of the whole 
section. 

Moreover the highest Brahman constitutes the topic of 
the entire section. Cp. ' The wise who knows the Self as 
great and omnipresent does not grieve ' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22) ; 
' That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by under- 
standing, nor by much learning. He whom the Self 
chooses, by him the Self can be gained ; the Self chooses 
him as his own ' (I, 2, 23). — Moreover, the clause (forming 
part of the text under discussion), ' Who knows him (i. e. the 
being which constitutes the topic of the section) where he 
is ?' clearly shows that we have to recognise here the Self 
of which it had previously been said that it is hard to 
know unless it assists us with its grace. 

To this conclusion a new objection presents itself. — 
Further on in the same Upanishad (I, 3, 1) we meet with 
the following text: ' There are two, drinking their reward in 
the world of their own works, entered into the cave, dwell- 
ing on the highest summit ; those who know Brahman call 
them shade and light, likewise those householders who 
perform the Trima£iketa-sacrince.' Now this text clearly 
refers to the individual soul which enjoys the reward of 
its works, together with an associate coupled to it. And 
this associate is either the vital breath, or the organ of 
knowledge (buddhi). For the drinking of 'r*ta' is the 
enjoyment of the fruit of works, and such enjoyment does 
not suit the highest Self. The buddhi, or the vital breath, 
on the other hand, which are instruments of the enjoying 
embodied soul, may somehow be brought into connexion 
with the enjoyment of the fruit of works. As the text is 
thus seen to refer to the embodied soul coupled with some 
associate, we infer, on the ground of the two texts belong- 
ing to one section, that also the ' eater ' described in the 



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268 ved'Anta-sOtras. 



former text is none other than the individual souL — To this 
objection the next Sutra replies. 

11. The 'two entered into the cave' are the two 
Selfs ; on account of this being seen. 

The two, entered into the cave and drinking their reward, 
are neither the embodied soul together with the vital 
breath, nor the embodied soul together with the buddhi ; 
it is rather the embodied Self and the highest Self which 
are designated by those terms. For this is seen, i. e. it is 
seen that in that section the individual Self and the highest 
Self only are spoken of as entered into the cave. To the 
highest Self there refers I, 2, 1 2, ' The wise who by medi- 
tation on his Self recognises the Ancient who is difficult to 
see, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the 
cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves 
joy and sorrow far behind.' And to the individual soul 
there refers I, 4, 7, • Who is together with the vital breath, 
who is Aditi, who is made of the deities, who entering into 
the cave abides therein, who was born variously through 
the elements.' Aditi here means the individual soul which 
enjoys (atti) the fruits of its works ; which is associated 
with the vital breath ; which is made of the deities, i. e. 
whose enjoyment is dependent on the different sense- 
organs ; which abides in the hollow of the heart ; and 
which, being connected with the elementary substances, 
earth, and so on, is born in various forms — human, divine, 
&c. — That the text speaks of the two Selfs as drinking their 
reward (while actually the individual soul only does so) is 
to be understood in the same way as the phrase 'there 
go the umbrella-bearers' (one of whom only carries the 
umbrella). Or else we may account for this on the ground 
that both are agents with regard to the drinking, in so far 
as the ' drinking ' individual soul is caused to drink by the 
highest Self. 

12. And on account of distinctive qualities. 

Everywhere in that section we meet with statements of 
distinctive attributes of the two Selfs, the highest Self 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, 12. 269 

being represented as the object of meditation and attain- 
ment, and the individual Self as the meditating and 
attaining subject The passage ' When he has known and 
understood that which is born from Brahman, the intelli- 
gent, to be divine and venerable, then he obtains everlast- 
ing peace' (1, 1, 17) refers to the meditating individual soul 
which recognises itself as being of the nature of Brahman. 
On the other hand, I, a, 3, ' That which is a bridge for 
sacrificers, the highest imperishable Brahman for those who 
wish to cross over to the fearless shore, the Na£iketa, may 
we be able to know that,' refers to the highest Self as the 
object of meditation ; ' Na£iketa ' here meaning that which 
is to be reached through the NiLHketa-rite. Again, the 
passage ' Know the Self to be sitting in the chariot and 
the body to be the chariot ' (1, 3, 3) refers to the meditating 
individual soul; and the verse, I, 3, 9, 'But he who has 
understanding for his charioteer, and holds the reins of the 
mind, he reaches the end of his journey, and that is the 
highest place of Vishwu,' refers to the embodied and the 
highest Selfs as that which attains and that which is to be 
attained. And in the text under discussion also (I, 3, 1), 
the two Selfs are distinctly designated as light and shade, 
the one being all-knowing, the other devoid of knowledge.' 
But, a new objection is raised, the initial passage, 1, 1, to, 
♦That doubt which there is when a man is dead — some 
saying, he is ; others, he is not,' clearly asks a question as 
to the true nature of the individual soul, and we hence 
conclude that that soul forms the topic of the whole 
chapter. — Not so, we reply. That question does not spring 
from any doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the 
soul apart from the body ; for if this were so the two first 
boons chosen by Na£iketas would be unsuitable. For the 
story runs as follows : When the sacrifice offered by the 
father of Na£iketas — at which all the possessions of the 
sacrificer were to be given to the priests — is drawing 
towards its close, the boy, feeling afraid that some deficiency 
on the part of the gifts might render the sacrifice unavail- 
ing, and dutifully wishing to render his father's sacrifice 
complete by giving his own person also, repeatedly asks 



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270 vedanta-sOtras. 



his father, * And to whom will you give me ' ? The father, 
irritated by the boy's persistent questioning, gives an angry 
reply, and in consequence of this the boy goes to the 
palace of Yama, and Yama being absent, stays there for 
three days without eating. Yama on his return is alarmed 
at this neglect of hospitality, and wishing to make up for 
it allows him to choose three boons. Na£iketas, thereupon, 
full of faith and piety, chooses as his first boon that his 
father should forgive him. Now it is clear that conduct of 
this kind would not be possible in the case of one not 
convinced of the soul having an existence independent of 
the body. For his second boon, again, he chooses the 
knowledge of a sacrificial fire, which has a result to be 
experienced only by a soul that has departed from the 
body ; and this choice also can clearly be made only by 
one who knows that the soul is something different from 
the body. When, therefore, he chooses for his third boon 
the clearing up of his doubt as to the existence of the soul 
after death (as stated in v. 30), it is evident that his ques- 
tion is prompted by the desire to acquire knowledge of the 
true nature of the highest Self— which knowledge has 
the form of meditation on the highest Self—, and by means 
thereof, knowledge of the true nature of final Release which 
consists in obtaining the highest Brahman. The passage, 
therefore, is not concerned merely with the problem as to 
the separation of the soul from the body, but rather with 
the problem of the Self freeing itself from all bondage 
whatever — the same problem, in fact, with which another 
scriptural passage also is concerned, viz. 'When he has 
departed there is no more knowledge' (Br*. Up. II, 4, 12). 
The full purport of Na£iketas' question, therefore, is as 
follows : When a man qualified for Release has died and 
thus freed himself from all bondage, there arises a doubt 
as to his existence or non-existence — a doubt due to the 
disagreement of philosophers as to the true nature of 
Release ; in order to clear up this doubt I wish to learn 
from thee the true nature of the state of Release. — Philo- 
sophers, indeed, hold many widely differing opinions as to 
what constitutes Release. Some hold that the Self is con- 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, 12. 271 

stitutcd by consciousness only, and that Release consists in 
the total destruction of this essential nature of the Self. 
Others, while holding the same opinion as to the nature of 
the Self, define Release as the passing away of Nescience 
(avidya). Others hold that the Self is in itself non-sentient, 
like a stone, but possesses, in the state of bondage, certain 
distinctive qualities, such as knowledge, and so on. Release 
then consists in the total removal of all these qualities, the 
Self remaining in a state of pure isolation (kaivalya). 
Others, again, who acknowledge a highest Self free from all 
imperfection, maintain that through connexion with limit- 
ing adjuncts that Self enters on the condition of an indi- 
vidual soul ; Release then means the pure existence of 
the highest Self, consequent on the passing away of the 
limiting adjuncts. Those, however, who understand the 
Vedanta, teach as follows: There is a highest Brahman 
which is the sole cause of the entire universe, which is 
antagonistic to all evil, whose essential nature is infinite 
knowledge and blessedness, which comprises within itself 
numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence, 
which is different in nature from all other beings, and which 
constitutes the inner Self of all. Of this Brahman, the indi- 
vidual souls — whose true nature is unlimited knowledge, 
and whose only essential attribute is the intuition of the 
supreme Self — are modes, in so far, namely, as they con- 
stitute its body. The true nature of these souls is, how- 
ever, obscured by Nescience, i. e. the influence of the 
beginningless chain of works ; and by Release then we have 
to understand that intuition of the highest Self, which is 
the natural state of the individual souls, and which follows 
on the destruction of Nescience. — When Na&ketas desires 
Yama graciously to teach him the true nature of Release 
and the means to attain it, Yama at first tests him by 
dwelling on the difficulty of comprehending Release, and 
by tempting him with various worldly enjoyments. But 
having in this way recognised the boy's thorough fitness, 
he in the end instructs him as to the kind of meditation on 
the highest Self which constitutes knowledge of the highest 
Reality, as to the nature of Release — which consists in 



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272 vedanta-sOtras. 



reaching the abode of the highest Self — , and as to all the 
required details. This instruction begins, I, 2, 13, 'The 
Ancient one who is difficult to see,' &c, and extends up to 
I, 3, 9, ' and that is the highest place of Vishwu.' — It thus 
is an established conclusion that the ' eater ' is no other 
than the highest Self. — Here terminates the adhikarana of 
' the eater.' 

13. (The Person) within the eye (is the highest 
Self) on account of suitability. 

The .Oandogas have the following text : ' The Person 
that is seen within the eye, that is the Self. This is the 
immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman ' (Kh. Up. IV, 15, 1). 
The doubt here arises whether the person that is here 
spoken of as abiding within the eye is the reflected Self, or 
some divine being presiding over the sense of sight, or the 
embodied Self, or the highest Self. — It is the reflected Selfj 
the Purvapakshin maintains; for the text refers to the 
person seen as something well known, and the expression, 
'is seen,' clearly refers to something directly perceived. 
Or it may be the individual soul, for that also may be 
referred to as something well known, as it is in special 
connexion with the eye : people, by looking into the open 
eye of a person, determine whether the living soul remains 
in him or is departing. Or else we may assume that the 
Person seen within the eye is some particular divine being, 
on the strength of the scriptural text, Br/. Up. V, 5, 2, ' He 
(the person seen within the sun) rests with his rays in him 
(the person within the eye).' Any of these beings may 
quite suitably be referred to as something well known. — 
Of these alternatives the Sutra disposes by declaring that 
the Person within the eye is the highest Self. For the 
text goes on to say about the Person seen within the eye, 
' They call him Samyadvama, for all blessings go towards 
him. He is also Vamanl, for he leads all blessings. He is 
also Bhamani, for he shines in all worlds.' And all these 
attributes can be reconciled with the highest Self only. 

14. And on account of the statement as to abode, 
and so on. 



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I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 15. 273 

Abiding within the eye, ruling the eye, and so on are 
predicated by scripture of the highest Self only, viz. in 
Br*. Up. Ill, 7, 18, 'He who dwells within the eye, who 
rules the eye within.' We therefore recognise that highest 
Self in the text, 'That Person which is seen within the 
eye.' The argument founded on reference to 'something 
well known ' thus suits the highest Self very well ; and also 
the clause which denotes immediate perception (' is seen ') 
appears quite suitable, since the highest Self is directly 
intuited by persons practising mystic concentration of 
mind (Yoga). 

15. And on account of the text referring only to 
what is characterised by pleasure. 

The Person abiding within the eye is the highest Person, 
for the following reason also. The topic of the whole 
section is Brahman characterised by delight, as indicated 
in the passage ' Ka (pleasure) is Brahman, Kha (ether) is 
Brahman ' (KA. Up. IV, 10, 5). To that same Brahman 
the passage under discussion (' The Person that is seen in 
the eye ') refers for the purpose of enjoining first a place 
with which Brahman is to be connected in meditation, and 
secondly some special qualities — such as comprising and 
leading all blessings — to be attributed to Brahman in 
meditation. — The word 'only' in the Sutra indicates the 
independence of the argument set forth. 

But — an objection is raised — between the Brahman intro- 
duced in the passage • Ka is Brahman,' &c, and the text under 
discussion there intervenes the vidya of the Fires (KA. 
Up. IV, n-13), and hence Brahman does not readily 
connect itself with our passage. For the text says that 
after the Fires had taught Upakojala the knowledge of 
Brahman (' Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman,' &c), they 
taught him a meditation on themselves ('After that the 
Garhapatya fire taught him,' &c, KA. Up. IV, 11, 1). And 
this knowledge of the Fires cannot be considered a mere 
subordinate part of the knowledge of Brahman, for the 
text declares that it has special fruits of its own — viz. 
the attainment of a ripe old age and prosperous descen- 
ds] T 



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a 74 vedAnta-sCtras. 



dants, &c. — which are not comprised in the results of the 
knowledge of Brahman, but rather opposed to them in 
nature. — To this we make the following reply. As both 
passages (viz. IV, 10, 5, * Breath is Brahman,' &c. ; and 
IV, 15, 1, 'this is Brahman') contain the word Brahman, 
and as from the words of the Fires, ' the teacher will tell 
you the way,' it follows that the knowledge of Brahman is 
not complete before that way has been taught, we deter- 
mine that the knowledge of the Fires which stands between 
the two sections of the knowledge of Brahman is a mere 
subordinate member of the latter. This also appears from 
the fact that the Garhapatya fire begins to instruct Upakojala 
only after he has been introduced into the knowledge of 
Brahman. Upakojala moreover complains that he is full 
of sorrows (I, 10, 3), and thus shows himself to be con- 
scious of all the sufferings incidental to human life — birth, 
old age, death, &c. — which result from man being troubled 
by manifold desires for objects other than the attainment 
of Brahman ; when therefore the Fires conclude their 
instruction by combining in saying, ' This, O friend, is the 
knowledge of us and the knowledge of the Self which we 
impart to thee,' it is evident that the vidya of the Fires has 
to be taken as a subordinate member of the knowledge of 
the Self whose only fruit is Release. And from this it 
follows that the statement of the results of the Agnividya 
has to be taken (not as an injunction of results — phalavidhi 
— but) merely as an arthavada (cp. Pu. Mt. Su. IV, 3, 1). 
It, moreover, is by no means true that the text mentions 
such fruits of the Agnividya as would be opposed to final 
Release ; all the fruits mentioned suit very well the case 
of a person qualified for Release. ' He destroys sin ' 
(Kh. Up. IV, 11, 2 ; 12, 2 ; 13, 2), i.e. he destroys all evil 
works standing in the way of the attainment of Brahman. 
' He obtains the world,' i. e. all impeding evil works having 
been destroyed he obtains the world of Brahman. ' He 
reaches his full age,' i. e. he fully reaches that age which 
is required for the completion of meditation on Brahman. 
' He lives long,' i. e. he lives unassailed by afflictions until 
he reaches Brahman. 'His descendants do not perish,' 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, 15. 275 

i. e. his pupils, and their pupils, as well as his sons, grand- 
sons, &C, do not perish ; i. e. they are all knowers of 
Brahman, in agreement with what another text declares 
to be the reward of knowledge of Brahman — ' In his 
family no one is born ignorant of Brahman' (Mu. Up. Ill, 
a, 9). ' We guard him in this world and the other,' i. e. 
we Fires guard him from all troubles until he reaches 
Brahman. — The Agnividya thus being a member of the 
Brahmavidya, there is no reason why the Brahman 
introduced in the earlier part of the Brahmavidya should 
not be connected with the latter part — the function of 
this latter part being to enjoin a place of meditation 
(Brahman being meditated on as the Person within the 
eye), and some special qualities of Brahman to be included 
in the meditation. — But (an objection is raised) as the 
Fires tell Upakojala ' the teacher will tell you the way,' 
we conclude that the teacher has to give information as 
to the way to Brahman only ; how then can his teaching 
refer to the place of meditation and the special qualities 
of Brahman? — We have to consider, we reply, in what 
connexion the Fires address those words to Upakarala. 
His teacher having gone on a journey without having 
imparted to him the knowledge of Brahman, and Upakojala 
being dejected on that account, the sacred fires of his 
teacher, well pleased with the way in which Upakayala had 
tended them, and wishing to cheer him up, impart to him 
the general knowledge of the nature of Brahman and the 
subsidiary knowledge of the Fires. But remembering 
that, as scripture says, 'the knowledge acquired from 
a teacher is best,' and hence considering it advisable that 
the teacher himself should instruct Upakarala as to the 
attributes of the highest Brahman, the place with which 
it is to be connected in meditation and the way leading to 
it, they tell him ' the teacher will tell you the way,' the 
• way ' connoting everything that remains to be taught by 
the teacher. In agreement herewith the teacher — having 
first said, ' I will tell you this ; and as water does not cling 
to a lotus leaf, so no evil clings to one who knows it' 
— instructs him about Brahman as possessing certain 

T 2 



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2 j6 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. 



auspicious attributes, and to be meditated upon as abiding 
within the eye, and about the way leading to Brahman. — 
It is thus a settled conclusion that the text under discussion 
refers to that Brahman which was introduced in the passage 
' Ka is Brahman,' and that hence the Person abiding within 
the eye is the highest Self. 

But — an objection is raised— how do you know that the 
passage ' Ka (pleasure) is Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brah- 
man' really refers to the highest Brahman, so as to be 
able to interpret on that basis the text about the Person 
within the eye? It is a more obvious interpretation to 
take the passage about Ka and Kha as enjoining a medi- 
tation on Brahman viewed under the form of elemental 
ether and of ordinary worldly pleasure. This interpretation 
would, moreover, be in agreement with other similarly 
worded texts (which are generally understood to enjoin 
meditation on Brahman in a definite form), such as ' Name 
is Brahman,' ' Mind is Brahman.' 

1 6. For that very reason that (ether) is Brahman. 

Because the clause ' What is Ka the same is Kha ' speaks 
of ether as characterised by pleasure, the ether which is 
denoted by ' Kha ' is no other than the highest Brahman. 
To explain. On the Fires declaring ' Breath is Brahman, 
Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upakarala says, 'I 
understand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand 
Ka and Kha.' The meaning of this is as follows. The 
Fires cannot speak of meditation on Brahman under the 
form of breath and so on, because they are engaged in 
giving instruction to me, who am afraid of birth, old age, 
death, &c, and desirous of final Release. What they 
declare to me therefore is meditation on Brahman itself. 
Now here Brahman is exhibited in co-ordination with 
certain well-known things, breath and so on. That Brahman 
should be qualified by co-ordination with breath is suitable, 
either from the point of view of Brahman having the attri- 
bute of supporting the world, or on account of Brahman 
being the ruler of breath, which stands to it in the relation 
of a body. Hence Upakarala says, ' I understand that 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, 17. 277 

breath is Brahman.' With regard to pleasure and ether, 
on the other hand, there arises the question whether they 
are exhibited in the relation of qualifying attributes of 
Brahman on the ground of their forming the body of 
Brahman, and hence being ruled by it, or whether the two 
terms are meant to determine each other, and thus to 
convey a notion of the true nature of Brahman being con- 
stituted by supreme delight. On the former alternative 
the declaration of the Fires would only state that Brahman 
is the ruler of the elemental ether and of all delight de- 
pending on the sense-organs, and this would give no notion 
of Brahman's true nature; on the latter alternative the 
Fires would declare that unlimited delight constitutes 
Brahman's true nature. In order to ascertain which of 
the two meanings has to be taken, Upakcrala therefore 
says, ' I do not understand Ka and Kha.' The Fires, com- 
prehending what is in his mind, thereupon reply, ' What is 
Ka the same is Kha, what is Kha the same is Ka,' which 
means that the bliss which constitutes Brahman's nature 
is unlimited. The same Brahman therefore which has 
breath for its attribute because breath constitutes its body, 
is of the nature of unlimited bliss ; the text therefore adds, 
' They taught him that (viz. Brahman) as breath and as 
ether.' What the text,' K a is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' 
teaches thus is Brahman as consisting of unlimited bliss, 
and this Brahman is resumed in the subsequent text about 
the Person seen within the eye. That Person therefore 
is the highest Self. 

1 7. And on account of the statement of the way 
of him who has heard the Upanishads. 

Other scriptural texts give an account of the way — the 
first station of which is light — that leads up to the highest 
Person, without any subsequent return, the soul of him 
who has read the Upanishads, and has thus acquired 
a knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self. Now 
this same way is described by the teacher to Upakojrala 
in connexion with the instruction as to the Person in the 
eye, ' They go to light, from light to day,' &c. This also 



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278 vedAnta-s6tras. 



proves that the Person within the eye is the highest 
Self. 

1 8. Not any other, on account of non-permanency 
of abode, and of impossibility. 

As the reflected Self and the other Selfs mentioned by 
the Purvapakshin do not necessarily abide within the eye, 
and as conditionless immortality and the other qualities 
(ascribed in the text to the Person within the eye) cannot 
possibly belong to them, the Person within the eye cannot 
be any Self other than the highest Self. Of the reflected 
Self it cannot be said that it permanently abides within 
the eye, for its presence there depends on the nearness 
to the eye of another person. The embodied Self again 
has its seat within the heart, which is the root of all sense- 
organs, so as to assist thereby the activities of the different 
senses ; it cannot therefore abide within the eye. And 
with regard to the divinity the text says that 'he rests 
with his rays in him, i. e. the eye ' : this implies that the 
divine being may preside over the organ of sight although 
itself abiding in another place ; it does not therefore abide 
in the eye. Moreover, non-conditioned immortality and 
similar qualities cannot belong to any of these three Selfs. 
The Person seen within the eye therefore is the highest 
Self. 

We have, under SO. I, 2, 14, assumed as proved that the 
abiding within the eye and ruling the eye, which is referred 
to in Bri. Up. 111,7, 18 (' He who dwells in the eye,' &c), can 
belong to the highest Self only, and have on that basis 
proved that the Self within the eye is the highest Self. 
— Here terminates the adhikarawa of that 'within.' — The 
next Sutra now proceeds to prove that assumption. 

1 9. The internal Ruler (referred to) in the clauses 
with respect to the gods, with respect to the 
worlds, &c. (is the highest Self), because the attri- 
butes of that are designated. 

The Va^asaneyins, of the Ka«va as well as the 
Madhyandina branch, have the following text : ' He who 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, 19. 279 

dwelling in the earth is within the earth, whom the earth 
does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the 
earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the Immortal.' 
The text thereupon extends this teaching as to a being 
that dwells in things, is within them, is not known by them, 
has them for its body and rules them ; in the first place to 
all divine beings, viz. water, fire, sky, air, sun, the regions, 
moon, stars, ether, darkness, light ; and next to all material 
beings, viz. breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge, 
seed— closing each section with the words, ' He is thy Self, 
the ruler within, the Immortal.' The Madhyandinas, how- 
ever, have three additional sections, viz. ' He who dwells 
in all worlds,' &c. ; ' He who dwells in all Vedas,' &c. ; 
' He who dwells in all sacrifices ' ; and, moreover, in place 
of 'He who dwells in knowledge' (vi^«ana) they read 
' He who dwells in the Self.' — A doubt here arises whether 
the inward Ruler of these texts be the individual Self or 
the highest Self. 

The individual Self, the Purvapakshin maintains. For 
in the supplementary passage (which follows upon the text 
considered so far) the internal Ruler is called the ' seer ' 
and ' hearer,' i. e. his knowledge is said to depend on the 
sense-organs, and this implies the view that the ' seer ' only 
(i. e. the individual soul only) is the inward Ruler ; and 
further the clause ' There is no other seer but he' negatives 
any other seer. 

This view is set aside by the Sutra. The Ruler within, 
who is spoken of in the clauses marked in the text by the 
terms 'with respect of the gods,' 'with respect of the 
worlds,' &c, is the highest Self free from all evil, Narayaaa. 
The Sutra purposely joins the two terms ' with respect to 
the gods ' and ' with respect to the worlds ' in order to 
intimate that, in addition to the clauses referring to the 
gods and beings (bhuta) exhibited by the Kanva-text, the 
Madhyandina-text contains additional clauses referring to 
the worlds, Vedas, &c. The inward Ruler spoken of in 
both these sets of passages is the highest Self ; for attri- 
butes of that Self are declared in the text. For it is 
a clear attribute of the highest Self that being one only 



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280 vedanta-sOtras. 



it rules all worlds, all Vedas, all divine beings, and so on. 
Uddalaka asks, ' Dost thou know that Ruler within who 
within rules this world and the other world and all beings ? 
&c. — tell now that Ruler within ' ; and Ya^wavalkya replies 
with the long passus, * He who dwells in the earth,' &c, 
describing the Ruler within as him who, abiding within all 
worlds, all beings, all divinities, all Vedas, and all sacrifices, 
rules them from within and constitutes their Self, they in 
turn constituting his body. Now this is a position which 
can belong to none else but the highest Person, who is 
all-knowing, and all whose purposes immediately realise 
themselves. That it is the highest Self only which rules 
over all and is the Self of all, other Upanishad-texts 
also declare ; cp. e. g. ' Entered within, the ruler of 
creatures, the Self of all ' ; ' Having sent forth this he 
entered into it. Having entered it he became sat and 
tyat,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 6). Similarly the text from the 
Subala-Up., which begins, 'there was not anything here 
in the beginning,' and extends up to 'the one God, 
Narayawa,' shows that it is the highest Brahman only 
which rules all, is the Self of all, and has all beings for its 
body. Moreover, essential immortality (which the text 
ascribes to the Ruler within) is an attribute of the highest 
Self only. — Nor must it be thought that the power of 
seeing and so on that belongs to the highest Self is 
dependent on sense-organs ; it rather results immediately 
from its essential nature, since its omniscience and power 
to realise its purposes are due to its own being only. In 
agreement herewith scripture says, ' He sees without eyes, 
he hears without ears, without hands and feet he grasps 
and hastes ' (Svet. Up. Ill, 19). What terms such as 
1 seeing ' and ' hearing ' really denote is not knowledge in 
so far as produced by the eye and ear, but the intuitive 
presentation of colour and sound. In the case of the 
individual soul, whose essentially intelligising nature is 
obscured by karman, such intuitive knowledge arises only 
through the mediation of the sense-organs ; in the case of 
the highest Self, on the other hand, it springs from its own 
nature. — Again, the clause ' there is no other seer but he' 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, 2r. 281 

means that there is no seer other than the seer and ruler 
described in the preceding clauses. To explain. The 
clauses ' whom the earth does not know,' &<x, up to ' whom 
the Self does not know ' mean to say that the Ruler within 
rules without being perceived by the earth, Self, and the 
other beings which he rules. This is confirmed by the 
subsequent clauses, ' unseen but a seer,' ' unheard but 
a hearer/ &c. And the next clauses, ' there is no other 
seer but he,' &c, then mean to negative that there is any 
other being which could be viewed as the ruler of that 
Ruler. Moreover, the clauses ' that is the Self of thee,' 
1 He is the Self of thee ' exhibit the individual Self in the 
genitive form (' of thee '), and thus distinguish it from the 
Ruler within, who is declared to be their Self. 

20. And not that which Smrtti assumes, on ac- 
count of the declaration of qualities not belonging 
to that ; nor the embodied one. 

•That which Smr*'ti assumes' is the Fradhana; the 'em- 
bodied one' is the individual soul. Neither of these can be 
the Ruler within, since the text states attributes which 
cannot possibly belong to either. For there is not even 
the shadow of a possibility that essential capability of 
seeing and ruling all things, and being the Self of all, and 
immortality should belong either to the non-sentient 
Fradhana or to the individual soul. — The last two Sutras 
have declared that the mentioned qualities belong to 
the highest Self, while they do not belong to the indi- 
vidual soul. The next Sutra supplies a new, independent 
argument. 

21. For both also speak of it as something 
different 

Both, i.e. the Madhyandinas as well as the Kawvas, dis- 
tinguish in their texts the embodied soul, together with 
speech and other non-intelligent things, from the Ruler 
within, representing it as an object of his rule. The 
Madhyandinas read, • He who dwells in the Self, whom the 
Self does not know,' &c; the Ka«vas, 'He who dwells 



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282 vedAnta-sOtras. 



within understanding,' &c. The declaration of the indi- 
vidual Self being ruled by the Ruler within implies of 
course the declaration of the former being different from 
the latter. 

The conclusion from all this is that the Ruler within is 
a being different from the individual soul, viz. the highest 
Self free from all evil, Narayawa. — Here terminates the 
adhikara«a of ' the internal Ruler.' 

22. That which possesses the qualities of in- 
visibility, &c, on account of the declaration of 
attributes. 

The Atharvawikas read in their text, ' The higher know- 
ledge is that by which that Indestructible is apprehended. 
That which is invisible, unseizable, without origin and 
qualities, &c, that it is which the wise regard as the source 
of all beings ' ; and further on, ' That which is higher than 
the high Imperishable' (Mu. Up. I, i, 5, 6; II, 1, »). The 
doubt here arises whether the Indestructible, possessing the 
qualities of imperceptibility, &c, and that which is higher 
than the Indestructible, should be taken to denote the Pra- 
dhana and the soul of the Sankhyas, or whether both denote 
the highest Self. — The Purvapakshin maintains the former 
alternative. For, he says, while in the text last discussed 
there is mentioned a special attribute of an intelligent being, 
viz. in the clause 'unseen but a seer,' no similar attribute is 
stated in the former of the two texts under discussion, and 
the latter text clearly describes the collective individual 
soul, which is higher than the imperishable Pradhana, which 
itself is higher than all its effects. The reasons for this 
decision are as follows : — Colour and so on reside in the 
gross forms of non-intelligent matter, viz. the elements, 
earth, and so on. When, therefore, visibility and so on are 
expressly negatived, such negation suggests a non-sentient 
thing cognate to earth, &c, but of a subtle kind, and such 
a thing is no other than the Pradhana. And as something 
higher than this Pradhana there are known the collective 
souls only, under whose guidance the Pradhana gives 
birth to all its effects, from the so-called Mahat downwards 



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i adhyAya, i pAda, 23. 283 

to individual things. This interpretation is confirmed by 
the comparisons set forth in the next jloka, 'As the spider 
sends forth and draws in its threads, as plants spring from 
the earth, as hair grows on the head and body of the living 
man, thus does everything arise here from the Inde- 
structible.' The section therefore is concerned only with 
the Pradhana and the individual soul. 

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sutra. That 
which possesses invisibility and the other qualities stated in 
the text, and that which is higher than the high In- 
destructible, is no other than the highest Self. For the 
text declares attributes which belong to the highest Self 
only, viz. in 1, 1, 9, ' He who knows all, cognises all,' &c. 
Let us shortly consider the connexion of the text The 
passage beginning ' the higher knowledge is that by which 
the Indestructible is apprehended' declares an inde- 
structible being possessing the attributes of invisibility and 
so on. The clause 'everything arises here from the 
Indestructible ' next declares that from that being all things 
originate. Next the jloka, ' He who knows all and cognises 
all,' predicates of that Indestructible which is the source of 
all beings, omniscience, and similar qualities. And finally 
the text, ' That which is higher than the high Indestructible,' 
characterises that same being — which previously had been 
called invisible, the source of beings, indestructible, all- 
knowing, &c. — as the highest of all. Hence it is evident 
that in the text ' higher than the high Indestructible ' the 
term 'Indestructible' does not denote the invisible, &c. 
Indestructible, which is the chief topic of the entire section ; 
for there can of course be nothing higher than that which, 
as being all-knowing, the source of all, &c, is itself higher 
than anything else. The ' Indestructible ' in that text there- 
fore denotes the elements in their subtle condition. 

23. Not the two others, on account of distinction 
and statement of difference. 

The section distinguishes the indestructible being, which 
is the source of all, &c, from the Pradhana as well as the 
individual soul, in so far, namely, as it undertakes to prove 



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284 vedAnta-s6tras. 



that by the cognition of one thing everything is known; 
and it moreover, in passages such as ' higher than the high 
Indestructible,' explicitly states the difference of the inde- 
structible being from those other two. — The text first relates 
that Brahma told the knowledge of Brahman, which is the 
foundation of the knowledge of all, to his eldest son 
Atharvan : this introduces the knowledge of Brahman as 
the topic of the section. Then, the text proceeds, in order 
to obtain this knowledge of Brahman, which had been 
handed down through a succession of teachers to Angiras, 
Saunaka approached Angiras respectfully and asked him : 
' What is that through which, if known, all this is known ? ' 
i. e. since all knowledge is founded on the knowledge of 
Brahman, he enquires after the nature of Brahman. An- 
giras replies that he who wishes to attain Brahman must 
acquire two kinds of knowledge, both of them having 
Brahman for their object : an indirect one which springs 
from the study of the jastras, viz. the Veda, Siksha, Kalpa, 
and so on, and a direct one which springs from concentrated 
meditation (yoga). The latter kind of knowledge is the 
means of obtaining Brahman, and it is of the nature of 
devout meditation (bhakti), as characterised in the text 
• He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained ' 
(III, a, 3). The means again towards this kind of know- 
ledge is such knowledge as is gained from sacred tradition, 
assisted by abstention and the other six auxiliary means 
(see above, p. 17); in agreement with the text, 'Him the 
Brahmawas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by 
sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting ' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 
23). — Thus the Reverend Parlrara also says, ' The cause of 
attaining him is knowledge and work, and knowledge is 
twofold, according as it is based on sacred tradition or 
springs from discrimination.' The Mu«<afaka-text refers to 
the inferior kind of knowledge in the passage ' the lower 
knowledge is the Rig-vtda.,' &c, up to ' and the dharma- 
jastras ' ; this knowledge is the means towards the intuition 
of Brahman ; while the higher kind of knowledge, which is 
called 'upasana,' has the character of devout meditation 
(bhakti), and consists in direct intuition of Brahman, is 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, 23. 285 

referred to in the clause ' the higher knowledge is that by 
which the Indestructible is apprehended.' The text next 
following, ' That which is invisible/ &c, then sets forth the 
nature of the highest Brahman, which is the object of 
the two kinds of knowledge previously described. After 
this the passage 'As the spider sends forth and draws in 
its thread ' declares that from that indestructible highest 
Brahman, as characterised before, there originates the 
whole universe of things, sentient and non-sentient. The 
next doka (tapasa £iyate, &c.) states particulars about this 
origination of the universe from Brahman. 'Brahman 
swells through brooding' ; through brooding, Le. thought — 
in agreement with a later text, 'brooding consists of 
thought' — Brahman swells, i.e. through thought in the 
form of an intention, viz. ' may I become many,' Brahman 
becomes ready for creation. From it there springs first 
'anna,' i.e. that which is the object of fruition on the part 
of all enjoying agents, viz. the non-evolved subtle principles 
Of all elements. From this ' anna ' there spring successively 
breath, mind, and all other effected things up to work, 
which is the means of producing reward in the form of the 
heavenly world, and Release. The last jloka of the first 
chapter thereupon first states the qualities, such as om- 
niscience and so on, which capacitate the highest Brahman 
for creation, and then declares that from the indestructible 
highest Brahman there springs the effected (karya) Brah- 
man, distinguished by name and form, and comprising all 
enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment. — The first 
jloka of the second chapter declares first that the highest 
Brahman is absolutely real ('That is true'), and then 
admonishes those who desire to reach the indestructible 
highest Self, which possesses all the blessed qualities stated 
before and exists through itself, to turn away from other 
rewards and to perform all those sacrificial works depending 
on the three sacred fires which were seen and revealed by 
poets in the four Vedas and are incumbent on men accord- 
ing to caste and ajrama. The section ' this is your path ' 
(I, a, 1) up to ' this is the holy Brahma-world gained by 
your good works ' (I, a, 6) next states the particular mode 



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286 vedanta-sAtras. 

of performing those works, and declares that an omission 
of one of the successive works enjoined in .Sniti and Smr/ti 
involves fruitlessness of the works actually performed, and 
that something not performed in the proper way is as good 
as not performed at all. Stanzas 7 and ff. (' But frail in truth 
are those boats') declare that those who perform this 
lower class of works have to return again and again into 
the Sawsara, because they aim at worldly results and are 
deficient in true knowledge. Stanza 8 ('but those who 
practise penance and faith') then proclaims that works 
performed by a man possessing true knowledge, and hence 
not aiming at worldly rewards, result in the attainment of 
Brahman ; and stanzas 12 a, 13 (' having examined all these 
worlds ') enjoin knowledge, strengthened by due works, on. 
the part of a man who has turned away from mere works, 
as the means of reaching Brahman ; and due recourse to 
a teacher on the part of him who is desirous of such know- 
ledge. — The first chapter of the second section of the 
Upanishad(II, i)then clearly teaches how the imperishable 
highest Brahman, i.e. the highest Self— as constituting the 
Self of all things and having all things for its body — has all 
things for its outward form and emits all things from itself. 
The remainder of the Upanishad ('Manifest, near,' &c.) 
teaches how this highest Brahman, which is imperishable 
and higher than the soul, which itself is higher than the 
Unevolved ; which dwells in the highest Heaven ; and 
which is of the nature of supreme bliss, is to be meditated 
upon as within the hollow of the heart; how this meditation 
has the character of devout faith (bhakti) ; and how the 
devotee, freeing himself from Nescience, obtains for his 
reward intuition of Brahman, which renders him like 
Brahman. 

It thus clearly appears that ' on account of distinction 
and statement of difference ' the Upanishad does not treat 
of the Pradhana and the soul. For that the highest Brah- 
man is different from those two is declared in passages 
such as ' That heavenly Person is without body ; he is both 
without and within, not produced, without breath and 
without mind, pure, higher than what is higher than the 



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I ADHYAYA, 2 pADA, 25. 287 

Imperishable' (II, 1, a); for the last words mean 'that 
imperishable highest Self possessing invisibility and similar 
qualities, which is higher than the aggregate of individual 
souls, which itself is higher than the non-evolved subtle 
elements.' The term ' akshara' (imperishable) is to be 
etymologically explained either as that which pervades 
(amute) or that which does not pass away (a-ksharati), and 
is on either of these explanations applicable to the highest 
Self, either because that Self pervades all its effects or 
because it is like the so-called Mahat (which is also called 
akshara), free from all passing away or decaying. — Here 
terminates the adhikara«a of ' invisibility and so on.' 

24. And on account of the description of its form, 

' Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon, the 
regions his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind 
his breath, his heart the universe ; from his feet came the 
earth ; he is indeed the inner Self of all things' (II, 1, 4)— 
the outward form here described can belong to none but 
the highest Self; that is, the inner Self of all beings. The 
section therefore treats of the highest Self. 

25. VaLrvanara (is the highest Self), on account of 
the distinctions qualifying the common term. 

The ATAandogas read in their text, 'You know at 
present that Vaisvanara Self, tell us that,' &c, and further 
on, ' But he who meditates on the VaLrvanara Self as a 
span long,' &c (Kh. Up. V, 11, 6 ; 18, 1). The doubt here 
arises whether that Vauvanara Self can be made out to 
be the highest Self or not The Purvapakshin maintains 
the latter alternative. For, he says, the word VaLrvanara 
is used in the sacred texts in four different senses. It 
denotes in the first place the intestinal fire, so in Br*. 
Up. V, 9, ' That is the Vairvanara fire by which the food 
that is eaten is cooked, i.e. digested. Its noise is that 
which one hears when one covers one's ears. When man 
is on the point of departing this life he does not hear 
that noise.' — It next denotes the third of the elements, so 
in Ri. Sa»»b. X, 88, 13, ' For the whole world the gods 



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288 vedAnta-sOtras. 



have made the Agni Vairvanara a sign of the days.' — It 
also denotes a divinity, so Ri. Samh. I, 98, 1, ' May we 
be in the favour of Vairvanara, for he is the king of the 
kings,' &c. And finally it denotes the highest Self, as in 
the passage, ' He offered it in the Self, in the heart, in 
Agni Vairvanara'; and in Pra. Up. I, 7, 'Thus he rises 
as Valrvanara, assuming all forms, as breath of life, as 
fire.' — And the characteristic marks mentioned in the 
introductory clauses of the ATAandogya-text under discus- 
sion admit of interpretations agreeing with every one of 
these meanings of the word Vairvanara. 

Against this prima facie view the S&tra declares itself. 
The term ' Vairvanara ' in the ATAandogya-text denotes the 
highest Self, because the ' common ' term is there qualified 
by attributes specially belonging to the highest Self. For 
the passage tells us how Aupamanyava and four other 
great AVshis, having met and discussed the question as to 
what was their Self and Brahman, come to the conclusion 
to go to Uddalaka because he is reputed to know the 
Vairvanara Self. Uddalaka, recognising their anxiety to 
know the Vairvanara Self, and deeming himself not to be 
fully informed on this point, refers them to Arvapati 
Kaikeya as thoroughly knowing the Vairvanara Self; and 
they thereupon, together with Uddalaka, approach Arva- 
pati. The king duly honours them with presents, and as 
they appear unwilling to receive them, explains that they 
may suitably do so, he himself being engaged in the per- 
formance of a religious vow; and at the same time instructs 
them that even men knowing Brahman must avoid what 
is forbidden and do what is prescribed. When thereupon 
he adds that he will give them as much wealth as to the 
priests engaged in his sacrifice, they, desirous of Release 
and of knowing the Vairvanara Self, request him to explain 
that Self to them. Now it clearly appears that as the 
Rishis are said to be desirous of knowing that Brahman 
which is the Self of the individual souls (' what is our Self, 
what is Brahman'), and therefore search for some one to 
instruct them on that point, the Vairvanara Self— to a 
person acquainted with which they address themselves— 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, 26. 289 

can be the highest Self only. In the earlier clauses the 
terms used are 'Self and • Brahman/ in the later * Self 
and ' VaLrvanara ' ; from this it appears also that the term 
• Vairvanara,' which takes the place of ' Brahman,' denotes 
none other but the highest Self. The results, moreover, of 
the knowledge of the Vauvanara Self, which are stated in 
subsequent passages, show that the VaLrvanara Self is the 
highest Brahman. ' He eats food in all worlds, in all 
beings, in all Selfs'; 'as the fibres of the Ishlka reed 
when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are 
burned' (V, 18, 1; 34,3). 

The next Sutra supplies a further reason for the same 
conclusion. 

