Sacred Books East Various Oriental Scholars with Index. 50 vols Max Muller Oxford 1879.1910.

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Lin

f
The New York Public Library
Astor, Lenox & Tilden Foundations

aS
* * * ?

The R. Heber Newhon

Collection

Presented by His Children

THE

SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

[48]

HENRY FROWDE, M.A.
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
LONDON, EDINBURGH
NEW YORK

THE

SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

TRANSLATED
BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MULLER

VOL. XLVIII

@rford
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1904

294
wid

pe - ove
sages eee, ie hes
All rights reserved) ~"°°°" ~*~ i
(Az rigi τ νον, eat
- pan

pet et ate

THE NEW YORK

sereith

ASTCP, L7 NOX ATT:
TILDBN FOC !OATIONS
R 1934 L

OXFORD
PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
BY HORACE HART, M.A.
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

THE

V EDANTA-SOTRAS

WITH THE COMMENTARY OF
RAMANUGA

TRANSLATED BY

GEORGE THIBAUT

PART III

@rford
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1904

[All rights reserved}

CONTENTS.

VEDANTA-SOTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY
OF RAMANUGA.

INTRODUCTION : ; . 3 : ἥ a ᾿ ἜΣ
Apuyfya I.
Pada I : : ‘ ἢ ὃ : ᾿ : ; 3
Pada II ξ : ἢ ν᾽ : : : : ᾿ 255
Pada III 5 : ; ‘ ; ; ὃ ᾿ 2 296
Pada IV 3 : 5 2 : ἢ ᾿ Ξ : 354
Apnydya 11.
Pada I : ᾿ ; . , : : : 4 408
Pada II 2 ‘ : i Β : < ; : 480
Péda II : . * ἢ " . ; : ᾿ 532
Pada IV ᾿ : ᾿ Ε ; : : ὃ : 568
Αρησάγυαᾳ III.
Pada I 2 : : ‘ . ‘ ὲ : i 584
P&éda II : : ‘ 2 5 : : : : 601
Pda III ᾿ ᾿ Ξ ‘ ; . . ; : 629
Pada IV % : F : é ᾿ Ἴ : é 686
Apuydya IV.
Pada I é ‘ : : ᾿ ‘ ; 3 : 715
Pada II : ‘ . : Ἶ ᾿ A : Σ 728
P4da III Σ : : 4 ‘ ὶ : : : 144
Pada IV ὃ : : : ς : ᾿ Ρ ; 155

Inpexss sy Dr. M. Winternitz:—
Index of Quotations : , j ᾿ . ᾿ 173

Index of Sanskrit Words . : : : ; : 782
Index of Names and Subjects . : . ἢ : 489
Corrigenda. δὲ, wey 4 ee ot ane 796

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the
Translations of the Sacred Books of the East . ᾳ 197

INTRODUCTION.

In the Introduttion to the first volume of the translation
of the ‘ Ved4nta-Sitras with Santkara’s Commentary’ (vol.
xxxiv of this Series) I have dwelt at some length on the
interest which Ram4anuga’s Commentary may claim—as

being, on the one hand, the fullest exposition of what may
be called the Theistic Vedanta, and as supplying us, on
the other, with means of penetrating to the true meaning
of Badarayana’s Aphorisms. I do not wish to enter here
into a fuller discussion of R&amAnuga’s work in either of
these aspects; an adequate treatment of them would, more-
over, require considerably more space than is at my
disposal. Some very useful material for the right under-
standing of Ramdnuga’s work is to be found in the

‘Analytical Outline of Contents’ which Messrs. M. Ran-

gakarya and M. B. Varadar4ga Aiyangar have prefixed to

the first volume of their scholarly translation of the

Sribhashya (Madras, 1899).

The question as to what the Sitras really teach is a
critical, not a philosophical one. This distinction seems
to have been imperfectly realised by several of those
critics, writing in India, who have examined the views ex-
pressed in my Introduction to the translation of Sankara’s
Commentary. A writer should not be taxed with ‘ philo-
sophic incompetency,’ ‘hopeless theistic bias due to early
training,’ and the like, simply because he, on the basis of
a purely critical investigation, considers himself entitled to
maintain that a certain ancient document sets forth one
philosophical view rather than another. I have nowhere
expressed an opinion as to the comparative philosophical
value of the systems of Sankara and Rém4nuga; not
because I have no definite opinions on this point, but
because to introduce them into a critical enquiry would
be purposeless if not objectionable. ᾿

The question as to the true meaning of the Sftras is

x INTRODUCTION.

no doubt of some interest; although the interest of
problems of this kind may easily be over-estimated.
Among the remarks of critics on my treatment of this
problem I have found little of solid value. The main argu-
ments which I have set forth, not so much in favour of
the adequacy of RamAnuga’s interpretation, as against the
validity of Sankarazarya’s understanding of the Sdtras,
appear to me not to have been touched. I do not by any
means consider the problem a hopeless one ; but its solution
will not be advanced, in any direction, but by those who
will be at the trouble of submitting the entire body of the
Sdtras to a new and detailed investigation, availing them-
selves to the full of the help that is to be derived from the
study of all the existing Commentaries.

The present translation of the Sribhashya claims to be
faithful on the whole, although I must acknowledge that
I have aimed rather at making it intelligible and, in a
certain sense, readable than scrupulously accurate. If
I had to rewrite it, I should feel inclined to go even further
in the same direction. Indian Philosophy would, in my
opinion, be more readily and widely appreciated than it is
at present, if the translators of philosophical works had been
somewhat more concerned to throw their versions into a form
less strange and repellent to the western reader than literal
renderings from technical Sanskrit must needs be in many
passages. I am not unaware of the peculiar dangers of
the plan now advocated—among which the most obvious
is the temptation it offers to the translator of deviating
from the text more widely than regard for clearness would
_ absolutely require. And I am conscious of having failed
in this respect in more than one instance. In other
cases I have no doubt gone astray through an imperfect
understanding of the author’s meaning. The fact is, that
as yet the time has hardly come for fully adequate
translations of comprehensive works of the type of the
Sribhashya, the authors of which wrote with reference—
in many cases tacit—to an immense and highly technical
philosophical literature which is only just beginning to be
studied, and comprehended in part, by European scholars.

INTRODUCTION. xi

It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the help
which I have received from various quarters in preparing this
translation. Pamsdit Gangddhara SAstrin, C. I. E., of the
Benares Sanskrit College, has, with unwearying kindness
and patience, supplied me throughout with comments of
his own on difficult sections of the text. Paxdit Svamin
Rama Misra SAstrin has rendered me frequent assistance
in the earlier portion of my task. And to Mr. A. Venis, the
learned Principal of the Benares Sanskrit College, I am
indebted for most instructive notes on some passages of
a peculiarly technical and abstruse character. Nor can

I conclude without expressing my sense of obligation to

Colonel G. A. Jacob, whose invaluable ‘Concordance to
the Principal Upanishads’ lightens to an incalculable
degree the task of any scholar who is engaged in work
bearing on the Vedanta.

|

ΡΝ

ΙΝ oN ae

VEDANTA-SOTRAS

WITH

RAMANUGA’S SRIBHASHYA.

-

(48) 5

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FIRST ADHYAYA.
FIRST PADA.

May my mind be filled with devotion towards the
highest Brahman, the abode of Lakshmi; who is luminously
revealed in the Upanishads; who in sport produces, sus-
tains, and reabsorbs the entire Universe; whose only aim
is to foster the manifold classes of beings that humbly
worship him.

The nectar of the teaching of Pardsara’s son (Vy4sa),—
which was brought up from the middle of the milk-ocean
of the Upanishads—which restores to life the souls whose
vital strength had departed owing to the heat of the fire
of transmigratory existence—which was well guarded by
the teachers of ofd—which was obscured by the mutual
conflict of manifold opinions,—may intelligent men daily
enjoy that as it is now presented to them in my words,

The lengthy explanation (vritti) of the Brahma-sdtras
which was composed by the Reverend Bodhayana has
been abridged by former teachers; according to their
views the words of the Sftras will be explained in this
present work.

1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.

In this SQtra the word ‘then’ expresses immediate
sequence ; the word ‘therefore’ intimates that what has
taken place (viz. the study of the karmakazda of the Veda)
constitutes the reason (of the enquiry into Brahman). For
the fact is that the enquiry into (lit. ‘the desire to know’)
Brahman—the fruit of which enquiry is infinite in nature
and permanent—follows immediately in the case of him
who, having read the Veda together with its auxiliary

B2

4 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

disciplines, has reached the knowledge that the fruit of
mere works is limited and non-permanent, and hence has
conceived the desire of final release.

The compound ‘brahmagig#4s4’ is to be explained as
‘the enquiry of Brahman,’ the genitive case ‘of Brahman’
being understood to denote the object ; in agreement with
the special rule as to the meaning of the genitive case,
Paxini II, 3,65. It might be said that even if we accepted
the general meaning of the genitive case—which is that
of connexion in general—Brahman’s position (in the above
compound) as an object would be established by the
circumstance that the ‘enquiry’ demands an object ; but
in agreement with the principle that the direct denota-
tion of a word is to be preferred to a meaning inferred
we take the genitive case ‘of Brahman’ as denoting the
object.

The word ‘Brahman’ denotes the highest Person (puru-
shottama), who is essentially free from all imperfections
and possesses numberless classes of auspicious qualities of
unsurpassable excellence. The term ‘Brahman’ is applied
to any things which possess the quality of greatness
(brthattva, from the root ‘brih’); but primarily denotes
that which possesses greatness, of essential nature as well
as of qualities, in unlimited fulness; and such is only the
Lord of all. Hence the word ‘Brahman’ primarily denotes
him alone, and in a secondary derivative sense only those
things which possess some small part of the Lord’s quali-
ties ; for it would be improper to assume several meanings
for the word (so that it would denote primarily or directly
more than one thing). The case is analogous to that of
the term ‘bhagavat!.’ The Lord only is enquired into,
for the sake of immortality, by all those who are afflicted
with the triad of pain. Hence the Lord of all is that
Brahman which, according to the Sdtra, constitutes the
object of enquiry. The word ‘gig#4sa’ is a desiderative
formation meaning ‘desire to know.’ And as in the

ὁ «Bhagavat’ denotes primarily the Lord, the Divinity ; second-
arily any holy person.

1 aDHYAyA, 1 PADA, 1. 5

case of any desire the desired object is the chief thing,
the Sitra means to enjoin knowledge — which is the
object of the desire of knowledge. The purport of the
entire Sftra then is as follows: ‘Since the fruit of
works known through the earlier part of the Mim4sms4
is limited and non-permanent, and since the fruit of the
knowledge of Brahman—which knowledge is to be reached
through the latter part of the Mim4ms4—is unlimited and
permanent; for this reason Brahman is to be known, after
the knowledge of works has previously taken place.’—The
same meaning is expressed by the Vrittikara when saying
‘after the comprehension of works has taken place there
follows the enquiry into Brahman.’ And that the enquiry
into works and that into Brahman constitute one body
of doctrine, he (the Vrittikéra) will declare later on ‘this
S4riraka-doctrine is connected with Gaimini’s doctrine as
contained in sixteen adhyayas; this proves the two to
constitute one body of doctrine.’ Hence the earlier and
the later Mim4ms4 are separate only in so far as there
is a difference of matter to be taught by each ; in the same
way as the two halves of the Parva Mimams4-sitras, con-
sisting of six adhydyas each, are separate’; and as each
adhydya is separate. The entire Mim4ms4-s4stra—which
begins with the Sdtra ‘Now therefore the enquiry into
religious duty’ and concludes with the Sitra ‘(From there
is) no return on account of scriptural statement ’—has,
owing to the special character of the contents, a definite
order of internal succession. This is as follows. At first
the precept ‘one is to learn one’s own text (svadhydya)’
enjoins the apprehension of that aggregate of syllables
which is called ‘ Veda, and is here referred to as ‘ sva-
dhy4ya.’ Next there arises the desire to know of what
nature the ‘ Learning’ enjoined is to be, and how it is to
be done. Here there come in certain injunctions such as

1 The first six books of the Parva Mim4ms4-sfitras give rules
for the fundamental forms of the sacrifice ; while the last six books
teach how these rules are to be applied to the so-called modified
forms.

6 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

‘Let a Brahmaza be initiated in his eighth year’ and ‘ The
teacher is to make him recite the Veda’; and certain rules
about special observances and restrictions—such as ‘ having
performed the upakarman on the full moon of Sravana
or Praush¢kapada according to prescription, he is to study
the sacred verses for four months and a half’—which enjoin
all the required details.

From all these it is understood that the study en-
joined has for its result the apprehension of the aggregate
of syllables called Veda, on the part of a pupil who has
been initiated by a teacher sprung from a good family,
leading a virtuous life, and possessing purity of soul;
who practises certain special observances and_restric-
tions ; and who learns by repeating what is recited by the
teacher.

And this study of the Veda is of the nature of a samsk4ra
of the text, since the form of the injunction ‘the Veda is to
be studied’ shows that the Veda is the object (of the
action of studying). By a samskara is understood an action
whereby something is fitted to produce some other effect ;
and that the Veda should be the object of such a samskara
is quite appropriate, since it gives rise to the knowledge
of the four chief ends of human action—viz. religious duty,
wealth, pleasure, and final release—and of the means to
effect them; and since it helps to effect those ends by
itself also, viz. by mere mechanical repetition (apart from
any knowledge to which it may give rise).

The injunction as to the study of the Veda thus aims
only at the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables
(constituting the Veda) according to certain rules; it is
in this way analogous to the recital of mantras.

It is further observed that the Veda thus apprehended
through reading spontaneously gives rise to the ideas of
certain things subserving certain purposes. A person,
therefore, who has formed notions of those things imme-
diately, i.e. on the mere apprehension of the text of the
Veda through reading, thereupon naturally applies himself
to the study of the Mim4msa, which consists in a methodical
discussion of the sentences constituting the text of the

1 ADHYAyA, 1 PADA, I. 7

Veda, and has for its result the accurate determination of
the nature of those things and their different modes.
Through this study the student ascertains the character
of the injunctions of work which form part of the Veda,
and observes that all work leads only to non-permanent
results ; and as, on the other hand, he immediately becomes
aware that the Upanishad sections—which form part of
the Veda which he has apprehended through reading—
refer to an infinite and permanent result, viz. immortality,
he applies himself to the study of the Sariraka-Mim4smsa,
which consists in a systematic discussion of the VedAnta-
texts, and has for its result the accurate determination
of their sense. That the fruit of mere works is transitory,
while the result of the knowledge of Brahman is something
permanent, the Ved4nta-texts declare in many places—
‘And as here the world acquired by work perishes, so
there the world acquired by merit perishes’ (K4. Up. VIII,
1,6); * That work of his has an end’ (Bré. Up. III, 8, 10);
‘ By non-permanent works the Permanent is not obtained’
(Ka. Up. I, 2, 10); ‘Frail indeed are those boats, the
sacrifices’ (Mu. Up. I, 2, 7); ‘Let a Brahmaxa, after he
has examined all these worlds that are gained by works,
acquire freedom from all desires. What is not made can-
not be gained by what is made. To understand this, let
the pupil, with fuel in his hand, go to a teacher who is
learned and dwells entirely in Brahman. To that pupil
who has approached him respectfully, whose mind is alto-
gether calm, the wise teacher truly told that knowledge
of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable
true Person’ (Mu. Up. I, 2, 12, 13).—‘ Told’ here means
‘he is to tell.’—QOn the other hand, ‘He who knows Brah-
man attains the Highest’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); ‘He who
sees this does not see death’ (Kz. Up. VII, 26, 2); ‘He
becomes a self-ruler’ (KA. Up. VII, 25, 2); ‘ Knowing him
he becomes immortal here’ (Taitt. Ar. III, 12,7); ‘Having
known him he passes over death ; there is no other path to
go’ (Svet. Up. VI, 15); ‘Having known as separate his Self
and the Mover, pleased thereby he goes to immortality’
(Svet. Up. I, 6).

8 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

But—an objection here is raised—the mere learning of the
Veda with its auxiliary disciplines gives rise to the know-
ledge that the heavenly world and the like are the results
of works, and that all such results are transitory, while
immortality is the fruit of meditation on Brahman. Pos-
sessing such knowledge, a person desirous of final release
may at once proceed to the enquiry into Brahman; and
what need is there of a systematic consideration of religious
duty (i.e. of the study of the Parva Mim4ms4)?—If this
reasoning were valid, we reply, the person desirous of
release need not even apply himself to the study of the
S&riraka Mim4msé, since Brahman is known from the mere
reading of the Veda with its auxiliary disciplines.—True.
Such knowledge arises indeed immediately (without deeper
enquiry). But a matter apprehended in this immediate
way is not raised above doubt and mistake. Hence a sys-
tematic discussion of the Vedanta-texts must be under-
taken in order that their sense may be fully ascertained.—
We agree. But you will have to admit that for the very
same reason we must undertake a systematic enquiry into
religious duty !

THE SMALL PORVAPAKSHA..

But—a further objection is urged—as that which has to
precede the systematic enquiry into Brahman we should
assign something which that enquiry necessarily presup-
poses. The enquiry into the nature of duty, however, does
not form such a prerequisite, since a consideration of the
Vedanta-texts may be undertaken by any one who has
read those texts, even if he is not acquainted with works.
—But in the Vedanta-texts there are enjoined medita-
tions on the Udgitha and the like which are matters
auxiliary to works; and such meditations are not possible
for him who is not acquainted with those works!—You
who raise this objection clearly are ignorant of what kind
of knowledge the Sariraka Mtm4ms4 is concerned with!
What that sastra aims at is to destroy completely that

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, I. 9

wrong knowledge which is the root of all pain, for man,
liable to. birth, old age, and death, and all the numberless
other evils connected with transmigratory existence—evils
that spring from the view, due to beginningless Nescience,
that there is plurality of existence; and to that end the
sastra endeavours to establish the knowledge of the unity
of the Self. Now to this knowledge, the knowledge of
works—which is based on the assumption of plurality of
existence—is not only useless but even opposed. The
consideration of the Udgitha and the like, which is sup-
plementary to works only, finds a place in the Vedanta-
texts, only because like them it is of the nature of know-
ledge; but it has no direct connexion with the true topic
of those texts. Hence some prerequisite must be indicated
which has reference to the principal topic of the s4stra.—
Quite so; and this prerequisite is just the knowledge of
works ; for scripture declares that final release results from
knowledge with works added. The Sitra-writer himself
says further on ‘And there is need of all works, on account
of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like’ (Ve.
Sd. III, 4,26). And if the required works were not known,
one could not determine which works have to be combined
with knowledge and which not. Hence the knowledge
of works is just the necessary prerequisite—Not so, we
reply. That which puts an end to Nescience is exclu-
sively the knowledge of Brahman, which is pure intelligence
and antagonistic to all plurality. For final release consists
just in the cessation of Nescience; how then can works—to
which there attach endless differences connected with caste,
asrama, object to be accomplished, means and mode of
accomplishment, &c.—ever supply a means for the cessation
of ignorance, which is essentially the cessation of the view
that difference exists? That works, the results of which
are transitory, are contrary to final release, and that such
release can be effected through knowledge only, scripture
declares in many places; compare all the passages quoted
above (p. 7).

As to the assertion that knowledge requires sacrifices
and other works, we remark that—as follows from the

10 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

essential contrariety of knowledge and works, and as further
appears from an accurate consideration of the words of
scripture—pious works can contribute only towards the.
rise of the desire of knowledge, in so far namely as they
clear the internal organ (of knowledge), but can have no
influence on the production of the fruit, i.e. knowledge
itself. For the scriptural passage concerned runs as fol-
lows: ‘ Brahmazas desire to know him by the study of the
Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, &c. (Bri. Up. XI, 4, 22).

According to this passage, the desire only of knowledge
springs up through works ; while another text teaches that
calmness, self-restraint, and so on, are the direct means for
the origination of knowledge itself. (Having become tran-
quil, calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, he is
to see the Self within the Self (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 23).)

The process thus is as follows. After the mind of a man
has been cleaned of all impurities through works per-
formed in many preceding states of existence, without a
view to special forms of reward, there arises in him the
desire of knowledge, and thereupon—through knowledge
itself originated by certain scriptural texts—‘ Being only,
this was in the beginning, one only without a second’
(KA. Up. VI, 1, 2); ‘Truth, Knowledge, the Infinite, is
Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. 11, 1); ‘ Without parts, without actions,
calm, without fault, without taint’ (Svet. Up. VI, 19) ; ‘ This
Self is Brahman’ (Bré. Up. II, 5, 19); ‘Thou art that’ (KA.
Up. VI, 9, 7), Nescience comes to an end. Now, ‘hear-
ing,’ ‘reflection, and ‘ meditation, are helpful towards
cognising the sense of these Vedic texts. ‘Hearing’
(stavana) means the apprehension of the sense of scripture,
together with collateral arguments, from a teacher who
possesses the true insight, viz. that the Ved4nta-texts
establish the doctrine of the unity of the Self. ‘ Reflec-
tion’ (mananam) means the confirmation within oneself of
the sense taught by the teacher, by means of arguments
showing it alone to be suitable. ‘ Meditation ’ (nididhydsa-
nam) finally means the constant holding of that sense before
one’s mind, so as to dispel thereby the antagonistic begin-
ningless imagination of plurality. In the case of him who

I ADHYAYA, I PADA; I. II

through ‘ hearing,’ ‘reflection,') and meditation, has dis-
dispelled the entire imagination of plurality, the knowledge
of the sense of Vedanta-texts puts an end to Nescience ;
and what we therefore require is a statement of the indis-
pensable prerequisites of such ‘ hearing,’ ‘ reflection,’ and so
on. Now of such prerequisites there are four, viz. dis-
crimination of what is permanent and what is non-perma-
nent; the full possession of calmness of mind, self-restraint
and similar means; the renunciation of all enjoyment of
fruits here below as well as in the next world; and the
desire of final release.

Without these the desire of knowledge cannot arise;
and they are therefore known, from the very nature of the
matter, to be necessary prerequisites. To sum up: The
root of bondage is the unreal view of plurality which itself
has its root in Nescience that conceals the true being of
Brahman. Bondage itself thus is unreal, and is on that
account cut short, together with its root, by mere know-
ledge. Such knowledge is originated by texts such as
‘ That art thou’; and work is of no help either towards its
nature, or its origination, or its fruit (i.e. release). It is
on the other hand helpful towards the desire of knowledge,
which arises owing to an increase of the element of good-
ness (sattva) in the soul, due to the destruction of the
elements of passion (ragas) and darkness (tamas) which are
the root of all moral evil. This use is referred to in the
text quoted above, ‘Brahmazas wish to know him,’ &c.
As, therefore, the knowledge of works is of no use towards
the knowledge of Brahman, we must acknowledge as the
prerequisite of the latter knowledge the four means men-
tioned above.

THE SMALL SIDDHANTA.

To this argumentation we make the following reply.
We admit that release consists only in the cessation of
Nescience, and that this cessation results entirely from
the knowledge of Brahman. But a distinction has here
to be made regarding the nature of this knowledge which

12 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the Vedanta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of
putting an end to Nescience, Is it merely the know-
ledge of the sense of sentences which originates from the
sentences? or is it knowledge in the form of meditation
(up4sana) which has the knowledge just referred to as its
antecedent? It cannot be knowledge of the former kind ;
for such knowledge springs from the mere apprehension of
the sentence, apart from any special injunction, and more-
over we do not observe that the cessation of Nescience is
effected by such knowledge merely. Our adversary will
perhaps attempt to explain things in the following way.
The Ved4nta-texts do not, he will say, produce that know-
ledge which makes an end of Nescience, so long as the
imagination of plurality is not dispelled. And the fact that
such knowledge, even when produced, does not at once and
for every one put a stop to the view of plurality by no means
subverts my opinion; for, to mention an analogous in-
stance, the double appearance of the moon—presenting itself
to a person affected with a certain weakness of vision—does
not come to an end as soon as the oneness of the moon
has been apprehended by reason. Moreover, even without
having come to an end, the view of plurality is powerless to
effect further bondage, as soon as the root, i.e. Nescience,
has once been cut. But this defence we are unable to
admit. It is impossible that knowledge should not arise
when its means, i.e. the texts conveying knowledge, are once
present. And we observe that even when there exists an
antagonistic imagination (interfering with the rise of know-
ledge), information given by competent persons, the pres-
ence of characteristic marks (on which a correct inference
may be based), and the like give rise to knowledge which
sublates the erroneous imagination. Nor can we admit
that even after the sense of texts has been apprehended,
the view of plurality may continue owing to some small
remainder of beginningless imagination. For as this ima-
gination which constitutes the means for the view of
plurality is itself false, it is necessarily put an end to by
the rise of true knowledge. If this did not take place, that
imagination would never come to an end, since there is no

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 13

other means but knowledge to effect its cessation. To say
that the view of plurality, which is the effect of that imagi-
nation, continues even after its root has been cut, is mere
nonsense. The instance of some one seeing the moon
double is not analogous. For in his case the non-cessation
of wrong knowledge explains itself from the circumstance
that the cause of wrong knowledge, viz. the real defect of
the eye which does not admit of being sublated by know-
ledge, is not removed, although that which would sublate
wrong knowledge is near. On the other hand, effects,
such as fear and the like, may come to an end because they
can be sublated by means of knowledge of superior force.
Moreover, if it were true that knowledge arises through the
dispelling of the imagination of plurality, the rise of know-
ledge would really never be brought about. For the
imagination of plurality has through gradual growth in the
course of beginningless time acquired an infinite strength,
and does not therefore admit of being dispelled by the
comparatively weak conception of non-duality. Hence
we conclude that the knowledge which the Vedanta-texts
aim at inculcating is a knowledge other than the mere
knowledge of the sense of sentences, and denoted by
‘dhyAna,’ ‘up4sana’ (i.e. meditation), and similar terms.
With this agree scriptural texts such as ‘Having known
it, let him practise meditation’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); ‘He
who, having searched out the Self, knows it’ (KA. Up.
VII, 7, 1); ‘ Meditate on the Self as Om’ (Mu. Up.
II, 2, 6); ‘Having known that, he is freed from the jaws
of death’ (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15); ‘Let a man meditate on the
Self only as his world’ (Βγί, Up. I, 4, 15); ‘The Self
is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be medi-
tated on’ (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); ‘That we must search out,
that we must try to understand’ (K4. Up. VIII, 7, 1).
(According to the principle of the oneness of purport
of the different sakh4s) all these texts must be viewed as
agreeing in meaning with the injunction of meditation
contained in the passage quoted from the Bz. Up.; and
what they enjoin is therefore meditation. In the first
and second passages quoted, the words ‘having known’ and

14 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

‘having searched out’ (vig#a4ya ; anuvidya) contain a mere
reference to (not injunction of) the apprehension of the
meaning of texts, such apprehension subserving medi-
tation; while the injunction of meditation (which is the
true purport of the passages) is conveyed by the clauses
‘let him practise meditation’ (prag#4m kurvita) and ‘he
knows it.’ In the same way the clause ‘the Self is to be
heard’ is a mere anuv&da, i.e. a mere reference to what
is already established by other means; for a person who
has read the Veda observes that it contains instruction
about matters connected with certain definite purposes, and
then on his own account applies himself to methodical
‘hearing,’ in order definitely to ascertain these matters;
‘hearing’ thus is established already. In the same way
the clause ‘the Self is to be reflected upon’ is a mere
anuvada of reflection which is known as a means of con-
‘firming what one has ‘heard.’ It is therefore meditation
only which all those texts enjoin. In agreement with
this a later Sdtra also says, ‘ Repetition more than once,
on account of instruction’ (Ve. Sd. IV, 1,1). That the
knowledge intended to be enjoined as the means of final
release is of the nature of meditation, we conclude from the
circumstance that the terms ‘knowing’ and ‘meditating’
are seen to be used in place of each other in the earlier
and later parts of Vedic texts. Compare the following
passages: ‘Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,’
and ‘he who knows this shines and warms through his
celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance’ (KA. Up.
III, 18, 1; 6). And ‘He does not know him, for he is not
complete,’ and ‘Let men meditate on him as the Self’
(Bri. Up. I, 4, 7). And ‘He who knows what he knows,’
and ‘Teach me the deity on which you meditate’ (KA.
Up. IV, 1, 6; 2, 2).

‘Meditation’ means steady remembrance, i.e. a con-
tinuity of steady remembrance, uninterrupted like the flow
of oil; in agreement with the scriptural passage which
declares steady remembrance to be the means of release,
‘on the attainment of remembrance all the ties are
loosened’ (ΚΑ. Up. VII, 26, 2). Such remembrance is of

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 15

the same character (form) as seeing (intuition); for the
passage quoted has the same purport as the following one,
‘The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved,
and all the works of that man perish when he has been
seen who is high and low’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). And this
being so, we conclude that the passage ‘the Self is to be
seen’ teaches that ‘ Meditation’ has the character of ‘see-
ing’ or ‘intuition. And that remembrance has the
character of ‘seeing’ is due to the element of imagination
(representation) which prevails in it. All this has been set
forth at length by the Vakyakara. ‘Knowledge (vedana)
means meditation (updsana), scripture using the word in
that sense’ ; i.e. in all Upanishads that knowledge which is
enjoined as the means of final release is Meditation. The
Vakyak4ra then propounds a pfrvapaksha (prim facie
view), ‘Once he is to make the meditation, the matter
enjoined by scripture being accomplished thereby, as in the
case of the pray4gas and the like’; and then sums up
against this in the words ‘but (meditation) is established
on account of the term meditation’; that means—know-
ledge repeated more than once (i.e. meditation) is deter-
mined to be the means of Release.—The Vakyak4ra then
goes on ‘ Meditation is steady remembrance, on the ground
of observation and statement.’ That means—this know-
ledge, of the form of meditation, and repeated more than
once, is of the nature of steady remembrance.

Such remembrance has been declared to be of the
character of ‘seeing,’ and this character of seeing consists
in its possessing the character of immediate presentation
(pratyakshat4). With reference to remembrance, which thus
acquires the character of immediate presentation and is the
means of final release, scripture makes a further determina-
tion, viz. in the passage Ka. Up. II, 23, ‘That Self cannot
be gained by the study of the Veda (“reflection”), nor by
thought (“ meditation ”), nor by much hearing. Whom the
Self chooses, by him it may be gained; to him the Self
reveals its being.’ This text says at first that mere hear-
ing, reflection, and meditation do not suffice to gain the
Self, and then declares, ‘Whom the Self chooses, by him

16 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

it may be gained.’ Now a ‘chosen’ one means a most
beloved person; the relation being that he by whom that
Self is held most dear is most dear to the Self. That the
Lord (bhagavan) himself endeavours that this most beloved
person should gain the Self, he himself declares in the
following words, ‘To those who are constantly devoted and
worship with love I give that knowledge by which they
reach me’ (Bha. Gi. X, 10), and ‘To him who has know-
ledge I am dear above all things, and he is dear to me’
(VII, 17). Hence, he who possesses remembrance, marked
by the character of immediate presentation (sakshatk4ra),
and which itself is dear above all things since the object
remembered is such; he, we say, is chosen by the highest
Self, and by him the highest Self is gained. Steady
remembrance of this kind is designated by the word
‘devotion’ (bhakti); for this term has the same meaning
as updsand (meditation). For this reason scripture and
smrtti agree in making the following declarations, ‘A man
knowing him passes over death’ (Svet. Up. III, 8); ‘Know-
ing him thus he here becomes immortal’ (Taitt. Ar. III,
12,7); ‘Neither by the Vedas, nor by austerities, nor by gifts,
nor by sacrifice can I be so seen as thou hast seen me. But
by devotion exclusive I may in this form be known and
seen in truth, O Arguna, and also be entered into’ (Bha.
Gf. XI, 53, 54); ‘That highest Person, O Partha, may be
obtained by exclusive devotion’ (VIII, 22).

That of such steady remembrance sacrifices and so on
are means will be declared later on (Ve. Sd. III, 4, 26).
Although sacrifices and the like are enjoined with a view
to the origination of knowledge (in accordance with the
passage ‘They desire to know,’ Bré. Up. IV, 4, 22), it is
only knowledge in the form of meditation which—being
daily practised, constantly improved by repetition, and
continued up to death—is the means of reaching Brahman,

and hence all the works connected with the different -

conditions of life are to be performed throughout life only
for the purpose of originating such knowledge. This the
Satrakara declares in Ve. SQ. IV, 1, 12; 16; III, 4, 33,
and other places. The V4akyakara also declares that

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 17

steady remembrance results only from abstention, and so
on; his words being ‘ This (viz. steady remembrance=
meditation) is obtained through abstention (viveka), freeness
of mind (vimoka), repetition (abhy4sa), works (kriy4),
virtuous conduct (kaly4za), freedom from dejection (ana-
vas4da), absence of exultation (anuddharsha) ; according to
feasibility and scriptural statement.’ The Vakyakdra also
gives definitions of all these terms. Abstention (viveka)
means keeping the body clean from all food, impure either
owing to species (such as the flesh of certain animals), or
abode (such as food belonging to a KAndAla or the like),
or accidental cause (such as food into which a hair or the
like has fallen). The scriptural passage authorising this
point is Kk. Up. VII, 26, ‘The food being pure, the mind
becomes pure ; the mind being pure, there results steady
remembrance.’ Freeness of mind (vimoka) means absence
of attachment to desires. The authoritative passage here
is ‘Let him meditate with a calm mind’ (KA. Up. III, 14, 1).
Repetition means continued practice. For this point the
Bhashya-kAra quotes an authoritative text from Smriti,
viz.: ‘Having constantly been absorbed in the thought of
that being’ (sad4 tadbhavabh4vita%z ; Bha. Gi. VITI, 6).—By
‘works’ (kriya) is understood the performance, according
to one’s ability, of the five great sacrifices. The authori-
tative passages here are ‘This person who performs works
is the best of those who know Brahman’ (Mu. Up. III,
1,4); and ‘Him Brahmazas seek to know by recitation
of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting’
(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).—By virtuous conduct (kalyA#4ni) are
meant truthfulness, honesty, kindness, liberality, gentleness,
absence of covetousness. Confirmatory texts are ‘ By truth
he is to be obtained’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 5), and ‘to them
belongs that pure Brahman-world’ (Pr. Up. I, 16).—That
lowness of spirit or want of cheerfulness which results from
unfavourable conditions of place or time and the remem-
brance of causes of sorrow, is denoted by the term ‘dejec-
tion’; the contrary of this is ‘freedom from dejection.’
The relevant scriptural passage is ‘This Self cannot be
obtained by one lacking in strength’ (Mu. Up. III, 2, 4).

[48] ς

18 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

—‘Exultation’ is that satisfaction of mind which springs
from circumstances opposite to those just mentioned ; the
contrary is ‘absence of exultation.’ Overgreat satisfaction
also stands in the way (of meditation). The scriptural
passage for this is ‘Calm, subdued,’ &c. (Brs. Up. IV, 4,
23).—What the Vakyak4ra means to say is therefore that
knowledge is realised only through the performance of the
duly prescribed works, on the part of a person fulfilling all
the enumerated conditions.

Analogously another scriptural passage says ‘He who
knows both knowledge and non-knowledge together, over-
coming death by non-knowledge reaches the Immortal
through knowledge’ (fs. Up. 11). Here the term ‘non-
knowledge’ denotes the works enjoined on the different
castes and 4sramas; and the meaning of the text is that,
having discarded by such works death, i.e. the previous
works antagonistic to the origination of knowledge, a man
reaches the Immortal, i.e. Brahman, through knowledge.
The non-knowledge of which this passage speaks as being
the means of overcoming death can only mean that which
is other than knowledge, viz. prescribed works. The word
has the same sense in the following passage: ‘Firm in
traditional knowledge he offered many sacrifices, leaning
on the knowledge of Brahman, so as to pass beyond death
by non-knowledge’ (Vi. Pu. VI, 6, 12).—Antagonistic to
knowledge (as said above) are all good and evil actions, and
hence—as equally giving rise to an undesirable result—they
may both be designated as evil. They stand in the way of
the origination of knowledge in so far as they strengthen the
elements of passion and darkness which are antagonistic to
the element of goodness which is the cause of the rise of
knowledge. That evil works stand in the way of such
origination, the following scriptural text declares: ‘He
makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these
worlds do an evil deed’ (Ka. Up. III, 8). That passion
and darkness veil the knowledge of truth while goodness
on the other hand gives rise to it, the Divine one has
declared himself, in the passage ‘From goodness springs
knowledge’ (Bha. Gi. XIV, 17). Hence, in order that

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1. 19

knowledge may arise, evil works have to be got rid of,
and this is effected by the performance of acts of religious
duty not aiming at some immediate result (such as the
heavenly world and the like); according to the text ‘by
works of religious duty he discards all evil.’ Knowledge
which is the means of reaching Brahman, thus requires the
works prescribed for the different 4sramas; and hence
the systematic enquiry into works (i.e. the Parva Mimamsé)
—from which we ascertain the nature of the works required
and also the transitoriness and limitation of the fruits of
mere works— forms a necessary antecedent to the systematic
enquiry into Brahman. Moreover the discrimination of
permanent and non-permanent things, &c. (i.e. the tetrad
of ‘means’ mentioned above, p. 11) cannot be accom-
plished without the study of the Mimams4; for unless we
ascertain all the distinctions of fruits of works, means,
modes of procedure and qualification (on the part of the
agent) we can hardly understand the true nature of works,
their fruits, the transitoriness or non-transitoriness of the
latter, the permanence of the Self; and similar matters.
That those conditions (viz. nityAnityavastuviveka, sama,
dama, &c.) are ‘means’ must be determined on the basis
of viniyoga (‘application’ which determines the relation
of principal and subordinate matters—angin and afga);
and this viniyoga which depends on direct scriptural state-
ment (sruti), inferential signs (liiga), and so on, is treated
of in the third book of the Parva Mimamsé-sitras.. And
further we must, in this connexion, consider also the
meditations on the Udgitha and similar things—which,
although aiming at the success of works, are of the nature
of reflections on Brahman (which is viewed in them under
various forms)—and as such have reference to knowledge of
Brahman. Those works also (with which these meditations
are connected) aim at no special results of their own, and
produce and help to perfect the knowledge of Brahman:
they are therefore particularly connected with the enquiry
into Brahman. And that these meditations presuppose
an understanding of the nature of works is admitted by
every one.
C2

20 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

THE GREAT PORVAPAKSHA.
The only Reality is Brahman.

Brahman, which is pure intelligence and opposed to all
difference, constitutes the only reality ; and everything else,
i.e. the plurality of manifold knowing subjects, objects of
knowledge, and acts of knowledge depending on those
two, is only imagined on (or ‘in’) that Brahman, and is
essentially false.

‘In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which
is, one only without a second’ (Kz. Up. VI, 2,1); ‘ The
higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is
apprehended’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5); ‘That which cannot be
seen nor seized, which has no eyes nor ears, no hands nor
feet, the permanent, the all-pervading, the most subtle, the
imperishable which the wise regard as the source of all
beings’ (Mu. Up. I, 1,6); ‘ The True, knowledge, the Infinite
is Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); ‘He who is without parts,
without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint ’ (νεῖ,
Up. VI, 19); ‘By whom it is not thought, by him it is
thought; he by whom it is thought knows it not. It
is not known by those who know it, known by those who
do not know it’ (Ke. Up. II, 3); ‘Thou mayest not see
the seer of sight; thou mayest not think the thinker of
thought’ (Br. Up. III, 4,2); ‘ Bliss is Brahman’ (Taitt. Up.
III, 6, 1); ‘All this is that Self’ (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 7);
‘There is here no diversity whatever’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19);
‘From death to death goes he who sees any difference
here’ (Ka. Up. II, 4, 10); ‘For where there is duality as
it were, there one sees the other’; ‘but where the Self has
become all of him, by what means, and whom, should he
see? by what means, and whom, should he know?’ (Bri. Up.
IV, 5, £5); ‘the effect is a name merely which has its
origin in speech; the truth is that (the thing made of clay)
is clay merely’ (KA. Up. VI, 1, 4); ‘for if he makes but
the smallest distinction in it there is fear for him’ (Taitt.
Up. II, 7);—the two following Ved4nta-sitras: III, 2, 11;
III, 2, 3—the following passages from the Vishzu-purdaza :

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 21

‘In which all difference vanishes, which is pure Being,
which is not the object of words, which is known by the
Self only—that knowledge is called Brahman’ (VI, 7, 53) ;
‘Him whose essential nature is knowledge, who is stain-
less in reality’; ‘Him who, owing to erroneous view,
abides in the form of things’ (I, 2, 6); ‘the Reality thou
art alone, there is no other, O Lord of the world!—
whatever matter is seen belongs to thee whose being is
knowledge ; but owing to their erroneous opinion the non-
devout look on it as the form of the world. This whole
world has knowledge for its essential nature, but the
Unwise viewing it as being of the nature of material
things are driven round on the ocean of delusion. Those
however who possess true knowledge and pure minds see
this whole world as having knowledge for its Self, as thy
form, O highest Lord !’ (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.).—‘ Of that Self,
although it exists in one’s own and in other bodies, the
knowledge is of one kind, and that is Reality; those who
maintain duality hold a false view’ (II, 14, 31); ‘If there
is some other one, different from me, then it can be said,
“1 am this and that one is another”’ (II, 13, 86); ‘As
owing to the difference of the holes of the flute the air
equally passing through them all is called by the names
of the different notes of the musical scale ; so it is with the
universal Self’ (II, 14, 32); ‘He is I; he is thou; he is
all: this Universe is his form. Abandon the error of
difference. The king being thus instructed, abandoned
the view of difference, having gained an intuition of Reality’
(II, 16, 24). ‘When that view which gives rise to differ-
ence is absolutely destroyed, who then will make the
untrue distinction between the individual Self and Brah-
man?’ (VI, 7, 94).—The following passages from the
Bhagavad-Gita: ‘I am the Self dwelling within all beings’
(X, 20); ‘ Know me to be the soul within all bodies ’ (XIII,
2); ‘Being there is none, movable or immovable, which is
without me’ (X, 39).—All these and other texts, the purport
of which clearly is instruction as to the essential nature of
things, declare that Brahman only, i.e. non-differenced pure
intelligence is real, while everything else is false.

22 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

The appearance of plurality is due to avidya.

‘Falsehood’ (mithyatva) belongs to what admits of being
terminated by the cognition of the real thing—such cogni-
tion being preceded by conscious activity (not by mere
absence of consciousness or knowledge). The snake, e. g.
which has for its substrate a rope or the like is false; for
it is due to an imperfection (dosha) that the snake is
imagined in (or ‘on’) the rope. In the same way this
entire world, with its distinctions of gods, men, animals,
inanimate matter, and so on, is, owing to an imperfection,
wrongly imagined in the highest Brahman whose substance
is mere intelligence, and therefore is false in so far as it
may be sublated by the cognition of the nature of the real
Brahman. What constitutes that imperfection is beginning-
less Nescience (avidya), which, hiding the truth of things,
gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot be defined either
as something that is or as something that is not.—‘ By the
Untrue they are hidden; of them which are true the
Untrue is the covering’ (ΑΔ. Up. VIII, 3, 1); ‘ Know
M4y4 to be Prakriti, and the great Lord him who is
associated with M4y4’ (Svet. Up. IV, 10); ‘Indra appears
manifold through the Mayas’ (Bvz. Up. II, 5, 19); ‘My
Maya is hard to overcome’ (Bha. Gi. VII, 14); ‘When the
soul slumbering in beginningless Maya awakes’ (Gau. K4.
I, 16)—These and similar texts teach that it is through
beginningless May4 that to Brahman which truly is pure
non-differenced intelligence its own nature hides itself,
and that it sees diversity within itself. As has been said,
‘Because the Holy One is essentially of the nature of
intelligence, the form of all, but not material; therefore
know that all particular things like rocks, oceans, hills and
so on, have proceeded from intelligence?. But when, on

1 In agreement with the use made of this passage by the Pfrva-
pakshin, vig#ana must here be understood in the sense of avidy4.
Vigfanasabdena vividham g#4yatesneneti karanavyutpatty4 =vidy4
sbhidhfyate. Sru. Pra.

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, I. 23

the cessation of all work, everything is only pure intelli-
gence in its own proper form, without any imperfections ;
then no differences—the fruit of the tree of wishes—any
longer exist between things. Therefore nothing whatever,
at any place or any time, exists apart from intelligence:
intelligence, which is one only, is viewed as manifold by
those whose minds are distracted by the effects of their
own works. Intelligence pure, free from stain, free from
grief, free from all contact with desire and other affections,
everlastingly one is the highest Lord—V4A4sudeva apart
from whom nothing exists. I have thus declared to you
the lasting truth of things—that intelligence only is true
and everything else untrue. And that also which is the
cause of ordinary worldly existence has been declared to
you’ (Vi. Pu. II, 12, 39, 40, 43-45).

Avidy& is put an end to by true Knowledge.

Other texts declare that this Nescience comes to an end
through the cognition of the essential unity of the Self
with Brahman which is nothing but non-differenced intelli-
gence. ‘He does not again go to death ;’ ‘He sees this
as one;’ ‘ He who sees this does not see death’ (K%. Up.
VI, 27); ‘When he finds freedom from fear and rest in
that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported,”
then he has obtained the fearless ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7); ‘The
fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved and all
his works perish when he has been beheld who is high and
low’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); ‘ He knows Brahman, he becomes
Brahman only’ (Mu. Up. III, 2,9); ‘Knowing him only
a man passes over death; there is no other path to go’
(Svet. Up. III, 8). In these and similar passages, the term
‘death’ denotes Nescience; analogously to the use of the
term in the following words of Sanatsugata, ‘ Delusion
I call death ; and freedom from delusion I call immortality ’
(Sanatsug. II, 5). The knowledge again of the essential
unity and non-difference of Brahman—which is ascertained
from decisive texts such as ‘The True, knowledge, the
Infinite is Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); ‘ Knowledge, bliss is

24 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Brahman’ (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28)—is confirmed by other
passages, such as ‘Now if a man meditates on another
deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does
not know’ (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10); ‘Let men meditate upon
him as the Self’ (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7); ‘Thou art that’ (KA.
Up. VI, 8,7); ‘Am I thou, O holy deity? and art thou
me, O holy deity ?’; ‘What I am that is he; what he is
that am I.’—This the Sdtrak4ra himself will declare ‘ But
as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us
apprehend (the Lord)’ (Ve. Sa. IV, 1, 3). Thus the Vakya-
kara also, ‘It is the Self—thus one should apprehend (every-
thing), for everything is effected by that.’ And to hold
that by such cognition of the oneness of Brahman essentially
false bondage, together with its cause, comes to an end, is
only reasonable.

Scripture is of greater force than Perception.

But, an objection is raised—how can knowledge, spring-
ing from fhe sacred texts, bring about a cessation of the
view of difference, in manifest opposition to the evidence
of Perception ?—How then, we rejoin, can the knowledge
that this thing is a rope and not a snake bring about, in
opposition to actual perception, the cessation of the (idea
of the) snake ?—You will perhaps reply that in this latter
case there is a conflict between two forms of perception,
while in the case under discussion the conflict is between
direct perception and Scripture which is based on percep-
tion. But against this we would ask the question how, in
the case of a conflict between two equal cognitions, we
decide as to which of the two is refuted (sublated) by the
other. If—as is to be expected—you reply that what
makes the difference between the two is that one of them
is due to a defective cause while the other is not : we point
out that this distinction holds good also in the case of
Scripture and perception being in conflict. It is not con-
siderations as to the equality of conflicting cognitions, as
to their being dependent or independent, and so on, that
determine which of the two sublates the other ; if that were

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 25

the case, the perception which presents to us the flame of
the lamp as one only would not be sublated by the cogni-
tion arrived at by inference that there is a succession of
different flames. Wherever there is a conflict between
cognitions based on two different means of knowledge we
assign the position of the ‘sublated one’ to that which
admits of being accounted for in some other way; while
that cognition which affords no opening for being held
unauthoritative and cannot be accounted for in another
way, is the ‘sublating one?.’ This is the principle on which
the relation between ‘ what sublates’ and ‘ what is sublated’
is decided everywhere. Now apprehension of Brahman—
which is mere intelligence, eternal, pure, free, self-luminous
—is effected by Scripture which rests on endless unbroken
tradition, cannot therefore be suspected of any, even the
least, imperfection, and hence cannot be non-authoritative ;
the state of bondage, on the other hand, with its manifold
distinctions is proved by Perception, Inference, and so on,
which are capable of imperfections and therefore may be
non-authoritative. It is therefore reasonable to conclude
that the state of bondage is put an end to by the appre-
hension of Brahman. And that imperfection of which
Perception—through which we apprehend a world of mani-
fold distinctions—may be assumed to be capable, is so-
called Nescience, which consists in the beginningless wrong
imagination of difference—Well then—a further objection
is raised—let us admit that Scripture is perfect because

1 The distinction is illustrated by the different views Perception
and Inference cause us to take of the nature of the flame of the
lamp. To Perception the flame, as long as it burns, seems one
and the same: but on the ground of the observation that the
different particles of the wick and the oil are consumed in succes-
sion, we infer that there are many distinct flames succeeding one
another. And we accept the Inference as valid, and as sublating
or refuting the immediate perception, because the perceived oneness
of the flame admits of being accounted for ‘ otherwise,’ viz. on the
ground of the many distinct flames originating in such rapid suc-
cession that the eye mistakes them for one. The inference on the
other hand does not admit of being explained in another way.

26 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

resting on an endless unbroken tradition; but must we
then not admit that texts evidently presupposing the view
of duality, as e.g. ‘Let him who desires the heavenly
world offer the Gyotish¢oma-sacrifice ’"—are liable to refuta-
tion ?—True, we reply. As in the case of the Udgatr? and
Pratihartri breaking the chain (not at the same time, but)
in succession}, so here also the earlier texts (which refer
to duality and transitory rewards) are sublated by the later
texts which teach final release, and are not themselves
sublated by anything else.

The texts which represent Brahman as devoid of
qualities have greater force.

The same reasoning applies to those passages in the
Ved4nta-texts which inculcate meditation on the qualified
Brahman, since the highest Brahman is without any quali-
ties.—But consider such passages as ‘He who cognises all,
who knows all’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); ‘His high power is
revealed as manifold, as essential, acting as force and
knowledge’ (Svet. Up. VI, 8); ‘He whose wishes are true,
whose purposes are true’ (KA. Up. VIII, 1, 5); how can
these passages, which clearly aim at defining the nature
of Brahman, be liable to refutation ?—Owing to the greater
weight, we reply, of those texts which set forth Brahman
as devoid of qualities. ‘It is not coarse, not fine, not short,
not long’ (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8); ‘The True, knowledge,
infinite is Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); ‘ That which is free
from qualities,’ ‘that which is free from stain’—these and
similar texts convey the notion of Brahman being change-
less, eternal intelligence devoid of all difference ; while the
other texts—quoted before—teach the qualified Brahman.
And there being a conflict between the two sets of passages,
we—according to the Mim4msé principle referred to above
—decide that the texts referring to Brahman as devoid
of qualities are of greater force, because they are later in

1 The reference is to the point discussed PQ. Mf. SQ. VI, 5, 54
(Gaim. Ny&. ΜΑΙὰ Vistara, p. 285).

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 27

order! than those which speak of Brahman as having quali-
ties. Thus everything is settled.

The text Taitt. Up. II, 1 refers to Brahman as
devoid of qualities.

But—an objection is raised—even the passage ‘The True,
knowledge, infinite is Brahman’ intimates certain qualities
of Brahman, viz. true being, knowledge, infinity !—Not so,
wereply. From the circumstance that all the terms of the
sentence stand in co-ordination, it follows that they convey
the idea of one matter (sense) only. If against this you urge
that the sentence may convey the idea of one matter only,
even if directly expressing a thing distinguished by several
qualities ; we must remark that you display an ignorance
of the meaning of language which appears to point to some
weakmindedness on your part. A sentence conveys the
idea of one matter (sense) only when all its constitutive
words denote one and the same thing; if, on the other
hand, it expresses a thing possessing several attributes,
the difference of these attributes necessarily leads to a
difference in meaning on the part of the individual words,
and then the oneness of meaning of the sentence is lost —
But from your view of the passage it would follow that
the several words are mere synonyms !—Give us your
attention, we reply, and learn that several words may
convey one meaning without being idle synonyms. From
the determination of the unity of purport of the whole
sentence ? we conclude that the several words, applied to
one thing, aim at expressing what is opposite in nature
to whatever is contrary to the meanings of the several
words, and that thus they have meaning and unity of
meaning and yet are not mere synonyms. The details

1 The texts which deny all qualities of Brahman are later in
order than the texts which refer to Brahman as qualified, because
denial presupposes that which is to be denied.

* The unity of purport of the sentence is iriferred from its con-
stituent words having the same case-ending.

28 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

are as follows. Brahman is to be defined as what is con-
trary in nature to all other things. Now whatever is
opposed to Brahman is virtually set aside by the three
words (constituting the definition of Brahman in the
Taittiriya-text). The word ‘true’ (or ‘truly being’) has
the purport of distinguishing Brahman from whatever
things have no truth, as being the abodes of change;
the word ‘knowledge’ distinguishes Brahman from all
non-sentient things whose light depends on something
else (which are not self-luminous); and the word ‘infinite’
distinguishes it from whatever is limited in time or space
or nature. Nor is this ‘distinction’ some positive or
negative attribute of Brahman, it rather is just Brahman
itself as opposed to everything else ; just as the distinction
of white colour from black and other colours is just the
true nature of white, not an attribute of it. The three
words constituting the text thus Aave a meaning, have
one meaning, and are non-synonymous, in so far as they
convey the essential distinction of one thing, viz. Brahman
from everything else. The text thus declares the one
Brahman which is self-luminous and free from all differ-
ence. On this interpretation of the text we discern its
oneness in purport with other texts, such as ‘Being only
this was in the beginning, one only, without a second.’
Texts such as ‘That from whence these beings are born’
(Taitt. Up. III, 1); ‘Being only this was in the beginning’
(Κα. Up. VI, 2, 1); ‘Self alone was this in the beginning’
(Bri. Up. I, 4, 1), &c., describe Brahman as the cause of
the world; and of this Brahman the Taittirtya passage
‘The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman’ gives the strict
definition.

In agreement with the principle that all sakh4s teach
the same doctrine we have to understand that, in all the
texts which speak of Brahman as cause, Brahman must
be taken as being ‘without a second,’ i.e. without any
other being of the same or a different kind; and the text
which aims at defining Brahman has then to be interpreted
in accordance with this characteristic of Brahman, viz. its
being without a second. The statement of the K sandogya

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, I. 29

as to Brahman being without a second must also be taken
to imply that Brahman is noa-dual as far as qualities are
concerned ; otherwise it would conflict with those passages
which speak of Brahman as being without qualities and
without stain. We therefore conclude that the defining
Taittiriya-text teaches Brahman to be an absolutely
homogeneous substance.

But, the above explanation of the passage being accepted,
it follows that the words ‘true being,’ ‘knowledge, &c.,
have to be viewed as abandoning their direct sense, and
merely suggesting a thing distinct in nature from all that
is opposite (to what the three words directly denote), and
this means that we resort to so-called implication (implied
meaning, lakshav4)!—What objection is there to such
a proceeding? we reply. The force of the general purport
of a sentence is greater than that of the direct denotative
power of the simple terms, and it is generally admitted
that the purport of grammatical co-ordination is oneness
(of the matter denoted by the terms co-ordinated).—But
we never observe that all words of a sentence are to be
understood in an implied sense !—lIs it then not observed,
we reply, that ove word is to be taken in its implied mean-
ing if otherwise it would contradict the purport of the
whole sentence? And if the purport of the sentence, which
is nothing but an aggregate of words employed together,
has once been ascertained, why should we not take two
or three or all words in an implied sense—just as we had
taken one—and thus make them fit in with the general
purport? In agreement herewith those scholars who
explain to us the sense of imperative sentences, teach that
in imperative sentences belonging to ordinary speech all
words have an implied meaning only (not their directly
denotative meaning). For, they maintain, imperative forms
have their primary meaning only in (Vedic) sentences
which enjoin something not established by other means;
and hence in ordinary speech the effect of the action is
conveyed by implication only. The other words also, which
form part of those imperative sentences and denote matters
connected with the action, have their primary meaning

30 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

only if connected with an action not established by other
means; while if connected with an ordinary action they
have a secondary, implied, meaning only!.

Perception reveals to us non-differenced
substance only.

We have so far shown that in the case of a conflict
between Scripture and Perception and the other instru-
ments of knowledge, Scripture is of greater force. The
fact, however, is that no such conflict is observed to exist,
since Perception itself gives rise to the apprehension of
a non-differenced Brahman whose nature is pure Being.—
But how can it be said that Perception, which has for its
object things of various kinds—and accordingly expresses
itself in judgments such as ‘ Here is a jar,’ ‘There is a piece
of cloth’—causes the apprehension of mere Being? If
there were no apprehension of difference, all cognitions
would have one and the same object, and therefore would
give rise to one judgment only—as takes place when one
unbroken perceptional cognition is continued for some
time.—True. We therefore have to enquire in what way,

? The theory here referred to is held by some of the Mim4m-
sakas. The imperative forms of the verb have their primary
meaning, i.e. the power of originating action, only in Vedic
sentences which enjoin the performance of certain actions for the
bringing about of certain ends: no other means of knowledge but
the Veda informing us that such ends can be accomplished by
such actions. Nobody, e.g. would offer a soma sacrifice in order
to obtain the heavenly world, were he not told by the Veda to do
so. In ordinary life, on the other hand, no imperative possesses
this entirely unique originative force, since any action which may
be performed in consequence of a command may be prompted
by other motives as well: it is, in technical Indian language,
established already, apart from the command, by other means of
knowledge. The man who, e.g. is told to milk a cow might have
proceeded to do so, apart from the command, for reasons of his
own. Imperatives in ordinary speech are therefore held not to
have their primary meaning, and this conclusion is extended,
somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all the words entering
into an imperative clause.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 31
I π-ἰ- οὐ τὺ’ τ
in the judgment ‘here is a jar, an assertion is made about
being as well as some special form of being. These implied
judgments cannot both be founded on perception, for they
are the results of acts of cognition occupying different
moments of time, while the perceptional cognition takes
place in one moment (is instantaneous), We therefore
must decide whether it is the essential nature of the jar,
or its difference from other things, that is the object of
perception. And we must adopt the former alternative,
because the apprehension of difference presupposes the
apprehension of the essential nature of the thing, and, in
addition, the remembrance of its counterentities (i.e. the
things from which the given thing differs). Hence differ-
ence is not apprehended by Perception ; and all judgments
and propositions relative to difference are founded on
etror only.

Difference—bheda—does not admit of logical definition.

The Logicians, moreover, are unable to give a definition
of such a thing as ‘difference.’ Difference cannot in the
first place be the essential nature (of that which differs) ;
for from that it would follow that on the apprehension
of the essential nature of a thing there would at once arise
not only the judgment as to that essential nature but also
judgments as to its difference from everything else——But,
it may be objected to this, even when the essential nature
of a thing is apprehended, the judgment ‘this thing is
different from other things’ depends on the remembrance
of its counterentities, and as long as this remembrance does
not take place so long the judgment of difference is not
formed !—Such reasoning, we reply, is inadmissible. He who
maintains that ‘difference’ is nothing but ‘essential nature’
has no right to assume a dependence on counterentities
since, according to him, essential nature and difference are
the same, i.e. nothing but essential nature: the judgment
of difference can, on his view, depend on counterentities
No more than the judgment of essential nature does. His
view really implies that the two words ‘the jar’ and
‘different’ (in the judgment ‘the jar is different’) are

32 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

synonymous, just as the words ‘hasta’ and ‘kara’ are (both
of which mean ‘ hand’).

Nor, in the second place, can ‘difference’ be held to
be an attribute (dharma). For if it were that, we should
have to assume that ‘difference’ possesses difference (i.e.
is different) from essential nature; for otherwise it would
be the same as the latter. And this latter difference
would have to be viewed as an attribute of the first
difference, and this would lead us on to a third difference,
and so in infinitum. And the view of ‘difference’ being
an attribute would further imply that difference is appre-
hended on the apprehension of a thing distinguished by
attributes such as generic character and so on, and at the
same time that the thing thus distinguished is apprehended
on the apprehension of difference; and this would consti-
tute a logical seesaw.—‘ Difference’ thus showing itself
incapable of logical definition, we are confirmed in our
view that perception reveals mere ‘ Being’ only.

Moreover, it appears that in states of consciousness such
as ‘Here is a jar,’ ‘There is a piece of cloth,’ ‘ The jar is
perceived,’ ‘The piece of cloth is perceived,’ that which
constitutes the things is Being (existence ; satt4) and per-
ception (or ‘consciousness’; anubhiti). And we observe
that it is pure Being only which persists in all states of
cognition: this pure Being alone, therefore, is veal. The
differences, on the other hand, which do not persist, are
unreal. The case is analogous to that of the snake-rope.
The rope which persists as a substrate is real, while the
non-continuous things (which by wrong imagination are
superimposed on the rope) such as a snake, a cleft in the
ground, a watercourse, and so on, are unreal.

But—our adversary objects—the instance is not truly
analogous. In the case of the snake-rope the non-reality
of the snake results from the snake’s being sublated
(badhita) by the cognition of the true nature of the sub-
strate ‘This is a rope, not a snake’; it does not result
from the non-continuousness of the snake. In the same
way the reality of the rope does not follow from its persist-
ence, but from the fact of its being not sublated (by another

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 33

cognition). But what, we ask, establishes the non-reality
of jars and pieces of cloth ?—All are agreed, we reply, that
we observe, in jars and similar things, individual difference
(vyAvritti, literally ‘separation,’ ‘ distinction’). The point
to decide is of what nature such difference is, Does it not
mean that the judgment ‘This is a jar’ implies the negation
of pieces of cloth and other things? But this means that
by this judgment pieces of cloth and other things are
sublated (badhita). Individual difference (vyAvritti) thus
means the cessation (or absence), due to sublation, of certain
objects of cognition, and it proves the non-reality of what-
ever has non-continuous existence; while on the other
hand, pure Being, like the rope, persists non-sublated.
Hence everything that is additional to pure Being is
non-real. — This admits of being expressed in technical
form. ‘Being’ is real because it persists, as proved by
the case of the rope in the snake-rope; jars and similar
things are non-real because they are non-continuous, as
proved by the case of the snake that has the rope for its
substrate.

From all this it follows that persisting consciousness only
has real being ; it alone is.

Being and Consciousness are one. Oonsciousness is

svayamprakaésa.

But, our adversary objects, as mere Being is the object
of consciousness, it is different therefrom (and thus there
exists after all ‘difference’ or ‘plurality’)—Not so, we
reply. That there is no such thing as ‘difference,’ we have
already shown above on the grounds that it is not the
object of perception, and moreover incapable of definition.
It cannot therefore be proved that ‘Being’ is the object
of consciousness. Hence Consciousness itself is ‘ Being’
—that which is—This consciousness is self-proved, just
because it is consciousness. Were it proved through some-
thing else, it would follow that like jars and similar things
it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for
consciousness, the need of another act of consciousness
(through which its knowledge would be established) ; for

[48] ἐν

34 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

it shines forth (prak4sate) through its own being. While
it exists, consciousness—differing therein from jars and the
like—is never observed not to shine forth, and it cannot
therefore be held to depend, in its shining forth, on some-
thing else—You (who object to the above reasoning)
perhaps hold the following view :—even when conscious-
ness has arisen, it is the object only which shines forth—
a fact expressed in sentences such as: the jar is perceived.
When a person forms the judgment ‘ This is a jar,’ he is
not at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not
an object and is not of a definite character. Hence the
existence of consciousness is the reason which brings about
the ‘shining forth’ of jars and other objects, and thus has
a similar office as the approximation of the object to the
eye or the other organs of sense (which is another condition
of perceptive consciousness). After this the existence of
consciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining
forth of the object is (not permanent, but) occasional only’.
And should this argumentation be objected to on the
ground of its implying that consciousness—which is essen-
tially of the nature of intelligence—is something non-
intelligent like material things, we ask you to define this
negation of non-intelligence (which you declare to be cha-
racteristic of consciousness). Have we, perhaps, to under-
stand by it the invariable concomitance of existence and
shining forth? If so, we point out that this invariable
concomitance is also found in the case of pleasure and
similar affections; for when pleasure and so on exist at
all, they never are non-perceived (i.e. they exist in so far
only as we are conscious of them). It is thus clear that
we have no consciousness of consciousness itself—just as the
tip of a finger, although touching other things, is incapable
of touching itself.

All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your
own fancy, without any due consideration of the power of
consciousness. The fact is, that in perceiving colour and

1 Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only, and
as such must have a cause.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 35

other qualities of things, we are not aware of a ‘shining
forth’ as an attribute of those things, and as something
different from consciousness; nor can the assumption of
an attribute of things called ‘light,’ or ‘shining forth,’ be
proved in any way, since the entire empirical world itself
can be proved only through consciousness, the existence
of which we both admit. Consciousness, therefore, is not
something which is inferred or proved through some other
act of knowledge; but while proving everything else it
is proved by itself. This may be expressed in technical
form as follows—Consciousness is, with regard to its attri-
butes and to the empirical judgments concerning it, inde-
pendent of any other thing, because through its connexion
with other things it is the cause of their attributes and
the empirical judgments concerning them. For it is a
general principle that of two things that which through
its connexion with the other is the cause of the attributes
of—and the empirical judgments about—the latter, is itself
independent of that other as to those two points. We see
e.g. that colour, through its conjunction with earth and the
like, produces in them the quality of visibility, but does
not itself depend for its visibility on conjunction with colour.
Hence consciousness is itself the cause of its own ‘shining
forth,’ as well as of the empirically observed shining forth
of objects such as jars and the like.

Consciousness is eternal and incapable of change.

This self-luminous consciousness, further, is eternal, for
it is not capable of any form of non-existence—whether
so-called antecedent non-existence or any other form.
This follows from its being self-established. For the
antecedent non-existence of self-established consciousness
cannot be apprehended either through consciousness or
anything else. If consciousness itself gave rise to the
apprehension of its’ own non-existence, it could not do so
in so far as ‘being,’ for that would contradict its being:
if it is, i.e. if its non-existence is not, how can it give rise
to the idea of its non-existence? Nor can it do so if not
being ; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish

D2

36 _ VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

a proof for its own non-existence? Nor can the non-
existence of consciousness be apprehended through any-
thing else; for consciousness cannot be the object of
anything else. Any instrument of knowledge proving the
non-existence of consciousness, could do so only by making
consciousness its object—‘ this is consciousness’; but con-
sciousness, as being self-established, does not admit of that
objectivation which is implied in the word ‘this,’ and hence
its previous non-existence cannot be proved by anything
lying outside itself.

As consciousness thus does not admit of antecedent
non-existence, it further cannot be held to originate, and
hence also all those other states of being which depend
on origination cannot be predicated of it.

As consciousness is beginningless, it further does not
admit of any plurality within itself; for we observe in this
case the presence of something which is contrary to what
invariably accompanies plurality (this something being
‘beginninglessness’ which is contrary to the quality of
having a beginning—which quality invariably accompanies
plurality). For we never observe a thing characterised by
plurality to be without a beginning—And moreover differ-
ence, origination, &c., are objects of consciousness, like
colour and other qualities, and hence cannot be attributes
of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness being essentially
consciousness only, nothing else that is an object of con-
sciousness can be its attribute. The conclusion is that
consciousness is free from difference of any kind.

The apparent difference between Consciousness and the
conscious subject is due to the unreal ahamkéra.

From this it further follows that there is no substrate of
consciousness—different from consciousness itself—such as
people ordinarily mean when speaking of a ‘knower.’ It
is self-luminous consciousness itself which constitutes the
so-called ‘knower.’ This follows therefrom also that con-
sciousness is not non-intelligent (gada) ; for non-intelligence
invariably accompanies absence of Selfhood (an4tmatva) ;

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 37

hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness, con-
sciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self.

But, our adversary again objects, the consciousness which
expresses itself in the judgment ‘/ know,’ proves that the
quality of being a ‘knower’ belongs to consciousness !—By
no means, we reply. The attribution to consciousness of
this quality rests on error, no less than the attribution, to
the shell, of the quality of being silver. Consciousness
cannot stand in the relation of an agent toward itself: the
attribute of being a knowing agent is erroneously imputed
to it—an error analogous to that expressed in the judg-
ment ‘I am a man,’ which identifies the Self of a person
with the outward aggregate of matter that bears the
external characteristics of humanity. To be a ‘knower’
means to be the agent in the action of knowing ; and this
is something essentially changeful and non-intelligent (gada),
having its abode in the ahamkdra, which is itself a thing
subject to change. How, on the other hand, could such
agency possibly belong to the changeless ‘ witness’ (of all
change, i.e. consciousness) whose nature is pure Being?
That agency cannot be an attribute of the Self follows
therefrom also that, like colour and other qualities, agency
depends, for its own proof, on seeing, i. e. consciousness.

That the Self does not fall within the sphere (is not an
object of), the idea of ‘I’ is proved thereby also that in
deep sleep, swoon, and similar states, the idea of the ‘I’
is absent, while the consciousness of the Self persists.
Moreover, if the Self were admitted to be an agent and
an object of the idea of ‘I,’ it would be difficult to avoid
the conclusion that like the body it is non-intelligent,
something merely outward (‘being for others only, not for
itself’) and destitute of Selfhood. That from the body,
which is the object of the idea of ‘I,’ and known to be an
agent, there is different that Self which enjoys the results
of the body’s actions, viz. the heavenly word, and so on, is
acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instru-
ments of knowledge; analogously, therefore, we must
admit that different from the knower whom we understand
by the term ‘I,’ is the ‘ witnessing’ inward Self. The non-

38 “VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

intelligent ahamkara thus merely serves to manifest the
nature of non-changing consciousness, and it effects this
by being its abode ; for it is the proper quality of manifest-
ing agents to manifest the objects manifested, in so far as
the latter abide in them. <A mirror, e.g., or a sheet of
water, or a certain mass of matter, manifests a face or the
disc of the moon (reflected in the mirror or water) or
the generic character of a cow (impressed on the mass of
matter) in so far as all those things abide in them.—In
this way, then, there arises the erroneous view that finds
expression in the judgment ‘I know.’—Nor must you, in
the way of objection, raise the question how self-luminous
consciousness is to be manifested by the non-intelligent
ahamkara, which rather is itself manifested by conscious-
ness ; for we observe that the surface of the hand, which
itself is manifested by the rays of sunlight falling on it,
at the same time manifests those rays. This is clearly seen
in the case of rays passing through the interstices of net-
work: the light of those rays is intensified by the hand
on which they fall, and which at the same time is itself
manifested by the rays.

It thus appears that the ‘ knowing agent,’ who is denoted
by the ‘I,’ in the judgment ‘I know, constitutes no real
attribute of the Self, the nature of which is pure intelligence.
This is also the reason why the consciousness of Egoity
does not persist in the states of deep sleep and final release :
in those states this special form of consciousness passes
away, and the Self appears in its true nature, i.e. as pure
consciousness. Hence a person who has risen from deep,
dreamless sleep reflects, ‘Just now I was unconscious of
myself.’

Summing up of the pfirvapaksha view.

As the outcome of all this, we sum up our view as
follows.—Eternal, absolutely non-changing consciousness,
_ whose nature is pure non-differenced intelligence, free from
all distinction whatever, owing to error illusorily manifests
itself (vivarttate) as broken up into manifold distinctions—
knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, acts of knowledge.

4

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 39

And the purpose for which we enter on the consideration
of the Vedanta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root
of that error, i.e. Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm
knowledge of the oneness of Brahman, whose nature is
mere intelligence—free, pure, eternal.

THE GREAT SIDDHANTA.

This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of
altogether hollow and vicious arguments, incapable of
“being stated in definite logical alternatives, and devised
by men who are destitute of those particular qualities
which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme
Person revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are
darkened by the impression of beginningless evil; and who
thus have no insight into the nature of words and sentences,
into the real purport conveyed by them, and into the
procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods
depending on perception and the other instruments of right
knowledge. The theory therefore must needs be rejected
by all those who, through texts, perception and the other
means of knowledge—assisted by sound reasoning—have
an insight into the true nature of things.

There is no proof of non-differenced substance.

To enter into details—Those who maintain the doctrine
of a substance devoid of‘all difference have no right to
assert that this or that is a proof of such a substance; for
all means of right knowledge have for their object things
affected with difference—Should any one, taking his stand
on the received views of his sect, assert that the theory of
a substance free from all difference (does not require any
further means of proof but) is immediately established by
one’s own consciousness ; we reply that he also is refuted
by the fact, warranted by the witness of the Self, that all
consciousness implies difference: all states of consciousness
have for their object something that is marked by some dif-
ference, as appears in the case of judgments like ‘I saw this.’
And should a state of consciousness—although directly

40 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

apprehended as implying difference—be determined by some
fallacious reasoning to be devoid of difference, this determi-
nation could be effected only by means of some special at-
tributes additional to the quality of mere Being ; and owing to
these special qualities on which the determination depends,
that state of consciousness would clearly again be character-
ised by difference. The meaning of the mentioned deter-
mination could thus only be that of a thing affected with
certain differences some other differences are denied ; but
manifestly this would not prove the existence of a thing free
from all difference. To thought there at any rate belongs
the quality of being thought and self-illuminatedness, for
the knowing principle is observed to have for its essential
nature the illumining (making to shine forth) of objects.
And that also in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., con-
sciousness is affected with difference we shall prove, in its
proper place, in greater detail. Moreover you yourself
admit that to consciousness there actually belong different
attributes such as permanency (oneness, self-luminousness,
&c.), and of these it cannot be shown that they are only
Being in general. And even if the latter point were
admitted, we observe that there takes place a discussion of
different views, and you yourself attempt to prove your
theory by means of the differences between those views
and your own. It therefore must be admitted that reality
is affected with difference well established by valid means
of proof.
Sabda proves difference.

As to sound (speech; sabda) it is specially apparent that
it possesses the power of denoting only such things as are
affected with difference. Speech operates with words and
sentences. Now a word (pada) originates from the com-
bination of a radical element and a suffix, and as these two
elements have different meanings it necessarily follows that
the word itself can convey only a sense affected with
difference. And further, the plurality of words is based on
plurality of meanings; the sentence therefore which is an
aggregate of words expresses some special combination of
things (meanings of words), and hence has no power to

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, I. 41

denote a thing devoid of all difference.—The conclusion is
that sound cannot be’a means of knowledge for a thing
devoid of all difference.

Pratyaksha—even of the nirvikalpaka kind—proves

difference.

Perception in the next place—with its two subdivisions
of non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savi-
kalpaka) perception—also cannot be a means of knowledge
for things devoid of difference. Determinate perception
clearly has for its object things affected with difference ; for
it relates to that which is distinguished by generic differ-
ence and so on. But also non-determinate perception has
for its object only what is marked with difference ; for it is
on the basis of non-determinate perception that the object
distinguished by generic character and so on is recognised
in the act of determinate perception. Non-determinate
perception is the apprehension of the object in so far as
destitute of some differences but not of all difference.
Apprehension of the latter kind is in the first place not
observed ever to take place, and is in the second place
impossible: for all apprehension by consciousness takes
place by means of some distinction ‘This is such and such.’
Nothing can be apprehended apart from some special feature
of make or structure, as e.g. the triangularly shaped dewlap
in the case of cows. The true distinction between non-
determinate and determinate perception is that the former
is the apprehension of the first individual among a number
of things belonging to the same class, while the latter is the
apprehension of the second, third, and so on, individuals.
On the apprehension of the first individual cow the per-
ceiving person is not conscious of the fact that the special
shape which constitutes the generic character of the class
‘cows ’ extends to the present individual also; while this
special consciousness arises in the case of the perception of
the second and third cow. The perception of the second
individual thus is ‘determinate’ in so far as it is determined
by a special attribute, viz. the extension, to the perception,
of the generic character of a class—manifested in a certain

42 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

outward shape—which connects this act of perception with
the earlier perception (of the first individual) ; such deter-
mination being ascertained only on the apprehension of the
second individual. Such extension or continuance of a
certain generic character is, on the other hand, not appre-
hended on the apprehension of the first individual, and
perception of the latter kind thence is ‘non-determinate.’
That it is such is not due to non-apprehension of struc-
ture, colour, generic character and so on, for all these
attributes are equally objects of sensuous perception
(and hence perceived as belonging to the first individual
also). Moreover that which possesses structure cannot be
perceived apart from the structure, and hence in the case
of the apprehension of the first individual there is already
perception of structure, giving rise to the judgment ‘The
thing is such and such.’ In the case of the second, third,
&c., individuals, on the other hand, we apprehend, in
addition to the thing possessing structure’ and to the
structure itself, the special attribute of the persistence of
the generic character, and hence the perception is ‘deter-
minate.’ From all this it follows that perception never has
for its object that which is devoid of all difference.

The bheddébheda view is untenable.

The same arguments tend to refute the view that there
is difference and absence of difference at the same time (the
so-called bhed4bheda view). Take the judgment ‘ This is
such and such’; how can we realise here the non-difference
of ‘being this’ and ‘ being such and such’? The ‘such and
such’ denotes a peculiar make characterised, e.g. by a
dewlap, the ‘this’ denotes the thing distinguished by that
peculiar make; the non-difference of these two is thus
contradicted by immediate consciousness. At the outset
the thing perceived is perceived as separate from all other
things, and this separation is founded on the fact that the
thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us say
the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term
‘such and such.’ In general, wherever we cognise the
relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished

.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 43

thereby, the two clearly present themselves to our mind as
absolutely different. Some things—e.g. staffs and bracelets
—appear sometimes as having a separate, independent
existence of their own; at other times they present them-
selves as distinguishing attributes of other things or beings
(i.e. of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets).
Other entities—e. g. the generic character of cows—have a
being only in so far as they constitute the form of substances,
and thus always present themselves as distinguishing attri-
butes of those substances. In both cases there is the same
relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished
thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely
different. The difference between the two classes of entities
is only that staffs, bracelets, and similar things are capable
of being apprehended in separation from other things,
while the generic characteristics of a species are absolutely
incapable thereof. The assertion, therefore, that the differ-
ence of things is refuted by immediate consciousness, is
based on the plain denial of a certain form of consciousness,
the one namely—admitted by every one—which is expressed
in the judgment ‘ This thing is such and such.—This same
point is clearly expounded by the Satrakara in II, 2, 33.

Inference 8180 teaches difference.

Perception thus having for its object only what is marked
by difference, inference also is in the same case; for its
object is only what is distinguished by connexion with
things known through perception and other means of know-
ledge. And thus, even in the case of disagreement as to the
number of the different instruments of knowledge, a thing
devoid of difference could not be established by any of them
since the instruments of knowledge acknowledged by all
have only one and the same object, viz. what is marked by
difference. And a person who maintains the existence of
a thing ‘devoid of difference on the ground of differences
affecting that very thing simply contradicts himself without
knowing what he does; he is in fact no better than a man
who asserts that his own mother never had any children.

44 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Perception does not reveal mere Being.

In reply to the assertion that perception causes the
apprehension of pure Being only, and therefore cannot have
difference for its object; and that ‘difference’ cannot be
defined because it does not admit of being set forth in
definite alternatives; we point out that these charges are
completely refuted by the fact that the only objects of
perception are things distinguished by generic character
and so on, and that generic character and so on—as being
relative things—give at once rise to the judgment as to the
distinction between themselves and the things in which they
inhere. You yourself admit that in the case of knowledge
and in that of colour and other qualities this relation holds
good, viz. that something which gives rise to a judgment
about another thing at the same time gives rise to a judg-
ment about itself; the same may therefore be admitted
with regard to difference 1.

For this reason the charge of a regressus in infinitum
and a logical seesaw (see above, p. 32) cannot be upheld.
For even if perceptive cognition takes place within one
moment, we apprehend within that moment the generic
character which constitutes on the one hand the difference
of the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar
character of the thing itself; and thus there remains
nothing to be apprehended in a second moment.

Moreover, if perception made us apprehend only pure
Being, judgments clearly referring to different objects—such
as ‘Here is a jar, ‘There is a piece of cloth’—would be
devoid of all meaning. And if through perception we did
not apprehend difference—as marked by generic character,
&c., constituting the structure or make of a thing—why
should a man searching for a horse not be satisfied with
finding a buffalo? And if mere Being only were the
object of all our cognitions, why should we not remember,

? Colour reveals itself as well as the thing that has colour;
knowledge reveals itself as well as the object known; so difference
manifests itself as well as the things that differ.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 45

in the case of each particular cognition, all the words which
are connected with all our cognitions? And further, if the
cognition of a horse and that of an elephant had one object
only, the later cognition would cause us to apprehend only
what was apprehended before, and there being thus no
difference (of object of cognition) there would be nothing
to distinguish the later state of cognition from remembrance.
If on the other hand a difference is admitted for each state
of consciousness, we admit thereby that perception has for
its objects things affected with difference.

If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only,
everything would be apprehended by one act of cognition ;
and from this it would follow that there are no persons
either deaf or blind!

Nor does, as a matter of fact, the eye apprehend mere
Being only; for what it does apprehend is colour and the
coloured thing, and those other qualities (viz. extension,
&c.), which inhere in the thing together with colour. Nor
does feeling do so; for it has for its objects things palp-
able. Nor have the ear and the other senses mere Being
for their object ; but they relate to what is distinguished by
a special sound or taste or smell. Hence there is not any
source of knowledge causing us to apprehend mere Being.
If moreover the senses had for their object mere Being free
from all difference, it would follow that Scripture which
has the same object would (not be originative of knowledge
but) perform the function of a mere anuvada, i.e. it would
merely make statements about something, the knowledge
of which is already established by some other means. And
further, according to your own doctrine, mere Being, i.e.
Brahman, would hold the position of an object with regard
to the instruments of knowledge; and thus there would
cling to it all the imperfections indicated by yourself—non-
intelligent nature, perishableness and so on.—From all this
we conclude that perception has for its object only what is
distinguished by difference manifesting itself in generic
character and so on, which constitute the make or structure
of a thing. (That the generic character of a thing is
nothing else but its particular structure follows) from the

46 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

fact that we do not perceive anything, different from
structure, which could be claimed as constituting the object
of the cognition ‘that several individuals possess one and
the same general form. And as our theory sufficiently
accounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character,
and as moreover even those who hold generic character to
be something different from structure admit that there is
such a thing as (common) structure, we adhere to the
conclusion that generic character is nothing but structure.
By ‘structure’ we understand special or distinctive form ;
and we acknowledge different forms of that kind according
to the different classes of things. And as the current
judgments as to things being different from one another
can be explained on the basis of the apprehension of generic
character, and as no additional entity is observed to exist,
and as even those who maintain the existence of such an
additional thing admit the existence of generic character,
we further conclude that difference (bheda) is nothing but
generic character (gAti).—But if this were so, the judgment as
to difference would immediately follow from the judgment as
to generic character, as soon as the latter is apprehended !—
Quite true, we reply. Asa matter of fact the judgment of
difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the
judgment as to generic character. For ‘the generic character’
of a cow, 6. δ.. means just the exclusion of everything else: as
soon as that character is apprehended all thought and speech
referring to other creatures belonging to the same wider
genus (which includes buffaloes and so on also) come to an
end. It is through the apprehension of difference only that
the idea of non-difference comes to an end.

Plurality is not unreal.

Next as to the assertion that all difference presented in
our cognition—as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like—is
unreal because such difference does not persist. This view,
we maintain, is altogether erroneous, springs in fact from
the neglect of distinguishing between persistence and non-
persistence on the one hand, and the relation between what
sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where

_TapuyAya, I PADA, 1. 47

two cognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter
relation holds good, and there is non-persistence of what is
sublated. But jars, pieces of cloth and the like, do not
contradict one another, since they are separate in place and
time. If on the other hand the non-existence of a thing is
cognised at the same time and the same place where and
when its existence is cognised, we have a mutual contra-
diction of two cognitions, and then the stronger one
sublates the other cognition which thus comes to an end.
But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion
with some place and time, the non-existence is perceived
in connexion with some other place and time, there arises
no contradiction; how then should the one cognition
sublate the other? or how can it be said that of a thing
absent at one time and place there is absence at other
times and places also? In the case of the snake-rope,
there arises a cognition of non-existence in connexion with
the given place and time; hence there is contradiction, one
judgment sublates the other and the sublated cognition
comes to an end. But the circumstance of something
which is seen at one time and in one place not persisting at
another time and in another place is not observed to be
invariably accompanied by falsehood, and hence mere non-
persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason for
unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real
because it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and
requires na further proof.

Being and Consciousness are not one.

Hence mere Being does not alone constitute reality.
And as the distinction between consciousness and its objects
—which rests just on this relation of object and that for
which the object is—is proved by perception, the assertion
that only consciousness has real existence is also dis-

posed of.

The true meaning of Svayamprakasatva.
We next take up the point as to the self-luminousness of
consciousness (above, p. 33). The contention that conscious-
ness is not an object holds good for the knowing Self at the

48 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

time when it illumines (i.e. constitutes as its objects) other
things; but there is no absolute rule as to all consciousness
never being anything but self-luminous. For common
observation shows that the consciousness of one person
may become the object of the cognition of another, viz. of
an inference founded on the person’s friendly or unfriendly
appearance and the like, and again that a person’s own past
states of consciousness become the object of his own
cognition—as appears from judgments such as ‘At one
time I knew.’ It cannot therefore be said ‘If it is con-
sciousness it is self-proved’ (above, p. 33), nor that con-
sciousness if becoming an object of consciousness would no
longer be consciousness; for from this it would follow that
one’s own past states, and the conscious states of others—
because being objects of consciousness—are not themselves
consciousness. Moreover, unless it were admitted that there
is inferential knowledge of the thoughts of others, there
would be no apprehension of the connexion of words and
meaning, and this would imply the absolute termination of all
human intercourse depending on speech. Nor also would it
be possible for pupils to attach themselves to a teacher of
sacred lore, for the reason that they had become aware of
his wisdom and learning. The general proposition that
consciousness does not admit of being an object is in fact
quite untenable. The essential nature of consciousness—
or knowledge — consists therein that it shines forth, or
manifests itself, through its own being to its own substrate
at the present moment ; or (to give another definition) that
it is instrumental in proving its own object by its own
being!.

* The comment of the Sru. Pra. on the above definitions runs,
with a few additional explanations, as follows: The term ‘anu-
bhati’ here denotes knowledge in general, not only such know-
ledge as is not remembrance (which limited meaning the term has
sometimes). With reference to the ‘shining forth’ it might be said
that in this way jars also and similar things know or are conscious
because they also ‘shine forth’ (viz. in so far as they are known);
to exclude jars and the like the text therefore adds ‘to its
own substrate’ (the jar ‘shines forth, not to itself, but to the

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 49

Now these two characteristics are established by a
person’s own state of consciousness and do not vanish
when that consciousness becomes the object of another
state of consciousness; consciousness remains also in the
latter case what it is. Jars and similar things, on the other
hand, do not possess consciousness, not because they are
objects of consciousness but because they lack the two
characteristics stated above. If we made the presence of
consciousness dependent on the absence of its being an
object of consciousness, we should arrive at the conclusion

knowing person). There are other attributes of the Self, such
as atomic extension, eternity, and so on, which are revealed (not
through themselves) but through an act of knowledge different
from them; to exclude those the text adds ‘through its own
being.” In order to exclude past states of consciousness or acts
of knowledge, the text adds ‘at the present moment.’ A past state
of consciousness is indeed not revealed without another act of
knowledge (representing it), and would thus by itself be excluded ;
but the text adds this specification (viz. ‘at the present moment’)
on purpose, in order to intimate that a past state of consciousness
can be represented by another state—a point denied by the oppo-
nent. ‘At the present moment’ means ‘the connexion with the
object of knowledge belonging to the present time.’ Without the
addition of ‘to its own substrate’ the definition might imply that
a state of consciousness is manifest to another person also; to
exclude this the clause is added. This first definition might be
objected to as acceptable only to those who maintain the svayam-
prak4satva-theory (which need not be discussed here); hence a
second definition is given. The two clauses ‘to its own substrate’
and ‘at the present moment’ have to be supplied in this second
definition also. ‘Instrumental in bringing about’ would apply to
staffs, wheels, and such like implements also; hence the text adds
‘its own object.’ (Staffs, wheels, &c. have no ‘objects.") Know-
ledge depending on sight does not bring about an object depending
on hearing ; to exclude this notion of universal instrumentality the
text specifies the object by the words ‘its own.’ The clause
‘through its own being’ excludes the sense organs, which reveal
objects not by their own being, but in so far as they give rise to
knowledge. The two clauses ‘at the present moment’ and ‘to
its own substrate’ have the same office in the second definition as
in the first.
(48) E

50 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

that ‘consciousness is not consciousness ; for there are things
—e. g. sky-flowers—which are not objects of consciousness
and at the same time are not consciousness. You will
perhaps reply to this that a sky-flower’s not being con-
sciousness is due not to its not being an object of conscious-
ness, but to its non-existence !—Well then, we rejoin, let us
say analogously that the reason of jars and the like not
being contradictory to Nescience (i. 6. of their being gada),
is their not being of the nature of consciousness, and let us
not have recourse to their being objects of consciousness !|—
But if consciousness is an object of consciousness, we con-
clude that it also is non-contradictory of Nescience, like
a jar'!—At this conclusion, we rejoin, you may arrive even
on the opposite assumption, reasoning as follows: ‘Con-
sciousness is non-contradictory of Nescience, because it is
not an object of consciousness, like a sky-flower! All
which shows that to maintain as a general principle that
something which is an object of consciousness cannot
itself be consciousness is simply ridiculous.’

Consciousness is not eternal.

It was further maintained by the pirvapakshin that as
consciousness is self-established it has no antecedent non-
existence and so on, and that this disproves its having an
origin. But this is an attempt to prove something not
proved by something else that is equally unproved; com-
parable to a man blind from birth undertaking to guide
another blind man! You have no right to maintain the
non-existence of the antecedent non-existence of conscious-
ness on the ground that there is nothing to make us
apprehend that non-existence; for there is something to
make us apprehend it, viz. consciousness itself !—But how
can consciousness at the time when it is, make us apprehend
its own previous non-existence which is contradictorily
opposed to it ?—Consciousness, we rejoin, does not neces-
sarily constitute as its objects only what occupies the same
time with itself; were it so it would follow that neither
the past nor the future can be the object of consciousness.
Or do you mean that there is an absolute rule that the

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1. 51

antecedent non-existence of consciousness, if proved, must
be contemporaneous with consciousness? Have you then,
we ask, ever observed this so as to be able to assert an
absolute rule? And if it were observed, that would prove
the existence of previous non-existence, not its negation !—
The fact, however, is that no person in his senses will
maintain the contemporaneous existence of consciousness
and its own antecedent non-existence.’ In the case of per-
ceptive knowledge originating from sensation, there is indeed
this limitation, that it causes the apprehension of such
things only as are actually present at the same time. But
this limitation does not extend to cognitions of all kinds,
nor to all instruments of knowledge; for we observe that
remembrance, inference, and the magical perception of
Yogis apprehend such things also as are not present at the
time of apprehension. On this very point there rests the
relation connecting the means of knowledge with their
objects, viz. that the former are not without the latter.
This does not mean that the instrument of knowledge is
connected with its object in that way that it is not without
something that is present at the time of cognition; but
rather that the instrument of knowledge is opposed to the
falsehood of that special form in which the object presents
itself as connected with some place and time.—This dis-
poses also of the contention that remembrance has no
external object; for it is observed that remembrance is
related to such things also as have perished.—Possibly you
will now argue as follows. The antecedent non-existence
of consciousness cannot be ascertained by perception, for it
is not something present at the time of perception. It
further cannot be ascertained by the other means of know-
ledge, since there is no characteristic mark (litga) on which
an inference could be based: for we do not observe any
characteristic mark invariably accompanied by the ante-
cedent non-existence of consciousness. Nor do we meet
with any scriptural text referring to this antecedent non-
existence. Hence, in the absence of any valid instrument
of knowledge, the antecedent non-existence of consciousness
cannot be established at all.—If, we reply, you thus,
E2

52 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

altogether setting aside the force of self-provedness (on
which you had relied hitherto), take your stand on the
absence of valid means of knowledge, we again must
request you to give in; for there is a valid means of
knowledge whereby to prove the antecedent non-existence
of consciousness, viz. valid non-perception (anupalabdhi).

Moreover, we observe that perceptional knowledge proves
its object, be it a jar or something else, to exist only as
long as it exists itself, not at all times; we do not, through
it, apprehend the antecedent or subsequent existence of
the jar. Now this absence of apprehension is due to the
fact that consciousness itself is limited in time. If that
consciousness which has a jar for its object were itself appre-
hended as non-limited in time, the object also—the jar—
would be apprehended under the same form, i.e. it would
be eternal. And if self-established consciousness were
eternal, it would be immediately cognised as eternal ; but
this is not the case. Analogously, if inferential conscious-
ness and other forms of consciousness were apprehended as
non-limited in time, they would all of them reveal their
objects also as non-limited, and these objects would thus be
eternal; for the objects are conform in nature to their
respective forms of consciousness.

There is no Consciousness without object.

Nor is there any consciousness devoid of objects; for
nothing of this kind is ever known. Moreover, the self-
luminousness of consciousness has, by our opponent him-
self, been proved on the ground that its essential nature
consists in illumining (revealing) objects ; the self-luminous-
ness of consciousness not admitting of proof apart from its
essential nature which consists in the lighting up of objects.
And as moreover, according to our opponent, consciousness
cannot be the object of another consciousness, it would
follow that (having neither an object nor itself being an
object) it is something altogether unreal, imaginary.

Nor are you justified in maintaining that in deep sleep,
swoon, senselessness and similar states, pure consciousness,
devoid of any object, manifests itself. This view is nega-

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, T. 53

tived by ‘valid non-perception’ (see above, p. 52). If
consciousness were present in those states also, there would
be remembrance of it at the time of waking from sleep or
recovery from swoon; but as a matter of fact there is no
such remembrance.—But it is not an absolute rule that
something of which we were conscious must be remem-
bered ; how then can the absence of remembrance prove
the absence of previous consciousness >—Unless, we reply,
there be some cause of overpowering strength which quite
obliterates all impressions—as e.g. the dissolution of the
body—the absence of remembrance does necessarily prove
the absence of previous consciousness. And, moreover, in
the present case the absence of consciousness does not only
follow from absence of remembrance; it is also proved by
the thought presenting itself to the person risen from sleep,
‘For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.’—Nor
may it be said that even if there was consciousness, absence
of remembrance would necessarily follow from the absence
(during deep sleep) of the distinction of objects, and from
the extinction of the consciousness of the ‘I’ ; for the non-
consciousness of some one thing, and the absence of some
one thing cannot be the cause of the non-remembrance of
some other thing, of which there had been consciousness.
And that in the states in question the consciousness of the
‘I’ does persist, will moreover be shown further on.

But, our opponent urges, have you not said yourself that
even in deep sleep and similar states there is consciousness
marked by difference ?—True, we have said so. But that
consciousness is consciousness of the Self, and that this is
affected by difference will be proved further on. At present
we are only interested in denying the existence of your
pure consciousness, devoid of all objects and without a
substrate. Nor can we admit that your pure consciousness
could constitute what we call the consciousness of the Self ;
for we shall prove that the latter has a substrate.

It thus cannot be maintained that the antecedent non-
existence of consciousness does not admit of being proved,
because consciousness itself does not prove it. And as we
have shown that consciousness itself may be an object of

54 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

consciousness, we have thereby disproved the alleged
impossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by
other means. Herewith falls the assertion that the non-
origination of consciousness can be proved.

Consciousness is capable of change.

Against the assertion that the alleged non-origination of
consciousness at the same time proves that consciousness
is not capable of any other changes (p. 36), we remark
that the general proposition on which this conclusion rests
is too wide: it would extend to antecedent non-existence
itself, of which it is evident that it comes to an end,
although it does not originate. In qualifying the changes
as changes of ‘Being,’ you manifest great logical acumen
indeed! For according to your own view Nescience also
(which is not ‘ Being ’) does not originate, is the substrate of
manifold changes, and comes to an end through the rise
of knowledge! Perhaps you will say that the changes of
Nescience are all unreal. But, do you then, we ask in
reply, admit that any change is real? You do not; and
yet it is only this admission which would give a sense to
the distinction expressed by the word ‘ Being !.’

Nor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any
division within itself, because it has no beginning (p. 36).
For the non-originated Self is divided from the body, the
senses, &c., and Nescience also, which is avowedly without
a beginning, must needs be admitted to be divided from
the Self. And if you say that the latter division is unreal,
we ask whether you have ever observed a real division
invariably connected with origination! Moreover, if the
distinction of Nescience from the Self is not real, it follows
that Nescience and the Self are essentially one. You
further have yourself proved the difference of views by
means of the difference of the objects of knowledge as
established by non-refuted knowledge; an analogous case

1 The Sankara is not entitled to refer to a distinction of real
and unreal division, because according to his theory all distinction
is unreal.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1. 55

being furnished by the difference of acts of cleaving, which
results from the difference of objects to be cleft. And if
you assert that of this knowing—which is essentially
knowing only—nothing that is an object of knowledge can
be an attribute, and that these objects—just because they
are objects of knowledge—cannot be attributes of knowing ;
we point out that both these remarks would apply also to
eternity, self-luminousness, and the other attributes of
‘knowing,’ which are acknowledged by yourself, and esta-
blished by valid means of proof. Nor may you urge
against this that all these alleged attributes are in reality
mere ‘consciousness’ or ‘knowing’; for they are essentially
distinct. By ‘being conscious’ or ‘knowing,’ we under-
stand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its
own substrate (i.e. the substrate of knowledge), by its own
existence (i.e. the existence of knowledge) merely ; by self-
luminousness (or ‘self-illuminatedness’) we understand the
shining forth or being manifest by its own existence merely
to its own substrate ; the terms ‘shining forth,’ ‘ illumining,’
‘being manifest’ in both these definitions meaning the
capability of becoming an object of thought and speech
which is common to all things, whether intelligent or non-
intelligent. Eternity again means ‘being present in all
time’; oneness means ‘being defined by the number one.’
Even if you say that these attributes are only negative
ones, i.e. equal to the absence of non-intelligence and so
on, you still cannot avoid the admission that they are
attributes of consciousness. If, on the other hand, being of
a nature opposite to non-intelligence and so on, be not
admitted as attributes of consciousness— whether of a
positive or a negative kind —in addition to its essential
nature; it is an altogether unmeaning proceeding to deny
to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the like.

We moreover must admit the following alternative:
consciousness is either proved (established) or not. If it is
proved it follows that it possesses attributes ; if it is not, it
is something absolutely nugatory, like a sky-flower, and
similar purely imaginary things.

56 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent
Conscious Self.

Let it then be said that consciousness is proof (siddhif)
itself. Proof of what, we ask in reply, and to whom? If
no definite answer can be given to these two questions,
consciousness cannot be defined as ‘ proof’; for ‘ proof’ is
a relative notion, like ‘son.’ You will perhaps reply ‘ Proof
to the Self’; and if we go on asking ‘But what is that
Self’? you will say, ‘Just consciousness as already said by us
before.’ True, we reply, you said so; but it certainly was
not well said. For if it is the nature of consciousness to be
‘proof’ (‘light,’ ‘enlightenment’) on the part of a person
with regard to something, how can this consciousness
which is thus connected with the person and the thing
be itself conscious of itself? To explain: the essential
character of consciousness or knowledge is that by its very
existence it renders things capable of becoming objects, to
its own substrate, of thought and speech. This conscious-
ness (anubhiti), which is also termed g#4na, avagati,
samvid, is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious
Self and related to an object: as such it is known to every
one on the testimony of his own Self—as appears from
ordinary judgments such as ‘I know the jar,’ ‘I understand
this matter,’ ‘I am conscious of (the presence of) this piece
of cloth.’ That such is the essential nature of conscious-
ness you yourself admit ; for you have proved thereby its
self-luminousness. Of this consciousness which thus clearly
presents itself as the attribute of an agent and as related to
an object, it would be difficult indeed to prove that at the
same time it is itself the agent; as difficult as it would be
to prove that the object of action is the agent.

For we clearly see that this agent (the subject of con-
sciousness) is permanent (constant), while its attribute, i.e.
consciousness, not differing herein from joy, grief, and the
like, rises, persists for some time, and then comes to an end.
The permanency of the conscious subject is proved by the
fact of recognition, ‘This very same thing was formerly
apprehended by me.’ The non-permanency of conscious-

1 ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 1. 57

ness, on the other hand, is proved by thought expressing
itself in the following forms, ‘I know at present,’ ‘I knew
at a time,’ ‘I, the knowing subject, no longer have know-
ledge of this thing.’ How then should consciousness and
the conscious subject be one? If consciousness which
changes every moment were admitted to constitute the
conscious subject, it would be impossible for us to recognise
the thing seen to-day as the one we saw yesterday; for
what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by
another. And even if consciousness were identified with
the conscious subject and acknowledged as permanent, this
would no better account for the fact of recognition. For
recognition implies a conscious subject persisting from the
earlier to the later moment, and not merely consciousness.
Its expression is ‘ myself perceived this thing on a former
occasion.’ According to your view the quality of being
a conscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness ;
for consciousness, you say, is just consciousness and nothing
more. And that there exists a pure consciousness devoid
of substrate and objects alike, we have already refuted on
the ground that of a thing of this kind we have absolutely
no knowledge. And that the consciousness admitted by
both of us should be the Self is refuted by immediate
consciousness itself. And we have also refuted the falla-
cious arguments brought forward to prove that mere
consciousness is the only reality.—But, another objection
is raised, should the relation of the Self and the ‘I’ not
rather be conceived as follows:—In_ self-consciousness
which expresses itself in the judgment ‘I know,’ that intel-
ligent something which constitutes the absolutely non-
objective element, and is pure homogeneous light, is the
Self; the objective element (yushmad-artha) on the other
hand, which is established through its being illumined
(revealed) by the Self is the 7—in ‘I know’—and this is
something different from pure intelligence, something
objective or external ?

By no means, we reply; for this view contradicts the
relation of attribute and substrate of attribute of which we
are directly conscious, as implied in the thought ‘I know.’

58 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Consider also what follows.—' If the 7 were not the Self, the
inwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the
consciousness of the 7 which separates the inward from
the outward.

‘“May I, freeing myself from all pain, enter on free
possession of endless delight?” This is the thought which
prompts the man desirous of release to apply himself to
the study of the sacred texts. Were it a settled matter
that release consists in the annihilation of the I, the same
man would move away as soon as release were only hinted
at. “When I myself have perished, there still persists
some consciousness different from me;” to bring this about
nobody truly will exert himself.

‘ Moreover the very existence of consciousness, its being
a consciousness at all, and its being self-luminous, depend
on its connexion with a Self; when that connexion is dis-
solved, consciousness itself cannot be established, not any
more than the act of cutting can take place when there is no
person to cut and nothing to be cut. Hence it is certain
that the I, i.e. the knowing subject, is the inward Self.’

This scripture confirms when saying ‘By what should
he know the knower?’ (Bré. Up. II, 4, 15); and Smriti
also, ‘Him who knows this they call the knower of the
body ’ (Bha. Gi. XIII, 1). And the Sdtrakdra also, in the
section beginning with ‘ Not the Self on account of scriptural
statement’ (II, 3, 17), will say ‘For this very reason (it is)
a knower’ (II, 3, 18); and from this it follows that the
Self is not mere consciousness.

What is established by consciousness of the ‘I’ is the
I itself, while the not-I is given in the consciousness of the
not-I; hence to say that the knowing subject, which is
established by the state of consciousness, ‘I know,’ is the
not-I, is no better than to maintain that one’s own mother
is a barren woman. Nor can it be said that this ‘I,’ the
knowing subject, is dependent on its light for something
else. It rather is self-luminous; for to be self-luminous
means to have consciousness for one’s essential nature.
And that which has light for its essential nature does not
depend for its light on something else. The case is

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 59

analogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle. From
the circumstance that the lamp illumines with its light
other things, it does not follow either that it is not
luminous, or that its luminousness depends on something
else; the fact rather is that the lamp being of luminous
nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things
also. To explain.—The one substance tegas, i.e. fire or
heat, subsists in a double form, viz. as light (prabha), and
as luminous matter. Although light is a quality of luminous
substantial things, it is in itself nothing but the substance
tegas, not a mere quality like e.g. whiteness; for it exists
also apart from its substrates, and possesses colour (which
is a quality). Having thus attributes different from those
of qualities such as whiteness and so on, and possessing
illumining power, it is the substance tegas, not anything
else (e.g. a quality). Illumining power belongs to it,
because it lights up itself and other things. At the same
time it is practically treated as a quality because it always
has the substance tegas for its substrate, and depends on
it. This must not be objected to on the ground that what
is called light is really nothing but dissolving particles
of matter which proceed from the substance tegas; for
if this were so, shining gems and the sun would in the
end consume themselves completely. Moreover, if the
flame of a lamp consisted of dissolving particles of matter,
it would never be apprehended as a whole; for no reason
can be stated why those particles should regularly rise
in an agglomerated form to the height of four fingers’
breadth, and after that simultaneously disperse themselves
uniformly in all directions—upwards, sideways, and down-
wards. The fact is that the flame of the lamp together
with its light is produced anew every moment and again
vanishes every moment ; as we may infer from the succes-
sive combination of sufficient causes (viz. particles of oil
and wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes
are completely consumed.

Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelli-
gent (Aid-rOpa), and has intelligence (éaitanya) for its
quality. And to be essentially intelligent means to be

60 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

self-luminous. There are many scriptural texts declaring
this, compare e. g. ‘As a mass of salt has neither inside nor
outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed that
Self has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass
of knowledge’ (Brz. Up. IV, 6, 12); ‘There that person
becomes self-luminous, there is no destruction of the know-
ing of the knower’ (Brz. Up. IV, 3, 14; 30); ‘He who
knows, let me smell this, he is the Self’ (K4. Up. VIII, 12,
4); ‘Who is that Self? That one who is made of know-
ledge, among the prdzas, within the heart, the light, the
person’ (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7); ‘For it is he who sees, hears,
smells, tastes, thinks, considers, acts, the person whose Self
is knowledge’ (Pr. Up. IV, 9); ‘Whereby should one
know the knower’ (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). ‘This person
knows,’ ‘ The seer does not see death nor illness nor pain’
(KA. Up. VIII, 26, 2); ‘That highest person not remem-
bering this body into which he was born’ (KA. Up. VIII,
12, 3); ‘ Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go
towards the person ; when they have reached the person, sink
into him’ (Pr. Up. VI, 5) ; ‘From this consisting of mind,
there is different an interior Self consisting of knowledge’
(Taitt. Up. II, 4). And the Satrakdra also will refer to the
Self as a ‘knower’ in II, 3, 18. All which shows that the
self-luminous Self is a knower, i.e. a knowing subject, and
not pure light (non-personal intelligence). In general we
may say that where there is light it must belong to some-
thing, as shown by the light of a lamp. The Self thus
cannot be mere consciousness. The grammarians moreover
tell us that words such as ‘consciousness,’ ‘ knowledge,’ &c.,
are relative; neither ordinary nor Vedic language uses
expressions such as ‘he knows’ without reference to an
object known and an agent who knows.

With reference to the assertion that consciousness con-
stitutes the Self, because it (consciousness) is not non-
intelligent (gada), we ask what you understand by this
‘absence of non-intelligence.’ If you reply ‘luminousness
due to the being of the thing itself (i.e. of the thing which
is agada)’; we point out that this definition would wrongly
include lamps also, and similar things; and it would more-

᾿Ξ

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 61

over give rise to a contradiction, since you do not admit
light as an attribute, different from consciousness itself.
Nor can we allow you to define agadatva as ‘being of that
nature that light is always present, without any exception,
for this definition would extend also to pleasure, pain, and
similar states. Should you maintain that pleasure and so
on, although being throughout of the nature of light, are non-
intelligent for the reason that, like jars, &c., they shine forth
(appear) to something else and hence belong to the sphere
of the not-Self; we ask in reply: Do you mean then to
say that knowledge appears to itself? Knowledge no less
than pleasure appears to some one else, viz. the ‘I’: there
is, in that respect, no difference between the judgment
‘I know,’ and the judgment ‘I am pleased.’ Non-intelli-
gence in the sense of appearingness-to-itself is thus not
proved for consciousness; and hence it follows that what
constitutes the Self is the non-gada ‘I’ which is proved to

- itself by its very Being. That knowledge is of the nature

of light depends altogether on its connexion with the
knowing ‘I’: it is due to the latter, that knowledge, like
pleasure, manifests itself to that conscious person who is its
substrate, and not to anybody else. The Self is thus not
mere knowledge, but is the knowing ‘I.’

The view that the conscious subject is something unreal,
due to the ahamkfra, cannot be maintained.

We turn to a further point. You maintain that con-
sciousness which is in reality devoid alike of objects and
substrate presents itself, owing to error, in the form of
a knowing subject, just as mother o’ pearl appears as silver ;
(consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an
erroneous imputation), because an erroneous imputation
cannot take place apart from a substrate. But this theory
is indefensible. If things were as you describe them, the
conscious ‘I’ would be cognised as co-ordinate with the
state of consciousness ‘I am consciousness,’ just as the
shining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be
silver. But the fact is that the state of consciousness
presents itself as something apart, constituting a distin-

62 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

guishing attribute of the I, just as the stick is an attribute
of Devadatta who carries it. The judgment ‘I am con-
scious’ reveals an ‘I’ distinguished by consciousness ; and
to declare that it refers only to a state of consciousness—
which is a mere attribute—is no better than to say that the
judgment ‘ Devadatta carries a stick’ is about the stick
only. Nor are you right in saying that the idea of the
Self being a knowing agent, presents itself to the mind of
him only who erroneously identifies the Self and the body,
an error expressing itself in judgments such as ‘I am stout,’
and is on that account false; for from this it would follow
that the consciousness which is erroneously imagined as
a Self is also false; for it presents itself to the mind of the
same person. You will perhaps rejoin that consciousness
is not false because it (alone) is not sublated by that
cognition which sublates everything else. Well, we reply,
then the knowership of the Self also is not false; for that
also is not sublated. You further maintain that the
character of being a knower, i.e. the agent in the action of
knowing, does not become the non-changing Self; that
being a knower is something implying change, of a non-
intelligent kind (gada), and residing in the ahamkara which
is the abode of change and a mere effect of the Unevolved
(the Prakriti); that being an agent and so on is like colour
and other qualities, an attribute of what is objective ; and
that if we admit the Self to be an agent and the object
of the notion of the ‘I,’ it also follows that the Self is, like
the body, not a real Self but something external and non-
intelligent. But all this is unfounded, since the internal
organ is, like the body, non-intelligent, an effect of Pra-
kriti, an object of knowledge, something outward and for
the sake of others merely; while being a knowing subject
constitutes the special essential nature of intelligent beings.
To explain. Just as the body, through its objectiveness,
outwardness, and similar causes, is distinguished from what
possesses the opposite attributes of subjectiveness, inward-
ness, and so on; for the same reason the ahamk4ra also—
which is of the same substantial nature as the body—is
similarly distinguished. Hence the ahamkara is no more

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 63

a knower than it is something subjective; otherwise there
would be an evident contradiction. As knowing cannot be
attributed to the ahamkdra, which is an object of know-
ledge, so knowership also cannot be ascribed to it; for of
that also it is the object. Nor can it be maintained that
to be a knower is something essentially changing. For to
be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of know-
ledge, and as the knowing Self is eternal, knowledge which
is an essential quality of the Self is also eternal. That the
Self is eternal will be declared in the Sitra, II, 3,17; and
in IT, 3, 18 the term ‘g#a’ (knower) will show that it is an
essential quality of the Self to be the abode of knowledge.
That a Self whose essential nature is knowledge should be
the substrate of the (quality of) knowledge—just as gems
and the like are the substrate of light—gives rise to no
contradiction whatever.

Knowledge (the quality) which is in itself unlimited, is
capable of contraction and expansion, as we shall show
later on. In the so-called kshetrag#a-condition of the
Self, knowledge is, owing to the influence of work (karman),
of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts itself to
work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the
different senses. With reference to this various flow of
knowledge as due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising
and setting, and the Self possesses the quality of an agent.
As this quality is not, however, essential, but originated by
action, the Self is essentially unchanging. This changeful
quality of being a knower can belong only to the Self
whose essential nature is knowledge; not possibly to the
non-intelligent ahamkAra. But, you will perhaps say, the
ahamkéra, although of non-intelligent nature, may become
a knower in so far as by approximation to intelligence it
becomes a reflection of the latter. How, we ask in return,
is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take
place? Does consciousness become a reflection of the
ahamk4ra, or does the ahamkara become a reflection of
consciousness? The former alternative is inadmissible,
since you will not allow to consciousness the quality of
being a knower; and so is the latter since, as explained

64 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

above, the non-intelligent ahamkara can never become a
knower. Moreover, neither consciousness nor the ahamkéra
are objects of visual perception. Only things seen by the
eye have reflections.—Let it then be said that as an iron
ball is heated by contact with fire, so the consciousness of
being a knower is imparted to the ahamk4ra through its
contact with Intelligence-—This view too is inadmissible ;
for as you do not allow real knowership to Intelligence,
knowership or the consciousness of knowership cannot be
imparted to the ahamkara by contact with Intelligence ;
and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of
it be imparted to Intelligence by contact with the essen-
tially non-intelligent ahamkara. Nor can we accept what
you say about ‘ manifestation.’ Neither the ahamkara, you
say, nor Intelligence is really a knowing subject, but the
ahamkara manifests consciousness abiding within itself
(within the ahamk4ra), as the mirror manifests the image
abiding within it. But the essentially non-intelligent
ahamkara evidently cannot ‘manifest’ the self-luminous
Self. As has been said ‘That the non-intelligent ahamkaéra
should manifest the self-luminous Self, has no more sense
than to say that a spent coal manifests the Sun.’ The
truth is that all things depend for their proof on self-
luminous consciousness; and now you maintain that one
of these things, viz. the non-intelligent ahaskara—which
itself depends for its light on consciousness—manifests con-
sciousness, whose essential light never rises or sets, and
which is the cause that proves everything !_ Whoever knows
the nature of the Self will justly deride such a view! The
relation of ‘manifestation’ cannot hold good between
consciousness and the ahamk4ra for the further reason also
that there is a contradiction in nature between the two, and
because it would imply consciousness not to be conscious-
ness. As has been said, ‘One cannot manifest the other,
owing to contradictoriness ; and if the Self were something
to be manifested, that would imply its being non-intelligent
like a jar. Nor is the matter improved by your intro-
ducing the hand and the sunbeams (above, p. 38), and to say
that as the sunbeams, while manifesting the hand, are at the

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1. 65

same time manifested by the hand, so consciousness, while
manifesting the ahamkara, is at the same time itself mani-
fested by the latter. The sunbeams are in reality not
manifested by the hand at all. What takes place is that
the motion of the sunbeams is reversed (reflected) by the
opposed hand; they thus become more numerous, and
hence are perceived more clearly; but this is due alto-
gether to the multitude of beams, not to any manifesting
power on the part of the hand.

What could, moreover, be the nature of that ‘ manifes-
tation’ of the Self consisting of Intelligence, which would
be effected through the ahamkara? It cannot be origin-
ation; for you acknowledge that what is self-established
cannot be originated by anything else. Nor can it be
‘illumination’ (making to shine forth), since consciousness
cannot—according to you—be the object of another con-
sciousness. For the same reason it cannot be any action
assisting the means of being conscious of consciousness.
For such helpful action could be of two kinds only. It
would either be such as to cause the connexion of the
object to be known with the sense-organs; as e.g. any
action which, in the case of the apprehension of a species or
of one’s own face, causes connexion between the organ of
sight and an individual of the species, or a looking-glass.
Or it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity
in the mind of the knowing person; of this kind is the
action of calmness and self-restraint with reference to scrip-
ture which is the means of apprehending the highest reality.
Moreover, even if it were admitted that consciousness may
be an object of consciousness, it could not be maintained
that the ‘I’ assists the means whereby that consciousness
is effected. For if it did so, it could only be in the way of
removing any obstacles impeding the origination of such
consciousness ; analogous to the way in which a lamp
assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which impedes
the origination of the apprehension of colour. But in the
case under discussion we are unable to imagine such
obstacles. There is nothing pertaining to consciousness
which obstructs the origination of the knowledge of con-

[48} F

66 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

sciousness and which could be removed by the ahamkéra.—
There is something, you will perhaps reply, viz. Nescience!
Not so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the
ahamk4ra cannot be admitted; knowledge alone can put
an end to Nescience. Nor can consciousness be the
abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience
would have the same abode and the same object as
knowledge.

In pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject
and no object of knowledge—the so-called ‘witnessing’
principle (s&kshin)—Nescience cannot exist. Jars and
similar things cannot be the abode of Nescience because
there is no possibility of their being the abode of know-
ledge, and for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot
be the abode of Nescience. And even if consciousness
were admitted to be the abode of Nescience, it could
not be the object of knowledge; for consciousness being
viewed as the Self cannot be the object of knowledge, and
hence knowledge cannot terminate the Nescience abiding
within consciousness. For knowledge puts an end to
Nescience only with regard to its own objects, as in the
case of the snake-rope. And the consequence of this would
be that the Nescience attached to consciousness could
never be destroyed by any one.—If Nescience, we further
remark, is viewed as that which can be defined neither as
Being nor non-Being, we shall show later on that such
Nescience is something quite incomprehensible——On the
other hand, Nescience, if understood to be the antecedent
non-existence of knowledge, is not opposed in nature to
the origination of knowledge, and hence the dispelling of
Nescience cannot be viewed as promoting the means of
the knowledge of the Self.—From all this it follows that
the ahamk4ra cannot effect in any way ‘manifestation of
consciousness.’

Nor (to finish up this point) can it be said that it is the
essential nature of manifesting agents to manifest things in
so far as the latter have their abode in the former; for
such a relation is not observed in the case of lamps and the
like (which manifest what lies outside them). The essen-

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 1. 67

tial nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that
they promote the knowledge of things as they really are,
and this is also the nature of whatever promotes knowledge
and the means thereof. Nor is it even true that the mirror
manifests the face. The mirror is only the cause of a
certain irregularity, viz. the reversion of the ocular rays of
light, and to this irregularity there is due the appearance
of the face within the mirror; but the manifesting agent is
the light only. And it is evident that the ahamkara is
not capable of producing an irregularity (analogous to that
produced by the mirror) in consciousness which is self-
luminous.—And—with regard to the second analogous
instance alleged by you—the fact is that the species is
known through the individual because the latter is its
substrate (as expressed in the general principle, ‘the species
is the form of the individual’), but not because the indi-
vidual ‘manifests’ the species. Thus there is no reason,
either real or springing from some imperfection, why the
consciousness of consciousness should be brought about by
its abiding in the ahamkara, and the attribute of being the
knowing agent or the consciousness of that cannot therefore
belong to the ahamkdra. Hence, what constitutes the
inward Self is not pure consciousness but the ‘I’ which
proves itself as the knowing subject. In the absence of
egoity, ‘inwardness’ could not be established for con-
sciousness,

The conscious subject persists in deep sleep.

We now come to the question as to the nature of deep.
sleep. In deep sleep the quality of darkness prevails in
the mind and there is no consciousness of outward things,
and thus there is no distinct and clear presentation of the
‘I’; but all the same the Self somehow presents itself up
to the time of waking in the one form of the ‘I,’ and the
latter cannot therefore be said to be absent. Pure con-
sciousness assumed by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep)
is really in no better case ; fora person risen from deep sleep
never represents to himself his state of consciousness during

F 2

΄

68 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

sleep in the form, ‘I was pure consciousness free from all
egoity and opposed in nature to everything else, witnessing
Nescience’; what he thinks is only ‘I slept well. From
this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep
the Self, i.e. the ‘I,’ was a knowing subject and perceptive
of pleasure. Nor must you urge against this that the reflec-
tion has the following form: ‘As now I feel pleasure, so I
slept then also’; for the reflection is distinctly not of that
kind!. Nor must you say that owing to the non-perma-
nency of the ‘I’ its perception of pleasure during sleep
cannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the ‘I’
is permanent as appears from the fact that) the person who
has risen from sleep recalls things of which he was conscious
before his sleep, ‘I did such and such a thing,’ ‘I observed
this or that,’ ‘I said so or so.’—But, you will perhaps
say, he also reflects, ‘ For such and such a time I was con-
scious of nothing !’—‘ And what does this imply?’ we ask.
—‘ It implies a negation of everything !’—By no means, we
rejoin. The words ‘I was conscious’ show that the know-
ing ‘I’ persisted, and that hence what is negated is only
the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in ‘ of
nothing’ included everything, it would also negative the
pure consciousness which you hold to persist in deep sleep.
In the judgment ‘I was conscious of nothing, the word
‘I’ clearly refers to the ‘I, i.e. the knowing Self which
persists even during deep sleep, while the words ‘ was con-
scious of nothing’ negative all knowledge on the part of
that ‘I’; if, now, in the face of this, you undertake to prove
by means of this very judgment that knowledge—which is
expressly denied—existed at the time, and that the per-
sisting knowing Self did not exist, you may address your
proof to the patient gods who give no reply !—But—our
opponent goes on to urge—I form the following judgment
also: ‘I then was not conscious of myself,’ and from this
I understand that the ‘I’ did not persist during deep sleep!
—You do not know, we rejoin, that this denial of the per-

Δ Te. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure refers to the
past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of reflection.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 69

sistence of the ‘I’ flatly contradicts the state of conscious-
ness expressed in the judgment ‘I was not conscious of
myself’ and the verbal form of the judgment itself !—But
what then is denied by the words ‘of myself’ ?—This, we
admit, is a reasonable question. Let us consider the
point. What is negatived in that judgment is not the
knowing ‘I’ itself, but merely the distinctions of caste,
condition of life, &c. which belong to the ‘I’ at the time
of waking. We must distinguish the objects of the several
parts of the judgment under discussion. The object of the
‘(me) myself’ is the ‘I’ distinguished by class characteris-
tics as it presents itself in the waking state; the object of
the word ‘I’ (in the judgment) is that ‘I’ which consists of
a uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep
also, but is then not quite distinct. The judgment ‘I did
not know myself’ therefore means that the sleeper was not
conscious of the place where he slept, of his special charac-
teristics, and so on.—It is, moreover, your own view that
in deep sleep the Self occupies the position of a witnessing
principle with regard to Nescience. But by a witness
(sAkshin) we understand some one who knows about some-
thing by personal observation (sakshat) ; a person who does
not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly, in scripture as
well as in ordinary language a knowing subject only, not
mere knowledge, is spoken of as a witness; and with this
the Reverend P4azini also agrees when teaching that the
word ‘sakshin’ means one who knows in person (PA. 50.
V, 2,91). Now this witness is nothing else but the ‘I’
which is apprehended in the judgment ‘I know’ ; and how
then should this ‘I’ not be apprehended in the state of
sleep? That which itself appears to the Self appears as
the ‘I,’ and it thus follows that also in deep sleep and
similar states the Self which then shines forth appears
as the ‘I.’

The conscious subject persists in the state of release.

To maintain that the consciousness of the ‘I’ does not
persist in the state of final release is again altogether inap-

70 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

propriate. It in fact amounts to the doctrine—only ex-
pressed in somewhat different words—that final release is
the annihilation of the Self. The ‘I’ is not a mere attri-
bute of the Self so that even after its destruction the essen-
tial nature of the Self might persist—as it persists on the
cessation of ignorance; but it constitutes the very nature
of the Self. Such judgments as ‘I know, ‘ Knowledge has
arisen in me, show, on the other hand, that we are con-
scious of knowledge as a mere attribute of the Self.—
Moreover, a man who suffering pain, mental or of other
kind—whether such pain be real or due to error only
—puts himself in relation to pain—‘I am suffering pain’—
naturally begins to reflect how he may once for all free
himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy a state
of untroubled ease; the desire of final release thus having
arisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it. If,
on the other hand, he were to realise that the effect of such
activity would be the loss of personal existence, he surely
would turn away as soon as somebody began to tell him
about ‘release.’ And the result of this would be that, in
the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole scrip-
tural teaching as to final release would lose its authorita-
tive character.—Nor must you maintain against this that
even in the state of release there persists pure conscious-
ness; for this by no means improves your case. No
sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the
idea that after he himself has perished there will remain
some entity termed ‘pure light!’—What constitutes the
‘inward’ Self thus is the ‘I,’ the knowing subject.

This ‘inward’ Self shines forth in the state of final release
also as an ‘I’; for it appears to itself. The general principle
is that whatever being appears to itself appears as an ‘I’;
both parties in the present dispute establish the existence
of the transmigrating Self on such appearance. On the
contrary, whatever does not appear as an ‘I,’ does not
appear to itself; as jars and the like. Now the emanci-
pated Self does thus appear to itself, and therefore it
appears as an ‘I.’ Nor does this appearance as an ‘I’
imply in any way that the released Self is subject to

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 71

Nescience and implicated in the Sams4ra; for this would
contradict the nature of final release, and moreover the
consciousness of the ‘I’ cannot be the cause of Nescience
and so on. Nescience (ignorance) is either ignorance as to
essential nature, or the cognition of something under an
aspect different from the real one (as when a person suffer-
ing from jaundice sees all things yellow); or cognition of
what is altogether opposite in nature (as when mother o’
pearl is mistaken for silver). Now the ‘I’ constitutes the
essential nature of the Self; how then can the conscious-
ness of the ‘I,’ i.e. the consciousness of its own true nature,
implicate the released Self in Nescience, or, in the Sams4ra ὃ
The fact rather is that such consciousness destroys Nes-
cience, and so on, because it is essentially opposed to them.
In agreement with this we observe that persons like the
rishi Vamadeva, in whom the intuition of their identity
with Brahman had totally destroyed all Nescience, en-
joyed the consciousness of the personal ‘1’; for scripture
says, ‘Seeing this the rishi Vamadeva understood, J was
Manu and the Sun’ (Brz. Up. I, 4, 10). And the highest
Brahman also, which is opposed to all other forms of
Nescience and denoted and conceived as pure Being, is
spoken of in an analogous way ; cp. ‘ Let me make each of
these three deities,’ ἄς. (KA. Up. VI, 3, 3); ‘May I be many,
may I grow forth’ (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3); ‘ He thought, shall I
send forth worlds?’ (Ait. Ar. II, 4,1, 1); and again, ‘ Since
I transcend the Destructible, and am higher also than the
Indestructible, therefore I am proclaimed in the world and
in the Veda as the highest Person’ (Bha. Gi. XV, 18) ;
‘Tam the Self, O Gidakesa’ (Bha. Gi. X, 20); ‘ Never was
I not’ (Bha. Gi. II, 12); ‘I am the source and the destruc-
tion of the whole world’ (Bha. Gi. VII, 6); ‘I am the
source of all; from me proceeds everything’ (Bha. Gi. X,
8); ‘I am he who raises them from the ocean of the world
of death’ (Bha. Gi. XII, 7); ‘I am the giver of seed, the
father’ (Bha. Gf. XIV, 4); ‘I know the things past’ (Bha.
Gi. VII, 26).—But if the ‘I’ (aham) constitutes the essen-
tial nature of the Self, how is it that the Holy One teaches
the principle of egoity (ahamkara) to belong to the sphere

72 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

of objects, ‘The great elements, the ahamkdra, the under-
standing (buddhi), and the Unevolved’ (Bha. Gi. XIII, 5)?
—Asin all passages, we reply, which give information about
the true nature of the Self it is spoken of as the ‘I,’ we con-
clude that the ‘I’ constitutes the essential nature of the in-
ward Self. Where, on the other hand, the Holy One declares
the ahamk&4ra—a special effect of the Unevolved—to be
comprised within the sphere of the Objective, he means
that principle which is called ahamkara, because it causes
the assumption of Egoity on the part of the body which
belongs to the Not-self. Such egoity constitutes the aham-
kara also designated as pride or arrogance, which causes
men to slight persons superior to themselves, and is referred
to by scripture in many places as something evil. Such
consciousness of the ‘I’ therefore as is not sublated by
anything else has the Self for its object; while, on the
other hand, such consciousness of the ‘I’ as has the body
for its object is mere Nescience. In agreement with this
the Reverend Pardsara has said, ‘ Hear from me the essen-
tial nature of Nescience; it is the attribution of Selfhood to
what is not the Self.’ If the Self were pure consciousness
then pure consciousness only, and not the quality of being
a knowing subject, would present itself in the body also,
which is a Not-self wrongly imagined to be a Self. The
conclusion therefore remains that the Self is nothing but
the knowing ‘I.’ Thus it has been said, ‘As is proved
by perception, and as also results from reasoning and
tradition, and from its connexion with ignorance, the Self
presents itself as a knowing ‘I.’ And again, ‘That which is
different from body, senses, mind, and vital airs; which
does not depend on other means; which is permanent,
pervading, divided according to bodies—that is the Self
blessed in itself.’ Here ‘not dependent on other means’
means ‘self-luminous’; and ‘ pervading’ means ‘being of
such a nature as to enter, owing to excessive minuteness,
into all non-sentient things.’

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 73

In cases of Scripture conflicting with Perception, Scrip-
ture is not stronger. The True cannot be known
through the Untrue.

With reference to the assertion (p. 24 ff.) that Perception,
which depends on the view of plurality, is based on some
defect and hence admits of being otherwise accounted for
—whence it follows that it is sublated by Scripture; we
ask you to point out what defect it is on which Perception
is based and may hence be accounted for otherwise.—‘ The
beginningless imagination of difference’ we expect you to
reply.—But, we ask in return, have you then come to know
by some other means that this beginningless imagination
of difference, acting in a manner analogous to that of certain
defects of vision, is really the cause of an altogether perverse
view of things ?—If you reply that this is known just from
the fact that Perception is in conflict with Scripture, we
point out that you are reasoning in a circle: you prove
the defectiveness of the imagination of plurality through
the fact that Scripture tells us about a substance devoid
of all difference ; and at the same time you prove the latter
point through the former. Moreover, if Perception gives rise
to perverse cognition because it is based on the imagination
of plurality, Scripture also is in no better case—for it is
based on the very same view.—If against this you urge that
Scripture, although based on a defect, yet sublates Perception
in so far as it is the cause of a cognition which dispels all
plurality apprehended through Perception, and thus is later
in order than Perception ; we rejoin that the defectiveness
of the foundation of Scripture having once been recognised,
the circumstance of its being later is of no avail. For if
a man is afraid of a rope which he mistakes for a snake
his fear does not come to an end because another man,
whom he considers to be in error himself, tells him ‘ This is
no snake, do not be afraid.’ And that Scripture ἐς founded
on something defective is known at the very time of hearing
Scripture, for the reflection (which follows on hearing) con-
sists in repeated attempts to cognise the oneness of Brahman
—a cognition which is destructive of all the plurality appre-

74 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

hended through the first hearing of the Veda.—We further
ask, ‘By what means do you arrive at the conclusion that
Scripture cannot possibly be assumed to be defective in any
way, while defects may be ascribed to Perception’? It is
certainly not Consciousness—self-proved and absolutely
devoid of all difference—which enlightens you on this point ;
for such Consciousness is unrelated to any objects whatever,
and incapable of partiality to Scripture. Nor can sense-
perception be the source of your conviction ; for as it is
founded on what is defective it gives perverse information.
Nor again the other sources of knowledge ; for they are all
based on sense-perception. As thus there are no acknow-
ledged means of knowledge to prove your view, you must
give it up.—But, you will perhaps say, we proceed by means
ofthe ordinary empirical means and objects of knowledge!—
What, we ask in reply, do you understand by ‘ empirical’?
—What rests on immediate unreflective knowledge, but is
found not to hold good when tested by logical reasoning !—
But what is the use, we ask, of knowledge of this kind? If
logical reasoning refutes something known through some
means of knowledge, that means of knowledge is no longer
authoritative !—Now you will possibly argue as follows:
‘Scripture as well as Perception is founded on Nescience;
but all the same Perception is sublated by Scripture. For
as the object of Scripture, i.e. Brahman, which is one and
without a second, is not seen to be sublated by any ulterior
cognition, Brahman, i.e. pure non-differenced Consciousness,
remains as the sole Reality.’—But here too you are wrong,
since we must decide that something which rests on a defect
is unreal, although it may remain unrefuted. We will illus-
trate this point by an analogous instance. Let us imagine
a race of men afflicted with a certain special defect of vision,
without being aware of this their defect, dwelling in some
remote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men pro-
vided with sound eyes. As we assume all of these cave
dwellers to be afflicted with the same defect of vision, they,
all of them, will equally see and judge bright things, e.g. the
moon, to be double. Now in the case of these people there
never arises a subsequent cognition sublating their primitive

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 75

cognition; but the latter is false all the same, and its object,
viz. the doubleness of the moon, is false likewise ; the defect
of vision being the cause of a cognition not corresponding
to reality.— And so it is with the cognition of Brahman also.
This cognition is based on Nescience, and therefore is false,
together with its object, viz. Brahman, although no sublating
cognition presents itself.—This conclusion admits of various
expressions in logical form. ‘The Brahman under dispute
is false because it is the object of knowledge which has
sprung from what is affected with Nescience; as the phe-
nomenal world is.’ ‘Brahman is false because it is the
object of knowledge; as the world is.’ ‘ Brahman is false
because it is the object of knowledge, the rise of which has
the Untrue for its cause ; as the world is.’

You will now perhaps set forth the following analogy.
States of dreaming consciousness—such as the perception
of elephants and the like in one’s dreams—are unreal, and
yet they are the cause of the knowledge of real things, viz.
good or ill fortune (portended by those dreams). Hence
there is no reason why Scripture—although unreal in so far
as based on Nescience—should not likewise be the cause
of the cognition of what is real, viz. Brahman.—The two
cases are not parallel, we reply. The conscious states ex-
perienced in dreams are ot unreal ; it is only their objects
that are false ; these objects only, not the conscious states,
are sublated by the waking consciousness. Nobody thinks
‘the cognitions of which I was conscious in my dream are
unreal’; what men actually think is ‘the cognitions are real,
but the things are not real.’ In the same way the illusive
state of consciousness which the magician produces in the
minds of other men by means of mantras, drugs, &c., is true,
and hence the cause of love and fear; for such states of
consciousness also are not sublated. The cognition which,
owing to some defect in the object, the sense organ, &c.,
apprehends a rope as a snake is real, and hence the cause
of fear and other emotions. True also is the imagination
which, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind
of a man though not actually bitten, viz. that he has been
bitten; true also is the representation of the imagined

76 VEDANTA-SCTRAS.

poison, for it may be the cause of actual death. In the
same way the reflection of the face in the water is real,
and hence enables us to ascertain details belonging to the
real face. All these states of consciousness are real, as
we conclude from their having a beginning and actual
effects—Nor would it avail you to object that in the
absence of real elephants, and so on, the ideas of them
cannot be real. For ideas require only some substrate
in general; the mere appearance of a thing is a sufficient
substrate, and such an appearance is present in the case in
question, owing to a certain defect. The thing we deter-
mine to be unreal because it is sublated; the idea is non-
sublated, and therefore real.