26. That which the text refers to is an inferential 
mark— thus. 

The text describes the shape of Vairvanara, of whom 
heaven, &c, down to earth constitute the several limbs ; 
and it is known from Scripture and Smrzti that such is 
the shape of the highest Self. When, therefore, we recog- 
nise that shape as referred to in the text, this supplies an 
inferential mark of Vairvanara being the highest Self. — 
The ' thus ' (iti) in the Sutra denotes a certain mode, that 
is to say, ' a shape of such a kind being recognised in the 
text enables us to infer that Vairvanara is the highest Self.' 
For in Scripture and Smrtti alike the highest Person 13 
declared to have such a shape. Cp. e.g. the text of the 
Atharvawas. 'Agni is his head, the sun and moon his eyes, 
the regions his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the 
wind his breath, his heart the Universe; from his feet 
came the earth ; he is indeed the inner Self of all things * 
(Mu. Up. II, 1, 4). 'Agni' in this passage denotes the 
heavenly world, in agreement with the text 'that world 
indeed is Agni.' And the following Smriti texts : ' He of 
whom the wise declare the heavenly world to be the head, 
the ether the navel, sun and moon the eyes, the regions 
the ears, the earth the feet ; he whose Self is unfathomable 
is the leader of all beings'; and 'of whom Agni is the 
mouth, heaven the head, the. ether the navel, the earth the 
[48] U 



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290 vedAnta-sOtras. 



feet, the sun the eye, the regions the ear ; worship to him, 
the Self of the Universe!' — Now our text declares the 
heavenly world and so on to constitute the head and the 
other limbs of Vauvanara. For Kaikeya on being asked 
by the Rtshis to instruct them as to the Vauvanara Self 
recognises that they all know something about the Vai- 
jvanara Self while something they do not know (for thus 
only we can explain his special questions), and then in 
order to ascertain what each knows and what not, questions 
them separately. When thereupon Aupamanyava replies 
that he meditates on heaven only as the Self, Kaikeya, in 
order to disabuse him from the notion that heaven is the 
whole Vauvanara Self, teaches him that heaven is the 
head of Vauvanara, and that of heaven which thus is a 
part only of Vaijvanara, Sute^fas is the special name. 
Similarly he is thereupon told by the other •fo'shis that 
they meditate only on sun, air, ether, and earth, and 
informs them in return that the special names of these 
beings are ' the omniform,' ' he who moves in various ways,' 
' the full one,' ' wealth,' and ' firm rest,' and that these all 
are mere members of the Vauvanara Self, viz. its eyes, 
breath, trunk, bladder, and feet. The shape thus described 
in detail can belong to the highest Self only, and hence 
Vauvanara is none other but the highest Self. 

The next Sutra meets a further doubt as to this decision 
not yet being well established. 

27. Should it be said that it is not so, on account 
of the word, &c, and on account of the abiding 
within ; we say, no ; on account of meditation being 
taught thus, on account of impossibility ; and be- 
cause they read of him as person. 

An objection is raised. Vauvanara cannot be ascer- 
tained to be the highest Self, because, on the account of 
the text and of the abiding within, we can understand by 
the Vauvanara in our text the intestinal fire also. The 
text to which we refer occurs in the Vauvanara-vidya of the 
Vaj'asaneyins, ' This one is the Agni Vauvanara,' where 
the two words ' Agni ' and * Vauvanara ' are exhibited in 



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I ADHYAVA, 2 PADA, 27. 291 

co-ordination. And in the section under discussion the 
passage, 'the heart is the Garhapatya fire, the mind the 
Anvaharya-pa£ana fire, the mouth the Ahavaniya fire' 
(Kk. Up. V, 18, a), represents the Vairvanara in so far as 
abiding within the heart and so on as constituting the triad 
of sacred fires. Moreover the text, ' The first food which 
a man may take is in the place of Soma. And he who 
offers that first oblation should offer it to Pra«a ' (V, 19, 1), 
intimates that Vaiwanara is the abode of the offering to 
Pra«a. In the same way the Vaj-asaneyins declare that 
Vairvanara abides within man, viz. in the passage ' He who 
knows this Agni Vairvanara shaped like a man abiding 
within man.' As thus Vairvanara appears in co-ordination 
with the word ' Agni,' is represented as the triad of sacred 
fires, is said to be the abode of the oblation to Breath, and 
to abide within man, he must be viewed as the intestinal 
fire, and it is therefore not true that he can be identified 
with the highest Self only. 

This objection is set aside by the Sutra. It is not so 
'on account of meditation (on the highest Self), being 
taught thus,' i.e. as the text means to teach that the 
highest Brahman which, in the manner described before, 
has the three worlds for its body should be meditated upon 
as qualified by the intestinal fire which (like other beings) 
constitutes Brahman's body. For the word 'Agni 'denotes 
not only the intestinal fire, but also the highest Self in so 
far as qualified by the intestinal fire. — But how is this to 
be known? — 'On account of impossibility x ' i.e. because it 
is impossible that the mere intestinal fire should have the 
three worlds for its body. The true state of the case 
therefore is that the word Agni, which is understood to 
denote the intestinal fire, when appearing in co-ordination 
with the term Vairvanara represented as having the three 
worlds for his body, denotes (not the intestinal fire, but) the 
highest Self as qualified by that fire viewed as forming the 
body of the Self. Thus the Lord also says, ' As Vairvanara 
fire I abide in the body of living creatures and, being 
assisted by breath inspired and expired, digest the four- 
fold food * (Bha. GL XIV, 15). « As Vairvanara fire ' here 

V 2 



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292 vedanta-sCtras. 



means ' embodied in the intestinal fire.' — The .Oandogya 
text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest 
Self embodied in the VaLrvanara fire. — Moreover the 
Va^asaneytns read of him, viz. the VaLrvanara, as man or 
person, viz. in the passage ' That Agni VaLrvanara is the 
person' (5a. Bra. X, 6, i, u). The intestinal fire by itself 
cannot be called a person ; unconditioned personality be- 
longs to the highest Self only. Compare 'the thousand- 
headed person' (Hi. Saiwh.), and 'the Person is all this' 
(Sve. Up. I, 3, 15). 

28. For the same reasons not the divinity and 
the element. 

For the reasons stated VaLrvanara can be neither the 
deity Fire, nor the elemental fire which holds the third 
place among the gross elements. 

29. 6aimini thinks that there is no objection to 
(the word 'Agni') directly (denoting the highest 

Self). 

So far it has been maintained that the word 'Agni,' 
which stands in co-ordination with the term ' VaLrvanara,' 
denotes the highest Self in so far as qualified by the 
intestinal fire constituting its body ; and that hence the 
text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest 
Self. Gaimini, on the other hand, is of opinion that there 
is no reasonable objection to the term ' Agni,' no less than 
the term ' VaLrvanara,' being taken directly to denote the 
highest Self. That is to say — in the same way as the term 
' VaLrvanara,' although a common term, yet when qualified 
by attributes especially belonging to the highest Self is 
known to denote the latter only as possessing the quality 
of ruling all men ; so the word ' Agni ' also when appearing 
in connexion with special attributes belonging to the highest 
Self denotes that Self only. For any quality on the ground 
of which ' Agni ' may be etymologically explained to de- 
note ordinary fire — as when e. g. we explain ' agni ' as he 
who ' agre nayati ' — may also, in its highest non-conditioned 
degree, be ascribed to the supreme Self. Another difficulty 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, 31. 293 



remains. The passage (V, 18, 1) 'yas tv etam evaw 
praderamatram abhivimlnam,' &c. declares that the non- 
limited highest Brahman is limited by the measure of the 
praderas, i. e. of the different spaces — heaven, ether, earth, 
&c. — which had previously been said to constitute the 
limbs of Vairvanara. How is this possible ? 

30. On account of definiteness ; thus Asmarathya 
opines. 

The teacher Armarathya is of opinion that the text 
represents the highest Self as possessing a definite extent, 
to the end of rendering the thought of the meditating 
devotee more definite. That is to say — the limitation due 
to the limited extent of heaven, sun, &c. has the purpose 
of rendering definite to thought him who pervades (abhi) 
all this Universe and in reality transcends all measure 
(vimana). — A further difficulty remains. For what purpose 
is the highest Brahman here represented like a man, 
having a head and limbs? — This point the next Sutra 
elucidates. 

31. On account of meditation, Badari thinks. 

The teacher Badari thinks that the representation in the 
text of the supreme Self in the form of a man is for the pur- 
pose of devout meditation. ' He who in this way meditates on 
that VaLrvanara Self as "pradejamatra" and " abhivimana," 
he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs.' What 
this text enjoins is devout meditation for the purpose of 
reaching Brahman. ' In this way ' means ' as having a 
human form.' And ' the eating ' of food in all worlds, &c. 
means the gaining of intuitional knowledge of Brahman 
which abides everywhere and is in itself of the nature of 
supreme bliss. The special kind of food, i. e. the special 
objects of enjoyment which belong to the different Selfs 
standing under the influence of karman cannot be meant 
here ; for those limited objects have to be shunned by 
those who desire final release. A further question arises. 
If Vauvanara is the highest Self, how can the text say that 
the altar is its chest, the grass on the altar its hairs, and so 



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294 vedanta-sOtras. 



on? (V, 1 8, 2.) Such a statement has a sense only if we 
understand by Valrvanara the intestinal fire. — This difficulty 
the next Sutra elucidates. 

32. On account of imaginative identification, thus 
£aimini thinks ; for thus the text declares. 

The teacher Caimini is of opinion that the altar is stated 
to be the chest of Valrvanara, and so on, in order to effect 
an imaginative identification of the offering to Prawa which 
is daily performed by the meditating devotees and is the 
means of pleasing Valrvanara, having the heaven and so on 
for his body, i.e. the highest Self, with the Agnihotra- 
offering. For the fruit due to meditation on the highest 
Self, as well as the identity of the offering to breath with 
the Agnihotra, is declared in the following text, 'He who 
without knowing this offers the Agnihotra — that would be 
as if removing the live coals he were to pour his libation on 
dead ashes. But he who offers this Agnihotra with a full 
knowledge of its purport, he offers it in all worlds, in all 
beings, in all Selfs. As the fibres of the Ishika reed when 
thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt.' 
(V, 24, 1-3.) 

33. Moreover, they record him in that 

They (i. e. the Va^asaneyins) speak of him, viz. Valrvanara 
who has heaven for his head, &c. — i. e. the highest Self — 
as within that, i. e. the body of the devotee, so as to form 
the abode of the oblation to Pra«a ; viz. in the text, ' Of 
that Valrvanara Self the head is Sute^as,' and so on. The 
context is as follows. The clause ' He who meditates on 
the Valrvanara Self as prad&ramatra,' &c. enjoins meditation 
on the highest Self having the three worlds for its body, i. e. 
on Valrvanara. The following clause 'he eats food in all 
worlds ' teaches that the attaining of Brahman is the reward 
of such meditation. And then the text proceeds to teach 
the Agnihotra offered to Prana, which is something sub- 
sidiary to the meditation taught. The text here establishes 
an identity between the members — fire, sun, &c. — of the 
Valrvanara enjoined as object of meditation (which members 



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i adhyAya, 2 pAda, 33. 295 

are called Sute^as, Vuvarupa, &c), and parts — viz. head, 
eye, breath, trunk, bladder, feet — of the worshipper's body. 
'The head is Sute^as' — that means: the head of the 
devotee is (identical with) heaven, which is the head of 
the highest Self; and so on up to ' the feet,' i. e. the feet of 
the devotee are identical with the earth, which constitutes 
the feet of the highest Self. The devotee having thus 
reflected on the highest Self, which has the three worlds for 
its body, as present within his own body, thereupon is told 
to view his own chest, hair, heart, mind and mouth as 
identical with the altar, grass and the other things which 
are required for the Agnihotra; further to identify the 
oblation to Pra«a with the Agnihotra, and by means 
of this Pra«a-agnihotra to win the favour of VaLrvanara, 
i.e. the highest Self. The final conclusion then remains 
that VaLrvanara is none other than the highest Self, the 
supreme Person. — Here terminates the adhikarana of 
' VaLrvanara.' 



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296 vedAnta-sOtras. 



THIRD PADA. 

1. The abode of heaven, earth, &c. (is the highest 
Self), on account of terms which are its own. 

The followers of the Atharva-veda have the following 
text, • He in whom the heaven, the earth and the sky are 
woven, the mind also, with all the vital airs, know him alone 
as the Self, and leave off other words ; he is the bank 
(setu) of the Immortal' (Mu. Up. II, a, 5). The doubt 
here arises whether the being spoken of as the abode of 
heaven, earth, and so on, is the individual soul or the 
highest Self. 

The Purvapakshin maintains the former alternative. 
For, he remarks, in the next .rloka, 'where like spokes 
in the nave of a wheel the arteries meet, he moves 
about within, becoming manifold,' the word ' where ' refers 
back to the being which in the preceding sloka. had been 
called the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, the clause 
beginning with 'where' thus declaring that that being is 
the basis of the arteries; and the next clause declares 
that same being to become manifold or to be born in 
many ways. Now, connexion with the arteries is clearly 
characteristic of the individual soul ; and so is being born 
in many forms, divine and so on. Moreover, in the very 
.rloka under discussion it is said that that being is the abode 
of the mind and the five vital airs, and this also is a 
characteristic attribute of the individual soul. It being, on 
these grounds, ascertained that the text refers to the in- 
dividual soul we must attempt to reconcile therewith, as 
well as we can, what is said about its being the abode of 
heaven, earth, &c. 

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sutra. That 
which is described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is 
none other than the highest Brahman, on account of a term 
which is ' its own,' i. e. which specially belongs to it. The 
clause we have in view is ' he is the bank of the Immortal.' 
This description applies to the highest Brahman only, which 



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I ADHYAYA, 3 I*ADA, 2. 297 

alone is, in all Upanishads, termed the cause of the attain* 
ment of Immortality ; cp. e. g. ' Knowing him thus a man 
becomes immortal ; there is no other path to go ' (Sve. 
Up. Ill, 8). The term 'setu' is derived from si, which 
means to bind, and therefore means that which binds, i. e. 
makes one to attain immortality ; or else it may be under- 
stood to mean that which leads towards immortality that 
lies beyond the ocean of samsara, in the same way as 
a bank or bridge (setu) leads to the further side of a river. — 
Moreover the word ' Self (atman) (which, in the text 
under discussion, is also applied to that which is the abode 
of heaven, earth, &c), without any further qualification, 
primarily denotes Brahman only; for 'atman' comes from 
dp, to reach, and means that which 'reaches' all other 
things in so far as it rules them. And further on (II, 2, 7) 
there are other terms, ' all knowing,' ' all cognising,' which 
also specially belong to the highest Brahman only. This 
Brahman may also be represented as the abode of the 
arteries; as proved e. g. by Mahanar. Up. (XI, 8-ia), 
• Surrounded by the arteries he hangs ... in the middle of 
this pointed flame there dwells the highest Self.' Of that 
Self it may also be said that it is born in many ways; in 
accordance with texts such as ' not born, he is born in many 
ways ; the wise know the place of his birth.' For in order 
to fit himself to be a refuge for gods, men, &c. the supreme 
Person, without however putting aside his true nature, 
associates himself with the shape, make, qualities and works 
of the different classes of beings, and thus is born in many 
ways. Smrrti says the same: 'Though being unborn, of 
non-perishable nature, the Lord of all beings, yet presiding 
over my Prakrfti I am born by my own mysterious power ' 
(Bha. Gi. IV, 6). Of the mind also and the other organs 
of the individual soul the highest Self is strictly the abode ; 
for it is the abode of everything. — The next Sutra supplies 
a further reason. 

2. And on account of its being declared that to 
•which the released have to resort. 
. The Person who is the abode of heaven, earth, and so 



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298 vedAnta-sCtras. 



on, is also declared by the text to be what is to be reached 
by those who are released from the bondage of Sawrsara 
existence. 'When the seer sees the brilliant maker and 
Lord as the Person who has his source in Brahman, then 
possessing true knowledge he shakes off good and evil, 
and, free from passion, reaches the highest oneness ' (Mu. 
Up. Ill, 1, 3). 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, 
losing their name and form, thus a wise man freed from 
name and form goes to the divine Person who is higher 
than the high ' (III, a, 8). For it is only those freed from 
the bondage of Sawsara who shake off good and evil, are 
free from passion, and freed from name and form. 

For the Samsara state consists in the possession of name 
and form, which is due to connexion with non-sentient 
matter, such connexion springing from good and evil works. 
The Person therefore who is the abode of heaven, earth, 
&c, and whom the text declares to be the aim to be 
reached by those who, having freed themselves from good 
and evil, and hence from all contact with matter, attain 
supreme oneness with the highest Brahman, can be none 
other than this highest Brahman itself. 

This conclusion, based on terms exclusively applicable 
to the highest Brahman, is now confirmed by reference to 
the absence of terms specially applicable to the individual 
soul. 

3. Not that which is inferred, on account of the 
absence of terms denoting it, and (so also not) the 
bearer of the Pra#as (i. e. the individual soul). 

As the section under discussion .does not treat of the 
Pradhana, there being no terms referring to that, so it is 
with regard to the individual soul also. In the text of the 
Sutra we have to read either anumanam, i. e. • inference,' 
in the sense of 'object of inference,' or else anumanam, 
' object of inference ' ; what is meant being in both cases 
the Pradhana inferred to exist by the Saftkhyas. 

4. On account of the declaration of difference. 
'On the same tree man sits immersed in grief, be- 



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I ADHVAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 299 

wildered by " anfo& " ; but- when he sees the other one, the 
Lord, contented, and his glory ; then his grief passes away ' 
(Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 2). This, and similar texts, speak of that 
one, i.e. the one previously described as the abode of 
heaven, earth, &c, as different from the individual soul. — 
The text means — the individual soul grieves, being be- 
wildered by her who is not ' Ua.' i. e. PrakWti, the object of 
fruition. But its grief passes away when it sees him who 
is other than itself, i. e. the beloved Lord of all, and his 
greatness which consists in his ruling the entire world. 

5. On account of the subject-matter. 

It has been already shown, viz. under I, 2, 21, that the 
highest Brahman constitutes the initial topic of the 
Upanishad. And by the arguments set forth in the pre- 
vious Stitras of the present Pada, we have removed all 
suspicion as to the topic started being dropped in the 
body of the Upanishad. 

6. And on account of abiding and eating. 

' Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. 
One of them eats the sweet fruit ; without eating, the other 
looks on ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1). This text declares that one 
enjoys the fruit of works while the other, without enjoying, 
shining abides within the body. Now this shining being 
which does not enjoy the fruit of works can only be the 
being previously described as the abode of heaven, earth, 
&c., and characterised as all knowing, the bridge of immor- 
tality, the Self of all ; it can in no way be the individual 
Self which, lamenting, experiences the results of its works. 
The settled conclusion, therefore, is that the abode of 
heaven, earth, and so on, is none other than the highest 
Self. — Here terminates the adhikarawa of 'heaven, earth, 
and so on.' 

7. The bhuman (is the highest Self), as the 
instruction about it is additional to that about 
serenity. 

The AT£andogas read as follows : 'Where one sees nothing 



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3<x> vedAnta-sOtras. 



else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is fulness 
(bhuman). Where one sees something else, hears some- 
thing else, knows something else, that is the Little ' (Kk. 
Up. VII, 23, 34). 

The term ' bhuman ' is derived from baku (much, many), 
and primarily signifies ' muchness.' By ' much ' in this 
connexion, we have however to understand, not what is 
numerous, but what is large, for the text uses the term in 
contrast with the « Little ' (alpa), i. e. the « Small.' And 
the being qualified as ' large,' we conclude from the con- 
text to be the Self ; for this section of the Upanishad at 
the outset states that he who knows the Self overcomes 
grief (VII, 1, 3), then teaches the knowledge of the 
bhuman, and concludes by saying that ' the Self is all this ' 
(VII, 3 5 , 3). 

The question now arises whether the Self called bhuman 
is the individual Self or the highest Self. — The Purva- 
pakshin maintains the former view. For, he says, to 
Narada who had approached Sanatkumara with the desire 
to be instructed about the Self, a series of beings, beginning 
with 'name' and ending with 'breath,' are enumerated 
as objects of devout meditation ; Narada asks each time 
whether there be anything greater than name, and so on, 
and each time receives an affirmative reply ('speech is 
greater than name,' &c); when, however, the series has 
advanced as far as Breath, there is no such question and 
reply. This shows that the instruction about the Self 
terminates with Breath, and hence we conclude that breath 
in this place means the individual soul which is associated 
with breath, not a mere modification of air. Also the 
clauses ' Breath is father, breath is mother,' &c. (VII, 15, 1), 
show that breath here is something intelligent And this 
is further proved by the clause ' Slayer of thy father, slayer 
of thy mother,' &c. (VII, 15, 3 ; 3), which declares that he 
who offends a father, a mother, &c, as long as there is 
breath in them, really hurts them, and therefore deserves 
reproach ; while no blame attaches to him who offers even 
the grossest violence to them after their breath has de- 
parted. For a conscious being only is capable of being 



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I adhyAya, 3 pAda, 7. 301 

hurt, and hence the word 'breath' here denotes such a 
being only. Moreover, as it is observed that also in the 
case of such living beings as have no vital breath (viz. 
plants), suffering results, or does not result, according as 
injury is inflicted or not, we must for this reason also 
decide that the breath spoken of in the text as something 
susceptible of injury is the individual soul. It conse- 
quently would be an error to suppose, on the ground of 
the comparison of Pra«a to the nave of a wheel in which 
the spokes are set, that Pra«a here denotes the highest 
Self; for the highest Self is incapable of being injured. 
That comparison, on the other hand, is quite in its place, 
if we understand by Pra»a the individual soul, for the 
whole aggregate of non-sentient matter which stands to 
the individual soul in the relation of object or instrument 
of enjoyment, has an existence dependent on the individual 
soul. And this soul, there called Prawa, is what the text 
later on calls Bhuman ; for as there is no question and 
reply as to something greater than Pra«a, Prawa continues, 
without break, to be the subject-matter up to the mention 
of bhuman. The paragraphs intervening between the 
section on Prawa (VII, 15) and the section on the BhCkman 
(VII, 23 ff.) are to be understood as follows. The Pra«a 
section closes with the remark that he who fully knows 
Prana is an ativadin, i. e. one who makes a final supreme 
declaration. In the next sentence then, ' But this one in 
truth is an ativadin who makes a supreme statement by 
means of the True,' the clause ' But this one is an ativadin ' 
refers back to the previously mentioned person who knows 
the Prawa, and the relative clause ' who makes,' &c, enjoins 
on him the speaking of the truth as an auxiliary element in 
the meditation on Prawa. The next paragraph, 'When 
one understands the truth then one declares the truth,' 
intimates that speaking the truth stands in a supplemen- 
tary relation towards the cognition of the true nature of 
the Prawa as described before. For the accomplishment 
of such cognition the subsequent four paragraphs enjoin 
reflection, faith, attendance on a spiritual guide, and the 
due performance of sacred duties. In order that such 



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302 vedanta-sOtras. 



duties may be undertaken, the next paragraphs then teach 
that bliss constitutes the nature of the individual soul, 
previously called Pra»a, and finally that the Bhuman, i. e. 
the supreme fulness of such bliss, is the proper object of 
inquiry. The final purport of the teaching, therefore, is 
that the true nature of the individual soul, freed from 
Nescience, is abundant bliss — a conclusion which perfectly 
agrees with the initial statement that he who knows the 
Self passes beyond sorrow. That being, therefore, which 
has the attribute of being 'bhuman,' is the individual Self. 
This being so, it is also intelligible why, further on, when 
the text describes the glory and power of the individual 
Self, it uses the term ' I ' ; for * I ' denotes just the indi- 
vidual Self : * I am below, I am above, &c, I am all this ' 
(VII, 25, 1). This conclusion having been settled, all re- 
maining clauses must be explained so as to agree with it. 

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sutra. The 
being characterised in the text as 'bhuman' is not the indi- 
vidual Self, but the highest Self, since instruction is given 
about the bhuman in addition to 'serenity' (samprasada). 
' Sawprasada ' denotes the individual soul, as we know 
from the following text, ' Now that " serenity," having 
risen from out this body, and having reached the highest 
light, appears in its true form ' [Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4). Now 
in the text under discussion instruction is given about 
a being called ' the True,' and possessing the attribute of 
• bhuman,' as being something additional to the individual 
soul; and this being called ' the True* is none other than the 
highest Brahman. Just as in the series of beings beginning 
with name and ending with breath, each successive being 
is mentioned in addition to the preceding one — wherefrom 
we conclude that it is something really different from what 
precedes ; so that being also which is called ' the True,' 
and which is mentioned in addition to the individual Self 
called Prawa, is something different from the individual 
Self, and this being called ' the True'* is the same as the 
Bhuman ; in other words, the text teaches that the Bhuman 
is the highest Brahman called ' the True.' This the Vn't- 
tikara also declares ; ' But the Bhuman only. The Bhuman 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 7. 303 

is Brahman, because in the series beginning with name 
instruction is given about it subsequently to the individual 
Self.' 

But how do we know that the instruction as to 'the 
True ' is in addition to, and refers to something different 
from, the being called Pra«a? — The text, after having 
declared that he who knows the Prawa is an ativadin, goes 
on, ' But really that one is an ativadin who makes a 
supreme declaration by means of the True.' The 'but' 
here clearly separates him who is an ativadin by means of 
the True from the previous ativadin, and the clause thus 
does not cause us to recognise him who is ativadin by means 
of Prawa ; hence ' the True' which is the cause of the latter 
ativadin being what he is must be something different from 
the Prawa which is the cause of the former ativadin's 
quality. — But we have maintained above that the text 
enjoins the speaking of ' the True ' merely as an auxiliary 
duty for him who knows Prana ; and that hence the 
Prawa continues to be the general subject-matter! — This 
contention is untenable, we reply. The conjunction ' but ' 
shows that the section gives instruction about a new 
ativadin, and does not merely declare that the ativadin 
previously mentioned has to speak the truth. It is dif- 
ferent with texts such as ' But that one indeed is an Agni- 
hotrin who speaks the truth ' ; there we have no knowledge 
of any further Agnihotrin, and therefore must interpret the 
text as enjoining truthfulness as an obligation incumbent 
on the ordinary Agnihotrin. In the text under discussion, 
on the other hand, we have the term ' the True,' which 
makes us apprehend that there is a further ativadin different 
from the preceding one ; and we know that that term is 
used to denote the highest Brahman, as e. g. in the text, 
'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.' The 
ativadin who takes his stand on this Brahman, therefore, 
must be viewed as different from the preceding ativadin ; 
and a difference thus established on the basis of the mean- 
ing and connexion of the different sentences cannot be set 
aside. An ativadin ('one who in his declaration goes 
beyond ') is one who maintains, as object of his devotion, 



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304 vedAnta-sOtras. 



something which, as being more beneficial to man, sur- 
passes other objects of devotion. The text at first declares 
that he who knows Pra»a, i. e. the individual soul, is an 
ativadin, in so far as the object of his devout meditation 
surpasses the objects from name-up to hope ; and then goes 
on to say that, as that object also is not of supreme benefit 
to man, an ativadin in the full sense of the term is he only 
who proclaims as the object of his devotion the highest 
Brahman, which alone is of supreme unsurpassable benefit 
to man. ' He who is an ativadin by the True,' i. e. he who 
is an ativadin characterised by the highest Brahman as the 
object of his meditation. For the same reason the pupil 
entreats, ' Sir, may I be an ativadin with the True ! ' and 
the teacher replies, ' But we must desire to know the 
True!' — Moreover, the text, VII, 26, 1, 'Pra«a springs 
from the Self,' declares the origination from the Self of the 
being called Pra«a; and from this we infer that the Self which 
is introduced as the general subject-matter of the section, 
in the clause * He who knows the Self passes beyond death,' 
is different from the being called Prawa. — The contention 
that, because there is no question and answer as to some- 
thing greater than Pra«a, the instruction about the Self 
must be supposed to come to an end with the instruction 
about Pra«a, is by no means legitimate. For that a new 
subject is introduced is proved, not only by those questions 
and answers ; it may be proved by other means also, and 
we have already explained such means. The following is 
the reason why the pupil does not ask the question whether 
there is anything greater than Prawa. With regard to the 
non-sentient objects extending from name to hope — each 
of which surpasses the preceding one in so far as it is more 
beneficial to man — the teacher does not declare that he 
who knows them is an ativadin ; when, however, he comes 
to the individual soul, there called Prawa, the knowledge 
of whose true nature he considers highly beneficial, he 
expressly says that 'he who sees this, notes this, under* 
stands this is an ativadin' (VII, 15, 4). The pupil there-, 
fore imagines that the instruction about the Self is now 
completed, and hence asks no further question. The 



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I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, f. 305 

teacher on the other hand, holding that even that know- 
ledge is not the highest, spontaneously continues his 
teaching, and tells the pupil that truly he only is an 
ativadin who proclaims the supremely and absolutely 
beneficial being which is called ' the True,' i. e. the highest 
Brahman. On this suggestion of the highest Brahman the 
pupil, desirous to learn its true nature and true worship, 
entreats the teacher, ' Sir, may I become an ativadin by 
the True ! ' Thereupon the teacher — in order to help the 
pupil to become an ativadin, — a position which requires 
previous intuition of Brahman — enjoins on him meditation 
on Brahman which is the means to attain intuition ('You 
must desire to know the True I ') ; next recommends to him 
reflection (manana) which is the means towards meditation 
('You must desire to understand reflection') ; then — taking 
it for granted that the injunction of reflection implies the 
injunction of ' hearing ' the sacred texts which is the pre- 
liminary for reflecting — advises him to cherish faith in 
Brahman which is the preliminary means towards hearing 
('You must desire to understand faith'); after that tells 
him to practise, as a preliminary towards faith, reliance on 
Brahman (' You must desire to understand reliance') ; next 
admonishes him, to apply himself to ' action,' i. e. to make 
the effort which is a preliminary requisite for all the 
activities enumerated ('You must desire to understand 
action '). Finally, in order to encourage the pupil to enter 
on all this, the teacher tells him to recognise that bliss 
constitutes the nature of that Brahman which is the aim of 
all his effort (' You must desire to understand bliss ') ; and 
bids him to realise that the bliss which constitutes Brah- 
man's nature is supremely large and full (' You must 
endeavour to understand the " bhuman," i. e. the supreme 
fulness of bliss '). And of this Brahman, whose nature is 
absolute bliss, a definition is then given as follows, ' Where 
one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing 
else, that is bhuman.' This means — when the meditating 
devotee realises the intuition of this Brahman, which con- 
sists of absolute bliss, he does not see anything apart from 
it, since the whole aggregate of things is contained within 
[48] X 



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306 vedAnta-sOtras. 



the essence and outward manifestation (vibhuti) of Brah- 
man. He, therefore, who has an intuitive knowledge of 
Brahman as qualified by its attributes and its vibhuti — 
which also is called aijvarya, i. e. lordly power — and con- 
sisting of supreme bliss, sees nothing else since there is 
nothing apart from Brahman ; and sees, i. e. feels no pain 
since all possible objects of perception and feeling are of 
the nature of bliss or pleasure ; for pleasure is just that 
which, being experienced, is agreeable to man's nature. — 
But an objection is raised, it is an actual fact that this very 
world is perceived as something different from Brahman, 
and as being of the nature of pain, or at the best, limited 
pleasure; how then can it be perceived as being a mani- 
festation of Brahman, as having Brahman for its Self, and 
hence consisting of bliss ? — The individual souls, we reply, 
which are under the influence of karman, are conscious of 
this world as different from Brahman, and, according to 
their individual karman, as either made up of pain or 
limited pleasure. But as this view depends altogether on 
karman, to him who has freed himself from Nescience in 
the form of karman, this same world presents itself as 
lying within the intuition of Brahman, together with its 
qualities and vibhuti, and hence as essentially blissful. To 
a man troubled with excess of bile the water he drinks has 
a taste either downright unpleasant or moderately pleasant, 
according to the degree to which his health is affected; 
while the same water has an unmixedly pleasant taste for 
a man in good health. As long as a boy is not aware that 
some plaything is meant to amuse him, he does not care 
for it ; when on the other hand he apprehends it as meant 
to give him delight, the thing becomes very dear to him. 
In the same way the world becomes an object of supreme 
love to him who recognises it as having Brahman for its 
Self, and being a mere plaything of Brahman — of Brah- 
man, whose essential nature is supreme bliss, and which is 
a treasure-house, as it were, of numberless auspicious quali- 
ties of supreme excellence. He who has reached such 
intuition of Brahman, sees nothing apart from it and feels 
no pain. This the concluding passages of the text set 



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i adhyAya, 3 pada, 8. 307 

forth in detail, ' He who sees, perceives and understands 
this, loves the Self, delights in the Self, revels in the Self, 
rejoices in the Self ; he becomes a Self ruler, he moves 
and rules in all worlds according to his pleasure. But 
those who have a different knowledge from this, they are 
ruled by others, they live in perishable worlds, they do not 
move in all the worlds according to their liking.' * They 
are ruled by others,' means 'they are in the power of 
karman.' And further on, ' He who sees this does not see 
death, nor illness, nor pain ; he who sees this sees every- 
thing and obtains everything everywhere.' 

That Brahman is of the nature of supreme bliss has been 
shown in detail under I, 1, 12 ff. — The conclusion from 
all this is that, as the text applies the term ' bhuman ' to 
what was previously called the Real or True, and which is 
different from the individual soul there called Prawa, the 
bhuman is the highest Brahman. 

8. And on account of the suitability of the 
attributes. 

The attributes also which the text ascribes to the bhuman 
suit the highest Self only. So immortality (• The Bhuman 
is immortal,' VII, 24, 1) ; not being based on something 
else (' it rests in its own greatness ') ; being the Self of all 
('the bhuman is below,' &c, 'it is all this'); being that 
which produces all (' from the Self there springs breath,' 
&c). All these attributes can be reconciled with the 
highest Self only. — The Purvapakshin has pointed to the 
text which declares the ' I ' to be the Self of all (VII, 25, 1) ; 
but what that text really teaches is meditation on Brah- 
man under the aspect of the ' I.' This appears from the in- 
troductory clause ' Now follows the instruction with regard 
to the I.' That of the ' I,' i. e. the individual Self, also the 
highest Self is the true Self, scripture declares in several 
places, so e. g. in the text about the inward Ruler (Brj. Up. 
Ill, 7). As therefore the individual soul finds its com- 
pletion in the highest Self only, the word ' I ' also extends 
in its connotation up to the highest Self; and the instruc- 
tion about the ' I ' which is given in the text has thus for 

x 2 



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308 vedAnta-sAtras. 



its object meditation on the highest Self in so far as having 
the individual Self for its body. As the highest Self has 
all beings for its body and thus is the Self of all, it is the 
Self of the individual soul also ; and this the text declares 
in the passage beginning ' Now follows the instruction 
about the Self,' and ending ' Self is all this.' In order to 
prove this the text declares that everything originates from 
the highest Self which forms the Self of the individual soul 
also, viz. in the passage ' From the Self of him who sees 
this, perceives this, knows this, there springs breath,' &c. — 
that means: breath and all other beings spring from the 
highest Self which abides within the Self of the medi- 
tating devotee as its inner ruler. Hence, the text means to 
intimate, meditation should be performed on the 'I,' in 
order thus firmly to establish the cognition that the highest 
Self has the ' I ,' i. e. the individual soul for its body. 

It is thus an established conclusion that the bhuman is 
the highest Self. Here terminates the adhikarana of 
• fulness.' 

9. The Imperishable (is Brahman), on account of 
its supporting that which is the end of ether. 

The Va^asaneyins, in the chapter recording the questions 
asked by Gargt, read as follows : ' He said, O Gargt, the 
Brahmawas call that the Imperishable. It is neither coarse 
nor fine, neither short nor long, it is not red, not fluid, it is 
without a shadow,' &c. (Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 8). A doubt here 
arises whether that Imperishable be the Pradhana, or the 
individual soul, or the highest Self. — The Pradhana, it may 
be maintained in the first place. For we see that in passages 
such as ' higher than that which is higher than the Imperish- 
able' the term 'Imperishable' actually denotes the Pra- 
dhana; and moreover the qualities enumerated, viz. not being 
either coarse or fine, &c, are characteristic of the Pradhana. 
— But, an objection is raised, in texts such as * That know- 
ledge by which the Imperishable is apprehended ' (Mu. Up. 
I, 1, 5), the word ' Imperishable ' is seen to denote the 
highest Brahman ! — In cases, we reply, where the meaning 
of a word may be determined on the basis either of some 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 9. 309 

other means of proof or of Scripture, the former meaning 
presents itself to the mind first, and hence there is no 
reason why such meaning should not be accepted. — But 
how do you know that the ether of the text is not ether in 
the ordinary sense ? — From the description, we reply, given 
of it in the text, ' That above the heavens,' &c. There it is 
said that all created things past, present and future rest on 
ether as their basis ; ether cannot therefore be taken as 
that elementary substance which itself is comprised in the 
sphere of things created. We therefore must understand 
by ' ether ' matter in its subtle state, i. e. the Pradhana; and 
the Imperishable which thereupon is declared to be the 
support of that Pradhana, hence cannot itself be the Pra- 
dhana. — Nor is there any force in the argument that a sense 
established by some other means of proof presents itself 
to the mind more immediately than a sense established by 
Scripture ; for as the word ' akshara ' (i. e. the non-perish- 
able) intimates its sense directly through the meaning of its 
constituent elements other means of proof need not be 
regarded at all. 

Moreover Ya^wavalkya had said previously that the ether 
is the cause and abode of all things past, present and 
future, and when Gargi thereupon asks him in what that 
ether 'is woven,' i. e. what is the causal substance and 
abode of ether, he replies ' the Imperishable.' Now this 
also proves that by the ' Imperishable ' we have to under- 
stand the Pradhana which from other sources is known to 
be the causal substance, and hence the abode, of all effected 
things whatsoever. 

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sutra. The 
'Imperishable' is the highest Brahman, because the text 
declares it to support that which is the end, i. e. that which 
lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter (avyakrj'tam). The 
ether referred to in Gargi's question is not ether in the 
ordinary sense, but what lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved 
matter, and hence the ' Imperishable ' which is said to be 
the support of that ' unevolved ' cannot itself be the * un- 
evolved,' i. e. cannot be the Pradhana. Let us, then, the 
Purvapakshin resumes, understand by the ' Imperishable,' 



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3io vedAnta-sAtras. 



the individual soul ; for this may be viewed as the support 
of the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, inclusive of 
the elements in their subtle condition ; and the qualities of 
non-coarseness, &c, are characteristic of that soul also. 
Moreover there are several texts in which the term ' Im- 
perishable ' is actually seen to denote the individual soul ; 
so e. g. ' the non-evolved ' is merged in the * Imperishable ' ; 
' That of which the non-evolved is the body ; that of which 
the Imperishable is the body' ; 'All the creatures are the 
Perishable, the non-changing Self is called the Imperish- 
able' (Bha. Gt. XV, 1 6). 

To this alternative prima facie view the next Sutra 
replies. 

10. And this (supporting) (springs) from com- 
mand. 

The text declares that this supporting of ether and all 
other things proceeds from command. ' In the command 
of that Imperishable sun and moon stand, held apart ; in 
the command of that Imperishable heaven and earth stand, 
held apart,' &c. Now such supreme command, through 
which all things in the universe are held apart, cannot pos- 
sibly belong to the individual soul in the state either of 
bondage or of release. The commanding ' Imperishable ' 
therefore is none other than the supreme Person. 

ii. And on account of the exclusion of (what is 
of) another nature (than Brahman). 

Another nature, i. e. the nature of the Pradhana, and so 
on. A supplementary passage excludes difference on the 
part of the Imperishable from the supreme Person. ' That 
Imperishable, O Gargi, is unseen but seeing ; unheard but 
hearing ; unthought but thinking ; unknown but knowing. 
There is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, 
nothing that thinks but it, nothing that knows but it. In 
that Imperishable, O Gargt, the ether is woven, warp and 
woof.' Here the declaration as to the Imperishable being 
what sees, hears, &c. excludes the non-intelligent Pradhana ; 
and the declaration as to its being all-seeing, &c. while not 



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I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 12. 31I 

seen by any one excludes the individual soul. This exclu- 
sion of what has a nature other than that of the highest 
Self thus confirms the view of that Self being meant. — 
Or else the Sutra may be explained in a different way, viz. 
' On account of the exclusion of the existence of another.' 
On this alternative the text ' There is nothing that sees but 
it,' &c, is to be understood as follows : ' while this Imperish- 
able, not seen by others but seeing all others, forms the basis 
of all things different from itself ; there is no other prin- 
ciple which, unseen by the Imperishable but seeing it, could 
form its basis,' i. e. the text would exclude the existence of 
any other thing but the Imperishable, and thus implicitly 
deny that the Imperishable is either the Pradhana or the in- 
dividual Self. — Moreover the text 'By the command of that 
Imperishable men praise those who give, the gods follow 
the Sacrificer, the fathers the Darvl-offering,' declares the 
Imperishable to be that on the command of which there 
proceed all works enjoined by Scripture and Snir/ti, such 
as sacrificing, giving, &c, and this again shows that the 
Imperishable must be Brahman, the supreme Person. 
Again, the subsequent passus, ' Whosoever without know- 
ing that Imperishable,' &c, declares that ignorance of the 
Imperishable leads to the Sawsara, while knowledge of it 
helps to reach Immortality : this also proves that the Im- 
perishable is the highest Brahman. — Here terminates the 
adhikarawa of ' the Imperishable.' 

12. On account of his being designated as the 
object of seeing, he (i. e. the highest Self) (is that 
object). 

The followers of the Atharva-veda, in the section contain- 
ing the question asked by Satyakama, read as follows : 
' He again who meditates with this syllable Aum of three 
Matras on the highest Person, he comes to light and to the 
sun. As a snake frees itself from its skin, so he frees 
himself from evil. He is led up by the Saman verses to 
the Brahma-world ; he sees the person dwelling in the 
castle who is higher than the individual souls concreted 



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312 VEDANTA-stiTR AS. 



with bodies and higher (than those)' (Pra. Up. V, a). 
Here the terms 'he meditates' and 'he sees' have the 
same sense, * seeing ' being the result of devout meditation ; 
for according to the principle expressed in the text (KA. 
Up. Ill, 14) 'According as man's thought is in this world,' 
what is reached by the devotee is the object of medita- 
tion ; and moreover the text exhibits the same object, viz. 
' the highest Person ' in connexion with both verbs. 

The doubt here presents itself whether the highest 
Person in this text be the so-called four-faced Brahma, the 
Lord of the mundane egg who represents the individual 
souls in their collective aspect, or the supreme Person 
who is the Lord of all. — The Purvapakshin maintains the 
former view. For, he argues, on the introductory question, 
' He who here among men should meditate until death on 
the syllable Om, what would he obtain by it?' The text 
first declares that he who meditates on that syllable as 
having one MatrS, obtains the world of men; and next, 
that he who meditates on it as having two Matras obtains 
the world of the atmosphere. Hence the Brahma-world, 
which the text after that represents as the object reached 
by him who meditates on Om as having three syllables, 
must be the world of Brahma Aaturmukha who is consti- 
tuted by the aggregate of the individual souls. What the 
soul having reached that world sees, therefore is the same 
Brahma ATaturmukha ; and thus only the attribute ' etasma^ 
^ivaghanat parat param ' is suitable ; for the collective 
soul, i. e. Brahma ATaturmukha, residing in the Brahma- 
world is higher (para) than the distributive or discrete soul 
feiva) which is concreted (ghant-bhuta) with the body and 
sense-organs, and at the same time is higher (para) than 
these. The highest Person mentioned in the text, there- 
fore, is Brahma ATaturmukha ; and the qualities mentioned 
further on, such as absence of decay, &c, must be taken in 
such a way as to agree with that Brahma. 

To this prima facie view the Sutra replies that the 
object of seeing is He, i. e. the highest Self, on account of 
designation. The text clearly designates the object of 
seeing as the highest Self. For the concluding jrloka, 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 12. 313 

which refers to that object of seeing, declares that 'by 
means of the Owkara he who knows reaches that which 
is tranquil, free from decay, immortal, fearless, the highest ' 
— all which attributes properly belong to the highest Self 
only, as we know from texts such as ' that is the Immortal, 
that is the fearless, that is Brahman ' {Kh. Up. IV, 15, 1). 
The qualification expressed in the clause ' etasma^ ^iva- 
ghanat,' &c. may also refer to the highest Self only, not to 
Brahma Afaturmukha ; for the latter is himself compre- 
hended by the term '^ivaghana.' For that term denotes 
all souls which are embodied owing to karman ; and that 
ATaturmukha is one of those we know from texts such as 
' He who first creates Brahma' (.Svet. Up. VI, 18). Nor is 
there any strength in the argument that, since the Brahma- 
world mentioned in the text is known to be the world of 
ATaturmukha, as it follows next on the world of the atmos- 
phere, the being abiding there must needs be ATaturmukha. 
We rather argue as follows — as from the concluding clause 
' that which is tranquil, free from decay,' &c, we ascertain that 
the object of intuition is the highest Brahman, the Brahma- 
world spoken of as the abode of the seeing devotee cannot be 
the perishable world of Brahma ATaturmukha. A further 
reason for this conclusion is supplied by what the text says 
about ' him who is freed from all evil being led up by the 
Saman verses to the world of Brahman'; for the place 
reached by him who is freed from all evil cannot be the 
mere abode of ATaturmukha. Hence also the concluding 
jloka says with reference to that Brahma-world ' that which 
the wise teach ' : what the wise see and teach is the abode of 
the highest, of Vishwu ; cp. the text ' the wise ever see that 
highest abode of Vishwu.' Nor is it even strictly true that 
the world of Brahma follows on the atmosphere, for the 
svarga-world and several others lie between the two. 

We therefore shortly explain the drift of the whole 
chapter as follows. At the outset of the reply given to 
Satyakama there is mentioned, in addition to the highest 
(para) Brahman, a lower (apara) Brahman. This lower or 
effected (karya) Brahman is distinguished as twofold, being 
connected either with this terrestrial world or yonder, non- 



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3 1 4 vedAnta-sOtras. 



terrestrial, world. Him who meditates on the Pra«ava as 
having one syllable, the text declares to obtain a reward in 
this world — he reaches the world of men. He, on the 
other hand, who meditates on the Prawava as having two 
syllables is said to obtain his reward in a super-terrestrial 
sphere— he reaches the world of the atmosphere. And he 
finally who, by means of the trisyllabic Prawava which 
denotes the highest Brahman, meditates on this very 
highest Brahman, is said to reach that Brahman, i. e. the 
supreme Person. — The object of seeing is thus none other 
than the highest Self. — Here terminates the adhikarawa of 
the ' object of seeing.' 

13. The small (ether) (is Brahman), on account 
of the subsequent (arguments). 

The A'Aandogas have the following text, ' Now in that 
city of Brahman there is the palace, the small lotus, and 
in it that small ether. Now what is within that small ether 
that is to be sought for, that is to be understood ' {Kh. 
Up. VIII, 1, 1). — The question here arises whether that 
small ether (space) within the lotus of the heart be the 
material element called ether, or the individual Self, or the 
highest Self. — The first view presenting itself is that the 
element is meant, for the reason that the word ' ether ' is 
generally used in that sense; and because the clause 
' what is within that small ether ' shows that the ether 
mentioned constitutes the abode of something else that is 
to be enquired into. — This view is set aside by the Sutra. 
The small ether within the heart is the highest Brahman, 
on account of the subsequent reasons, contained in clauses 
of the same section. The passage ' That Self which is free 
from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from 
grief, free from hunger and thirst, whose wishes and 
purposes come true' (VIII, 7, 1) ascribes to that small 
ether qualities — such as unconditioned Selfhood, freedom 
from evil, &c. — which clearly show that ether to be the 
highest Brahman. And this conclusion is confirmed by 
what other texts say about him who knows the small ether 
attaining the power of realising his own wishes, ' Those who 



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I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 3. 315 

depart from hence having come to know the Self and those 
real wishes, for them there is freedom in all worlds ' ; and 
' whatever object he desires, by his mere will it comes to 
him ; having obtained it he is happy' (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 6 ; 
a, 9). If moreover the ether within the heart were the 
elemental ether, the comparison instituted in the passage 
' As large as that (elemental) ether is, so large is this ether 
within the heart' would be wholly inappropriate. Nor 
must it be said that that comparison rests on the limitation 
of the ether within the heart (so that the two terms com- 
pared would, be the limited elemental ether within the 
heart, and the universal elemental ether) ; for there still 
would remain the inappropriate assertion that the ether 
within the heart is the abode of heaven, earth and all 
other things. — But, an objection is raised, also on the 
alternative of the small ether being the highest Brahman, 
the comparison to the universal elemental ether is unsuit- 
able; for scripture explicitly states that the highest Self is 
(not as large but) larger than everything else, ' larger than 
the earth, larger than the sky,' &c. (A7/. Up. Ill, 14, 3). 
Not so, we reply ; what the text says as to the ether 
within the heart being as large as the universal ether 
is meant (not to make a conclusive statement as to its 
extent but only) to negative that smallness of the ether 
which is established by its abiding within the heart. 
Similarly we say • the sun moves with 4 the speed of an 
arrow ' ; the sun indeed moves much faster than an arrow, 
but what our assertion means is merely that he does not 
move slowly. — But, a further doubt is started, the passage 
• That Self which is free from sin/ &c. does not appear to 
refer back to the small ether within the heart. For the 
text makes a distinction between that ether and that within 
that ether which it declares to be the due object of search 
and enquiry. This latter object therefore is the topic of 
discussion, and when the text says later on ' That Self, free 
from sin, &c. is to be searched out ' we must understand it 
to refer to the same object of search. — This would be so, 
we reply, if the text did not distinguish the small ether 
and that which abides within it ; but as a matter of fact it 



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3 i 6 vedAnta-sOtras. 

does distinguish the two. The connexion is as follows. 
The text at first refers to the body of the devotee as the 
city of Brahman, the idea being that Brahman is present 
therein as object of meditation ; and then designates an 
organ of that body, viz. the small lotus-shaped heart as the 
palace of Brahman. It then further refers to Brahman — 
the all knowing, all powerful, whose love towards his 
devotees is boundless like the ocean — as the small ether 
within the heart, meaning thereby that Brahman who for 
the benefit of his devotees is present within that palace 
should be meditated upon as of minute size, and finally — in 
the clause ' that is to be searched out ' — enjoins as the 
object of meditation that which abides in that Brahman, 
i.e. on the one hand, its essential freedom from all evil 
qualities, and on the other the whole treasure of its aus- 
picious qualities, its power of realising its wishes and so 
on. The ' that ' (in ' that is to be searched out ') enjoins 
as objects of search the small ether, i. e. Brahman itself as 
well as the qualities abiding within it. — But how, it may 
be asked, do you know that the word ' that ' really refers 
to both, viz. the highest Brahman, there called 'small 
ether,' and the qualities abiding in it, and that hence the 
clause enjoins an enquiry into both these entities ? — Listen, 
attentively, we reply, to our explanation ! The clause ' As 
large as this ether is, so large is this ether within the heart ' 
declares the exceeding greatness of the small ether ; the 
clause * Both heaven and earth are contained within it ' up 
to ' lightning and stars ' declares that same small ether to 
be the abode of the entire world; and the clause 'And 
whatever there is for him in this world, and whatever there 
is not, all that is contained within it ' declares that what- 
ever objects of enjoyment there are for the devotee in this 
world, and whatever other objects there are not for him, 
i. e. are merely wishes but not obtained by him, all those 
objects are contained within that same small ether. The 
text next declares that that small ether, although dwelling 
within the heart which is a part of the body, is not affected 
by the body's old age and decay, for being extremely 
minute it is not capable of change ; and adds ' that true 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 14. 317 

being is the Brahman-city,' i. e. that Reality which is the 
cause of all is the city called Brahman, i. e. the abode of 
the entire Universe. The following clause ' in it all desires 
are contained ' again referring to the small ether (' in it ') 
declares that in it all desires, i. e. all desirable qualities are 
contained. The text next proceeds to set forth that the 
small ether possesses Selfhood and certain desirable aus- 
picious qualities — this is done in the passage ' It is the 
Self free from sin ' &c. up to ' whose purposes realise 
themselves.' The following section — 'And as here on 
earth' down to 'for them there is freedom in all the 
worlds ' — declares that those who do not know those eight 
qualities and the Self, called ' small ether,' which is 
characterised by them, and who perform actions aiming at 
objects of enjoyment different from that Self, obtain perish- 
able results only, and do not attain the power of realising 
their wishes ; while those on the other hand who know the 
Self called ' small ether ' and the qualities abiding within 
it, through the grace of that very same highest Self, obtain 
all their wishes and the power of realising their purposes. 
On the ground of this connected consideration of the whole 
chapter we are able to decide that the text enjoins as the 
object of search and enquiry both the highest Brahman and 
the whole body of auspicious qualities abiding within it. 
This the Vakyakara also renders clear in the passage 
beginning ' In the text " what is within that " there is 
designation of wishes (i. e. desirable qualities).' — For all 
these reasons the small ether is the highest Brahman. 

14. On account of the going and of the word; for 
thus it is seen ; and (there is) an inferential sign. 

' As people who do not know the country walk again and 
again over a gold treasure ' &c, ' thus do all these creatures 
day after day go into that Brahma-world ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 
3, a). The circumstance, here stated, of all individual souls 
going to a place which the qualification ' that' connects 
with the subject-matter of the whole chapter, i. e. the small 
ether ; and the further circumstance of the goal of their 
going being called the Brahma-world, also prove that the 



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318 vedAnta-sOtras. 



small ether is none other than the highest Brahman. — But in. 
what way do these two points prove what they are claimed 
to prove ?— ' For thus it is seen ' ; the Sutra adds. For we 
see it stated in other texts, that all individual souls go 
daily to Brahman, viz. in the state of deep sleep, ' All these 
creatures having become united with the True do not 
know that they are united with the True ' ; * Having 
come back from the True they know not that they have 
come back from the True ' (Kh. Up. VI, 9, a ; 10, a). And 
in the same way we see that the word * Brahma-world ' 
denotes the highest Brahman ; so e. g. ' this is the Brahma- 
world, O King' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 32). — The Stitra subjoins 
a further reason. Even if the going of the souls to 
Brahman were not seen in other texts, the fact that the 
text under discussion declares the individual souls to abide 
in Brahman in the state of deep sleep, enjoying freedom 
from all pain and trouble just as if they were merged in 
the pralaya state, is a sufficient ' inferential sign ' to prove 
that the ' small ether ' is the highest Brahman. And 
similarly the term * Brahma-world ' as exhibited in the 
text under discussion, if understood as denoting co-ordina- 
tion (i. e. ' that world which is Brahman '), is sufficient to 
prove by itself that the ' small ether ' — to which that term 
is applied — is the highest Brahman ; it therefore is needless 
to appeal to other passages. That this explanation of 
« Brahma-world' is preferable to the one which understands 
by Brahma-world ' the world of Brahman ' is proved by 
considerations similar to those by which the PiL Ml. Sutras 
prove that ' Nishada-sthapati ' means a headman who at 
the same time is a Nishada. — Another explanation of the 
passage under discussion may also be given. What is said 
there about all these creatures daily 'going into the 
Brahma-world,' may not refer at all to the state of deep 
sleep, but rather mean that although ' daily going into the 
Brahman-world,' i.e. although at all time moving above 
the small ether, i. e. Brahman which as the universal Self is 
everywhere, yet all these creatures not knowing Brahman 
do not find, i. e. obtain it ; just as men not knowing the 
place where a treasure is hidden do not find it, although, 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, i 6. 319 

they constantly pass over it. This constant moving about 
on the part of ignorant creatures on the surface, as it were, 
of the small ether abiding within as their inward Ruler, 
proves that small ether to be the highest Brahman. That 
the highest Brahman abides within as the inner Self of 
creatures which dwell in it and are ruled by it, we are told 
in other texts also, so e. g. in the Antaryamin-brahma»a. 
'He who dwells in the Self, within the Self, whom the 
Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who 
rules the Self within; unseen but seeing, unheard but 
hearing' (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 22 ; 23). — On this interpretation 
we explain the last part of the Sutra as follows. Even 
if other texts did not refer to it, this daily moving about 
on the part of ignorant creatures, on the ether within the 
heart — which the comparison with the treasure of gold 
shows to be the supreme good of man — , is in itself a 
sufficient proof for the small ether being Brahman. 

15. And on account of there being observed in 
that (small ether), supporting which is a greatness 
of that (i. e. Brahman). 

In continuation of the passage ' It is the Self free from 
Sin,' &c, which refers to the small ether, the text says : 
' it is a bank, a limitary support, that these worlds may not 
be confounded.' What the text here says about the small 
ether supporting the world proves it to be the highest 
Brahman ; for to support the world is the glory of Brahman. 
Compare ' He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the 
protector of all things. He is a bank and a boundary, so 
that these worlds may not be confounded ' (Bri. Up. IV, 
4, 22) ; « By the command of that Imperishable, O Gargt, 
heaven and earth stand, held apart* (Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 9). 
Now this specific greatness of the highest Brahman, which 
consists in its supporting the world, is also observed in the 
small ether — which proves the latter to be none other than 
Brahman. 

16. And on account of the settled meaning. 

The word 'ether,' moreover, is known to have, among 



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320 vedAnta-sOtras. 



other meanings, that of Brahman. Compare 'For who 
could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that ether were 
not bliss?' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'All these beings take their 
rise from the ether ' (Kh. Up. I, 9, 1). It has to be kept in 
view that in the text under discussion the meaning ' Brah- 
man' is supported by what is said about the qualities of the 
small ether — viz. freedom from sin, &c. — and hence is 
stronger than the other meaning, according to which 
akara signifies the elemental ether. 

So far the Sutras have refuted the view of the small 
ether being the element. They now enter on combating 
the notion that the small ether may possibly be the 
individual soul. 

17. If it be said that on account of reference to 
the other one he is meant ; we say no, on account 
of impossibility. 

An objection is raised to the argumentation that, on 
account of complementary passages, the small ether must 
be explained to mean the highest Self. 

For, the objector says, a clear reference to him who is 
'other' than the highest Self, i.e. to the individual soul, is 
contained in the following passage (VIII, 12, 3): 'Thus 
does that serenity (samprasada), having risen from this 
body and approached the highest light, appear in its own 
form.' ' That is the Self,' he said. * That is the immortal, 
the fearless, this is Brahman* (VIII, 7, 3?). We admit 
that for the different reasons stated above the ether within 
the heart cannot be the elemental ether ; but owing to the 
force of the intimations conveyed by the complementary 
passages just quoted, we must adopt the view that what is 
meant is the individual soul. And as the word 'akaxa* 
may be connected with praklra (light), it may be applied 
to the individual soul also. — This view is set aside by the 
Sutra. The small ether cannot be the individual soul 
because the qualities attributed in the text to the former, 
viz. freedom from sin, &c, cannot possibly belong to the 
individual soul. 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, i 8. 321 

18. Should it be said that from a subsequent 
passage (it appears that the individual Soul is 
meant) ; rather (the soul) in so far as its true nature 
has become manifest. 

The Purvapakshin now maintains that we ascertain from 
a subsequent declaration made by Pra^apati that it is just 
the individual Soul that possesses freedom from sin and the 
other qualities enumerated. The whole teaching of Pra^a- 
pati, he says, refers to the individual Soul only. Indra 
having heard that Pra^apati had spoken about a Self free 
from sin, old age, &c, the enquiry into which enables the 
soul to obtain all worlds and desires, approaches Pra^apati 
with the wish to learn the true nature of that Self which 
should be enquired into. Pra^apati thereupon, wishing to 
test the capacity of his pupil for receiving true instruction, 
gives him successive information about the embodied soul 
in the state of waking, dream and dreamless sleep. When 
he finds that Indra sees no good in instruction of this kind 
and thus shows himself fit to receive instruction about 
the true nature of the disembodied Self, he explains to him 
that the body is a mere abode for a ruling Self; that that 
bodiless Self is essentially immortal ; and that the soul, as 
long as it is joined to a body due to karman, is compelled 
to experience pleasure and pain corresponding to its em- 
bodied state, while it rises above all this when it has freed 
itself from the body (VIII, 12, 1). He then continues: 
'Thus that serenity having risen from this body and 
approached the highest light, appears in its own form'; 
thus teaching him the true nature, free from a body, of the 
individual soul. He next informs him that the 'highest 
light ' which the soul reaches is the supreme Person (' That 
is the supreme Person '), and that the soul having reached 
that highest light and freed itself from what obscured its 
own true nature, obtains in the world of Brahman whatever 
enjoyments it desires, and is no longer connected with 
a body springing from karman and inseparable from pain 
and pleasure, or with anything else that causes distress. 
('He moves about there laughing,' &c). He next illus- 

[48] Y 



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322 vedanta-sOtras. 



trates the connexion with a body, of the soul in the 
Sawsara state, by means of a comparison : ' Like as a horse 
attached to a cart,' &c. After that he explains that the 
eye and the other sense-organs are instruments of know- 
ledge, colour, and so on, the objects of knowledge, and the 
individual Self the knowing subject ; and that hence that Self 
is different from the body and the sense-organs (' Now where 
the sight has entered ' up to ' the mind is his divine eye '), 
Next he declares that, after having divested itself of the 
body and the senses, the Self perceives all the objects 
of its desire by means of its ' divine eye,' i.e. the power of 
cognition which constitutes its essential nature ('He by 
means of the divine eye,' &c). He further declares that 
those who have true knowledge know the Self as such (' on 
that Self the devas meditate ') ; and in conclusion teaches 
that he who has that true knowledge of the Self obtains for 
his reward the intuition of Brahman- — which is suggested 
by what the text says about the obtaining of all worlds 
and all desires (' He obtains all worlds and all desires,' &c, 
up to the end of the chapter). — It thus appears that the 
entire chapter proposes as the object of cognition the indi- 
vidual soul free from sin, and so on. The qualities, viz. 
freedom from guilt, &c, may thus belong to the individual 
Self, and on this ground we conclude that the small ether 
is the individual Self. 

This view the second half of the Sutra sets aside. The 
two sections, that which treats of the small ether and that 
which contains the teaching of Pra^apati, have different 
topics. Pra^apati's teaching refers to the individual soul, 
whose true nature, with its qualities such as freedom from 
evil, &c, is at first hidden by untruth, while later on, when 
it has freed itself from the bondage of karman, risen from 
the body, and approached the highest light, it manifests 
itself in its true form and then is characterised by freedom 
from all evil and by other auspicious qualities. In the sec- 
tion treating of the small ether, on the other hand, we have 
to do with the small ether, i.e. the highest Brahman, whose 
true nature is never hidden, and which therefore is uncon- 
ditionally characterised by freedom from evil, and so on. — • 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 19. 323 

Moreover, the daharaklra-section ascribes to the small 
*ether other attributes which cannot belong to the individual 
Self even * when its true nature has manifested itself.' The 
small ether is there called a bank and support of all worlds ; 
and one of its names, ' satyam,' is explained to imply that 
it governs all sentient and non-sentient beings. All this 
also proves that the small ether is none other than the highest 
Self. That the individual soul, ' even when its true nature 
is manifest,' cannot be viewed as a bank and support of the 
worlds, &c, we shall show under IV, 4. 

But if this is so, what then is the meaning of the 
reference to the individual soul which is made in the section 
treating of the small ether, viz. in the passage, ' Now that 
serene being, which after having risen from this body,' &c. 

(VIII, 3, 4)? 
To this question the next Sutra replies. 

19. And the reference has a different meaning'. 

The text in question declares that the released individual 
soul when reaching the highest light, i. e. Brahman, which 
is free from all sin, and so on, attains its true nature, which 
is characterised by similar freedom from sin, and so on. 
Now this reference to the individual soul, as described in 
the teaching of Pra^apati, has the purpose of giving in- 
struction (not about the qualities of the individual soul, but) 
about the nature of that which is the cause of the qualities 
of the individual soul, i.e. the qualities specially belonging 
to the supreme Person. The reason why, in the section 
containing the teaching of Pra^apati, information is given 
as to the true nature of the released individual soul is that 
such knowledge assists the doctrine referring to the small 
ether. For the individual Self which wishes to reach 
Brahman must know his own true nature also, so as to 
realise that he, as being himself endowed with auspicious 
qualities, will finally arrive at an intuition of the highest 
Brahman, which is a mass of auspicious qualities raised to 
the highest degree of excellence. The cognition of the 
soul's own true nature is itself comprised in the result of 
the meditation on Brahman, and the results which are 

V 2 



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324^ vedAnta-sOtras. 



proclaimed in the teaching of Pra^apati (' He obtains all 
worlds and all wishes ' ; ' He moves about there laughing/ 
&c.) thus really are results of the knowledge of the small 
ether. 

20. If it be said, owing to the scriptural declara- 
tion of smallness ; that has been explained. 

The text describes the ether within the heart as being of 
small compass, and this agrees indeed with the individual 
soul which elsewhere is compared to the point of an awl, 
but not with Brahman, which is greater than everything. — 
The reply to this objection has virtually been given before, 
viz. under I, 2, 7, where it is said that Brahman may be 
viewed as of small size, for the purpose of devout medi* 
tation. 

It thus remains a settled conclusion that the small ether 
is none other but the highest Person who is untouched by 
even a shadow of imperfection, and is an ocean of infinite, 
supremely exalted, qualities — knowledge, strength, lordly 
power, &c. The being, on the other hand, which in the 
teaching of Pra^apati is described as first having a body 
due to karman — as we see from passages such as ' they 
strike it as it were, they cut it as it were ' — and as after- 
wards approaching the highest light, and then manifesting 
its essential qualities, viz. freedom from sin, &c, is the 
individual soul ; not the small ether (or Brahman). 

The next Sutra supplies a further reason for this con- 
clusion. 

21. And on account of the imitation of that. 

The individual soul, free from bondage, and thus pos- 
sessing the qualities of freedom from sin, &c, cannot be 
the small ether, i. e. the highest Brahman, because it is 
stated to ' imitate,' i. e. to be equal to that Brahman. The 
text making that statement is Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 3, ' When 
the seer (i. e. the individual soul) sees the brilliant maker, 
the Lord, the Person who has his source in Brahman ; then 
becoming wise and shaking off good and evil, he reaches 
the highest equality, free from passions.' The being to 



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i adhvAya, 3 pAda, 23. 325 

which the teaching of Pra^apati refers is the 'imitator,' 
i. e. the individual soul ; the Brahman which is ' imitated ' 
is the small ether. 

22. The same is declared by Smnti also. 

Smrtti also declares that the transmigrating soul when 
reaching the state of Release ' imitates,' i.e. attains supreme 
equality of attributes with the highest Brahman. 'Abiding 
by this knowledge they, attaining to equality of attributes 
with me, are not born again at the time of creation, nor 
are they affected by the general dissolution of the world ' 
(Bha. Gi. XIV, 2). 

Some maintain that the last two Sutras constitute a 
separate adhikarawa (head of discussion), meant to prove 
that the text Mu. Up. II, 2, 10 ('After him the shining 
one, everything shines ; by the light of him all this is 
lighted '), refers to the highest Brahman. This view is, 
however, inadmissible, for the reason that with regard to 
the text quoted no purvapaksha can arise, it having been 
proved under I, 2, 21 ff., and 1, 3, 1 ff., that the whole section 
of which that text forms part is concerned with Brahman ; 
and it further having been shown under I, 1, 24 ff., that 
Brahman is apprehended under the form of light. — The 
interpretation moreover does not fit in with the wording of 
the Sutras. — Here terminates the adhikarawa of the ' small 
one.' 

23. On account of the term, the one measured. 

We read in the Ka/Aavalli * The Person of the size of 
a thumb stands in the middle of the Self, as lord of the 
past and the future, and henceforward fears no more ' ; 
• That Person of the size of a thumb is like a light without 
smoke,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12 ; 13). And 'The Person not 
larger than a thumb, the inner Self, is always settled in the 
heart of men' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 17). A doubt here arises 
whether the being measured by the extent of a span be 
the individual soul or the highest Self. — The Purvapakshin 
maintains the former view ; for, he says, another scriptural 
text also declares the individual soul to have that measure, 



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326 vedAnta-sOtras. 



* the ruler of the vital airs moves through his own works, 
of the size of a thumb, brilliant like the son, endowed with 
purposes and egoity' (Svet. Up. V, 11, 7; 8). Moreover, 
the highest Self is not anywhere else, not even for the 
purpose of meditation, represented as having the size of 
a thumb. It thus being determined that the being of the 
length of a thumb is the individual Self, we understand 
the term ' Lord,' which is applied to it, as meaning that it 
is the Lord of the body, the sense-organs, the objects and 
the instruments of fruition. — Of this view the Sutra- dis- 
poses, maintaining that the being a thumb long can be 
none but the highest Self, just on account of that term. 
For lordship over all things past and future cannot pos- 
sibly belong to the individual Self, which is under the 
power of karman. — But how can the highest Self be said 
to have the measure of a thumb ?-On this point the next 
Sutra satisfies us. 

24. But with reference to the heart, men being 
qualified. 

In so far as the highest Self abides, for the purpose of 
devout meditation, in the heart of the devotee — which 
heart is of the measure of a thumb — it may itself be 
viewed as having the measure of a thumb. The individual 
soul also can be said to have the measure of a thumb 
only in so far as dwelling within the heart ; for scripture 
directly states that its real size is that of the point of 
a goad, i.e. minute. And as men only are capable of 
devout meditation, and hence alone have a claim on scrip- 
ture, the fact that the hearts of other living creatures also, 
such as donkeys, horses, snakes, &c, have the same size, 
cannot give rise to any objection. — The discussion of this 
matter will be completed later on *. 

25. Also beings above them (i.e. men), Badara- 
ya«a thinks, on account of possibility. 

In order to prove that the highest Brahman may be 

1 The ' pramitadhikarawa ' is resumed in Sutra 41. 

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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 25. 327 

viewed as having the size of a thumb, it has been declared 
that the scriptural texts enjoining meditation on Brahman 
are the concern of men. This offers an opportunity for 
the discussion of the question whether also other classes of 
individual souls, such as devas, are qualified for knowledge 
of Brahman. The Purvapakshin denies this qualification 
in the case of gods and other beings, on the ground of 
absence of capability. For, he says, bodiless beings, such 
as gods, are incapable of the accomplishment of meditation 
.on Brahman, which requires as its auxiliaries the seven 
means enumerated above (p. 17). This must not be 
objected to on the ground of the devas, and so on, having 
bodies ; for there is no means of proof establishing such 
embodiedness. We have indeed proved above that the 
Vedanta-texts may intimate accomplished things, and 
hence are an authoritative means for the cognition of 
Brahman ; but we do not meet with any Vedanta-text, 
the purport of which is to teach that the devas, and so 
on, possess bodies. Nor can this point be established 
through mantras and arthavada texts ; for these are merely 
supplementary to the injunctions of actions (sacrificial, and 
so on), and therefore have a different aim. And the injunc- 
tions themselves prove nothing with regard to the devas, 
except that the latter are that with a view to which those 
actions are performed. In the same way it also cannot be 
shown that the gods have any desires or wants (to fulfil or 
supply which they might enter on meditation of Brahman). 
For the two reasons above we therefore conclude that the 
devas, and so on, are not qualified for meditation on 
Brahman. — This view is contradicted by the Sutra. Such 
meditation is possible in the case of higher beings also, 
Badarayawa thinks ; on account of the possibility of want 
and capacity on their part also. Want and wish exist in 
their case since they also are liable to suffering, springing 
from the assaults, hard to be endured, of the different 
kinds of pain, and since they also know that supreme 
enjoyment is to be found in the highest Brahman, which is 
untouched by the shadow even of imperfection, and is 
a mass of auspicious qualities in their highest perfection. 



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328 vedAnta-sOtras. 



* Capability,' on the other hand, depends on the possession 
of a body and sense-organs of whatever degree of .tenuity ; 
and that the devas, from Brahma downward, possess a 
body and sense-organs, is declared in all the Upanishads, 
in the chapters treating of creation and the chapters en- 
joining meditation. In the ATAandogya, e.g. it is related 
how the highest Being having resolved on creation, evolved 
the aggregate of non-sentient matter with its different 
kinds, and then produced the fourfold multitude of living 
creatures, each having a material body corresponding to 
its karman, and a suitable name of its own. Similarly, all 
the other scriptural accounts of creation declare that there 
are four classes of creatures — devas, men, animals, and non- 
moving beings, such as plants — and the difference of these 
classes depends on* the individual Selfs being joined to 
various bodies capacitating them to experience the results 
of their works, each in that one of the fourteen worlds — 
beginning with the world of Brahma — which is the suitable 
place for retribution. For in themselves, apart from bodies, 
the individual Selfs are not distinguished as men, gods, 
and so on. In the same way the story of the devas and 
Asuras approaching Pra^apati with fuel in their hands, 
staying with him as pupils for thirty-two years, &c. (Kh. 
Up. VIII, 7 ff.), clearly shows that the devas possess bodies 
and sense-organs. Analogously, mantras and arthavadas, 
which are complementary to injunctions of works, contain 
unmistakeable references to the corporeal nature of the 
gods (' Indra holding in his hand the thunderbolt ' ; ' Indra 
lifted the thunderbolt,' &c.) ; and as the latter is not con- 
tradicted by any other means of proof it must be accepted 
on the authority stated. Nor can it be said that those 
mantras and arthavadas are really meant to express some- 
thing else (than those details mentioned above), in so far, 
namely, as they aim at proclaiming or glorifying the action 
with which they are connected ; for those very details sub- 
serve the purpose of glorification, and so on, and without 
them glorification is not possible. For we praise or glorify 
a thing by declaring its qualities ; if such qualities do not 
exist all glorification lapses. It cannot by any means be 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 25. 329 

maintained that anything may be glorified by the proclama- 
tion of its qualities, even if such qualities do not really 
exist. Hence the arthavadas which glorify a certain action, 
just thereby intimate the real existence of the qualities and 
details of the action. The mantras again, which are pre- 
scribed in connexion with the actions, serve the purpose of 
throwing light on the use to be derived from the perform- 
ance of the actions, and this they accomplish by making 
statements as to the particular qualities, such as embodied- 
ness and the like, which belong to the devas and other 
classes of beings. Otherwise Indra, and so on, would not 
be remembered at the time of performance ; for the idea 
of a divinity presents itself to the mind only in connexion 
with the special attributes of that divinity. In the case of 
such qualities as are not established by other means of 
proof, the primary statement is made by the arthavada or 
the mantra : the former thereby glorifies the action, and 
the latter proclaims it as possessing certain qualities or 
details ; and both these ends are accomplished by making 
statements as to the gods, &c, possessing certain qualities, 
such as embodiedness and the like. In the case, again, of 
certain qualities being already established by other means 
of proof, the mantras and arthavadas merely refer to them 
(as something already known), and in this way per- 
form their function of glorification and elucidation. And 
where, thirdly, there is a contradiction between the other 
means of knowledge and what mantras and arthavadas 
state (as when, e. g. a text of the latter kind says that ' the 
sacrificial post is the sun'), the intention of the text is 
metaphorically to denote, by means of those apparently 
unmeaning terms, certain other qualities which are not 
excluded by the other means of knowledge; and in this 
way the function of glorification and elucidation is again 
accomplished. Now what the injunction of a sacrificial 
action demands as its supplement, is a statement as to the 
power of the divinity to whom the sacrifice is offered; for 
the performance which scripture enjoins on men desirous 
of certain results, is itself of a merely transitory nature, 
and hence requires some agent capable of bringing about, 



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330 vedAnta-sAtras. 



at some future time, the result desired as, e. g. the heavenly 
world. ' Vayu is the swiftest god ; he (the sacrificer) 
approaches Vayu with his own share ; the god then leads 
him to prosperity' (Taitt. Samh. I, a, i) ; ' What he seeks 
by means of that offering, may he obtain that, may he 
prosper therein, may the gods favourably grant him that ' 
(Taitt. Br. Ill, 5, 10, 5) ; these and similar arthavadas 
and mantras intimate that the gods when propitiated by 
certain sacrificial works, give certain rewards and possess 
the power to do so ; and they thus connect themselves 
with the general context of scripture as supplying an 
evidently required item of information. Moreover, the 
mere verb ' to sacrifice ' (y&g), as denoting worship of the 
gods, intimates the presence of a deity which is to be 
propitiated by the action called sacrifice, and thus consti- 
tutes the main element of that action. A careful con- 
sideration of the whole context thus reveals that everything 
which is wanted for the due accomplishment of the action 
enjoined is to be learned from the text itself, and that 
hence we need not have recourse to such entities as the 
' unseen principle ' (apurva), assumed to be denoted by, 
or to be imagined in connexion with, the passages en- 
joining certain actions. Hence the dharmasastras, itihasas, 
and purawas also, which are founded on the different 
brahmawas, mantras and arthavadas, clearly teach that 
Brahma and the other gods, as well as the Asuras and 
other superhuman beings, have bodies and sense-organs, 
constitutions of different kinds, different abodes, enjoy- 
ments, and functions. — Owing to their having bodies, 
the gods therefore are also qualified for meditation on 
Brahman. 

26. If it be said that there results a contradiction 
to work ; we deny this, on account of the observa- 
tion of the assumption of several (bodies). 

An objection here presents itself. If we admit the gods 
to have bodies, a difficulty arises at the sacrifices, as it is 
impossible that one and the same corporeal Indra — who 
is at the same time invited by many sacrificers 'come, 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 27. 33 1 

i — ■ — —^ 1 

O Indra,' ' come, O Lord of the red horses,' &c — should be 
present at all those places. And that the gods, Agni and 
so on, really do come to the sacrifices is proved by the 
following scriptural text : * To whose sacrifice do the gods 
go, and to whose not? He who first receives the gods, 
sacrifices to them on the following day ' (Taitt. Sawh. I, 6, 
7, 1). In refutation of this objection the Sutra points out 
that there is seen, i. e. recorded, the assumption of several 
bodies at the same time, on the part of beings endowed 
with special powers, such as Saubhari. 

27. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) 
with regard to words; we say no, since beings 
originate from them (as appears) from perception 
and inference. 

Well then let us admit that there is no difficulty as far 
as sacrifices are concerned, for the reason stated in the 
preceding Sutra. But another difficulty presents itself with 
regard to the words of which the Veda consists. For if 
Indra and the other gods are corporeal beings, it follows 
that they are made up of parts and hence non-permanent. 
This implies either that the Vedic words denoting them — 
not differing therein from common worldly words such as 
Devadatta — are totally devoid of meaning during all those 
periods which precede the origination of the beings called 
Indra and so on, or follow on their destruction ; or else that 
the Veda itself is non-permanent, non-eternal. — This ob- 
jection is not valid, the Sutra points out, for the reason that 
those beings, viz. Indra and so on, again and again originate 
from the Vedic words. To explain. Vedic words, such as 
Indra and so on, do not, like the word Devadatta and the 
like, denote, on the basis of convention, one particular in- 
dividual only: they rather denote by their own power 
particular species of beings, just as the word ' cow ' denotes 
a particular species of animals. When therefore a special 
individual of the class called Indra has perished, the 
creator, apprehending from the Vedic word ' Indra ' which 
is present to his mind the class characteristics of the beings 
denoted by that word, creates another Indra possessing 



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332 vedAnta-sOtras. 



those very same characteristics ; just as the potter fashions 
a new jar, on the basis of the word ' jar ' which is stirring in 
his mind. — But how is this known ? — ' Through perception 
and inference,' i. e. through Scripture and Smrtti. Scripture 
says, e. g. ' By means of the Veda Praf apati evolved names 
and forms, the being and the non-being ' ; and ' Saying 
" bhuh " (earth) he created the earth ; saying " bhuvaA " he 
created the air,' and so on ; which passages teach that the 
creator at first bethinks himself of the characteristic make 
of a thing, in connexion with the word denoting it, and 
thereupon creates an individual thing characterised by that 
make. Smrz'ti makes similar statements ; compare, e. g. 
• In the beginning there was sent forth by the creator, divine 
speech — beginningless and endless — in the form of the Veda, 
and from it there originated all creatures'; and 'He, in the 
beginning, separately created from the words of the Veda 
the names and works and shapes of all things ' ; and ' The 
names and forms of beings, and all the multiplicity of 
works He in the beginning created from the Veda.' This 
proves that from the corporeality of the gods, and so on, it 
follows neither that the words of the Veda are unmeaning 
nor that the Veda itself is non-eternal. 

28. And for this very reason eternity (of the Veda). 

As words such as Indra and Vastsh/Aa, which denote 
gods and /?/shis, denote (not individuals only, but) classes, 
and as the creation of those beings is preceded by 
their being suggested to the creative mind through those 
words ; for this reason the eternity of the Veda admits of 
being reconciled with what scripture says about the man- 
tras and ka«*/as (sections) of the sacred text having 'makers' 
and about J?*shis seeing the hymns ; cp. such passages as 
' He chooses the makers of mantras ' ; ' Reverence to the 
J? tshis who are the makers of mantras ' ; ' That is Agni ; 
this is a hymn of Vwvamitra.' For by means of these very 
texts Pra^apati presents to his own mind the characteristics 
and powers of the different Riahis who make the different 
sections, hymns, and mantras, thereupon creates them en- 
dowed with those characteristics and powers, and appoints 



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I ADHYAYA, 3 PAdA, 29. 333 

them to remember the very same sections, hymns, &c. 
The Jiishis being thus gifted by Pra^apati with the requisite 
powers, undergo suitable preparatory austerities and finally 
see the mantras, and so on, proclaimed by the Vasish/^as 
and other j?t'shis of former ages of the world, perfect in all 
their sounds and accents, without having learned them from 
the recitation of a teacher. There is thus no conflict be- 
tween the eternity of the Veda and the fact that the J? sshis 
are the makers of its sections, hymns, and so on. A further 
objection is raised. Let it be admitted that after each 
pralaya of the kind called 'contingent' (naimittika), 
Pra^apati may proceed to create new Indras, and so on, in 
the way of remembering on the basis of the Veda the 
Indras, and so on, of preceding periods. In the case, on the 
other hand, of a pralaya of the kind called elemental 
(prakritika), in which the creator, Pra^apati himself, and 
words — which are the effects of the elemental ahankara — 
pass away, what possibility is there of Pra^apati under- 
taking a new creation on the basis of Vedic words, and 
how can we speak of the permanency of a Veda which 
perishes? He who maintains the eternity of the Veda and 
the corporeality of gods, and so on, is thus really driven to 
the hypothesis of the course of mundane existence being 
without a beginning (i.e. not preceded by a pralaya). — Of 
this difficulty the next Sutra disposes. 

29. And on account of the equality of names and 
forms there is no contradiction, even in the renova- 
tion (of the world) ; as appears from 6ruti and 
SmWti. 

On account of the sameness of names and forms, as 
stated before, there is no difficulty in the way of the 
origination of the world, even in the case of total pralayas. 
For what actually takes place is as follows. When the 
period of a great pralaya draws towards its close, the divine 
supreme Person, remembering the constitution of the 
world previous to the pralaya, and forming the volition 
' May I become manifold,' separates into its constituent 



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334 vedAnta-sCtras. 



elements the whole mass of enjoying souls and objects of 
enjoyment which, during the pralaya state, had been 
merged in him so as to possess a separate existence (not 
actual but) potential only, and then emits the entire world 
just as it had been before, from the so-called Mahat 
down to the Brahman-egg, and Hirawyagarbha (Pra^apati). 
Having thereupon manifested the Vedas in exactly the 
same order and arrangement they had had before, and 
having taught them to Hirawyagarbha, he entrusts to 
him the new creation of the different classes of beings, 
gods, and so on, just as it was before ; and at the same 
time abides himself within the world so created as its inner 
Self and Ruler. This view of the process removes all 
difficulties. The superhuman origin and the eternity of 
the Veda really mean that intelligent agents having 
received in their minds an impression due to previous 
recitations of the Veda in a fixed order of words, chapters, 
and so on, remember and again recite it in that very same 
order of succession. This holds good both with regard 
to us men and to the highest Lord of all ; there however 
is that difference between the two cases that the representa- 
tions of the Veda which the supreme Person forms in his 
own mind are spontaneous, not dependent on an impression 
previously made. 

To the question whence all this is known, the Sutra 
replies ' from Scripture and Smr/ti.' The scriptural passage 
is * He who first creates Brahma and delivers the Vedas to 
him' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). And as to Smr/ti we have the 
following statement in Manu, ' This universe existed in 
the shape of darkness, &c. — He desiring to produce beings 
of many kinds from his own body, first with a thought 
created the waters and placed his seed in them. That seed 
became a golden egg equal to the sun in brilliancy ; in that 
he himself was born as Brahma, the progenitor of the 
whole world ' (Manu I, i, 5; 8-9). To the same effect are 
the texts of the Pauramkas, ' From the navel of the sleeping 
divinity there sprung up a lotus, and in that lotus there 
was born Brahma fully knowing all Vedas and Vedangas. 
And then Brahma was told by him (the highest Divinity), 



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i adhvAya, 3 pAda, 31. 335 

' Do thou create all beings, O Great-minded one'; and the 
following passage, ' From the highest Narayawa there was 
born the Four-faced one.' — And in the section which begins 
' I will tell the original creation,' we read • Because having 
created water (nara) I abide within it, therefore my name 
shall be Naraya«a. There I lie asleep in every Kalpa, and 
as I am sleeping there springs from my navel a lotus, and 
in that lotus there is born the Four-faced one, and I tell 
him " Do thou, Great-minded one, create all beings." ' — 
-Here terminates the adhikarawa of ' the deities.' 

30. On account of the impossibility (of qualifica- 
tion for the madhuvidya, &c.) Gaimini maintains 
the non-qualification (of gods, &c). 

So far it has been proved that also the gods, and so on, 
are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. But a further 
point here presents itself for consideration, viz. whether the 
gods are qualified or not to undertake those meditations of 
which they themselves are the objects. The Sutra states 
as a purvapaksha view held by Gaimini, that they are not 
so qualified, for the reason that there are no other Adityas, 
Vasus, and so on, who could be meditated on by the 
Adityas and Vasus themselves; and that moreover for 
the Adityas and Vasus the qualities and position of those 
classes of deities cannot be objects of desire, considering 
that they possess them already. The so-called Madhuvidya. 
{Kh. Up. Ill) represents as objects of devout meditation 
certain parts of the sun which are being enjoyed by 
the different classes of divine beings, Vasus, Adityas, and 
so on — the sun being there called ' madhu,' i. e. honey or 
nectar, on account of his being the abode of a certain 
nectar to be brought about by certain sacrificial works to 
be known from the i?*'g-veda, and so on ; and as the reward 
of such meditation the text names the attainment of the 
position of the Vasus, Adityas, and so on. 