Nor can you quote in favour of your view—of the real
being known through the unreal—the instance of the stroke
and the letter. The letter being apprehended through the
stroke (i.e. the written character) does not furnish a case
of the real being apprehended through the unreal ; for the
stroke itself is real— But the stroke causes the idea of the
letter only in so far as it is apprehended as being a letter,
and this ‘ being a letter’ is untrue!—Not so, we rejoin. If
this ‘ being a letter’ were unreal it could not be a means of
the apprehension of the letter; for we neither observe nor
can prove that what is non-existent and indefinable con-
stitutes a means.—Let then the idea of the letter constitute
the means !—In that case, we rejoin, the apprehension of
the real does not spring from the unreal ; and besides, it
would follow therefrom that the means and what is to be
effected thereby would be one, i.e. both would be, without
any distinction, the idea of the letter only. Moreover, if the
means were constituted by the stroke in so far as it is not
the letter, the apprehension of all letters would result from
the sight of one stroke ; for one stroke may easily be con-
ceived as not being any letter.— But, in the same way as the
word ‘ Devadatta’ conventionally denotes some particular
man, so some particular stroke apprehended by the eye
may conventionally symbolise some particular letter to be
apprehended by the ear, and thus a particular stroke may
be the cause of the idea of a particular letter !—Quite so,

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 77

we reply, but on this explanation the real is known through
the real ; for both stroke and conventional power of sym-
bolisation are real. The case is analogous to that of the
idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a buffalo ;
that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing depicted,
and that similarity is something real. Nor can it be said
(with a view to proving the pdrvapaksha by another analo-
gous instance) that we meet with a cognition of the real by
means of the unreal in the case of sound (sabda) which is
essentially uniform, but causes the apprehension of different
things by means of difference of tone (ndda). For sound
is the cause of the apprehension of different things in so
far only as we apprehend the connexion of sound manifest-
ing itself in various tones, with the different things indicated
-by those various tones!. And, moreover, it is not correct
to argue on the ground of the uniformity of sound; for
only particular significant sounds such as ‘ga,’ which can
be apprehended by the ear, are really ‘sound.’—All this
proves that it is difficult indeed to show that the know-
ledge of a true thing, viz. Brahman, can be derived from
Scripture, if Scripture—as based on Nescience—is itself
untrue.

Our opponent may finally argue as follows :—Scripture
is not unreal in the same sense as a sky-flower is unreal ;
for antecedently to the cognition of universal non-duality
Scripture is viewed as something that ἐς, and only on the
rise of that knowledge it is seen to be unreal. At this
latter time Scripture no longer is a means of cognising
Brahman, devoid of all difference, consisting of pure Intel-
ligence ; as long on the other hand as it is such a means,
Scripture 7s; for then we judge ‘Scripture is..—But to
this we reply that if Scripture is not (true), the judgment
‘Scripture is’ is false, and hence the knowledge resting on
false Scripture being false likewise, the object of that know-
ledge, i.e. Brahman itself, is false. If the cognition of fire
which rests on mist being mistaken for smoke is false, it

1 And those manifestations of sound by means of various tones
are themselves something real.

78 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

follows that the object of that cognition, viz. fire itself, is
likewise unreal. Nor can it be shown that (in the case
of Brahman) there is no possibility of ulterior sublative
cognition ; for there may be such sublative cognition, viz.
the one expressed in the judgment ‘the Reality is a Void.’
And if you say that this latter judgment rests on error,
we point out that according to yourself the knowledge of
Brahman is also based on error. And of our judgment
(viz. ‘ the Reality is a Void’) it may truly be said that all
further negation is impossible-—But there is no need to
continue this demolition of an altogether baseless theory.

No scriptural texts teach a Brahman devoid of all
difference.

We now turn to the assertion that certain scriptural
texts, as e.g. ‘Being only was this in the beginning,’ are
meant to teach that there truly exists only one homo-
geneous substance, viz. Intelligence free from all difference.—
This we cannot allow. For the section in which the quoted
text occurs, in order to make good the initial declaration
᾿ς that by the knowledge of one thing all things are known,
shows that the highest Brahman which is denoted by the
term ‘Being’ is the substantial and also the operative
cause of the world; that it is all-knowing, endowed with all
powers ; that its purposes come true; that it is the inward
principle, the support and the ruler of everything; and
that distinguished by these and other good qualities it
constitutes the Self of the entire world ; and then finally
proceeds to instruct Svetaketu that this Brahman consti-
tutes his Self also (‘Thou art that’). We have fully set
forth this point in the Ved4rtha-samgraha, and shall estab-
lish it in greater detail in the present work also, in the
so-called 4rambhaza-adhikaraza.—In the same way the
passage ‘the higher knowledge is that by which the Inde-
structible is apprehended, &c.’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5) first denies
of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Prakriti,
and then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-per-
vadingness, subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperish-

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 79

ableness, creativeness with regard to all beings, and other
auspicious qualities. Now we maintain that also the text
‘True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,’ does not prove a
substance devoid of all difference, for the reason that the
co-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains
itself in so far only as denoting one thing distinguished by
several attributes. For ‘co-ordination’ (sam4nAdhikarazya,
lit. ‘the abiding of several things in a common substrate ἢ
means the reference (of several terms) to one thing, there
being a difference of reason for the application (of several
terms to one thing). Now whether we take the several
terms, ‘ True,’ ‘ Knowledge,’ ‘ Infinite,’ in their primary sense,
i.e. as denoting qualities, or as denoting modes of being
opposed to whatever is contrary to those qualities; in either
case we must needs admit a plurality of causes for the
application of those several terms to one thing. There is
however that difference between the two alternatives that
in the former case the terms preserve their primary mean-
ing, while in the latter case their denotative power depends
on so-called ‘implication’ (lakshaz4). Nor can it be said
that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge, &c. (which
is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of lakshama),
constitutes nothing more than the essential nature (of one
non-differenced substance; the three terms thus having
one purport only); for as such essential nature would be
sufficiently apprehended through one term, the employ-
ment of further terms would be purposeless. This view
would moreover be in conflict with co-ordination, as it
would not allow of difference of motive for several terms
applied to one thing. On the other hand it cannot be
urged against the former alternative that the distinction of
several attributes predicated of one thing implies a dis-
tinction in the thing to which the attributes belong, and
that from this it follows that the several terms denote
several things—a result which also could not be recon-
ciled with ‘ co-ordination’; for what ‘co-ordination’ aims
at is just to convey the idea of one thing being qualified
by several attributes. For the grammarians define ‘co-
ordination ’ as the application, to one thing, of several words,

80 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

for the application of each of which there is a different
motive.

You have further maintained the following view :—In the
text ‘one only without a second,’ the phrase ‘ without a
second’ negatives all duality on Brahman’s part even in so
far as qualities are concerned. We must therefore, accord-
ing to the principle that all Sakhas convey the same doc-
trine, assume that all texts which speak of Brahman
as cause, aim at setting forth an absolutely non-dual sub-
stance. Of Brahman thus indirectly defined as a cause, the
text ‘The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,’ contains
a direct definition; the Brahman here meant to be defined
must thus be devoid of all qualities. Otherwise, moreover,
the text would be in conflict with those other texts which
declare Brahman to be without qualities and blemish._—But
this also cannot be admitted. What the phrase ‘without a
second’ really aims at intimating is that Brahman possesses
manifold powers, and this it does by denying the existence
of another ruling principle different from Brahman, That
Brahman actually possesses manifold powers the text shows
further on, ‘It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,’
and ‘it sent forth fire,’ and so on.—But how are we to
know that the mere phrase ‘ without a second’ is meant to
negative the existence of all other causes in general ?—As
follows, we reply. The clause ‘ Being only this was in the
beginning, one only,’ teaches that Brahman when about to
create constitutes the substantial cause of the world. Here
the idea of some further operative cause capable of giving
rise to the effect naturally presents itself to the mind, and
hence we understand that the added clause ‘without a
second’ is meant to negative such an additional cause. If
it were meant absolutely to deny all duality, it would deny
also the eternity and other attributes of Brahman which
you yourself assume. You in this case make just the
wrong use of the principle of all the Sakhas containing the
same doctrine; what this principle demands is that the
qualities attributed in all Sakh4s to Brahman as cause
should be taken over into the passage under discussion
also. The same consideration teaches us that also the

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 81

text ‘True, knowledge,’ &c., teaches Brahman to possess
attributes ; for this passage has to be interpreted in agree-
ment with the texts referring to Brahman as a cause. Nor
does this imply a conflict with the texts which declare
Brahman to be without qualities; for those texts are
meant to negative the evil qualities depending on Prakriti.
—Those texts again which refer to mere knowledge declare
indeed that knowledge is the. essential nature of Brahman,
but this does not mean that mere knowledge constitutes
the fundamental reality. For knowledge constitutes the
essential nature of a knowing subject only which is the
substrate of knowledge, in the same way as the sun, lamps,
and gems are the substrate of Light. That Brahman is
a knowing subject all scriptural texts declare; cp. ‘He
who is all knowing’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); ‘It thought’ (ΚΛ.
Up. VI, 2, 3); ‘This divine being thought’ (KA. Up. VI,
3, 2); * He thought, let me send forth the worlds’ (Ait.
Ar. II, 4, 1, 2); ‘He who arranges the wishes—as eternal.
of those who are not eternal, as thinker of (other) thinkers,
as one of many’ (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); ‘There are two
unborn ones—one who knows, one who does not know—
one strong, the other weak’ (Svet. Up. I, 9) ; ‘ Let us know
Him, the highest of Lords, the great Lord, the highest
deity of deities, the master of masters, the highest above
the god, the lord of the world, the adorable one’ (Svet. Up.
VI, 7); ‘Of him there is known no effect (body) or instru-
ment; no one is seen like unto him or better; his high
power is revealed as manifold, forming his essential nature,
as knowledge, strength, and action’ (Svet. Up. VI, 8);
‘ That is the Self, free from sin, ageless, deathless, griefless,
free from hunger and thirst, whose wishes are true, whose
purposes are true’ (K4%. Up. VIII, 1, 5). These and other
texts declare that to Brahman, whose essential nature is
knowledge, there belong many excellent qualities—among
which that of being a knowing subject stands first, and
that Brahman is free from all evil qualities. That the
texts referring to Brahman as free from qualities, and those
which speak of it as possessing qualities, have really one
and the same object may be inferred from the last of the
[48] G

82 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

passages quoted above; the earlier part of which—‘ free
from sin,’ up to ‘free from thirst ’—denies of Brahman all
evil qualities, while its latter part—‘ whose wishes are true,’
and so on—asserts of its certain excellent qualities. As
thus there is no contradiction between the two classes of
texts, there is no reason whatever to assume that either of
them has for its object something that is false-—With
regard to the concluding passage of the Taittiriya-text,
‘from whence all speech, together with the mind, turns
away, unable to reach it?,’ we point out that with the
passage ‘From terror of it the wind blows,’ there begins
a declaration of the qualities of Brahman, and that the
next section ‘one hundred times that human bliss,’ &c.,
makes statements as to the relative bliss enjoyed by the
different classes of embodied souls; the concluding passage
‘ He who knows the bliss of that Brahman from whence all
speech, together with the mind, turns away unable to reach
it,’ hence must be taken as proclaiming with emphasis the
infinite nature of Brahman’s auspicious qualities. More-~
over, a clause in the chapter under discussion—viz. ‘he
obtains all desires, together with Brahman the all-wise’
(II, 1)—which gives information as to the fruit of the know-
ledge of Brahman clearly declares the infinite nature of the
qualities of the highest all-wise Brahman. The desires are
the auspicious qualities of Brahman which are the objects
of desire ; the man who knows Brahman obtains, together
with Brahman, all qualities of it. The expression ‘ together
with’ is meant to bring out the primary importance of the
qualities; as also described in the so-called dahara-vidy4
(KA. Up. VII, 1). And that fruit and meditation are of
the same character (i.e. that in meditations on Brahman
its qualities are the chief matter of meditation, just as these
qualities are the principal point in Brahman reached by
the Devotee) is proved by the text ‘According to what
a man’s thought is in this world, so will he be after he has

1 Which passage appears to refer to a nirguza brahman, whence
it might be inferred that the connected initial passage—‘ Satyam
«δηλ, &c.—has a similar purport.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 83

departed this life’ (KA. Up. III, 14,1). If it be said that
the passage ‘By whom it is not thought by him it is
thought,’ ‘not understood by those who understand’ (Ke.
Up. II, 3), declares Brahman not to be an object of know-
ledge; we deny this, because were it so, certain other
texts would not teach that final Release results from
knowledge ; cp. ‘He who knows Brahman obtains the
Highest’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); ‘He knows Brahman, he
becomes Brahman.’ And, moreover, the text ‘ He who
knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-
existing ; he who knows Brahman as existing, him we
know himself as existing’ (Taitt, Up. II, 6, 1), makes the
existence and non-existence of the Self dependent on the
existence and non-existence of knowledge which has Brah-
man for its object. We thus conclude that all scriptural
texts enjoin just the knowledge of Brahman for the sake of
final Release. This knowledge is, as we already know,
of the mature of meditation, and what is to be meditated
on is Brahman as possessing qualities. (The text from
the Ke. Up. then explains itself as follows:—) We are
informed by the passage ‘from whence speech together
with mind turns away, being unable to reach it,’ that the
infinite Brahman with its unlimited excellences cannot be
defined either by mind or speech as being so or so much,
and from this we conclude the Kena text to mean that
Brahman is not thought and not understood by those who
understand it to be of a definitely limited nature ; Brahman
in truth being unlimited. If the text did not mean this, it
would be self-contradictory, parts of it saying that Brah-
man is of thought and zof understood, and other parts,
that it ἐς thought and zs understood.

Now as regards the assertion that the text ‘Thou mayest
not see the seer of seeing; thou mayest not think the
thinker of thinking’ (Bz. Up. III, 5, 2), denies the exis-
tence of a seeing and thinking subject different from mere
seeing and thinking.—This view is refuted by the following
interpretation. The text addresses itself to a person who
has formed the erroneous opinion that the quality of con-
sciousness or knowledge does not constitute the essential

G2

84 VEDANTA-SOTRAS. ~

nature of the knower, but belongs to it only as an adventi-
tious attribute, and tells him ‘Do not view or think the
Self to be such, but consider the seeing and thinking Self
to have seeing and thinking for its essential nature.’— Or else
this text may mean that the embodied Self which is the seer
of seeing and the thinker of thinking should be set aside, and
that only the highest Self—the inner Self of all beings—
should be meditated upon.—Otherwise a conflict would
arise with texts declaring the knowership of the Self, such as
‘whereby should he know the knower ?’ (Br. Up. IV, 5, 15).

Your assertion that the text ‘ Bliss is Brahman’ (Taitt.
Up. III, 6, 1) proves pure Bliss to constitute the essential
nature of Brahman is already disposed of by the refutation
of the view that knowledge (consciousness) constitutes the
essential nature of Brahman; Brahman being in reality
the substrate only of knowledge. For by bliss we under-
stand a pleasing state of consciousness. Such passages as
‘consciousness, bliss is Brahman, therefore mean ‘con-
sciousness—the essential character of which is bliss—is
Brahman. On this identity of the two things there rests
that homogeneous character of Brahman, so much insisted
upon by yourself. And in the same way as numerous
passages teach that Brahman, while having knowledge for
its essential nature, is at the same time a knowing subject ;
so other passages, speaking of Brahman as something
separate from mere bliss, show it to be not mere bliss but
a subject enjoying bliss ; cp.‘ That is one bliss of Brahman’
(Taitt. Up. I, 8, 4); ‘he knowing the bliss of Brahman’
(Taitt. Up. II, 9,1). To be a subject enjoying bliss is in
fact the same as to be a conscious subject.

We now turn to the numerous texts which, according to
the view of our opponent, negative the existence of plurality.
—' Where there is duality as it were’ (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15);
‘ There is not any plurality here; from death to death goes
he who sees here any plurality’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); ‘ But
when for him the Self alone has become all, by what means,
and whom, should he see?’ (Brz. Up. IV, 5, 15) &c.—But
what all these texts deny is only plurality in so far as con-
tradicting that unity of the world which depends on its

I ADHYAYA, } PADA, I. 85

being in its entirety an effect of Brahman, and having
Brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true Self.
They do not, on the other hand, deny that plurality on
Brahman’s part which depends on its intention to become
manifold—a plurality proved by the text ‘May I be many,
may I grow forth’ (KA. Up. VI, 2, 3). Nor can our op-
ponent urge against this that, owing to the denial of
plurality contained in other passages this last text refers to
something not real; for it is an altogether laughable
assertion that Scripture should at first teach the doctrine,
difficult to comprehend, that plurality as suggested by
Perception and the other means of Knowledge belongs to
Brahman also, and should afterwards negative this very
doctrine !

Nor is it true that the text ‘If he makes but the smallest
“antaram” (i.e. difference, interval, break) in it there is
fear for him’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7) implies that he who sees
plurality within Brahman encounters fear. For the other
text ‘All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with calm
mind on all this as beginning, ending and breathing in it,
i.e. Brahman’ (KA. Up. III, 14, 1) teaches directly that
reflection on the plurality of Brahman is the cause of peace
of mind. For this passage declares that peace of mind is
produced by a reflection on the entire world as springing
from, abiding within, and being absorbed into Brahman,
and thus having Brahman for its Self; and as thus the
view of Brahman constituting the Self of the world with
all its manifold distinctions of gods, men, animals, inanimate
matter and so on, is said to be the cause of peace of mind,
and, consequently, of absence of fear, that same view surely
cannot be a cause of fear!—But how then is it that the
Taitt. text declares that ‘there is fear for him’ ?—That text,
we reply, declares in its earlier part that rest in Brahman.
is the cause of fearlessness (‘when he finds freedom from
fear, rest, in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined,
unsupported ; then he has obtained fearlessness’); its
latter part therefore means that fear takes place when there
is an interval, a break, in this resting in Brahman. As the
great Rishi says ‘When Vasudeva is not meditated on for

86 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

an hour or even a moment only; that is loss, that is great
calamity, that is error, that is change.’

The Sdtra III, 2,11 does not, as our opponent alleges,
refer to a Brahman free from all difference, but to Brahman
as possessing attributes—as we shall show in its place.
And the Satra IV, 2, 3 declares that the things seen in
dreams are mere ‘ May&’ because they differ in character
from the things perceived in the waking state; from which
it follows that the latter things are real.

Nor do Smriti and Purfima teach such a doctrine.

Nor is it true that also according to Smr#ti and Purdzas
only non-differenced consciousness is real and everything
else unreal.—t He who knows me as unborn and without
a beginning, the supreme Lord of the worlds’ (Bha. Gi.
X, 3); ‘ All beings abide in me, I abide not inthem. Nay,
the beings abide not in me—behold my lordly power. My
Self bringing forth the beings supports them but does not
abide in them’ (Bha. Gi. IX, 4, 5); ‘I am the origin and
the dissolution of the entire world; higher than I there is
nothing else: on me all this is strung as pearls on a thread’
(Bha. Gi. VII, 6, 7); ‘ Pervading this entire Universe by
a portion (of mine) I abide ’ (Bha. Gi. X, 42) ; ‘ But another,
the highest Person, is called the highest Self who, per-
vading the three worlds supports them, the eternal Lord.
Because I transcend the Perishable and am higher than the
Imperishable even, Iam among the people and in the Veda
celebrated as the supreme Person’ (Bha. Gi. XV, 17, 18).

‘ He transcends the fundamental matter of all beings, its
modifications, properties and imperfections; he transcends
all investing (obscuring) influences, he who is the Self of
all. Whatever (room) there is in the interstices of the
world is filled by him; all auspicious qualities constitute
his nature. The whole creation of beings is taken out of
a small part of his power. Assuming at will whatever form
he desires he bestows benefits on the whole world effected
by him. Glory, strength, dominion, wisdom, energy, power
and other attributes are collected in him, Supreme of the
supreme in whom no troubles abide, ruler over high and

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 87

low, lord in collective and distributive form, non-manifest
and manifest, universal lord, all-seeing, all-knowing, all-
powerful, highest Lord. The knowledge by which that
perfect, pure, highest, stainless homogeneous (Brahman) is
known or perceived or comprehended—that is knowledge :
all else is ignorance’ (Vishvu Puraza VI, 5, 82-87).—‘ To that
pure one of mighty power, the highest Brahman to which
no term is applicable, the cause of all causes, the name
“Bhagavat ” is suitable. The letter bha implies both the
cherisher and supporter; the letter ga the leader, mover
and creator. The two syllables bhaga indicate the six
attributes—dominion, strength, glory, splendour, wisdom,
dispassion. That in him—the universal Self, the Self of
the beings—all beings dwell and that he dwells in all, this
is the meaning of the letter va. Wisdom, might, strength,
dominion, glory, without any evil qualities, are all denoted
by the word bhagavat. This great word bhagavat is the
name of V4sudeva who is the highest Brahman—and of no
oneelse. This word which denotes persons worthy of rever-
ence in general is used in its primary sense with reference
to Vasudeva only ; in a derived sense with regard to other
persons’ (Vi. Pu. VI, 5, 72 ff.);. ‘Where all these powers
abide, that is the form of him who is the universal form:
that is the great. form of Hari. That form produces in its
sport forms endowed with all powers, whether of gods or
men or animals, For the purpose of benefitting the worlds,
not springing from work (karman) is this action of the
unfathomable one ; all-pervading, irresistible’ (Vi. Pu. VI,
7, 69-71); ‘Him who is of this kind, stainless, eternal, all-
pervading, imperishable, free from all evil, named Vishzu,
the highest abode’ (Vi. Pu. I, 22, 53); ‘He who is the
highest of the high, the Person, the highest Self, founded
on himself; who is devoid of all the distinguishing character-
istics of colour, caste and the like; who is exempt from
birth, change, increase, decay and death; of whom it can
only be said that he ever is. Hé is everywhere and in him
everything abides; hence he is called Vasudeva by those
who know. He is Brahman, eternal, supreme, imperish-
able, undecaying; of one essential nature and ever pure,

88 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

as free from all defects. This whole world is Brahman,
comprising within its nature the Evolved and the Un-
evolved ; and also existing in the form of the Person and
in that of time’ (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 10-14); ‘The Prakriti about
which I told and which is Evolved as well as Unevolved,
and the Person—both these are merged in the highest Self.
The highest Self is the support of all, the highest Lord ; as
Vishzu he is praised in the Vedas and the Ved4nta-texts’
(Vi. Pu. VI, 4, 38, 39). ‘Two forms are there of that Brah-
man, one material, the other immaterial. These two forms,
perishable and imperishable, are within all things: the
imperishable one is the highest Brahman, the perishable
one this whole world. As the light of a fire buming in
one place spreads all around, so the energy of the highest
Brahman constitutes this entire world ’ (Vi. Pu. I, 23, 53-55)-
‘ The energy of Vishzu is the highest, that which is called the
embodied soul is inferior ; and there is another third energy
called karman or Nescience, actuated by which the omni-
present energy of the embodied soul perpetually undergoes
the afflictions of worldly existence. Obscured by Nescience
the energy of the embodied soul is characterised in the
different beings by different degrees of perfection’ (Vi. Pu.
VI, 7, 61-63).

These and other texts teach that the highest Brahman is
essentially free from all imperfection whatsoever, comprises
within itself all auspicious qualities, and finds its pastime in
originating, preserving, reabsorbing, pervading, and ruling
the universe ; that the entire complex of intelligent and non-
intelligent beings (souls and matter) in all their different
estates is real, and constitutes the form, i.e. the body of
the highest Brahman, as appears from those passages which
co-ordinate it with Brahman by means of terms such as sarira
(body), rapa (form), tanu (body), amsa (part), sakti (power),
vibhati (manifestation of power), and so on ;—that the souls
which are a manifestation of Brahman’s power exist in their
own essential nature, and also, through their connexion
with matter, in the form of embodied souls (kshetragya) ;—
and that the embodied souls, being engrossed by Nescience
in the form of good and evil works, do not recognise their

I ADHYAYA, I PADA;, I. . 89

essential nature, which is knowledge, but view themselves
as having the character of material things.—The outcome
of all this is that we have to cognise Brahman as carrying
plurality within itself, and the world, which is the manifes-
tation of his power, as something real.

When now the text, in the sloka ‘ where all difference has
vanished ’ (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 53), declares that the Self, although
connected with the different effects of Prakriti, such as
divine, human bodies, and so on, yet is essentially free from
all such distinctions, and therefore not the object of the words
denoting those different classes of beings, but to be defined
as mere knowledge and Being; to be known by the Self
and not to be reached by the mind of the practitioner of
Yoga (yogayug); this must in no way be understood as
denying the reality of the world.—But how is this known ?—
As follows, we reply. The chapter of the Pur4za in which
that sloka occurs at first declares concentration (Yoga) to be
the remedy of all the afflictions of the Samsara ; thereupon
explains the different stages of Yoga up to the so-called
pratyahara (complete restraining of the senses from re-
ceiving external impressions) ; then, in order to teach the
attainment of the ‘perfect object’ (subhasraya) required
for dh4raz4, declares that the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishau,
possesses two forms, called powers (sakti), viz. a defined
one (marta) and an undefined one (amdrta); and then
teaches that a portion of the ‘defined’ form, viz. the
embodied soul (kshetrag#a), which is distinguished by its
connexion with matter and involved in Nescience—that is
termed ‘action,’ and constitutes a third power—is not perfect.
The chapter further teaches that a portion of the undefined
form which is free from Nescience called action, separated
from all matter, and possessing the character of pure
knowledge, is also not the ‘perfect object,’ since it is
destitute of essential purity ;- and, finally, declares that the
‘ perfect object’ is to be found in that defined form which
is special to Bhagavat, and which is the abode of the three
powers, viz. that non-defined form which is the highest
power, that non-defined form which is termed embodied
soul, and constitutes the secondary (apara) power, and

90 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Nescience in the form of work—which is called the third
power, and is the cause of the Self, which is of the essence of
the highest power, passing into the state of embodied soul.
This defined form (which is the ‘ perfect object’) is proved
by certain Ved4nta-texts, such as ‘that great person of
sun-like lustre’ (Svet. Up. III, 8). We hence must take the
Sloka, ‘in which all differences vanish, &c., to mean that
the pure Self (the Self in so far as knowledge only) is not
capable of constituting the ‘ perfect object.’ Analogously
two other passages declare ‘ Because this cannot be reflected
upon by the beginner in Yoga, the second (form) of Vishzu
is to be meditated upon by Yogins—the highest abode.’
‘That in which all these powers have their abode, that is
the other great form of Hari, different from the (material)
Visva form.’

In an analogous manner, Pardsara declares that Brahma,
KXaturmukha, Sanaka, and similar mighty beings which
dwell within this world, cannot constitute the ‘ perfect
object’ because they are involved in Nescience ; after that
goes on to say that the beings found in the Samsara are in
the same condition—for they are essentially devoid of
purity since they reach their true nature only later on,
when through Yoga knowledge has arisen in them—; and
finally teaches that the essential individual nature of the
highest Brahman, i.e. Vish#u, constitutes the ‘perfect
object.’ ‘From Brahmé down to a blade of grass, all living
beings that dwell within this world are in the power of the
Sams4ra due to works, and hence no profit can be derived
by the devout from making them objects of their meditation.
They are all implicated in Nescience, and stand within the
sphere of the Samsdra; knowledge arises in them only later
on, and they are thus of no use in meditation. Their
knowledge does not belong to them by essential nature, for
it comes to them through something else. Therefore the
stainless Brahman which possesses essential knowledge,’
&c. &c.— All this proves that the passage ‘in which all
difference vanishes’ does not mean to deny the reality of
the world.

Nor, again, does the passage ‘that which has knowledge

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1. oI

for its essential nature’ (Vi. Pu. I, 2,6) imply that the whole
complex of things different from knowledge is false ; for it
declares only that the appearance of the Self—the essential
nature of which is knowledge—as gods, men, and so on, is
erroneous. A declaration that the appearance of mother
οὐ pearl as silver is founded on error surely does not imply
that all the silver in the world is unreal !—But if, on the
ground of an insight into the oneness of Brahman and the
world—as expressed in texts where the two appear in
co-ordination—a text declares that it is an error to view
Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, under the
form of material things, this after all implies that the whole
aggregate of things is false!l—By no means, we rejoin.
As our sAstra distinctly teaches that the highest Brahman,
i.e. Vishnu, is free from all imperfections whatsoever, com-
prises within himself all auspicious qualities, and reveals
his power in mighty manifestations, the view of the world’s
reality cannot possibly be erroneous. That information as
to the oneness of two things by means of co-ordination does
not allow of sublation (of either of the two), and is non-con-
tradictory, we shall prove further on. Hence also the sloka
last referred to does not sublate the reality of the world.

‘ That from whence these beings are born, by which, when
born, they live, into which they enter when they die,
endeavour to know that; that is Brahman’ (Taitt. Up.
III, 1). From this scriptural text we ascertain that
Brahman is the cause of the origination, and so on, of
the world. After this we learn from a Purdza text (‘He
should make the Veda grow by means of Itihdsa and
Puraza; the Veda fears that a man of little reading
may do it harm’) that the Veda should be made to grow
by Itihdsa and Purd#za. By this ‘making to grow’ we
have to understand the elucidation of the sense of the
Vedic texts studied by means of other texts, promul-
gated by men who had mastered the entire Veda and
its contents, and by the strength of their devotion had
gained full intuition of Vedic truth. Such ‘making to
grow’ must needs be undertaken, since the purport of the
entire Veda with all its Sakhas cannot be fathomed by one

92 - VEDANTA-SOTRAS. ~

who has studied a small part only, and since without
knowing that purport we cannot arrive at any certitude.
The Vishzu Purdza relates how Maitreya, wishing to
have his knowledge of Vedic matters strengthened by the
holy Pardsara, who through the favour of Pulastya and
Vasishzha had obtained an insight into the true nature of
the highest divinity, began to question Pardsara, ‘I am
desirous to hear from thee how this world originated, and
how it will again originate in future, and of what it consists,
and whence proceed animate and inanimate things ; how
and into what it has been resolved, and into what it will in
future be resolved?’ &c. (Vi Pu. I, 1). The questions
asked refer to the essential nature of Brahman, the different
modes of the manifestation of its power, and the different
results of propitiating it. Among the questions belonging
to the first category, the question ‘ whence proceed animate
and inanimate things?’ relates to the efficient and the
material cause of the world, and hence the clause ‘ of what
the world consists’ is to be taken as implying a question
as to what constitutes the Self of this world, which is the
object of creation, sustentation, and dissolution. The reply
to this question is given in the words ‘and the world is
He.’ Now the identity expressed by this clause is founded
thereon that he (i.e. Brahman or Vishzu) pervades the
world as its Self in the character of its inward Ruler; and
is not founded on unity of substance of the pervading
principle and the world pervaded. The phrase ‘consists
of ’ (-maya) does not refer to an effect (so that the question
asked would be as to the causal substance of which this
world is an effect), for a separate question on this point
would be needless. Nor does the -maya express, as it
sometimes does—e. g. in the case of praza-maya', the own
sense of the word to which it is attached ; for in that case
the form of the reply ‘and the world is He’ (which implies
a distinction between the world and Vishzu) would be
inappropriate ; the reply would in that case rather be
‘Vishzu only.’ What ‘maya’ actually denotes here is

2. *Pranamaya’ is explained as meaning ‘ prana’ only.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 93

abundance, prevailingness, in agreement with Pazini, V, 4,
21, and the meaning is that Brahman prevails in the world
in so far as the entire world constitutes its body. The
co-ordination of the two words ‘the world’ and ‘He’ thus
rests on that relation between the two, owing to which the
world is the body of Brahman, and Brahman the Self of the
world. If, on the other hand, we maintained that the sAstra
aims only at inculcating the doctrine of one substance free
from all difference, there would be no sense in all those
questions and answers, and no sense in an entire sAstra
devoted to the explanation of that one thing. In that case
there would be room for one question only, viz. ‘what is
the substrate of the erroneous imagination of a world ?’ and
for one answer to this question, viz. ‘ pure consciousness
devoid of all distinction!’—And if the co-ordination
expressed in the clause ‘and the world is he’ was meant
to set forth the absolute oneness of the world and Brahman,
then it could not be held that Brahman possesses all kinds
of auspicious qualities, and is opposed to all evil; Brahman
would rather become the abode of all that is impure. All
this confirms the conclusion that the co-ordination expressed
in that clause is to be understood as directly teaching the
relation between a Self and its body.—The sloka, ‘From
Vishzu the world has sprung: in him he exists: he is the
cause of the subsistence and dissolution of this world : and
the world is he’ (Vi. Pu. I, 1, 35), states succinctly what
a subsequent passage—beginning with ‘the highest of the
high’ (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 10}—sets forth in detail. Now there the
sloka, ‘to the unchangeable one’ (I, 2, 1), renders homage
to the holy Vishau, who is the highest Brahman in so far
as abiding within his own nature, and then the text pro-
ceeds to glorify him in his threefold form as Hiranyagarbha,
Hari, and Sankara, as Pradhana, Time, and as the totality
of embodied souls in their combined and distributed form.
Here the sloka, ‘Him whose essential nature is know-
ledge’ (I, 2, 6), describes the aspect of the highest Self in
so far as abiding in the state of discrete embodied souls ;
the passage cannot therefore be understood as referring to
a substance free from all difference. If the sdstra aimed

94 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

at teaching that the erroneous conception of a manifold
world has for its substrate a Brahman consisting of non-
differenced intelligence, there would be room neither for
the objection raised in I, 3, 1 (‘How can we attribute
agency creative and otherwise to Brahman which is without
qualities, unlimited, pure, stainless?’) nor for the refutation
of that objection, ‘ Because the powers of all things are the
objects of (true) knowledge excludimg all (bad) reasoning,
therefore there belong to Brahman also such essential
powers as the power of creating, preserving, and so on, the
world ; just as heat essentially belongs to fire.’ In that
case the objection would rather be made in the following
form: ‘How can Brahman, which is without qualities, be
the agent in the creation, preservation, and so on, of the
world?’ and the answer would be, ‘Creation by Brahman
is not something real, but something erroneously imagined.’
—The purport of the objection as it stands in the text is as
follows: ‘We observe that action creative and otherwise
belongs to beings endowed with qualities such as goodness,
and so on, not perfect, and subject to the influence of
karman; how then can agency creative, and so on, be
attributed to Brahman which is devoid of qualities, perfect,
not under the influence of karman, and incapable of any
connexion with action?’ And the reply is, ‘There is
nothing unreasonable in holding that Brahman as being of
the nature described above, and different in kind from all
things perceived, should possess manifold powers ; just as
fire, which is different in kind from water and all other
material substances, possesses the quality of heat and other
qualities. The slokas also, which begin with the words
‘Thou alone art real’ (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.), do not assert
that the whole world is unreal, but only that, as Brahman
is the Self of the world, the latter viewed apart from
Brahman is not real. This the text proceeds to confirm,

1 The sense in which this sloka has to be taken is ‘As in
ordinary life we ascribe to certain things (e.g. gems, mantras)
certain special powers because otherwise the effects they produce
could not be accounted for; so to Brahman also,’ &c.

1 ADHYAya, I PADA, I. 95

‘thy greatness it is by which all movable and immovable
things are pervaded.’ This means—because all things
movable and immovable are pervaded by thee, therefore
all this world has thee for its Self, and hence‘ there is none
other than thee,’ and thus thou being the Self of all art
alone real. Such being the doctrine intended to be set
forth, the text rightly says, ‘this all-pervasiveness of thine
is thy greatness’; otherwise it would have to say, ‘it is
thy error.’ Were this latter view intended, words such as
‘Lord of the world,’ ‘thou,’ &c., could not, moreover, be
taken in their direct sense, and there would arise a con-
tradiction with the subject-matter of the entire chapter,
viz. the praise of the Holy one who in the form of a mighty
boar had uplifted in play the entire earth.—Because this
entire world is thy form in so far as it is pervaded as its
Self by thee whose true nature is knowledge ; therefore
those who do not possess that devotion which enables men
to view thee as the Self of all, erroneously view this world
as consisting only of gods, men, and other beings ; this is
the purport of the next sloka, ‘this which is seen..—And
it is an error not only to view the world which has its real
Self in thee as consisting of gods, men, and so on, but also
to consider the Selfs whose ‘true nature is knowledge as
being of the nature of material beings such as gods, men,
and the like; this is the meaning of the next sloka, ‘this
world whose true nature is knowledge.—Those wise men,
on the other hand, who have an insight into the essentially
intelligent Self, and whose minds are cleared by devotion—
the means of apprehending the Holy one as the universal
Self—, they view this entire world with all its manifold
bodies—the effects of primeval matter—as thy body—
a body the Self of which is constituted by knowledge
abiding apart from its world-body; this is the meaning
of the following sloka: ‘ But those who possess knowledge,’
&c.—If the different slokas were not interpreted in this
way, they would be mere unmeaning reiterations ; their
constitutive words could not be taken in their primary
sense ; and we should come into conflict with the sense of
the passages, the subject-matter of the chapter, and the

96 ᾿ VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

purport of the entire sdstra. The passage, further, ‘ Of
that Self although it exists in one’s own and in other
bodies, the knowledge is of one kind’ (Vi. Pu. II, 14, 31 ff.),
refers to that view of duality according to which the
different Selfs—although equal in so far as they are all of
the essence of knowledge—are constituted into separate
beings, gods, men, &c., by their connexion with different
portions of matter all of which are modifications of primary
matter, and declares that view to be false. But this does
not imply a denial of the duality which holds good between
matter on the one hand and Self on the other: what the
passage means is that the Self which dwells in the different
material bodies of gods, men, and so on, is of one and the
same kind. So the Holy one himself has said, ‘In the dog
and the low man eating dog’s flesh the wise see the same’;
‘Brahman, without any imperfection, is the same’ (Bha.
Gi. V, 18, 19). And, moreover, the clause ‘Of the Self
although existing in one’s own and in other bodies’ directly
declares that a thing different from the body is distributed
among one’s own and other bodies.

Nor does the passage ‘If there is some other (para)
different (anya) from me,’ &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 86) intimate
the oneness of the Self; for in that case the two words
‘para’ and ‘anya’ would express one meaning only (viz.
‘other’ in the sense of ‘ distinct from’). The word ‘ para’
there denotes a Self distinct from that of one’s own Self,
and the word ‘anya’ is introduced to negative a character
different from that of pure intelligence: the sense of the
passage thus is ‘If there is some Self distinct from mine,
and of a character different from mine which is pure know-
ledge, then it can be said that I am of such a character
and he of a different character’; but this is not the case,
because all Selfs are equal in as far as their nature consists
of pure knowledge.—Also the sloka beginning ‘Owing to
the difference of the holes of the flute’ (Vi. Pu. II, 14, 32)
only declares that the inequality of the different Selfs is
owing not to their essential nature, but to their dwelling in
different material bodies; and does not teach the oneness
of all Selfs. The different portions of air, again, passing

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 97

through the different holes of the flute—to which the many
Selfs are compared—are not said to be one but only to be
equal in character; they are one in character in so far
as all of them are of the nature of air, while the different
names of the successive notes of the musical scale are
applied to them because they pass out by the different
holes of the instrument. For an analogous reason the
several Selfs are denominated by different names, viz.
gods and so on. Those material things also which are parts
of the substance fire, or water, or earth, are one in so far
only as they consist of one kind of substance; but are not
absolutely one; those different portions of air, therefore,
which constitute the notes of the scale are likewise not
absolutely one. Where the Pur4sza further says ‘ He (or
“that ἢ) I am and thou art He (or “that ”); all this universe
that has Self for its true nature is He (or “that ”); abandon
the error of distinction’ (Vi. Pu. II, 16, 23); the word
‘that’ refers to the intelligent character mentioned pre-
viously which is common to all Selfs, and the co-ordination
stated in the two clauses therefore intimates that intelli-
gence is the character of the beings denoted ‘I’ and
‘Thou’; ‘abandon therefore, the text goes on to say,
‘the illusion that the difference of outward form, divine and
80 on, causes a corresponding difference in the Selfs.’ If this
explanation were not accepted (but absolute non-difference
insisted upon) there would be no room for the references to
difference which the passages quoted manifestly contain.
Accordingly the text goes on to say that the king acted
on the instruction he had received, ‘he abandoned the view
of difference, having recognised the Real.—But on what
ground do we arrive at this decision (viz. that the passage
under discussion is not meant to teach absolute non-
duality)?—On the ground, we reply, that the proper topic
of the whole section is to teach the distinction of the Self
and the body—for this is evident from what is said in an
early part of the section, ‘as the body of man, characterised
by hands, feet, and the like, ἃς. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 85).—For
analogous reasons the sloka ‘When that knowledge which
gives rise to distinction’ &c. (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 94) teaches
[48] Η

98 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

neither the essential unity of all Selfs nor the oneness of
the individual Self and the highest Self. And that the
embodied soul and the highest Self should be essentially
one, is no more possible than that the body and the Self
should be one. In agreement herewith Scripture says,
‘Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree.
One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without
eating’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1). ‘There are two drinking
their reward in the world of their own works, entered into
the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know
Brahman call them shade and light, &c. (Ka. Up. I, 3, 1).
And in this sdstra also (i.e. the Vishvu Puraa) there are
passages of analogous import ; cp. the stanzas quoted above,
‘He transcends the causal matter, all effects, all imperfec-
tions such as the guvas’ &c.

The Satras also maintain the same doctrine, cp. I, 1, 17;
I, 2, 21; II, 1, 22; and others. They therein follow Scrip-
ture, which in several places refers to the highest and the
individual soul as standing over against each other, cp. e.g.
* He who dwells in the Self and within the Self, whom the
Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules
the Self from within’ (Brz. Up. III, 7, 22) ; ‘Embraced by
the intelligent Self’ (Brz. Up. IV, 3, 21); ‘ Mounted by the
intelligent Self’ (IV, 3, 35). Nor can the individual Self
become one with the highest Self by freeing itself from
Nescience, with the help of the means of final Release; -
for that which admits of being the abode of Nescience can
never become quite incapable of it. So the Purama says,
‘It is false to maintain that the individual Self and the
highest Self enter into real union; for one substance can-
not pass over into the nature of another substance.’
Accordingly the Bhagavad Gita declares that the released
soul attains only the same attributes as the highest Self.
‘ Abiding by this knowledge, they, attaining to an equality
of attributes with me, do neither come forth at the time
of creation, nor are troubled at the time of general destruc-
tion’ (XIV, 2). Similarly our Ρυγᾶπα says, ‘That Brahman
leads him who meditates on it, and who is capable of
change, towards its own being (Atmabh4va), in the same

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, I. 99

way as the magnet attracts the iron’ (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 30).
Here the phrase ‘leads him towards his own being’ means
‘imparts to him a nature like his own’ (not ‘completely
identifies him with itself’); for the attracted body does not
become essentially one with the body attracting.

The same view will be set forth by the Sdtrakara in
IV, 4, 17; 21, and I, 3, 2. The Vritti also says (with
reference to Sd. IV, 4, 17) ‘with the exception of the
business of the world (the individual soul in the state of
release) is equal (to the highest Self) through light’; and
the author of the Dramidabhdshya says, ‘Owing to its
equality (s4yugya) with the divinity the disembodied soul
effects all things, like the divinity.’ The following scrip-
tural texts establish the same view, ‘Those who depart
from hence, after having known the Self and those true
desires, for them there is freedom in all the worlds’ (KA.
Up. VIII, 1, 6); ‘He who knows Brahman reaches the
Highest’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); ‘ He obtains all desires together
with the intelligent Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1) ; ‘ Having
reached the Self which consists of bliss, he wanders about
in these worlds having as much food and assuming as many
forms as he likes’ (Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5); ‘There he moves
about’ (KA. Up. VII, 12, 3); ‘ For he is flavour ; for only
after having perceived a flavour can any one perceive
pleasure’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7); ‘As the flowing rivers go to
’ their setting in the sea, losing name and form; thus he
who knows, freed from name and form, goes to the divine
Person who is higher than the high’ (Mu. Up. ITI, 2, 8) ;
‘He who knows, shaking off good and evil, reaches the
highest oneness, free from stain’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3).

The objects of meditation in all the vidy4s which refer to
the highest Brahman, are Brahman viewed as having
qualities, and the fruit of all those meditations. For this
reason the author of the Sdtras declares that there is
option among the different vidyAs—cp. Ve. Sd. IIT, 3, 11;
III, 3, 59. In the same way the Vakyakdra teaches that
the qualified Brahman only is the object of meditation, and
that there is option of vidy4s; where he says ‘ (Brahman)
connected (with qualities), since the meditation refers to its

o37831A

100 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

qualities.’ The same view is expressed by the Bhashya-
kara in the passage beginning ‘ Although he who bases
himself on the knowledge of Being.’—Texts such as ‘He
knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman’ (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9)
have the same purport, for they must be taken in con-
nexion with the other texts (referring to the fate of him
who knows) such as ‘Freed from name and form he
goes to the divine Person who is higher than the high’;
‘Free from stain he reaches the highest oneness’ (Mu. Up.
III, 2, 8; III, 1, 3); ‘ Having approached the highest light
he manifests himself in his own shape’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4).
Of him who has freed himself from his ordinary name and
form, and all the distinctions founded thereon, and has
assumed the uniform character of intelligence, it may be
said that he is of the character of Brahman.—Our Purdaa
also propounds the same view. The sloka (VI, 7, 91),
‘Knowledge is the means to obtain what is to be obtained,
viz. the highest Brahman: the Self is to be obtained, freed
from all kinds of imagination,’ states that that Self which
through meditation on Brahman, is freed from all imagina-
tion so as to be like Brahman, is the object to be attained.
(The three forms of imagination to be got rid of are so-
called karma-bhavan4, brahma-bhavan4 and a combination
of the two. See Vi. Pu. VI, 7.) The text then goes on,
‘The embodied Self is the user of the instrument, know-
ledge is its instrument; having accomplished Release—
whereby his object is attained—he may leave off.’ This
means that the Devotee is to practise meditation on the
highest Brahman until it has accomplished its end, viz.
the attainment of the Self free from all imagination.—The
text continues, ‘Having attained the being of its being,
then he is non-different from the highest Self; his differ-
ence is founded on Nescience only.’ This sloka describes
the state of the released soul. ‘Its being’ is the being, viz.
the character or nature, of Brahman; but this does not
mean absolute oneness of nature; because in this latter
case the second ‘ being’ would be out of place and the
sloka would contradict what had been said before. The
meaning is: when the soul has attained the nature of

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 101

Brahman, i.e. when it has freed itself from all false imagina-
tion, then it is non-different from the highest Self. This
non-difference is due to the soul, as well as the highest Self,
having the essential nature of uniform intelligence. The
difference of the soul—presenting itself as the soul of a god,
a man, &c.—from the highest Self is not due to its essential
nature, but rests on the basis of Nescience in the form of
work : when through meditation on Brahman this basis is
destroyed, the difference due to it comes to an end, and the
soul no longer differs from the highest Self. So another
text says, ‘The difference of things of one nature is due to
the investing agency of outward works ; when the difference
of gods, men, &c., is destroyed, it has no longer any invest-
ing power’ (Vi. Pu. II, 14, 33).—The text then adds
a further explanation, ‘when the knowledge which gives
rise to manifold difference is completely destroyed, who
then will produce difference that has no real existence?’
The manifold difference is the distinction of gods, men,
animals, and inanimate things: compare the saying of
Saunaka: ‘this fourfold distinction is founded on false know-
ledge. The Self has knowledge for its essential nature ;
when Nescience called work—which is the cause of the
manifold distinctions of gods, men, &c.—has been com-
pletely destroyed through meditation on the highest
Brahman, who then will bring about the distinction of
gods, &c., from the highest Self—a distinction which in the
absence of a cause cannot truly exist.—That Nescience is
called karman (work) is stated in the same chapter of the
Purdsa (st. 61—avidyA karmasamgfia).

The passage in the Bhagavad Gita, ‘Know me to
be the kshetrag#a’ (XIII, 2), teaches the oneness of all in
so far as the highest Self is the inward ruler of all; taken
in any other sense it would be in conflict with other texts,
such as ‘All creatures are the Perishable, the unchanging
soul is the Imperishable ; but another is the highest
Person’ (Bha. Gi. XV, 16). In other places the Divine one
declares that as inward Ruler he is the Self of all: ‘The
Lord dwells in the heart of all creatures’ (XVIII, 61), and
‘I dwell within the heart of all’ (XV, 15), and ‘I am the

102 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Self which has its abode within all creatures’ (X, 20).
The term ‘creature’ in these passages denotes the entire
aggregate of body, &c., up to the Self—Because he is the
Self of all, the text expressly denies that among all the
things constituting his body there is any one separate from
him,‘ There is not anything which is without me’ (X, 39).
The place where this text occurs is the winding up of
a glorification of the Divine one, and the text has to be
understood accordingly. The passage immediately follow-
ing is ‘Whatever being there is, powerful, beautiful, or
glorious, even that know thou to have sprung from a
portion of my glory; pervading this entire Universe by
a portion of mine I do abide’ (X, 41 ; 42).

All this clearly proves that the authoritative books do
not teach the doctrine of one non-differenced substance ;
that they do ποΖ teach that the universe of things is false;
and that they do zo¢ deny the essential distinction of in-
telligent beings, non-intelligent things, and the Lord.

The theory of Nescience cannot be proved.

We now proceed to the consideration of Nescience.—
According to the view of our opponent, this entire world,
with all its endless distinctions of Ruler, creatures ruled,
and so on, is, owing to a certain defect, fictitiously super-
imposed upon the non-differenced, self-luminous Reality ;
and what constitutes that defect is beginningless Nescience,
which invests the Reality, gives rise to manifold illusions,
and cannot be defined either as being or non-being. Such
Nescience, he says, must necessarily be admitted, firstly on
the ground of scriptural texts, such as ‘ Hidden by what is
untrue’ (Χά. Up. VIII, 3, 2), and secondly because other-
wise the oneness of the individual souls with Brahman—
which is taught by texts such as ‘Thou are that ’—cannot
be established. This Nescience is neither ‘being,’ because
in that case it could not be the object of erroneous cogni-
tion (bhrama) and sublation (badha) ; nor is it ‘non-being,”
because in that case it could not be the object of apprehen-
sion and sublation’. Hence orthodox Philosophers declare

’ *Nescience’ is sublated (refuted) by the cognition of Brahman,

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 103

that this Nescience falls under neither of these two opposite
categories.

Now this theory of Nescience is altogether untenable.
In the first place we ask, ‘What is the substrate of this
Nescience which gives rise to the great error of plurality
of existence?’ You cannot reply ‘the individual soul’;
for the individual soul itself exists in so far only as it is
fictitiously imagined through Nescience. Nor can you say
‘Brahman’; for Brahman is nothing but self-luminous
intelligence, and hence contradictory in nature to Nescience,
which is avowedly sublated by knowledge.

‘The highest Brahman has knowledge for its essential
nature: if Nescience, which is essentially false and to be
terminated by knowledge, invests Brahman, who then will
be strong enough to put an end to it?’

‘What puts an end to Nescience is the knowledge that
Brahman is pure knowledge !’—‘ Not so, for that knowledge
also is, like Brahman, of the nature of light, and hence has
no power to put an end to Nescience.—And if there exists
the knowledge that Brahman is knowledge, then Brahman
is an object of knowledge, and that, according to your own
teaching, implies that Brahman is not of the nature of
consciousness.’

To explain the second of these slokas.—If you maintain
that what sublates Nescience is not that knowledge which
constitutes Brahman’s essential nature, but rather that
knowledge which has for its object the truth of Brahman
being of such a nature, we demur ; for as both these kinds
of knowledge are of the same nature, viz. the nature of
light, which is just that which constitutes Brahman’s nature,
there is no reason for making a distinction and saying that
one knowledge is contradictory of Nescience, and the other
is not. Or, to put it otherwise—that essential nature
of Brahman which is apprehended through the cognition

and thereby shown to have been the object of erroneous cognition :
it thus cannot be ‘being,’ i.e. real. Nor can it be altogether
unreal, ‘non-being,’ because in that case it could not be the object
: either of mental apprehension or of sublation.

104 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

that Brahman is knowledge, itself shines forth in con-
sequence of the self-luminous nature of Brahman, and hence
we have no right to make a distinction between that
knowledge which constitutes Brahman’s nature, and that of
which that nature is the object, and to maintain that the
latter only is antagonistic to Nescience.—Moreover (and
this explains the third sloka), according to your own view
Brahman, which is mere consciousness, cannot be the object
of another consciousness, and hence there is no knowledge
which has Brahman for its object. If, therefore, knowledge
is contradictory to non-knowledge (Nescience), Brahman
itself must be contradictory to it, and hence cannot be its
substrate. Shells (mistaken for silver) and the like which
by themselves are incapable of throwing light upon their
own true nature are not contradictory to non-knowledge of
themselves, and depend, for the termination of that non-
knowledge, on another knowledge (viz. on the knowledge
of an intelligent being); Brahman, on the other hand,
whose essential nature is established by its own conscious-
ness, is contradictorily opposed to non-knowledge of itself,
and hence does not depend, for the termination of that non-
knowledge, on some other knowledge.—If our opponent
should argue that the knowledge of the falsity of whatever
is other than Brahman is contradictory to non-know-
ledge, we ask whether this knowledge of the falsity of
what is other than Brahman is contradictory to the non-
knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, or to that non-
knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the
apparent world. The former alternative is inadmissible ;
because the cognition of the falsity of what is other than
Brahman has a different object (from the non-knowledge
of Brahman’s true nature) and therefore cannot be con-
tradictory to it; for knowledge and non-knowledge are
contradictory in so far only as they refer to one and the
same object. And with regard to the latter alternative we
point out that the knowledge of the falsity of the world is
contradictory to the non-knowledge which consists in the
view of the reality of the world; the former knowledge
therefore sublates the latter non-knowledge only, while

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, I. 105

the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is not
touched by it.—Against this it will perhaps be urged that
what is here called the non-knowledge of the true nature of
Brahman, really is the view of Brahman being dual in
nature, and that this view is put an end to by the cognition
of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman; while
the true nature of Brahman itself is established by its own
consciousness.—But this too we refuse to admit. If non-
duality constitutes the true nature of Brahman, and is
proved by Brahman’s own consciousness, there is room
neither for what is contradictory to it, viz. that non-know-
ledge which consists in the view of duality, nor for the
sublation of that non-knowledge.— Let then non-duality be
taken for an attribute (not the essential nature) of Brahman !
—This too we refuse to admit; for you yourself have
proved that Brahman, which is pure Consciousness, is free
from attributes which are objects of Consciousness.—From
all this it follows that Brahman, whose essential nature is
knowledge, cannot be the substrate of Nescience: the
theory, in fact, involves a flat contradiction.

When, in the next place, you maintain that Brahman,
whose nature is homogeneous intelligence, is invested and
hidden by Nescience, you thereby assert the destruction of
Brahman’s essential nature. Causing light to disappear
means either obstructing the origination of light, or else
destroying light that exists. And as you teach that light
(consciousness) cannot originate, the ‘hiding’ or ‘making
to disappear’ of light can only mean its destruction.—
Consider the following point also. Your theory is that
self-luminous consciousness, which is without object and
without substrate, becomes, through the influence of an
imperfection residing within itself, conscious of itself as
connected with innumerous substrata and innumerous
objects.—Is then, we ask, that imperfection residing within
consciousness something rea] or something unreal ?—The
former alternative is excluded, as not being admitted by
yourself, Nor can we accept the latter alternative; for
if we did we should have to view that imperfection as
being either a knowing subject, or an object of knowledge,

106 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

or Knowing itself. Now it cannot be ‘Knowing,’ as you
deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing ;
and that ‘Knowing,’ which is the substrate of the imper-
fection, cannot be held to be unreal, because that would
involve the acceptance of the Madhyamika doctrine, viz.
of a general void '.

And if knowers, objects of knowledge and knowing as
determined by those two are fictitious, i.e. unreal, we have
to assume another fundamental imperfection, and are thus
driven into a regressus in infinitum.—To avoid this diffi-
culty, it might now be said that real consciousness itself,
which constitutes Brahman’s nature, is that imperfection. —
But if Brahman itself constitutes the imperfection, then
Brahman is the basis of the appearance of a world, and it
is gratuitous to assume an additional avidy4 to account
for the world. Moreover, as Brahman is eternal, it would
follow from this hypothesis that no release could ever take
place. Unless, therefore, you admit a real imperfection
apart from Brahman, you are unable to account for the
great world-error.

What, to come to the next point, do you understand by
the inexplicability (anirvazaniyaté) of Nescience?—Its dif-
ference in nature from that which zs, as well as that which
zs notl—A thing of such kind would be inexplicable
indeed ; for none of the means of knowledge apply to it.
That is to say—the whole world of objects must be ordered
according to our states of consciousness, and every state
of consciousness presents itself in the form, either of some-
thing existing or of something non-existing. If, therefore,
we should assume that of states of consciousness which are
limited to this double form, the object can be something
which is neither existing nor non-existing, then anything

Δ If the imperfection inhering in Consciousness is itself of the
nature of consciousness, and at the same time unreal, we should
have to distinguish two kinds of Consciousness—which is contrary
to the fundamental doctrine of the oneness of Consciousness. And
if, on the other hand, we should say that the Consciousness in
which the imperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter,
i.e. unreal, we are landed in the view of universal unreality.

Φ

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 107

whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness
whatever.

Against this our opponent may now argue as follows :—
There is, after all, something, called avidyA, or ag#Ana, or
by some other name, which is a positive entity (bhava),
different from the antecedent non-existence of knowledge ;
which effects the obscuration of the Real; which is the
material cause of the erroneous superimposition on the
Real, of manifold external and internal things; and which
is terminated by the cognition of the true nature of the
one substance which constitutes Reality. For this avidya
is apprehended through Perception as well as Inference.
Brahman, in so far as limited by this avidy4, is the material
cause of the erroneous superimposition—upon the inward
Self, which in itself is changeless pure intelligence, but has
its true nature obscured by this superimposition—of that
plurality which comprises the ahamkara, all acts of know-
ledge and all objects of knowledge. Through special forms
of this defect (i.e. avidy4) there are produced, in this world
superimposed upon Reality, the manifold special superim-
positions presenting themselves in the form of things and
cognitions of things—such as snakes (superimposed upon
ropes), silver (superimposed on shells), and the like. Avidya
constitutes the material cause of this entire false world;
since for a false thing we must needs infer a false cause.
That this avidy4 or ag#4na (non-knowledge) is an object
of internal Perception, follows from the fact that judgments
such as ‘I do not know,’ ‘I do not know either myself or
others,’ directly present themselves to the mind. A mental
state of this kind has for its object not that non-knowledge
which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge—for
such absence of knowledge is ascertained by the sixth ©
means of proof (anupalabdhi); it rather is a state which
presents its object directly, and thus is of the same kind
as the state expressed in the judgment ‘I am experiencing
pleasure.’ Even if we admit that ‘absence of something’
(abhava) can be the object of perception, the state of con-
sciousness under discussion cannot have absence of know-
ledge in the Self for its object. For at the very moment

108 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

of such consciousness knowledge exists ; or if it does not
exist there can be no consciousness of the absence of
knowledge. To explain. When I am conscious that I am
non-knowing, is there or is there not apprehension of the Self
as having non-existence of knowledge for its attribute, and
of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge? In
the former case there can be no consciousness of the absence
of knowledge, for that would imply a contradiction. In
the latter case, such consciousness can all the less exist,
for it presupposes knowledge of that to which absence of
knowledge belongs as an attribute (viz. the Self) and of its
own counterentity, viz. knowledge. The same difficulty
arises if we view the absence of knowledge as either the
object of Inference, or as the object of the special means of
proof called ‘abhava’ (i.e. anupalabdhi). If, on the other
hand, non-knowledge is viewed (not as a merely negative,
but) as a positive entity, there arises no contradiction even
if there is (as there is in fact) at the same time knowledge
of the Self as qualified by non-knowledge, and of know-
ledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge; and we
therefore must accept the conclusion that the state of
consciousness expressed by ‘I am non-knowing,’ has for
its object a non-knowledge which is a positive entity—
But, a Nescience which is a positive entity, contradicts the
witnessing consciousness, whose nature consists in the
lighting up of the truth of things!—Not so, we reply.
Witnessing consciousness has for its object not the true
nature of things, but Nescience; for otherwise the lighting
up (i.e. the consciousness) of false things could not take place.
Knowledge which has for its object non-knowledge (Nesci-
ence), does not put an end to that non-knowledge. Hence
there is no contradiction (between daitanya and ag¥ana).—
But, a new objection is raised, this positive entity, Nescience,
becomes an object of witnessing Consciousness, only in so
far as it (Nescience) is defined by some particular object
(viz. the particular thing which is not known), and such
objects depend for their proof on the different means of
knowledge. How then can that Nescience, which is defined
by the ‘I’ (as expressed e.g. in the judgment, ‘I do not

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 109

know myself’), become the object of witnessing Conscious-
ness ?—There is no difficulty here, we reply. All things
whatsoever are objects of Consciousness, either as things
known or as things not known. But while the mediation
of the means of knowledge is required in the case of all
those things which, as being non-intelligent (gada), can be
proved only in so far as being objects known (through
some means of knowledge), such mediation is not required
in the case of the intelligent (agada) inner Self which proves
itself. Consciousness of Nescience is thus possible in all
cases (including the case ‘I do not know myself’), since
witnessing Consciousness always gives definition to Nes-
cience.—From all this it follows that, through Perception
confirmed by Reasoning, we apprehend Nescience as a
positive entity. This Nescience, viewed as a positive entity,
is also proved by Inference—viz. in the following form:
All knowledge established by one of the different means
of proof is preceded by something else, which is different
from the mere antecedent non-existence of knowledge ;
which hides the object of knowledge; which is terminated
by knowledge; and which exists in the same place as
knowledge ;— because knowledge possesses the property of
ilumining things not illumined before ;—just as the light
of a lamp lit in the dark illumines things.—Nor must you
object to this inference on the ground that darkness is not
a substance, but rather the mere absence of light, or else
the absence of visual perception of form and colour, and
that hence darkness cannot be brought forward as a similar
instance proving Nescience to be a positive entity. For
that Darkness must be considered a positive substance
follows, firstly, from its being more or less dense, and
secondly, from its being perceived as having colour.

To all this we make the following reply. Neither
Perception alone, nor Perception aided by Reasoning, reveals
to us a positive entity, Nescience, as implied in judgments
such as ‘I am non-knowing, ‘I know neither myself nor
others.’ The contradiction which was urged above against
the view of non-knowledge being the antecedent non-
existence of knowledge, presents itself equally in connexion

110 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

with non-knowledge viewed as a positive entity. For here
the following alternative presents itself—the inner Reality
is either known or not known as that which gives definition
to Nescience by being either its object or its substrate.
If it be thus known, then there is in it no room for
Nescience which is said to be that which is put an end
to by the cognition of the true nature of the Inner Reality.
If, on the other hand, it be not thus known, how should
there be a consciousness of Nescience in the absence of
that which defines it, viz. knowledge of the substrate or
of the object of Nescience?—Let it then be said that what
is contradictory to non-knowledge is the clear presentation
of the nature of the inner Self, and that (while there is
consciousness of ag#4na) we have only an obscure presenta-
tion of the nature of the Self; things being thus, there is
no contradiction between the cognition of the substrate
and object of Nescience on the one side, and the conscious-
ness of ag#Ana on the other.—Well, we reply, all this’
holds good on our side also. Even if ag#ana means ante-
cedent non-existence of knowledge, we can say that know-
ledge of the substrate and object of non-knowledge has
for its object the Self presented obscurely only; and
thus there is no difference between our views—unless you
choose to be obstinate!

Whether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or
as the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, in either
case it comes out as what the word indicates, viz. non-
knowledge. Non-knowledge means either absence of
knowledge, or that which is other than knowledge, or
that which is contradictory to knowledge; and in any of
these cases we have to admit that non-knowledge pre-
supposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge. Even
though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not
require the knowledge of the nature of light, yet when
darkness is considered under the aspect of being contrary
to light, this presupposes the cognition of light. And the
non-knowledge held by you is never known in its own
nature but merely as ‘non-knowledge, and it therefore
presupposes the cognition of knowledge no less than our

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 11ΠΙ

view does, according to which non-knowledge is simply
the negation of knowledge. Now antecedent non-existence
of knowledge is admitted by you also, and is an undoubted
object of consciousness ; the right conclusion therefore is
that what we are conscious of in such judgments as ‘I am
non-knowing,’ &c., is this very antecedent non-existence of
knowledge which we both admit.

It, moreover, is impossible to ascribe to Brahman, whose
nature is constituted by eternal free self-luminous in-
telligence, the consciousness of Nescience ; for what con-
stitutes its essence is consciousness of itself. If against this
you urge that Brahman, although having consciousness of
Self for its essential nature, yet is conscious of non-know-
ledge in so far as its (Brahman’s) nature is hidden ; we ask
in return what we have to understand by Brahman’s nature
being hidden. You will perhaps say ‘the fact of its not
being illumined.’ But how, we ask, can there be absence
of illumination of the nature of that whose very nature con-
sists in consciousness of Self, i.e. self-illumination? If you
reply that even that whose nature is consciousness of Self
may be in the state of its nature not being illumined by an
outside agency, we point out that as according to you
light cannot be considered as an attribute, but constitutes
the very nature of Brahman, it would—illumination coming
from an external agency—follow that the very nature of

᾿ Brahman can be destroyed from the outside. This we
have already remarked.—Further, your view implies on the
one hand that this non-knowledge which is the cause of
the concealment of Brahman’s nature hides Brahman in
so far as Brahman is conscious of it, and on the other
hand that having hidden Brahman, it becomes the object
of consciousness on the part of Brahman ; and this evidently
constitutes a logical see-saw. You will perhaps say! that
it hides Brahman in so far only as Brahman is conscious of
it. But, we point out, if the consciousness of ag#Ana takes
place on the part of a Brahman whose nature is not hidden,
the whole hypothesis of the ‘hiding’ of Brahman’s nature

1 Allowing the former view of the question only.

112 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

loses its purport, and with it the fundamental hypothesis
as to the nature of ag#4na; for if Brahman may be
conscious of ag#4na (without a previous obscuration of
its nature by ag#Ana) it may as well be held to be in the
same way conscious of the world, which, by you, is considered
to be an effect of ag#Ana.

How, further, do you conceive this consciousness of
ag#ana on Brahman’s part? Is it due to Brahman itself,
or to something else? In the former case this conscious-
ness would result from Brahman’s essential nature, and
hence there would never be any Release. Or else, con-
sciousness of ag#Ana constituting the nature of Brahman,
which is admittedly pure consciousness, in the same way
as the consciousness of false silver is terminated by that
cognition which sublates the silver, so some terminating act
of cognition would eventually put an end to Brahman’s
essential nature itself—On the second alternative we ask
what that something else should be. If you reply ‘another
agfana,’ we are led into a regressus in infinitum.—Let it
then be said! that ag#4na having first hidden Brahman
then becomes the object of its consciousness——This, we
rejoin, would imply that ag#a4na—acting like a defect of
the eye—by its very essential being hides Brahman, and
then ag#4na could not be sublated by knowledge.—Let
us then put the case as follows:—Ag#4na, which is by
itself beginningless, at the very same time effects Brahman’s
witnessing it (being conscious of it), and Brahman’s nature
being hidden; in this way the regressus in infinitum and
other difficulties will be avoided.—But this also we cannot
admit ; for Brahman is essentially consciousness of Self,
and cannot become a witnessing principle unless its nature
be previously hidden.—Let then Brahman be hidden by
some other cause !|—This, we rejoin, would take away from
agf#ana its alleged beginninglessness, and further would
also lead to an infinite regress) And if Brahman were
assumed to become a witness, without its essential nature
being hidden, it could not possess—what yet it is main-

‘ Adopting the latter view only; see preceding note.

I ADIYAYA, I PADA, I. 113

tained to possess—the uniform character of consciousness
of Self.—If, moreover, Brahman is hidden by avidy4, does
it then not shine forth at all, or does it shine forth to some
extent? On the former alternative the not shining forth of
Brahman—whose nature is mere light—reduces it to an
absolute non-entity. Regarding the latter alternative we
ask, ‘of Brahman, which is of an absolutely homogeneous
nature, which part do you consider to be concealed, and
which to shine forth?’ To that substance which is pure
light, free from all division and distinction, there cannot
belong two modes of being, and hence obscuration and
light cannot abide in it together.—Let us then say that
Brahman, which is homogeneous being, intelligence, bliss,
has its nature obscured by avidy4, and hence is seen
indistinctly as it were—But how, we ask, are we to
conceive the distinctness or indistinctness of that whose
nature is pure light? When an object of light which has
parts and distinguishing attributes appears in its totality,
we say that it appears distinctly ; while we say that its
appearance is indistinct when some of its attributes do not
appear. Now in those aspects of the thing which do not
appear, light (illumination) is absent altogether, and hence
we cannot there speak of indistinctness of light ; in those
parts on the other hand which do appear, the light of which’
they are the object is distinct. Indistinctness is thus not
possible at all where there is light. In the case of such
things as are apprehended as objects, indistinctness may
take place, viz. in so far as some of their distinguishing
attributes are not apprehended. But in Brahman, which is
not an object, without any distinguishing attributes, pure
light, the essential nature of which it is to shine forth,
indistinctness which consists in the non-apprehension of
certain attributes can in no way be conceived, and hence
not be explained as the effect of avidy4.

We, moreover, must ask the following question: ‘Is this
indistinctness which you consider an effect of avidy4 put an
end to by the rise of true knowledge or not?’ On the latter
alternative there would be no final release. In the former
ease we have to ask of what nature Reality is. ‘It is of

[48] ΟἹ

114 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

an essentially clear and distinct nature.’ Does this nature
then exist previously (to the cessation of indistinctness), or
not? If.it does, there is no room whatever either for
indistinctness the effect of avidy4, or for its cessation. If
it does not previously exist, then Release discloses itself
as something to be effected, and therefore non-eternal.—
And that such non-knowledge is impossible because there
is no definable substrate for it we have shown above.
—He, moreover, who holds the theory of error resting
on a non-real defect, will find it difficult to prove the
impossibility of error being without any substrate ; for, if
the cause of error may be unreal, error may be supposed
to take place even in case of its substrate being unreal,
And the consequence of this would be the theory of a
general Void.

The assertion, again, that non-knowledge as a positive
entity is proved by Inference, also is groundless. But the
inference was actually set forth!—True; but it was set
forth badly. For the reason you employed for proving
ag#ana is a so-called contradictory one (i.e. it proves the
contrary of what it is meant to prove), in so far as it proves
what is not desired and what is different from ag#4na (for
what it proves is that there is a certain knowledge, viz.
that all knowledge resting on valid means of proof has
non-knowledge for its antecedent). (And with regard to
this knowledge again we must ask whether it also has non-
knowledge for its antecedent.) If the reason (relied on in
all this argumentation) does not prove, in this case also,
the antecedent existence of positive non-knowledge, it is
too general (and hence not to be trusted in any case).
If, on the other hand, it does prove antecedent non-
knowledge, then this latter non-knowledge stands in the
way of the non-knowledge (which you try to prove by
inference) being an object of consciousness, and thus
the whole supposition of ag#4na as an entity becomes
useless.

The proving instance, moreover, adduced by our oppo-
nent, has no proving power; for the light of a lamp does
not possess the property of illumining things not illumined

1 ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, I. 115

before. Everywhere illumining power belongs to know-
ledge only ; there may be light, but if there is not also
knowledge there is no lighting up of objects. The senses
also are only causes of the origination of knowledge, and
possess no illumining power. The function of the light of
the lamp on the other hand is a merely auxiliary one, in so
far as it dispels the darkness antagonistic to the organ of
sight which gives rise to knowledge; and it is only with
a view to this auxiliary action that illumining power is
conventionally ascribed to the lamp.—But in using the
light of the lamp as a proving instance, we did not mean
to maintain that it possesses illumining power equal to
that of light; we introduced it merely with reference to
the illumining power of knowledge, in so far as preceded
by the removal of what obscures its object !—We refuse
to accept this explanation. Illumining power does not
only mean the dispelling of what is antagonistic to it, but
also the defining of things, i.e. the rendering them capable
of being objects of empirical thought and speech ; and this
belongs to knowledge only (not to the light of the lamp).
If you allow the pewer of illumining what was not illumined,
to auxiliary factors also, you must first of all allow it to the
senses which are the most eminent factors of that kind ;
and as in their case there exists no different thing to be
terminated by their activity, (i.e. nothing analogous to the
ag#ana to be terminated by knowledge), this whole argu-
mentation is beside the point.

There are also formal inferences, opposed to the conclu-
sion of the pdrvapakshin.—Of the ag#4na under discussion,
Brahman, which is mere knowledge, is not the substrate,
just because it is ag#Ana; as shown by the case of the non-
knowledge of the shell (mistaken for silver) and similar
cases ; for such non-knowledge abides within the knowing
subject—The ag#4na under discussion does not obscure
knowledge, just because it is ag#4na; as shown by the
cases of the shell, &c.; for such non-knowledge hides the
object.—Ag#Ana is not terminated by knowledge, because
it does not hide the object of knowledge; whatever non-
knowledge is terminated by knowledge, is such as to hide

12

116 VEDANTA-SOUTRAS.

the object of knowledge; as e.g. the non-knowledge of the
shell.— Brahman is not the substrate of ag#4na, because it is
devoid of the character of knowing subject; like jars and
similar things.— Brahman is not hidden by ag#ana, because
it is not the object of knowledge; whatever is hidden by
non-knowledge is the object of knowledge; so e.g. shells
and similar things——Brahman is not connected with non-
knowledge to be terminated by knowledge, because it is
not the object of knowledge; whatever is connected with
non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge is an object
of knowledge; as e.g. shells and the like.—Knowledge
based on valid means of proof, has not for its antecedent,
non-knowledge other than the antecedent non-existence of
knowledge ; just because it is knowledge based on valid
proof; like that valid knowledge which proves the ag#4na
maintained by you.—Knowledge does not destroy a real
thing, because it is knowledge in the absence of some
specific power strengthening it; whatever is capable of
destroying things is—whether it be knowledge or ag#ana—
strengthened by some specific power; as e.g. the know-
ledge of the Lord and of Yogins; and as the ag#ana
consisting in a pestle (the blow of which destroys the pot).
—Ag#iana which has the character of a positive entity cannot
be destroyed by knowledge; just because it is a positive
entity, like jars and similar things.

But, it now may be said, we observe that fear and other
affections, which are positive entities and produced by
previous cognitions, are destroyed by sublative acts of
cognition !—Not so, we reply. Those affections are not
destroyed by knowledge; they rather pass away by them-
selves, being of a momentary (temporary) nature only, and
on the cessation of their cause they do not arise again.
That they are of a momentary nature only, follows from
their being observed only in immediate connexion with the
causes of their origination, and not otherwise. If they were
not of a temporary nature, each element of the stream of
cognitions, which are the cause of fear and the like, would
give rise to a separate feeling of fear, and the result would
be that there would be consciousness of many distinct

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 117

feelings of fear (and this we know not to be the case).—In
conclusion we remark that in defining right knowledge as
‘that which has for its antecedent another entity, different
from its own antecedent non-existence,’ you do not give
proof of very eminent logical acuteness; for what sense has
it to predicate of an entity that it is different from non-
entity?—For all these reasons Inference also does not
prove an ag#iana which is a positive entity. And that it is
not proved by Scripture and arthApatti, will be shown later
on. And the reasoning under Sa. II, 1, 4, will dispose of
the argument which maintains that of a false thing the
substantial cause also must be false.

We thus see that there is no cognition of any kind which
has for its object a Nescience of ‘inexplicable’ nature.—
Nor can such an inexplicable entity be admitted on the
ground of apprehension, erroneous apprehension and subla-
tion (cp. above, p. 102). For that only which is actually
apprehended, can be the object of apprehension, error and
sublation, and we have no right to assume, as an object of
these states of consciousness, something which is appre-
hended neither by them nor any other state of consciousness.
—‘ But in the case of the shell, &c., silver is actually appre-
hended, and at the same time there arises the sublating
consciousness ‘“‘ this silver is not real,” and it is not possible
that one thing should appear as another ; we therefore are
driven to the hypothesis that owing to some defect, we
actually apprehend silver of an altogether peculiar kind, viz.
such as can be defined neither as real nor as unreal.’—This
also we cannot allow, since this very assumption necessarily
implies that one thing appears as another. For appre-
hension, activity, sublation, and erroneous cognition, all
result only from one thing appearing as another, and it
is not reasonable to assume something altogether non-
perceived and groundless. The silver, when apprehended,
is not apprehended as something ‘inexplicable,’ but as
something real; were it apprehended under the former
aspect it could be the object neither of erroneous nor of
sublative cognition, nor would the apprehending person
endeavour to seize it, For these reasons you (the anirva-

118 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

kaniyatva-vadin) also must admit that the actual process
is that of one thing appearing as another.

Those also who hold other theories as to the kind of
cognition under discussion (of which the shell, mistaken for
silver, is an instance) must—whatsoever effort they may
make to avoid it—admit that their theory finally implies
the appearing of one thing as another. The so-called
asatkhyati-view implies that the non-existing appears
as existing; the Atmakhydti-view, that the Self—which
here means ‘cognition’—appears as a thing; and the
akhyati-view, that the attribute of one thing appears as
that of another, that two acts of cognition appear as one,
and—on the view of the non-existence of the object—that
the non-existing appears as existing 1.

Moreover, if you say that there is originated silver of
a totally new inexplicable kind, you are bound to assign
the cause of this origination. This cause cannot be the
perception of the silver ; for the perception has the silver
for its object, and hence has no existence before the
origination of the silver. And should you say that the
perception, having arisen without an object, produces
the silver and thereupon makes it its object, we truly do
not know what to say to such excellent reasoning !—Let it
then be said that the cause is some defect in the sense-
organ.—This, too, is inadmissible ; for a defect abiding in
the percipient person cannot produce an objective effect.—
Nor can the organs of sense (apart from defects) give rise
to the silver; for they are causes of cognitions only (not of
things cognised). Nor, again, the sense-organs in so far as
modified by some defect; for they also can only produce
modifications in what is effected by them, i.e. cognition.—
And the hypothesis of a beginningless, false ag#4na consti-
tuting the general material cause of all erroneous cognitions
has been refuted above.

How is it, moreover, that this new and inexplicable thing

‘ For a full explanation of the nature of these ‘khyAtis,’ see
A. Venis’ translation of the Vedanta Siddhanta MuktAvali (Reprint
from the Pandit, p. 130 ff.).

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1. 119
(which you assume to account for the silver perceived on
the shell) becomes to us the object of the idea and word
‘silver,’ and not of some other idea and term, e.g. of
a jar?—If you reply that this is due to its similarity to
silver, we point out that in that case the idea and the word
presenting themselves to our mind should be that of
‘something resembling silver.’ Should you, on the other
hand, say that we apprehend the thing as silver because it
possesses the generic characteristics of silver, we ask whether
these generic characteristics are real or unreal. The former
alternative is impossible, because something real cannot
belong to what is unreal; and the latter is impossible
because something unreal cannot belong to what is
real.
But we need not extend any further this refutation of an
altogether ill-founded theory.

All knowledge is of the Real.

‘Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition
has for its object what is real; for Sruti and Smriti alike
teach that everything participates in the nature of every-
thing else. In the scriptural account of creation preceded
by intention on the part of the Creator it is said that each
of these elements was made tripartite ; and this tripartite
constitution of all things is apprehended by Perception as
well. The red colour in burning fire comes from (primal
elementary) fire, the white colour from water, the black
colour from earth—in this way Scripture explains the
threefold nature of burning fire. In the same way all
things are composed of elements of all things. The
Vish#u Purana, in its account of creation, makes a similar
statement: “The elements possessing various powers
and being unconnected could not, without combination,
produce living beings, not having mingled in any way.
Having combined, therefore, with one another, and enter-
ing into mutual associations—beginning with the principle
called Mahat, and extending down to the gross elements
—they formed an egg,” &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 50; 52). This
tripartiteness of the elements the Sdtrakara also de-

120 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

clares (Ve. SQ. III, 1, 3). For the same reason Sruti
enjoins the use of Putika sprouts when no Soma can be
procured ; for, as the Mim4msakas explain, there are in the
Putika plant some parts of the Soma plant (Pa. Mi. Sd.) ;
and for the same reason nivéra grains may be used as
a substitute for rice grains. That thing is similar to
another which contains within itself some part of that
other thing; and Scripture itself has thus stated that in
shells, &c., there is contained some silver, and so on.
That one thing is called “silver” and another “shell” has
its reason in the relative preponderance of one or the other
element. We observe that shells are similar to silver ; thus
perception itself informs us that some elements of the latter
actually exist in the former. Sometimes it happens that
owing to a defect of the eye the silver-element only is
apprehended, not the shell-element, and then the percipient
person, desirous of silver, moves to pick up the shell. 1,
on the other hand, his eye is free from such defect, he
apprehends the shell-element and then refrains from action.
Hence the cognition of silver in the shell is a true one.
In the same way the relation of one cognition being sublated
by another explains itself through the preponderant
element, according as the preponderance of the shell-
element is apprehended partially or in its totality, and
does not therefore depend on one cognition having for its
object the false thing and another the true thing. The
distinctions made in the practical thought and business
of life thus explain themselves on the basis of everything
participating in the nature of everything else.’

In dreams, again, the divinity creates, in accordance with
the merit or demerit of living beings, things of a special
nature, subsisting for a certain time only, and perceived
only by the individual soul for which they are meant. In
agreement herewith Scripture says, with reference to the
state of dreaming, ‘ There are no chariots in that state, no
horses, no roads; then he creates chariots, horses, and
roads. There are no delights, no joys, no bliss; then he
creates delights, joys, and bliss. There are no tanks, no
lakes, no rivers; then he creates tanks, lakes, and rivers.

1 ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. ‘721

For he is the maker’ (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). The meaning
of this is, that although there are then no chariots, &c., to
be perceived by other persons, the Lord creates such
things to be perceived by the.dreaming person only.
‘For he is the maker’; for such creative agency belongs
to him who possesses the wonderful power of making all
his wishes and plans to come true. Similarly another
passage, ‘That person who is awake in those who are
asleep, shaping one lovely sight after another, that indeed
is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is called the
Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes
beyond it’ (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8).— The Satrak4ra also, after
having in two Satras (III, 2, 1; 2) stated the hypothesis of
the individual soul creating the objects appearing in dreams,
finally decides that that wonderful creation is produced by
the Lord for the benefit of the individual dreamer; for the
reason that as long as the individual soul is in the sams4ra
state, its true nature—comprising the power of making its
wishes to come true—is not fully manifested, and hence it
cannot practically exercise that power. The last clause
of the Katha text (‘all worlds are contained in it,’ &c.)
clearly shows that the highest Self only is the creator
meant. That the dreaming person who lies in his chamber
should go in his body to other countries and experience
various results of his merit or demerit—being at one time
crowned a king, having at another time his head cut off,
and so on—is possible in so far as there is created for
him another body in every way. resembling the body
resting on the bed.

The case of the white shell being seen as yellow, explains
itself as follows, The visual rays issuing from the eye are

in contact with the bile contained in the eye, and thereupon Ὁ

enter into conjunction with the shell ; the result is that the
whiteness belonging to the shell is overpowered by the
yellowness of the bile, and hence not apprehended ;
the shell thus appears yellow, just as if it were gilt
The bile and its yellowness is, owing to its exceeding
tenuity, not perceived by the bystanders ; but thin though
it be it is apprehended by the person suffering from jaundice,

122 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

to whom it is very near, in so far as it issues from his own
eye, and through the mediation of the visual rays, aided by
the action of the impression produced on the mind by that
apprehension, it is apprehended even in the distant object,
viz. the shell—In an analogous way the crystal which is
placed near the rose is apprehended as red, for it is over-
powered by the brilliant colour of the rose ; the brilliancy
of the rose is perceived in a more distinct way owing to its
close conjunction with the transparent substance of the
crystal_—In the same way the cognition of water in the
mirage is true. There always exists water in connexion
with light and earth; but owing to some defect of the
eye of the perceiving person, and to the mysterious in-
fluence of merit and demerit, the light and the earth are
not apprehended, while the water ἐς apprehended. — In
the case again of the firebrand swung round rapidly, its
appearance as a fiery wheel explains itself through the
circumstance that moving very rapidly it is in conjunction
with all points of the circle described without our being
able to apprehend the intervals. The case is analogous to
that of the perception of a real wheel; but there is the
difference that in the case of the wheel no intervals are
apprehended, because there are none; while in the case of
the firebrand none are apprehended owing to the rapidity
of the movement. But in the latter case also the cognition
is true.—Again, in the case of mirrors and similar reflecting
surfaces the perception of one’s own face is likewise true.
The fact is that the motion of the visual rays (proceeding
from the eye towards the mirror) is reversed (reflected) by
the mirror, and that thus those rays apprehend the person’s
own face, subsequently to the apprehension of the surface
of the mirror; and as in this case also, ewing to the
rapidity of the process, there is no apprehension of any
interval (between the mirror and the face), the face presents
itself as being in the mirror.—In the case of one direction
being mistaken for another (as when a person thinks the
south to be where the north is), the fact is that, owing to
the unseen principle (i.e. merit or demerit), the direction
which actually exists in the other direction (for a point

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 123

which is to the north of me is to the south of another
point) is apprehended by itself, apart from the other elements
of direction ; the apprehension which actually takes place
is thus likewise true.—Similar is the case of the double
moon. Here, either through pressure of the finger upon
the eye, or owing to some abnormal affection of the eye,
the visual rays are divided (split), and the double, mutually
independent apparatus of vision thus originating, becomes
the cause of a double apprehension of the moon. One
apparatus apprehends the moon in her proper place; the.
other which moves somewhat obliquely, apprehends at first
a place close by the moon, and then the moon herself, which
thus appears somewhat removed from her proper place.
Although, therefore, what is apprehended is the one moon
distinguished by connexion with two places at the same
time—an apprehension due to the double apparatus of
vision—yet, owirig to the difference of apprehensions, there
is a difference in the character of the object apprehended,
and an absence of the apprehension of unity, and thus
a double moon presents itself to perception. That the
second spot is viewed as qualifying the moon, is due to the
circumstance that the apprehension of that spot, and that
of the moon which is not apprehended in her proper place,
are simultaneous. Now here the doubleness of the
apparatus is real, and hence the apprehension of the
moon distinguished by connexion with two places is real
also, and owing to this doubleness of apprehension, the
doubleness of aspect of the object apprehended,i.e. the moon,
is likewise real. That there is only one moon constituting
the true object of the double apprehension, this is a matter
for which ocular perception by itself does not suffice, and
hence what is actually seen is a double moon. That,
although the two eyes together constitute one visual
apparatus only, the visual rays being divided through
some defect of the eyes, give rise to a double apparatus—
this we infer from the effect actually observed. When that
defect is removed there takes place only one apprehension
of the moon as connected with her proper place, and thus
the idea of one moon only arises. It is at the same time

124 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

quite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double
visual apparatus, the latter to a double apprehension,
and the latter again to a doubleness of the object of
apprehension.

We have thus proved that all cognition is true. The
shortcomings of other views as to the nature of cognition
have been set forth at length by other philosophers, and
we therefore do not enter on that topic. What need is
there, in fact, of lengthy proofs? Those who acknowledge the
validity of the different means of knowledge, perception, and
so on, and—what is vouched for by sacred tradition—the
existence of a highest Brahman—free from all shadow of
imperfection, of measureless excellence, comprising within
itself numberless auspicious qualities, all-knowing, immedi-
ately realising all its purposes—, what should they not be
able to prove? That holyhighest Brahman—while producing
the entire world as an object of fruition for the individual
souls, in agreement with their respective good and ill deserts
—creates certain things of such a nature as to become
common objects of consciousness, either pleasant or un-
pleasant, to all souls together, while certain other things
are created in such a way as to be perceived only by
particular persons, and to persist for a limited time only.
And it is this distinction—viz. of things that are objects of
general consciousness, and of things that are not so—which
makes the difference between what is called ‘things sublat-
ing ’ and ‘things sublated.’—Everything is explained hereby.

Neither Scripture nor Smriti and Purfina teach
Nescience.

The assertion that Nescience—to be defined neither as
that which is nor as that which is not—rests on the
authority of Scripture is untrue. In passages such as
‘hidden by the untrue’ (K%. Up. VIII, 3, 2), the word
‘untrue’ does not denote the Undefinable; it rather means
that which is different from ‘rtta,’ and this latter word—
as we see from the passage ‘enjoying the rzta’ (Ka. Up.
III, 1)—denotes such actions as aim at no worldly end, but
only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and thus

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 125

enable the devotee to reach him. The word ‘anrtta’
therefore denotes actions of a different kind, i.e. such as
aim at worldly results and thus stand in the way of the soul
reaching Brahman; in agreement with the passage ‘they do
not find that Brahma-world, for they are carried away by
anrita’ (KA. Up. VII, 3, 2). — Again, in the text ‘ Then
there was neither non-Being nor Being’ (Ri. Samh. X,
129, 1), the terms ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ denote intelligent
and non-intelligent beings in their distributive state. What
that text aims at stating is that intelligent and non-intelli-
gent beings, which at the time of the origination of the
world are called ‘sat’ and ‘tyat’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6), are,
during the period of reabsorption, merged in the collective
totality of non-intelligent matter which the text denotes
by the term ‘darkness’ (Xi. Samh. X, 129, 3). There is
thus no reference whatever to something ‘not definable
either as being or non-being’: the terms ‘ being’ and ‘ non-
being’ are applied to different modes of being at different
times. That the term ‘darkness’ denotes the collective
totality of non-intelligent matter appears from another
scriptural passage, viz. ‘The Non-evolved (avyaktam) is
merged in the Imperishable (akshara\, the Imperishable in
darkness (tamas), darkness becomes one with the highest
divinity. —True, the word ‘darkness’ denotes the subtle
condition of primeval matter (prakriti), which forms the
totality of non-intelligent things; but this very Prakriti
is called M4yA—in the text ‘Know Prakriti to be Maya,’
and this proves it be something ‘ undefinable’!—Not so,
we reply; we meet with no passages where the word
‘Maya’ denotes that which is undefinable !—But the word
‘ May4’ is synonymous with ‘ mithy4,’ i.e. falsehood, and
hence denotes the Undefinable also !—This, too, we cannot
admit ; for the word ‘MAy&’ does not in all places refer to
what is false; we see it applied e.g. to such things as the
weapons of Asuras and Rakshasas, which are not ‘false’ but
real. ‘MA4y4,’ in such passages, really denotes that which
produces various wonderful effects, and it is in this sense
that Prakriti is called M4y4. This appears from the
passage (Svet. Up. IV, 9) ‘ From that the “ mayin ” creates

126 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

all this, and in that the other one is bound up by m4yé.’
For this text declares that Prakrzti—there called Maya—
produces manifold wonderful creations, and the highest
Person is there called ‘mAyin’ because he possesses that
power of m4y4; not on account of any ignorance or nescience
on his part. The latter part of the text expressly says that
(not the Lord but) another one, i.e. the individual soul is
bound up by may4; and therewith agrees another text,
viz. ‘When the soul slumbering in beginningless May4
awakes’ (Gaud. K4.). Again, in the text ‘Indra goes
multiform through the May4s’ (Az. Samh. VI, 47, 18), the
manifold powers of Indra are spoken of, and with this
agrees what the next verse says, ‘he shines greatly as
Tvashéri’: for an unreal being does not shine. And where
the text says ‘my M4y4 is hard to overcome’ (Bha. Gi. VII,
14), the qualification given there to May, viz. ‘ consisting of
the guzas,’ shows that what is meant is Prakriti consisting
of the three guzas.— All this shows that Scripture does not
teach the existence of a ‘ principle called Nescience, not to
be defined either as that which is or that which is not.’

Nor again is such Nescience to be assumed for the reason
that otherwise the scriptural statements of the unity of all
being would be unmeaning. For if the text ‘Thou art
that,’ be viewed as teaching the unity of the individual soul
and the highest Self, there is certainly no reason, founded
on unmeaningness, to ascribe to Brahman, intimated by
the word ‘that’—which is all-knowing, &c.—Nescience,
which is contradictory to Brahman’s nature.—Itihasa and
Purdza also do not anywhere teach that to Brahman there
belongs Nescience.

But, an objection is raised, the Vishzu Purdaa, in the
sloka, ‘ The stars are Vishu,’ &c. (II, 12, 38), first refers to
Brahman as one only, and comprising all_things within
itself; thereupon states in the next sloka that this entire
world, with all its distinctions of hills, oceans, &c., is sprung
out of the ‘ag#4na’ of Brahman, which in itself is pure
‘ghana,’ i.e. knowledge; thereupon confirms the view of
the world having sprung from ag#4na by referring to the
fact that Brahman, while abiding in its own nature, is free

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 127

from all difference (sl. 40) ; proves in the next two slokas
the non-reality of plurality by a consideration of the things
of this world ; sums up, in the following sloka, the un-
reality of all that is different from Brahman; then (43)
explains that action is the root of that ag#4na which causes
us to view the one uniform Brahman as manifold ; there-
upon declares the intelligence constituting Brahman’s
nature to be free from all distinction and imperfection (44);
and finally teaches (45) that Brahman so constituted, alone
is truly real, while the so-called reality of the world is
merely conventional.—This is not, we reply, a true repre-
sentation of the drift of the passage. The passage at the
outset states that, in addition to the detailed description of
the world given before, there will now be given a succinct
account of another aspect of the world not yet touched
upon. This account has to be understood as follows. Of
this universe, comprising intelligent and non-intelligent
beings, the intelligent part—which is not to be reached by
mind and speech, to be known in its essential nature by the
Self only, and, owing to its purely intelligential character,
not touched by the differences due to Prakriti—is, owing to
its imperishable nature, denoted as that which is; while the
non-intelligent, material, part which, in consequence of
the actions of the intelligent beings undergoes manifold
changes, and thus is perishable, is denoted as that which
isnot. Both parts, however, form the body of Vasudeva,
ie. Brahman, and hence have Brahman for their Self,
The text therefore says (37), ‘ From the waters which form
the body of Vishzu was produced the lotus-shaped earth,
with its seas and mountains’: what is meant is that the
entire Brahma-egg which has arisen from water consti-
tutes the body of which Vishzu is the soul. This relation
of soul and body forms the basis of the statements of
co-ordination made in the next sloka (38), ‘ The stars are
Vishsu,’ &c.; the same relation had been already declared in
numerous previous passages of the Purdza (‘all this is the
body of Hari,’ &c.). All things in the world, whether they
are or are not, are Vishzu’s body, and he is their soul. Of
the next sloka, ‘ Because the Lord has knowledge for his

128 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

essential nature,’ the meaning is ‘ Because of the Lord who
abides as the Self of all individual souls, the essential
nature is knowledge only—while bodies divine, human, &c.,
have no part in it—, therefore all non-intelligent things,
bodies human and divine, hills, oceans, &c., spring from his
knowledge, i.e. have their root in the actions springing
from the volitions of men, gods, &c., in whose various
forms the fundamental intelligence manifests itself. And
since non-intelligent matter is subject to changes corres-
ponding to the actions of the individual souls, it may be
called ‘non-being,’ while the souls are ‘ being.’—This the
next sloka further explains ‘when knowledge is pure,’ &c.
The meaning is ‘when the works which are the cause of
the distinction of things are destroyed, then all the dis-
tinctions of bodies, human or divine, hills, oceans, &c.—
all which are objects of fruition for the different individual
souls—pass away.’ Non-intelligent matter, as entering
into various states of a non-permanent nature, is called
‘non-being’; while souls, the nature of which consists in
permanent knowledge, are called ‘being.’ On this differ-
ence the next sloka insists (41). We say ‘it is’ of that
thing which is of a permanently uniform nature, not con-
nected with the idea of beginning, middle and end, and
which hence never becomes the object of the notion of
non-existence ; while we say ‘it is not’ of non-intelligent
matter which constantly passes over into different states,
each later state being out of connexion with the earlier
state. The constant changes to which non-intelligent matter
is liable are illustrated in the next sloka, ‘ Earth is made
into a jar, &c. And for this reason, the subsequent sloka
goes on to say that there zs nothing but knowledge. This
fundamental knowledge or intelligence is, however, variously
connected with manifold individual forms of being due to
karman, and hence the text adds: ‘ The one intelligence is
in many ways connected with beings whose minds differ,
owing to the difference of their own acts’ (sl. 43, second
half). Intelligence, pure, free from stain and grief, &c.,
which constitutes the intelligent element of the world, and
unintelligent matter—these two together constitute the

1 ADHYAYA, I PADA, T. 129

world, and the world is the body of Vasudeva ; such is
the purport of sloka 44.—The next sloka sums up the
whole doctrine ; the words ‘true and untrue’ there denote
what in the preceding verses had been called ‘ being’ and
‘non-being’; the second half of the sloka refers to the
practical plurality of the world as due to karman.

Now all these slokas do not contain a single word sup-
porting the doctrine of a Brahman free from all difference ;
of a principle called Nescience abiding within Brahman
and to be defined neither as that which is nor as that
which is not; and of the world being wrongly imagined,
owing to Nescience. The expressions ‘ that which is’ and
‘that which is not’ (sl. 35), and ‘satya’ (true) and ‘asatya’
(untrue; sl. 45), can in no way denote something not to be
defined either as being or non-being. By ‘that which is
not’ or ‘which is untrue,’ we have to understand not what
is undefinable, but that which Has no true being, in so far
as it is changeable and perishable. Of this character is
all non-intelligent matter. This also appears from the
instance adduced in sl. 42: the jar is something perishable,
but not a thing devoid of proof or to be sublated by true
knowledge. ‘ Non-being’ we may call it, in so far as while
it is observed at a certain moment in a certain form it is at
some other moment observed in a different condition. But
there is no contradiction between two different conditions
of athing which are perceived at different times; and hence
there is no reason to call it something futile (tuéAé/a) or
false (mithy4), &c.

Scripture does not teach that Release is due to the know-
ledge of a non-qualified Brahman.—The meaning of
‘tat tvam asi.’

Nor can we admit the assertion that Scripture teaches
the cessation of avidy4 to spring only from the cognition
of a Brahman devoid of all difference. Such a view is
clearly negatived by passages such as the following: ‘I
know that great person of sun-like lustre beyond darkness ;
knowing him a man becomes immortal, there is no other

[48] K

130 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

path to go’ (Svet. Up. III, 8); ‘All moments sprang from
lightning, the Person—none is lord over him, his name
is great glory—they who know him become immortal’
(Mah4na. Up. I, 8-11). For the reason that Brahman is
characterised by difference all Vedic texts declare that
final release results from the cognition of a qualified
Brahman. And that even those texts which describe
Brahman by means of negations really aim at setting
forth a Brahman possessing attributes, we have already
shown above.

In texts, again, such as ‘ Thou art that,’ the co-ordination,
of the constituent parts is not meant to convey the idea
of the absolute unity of a non-differenced substance: om
the contrary, the words ‘that’ and ‘thou’ denote a Brahman
distinguished by difference. The word ‘that’ refers to
Brahman omniscient, &c., which had’ been introduced as
the general topic of consideration in previous passages of
the same section, such as ‘It thought, may I be many’;
the word ‘thou, which stands in co-ordination to ‘that,’
conveys the idea of Brahman in so far as having for its
body the individual souls connected with non-intelligent
matter. This is in accordance with the general principle
that co-ordination is meant to express one thing subsisting
in a twofold form. If such doubleness of form (or cha-
racter) were abandoned, there could be no difference of
aspects giving rise to the application of different terms,
and the entire principle of co-ordination would thus be
given up. And it would further follow that the two words
co-ordinated would have to be taken in an implied sense
(instead of their primary direct meaning). Nor is there any
need of our assuming implication (lakshav4) in sentences?
such as ‘this person is that Devadatta (known to me from
former occasions)’; for there is no contradiction in the
cognition of the oneness of a thing connected with the past
on the one hand, and the present on the other, the contra-
diction that arises from difference of place being removed

2 Which are alleged to prove that siman4dhikaranya is to be
explained on the basis of lakshand,

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 131

by the accompanying difference of time. If the text ‘Thou
art that’ were meant to express absolute oneness, it would,
moreover, conflict with a previous statement in the same
section, viz. ‘It thought, may I be many’; and, further, the
promise (also made in the same section) that by the know-
ledge of one thing all things are to be known could not be
considered as fulfilled. It, moreover, is not possible (while,
however, it would result from the absolute oneness of ‘tat’
and ‘tvam’) that to Brahman, whose essential nature is
knowledge, which is free from. all imperfections, omniscient,
comprising within itself all auspicious qualities, there should
belong Nescience ; and that it should be the substrate of
all those defects and afflictions which spring from Nescience.
If, further, the statement.of co-ordination (‘ thou art that’)
were meant to sublate (the previously existing wrong notion
of plurality), we should have to admit that the two terms
‘that’ and ‘thou’ have an implied meaning, viz. in so far
as denoting, on the one hand, one substrate only, and,
on the other, the cessation of the different attributes
(directly expressed by the two terms); and thus implica-
tion and the other shortcomings mentioned above would
cling to this interpretation as well. And there would be
even further difficulties. When we form the sublative
judgment ‘this is not silver,’ the sublation is founded on
an independent positive judgment, viz. ‘this is a shell’ ;
in the case under discussion, however, the sublation would
not be known (through an independent positive judgment),
but would be assumed merely on the ground that it cannot
be helped. And, further, there is really no possibility of
sublation, since the word ‘that’ does not convey the idea
of an attribute in addition to the mere substrate. To this
it must not be objected that the substrate was previously
concealed, and that hence it is the special function of the
word ‘that’ to present the substrate in its non-concealed
aspect; for if, previously to the sublative judgment, the
substrate was not evident (as an object of consciousness),
there is no possibility of its becoming the object either
of an error or its sublation—Nor can we allow you to say
that, previously to sublation, the substrate was non-can-
K 2

132 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

cealed in so far as (i.e. was known as) the object of error,
for in its ‘non-concealed’ aspect the substrate is opposed
to all error, and when that aspect shines forth there is no
room either for error or sublation.—The outcome of this is
that as long as you do not admit that there is a real attri-
bute in addition to the mere substrate, and that this attribute
is for a time hidden, you cannot show the possibility either
of error or sublation.. We add an illustrative instance.
That with regard to a man there should arise the error
that he is a mere low-caste hunter is only possible on
condition of a real additional attribute—e.g. the man’s
princely birth—being hidden at the time; and the cessa-
tion of that error is brought about by the declaration of
this attribute of princely birth, not by a mere declaration
of the person being a man: this latter fact being evident
need not be declared at all, and if it is declared it sublates
no error.—If, on the other hand, the text is understood to
refer to Brahman as having the individual souls for its body,
both words (‘that’ and ‘thou’) keep their primary denota-
tion; and, the text thus making a declaration about one
substance distinguished by two aspects, the fundamental
principle of ‘co-ordination’ is preserved. On this interpre-
tation the text further intimates that Brahman—free from
all imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious
qualities—is the internal ruler of the individual souls and
possesses lordly power. It moreover satisfies the demand
of agreement with the teaching of the previous part of the
section, and it also fulfils the promise as to all things being
known through one thing, viz. in so far as Brahman having
for its body all intelligent and non-intelligent beings in
their gross state is the effect of Brahman having for its
body the same things in their subtle state. And this inter-
pretation finally avoids all conflict with other scriptural
passages, such as ‘Him the great Lord, the highest of
Lords’ (Svet. Up. VI, 7); ‘His high power is revealed as
manifold’ (ibid. VI, 8); ‘He that is free from sin, whose
wishes are true, whose purposes are true’ (K4, Up. VIII,
7, 1), and so on.

But how, a question may be asked, can we decide, on

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1. 133

your interpretation of the text, which of the two terms
is meant to make an original assertion with regard to the
other ?—The question does not arise, we reply; for the
text does not mean to make an original assertion at all,
the truth which it states having already been established
by the preceding clause, ‘In that all this world has its
Self.’ This clause does make an original statement—in
agreement with the principle that ‘ Scripture has a purport
with regard to what is not established by other means’—
that is, it predicates of ‘all this, i.e. this entire world
together with all individual souls, that ‘that,’ i.e. Brahman
is the Self of it. The reason of this the text states in
a previous passage, ‘All these creatures have their root
in that which is, their dwelling and their rest in that which
is’; a statement which is illustrated by an earlier one
(belonging to a different section), viz. ‘ All this is Brahman ;
let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as begin-
ning, ending, and breathing in Brahman’ (KA. Up. III,
14,1). Similarly other texts also teach that the world
has its Self in Brahman, in so far as the whole aggregate
of intelligent and non-intelligent beings constitutes Brah-
man’s body. Compare ‘ Abiding within, the ruler of beings,
the Self of all’; ‘He who dwells in the earth, different
from the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose
body the earth is, who rules the earth within—he is thy
Self, the ruler within, the immortal.— He who dwells in
the Self,’ &c. (Bré. Up. III, 7, 3; 22); ‘He who moving
within the earth, and so on—whose body is death, whom
death does not know, he is the Self of all beings, free from
sin, divine, the one God, Nardyaza’ (Subal. Up. VII, 1);
‘ Having created that he entered into it; having entered
it he became sat and tyat’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And also
in the section under discussion the passage ‘ Having en-
tered into them with this living Self let me evolve names
and forms,’ shows that it is only through the entering into
them of the living soul whose Self is Brahman, that all
things possess their substantiality and their connexion with
the words denoting them. And as this passage must be
understood in. connexion with Taitt. Up. II, 6 (where the

134 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

‘sat’ denotes the individual soul) it follows that the indi-
vidual soul also has Brahman for its Self, owing to the fact
of Brahman having entered into it.—From all this it follows
that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent and non-
intelligent, has its Self in Brahman in so far as it constitutes
Brahman’s body. And as, thus, the whole world different
from Brahman derives its substantial being only from con-
stituting Brahman’s body, any term denoting the world or
something in it conveys a meaning which has its proper
consummation in Brahman only: in other words all terms
whatsoever denote Brahman in so far as distinguished by
the different things which we associate with those terms
on the basis of ordinary use of speech and etymology.—
The text ‘that art thou’ we therefore understand merely as
a special expression of the truth already propounded in the
clause ‘in that all this has its Self.’

This being so, it appears that those as well who hold the
theory of the absolute unity of one non-differenced sub-
stance, as those who teach the doctrine of bhedabheda
(co-existing difference and non-difference), and those who
teach the absolute difference of several substances, give up
all those scriptural texts which teach that Brahman is the
universal Self. With regard to the first-mentioned doctrine,
we ask ‘if there is only one substance; to what can the
doctrine of universal identity refer?’—The reply will
perhaps be ‘to that very same substance.’—But, we reply,
this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature
of Brahman!, and there is nothing left to be determined
by the passages declaring the identity of everything with
Brahman.—But those texts serve to dispel the idea of
fictitious difference!—This, we reply, cannot, as has been
shown above, be effected by texts stating universal identity
in the way of co-ordination ; and statements of co-ordination,
moreover, introduce into Brahman a doubleness of aspect,
and thus contradict the theory of absolute oneness.—The
bhedabheda view implies that owing to Brahman’s con-
nexion with limiting adjuncts (upAdhi) all the imperfections

* Such as ‘ The True, knowledge,’ &c.

1 aDHYAYA, I PADA, I. 135

resulting therefrom—and which avowedly belong to the
individual soul—would manifest themselves in Brahman
itself; and as this contradicts the doctrine that the Self of
all is constituted by a Brahman free from all imperfection
and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities, the
texts conveying that doctrine would have to be disregarded.
If, on the other hand, the theory be held in that form that
‘bhed4bheda’ belongs to Brahman by its own nature (not
only owing to an up&dhi), the view that Brahman by its
essential nature appears as individual soul, implies that
imperfections no less than perfections are essential to
Brahman, and this is in conflict with the texts teaching
that everything is identical with Brahman free from all
imperfections.—For those finally who maintain absolute
difference, the doctrine of Brahman being the Self of all
has no meaning whatsoever—for things absolutely different
can in no way be one—and this implies the abandonment
of all Vedanta-texts together.

Those, on the other hand, who take their stand on the
doctrine, proclaimed by all Upanishads, that the entire
world forms the body of Brahman, may accept in their
fulness all the texts teaching the identity of the world with
Brahman. For as genus (gati) and quality (gusa), so
substances (dravya) also may occupy the position of
determining attributes (viseshaza), in so far namely as they
constitute the body of something else. Enunciations such
as ‘the Self (soul) is, according to its works, born either
(as) a god, or a man, or a horse, or a bull,’ show that in
ordinary speech as well as in the Veda co-ordination
has to be taken in a real primary (not implied) sense.
In the same way it is also in the case of generic character
and of qualities the relation of ‘mode’ only (in which
generic character and qualities stand to substances) which
determines statements of co-ordination, such as ‘ the ox is
broken-horned,’ ‘the cloth is white. And as material
bodies bearing the generic marks of humanity are definite
things, in so far only as they are modes of a Self or soul,
enunciations of co-ordination such as ‘the soul has been
born as a man, or a eunuch, or a woman, are in every way

136 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

appropriate. What determines statements of co-ordination
is thus only the relation of ‘mode’ in which one thing stands
to another, not the relation of generic character, quality,
and so on, which are of an exclusive nature (and cannot
therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with substances).
Such words indeed as denote substances capable of sub-
sisting by themselves occasionally take suffixes, indicating
that those substances form the distinguishing attributes of
other substances—as when from danda, ‘staff, we form
dandin, ‘staff-bearer’; in the case, on the other hand, of
substances not capable of subsisting and being apprehended
apart from others, the fact of their holding the position of
attributes is ascertained only from their appearing in
grammatical co-ordination.—But, an objection is raised, if
it is supposed that in sentences such as ‘the Self is born,
as god, man, animal, &c., the body of a man, god, &c.,
stands towards the Self in the relation of a mode, in the
same way as in sentences such as ‘the ox is broken-horned,’
‘ the cloth is white, the generic characteristic and the quality
stand in the relation of modes to the substances (‘cow,’
‘cloth’) to which they are grammatically co-ordinated ;
then there would necessarily be simultaneous cognition
of the mode, and that to which the mode belongs, i.e. of
the body and the Self; just as there is simultaneous
cognition of the generic character and the individual.
But as a matter of fact this is not the case; we do not
necessarily observe a human, divine, or animal body
together with the Self. The co-ordination expressed in
the form ‘the Self is a man,’ is therefore an ‘implied’ one
only (the statement not admitting of being taken in its
primary literal sense).—This is not so, we reply. The
relation of bodies to the Self is strictly analogous to that
of class characteristics and qualities to the substances in
which they inhere; for it is the Self only which is their
substrate and their final cause (prayogana), and they are
modes of the Self. That the Self only is their substrate,
appears from the fact that when the Self separates itself
from the body the latter perishes; that the Self alone is
their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 137

the end that the fruits of the actions of the Self may be
enjoyed; and that they are modes of the Self, appears from
the fact that they are mere attributes of the Self manifest-
ing itself as god, man, or the like. These are just the
circumstances on account of which words like ‘ cow’ extend
in their meaning (beyond the class characteristics) so as to
comprise the individual also. Where those circumstances
are absent, as in the case of staffs, earrings, and the like, the
attributive position is expressed (not by co-ordination but)
‘by-means of special derivative forms—such as dandin
(staff-bearer), kuadalin (adorned with earrings). In the
case of bodies divine, human, &c., on the other hand, the -
essential nature of which it is to be mere modes of the Self
which constitutes their substrate and final cause, both
ordinary and Vedic language express the relation sub-
sisting between the two, in the form of co-ordination,
‘This Self is a god, or a man,’ ἃς. That class charac-
teristics and individuals are invariably observed together,
is due to the fact of both being objects of visual perception ;
the Self, on the other hand, is not such, and hence is not
apprehended by the eye, while the body is so apprehended.
Nor must you raise the objection that it is hard to under-
stand how that which is capable of being apprehended by
itself can be a mere mode of something else: for that the
body’s essential nature actually consists in being a mere
mode of the Self is proved—just as in the case of class
characteristics and so on—by its having the Self only for
its substrate and final cause, and standing to it in the
relation of a distinguishing attribute. That two things are
invariably perceived together, depends, as already observed,
on their being apprehended by means of the same apparatus,
visual or otherwise. Earth is naturally connected with
smell, taste, and so on, and yet these qualities are not
perceived by the eye; in the same way the eye which
perceives the body does not perceive that essential charac-
teristic of the body which consists in its being a mere mode
of the Self; the reason of the difference being that the
eye has no capacity to apprehend the Self. But this does
not imply that the body does not possess that essential

138 . VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

nature: it rather is just the possession of that essential
nature on which the judgment of co-ordination (‘the Self is
a man, god,’ &c.) is based. And as words have the power
of denoting the relation of something being a mode of the
Self, they denote things together with this relation.—But
in ordinary speech the word ‘body’ is understood to mean
the mere body; it does not therefore extend in its denota-
tion up to the Self!—Not so, we reply. The body is, in
reality, nothing but a mode of the Self; but, for the purpose
of showing the distinction of things, the word ‘body’ is
used in a limited sense. Analogously words such as
‘ whiteness,’ ‘ generic character of a cow,’ ‘ species,’ ‘ quality,’
are used in a distinctive sense (although ‘whiteness’ is not
found apart from a white thing, of which it is the prakara,
and so on). Words such as ‘god,’ ‘man,’ &c., therefore do
extend in their connotation up to the Self. And as the
individual souls, distinguished by their connexion with
aggregates of matter bearing the characteristic marks of
humanity, divine nature, and so on, constitute the body
of the highest Self, and hence are modes of it, the words
denoting those individual souls extend in their connotation
up to the very highest Self. And as all intelligent and
non-intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest
Brahman, and have reality thereby only, the words denot-
ing them are used in co-ordination with the terms denoting
Brahman.—This point has been demonstrated by me in
the Vedarthasamgraha. A Sdatra also (IV, 1, 3) will declare
the identity-of the world and Brahman to consist in the
relation of body and Self; and the Vakyak4ra too says ‘It is
the Self—thus everything should be apprehended.’

Summary statement as to the way in which different
scriptural texts are to be reconciled.

The whole matter may be summarily stated as follows.
Some texts declare a distinction of nature between non-
intelligent matter, intelligent beings, and Brahman, in so
far as matter is the object of enjoyment, the souls the enjoy-
ing subjects, and Brahman the ruling principle. ‘From
that the Lord of M4yé creates all this; in that the other

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 139

one is bound up through that May4’ (Svet. Up. IV, 9);
‘Know Prakriti to be Maya, and the great Lord the ruler
of Maya’ (10); ‘What is perishable is the Pradhdna, the
immortal and imperishable is Hara: the one God rules the
Perishable and the Self’ (Svet. Up. I, 10)—In this last
passage the clause ‘the irhmortal and imperishable is Hara,’
refers to the enjoying individual soul, which is called ‘ Hara,’
because it draws (harati) towards itself the pradhana as the
object of its enjoyment.—‘ He is the cause, the lord of the
lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor
lord’ (Svet. Up. VI, 9); ‘The master of the pradhana and
of the individual souls’ (Svet. Up. VI, 16); ‘The ruler of all,
the lord of the Selfs, the eternal, blessed, undecaying one’
(Mahanéar. Up. XI, 3); ‘There are two unborn ones, oné
knowing, the other not knowing, one a ruler, the other not
a ruler’ (Svet. Up. I, 9); ‘The eternal among the non-
eternal, the intelligent one among the intelligent, who
though one fulfils the desires of many’ (Svet. Up. VI, 13);
‘Knowing the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the
Mover’ (Svet. Up. i, 12); ‘One of them eats the sweet
fruit, the other looks on without eatiag’ (Svet. Up. IV, 6);
‘Thinking that the Self is different from the Mover, blessed
by him he reaches Immortality’ (Svet. Up. I, 6); ‘ There is
one unborn female being, red, white, and black, uniform but
producing manifold offspring. There is one unborn male
being who loves her and lies by her; there is another who
leaves her after he has enjoyed her’ (νεῖ. Up. IV, 5). ‘On
the same tree man, immersed, bewildered, grieves on
account of his impotence; but when he sees the other
Lord contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes
away’ (Svet. Up. IV, 9).—Sm~riti expresses itself similarly.
—‘Thus eightfold is my nature divided. Lower is this
Nature; other than this and higher know that Nature of
mine which constitutes the individual soul, by which this
world is supported’ (Bha. Gi. VII, 4, 5). ‘All beings at
the end of a Kalpa return into my Nature, and again
at the beginning of a Kalpa do Isend them forth. Resting
on my own Nature again and again do I send forth this
entire body of beings, which has no power of its own,

140 | VEDANTA-SOTRAS. 5
being subject to the power of nature’ (Bha. Gi. IX, 7, 8) ;
‘With me as supervisor Nature brings forth the movable
and the immovable, and for this reason the world ever
moves round’ (Bha. Gi. IX, 10); ‘Know thou both Nature
and the Soul to be without beginning’ (XIII, 19); ‘The
great Brahman is my womb, in which I place the embryo,
and thence there is the origin of all beings’ (XIV, 3).
This last passage means—the womb of the world is the
great Brahman, i.e. non-intelligent matter in its subtle
state, commonly called Prakriti; with this I connect the
embryo, i.e. the intelligent principle. From this contact
of the non-intelligent and the intelligent, due to my will,
there ensues the origination of all beings from gods down
to lifeless things.

Non-intelligent matter and intelligent beings—holding
the relative positions of objects of enjoyment and enjoying
subjects, and appearing in multifarious forms—other scrip-
tural texts declare to be permanently connected with the
highest Person in so far as they constitute his body, and
thus are controlled by him; the highest Person thus con-
stituting their Self. Compare the following passages: ‘He
who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the
earth does not know, whose body the earth is, and who
rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the im-
mortal,’ &c. (Brt. Up. III, 7, 3-23); ‘He who moves within the
earth, whose body the earthis, &c.; he who moves withindeath,
whose body death is,’ &c. (Subala Up. VII, 1). In this latter
passage the word ‘death’ denotes what is also called ‘ dark-
ness, viz.non-intelligent matter in its subtle state; as appears
from another passage in the same Upanishad, ‘ the Imperish-
able is merged in darkness.’ And compare also ‘Entered
within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all’ (Taitt. Ar. III, 24).

Other texts, again, aim at teaching that the highest Self
to whom non-intelligent and intelligent beings stand in the
relation of body, and hence of modes, subsists in the form
of the world, in its causal as well as in its effected aspect,
and hence speak of the world in this its double aspect as
that which is (the Real); so e.g. ‘Being only this was in
the beginning, one only without a second—it desired, may

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 141

I be many, may I grow forth—it sent forth fire,’ &c.,
up to ‘all these creatures have their root in that which is,’
&c., up to ‘that art thou, O Svetaketu’ (K4%. Up. VI,
2-8); ‘He wished, may I be many,’ &c., up to ‘it became
the true and the untrue’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6). These sections
also refer to the essential distinction of nature between
non-intelligent matter, intelligent beings, and the highest
Self which is established by other scriptural texts; so in
the KAandogya passage, ‘Let me enter those three divine
beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names
and forms’; and in the Taitt. passage, ‘ Having sent forth
that he entered into it; having entered it he became sat
and tyat, knowledge and (what is) without knowledge, the
true and the untrue, &c. These two passages evidently
have the same purport, and hence the soul’s having its Self
in Brahman—which view is implied in the K%. passage—
must be understood as resting thereon that the souls
(together with matter) constitute the body of Brahman as
asserted in the Taitt. passage (‘it became knowledge and
that which is without knowledge,’ i.e. souls and matter).
The same process of evolution of names and forms is
described elsewhere also, ‘ All this was then unevolved ; it
became evolved by form and name’ (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).
The fact is that the highest Self is in its causal or in its
‘effected’ condition, according as it has for its body
intelligent and non-intelligent beings either in their subtle
or their gross state; the effect, then, being non-different
from the cause, and hence being cognised through the
cognition of the cause, the result is that the desired
‘cognition of all things through one’ can on our view be well
established. In the clause ‘I will enter into these three
divine beings with this living Self, &c., the term ‘the
three divine beings’ denotes the entire aggregate of non-
sentient matter, and as the text declares that the highest
Self evolved names and forms by entering into matter
by means of the living souls of which he is the Self, it
follows that all terms whatsoever denote the highest Self
as qualified by individual Selfs, the latter again being
qualified by non-sentient matter. A term which denotes

142 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the highest Self in its causal condition may therefore be
exhibited in co-ordination with another term denoting
the highest Self in its ‘effected’ state, both terms being
used in their primary senses. Brahman, having for its
modes intelligent and non-intelligent things in their gross
and subtle states, thus constitutes effect and cause,
and the world thus has Brahman for its material cause
(upadana). Nor does this give rise to any confusion of the
essential constituent elements of the great aggregate of
things. Of some parti-coloured piece of cloth the material
cause is threads white, red, black, &c.; all the same, each
definite spot of the cloth is connected with one colour only
white e.g., and thus there is no confusion of colours even
in the ‘effected’ condition of the cloth. Analogously the
combination of non-sentient matter, sentient beings, and
the Lord constitutes the material cause of the world, but
this does not imply any confusion of the essential charac-
teristics of enjoying souls, objects of enjoyment, and the
universal ruler, even in the world’s ‘effected’ state. There
is indeed a difference between the two cases, in so far as
the threads are capable of existing apart from one another,
‘and are only occasionally combined according to the
volition of men, so that the web sometimes exists in its
causal, sometimes in its effected state ; while non-sentient
matter and sentient beings in all their states form the body
of the highest Self, and thus have a being only as the
modes of that—on which account the highest Self may, in
all cases, be denoted by any term whatsoever. But the
two cases are analogous, in so far as there persists a dis-
tinction and absence of all confusion, on the part of the
constituent elements of the aggregate. This being thus,
it follows that the highest Brahman, although entering into
the ‘effected’ condition, remains unchanged—for its essential
nature does not become different—and we also understand
what constitutes its ‘effected’ condition, viz. its abiding as
the Self of non-intelligent and intelligent beings in their gross
condition, distinguished by name and form. For becoming
an effect means entering into another state of being.
Those texts, again, which speak of Brahman as devoid of

1 ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, I. 143

qualities, explain themselves on the ground of Brahman
being free from all touch of evil. For the passage, Kh.
Up. VIII, 1, 5—which at first negatives all evil qualities
‘free from sin, from old age, from death, from grief, from
hunger and thirst, and after that affirms auspicious qualities
‘whose wishes and purposes come true’—enables us ta
decide that in other places also the general denial of
qualities really refers to evil qualities only.—Passages
which declare knowledge to constitute the essential nature
of Brahman explain themselves on the ground that of
Brahman—which is all-knowing, all-powerful, antagonistic
to all evil, a mass of auspicious qualities—the essential
nature can be defined as knowledge (intelligence) only—
which also follows from the ‘self-luminousness’ predicated
of it. Texts, on the other hand, such as ‘He who is all-
knowing’ (Ma. Up. I, 1, 9); ‘ His high power is revealed as
manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge ’ (νεῖ,
Up. VI, 11, 8); ‘Whereby should he know the knower’
(Bri. Up. II, 4, 14), teach the highest Self to be a knowing
subject. Other texts, again, such as ‘ The True, knowledge,
infinite is Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. I, 1, 1), declare knowledge to
constitute its nature, as it can be defined through knowledge
only, and is self-luminous. And texts such as‘ He desired,
may I be many’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6); ‘It thought, may I be
many ; it evolved itself through name and form’ (ΚΛ. Up.
VI, 2), teach that Brahman, through its mere wish, appears
in manifold modes. Other texts, again, negative the opposite
view, viz. that there is a plurality of things not having
their Self in Brahman. ‘From death to death goes he who
sees here any plurality’; ‘There is here not any plurality’
(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); ‘For where there is duality as it were’
(Bri. Up. II, 4,14). But these texts in no way negative
that plurality of modes—declared in passages such as ‘ May
I be many, may I grow forth’—which springs from
Brahman’s will, and appears in the distinction of names
and forms. This is proved by clauses in those ‘ negativing’
texts themselves, ‘Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere
than in the Self, ‘from that great Being there has been
breathed forth the Rig-veda, &c. (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6, 10).—

144 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

On this method of interpretation we find that the texts
declaring the essential distinction and separation of non-
sentient matter, sentient beings, and the Lord, and those
declaring him to be the cause and the world to be the
effect, and cause and effect to be identical, do not in any
way conflict with other texts declaring that matter and
souls form the body of the Lord, and that matter and souls
in their causal condition are in a subtle state, not admitting
of the distinction of names and forms while in their
‘effected’ gross state they are subject to that distinction.
On the other hand, we do not see how there is any opening
for theories maintaining the connexion of Brahman with
Nescience, or distinctions in Brahman due to limiting
adjuncts (upadhi)—such and similar doctrines rest on
fallacious reasoning, and flatly contradict Scripture.
There is nothing contradictory in allowing that certain
texts declare the essential distinction of matter, souls, and
the Lord, and their mutual relation as modes and that to
which the modes belong, and that other texts again repre-
sent them as standing in the relation of cause and effect,
and teach cause and effect to be one. We may illustrate
this by an analogous case from the Karmakdaada. There
six separate oblations to Agni, and so on, are enjoined by
separate so-called originative injunctions ; these are there-
upon combined into two groups (viz. the new moon and
the full-moon sacrifices) by a double clause referring to
those groups, and finally a so-called injunction of quali-
fication enjoins the entire sacrifice as something to be
performed by persons entertaining a certain wish. In a
similar way certain Ved4nta-texts give instruction about
matter, souls, and the Lord as separate entities (‘Perishable
is the pradh4ana, imperishable and immortal Hara, &c.,
Svet. Up. I, 10; and others); then other texts teach that
matter and souls in all their different states constitute the
body of the highest Person, while the latter is their Self
(‘ Whose body the earth is,’ &c.); and finally another group
of texts teaches—by means of words such as ‘Being,’
‘ Brahman, ‘ Self,’ denoting the highest Self to which the
body belongs—that the one highest Self in its causal and

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1. . 145

effected states comprises within itself the triad of entities
which had been taught in separation (‘ Being only this was
in the beginning’; ‘In that all this has its Self’; ‘All this
is Brahman ’).—That the highest Self with matter and souls
for its body should be simply called the highest Self, is no
more objectionable than that that particular form of Self
which is invested with a human body should simply be
spoken of as Self or soul—as- when we say ‘ This is a happy
soul,’

Nescience cannot be terminated by the simple act of
cognising Brahman as the Universal Self.

The doctrine, again, that Nescience is put an end to by
the cognition of Brahman being the Self of all can in no
way be upheld; for as bondage is something real it cannot
be put an end to by knowledge. How, we ask, can any
one assert that bondage—which consists in the experience
of pleasure and pain caused by the connexion of souls with
bodies of various kind, a connexion springing from good
or evil actions—is something false, unreal? And that the
cessation of such bondage is to be obtained only through
the grace of the highest Self pleased by the devout medi-
tation of the worshipper, we have already explained. As
the cognition of universal oneness which you assume
rests on a view of things directly contrary to reality, and
therefore is false, the only effect it can have is to strengthen
the ties of bondage. Moreover, texts such as ‘ But different
is the highest Person’ (Bha. Gi. XV, 17), and ‘ Having
known the Self and the Mover as separate’ (Svet. Up. I, 6),
teach that it is the cognition of Brahman as the inward
ruler different from the individual soul, that effects the
highest aim of man, i.e. final release. And, further, as that
‘bondage-terminating’ knowledge which you assume is
itself unreal, we should have to look out for another act
of cognition to put an end to it.—But may it not be said
that this terminating cognition, after having put an end
to the whole. aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it,
immediately passes away itself, because being of a merely

[48] L

146 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

instantaneous nature?—No, we reply. Since its nature, its
origination, and its destruction are all alike fictitious, we
have clearly to search for another agency capable of de-
stroying that avidy4 which is the cause of the fiction of its
destruction !—Let us then say that the essential nature of
Brahman itself is the destruction of that cognition !—From
this it would follow, we reply, that such ‘ terminating’ know-
ledge would not arise at all; for that the destruction of
what is something permanent can clearly not originate !—
Who moreover should, according to you, be the cognising
subject in a cognition which has for its object the nega-
tion of everything that is different from Brahman ?—That
cognising subject is himself something fictitiously super-
imposed on Brahman!—This may not be, we reply: he
himself would in that case be something to be negatived,
and hence an object of the ‘terminating’ cognition; he
could not therefore be the subject of cognition !—Well, then,
let us assume that the essential nature of Brahman itself is
the cognising subject!—Do you mean, we ask in reply, that
Brahman’s being the knowing subject in that ‘ terminating’
cognition belongs to Brahman’s essential nature, or that
it is something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman? In
the latter case that superimposition and the Nescience
founded on it would persist, because they would not be
objects of the terminating cognition, and if a further ter-
minating act of knowledge were assumed, that also would
possess a triple aspect (viz. knowledge, object known, and
subject knowing), and we thus should be led to assume an
infinite series of knowing subjects. If, on the other hand,
the essential nature of Brahman itself constitutes the
knowing subject, your view really coincides with the one
held by us?. And if you should say that the terminating
knowledge itself and the knowing subject in it are things
separate from Brahman and themselves contained in the
sphere of what is to be terminated by that knowledge,
your statement would be no less absurd than if you were
to say ‘everything on the surface of the earth has been cut

1 According to which Brahman is not g#4nam, but gitatr?.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 147

down by Devadatta with one stroke’—meaning thereby
that Devadatta himself and the action of cutting down
are comprised among the things cut down!—The second
alternative, on the other hand—according to which the
knowing subject is not Brahman itself, but a knower super-
imposed upon it—would imply that that subject is the
agent in an act of knowledge resulting in his own de-
struction; and this is impossible since no person aims at
destroying himself. And should it be said that the de
struction of the knowing agent belongs to the very nature
of Brahman itself, it would follow that we can assume
neither plurality nor the erroneous view of plurality, nor
avidyA as the root of that erroneous view.—All this con-
firms our theory, viz. that since bondage springs from
agfana in the form of an eternal stream of karman, it can
be destroyed only through knowledge of the kind main-
tained by us. Such knowledge is to be attained only
through the due daily performance of religious duties as
prescribed for a man’s caste and Asrama, such performance
being sanctified by the accompanying thought of the true
nature of the Self, and having the character of propitiation of
the highest Person. Now, that mere works produce limited
and non-permanent results only, and that on the other
hand works not aiming at an immediate result but meant
to please the highest Person, bring about knowledge of
the character of devout meditation, and thereby the un-
limited and permanent result of the intuition of Brahman
being the Self of all—these are points not to be known
without an insight into the naturé of works, and hence,
without this, the attitude described—which is preceded
by the abandonment of mere works—cannot be reached.
For these reasons the enquiry into Brahman has to be
entered upon after the enquiry into the nature of
works.

1 And, on that account, belongs to what constitutes man’s
highest aim.

L2

148 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

The Vedaéntin aiming to ascertain the nature of Brahman
from Scripture, need not be disconcerted by the Mi-
mA&ms&-theory of all speech having informing power
with regard to actions only.

Here another prima facie view! finally presents itself.
The power of words to denote things cannot be ascertained
in any way but by observing the speech and actions of
experienced people. Now as such speech and action
always implies the idea of something to be done (k4rya),
words are means of knowledge only with reference to
things to be done; and hence the matter inculcated by the
Veda also is only things to be done. From this it follows
that the Vedanta-texts cannot claim the position of autho-
ritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman,
which is (not a thing to be done but) an accomplished
fact—Against this view it must not be urged that in the
case of sentences expressive of accomplished facts—as e.g.
that a son is born to somebody—the idea of a particular
thing may with certainty be inferred as the cause of certain
outward signs—such as e.g. a pleased expression of coun-
tenance—which are generally due to the attainment of
a desired object ; for the possible causes of joy, past, present,
and future, are infinite in number, and in the given case
other causes of joy, as e.g. the birth having taken place in
an auspicious moment, or having been an easy one, &c.,
may easily be imagined. Nor, again, can it be maintained
that the denotative power of words with regard to accom-
plished things may be ascertained in the way of our irfer-
ring either the meaning of one word from the known
meaning of other words, or the meaning of the radical
part of a word from the known meaning of a formative
element ; for the fact is that we are only able to infer on
the basis of a group of words known to denote a certain
thing to be done, what the meaning of some particular
constituent of that group may be.—Nor, again, when
a person, afraid of what he thinks to be a snake, is ob-

1 This view is held by the Prabhikara Mfm4msakas,

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, I. 149

served to dismiss his fear on being told that the thing
is not a snake but only a rope, can we determine thereby
that what terminates his fear is the idea of the non-
existence of a snake. For there are many other ideas
which may account for the cessation of his fear—he may
think, e.g., ‘this is a thing incapable of moving, devoid of
poison, without consciousness ’—the particular idea present
to his mind we are therefore not able to determine.—
The truth is that from the fact of all activity being in-
variably dependent on the idea of something to be done, we
learn that the meaning which words convey is something
prompting activity. All words thus denoting something
to be done, the several words of a sentence express only
some particular action to be performed, and hence it is
not possible to determine that they possess the power of
denoting their own meaning only, in: connexion with the
meaning of the other words of the sentence.—{Nor must
it be said that what moves to action is not the idea of
the thing to be done, but the idea of the means to do
it; for) the idea of the means to bring about the desired
end causes action only through the idea of the thing to be
done, not through itself; as is evident from the fact that
the idea of means past, future, and even present (when
divorced from the idea of an end to be accomplished),
does not prompt to action. As long as a man does not
reflect ‘the means towards the desired end are not to be
accomplished without an effort of mine ; it must therefore
be accomplished through my activity’; so long he does
not begin to act. What causes activity is thus only the
idea of things to be done; and as hence words denote
such things only, the Veda also can tell us only about
things to be done, and is not therefore in a position to give
information about the attainment of an infinite and per-
manent result, such result being constituted by Brahman,
which is (not a thing to be done, but) an accomplished
entity. The Veda does, on the other hand, actually teach
that mere works have a permanent result (‘ Imperish-
able is the merit of him who offers the #aturmasya-sacri-
fices, and so on); and hence it follows that to enter on an

150 . VEDANTA-SOTRAS, ~

enquiry into Brahman for the reason that the knowledge
of Brahman has an infinite and permanent result, while the
xesult of works is limited and non-permanent, is an alto-
‘gether unjustified proceeding.

To this we make the following reply—To set aside
the universally known mode of ascertaining the connexion
of words and their meanings, and to assert that all words
express only one non-worldly meaning (viz. those things to
be done which the Veda inculcates), is a proceeding for
which men paying due ‘attention to the means of proof
can have only a slight regard. A child avowedly learns
the connexion of words and meanings in the following
way. The father and mother and other people about him
point with the finger at the child’s mother, father, uncle,
&c., as well as at various domestic and wild animals, birds,
snakes, and so on, to the end that the child may at the
same time pay attention to the terms they use and to the
beings denoted thereby, and thus again and again make
him understand that such and such words refer to such
and such things. The child thus observing in course of
time that these words of themselves give rise to certain
ideas in his mind, and at the same time observing neither
any different connexion of words and things, nor any
person arbitrarily establishing such connexion, comes to
the conclusion that the application of such and such words
to such and such things is based on the denotative power
of the words. And being taught later on by his elders
that other words also, in addition to those learned first,

“have their definite meaning, he in the end becomes ac-
quainted with the meanings of all words, and freely forms
sentences conveying certain meanings for the purpose of
imparting those meanings to other persons.

And there is another way also in which the connexion of
words and things can easily be ascertained. Some person
orders another, by means of some expressive gesture, to go
and inform Devadatta that his father is doing well, and the
man ordered. goes and tells Devadatta ‘Your father is
doing well.’ A by-stander who is acquainted with the
meaning of various gestures, and thus knows on what.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I5r

errand the messenger is sent, follows him and hears the
words employed by him to deliver his message: he there-
fore readily infers that such and such words have such and
such a meaning.—We thus see that the theory of words
having a meaning only in relation to things to be done is
baseless. The Ved4nta-texts tell us about Brahman, which
is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on Brahman
as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to
undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain
its nature.

We further maintain that even on the supposition of the
Veda relating only to things to be done, an enquiry into
Brahman must be undertaken. For ‘ The Self is to be seen,
to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on’ (Bri.
Up. II, 4,5); ‘ He is to be searched out, him we must try to
understand’ (KA. Up. VIII, 7,1); ‘ Leta Brahmava having
known him practise wisdom’ (Bri. Up. XI, 4, 21); ‘ What
is within that small ether, that is to be sought for, that is
to be understood’ (ΑΛ. Up. VIII, 1, 1); ‘What is in that
small ether, that is to be meditated upon’ (Mahanar.
Up. X, 7)}-these and similar texts enjoin a certain action,
viz. meditation on Brahman, and when we then read ‘ He
who knows Brahman attains the highest,’ we understand that
the attainment of Brahman is meant as a reward for him
who is qualified for and enters on such meditation. Brah-
man itself and its attributes are thus established thereby
only—that they subserve a certain action, viz. meditation.
There are analogous instances in the Karmakaada of the
Veda. When an arthavdda-passage describes the heavenly
world as a place where there is no heat, no frost, no grief,
&c., this is done merely with a view to those texts which
enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of the
heavenly world. Where another arthavada says that ‘those
who perform certain sattra-sacrifices are firmly established,’
such ‘firm establishment’ is referred to only because it is
meant as the reward for those acting on the text which
enjoins those sattras, ‘Let him perform the rAtri-sattras’
(Pa. Mt. Sd. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a
person threatening a Brahmama is to be punished with

152 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

a fine of one hundred gold pieces, this statement is made
merely with reference to the prohibitory passage, ‘Let him
not threaten a Brahmaza’ (Pd. Mi. Sd. III, 4, 17).

We, however, really object to the whole theory of the
meaning of words depending on their connexion with
‘things to be done,’ since this is not even the case in
imperative clauses such as ‘bring the cow.’ For you are
quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your ‘ thing
to be done’ (karya). You understand by ‘kArya’ that which
follows on the existence of action (kr#ti) and is aimed at
by action, Now to be aimed at by action is to be the
object (karman): of action, and to be the object of action is
to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action
(according to the grammarian’s definition). But what one
desires most to obtain is pleasure or the cessation of
pain. When a person desirous of some pleasure or cessa-
tion of pain is aware that his object is not to be accom-
plished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and
begins to act: in no case we observe an object of desire to
be aimed at by action in any other sense than that of its
accomplishment depending on activity. The prompting
quality (prerakatva) also, which belongs to objects of desire,
is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment de-.
pending on activity; for it is this which’ moves to action.—
Nor can it be said that ‘to be aimed at by action’ means
to be that which is ‘agreeable’ (anuk(la) to man; for it is
pleasure only that is agreeable to man. The cessation of
pain, on the other hand, is not what is ‘ agreeable’ to man.
The essential distinction between pleasure and pain is that
the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable
(pratikdla), and the cessation of pain is desired not because
it is agreeable, but because pain is disagreeable : absence
of pain means that a person is in his normal condition,
affected neither with pain nor pleasure. Apart from pleasure,
action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor does it become so
by being subservient to pleasure; for its essential nature
is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the
resolve of undertaking it——Nor, again, can we define that
which is aimed at by action as that to which action is

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 153

auxiliary or supplementary (sesha), while itself it holds the
position of something principal to be subserved by other
things (seshin); for of the sesha and seshin also no proper
definition can be given: It cannot be said that a sesha is
that which is invariably accompanied by an activity pro-
ceeding with a view to something else, and that the corre-
late of such a sesha is the seshin; for on this definition the
action is not a sesha, and hence that which is to be effected
by the action cannot be the correlative seshin. And more-
over a seshin may not be defined as what is correlative to
an action proceeding with a view to—i.e. aiming at—
something else; for it is just this ‘being-aimed at’ of which
we require a definition, and moreover we observe that also
the seshin (or ‘pradhAna’) is capable of action proceeding
with a view to the sesha, as when e.g. a master does
something for—let us say, keeps or feeds—his servant.
This last criticism you must not attempt to ward off by
maintaining that the master in keeping his servant acts with
a view to himself (to his own advantage); for the servant
in serving the master likewise acts with a view to himself.
—And as, further, we have no adequate definition of
‘karya,’ it would be inappropriate to define sesha as that
which is correlative to kArya, and seshin as that which is
correlative to sesha.—Nor, finally, may we define ‘that
which is aimed at by action’ as that which is the final end
(prayogana) of action ; for by the final end of an action we
could only understand the end for which the agent under-
takes the action, and this end is no other than the desired
object. As thus ‘what is aimed at by action’ cannot be
defined otherwise than: what is desired, kérya cannot be
defined as what is to be effected by action and stands to
action in the relation of principal matter (pradhana or seshin).

(Let it then be said that the ‘niyoga,’ i.e. what is com-
monly called the apfirva—the supersensuous result of an
action which later on produces the sensible result—con-
stitutes the prayogana—the final purpose—of the action.—
But) the apdrva also can, as it is something different from
the direct objects of desire, viz. pleasure and the cessation
of pain, be viewed only as a means of bringing about these.

154 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

direct objects, and as something itself to be effected by the
action; it is for this very reason that it is something
different from the action, otherwise the action itself would
be that which is effected by the action. The thing to be
effected by the action—which is expressed by means of
optative and imperative verbal forms such as yageta, ‘let
him sacrifice ’—is, in accordance with the fact of its being
connected with words such as svargak4maA&, ‘he who
is desirous of heaven,’ understood to be the means of
bringing about (the enjoyment of) the heavenly world;
and as the (sacrificial) action itself is transitory, there is
assumed an altogether ‘new’ or ‘ unprecedented’ (apdrva)
effect of it which (later on) is to bring about the enjoyment
of heaven. This so-called ‘apfrva’ can therefore be |
understood only with regard to its, capability of bringing
about the heavenly world. Now it certainly is ludicrous
to assert that the apfrva, which is assumed to the end of
firmly establishing the independent character of the effect
of the action first recognised as such (i.e. independent),
later on becomes the means of realising the heavenly
world ; for as the word expressing the result of the action
(yageta) appears in syntactical connexion with ‘svarga-
k4mah’ (desirous of heaven), it does not, from the very
beginning, denote an independent object of action, and
moreover it is impossible to recognise an independent
result of action other than either pleasure or cessation of
pain, or the means to bring about these two results.—What,
moreover, do you understand by the apdrva being a final
end (prayogana)?—You will perhaps reply, ‘its being
agreeable like pleasure. —Is then the apfirva ἃ pleasure?
It is pleasure alone which is agreeable!—Well, let us then
define the apfirva as a kind of pleasure of a special nature,
called by that name !—But what proof, we ask, have you for
this? You will, in the first place, admit yourself that you
do not directly experience any pleasure springing from con-
sciousness of your apfrva, which could in any way be
compared to the pleasure caused by the consciousness of
the objects of the senses.—Well, let us say then that as
authoritative doctrine gives us the notion of an apirva as

1 ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 155

something beneficial to man, we conclude that it will be
enjoyed later on.—But, we ask, what is the authoritative
doctrine establishing such an apfirva beneficial to man?
Not, in the first place, ordinary, i.e. non-Vedic doctrine ;
for such has for its object action only which always is
essentially painful. Nor, in the next place, Vedic texts;
for those also enjoin action only as the means to bring
about certain results such as the heavenly world. Nor
again the Smrsti texts enjoining works of either permanent
or occasional obligation ; for those texts always convey the
notion of an apfirva only on the basis of an antecedent
knowledge of the apfirva as intimated by Vedic texts
containing terms such assvargakama&. And we, more-
over, do not observe that in the case of works having
a definite result in this life, there is enjoyment of any
specia] pleasure called apdrva, in addition to those advan-
tages which constitute the special result of the work and are
enjoyed here below, as e. g. abundance of food or freedom _
from sickness. Thus there is not any proof of the apdrva _
being a pleasure. The arthavada-passages of the Veda
also, while glorifying certain pleasurable results of works,
as e.g. the heavenly world, do not anywhere exhibit a
similar glorification of a pleasure called apirva.

From all this we conclude that also in injunctory sen-
tences that which is expressed by imperative and similar
forms is only the idea that the meaning of the root—as
known from grammar—is to be effected by the effort of
the agent. And that what constitutes the meaning of
roots, viz. the action of sacrificing and the like, possesses
the quality of pleasing the highest Person, who is the
inner ruler of Agni and other divinities (to whom the sacri-
fices are ostensibly offered), and that through the highest
Person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is accom-
plished, we shall show later on, under Sd. III, 2, 37.—It
is thus finally proved that the Ved4nta-texts give informa-
tion about an accomplished entity, viz. Brahman, and that
the fruit of meditation on Brahman is something infinite and _
permanent. Where, on the other hand, Scripture refers
to the fruit of mere works, such as the katurmasya-sacrifices,

156 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

as something imperishable, we have to understand this
imperishableness in a merely relative sense, for Scripture
definitely teaches that the fruit of all works is perishable.

We thus arrive at the settled conclusion that, since the
fruit of mere works is limited and perishable, while that of
the cognition of Brahman is infinite and permanent, there
is good reason for entering on an enquiry into Brahman—
the result of which enquiry will be the accurate determina-
tion of Brahman’s nature.—Here terminates the adhikaraza
of ‘Enquiry.’

What then is that Brahman which is here said to be an ©
object that should be enquired into ?—To this question the
second Sfatra gives a reply.

2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c.,
of this (world proceed).

The expression ‘the origih,’ &c., means ‘creation, sub-
sistence, and reabsorption.’ The ‘this’ (in ‘of this’) denotes
this entire world with its manifold wonderful arrangements,
not to be fathomed by thought, and comprising within
itself the aggregate of living souls from Brahma down to
blades of grass, all of which experience the fruits (of their
former actions) in definite places and at definite times.
‘That from which, i.e. that highest Person who is the
ruler of all; whose nature is antagonistic to all evil; whose
purposes come true; who possesses infinite auspicious
qualities, such as knowledge, blessedness, and so on; who
is omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful ; from
whom the creation; subsistence, and reabsorption of this
world proceed—he is Brahman: such is the meaning of
the Sitra—The definition here given of Brahman is
founded on the text Taitt. Up. ITI, 1,‘Bhrigu Varuzi went
to his father Varuma, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,’ &c.,
up to ‘That from which these beings are born, that by
which when born they live, that into which they enter at
their death, try to know that: that is Brahman.’

A doubt arises here. Is it possible, or not, to gain
a knowledge of Brahman from the characteristic marks
stated in this passage?—It is not possible, the Pirva-

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 2. 157

pakshin contends. The attributes stated in that passage—
viz. being that from which the world originates, and so
on—do not properly indicate Brahman ; for as the essence
of an attribute lies in its separative or distinctive func-
tion, there would result from the plurality of distinctive
attributes plurality on the part of Brahman itself.—But
when we say ‘ Devadatta is of a dark complexion, is young,
has reddish eyes, &c., we also make a statement as to
several attributes, and yet we are understood to refer
to one Devadatta only; similarly we understand in the
case under discussion also that there is one Brahman only!
—Not so, we reply. In Devadatta’s case we connect all
attributes with one person, because we know his unity
through other means of knowledge; otherwise the dis-
tinctive power of several attributes would lead us, in this
case also, to the assumption of several substances to which
the several attributes belong. In the case under discussion,
on the other hand, we do not, apart from the statement as
to attributes, know anything about the unity of Brahman,
and the distinctive power of the attributes thus necessarily
urges upon us the idea of several Brahmans.—But we
maintain that the unity of the term ‘ Brahman’ intimates
the unity of the thing ‘Brahman’ !—By no means, we
reply. If a man who knows nothing about cows, but
wishes to know about them, is told ‘a cow is that which
has either entire horns, or mutilated horns, or no horns,’
the mutally exclusive ideas of the possession of entire
horns, and so on, raise in his mind the ideas of several
individual cows, although the term ‘cow’ is one only; and
in the same way we are led to the idea of several distinct
Brahmans, For this reason, even the different attributes
combined are incapable of defining the thing, the definition
of which is desired.—Nor again are the characteristics
enumerated in the Taitt. passage (viz. creation of the
world, &c.) capable of defining Brahman in the way of
secondary marks (upalakshaa), because the thing to be
defined by them is not previously known in a different
aspect. So-called secondary marks are the cause of some-
thing already known from a certain point of view, being

158 . VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

known in a different aspect—as when it is said ‘Where
that crane is standing, that is the irrigated field of Deva-
datta.’—But may we not say that from the text ‘The True,
knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,’ we already have an
idea of Brahman, and that hence its being the cause of the
origin, &c., of the world may be taken as collateral indi-
cations (pointing to something already known in a certain
way)?—Not so, we reply; either of these two defining
texts has a meaning only with reference to an aspect of
Brahman already known from the other one, and this
mutual dependence deprives both of their force.—Brahman
cannot therefore be known through the characteristic marks
mentioned in the text under discussion.

To this prima facie view we make the following reply.
Brahman can be known on the basis of the origination,
subsistence, and reabsorption of the world—these charac-
teristics occupying the position of collateral marks. No
objection can be raised against this view, on the ground
that, apart from what these collateral marks point to, no
other aspect of Brahman is known; for as a matter of fact
they point to that which is known to us as _ possess-
ing supreme greatness (brzhattva) and power of growth
(brémhana)—this being the meaning of the root brimh
(from which ‘Brahman’ is derived). Of this Brahman,
thus already known (on the basis of etymology), the
origination, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world are
collateral marks. Moreover, in the Taitt. text under dis-
cussion, the relative pronoun—which appears in three forms,
(that) ‘from whence,’ (that) ‘by which,’ (that) ‘ into which’
—trefers to something which is already known as the cause
of the origin, and so on, of the world. This previous know-
ledge rests on the KA. passage, ‘ Being only this was in the
beginning,’ &c., up to ‘it sent forth fire’—which declares
that the one principle denoted as ‘ being’ is the universal
material, and instrumental cause. There the clause ‘ Being
only this was in the beginning, one only,’ establishes that
one being as the general material cause ; the word ‘ without
a second’ negatives the existence of a second operative
cause; and the clauses ‘it thought, may I be many, may

I ADHYAYA, I PADA; 2. 159

I grow forth, and ‘it sent forth fire,’ establish that one
being (as the cause and substance of everything). If,
then, it is said that Brahman is that which is the root of
the world’s origination, subsistence, and reabsorption, those
three processes sufficiently indicate Brahman as that entity
which is their material and operative cause; and as being
the material and the operative cause implies greatness
(brthattva) manifesting itself in various powers, such as
omniscience, and so on, Brahman thus is something already
known ; and as hence origination, &c., of the world are
marks of something already known, the objection founded
above on the absence of knowledge of another aspect of
Brahman is seen to be invalid.—Nor is there really any
objection to the origination, &c., of the world being taken
as characteristic marks of Brahman in so far as they are
distinctive attributes. For taken as attributes they indi-
cate Brahman as something different from what is opposed
to those attributes. Several attributes which do not con-
tradict each other may serve quite well as characteristic
marks defining one thing, the nature of which is not other-
wise known, without the plurality of the attributes in any
way involving plurality of the thing defined ; for as those
attributes are at once understood to belong to one substrate,
we naturally combine them within that one substrate. Such
attributes, of course, as the possession of mutilated horns
(mentioned above), which are contradictorily opposed to
each other, necessarily lead to the assumption of several
individual cows to which they severally belong ; but the
origination, &c., of the world are processes separated from
each other by difference of time only, and may therefore,
without contradiction, be connected with one Brahman in
succession.—The text ‘ from whence these beings,’ &c.,
teaches us that Brahman is the cause. of the origination,
* &c., of the world, and of this Brahman thus known the
other text ‘The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,
tells us that its essential nature marks it off from every-
thing else. The term ‘True’ expresses Brahman in so far
as possessing absolutely non-conditioned existence, and
thus distinguishes it from non-intelligent matter, the abode

160 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

of change, and the souls implicated in matter ; for as both
of these enter into different states of existence called by
different names, they do not enjoy unconditioned being.
The term ‘knowledge’ expresses the characteristic of
permanently non-contracted intelligence, and thus distin-
guishes Brahman from the released souls whose intelligence
is sometimes in a contracted state. And the term ‘Infinite’
denotes that, whose nature is free from all limitation of
place, time, and particular substantial nature; and as
Brahman’s essential nature possesses attributes, infinity
belongs both to the essential nature and to the attributes.
The qualification of Infinity excludes all those individual
souls whose essential nature and attributes are not unsur-
passable, and who are distinct from the two classes of
beings already excluded by the two former terms (viz.
‘true being’ and ‘ knowledge’).—The entire text therefore
defines Brahman—which is already known to be the cause
of the origination, &c., of the world—as that which is in
kind different from all other things; and it is therefore not
true that the two texts under discussion have no force
because mutually depending on each other. And from this
it follows that a knowledge of Brahman may be gained
on the ground of its characteristic marks—such as its being
the cause of the origination, &c., of the world, free from all
evil, omniscient, all-powerful, and so on.

To those, on the other hand, who maintain that the
object of enquiry is a substance devoid of all difference,
neither the first nor the second S(tra can be acceptable ;
for the Brahman, the enquiry into which the first Sdtra
proposes, is, according to authoritative etymology, some-
thing of supreme greatness; and according to the second
Stitra it is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and final
destruction of the world. The same remark holds good
with regard to all following Sdtras, and the scriptural texts
on which they are based—none of them confirm the theory
of a substance devoid of all difference. Nor, again, does
Reasoning prove such a theory; for Reasoning has for
its object things possessing a ‘proving’ attribute which
constantly goes together with an attribute ‘to be proved.’

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 3. 161

And even if, in agreement with your view, we explained
the second Sfitra as meaning ‘ Brahman is that whence
proceeds the error of the origination, &c., of the world,’ we
should not thereby advance your theory of a substance
devoid of all difference. For, as you teach, the root of all
error is Nescience, and Brahman is that which witnesses
(is conscious of) Nescience, and the essence of witnessing
consciousness consists in being pure light (intelligence),
and the essence of pure light or intelligence is that, distin-
guishing itself from the Non-intelligent, it renders itself, as
well as what is different from it, capable of becoming the
object of empiric thought and speech (vyavah4ra). All this
implies the presence of difference—if there were no differ-
ence, light or intelligence could not be what. it is, it would
be something altogether void, without any meaning.—Here
terminates the adhikaraza of ‘origination and so on.’

An objection to the purport of the preceding Satras
here presents itself—The assertion that Brahman, as the
cause of the origination, &c., of the world, must be known
through the Ved4nta-texts is unfounded; for as Brahman
may be inferred as the cause of the world through ordinary
reasoning, it is not something requiring to be taught by
authoritative texts—To this objection the next Sftra
replies.

3. Because Scripture is ‘the source (of the know-
ledge of Brahman).

Because Brahman, being raised above all contact with
the senses, is not an object of perception and the other
means of proof, but to be known through Scripture only;
therefore the text ‘Whence these creatures are born,’ &c.,
has to be accepted as instructing us regarding the true
nature of Brahman.—But, our opponent points out, Scrip-
ture cannot be the source of our knowledge of Brahman,
because Brahman is to be known through other means.
For it is an ackfowledged principle that Scripture has
a meaning only with regard to what is not established by
other sources of knowledge.—But what, to raise a prima
facie counter objection, are those other sources of know-

[48] M

162 vEDAwTaA-SOTRAS.

ledge? It cannot, in the first place, be Perception.
Perception is twofold, being based either on the sense-
organs or on extraordinary concentration of mind (yoga).
Of Perception of the former kind there are again two
sub-species, according as Perception takes place either
through the outer sense-organs or the internal organ
(manas). Now the outer sense-organs produce knowledge
of their respective objects, in so far as the latter are in
actual contact with the organs, but are quite unable to
give rise to the knowledge of the special object constituted
by a supreme Self that is capable of being conscious of
and creating the whole aggregate of things. Nor can
internal perception give rise to such knowledge ; for only
purely internal things, such as pleasure and pain, fall within
its cognisance, and it is incapable of relating itself to external
objects apart from the outer sense-organs. Nor, again,
perception based on Yoga; for although such perception
—which springs from intense imagination—implies a vivid
presentation of things, it is, after all, nothing more than
a reproduction of objects perceived previously, and does
not therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge ; for it
has no means of applying itself to objects other than those
perceived previously. And if, after all, it does so, it is
(not a means of knowledge but) a source of error.—Nor
also inference either of the kind which proceeds on the
observation of special cases or of the kind which rests on
generalizations (cp. NyAya Sd. I, 1, 5). Not inference of
the former kind, because such inference is not known
to relate to anything lying beyond the reach of the
senses. Nor inference of the latter kind, because we do
not observe any characteristic feature that is invariably
accompanied by the presence of a supreme Self capable

of being conscious of, and constructing, the universe of.

things.—But there ἐς such a feature, viz. the world’s being
an effected thing; it being a matter of common experience
that whatever is an effect or product, is due to an agent
who possesses a knowledge of the material cause, the instru-
mental cause, the final end, and the person meant to make
use of the thing produced, It further is matter of ex-

σου

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 163

perience that whatever consists of non-sentient matter is
dependent on, or ruled by, a single intelligent principle.
The former generalization is exemplified by the case of
jars and similar things, and the latter by a living body
in good health, which consists of non-intelligent matter
dependent on an intelligent principle. And that the body
is an effected thing follows from its consisting of parts.—
Against this argumentation also objections may be raised.
What, it must be asked, do you understand by this depen-
dence on an intelligent principle? Not, we suppose, that
the origination and subsistence of the non-intelligent thing
should be dependent on the intelligent principle; for in
that case your example would not help to prove your
contention. Neither the origin nor the subsistence of
a person’s healthy body depends on the intelligent soul
of that person alone; they rather are brought about by
the merit and demerit of all those souls which in any way
share the fruition of that body—the wife, e.g. of that
person, and others. Moreover, the existence of a body
made up of parts means that body’s being connected with
its parts in the way of so-called intimate relation (sama-
vaya), and this requires a certain combination of the parts
but not a presiding intelligent principle. The existence
of animated bodies, moreover, has for its characteristic
mark the process of breathing, which is absent in the case
of the earth, sea, mountains, &c.—all of which are included
in the class of things concerning which you wish to prove
something—, and we therefore miss a uniform kind of exis-
tence common to all those things.—Let us then understand
by the dependence of a non-intelligent thing on an intelli-
gent principle, the fact of the motion of the former de-
pending on the latter !—This definition, we rejoin, would
comprehend also those cases in which heavy things, such
as carriages, masses of stone, trees, &c., are set in motion
by several intelligent beings (while what you want to prove
is the dependence of a moving thing on one intelligent
principle). If, on the other hand, you mean to say that
all motion depends on intelligence in general, you only
prove what requires no proof.—Another alternative, more-
M2

164 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

over, here presents itself. As we both admit the existence
of individual souls, it will be the more economical hypo-
thesis to ascribe to them the agency implied in the con-
struction of the world. Nor must you object to this view
on the ground that such agency cannot belong to the
individual souls because they do not possess the knowledge
of material causes, &c., as specified above; for all intelli-
gent beings are capable of direct knowledge of material
causes, such as earth and so on, and instrumental causes,
such as sacrifices and the like. Earth and other material
substances, as well as sacrifices and the like, are directly
perceived by individual intelligent beings at the present
time (and were no doubt equally perceived so at a former
time when this world had to be planned and constructed). .
Nor does the fact that intelligent beings are not capable of
direct insight into the unseen principle—called ‘ apdrva,’ or
by similar names—which resides in the form of a power in
sacrifices and other instrumental causes, in any way pre-
clude their being agents in the construction of the world.
Direct insight into powers is nowhere required for under-
taking work: what zs required for that purpose is only
direct presentative knowledge of the things endowed with
power, while of power itself it suffices to have some kind
of knowledge. Potters apply themselves to the task of
making pots and jars on the strength of the direct know-
ledge they possess of the implements of their work—the
wheel, the staff, &c.—without troubling about a similar
knowledge of the powers inherent in those implements;
and in the same way intelligent beings may apply them-
selves to their work (to be effected by means of sacri-
fices, &c.), if only they are assured by sacred tradition of
the existence of the various powers possessed by sacrifices
and the like-——Moreover, experience teaches that agents
having a knowledge of the material and other causes must
be inferred only in the case of those effects which can be
produced, and the material and other causes of which can
be known: such things, on the other hand, as the earth,
meuntains, and oceans, can neither be produced, nor can
their material and other causes ever be known; we there-

1 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 165

"fore have no right to infer for them, iatelligent producers.
Hence the quality of being an effected thing can be used
as an argument for proving the existence of an intelligent
causal agent, only where that quality is found in things, the
production of which, and the knowledge of the causes of
which, is possible at all—Experience further teaches that
earthen pots and similar things are produced by intelligent
agents possessing material bodies, using implements, not
endowed with the power of a Supreme Lord, limited in
knowledge and so on; the quality of being an effect there-
fore supplies a reason for inferring an intelligent agent of the
kind described only, and thus is opposed to the inference
of attributes of a contrary nature, viz. omniscience, omni-
potence, and those other attributes that belong to the
highest Soul, whose existence you wish to establish.—Nor
does this (as might be objected) imply an abandonment of all
inference. Where the thing to be inferred is known through
other means of proof also, any qualities of an opposite nature
which may be suggested by the inferential mark (linga) are
opposed by those other means of proof, and therefore must
be dropped. In the case under discussion, however, the
thing to be inferred is something not guaranteed by any
other means of proof, viz. a person capable of constructing
the entire universe: here there is nothing to interfere with
the ascription to such a person of all those qualities which,
on the basis of methodical inference, necessarily belong to it.
—The conclusion from all this is that, apart from Scripture,
the existence of a Lord does not admit of proof.

Against all this the Pdrvapakshin now restates his case
as follows :—It cannot be gainsaid that the world is some-
thing effected, for it is made up of parts. We may state
this argument in various technical forms. ‘The earth,
mountains, &c., are things effected, because they consist of
parts; in the same way as jars and similar things.’ ‘The
earth, seas, mountains, &c., are effects, because, while being
big (i.e. non-atomic), they are capable of motion ; just as
jars and the like. ‘Bodies, the world, &c., are effects,
because, while being big, they are solid (mArtta); just as
jars and the like.—But, an objection is raised, in the case

166 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

of things made up of parts we do not, in addition to this
attribute of consisting of parts, observe any other aspect
determining that the thing is an effect—so as to enable us
to say ‘this thing is effected, and that thing is not’; and,
on the other hand, we do observe it as an indispensable
condition of something being an effect, that there should
be the possibility of such an effect being brought about,
and of the existence of such knowledge of material causes,
&c. (as the bringing about of the effect presupposes).—Not
so, we reply. In the case of a cause being inferred on the
ground of an effect, the knowledge and power of the cause
must be inferred in accordance with the nature of the
effect. From the circumstance of a thing consisting of
parts we know it to be an effect, and on this basis we
judge of the power and knowledge of the cause. A person
recognises pots, jars and the like, as things produced,
and therefrom infers the constructive skill and knowledge
of their maker; when, after this, he sees for the first
time a kingly palace with all its various wonderful parts
and structures, he concludes from the special way in which
the parts are joined that this also is an effected thing, and
then makes an inference as to the architect’s manifold
knowledge and skill. Analogously, when a living body and
the world have once been recognised to be effects, we infer
—as their maker—some special intelligent being, possessing
direct insight into their nature and skill to construct them.—
Pleasure and pain, moreover, by which men are requited for
their merit and demerit, are themselves of a non-intelligent
nature, and hence cannot bring about their results unless
they are controlled by an intelligent principle, and this
also compels us to assume a being capable of allotting to
each individual soul a fate corresponding to its deserts.
For we do not observe that non-intelligent implements, such
as axes and the like, however much they may be favoured
by circumstances of time, place, and so on, are capable
of producing posts and pillars unless they be handled by
a carpenter. And to quote against the generalization on
which we rely the instance of the seed and sprout and the
like can only spring from an ignorance and stupidity which

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 167

may be called truly demoniac. The same remark would
apply to pleasure and pain if used as a counter instance.
(For in all these cases the action which produces an effect
must necessarily be guided by an intelligent principle.)—
Nor may we assume, as a ‘less complicated hypothesis,’
that the guiding principle in the construction of the world
is the individual souls, whose existence is acknowledged
by both parties. For on the testimony of observation we
must deny to those souls the power of seeing what is
extremely subtle or remote in time or place (while such
power must necessarily be ascribed to a world-constructing
intelligence). On the other hand, we have no ground for
concluding that the Lord is, like the individual souls,
destitute of such power ; hence it cannot be said that other
means of knowledge make it impossible to infer such a Lord.
The fact rather is that as his existence is proved by the
argument that any definite effect presupposes a causal
agent competent to produce that effect, he is proved at the
same time as possessing the essential power of intuitively
knowing and ruling all things in the universe.—The
contention that from the world being an effect it follows
that its maker does not possess lordly power and so on,
so that the proving reason would prove something contrary
to the special attributes (belonging to a supreme agent, viz.
omnipotence, omniscience, &c.), is founded on evident
ignorance of the nature of the inferential process. For the
inference clearly does not prove that there exist in the
thing inferred all the attributes belonging to the proving
collateral instances, including even those attributes which
stand in no causal relation to the effect. A certain effect
which is produced by some agent presupposes just so much
power and knowledge on the part of that agent as is
requisite for the production of the effect, but in no way
presupposes any incapability or ignorance on the part of
that agent with regard to things other than the particular
effect ; for such incapability and ignorance do not stand
towards that effect in any causal relation. If the origina-
tion of the effect can be accounted for on the basis of the
agent’s capability of bringing it about, and of his knowledge

168 | VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

of the special material and instrumental causes, it would be
unreasonable to ascribe causal agency to his (altogether
irrelevant) incapabilities and ignorance with regard to other
things, only because those incapabilities, &c., are observed
to exist together with his special capability and knowledge.
The question would arise moreover whether such want of
capability and knowledge (with regard to things other than
the one actually effected) would be helpful towards the
bringing about of that one effect, in so far as extending to
all other things or to some other things. The former
alternative is excluded because no agent, a potter e.g., is
quite ignorant of all other things but his own special work ;
and the second alternative is inadmissible because there is
no definite rule indicating that there should be certain
definite kinds of want of knowledge and skill in the case of
all agents!, and hence exceptions would arise with regard
to every special case of want of knowledge and skill. From
this it follows that the absence of lordly power and similar
qualities which (indeed is observed in the case of ordinary
agents but) in no way contributes towards the production of
the effects (to which such agents give rise) is not proved in the
case of that which we wish to prove (i.e. a Lord, creator
of the world); and that hence Inference does not establish
qualities contrary (to the qualities characteristic of a Lord).

A further objection will perhaps be raised, viz. that as
experience teaches that potters and so on direct their im-
plements through the mediation of their own bodies, we
are not justified in holding that a bodiless Supreme Lord
directs the material and instrumental causes of the universe.
—But in reply to this we appeal to the fact of experience,
that evil demons possessing men’s bodies, and also venom,
are driven or drawn out of those bodies by mere will power.
Nor must you ask in what way the volition of a bodiless

1 A certain potter may not possess the skill and knowledge
required to make chairs and beds; but some other potter may
possess both, and so on. We cannot therefore point to any
definite want of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying
the capability of producing effects of some other kind.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 169

Lord can put other bodies in motion; for volition is not
dependent on a body. The cause of volitions is not the
body but the internal organ (manas), and such an organ we
ascribe to the Lord also, since what proves the presence of
an internal organ endowed with power and knowledge is
just the presence of effects.—But volitions, even if directly
springing from the internal organ, can belong to embodied
beings only, such only possessing internal organs !—This
objection also is founded on a mistaken generalization : the
fact rather is that the internal organ is permanent, and
exists also in separation from the body. The conclusion,
therefore, is that—as the individual souls with their limited
capacities and knowledge, and their dependence on merit
and demerit, are incapable of giving rise to things so
variously and wonderfully made as worlds and animated
bodies are—inference directly leads us to the theory that
there is a supreme intelligent agent, called the Lord, who
possesses unfathomable, unlimited powers and wisdom, is
capable of constructing the entire world, is without a body,
and through his mere volition brings about the infinite
expanse of this entire universe so variously and wonder-
fully planned. As Brahman may thus be ascertained by
means of knowledge other than revelation, the text quoted
under the preceding Sftra cannot be taken to convey
instruction as to Brahman. Since, moreover, experience
demonstrates that material and instrumental causes always
are things absolutely distinct from each other, as e.g. the
clay and the potter with his implements; and since, further,
there are substances not made up of parts, as e.g. ether,
which therefore cannot be viewed as effects; we must
object on these grounds also to any attempt to represent the
one Brahman as the universal material and mseumente
cause of the entire world.

Against all this we now argue as follows :—The Vedanta-
text declaring the origination, &c., of the world does teach
that there is a Brahman possessing the characteristics men-
tioned; since Scripture alone is a means for the knowledge
of Brahman. That the world is an effected thing because
it consists of parts; and that, as all effects are observed to

170 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

have for their antecedents certain appropriate agents com-
petent to produce them, we must infer a causal agent
competent to plan and construct the universe, and stand-
ing towards it in the relation of material and operative
cause—this would be a conclusion altogether unjustified.
There is no proof to show that the earth, oceans, &c.,
although things produced, were created at one time by one
creator. Nor can it be pleaded in favour of such a con-
clusion that all those things have one uniform character of
being effects, and thus are analogous to one single jar;
for we observe that various effects are distinguished by
difference of time of production, and difference of producers.
Nor again may you maintain the oneness of the creator
on the ground that individual souls are incapable of the
creation of this wonderful universe, and that if an additional
principle be assumed to account for the world—which
manifestly is a product—it would be illegitimate to assume
more than one such principle. For we observe that in-
dividual beings acquire more and more extraordinary
powers in consequence of an increase of religious merit ;
and as we may assume that through an eventual supreme
degree of merit they may in the end qualify themselves
for producing quite extraordinary effects, we have no right
to assume a highest soul of infinite merit, different from all
individual souls. Nor also can it be proved that all things
are destroyed and produced all at once; for no such thing
is observed to take place, while it is, on the other hand,
observed that things are produced and destroyed in suc-
cession; and if we infer that all things are produced and
destroyed because they are effects, there is no reason why
this production and destruction should not take place in
a way agreeing with ordinary experience. If, therefore,
what it is desired to prove is the agency of one intelligent
being, we are met by the difficulty that the proving reason
(viz. the circumstance of something being an effect) is not
invariably connected with what it is desired to prove;
there, further, is the fault of qualities not met with in
experience being attributed to the subject about which
something has to be proved; and lastly there is the fault

1 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 171

of the proving collateral instances being destitute of what
has to be proved—for experience does not exhibit to us one
agent capable of producing everything. If, on the other
hand, what you wish to prove is merely the existence of
an intelligent creative agent, you prove only what is
proved already (not contested by any one).—Moreover,
if you use the attribute of being an effect (which belongs
to the totality of things) as a means to prove the existence
of one omniscient and omnipotent creator, do you view
this attribute as belonging to all things in so far as pro-
duced together, or in so far as produced in succession ?
In the former case the attribute of being an effect is not
established (for experience does not show that all things
are produced together) ; and in the latter case the attribute
would really prove what is contrary to the hypothesis
of one creator (for experience shows that things produced
in, succession have different causes). In attempting to
prove the agency of one intelligent creative being only, we
thus enter into conflict with Perception and Inference, and
we moreover contradict Scripture, which says that ‘the
potter is born’ and ‘the cartwright is born’ (and thus
declares a plurality of intelligent agents). Moreover, as
we observe that all effected things, such as living bodies
and so on, are connected with pleasure and the like, which
are the effects of sattva (goodness) and the other primary
constituents of matter, we must conclude that effected
things have sattva and so on for their causes. Sattva and
so on—which constitute the distinctive elements of the
causal substance—are the causes of the various nature of the
effects. Now those effects can be connected with their
causes only in so far as the internal organ of a person
possessing sattva and so on undergoes modifications, And
that a person possesses those qualities is due to karman.
Thus, in order to account for the origination of different
effects we must necessarily assume the connexion of an
intelligent agent with karman, whereby alone he can become
the cause of effects; and moreover the various character
of knowledge and power (which the various effects pre-
suppose) has its reason in karman. And if it be said that

172 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

it is (not the various knowledge, &c., but) the mere wish
of the agent that causes the origination of effects, we point
out that the wish, as being specialised by its particular
object, must be based on sattva and so on, and hence
is necessarily connected with karman. From all this it
follows that individual souls only can be causal agents: no
legitimate inference leads to a Lord different from them in
nature.—This admits of various expressions in technical
form. ‘Bodies, worlds, &c., are effects due to the causal
energy of individual souls, just as pots are’; ‘the Lord is
not a causal agent, because he has no aims; just as the
released souls have none’; ‘the Lord is not an agent,
because he has no body; just as the released souls have
none.’ (This last argumentation cannot be objected to on
the ground that individual souls take possession of bodies ;
for in their case there exists a beginningless subtle body
by means of which they enter into gross bodies).—‘ Time
is never devoid of created worlds; because it is time, just
like the present time (which has its created world).’
Consider the following point also. Does the Lord pro-
duce his effects, with his body or apart from his body?
Not the latter; for we do not observe causal agency on
the part of any bodiless being: even the activities of the
internal organ are found only in beings having a body, and
although the internal organ be eternal we do not know of
its producing any effects in the case of released disembodied
souls. Nor again is the former alternative admissible; for
in that case the Lord’s body would either be permanent or
non-permanent. The former alternative would imply that
something made up of parts is eternal; and if we once
admit this we may as well admit that the world itself is
eternal, and then there is no reason to infer a Lord. And
the latter alternative is inadmissible because in that case
there would be no cause of the body, different from it
(which would account for the origination of the body).
Nor could the Lord himself be assumed as the cause of the
body, since a bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body.
Nor could it be maintained that the Lord can be assumed
to be ‘embodied’ by means of some other body; for this

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 173

leads us into a regressus in infinitum.—Should we, more-
over, represent to ourselves the Lord (when productive) as
engaged in effort or not?—The former is inadmissible,
because he is without a body. And the latter alternative
is excluded because a being not making an effort does not
produce effects. And if it be said that the effect, i.e. the
world, has for its causal agent one whose activity consists
in mere desire, this would be to ascribe to the subject of
the conclusion (i.e. the world) qualities not known from
experience ; and moreover the attribute to be proved would
be absent in the case of the proving instances (such as
jars, &c., which are not the work of agents engaged in mere
wishing). Thus the inference of a creative Lord which
claims to be in agreement with observation is refuted
by reasoning which itself is in agreement with observation,
and we hence conclude that Scripture is the only source of
knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the
Lord of all and constitutes the highest Brahman. What
Scripture tells us of is a being which comprehends within
itself infinite, altogether unsurpassable excellences such as
omnipotence and so on, is antagonistic to all evil, and totally
different in character from whatever is cognised by the
other means of knowledge: that to such a being there
should attach even the slightest imperfection due to its
similarity in nature to the things known by the ordinary
means of knowledge, is thus altogether excluded.—The
Pdrvapakshin had remarked that the oneness of the in-
strumental and the material cause is neither matter of
observation nor capable of proof, and that the same holds
good with regard to the theory that certain non-composite
substances such as ether are created things; that these points
also are in no way contrary to reason, we shall show later
on under Sa. I, 4, 23, and Sa. II, 3, 1.

The conclusion meanwhile is that, since Brahman does
not fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge,
and is the topic of Scripture only, the text ‘from whence
these creatures,’ &c., does give authoritative information as to
a Brahman possessing the characteristic qualities so often
enumerated. Here terminates the adhikarava of ‘ Scripture
being the source.’

174 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

A new objection here presents itself.—Brahman does not
indeed fall within the province of the other means of
knowledge; but all the same Scripture does not give
authoritative information regarding it: for Brahman is
not something that has for its purport activity or cessation
from activity, but is something fully established and ac-
complished within itself.—To this objection the following
SAatra replies.

4. But that (i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture
with regard to Brahman) exists on account of the con-
nexion (of Scripture with the highest aim of man).

The word ‘but’ is meant to rebut the objection raised.
That, i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to
Brahman, is possible, on account of samanvaya, i.e. con-
nexion with the highest aim of man—that is to say because
the scriptural texts are connected with, i.e. have for their
subject, Brahman, which constitutes the highest aim of man.
For such is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate
of words which constitutes the Upanishads—‘ That from
whence these beings are born’ (Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). ‘ Being
only this was in the beginning, one, without a second’
(Kk. Up. VI, 2), ἃς. &c. And of aggregates of words
which are capable of giving information about accomplished
things known through the ordinary means of ascertaining
the meaning of words, and which connectedly refer to
a Brahman which is the cause of the origination, subsistence,
and destruction of the entire world, is antagonistic to all
imperfection and so on, we have no right to say that, owing
to the absence of a purport in the form of activity or
cessation of activity, they really refer to something other
than Brahman.

For all instruments of knowledge have their end in
determining the knowledge of their own special objects:
their action does not adapt itself to a final purpose, but the
latter rather adapts itself to the means of knowledge. Nor
is it true that where there is no connexion with activity or
cessation of activity all aim is absent ; for in such cases we
observe connexion with what constitutes the general aim, i. e.

1 ADHYAyA, I PADA, 4. 175

the benefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of
fact—such as ‘a son is born to thee.’ ‘This is no snake’—
evidently have an aim, viz. in so far as they either give rise
to joy or remove pain and fear.

᾿ Against this view the POrvapakshin now argues as follows.
The Vedanta-texts do not impart knowledge of Brahman ;
for unless related to activity or the cessation of activity,
Scripture would be unmeaning, devoid of all purpose.
Perception and the other means of knowledge indeed have
their aim and end in supplying knowledge of the nature of
accomplished things and facts ; Scripture, on the other hand,
must be supposed to aim at some practical purpose. For
neither in ordinary speech nor in the Veda do we ever
observe the employment of sentences devoid of a practical
purpose: the employment of sentences not having such
a purpose is in fact impossible. And what constitutes such
purpose is the attainment of a desired, or the avoidance of a
non-desired object, to be effected bysome action or abstention
from action. ‘Let a man desirous of wealth attach himself
to the court of a prince’; ‘a man with a weak digestion
must not drink much water’; ‘let him who is desirous of
the heavenly world offer sacrifices’; and so on. With
regard to the assertion that such sentences also as refer to
accomplished things—‘a son is born to thee’ and so on—
are connected with certain aims of man, viz. joy or the
cessation of fear, we ask whether in such cases the attain-
ment of man’s purpose results from the thing or fact itself,
as e.g. the birth of a son, or from the knowledge of that
thing or fact—yYou will reply that as a thing although
actually existing is of no use to man as long as it is not
known to him, man’s purpose is accomplished by his
knowledge of the thing.—It then appears, we rejoin, that
man’s purpose is effected through mere knowledge, even if
there is no actual thing; and from this it follows that
Scripture, although connected with certain aims, is not
a means of knowledge for the actual existence of things.
In all cases, therefore, sentences have a practical purpose ;
they determine either some form of activity or cessation
from activity, or else some form of knowledge. No sentence,

176 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

therefore, can have for its purport an accomplished thing,
and hence the Ved4nta-texts do not convey the knowledge
of Brahman as such an accomplished entity.

At this point somebody propounds the following view.
The Vedanta-texts ave an authoritative means for the cog-
nition of Brahman, because as a matter of fact they also aim
at something to be done. What they really mean to teach
is that Brahman, which in itself is pure homogeneous know-
ledge, without a second, not connected with a world, but is,
owing to beginningless Nescience, viewed as connected
with a world, should be freed from this connexion. And it
is through this process of dissolution of the world that
Brahman becomes the object of an injunction—But which
texts embody this injunction, according to which Brahman
in its pure form is to be realised through the dissolution of
this apparent world with its distinction of knowing subjects
and objects of knowledge ?—Texts such as the following :
‘One should not see (i.e. represent to oneself) the seer of
seeing, one should not think the thinker of thinking’
(Brz. Up. III, 4, 2); for this means that we should realise
Brahman in the form of pure Seeing (knowledge), free from
the distinction of seeing agents and objects of sight.
Brahman is indeed accomplished through itself, but all the
same it may constitute an object to be accomplished, viz. in
so far as it is being disengaged from the apparent world.

This view (the MimAmsaka rejoins) is unfounded. He
who maintains that injunction constitutes the meaning of
sentences must be able to assign the injunction itself, the
qualification of the person to whom the injunction is |
addressed, the object of the injunction, the means to carry
it out, the special mode of the procedure, and the person
carrying out the injunction. Among these things the
qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses
itself is something not to be enjoined (but existing previously
to the injunction), and is of the nature either of cause
(nimitta) or a result aimed at (phala). We then have to
decide what, in the case under discussion (i.e. the alleged
injunction set forth by the antagonist), constitutes the
qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 177

itself, and whether it be of the nature of a cause or of
a result.—Let it then be said that what constitutes the
qualification in our case is the intuition of the true nature
of Brahman (on the part of the person to whom the
injunction is addressed).—This, we rejoin, cannot be a
cause, as it is not something previously established; while
in other cases the nimitta is something so established, as
e.g. ‘life’ is in the case of a person to whom the following
injunction is addressed, ‘As long as his life lasts he is to
make the Agnihotra-oblation.’ And if, after all, it were
admitted to be a cause, it would follow that, as the
intuition of the true nature of Brahman is something
permanent, the object of the injunction would have to be
accomplished even subsequently to final release, in the
same way as the Agnihotra has .to be performed per-
manently as long as life lasts—Nor again can the intuition
of Brahman’s true nature be a.result ; for then, being the
result of an action enjoined, it would be something non-
permanent, like the heavenly world—What, in the next
place, would be the ‘object to be accomplished’ of the
injunction? You may not reply ‘Brahman’; for as
Brahman is something permanent it is not something
that can be realised, and moreover it is not denoted by
a verbal form (such as denote actions that can be accom-
plished, as e.g. yaga, sacrifice)—-Let it then be said that
what is to be realised is Brahman,.in so far as free from the
world !—But, we rejoin, even if this be accepted as a thing
to be realised, it is not the object (vishaya) of the injunc-
tion—that it cannot be for the second reason just stated—
but its final result (phala). What moreover is, on this last
assumption, the thing to be realised—Brahman, or the
cessation of the apparent world?—Not Brahman; for
Brahman is something accomplished, and from your
assumption it would follow that it is not eternal—Well
then, the dissolution of the world !—Not so, we reply ; for
then it would not be Brahman that is realised.—Let it then
be said that the dissolution of the world only is the object
of the injunction !—This, too, cannot be, we rejoin; that
dissolution is the result (phala) and cannot therefore be the
[48] Ν

178 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

object of the injunction. For the dissolution of the world
means final release; and that is the result aimed at.
Moreover; if the dissolution of the world is taken as the
object of the injunction, that dissolution would follow
from the injunction, and the injunction would be carried
out by the dissolution of the world; and this would be
a case of vicious mutual dependence—We further ask—is
the world, which is to be put an end to, false or real ?—If
it is false, it is put an end to by knowledge alone, and then
the injunction is needless. Should you reply to this that
the injunction puts an end to the world in so far as it gives
rise to knowledge, we reply that knowledge springs of itself
from the texts which declare the highest truth: hence
there is no need of additional injunctions. As knowledge of
the meaning of those texts sublates the entire false world
distinct from Brahman, the injunction itself with all its
adjuncts is seen to be something baseless.—If, on the
other hand, the world is true, we ask—is the injunction,
which puts an end to the world, Brahman itself or some-
thing different from Brahman? If the former, the world
cannot exist at all: for what terminates it, viz. Brahman,
is something eternal ; and the injunction thus being eternal
itself cannot be accomplished by means of certain actions.—
Let then the latter alternative be accepted !—But in that
case, the niyoga being something which is accomplished
by a set of performances the function of which it is to put
an end to the entire world, the performing person himself
perishes (with the rest of the world), and the niyoga thus
remains without a substrate. And if everything apart
from Brahman is put an end to by a performance the
function of which it is to put an end to the world, there
remains no result to be effected by the niyoga, consequently
there is no release.

Further, the dissolution of the world cannot constitute
the instrument (karaza) in the action enjoined, because no
mode of procedure (itikartavyat4) can be assigned for the
instrument of the niyoga, and unless assisted by a mode of
procedure an instrument cannot operate.—But why is there
no ‘mode of procedure’?—For the following reasons.

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 4. 179

A mode of procedure is either of a positive or a negative
kind. If positive, it may be of two kinds, viz. either such
as to bring about the instrument or to assist it. Now in
our case there is no room for either of these alternatives.
Not for the former; for there exists in our case nothing
analogous to the stroke of the pestle (which has the
manifest effect of separating the rice grains from the husks),
whereby the visible effect of the dissolution of the whole
world could be brought about. Nor, secondly, is there
the possibility of anything assisting the instrument, already
existing independently, to bring about its effect; for
owing to the existence of such an assisting factor the
instrument itself, i.e. the cessation of the apparent world,
cannot be established. Nor must you say that it is the
cognition of the non-duality of Brahman that brings about
the means for the dissolution of the world; for, as we have
already explained above, this cognition directly brings
about final Release, which is the same as the dissolution’
of the world, and thus there is nothing left to be effected
by special means.—And if finally the mode of procedure is —
something purely negative, it can, owing to this its nature,
neither bring about nor in any way assist the instrumental
cause. From all this it follows that there is no possibility
of injunctions having for their object the realisation of
Brahman, in so far as free from the world.

Here another primA facie view of the question is set
forth—It must be admitted that the Vedanta-texts are
not means of authoritative knowledge, since they refer to
Brahman, which is an accomplished thing (not a thing ‘to
be accomplished’); nevertheless Brahman itself is esta-
blished, viz. by means of those passages which enjoin
meditation (as something ‘to be done’). This is the pur-
port of texts such as the following: ‘The Self is to be
seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated upon’
(Brz. Up. II, 4, 5); ‘The Self which is free from sin must
be searched out’ (KA. Up. VIII, 7, 1); ‘Let a man medi-
tate upon him as the Self’ (Brz. Up. I, 4, 7); ‘ Let a man
meditate upon the Self as his world’ (Brz. Up. I, 4, 15).—
These injunctions have meditation for their object, and

N 2

180 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

meditation again is defined by its own object only, so that
the injunctive word immediately suggests an object of
meditation ; and as such an object there presents itself,
the ‘Self’ mentioned in the same sentence. Now there
arises the question, What are the characteristics of that
Self? and in reply to it there come in texts such as ‘The
True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman’; ‘Being only this
was in the beginning, one without a second.’ As these
texts give the required special information, they stand in
a supplementary relation to the injunctions, and hence are
means of right knowledge ; and in this way the purport of
the Vedanta-texts includes Brahman—as having a definite
place in meditation.which is the object of injunction. Texts
such as ‘One only without a second’ (ΚΛ. Up. VI, 2, 1);
‘That is the true, that is the Self’ (ΧΑ. Up. VI, 8, 7);
‘ There is here not any plurality’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19), teach
that there is one Reality only, viz. Brahman, and that every-
thing else is false. And as Perception and the other means
of proof, as well as that part of Scripture which refers to
action and is based on the view of plurality, convey the
notion of plurality, and as there is contradiction between
plurality and absolute Unity, we form the conclusion that
the idea of plurality arises through beginningless avidya,
while absolute Unity alone is real. And thus it is through
the injunction of meditation on Brahman—which has for
its result the intuition of Brahman—that man reaches final
release, i.e. becomes one with Brahman, which consists of
non-dual intelligence free of all the manifold distinctions
that spring from Nescience. Nor is this becoming one
with Brahman to be accomplished by the mere cognition
of the sense of certain Vedanta-texts; for this is not observed
—the fact rather being that the view of plurality persists
even after the cognition of the sense of those texts—, and,
moreover, if it were so, the injunction by Scripture of
hearing, reflecting, &c., would be purposeless.

To this reasoning the following objection might be raised.
—We observe that when a man is told that what he is afraid
of is not a snake, but only a rope, his fear comes to an end;
and as bondage is as unreal as the snake imagined in the

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 181

rope it also admits of being sublated by knowledge, and
may therefore, apart from all injunction, be put an end to
by the simple comprehension of the sense of certain texts.
If final release were to be brought about by injunctions, it
would follow that it is not eternal—not any more than the
heavenly world and the like; while yet its eternity is ad-
mitted by every one. Acts of religious merit, moreover
(such as are prescribed by injunctions), can only be the
causes of certain results in so far as they give rise to a body
capable of experiencing those results, and thus necessarily
produce the so-called sams4ra-state (which is opposed to
final release, and) which consists in the connexion of the
soul with some sort of body, high or low. Release, therefore,
is not something to be brought about by acts of religious
merit. In agreement herewith Scripture says, ‘For the
soul as long as it is in the body, there is no release from
pleasure and pain; when it is free from the body, then
neither pleasure nor pain touch it’ (ΑΛ. Up. VIII, 12, 1).
This passage declares that in the state of release, when
the soul is freed from the body, it is not touched by either
pleasure or pain—the effects of acts of religious merit or
demerit ; and from this it follows that the disembodied
State is not to be accomplished by acts of religious merit.
Nor may it be said that, as other special results are accom-
plished by special injunctions, so the disembodied state is
to be accomplished by the injunction of meditation; for
that state is essentially something “097 to be effected. Thus
scriptural texts say, ‘The wise man who knows the Self
as bodiless among the bodies, as persisting among non-
persisting things, as great and all-pervading; he does not
grieve’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); ‘That person is without breath,
without internal organ, pure, without contact’ (Mu. Up.
II, 1, 2).—Release which is a bodiless state is eternal, and
cannot therefore be accomplished through meritorious acts.

In agreement herewith Scripture says, ‘ That which thou
seest apart from merit (dharma) and non-merit, from what
is done and not done, from what exists and what has to be
accomplished—tell me that’ (Ka. Up. I, %, 14).—Consider
what follows also. When we speak of something being

182 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

accomplished (effected—sadhya) we mean one of four things,
viz. its being originated (utpatti), or obtained (pr4pti), or
modified (vikviti), or in some way or other (often purely
ceremonial) made ready or fit (samskriti). Now in neither
of these four senses can final Release be said to be accom-
plished. It cannot be originated, for being Brahman itself it
is eternal. It cannot be attained; for Brahman, being the
Self, is something eternally attained. It cannot be modi-
fied ; for that would imply that like sour milk and similar
things (which are capable of change) it is non-eternal.
Nor finally can it be made ‘ready’ or ‘fit.’ A thing is
made ready or fit either by the removal of some imper-
fection or by the addition of some perfection. Now
Brahman cannot be freed from any imperfection, for it
is eternally faultless; nor can a perfection be added to it,
for it is absolutely perfect. Nor can it be improved in the
sense in which we speak of improving a mirror, viz. by
polishing it; for as it is absolutely changeless it cannot
become the object of any action, either of its own or of an
outside agent. And, again, actions affecting the body, such
as bathing, do not ‘ purify’ the Self (as might possibly be
maintained) but only the organ of Egoity (ahamkartr?)
which is the product of avidya, and connected with the
body; it is this same ahamkartr? also that enjoys the
fruits springing from any action upon the body. Nor must
it be said that the Self zs the ahamkartrz; for the Self
rather is that which is conscious of the ahamkartr?. This
is the teaching of the mantras: ‘ One of them eats the sweet
fruit, the other looks on without eating’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1);
‘When he is in union with the body, the senses, and the
mind, then wise men call him the Enjoyer’ (Ka. Up. I,
3,4); ‘The one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading,
the Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling
in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one, free
from qualities’ (Svet. Up. VI, 11); ‘ He encircled all, bright,
bodiless, scatheless, without muscles, pure, untouched by
evil’ (Isa Up. 8)—All these texts distinguish from the
ahamkartri due to Nescience, the true Self, absolutely
perfect and pure, free from all change. Release therefore

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 183

—which ἐς the Self—cannot be brought about in any
way.—But, if this is so, what then is the use of the com-
* prehension of the texts ?—It is of use, we reply, in so far as
it puts an end to the obstacles in the way of Release. This
scriptural texts declare: ‘You indeed are our father, you who
carry us from our ignorance to the other shore’ (Pra. Up.
VI, 8); ‘I have heard from men like you that he who
knows the Self overcomes grief. Iam in grief. Do, Sir,
help me over this grief of mine’ (KA. Up. VII, 1, 3); ‘To
him whose faults had thus been rubbed out Sanatkuméra
showed the other bank of Darkness’ (K%. Up. VII, 26, 2).
This shows that what is effected by the comprehension of
the meaning of texts is merely the cessation of impediments
in the way of Release. This cessation itself, although
something effected, is of the nature of that kind of non-
existence which results from the destruction of something
existent, and as such does not pass away.—Texts such
as ‘He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman’ (Mu. Up.
III, 2, 9); ‘Having known him he passes beyond death’
(Svet. Up. IIT, 8), declare that Release follows immediately
on the cognition of Brahman, and thus negative the inter-
vention of injunctions—Nor can it be maintained that
Brahman is related to action in so far as constituting the
object of the action either of knowledge or of meditation ;
for scriptural texts deny its being an object in either of
these senses. Compare ‘ Different is this from what is
known, and from what is unknown’ (Ke. Up. III); ‘ By
whom he knows all this, whereby should he know him ?’
(Bri. Up. IV, 5,15); ‘That do thou know as Brahman, not
that on which they meditate as being this’ (Ke. Up. IV, 4).
Nor does this view imply that the sacred texts have no
object at all; for it is their object to put an end to the
view of difference springing from avidya. Scripture does
not objectivise Brahman in any definite form, but rather
teaches that its true nature is to be non-object, and thereby
puts an end to the distinction, fictitiously suggested by
Nescience, of knowing subjects, acts of knowledge, and
objects of knowledge. Compare the text ‘ You should not
see a séer of seeing, you should not think a thinker of

184 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

thought,’ &c. (Bvz. Up. III, 4, 2).—Nor, again, must it be
said that, if knowledge alone puts an end to bondage, the’
injunctions of hearing and so on are purposeless; for their Ὁ
function is to cause the origination of the comprehension
of the texts, in so far as they divert from all other alterna-
tives the student who is naturally inclined to yield to dis-
tractions.—Nor, again, can it be maintained that a cessation
of bondage through mere knowledge is never observed to
take place; for as bondage is something false (unreal) it
cannot possibly persist after the rise of knowledge. For
the same reason it is a mistake to maintain that the cessa-
tion of bondage takes place only after the death of the

- body. In order that the fear inspired by the imagined
snake should come to an end, it is required only that the
rope should be recognised as what it is, not that a snake
should be destroyed. If the body were something real,
its destruction would be necessary ; but being apart from
Brahman it is unreal. He whose bondage does not come
to an end, in him true knowledge has not arisen; this we
infer from the effect of such knowledge not being observed
in him. Whether the body persist or not, he who has
reached true knowledge is released from that very moment.
—The general conclusion of all this is that, as Release is
not something to be accomplished: by injunctions of medi-
tation, Brahman is not proved to be something standing in
a supplementary relation to such injunctions ; but is rather
proved by (non-injunctory) texts, such as ‘Thou art that’;
‘The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman’; ‘ This Self is
Brahman.’

This view (the holder of the dhy&na-vidhi theory rejoins)
is untenable; since the cessation of bondage cannot possibly
spring from the mere comprehension of the meaning of
texts. Even if bondage were something unreal, and there-
fore capable of sublation by knowledge, yet being some-
thing direct, immediate, it could not be sublated by the
indirect comprehension of the sense of texts. When a man
directly conscious of a snake before him is told by a com-
petent by-stander that it is not a snake but merely a rope,
his fear is not dispelled by a mere cognition contrary to

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 4. 185

that of a snake, and due to the information received ; but
the information brings about the cessation of his fear in
that way that it rouses him to an activity aiming at the
direct perception, by means of his senses, of what the thing
before him really is. Having at first started back in fear
of the imagined snake, he now proceeds to ascertain by
means of ocular perception the true nature of the thing,
and having accomplished this is freed from fear. It would
not be correct to say that in this case words (viz. of the
person informing) produce this perceptional knowledge;
‘for words are not a sense-organ, and among the means of
knowledge it is the sense-organs only that give rise to
direct knowledge. Nor, again, can it be pleaded that in the
special case of Vedic texts sentences may give rise to direct
knowledge, owing to the fact that the person concerned
has cleansed himself of all imperfection through the per-
formance of actions not aiming at immediate results, and
has been withdrawn from all outward objects by hearing,
reflection, and meditation; for in other cases also, where
special impediments in the way of knowledge are being
removed, we never observe that the special means of know-
ledge, such as the sense-organs and so on, operate outside
their proper limited sphere.—Nor, again, can it be main-
tained that meditation acts as a means helpful towards the
comprehension of texts; for this leads to vicious reciprocal
dependence—when the meaning of the texts has been
comprehended it becomes the object of meditation; and
when meditation has taken place there arises compre-
hension of the meaning of the texts!—Nor can it be said
that meditation and the comprehension of the meaning of
texts have different objects; for if this were so the com-
prehension of the texts could: not be a means helpful
towards meditation: meditation on one thing does not
give rise to eagerness with regard to another thing !—For
meditation which consists in uninterrupted remembrance
of a thing cognised, the cognition of the sense of texts,
moreover, forms an indispensable prerequisite ; for know-
ledge of Brahman—the object of meditation—cannot
originate from any other source.—Nor can it be said that

186 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

that knowledge on which meditation is based is produced
by one set of texts, while that knowledge which puts an
end to the world is produced by such texts as ‘thou art
that,’ and the like. For, we ask, has the former knowledge
- the same object as the latter, or a different one? On the
former alternative we are led to the same vicious reciprocal
dependence which we noted above; and on the latter
alternative it cannot be shown that meditation gives rise
to eagerness with regard to the latter kind of knowledge.
Moreover, as meditation presupposes plurality comprising
an object of meditation, a meditating subject and so on, it
really cannot in any perceptible way be helpful towards
the origination of the comprehension of the sense of texts,
the object of which is the oneness of a Brahman free from
all plurality: he, therefore, who maintains that Nescience
comes to an end through the mere comprehension of the
meaning of texts really implies that the injunctions of
hearing, reflection, and meditation are purposeless.

The conclusion that, since direct knowledge cannot spring
from texts, Nescience is not terminated by the compre-
hension of the meaning of texts, disposes at the same time
of the hypothesis of the so-called ‘ Release in this life’
(givanmukti). For what definition, we ask, can be given
of this ‘ Release in this life’ ?—‘ Release of a soul while yet
joined to a body’!—You might as well say, we reply, that
your mother never had any children! You have yourself
proved by scriptural passages that ‘ bondage’ means the
being joined to a body, and ‘release’ being free from a
body !—Let us then define givanmukti as the cessation of
embodiedness, in that sense that a person, while the appear-
ance of embodiedness persists, is conscious of the unreality
of that appearance.—But, we rejoin, if the consciousness of
the unreality of the body puts an end to embodiedness,
how can you say that givanmukti means release of a soul
while joined to a body? On this explanation there remains
no difference whateoever between ‘ Release in this life’ and
Release after death ; for the latter also can only be defined
as cessation of the false appearance of embodiedness.— Let
us then say that a person is ‘givanmukta ’ when the appear-

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 187

ance of embodiedness, although sublated by true know-
ledge, yet persists in the same way as the appearance of
the moon being double persists (even after it has been
recognised as false).—This too we cannot allow. As the
sublating act of cognition on which Release depends
extends to everything with the exception of Brahman, it
sublates the general defect due to causal Nescience, inclusive
of the particular erroneous appearance of embodiedness :
the latter being sublated in this way cannot persist. In
the case of the double moon, on the other hand, the defect
of vision on which the erroneous appearance depends is
not the object of the sublative art of cognition, i.e. the
cognition of the oneness of the moon, and it therefore
remains non-sublated; hence the false appearance of a
double moon may persist.—Moreover, the text ‘For him
there is delay only as long as he is not freed from the
body ; then he will be released’ (K%. Up. VI, 14, 2), teaches
that he who takes his stand on the knowledge of the Real
requires for his Release the putting off of the body only:
the text thus negatives givanmukti. Apastamba also
rejects the view of givanmukti, ‘Abandoning the Vedas,
this world and the next, he (the Samnydsin) is to seek the
Self. (Some say that) he obtains salvation when he knows
(the Self). This opinion is contradicted by the sAstras.
(For) if Salvation were obtained when the Self is known,
he should not feel any pain even in this world. Hereby
that which follows is explained’ (Dh. Sa. II, 9, 13-17).—
This refutes also the view that Release is obtained through
mere knowledge.—The conclusion to be drawn from all
this is that Release, which consists in the cessation of all
Plurality, cannot take place as long as a man lives. And
we therefore adhere to our view that Bondage is to be
terminated only by means of the injunctions of meditation,
the result of which is direct knowledge of Brahman. Nor
must this be objected to on the ground that Release, if
brought about by injunctions, must therefore be something
non-eternal ; for what is effected is not Release itself, but
only the cessation of what impedes it. Moreover, the
injunction does not directly produce the cessation of

188 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Bondage, but only through the mediation of the direct
cognition of Brahman as consisting of pure knowledge, and
not connected with a world. It is this knowledge only
which the injunction: produces.—But how can an injunction
cause the origination of knowledge?—How, we ask in
return, can, on your view, works not aiming at some imme-
diate result cause the origination of knowledge ?—You will
perhaps reply ‘by means of purifying the mind’ (manas) ;
but this reply may be given by me also.—But (the objector
resumes) there is a difference. On: my view Scripture pro-
duces knowledge in the mind purified by works ; while on
your view we must assume that in the purified mind the
means of knowledge are produced by injunction.—The
mind itself, we reply, purified by knowledge, constitutes this
means.—How do you know this? our opponent questions.
—How, we ask in return, do you know that the mind is
purified by works, and that, in the mind so purified of a
person withdrawn from all other objects by hearing, re-
flection and meditation, Scripture produces that knowledge
which destroys bondage?—Through certain texts such as
the following: ‘They seek to know him by sacrifice, by
gifts, by penance, by fasting’ (Bvz. Up. IV, 4, 22); ‘ He is
to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on’ (Βγέ.
Up. IT, 4, 5); ‘He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman’
(Mu. Up. III, 2, 9).—Well, we reply, in the same way our
view—viz. that through the injunction of meditation the
mind is cleared, and that a clear mind gives rise to direct
knowledge of Brahman—is confirmed by scriptural texts
such as ‘He is to be heard, to be reflected on, to be
meditated on’ (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); ‘He who knows Brahman
reaches the highest’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1,1) ; ‘He is not appre-
hended by the eye nor by speech’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8);
‘But by a pure mind’ (?); ‘He is apprehended by the
heart, by wisdom, by the mind’ (Ka. Up. II, 6,9). Nor
can it be said that the text ‘not that which they meditate
upon as this’ (Ke. Up. IV) negatives meditation ; it does
not forbid meditation on Brahman, but merely declares
that Brahman is different from the world. The mantra is
to be explained as follows: ‘What men meditate upon as_

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 189

this world, that is not Brahman; know Brahman to be that
which is not uttered by speech, but through which speech
is uttered.’ On a different explanation the clause ‘know
that to be Brahman’ would be irrational, and the injunc-
tions of meditation on the Self would be meaningless.—
The outcome of all this is that unreal Bondage which
appears in the form of a plurality of knowing subjects,
objects of knowledge, &c., is put an end to by the injunc-
tions of meditation, the fruit of which is direct intuitive
knowledge of Brahman.

Nor can we approve of-the doctrine held by some that
there is no contradiction between difference and non-
difference ; for difference and non-difference cannot co-exist
in one thing, any more than coldness .and heat, or light
and darkness.—Let us first hear in detail what the holder
of this so-called bhedabheda view has to say. The
whole universe of things must be ordered in agreement
with our cognitions. Now we are conscious of all things
as different and non-different at the same time: they are
non-different .in their causal and generic aspects, and
different in so far as viewed as effects and individuals.
There indeed is a contradiction between light and darkness
and so on; for these cannot possibly exist together, and
they are actually met with in different abodes. Such
contradictoriness is not, on the other hand, observed in the
case of cause and effect, and genus and individual; on the
contrary we here distinctly apprehend one thing as having
two aspects—‘ this jar is clay,’ ‘this cow is short-horned.’
The fact is that experience does not show us anything that
has one aspect only. Nor can it be said that in these cases
there is absence of contradiction because as fire consumes
grass so non-difference absorbs difference; for the same
thing which: exists as clay, or gold, or cow, or horse, &c.,
at the same time exists as jar or diadem, or short-horned
cow or mare. There is no command of the Lord to the
effect that one aspect only should belong to each thing,
non-difference to what is non-different, and difference to
what is different—But one aspect only belongs to each
thing, because it is thus that things are perceived !—On

190 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the contrary, we reply, things have twofold aspects, just
because it is ¢kus that they are perceived. No man, how-
ever wide he may open his eyes, is able to distinguish in
an object—e. g. a jar or a cow—placed before him which
part is the clay and which the jar, or which part is the
generic character of the cow and which the individual cow.
On the contrary, his thought finds its true expression in the
following judgments : ‘ this jar is clay’; ‘this cow is short-
horned.’ Nor can it be maintained that he makes a dis-
tinction between the cause and genus as objects of the idea
of persistence, and the effect and individual as objects of
the idea of discontinuance (difference); for as a matter of
fact there is no perception of these two elements in separa-
tion. A man may look ever so close at a thing placed
before him, he will not be able to perceive a difference of
aspect and to point out ‘this is the persisting, general,
element in the thing, and that the non-persistent, individual,
element.’ Just as an effect and an individual give rise to
the idea of one thing, so the effect f/us cause, and the
individual ~/us generic character, also give rise to the idea
of one thing only. This very circumstance makes it
possible for us to recognise each individual thing, placed as
it is among a multitude of things differing in place, time,
and character.—Each thing thus being cognised as en-
dowed with a twofold aspect, the theory of cause and
effect, and generic character and individual, being absolutely
different, is clearly refuted by perception.

But, an objection is raised, if on account of grammatical
co-ordination and the resulting idea of oneness, the judgment
‘this pot is clay’ is taken to express the relation of
difference plus non-difference, we shall have analogously
to infer from judgments such as ‘I am a man,’ ‘I am
a divine being’ that the Self and the body also stand in
the bhedabheda-relation ; the theory of the co-existence of
difference and non-difference will thus act like a fire which
a man has lit on his hearth, and which in the end consumes
the entire house !—This, we reply, is the baseless idea of
a person who has not duly considered the true nature of
co-ordination as establishing the bhed4bheda-relation. The

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 191

correct principle is that all reality is determined by states
of consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof.
The imagination, however, of the identity of the Self and
the body zs sublated by all the means of proof which apply
to the Self: it is infact no more valid than the imagination
of the snake in the rope, and does not therefore prove the
non-difference of the two. The co-ordination, on the other
hand, which is expressed in the judgment ‘the cow is
short-horned ’ is never observed to be refuted in any way,
and hence establishes the bhed4bheda-relation.

For the same reasons the individual soul (giva) is not
absolutely different from Brahman, but stands to it in the
bheddbheda-relation in so far as it is a part (amsa) of
Brahman. Its non-difference from Brahman is essential
(svabh4vika); its difference is due to limiting adjuncts
(aup4dhika). This we know, in the first place, from those
-scriptural texts which declare non-difference—such as
‘ Thou art that’ (KA. Up. VI); ‘There is no other seer but
he’ (Brs. Up. III, 7, 23); ‘ This Self is Brahman’ (Brz. Up.
II, 5, 19); and the passage from the Brahmasikta in the
Samhitopanishad of the Atharvanas which, after having
said that Brahman is Heaven and Earth, continues, ‘ The
fishermen are Brahman, the slaves are Brahman, Brahman
are these gamblers; man and woman are born from
Brahman; women are Brahman and so are men.’ And, in
the second place, from those texts which declare difference :
‘He who, one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of
many non-eternal intelligent beings’ (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13);
‘There are two unborn, one knowing, the other not-
knowing; one strong, the other weak’ (Svet. Up. I, 9);
‘ Being the cause of their connexion with him, through the
qualities of, action and the qualities of the Self, he is seen
as another ’(Svet. Up. V, 12); ‘ The Lord of nature and the
souls, the ruler of the qualities, the cause of the bondage,
the existence and the release of the samsfra’ (Svet. Up.
VI, 16); ‘He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the
organs’ (Svet. Up. VI,9); ‘One of the two eats the sweet
fruit, without eating the other looks on’ (Svet. Up. 1V, 6);
‘He who dwelling in the Self’ (Br#. Up. III, 7, 22);

192 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

‘ Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows nothing that is
without, nothing that is within’ (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21);
‘Mounted by the intelligent Self he goes groaning’ (Βγέ.
Up. IV, 3, 35); ‘ Having known him he passes beyond death’
(Svet. Up. III, 8).—On the ground of these two sets of
passages the individual and the highest Self must needs be
assumed to stand in the bhed4bheda-relation. And texts
such as ‘ He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman’ (Mu.
Up. III, 2, 9), which teach that in the state of Release the
individual soul enters into Brahman itself ; and again texts
such as ‘But when the Self has become all for him,
whereby should he see another’ (Bvz. Up. II, 4, 13), which
forbid us to view, in the state of Release, the Lord as
something different (from the individual soul), show that
non-difference is essential (while difference is merely
aup4dhika).

But, an objection is raised, the text ‘He reaches all
desires together in the wise Brahman,’ in using the word
‘together’ shows that even in the state of Release the
soul is different from Brahman, and the same view is
expressed in two of the Sftras, viz. IV, 4, 17; 21.— This
is not so, we reply ; for the text, ‘There is no other seer
but he’ (Bri. Up. III, 7, 23), and many similar texts
distinctly negative all plurality in the Self. The Taittiriya-
text quoted by you means that man reaches Brahman with
all desires, i.e. Brahman comprising within itself all objects
of desire ; if it were understood differently, it would follow
that Brahman holds a subordinate position only. And if
the Stra IV, 4, 17 meant that the released soul is separate
from Brahman it would follow that it is deficient in lordly
power ; and if this were so the Satra would be in conflict
with other Sftras such as IV, 4, 1—For these reasons,
non-difference is the essential condition ; while the distinc-
tion of the souls from Brahman and from each other is due
to their limiting adjuncts, i.e. the internal organ, the sense-
organs, and the body. Brahman indeed is without parts
and omnipresent; but through its adjuncts it becomes
capable of division just as ether is divided by jars and the
like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a reprehensible

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 193

mutual dependence—Brahman in so far as divided entering
into conjunction with its adjuncts, and again the division
in Brahman being caused by its conjunction with its
adjuncts; for these adjuncts and Brahman’s connexion
with them are due to action (karman), and the stream of
action is without a beginning. The limiting adjuncts to
which a soul is joined spring from the soul as connected
with previous works, and work again springs from the soul
as joined to its adjuncts: and as this connexion with works
and adjuncts is without a beginning in time, no fault can
be found with our theory.—The non-difference of the souls
from each other and Brahman is thus essential, while their
difference is due to the Upadhis. These Upadhis, on the
other hand, are at the same time essentially non-distinct
and essentially distinct from each other and Brahman;
for there are no other Upadhis (to account for their dis-
tinction if non-essential), and if we admitted such, we
should again have to assume further Upadhis, and so on
in infinitum. We therefore hold that the Up4dhis are pro-
duced, in accordance with the actions of the individual souls,
as essentially non-different and different from Brahman.
To this bhedabheda view the Parvapakshin now objects
on the following grounds:—The whole aggregate of
Vedanta-texts aims at enjoining meditation on a non-
dual Brahman whose essence is reality, intelligence, and
bliss, and thus sets forth the view of non-difference; while
on the other hand the karma-section of the Veda, and like-
wise perception and the other means of knowledge, intimate
the view of the difference of things. Now, as difference
and non-difference are contradictory, and as the view of
difference may be accounted for as resting on beginningless
Nescience, we conclude that universal non-difference is
what is real_—The tenet that difference and non-difference
are not contradictory because both are proved by our con-
sciousness, cannot be upheld. If one thing has different
characteristics from another there is distinction (bheda)
of the two; the contrary condition of things constitutes
non-distinction (abheda); who in his senses then would
maintain that these two—suchness and non-suchness—can

[48] ο

194 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

be found together? You have maintained that non-
difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus,
and difference to the same viewed as effect and individual ;
and that, owing to this twofold aspect of things, non-
difference and difference are not irreconcileable. But that
this view also is untenable, a presentation of the question
in definite alternatives will show. Do you mean to say
that the difference lies in one aspect of the thing and the
non-difference in the other? or that difference and non-
difference belong to the thing possessing two aspects ?—
On the former alternative the difference belongs to the
individual and the non-difference to the genus; and this
implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect.
And should you say that the genus and individual together
constitute one thing only, you abandon the view that it is
difference of aspect which takes away the contradictoriness
of difference and non-difference. We have moreover re-
marked already that difference in characteristics and its
opposite are absolutely contradictory—On the second
alternative we have two aspects of different kind and an
unknown thing supposed to be the substrate of those
aspects; but this assumption of a triad of entities proves
only their mutual difference of character, not their non-
difference. Should you say that the non-contradictoriness
of two aspects constitutes simultaneous difference and non-
difference in the thing which is their substrate, we ask in
return—How can two aspects which have a thing for their
substrate, and thus are different from the thing, introduce
into that thing a combination of two contradictory attri-
butes (viz. difference and non-difference)? And much
less even are they able to do so if they are viewed as
non-different from the thing which is their substrate. If,
moreover, the two aspects on the one hand, and the
thing in which they inhere on the other, be admitted to
be distinct entities, there will be required a further factor
to bring about their difference and non-difference, and we
shall thus be led into a regressus in infinitum.—Nor is it
a fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of its generic
character bears the character of unity, in the same way as

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 195

the admittedly uniform idea of an individual ; for wherever
a state of consciousness expresses itself in the form ‘this is
such and such’ it implies the distinction of an attribute or
mode, and that to which the attribute or mode belongs,
In the case under discussion the genus constitutes the
mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs:
the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity.
For these very reasons the individual soul cannot stand
to Brahman in the bhedabheda-relation. And as the view
of non-difference is founded on Scripture, we assume that
the view of difference rests on beginningless Nescience.—
But on this view want of knowledge and all the imperfec-
tions springing therefrom, such as birth, death, &c., would
cling to Brahman itself, and this would contradict scriptural
texts such as ‘He who is all-knowing’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9);
‘That Self free from all evil’ (Χά. Up. VIII, 1,5). Not
so, we reply. For all those imperfections we consider to
be unreal. On your view on the other hand, which admits
nothing but Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, all the
imperfections which spring from contact with those
adjuncts must really belong to Brahman. For as Brahman
is without parts, indivisible, the upadhis cannot divide or
split it so as ta connect themselves with a part only ; but
necessarily connect themselves with Brahman itself and
produce their effects on it—Here the following explanation
may possibly be attempted. Brahman determined by an
upadhi constitutes the individual soul. This soul is of
atomic size since what determines it, viz. the internal organ,
is itself of atomic size; and the limitation itself is without
beginning. All the imperfections therefore connect them-
selves only with that special place that is determined by
the upadhi, and do not affect the highest Brahman which
is not limited by the upd4dhi—In reply to this we ask—
Do you mean to say that what constitutes the atomic
individual soul is a part of Brahman which is limited and
cut off by the limiting adjunct; or some particular part of
Brahman which, without being thereby divided off, is con-
nected with an atomic upAdhi; or Brahman in its totality
as connected with an upadhi; or some other intelligent
02

196 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

being connected with an upddhi, or finally the upAdhi
itself?—The first alternative is not possible, because
Brahman cannot be divided; it would moreover imply
that the individual soul has a beginning, for division means
the making of one thing into two.—On the second alter-
native it would follow that, as a part of Brahman would be
connected with the upAdhi, all the imperfections due to the
upadhis would adhere to that part. And further, if the
upadhi would not possess the power of attracting to itself
the particular part of Brahman with which it is connected,
it would follow that when the upAdhi moves the part with
which it is connected would constantly change; in other
words, bondage and release would take place at every
moment. If, on the contrary, the up4dhi possessed the
power of attraction, the whole Brahman—as not being
capable of division—would be attracted and move with the
upadhi. And should it be said that what is all-pervading
and without parts cannot be attracted and move, well then
the upddhi only moves, and we are again met by the
difficulties stated above. Moreover, if all the upAdhis
were connected with the parts of Brahman viewed as one
and undivided, all individual souls, being nothing but parts
of Brahman, would be considered as non-distinct. And
should it be said that they are not thus cognised as one
because they are constituted by different parts of Brahman,
it would follow that as soon as the up4dhi of one individual
soul is moving, the identity of that soul would be lost (for
it would, in successive moments, be constituted by different
parts of Brahman).—On the third alternative (the whole
of) Brahman itself being connected with the up4dhi enters
into the condition of individual soul, and there remains no
@on-conditioned Brahman. And, moreover, the soul in all
bodies will then be one only.—On the fourth alternative
the individual soul is something altogether different from
Brahman, and the difference of the soul from Brahman
thus ceases to depend on the up4dhis of Brahman.—And
the fifth alternative means the embracing of the view of
the XArvaka (who makes no distinction between soul and
matter)—The conclusion from all this is that on the

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 197

strength of the texts declaring non-difference we must
admit that all difference is based on Nescience only.
Hence, Scripture being an authoritative instrument of
knowledge in so far only as it has for its end action and
the cessation of action, the Ved4nta-texts must be allowed
to be a valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman’s
nature, in so far as they stand in a supplementary relation
to the injunctions of meditation.

This view is finally combated by the Mim4msaka. Even
if, he says, we allow the Ved4nta-texts to have a purport in so
far as they are supplementary to injunctions of meditation,
they cannot be viewed as valid means of knowledge with
regard to Brahman. Do the texts referring to Brahman,
we ask, occupy the position of valid means of knowledge
in so far as they form a syntactic whole with the injunctions
of meditation, or as independent sentences? In the former
case the purport of the syntactic whole is simply to enjoin
meditation, and it cannot therefore aim at giving instruction
about Brahman. If, on the other hand, the texts about
Brahman are separate independent sentences, they cannot
have the purport of prompting to action and are therefore
devoid of instructive power. Nor must it be said that
meditation is a kind of continued remembrance, and as such
requires to be defined by the object remembered ; and that
the demand of the injunction of meditation for something
to be remembered is satisfied by texts such as ‘ All this is
that Self, ‘the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,’ &c.,
which set forth the nature and attributes of Brahman and—
forming a syntactic whole with the injunctions—are a valid
means of knowledge with regard to the existence of the
matter they convey. For the fact is that the demand on
the part of an injunction of meditation for an object to be
remembered may be satisfied even by something unreal (not
true), as in the case of injunctions such as ‘ Let him meditate
upon mind as Brahman’ (KA. Up. III, 18,1): the real existence
of the object of meditation is therefore not demanded.—The
final conclusion arrived at in this pirvapaksha is therefore as
follows. As the VedAnta-texts do not aim at prompting to
action or the cessation of action ; as, even on the supposition

198 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

of their being supplementary to injunctions of meditation,
the only thing they effect is to set forth the nature of the
object of meditation; and as, even if they are viewed as
independent sentences, they accomplish the end of man
(i.e. please, gratify) by knowledge merely—being thus
comparable to tales with which we soothe children or sick
persons; it does not lie within their province to establish
the reality of an accomplished thing, and hence Scripture
cannot be viewed as a valid means for the cognition of
Brahman.

To this prima facie view the Satrakdra replies, ‘But this
on account of connexion.’ ‘Connexion’ is here to be taken
in an eminent sense, as ‘connexion with the end of man.’
That Brahman, which is measureless bliss and therefore
constitutes the highest end of man, is connected with the
texts as the topic set forth by them, proves Scripture to be
a valid means for the cognition of Brahman. To maintain
that the whole body of VedAnta-texts—which teach us that
Brahman is the highest object to be attained, since it con-
sists of supreme bliss free of all blemish whatsoever—is
devoid of all use and purpose merely because it does not
aim at action or the cessation of action; is no better than
to say that a youth of royal descent is of no use because he
does not belong to a community of low wretches living on
the flesh of dogs!

The relation of the different texts is as follows. There
are individual souls of numberless kinds—gods, Asuras,
Gandharvas, Siddhas, Vidyadharas, Kinnaras, Kimpurushas,
Yakshas, Rakshasas, Pisé#as, men, beasts, birds, creeping
animals, trees, bushes, creepers, grasses and so on—dis-
tinguished as male, female, or sexless, and having different
sources of nourishment and support and different objects of
cnjoyment. Now all these souls are deficient in insight
into the true nature of the highest reality, their under-
standings being obscured by Nescience operating in the
form of beginningless karman ; and hence those texts only
are fully useful to them which teach that there exists
a highest Brahman—which the souls in the state of release
may cognise as non-different from themselves, and which

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 199

then, through its own essential nature, qualities, power and
energies, imparts to those souls bliss infinite and unsur-
passable. When now the question arises—as it must arise—,
as to how this Brahman is to be attained, there step in
certain other Vedanta-texts— such as ‘He who knows
Brahman reaches the highest ’ (Brz. Up. II, 1, 1), and ‘ Let
a man meditate on the Self as his world ’ (Brz. Up. I, 4, 15)
—and, by means of terms denoting ‘knowing’ and so on,
enjoin meditation as the means of attaining Brahman.
(We may illustrate this relation existing between the texts
setting forth the nature of Brahman and those enjoining
meditation by two comparisons.) The case is like that of
aman who has been told ‘There is a treasure hidden in
your house.’ He learns through this sentence the existence
of the treasure, is satisfied, and then takes active steps to
find it and make it his own.—Or take the case of a young
prince who, intent on some boyish play, leaves his father’s
palace and, losing his way, does not return. The king
thinks his son is lost; the boy himself is received by some
good Brahman who brings him up and teaches him without
knowing who the boy’s father is. When the boy has reached
his sixteenth year and is accomplished in every way, some
fully trustworthy person tells him, ‘ Your father is the ruler
of all these lands, famous for the possession of all noble
qualities, wisdom, generosity, kindness, courage, valour and
so on, and he stays in his capital, longing to see you, his
lost child. Hearing that his father is alive and a man so
high and noble, the boy’s heart is filled with supreme joy ;
and the king also, understanding that his son is alive, in
good health, handsome and well instructed, considers him-
self to have. attained all a mancan wish for. He then takes
steps to recover his son, and finally the two are reunited.
The assertion again that a statement referring to some
accomplished thing gratifies men merely by imparting a
knowledge of the thing, without being a means of knowledge
with regard to its real existence—so that it would be com-
parable to the tales we tell to children and sick people—,
can in no way be upheld. When it is ascertained that
a thing has no real existence, the mere knowiedge or idea

200 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

of the thing does not gratify. The pleasure which stories
give to children and sick people is due to the fact that they
erroneously believe them to be true; if they were to find
out that the matter present to their thought is untrue their
pleasure would come to an end that very moment. And
thus in the case of the texts of the Upanishads also. If we
thought that these texts do not mean to intimate the real
existence of Brahman, the mere idea of Brahman to which
they give rise would not satisfy us in any way.

The conclusion therefore is that texts such as ‘ That from
whence these beings are born’ &c. do convey valid instruc-
tion as to the existence of Brahman, i.e. that being which is
the sole cause of the world, is free from all shadow of im-
perfection, comprises within itself all auspicious qualities,such
as omniscience and so on, and is of the nature of supreme
bliss——Here terminates the adhikaraaa of ‘connexion.’

5. On account of seeing (i. e. thinking) that which
is not founded on Scripture (i.e. the Pradh4na) is
not (what is taught by the texts referring to the
origination of the world).

“We have maintained that what is taught by the texts
relative to the origination of the world is Brahman, om-
niscient, and so on. The present Sftra and the following
Siatras now add that those texts can in no way refer to the
Pradhana and similar entities which rest on Inference
only.

We read in the KAAndogya, ‘ Being only was this in the
beginning, one only, without a second.—It thought, may
I be many, may I grow forth.—It sent forth fire’ (VI, 2,
1 ff. —Here a doubt arises whether the cause of the world
denoted by the term ‘Being’ is the Pradh4na, assumed by
others, which rests on Inference, or Brahman as defined
by us.

The Pfrvapakshin maintains that the Pradhana is meant.
For he says, the K/4ndogya text quoted expresses the
causal state of what is denoted by the word “ this,’ viz. the
aggregate of things comprising manifold effects, such as
ether, &c., consisting of the three elements of Goodness,

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5. 201

. Passion and Darkness, and forming the sphere of fruition of
intelligent beings. By the ‘effected’ state we understand
the assuming, on the part of the causal substance, of
a different condition; whatever therefore constitutes the
essential nature of a thing in its effected state the same
constitutes its essential nature in the causal state also.
Now the effect, in our case, is made up of the three elements
Goodness, Passion and Darkness ; hence the cause is the
Pradhana which consists in an equipoise of those three
elements. And as in this Pradhdna all distinctions are
merged, so that it is pure Being, the KAandogya text refers
to it as ‘ Being, one only, without a second.’ This estab-
Jishes the non-difference of effect and cause, and in this
way the promise that through the knowledge of one thing
all things are to be known admits of being fulfilled. Other-
wise, moreover, there would be no analogy between the
instance of the lump of clay and the things made of it, and
the matter to be illustrated thereby. The texts speaking
of the origination of the world therefore intimate the
Pradhana taught by the great Sage Kapila. And as the
K handogya passage has, owing to the presence of an initial
statement (pratig#4) and a proving instance, the form of an
inference, the term ‘ Being’ means just that which rests on
inference, viz. the Pradhana.

This prim4 facie view is set aside by the words of the
Satra. That which does not rest on Scripture, i.e. the
Pradhana, which rests on Inference only, is not what is
intimated by the texts referring to the origination of the
world ; for the text exhibits the root ‘iksh ’—which means
‘to think’—as denoting a special activity on the part of
what is termed ‘ Being.’ ‘It thought, may I be many, may
I grow forth.’ ‘Thinking’ cannot possibly belong to the
non-sentient Pradhina: the term ‘Being’ can therefore
denote only the all-knowing highest Person who is capable
of thought. In agreement with this we find that, in all
sections which refer to creation, the act of creation is stated
to be preceded by thought. ‘He thought, shall I send
forth worlds. He sent forth these worlds’ (Ait. Ar. II, 4,
1,2); ‘He thought he sent forth Praza’ (Pr. Up. VI, 3);

202 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

and others.—But it is a rule that as a cause we must
assume only what corresponds to the effect !—Just so;
and what corresponds to the total aggregate of effects is
the highest Person, all-knowing, all-powerful, whose pur-
poses realise themselves, who has minds and matter in their
subtle state for his body. Compare the texts ‘ His high
power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force
and knowledge’ (Svet. Up. VI, 8) ; ‘He who is all-knowing,
all-perceiving’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); ‘He of whom the
Unevolved is the body, of whom the Imperishable is the
body, of whom Death is the body, he is the inner Self of all
things’ (Subal. Up. VII).—This point (viz. as to the body of
the highest Person) will be established under Sd. II, 1, 4.
The present ϑύϊγα declares that the texts treating of
creation cannot refer to the Pradhana; the Sdtra just
mentioned will dispose of objections. Nor is the Pfrva-
pakshin right in maintaining that the KAandogya passage
is of the nature of an Inference; for it does not state
a reason (hetu—which is the essential thing in an Inference).
The illustrative instance (of the lump of clay) is introduced
merely in order to convince him who considers it impossible
that all things should be known through one thing—as
maintained in the passage ‘through which that is heard
which was not heard,’ &c.,—that this ἐς possible after all.
And the mention made in the text of ‘seeing’ clearly
shows that there is absolutely no intention of setting forth
an Inference.

Let us assume, then, the Parvapakshin resumes, that the
‘seeing’ of the text denotes not ‘seeing’ in its primary,
direct sense—such as belongs to intelligent beings only ;
but ‘seeing’ in a secondary, figurative sense which there is
ascribed to the Pradh4ana in the same way as in passages
immediately following it is ascribed to fire and water—
‘the fire saw’; ‘the water saw’ (K4. Up. VI, 2, 3). The
transference, to non-existent things, of attributes properly
belonging to sentient beings is quite common; as when
we say ‘the rice-fields look out for rain’; ‘the rain
delighted the seeds.’—This view is set aside by the next
Sdtra.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 7. 203

6. If it be said that (the word ‘ seeing’) has a
secondary (figurative) meaning; we deny this, on
account of the word ‘Self’ (being applied to the
cause of the world).

The contention that, because, in passages standing close
by, the word ‘seeing’ is used in a secondary sense, the
‘ seeing ’ predicated of the Sat (‘ Being ’) is also to be taken
in a secondary sense, viz. as denoting (not real thought
but) a certain condition previous to creation, cannot be
upheld ; for in other texts met with in the same section
(viz. ‘ All this has that for its Self; that is the True, that
is the Self, KA. Up. VI, 8, 7), that which first had been
spoken of as Sat is called the ‘Self.’ The designation
‘Self’ which in this passage is applied to the Sat in
its relation to the entire world, sentient or non-sentient, is
in no way appropriate to the Pradhana. We therefore
conclude that, as the highest Self is the Self of fire, water,
and earth also, the words fire, &c. (in the passages stating
that fire, &c. thought) denote the highest Self only. This
conclusion agrees with the text ‘Let me enter into these
three beings with this living Self, and evolve names and
forms,’ for this text implies that fire, water, &c. possess sub-
stantial being and definite names only through the highest
Self having entered into them. The thought ascribed in
the text to fire, water, &c. hence is thought in the proper
sense, and the hypothesis that, owing to its connexion with
these latter texts, the thought predicated of ‘Being’ (‘z¢
thought,’ &c.) should be thought in a figurative sense only
thus lapses altogether.

The next following Sftra confirms the same view.

7. Because release is taught of him who takes his
stand on it.

Svetaketu, who is desirous of final release, is at first—
by means of the clause ‘Thou art that’— instructed
to meditate on himself as having his Self in that
which truly is ; and thereupon the passage ‘for him there is
delay’ only as long as ‘I shall not be released, then I shall

204 . VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

be united’ teaches that for a man taking his stand upon
that teaching there will be Release, i.e. union with
Brahman—which is delayed only until this mortal body
falls away. If, on the other hand, the text would teach
that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the general cause, it
could not possibly teach that meditation on this Pradhana
being a man’s Self is the means towards his Release.
A man taking his stand on such meditation rather would
on death be united with a non-sentient principle, according
to the scriptural saying, ‘According as his thought is in
this world, so will he be when he has departed this life’
(Kz. Up. ITI, 14,1). And Scripture, which is more loving
than even a thousand parents, cannot possibly teach such
union with the Non-sentient, which is acknowledged to be
the cause of all the assaults of suffering in its threefold
form. Moreover, those who hold the theory of the Pra-
dhana being the cause of the world do not themselves
maintain that he who takes his stand upon the Pradhana
attains final release.

The Pradhdna is not the cause of the world for the
following reason also:

8. And because there is no statement of its having
to be set aside.

If the word ‘ Sat’ denoted the Pradh4na as the cause of
the world, we should expect the text to teach that the idea
of having his Self in that ‘Sat’ should be set aside by
Svetaketu as desirous of Release; for that idea would be
contrary to Release. So far from teaching this, the text,
however, directly inculcates that notion in the words ‘ Thou
art that..—The next Satra adds a further reason.

9. And on account of the contradiction of the
initial statement.

The Pradh4na’s being the cause of the world would imply
a contradiction of the initial statement, viz. that through the
knowledge of one thing all things are to be known. Now,
on the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect,
this initial statement can only be fulfilled in that way that

I. ADHYAYA, I PADA, 10, 205

through the knowledge of the ‘ Sat,’ which is the cause, there
is known the entire world, whether sentient or non-sentient,
which constitutes the effect. But if the Pradhana were the
cause, the aggregate of sentient beings could not be known
through it—for sentient beings are not the effect of a non-
sentient principle, and there would thus arise a contradic-
tion.—The next Stra supplies a further reason.

10. On account of (the individual soul) going to
the Self.

With reference to the ‘Sat’ the text says, ‘ Learn from
me the true nature of sleep. When a man sleeps here, he
becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self).
Therefore they say he sleeps (svapiti), because he is gone
to his own (sva-apita)’ (ΑΛ. Up. VI, 8,1). This text desig-
nates the soul in the state of deep sleep as having entered
into, or being merged or reabsorbed in, the Self. By
reabsorption we understand something being merged in
its cause. Now the non-intelligent Pradhana cannot be
the cause of the intelligent soul; hence the soul’s going to
its Self can only mean its going to the, i.e. the universal,
Self. The term ‘individual soul’ (giva) denotes Brahman
in so far as having an intelligent substance for its body,
Brahman itself constituting the Self; as we learn from the
text referring to the distinction of names and forms. This
Brahman, thus called giva, is in the state of deep sleep, no
less than in that of a general pralaya, free from the invest-
ment of names and forms, and is then designated as mere
‘Being’ (sat); as the text says, ‘he is then united with the
Sat.’ As the soul is in the state of deep sleep free from
the investment of name and form, and invested by the
intelligent Self only, another text says with reference to
the same state,‘ Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows
nothing that is without, nothing that is within’ (Brz. Up. IV,
3,21). Up to the time of final release there arise in the
soul invested by name and form the cognitions of objects
different from itself. During deep sleep the souls divest
themselves of names and forms, and are embraced by the
‘Sat’ only ; but in the waking state they again invest them-

206 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

selves with names and forms, and thus bear corresponding
distinctive names and forms. This, other scriptural texts
also distinctly declare, ‘When a man lying in deep sleep
sees no dream whatever, he becomes one with that praza
alone ;—from that Self the prazas proceed, each towards
its place’ (Ka. Up. III, 3); ‘ Whatever these creatures are
here, whether a lion or a wolf or a boar or a gnat or a
mosquito, that they become again’ (Kz. Up. VI, 9, 3).—
Hence the term ‘Sat’ denotes the highest Brahman, the
all-knowing highest Lord, the highest Person. Thus the
Vrittikara also says, ‘Then he becomes united with the
Sat—this is proved by (all creatures) entering into it and
coming back out of it.’ And Scripture also says, ‘ Embraced
by the intelligent Self.’ —The next Satra gives an additional
reason.

11. On account of the uniformity of view.

‘In the beginning the Self was all this; there was nothing |
else whatsoever thinking. He thought, shall I send forth
worlds? He sent forth these worlds’ (Ait. Ar. II, 4,1, 1);
‘From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air fire,
from fire water, from water earth’ (Taitt. Up. II,1); ‘From
this great Being were breathed forth the Rig-veda, &c—
These and similar texts referring to the creation have all
the same purport: they all teach us that the Supreme Lord
is the cause of the world. We therefore conclude that in
the Kk. passage also the Sat, which is said to be the cause
of the world, is the Supreme Lord.

12. And because it is directly stated in Scripture,

The text of the same Upanishad directly declares that the
being denoted by the word ‘Sat’ evolves, as the universal
Self, names and forms; is all-knowing, all-powerful, all-+
embracing ; is free from all evil, &c.; realises all its wishes
and purposes. ‘Let me, entering those beings with this
living Self, evolve names and forms’ (KA. Up. VI, 3, 2);
‘ All these creatures have their root in the Sat, they dwell
in the Sat, they rest in the Sat’ (VI, 8, 4); ‘All this has
that for its Self; it is the True, it is the Self’ (VI, 8, 7);

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12. 207

© Whatever there is of him here in the world, and whatever
is not, all that is contained within it’ (VIII, 1, 3); ‘In it
all desires are contained. It is the Self free from sin,
free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and
thirst, whose wishes come true, whose purposes come true‘
(VIII, 1, 5)—And analogously other scriptural texts, ‘Of
him there is no master in the world, no ruler; not even a
sign of him. He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the
organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord’ (Svet.
Up. VI, 9). ‘The wise one who, having created all forms
and having given them names, is calling them by those
names’ (Taitt. Ar. III, 12,7); ‘He who entered within is
the ruler of all beings, the Self of all’ (Taitt. Ar. III, 24);
‘The Self of all, the refuge, the ruler of all, the Lord of
the souls’ (Mahanar. Up. XI); ‘ Whatsoever is seen or
heard in this world, inside or outside, pervading that all
Narayana abides’ (Mahanar. Up. XI); ‘He is the inner
Self of all beings, free from all evil, the divine, the only
god Narayana.’—These and other texts which declare the
world to have sprung from the highest Lord, can in no
way be taken as establishing the Pradhana. Hence it
remains a settled conclusion that the highest Person,
Narayaaa, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c., is the
single cause of the whole Universe, and is that Brahman
which these Sitras point out as the object of enquiry.

For the same reasons the theory of a Brahman, which
is nothing but non-differenced intelligence, must also be
considered as refuted by the Sdtrak4ra, with the help of
the scriptural texts quoted ; for those texts prove that the
Brahman, which forms the object of enquiry, possesses
attributes such as thinking, and so on, in their real literal
sense. On the theory, on the other hand, of a Brahman
that is nothing but distinctionless intelligence even the
witnessing function of consciousness would be unreal. The
Satras propose as the object of enquiry Brahman as known
from the Ved4nta-texts, and thereupon teach that Brahman
is intelligent (SG. I, 1, 5 ff.) To be intelligent means to
possess the quality of intelligence: a being devoid of the
quality of thought would not differ in nature from the

208 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Pradhana. Further, on the theory of Brahman being mere
non-differenced light it would be difficult to prove that
Brahman is self-luminous. For by light we understand
that particular thing which renders itself, as well as other
things, capable of becoming the object of ordinary thought
and speech; but as a thing devoid of all difference does
not, of course, possess these two characteristics it follows
that it is as devoid of intelligence as a pot may be.—Let
it then be assumed that although a thing devoid of all
distinction does not actually possess these characteristics,
yet it has the potentiality of possessing them !—But if it
possesses the attribute of potentiality, it is clear that you
abandon your entire theory of a substance devoid of all
distinction !—Let us then admit, on the authority of Scrip-
ture, that the universal substance possesses this one dis-
tinguishing attribute of self-luminousness.—Well, in that
case you must of course admit, on the same authority, all
those other qualities also which Scripture vouches for, such
as all-knowingness, the possession of all powers, and so
on.—Moreover, potentiality means capability to produce
certain special effects, and hence can be determined on the
ground of those special effects only. But if there are no
means of knowing these particular effects, there are also no
means of cognising potentiality—And those who hold the
theory of a substance devoid of all difference, have not
even means of proof for their substance; for as we have
shown before, Perception, Inference, Scripture, and one’s
own consciousness, are all alike in so far as having for
their objects things marked by difference—It therefore
remains a settled conclusion that the Brahman to: be
known is nothing else but the highest Person capable of
the thought ‘of becoming many’ by manifesting himself
in a world comprising manifold sentient and non-sentient
creatures,—Here terminates the adhikarama of ‘seeing.’

So far the Sdtras have declared that the Brahman which
forms the object of enquiry is different from the non-
intelligent Pradhana, which is merely an object of fruition
for intelligent beings. They now proceed to show that
Brahman—which is antagonistic to all evil and constituted

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13. 209

by supreme bliss—is different from the individual soul,
which is subject to karman, whether that soul be in its
purified state or in the impure state that is due to its
immersion in the ocean of manifold and endless sufferings,
springing from the soul’s contact with Prakr#ti (Pradhana).

13. The Self consisting of Bliss (is the highest
Self) on account of multiplication.

We read in the. text of the Taittiriyas, ‘ Different from
this Self, which consists of Understanding, is the other
inner Self which consists of bliss’ (Taitt. Up. 11, 5).—Here
the doubt arises whether the Self consisting of bliss be the
highest Self, which is different from the inner Self subject
to bondage and release, and termed ‘giva’ (i. 6. living self
or individual soul), or whether it be that very inner Self,
i.e. the giva— It ἐς that inner Self, the POrvapakshin
contends. For the text says ‘of that this, i.e. the Self
consisting of bliss, is the sarira Self’; and sarira means
that which is joined to a body, in other words, the so-called
giva.—But, an objection is raised, the text enumerates the
different Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of bliss,
to the end that man may obtain the bliss of Brahman,
which was, at the outset, stated to be the cause of the
world (II, 1), and in the end teaches that the Self con-
sisting of bliss is the cause of the world (II, 6). And that
the cause of the world is the all-knowing Lord, since
Scripture says of him that ‘he thought,’ we have already
explained.—That cause of the world, the Parvapakshin re-
joins, is not different from the giva; for in the text of
the KAandogyas that Being which first is described as
the creator of the world is exhibited, in two passages, in
co-ordination with the giva (‘ having entered into them with
that living Self’ and ‘ Thou art that, O Svetaketu’). And
the purport of co-ordination is to express oneness of being,
as when we say,‘ This person here is that Devadatta we
knew before.’ And creation preceded by thought can very
well be ascribed to an intelligent giva. The connexion of
the whole Taittiriya-text then is as follows. In the intro-
ductory clause, ‘He who knows Brahman attains the

[48] Ρ

210 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

Highest,’ the true nature of the giva, free from all com
nexion with matter, is referred to as something to be
attained; and of this nature a definition is given in the
words, ‘The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.’
The attainment of the giva in this form is what consti-
tutes Release, in agreement with the text, ‘So long as he is
in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain ; but
when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor
pain touches him’ (KA. Up. VIII, 12, 1). This true nature
of the Self, free from all avidy4, which the text begins by
presenting as an object to be attained, is thereupon declared
to be the Self consisting of bliss. In order to lead up ta
this—just as a man points out to another the moon by first
pointing out the branch of a tree near which the moon is to
be seen —the text at first refers to the body (‘ Man consists
of food’);.next to the vital breath with its five modifica-
tions which is within the body and supports it ; then to the
manas within the vital breath; then to the buddhi within
the manas—‘ the Self consisting of breath’; ‘the Self con-
sisting of mind’ (manas); ‘the Self consisting of under-
standing’ (vig#4na). Having thus gradually led up to the
fiva, the text finally points out the latter, which is the
innermost of all (‘Different from that is the inner Self
which consists of bliss’), and thus completes the series of
Selfs one inside the other. We hence conclude that the Self
consisting of bliss is that same giva-self which was at the
outset pointed out as the Brahman to be attained.—But the
elause immediately following, ‘Brahman is the tail, the
support (of the Self of bliss’), indicates that Brahman is
something different from the Self of bliss!—By no means
(the Pdrvapakshin rejoins). Brahman is, owing to its
different characteristics, there compared to an animal body,
and head, wings, and tail are ascribed to it, just as in a pre-
ceding clause the body consisting of food had also been
imagined as having head, wings, and tail—these members
hot being something different from the body, but the body
itself. Joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss, are imagined
as the members, non-different from it, of Brahman consisting
ef bliss, and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13. 211

Brahman is said to be the tail or support. If Brahman
were something different from the Self consisting of bliss,
the text would have continued, ‘ Different from this Self
consisting of bliss is the other inner Self—Brahman. But
there is no such continuation. The connexion of the
different clauses stands as follows: After Brahman has
been introduced as the topic of the section (‘He who knows
Brahman attains the Highest’), and defined as different in
nature from everything else (‘The True, knowledge’), the
text designates it by the term ‘ Self,’ &c. (‘ From that Self
sprang ether’), and then, in order to make it clear that
Brahman is the innermost Self of all, enumerates the praza-
maya and so on—designating them in succession as more and
more inward Selfs—, and finally leads up to the Anandamaya
as the innermost Self(‘ Different from this, &c., is the Self con-
sisting of bliss’). From all which it appears that the term
‘Self’ up to the end denotes the Brahman mentioned at the
beginning.— But, in immediate continuation of the clause,
‘Brahman is the tail, the support,’ the text exhibits the fol-
lowing sloka: ‘Non-existing becomes he who views Brahman
as non-existing; who knows Brahman as existing, him we
know as himself existing.’ Here the existence and non-exis-
tence of the Self are declared to depend on the knowledge
and non-knowledge of Brahman, not of the Self consisting of
bliss. Now no doubt can possibly arise as to the existence
or non-existence of this latter Self, which, in the form of
joy, satisfaction, &c., is known to every one. Hence the
Sloka cannot refer to that Self, and hence Brahman is
different from that Self.—This objection, the Parvapakshin
rejoins, is unfounded. In the earlier parts of the chapter
we have corresponding slokas, each of them following on
a preceding clause that refers to the tail or support of a
particular Self: in the case, e.g. of the Self consisting of
food, we read, ‘ This is the tail, the support,’ and then comes
the sloka, ‘From food are produced all creatures,’ &c.
Now it is evident that all these slokas are meant to set
forth not only what had been called ‘tail,’ but the entire
Self concerned (Self of food, Self of breath, &c.) ; and from
this it follows that also the sloka, ‘ Non-existing becomes
P2

212 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

he,’ does not refer to the ‘tail’ only as something other
than the Self of bliss, but to the entire Self of bliss.
And there may very well be a doubt with regard to the
knowledge or non-knowledge of the existence of that Self
consisting of unlimited bliss) On your view also the
circumstance of Brahman which forms the tail not being
known is due to its being of the nature of limitless bliss.
And should it be said that the Self of bliss cannot be
Brahman because Brahman does not possess a head
and other members; the answer is that Brahman also
does not possess the quality of being a tail or support,
and that hence Brahman cannot be a tail.—Let it then be
said that the expression, ‘Brahman is the tail,’ is merely
figurative, in so far as Brahman is the substrate of all things
imagined through avidya !—But, the Parvapakshin rejoins,
we may as well assume that the ascription to Brahman of
joy, as its head and so on, is also merely figurative, meant to
illustrate the nature of Brahman, i.e. the Self of bliss as free
from all pain. To speak of Brahman or the Self as consisting
of bliss has thus the purpose of separating from all pain and
grief that which in a preceding clause (‘The True, knowledge,
the Infinite is Brahman’) had already been separated from
all changeful material things. As applied to Brahman (or
the Self), whose nature is nothing but absolute bliss, the term
‘anandamaya’ therefore has to be interpreted as meaning
nothing more than ‘Ananda’; just as prazamaya means prada.

The outcome of all this is that the term ‘ 4nandamaya'
denotes the true essential nature—which is nothing but
absolute uniform bliss—of the giva that appears as dis-
tinguished by all the manifold individualising forms which
are the figments of Nescience. The Self of bliss is the
giva or pratyag-4tman, i.e. the individual soul.

Against this prima facie view the Sdtrakara contends
that the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self ‘on
account of multiplication. —The section which begins with
the words, ‘ This is an examination of bliss, and terminates
with the sloka, ‘from whence all speech turns back’ (Taitt.
Up. I, 8), arrives at bliss, supreme and not to be surpassed,
by successively multiplying inferior stages of bliss by a

1 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13. 213

hundred ; now such supreme bliss cannot possibly belong
to the individual soul which enjoys only a small share of
very limited happiness, mixed with endless pain and grief ;
and therefore clearly indicates, as its abode, the highest
Self, which differs from all other Selfs in so far as being
radically opposed to all evil and of an unmixed blessed
nature, The text says, ‘ Different from this Self consisting
of understanding (vig#4na) there is the inner Self consist-
ing of bliss. Now that which consists of understanding
(vig#4na) is the individual soul (giva), not the internal
organ (buddhi) only; for the formative element, ‘ maya,’
(‘consisting of’; in vig#4namaya) indicates a difference
(between vig#4na and vig#4namaya). The term ‘ prama-
maya’ (‘consisting of breath ’) we explain to mean ‘ praza’
only, because no other explanation is possible; but as
vigfanamaya may be explained as giva, we have no right
to neglect ‘maya’ as unmeaning. And this interpretation
is quite suitable, as the soul in the states of bondage and
release alike is a ‘knowing’ subject. That moreover even
in ‘ prazamaya,’ and so on, the affix ‘maya’ may be taken
as having a meaning will be shown further on.—But how
is it then that in the sloka which refers to the vig#anamaya,
‘Understanding (vigvi4na) performs the sacrifice, the term
‘ vig#ana’ only is used ?—The essential nature, we reply,
of the knowing subject is suitably called ‘ knowledge,’ and
this term is transferred to the knowing subject itself which
is defined as possessing that nature. For we generally
see that words which denote attributes defining the essen-
tial nature of a thing also convey the notion of the essential
nature of the thing itself. This also accounts for the fact
that the sloka (‘ Vig#4na performs the sacrifice, it performs
all sacred acts’) speaks of vig#4na as being the agent in
sacrifices and so on; the buddhi alone could not be called
an agent. For this reason the text does not ascribe agency
to the other Selfs (the prazamaya and so on) which are
mentioned before the vig#anamaya; for they are non-
intelligent instruments of intelligence, and the latter only
can be an agent. With the same view the text further on
(II, 6), distinguishing the intelligent and the non-intelligeat

214 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

by means of their different characteristic attributes, says in
the end ‘knowledge and non-knowledge,’ meaning thereby
that which possesses the attribute of knowledge and that
which does not. An analogous case is met with in the
so-called antarya4mi-brahmaza (Brz. Up. III, 7). There the
KaAavas read, ‘ He who dwells in knowledge’ (vig#ana; III,
7, 16), but instead of this the MAdhyandinas read ‘he who
dwells in the Self,” and so make clear that what the Kasvas
designate as ‘knowledge’ really is the knowing Self.—
That the word vig#ana, although denoting the knowing
Self, yet has a neuter termination, is meant to denote it as
something substantial. We hence conclude that he who is
different from the Self consisting of knowledge, ie. the
individual Self, is the highest Self which consists of bliss.
It is true indeed that the sloka, ‘ Knowledge performs the
sacrifice,’ directly mentions knowledge only, not the knowing
Self; all the same we have to understand that what is
meant is the latter, who is referred to in the clause, ‘different
from this is the inner Self which consists of knowledge.’
This conclusion is supported by the sloka referring to the
Self which consists of food (II, 2); for that sloka refers to
food only, ‘From food are produced all creatures, &c.,
all the same the preceding clause ‘this man consists of the
essence of food’ does not refer to food, but to an effect of
it which consists of food. Considering all this the Satra-
k4ra himself in a subsequent Sftra (I, 1, 18) bases his view
on the declaration, in the scriptural text, of difference. —
We now turn to the assertion, made by the Parvapakshin,
that the cause of the world is not different from the indivi-
dual soul because in two X 4Andogya passages it is exhibited
in co-ordination with the latter (‘ having entered into them
with this living Self,’ ‘Thou art that’); and that hence the
introductory clause of the Taitt. passage (‘ He who knows
Brahman reaches the Highest’) refers to the individual
soul—which further on is called ‘ consisting of bliss,’ because
it is free from all that is not pleasure.—This view cannot
be upheld; for although the individual soul is intelligent, it
is incapable of producing through its volition this infinite
and wonderful Universe—a process described in texts such

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13. 215

as ‘It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth—It sent
forth fire,’ &c. That even the released soul is unequal to
such ‘world business’ as creation, two later Satras will
expressly declare. But, if you deny that Brahman, the
cause of the world, is identical with the individual soul, how
then do you account for the co-ordination in which the two
appear in the K4andogya texts ?—How, we ask in return,
can Brahman, the cause of all, free from all shadow of
imperfection, omniscient, omnipotent, &c. &c., be one with
the individual soul, all whose activities—whether it be
thinking, or winking of an eye, or anything else—depend
on karman, which implies endless suffering of various kind ?
—If you reply that this is possible if one of two things
is unreal, we ask—which then do you mean to be unreal?
Brahman’s connexion with what is evil ?—or its essential
nature, owing to which it is absolutely good and antagonistic
to all evil?—You will perhaps reply that, owing to the fact
of Brahman, which is absolutely good and antagonistic to
all evil, being the substrate of beginningless Nescience,
there presents itself the false appearance of its being con-
nected with evil. But there you maintain what is contra-
dictory. On the one side there is Brahman’s absolute
perfection and antagonism to all evil; on.the other it is
the substrate of Nescience, and thereby the substrate of
a false appearance which is involved in endless pain ; for to
be connected with evil means to be the substrate of Ne-
science and the appearance of suffering which is produced
thereby. Now it is a contradiction to say that Brahman
is connected with all this and at the same time antagonistic
to it !—Nor can we allow you to say that there is no real
contradiction because that appearance is something false.
For whatever is false belongs to that group of things con-
trary to man’s true interest, for the destruction of which
the Vedanta-texts are studied. To be connected with what
is hurtful to man, and to be absolutely perfect and antago-
nistic to all evil is self-contradictory.—But, our adversary
now rejoins, what after all are we todo? The holy text at
first clearly promises that through the cognition of one
thing everything will be known (‘by which that which is

216 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

not heard ἐς heard, &c., KA’. Up. VI, 1, 3); thereupon
declares that Brahman is the sole cause of the world
(‘Being only this was in the beginning’), and possesses
exalted qualities such as the power of realising its inten-
tions (‘it thought, may I be many’); and then finally, by
means of the co-ordination, ‘ Thou art that, intimates that
Brahman is one with the individual soul, which we know to
be subject to endless suffering! Nothing therefore is left
to us but the hypothesis that Brahman is the substrate of
Nescience and all that springs from it!—Not even for the
purpose, we reply, of making sense of Scripture may we
assume what in itself is senseless and contradictory !—Let
us then say that Brahman’s connexion with evil is real,
and its absolute perfection unreal !—Scripture, we reply,
aims at comforting the soul afflicted by the assaults of
threefold pain, and now, according to you, it teaches that the
assaults of suffering are real, while its essential perfection
and happiness are unreal figments, due to error! This is
excellent comfort indeed !—To avoid these difficulties let us
then assume that both aspects of Brahman—viz. on the
one hand its entering into the distressful condition of indi-
vidual souls other than non-differenced intelligence, and on
the other its being the cause of the world, endowed with
all perfections, &c.—are alike unreal !—Well, we reply,
we do not exactly admire the depth of your insight into
the connected meaning of texts. The promise that through
the knowledge of one thing everything will be known can
certainly not be fulfilled if everything is false, for in that
case there exists nothing that could be known. In so far
as the cognition of one thing has something real for its
object, and the cognition of all things is of the same kind,
and moreover is comprised in the cognition of one thing ;
in so far it can be said that everything is known through
one thing being known. Through the cognition of the real
shell we do not cognise the unreal silver of which the shell
is the substrate.—Well, our adversary resumes, let it then
be said that the meaning of the declaration that through
the cognition of one thing everything is to be known is
that only non-differenced Being is real, while everything

1 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13. 217

else is unreal.—If this were so, we rejoin, the text would
not say, ‘by which the non-heard is heard—, the non-known
is known’; for the meaning of this is, ‘by which when heard
and known’ (ποῖ ‘known as false’) ‘the non-heard is heard,
&c. Moreover, if the meaning were that only the one non-
differenced substance understood to be the cause of the
world is real, the illustrative instance, ‘ As by one lump of
clay everything made of clay is known,’ would not be suit-
able ; for what is meant there is that through the cognition
of the (real) lump of clay its (real) effects are known. Nor
must you say that in the illustrative instance also the
unreality of the effect is set forth; for as the person to be
informed is not in any way convinced at the outset that
things made of clay are unreal, like the snake imagined in
the rope, it is impossible that such unreality should be
referred to as if it were something well known (and the
clause, ‘as by one lump of clay,’ &c., undoubtedly does
refer to something well known), in order to render the
initial assertion plausible. And we are not aware of any
means of knowledge—assisted or non-assisted by ratio-
cination— that would prove the non-reality of things
effected, previous to the cognition produced by texts such
as ‘That art thou’; a point which will be discussed at
length under II, 1.—‘ Being only this was in the beginning,
one, without a second’; ‘it thought, may I be many, may
I grow forth; it sent forth fire’; ‘Let me now enter those
three beings with this living Self and evolve names and
forms’; ‘All these creatures, my son, have their root in the
True, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True,’ &c. ;
these passages declare in succession that that which really
is is the Self of this world; that previous to creation there
is no distinction of names and forms ; that for the creation
of the world Brahman, termed ‘the True’ (or ‘ Real’),
requires no other operative cause but itself; that at the
time of creation it forms a resolution, possible to itself
only, of making itself manifold in the form of endless
movable and immovable things; that in accordance with
this resolution there takes place a creation, proceeding
in a particular order, of an infinite number of manifold

218 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

beings ; that by Brahman entering into all non-intelligent
beings with the living soul—which has its Self in Brahman
—there takes place an evolution, infinite in extent, of all
their particular names and forms; and that everything
different from Brahman has its root and abode in that, is
moved by that, lives by that, rests on that. All the
different points—to be learned from Scripture only—which
are here set forth agree with what numerous other scriptural
texts teach about Brahman, viz. that it is free from all evil,
devoid of all imperfection, all-knowing, all-powerful ; that
all its wishes and purposes realise themselves; that it is
the cause of all bliss; that it enjoys bliss not to be sur-
passed. To maintain then that the word ‘that, which
refers back to the Brahman mentioned before, i.e. a
Brahman possessing infinite attributes, should aim at con-
veying instruction about a substance devoid of all attributes,

is as unmeaning as the incoherent talk of a madman. ὶ

The word ‘thou’ again denotes the individual soul as
distinguished by its implication in the course of transmigra-
tory existence, and the proper sense of this term also would
have to be abandoned if it were meant to suggest a sub-
stance devoid of all distinctions. And that, in the case of
a being consisting of non-differenced light, obscuration by
Nescience would be tantamount to complete destruction,
we have already explained above.—All this being thus,
your interpretation would involve that the proper meaning
of the two words ‘that’ and ‘thou’—which refer to one
thing—would have to be abandoned, and both words would
have to be taken in an implied sense only.

Against this the Pirvapakshin now may argue as follows.
Several words which are applied to one thing are meant to
express one sense, and as this is not possible in so far as
the words connote different attributes, this part of their
connotation becomes inoperative, and they denote only the
unity of one substance ; implication (lakshaw4), therefore,
does not take place. When we say ‘blue (is) (the) lotus’
we employ two words with the intention of expressing the
unity of one thing, and hence do not aim at expressing
a duality of attributes, viz. the quality of blueness and the

1 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13. 219

generic character of a lotus. If this latter point was aimed
at, it would follow that the sentence would convey the
oneness of the two aspects of the thing, viz. its being blue
and its being a lotus; but this is not possible, for the
thing (denoted by the two terms) is not characterised by
(the denotation of) the word ‘lotus,’ in so far as itself
characterised by blueness; for this would imply a re-
ciprocal inherence (samavaya) of class-characteristics and
quality ?. What the co-ordination of the two words conveys
is, therefore, only the oneness of a substance characterised
by the quality of blueness, and at the same time by the
class attributes of a lotus. In the same way, when we say
‘this (person is) that Devadatta’ the co-ordination of the
words cannot possibly mean that Devadatta in so far as
distinguished by his connexion with a past time and a
distant place is one with Devadatta in so far as dis-
tinguished by his connexion with the present time and
a near place; what it means to express is only that there
is oneness on the part of a personal substance—which sub-
stance is characterised by connexion with both places and
moments of time. It is true indeed that when we at first
hear the one word ‘blue’ we form the idea of the attribute
. of blueness, while, after having apprehended the relation of
co-ordination (expressed in ‘blue is the lotus’), this idea
no longer presents itself, for this would imply a contra-
diction ; but all the same ‘implication ’ does not take place.
The essence of co-ordination consists, in all cases, therein
that it suppresses the distinguishing elements in the words
co-ordinated. And as thus our explanation cannot be
charged with ‘implication,’ it cannot be objected to.

All this, we rejoin, is unfounded. What the words in all
sentences whatsoever aim at conveying is only a particular
connexion of the things known to be denoted by those
words. Words such as ‘blue,’ standing in co-ordination
with others, express that some matter possessing the attri-

1 Le. we should not in that case be able to decide whether the
quality (i.e., here, the blueness) inheres in the class (i.e., here, the
lotus), or vice versa.

220 _ “VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

bute of blueness, &c., as known from the ordinary use of
language, is connected with some other matter. When, e.g.,
somebody says ‘bring the blue lotus,’ a thing is brought
which possesses the attribute of blueness. And when we
are told that ‘a herd of elephants excited with passion
lives in the Vindhya-forest,’ we again understand that what
is meant is something possessing several attributes denoted
by several words. Analogously we have to understand, as
the thing intimated by Ved4nta-texts in the form of co-
ordination, Brahman as possessing such and such attributes.
—It is an error to assume that, where a sentence aims at
setting forth attributes, one attribute is to be taken as
qualifying the thing in so far as qualified by another
attribute; the case rather is that the thing itself is equally
qualified by all attributes. For co-ordination means the
application, to one thing, of several words having different
reasons of application ; and the effect of co-ordination is
that one and the same thing, because being connected—
positively or negatively—with some attribute other than
that which is conveyed by one word, is also known through
other words, As e.g. when it is said that ‘ Devadatta (is)
dark-complexioned, young, reddish-eyed, not stupid, not
poor, of irreproachable character,’ Where two co-ordinate
words express two attributes which cannot exist combined
in one thing, one of the two words is to be taken in a
secondary sense, while the other retains its primary mean-
ing, as e.g. in the case of the sentence, ‘The Vahika man is
an ox.’ But in the case of the ‘ blue lotus’ and the like,
where there is nothing contradictory in the connexion of
the two attributes with one thing, co-ordination expresses
the fact of one thing being characterised by two attributes.
—Possibly our opponent will here make the following
remark. A thing in so far as defined by its correlation to
some one attribute is something different from the thing in
so far as defined by its correlation to some second attri-
bute ; hence, even if there is equality of case affixes (as in
‘nilam utpalam’), the words co-ordinated are incapable of
expressing oneness, and cannot, therefore, express the one-
ness of a thing qualified by several attributes; not any

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12. 221

more than the juxtaposition of two words such as ‘jar’ and
‘cloth’—both having the same case-ending—can prove
that these two things are one. A statement of co-ordination,
therefore, rather aims at expressing the oneness of a thing
in that way that it presents to the mind the essential nature
of the thing by means of (words denoting) its attributes.—
This would be so, we reply, if it were only the fact of
a thing's standing in correlation to two attributes that is
in the way of its unity. But this is not the case; for
what stands in the way of such unity is the fact of there
being several attributes which are not capable of being
combined in one thing. Such incapability is, in the case of
the generic character of a jar and that of a piece of cloth,
proved by other means of knowledge; but there is no
contradiction between a thing being blue and its being a
Jotus; not any more than there is between a man and the
stick or the earrings he wears, or than there is between the
colour, taste, smell, &c., of one and the same thing. Not
only is there no contradiction, but it is this very fact of
one thing possessing two attributes which makes possible
co-ordination—the essence of which is that, owing to a
difference of causes of application, several words express
one and the same thing. For if there were nothing but
essential unity of being, what reason would there be for
the employment of several words? If the purport of the
Sttributes were, not to intimate their connexion with the
thing, but merely to suggest the thing itself, one attribute
would suffice for such suggestion, and anything further
would be meaningless. If, on the other hand, it were
assumed that the use of a further ‘suggestive’ attribute is
to bring out a difference of aspect in the thing suggested,
such difference of aspect would imply differentiation in the
thing (which you maintain to be free from all difference).—
Nor is there any shade even of ‘implication’ in the judg-
ment, ‘ This person is that Devadatta’; for there is abso-
lutely no contradiction between the past Devadatta, who
was connected with some distant place, and the present
Devadatta, who is connected with the place before us. For
this very reason those who maintain the permanency of

222 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

things prove the oneness of a thing related to two moments
of time on the basis of the judgment of recognition (‘this
is that’); if there really were a contradiction between the
two representations it would follow that all things are (not
permanent but) momentary only. The fact is that the
contradiction involved in one thing being connected with
two places is removed by the difference of the correlative
moments of time. We therefore hold to the conclusion
that co-ordinated words denote one thing qualified by the
possession of several attributes.

For this very reason the Vedic passage, ‘ He buys the
Soma by means of a cow one year old, of a tawny colour,
with reddish-brown eyes’ (aruzay4,ekahayanyé, pingakshy4),
must be understood to enjoin that the purchase is to be
effected by means of a cow one year old, possessing the
attributes of tawny colour, &c. This point is discussed
Pa. Mi. Sa. ITI, 1, 12—The Pfarvapakshin there argues as
follows : We admit that the word ‘ arusaya’ (‘ by means of
a tawny one’) denotes the quality of tawniness inclusive of
the thing possessing that quality; for qualities as well as
generic character exist only in so far as being modes of
substances. But it is not possible to restrict tawny colour
to connexion with a cow one year old, for the injunction of
two different things (which would result from such restric-
tion ; and which would necessitate the sentence to be
construed as—) ‘He buys by means of a cow one year old,
and that a red one’ is not permissible’. We must therefore
break up the sentence into two, one of which is constituted
by the one word ‘arusaya’—this word expressing that
tawny colour extends equally to all the substances enjoined
in that section (as instrumental towards the end of the
sacrifice). And the use of the feminine case-termination
of the word is merely meant to suggest a special instance
(viz. the cow) of all the things, of whatever gender, which
are enjoined in that section. Tawniness must not therefore

1 For it would imply so-called vakyabheda, ‘split of the
sentence,’ which arises when one injunctory clause is made to
enjoin two different things.

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 13. 223

be restricted te the cow one year old only.—Of this
parvapaksha the Sitra disposes in the follawing words:
‘ There being oneness of sense, and hence connexion of sub-
stance and quality with one action, there is restriction. —
The fact that the two words ‘aruszay4’ and ‘ ekahayanya’
—which denote a substance, viz. a cow one year old, distin-
guished by the quality of possessing tawny colour—stand
in co-ordination establishes that they have one sense ; and
as the substance, viz. the cow, and the quality, viz. tawny
colour—which the word ‘arusay4’ denotes as standing in
the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distin-
guished thereby—can thus, without any contradiction, be
connected with the one action called ‘the buying of the
Soma,’ tawny colour ἐς restricted to the cow one year old
which is instrumental with regard to the purchase. If the
connexion of tawniness with the action of buying were to
be determined from syntactical connexion—in the same way
as there is made out the connexion of the cow one year
old with that action—then the injunctory sentence would in-
deed enjoin two matters (and this would be objectionable).
But such is not the case; for the one word ‘arusaya’
denotes a substance characterised by the quality of tawni-
ness, and the co-ordination in which ‘aruzay4’ stands to
‘ekah4yany4’ makes us apprehend merely that the thing
characterised by tawniness also is one year old, but does
not make a special statement as to the connexion of that
quality with the thing. For the purport of co-ordination is
the unity of a thing distinguished by attributes ; according
to the definition that the application to one thing of several
words possessing different reasons of application, constitutes
co-ordination. For the same reason, the syntactical unity
(ekavakyatvam) of sentences such as ‘the cloth is red’
follows from all the words referring to one thing. The
function of the syntactical collocation is to express the
connexion of the cloth with the action of being; the con-
nexion of the red colour (with the cloth) on the other hand
is denoted by the word ‘red’ only. And what is ascertained
from co-ordination (samAnddhikaramya) is only that the
cloth is a substance to which a certain colour belongs.

224 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

The whole matter may, without any contradiction, be con-
ceived as follows. Several words—having either the affixes
of the oblique cases or that of the nominative case—which
denote one or two or several qualities, present to the mind
the idea of that which is characterised by those qualities,
and their co-ordination intimates that the thing characterised
by all those attributes is one only ; and the entire sentence
finally expresses the connexion in which the thing with its
attributes stands to the action denoted by the verb, This
may be illustrated by various sentences exhibiting the
co-ordination of words possessing different case-endings,
as e.g. ‘ There stands Devadatta, a young man of a darkish
complexion, with red eyes, wearing earrings and carrying
a stick’ (where all the words standing in apposition to
Devadatta have the nominative termination); ‘Let him
make a stage curtain by means of a white cloth’ (where
‘white’ and ‘cloth’ have instrumental case-endings), &c. &c.
We may further illustrate the entire relation of co-ordinated
words to the action by means of the following two
examples : ‘ Let him boil rice in the cooking-pot by means
of firewood’: here we take in simultaneously the idea of
an action distinguished by its connexion with several
things. If we now consider the following amplified sen-
tence, ‘ Let a skilful cook prepare, in a vessel of even shape,
boiled rice mixed with milk, by means of sticks of dry
khadira wood,’ we find that each thing connected with the
action is denoted by an aggregate of co-ordinated words ;
but as soon as each thing is apprehended, it is at one and
the same moment conceived as something distinguished by
several attributes, and as such connects itself with the
action expressed by the verb. In all this there is no con-
tradiction whatever—We must further object to the
assertion that a word denoting a quality which stands in
a sentence that has already mentioned a substance denotes
the quality only (exclusive of the substance so qualified),
and that hence the word ‘arusay4’ also denotes a quality
only. The fact is that neither in ordinary nor in Vedic
language we ever meet with a word which—denoting
a quality and at the same time standing in co-ordination

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 13. 225

with a word denoting a substance—denotes a mere quality.
Nor is it correct to say that a quality-word occurring in a
sentence which has already mentioned a substance denotes
a mere quality: for in a sentence such as ‘the cloth (is)
white,’ where a substance is mentioned in the first place,
the quality-word clearly denotes (not mere whiteness but)
something which possesses the quality of whiteness. When,
on the other hand, we have a collocation of words such as
‘patasya suklak’ (‘of the cloth ’—gen. ; ‘white’ nom.), the
idea of a cloth distinguished by whiteness does not arise ; but
this is due not to the fact of the substance being mentioned
first, but to the fact of the two words exhibiting different
case-terminations. As soon as we add to those two words
an appropriate third one, e.g. ‘ bhaga’’ (so that the whole
means ‘ The white part of a cloth’), the co-ordination of two
words with the same case-termination gives rise to the idea
of a thing distinguished by the attribute of whiteness.—Nor
can we agree to the contention that, as the buying of the
Soma is exclusively concluded by the cow one year old (as
instrumental in the purchase), the quality of tawniness
(denoted by the word ‘ arusay4’) cannot connect itself with
the action expressed by the verb ; for a word that denotes
a quality and stands in co-ordination with a word denoting
a substance which has no qualities opposed in nature to
that quality, denotes a quality abiding in that substance,
and thus naturally connects itself with the action expressed
by the verb. And since, as shown, the quality of tawniness
connects itself with its substance (the cow) on the mere
basis of the form of the words, it is wrong (on the part of
the Pdrvapakshin to abandon this natural connexion and)
to establish their connexion on the ground of their being
otherwise incapable of serving as means of the purchase.
All this confirms our contention, viz. that the co-ordi-
nation of ‘thou’ and ‘that’ must be understood to express
oneness, without, at the same time, there being given up
the different attributes denoted by the two words. This
however is not feasible for those who do not admit a
highest Self free from all imperfection and endowed with
all perfections, and different from that intelligent soul which

[48] Q

226 . VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

is conditioned by Nescience, involved in endless suffering
and undergoing alternate states of purity and impurity.—
But, an objection is raised, even if such a highest Self be
acknowledged, it would have to be admitted that the sen-
tence aims at conveying the oneness of that which is
distinguished by the different attributes denoted by the
words co-ordinated, and from this it follows that the highest
Self participates in all the suffering expressed by the word
‘thou ’!—This is not so, we reply; since the word ‘ thou’
also denotes the highest Self, viz. in so far as it is the
inner Ruler (antaryA4min) of all souls——The connected
meaning of the text is as follows. That which is denoted
as ‘Being,’ i.e. the highest Brahman which is the cause
of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c., resolved
‘to be many’; it thereupon sent forth the entire world,
consisting of fire, water, &c.; introduced, in this world so
sent forth, the whole mass of individual souls into different
bodies divine, human, &c., corresponding to the desert of
each soul—the souls thus constituting the Self of the
bodies ; and finally, itself entering according to its wish
into these souls—so as to constitute their inner Self—
evolved in all these aggregates, names and forms, i.e.
rendered each aggregate something substantial (vastu) and
capable of being denoted by a word. ‘Let me enter into
these beings with this living Self’ (givena 4tmana) means
‘with this living me,’ and this shows the living Self, i.e. the
individual soul to have Brahman for its Self. And that
this having Brahman for its Self means Brahman’s being
the inner Self of the soul (i.e. the Self inside the soul, but
not identical with it), Scripture declares by saying that
Brahman entered into it. This is clearly stated in the
passage Taitt. Up. II, 6, ‘ He sent forth all this, whatever
there is. Having sent forth he entered into it. Having
entered it he became “42 and tyat. For here ‘all this’
comprises beings intelligent as well as non-intelligent, which
afterwards are distinguished as sat and tyat, as knowledge
(vig#ana) and non-knowledge. Brahman is thus said to enter
into intelligent beings also. Hence, owing to this evolution
of names and forms, all words denote the highest Self dis-

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13. 227

tinguished by non-intelligent matter and intelligent souls.—.
Another text, viz. KA. Up. VI, 8, 7, ‘ All this has its Self in
that,’ denotes by ‘all this’ the entire world inclusive of in-
telligent souls, and says that of this world that (i.e. Brahman)
is the Self. Brahman thus being the Self with regard to the
whole universe of matter and souls, the universe inclusive of
intelligent souls is the body of Brahman.—Other scriptural
texts teach the same doctrine; cp.‘ Entered within, the ruler of
beings, the Self of all’ (Taitt. Ar. III, 24) ; ‘ He who dwelling in
the earth is within the earth—whose body is the earth,’ &c., up
to ‘he who dwelling within the Self is within the Self, whom
the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who
rules the Self from within, he is thy Self, the Ruler within,
the Immortal’ (Bré. Up. III, 7, 3-22; M&dhyand. S4.) ;
‘He who moves within the earth, of whom the earth is the
body, &c.—who moves within the Imperishable, of whom
the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does
not know; he the inward ruler of all beings, free from evil,
the divine, the one god, Narayana’ (Suba. Up. VII). All
these texts declare that the world inclusive of intelligent
souls is the body of the highest Self, and the latter the
Self of everything. Hence those words also that denote
intelligent souls designate the highest Self as having intel-
ligent souls for his body and constituting the Self of them ;
in the same way as words denoting non-sentient masses of
matter, such as the bodies of gods, men, &c., designate the
individual souls to which those bodies belong. For the
body stands towards the embodied soul in the relation of
a mode (prak4ra); and as words denoting a mode ac-
complish their full function only in denoting the thing to
which the mode belongs, we must admit an analogous
comprehensiveness of meaning for those words which denate
a body. For, when a thing is apprehended under the form
‘this is such,’ the element apprehended as ‘such’ is what
constitutes a mode; now as this element is relative to the
thing, the idea of it is also relative to the thing, and finds
its accomplishment in the thing only ; hence the word also
which expresses the mode finds its accomplishment in the
thing. Hence words such as ‘cow,’ ‘horse,’ ‘man,’ which

Q2

228 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

denote a mode, viz. a species, comprise in their meaning
also that mass of matter which exhibits the characteristics
of the species, and as that mass of matter constitutes the
body and therefore is a mode of a soul, and as that soul
again, so embodied, is a mode of the highest Self; it
follows that all these words extend in their signification up
to the highest Self. The meaning of all words then is the
‘highest Self, and hence their co-ordination with words
directly denoting that highest Self is a primary (not
merely ‘implied ’) one.