31. And on account of (meditating on the part 
of the gods) being in the Light. 

' Him the devas meditate upon as the light of lights, as 



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336 vedanta-sOtras. 



immortal time' (Br*. Up. IV, 4, 16). This text declares 
that the meditation of the gods has for its object the Light, 
i. e. the highest Brahman. Now this express declaration 
as to the gods being meditating devotees with regard to 
meditations on Brahman which are common to men and 
gods, implies a denial of the gods being qualified for medi- 
tations on other objects. The conclusion therefore is that 
the Vasus, and so on, are not qualified for meditations on 
the Vasus and other classes of deities. 

32. But Badaraya«a (maintains) the existence (of 
qualification) ; for there is (possibility of such). 

The Reverend Badaraya»a thinks that the Adityas, Vasus, 
and so on, are also qualified for meditations on divinities. 
For it is in their case also possible that their attainment of 
Brahman should be viewed as preceded by their attainment 
of Vasu-hood or Aditya-hood, in so far, namely, as they 
meditate on Brahman as abiding within themselves. They 
may be Vasus and Adityas in the present age of the 
world, but at the same time be desirous of holding the 
same position in future ages also. In the Madhuvidya we 
have to distinguish two sections, concerned respectively 
with Brahman in its causal and its effected state. The 
former section, extending from the beginning up to • when 
from thence he has risen upwards,' enjoins meditation on 
Brahman in its condition as effect, L e. as appearing in the 
form of creatures such as the Vasus, and so on ; while 
the latter section enjoins meditation on the causal Brahman 
viewed as abiding within the sun as its inner Self. The 
purport of the whole vidya is that he who meditates on 
Brahman in this its twofold form will in a future age of the 
world enjoy Vasu-hood, and will finally attain Brahman in 
its causal aspect, i.e. the very highest Brahman. From the 
fact that the text, ' And indeed to him who thus knows 
the Brahma-upanishad, the sun does not rise and does not 
set ; for him there is day once and for all,' calls the whole 
Madhuvidya a ' Brahma '- upanishad, and that the reward 
declared is the attainment of Vasu-hood, and so on, leading 
up to the attainment of Brahman, we clearly are entitled to 



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I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 32. 337 

infer that the meditations which the text enjoins, viz. 
on the different parts of the sun viewed as objects of 
enjoyment for the Vasus, and so on, really are meant as 
meditations on Brahman as abiding in those different forms. 
Meditation on the Vasus and similar beings is thus seen to be 
possible for the Vasus themselves. And as Brahman really 
constitutes the only object of meditation, we also see the 
appropriateness of the text discussed above, 'On him 
the gods meditate as the light of lights.' The Vr/ttikara 
expresses the same opinion, ' For there is possibility with 
regard to the Madhu-vidya, and so on, Brahman only 
being the object of meditation everywhere.' — Here ter- 
minates the adhikarana of ' honey.' 

The Sutras now enter on a discussion of the question 
whether the Sudras also are qualified for the knowledge of 
Brahman. 

The Purvapakshin maintains that they are so qualified ; 
for qualification, he says, depends on want and capacity, 
and both these are possible in the case of .Sudras also. 
The Sudra is not indeed qualified for any works depending 
on a knowledge of the sacred fires, for from such know- 
ledge he is debarred; but he possesses qualification for 
meditation on Brahman, which after all is nothing but 
a certain mental energy. The only works prerequisite for 
meditation are those works which are incumbent on a man 
as a member of a caste or ibrama, and these consist, in the 
.SAdra's case, in obedience to the higher castes. And when 
we read ' therefore the Sfldra is not qualified for sacrifices,' 
the purport of this passage is only to make a confirmatory 
reference to something already settled by reason, viz. that 
the Stidra is not qualified for the performance of sacrifices 
which cannot be accomplished by one not acquainted with 
the sacred fires (and not to deny the Stidra's competence 
for devout meditation). — But how can meditation on Brah- 
man be undertaken by a man who has not studied the 
Vedas, inclusive of the Vedanta, and hence knows nothing 
about the nature of Brahman and the proper modes of 
meditation ? — Those also, we reply, who do not study Veda 
and Vedanta may acquire the requisite knowledge by 
[48] z 



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338 vedanta-sCtras. 



hearing Itihasas and Purawas; and there are texts which 
allow Sudras to become acquainted with texts of that kind ; 
cp. e.g. 'one is to make the four castes to hear texts, the 
Brahmana coming first.' Moreover, those Pura»as and 
Itihasas make mention of SQdras, such as Vidura, who had 
a knowledge of Brahman. And the Upanishads them- 
selves, viz. in the so-called Sa/«varga-vidya, show that 
a 5udra is qualified for the knowledge of Brahman ; for 
there the teacher Raikva addresses £anamiti, who wishes 
to learn from him, as 5udra, and thereupon instructs him in 
the knowledge of Brahman {Kk. Up. IV, a, 3). All this 
proves that .Sudras also have a claim to the knowledge of 
Brahman. 

This conclusion we deny, on the ground of the absence 
of capability. It is impossible that the capability of per- 
forming meditations on Brahman should belong to a person 
not knowing the nature of Brahman and the due modes of 
meditation, and not qualified by the knowledge of the 
requisite preliminaries of such meditation, viz. recitation of 
the Veda, sacrifices, and so on. Mere want or desire does 
not impart qualification to a person destitute of the required 
capability. And this absence of capability is due, in the 
Sudra's case, to absence of legitimate study of the Veda. 
The injunctions of sacrificial works naturally connect them- 
selves with the knowledge and the means of knowledge 
(i.e. religious ceremonies and the like) that belong to the 
three higher castes, for these castes actually possess 
the knowledge (required for the sacrifices), owing to their 
studying the Veda in agreement with the injunction which 
prescribes such study for the higher castes; the same 
injunctions do not, on the other hand, connect themselves 
with the knowledge and means of knowledge belonging to 
others (than members of the three higher castes). And 
the same naturally holds good with regard to the injunc- 
tions of meditation on Brahman. And as thus only such 
knowledge as is acquired by study prompted by the Vedic 
injunction of study supplies a means for meditation on 
Brahman, it follows that the Sudra for whom that injunc- 
tion is not meant is incapable of such meditation. Itihasas 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 33. 339 

and Purawas hold the position of being helpful means 
towards meditation in so far only as they confirm or 
support the Veda, not independently of the Veda. And 
that Sudras are allowed to hear Itihasas and Puranas is 
meant only for the end of destroying their sins, not to 
prepare them for meditation on Brahman. The case of 
Vidura and other Sudras having been ' founded on Brah- 
man,' explains itself as follows : — Owing to the effect of 
former actions, which had not yet worked themselves out, 
they were born in a low caste, while at the same time they 
possessed wisdom owing to the fact that the knowledge 
acquired by them in former births had not yet quite 
vanished. 

(On these general grounds we object to .Sudras being 
viewed as qualified for meditation on Brahman.) The 
Sutra now refutes that argument, which the Purvapakshin 
derives from the use of the word 'Sudra ' in the Sa>«- 
varga-vidya. 

33. (That) grief of him (arose), this is intimated 
by his (CPanasruti's) resorting to him (kaikva) on 
hearing a disrespectful speech about himself. 

From what the text says about Gknastati Pautrayawa 
having been taunted by a flamingo for his want of know- 
ledge of Brahman, and having thereupon resorted to 
Raikva, who possessed the knowledge of Brahman, it 
appears that sorrow (suk) had taken possession of him ; 
and it is with a view to this that Raikva addresses him as 
.Sudra. For the word Sudra, etymologically considered, 
means one who grieves or sorrows (sokati). The appella- 
tion ' judra ' therefore refers to his sorrow, not to his being 
a member of the fourth caste. This clearly appears from 
a consideration of the whole story. Ganamiti Pautraya»a 
was a very liberal and pious king. Being much pleased 
with his virtuous life, and wishing to rouse in him the 
desire of knowing Brahman, two noble-minded beings, 
assuming the shape of flamingoes, new past him at night 
time, when one of them addressed the other, ' O Bhallaksha, 
the light of (zanarruti has spread like the sky ; do not go 

z 2 



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340 vedAnta-sOtras. 



near that it may not burn thee.' To this praise of 
£anamiti the other flamingo replied, ' How can you speak 
of him, being what he is, as if he were Raikva " sayuktvan" ?' 
i. e. ' how can you speak of (7anajruti, being what he is, as 
if he were Raikva, who knows Brahman and is endowed 
with the most eminent qualities? Raikva, who knows 
Brahman, alone in this world is truly eminent. Ganajxuti 
may be very pious, but as he does not know Brahman 
what quality of his could produce splendour capable of 
burning me like the splendour of Raikva ? ' The former 
flamingo thereupon asks who that Raikva is, and its com- 
panion replies, ' He in whose work and knowledge there 
are comprised all the works done by good men and all the 
knowledge belonging to intelligent creatures, that is Raikva.' 
<7anajruti, having heard this speech of the flamingo — which 
implied a reproach to himself as being destitute of the 
knowledge of Brahman, and a glorification of Raikva as 
possessing that knowledge — at once sends his door-keeper 
to look for Raikva; and when the door-keeper finds him 
and brings word, the king himself repairs to him with six 
hundred cows, a golden necklace, and a carriage yoked with 
mules, and asks him to teach him the deity on which he 
meditates, i.e. the highest deity. Raikva, who through 
the might of his Yoga-knowledge is acquainted with every- 
thing that passes in the three worlds, at once perceives that 
£anarruti is inwardly grieved at the slighting speech of 
the flamingo, which had been provoked by the king's want 
of knowledge of Brahman, and is now making an effort due 
to the wish of knowing Brahman ; and thus recognises that 
the king is fit for the reception of that knowledge. Re- 
flecting thereupon that a knowledge of Brahman may be 
firmly established in this pupil even without long attendance 
on the teacher if only he will be liberal to the teacher to 
the utmost of his capability, he addresses him : ' Do thou 
take away (apahara) (these things), O Sudra; keep (the 
chariot) with the cows for thyself.' What he means to say 
is, ' By so much only in the way of gifts bestowed on me, 
the knowledge of Brahman cannot be established in thee, 
who, through the desire for such knowledge, art plunged 



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I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 35. 341 

in grief — the address' O .Sudra' intimating that Raikva 
knows Ganarruti to be plunged in grief, and on that account 
fit to receive instruction about Brahman. Ganarruti there- 
upon approaches Raikva for a second time, bringing as 
much wealth as he possibly can, and moreover his own 
daughter. Raikva again intimates his view of the pupil's 
fitness for receiving instruction by addressing him a second 
time as • .Sudra,' and says, ' You have brought these, 
O Sudra ; by this mouth only you made me speak,' i. e. 
' You now have brought presents to the utmost of your 
capability ; by this means only you will induce me, without 
lengthy service on your part, to utter speech containing 
that instruction about Brahman which you desire.' — Having 
said this he begins to instruct him. — We thus see that the 
appellation 'judra' is meant to intimate the grief of 
Ganamrti — which grief in its turn indicates the king's fit- 
ness for receiving instruction ; and is not meant to declare 
that Ganamiti belongs to the lowest caste. 

34. And on account of (Ganamiti's) kshattriya- 
hood being understood. 

The first section of the vidya tells us that Ganajruti 
bestowed much wealth and food ; later on he is represented 
as sending his door-keeper on an errand ; and in the end, 
as bestowing on Raikva many villages — which shows him 
to be a territorial lord. All these circumstances suggest 
Ganamiti's being a Kshattriya, and hence not a member 
of the lowest caste. — The above SGtra having declared 
that the kshattriya-hood of Ganarruti is indicated in the 
introductory legend, the next Sutra shows that the same 
circumstance is indicated in the concluding legend. 

35. On account of the inferential sign further on, 
together with Aaitraratha. 

The kshattriya-hood of Ganarruti is further to be accepted 
on account of the Kshattriya Abhipratarin ATaitraratha, 
who is mentioned further on in this very same Sawvarga- 
vidya which Raikva imparts to Ganarruti. — But why? — 
As follows. The section beginning ' Once a Brahma£arin 



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342 vedAnta-sOtras. 

begged of Saunaka Kapeya and Abhipratarin Kakshaseni 
while being waited on at their meal/ and ending ' thus do 
we, O Brahma^arin, meditate on that being,' shows Kapeya, 
Abhipratarin, and the Brahma£arin to be connected with 
the Sa»*varga-vidya. Now Abhipratarin is a Kshattriya, 
the other two are Brahmawas. This shows that there are 
connected with the vidya, Brahma»as, and from among 
non-Brahma»as, a Kshattriya only, but not a Sudra. It 
therefore appears appropriate to infer that the person, 
other than the Brahmawa Raikva, who is likewise connected 
with this vidya, viz. £anarruti, is likewise a Kshattriya, not 
a .Sudra. — But how do we know that Abhipratarin is 
a A'aitraratha and a Kshattriya? Neither of these cir- 
cumstances is stated in the legend in the Sa**varga-vidya ! 
To this question the Sutra replies, 'on account of the 
inferential mark.' From the inferential mark that Saunaka 
Kapeya and Abhipratarin Kakshaseni are said to have 
been sitting together at a meal we understand that there 
is some connexion between Abhipratarin and the Kapeyas. 
Now another scriptural passage runs as follows : ' The 
Kapeyas made A'aitraratha perform that sacrifice ' (T&nd. 
Bra. XX, 12, 5), and this shows that one connected with 
the Kapeyas was a A'aitraratha ; and a further text shows 
that a A'aitraratha is a Kshattriya, ' from him there was 
descended a A'aitraratha who was a prince.' All this 
favours the inference that Abhipratarin was a A'aitraratha 
and a Kshattriya. 

So far the Sutras have shown that there is no inferential 
mark to prove what is contradicted by reasoning, viz. the 
qualification of the Sudras. The next Sutra declares that 
the non-qualification of the Sudra proved by reasoning is 
confirmed by Scripture and Smriti. 

36. On account of the reference to ceremonial 
purifications, and on account of the declaration of 
their absence. 

In sections the purport of which is to give instruction 
about Brahman the ceremony of initiation is referred to, 
' I will initiate you ; he initiated him ' (Kh. Up. IV, 4). 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 39. 343 

And at the same time the absence of such ceremonies 
in the case of Sudras is stated : ' In the Sudra there is 
not any sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony ' (Manu 
X, 1 26) ; and 'The fourth caste is once born, and not fit 
for any ceremony ' (Manu X, 4). 

37. And on account of the procedure, on the 
ascertainment of the non-being of that 

That a Sudra is not qualified for knowledge of Brahman 
appears from that fact also that as soon as Gautama has 
convinced himself that Cabala, who wishes to become his 
pupil, is not a Sudra, he proceeds to teach him the 
knowledge of Brahman. 

38. And on account of the prohibition of hearing, 
studying, and performance of (Vedic) matter. 

The Sudra is specially forbidden to hear and study the 
Veda and to perform the things enjoined in it. 'For 
a .Sudra is like a cemetery, therefore the Veda must not 
be read in the vicinity of a Sudra ; ' ' Therefore the Sudra 
is like a beast, unfit for sacrifices.' And he who does not 
hear the Veda recited cannot learn it so as to understand 
and perform what the Veda enjoins. The prohibition of 
hearing thus implies the prohibition of understanding and 
whatever depends on it. 

39. And on account of Smrhi. 

Smr/ti also declares this prohibition of hearing, and so 
on. ' The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled 
with molten lead and lac ; if he pronounces it his tongue is 
to be slit ; if he preserves it his body is to be cut through.' 
And ' He is not to teach him sacred duties or vows.' — It 
is thus a settled matter that the Sudras are not qualified 
for meditations on Brahman. 

We must here point out that the non-qualification of 
Sudras for the cognition of Brahman can in no way be 
asserted by those who hold that a Brahman consisting of 
pure non-differenced intelligence constitutes the sole reality ; 
that everything else is false; that all bondage is unreal; 



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344 vedAnta-sAtras. 



that such bondage may be put an end to by the mere 
cognition of the true nature of Reality — such cognition 
resulting from the hearing of certain texts ; and that the 
cessation of bondage thus effected constitutes final Release. 
For knowledge of the true nature of Reality, in the sense 
indicated, and the release resulting from it, may be secured 
by any one who learns from another person that Brahman 
alone is real and that everything else is falsely super- 
imposed on Brahman. That the cognition of such truth 
can be arrived at only on the basis of certain Vedic texts, 
such as ' Thou art that,' is a restriction which does not 
admit of proof; for knowledge of the truth does not depend 
on man's choice, and at once springs up in the mind even 
of an unwilling man as soon as the conditions for such 
origination are present. Nor can it be proved in any way 
that bondage can be put an end to only through such 
knowledge of the truth as springs from Vedic texts ; for 
error comes to an end through the knowledge of the true 
nature of things, whatever agency may give rise to such 
knowledge. True knowledge, of the kind described, will 
spring up in the mind of a man as soon as he hears the 
non-scriptural declaration, 'Brahman, consisting of non- 
differenced intelligence, is the sole Reality ; everything else 
is false,' and this will suffice to free him from error. When 
a competent and trustworthy person asserts that what was 
mistaken for silver is merely a sparkling shell, the error of 
a Sildra no less than of a Brahmana comes to an end ; in the 
same way a .Stidra also will free himself from the great 
cosmic error as soon as the knowledge of the true nature of 
things has arisen in his mind through a statement resting 
on the traditional lore of men knowing the Veda. Nor 
must you object to this on the ground that men knowing 
the Veda do not instruct Sudras, and so on, because the 
text, 'he is not to teach him sacred things,' forbids them to 
do so ; for men who have once learned — from texts such 
as ' Thou art that ' — that Brahman is their Self, and thus 
are standing on the very top of the Veda as it were, move 
no longer in the sphere of those to whom injunctions and 
prohibitions apply, and the prohibition quoted does not 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 39. 345 

therefore touch them. Knowledge of Brahman may thus 
spring up in the mind of Sudras and the like, owing to 
instruction received from one of those men who have passed 
beyond all prohibition. Nor must it be said that the 
instance of the shell and the silver is not analogous, in so 
far, namely, as the error with regard to silver in the shell 
comes to an end as soon as the true state of things is 
declared ; while the great cosmic error that clouds the 
Sudra's mind does not come to an end as soon as, from 
the teaching of another -man, he learns the truth about 
Reality. For the case of the .Sudra does not herein differ 
from that of the Brahmawa ; the latter also does not at 
once free himself from the cosmic error. Nor again will it 
avail to plead that the sacred texts originate the demanded 
final cognition in the mind of the Brahmana as soon as 
meditation has dispelled the obstructive imagination of 
plurality; for in the same way, i.e. helped by meditation, 
the non-Vedic instruction given by another person pro- 
duces the required cognition in the mind of the .Sudra. 
For meditation means nothing but a steady consideration 
of the sense which sentences declaratory of the unity of 
Brahman and the Self may convey, and the effect of such 
meditation is to destroy all impressions opposed to such 
unity; you yourself thus admit that the injunction of medi- 
tation aims at something visible (i.e. an effect that can be 
definitely assigned, whence it follows that the Sudra also 
is qualified for it, while he would not be qualified for an 
activity having an ' adWsh/a,' i.e. supersensuous, transcen- 
dental effect). The recital of the text of the Veda also 
and the like (are not indispensable means for bringing 
about cognition of Brahman, but) merely subserve the 
origination of the desire of knowledge. The desire of 
knowledge may arise in a Sudra also (viz. in some other 
way), and thereupon real knowledge may result from non- 
Vedic instruction, obstructive imaginations having pre- 
viously been destroyed by meditation. And thus in his 
case also non-real bondage will come to an end. — The same 
conclusion may also be arrived at by a different road. The 
mere ordinary instruments of knowledge, viz. perception 



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346 vedAnta-sOtras. 



and inference assisted by reasoning, may suggest to the 
•Sudra the theory that there is an inward Reality constituted 
by non-differenced self-luminous intelligence, that this 
inward principle witnesses Nescience, and that owing to 
Nescience the entire apparent world.with its manifold distinc- 
tions of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge, is super- 
imposed upon the inner Reality. He may thereupon, by 
uninterrupted meditation on this inner Reality, free himself 
from all imaginations opposed to it, arrive at the intuitive 
knowledge of the inner principle, and thus obtain final 
release. And this way being open to release, there is really 
no use to be discerned in the Vedanta-texts, suggesting as 
they clearly do the entirely false view that the real being (is 
not absolutely homogeneous intelligence, but) possesses infi- 
nite transcendent attributes, being endowed with manifold 
powers, connected with manifold creations, and so on. In 
this way the qualification of .Sudras for the knowledge 
of Brahman is perfectly clear. And as the knowledge of 
Brahman may be reached in this way not only by Sudras but 
also by Brahmawas and members of the other higher castes, 
the poor Upanishad is practically defunct. — To this the 
following objection will possibly be raised. Man being 
implicated in and confused by the beginningless course 
of mundane existence, requires to receive from somewhere 
a suggestion as to this empirical world being a mere error 
and the Reality being something quite different, and thus 
only there arises in him a desire to enter on an enquiry, 
proceeding by means of perception, and so on. Now that 
which gives the required suggestion is the Veda, and hence 
we cannot do without it. — But this objection is not valid. 
For in the minds of those who are awed by all the dangers 
and troubles of existence, the desire to enter on a philo- 
sophical investigation of Reality, proceeding by means of 
Perception and Inference, springs up quite apart from the 
Veda, owing to the observation that there are various sects 
of philosophers, Sankhyas, and so on, who make it their busi- 
ness to carry on such investigations. And when such 
desire is once roused, Perception and Inference alone (in 
the way allowed by the Sankaras themselves) lead on to 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 40. 347 

the theory that the only Reality is intelligence eternal, 
pure, self-luminous, non-dual, non-changing, and that 
everything else is fictitiously superimposed thereon. That 
this self-luminous Reality possesses no other attribute to 
be learned from scripture is admitted ; for according 
to your opinion also scripture sublates everything that is 
not Brahman and merely superimposed on it. Nor should 
it be said that we must have recourse to the Upanishads 
for the purpose of establishing that the Real found in the 
way of perception and inference is at the same time of 
the nature of bliss; for the merely and absolutely Intelli- 
gent is seen of itself to be of that nature, since it is different 
from everything that is not of that nature. — There are, on 
the other hand, those who hold that the knowledge which 
the Vedanta-texts enjoin as the means of Release is of the 
nature of devout meditation ; that such meditation has 
the effect of winning the love of the supreme Spirit and is 
to be learned from scripture only; that the injunctions 
of meditation refer to such knowledge only as springs from 
the legitimate study of the Veda on the part of a man duly 
purified by initiation and other ceremonies, and is assisted 
by the seven means (see above, p. 17); and that the 
supreme Person pleased by such meditation bestows on 
the devotee knowledge of his own true nature, dissolves 
thereby the Nescience springing from works, and thus 
releases him from bondage. And on this view the proof of 
the non-qualification of the Sudra, as given in the preceding 
Sutras, holds good. — Here terminates the adhikarawa of 
' the exclusion of the .Sudras.' 

Having thus completed the investigation of qualification 
which had suggested itself in connexion with the matter 
in hand, the Sutras return to the being measured by 
a thumb, and state another reason for its being explained as 
Brahman — as already understood on the basis of its being 
declared the ruler of what is and what will be. 

40. On account of the trembling. 

In the part of the KaMa-Upanishad which intervenes 
between the passage ' The Person of the size of a thumb 



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348 vedAnta-sCtras. 



stands in the middle of the Self (II, 4, 12), and the pas- 
sage ' The Person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self ' 
(II, 6, 17), we meet with the text 'whatever there is, the 
whole world, when gone forth, trembles in its breath. 
A great terror, a raised thunderbolt ; those who knew 
it became immortal. From fear of it fire burns, from 
fear the sun shines, from fear Indra and Vayu, and 
Death as the fifth run away' (II, 6, 2; 3). This text 
declares that the whole world and Agni, Surya, and 
so on, abiding within that Person of the size of a thumb, 
who is here designated by the term ' breath,' and going 
forth from him, tremble from their great fear of him. 
' What will happen to us if we transgress his command- 
ments ? ' — thinking thus the whole world trembles on 
account of great fear, as if it were a raised thunderbolt. 
In this explanation we take the clause ' A great fear, 
a raised thunderbolt,' in the sense of ' (the world trembles) 
from great fear,' &c, as it is clearly connected in meaning 
with the following clause : ' from fear the fire burns,' &c — 
Now what is described here is the nature of the highest 
Brahman ; for that such power belongs to Brahman only 
we know from other texts, viz. : ' By the command of that 
Imperishable, O Gargl, sun and moon stand apart' (Br*. 
Up. Ill, 8, 9) ; and ' From fear of it the wind blows, from 
fear the sun rises ; from fear of it Agni and Indra, yea 
Death runs as the fifth ' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1).— The next 
Sutra supplies a further reason. 

41. On account of light being seen (declared in 
the text). 

Between the two texts referring to the Person of the size 
of a thumb, there is a text declaring that to that Person 
there belongs light that obscures all other light, and is the 
cause and assistance of all other light ; and such light is 
characteristic of Brahman only. ' The sun does not shine 
there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, and 
much less this fire. After him, the shining one, every- 
thing shines ; by his light all this is lighted ' (Ka. Up. II, 
5, 15). This very same jloka is read in the Atharvana (i. e. 



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I ADHYAYA, 3 pAdA, 42. 349 

MuWaka) with reference to Brahman. Everywhere, in fact, 
the texts attribute supreme luminousness to Brahman 
only. Compare : ' Having approached the highest light he 
manifests himself in his own shape' (Kk. Up. VIII, 12, 3); 
* Him the gods meditate on as the light of lights, as 
immortal time ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 16) ; ' Now that light which 
shines above this heaven* (Kh. Up. Ill, 13, 7). — It is thus 
a settled conclusion that the Person measured by a thumb 
is the highest Brahman. — Here terminates the adhikarawa 
of him who is measured ' (by a thumb). 

42. The ether, on account of the .designation of 
something different, and so on. 

We read in the A'Aandogya ' The ether is the evolver of 
forms and names. That within which these forms and 
names are (or "that which is within — or without — these 
forms and names ") is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self ' 
(VIII, 14). A doubt here arises whether the being here 
called ether be the released individual soul, or the highest 
Self. — The Pflrvapakshin adopts the former view. For, he " 
says, the released soul is introduced as subject-matter in 
an immediately preceding clause, ' Shaking off all as a horse 
shakes his hair, and as the moon frees himself from the 
mouth of Rahu; having shaken off the body I obtain, 
satisfied, the uncreated world of Brahman.' Moreover, 
the clause ' That which is without forms and names ' clearly 
designates the released soul freed from name and form. 
And ' the evolver of names and forms ' is again that same 
soul characterised with a view to its previous condition ; 
for the individual soul in its non-released state supported 
the shapes of gods, and so on, and their names. With 
a view, finally, to its present state in which it is free from 
name and form, the last clause declares ' that is Brahman, 
the Immortal.' The term ' ether ' may very well be applied 
to the released soul which is characterised by the possession 
of non-limited splendour. — But, as the text under discus- 
sion is supplementary to the section dealing with the small 
ether within the heart (VIII, 1, 1 ff.), we understand that 



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350 vedAnta-sOtras. 



that small ether is referred to here also ; and it has been 
proved above that that small ether is Brahman ! — Not so, 
we reply. The text under discussion is separated from the 
section treating of the small ether within the heart, by the 
teaching of Pra^apati, and that teaching is concerned with 
the characteristics of the individual soul in its different 
conditions up to Release ; and moreover the earlier part of 
the section under discussion speaks of the being which 
shakes off evil, and this undoubtedly is the released indi- 
vidual soul introduced in the teaching of Pra^apati. All 
this shows that the ether in our passage denotes the released 
individual soul. 

This view is set aside by the Sutra. The ether in our 
passage is the highest Brahman, because the clause ' Ether 
is the evolver of forms and names ' designates something 
other than the individual soul. The ether which evolves 
names and forms cannot be the individual soul either in 
the state of bondage or that of release. In the state of 
bondage the soul is under the influence of karman, itself par- 
ticipates in name and form, and hence cannot bring about 
names and forms. And in its released state it is expressly 
said not to take part in the world-business (Ve. Su. IV, 4, 1 7), 
and therefore is all the less qualified to evolve names and 
forms. The Lord, on the other hand, who is the ruling 
principle in the construction of the Universe is expressly 
declared by scripture to be the evolver of names and forms ; 
cp. ' Entering into them with this living Self, let me evolve 
names and forms ' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2) ; ' Who is all-knowing, 
whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born 
this Brahman, name, form, and matter' (Mu.Up. 1, 1, 9), &c. 
Hence the ether which brings about names and forms is 
something different from the soul for which name and form 
are brought about ; it is in fact the highest Brahman. This 
the next clause of the text confirms, ' That which is within 
those forms and names ' ; the purport of which is : because 
that ether is within names and forms, not being touched 
by them but being something apart, therefore it is the 
evolver of them ; this also following from his being free 
from evil and endowed with the power of realising his 



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i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 42. 351 

purposes. The 'and so on* in the Sutra refers to the 
Brahma-hood, Self-hood, and immortality mentioned in the 
text (' That is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self). For 
Brahma-hood, i. e. greatness, and so on, in their uncon- 
ditioned sense, belong to the highest Self only. It is thus 
clear that the ether is the highest Brahman. — Nor is the 
Purvapakshin right in maintaining that a clause immediately 
preceding (' shaking off all evil ') introduces the individual 
soul as the general topic of the section. For what the part 
of the text immediately preceding the passage under dis- 
cussion does introduce as general topic, is the highest 
Brahman, as shown by the clause ' I obtain the Brahma- 
world.' Brahman is, it is true, represented there as the 
object to be obtained by the released soul ; but as the 
released soul cannot be the evolver of names and forms, 
&c, we must conclude that it is Brahman (and not the 
released soul), which constitutes the topic of the whole 
section. Moreover (to take a wider view of the, context of 
our passage) the term ' ether ' prompts us to recognise here 
the small ether (mentioned in the first section of the eighth 
book) as the general topic of the book ; and as the teach- 
ing of Pra^apati is meant to set forth (not the individual 
soul by itself but) the nature of the soul of the meditating 
devotee, it is proper to conclude that the text under dis- 
cussion is meant finally to represent, as the object to be 
obtained, the small ether previously inculcated as object of 
meditation. In conclusion we remark that the term ' ether ' 
is nowhere seen to denote the individual Self. — The ether 
that evolves names and forms, therefore, is the highest 
Brahman. 

But, an objection is raised, there is no other Self different 
from the individual Self; for scripture teaches the unity of 
all Selfs and denies duality. Terms such as ' the highest 
Self,' • the highest Brahman,' ' the highest Lord,' are merely 
designations of the individual soul in the state of Release. 
The Brahma-world to be attained, therefore, is nothing 
different from the attaining individual soul ; and hence the 
ether also that evolves names and forms can be that soul 
only. — To this objection the next Sfltra replies. 



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352 vedanta-s6tras. 

43. On account of difference in deep sleep and 
departing. 

We have to supply ' on account of designation ' from the 
preceding Sutra. Because the text designates the highest 
Self as something different from the individual Self in the 
state of deep sleep as well as at the time of departure, the 
highest Self is thus different. For the Va^asaneyaka, after 
having introduced the individual Self in the passage ' Who 
is that Self? — He who consisting of knowledge is among 
the pra«as,' &c. (Br*. Up. IV, 3, 7), describes how, in the 
state of deep sleep, being not conscious of anything it is 
held embraced by the all-knowing highest Self, ' embraced 
by the intelligent Self it knows nothing that is without, 
nothing that is within ' (IV, 3, 21). So also with reference 
to the time of departure, i. e. dying * Mounted by the intel- 
ligent Self it moves along groaning' (IV, 3, 35). Now it 
is impossible that the unconscious individual Self, either 
lying in deep sleep or departing from the body, should at 
the same time be embraced or mounted by itself, being 
all-knowing. Nor can the embracing and mounting Self 
be some other individual Self; for no such Self can be all- 
knowing. — The next Sutra supplies a further reason. 

44. And on account of such words as Lord. 
That embracing highest Self is further on designated by 

terms such as Lord, and so on. ' He is the Lord of all, 
the master of all, the ruler of all. He does not become 
greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works. He is 
the lord of all, the king of beings, the protector of beings. 
He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not 
be confounded. Brahmanas seek to know him by the 
study of the Veda. He who knows him becomes a Muni. 
Wishing for that world only, mendicants leave their homes ' 
(IV, 4, 22). ' This indeed is the great unborn Self, the strong, 
the giver of wealth, — undecaying, undying, immortal, fear- 
less is Brahman ' (IV, 4, 24 ; 25). Now all the qualities here 
declared, viz. being the lord of all, and so on, cannot pos- 
sibly belong to the individual Self even in the state of 
Release ; and we thus again arrive at the conclusion that 



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I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 44. 353 

the ether evolving forms and names is something different 
from the released individual soul. The declarations of 
general Unity which we meet with in the texts rest 
thereon, that all sentient and non-sentient beings are effects 
of Brahman, and hence have Brahman for their inner Self. 
That this is the meaning of texts such as 'AH this is 
Brahman,' &c, we have explained before. And the texts 
denying plurality are to be understood in the same way. — 
Here terminates the adhikarawa of 'the designation of 
something different, and so on.' 



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354 vedAnta-sCtras. 



FOURTH PADA. 

i. If it be said that some (mention) that which 
rests on Inference ; we deny this because (the form) 
refers to what is contained in the simile of the 
body; and (this the text) shows. 

So far the Sutras have given instruction about a Brah- 
man, the enquiry into which serves as a means to obtain 
what is the highest good of man, viz. final release j which 
is the cause of the origination, and so on, of the world ; 
which differs in nature from all non-sentient things such 
as the Pradhana, and from all intelligent beings whether 
in the state of bondage or of release ; which is free from 
all shadow of imperfection ; which is all knowing, all 
powerful, has the power of realising all its purposes, com- 
prises within itself all blessed qualities, is the inner Self of 
all, and possesses unbounded power and might. But here 
a new special objection presents itself. In order to estab- 
lish the theory maintained by Kapila, viz. of there being 
a Pradhana and individual souls which do not have their 
Self in Brahman; it is pointed out by some that in certain 
branches of the Veda there are met with certain passages 
which appear to adumbrate the doctrine of the Pradhana 
being the universal cause. The Sutras now apply them- 
selves to the refutation Of this view, in order thereby 
to confirm the theory of Brahman being the only cause 
of all 

We read in the Kal&a-Upanishad, ' Beyond the senses 
there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, 
beyond the mind there is the intellect, the great Self is 
beyond the intellect. Beyond the Great there is the 
Unevolved, beyond the Unevolved there is the Person. 
Beyond the Person there is nothing — this is the goal, the 
highest road ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11). The question here arises 
whether by the •Unevolved' be or be not meant the 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, i. 355 

Pradhana, as established by Kapila's theory, of which 
Brahman is not the Self. — The Pflrvapakshin maintains 
the former alternative. For, he says, in the clause ' beyond 
the Great is the Unevolved, beyond the Unevolved is the 
Person,' we recognise the arrangement of entities as estab- 
lished by the Sankhya-system, and hence must take the 
'Unevolved' to be the Pradhana. This is further con- 
firmed by the additional clause ' beyond the Person there 
is nothing,' which (in agreement with Sankhya principles) 
denies that there is any being beyond the soul, which itself 
is the twenty-fifth and last of the principles recognised by 
the Sankhyas. This prima facie view is expressed in the 
former part of the Sutra, * If it be said that in the jakhas 
of some that which rests on Inference, i.e. the Pradhana, is 
stated as the universal cause.' 

The latter part of the Sutra refutes this view. The word 
'Unevolved' does not denote a Pradhana independent of 
Brahman ; it rather denotes the body represented as a 
chariot in the simile of the body, i.e. in the passage in- 
stituting a comparison between the Self, body, intellect, 
and so on, on the one side, and the charioteer, chariot, &c. 
on the other side. — The details are as follows. The text 
at first— in the section beginning ' Know the Self to be the 
person driving,' &c, and ending ' he reaches the end of the 
journey, and that is the highest place of Vish«u ' (I, 3, 3-9) 
— compares the devotee desirous of reaching the goal of 
his journey through the samsara, i.e. the abode of Vishwu, 
to a man driving in a chariot ; and his body, senses, and so 
on, to the chariot and parts of the chariot ; the meaning of 
the whole comparison being that he only reaches the goal 
who has the chariot, &c. in his control. It thereupon pro- 
ceeds to declare which of the different beings enumerated 
and compared to a chariot, and so on, occupy a superior 
position to the others in so far, namely, as they are that 
which requires to be controlled — ' higher than the senses 
are the objects,' and so on. Higher than the senses — 
compared to the horses — are the objects — compared to 
roads, — because even a man who generally controls his 
senses finds it difficult to master them when they are in 

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356 vedAnta-sOtras. 



contact with their objects ; higher than the objects is the 
mind — compared to the reins — because when the mind 
inclines towards the objects even the non-proximity of the 
latter does not make much difference; higher than the 
mind (manas) is the intellect (buddhi) — compared to the 
charioteer — because in the absence of decision (which is 
the characteristic quality of buddhi) the mind also has 
little power; higher than the intellect again is the (indi- 
vidual) Self, for that Self is the agent whom the intellect 
serves. And as all this is subject to the wishes of the Self, 
the text characterises it as the ' great Self.' Superior to 
that Self again is the body, compared to the chariot, for 
all activity whereby the individual Self strives to bring 
about what is of advantage to itself depends on the body. 
And higher finally than the body is the highest Person, 
the inner Ruler and Self of all, the term and goal of the 
journey of the individual soul ; for the activities of all 
the beings enumerated depend on the wishes of that 
highest Self. As the universal inner Ruler that Self brings 
about the meditation of the Devotee also ; for the Sutra 
(II, 3, 41) expressly declares that the activity of the indi- 
vidual soul depends on the Supreme Person. Being the 
means for bringing about the meditation and the goal of 
meditation, that same Self is the highest object to be 
attained ; hence the text says ' Higher than the Person 
there is nothing — that is the goal, the highest road.' 
Analogously scripture, in the antatyamin-Brahmana, at 
first declares that the highest Self within witnesses and 
rules everything, and thereupon negatives the existence 
of any further ruling principle ' There is no other seer 
but he,' &c. Similarly, in the Bhagavad-gita, ' The abode, 
the agent, the various senses, the different and manifold 
functions, and fifth the Divinity (i.e. the highest Person)' 
(XVIII, 14) ; and ' I dwell within the heart of all ; memory 
and perception, as well as their loss, come from me ' (XV, 
15). And if, as in the explanation of the text under dis- 
cussion, we speak of that highest Self being ' controlled,' we 
must understand thereby the soul's taking refuge with it ; 
compare the passage Bha. Gl. XVIII, 61-62, 'The Lord 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, i. 357 

dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling them round 
as if mounted on a machine ; to Him go for refuge.' 

Now all the beings, senses, and so on, which had been 
mentioned in the simile, are recognised in the passage 
' higher than the senses are the objects,' &c, being desig- 
nated there by their proper names ; but there is no mention 
made of the body which previously had been compared to 
the chariot ; we therefore conclude that it is the body which 
is denoted by the term ' the Unevolved.' Hence there is 
no reason to see here a reference to the Pradhana as estab- 
lished in the theory of Kapila. Nor do we recognise, in 
the text under discussion, the general system of Kapila. 
The text declares the objects, i. e. sounds and so on, to be 
superior to the senses ; but in Kapila's system the objects 
are not viewed as the causes of the senses. For the same 
reason the statement that the manas is higher than the 
objects does not agree with Kapila's doctrine. Nor is this 
the case with regard to the clause ' higher than the buddhi 
is the great one, the Self ; for with Kapila the ' great one ' 
(mahat) is the buddhi, and it would not do to say ' higher 
than the great one is the great one.' And finally the 
'great one,' according to Kapila, cannot be called the 
• Self.' The text under discussion thus refers only to those 
entities which had previously appeared in the simile. The 
text itself further on proves this, when saying 'That Self is 
hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen 
by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect. 
A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he 
should keep that within knowledge (which is) within the 
Self; he should keep knowledge within the great Self, 
and that he should keep within the. quiet Self.' For this 
passage, after having stated that the highest Self is difficult 
to see with the inner and outer organs of knowledge, de- 
scribes the mode in which the sense-organs, and so on, are 
to be held in control. The wise man should restrain the 
sense-organs and the organs of activity within the mind ; 
he should restrain that (i.e. the mind) within knowledge, 
i.e. within the intellect (buddhi), which abides within the 
Self; he should further restrain the intellect within the 



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558 vedAnta-sCtras. 



great Self, i.e. the active individual Self; and that Self 
finally he should restrain within the quiet Self, i.e. the 
highest Brahman, which is the inner ruler of all ; i.e. he 
should reach; with his individual Self so qualified, the place 
of Vish«u, i.e. Brahman. — But how can the term 'the Un- 
evolved ' denote the evolved body ? — To this question the 
next Sutra furnishes a reply. 

2. But the subtle (body), on account of its capa- 
bility. 

The elements in their fine state are what is called the 
' Unevolved,' and this entering into a particular condition 
becomes the body. It is the ' Unevolved ' in the particular 
condition of the body, which in the text under discussion 
is called the ' Unevolved.' ' On account of its capability,' 
i.e. because unevolved non-sentient matter, when assuming 
certain states and forms, is capable of entering on activities 
promoting the interest of man. But, an objection is raised, 
if the ' Unevolved ' is taken to be matter in its subtle state, 
what objection is there to our accepting for the explanation 
of our text that which is established in the Sankhya- 
system? for there also the 'Unevolved' means nothing 
else but matter in its subtle state. 

To this the next Sutra replies — 

3. (Matter in its subtle state) subserves an end, on 
account of its dependence on him (viz. the Supreme 
Person). 

Matter in its subtle state subserves ends, in so far only 
as it is dependent on the Supreme Person who is the cause 
of all. We by no means wish to deny unevolved matter 
and all its effects in themselves, but in so far only as they 
are maintained not to have their Self in the Supreme 
Person. For the fact is that they constitute his body and 
He thus constitutes their Self; and it is only through this 
their relation to him that the Pradhana, and so on, are 
capable of accomplishing their several ends. Otherwise 
the different essential natures of them all could never 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 4. 359 

exist, — nor persist, nor act. It is just on the ground of 
this dependence on the Lord not being acknowledged by 
the Sankhyas that their system is disproved by us. In 
Scripture and Smriti alike, wherever the origination and 
destruction of the world are described, or the greatness of 
the Supreme Person is glorified, the Pradhana and all its 
effects, no less than the individual souls, are declared to 
have their Self in that Supreme Person. Compare, e.g. 
the text which first says that the earth is merged in water, 
and further on ' the elements are merged in the Mahat, the 
Mahat in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the Imperish- 
able, the Imperishable in Darkness ; Darkness becomes 
one with the highest divinity.' And 'He of whom the 
earth is the body,' &c. up to 'he of whom the Unevolved 
is the body; of whom the Imperishable is the body; of 
whom death is the body; he the inner Self of all beings, 
free from all evil, the divine one, the one God Naraya«a.' 
And ' Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intellect, egoity— 
thus eightfold is my nature divided. Lower is this nature ; 
other than this and higher know that nature of mine 
which has become the individual soul by which this 
world is supported. Remember that all beings spring from 
this; I am the origin and the dissolution of the whole 
Universe. Higher than I there is none else; all this is 
strung on me as pearls on a thread ' (Bha. Gl. VII, 4-7).' 
And ' the Evolved is Vish«u, and the Unevolved, he is the 
Person and time. — The nature (prakriti) declared by me, 
having the double form of the Evolved and the Unevolved, 
and the soul — both these are merged in the highest Self. 
That Self is the support of all, the Supreme Person who 
under the name of Vish«u is glorified in the Vedas and the 
Vedanta books.' 