But, an objection is raised, we indeed observe that words
denoting species or qualities stand in co-ordination to
words denoting substances, ‘the ox is short-horned,’ ‘the
sugar is white’; but where substances appear as the modes
of other substances we find that formative affixes are used,
‘the man is dazdin, kuxdalin’ (bearing a stick; wearing
earrings).—This is not so, we reply. There is nothing to
single out either species, or quality, or substance, as what
determines co-ordination : co-ordination disregards such
limitatioris. Whenever a ¢Aing (whether species, or quality,
or substance) has existence as a mode only—owing to its
proof, existence and conception being inseparably con-
nected with something else—the words denoting it, as
they designate a substance characterised by the attribute
denoted by them, appropriately enter into co-ordination
with other words denoting the same substance as charac-
terised by other attributes. Where, on the other hand,
a substance which is established in separation from other
things and rests on itself, is assumed to stand occasionally
in the relation of mode to another substance, this is appro-
priately expressed by the use of derived forms such as
‘dandin, kuadalin.’ Hence such words as ‘I,’ ‘thou,’ &c.,
which are different forms of appellation of the individual
soul, at bottom denote the highest Self only; for the
individual souls together with non-sentient matter are the
body—and hence modes—of the highest Self. This entire
view is condensed in the co-ordination ‘Thou art that.’
The individual soul being thus connected with the highest
Self as its body, its attributes do not touch the highest

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 13. 229

Self, not any more than infancy, youth, and other
attributes of the material body touch the individual soul.
Hence, in the co-ordination ‘Thou art that,’ the word
‘that’ denotes the highest Brahman which is the cause of
the world, whose purposes come true, which comprises
within itself all blessed qualities, which is free from all
shadow of evil; while the word ‘thou’ denotes the same
highest Self in so far as having for its body the individual
souls together with their bodies. The terms co-ordinated
may thus be taken in their primary senses; there is no
contradiction either with the subject-matter of the section,
or with scripture in general; and not a shadow of imper-
fection such as Nescience, and so on, attaches to Brahman,
the blameless, the absolutely blessed. The co-ordination
with the individual soul thus proves only the difference of
Brahman from the soul, which is a mere mode of Brah-
man; and hence we hold that different from the Self
consisting of knowledge, i.e. the individual soul, is the Self
consisting of bliss, i.e. the highest Self.

Nor is there any force in the objection that as the
Self of bliss is said to be ‘ sArira,’ i.e. embodied—viz. in
the clause ‘of him the embodied Self is the same’ (Taitt.
Up. II, 5, 6)—it cannot be different from the individual
soul. For throughout this section the recurring clause ‘of
him the embodied Self is the same as of the preceding one,’
refers to the highest Self, calling that the ‘ embodied ’ one.
The clause ‘From that same Self sprang ether’ (II, 1)
designates the highest Brahman—which is different from
the individual soul and is introduced as the highest cause
of all things created—as the ‘Self’; whence we conclude
that all things different from it—from ether up to the
Self of food—constitute its body. The Subdla-upanishad
Moreover states quite directly that all beings constitute
the body of the highest Self: ‘ He of whom the earth is the
body, of whom water is the body, of whom fire is the body,
of whom wind is the body, of whom ether is the body, of
whom the Imperishable is the body, of whom Death is the
body, he the inner Self of all, the divine one, the one god
Narayana.’ From this it follows that what constitutes the

240 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

embodied Self of the Self of food is nothing else but the
highest Self referred to in the clause ‘From that same
Self sprang ether.’ When, then, the text further on says
with regard to the Self of breath, ‘of him the embodied
Self is the same as of the preceding one’ (II, 3), the meaning
can only be that what constitutes the embodied Self of the
‘preceding’ Self of food, viz. the highest Self which is the uni-
versal cause, is also the embodied Self of the Self consisting
of breath. The same reasoning holds good with regard to the
Self consisting of mind and the Self consisting of knowledge.
In the case, finally, of the Self consisting of bliss, the expres-
sion ‘the same’ (esha eva) is meant to convey that that Self
has its Self in nothing different from itself. For when, after
having understood that the highest Self is the embodied
Self of the vig#4namaya also, we are told that the embodied
Self of that vig#4namaya is also the embodied Self of the
Anandamaya, we understand that of the 4nandamaya—
which we know to be the highest Self on the ground of
‘ multiplication ’—its own Self is the Self. The final pur-
port of the whole section thus is that everything different
from the highest Self, whether of intelligent or non-intel-
ligent nature, constitutes its body, while that Self alone is
the non-conditioned embodied Self. For this very reason
competent persons designate this doctrine which has the
highest Brahman for its subject-matter as the ‘ sArtraka,’
i.e. the doctrine of the ‘embodied’ Self.—We have thus
arrived at the conclusion that the Self of bliss is something
different from the individual Self, viz. the highest Self.
Here the Parvapakshin raises the following objection. —
The Self consisting of bliss (anandamaya) is not something
different from the individual soul, because the formative
element -maya denotes something made, a thing effected.
That this is the meaning of -maya in 4nandamaya we know
from Pasini IV, 3, 144.—But according to Pa. V, 4, 21,
-maya has also the sense of ‘ abounding in’; as when we
say ‘the sacrifice is annamaya,’ i.e. abounds in food. And
this may be its sense in ‘4nandamaya’ also |—Not so, the
Parvapakshin replies. In ‘annamaya,’ in an earlier part of
the chapter, -maya has the sense of ‘made of,’ ‘ consisting

1 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 14. 241

of’; and for the sake of consistency, we must hence ascribe
the same sense to it in ‘Anandamaya.’ And even if, in
the latter word, it denoted abundance, this would not
prove that the 4nandamaya is other than the individual
soul. For if we say that a Self ‘abounds’ in bliss, this
implies that with all this bliss there is mixed some small
part of pain ; and to be ‘ mixed with pain’ is what consti-
tutes the character of the individual soul. It is therefore
proper to assume, in agreement with its previous use, that
‘4nandamaya’ means ‘consisting of bliss. In ordinary
speech as well as in Védic language (cp. common words such
as ‘mrinmaya,’ ‘hiranmaya’; and Vedic clauses such as
‘ parnamayi guhd/’ ) -maya as a rule means ‘ consisting of,’
and this meaning hence presents itself to the mind first.
And the individual soul may be denoted as‘ made of bliss’;
for in itself it is of the essence of bliss, and its Samsara
state therefore is something ‘ made of bliss.’ The conclu-
sion therefore is that, owing to the received meaning of
-maya, the 4nandamaya is none other than the individual
soul.—To this prima facie view the next Sdtra refers and
refutes it.

14. If, on account of its being a word denoting an
effect, (€Anandamaya be said) not (to denote the
highest Self); (we say) no, on account of abundance,

We deny the conclusion of the Pdrvapakshin, on the
ground of there being abundance of bliss in the highest
Brahman, and ‘abundance’ being one of the possible
meanings of -maya.—sSince bliss such as described in the
Taitt.U p.—bliss which is reached by successively multiplying
by hundred all inferior kinds of bliss—cannot belong to
the individual soul, we conclude that it belongs to Brahman;
and as Brahman cannot be an effect, and as -maya may
have the sense of ‘abounding in, we conclude that the
Anandamaya is Brahman itself; inner contradiction obliging
us to set aside that sense of -maya which is recommended
by regard to ‘consequence’ and frequency of usage. The
regard for consistency, moreover, already has to be set
aside in the case of the ‘pramzamaya’; for in that term

232 VEDANTA-SCTRAS.

-maya cannot denote ‘made of.’ The ‘prazamaya’ Self
can only be called by that name in so far as air with its
five modifications has (among others) the modification
called prama, i.e. breathing out, or because among the five
modifications or functions of air praza is the ‘ abounding,’
i.e. prevailing one.—Nor can it be truly said that -maya
is but rarely used in the sense of ‘abounding in’: expres-
sions such as ‘a sacrifice abounding in food’ (annamaya),
“ἃ procession with many carriages’ (sakafamayi), are by no
means uncommon.—Nor can we admit that to call some-
thing ‘abounding in bliss’ implies the presence of some
pain. For ‘abundance’ precludes paucity on the part of
that which is said to abound, but does not imply the
presence of what is contrary.. The presence or absence
of what is contrary has to be ascertained by other means of
proof ; and in our case we do ascertain the absence of what
is contrary to bliss by such means, viz. the clause ‘free
from evil, &c. Abundance of bliss on the part of Brahman
certainly implies a relation to paucity on the part of some
other bliss ; and in accordance with this demand the text
says ‘That is one measure of human bliss,’ &c. (II, 8, 1).
The bliss of Brahman is of measureless abundance, com-
pared to the bliss of the individual soul—Nor can it be
maintained that the individual soul may be viewed as being
an effect of bliss. For that a soul whose essential nature is
knowledge and bliss should in any way be changed into
something else, as a lump of clay is made into a pot, is an
assumption contradicted by all scripture, sacred tradition,
and reasoning. That in the Samsara state the soul’s bliss
and knowledge are contracted owing to karman will be
shown later on.—The Self of bliss therefore is other than
the individual soul ; it is Brahman itself.

A further reason for this conclusion is supplied by the
next Sdtra.

15. And because he is. declared to be the cause
of that.

‘For who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that
bliss existed not in the ether? He alone causes bliss’

1 aDHyAya, 1 PADA, 16. 233

(Taitt. Up. II, 7). This means—He alone is the cause of
bliss on the part of the individual souls—Some one is here
designated as the cause of bliss enjoyed by the souls; and
we thus conclude that the causer of bliss, who must be other
than the souls to which bliss is imparted, is the highest
Self abounding in bliss.

In the passage quoted the term ‘ bliss’ denotes him who
abounds in bliss, as will be shown later on.—A further
reason is given in the next Sitra.

16. And because that (Brahman) which is referred
to in the mantra is declared (to be the 4nandamaya).

That Brahman which is described in the mantra, ‘True
Being, knowledge, infinite is Brahman, is proclaimed as
the Self abounding in bliss) And that Brahman is the
highest Brahman, other than the individual soul; for the
passage ‘He who knows Brahman attains the Highest’
refers to Brahman as something to be obtained by the
individual soul, and the words ‘ On this the following verse
is recorded’ show that the verse is related to that same
Brahman. The mantra thus is meant to render clear the
meaning of the Brahmaza passage. Now the Brahman to
be reached by the meditating Devotee must be something
different from him. The same point is rendered clear by
all the following Brahmaza passages and mantras: ‘from
that same Self sprang ether, and so on. The Self
abounding in bliss therefore is other than the individual
soul.

Here an opponent argues as follows :—We indeed must
acknowledge that the object to be reached is something
different from the meditating Devotee; but the fact is that
the Brahman described in the mantra does not substantially
differ from the individual soul; that Brahman is nothing
but the soul of the Devotee in its pure state, consisting of
mere non-differenced intelligence; free from all shade of
Nescience. To this pure condition it is reduced in the
mantra describing it as true Being, knowledge, infinite.
A subsequent passage, ‘ that from which all speech, with the
mind, turns away, unable to reach it’ (II, 9), expresses this

234 ᾿ vEDANTA-SOTRAS.

same state of non-differentiation, describing it as lying
beyond mind and speech. It is this therefore to which the
mantra refers, and the Self of bliss is identical with it—To
this view the next Satra replies.

17. Not the other, on account of impossibility.

The other than the highest Self, i.e. the one called giva,
even in the state of release, is not that Self which the
mantra describes; for this is not possible. For to a Self
of that kind unconditioned intelligence (such as is, in the
mantra, ascribed to Brahman; cp. the term ‘vipaskita’)
cannot belong. Unconditioned intelligence is illustrated
by the power of all one’s purposes realising themselves; as
expressed in the text ‘He desired, may I be many, may
I grow forth.’ Intelligence (vipaséittvam, i,e. power of
insight into various things) does indeed belong to the soul
in the state of release; but as in the Sams4ra state the
same soul is devoid of such insight, we cannot ascribe to it
non-conditioned intelligence. And if the released soul is
viewed as being mere non-differenced intelligence, it does
not possess the capacity of seeing different things, and
hence cannot of course possess vipaskittva in the sense
stated above. That, however, the existence of a substance
devoid of all difference cannot be proved by any means of
knowledge, we have already shown before. Again, if the
clause ‘from whence speech returns,’ &c., were meant to
express that speech and mind return from Brahman, this
could not mean that the Real is devoid of all difference,
but only that mind and speech are not means for the
knowledge of Brahman. And from this it would follow
that Brahman is something altogether empty, futile.
Let us examine the context. The whole section, begin-
ning with ‘He who knows Brahman reaches Brahman,
declares that Brahman is all-knowing, the cause of the
world, consisting of pure bliss, the cause of bliss in others ;
that through its mere wish it creates the whole universe
comprising matter and souls; that entering into the uni-
verse of created things it constitutes their Self; that it is
the cause of fear and fearlessness; that it rules Vayu

1 ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 18. 235

Aditya and other divine beings; that its bliss is ever so
much superior to all other bliss; and many other points,
Now, all at once, the clause ‘from whence speech returns’
is said to mean that neither speech nor mind applies to
Brahman, and that thus there are no means whatever of
knowing Brahman! This is idle talk indeed! In the
clause ‘ (that) from which speech returns,’ the relative pro-
noun ‘from which’ denotes bliss; this bliss is again ex-
plicitly referred to in the clause ‘knowing the bliss of
Brahman ’—the genitive ‘of Brahman’ intimating that
the bliss belongs to Brahman; what then could be the
meaning of this clause which distinctly speaks of a know-
ledge of Brahman, if Brahman had at the same time to be
conceived as transcending all thought and speech? What
the clause really means rather is that if one undertakes to
state the definite amount of the bliss of Brahman—the
superabundance of which is illustrated by the successive
multiplications with hundred—mind and speech have to
turn back powerless, since no such definite amount can be
assigned. He who knows the bliss of Brahman as not to
be defined by any definite amount, does not fear anything.
—That, moreover, the all-wise being referred to in the
mantra is other than the individual soul in the state of re-
lease, is rendered perfectly clear by what—in passages such
as ‘it desired,’ &c.—is said about its effecting, through its
mere volition, the origination and subsistence of the world,
its being the inner Self of the world, and so on.

18. And on account of the declaration of differ-
ence.

The part of the chapter—beginning with the words
‘From that same Self there sprang ether’—which sets
forth the nature of the Brahman referred to in the mantra,
declares its difference from the individual soul, no less than
from the Selfs consisting of food, breath, and mind, viz. in
the clause ‘different from this which consists of knowledge,
is the other inner Self which consists of bliss.—Through
this declaration of difference from the individual soul we

236 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

know that the Self of bliss referred to in the mantra is
other than the individual soul.

19. And on account of desire, there is no regard
to what is inferred (i. e. matter).

In order that the individual soul which is enthralled by
Nescience may operate as the cause of the world, it must
needs be connected with non-sentient matter, called by such
names as pradhéna, or 4numanika (that which is inferred).
For such is the condition for the creative energy of Brahma
and similar beings. Our text, on the other hand, teaches
that the creation of the aggregate of sentient and non-
sentient things results from the mere wish of a being free
from all connexion with non-sentient matter, ‘He desired,
may I be many, may I grow forth;’ ‘He sent forth all,
whatever there is’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6). We thus understand
that that Self of bliss which sends forth the world does
not require connexion with non-sentient matter called
AnumA&nika, and hence conclude that it is other than the
individual soul.—A further reason is stated in the next
Sotra.

20. And Scripture teaches the joining of this (i. e.
the individual soul) with that (i.e. bliss) in that (i.e.
the 4nandamaya).

‘A flavour he is indeed ; having obtained a flavour this
one enjoys bliss’ (Taitt. Up. II,7). This text declares that
this one, i.e. the so-called individual soul, enjoys bliss
through obtaining the Anandamaya, here called ‘flavour.’
Now to say that any one is identical with that by obtain-
ing which he enjoys bliss, would be madness indeed.—It
being thus ascertained that the Self of bliss is the highest
Brahman, we conclude that in passages such as ‘if that
bliss were not in the ether ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7), and ‘knowledge,
bliss is Brahman’ (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28), the word ‘4nanda’
denotes the ‘Anandamaya’; just as vig#dna means the
vig#anamaya. It is for the same reason (viz. of Ananda mean-
ing the same as Anandamaya) that the clause ‘he who knows
the bliss of Brahman’ exhibits Brahman as being connected

1 ADHYAya, 1 PADA, 21. 237

with ananda, and that ‘the further clause ‘he who knows
this reaches the Self of bliss,’ declares the reaching of the
Self of bliss to be the fruit of the knowledge of bliss. In
the subsequent anuvaka also, in the clauses ‘he perceived
that food is Brahman,’ ‘he perceived that breath is Brah-
man, &c. (III, 1; 2, &c.), the words ‘food,’ ‘breath,’ and
80 On, are meant to suggest the Self made of food, the Self
made of breath, &c., mentioned in the preceding anuvaka ;
and hence also in the clause ‘he perceived that bliss is
Brahman,’ the word ‘bliss’ must be understood to denote
the Self of bliss. Hence, in the same anuv4ka, the account
of the fate after death of the man who knows concludes
with the words ‘ having reached the Self of bliss’ (III, 10, 5).
It is thus finally proved that the highest Brahman—which
in the previous adhikaraza had to be shown to be other
than the so-called Pradhana—is also other than the being
called individual soul.—This concludes the topic of the
Aanandamaya.

A new doubt here presents itself.—It must indeed be
admitted that such individual souls as possess only a
moderate degree of merit are unable to accomplish the
creation of the world by their mere wish, to enjoy supreme
bliss, to be the cause of fearlessneas, and so on; but why
should not beings like Aditya and PragApati, whose merit
is extraordinarily great, be capable of all this?—Of this
suggestion the next Satra disposes.

21. The one within (the sun and the eye); on
account of his qualities being declared.

It issaid in the KAAndogya: ‘ Now that person bright as
gold, who is seen within the sun, with beard bright as gold
and hair bright as gold, golden altogether to the very tips
of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus; his name is Ut,
for he has risen (udita) above all evil. He also who knows
this rises above all evil. Rzk and Saman are his joints.—
So much with reference to the devas—Now with reference
to the body.—Now that person who is seen within the eye,
he is Rik, he is SAman, Uktha, Yagus, Brahman. The
form of this person (in the eye) is the same as of that
person yonder (in the sun), the joints of the one are the

238 οὐ vEDANTA-SOTRAS,” ~

joints of the other, the name of the one is the name of
the other’ (K#. Up. I, 7).—Here there arises the doubt
whether that person dwelling within the eye and the sun
be the individual soul called Aditya, who through accumu-
lation of religious merit possesses lordly power, or the
highest Self other than that soul.

That individual soul of high merit, the Pdrvapakshin
maintains. For the text states that that person has a body,
and connexion with a body belongs to individual souls
only, for it is meant to bring the soul into contact with
pleasure and pain, according to its deserts. It is for this
reason that Scripture describes final Release where there is
no connexion with works as a state of disembodiedness.
‘So long as he is in the body he cannot get free from
pleasure and pain. But when he is free from the body,
then neither pleasure nor pain touches him’ (K4%, Up. VIII,
12, 1). And a soul of transcendent merit may possess
surpassing wisdom and power, and thus be capable of being
lord of the worlds and the wishes (I, 6, 8), For the same
reason such a soul may be the object of devout meditation,
bestow rewards, and by being instrumental in destroying
evil, be helpful towards final release. Even among men
some are seen to be of superior knowledge and power,
owing to superior religious merit; and this holds good
with regard to the Siddhas and Gandharvas also; then
with regard to the devas; then with regard to the divine
beings, beginning with Indra. Hence, also, one among the
divine beings, beginning with Brahma, may in each kalpa
reach, through a particularly high degree of merit, vast
lordly power and thus effect the creation of the world, and
so on. On this supposition the texts about that which
constitutes the cause of the world and the inward Self of
the world must also be understood to refer to some such
soul which, owing to superiority of merit, has become
all-knowing and all-powerful. A so-called highest Self,
different from the individual souls, does not therefore exist.
Where the texts speak of that which is neither coarse nor
fine nor short, &c., they only mean to characterise the
individual soul; and those texts also which refer to final

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 21. 239

Release aim only at setting forth the essential nature of
the individual soul and the means of attaining that essential
nature,

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sdtra. The person
who is perceived within the sun and within the eye, is some-
thing different from the individual soul, viz. the highest Self ;
because there are declared qualities belonging tothat. The
text ascribes to him the quality of having risen above, i. e.
being free from all evil, and this can belong to the highest
Self only, not to the individual soul. For to be free from
all evil means to be free from all influence of karman, and
this quality can belong to the highest Self only, differing
from all individual souls which, as is shown by their experi-
ence of pleasure and pain, are in the bonds of karman. Those
essential qualities also which presuppose freedom from all
evil (and which are mentioned in other Vedic passages),
such as mastery over all worlds and wishes, capability of
realising one’s purposes, being the inner Self of all, &c.,
belong to the highest Self alone. Compare passages such
as ‘It is the Self free from evil, free from old age, from
death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose wishes come
true, whose purposes come true’(A4#. Up. VII, 1, 5); and
‘He is the inner Self of all, free from evil, the divine one,
the one god Nardyana’ (Suba. Up.). Attributes such
as the attribute of being the creator of the whole
universe—which presupposes the power of realising one’s
wishes—(cp. the passage ‘it desired, may I be many’);
the attribute of being the cause of fear and fearlessness ;
the attribute of enjoying transcending bliss not limited by
the capabilities of thought and speech and the like, are
essential characteristics of that only which is not touched
by karman, and they cannot therefore belong to the in-
dividual soul.—Nor is there any truth in the contention
that the person within the sun, &c., cannot be a being
different from individual souls because it possesses a body.
For since a being which possesses the power of realising
all its desires can assume a body through its mere wish, it
is not generally true that embodiedness proves dependence
on karman.—But, it may be said, by a body we understand

240 _ > VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

a certain combination of matter which springs from the
primal substance (prak/tti) with its three constituents. Now
connexion with such a body cannot possibly be brought
about by the wish of such souls even as are free from all
evil and capable of realising their desires ; for such con-
nexion would not be to the soul’s benefit. In the case, on
the other hand, of a soul subject to karman and not know-
ing its own essential nature, such connexion with a body
necessarily takes place in order that the soul may enjoy
the fruit of its actions—quite apart from the soul’s desire.—
Your objection would be well founded, we reply, if the body
of the highest Self were an effect of Prakrsti with its three
constituents ; but it is not so, it rather is a body suitable
to the nature and intentions of that Self. The highest
Brahman, whose nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all
evil and essentially composed of infinite knowledge and
bliss—whereby it differs from all other souls—possesses an
infinite number of qualities of unimaginable excellence, and,
analogously, a divine form suitable to its nature and in-
tentions, i. 6. adorned with infinite, supremely excellent and
wonderful qualities—splendour, beauty, fragrance, tender-
ness, loveliness, youthfulness, and so on. And in order to
gratify his devotees he individualises that form so as to
render it suitable to their apprehension—he who is
a boundless ocean as it were of compassion, kindness and
lordly power, whom no shadow of evil may touch—he who
is the highest Self, the highest Brahman, the supreme soul,
Narayaza |—Certain texts tell us that the highest Brahman
is the sole cause of the entire world: ‘From which these
beings originate’ (Taitt. Up.); ‘Being only was this in
the beginning’ (KA. Up. VI, 2, 1); ‘The Self only was
this in the beginning’ (Ai. Up. I, 1); ‘Nd&rayawa alone
existed, not Brahma nor Siva.’ Other texts define
his nature: ‘The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman’
(Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); ‘Knowledge, bliss is Brahman’
(Br. Up. III, 9, 28); and others again deny of Brahman
all connexion with evil qualities and inferior bodies sprung
from Prakriti, and all dependence on karman, and proclaim
his glorious qualities and glorious forms: ‘Free from

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 22. 241

qualities’ (?); ‘ Free from taint’ (Svet. Up. VI, 19); ‘ Free
from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst,
realising his wishes and purposes’ (X4. Up. VIII, 1, 5);
‘There is no effect and no cause known of him, no one is
seen like to him or superior: his high power is revealed as
manifold, as inherent action of force and knowledge’ (Svet.
Up. VI, 8); ‘ That highest great lord of lords, the highest
deity of deities’ (Svet. Up. VI, 7); ‘He is the cause, the
lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither
parent nor lord’ (Svet. Up. VI, 9); ‘Having created all
forms and given names to them the wise one goes on calling
them by those names’ (Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 7); ‘I know that
great Person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness’ (Svet.
Up. III, 8); ‘All moments originated from the Person
shining like lightning’ (Mah4nar. Up. I, 6).—This essential
form of his the most compassionate Lord by his mere will
individualises as a shape human or divine or otherwise, so
as to render it suitable to the apprehension of the devotee
and thus satisfy him. This the following scriptural passage
declares, ‘Unborn he is born in many ways’ (Gau. Ka.
III, 24); and likewise Smriti, ‘Though unborn I, the im-
perishable Self, the Lord of the beings, presiding over my
Nature, manifest myself by my May4 for the protection of
the Good and the destruction of the evil doers’ (Bha. Gi. IV,
6, 8). The ‘Good ’ here are the Devotees; and by ‘ May4’
is meant the purpose, the knowledge of the Divine Being ;
in agreement with the Naighaz¢ukas who register ‘ Maya’
as a synonym of g#ana (knowledge). In the Mahabhérata
also the form assumed by the highest Person in his avataras
is said not to consist of Prakriti, ‘the body of the highest
Self does not consist of a combination of material elements.’
—For these reasons the Person within the Sun and the eye
is the highest Self which is different from the individual
soul of the Sun, &c.

22. Andon account of the declaration of difference
(the highest Self is) other (than the individual souls
of the sun, &c.),

There are texts which clearly state that the highest

[48] R

242 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

Self is different from Aditya and the other individual souls :
‘He who, dwelling within Aditya (the sun), is different from
Aditya, whom Aditya does not know, of whom Aditya is
the body, who rules Aditya from within; who dwelling
within the Self is different from the Self, &c. (Br. Up. III,
7,9 ff.); ‘Of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom
the Imperishable does not know ; who moves within Death,
of whom Death is the body, whom Death does not know;
he is the inner self of all beings, free from evil, divine, the
one God Narayana’ (Sub. Up.VII). These texts declare all
individual souls to be the body of the sinless highest Self
which is said to be the inward principle of all of them.—It
is thereby completely proved that the highest Self is some-
thing different from all individual souls such as Aditya, and
so on.—Here terminates the adhikarana of the ‘ one within.’

The text, ‘That from which these beings are born,’
teaches that Brahman is the cause of the world; to the
question thence arising of what nature that cause of the
world is, certain other texts give a reply in general terms
(‘Being only this was in the beginning’; ‘It sent forth
fire’; ‘The Self only this was in the beginning,’ &c.) ; and
thereupon it is shown on the basis of the special nature of
that cause as proved by the attributes of ‘thought’ and
‘bliss,’ that Brahman is different from the pradhana and
the individual souls, The remaining part of this Pada now
is devoted to the task of proving that where such special
terms as Ether and the like are used in sections setting
forth the creation and government of the world, they
designate not the thing—sentient or non-sentient—which
is known from ordinary experience, but Brahman as proved
so far.

23. Ether (is Brahman), on account of the charac-
teristic marks,

We read in the KAandogya (I, 9), ‘ What is the origin of
this world?’ ‘Ether,’ he replied. ‘For all these beings
spring from the ether only, and return into the ether.
Ether is greater than these; ether is their rest.’ Here
there arises the doubt whether the word ‘ether’ denotes

1 ADHyAya, I PADA, 22. - 243

the well-known element or Brahman.—The Parvapakshin
maintains the former alternative. For, he says, in the case
of things to be apprehended through words we must accept
that sense of the word which, proved by etymology, is
immediately suggested by the word. We therefore conclude
from the passage that the well-known Ether is the cause
of the entire aggregate of things, moving or non-moving,
and that hence Brahman is the same as Ether.—But has it
not been shown that Brahman is something different from
non-sentient things because its creative activity is preceded
by thought?—This has been asserted indeed, but by no
means proved. For the proper way to combine the dif-
ferent texts is as follows. Having been told that ‘that
from which these beings are born is Brahman,’ we desire to
know more especially what that source of all beings is, and
this desire is satisfied by the special information given by
the text, ‘ All these things spring from the ether.’ It thus
being ascertained that the ether only is the cause of the
origin, and so on, of the world, we conclude that also such
general terms as ‘Being’ (‘Being only was this in the
beginning’) denote the particular substance called ‘ ether.’
And we further conclude that in passages such as ‘the
Self only was all this in the beginning,’ the word ‘Self’
(4tman) also denotes the ether; for that word is by no
means limited to non-sentient things—cp., 6. g., the phrase,
‘Clay constitutes the Self of the jar’—, and its etymology
also (4tman from 4p, to reach) shows that it may very well
be applied to the ether. It having thus been ascertained
that the ether is the general cause or Brahman, we must
interpret such words as ‘thinking’ (which we meet with in
connexion with the creative activity of the general cause) in
a suitable, i.e. secondary, or metaphorical sense. If the
texts denoted the general cause by general terms only,
such as ‘ Being,’ we should, in agreement with the primary
sense of ‘ thinking,’ and similar terms, decide that that cause
is an intelligent being ; but since, as a matter of fact, we
ascertain a particular cause on the basis of the word
‘ether,’ our decision cannot be formed on general con-
siderations of what would suit the sense.—But what then
R2

244 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

about the passage, ‘ From the Self there sprang the ether’
(Taitt. Up. II, 1,1), from which it appears that the ether
itself is something created?—All elementary substances,
we reply, such as ether, air, and so on, have two different
states, a gross material one, and a subtle one. The ether,
in its subtle state, is the universal cause ; in its gross state
it is an effect of the primal cause; in its gross state it
thus springs from itself, i.e. ether in the subtle state. The
text, ‘All these beings spring from ether only’ (Χά. Up. I,
9, 1), declares that the whole world originates from ether
only, and from this it follows that ether is none other than
the general cause of the world, i.e. Brahman. This non-
difference of Brahman from the empirically known ether
also gives a satisfactory sense to texts such as the follow-
ing: ‘If this ether were not bliss’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1);
‘ Ether, indeed, is the evolver of names and forms’ (4. Up.
VIII, 14, 1, and so on).—It thus appears that Brahman
is none other than the well-known elemental ether.

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sftra. The
word ‘ether’ in the text under discussion denotes the
highest Self with its previously established characteristics
—which is something quite different from the non-sentient
elemental ether. For the qualities which the passage attri-
butes to ether, viz. its being the one cause of the entire world,
its being greater than all, and the rest of all, clearly indicate
the highest Self. The non-intelligent elemental ether can-
not be called the cause of all, since intelligent beings
clearly cannot be its effects; nor can it be called the ‘rest’
of intelligent beings, for non-sentient things are evil and
antagonistic to the true aim of man; nor can it be called
‘greater’ than all, for it is impossible that a non-sentient
element should possess all excellent qualities whatever and
thus be absolutely superior to everything else.—Nor is the
Pdrvapakshin right when maintaining that, as the word
‘ether’ satisfies the demand for a special cause of the
world, all other texts are to be interpreted in accordance
herewith. The words, ‘ All these beings indeed spring from
the ether only,’ merely give expression to something gener-
ally known, and statements of this nature presuppose other

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 23. 245

means of knowledge to prove them. Now these other
means required are, in our case, supplied by such texts as
‘Being only was this in the beginning,’ and these, as we
have shown, establish the existence of Brahman. To
Brahman thus established, the text mentioning the ether
merely refers as to something well known. Brahman may .
suitably be called ‘ether’ (4k4sa), because being of the
nature of light it shines (4k4sate) itself, and makes other
things shine forth (4kAsayati). Moreover, the word ‘ ether’
is indeed capable of conveying the idea of a special being
(as cause), but as it denotes a special non-intelligent thing
which cannot be admitted as the cause of the intelligent
part of the world we must deny all authoritativeness to
the attempt to tamper, in the interest of that one word,
with the sense of other texts which have the power of
giving instruction as to an entirely new thing (viz. Brah-
man), distinguished by the possession of omniscience,
the power of realising its purposes and similar attri-
butes, which we ascertain from certain complementary
texts—such as ‘it thought, may I be many, may I grow
forth, and ‘it desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.’
We also point out that the agreement in purport of a
number of texts capable of establishing the existence of
a wonderful being possessing infinite wonderful attributes is
not lightly to be disregarded in favour of one single text
which moreover (has not the power of intimating something
not known before, but) only makes a reference to what is
already established by other texts——As to the averment
that the word ‘Self’ is not exclusively limited to sentient
beings, we remark that that word is indeed applied occa-
sionally to non-sentient things, but prevailingly to that
which is the correlative of a body, i.e. the soul or spirit ;
in texts such as ‘ the Self only was this in the beginning,’
and ‘from the Self there sprang the ether, we must there-
fore understand by the ‘Self the universal spirit. The
denotative power of the term ‘4tman,’ which is thus proved
by itself, is moreover confirmed by the complementary
passages ‘it desired, may I send forth the worlds,’ ‘it
desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.’—We thus

246 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

arrive at the following conclusion: Brahman, which—by
the passage ‘Being only this was in the beginning ’—is
established as the sole cause of the world, possessing all
those manifold wonderful attributes which are ascertained
from the complementary passages, is, in the text under
discussion, referred to as something already known, by
means of the term ‘ ether. — Here terminates the adhikaraza
of ‘ether.’

24. For the same reason breath (is Brahman).

We read in the K/andogya (I, 10; 11), ‘ Prastotrs, that
deity which belongs to the Prast4va,’ &c.; and further on,
‘which then is that deity? He said—Breath. For all
these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath they
arise. This is the deity belonging to the Prastdva. If
without knowing that deity you had sung forth, your head
would have fallen off.’ Here the word ‘breath,’ analogously
to the word ‘ether,’ denotes the highest Brahman, which is
different from what is commonly called breath; we infer
this from the fact that special characteristics of Brahman,
viz. the whole world’s entering into and rising from it,
are in that text referred to as well-known things. There
indeed here arises a further doubt ; for as it is a matter of
observation that the existence, activity, &c., of the whole
aggregate of creatures depend on breath, breath—in its
ordinary acceptation—may be called the cause of the world.
This doubt is, however, disposed of by the consideration
that breath is not present in things such as stones and
wood, nor in intelligence itself, and that hence of breath
in the ordinary sense it cannot be said that ‘all beings
enter into it,’ &c. We therefore conclude that Brahman
is here called ‘breath’ in so far as he bestows the breath
of life on all beings. And the general result of the discus-
sion carried on in connexion with the last two Sitras thus
is that the words ‘ether’ and ‘breath’ denote something
other than what is ordinarily denoted by those terms, viz.
the highest Brahman, the sole cause of this entire world,
free from all evil, &c. &c—Here terminates the adhikarana
of ‘ breath.’

1 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 25. 247

The subsequent Sitras up to the end of the Pada de-
monstrate that the being which the texts refer to as ‘ Light
or ‘Indra’—terms which in ordinary language are applied
to certain other well-known beings—, and which is repre-
sented as possessing some one or other supremely exalted
quality that is invariably connected with world-creative
power, is no other than the highest Brahman.

25. The light (is Brahman), on account of the
mention of feet.

We read in the KAAndogya (III, 13, 7), ‘ Now that light
which shines above this heaven, higher than everything, in
the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worlds,
that is the same light which is within man.’—Here a doubt
arises, viz. whether the brightly shining thing here called
‘light’ is the well-known light of the sun and so on, viewed
as a causal universal principle (Brahman); or the all-
knowing, &c., highest Person of infinite splendour, who is
different in nature from all sentient and non-sentient beings,
and is the highest cause.—The Pdrvapakshin maintains
that the reference is to ordinary light. For, he says, the
passage does not mention a particular characteristic attri-
bute which can belong to the highest Self only—while
such attributes were met with in the texts referring to
Ether and Breath—, and as thus there is no opening for
a recognition of the highest Self, and as at the same time
the text identifies ‘light’ with the intestinal heat of living
beings, we conclude that the text represents the well-known
ordinary light as Brahman, the cause of the world—which
is possible as causal agency is connected with extreme light
and heat.—This prima facie view the Satra sets aside. The
light which the text states to be connected with heaven and
possessing supreme splendour can be the highest Person
only, since a preceding passage in the same section—‘ All
the beings are one foot of it, three feet are the Immortal in
heaven ’—refers to all beings as being a foot of that same
being which is connected with heaven. Although the
passage, ‘That light which shines above, &c., does not
mention a special attribute of the highest Person, yet the

248 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

passage previously quoted refers to the highest Person as
connected with heaven, and we therefore recognise that
Person as the light connected with heaven, mentioned in
the subsequent passage.

Nor does the identification, made in a clause of the text,
of light with the intestinal heat give rise to any difficulty ;
for that clause is meant to enjoin meditation on the highest
Brahman in the form of intestinal heat, such meditation
having a special result of its own. Moreover, the Lord
himself declares that he constitutes the Self of the intestinal
fire, ‘Becoming the Vaisvanara-fire I abide in the body of
living creatures ’ (Bha. Gt. XV, 14).

26. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not
(denoted) on account of the metre being denoted ;
(we reply) not so, because thus the direction of the
mind (on Brahman) is declared; for thus it is seen.

The previous section at first refers to the metre called
Gayatri, ‘The Gayatri indeed is everything’ (III, 12, 1),
and then introduces—with the words ‘ this is also declared
by a Rik verse’—the verse, ‘Such is the greatness of it
(viz. the Gayatri)’ &c. Now, as this verse also refers to
the metre, there is not any reference to the highest Person.
—To this objection the second part of the Sitra replies.
The word ‘ Gayatri’ does not here denote the metre only,
since this cannot possibly be the Self of all; but the text
declares the application of the idea of Gayatri to Brahman,
i.e. teaches, to the end of a certain result being obtained,
meditation on Brahman in so far as similar to GAyatri.
For Brahman having four feet, in the sense indicated by
the vk, may be compared to the Gdyatri with its four
(metrical) feet. The Gayatri (indeed has asa rule three feet,
but) occasionally a Gayatrt with four feet is met with; so,
e.g., ‘Indras sakipati£ | valena ptditak | duskyavano vrishé |
samitsu sasahik.’ We see that in other passages also words
primarily denoting metres are employed in other senses ;
thus, e.g., in the samvargavidya (KA. Up. IV, 3, 8), where
Virag (the name of a metre of ten syllables) denotes a group
of ten divine beings.

1 aDHyYAYA, 1 PADA, 28. 249

For this conclusion the next Sftra supplies a further
argument.

27. And thus also, because (thus only) the desig-

nation of the beings, and so on, being the (four) feet
is possible.
. The text, moreover, designates the Gayatri as having
four feet, after having referred to the beings, the earth, the
body, and the heart; now this has a sense only if it is
Brahman, which here is called Gayatri.

28. Ifit be said that (Brahman is) not (recognised)
on account of the difference of designation ; (we say)
not so, on account of there being no contradiction in
either (designation).

In the former passage, ‘ three feet of it are what is im-
mortal in heaven,’ heaven is referred to as the abode of
the being under discussion; while in the latter passage,
‘that light which shines above this heaven,’ heaven is men-
tioned as marking its boundary. Owing to this discre-
pancy, the Brahman referred to in the former text is not
recognised in the latter.—This objection the Sitra disposes
of by pointing out that owing to the essential agreement of
the two statements, nothing stands in the way of the re-
quired recognition. When we say, ‘The hawk is on the
top of the tree, and ‘the hawk is above the top of the
tree, we mean one and the same thing.—The ‘ light,’ there-
fore, is nothing else but the most glorious and luminous
highest Person. Him who in the former passage is called
four-footed, we know to have an extraordinarily beautiful
shape and colour—(cp., e.g., ‘I know that great Person of
sunlike colour beyond the darkness ’ (Svet. Up. III, 9)—, and
as hence his brilliancy also must be extraordinary, he is,
in the text under discussion, quite appropriately called
‘light. —Here terminates the adhikaraaa of ‘light.’

It has been shown that the being endowed with supreme
brilliance, called ‘ Light,’ which the text mentions as some-
thing well known, is the highest Person. The Sitrakara
will now show that the being designated as Indra and

250 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Prana, which the text enjoins as an object of meditation,
for the reason that it is the means for attaining immor-
tality—a power which is inseparable from causal power—,
is likewise the highest Person.

29. Prdza is Brahman, on account of connexion.

We read in the Pratardana-vidy4 in the Kaushitaki-
brahmaza that ‘Pratardana, the son of Divoddsa, came,
by fighting and strength, to the beloved abode of Indra.’
Being asked by Indra to choose a boon he requests
the God to bestow on him that boon which he himself
considers most beneficial to man; whereupon Indra
says, ‘I am prdvza (breath), the intelligent Self, meditate
on me as Life, as Immortality.’ Here the doubt arises
whether the being called Praza and Indra, and desig-
nating itself as the object of a meditation most beneficial
to man, is an individual soul, or the highest Self—An
individual soul, the Pdrvapakshin maintains. For, he
says, the word ‘Indra’ is known to denote an individual
God, and the word ‘ Prama,’ which stands in grammatical
co-ordination with Indra, also applies to individual souls.
This individual being, called Indra, instructs Pratardana
that meditation on himself is most beneficial to man. But
what is most beneficial to man is only the means to attain
immortality, and such a means is found in meditation on
the causal principle of the world, as we know from the
text, ‘For him there is delay only so long as he is not
delivered; then he will be perfect’ (K%. Up. VI, 14, 2).
We hence conclude that Indra, who is known as an indi-
vidual soul, is the causal principle, Brahman.

This view is rejected by the Sitra. The being called
Indra and Prana is not a mere individual soul, but the
highest Brahman, which is other than all individual souls.
For on this supposition only it is appropriate that the
being introduced as Indra and Prasa should, in the way of
grammatical co-ordination, be connected with such terms
as ‘blessed,’ ‘non-ageing,’ ‘immortal.’ (‘That praza indeed
is the intelligent Self, blessed, non-ageing, immortal,’ Kau.
Up. IIT, 9.)

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 30. 251

30. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted)
on account of the speaker denoting himself; (we
say, not so), because the multitude of connexions
with the inner Self (is possible only) in that (speaker
if viewed as Brahman),

An objection is raised—That the being introduced as
Indra and Prdna should be the highest Brahman, for the
reason that it is identical with him who, later on, is called
‘ blessed,’ ‘ non-ageing, ‘immortal ’—this we cannot admit.
‘Know me only, I am prdza, meditate on me as the
intelligent Self, as life, as immortality’—the speaker of
these words is Indra, and this Indra enjoins on Pratardana
meditation on his own person only, the individual character
of which is brought out by reference to certain deeds of
strength such as the slaying of the son of Tvashéri (‘I
slew the three-headed son of Tvash#:,’ &c.). As thus the
initial part of the section clearly refers to an individual
being, the terms occurring in the concluding part (‘ blessed,’
‘non-ageing,’ ‘immortal’) must be interpreted so as. to
make them agree with what precedes.—This objection the
Sdtra disposes of. ‘For the multitude of connexions with
the Self ’—i.e. the multitude of things connected with the
Self as its attributes—is possible only ‘in that,’ i.e. in that
speaker viewed as the highest Brahman. ‘ For, as in
a car, the circumference of the wheel is placed on the
spokes, and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects
placed on the subjects, and the subjects on the prAna.
That praaa indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, non-
ageing, immortal.’ The ‘objects’ (bhitamatraf) here are
the aggregate of non-sentient things; the ‘subjects’
(prag#amatra£) are the sentient beings in which the objects
are said to abide; when thereupon the texts says that of
these subjects the being called Indra and Praxa is the
abode, and that he is blessed, non-ageing, immortal; this
qualification of being the abode of this Universe, with all
its non-sentient and sentient beings, can belong to the
highest Self only, which is other than all individual
souls,

252 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

The Stra may also be explained in a somewhat different
way, viz. ‘there is a multitude of connexions belonging to
the highest Self, i.e. of attributes special to the highest
Self, in that, viz. section.’ The text at first says, ‘Choose
thou that boon for me which thou deemest most beneficial to
man ’—to which the reply is, ‘Meditate on me.’ Here Indra-
prdaa is represented as the object of a meditation which
is to bring about Release; the object of such meditation
can be none but the highest Self—‘ He makes him whom
he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed;
and him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds
he makes do a bad deed.’ The causality with regard to
all actions which is here described is again a special attri-
bute of the highest Self—The same has to be said with
regard to the attribute of being the abode of all, in the
passage about the wheel and spokes, quoted above; and
with regard to the attributes of bliss, absence of old age
and immortality, referred to in another passage quoted
before. Also the attributes of being ‘the ruler of the
worlds, the lord of all, can belong to the highest Self
only.—The conclusion therefore is that the being called
Indra and Prama is none other but the highest Self—But
how then can Indra, who is known to be an individual
person only, enjoin meditation on himself?—To this ques-
tion the next Satra replies.

31. The instruction (given by Indra about him-
self) (is possible) through insight based on Scripture,
as in the case of Vamadeva.

The instruction which, in the passages quoted, Indra
gives as to the object of meditation, i.e. Brahman consti-
tuting his Self, is not based on such an insight into his own
nature as is established by other means of proof, but on an
intuition of his own Self, mediated by Scripture. ‘Having
entered into them with this living Self let me evolve names
and forms’ (K&. Up. VI, 3, 2); ‘In it all that exists has its
Self’ (KA. Up. VI, 8, 7); ‘Entered within, the ruler of
creatures, the Self of all’ (Taitt. Ar. III, 21); ‘He who
dwelling in the Self is different from the Self, &c. (Bri. Up.

1 aDHYAYA, 1 PADA, 32. 253

III, 7, 22)—from these and similar texts Indra has
learned that the highest Self has the individual souls
for its body, and that hence words such as ‘I’ and ‘thou,’
which denote individual beings, extend in their connotation
up to the highest Self; when, therefore, he says, ‘ Know me
only,’ and ‘ Meditate on me,’ he really means to teach that
the highest Self, of which his own individual person is the
body, is the proper object of meditation. ‘As in the case
of Vamadeva.’ As the Rzshi Vamadeva perceiving that
Brahman is the inner Self of all, that all things constitute
its body, and that the meaning of words denoting a body
extends up to the principle embodied, denotes with the
word “1 the highest Brahman to which he himself stands
in the relation of a body, and then predicates of this ‘I’
Manu ϑύγγα and other beings— Seeing this the Rzshi.
Vamadeva understood, I am Manu, I am Sarya’ (Bri. Up.
I, 4, 10). Similarly Prahlada says, ‘As the Infinite one
abides within all, he constitutes my “I” also; all is from
me, I am all, within me is all.’ (Vi. Pu. I, 19, 85.)
The next Sftra states, in reply to an objection, the reason
why, in the section under discussion, terms denoting the
individual soul, and others denoting non-sentient things are
applied to Brahman.

32. If it be said (that Brahman is not meant) on
account of characteristic marks of the individual soul
and the chief vital air; we say no, on account of the
threefoldness of meditation; on account of (such
threefold meditation) being met (in other texts also) ;
and on account of (such threefold meditation) being
appropriate here (also).

An objection is raised. ‘Let none try to find out what
speech is, let him know the speaker’; ‘I slew the three-
headed son of Tvashzvi; I delivered the Arunmukhas, the
devotees, to the wolves’; these passages state characteristic
marks of an individual soul (viz. the god Indra).—' As long
as Prana dwells in this body, so long there is life’; ‘ Prana
alone is the conscious Self, and having laid hold of this
body, it makes it rise up..——These passages again mention

254 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

characteristic attributes of the chief vital air. Hence
there is here no ‘multitude of attributes belonging to the
Self.’—The latter part of the Sftra refutes this objection.
The highest Self is called by these different terms in
order to teach threefoldness of devout meditation; viz.
meditation on Brahman in itself as the cause of the entire
world; on Brahman as having for its body the totality of
enjoying (individual) souls; and on Brahman as having
for its body the objects and means of enjoyment.—This
threefold meditation on Brahman, moreover, is met with
also in other chapters of the sacred text. Passages such
as ‘The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,’ ‘ Bliss is
Brahman, dwell on Brahman in itself. Passages again such
as ‘ Having created that he entered into it. Having entered
it he became sa¢ and ¢yat, defined and undefined, &c. (Taitt.
Up. II, 6), represent Brahman as having for its body the
individual souls and inanimate nature. Hence, in the
chapter under discussion also, this threefold view of
Brahman is quite appropriate. Where to particular indi-
vidual beings such as Hiramyagarbha, and so on, or to
particular inanimate things such as prakriti, and so on,
there are attributed qualities especially belonging to the
highest Self; or where with words denoting such persons
and things there are co-ordinated terms denoting the
highest Self, the intention of the texts is to convey the
idea of the highest Self being the inner Self of all such
persons and things.—The settled conclusion, therefore, is
that the being designated as Indra and Prava is other
than an individual soul, viz. the highest Self.

I ADHYAyA, 2 PADA, 255

SECOND PADA.

THE contents of the first Pada may be summed up as
follows :—It has been shown that a person who has read
the text of the Veda; who further, through the study of
the Karma-Mim4msa, has acquired a full knowledge of the
nature of (sacrificial and similar) works, and has recognised
that the fruits of such works are limited and non-per-
manent; in whom there has arisen the desire for the
highest aim of man, i.e. Release, which, as he has come to
know in the course of reading the Vedanta portions of
scripture, is effected by meditation on the nature of Brah-
man—such meditation having an infinite and permanent
result; who has convinced himself that words are capable
of conveying information about accomplished things (not
only about things to be done), and has arrived at the con-
clusion that the Ved4nta-texts are an authoritative means
of knowledge with regard to the highest Brahman ;—that
such a person, we say, should begin the study of the
S4riraka-Mim4ms4 which indicates the method how Brah-
man is to be known through the Ved4nta-texts.

We next have shown that the text ‘That from which
these creatures are born, &c., conveys the idea of the
highest Brahman as that being which in sport, as it were,
creates, sustains, and finally reabsorbs this entire universe,
comprising within itself infinite numbers of variously con-
stituted animated beings—moving and non-moving—, of
objects of enjoyment for those beings, of means of enjoy-
ment, and of abodes of enjoyment; and which is the sole
cause of all bliss. We have established that this highest
Brahman, which is the sole cause of the world, cannot be
the object of the other means of knowledge, and hence is
to be known through scripture only, We have pointed
out that the position of scripture as an authoritative means
of knowledge is established by the fact that all the Vedanta-
texts connectedly refer to the highest Brahman, which,
although not related to any injunctions of action or absten,

256 . VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

tion from action, by its own essential nature constitutes the
highest end of man. We have proved that Brahman, which
the Ved4nta-texts teach to be the sole cause of the world,
must be an intelligent principle other than the non-sentient
pradhana, since Brahman is said to think. We have
declared that this intelligent principle is other than the
so-called individual soul, whether in the state of bondage
or that of release; since the texts describe it as in the
enjoyment of supreme bliss, all-wise, the cause of fear or
fearlessness on the part of intelligent beings, the inner Self
of all created things, whether intelligent or non-intelligent,
possessing the power of realising all its purposes, and so
on.—We have maintained that this highest Being has
a divine form, peculiar to itself, not made of the stuff of
Prakriti, and not due to karman.—We have explained
that the being which some texts refer to as a well-known
cause of the world—designating it by terms such as ether
or breath, which generally denote a special non-sentient
being—-is that same highest Self which is different from all
beings, sentient or non-sentient.—We have declared that,
owing to its connexion with heaven, this same highest Self
is to be recognised in what the text calls a ‘light,’ said to
possess supreme splendour, such as forms a special charac-
teristic of the highest Being. We have stated that, as we
recognise through insight derived from scripture, that same
highest Person is denoted by terms such as Indra, and so
on; as the text ascribes to that ‘Indra’ qualities exclu-
sively belonging to the highest Self, such, e.g., as being
the cause of the attainment of immortality.—And the
general result arrived at was that the Ved4nta-texts help
us to the knowledge of one being only, viz. Brahman, or
the highest Person, or N4rayana—of whom it is shown
that he cannot possibly be the object of the other means
of knowledge, and whom the possession of an unlimited
number of glorious qualities proves to differ totally from
all other beings whatsoever.

Now, although Brahman is the only object of the teach-
ing of the Vedanta-texts, yet some of these texts might give
rise to the notion that they aim at setting forth (not

T aDHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 257

Brahman), but some particular being comprised within
either the pradhana or the aggregate of individual souls.
The remaining Padas of the first Adhydya therefore apply
themselves to the task of dispelling this notion and
proving that what the texts in question aim at is to set
forth certain glorious qualities of Brahman. The second
P4da discusses those texts which contain somewhat obscure
references to the individual soul; the third PAda those
which contain clear references to the same; and the fourth
Pada finally those texts which appear to contain even
clearer intimations of the individual soul, and so on.

1. Everywhere; because there is taught what is
known.

We read in the XAandogya, ‘ Man is made of thought;
according to what his thought is in this world, so will he be
when he has departed this life. Let him form this thought :
he who consists of mind, whose body is breath, whose form is
light, &c. (III, 14). We here understand that of the medita-
tion enjoined by the clause ‘let him form this thought’ the
object is the being said to consist of mind, to have breath
for its body, &c. A doubt, however, arises whether the
being possessing these attributes be the individual soul or
the highest Self.—The Parvapakshin maintains the former
alternative. For, he says, mind and breath are instru-
ments of the individual soul; while the text ‘without
breath, without mind,’ distinctly denies them to the highest
Self. Nor can the Brahman mentioned in a previous
clause of the same section (‘All this indeed is Brahman’)
be connected as an object with the meditation enjoined in
the passage under discussion; for Brahman is there re-
ferred to in order to suggest the idea of its being the Self
of all—which idea constitutes a means for bringing about
that calmness of mind which is helpful towards the act of.
meditation enjoined in the clause ‘Let a man meditate.
with calm mind,’ &c. Nor, again, can it be said that as the:
meditation conveyed by the clause ‘let him form this.
thought ’ demands an object, Brahman, although mentioned
in another passage, only admits of being connected with;

[48] s

258 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

the passage under discussion; for the demand for an
object is fully satisfied by the being made of mind, &c.,
which is mentioned in that very passage itself; in order to
supply the object we have merely to change the case-
terminations of the words ‘ manomayak prAmasarirak, &c.
It having thus been determined that the being made of
mind is the individual soul, we further conclude that the
Brahman mentioned in the concluding passage of the
section (‘That is Brahman’) is also the individual soul,
there called Brahman in order to glorify it.

This prim facie view is set aside by the Sdtra. The
being made of mind is the highest Self; for the text states
certain qualities, such as being made of mind, &c., which
are well known to denote, in all VedAnta-texts, Brahman
only. Passages such as ‘He who is made of mind, the
guide of the body of breath’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 7); ‘ There is
the ether within the heart, and in it there is the Person,
consisting of mind, immortal, golden’ (Taitt. Up. I, 6, 1) ;
‘He is conceived by the heart, by wisdom, by the mind.
Those who know him are immortal’ (Ka. Up. II, 6, 9);
‘He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech, but by
a purified mind’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8); ‘The breath of
breath’ (Bvé. Up. IV, 4, 18?); ‘Breath alone is the con.
scious Self, and having laid hold of this body it makes it
rise up’ (Ka. Up. III, 3); ‘All these beings merge inta
breath alone, and from breath they arise’ (KA. Up. I, 11,
5)—these and similar texts refer to Brahman as consisting
of mind, to be apprehended by a purified mind, having
breath for its body, and being the abode and ruler of
breath. This being so, we decide that in the concluding
passage, ‘my Self within the heart, that is Brahman,’ the
word ‘ Brahman’ has to be taken in its primary sense (and
does not denote the individual soul). The text which
declares Brahman to be without mind and breath, merely
means to deny that the thought of Brahman depends on
a mind (internal organ), and that its life depends on
breath.

Or else we may interpret the Vedic text and the Sftra
as follows. The passage ‘ All this is Brahman; let a man

1 ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 259

meditate with a calm mind on this world as originating,
ending, and breathing in Brahman,’ conveys the imagina-
tion of meditation on Brahman as the Self of all. The
subsequent clause ‘ Let him form the thought,’ &c., forms
an additional statement to that injunction, the purport of
which is to suggest certain attributes of Brahman, such as
being made of mind, So that the meaning of the whole
section is ‘Let a man meditate on Brahman, which is made
of mind, has breath for its body, &c., as the Self of the
whole world. —Here a doubt presents itself. Does the
term ‘ Brahman’ in this section denote the individual soul
or the highest Self ?—The individual soul, the Pdirva-
pakshin maintains, for that only admits of being exhibited
in co-ordination with the word ‘all.’ For the word ‘all’
denotes the entire world from Brahma down to a blade of
grass; and the existence of Brahma and other individual
beings is determined by special forms of karman, the root
of which is the beginningless Nescience of the individual
soul, The highest Brahman, on the other hand, which is
all-knowing, all-powerful, free from all evil and all shadow
of Nescience and similar imperfections, cannot possibly
exist as the ‘All’ which comprises within itself everything
that is bad. Moreover we find that occasionally the term
‘Brahman’ is applied to the individual soul also; just as
the highest Lord (paramesvara) may be called ‘the highest
Self’ (param4tman) or ‘the highest Brahman.’ That
‘ greatness’ (brzhattva ; which is the essential characteristic
of ‘brahman’) belongs to the individual soul when it has
freed itself from its limiting conditions, is moreover attested
by scripture : ‘ That (soul) is fit for infinity’ (Svet. Up.V, 9).
And as the soul’s Nescience is due to karman (only), the
text may very well designate it—as it does by means of
the term ‘ taggalan ’—as the cause of the origin, subsistence,
and reabsorption of the world. That is to say—the indi-
vidual soul which, in its essential nature, is non-limited,
and therefore of the nature of Brahman, owing to the
influence of Nescience enters into the state of a god, or
a man, or an animal, or a plant.

This view is rejected by the Sdtra. ‘Everywhere,’ i.e,

52

260 . VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

in the whole world which is referred to in the clause ‘ All
this is Brahman’ we have to understand the highest
Brahman—which the term ‘ Brahman’ denotes as the Self
of the world—, and not the individual soul ; ‘ because there
is taught what is known, i.e. because the clause ‘All this is
Brahman ’—for which clause the term ‘taggalan’ supplies
the reason—refers to Brahman as something generally
known. Since the world springs from Brahman, is merged
in Brahman, and depends on Brahman for its life, therefore
—as the text says— All this has its Self in Brahman’; and
this shows to us that what the text understands by Brah-
man is that being from which, as generally known from the
Ved4nta-texts, there proceed the creation, and so on, of
the world. That the highest Brahman only, all-wise and
supremely blessed, is the cause of the origin, &c., of the
world, is declared in the section which begins, ‘That from
which these beings are born,’ &c., and which says further
on, ‘he knew that Bliss is Brahman, for from bliss these
beings are born’ (Taitt. Up. III, 6); and analogously
the text ‘He is the cause, the lord of lords of the organs,’
&c. (Svet. Up. VI, 9), declares the highest Brahman to be
the cause of the individual soul. Everywhere, in fact, the
texts proclaim the causality of the highest Self only. As
thus the world which springs from Brahman, is merged in
it; and breathes through it, has its Self in Brahman, the
identity of the two may properly be asserted; and hence
the text—the meaning of which is ‘Let a man meditate
with calm mind on the highest Brahman of which the world
is a mode, which has the world for its body, and which is
the Self of the world’—first proves Brahman’s being the
universal Self, and then enjoins meditation on it. The
highest Brahman, in its causal condition as well as in its
so-called ‘effected’ state, constitutes the Self of the world,
for in the former it has for its body all sentient and non-
sentient beings in their subtle form, and in the latter the
same beings in their gross condition. Nor is there any
contradiction between such identity with the world on
Brahman’s part, and the fact that Brahman treasures within
itself glorions qualities antagonistic to all evil; for the

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2. 261

imperfections adhering to the bodies, which are mere
modes of Brahman, do not affect Brahman itself to which
the modes belong. Such identity rather proves for Brah-
man supreme lordly power, and thus adds to its excel
lences. Nor, again, can it rightly be maintained that of
the individual soul also identity with the world can be
predicated ; for the souls being separate according to the
bodies with which they are joined cannot be identical with
each other. Even in the state of release, when the indi-
vidual soul is not in any way limited, it does not possess
that identity with the world on which there depends
causality with regard to the world’s creation, sustentation,
and reabsorption; as will be declared in Sdtra IV, 4, 17.
Nor, finally, does the Parvapakshin improve his case by
contending that the individual soul may be the cause of the
creation, &c., of the world because it (viz. the soul) is due
to karman; for although the fact given as reason is true,
all the same the Lord alone is the cause of the Universe.—
All this proves that the being to which the text refers as
Brahman is none other than the highest Self.

This second alternative interpretation of the Sitra is
preferred by most competent persons. The Vvittik4ra,
e.g. says, ‘That Brahman which the clause “All this is
Brahman” declares to be the Self of all is the Lord.’

2. And because the qualities meant to be stated
are possible (in Brahman).

The qualities about to be stated can belong to the
highest Self only. ‘ Made of mind, having breath for its
body,’ &c. ‘Made of mind’ means to be apprehended by
a purified mind only. The highest Self can be appre-
hended only by a mind purified by meditation on that
Self, such meditation being assisted by the seven means,
viz. abstention, &c. (see above, p.17). This intimates that
the highest Self is of pure goodness, precluding all evil, and
therefore different in nature from everything else; for by
the impure minded impure objects only can be appre-
hended.—‘ Having the vital breath for its body’ means—
being the supporter of all life in the world. To stand in.

262 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the relation of a body to something else, means to abide in
that other thing, to be dependent on it, and to subserve it
in a subordinate capacity, as we shall fully show later on.
And all ‘vital breath’ or ‘life’ stands in that relation to
the highest Self. ‘Whose form is light’; i.e. who is of
supreme splendour, his form being a divine one of supreme
excellence peculiar to him, and not consisting of the stuff
of Prakr#ti— Whose purposes are true’; i.e. whose pur-
poses realise themselves without any obstruction. ‘Who
is the (or “of the”) Self of ether’; i.e. who is of a delicate
and transparent nature, like ether; or who himself is the
Self of ether, which is the causal substance of everything
else; or who shines forth himself and makes other things
shine forth.‘ To whom all works belong’; i.e. he of whom
the whole world is the work ; or he to whom all activities
belong.—‘ To whom all wishes belong’; i. e. he to whom all
pure objects and means of desire and enjoyment belong.
‘He to whom all odours and tastes belong’; i.e. he to
whom there belong, as objects of enjoyment, all kinds of
uncommon, special, perfect, supremely excellent odours
and tastes; ordinary smells and tastes being negatived by
another text, viz. ‘That which is without sound, without
touch, without taste, ἄς. (Ka. Up. III, 15).—‘He who
embraces all this’; i.e. he who makes his own the whole
group of glorious qualities enumerated‘ He who does
not speak,’ because, being in possession of all he could
desire, he ‘has no regard for anything’ ; i.e. he who, in full
possession of lordly power, esteems this whole world with
all its creatures no higher than a blade of grass, and hence
abides in silence— All these qualities stated in the text
can belong to the highest Self only.

3. But, on account of impossibility, not the em-
bodied soul,

Those who fully consider this infinite multitude of
exalted qualities will recognise that not even a shadow of
them can belong to the individual soul—whether in the
state of bondage or that of release—which is a thing as
insignificant as a glow-worm and, through its connexion

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7. 263

with a body, liable to the attacks of endless suffering. It
is not possible therefore to hold that the section under
discussion should refer to the individual soul.

4. And because there is (separate) denotation of
the object and the agent.

The clause ‘When I shall have departed from hence I
shall obtain him’ denotes the highest Brahman as the
object to be obtained, and the individual soul as that
which obtains it. This shows that the soul which obtains
‘is the person meditating, and the highest Brahman that is
to be obtained, the object of meditation: Brahman, there-
fore, is something different from the attaining soul.

5. On account of the difference of words.

The clause ‘That is the Self of me, within the heart’
designates the embodied soul by means of a genitive form,
while the object of meditation is exhibited in the nomina-
tive case. Similarly, a text of the VAgasaneyins, which
treats of the same topic, applies different terms to the
embodied and the highest Self, ‘Like a rice grain, or a
barley grain, or a canary seed, or the kernel of a canary
seed, thus that golden Person is within the Self’ (Sat. Br.
X, 6, 3, 2). Here the locative form, ‘within the Self,’
denotes the embodied Self, and the nominative, ‘ that
golden Person, the object to be meditated on.—All this
proves the highest Self to be the object of meditation.

6. And on account of Smr‘ti.

“1 dwell within the hearts of all, from me come memory
and knowledge, as well as their loss’; ‘He who free from
delusion knows me to be the highest Person’; ‘The Lord,
O Arguna, is seated in the heart of all Beings, driving
round by his mysterious power all beings as if mounted on
a machine; to him fly for refuge’ (Bha. Gi. XV, 15, 19;
XVIII, 61). These Smriti-texts show the embodied soul
to be the meditating subject, and the highest Self the
object of meditation.

7. Should it be said that (the passage does) not

264 - VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

(refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of
the abode, and on account of the denotation of that
(viz. minuteness of the being meditated on); we
say no, because (Brahman) has thus to be medi-
tated upon, and because (in the same passage) it is
said to be like ether.

It might be contended that, as the text ‘he is my Self
within the heart’ declares the being meditated on to dwell
within a minute abode, viz. the heart; and as moreover
another text—‘ smaller than a grain of rice,’ &c., declares it
to be itself of minute size, that being cannot be the highest
Self, but only the embodied soul. For other passages
speak of the highest Self as unlimited, and of the embodied
soul as having the size of the point of a goad (cp. e.g.
Mu. Up. I, 1, 6, and Svet. Up. V, 8).—This objection the
Sitra rebuts by declaring that the highest Self is spoken of
as such, i. e. minute, on account of its having to be medi-
tated upon as such. Such minuteness does not, however,
belong to its true nature; for in the same section it is
distinctly declared to be infinite like ether—‘ greater than
the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven,
greater than all these worlds’ (ΧΑ. Up. III, 14, 3). This
shows that the designation of the highest Self as minute is
for the purpose of meditation only.—The connexion of the
whole section then is as follows. The clause ‘ All this is
Brahman ; let a man meditate with calm mind on this
world as beginning, ending, and breathing in Brahman,’
enjoins meditation on Brahman as being the Self of all,
in so far as it is the cause of the origin and destruction of
all, and entering into all beings as their soul gives life to
them. The next clause, ‘Man is made of thought ; accord-
ing as his thought is in this world, so will he be when he
has departed this life,’ declares the attainment of the
desired object to depend on the nature of the meditation ;
and the following clause, ‘Let him therefore form the fol-
lowing thought,’ thereupon repeats the injunction with a
view to the declaration of details. The clause ‘He who
consists of mind, &c., up to ‘ who is never surprised,’ then

1 ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 8. 265

states the nature and qualities, of the being to be medi-
tated upon, which are to be comprised in the meditation.
Next, the clause ‘He is my Self,’ up to ‘the kernel of a
canary seed,’ declares that the highest Person, for the
purpose of meditation, abides in the heart of. the medi-
tating devotee ; representing it as being itself minute, since
the heart is minute. After this the clause ‘ He also is my
Self,’ up to ‘ who is never surprised,’ describes those aspects
of the being meditated upon as within the heart, which are
to be attained by the devotee. Next, the words ‘this my
Self within the heart is that Brahman’ enjoins the reflection
that the highest Brahman, as described before, is, owing to
its supreme kindness, present in our hearts in order thereby
to refresh and inspirit us. Then the clause ‘ When I shall
have departed from hence I shall obtain him’ suggests the
idea that there is a certainty of obtaining. him on the basis
of devout meditation ; and finally the clause ‘He who has
this faith has no doubt’ declares that the devotee who is
firmly convinced of his aim being attainable in the way
described, will attain it beyond any doubt.—From all this
it appears that the ‘limitation of abode,’ and the ‘ minute-
ness’ ascribed to Brahman, are merely for the purpose of
meditation.

8. Should it be said that there is attainment of
fruition (of pleasure and pain); we reply, not so, on
account of difference.

But, if the highest Brahman is assumed to dwell within
bodies, like the individual soul, it follows that, like the
latter, it is subject to the experience of pleasure and pain,
such experience springing from connexion with bodies !—
Of this objection the Stra disposes by remarking ‘ not so,
on account of difference (of reason).’ For what is the
cause of experiences, pleasurable or painful, is not the mere
dwelling within a body, but rather the subjection to the
influence of good and evil deeds; and such subjection is
impossible in the case of the highest Self to which all evil
is foreign. Compare the scriptural text ‘One of the two
eats the sweet fruit, the other one looks on without eating’

266 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

(Mu. Up. ITI, 1, 1).—Here finishes the adhikaraza of ‘ what
is known everywhere.’

Well then, if the highest Self is not an enjoyer, we
must conclude that wherever fruition is referred to, the
embodied soul only is meant !—Of this view the next adhi-
karana disposes.

9. The eater (is the highest Self) on account of
there being taken all that is movable and im-
movable.

We read in the Ka/avalli (I, 2, 25), ‘ Who then knows
where he is to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are
but food, and death itself a condiment?’ A doubt here
arises whether the ‘eater,’ suggested by the words ‘food’
and ‘condiment,’ is the individual soul or the highest Self.
—The individual soul, the Parvapakshin maintains; for
all enjoyment presupposes works, and works belong to the
individual soul only.—Of this view the Sdtra disposes.
The ‘eater’ can be the highest Self only, because the
taking, i.e. eating, of the whole aggregate of movable and
immovable things can be predicated of that Self only.
‘Eating’ does not here mean fruition dependent on work,
but rather the act of reabsorption of the world on the part
of the highest Brahman, i.e. Vishzu, who is the cause of
the origination, subsistence, and final destruction of the
universe. This appears from the fact that Vishvu is
mentioned in the same section, ‘ He reaches the end of his
journey, and that is the highest place of Vishzu’ (Ka. Up.
I, 3,9). Moreover the clause ‘to whom death is a condi-
ment’ shows that by the Brahmans and Kshattriyas, men-
tioned in the text, we have to understand the whole
universe of moving and non-moving things, viewed as
things to be consumed by the highest Self. For a condi-
ment is a thing which, while itself being eaten, causes other
things to be eaten; the meaning of the passage, therefore,
is that while death itself is consumed, being a condiment
as it were, there is at the same time eaten whatever is
‘flavoured or made palatable by death, and that is the
entire world of beings in which the Brahmans and Kshat-

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 10. 267

triyas hold the foremost place. Now such eating of course
is destruction or reabsorption, and hence such enjoyment—
meaning general reabsorption—can belong to the highest
Self only.

10. And on account of the topic of the whole
section.

Moreover the highest Brahman constitutes the topic of
the entire section. Cp. ‘The wise who knows the Self as
great and omnipresent does not grieve’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22);
‘That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by under-
standing, nor by much learning. He whom the Self
chooses, by him the Self can be gained; the Self chooses
him as his own’ (I, 2, 23).—Moreover, the clause (forming
part of the text under discussion), ‘ Who knows him (i.e. the
being which constitutes the topic of the section) where he
is?’ clearly shows that we have to recognise here the Self
of which it had previously been said that it is hard to
know unless it assists us with its grace.

To this conclusion a new objection presents itself —
Further on in the same Upanishad (I, 3, 1) we meet with
the following text: ‘ There are two, drinking their reward in
the world of their own works, entered into the cave, dwell-
ing on the highest summit ; those who know Brahman call
them shade and light, likewise those householders who
perform the Trinasiketa-sacrifice.’ Now this text clearly
refers to the individual soul which enjoys the reward of
its works, together with an associate coupled to it. And
this associate is either the vital breath, or the organ of
knowledge (buddhi). For the drinking of ‘vita’ is the
enjoyment of the fruit of works, and such enjoyment does
not suit the highest Self. The buddhi, or the vital breath,
on the other hand, which are instruments of the enjoying
embodied soul, may somehow be brought into connexion
with the enjoyment of the fruit of works. As the text is
thus seen to refer to the embodied soul coupled with some
associate, we infer, on the ground of the two texts belong-
ing to one section, that also the ‘eater’ described in the

268 VEDANTA-SOUTRAS. ~

former text is none other than the individual soul—_To this
objection the next Satra replies.

11. The ‘two entered into the cave’ are the two
Selfs ; on account of this being seen.

- The two, entered into the cave and drinking their reward,
are neither the embodied soul together with the vital
breath, nor the embodied soul together with the buddhi ;
it is rather the embodied Self and the highest Self which
are designated by those terms. For this is seen, i.e. it is
seen that in that section the individual Self and the highest
Self only are spoken of as entered into the cave. To the
highest Self there refers 1, 2, 12, ‘The wise who by medi-
tation on his Self recognises the Ancient who is difficult to
see, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the
cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves
joy and sorrow far behind.’ And to the individual soul
there refers I, 4, 7,‘ Who is together with the vital breath,
who is Aditi, who is made of the deities, who entering into
the cave abides therein, who was born variously through
the elements.’ Aditi here means the individual soul which
enjoys (atti) the fruits of its works; which is associated
with the vital breath; which is made of the deities, i.e.
whose enjoyment is dependent on the different sense-
organs; which abides in the hollow of the heart; and
which, being connected with the elementary substances,
earth, and so on, is born in various forms—human, divine,
&c.—That the text speaks of the two Selfs as drinking their
reward (while actually the individual soul only does so) is
to be understood in the same way as the phrase ‘there
go the umbrella-bearers’ (one of whom only carries the
umbrella). Or else we may account for this on the ground
that both are agents with regard to the drinking, in so far
as the ‘drinking ’ individual soul is caused to drink by the
highest Self.

12. And on account of distinctive qualities.

Everywhere in that section we meet with statements of
distinctive attributes of the two Selfs, the highest Self.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12. 269

being represented as the object of meditation and attain-
ment, and the individual Self as the meditating and
attaining subject. The passage ‘When he has known and
understood that which is born from Brahman, the intelli-
gent, to be divine and venerable, then he obtains everlast-
ing peace’ (I, 1, 17) refers to the meditating individual soul
which recognises itself as being of the nature of Brahman.
On the other hand, I, 2, 3, ‘ That which is a bridge for
sacrificers, the highest imperishable Brahman for those who
wish to cross over to the fearless shore, the Nafiketa, may.
we be able to know that,’ refers to the highest Self as the
object of meditation ; ‘NAziketa’ here meaning that which
is to be reached through the NAfiketa-rite. Again, the
passage ‘ Know the Self to be sitting in the chariot and
the body to be the chariot’ (I, 3, 3) refers to the meditating
individual soul; and the verse, I, 3, 9, ‘But he who has
understanding for his charioteer, and holds the reins of the
mind, he reaches the end of his journey, and that is the
highest place of Vishwu, refers to the embodied and the
highest Selfs as that which attains and that which is to be
attained. And in the text under discussion also (I, 3, 1),
the two Selfs are distinctly designated as light and shade,
the one being all-knowing, the other devoid of knowledge.
But, a new objection is raised, the initial passage, I, 1, 2a,
‘That doubt which there is when a man is dead—some
saying, he is; others, he is not,’ clearly asks a question as
to the true nature of the individual soul, and we hence
conclude that that soul forms the topic of the whole
chapter.—Not 50, we reply. That question does not spring
from any doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the
soul apart from the body; for if this were so the two first
boons chosen by Nafiketas would be unsuitable. For the
story runs as follows: When the sacrifice offered by the
father of Natiketas—at which all the possessions of the
sacrificer were to be given to the priests—is drawing
towards its close, the boy, feeling afraid that some deficiency
on the part of the gifts might render the sacrifice unavail~
ing, and dutifully wishing to render his father’s sacrifice
complete by giving his own person also, repeatedly asks

270 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

his father, ‘And to whom will you give me’? The father,
irritated by the boy’s persistent questioning, gives an angry
reply, and in consequence of this the boy goes to the
palace of Yama, and Yama being absent, stays there for
three days without eating. Yama on his return is alarmed
at this neglect of hospitality, and wishing to make up for
it allows him to choose three boons. Nafiketas, thereupon,
full of faith and piety, chooses as his first boon that his
father should forgive him. Now it is clear that conduct of
this kind would not be possible in the case of one not
convinced of the soul having an existence independent of
the body. For his second boon, again, he chooses the
knowledge of a sacrificial fire, which has a result to be
experienced only by a soul that has departed from the
body; and this choice also can clearly be made only by
one who knows that the soul is something different from
the body. When, therefore, he chooses for his third boon
the clearing up of his doubt as to the existence of the soul
after death (as stated in v. 20), it is evident that his ques-
tion is prompted by the desire to acquire knowledge of the
true nature of the highest Self—which knowledge has
the form of meditation on the highest Self—, and by means
thereof, knowledge of the true nature of final Release which
consists in obtaining the highest Brahman. The passage,
therefore, is not concerned merely with the problem as to
the separation of the soul from the body, but rather with
the problem of the Self freeing itself from all bondage
whatever—the same problem, in fact, with which another
scriptural passage also is concerned, viz. ‘When he has
departed there is no more knowledge’ (Br#. Up. II, 4, 12).
The full purport of Nagiketas’ question, therefore, is as
follows: When a man qualified for Release has died and
thus freed himself from all bondage, there arises a doubt
as to his existence or non-existence—a doubt due to the
disagreement of philosophers as to the true nature of
Release ; in order to clear up this doubt I wish to learn
from thee the true nature of the state of Release.—Philo-
sophers, indeed, hold many widely differing opinions as to
what constitutes Release. Some hold that the Self is cons

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12. 271

stituted by consciousness only, and that Release consists in
the total destruction of this essential nature of the Self.
Others, while holding the same opinion as to the nature of
the Self, define Release as the passing away of Nescience
(avidya). Others hold that the Self is in itself non-sentient,
like a stone, but possesses, in the state of bondage, certain
distinctive qualities, such as knowledge, and so on. Release
then consists in the total removal of all these qualities, the
Self remaining in a state of pure isolation (kaivalya).
Others, again, who acknowledge a highest Self free from all
imperfection, maintain that through connexion with limit-
ing adjuncts that Self enters on the condition of an indi-
vidual soul; Release then means the pure existence of
the highest Self, consequent on the passing away of the
limiting adjuncts. Those, however, who understand the
Vedanta, teach as follows: There is a highest Brahman
which is the sole cause of the entire universe, which is
antagonistic to all evil, whose essential nature is infinite
knowledge and blessedness, which comprises within itself
numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence,
which is different in nature from all other beings, and which
constitutes the inner Self of all. Of this Brahman, the indi-
vidual souls—whose true nature is unlimited knowledge,
and whose only essential attribute is the intuition of the
supreme Self—are modes, in so far, namely, as they con-
Stitute its body. The true nature of these souls is, how-
ever, obscured by Nescience, i.e. the influence of the
beginningless chain of works ; and by Release then we have
to understand that intuition of the highest Self, which is
the natural state of the individual souls, and which follows
on the destruction of Nescience—When Naéiketas desires
Yama graciously to teach him the true nature of Release
and the means to attain it, Yama at first tests him by
dwelling on the difficulty of comprehending Release, and
by tempting him with various worldly enjoyments. But
having in this way recognised the boy’s thorough fitness,
he in the end instructs him as to the kind of meditation on
the highest Self which constitutes knowledge of the highest
Reality, as to the nature of Release—which consists in

272 τ᾿ VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

reaching the abode of the highest Self—, and as to all the
required details.) This instruction begins, I, 2, 12, ‘The
Ancient one who is difficult to see,’ &c., and extends up to
I, 3, 9, ‘and that is the highest place of Vishwu.’—It thus
is an established conclusion that the ‘eater’ is no other
than the highest Self.—Here terminates the adhikarana of
“τῆς eater.’

13. (The Person) within the eye (is the highest
Self) on account of suitability.

The Khandogas have the following text: ‘The Person
that is seen within the eye, that is the Self. This is the
immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman’ (KX. Up. IV, 15, 1).
The doubt here arises whether the person that is here
spoken of as abiding within the eye is the reflected Self, or
some divine being presiding over the sense of sight, or the
embodied Self, or the highest Self.—It is the reflected Self,
the Parvapakshin maintains; for the text refers to the
person seen as something well known, and the expression,
‘is seen, clearly refers to something directly perceived.
Or it may be the individual soul, for that also may be
referred to as something well known, as it is in special
connexion with the eye: people, by looking into the open
eye of a person, determine whether the living soul remains
in him or is departing. Or else we may assume that the
Person seen within the eye is some particular divine being,
on the strength of the scriptural text, Bri. Up. V, 5, 2, ‘He
(the person seen within the sun) rests with his rays in him
(the person within the eye).’ Any of these beings may
quite suitably be referred to as something well known.—
Of these alternatives the Sitra disposes by declaring that
the Person within the eye is the highest Self. For the
text goes on to say about the Person seen within the eye,
‘ They call him Sasyadvama, for all blessings go towards
him. He is also V4mani, for he leads all blessings. He is
also Bhamani, for he shines in all worlds.’ And all these
attributes can be reconciled with the highest Self only.

14. Andon account of the statement as to abode,
and so on. : :

1 ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 15. 273
Abiding within the eye, ruling the eye, and so on are
predicated by scripture of the highest Self only, viz. in
Bri. Up. III, 7, 18, ‘He who dwells within the eye, who
rules the eye within.’ We therefore recognise that highest
Self in the text, ‘That Person which is seen within the
eye.’ The argument founded on reference to ‘something
well known’ thus suits the highest Self very well; and also
the clause which denotes immediate perception (‘is seen ’)
appears quite suitable, since the highest Self is directly
intuited by persons practising mystic concentration of
mind (Yoga).

15. And on account of the text referring only to
what is characterised by pleasure.

The Person abiding within the eye is the highest Person,
for the following reason also. The topic of the whole
section is Brahman characterised by delight, as indicated
in the passage ‘Ka (pleasure) is Brahman, Kha (ether) is
Brahman’ (KA. Up. IV, 10, 5). To that same Brahman
the passage under discussion (‘The Person that is seen in
the eye’) refers for the purpose of enjoining first a place
with which Brahman is to be connected in meditation, and
secondly some special qualities—such as comprising and
leading all blessings—to be attributed to Brahman in
meditation.—The word ‘only’ in the Satra indicates the
independence of the argument set forth.

But—an objection is raised—between the Brahman intro-
duced in the passage ‘Ka is Brahman,’ &c.,and the text under
discussion there intervenes the vidya of the Fires (KA.
Up. IV, 11-13), and hence Brahman does not readily
connect itself with our passage. For the text says that
after the Fires had taught Upakosala the knowledge of
Brahman (‘Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman,’ &c.), they
taught him a meditation on themselves (‘ After that the
Garhapatya fire taught him, &c., KA. Up. IV, 11, 1). And
this knowledge of the Fires cannot be considered a mere
subordinate part of the knowledge of Brahman, for the
text declares that it has special fruits of its own—viz.
the attainment of a ripe old age and prosperous descen-

[48] T

274 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

dants, &c.—which are not comprised in the results of the
knowledge of Brahman, but rather opposed to them in
nature.—To this we make the following reply. As both
passages (viz. IV, 10, 5, " Breath is Brahman,’ &c.; and
IV, 15, 1, ‘this is Brahman’) contain the word Brahman,
and as from the words of the Fires, ‘the teacher will tell
you the way,’ it follows that the knowledge of Brahman is
not complete before that way has been taught, we deter-
mine that the knowledge of the Fires which stands between
the two sections of the knowledge of Brahman is a mere
subordinate member of the latter. This also appears from
the fact that the Garhapatya fire begins to instruct Upakosala
only after he has been introduced into the knowledge of
Brahman. Upakosala moreover complains that he is full
of sorrows (I, 10, 3), and thus shows himself to be con-
scious of all the sufferings incidental to human life—birth,
old age, death, &c.—which result from man being troubled
by manifold desires for objects other than the attainment
of Brahman; when therefore the Fires conclude their
instruction by combining in saying, ‘ This, O friend, is the
knowledge of us and the knowledge of the Self which we
impart to thee,’ it is evident that the vidya of the Fires has
to be taken as a subordinate member of the knowledge of
the Self whose only fruit is Release, And from this it
follows that the statement of the results of the Agnividya
has to be taken (not as an injunction of results—phalavidhi
—but) merely as an arthavada (cp. Pd. Mi. Sa. IV, 3, 1).
It, moreover, is by no means true that the text mentions
such fruits of the Agnividy4 as would be opposed to final
Release ; all the fruits mentioned suit very well the case
of a person qualified for Release. ‘He destroys sin’
(KA. Up. IV, 11, 2; 12, 2; 13, 2), i.e. he destroys all evil
works standing in the way of the attainment of Brahman,
‘He obtains the world, i. e. all impeding evil works having
been destroyed he obtains the world of Brahman. ‘He
reaches his full age,’ i.e. he fully reaches that age which
is required for the completion of meditation on Brahman,
‘He lives long,’ i. 6. he lives unassailed by afflictions until
he reaches Brahman, ‘His descendants do not perish,’

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 15. 275

i.e. his pupils, and their pupils, as well as his sons, grand-
sons, &c., do not perish; i.e. they are all knowers of
Brahman, in agreement with what another text declares
to be the reward of knowledge of Brahman—‘ In _ his
family no one is born ignorant of Brahman’ (Mu. Up. III,
2,9). ‘We guard him in this world and the other,’ i.e.
we Fires guard him from all troubles until he reaches
Brahman.—The Agnividy4 thus being a member of the
Brahmavidy4, there is no reason why the Brahman
introduced in the earlier part of the Brahmavidy4 should
not be connected with the latter part—the function of
this latter part being to enjoin a place of meditation
(Brahman being meditated on as the Person within the
eye), and some special qualities of Brahman to be included
in the meditation—But (an objection is raised) as the
Fires tell Upakosala ‘the teacher will tell you the way,’
we conclude that the teacher has to give information as
to the way to Brahman only; how then can his teaching
refer to the place of meditation and the special qualities
of Brahman?—We have to consider, we reply, in what
connexion the Fires address those words to Upakosala.
His teacher having gone on a journey without having
imparted to him the knowledge of Brahman, and Upakosala
being dejected on that account, the sacred fires of his
teacher, well pleased with the way in which Upakosala had
tended them, and wishing to cheer him up, impart to him
the general knowledge of the nature of Brahman and the
subsidiary knowledge of the Fires. But remembering
that, as scripture says, ‘the knowledge acquired from
a teacher is best,’ and hence considering it advisable that
the teacher himself should instruct Upakosala as to the
attributes of the highest Brahman, the place with which
it is to be connected in meditation and the way leading to
it, they tell him ‘the teacher will tell you the way,’ the
‘way ’ connoting everything that remains to be taught by
the teacher. In agreement herewith the teacher—having
first said, ‘I will tell you this ; and as water does not cling
to a lotus leaf, so no evil clings to one who knows it’
— instructs him about Brahman as possessing certain
T2

276 . VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

auspicious attributes, and to be meditated upon as abiding
within the eye, and about the way leading to Brahman.—
It is thus a settled conclusion that the text under discussion
refers to that Brahman which was introduced in the passage
‘Ka is Brahman,’ and that hence the Person abiding within
the eye is the highest Self.

But—an objection is raised—how do you know that the
passage ‘ Ka (pleasure) is Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brah-
man’ really refers to the highest Brahman, so as to be
able to interpret on that basis the text about the Person
within the eye? It is a more obvious interpretation to
take the passage about Ka and Kha as enjoining a medi-
tation on Brahman viewed under the form of elemental
ether and of ordinary worldly pleasure. This interpretation
would, moreover, be in agreement with other similarly
worded texts (which are generally understood to enjoin
meditation on Brahman in a definite form), such as ‘ Name
is Brahman,’ ‘ Mind is Brahman.’

16. For that very reason that (ether) is Brahman.

Because the clause ‘What is Ka the same is Kha’ speaks
of ether as characterised by pleasure, the ether which is
denoted by ‘ Kha’ is no other than the highest Brahman.
To explain. On the Fires declaring ‘ Breath is Brahman,
Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,’ Upakosala says, ‘I
understand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand
Ka and Kha.’ The meaning of this is as follows. The
Fires cannot speak of meditation on Brahman under the
form of breath and so on, because they are engaged in
giving instruction to me, who am afraid of birth, old age,
death, &c., and desirous of final Release. What they
declare to me therefore is meditation on Brahman itself.
Now here Brahman is exhibited in co-ordination with
certain well-known things, breath and so on, That Brahman
should be qualified by co-ordination with breath is suitable,
either from the point of view of Brahman having the attri-
bute of supporting the world, or on account of Brahman
being the ruler of breath, which stands to it in the relation
of a body. Hence Upakosala says, ‘I understand that

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 17, 277

breath is Brahman.’ With regard to pleasure and ether,
on the other hand, there arises the question whether they
are exhibited in the relation of qualifying attributes of
Brahman on the ground of their forming the body of
Brahman, and hence being ruled by it, or whether the two
terms are meant to determine each other, and thus to
convey a notion of the true nature of Brahman being con-
stituted by supreme delight. On the former alternative
the declaration of the Fires would only state that Brahman
is the ruler of the elemental ether and of all delight de-
pending on the sense-organs, and this would give no notion
of Brahman’s true nature; on the latter alternative the
Fires would declare that unlimited delight constitutes
Brahman’s true nature. In order to ascertain which of
the two meanings has to be taken, Upakosala therefore
says, ‘I do not understand Ka and Kha.’ The Fires, com-
prehending what is in his mind, thereupon reply, ‘What is
Ka the same is Kha, what is Kha the same is Ka,’ which
means that the bliss which constitutes Brahman’s nature
is unlimited. The same Brahman therefore which has
breath for its attribute because breath constitutes its body,
is of the nature of unlimited bliss; the text therefore adds,
‘ They taught him that (viz. Brahman) as breath and as
ether. What the text,‘Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,’
teaches thus is Brahman as consisting of unlimited bliss,
and this Brahman is resumed in the subsequent text about
the Person seen within the eye. That Person therefore
is the highest Self.

17. And on account of the statement of the way
of him who has heard the Upanishads.

Other scriptural texts give an account of the way—the
first station of which is light—that leads up to the highest
Person, without any subsequent return, the soul of him
who has read the Upanishads, and has thus acquired
a knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self. Now
this same way is described by the teacher to Upakosala
in connexion with the instruction as to the Person in the
eye, ‘ They go to light, from light to day,’ &c. This also

278 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

proves that the Person within the eye is the highest

Self.

18, Not any other, on account of non-permanency
of abode, and of impossibility.

As the reflected Self and the other Selfs mentioned by
the Pfirvapakshin do not necessarily abide within the eye,
and as conditionless immortality and the other qualities
(ascribed in the text to the Person within the eye) cannot
possibly belong to them, the Person within the eye cannot
be any Self other than the highest Self. Of the reflected
Self it cannot be said that it permanently abides within
the eye, for its presence there depends on the nearness
to the eye of another person. The embodied Self again
has its seat within the heart, which is the root of all sense-
organs, so as to assist thereby the activities of the different
senses; it cannot therefore abide within the eye. And
with regard to the divinity the text says that ‘he rests
with his rays in him, i.e. the eye’: this implies that the
divine being may preside over the organ of sight although
itself abiding in another place ; it does not therefore abide
in the eye. Moreover, non-conditioned immortality and
similar qualities cannot belong to any of these three Selfs.
The Person seen within the eye therefore is the highest
Self.

We have, under SQ. I, 2, 14, assumed as proved that the
abiding within the eye and ruling the eye, which is referred
to in Brz. Up. III,7, 18 (‘ He who dwells in the eye,’ &c.), can
belong to the highest Self only, and have on that basis
proved that the Self within the eye is the highest Self.
—Here terminates the adhikaraza of that ‘ within.’ —The
next Satra now proceeds to prove that assumption.

19. The internal Ruler (referred to) in the clauses
with respect to the gods, with respect to the
worlds, &c. (is the highest Self), because the attri-
butes of that are designated.

The V4gasaneyins, of the KAvva as well as the
Madhyandina branch, have the following text: ‘He who

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 19. 279

dwelling in the earth is within the earth, whom the earth
does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the
earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the Immortal.’
The text thereupon extends this teaching as to a being
that dwells in things, is within them, is not known by them,
has them for its body and rules them; in the first place to
all divine beings, viz. water, fire, sky, air, sun, the regions,
moon, stars, ether, darkness, light ; and next to all material
beings, viz. breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge,
seed—closing each section with the words, ‘ He is thy Self,
the ruler within, the Immortal.’ The Madhyandinas, how-
ever, have three additional sections, viz. ‘He who dwells
in all worlds,’ &c.; ‘He who dwells in all Vedas, &c.;
“Ἧς who dwells in all sacrifices’ ; and, moreover, in place
of ‘He who dwells in knowledge’ (vig#ana) they read
‘ He who dwells in the Self.—A doubt here arises whether
the inward Ruler of these texts be the individual Self or
the highest Self.

The individual Self, the POrvapakshin maintains. For
in the supplementary passage (which follows upon the text
considered so far) the internal Ruler is called the ‘seer’
and ‘hearer,’ i.e. his knowledge is said to depend on the
sense-organs, and this implies the view that the ‘seer’ only
(i.e. the individual soul only) is the inward Ruler; and
further the clause ‘ There is no other seer but he’ negatives
any other seer.

This view is set aside by the Sdtra. The Ruler within,
who is spoken of in the clauses marked in the text by the
terms ‘with respect of the gods,’ ‘with respect of the
worlds,’ &c., is the highest Self free from all evil, Narayana,
The Sftra purposely joins the two terms ‘ with respect to
the gods’ and ‘with respect to the worlds’ in order to
intimate that, in addition to the clauses referring to the
gods and beings (bhita) exhibited by the Kazva-text, the
MAdhyandina-text contains additional clauses referring to
the worlds, Vedas, &c. The inward Ruler spoken of in
both these sets of passages is the highest Self; for attri-
butes of that Self are declared in the text. For it is
a clear attribute of the highest Self that being one only

280 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

it rules all worlds, all Vedas, all divine beings, and so on.
Udd4laka asks,‘ Dost thou know that Ruler within who
within rules this world and the other world and all beings?
&c.—tell now that Ruler within’ ; and Y4g#avalkya replies
with the long passus, ‘He who dwells in the earth,’ &c.,
describing the Ruler within as him who, abiding within all
worlds, all beings, all divinities, all Vedas, and all sacrifices,
rules them from within and constitutes their Self, they in
turn constituting his body. Now this is a position which
can belong to none else but the highest Person, who is
all-knowing, and all whose purposes immediately realise
themselves. That it is the highest Self only which rules
over all and is the Self of all, other Upanishad-texts
also declare; cp. e.g. ‘Entered within, the ruler of
creatures, the Self of all’; ‘Having sent forth this he
entered into it. Having entered it he became sat and
tyat,’ &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 6). Similarly the text from the
Sub4la-Up., which begins, ‘there was not anything here
in the beginning, and extends up to ‘the one God,
N4rdyana,’ shows that it is the highest Brahman only
which rules all, is the Self of all, and has all beings for its
body. Moreover, essential immortality (which the text
ascribes to the Ruler within) is an attribute of the highest
Self only.—Nor must it be thought that the power of
seeing and so on that belongs to the highest Self is
dependent on sense-organs ; it rather results immediately
from its essential nature, since its omniscience and power
to realise its purposes are due to its own being only, In
agreement herewith scripture says, ‘ He sees without eyes,
he hears without ears, without hands and feet he grasps
and hastes’ (Svet. Up. III, 19). What terms such as
‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ really denote is not knowledge in
so far as produced by the eye and ear, but the intuitive
presentation of colour and sound. In the case of the
individual soul, whose essentially intelligising nature is
obscured by karman, such intuitive knowledge arises only
through the mediation of the sense-organs ; in the case of
the highest Self, on the other hand, it springs from its own
nature.—Again, the clause ‘ there is no other seer but he’

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. 281

means that there is no seer other than the seer and ruler
described in the preceding clauses. Τὸ explain. The
clauses ‘ whom the earth does not know,’ &c., up to ‘ whom
the Self does not know’ mean to say that the Ruler within
rules without being perceived by the earth, Self, and the
other beings which he rules. This is confirmed by the
subsequent clauses, ‘unseen but a seer,’ ‘unheard but
a hearer,’ &c. And the next clauses, ‘there is no other
seer but he,’ &c., then mean to negative that there is any
other being which could be viewed as the ruler of that
Ruler. Moreover, the clauses ‘ that is the Self of thee,’
‘He is the Self of thee’ exhibit the individual Self in the
genitive form (‘ of thee’), and thus distinguish it from the
Ruler within, who is declared to be their Self.

20. And not that which Smyzti assumes, on ac-
count of the declaration of qualities not belonging
to that; nor the embodied one.

‘That which Smriti assumes’ is the Pradhana; the ‘em-
bodied one’ is the individual soul. Neither of these can be
the Ruler within, since the text states attributes which
cannot possibly belong to either. For there is not even
the shadow of a possibility that essential capability of
seeing and ruling all things, and being the Self of all, and
immortality should belong either to the non-sentient
Pradhana or to the individual soul—The last two Satras
have declared that the mentioned qualities belong to
the highest Self, while they do not belong to the indi-
vidual soul. The next Sdtra supplies a new, independent
argument.

21. For both also speak of it as something
different.

Both, i.e. the Madhyandinas as well as the KAavas, dis-
tinguish in their texts the embodied soul, together with
speech and other non-intelligent things, from the Ruler
within, representing it as an object of his rule. The
MAdhyandinas read, ‘ He who dwells in the Self, whom the
Self does not know,’ &c.; the Kasvas, ‘He who dwells

282 _ vepAnTa-sOTRAS.

within understanding, &c. The declaration of the indi-
vidual Self being ruled by the Ruler within implies of
course the declaration of the former being different from
the latter.

The conclusion from all this is that the Ruler within is
a being different from the individual soul, viz. the highest
Self free from all evil, Narayaza.—Here terminates the
adhikaraza of ‘the internal Ruler.’

22. That which possesses the qualities of in-
visibility, &c., on account of the declaration of
attributes.

The Atharvaikas read in their text, ‘The higher know-
ledge is that by which that Indestructible is apprehended.
That which is invisible, unseizable, without origin and
qualities, &c., that it is which the wise regard as the source
of all beings’; and further on, ‘ That which is higher than
the high Imperishable’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5,6; II, 1,2). The
doubt here arises whether the Indestructible, possessing the
qualities of imperceptibility, &c., and that which is higher
than the Indestructible, should be taken to denote the Pra-
dhana and the soul of the Sankhyas, or whether both denote
the highest Self—The Parvapakshin maintains the former
alternative. For, he says, while in the text last discussed
there is mentioned a special attribute of an intelligent being,
viz. in the clause ‘unseen but a seer,’ no similar attribute is
stated in the former of the two texts under discussion, and
the latter text clearly describes the collective individual
soul, which is higher than the imperishable Pradhana, which
itself is higher than all its effects. The reasons for this
decision are as follows :—Colour and so on reside in the
gross forms of non-intelligent matter, viz. the elements,
earth, and so on. When, therefore, visibility and so on are
expressly negatived, such negation suggests a non-sentient
thing cognate to earth, &c., but of a subtle kind, and such
a thing is no other than the Pradhana. And as something
higher than this Pradhana there are known the collective
souls only, under whose guidance the Pradhfna gives
birth to all its effects, from the so-called Mahat downwards

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 23. 283

to individual things. This interpretation is confirmed by
the comparisons set forth in the next sloka, ‘As the spider
sends forth and draws in its threads, as plants spring from
the earth, as hair grows on the head and body of the living
man, thus does everything arise here from the Inde-
structible.’ The section therefore is concerned only with
the Pradhana and the individual soul.

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sdtra. That
which possesses invisibility and the other qualities stated in
the text, and that which is higher than the high In-
destructible, is no other than the highest Self. For the
text declares attributes which belong to the highest Self
only, viz. in I, 1, 9,‘ He who knows all, cognises all,’ &c.
Let us shortly consider the connexion of the text. The
passage beginning ‘the higher knowledge is that by which
the Indestructible is apprehended’ declares an inde-
Structible being possessing the attributes of invisibility and
so on, The clause ‘everything arises here from the
Indestructible’ next declares that from that being all things
originate. Next the sloka, ‘He who knows all and cognises
all,’ predicates of that Indestructible which is the source of
all beings, omniscience, and similar qualities. And finally
the text, ‘ That which is higher than the high Indestructible,’
characterises that same being—which previously had been
called invisible, the source of beings, indestructible, all-
knowing, &c.—as the highest of all. Hence it is evident
that in the text ‘higher than the high Indestructible’ the
term ‘Indestructible’ does not denote the invisible, &c.
Indestructible, which is the chief topic of the entire section ;
for there can of course be nothing higher than that which,
as being all-knowing, the source of all, &c., is itself higher
than anything else. The ‘ Indestructible’ in that text there-
fore denotes the elements in their subtle condition.

23. Not the two others, on account of distinction
and statement of difference.

The section distinguishes the indestructible being, which
is the source of al], &c., from the Pradhana as well as the
individual soul, in so far, namely, as it undertakes to prove

284 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

that by the cognition of one thing everything is known;
and it moreover, in passages such as ‘higher than the high
Indestructible,’ explicitly states the difference of the inde-
structible being from those other two.—The text first relates
that Brahmé told the knowledge of Brahman, which is the
foundation of the knowledge of all, to his eldest son
Atharvan: this introduces the knowledge of Brahman as
the topic of the section. Then, the text proceeds, in order
to obtain this knowledge of Brahman, which had been
handed down through a succession of teachers to Aagiras,
Saunaka approached Angiras respectfully and asked him:
‘ What is that through which, if known, all this is known?’
i.e. since all knowledge is founded on the knowledge of
Brahman, he enquires after the nature of Brahman. An-
giras replies that he who wishes to attain Brahman must
acquire two kinds of knowledge, both of them having
Brahman for their object: an indirect one which springs
from the study of the s4stras, viz. the Veda, Siksha, Kalpa,
and so on, and a direct one which springs from concentrated
meditation (yoga). The latter kind of knowledge is the
means of obtaining Brahman, and it is of the nature of
devout meditation (bhakti), as characterised in the text
‘He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained’
(III, 2, 3). The means again towards this kind of know-
ledge is such knowledge as is gained from sacred tradition,
assisted by abstention and the other six auxiliary means
(see above, p.17); in agreement with the text, ‘Him the
Brahmavas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by
sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting’ (Brz. Up. IV, 4,
22).—Thus the Reverend Pardsara also says, ‘ The cause of
attaining him is knowledge and work, and knowledge is
twofold, according as it is based on sacred tradition or
springs from discrimination.’ The Muzdaka-text refers to
the inferior kind of knowledge in the passage ‘the lower
knowledge is the Rig-veda,’ &c., up to ‘and the dharma-
sastras’; this knowledge is the means towards the intuition
of Brahman; while the higher kind of knowledge, which is
called ‘up4sana,’ has the character of devout meditation
(bhakti), and consists in direct intuition of Brahman, is

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 23. 285

referred to in the clause ‘the higher knowledge is that by
which the Indestructible is apprehended.’ The text next
following, ‘ That which is invisible,’ &c., then sets forth the
nature of the highest Brahman, which is the object of
the two kinds of knowledge previously described. After
this the passage ‘As the spider sends forth and draws in
its thread’ declares that from that indestructible highest
Brahman, as characterised before, there originates the
whole universe of things, sentient and non-sentient. The
next sloka (tapasA Aiyate, &c.) states particulars about this
origination of the universe from Brahman. ‘Brahman
swells through brooding’; through brooding, i.e. thought—
in agreement with a later text, ‘brooding consists of
thought ’"—Brahman swells, i.e. through thought in the
form of an intention, viz. ‘may I become many,’ Brahman
becomes ready for creation. From it there springs first
‘anna,’ i.e. that which is the object of fruition on the part
of all enjoying agents, viz. the non-evolved subtle principles
of all elements. From this ‘anna’ there spring successively
breath, mind, and all other effected things up to work,
which is the means of producing reward in the form of the
heavenly world, and Release. The last sloka of the first
chapter thereupon first states the qualities, such as om-
niscience and so on, which capacitate the highest Brahman
for creation, and then declares that from the indestructible
highest Brahman there springs the effected (karya) Brah-
man, distinguished by name and form, and comprising all
enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment.—The first
sloka of the second chapter declares first that the highest
Brahman is absolutely real (‘That is true’), and then
admonishes those who desire to reach the indestructible
highest Self, which possesses all the blessed qualities stated
before and exists through itself, to turn away from other
rewards and to perform all those sacrificial works depending
on the three sacred fires which were seen and revealed by
poets in the four Vedas and are incumbent on men accord-
ing to caste and Asrama. The section ‘this is your path’
(I, 2, 1) up to ‘this is the holy Brahma-world gained by
your good works’ (I, 2, 6) next states the particular mode

286 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

of performing those works, and declares that an omission
of one of the successive works enjoined in Sruti and Smriti
involves fruitlessness of the works actually performed, and
that something not performed in the proper way is as good
as not performed at all. Stanzas 7 and ff. (‘ But frail in truth
are those boats’) declare that those who perform this
lower class of works have to return again and again into
the Samsdra, because they aim at worldly results and are
deficient in true knowledge. Stanza 8 (‘but those who
practise penance and faith’) then proclaims that works
performed by a man possessing true knowledge, and hence
not aiming at worldly rewards, result in the attainment of
Brahman; and stanzas 12a, 13 (‘having examined all these
worlds’) enjoin knowledge, strengthened by due works, on
the part of a man who has turned away from mere works,
as the means of reaching Brahman; and due recourse to
a teacher on the part of him who is desirous of such know-
ledge.—The first chapter of the second section of the
Upanishad (II, 1) then clearly teaches how the imperishable
highest Brahman, i.e. the highest Self—as constituting the
Self of all things and having all things for its body—has all
things for its outward form and emits all things from itself.
The remainder of the Upanishad (‘ Manifest, near,’ &c.)
teaches how this highest Brahman, which is imperishable
and higher than the soul, which itself is higher than the
Unevolved; which dwells in the highest Heaven; and
which is of the nature of supreme bliss, is to be meditated
upon as within the hollow of the heart; how this meditation
has the character of devout faith (bhakti); and how the
devotee, freeing himself from Nescience, obtains for his
reward intuition of Brahman, which renders him like
Brahman.

It thus clearly appears that ‘on account of distinction
and statement of difference’ the Upanishad does not treat
of the Pradhana and the soul, For that the highest Brah-
man is different from those two is declared in passages
such as ‘ That heavenly Person is without body; he is both
without and within, not produced, without breath and
without mind, pure, higher than what is higher than the

1 ADHYAyA, 2 PADA, 25. 287

Imperishable’ (II, 1, 2); for the last words mean ‘that
imperishable highest Self possessing invisibility and similar
qualities, which is higher than the aggregate of individual
souls, which itself is higher than the non-evolved subtle
elements.’ The term ‘akshara’ (imperishable) is to be
etymologically explained either as that which pervades
(asnute) or that which does not pass away (a-ksharati), and
is on either of these explanations applicable to the highest
Self, either because that Self pervades all its effects or
because it is like the so-called Mahat (which is also called
akshara), free from all passing away or decaying.—Here
terminates the adhikarava of ‘invisibility and so on.’

24. And on account of the description of its form,

‘Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon, the
regions his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind
his breath, his heart the universe ; from his feet came the
earth ; he is indeed the inner Self of all things’ (II, 1, 4)—
the outward form here described can belong to none but
the highest Self; that is, the inner Self of all beings. The
section therefore treats of the highest Self,

25. Vaisvanara (is the highest Self), on account of
the distinctions qualifying the common term.

The Kkhandogas read in their text, ‘You know at
present that Vaisvanara Self, tell us that,’ &c., and further
on, ‘But he who meditates on the Vaisvdnara Self as a
span long,’ ἃς, (K%. Up. V, 11, 6; 18,1). The doubt here
arises whether that Vaisvanara Self can be made out ta
be the highest Self or not. The Parvapakshin maintains
the latter alternative. For, he says, the word Vaisvanara
is used in the sacred texts in four different senses. It
denotes in the first place the intestinal fire, so in Β γέ.
Up. V, 9, ‘ That is the Vaisvanara fire by which the food
that is eaten is cooked, i.e. digested. Its noise is that
which one hears when one covers one’s ears. When man
is on the point of departing this life he does not hear
that noise.’—It next denotes the third of the elements, sa
in Ri. Samh. X, 88, 12, ‘For the whole world the gods

288 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

have made the Agni Vaisvanara a sign of the days. —It
also denotes a divinity, so Rt. Samh. I, 98,1, ‘May we
be in the favour of Vaisvanara, for he is the king of the
kings,’ &c. And finally it denotes the highest Self, as in
the passage, ‘He offered it in the Self, in the heart, in
Agni Vaisvanara’; and in Pra. Up. I, 7, ‘Thus he rises
as VaisvAnara, assuming all forms, as breath of life, as
fire. —And the characteristic marks mentioned in the
introductory clauses of the KAandogya-text under discus-
sion admit of interpretations agreeing with every one of
these meanings of the word Vaisvanara.

Against this prima facie view the Sdtra declares itself.
The term ‘ Vaisvanara’ in the K/4ndogya-text denotes the
highest Self, because the ‘common’ term is there qualified
by attributes specially belonging to the highest Self. For
the passage tells us how Aupamanyava and four other
great Xishis, having met and discussed the question as to
what was their Self and Brahman, come to the conclusion
to go to Udd4laka because he is reputed to know the
Vaisvanara Self. Uddalaka, recognising their anxiety to
know the Vaisvanara Self, and deeming himself not to be
fully informed on this point, refers them to Asvapati
Kaikeya as thoroughly knowing the Vaisvanara Self; and
they thereupon, together with Uddalaka, approach Asva-
pati. The king duly honours them with presents, and as
they appear unwilling to receive them, explains that they
may suitably do so, he himself being engaged in the per-
formance of a religious vow; and at the same time instructs
them that even men knowing Brahman must avoid what
is forbidden and do what is prescribed. When thereupon
he adds that he will give them as much wealth as to the
priests engaged in his sacrifice, they, desirous of Release
and of knowing the Vaisvanara Self, request him to explain
that Self to them. Now it clearly appears that as the
Rishis are said to be desirous of knowing that Brahman
which is the Self of the individual souls (‘ what is our Self,
what is Brahman’), and therefore search for some one to
instruct them on that point, the Vaisvanara Self—to a
person acquainted with which they address themselves —

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 26. 289

can be the highest Self only. In the earlier clauses the
terms used are ‘Self’ and ‘ Brahman,’ in the later ‘ Self’
and ‘ Vaisvanara’; from this it appears also that the term
‘ Vaisvanara, which takes the place of ‘ Brahman,’ denotes
none other but the highest Self. The results, moreover, of
the knowledge of the Vaisvanara Self, which are stated in
subsequent passages, show that the Vaisvanara Self is the
highest Brahman. ‘He eats food in all worlds, in all
beings, in all Selfs’; ‘as the fibres of the Ishika reed
when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are
burned’ (V, 18, 1; 24, 3).

The next Sfitra supplies a further reason for the same
conclusion.

26. That which the text refers to is an inferential
mark—thus.

The text describes the shape of Vaisvdnara, of whom
heaven, &c., down to earth constitute the several limbs;
and it is known from Scripture and Smrzti that such is
the shape of the highest Self. When, therefore, we recog-
nise that shape as referred to in the text, this supplies an
inferential mark of Vaisvanara being the highest Self.—
The ‘thus’ (iti) in the Sdtra denotes a certain mode, that
is to say, ‘a shape of such a kind being recognised in the
text enables us to infer that Vaisvanara is the highest Self,’
For in Scripture and Smriti alike the highest Person is
declared to have such a shape. Cp. e.g. the text of the
Atharvanas. ‘Agni is his head, the sun and moon his eyes,
the regions his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the
wind his breath, his heart the Universe; from his feet
came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of all things’
(Mu. Up. II, 1, 4). ‘Agni’ in this passage denotes the
heavenly world, in agreement with the text ‘that world
indeed is Agni.’ And the following Smriti texts: ‘He of
whom the wise declare the heavenly world to be the head,
the ether the navel, sun and moon the eyes, the regions
the ears, the earth the feet; he whose Self is unfathomable
is the leader of all beings’; and ‘of whom Agni is the
mouth, heaven the head, the ether the navel, the earth the

[48] υ

290 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

feet, the sun the eye, the regions the ear; worship to him,
the Self of the Universe!’—Now our text declares the
heavenly world and so on to constitute the head and the
other limbs of Vaisvanara. For Kaikeya on being asked
by the Rishis to instruct them as to the Vaisvanara Self
recognises that they all know something about the Vai-
svanara Self while something they do not know (for thus
only we can explain his special questions), and then in
order to ascertain what each knows and what not, questions
them separately. When thereupon Aupamanyava replies
that he meditates on heaven only as the Self, Kaikeya, in
order to disabuse him from the notion that heaven is the
whole Vaisvanara Self, teaches him that heaven is the
head of Vaisvanara, and that of heaven which thus is a
part only of Vaisvanara, Sutegas is the special name.
Similarly he is thereupon told by the other Xishis that
they meditate only on sun, air, ether, and earth, and
informs them in return that the special names of these
beings are ‘the omniform,’ ‘he who moves in various ways,’
‘the full one, ‘ wealth,’ and ‘firm rest,’ and that these all
are mere members of the Vaisvanara Self, viz. its eyes,
breath, trunk, bladder, and feet. The shape thus described
in detail can belong to the highest Self only, and hence
Vaisvanara is none other but the highest Self.

The next Sdtra meets a further doubt as to this decision
not yet being well established.

27. Should it be said that it is not so, on account
of the word, &c., and on account of the abiding
within; we say, no; on account of meditation being
taught thus, on account of impossibility ; and be-
cause they read of him as person.

An objection is raised. Vaisvanara cannot be ascer-
tained to be the highest Self, because, on the account of
the text and of the abiding within, we can understand by
the Vaisvanara in our text the intestinal fire also. The
text to which we refer occurs in the Vaisvanara-vidy4 of the
Vagasaneyins, ‘This one is the Agni Vaisvdnara,’ where
the two words ‘ Agni’ and ‘ Vaisv4nara’ are exhibited in

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 27. 291

co-ordination. And in the section under discussion the
passage, ‘the heart is the Garhapatya fire, the mind the
Anvaharya-pazana fire, the mouth the Ahavaniya fire’
(Kk. Up. V, 18, 2), represents the Vaisvanara in so far as
abiding within the heart and so on as constituting the triad
of sacred fires. Moreover the text, ‘The first food which
a man may take is in the place of Soma. And he who
offers that first oblation should offer it to Prana’ (V, 19, 1),
intimates that Vaisvanara is the abode of the offering to
Praza. In the same way the V4gasaneyins declare that
Vaisvanara abides within man, viz. in the passage ‘He who
knows this Agni Vaisvanara shaped like a man abiding
within man.’ As thus Vaisvanara appears in co-ordination
with the word ‘ Agni,’ is represented as the triad of sacred
fires, is said to be the abode of the oblation to Breath, and
to abide within man, he must be viewed as the intestinal
fire, and it is therefore not true that he can be identified
with the highest Self only.

This objection is set aside by the δῖα. It is not so
‘on account of meditation (on the highest Self) being
taught thus,’ i.e. as the text means to teach that the
highest Brahman which, in the manher described before,
has the three worlds for its body should be meditated upon
as qualified by the intestinal fire which (like other beings)
constitutes Brahman’s body. For the word ‘Agni’ denotes
not only the intestinal fire, but also the highest Self in so
far as qualified by the intestinal fire——But how is this to
be known?—‘ On account of impossibility,’ i.e. because it
is impossible that the mere intestinal fire should have the
three worlds for its body. The true state of the case
therefore is that the word Agni, which is understood to
denote the intestinal fire, when appearing in co-ordination
with the term Vaisvanara represented as having the three
worlds for his body, denotes (not the intestinal fire, but) the
highest Self as qualified by that fire viewed as forming the
body of the Self. Thus the Lord also says, ‘ As Vaisvanara
fire I abide in the body of living creatures and, being
assisted by breath inspired and expired, digest the four-
fold food’ (Bha. Gi. XIV, 15). ‘As Vaisvanara fire’ here

U2

292 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.
means ‘embodied in the intestinal fire. —The KAandogya
text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest
Self embodied in the Vaisvanara fire—Moreover the
Vagasaneyins read of him, viz. the Vaisvanara, as man or
person, viz. in the passage ‘ That Agni Vaisvanara is the
person’ (Sa. Bra. X, 6,1, 11). The intestinal fire by itself
cannot be called a person; unconditioned personality be-
longs to the highest Self only. Compare ‘the thousand-
headed person’ (Ri. Samh.), and ‘the Person is all this’
(Sve. Up. I, 3, 15).

28. For the same reasons not the divinity and
the element.

For the reasons stated Vaisvanara can be neither the
deity Fire, nor the elemental fire which holds the third
place among the gross elements.

29. Gaimini thinks that there is no objection to
(the word ‘Agni’) directly (denoting the highest
Self).

So far it has been maintained that the word ‘ Agni,’
which stands in co-ordination with the term ‘ Vaisvanara,’
denotes the highest Self in so far as qualified by the
intestinal fire constituting its body; and that hence the
text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest
Self. Gaimini, on the other hand, is of opinion that there
is no reasonable objection to the term ‘ Agni,’ no less than
the term ‘ Vaisvanara,’ being taken directly to denote the
highest Self. That is to say—in the same way as the term
‘ Vaisvanara,’ although a common term, yet when qualified
by attributes especially belonging to the highest Self is
known to denote the latter only as possessing the quality
of ruling all men ; so the word ‘ Agni’ also when appearing
in connexion with special attributes belonging to the highest
Self denotes that Self only. For any quality on the ground
of which ‘Agni’ may be etymologically explained to de-
note ordinary fire—as when e.g. we explain ‘agni’ as he
who ‘agre nayati’—may also, in its highest non-conditioned
degree, be ascribed to the supreme Self. Another difficulty

~ 4

I ADHYAyA, 2 PADA, 31. 293

remains. The passage (V, 18, 1) ‘yas tv etam evam
pradesamatram abhivimanam,’ &c. declares that the non-
limited highest Brahman is limited by the measure of the
pradesas, i.e. of the different spaces—heaven, ether, earth,
&c.—which had previously been said to constitute the
limbs of Vaisvanara. How is this possible?

30. On account of definiteness; thus Asmarathya
opines.

The teacher Asmarathya is of opinion that the text
represents the highest Self as possessing a definite extent,
to the end of rendering the thought of the meditating
devotee more definite. That is to say—the limitation due
to the limited extent of heaven, sun, &c. has the purpose
of rendering definite to thought him who pervades (abhi)
all this Universe and in reality transcends all measure
(vimana).—A further difficulty remains. For what purpose
is the highest Brahman here represented like a man,
having a head and limbs?—This point the next Sdtra
elucidates.

31. On account of meditation, Badari thinks.

The teacher BAdari thinks that the representation in the
text of the supreme Self in the form of a man is for the pur-
pose of devout meditation. ‘He who in this way meditates on
that Vaisvanara Self as “pradesamatra” and “ abhivimana,”

_ he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs.’ What
this text enjoins is devout meditation for the purpose of
reaching Brahman. ‘In this way’ means ‘as having a
human form.’ And ‘the eating’ of food in all worlds, &c.
means the gaining of intuitional knowledge of Brahman
which abides everywhere and is in itself of the nature of
supreme bliss. The special kind of food, i.e. the special
objects of enjoyment which belong to the different Selfs
standing under the influence of karman cannot be meant
here ; for those limited objects have to be shunned by
those who desire final release. A further question arises.
If Vaisvanara is the highest Self, how can the text say that
the altar is its chest, the grass on the altar its hairs, and so

294 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

on? (V, 18,2.) Such a statement has a sense only if we
understand by Vaisvanara the intestinal fire—This difficulty
the next Sftra elucidates.

32. On account of imaginative identification, thus
Gaimini thinks; for thus the text declares.

The teacher Gaimini is of opinion that the altar is stated
to be the chest of Vaisv4nara, and so on, in order to effect
an imaginative identification of the offering to Praza which
is daily performed by the meditating devotees and is the
means of pleasing Vaisvanara, having the heaven and so on
for his body, i.e. the highest Self, with the Agnihotra-
offering. For the fruit due to meditation on the highest
Self, as well as the identity of the offering to breath with
the Agnihotra, is declared in the following text, ‘He who
without knowing this offers the Agnihotra—that would be
as if removing the live coals he were to pour his libation on
dead ashes. But he who offers this Agnihotra with a full
knowledge of its purport, he offers it in all worlds, in all
beings, in all Selfs. As the fibres of the Ishika reed when
thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt.’
(V, 24, 1-3.)

33. Moreover, they record him in that.

They (i. e. the Vagasaneyins) speak of him, viz. Vaisvanara
who has heaven for his head, &c.—i.e. the highest Self—
as within that, i.e. the body of the devotee, so as to form
the abode of the oblation to Prana; viz. in the text, ‘Of
that Vaisvanara Self the head is Sutegas, and so on. The
context is as follows, The clause ‘He who meditates on
the Vaisvanara Self as pradesamatra, &c. enjoins meditation
on the highest Self having the three worlds for its body, i.e.
on Vaisvanara. The following clause ‘he eats food in all
worlds’ teaches that the attaining of Brahman is the reward
of such meditation. And then the text proceeds to teach
the Agnihotra offered to Praza, which is something sub-
sidiary to the meditation taught. The text here establishes
an identity between the members—fire, sun, &c.—of the
Vaisvanara enjoined as object of meditation (which members

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 33. 295

are called Sutegas, Visvardpa, &c.), and parts—viz. head,
eye, breath, trunk, bladder, feet—of the worshipper’s body.
‘The head is Sutegas’—that means: the head of the
devotee is (identical with) heaven, which is the head of
the highest Self; and so on up to ‘ the feet,’ i.e. the feet of
the devotee are identical with the earth, which constitutes
the feet of the highest Self. The devotee having thus
reflected on the highest Self, which has the three worlds for
_ its body, as present within his own body, thereupon is told

to view his own chest, hair, heart, mind and mouth as
identical with the altar, grass and the other things which
are required for the Agnihotra; further to identify the
oblation to Prana with the Agnihotra, and by means
of this Praza-agnihotra to win the favour of Vaisvanara,
i.e. the highest Self. The final conclusion then remains
that Vaisv4nara is none other than the highest Self, the
supreme Person.—Here terminates the adhikaraza of
‘Vaisvanara.’

296 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

THIRD PADA.

1. The abode of heaven, earth, &c. (is the highest
Self), on account of terms which are its own.

The followers of the Atharva-veda have the following
text, ‘He in whom the heaven, the earth and the sky are
woven, the mind also, with all the vital airs, know him alone
as the Self, and leave off other words; he is the bank
(setu) of the Immortal’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5). The doubt
here arises whether the being spoken of as the abode of
heaven, earth, and so on, is the individual soul or the
highest Self.

The Pdrvapakshin maintains the former alternative.
For, he remarks, in the next sloka, ‘where like spokes
in the nave of a wheel the arteries meet, he moves
about within, becoming manifold,’ the word ‘ where’ refers
back to the being which in the preceding sloka had been
called the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, the clause
beginning with ‘where’ thus declaring that that being is
the basis of the arteries; and the next clause declares
that same being to become manifold or to be born in
many ways. Now, connexion with the arteries is clearly
characteristic of the individual soul; and so is being born
in many forms, divine and so on. Moreover, in the very
sloka under discussion it is said that that being is the abode
of the mind and the five vital airs, and this also is a
characteristic attribute of the individual soul. It being, on
these grounds, ascertained that the text refers to the in-
dividual soul we must attempt to reconcile therewith, as
well as we can, what is said about its being the abode of
heaven, earth, &c.

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sitra. That
which is described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is
none other than the highest Brahman, on account of a term
which is ‘ its own,’ i.e. which specially belongs to it. The
clause we have in view is ‘ he is the bank of the Immortal.’
This description applies to the highest Brahman only, which

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 2. 297

alone is, in all Upanishads, termed the cause of the attain-
ment of Immortality; cp. e.g. ‘Knowing him thus a man
becomes immortal; there is no other path to go’ (Sve.
Up. III, 8). The term ‘setu’ is derived from st, which
means to bind, and therefore means that which binds, i.e.
makes one to attain immortality; or else it may be under-
stood to mean that which leads towards immortality that
lies beyond the ocean of samsara, in the same way as
a bank or bridge (setu) leads to the further side of a river.—
Moreover the word ‘Self’ (4tman) (which, in the text
under discussion, is also applied to that which is the abode
of heaven, earth, &c.), without any further qualification,
primarily denotes Brahman only; for ‘4tman’ comes from
ép, to reach, and means that which ‘reaches’ all other
things in so far as it rules them. And further on (II, 2, 7)
there are other terms, ‘all knowing,’ ‘ all cognising,’ which
also specially belong to the highest Brahman only. This
Brahman may also be represented as the abode of the
arteries; as proved e.g. by Mahandr. Up. (XI, 8-12),
‘ Surrounded by the arteries he hangs .. . in the middle of
this pointed flame there dwells the highest Self’? Of that
Self it may also be said that it is born in many ways; in
accordance with texts such as ‘ not born, he is born in many
ways; the wise know the place of his birth.’ For in order
to fit himself to be a refuge for gods, men, &c. the supreme
Person, without however putting aside his true nature,
associates himself with the shape, make, qualities and works
of the different classes of beings, and thus is born in many
ways. Sm~riti says the same: ‘Though being unborn, of
non-perishable nature, the Lord of all beings, yet presiding
over my Prakriti I am born by my own mysterious power’
(Bha. Gi. IV, 6). Of the mind also and the other organs
of the individual soul the highest Self is strictly the abode ;
for it is the abode of everything.—The next Sitra supplies
a further reason,

2. And on account of its being declared that to
which the released have to resort.
. The Person who is the abode of heaven, earth, and so

298 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

on, is also declared by the text to be what is to be reached
by those who are released from the bondage of Samsara
existence. ‘When the seer sees the brilliant maker and
Lord as the Person who has his source in Brahman, then
possessing true knowledge he shakes off good and evil,
and, free from passion, reaches the highest oneness’ (Mu.
Up. III, 1, 3). ‘As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea,
losing their name and form, thus a wise man freed from
name and form goes to the divine Person who is higher
than the high’ (III, 2, 8). For it is only those freed from
the bondage of Sams4ra who shake off good and evil, are
free from passion, and freed from name and form.

For the Samsara state consists in the possession of name
and form, which is due to connexion with non-sentient
matter, such connexion springing from good and evil works.
The Person therefore who is the abode of heaven, earth,
&c., and whom the text declares to be the aim to be
reached by those who, having freed themselves from good
and evil, and hence from all contact with matter, attain
supreme oneness with the highest Brahman, can be none
other than this highest Brahman itself.

This conclusion, based on terms exclusively applicable
to the highest Brahman, is now confirmed by reference to
the absence of terms specially applicable to the individual
soul.

3. Not that which is inferred, on account of the
absence of terms denoting it, and (so also not) the
bearer of the Pramas (i.e. the individual soul), Ὁ

As the section under discussion does not treat of the
Pradhana, there being no terms referring to that, so it is
with regard to the individual soul also. In the text of the
Stra we have to read either anum4nam, i.e. ‘inference,’
in the sense of ‘object of inference, or else 4numanam,
‘object of inference’; what is meant being in both cases
the Pradh4na inferred to exist by the Sankhyas.

4. On account of the declaration of difference.
‘On the same tree man sits immersed in grief, be-

1 ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 299

wildered by “ anisa” ; but when he sees the other one, the
Lord, contented, and his glory ; then his grief passes away’
(Mu. Up. ITI, 1, 2). This, and similar texts, speak of that
one, i.e. the one previously described as the abode of
heaven, earth, &c., as different from the individual soul.—
The text means—the individual soul grieves, being be-
wildered by her who is not ‘isa,’ i.e. Prakriti, the object of
fruition. But its grief passes away when it sees him who
is other than itself, i.e. the beloved Lord of all, and his
greatness which consists in his ruling the entire world.

5. On account of the subject-matter.

It has been already shown, viz. under I, 2, 21, that the
highest Brahman constitutes the initial topic of the
Upanishad. And by the arguments set forth in the pre-
vious Sitras of the present Pada, we have removed all
suspicion as to the topic started being dropped in the
body of the Upanishad.

6. And on account of abiding and eating.

‘Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree.
One of them eats the sweet fruit ; without eating, the other
looks on’ (Mu. Up. III, 1,1). This text declares that one
enjoys the fruit of works while the other, without enjoying,
shining abides within the body. Now this shining being
which does not enjoy the fruit of works can only be the
being previously described as the abode of heaven, earth,
&c., and characterised as all knowing, the bridge of immor-
tality, the Self of all; it can in no way be the individual
Self which, lamenting, experiences the results of its works.
The settled conclusion, therefore, is that the abode of
heaven, earth, and so on, is none other than the highest
Self.—Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘heaven, earth,
and so on.’

7. The bhfiman (is the highest Self), as the
instruction about it is additional to that about
serenity.

The X Aandogas read as follows : ‘Where one sees nothing

300 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is fulness
(bhiman). Where one sees something else, hears some-
thing else, knows something else, that is the Little’ (KA.
Up. VII, 23, 24). ᾿

The term ‘ bhdman’ is derived from daku (much, many),
and primarily signifies ‘muchness.’ By ‘much’ in this
connexion, we have however to understand, not what is
numerous, but what is large, for the text uses the term in
contrast with the ‘Little’ (alpa), i.e. the ‘Small. And
the being qualified as ‘large,’ we conclude from the con-
text to be the Self; for this section of the Upanishad at
the outset states that he who knows the Self overcomes
grief (VII, 1, 3), then teaches the knowledge of the
bhdiman, and concludes by saying that ‘the Self is all this’
(VII, 25, 2).

The question now arises whether the Self called bhQman
is the individual Self or the highest Self.—The Parva-
pakshin maintains the former view. For, he says, to
Narada who had approached Sanatkumara with the desire
to be instructed about the Self, a series of beings, beginning
with ‘name’ and ending with ‘breath,’ are enumerated
as objects of devout meditation ; Narada asks each time
whether there be anything greater than name, and so on,
and each time receives an affirmative reply (‘speech is
greater than name,’ &c.); when, however, the series has
advanced as far as Breath, there is no such question and
reply. This shows that the instruction about the Self
terminates with Breath, and hence we conclude that breath
in this place means the individual soul which is associated
with breath, not a mere modification of air. Also the
clauses ‘ Breath is father, breath is mother,’ &c. (VII, 15,1),
show that breath here is something intelligent. And this
is further proved by the clause ‘ Slayer of thy father, slayer
of thy mother,’ &c. (VII, 15, 2; 3), which declares that he
who offends a father, a mother, &c., as long as there is
breath in them, really hurts them, and therefore deserves
reproach ; while no blame attaches to him who offers even
the grossest violence to them after their breath has de-
parted. For a conscious being only is capable of being

1 ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 301

hurt, and hence the word ‘breath’ here denotes such a
being only. Moreover, as it is observed that also in the
case of such living beings as have no vital breath (viz.
plants), suffering results, or does not result, according as
injury is inflicted or not, we must for this reason also
decide that the breath spoken of in the text as something
susceptible of injury is the individual soul. It conse-
quently would be an error to suppose, on the ground of
the comparison of Praza to the nave of a wheel in which
the spokes are set, that Praza here denotes the highest
Self; for the highest Self is incapable of being injured.
That comparison, on the other hand, is quite in its place,
if we understand by Pramza the individual soul, for the
whole aggregate of non-sentient matter which stands to
the individual soul in the relation of object or instrument
of enjoyment, has an existence dependent on the individual
soul. And this soul, there called Praza, is what the text
later on calls Bhiman; for as there is no question and
reply as to something greater than Praza, Prama continues,
without break, to be the subject-matter up to the mention
of bhiman. The paragraphs intervening between the
section on Pra#a (VII, 15) and the section on the Bhdman
(VII, 23 ff.) are to be understood as follows. The Praxa
section closes with the remark that he who fully knows
Prana is an ativadin, i.e. one who makes a final supreme
declaration. In the next sentence then, ‘But this one in
truth is an ativadin who makes a supreme statement by
means of the True,’ the clause ‘But this one is an ativadin’
refers back to the previously mentioned person who knows
the Praza, and the relative clause ‘who makes,’ &c., enjoins
on him the speaking of the truth as an auxiliary element in
the meditation on Prana. The next paragraph, ‘ When
one understands the truth then one declares the truth,
intimates that speaking the truth stands in a supplemen-
tary relation towards the cognition of the true nature of
the Pra#a as described before. For the accomplishment
of such cognition the subsequent four paragraphs enjoin
reflection, faith, attendance on a spiritual guide, and the
due performance of sacred duties. In order that such

302 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

duties may be undertaken, the next paragraphs then teach
that bliss constitutes the nature of the individual soul,
previously called Praza, and finally that the BhQman, i.e.
the supreme fulness of such bliss, is the proper object of
inquiry. The final purport of the teaching, therefore, is
that the true nature of the individual soul, freed from
Nescience, is abundant bliss—a conclusion which perfectly
agrees with the initial statement that he who knows the
Self passes beyond sorrow. That being, therefore, which
has the attribute of being ‘bhiman,’ is the individual Self.
This being so, it is also intelligible why, further on, when
the text describes the glory and power of the individual
Self, it uses the term ‘I’; for ‘I’ denotes just the indi-
vidual Self: ‘I am below, Iam above, &c., I am all this’
(VII, 25,1). This conclusion having been settled, all re-
maining clauses must be explained so as to agree with it.
This prima facie view is set aside by the Satra. The
being characterised in the text as ‘bhiman’ is not the indi-
vidual Self, but the highest Self, since instruction is given
about the bhiman in addition to ‘serenity’ (samprasAda).
‘Samprasada’ denotes the individual soul, as we know
from the following text, ‘Now that “serenity,” having
risen from out this body, and having reached the highest
light, appears in its true form’ (KA. Up. VIII, 3, 4). Now
in the text under discussion instruction is given about
a being called ‘the True,’ and possessing the attribute of
‘ bhiman,’ as being something additional to the individual
soul; and this being called ‘the True’ is none other than the
highest Brahman. Just as in the series of beings beginning
with name and ending with breath, each successive being
is mentioned in addition to the preceding one—wherefrom
we conclude that it is something really different from what
precedes; so that being also which is called ‘the True,’
and which is mentioned in addition to the individual Self
called Praza, is something different from the individual
Self, and this being called ‘the True’ is the same as the
Bhdman; in other words, the text teaches that the Bhiman
is the highest Brahman called ‘the True. This the Vrit-
tikara also declares ; ‘But the BhOman only. The Bhaman

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 303

is Brahman, because in the series beginning with name
instruction is given about it subsequently to the individual
Self.’

But how do we know that the instruction as to ‘the
True’ is in addition to, and refers to something different
from, the being called Praza?—The text, after having
declared that he who knows the Praza is an ativadin, goes
on, ‘But really that one is an atividin who makes a
supreme declaration by means of the True. The ‘but’
here clearly separates him who is an ativddin by means of
the True from the previous ativadin, and the clause thus
does not cause us to recognise him who is ativadin by meang
of Praza; hence ‘ the True’ which is the cause of the latter
ativadin being what he is must be something different from
the Praza which is the cause of the former ativddin’s
quality.—But we have maintained above that the text
enjoins the speaking of ‘the True’ merely as an auxiliary
duty for him who knows Prava; and that hence the
Praza continues to be the general subject-matter !—This
contention is untenable, we reply, The conjunction ‘ but’
shows that the section gives instruction about a new
ativadin, and does not merely declare that the ativadin
previously mentioned has to speak the truth. It is dif-
ferent with texts such as ‘ But that one indeed is an Agni-
hotrin who speaks the truth’ ; there we have no knowledge
of any further Agnihotrin, and therefore must interpret the
text as enjoining truthfulness as an obligation incumbent
on the ordinary Agnihotrin. In the text under discussion,
on the other hand, we have the term ‘the True,’ which
makes us apprehend that there is a further ativadin different
from the preceding one; and we know that that term is
used to denote the highest Brahman, as e.g. in the text,
‘The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.’ The
ativAdin who takes his stand on this Brahman, therefore,
must be viewed as different from the preceding ativadin ;
and a difference thus established on the basis of the mean-
ing and connexion of the different sentences cannot be set
aside. An ativadin (‘one who in his declaration goes
beyond’) is one who maintains, as object of his devotion,

304 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

something which, as being more beneficial to man, sur-
passes other objects of devotion. The text at first declares
that he who knows Prdaa, i.e. the individual soul, is an
ativadin, in so far as the object of his devout meditation
surpasses the objects from name-up to hope; and then goes
on to say that, as that object also is not of supreme benefit
to man, an ativddin in the full sense of the term is he only
who proclaims as the object of his devotion the highest
Brahman, which alone is of supreme unsurpassable benefit
to man. ‘He who is an ativadin by the True, i.e. he who
is an ativadin characterised by the highest Brahman as the
object of his meditation. For the same reason the pupil
entreats, ‘Sir, may I be an ativadin with the True!’ and
the teacher replies, ‘But we must desire to know the
True!’—Moreover, the text, VII, 26, 1, ‘Praza springs
from the Self,’ declares the origination from the Self of the
being called Praza; and from this we infer that the Self which
is introduced as the general subject-matter of the section,
in the clause ‘He who knows the Self passes beyond death,’
is different from the being called Praza.—The contention
that, because there is no question and answer as to some-
thing greater than Praza, the instruction about the Self
must be supposed to come to an end with the instruction
about Praza, is by no means legitimate. For that a new
subject is introduced is proved, not only by those questions
and answers; it may be proved by other means also, and
we have already explained such means. The following is
the reason why the pupil does not ask the question whether
there is anything greater than Praza. With regard to the
non-sentient objects extending from name to hope—each
of which surpasses the preceding one in so far as it is more
beneficial to man—the teacher does not declare that he
who knows them is an ativddin ; when, however, he comes
to the individual soul, there called Praga, the knowledge
of whose true nature he considers highly beneficial, he
expressly says that ‘he who sees this, notes this, under
stands this is an ativadin’ (VII, 15, 4). The pupil there-
fore imagines that the instruction about the Self is now
completed, and hence asks no further question. The

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 305

teacher on the other hand, holding that even that know-
ledge is not the highest, spontaneously continues his
teaching, and tells the pupil that truly he only is an
ativadin who proclaims the supremely and absolutely
beneficial being which is called ‘ the True,’ i.e. the highest
Brahman. On this suggestion of the highest Brahman the
pupil, desirous to learn its true nature and true worship,
entreats the teacher, ‘Sir, may I become an ativddin by
the True!’ Thereupon the teacher—in order to help the
pupil to become an ativadin,—a position which requires
previous intuition of Brahman—enjoins on him meditation
on Brahman which is the means to attain intuition (‘You
must desire to know the True!’); next recommends to him
reflection (manana) which is the means towards meditation
(‘You must desire to understand reflection’); then—taking
it for granted that the injunction of reflection implies the
injunction of ‘hearing’ the sacred texts which is the pre-
liminary for reflecting—advises him to cherish faith in
Brahman which is the preliminary means towards hearing
(‘You must desire to understand faith’); after that tells
him to practise, as a preliminary towards faith, reliance on
Brahman (‘ You must desire to understand reliance’); next
admonishes him, to apply himself to ‘action,’ i.e. to make
the effort which is a preliminary requisite for all the
activities enumerated (‘You must desire to understand
action’). Finally, in order to encourage the pupil to enter
on all this, the teacher tells him to recognise that bliss
constitutes the nature οὗ that Brahman which is the aim of
all his effort (‘You must desire to understand bliss’); and
bids him to realise that the bliss which constitutes Brah-
man’s nature is supremely large and full (‘You must
endeavour to understand the “ bhiman,” i.e. the supreme
fulness of bliss’). And of this Brahman, whose nature is
absolute bliss, a definition is then given as follows, ‘Where
one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing
else, that is bhOman.’ This means—when the meditating
devotee realises the intuition of this Brahman, which con-
sists of absolute bliss, he does not see anything apart from
it, since the whole aggregate of things is contained within

(48) : x

306 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the essence and outward manifestation (vibhati) of Brah-
man. He, therefore, who has an intuitive knowledge of
Brahman as qualified by its attributes and its vibhdti—
which also is called aisvarya, i.e. lordly power—and con-
sisting of supreme bliss, sees nothing else since there zs
nothing apart from Brahman ; and sees, i.e. feels no pain
since all possible objects of perception and feeling are of
the nature of bliss or pleasure; for pleasure is just that
which, being experienced, is agreeable to man’s nature.—
But an objection is raised, it is an actual fact that this very
world is perceived as something different from Brahman,
and as being of the nature of pain, or at the best, limited
pleasure; how then can it be perceived as being a mani-
festation of Brahman, as having Brahman for its Self, and
hence consisting of bliss ?—The individual souls, we reply,
which are under the influence of karman, are conscious of
this world as different from Brahman, and, according to
their individual karman, as either made up of pain or
limited pleasure. But as this view depends altogether on
karman, to him who has freed himself from Nescience in
the form of karman, this same world presents itself as
lying within the intuition of Brahman, together with its
qualities and vibhati, and hence as essentially blissful. To
a man troubled with excess of bile the water he drinks has
a taste either downright unpleasant or moderately pleasant,
according to the degree to which his health is affected;
while the same water has an unmixedly pleasant taste for
a man in good health. As long as a boy is not aware that
some plaything is meant to amuse him, he does not care
for it; when on the other hand he apprehends it as meant
to give him delight, the thing becomes very dear to him.
In the same way the world becomes an object of supreme
love to him who recognises it as having Brahman for its
Self, and being a mere plaything of Brahman—of Brah-
man, whose essential nature is supreme bliss, and which is
a treasure-house, as it were, of numberless auspicious quali-
ties of supreme excellence. He who has reached such
intuition of Brahman, sees nothing apart from it and feels
no pain. This the concluding passages of the text set

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 8. 307

forth in detail, ‘He who sees, perceives and understands
this, loves the Self, delights in the Self, revels in the Self,
rejoices in the Self; he becomes a Self ruler, he moves
and rules in all worlds according to his pleasure. But
those who have a different knowledge from this, they are
ruled by others, they live in perishable worlds, they do not
move in all the worlds according to their liking.” ‘They
are ruled by others,’ means ‘they are in the power of
karman.’ And further on, ‘He who sees this does not see
death, nor illness, nor pain; he who sees this sees every-
thing and obtains everything everywhere.’

That Brahman is of the nature of supreme bliss has been
shown in detail under I, 1, 12 ff—The conclusion from
all this is that, as the text applies the term ‘bhiman’ to
what was previously called the Real or True, and which is
different from the individual soul there called Praza, the
bhiman is the highest Brahman.

8. And on account of the suitability of the
attributes.

The attributes also which the text ascribes to the bhOman
suit the highest Self only. So immortality (‘The Bhdman
is immortal,’ VII, 24, 1); not being based on something
else (‘it rests in its own greatness’); being the Self of alt
(‘the bhdman is below,’ &c., ‘it is all this’); being that
which produces all (‘from the Self there springs breath,’
&c.). All these attributes can be reconciled with the
highest Self only.—The Pirvapakshin has pointed to the
text which declares the ‘I’ to be the Self of all (VII, 25, 1);
but what that text really teaches is meditation on Brah-
man under the aspect of the “1. This appears from the in«
troductory clause ‘ Now follows the instruction with regard
tothe I.’ That of the ‘I,’ i.e. the individual Self, also the
highest Self is the true Self, scripture declares in several
places, so e.g. in the text about the inward Ruler (Bri. Up.
III, 7). As therefore the individual soul finds its com-
pletion in the highest Self only, the word ‘I’ also extends
in its connotation up to the highest Self; and the instruc-
tion about the ‘I’ which is given in the text has thus for

x2

308 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

its object meditation on the highest Self in so far as having
the individual Self for its body. As the highest Self has
all beings for its body and thus is the Self of all, it is the
Self of the individual soul also; and this the text declares
in the passage beginning ‘ Now follows the instruction
about the Self,’ and ending ‘Self is all this.’ In order to
prove this the text declares that everything originates from
the highest Self which forms the Self of the individual soul
also, viz. in the passage ‘From the Self of him who sees
this, perceives this, knows this, there springs breath,’ &c.—
that means: breath and all other beings spring from the
highest Self which abides within the Self of the medi-
tating devotee as its inner ruler. Hence, the text means to
intimate, meditation should be performed on the ‘I,’ in
order thus firmly to establish the cognition that the highest
Self has the ‘I,’ i.e. the individual soul for its body.

It is thus an established conclusion that the bhfiman is
the highest Self. Here terminates the adhikaraza of
‘ fulness.’

9. The Imperishable (is Brahman), on account of
its supporting that which is the end of ether.

The Vagasaneyins, in the chapter recording the questions
asked by G§&rgi, read as follows: ‘He said, O G&rgi, the
Brahmamas call that the Imperishable. It is neither coarse
nor fine, neither short nor long, it is not red, not fluid, it is
without a shadow,’ &c. (Brz. Up. IIT, 8, 8). A doubt here
arises whether that Imperishable be the Pradh4na, or the
individual soul, or the highest Self—The Pradhana, it may
be maintained in the first place. For we see that in passages
such as ‘higher than that which is higher than the Imperish-
able’ the term ‘Imperishable’ actually denotes the Pra-
dhana; and moreover the qualities enumerated, viz. not being
either coarse or fine, &c., are characteristic of the Pradhdna.
—But, an objection is raised, in texts such as ‘ That know-
ledge by which the Imperishable is apprehended’ (Mu. Up.
I, 1, 5), the word ‘Imperishable’ is seen to denote the
highest Brahman !—In cases, we reply, where the meaning
of a word may be determined on the basis either of some

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 9. 309

other means of proof or of Scripture, the former meaning
presents itself to the mind first, and hence there is no
reason why such meaning should not be accepted.—But
how do you know that the ether of the text is not ether in
the ordinary sense p—From the description, we reply, given
of it in the text,‘ That above the heavens,’ &c. There it is
said that all created things past, present and future rest on
ether as their basis; ether cannot therefore be taken as
that elementary substance which itself is comprised in the
sphere of things created. We therefore must understand
by ‘ether’ matter in its subtle state, i.e. the Pradh4na; and
the Imperishable which thereupon is declared to be the
support of that Pradhana, hence cannot itself be the Pra-
dhana.—Nor is there any force in the argument that a sense
established by some other means of proof presents itself
to the mind more immediately than a sense established by
Scripture ; for as the word ‘akshara’ (i.e. the non-perish-
able) intimates its sense directly through the meaning of its
constituent elements other means of proof need not be
regarded at all.

Moreover Y4gé#avalkya had said previously that the ether
is the cause and abode of all things past, present and
future, and when GAargi thereupon asks him in what that
ether ‘is woven,’ i.e. what is the causal substance and
abode of ether, he replies ‘the Imperishable.’ Now this
also proves that by the ‘Imperishable’ we have to under-
stand the Pradhana which from other sources is known to
be the causal substance, and hence the abode, of all effected
things whatsoever.

This prim4 facie view is set aside by the Sftra. The
‘Imperishable’ is the highest Brahman, because the text
declares it to support that which is the end, i.e. that which
lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter (avyakritam). The
ether referred to in GArgi’s question is not ether in the
ordinary sense, but what lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved
matter, and hence the ‘Imperishable’ which is said to be
the support of that ‘unevolved’ cannot itself be the ‘ un-
evolved,’ i.e. cannot be the Pradh4na. Let us, then, the
Parvapakshin resumes, understand by the ‘ Imperishable,’

310 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the individual soul; for this may be viewed as the support
of the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, inclusive of
the elements in their subtle condition ; and the qualities of
non-coarseness, &c., are characteristic of that soul also.
Moreover there are several texts in which the term ‘Im-
perishable’ is actually seen to denote the individual soul;
so e.g. ‘ the non-evolved ’ is merged in the ‘ Imperishable’ ;
‘That of which the non-evolved is the body; that of which
the Imperishable is the body’; ‘All the creatures are the
Perishable, the non-changing Self is called the Imperish-
able’ (Bha. Gi. XV, 16).

To this alternative prima facie view the next Sdtra
replies.

10. And this (supporting) (springs) from com-
mand.

The text declares that this supporting of ether and all
other things proceeds from command. ‘In the command
of that Imperishable sun and moon stand, held apart; in
the command of that Imperishable heaven and earth stand,
held apart, &c. Now such supreme command, through
which all things in the universe are held apart, cannot pos-
sibly belong to the individual soul in the state either of
bondage or of release. The commanding ‘Imperishable’
therefore is none other than the supreme Person.

11. And on account of the exclusion of (what is
of) another nature (than Brahman).

Another nature, i.e. the nature of the Pradh4na, and so
on. A supplementary passage excludes difference on the
part of the Imperishable from the supreme Person. ‘That
Imperishable, O Garg?, is unseen but seeing; unheard but
hearing; unthought but thinking ; unknown but knowing.
There is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it,
nothing that thinks but it, nothing that knows but it. In
that Imperishable, O Gargi, the ether is woven, warp and
woof.’ Here the declaration as to the Imperishable being
what sees, hears, &c. excludes the non-intelligent Pradhana ;
and the declaration as to its being all-seeing, &c. while not

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 12. 211

seen by any one excludes the individual soul. This exclu-
sion of what has a nature other than that of the highest
Self thus confirms the view of that Self being meant.—
Or else the Sitra may be explained in a different way, viz.
‘On account of the exclusion of the existence of another.’
On this alternative the text ‘ There is nothing that sees but
it,’ &c., is to be understood as follows: ‘ while this Imperish-
able, not seen by others but seeing all others, forms the basis
of all things different from itself; there is no other prin-
ciple which, unseen by the Imperishable but seeing it, could
form its basis, i. 6. the text would exclude the existence of
any other thing but the Imperishable, and thus implicitly
deny that the Imperishable is either the Pradhana or the in-
dividual Self.— Moreover the text ‘By the command of that
Imperishable men praise those who give, the gods follow
the Sacrificer, the fathers the Darvi-offering,’ declares the
Imperishable to be that on the command of which there
proceed all works enjoined by Scripture and Smiiti, such
as sacrificing, giving, &c., and this again shows that the
Imperishable must be Brahman, the supreme Person,
Again, the subsequent passus, ‘Whosoever without know-
ing that Imperishable,’ &c., declares that ignorance of the
Imperishable leads to the Samsara, while knowledge of it
helps to reach Immortality: this also proves that the Im-
perishable is the highest Brahman.—Here terminates the
adhikarana of ‘the Imperishable.’

12. On account of his being designated as the
object of seeing, he (i.e. the highest Self) (is that
object).

The followers of the Atharva-veda, in the section contain-
ing the question asked by SatyakAma, read as follows: |
‘He again who meditates with this syllable Aum of three
Matr4s on the highest Person, he comes to light and to the
sun. As a snake frees itself from its skin, so he frees
himself from evil. He is led up by the Saman verses to
the Brahma-world ; he sees the person dwelling in the
castle who is higher than the individual souls concreted

312 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

with bodies and higher (than those)’ (Pra. Up. V, 2).
Here the terms ‘he meditates’ and ‘he sees’ have the
same sense, ‘ seeing’ being the result of devout meditation ;
for according to the principle expressed in the text (Kz.
Up. III, 14) ‘According as man’s thought is in this world,’
what is reached by the devotee is the object of medita-
tion ; and moreover the text exhibits the same object, viz.
‘the highest Person’ in connexion with both verbs.

The doubt here presents itself whether the highest
Person in this text be the so-called four-faced Brahmé, the
Lord of the mundane egg who represents the individual
souls in their collective aspect, or the supreme Person
who is the Lord of all—The Pirvapakshin maintains the
former view. For, he argues, on the introductory question,
‘He who here among men should meditate until death on
the syllable Om, what would he obtain by it?’ The text
first declares that he who meditates on that syllable as
having one Matra, obtains the world of men; and next,
that he who meditates on it as having two Matras obtains
the world of the atmosphere. Hence the Brahma-world,
which the text after that represents as the object reached
by him who meditates on Om as having three syllables,
must be the world of Brahma Xaturmukha who is consti-
tuted by the aggregate of the individual souls. What the
soul having reached that world sees, therefore is the same
Brahma Xaturmukha; and thus only the attribute ‘ etasmag
givaghanat parat param’ is suitable; for the collective
soul, i.e. Brahm&4 Katurmukha, residing in the Brahma-
world is higher (para) than the distributive or discrete soul
(giva) which is concreted (ghani-bhita) with the body and
sense-organs, and at the same time is higher (para) than
these. The highest Person mentioned in the text, there-
fore, is Brahm& Katurmukha; and the qualities mentioned
further on, such as absence of decay, &c., must be taken in
such a way as to agree with that Brahma.

To this prima facie view the Sdtra replies that the
object of seeing is He, i.e. the highest Self, on account of
designation. The text clearly designates the object of
seeing as the highest Self. For the concluding sloka,

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 12. 313

which refers to that object of seeing, declares that ‘ by
means of the Omk4ra he who knows reaches that which
is tranquil, free from decay, immortal, fearless, the highest’
—all which attributes properly belong to the highest Self
only, as we know from texts such as ‘ that is the Immortal,
that is the fearless, that is Brahman’ (K&. Up. IV, 15, 1).
The qualification expressed in the clause ‘etasm4g giva-
ghanat,’ &c. may also refer to the highest Self only, not to
Brahma Xaturmukha ; for the latter is himself compre-
hended by the term ‘givaghana.’ For that term denotes
all souls which are embodied owing to karman ; and that
Katurmukha is one of those we know from texts such as
‘He who first creates Brahma’ (Svet. Up. VI, 18). Nor is
there any strength in the argument that, since the Brahma-
world mentioned in the text is known to be the world of
Katurmukha, as it follows next on the world of the atmos-
phere, the being abiding there must needs be Katurmukha.
We rather argue as follows—as from the concluding clause
‘that which is tranquil, free from decay,’ &c., we ascertain that
the object of intuition is the highest Brahman, the Brahma-
world spoken of as the abode of the seeing devotee canzot be
the perishable world of Brahma4 Katurmukha. A further
reason for this conclusion is supplied by what the text says
about ‘him who is freed from all evil being led up by the
Saman verses to the world of Brahman’; for the place
reached by him who is freed from all evil cannot be the
mere abode of Katurmukha. Hence also the concluding
sloka says with reference to that Brahma-world ‘that which
the wise teach’: what the wise see and teach is the abode of
the highest, of Vishzu ; cp. the text ‘ the wise ever see that
highest abode of Vishzu.’ Nor is it even strictly true that
the world of Brahma follows on the atmosphere, for the
svarga-world and several others lie between the two.

We therefore shortly explain the drift of the whole
chapter as follows. At the outset of the reply given to
SatyakA4ma there is mentioned, in addition to the highest
(para) Brahman, a lower (apara) Brahman. This lower or
effected (karya) Brahman is distinguished as twofold, being
connected either with this terrestrial world or yonder, non-

314 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

terrestrial, world. Him who meditates on the Prazava as
having one syllable, the text declares to obtain a reward in
this world—he reaches the world of men. He, on the
other hand, who meditates on the Pravava as having two
syllables is said to obtain his reward in a super-terrestrial
sphere—he reaches the world of the atmosphere. And he
finally who, by means of the trisyllabic Prazava which
denotes the highest Brahman, meditates on this very
highest Brahman, is said to reach that Brahman, i.e. the
supreme Person.—The object of seeing is thus none other
than the highest Self—Here terminates the adhikarama of
the ‘ object of seeing.’

13. The small (ether) (is Brahman), on account
of the subsequent (arguments).

The X4andogas have the following text, ‘ Now in that
city of Brahman there is the palace, the small lotus, and
in it that small ether. Now what is within that small ether
that is to be sought for, that is to be understood’ (KA.
Up. VIII, 1, 1).—The question here arises whether that
small ether (space) within the lotus of the heart be the
material element called ether, or the individual Self, or the
highest Self.—The first view presenting itself is that the
element is meant, for the reason that the word ‘ether’ is
generally used in that sense; and because the clause
‘what is within that small ether’ shows that the ether
mentioned constitutes the abode of something else that is
to be enquired into.—This view is set aside by the Satra.
The small ether within the heart is the highest Brahman,
on account of the subsequent reasons, contained in clauses
of the same section. The passage ‘ That Self which is free
from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from
grief, free from hunger and thirst, whose wishes and
purposes come true’ (VIII, 7, 1) ascribes to that small
ether qualities—such as unconditioned Selfhood, freedom
from evil, &c.—which clearly show that ether to be the
highest Brahman. And this conclusion is confirmed by
what other texts say about him who knows the small ether
attaining the power of realising his own wishes, ‘Those who

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 13. 315

depart from hence having come to know the Self and those
real wishes, for them there is freedom in all worlds’; and
‘whatever object he desires, by his mere will it comes to
him ; having obtained it he is happy’ (Kz. Up. VIII, 1, 63
2, 9). If moreover the ether within the heart were the
elemental ether, the comparison instituted in the passage
‘ As large as that (elemental) ether is, so large is this ether
within the heart’ would be wholly inappropriate. Nor
must it be said that that comparison rests on the limitation
of the ether within the heart (so that the two terms com-
pared would. be the limited elemental ether within the
heart, and the universal elemental ether); for there still
would remain the inappropriate assertion that the ether
within the heart is the abode of heaven, earth and all
other things.—But, an objection is raised, also on the
alternative of the smal! ether being the highest Brahman,
the comparison to the universal elemental ether is unsuit-
able; for scripture explicitly states that the highest Self is
(not as large but) larger than everything else, ‘larger than
the earth, larger than the sky,’ ἄς. (A/. Up. III, 14, 3).
Not so, we reply; what the text says as to the ether
within the heart being as large as the universal ether
is meant (not to make a conclusive statement as to its
extent but only) to negative that smallness of the ether
which is established by its abiding within the heart.
Similarly we say ‘the sun moves with the speed of an
arrow’; the sun indeed moves much faster than an arrow,
but what our assertion means is merely that he does not
move slowly.—But, a further doubt is started, the passage
*That Self which is free from sin,’ &c. does not appear to
refer back to the small ether within the heart. For the
text makes a distinction between that ether and that within
that ether which it declares to be the due object of search
and enquiry. This latter object therefore is the topic of
discussion, and when the text says later on ‘That Self, free
from sin, &c. is to be searched out’ we must understand it
to refer to the same object of search.—This would be so,
we reply, if the text did not distinguish the small ether
and that which abides within it; but as a matter of fact it

316 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

does distinguish the two. The connexion is as follows.
The text at first refers to the body of the devotee as the
city of Brahman, the idea being that Brahman is present
therein as object of meditation; and then designates an
organ of that body, viz. the small lotus-shaped heart as the
palace of Brahman. It then further refers to Brahman—
the all knowing, all powerful, whose love towards his
devotees is boundless like the ocean—as the small ether
within the heart, meaning thereby that Brahman who for
the benefit of his devotees is present within that palace
should be meditated upon as of minute size, and finally—in
the clause ‘that is to be searched out’—enjoins as the
object of meditation that which abides in that Brahman,
i.e. on the one hand, its essential freedom from all evil
qualities, and on the other the whole treasure of its aus-
picious qualities, its power of realising its wishes and so
on. The ‘that’ (in ‘that is to be searched out’) enjoins
as objects of search the small ether, i.e. Brahman itself as
well as the qualities abiding within it—But how, it may
be asked, do you know that the word ‘that’ really refers
to both, viz. the highest Brahman, there called ‘small
ether,’ and the qualities abiding in it, and that hence the
clause enjoins an enquiry into both these entities >—Listen,
attentively, we reply, to our explanation! The clause ‘As
large as this ether is, so large is this ether within the heart’
declares the exceeding greatness of the small ether; the
clause ‘ Both heaven and earth are contained within it’ up
to ‘lightning and stars’ declares that same small ether to
be the abode of the entire world; and the clause ‘And
whatever there is for him in this world, and whatever there
is not, all that is contained within it’ declares that what-
ever objects of enjoyment there are for the devotee in this
world, and whatever other objects there are not for him,
i.e. are merely wishes but not obtained by him, all those
objects are contained within that same small ether. The
text next declares that that small ether, although dwelling
within the heart which is a part of the body, is not affected
by the body’s old age and decay, for being extremely
minute it is not capable of change; and adds ‘that true

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 14. 417

being is the Brahman-city,’ i.e. that Reality which is the
cause of all is the city called Brahman, i.e. the abode of
the entire Universe. The following clause ‘in it all desires
are contained’ again referring to the small ether (‘in it’)
declares that in it all desires, i. 6. all desirable qualities are
contained. The text next proceeds to set forth that the
small ether possesses Selfhood and certain desirable aus-
picious qualities—this is done in the passage ‘It is the
Self free from sin’ &c. up to ‘whose purposes realise
themselves.’ The following section—‘And as here on
earth’ down to ‘for them there is freedom in all the
worlds ’—declares that those who do not know those eight
qualities and the Self, called ‘small ether, which is
characterised by them, and who perform actions aiming at
objects of enjoyment different from that Self, obtain perish-
able results only, and do not attain the power of realising
their wishes ; while those on the other hand who know the
Self called ‘small ether’ and the qualities abiding within
it, through the grace of that very same highest Self, obtain
all their wishes and the power of realising their purposes.
On the ground of this connected consideration of the whole
chapter we are able to decide that the text enjoins as the
object of search and enquiry both the highest Brahman and
the whole body of auspicious qualities abiding within it.
This the V4kyak4ra also renders clear in the passage
beginning ‘In the text “what is within that” there is
designation of wishes (i.e. desirable qualities).’—For all
these reasons the small ether is the highest Brahman.

14. On account of the going and of the word; for
thus it is seen; and (there is) an inferential sign.

‘As people who do not know the country walk again and
again over a gold treasure’ &c., ‘thus do all these creatures
day after day go into that Brahma-world’ (KA. Up. VIII,
3, 2). The circumstance, here stated, of all individual souls
going to a place which the qualification ‘ ¢#at’ connects
with the subject-matter of the whole chapter, i. e. the small
ether; and the further circumstance of the goal of their
going being called the Brahma-world, also prove that the

318 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

small ether is none other than the highest Brahman.— But in
what way do these two points prove what they are claimed
to prove >p—‘ For thus it is seen’; the Sitra adds. For we
see it stated in other texts, that all individual souls go
daily to Brahman, viz. in the state of deep sleep, ‘ All these
creatures having become united with the True do not
know that they are united with the True’; ‘ Having
come back from the True they know not that they have
come back from the True’ (K%. Up. VI, 9, 2; 10,2). And
in the same way we see that the word ‘ Brahma-world’
denotes the highest Brahman ; so e.g. ‘this is the Brahma-
world, O King’ (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 32).—The Sdtra subjoins
a further reason. Even if the going of the souls to
Brahman were not seen in other texts, the fact that the
text under discussion declares the individual souls to abide
in Brahman in the state of deep sleep, enjoying freedom
from all pain and trouble just as if they were merged in
the pralaya state, is a sufficient ‘inferential sign’ to prove
that the ‘small ether’ is the highest Brahman. And
similarly the term ‘ Brahma-world’ as exhibited in the
text under discussion, if understood as denoting co-ordina-
tion (i.e. ‘that world which is Brahman’), is sufficient to
prove by itself that the ‘small ether’—to which that term
is applied—is the highest Brahman ; it therefore is needless
to appeal to other passages. That this explanation of
‘ Brahma-world’ is preferable to the one which understands
by Brahma-world ‘the world of Brahman’ is proved by
considerations similar to those by which the Pd. Mi. Sftras
prove that ‘ Nishada-sthapati’ means a headman who at
the same time is a Nishada.—Another explanation of the
passage under discussion may also be given. What is said
there about all these creatures daily ‘going into the
Brahma-world, may not refer at all to the state of deep
sleep, but rather mean that although ‘daily going into the
Brahman-world,’ i.e. although at all time moving above
the small ether, i.e. Brahman which as the universal Self is
everywhere, yet all these creatures not knowing Brahman
do not find, i.e. obtain it; just as men not knowing the
place where a treasure is hidden do not find it, although

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 16. 319

they constantly pass over it. This constant moving about
on the part of ignorant creatures on the surface, as it were,
of the small ether abiding within as their inward Ruler,
proves that small ether to be the highest Brahman. That
the highest Brahman abides within as the inner Self of
creatures which dwell in it and are ruled by it, we are told
in other texts also, so e.g. in the AntaryAmin-brahmama.
‘He who dwells in the Self, within the Self, whom the
Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who
rules the Self within; unseen but seeing, unheard but
hearing ’ (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22 ; 23).—On this interpretation
we explain the last part of the Sdtra as follows. Even
if other texts did not refer to it, this daily moving about
on the part of ignorant creatures, on the ether within the
heart—which the comparison with the treasure of gold
shows to be the supreme good of man—, is in itself a
sufficient proof for the small ether being Brahman.

15. And on account of there being observed in
that (small ether), supporting which is a greatness
of that (i.e. Brahman).

In continuation of the passage ‘It is the Self free from
Sin” &c., which refers to the small ether, the text says:
‘it is a bank, a limitary support, that these worlds may not
be confounded.’ What the text here says about the small
ether supporting the world proves it to be the highest
Brahman ; for to support the world is the glory of Brahman.
Compare ‘ He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the
protector of all things. He is a bank and a boundary, so
that these worlds may not be confounded’ (Bri. Up. IV,
4, 22); “ΒΥ the command of that Imperishable, O GArgi,
heaven and earth stand, held apart’ (Brz. Up. III, 8, 9).
Now this specific greatness of the highest Brahman, which
consists in its supporting the world, is also observed in the
small ether—which proves the latter to be none other than
Brahman.

16. And on account of the settled meaning.

The word ‘ether,’ moreover, is known to have, among

320 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

other meanings, that of Brahman. Compare ‘For who
could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that ether were
not bliss?’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7); ‘ All these beings take their
rise from the ether’ (K%. Up. I, 9, 1). It has to be kept in
view that in the text under discussion the meaning ‘ Brah-
man’ is supported by what is said about the qualities of the
small ether—viz. freedom from sin, &c.—and hence is
stronger than the other meaning, according to which
Akasa signifies the elemental ether.

So far the Satras have refuted the view of the small
ether being the element. They now enter on combating
the notion that the small ether may possibly be the
individual soul.

17. If it be said that on account of reference to
the other one he is meant; we say no, on account
of impossibility.

An objection is raised to the argumentation that, on
account of complementary passages, the small ether must
be explained to mean the highest Self.

For, the objector says, a clear reference to him who is
‘other’ than the highest Self, ie. to the individual soul, is
contained in the following passage (VIII, 12, 3): ‘Thus
does that serenity (samprasdda), having risen from this
body and approached the highest light, appear in its own
form.’ ‘That is the Self,’ he said. ‘That is the immortal,
the fearless, this is Brahman’ (VIII, 7, 3?). We admit
that for the different reasons stated above the ether within
the heart cannot be the elemental ether; but owing to the
force of the intimations conveyed by the complementary
passages just quoted, we must adopt the view that what is
meant is the individual soul. And as the word ‘4k4sa’
may be connected with prakdsa (light), it may be applied
to the individual soul also.—This view is set aside by the
Sfitra. The small ether cannot be the individual soul
because the qualities attributed in the text to the former,

viz. freedom from sin, &c., cannot possibly belong to the
individual soul.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 18. 321

18. Should it be said that from a subsequent
passage (it appears that the individual Soul is
meant) ; rather (the soul) in so far as its true nature
has become manifest,

The Parvapakshin now maintains that we ascertain from
a subsequent declaration made by Pragdpati that it is just
the individual Soul that possesses freedom from sin and the
other qualities enumerated. The whole teaching of Pragé-
pati, he says, refers to the individual Soul only. Indra
having heard that Pragdpati had spoken about a Self free
from sin, old age, &c., the enquiry into which enables the
soul to obtain all worlds and desires, approaches Prag4pati
with the wish to learn the true nature of that Self which
should be enquiréd into. Pragdpati thereupon, wishing to
test the capacity of his pupil for receiving true instruction,
gives him successive information about the embodied soul
in the state of waking, dream and dreamless sleep. When
he finds that Indra sees no good in instruction of this kind
and thus shows himself fit to receive instruction about
the true nature of the disembodied Self, he explains to him
that the body is a mere abode for a ruling Self; that that
bodiless Self is essentially immortal; and that the soul, as
long as it is joined to a body due to karman, is compelled
to experience pleasure and pain corresponding to its em-
bodied state, while it rises above all this when it has freed
itself from the body (VIII, 12, 1). He then continues:
‘Thus that serenity having risen from this body afid
approached the highest light, appears in its own form’;
thus teaching him the true nature, free from a body, of the
individual soul. He next informs him that the ‘highest
light’ which the soul reaches is the supreme Person (‘ That
is the supreme Person’), and that the soul having reached
that highest light and freed itself from what obscured its
own true nature, obtains in the world of Brahman whatever
enjoyments it desires, and is no longer connected with
a body springing from karman and inseparable from pain
and pleasure, or with anything else that causes distress.
(‘He moves about there laughing,’ &c.). He next illus-

[48] y

322 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

trates the connexion with a body, of the soul in the

Samséra state, by means of a comparison: ‘Like as a horse

attached to a cart,’ &c. After that he explains that the

eye and the other sense-organs are instruments of know-

ledge, colour, and so on, the objects of knowledge, and the

individual Self the knowing subject ; and that hence that Self
is different from the body and the sense-organs (‘ Now where ©
the sight has entered’ up to ‘the mind is his divine eye’),

Next he declares that, after having divested itself of the

body and the senses, the Self perceives all the objects

of its desire by means of its ‘divine eye,’ i.e. the power of
cognition which constitutes its essential nature (‘He by

means of the divine eye,’ &c.), He further declares that

those who have true knowledge know the Self as such (‘on

that Self the devas meditate’); and in conclusion teaches

that he who has that true knowledge of the Self obtains for

his reward the intuition of Brahman—which is suggested

by what the text says about the obtaining of all worlds

and all desires (‘ He obtains all worlds and all desires,’ &c.,

up to the end of the chapter).—It thus appears that the

entire chapter proposes as the object of cognition the indi-

vidual soul free from sin, and so on. The qualities, viz.

freedom from guilt, &c., may thus belong to the individual

Self, and on this ground we conclude that the small ether

is the individual Self.

This view the second half of the Sdtra sets aside. The
two sections, that which treats of the small ether and that
which contains the teaching of Pragapati, have different
topics. Pragapati’s teaching refers to the individual soul,
whose true nature, with its qualities such as freedom from
evil, &c., is at first hidden by untruth, while later on, when
it has freed itself from the bondage of karman, risen from
the body, and approached the highest light, it manifests
itself in its true form and then is characterised by freedom
from all evil and by other auspicious qualities. In the sec-
tion treating of the small ether, on the other hand, we have
to do with the small ether, i.e. the highest Brahman, whose
true nature is never hidden, and which therefore is uncon-
ditionally characterised by freedom from evil, and so on.—.

I ADHYAYa, 3 PADA, I9. 323

Moreover, the daharfkdsa-section ascribes to the small .

ether other attributes which cannot belong to the individual
Self even ‘when its true nature has manifested itself.’ The
small ether is there called a bank and support of all worlds ;
and one of its names, ‘ satyam,’ is explained to imply that
it governs all sentient and non-sentient beings. All this
also proves that the small ether is none other than the highest
Self. That the individual soul, ‘even when its true nature
is manifest,’ cannot be viewed as a bank and support of the
worlds, &c., we shall show under IV, 4.

But if this is so, what then is the meaning of the
reference to the individual soul which is made in the section
treating of the small ether, viz. in the passage, ‘ Now that
serene being, which after having risen from this body,’ &c.
(ΤΙ, 3, 4)?

To this question the next Sdtra replies.

19. And the reference has a different meaning.

The text in question declares that the released individual
soul when reaching the highest light, i.e. Brahman, which
is free from all sin, and so on, attains its true nature, which
is characterised by similar freedom from sin, and so on,
Now this reference to the individual soul, as described in
the teaching of Prag4pati, has the purpose of giving in-
struction (not about the qualities of the individual soul, but)
about the nature of that which is the cause of the qualities
of the individual soul, i.e. the qualities specially belonging
to the supreme Person, The reason why, in the section,
containing the teaching of Prag4pati, information is given
as to the true nature of the released individual soul is that
such knowledge assists the doctrine referring to the small
ether. For the individual Self which wishes to reach
Brahman must know his own true nature also, so as to
realise that he, as being himself endowed with auspicious
qualities, will finally arrive at an intuition of the highest
Brahman, which is a mass of auspicious qualities raised to
the highest degree of excellence. The cognition of the
soul’s own true nature is itself comprised in the result of
the meditation on Brahman, and the results which are

y2

324 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

proclaimed in the teaching of Pragapati (‘He obtains all
worlds and all wishes’; ‘He moves about there laughing,’
&c.) thus really are results of the knowledge of the small
ether.

20. If it be said, owing to the scriptural declara-
tion of smallness; that has been explained.

The text describes the ether within the heart as being of
small compass, and this agrees indeed with the individual
soul which elsewhere is compared to the point of an awl,
but not with Brahman, which is greater than everything.—
The reply to this objection has virtually been given before,
viz. under I, 2, 7, where it is said that Brahman may be
viewed as of small size, for the purpose of devout medi-
tation. :

It thus remains a settled conclusion that the small ether
is none other but the highest Person who is untouched by
even a shadow of imperfection, and is an ocean of infinite,
supremely exalted, qualities—knowledge, strength, lordly
power, &c. The being, on the other hand, which in the
teaching of Prag4pati is described as first having a body
due to karman—as we see from passages such as ‘they
strike it as it were, they cut it as it were’—and as after-
wards approaching the highest light, and then manifesting
its essential qualities, viz. freedom from sin, &c., is the
individual soul; not the small ether (or Brahman).

The next Sdtra supplies a further reason for this con-
clusion.

21. And on account of the imitation of that.

The individual soul, free from bondage, and thus pos-
sessing the qualities of freedom from sin, &c., cannot be
the small ether, iie. the highest Brahman, because it is
stated to ‘imitate,’ i.e. to be equal to that Brahman. The
text making that statement is Mu. Up. III, 1, 3, ‘When
the seer (i.e. the individual soul) sees the brilliant maker,
the Lord, the Person who has his source in Brahman ; then
becoming wise and shaking off good and evil, he reaches
the highest equality, free from passions.’ The being to

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 23. 325

which the teaching of Pragdpati refers is the ‘imitator,’
i.e. the individual soul ; the Brahman which is ‘imitated’
is the small ether.

22. The same is declared by Smztti also.

Smriti also declares that the transmigrating soul when
reaching the state of Release ‘ imitates, i.e. attains supreme
equality of attributes with the highest Brahman. ‘Abiding
by this knowledge they, attaining to equality of attributes
with me, are not born again at the time of creation, nor
are they affected by the general dissolution of the world’
(Bha, Gi. XIV, 2).

Some maintain that the last two Sdtras constitute a
separate adhikarama (head of discussion), meant to prove
that the text Mu. Up. II, 2, 10 (‘After him the shining
one, everything shines; by the light of him all this is
lighted’), refers to the highest Brahman. This view is,
however, inadmissible, for the reason that with regard to
the text quoted no pirvapaksha can arise, it having been
proved under I, 2, 21 ff., and I, 3, 1 ff., that the whole section
of which that text forms part is concerned with Brahman;
and it further having been shown under I, 1, 24 ff., that
Brahman is apprehended under the form of light.—The
interpretation moreover does not fit in with the wording of
the Sdtras.—Here terminates the adhikarawa of the ‘small

one.’

23. On account of the term, the one measured.

We read in the Kaf¢havallt ‘The Person of the size of
a thumb stands in the middle of the Self, as lord of the
past and the future, and henceforward fears no more’;
‘ That Person of the size of a thumb is like a light without
smoke, ἃς, (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12; 13). And ‘The Person not
larger than a thumb, the inner Self, is always settled in the
heart of men’ (Ka. Up. II, 6, 17). A doubt here arises
whether the being measured by the extent of a span be
the individual soul or the highest Self—The Pdrvapakshin
maintains the former view ; for, he says, another scriptural
text also declares the individual soul to have that measure,

326 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

‘the ruler of the vital airs moves through his own works,
of the size of a thumb, brilliant like the sun, endowed with
purposes and egoity’ (Svet. Up. V, 11, 7; 8). Moreover,
the highest Self is not anywhere else, not even for the
purpose of meditation, represented as having the size of
athumb. It thus being determined that the being of the
length of a thumb is the individual Self, we understand
the term ‘Lord,’ which is applied to it, as meaning that it
is the Lord of the body, the sense-organs, the objects and
the instruments of fruition.—Of this view the Sdtra- dis-
poses, maintaining that the being a thumb long can be
none but the highest Self, just on account of that term.
For lordship over all things past and future cannot pos-
sibly belong to the individual Self, which is under the
power of karman.—But how can the highest Self be said
to have the measure of a thumb ?—On this point the next
Sitra satisfies us.

24. But with reference to the heart, men being
qualified.

In so far as the highest Self abides, for the purpose of
devout meditation, in the heart of the devotee—which
heart is of the measure of a thumb—it may itself be
viewed as having the measure of a thumb. The individual
soul also can be said to have the measure of a thumb
only in so far as dwelling within the heart; for scripture
directly states that its real size is that of the point of
a goad, i.e. minute. And as men only are capable of
devout meditation, and hence alone have a claim on scrip-
ture, the fact that the hearts of other living creatures also,
such as donkeys, horses, snakes, &c., have the same size,
cannot give rise to any objection—The discussion of this
matter will be completed later on!.

25. Also beings above them (i.e. men), Badaré-
yava thinks, on account of possibility.
In order to prove that the highest Brahman may be

1 The ‘ pramit4dhikarana’ is resumed in Stra 41.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 25. 327

viewed as having the size of a thumb, it has been declared
that the scriptural texts enjoining meditation on Brahman
are the concern of men. This offers an opportunity for
the discussion of the question whether also other classes of
individual souls, such as devas, are qualified for knowledge
of Brahman. The Pirvapakshin denies this qualification
in the case of gods and other beings, on the ground of
absence of capability. For, he says, bodiless beings, such
as gods, are incapable of the accomplishment of meditation
-on Brahman, which requires as its auxiliaries the seven
means enumerated above (p. 17). This must not be
objected to on the ground of the devas, and so on, having
bodies; for there is no means of proof establishing such
embodiedness. We have indeed proved above that the
Vedanta-texts may intimate accomplished things, and
hence are an authoritative means for the cognition of
Brahman; but we do not meet with any Vedanta-text,
the purport of which is to teach that the devas, and so
on, possess bodies. Nor can this point be established
through mantras and arthavdda texts ; for these are merely
supplementary to the injunctions of actions (sacrificial, and
so on), and therefore have a different aim. And the injunc-
tions themselves prove nothing with regard to the devas,
except that the latter are that with a view to which those
actions are performed. In the same way it also cannot be
shown that the gods have any desires or wants (to fulfil or
supply which they might enter on meditation of Brahman).
For the two reasons above we therefore conclude that the
devas, and so on, are not qualified for meditation on
Brahman.—This view is contradicted by the Satra. Such
meditation is possible in the case of higher beings also,
Badarayaaa thinks ; on account of the possibility of want
and capacity on their part also. Want and wish exist in
their case since they also are liable to suffering, springing
from the assaults, hard to be endured, of the different
kinds of pain, and since they also know that supreme
enjoyment is to be found in the highest Brahman, which is
untouched by the shadow even of imperfection, and is
a mass of auspicious qualities in their highest perfection.

328 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

‘Capability,’ on the other hand, depends on the possession
of a body and sense-organs of whatever degree of tenuity ;
and that the devas, from Brahma downward, possess a
body and sense-organs, is declared in all the Upanishads,
in the chapters treating of creation and the chapters en-
joining meditation. In the AAandogya, e.g. it is related
how the highest Being having resolved on creation, evolved
the aggregate of non-sentient matter with its different
kinds, and then produced the fourfold multitude of living
creatures, each having a material body corresponding to
its karman, and a suitable name of its own. Similarly, all
the other scriptural accounts of creation declare that there
are four classes of creatures—devas, men, animals, and non-
moving beings, such as plants—and the difference of these
classes depends on’ the individual Selfs being joined to
various bodies capacitating them to experience the results
of their works, each in that one of the fourteen worlds—
beginning with the world of Brahm4—which is the suitable
place for retribution. For in themselves, apart from bodies,
the individual Selfs are not distinguished as men, gods,
and so on. In the same way the story of the devas and
Asuras approaching Pragapati with fuel in their hands,
staying with him as pupils for thirty-two years, &c. (KA.
Up. VIII, 7 ff.), clearly shows that the devas possess bodies
and sense-organs. Analogously, mantras and arthavddas,
which are complementary to injunctions of works, contain
unmistakeable references to the corporeal nature of the
gods (‘Indra holding in his hand the thunderbolt’; ‘Indra
lifted the thunderbolt,’ &c.) ; and ‘as the latter is not con-
tradicted by any other means of proof it must be accepted
on the authority stated. Nor can it be said that those
mantras and arthavadas are really meant to express some-
thing else (than those details mentioned above), in so far,
namely, as they aim at proclaiming or glorifying the action
with which they are connected; for those very details sub-
serve the purpose of glorification, and so on, and without
them glorification is not possible. For we praise or glorify
a thing by declaring its qualities ; if such qualities do not
exist all glorification lapses. It cannot by any means be

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 25. 329

maintained that anything may be glorified by the proclama-_.
tion of its qualities, even if such qualities do not really
exist. Hence the arthavadas which glorify a certain action,
just thereby intimate the real existence of the qualities and
details of the action. The mantras again, which are pre-
scribed in connexion with the actions, serve the purpose of
throwing light on the use to be derived from the perform-
ance of the actions, and this they accomplish by making
statements as to the particular qualities, such as embodied-
ness and the like, which belong to the devas and other
classes of beings. Otherwise Indra, and so on, would not
be remembered at the time of performance; for the idea
of a divinity presents itself to the mind only in connexion
with the special attributes of that divinity. In the case of
such qualities as are not established by other means of
proof, the primary statement is made by the arthavada or
the mantra: the former thereby glorifies the action, and
the latter proclaims it as possessing certain qualities or
details ; and both these ends are accomplished by making
statements as to the gods, &c., possessing certain qualities,
such as embodiedness and the like. In the case, again, of
certain qualities being already established by other means
of proof, the mantras and arthavadas merely refer to them
(as something already known), and in this way per-
form their function of glorification and elucidation. And
where, thirdly, there is a contradiction between the other
means of knowledge and what mantras and arthavadas
state (as when, e.g. a text of the latter kind says that ‘ the
sacrificial post is the sun’), the intention of the text is
metaphorically to denote, by means of those apparently
unmeaning terms, certain other qualities which are not
excluded by the other means of knowledge; and in this
way the function of glorification and elucidation is again
accomplished. Now what the injunction of a sacrificial
action demands as its supplement, is a statement as to the
power of the divinity to whom the sacrifice is offered; for
the performance which scripture enjoins on men desirous
of certain results, is itself of a merely transitory nature,
and hence requires some agent capable of bringing about,

330 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

at some future time, the result desired as, e.g, the heavenly
world. ‘VAayu is the swiftest god; he (the sacrificer)
approaches Vayu with his own share; the god then leads
him to prosperity’ (Taitt. Sah. I, 2,1); ‘ What he seeks
by means of that offering, may he obtain that, may he
prosper therein, may the gods favourably grant him that’
(Taitt. Br. III, 5, 10, 5); these and similar arthavadas
and mantras intimate that the gods when propitiated by
certain sacrificial works, give certain rewards and possess
the power to do so; and they thus connect themselves
with the general context of scripture as supplying an
evidently required item of information. Moreover, the
mere verb ‘to sacrifice’ (yag), as denoting worship of the
gods, intimates the presence of a deity which is to be
propitiated by the action called sacrifice, and thus consti-
tutes the main element of that action. A careful con-
sideration of the whole context thus reveals that everything
which is wanted for the due accomplishment of the action
enjoined is to be learned from the text itself, and that
hence we need not have recourse to such entities as the
‘unseen principle’ (apdrva), assumed to be denoted by,
or to be imagined in connexion with, the passages en-
joining certain actions. Hence the dharmasdstras, itihdsas,
and purd4zas also, which are founded on the different
brahmazas, mantras and arthavddas, clearly teach that
Brahma and the other gods, as well as the Asuras and
other superhuman beings, have bodies and sense-organs,
constitutions of different kinds, different abodes, enjoy-
ments, and functions.— Owing to their having bodies,
the gods therefore are also qualified for meditation on
Brahman.

26. If it be said that there results a contradiction
to work; we deny this, on account of the observa-
tion of the assumption of several (bodies).

An objection here presents itself. If we admit the gods
to have bodies, a difficulty arises at the sacrifices, as it is
impossible that one and the same corporeal Indra—who
is at the same time invited by many sacrificers ‘come,

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 27. 331

O Indra,’ ‘ come, O Lord of the red horses,’ &c.—should be
present at all those places. And that the gods, Agni and
so on, really do come to the sacrifices is proved by the
following scriptural text : ‘To whose sacrifice do the gods
go, and to whose not? He who first receives the gods,
sacrifices to them on the following day’ (Taitt. Samzh. I, 6,
7,1). In refutation of this objection the Satra points out
that there is seen, i.e. recorded, the assumption of several
bodies at the same time, on the part of beings endowed
with special powers, such as Saubhari.

27. If it be said (that a contradiction will result)
with regard to words; we say no, since beings
originate from them (as appears) from perception
and inference.

Well then let us admit ‘that there is no difficulty as far
as sacrifices are concerned, for the reason stated in the
preceding Satra. But another difficulty presents itself with
regard to the words of which the Veda consists. For if
Indra and the other gods are corporeal beings, it follows
that they are made up of parts and hence non-permanent.
This implies either that the Vedic words denoting them—
not differing therein from common worldly words such as
Devadatta—are totally devoid of meaning during all those
periods which precede the origination of the beings called
Indra and so on, or follow on their destruction; or else that
the Veda itself is non-permanent, non-eternal.—This ob-
jection is not valid, the Sdtra points out, for the reason that
those beings, viz. Indra and so on, again and again originate
from the Vedic words. To explain. Vedic words, such as
Indra and so on, do not, like the word Devadatta and the
like, denote, on the basis of convention, one particular in-
dividual only: they rather denote by their own power
particular species of beings, just as the word ‘cow’ denotes
a particular species of animals. When therefore a special
individual of the class called Indra has perished, the
creator, apprehending from the Vedic word ‘Indra’ which
is present to his mind the class characteristics of the beings
denoted by that word, creates another Indra possessing

332 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

those very same characteristics ; just as the potter fashions
a new jar, on the basis of the word ‘jar’ which is stirring in
Ats mind.—But how is this known ?—‘ Through perception
and inference, i.e. through Scripture and Smri#ti. Scripture
says, e.g.‘ By means of the Veda Pragépati evolved names
and forms, the being and the non-being’; and ‘Saying
‘“ bhdh ” (earth) he created the earth; saying “ bhuvaé”’ he
created the air, and so on; which passages teach that the
creator at first bethinks himself of the characteristic make
of a thing, in connexion with the word denoting it, and
thereupon creates an individual thing characterised by that
make. Sm~riti makes similar statements; compare, e.g.
‘In the beginning there was sent forth by the creator, divine
speech—beginningless and endless—in the form of the Veda,
and from it there originated all creatures’; and ‘He, in the
beginning, separately created from the words of the Veda
the names and works and shapes of all things’; and ‘ The
names and forms of beings, and all the multiplicity of
works He in the beginning created from the Veda.’ This
proves that from the corporeality of the gods, and so on, it
follows neither that the words of the Veda are unmeaning
nor that the Veda itself is non-eternal.

28. And for this very reason eternity (of the Veda).

As words such as Indra and Vasishzka, which denote
gods and Xishis, denote (not individuals only, but) classes,
and as the creation of those beings is preceded by
their being suggested to the creative mind through those
words ; for this reason the eternity of the Veda admits of
being reconciled with what scripture says about the man-
tras and kAndas (sections) of the sacred text having ‘makers’
and about Xzshis seeing the hymns; cp. such passages as
‘He chooses the makers of mantras’; ‘ Reverence to the
Rishis who are the makers of mantras’; ‘That is Agni;
this is a hymn of Visvamitra.’ For by means of these very
texts PragApati presents to his own mind the characteristics
and powers of the different Rishis who make the different
sections, hymns, and mantras, thereupon creates them en-
dowed with those characteristics and powers, and appoints

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 29. 333

them to remember the very same sections, hymns, &c.
The Rishis being thus gifted by PragApati with the requisite
powers, undergo suitable preparatory austerities and finally
see the mantras, and so on, proclaimed by the Vasishzhas
and other Rishis of former ages of the world, perfect in all
their sounds and accents, without having learned them from
the recitation of a teacher. There is thus no conflict be-
tween the eternity of the Veda and the fact that the Rishis
are the makers of its sections, hymns, and so on. A further
objection is raised. Let it be admitted that after each
pralaya of the kind called ‘contingent’ (naimittika),
Pragapati may proceed to create new Indras, and so on, in
the way of remembering on the basis of the Veda the
Indras, and so on, of preceding periods. In the case, on the
other hand, of a pralaya of the kind called elemental
(prakritika), in which the creator, Pragdpati himself, and
words—which are the effects of the elemental ahankara—
pass away, what possibility is there of Pragapati under-
taking a new creation on the basis of Vedic words, and
how can we speak of the permanency of a Veda which
perishes? He who maintains the eternity of the Veda and
the corporeality of gods, and so on, is thus really driven to
the hypothesis of the course of mundane existence being
without a beginning (i.e. not preceded by a pralaya).—Of
this difficulty the next Sdtra disposes.

29. And on account of the equality of names and
forms there is no contradiction, even in the renova-
tion (of the world); as appears from Sruti and
Smriti. .

On account of the sameness of names and forms, as
stated before, there is no difficulty in the way of the
origination of the world, even in the case of total pralayas.
For what actually takes place is as follows. When the
period of a great pralaya draws towards its close, the divine
supreme Person, remembering the constitution of the
world previous to the pralaya, and forming the volition
‘May I become manifold,’ separates into its constituent

334 VEDANTA-SCTRAS,

elements the whole mass of enjoying souls and objects of
enjoyment which, during the pralaya state, had been
merged in him so as to possess a separate existence (not
actual but) potential only, and then emits the entire world
just as it had been before, from the so-called Mahat
down to the Brahman-egg, and Hirazyagarbha (PragApati).
Having thereupon manifested the Vedas in exactly the
same order and arrangement they had had before, and
having taught them to Hirazyagarbha, he entrusts to
him the new creation of the different classes of beings,
gods, and so on, just as it was before; and at the same
time abides himself within the world so created as its inner
Self and Ruler. This view of the process removes all
difficulties, The superhuman origin and the eternity of
the Veda really mean that intelligent agents having
received in their minds an impression due to previous
recitations of the Veda in a fixed order of words, chapters,
and so on, remember and again recite it in that very same
order of succession. This holds good both with regard
to us men and to the highest Lord of all; there however
is that difference between the two cases that the representa-
tions of the Veda which the supreme Person forms in his
own mind are spontaneous, not dependent on an impression
previously made. :

To the question whence all this is known, the Sdtra
replies ‘from Scriptureand Smriti.’ The scriptural passage
is ‘He who first creates Brahma and delivers the Vedas to
him’ (Svet. Up. VI, 18). And as to Smriti we have the
following statement in Manu, ‘This universe existed in
the shape of darkness, &c.—He desiring to produce beings
of many kinds from his own body, first with a thought
created the waters and placed his seed in them. That seed
became a golden egg equal to the sun in brilliancy; in that
he himself was born as Brahmé, the progenitor of the
whole world’ (Manu I, 1,5; 8-9). To the same effect are
the texts of the Paurazikas, ‘ From the navel of the sleeping
divinity there sprung up a lotus, and in that lotus there
was born Brahma fully knowing all Vedas and Vedangas,
And then Brahma was told by him (the highest Divinity),

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 31. 335

‘ Do thou create all beings, O Great-minded one’; and the
following passage, ‘From the highest Naraéyaza there was
born the Four-faced one.’-—And in the section which begins
‘I will tell the original creation,’ we read ‘ Because having
created water (nara) I abide within it, therefore my name
shall be Narayaza. There I lie asleep in every Kalpa, and
as Iam sleeping there springs from my navel a lotus, and
in that lotus there is born the Four-faced one, and I tell
him “ Do thou, Great-minded one, create all beings.” ’—
Here terminates the adhikarana of ‘ the deities.’

30. On account of the impossibility (of qualifica-
tion for the madhuvidy4, δὲς.) Gaimini maintains
the non-qualification (of gods, &c.).

So far it has been proved that also the gods, and so on,
-are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. But a further
point here presents itself for consideration, viz. whether the
gods are qualified or not to undertake those meditations of
which they themselves are the objects. The Sitra states
as a prvapaksha view held by Gaimini, that they are not
so qualified, for the reason that there are no other Adityas,
Vasus, and so on, who could be meditated on by the
Adityas and Vasus themselves; and that moreover for
the Adityas and Vasus the qualities and position of those
classes of deities cannot be objects of desire, considering
that they possess them already. The so-called Madhuvidya
(K&. Up. ITI) represents as objects of devout meditation
certain parts of the sun which are being enjoyed by
the different classes of divine beings, Vasus, Adityas, and
so on—the sun being there called ‘madhu,’ i.e. honey or
nectar, on account of his being the abode of a certain
nectar to be brought about by certain sacrificial works to
be known from the Rig-veda, and so on; and as the reward
of such meditation the text names the attainment of the
position of the Vasus, Adityas, and so on.

31. And on account of (meditating on the part
of the gods) being in the Light,
‘Him the devas meditate upon as the light of lights, as

336 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

immortal time’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 16). This text declares
that the meditation of the gods has for its object the Light,
i.e. the highest Brahman. Now this express declaration
as to the gods being meditating devotees with regard to
meditations on Brahman which are common to men and
gods, implies a denial of the gods being qualified for medi-
tations on other objects. The conclusion therefore is that
the Vasus, and so on, are not qualified for meditations on
the Vasus and other classes of deities. ᾿

32. But Badardyaza (maintains) the existence (of
qualification) ; for there is (possibility of such).

The Reverend Badarayaza thinks that the Adityas, Vasus,
and so on, are also qualified for meditations on divinities.
For it is in their case also possible that their attainment of
Brahman should be viewed as preceded by their attainment
of Vasu-hood or Aditya-hood, in so far, namely, as they
meditate on Brahman as abiding within themselves. They
may be Vasus and Adityas in the present age of the
world, but at the same time be desirous of holding the
same position in future ages also. In the Madhuvidy4 we
have to distinguish two sections, concerned respectively
with Brahman in its causal and its effected state. The
former section, extending from the beginning up to ‘ when
from thence he has risen upwards,’ enjoins meditation on
Brahman in its condition as effect, i.e. as appearing in the
form of creatures such as the Vasus, and so on; while
the latter section enjoins meditation on the causal Brahman
viewed as abiding within the sun as its inner Self. The
purport of the whole vidya is that he who meditates on
Brahman in this its twofold form will in a future age of the
world enjoy Vasu-hood, and will finally attain Brahman in
its causal aspect, i.e. the very highest Brahman. From the
fact that the text, ‘And indeed to him who thus knows
the Brahma-upanishad, the sun does not rise and does not
set ; for him there is day once and for all,’ calls the whole
Madhuvidya a ‘ Brakma’-upanishad, and that the reward
declared is the attainment of Vasu-hood, and so on, leading
up to the attainment of Brahman, we clearly are entitled to

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 32. 337

infer that the meditations which the text enjoins, viz.
on the different parts of the sun viewed as objects of
enjoyment for the Vasus, and so on, really are meant as
meditations on Brahman as abiding in those different forms.
Meditation on the Vasus and similar beings is thus seen to be
possible for the Vasus themselves. And as Brahman really
constitutes the only object of meditation, we also see the
appropriateness of the text discussed above, ‘On him
the gods meditate as the light of lights.’ The Vrittikara
expresses the same opinion, ‘ For there is possibility with
regard to the Madhu-vidya, and so on, Brahman only
being the object of meditation everywhere.—Here ter-
minates the adhikaraza of ‘honey.’

The Sfdtras now enter on a discussion of the question
whether the Sfdras also are qualified for the knowledge of
Brahman.

The Pfrvapakshin maintains that they are so qualified ;
for qualification, he says, depends on want and capacity,
and both these are possible in the case of Sfdras also.
The Sfdra is not indeed qualified for any works depending
on a knowledge of the sacred fires, for from such know-
ledge he is debarred; but he possesses qualification for
meditation on Brahman, which after all is nothing but
a certain mental energy. The only works prerequisite for
meditation are those works which are incumbent on a man
as a member of a caste or 4srama, and these consist, in the
Sddra’s case, in obedience to the higher castes. And when
we read ‘therefore the Sfdra is not qualified for sacrifices,’
the purport of this passage is only to make a confirmatory
reference to something already settled by reason, viz. that
the Sfdra is not qualified for the performance of sacrifices
which cannot be accomplished by one not acquainted with
the sacred fires (and not to deny the Stdra’s competence
for devout meditation).—But how can meditation on Brah-
man be undertaken by a man who has not studied the
Vedas, inclusive of the Vedanta, and hence knows nothing
about the nature of Brahman and the proper modes of
meditation >—Those also, we reply, who do not study Veda
and Vedanta may acquire the requisite knowledge by

[48] Ζ

338 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

hearing Itih4sas and Purdzas; and there are texts which
allow Siadras to become acquainted with texts of that kind;
cp. e.g. ‘one is to make the four castes to hear texts, the
Brahmana coming first. Moreover, those Pura#zas and
Itih4sas make mention of Sddras, such as Vidura, who had
a knowledge of Brahman. And the Upanishads them-
selves, viz. in the so-called Samvarga-vidy4, show that
a Sidra is qualified for the knowledge of Brahman; for
there the teacher Raikva addresses GAnasruti, who wishes
to learn from him, as Sddra, and thereupon instructs him in
the knowledge of Brahman (XA. Up. IV, 2, 3). All this
proves that Sddras also have a claim to the knowledge of
Brahman.

This conclusion we deny, on the ground of the absence
of capability. It is impossible that the capability of per-
forming meditations on Brahman should belong to a person
not knowing the nature of Brahman and the due modes of
meditation, and not qualified by the knowledge of the
requisite preliminaries of such meditation, viz. recitation of
the Veda, sacrifices, and so on. Mere want or desire does
not impart qualification toa person destitute of the required
capability. And this absence of capability is due, in the
Sddra’s case, to absence of legitimate study of the Veda.
The injunctions of sacrificial works naturally connect them-
selves with the knowledge and the means of knowledge
(i.e. religious ceremonies and the like) that belong to the
three higher castes, for these castes actually possess
the knowledge (required for the sacrifices), owing to their
studying the Veda in agreement with the injunction which
prescribes such study for the higher castes; the same
injunctions do not, on the other hand, connect themselves
with the knowledge and means of knowledge belonging to
others (than members of the three higher castes). And
the same naturally holds good with regard to the injunc-
tions of meditation on Brahman. And as thus only such
knowledge as is acquired by study prompted by the Vedic
injunction of study supplies a means for meditation on
Brahman, it follows that the Sddra for whom that injunc-
tion is not meant is incapable of such meditation. ItihAsas

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33. 339

and Purdzas hold the position of being helpful means
towards meditation in so far only as they confirm or
support the Veda, not independently of the Veda. And
that Sfdras are allowed to hear Itihasas and Purdmas is
meant only for the end of destroying their sins, not to
prepare them for meditation on Brahman. The case of
Vidura and other Sfidras having been ‘founded on Brah-
man, explains itself as follows:—Owing to the effect of
former actions, which had not yet worked themselves out,
they were born in a low caste, while at the same time they
possessed wisdom owing to the fact that the knowledge
acquired by them in former births had not yet quite
vanished.

(On these general grounds we object to Sfidras being
viewed as qualified for meditation on Brahman.) The
Sftra now refutes that argument, which the Parvapakshin
derives from the use of the word ‘Sddra’ in the Sam-
varga-vidya.

33. (That) grief of him (arose), this is intimated
by his (GAnasruti’s) resorting to him (Raikva) on
hearing a disrespectful speech about himself.

From what the text says about Ganastuti Pautrayaza
having been taunted by a flamingo for his want of know-
ledge of Brahman, and having thereupon resorted to
Raikva, who possessed the knowledge of Brahman, it
appears that sorrow (sué) had taken possession of him;
and it is with a view to this that Raikva addresses him as
Sidra. For the word Sidra, etymologically considered,
means one who grieves or sorrows (sokati). The appella-
tion ‘sQdra’ therefore refers to his sorrow, not to his being
a member of the fourth caste. This clearly appears from
a consideration of the whole story. Ganasruti Pautrayaza
was a very liberal and pious king. Being much pleased
with his virtuous life, and wishing to rouse in him the
desire of knowing Brahman, two noble-minded beings,
assuming the shape of flamingoes, flew past him at night
time, when one of them addressed the other, ‘O Bhallaksha,
the light of Ganasruti has spread like the sky ; do not go

22

340 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

near that it may not burn thee.’ To this praise of
Ganasruti the other flamingo replied, ‘ How can you speak
of him, being what he is, as if he were Raikva “ sayuktvan” ?’
i.e. ‘how can you speak of GAnasruti, being what he is, as
if he were Raikva, who knows Brahman and is endowed
with the most eminent qualities? Raikva, who knows
Brahman, alone in this world is truly eminent. GAnasruti
may be very pious, but as he does not know Brahman
what quality of his could produce splendour capable of
burning me like the splendour of Raikva?’ The former
flamingo thereupon asks who that Raikva is, and its com-
panion replies, ‘He in whose work and knowledge there
are comprised all the works done by good men and all the
knowledge belonging to intelligent creatures, that is Raikva.’
G4nasruti, having heard this speech of the flamingo—which
implied a reproach to himself as being destitute of the
knowledge of Brahman, and a glorification of Raikva as
possessing that knowledge—at once sends his door-keeper
to look for Raikva; and when the door-keeper finds him
and brings word, the king himself repairs to him with six
hundred cows, a golden necklace, and a carriage yoked with
mules, and asks him to teach him the deity on which he
meditates, i.e. the highest deity. Raikva, who through
the might of his Yoga-knowledge is acquainted with every-
thing that passes in the three worlds, at once perceives that
Ganasruti is inwardly grieved at the slighting speech of
the flamingo, which had been provoked by the king’s want
of knowledge of Brahman, and is now making an effort due
to the wish of knowing Brahman; and thus recognises that
the king is fit for the reception of that knowledge. Re-
flecting thereupon that a knowledge of Brahman may be
firmly established in this pupil even without long attendance
on the teacher if only he will be liberal to the teacher to
the utmost of his capability, he addresses him: ‘ Do thou
take away (apdhara) (these things), O Sfdra; keep (the
chariot) with the cows for thyself.’ What he means to say
is, ‘By so much only in the way of gifts bestowed on me,
the knowledge of Brahman cannot be established in thee,
who, through the desire for such knowledge, art plunged

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 35. 341

in grief’—the address ‘O Sddra’ intimating that Raikva
knows GAnasruti to be plunged in grief, and on that account
fit to receive instruction about Brahman. GaAnasruti there-
upon approaches Raikva for a second time, bringing as
much wealth as he possibly can, and moreover his own
daughter. Raikva again intimates his view of the pupil’s
fitness for receiving instruction by addressing him a second
time as ‘ Sddra,’ and says, ‘You have brought these,
O Sfdra; by this mouth only you made me speak,’ i.e.
‘You now have brought presents to the utmost of your
capability ; by this means only you will induce me, without
lengthy service on your part, to utter speech containing
that instruction about Brahman which you desire.’-— Having
said this he begins to instruct him.—We thus see that the
appellation ‘sidra’ is meant to intimate the grief of
GAnasruti—which grief in its turn indicates the king’s fit-
ness for receiving instruction ; and is not meant to declare
that Ganasruti belongs to the lowest caste.

34. And on account of (Ganasruti’s) kshattriya-
hood being understood.

The first section of the vidy4 tells us that GAnasruti
bestowed much wealth and food ; later on he is represented
as sending his door-keeper on an errand; and in the end,
as bestowing on Raikva many villages—which shows him
to be a territorial lord. All these circumstances suggest
GAnasruti’s being a Kshattriya, and hence not a member
of the lowest caste-——The above Sdtra having declared
that the kshattriya-hood of GAnasruti is indicated in the
introductory legend, the next Sdtra shows that the same
circumstance is indicated in the concluding legend.

35. On account of the inferential sign further on,
together with Aaitraratha.

The kshattriya-hood of Ganasruti is further to be accepted
on account of the Kshattriya Abhipratérin Kaitraratha,
who is mentioned further on in this very same Samvarga-
vidya which Raikva imparts to GAnasruti—But why ?—
As follows. The section beginning ‘Once a Brahmaarin

-

342 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

begged of Saunaka K4peya and Abhipratarin Kakshaseni
while being waited on at their meal,’ and ending ‘thus do
we, O Brahmafarin, meditate on that being,’ shows Kapeya,
Abhipratarin, and the Brahma#4rin to be connected with
the Samvarga-vidya4. Now Abhipratarin is a Kshattriya,
the other two are Brahmavzas. This shows that there are
connected with the vidy4, Brahmazas, and from among
non-Braéhmavas, a Kshattriya only, but not a Sddra. It
therefore appears appropriate to infer that the person,
other than the Brahmana Raikva, who is likewise connected
with this vidy4, viz. Ganasruti, is likewise a Kshattriya, not
a Sddra.—But how do we know that Abhipratdrin is
a Kaitraratha and a Kshattriya? Neither of these cir-
cumstances is stated in the legend in the Sas#varga-vidya !
To this question the Sftra replies, ‘on account of the
inferential mark.’ From the inferential mark that Saunaka
Ka4peya and Abhipratérin Kakshaseni are said to have
been sitting together at a meal we understand that there
is some connexion between Abhipratarin and the Kapeyas.
Now another scriptural passage runs as follows: ‘The
K4peyas made Xaitraratha perform that sacrifice’ (Tand.
Bra. XX, 12, 5), and this shows that one connected with
the Kapeyas was a Xaitraratha; and a further text shows
that a Xaitraratha is a Kshattriya, ‘from him there was
descended a Xaitraratha who was a prince.’ All this
favours the inference that Abhipratérin was a Xaitraratha
and a Kshattriya.

So far the Satras have shown that there is no inferential
mark to prove what is contradicted by reasoning, viz. the
qualification of the Sddras. The next Sdtra declares that
the non-qualification of the Sddra proved by reasoning is
confirmed by Scripture and Smriti.

36. On account of the reference to ceremonial
purifications, and on account of the declaration of
their absence.

In sections the purport of which is to give instruction
about Brahman the ceremony of initiation is referred to,
‘I will initiate you; he initiated him’ (K%. Up. IV, 4).

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 39. 343

And at the same time the absence of such ceremonies
in the case of Sidras is stated: ‘In the Sidra there is
not any sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony’ (Manu
X, 126) ; and ‘The fourth caste is once born, and not fit
for any ceremony’ (Manu X, 4).

37. And on account of the procedure, on the
ascertainment of the non-being of that.

That a SQdra is not qualified for knowledge of Brahman
appears from that fact also that as soon as Gautama has
convinced himself that Gabala, who wishes to become his
pupil, is not a Sidra, he proceeds to teach him the
knowledge of Brahman.

38. And on account of the prohibition of hearing,
studying, and performance of (Vedic) matter.

The Sfdra is specially forbidden to hear and study the
Veda and to perform the things enjoined in it. ‘For
a Sfdra is like a cemetery, therefore the Veda must not
be read in the vicinity of a SQdra ;’ ‘ Therefore the Sddra
is like a beast, unfit for sacrifices.’ And he who does not
hear the Veda recited cannot learn it so as to understand
and perform what the Veda enjoins. The prohibition of
hearing thus implies the prohibition of understanding and
whatever depends on it.

39. And on account of Smriti.

Smriti also declares this prohibition of hearing, and so
on. ‘The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled
with molten lead and lac; if he pronounces it his tongue is
to be slit; if he preserves it his body is to be cut through.’
And ‘He is not to teach him sacred duties or vows.’—It
is thus a settled matter that the Sfdras are not qualified
for meditations on Brahman.

We must here point out that the non-qualification of
Sddras for the cognition of Brahman can in no way be
asserted by those who hold that a Brahman consisting of
pure non-differenced intelligence constitutes the sole reality ;
that everything else is false; that all bondage is unreal ;

344 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

that such bondage may be put an end to by the mere
cognition of the true nature of Reality—such cognition
resulting from the hearing of certain texts; and that the
cessation of bondage thus effected constitutes final Release.
For knowledge of the true nature of Reality, in the sense
indicated, and the release resulting from it, may be secured
by any one who learns from another person that Brahman
alone is real and that everything else is falsely super-
imposed on Brahman. That the cognition of such truth
can be arrived at only on the basis of certain Vedic texts,
such as‘ Thou art that,’ is a restriction which does not
admit of proof; for knowledge of the truth does not depend
on man’s choice, and at once springs up in the mind even
of an unwilling man as soon as the conditions for such
origination are present. Nor can it be proved in any way
that bondage can be put an end to only through such
knowledge of the truth as springs from Vedic texts; for
error comes to an end through the knowledge of the true
nature of things, whatever agency may give rise to such
knowledge. True knowledge, of the kind described, will
spring up in the mind of a man as soon as he hears the
non-scriptural declaration, ‘Brahman, consisting of non-
differenced intelligence, is the sole Reality; everything else
is false, and this will suffice to free him from error. When
a competent and trustworthy person asserts that what was
mistaken for silver is merely a sparkling shell, the error of
a Sidra no less than of a Brdhmaza comes to an end; in the
same way ἃ Sddra also will free himself from the great
cosmic error as soon as the knowledge of the true nature of
things has arisen in his mind through a statement resting
on the traditional lore of men knowing the Veda. Nor
must you object to this on the ground that men knowing
the Veda do not instruct Sidras, and so on, because the
text, ‘he is not to teach him sacred things,’ forbids them to
do so; for men who have once learned—from texts such
as ‘Thou art that’—that Brahman is their Self, and thus
are standing on the very top of the Veda as it were, move
no longer in the sphere of those to whom injunctions and
prohibitions apply, and the prohibition quoted does not

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 39. 345

therefore touch them. Knowledge of Brahman may thus
spring up in the mind of Sfdras and the like, owing to
instruction received from one of those men who have passed
beyond all prohibition. Nor must it be said that the
instance of the shell and the silver is not analogous, in so
far, namely, as the error with regard to silver in the shell
comes to an end as soon as the true state of things is
declared; while the great cosmic error that clouds the
Sfdra’s mind does not come to an end as soon as, from
the teaching of another-man, he learns the truth about
Reality. For the case of the Sfidra does not herein differ
from that of the Brahmamza; the latter also does not at
once free himself from the cosmic error. Nor again will it
avail to plead that the sacred texts originate the demanded
final cognition in the mind of the Brahmavza as soon as
meditation has dispelled the obstructive imagination of
plurality; for in the same way, i.e. helped by meditation,
the non-Vedic instruction given by another person pro-
duces the required cognition in the mind of the Sddra.
For meditation means nothing but a steady consideration
of the sense which sentences declaratory of the unity of
Brahman and the Self may convey, and the effect of such
meditation is to destroy all impressions opposed to such
unity; you yourself thus admit that the injunction of medi-
tation aims at something visible (i.e. an effect that can be
definitely assigned, whence it follows that the Sddra also
is qualified for it, while he would not be qualified for an
activity having an ‘advésh/a, i.e. supersensuous, transcen-
dental effect). The recital of the text of the Veda also
and the like (are not indispensable means for bringing
about cognition of Brahman, but) merely subserve the
origination of the desire of knowledge. The desire of
knowledge may arise in a Sfidra also (viz. in some other
way), and thereupon real knowledge may result from non-
Vedic instruction, obstructive imaginations having pre-
viously been destroyed by meditation. And thus in his
case also non-real bondage will come to an end.—The same
conclusion may also be arrived at by a different road. The
mere ordinary instruments of knowledge, viz. perception

346 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

and inference assisted by reasoning, may suggest to the
Sddra the theory that there is an inward Reality constituted
by non-differenced self-luminous intelligence, that this
inward principle witnesses Nescience, and that owing to
Nescience the entire apparent world, with its manifold distinc-
tions of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge, is super-
imposed upon the inner Reality. He may thereupon, by
uninterrupted meditation on this inner Reality, free himself
from all imaginations opposed to it, arrive at the intuitive
knowledge of the inner principle, and thus obtain final
release. And this way being open to release, there is really
no use to be discerned in the Ved4nta-texts, suggesting as
they clearly do the entirely false view that the real being (is
not absolutely homogeneous intelligence, but) possesses infi-
nite transcendent attributes, being endowed with manifold
powers, connected with manifold creations, and soon. In
this way the qualification of Stdras for the knowledge
of Brahman is perfectly clear. And as the knowledge of
Brahman may be reached in this way not only by Sfdras but
also by Brahmazas and members of the other higher castes,
the poor Upanishad is practically defunct—To this the
following objection will possibly be raised. Man being
implicated in and confused by the beginningless course
of mundane existence, requires to receive from somewhere
a suggestion as to this empirical world being a mere error
and the Reality being something quite different, and thus
only there arises in him a desire to enter on an enquiry,
proceeding by means of perception, and so on. Now that
which gives the required suggestion is the Veda, and hence
we cannot do without it.—But this objection is not valid.
For in the minds of those who are awed by all the dangers
and troubles of existence, the desire to enter on a philo-
sophical investigation of Reality, proceeding by means of
Perception and Inference, springs up quite apart from the
Veda, owing to the observation that there are various sects
of philosophers, Sankhyas, and so on, who make it their busi-
ness to carry on such investigations. And when such
desire is once roused, Perception and Inference alone (in
the way allowed by the Sankaras themselves) lead on to

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40. 347

the theory that the only Reality is intelligence eternal,
pure, self-luminous, non-dual, non-changing, and that
everything else is fictitiously superimposed thereon. That
this self-luminous Reality possesses no other attribute to
be learned from scripture is admitted; for according
to your opinion also scripture sublates everything that is
not Brahman and merely superimposed on it. Nor should
it be said that we must have recourse to the Upanishads
for the purpose of establishing that the Real found in the
way of perception and inference is at the same time of
the nature of bliss; for the merely and absolutely Intelli-
gent is seen of itself to be of that nature, since it is different
from everything that is not of that nature.—There are, on
the other hand, those who hold that the knowledge which
the Vedanta-texts enjoin as the means of Release is of the
nature of devout meditation; that such meditation has
the effect of winning the love of the supreme Spirit and is
to be learned from scripture only; that the injunctions
of meditation refer to such knowledge only as springs from
the legitimate study of the Veda on the part of a man duly
purified by initiation and other ceremonies, and is assisted
by the seven means (see above, p. 17); and that the
supreme Person pleased by such meditation bestows on
the devotee knowledge of his own true nature, dissolves
thereby the Nescience springing from works, and thus
releases him from bondage. And on this view the proof of
the non-qualification of the Sddra, as given in the preceding
Satras, holds good.—Here terminates the adhikaraza of
‘the exclusion of the Sddras.’

Having thus completed the investigation of qualification
which had suggested itself in connexion with the matter
in hand, the Sftras return to the being measured by
athumb, and state another reason for its being explained as
Brahman—as already understood on the basis of its being
declared the ruler of what is and what will be.

40. On account of the trembling.

In the part of the Ka¢ka-Upanishad which intervenes
between the passage ‘The Person of the size of a thumb

.

348 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

stands in the middle of the Self’ (II, 4, 12), and the pas-
sage ‘The Person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self’
(II, 6, 17), we meet with the text ‘whatever there is, the
whole world, when gone forth, trembles in its breath.
A great terror, a raised thunderbolt ; those who knew
it became immortal. From fear of it fire burns, from
fear the sun shines, from fear Indra and Vayu, and
Death as the fifth run away’ (II, 6, 2; 3). This text
declares that the whole world and Agni, Sfrya, and
so on, abiding within that Person of the size of a thumb,
who is here designated by the term ‘breath,’ and going
forth from him, tremble from their great fear of him.
‘What will happen to us if we transgress his command-
ments ?’—thinking thus the whole world trembles on
account of great fear, as if it were a raised thunderbolt.
In this explanation we take the clause ‘A great fear,
a raised thunderbolt,’ in the sense of ‘(the world trembles)
from great fear,’ &c., as it is clearly connected in meaning
with the following clause: ‘from fear the fire burns,’ &c.—
Now what is described here is the nature of the highest
Brahman ; for that such power belongs to Brahman only
we know from other texts, viz.: ‘By the command of that
Imperishable, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart’ (Bri.
Up. III, 8, 9); and ‘ From fear of it the wind blows, from
fear the sun rises; from fear of it Agni and Indra, yea
Death runs as the fifth’ (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1)—The next
Sdtra supplies a further reason.

41, On account of light being seen (declared in
the text).

Between the two texts referring to the Person of the size
of a thumb, there is a text declaring that to that Person
there belongs light that obscures all other light, and is the
cause and assistance of all other light ; and such light is
characteristic of Brahman only. ‘The sun does not shine
there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, and
much less this fire. After him, the shining one, every-
thing shines; by his light all this is lighted’ (Ka. Up. II,
5, 15). This very same sloka is read in the Atharvama (i.e.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 349

Murndaka) with reference to Brahman. Everywhere, in fact,
the texts attribute supreme luminousness to Brahman
only. Compare: ‘ Having approached the highest light he
manifests himself in his own shape’ (KA. Up. VIII, 12, 3);
‘Him the gods meditate on as the light of lights, as
immortal time’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 16); ‘ Now that light which
shines above this heaven’ (KA. Up. III, 13, 7).—It is thus
a settled conclusion that the Person measured by a thumb
is the highest Brahman.—Here terminates the adhikarava
of ‘him who is measured’ (by a thumb).

42. The ether, on account of the designation of
something different, and so on.

We read in the KAandogya ‘ The ether is the evolver of
forms and names. That within which these forms and
names are (or “that which is within—or without—these
forms and names”) is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self’
(VIII, 14). A doubt here arises whether the being here
called ether be the released individual soul, or the highest
Self.—The Pirvapakshin adopts the former view. For, he °
says, the released soul is introduced as subject-matter in
an immediately preceding clause, ‘ Shaking off all as a horse
shakes his hair, and as the moon frees himself from the
mouth of R&hu; having shaken off the body I obtain,
satisfied, the uncreated world of Brahman.’ Moreover,
the clause ‘That which is without forms and names’ clearly
designates the released soul freed from name and form.
And ‘the evolver of names and forms’ is again that same
soul characterised with a view to its previous condition ;
for the individual soul in its non-released state supported
the shapes of gods, and so on, and their names. With
a view, finally, to its present state in which it is free from
name and form, the last clause declares ‘that is Brahman,
the Immortal.’ The term ‘ether’ may very well be applied
to the released soul which is characterised by the possession
of non-limited splendour.—But, as the text under discus-
sion is supplementary to the section dealing with the small
ether within the heart (VIII, 1, 1 ff.), we understand that

350 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

that small ether is referred to here also; and it has been
proved above that that small ether is Brahman !—Not so,
we reply. The text under discussion is separated from the
section treating of the small ether within the heart, by the
teaching of Pragdpati, and that teaching is concerned with
the characteristics of the individual soul in its different
conditions up to Release; and moreover the earlier part of
the section under discussion speaks of the being which
shakes off evil, and this undoubtedly is the released indi-
vidual soul introduced in the teaching of Pragapati. All
this shows that the ether in our passage denotes the released
individual soul.

This view is set aside by the Sitra. The ether in our
passage is the highest Brahman, because the clause ‘ Ether
is the evolver of forms and names’ designates something
other than the individual soul. The ether which evolves
names and forms cannot be the individual soul either in
the state of bondage or that of release. In the state of
bondage the soul is under the influence of karman, itself par-
ticipates in name and form, and hence cannot bring about
names and forms. And in its released state it is expressly
said not to take part in the world-business (Ve. SG. IV, 4, 17),
and therefore is all the less qualified to evolve names and
forms. The Lord, on the other hand, who is the ruling
principle in the construction of the Universe is expressly
declared by scripture to be the evolver of names and forms;
cp. ‘Entering into them with this living Self, let me evolve
names and forms’ (K%. Up.VI, 3, 2); ‘ Who is all-knowing,
whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born
this Brahman, name, form, and matter’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), &c.
Hence the ether which brings about names and forms is
something different from the soul for which name and form
are brought about; it is in fact the highest Brahman. This
the next clause of the text confirms, ‘That which is within
those forms and names’; the purport of which is: because
that ether is within names and forms, not being touched
by them but being something apart, therefore it is the
evolver of them; this also following from his being free
from evil and endowed with the power of realising his

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 451

purposes. The ‘and so on’ in the Sdtra refers to the
Brahma-hood, Self-hood, and immortality mentioned in the
text (‘ That is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self’). For
Brahma-hood, i.e. greatness, and so on, in their uncon-
ditioned sense, belong to the highest Self only. It is thus
clear that the ether is the highest Brahman.—Nor is the
Parvapakshin right in maintaining that a clause immediately
preceding (‘shaking off all evil’) introduces the individual
soul as the general topic of the section. For what the part
of the text immediately preceding the passage under dis-
cussion does introduce as general topic, is the highest
Brahman, as shown by the clause ‘I obtain the Brahma-
world.’ Brahman is, it is true, represented there as the
object to be obtained by the released soul; but as the
released soul cannot be the evolver of names and forms,
&c., we must conclude that it is Brahman (and not the
released soul), which constitutes the topic of the whole
section. Moreover (to take a wider view of the, context of
our passage) the term ‘ether’ prompts us to recognise here
the small ether (mentioned in the first section of the eighth
book) as the general topic of the book ; and as the teach-
ing of Pragdpati is meant to set forth (not the individual
soul by itself but) the nature of the soul of the meditating
devotee, it is proper to conclude that the text under dis-
cussion is meant finally to represent, as the object to be
obtained, the small ether previously inculcated as object of
meditation. In conclusion we remark that the term ‘ether’
is nowhere seen to denote the individual Self—The ether
that evolves names and forms, therefore, is the highest
Brahman.

But, an objection is raised, there is no other Self different
from the individual Self; for scripture teaches the unity of
all Selfs and denies duality. Terms such as ‘the highest
Self, ‘the highest Brahman,’ ‘the highest Lord,’ are merely
designations of the individual soul in the state of Release.
The Brahma-world to be attained, therefore, is nothing
different from the attaining individual soul; and hence the
ether also that evolves names and forms can be that soul
only.—To this objection the next Satra replies.

352 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

43. On account of difference in deep sleep and
departing.

We have to supply ‘on account of designation’ from the
preceding Stra. Because the text designates the highest
Self as something different from the individual Self in the
state of deep sleep as well as at the time of departure, the
highest Self is thus different. For the Vagasaneyaka, after
having introduced the individual Self in the passage ‘ Who
is that Self ?—He who consisting of knowledge is among
the prazas, &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7), describes how, in the
state of deep sleep, being not conscious of anything it is
held embraced by the all-knowing highest Self, ‘ embraced
by the intelligent Self it knows nothing that is without,
nothing that is within’ (IV, 3, 21). So also with reference
to the time of departure, i. e. dying ‘ Mounted by the intel-
ligent Self it moves along groaning’ (IV, 3, 35). Now it
is impossible that the unconscious individual Self, either
lying in deep sleep or departing from the body, should at
the same time be embraced or mounted by itself, being
all-knowing. Nor can the embracing and mounting Self
be some other individual Self; for no such Self can be all-
knowing.—The next Satra supplies a further reason.

44. And on account of such words as Lord.

That embracing highest Self is further on designated by
terms such as Lord, and so on. ‘He is the Lord of all,
the master of all, the ruler of all. He does not become
greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works. He is
the lord of all, the king of beings, the protector of beings.
He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not
be confounded. Brahmavzas seek to know him by the
study of the Veda. He who knows him becomes a Muni.
Wishing for that world only, mendicants leave their homes’
(IV, 4,22). ‘This indeed is the great unborn Self, the strong,
the giver of wealth,—undecaying, undying, immortal, fear-
less is Brahman’? (IV, 4,24; 25). Now all the qualities here
declared, viz. being the lord of all, and so on, cannot pos-
sibly belong to the individual Self even in the state of
Release ; and we thus again arrive at the conclusion that

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 44. 353

the ether evolving forms and names is something different
from the released individual soul. The declarations of
general Unity which we meet with in the texts rest
thereon, that all sentient and non-sentient beings are effects
of Brahman, and hence have Brahman for their inner Self.
That this is the meaning of texts such as ‘All this is
Brahman,’ &c., we have explained before. And the texts
denying plurality are to be understood in the same way.—
Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the designation of
something different, and so on,’

| [48] Aa

354 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

FOURTH PADA.

1. If it be said that some (mention) that which
rests on Inference; we deny this because (the form)
refers to what is contained in the simile of the
body; and (this the text) shows.

So far the Sdtras have given instruction about a Brah-
man, the enquiry into which serves as a means to obtain
what is the highest good of man, viz. final release; which
is the cause of the origination, and so on, of the world;
which differs in nature from all non-sentient things such
as the Pradhana, ahd from all intelligent beings whether
in the state of bondage of of release ; which is free from
all shadow of imperfection; which is all knowing, all
powerful, has the power of realising all its purposes, com-
prises within itself all blessed qualities, is the inner Self of
all, and possesses unbounded power and might. But here
a new special objection presents itself. In order to estab-
lish the theory maintained by Kapila, viz. of there being
a Pradhana and individual souls which do not have their
Self in Brahman; it is pointed out by some that in certain
branches of the Veda there are met with certain passages
which appear to adumbrate the doctrine of the Pradhana
being the universal cause. The Sftras now apply them-
selves to the refutation of this view, in order thereby
to confirm the theory of Brahman being the only cause
of all.

We read in the Katha-Upanishad, ‘Beyond the senses
there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind,
beyond the mind there is the intellect, the great Self is
beyond the intellect. Beyond the Great there is the
Unevolved, beyond the Unevolved there is the Person.
Beyond the Person there is nothing—this is the goal, the
highest road’ (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), The question here arises
whether by the ‘Unevolved’ be or be not meant the

1 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I. 355

Pradhdna, as established by Kapila’s theory, of which
Brahman is not the Self.—The Pdrvapakshin maintains
the former alternative. For, he says, in the clause ‘beyond
the Great is the Unevolved, beyond the Unevolved is the
Person,’ we recognise the arrangement of entities as estab<
lished by the Sankhya-system, and hence must take the
‘Unevolved’ to be the Pradh4na. This is further con-
firmed by the additional clause ‘beyond the Person there
is nothing,’ which (in agreement with Saakhya principles)
denies that there is any being beyond the soul, which itself
is the twenty-fifth and last of the principles recognised by
the SAnkhyas. This prima facie view is expressed in the
former part of the Sitra, ‘If it be said that in the sakhds
of some that which rests on Inference, i.e. the Pradhana, is
stated as the universal cause.’

The latter part of the Sdtra refutes this view. The word
‘Unevolved’ does not denote a Pradh4na independent of
Brahman ; it rather denotes the body represented as a
chariot in the simile of the body, i.e. in the passage in-
stituting a comparison between the Self, body, intellect,
and so on, on the one side, and the charioteer, chariot, &c.
on the other side.—The details are as follows. The text
at first—in the section beginning ‘ Know the Self to be the
person driving,’ &c., and ending ‘he reaches the end of the
journey, and that is the highest place of Vishzu’ (I, 3, 3-9)
—compares the devotee desirous of reaching the goal of
his journey through the samsara, i.e. the abode of Vishzu,
to a man driving in a chariot ; and his body, senses, and so
on, to the chariot and parts of the chariot} the meaning of
the whole comparison being that he only reaches the goal
who has the chariot, &c. in his control. It thereupon pro-
ceeds to declare which of the different beings enumerated
and compared to a chariot, and so on, occupy a superior
position to the others in so far, namely, as they are that
which requires to be controlled—‘ higher than the senses
are the objects,’ and so on. Higher than the senses—
compared to the horses—are the objects—compared to
roads,—because even a man who generally controls his
senses finds it difficult to master thém when they are in

Aa2 :

356 _ VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

contact with their objects; higher than the objects is the
mind—compared to the reins—because when the mind
inclines towards the objects even the non-proximity of the
latter does not make much difference; higher than the
mind (manas) is the intellect (buddhi)—compared to the
charioteer—because in the absence of decision (which is
the characteristic quality of buddhi) the mind also has
little power; higher than the intellect again is the (indi-
vidual) Self, for that Self is the agent whom the intellect
serves. And as all this is subject to the wishes of the Self,
the text characterises it as the ‘great Self.’ Superior to
that Self again is the body, compared to the chariot, for
all activity whereby the individual Self strives to bring
about what is of advantage to itself depends on the body.
And higher finally than the body is the highest Person,
the inner Ruler and Self of all, the term and goal of the
journey of the individual soul; for the activities of all
the beings enumerated depend on the wishes of that
highest Self. As the universal inner Ruler that Self brings
about the meditation of the Devotee also; for the Sdtra
(II, 3, 41) expressly declares that the activity of the indi-
vidual soul depends on the Supreme Person. Being the
means for bringing about the meditation and the goal of
meditation, that same Self is the highest object to be
attained; hence the text says ‘ Higher than the Person
there is nothing—that is the goal, the highest road.’
Analogously scripture, in the antaryamin-Brahmaza, at
first declares that the highest Self within witnesses and
rules everything, and thereupon negatives the existence
of any further ruling principle ‘There is no other seer
but he,’ &c. Similarly, in the Bhagavad-git4, ‘ The abode,
the agent, the various senses, the different and manifold
functions, and fifth the Divinity (i.e. the highest Person)’
(XVIII, 14) ; and ‘I dwell within the heart of all; memory
and perception, as well as their loss, come from me’ (XV,
15). And if, as in the explanation of the text under dis-
cussion, we speak of that highest Self being ‘controlled,’ we
must understand thereby the soul’s taking refuge with it ;
compare the passage Bha. Gi. XVIII, 61-62, ‘The Lord

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I. 357

dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling them round
as if mounted on a machine; to Him go for refuge.’

Now all the beings, senses, and so on, which had been
mentioned in the simile, are recognised in the passage
‘higher than the senses are the objects,’ &c., being desig-
nated there by their proper names ; but there is no mention
made of the body which previously had been compared to
the chariot ; we therefore conclude that it is the body which
is denoted by the term ‘the Unevolved.’ Hence there is
no reason to see here a reference to the Pradhdna as estab-
lished in the theory of Kapila. Nor do we recognise, in
the text under discussion, the general system of Kapila.
The text declares the objects, i.e. sounds and so on, to be
superior to the senses; but in Kapila’s system the objects
are not viewed as the causes of the senses. For the same
reason the statement that the manas is higher than the
objects does not agree with Kapila’s doctrine. Nor is this
the case with regard to the clause ‘higher than the buddhi
is the great one, the Self’ ; for with Kapila the ‘great one’
(mahat) is the buddhi, and it would not do to say ‘higher
than the great one is the great one.’ And finally the
‘great one,’ according to Kapila, cannot be called the
‘Self.’ The text under discussion thus refers only to those
entities which had previously appeared in the simile. The
text itself further on proves this, when saying ‘That Self is
hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen
by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect.
A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he
should keep that within knowledge (which is) within the
Self; he should keep knowledge within the great Self,
and that he should keep within the quiet Self.’ For this
passage, after having stated that the highest Self is difficult
to see with the inner and outer organs of knowledge, de-
scribes the mode in which the sense-organs, and so on, are
to be held in control. The wise man should restrain the
-sense-organs and the organs of activity within the mind;
he should restrain that (i.e. the mind) within knowledge,
i.e. within the intellect (buddhi), which abides within the
Self; he should further restrain the intellect within the

358 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

great Self, i.e. the active individual Self; and that Self
finally he should restrain within the quiet Self, i.e. the
highest Brahman, which is the inner ruler of all; i.e. he
should reach, with his individual Self so qualified, the place
of Vishzu, i.e. Brahman.—But how can the term ‘the Un-
evolved’ denote the evolved body ?—To this question the
next Sitra furnishes a reply.

2. But the subtle (body), on account of its capa-
bility.

The elements in their fine state are what is called the
‘Unevolved, and this entering into a particular condition
becomes the body. It is the ‘ Unevolved’ in the particular
condition of the body, which in the text under discussion
is called the ‘ Unevolved.’ ‘On account of its capability,’
i.e. because unevolved non-sentient matter, when assuming
certain states and forms, is capable of entering on activities
promoting the interest of man. But, an objection is raised,
if the ‘ Unevolved’ is taken to be matter in its subtle state,
what objection is there to our accepting for the explanation
of our text that which is established in the Saakhya-
system? for there also the ‘Unevolved’ means nothing
else but matter in its subtle state.

To this the next Sdtra replies—

3. (Matter in its subtle state) subserves an end, on
account of its dependence on him (viz. the Supreme
Person).

Matter in its subtle state subserves ends, in so far only
as it is dependent on the Supreme Person who is the cause
of all. We by no means wish to deny unevolved matter
and all its effects in themselves, but in so far only as they
are maintained not to have their Self in the Supreme
Person. For the fact is that they constitute his body and
He thus constitutes their Self; and it is only through this
their relation to him that the Pradhana, and so on, are
capable of accomplishing their several ends. Otherwise
the different essential natures of them all could never

1 aADHYAyA, 4 PADA, 4. 359

exist,—nor persist, nor act. It is just on the ground of
this dependence on the Lord not being acknowledged by
the Sankhyas that their system is disproved by us. In
Scripture and Smriti alike, wherever the origination and
destruction of the world are described, or the greatness of
the Supreme Person is glorified, the Pradh4na and all its
effects, no less than the individual souls, are declared to
have their Self in that Supreme Person. Compare, e.g.
the text which first says that the earth is merged in water,
and further on ‘the elements are merged in the Mahat, the
Mahat in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the Imperish-
- able, the Imperishable in Darkness; Darkness becomes
one with the highest divinity.’ And ‘He of whom the
earth is the body,’ &c. up to ‘he of whom the Unevolved
is the body; of whom the Imperishable is the body; of
whom death is the body; he the inner Self of all beings,
free from all evil, the divine one, the one God Narayana,’
And ‘ Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intellect, egoity—
thus eightfold is my nature divided. Lower is this nature ;
other than this and higher know that nature of mine
which has become the individual soul by which this
world is supported. Remember that all beings spring from
this; I am the origin and the dissolution of the whole
Universe. Higher than I there is none else; all this is
strung on me as pearls on a thread’ (Bha. Gi. VII, 4-7).
And ‘the Evolved is Vishzu, and the Unevolved, he is the
Person and time.—The nature (prakriti) declared by me,
having the double form of the Evolved and the Unevolved,
and the soul—both these are merged in the highest Self.
That Self is the support of all, the Supreme Person who
under the name of Vishzu is glorified in the Vedas and the
Vedanta, books.’

4. And on account of there being no statement of
its being an object of knowledge.

If the text meant the Non-evolved as understood by the
Sankhyas it would refer to it as something to be known ;
for the Sankhyas, who hold the theory of Release resulting
from the discriminative knowledge of the Evolved, the

360 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Non-evolved, and the soul, admit that all these are objects
of knowledge. Now our text does not refer to the Un-
evolved as an object of knowledge, and it cannot therefore
be the Pradhdna assumed by the Sénkhyas.

5. Should it be said that (the text) declares (it) ;
we say, not so; for the intelligent Self (is meant), on
account of subject-matter.

‘He who has meditated on that which is without sound,
without touch, without form, without decay, without taste,
eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end,
beyond the Great, unchangeable ; is freed from the jaws of
death’ (Ka. Up. II, 3, 15), this scriptural text, closely follow-
ing on the text under discussion, represents the ‘ Unevolved’
as the object of knowledge !—Not so, we reply. What that
' sloka represents as the object of meditation is (not the Un-
evolved but) the intelligent Self, i.e. the Supreme Person.
For it is the latter who forms the general subject-matter,
as we infer from two preceding passages, viz. ‘He who has
knowledge for his charioteer, and who holds the reins of the
mind, he reaches the end of his journey, the highest place
of Vishsu’; and ‘ That Self is hidden in all beings and
does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through
their sharp and subtle intellect.’ For this reason, also,
the clause ‘ Higher than the person there is nothing’ can-
not be taken as meant to deny the existence of an entity
beyond the ‘purusha’ in the Sankhya sense. That the
highest Self possesses the qualities of being without sound,
&c., we moreover know from other scriptural texts, such as
Mu. Up. I, 1, 6 ‘ That which is not to be seen, not to be
grasped,’ &c. And the qualification ‘beyond the Great,
unchangeable’ is meant to declare that the highest Self is
beyond the individual Self which had been called ‘the
Great’ in a previous passage ‘ beyond the intellect is the
Great Self.’

6. And of three only there is this mention and
question.
In the Upanishad under discussion there is mention

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 361

made of three things only as objects of knowledge—the.
three standing to one another in the relation of means, end
to be realised by those means, and persons realising,—and
questions are asked as to those three only. There is no
mention of, nor question referring to, the Unevolved.—
Nakiketas desirous of Release having been allowed by
Death to choose three boons, chooses for his first boon that
his father should be well disposed towards him—without
which he could not hope for spiritual welfare. For his
second boon he chooses the knowledge of the Nasiketa-
fire, which is a means towards final Release. ‘Thou
knowest, O Death, the fire-sacrifice which leads to heaven ;
tell it to me, full of faith. Those who live in the heaven-
world reach Immortality—this I ask as my second boon.’
The term ‘heaven-world’ here denotes the highest aim of
man, i.e. Release, as appears from the declaration that those
who live there enjoy freedom from old age and death ; from
the fact that further on (I, 1,26) works leading to perishable
results are disparaged ; and from what Yama says in reply
to the second demand ‘ He who thrice performs this Na-
kiketa-rite overcomes birth and death.’ As his third boon
he, in the form of a question referring to final release, actually
enquires about three things, viz. ‘the nature of the end to
be reached, i.e. Release; the nature of him who wishes
to reach that end; and the nature of the means to reach it,
i. e. of meditation assisted by certain works. Yama, having
tested Nafiketas’ fitness to receive the desired instruction,
thereupon begins to teach him. ‘The Ancient who is diffi-
cult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is
hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss ; having known
him as God, by means of meditation on his Self, the wise
one leaves joy and sorrow behind.’ Here the clause
‘having known the God,’ points to the divine Being that
is to be meditated upon; the clause ‘by means of medi-
tation on his Self’ points to the attaining agent, i.e. the
individual soul as an object of knowledge; and the
clause ‘having known him the wise ones leave joy and
sorrow behind’ points to the meditation through which
Brahman is to be reached. Nasiketas, pleased with the

362 VEDANTA-SUTRAS,

general instruction received, questions again in order to
receive clearer information on those three matters, ‘What
thou seest as different from dharma and different from
adharma, as different from that, from that which is done
and not done, as different from what is past or future,
tell me that’; a question referring to three things, viz.
an object to be effected, a means to effect it, and an effect-
ing agent—each of which is to be different from any-
thing else past, present, or future', Yama thereupon at
first instructs him as to the Pravava, ‘ That word which all
the Vedas record, which all penances proclaim, desiring
which men become religious students; that word I tell
thee briefly—it is OQm’—an instruction which implies
praise of the Prazava, and in a general way sets forth that
which the Prazava expresses, e. g. the nature of the object
to be reached, the nature of the person reaching it, and the
means for reaching it, such means here consisting in the
word ‘Om,’ which denotes the object to be reached*. He
then continues to glorify the Prazava (I, 2, 16-17), and
thereupon gives special information in the first place about
the nature of the attaining subject, i.e, the individual
soul, ‘The knowing Self is not born, it dies not,’ &c. Next
he teaches Nafiketas as to the true nature of the object to
be attained, viz. the highest Brahman or Vishau, in the
section beginning ‘ The Self smaller than small,’ and ending
‘Who then knows where he is?’ (I, 2, 20-25). Part of this
section, viz. ‘ That Self cannot be gained by the Veda,’ &c.,

1 The commentary proposes different ways of finding those three
objects of enquiry in the words of Nafiketas. According to the
first explanation, ‘that which is different from dharma’ is a means
differing from all ordinary means; ‘adharma’ ‘not-dharma’ is
what is not a means, but the result to be reached: hence ‘ that
which is different from adharma’ is a result differing from all
ordinary results. ‘What is different from that’ is an agent
different from ‘that’; i.e. an ordinary agent, and so on. (Sru.
Prak4s. p. 1226.)

* The syllable ‘Om,’ which denotes Brahman, is a means towards
meditation (Brahman being meditated upon under this form), and
thus indirectly a means towards reaching Brahman.

1 ADHYAvA, 4 PADA, 8. 363

at the same time teaches that the meditation through which
Brahman is attained is of the nature of devotion (bhakti).
Next the sloka I, 3,1 ‘There are the two drinking their
reward’ shows that, as the object of devout meditation and
the devotee abide together, meditation is easily performed.
Then the section beginning ‘ Know the Self to be him who
drives in the chariot,’ and ending ‘ the wise say the path is
hard’ (I, 3, 3-14), teaches the true mode of meditation, and
how the devotee reaches the highest abode of Vishzu ; and
then there is a final reference to the object to be reached
in I, 3, 15,‘ That which is without sound, without touch,’ &c.
It thus appears that there are references and questions
regarding those three matters only; and hence the ‘ Un-
evolved ’ cannot mean the Pradhdna of the Sankhyas.

7. And as in the case of the ‘ Great.’

In the case of the passage ‘ Higher than the intellect is
the Great Self,’ we conclude from the co-ordination of ‘ the
Great’ with the Self that what the text means is not the
‘Great’ principle of the Sankhyas ; analogously we conclude
that the ‘ Unevolved,’ which is said to be higher than the
Self, cannot be the Pradhana of Kapila’s system.

8. On account of there being no special charac-
teristic ; as in the case of the cup.

In the discussion of the following passages also we aim
only at refuting the system of the Sankhyas; not at dis-
proving the existence and nature of Prakriti, the ‘ great’
principle, the ahamk4ra, and so on, viewed as dependent
on Brahman. For that they exist in this latter relation is
proved by Scripture as well as Smriti.—A text of the fol-
lowers of the Atharvan runs as follows: ‘Her who pro-
duces all effects, the non-knowing one, the unborn one, wear-
ing eight forms, the firm one—she is known (by the Lord)
and ruled by him, she is spread out and incited and ruled
by him, gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls.
A cow she is without beginning and end, a mother producing
all beings ; white, black, and red, milking all wishes for the
Lord. Many babes unknown drink her, the impartial one ;

364 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

but one God only, following his own will, drinks her submit-
ting tohim. By his own thought and work the mighty God
strongly enjoys her, who is common to all, the milkgiver, who
is pressed by the sacrifices. The Non-evolved when being
counted by twenty-four is called the Evolved.’ This pas-
sage evidently describes the nature of Prakr:ti, and so on,
and the same Upanishad also teaches the Supreme Person
who constitutes the Self of Prakrzti, and so on. ‘Him they
call the twenty-sixth or also the twenty-seventh ; as the
Person devoid of all qualities of the Sankhyas he is known
by the followers of the Atharvan '.’—Other followers of the
Atharvan read in their text that there are sixteen origi-
nating principles (prakriti) and eight effected things (vikara ;
Garbha Up. 3).—The Svet4svataras again set forth the
nature of Prakriti, the soul and the Lord as follows. ‘ The
Lord supports all this together; the Perishable and the
Imperishable, the Evolved and the Unevolved ; the other
one is in bondage, since he is an enjoyer ; but having known
the God he is free from all fetters. There are two unborn
ones, the one knowing and a Lord, the other without
knowledge and lordly power; there is the one unborn
female on whom the enjoyment of all enjoyers depends ;
and there is the infinite Self appearing in all shapes, but
itself inactive. When a man finds out these three, that is
Brahman. The Perishable is the Pradhdna, the Immortal
and Imperishable is Hara ; the one God rules the Perishable
and the Self. From meditation on him, from union with
him, from becoming one with him there is in the end cessa-
tion of all Maya’ (Svet. Up. I, 8-10). And ‘ The sacred
verses, the offerings, the sacrifices, the vows, the past, the
future, and all that the Vedas declare—from that the Ruler
of Maya creates all this ; and in this the other one is bound
up through M4y4. Know then Prakriti to be May4 and
the great Lord the ruler of M4y4; with his members this

1 These quotations are from the Aulik4-Upanishad (transl. by
Deussen, Seventy Upanishads, p. 638 ff.) The translation as
given above follows the readings adopted by Ramfnuga and
explained in the Sruta-Prak4sik&.

1 aADHyYAya, 4 PADA, 8. 365

whole world is filled’ (Svet. Up. V,9-10). And, further on,
‘The master of Pradhana and the soul, the lord of the
guzas, the cause of the bondage, existence, and release of
worldly existence’ (VI, 16). Thus likewise in Smriti,
‘Do thou know both Nature and the soul to be without
beginning, and know all effects and qualities to have
sprung from Nature. Nature is declared to be the cause
of the activity of causes and effects, whilst the soul is the
cause of there being enjoyment of pleasure and pain. For
the soul abiding in Nature experiences the qualities derived
from Nature, the reason being its connexion with the quali-
ties, in its births in good and evil wombs’ (Bha. Gi. XIII,
19-21). And ‘Goodness, Passion, and Darkness—these
are the qualities which, issuing from nature, bind in the
body the embodied soul, the undecaying one’ (XIV, 5).
And ‘All beings at the end of a kalpa return into my
Nature, and again, at the beginning of a kalpa, do I send
them forth. Presiding over my own nature again and
again do I send forth this vast body of beings which has
no freedom of its own, being subject to Nature—With me
as ruler Nature brings forth all moving and non-moving
things, and for this reason the world does ever go round’
(Bha. Gi. IX, 7,8, 10). What we therefore refuse to accept
are a Prakviti, and so on, of the kind assumed by Kapila,
i.e. not having their Self in Brahman.—We now proceed
to explain the Satra.

We read in the Svetasvatara-Upanishad ‘ There is one
aga, red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the
same nature. One aga loves her and lies by her; another
leaves her after having enjoyed her.’ A doubt arises here
whether this mantra declares a mere Prakriti as assumed in
Kapila’s system, or a Prakréti having its Self in Brahman.

The P@rvapakshin maintains the former alternative.
For, he points out, the text refers to the non-originated-
ness of Prakriti, calling her ag4, i.e. unborn, and further
says that she by herself independently produces manifold
offspring resembling herself. This view is rejected by the
Sftra, on the ground that there is no intimation of a special
circumstance determining the acceptance of the Prakriti as

366 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

assumed by the Saénkhyas, i.e. independent of Brahman ;
for that she is ἀρᾷ, i.e. not born, is not a sufficiently special
characteristic. The case is analogous to that of the ‘ cup.’
In the mantra ‘There is a cup having its mouth below and
its bottom above’ (Brz. Up. II, 2, 3), the word #amasa
conveys to us only the idea of some implement used in
eating, but we are unable to see what special kind of
kamasa is meant; for in the case of words the meaning
of which is ascertained on the ground of their derivation
(as ‘kamasa’ from ‘kam,’ to eat or drink), the special
sense of the word in any place cannot be ascertained with-
out the help of considerations of general possibility, general
subject-matter, and so on. Now in the case of the cup we
are able to ascertain that the cup meant is the head, be-
cause there is a complementary passage ‘What is called
the cup with its mouth below and its bottom above is the
head’; but if we look out for a similar help to determine
the special meaning of δρᾶ, we find nothing to convince us
that the ag4, i.e. the ‘unborn’ principle, is the Prakriti of
the Sankhyas. Nor is there anything in the text to convey
the idea of that aga having the power of independent crea-
tion; for the clause ‘giving birth to manifold offspring ’
declares only that she creates, not that she creates unaided.
The mantra does not therefore tell us about an ‘unborn’
principle independent of Brahman.—There moreover is
a special reason for understanding by the ag4 something
that depends on Brahman. This the following Sidtra
states.

9. But she begins with light; for thus some read
in their text.

The ‘but’ has assertory force. ‘Light’ in the Sdtra
means Brahman, in accordance with the meaning of the
term as known from texts such as ‘On him the gods medi-
tate, the light of lights’ (Bri. Up. X, 4, 16); ¢ That light
which shines beyond heaven’ (KA. Up. III, 13, 7). ‘She
begins with light’ thus means ‘she has Brahman for her
cause.’—‘ For thus some read in their text,’ i.e. because
the members of one Sakhé, viz. the Taittiriyas read in their

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 9. 367

text that this ‘aga’ has Brahman for her cause. The
Mahanardyana-Upanishad (of the Taittirtyas) at first refers
to Brahman abiding in the hollow of the heart as the object
of meditation. ‘Smaller than the small, greater than the
great, the Self placed in the hollow of this creature’; next
declares that all the worlds and Brahmé and the other
gods originated from that Self ; and then says that there
sprung from it also this aga which is the cause of all ‘ The
one agA (goat), red, white and black, which gives birth to
numerous offspring of the same shape, one aga (he-goat)
loves and lies by her; another one forsakes her after
having enjoyed her.’ The subject-matter of the entire
section evidently is to give instruction as to the whole
aggregate of things other than Brahman originating from
Brahman and thus having its Self in it; hence we con-
clude that also the aga which gives birth to manifold crea-
tures like her, and is enjoyed by the soul controlled by
karman, while she is abandoned by the soul possessing
true knowledge is, no less than vital airs, seas, mountains,
&c., a creature of Brahman, and hence has its Self in
Brahman. We then apply to the interpretation of the
SvetAsvatara-text the meaning of the analogous Mah4né4-
rayama-text, as determined by the complementary pas-
sages, and thus arrive at the conclusion that the ag4 in
the former text also is a being having its Self in Brahman.

That this is so, moreover, appears from the SvetAsvatara
itself. For in the early part of that Upanishad, we have
after the introductory question, ‘Is Brahman the cause?’
the passage ‘The sages devoted to meditation and concen-
tration have seen the person whose Self is the divinity, hidden
in its own qualities’ (I, 1, 3); which evidently refers to the
aga as being of the nature of a power of the highest Brah-
man. And as further on also (viz. in the passages ‘From
that the M4yin creates all this, and in this the other is
bound up through May&’; ‘Know then Prakriti to be
Maya and the Great Lord the ruler of M4y4’; and ‘he
who rules every place of birth,’ V, 9-11) the very same
being is referred to, there remains not even a shadow of
proof for the assertion that the mantra under discussion

368 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

refers to an independent Prakriti as assumed by the
Sankhyas.

But a further objection is raised, if the Prakriti denoted
by aga begins with, i.e. is caused by Brahman, how can it
be called aga, i.e. the non-produced one; or, if it is non-
produced, how can it be originated by Brahman? To this
the next Sitra replies.

to. And on account of the teaching of formation
(i. e. creation) there is no contradiction; as in the
case of the honey.

The ‘and’ expresses disposal of a doubt that had arisen.
There is no contradiction between the Prakriti being aga
and originating from light. On account of instruction
being given about the formation (kalpana), i.e. creation of
the world. This interpretation of ‘kalpana’ is in agree-
ment with the use of the verb k/p in the text, ‘as formerly
the creator made (akalpayat) sun and moon.’

In our text the sloka ‘from that the Lord of Maya
creates all this’ gives instruction about the creation of the
world. From that, i.e. from matter in its subtle causal
state when it is not yet divided, the Lord of all creates
the entire Universe. From this statement about creation
we understand that Prakriti exists in a twofold state
according as it is either cause or effect. During a pralaya
it unites itself with Brahman and abides in its subtle state,
without any distinction of names and forms; it then is
called the ‘ Unevolved,’ and by other similar names. At
the time of creation, on the other hand, there reveal them-
selves in Prakriti Goodness and the other gunas, it divides
itself according to names and forms, and then is called the
‘ Evolved,’ and so on, and, transforming itself into fire, water,
and earth, it appears as red, white, and black. In its causal
condition it is aga, i.e. unborn, in its effected condition it
is ‘ caused by light, i.e. Brahman’; hence there is no con-
tradiction. The case is analogous to that of the ‘honey.’
The sun in his causal state is one only, but in his effected
state the Lord makes him into honey in so far namely as he
then, for the purpose of enjoyment on the part of the Vasug

1 ADHYAyA, 4 PADA; 10. 369

and other gods, is the abode of nectar brought about by
sacrificial works to be learned from the &zk and the other
Vedas ; and further makes him to rise and to set. And
between these two conditions there is no contradiction.
This is declared in the Madhuvidya (Κλ. Up. III), from
“*The sun is indeed the honey of the Devas, down to ‘ when
from thence he has risen upwards he neither rises nor sets ;
being one he stands in the centre’—‘ one’ here means ‘ of
one nature.’—The conclusion therefore is that the Sveta-
svatara mantra under discussion refers to Prakriti as having
her Self in Brahman, not to the Prakriti assumed by the
Saakhyas,

Others, however, are of opinion that the one agd of
which the mantra speaks has for its characteristics light,
water, and earth. To them we address the following ques-
tions. Do you mean that by what the text speaks of as
an δρᾶ, consisting of fire, water, and earth, we have to
understand those three elements only; or Brahman in the
form of those three elements ; or some power or principle
which is the cause of the three elements? The first alter-
native is in conflict with the circumstance that, while fire,
water, and earth are several things, the text explicitly refers
to one aga. Nor may it be urged that fire, water, and
earth, although several, become one, by being made tripar-
tite (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 3); for this making them tripartite,
does not take away their being several; the text clearly
showing that each several element becomes tripartite, ‘ Let
me make each of these three divine beings tripartite. —The
second alternative again divides itself into two alternatives.
Is the one ag4 Brahman in so far as having passed over
into fire, water, and earth; or Brahman in so far as abiding
within itself and not passing over into effects? The
former alternative is excluded by the consideration that it
does not remove plurality (which cannot be reconciled with
the one aga). The second alternative is contradicted by
the text calling that ag4 red, white, and black; and more-
over Brahman viewed as abiding within itself cannot be
characterised by fire, water,and earth. On the third alter-
native it has to be assumed that the text denotes by the

[48] Bb

370 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

term ‘ag4’ the three elements, and that on this basis there
is imagined a causal condition of these elements; but
better than this assumption it evidently is to accept the
term ‘agA’ as directly denoting the causal state of those
three elements as known from scripture.

Nor can we admit the contention that the term ‘ag’ is
meant to teach that Prakriti should metaphorically be
viewed as a she-goat ; for such a view would be altogether
purposeless. Where—in the passage ‘Know the Self to
be him who drives in the chariot’—the body, and so on,
are compared to a chariot, and so on, the object is to set
forth the means of attaining Brahman; where the sun is
compared to honey, the object is to illustrate the enjoyment
of the Vasus and other gods ; but what similar object could
possibly be attained by directing us to view Prakriti as
a goat? Such a metaphorical view would in fact be not
merely useless; it would be downright irrational. Prakriti
is a non-intelligent principle, the causal substance of the
entire material Universe, and constituting the means for
the experience of pleasure and pain, and for the final
release, of all intelligent souls which are connected with it
from all eternity. Now it would be simply contrary to
good sense, metaphorically to transfer to Prakriti such as
described the nature of a she-goat—which is a sentient
being that gives birth to very few creatures only, enters
only occasionally into connexion with others, is of small
use only, is not the cause of herself being abandoned by
others, and is capable of abandoning those connected with
her. Nor does it recommend itself to take the word ag&
(understood to mean ‘she-goat’) in a sense different from
that in which we understand the term ‘aga’ which occurs
twice in the same mantra.—Let then all three terms be
taken in the same metaphorical sense (aga meaning he-goat),
—It would be altogether senseless, we reply, to compare
the soul which absolutely dissociates itself from Prakriti
(‘Another aga leaves her after having enjoyed her’) to
a he-goat which is able to enter again into connexion with
what he has abandoned, or with anything else—Here
terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the cup.’

1 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 11. 471

11. Not from the mention of the number even, on
account of the diversity and of the excess.

The Vagasaneyins read in their text ‘He in wham the
five “ five-people” and the ether rest, him alone I believe
to be the Self; I, who know, believe him to be Brahman’
(Bri. Up. IV, 4,17). The doubt here arises whether this
text be meant to set forth the categories as established in
Kapila’s doctrine, or not.—The Padrvapakshin maintains
the former view, on the ground that the word ‘ five-people,’
qualified by the word ‘five,’ intimates the twenty-five cate-
gories of the Sankhyas. The compound ‘ five-people *
(pa#kaganahk) denotes groups of five beings, just as the
term pa#ka-pfilyak denotes aggregates of five bundles of
grass. And as we want to know how many such groups
there are, the additional qualification ‘five’ intimates that
there are five such groups; just as if it were said ‘five five-
bundles, i. e. five aggregates consisting of five bundles each.’
We thus understand that the ‘ five five-people’ are twenty-
five things, and as the mantra in which the term is met with
refers to final release, we recognise the twenty-five categories
known from the Sankhya-smrzti which are here referred to
as objects to be known by persons desirous of release,
For the followers of Kapila teach that ‘ there is the funda-
mental causal substance which is not an effect. There are
seven things, viz. the Mahat, and so on, which are causal
substances as well as effects. There are sixteen effects,
The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect’ (San.
Ka. 3). The mantra therefore is meant to intimate the
categories known from the Sankhya.—To this the Sdtra
replies that from the mention of the number twenty-five
supposed to be implied in the expression ‘the five five-
people, it does not follow that the categories of the
Sankhyas are meant. ‘On account of the diversity,’ i.e.
on account of the five-people further qualified by the
number five being different from the categories of the
Sankhyas. For in the text ‘in whom the five five-people
and the ether rest,’ the ‘in whom’ shows the five-people to
have their abode, and hence their Self, in Brahman; and

Bb2

372 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

in the continuation of the text, ‘him I believe the Self,’
the ‘him’ connecting itself with the preceding ‘in whom’
is recognised to be Brahman. The five five-people must
therefore be different from the categories of the SAn-
khya-system. ‘And on account of the excess.’ Moreover
there is, in the text under discussion, an excess over and
above the SAnkhya categories, consisting in the Self
denoted by the relative pronoun ‘in whom,’ and in the
specially mentioned Ether. What the text designates there-
fore is the Supreme Person who is the Universal Lord in
whom all things abide—such as he is described in the
text quoted above, ‘Therefore some call him the twenty-
sixth, and others the twenty-seventh.’ The ‘even’ in the
Satra is meant to intimate that the ‘five five-people’ can in
no way mean the twenty-five categories, since there is no
pentad of groups consisting of five each. For in the case
of the categories of the Safkhyas there are no generic
characteristics or the like which could determine the ar-
rangement of those categories in fives. Nor must it be
urged against this that there zs a determining reason for
such an arrangement in so far as the tattvas of the S4n-
khyas form natural groups comprising firstly, the five
organs of action; secondly, the five sense-organs ; thirdly,
the five gross elements; fourthly, the subtle parts of those
elements ; and fifthly, the five remaining tattvas; for as
the text under discussion mentions the ether by itself, the
possibility of a group consisting of the five gross elements
is precluded. We cannot therefore take the compound
‘five people’ as denoting a group consisting of five con-
stituent members, but, in agreement with II, 1, 50, as
merely being a special name. There are certain beings
the special name of which is ‘five-people, and of these
beings the additional word ‘ pa#ka’ predicates that they
are five in number. The expression is thus analogous to
the term ‘the seven seven-rishis’ (where the term ‘ seven-
rvishis’ is to be understood as the name of a certain class of
rishis only).—Who then are the beings called ‘five-people ?’
—To this question the next Sitra replies.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 13. 373

12. The breath, and so on, on the ground of the

complementary passage.

We see from a complementary passage, viz. ‘ They who
know the breath of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of
the ear, the food of food, the mind of mind,’ that the ‘ five-
people’ are the breath, and eye, and so on, all of which
have their abode in Brahman.

But, an objection is raised, while the mantra ‘in whom
the five five-people,’ &c., is common to the K4zvas and the
Madhyandinas, the complementary passage ‘they who
know the breath of breath,’ &c., in the text of the former
makes no mention of food, and hence we have no reason
to say that the ‘five-people’ in their text are the breath,
eye, and so on. ‘

To this objection the next Sdtra replies,

13. By light, food not being (mentioned in the
text) of some.

In the text of some, viz. the K4avas, where food is not
mentioned, the five-people are recognised to be the five
senses, owing to the phrase ‘ of lights’ which is met with in
another complementary passage. In the mantra, ‘him the
gods worship as the light of lights, which precedes the
mantra about the ‘ five-people,’ Brahman is spoken of as the
light of lights, and this suggests the idea of certain lights
the activity of which depends on Brahman. The mantra
leaves it undetermined what these lights are; but from
what follows about the ‘five-people,’ &c., we learn that
what is meant are the senses which light up as it were
their respective objects. In ‘the breath of breath’ the
second ‘breath’ (in the genitive case) denotes the sense-
organ of touch, as that organ is connected with air, and as
the vital breath (which would otherwise suggest itself
as the most obvious explanation of pra#a) does not har-
monise with the metaphorical term ‘light.’ ‘Of the eye’
refers to the organ of sight; ‘of the ear’ to the organ of
hearing. ‘Of food’ comprises the senses of smell and taste
together: it denotes the sense of smell on the ground that
that sense is connected with earth, which may be ‘food,’

374 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

and the sense of taste in so far as ‘anna’ may be also
explained as that by means of which eating goes on
(adyate). ‘Of mind’ denotes mind, i.e. the so-called
internal organ. Taste and smell thus being taken in com-
bination, we have the required number of five, and we thus
explain the ‘five-people’ as the sense-organs which throw
light on their objects, together with the internal organ, i. e.
mind. The meaning of the clause about the ‘ five-people’
therefore is that the senses—called ‘ five-people ’—and the
elements, represented by the Ether, have their basis in
Brahman ; and as thus all beings are declared to abide in
Brahman, the five ‘five-people’ can in no way be the
twenty-five categories assumed by the Sankhyas.—The
general conclusion is that the Vedanta-texts, whether refer-
ring to numbers or not, nowhere set forth the categories
established in Kapila’s system. °

14. And on account of (Brahman) as described
being declared to be the cause with regard to Ether,
and so On,

Here the philosopher who holds the Pradhdna to be the
general cause comes forward with another objection. The
Vedanta-texts, he says, do not teach that creation pro-
ceeds from one and the same agent only, and you therefore
have no right to hold that Brahman is the sole cause of the
world. In one place it is said that our world proceeded
from ‘Being, ‘Being only this was in the beginning’
(Kz. Up. VI, 2, 1). In other places the world is said to
have sprung from ‘ Non-being,’ ‘ Non-being indeed this was
in the beginning’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7,1); and ‘Non-being
only was this in the beginning; it became Being’ (Κλ.
Up. III, 19, 1). As the Veddnta-texts are thus not con-
sequent in their statements regarding the creator, we
cannot conclude from them that Brahman is the sole
cause of the world. On the other hand, those texts do
enable us to conclude that the Pradh4na only is the uni-
versal cause. For the text ‘ Now all this was then un-
developed’ (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7) teaches that the world was
merged in the undeveloped’ Pradh4na, and the subsequent

1 aDHYAYA, 4 PADA, 14. 375

clause, ‘That developed itself by form and name,’ that
from that Undeveloped there resulted the creation of the
world. For the Undeveloped is that which is not distin-
guished by names and forms, and this is none other than
the Pradhana. And as this Pradhana is at the same time
eternal, as far as its essential nature is concerned, and the
substrate of all change, there is nothing contradictory in
the different accounts of creation calling it sometimes
‘Being’ and sometimes ‘Non-being’; while, on the other
hand, these terms cannot, without contradiction, both be
applied to Brahman. The causality of the Undeveloped
having thus been ascertained, such expressions as ‘it
thought, may I be many,’ must be interpreted as meaning
its being about to proceed to creation. The terms ‘ Self’
and ‘ Brahman’ also may be applied to the Pradhana in so
far as it is all-pervading (4tman from apnoti), and pre-
eminently great (br#hat). | We therefore conclude that
the only cause of the world about which the Vedanta-texts
give information is the Pradhana.

This view is set aside by the Sdtra. The word and is
used in the sense of Juz. It is possible to ascertain from
the Ved4nta-texts that the world springs from none other
than the highest Brahman, which is all-knowing, lord of all,
free from all shadow of imperfection, capable of absolutely
realising its purposes, and so on; since scripture declares
Brahman as described to be the cause of Ether, and so on.
By ‘Brahman as described’ is meant ‘ Brahman distin-
guished by omniscience and other qualities, as described
in the Stra “ that from which the origination, and so on, of
the world proceed,” and in other places.’ That Brahman
only is declared by scripture to be the cause of Ether, and
so on, i.e, the being which is declared to be the cause in
passages such as ‘ From that Self sprang Ether’ (Taitt. Up.
II, 1); ‘that sent forth fire’ (1 Ἅ. Up. VI, 2, 3), is none other
than Brahman possessing omniscience and similar quali-
ties. For the former of these texts follows on the passage
‘The True, intelligence, infinite is Brahman; he reaches
all desires together with the intelligent Brahman, which
introduces Brahman as the general subject-matter—that

376 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Brahman being then referred to by means of the connect-
ing words ‘from that’ In the same way the ‘that’ (in
‘that sent forth fire’) refers back to the omniscient Brah-
man introduced in the clause ‘that thought, may I be
many. This view is confirmed by a consideration of all
the accounts of creation, and we hence conclude that Brah-
man is the sole cause of the world.—But the text ‘ Non-
being indeed this was in the beginning’ calls the general
cause ‘something that is not’; how then can you say that
we infer from the Vedanta-texts as the general cause of
the world a Brahman that is all-knowing, absolutely realises
its purposes, and so on?—To this question the next Satra
replies.

15. From connexion,

The fact is that Brahman intelligent, consisting of bliss,
&c., connects itself also with the passage ‘ Non-being was
this in the beginning’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For the section of
the text which precedes that passage (viz. ‘ Different from
this Self consisting of understanding is the Self consisting
of Bliss ;—he wished, may I be many ;—he created all
whatever there is. Having created he entered into it;
having entered it he became sat and tyat’) clearly refers
to Brahman consisting of Bliss, which realises its purposes,
creates all beings, and entering into them is the Self of all.
When, therefore, after this we meet with the sloka (‘ Non-
being this was in the beginning ’) introduced by the words
‘On this there is also this sloka’—which shows that the
sloka is meant to throw light on what precedes ; and when
further on we have the passage ‘From fear of it the wind
blows,’ &c., which, referring to the same Brahman, predi-
cates of it universal rulership, bliss of nature, and so on;
we conclude with certainty that the sloka about ‘Non-
being’ also refers to Brahman. As during a pralaya the
distinction of names and forms does not exist, and Brahman
also then does not exist in so far as connected with names
and forms, the text applies to Brahman the term ‘ Non-
being.’ The text ‘Non-being only this was in the begin-
ning’ explains itself in the same way.—Nor can we admit

1 ΑΡΉΥΑΥΑ, 4 PADA, 16, 377

the contention that the text ‘ Now all this was then unde-
veloped’ refers to the Pradhana as the cause of the world ;
for the Undeveloped there spoken of is nothing else but
Brahman in so far as its body is not yet evolved. For
the text continues ‘That same being entered thither to
the very tips of the finger-nails ;’ ‘When seeing, eye by
name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind
by name ;’ ‘Let men meditate upon him as Self ;’ where
the introductory words ‘that same being’ refer back to the
Undeveloped—which thus is said to enter into all things
and thereby to become their ruler. And it is known from
another text also (KA. Up. VI, 3, 2) that it is the all-creative
highest Brahman which enters into its creation and evolves
names and forms. The text ‘Having entered within, the
ruler of creatures, the Self of all’ moreover shows that
the creative principle enters into its creatures for the
purpose of ruling them, and such entering again cannot be
attributed to the non-sentient Pradhana. The Undeveloped
therefore is Brahman in that state where its body is not
yet developed ; and when the text continues ‘it developed
itself by names and forms’ the meaning is that Brahman
developed itself in so far as names and forms were distin-
guished in the world that constitutes Brahman’s body. On
this explanation of the texts relating to creation we further
are enabled to take the thought, purpose, &c., attributed to
the creative principle, in their primary literal sense. And,
we finally remark, neither the term ‘Brahman’ nor the
term ‘Self’ in any way suits the Pradh4na, which is neither
absolutely great nor pervading in the sense of entering into
things created with a view to ruling them. It thus remains
a settled conclusion that Brahman is the sole cause of the
world.—Here terminates the adhikarana of ‘(Brahman’s)
causality.’