4. And on account of there being no statement of 
its being an object of knowledge. 

If the text meant the Non-evolved as understood by the 
Sankhyas it would refer to it as something to be known ; 
for the Sankhyas, who hold the theory of Release resulting 
from the discriminative knowledge of the Evolved, the 



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360 vedAnta-sAtras. 



Non-evolved, and the soul, admit that all these are objects 
of knowledge. Now our text does not refer to the Un- 
evolved as an object of knowledge, and it cannot therefore 
be the Pradhana assumed by the Sankhyas. 

5. Should it be said that (the text) declares (it) ; 
we say, not so ; for the intelligent Self (is meant), on 
account of subject-matter. 

' He who has meditated on that which is without sound, 
without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, 
eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, 
beyond the Great, unchangeable ; is freed from the jaws of 
death ' (Ka. Up. II, 3, 15), this scriptural text, closely follow- 
ing on the text under discussion, represents the ' Unevolved ' 
as the object of knowledge ! — Not so, we reply. What that 
jloka represents as the object of meditation is (not the Un- 
evolved but) the intelligent Self, i. e. the Supreme Person. 
For it is the latter who forms the general subject-matter, 
as we infer from two preceding passages, viz. * He who has 
knowledge for his charioteer, and who holds the reins of the 
mind, he reaches the end of his journey, the highest place 
of Vishftu ' ; and ' That Self is hidden in all beings and 
does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through 
their sharp and subtle intellect.' For this reason, also, 
the clause ' Higher than the person there is nothing ' can- 
not be taken as meant to deny the existence of an entity 
beyond the 'purusha' in the Sinkhya sense. That the 
highest Self possesses the qualities of being without sound, 
&c, we moreover know from other scriptural texts, such as 
Mu. Up. 1, 1, 6 ' That which is not to be seen, not to be 
grasped,' &c. And the qualification ' beyond the Great, 
unchangeable ' is meant to declare that the highest Self is 
beyond the individual Self which had been called 'the 
Great ' in a previous passage ' beyond the intellect is the 
Great Self.' 

6. And of three only there is this mention and 
question. 

In the Upanishad under discussion there is mention 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 6. 361 

made of three things only as objects of knowledge — the 
three standing to one another in the relation of means, end 
to be realised by those means, and persons realising, — and 
questions are asked as to those three only. There is no 
mention of, nor question referring to, the Unevolved. — 
Na£iketas desirous of Release having been allowed by 
Death to choose three boons, chooses for his first boon that 
his father should be well disposed towards him — without 
which he could not hope for spiritual welfare. For his 
second boon he chooses the knowledge of the Na&keta- 
fire, which is a means towards final Release. 'Thou 
knowest, O Death, the fire-sacrifice which leads to heaven ; 
tell it to me, full of faith. Those who live in the heaven- 
world reach Immortality — this I ask as my second boon.' 
The term * heaven-world ' here denotes the highest aim of 
man, i. e. Release, as appears from the declaration that those 
who live there enjoy freedom from old age and death ; from 
the fact that further on (1, 1, 26) works leading to perishable 
results are disparaged ; and from what Yama says in reply 
to the second demand ' He who thrice performs this Na- 
£iketa-rite overcomes birth and death.' As his third boon 
he, in the form of a question referring to final release, actually 
enquires about three things, viz. ' the nature of the end to 
be reached, i. e. Release ; the nature of him who wishes 
to reach that end ; and the nature of the means to reach it, 
i. e. of meditation assisted by certain works. Yama, having 
tested Na£iketas' fitness to receive the desired instruction, 
thereupon begins to teach him. ' The Ancient who is diffi- 
cult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is 
hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss ; having known 
him as God, by means of meditation on his Self, the wise 
one leaves joy and sorrow behind.' Here the clause 
' having known the God,' points to the divine Being that 
is to be meditated upon ; the clause ' by means of medi- 
tation on his Self points to the attaining agent, i. e. the 
individual soul as an object of knowledge ; and the 
clause 'having known him the wise ones leave joy and 
sorrow behind' points to the meditation through which 
Brahman is to be reached. Na£iketas, pleased with the 



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362 vedAnta-sAtras. 



general instruction received, questions again in order to 
receive clearer information on those three matters, • What 
thou seest as different from dharma and different from 
adharma, as different from that, from that which is done 
and not done, as different from what is past or future, 
tell me that ' ; a question referring to three things, viz. 
an object to be effected, a means to effect it, and an effect- 
ing agent — each of which is to be different from any- 
thing else past, present, or future 1 . Yama thereupon at 
first instructs him as to the Prawava, ' That word which all 
the Vedas record, which all penances proclaim, desiring 
which men become religious students ; that word I tell 
thee briefly — it is Om' — an instruction which implies 
praise of the Praaava, and in a general way sets forth that 
which the Prawava expresses, e. g. the nature of the object 
to be reached, the nature of the person reaching it, and the 
means for reaching it, such means here consisting in the 
word ' Om,' which denotes the object to be reached 2 . He 
then continues to glorify the Prawava (I, a, 16-17), and 
thereupon gives special information in the first place about 
the nature of the attaining subject, i.e. the individual 
soul, ' The knowing Self is not born, it dies not,' &c. Next 
he teaches Naftketas as to the true nature of the object to 
be attained, viz. the highest Brahman or Vishmi, in the 
section beginning ' The Self smaller than small,' and ending 
' Who then knows where he is ? ' (I, a, 20-25). Part of this 
section, viz. ' That Self cannot be gained by the Veda,' &c, 

1 The commentary proposes different ways of finding those three 
objects of enquiry in the words of Naiiketas. According to the 
first explanation, ' that which is different from dharma ' is a means 
differing from all ordinary means; 'adharma' 'not-dharma' is 
what is not a means, but the result to be reached : hence ' that 
which is different from adharma' is a result differing from all 
ordinary results. * What is different from that ' is an agent 
different from 'that'; i.e. an ordinary agent, and so on. (.Shi. 
Prakir. p. 1326.) 

* The syllable ' Om,' which denotes Brahman, is a means towards 
meditation (Brahman being meditated upon under this form), and 
thus indirectly a means towards reaching Brahman. 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 8. 363 

at the same time teaches that the meditation through which 
Brahman is attained is of the nature of devotion (bhakti). 
Next the jloka I, 3, 1 ' There are the two drinking their 
reward ' shows that, as the object of devout meditation and 
the devotee abide together, meditation is easily performed. 
Then the section beginning ' Know the Self to be him who 
drives in the chariot,' and ending ' the wise say the path is 
hard ' (1, 3, 3-14), teaches the true mode of meditation, and 
how the devotee reaches the highest abode of Vishnu ; and 
then there is a final reference to the object to be reached 
in 1, 3, 15, • That which is without sound, without touch,' &c. 
It thus appears that there are references and questions 
regarding those three matters only ; and hence the ' Un- 
evolved ' cannot mean the Pradhfina of the Sankhyas. 

7. And as in the case of the ' Great.' 

In the case of the passage ' Higher than the intellect is 
the Great Self/ we conclude from the co-ordination of ' the 
Great ' with the Self that what the text means is not the 
' Great ' principle of the Sankhyas ; analogously we conclude 
that the ' Unevolved,' which is said to be higher than the 
Self, cannot be the Pradhana of Kapila's system. 

8. On account of there being no special charac- 
teristic ; as in the case of the cup. 

In the discussion of the following passages also we aim 
only at refuting the system of the Sankhyas ; not at dis- 
proving the existence and nature of Pralcrfti, the ' great ' 
principle, the ahawkara, and so on, viewed as dependent 
on Brahman. For that they exist in this latter relation is 
proved by Scripture as well as Sm«ti. — A text of the fol- 
lowers of the Atharvan runs as follows : • Her who pro- 
duces all effects, the non-knowing one, the unborn one, wear- 
ing eight forms, the firm one — she is known (by the Lord) 
and ruled by him, she is spread out and incited and ruled 
by him, gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls. 
A cow she is without beginning and end, a mother producing 
all beings ; white, black, and red, milking all wishes for the 
Lord. Many babes unknown drink her, the impartial one ; 



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364 vedAnta-sOtras. 



but one God only, following his own will, drinks her submit- 
ting to him. By his own thought and work the mighty God 
strongly enjoys her, who is common to all, the milkgiver, who 
is pressed by the sacrifices. The Non-evolved when being 
counted by twenty-four is called the Evolved.' This pas- 
sage evidently describes the nature of Prakrrti, and so on, 
and the same Upanishad also teaches the Supreme Person 
who constitutes the Self of Prakrfti, and so on. ' Him they 
call the twenty-sixth or also the twenty-seventh ; as the 
Person devoid of all qualities of the Sankhyas he is known 
by the followers of the Atharvan V — Other followers of the 
Atharvan read in their text that there are sixteen origi- 
nating principles (prakrrti) and eight effected things (vikara ; 
Garbha Up. 3). — The .SvetiLrvataras again set forth the 
nature of Prakr/ti, the soul and the Lord as follows. ' The 
Lord supports all this together,- the Perishable and the 
Imperishable, the Evolved and the Unevolved ; the other 
one is in bondage, since he is an enjoyer ; but having known 
the God he is free from all fetters. There are two unborn 
ones, the one knowing and a Lord, the other without 
knowledge and lordly power; there is the one unborn 
female on whom the enjoyment of all enjoyers depends ; 
and there is the infinite Self appearing in all shapes, but 
itself inactive. When a man finds out these three, that is 
Brahman. The Perishable is the Pradhana, the Immortal 
and Imperishable is Hara ; the one God rules the Perishable 
and the Self. From meditation on him, from union with 
him, from becoming one with him there is in the end cessa- 
tion of all Maya* (.Svet. Up. I, 8-10). And « The sacred 
verses, the offerings, the sacrifices, the vows, the past, the 
future, and all that the Vedas declare — from that the Ruler 
of Maya creates all this ; and in this the other one is bound 
up through Maya. Know then Praknti to be Maya and 
the great Lord the ruler of Maya ; with his members this 

1 These quotations are from the JTuIikA-Upanishad (transl. by 
Deussen, Seventy Upanishads, p. 638 ff.) The translation as 
given above follows the readings adopted by RSm&nqpa and 
explained in the 5ruta-Praka*ikl 



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I adhyAya, 4 pAda, 8. 365 

whole world is filled ' (Svet. Up. V, 9-xo). And, further on, 
'The master of Pradhana and the soul, the lord of the 
guwas, the cause of the bondage, existence, and release of 
worldly existence' (VI, 16). Thus likewise in Stariti, 
'Do thou know both Nature and the soul to be without 
beginning, and know all effects and qualities to have 
sprung from Nature. Nature is declared to be the cause 
of the activity of causes and effects, whilst the soul is the 
cause of there being enjoyment of pleasure and pain. For 
the soul abiding in Nature experiences the qualities derived 
from Nature, the reason being its connexion with the quali- 
ties, in its births in good and evil wombs ' (Bha. Gl. XIII, 
19-21). And ' Goodness, Passion, and Darkness — these 
are the qualities which, issuing from nature, bind in the 
body the embodied soul, the undecaying one ' (XIV, 5). 
And ' All beings at the end of a kalpa return into my 
Nature, and again, at the beginning of a kalpa, do I send 
them forth. Presiding over my own nature again and 
again do I send forth this vast body of beings which has 
no freedom of its own, being subject to Nature. — With me 
as ruler Nature brings forth all moving and non-moving 
things, and for this reason the world does ever go round ' 
(Bha. Gi. IX, 7, 8, 10). What we therefore refuse to accept 
are a Prakn'ti, and so on, of the kind assumed by Kapila, 
i. e. not having their Self in Brahman. — We now proceed 
to explain the Sfttra. 

We read in the Svetlrvatara-Upanishad ' There is one 
a^a, red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the 
same nature. One a^a loves her and lies by her ; another 
leaves her after having enjoyed her.' A doubt arises here 
whether this mantra declares a mere PrakrAi as assumed in 
Kapila's system, or a PrakWti having its Self in Brahman. 

The Pftrvapakshin maintains the former alternative; 
For, he points out, the text refers to the non-originated- 
ness of Prakr&i, calling her zgt, i. e. unborn, and further 
says that she by herself independently produces manifold 
offspring resembling herself. This view is rejected by the 
Sfitra, on the ground that there is no intimation of a special 
circumstance determining the acceptance of the Prakrt'ti as 



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366 vedAnta-sOtras. 



assumed by the S&nkhyas, i. e. independent of Brahman ; 
for that she is agk, i. e. not born, is not a sufficiently special 
characteristic. The case is analogous to that of the ' cup.' 
In the mantra ' There is a cup having its mouth below and 
its bottom above' (Br*. Up. II, a, 3), the word £amasa 
conveys to us only the idea of some implement used in 
eating, but we are unable to see what special kind of 
£amasa is meant ; for in the case of words the meaning 
of which is ascertained on the ground of their derivation 
(as '£amasa' from 'kam,' to eat or drink), the special 
sense of the word in any place cannot be ascertained with- 
out the help of considerations of general possibility, general 
subject-matter, and so on. Now in the case of the cup we 
are able to ascertain that the cup meant is the head, be- 
cause there is a complementary passage 'What is called 
the cup with its mouth below and its bottom above is the 
head ' ; but if we look out for a similar help to determine 
the special meaning of a^a, we find nothing to convince us 
that the agt, i. e. the ' unborn ' principle, is the Prakrrti of 
the Sankhyas. Nor is there anything in the text to convey 
the idea of that ag-a having the power of independent crea- 
tion ; for the clause ' giving birth to manifold offspring ' 
declares only that she creates, not that she creates unaided. 
The mantra does not therefore tell us about an ' unborn ' 
principle independent of Brahman. — There moreover is 
a special reason for understanding by the agt something 
that depends on Brahman. This the following Sfttra 
states. 

9. But she begins with light ; for thus some read 
in their text. 

The ' but ' has assertory force. • Light ' in the Sutra 
means Brahman, in accordance with the meaning of the 
term as known from texts such as ' On him the gods medi- 
tate, the light of lights ' (Br*. Up. X, 4, 16) ; ' That light 
which shines beyond heaven* (Kh. Up. Ill, 13, 7). 'She 
begins with light ' thus means ' she has Brahman for her 
cause.' — ' For thus some read in their text,' i. e. because 
the members of one Sakha, viz. the Taittiriyas read in their 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 9. 367 

text that this 'ag£' has Brahman for her cause. The 
Mahanarayawa-Upanishad (of the Taittirfyas) at first refers 
to Brahman abiding in the hollow of the heart as the object 
of meditation. ' Smaller than the small, greater than the 
great, the Self placed in the hollow of this creature ' ; next 
declares that all the worlds and Brahma and the other 
gods originated from that Self ; and then says that there 
sprung from it also this agA which is the cause of all ' The 
one aga (goat), red, white and black, which gives birth to 
numerous offspring Of the same shape, one a^a (he-goat) 
loves and lies by her; another one forsakes her after 
having enjoyed her.' The subject-matter of the entire 
section evidently is to give instruction as to the whole 
aggregate of things other than Brahman originating from 
Brahman and thus having its Self in it; hence we con- 
clude that also the a^a which gives birth to manifold crea- 
tures like her, and is enjoyed by the soul controlled by 
karman, while she is abandoned by the soul possessing 
true knowledge is, no less than vital airs, seas, mountains, 
&c, a creature of Brahman, and hence has its Self in 
Brahman. We then apply to the interpretation of the 
•SvetcLrvatara-text the meaning of the analogous Mahana- 
rayawa-text, as determined by the complementary pas- 
sages, and thus arrive at the conclusion that the a^a in 
the former text also is a being having its Self in Brahman. 
That this is so, moreover, appears from the Svet&yvatara 
itself. For in the early part of that Upanishad, we have 
after the introductory question, ' Is Brahman the cause ? ' 
the passage ' The sages devoted to meditation and concen- 
tration have seen the person whose Self is the divinity, hidden 
in its own qualities ' (I, 1, 3); which evidently refers to the 
3g& as being of the nature of a power of the highest Brah- 
man. And as further on also (viz. in the passages ' From 
that the Mayin creates all this, and in this the other is 
bound up through Maya ' ; ' Know then Prakr/ti to be 
Maya and the Great Lord the ruler of Maya * ; and • he 
who rules every place of birth,' V, 9-11) the very same 
being is referred to, there remains not even a shadow of 
proof for the assertion that the mantra under discussion 



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368 vedAnta-sCtras. 



refers to an independent Prakrfti as assumed by the 
Sankhyas. 

But a further objection is raised, if the Prakriti denoted 
by a^a begins with, i. e. is caused by Brahman, how can it 
be called a^a, i. e. the non-produced one ; or, if it is non- 
produced, how can it be originated by Brahman ? To this 
the next Sutra replies. 

10. And on account of the teaching of formation 
(i. e. creation) there is no contradiction ; as in the 
case of the honey. 

The ' and ' expresses disposal of a doubt that had arisen. 
There is no contradiction between the Prakr*ti being ag& 
and originating from light. On account of instruction 
being given about the formation (kalpana), i. e. creation of 
the world. This interpretation of 'kalpana' is in agree- 
ment with the use of the verb klip in the text, ' as formerly 
the creator made (akalpayat) sun and moon.' 

In our text the doka 'from that the Lord of Maya 
creates all this ' gives instruction about the creation of the 
world. From that, i.e. from matter in its subtle causal 
state when it is not yet divided, the Lord of all creates 
the entire Universe. From this statement about creation 
we understand that Prakr/ti exists in a twofold state 
according as it is either cause or effect During a pralaya 
it unites itself with Brahman and abides in its subtle state, 
without any distinction of names and forms; it then is 
called the ' Unevolved,' and by other similar names. At 
the time of creation, on the other hand, there reveal them- 
selves in Prakr/ti Goodness and the other gu«as, it divides 
itself according to names and forms, and then is called the 
' Evolved,' and so on, and, transforming itself into fire, water, 
and earth, it appears as red, white, and black. In its causal 
condition it is a^a, i. e. unborn, in its effected condition it 
is ' caused by light, i. e. Brahman ' ; hence there is no con- 
tradiction. The case is analogous to that of the ' honey.' 
The sun in his causal state is one only, but in his effected 
state the Lord makes him into honey in so far namely as he 
then, for the purpose of enjoyment on the part of the Vasus. 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, io. 369 

and other gods, is the abode of nectar brought about by 
sacrificial works to be learned from the Rik and the other 
Vedas; and further makes him to rise and to set. And 
between these two conditions there is no contradiction. 
This is declared in the Madhuvidya (Kh. Up. Ill), from 
' The sun is indeed the honey of the Devas,' down to ' when 
from thence he has risen upwards he neither rises nor sets ; 
being one he stands in the centre ' — ' one ' here means ' of 
one nature.' — The conclusion therefore is that the .Sveta- 
jvatara mantra under discussion refers to Prakrz'ti as having 
her Self in Brahman, not to the Prakrzti assumed by the 
Sankhyas. 

Others, however, are of opinion that the one a^a of 
which the mantra speaks has for its characteristics light, 
water, and earth. To them we address the following ques- 
tions. Do you mean that by what the text speaks of as 
an ag&, consisting of fire, water, and earth, we have to 
understand those three elements only ; or Brahman in the 
form of those three elements ; or some power or principle 
which is the cause of the three elements ? The first alter- 
native is in conflict with the circumstance that, while fire, 
water, and earth are several things, the text explicitly refers 
to one a^a. Nor may it be urged that fire, water, and 
earth, although several, become one, by being made tripar- 
tite (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 3) ; for this making them tripartite, 
does not take away their being several ; the text clearly 
showing that each several element becomes tripartite, ' Let 
me make each of these three divine beings tripartite.' — The 
second alternative again divides itself into two alternatives. 
Is the one a^-a Brahman in so far as having passed over 
into fire, water, and earth ; or Brahman in so far as abiding 
within itself and not passing over into effects? The 
former alternative is excluded by the consideration that it 
does not remove plurality (which cannot be reconciled with 
the one a^a). The second alternative is contradicted by 
the text calling that zgk red, white, and black ; and more- 
over Brahman viewed as abiding within itself cannot be 
characterised by fire, water, and earth. On the third alter- 
native it has to be assumed that the text denotes by the 
[48] B b 



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370 vedAnta-sOtras. 

term ' ag& ' the three elements, and that on this basis there 
is imagined a causal condition of these elements; but 
better than this assumption it evidently is to accept the 
term ' a^a ' as directly denoting the causal state of those 
three elements as known from scripture. 

Nor can we admit the contention that the term ' a^a ' is 
meant to teach that Prakriti should metaphorically be 
viewed as a she-goat ; for such a view would be altogether 
purposeless. Where — in the passage ' Know the Self to 
be him who drives in the chariot ' — the body, and so on, 
are compared to a chariot, and so on, the object is to set 
forth the means of attaining Brahman ; where the sun is 
compared to honey, the object is to illustrate the enjoyment 
of the Vasus and other gods ; but what similar object could 
possibly be attained by directing us to view Prakrfti as 
a goat ? Such a metaphorical view would in fact be not 
merely useless ; it would be downright irrational. Prakriti 
is a non-intelligent principle, the causal substance of the 
entire material Universe, and constituting the means for 
the experience of pleasure and pain, and for the final 
release, of all intelligent souls which are connected with it 
from all eternity. Now it would be simply contrary to 
good sense, metaphorically to transfer to Prakrrti such as 
described the nature of a she-goat — which is a sentient 
being that gives birth to very few creatures only, enters 
only occasionally into connexion with others, is of small 
use only, is not the cause of herself being abandoned by 
others, and is capable of abandoning those connected with 
her. Nor does it recommend itself to take the word agA. 
(understood to mean ' she-goat ') in a sense different from 
that in which we understand the term ' a^a ' which occurs 
twice in the same mantra. — Let then all three terms be 
taken in the same metaphorical sense (a^a meaning he-goat). 
— It would be altogether senseless, we reply, to compare 
the soul which absolutely dissociates itself from Prakr/ti 
('Another a^a leaves her after having enjoyed her') to 
a he-goat which is able to enter again into connexion with 
what he has abandoned, or with anything else. — Here 
terminates the adhikarana of ' the cup.' 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, ii. 371 

1 1. Not from the mention of the number even, on 
account of the diversity and of the excess. 

The Va^asaneyins read in their text • He in whom the 
five " five-people " and the ether rest, him alone I believe 
to be the Self ; I, who know, believe him to be Brahman ' 
(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 17). The doubt here arises whether this 
text be meant to set forth the categories as established in 
Kapila's doctrine, or not. — The Purvapakshin maintains 
the former view, on the ground that the word ' five-people/ 
qualified by the word ' five,' intimates the twenty-five cate- 
gories of the Sankhyas. The compound ' five-people ' 
(panka^ankA) denotes groups of five beings, just as the 
term pa££a-pulya^ denotes aggregates of five bundles of 
grass. And as we want to know how many such groups 
there are, the additional qualification ' five ' intimates that 
there are five such groups ; just as if it were said * five five- 
bundles, i. e. five aggregates consisting of five bundles each.' 
We thus understand that the * five five-people ' are twenty- 
five things, and as the mantra in which the term is met with 
refers to final release, we recognise the twenty-five categories 
known from the Sankhya-smrzti which are here referred tq 
as objects to be known by persons desirous of release. 
For the followers of Kapila teach that ' there is the funda- 
mental causal substance which is not an effect. There are 
seven things, viz. the Mahat, and so on, which are causal 
substances as well as effects. There are sixteen effects. 
The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect' (San. 
Ka. 3). The mantra therefore is meant to intimate the 
categories known from the Sankhya. — To this the SQtra 
replies that from the mention of the number twenty-five 
supposed to be implied in the expression ' the five five- 
people,' it does not follow that the categories of the 
Sankhyas are meant. * On account of the diversity,' i. e. 
on account of the five-people further qualified by the 
number five being different from the categories of the 
Sankhyas. For in the text • in whom the five five-people 
and the ether rest,' the ' in whom ' shows the five-people to 
have their abode, and hence their Self, in Brahman ; and 

B b 2 



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372 vedAnta-sAtras. 



in the continuation of the text, 'him I believe the Self,' 
the ' him ' connecting itself with the preceding ' in whom ' 
is recognised to be Brahman. The five five-people must 
therefore be different from the categories of the San- 
khya-system. ' And on account of the excess.' Moreover 
there is, in the text under discussion, an excess over and 
above the Sankhya categories, consisting in the Self 
denoted by the relative pronoun 'in whom,' and in the 
specially mentioned Ether. What the text designates there- 
fore is the Supreme Person who is the Universal Lord in 
whom all things abide — such as he is described in the 
text quoted above, ' Therefore some call him the twenty- 
sixth, and others the twenty-seventh.' The ' even ' in the 
Sutra is meant to intimate that the ' five five-people ' can in 
no way mean the twenty-five categories, since there is no 
pentad of groups consisting of five each. For in the case 
of the categories of the Sankhyas there are no generic 
characteristics or the like which could determine the ar- 
rangement of those categories in fives. Nor must it be 
urged against this that there is a determining reason for 
such an arrangement in so far as the tattvas of the San- 
khyas form natural groups comprising firstly, the five 
organs of action ; secondly, the five sense-organs ; thirdly, 
the five gross elements ; fourthly, the subtle parts of those 
elements ; and fifthly, the five remaining tattvas ; for as 
the text under discussion mentions the ether by itself, the 
possibility of a group consisting of the five gross elements 
is precluded. We cannot therefore take the compound 
' five people ' as denoting a group consisting of five con- 
stituent members, but, in agreement with II, i, 50, as 
merely being a special name. There are certain beings 
the special name of which is 'five-people,' and of these 
beings the additional word ' pa££a ' predicates that they 
are five in number. The expression is thus analogous to 
the term ' the seven seven-r*shis ' (where the term ' seven- 
rishis ' is to be understood as the name of a certain class of 
rishia only). — Who then are the beings called ' five-people ?' 
— To this question the next SQtra replies. 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 13. 373 

1 2. The breath, and so on, on the ground of the 
complementary passage. 

We see from a complementary passage, viz. ' They who 
know the breath of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of 
the ear, the food of food, the mind of mind,' that the ' five- 
people ' are the breath, and eye, and so on, all of which 
have their abode in Brahman. 

But, an objection is raised, while the mantra ' in whom 
the five five-people/ &c, is common to the Kawvas and the 
Madhyandinas, the complementary passage 'they who 
know the breath of breath,' &c, in the text of the former 
makes no mention of food, and hence we have no reason 
to say that the ' five-people ' in their text are the breath, 
eye, and so on. 

To this objection the next Sutra replies. 

13. By light, food not being (mentioned in the 
text) of some. 

In the text of some, viz. the Kawvas, where food is not 
mentioned, the five-people are recognised to be the five 
senses, owing to the phrase ' of lights ' which is met with in 
another complementary passage. In the mantra, ' him the 
gods worship as the light of lights,' which precedes the 
mantra about the ' five-people,' Brahman is spoken of as the 
light of lights, and this suggests the idea of certain lights 
the activity of which depends on Brahman. The mantra 
leaves it undetermined what these lights are ; but from 
what follows about the 'five-people,' &c, we learn that 
what is meant are the senses which light up as it were 
their respective objects. In ' the breath of breath ' the 
second 'breath' (in the genitive case) denotes the sense- 
organ of touch, as that organ is connected with air, and as 
the vital breath (which would otherwise suggest itself 
as the most obvious explanation of pra«a) does not har- 
monise with the metaphorical term ' light.' ' Of the eye ' 
refers to the organ of sight; 'of the ear' to the organ of 
hearing. ' Of food ' comprises the senses of smell and taste 
together : it denotes the sense of smell on the ground that 
that sense is connected with earth, which may be ' food,' 



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374 vedAnta-sAtras. 



and the sense of taste in so far as ' anna ' may be also 
explained as that by means of which eating goes on 
(adyate). ' Of mind ' denotes mind, i. e. the so-called 
internal organ. Taste and smell thus being taken in com- 
bination, we have the required number of five, and we thus 
explain the ' five-people ' as the sense-organs which throw 
light on their objects, together with the internal organ, i. e. 
mind. The meaning of the clause about the ' five-people' 
therefore is that the senses — called ' five-people ' — and the 
elements, represented by the Ether, have their basis in 
Brahman ; and as thus all beings are declared to abide in 
Brahman, the five 'five-people' can in no way be the 
twenty-five categories assumed by the Sankhyas. — The 
general Conclusion is that the Vedanta-texts, whether refer- 
ring to numbers or not, nowhere set forth the categories 
established in Kapila's system. 

14. And on account of (Brahman) as described 
being declared to be the cause with regard to Ether, 
and so On. 

Here the philosopher who holds the Pradhana to be the 
general cause comes forward with another objection. The 
Vedanta-texts, he says, do not teach that creation pro- 
ceeds from one and the same agent only, and you therefore 
have no right to hold that Brahman is the sole cause of the 
world. In one place it is said that our world proceeded 
from ' Being,' ' Being only this was in the beginning ' 
{Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1). In other places the world is said to 
have sprung from ' Non-being,' ' Non-being indeed this was 
in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1); and 'Non-being 
only was this in the beginning; it became Being' (Kh, 
Up. Ill, 19, i ). As the Vedanta-texts are thus not con- 
sequent in their statements regarding the creator, we 
cannot conclude from them that Brahman is the sole 
cause of the world. On the other hand, those texts do 
enable us to conclude that the Pradhana only is the uni- 
versal cause. For the text ' Now all this was then un- 
developed ' (Br*. Up. I, 4, 7) teaches that the world was 
merged in the undeveloped' Pradhana, and the subsequent 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 14. 375 

clause, 'That developed itself by form and name,' that 
from that Undeveloped there resulted the creation of the 
world. For the Undeveloped is that which is not distin- 
guished by names and forms, and this is none other than 
the Pradhana. And as this Pradhana is at the same time 
eternal, as far as its essential nature is concerned, and the 
substrate of all change, there is nothing contradictory in 
the different accounts of creation calling it sometimes 
'Being' and sometimes 'Non-being'; while, on the other 
hand, these terms cannot, without contradiction, both be 
applied to Brahman. The causality of the Undeveloped 
having thus been ascertained, such expressions as ' it 
thought, may I be many,' must be interpreted as meaning 
its being about to proceed to creation. The terms ' Self ' 
and ' Brahman ' also may be applied to the Pradhana in so 
far as it is all-pervading (atman from apnoti), and pre- 
eminently great (bri'hat). We therefore conclude that 
the only cause of the world about which the Vedanta-texts 
give information is the Pradhana. 

This view is set aside by the Sutra. The word and is 
used in the sense of but. It is possible to ascertain from 
the Vedanta-texts that the world springs from none other 
than the highest Brahman, which is all-knowing, lord of all, 
free from all shadow of imperfection, capable of absolutely 
realising its purposes, and so on ; since scripture declares 
Brahman as described to be the cause of Ether, and so on. 
By ' Brahman as described ' is meant ' Brahman distin- 
guished by omniscience and other qualities, as described 
in the Sutra " that from which the origination, and so on, of 
the world proceed," and in other places.' That Brahman 
only is declared by scripture to be the cause of Ether, and 
so on, i. e. the being which is declared to be the cause in 
passages such as ' From that Self sprang Ether ' (Taitt. Up. 
II, 1 ) ; ' that sent forth fire ' (Kh. Up. VI, a, 3), is none other 
than Brahman possessing omniscience and similar quali- 
ties. For the former of these texts follows on the passage 
'The True, intelligence, infinite is Brahman; he reaches 
all desires together with the intelligent Brahman,' which 
introduces Brahman as the general subject-matter — that 



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376 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Brahman being then referred to by means of the connect- 
ing words 'from that.' In the same way the 'that' (in 
' that sent forth fire ') refers back to the omniscient Brah- 
man introduced in the clause 'that thought, may I be 
many.' This view is confirmed by a consideration of all 
the accounts of creation, and we hence conclude that Brah- 
man is the sole cause of the world. — But the text ' Non- 
being indeed this was in the beginning ' calls the general 
cause ' something that is not ' ; how then can you say that 
we infer from the Vedanta-texts as the general cause of 
the world a Brahman that is all-knowing, absolutely realises 
its purposes, and so on ? — To this question the next Sutra 
replies. 

15. From connexion. 

The fact is that Brahman intelligent, consisting of bliss, 
&c, connects itself also with the passage ' Non-being was 
this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For the section of 
the text which precedes that passage (viz. ' Different from 
this Self consisting of understanding is the Self consisting 
of Bliss; — he wished, may I be many; — he created all 
whatever there is. Having created he entered into it; 
having entered it he became sat and tyat ') clearly refers 
to Brahman consisting of Bliss, which realises its purposes, 
creates all beings, and entering into them is the Self of all. 
When, therefore, after this we meet with the jloka (' Non- 
being this was in the beginning ') introduced by the words 
'On this there is also this iloka' — which shows that the 
jrloka is meant to throw light on what precedes ; and when 
further on we have the passage ' From fear of it the wind 
blows,' &c, which, referring to the same Brahman, predi- 
cates of it universal rulership, bliss of nature, and so on ; 
we conclude with certainty that the doka about 'Non- 
being ' also refers to Brahman. As during a pralaya the 
distinction of names and forms does not exist, and Brahman 
also then does not exist in so far as connected with names 
and forms, the text applies to Brahman the term ' Non- 
being.' The text ' Non-being only this was in the begin- 
ning' explains itself in the same way. — Nor can we admit 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, i 6. 377 

the contention that the text ' Now all this was then unde- 
veloped ' refers to the Pradhana as the cause of the world ; 
for the Undeveloped there spoken of is nothing else but 
Brahman in so far as its body is not yet evolved. For 
the text continues 'That same being entered thither to 
the very tips of the finger-nails ; ' 'When seeing, eye by 
name ; when hearing, ear by name ; when thinking, mind 
by name ; ' ' Let men meditate upon him as Self ; ' where 
the introductory words ' that same being ' refer back to the 
Undeveloped — which thus is said to enter into all things 
and thereby to become their ruler. And it is known from 
another text also (Kk. Up. VI, 3, a) that h is the all-creative 
highest Brahman which enters into its creation and evolves 
names and forms. The text ' Having entered within, the 
ruler of creatures, the Self of all ' moreover shows that 
the creative principle enters into its creatures for the 
purpose of ruling them, and such entering again cannot be 
attributed to the non-sentient Pradhana. The Undeveloped 
therefore is Brahman in that state where its body is not 
yet developed ; and when the text continues • it developed 
itself by names and forms ' the meaning is that Brahman 
developed itself in so far as names and forms were distin- 
guished in the world that constitutes Brahman's body. On 
this explanation of the texts relating to creation we further 
are enabled to take the thought, purpose, &c, attributed to 
the creative principle, in their primary literal sense. And, 
we finally remark, neither the term 'Brahman' nor the 
term ' Self in any way suits the Pradhana, which is neither 
absolutely great nor pervading in the sense of entering into 
things created with a view to ruling them. It thus remains 
a settled conclusion that Brahman is the sole cause of the 
world. — Here terminates the adhikarawa of '(Brahman's) 
causality.' 

1 6. Because it denotes the world. 

The Sankhya comes forward with a further objection. 
Although the Vedanta-texts teach an intelligent principle 
to be the cause of the world, they do not present to us as 
objects of knowledge anything that could be the cause of 



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378 vedAnta-s6tras. 



the world, apart from the Pradhana and the soul as estab- 
lished by the Sankhya-system. For the Kaushltakins declare 
in their text, in the dialogue of Balaki and Agatayatru, 
that none but the enjoying (individual) soul is to be known 
as the cause of the world, ' Shall I tell you Brahman ? He 
who is the maker of those persons and of whom this is the 
work (or " to whom this work belongs ") he indeed is to be 
known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). Balaki at the outset proposes 
Brahman as the object of instruction, and when he is found 
himself not to know Brahman, A^ataratru instructs him 
about it, ' he indeed is to be known.' But from the relative 
clause 'to whom this work belongs,' which connects the 
being to be known with work, we infer that by Brahman 
we have here to understand the enjoying soul which is the 
ruler of Prakr*'ti, not any other being. For no other being 
is connected with work ; work, whether meritorious or the 
contrary, belongs to the individual soul only. Nor must 
you contest this conclusion on the ground that ' work ' is 
here to be explained as meaning the object of activity, 
so that the sense of the clause would be ' he of whom this 
entire world, as presented by perception and the other means 
of knowledge, is the work.' For in that case the separate 
statements made in the two clauses, ' who is the maker of 
those persons ' and ' of whom this is the work,' would be 
devoid of purport (the latter implying the former). More- 
over, the generally accepted meaning of the word ' karman,' 
both in Vedic and worldly speech, is work in the sense of 
good and evil actions. And as the origination of the world 
is caused by actions of the various individual souls, the 
designation of ' maker of those persons ' also suits only the 
individual soul. The meaning of the whole passage there- 
fore is ' He who is the cause of the different persons that 
have their abode in the disc of the sun, and so on, and 
are instrumental towards the retributive experiences of the 
individual souls ; and to whom there belongs karman, good 
and evil, to which there is due his becoming such a cause ; 
he indeed is to be known, his essential nature is to be 
cognised in distinction from Pralcr/ti.' And also in what 
follows, « The two came to a person who was asleep. He 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, i 6. 379 

pushed him with a stick,' &c, what is said about the 
sleeping man being pushed, roused, &c, all points only to 
the individual soul being the topic of instruction. Further 
on also the text treats of the individual soul only, 'As the 
master feeds with his people, nay as his people feed on 
the master, thus does this conscious Self feed with the 
other Selfs.' We must consider also the following passage — 
which contains the explanation given by A^-ataratru to 
Balaki, who had been unable to say where the soul goes at 
the time of deep sleep — ' There are the arteries called 
Hitas. In these the person is ; when sleeping he sees no 
dream, then he (or that, i.e. the aggregate of the sense- 
organs) becomes one with this pra«a alone. Then speech 
goes to him with all names, &c, the mind with all thoughts. 
And when he awakes, then, as from a burning fire sparks 
proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pra«as 
proceed each towards its place, from the prawas the gods, 
from the gods the worlds.' The individual soul which 
passes through the states of dream, deep sleep and waking, 
and is that into which there are merged and from which 
there proceed speech and all the other organs, is here 
declared to be the abode of deep sleep 'then it (viz. the 
aggregate of the organs) becomes one in that prawa.' 
Pra«a here means the individual soul in so far as supporting 
life; for the text Continues 'when that one awakes' and 
neither the vital breath nor the Lord (both of whom might 
be proposed as explanations of prawa) can be said to be 
asleep and to wake. Or else 'asmin pra«e' might be 
explained as 'in the vital breath (which abides) in the 
individual soul/ the meaning of the clause being ' all the 
organs, speech and so on, become one in the vital breath 
which itself abides in this soul.' The word ' prawa ' would 
thus be taken in its primary literal sense ; yet all the same 
the soul constitutes the topic of the section, the vital 
breath being a mere instrument of the soul. The Brahman 
mentioned at the outset therefore is none other than the 
individual soul, and there is nothing to prove a lord different 
from it And as the attributes which the texts ascribe to 
the general cause, viz. thought and so on, are attributes of 



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380 vedAnta-sOtras. 



intelligent beings only, we arrive at the conclusion that 
what constitutes the cause of the world is the non-intelligent 
Pradhana guided by the intelligent soul. 

This prima facie view the Sutra disposes of, by saying 
'because (the work) denotes the world.' It is not the 
insignificant individual soul — which is under the influence 
of its good and evil works, and by erroneously imputing 
to itself the attributes of Prakrrti becomes the cause of the 
effects of the latter — that is the topic of our text; but 
rather the Supreme Person who is free from all shadow 
of imperfection such as Nescience and the like, who is 
a treasure of all possible auspicious qualities in their highest 
degree of perfection, who is the sole cause of this entire 
world. This is proved by the circumstance that the term 
'work' connected with 'this* (in 'of whom this (is) the 
work') denotes the Universe which is an effect of the 
Supreme Person. For the word 'this' must, on account 
of its sense, the general topic of the section and so on, 
be taken in a non-limited meaning, and hence denotes the 
entire world, as presented by Perception and the other 
means of knowledge, with all its sentient and non-sentient 
beings. That the term ' work ' does not here denote good 
and evil actions, appears from the following consideration 
of the context. Balaki at first offers to teach Brahman 
('Shall I tell you Brahman?') and thereupon holds forth 
on various persons abiding in the sun, and so on, as being 
Brahman. .A^at&ratru however refuses to accept this 
instruction as not setting forth Brahman, and finally, in 
order to enlighten Balaki, addresses him 'He, O Balaki, 
who is the maker of those persons,' &c. Now as the 
different personal souls abiding in the sun, &c, and 
connected with karman in the form of good and evil 
actions, are known already by Balaki, the term 'karman' — 
met with in the next clause — is clearly meant to throw 
light on some Person so far not known to Balaki, and 
therefore must be taken to mean not good and evil deeds 
or action in general, but rather the entire Universe in so 
far as being the outcome of activity. On this interpretation 
only the passage gives instruction about something not 



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I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 17. 381 

known before. Should it be said that this would be the 
case also if the subject to which the instruction refers were 
the true essential nature of the soul, indicated here by its 
connexion with karman, we reply that this would involve 
the (objectionable) assumption of so-called implication 
(lakshawa), in so far namely as what the clause would 
directly intimate is (not the essential nature of the soul 
as free from karman but rather) the connexion of the soul 
with karman. Moreover if the intention of the passage 
were this, viz. to give instruction as to the soul, the latter 
being pointed at by means of the reference to karman, the 
intention would be fully accomplished by saying ' to whom 
karman belongs, he is to be known ; ' while in the text 
as it actually stands ' of whom this is the karman ' the 
'this' would be unmeaning. The meaning of the two 
separate clauses ' who is the maker of those persons ' and 
• of whom this is the work ' is as follows. He who is the 
creator of those persons whom you called Brahman, and 
of whom those persons are the creatures ; he of whom this 
entire world is the effect, and before whom all things 
sentient and non-sentient are equal in so far as being 
produced by him; he, the highest and universal cause, 
the Supreme Person, is the object to be known. The 
meaning implied here is — although the origination of the 
world has for its condition the deeds of individual souls, 
yet those souls do not independently originate the means 
for their own retributive experience, but experience only 
what the Lord has created to that end in agreement with 
their works. The individual soul, hence, cannot stand in 
creative relation to those persons. — What the text under 
discussion inculcates as the object of knowledge therefore 
is the highest Brahman which is known from all Vedanta- 
texts as the universal cause. 

1 7. Should it be said that this is not so on account 
of the inferential marks of the individual soul and 
the chief vital air ; we reply that this has been 
explained before. 