16. Because it denotes the world.

The Sankhya comes forward with a further objection.
Although the Vedanta-texts teach an intelligent principle

to be the cause of the world, they do not present to us as
objects of knowledge anything that could be the cause of

378 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the world, apart from the Pradh4na and the soul as estab-
lished by the Sankhya-system. For the Kaushitakins declare
in their text, in the dialogue of Balaki and Aydatasatru,
that none but the enjoying (individual) soul is to be known
as the cause of the world, ‘Shall I tell you Brahman? He
who is the maker of those persons and of whom this is the
work (or “to whom this work belongs”) he indeed is to be
known’ (Kau. Up. IV, 19). Balaki at the outset proposes
Brahman as the object of instruction, and when he is found
himself not to know Brahman, Agatasatru instructs him
about it, ‘he indeed is to be known.’ But from the relative
clause ‘to whom this work belongs,’ which connects the
being to be known with work, we infer that by Brahman
we have here to understand the enjoying soul which is the
ruler of Prakriti, not any other being. For no other being
is connected with work ; work, whether meritorious or the
contrary, belongs to the individual! soul only. Nor must
you contest this conclusion on the ground that ‘work’ is
here to be explained as meaning the object of activity,
so that the sense of the clause would be ‘he of whom this
entire world, as presented by perception and the other means
of knowledge, is the work.’ For in that case the separate
statements made in the two clauses, ‘who is the maker of
those persons’ and ‘of whom this is the work,’ would be
devoid of purport (the latter implying the former). More-
over, the generally accepted meaning of the word ‘karman,’
both in Vedic and worldly speech, is work in the sense of
good and evil actions. And as the origination of the world
is caused by actions of the various individual souls, the
designation of ‘maker of those persons’ also suits only the
individual soul. The meaning of the whole passage there-
fore is ‘He who is the cause of the different persons that
have their abode in the disc of the sun, and so on, and
are instrumental towards the retributive experiences of the
individual souls ; and to whom there belongs karman, good
and evil, to which there is due his becoming such a cause ;
he indeed is to be known, Azs essential nature is to be
cognised in distinction from Prakriti. And also in what
follows, ‘The two came to a person who was asleep. He

1 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 16. 379

pushed him with a stick,’ &c., what is said about the
sleeping man being pushed, roused, &c., all points only to
the individual soul being the topic of instruction. Further
on also the text treats of the individual soul only, ‘As the
master feeds with his people, nay as his people feed on
the master, thus does this conscious Self feed with the
other Selfs.’ We must consider also the following passage—
which contains the explanation given by Agdtasatru to
Balaki, who had been unable to say where the soul goes at
the time of deep sleep—' There are the arteries called
Hitas. In these the person is; when sleeping he sees no
dream, then he (or that, i.e. the aggregate of the sense-
organs) becomes one with this praza alone. Then speech
goes to him with all names, &c., the mind with all thoughts.
And when he awakes, then, as from a burning fire sparks
proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the prazas
proceed each towards its place, from the prazas the gods,
from the gods the worlds.’ The individual soul which
passes through the states of dream, deep sleep and waking,
and is that into which there are merged and from which
there proceed speech and all the other organs, is here
declared to be the abode of deep sleep ‘then it (viz. the
aggregate of the organs) becomes one in that prama.’
Praza here means the individual soul in so far as supporting
life; for the text continues ‘when ¢4at one awakes’ and
neither the vital breath nor the Lord (both of whom might
be proposed as explanations of praza) can be said to be
asleep and to wake. Or else ‘asmin prfize’ might be
explained as ‘in the vital breath (which abides) in the
individual soul, the meaning of the clause being ‘all the
organs, speech and so on, become one in the vital breath
which itself abides in this soul.’ The word ‘ praza’ would
thus be taken in its primary literal sense; yet all the same
the soul constitutes the topic of the section, the vital
breath being a mere instrument of the soul. The Brahman
mentioned at the outset therefore is none other than the
individual soul, and there is nothing to prove a lord different
from it. And as the attributes which the texts ascribe to
the general cause, viz. thought and so on, are attributes of

380 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

_ intelligent beings only, we arrive at the conclusion that
what constitutes the cause of the world is the non-intelligent
Pradhana guided by the intelligent soul.

This prima facie view the Sdtra disposes of, by saying
“because (the work) denotes the world.’ It is not the
insignificant individual soul—which is under the influence
of its good and evil works, and by erroneously imputing
to itself the attributes of Prakriti becomes the cause of the
effects of the latter—that is the topic of our text; but
rather the Supreme Person who is free from all shadow
of imperfection such as Nescience and the like, who is
a treasure of all possible auspicious qualities in their highest
degree of perfection, who is the sole cause of this entire
world. This is proved by the circumstance that the term
‘work’ connected with ‘this’ (in ‘of whom this (is) the
work’) denotes the Universe which is an effect of the
Supreme Person. For the word ‘this’ must, on account
of its sense, the general topic of the section and so on,
be taken in a non-limited meaning, and hence denotes the
entire world, as presented by Perception and the other
means of knowledge, with all its sentient and non-sentient
beings. That the term ‘work’ does not here denote good
and evil actions, appears from the following consideration
of the context. Bélaki at first offers to teach Brahman
(‘Shall I tell you Brahman?’) and thereupon holds forth
on various persons abiding in the sun, and so on, as being
Brahman. Agdtasatru however refuses to accept this
instruction as not setting forth Brahman, and finally, in
order to enlighten Balaki, addresses him ‘He, O Balaki,
who is the maker of those persons, ὅς. Now as the
different personal souls abiding in the sun, &c., and
connected with karman in the form of good and evil
actions, are known already by Balaki, the term ‘karman’—
met with in the next clause—is clearly meant to throw
light on some Person so far not known to Balaki, and
therefore must be taken to mean not good and evil deeds
or action in general, but rather the entire Universe in so
far as being the outcome of activity. On this interpretation
only the passage gives instruction about something not

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 17. 381

known before. Should it be said that this would be the
case also if the subject to which the instruction refers were
the true essential nature of the soul, indicated here by its
connexion with karman, we reply that this would involve
the (objectionable) assumption of so-called implication
(lakshaz4), in so far namely as what the clause would
directly intimate is (not the essential nature of the soul
as free from karman but rather) the connexion of the soul
with karman. Moreover if the intention of the passage
were this, viz. to give instruction as to the soul, the latter
being pointed at by means of the reference to karman, the
intention would be fully accomplished by saying ‘to whom
karman belongs, he is to be known;’ while in the text
as it actually stands ‘of whom this is the karman’ the
‘this’ would be unmeaning. The meaning of the two
separate clauses ‘who is the maker of those persons’ and
‘of whom this is the work’ is as follows. He who is the
creator of those persons whom you called Brahman, and
of whom those persons are the creatures; he of whom this
entire world is the effect, and before whom all things
sentient and non-sentient are equal in so far as being
produced by him; he, the highest and universal cause,
the Supreme Person, is the object to be known. The
meaning implied here is—although the origination of the
world has for its condition the deeds of individual souls,
yet those souls do not independently originate the means
for their own retributive experience, but experience only
what the Lord has created to that end in agreement with
their works. The individual soul, hence, cannot stand in
creative relation to those persons.—What the text under
discussion inculcates as the object of knowledge therefore
is the highest Brahman which is known from all Vedanta-
texts as the universal cause.

17. Should it be said that this is not so on account
of the inferential marks of the individual soul and
the chief vital air; we reply that this has been
explained before.

With reference to the plea urged by the Pdrvapakshin

382 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

that, owing to inferential marks pointing to the individual
soul, and the circumstance of mention being made of the
chief vital air, we must decide that the section treats of
the enjoying individual soul and not of the highest Self,
the Stra remarks that this argumentation has already been
disposed of, viz. in connexion with the Pratardana vidya.
For there it was shown that when a text is ascertained,
on the ground of a comprehensive survey of initial and
concluding clauses, to refer to Brahman, all inferential
marks which point to other topics must be interpreted
so as to fall in with the principal topic. Now in our text
Brahman is introduced at the outset ‘Shall I tell you
Brahman?’ it is further mentioned in the middle of the
section, for the clause ‘of whom this is the work’ does not
refer to the soul in general but to the highest Person who
is the cause of the whole world; and at the end again we
hear of a reward which connects itself only with meditations
on Brahman, viz. supreme sovereignty preceded by the
conquest of all evil. ‘Having overcome all evil he obtains
pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty and supremacy—
yea, he who knows this.’ The section thus being concerned
with Brahman, the references to the individual soul and
to the chief vital air must also be interpreted so as to fall
in with Brahman. In the same way it was shown above
that the references to the individual soul and the chief
vital air which are met with in the Pratardana vidya really
explain themselves in connexion with a threefold meditation
on Brahman. As in the passage ‘Then with this pra#a alone
he becomes one’ the two words ‘this’ and ‘praza’ may
be taken as co-ordinated and it hence would be inappropriate
to separate them (and to explain ‘in the praza which
abides in this soul’), and as the word ‘pra#a’ is ascertained
to mean Brahman also, we must understand the mention
of prana to be made with a view to meditation on Brahman
in so far as having the prdza for its body. But how can
the references to the individual soul be put in connexion
with Brahman ?—This point is taken up by the next Sftra.

18. But Gaimini thinks that it has another purport,

1 ADHYAya, 4 ΡΑ͂ΡΑ, 18. 383

on account of the question and answer; and thus
some also.

The ‘but’ is meant to preclude the idea that the mention
made of the individual soul enables us to understand the
whole section as concerned with that soul_—The teacher
Gaimini is of opinion that the mention made of the
individual soul has another meaning, i.e. aims at conveying
the idea of what is different from the individual soul, i.e. the
nature of the highest Brahman. ‘On account of question
and answer.’ According to the story told in the Upanishad,
Agatasatru leads Balaki to where a sleeping man is
resting, and convinces him that the soul is different from
breath, by addressing the sleeping person, in whom breath
only is awake, with names belonging to praza! without the
sleeper being awaked thereby, and after that rousing him
by a push of his staff. Then, with a view to teaching
‘Balaki the difference of Brahman from the individual soul,
he asks him the following questions: ‘Where, O Balaki,
did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence did
he thus come back?’ To these questions he thereupon
himself replies, ‘When sleeping he sees no dream, then
he becomes one in that praza alone.—From that Self the
organs proceed each towards its place, from the organs
the gods, from the gods the worlds.’ Now this reply, no
less than the questions, clearly refers to the highest Self
as something different from the individual Self. For that
entering into which the soul, in the state of deep sleep,
attains its true nature and enjoys complete serenity, being
free from the disturbing experiences of pleasure and pain
that accompany the states of waking and of dream; and

1 The names with which the king addresses the sleeper are
Great one, clad in white raiment, Soma, king. The Sru. Pra. com-
ments as follows: Great one; because according to Sruti Prana is
the oldest and best. Clad in white raiment; because Sruti says
that water is the raiment of Prana; and elsewhere, that what is
white belongs to water. Soma; because scripture says ‘of this
prana water is the body, light the form, viz. yonder moon,’ Xing;
for Sruti says ‘ Pra#a indeed is the ruler,’

384 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

that from which it again returns to the fruition of pleasure
and pain; that is nothing else but the highest Self. For,
as other scriptural texts testify (‘Then he becomes united
with the True, Az. Up. VI, 8, 1; ‘Embraced ὃν the
intelligent Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing
that is within,’ Brz. Up. IV, 3, 21), the abode of deep
sleep is the intelligent Self which is different from the
individual Self, ie. the highest Self. We thus conclude
that the reference, in question and answer, to the individual
soul subserves the end of instruction being given about
what is different from that soul, i.e. the highest Self. We
hence also reject the Pdrvapakshin’s contention that
question and answer refer to the individual soul, that the
veins called hita are the abode of deep sleep, and that
the well-known clause as to the praza must be taken to
mean that the aggregate of the organs becomes one in the
individual soul called praza. For the veins are the abode,
not of deep sleep, but of dream, and, as we have shown
above, Brahman only is the abode of deep sleep; and the
text declares that the individual soul, together with all its
fninistering organs, becomes one with, and again proceeds
from, Brahman only—which the text designates as Praza.
—Moreover some, viz. the V4gasaneyins in this same
colloquy of Balaki and Agdtasatru as recorded in their
text, clearly distinguish from the vig#4na-maya, i.e. the
individual soul in the state of deep sleep, the highest Self
which then is the abode of the individual soul. ‘Where
was then the person, consisting of intelligence, and from
whence did he thus come back?—When he was thus
asleep, then the intelligent person, having through the
intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all
intelligence, lies in the ether that is within the heart.’ Now
the word ‘ether’ is known to denote the highest Self;
cf. the text ‘there is within that the small ether’ (KA. Up.
VIII, 1, 1). This shows us that the individual soul is
mentioned in the V4gasaneyin passage to the end of
setting forth what is different from it, viz. the pragva Self,
i.e. the highest Brahman. The general conclusion therefore
is that the Kaushitaki-text under discussion proposes as

1 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 19. 385

the object of knowledge something that is different from
the individual soul, viz. the highest Brahman which is the
cause of the whole world, and that hence the Vedanta-
texts nowhere intimate that general causality belongs
either to the individual soul or to the Pradh4na under the
soul’s guidance. Here terminates the adhikdrama of
‘denotation of the world.’

19. On account of the connected meaning of the
sentences.

In spite of the conclusion arrived at there may remain
a suspicion that here and there in the Upanishads texts
are to be met with which aim at setting forth the soul as
maintained in Kapila’s system, and that hence there is no
room for a being different from the individual soul and
called Lord. This suspicion the Sftra undertakes to
remove, in connexion with the Maitreyi-brahmama, in the
Brthadaranyaka. There we read ‘Verily, a husband is
dear, not for the love of the husband, but for the love of the
Self a husband is dear, and so on. Everything is dear, not
for the love of everything, but for the love of the Self
everything is dear. The Self should be seen, should be
heard, should be reflected on, should be meditated upon.
When the Self has been seen, heard, reflected upon,
meditated upon, then all this is known’ (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6).
—Here the doubt arises whether the Self enjoined in this
passage as the object of seeing, &c., be the soul as held
by the Sankhyas, or the Supreme Lord, all-knowing,
capable of realising all his purposes, and so on. The
Parvapakshin upholds the former alternative. For, he
says, the beginning no less than the middle and the
concluding part of the section conveys the idea of the
individual soul only. In the beginning the individual soul
only is meant, as appears from the connexion of the Self
with husband, wife, children, wealth, cattle, and so on. This
is confirmed by the middle part of the section where the
Self is said to be connected with origination and destruction,
‘a mass of knowledge, he having risen from these elements
vanishes again into them. When he has departed there

[48] cc

386 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

is no more consciousness. And in the end we have
‘whereby should he know the knower’; where we again
recognise the knowing subject, i.e. the individual soul, not
the Lord. We thus conclude that the whole text is meant
to set forth the soul as held by the Sankhyas.—But in the
beginning there is a clause, viz. ‘There is no hope of
immortality by wealth, which shows that the whole section
is meant to instruct us as to the means of immortality ;
how then can it be meant to set forth the individual soul
only ?—You state the very reason proving that the text
is concerned with the individual soul only! For according
to the Sankhya-system immortality is obtained through
the cognition of the true nature of the soul viewed as free
from all erroneous imputation to itself of the attributes
of non-sentient matter; and the text therefore makes it its
task to set forth, for the purpose of immortality, the essential
nature of the soul free from all connexion with Prakrstti,
‘the Self should be heard,’ and so on. And as the souls
dissociated from Prakriti are all of a uniform nature, all
souls are known through the knowledge of the soul free
from Prakriti, and the text therefore rightly says that
through the Self being known everything is known. And
as the essential nature of the Self is of one and the same
kind, viz. knowledge or intelligence, in all beings from gods
down to plants, the text rightly asserts the unity of the
Self ‘that Self is all this’; and denies all otherness from
the Self, on the ground of the characteristic attributes
of gods and so on really being of the nature of the Not-
self, ‘he is abandoned by everything, &c. The clause,
‘For where there is duality as it were,’ which denies
plurality, intimates that the plurality introduced into the
homogeneous Self by the different forms—such as of gods,
and so on—assumed by Prakriti, is false. And there is also
no objection to the teaching that ‘the Rig-veda and so on
are breathed forth from that great being (i.e. Prakriti) ;
for the origination of the world is caused by the soul in its
quality as ruler of Prakrzti.—It thus being ascertained that
the whole Maitreyi-brahmaza is concerned with the soul
in the Sankhya sense, we, according to the principle of the

1 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 19. 387

unity of purport of all Vedanta-texts, conclude that they
all treat of the Sankhya soul only, and that hence the
cause of the world is to be found not in a so-called Lord
but in Prakr#ti ruled and guided by the soul.

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sdtra. The
whole text refers to the Supreme Lord only; for on this
supposition only a satisfactory connexion of the parts of
the text can be made out. On being told by YAag#avalkya
that there is no hope of immortality through wealth,
Maitrey? expresses her slight regard for wealth and all
such things as do not help to immortality, and asks to be
instructed as to the means of immortality only (‘ What
should I do with that by which I do not become immortal?
What my lord knows tell that clearly to me’). Now the
Self which Yag#avalkya, responding to her requests, points
out to her as the proper object of knowledge, can be none
other than the highest Self; for other scriptural texts
clearly teach that the only means of reaching immortality
is to know the Supreme Person— Having known him thus
man passes beyond death’; ‘Knowing him thus he becomes
immortal here, there is no other path to go’ (Svet. Up.
III, 8). The knowledge of the true nature of the individual
soul which obtains immortality, and is a mere manifestation
of the power of the Supreme Person, must be held to be
useful towards the cognition of the Supreme Person who
brings about Release, but is not in itself instrumental
towards such Release; the being the knowledge of which
the text declares to be the means of immortality is
therefore the highest Self only. Again, the causal power
with regard to the entire world which is expressed in the
passage, ‘from that great Being there were breathed forth
the Rig-veda,’ &c., cannot possibly belong to the mere
individual soul which in its state of bondage is under the
influence of karman and in the state of release has nothing
to do with the world ; it can in fact belong to the Supreme
Person only. Again, what the text says as to everything
being known by the knowledge of one thing (‘By the
seeing indeed of the Self,’ &c.) is possible only in the case
of a Supreme Self which constitutes the Self of all. What

cc2

388 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the Pdrvapakshin said as to everything being known
through the cognition of the one individual soul, since
all individual souls are of the same type—this also cannot
be upheld ; for as long as there is a knowledge of the soul
only and not also of the world of non-sentient things, there
is no knowledge of everything. And when the text
enumerates different things (‘this Brahman class, this
Kshatra class,’ &c.), and then concludes ‘all this is that
Self’—where the ‘this’ denotes the entire Universe of
animate and inanimate beings as known through Perception,
Inference, and so on—universal unity such as declared here
is possible only through a highest Self which is the Self
of all. It is not, on the other hand, possible that what the
word ‘this’ denotes, i. e. the whole world of intelligent and
non-intelligent creatures, should be one with the personal
soul as long as it remains what it is, whether connected
with or disassociated from non-sentient matter. In the
same spirit the passage, ‘All things abandon him who
views all things elsewhere than in the Self, finds fault
with him who views anything apart from the universal
Self. The qualities also which in the earlier Maitreyi-
brahmama (II, 4, 12) are predicated of the being under
discussion, viz. greatness, endlessness, unlimitedness, cannot
belong to any one else but the highest Self. That Self
therefore is the topic of the Brahmaza.

We further demur to our antagonist’s maintaining that
the entire Brahmama treats of the individual soul because
that soul is at the outset represented as the object of
enquiry, this being inferred from its connexion with
husband, wife, wealth, &c. For if the clause ‘for the love
(literally, for the desire) of the Self’ refers to the individual
Self, we cannot help connecting (as, in fact, we must do in
any case) that Self with the Self referred to in the
subsequent clause, ‘the Self indeed is to be seen,’ &c.; the
connexion having to be conceived in that way that the
information given in the former clause somehow subserves
the cognition of the Self enjoined in the latter clause.
‘For the desire of the Self’ would then mean ‘for the
attainment of the objects desired by the Self’ But if it

1 aDHYAYA, 4 PADA, 19. 389

is first said that husband, wife, &c., are dear because they
fulfil the wishes of the individual Self, it could hardly be
said further on that the nature of that Self must be enquired
into; for what, in the circumstances of the case, naturally
is to be enquired into and searched for are the dear objects
but not the true nature of him to whom those objects are
dear, apart from the objects themselves. It would certainly
be somewhat senseless to declare that since husband, wife,
&c., are dear because they fulfil the desires of the individual
soul, therefore, setting aside those dear objects, we must
enquire into the true nature of that soul apart from all the
objects of its desire. On the contrary, it having been
declared that husband, wife, &c., are dear not on account
of husband, wife, &c., but on account of the Self, they should
not be dropped, but included in the further investigation,
just because they subserve the Self. And should our
opponent (in order to avoid the difficulty of establishing
a satisfactory connexion between the different clauses)
maintain that the clause, ‘but everything is dear for the
love of the Self,’ is not connected with the following clause,
‘the Self is to be seen,’ &c., we point out that this would
break the whole connexion of the Brahmavza. And if we
allowed such a break, we should then be unable to point
out what is the use of the earlier part of the Brahmaaa.
We must therefore attempt to explain the connexion in
such a way as to make it clear why all search for dear
objects—husband, wife, children, wealth, &c.—should be
abandoned and the Self only should be searched for. This
explanation is as follows. After having stated that wealth,
and so on, are no means to obtain immortality which
consists in permanent absolute bliss, the text declares that
the pleasant experiences which we derive from wealth,
husband, wife, &c., and which are not of a permanent
nature and always alloyed with a great deal of pain, are
caused not by wealth, husband, wife, &c., themselves, but
rather by the highest Self whose nature is absolute bliss.
He therefore who being himself of the nature of perfect
bliss causes other beings and things also to be the abodes
of partial bliss, he—the highest Self—is to be constituted

390 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the object of knowledge. The clauses, ‘not for the wish
of the husband a husband is dear,’ &c., therefore must
be understood as follows—a husband, a wife, a son, &c., are
not dear to us in consequence of a wish or purpose on their
part, ‘may I, for my own end or advantage be dear to
him, but they are dear to us for the wish of the Self, i.e.
to the end that there may be accomplished the desire of
the highest Self—which desire aims at the devotee
obtaining what is dear to him. For the highest Self
pleased with the works of his devotees imparts to different
things such dearness, i. e. joy-giving quality as corresponds
to those works, that ‘dearness’ being bound in each case
to a definite place, time, nature and degree. This is in
accordance with the scriptural text, ‘For he alone bestows
bliss’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Things are not dear, or the
contrary, to us by themselves, but only in so far as the
highest Self makes them such. Compare the text, ‘The
same thing which erst gave us delight later on becomes
the source of grief; and what was the cause of wrath
afterwards tends to peace. Hence there is nothing that
in itself is of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.’

But, another view of the meaning of the text is proposed,
even if the Self in the clause ‘for the desire of the Self’
were accepted as denoting the individual Self, yet the
clause ‘the Self must be seen’ would refer to the highest
Self only. For in that case also the sense would be as
follows—because the possession of husband, wife, and other
so-called dear things is aimed at by a person to whom
they are dear, not with a view of bringing about what
is desired by them (viz. husband, wife, &c.), but rather
to the end of bringing about what is desired by himself;
therefore that being which is, to the individual soul,
absolutely and unlimitedly dear, viz. the highest Self, must
be constituted the sole object of cognition, not such objects
as husband, wife, wealth, &c., the nature of which depends
on various external circumstances and the possession of
which gives rise either to limited pleasure alloyed with
pain or to mere pain.—But against this we remark that as,
in the section under discussion, the words designating the

1 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20. 391

individual Self denote the highest Self also’, the term
‘Self’ in both clauses, ‘For the desire of the Self’ and
‘The Self is to be seen,’ really refers to one and the same
being (viz. the highest Self), and the interpretation thus
agrees with the one given above.—In order to prove the
tenet that words denoting the individual soul at the same
time denote the highest Self, by means of arguments made
use of by other teachers also, the Sitrakdra sets forth the
two following Satras. ᾿

20. (It is) a mark indicating that the promissory
statement is proved; thus Asmarathya thinks.

According to the teacher Asmarathya the circumstance
that terms denoting the individual soul are used to denote
Brahman is a mark enabling us to infer that the promissory
declaration according to which through the knowledge
of one thing everything is known is well established. If
the individual soul were not identical with Brahman in so
far as it is the effect of Brahman, then the knowledge
of the soul—being something distinct from Brahman—
would not follow from the knowledge of the highest Self.
There are the texts declaring the oneness of Brahman
previous to creation, such as ‘ the Self only was this in the
beginning’ (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), and on the other hand
those texts which declare that the souls spring from and
again are merged in Brahman ; such as ‘As from a blazing
fire sparks being like unto fire fly forth a thousandfold,
thus are various beings brought forth from the Imperish-
able, and return thither also’ (Mu. Up. II, 1,1). These
two sets of texts together make us apprehend that the
souls are one with Brahman in so far as they are its effects.
On this ground a word denoting the individual soul denotes
the highest Self as well.

1 If it be insisted upon that the Self in ‘for the desire of the
Self’ is the individual Self, we point out that terms denoting the
individual Self at the same time denote the highest Self also. This
tenet of his R&m4nuga considers to be set forth and legitimately
proved in Sfitra 23, while Sfttras 21 and 22 although advocating
the right principle fail to assign valid arguments.

392 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

21. Because (the soul) when it will depart is such;
thus Audulomi thinks.

It is wrong to maintain that the designation of Brahman
by means of terms denoting the individual soul is intended
to prove the truth of the declaration that through the
knowledge of one thing everything is known, in so far
namely as the soul is an effect of Brahman and hence one
with it. For scriptural texts such as ‘the knowing Self
is not born, it dies not’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), declare the soul
not to have originated, and it moreover is admitted that
the world is each time created to the end of the souls
undergoing experiences retributive of their former deeds;
otherwise the inequalities of the different parts of the
creation would be inexplicable. If moreover the soul were
a mere effect of Brahman, its Release would consist in
a mere return into the substance of Brahman,—analogous
to the refunding into Brahman of the material elements,
and that would mean that the injunction and performance
of acts leading to such Release would be purportless.
Release, understood in that sense, moreover would not
be anything beneficial to man; for to be refunded into
Brahman as an earthen vessel is refunded into its own
causal substance, i. e. clay, means nothing else but complete
annihilation. How, under these circumstances, certain texts
can speak of the origination and reabsorption of the
individual soul will be set forth later on.—According to
the opinion of the teacher Audulomi, the highest Self’s
being denoted by terms directly denoting the individual
soul is due to the soul’s becoming Brahman when departing
from the body. This is in agreement with texts such
as the following, ‘This serene being having risen from this
body and approached the highest light appears in its true
form’ (ΑΛ. Up. VIII, 3, 4); ‘As the flowing rivers disappear
in the sea, losing their name and form, thus a wise man
freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who
is higher than the high’ (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8).

22. On account of (Brahman’s) abiding (within the
individual soul); thus KAsakvztsna (holds).

1 aDHyAya, 4 PADA, 22. 393

We must object likewise to the view set forth in the
preceding Sftra, viz. that Brahman is denoted by terms
denoting the individual soul because that soul when
departing becomes one with Brahman. For that view
cannot stand the test of being submitted to definite
alternatives.—Is the soul’s not being such, i.e. not being
Brahman, previously to its departure from the body, due
to its own essential nature or to a limiting adjunct, and is it
in the latter case real or unreal? In the first case the soul
can never become one with Brahman, for if its separation
from Brahman is due to its own essential nature, that
separation can never vanish as long as the essential nature
persists. And should it be said that its essential nature
comes to an end together with its distinction from Brahman,
we reply that in that case it perishes utterly and does not
therefore become Brahman. The latter view, moreover,
precludes itself as in no way beneficial to man, and so on.—
If, in the next place, the difference of the soul from
Brahman depends on the presence of real limiting adjuncts,
the soul is Brahman even before its departure from the
body, and we therefore cannot reasonably accept the
distinction implied in saying that the soul becomes Brahman
only when it departs. For on this view there exists
nothing but Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, and as
those adjuncts cannot introduce difference into Brahman
which is without parts and hence incapable of difference,
the difference resides altogether in the adjuncts, and hence
the soul is Brahman even before its departure from the
body.—If, on the other hand, the difference due to the
adjuncts is not real, we ask—what is it then that becomes
Brahman on the departure of the soul?—Brahman itself
whose true nature had previously been obscured by
Nescience, its limiting adjunct!—Not so, we reply. Of
Brahman whose true nature consists in eternal, free, self-
luminous intelligence, the true nature cannot possibly be
hidden by Nescience. For by ‘hiding’ or ‘ obscuring’ we
understand the cessation of the light that belongs to the
essential nature of a thing. Where, therefore, light itself
and alone constitutes the essential nature of a thing, there

eo

394 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

can either be no obscuration at all, or if there is such
it means complete annihilation of the thing. Hence
Brahman’s essential nature being manifest at all timés,
there exists no difference on account of which it could
be said to decome Brahman at the time of the soul’s
departure ; and the distinction introduced in the last Satra
(‘when departing’) thus has no meaning. The text on
which Audulomi relies, ‘ Having risen from this body,’ &c.,
does not declare that that which previously was not
Brahman becomes such at the time of departure, but rather
that the true nature of the soul which had previously existed
already becomes manifest at the time of departure. This
will be explained under IV, 4, t.

The theories stated in the two preceding Sftras thus
having been found untenable, the teacher K4sakrstsna states
his own view, to the effect that words denoting the giva are
applied to Brahman because Brahman abides as its Self
within the individual soul which thus constitutes Brahman’s
body. This theory rests on a number of well-known texts,
‘Entering into them with this living (individual) soul let
me evolve names and forms’ (K%. Up. VI, 3, 2); ‘He who
dwelling within the Self, &c., whose body the Self is,’ &c.
(Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); ‘He who moves within the Imperish-
able, of whom the Imperishable is the body,’ ἃς. ;
‘Entered within, the ruler of beings, the Self of all’
That the term ‘giva’ denotes not only the giva itself,
but extends in its denotation up to the highest Self,
we have explained before when discussing the text,
‘Let me evolve names and forms.’ On this view of the
identity of the individual and the highest Self con-
sisting in their being related to each other as body and
soul, we can accept in their full and unmutilated meaning
all scriptural texts whatever—whether they proclaim the
perfection and omniscience of the highest Brahman, or
teach how the individual soul steeped in ignorance and
misery is to be saved through meditation on Brahman,
or describe the origination and reabsorption of the world,
or aim at showing how the world is identical with
Brahman. For this reason the author of the Sidtras,

Ι ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 22. 395

rejecting other views, accepts the theory of K4sakritsna.
Returning to the Maitreyi-brahmaza we proceed to explain
the general sense, from the passage previously discussed
onwards, Being questioned by Maitreyi as to the means
of immortality, Yag#avalkya teaches her that this means
is given in meditation on the highest Self (‘The Self is to
be seen,’ &c.). He next indicates in a general way the
nature of the object of meditation (‘When the Self is seen,’
&c.), and—availing himself of the similes of the drum, &c.—
of the government over the organs, mind, and so on, which
are instrumental towards meditation. He then explains
in detail that the object of meditation, i.e. the highest
Brahman, is the sole cause of the entire world; and the
ruler of the aggregate of organs on which there depends
all activity with regard to the objects of the senses (‘As
clouds of smoke proceed,’ &c.; ‘As the ocean is the home
of all the waters’). He, next, in order to stimulate the
effort which leads to immortality, shows how the highest
Self abiding in the form of the individual Self, is of one
uniform character, viz. that of limitless intelligence (‘ As
a lump of salt,’ &c.), and how that same Self characterised
by homogeneous limitless intelligence connects itself in the
Samsara state with the products of the elements (‘a mass
of knowledge, it rises from those elements and again
vanishes into them’). He then adds, ‘When he has
departed, there is no more knowledge’; meaning that
in the state of Release, where the soul’s unlimited essential
intelligence is not contracted in any way, there is none
of those specific cognitions by which the Self identifying
itself with the body, the sense-organs, &c., views itself
as a man or a god, and soon. Next—in the passage, ‘ For
where there is duality as it were’—he, holding that the
view of a plurality of things not having their Self in
Brahman is due to ignorance, shows that for him who has
freed himself from the shackles of ignorance and recognises
this whole world as animated by Brahman, the view of
plurality is dispelled by the recognition of the absence
of any existence apart from Brahman. He then proceeds,
‘He by whom he knows all this, by what means should

396 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

he know Him?’ This means—He, i.e. the highest Self,
which abiding within the individual soul as its true
Self bestows on it the power of knowledge so that the soul
knows all this through the highest Self; by what means
should the soul know Him? In other words, there is no.
such means of knowledge: the highest Self cannot be fully
understood by the individual soul. ‘That Self,” he
continues, ‘is to be expressed as—not so, not so!’ That
means—He, the highest Lord, different in nature from
everything else, whether sentient or non-sentient, abides
within all beings as their Self, and hence is not touched
by the imperfections of what constitutes his body merely.
He then concludes, ‘Whereby should he know the Knower?
Thus, O Maitreyt, thou hast been instructed. Thus far
goes Immortality’; the purport of these words being—By
what means, apart from the meditation described, should
man know Him who is different in nature from all other
beings, who is the sole cause of the entire world, who
is the Knower of all, Him the Supreme Person? It is
meditation on Him only which shows the road to Immor-
tality. It thus appears that the Maitreyi-brahmana is
concerned with the highest Brahman only; and this
confirms the conclusion that Brahman only, and with it
Prakriti as ruled by Brahman, is the cause of the world.—
Here terminates the adhikarava of ‘the connexion of
sentences.’

23. (Brahman is) the material cause on account
of this not being in conflict with the promissory
statements and the illustrative instances.

The claims raised by the atheistic Sankhya having thus
been disposed of, the theistic SAnkhya comes forward as an
opponent. It must indeed be admitted, he says, that the
Ved4nta-texts teach the cause of the world to be an all-
knowing Lord; for they attribute to that cause thought
and similar characteristics. But at the same time we learn
from those same texts that the material cause of the world
is none other than the Pradhana; with an all-knowing, un-
changing superintending Lord they connect a Pradh4na,

1 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 23. 397

ruled by him, which is non-intelligent and undergoes
changes, and the two together only they represent as the
cause of the world. This view is conveyed by the following
texts, ‘who is without parts, without actions, tranquil,
without fault, without taint’ (Svet. Up. VI, 18); ‘This
great unborn Self, undecaying, undying’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25);
‘He knows her who produces all effects, the non-knowing
one, the unborn one, wearing eight forms, the firm one.
Ruled by him she is spread out, and incited and guided by
him gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls.
A cow she is without beginning and end, a mother pro-
ducing all beings’ (see above, p. 363). That the Lord
creates this world in so far only as guiding Prakriti, the
material cause, we learn from the following text, ‘From
that the Lord of Maya creates all this. Know Maya to be
Prakriti and the Lord of Maya the great Lord’ (νεῖ.
Up. IV, 9, 10). And similarly Smrtti, ‘with me as super-
visor Prakriti brings forth the Universe of the movable and
the immovable’ (Bha. Gi. IX, 10), Although, therefore,
the Pradhana is not expressly stated by Scripture to be
the material cause, we must assume that there is such
a Pradhana and that, superintended by the Lord, it con-
stitutes the material cause, because otherwise the texts
declaring Brahman to be the cause of the world would not
be fully intelligible. For ordinary experience shows us on
all sides that the operative cause and.the material cause
are quite distinct : we invariably have on the one side clay,
gold, and other material substances which form the material
causes of pots, ornaments, and so on, and on the other
hand, distinct from them, potters, goldsmiths, and so on,
who act as operative causes. And we further observe that
the production of effects invariably requires several in-
strumental agencies, The Vedanta-texts therefore cannot
possess the strength to convince us, in open defiance of
the two invariable rules, that the one Brahman is at
the same time the material and the operative cause of the
world ; and hence we maintain that Brahman is only the
operative but not the material cause, while the material cause
is the Pradhana guided by Brahman.

398 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

This prima facie view the Sdtra combats. Prakriti, i.e. the
material cause, not only the operative cause, is Brahman
only; this view being in harmony with the promissory
declaration and the illustrative instances. The promissory
declaration is the one referring to the knowledge of all
things through the knowledge of one, ‘ Did you ever ask for
that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes
heard?’ ἅς, (KA. Up. VI, 1, 3). And the illustrative in-
stances are those which set forth the knowledge of the
effect as resulting from the knowledge of the cause, ‘ As by
one lump of clay there is made known all that is made of
clay ; as by one nugget of gold, &c.; as by one instrument
for paring the nails,’ &c. (KA. Up. VI, 1, 4). If Brahman
were merely the operative cause of the world, the know-
ledge of the entire world would not result from the knowledge
of Brahman; not any more than we know the pot when we
know the potter. And thus scriptural declaration and
illustrative instances would be stultified. But if Brahman
is the general material cause, then the knowledge of Brah-
man implies the knowledge of its effect, i.e. the world, in
the same way as the knowledge of such special material
causes as a lump of clay, a nugget of gold, an instrument
for paring the nails, implies the knowledge of all things
made of clay, gold or iron—such as pots, bracelets, diadems,
hatchets, and so on. For an effect is not a substance
different from its cause, but the cause itself which has
passed into a different state. The initial declaration thus
being confirmed by the instances of clay and its products, &c.,
which stand in the relation of cause and effect, we conclude
that Brahman only is the material cause of the world.
That Scripture teaches the operative and the material
causes to be separate, is not true; it rather teaches the
unity of the two. For in the text, ‘Have you asked for
that A4desa (above, and generally, understood to mean
“instruction ἢ), by which that which is not heard becomes
heard?’ the word ‘Adesa’ has to be taken to mean ru/er,
in agreement with the text, ‘by the command—or rule—of
that Imperishable sun and moon stand apart’ (Bri. Up. ITI,
8, 9), so that the passage means, ‘ Have you asked for that

1 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 23. 399

Ruler by whom, when heard and known, even that which is
not heard and known, becomes heard and known?’ This
clearly shows the unity of the operative (ruling or super-
vising) cause and the material cause ; taken in conjunction
with the subsequent declaration of the unity of the cause
previous to creation, ‘ Being only, this was in the beginning,
one only,’ and the denial of a further operative cause implied
in the further qualification ‘advitiyam,’ i.e. ‘without a
second.’—But how then have we to understand texts such
as the one quoted above (from the X dlika-Upanishad)
which declare Prakriti to be eternal and the material cause
of the world ?—Prakviti, we reply, in such passages denotes
Brahman in its causal phase when names and forms are not
yet distinguished. For a principle independent of Brahman
does not exist, as we know from texts such as ‘ Everything
abandons him who views anything as apart from the Self’ ;
and ‘ But where for him the Self has become all, whereby
should he see whom?’ (Bri. Up. II, 4,6; 15). Consider
also the texts, ‘ All this is Brahman’ (KA. Up. ITI, 14, 1);
and ‘All this has its Self in that’ (KA. Up. VI, 8, 7);
which declare that the world whether in its causal or its
effected condition has Brahman for its Self. The re-
lation of the world to Brahman has to be conceived in
agreement with scriptural texts such as ‘He who moves
within the earth,’ &c., up to ‘He who moves within
the Imperishable’; and ‘He who dwells within the
earth,’ &c., up to ‘He who dwells within the Self’ (Brz.
Up. III, 7, 3-23). The highest Brahman, having the
whole aggregate of non-sentient and sentient beings for its
body, ever is the Self of all. Sometimes, however, names
and forms are not evolved, not distinguished in Brahman ;
at other times they are evolved, distinct. In the latter
state Brahman is called an effect and manifold; in the
former it is called one, without a second, the cause. This
causal state of Brahman is meant where the text quoted
above speaks of the cow without beginning and end, giving
birth to effects, and so on.—But, the text, ‘The great one
is merged in the Unevolved, the Unevolved is merged in
the Imperishable,’ intimates that the Unevolved originates

400 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

and again passes away; and similarly the Mahabharata
says, ‘from that there sprung the Non-evolved comprising
the three guzas; the Non-evolved is merged in the in-
divisible Person.’—These texts, we reply, present no real
difficulty. For Brahman having non-sentient matter for its
body, that state which consists of the three gusas and is
denoted by the term ‘ Unevolved’ is something effected.
And the text, ‘ When there was darkness, neither day nor
night,’ states that also in a total pralaya non-sentient
matter having Brahman for its Self continues to exist in
a highly subtle condition. This highly subtle matter stands
to Brahman the cause of the world in the relation of a
mode (prak4ra), and it is Brahman viewed as having such
a mode that the text from the ΚΙ. Upanishad refers to.
For this reason also the text, ‘the Imperishable is merged
in darkness, darkness becomes one with the highest God,’
declares not that darkness is completely merged and lost
in the Divinity but only that it becomes one with it; what
the text wants to intimate is that state of Brahman in
which, having for its mode extremely subtle matter here
called ‘Darkness,’ it abides without evolving names and
forms. The mantra, ‘ There was darkness, hidden in dark-
ness,’ ὅς. (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 3), sets forth the same
view ; and so does Manu (I, 5), ‘This universe existed
in the shape of Darkness, unperceived, destitute of dis-
tinctive marks, unattainable by reasoning, unknowable,
wholly immersed as it were in deep sleep.’ And, as to the
text, ‘from that the Lord of May4 creates everything,’ we
shall prove later on the unchangeableness of Brahman, and
explain the scriptural texts asserting it.

As to the contention raised by the Pdrvapakshin that on
the basis of invariable experience it must be held that one
and the same principle cannot be both material and opera-
tive cause, and that effects cannot be brought about by one
agency, and that hence the Ved4anta-texts can no more
establish the view of Brahman being the sole cause than
the command ‘sprinkle with fire’ will convince us that fire
may perform the office of water; we simply remark that
the highest Brahman which totally differs in nature from

1 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 25. 401

all other beings, which is omnipotent and omniscient, can
by itself accomplish everything. The invariable rule of
experience holds good, on the other hand, with regard to
clay and similar materials which are destitute of intelligence
and hence incapable of guiding and supervising ; and with
regard to potters and similar agents who do not possess the
power of transforming themselves into manifold products,
and cannot directly realise their intentions.—The con-
clusion therefore remains that Brahman alone is the material
as well as the operative cause of the Universe.

24. Andon account of the statement of reflection.

Brahman must be held to be both causes for that reason
also that texts such as ‘He desired, may I be many, may
I grow forth,’ and ‘It thought, may I be many, may I grow
forth,’ declare that the creative Brahman forms the purpose
of its own Self multiplying itself. The text clearly teaches
that creation on Brahman’s part is preceded by the pur-
pose ‘ May I, and no other than I, become manifold in the
shape of various non-sentient and sentient beings.’

25. And on account of both being directly
declared.

The conclusion arrived at above is based not only on
scriptural declaration, illustrative instances and statements
of reflection ; but in addition Scripture directly states that
Brahman alone is the material as well as operative cause
of the world. ‘What was the wood, what the tree from
which they have shaped heaven and earth? You wise
ones, search in your minds, whereon it stood, supporting
the worlds.—Brahman was the wood, Brahman the tree
from which they shaped heaven and earth ; you wise ones,
I tell you, it stood on Brahman, supporting the worlds.’ —
Here a question is asked, suggested by the ordinary
worldly view, as to what was the material and instruments
used by Brahman when creating; and the answer—based
on the insight that there is nothing unreasonable in ascrib-
ing all possible powers to Brahman which differs from all
other beings—declares that Brahman itself is the material

[48] pd

402 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

and the instruments;—whereby the ordinary view is
disposed of.—The next Sftra supplies a further reason.

26. On account of (the Self) making itself.

Of Brahman which the text had introduced as intent on
creation, ‘He wished, may I be many’ (Taitt. Up. IT, 6),
a subsequent text says, ‘ That itself made its Self’ (II, 7),
so that Brahman is represented as the object as well as the
agent in the act of creation. It being the Self only which
here is made many, we understand that the Self is material
cause as well as operative one. The Self with names and
forms non-evolved is agent (cause), the same Self with
names and forms evolved is object (effect). There is
thus nothing contrary to reason in one Self being object
as well as agent.

A new doubt here presents itself—‘ The True, knowledge,
infinite is Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); ‘ Bliss is Brahman’
(Bri. Up. III, 9, 28); ‘Frée from sin, free from old age,
free from death and grief, free from hunger and thirst’
(KA. Up. VIII, 1, 5); ‘Without parts, without action,
tranquil, without fault, without taint’ (Svet. Up. VI, 19);
‘This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying’ (Bri. Up.
IV, 4, 25)-from all these texts it appears that Brahman
is essentially free from even a shadow Of all the imperfec-
tions which afflict all sentient and non-sentient beings, and
has for its only characteristics absolutely supreme bliss
and knowledge. How then is it possible that this Brahman
should form the purpose of becoming, and actually become,
manifold, by appearing in the form of a world comprising
various sentient and non-sentient beings—all of which are
the abodes of all kinds of imperfections and afflictions?
To this question the next Sftra replies.

27. Owing to modification.

This means—owing to the essential nature of modifica-
tion (pariz4ma). The modification taught in our system is
not such as to introduce imperfections into the highest
Brahman, on the contrary it confers on it limitless glory.
For our teaching as to Brahman’s modification is as follows.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 27. 403

Brahman—essentially antagonistic to all evil, of uniform
goodness, differing in nature from all beings other than
itself, all-knowing, endowed with the power of immediately
realising all its purposes, in eternal possession of all it
wishes for, supremely blessed—has for its body the entire
universe, with all its sentient and non-sentient beings—the
universe being for it a plaything as it were—and con-
stitutes the Self of the Universe. Now, when this world
which forms Brahman’s body has been gradually reabsorbed
into Brahman, each constituent element being refunded
into its immediate cause, so that in the end there remains
only the highly subtle, elementary matter which Scripture
calls Darkness; and when this so-called Darkness itself,
by assuming a form so extremely subtle that it hardly
deserves to be called samething separate from Brahman,
of which it constitutes the body, has become one with
Brahman; then Brahman invested with this ultra-subtle
body forms the resolve ‘ May I again possess a world-body
constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings, dis-
tinguished by names and forms just as in the previous
aeon, and modifies (pariz4mayati) itself by gradually
evolving the world-body in the inverse order in which
reabsorption had taken place.

All Vedanta-texts teach such modification or change on
Brahman’s part. There is, e.g., the text in the Brzhad-
Aranyaka which declares that the whole world constitutes
the body of Brahman and that Brahman is its Self. That
text teaches that earth, water, fire, sky, air, heaven, sun,
the regions, moon and stars, ether, darkness, light, all
beings, breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge
form the body of Brahman which abides within them as
their Self and Ruler. Thus in the Ka&sva-text; the
MA&dhyandina-text reads ‘ the Self’ instead of ‘knowledge’ ;
and adds the worlds, sacrifices and vedas. The parallel
passage in the Sub4éla-Upanishad adds to the beings
enumerated as constituting Brahman’s body in the Brzhad-
Aranyaka, buddhi, ahamkéra, the mind (éitta), the Un-
evolved (avyakta), the Imperishable (akshara), and concludes
‘He who moves within death, of whom death is the body,

pd2

404 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

whom death does not know, he is the inner Self of all,
free from all evil, divine, the one god Narayana.’ The
term ‘Death’ here denotes matter in its extremely subtle
form, which in other texts is called Darkness; as we infer
from the order of enumeration in another passage in the
same Upanishad, ‘the Unevolved is merged in the Imperish-
able, the Imperishable in Darkness.’ That this Darkness
is called ‘Death’ is due to the fact that it obscures the
understanding of all souls and thus is harmful to them.
The full text in the Subdla-Up. declaring the successive
absorption of all the beings forming Brahman’s body is
as follows, ‘The earth is merged in water, water in fire,
fire in air, air in the ether, the ether in the sense-organs,
the sense-organs in the tanmAtras, the tanmatras in the
gross elements, the gross elements in the great principle,
the great principle in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the
Imperishable; the Imperishable is merged in Darkness ;
‘Darkness becomes one with the highest Divinity.’ That
even in the state of non-separation (to which the texts refer
as ‘becoming one’) non-sentient matter as well as sentient
beings, together with the impressions of their former deeds,
persists in an extremely subtle form, will be shown under
II, 1, 35. We have thus a Brahman all-knowing, of the
nature of supreme bliss and so on, one and without
a second, having for its body all sentient and non-sentient
beings abiding in an extremely subtle condition and having
become ‘one’ with the Supreme Self in so far as they
cannot be designated as something separate from him; and
of this Brahman Scripture records that it forms the resolve
of becoming many—in so far, namely, as investing itself
with a body consisting of all sentient and non-sentient
beings in their gross, manifest state which admits of
distinctions of name and form—and thereupon modifies
(pariz4ma) itself into the form of the world. This is dis-
tinctly indicated in the Taittiriya-U panishad, where Brahman
is at first described as ‘The True, knowledge, infinite,’ as
‘the Self of bliss which is different from the Self of
Understanding,’ as ‘he who bestows bliss’; and where
the text further on says, ‘ He desired, may I be many, may

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 27. 405

I grow forth. He brooded over himself, and having thus
brooded he sent forth all whatever there is. Having sent
forth he entered it. Having entered it he became sat and
tyat, defined and undefined, supported and non-supported,
knowledge and non-knowledge, real and unreal.’ The
‘brooding’ referred to in this text denotes knowing, viz.
reflection on the shape and character of the previous world
which Brahman is about to reproduce. Compare the text
‘whose brooding consists of knowledge’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9).
The meaning therefore is that Brahman, having an inward
intuition of the characteristics of the former world, creates
the new world on the same pattern. That Brahman in all
kalpas again and again creates the same world is generally
known from Sruti and Smvtti. Cp.‘ As the creator formerly
made sun and moon, and sky and earth, and the atmo-
sphere and the heavenly world,’ and ‘ whatever various signs
of the seasons are seen in succession, the same appear again
and again in successive yugas and kalpas.’

The sense of the Taittiriya-text therefore is as follows.
The highest Self, which in itself is of the nature of unlimited
knowledge and bliss, has for its body all sentient and
non-sentient beings—instruments of sport for him as it
were—in so subtle a form that they may be called non-
existing ; and as they are his body he may be said to
consist of them (tan-maya). Then desirous of providing
himself with an infinity of playthings of all kinds he,
by a series of steps beginning with Prakriti and the
aggregate of souls and leading down to the elements in
their gross state, so modifies himself as to have those
elements for his body—when he is said to consist of
them—and thus appears in the form of our world con-
taining what the text denotes as sat and tyat, i.e. all
intelligent and non-intelligent things, from gods down to
plants and stones. When the text says that the Self
having entered into it became sat and tyat, the meaning
is that the highest Self, which in its causal state had been
the universal Self, abides, in its effected state also, as the
Self of the different substances undergoing changes and
thus becomes this and that. While the highest Self thus

406 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

undergoes a change—in the form of a world comprising the
whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings—all
imperfection and suffering are limited to the sentient beings
constituting part of its body, and all change is restricted to
the non-sentient things which constitute another part. The
highest Self is effected in that sense only that it is the
ruling principle, and hence the Self, of matter and souls
in their gross or evolved state; but just on account of
being this, viz. their inner Ruler and Self, it is in no way
touched by their imperfections and changes. Consisting of
unlimited knowledge and bliss he for ever abides in his
uniform nature, engaged in the sport of making this world
goround. This is the purport of the clause ‘it became the
real and the unreal’: although undergoing a change into
the multiplicity of actual sentient and non-sentient things,
Brahman at the same time was the Real, i, 6. that which is
free from all shadow of imperfection, consisting of nothing
but pure knowledge and bliss. That all beings, sentient
and non-sentient, and whether in their non-evolved or
evolved states, are mere playthings of Brahman, and that
the creation and reabsorption of the world are only his
sport, this has been expressly declared by Dvaipdyana,
Pardsara and other Xishis, ‘ Know that all transitory beings,
from the Unevolved down to individual things, are a mere
play of Hari’; ‘View his action like that of a playful
child,” &c. The Sftrakdra will distinctly enounce the
same view in II, 1, 33. With a similar view the text
‘from that the Lord of M4ya sends forth all this ; and in
that the other is bound by Maya’ (Svet. Up. IV, 9),
refers to Prakriti and soul, which together constitute the
body of Brahman, as things different from Brahman,
although then, i.e. at the time of a pralaya, they are one
with Brahman in so far as their extreme subtlety does not
admit of their being conceived as separate ; this it does to
the end of suggesting that even when Brahman undergoes
the change into the shape of this world, all changes ex-
clusively belong to non-sentient matter which is a mode
of Brahman, and all imperfections and sufferings to the
individual souls which also are modes of Brahman. The

1 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 29. 407

text has to be viewed as agreeing in meaning with ‘that
Self made itself.’ Of a similar purport is the account given
in Manu, ‘ He being desirous to send forth from his body
beings of many kinds, first with a thought created the
waters and placed his seed in them’ (I, 8).

It is in this way that room is found for those texts also
which proclaim Brahman to be free from all imperfection
and all change. It thus remains a settled conclusion that
Brahman by itself constitutes the material as well as the
operative cause of the world.

28. And because it is called the womb.

Brahman is the material as well as the operative cause
of the world for that reason also that certain texts call it
the womb, ‘the maker, the Lord, the Person, Brahman,
the womb’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); ‘that which the wise
regard as the womb of all beings’ (I, 1, 6). And that
‘womb’ means as much as material cause, appears from
the complementary passage ‘As a spider sends forth and
draws in its threads’ (I, 1, 7). ©

29. Herewith all (texts) are explained, explained.

Hereby, i.e. by the whole array of arguments set forth
in the four p4das of the first adhydya ; all those particular
passages of the Ved4nta-texts which give instruction as to
the cause of the world, are explained as meaning to set
forth a Brahman all-wise, all-powerful, different in nature
from all beings intelligent and non-intelligent. The repeti-
tion of the word ‘explained’ is meant to indicate the
termination of the adhydya.

SECOND ADHYAYA.
FIRST PADA.

1. If it be said that there would result the fault
of there being no room for (certain) Smvztis: (we
reply) ‘no,’ because there would result the fault of
want of room for other Smr“tis.

The first adhydya has established the truth that what
the Ved4nta-texts teach is a Supreme Brahman, which is
something different as well from non-sentient matter known
through the ordinary means of proof, viz. Perception and
so on, as from the intelligent souls whether connected
with or separated from matter; which is free from even
a shadow of imperfection of any kind ; which is an ocean as
it were of auspicious qualities and so on; which is the sole
cause of the entire Universe; which constitutes the inner
Self of all things. The second adhy4ya is now begun for the
purpose of proving that the view thus set forth cannot be
impugned by whatever arguments may possibly be brought
forward. The Sdtrakara at first turns against those who
maintain that the Ved4nta-texts do not establish the view
indicated above, on the ground of that view being contra-
dicted by the Smriti of Kapila, i. e. the Sankhya-system.

But how can it be maintained at all that Scripture does
not set forth a certain view because thereby it would
enter into conflict with Smriti? For that Smrtti if con-
tradicted by Scripture is to be held of no account, is
already settled in the Parva Mim4msa (‘But where there
is contradiction Smr#ti is not to be regarded,’ I, 3, 3).—
Where, we reply, a matter can be definitely settled on the
basis of Scripture—as e.g. in the case of the Vedic in-
junction, ‘ he is to sing, after having touched the Udumbara
branch’ (which clearly contradicts the Smrsti injunction
that the whole branch is to be covered up)—Sm~rsti indeed

11 ADHYAyA, 1 PADA, I. 409

need not be regarded. But the topic with which the Vedanta-
texts are concerned is hard to understand, and hence, when
a conflict arises between those texts and a Smriti pro-
pounded by some great Kishi, the matter does not admit
of immediate decisive settlement: it is not therefore un-
reasonable to undertake to prove by Smv#ti that Scripture
does not set forth a certain doctrine. That is to say—we
possess a Smrsti composed with a view to teach men the
nature and means of supreme happiness, by the great
Rishi Kapila to whom Scripture, Smrsti, Itihdsa and
Pura#a alike refer as a person worthy of all respect
(compare e.g. ‘the Rishi Kapila,’ Svet. Up. V, 2), and
who moreover (unlike Brzhaspati and other Smriti-writers)
fully acknowledges the validity of all the means of earthly
happiness which are set forth in the karmak4nda of the
Veda, such as the daily oblations to the sacred fires, the
New and Full Moon offerings and the great Soma
sacrifices. Now, as men having only an imperfect
knowledge of the Veda, and moreover naturally slow-
minded, can hardly ascertain the sense of the Ved4nta-
texts without the assistance of such a Smriti, and as to
be satisfied with that sense of the Vedanta which discloses
itself on a mere superficial study of the text would imply
the admission that the whole Sankhya Smriti, although
composed by an able and trustworthy person, really is
useless; we see ourselves driven to acknowledge that the
doctrine of the Ved4nta-texts cannot differ from the one
established by the Sankhyas. Nor must you object that
to do so would force on us another unacceptable con-
clusion, viz. that those Smritis, that of Manu e. g., which
maintain Brahman to be the universal cause, are destitute
of authority; for Manu and similar works inculcate
practical religious duty and thus have at any rate
the uncontested function of supporting the teaching of
the karmakanda of the Veda. The Sankhya Smriti, on
the other hand, is entirely devoted to the setting forth of
theoretical truth (not of practical duty), and if it is not
accepted in that quality, it is of no use whatsoever—
On this ground the Sdtra sets forth the prima facie view,

410 . VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

‘If it be said that there results the fault of there being no
room for certain Smritis.’

The same Sitra replies ‘no ; because there would result
the fault of want of room for other Smritis.’ For other
Smritis, that of Manu e.g. teach that Brahman is the
universal cause, Thus Manu says, ‘ This (world) existed
in the shape of darkness, and so on. Then the divine
Self existent, indiscernible but making discernible all this,
the great elements and the rest, appeared with irresistible
power, dispelling the darkness. He, desiring to produce
beings of many kinds from his own body, first with a
thought created the waters, and placed his seed in them’
(Manu I, 5-8). And the Bhagavad-gita, ‘I am the origin
and the dissolution of the whole Universe’ (VII, 6).
‘I am the origin of all; everything proceeds from me’
(X, 8). Similarly, in the Mah4bh4rata, to the question
“Whence was created this whole world with its movable
and immovable beings?’ the answer is given, ‘ Narayaza
assumes the form of the world, he the infinite, eternal one’ ;
and ‘from hjm there originates the Unevolved consisting
of the three guzas’; and ‘the Unevolved is merged in
the non-acting Person.’ And Pardsara says, ‘From Vishzu
there sprang the world and in him it abides; he makes
this world persist and he rules it—he is the world.’ Thus
also Apastamba, ‘ The living beings are the dwelling of
him who lies in all caves, who is not killed, who is
spotless’; and ‘From him spring all bodies; he is the
primary cause, he is eternal, permanent’ (Dharmasi. I, 8,
22,4; 23, 2).—If the question as to the meaning of the
Vedanta-texts were to be settled by means of Kapila’s
Smriti, we should have to accept the extremely undesirable
conclusion that all the Smv#tis quoted are of no authority.
It is true that the Vedanta-texts are concerned with
theoretical truth lying outside the sphere of Perception
and the other means of knowledge, and that hence students
possessing only a limited knowledge of the Veda require
some help in order fully to make out the meaning of the
Vedanta. But what must be avoided in this case is to
give any opening for the conclusion that the very numerous

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 4Il

Smritis which closely follow the doctrine of the Vedanta,
are composed by the most competent and trustworthy
persons and aim at supporting that doctrine, are irrelevant ;
and it is for this reason that Kapila’s Smriti which contains
a doctrine opposed to Scripture must be disregarded. The
support required is elucidation of the sense conveyed by
Scripture, and this clearly cannot be effected by means
of a Smriti contradicting Scripture. Nor is it of any avail
to plead, as the Pairvapakshin does, that Manu and other
Smritis of the same kind fulfil in any case the function of
elucidating the acts of religious duty enjoined in the
karmakanda. For if they enjoin acts of religious duty
as means to win the favour of the Supreme Person but
do not impress upon us the idea of that Supreme Person
himself who is to be pleased by those acts, they are also
not capable of impressing upon us the idea of thase acts
themselves. That it is the character of all religious acts
to win the favour of the Supreme Spirit, Smriti distinctly
declares, ‘Man attains to perfection by worshipping with
his proper action Him from whom all Beings proceed ;
and by whom all this is stretched out’ (Bha. Gi. XVIII,
46); ‘Let a man meditate on Nardyama, the divine one,
at all works, such as bathing and the like; he will then
reach the world of Brahman and not return hither’
(Daksha-smriti) ; and ‘ Those men with whom, intent on
their duties, thou art pleased, O Lord, they pass beyond
all this Maya and find Release for their souls’ (Vi. Pu.).
Nor can it be said that Manu and similar Smritis have
a function in so far as setting forth works (not aiming
at final Release but) bringing about certain results
included in transmigratory existence, whether here on
earth or in a heavenly world; for the essential character
of those works also is to please the highest Person. As
is said in the Bhagavad-gita (IX, 23, 24); ‘Even they
who devoted to other gods worship them with faith,
worship me, against ordinance. For I am the enjoyer
and the Lord of all sacrifices; but they know me not in
truth and hence they fall, and ‘Thou art ever worshipped
by me with sacrifices; thou alone, bearing the form of

412 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

pitris and of gods, enjoyest all the offerings made to
either.” Nor finally can we admit the contention that
it is rational to interpret the Vedanta-texts in accordance
with Kapila’s Smriti because Kapila, in the Svetasvatara
text, is referred to as a competent person. For from
this it would follow that, as Brzhaspati is, in Sruti and
Smriti, mentioned as a pattern of consummate wisdom,
Scripture should be interpretéd in agreement with the
openly materialistic and atheistic Smrzti composed by
that authority.—But, it may here be said, the Ved4nta-
texts should after all be interpreted in agreement with
Kapila’s Smriti, for the reason that Kapila had through
the power of his concentrated meditation (yoga) arrived
at an insight into truth —To this objection the next S(tra
replies. :

2. And on account of the non-perception (of truth
on the part) of others.

The ‘and’ in the Sdtra has the force of ‘but,’ being
meant to dispel the doubt raised. There are many other
authors of Smritis, such as Manu, who through the power
of their meditation had attained insight into the highest
truth, and of whom it is known from Scripture that the
purport of their teaching was a salutary medicine to the
whole world (‘whatever Manu said that was medicine’).
Now, as these Azshis did not see truth in the way of
Kapila, we conclude that Kapila’s view, which contradicts
Scripture, is founded on error, and cannot therefore be
used to modify the sense of the VedAnta-texts.—Here
finishes the adhikarava treating of ‘Smriti.’

3. Hereby the Yoga is refuted.

By the above refutation of Kapila’s Smriti the Yoga-
smriti also is refuted. —But a question arises, What further
doubt arises here with regard to the Yoga system, so as to
render needful the formal extension to the Yoga of the
arguments previously set forth against the SAnkhya?—It
might appear, we reply, that the Ved4nta should be sup-
ported by the Yoga-smriti, firstly, because the latter admits

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 413

the existence of a Lord; secondly, because the Vedanta-
texts mention Yoga as a means to bring about final Release;
and thirdly, because Hirazyagarbha, who proclaimed the
Yoga-smriti, is qualified for the promulgation of all Vedanta-
texts.—But these arguments refute themselves as follows.
In the first place the Yoga holds the Pradhdna, which is
independent of Brahman, to be the general material cause,
and hence the Lord acknowledged by it is a mere operative
cause. In the second place the nature of meditation, in
which Yoga consists, is determined by the nature of the
object of meditation, and as of its two objects, viz. the soul
and the Lord, the former does not have its Self in Brahman,
and the latter is neither the cause of the world nor en-
dowed with the other auspicious qualities (which belong to
Brahman), the Yoga is not of Vedic character. And as to
the third point, Hirazyagarbha himself is only an indi-
vidual soul, and hence liable to be overpowered by the
inferior guaas, i.e. passion and darkness; and hence the
Yoga-smriti is founded on error, no less than the Purdzas,
promulgated by him, which are founded on ragas and
tamas. The Yoga cannot, therefore, be used for the sup-
port of the Vedanta.—Here finishes the adhikaraza of ‘ the
refutation of the Yoga.’

4. Not, on account of the difference of character
of that ; and its being such (appears) from Scripture.

The same opponent who laid stress on the conflict
between Scripture and Smv#ti now again comes forward,
relying this time (not on Smr#ti but) on simple reasoning.
Your doctrine, he says, as to the world being an effect of
Brahman which you attempted to prove by a refutation
of the Sankhya Smriti shows itself to be irrational for
the following reason. Perception and the other means of
knowledge show this world with all its sentient and non-
sentient beings to be of a non-intelligent and impure
nature, to possess none of the qualities of the Lord, and to
have pain for its very éssence; and such a world totally
differs in nature from the Brahman, postulated by you,
which is said to be all-knowing, of supreme lordly power,

414 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

antagonistic to all evil, enjoying unbroken uniform blessed-
ness. This difference in character of the world from
Brahman is, moreover, not only known through Percep-
tion, and so on, but is seen to be directly stated in Scripture
itself ; compare ‘Knowledge and non-knowledge’ (Taitt.
Up. II, 6,1); ‘ Thus are these objects placed on the subjects,
and the subjects on the praza’ (Kau. Up. III, 9); ‘On the
same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his
own impotence’ (Svet. Up. IV, 7); ‘The soul not being
a Lord is bound because he has to enjoy ’ (Svet. Up. I, 8);
and so on; all which texts refer to the effect, i.e. the
world as being non-intelligent, of the essence of pain, and
so on. The general rule is that an effect is non-different
in character from its cause; as e.g. pots and bracelets are
non-different in character from their material causes—clay
and gold. The world cannot, therefore, be the effect of
Brahman from which it differs in character, and we hence
conclude that, in agreement with the SAankhya Smriti, the
Pradhana which resembles the actual world in character must
be assumed to be the general cause. Scripture, although
not dependent on anything else and concerned with super-
sensuous objects, must all the same come to terms with
ratiocination (tarka); for all the different means of know-
ledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a decisive
conclusion, only if they are supported by ratiocination.
For by tarka we understand that kind of knowledge
(intellectual activity) which in the case of any given matter,
by means of an investigation either into the essential
nature of that matter or into collateral (auxiliary) factors,
determines what possesses proving power, and what are the
special details of the matter under consideration : this kind
of cognitional activity is also called Oha. All means of
knowledge equally stand in need of tarka; Scripture how-
ever, the authoritative character of which specially depends
on expectancy (4kanksha), proximity (sannidhi), and com-
patibility (yogyata), throughout requires to be assisted by
tarka. Inaccordance with this Manu says, ‘ He who investi-
gates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty,
and none other.’ It is with a view to such confirmation of

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 415

the sense of Scripture by means of Reasoning that the
texts declare that certain topics such as the Self must be
‘reflected on’ (mantavya).—Now here it might possibly
be said that as Brahman is ascertained from Scripture to
be the sole cause of the world, it must be admitted that
intelligence exists in the world also, which is an effect of
Brahman. In the same way as the consciousness of an
intelligent being is not perceived when it is in the states
of deep sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligent nature of jars
and the like also is not observed, although it really exists ;
and it is this very difference of manifestation and non-
manifestation of intelligence on which the distinction of
intelligent and non-intelligent beings depends.—But to this
we reply that permanent non-perception of intelligence
proves its non-existence. This consideration also refutes
the hypothesis of things commonly called non-intelligent
possessing the power, or potentiality, of consciousness.
For if you maintain that a thing possesses the power of
producing an effect while yet that effect is never and
nowhere seen to be produced by it, you may as well pro-
claim at a meeting of sons of barren women that their
mothers possess eminent procreative power! Moreover, to
prove at first from the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the
material cause of the world, and from this that pots and
the like possess potential consciousness, and therefrom the
existence of non-manifested consciousness; and then, on
the other hand, to start from the last principle as proved
and to deduce therefrom that the Vedanta-texts prove
Brahman to be the material cause of the world, is simply
to argue in a circle; for that the relation of cause and
effect should exist between things different in character is
just what cannot be proved.— What sameness of character,
again, of causal substance and effects, have you in mind
when you maintain that from the absence of such same-
ness it follows that Brahman cannot be proved to be the
material cause of the world? It cannot be complete same-
ness of all attributes, because in that case the relation of
cause and effect (which after all requires some difference)
could not be established. For we do not observe that in

416 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

pots and jars which are fashioned out of a lump of clay
there persists the quality of ‘being a lump’ which belongs
to the causal substance. And should you say that it
suffices that there should be equality in some or any
attribute, we point out that such is actually the case with
regard to Brahman and the world, both of which have the
attribute of ‘existence’ and others. The true state of
the case rather is as follows. There is equality of nature
between an effect and a cause, in that sense that those
essential characteristics by which the causal substance
distinguishes itself from other things persist in its effects
also: those characteristic features, e.g., which distinguish
gold from clay and other materials, persist also in things
made of gold—bracelets and the like. But applying this
consideration to Brahman and the world we find that
Brahman’s essential nature is to be antagonistic to all
evil, and to consist of knowledge, bliss and power, while
the world’s essential nature is to be the opposite of all
this. Brahman cannot, therefore, be the material cause of
the world.

But, it may be objected, we observe that even things of
different essential characteristics stand to each other in the
relation of cause and effect. From man, e.g., who is a
sentient being, there spring nails, teeth, and hair, which are
non-sentient things ; the sentient scorpion springs from non-
sentient dung ; and non-sentient threads proceed from the
sentient spider—This objection, we reply, is not valid ; for
in the instances quoted the relation of cause and effect
rests on the non-sentient elements only (i.e. it is only
the non-sentient matter of the body which produces
nails, &c.).

But, a further objection is raised, Scripture itself declares
in many places that things generally held to be non-sen-
tient really possess intelligence ; compare ‘to him the earth
said’; ‘the water desired’; ‘the prazas quarrelling among
themselves as to their relative pre-eminence went to Brah-
man.’ And the writers of the Purdzas also attribute
consciousness to rivers, hills, the sea, and so on. Hence
there is after all no essential difference in nature between

11 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. 417

x

sentient and so-called non-sentient beings——To this ob-
jection the Parvapakshin replies in the next Sfatra.

5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending
(deities), on account of distinction and entering.

The word ‘but’ is meant to set aside the objection
started. In texts such as ‘to him the earth said,’ the
terms ‘earth’ and so on, denote the divinities presiding
over earth and the rest.—How is this known ?— Through
distinction and connexion.’ For earth and so on are
denoted by the distinctive term ‘divinities’; so e.g. ‘ Let
me enter into those three divinities’ (K%. Up. VI, 3, 2),
where fire, water, and earth are called divinities ; and Kau.
Up. II, 14,‘ All divinities contending with each other as
to pre-eminence, and ‘all these divinities having recognised
pre-eminence in prava.’ The ‘entering’ of the Satra refers
to Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4, ‘Agni having become speech entered
into the mouth; Aditya having become sight entered into
the eyes, &c., where the text declares that Agni and
other divine beings entered into the sense-organs as their
superintendents.

We therefore adhere to our conclusion that the world,
being non-intelligent and hence essentially different in
nature from Brahman, cannot be the effect of Brahman ;
and that therefore, in agreement with Smriti confirmed
by reasoning, the Vedanta-texts must be held to teach
that the Pradhana is the universal material cause. This
prima facie view is met by the following Satra.

6. But it is seen.

The ‘ but’ indicates the change of view (introduced in the
present Sdtra). The assertion that Brahman cannot be
the material cause of the world because the latter differs
from it in essential nature, is unfounded; since it is a matter
of observation that even things of different nature stand
to each other in the relation of cause and effect. For
it is observed that from honey and similar substances there
originate worms and other little animals——But it has been
said above that in those cases there is sameness of nature,

[48] Ee

418 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

in so far as the relation of cause and effect holds good
only between the non-intelligent elements in both!—This
assertion was indeed made, but it does not suffice to prove
that equality of character between cause and effect which
you have in view. For, being apprehensive that from the
demand of equality of character in some point or other
only it would follow that, as all things have certain
characteristics in common, anything might originate from
anything, you have declared that the equality of character
necessary for the relation of cause and effect is constituted
by the persistence, in the effect, of those characteristic
points which differentiate the cause from other things.
But it is evident that this restrictive rule does not hold
good in the case of the origination of worms and the like
from honey and so on; and hence it is not unreasonable
to assume that the world also, although differing in
character from Brahman, may originate from the latter.
For in the case of worms originating from honey, scorpions
from dung, &c., we do not observe—what indeed we do
observe in certain other cases, as of pots made of clay,
omaments made of gold—that the special characteristics
distinguishing the causal substance from other things
persist in the effects also.

7. If it be said that (the effect is) non-existing ;
we say no, there being a mere denial.

But, an objection is raised, if Brahman, the cause, differs
in nature from the effect, viz. the world, this means that
cause and effect are separate things and that hence the
effect does not exist in the cause, i.e. Brahman; and this
again implies that the world originates from what has
no existence!—Not so, we reply. For what the preceding
Sdtra has laid down is merely the denial of an absolute
rule demanding that cause and effect should be of the same
nature; it was not asserted that the effect is a thing
altogether different and separate from the cause. We by
no means abandon our tenet that Brahman the cause
modifies itself so as to assume the form of a world differing
from it in character. For such is the case with the honey

II ADHYAyA, I PADA, 8. 419

and the worms also. There is difference of characteristics,
but—as in the case of gold and golden bracelets—there is
oneness of substance.—An objection is raised.

8. On account of such consequences in reabsorp-
tion (the Veddnta-texts would be) inappropriate.

The term ‘reabsorption’ here stands as an instance of all
the states of Brahman, reabsorption, creation, and so on—
among which it is the first as appears from the texts giving
instruction about those several states ‘Being only was this
in the beginning’; ‘The Self only was this in the begin-
ning.’ If we accept the doctrine of the oneness of substance
of cause and effect, then, absorption, creation, &c. of the
world all being in Brahman, the different states of the world
would connect themselves with Brahman, and the latter
would thus be affected by all the imperfections of its
effect ; in the same way as all the attributes of the bracelet
are present in the gold also. And the undesirable conse-
quence of this would be that contradictory attributes as
predicated in different Veddnta-texts would have to be
attributed to one and the same substance; cp. ‘He who
is all-knowing’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); ‘ Free from sin, free from
old age and death’ (KA. Up. VIII, 1, 5); ‘Of him there is
known neither cause nor effect’ (Svet. Up. VI, 8); ‘Of
these two one eats the sweet fruit’ (Svet. Up. IV, 6); ‘ The
Self that is not a Lord is bound because he has to enjoy’
(Svet. Up. I, 8); ‘On account of his impotence he laments,
bewildered’ (Svet. Up. IV, 7)—Nor can we accept the
explanation that, as Brahman in its causal as well as its
effected state has all sentient and non-sentient beings for
jts body ; and as all imperfections inhere in that body only,
they do not touch Brahman in either its causal or effected
state. For it is not possible that the world and Brahman
should stand to each other in the relation of effect and
cause, and if it were possible, the imperfections due to
connexion with a body would necessarily cling to Brahman.
It is not, we say, possible that the intelligent and non-
ntelligent beings together should constitute the body of
Brahman. For a body is a particular aggregate of earth

Ee€2

420 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

and the other elements, depending for its subsistence on
vital breath with its five modifications, and serving as an
abode to the sense-organs which mediate the experiences
of pleasure and pain retributive of former works: such is
in Vedic and worldly speech the sense connected with the
term ‘body.’ But numerous Vedic texts—‘ Free from sin, |
from old age and death’ (ΚΛ. Up. VIII, 1); ‘Without
eating the other one looks on’ (Svet. Up. IV, 6); ‘Grasping
without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes,
he hears without ears’ (Svet. Up. III, 19) ; ‘Without breath,
without mind’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2)}—declare that the highest
Self is free from karman and the enjoyment of its fruits,
is not capable of enjoyment dependent on sense-organs,
and has no life dependent on breath: whence it follows that
he cannot have a body constituted by all the non-sentient
and sentient beings. Nor can either non-sentient beings
in their individual forms such as grass, trees, &c., or the
aggregate of all the elements in their subtle state be viewed
as the abode of sense-activity (without which they cannot
constitute a body); nor are the elements in their subtle
state combined into earth and the other gross elements
(which again would be required for a body). And sentient
beings which consist of mere intelligence are of course
incapable of all this, and hence even less fit to constitute
a body. Nor may it be said that to have a body merely
means to be the abode of fruition, and that Brahman may
possess a body in this latter sense; for there are abodes
of fruition, such as palaces and the like, which are not
considered to be bodies. Nor will it avail, narrowing the
last definition, to say that that only is an abode of enjoy-
ment directly abiding in which a being enjoys pain and
pleasure; for if a soul enters a body other than its own,
that body is indeed the abode in which it enjoys the pains
and pleasures due to such entering, but is not admitted
to be in the proper sense of the word the dody of the soul
thus entered. In the case of the Lord, on the other hand,
who is in the enjoyment of self-established supreme bliss,
it can in no way be maintained that he must be joined
to a body, consisting of all sentient and non-sentient

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 9. 421

beings, for the purpose of enjoyment.—That view also
according to which a ‘body’ means no more than a means
of enjoyment is refuted hereby.

You will now possibly try another definition, viz. that the
body of a being is constituted by that, the nature, subsistence
and activity of which depend on the will of that being, and
that hence a body may be ascribed to the Lord in so far as
the essential nature, subsistence, and activity of all depend
on him.—But this also is objectionable; since in the first
place it is not a fact that the nature of a body depends on
the will of the intelligent soul joined with it; since, further,
an injured body does not obey in its movements the will
of its possessor; and since the persistence of a dead body
does not depend on the soul that tenanted it. Dancing
puppets and the like, on the other hand, are things the
nature, subsistence, and motions of which depend on the
will of intelligent beings, but we do not on that account
consider them to be the bodies of those beings. As,
moreover, the nature of an eternal intelligent soul does not
depend on the will of the Lord, it cannot be its body
under the present definition.—Nor again can it be said that
the body of a being is constituted by that which is
exclusively ruled and supported by that being and stands
towards it in an exclusive subservient relation (sesha); for
this definition would include actions also. And finally
it is a fact that several texts definitely declare that the
Lord is without a body, ‘ Without hands and feet he grasps
and hastens’ &c.

As thus the relation of embodied being and body
cannot subsist between Brahman and the world, and as
if it did subsist, all the imperfections of the world would
cling to Brahman; the Vedanta-texts are wrong in teaching
that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

To this prima facie view the next Sitra replies.

9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.

The teaching of the Ved4nta-texts is not inappropriate,
since there are instances of good and bad qualities being
separate in the case of one thing connected with two

422 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

different states. The ‘but’ in the Sftra indicates the
impossibility of Brahman being connected with even
a shadow of what is evil. The meaning is as follows.
As Brahman has all sentient and non-sentient things for
its body, and constitutes the Self of that body, there
is nothing contrary to reason in Brahman being connected
with two states, a causal and an effected one, the essential
characteristics of which are expansion on the one hand
and contraction on the other; for this expansion and
contraction belong (not to Brahman itself, but) to the
sentient and non-sentient beings. The imperfections
adhering to the body do not affect Brahman, and the good
qualities belonging to the Self do not extend to the body ;
in the same way as youth, childhood, and old age, which
are attributes of embodied beings, such as gods or men,
belong to the body only, not to the embodied Self ; while
knowledge, pleasure and so on belong to the conscious Self
only, not to the body. On this understanding there is no
objection to expressions such as ‘he is born as a god or as
a man’ and ‘the same person is a child, and then a youth,
and then an old man.’ That the character of a god or man
belongs to the individual soul only in so far as it has
a body, will be shown under ITI, 1, 1.

The assertion made by the Pdrvapakshin as to the
impossibility of the world, comprising matter and souls
and being either in its subtle or its gross condition, standing
to Brahman in the relation of a body, we declare to be the
vain outcome of altogether vicious reasoning springing
from the idle fancies of persons who have never fully
considered the meaning of the whole body of Vedanta-
texts as supported by legitimate argumentation. For as
a matter of fact all Ved4nta-texts distinctly declare that
the entire world, subtle or gross, material or spiritual,
stands to the highest Self in the relation of a body. Compare
e.g. the antary4min-brahmama, in the K4zva as well as the
MAdhyandina-text, where it is said first of non-sentient
things (‘he who dwells within the earth, whose body the
earth is’ &c.), and afterwards separately of the intelligent
soul (‘he who dwells in understanding,’ according to the

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 9. 423

Ka4avas ; ‘he who dwells within the Self; according to the
MAdhyandinas) that they constitute the body of the highest
Self. Similarly the Subéla-Upanishad declares that matter
and souls in all their states constitute the body of the
highest Self (‘He who dwells within the earth’ &c.), and
concludes by saying that that Self is the soul of all those
beings (‘ He is the inner Self of all’ &c.). Similarly Smriti,
‘The whole world is thy body’; ‘ Water is the body of
Vishzu’; ‘ All this is the body of Hari’; ‘All these things
are his body’; ‘He having reflected sent forth from his
body ’—where the ‘body’ means the elements in their
subtle state. In ordinary language the word ‘body’ is not,
like words such as jar, limited in its denotation to things
of one definite make or character, but is observed to be
applied directly (not only secondarily or metaphorically) to
things of altogether different make and characteristics—such
as worms, insects, moths, snakes, men, four-footed animals,
and so on. We must therefore aim at giving a definition
of the word that is in agreement with general use. The
definitions given by the Pdrvapakshin—‘a body is that
which causes the enjoyment of the fruit of actions’ &c.—
do not fulfil this requirement ; for they do not take in such
things as earth and the like which the texts declare to be
the body of the Lord. And further they do not take in
those bodily forms which the Lord assumes according to
his wish, nor the bodily forms released souls may assume,
according to ‘He is one’ &c. (KA. Up. VII, 26, 2); for
none of those embodiments subserve the fruition of the
results of actions. And further, the bodily forms which
the Supreme Person assumes at wish are not special
combinations of earth and the other elements; for Smriti
says, ‘The body of that highest Self is not made from
a combination of the elements.’ It thus appears that
it is also too narrow a definition to say that a body is
a combination of the different elements. Again, to say
that a body is that, the life of which depends on the vital
breath with its five modifications is also too narrow, viz.
in respect of plants; for although vital air is present in
plants, it does not in them support the body by appearing

424 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

in five special forms. Nor again does it answer to define
a body as either the abode of the sense-organs or as the
cause of pleasure and pain; for neither of these definitions
takes in the bodies of stone or wood which were bestowed on
Ahalya and other persons in accordance with their deeds.
We are thus led to adopt the following definition—Any
substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely
controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which
stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the
body of that soul. In the case of bodies injured, paralysed,
&c., control and so on are not actually perceived because
the power of control, although existing, is obstructed ; in
the same way as, owing to some obstruction, the powers
of fire, heat, and so on may not be actually perceived.
A dead body again begins to decay at the very moment
in which the soul departs from it, and is actually dissolved
shortly after; it (thus strictly speaking is not a body at all
but) is spoken of as a body because it is a part of the
aggregate of matter which previously constituted a body.
In this sense, then, all sentient and non-sentient beings
together constitute the body of the Supreme Person, for
they are completely controlled and supported by him for his
own ends, and are absolutely subordinate to him. Texts
which speak of the highest Self as ‘ bodiless among bodies’
(e.g. Ka. Up. I, 2, 22), only mean to deny of the Self
a body due to karman; for as we have seen, Scripture
declares that the Universe zs his body. This point will be
fully established in subsequent adhikarazas also. The two
preceding Sdtras (8 and 9g) merely suggest the matter
proved in the adhikaraza beginning with II, 1, a1.

10. And on account of the objections to his view.

The theory of Brahman being the universal cause has
to be accepted not only because it is itself free from
objections, but also because the pradh4na theory is open
to objections, and hence must be abandoned. For on this
latter theory the origination of the world cannot be
accounted for. The Sanikhyas hold that owing to the
soul's approximation to Prakréti the attributes of the latter

Il ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 12. 425

are fictitiously superimposed upon the soul which in itself
consists entirely of pure intelligence free from all change,
and that thereon depends the origination of the empirical
world. Now here we must raise the question as to the
nature of that approximation or nearness of Prakriti
which causes the superimposition on the changeless soul
of the attributes of Prakriti. Does that nearness mean
merely the existence of Prakriti or some change in
Prakréti? or does it mean some change in the soul ?—
Not the latter; for the soul is assumed to be incapable
of change.—Nor again a change in Prakriti; for changes
in Prakriti are supposed, in the system, to be the effects
of superimposition, and cannot therefore be its cause.
And if, finally, the nearness of Prakriti means no more
than its existence, it follows that even the released soul
would be liable to that superimposition (for Prakriti exists
always).—The Sankhya is thus unable to give a rational
account of the origination of the world. This same point
will be treated of fully in connexion with the special
refutation of the Sankhya theory. (II, 2, 6.)

11. Also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of
reasoning.

The theory, resting on Scripture, of Brahman being the
universal cause must be accepted, and the theory of the
Pradhéna must be abandoned, because all (mere) reasoning
is ill-founded. This latter point is proved by the fact that
the arguments set forth by Buddha, Kaz4da, Akshapada,
Gina, Kapila and Pata#gali respectively are all mutually
contradictory.

12. Should it be said that inference is to be
carried on in a different way; (we reply that) thus
also it follows that (the objection raised) is not got
rid of.

Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments
actually set forth by Buddha and others may have to be
considered as invalid, but all the same we may arrive at the
Pradhana theory through other lines of reasoning by which

426 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

the objections raised against the theory are refuted.—But,
we reply, this also is of no avail. A theory which rests
exclusively on arguments derived from human reason
may, at some other time or place, be disestablished by
arguments devised by people more skilful than you in
reasoning ; and thus there is no getting over the objection
founded on the invalidity of all mere argumentation. The
conclusion from all this is that, with regard to super-
sensuous matters, Scripture alone is authoritative, and
that reasoning is to be applied only to the support of
Scripture. In agreement herewith Manu says, ‘He who
supports the teaching of the Rishis and the doctrine as
to sacred duty with arguments not conflicting with the
Veda, he alone truly knows sacred duty’ (Manu XII,
106). The teaching of the Saénkhyas which conflicts
with the Veda cannot therefore be used for the pur-
pose of confirming and elucidating the meaning of the
Veda.—Here finishes the section treating of ‘ difference of
nature.’

13. Thereby also the remaining (theories) which
are not comprised (within the Veda) are explained.

Not comprised means those theories which are not
known to be comprised within (countenanced by) the
Veda. The Sdtra means to say that by the demolition
given above of the Sankhya doctrine which is not
comprised within the Veda the remaining theories which
are in the same position, viz. the theories of Kanada,
Akshap4da, Gina, and Buddha, must likewise be considered
as demolished.

Here, however, a new objection may be raised, on the
ground namely that, since all these theories agree in the
view of atoms constituting the general cause, it cannot
be said that their reasoning as to the causal substance
is ill-founded—They indeed, we reply, are agreed to
that extent, but they are all of them equally founded on
Reasoning only, and they are seen to disagree in many
ways as to the nature of the atoms which by different
schools are held to be either fundamentally void or non-

1 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 14. 427

void, having either a merely cognitional or an objective
existence, being either momentary or permanent, either
of a definite nature or the reverse, either real or unreal, &c.
This disagreement proves all those theories to be ill-
founded, and the objection is thus disposed of.—Here
finishes the section of ‘the remaining (theories) non-
comprised (within the Veda).’

14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming
an enjoyer, there follows non-distinction (of Brahman
and the individual soul) ; we reply—it may be as in
ordinary life.

The Sankhya here comes forward with a new objection.
You maintain, he says, that the highest Brahman has the
character either of a cause or an effect according as it has
for its body sentient and non-sentient beings in either
their subtle or gross state; and that this explains the
difference in nature between the individual soul and
Brahman. .But such difference is not possible, since
Brahman, if embodied, at once becomes an enjoying subject
(just like the individual soul). For if, possessing a body,
the Lord necessarily experiences all pain and pleasure
due to embodiedness, no less than the individual soul
does.—But we have, under I, 2, 8, refuted the view of the
Lord’s being liable to experiences of pleasure and pain !—
By no means! There you have shown only that the Lord’s
abiding within the heart of a creature so as to constitute
the object of its devotion does not imply fruition on his
part of pleasure and pain. Now, however, you maintain
that the Lord is embodied just like an individual soul,
and the unavoidable inference from this is that, like that
soul, he undergoes pleasurable and painful experiences.
For we observe that embodied souls, although not capable
of participating in the changing states of the body such
as childhood, old age, &c., yet experience pleasures and
pains caused by the normal or abnormal condition of the
matter constituting the body. In agreement with this
Scripture says, ‘As long as he possesses a body there is
for him no escape from pleasure and pain; but when he

428 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

is free of the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches
him’ (AKA. Up. VIII, 12, 1). As thus, the theory of an
embodied Brahman constituting the universal cause does
not allow of a distinction in nature between the Lord and
the individual soul; and as, further, the theory of a mere
Brahman (i.e. an absolutely homogeneous Brahman) leads
to the conclusion that Brahman is the abode of all the
imperfections attaching to the world, in the same way as

a lump of clay or gold participates in the imperfections
᾿ς of the thing fashioned out of it; we maintain that the
theory of the Pradh4ana being the general cause is the
more valid one.

To this objection the Sdtra replies in the words, ‘it
may be, as in ordinary life.’ The desired distinction in
nature between the Lord and the individual soul may
exist all the same. That a soul experiences pleasures
and pains caused by the various states of the body
is not due to the fact of its being joined to a body, but
to its karman in the form of good and evil deeds. The
scriptural text also which you quote refers to that body
only which is originated by karman; for other texts (‘He
is onefold, he is threefold’; ‘If he desires the world of
the Fathers’; ‘He moves about there eating, playing,
rejoicing’; KA. Up. VII, 26, 2; VIII, 2,1; 12, 3) show
that the person who has freed himself from the bondage
of karman and become manifest in his true nature is not
touched by a shadow of evil while all the same he has
a body. The highest Self, which is essentially free from
all evil, thus has the entire world in its gross and its
subtle form for its body; but being in no way connected
with karman it is all the less connected with evil of any
kind.—‘ As in ordinary life.’ We observe in ordinary life
that while those who either observe or transgress the
ordinances of a ruler experience pleasure or pain according
as the ruler shows them favour or restrains them, it does
not follow from the mere fact of the ruler’s having a body
that he himself also experiences the pleasure and pain
due to the observance or transgression of his commands.
The author of the Dramida-bhashya gives expression to

11 ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 14. 429

the same view, ‘As in ordinary life a prince, although
staying in a very unpleasant place infested with mosquitoes
and full of discomforts of all kind is yet not touched by
all these troubles, his body being constantly refreshed by
fans and other means of comfort, rules the countries for
which he cares and continues to enjoy all possible
pleasures, such as fragrant odours and the like; so the
Lord of creation, to whom his power serves as an ever-
moving fan as it were, is not touched by the evils of that
creation, but rules the world of Brahman and the other
worlds for which he cares, and continues to enjoy all
possible delights.’ That the nature of Brahman should
undergo changes like a lump of clay or gold we do not
admit, since many texts declare Brahman to be free from
all change and imperfection.—Others give a different
explanation of this Sdtra. According to them it refutes
the pdrvapaksha that on the view of Brahman being the
general cause the distinction of enjoying subjects and
objects of enjoyment cannot be accounted for—proving
the possibility of such distinction by means of the
analogous instance of the sea and its waves and flakes
of foam. But this interpretation is inappropriate, since
for those who hold that creation proceeds from Brahman
connected with some power or Nescience or a limiting
adjunct (upadhi) no such prima facie view can arise. For
on their theory the enjoying subject is that which is
conditioned by the power or Nescience or up4dhi inhering
in the causal substance, and the power or Nescience or
upadhi is the object of enjoyment ; and as the two are of
different nature, they cannot pass over into each other.
The view of Brahman itself undergoing an essential change
(on which that prima facie view might possibly be held to
arise) is not admitted by those philosophers ; for Sdtra II,
i, 35 teaches that the individual souls and their deeds form
a stream which has no beginning (so that the distinction
of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment is eternal).
But even if it be held that Brahman itself undergoes
a change, the doubt as to the non-distinction of subjects
and objects of enjoyment does not arise ; for the distinction

430 ᾿ς vepAnTa-sOTRAS.

of the two groups will, on that view, be analogous to that
of jars and platters which are modifications of the one
substance clay, or to that of bracelets and crowns fashioned
out of the one substance gold. And on the view of
Brahman itself undergoing a change there arises a further
difficulty, viz. in so far as Brahman (which is nothing but
pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to transform
itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient) objects
of enjoyment.

15. The non-difference (of the world) from that
(viz. Brahman) follows from what begins with the
word 4rambhana.

Under II, 1, 7 and other Sitras the non-difference of the
effect, i.e. the world from the cause, i.e. Brahman was
assumed, and it was on this basis that the proof of Brahman
being the cause of the world proceeded. The present
Sdtra now raises a prima facie objection against that very
non-difference, and then proceeds to refute it.

On the point in question the school of Kaz4da argues as
follows. It is in no way possible that the effect should be
non-different from the cause. For cause and effect are the
objects of different ideas: the ideas which have for their
respective objects threads and a piece of cloth, or a lump
of clay and a jar, are distinctly not of one and the same
kind. The difference of words supplies a second argument ;
nobody applies to mere threads the word ‘ piece of cloth,’
or vice versd. A third argument rests on the difference of
effects: water is not fetched from the well in a lump of
clay, nor isa well built with jars. There, fourthly, is the
difference of time; the cause is prior in time, the effect
posterior. There is, fifthly, the difference of form: the
cause has the shape of a lump, the effect (the jar) is shaped
like a belly with a broad basis; clay in the latter condition
only is meant when we say ‘ The jar has gone to pieces.’
There, sixthly, is a numerical difference: the threads are
many, the piece of cloth is one only. In the seventh place,
there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing
agent (which would result from cause and effect being

II ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 15. 431

identical); for if the effect were nothing but the cause,
what could be effected by the activity of the agent ?—Let
us then say that, although the effect exists (at all times), the
activity of the agent must be postulated as helpful towards
the effect.—But in that case the activity of the agent would
have to be assumed as taking place perpetually, and as
hence everything would exist always, there would be no
distinction between eternal and non-eternal things !—Let
us then say that the effect, although always existing, is
at first non-manifest and then is manifested through the
activity of the agent; in this way that activity will not be
purposeless, and there will be a distinction between eternal
and non-eternal things !—This view also is untenable. For
if that manifestation requires another manifestation (to
account for it) we are driven into a regressus in infinitum.
If, on the other hand, it is independent of another manifesta-
tion (and hence eternal), it follows that the effect also is
eternally perceived. And if, as a third alternative, the
manifestation is said to originate, we lapse into the asat-
karyavada (according to which the effect does not exist
before its origination). Moreover, if the activity of the
agent serves to manifest the effect, it follows that the
activity devoted to a jar will manifest also waterpots and
similar things. For things which admittedly possess mani-
festing power, such as lamps and the like, are not observed
to be restricted to particular objects to be manifested by
them: we do not see that a lamp lit for showing a jar does
not at the same time manifest waterpots and other things.
All this proves that the activity of the agent has a purpose
in so far only as it is the cause of the origination of an
effect which previously did ποΐ exist ; and thus the theory
of the previous existence of the effect cannot be upheld.
Nor does the fact of definite causes having to be employed
(in order to produce definite effects; clay e.g. to produce
a jar) prove that that only which already exists can become
an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the
hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (de-
termining the definite effect which will result from the
cause).

432 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

But, an objection is raised, he also who holds the theory
of the previous non-existence of the effect, can really do
nothing with the activity of the agent. For as, on his
view, the effect has no existence before it is originated, the
activity of the agent must be supposed to operate elsewhere
than on the effect ; and as this ‘elsewhere’ comprises with-
out distinction all other things, it follows that the agent’s
activity with reference to threads may give rise to water-
pots also (not only to cloth).—Not so, the Vaiseshika
replies. Activity applied to a certain cause gives rise to
those effects only the potentiality of which inheres in that
cause.

Now, against all this, the following objection is raised.
The effect is non-different from the cause. For in reality
there is no such thing as an effect different from the
cause, since all effects, and all empirical thought and
speech about effects, are based on Nescience. Apart from
the causal substance, clay, which is seen to be present
in effected things such as jars, the so-called effect, i.e. the
jar or pot, rests altogether on Nescience. All effected
things whatever, such as jars, waterpots, &c., viewed as
different from their causal substance, viz. clay, which is
perceived to exist in these its effects, rest merely on em-
pirical thought and speech, and are fundamentally false,
unreal ; while the causal substance, i.e. clay, alone is real.
In the same way the entire world in so far as viewed apart
from its cause, i.e. Brahman which is nothing but pure
non-differenced Being, rests exclusively on the empirical
assumption of Egoity and so on, and is false; while reality
belongs to the causal Brahman which is mere Being. It
follows that there is no such thing as an effect apart from
its cause; the effect in fact is identical with the cause.
Nor must you object to our theory on the ground that the
corroborative instance of the silver erroneously imagined in
the shell is inappropriate because the non-reality of such
effected things as jars is by no means well proved while the
non-reality of the shell-silver is so proved; for as a matter.
of fact it ἐς determined by reasoning that it is the causal
substance of jars, viz. clay, only that is real while the

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 15. 433

reality of everything apart from clay is disproved by
reasoning. And if you ask whereupon that reasoning rests,
we reply—on the fact that the clay only is continuous,
permanent, while everything different from it is discon-
tinuous, non-permanent. For just, as in the case of the
snake-rope we observe that the continuously existing rope
only —which forms the substrate of the imagined snake—is
real, while the snake or cleft in the ground, which is non-
continuous, is unreal; so we conclude that it is the per-
manently enduring clay-material only which is real, while
the non-continuous effects, such as jars and pots, are unreal.
And, further, since what is real, i.e. the Self, does not perish,
and what is altogether unreal, as e.g. the horn of a hare, is
not perceived, we conclude that an effected thing, which on
the one hand is perceived and on the other is liable to
destruction, must be viewed as something to be defined
neither as that which is nor as that which is not. And
what is thus undefinable, is false, no less than the silver
imagined in the shell, the anirvakaniyatva of which is
proved by perception and sublation (see above, p. 102 ff.).—
We further ask, ‘Is a causal substance, such as clay, when
producing its effect, in a non-modified state, or has it
passed over into some special modified condition?’ The
former alternative cannot be allowed, because thence it
would follow that the cause originates effects at all times ;
and the latter must equally be rejected, because the passing
over of the cause into a special state would oblige us to
postulate a previous passing over into a different state (to
account for the latter passing over) and again a previous
one, &c., so that a regressus in infinitum would result.—
Let it then be said that the causal substance when giving
rise to the effect is indeed unchanged, but connected with
a special operative cause, time and place (this connexion
accounting for the origination of the effect).—But this also
we cannot allow; for such connexion would be with the
causal substance either as unchanged or as having entered
on a changed condition; and thus the difficulties stated
above would arise again.—Nor may you say that the
origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk from clay,

[48] Ff

434 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

gold, and milk respectively is actually perceived ; that this
perception is not sublated with regard to time and place—
while, on the other hand, the perception of silver in
the shell is so sublated—and that hence all those who
trust perception must necessarily admit that the effect does
originate from the cause. For this argumentation does not
stand the test of being set forth in definite alternatives.
Does the mere gold, &c., by itself originate the svastika-
ornament? or is it the gold coins (used for making orna-
ments) which originate? or is it the gold, as forming the
substrate of the coins}? The mere gold, in the first place,
cannot be originative as there exists no effect different from
the gold (to which the originative activity could apply
itself); and a thing cannot possibly display originative
activity with regard to itself—But, an objection is raised,
the svastikasornament is perceived as different from the
gold !—It is not, we reply, different from the gold ; for the
gold is recognised in it, and no other thing but gold is per-
ceived.—But the existence of another thing is proved by the
fact of there being a different idea, a different word, and so
on!—By no means, we reply. Other ideas, words, and so
on, which have reference to an altogether undefined thing
are founded on error, no less than the idea of, and the word
denoting, shell-silver, and hence have no power of proving
the existence of another thing. Nor, in the second place, is
the gold coin originative of the svastika-ornament ; for we
do not perceive the coin in the svastika, as we do perceive
the threads in the cloth. Nor, in the third place, is the
effect originated by the gold in so far as being the substrate
of the coin ; for the gold in so far as forming the substrate
of the coin is not perceived in the svastika. As it thus
appears that all effects viewed apart from theif causal

1 In other words — is the golden ornament originated by the
mere formless substance, gold} or by the form belonging to that
special piece of gold (a coin, a bar, &c.), out of which the orna-
ment is fashioned ; or by the substance, gold, in so far as possessing
that special form? The rugaka of the text has to be taken in the
sense of nishka.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I5. 435

substances are unreal, we arrive at the conclusion that the
entire world, viewed apart from Brahman, is also something
unreal ; for it also is an effect.

In order to facilitate the understanding of the truth that
eyerything apart from Brahman is false, we have so far
reasoned on the assumption of things suclt as clay, gold, &c.,
being real, and have thereby proved the non-reality of all
effects. In truth, however, all special causal substances
are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments
are; for they are all of them equally effects of Brahman.

‘In that all this has its Self; it is the True’ (KA. Up.
VI, 8, 7); ‘There is here no plurality; from death to
death goes he who sees here plurality as it were’ (Brz. Up.
IV, 4, 19); ‘For where there is duality as it were, there one
sees another; but when for him the Self only has become
all, whereby then should he see and whom should he see?’
(Brz. Up. II, 4,13); ‘Indra goes manifold by means of his
mayas’ (Brt. Up. II, 5, 19) ;-~these and other similar texts
teach that whatever is different from Brahman is false. Nor
must it be imagined that the truth intimated by Scripture
can be in conflict with Perception ; for in the way set forth
above we prove that all effects are false, and moreover
Perception really has for its object pure Being only (cp.
above, p. 30). And if there is a conflict between the
two, superior force belongs to Scripture, to which no
imperfection can be attributed; which occupies a final
position among the means of knowledge; and which,
although dependent on Perception, and so on, for the
apprehension of the form and meaning of words, yet is in-
dependent as far as proving power is concerned. Hence it
follows that everything different from Brahman, the general
cause, is unreal.

Nor must this conclusion be objected to on the ground
that from the falsity of the world it follows that the
individual souls also are non-real. For it is Brahman
itself which constitutes the individual souls: Brahman
alone takes upon itself the condition of individual soul
‘in all living bodies ; as we know from many texts: ‘ Having
entered into them with this living Self’ (Κλ. Up. VI, 3);

Ff2

436 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

‘The one god hidden within all beings’ (Svet. Up. VI, 11);
‘ The one god entered in many places’ ; ‘ That Self hidden
in all beings does not shine forth’ (Ka. Up. I, 3,12); ‘ There
is no other seer but he’ (Brz. Up. III, 3, 23); and others.—
But if you maintain that the one Brahman constitutes the
soul in all living bodies, it follows that any particular pain
or pleasure should affect the consciousness of all embodied
beings, just as an agreeable sensation affecting the foot
gives rise to a feeling of pleasure in the head; and that
there would be no distinction of individual soul and Lord,
released souls and souls in bondage, pupils and teachers,
men wise and ignorant, and so on.

Now, in reply to this, some of those who hold the
non-duality of Brahman give the following explanation.
The many individual souls are the reflections of the one
Brahman, and their states of pain, pleasure, and so on,
remain distinct owing to the different limiting adjuncts
(on which the existence of each individual soul as such
depends), in the same way as the many reflected images
of one and the same face in mirrors, crystals, sword-blades,
&c., remain distinct owing to their limiting adjuncts (viz.
mirrors, &c.); one image being small, another large, one
being bright, another dim, and so on.—But you have said
that scriptural texts such as ‘Having entered with this
living Self’ show that the souls are not different from
Brahman !—They are indeed not different in reality, but
we maintain their distinction on the basis of an imagined
difference.—To whom then does that imagination belong?
Not to Brahman surely whose nature, consisting of pure
intelligence, allows no room for imagination of any kind!
Nor also to the individual souls; for this would imply
a faulty mutual dependence, the existence of the soul
depending on imagination and that imagination residing
in the soul !—Not so, the advaita-v4din replies. Nescience
(wrong imagination) and the existence of the souls form
an endless retrogressive chain; their relation is like that
of the seed and the sprout. Moreover, mutual dependence
and the like, which are held to constitute defects in the
case of real things, are unable to disestablish Nescience,

11 ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 15. 437

the very nature of which consists in being that which
cannot rationally be established, and which hence may be
compared to somebody’s swallowing a whole palace and the
like (as seen in a dream or under the influence of a magical
illusion). In reality the individual souls are non-different
from Brahman, and hence essentially free from all impurity;
but as they are liable to impurity caused by their limiting
adjuncts—in the same way as'the face reflected in a mirror
is liable to be dimmed by the dimness of the mirror—
they may be the abodes of Nescience,and hence may be
viewed as the figments of wrong imagination. Like the
dimness of the reflected face, the imperfection adhering to
the soul is a mere error; for otherwise it would follow
that the soul can never obtain release. And as this error
of the souls has proceeded from all etemity, the question
as to its cause is not to be raised.

This, we reply, is the view of teachers who have no
insight into the true nature of aduality, and are prompted
by the wish of capturing the admiration and applause of
those who believe in the doctrine of duality. For if, as
a first alternative, you should maintain that the abode
of Nescience is constituted by the soul in its essential,
not fictitiously imagined, form ; this means that Brahman
itself is the abode of Nescience. If, in the second
place, you should say that the abode of Nescience is the
soul, viewed as different from Brahman and fictitiously
imagined in it, this would mean that the Non-intelligent
(gada) is the abode of Nescience. For those who hold
the view of Non-duality do not acknowledge a third
aspect different from these two (i.e. from Brahman which
is pure intelligence, and the Non-intelligent fictitiously
superimposed on Brahman). And if,as a third alternative,
it be maintained that the abode of Nescience is the soul
in its essential nature, this nature being however qualified
by the fictitiously imagined aspect ; we must negative this
also, since that which has an absolutely homogeneous
nature cannot in any way be shown to be qualified, apart
from Nescience. The soul is qualified in so far only as
it is the abode of Nescience, and you therefore define

438 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

nothing.—Moreover, the theory of Nescience abiding
within the individual soul is resorted to for the purpose
of establishing a basis for the distinction of bondage and
release, but it really is quite unable to effect this. For
if by Release be understood the destruction of Nescience,
it follows that when one soul attains Release and Nescience
is thus destroyed, the other souls also will be released.—
But Nescience persists because other souls are not re-
leased !—Well then the one soul also is not released since
Nescience is not destroyed!—But we assume a different
Nescience for each soul; that soul whose Nescience is
destroyed will be released, and that whose Nescience is
not destroyed will remain in Bondage!—You now argue
on the assumption of a special avidy4 for each soul. But
what about the distinction of souls implied therein? Is
that distinction essential to the nature of the soul, or is
it the figment of Nescience? The former alternative is
excluded, as it is admitted that the soul essentially is pure,
non-differenced intelligence; and because on that alter-
native the assumption of avidy4 to account for the
distinction of souls would be purposeless. On the latter
alternative two subordinate alternatives arise—Does this
avidya which gives rise to the fictitious distinction of souls
belong to Brahman? or to the individual souls?—If you
say ‘to Brahman,’ your view coincides with mine.—Well
then, ‘to the souls’!—But have you then quite forgotten
that Nescience is assumed for the purpose of accounting
for the distinction of souls?—Let us then view the matter
as follows—those several avidy4s which are assumed for
the purpose of establishing the distinction of souls bound
and released, to those same avidyds the distinction of
souls is due-——But here you reason in a manifest circle:
the avidy4s are established on the basis of the distinction
of souls, and the distinction of souls is established when
the avidyds are established. Nor does the argument of
the seed and sprout apply to the present question. For
in the case of seeds and plants each several seed gives
rise to a different plant ; while in the case under discussion
you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing the

II ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 15. 439

several avidyds on the basis of the very souls which are
assumed to be due to those avidy4s. And if you attempt
to give to the argument a somewhat different turn, by
maintaining that it is the avidy4s abiding in the earlier
souls which fictitiously give rise to the later souls, we
point out that this implies the souls being short-lived
only, and moreover that each soul would have to take
upon itself the consequences of deeds not its own and
escape the consequences of its own deeds. The same
reasoning disposes of the hypothesis that it is Brahman
which effects the fictitious existence of the subsequent
souls by means of the avidy4s abiding within the earlier
souls. And if there is assumed a beginningless flow of
avidyas, it follows that there is also a beginningless flow
of the condition of the souls dependent on those avidyds,
and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which
is supposed to hold good up to the moment of Release
could thus not be established. Concerning your assertion
that, as Nescience is something unreal and hence altogether
unproved, it is not disestablished by such defects as mutual
dependence which touch real things only ; we remark that
in that case Nescience would cling even to released souls
and the highest Brahman itself—But impure Nescience
cannot cling to what has for its essence pure cognition !—
Is Nescience then to be dealt with by rational arguments?
If so, it will follow that, on account of the arguments set
forth (mutual dependence, and so on), it likewise does not
cling to the individual souls. We further put the following
question—When the Nescience abiding in the individual
soul passes away, owing to, the rise of the knowledge of
truth, does then the soul also perish or does it not perish ?
In the former case Release is nothing else but destruction
of the essential nature of the soul; in the latter case the
soul does not attain Release even on the destruction of
Nescience, since it continues to exist as soul different
from Brahman.—You have further maintained that the
distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c., admits of
being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or
clearness, and so on, of the different images of a face as

440 . VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

seen reflected in mirrors, crystals, sword-blades and the
like. But here the following point requires consideration.
On what occasion do the smallness, dimness and other
imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts (i.e. the mirrors,
&c.) pass away ?—When the mirrors and other limiting
adjuncts themselves pass away !—Does then, we ask, the
reflected image which is the substrate of those imperfections
persist or not? If you say that it persists, then by analogy
the individual soul also must be assumed to persist, and
from this it follows that it does not attain Release. And
if the reflected image is held to perish together with its
imperfections, by analogy the soul also will perish and
then Release will be nothing but annihilation.—Consider
the following point also. The destruction of a non-
advantageous (apurushartha) defect is of advantage to
him who is conscious of that disadvantage. Is it then, we
ask, in the given case Brahman—which corresponds to the
thing reflected—that is conscious of the imperfections due
to the limiting adjuncts? or is it the soul which corresponds
to the reflected image? or is it something else? On the
two former alternatives it appears that the comparison
(between Brahman and the soul on the one hand, and the
thing reflected and the reflection on the other—on which
comparison your whole theory is founded) does not hold
good; for neither the face nor the reflection of the face
is conscious of the imperfections due to the adjuncts ;
for neither of the two is a being capable of conscious-
ness. And, moreover, Brahman’s being conscious of imper-
fections would imply its being the abode of Nescience.
And the third alternative, again, is impossible, since there
is no other knowing subject dz¢ Brahman and the soul._—
It would, moreover, be necessary to define who is the
imaginatively shaping agent (kalpaka) with regard to the
soul as formed from Nescience. It cannot be Nescience
itself, because Nescience is not an intelligent principle.
Nor can it be the soul, because this would imply the
defect of what has to be proved being presupposed for
the purposes of the proof; and because the existence of
the soul is that which ἐς formed by Nescience, just as

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I5. 441

shell-silver is. And if, finally, you should say that
Brahman is the fictitiously forming agent, we have again
arrived at a Brahman that is the abode of Nescience.—
If Brahman is not allowed to be the abode of Nescience,
we further must ask whether Brahman sees (is conscious
of) the individual souls or not. If not, it is not possible
that Brahman should give rise to this manifold creation
which, as Scripture declares, is preceded by ‘seeing’ on
his part, and to the differentiation of names and forms.
If, on the other hand, Brahman which is of an absolutely
homogeneous nature sees the souls, it cannot do so without
Nescience; and thus we are again led to the view of
Nescience abiding in Brahman.

For similar reasons the theory of the distinction of
Μᾶγᾶ and Nescience must also be abandoned. For even
if Brahman possesses May, i.e. illusive power, it cannot,
without Nescience, be conscious of souls. And without
being conscious of others the lord of Maya is unable to
delude them by his M4ya; and M4yéd herself cannot bring
about the consciousness of others on the part of its Lord,
for it is a mere means to delude others, after they have (by
other means) become objects of consciousness.— Perhaps
you will say that the May4 of Brahman causes him to be
conscious of souls, and at the same time is the cause of
those souls’ delusion. But if MAay4 causes Brahman—which
is nothing but self-illuminated intelligence, absolutely
homogeneous and free from all foreign elements—to become
conscious of other beings, then Mayé is nothing but another
name for Nescience.—Let it then be said that Nescience is
the cause of the cognition of what is contrary to truth ;
such being the case, Maya which presents all false things
different from Brahman as false, and thus is not the cause
of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, is zo¢ avidy4.—
But this is inadmissible ; for, when the oneness of the moon
is known, that which causes the idea of the moon being
double can be nothing else but avidy4. Moreover, if
Brahman recognises all beings apart from himself as false,
he does not delude them; for surely none but a madman
would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal !-—

442 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Let us then define avidy4 as the cause of a disadvantageous
cognition of unreal things. Maya then, as not being the
cause of such a disadvantageous cognition on Brahman’s
part, cannot be of the nature of avidya!—But this also is
inadmissible ; for although the idea of the moon being
double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not dis-
advantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidy4;
and if, on the other hand, Maya which aims at dispelling
that idea (in so far as it presents the image and idea of one
moon) did not present what is of disadvantage, it would
not be something to be destroyed, and hence would be
permanently connected with Brahman’s nature.—Well, if it
were so, what harm would there be ?>—The harm would be
that such a view implies the theory of duality, and hence
would be in conflict with the texts inculcating non-
duality such as ‘ For where there is duality as it were, &c. ;
but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby
then should he see, and whom should he see ?’—But those
texts set forth the Real; M4yA on the other hand is non-
real, and hence the view of its permanency is not in real
conflict with the texts !—Brahman, we reply, has for its
essential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be con-
scious of, or affected with, unreal MAya, without avidya.
Of what use, we further ask, should an eternal non-real
MAya be to Brahman ?—Brahman by means of it deludes
the individual souls!—But of what use should such delusion
be to Brahman ?—It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or
play !—But of what use is play to a being whose nature is
unlimited bliss? —Do we not then see in ordinary life also
that persons in the enjoyment of full happiness and pros-
perity indulge all the same in play ?—The cases are not
parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right
mind would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by
means of implements unreal and known by them to be
unreal, and in the consciousness, itself, unreal of such a play!
—tThe arguments set forth previously also prove the im-
possibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul
considered as the abode of avidy4, apart from Brahman
considered as the abode of Maya.

Il ADHYAYA, I PADA, 15. 443

We thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold
the non-duality of Brahman must also admit that it is
Brahman alone which is affected with beginningless avidy4,
and owing to this avidy4 is conscious of plurality within
itself. Nor must it be urged against him who holds this
view of avidy4 belonging to Brahman that he is unable to
account for the distinction of bondage and release, for
as there is only the one Brahman affected with Nescience
and to be released by the cessation of that Nescience, the
distinction of souls bound and released, &c., has no true
existence : the empirical distinction of souls bound and re-
leased, of teachers and pupils, &c. is a merely fictitious one,
and all such fiction can be explained by means of the avidy4
of one intelligent being. The case is analogous to that of
a person dreaming: the teachers and pupils and all the
other persons and things he may see in his dream are
fictitiously shaped out of the avidyA of the one dreaming
subject. For the same reason there is no valid foundation
for the assumption of many avidyas. For those also who
hold that avidya belongs to the individual souls do not
maintain that the distinction of bondage and release, of
one’s own self and other persons, is real ; and if it is unreal
it can be accounted for by the avidyA of one subject. This
admits of being stated in various technical ways—The
distinctions of bondage and of one’s own self and other
persons are fictitiously shaped by one’s own avidya ; for
they are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming
person.—Other bodies also have a Self through me only ;
for they are bodies like this my body.—Other bodies also
are fictitiously shaped by my avidyA; for they are bodies
or effects, or non-intelligent or fictitious creations, as this
my body is.—The whole class of intelligent subjects is
nothing but me; for they are of intelligent nature ; what is
not me is seen to be of non-intelligent nature ; as e. g. jars.
—It thus follows that the distinctions of one’s own self
and other persons, of souls bound and released, of pupils
and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by the avidya
of one intelligent subject.

The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not

444 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

able to account for the distinction of souls bound and
released. For as there is an infinity of past aeons, it follows
that, even if one soul only should attain release in each aeon,
all souls would by this time have attained release; the actual
existence of non-released souls cannot thus be rationally
accounted for.—But the souls are ‘infinite’; this accounts
for there being souls not yet released !—What, pray, do
you understand by this ‘infinity’ of souls? Does it mean
that they cannot be counted? This we cannot allow, for
although a being of limited knowledge may not be able to
count them, owing to their large number, the all-knowing
Lord surely can count them ; if he could not do so it
would follow that he is not all-knowing.—But the souls are
really numberless, and the Lord’s not knowing a definite
number which does not exist does not prove that he is
not all-knowing |—Not so, we reply. Things which are
definitely separate (bhinna) from each. other cannot be
without number. Souls have a number, because they are
separate ; just as mustard seeds, beans, earthen vessels,
pieces of cloth, and so on. And from their being separate
it moreover follows that souls, like earthen vessels, and so
on, are non-intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perish-
able ; and it further follows therefrom that Brahman is not
infinite. For by infinity we understand the absence of all
limitation. Now on the theory which holds that there is
a plurality of separate existences, Brahman which is con-
sidered to differ in character from other existences cannot
be said to be free from substantial limitation; for sub-
stantial limitation means nothing else than the existence of
other substances. And what is substantially limited can-
not be said to be free from temporal and spatial limitation ;
for observation shows that it is just those things which
differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially
limited—such as earthen vessels, and so on—which are also
limited in point of space and time. Hence all intelligent
existences, including Brahman, being substantially limited,
are also limited in point of space and time. But this con-
clusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural texts which
declare Brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 15. 445

(‘The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman, and similar
texts), and moreover would imply that the souls as well as
Brahman are liable to origination, decay, and so on; for
limitation in time means nothing else but a being’s passing
through the stages of origination, decay, and so on.

The dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides,
we adhere to our doctrine that this entire world, from
Brahma down to a blade of grass, springs from the avidya
attached to Brahman which in itself is absolutely unlimited;
and that the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and
pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from
the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidy4, just as
the distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious.
The one Brahman, whose nature is eternal self-illumined-
ness, free from all heterogeneous elements, owing to the
influence of avidy4 illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) in
the form of this world ; and as thus in reality there exists
nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the
world is ‘non-different’ from Brahman.

To this the Dvaitavddin, i.e. the Vaiseshika, replies as
follows. The doctrine that Brahman, which in itself is
pure, non-differenced self-illuminedness, has its own true
nature hidden by avidy4 and hence sees plurality within
itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of right
knowledge; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration,
i.e. cessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean com-
plete destruction of Brahman; so that the hypothesis of
obscuration is altogether excluded. This and other argu-
ments have been already set forth; as also that the
hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by
the Advaitin. Nor is there any proof for the assertion
that effects apart from their causes are mere error, like
shell-silver, the separate existence of the effect being refuted
by Reasoning ; for as a matter of fact there is no valid
reasoning of the kind. The assertion that the cause only
is real because it persists, while the non-continuous effects
—such as jars and waterpots—are unreal, has also been
refuted before, on the ground that the fact of a thing not
existing at one place and one time does not sublate its

446 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

real existence at another time and place. Nor is there
any soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false
because, owing to its being perceived and its being perish-
able, it cannot be defined either as real or unreal. For
a thing’s being perceived and its being perishable does not
prove the thing’s falseness, but only its non-permanency.
To prove a thing’s falseness it is required to show that it
is sublated (i.e. that its non-existence is proved by valid
means) with reference to that very place and time in
connexion with which it is perceived; but that a thing is
sublated with reference to a place and time other than
those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves only
that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place
and time, but not that it is false. This view also may be
put in technical form, viz. effects such as jars and the like
are real because they are not sublated with regard to their
definite place and time; just as the Self is—Nor is there
any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot originate
from the cause either modified or unmodified; for the effect
may originate from the cause if connected with certain
favouring conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you
show any proof for the assertion that the cause, whether
modified or non-modified, cannot enter into connexion with
such favouring conditions; as a matter of fact the cause
may very well, without being modified, enter into such
connexion.—But from this it follows that the cause must
have been previously connected with those conditions,
since previously also it was equally unmodified !—Not so,
we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions of
time, place, &c., into which the cause enters, depends on
some other cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not
being modified. No fault then can be found with the
view of the cause, when having entered into a special
state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c.,
producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way
that the cause possesses originative agency with regard to
the effect ; for such agency is actually observed, and can-
not be proved to be irrational—Further there is no proof
for the assertion that originative agency cannot belong

11 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 15. 447

either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as
coined gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate
for coins and the like; for as a matter of fact mere gold
(gold in general), if connected with the helpful factors men-
tioned above, may very well possess originative capacity.
To say that we do not perceive any effect different from
gold is futile; for as a matter of fact we perceive the
svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and
the existence of different terms and ideas moreover proves
the existence of different things. Nor have we here to do
with a mere error analogous to that of shell-silver. For
a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is per-
ceived during the whole period intervening between its
origination and destruction, and such perception is not
sublated with regard to that time and place. Nor is there
any valid line of reasoning to sublate that perception. That
at the same time when the previously non-perceived svastika-
ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to the
fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament,
and hence such recognition of the causal substance does not
disprove the reality of the effect—And the attempts to prove
the unreality of the world by means of scriptural texts we
have already disposed of in a previous part of this work.
We further object to the assertion that it is one Self
which bestows on all bodies the property of being con-
nected with the Self; as from this it would follow that one
person is conscious of all the pains and pleasures caused
by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and
others, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one
person is conscious of the pains and pleasures due to
several bodies. Nor again must you allege that the non-
consciousness (on the part of one Self of all pleasures
and pains whatever) is due to the plurality of the Egos,
which are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality
of Selfs; for the Self is none other than the subject of cog-
nition and the Ego. The organ of egoity (ahamkéra),
on the other hand, which is the same as the internal organ
(antakkaraza), cannot be the knowing subject, for it is of
a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the

448 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

body and the sense-organs. This also has been proved
before.—Nor is there any proof for your assertion that
all bodies must be held to spring from the avidya of one
subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent, effects,
fictitious. For that all bodies are the fictitious creations
of avidya is not true; since that which is not sublated by
valid means of proof must be held to be real—Nor again
can you uphold the assertion that all intelligent subjects
are non-different, i.e. one, because we observe that whatever
is other than a subject of cognition is non-intelligent; for
this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of intel-
ligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution,
among them, of pleasures and pains.——You have further
maintained ‘ Through me only all bodies are animated by
a Self; they are the fictitious creations of my avidy4;
7 alone constitute the whole aggregate of intelligent sub-
jects, and, on the basis of these averments, have attempted
to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing
but the random talk of a person who has not mastered
even the principles of his own theory; for according to
your theory the Self is pure intelligence to which the
whole distinction of ‘I,’ ‘ Thou,’ &c., is altogether foreign.
Moreover, if it be held that everything different from pure,
non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all effort
spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruit-
less, for the Veda also is the effect of avidy4, and the effort
spent on it therefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold
of the silver wrongly imagined in the shell. Or, to put it
from a different point of view, all effort devoted to Release
is purposeless, since it is the effect of knowledge depending
on teachers of merely fictitious existence. Knowledge
produced by texts such as ‘Thou art that’ does not put
an end to bondage, because it is produced by texts which
are the fictitious product of avidy4; or because it is itself
of the nature of avidy4; or because it has for its abode
knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of avidyA; or
because it is the product of a process of study which de-
pends on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidya ; it
is thus no better than knowledge resting on texts teaching

11 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 15. 449

how bondage is to be put an end to, which one might
have heard in a dream. Οὐ, to put the matter again
from a different point of view, Brahman constituted by
pure non-differenced intelligence is false, since it is to be
attained by knowledge, which is the effect of avidyA; or
since it is to be attained by knowledge abiding in knowing
subjects who are mere figments of avidy4; or because it
is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment
of avidy4. For whatever is attained through knowledge
of that kind is false; as e.g. the things seen in dreams or
a town of the Gandharvas (Fata Morgana).

Nor does Brahman, constituted by pure non-differenced
intelligence, shine forth by itself, so as not to need—for
its cognition—other means of knowledge. And that that
self-luminous knowledge which you declare to be borne
witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of
particular objects of knowledge—such knowledge abiding
in particular cognising subjects—this also has been proved
previously. And the different arguments which were set
forth as proving Brahman’s non-differenced nature, are
sufficiently refuted by what we have said just now as to all
such arguments themselves being the products of avidyé.

Nor again is there any sense in the theory that the
principle of non-differenced intelligence ‘ witnesses’ avidy4,
and implicates itself in the error of the world. For ‘ wit-
nessing’ and error are observed to abide only in definite
conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general. Nor
can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess
illumining power or light depending on itself only. For
by light (enlightenment) we can understand nothing but
definite well-established knowledge (siddhi) on the part
of some knowing subject with regard to some particular
object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove
the self-illuminedness of your universal principle; to an
absolutely non-differenced intelligence not implying the
distinction of subject and object such ‘ svayamprak4sataé’
could not possibly belong. With regard again to what
you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real
effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point

[48] Gg

450 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

out that although you allow to such effects, being non-
sublated as it were, a kind of existence called ‘empirical’
(or ‘conventional ’—vy4vaharika), you yourself acknow-
ledge that fundamentally they are nothing but products
of avidyé ; you thus undermine your own position. We
have, on the other hand, already disposed of this your view
above, when proving that in all cases effects are originated
by real causes only. Nor may you plead that what per-
ception tells us in such cases is contradicted by Scripture ;
for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and
hence of the essence of avidy4, it is in no better case than
the instances quoted.—You have further declared that,
although Brahman is to be attained only through unreal
knowledge, yet it is real since when once attained it is not
sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this reasoning
also is not valid; for when it has once been ascertained
that some principle is attained through knowledge resting
on a vicious basis, the fact that we are not aware of a
subsequent sublation of that principle is irrelevant. That
the principle ‘the reality of things is a universal Void’ is
false, we conclude therefrom that the reasoning leading to
that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although
we are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that
principle. Moreover, for texts such as ‘There is here
no plurality whatsoever,’ ‘Knowledge, bliss is Brahman,’
the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the
ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things
different from mere intelligence, and hence are later in
order than all other texts (which had established that
aggregate of things). But somebody may rise and say
‘the Reality is a Void, and thus negative the existence of
the principle of mere Intelligence also; and the latter
principle is thus sublated by the assertion as to the Void,
which is later in order than the texts which it negatives.
On the other hand the assertion as to the Void being the
universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation;
for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And
as to resting on a vicious basis, there is in that respect
no difference between Perception and the other means of

11 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 15. 451

knowledge, and the view of general unreality, founded on
the Vedanta. The proper conclusion therefore is that all
cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition
and are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with
regard to special objects. Some of these cognitions rest
on defects which themselves are real ; others spring from a
combination of causes, real and free from all defect. Unless
we admit all this we shall not be able to account in a
satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and
things false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical
thought, whether true or of the nature of error, presupposes
inward light (illumination) in the form of certainty with
regard to a particular object, and belonging to a real
knowing subject ; mere non-differenced Being, on the other
hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing subject),
cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether
referring to real or unreal things, and cannot therefore form
the basis of empirical thought.

Against our opponent's argument that pure Being must
be held the real substrate of all erroneous superimposition
(adhy4sa), for the reason that no error can exist without
a substrate, we remark that an error may take place even
when its substrate is unreal, in the same way as an error
may exist even when the defect (giving rise to the error),
the abode of the defect, the subject of cognition and the
cognition itself are unreal. The argument thus loses its
force. Possibly he will now argue that as an error is never
seen to exist where the substrate is unreal, the reality of
pure Being (as furnishing the required basis for error)
must necessarily be admitted. But, we point out, it also
is a fact that errors are never observed where the defect,
the abode of the defect, the knowing subject and the act of
knowledge are unreal ; and if we pay regard to observation,
we must therefore admit the reality of all these factors as
well, There is really no difference between the two cases,
unless our opponent chooses to be obstinate.

You further asserted that, on the theory of many really
different Selfs, it would follow from the infinity of the past
seons that all souls must have been released before this,

Gg2

452 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

none being left in the state of bondage ; and that hence the
actually observed distinction of souls bound and released
remains unexplained. But this argumentation is refuted
by the fact of the souls also being infinite. You indeed
maintained that, if the souls are really separate,.they must
necessarily have a definite number like beans, mustard-
seeds, earthen vessels, and so on; but these instances are
beside the point, as earthen vessels, and so on, are also
infinite in number.—But do we not actually see that all
these things have definite numbers, ‘Here are ten jars;
a thousand beans,’ &c.?—True, but those numbers do not
belong to the essential nature of jars, and so on, but only
to jars in so far as connected with time, place, and other
limiting adjuncts, And that souls also have definite
numbers in this sense, we readily admit. And from this
it does not follow that all souls should be released; for
essentially the souls are infinite (in number).—Nor are
you entitled to maintain that the real separation of indi-
vidual souls would imply that, as earthen vessels and the
like, they are non-intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and
perishable. For the circumstance of individuals of one
species being distinct from each other, does in no way
imply that they possess the characteristics of things
belonging to another species: the individual separation
of jars does not imply their having the characteristics of
pieces of cloth—yYou further maintain that from the
hypothesis of a real plurality of souls it follows that
Brahman is substantially limited, and in consequence
of this limited with regard to time and space also, and
that hence its infinity is disproved. But this also is
a mistaken conclusion. Things substantially limited may
be limited more or less with regard to time and place:
there is no invariable rule on this point, and the measure
of their connexion with space and time has hence to be
determined in dependence on other means of knowledge.
Now Brahman’s connexion with αὐ space and ai/ time
results from such other means of proof, and hence there is
no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard
to space and time, and its limitation in point of substance—

11 ADHYAyYA, 1 PADA, 15. 453

which is due to the existence of other souls).—But mere
substantial limitation, as meaning the absence of non-
limitation of any kind, by itself proves that Brahman is
not infinite !—Well, then you yourself are in no better
case; for you admit that Brahman is something different
from avidyé. From this admission it follows that Brahman
also is something ‘ different,’ and thus all the disadvantages
connected with the view of difference cling to your theory
as well. If on the other hand it should not be allowed that
Brahman differs in nature from avidyA, then Brahman’s
nature itself is constituted by avidy4, and the text defining
Brahman as ‘the True, knowledge, infinite’ is contrary to
sense.—If the reality of ‘difference’ is not admitted, then
there is no longer any distinction between the.proofs and
the mutual objections set forth by the advocates of different
theories, and we are landed in gerteral confusion. The
proof of infinity, we further remark, rests altogether on the
absence of limitation of space and time, not on absence of
substantial limitation ; absence of such limitation is some-
thing very much akin to the ‘horn of a hare’ and is
perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other
hand, the whole world, as constituting Brahman’s body,
is its mode, and Brahman is thus limited neither through
itself nor through other things—We thus arrive at the
conclusion that, as effects are real in so far as different from
their cause, the effect of Brahman, i.e. the entire world, is
different from Brahman.

Against this view the Sftra now declares itself as
follows.—The non-difference of the world from Brahman,
the highest cause, follows from ‘ what begins with the word
4rambhana’—which proves such non-difference ; ‘ what
begins with the word 4rambhana’ means those clauses
at the head of which that word is met with, viz. ‘va#4ram-
bhanam vikéro namadheyam mrittikety eva satyam’ ;
‘Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without
a second’ ; ‘it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth;
it sent forth fire’; ‘having entered with this living Self’ ;
‘In the True, my son, all these creatures have their root,
in the True they dwell, in the True they rest’; ‘In that all

454 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

that exists has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self; and
thou art it, O Svetaketu’ (KA. Up. VI, 1-8)—it is these
clauses and others of similar purport which are met with in
other chapters, that the Sdtra refers to. For these texts
prove the non-difference from Brahman of the world
consisting of non-sentient and sentient beings. This is as
follows. The teacher, bearing in his mind the idea of
Brahman constituting the sole cause of the entire world
and of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, asks
the pupil, ‘Have you ever asked for that instruction by
which the non-heard is heard, the non-perceived is per-
ceived, the not known is known’ ; wherein there is implied
the promise that, through the knowledge of Brahman the
general cause, its effect, i.e. the whole Universe, will be
known? The pupil, not knowing that Brahman is the sole
cause of the Universe, raises a doubt as to the possibility
of one thing being known through another, ‘ How then, Sir,
is that instruction?’ and the teacher thereupon, in order to
convey the notion of Brahman being the sole universal
cause, quotes an instance showing that the non-difference
of the effect from the cause is proved by ordinary experi-
ence, ‘As by one clod of clay there is known everything
that is made of clay’; the meaning being ‘as jars, pots,
and the like, which are fashioned out of one piece of clay,
are known through the cognition of that clay, since their
substance is not different from it.’ In order to meet the
objection that according to Kaz4da’s doctrine the effect
constitutes a substance different from the cause, the teacher
next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the effect from
the cause by reference to ordinary experience, ‘ vaédram-
bhanam vikéro namadheyam mrittikety eva satyam.
Arambhanam must here be explained as that which is
taken or touched (4-rabh= 4-labh; and ‘alambha/ sparsa-
himsayohk’); compare P4zini III, 3, 113, as to the form and
meaning of the word. ‘Va4é4,’ ‘on account of speech,’ we ©
take to mean ‘on account of activity preceded by speech’ ;
for activities such as the fetching of water in a pitcher are
preceded by speech, ‘ Fetch water in the pitcher,’ and so on.
For the bringing about of such activity, the material clay

1 ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 15. 455

(which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters into
contact with) an effect (vik4ra), ie. a particular make or
configuration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and
resembling the shape of a belly, and a special name
(namadheya), viz. pitcher, and so on, which is applied
to that effect; or, to put it differently, to the end that
certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay
receives a new configuration and a new name, Hence jars
and other things of clay are clay (mrittik4), i.e. are of the
substance of clay, only; this only is true (satyam), i.e.
known through authoritative means of proof; only (eva),
because the effects are not known as different substances.
One and the same substance therefore, such as clay
or gold, gives occasion for different ideas and words
only as it assumes different configurations ; just as we, ob-
serve that one and the same Devadatta becomes the object
of different ideas and terms, and gives rise to different
effects, according to the different stages of life—youth,
old age, &c.—which he has reached.—The fact of our
saying ‘the jar has perished’ while yet the clay persists,
was referred to by the Parvapakshin as proving that the
effect is something different from the cause ; but this view
is disproved by the view held by us that origination,
destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one
and the same causal substance. According as one and
the same substance is in this or that state, there belong to
it different terms and different activities, and these different
states may rightly be viewed as depending on the activity

1 The meaning of the four words constituting the clause there-
fore would be, ‘On account of speech (i.e. for the sake of the
accomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water,
which are preceded by speech), there is touched (by the previously
mentioned substance clay) an effect and a name; i.e. for the sake
of, &c., clay modifies itself into an effect having a special name.’
The Commentary remarks that ‘4rambhanam ’ cannot be taken in
the sense of upfdina; since, on the theory of the unreality of
effects, the effect is originated not by speech but by thought
(imagination) only; and on the pariv4ma doctrine the effect is
likewise not originated by speech but by Brahman.

456 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

of an agent. The objections again which are connected
with the theory of ‘manifestation’ are refuted by our not
acknowledging such a thing at all as ‘ manifestation.’ Nor
does the admission of origination render the doctrine of
the reality of the effect irrational ; for it is only the Real
that originates.—But it is a contradiction to maintain that
that which previously exists is originated !—This, we reply,
is the objection of a person who knows nothing about the
true nature of origination and destruction. A substance
enters into different states in succession; what passes away
is the substance in its previous states, what originates is
the substance in its subsequent states. As thus the
substance in all its states has being, there is nothing
irrational in the satkarya theory.—But the admission of
the. origination of a non-existing state lands us in the
asatkarya theory !—If he, we retort, who holds the asatkarya
theory is of opinion that the origination of the effect does

not itself originate, he is similarly landed in the satkarya
theory; and if he holds that the origination itself
originates, he is led into a regressus in infinitum. According
to us, on the other hand, who hold that states are incapable
of being apprehended and of acting apart from that of
which they aré states, origination, destruction, and so on,
belong only to ἃ substance whith is in a certain state;
and on this theory ho difficulty remains. And in the
same way as the state of being a jar results from the clay
abandoning the condition of being either two halves of
a jar or a lump of clay, plurality results from a substance
giving up the state of oneness, and oneness from the giving
up of plurality; hence this point also gives rise to no
difficulty.

We now consider the whole KAandogya-text in con-
nexion, ‘Sad eva somye=dam agra 4sid ekam evAdvitiyam.’
This means—That which is Being, i.e. this world which
now, owing to the distinction of names and forms, bears
a manifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing
to the absence of the distinction of names and forms. And
as, owing to the ‘Sat’ being endowed with all powers, a
further ruling principle is out of the question, the world was

Il ADHYAYA, I PADA, 15. 457

also ‘without a second.’ This proves the non-difference of
the world from Brahman. In the same way the next clause
also, ‘It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,’ which
describes the creation of the world ‘as proceeding from
a resolve of the Self to differentiate itself into a world
consisting of manifold beings movable and immovable,
viz. Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the
effect, i.e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause,
i.e. the highest Brahman.

And as now a further doubt may arise as to how the
highest Brahman with all its perfections can be designated
as one with the world, and how the world can be desig-
nated as one, without a second, not dependent on another
guiding principle; and how this thought, i.e. the resolution,
on the part of the Supreme cause, of differentiating itself
into a manifold world, and the creation corresponding to
that resolution are possible ; the text continues, ‘ That deity
thought—Let me now enter those three beings with this
living Self (giva 4tman) and distinguish names and forms ’—
which means, ‘Let me make the aggregate of non-sentient
things (for this is meant by the “three beings”) to possess
various names and forms, by entering into them by means
of the giva which is of the nature of my Self’ The
possession of names and forms must thus be understood
to be effected by the giva entering into matter as its Self.
There is another scriptural text also which makes it clear
that the highest Brahman enters, so as to be their Self,
into the world together with the givas. ‘Having sent
forth that he entered into it. Having entered into it he
became sat and tyat (i.e. sentient and non-sentient
beings). And that the entire aggregate of sentient and
non-sentient beings, gross or subtle, in their effected or
their causal state, constitutes the body of the highest
Brahman, and that on the other hand the highest Brahman
constitutes their Self—this is proved by the antaryamin-
brahmaza and similar texts. This disposes of the doubt
raised above. Since Brahman abides, as their Self, in all
non-sentient matter together with the givas, Brahman is
denoted by the term ‘world’ in so far only as it (i.e.

458 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Brahman) has non-sentient and sentient beings for its
body, and hence utterances such as ‘This which is Being
only was in the beginning one only’ are unobjectionable in
every way. All change and all imperfection belongs only
to the beings constituting Brahman’s body, and Brahman
itself is thus proved to be free from all imperfection,
a treasure as it were of all imaginable holy qualites. This
point will be further elucidated under II, 1, 22.—The
-Khandogya-text then further teaches that all sentient
and non-sentient beings have their Self in Brahman ‘in
that all this has its Self’; and further inculcates this truth
in ‘ Thou art that.’

Texts met with in other sections also teach this same
non-difference of the general cause and its effect: ‘ All this
indeed is Brahman’ (KA. Up. III, 14, 1); ‘When the Self
has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this
is known’ (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); ‘ That Self is all this’ (Bré.
Up. II, 4, 6); ‘ Brahman indeed is all this’ (Mai. Up. IV,
6); ‘ The Self only is all this’ (KZ. Up. VII, 25, 2). Other
texts, too, negative difference: ‘ Everything abandons him
who looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self’ (Brz.
Up. II, 4, 6); ‘There is not any plurality here’ (Bri. Up.
IV, 4, 19); ‘From death to death goes he who sees here
any plurality’ (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 19). And in the same spirit
the passage ‘ For where there is duality as it were, one sees
the other; but when for him the Self has become all,
whereby then should he see and whom?’ (Bri. Up. II, 4,
13)—in setting forth that the view of duality belongs to him
who does not know and the view of non-duality to him who
knows—intimates that non-difference only is real.

It is in this way that we prove, by means of the texts
beginning with 4rambhama, that the world is non-different
from the universal cause, i.e. the highest Brahman. Brahman
only, having the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient
beings for its body and hence for its modes (prak4ra),
is denoted by all words whatsoever. The body of this
Brahman is sometimes constituted by sentient and non-
sentient beings in their subtle state, when—just owing to
that subtle state—they are incapable of being (conceived

Il ADHYAYA, I PADA, 15. 459

and) designated as apart from Brahman whose body they
form: Brahman is then in its so-called causal condition.
At other times the body of Brahman is constituted by all
sentient and non-sentient beings in their gross, manifest
state, owing to which they admit of being thought and
spoken of as having distinct names and forms: Brahman
then is in its ‘effected’ state. The effect, i.e. the world,
is thus seen to be non-different from the cause, i.e. the
highest Brahman. And that in the effected as well as
the causal state of Brahman’s body as constituted by
sentient and non-sentient beings, and. of Brahman embodied
therein, perfections and imperfections are distributed
according to the difference of essential nature between
Brahman and its body, as proved by hundreds of scriptural
texts, we have shown above.

Those on the other hand who establish the non-difference
of cause and effect, on the basis of the theory of the effect’s
non-reality, are unable to prove what they wish to prove;
for the True and the False cannot possibly be one. If
these two were one, it would follow either that Brahman
is false or that the world is real—Those again who (like
Bhaskara) hold the effect also to be real—the difference
of the soul and Brahman being due to limiting conditions,
while their non-difference is essential; and the difference
as well as the non-difference of Brahman and matter being
essential—enter into conflict with all those texts which
declare that the soul and Brahman are distinct in so far as
the soul is under the power of karman while Brahman is
free from all evil, &c., and all those texts which teach that
non-sentient matter undergoes changes while Brahman
does not. For as, according to them, nothing exists but
Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, Brahman—as being
indivisible—must be undivided while entering into connexion
with the upddhis, and hence itself undergoes a change into
inferior forms. And if they say that it is only the power
(sakti), not Brahman itself, which undergoes a change ; this
also is of no avail since Brahman and its power are non-
different.

. Others again (Y4davaprak4sa) hold that the general

460 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

cause, i.e. Brahman, is pure Being in which all distinctions
and changes such as being an enjoying subject, and so on,
have vanished, while however it is endowed with all possible
potentialities. During a pralaya this causal substance
abides self-luminous, with all the distinctions of conscious-
ness of pleasure and pain gone to rest, comparable to the
soul of a man held by dreamless sleep, different however
in nature from mere non-sentient matter. During the
period of a creation, on the other hand, just as the substance
called clay assumes the forms of jars, platters, and so on,
or as the. water of the sea turns itself into foam, waves,
bubbles, and so on, the universal causal substance abides
in the form of a triad of constituent parts, viz. enjoying
subjects, objects of enjoyment, and a ruler. The attributes
of being a ruler, or an object of enjoyment, or an enjoying
subject, and the perfections and imperfections depending
on those attributes, are therefore distributed in the same
way as the attributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter ;
and the different effects of these attributes are distributed
among different parts of the substance, clay. The objects
of enjoyment, subjects of enjoyment, and the ruler are one,
on the other hand, in so far as ‘that which is’ constitutes
their substance; just as jars, platters and pitchers are one
in so far as their substance is constituted by clay. It is
thus one substance only, viz. ‘that which is,’ that appears
in different conditions, and it is in this sense that the world
is non-different from Brahman.—But this theory is really
in conflict with all Scripture, Smriti, Itihdsa, Puraza and
Reasoning. For Scripture, Smriti, Itihdsa and Purdza
alike teach that there is one supreme cause, viz. Brahman—
a being that is the Lord of all Lords, all-knowing, all-
powerful, instantaneously realising all its purposes, free
of all blemish, not limited either by place or time, enjoying
supreme unsurpassable bliss. Nor can it be held that
above the Lord there is ‘ pure Being’ of which the Lord
is a part only. For ‘ This which is “ being” only was in the
beginning one only, without a second; it thought, may I be
many, may I grow forth’ (KA. Up. VI, 2, 3); ‘ Verily, in
the beginning this was Brahman, one only. Being one

11 ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 15. 461

it was not strong enough. It created the most excellent
Kshattra, viz. those Kshattras among the Devas—Indra,
Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Parganya, Yama, Mrityu, fsana’ (Bré,
Up. I, 4, 11); ‘In the beginning all this was Self, one
only; there was nothing whatsoever else blinking. He
thought, shall I send forth worlds’ (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1, 2);
‘There was in truth N4rayaza only, not Brahmé, not fsana,
nor heaven and earth, nor the nakshatras, nor the waters,
nor Agni, nor Soma, nor Sfrya. Being alone he felt
no delight. Of him merged in meditation’ &c. (Mahana.
Up. I, 1)}—these and other texts prove that the highest
cause is the Lord of all Lords, Narayana. For as the
terms ‘Being,’ ‘Brahman,’ ‘Self, which are met with in
sections treating of the same topic, are in one of those
parallel sections particularised by the term ‘Nardyaza,’
it follows that they all mean Néradyaza. That the Lord
only is the universal cause is shown by the following text
also, ‘ He the highest great lord of lords, the highest deity
of deities—he is the cause, the lord of the lords of the
organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord’ (Svet.
Up. VI, 7, 9). Similarly the Manu Smriti, ‘Then the
divine Self-existent (Brahm4)—dgesirous to produce from
his own body beings of many kind—first with a thought
created the waters and placed his seed in them’ (Ma. I,
6-8). Itihdsas and Purds#as also declare the Supreme
Person only to be the universal cause, ‘ Narayana, of whom
the world is the body, of infinite nature, eternal, when
desirous to create sent forth from a thousandth part of
himself the souls in two divisions, ‘From Vishzu the
world originated and in him it abides.’

Nor is it possible to hold that the Lord is pure ‘ Being’
only, for such ‘ Being ’ is admitted to be an element of the
Lord; and moreover all ‘Being’ has difference. Nor can
it be maintained that the Lord’s connexion with all his
auspicious qualities— knowledge, bliss, and so on—is
occasional (adventitious) merely ; it rather is essential and
hence eternal. Nor may you avail yourself of certain
texts—viz. ‘His high power (sakti) is revealed as manifold,
as essential, and (so) his knowledge, strength and action’

462 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

(Svet. Up. VI, 8); ‘He who is all-knowing, all-cognising ’
(Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), and others—to the end of proving that
what is essential is only the Lord’s connexion with the
potentialities (sakti) of knowledge, bliss, and so on. For in
the Svet4svatara-text the word ‘essential’ independently
qualifies ‘knowledge, strength, and action’ no less than
‘sakti’; and your explanation would necessitate so-called
implication (lakshav4). Nor again can it be said that in
words such as sarvagaa (all-knowing), the formative sufhix
expresses potentiality only, as it admittedly does in other
words such as pAkaka (cook); for grammar does not
teach that all these (krzt) affixes in general express
potentiality or capability only. It rather teaches (cp.
Panini III, 2, 54) that a few krit-affixes only have this
limited meaning ; and in the case of pa#aka and similar
words we must assume capability to be denoted, because
there is no other explanation open to us.—If, moreover,
the Lord were held to be only a part of the Sat it would
follow that the Sat, as the whole, would be superior to the
Lord just as the ocean is superior to a wave, and this
would be in conflict with ever so many scriptural texts
which make statements about the Lord, cp. e.g. ‘ Him the
highest great lord of lords’; ‘There is none seen like to
him or superior’ (Svet. Up. VI, 7, 8). If, moreover, mere
Being is held to be the Self of all and the general whole,
and the Lord only a particular part of it, this would imply
the stultification of all those texts which declare the Lord
to be the general Self and the whole of which all beings
are parts; for jars and platters certainly cannot be held
to be parts of, and to have their being in, pitchers (which
themselves are only special things made of clay). Against
this you perhaps will plead that as Being in general is fully
present in all its parts, and hence also in that part which
is the Lord, all other things may be viewed as having their
Self in, and being parts of, him.—But from your principles
we might with equal right draw the inference that as Being
in general is fully present in the jar, the Lord is a part
of the jar and has his Self in that! From enunciations
such as ‘the jar is,’ ‘the cloth is,’ it appears that Being

Il ADHYAYA, I PADA, 16. 463

is an attribute of things, and cannot therefore be a substance
and a cause. By the ‘being’ of a thing we understand
the attribute of its being suitable for some definite practical
effect ; while its ‘non-being’ means its suitability for an
effect of an opposite nature.—Should it on the other hand
be held that substances only have being, the (unacceptable)
consequence would be that actions, and so on, are non-
existent. And if (to avoid this consequence) it were said
that the being of actions, and so on, depends on their
connexion with substances, it would be difficult to show
(what yet should be shown) that ‘being’ is everywhere of
one and the same nature. Moreover, if everything were
non-different in so far as ‘being,’ there would be a universal
consciousness of the nature of everything, and from this
there would follow a general confusion of all good and evil
(i.e. every one would have conscious experience of every-
thing) This point we have explained before. For all
these reasons non-difference can only have the meaning set
forth by us.—Here the following doubt may arise. In the
case of childhood, youth, and so on, we observe that
different ideas and different terms are applied to different
states of one and the same being; in the case of clay,
wood, gold, &c., on the other hand, we observe that different
ideas and terms are applied to different things. On what
ground then do you determine that in the case of causes
and effects, such as e.g. clay and jars, it is mere difference
of state on which the difference of ideas and terms is based ?—
To this question the next Sftra gives a reply.

16. And because (the cause) is perceived in the
existence of the effect.

This means—because gold which is the cause is perceived
in the existence of its effects, such as earrings and the like;
i.e. on account of the recognition of gold which expresses
itself in the judgment ‘this earring is gold.’ We do not on
the other hand perceive the presence of clay, and so on, in
gold, and so on. The case of the cause and the effect is
thus analagous to that of the child and the youth: the word
‘effect’ denotes nothing else but the causal substance which

464 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

has passed over into a different condition. He also who
holds the effect to be a new thing acknowledges that the
effect is connected with a different state, and as this dif-
ferent state suffices to account for the difference of ideas
and words, we are not entitled to assume a new substance
which is not perceived. Nor must it be said that the
recognition of the gold in the earring is due to generic
nature (the two ἐλέησε being different, but having the same
generic nature); for we perceive no new substance which
could be the abode of the generic character. What we
actually perceive is one and the same substance possessing
the generic characteristics of gold, first in the causal state
and then in the effected state. Nor again can it be said
that even on the supposition of difference of substance,
recognition of the cause in the effect results from the con-
tinuity of the so-called intimate cause (samavdyi-kdrana).
For where there is difference of substances we do not
observe that mere continuity of the abode gives rise to the
recognition (of one substance) in the other substance
residing in that abode.—But in the case of certain effects, as
e.g. scorpions and other vermin which originate from dung,
that recognition of the causal substance, i.e. dung (to which
you refer as proving the identity of cause and effect), is not
observed to take place !—You misstate the case, we reply;
here also we do recognise in the effect that substance which
is the primal cause, viz. earth.—But in smoke, which is the
effect of fire, we do not recognise fire!—True! but this
does not disprove our case. Fire is only the operative cause
of smoke; for smoke originates from damp fuel joined
with fire. That smoke is the effect of damp fuel is proved
thereby, as well as that both have smell (which shows
them to be alike of the substance of earth).—As thus the
identity of the substance is perceived in the effect also, we
are entitled to conclude that the difference of ideas and
terms rests on difference of state only. The effect, there-
fore, is non-different from the cause.—This is so for the
following reason also.

17. Andon account of the existence of that which
is posterior.

11 ADHYAyA, 1 PADA, 18. 465

On account of the existence of the posterior, i.e. the
effect existing in the cause—for this reason also the
effect is non-different from the cause. For in. ordinary
language as well as in the Veda the effect is spoken of in
terms of the cause; as when we say, ‘all these things—
jars, platters, &c.—were clay only this morning’; or when
the Veda says, ‘ Being only was this in the beginning.’

18. If it be said ‘not, on account of the designa-
tion of the (effect as the) non-existent; we reply,
not so, on account (of such designation being due
to) another attribute, (as appears) from the comple-
mentary passage, from Reasoning, and from another
Vedic text.

The assertion that ordinary speech as well as the Veda
acknowledges the existence of the effect in the cause cannot
be upheld ‘on account of the designation of (the effect as)
the non-existent.’ For the Veda says, ‘Non-being only
was this in the beginning’ (KA. Up. III, 19, 1) ; ‘ Non-being
indeed was this in the beginning’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1); ‘In
the beginning truly this was not anything whatever.’ And
in ordinary language we say ‘In the morning all this—jars,
platters, and so on,—was not.’—This objection the Stra pro-
ceeds to refute. ‘Not so,on account of such designation being
due to another attribute.’ The designation of the effected
substance as the non-existent is due to the effect having at
an earlier time a different quality, i.e. a different consti-
tution; not to its being, as you think, absolutely non-
existing. The quality different from the quality of exist-
ence is non-existence ; that is to say, of the world designated
as this, the quality of existence is constituted by name
and form, while the quality of non-existence consists in the
subtle state opposed to name and form.—But how is this
known ?—‘ From the complementary passage, from Reason-
ing, and from another text.’ The complementary passage
is the one following on the last text quoted above, viz.
‘that Non-existent formed the resolve “may I be.”’ The
resolve referred to in this complementary text serving as

[48] Hh

466 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

an inferential sign to determine that the Non-existence
spoken of is other than absolute Non-existence, we, on the
basis of the observation that all the three texts quoted
treat of the same matter, conclude that in the other two
texts also the Non-existent has to be understood in the
same sense. ‘From Reasoning.’ Reasoning shows Being
and Non-being to be attributes of things. The possession,
on the part of clay, of a certain shape, a broad base,
a belly-shaped body, and so on, is the cause of our thinking
and saying ‘the jar exists,’ while the connexion, on the
part of the clay, with a condition opposed to that of a jar
is the cause of our thinking and saying ‘the jar does not
exist.’ A condition of the latter kind is e.g. the clay’s
existing in the form of two separate halves of a jar, and it
is just this and similar conditions of the clay which account
for our saying that the jar does not exist. We do not
perceive any non-existence of the jar different from the
kind of non-existence described; and as the latter suf-
ficiently accounts for all current ideas and expressions as to
non-existence, there is no occasion to assume an additional
kind of non-existence—And also ‘from another text.’
The text meant is that often quoted, ‘Being only was
this in the beginning.’ For there the view of the absolute
non-being of the effect is objected to, ‘But how could it be
thus?’ &c., and then the decision is given that from the
beginning the world was ‘being.’ This matter is clearly
set forth in the text ‘This was then undistinguished; it
became distinguished by name and form’ (Brz. Up. I, 4, 7).

The next two Sftras confirm the doctrine of the non-
difference of the effect from the cause by two illustrative
instances.

19. And like a piece of cloth.

As threads when joined in a peculiar cross-arrangement
are called a piece of cloth, thus acquiring a new name,
a new form, and new functions, so it is with Brahman
also.

20. And as the different vital airs.

As the one air, according as it undergoes in the body

11 ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 21. 467

different modifications, acquires a new name, new charac-
teristics, and new functions, being then called prdza,
ap4na, and so on; thus the one Brahman becomes the
world, with its manifold moving and non-moving beings.—
The non-difference of the world from Brahman, the highest
cause, is thus fully established.

Here terminates the ‘4rambhaza’ adhikarama.

21. From the designation of the ‘ other’ (as non-
different from Brahman) there result (Brahman’s) not
creating what is beneficial, and other imperfections.

‘Thou art that’; ‘this Self is Brahman’—these and
similar texts which declare the non-difference of the world
from Brahman, teach, as has been said before, at the same
time the non-difference from Brahman of the individual
soul also. But an objection here presents itself. If these
texts really imply that the ‘other one,’ i.e. the soul, is
Brahman, there will follow certain imperfections on Brah-
man’s part, viz. that Brahman, endowed as it is with
omniscience, the power of realising its purposes, and so on,
does not create a world of a nature beneficial to itself, but
rather creates a world non-beneficial to itself; and the like.
This world no doubt is a storehouse of numberless pains,
either originating in living beings themselves or due to the
action of other natural beings, or caused by supernatural
agencies. No rational independent person endeavours to
produce what is clearly non-beneficial to himself. And
as you hold the view of the non-difference of the world
from Brahman, you yourself set aside all those texts which
declare Brahman to be different from the soul; for were
there such difference, the doctrine of general non-difference
could not be established. Should it be maintained that
the texts declaring difference refer to difference due to
limiting adjuncts, while the texts declaring non-difference
mean essential non-difference, we must ask the following
question—does the non-conditioned Brahman know, or does
it not know, the soul which is essentially non-different from
it? If it does not know it, Brahman’s omniscience has to
be abandoned. If, on the other hand, it knows it, then

Hh2

468 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Brahman is conscious of the pains of the soul—which is
non-different from Brahman—as its own pains; and from
this there necessarily follows an imperfection, viz. that Brah-
man does not create what is beneficial and does create what
is non-beneficial to itself. If, again, it be said that the
difference of the soul and Brahman is due to Nescience on
the part of both, and that the texts declaring difference
refer to difference of this kind, the assumption of Nescience
belonging to the soul leads us to the very alternatives just
stated and to their respective results. Should the ag#ana,
on the other hand, belong to Brahman, we point out that
Brahman, whose essential nature is self-illuminedness, can-
not possibly be conscious of ag#4na and the creation of
the world effected by it. And if it be said that the light
of Brahman is obscured by ag#4na, we point to all the
difficulties, previously set forth, which follow from this
hypothesis—to obscure light means to make it cease, and
to make cease the light of Brahman, of whom light is the
essential nature, means no less than to destroy Brahman
itself. The view of Brahman being the cause of the world
thus shows itself to be untenable.—This prima facie view
the next Satra refutes.

22. But (Brahman is) additional, on account of
the declaration of difference.

The word ‘but’ sets aside the prima facie view. To the
individual soul capable of connexion with the various kinds
of pain there is additional, i.e. from it there is different,
Brahman.—On what ground >—‘ Owing to the declaration
of difference.’ For Brahman is spoken of as different from
the soul in the following texts:—‘ He who dwells in the
Self and within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of
whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self within, he is
thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal’ (Bri. Up. III,
7, 22); ‘Knowing as separate the Self and the Mover,
blessed by him he gains Immortality’ (Svet. Up. I, 6); ‘He
is the cause, the Lord of the lords of the organs’ (i.e. the
individual souls) (Svet. Up. VI, 9); ‘One of them eats
the sweet fruit; without eating the other looks on’ (Svet. Up.

11 ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 23. 469

IV, 6); ‘There are two, the one knowing, the other not
knowing, both unborn, the one a ruler, the other not a
ruler’ (Svet. Up. I, 9); ‘Embraced by the prag#a Self’
(Brz. Up. IV, 3, 21); ‘Mounted by the prag#a Self’ (Bri.
Up. IV, 3, 35); ‘From that the ruler of mAyA sends forth
all this, in that the other is bound up through may
(Svet. Up. IV, 9); ‘the Master of the Pradhana and the
souls, the lord of the guszas’ (Svet. Up. VI, 16) ; ‘the eternal
among eternals, the intelligent among the intelligent, who,
one, fulfils the desires of many’ (Svet. Up. VI, 13); ‘who
moves within the Unevolved, of whom the Unevolved is the
body, whom the Unevolved does not know; who moves
within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the
body, whom the Imperishable does not know; who moves
within Death, of whom Death is the body, whom Death
does not know ; he is the inner Self of all beings, free from
evil, the divine one, the one God, Narayaza’; and other
similar texts. ;

23. And as in the analogous case of stones and
the like, there is impossibility of that.

In the same way as it is impossible that the different
non-sentient things such as stones, iron, wood, herbs, &c.,
which are of an extremely low constitution and subject to
constant change, should be one in nature with Brahman,
which is faultless, changeless, fundamentally antagonistic to
all that is evil, &c. &c.; so it is also impossible that the
individual soul, which is liable to endless suffering, and
a mere wretched glowworm as it were, should be one with
Brahman who, as we know from the texts, comprises within
himself the treasure of all auspicious qualities, &c. &c.
Those texts, which exhibit Brahman and the soul in co-
ordination, must be understood as conveying the doctrine,
founded on passages such as ‘of whom the Self is the body,’
that as the giva constitutes Brahman’s body and Brahman
abides within the giva as its Self, Brahman has the giva for
its mode; and with this doctrine the co-ordination referred
to is not only not in conflict but even confirms it—as we
have shown repeatedly, e.g. under SQ. 1, 4, 22. Brahman

470 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

in all its states has the souls and matter for its body ; when
the souls and matter are in their subtle state Brahman is in
its causal condition; when, on the other hand, Brahman
has for its body souls and matter in their gross state, it is
‘effected’ and then called world. In this way the co-ordina-
tion above referred to fully explains itself. The world is
non-different from Brahman in so far as it is its effect.
There is no confusion of the different characteristic qualities;
for liability to change belongs to non-sentient matter,
liability to pain to sentient souls, and the possession of all
excellent qualities to Brahman: hence the doctrine is not
in conflict with any scriptural text. That even in the state
of non-separation—described in texts such as, ‘ Being only
this was in the beginning’—the souls joined to non-sentient
matter persist in a subtle condition and thus constitute
Brahman’s body must necessarily be admitted; for that the
souls at that time also persist in a subtle form is shown
under Satras II, 1, 34; 35. Non-division, at that time, is
possible in so far as there is no distinction of names and
forms. It follows from all this that Brahman’s causality is
not contrary to reason.

Those, on the other hand, who explain the difference,
referred to in Sfitra 22, as the difference between the giva
in its state of bondage and the giva in so far as free from
avidya, i.e. the unconditioned Brahman, implicate them-
selves in contradictions. For the giva, in so far as free
from avidya, is neither all-knowing, nor the Lord of all, nor
the cause of all, nor the Self of all, nor the ruler of all—it
in fact possesses none of those characteristics on which the
scriptural texts found the difference of the released soul ;
for according to the view in question all those attributes
are the mere figment of Nescience. Nor again can the
Sdtra under discussion be said to refer to the distinction,
from the individual soul, of a Lord fictitiously created by
avidy4—a distinction analogous to that which a man in the
state of avidy4 makes between the shell and the silver; for
it is the task of the Veddnta to convey a knowledge of that
true Brahman which is introduced as the object of enquiry
in the first Satra (‘Now then the enquiry into Brahman’)

II ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 24. 471

and which is the cause of the origination and so on of the
world, and what they at this point are engaged in is to
refute the objections raised against the doctrine of that
Brahman on the basis of Smrsti and Reasoning.—The two
Sdtras II, 1,8; 9 really form a complementary statement
to what is proved in the present adhikaraza; for their
purport is to show also that things of different nature can
stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect.
And the Sitra II, 1, 7 has reference to what is contained
in the previous adhikaraza.

Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘designation of the
other.’

24. Should it be said that (it is) not, on account
of the observation of employment ; we say, not so ;
for as in the case of milk.

We have so far determined that it is in no way unreason-
able to hold that the highest Brahman, which is all-knowing,
capable of realising its purposes, &c., has all beings, sentient
and non-sentient, for its body, and hence constitutes the
Self of all and differs in nature from everything else. We
now proceed to show that it is not unreasonable to hold
that, possessing all those attributes, it is able to effect by
its mere will and wish the creation of this entire manifold
Universe.—But, it may here be said, it is certainly a matter
of observation that agents of limited power are obliged to
employ a number of instrumental agencies in order to effect
their purposes ; but how should it follow therefrom that the
view of the all-powerful Brahman producing the world
without such instrumental agencies is in any way irrational ?
—dAs, we reply, it is observed in ordinary life that even
such agents as possess the capability of producing certain
effects stand in need of certain instruments, some slow-
witted person may possibly imagine that Brahman, being
destitute of all such instruments, is incapable of creating
the world. It is this doubt which we have to dispel. It is
seen that potters, weavers, &c., who produce jars, cloth, and
the like, are incapable of actually producing unless they
make use of certain implements, although they may fully

472 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

possess the specially required skill. Men destitute of such
skill are not capable of production, even with the help of
implements ; those having the capacity produce by means
of the instruments only. This leads to the conclusion that
Brahman also, although possessing all imaginable powers,
is not capable of creating the world without employing the
required instrumental agencies. But before creation there
existed nothing that could have assisted him, as we know
from texts such as ‘ Being only this was in the beginning’ ;
‘there was N&rdyama alone. Brahman’s creative agency
thus cannot be rendered plausible; and hence the prima
facie view set forth in the earlier part of the Satra, ‘Should
it be said that (it is) not; on account of the observation of
employment (of instruments).’

This view is set aside by the latter part of the Satra,
‘not so; for as in the case of milk.’ It is by no means
a fact that every agent capable of producing a certain effect -
stands in need of instruments. Milk, e.g. and water, which
have the power of producing certain effects, viz. sour milk
and ice respectively, produce these effects unaided. Analo-
gously Brahman also, which possesses the capacity of
producing everything, may actually do so without using
instrumental aids. The ‘for’ in the Sdtra is meant to
point out the fact that the proving instances are generally
known, and thus to indicate the silliness of the objection.
Whey and similar ingredients are indeed sometimes mixed
with milk, but not to the end of making the milk turn sour,
but merely in order to accelerate the process and give to
the sour milk a certain flavour.

25. And as in the case of the gods and so on, in
(their) world.

As the gods and similar exalted beings create, each in
his own world, whatever they require by their mere volition,
so the Supreme Person creates by his mere volition the
entire world. That the gods about whose powers we know
from the Veda only (not through perception) are here quoted
as supplying a proving instance, is done in order to facilitate
the comprehension of the creative power of Brahman, which

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 27. 473

is also known through the Veda.—Here terminates the
adhikaraza of ‘the observation of employment.’

26. Or the consequence of the entire (Brahman
entering into the effect), and stultification of (Brah-
man’s) being devoid of parts.

‘Being only was this in the beginning’; ‘This indeed
was in the beginning not anything’; ‘The Self alone indeed
was this in the beginning ’—these and other texts state
that in the beginning Brahman was one only, i. e. without
parts—that means: Brahman, in its causal state, was with-
out parts because then all distinction of matter and souls
had disappeared. This one, non-divided, Brahman there-
upon having formed the resolution of being many divided
itself into the aggregate of material things—ether, air, and
so on—and the aggregate of souls from Brahma down to
blades of grass, This being so, it must be held that the
entire highest Brahman entered into the effected state ;
that its intelligent part divided itself into the individual
souls, and its non-intelligent part into ether, air, and so on.
This however stultifies all those often-quoted texts which
declare Brahman in its causal state to be devoid of parts.
For although the cause is constituted by Brahman in so far
as having for its body matter and souls in their subtle
state, and the effect by Brahman invested with matter and
souls in their gross state; the difficulty stated above
cannot be avoided, since also that element in Brahman
which is embodied is held to enter into the effect. If, on
the other hand, Brahman is without parts, it cannot become
many, and it is not possible that there should persist a part
not entering into the effected state. On the ground of
these unacceptable results we conclude that Brahman
cannot be the cause.—This objection the next Sdtra
disposes of.

27. But on account of Scripture; (Brahman’s
possession of various powers) being founded upon
the word.

The ‘but’ sets aside the difficulty raised. There is no

474 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

inappropriateness; ‘on account of Scripture.’ Scripture
declares on the one hand that Brahman is not made
up of parts, and on the other that from it a multiform
creation proceeds. And in matters vouched for by Scrip-
ture we must conform our ideas to what Scripture
actually says—But then Scripture might be capable of
conveying to us ideas of things altogether self-contra-
dictory; like as if somebody were to tell us ‘Water
with fire’ !—The Stra therefore adds ‘on account of its
being founded on the word.’ As the possession, on Brah-
man’s part, of various powers (enabling it to emit the
world) rests exclusively on the authority of the word of
the Veda and thus differs altogether from other matters
(which fall within the sphere of the other means of know-
ledge also), the admission of such powers is not contrary
to reason. Brahman cannot be either proved or disproved
by means of generalisations from experience.

28. And thus in the Self; for (there are) manifold
(powers).

If attributes belonging to one thing were on that account
to be ascribed to other things also, it would follow that
attributes observed in non-sentient things, such as jars and
the like, belong also to the intelligent eternal Self, which is
of an altogether different kind. But that such attributes
do not extend to the Self is due to the variety of the
essential nature of things. This the Sdtra expresses in
‘for (there are) manifold (powers).’ We perceive that fire,
water, and so on, which are of different kind, possess
different powers, viz. heat, and so on: there is therefore
nothing unreasonable in the view that the highest Brahman
which differs in kind from all things observed in ordinary
life should possess innumerous powers not perceived in
ordinary things. Thus Parasara also—in reply to a ques-
tion founded on ordinary observation—viz. ‘How can
creative energy be attributed to Brahman, devoid of
qualities, pure, &c. ?’—declares ‘ Numberless powers, lying
beyond the sphere of all ordinary thought, belong to
Brahman, and qualify it for creation, and so on; just as

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 29. 475

heat belongs-to fire. Similarly, Scripture says, ‘ what
was that wood, what was that tree from which they built
heaven and earth?’ ὅς. (Ri. Samh. X, 81); and ‘ Brah-
man was that wood, Brahman was that tree,’ and so on.—
Objections founded on ordinary generalisations have no
force against Brahman which differs in nature from all
other things.

29. And on account of the defects of his view
also.

On his view, i.e. on the view of him who holds the
theory of the Pradh4na or something similar, the imper-
fections observed in ordinary things would attach them-
selves to the Pradhana also, since it does not differ in
nature from those things. The legitimate conclusion there-
fore is that Brahman only which differs in nature from all
other things can be held to be the general cause.

The Pradhdna, moreover, is without parts; how then is
' it possible that it should give rise to a manifold world,
comprising the ‘great principle,’ and so on ?—But there are
parts of the Pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Dark-
ness!—This we reply necessitates the following distinc-
tion. Does the aggregate of Goodness, Passion, and
Darkness constitute the Pradh4ana? or is the Pradh4na the
effect of those three? The latter alternative is in conflict
with your own doctrine according to which the Pradhana
is cause only. It moreover contradicts the number of
tattvas (viz. 24) admitted by you; and as those three
guzas also have no parts one does not see how they can
produce an effect. On the former alternative, the guxas
not being composed of parts must be held to aggregate or
join themselves without any reference to difference of
space, and from such conjunction the production of gross
effects cannot result—The same objection applies to the
doctrine of atoms being the general cause. For atoms,
being without parts and spatial distinction of parts, can
join only without any reference to such spatial distinc-
tion, and hence do not possess the power of originating
effects. ἰ

476 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

30. And (the divinity is) endowed with all powers,
because that is seen.

The highest divinity which is different in nature from all
other things is endowed with all powers; for scriptural
texts show it to be such, ‘His high power is revealed as
manifold, as essential, and so his knowledge, force, and
‘ action’ (Svet. Up. VI, 8). In the same way another text
first declares the highest divinity to differ in nature from
everything else, ‘Free from sin, from old age, from death
and grief, from hunger and thirst, and then goes on to
represent it as endowed with all powers, ‘realising all its
wishes, realising all its intentions,’ &c. (A. Up. VIII, 1, 5).
Compare also ‘ He, consisting of mind, having prasa for
his body, whose form is light, who realises his wishes, &c.
(KA. Up. III, 14, 2).

31. Not, on account of the absence of organs ;
this has been explained (before).

Although the one Brahman is different from all other
beings and endowed with all powers, we yet infer from the
text ‘Of him there is known no effect and no instrument,’
that as it is destitute of instruments it cannot produce any
effect.—To this objection an answer has already been -
given in II, 1, 27; 28, ‘on account of its being founded on
the word,’ and ‘for there are manifold (powers).’ That
for which the sacred word is the only means of knowledge,
and which is different from all other things, is capable of
producing those effects also of the instrumental means of
which it is destitute. It is in this spirit that Scripture
says ‘ He sees without eyes, he hears without ears, without
hands and feet he hastens and grasps’ (Svet. Up. III, 19).—
Here terminates the adhikarama of ‘the consequence of the
entire (Brahman).

32. (Brahman is) not (the cause) ; on account of
(the world) having the nature of what depends on a
motive.

Although the Lord, who before creation is alone, is
endowed with all kinds of powers since he differs in nature

II ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 34. «477

from all other beings, and hence is by himself capable of
creating the world ; we all the same cannot ascribe to him
actual causality with regard to the world ; for this manifold
world displays the nature of a thing depending on a motive,
and the Lord has no motive to urge him to creation. In
the case of all those who enter on some activity after
having formed an idea of the effect to be accomplished,
there exists a motive in the form of something beneficial
either to themselves or to others. Now Brahman, to whose
essential nature it belongs that all his wishes are eternally
fulfilled, does not attain through the creation of the world
any object not attained before. Nor again is the second
alternative possible. For a being, all whose wishes are
fulfilled, could concern itself about others only with a view
to benefitting them. No merciful divinity would create
a world so full, as ours is, of evils of all kind—birth, old
age, death, hell, and so on ;—if it created at all, pity would
move it to create a world altogether happy. Brahman thus
having no possible motive cannot be the cause of the world.
—This prima facie view is disposed of in the next Sftra.

33. But (it is) mere sport, as in ordinary life.

The motive which prompts Brahman—all whose wishes
are fulfilled and who is perfect in himself—to the creation
of a world comprising all kinds of sentient and non-
sentient beings dependent on his volition, is nothing else
but sport, play. We see in ordinary life how some great
king, ruling this earth with its seven dvipas, and possessing
perfect strength, valour, and so on, has a game at balls, or
the like, from no other motive than to amuse himself ;
hence there is no objection to the view that sport only is
the motive prompting Brahman to the creation, sustenta-
tion, and destruction of this world which is easily fashioned
by his mere will.

34. Not inequality and cruelty, on account of
there being regard ; for so (Scripture) declares.

It must indeed be admitted that the Lord, who differs in
nature from all other beings, intelligent and non-intelligent,

478 ’ -veDANTA-SOTRAS,

and hence possesses powers unfathomable by thought, is
capable of creating this manifold world, although before
creation he is one only and without parts. But the assump-
tion of his having actually created the world would lay him
open to the charge of partiality, in so far as the world
contains beings of high, middle, and low station—gods,
men, animals, immovable beings; and to that of cruelty,
in so far as he would be instrumental in making his
creatures experience pain of the most dreadful kind.—The
reply to this is ‘not so, on account of there being regard’;
i.e. ‘on account of the inequality of creation depending on
the deeds of the intelligent beings, gods, and 90 on, about
to be created.’ Sruti and Smriti alike declare that the
connexion of the individual souls with bodies of different
kinds—divine, human, animal, and so on—depends on the
karman of those souls ; compare ‘He who performs good
works becomes good, he who performs bad works becomes
bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by bad deeds’
(Bri. Up. IV, 4,5). In the same way the reverend Pardsara
declares that what causes the difference in nature and status
between gods, men, and so on, is the power of the former
deeds of the souls about to enter into a new creation—
‘He (the Lord) is the operative cause only in the creation
of new beings; the material cause is constituted by the
potentialities of the beings to be created. The being to
be embodied requires nothing but an operative cause ; it is
its own potentiality which leads its being into that con-
dition of being (which it is to occupy in the new creation).’
Potentiality here means karman,

35. If it be said ‘not so, on account of non-distinc-
tion of deeds’; we say, ‘not so, on account of begin-
ninglessness’; this is reasonable, and it is also
observed.

But before creation the individual souls do not exist ;
since Scripture teaches non-distinction ‘ Being only this was
in the beginning.’ And as then the souls do not exist, no
karman can exist, and it cannot therefore be said that the
inequality of creation depends on karman.—Of this objec-

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 36, 479

tion the Sfitra disposes by saying ‘on account of beginning-
lessness,’ i.e. although the individual souls and their deeds
form an eternal stream, without a beginning, yet non-
distinction of them ‘is reasonable’ (i.e. may reasonably be
asserted) in so far as, previous to creation, the substance
of the souls abides in a very subtle condition, destitute of
names and forms, and thus incapable of being designated
as something apart from Brahman, although in reality then
also they constitute Brahman’s body only. If it were not
admitted (that the distinctions in the new creation are
due to karman), it would moreover follow that souls are
requited for what they have not done, and not requited
for what they have done. The fact of the souls being
without a beginning is observed, viz., to be stated in
Scripture, ‘The intelligent one is not born and dies not’
(Ka. Up. I, 2, 18) ; so also the fact of the flow of creation
going on from all eternity, ‘As the creator formed sun and
moon formerly.’ Moreover, the text, ‘Now all this was
then undeveloped. It became developed by form and
name’ (Br#. Up. I, 4, 7), states merely that the names and
forms of the souls were developed, and this shows that the
souls themselves existed from the beginning. Smritti also
says, ‘Dost thou know both Prakriti and the soul to be
without beginning ?’ (Bha. Gi. XIII, 19.)—As Brahman thus
differs in nature from everything else, possesses all powers,
has no other motive than sport, and arranges the diversity of
the creation in accordance with the different karman of the
individual souls, Brahman alone can be the universal cause,

36. And because all the attributes are proved (to
be present in Brahman),

As all those attributes required to constitute causality
which have been or will be shown to be absent in the
Pradhana, the atoms, and so on, can be shown to be pre-
sent in Brahman, it remains a settled conclusion that
Brahman only is the cause of the world. Here terminates
the adhikarawa of ‘that which has the nature of depending
on a motive.’

480 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

SECOND PADA.

1. Not that which is inferred, on account of the
impossibility of construction, and on account of
activity.

The Satras have so far set forth the doctrine that the
highest Brahman is the cause of the origination and so on
of the world, and have refuted the objections raised by
others. They now, in order to safeguard their own position,
proceed to demolish the positions held by those very
adversaries. For otherwise it might happen that some
slow-witted persons, unaware of those other views resting
on mere fallacious arguments, would imagine them possibly
to be authoritative, and hence might be somewhat shaken
in their belief in the Vedic doctrine. Another pada there-
fore is begun to the express end of refuting the theories of
others. The beginning is made with the theory of Kapila,
because that theory has several features, such as the view
of the existence of the effect in the cause, which are
approved of by the followers of the Veda, and hence is
more likely, than others, to give rise to the erroneous
view of its being the true doctrine. The Sdtras I, 1, 5
and ff. have proved only that the Vedic texts do not set
forth the Sankhya view, while the task of the present
pada is to demolish that view itself: the Sdtras cannot
therefore be charged with needless reiteration.

The outline of the Saakhya doctrine is as follows.
‘ There is the fundamental Prakriti, which is not an effect;
there are the seven effects of Prakriti, viz. the Mahat and
so on, and the sixteen effects of those effects ; and there is
the soul, which is neither Prakrzti nor effect’—such is the
comprehensive statement of the principles. The entity
called ‘fundamental Prakr#ti’ is constituted by the three

Il ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 481

substances called Sattva, Ragas, and Tamas, (when) in a
state of complete equipoise, none of the three being either
in defect or in excess; the essential nature of those three
consists respectively in pleasure, pain, and dullness; they
have for their respective effects lightness and illumination,
excitement and mobility, heaviness and obstruction ; they
are absolutely non-perceivable by means of the senses, and
to be defined and distinguished through their effects only.
Prakriti, consisting in the equipoise of Sattva, Ragas, and
Tamas, is one, itself non-sentient but subserving the enjoy-
ment and final release of the many sentient beings, eternal,
all-pervading, ever active, not the effect of anything, but
the one general cause. There are seven Principles which
are the effects of Prakriti and the causal substances of
everything else ; these seven are the Mahat, the ahankdra,
the subtle matter (tanm4tra) of sound, the subtle matter of
touch, the subtle matter of colour, the subtle matter of
taste, and the subtle matter of smell. The ahankara is
threefold, being either modified (vaikdrika), or active
(taigasa), or the originator of the elements (Ὁ 841).

The vaik4rika is of sattva-nature and the originator of
the sense-organs ; the bhitadi is of tamas-nature, and the
cause of those subtle matters (tanmAtra) which in their turn
are the cause of the gross elements; the taigasa is of the
nature of ragas, and assists the other two. The five gross
elements are the ether and so on; the five intellectual
senses are hearing and so on; the five organs of action are
speech and so on. With the addition of the internal organ
(manas) these are the sixteen entities which are mere
effects.—The soul, not being capable of any change, is not
either the causal matter or the effect of anything. For
the same reason it is without attributes, consisting of mere
intelligence, eternal, non-active, all-pervading, and different
in each body. Being incapable of change and non-active,
it can neither be an agent nor an enjoyer; but although
this is so, men in their confusion of mind, due to the close-
ness to each other of Prakr:ti and the soul, erroneously
attribute to Prakriti the intelligence of the soul, and to the
soul the activity of Prakriti—just as the redness of the rose

[48] li

482 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

superimposes itself on the crystal near it,—and thus con-
sider the soul to be an ‘I’ and an enjoyer. Fruition thus
results from ignorance, and release from knowledge of the
truth. This their theory the Saakhyas prove by means
of perception, inference, and authoritative tradition. Now
with regard to those matters which are proved by percep-
tion, we Vedantins have no very special reason for dis-
senting from the Sankhyas ; and what they say about their
authoritative tradition, claiming to be founded on the
knowledge of all-knowing persons such as Kapila, has: been
pretty well disproved by us in the first adhydya. If, now,
we further manage to refute the inference which leads them
to assume the Pradh4na as the cause of the world, we
shall have disestablished their whole theory. We therefore
proceed to give this refutation.

On this point the Sankhyas reason as follows. It must
necessarily be admitted that the entire world has one
cause only; for if effects were assumed to originate from
several causes we should never arrive at an ultimate cause.
Assume that parts such as e.g. threads produce a whole
(i.e. in the case of threads, a piece of cloth) in the way
of their being joined together by means of their six sides,
which are parts of the threads. You must then further
assume that the threads themselves are in the same way
produced by their parts, having a similar constitution.
And these parts again by their parts, until you reach the
atoms; these also must be assumed to produce their
immediate effects by being joined together with their six
sides, for otherwise solid extension (prathiman) could not
be brought about. And then the atoms also as being
wholes, consisting of parts', must be viewed as produced
by their parts, and these again by their parts and so on,
so that we never arrive at an ultimate cause. In order
therefore to establish such an ultimate cause we must have
recourse to the hypothesis of the general cause being con-
stituted by one substance, which possesses the power of
transforming itself in various different ways, without at the

* As follows from their having six sides.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 483

same time forfeiting its own essential nature, and which
forms the general substrate for an infinity of different
effects, from the Mahat downwards. This one general
cause is the Pradh4na constituted by the equipoise of the
three guazas, The reasons for the assumption of this Pra-
dhéna are as follows :—‘On account of the limitedness
of particular things; of connexion (anvaya); of activity
proceeding from special power; and of the difference and
non-difference of cause and effect—the Non-evolved (Pra-
dhana) is the general cause of this many-natured Universe’
(vaisvardpya) (SAnkhya ΚΑ. I, 15; 16).—The term ‘vai-
svaripya’ denotes that which possesses all forms, i.e. the
entire world with its variously constituted parts—bodies,
worlds, and so on. This world, which on account of its
variegated constitution must be held to be an effect, has for
its cause the Unevolved (avyakta= Prakriti), which is of
the same nature as the world. Why so? Because it is an
effect ; for we perceive that every effect is different from
its special cause—whieh has the same nature as the effect—
and at the same time is non-different. Such effected things
as e.g. a jar and a gold ornament are different from their
causes, i.e. clay and gold, which have the same nature as
the effects, and at the same time non-different. Hence the
manifold-natured world originates from the Pradh4na which
has the same nature, and is again merged in it: the world
thus has the Pradh4na alone for its cause. This Pradhana
is constituted by the equipoise of the three guzas, and thus
is a cause possessing a nature equal to that of its effect, i.e.
the world; for the world is of the nature of pleasure, pain,
and dullness, which consist of sattva, ragas, and tamas
respectively. The case is analogous to that of a jar con-
sisting of clay; of that also the cause is none other than the
substance clay. For in every case observation shows that
only such causal substances as are of the same nature as
the effects possess that power which is called the origination
of the effect. That the general cause can be found only in
the unevolved Pradh4na, which consists of the three guzas
in a state of equipoise and is unlimited with regard to space
as well as time, follows from the limitedness of the particular
112

484 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

things, viz. the Mahat, the ahank4ra, and so on. These
latter things are limited like jars and so on, and hence
incapable of originating the entire world. Hence it follows
that this world, consisting of the three guvas, has for its
only cause the Pradh4na, which is constituted by those
three guzas in a state of equipoise.

Against this argumentation the Sdtra says, ‘Not that
which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of con-
struction, and on account of activity.’—‘ Inference’ means
‘that which is inferred,’ i.e. the Pradhana. The Pradhana
postulated by you is not capable of constructing this mani-
fold-natured world, because while itself being non-intelli-
gent it is not guided by an intelligent being understanding
its nature. Whatever is of this latter kind is incapable
of producing effects; as e.g. wood and the like by them-
selves are not capable of constructing a palace or a carriage.
As it is matter of observation that non-intelligent wood,
not guided by an intelligent agent understanding its nature,
cannot produce effects ; and as it is observed that if guided
by such an agent matter does enter on action so as to
produce effects; the Pradhana, which is not ruled by an
intelligent agent, cannot be the general cause. The ‘and’
in the Sftra is meant to add as a further argument that
‘ presence’ (anvaya) has no proving force. For whiteness
present in cows and so on is not invariably accompanied
by the quality of being the cause of the class characteristics
of cows. Nor must it be said that qualities such as white-
ness, although present in the effect, may not indeed be
causes, but that substances such as gold and the like which
are present in certain effects are invariably accompanied
by the quality of being causes, and that hence also the
᾿ substances called sattva, ragas, and tamas, which are found
present in all effects, are proved to be the causes of all
those effects. For sattva and so on are attributes of
substances, but not themselves substances. Sattva and so
on are the causes of the lightness, light, &c., belonging to
substances such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive
attributes of the essential nature of those substances, but
they are not observed to be present in any effects in

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2. 485

a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other substances are.
It is for this reason that they are known as ‘guzas.’ You
have further said that the world’s having one cause only
must be postulated in order that an ultimate cause may be
reached. But as the sattva, ragas, and tamas are not one
but three, you yourself do not assume one cause, and hence
do not manage to arrive at an ultimate cause. For your
Pradhana consists in the equipoise of the three guzas;
there are thus several causes, and you have no more an
ultimate cause than others. Nor can you say that this
end is accomplished through the three gu#as being un-
limited. For if the three guaas are all alike unlimited,
and therefore omnipresent, there is nowhere a plus or minus
of any of them, and as thus no inequality can result,
effects cannot originate. In order to explain the origination
of results it is therefore necessary to assume limitation of
the guzas.

Nor is our view confirmed by those cases only in which
it is clearly perceived that matter produces effects only
when guided by an intelligent principle; other cases 8150
(where the fact is not perceived with equal clearness) are
in favour of our view. This the next Sdtra declares.

2. If it be said—like milk or water; there also
(intelligence guides).

What has been said—the Sankhya rejoins—as to the
impossibility of the Pradhana not guided by an intelligent
principle constructing this variously constituted world, is
unfounded ; for the Pradh4na may be supposed to act in the
same way as milk and water do. Milk, when turning into
sour milk, is capable of going by itself through a series of
changes: it does not therefore depend on anything else.
In the same way we observe that the homogeneous water
discharged from the clouds spontaneously proceeds to trans-
form itself into the various saps and juices of different
plants, such as palm trees, mango trees, wood-apple trees,
lime trees, tamarind trees, and so on. In the same way
the Pradhdna, of whose essential nature it is to change, may,
without being guided by another agent, abide in the interval

486 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

between two creations in a state of homogeneousness, and
then when the time for creation comes modify itself into
many various effects due to the loss of equilibrium on the
part of the guzas. As has been said ‘(the Pradhana acts),
owing to modification, as water according to the difference
of the abodes of the several guzas’ (S4nkhya Ka. I, 16).
In this way the Unevolved acts independently of anything
else.

To this reasoning the Sftra replies ‘there also.’ Also,
in the instances of milk and water, activity is not possible
in the absence of an intelligent principle, for these very
cases have already been referred to as proving our posi-
tion. The Sdtra II, 1, 24 (where the change of milk into
sour milk is instanced) meant to prove only that a being
destitute of other visible instruments of action is able to
produce its own special effect, but not to disprove the
view of all agency presupposing an intelligent principle.
That even in water and so on an intelligent principle is
present is proved by scriptural texts, ‘he who dwells in
water’ and so on.

3. And because from the independence (of the
Pradhdna) there would follow the non-existence of
what is different (from creation, i.e. of the pralaya
condition).

That the Pradhana which is not guided by an intelligent
principle is not the universal cause is proved also by the fact
that, if we ascribe to it a power for change independent of
the guidance of a Lord capable of realising all his purposes,
it would follow that the pralaya state, which is different
from the state of creation, would not exist; while on the
other hand the guidance of the Pradhana by a Lord
explains the alternating states of creation and pralaya as
the effects of his purposes. Nor can the Sankhya retort
that our view gives rise to similar difficulties in so far,
namely, as the Lord, all whose wishes are eternally accom-
plished, who is free from all imperfection, &c. &c., cannot
be the originator of either creation or pralaya, and as the
creation of an unequal world would lay him open to the

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3. 487

charge of mercilessness. For, as explained before, even
a being perfect and complete may enter on activity for the
sake of sport; and as the reason for a particular creation
on the part of an all-knowing Lord may be his recognition
of Prakriti having reached a certain special state, it is the
deeds of the individual souls which bring about the in-
equalities in the new creation.—But if this is so, all differ-
ence of states is caused exclusively by the good and evil
deeds of the individual souls; and what position remains
then for a ruling Lord? Prakriti, impressed by the good
and evil deeds of the souls, will by herself modify herself on
such lines as correspond to the deserts of the individual
souls; in the same way as we observe that food and drink,
if either vitiated by poison or reinforced by medicinal herbs
and juices, enter into new states which render them the
causes of either pleasure or pain. Hence all the differences
between states of creation and pralaya, as also the in-
equalities among created beings such as gods, men, and so
on, and finally the souls reaching the condition of Release,
may be credited to the Pradhana, possessing as it does the
capability of modifying itself into all possible forms !—You
do not, we reply, appear to know anything about the nature
of good and evil works ; for this is a matter to be learned
from the Sastra. The Sastra is constituted by the aggre-
gate of words called Veda, which is handed on by an endless
unbroken succession of pupils learning from qualified
teachers, and raised above all suspicion of imperfections such
as spring from mistake and the like. It is the Veda which
gives information as to good and evil deeds, the essence of
which consists in their pleasing or displeasing the Supreme
Person, and as to their results, viz. pleasure and pain, which
depend on the grace or wrath of the Lord. In agreement
herewith the DramidAarya says, ‘From the wish of giving
rise to fruits they seek to please the Self with works; he
being pleased is able to bestow fruits, this is the purport of
the SAstra.’ Thus Sruti also says, ‘Sacrifices and pious
works which are performed in many forms, all that he bears
(i.e. he takes to himself); he the navel of the Universe’
(Mahanar. Up. I, 6). And in the same spirit the Lord

488 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

himself declares, ‘From whom there proceed all beings, by
whom all this is pervaded—worshipping him with the
proper works man attains to perfection’ (Bha. Gi. XVIII,
46); and ‘These evil and malign haters, lowest of men,
I hurl perpetually into transmigrations and into demoniac
wombs’ (Bha. Gi. XVI, 19). The divine Supreme Person,
all whose wishes are eternally fulfilled, who is all-knowing
and the ruler of all, whose every purpose is immediately
realised, having engaged in sport befitting his might and
greatness and having settled that work is of a twofold
nature, such and such works being good and such and such
being evil, and having bestowed on all individual souls
bodies and sense-organs capacitating them for entering on
such work and the power of ruling those bodies and organs ;
and having himself entered into those souls as their inner
Self abides within them, controlling them as an animating
and cheering principle. The souls, on their side, endowed
with all the powers imparted to them by the Lord and with
bodies and organs bestowed by him, and forming abodes in
which he dwells, apply themselves on their own part, and
in accordance with their own wishes, to works either good
or evil. The Lord, then, recognising him who performs
good actions as one who obeys his commands, blesses him
with piety, riches, worldly pleasures, and final release ; while
him who transgresses his commands he causes to experience
the opposites of all these. There is thus no room whatever
for objections founded on deficiency, on the Lord’s part, of
independence in his dealings with men, and the like. Nor
can he be arraigned with being pitiless or merciless. For
by pity we understand the inability, on somebody’s part, to
bear the pain of others, coupled with a disregard of his own
advantage. When pity has the effect of bringing about the
transgression of law on the part of the pitying person, it is
in no way to his credit; it rather implies the charge of
unmanliness (weakness), and it is creditable to control and
subdue it. For otherwise it would follow that to subdue
and chastise one’s enemies is something to be blamed.
What the Lord himself aims at is ever to increase happiness
to the highest degree, and to this end it is instrumental that

11 ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 5. 489

he should reprove and reject the infinite and intolerable
mass of sins which accumulates in the course of beginning
and endless aeons, and thus check the tendency on the part
of individual beings to transgress his laws. For thus he says :
‘To them ever devoted; worshipping me in love, I give that
means of wisdom by which they attain to me. In mercy
only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the
darkness born of ignorance with the brilliant light of know-
ledge’ (Bha. Gi. X, 10, 11).—It thus remains a settled
conclusion that the Pradhdna, which is not guided by an
intelligent principle, cannot be the general cause.—Here
a further objection is raised. Although Prakriti, as not
being ruled by an intelligent principle, is not capable of
that kind of activity which springs from effort, she may yet
be capable of that kind of activity which consists in mere
transformation. For we observe parallel cases; the grass
and water e.g. which are consumed by a cow change on
their own account into milk. In the same way, then, Pra-
kriti may on her own account transform herself into the
world.—To this the next Sdtra replies.

4. Nor like grass and so on; because (milk) does
not exist elsewhere.

This argumentation does not hold good; for as grass and
the like do not transform themselves without the guidance
of an intelligent principle, your proving instance is not
established.— But why is it not established ?—‘ Because it
does not exist elsewhere.’ If grass, water and so on
changed into milk even when consumed by a bull or when
not consumed at all, then indeed it might be held that they
change without the guidance of an intelligent principle.
But nothing of the kind takes place, and hence we conclude
that it is the intelligent principle only which turns the grass
eaten by the cow into milk.—This point has been set
forth above under Sitra 3; the present Sfitra is meant
to emphasise and particularise it.

5. And if you say—as the man and the stone;
thus also.

490 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Here the following view might be urged. Although the
soul consists of mere intelligence and is inactive, while the
Pradhdna is destitute of all power of thought ; yet the non-
sentient Pradhadna may begin to act owing to the mere
nearness of the soul. For we observe parallel instances.
A man blind but capable of motion may act in some way,
owing to the nearness to him of some lame man who has
no power of motion but possesses good eyesight and assists
the blind man with his intelligence. And through the
nearness of the magnetic stone iron moves. In the same
way the creation of the world may result from the con-
nexion of Prakriti and the soul. As has been said, ‘In order
that the soul may know the Pradh4na and become isolated,
the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame
and the blind; and thence creation springs’ (Sankhya Ka.
2t). This means—to the end that the soul may experience
the PradhAna, and for the sake of the soul’s emancipation,
the Pradh4na enters on action at the beginning of creation,
owing to the nearness of the soul.

To this the Sdtra replies ‘thus also.’ This means—the
inability of the PradhAana to act remains the same, in spite
of these instances. The lame man is indeed incapable of
walking, but he possesses various other powers—he can see
the road and give instructions regarding it ; and the blind
man, being an intelligent being, understands those instruc-
tions and directs his steps accordingly. The magnet again
possesses the attribute of moving towards the iron and so
on. The soul on the other hand, which is absolutely inactive,
is incapable of all such changes. As, moreover, the mere
nearness of the soul to the Pradh4na is something eternal,
it would follow that the creation also is eternal. If, on the
other hand, the soul is held to be eternally free, then there
can be no bondage and no release.

6. And on account of the impossibility of the
relation of principal (and subordinate) matter.

You Sankhyas maintain that the origination of the world
results from a certain relation between principal and sub-
ordinate entities which depends on the relative inferiority

11 ADHYAyA, 2 PADA, 8. 491

and superiority of the guzas—‘ according to the difference
of the abodes of the several guzas’ (Sankhya Ka. I, 16).

But, as in the pralaya state the three gumas are in a state
of equipoise, none of them being superior or inferior to the
others, that relation of superiority and subordination -can-
not then exist, and hence the world cannot originate.
Should it, on the other hand, be maintained that even in
the pralaya state there is a certain inequality, it would
follow therefrom that creation is eternal.

7. And if another inference be made (the result
remains unchanged), on account of (the Pradhdna)
being destitute of the power of a knowing subject.

Even if the Pradhana were inferred by some reasoning
different from the arguments so far refuted by us, our ob-
jections would remain in force because, anyhow, the Pra-
dhana is devoid of the power of a cognising subject. The
Pradhd4na thus cannot be established by any mode of
inference.

8. And even if it be admitted ; on account of the
absence of a purpose.

Even if it were admitted that the Pradh4na is established
by Inference, the Sankhya theory could not be accepted for
the reason that the Pradhana is without a purpose. For,
according to the view expressed in the passage, ‘In order
that the soul may know the Pradhdna and become isolated’
(Sankhya Ka. I, 21), the purpose of the Pradhana is fruition
and final release on the part of the soul; but both these are
impossible. For, as the soul consists of pure intelligence,
is inactive, changeless, and spotless, and hence eternally
emancipated, it is capable neither of fruition which consists
in consciousness of Prakriti, nor of Release which consists
in separation from Prakriti. If, on the other hand, it be
held that the soul constituted as described is, owing to the
mere neamess of Prakriti, capable of fruition, i.e. of being
conscious of pleasure and pain, which are special modifica-
tions of Prakriti, it follows that, as Prakriti is ever near,
the soul will never accomplish emancipation.

492 VEDANTA-SOUTRAS.

9. And (it is) objectionable on account of the
contradictions. ἢ

The S4akhya-system, moreover, labours from many in-
ternal contradictions—The Sankhyas hold that while
Prakriti is for the sake of another and the object of know-
ledge and fruition, the soul is independent, an enjoying and
knowing agent, and conscious of Prakriti; that the soul
reaches isolation through the instrumentality of Prakriti
only, and that as its nature is pure, permanent, unchanging
consciousness, absence of all activity and isolation belong
to that nature; that for this reason the accomplishing of
the means of bondage and release and of release belong
to Prakriti only; and that, owing to Prakriti’s proximity
to the unchanging non-active soul, Prakriti, by a process of
mutual superimposition (adhy4sa), works towards the crea-
tion of a world and subserves the purposes of the soul’s
fruition and emancipation.—‘ Since the aggregate of things
is for the sake of another ; since there is an opposite of the
three gua#as and the rest; since there is superintendence ;
since there is an experiencing subject ; and since there is
activity for the sake of isolation ; the soul exists’ (SAnkhya
Ka. 17); ‘And from that contrast the soul is proved to be
a witness, isolated, neutral, cognising, and inactive’ (18).—
And after having stated that the activity of the Pradh4na
is for the purpose of the release of the Self, the text says,
‘therefore no (soul) is either bound or released, nor does it
migrate ; it is Prakrzti, which, abiding in various beings, is
bound and released and migrates’ (62). And ‘From this
connexion therewith (i.e. with the soul) the non-intelligent
appears as intelligent ; and although all agency belongs to
the guwas, the indifferent (soul) becomes an agent. In
order that the soul may know the Pradhana and become
isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like that
of the lame and the blind; and thence creation springs’
(20, 21).—Now to that which is eternally unchanging, non-
active and isolated, the attributes of being a witness and
an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong.
Nor also can such a being be subject to error resting on

Ir ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 9. 493

superimposition ; for error and superimposition both are of
the nature of change. And, on the other hand, they also
cannot belong to Prakriti, since they are attributes of in-
telligent beings. For by superimposition we understand
the attribution, on the part of an intelligent being, of the
qualities of one thing to another thing; and this is the
doing of an intelligent being, and moreover a change. Nor
is it possible that superimposition and the like should take
place in the soul only if it is in approximation to Prakriti.
—They may take place just on account of the non-changing
nature of the soul !—Then, we reply, they would take place
permanently. And that mere proximity has no effective
power we have already shown under II, 1, 4. And if it is
maintained that it is Prakriti only that migrates, is bound
and released, how then can she be said to benefit the soul,
which is eternally released ? That she does so the Sankhyas
distinctly assert, ‘By manifold means Prakriti, helpful and
endowed with the guzas, without any benefit to herself,
accomplishes the purpose of the soul, which is thankless
and not composed of the guvas’ (S4nkhya K4. 60).—The
Sankhyas further teach that Prakriti, on being seen by
any soul in her true nature, at once retires from that soul
—‘ As a dancer having exhibited herself on the stage with-
draws from the soul, so Praky#ti withdraws from the soul
when she has manifested herself to it’ (59); ‘My opinion
is that there exists nothing more sensitive than Prakriti,
who knowing “I have been seen” does not again show
itself to the soul’ (61). But this doctrine also is inappro-
priate. For, as the soul is eternally released and above all
change, it never sees Prakriti, nor does it attribute to itself
her qualities ; and Prakriti herself does not see herself since
she is of non-intelligent nature ; nor can she wrongly impute
to herself the soul’s seeing of itself as her own seeing of
herself, for she herself is non-intelligent and the soul is
incapable of that change which consists in seeing or know-
ing.—Let it then be said that the ‘seeing’ means nothing
more than the proximity of Prakriti to the soul !—But this
also does not help you ; for, as said above, from that there
would follow eternal seeing, since the two are in eternal

494 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

proximity. Moreover, the ever unchanging soul is not
capable of an approximation which does not form an
element of its unchanging nature.—Moreover, if you define
the seeing as mere proximity and declare this to be the
cause of Release, we point out that it equally is the cause
of bondage—so that bondage and release would both be
permanent.—Let it then be said that what causes bondage
is wrong seeing—while intuition of the true nature of things
is the cause of Release !—But as both these kinds of seeing
are nothing but proximity, it would follow that both take
place permanently. And if, on the other hand, the prox-
imity of Soul and Prakriti were held not to be permanent,
then the cause of such proximity would have to be assigned,
and again the cause of that, and so on ad infinitum.—Let
us then, to escape from these difficulties, define proximity
as nothing more than the true nature of soul and Prakriti !
—As the true nature is permanent, we reply, it would follow
therefrom that bondage and release would be alike per-
manent.—On account of all these contradictory views the
system of the Sankhyas is untenable.

We finally remark that the arguments here set forth
by us at the same time prove the untenableness of the
view of those who teach that there is an eternally unchang-
ing Brahman whose nature is pure, non-differenced intelli-
gence, and which by being conscious of Nescience experi-
ences unreal bondage and release. For those philosophers
can show no more than the Sankhyas do how their Brahman
can be conscious of Nescience, can be subject to adhydasa,
and soon. There is, however, the following difference be-
tween the two theories. The Sankhyas, in order to account
for the definite individual distribution of birth, death, and
80 on, assume a plurality of souls. The Vedantins, on the
other hand, do not allow even so much, and their doctrine
is thus all the more irrational. The assertion that there is
a difference (in favour of the Ved4ntins) between the two
doctrines, in so far as the Vedantins hold Prakriti to be
something unreal, while the Sankhyas consider it to be real,
is unfounded ; for pure, homogeneous intelligence, eternally
non-changing, cannot possibly be conscious of anything

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 10. 495

different from itself, whether it be unreal or real. And if
that thing is held to be unreal, there arise further difficulties,
owing to its having to be viewed as the object of know-
ledge, of refutation, and so on.

Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the impossibility of
construction.’

10. Or in the same way as the big and long from
the short and the atomic.

We have shown that the theory of the Pradhana being
the universal cause is untenable, since it rests on fallacious
arguments, and suffers from inner contradictions. We shall
now prove that the view of atoms constituting the universal
cause is untenable likewise. ‘Or in the same way as the
big and long from the short and the atomic.’—‘Is unten-
able’ must be supplied from the preceding Sdtra ; ‘or’ has
to be taken in the sense of ‘and.’ The sense of the Satra
is—in the same way as the big and long, i.e. as the theory
of ternary compounds originating from the short and the
atomic, i.e. from binary compounds and simple atoms is
untenable, so everything else which they (the Vaiseshikas)
maintain is untenable ; or, in other words—as the theory of
the world originating from atoms through binary compounds
is untenable, so everything else is likewise untenable.—
Things consisting of parts, as e.g. a piece of cloth, are pro-
duced by their parts, e.g. threads, being joined by means of
the six sides which are parts of those parts. Analogously
the atoms also must be held to originate binary compounds
in the way of combining by means of their six sides; for if
the atoms possessed no distinction of parts (and hence filled
no space), a group of even a thousand atoms would not
differ in extension from a single atom, and the different
kinds of extension—minuteness, shortness, bigness, length,
&c.—would never emerge. If, on the other hand, it is ad-
mitted that the atoms also have distinct sides, they have
parts and are made up of those parts, and those parts again
are made up of their parts, and so on in infinitum.—But,
the Vaiseshika may object, the difference between a mustard
seed and a mountain is due to the paucity-of the constituent

496 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

parts on the one hand, and their multitude on the other.
If, now, it be held that the atom itself contains an infinity
of parts, the mustard seed and the mountain alike will
contain an infinity of parts, and thus their inequality
cannot be accounted for. We must therefore assume that
there is a limit of subdivision (i.e. that there are real atoms
which do not themselves consist of parts).—Not so, we
reply. If the atoms did not possess distinct parts, there
could originate no extension greater than the extension
of one atom (as already shown), and thus neither mustard
seed nor mountain would ever be brought about.—But
what, then, are we to do to get out of this dilemma?—
You have only to accept the Vedic doctrine of the origina-
tion of the world!

Others explain the above Sftra as meant to refute an
objection against the doctrine of Brahman being the general
cause. But this does not suit the arrangement of the
Sdtras, and would imply a meaningless iteration. The
objections raised by some against the doctrine of Brahman
have been disposed of in the preceding pAda, and the pre-
sent pada is devoted to the refutation of other theories.
And that the world admits of being viewed as springing
from an intelligent principle such as Brahman was shown
at length under II, 1,4. The sense of the Satra, therefore,
is none other than what we stated above.—But what are
those other untenable views to which the Sftra refers ?—
To this question the next Sitra replies.

11. On both assumptions also there is no motion,
and thence non-being (of the origination of the
world).

The atomic theory teaches that the world is produced
by the successive formation of compounds, binary, ternary,
and so on, due to the aggregation of atoms—such aggrega-
tion resulting from the motion of the atoms. The primary
motion of the atoms—which are the cause of the origination
of the entire world—is assumed to be brought about by the
unseen principle (advésh/a), ‘The upward flickering of fire,
the sideway motion of air, the primary motion on the part

1 ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IT. 497

of atoms and of the manas are caused by the unseen prin-
ciple. —Is then, we ask, this primary motion of the atoms
caused by an advish/a residing in them, or by an advishfa
residing in the souls? Neither alternative is possible. For
the unseen principle which is originated by the good and
evil deeds of the individual souls cannot possibly reside in
the atoms; and if it could, the consequence would be that
the atoms would constantly produce the world. Nor again
can the advishéa residing in the souls be the cause of motion
originating in the atoms.—Let it then be assumed that
motion originates in the atoms, owing to their being in
contact with the souls in which the advishfa abides !—If
this were so, we reply, it would follow that the world would
be permanently created, for the advish¢a of the souls forms
an eternal stream.—But the advishfa requires to be matured
in order to produce results. The advishéas of some souls
come to maturity in the same state of existence in which
the deeds were performed ; others become mature in a sub-
sequent state of existence only; and others again do not
become mature before a new Kalpa has begun. It is owing
to this dependence on the maturation of the adrishéas that
the origination of the world does not take place at all times.
—But this reasoning also we cannot admit. For there is
nothing whatever to establish the conclusion that all the
different adyzsh¢as which spring from the manifold actions
performed at different times, without any previous agree-
ment, by the infinite multitude of individual Selfs should
reach a state of uniform maturation at one and the same
moment of time (so as to give rise to a new creation),
Nor does this view of yours account for the fact of the
entire world being destroyed at the same time, and re-
maining in a state of non-maturation for the period of
a dviparardha.—Nor can you say that the motion of the
atoms is due to their conjunction with (souls whose) advishéa
possesses certain specific qualities imparted to them by the
will of the Lord; for by mere inference the existence of
a Lord cannot be proved, as we have shown under I, 1.

The origin of the world cannot, therefore, be due to any
action on the part of the atoms.

[48] Kk

498 ~* VEDANTA-SOTRAS.” ὁ"

12. And because owing to the acknowledgment
of samavaya, there results a regressus in infinitum
from equality.

The Vaiseshika doctrine is further iutenable on account
of the acknowledgment of samavaya.—Why so ?—Because
the samavAya also, like part, quality, and generic character-
istics, requires something else to establish it,and that some-
thing else again requires some further thing to establish it
—from which there arises an infinite regress. . To explain.
The Vaiseshikas assume the so-called samavaya relation,
defining it as ‘that connexion which is the cause of the
idea “ this is here,” in the case of things permanently and
inseparably connected, and standing to each other in the
relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode.’ Now,
if such a samavaya relation is assumed in order to account
for the fact that things observed to be inseparably con-
nected—as, e.g., class characteristics are inseparably con-
nected with the individuals to which they belong—are
such, i.e. inseparably connected, a reason has also to be
‘searched for why the samavaya, which is of the same nature
as those things (in so far, namely, as it is also inseparably
‘connected with the things connected by it), is such; and for
that reason, again, a further reason has to be postulated, and
So on, in infinitum. Nor can it be said that inseparable
connexion must be assumed to constitute the essential
nature of samavaya (so that no further reason need be
demanded for its inseparable connexion); for on this
reasoning you would have to assume the same essential
nature for class characteristics, qualities, and so on (which
would render the assumption of a samavaya needless for
-them also). Nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate
an unseen entity such as the samavdya is, and then to
assume for it such and such an essential nature.—These
objections apply to the samavaya whether it be viewed as
eternal or non-eternal. The next Sfitra urges a further
objection against it if viewed as eternal.

13. And because world ia would thus be
eternal.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 15. 499

The samavdya 15 ἃ relation, and if that relation is eternal
that to which the relation belongs must also be eternal, so
that we would arrive at the unacceptable conclusion that
the world is eternal.

14. And on account of (the atoms) having colour
and so on, the reverse (takes place); as it is
observed.

From the view that the atoms of four kinds—viz. of earth
‘or water or fire or air—possess colour, taste, smell, and
touch, it would follow that the atoms are non-eternal,
gross, and made up of parts—and this is the reverse of
what the Vaiseshikas actually teach as to their atoms, viz.
that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts.
For things possessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal,
because it is observed that they are produced from other
causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal nature, and soon. To
a non-perceived thing which is assumed in accordance with
what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any attri-
butes that would be convenient to us; and it is in accor-
dance with actual experience that you Vaiseshikas assume
the atoms to possess colour and other qualities. Hence
your theory is untenable.—Let it then, in order to avoid
this difficulty, be assumed that the atoms do not possess
colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative
the next Sftra refers.

1 5. And as there are objections in both cases.

A difficulty arises not only on the view of the atoms
‘having colour and other sensible qualities, but also on the
‘view of their being destitute of those qualities. For as the
qualities of effected things depend on the qualities of their
causes, earth, water, and so on, would in that case be
destitute of qualities. And if to avoid this difficulty, it be
held that the atoms do possess qualities, we are again met
by the difficulty stated in the preceding Sfitra. Objections
thus arising in both cases, the theory of the atoms is
untenable. ise

Kk 2

500 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

16. And as it is not accepted, it is altogether
disregarded.

Kapila’s doctrine, although to be rejected on account of
its being in conflict with Scripture and sound reasoning,
yet recommends itself to the adherents of the Veda on
some accounts—as e.g. its view of the existence of the
effect in the cause. Kazd4da’s theory, on the other hand,
of which no part can be accepted and which is totally
destitute of proof, cannot but be absolutely disregarded by
all those who aim at the highest end of man.—Here
terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the big and long.’

17. Even on the aggregate with its two causes,
there is non-establishment of that.

We so far have refuted the Vaiseshikas, who hold the
doctrine of atoms constituting the general cause. Now the
followers of Buddha also teach that the world originates
from atoms, and the Sdtras therefore proceed to declare
that on their view also the origination, course, and so on,
of the world cannot rationally be accounted for. These
Bauddhas belong to four different classes. Some of them
hold that all outward things, which are either elements
(bhdta) or elemental (bhautika), and all inward things
which are either mind (Aitta) or mental (4aitta),—all these
things consisting of aggregates of the atoms of earth, water,
fire and air—are proved by means of Perception as well as
Inference. Others hold that all external things, earth, and
so on, are only to be inferred from ideas (vig#4na). Others
again teach that the only reality are ideas to which no
outward things correspond; the (so-called) outward things
‘are like the things seen in dreams. The three schools
mentioned agree in holding that the things admitted by
them have a momentary existence only, and do not allow
that, in addition to the things mentioned, viz. elements
and elemental things, mind and mental things, there are
certain further independent entities such as ether, Self, and
so on.—Others finally assert a universal void, i.e. the non-
reality of everything.

ll ADHYAyA, 2 PADA, 17. 501

The SAtras at first dispose of the theory of those who
acknowledge the real existence of external things. Their
opinion is as follows. The atoms of earth which possess
the qualities of colour, taste, touch and smell; the atoms
of water which possess the qualities of colour, taste and
touch ; the atoms of fire which possess the qualities of
colour and touch ; and the atoms of air which possess the
quality of touch only, combine so as to constitute earth,
water, fire and air; and out of the latter there originate
the aggregates called bodies, sense-organs, and objects of
sense-organs. And that flow of ideas, which assumes the
form of the imagination of an apprehending agent abiding
within the body, is what constitutes the so-called Self. On the
agencies enumerated there rests the entire empiric world.—
On this view the Sitra remarks, ‘Even on the aggregate
with its two causes, there is non-establishment of that.’
That aggregate which consists of earth and the other
elements and of which the atoms are the cause; and that
further aggregate which consists of bodies, sense-organs
and objects, and of which the elements are the cause—on
neither of these two aggregates with their twofold causes
can there be proved establishment of that, i.e. can the
origination of that aggregate which we call the world be
rationally established. If the atoms as well as earth and
the other elements are held to have a momentary existence
only, when, we ask, do the atoms which perish within
a moment, and the elements, move towards combination,
and when do they combine? and when do they become
the objects of states of consciousness? and when do they
become the abodes of the activities of appropriation,
avoidance and so on (on the part of agents)? and what is
the cognising Self? and with what objects does it enter
into contact through the sense-organs? and which cog-
nising Self cognises which objects, and at what time? and
which Self proceeds to appropriate which objects, and at
what time? For the sentient subject has perished, and
the object of sensation has perished; and the cognising
subject has perished, and the object cognised has perished.
And how can one subject cognise what has been appre-

502 ν᾿ VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

hended through the senses of another? and how is one
subject to take to itself what another subject has cognised ?.
And should it be said that each stream of cognitions is one
(whereby a kind of unity of the cognising subject is claimed
to be established), yet this affords no sufficient basis for
the ordinary notions and activities of life, since the stream
really is nothing different from the constituent parts of the
stream (all of which are momentary and hence discrete).—
That in reality the Ego constitutes the Self and is the
knowing subject, we have proved previously.

18. If it be said that (this) is to be explained
through successive causality ; we say ‘no,’ on account
of their not being the causes of aggregation.

‘If it be said that through the successive causality of
Nescience and so on, the formation of aggregates and
other matters may be satisfactorily accounted for.’. To
explain. Although all the entities (acknowledged by the
Bauddhas) have a merely momentary existence, yet all
that is accounted for by avidy4. AvidyA means that con-
ception, contrary to reality, by which permanency, and so
on, are ascribed to what is momentary, and so on. Through
avidya there are originated desire, aversion, &c., which are
comprised under the general term ‘impression’ (samskAra) ;
and from those there springs cognition (vig#Ana) which con-
sists in the ‘kindling’ of mind ; from that mind (Aitta) and
what is of the nature of mind (faitta) and the substances
possessing colour, and so on, viz. earth, water, &c. From
that again the six sense-organs, called ‘the six abodes’;
from that the body, called ‘touch’ (sparsa) ; from that
sensation (vedand), and so on. And from that again
avidy4, and the whole series as described ; so that there is
an endlessly revolving cycle, in which avidy4, and so on, are
in turn the causes of the links succeeding them. Now all
this is not possible without those aggregates of the elements
and elemental things which are called earth, and so on;
and thereby the rationality of the formation of those
aggregates is proved.

“Τὸ this the second half of the Sftra replies “Not so, on

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 19. 503,

account of (their) not being the causes of aggregation’.
This cannot rationally be assumed, because avidya, and so
on, cannot be operative causes with regard to the aggrega-
tion of earth and the other elements and elemental things..
For avidy4, which consists in the view of permanency and
so on, belonging to what is non-permanent, and desire,
aversion and the rest, which are originated by avidy4, cannot
constitute the causes of (other) momentary things entering
into aggregation ; not any more than the mistaken idea of
Shell-silver is the cause of the aggregation of things such as
shells. Moreover, on the Bauddha doctrine, he who. views
a momentary thing as permanent himself perishes at the
same moment; who then is the subject in whom the so-
called samskéras, i. e. desire, aversion, and so on, originate ?
Those who do not acknowledge one permanent substance
constituting the abode of the samskaras have no right to
assume the continuance of the samskéras.

19. And on account of the cessation of the pre-
ceding one on the origination of the subsequent one.

. For the following reason also the origination of the world
cannot be accounted for on the view of the momentariness
of all existence. At the time when the subsequent momen-
tary existence originates, the preceding momentary exist-
ence has passed away, and it cannot therefore stand in
a causal relation towards the subsequent one. For if non-
existence had causal power, anything might originate at
any time at any place—Let it then be said that what con-
stitutes a cause is nothing else but existence in a previous
moment.—But, if this were so, the previous momentary
existence of a jar, let us say, would be the. cause of all
things whatever that would be met with in this threefold
world in the subsequent moment—cows, buffaloes, horses,
chairs, stones, &c. !—Let us then say that a thing existing
in a previous moment is the cause only of those things,
existing in the subsequent moment, which belong to the
same species.—But from this again it would follow that
one jar existing in the previous moment would be the
cause of all jars, to be met with in any place, existing in

504 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the following moment !—Perhaps you mean to say that one
thing is the cause of one subsequent thing only. But how
then are we to know which thing is the cause of which one
subsequent thing ?—Well then I say that the momentarily
existing jar which exists in a certain place is the cause of
that one subsequent momentary jar only which exists at
the very same place!—Very good, then you hold that
a place is something permanent! (while yet your doctrine
is that there is nothing permanent).—Moreover as, on your
theory, the thing which has entered into contact with the
eye or some other sense-organ does no longer exist at
the time when the idea originates, nothing can ever be the
object of a cognition.

20, There not being (a cause), there results con-
tradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise simul-
taneousness,

If it be said that the effect may originate even when
a cause does not exist, then—as we have pointed out
before—anything might originate anywhere and at any
time. And not only would the origination of the effect
thus remain unexplained, but an admitted principle would
also be contradicted. For you hold the principle that
there are four causes bringing about the origination of
a cognition, viz. the adhipati-cause, the sahakdri-cause, the
A4lambhana-cause, and the samanantara-cause. The term
adhipati denotes the sense-organs.—And if, in order to
avoid opposition to an acknowledged principle, it be as-
sumed that the origination of a further momentary jar takes
place at the time when the previous momentary jar still
exists, then it would follow that the two momentary jars,
the causal one and the effected one, would be perceived
together; but as a matter of fact they are not so perceived.
And, further, the doctrine of general momentariness would
thus be given up. And should it be said that (this is not
so, but that) momentariness remains, it would follow that
the connexion of the sense-organ with the object and the
cognition are simultaneous.

21. There is non-establishment of pratisankhya

11 ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 22. 505

and apratisankhy4 destruction, on account of non-
interruption.

So far the hypothesis of origination from that which is
not has been refuted. The present Sfitra now goes on to
declare that also the absolute (niranvaya) destruction of
that which is cannot rationally be demonstrated. Those
who maintain the momentariness of all things teach that
there are two kinds of destruction, one of a gross kind,
which consists in the termination of a series of similar
momentary existences, and is capable of being perceived
as immediately resulting from agencies such as the blow
of a hammer (breaking a jar, e.g.); and the other of a
subtle kind, not capable of being perceived, and taking
place in a series of similar momentary existences at every
moment. The former is called pratisaikhy4-destruction ;
the latter apratisankhy4-destruction.— Both these kinds of
destruction are not possible.—Why?—On account of the
non-interruption, i.e. on account of the impossibility of
the complete destruction of that which is, The impossi-
bility of such destruction was proved by us under II, 1, 14,
where we showed that origination and destruction mean
only the assumption of new states on the part of one and
the same permanent substance, and therefrom proved the
non-difference of the effect from the cause.—Here it may
possibly be objected that as we see that a light when
extinguished passes away absolutely, such absolute destruc-
tion may be inferred in other cases also. But against this
we point out that in the case of a vessel of clay being
smashed we perceive that the material, i.e. clay, continues
to exist, and that therefrom destruction is ascertained
to be nothing else but the passing over of a real sub-
stance into another state. The proper assumption, therefore,
is that the extinguished light also has passed over into
a different state, and that in that state it is no longer
perceptible may be explained by that state being an
extremely subtle one.

22. And on account of the objections presenting
themselves in either case.

506 - vEDANTA-SOTRAS.

-. It has been shown that neither origination from nothing,
as held by the advocates of general ‘momentariness, is
possible ; nor the passing. away into nothing on the part
of the thing originated. The acknowledgment of either of
these views gives rise to difficulties. If the effect originates
from nothing, it is itself of the nature of nothing ; for it
is observed that effects share the nature of what they
originate from. Pitchers and ornaments, e.g. which are
produced from clay and gold respectively, possess the
nature of their causal substances. But you hold yourself
that the world is not seen to be of the nature of nothing-
ness ; and certainly it is not observed to be so.—Again, if
that which is underwent absolute destruction, it would follow
that after one moment the entire world would pass away
into nothingness; and subsequently the world again
originating from nothingness, it would follow that, as
shown above, it would itself be of the nature of nothingness
(i.e. there would no longer be a real world).—There being
thus difficulties on both views, origination and destruction
cannot take place as described by you.

23. And in the case of space also, on account of
there being no difference.

In order to prove the permanency of external and internal
things, we have disproved the view that the two forms of
destruction called pratisankhy4 and apratisankhy4 mean
reduction of an existing thing to nothing. This gives us
an opportunity to disprove the view of Ether (space) being
likewise a mere irrational non-entity, as the Bauddhas hold
it to be. Ether cannot be held to be a mere irrational
non-entity, because, like those things which are admitted
to be positive existences, i.e. earth, and so on, it is proved
by consciousness not invalidated by any means of proof,
For the formation of immediate judgments such as ‘ here
a hawk flies, and there a vulture,’ implies our being con-
scious of ether as marking the different places of the flight
of the different birds. Nor is it possible to hold that
Space is nothing else but the non-existence (abh4va) of
earth, and so on; for this view collapses as soon as set

Il ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 24. 507

forth in definite alternatives. For whether we define Space’
as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth,
and so on, or as their mutual non-existence, or as their.
absolute non-existence—on none of these alternatives we
attain the proper idea of Space. If, in the first place, we:
define it as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence
of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as the idea of
Space can thus not be connected with earth and other
things existing at the present moment, the whole world is
without Space.

If, in the second place, we define it as the mutual non-
existence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as such
mutual non-existence inheres in the things only which
stand towards each other in the relation of mutual non-
existence, there is no perception of Space in the intervals
between those things (while as a matter of fact there is),
And, in the third place, absolute non-existence of earth,
and so on, cannot of course be admitted. And as non-
existence (abh4va) is clearly conceived as a special state of
something actually existing, Space even if admitted to be
of the nature of abhava, would not on that account bea
futile non-entity (something ‘ tuéAa’ or ‘ nirupakhya’).

24. And on account of recognition.

We return to the proof of the, previously mooted, per-
manence of things. The ‘anusmriti’ of the Sditra means
cognition of what was previously perceived, i. e. recognition.
It is a fact that all things which were perceived in the past
may be recognised, such recognition expressing itself in the
form ‘this is just that (I knew before).’ Nor must you say that
this is a mere erroneous assumption of oneness due to the fact
of the thing now perceived being similar to the thing per-
ceived before; as in the case of the flame (where a succession
of flames continually produced anew is mistaken for one
continuous flame); for you do not admit that there is one
permanent knowing subject that could have that erroneous
idea. What one person has perceived, another cannot
judge to be the same as, or similar to, what he is perceiving
himself. If therefore you hold that there is an erroneous

508 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

idea of oneness due to the perception of similarity residing
in different things perceived at different times, you neces-
sarily must acknowledge oneness on the part of the cog-
nising subject. In the case of the flame there is a valid
means of knowledge to prove that there really is a succession
of similar flames, but in the case of the jar, we are not aware
of such a means, and we therefore have no right to assume
that recognition is due to the similarity of many successive
jats—Perhaps you will here argue as follows. The
momentariness of jars and the like is proved by Perception
as well as Inference. Perception in the first place presents
as its object the present thing which is different from non-
present things, in the same way as it presents the blue
thing as different from the yellow; it is in this way that we
know the difference of the present thing from the past and
the future. Inference again proceeds as follows—jars and
the like are momentary because they produce effects and
have existence (sattva); what is non-momentary, such as
the horn of a hare, does not produce effects and does
not possess existence. We therefore conclude from the
existence of the last momentary jar that the preceding
jar-existences also are perishable, just because they are
momentary existences like the existence of the last jar.—
But both this perception and this inference have already
been disproved by what was said above about the im-
possibility of momentary existences standing to one another
in the relation of cause and effect. Moreover, that differ-
ence of the present object from the non-present object
which is intimated by Perception does not prove the present
object to be a different thing (from the past object of Per-
ception), but merely its being connected with the present
time. This does not prove it to be a different thing, for
the same thing can be connected with different times. The
two reasons again which were said to prove the momentari-
ness of jars are invalid because they may be made to prove
just the contrary of what they are alleged to prove. For
we may argue as follows—From existence and from their
having effects it follows that jars, and so on, are permanent ;
for whatever is non-permanent, is non-existent, and does

1 ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 24. 509

not produce effects, as e.g. the horn of a hare. The
capacity of producing effects can in fact be used only to
prove non-momentariness on the part of jars, and so on;
for as things perishing within a moment are not capable of
acting, they are not capable of producing effects. Further,
as it is seen in the case of the last momentary existence
that its destruction is due to a visible cause (viz. the blow
of a hammer or the like), the proper conclusion is that also
the other momentary jars (preceding the last one) require
visible causes for their destruction ; and (as no such causes
are seen, it follows that) the jar is permanent and continuous
up to the time when a destructive cause, such as the blow of
a hammer, supervenes. Nor can it be said that hammers
and the like are not the causes of destruction, but only the
causes of the origination of a new series of momentary
existences dissimilar to the former ones—in the case of the
jar, e. g. of a series of momentary fragments of a jar; for we
have proved before that the destruction of jars, and so
on, means nothing but their passing over into a different
condition, e.g. that of fragments. And even if destruction
were held to be something different from the origination of
fragments, it would yet be reasonable to infer, on the
ground of immediate succession in time, that the cause of
the destruction is the blow of the hammer.

Hence it is impossible to deny in any way the permanency
of things as proved by the fact of recognition. He who
maintains that recognition which has for its object the
oneness of a thing connected with successive points of time
has for its objects different things, might as well say that
several cognitions of, let us say, blue colour have for their
object something different from blue colour. Moreover,
for him who maintains the momentariness of the cognising
subject and of the objects of cognition, it would be difficult
indeed to admit the fact of Inference which presupposes the
ascertainment and remembrance of general propositions.
He would in fact not be able to set forth the reason required
to prove his assertion that things are momentary ; for the
speaker perishes in the very moment when he states the
proposition to be proved, and another person is unable to

510 - vEDANTA-SOTRAS.

complete what has been begun by another and about wack
he himself does not know anything.

25. Not from non-entity, this not being observed.

So far we have set forth the arguments refuting the views
of the Vaibhashikas as well as the Sautrantikas—both
which schools maintain the reality of external things—Now
the Sautrantika comes forward and opposes one of the
arguments set forth by'us above, viz. that, on the view of
general momentariness, nothing can ever become an object
of cognition, since the thing which enters into connexioa
‘with the sense-organ is no longer in existence when the
cognition originates.—It is not, he says, the persistence of
the thing up to the time of cognition which is the cause
-of its becoming an object of cognition. To be an object of
cognition means nothing more than to be the cause of the
origination of cognition. Nor does this definition imply
that the sense-organs also are the objects of cognition. For
a cause of cognition is held to be an object of cognition
only in so far as it imparts to the cognition its own form
(and this the sense-organs do not). Noweven a thing that
thas perished may have imparted its form to the cognition,
and on the basis of that form, blue colour, and so on, the
thing itself is inferred. Nor can it be said (as the Yogataras
-do) that the form of subsequent cognitions is due to the
action of previous cognitions (and not to the external
thing); for on this hypothesis it could not be explained
how in the midst of a series of cognitions of blue colour
there all at once arises the cognition of yellow colour. The
-manifold character of cognitions must therefore be held to
‘be due to the manifold character of real things.—To this
we reply ‘not from non-entity; this not being observed.’
The special forms of cognition, such as blue colour, and so
on, cannot be the forms of things that have perished, and
therefore are not in Being, since this is not observed. For
it is not observed that when a substrate of attributes has
perished, its attributes pass over into another thing. (Nor
«an it be said that the thing that perished leaves in cog-
nition a reflection of itself, for) reflections also are only of

Il ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 27. 51

persisting things, not of mere attributes. We therefore
‘conclude that the manifoldness of cognitions can result ‘from
the manifoldness of things only on the condition of the
thing persisting at the time of cognition —The Sdtras now
set forth a further objection which applies to both anol

_ 26. And thus there would be accomplishment on
the part of non-active people also.

- Thus, i.e. on the theory of universal momentariness,
origination from the non-existent, causeless cognition, and
so on, it would follow that persons also not making any
efforts may accomplish all their ends. It is a fact that the
attainment of things desired and the warding off of things
not desired is effected through effort, and so on. But if all
existences momentarily perish, a previously existing thing,
or special attributes of it, such as after-effects (through
which Svarga and the like are effected) or knowledge
(through which Release is effected) do not persist, and
hence nothing whatever can be accomplished by effort.
And as thus all effects would be accomplished without a
cause, even perfectly inert men would accomplish all the ends
to be reached in this and in the next life, including final re-
lease.— Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘ the aggregates.’

27. Not.non-existence, on account of conscious-
ness.

. Here now come forward the Yog4é4ras, who hold that
cognitions (ideas) only are real. There is no reasonable
ground, they say, for the view that the manifoldness of
ideas is due to the manifoldness of things, since ideas them-
selves—no less than the things assumed. by others—have
their distinct forms, and hence are manifold. And this
‘manifold nature of Ideas is sufficiently explained by so-
called visana. Vd4san4 means a flow of ideas (states of
‘conscioushess—pratyaya) of different character. We ob-
serve, e.g., that.a cognition which has the form of a jar
{i-e. the idea of a jar) gives rise to the cognition of the two
halves of a jar, and is itself preceded and produced by the
cognition of a jar, and this again by a similar cognition,

512 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

and so on; this is what we call a stream or flow of ideas.—
But how, then, is it that internal cognitions have the forms
of external things, mustard-grains, mountains, and so on?
—Even if real things are admitted, the Yog4s4ra replies,
their becoming objects of thought and speech depends
altogether on the light of knowledge, for otherwise it
would follow that there is no difference between the ob-
jects known by oneself and those known by others. And
that cognitions thus shining forth to consciousness have
forms (distinctive characteristics) must needs be admitted ;
for if they were without form they could not: shine forth.
Now we are conscious only of one such form, viz. that of
the cognition; that this form at the same time appears
to us as something external (i.e. as the form of an out
ward thing) is due to error. From the general law that
we are conscious of ideas and things together only, it
follows that the thing is not something different from the
idea.

As, moreover, the fact of one idea specially representing
one particular thing only, whether it be a jar or a piece of
cloth or anything else, requires for its explanation an
equality in character of the idea and the thing, those also
who hold the existence of external things must needs
assume that the idea has a form similar to that of the
thing ; and as this suffices for rendering possible practical
thought and intercourse, there is nothing authorising us to
assume the existence of things in addition to the ideas,
Hence cognitions only constitute reality ; external things
do not exist.

To this the Satra replies, ‘Not non-existence, on account
of consciousness.’ The non-existence of things, apart from
ideas, cannot be maintained, because we are conscious of
cognitions as what renders the knowing subject capable of
thought and intercourse with regard to particular things.
For the consciousness of all men taking part in worldly
life expresses itself in forms such as ‘I know the jar.’
Knowledge of this kind, as everybody’s consciousness will
testify, presents itself directly as belonging to a knowing
subject and referring to an object; those therefore who

1 ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 27. 513

attempt to prove, on the basis of this very knowledge,
that Reality is constituted by mere knowledge, are fit
subjects for general derision. This point has already been
set forth in detail in our refutation of those crypto-Baud-
dhas who take shelter under a pretended Vedic theory.—
To maintain, as the Yoga#aras do, that the general rule of
idea and thing presenting themselves together proves the
non-difference of the thing from the. idea, implies a self-
contradiction; for ‘going together’ can only be where there
are different things. To hold that it is a general rule that
of the idea—the essential nature of which is to make the
thing to which it refers capable of entering into common
thought and intercourse—we are always conscious together
with the thing, and then to prove therefrom that the thing
is not different from the idea, is a laughable proceeding
indeed. And as, according to you, cognitions perish ab-
solutely, and do not possess any permanently persisting
aspect, it is rather difficult to prove that such cognitions
form a series in which each member colours or affects the
next one (v4san4); for how is the earlier cognition, which
has absolutely perished, to affect the later one, which has
not yet arisen? We conclude therefore that the manifold-
ness of cognitions is due solely to the manifoldness of things.
We are directly conscious of cognitions (ideas) as rendering:
the things to which they refer capable of being dealt with
by ordinary thought and speech, and the specific char-
acter of each cognition thus depends on the relation which
connects it with a particular thing. This relation is of the
nature of conjunction (samyoga), since knowledge (cogni-
tion) also is a substance. Just as light (prabha), although
a substance, stands to the lamp in the relation of an attri-
bute (gua), so knowledge stands in the relation of an
attribute to the Self, but, viewed in itself, it is a substance.
—From all this it follows that external things are not -non-
existent.

The next Stra refutes the opinion of those who attempt
to prove the baselessness of the cognitions of the waking
state by comparing them to the cognitions of a dreaming
person. | ee
[48] Ll

514 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

28. And on account of difference of nature (they
are) not like dreams.

Owing to the different nature of dream-cognitions, it
cannot be said that, like them, the cognitions of the waking
state also have no things to correspond to them, For
dream-cognitions are originated by organs impaired by
certain defects, such as drowsjness, and are moreover sub-
lated by the cognitions of the waking state; while the
cognitions of the waking state are of a contrary nature.
There ig thus no equality between the two sets—Moreover,
if all cognitions are empty of real content, you are unable
to prove what you wish to prove since your inferential
Cognition also is devoid of true content. If, on the other
hand, it be held to have a real content, then it follows that
no cognition is devoid of such content ; for all of them are
alike cognitions, just like the inferential cognition.

29. The existence (is) not, on account of the
absence of perception.

The existence of mere cognitions devoid of correspond-
ing things is not possible, because such are nowhere per-
ceived. For we nowhere perceive cognitions not inherent
in a cognising subject and not referring to objects. That
even dream-cognitions are not devoid of real matter we
have explained in the discussion of the different khyAtis
(above, p. 118).—Here terminates the adhikarana of ‘per-
ception.

30. And on account of its being unproved in every
way.

Here now come forward the Madhyamikas who teach
that there is nothing but a universal Void. This theory
of a universal Nothing is the real purport of Sugata’s
doctrine; the theories of the momentariness of all exist-
ence, &c., which imply the acknowledgment of the
reality of things, were set forth by him merely as
suiting the limited intellectual capacities of his pupils.—
Neither cognitions nor external objects have real exist-
ence; the Void (the ‘ Nothing’) only constitutes Reality,
and final Release means passing over into Non-being.

1 ApHYAyA, 2 PADA, 30. 515

This is the real view of Buddha, and its truth is proved by
the following considerations. As the Nothing is not to be
proved by any argument, it is self-proved. For a cause has
to be assigned for that only which zs. But what ἐς does
not originate either from that which is or that which is not,
We never observe that which is to originate from Being ;
for things such as jars, and so on, do not originate as long as
the lump of clay, &c., is non-destroyed. Nor can Being
originate from Non-being; for if the jar were supposed to
originate from Non-being, i.e. that non-being which results
from the destruction of the lump of clay, it would itself be
of the nature of Non-being. Similarly it can be shown
that nothing can originate either from itself or from
anything else. For the former hypothesis would imply
the vicious procedure of the explanation presupposing
the thing to be explained; and moreover no motive
can be assigned for a thing originating from itself.
And on the hypothesis of things originating from other
things, it would follow that anything might originate
from anything, for all things alike are other things.
And as thus there is no origination there is also no
destruction. Hence the Nothing constitutes Reality:
origination, destruction, Being, Non-being, and so on, are
mere illusions (bhranti). Nor must it be said that as even
an illusion cannot take place without a substrate we must
assume something real to serve as a substrate; for in the
same way as an illusion may arise even when the defect, the
abode of the defect, and the knowing subject are unreal, it
also may arise even when the substrate of the illusion is
unreal. Hence the Nothing is the only reality.—To this the
Satra replies, ‘And on account of its being in every way
unproved’—the theory of general Nothingness which
you hold cannot stand. Do you hold that everything is
being or non-being, or anything else? On none of these
views the Nothingness maintained by you can be established.
For the terms deing and non-being and the ideas expressed
‘by them are generally understood to refer to particular
states of actually existing things only. If therefore you
declare ‘everything is nothing,’ your declaration is equivay
Ll2

516 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

lent to the declaration, ‘everything is being,’ for your
statement also can only mean that everything that exists is
capable of abiding in a certain condition (which you calt
‘Nothing’). The absolute Nothingness you have in mind
cannot thus be established in any way. Moreover, he
who tries to establish the tenet of universal Nothingness
can attempt this in so far only as, through some means of
knowledge, he has come to know Nothingness, and he
must therefore acknowledge the truth of that means. For
if it were not true it would follow that everything is real.
The view of general Nothingness is thus altogether in-
capable of proofi—Here terminates the adhikarawa of
: unprovedness i in every way.’

31. Νοῖ 80, on account of the impossibility in one,

The Bauddhas have been refuted. As now the Gainas
also hold the view of the world originating from atoms and
similar views, their theory is reviewed next.—The Gainas
hold that the world comprises souls (giva), and non-souls
(agiva), and that there is no Lord. The world further
comprises six substances (dravya), viz. souls (giva), merit
(dharma), demerit (adharma), bodies (pudgala), time (kAla),
and space (ak4sa). The souls are of three different
kinds—bound (in the state of bondage), perfected by Yoga
(Yogasiddha), and released (mukta). ‘ Merit’ is that par-
ticular world-pervading substance which is the cause of the
motion of all things moving ; ‘ demerit’ is that all-pervading
‘substance which is the cause of stationariness, ‘Body’ is
that substance which possesses colour,smell, taste, and touch,
It is of two kinds, atomic or compounded of atoms ; to the
latter kind belong wind, fire, water, earth, the bodies of
living creatures, and so on. ‘Time’ is a particular atomic
substance which is the cause of the current distinction of past,
present, and future. ‘Space’ is one, and of infinite extent.
From among these substances those which are not atomic
are comprehended under the term ‘the five astikayas
(existing bodies) ’—the astikaya of souls, the astikaya of
merit, the astikaya of demerit, the astikaya of matter, the
astikaya of space. This term ‘astikaya’ is applied to

Il ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 31. 517

substances occupying several parts of space.—They also
use another division of categories which subserves the
purpose of Release; distinguishing souls, non-souls,
influx (4srava), bondage, nirgara, samvara, and Release.
Release comprises the means of Release also, viz. perfect
knowledge, good conduct, and so on. The soul is that
which has knowledge, seeing, pleasure, strength (virya) for
its qualities. Non-soul is the aggregate of the things
enjoyed by the souls. ‘Influx’ is whatever is instrumental
towards the souls having the fruition of objects, viz. the
sense-organs, and so on.—Bondage is of eight different
kinds, comprising the four ghatikarman, and the four
aghatikarman. The former term denotes whatever ob-
structs the essential qualities of the soul, viz. knowledge,
intuition, strength, pleasure; the latter whatever causes
pleasure, pain, and indifference, which are due to the persis-
tence of the wrong imagination that makes the soul identify
itself with its body.—‘ Decay’ means the austerities (tapas),
known from the teaching of the Arhat, which are the means
of Release.—Samvara is such deep meditation (Samadhi)
as stops the action of the sense-organs.—Release, finally, is
the manifestation of the Self in its essential nature, free
from all afflictions such as passion, and so on.—The atoms
which are the causes of earth and the other compounds, are
not, as the Vaiseshikas and others hold, of four different
kinds, but have all the same nature ; the distinctive qualities
of earth, and so on, are due to a modification (parizima)
ef the atoms. The Gainas further hold that the whole
complex of things is of an ambiguous nature in so far as
being existent and non-existent, permanent and non-
permanent, separate and non-separate. To prove this they
apply their so-called sapta-bhangi-nydya (‘the system of
the seven paralogisms’)—‘ May be, it is’; ‘May be, it is
not’; ‘ May be, it is and is not’; ‘ May be, it is not predic-
able’; ‘May be, it is and is not predicable’; ‘May be, it
is not, and is not predicable’ ; ‘ May be, it is and is not,
and is not predicable.’ With the help of this they prove
that all things—which they declare to consist of substance
(dravya), and parya4ya—to be existing, one and permanent

518 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

in so far as they are substances, and the opposite in so far
as they are pary4yas. By parydya they understand the
particular states of substances, and as those are of the
nature of Being as well as Non-being, they manage to
prove existence, non-existence, and so on.—With regard to
this the Sdtra remarks that no such proof is possible, ‘ Not
80, on account of the impossibility in one’; i.e. because
contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence
cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more
than light and darkness. As a substance and particular
states qualifying it—and (by the Gainas), called parya4ya—
are different things (padfrtha), one substance cannot be
connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible
that a substance qualified by one particular state, such as
existence, should at the same time be qualified by the
opposite state, i.e. non-existence. The non-permanency,
further, of a substance consists in its being the abode of
those particular states which are called origination and
destruction ; how then should permanency, which is of an
opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time?
Difference (bhinnatva) again consists in things being the
abodes of contradictory attributes; non-difference, which is
the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the
same things which are the abode of difference; not any
more than the generic character of a horse and that of
a buffalo can belong to one animal. We have explained
this matter at length, when—under Sdtra I, 1—refuting the
bhedabheda-theory. Time we are conscious of only as an
attribute of substances (not as an independent substance),
and the question as to its being and non-being, and so on,
does not therefore call for a separate discussion. To speak
of time as being and non-being in no way differs from
generic characteristics (gati), and so on, being spoken of in
the same way ; for—as we have explained before—of gAti
and the like we are conscious only as attributes of sub-
stances.—But (the Gaina may hére be supposed to ask the
Vedantin), how can you maintain that Brahman, although
one only, yet at the same time is the Self of all >—Because,
we reply, the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 34. 519

beings constitutes the body of the Supreme Person, om-
niscient, omnipotent, and so on. And that the body and
the person embodied and their respective attributes are of
totally different nature (so that Brahman is not touched by
the defects of his body), we have explained likewise —
Moreover, as your six substances, soul, and so on, are not
one substance and one parydya, their being one substance,
and so on, cannot be used to prove their being-one and also
not one, and so on.—And if it should be said that those
six substances are such (viz. one and several, and so on),
each owing to its own parydya and its own nature, we
remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own
theory of everything being of an ambiguous nature.
Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual
non-existence cannot after all be identical—Hence the
theory of the Gainas is not reasonable. Moreover it is liable
to the same objections which we have above set forth as
applying to all theories of atoms constituting the universal
cause, without the guidance of a Lord.

33. And likewise non-entireness of the Self.

On your view there would likewise follow non-entireness
of the Self. For your opinion is that souls abide in num-
berless places, each soul having the same size as the body.
which it animates. When, therefore, the soul previously
abiding in the body of an elephant or the like has to enter
into a body of smaller size, e.g. that of an ant, it would
follow that as the soul then occupies less space, it would not
remain entire, but would become incomplete.—Let us then
avoid this difficulty by assuming that the soul passes over
into a different state—which process is called pary4ya,—
which it may manage because it is capable of contraction
and dilatation.—To this the next Sdtra replies.

34. Nor also is there non-contradiction from
paryd4ya ; on account of change, and so on.
Nor is the difficulty to be evaded by the assumption of

the soul assuming a different condition through contraction
or dilatation. For this would imply that the soul is subject

520 "> vEDANTA-SOTRAS. ~~

to change, and all the imperfections springing from it, viz.
non-permanence, and so on, and hence would not be superior
to non-sentient things such as jars and the like.

_ 35. And on account of the endurance of the final
(size), and the (resulting) permanency of both; there
is no difference.

The final size of the soul, i.e. the size it has in the state
of Release, is enduring since the soul does not subsequently
pass into another body ; and both, i. 6. the soul in the state
of Release and the size of that soul, are permanent (nitya).
From this it follows that that ultimate size is the true
essential size of the soul and also belongs to it previously
to Release. Hence there is no difference of sizes, and the
soul cannot therefore have the size of its temporary bodies.
The Arhata theory is therefore untenable.—Here terminates
the adhikaraza of ‘the impossibility in one.’

36. (The system) of the Lord (must be disre-
garded), on account of inappropriateness.

So far it has been shown that the doctrines of Kapila,
Kamada, Sugata, and the Arhat must be disregarded by
men desirous of final beatitude; for those doctrines are all
alike untenable and foreign to the Veda. The Sitras now
declare that, for the same reasons, the doctrine of Pasupati
also has to be disregarded. The adherents of this view
belong to four different classes—KaA4p4las, Kalamukhas,
Pasupatas, and Saivas. All of them hold fanciful theories
of Reality which are in conflict with the Veda, and invent
various means for attaining happiness in this life and the
next. They maintain the general material cause and the
operative cause to be distinct, and the latter cause to be
constituted by Pasupati. They further hold the wearing
of the six so-called ‘mudra’ badges and the like to be
means to accomplish the highest end of man.

Thus the K4palas say, ‘He who knows the true nature
of the six mudras, who understands the highest mudra,
meditating on himself as in the position called bhagdAsana,
reaches Nirvana. The necklace, the golden ornament, the

11 ADHYAYA, 2 FADA, 36. 521

earring, the head-jewel, ashes, and the sacred thread are
called the six mudras. He whose body is marked with thesé
is not born here again.’—Similarly the K4lamukhas teach
that the means for obtaining all desired results in this
world as well as the next are constituted by certain prac-
tices—such as using a skull as a drinking vessel, smearing
oneself with the ashes of a dead bady, eating the flesh
of such a body, carrying a heavy stick, setting up a liquor-
jar and using it as a platform for making offerings to the
gods, and the like. ‘A bracelet made of Rudradksha-seeds
on the arm, matted hair on the head, a skull, smearing
oneself with ashes, &c.’—all this is well known from the
sacred writings of the Saivas. They also hold that by
some special ceremonial performance’ men of different
castes may become Bradhmanas and reach the highest
asrama: ‘by merely entering on the initiatory ceremony
(diksha) a man becomes a Brahmaza at once; by under-
taking the kapdla rite a man becomes at once an ascetic.’
With regard to these views the Stra says ‘of pati, on
account of inappropriateness. A ‘not’ has here to be
supplied from Sdtra 32. The system of Pasupati has to be
disregarded because it is inappropriate, i.e. because the
different views and practices referred to are opposed to
one another and in conflict with the Veda. The different
practices enumerated above, the wearing of the six mudr4s
and so on, are opposed to each other; and moreover the
theoretical assumptions of those people, their forms of
devotion and their practices, are in conflict with the Veda.
For the Veda declares that Narayana who is the highest
Brahman is alone the operative and the substantial cause
of the world, ‘ Narayana is the highest Brahman, Narayana
is the highest Reality, Narayaza is the highest light,
Nardyana is the highest Self’; ‘That thought, may I be
many, may I grow forth’ (KA. Up. VI, 2, 3); ‘He desired,
may I be many, may I grow forth’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1), and
so on. In the same way the texts declare meditation
on the Supreme Person, who is the highest Brahman, to
be the only meditation which effects final release; cp.
41 know that great Person of sunlike lustre beyond the

522 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

darkness. A man who knows him passes over death; there
is no other path to go’ (Svet. Up. III, 8). And in the same
way all texts agree in declaring that the works subserving
the knowledge of Brahman are only those sacrificial and
other works which the Veda enjoins on men in the different
castes and stages of life: ‘Him Brahmazas seek to know
by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance,
by fasting. Wishing for that world only, mendicants wander
forth from their homes’ (Bré. Up. XI, 4, 22). In some
texts enjoining devout meditation, and so on, we indeed
meet with terms such as Pragdpati, Siva, Indra, AkAsa,
Praza, &c., but that these all refer to the supreme Reality
established by the texts concerning Narayaxa—the aim
of which texts it is to set forth the highest Reality in its
purity—, we have already proved under I, 1, 30. In the
same way we have proved under Si. I, 1, 2 that in texts
treating of the creation of the world, such as ‘ Being only
this was in the beginning,’ and the like, the words Being,
Brahman, and so on, denote nobody else but Narayasa,
who is set forth as the universal creator in the account
of creation given in the text, ‘Alone indeed there was
Nardyaza, not Brahma, not Isana—he being alone did not
rejoice’ (Mahopanishad I).—As the Pasupati theory thus
teaches principles, meditations and acts conflicting with the
Veda, it must be disregarded.

37. And on account of the impossibility of ruler-
ship.

Those who stand outside the Veda arrive through infer-
ence at the conclusion that the Lord is a mere operative
cause. This being so, they must prove the Lord’s being
the ruler (of the material cause) on the basis of observation.
But it is impossible to prove that the Lord is the ruler
of the Pradhana in the same way as the potter e.g. is the
ruler of the clay. For the Lord is without a body, while
the power of ruling material causes is observed only in the
case of embodied beings such as potters. Nor may you
have recourse to the hypothesis of the Lord being em-
bodied ; for—as we have shown under I, 1, 3—there arise

Il ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 40. 522

difficulties whether that body, which as body must consist
of parts, be viewed as eternal or as non-eternal.

38. If you say, as in the case of the organs; we
deny this, on account of enjoyment and so on.

It may possibly be said that, in the same way as the
enjoying (individual) soul, although in itself without a body,
is seen to rule the sense-organs, the body, and so on, the
great Lord also, although without a body, may rule the
Pradhana. But this analogy cannot be allowed ‘on account
of enjoyment,’ and so on. The body’s being ruled by the
soul is due to the unseen principle in the form of good and
evil works, and has for its end the requital of those works.
Your analogy would thus imply that the Lord also is under
the influence of an unseen principle, and is requited for
his good and evil works——The Lord cannot therefore be
a ruler.

39. Finiteness or absence of omniscience.

‘Or’ here has the sense of ‘arid.’ If the Lord is under
the influence of the adrisha, it follows that, like the indi-
vidual soul, he is subject to creation, dissolution, and so on,
and that he is not omniscient. The Pasupati theory cannot
therefore be accepted.—It is true that the Sfitra, ‘but in
case of conflict (with Scripture) it is not to be regarded’
(Pd. Mi. Sd. I, 3, 3), has already established the non-
acceptability of all views contrary to the Veda ; the present
adhikarama, however, raises this question again in order
specially to declare that the Pasupati theory ἐς contrary
to the Veda. Although the Pasupata and the Saiva
systems exhibit some features which are not altogether
contrary to the Veda, yet they are unacceptable because
they rest on an assumption contrary to the Veda, viz. of
the difference of the general, instrumental and material
causes, and imply an erroneous interchange of higher and
lower entities—Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘ Pasu-

μὰ;

pati.

40. On account of the impossibility of origination.
The Satras now proceed to refute a further doubt, viz.

524 - VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

that the Pa#karatra tantra—which sets forth the means
of attaining supreme beatitude, as declared by the Lord
(Bhagavat)—may also be destitute of authority, in so far,
namely, as belonging to the same class as the tantras of
Kapila and others. The above Stra raises the doubt.

* The theory of the Bh4gavatas is that from VAsudeva,
who is the highest Brahman and the highest cause, there
originates the individual soul called Sankarshaza ; from
Sankarshaza the internal organ called Pradyumna; and
from Pradyumna the principle of egoity called Aniruddha.
Now this theory implies the origination of the individual
soul, and this is contrary to Scripture. For scriptural texts
declare the soul to be without a beginning—cp. ‘the intel-
ligent one is not born and does not die’ (Ka. Up. II, 18),
and other texts.

41. And there is not (origination) of the instru-
ment from the agent..
_ ‘The internal organ called Pradyumna originates from
Safikarshaaa,’ i.e. the internal organ originates from the
individual soul which is the agent. But this is inadmis-
sible, since the text ‘from him there is produced breath,
mind, and all sense-organs’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) declares that
the mind also springs from none else but the highest
Brahman. As the Bhagavata doctrine thus teaches things
opposed to Scripture, its authoritativeness cannot be ad-
mitted.— Against these objections the next Sitra declares
itself.

42. Or, if they are of the nature of that which is
knowledge and so on, there is no contradiction to
that (i.e. the Bhagavata doctrine).

The ‘or’ sets aside the view previously maintained. By
‘that which is knowledge and so on’! we have to under-
stand the highest Brahman. If Sankarshaza, Pradyumna,
and Aniruddha are of the nature of the highest Brahman,
then truly there can be no objection to a body of doctrine

* Or ‘by that which is knowledge and cause.’

1 ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 42. 525

which sets forth this relation. _ The criticism that the
Bhagavatas teach an inadmissible origination of the indi-
vidual soul, is made by people who do not understand
that system. What it teaches is that the highest Brahman,
there called Vasudeva, from kindness to those devoted
to it, voluntarily abides in a fourfold form, so as to render
itself accessible to its devotees. Thus it is said in the
Paushkara-samhit4, ‘That which enjoins that Brahmazas
have to worship, under. its proper names, the fourfold
nature of the Self; that is the authoritative doctrine.’
That this worship of that which is of a fourfold nature
means worship of the highest Brahman, called Vasudeva,
is declared in the Satvata-samhit4, ‘This is the supreme
sdstra, the great Brahmopanishad, which imparts true dis-
crimination to Brahmamas worshipping the real Brahman
under the name of VAsudeva.’ That highest Brahman,
called Vasudeva, having for its body the complete aggre-
gate of the six qualities, divides itself in so far as it is eithet
the ‘ Subtle’ (sdkshma), or ‘ division’ (vydha), or ‘ manifesta«
tion ’ (vibhava), and is attained in its fulness by the devotees
who, according to their qualifications, do worship to it by
means of works guided by knowledge. ‘From the worship
of the vibhava-aspect one attains to the vydha, and from
the worship of the vyfha one attains to the “ Subtile” called
Va4sudeva, i.e. the highest Brahman ’—such is their doctrine.
By the ‘vibhava’ we have to understand the aggregate of
beings, such as Rama, Krishna, &c., in whom the highest
Being. becomes manifest; by the ‘vyQha’ the fourfold
arrangement or division of the highest Reality, as Vasu-
deva, Sankarshaza, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha; by the
‘ Subtle’ the highest Brahman itself, in so far as it has fot
its body the mere aggregate of the six qualities—as which
it is called ‘Vasudeva.’ Compare on this point the Paush-
kara, ‘That body of doctrine through which, by means
of works based on knowledge, one fully attains to the
imperishable highest Brahman, called Vasudeva,’ and so on,
Sankarshaza, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha are thus mere
bodily forms which the highest Brahman voluntarily as-
sumes, Scripture already declares, ‘Not born he is born

,

526 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

in many-ways, and it is this birth—consisting in the volun-
tary assumption of bodily form, due to tenderness towards
its devotees—which the Bhagavata system teaches ; hence
there lies no valid objection to the authoritativeness of that
system. And as Sankarshavza, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha
are the beings ruling over the individual souls, internal
organs and organs of egoity, there can be no objection
to their being themselves denoted by those latter terms,
viz. individual soul, and so on. The case is analogous to
that of Brahman being designated, in some texts, by terms
such as ether, breath, and the like.

43. And on account of contradiction.

The origination of the giva is, moreover, distinctly con-
troverted in the books of the Bh4gavatas also. Thus in
the Parama-samhita ‘The nature of Prak/iti consists therein
that she is non-sentient, for the sake of another, eternal,
ever-changing, comprising within herself the three gusas,
and constituting the sphere of action and experience for
all agents. With her the soul (purusha) is connected in
the way of inseparable association; that soul is known
to be truly without beginning and without end.’ And as
all Saszhités make similar statements as to the eternity
of the soul, the Pa#arAtra doctrine manifestly controverts
the view of the essential nature of the giva being something
that originates. How it is possible that in the Veda as
well as in common life the soul is spoken of as being born,
dying, &c., will be explained under Sd. II, 3, 17. The
conclusion, therefore, is that the Bhagavata system also
denies the origination of the soul, and that hence the
pbjections raised on this ground against its authoritative-
ness are without any force. Another objection is raised
by some. Sadzdilya, they argue, is said to have promul-
gated the Pa#karatra doctrine because he did not find
a sure basis for the highest welfare of man in the Veda
and its auxiliary disciplines, and this implies that the
Pag#karatra is opposed to the Veda.—This objection, we
reply, springs from nothing else but the mere unreasoning
faith of men who do not possess the faintest knowledge

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 43. 527

of the teachings of the Veda, and have never considered
the hosts of arguments which confirm that teaching. When
the Veda says, ‘Morning after morning those speak un-
truth who make the Agnihotra offering before sunrise,’ it
is understood that the censure there passed on the offering
before sunrise is really meant to glorify the offering after
sunrise. We meet with a similar case in the ‘bhima-
vidya’ (Kz. Up. VII, 2). There at the beginning Narada
says, ‘I know the Rig-veda, the Yagur-veda, the SAma-veda,
the Atharvaza as the fourth, the Itih4sa-puriza as the
fifth,’ and so on, enumerating all the various branches of
knowledge, and finally summing up ‘ with all this I know
the mantras only, I do not know the Self’ Now this
declaration of the knowledge of the Self not being attain-
able through any branch of knowledge except the know-
ledge of the BhOman evidently has no other purpose but
to glorify this latter knowledge, which is about to be
expounded. Or else NArada’s words refer to the fact that
from the Veda and its auxiliary disciplines he had not
obtained the knowledge of the highest Reality. Analogous
to this is the case of SAzdilya’s alleged objection to the
Veda. That the Bhagavata doctrine is meant to facilitate
the understanding of the sense of the Veda which by itself
is difficult of comprehension, is declared in the Parama-
samhita, ‘I have read the Vedas at length, together with all
the various auxiliary branches of knowledge. But in all
these I cannot see a clear indication, raised above all doubt,
of the way to blessedness, whereby I might reach perfec.
tion’; and ‘The wise Lord Hari, animated by kindness
for those devoted to him, extracted the essential meaning
of all the Vedanta-texts and condensed it in an easy form.’
The incontrovertible fact then is as follows. The Lord
who is known from the Ved4nta-texts, i.e. Vasudeva,
called there the highest Brahman—who is antagonistic to
all evil, whose nature is of uniform excellence, who is
an ocean, as it were, of unlimited exalted qualities, such
as infinite intelligence, bliss, and so on, all whose purposes
come true—perceiving that those devoted to him, according
as they are differently placed in the four castes and the

528 . VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

four stages of life, are intent on the different ends of life,
viz. religious observances, wealth, pleasure, and final release;
and recognising that the Vedas—which teach the truth
about his own nature, his glorious manifestations, the means
of rendering him propitious and the fruits of such endeavour
—are difficult to fathom by all beings other than himself,
whether gods or men, since’ those Vedas are divided into
Rik, Yagus, Saman, and Atharvan; and being animated by
infinite pity, tenderness, and magnanimity ; with a view to
enable his devotees to grasp the true meaning of the Vedas,
himself composed the Pa#karatra-sdstra. The author of
the Sftras (Vy4sa)—who first composed the Satras, the
purport of which it is to set forth the arguments establish-
ing the Vedanta doctrine, and then the Bh4rata-sas#hit4
(i.e. the Mahabh4rata) in a hundred thousand slokas in
order to support thereby the teaching of the Veda—himself
says in the chapter called Mokshadharma, which treats of
knowledge, ‘ If a householder, or a Brahmaaérin, or a hermit,
or a mendicant wishes to achieve success, what deity should
he worship?’ and so on; explains then at great length the
Pagkaratra system, and then says, ‘From the lengthy
Bharata story, comprising one hundred thousand slokas,
this body of doctrine has been extracted, with the churn-
ing-staff of mind, as butter is churned from curds—as
butter from milk, as the Brahmava from men, as the Ara-
ayaka from the Vedas, as Amrita from medicinal herbs.—
This great Upanishad, consistent with the four Vedas,
in harmony with Saikhya and Yoga, was called by him
by the name of Pa#karatra. This is excellent, this is
Brahman, this is supremely beneficial. Fully agreeing
with the Azk, the Yagus, the SAman, and the Atharvan-
giras, this doctrine will be truly authoritative.’ The terms
Sankhya and Yoga here denote the concentrated appli-
cation of knowledge and of works. As has been said, ‘ By
the application of knowledge on the part of the Sankhya,
and of works on the part of the Yogins.’ And in the
Bhishmaparvan we read, ‘By Brahmasas, Kshattriyas,
Vaisyas and Sidras, MA4dhava is to be honoured,, served
and worshipped—he who was proclaimed by Sankarshavza

11 ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 43. 529

in agreement with the S4tvata law.—How then could
these utterances of Badardyama, the foremost among all
those who understand the teaching of the Veda, be recon-
ciled with the view that in the.S(tras he maintains the
non-authoritativeness of the Satvata doctrine, the purport
of which is to teach the worship of, and meditation on,
Vasudeva, who is none other than the highest Brahman
known from the Ved4nta-texts ?

But other passages in the Mahabharata, such as ‘ There
is the Sankhya, the Yoga, the Paf#éaratra, the Vedas, and
the Pasupata doctrine; do all these rest on one and the
same basis, or on different ones?’ and so on, declare that
the Sankhya and other doctrines also are worthy of regard,
while yet in the S4riraka Sdtras those very same doctrines
are formally refuted. Why, therefore, should not the same
hold good in the case of the Bhagavata doctrine ?—Not so,
we reply. In the Mahabh4rata also Badarayasa applies.
to the Sankhya and other doctrines the same style of
reasoning as in the Sitras. The question, asked in the
passage quoted, means ‘Do the Sankhya, the Yoga, the
Pasupata, and the Pa#éaratra set forth one and the same
reality, or different ones? If the former, what is that
reality? If the latter, they convey contradictory doc-
trines, and, as reality is not something which may be
optionally assumed to be either such or such, one of those
doctrines only can be acknowledged as authoritative, and
the question then arises which is to be so acknowledged ?’—.
The answer to the question is given in the passage begin-
ning, ‘ Know, O royal Sage, all those different views. The
promulgator of the S4nkhya is Kapila,’ &c. Here the
human origin of the Sankhya, Yoga, and P4supata is
established on the ground of their having been produced
by Kapila, Hirazyagarbha, and Pasupati. Next the clause
‘ Aparantatamas is said to be the teacher of the Vedas’
intimates the non-human character of the Vedas; and
finally the clause ‘Of the whole Pa#zaratra, Narayana
himself is the promulgator’ declares that N4rayaza himself
revealed the Pa#éaratra doctrine. The connected purport
of these different clauses is as follows. As the systems

[48] Mm

530 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

of human origin set forth doctrines mutually contradictory,
and, moreover, teach what is in conflict with the matter
known from the Veda—which, on account of its non-human
character, is raised above all suspicion of error and other
imperfections—they cannot be accepted as authoritative
with regard to anything not depending on human action
and choice. Now the matter to be known from the Veda
is Narayaza, who is none other than the highest Brahman.
It hence follows that the entities set forth in those different
systems—the pradh4na, the soul (purusha), Pasupati, and
so on—have to be viewed as real only in so far as Nara-
yana, i.e. the highest Brahman, as known from the Vedanta-
texts, constitutes their Self. This the text directly declares
in the passage, ‘In all those doctrines it is seen, in accord-
ance with tradition and reasoning, that the lord Narayana
is the only basis.’ This means— To him who considers
the entities set forth in those systems with the help of
argumentation, it is evident that Narayasa alone is the
basis of all those entities.’ In other words, as the entities
set forth in those systems are not Brahman, any one who
remembers the teaching of texts such as ‘all this indeed
is Brahman,’ ‘ Narayama is all,’ which declare Brahman to
be the Self of all, comes to the conclusion that Narayaxa
alone is the basis of those entities. As thus it is settled
that the highest Brahman, as known from the Vedanta-
texts, or Narayaza, himself is the promulgator of the
entire Pa#arAtra, and that this system teaches the nature
of Naérfyavza and the proper way of worshipping him, none
can disestablish the view that in the Pa#éaratra all the
other doctrines are comprised. For this reason the Mahé-
bh4rata says, ‘Thus the Sankhya-yoga and the Veda and
the Arazyaka, being members of one another, are called
the Pa#karatra,’ i.e. the Saikhya, the Yoga, the Vedas,
and the Aramyakas, which are members of one another
because they are one in so far as aiming at setting forth
one Truth, together are called the Pa#sardtra.—The
Sankhya explains the twenty-five principles, the Yoga
teaches certain practices and means of mental concentra-
tion, and the Arasyakas teach that all the subordinate

Il ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 43. 531

principles have their true Self in Brahman, that the mental
concentration enjoined in the Yoga is a mode of meditation
on Brahman, and that the rites and works which are set
forth in the Veda are means to win the favour of Brahman
—thus giving instruction as to Brahman’s nature. Now
all these elements, in their inward connexion, are clearly
set forth in the Pag#aratra by the highest Brahman, i.e.
NArayaaa, himself. The S4riraka SAstra (i.e. the Vedanta)
does not disprove the principles assumed by the Sankhyas,
but merely the view of their not having Brahman for their
Self; and similarly in its criticism on the Yoga and Pasu-
pata systems, it merely refutes the view of the Lord being
a mere instrumental cause, the erroneous assumptions as
to the relative position of higher and lower entities, and
certain practices not warranted by the Veda; but it does
not reject the Yoga itself, nor again the lord Pasupati.
Hence Smriti says, ‘The Saakhya, the Yoga, the Pa#kara-
tra, the Vedas, and the Pasupata doctrine—all these having
their proof in the Self may not be destroyed by arguments.’
The essential points in all these doctrines are to be adopted,
not to be rejected absolutely as the teaching of Gina or
Sugata is to be rejected. For, as said in the Smrtti text
quoted above, ‘in all those doctrines it is seen, according
to tradition and reasoning, that the lord Narayaza is the
only basis.—Here terminates the adhikarama of ‘the im-
possibility of origination.’

Mm 2

532 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

THIRD PADA.

1. Not Ether; on account of the absence of
scriptural statement.

We have demonstrated that the SAnkhya-system and
other systems standing outside the Veda are untenable
since they rest on fallacious reasoning and are self-contra-
dictory. In order to prove that our own view is altogether
free from all objections of this kind, we shall now explain
in detail the mode in which this world, with all its sentient
and non-sentient beings, is produced by Brahman, whom we
hold to be the general creator.

The first doubt here presenting itself is whether Ether
be something produced or not.—The Parvapakshin main-
tains that it is not produced, since there is no scriptural
statement to that effect. A scriptural statement may be
expected with regard to what is possible ; but what is im-
possible—as e.g. the origination of a sky-flower or of
Ether—cannot possibly be taught by Scripture. For the
origination of Ether, which is not made up of parts and is
all pervasive, cannot be imagined in any way. For this
very reason, i.e. the impossibility of the thing, the KAan-
dogya, in its account of creation, mentions the origination
of fire, water, &c. only (but not of Ether)—‘It thought,
may I be many, may I grow forth,’ ‘It sent forth fire,’
and soon. When therefore the Taittirtya, the Atharvaza,
and other texts tell us that Ether did originate—' From
that Self sprang Ether’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); ‘From him is
born breath, mind, and all organs of sense, Ether, air, light,
water,’ ὅς, (Mu. Up. II, 1, 4)—such statements are con-
trary to sense, and hence refute themselves.—To this the
Satra replies,

2. But there is.

But there is origination of Ether. For Scripture, which
is concerned with matters transcending sense perception, is
able to establish the truth even of the origination of Ether,
although this be not proved by other means of knowledge.

II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 4. 533

And in a matter known from Scripture a contradictory
inference, such as that Ether cannot originate because it is
without parts, is not of sufficient force. That the non-
originatedness of the Self also does not rest on its being
without parts will be shown further on.—Here the Pirva-
pakshin raises an objection.

3. It has a secondary sense, on account of impos-
sibility and of the text.

It is reasonable to assume that in passages such as
‘From that Self there sprang Ether,’ the origination of
Ether is not to be taken in its literal sense; for according
to the AKAandogya-text ‘it sent forth fire.’ Brahman
engaged in creation first produces fire, and fire thus having
the first place, the text cannot possibly mean to say that
Ether also was produced. Moreover, there is another text,
viz. ‘ Vayu and antariksha (i.e. Ether), this is the Immortal,’
according to which Ether is immortal, i.e. non-produced.
—But how can one and the same word, viz. it ‘sprang’
(i. e. originated), be taken in a metaphorical sense with
reference to Ether, and in its literal sense with reference to
fire, and so on ?—To this the next Sitra replies.

4. There may be (a double sense) of the one
(word), as in the case of the word ‘ Brahman.’

Since in the clause ‘from that Self there sprang Brah-
man,’ the word ‘ sprang’ cannot be taken in its literal sense,
it may be used there in a secondary sense ; while the same
word as connected with the subsequent clauses ‘from Vayu
Agni,’ &c., may have its primary sense. This would be
analogous to the use of the word Brahman in Mu. Up. I, 1.
There in the clause ‘From him is born that Brahman,
name, form, and matter’ (9), the word Brahman is used in
a secondary sense, i.e. denotes the Pradhana ; while in the
* same chapter, in the clause ‘ Brahman swells by means of
brooding’ (8), the same word denotes Brahman in its pri-
mary sense. It is true indeed that in this latter case the
word ‘ Brahman’ occurs twice ; while in the Taitt. text the
word ‘sambhita’ occurs once only, and has to be carried

534 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

over from the first clause into the subsequent ones; but
this makes no difference, for, in the case of such carrying
over of a word, no less than in the case of actual repetition,
the general denotation of the word is repeated.—The next
Sdtra refutes this objection.

5. The non-abandonment of the promissory state-
ment (results) from non-difference.

It is not appropriate to assume, from deference to the
Khandogya-text, a secondary meaning for those other
texts also which declare Ether to have originated. For
the KAAndogya itself virtually admits the origination of
Ether ; in so far, namely, as the clause ‘ that by which the
non-heard is heard,’ &c., declares that through the know-
ledge of Brahman everything is known. This declaration
is not abandoned, i.e. is adhered to, only if the Ether also
is an effect of Brahman and thus non-different from it.

6. (As follows also) from (other) texts.

That Ether is an originated thing follows from other
clauses also in the KAAandogya: ‘ Being only this was in
the beginning, one without a second’ affirms the oneness
of everything before creation, and ‘In that all this has its
Self’ implies that everything is an effect of, and hence non-
different from, Brahman.—Nor does the statement as to
the creation of fire, ‘it sent forth fire,’ exclude the creation
of Ether. For the first place which there is assigned to
fire rests only thereon that no mention is made of the
creation of Ether, and this has no force to negative the
creation of Ether as positively stated in other texts.

7. But the division (origination) extends over all
effects ; as in ordinary life.

The ‘but’ has the sense of ‘and.’ As the clause ‘In
that all this has its Self’ and similar ones directly state
that Ether also is a creation of Brahman, the division, i.e.
the origination of Ether from Brahman, is implicitly de-
clared thereby. As in ordinary life. When in ordinary
life somebody has said ‘all these men are the sons of

II ADHYAyA, 3 PADA, IO. 535

Devadatta,’ it is known that any particulars which may
afterwards be given about the descent of some of them are
meant to apply to all—In accordance with this our con-
clusion we interpret the text ‘Air and Ether, this is the
Immortal,’ as asserting only that air and Ether continue to
exist for a long time, as the Devas do.