With reference to the plea urged by the Purvapakshin 



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382 vedAnta-sOtras. 



that, owing to inferential marks pointing to the individual 
soul, and the circumstance of mention being made of the 
chief vital air, we must decide that the section treats of 
the enjoying individual soul and not of the highest Self, 
the Sutra remarks that this argumentation has already been 
disposed of, viz. in connexion with the Fratardana vidyd. 
For there it was shown that when a text is ascertained, 
on the ground of a comprehensive survey of initial and 
concluding clauses, to refer to Brahman, all inferential 
marks which point to other topics must be interpreted 
so as to fall in with the principal topic. Now in our text 
Brahman is introduced at the outset 'Shall I tell you 
Brahman ? ' it is further mentioned in the middle of the 
section, for the clause ' of whom this is the work ' does not 
refer to the soul in general but to the highest Person who 
is the cause of the whole world ; and at the end again we 
hear of a reward which connects itself only with meditations 
on Brahman, viz. supreme sovereignty preceded by the 
conquest of all evil. ' Having overcome all evil he obtains 
pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty and supremacy — 
yea, he who knows this.' The section thus being concerned 
with Brahman, the references to the individual soul and 
to the chief vital air must also be interpreted so as to fall 
in with Brahman. In the same way it was shown above 
that the references to the individual soul and the chief 
vital air which are met with in the Pratardana vidyl really 
explain themselves in connexion with a threefold meditation 
on Brahman. As in the passage 'Then with this prawa alone 
he becomes one' the two words 'this' and 'prA«a' may 
be taken as co-ordinated and it hence would be inappropriate 
to separate them (and to explain 'in the pra#a which 
abides in this soul'), and as the word 'pttktta.' is ascertained 
to mean Brahman also, we must understand the mention 
of prawa to be made with a view to meditation on Brahman 
in so far as having the prana for its body. But how can 
the references to the individual soul be put in connexion 
with Brahman ? — This point is taken up by the next Sutra. 

18. But Caimini thinks that it has another purport, 

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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, i 8. 383 

on account of the question and answer ; and thus 
some also. 

The .'but' is meant to preclude the idea that the mention 
made oT the individual soul enables us to understand the 
whole section as concerned with that soul. — The teacher 
Caimini is of opinion that the mention made of the 
individual soul has another meaning, i.e. aims at conveying 
the idea of what is different from the individual soul, i.e. the 
nature of the highest Brahman. ' On account of question 
and answer.' According to the story told in the Upanishad, 
A^ataratru leads Bal&ki to where a sleeping man is 
resting, and convinces him that the soul is different from 
breath, by addressing the sleeping person, in whom breath 
only is awake, with names belonging to pra«a 1 without the 
sleeper being awaked thereby, and after that rousing him 
by a push of his staff. Then, with a view to teaching 
Balaki the difference of Brahman from the individual soul, 
he asks him the following questions: 'Where, O Baldki, 
did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence did 
he thus come back?' To these questions he thereupon 
himself replies, *When sleeping he sees no dream, then 
he becomes one in that prana alone. — From that Self the 
organs proceed each towards its place, from the organs 
the gods, from the gods the worlds.' Now this reply, no 
less than the questions, clearly refers to the highest Self 
as something different from the individual Self. For that 
entering into which the soul, in the state of deep sleep, 
attains its true nature and enjoys complete serenity, being 
free from the disturbing experiences of pleasure and pain 
that accompany the states of waking and of dream ; and 

1 The names with which the king addresses the sleeper are 
Great one, clad in while raiment, Soma, king. The .Shi. Pra. com- 
ments as follows : Great one ; because according to .Sruti Prana is 
the oldest and best. Clad in while raiment; because .Sruti says 
that water is the raiment of Pra«a ; and elsewhere, that what is 
white belongs to water. Soma ; because scripture says ' of this 
prawa water is the body, light the form, viz. yonder moon.' King ; 
for •Sruti says ' Praxa indeed is the ruler.' 



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384 vedAnta-sOtras. 



that from which it again returns to the fruition of pleasure 
and pain ; that is nothing else but the highest Self. For, 
as other scriptural texts testify (' Then he becomes united 
with the True,' Kh. Up. VI, 8, i; 'Embraced ,by the 
intelligent Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing 
that is within,' Bri. Up. IV, 3, ai), the abode of deep 
sleep is the intelligent Self which is different from the 
individual Self, Le. the highest Self. We thus conclude 
that the reference, in question and answer, to the individual 
soul subserves the end of instruction being given about 
what is different from that soul, i. e. the highest Self. We 
hence also reject the Purvapakshin's contention that 
question and answer refer to the individual soul, that the 
veins called hita are the abode of deep sleep, and that 
the well-known clause as to the prawa must be taken to 
mean that the aggregate of the organs becomes one in the 
individual soul called pra«a. For the veins are the abode, 
not of deep sleep, but of dream, and, as we have shown 
above, Brahman only is the abode of deep sleep ; and the 
text declares that the individual soul, together with all its 
ministering organs, becomes one with, and again proceeds 
from, Brahman only — which the text designates as Prawa. 
— Moreover some, viz. the Va^asaneyins in this same 
colloquy of Balaki and A^atajatru as recorded in their 
text, clearly distinguish from the v\f»ana-maya, i.e. the 
individual soul in the state of deep sleep, the highest Self 
which then is the abode of the individual soul. 'Where 
was then the person, consisting of intelligence, and from 
whence did he thus come back? — When he was thus 
asleep, then the intelligent person, having through the 
intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all 
intelligence, lies in the ether that is within the heart.' Now 
the word 'ether' is known to denote the highest Self; 
cf. the text ' there is within that the small ether' (Kh. Up. 
VIII, 1, 1). This shows us that the individual soul is 
mentioned in the Va^asaneyin passage to the end of 
setting forth what is different from it, viz. the pra^wa Self, 
i.e. the highest Brahman. The general conclusion therefore 
is that the Kaushitaki-text under discussion proposes as 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 19. 385 

the object of knowledge something that is different from 
the individual soul, viz. the highest Brahman which is the 
cause of the whole world, and that hence the Vedanta- 
texts nowhere intimate that general causality belongs 
either to the individual soul or to the Pradhana under the 
soul's guidance. Here terminates the adhikarawa of 
'denotation of the world.' 

19. On account of the connected meaning of the 
sentences. 

In spite of the conclusion arrived at there may remain 
a suspicion that here and there in the Upanishads texts 
are to be met with which aim at setting forth the soul as 
maintained in Kapila's system, and that hence there is no 
room for a being different from the individual soul and 
called Lord. This suspicion the Sutra undertakes to 
remove, in connexion with the Maitreyt-brahma«a, in the 
Brthadaranyaka. There we read 'Verily, a husband is 
dear, not for the love of the husband, but for the love of the 
Self a husband is dear, and so on. Everything is dear, not 
for the love of everything, but for the love of the Self 
everything is dear. The Self should be seen, should be 
heard, should be reflected on, should be meditated upon. 
When the Self has been seen, heard, reflected upon, 
meditated upon, then all this is known ' (Br*. Up. IV, 5, 6). 
— Here the doubt arises whether the Self enjoined in this 
passage as the object of seeing, &c, be the soul as held 
by the Sankhyas, or the Supreme Lord, all-knowing, 
capable of realising all his purposes, and so on. The 
Purvapakshin upholds the former alternative. For, he 
says, the beginning no less than the middle and the 
concluding part of the section conveys the idea of the 
individual soul only. In the beginning the individual soul 
only is meant, as appears from the connexion of the Self 
with husband, wife, children, wealth, cattle, and so on. This 
is confirmed by the middle part of the section where the 
Self is said to be connected with origination and destruction, 
' a mass of knowledge, he having risen from these elements 
vanishes again into them. When he has departed there 
[48] c c 



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386 vedAnta-sCtras. 



is no more consciousness.' And in the end we have 
'whereby should he know the knower'; where we again 
recognise the knowing subject, i. e. the individual soul, not 
the Lord. We thus conclude that the whole text is meant 
to set forth the soul as held by the Sankhyas. — But in the 
beginning there is a clause, viz. 'There is no hope of 
immortality by wealth,' which shows that the whole section 
is meant to instruct us as to the means of immortality; 
how then can it be meant to set forth the individual soul 
only? — You state the very reason proving that the text 
is concerned with the individual soul only ! For according 
to the Sankhya-system immortality is obtained through 
the cognition of the true nature of the soul viewed as free 
from all erroneous imputation to itself of the attributes 
of non-sentient matter ; and the text therefore makes it its 
task to set forth, for the purpose of immortality, the essential 
nature of the soul free from all connexion with Prakr/ti, 
'the Self should be heard,' and so on. And as the souls 
dissociated from Prakrtti are all of a uniform nature, all 
souls are known through the knowledge of the soul free 
from Prakn'ti, and the text therefore rightly says that 
through the Self being known everything is known. And 
as the essential nature of the Self is of one and the same 
kind, viz. knowledge or intelligence, in all beings from gods 
down to plants, the text rightly asserts the unity of the 
Self ' that Self is all this ' ; and denies all otherness from 
the Self, on the ground of the characteristic attributes 
of gods and so on really being of the nature of the Not- 
self, 'he is abandoned by everything,' &c. The clause, 
• For where there is duality as it were,' which denies 
plurality, intimates that the plurality introduced into the 
homogeneous Self by the different forms — such as of gods, 
and so on — assumed by Prakn'ti, is false. And there is also 
no objection to the teaching that ' the .tfjg-veda and so on 
are breathed forth from that great being (i.e. Prakriti); 
for the origination of the world is caused by the soul in its 
quality as ruler of Prakrrti. — It thus being ascertained that 
the whole Maitreyt-brahmana is concerned with the soul 
in the Sankhya sense, we, according to the principle of the 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAdA, 19. 387 

unity of purport of all Vedanta-texts, conclude that they 
all treat of the Sahkhya soul only, and that hence the 
cause of the world is to be found not in a so-called Lord 
but in Prakrzti ruled and guided by the soul. 

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sutra. The 
whole text refers to the Supreme Lord only; for on this 
supposition only a satisfactory connexion of the parts of 
the text can be made out. On being told by Ya^wavalkya 
that there is no hope of immortality through wealth, 
Maitreyl expresses her slight regard for wealth and all 
such things as do not help to immortality, and asks to be 
instructed as to the means of immortality only (' What 
should I do with that by which I do not become immortal? 
What my lord knows tell that clearly to me '). Now the 
Self which Ya^fwavalkya, responding to her requests, points 
out to her as the proper object of knowledge, can be none 
other than the highest Self; for other scriptural texts 
clearly teach that the only means of reaching immortality 
is to know the Supreme Person — ' Having known him thus 
man passes beyond death'; 'Knowing him thus he becomes 
immortal here, there is no other path to go' (.Svet. Up. 
Ill, 8). The knowledge of the true nature of the individual 
soul which obtains immortality, and is a mere manifestation 
of the power of the Supreme Person, must be held to be 
useful towards the cognition of the Supreme Person who 
brings about Release, but is not in itself instrumental 
towards such Release ; the being the knowledge of which 
the text declares to be the means of immortality is 
therefore the highest Self only. Again, the causal power 
with regard to the entire world which is expressed in the 
passage, ' from that great Being there were breathed forth 
the .#*g-veda,' &c, cannot possibly belong to the mere 
individual soul which in its state of bondage is under the 
influence of karman and in the state of release has nothing 
to do with the world ; it can in fact belong to the Supreme 
Person only. Again, what the text says as to everything 
being known by the knowledge of one thing ('By the 
seeing indeed of the Self,' &c.) is possible only in the case 
of a Supreme Self which constitutes the Self of all. What 

C c 2 



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388 vedAnta-sOtras. 



the Purvapakshin said as to everything being known 
through the cognition of the one individual soul, since 
all individual souls are of the same type — this also cannot 
be upheld ; for as long as there is a knowledge of the soul 
only and not also of the world of non-sentient things, there 
as no knowledge of everything. And when the text 
enumerates different things ('this Brahman class, this 
Kshatra class,' &c), and then concludes 'all this is that 
Self — where the 'this' denotes the entire Universe of 
animate and inanimate beings as known through Perception, 
Inference, and so on — universal unity such as declared here 
is possible only through a highest Self which is the Self 
of all. It is not, on the other hand, possible that what the 
word ' this ' denotes, i. e. the whole world of intelligent and 
non-intelligent creatures, should be one with the personal 
soul as long as it remains what it is, whether connected 
with or disassociated from non-sentient matter. In the 
same spirit the passage, 'AH things abandon him who 
views all things elsewhere than in the Self,' finds fault 
with him who views anything apart from the universal 
Self. The qualities also which in the earlier Maitreyi- 
brahma»a (II, 4, 12) are predicated of the being under 
discussion, viz. greatness, endlessness, unlimitedness, cannot 
belong to any one else but the highest Self. That Self 
therefore is the topic of the Brahmana. 

We further demur to our antagonist's maintaining that 
the entire Brahmawa treats of the individual soul because 
that soul is at the outset represented as the object of 
enquiry, this being inferred from its connexion with 
husband, wife, wealth, &c. For if the clause ' for the love 
(literally, for the desire) of the Self refers to the individual 
Self, we cannot help connecting (as, in fact, we must do in 
any case) that Self with the Self referred to in the 
subsequent clause, ' the Self indeed is to be seen,' &c. ; the 
connexion having to be conceived in that way that the 
information given in the former clause somehow subserves 
the cognition of the Self enjoined in the latter clause. 
'For the desire of the Self would then mean 'for the 
attainment of the objects desired by the Self.' But if it 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 19. 389 

is first said that husband, wife, &c, are dear because they 
fulfil the wishes of the individual Self, it could hardly be 
said further on that the nature of that Self must be enquired 
into ; for what, in the circumstances of the case, naturally 
is to be enquired into and searched for are the dear objects 
but not the true nature of him to whom those objects are 
dear, apart from the objects themselves. It would certainly 
be somewhat senseless to declare that since husband, wife, 
&c, are dear because they fulfil the desires of the individual 
soul, therefore, setting aside those dear objects, we must 
enquire into the true nature of that soul apart from all the 
objects of its desire. On the contrary, it having been 
declared that husband, wife, &c, are dear not on account 
of husband, wife, &c, but on account of the Self, they should 
not be dropped, but included in the further investigation, 
just because they subserve the Self. And should our 
opponent (in order to avoid the difficulty of establishing 
a satisfactory connexion between the different clauses) 
maintain that the clause, 'but everything is dear for the 
love of the Self,' is not connected with the following clause, 
* the Self is to be seen,' &c, we point out that this would 
break the whole connexion of the Brahmawa. And if we 
allowed such a break, we should then be unable to point 
out what is the use of the earlier part of the Brahmaaa. 
We must therefore attempt to explain the connexion in 
such a way as to make it clear why all search for dear 
objects — husband, wife, children, wealth, &c. — should be 
abandoned and the Self only should be searched for. This 
explanation is as follows. After having stated that wealth, 
and so on, are no means to obtain immortality which 
consists in permanent absolute bliss, the text declares that 
the pleasant experiences which we derive from wealth, 
husband, wife, &c, and which are not of a permanent 
nature and always alloyed with a great deal of pain, are 
caused not by wealth, husband, wife, &c, themselves, but 
rather by the highest Self whose nature is absolute bliss. 
He therefore who being himself of the nature of perfect 
bliss causes other beings and things also to be the abodes 
of partial bliss, he — the highest Self— is to be constituted 



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390 vedanta-sOtras. 



the object of knowledge. The clauses, ' not for the wish 
of the husband a husband is dear,' &c, therefore must 
be understood as follows — a husband, a wife, a son, &c, are 
not dear to us in consequence of a wish or purpose on their 
part, ' may I, for my own end or advantage be dear to 
him,' but they are dear to us for the wish of the Self, i.e. 
to the end that there may be accomplished the desire of 
the highest Self — which desire aims at the devotee 
obtaining what is dear to him. For the highest Self 
pleased with the works of his devotees imparts to different 
things such dearness, i. e. joy-giving quality as corresponds 
to those works, that ' dearness ' being bound in each case 
to a definite place, time, nature and degree. This is in 
accordance with the scriptural text, ' For he alone bestows 
bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Things are not dear, or the 
contrary, to us by themselves, but only in so far as the 
highest Self makes them such. Compare the text, 'The 
same thing which erst gave us delight later on becomes 
the source of grief; and what was the cause of wrath 
afterwards tends to peace Hence there is nothing that 
in itself is of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.' 

But, another view of the meaning of the text is proposed, 
even if the Self in the clause ' for the desire of the Self 
were accepted as denoting the individual Self, yet the 
clause ' the Self must be seen ' would refer to the highest 
Self only. For in that case also the sense would be as 
follows — because the possession of husband, wife, and other 
so-called dear things is aimed at by a person to whom 
they are dear, not with a view of bringing about what 
is desired by them (viz. husband, wife, &c), but rather 
to the end of bringing about what is desired by himself ; 
therefore that being which is, to the individual soul, 
absolutely and unlimitedly dear, viz. the highest Self, must 
be constituted the sole object of cognition, not such objects 
as husband, wife, wealth, &c, the nature of which depends 
on various external circumstances and the possession of 
which gives rise either to limited pleasure alloyed with 
pain or to mere pain. — But against this we remark that as, 
in the section under discussion, the words designating the 



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I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20. 391 

individual Self denote the highest Self also 1 , the term 
'Self in both clauses, 'For the desire of the Self and 
' The Self is to be seen,' really refers to one and the same 
being (viz. the highest Self), and the interpretation thus 
agrees with the one given above. — In order to prove the 
tenet that words denoting the individual soul at the same 
time denote the highest Self, by means of arguments made 
use of by other teachers also, the Sutrakara sets forth the 
two following Sutras. 

20. (It is) a mark indicating that the promissory 
statement is proved ; thus Ajmarathya thinks. 

According to the teacher A-rmarathya the circumstance 
that terms denoting the individual soul are used to denote 
Brahman is a mark enabling us to infer that the promissory 
declaration according to which through the knowledge 
of one thing everything is known is well established. If 
the individual soul were not identical with Brahman in so 
far as it is the effect of Brahman, then the knowledge 
of the soul — being something distinct from Brahman — 
would not follow from the knowledge of the highest Self. 
There are the texts declaring the oneness of Brahman 
previous to creation, such as ' the Self only was this in the 
beginning* (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), and on the other hand 
those texts which declare that the souls spring from and 
again are merged in Brahman ; such as ' As from a blazing 
fire sparks being like unto fire fly forth a thousandfold, 
thus are various beings brought forth from the Imperish- 
able, and return thither also* (Mu. Up. II, 1, 1). These 
two sets of texts together make us apprehend that the 
souls are one with Brahman in so far as they are its effects. 
On this ground a word denoting the individual soul denotes 
the highest Self as well. 

1 If it be insisted upon that the Self in ' for the desire of the 
Self is the individual Self, we point out that terms denoting the 
individual Self at the same time denote the highest Self also. This 
tenet of his Riminu^a considers to be set forth and legitimately 
proved in Sutra 23, while Sutras 21 and 22 although advocating 
the right principle fail to assign valid arguments. 



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392 vedAnta-sOtras. 



21. Because (the soul) when it will depart is such; 
thus Auflfalomi thinks. 

It is wrong to maintain that the designation of Brahman 
by means of terms denoting the individual soul is intended 
to prove the truth of the declaration that through the 
knowledge of one thing everything is known, in so far 
namely as the soul is an effect of Brahman and hence one 
with it. For sc/iptural texts such as 'the knowing Self 
is not born, it dies not' (Ka. Up. I, a, 18), declare the soul 
not to have originated, and it moreover is admitted that 
the world is each time created to the end of the souls 
undergoing experiences retributive of their former deeds ; 
otherwise the inequalities of the different parts of the 
creation would be inexplicable. If moreover the soul were 
a mere effect of Brahman, its Release would consist in 
a mere return into the substance of Brahman, — analogous 
to the refunding into Brahman of the material elements, 
and that would mean that the injunction and performance 
of acts leading to such Release would be purportless. 
Release, understood in that sense, moreover would not 
be anything beneficial to man; for to be refunded into 
Brahman as an earthen vessel is refunded into its own 
causal substance, i. e. clay, means nothing else but complete 
annihilation. How, under these circumstances, certain texts 
can speak of the origination and reabsorption of the 
individual soul will be set forth later on. — According to 
the opinion of the teacher Au</ulomi, the highest Self s 
being denoted by terms directly denoting the individual 
soul is due to the soul's becoming Brahman when departing 
from the body. This is in agreement with texts such 
as the following, ' This serene being having risen from this 
body and approached the highest light appears in its true 
form' (Kk. Up. VIII, 3, 4); ' As the flowing rivers disappear 
in the sea, losing their name and form, thus a wise man 
freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who 
is higher than the high ' (Mu. Up. Ill, », 8). 

22. On account of (Brahman's) abiding (within the 
individual soul); thus Ka*akr*tsna (holds). 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 22. 393 

We must object likewise to the view set forth in the 
preceding Sutra, viz. that Brahman is denoted by terms 
denoting the individual soul because that soul when 
departing becomes one with Brahman. For that view 
cannot stand the test of being submitted to definite 
alternatives. — Is the soul's not being such, i.e. not being 
Brahman, previously to its departure from the body, due 
to its own essential nature or to a limiting adjunct, and is it 
in the latter case real or unreal ? In the first case the soul 
can never become one with Brahman, for if its separation 
from Brahman is due to its own essential nature, that 
separation can never vanish as long as the essential nature 
persists. And should it be said that its essential nature 
comes to an end together with its distinction from Brahman, 
we reply that in that case it perishes utterly and does not 
therefore become Brahman. The latter view, moreover, 
precludes itself as in no way beneficial to man, and so on. — 
If, in the next place, the difference of the soul from 
Brahman depends on the presence of real limiting adjuncts, 
the soul is Brahman even before its departure from the 
body, and we therefore cannot reasonably accept the 
distinction implied in saying that the soul becomes Brahman 
only when it departs. For on this view there exists 
nothing but Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, and as 
those adjuncts cannot introduce difference into Brahman 
which is without parts and hence incapable of difference, 
the difference resides altogether in the adjuncts, and hence 
the soul is Brahman even before its departure from the 
body. — If, on the other hand, the difference due to the 
adjuncts is not real, we ask — what is it then that becomes 
Brahman on the departure of the soul? — Brahman itself 
whose true nature had previously been obscured by 
Nescience, its limiting adjunct! — Not so, we reply. Of 
Brahman whose true nature consists in eternal, free, self- 
luminous intelligence, the true nature cannot possibly be 
hidden by Nescience. For by ' hiding ' or * obscuring' we 
understand the cessation of the light that belongs to the 
essential nature of a thing. Where, therefore, light itself 
and alone constitutes the essential nature of a thing, there 



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394 vedAnta-sCtras. 



can either be no obscuration at all, or if there is such 
it means complete annihilation of the thing. Hence 
Brahman's essential nature being manifest at all times, 
there exists no difference on account of which it could 
be said to become Brahman at the time of the soul's 
departure ; and the distinction introduced in the last Sutra 
('when departing') thus has no meaning. The text on 
which Aiu/ulomi relies, ' Having risen from this body,' &c, 
does not declare that that which previously was not 
Brahman becomes such at the time of departure, but rather 
that the true nature of the soul which had previously existed 
already becomes manifest at the time of departure. This 
will be explained under IV, 4, 1. 

The theories stated in the two preceding Sutras thus 
having been found untenable, the teacher Klfakrz'tsna states 
his own view, to the effect that words denoting the £-iva are 
applied to Brahman because Brahman abides as its Self 
within the individual soul which thus constitutes Brahman's 
body. This theory rests on a number of well-known texts, 
' Entering into them with this living (individual) soul let 
me evolve names and forms ' (KA. Up. VI, 3, a) ; * He who 
dwelling within the Self, &c, whose body the Self is,' &c. 
(Br/. Up. Ill, 7, zz) ; ' He who moves within the Imperish- 
able, of whom the Imperishable is the body,' &c. ; 
' Entered within, the ruler of beings, the Self of all.' 
That the term '^tva' denotes not only the ^!va itself, 
but extends in its denotation up to the highest Self, 
we have explained before when discussing the text, 
' Let me evolve names and forms.' On this view of the 
identity of the individual and the highest Self con- 
sisting in their being related to each other as body and 
soul, we can accept in their full and unmutilated meaning 
all scriptural texts whatever — whether they proclaim the 
perfection and omniscience of the highest Brahman, or 
teach how the individual soul steeped in ignorance and 
misery is to be saved through meditation on Brahman, 
or describe the origination and reabsorption of the world, 
or aim at showing how the world is identical with 
Brahman. For this reason the author of the Sutras, 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 22. 395 

rejecting other views, accepts the theory of Klrakrttsna. 
Returning to the Maitreyl-brahmawa we proceed to explain 
the general sense, from the passage previously discussed 
onwards. Being questioned by Maitreyt as to the means 
of immortality, Ya£*avalkya teaches her that this means 
is given in meditation on the highest Self (' The Self is to 
be seen,' &c). He next indicates in a general way the 
nature of the object of meditation (' When the Self is seen,' 
&c), and — availing himself of the similes of the drum, &c. — 
of the government over the organs, mind) and so on, which 
are instrumental towards meditation. He then explains 
in detail that the object of meditation, i.e. the highest 
Brahman, is the sole cause of the entire world ; and the 
ruler of the aggregate of organs on which there depends 
all activity with regard to the objects of the senses (' As 
clouds of smoke proceed,' &c. ; ' As the ocean is the home 
of all the waters'). He, next, in order to stimulate the 
effort which leads to immortality, shows how the highest 
Self abiding in the form of the individual Self, is of one 
uniform character, viz. that of limitless intelligence ('As 
a lump of salt,' &c), and how that same Self characterised 
by homogeneous limitless intelligence connects itself in the 
Sawsara state with the products of the elements (' a mass 
of knowledge, it rises from those elements and again 
vanishes into them '). He then adds, • When he has 
departed, there is no more knowledge ' ; meaning that 
in the state of Release, where the soul's unlimited essential 
intelligence is not contracted in any way, there is none 
of those specific cognitions by which the Self identifying 
itself with the body, the sense-organs, &c, views itself 
as a man or a god, and so on. Next — in the passage, ' For 
where there is duality as it were' — he, holding that the 
view of a plurality of things not having their Self in 
Brahman is due to ignorance, shows that for him who has 
freed himself from the shackles of ignorance and recognises 
this whole world as animated by Brahman, the view of 
plurality is dispelled by the recognition of the absence 
of any existence apart from Brahman. He then proceeds, 
' He by whom he knows all this, by what means should 



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396 vedAnta-sOtras. 



he know Him?' This means — He, i.e. the highest Self, 
which abiding within the individual soul as its true 
Self bestows on it the power of knowledge so that the soul 
knows all this through the highest Self; by what means 
should the soul know Him? In other words, there is no. 
such means of knowledge : the highest Self cannot be fully 
understood by the individual soul. ' That Self,' he 
continues, • is to be expressed as — not so, not so 1 ' That 
means — He, the highest Lord, different in nature from 
everything else, whether sentient or non-sentient, abides 
within all beings as their Self, and hence is not touched 
by the imperfections of what constitutes his body merely. 
He then concludes, ' Whereby should he know the Knower? 
Thus, O Maitreyt, thou hast been instructed. Thus far 
goes Immortality' ; the purport of these words being — By 
what means, apart from the meditation described, should 
man know Him who is different in nature from all other 
beings, who is the sole cause of the entire world, who 
is the Knower of all, Him the Supreme Person? It is 
meditation on Him only which shows the road to Immor- 
tality. It thus appears that the Maitreyl-brahmawa is 
concerned with the highest Brahman only; and this 
confirms the conclusion that Brahman only, and with it 
Prakr*'ti as ruled by Brahman, is the cause of the world.— 
Here terminates the adhikarawa of 'the connexion of 
sentences.' 

23-. (Brahman is) the material cause on account 
of this not being in conflict with the promissory 
statements and the illustrative instances. 

The claims raised by the atheistic Sankhya having thus 
been disposed of, the theistic Sankhya comes forward as an 
opponent It must indeed be admitted, he says, that the 
Vedanta-texts teach the cause of the world to be an all- 
knowing Lord; for they attribute to that cause thought 
and similar characteristics. But at the same time we leam 
from those same texts that the material cause of the world 
is none other than the Pradhana ; with an all-knowing, un- 
changing superintending Lord they connect a Pradhana, 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 23. 397 

ruled by him, which is non-intelligent and undergoes 
changes, and the two together only they represent as the 
cause of the world. This view is conveyed by the following 
texts, 'who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, 
without fault, without taint' (.Svet. Up. VI, 18); 'This 
great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25) ; 
' He knows her who produces all effects, the non-knowing 
one, the unborn one, wearing eight forms, the firm one. 
Ruled by him she is spread out, and incited and guided by 
him gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls. 
A cow she is without beginning and end, a mother pro- 
ducing all beings' (see above, p. 363). That the Lord 
creates this world in so far only as guiding PrakrAi, the 
material cause, we learn from the following text, 'From 
that the Lord of Maya creates all this. Know Maya to be 
Prak^ti and the Lord of Maya the great Lord' (.Svet. 
Up. IV, 9, 10). And similarly Smn'ti, * with me as super- 
visor Prakrtti brings forth the Universe of the movable and 
the immovable' (Bha. G!. IX, 10). Although, therefore, 
the Pradhana is not expressly stated by Scripture to be 
the material cause, we must assume that there is such 
a Pradhana and that, superintended by the Lord, it con- 
stitutes the material cause, because otherwise the texts 
declaring Brahman to be the cause of the world would not 
be fully intelligible. For ordinary experience shows us on 
all sides that the operative cause and. the material cause 
are quite distinct : we invariably have on the one side clay, 
gold, and other material substances which form the material 
causes of pots, ornaments, and so on, and on the other 
hand, distinct from them, potters, goldsmiths, and so on, 
who act as operative causes. And we further observe that 
the production of effects invariably requires several in- 
strumental agencies. The Vedanta-texts therefore cannot 
possess the strength to convince us, in open defiance of 
the two invariable rules, that the one Brahman is at 
the same time the material and the operative cause of the 
world ; and hence we maintain that Brahman is only the 
operative but not the material cause, while the material cause 
is the Pradhana guided by Brahman. 



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398 vedanta-sOtras. 



This prim& fade view the Sutra combats. Prakriti, i. e. the 
material cause, not only the operative cause, is Brahman 
only ; this view being in harmony with the promissory 
declaration and the illustrative instances. The promissory 
declaration is the one referring to the knowledge of all 
things through the knowledge of one, ' Did you ever ask for 
that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes 
heard ? ' &c. {Kh. Up. VI, i, 3). And the illustrative in- 
stances are those which set forth the knowledge of the 
effect as resulting from the knowledge of the cause, ' As by 
one lump of clay there is made known all that is made of 
clay ; as by one nugget of gold, &c. ; as by one instrument 
for paring the nails,' &c. {Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4). If Brahman 
were merely the operative cause of the world, the know- 
ledge of the entire world would not result from the knowledge 
of Brahman ; not any more than we know the pot when we 
know the potter. And thus scriptural declaration and 
illustrative instances would be stultified. But if Brahman 
is the general material cause, then the knowledge of Brah- 
man implies the knowledge of its effect, i. e. the world, in 
the same way as the knowledge of such special material 
causes as a lump of clay, a nugget of gold, an instrument 
for paring the nails, implies the knowledge of all things 
made of clay, gold or iron — such as pots, bracelets, diadems, 
hatchets, and so on. For an effect is not a substance 
different from its cause, but the cause itself which has 
passed into a different state. The initial declaration thus 
being confirmed by the instances of clay and its products, &c, 
which stand in the relation of cause and effect, we conclude 
that Brahman only is the material cause of the world. 
That Scripture teaches the operative and the material 
causes to be separate, is not true ; it rather teaches the 
unity of the two. For in the text, ' Have you asked for 
that adera (above, and generally, understood to mean 
" instruction "), by which that which is not heard becomes 
heard ? ' the word ' adera ' has to be taken to mean ruler ; 
in agreement with the text, ' by the command— or rule — of 
that Imperishable sun and moon stand apart ' (B«. Up. Ill, 
8, 9), so that the passage means, ' Have you asked for that 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 23. 399 

Ruler by whom, when heard and known, even that which is 
not heard and known, becomes heard and known ? ' This 
clearly shows the unity of the operative (ruling or super- 
vising) cause and the material cause ; taken in conjunction 
with the subsequent declaration of the unity of the cause 
previous to creation, ' Being only, this was in the beginning, 
one only,' and the denial of a further operative cause implied 
in the further qualification ' advitiyam,' i.e. 'without a 
second.' — But how then have we to understand texts such 
as the one quoted above (from the A!"ulika-Upanishad) 
which declare Prakrtti to be eternal and the material cause 
of the world ? — Prakrtti, we reply, in such passages denotes 
Brahman in its causal phase when names and forms are not 
yet distinguished. For a principle independent of Brahman 
does not exist, as we know from texts such as ' Everything 
abandons him who views anything as apart from the Self ; 
and ' But where for him the Self has become all, whereby 
should he see whom?' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6 ; 15). Consider 
also the texts, ' All this is Brahman ' (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1) ; 
and 'All this has its Self in that' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); 
which declare that the world whether in its causal or its 
effected condition has Brahman for its Self. The re- 
lation of the world to Brahman has to be conceived in 
agreement with scriptural texts such as ' He who moves 
within the earth,' &c, up to ' He who moves within 
the Imperishable ' ; and ' He who dwells within the 
earth,' &c, up to ' He who dwells within the Self (Bri. 
Up. Ill, 7, 3-23). The highest Brahman, having the 
whole aggregate of non-sentient and sentient beings for its 
body, ever is the Self of all. Sometimes, however, names 
and forms are not evolved, not distinguished in Brahman ; 
at other times they are evolved, distinct. In the latter 
state Brahman is called an effect and manifold ; in the 
former it is called one, without a second, the cause. This 
causal state of Brahman is meant where the text quoted 
above speaks of the cow without beginning and end, giving 
birth to effects, and so on. — But, the text, ' The great one 
is merged in the Unevolved, the Unevolved is merged in 
the Imperishable,' intimates that the Unevolved originates 



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40o vedAnta-sOtras. 



and again passes away; and similarly the Mahabharata 
says, ' from that there sprung the Non-evolved comprising 
the three gunas ; the Non-evolved is merged in the in- 
divisible Person.' — These texts, we reply, present no real 
difficulty. For Brahman having non-sentient matter for its 
body, that state which consists of the three gunas and is 
denoted by the term ' Unevolved ' is something effected. 
And the text, ' When there was darkness, neither day nor 
night,' states that also in a total pralaya non-sentient 
matter having Brahman for its Self continues to exist in 
a highly subtle condition. This highly subtle matter stands 
to Brahman the cause of the world in the relation of a 
mode (prakara), and it is Brahman viewed as having such 
a mode that the text from the ATul. Upanishad refers to. 
For this reason also the text, ' the Imperishable is merged 
in darkness, darkness becomes one with the highest God,' 
declares not that darkness is completely merged and lost 
in the Divinity but only that it becomes one with it ; what 
the text wants to intimate is that state of Brahman in 
which, having for its mode extremely subtle matter here 
called 'Darkness,' it abides without evolving names and 
forms. The mantra, ' There was darkness, hidden in dark- 
ness,' &c. (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 3), sets forth the same 
view ; and so does Manu (I, 5), ' This universe existed 
in the shape of Darkness, unperceived, destitute of dis- 
tinctive marks, unattainable by reasoning, unknowable, 
wholly immersed as it were in deep sleep.' And, as to the 
text, ' from that the Lord of Maya creates everything,' we 
shall prove later on the unchangeableness of Brahman, and 
explain the scriptural texts asserting it. 

As to the contention raised by the Purvapakshin that on 
the basis of invariable experience it must be held that one 
and the same principle cannot be both material and opera- 
tive cause, and that effects cannot be brought about by one 
agency, and that hence the Vedanta-texts can no more 
establish the view of Brahman being the sole cause than 
the command ' sprinkle with fire ' will convince us that fire 
may perform the office of water ; we simply remark that 
the highest Brahman which totally differs in nature from 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 25. 401 

all other beings, which is omnipotent and omniscient, can 
by itself accomplish everything. The invariable rule of 
experience holds good, on the other hand, with regard to 
clay and similar materials which are destitute of intelligence 
and hence incapable of guiding and supervising ; and with 
regard to potters and similar agents who do not possess the 
power of transforming themselves into manifold products, 
and cannot directly realise their intentions. — The con- 
clusion therefore remains that Brahman alone is the material 
as well as the operative cause of the Universe. 

24. And on account of the statement of reflection. 
Brahman must be held to be both causes for that reason 

also that texts such as ' He desired, may I be many, may 
I grow forth,' and ' It thought, may I be many, may I grow 
forth,' declare that the creative Brahman forms the purpose 
of its own Self multiplying itself. The text clearly teaches 
that creation on Brahman's part is preceded by the pur- 
pose ' May I, and no other than I, become manifold in the 
shape of various non-sentient and sentient beings.' 

25. And on account of both being directly 
declared. 

The conclusion arrived at above is based not only on 
scriptural declaration, illustrative instances and statements 
of reflection ; but in addition Scripture directly states that 
Brahman alone is the material as well as operative cause 
of the world. • What was the wood, what the tree from 
which they have shaped heaven and earth? You wise 
ones, search in your minds, whereon it stood, supporting 
the worlds. — Brahman was the wood, Brahman the tree 
from which they shaped heaven and earth ; you wise ones, 
I tell you, it stood on Brahman, supporting the worlds.' — 
Here a question is asked, suggested by the ordinary 
worldly view, as to what was the material and instruments 
used by Brahman when creating ; and the answer — based 
on the insight that there is nothing unreasonable in ascrib- 
ing all possible powers to Brahman which differs from all 
other beings — declares that Brahman itself is the material 
[48] d d 



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402 vedAnta-sOtras. 



and the instruments; — whereby the ordinary view is 
disposed of. — The next Sutra supplies a further reason. 

26. On account of (the Self) making itself. 

Of Brahman which the text had introduced as intent on 
creation, 'He wished, may I be many' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), 
a subsequent text says, ' That itself made its Self (II, 7), 
so that Brahman is represented as the object as well as the 
agent in the act of creation. It being the Self only which 
here is made many, we understand that the Self is material 
cause as well as operative one. The Self with names and 
forms non-evolved is agent (cause), the same Self with 
names and forms evolved is object (effect). There is 
thus nothing contrary to reason in one Self being object 
as well as agent. 

A new doubt here presents itself. — ' The True, knowledge, 
infinite is Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ; ' Bliss is Brahman ' 
(Br*. Up. Ill, 9, 28); 'Free from sin, free from old age, 
free from death and grief, free from hunger and thirst' 
(Kk. Up. VIII, 1, 5); 'Without parts, without action, 
tranquil, without fault, without taint ' (Svet. Up. VI, 19) ; 
* This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying ' (Bri. Up. 
IV, 4, 25) — from all these texts it appears that Brahman 
is essentially free from even a shadow Of all the imperfec- 
tions which afflict all sentient and non-sentient beings, and 
has for its only characteristics absolutely supreme bliss 
and knowledge. How then is it possible that this Brahman 
should form the purpose of becoming, and actually become, 
manifold, by appearing in the form of a world comprising 
various sentient and non-sentient beings — all of which are 
the abodes of all kinds of imperfections and afflictions? 
To this question the next Sutra replies. 

27. Owing to modification. 

This means — owing to the essential nature of modifica- 
tion (pariwama). The modification taught in our system is 
not such as to introduce imperfections into the highest 
Brahman, on the contrary it confers on it limitless glory. 
For our teaching as to Brahman's modification is as follows. 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 27. 403 

Brahman — essentially antagonistic to all evil, of uniform 
goodness, differing in nature from all beings other than 
itself, all-knowing, endowed with the power of immediately 
realising all its purposes, in eternal possession of all it 
wishes for, supremely blessed — has for its body the entire 
universe, with all its sentient and non-sentient beings — the 
universe being for it a plaything as it were — and con- 
stitutes the Self of the Universe. Now, when this world 
which forms Brahman's body has been gradually reabsorbed 
into Brahman, each constituent element being refunded 
into its immediate cause, so that in the end there remains 
only the highly subtle, elementary matter which Scripture 
calls Darkness; and when this so-called Darkness itself, 
by assuming a form so extremely subtle that it hardly 
deserves to be called something separate from Brahman, 
of which it constitutes the body, has become one with 
Brahman; then Brahman invested with this ultra-subtle 
body forms the resolve ' May I again possess a world-body 
constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings, dis- 
tinguished by names and forms just as in the previous 
aeon,' and modifies (pariwamayati) itself by gradually 
evolving the world-body in the inverse order in which 
reabsorption had taken place. 

All Vedanta-texts teach such modification or change on 
Brahman's part. There is, e.g., the text in the Brjhad- 
Arawyaka which declares that the whole world constitutes 
the body of Brahman and that Brahman is its Self. That 
text teaches that earth, water, fire, sky, air, heaven, sun, 
the regions, moon and stars, ether, darkness, light, all 
beings, breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge 
form the body of Brahman which abides within them as 
their Self and Ruler. Thus in the K4«va-text; the 
Madhyandina-text reads ' the Self ' instead of ' knowledge ' ; 
and adds the worlds, sacrifices and vedas. The parallel 
passage in the Subala-Upanishad adds to the beings 
enumerated as constituting Brahman's body in the Brmad- 
Arawyaka, buddhi, ahamkara, the mind (£itta), the Un- 
evolved (avyakta), the Imperishable (akshara), and concludes 
' He who moves within death, of whom death is the body, 

Dd2 



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404 vedAnta-sCtras. 



whom death does not know, he is the inner Self of all, 
free from all evil, divine, the one god Narayawa.' The 
term ' Death ' here denotes matter in its extremely subtle 
form, which in other texts is called Darkness ; as we infer 
from the order of enumeration in another passage in the 
same Upanishad, ' the Unevolved is merged in the Imperish- 
able, the Imperishable in Darkness.' That this Darkness 
is called 'Death' is due to the fact that it obscures the 
understanding of all souls and thus is harmful to them. 
The full text in the Sub&la-Up. declaring the successive 
absorption of all the beings forming Brahman's body is 
as follows, 'The earth is merged in water, water in fire, 
fire in air, air in the ether, the ether in the sense-organs, 
the sense-organs in the tanmatras, the tanmatras in the 
gross elements, the gross elements in the great principle, 
the great principle in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the 
Imperishable ; the Imperishable is merged in Darkness ; 
Darkness becomes one with the highest Divinity.' That 
even in the state of non-separation (to which the texts refer 
as ' becoming one ') non-sentient matter as well as sentient 
beings, together with the impressions of their former deeds, 
persists in an extremely subtle form, will be shown under 
II, 1, 35. We have thus a Brahman all-knowing, of the 
nature of supreme bliss and so on, one and without 
a second, having for its body all sentient and non-sentient 
beings abiding in an extremely subtle condition and having 
become 'one' with the Supreme Self in so far as they 
cannot be designated as something separate from him ; and 
of this Brahman Scripture records that it forms the resolve 
of becoming many — in so far, namely, as investing itself 
with a body consisting of all sentient and non-sentient 
beings in their gross, manifest state which admits of 
distinctions of name and form — and thereupon modifies 
(parmama) itself into the form of the world. This is dis- 
tinctly indicated in the Taittiriya- Upanishad, where Brahman 
is at first described as ' The True, knowledge, infinite,' as 
'the Self of bliss which is different from the Self of 
Understanding,' as ' he who bestows bliss ' ; and where 
the text further on says, ' He desired, may I be many, may 



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i adhvAya, 4 pAda, 27. 405 

I grow forth. He brooded over himself, and having thus 
brooded he sent forth all whatever there is. Having sent 
forth he entered it. Having entered it he became sat and 
tyat, defined and undefined, supported and non-supported, 
knowledge and non-knowledge, real and unreal.' The 
' brooding ' referred to in this text denotes knowing, viz. 
reflection on the shape and character of the previous world 
which Brahman is about to reproduce. Compare the text 
'whose brooding consists of knowledge' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9). 
The meaning therefore is that Brahman, having an inward 
intuition of the characteristics of the former world, creates 
the new world on the same pattern. That Brahman in all 
kalpas again and again creates the same world is generally 
known from 5ruti and Sm«ti. Cp. ' As the creator formerly 
made sun and moon, and sky and earth, and the atmo- 
sphere and the heavenly world,' and ' whatever various signs 
of the seasons are seen in succession, the same appear again 
and again in successive yugas and kalpas.' 

The sense of the Taittiriya-text therefore is as follows. 
The highest Self, which in itself is of the nature of unlimited 
knowledge and bliss, has for its body all sentient and 
non-sentient beings — instruments of sport for him as it 
were — in so subtle a form that they may be called non- 
existing; and as they are his body he may be said to 
consist of them (tan-maya). Then desirous of providing 
himself with an infinity of playthings of all kinds he, 
by a series of steps beginning with Prakn'ti and the 
aggregate of souls and leading down to the elements in 
their gross state, so modifies himself as to have those 
elements for his body — when he is said to consist of 
them — and thus appears in the form of our world con- 
taining what the text denotes as sat and tyat, i.e. all 
intelligent and non-intelligent things, from gods down to 
plants and stones. When the text says that the Self 
having entered into it became sat and tyat, the meaning 
is that the highest Self, which in its causal state had been 
the universal Self, abides, in its effected state also, as the 
Self of the different substances undergoing changes and 
thus becomes this and that While the highest Self thus 



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406 vedAnta-sCtras. 



undergoes a change — in the form of a world comprising the 
whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings— all 
imperfection and suffering are limited to the sentient beings 
constituting part of its body, and all change is restricted to 
the non-sentient things which constitute another part. The 
highest Self is effected in that sense only that it is the 
ruling principle, and hence the Self, of matter and souls 
in their gross or evolved state ; but just on account of 
being this, viz. their inner Ruler and Self, it is in no way 
touched by their imperfections and changes. Consisting of 
unlimited knowledge and bliss he for ever abides in his 
uniform nature, engaged in the sport of making this world 
go round. This is the purport of the clause ' it became the 
real and the unreal ' : although undergoing a change into 
the multiplicity of actual sentient and non-sentient things, 
Brahman at the same time was the Real, i. e. that which is 
free from all shadow of imperfection, consisting of nothing 
but pure knowledge and bliss. That all beings, sentient 
and non-sentient, and whether in their non-evolved or 
evolved states, are mere playthings of Brahman, and that 
the creation and reabsorption of the world are only his 
sport, this has been expressly declared by Dvaipayana, 
Parajara and other Hishis, ' Know that all transitory beings, 
from the Unevolved down to individual things, are a mere 
play of Hari ' ; ' View his action like that of a playful 
child,' &c. The Sutrakara will distinctly enounce the 
same view in II, i, 33. With a similar view the text 
' from that the Lord of Maya sends forth all this ; and in 
that the other is bound by Maya' (Svet Up. IV, 9), 
refers to Prakrtti and soul, which together constitute the 
body of Brahman, as things different from Brahman, 
although then, i. e. at the time of a pralaya, they are one 
with Brahman in so far as their extreme subtlety does not 
admit of their being conceived as separate ; this it does to 
the end of suggesting that even when Brahman undergoes 
the change into the shape of this world, all changes ex- 
clusively belong to non-sentient matter which is a mode 
of Brahman, and all imperfections and sufferings to the 
individual souls which also are modes of Brahman. The 



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i adhyAya, 4 pAda, 29. 407 

text has to be viewed as agreeing in meaning with ' that 
Self made itself.' Of a similar purport is the account given 
in Manu, ' He being desirous to send forth from his body 
beings of many kinds, first with a thought created the 
waters and placed his seed in them ' (I, 8). 

It is in this way that room is found for those texts also 
which proclaim Brahman to be free from all imperfection 
and all change. It thus remains a settled conclusion that 
Brahman by itself constitutes the material as well as the 
operative cause of the world. 

28. And because it is called the womb. 
Brahman is the material as well as the operative cause 

of the world for that reason also that certain texts call it 
the womb, 'the maker, the Lord, the Person, Brahman, 
the womb ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 3) ; ' that which the wise 
regard as the womb of all beings' (I, 1, 6). And that 
'womb' means as much as material cause, appears from 
the complementary passage 'As a spider sends forth and 
draws in its threads ' (I, 1, 7). 

29. Herewith all (texts) are explained, explained. 

Hereby, i. e. by the whole array of arguments set forth 
in the four padas of the first adhyaya ; all those particular 
passages of the Ved^nta-texts which give instruction as to 
the cause of the world, are explained as meaning to set 
forth a Brahman all-wise, all-powerful, different in nature 
from all beings intelligent and non-intelligent The repeti- 
tion of the word ' explained ' is meant to indicate the 
termination of the adhyaya. 



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SECOND ADHYAYA. 

FIRST PADA. 

i. If it be said that there would result the fault 
of there being no room for (certain) Smrctis : (we 
reply) ' no,' because there would result the fault of 
want of room for other Snwztis. 

The first adhyaya has established the truth that what 
the Vedanta-texts teach is a Supreme Brahman, which is 
something different as well from non-sentient matter known 
through the ordinary means of proof, viz. Perception and 
so on, as from the intelligent souls whether connected 
with or separated from matter ; which is free from even 
a shadow of imperfection of any kind ; which is an ocean as 
it were of auspicious qualities and so on ; which is the sole 
cause of the entire Universe ; which constitutes the inner 
Self of all things. The second adhyaya is now begun for the 
purpose of proving that the view thus set forth cannot be 
impugned by whatever arguments may possibly be brought 
forward. The Sutrakara at first turns against those who 
maintain that the Vedanta-texts do not establish the view 
indicated above, on the ground of that view being contra- 
dicted by the Smr*ti of Kapila, i. e. the Sankhya-system. 

But how can it be maintained at all that Scripture does 
not set forth a certain view because thereby it would 
enter into conflict with Smrx'ti? For that Smrzti if con- 
tradicted by Scripture is to be held of no account, is 
already settled in the Purva Mlmawsa (' But Where there 
is contradiction Smrrti is not to be regarded,' I, 3, 3). — 
Where, we reply, a matter can be definitely settled on the 
basis of Scripture — as e.g. in the case of the Vedic in- 
junction, ' he is to sing, after having touched the ILAimbara 
branch' (which clearly contradicts the Smn'ti injunction 
that the whole branch is to be covered up) — Smrt'ti indeed 



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ii adhyAya, i pAda, i. 409 

need not be regarded. But the topic with which the Vedanta- 
texts are concerned is hard to understand, and hence, when 
a conflict arises between those texts and a Smrtti pro- 
pounded by some great Rishi, the matter does not admit 
of immediate decisive settlement : it is not therefore un- 
reasonable to undertake to prove by Smrtti that Scripture 
does not set forth a certain doctrine. That is to say — we 
possess a Smrtti composed with a view to teach men the 
nature and means of supreme happiness, by the great 
Rishi Kapila to whom Scripture, Smrtti, Itihasa and 
Purawa alike refer as a person worthy of all respect 
(compare e. g. 'the Rishi Kapila,' Svet Up. V, a), and 
who moreover (unlike Brthaspati and other Smrt'ti-writers) 
fully acknowledges the validity of all the means of earthly 
happiness which are set forth in the karmaka«<fe of the 
Veda, such as the daily oblations to the sacred fires, the 
New and Full Moon offerings and the great Soma 
sacrifices. Now, as men having only an imperfect 
knowledge of the Veda, and moreover naturally slow- 
minded, can hardly ascertain the sense of the Vedanta- 
texts without the assistance of such a Smrz'ti, and as to 
be satisfied with that sense of the Vedanta which discloses 
itself on a mere superficial study of the text would imply 
the admission that the whole Sankhya Smrtti, although 
composed by an able and trustworthy person, really is 
useless ; we see ourselves driven to acknowledge that the 
doctrine of the Vedanta-texts cannot differ from the one 
established by the Sankhyas. Nor must you object that 
to do so would force on us another unacceptable con- 
clusion, viz. that those Smrttis, that of Manu e. g., which 
maintain Brahman to be the universal cause, are destitute 
of authority; for Manu and similar works inculcate 
practical religious duty and thus have at any rate 
the uncontested function of supporting the teaching of 
the karmaka»</a of the Veda. The Sankhya Smrtti, on 
the other hand, is entirely devoted to the setting forth of 
theoretical truth (not of practical duty), and if it is not 
accepted in that quality, it is of no use whatsoever. — 
On this ground the Sutra sets forth the prima facie view, 



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4io vedAnta-sOtras. 



' If it be said that there results the fault of there being no 
room for certain SmWtis.' 

The same Sutra replies ' no ; because there would result 
the fault of want of room for other Smrjtis.' For other 
Smr/tis, that of Manu e.g., teach that Brahman is the 
universal cause. Thus Manu says, ' This (world) existed 
in the shape of darkness, and so on. Then the divine 
Self existent, indiscernible but making discernible all this, 
the great elements and the rest, appeared with irresistible 
power, dispelling the darkness. He, desiring to produce 
beings of many kinds from his own body, first with a 
thought created the waters, and placed his seed in them ' 
(Manu I, 5-8). And the Bhagavad-gita, ' I am the origin 
and the dissolution of the whole Universe ' (VII, 6). 
' I am the origin of all ; everything proceeds from me ' 
(X, 8). Similarly, in the Mahabharata, to the question 
'Whence was created this whole world with its movable 
and immovable beings ? ' the answer is given, ' Naraya«a 
assumes the form of the world, he the infinite, eternal one ' ; 
and ' from him there originates the Unevolved consisting 
of the three gu«as ' ; and ' the Unevolved is merged in 
the non-acting Person.' And Parajara says, ' From Vishwu 
there sprang the world and in him it abides; he makes 
this world persist and he rules it — he is the world.' Thus 
also Apastamba, ' The living beings are the dwelling of 
him who lies in all caves, who is not killed, who is 
spotless. ' ; apd ' From him spring all bodies ; he is the 
primary cause, he is eternal, permanent ' (Dharmasu. I, 8, 
22, 4 ; »3, a). — If the question as to the meaning of the 
Vedanta-texts were to be settled by means of Kapila's 
Smnti, we should have to accept the extremely undesirable 
conclusion that all the Smri'tis quoted are of no authority. 
It is true that the Vedanta-texts are concerned with 
theoretical truth lying outside the sphere of Perception 
and the other means of knowledge, and that hence students 
possessing only a limited knowledge of the Veda require 
some help in order fully to make out the meaning of the 
Vedanta. But what must be avoided in this case is to 
give any opening for the conclusion that the very numerous 



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n adhyAya, i pAda, i. 411 

Smn'tis which closely follow the doctrine of the Vedanta, 
are composed by the most competent and trustworthy 
persons and aim at supporting that doctrine, are irrelevant ; 
and it is for this reason that Kapila's SmWti which contains 
a doctrine opposed to Scripture must be disregarded. The 
support required is elucidation of the sense conveyed by 
Scripture, and this clearly cannot be effected by means 
of a Smrrti contradicting Scripture. Nor is it of any avail 
to plead, as the Purvapakshin does, that Manu and other 
Smrztis of the same kind fulfil in any case the function of 
elucidating the acts of religious duty enjoined in the 
karmakawrfa. For if they enjoin acts of religious duty 
as means to win the favour of the Supreme Person but 
do not impress upon us the idea of that Supreme Person 
himself who is to be pleased by those acts, they are also 
not capable of impressing upon us the idea of those acts 
themselves. That it is the character of all religious acts 
to win the favour of the Supreme Spirit, Smrj'ti distinctly 
declares, ' Man attains to perfection by worshipping with 
his proper action Him from whom all Beings proceed ; 
and by whom all this is stretched out* (Bha. Gl. XVIII, 
46) ; ' Let a man meditate on Narayawa, the divine one, 
at all works, such as bathing and the like ; he will then 
reach the world of Brahman and not return hither' 
(Daksha-smriti) ; and ' Those men with whom, intent on 
their duties, thou art pleased, O Lord, they pass beyond 
all this Maya and find Release for their souls' (Vi. Pu.). 
Nor can it be said that Manu and similar Smrt'tis have 
a function in so far as setting forth works (not aiming 
at final Release but) bringing about certain results 
included in transmigratory existence, whether here on 
earth or in a heavenly world ; for the essential character 
of those works also is to please the highest Person. As 
is said in the Bhagavad-gltl (IX, 23, 34); 'Even they 
who devoted to other gods worship them with faith, 
worship me, against ordinance. For I am the enjoyer 
and the Lord of all sacrifices ; but they know me not in 
truth and hence they fall,' and ' Thou art ever worshipped 
by me with sacrifices ; thou alone, bearing the form of 



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412 vedAnta-sCtras. 



pttrts and of gods, enjoyest all the offerings made to 
either.' Nor finally can we admit the contention that 
it is rational to interpret the Vedanta-texts in accordance 
with Kapila's Smrtti because Kapila, in the .SvetiLrvatara 
text, is referred to as a competent person. For from 
this it would follow that, as IWhaspati is, in 5ruti and 
Smrz'ti, mentioned as a pattern of consummate wisdom, 
Scripture should be interpreted in agreement with the 
openly materialistic and atheistic Smrtti composed by 
that authority. — But, it may here be said, the Vedanta- 
texts should after all be interpreted in agreement with 
Kapila's Smrtti, for the reason that Kapila had through 
the power of his concentrated meditation (yoga) arrived 
at an insight into truth. — To this objection the next Sutra 
replies. 

2. And on account of the non-perception (of truth 
on the part) of others. 

The ' and ' in the Sutra has the force of ' but,' being 
meant to dispel the doubt raised. There are many other 
authors of Smn'tis, such as Manu, who through the power 
of their meditation had attained insight into the highest 
truth, and of whom it is known from Scripture that the 
purport of their teaching was a salutary medicine to the 
whole world ('whatever Manu said that was medicine'). 
Now, as these Rishis did not see truth in the way of 
Kapila, we conclude that Kapila's view, which contradicts 
Scripture, is founded on error, and cannot therefore be 
used to modify the sense of the Vedanta-texts. — Here 
finishes the adhikarawa treating of ' Smrtti.' 

3. Hereby the Yoga is refuted. 

By the above refutation of Kapila's Smr/tt the Yoga- 
smrj'ti also is refuted. — But a question arises, What further 
doubt arises here with regard to the Yoga system, so as to 
render needful the formal extension to the Yoga of the 
arguments previously set forth against the Sankhya? — It 
might appear, we reply, that the Vedanta should be sup- 
ported by the Yoga-smrAi, firstly, because the latter admits 



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n adhyAya, i pAda, 4. 413 

the existence of a Lord ; secondly, because the Vedanta- 
texts mention Yoga as a means to bring about final Release ; 
and thirdly, because Hirawyagarbha, who proclaimed the 
Yoga-smnti, is qualified for the promulgation of all Vedanta- 
texts. — But these arguments refute themselves as follows. 
In the first place the Yoga holds the Pradhana, which is 
independent of Brahman, to be the general material cause, 
and hence the Lord acknowledged by it is a mere operative 
cause. In the second place the nature of meditation, in 
which Yoga consists, is determined by the nature of the 
object of meditation, and as of its two objects, viz. the soul 
and the Lord, the former does not have its Self in Brahman, 
and the latter is neither the cause of the world nor en- 
dowed with the other auspicious qualities (which belong to 
Brahman), the Yoga is not of Vedic character. And as to 
the third point, Hiranyagarbha himself is only an indi- 
vidual soul, and hence liable to be overpowered by the 
inferior guwas, i. e. passion and darkness ,* and hence the 
Yoga-smriti is founded on error, no less than the Puranas, 
promulgated by him, which are founded on ra^as and 
tamas. The Yoga cannot, therefore, be used for the sup- 
port of the Vedanta. — Here finishes the adhikarana of ' the 
refutation of the Yoga.' 

4. Not, on account of the difference of character 
of that ; and its being such (appears) from Scripture. 

The same opponent who laid stress on the conflict 
between Scripture and Smrs'ti now again comes forward, 
relying this time (not on Smrz'ti but) on simple reasoning. 
Your doctrine, he says, as to the world being an effect of 
Brahman which you attempted to prove by a refutation 
of the Sankhya Smri'ti shows itself to be irrational for 
the following reason. Perception and the other means of 
knowledge show this world with all its sentient and non- 
sentient beings to be of a non-intelligent and impure 
nature, to possess none of the qualities of the Lord, and to 
have pain for its very essence ; and such a world totally 
differs in nature from the Brahman, postulated by you, 
which is said to be all-knowing, of supreme lordly power, 



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414 vedAnta-sOtras. 



antagonistic to all evil, enjoying unbroken uniform blessed- 
ness. This difference in character of the world from 
Brahman is, moreover, not only known through Percep- 
tion, and so on, but is seen to be directly stated in Scripture 
itself; compare 'Knowledge and non-knowledge' (Taitt. 
Up. II, 6, i) ; ' Thus are these objects placed on the subjects, 
and the subjects on the pra«a' (Kau. Up. Ill, 9); 'On the 
same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his 
own impotence ' (.Svet. Up. IV, 7) ; ' The soul not being 
a Lord is bound because he has to enjoy ' (Svet. Up. I, 8) ; 
and so on ; all which texts refer to the effect, i. e. the 
world as being non-intelligent, of the essence of pain, and 
so on. The general rule is that an effect is non-different 
in character from its cause ; as e. g. pots and bracelets are 
non-different in character from their material causes— clay 
and gold. The world cannot, therefore, be the effect of 
Brahman from which it differs in character, and we hence 
conclude that, in agreement with the Sankhya Smrtti, the 
Pradhana which resembles the actual world in character must 
be assumed to be the general cause. Scripture, although 
not dependent on anything else and concerned with super- 
sensuous objects, must all the same come to terms with 
ratiocination (tarka) ; for all the different means of know- 
ledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a decisive 
conclusion, only if they are supported by ratiocination. 
For by tarka we understand that kind of knowledge 
(intellectual activity) which in the case of any given matter, 
by means of an investigation either into the essential 
nature of that matter or into collateral (auxiliary) factors, 
determines what possesses proving power, and what are the 
special details of the matter under consideration : this kind 
of cognitional activity is also called una. All means of 
knowledge equally stand in need of tarka ; Scripture how- 
ever, the authoritative character of which specially depends 
on expectancy (akanksha), proximity (sannidhi), and com- 
patibility (yogyata), throughout requires to be assisted by 
tarka. In accordance with this Maftu says, ' He who investi- 
gates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty, 
and none other.' It is with a view to such confirmation of 



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ii adhyAya, i pAda, 4. 415 

the sense of Scripture by means of Reasoning that the 
texts declare that certain topics such as the Self must be 
' reflected on ' (mantavya). — Now here it might possibly 
be said that as Brahman is ascertained from Scripture to 
be the sole cause of the world, it must be admitted that 
intelligence exists in the world also, which is an effect of 
Brahman. In the same way as the consciousness of an 
intelligent being is not perceived when it is in the states 
of deep sleep, swoon, &c, so the intelligent nature of jars 
and the like also is not observed, although it really exists ; 
and it is this very difference of manifestation and non- 
manifestation of intelligence on which the distinction of 
intelligent and non-intelligent beings depends. — But to this 
we reply that permanent non-perception of intelligence 
proves its non-existence. This consideration also refutes 
the hypothesis of things commonly called non-intelligent 
possessing the power, or potentiality, of consciousness. 
For if you maintain that a thing possesses the power of 
producing an effect while yet that effect is never and 
nowhere seen to be produced by it, you may as well pro- 
claim at a meeting of sons of barren women that their 
mothers possess eminent procreative power ! Moreover t to 
prove at first from the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the 
material cause of the world, and from this that pots and 
the like possess potential consciousness, and therefrom the 
existence of non-manifested consciousness ; and then, on 
the other hand, to start from the last principle as proved 
and to deduce therefrom that the Vedanta-texts prove 
Brahman to be the material cause of the world, is simply 
to argue in a circle; for that the relation of cause and 
effect should exist between things different in character is 
just what cannot be proved. — What sameness of character, 
again, of causal substance and effects, have you in mind 
when you maintain that from the absence of such same- 
ness it follows that Brahman cannot be proved to be the 
material cause of the world ? It cannot be complete same- 
ness of all attributes, because in that case the relation of 
cause and effect (which after all requires some difference) 
could not be established. For we do not observe that in 



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416 vedAnta-sCtras. 



pots and jars which are fashioned out of a lump of clay 
there persists the quality of ' being a lump ' which belongs 
to the causal substance. And should you say that it 
suffices that there should be equality in some or any 
attribute, we point out that such is actually the case with 
regard to Brahman and the world, both of which have the 
attribute of 'existence' and others. The true state of 
the case rather is as follows. There is equality of nature 
between an effect and a cause, in that sense that those 
essential characteristics by which the causal substance 
distinguishes itself from other things persist in its effects 
also: those characteristic features, e.g., which distinguish 
gold from clay and other materials, persist also in things 
made of gold — bracelets and the like. But applying this 
consideration to Brahman and the world we find that 
Brahman's essential nature is to be antagonistic to all 
evil, and to consist of knowledge, bliss and power, while 
the world's essential nature is to be the opposite of all 
this. Brahman cannot, therefore, be the material cause of 
the world. 

But, it may be objected, we observe that even things of 
different essential characteristics stand to each other in the 
relation of cause and effect. From man, e.g., who is a 
sentient being, there spring nails, teeth, and hair, which are 
non-sentient things ; the sentient scorpion springs from non- 
sentient dung ; and non-sentient threads proceed from the 
sentient spider. — This objection, we reply, is not valid ; for 
in the instances quoted the relation of cause and effect 
rests on the non-sentient elements only (i.e. it is only 
the non-sentient . matter of the body which produces 
nails, &c). 

But, a further objection is raised, Scripture itself declares 
in many places that things generally held to be non-sen- 
tient really possess intelligence ; compare ' to him the earth 
said ' ; ' the water desired '; 'the pra»as quarrelling among 
themselves as to their relative pre-eminence went to Brah- 
man.' And the writers of the Purawas also attribute 
consciousness to rivers, hills, the sea, and so on. Hence 
there is after all no essential difference in nature between 



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, ii adhyAya, i pAda, 6. 417 

sentient and so-called non-sentient beings. — To this ob- 
jection the Purvapakshin replies in the next Sutra. 

5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending 
(deities), on account of distinction and entering. 

The word 'but* is meant to set aside the objection 
started. In texts such as 'to him the earth said,' the 
terms 'earth* and so on, denote the divinities presiding 
over earth and the rest. — How is this known ? — ' Through 
distinction and connexion.' For earth and so on are 
denoted by the distinctive term ' divinities ' ; so e. g. ' Let 
me enter into those three divinities ' {Kh. Up. VI, 3, a), 
where fire, water, and earth are called divinities ; and Kau. 
Up. II, 14, 'AH divinities contending with each other as 
to pre-eminence,' and ' all these divinities having recognised 
pre-eminence in pra«a.' The ' entering ' of the Sutra refers 
to Ait. Ar. II, 4, a, 4, ' Agni having become speech entered 
into the mouth ; Aditya having become sight entered into 
the eyes,' &c, where the text declares that Agni and 
other divine beings entered into the sense-organs as their 
superintendents. 

We therefore adhere to our conclusion that the world, 
being non-intelligent and hence essentially different in 
nature from Brahman, cannot be the effect of Brahman ; 
and that therefore, in agreement with Smrj'ti confirmed 
by reasoning, the Vedanta-texts must be held to teach 
that the Pradhana is the universal material cause. This 
prima facie view is met by the following Sfltra. 

6. But it is seen. 

The ' but' indicates the change of view (introduced in the 
present Sutra). The assertion that Brahman cannot be 
the material cause of the world because the latter differs 
from it in essential nature, is unfounded; since it is a matter 
of observation that even things of different nature stand 
to each other in the relation of cause and effect. For 
it is observed that from honey and similar substances there 
originate worms and other little animals. — But it has been 
said above that in those cases there is sameness of nature, 
[48] e e 



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418 vedAnta-sOtras. 



in so far as the relation of cause and effect holds good 
only between the non-intelligent elements in both J — This 
assertion was indeed made, but it does not suffice to prove 
that equality of character between cause and effect which 
you have in view. For, being apprehensive that from the 
demand of equality of character in some point or other 
only it would follow that, as all things have certain 
characteristics in common, anything might originate from 
anything, you have declared that the equality of character 
necessary for the relation of cause and effect is constituted 
by the persistence, in the effect, of those characteristic 
points which differentiate the cause from other things. 
But it is evident that this restrictive rule does not hold 
good in the case of the origination of worms and the like 
from honey and so on ; and hence it is not unreasonable 
to assume that the world also, although differing in 
character from Brahman, may originate from the latter. 
For in the case of worms originating from honey, scorpions 
from dung, &c, we do not observe — what indeed we do 
observe in certain other cases, as of pots made of clay, 
ornaments made of gold — that the special characteristics 
distinguishing the causal substance from other things 
persist in the effects also. 

7. If it be said that (the effect is) non-existing ; 
we say no, there being a mere denial. 

But, an objection is raised, if Brahman, the cause, differs 
in nature from the effect, viz. the world, this means that 
cause and effect are separate things and that hence the 
effect does not exist in the cause, i. e. Brahman ; and this 
again implies that the world originates from what has 
no existence! — Not so, we reply. For what the preceding 
Sutra has laid down is merely the denial of an absolute 
rule demanding that cause and effect should be of the same 
nature; it was not asserted that the effect is a thing 
altogether different and separate from the cause. We by 
no means abandon our tenet that Brahman the cause 
modifies itself so as to assume the form of a world differing 
from it in character. For such is the case with the honey 



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ii adhyAya, i pAda, 8. 419 

and the worms also. There is difference of characteristics, 
but — as in the case of gold and golden bracelets — there is 
oneness of substance. — An objection is raised. 

8. On account of such consequences in reabsorp- 
tion (the Vedanta-texts would be) inappropriate. 

The term 'reabsorption' here stands as an instance of all 
the states of Brahman, reabsorption, creation, and so on — 
among which it is the first as appears from the texts giving 
instruction about those several states ' Being only was this 
in the beginning ' ; ' The Self only was this in the begin- 
ning.' If we accept the doctrine of the oneness of substance 
of cause and effect, then, absorption, creation, &c. of the 
world all being in Brahman, the different states of the world 
would connect themselves with Brahman, and the latter 
would thus be affected by all the imperfections of its 
effect ; in the same way as all the attributes of the bracelet 
are present in the gold also. And the undesirable conse- 
quence of this would be that contradictory attributes as 
predicated in different Vedanta-texts would have to be 
attributed to one and the same substance ; cp. ' He who 
is all-knowing ' (Mu. Up. 1, 1,9); ' Free from sin, free from 
old age and death ' (Kh. Up. Vlll, 1, 5) ; ' Of him there is 
known neither cause nor effect* (.Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'Of 
these two one eats the sweet fruit ' (.Svet. Up. IV, 6) ; * The 
Self that is not a Lord is bound because he has to enjoy' 
(Svet Up. I, 8) ; ' On account of his impotence he laments, 
bewildered' (.Svet. Up. IV, 7). — Nor can we accept the 
explanation that, as Brahman in its causal as well as its 
effected state has all sentient and non-sentient beings for 
jts body ; and as all imperfections inhere in that body only, 
they do not touch Brahman in either its causal or effected 
state. For it is not possible that the world and Brahman 
should stand to each other in the relation of effect and 
cause, and if it were possible, the imperfections due to 
connexion with a body would necessarily cling to Brahman. 
It is not, we say, possible that the intelligent and non- 
ntelligent beings together should constitute the body of 
Brahman. For a body is a particular aggregate of earth 

E e 2 



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420 vedAnta-sOtras. 



and the other elements, depending for its subsistence on 
vital breath with its five modifications, and serving as an 
abode to the sense-organs which mediate the experiences 
of pleasure and pain retributive of former works : such is 
in Vedic and worldly speech the sense connected with the 
term ' body.' But numerous Vedic texts — ' Free from sin, 
from old age and death' {Kk. Up. VIII, 1); 'Without 
eating the other one looks on ' (.Svet. Up. IV, 6) ; ' Grasping 
without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, 
he hears without ears' (Svet. Up. Ill, 19) ; 'Without breath, 
without mind' (Mu. Up. II, 1, a) — declare that the highest 
Self is free from karman and the enjoyment of its fruits, 
is not capable of enjoyment dependent on sense-organs, 
and has no life dependent on breath: whence it follows that 
he cannot have a body constituted by all the non-sentient 
and sentient beings. Nor can either non-sentient beings 
in their individual forms such as grass, trees, &c, or the 
aggregate of all the elements in their subtle state be viewed 
as the abode of sense-activity (without which they cannot 
constitute a body); nor are the elements in their subtle 
state combined into earth and the other gross elements 
(which again would be required for a body). And sentient 
beings which consist of mere intelligence are of course 
incapable of all this, and hence even less fit to constitute 
a body. Nor may it be said that to have a body merely 
means to be the abode of fruition, and that Brahman may 
possess a body in this latter sense ; for there are abodes 
of fruition, such as palaces and the like, which are not 
considered to be bodies. Nor will it avail, narrowing the 
last definition, to say that that only is an abode of enjoy- 
ment directly abiding in which a being enjoys pain and 
pleasure ; for if a soul enters a body other than its own, 
that body is indeed the abode in which it enjoys the pains 
and pleasures due to such entering, but is not admitted 
to be in the proper sense of the word the body of the soul 
thus entered. In the case of the Lord, on the other hand, 
who is in the enjoyment of self-established supreme bliss, 
it can in no way be maintained that he must be joined 
to a body, consisting of all sentient and non-sentient 



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n adhyAya, i pAda, 9. 421 

beings, for the purpose of enjoyment— That view also 
according to which a ' body ' means no more than a means 
of enjoyment is refuted hereby. 

You wfll now possibly try another definition, viz. that the 
body of a being is constituted by that, the nature, subsistence 
and activity of which depend on the will of that being, and 
that hence a body may be ascribed to the Lord in so far as 
the essential nature, subsistence, and activity of all depend 
on him. — But this also is objectionable; since in the first 
place it is not a fact that the nature of a body depends on 
the will of the intelligent soul joined with it; since, further, 
an injured body does not obey in its movements the will 
of its possessor ; and since the persistence of a dead body 
does not depend on the soul that tenanted it Dancing 
puppets and the like, on the other hand, are things the 
nature, subsistence, and motions of which depend on the 
will of intelligent beings, but we do not on that account 
consider them to be the bodies of those beings. As, 
moreover, the nature of an eternal intelligent soul does not 
depend on the will of the Lord, it cannot be its body 
under the present definition. — Nor again can it be said that 
the body of a being is constituted by that which is 
exclusively ruled and supported by that being and stands 
towards it in an exclusive subservient relation (.resha) ; for 
this definition would include actions also. And finally 
it is a fact that several texts definitely declare that the 
Lord is without a body, ' Without hands and feet he grasps 
and hastens' &c. 

As thus the relation of embodied being and body 
cannot subsist between Brahman and the world, and as 
if it did subsist, all the imperfections of the world would 
cling to Brahman ; the Vedanta-texts are wrong in teaching 
that Brahman is the material cause of the world. 

To this prima facie view the next Sutra replies. 

9. Not so ; as there are parallel instances. 

The teaching of the Vedanta-texts is not inappropriate, 
since there are instances of good and bad qualities being 
separate in the case of one thing connected with two 



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422 vedanta-sOtras. 



different states. The 'but' in the Sutra indicates the 
impossibility of Brahman being connected with even 
a shadow of what is evil. The meaning is as follows. 
As Brahman has all sentient and non-sentient things for 
its body, and constitutes the Self of that body, there 
is nothing contrary to reason in Brahman being connected 
with two states, a causal and an effected one, the essential 
characteristics of which are expansion on the one hand 
and contraction on the other ; for this expansion and 
contraction belong (not to Brahman itself, but) to the 
sentient and non-sentient beings. The imperfections 
adhering to the body do not affect Brahman, and the good 
qualities belonging to the Self do not extend to the body ; 
in the same way as youth, childhood, and old age, which 
are attributes of embodied beings, such as gods or men, 
belong to the body only, not to the embodied Self ; while 
knowledge, pleasure and so on belong to the conscious Self 
only, not to the body. On this understanding there is no 
objection to expressions such as ' he is born as a god or as 
a man ' and ' the same person is a child, and then a youth, 
and then an old man.' That the character of a god or man 
belongs to the individual soul only in so far as it has 
a body, will be shown under III, i, i, 

The assertion made by the Purvapakshin as to the 
impossibility of the world, comprising matter and souls 
and being either in its subtle or its gross condition, standing 
to Brahman in the relation of a body, we declare to be the 
vain outcome of altogether vicious reasoning springing 
from the idle fancies of persons who have never fully 
considered the meaning of the whole body of Vedanta- 
texts as supported by legitimate argumentation. For as 
a matter of fact all Vedanta-texts distinctly declare that 
the entire world, subtle or gross, material or spiritual, 
stands to the highest Self in the relation of a body. Compare 
e. g. the antaryamin-brahma»a, in the Ka«va as well as the 
Madhyandina-text, where it is said first of non-sentient 
things (' he who dwells within the earth, whose body the 
earth is ' &c), and afterwards separately of the intelligent 
soul ('he who dwells in understanding,' according to the 



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ii adhyAya, i pAda, 9. 423 

Ka»vas ; ' he who dwells within the Self,' according to the 
Madhyandinas) that they constitute the body of the highest 
Self. Similarly the Subala-Upanishad declares that matter 
and souls in all their states constitute the body of the 
highest Self (' He who dwells within the earth ' &c), and 
concludes by saying that that Self is the soul of all those 
beings (' He is the inner Self of all ' &c). Similarly Smriti, 
'The whole world is thy body'; 'Water is the body of 
Vishwu ' ; 'All this is the body of Hari* ; ' All these things 
are his body ' ; ' He having reflected sent forth from his 
body' — where the 'body' means the elements in their 
subtle state. In ordinary language the word 'body' is not, 
like words such as jar, limited in its denotation to things 
of one definite make or character, but is observed to be 
applied directly (not only secondarily or metaphorically) to 
things of altogether different make and characteristics — such 
as worms, insects, moths, snakes, men, four-footed animals, 
and so on. We must therefore aim at giving a definition 
of the word that is in agreement with general use. The 
definitions given by the Purvapakshin — ' a body is that 
which causes the enjoyment of the fruit of actions ' &c. — 
do not fulfil this requirement ; for they do not take in such 
things as earth and the like which the texts declare to be 
the body of the Lord. And further they do not take in 
those bodily forms which the Lord assumes according to 
his wish, nor the bodily forms released souls may assume, 
according to 'He is one' &c. {Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2); for 
none of those embodiments subserve the fruition of the 
results of actions. And further, the bodily forms which 
the Supreme Person assumes at wish are not special 
combinations of earth and the other elements ; for Smrtti 
says, ' The body of that highest Self is not made from 
a combination of the elements.' It thus appears that 
it is also too narrow a definition to say that a body is 
a combination of the different elements. Again, to say 
that a body is that, the life of which depends on the vital 
breath with its five modifications is also too narrow, viz. 
in respect of plants ; for although vital air is present in 
plants, it does not in them support the body by appearing 



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424 vedAnta-sOtras. 



in five special forms. Nor again does it answer to define 
a body as either the abode of the sense-organs or as the 
cause of pleasure and pain ; for neither of these definitions 
takes in the bodies of stone or wood which were bestowed on 
Ahalya and other persons in accordance with their deeds. 
We are thus led to adopt the following definition — Any 
substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely 
controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which 
stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the 
body of that soul. In the case of bodies injured, paralysed, 
&c, control and so on are not actually perceived because 
the power of control, although existing, is obstructed ; in 
the same way as, owing to some obstruction, the powers 
of fire, heat, and so on may not be actually perceived. 
A dead body again begins to decay at the very moment 
in which the soul departs from it, and is actually dissolved 
shortly after ; it (thus strictly speaking is not a body at all 
but) is spoken of as a body because it is a part of the 
aggregate of matter which previously constituted a body. 
In this sense, then, all sentient and non-sentient beings 
together constitute the body of the Supreme Person, for 
they are completely controlled and supported by him for his 
own ends, and are absolutely subordinate to him. Texts 
which speak of the highest Self as ' bodiless among bodies ' 
(e.g. Ka. Up. I, 2, a»), only mean to deny of the Self 
a body due to karman; for as we have seen, Scripture 
declares that the Universe is his body. This point will be 
fully established in subsequent adhikara/tas also. The two 
preceding Sutras (8 and 9) merely suggest the matter 
proved in the adhikarawa beginning with II, 1, at. 

10. And on account of the objections to his view. 

The theory of Brahman being the universal cause has 
to be accepted not only because it is itself free from 
objections, but also because the pradhana theory is open 
to objections, and hence must be abandoned. For on this 
latter theory the origination of the world cannot be 
accounted for. The Sankhyas hold that owing to the 
soul's approximation to Prakrsti the attributes of the latter 



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n adhyAya, i pAda, 12. 425 

are fictitiously superimposed upon the soul which in itself 
consists entirely of pure intelligence free from all change, 
and that thereon depends the origination of the empirical 
world. Now here we must raise the question as to the 
nature of that approximation or nearness of Prakrzti 
which causes the superimposition on the changeless soul 
of the attributes of Prakrrti. Does that nearness mean 
merely the existence of Prakn'ti or some change in 
Prakriti? or does it mean some change in the soul? — 
Not the latter; for the soul is assumed to be incapable 
of change. — Nor again a change in Prakn'ti ; for changes 
in Prakrrti are supposed, in the system, to be the effects 
of superimposition, and cannot therefore be its cause. 
And if, finally, the nearness of Prakr/ti means no more 
than its existence, it follows that even the released soul 
would be liable to that superimposition (for Prakrtti exists 
always). — The Sankhya is thus unable to give a rational 
account of the origination of the world. This same point 
will be treated of fully in connexion with the special 
refutation of the Sankhya theory. (II, 2, 6.) 

11. Also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of 
reasoning. 

The theory, resting on Scripture, of Brahman being the 
universal cause must be accepted, and the theory of the 
Pradhana must be abandoned, because all (mere) reasoning 
is ill-founded. This latter point is proved by the fact that 
the arguments set forth by Buddha, Kawada, Akshapada, 
Gina, Kapila and Pata^jali respectively are all mutually 
contradictory. 

12. Should it be said that inference is to be 
carried on in a different way ; (we reply that) thus 
also it follows that (the objection raised) is not got 
rid of. 

Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments 
actually set forth by Buddha and others may have to be 
considered as invalid, but all the same we may arrive at the 
Pradhana theory through other lines of reasoning by which 



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426 vedAnta-sOtras. 



the objections raised against the theory are refuted. — But, 
we reply, this also is of no avail. A theory which rests 
exclusively on arguments derived from human reason 
may, at some other time or place, be disestablished by 
arguments devised by people more skilful than you in 
reasoning ; and thus there is no getting over the objection 
founded on the invalidity of all mere argumentation. The 
conclusion from all this is that, with regard to super- 
sensuous matters, Scripture alone is authoritative, and 
that reasoning is to be applied only to the support of 
Scripture. In agreement herewith Manu says, 'He who 
supports the teaching of the ifoshis and the doctrine as 
to sacred duty with arguments not conflicting with the 
Veda, he alone truly knows sacred duty* (Manu XII, 
106). The teaching of the Sankhyas which conflicts 
with the Veda cannot therefore be used for the pur- 
pose of confirming and elucidating the meaning of the 
Veda. — Here finishes the section treating of ' difference of 
nature.' 

1 3. Thereby also the remaining (theories) which 
are not comprised (within the Veda) are explained. 

Not comprised means those theories which are not 
known to be comprised within (countenanced by) the 
Veda. The SQtra means to say that by the demolition 
given above of the Sankhya doctrine which is not 
comprised within the Veda the remaining theories which 
are in the same position, viz. the theories of Kanada, 
Akshapada, Gina., and Buddha, must likewise be considered 
as demolished. 

Here, however, a new objection may be raised, on the 
ground namely that, since all these theories agree in the 
view of atoms constituting the general cause, it cannot 
be said that their reasoning as to the causal substance 
is ill-founded. — They indeed, we reply, are agreed to 
that extent, but they are all of them equally founded on 
Reasoning only, and they are seen to disagree in many 
ways as to the nature of the atoms which by different 
schools are held to be either fundamentally void or non.- 



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n adhyAya, i pAda, 14. 427 

void, having either a merely cognitional or an objective 
existence, being either momentary or permanent, either 
of a definite nature or the reverse, either real or unreal, &c. 
This disagreement proves all those theories to be ill- 
founded, and the objection is thus disposed of. — Here 
finishes the section of 'the remaining (theories) non- 
comprised (within the Veda).' 

14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming 
an enjoyer, there follows non-distinction (of Brahman 
and the individual soul) ; we reply — it may be as in 
ordinary life. 

The Sankhya here comes forward with a new objection. 
You maintain, he says, that the highest Brahman has the 
character either of a cause or an effect according as it has 
for its body sentient and non-sentient beings in either 
their subtle or gross state; and that this explains the 
difference in nature between the individual soul and 
Brahman. .But such difference is not possible, since 
Brahman, if embodied, at once becomes an enjoying subject 
(just like the individual soul). For if, possessing a body, 
the Lord necessarily experiences all pain and pleasure 
due to embodiedness, no less than the individual soul 
does. — But we have, under I, a, 8, refuted the view of the 
Lord's being liable to experiences of pleasure and pain ! — 
By no means I There you have shown only that the Lord's 
abiding within the heart of a creature so as to constitute 
the object of its devotion does not imply fruition on his 
part of pleasure and pain. Now, however, you maintain 
that the Lord is embodied just like an individual soul, 
and the unavoidable inference from this is that, like that 
soul, he undergoes pleasurable and painful experiences. 
For we observe that embodied souls, although not capable 
of participating in the changing states of the body such 
as childhood, old age, &c, yet experience pleasures and 
pains caused by the normal or abnormal condition of the 
matter constituting the body. In agreement with this 
Scripture says, ' As long as he possesses a body there is 
for him no escape from pleasure and pain ; but when he 



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428 vedAnta-sOtras. 



is free of the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches 
him ' (KA. Up. VIII, 12, 1). As thus, the theory of an 
embodied Brahman constituting the universal cause does 
not allow of a distinction in nature between the Lord and 
the individual soul ; and as, further, the theory of a mere 
Brahman (i.e. an absolutely homogeneous Brahman) leads 
to the conclusion that Brahman is the abode of all the 
imperfections attaching to the world, in the same way as 
a lump of clay or gold participates in the imperfections 
of the thing fashioned out of it; we maintain that the 
theory of the Pradhana being the general cause is the 
more valid one. 

To this objection the Sutra replies in the words, 'it 
may be, as in ordinary life.' The desired distinction in 
nature between the Lord and the individual soul may 
exist all the same. That a soul experiences pleasures 
and pains caused by the various states of the body 
is not due to the fact of its being joined to a body, but 
to its karman in the form of good and evil deeds. The 
scriptural text also which you quote refers to that body 
only which is originated by karman ; for other texts (' He 
is onefold, he is threefold ' ; ' If he desires the world of 
the Fathers ' ; 'He moves about there eating, playing, 
rejoicing'; Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2; VIII, a, 1 ; 12, 3) show 
that the person who has freed himself from the bondage 
of karman and become manifest in his true nature is not 
touched by a shadow of evil while all the same he has 
a body. The highest Self, which is essentially free from 
all evil, thus has the entire world in its gross and its 
subtle form for its body ; but being in no way connected 
with karman it is all the less connected with evil of any 
kind. — ' As in ordinary life.' We observe in ordinary life 
that while those who either observe or transgress the 
ordinances of a ruler experience pleasure or pain according 
as the ruler shows them favour or restrains them, it does 
not follow from the mere fact of the ruler's having a body 
that he himself also experiences the pleasure and pain 
due to the observance or transgression of his commands. 
The author of the DramWa-bhashya gives expression to 



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ii adhyAya, i pAda, 14. 429 

the same view, 'As in ordinary life a prince, although 
staying in a very unpleasant place infested with mosquitoes 
and full of discomforts of all kind is yet not touched by 
all these troubles, his body being constantly refreshed by 
fans and other means of comfort, rules the countries for 
which he cares and continues to enjoy all possible 
pleasures, such as fragrant odours and the like; so the 
Lord of creation, to whom his power serves as an ever- 
moving fan as it were, is not touched by the evils of that 
creation, but rules the world of Brahman and the other 
worlds for which he cares, and continues to enjoy all 
possible delights.' That the nature of Brahman should 
undergo changes like a lump of clay or gold we do not 
admit, since many texts declare Brahman to be free from 
all change and imperfection. — Others give a different 
explanation of this Sutra. According to them it refutes 
the purvapaksha that on the view of Brahman being the 
general cause the distinction of enjoying subjects and 
objects of enjoyment cannot be accounted for — proving 
the possibility of such distinction by means of the 
analogous instance of the sea and its waves and flakes 
of foam. But this interpretation is inappropriate, since 
for those who hold that creation proceeds from Brahman 
connected with some power or Nescience or a limiting 
adjunct (upadhi) no such prima facie view can arise. For 
on their theory the enjoying subject is that which is 
conditioned by the power or Nescience or upadhi inhering 
in the causal substance, and the power or Nescience or 
upadhi is the object of enjoyment ; and as the two are of 
different nature, they cannot pass over into each other. 
The view of Brahman itself undergoing an essential change 
(on which that prima facie view might possibly be held to 
arise) is not admitted by those philosophers ; for Sutra II, 
i, 35 teaches that the individual souls and their deeds form 
a stream which has no beginning (so that the distinction 
of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment is eternal). 
But even if it be held that Brahman itself undergoes 
a change, the doubt as to the non-distinction of subjects 
and objects of enjoyment does not arise ; for the distinction 



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43Q vedAnta-sOtras. 



of the two groups will, on that view, be analogous to that 
of jars and platters which are modifications of the one 
substance clay, or to that of bracelets and crowns fashioned 
out of the one substance gold. And on the view of 
Brahman itself undergoing a change there arises a further 
difficulty, viz. in so far as Brahman (which is nothing but 
pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to transform 
itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient) objects 
of enjoyment. 

15. The non-difference (of the world) from that 
(viz. Brahman) follows from what begins with the 
word arambhana. 

Under II, 1, 7 and other Sutras the non-difference of the 
effect, i.e. the world from the cause, i.e. Brahman was 
assumed, and it was on this basis that the proof of Brahman 
being the cause of the world proceeded. The present 
Sutra now raises a prima facie objection against that very 
non-difference, and then proceeds to refute it. 

On the point in question the school of Ka»ada argues as 
follows. It is in no way possible that the effect should be 
non-different from the cause. For cause and effect are the 
objects of different ideas : the ideas which have for their 
respective objects threads and a piece of cloth, or a lump 
of clay and a jar, are distinctly not of one and the same 
kind. The difference of words supplies a second argument ; 
nobody applies to mere threads the word ' piece of cloth,' 
or vice versa. A third argument rests on the difference of 
effects : water is not fetched from the well in a lump of 
clay, nor is a well built with jars. There, fourthly, is the 
difference of time; the cause is prior in time, the effect 
posterior. There is, fifthly, the difference of form : the 
cause has the shape of a lump, the effect (the jar) is shaped 
like a belly with a broad basis ; clay in the latter condition 
only is meant when we say ' The jar has gone to pieces.' 
There, sixthly, is a numerical difference : the threads are 
many, the piece of cloth is one only. In the seventh place, 
there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing 
agent (which would result from cause and effect being 



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ii adhyAya, i pAda, 15. 431 

identical) ; for if the effect were nothing but the cause, 
what could be effected by the activity of the agent ? — Let 
us then say that, although the effect exists (at all times), the 
activity of the agent must be postulated as helpful towards 
the effect. — But in that case the activity of the agent would 
have to be assumed as taking place perpetually, and as 
hence everything would exist always, there would be no 
distinction between eternal and non-eternal things! — Let 
us then say that the effect, although always existing, is 
at first non-manifest and then is manifested through the 
activity of the agent ; in this way that activity will not be 
purposeless, and there will be a distinction between eternal 
and non-eternal things ! — This view also is untenable. For 
if that manifestation requires another manifestation (to 
account for it) we are driven into a regressus in infinitum. 
If, on the other hand, it is independent of another manifesta- 
tion (and hence eternal), it follows that the effect also is 
eternally perceived. And if, as a third alternative, the 
manifestation is said to originate, we lapse into the asat- 
karyavada (according to which the effect does not exist 
before its origination). Moreover, if the activity of the 
agent serves to manifest the effect, it follows that the 
activity devoted to a jar will manifest also waterpots and 
similar things. For things which admittedly possess mani- 
festing power, such as lamps and the like, are not observed 
to be restricted to particular objects to be manifested by 
them : we do not see that a lamp lit for showing a jar does 
not at the same time manifest waterpots and other things. 
All this proves that the activity of the agent has a purpose 
in so far only as it is the cause of the origination of an 
effect which previously did not exist ; and thus the theory 
of the previous existence of the effect cannot be upheld. 
Nor does the fact of definite causes having to be employed 
(in order to produce definite effects ; clay e. g. to produce 
a jar) prove that that only which already exists can become 
an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the 
hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (de- 
termining the definite effect which will result from the 
cause). 



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432 vedAnta-sAtras. 



But, an objection is raised, he also who holds the theory 
of the previous non-existence of the effect, can really do 
nothing with the activity of the agent For as, on his 
view, the effect has no existence before it is originated, the 
activity of the agent must be supposed to operate elsewhere 
than on the effect ; and as this ' elsewhere ' comprises with- 
out distinction all other things, it follows that the agent's 
activity with reference to threads may give rise to water- 
pots also (not only to cloth). — Not so, the VaLreshika 
replies. Activity applied to a certain cause gives rise to 
those effects only the potentiality of which inheres in that 
cause. 

Now, against all this, the following objection is raised. 
The effect is non-different from the cause. For in reality 
there is no such thing as an effect different from the 
cause, since all effects, and all empirical thought and 
speech about effects, are based on Nescience. Apart from 
the causal substance, clay, which is seen to be present 
in effected things such as jars, the so-called effect, i. e. the 
jar or pot, rests altogether on Nescience. All effected 
things whatever, such as jars, waterpots, &c, viewed as 
different from their causal substance, viz. clay, which is 
perceived to exist in these its effects, rest merely on em- 
pirical thought and speech, and are fundamentally false, 
unreal ; while the causal substance, i.e. clay, alone is real. 
In the same way the entire world in so far as viewed apart 
from its cause, i.e. Brahman which is nothing but pure 
non-differenced Being, rests exclusively on the empirical 
assumption of Egoity and so on, and is false ; while reality 
belongs to the causal Brahman which is mere Being. It 
follows that there is no such thing as an effect apart from 
its cause; the effect in fact is identical with the cause. 
Nor must you object to our theory on the ground that the 
corroborative instance of the silver erroneously imagined in 
the shell is inappropriate because the non-reality of such 
effected things as jars is by no means well proved while the 
non-reality of the shell-silver is so proved ; for as a matter, 
of fact it is determined by reasoning that it is the causal 
substance of jars, viz. clay, only that is real while the 



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ii adhyAya, i pAda, 15. 433 

reality of everything apart from clay is disproved by 
reasoning. And if you ask whereupon that reasoning rests, 
we reply — on the fact that the clay only is continuous, 
permanent, while everything different from it is discon- 
tinuous, non-permanent. For just, as in the case of the 
snake-rope we observe that the continuously existing rope 
only— which forms the substrate of the imagined snake— is 
real, while the snake or cleft in the ground, which is non- 
continuous, is unreal; so we conclude that it is the per- 
manently enduring clay-material only which is real, while 
the non-continuous effects, such as jars and pots, are unreal. 
And, further, since what is real, i. e the Self, does not perish, 
and what is altogether unreal, as e. g. the horn of a hare, is 
not perceived, we conclude that an effected thing, which on 
the one hand is perceived and on the other is liable to 
destruction, must be viewed as something to be defined 
neither as that which is nor as that which is not. And 
what is thus undefinable, is false, no less than the silver 
imagined in the shell, the anirva£aniyatva of which is 
proved by perception and sublation (see above, p. 102 ff.). — 
We further ask, ' Is a causal substance, such as clay, when 
producing its effect, in a non-modified state, or has it 
passed over into some special modified condition?' The 
former alternative cannot be allowed, because thence it 
would follow that the cause originates effects at all times ; 
and the latter must equally be rejected, because the passing 
over of the cause into a special state would oblige us to 
postulate a previous passing over into a different state (to 
account for the latter passing over) and again a previous 
one, &c, so that a regressus in infinitum would result. — 
Let it then be said that the causal substance when giving 
rise to the effect is indeed unchanged, but connected with 
a special operative cause, time and place (this connexion 
accounting for the origination of the effect). — But this also 
we cannot allow; for such connexion would be with the 
causal substance either as unchanged or as having entered 
on a changed condition ; and thus the difficulties stated 
above would arise again. — Nor may you say that the 
origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk from clay, 

[48] ' F f 



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434 vedAnta-sCtras. 



gold, and milk respectively is actually perceived ; that this 
perception is not sublated with regard to time and place — 
while, on the other hand, the perception of silver in 
the shell is so sublated — and that hence all those who 
trust perception must necessarily admit that the effect does 
originate from the cause. For this argumentation. does not 
stand the test of being set forth in definite alternatives. 
Does the mere gold, &c, by itself originate the svastika- 
ornament ? or is it the gold coins (used for making orna- 
ments) which originate ? or is it the gold, as forming the 
substrate of the coins * ? The mere gold, in the first place, 
cannot be originative as there exists no effect different from 
the gold (to which the originative activity could apply 
itself) ; and a thing cannot possibly display originative 
activity with regard to itself. — But, an objection is raised, 
the svastika-ornament is perceived as different from the 
gold ! — It is not, we reply, different from the gold ; for the 
gold is recognised in it, and no other thing but gold is per- 
ceived. — But the existence of another thing is proved by the 
fact of there being a different idea, a different word, and so 
on! — By no means, we reply. Other ideas, words, and so 
on, which have reference to an altogether undefined thing 
are founded on error, no less than the idea of, and the word 
denoting, shell-silver, and hence have no power of proving 
the existence of another thing. Nor, in the second place, is 
the gold coin originative of the svastika-ornament ; for we 
do not perceive the coin in the svastika, as we do perceive 
the threads in the cloth. Nor, in the third place, is the 
effect originated by the gold in so far as being the substrate 
of the Coin ; for the gold in so far as forming the substrate 
of the coin is not perceived in the svastika. As it thus 
appears that all effects viewed apart from their causal 

1 In other words — is the golden ornament originated by the 
mere formless substance, gold } or by the form belonging to that 
special piece of gold (a coin, a bar, &c), out of which the orna- 
ment is fashioned ; or by the substance, gold, in so far as possessing 
that special form ? The ru£aka of the text has to be taken in the 
sense of nishka. 



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ii adhyAya, i pAda, 15. 435 

substances are unreal, we arrive at the conclusion that the 
entire world, viewed apart from Brahman, is also something 
unreal ; for it also is an effect. 

In order to facilitate the understanding of the truth that 
everything apart from Brahman is false, we have so far 
reasoned on the assumption of things such as clay, gold, &c, 
being real, and have thereby proved the non-reality of all 
effects. In truth, however, all special causal substances 
are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments 
are ; for they are all of them equally effects of Brahman. 

' In that all this has its Self; it is the True ' (KA. Up. 
VI, 8, 7) ; * There is here no plurality ; from death to 
death goes he who sees here plurality as it were ' (Br*. Up. 
IV, 4, 19) ; ' For where there is duality as it were, there one 
sees another ; but when for him the Self only has become 
all, whereby then should he see and whom should he see ? ' 
(Br*. Up. II, 4, 13) ; ' Indra goes manifold by means of his 
mayas ' (Br*. Up. II, 5, 19) ;-— these and other similar texts 
teach that whatever is different from Brahman is false. Nor 
must it be imagined that the truth intimated by Scripture 
can be in conflict with Perception ; for in the way set forth 
above we prove that all effects are false, and moreover 
Perception really has for its object pure Being only (cp. 
above, p. 30). And if there is a conflict between the 
two, superior force belongs to Scripture, to which no 
imperfection can be attributed; which occupies a final 
position among the means of knowledge; and which, 
although dependent on Perception, and so on, for the 
apprehension of the form and meaning of words, yet is in- 
dependent as far as proving power is concerned. Hence it 
follows that everything different from Brahman, the general 
cause, is unreal. 

Nor must this conclusion be objected to on the ground 
that from the falsity of the world it follows that the 
individual souls also are non-real. For it is Brahman 
itself which constitutes the individual souls: Brahman 
alone takes upon itself the condition of individual soul 
in all living bodies ; as we know from many texts : ' Having 
entered into them with this living Self (KA. Up. VI, 3); 

F f 2 



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436 vedanta-sOtras. 



' The one god hidden within all beings ' (Svet Up. VI, 1 1) ; 
' The one god entered in many places ' ; ' That Self hidden 
in all beings does not shine forth ' (Ka. Up. 1, 3, 12) ; ' There 
is no other seer but he ' (Br*. Up. Ill, 3, 23) ; and others. — 
But if you maintain that the one Brahman constitutes the 
soul in all living bodies, it follows that any particular pain 
or pleasure should affect the consciousness of all embodied 
beings, just as an agreeable sensation affecting the foot 
gives rise to a feeling of pleasure in the head ; and that 
there would be no distinction of individual soul and Lord, 
released souls and souls in bondage, pupils and teachers, 
men wise and ignorant, and so on. 

Now, in reply to this, some of those who hold the 
non-duality of Brahman give the following explanation. 
The many individual souls are the reflections of the one 
Brahman, and their states of pain, pleasure, and so on, 
remain distinct owing to the different limiting adjuncts 
(on which the existence of each individual soul as such 
depends), in the same way as the many reflected images 
of one and the same face in mirrors, crystals, sword-blades, 
&c, remain distinct owing to their limiting adjuncts (viz. 
mirrors, &c.) ; one image being small, another large, one 
being bright, another dim, and so on. — But you have said 
that scriptural texts such as ' Having entered with this 
living Self show that the souls are not different from 
Brahman! — They are indeed not different in reality, but 
we maintain their distinction on the basis of an imagined 
difference. — To whom then does that imagination belong? 
Not to Brahman surely whose nature, consisting of pure 
intelligence, allows no room for imagination of any kind ! 
Nor also to the individual souls; for this would imply 
a faulty mutual dependence, the existence of the soul 
depending on imagination and that imagination residing 
in the soul ! — Not so, the advaita-vadin replies. Nescience 
(wrong imagination) and the existence of the souls form 
an endless retrogressive chain ; their relation is like that 
of the seed and the sprout. Moreover, mutual dependence 
and the like, which are held to constitute defects in the 
case of real things, are unable to disestablish Nescience, 



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n adhyAya, i pAda, 15. 437 

the very nature of which consists in being that which 
cannot rationally be established, and which hence may be 
compared to somebody's swallowing a whole palace and the 
like (as seen in a dream or under the influence of a magical 
illusion). In reality the individual souls are non-different 
from Brahman, and hence essentially free from all impurity; 
but as they are liable to impurity caused by their limiting 
adjuncts — in the same way as' the face reflected in a mirror 
is liable to be dimmed by the dimness of the mirror — 
they may be the abodes of Nescience. and hence may be 
viewed as the figments of wrong imagination. Like the 
dimness of the reflected face, the imperfection adhering to 
the soul is a mere error; for otherwise it would follow 
that the soul can never obtain release. And as this error 
of the souls has proceeded from all eternity, the question 
as to its cause is not to be raised. 

This, we reply, is the view of teachers who have no 
insight into the true nature of aduality, and are prompted 
by the wish of capturing the admiration and applause of 
those who believe in the doctrine of duality. For if, as 
a first alternative, you should maintain that the abode 
of Nescience is constituted by the soul in its essential, 
not fictitiously imagined, form ; this means that Brahman 
itself is the abode of Nescience. If, in the second 
place, you should say that the abode of Nescience is the 
soul, viewed as different from Brahman and fictitiously 
imagined in it, this would mean that the Non-intelligent 
(^a</a) is the abode of Nescience. For those who hold 
the view of Non-duality do not acknowledge a third 
aspect different from these two (i. e. from Brahman which 
is pure intelligence, and the Non-intelligent fictitiously 
superimposed on Brahman). And if, as a third alternative, 
it be maintained that the abode of Nescience is the soul 
in its essential nature, this nature being however qualified 
by the fictitiously imagined aspect ; we must negative this 
also, since that which has an absolutely homogeneous 
nature cannot in any way be shown to be qualified, apart 
from Nescience. The soul is qualified in so far only as 
it is the abode of Nescience, and you therefore define 



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438 vedAnta-sOtras. 



nothing. — Moreover, the theory of Nescience abiding 
within the individual soul is resorted to for the purpose 
of establishing a basis for the distinction of bondage and 
release, but it really is quite unable to effect this. For 
if by Release be understood the destruction of Nescience, 
it follows that when one soul attains Release and Nescience 
is thus destroyed, the other souls also will be released. — 
But Nescience persists because other souls are not re- 
leased ! — Well then the one soul also is not released since 
Nescience is not destroyed! — But we assume a different 
Nescience for each soul; that soul whose Nescience is 
destroyed will be released, and that whose Nescience is 
not destroyed will remain in Bondage! — You now argue 
on the assumption of a special avidya for each soul. But 
what about the distinction of souls implied therein? Is 
that distinction essential to the nature of the soul, or is 
it the figment of Nescience? The former alternative is 
excluded, as it is admitted that the soul essentially is pure, 
non-differenced intelligence ; and because on that alter- 
native the assumption of avidya to account for the 
distinction of souls would be purposeless. On the latter 
alternative two subordinate alternatives arise — Does this 
avidya which gives rise to the fictitious distinction of souls 
belong to Brahman? or to the individual souls? — If you 
say 'to Brahman,' your view coincides with mine. — Well 
then, ' to the souls ' ! — But have you then quite forgotten 
that Nescience is assumed for the purpose of accounting 
for the distinction of souls ? — Let us then view the matter 
as follows — those several avidyas which are assumed for 
the purpose of establishing the distinction of souls bound 
and released, to those same avidyas the distinction of 
souls is due. — But here you reason in a manifest circle: 
the avidyas are established on the basis of the distinction 
of souls, and the distinction of souls is established when 
the avidyas are established. Nor does the argument of 
the seed and sprout apply to the present question. For 
in the case of seeds and plants each several seed gives 
rise to a different plant ; while in the case under discussion 
you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing the 



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II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 439 

several avidyas on the basis of the very souls which are 
assumed to be due to those avidyas. And if you attempt 
to give to the argument a somewhat different turn, by 
maintaining that it is the avidyas abiding in the earlier 
souls which fictitiously give rise to the later souls, we 
point out that this implies the souls being short-lived 
only, and moreover that each soul would have to take 
upon itself the consequences of deeds not its own and 
escape the consequences of its own deeds. The same 
reasoning disposes of the hypothesis that it is Brahman 
which effects the fictitious existence of the subsequent 
souls by means of the avidyas abiding within the earlier 
souls. And if there is assumed a beginningless flow of 
avidyas, it follows that there is also a beginningless flow 
of the condition of the souls dependent on those avidyas, 
and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which 
is supposed to hold good up to the moment of Release 
could thus not be established. Concerning your assertion 
that, as Nescience is something unreal and hence altogether 
unproved, it is not disestablished by such defects as mutual 
dependence which touch real things only ; we remark that 
in that case Nescience would cling even to released souls 
and the highest Brahman itself. — But impure Nescience 
cannot cling to what has for its essence pure cognition ! — 
Is Nescience then to be dealt with by rational arguments ? 
If so, it will follow that, on account of the arguments set 
forth (mutual dependence, and so on), it likewise does not 
cling to the individual souls. We further put the following 
question — When the Nescience abiding in the individual 
soul passes away, owing to. the rise of the knowledge of 
truth, does then the soul also perish or does it not perish ? 
In the former case Release is nothing else but destruction 
of the essential nature of the soul ; in the latter case the 
soul does not attain Release even on the destruction of 
Nescience, since it continues to exist as soul different 
from Brahman. — You have further maintained that the 
distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c, admits of 
being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or 
clearness, and so on, of the different images of a face as 



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440 vedanta-sOtras. 



seen reflected in mirrors, crystals, sword-blades and the 
like. But here the following point requires consideration. 
On what occasion do the smallness, dimness and other 
imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts (i.e. the mirrors, 
&c.) pass away? — When the mirrors and other limiting 
adjuncts themselves pass away ! — Does then, we ask, the 
reflected image which is the substrate of those imperfections 
persist or not ? If you say that it persists, then by analogy 
the individual soul also must be assumed to persist, and 
from this it follows that it does not attain Release. And 
if the reflected image is held to perish together with its 
imperfections, by analogy the soul also will perish and 
then Release will be nothing but annihilation. — Consider 
the following point also. The destruction of a non- 
advantageous (apurushartha) defect is of advantage to 
him who is conscious of that disadvantage. Is it then, we 
ask, in the given case Brahman — which corresponds to the 
thing reflected — that is conscious of the imperfections due 
to the limiting adjuncts ? or is it the soul which corresponds 
to the reflected image? or is it something else? On the 
two former alternatives it appears that the comparison 
(between Brahman and the soul on the one hand, and the 
thing reflected and the reflection on the other — on which 
comparison your whole theory is founded) does not hold 
good ; for neither the face nor the reflection of the face 
is conscious of the imperfections due to the adjuncts ; 
for neither of the two is a being capable of conscious- 
ness. And, moreover, Brahman's being conscious of imper- 
fections would imply its being the abode of Nescience. 
And the third alternative, again, is impossible, since there 
is no other knowing subject but Brahman and the soul. — 
It would, moreover, be necessary to define who is the 
imaginatively shaping agent (kalpaka) with regard to the 
soul as formed from Nescience. It cannot be Nescience 
itself, because Nescience is not an intelligent principle. 
Nor can it be the soul, because this would imply the 
defect of what has to be proved being presupposed for 
the purposes of the proof; and because the existence of 
the soul is that which is formed by Nescience, just as 



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II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 15. 44I 

shell-silver is. And if, finally, you should say that 
Brahman is the fictitiously forming agent, we have again 
arrived at a Brahman that is the abode of Nescience. — 
If Brahman is not allowed to be the abode of Nescience, 
we further must ask whether Brahman sees (is conscious 
of) the individual souls or not. If not, it is not possible 
that Brahman should give rise to this manifold creation 
which, as Scripture declares, is preceded by 'seeing* on 
his part, and to the differentiation of names and forms. 
If, on the other hand, Brahman which is of an absolutely 
homogeneous nature sees the souls, it cannot do so without 
Nescience ; and thus we are again led to the view of 
Nescience abiding in Brahman. 

For similar reasons the theory of the distinction of 
Maya and Nescience must also be abandoned. For even 
if Brahman possesses Maya, i. e. illusive power, it cannot, 
without Nescience, be conscious of souls. And without 
being conscious of others the lord of Maya is unable to 
delude them by his Maya ; and Maya herself cannot bring 
about the consciousness of others on the part of its Lord, 
for it is a mere means to delude others, after they have (by 
other means) become objects of consciousness. — Perhaps 
you will say that the Maya of Brahman causes him to be 
conscious of souls, and at the same time is the cause of 
those souls' delusion. But if Maya causes Brahman — which 
is nothing but self-illuminated intelligence, absolutely 
homogeneous and free from all foreign elements — to become 
conscious of other beings, then Maya is nothing but another 
name for Nescience. — Let it then be said that Nescience is 
the cause of the cognition of what is contrary to truth ; 
such being the case, Maya which presents all false things 
different from Brahman as false, and thus is not the cause 
of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, is not avidya. — 
But this is inadmissible ; for, when the oneness of the moon 
is known, that which causes the idea of the moon being 
double can be nothing else but avidya. Moreover, if 
Brahman recognises all beings apart from himself as false, 
he does not delude them ; for surely none but a madman 
would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal !— - 



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442 vedAnta-sOtras. 



Let us then define avidya as the cause of a disadvantageous 
cognition of unreal things. Maya then, as not being the 
cause of such a disadvantageous cognition on Brahman's 
part, cannot be of the nature of avidya ! — But this also is 
inadmissible ; for although the idea of the moon being 
double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not dis- 
advantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidya ; 
and if, on the other hand, Maya which aims at dispelling 
that idea (in so far as it presents the image and idea of one 
moon) did not present what is of disadvantage, it would 
not be something to be destroyed, and hence would be 
permanently connected with Brahman's nature.-r-Well, if it 
were so, what harm would there be ? — The harm would be 
that such a view implies the th«ory of duality, and hence 
would be in conflict with the texts inculcating non- 
duality such as ' For where there is duality as it were, &c. ; 
but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby 
then should he see, and whom should he see ? ' — But those 
texts set forth the Real ; Maya on the other hand is non- 
real, and hence the view of its permanency is not in real 
conflict with the texts! — Brahman, we reply, has for its 
essential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be con- 
scious of, or affected with, unreal Maya, without avidya. 
Of what use, we further ask, should an eternal non-real 
Maya be to Brahman ? — Brahman by means of it deludes 
the individual souls! — But of what use should such delusion 
be to Brahman ? — It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or 
play ! — But of what use is play to a being whose nature is 
unlimited bliss? — Do we not then see in ordinary life also 
that persons in the enjoyment of full happiness and pros- 
perity indulge all the same in play? — The cases are not 
parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right 
mind would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by 
means of implements unreal and known by them to be 
unreal, and in the consciousness, itself, unreal of such a play 1 
— The arguments set forth previously also prove the im- 
possibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul 
considered as the abode of avidya, apart from Brahman 
considered as the abode of Maya. 



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ii adhyAya, i pAda, 15. 443 

We thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold 
the non-duality of Brahman must also admit that it is 
Brahman alone which is affected with beginningless avidya, 
and owing to this avidya is conscious of plurality within 
itself. Nor must it be urged against him who holds this 
view of avidya belonging to Brahman that he is unable to 
account for the distinction of bondage and release, for 
as there is only the one Brahman affected with Nescience 
and to be released by the cessation of that Nescience, the 
distinction of souls bound and released, &c, has no true 
existence : the empirical distinction of souls bound and re- 
leased, of teachers and pupils, &c. is a merely fictitious one, 
and all such fiction can be explained by means of the avidya 
of one intelligent being. The case is analogous to that of 
a person dreaming: die teachers and pupils and all the 
other persons and things he may see in his dream are 
fictitiously shaped out of the avidya of the one dreaming 
subject. For the same reason there is no valid foundation 
for the assumption of many avidyas. For those also who 
hold that avidya belongs to the individual souls do not 
maintain that the distinction of bondage and release, of 
one's own self and other persons, is real ; and if it is unreal 
it can be accounted for by the avidya of one subject. This 
admits of being stated in various technical ways. — The 
distinctions of bondage and of one's own self and other 
persons are fictitiously shaped by one's own avidya ; for 
they are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming 
person. — Other bodies also have a Self through me only ; 
for they are bodies like this my body. — Other bodies also 
are fictitiously shaped by my avidya ; for they are bodies 
or effects, or non-intelligent or fictitious creations, as this 
my body is. — The whole class of intelligent subjects is 
nothing but me ; for they are of intelligent nature ; what is 
not me is seen to be of non-intelligent nature ; as e. g. jars. 
— It thus follows that the distinctions of one'? own self 
and other persons, of souls bound and released, of pupils 
and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by the avidya 
of one intelligent subject. 

The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not 



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444 vedanta-sOtras. 



able to account for the distinction of souls bound and 
released. For as there is an infinity of past aeons, it follows 
that, even if one soul only should attain release in each aeon, 
all souls would by this time have attained release ; the actual 
existence of non-released souls cannot thus be rationally 
accounted for. — But the souls are ' infinite ' ; this accounts 
for there being souls not yet released! — What, pray, do 
you understand by this ' infinity ' of souls ? Does it mean 
that they cannot be counted ? This we cannot allow, for 
although a being of limited knowledge may not be able to 
count them, owing to their large number, the all-knowing 
Lord surely can count them ; if he could not do so it 
would follow that he is not all-knowing. — But the souls are 
really numberless, and the Lord's not knowing a definite 
number which does not exist does not prove that he is 
not all-knowing! — Not so, we reply. Things which are 
definitely separate (bhinna) from each, other cannot be 
without number. Souls have a number, because they are 
separate ; just as mustard seeds, beans, earthen vessels, 
pieces of cloth, and so on. And from their being separate 
it moreover follows that souls, like earthen vessels, and so 
on, are non-intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perish- 
able ; and it further follows therefrom that Brahman is not 
infinite. For by infinity we understand the absence of all 
limitation. Now on the theory which holds that there is 
a plurality of separate existences, Brahman which is con- 
sidered to differ in character from other existences cannot 
be said to be free from substantial limitation; for sub- 
stantial limitation means nothing else than the existence of 
other substances. And what is substantially limited can- 
not be said to be free from temporal and spatial limitation ; 
for observation shows that it is just those things which 
differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially 
limited — such as earthen vessels, and so on — which are also 
limited in point of space and time. Hence all intelligent 
existences, including Brahman, being substantially limited, 
are also limited in point of space and time. But this con- 
clusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural texts which 
declare Brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever 



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ii adhyAya, i pAda, i 5. 445 

('The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman/ and similar 
texts), and moreover would imply that the souls as well as 
Brahman are liable to origination, decay, and so on ; for 
limitation in time means nothing else but a being's passing 
through the stages of origination, decay, and so on. 

The dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides, 
we adhere to our doctrine that this entire world, from 
Brahma down to a blade of grass, springs from the avidya 
attached to Brahman which in itself is absolutely unlimited ; 
and that the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and 
pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from 
the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidya, just as 
the distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious. 
The one Brahman, whose nature is eternal self-illumined- 
ness, free from all heterogeneous elements, owing to the 
influence of avidya illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) in 
the form of this world ; and as thus in reality there exists 
nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the 
world is ' non-different ' from Brahman. 

To this the Dvaitavadin, i. e. the Vaweshika, replies as 
follows. The doctrine that Brahman, which in itself is 
pure, non-differenced self-illuminedness, has its own true 
nature hidden by avidya and hence sees plurality within 
itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of right 
knowledge ; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration, 
i. e. cessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean com- 
plete destruction of Brahman ; so that the hypothesis of 
obscuration is altogether excluded. This and other argu- 
ments have been already set forth ; as also that the 
hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by 
the Advaitin. Nor is there any proof for the assertion 
that effects apart from their causes are mere error, like 
shell-silver, the separate existence of the effect being refuted 
by Reasoning ; for as a matter of fact there is no valid 
reasoning of the kind. The assertion that the cause only 
is real because it persists, while the non-continuous effects 
— such as jars and waterpots — are unreal, has also been 
refuted before, on the ground that the fact of a thing not 
existing at one place and one time does not sublate its 



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446 vedAnta-sOtras. 



real existence at another time and place. Nor is there 
any soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false 
because, owing to its being perceived and its being perish- 
able, it cannot be defined either as real or unreal. For 
a thing's being perceived and its being perishable does not 
prove the thing's falseness, but only its non-permanency. 
To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it 
is sublated (i. e. that its non-existence is proved by valid 
means) with reference to that very place and time in 
connexion with which it is perceived ; but that a thing is 
sublated with reference to a place and time other than 
those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves only 
that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place 
and time, but not that it is false. This view also may be 
put in technical form, viz. effects such as jars and the like 
are real because they are not sublated with regard to their 
definite place and time ; just as the Self is. — Nor is there 
any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot originate 
from the cause either modified or unmodified ; for the effect 
may originate from the cause if connected with certain 
favouring conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you 
show any proof for the assertion that the cause, whether 
modified or non-modified, cannot enter into connexion with 
such favouring conditions ; as a matter of fact the cause 
may very well, without being modified, enter into such 
connexion. — But from this it follows that the cause must 
have been previously connected with those conditions, 
since previously also it was equally unmodified ! — Not so, 
we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions of 
time, place, &c, into which the cause enters, depends on 
some other cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not 
being modified. No fault then can be found with the 
view of the cause, when having entered into a special 
state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c, 
producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way 
that the cause possesses originative agency with regard to 
the effect ; for such agency is actually observed, and can- 
not be proved to be irrational.— ^Further there is no proof 
for the assertion that originative agency cannot belong 



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ii adhyAya, i pAda, 15. 447 

either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as 
coined gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate 
for coins and the like ; for as a matter of fact mere gold 
(gold in general), if connected with the helpful factors men- 
tioned above, may very well possess originative capacity. 
To say that we do not perceive any effect different from 
gold is futile; for as a matter of fact we perceive the 
svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and 
the existence of different terms and ideas moreover proves 
the existence of different things. Nor have we here to do 
with a mere error analogous to that of shell-silver. For 
a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is per- 
ceived during the whole period intervening between its 
origination and destruction, and such perception is not 
sublated with regard to that time and place. Nor is there 
any valid line of reasoning to sublate that perception. That 
at the same time when the previously non-perceived svastika- 
ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to the 
fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, 
and hence such recognition of the Causal substance does not 
disprove the reality of the effect. — And the attempts to prove 
the unreality of the world by means of scriptural texts we 
have already disposed of in a previous part of this work. 

We further object to the assertion that it is one Self 
which bestows on all bodies the property of being con- 
nected with the Self; as from this it would follow that one 
person is conscious of all the pains and pleasures caused 
by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and 
others, it is Owing to the oneness of the Self that one 
person is conscious of the pains and pleasures due to 
several bodies. Nor again must you allege that the non- 
consciousness (on the part of one Self of all pleasures 
and pains whatever) is due to the plurality of the Egos, 
which are the subjects Of cognition, and not to the plurality 
of Selfs ; for the Self is none other than the subject of Cog- 
nition and the Ego. The organ of egoity (aharakara), 
on the other hand, which is the same as the internal organ 
(anta^kara«a), cannot be the knowing subject, for it is of 
a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the 



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448 vedAnta-sOtras. 



body and the sense-organs. This also has been proved 
before. — Nor is there any proof for your assertion that 
all bodies must be held to spring from the avidya of one 
subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent, effects, 
fictitious. For that all bodies are the fictitious creations 
of avidya is not true ; since that which is not sublated by 
valid means of proof must be held to be real — Nor again 
can you uphold the assertion that all intelligent subjects 
are non-different, i.e. one, because we observe that whatever 
is other than a subject of cognition is non-intelligent ; for 
this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of intel- 
ligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution, 
among them, of pleasures and pains. — You have further 
maintained ' Through me only all bodies are animated by 
a Self; they are the fictitious creations of my avidya; 
/ alone constitute the whole aggregate of intelligent sub- 
jects,' and, on the basis of these averments, have attempted 
to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing 
but the random talk of a person who has not mastered 
even the principles of his own theory; for according to 
your theory the Self is pure intelligence to which the 
whole distinction of ' I,' ' Thou,' &c, is altogether foreign. 
Moreover, if it be held that everything different from pure, 
non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all effort 
spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruit- 
less, for the Veda also is the effect of avidya, and the effort 
spent on it therefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold 
of the silver wrongly imagined in the shell. Or, to put it 
from a different point of view, all effort devoted to Release 
is purposeless, since it is the effect of knowledge depending 
on teachers of merely fictitious existence. Knowledge 
produced by texts such as 'Thou art that' does not put 
an end to bondage, because it is produced by texts which 
are the fictitious product of avidya ; or because it is itself 
of the nature of avidya ; or because it has for its abode 
knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of avidya; or 
because it is the product of a process of study which de- 
pends on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidya ; it 
is thus no better than knowledge resting on texts teaching 



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n adhyAya, i pAda, 15. 449 

how bondage is to be put an end to, which one might 
have heard in a dream. Or, to put the matter again 
from a different point of view, Brahman constituted by 
pure non-differenced intelligence is false, since it is to be 
attained by knowledge, which is the effect of avidya ; or 
since it is to be attained by knowledge abiding in knowing 
subjects who are mere figments of avidya ; or because it 
is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment 
of avidya. For whatever is attained through knowledge 
of that kind is false ; as e.g. the things seen in dreams or 
a town of the Gandharvas (Fata Morgana). 

Nor does Brahman, constituted by pure non-differenced 
intelligence, shine forth by itself, so as not to need — for 
its cognition — other means of knowledge. And that that 
self-luminous knowledge which you declare to be borne 
witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of 
particular objects of knowledge — such knowledge abiding 
in particular cognising subjects — this also has been proved 
previously. And the different arguments which were set 
forth as proving Brahman's non-differenced nature, are 
sufficiently refuted by what we have said just now as to all 
such arguments themselves being the products of avidya. 

Nor again is there any sense in the theory that the 
principle of non-differenced intelligence ' witnesses ' avidya, 
and implicates itself in the error of the world. For ' wit- 
nessing' and error are observed to abide only in definite 
conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general. Nor 
can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess 
illumining power or light depending on itself only. For 
by light (enlightenment) we can understand nothing but 
definite well-established knowledge (siddhi) on the part 
of some knowing subject with regard to some particular 
object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove 
the self-illuminedness of your universal principle ; to an 
absolutely non-differenced intelligence not implying the 
distinction of subject and object such ' svayampraklrata ' 
could not possibly belong. With regard again to what 
you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real 
effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point 
[48] * g g 



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450 vedAnta-s^jtras. 



out that although you allow to such effects, being non- 
sublated as it were, a kind of existence called ' empirical ' 
(or « conventional ' — vyavah&rika), you yourself acknow- 
ledge that fundamentally they are nothing but products 
of avidyd ; you thus undermine your own position. We 
have, on the other hand, already disposed of this your view 
above, when proving that in all cases effects are originated 
by real causes only. Nor may you plead that what per- 
ception tells us in such cases is contradicted by Scripture ; 
for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and 
hence of the essence of avidya, it is in no better case than 
the instances quoted. — You have further declared that, 
although Brahman is to be attained only through unreal 
knowledge, yet it is real since when once attained it is not 
sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this reasoning 
also is not valid ; for when it has once been ascertained 
that some principle is attained through knowledge resting 
on a vicious basis, the fact that we are not aware of a 
subsequent sublation of that principle is irrelevant. That 
the principle ' the reality of things is a universal Void ' is 
false, we Conclude therefrom that the reasoning leading to 
that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although 
we are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that 
principle. Moreover, for texts such as 'There is here 
no plurality whatsoever,' ' Knowledge, bliss is Brahman,' 
the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the 
ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things 
different from mere intelligence, and hence are later in 
order than all other texts (which had established that 
aggregate of things). But somebody may rise and say 
' the Reality is a Void,' and thus negative the existence of 
the principle of mere Intelligence also ; and the latter 
principle is thus sublated by the assertion as to the Void, 
which is later in order than the texts which it negatives. 
On the other hand the assertion as to the Void being the 
universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation; 
for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And 
as to resting on a vicious basis, there is in that respect 
no difference between Perception and the other means of 



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ii adhyaya, i pAda, 15. 451 

knowledge, and the view of general unreality, founded on 
the Vedanta. The proper conclusion therefore is that all 
cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition 
and are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with 
regard to special objects. Some of these cognitions rest 
on defects which themselves are real ; others spring from a 
combination of causes, real and free from all defect. Unless 
we admit all this we shall not be able to account in a 
satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and 
things false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical 
thought, whether true or of the nature of error, presupposes 
inward light (illumination) in the form of certainty with 
regard to a particular object, and belonging to a real 
knowing subject ; mere non-differenced Being, on the other 
hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing subject), 
cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether 
referring to real or unreal things, and cannot therefore form 
the basis of empirical thought. 

Against our opponent's argument that pure Being must 
be held the real substrate of all erroneous superimposition 
(adhyasa), for the reason that no error can exist without 
a substrate, we remark that an error may take place even 
when its substrate is unreal, in the same way as an error 
may exist even when the defect (giving rise to the error), 
the abode of the defect, the subject of cognition and the 
cognition itself are unreal. The argument thus loses its 
force. Possibly he will now argue that as an error is never 
seen to exist where the substrate is unreal, the reality of 
pure Being (as furnishing the required basis for error) 
must necessarily be admitted. But, we point out, it also 
is a fact that errors are never observed where the defect, 
the abode of the defect, the knowing subject and the act of 
knowledge are unreal ; and if we pay regard to observation, 
we must therefore admit the reality of all these factors as 
well. There is really no difference between the two cases, 
unless our opponent chooses to be obstinate. 

You further asserted that, on the theory of many really 
different Selfs, it would follow from the infinity of the past 
aeons that all souls must have been released before this, 

Gg2 



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452 ved anta-sOtras. 



none being left in the state of bondage ; and that hence the 
actually observed distinction of souls bound and released 
remains unexplained. But this argumentation is refuted 
by the fact of the souls also being infinite. You indeed 
maintained that, if the souls are really separate, they must 
necessarily have a definite number like beans, mustard- 
seeds, earthen vessels, and so on ; but these instances are 
beside the point, as earthen vessels, and so on, are also 
infinite