8. Hereby air is explained.

The same argumentation explains the origination of air
also. That a special Stra is devoted to the origination of
air—instead of disposing in one Sitra of Ether and air—is
for the sake of Sdtra 10, which states that ‘hence (i.e. from
air) there originated fire.’

9. But there is non-origination of that which is
(only); on account of impossibility.

The ‘but’ has an affirmative sense. There is non-
origination of that which is, i.e. of Brahman only; of
whatever is different from Brahman non-origination cannot
possibly be established. This means—the origination of
Ether and air has been proved only in order to illustrate a
general truth. Only that which ἐς, i.e. Brahman, which is
the general cause, cannot originate. Whatever is other than
Brahman, i.e. the entire world comprising the Unevolved,
the great principle (mahat), ahankara, the tanmatras, the
sense-organs, the Ether, the air, and so on, cannot possibly
be shown to be non-originated, since its being an effect is
proved by the text declaring that everything is known
through one thing, and in other ways.—Here terminates
the adhikarana of ‘the Ether.’

10. Fire (is produced) thence, for thus Scripture
declares.

It has been stated that everything different from Brah-
man is the effect of Brahman. The doubt now arises
whether the more remote effects of Brahman originate, each
of them, only from that substance which is their imme-
diately antecedent cause or from Brahman in the form of that
substance.—The decision is that they originate from those

536 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

substances only; for the text ‘from air fire’ directly states
the origination of fire from air.

11. Water (from fire).

Water also originates ‘thence,’ i.e. from fire; for so the
texts declare ‘From fire water’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); ‘ that
sent forth water’ (KA. Up. VI, 2, 3).

12. Earth (from water).

Earth originates from water; for so the texts declare
‘From water earth’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1). ‘It (water) sent
forth food’ (KA. Up. VI, 2, 3). But how can the word
‘food’ denote earth ?—To this the next Sdtra replies.

13. Earth on account of the subject-matter, the
colour, and other texts.

That the word ‘food’ denotes the earth is to be inferred
from the fact that the section in which the word occurs has
for its subject-matter the creation of the elements; as
everything eatable is a product of the earth, the term
denoting the effect is there applied to denote the cause.
In the same chapter, where the colour of the elements is
mentioned (‘The red colour of a flame is the colour of fire,
the white one that of water, the black one that of food’),
the collocation of words clearly shows that ‘food’ means
something of the same kind as fire and water, viz. the ele-
ments of earth. And there are other texts also which treat
of the same topic and declare the origination of earth from
water, cp. Taitt. Up. II, 1, ‘from fire sprang water, from
water earth.’ All this proves that the term ‘food’ denotes
earth, and that hence earth originates from water.

Fire and the other substances, the origination of which
has been detailed, are mentioned merely as instances, and
it must be understood that also other entities, such as the
‘ Mahat,’ and so on, originate only from the immediately
preceding cause, in agreement with scriptural statements.
And texts such as ‘ From him is born breath, mind, and all
organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the
support of all’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3); ‘From him is born that

1 ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 15. 537

Brahman, name, form, and food’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); ‘From
that Self there sprang ether’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); ‘It (ie.
that which is) sent forth fire’ (ΧΑ. Up. VI, 2, 3)—(which
seems to teach the direct origination from Brahman of the
different elements, and so on)—may be interpreted on the
understanding of Brahman being their mediate cause also.—
This prima facie view the next Sdtra disposes of. ¢

14. But he; from the inferential mark supplied
by their reflection.

The ‘but’ indicates the setting aside of the prima facie
view raised. Of all effected things, the Maat, and so on,
the highest Person himself, in so far as embodied in the
immediately preceding substance, is the direct cause.—
How is this known ?>—‘ From the inferential mark supplied
by the reflection of them.’ By ‘reflection’ the Sdtra means
the resolve expressed in the recurring phrase, ‘May I be
many’; ‘ That fire thought, may I be many’ ; ‘ That water
thought, may I be many’ (Kz. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). As these
texts declare that there was thought—in the form of a re-
solve of self-multiplication—which thought can belong to ᾿
a Self only, we conclude that also the Mahat, the ahankdra,
the Ether, and so on, accomplish the sending forth of their
respective effects only after similar thought, and such
thought can belong only to the highest Brahman em-
bodied in the Mahat, ahank4ra, and so on. That the
highest Brahman is embodied in all beings and constitutes
their Self, is directly stated in the antaryamin-brahmaaa,
‘He who abiding in the earth ; abiding in water ; abiding
in fire, &c. &c. (Bez. Up. III, 7, 3 66); and likewise in the
Subala-Up., ‘Whose body is the earth,’ &c. &c., up to
‘ Whose body is the Unevolved.’-—The Parvapakshin had
maintained that the creation, from Brahman, of breath, and
so on, which is declared in texts such as ‘From him are
born breath, mind,’ &c., may be understood as a mediate
creation. This point is taken up by the next Satra.

15. But the order of succession (which is stated)
in reverse order (of the true one) is possible, (only

538 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

if the origination of all effects is) thence (i.e. from
Brahman).

The ‘ but’ has an asseverative sense. The direct origina-
tion from Brahman of all effects—which in passages such
as the one quoted by the Pdarvapakshin is stated in a
form the reverse of the (true) order of origination accord-
ing to which the Unevolved, the Mahat, the ahankdra,
Ether, and so on, succeed each other—is possible only on
the supposition of the origination of each effect being
really from Brahman itself in the form of a special causal
substance. To understand the causality of Brahman as
a merely mediate one would be to contradict all those
statements of immediate origination. Texts such as the
one quoted thus confirm the conclusion that everything
originates from Brahman directly.

16. If it be said that knowledge and mind (which
are mentioned) between (breath and the elements)
(are stated) in order of succession, owing to an
inferential mark of this; we say, not so, on account
of non-difference.

‘Knowledge’ in the Sfitra denotes the means of know-
ledge, i.e. the sense-organs.—An objection is raised against
the conclusion arrived at under the preceding Sdtra. We
cannot, the opponent says, admit the conclusion that the
passage from the Muzdaka Up. ‘from him is born breath,
mind,’ &c., declares the immediate origination from Brah-
man of all things, and that hence the passage confirms the
view, first suggested by the inferential mark of ‘thought’
(see above, SQ. 14), that everything springs from Brahman
direct. For the purport of the text is to state a certain
order of succession, and we hence conclude that all the
beings mentioned were successively created. In the second
half of the text we recognise the series of ether, air, fire, &c.,
which is known to us from other texts, and from the fact
of their being exhibited in one and the same text we con-
clude that knowledge and mind—which are mentioned
between breath on the one side and the elements on the

1 ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 17. 539

other—must be viewed as created in that order. The text
therefore in no way confirms the direct origination of every-
thing from Brahman. To this the Sftra replies, ‘ Not so,
on account of non-difference.’ The first words of the text
‘from him is born’ connect themselves equally with breath,
and knowledge, and mind, and the series of elements begin-
ning with ether ; and the meaning of the whole therefore
is to declare that all the entities spring directly from Brah-
man, not to teach the order of succession in which they are
produced. It moreover cannot have the purport of teach-
ing a certain order of succession, because the order stated
contradicts the order established by other scriptural pas-
sages ; such as the one beginning ‘the earth is merged in
water,’ and ending ‘darkness becomes one.’ We hence
hold to the conclusion that all effects originate from Brah-
man only, in so far as embodied in the Unevolved, and so
on, and that the terms ‘ fire’ and so on denote Brahman,
which is the Self of all those substances.—But to interpret
all these words as denoting Brahman is to set aside their
special denotative power as established by etymology !—
To this objection the next Satra replies.

17. But that which abides in the things movable
and immovable, i.e. the terms denoting those things,
are non-secondary (i.e. of primary denotative power,
viz. with regard to Brahman); since (their deno-
tative power) is effected by the being of that
(i.e. Brahman).

The ‘but’ sets aside the objection raised. (The prima
facie view here is as follows.) As Brahman, which has all
things for its modes, is not the object of Perception and the
other means of knowledge which give rise to the appre-
hension of the things only which are Brahman’s modes, and
as hence, previously to the study of the Ved4nta-texts, the
idea of that to which the modes belong (i. 6. of Brahman)
does not arise, and as the knowledge of all words finally
denoting Brahman depends on the existence of the idea
of that to which the modes belong (i.e. Brahman); all the

540 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

individual words are used in worldly language only sepa-
rately to denote special things. In other words, as the
terms ‘fire’ and so on have denotative power with regard to
particular things only, their denotative power with regard
to Brahman is secondary, indirect only.—Of this view the
Stra disposes by saying ‘that which abides in the moving
and the non-moving, &c. The meaning is—the terms
which abide in, i. e. are connected with, the different moving
and non-moving things, and hence denote those things,
possess with regard to Brahman a denotative power which
is not ‘bhakta, i.e. secondary or figurative, but primary
and direct. ‘Why so?’ Because the denotative power of
all words is dependent on the being of Brahman. For this
we know from the scriptural passage which tells how
names and forms were evolved by Brahman.—Here ter-
minates the adhikaraza of ‘fire.’

18. Not the Self, on account of scriptural state-
ment, and on account of the eternity (which results)
from them.

The Sdtras so far have stated that this entire world,
from Ether downwards, originates from the highest Brah-
man. It now becomes a matter for discussion whether the
individual soul also originates in the same way or not.—It
does so originate, the Pfrvapakshin maintains. For on
this assumption only the scriptural statement as to the cog-
nition of all things through the cognition of one thing holds
good, and moreover Scripture declares that before creation
everything was one. Moreover, there are texts directly
stating that the soul also was produced in the same way as
Ether and other created things.

‘Pragapati sent forth all creatures’; ‘All these creatures
have their root in the True, they abide in the True, they
rest on the True’ (K. Up. VI, 8, 6) ; ‘From whence these
beings are produced’ (Taitt. Up. ITI, 1,1). As these pas-
sages declare the origination of the world inclusive of sen-
tient beings, we conclude that the souls also originate.
Nor must this be objected to on the ground that from the
fact that Brahman is eternal, and the other fact that texts

Il ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 18. 541

such as ‘ That art thou’ teach the soul to be of the nature
of Brahman, it follows that the soul also is eternal. For if
we reasoned in this style we should have to admit also that
the Ether and the other elements are eternal, since texts
such as ‘in that all this has its Self’ and ‘all this indeed is
Brahman’ intimate them also to be of the nature of Brah-
man. Hence the individual soul also originates no less than
Ether and the rest.—To this the Sdtra replies, ‘ Not the
Self, on account of scriptural statement.’ The Self is not
produced, since certain texts directly deny its origination ;
cp. ‘the intelligent one is not born nor does he die’ (Ka.
Up. I, 2, 18); ‘There are two unborn ones, one intelligent
and strong, the other non-intelligent and weak’ (νεῖ. Up.
I, 9). And the eternity of the soul is learned from the
same texts, cp. ‘ There is one eternal thinker,’ &c. (Ka. Up.
II, 5,13); ‘ Unborn, eternal, everlasting is that ancient one;
he is not killed though the body is killed ’ (Ka. Up. I, 2,
18).—For these reasons the soul is not produced.
But how then about the declaration that through the
cognition of one thing everything is known ?—There is no
difficulty here, since the soul also is an effect; and since
effect and cause are non-different.—But this implies that
the soul is an originated thing just like Ether and so on !—
Not so, we reply. By a thing being an effect we mean its
being due to a substance passing over into some other
state; and from this point of view the soul also is an effect.
There is, however, the difference, that the ‘ other condition’
which is represented by the soul is of a different kind from
that which constitutes non-sentient things, such as Ether
and so on. The ‘otherness’ on which the soul depends
consists in the contraction and expansion of intelligence;
while the change on which the origination of Ether and so
on depends is a change of essential nature. And change
of the latter kind is what we deny of the soul. We have
shown that there are three entities of distinct nature, viz.
objects of fruition, enjoying subjects, and a Ruler; that
origination and so on which are characteristic of the objects
do not belong to the subjects, and that the latter are
eternal; that the characteristic qualities of the objects and

542 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

likewise those of the subjects—viz. liability to pain and
suffering—do not belong to the Ruler; that the latter is
eternal, free from all imperfections, omniscient, imme-
diately realising all his purposes, the Lord of the lords of
the organs, the highest Lord of all; and that sentient and
non-sentient beings in all their states constitute the body of
the Lord while he constitutes their Self. While Brahman
thus has for its modes (prakéra) the sentient and non-
sentient beings in which it ever is embodied, during certain
periods those beings abide in so subtle a condition as to be
incapable of receiving designations different from that of
Brahman itself; Brahman then is said to be in its causal
state. When, on the other hand, its body is constituted
by all those beings in their gross state, when they have
separate, distinct names and forms, Brahman is said to be
in its effected condition. When, now, Brahman passes
over from the causal state into the effected state, the aggre-
gate of non-sentient things which in the causal state were
destitute of name and form undergoes an essential change
of nature—implying the possession of distinct names and
so on—so as to become fit to constitute objects of fruition
for sentient beings; the change, on the other hand, which
the sentient beings (the souls) undergo on that occasion is
nothing more than a certain expansion of intelligence (or
consciousness), capacitating them to experience the dif-
ferent rewards or punishments for their previous deeds.
The ruling element of the world, i.e. the Lord, finally, who
has the sentient and non-sentient beings for his modes,
undergoes a change in so far as he is, at alternating periods,
embodied in all those beings in their alternating states. The
two modes, and he to whom the modes belong, thus undergo
a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the
causal condition passes over into a different condition.

It is with reference to this change undergone by one
substance in passing over into a different state that the
K/Andogya says that through the knowledge of one thing
everything is known, and illustrates this by the case of the
lump of clay (knowing which we know all things made of
clay). Texts such as‘ Pragdpati sent forth the creatures,’

II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 18, 543

which declare the origination of the soul, really mean only
to state that the souls are by turns associated with or dis-
- sociated from bodies—the effect of which is that their intel-
ligence is either contracted or expanded. Texts again
which deny the origination of the soul and affirm its per-
manency (‘ He is not born and does not die,’ &c.) mean to
say that the soul does not, like the non-sentient element of
creation, undergo changes of essential nature. And finally
there are texts the purport of which it is to declare the
absence of change of essential nature as well as of alternate
expansion and contraction of intelligence—cp. ‘ That is the
great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, Brah-
man’ (Bri. Up. XI, 4, 25); ‘the eternal thinker, &c. (Ka.
Up. II, 5, 13); such texts have for their subject the highest
Lord.—All this also explains how Brahman, which is at all
times differentiated by the sentient and non-sentient beings
that constitute its body, can be said to be one only pre-
vious to creation ; the statement is possible because at that
time the differentiation of names and forms did not exist.
That that which makes the difference between plurality and
unity is the presence or absence of differentiation through
names and forms, is distinctly declared in the text, ‘Now
all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by
form and name’ (Brz. Up. I, 4, 7).—Those also who hold
that the individual soul is due to Nescience ; and those who
hold it to be due to a real limiting adjunct (up4dhi) ; and
those who hold that Brahman, whose essential nature. is
mere Being, assumes by itself the threefold form of enjoy-
ing subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler ; can
all of them explain the unity which Scripture predicates of
Brahman in the pralaya state, only on the basis of the
absence of differentiation by names and forms ; for accord-
ing to them also (there is no absolute unity at any time,
but) either the potentiality of Nescience, or the potentiality of
the limiting adjunct, or the potentialities of enjoying subjects,
objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler persist in the pra-
laya condition also. And, moreover, it is proved by the
two Sitras, II, 1, 33; 35, that the distinction of the several
individual souls and the stream of their works are eternal.

544 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

There is, however, the following difference between those
several views. The first-mentioned view implies that
Brahman itself is under the illusive influence of begin-
ningless Avidya. According to the second view, the effect
of the real and beginningless limiting adjunct is that Brah-
man itself is in the state of bondage; for there is no other
entity but Brahman and the adjunct. According to the
third view, Brahman itself assumes different forms, and
itself experiences the various unpleasant consequences of
deeds. Nor would it avail to say that that part of Brah-
man which is the Ruler is not an experiencing subject ;
for as Brahman is all-knowing it recognises the enjoying
subject as non-different from itself, and thus is itself an
enjoying subject.—According to our view, on the other
hand, Brahman, which has for its body all sentient and
non-sentient beings, whether in their subtle or their gross
state, is always—in its effected as well as in its causal con-
dition—free from all shadow of imperfection, and a limit-
less ocean as it were of all exalted qualities. All im-
perfections, and suffering, and all change belong not to
Brahman, but only to the sentient and non-sentient beings
which are its modes. This view removes all difficulties. —
Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the Self’

19. For this very reason (the individual soul is)
a knower.

It has been shown that, different therein from Ether
and the rest, the soul is not produced. This leads to the
consideration of the soul’s essential nature. Is that essen-
tial nature constituted by mere intelligence as Sugata and
Kapila hold; or is the soul as Καμᾶδα thinks, essentially
non-intelligent, comparable to a stone, while intelligence
is merely an adventitious quality of it; or is it essentially
a knowing subject?—The soul is mere intelligence, the
Pfrvapakshin maintains; for the reason that Scripture
declares it to be so. For in the antaryAmin-brahmava
the clause which in the MAdhyandina-text runs as follows,
‘he who abides in the Self,’ is in the text of the KAxvas
represented by the clause ‘he who abides in knowledge.’

II ADHYAvYA, 3 PADA, 19. 545

Similarly the text ‘knowledge performs the sacrifice and
all sacred acts’ (Taitt. Up. II, 5, 1) shows that it is know-
ledge only which is the true nature of the active Self. And
Smriti texts convey the same view, as e.g. ‘it in reality
is of the nature of absolutely spotless intelligence. A
second Pirvapakshin denies the truth of this view. If,
he says, we assume that the Self’s essential nature consists
either in mere knowledge or in its being a knowing subject,
it follows that as the Self is omnipresent there must be
consciousness at all places and at all times. On that
doctrine we, further, could not account for the use of
the instruments of cognition (i.e. the sense-organs, &c.) ;
nor for the fact that in the states of deep sleep, swoon
and so on, the Self although present is not observed to be
conscious, while on the other hand consciousness is seen
to arise as soon as the conditions of the waking state are
realised. We therefore conclude that neither intelligence
or consciousness, nor being a knowing agent, constitutes the
essence of the soul, but that consciousness is a mere adven-
titious or occasional attribute. And the omnipresence of
the Self must needs be admitted since its effects are per-
ceived everywhere. Nor is there any valid reason for
holding that the Self moves to any place; for as it is
assumed to be present everywhere the actual accomplish-
ment of effects (at certain places only) may be attributed
to the moving of the body only.—Scripture also directly
declares that in the state of deep sleep there is no con-
sciousness, ‘I do not indeed at the present moment know
myself, so as to be able to say “that am I,” nor do I know
those beings.’ Similarly Scripture declares the absence of
consciousness in the state of final release, ‘when he has
departed there is no consciousness’ (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12);
where the Self is spoken of as having knowledge for its
essential nature, the meaning only is that knowledge con-
stitutes its specific quality, and the expression is therefore
not to be urged in its literal sense.

Against all this the Sdtra declares ‘for this very reason
a knower.’ This Self is essentially a knower, a knowing
subject; not either mere knowledge or of non-sentient

[48] Nn

546 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

nature.—Why ?—‘ For this very reason,’ i.e. on account of
Scripture itself. ‘For this reason’ refers back to the ‘on
account of Scripture’ in the preceding Sifitra. For in the
Kh&andogya, where the condition of the released and the
non-released soul is described, the text says ‘He who
knows, let’ me smell this, he is the Self—with the mind
seeing those pleasures he rejoices—the devas who are in
the world of Brahman—whose desires are true, whose
purposes are true—not remembering the body into which
he was born’ (KA. Up. VIII, 12, 4-5; 1, 53 12, 3). And
elsewhere ‘The seer does not see death’ (K%. Up. VII,
26, 2). Similarly we read in the Vagasaneyaka, in reply
to the question ‘Who is that Self?’—‘ He who is within
the heart, surrounded by the Prdaas, the person of light,
consisting of knowledge’ (Brz. Up. IV, 3, 7); "ΒΥ what
should one know the knower?’ (Brz. Up. IV, 5, 15); ‘ That
person knows.’ And ‘for he is the knower, the hearer,
the smeller, the taster, the perceiver, the thinker, the
agent—he the person whose Self is knowledge’; and
‘thus these sixteen parts of that seer’ (Pra. Up. IV, 9;
VI, 5). To the objection that if being a cognising subject
constituted the essential nature of the Self it would follow
that as the Self is omnipresent, there would be conscious-
ness always and everywhere, the next Satra replies.

20. On account of (its) passing out, moving and
returning.

The Self is not omnipresent, -but on the contrary, of
atomic size (azu)—How is this known ?—Since Scripture
says that it passes out, goes and returns. Its passing out
is described in the following passage ‘by that light this
Self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull,
or through other parts of the body’ (Bré. Up. IV, 4, 2).
Its going in the following text ‘all those who pass away
out of this world go to the moon,’ and its returning in the
text ‘from that world he comes again into this world, for
action.’ All this going, and so on, cannot be reconciled
with the soul being present everywhere.

II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 23. 547

21. And on account of the latter two (being
effected) through the Self.

The ‘and’ has affirming power. The ‘passing out’
might somehow be reconciled with a non-moving Self (such
as the omnipresent Self would be) if it were taken in the
sense of the Self separating from the body; but for the
going and returning no analogous explanation is possible.
They, therefore, must be taken as effected by the Self
itself (which, then, cannot be omnipresent and non-
moving).

22. If it be said that (the soul) is not atomic, on
account of scriptural statement of (what is) not that;
we Say no, on account of the other one being the
topic.

The passage ‘He who is within the heart, surrounded
by the Pramas, the person consisting of knowledge’ (Bré.
Up. IV, 3, 7) introduces as the topic of discussion the
personal Self, and further on in the same chapter we read
‘the unborn Self, the great one’ (IV, 4,22). The personal
Self, being expressly called great, cannot, therefore, be
atomic!—Not so, we reply. ‘Since the other one is the
topic.’ In the second text quoted that Self which is other
than the personal Self—i.e. the highest Self (prag#a) con-
stitutes the topic. In the beginning of the chapter, indeed,
the individual Self is introduced, but Jater on, between the
two texts quoted, the instruction begins to concern itself
with the highest Self,‘he by whom there is known the
Self of intelligence’ (pratibuddha 4tm4; IV, 4, 13). It is
this latter Self which, in 22, is called great, not the indi-
vidual Self.

23. And on account of the very word, and of
measure.

Scripture directly applies the word ‘au’ to the indi-
vidual Self, ‘By thought is to be known that atomic Self
into which Breath has entered fivefold’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 9).
—By the term ‘unm4na’ in the Sftra we have to under-
stand measurement by selection of comparative instances.

Nn 2

548 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Scripture declares the minuteness of the individual Self
by reference to things which are like atoms in size, ‘ The
individual soul is to be known as part of the hundredth
part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times, and
yet it is to be infinite’ (Svet. Up. V, 9); ‘that lower one
is seen of the measure of the point of a goad’ (V, 8). For
these reasons also the individual Self must be viewed as
atomic.—But this conflicts with the fact that sensation
extends over the whole body !—This objection the next
Satra refutes by means of an analogous instance.

24. There is no contradiction, as in the case of
sandal-ointment.

As a drop of sandal-ointment, although applied to one
spot of the body only, yet produces a refreshing sensation
extending over the whole body ; thus the Self also, although
dwelling in one part of the body only, is conscious of sensa-
tions taking place in any part of the body.

25. Should it be said (that this is not so) on
account of specialisation of abode; we say no, on
account of the acknowledgment (of a place of the
Self), viz. in the heart.

There is a difference. The drop of ointment can produce
its effect as at any rate it is in contact with a definite part
of the body. But we know of no such part in the case
of the soul !—Not so, we reply. Scripture informs us that
the Self abides in a definite part of the body, viz. the heart.
‘For that Self is in the heart, there are a hundred and one
veins.’ And in reply to the question ‘What is that Self?’
the text has ‘He who is within the heart, surrounded by.
the Prazas, the Person of light, consisting of knowledge’
(Brz. Up. IV, 3, 7).—The parallel case of the sandal-oint-
ment is referred to in order to point out that the Self abides
in some particular part of the body; while the ointment
is not bound to any special place.—In the next Sidtra the
Sdtrak4ra proceeds to state how, according to his own view,
the Self, although abiding in one spot only, gives rise to
effects extending over the whole body.

Il ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 29. 549

26. Or on account of its quality as light.

The ‘or’ is meant to set aside the view previously stated.
The Self extends through the whole body by means of its
quality, viz. knowledge or consciousness. ‘As light.’ As
the light of things abiding in one place—such as gems, the
sun, and so on—is seen to extend to many places, so the
consciousness of the Self dwelling in the heart pervades
the entire body. That the knowledge of the knowing
subject may extend beyond its substrate, as the light of
a luminous body does, we have already explained under
the first SQtra.—But it has been said that the Self is mere
knowledge ; how then can knowledge be said to be a
quality—which is something different from the essential
nature of a thing ?—This the next Stra explains.

27. There is distinction a§ in the case of smell;
and thus Scripture declares.

Just as smell, which is perceived as a quality of earth,
is distinct from earth; thus knowledge of which we are
conscious as the quality of a knowing subject—which
relation expresses itself in judgments such as ‘I know’—
is different from the knowing subject. Scriptural texts
also prove this relation, as e.g. ‘ This Person knows.’

28. On account of the separate statement.

Scripture even states quite directly that knowledge is
something distinct from the knowing subject, viz. in the
passage ‘For there is not known any intermission of the
knowing of the knower’ (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 30).—It has been
said that in passages such as ‘ he who abiding in knowledge’
(Brz. Up. III, 7, 22); ‘Knowledge performs the sacrifice’
(Taitt. Up. II, 5, 1); ‘having knowledge for its nature,
absolutely free from stain,’ Scripture speaks of the Self as
being mere knowledge (not a knower). This point the next
Sftra elucidates.

29. But(the Self) isdesignated as that becauseit has
that quality (viz. knowledge) for its essential quality ;
as in the case of the intelligent (prag#a) Self.

550 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

The ‘ but’ discards the objection. Because that quality,
viz. the quality of knowledge, is the essential quality, there-
fore the Self is, in the passages quoted, designated as know-
ledge. For knowledge constitutes the essential quality of
the Self. Similarly, the intelligent highest Self is occa-
sionally called ‘ Bliss,’ because bliss is its essential quality.
Compare ‘If that bliss existed not in the ether’ (Taitt.
Up. II, 7, 1); ‘ He perceived that bliss is Brahman’ (Taitt.
Up. III, 6, 1). That bliss is the essential attribute of
Brahman is proved by texts such as ‘That is one bliss
of Brahman’; ‘He who knows the bliss of Brahman is
afraid of nothing’ (Taitt. Up. II, 4, 1).—Or else the analo-
gous case to which the Sftra refers may be that of the
intelligent Brahman being designated by the term ‘know-
ledge,’ in texts such as ‘ Truth, knowledge, the Infinite is
Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1). That knowledge is the
essential quality of Brahman is known from passages
such as ‘together with the intelligent Brahman ’ (Taitt. Up.
II, 1, 1); ‘He who is all-knowing’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9).

30. And there is no objection, since (the quality
of knowledge) exists wherever the Self is; this
being observed.

Since knowledge is an attribute which is met with
wherever a Self is, there is no objection to the Self being
designated by that attribute. Similarly we observe that
special kinds of cows, as e.g. hornless ones, are designated
by the term ‘cow,’ since the quality of possessing the
generic character of cows is met with everywhere in con-
nexion with the essential character of such animals with
mutilated horns; since in fact that quality contributes to
define their essential character. The ‘and’ of the Sdtra
is meant to suggest a further argument, viz. that to apply
to the Self the term ‘knowledge’ is suitable for that reason
also that like knowledge the Self is self-illuminated.
The objection that knowledge or consciousness cannot be
an attribute inseparably connected with the essential nature
of the Self as there is no consciousness in deep sleep and
similar states is taken up in the next Satra.

II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 31. 551

31. Since there may be manifestation of that
which exists; as in the case of virile power and
80 on.

The ‘but’ is meant to set the raised objection aside.
The case may be that while consciousness is present also in
deep sleep, and so on, it is manifested in the waking state
only; whence there would be no objection to viewing
consciousness as an essential attribute of the Self. ‘As
in the case of virile power and the like.’ Special substances
such as the virile element are indeed present in the male
child already, but then are not manifest, while later on they
manifest themselves with advancing youth; but all the
same the possession of those substances is essential to the
male being, not merely adventitious. For to be made up
of seven elementary substances (viz. blood, humour, flesh,
fat, marrow, bone, and semen) is an essential property of
the body. That even in deep sleep and similar states the
‘I’ shines forth we have explained above. Consciousness
is always there, but only in the waking state and in dreams
it is observed to relate itself to objects. And that to be
a subject of cognition, and so on, are essential attributes of
the Self, we have also proved before. The conclusion,
therefore, is that to be a knowing subject is the essential
character of the Self. And that Self is of atomic size.
The text ‘when he has departed there is no consciousness’
(samgha ; Bri. Up. II, 4, 12) does not declare that the
released Self has no consciousness; but only that in the
case of that Self there is absent that knowledge (experi-
ence) of birth, death, and so on, which in the Samsara state
is caused by the connexion of the Self with the elements—
as described in the preceding passage, ‘that great being
having risen from out these elements again perishes after
them.’ For the text as to the absence of samg#4 after
death must be interpreted in harmony with other texts
describing the condition of the released soul, such as ‘the
seeing one does not see death nor illness nor pain; the
seeing one sees everything and obtains everything every-
where’ (KA. Up. VII, 25, 2) ; ‘not remembering that body

552 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

into which he was born—seeing these pleasures with the
mind he rejoices’ (VIII, 12, 33 5).

The Sftras now proceed to refute the doctrine of the
Self being (not a knower) but mere knowledge, and being
omnipresent.

32. There would result permanent consciousness
or non-consciousness, or else limitative restriction to
either.

On the other view, i.e. on the view of the Self being
omnipresent and mere knowledge, it would follow either
that consciousness and also non-consciousness would per-
manently take place together everywhere; or else that
there would be definite permanent restriction to either of
the two, i.e. either permanent consciousness or permanent
non-consciousness.—If the omnipresent Self, consisting of
mere knowledge only, were the cause of all that actual
consciousness and non-consciousness on the part of Selfs
which takes place in the world, it might be conceived either
as the cause of both—i. e. consciousness and non-conscious-
ness—and this would mean that there is everywhere and at
all times simultaneous consciousness and non-consciousness,
If, on the other hand, it were the cause of consciousness
only, there would never and nowhere be unconsciousness of
anything ; and if it were the cause of non-consciousness
only, there would never and nowhere be consciousness of
anything. On our view, on the other hand, the actually
perceived distribution of consciousness and non-conscious-
ness explains itself, since we hold the Self to abide within
bodies only, so that naturally consciousness takes place
there only, not anywhere else.—The view, finally (held by
the Vaiseshikas), of the consciousness of the Self depending
on its organs (mind, senses, &c. ; while the omnipresent Self
is, apart from those organs, non-sentient, gada), results in
the same difficulties as the view criticised above ; for as all
the Selfs are omnipresent they are in permanent conjunc-
tion with all organs ; and moreover it would follow that the
adrish/as (due to the actions of the different bodies) could

1 ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33. 553

not thus be held apart (but would cling to all Selfs, each of
which is in contact with all bodies).
Here terminates the adhikarana of ‘the knower.’

33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture
(thus) having a purport.

It has been shown that the individual Self is a knowing
subject and atomic. Now the question arises whether that
Self is an agent or, being itself non-active, erroneously
ascribes to itself the activity of the non-sentient gumas.
The prima facie answer is that the individual Self is not
an agent, since the sacred texts concerned with the Self
declare that the Self does not act, while the guaas do act.
Thus, e. g. in the Ka//avalli, where the text at first denies
of the individual Self all the attributes of Prakriti, such
as being born, ageing and dying (‘he is not born, he does
not die’), and then also denies that the Self is the agent
in acts such as killing and the like, ‘If the slayer thinks
that he slays, if the slain thinks that he is slain, they both
do not understand; for this one does not slay, nor is that
one slain’ (II, 18). This means—if one thinks the Self to
be the slayer one does not know the Self. And the Lord
himself teaches that non-agency is the essential nature of
the individual soul, and that it is mere delusion on the Self's
part to ascribe to itself agency. ‘By the attributes (guaa)
of Prakriti, actions are wrought all round.’ He who is
deluded by self-conceit thinks ‘I am the agent’; ‘when
the seer beholds no other agent than the guzas’ ; ‘ Prakriti
is said to be the cause of all agency of causes and effects,
whilst the soul is the cause of all enjoyment of pleasure and
pain’ (Bha. Gi. III, 27; XIV, 19; XIII, 20).—The soul,
therefore, is an enjoyer only, while all agency belongs to
Prakriti—To this the Sftra replies, ‘an agent, on account
of Scripture thus having a meaning.’ The Self only is an
agent, not the gumas, because thus only Scripture has
a meaning. For the scriptural injunctions, such as ‘he
who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice, ‘He who
desires Release is to meditate on Brahman,’ and similar
ones, enjoin action on him only who will enjoy the fruit

554 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

of the action—whether the heavenly world, or Release, or
anything else. If a non-sentient thing were the agent, the
injunction would not be addressed to another being (viz.
to an intelligent being—to which it actually is addressed).
The term ‘sAstra’ (scriptural injunction) moreover comes
from s4s, to command, and commanding means impelling
to action. But scriptural injunctions impel to action
through giving rise to a certain conception (in the mind
of the being addressed), and the non-sentient Pradhana
cannot be made to conceive anything. Scripture therefore
has a sense only, if we admit that none but the intelligent
enjoyer of the fruit of the action is at the same time the
agent. Thus the Pirva Mim4msa declares ‘the fruit of the
injunction belongs to the agent’ (III, 7, 18). The Pdarva-
pakshin had contended that the text ‘if the slayer thinks,
&c.,’ proves the Self not to be the agent in the action of
slaying ; but what the text really means is only that the
Self as being eternal cannot be killed. The text, from
Smriti, which was alleged as proving that the gua#as only
possess active power, refers to the fact that in all activities
lying within the sphere of the samsara, the activity of the
Self is due not to its own nature but to its contact with the
different guzas. The activity of the gusas, therefore, must
be viewed not as permanent, but occasional only. In the
same sense Smriti says ‘the reason is the connexion of the
soul with the guzas, in its births, in good and evil wombs’
(Bha. Gi. XIII, 21). Similarly it is said there (XVIII, 16)
that ‘he who through an untrained understanding looks
upon the isolated Self as an agent, that man of perverted
mind does not see’; the meaning being that, since it
appears from a previous passage that the activity of the
Self depends on five factors (as enumerated in sl. 16), he
who views the isolated Self to be an agent has no true
insight.

34. On account of taking and the declaration as
to its moving about.

The text beginning ‘And as a great king,’ &c., declares
that ‘the Self taking the prazas moves about in its own body,

II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 37. 555

according to its pleasure’ (Brz. Up. II, 1, 18), i.e. it teaches
that the Self is active in taking to itself the prazas and
moving about in the body.

35. And on account of the designation (of the
Self as the agent) in actions. If not so, there would
be change of grammatical expression.

Because in the text ‘Knowledge performs the sacrifice,
it performs all works’ (Taitt. Up. II, 5) the Self is designated
as the agent in all worldly and Vedic works, for this reason
also the Self must be held to be an agent. And should
it be said that the word ‘knowledge’ in that text denotes
not the Self, but the internal organ or buddhi, we point
out that in that ‘case there would be a change of gram-
matical expression, that is to say, as the buddhi is the
instrument of action, the text would exhibit the instru-
mental case instead of the nominative case ‘ by knowledge,
and so on’ (vig#4nena instead of vig#4nam).

36. (There would be) absence of definite rule, as
in the case of consciousness.

The Satra points out a difficulty which arises on the view
of the Self not being an agent. Sitra 32 has declared that
if the Self were all-pervading it would follow that there
would be no definite determination with regard to con-
sciousness. Similarly, if the Self were not an agent but
all activity belonged to Prakriti, it would follow that as
Prakriti is a common possession of all souls, all actions
would result in enjoyment (experience) on the part of all
souls, or else on the part of none; for as each Self is held
to be omnipresent, they are all of them in equal proximity
to all parts of the Pradh4na. For the same reason it could
not be maintained that the distribution of results between
the different souls depends on the different internal organs
which are joined to the souls; for if the souls are omni-
present, no soul will be exclusively connected with any
particular internal organ.

37. On account of the inversion of power.
If the internal organ were the agent, then—-since it is

556 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

impossible that a being other than the agent should be
the enjoyer of the fruit of the action—the power of enjoy-
ment also would belong to the internal organ, and would
consequently have to be denied of the Self. But if this
were so, there would be no longer any proof for the exist-
ence of the Self ; for they expressly teach that ‘the person
(i.e. the soul) exists, on account of the fact of enjoyment.’

38. And on account of the absence of samAdhi.

If the internal organ were the agent, it would be such
even in that final state of meditation, called samadhi, which
is the instrument of Release. But that state consists therein
that the meditating being realises its difference from Pra-
kriti, and this is a conception which Prakriti itself (of which
the internal organ is only a modification) cannot form.—
The Self alone, therefore, is the agent.—But this would
imply that the activity of the Self is never at rest!—Of
this difficulty the next Sdtra disposes.

39. And as the carpenter, in both ways.

The Self, although always provided with the instruments
of action, such as the organ of speech, and so on, acts when
it wishes to do so, and does not act when it does not wish
to do so. Just as a carpenter, although having his axe and
other implements ready at hand, works or does not work
just as he pleases.—If the internal organ, on the contrary,
were essentially active, it would constantly be acting, since
as a non-intelligent being it could not be influenced by
particular reasons for action, such as the desire for enjoy-
ment.

Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the agent.’

40. But from the highest, this being declared by
Scripture.

Is the activity of the individual soul independent (free),
or does it depend on the highest Self?—It is free; for
if it were dependent on the highest Self, the whole body
of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be un-
meaning. For commandments can be addressed to such

II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 41. 557

agents only as are capable of entering on action or refrain-
ing from action, according to their own thought and will.

This prima facie view is set aside by the Sdtra. The
activity of the individual soul proceeds from the highest
Self as its cause. For Scripture teaches this. ‘Entered
within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all’; ‘ who dwelling
in the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does
not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the Self from
within, he is thy Self, the inward ruler, the immortal one.’
Sm~riti teaches the same, ‘I dwell within the heart of all;
memory and knowledge as well as their loss come from
me’ (Bha. Gi. XV, 15); ‘The Lord, O Arguna, dwells in
the heart of all creatures, whirling, by his mysterious power,
all creatures as if mounted on a machine’ (Bha. Gi. XVIII,
61).—But this view implies the meaninglessness of all
scriptural injunctions and prohibitions!—To this the next
Satra replies.

41. But with a view to the efforts made (the
Lord makes the soul act) on account of the (thus
resulting) non-meaninglessness of injunctions and
prohibitions and the rest.

The inwardly ruling highest Self promotes action in so
far as it regards in the case of any action the volitional
effort made by the individual soul, and then aids that effort
by granting its favour or permission (anumati); action is
not possible without permission on the part of the highest
Self. In this way (i.e. since the action primarily depends
on the volitional effort of the soul) injunctions and pro-
hibitions are not devoid of meaning. The ‘and the rest’
of the Sdtra is meant to suggest the grace and punishments
awarded by the Lord.—The case is analogous to that of
property of which two men are joint owners. If one of
these wishes to transfer that property to a third person he
cannot do so without the permission of his partner, but
that that permission is given is after all his own doing,
and hence the fruit of the action (reward or anything)
properly belongs to him only.—That, in the case of evil

558 VEDANTa-SOTRAS.

actions, allowance of the action on the part of one able
to stop it does not necessarily prove hardheartedness, we
have shown above when explaining the Sankhya doctrine.
—But there is a scriptural text—* He (the Lord) makes
him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do
a good deed, and the same makes him whom he wishes
to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed’ (Kau. Up.
III, 8)—which means that the Lord himself causes men
to do good and evil actions, and this does not agree with
the partial independence claimed above for the soul_—The
text quoted, we reply, does not apply to all agents, but
means that the Lord, wishing to do a favour to those who
are resolved on acting so as fully to please the highest
Person, engenders in their minds a tendency towards highly
virtuous actions, such as are means to attain to him; while
on the other hand, in order to punish those who are re-
solved on lines of action altogether displeasing to him, he
engenders in their minds a delight in such actions as have
a downward tendency and are obstacles in the way of the
attainment of the Lord. Thus the Lord himself says, ‘Iam
the origin of all, everything proceeds from me; knowing
this the wise worship me with love. To them ever devoted,
worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by
which they attain to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling
in their hearts, do I destroy the darkness born of ignorance,
with the brilliant light of knowledge’ (Bha. Gi. X, 8; 10-11).
And further on the Lord—after having described ‘de-
moniac’ people, in the passus beginning ‘they declare the
world to be without a Truth, without a resting-place, with-
out a Ruler, and ending ‘ malignantly hating me who abides
in their own bodies and those of others ’—declares, ‘ These
evil and malign haters, most degraded of men, I hurl
perpetually into transmigrations and into demoniac wombs’
(XVI, 8-19).

Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘that which depends
on the Highest.’

42. (The soul is) a part, on account of the decla-
rations of difference and otherwise ; some also record

1 ADHYAya, 3 PADA, 42. 559

(that Brahman is of) the nature of slaves, fishermen,
and so on.

The Sdtras have declared that the individual soul is an
agent, and as such dependent on the highest Person. The
following question now arises—Is the individual soul
absolutely different from Brahman? or is it nothing else
than Brahman itself in so far as under the influence of
error? or is it Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting
adjunct (upadhi)? or is it a part (amsa) of Brahman ?—The
doubt on this point is due to the disagreement of the
scriptural texts.—But this whole matter has already been
decided under 50. II, 1, 22.—True. But as a difficulty
presents itself on the ground of the conflicting nature of
the texts—some asserting the difference and some the
unity of the individual soul and Brahman—the matter is
here more specially decided by its being proved that the
soul is a part of Brahman. As long as this decision remains
unsettled, the conclusions arrived at under the two S(tras
referred to, viz. that the soul is non-different from Brahman
and that Brahman is ‘additional’ to the soul, are without
a proper basis.

Let it then first be said that the soul is absolutely
different from Brahman, since texts such as ‘There are
two, the one knowing, the other not knowing, both unborn,
the one strong, the other weak’ (Svet. Up. I, 9) declare
their difference. Texts which maintain the non-difference
of a being which is knowing and another which is not know-
ing, if taken literally, convey a contradiction—as if one were
to say, ‘Water the ground with fire’!—and must therefore
be understood in some secondary metaphorical sense.
To hold that the individual soul is a part of Brahman
does not explain matters; for by a ‘part’ we under-
stand that which constitutes part of the extension of some-
thing. If, then, the soul occupied part of the extension
of Brahman, all its imperfections would belong to Brahman.
Nor can the soul be a part of Brahman if we take ‘part’ to
mean a piece (khamda); for Brahman does not admit of
being divided into pieces, and moreover, the difficulties

560 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

connected with the former interpretation would present
themselves here also. That something absolutely different
from something else should yet be a part of the latter
cannot in fact be proved.

Or else let it be said that the soul is Brahman affected
by error (bhrama). For this is the teaching of texts such
as ‘Thou art that’; ‘this Self is Brahman.’ Those texts,
on the other hand, which declare the difference of the two
merely restate what is already established by perception
and the other means of knowledge, and therefore are
shown, by those texts the purport of which it is to teach
non-duality not established by other means, to lie—like
perception and the other means of knowledge themselves—
within the sphere of Nescience.

Or let it be assumed, in the third place, that the individual
soul is Brahman as determined by a beginningless limiting
adjunct (upadhi). For it is on this ground that Scripture
teaches the Self to be Brahman. And that upAdhi must
not be said to be a mere erroneous imagination, for on that
view the distinction of bondage, release, and so on, would be
impossible.

Against all these views the Sftra declares that the
soul is a part of Brahman; since there are declara-
tions of difference and also ‘ otherwise,’ i.e. declarations
of unity. To the former class belong all those texts
which dwell on the distinction of the creator and the
creature, the ruler and the ruled, the all-knowing and the
ignorant, the independent and the dependent, the pure and
the impure, that which is endowed with holy qualities
and that which possesses qualities of an opposite kind, the
lord and the dependent. To the latter class belong such
texts as ‘Thou art that’ and ‘this Self is Brahman.’ Some
persons even record that Brahman is of the nature of slaves,
fishermen, and so on. The Atharvazikas, that is to say,
have the following text, ‘ Brahman are the slaves, Brahman
are these fishers,’ and so on; and as Brahman there is said
to comprise within itself all individual souls, the passage
teaches general non-difference of the Self. In order, then,
that texts of both these classes may be taken in their

11 ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 561

primary, literal sense, we must admit that the individual
soul is a part of Brahman. Nor is it a fact that the
declarations of difference refer to matters settled by other
means of knowledge, such as perception and so on, and on
that account are mere reiterations of something established
otherwise (in consequence of which they would have no
original proving force of their own, and would be sublated
by the texts declaring non-duality). For the fact that the
soul is created by Brahman, is ruled by it, constitutes its
body, is subordinate to it, abides in it, is preserved by it, is
absorbed by it, stands to it in the relation of a meditating
devotee, and through its grace attains the different ends of
man, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure and final release—
all this and what is effected thereby, viz. the distinction of
the soul and Brahman, does not fall within the cognisance
of perception and the other means of proof, and hence is
not established by something else. It is therefore not true
that the texts declaring the creation of the world, and so on,
are mere reiterations of differences established by other
means of authoritative knowledge, and hence have for their
purport to teach things that are false.—[Nor will it do to
say that the texts declaring duality teach what indeed
is not established by other means of knowledge but is
erroneous.] ‘Brahman conceives the thought of differen-
tiating itself, forms the resolution of becoming many, and
accordingly creates the ether and the other elements, enters
into them as individual soul, evolves all the different forms
and names, takes upon himself all the pleasures and pains
which spring from experiencing the infinite multitude of
objects thus constituted, abides within and inwardly rules
all beings, recognises itself in its giva-condition to be one
with the universal causal Brahman, and finally accomplishes
its release from the samsara and the body of sacred doctrine
by which this release is effected ’—all this the Veda indeed
declares, but its real purport is that all this is only true
of a Brahman under the influence of an illusion, and therefore
is unreal!—while at the same time Brahman is defined as
that the essential nature of which is absolutely pure intelli-
gence! Truly, if such were the purport of the Veda, what
[48] oo

562 VEDANTA-SOTRAS. Ὁ

more would the Veda be than the idle talk of a person out
of his mind!

Nor finally is there any good in the theory of the soul
being Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting
adjunct. For this view also is in conflict with the texts
which distinguish Brahman as the ruling and the soul as
the ruled principle, and so on. One and the same Devadatta
does not become double as it were—a ruler on the one hand
and a ruled subject on the other—because he is determined
by the house in which he is, or by something else.

In order to be able to account for the twofold designations
of the soul, we must therefore admit that the soul is a part
of Brahman.

43. And on account of the mantra.

‘One part (quartery of it are all beings, three feet
(quarters) of it are the Immortal in heaven’ (Kz. Up. III,
12, 6}—on account of this mantra also the soul must be
held to be a part of Brahman. For the word ‘foot’ denotes
a part. As the individual souls are many the mantra
uses the plural form ‘all beings.’ In the Sitra (42) the
word ‘part’ is in the singular, with a view to denote
the whole class. For the same reason in II, 3, 18 also the
word ‘atman’ is in the singular. For that the individual
Selfs are different from the Lord, and are many and eternal,
is declared by texts such as‘ He who, eternal and intelligent,
fulfils the desires of many who likewise are eternal and
intelligent’ (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13). Since thus the plurality
of the eternal individual Selfs rests on good authority,
those who have an insight into the true nature of Selfs
will discern without difficulty different characteristics
distinguishing the individual Selfs, although all Selfs are
alike in so far as having intelligence for their essential
nature. Moreover the Sdtra II, 3, 48 directly states the
plurality of the individual Selfs.

44. Moreover it is so stated in Smetti.

Smriti moreover declares the individual soul to be a part
of the highest Person, ‘An eternal part of myself becomes

11 ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 45. 563

the individual soul (giva) in the world of life’ (Bha. Gi.
XV, 7)—For this reason also the soul must be held to be
a part of Brahman.

But if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections
of the soul are Brahman’s also!—To this objection the
next Sdtra replies.

45. But as in the case of light and so on. Not
so is the highest.

The ‘but’ discards the objection.—‘ Like light and so on.’
The individual soul is a part of the highest Self; as the
light issuing from a luminous thing such as fire or the sun
is a part of that body; or as the generic characteristics of
a cow or horse, and the white or black colour of things so
coloured, are attributes and hence parts of the things in
which those attributes inhere ; or 85. the body is a part of
an embodied being. For by a part we understand that
which constitutes one place (desa) of some thing, and hence
a distinguishing attribute (viseshaza) is a part of the thing
distinguished by that attribute. Hence those analysing
a thing of that kind discriminate between the destinguishing
element or part of it, and the distinguished element or part.
Now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing
distinguished thereby stand to each other in the relation of
part and whole, yet we observe them to differ in essential
character. Hence there is no contradiction between the
individual and the highest Self—the former of which is
a viseshana of the latter—standing to each other in the
relation of part and whole, and their being at the same
time of essentially different nature. This the Sfitra declares
‘not so is the highest,’ i.e. the highest Self is not of the
same nature as the individual soul. For as the luminous
body is of a nature different from that of its light, thus
the highest Self differs from the individual soul which is
a part of it. It is this difference of character—due to the
individual soul being the distinguishing element and the
highest Self being the substance distinguished thereby—to
which all those texts refer which declare difference. Those
texts, on the other hand, which declare non-difference are

O02

564 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

based on the circumstance that attributes which are incapable
of separate existence are ultimately bound to the substance
which they distinguish, and hence are fundamentally valid.
That in declarations such as ‘Thou art that’ and ‘this Self
is Brahman,’ the words thou and Se/f, no less than the
words that and Brahman, denote Brahman in so far as
having the individual souls for its body, and that thus the
two sets of words denote fundamentally one and the same
thing, has been explained previously.

46. And Smrti texts declare this.

That the world and Brahman stand to each other in the
relation of part and whole, the former being like the light
and the latter like the luminous body, or the former being
like the power and the latter like that in which the power
inheres, or the former being like the body and the latter
like the soul; this Parasara also and other Smrsti writers
declare, ‘As the light of a fire which abides in one place
only spreads all around, thus this whole world is the power
(sakti) of the highest Brahman.’ The ‘and’ in the Sdtra
implies that scriptural texts also (‘of whom the Self is the
body ’ and others) declare that the individual Self is a part
of Brahman in so far as it is its body.

But if all individual souls are equal in so far as being
alike parts of Brahman, alike actuated by Brahman, and
alike knowing subjects, what is the reason that, as Scripture
teaches, some of them are allowed to read the Veda and
act according to its injunctions, while others are excluded
therefrom; and again that some are to see, feel, and so on,
while others are excluded from these privileges?—This
question is answered by the next Sitra.

47. Permission and exclusion (result) from con-
nexion with a body; as in the case of light and
so on.

Although all souls are essentially of the same nature in
so far as they are parts of Brahman, knowing subjects and
so on, the permissions and exclusions referred to are possible
for the reason that each individual soul is joined to some

11 ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 49. 565

particular body, pure or impure, whether of a Brahmaza or
Kshattriya or Vaisya or Sddra, and so on. ‘As in the case
of fire and so on.’ All fire is of the same kind, and yet one
willingly fetches fire from the house of a Brahmana, while
one shuns fire from a place where dead bodies are burnt.
And from a Brahmana one accepts food without any
objection, while one refuses food from a low person.

48. And on account of non-connectedness there is
no confusion.

Although the souls, as being parts of Brahman and so
on, are of essentially the same character, they are actually
separate, for each of them is of atomic size and resides in a
separate body. For this reason there is no confusion or mix-
ing up of the individual spheres of enjoyment and experience.
The Sdtrakara introduces this reference to an advantage of
his own view of things, in order to intimate that the views
of the soul being Brahman deluded or else Brahman affected
by a limiting adjunct are on their part incapable of explain-
ing how it is that the experiences of the individual Self and
the highest Self, and of the several individual Selfs, are not
mixed up.

But may not, on the view of the soul being Brahman
deluded, the distinction of the several spheres of experience
be explained by means of the difference of the limiting
adjuncts presented by Nescience?—This the next Sdtra
negatives.

49. And it is a mere apparent argument.

The argumentation by which it is sought to prove that
that being whose nature is constituted by absolutely
uniform light, i.e. intelligence, is differentiated by limiting
adjuncts which presuppose an obscuration of that essential
nature, is a mere apparent (fallacious) one. For, as we have
shown before, obscuration of the light of that which is
nothing but light means destruction of that light.—If we
accept as the reading of the Sdtra ‘ 4bhas4%’ (in plural) the
meaning is that the various reasons set forth by the adherents
of that doctrine are all of them fallacious. The ‘and’ of

566 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the Stra is meant to point out that that doctrine, moreover,
is in conflict with texts such as ‘thinking himself to be
different from the Mover’ (Svet. Up. I, 6); ‘there are two
unborn ones, one a ruler, the other not a ruler’ (I, 9); ‘of
those two one eats the sweet fruit’ (V, 6); and others.
For even if difference is due to upadhis which are the
figment of Nescience, there is no escaping the conclusion
that the spheres of experience must be mixed up, since the
theory admits that the thing itself with which all the limiting
adjuncts connect themselves is one only.

But this cannot be urged against the theory of the
individual soul being Brahman in so far as determined by
real limiting adjuncts; for°on that view we may explain
the difference of spheres of experience as due to the begin-
ningless advéshfas which are the cause of the difference of
the limiting adjuncts !—To this the next Satra replies.

50. On account of the non-determination of the
adrzshéas.

As the advish/as also which are the causes of the series
of upadhis have for their substrate Brahman itself, there is
no reason for their definite allotment (to definite individual
souls), and hence again there is no definite separation of
the spheres of experience. For the limiting adjuncts as
well as the advishtas cannot by their connexion with
Brahman split up Brahman itself which is essentially one.

51. And it is thus also in the case of purposes
and so on.

For the same reason there can be no definite restriction
in the case of purposes and so on which are the causes of
the different adrishfas. (For they also cannot introduce
plurality into Brahman that is fundamentally one.)

52. Should it be said (that that is possible) owing
to the difference of place; we deny this, on account
of (all up4dhis) being within (all places).

Although Brahman is one only and not to be split by
the several limiting adjuncts with which it is connected,

1 ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 52. 567

yet the separation of the spheres of enjoyment is not
impossible since the places of Brahman which are connected
with the up&dhis are distinct——This the Sitra negatives on
the ground that, as the upadhis move here and there and
hence all places enter into connexion with all upAdhis, the
mixing up of spheres of enjoyment cannot be avoided.
And even if the up4dhis were connected with different
places, the pain connected with some particular place would
affect the whole of Brahman which is one only.—The two
Satras II, 3, 32 and 37 have stated an objection against
those who, without taking their stand on the Veda, held
the view of an all-pervading soul. The Sdtras II, 3, 50
and ff.,on the other hand, combat the view of those who,
while basing their doctrine on the Veda, teach the absolute
unity of the Self— Here terminates the adhikarama of ‘the
part.’

568 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

FOURTH PADA.

1. Thus the prazas.

After having taught that Ether and all the other ele-
ments are effects, and hence have originated, the Sdtras had
shown that the individual soul, although likewise an effect,
does not originate in the sense of undergoing a change of
essential nature; and had in connexion therewith clearly
set forth wherein the essential nature of the soul consists.
They now proceed to elucidate the question as to the
origination of the instruments of the individual soul, viz.
the organs and the vital breath.

The point here to be decided is whether the organs are
effects as the individual soul is an effect, or as ether and
the other elements are. As the soul is, thus the prasas
are, the Parvapakshin maintains. That means—as the soul
is not produced, thus the organs also are not produced.
For the latter point no less than the former is directly
stated in Scripture; the wording of the Stra ‘thus the
prazas’ being meant to extend to the case of the pramas
also, the authority of Scripture to which recourse was had
_ in the case of the soul.—But what is the scriptural text
you mean?

‘ Non-being, truly this was in the beginning. Here they
say, what was that? Those Aishis indeed were that Non-
being, thus they say. And who were those Rishis? The
prazas indeed were those Xzshis.’ This is the passage
which declares that before the origination of the world the
Rishis existed. As ‘pra#z4%’ is in the plural, we conclude
that what is meant is the organs and the vital air. Nor
can this text be interpreted to mean only that’ the prazas
exist for a very long time (but are not uncreated); as we
may interpret the texts declaring Vayu and the atmosphere
(antariksha) to be immortal : ‘Vayu and the atmosphere are
immortal’; ‘Vayu is the deity that never sets’ (Bri. Up.
II, 3, 3; 1, 5, 22). For the clause ‘Non-being indeed was

II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2. 569

this in the beginning’ declares that the pranas existed even
at the time when the entire world was in the pralaya state.
Those texts, then, which speak of an origination of the
prazas must be explained somehow, just as we did with
the texts referring to the origination of the individual soul.

To this the Siddh4ntin replies, ‘the prasas also originate
in the same way as ether, and so on.’-—Why ?—Because we
have scriptural texts directly stating that before creation
everything was one, ‘ Being only this was in the beginning,’
‘ The Self only was this in the beginning.’ And moreover,
the text ‘from that there is produced the praza and the
mind and all organs’ (Mu. Up. II, 3, 1) declares that the
organs originated; they therefore cannot have existed
before creation. Nor is it permissible to ascribe a different
meaning to the texts which declare the origination of the
sense-organs—as we may do in the case of the texts de-
claring the origination of the soul. For we have no texts
directly denying the origination of the sense-organs, or
affirming their eternity, while we ave such texts in the
case of the individual soul. In the text quoted by the
Parvapakshin, ‘Non-being indeed was this in the begin-
ning,’ &c., the word praza can denote the highest Self
only; for from texts such as ‘ All these beings indeed enter
into breath alone, and from breath they arise’ (Κλ. Up. I,
11, 5), the word prAza is known to be one of the designa- -
tions of the highest Self. And as to the clause ‘the prazas
indeed are those Rishis,’ we remark that the term Rishi
may properly be applied to the all-seeing highest Self, but
not to the non-intelligent organs.

But how then is the plural form ‘the Réshis are the
pranas’ to be accounted for? This the next Sdtra
explains. ἷ

2. (The scriptural statement of the plural) is
secondary, on account of impossibility; and since
(the highest Self) is declared before that.

The plural form exhibited by the text must be taken
(not in its literal, but) in a secondary figurative sense, since
there is no room there for a plurality of things. For Scrip-

570 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

ture declares that previous to creation the highest Self only
exists,

3. On account of speech having for its antecedent
that.

For the following reason also the word ‘ prdsa,’ in the
text quoted, can denote Brahman only. Speech, i.e. the
names which have for their object all things apart from
Brahman, presupposes the existence of the entire universe
of things—ether, and so on—which is the object of speech.
But, as according to the text ‘this was then non-differenti-
ated ; it was thereupon differentiated by names and forms,’
then (i.e. before the differentiation of individual things), no
things having name and form existed, there existed also
no effects of speech and the other organs of action and
sensation, and hence it cannot be inferred that those organs
themselves existed.— Here terminates the adhikarana of ‘the
origination of the prazas.’

4. (They are seven) on account of the going of
the seven and of specification.

The question here arises whether those organs are seven
only, or eleven—the doubt on this point being due to the
conflicting nature of scriptural texts—The Pdrvapakshin
maintains the former alternative-—On what grounds ?—‘ On
account of going, and of specification.’ For the text
refers to the ‘going,’ i.e. to the moving about in the
different worlds, together with the soul when being born
or dying, of seven prazas only, ‘seven are these worlds in
which the prazas move which rest in the cave, being placed
there as seven and seven’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8)—where the
repetition ‘seven and seven’ intimates the plurality of
souls to which the prazas are attached. Moreover those
moving pra#zas are distinctly specified in the following
text, ‘when the five instruments of knowledge stand still,
together with the mind (manas), and when the buddhi does
not move, that they call the highest “going”’ (gati—Ka.
Up. II, 6,10). The ‘highest going’ here means the moving
towards Release, all movement within the body having

Il ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 5. 57t

come to an end. As thus the text declares that at the
time of birth and death seven prazas only accompany the
soul, and as, with regard to the condition of final concen-
tration, those pra#as are distinctly specified as forms of
knowledf& (g#AnAni), we conclude that the prazas are the
seven following instruments of the soul—the organs of
hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling, the buddhi
and the manas. In various other passages indeed, which
refer to the pra#as, higher numbers are mentioned, viz. up
to fourteen, speech, the hands, the feet, the anus, the organ
of generation, the ahank4ra and the ἰτέα being added to
those mentioned above ; cp. e.g. ‘there are eight grahas’
(Brz. Up. III, 2,1); ‘Seven are the prazas of the head,
two the lower ones’ (Taitt. Samh. V, 3, 2, 5). But as the
text says nothing about those additional organs accompany-
ing the soul, we assume that they are called prazas in
a metaphorical sense only, since they all, more or less,
assist the soul.—This view the next Sftra sets aside.

5. But the hands and so on also; (since they
assist the soul) abiding (in the body). Hence (it is)
not so.

The organs are not seven only, but eleven, since the
hands and the rest also contribute towards the experience
and fruition of that which abides in the body, i.e. the soul,
and have their separate offices, such as seizing, and so on.
Hence it is not so, i.e. it must not be thought that the
hands and the rest are not organs. Buddhi, ahankara
and &itta, on the other hand, are (not independent organs
but) mere designations of the manas, according as the
latter is engaged in the functions of deciding (adhyavasaya),
or misconception (abhim4na), or thinking (Ainta). The
organs therefore are eleven. From this it follows that in
the passage ‘Ten are these prazas in man, and Atman
is the eleventh’ (Bré. Up. II, 4, 11), the word Atman
denotes the manas. The number e/even is confirmed by
scriptural and Smriti passages, cp. ‘the ten organs and the
one’ (Bha. Gi. XIII, 5); ‘ten are the vaikarika beings, the
manas is the eleventh,’ and others. Where more organs

572 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

are mentioned, the different functions of the manas are
meant; and references to smaller numbers are connected
with special effects of the organs, such as accompanying
the soul, and the like—Here terminates the adhikasaes of
‘the going of the seven.’

6. And (they are) minute.

As the text ‘these are all alike, all infinite’ (Br. Up. I,
5, 13), declares speech, mind, and breath to be infinite, we
conclude that the praszas are all-pervading—To this the
Stra replies, that they are minute; for the text ‘ when the
vital breath passes out of the body, all the prazas pass out
after it’ (Brz. Up. V, 4, 2), proves those prazas to be of
limited size, and as when passing out they are not per-
ceived by bystanders, they must be of minute size—The
text which speaks of them as infinite is a text enjoining
meditation (‘he who meditates on them as infinite’), and
infinity there means only that abundance of activities which
is an attribute of the praza to be meditated on.

7. And the best.

By ‘the best’ we have to understand the chief vital air
(mukhya prada), which, in the colloquy of the prasas, is
determined to be the best because it is the cause of the
preservation of the body. This chief vital air the Parva-
pakshin maintains to be something non-created, since
Scripture (Xi. Samh. V, 129, 2), ‘By its own law the One
was breathing without wind,’ shows that an effect of it, viz.
the act of breathing, existed even previously to creation,
at the time of a great pralaya; and because texts declaring
it to have been created—such as ‘from him is bor breath’
(Mu. Up. II, 1, 3)}—may be interpreted in the same way
as the texts declaring that the soul is something created
(see Ὁ. 540 ff.).—To this the reply is that, since this view
contradicts scriptural statements as to the oneness of all,
previous to creation; and since the Mundaka-text declares
the praza to have been created in the same way as earth
and the other elements; and since there are no texts
plainly denying its createdness, the chief vital air also must

11 ADHYAyA, 4 PADA, 8. 573

be held to have been created. The words ‘the One was
breathing without wind’ by no means refer to the vital
breath of living creatures, but intimate the existence of the
highest Brahman, alone by itself; as indeed appears from
the qualification ‘ without wind.—That the vital breath,
although really disposed of in the preceding Sitras, is
specially mentioned in the present Sftra, is with a view
to the question next raised for consideration.—Here ter-
minates the adhikarama of ‘the minuteness of the prazas.’

8. Neither air nor function, on account of its
being stated separately.

Is this main vital breath nothing else but air, the second
of the elements? Or is it a certain motion of the air? Or
is it air that has assumed some special condition?—The
first alternative may be adopted, on account of the text
‘praza is air.—Or, since mere air is not called breath,
while this term is generally applied to that motion of air
which consists in inhalation and exhalation, we may hold
that breath is a motion of air—Of both these views the
Sdtra disposes by declaring ‘ not so, on account of separate
statement.’ For in the passage ‘From him there is pro-
duced breath, mind, and all sense-organs, ether and air,’ &c.,
breath and air are mentioned as two separate things. For
the same reason breath also cannot be a mere motion or
function of air; for the text does not mention any functions
of fire and the other elements, side by side with these
elements, as separate things (and this shows that breath
also cannot, in that text, be interpreted to denote a function
of air). The text ‘prava is air,’ on the other hand, inti-
mates (not that breath is identical with air, but) that breath
is air having assumed a special form, not a thing altogether
different from it, like fire. In ordinary language, more-
over, the word dreath does not mean a mere motion but
a substance to which motion belongs; we say, ‘the breath
moves to and fro in inhalation and exhalation.’

Is breath, which we thus know to be a modification of
air, to be considered as a kind of elementary substance,
like fire, earth, and so on? Not so, the next Satra replies.

574 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

9. But like the eye and the rest, on account of
being taught with them, and for other reasons.

Breath is not an element, but like sight and the rest,
a special instrument of the soul. This appears from the
fact that the texts mention it together with the recognised
organs of the soul, the eye, and so on; so e.g. in the
colloquy of the prazas. And such common mention is
suitable in the case of such things only as belong to one
class.—The ‘and for other reasons’ of the Sitra refers to
the circumstance of the principal breath being specially
mentioned among the organs comprised under the term
‘prana’; cp. ‘that principal breath’ (X4%. Up. I, 2, 7);
‘that central breath’ (Brz. Up. I, 5, 21).—But if the chief
breath is, like the eye and the other organs, an instrument
of the soul, there must be some special form of activity
through which it assists the soul, as the eye e. g. assists the
soul by seeing. But no such activity is perceived, and the
breath cannot therefore be put in the same category as
the organs of sensation and action!—To this objection the
next Sitra replies.

10. And there is no objection on account of its
not having an activity (karaza) ; for (Scripture) thus
declares.

The karaza of the Sitra means kriy4, action. The
objection raised on the ground that the principal breath
does not exercise any form of activity helpful to the soul,
is without force, since as a matter of fact Scripture declares
that there is such an activity, in so far as the vital breath
supports the body with all its organs. For the text
(KA. Up.V, 1, 7 ff.) relates how on the successive departure
of speech, and so on, the body and the other organs main-
tained their strength, while on the departure of the vital
breath the body and all the organs at once became weak
and powerless.—The conclusion therefore is that the breath,
in its fivefold form of praza, apana, and so on, subserves
the purposes of the individual soul, and thus occupies the
position of an instrument, no less than the eye and the
other organs.

II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 13. 575

But as those five forms of breath, viz. praza, uddna, &c.,
have different names and functions they must be separate
principles (and hence there is not one principal breath)}
To this the next Satra replies.

11, It is designated as having five functions like
mind,

As desire, and so on, are not principles different from
mind, although they are different functions and produce
different effects—according to the text, ‘Desire, purpose,
doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, absence of firmness,
shame, reflection, fear—all this is mind’ (Brz. Up. I, 5, 3);
so, on the ground of the text, ‘ praza, apana, vy4na, ud4na,
samana—all this is praza’ (ibid.), apdna and the rest must
be held to be different functions of pra#za only, not inde-
pendent principles—Here terminates the adhikarawa of
what is ‘a modification of air.’

12. And (it is) minute.

This pra#za also is minute, since as before (i.e. as in the
case of the organs) the text declares it to pass out of the
body, to move, and so on, ‘him when he passes out the _
praza follows after’ (Bri. Up. V, 4,2). A further doubt
arises, in the case of praza, owing to the fact that in other
texts it is spoken of as of large extent, ‘It is equal to these
three worlds, equal to this Universe’ (Bri. Up. I, 3, 22);
‘On prasza everything is founded’; ‘For all this is shut up
in praza.’ But as the texts declaring the passing out, and
so on, of the prava, prove it to be of limited size, the all-
embracingness ascribed to présa in those other texts must
be interpreted to mean only that the life of all living and
breathing creatures depends on breath.—Here terminates
the adhikaraza of ‘the minuteness of the best.’

13. But the rule (over the prazas) on the part of
Fire and the rest, together with him to whom the
prazas belong (i.e. the soul), is owing to the think-
ing of that (viz. the highest Self); on account of
scriptural statement,

576 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

It has been shown that the prasas, together with the
main pravza, originate from Brahman, and have a limited
size. That the praas are guided by Agni and other divine
beings has also been explained on a previous occasion,
viz. under SQ. II, 1, 5. And it is known from ordinary ex-
perience that the organs are ruled by the individual soul,
which uses them as means of experience and fruition.
And this is also established by scriptural texts, such as
‘Having taken these pravas he (ie. the soul) moves about in
his own body, according to his pleasure’ (Bré. Up. II, 1, 18).
The question now arises whether the rule of the soul and
of the presiding divine beings over the prazas depends on
them (i.e. the soul and the divinities) only, or on some
other being.—On them only, since they depend on no one
else!—Not so, the Stra declares. The rule which light,
and so on, i.e. Agni and the other divinities, together with
him to whom the prazas belong, i.e. the soul, exercise over
the pramas, proceeds from the thinking of that, i.e. from the
will of the highest Self—How is this known ?— From
scriptural statement.’ For Scripture teaches that the
organs, together with their guiding divinities and the indi-
vidual soul, depend in all their doings on the thought of
the highest Person. ‘He, who abiding within Fire, rules
Fire from within.—He, who abiding within air—within the
Self—within the eye, and so on’ (Bri. Up. III, 7); ‘From
fear of it the wind blows, from fear of it the sun rises, from
fear of it Agni and Indra, yea Death runs as the fifth’
(Taitt. Up. IT, 8,1); ‘ By the command of that Imperishable
one, sun and moon stand, held apart’ (Bré. Up. II, 8, 9).

14. And on account of the eternity of this.

As the quality, inhering in all things, of being ruled by
the highest Self, is eternal and definitely fixed by being
connected with his essential nature, it is an unavoidable
conclusion that the rule of the soul and of the divinities over
the organs depends on the will of the highest Self. The
text, ‘Having sent forth this he entered into it, having
entered into it he became sat and tyat’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6),
shows that the entering on the part of the highest Person

11 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 16. 577

into all things, so as to be their ruler, is connected with his
essential nature. Similarly Smriti says, ‘Pervading this
entire Universe by a portion of mine I do abide’ (Bha. Gi.
X, 42).—Here terminates the adhikarava of ‘the rule of
Fire and the rest.’

15. They, with the exception of the best, are
organs, on account of being so designated.

Are all principles called prazas to be considered as
‘organs’ (indriy4mi), or is the ‘ best,’ i.e. the chief praza, to
be excepted ?>—All of them, without exception, are organs ;
for they all are called prazas equally, and they all are
instruments of the soul.—Not so, the Sitra replies. The
‘best’ one is to be excepted, since only the prazas other
than the best are designated as organs. Texts such as
‘the organs are ten and one’ (Bha. Gi. XIII, 5) apply the
term ‘organ’ only to the senses of sight and the rest, and
the internal organ.

16. On account of scriptural statement of differ-
ence, and on account of difference of characteristics,

Texts such as ‘from him is born praaa, and the internal
organ, and all organs’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) mention the vital
breath separately from the organs, and this shows that the
breath is not one of the organs. The passage indeed
mentions the internal organ (manas) also as something
separate ; but in other passages the manas is formally in-
cluded in the organs, ‘the (five) organs with mind as the
sixth’ (Bha. Gi. XV, 7). That the vital breath differs in
nature from the organ of sight and the rest, is a matter of
observation. For in the state of deep sleep the function
of breath is seen to continue, while those of the eye, and
80 ON, are not perceived. The work of the organs, inclusive
of the manas, is to act as instruments of cognition and
action, while the work of breath is to maintain the body
and the organs. It is for the reason that the subsistence
of the organs depends on breath, that the organs them-
selves are called prazas. Thus Scripture says, ‘they all
became the form of that (breath), and therefore they are
called after him praxzas’ (Bri. Up. I, 5,21). ‘They became

[48] Pp

578 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

its form’ means—they became its body, their activity de-
pended on it——Here terminates the adhikaranza of ‘the
organs.’

17. But the making of names and forms (belongs)
to him who renders tripartite, on account of scrip-
tural teaching.

The Sfitras have shown that the creation of the elements
and organs in their collective aspect (samashé) and the
activity of the individual souls proceed from the highest
Self; and they have also further confirmed the view that
the rule which the souls exercise over their organs depends
on the highest Self. A question now arises with regard to
the creation of the world in its discrete aspect (vyashai),
which consists in the differentiation of names and forms
(i.e. of individual beings). Is this latter creation the work
of Hirazyagarbha only, who represents the collective aggre-
gate of all individual souls; or, fundamentally, the work of
the highest Brahman having Hirazyagarbha for its body—
just as the creation of water e.g. is the work of the highest
Brahman having fire for its body ?—The Parvapakshin
maintains the former alternative. For, he says, the text
‘Having entered with this living-soul-self (anena givenat-
mana), let me differentiate names and forms’ (K4. Up. VI,
3, 2), declares the giva-soul to be the agent in differentia-
tion. For the resolve of the highest deity is expressed,
not in the form ‘let me differentiate names and forms by
myself’ (svena ripeza), but ‘by this soul-self, i.e. by a part
of the highest Self, in the form of the individual soul.—
But on this interpretation the first person in ‘vyakaravazi’
(let me enter), and the grammatical form of ‘having
entered,’ which indicates the agent, could not be taken in
their literal, but only in an implied, sense—as is the case
in a sentence such as ‘Having entered the hostile army
by means of a spy, I will estimate its strength’ (where the
real agent is not the king, who is the speaker, but the spy).
—The cases are not analogous, the Padrvapakshin replies.
For the king and the spy are fundamentally separate, and
hence the king is agent by implication only. But in the

1 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I7- 579

case under discussion the soul is a part, and hence con-
tributes to constitute the essential nature of, the highest
Self; hence that highest Self itself enters and differentiates
in the form of the soul. Nor can it be said that the instru-
mental case (‘ with this soul-self’) has the implied meaning
of association (‘together with this soul-self’); for if a case
can be taken in its primary sense, it is not proper to under-
stand it in a sense which has to be expressed by means of
a preposition. But the third case, givena, cannot here
be understood even in its primary sense, i.e. that of the
instrument of the action; for if Brahman is the agent in
the acts of entering and differentiating, the soul is not that
which is most suitable to accomplish the end of action
(while yet grammar defines the instrumental case—karana
—on this basis). Nor can it be said that the activity of
the soul comes to an end with the entering, while the
differentiation of names and forms is Brahman’s work, for
the past participle (pravisya) indicates (according to the
rules of grammar) that the two actions—of entering and
differentiating—belong to the same agent. And although
the soul as being a part of the highest Self shares in its
nature, yet in order to distinguish it from the highest Self,
the text by means of the clause ‘with ‘tha? living Self’
refers to it as something outward (not of the nature of the
Self). The agent in the action of differentiation of names
and forms therefore is Hirazyagarbha. Smriti texts also
ascribe to him this activity ; cp. ‘he in the beginning made,
from the words of the Veda, the names and forms of beings,
of the gods and the rest, and of actions.’

Against this view the Stra declares itself. The differ-
entiation of names and forms belongs to him who renders
tripartite, i.e. the highest Brahman ; since it is assigned by
Scripture to the latter only. For the text ‘That divinity
thought, let me, having entered these three beings with
this living-soul-self, differentiate names and forms—let me
make each of these three tripartite, shows that all the
activities mentioned have one and the same agent. But
the rendering tripartite cannot belong to Brahma (Hirazya-
garbha), who abides within the Brahma-egg, for that egg

Pp2

580 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

itself is produced from fire, water, and earth, only after
these elements have been rendered tripartite; and Smriti
says that Brahma himself originated in that egg, ‘in that
egg there originated Brahmé, the grandfather of all the
worlds.’ As thus the action of rendering tripartite can
belong to the highest Brahman only, the differentiation of
names and forms, which belongs to the same agent, also is
Brahman’s only.—But how then does the clause ‘ with that
living-soul-self’ fit in?—The co-ordination ‘ with that soul,
with the Self,’ shows that the term ‘soul’ here denotes the
highest Brahman as having the soul for its body ; just as in
the clauses ‘that fire thought’; ‘it sent forth water’;
‘water thought,’ and so on, what is meant each time is
Brahman having fire, water, and so on, for its body. The
work of differentiating names and forms thus belongs to
the highest Brahman which has for its body Hirasya-
garbha, who represents the soul in its aggregate form. On
this view the first person (in ‘let me differentiate’) and the
agency (conveyed by the form of ‘ pravisya’) may, without
any difficulty, be taken in their primary literal senses ; and
the common agency, implied in the connexion of pravisya
and vyakarav4zi, is accounted for. The view here set
forth as to the relation of Brahman and Hiraxyagarbha also
explains how the accounts of Hirazyagarbha’s (Brahma’s)
creative activity can say that ἀφ differentiated names and
forms.

The whole passus beginning ‘that divinity thought,’ there-
fore has the following meaning— Having entered into
those three beings, viz. Fire, Water, and Earth, with my
Self which is qualified by the collective soul (as constituting
its body), let me differentiate names and forms, i.e. let me
produce gods and all the other kinds of individual beings,
and give them names; and to that end, since fire, water,
and earth have not yet mutually combined, and hence are
incapable of giving rise to particular things, let me make
each of them tripartite, and thus fit them for creation”—
The settled conclusion then is, that the differentiation of
names and forms is the work of the highest Brahman only.

But, an objection is raised, the fact that the differentia-

II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 18. 581

tion of names and forms must be due to the same agent as
the rendering tripartite, does not after all prove that the
former is due to the highest Self. For the rendering tri-
partite may itself belong to the individual soul. For the
text relates how, after the creation of the cosmic egg, a
process of tripartition was going on among the individual
living beings created by Brahma. ‘Learn from me, my
friend, how those three beings having reached man become
tripartite, each of them. The earth when eaten is disposed
of in three ways; its grossest portion becomes feces, its
middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion mind, and so on.
Similarly, in the preceding section, it is described how the
process of tripartition goes on in the case of fire, sun,
moon, and lightning, which all belong to the world created
by Brahmé, ‘the red colour of burning fire is the colour of
fire, ἅς. And the text moreover states the original
tripartition to have taken place after the differentiation of
names and forms: ‘ That divinity having entered into these
three beings differentiated names and forms. Each of
these (beings) it rendered tripartite. —To this objection
the next Sdtra replies.

18. Flesh is of earthy nature; in the case of the
two others also according to the text.

The view that the description of tripartition, given in the
passage ‘each of these he made tripartite,’ refers to a time
subsequent to the creation of the mundane egg and to the
gods created by Brahma, cannot be upheld. For from it
there would follow that, as in the passage ‘earth when eaten
is disposed of in three ways,’ &c., flesh is declared to be
more subtle than feces, and mind yet subtler, it would
have to be assumed—in agreement with the nature of the
causal substance—that flesh is made of water and manas of
fire’. And similarly we should have to assume that urine

1 Le. if the tripartition of earth (i.e. solid food) when eaten,
which is described in VI, 5, 1, were the same tripartition which is
described in VI, 3, 3-4, we should have to conclude that the former
tripartition consists, like the latter, in an admixture to earth of
water and fire.

582 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

—which is the grossest part of water drunk (cp. VI, 5, 2)—
is of the nature of earth, and breath, which is its subtlest
part, of the nature of fire. But this is not admissible; for
as the text explicitly states that earth when eaten is dis-
posed of in three ways, flesh and mind also must be
assumed to be of an earthy nature. In the same way we
must frame our view concerning ‘the two others,’ i. e. water
and fire, ‘according to the text.’ That means—the three
parts into which water divides itself when drunk, must be
taken to be 41] "οὗ them modifications of water, and the
three parts of fire when consumed must be held to be all
of them modifications of fire. Thus feces, flesh and mind
are alike transformations of earth ; urine, blood and breath
transformations of water ; bones, marrow and speech trans-
formations of fire.

This moreover agrees with the subsequent statement
(VI, 5, 4), ‘For, truly, mind consists of earth, breath of
water, speech of fire. The process of tripartition referred
to in VI, 3, 4, is not therefore the same as the one described
in the section that tells us what becomes of food when
eaten, water when drunk, &c. Were this (erroneous) as-
sumption made, and were it thence concluded that mind,
breath and speech—as being the subtlest created things—
are made of fire, this would flatly contradict the comple-
mentary text quoted above (‘mind consists of earth,’ &c.).
When the text describes how earth, water and fire, when
eaten, are transformed in a threefold way, it refers to
elements which had already been rendered tripartite ;
the process of tripartition must therefore have taken
place before the creation of the cosmic egg. Without
such tripartition the elements would be incapable of
giving rise to any effects; such capability they acquire
only by being mutually. conjoined, and that is just the
process of tripartition. In agreement herewith Smriti
says, ‘Separate from each other, without connexion, those
elements with their various powers were incapable of
producing creatures. But having combined completely,
entered into mutual conjunction, abiding one within the
other, the principles—from the highest Mahat down to

Il ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 19. | 583

individual things—produced the mundane egg.’—When the
text therefore says (VI, 3, 3) ‘The divinity having entered
into those three beings with that soul-self differentiated
names and forms; he made each of these tripartite,’ the
order in which the text mentions the activities of differentia-
tion and tripartition is refuted by the order demanded by
the sense1.—The text then proceeds to exemplify the
process of tripartition, by means of burning fire, the sun
and lightning, which indeed are things contained within the
mundane egg (while yet the tripartition of elements took
place before the egg, with all its contents, was created) ;
but this is done for the information of Svetaketu, who
himself is a being within the mundane egg, and has to be
taught with reference to things he knows.

But, a final objection is raised, as on this view of the
matter the elements—earth, water and fire—which are
eaten and drunk, are already tripartite, each of them con-
taining portions of all, and thus are of a threefold nature,
how can they be designated each of them by a simple
term—carth, water, fire?—To this the next Siatra replies.

19. But on account of their distinctive nature
there is that designation, that designation.

Each element indeed is of a threefold nature, owing to
the primary tripartition ; but as in each mixed element one
definite element prevails—so that each element has a dis-
tinctive character of its own—a definite designation is given
to each.—The repetition (of ‘that designation’) in the
Sitra indicates the completion of the adhyd4ya.—Here
terminates the adhikarama of ‘the fashioning of names and
forms.’

1 That means—in reality the tripartition of the elements came
first, and after that the creation of individual beings.

THIRD ADHYAYA.
FIRST PADA.

1. In obtaining another of that, it goes enveloped,
(as appears) from question and explanation.

That the Vedanta-texts establish as the proper object
of meditation, on the part of all men desirous of Release,
the highest Brahman, which is the only cause of the entire
world, which is not touched by even a shadow of imperfec-
tion, which is an ocean, as it were, of supremely exalted
qualities, and which totally differs in nature from all other
beings—this is the point proved in the two previous adhy4-
yas; there being given at the same time arguments to
disprove the objections raised against the Vedanta doc-
trine on the basis of Smrzti and reasoning, to refute the
views held by other schools, to show that the different
Vedanta-texts do not contradict each other, and to prove
that the Self is the object of activities (enjoined in injunc-
tions of meditation, and so on). In short, those two
adhydyas have set forth the essential nature of Brahman.
The subsequent part of the work now makes it its task to
enquire into the mode of attaining to Brahman, together
with the means of attainment. The third adhydya is con-
cerned with an enquiry into meditation—which is the
means of attaining to Brahman; and as the motive for
entering on such meditation is supplied by the absence of
all desire for what is other than the thing to be obtained,
and by the desire for that thing, the points first to be
enquired into are the imperfections of the individual soul—
moving about in the different worlds, whether waking or
dreaming or merged in dreamless sleep, or in the state of
swoon; and those blessed characteristics by which Brah-
man is raised above all these imperfections. These are the
topics of the first and second pddas of the adhyAya.

The first question to be considered is whether the soul,

Il] ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 585

when moving from one body into another, is enveloped by
those subtle rudiments of the elements from which the new
body is produced, or not. The Pdrvapakshin maintains
the latter alternative ; for, he says, wherever the soul goes
it can easily provide itself there with those rudiments.
Other reasons supporting this prima facie view will be
mentioned and refuted further on.—The Sdtra states the
view finally accepted, ‘In obtaining another “of that” it
goes enveloped.’ The ‘of that’ refers back to the form,
i.e. body, mentioned in II, 4,17. The soul when moving
towards another embodiment goes enveloped by the rudi-
ments of the elements. This is known ‘from question and
explanation,’ i.e. answer. Question and answer are re-
corded in the ‘Knowledge of the five fires’ (KA. Up. V,
3-10), where Pravéhama, after having addressed to Sveta-
ketu several other questions, finally asks ‘Do you know
why in the fifth libation water is called man?’ In answer
to this last question the text then explains how the Devas,
i.e. the prazas attached to the soul, offer into the heavenly
world, imagined as a sacrificial fire, the oblation called
sraddha; how this sraddh4 changes itself into a body con-
sisting of amrita, which body is called moon; how the
same prazas offer this body of amrita in Parganya,
imagined as a fire, whereupon the body so offered becomes
rain ; how the same pravas throw that rain on to the earth,
also imagined as a sacrificial fire, whereupon it becomes
food ; how this food is then offered into man, also com-
pared to fire, where it becomes seed ; and how, finally, this
seed is offered into woman, also compared to a fire, and
there becomes an embryo. The text then goes on, ‘Thus
in the fifth oblation water becomes purushavaéas,’ i.e.
to be designated by the term man. And this means that
the water which, in a subtle form, was throughout present
in the previous oblations also, now, in that fifth oblation,
assumes the form of a man.—From this question and
answer it thus appears that the soul moves towards a new
embodiment, together with the subtle rudiments from
which the new body springs——But the words, ‘water be-
comes purushavaéas, only intimate that water assumes

586 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the form of a man, whence we conclude that water only
invests the soul during its wanderings; how then can it be
held that the soul moves invested by the rudiments of all
elements ?—To this question the next Stra replies.

2. But on account of (water) consisting of the
three elements; on account of predominance.

Water alone could not produce a new body; for the text
Kh. Up. VI, 3, 4, ‘Each of these he made tripartite,’ shows
that all the elements were made tripartite to the end of
producing bodies. That the text under discussion mentions
water only, is due to the predominance of water ; and that
among the elements giving rise to a new body water pre-
dominates, we infer from the fact that blood and the other
humours are the predominating element in the body.

3. And on account of the going of the pravtas.

That the soul goes embedded in the subtle rudiments of
the elements follows therefrom also that when passing out
of the old body it is said to be followed by the prazas,
‘when he thus passes out, the chief praza follows after
him,’ &c. (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). Compare also Smrsti: ‘It
draws to itself the organs of sense, with the mind for the
sixth. When the Ruler (soul) obtains a new body, and
passes out of another, he takes with him those organs and
then moves on, as the wind takes the odours from their
abodes (the flowers)’ (Bha. Gi. XV, 8). But the prasas
cannot move without a substrate, and hence we must admit
that the rudiments of the elements—which are their sub-
strate—are also moving.

4. If it be said (that it is not so) on account of
scriptural statement as to going to Agni and the
rest; we say no, on account of the secondary nature
(of the statement).

But the text, ‘when the speech of the dead person enters
into fire,’ &c. (Brz. Up. III, 2, 13), declares that when a
person dies his organs go into fire, and so on; they cannot
therefore accompany the soul. Hence the text which

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 5. 587

asserts the latter point must be explained in some other
way !—Not so, the Sftra replies. The text stating that
the organs go to fire, and so on, cannot be taken in its
literal sense; for it continues, ‘the hairs of the body enter
into herbs, the hair of the head into trees’ (which mani-
festly is not true, in its literal sense). The going of speech,
the eye, and so on, must therefore be understood to mean
that the different organs approach the divinities (Agni and
the rest) who preside over them.

5. Should it be said, on account of absence of
mention in the first (reply); we say no, for just that
(is meant), on the ground of fitness.

An objection is raised to the conclusion arrived at under
ITI, 1, τὸ; on the ground that in the first oblation, described
in Kk. Up. V, 4, 2, as being made into the heavenly world,
water is not mentioned at all as the thing offered. The
text says, ‘on that altar the gods offer sraddh&’; and by
sraddha (belief) everybody understands a certain activity
of mind. Water therefore is not the thing offered—Not
so, we reply. It is nothing else but water, which there is
called sraddha. For thus only question and answer have
asense. For the question is, ‘Do you know why in the
fifth libation water is called man?’ and at the outset of the
reply sraddh4 is mentioned as constituting the oblation
made into the heavenly world viewed as a fire. If here
the word sraddh4 did not denote water, question and
answer would refer to different topics, and there would be
no connexion. The form in which the final statement is
introduced (iti tu pa#kamydm, &c., ‘but thus in the fifth
oblation,’ &c.), moreover, also intimates that sraddha means
water. The word ‘iti,’ Aus, here intimates that the answer
is meant to dispose of the question, ‘Do you know how?’ &c.
Sraddha becomes moon, rain, food, seed, embryo in suc-
cession, and ¢hus the water comes to be called man. More-
over, the word sraddhé is actually used in the Veda in the
sense of ‘water’; ‘he carries water, sraddha indeed is
water’ (Taitt. Samh. I, 6, 8, 1). And what the text says as

588 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

to king Soma (the moon) originating from sraddha when
offered, also shows that sraddh4 must mean water.

6. ‘On account of this not being stated by Scrip-
ture’; not so, on account of those who perform
sacrifices and so on being understood.

But, a further objection is raised, in the whole section
under discussion no mention at all is made of the soul;
the section cannot therefore prove that the soul moves,
enveloped by water. The text speaks only of different
forms of water—sraddha and the rest.—This, the Sftra
points out, is not so, on account of those who perform
sacrifices being understood. For further on in the same
chapter it is said, that those who, while destitute of the
knowledge of Brahman, practise sacrifices, useful works and
alms, reach the heavenly world and become there of the
essence of the moon (somarag4nah); whence, on the results of
their good works being exhausted, they return again and
enter on a new embryonic state (KA. Up. V, 10). Now in
the preceding section (V, 9) it is said that they offer sraddha
in the heavenly world, and that from that oblation there
arises the king Soma—an account which clearly refers to
the same process as the one described in V, 10. We here-
from infer that what is meant in V, 9 is that that being
which was distinguished by a body of sraddha, becomes
a being distinguished by a body of the nature of the moon.
The word Jody denotes that the nature of which it is to
be the attribute of a soul, and thus extends in its connota-
tion up to the soul. The meaning of the section therefore
is that it is the soul which moves enveloped by water and
the other rudimentary elements.—But the phrase ‘him the
gods eat’(V, 10, 4) shows that the king Soma cannot be
the soul, for that cannot be eaten!—To this the next Satra
replies.

7. Or it is metaphorical, on account of their not
knowing the Self. For thus Scripture declares.

He who performs sacrifices, and so on, and thus does not
know the Self, is here below and in yonder world a mere

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. 589

means of enjoyment for the devas. He serves them here,
by propitiating them with sacrifices, and so on; and when
the gods, pleased with his service, have taken him up into
yonder world, he there is a common means of enjoyment
for them (since they are gratified by the presence of a
faithful servant). That those not knowing the Self serve
and benefit the gods, Scripture explicitly declares, ‘ He is
like a beast for the devas’ (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). Sma~iti also
declares, that while those who know the Self attain to
Brahman, those who do not know it are means of enjoy-
ment for the devas, ‘To the gods go the worshippers of the
gods, and they that are devoted to me go to me’ (Bha. Gi.
VII, 23). When Scripture speaks of the soul being eaten
by the gods, it therefore only means that the soul is to
them a source of enjoyment. That eating the soul means
no more than satisfaction with it, may also be inferred from
the following scriptural passage, ‘The gods in truth do not
eat nor do they drink; by the mere sight of that amrita
they are satisfied.’—It thus remains a settled conclusion
that the soul moves enveloped by the subtle rudiments of
the elements.—Here terminates’ the adhikaraza of ‘the
obtaining of another body.’

8. On the passing away of the works, with a
remainder, according to Scripture and Smriti; as it
went and not so.

The text declares that those who only perform sacrifices
and useful works ascend by the road of the fathers, and
again return to the earth when they have fully enjoyed the
fruit of their works, ‘having dwelt there yavat sampa-
tam, they return by the same way’ (ΑΔ. Up. V, 10, 5).
The question here arises whether the descending soul
carries a certain remainder (anusaya) of its works or not.—
It does not, since it has enjoyed the fruit of all its works,
For by ‘anusaya’ we have to understand that part of the
karman which remains over and above the part retri-
butively enjoyed ; but when the fruit of the entire karman
has been enjoyed, there is no such remainder. And that
this is so we learn from the phrase ‘yAvat sampdtam

590 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

ushitva,’ which means ‘having dwelt there as long as
the karman lasts’ (sampatanty anena svargalokam iti
sampata%). Analogously another text says, ‘ Having ob-
tained the end of whatever deed he does on earth, he again
returns from that world to this world to action’ (Bri. Up.
V, 4, 6).—Against this prima facie view the Sdtra declares
‘with a remainder he descends, on account of what is seen,
i.e. scriptural text, and Smriti.’ The scriptural text is the
one ‘ Those whose conduct has been good’ (V, 10, 7), which
means that among the souls that have returned, those
whose karman is good obtain a good birth as Brahmanas
or the like, while those whose karman is bad are born
again as low creatures—dogs, pigs, K4md4las, and the like.
This shows that the souls which have descended are still
connected with good or evil karman. Sm~riti also declares
this: ‘Men of the several castes and orders, who always
stand firm in the works prescribed for them, enjoy after
death the rewards of their works, and by virtue of a
remnant (of their works) they are born again in excellent
countries, castes and families, endowed with beauty, long
life, learning in the Veda§, wealth, good conduct, happiness
and wisdom. Those who act in a contrary manner perish’
(Gautama Dha. SQ. XI, 29); ‘Afterwards when a man
returns to this world he obtains, by virtue of a remainder of
works, birth in a good family, beauty of form, beauty of
complexion, strength, aptitude for learning, wisdom, wealth,
and capacity for fulfilling his duties. Therefore, rolling
like a wheel (from the one to the other), in both worlds he
dwells in happiness’ (Apast. Dha. Sd. II, 1, 2, 3). The
clause ‘as long as his works last’ (yavat-sampAtam) refers
to that part of his works only which was performed with
a view to reward (as promised for those works by the
Veda); and the same holds true with regard to the passage
‘whatever work man does here on earth’ (Bri. Up. V, 4, 6).
Nor is it possible that works, the fruit of which has not
yet been enjoyed, and those the result of which has not
been wiped out by expiatory ceremonies, should be de-
stroyed by the enjoyment of the fruits of other works.
Hence those who have gone to that world return with

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, I PADA, 10. 591

a remnant of their works, ‘as they went and not so’—i.e,
in the same way as they ascended and also in a different
way. For the ascent takes place by the following stages—
smoke, night, the dark half of the moon, the six months of
the sun’s southern progress, the world of the fathers, ether,
moon. The descent, on the other hand, goes from the
place of the moon, through ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud. .
The two journeys are alike in so far as they pass through
ether, but different in so far as the descent touches wind,
and so on, and does not touch the world of the fathers, and
other stages of the ascent.

9. ‘On account of conduct’; not so, since (éaraza)
connotes works; thus K4arshzagini thinks.

In the phrases ‘those whose works were good’ (ramaniya-
karanih), and ‘those whose works were bad’ (kapQy4-
karan&h), the word arama does not denote good and
evil works (i.e. not such works as the Veda on the one
hand enjoins as leading to certain rewards, and on the
other prohibits, threatening punishment), for, in Vedic as
well as ordinary language, the term arava is generally
used in the sense of ἀζᾶγα, i.e. general conduct. In
ordinary speech such words as 4é#4ra, sila, vrétta are
considered synonymous, and in the Veda we read ‘ whatever
works (karm4zi) are blameless, those should be regarded,
not others. Whatever our good conduct (su-faritani) was,
that should be observed by thee, nothing else’ (Taitt. Up.
I, 11, 2)—where ‘works’ and ‘conduct’ are distinguished,
Difference in quality of birth therefore depends on conduct,
not on the remainder of works performed with a view to
certain results.—This prima facie view the Satra sets aside,
“ποῖ so, because the scriptural term £araza connotes works;
thus the teacher K4rshz4gini thinks.’ For mere conduct
does not lead to experiences of pleasure and pain; pleasure
and pain are the results of works in the limited sense.

10. ‘ There is purposelessness’; not so, on account
of the dependence on that.
But if conduct has no result, it follows that good con-

592 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

duct, as enjoined in the Smritis, is useless!—Not so, we
reply; for holy works enjoined by the Veda depend on
conduct, in so far as a man of good conduct only is entitled
to perform those works. This appears from passages such
as the following: ‘A man who is not pure is unfit for all
religious work,’ and ‘Him who is devoid of good conduct
the Vedas do not purify.’ Ka4rshz4gini’s view thus is, that
the éarana of the text implies karman.

11. But only good and evil works, thus Baédari
thinks.

As the verb 4-ar takes karman for its object (punyame
karmé: farati, &c.), and as the separate denotation (i.e. the
use of apparently equivalent words, viz. 44ar and karman)
can be accounted for on the ground that one of them refers
to works established by manifest texts, and the other to
texts inferred from actually existing rules of good conduct ;
and as, when the primary meaning is possible, no secondary
meaning must be adopted; nothing else but good and evil
works (in the Vedic sense) are denoted by the word éarana :
such is the opinion of the teacher Badari. This opinion
of Badari, the author of the Sftra states as representing his
own. On the other hand, he adopts the view of K4rshn4-
gini in so far as he considers such items of virtuous conduct
as the Sandhy4a—which are enjoined by scriptural texts,
the existence of which is inferred on the basis of conduct
as enjoined by Smriti—to have the result of qualifying

‘the agent for the performance of other works.—The
conclusion therefore is that the souls descend, carrying
a remnant of their works.—Here terminates the adhikaraza
of ‘the passing of works.’

12. Of those also who do not perform sacrifices
(the ascent) is declared by Scripture.

It has been said that those who perform only sacrifices,
and so on, go to the moon and thence return with a re-
mainder of their works. The question now arises whether
those also who do not perform sacrifices go to the moon.
The phrase ‘who do not perform sacrifices’ denotes evil-

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, I PADA, 16. 593

doers of two kinds, viz. those who do not do what is
enjoined, and those who do what is forbidden.—These also
go to the moon, the Pdrvapakshin maintains; for the text
contains a statement to that effect, ‘All who depart from
this world go to the moon’ (Ka. Up. I, 2)—where it is said
that all go, without any distinction. So that those who
perform good works ‘and those who perform evil works,
equally go to the moon.—This the next Sitra negatives.

13. But of the others having enjoyed in Samya-
mana, there is ascent and descent ; as such a course
is declared.

Of the others, i.e. those who do not perform sacrifices,
and so on, there is ascent to the moon and descent from
there, only after they have in the kingdom of Yama
suffered the punishments due to their actions. For the
text declares that evil-doers fall under the power of Yama,
and have to go to him, ‘He who thinks, this is the world
there is no other, falls again and again under my sway’
(Ka. Up. I, 2, 6); ‘the son of Vivasvat, the gathering place
of men’ (Atk Samh. X, 14,1); ‘King Yama,’ and other
texts.

14. Smrti texts also declare this.

That all beings are under the sway of Yama, Pardasara
also and other Smriti writers declare, ‘And all these pass
under the sway of Yama.’

15. Moreover there are seven.

The Smritis moreover declare that there are seven hells,
called Raurava, and so on, to which evil-doers have to go.—
But how do they, if moving about in those seven places,
reach the palace of Yama?

16. On account of his activity there also, there is
no contradiction.

As their going to those seven places also is due to the
command of Yama, there is no contradiction—Thus those
also who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, after having
gone to the world of Yama, and there undergone punish-

[48] 4

594 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

ments according to the nature of their works, later on
ascend to the moon and again descend from there.—Of
this conclusion the next Stra disposes.

17. But, of knowledge and work—as these are the
leading topics.

The ‘but’ sets aside the view developed so far. It
cannot be admitted that those also who do not perform
sacrifices, and so on, reach the moon; because the path of
the gods and the path of the fathers are meant for the
enjoyment of the fruits ‘of knowledge and work.’ That is
to say—as those who do not perform sacrifices cannot
ascend by the path of the gods, since they are destitute of
knowledge; so they also cannot go by the path of the
fathers, since they are destitute of meritorious works. And
that these two paths are dependent respectively on know-
ledge and works, we know from the fact that these two are
the leading topics. For knowledge forms the leading topic
with regard to the path of the gods, ‘Those who know this,
and those who in the forest follow faith and austerities, go
to light,’ &c.; and works have the same position with regard
to the path of the fathers, ‘they who living in a village
perform sacrifices, &c. go to the smoke,’ &c. The text,
‘all those who depart from this world go to the moon,’
must therefore be interpreted to mean ‘all those who per-
form sacrifices go to the moon. —But if evil-doers do not
go to the moon, the fifth oblation cannot take place, and
no new body can be produced. For the text says, ‘In the
fifth oblation water is called man,’ and, as we have shown,
that fifth oblation presupposes the soul’s going to the
moon. In order, therefore, to understand how in their case
also a new embodiment is possible, it must needs be ad-
mitted that they also ascend to the moon.—To this the
next Sitra replies.

18, Not in the case of the third (place), as it is
thus perceived.

The third ‘place’ does not, for the origination of a new
body, depend on the fifth oblation. The term, ‘the third

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 21. 595

place,’ denotes mere evil-doers. That these do not, for the
origination of a new body, depend on the fifth oblation, is
seen from Scripture. For, in answer to the question ‘Do
you know why that world never becomes full?’ the text
says, ‘On neither of these two ways are those small
creatures continually returning, of whom it may be said,
Live and die. This is the third place. Therefore that
world never becomes full.’ As this passage states that in
consequence of ‘the third place’ (i. e. the creatures forming
a third class) not ascending to and descending from the -
heavenly world that world never becomes full, it follows
that that third place does not, for the origination of bodies,
depend on the fifth oblation, The clause, ‘in the fifth
oblation,’ moreover, merely states that the connexion of
water with the fifth fire is the cause of the water ‘being
called man’ (i.e. becoming an embryo), but does not deny
the origination of embryos in other ways; for the text
contains no word asserting such a limitation.

19. It moreover is recorded, in the world.

Sm~riti, moreover, states that the bodies of some specially
meritorious persons, such as Draupadi, Drishfadyumna,
and others, were formed independently of the fifth obla-
tion’ (i.e. sexual union).

20. And on account of its being seen.

And it is seen in Scripture also, that the bodies of some
beings originate independently of the fifth oblation : ‘ Of all
beings there are indeed three origins only, that which
springs from an egg, that which springs from a living
being, that which springs from a germ’ (K4. Up. VI, 3, 1).
It is observed that from among these beings those spring-
ing from a germ and those springing from heat originate
without that fifth oblation—But the text quoted does not
refer to the creatures springing from heat; for it says that
there are three origins only!—To this the next Sdtra
replies.

21, The third term includes that which springs
from heat.

Qq2

ee gh en Oy Be ey ee ee ἢ ἘΝ ΤΟΣ μεν ON Ny wig or τε Ὑὴ MEMES a on ΤΡ ΤΣ τ Γ

596 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Creatures sprung from heat are included in the third
term—viz. that which springs from a germ—which is
exhibited in the text quoted. The settled conclusion
therefore is that the evil-doers do not go to the moon.—
Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘those who do not
perform sacrifices.’

22. There is entering into similarity of being with
those, there being a reason.

The text describes the manner in which those who
perform sacrifices, and so on, descend from the moon as
follows: ‘They return again that way as they came, to
the ether, from the ether to the air. Then having become
air they become smoke, having become smoke they become
mist,’ &c. The doubt here arises whether the soul when
reaching ether, and so on, becomes ether in the same sense
as here on earth it becomes a man or other being, or merely
becomes similar to ether, and so on.—The former view is
the true one; for as the soul in the στα ἢ state becomes
the moon, so it must likewise be held to decome ether, and
so on, there being no reason for a difference in the two
cases.—This prim facie view the Stra sets aside. The
descending soul enters into similarity of being with ether,
and so on; since there is a reason for this. When the soul
becomes a man or becomes the moon, there is a reason for
that, since it thereby becomes capacitated for the enjoy-
ment of pain and pleasure. But there is no similar reason
for the soul becoming ether, and so on, and hence the state-
.ment that the soul becomes ether, and so on, can only mean
that, owing to contact with them, it becomes similar to
them.—Here terminates the adhikarawa of ‘entering into
similarity of being.’

23. Not very long; on account of special state-
ment.

Does the soul in its descent through ether, and so on,
stay at each stage for a not very long time, or is there
nothing to define that time ?—It stays at each stage for an
indefinite time, there being nothing to define the time—

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, I PADA, 24, 597

Not so, the Stra decides. For there is a special statement,
i.e. the text says that when the soul has become rice or
grain or the like, the passing out of that stage is beset
with difficulties. From this we infer that as there is no
such statement concerning the earlier stages, the soul stays
at each of them for a short time only.—Here terminates
the adhikarava of ‘ the not very long time.’

24. Into (plants) animated by other souls, because
the statement is as in the previous cases.

The text declares that the descending souls are born
as rice, corn, &c., ‘they are born here as rice, corn, herbs,
trees, &c. The question here is whether the souls cling
to plants animated by other souls which have those plants
for their bodies; or whether the descending souls them-
selves are born with those plants for their bodies—The
latter view is the right one; for the text says, ‘they are
born as rice, grain,’ and so on, and this expression is.of the
same kind as when we say ‘he is born as a man, as a deva,’
and so on. The text therefore means that the souls are
embodied in the different plants——This view the Sdtra
rejects. The souls merely cling to those plants which
constitute the bodies of other souls; ‘since the statement
is as in the previous cases,’ i.e. because the text only says
that the souls become plants as it had previously been said
that they become ether, and so on. Where the text means
to say that the soul enters on the condition of an enjoying
soul (i.e. of a soul assuming a new body for the purpose
of retributive enjoyment), it refers to the deeds which lead
to such enjoyment; so e.g. in the passage, ‘Those whose
works have been good obtain a good birth,’ &c. But in
the text under discussion there is no such reference to
karman. For those works—viz. sacrifices and the like—
which were undertaken with a view to reward, such as
enjoyment of the heavenly world, are, in the case of the
descending souls, completely wiped out by the enjoyment
of the heavenly world (which precedes the descent of the
souls) ; and those works on the other hand, the action of
which has not yet begun, lead to the embodiments men-

598 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

tioned further on (‘Those whose works are good’). And
in the interval between those two conditions no new
karman originates, When, therefore, the text says that
the souls are born as plants, the statement cannot be taken
in its literal sense.

25. It is unholy. Not so, on the ground of
Scripture.

The conclusion arrived at above cannot be accepted,
since there is a reason why the descending soul should
enter on the condition of an enjoying soul. Such works
as sacrifices, the fruit of which is the enjoyment of the
heavenly world, are mixed with evil, for they imply injury
to living beings as in the case of the goat offered to Agni-
shomau. And such injury is evil as it is forbidden by
texts such as ‘let him not harm any creature.’ Nor can
it be said that the injunctions of sacrificing animals con-
stitute exceptions to the general rule of not harming any
creature.—For the two injunctions refer to different things.
The injunction to kill the gaat for Agnishomau intimates
that the killing of the animal subserves the accomplish-
ment of the sacrifice, while the injunction not to ‘harm’
teaches that such harming has disastrous consequences.
Should it be said that the prohibition of harming does not
refer to such actions as the sacrifice of the goat which
proceed on the basis of scriptural injunction, but only to
such actions as spring from natural passion or desire
(raga) ; we remark that in the case of sacrifices also the
action is equally prompted by natural desire. Injunctions
such as ‘ He who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,’
teach that sacrifices are to be undertaken by persons
desirous of certain pleasant results, and such persons having
thus learned by what means the result is to be accom-
plished proceed to action from the natural desire of the
result. This applies to the killing of the goat also which
is offered to Agnishomau; man learns from Scripture that
such actions help to accomplish the sacrifice which effects
the result, and then performs those actions from natural
desire, The case in no way differs from that of harm

1Π ADHYAYA, I PADA, 26. 599

done in ordinary life—where the agent always is prompted
by natural desire, having somehow arrived at the conclusion
that his action will accomplish something aimed at by
himself. The same holds good with regard to works of
permanent obligation. Men learn from Scripture that
through the performance of the special duties of their caste
they attain happiness of the highest kind, and then apply
themselves to their duties from a natural desire of such
happiness, and therefore such works also are mixed with
evil. Hence the souls of those who have performed sacri-
fices, and so on, which contain an element of evil, at first
experience in the heavenly world that result which is to
be enjoyed there, and then embodying themselves in non-
moving things such as plants, experience the fruit of that
part of their actions which is of a harmful nature. That
embodiment in non-moving beings is the result of evil
deeds Smriti declares: ‘Owing to those defects of work
which are due to the body, a man becomes a non-moving
being.’ From all this it follows that the souls embody
themselves in plants to the end of enjoying the fruits of
their works.—To this the Sdtra replies—it is not so, on
account of scriptural statement. For Scripture declares
that the killing of sacrificial animals makes them to go up
to the heavenly world, and therefore is not of the nature
of harm. This is declared in the text, ‘The animal killed
at the sacrifice having assumed a divine body goes to the
heavenly world’; ‘with a golden body it ascends to the
heavenly world.’ An action which is the means of supreme
exaltation is not of the nature of harm, even if it involves
some little pain; it rather is of beneficial nature—With
this the mantra also agrees: ‘Thou dost not die, thou
goest to the gods on easy paths; where virtuous men go,
not evil-doers, there the divine Savitri may lead thee.’
An act which has a healing tendency, although it may
cause a transitory pain, men of insight declare to be pre-
servative and beneficial.

26. After that conjunction with him who performs
the act of generation.

600 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

The declaration that the descending souls decome rice
plants, and so on, cannot be taken literally for that reason
also, that the text afterwards declares them to decome those
who perform the act of generation: ‘Whoever the being
may be that eats the food and begets offspring, that being
he (i.e. the soul that has descended) becomes.’ Now the
meaning of this latter text can only be that the soul enters
into conjunction with the creature which eats the grain;
and hence we have to interpret the previous text, as to the
soul’s becoming a plant, in the same way. ,

27. From the yoni the body.

Only after having reached a yoni the soul, affected with
a remnant of its works, obtains a new body, and only in a
body there can be the enjoyment of pleasure and pain.
When, therefore, previous to that the soul is said to reach
ether, wind, and so on, this can only mean that it enters into
conjunction with them.—Here terminates the adhikarana
of ‘that animated by another soul.’

III ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2. 601

SECOND PADA,

1. In the intermediate sphere the creation (is
effected by the soul); for (Scripture) says (so).

So far it has been shown that the soul in the waking
state suffers affliction since, in accordance with its deeds,
it goes, returns, is born, and so on. Next an enquiry is
.instituted into its condition in the state of dream. With
reference to the state of dreaming Scripture says, ‘ There
are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads; then he
creates chariots, horses and roads. There are no blessings,
no happiness, no joys; then he himself creates blessings,
happiness, joys, and so on. For he is the creator’ (Bri. Up.
IV, 3, 10). A doubt here arises whether this creation of
chariots and the rest is accomplished by the individual soul,
or by the Lord.—‘ The creation in the intermediate state’
is due to the individual soul only. ‘The intermediate
state’ means the sphere of dreams, in agreement with the
passage ‘There is a third intermediate state, the place of
dreams’ (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 1). And that creation is effected
by the soul only; for what is referred to in the passages
‘he creates,’ ‘For he is the maker,’ is none other but the
dreaming soul.

2. And some (state the soul to be) the shaper;
and sons, and so on.

And the followers of one sakha state in their text that
the dreaming soul is the shaper of its desires: ‘He, the
person who is awake in those who sleep, shaping one
desired thing (kama) after the other. The term ‘k&4ma’
there denotes not mere desires, but such things as sons
and the like which are objects of desire. For sons and
so on are introduced as ‘kiémas’ in previous passages:
‘ Ask for all kAmas according to thy wish’; ‘Choose sons
and grandsons living a hundred years’ (I, 1, 25; 23).
The individual soul thus creates chariots, and so on, in its
dreams, That the soul has the power of realising all its

602 . VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

wishes is known from the declaration of Pragdpati. It
is therefore able to create, even in the absence of special
instruments.—This view is set aside by the next Sitra.

3. But it is mere MAy4; on account of the true
nature (of the soul) not being fully manifested.

The things appearing in dreams—chariots, lotus tanks,
and so on—are absolute May4, i.e. things created by the
Supreme Person. For the term ‘ Maya’ denotes wonderful
things, as appears from passages such as ‘She was born
in the race of Ganaka, appearing like the wonderful power
of the divine being in bodily shape’ (devamay4). The
sense of the passage ‘there are no chariots,’ &c. then is—
there are no chariots and horses to be perceived by any
other person but the dreaming one; and then ‘he creates
chariots, &c.—i.e. the Supreme Person creates things to
be perceived by the dreamer and persisting for a certain
time only. Those things therefore are of a wonderful nature
(but not illusions). And the creation of such wonderful
things is possible for the Supreme Person who can imme-
diately realise all his wishes; but not for the individual
soul. The latter also, indeed, fundamentally possesses that
power ; but asin the Samsara state the true nature of the soul
is not fully manifested, it is then incapable of accomplish-
- ing such wonderful creations, The text ‘the person shap-
ing one desired thing after the other’ declares the Supreme
Person to be the creator, for the clauses immediately
preceding and following that text (viz. ‘He who is awake
in those who sleep’; and ‘that is the Bright, that is
Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal; all worlds
are contained in it and no one goes beyond ’—Ka. Up. II,
5, 8) mention attributes distinctively characteristic of the
Supreme Person. And the Bri. Up. text, ‘For he is the
maker,’ must therefore, in agreement with the Ka/ha-text,
also be understood as declaring that it is the Supreme
Person only that creates the things seen in a dream.—But
if it is the true nature of the soul to be free from all im-
perfections, and so on, why then does this not manifest
itself?—To this the next Stra replies.

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 5. 603

4. But owing to the wish of the highest it is
hidden; for from that are its bondage and the
opposite state.

The dut sets the objection aside. Owing to the wish
of the highest, i.e. the Supreme Person, the essential
nature of the individual soul is hidden. The Supreme
Person hides the true, essentially blessed, nature of the
soul whieh is in a state of sin owing to.the endless chain
of karman. For this reason we find it stated in Scripture
that the bondage and release of the soul result from the
wish of the Supreme Person only ‘when he finds freedom
from fear and rest in that invisible, incorporeal, undefined,
unsupported ; then he has gone to fearlessness’; ‘for he
alone causes blessedness’ ; ‘from fear of it the wind blows’
(Taitt. Up. II, 7, 8).

5. Or that (results) also from connexion with the
body.

The obscuration of the soul’s true nature results either
from the soul’s connexion with the body or from its con-
nexion with the power of matter in a subtle state. As
long as the creation lasts, the soul is obscured by its
connexion with matter in the form of a body; at the time
of a pralaya, on the other hand, by its connexion with
matter of so exceedingly subtle a kind as not to admit
of differentiation by means of name and form. As thus
its true nature is not manifest, the soul is unable to create,
in dreams, chariots, lotus tanks, and so on, by its mere wish.
And what the texts say about a being that is awake in —
those who sleep and is the abode of all worlds (‘in that
all the worlds abide, and no one goes beyond it ’—Ka. Up.
II, 4, 9) can apply to the Supreme Person only. The
things seen by an individual soul in its dreams therefore
are specially created by the Supreme Person, and are
meant by him to be a retribution—whether reward or
punishment—for deeds of minor importance; they there-
fore last for the time of the dream only, and are perceived
by that one soul only.

604 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.
6. And it is suggestive, according to Scripture ;
this the experts also declare.

The things seen in dreams are not created by the wish
of the individual soul for this reason also, that according
to Scripture dreams are prophetic of future good or ill
fortune. ‘When a man engaged in some work under-
taken for some special wish sees a woman in his dream,
he may infer success from his dream vision.’ Those also
who understand the science of dreams teach that dreams
foreshadow good and evil fortune. But that which depends
on one’s own wish can have no prophetic quality; and
as ill fortune is not desired the dreamer would create for
himself only such visions as would indicate good fortune.
Hence the creation which takes place in dreams can be
the Lord’s work only.—Here terminates the adhikarana of |
‘the intermediate state.’

7. The absence of that takes place in the n&dis
and in the Self, according to scriptural statement.

Next the state of deep dreamless sleep is enquired into.
Scripture says, ‘When a man is asleep, reposing and at
perfect rest, so that he sees no dream, then he lies asleep
in those nadis’ (KA. Up. VIII, 6, 3); ‘ When he is in pro-
found sleep and is conscious of nothing, there are seventy-
two thousand veins called hita which from the heart
spread through the pericardium. Through them he moves
forth and rests in the pericardium’ (Brz. Up. II, 1, 19).
‘When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with the
True’ (Kz. Up. VI, 8,1). These texts declare the veins,
the pericardium, and Brahman to be the place of deep
sleep ; and hence there is a doubt whether each of them
in turns, or all of them together, are that place.—There is
an option between them, since they are not in mutual de-
pendence, and since the sleeping soul cannot at the same
time be in several places!—To this the Sftra replies—the
absence of dreams, i.e. deep sleep takes place in the veins,
in the pericardium, and in the highest Self together; since
these three are declared by Scripture. When different
alternatives may be combined, on the ground of there being

ΠῚ ADHYAyA, 2 PADA, 9. 605

different effects in each case, it is improper to assume an
option which implies sublation of some of the alternatives.
And in the present case such combination is possible, the
veins and the pericardium holding the position of a mansion,
as it were, and a couch within the mansion, while Brahman
is the pillow, as it were. Thus Brahman alone is the im-
mediate resting-place of the sleeping soul.

8. Hence the awaking from that.

Since Brahman alone directly is the place of deep sleep,
Scripture is able to declare that the souls awake from that,
i.e. Brahman; compare ‘Having come back from the
True they do not know that they come from the True’
(KA. Up. VI, 10, 2), and other texts.—Here terminates the
adhikarama of ‘the absence of that.’ .

g. But the same, on account of work, remem-
brance, text, and injunction.

Does the same person who had gone to sleep rise again
at the time of waking, or a different one ?—Since the soul
in deep sleep frees itself from all limiting adjuncts, unites .
itself with Brahman, and thus being in no way different
from the released soul, is no longer in any way connected
with its previous body, organs, and so on; the person
rising from sleep is a different one.—This view the Sdtra
sets aside, saying ‘but the same.’ For there remains the
work, i.e. the good and evil deeds previously done by the
sleeper, for which the same person has to undergo retribu-
tion before the knowledge of truth arises. There is next
remembrance— I, the waking -person, am the same as I who
was asleep.’ Scripture also declares this : ‘Whatever these
creatures are here, whether a lion, or tiger, or wolf, &c.,
that they. become again’ (KA. Up. VI, 10, 2). And, lastly,
the injunctions which enjoin certain acts for the sake of
final Release would be purportless if the person merged
in deep sleep attained Release. Nor can it be said that
the sleeping soul is free from all limiting adjuncts and
manifests itself in its true nature (so as not to be different
from the released soul). For with regard to the sleeping

606 VEDANTA-SOUTRAS.

person the text says, ‘In truth he thus does not know him-
self that he is I, nor does he know anything that exists.
He is gone to utter annihilation. I see no good in this’
(KA. Up. VIII, 11, 1); while, on the other hand, the texts,
‘ Having approached the highest light he manifests himself
in his true nature; he moves about there laughing, play-
ing, delighting himself’; ‘He becomes a Self-ruler; he
moves about in all the worlds according to his wish’; ‘The
seeing one sees everything, and attains everything every-
where’ (KA. Up. VIII, 12, 3; VII, 25,2; 26, 2), declare
that the released soul is all-knowing, and so on. What
is true about the sleeping person is that he is still com-
prised within the Samsdra, but for the time having put
off all instruments of knowledge and action and become
incapable of knowledge and enjoyment repairs to the place
of utter rest, i.e. the highest Self, and having there refreshed
himself, again rises to new enjoyment of action—Here
terminates the adhikaraza of ‘ work, remembrance, text, and
injunction.’

10. In the swooning person there is half-com-
bination; this being the remaining (hypothesis).

With regard to a person lying in a swoon or stunned,
the question arises whether that state of swoon is one of
the other states, viz. deep sleep and so on, or whether it is
a special condition of its own—-The former alternative
must be accepted. For the term ‘swoon’ may be explained
as denoting either deep sleep or some other acknowledged
state, and there is no authority for assuming an altogether
different new state.—This view the Sftra sets aside. The
condition of a swooning person consists in reaching half,
viz. of what leads to death ; for this is the only hypothesis
remaining. A swoon cannot be either dreaming or being
awake ; for in a swoon there is no consciousness. And as
it is different in character as well as in the occasions giving
rise to it from deep sleep and death, it cannot be either of
those two states ; for there are special circumstances occa-
sioning a swoon, such as a blow on the head. The only
possible alternative then is to view a swoon as a state in

III ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, ITI. 607

which there is made a half-way approach to death. For
while death consists in the complete cessation of the soul’s
connexion with the body or organs of any kind, a swoon
consists in the soul’s remaining connected with the subtle
body and organs only.—Here terminates the adhikaraza of
‘the swooning person.’

11. Not on account of place even (is there any
imperfection) of the Highest; for everywhere (it is
described) as having twofold characteristics.

The different states of the individual soul have been
discussed, to the end that an insight into their imperfections
may give rise to indifference towards all worldly enjoy-
ments. Next now, in order to give rise to the desire of
attaining to Brahman, the Sdtras proceed to expound how
Brahman’s nature is raised above all imperfections and
constituted by mere blessed qualities. The following point
requires to be considered first. Do those imperfections
which cling to the individual soul in consequence of its
different states—viz. the waking state, dreams, deep sleep,
swoon, departure from the body—affect also the highest
Brahman which as its inner Ruler abides within the soul
in those different states, or not ?—They do affect it, since
Brahman abides within the bodies which are in those
different states—But Sfitras such as I, 2, 8 have already
declared that the highest Brahman, because not subject to
the influence of karman, is free from all imperfections ; how
then can imperfections cling to it for the reason that it is
connected with this or that place?—In the following way.
As was shown under III, 2, 6, works give rise to imperfec-
tion and suffering in so far as they cause the connexion of
the soul with a body. The efficient cause therein is the
imperfection inherent in the connexion with a body; for
otherwise the works themselves would directly give rise to
pain, and what then would be the use of the connexion with
a body? Hence, even in the case of a being not subject
to karman, its connexion with various unholy bodies will
cause imperfection and suffering. And even when such
a being voluntarily enters into such bodies in order to rule

608 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

them, connexion with imperfections is unavoidable ; no less
than to be immersed in blood and purulent matter, even
if done voluntarily, will make a man unclean. Although
therefore Brahman is the sole cause of the world and
a treasure-house of all blessed qualities, yet it is affected by
the imperfections springing therefrom that, as declared by
Scripture, it abides within matter, bodies, and their parts,
and thus is connected with them (cp. ‘he who abides
within earth, within the soul, within the eye, within the
seed,’ &c., Bré. Up. III, 7, 3).

Of this prima facie view the Sfitra disposes by saying—
‘Not even from place, such as earth, soul, &c., is there
possible for the highest Self a shadow even of imperfection ;
since everywhere in Scripture as well as Smr#ti Brahman
is described as having characteristics of a double kind ;
viz. on the one hand freedom from all imperfections, and
on the other possession of all blessed qualities. For
Scripture says that the Supreme Person is free from evil,
free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from
hunger and thirst ; that all his wishes realise themselves,
that all its purposes realise themselves’ (A. Up. VIII,
1,5). And Smriti says, ‘He comprises within himself all
blessed qualities, by a particle of his power the whole mass
of beings is supported. In him there are combined energy,
strength, might, wisdom, valour, and all other noble quali-
ties. He is the Highest of the high, no pain or other
imperfections affect him, the Lord of all, high or low.
From all evil he is free, he whose name is Vishzu, the
highest abode.’ These and other passages teach that Brah-
man possesses the double characteristics stated above.

12. Should it be said ‘on account of difference’;
not so, because with reference to each the text says
what is not that.

But, an objection is raised, we observe, that the individual
soul also, although in reality possessing the same twofold
attributes, viz. freedom from all evil and so on, as we learn
from the teaching of Pragapati (KA. Up. VIII, 7), yet is
affected with imperfections owing to the fact that it is

III ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12. 609

connected with bodies, divine, human, and so on, and thus
undergoes a variety of conditions. Analogously we cannot
avoid the conclusion that the inner Ruler also, although in
reality possessing those same twofold attributes, is also
affected by imperfection, because through its connexion
with those different bodies it likewise undergoes a variety
of conditions—This objection the Sitra sets aside in the
words, ‘not so, because with reference to each the text says
what is not that,’ i.e. what is contrary. For where the
text says that the inner Ruler dwells within the earth,
within the soul, within the eye, and so on, it concludes
each clause by saying, ‘that Ys thy Self, the inner Ruler,
the immortal one,’ i.e. declares the inner Ruler to be
immortal, and thus denies of him any imperfections due to
his connexion with the bodies which he voluntarily enters
in order to rule them. The true (perfect) nature of the
individual soul, on the other hand, is obscured as long as
it is connected with a body, as we have explained under
III, 2, 5.—But, as the Parvapakshin has pointed out, even
if the highest Self voluntarily enters into bodies, it cannot
escape connexion with the imperfections which depend on
the essential nature of those bodies.—Not so, we reply.
The fact is, that not even non-sentient things are, essen-
tially or intrinsically, bad; but in accordance with the
nature of the works of those beings which are under the
rule of karman, one thing, owing to the will of the Supreme
Person, causes pain to one man at one time and pleasure
at another time, and causes pleasure or pain to one person
and the opposite to another person. If the effects of
things depended on their own nature only, everything
would at all times be productive for all persons, either of
pleasure only or of pain only. But this is not observed to
be the case. In agreement herewith Smrtti says, ‘ Because
one and the same thing causes pain and pleasure and envy
and wrath, the nature of a thing cannot lie in itself. As
the same thing which erst gave rise to love causes pain
later on, and that which once caused anger now causes
satisfaction, nothing is in itself of the nature either of
pleasure or of pain.’ To the soul therefore which is sub-

[48] Rr

610 . vEeDANTAa-SOTRAS.

ject to karman the connexion with different things is the
source of imperfection and suffering, in agreement with the
nature of its works; while to the highest Brahman, which
is subject to itself only, the same connexion is the source
of playful sport, consisting therein that he in various ways
guides and rules those things.

13. Some also (teach) thus.

Moreover, the followers of one sakh4 explicitly teach
that the connexion with one and the same body is for the
individual soul a source of disadvantage, while for the
highest Brahman it is nothing of the kind, but constitutes
an accession of glory in so far as it manifests him as a Lord
and Ruler, ‘Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the
same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other
looks on without eating’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1).—But the text,
‘Having entered by means of that giva-self I will differ-
entiate names and forms,’ teaches that the differentiation
of names and forms depends on the entering into the
elements of the giva-soul whose Self is Brahman, and this
implies that Brahman also, as the Self of the individual
soul, possesses definite shapes, divine, human, and so on,
and is to be denominated by the corresponding names.
Brahman thus falls within the sphere of beings to which
injunctions and prohibitions are addressed—such as ‘a
Brahmaza is to sacrifice’—and hence necessarily is under
the power of karman.—To this the next Sftra replies.

14. For (Brahman is) without form merely, since
it is the principal agent with regard to that.

Brahman, although by entering into bodies, human,
divine, and so on, it becomes connected with various forms,
yet is in itself altogether devoid of form, and therefore
does not share that subjection to karman which in the
case of the soul is due to its embodiedness.—Why ?—
Because as it is that which brings about names and forms
it stands to them in the relation of a superior (pradhana).
For the text, ‘The Ether (Brahman) indeed is the accom-

III ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 15. 61t

plisher of names and forms; that which is without these
two is Brahman,’ teaches that Brahman, although entering
into all beings, is not touched by name and form, but is
that which brings about name and form.—But, an objec-
tion is raised, if Brahman is the inner ruler of beings in so
far as he has them for its body, how can it be said that it
is altogether destitute of form?—There is a difference, we
reply. The individual soul is connected with the shape of
‘the body in which it dwells because it participates in the
pleasures and pains to which the body gives rise; but as
Brahman does not share those pleasures and pains, it has
no shape or form. And the scriptural injunctions and pro-
hibitions apply to those only who are under the power of
karman. The highest Brahman therefore is like a being
without form, and hence, although abiding within all things,
free from all imperfection and endowed with all blessed
qualities.

_ But, an objection is raised, texts such as ‘the True,
knowledge, infinite is Brahman’ suggest a Brahman whose
nature is constituted exclusively by non-differentiated
light ; while at the same time a Brahman endowed with
qualities—such as omniscience, being the cause of the
world, being the inner Self of all, having the power of im-
mediately realising its wishes and purposes—is expressly
negatived by texts such as ‘ not so, not so’ (Brz. Up. IT, 3, 6),
and therefore must be held to be false. How then can
it be maintained that Brahman possesses the ‘twofold
characteristics’ mentioned under Sitra 11?—To this the
next Sdtra replies.

15. And in the same way as (a Brahman) con-
sisting of light; (the texts thus) not being devoid of
meaning.

In order that texts such as ‘ the True, knowledge, infinite
is Brahman’ may .not be devoid of meaning, we have to
admit that light (intelligence) constitutes the essential
nature of Brahman. But analogously we have also to
admit that Brahman possesses the ‘twofold characteristics’;
for otherwise the texts declaring it to be free from all

Rr2

612 _ vEDANTAaA-SOTRAS.

imperfections, all-knowing, the cause of the world, and sa
on, would in their turn bedevoid of meaning.

16, And (the text) says so much only.

Moreover the text ‘the True, knowledge, infinite is
Brahman’ only teaches that Brahman has light for its
essential nature, and does not negative those other at-
tributes of Brahman—omniscience, being the cause of the
world, &c.—which are intimated by other texts. What is
the object of the negation in ‘not so, not so’ will be shown
further on.

17. (This Scripture) also shows, and it is also
stated in Smzrtti. |

That Brahman is a treasure as it were of all blessed
qualities and free from all imperfections, the whole body
of Veddnta-texts clearly declares: ‘ That highest great lord
of lords, that highest deity of deities’; ‘He is the cause,
the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him
neither parent nor lord’; ‘ There is no effect and no cause
known of him, no one is seen like unto him or higher.
His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential action
of knowledge and strength’ (Svet. Up. VI, 7-9); ‘He who
is all-knowing, whose brooding consists of knowledge’
(Mu. I, 1, 9); ‘From fear of him the wind blows, from fear
of him the sun moves’; ‘That is one bliss of Brahman’
(Taitt. Up. II, 8); ‘That from which all speech with the
mind turns away, not having reached it, knowing the bliss
of that Brahman man fears nothing’ (Taitt. Up. II, 9); ‘He
who is without parts, without action, tranquil, without
fault, without taint’ (Svet. Up. VI, 19).—And Smriti: ‘He
who knows me to be unborn and without a beginning, the
Supreme Lord of the worlds’; ‘ Pervading this entire
universe, by one part of mine I do abide’; ‘With me
as supervisor Prakviti brings forth the universe of the
movable and the immovable, and for this reason the world
does ever move round’; ‘But another is the Supreme
Person, who is called the Supreme Spirit, who pervading
the three worlds supports them—the eternal Lord’ (Bha.

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 10. 613

Gi. X, 3; 42; IX,10; XV,17); ‘ The all-working, all-power-
ful one, rich in knowledge and strength, who becomes
neither less nor more, who is self-dependent, without be-
ginning, master of all; who knows neither weariness nor
exhaustion, nor fear, wrath and desire ; the blameless one,
raised above all, without support, imperishable.—As thus
Brahman in whatever place it may abide has the ‘ twofold
characteristics,’ the imperfections dependent on those places
do not touch it.

18. For this very reason comparisons, such as
reflected images of the sun and the like.

Because Brahman, although abiding in manifold places,
ever possesses the twofold characteristics, and hence does
not share the imperfections due to those places, scriptural
texts illustrate its purity in the midst of inferior surround-
ings by comparing it to the sun reflected in water, mirrors,
and the like. Compare e.g. ‘As the one ether is rendered
manifold by jars and the like, or as the one sun becomes
manifold in several sheets of water; thus the one Self is
rendered manifold by abiding in many places. For the
Self of all beings, although one, abides in each separate
being and is thus seen as one and many at the same time,
as the moon reflected in water.’

19. But because it is not apprehended like water,
there is no equality.

The ‘but’ indicates an objection—The highest Self is
not apprehended in earth and other places in the same way
as the sun or a face is apprehended in water or a mirror.
For the sun and a face are erroneously apprehended as
abiding in water or a mirror; they do not really abide
there. When, on the other hand, Scripture tells us that the
highest Self dwells in the earth, in water, in the soul, &c.,
we apprehend it as really dwelling in all those places.
That the imperfections caused by water and mirrors do
not attach themselves to the sun or a face is due to the
fact that the sun and the face do not really abide in the
water and the mirror. Hence there is no real parallelism

612 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

between the thing compared (the highest Self) and the
thing to which it is compared (the reflected image).

20. The participation (on Brahman’s part) in
increase and decrease, due to its abiding within (is
denied); on account of the appropriateness of both
(comparisons), and because thus it is seen.

The comparison of the highest Self to the reflected sun
and the rest is meant only to deny of the Self that it
participates in the imperfections—such as increase, decrease,
and the like—which attach to the earth and the other
beings within which the Self abides——How do we know
this?—From the circumstance that on this supposition
both comparisons are appropriate. In the scriptural text
quoted above Brahman is compared to ether, which although
one becomes manifold through the things—jars and so
on—within it; and to the sun, which is multiplied by the
sheets of water in which he is reflected. Now the employ-
ment of these comparisons—with ether which really does
abide within the jars and so on, and with the sun which
in reality does not abide in the water—is appropriate only
if they are meant to convey the idea that the highest Self
does not participate in the imperfections inherent in earth
and soon. Just as ether, although connecting itself sepa-
rately with jars, pots, and so on, which undergo increase
and decrease, is not itself touched by these imperfections ;
and just as the sun, although seen in sheets of water of
unequal extent, is not touched by their increase and de-
crease; thus the highest Self, although abiding within
variously-shaped beings, whether non-sentient like earth
or sentient, remains untouched by their various imperfec-
tions—increase, decrease, and so on—, remains one although
abiding in all of them, and ever keeps the treasure of its
blessed qualities unsullied by an atom even of impurity.—
The comparison of Brahman with the reflected sun holds
good on the following account. As the sun is not touched
by the imperfections belonging to the water, since he does
not really abide in the water and hence there is no reason
for his sharing those imperfections, thus the highest Self,

III ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. 615

which really abides within earth and the rest, is not affected
by their imperfections ; for as the nature of the highest Self
is essentially antagonistic to all imperfection, there is no
reason for its participating in the imperfection of others.—
‘And as this is seen.’ This means—Since we observe in
ordinary life also that comparisons are instituted between
two things for the reason that although they do not
possess all attributes in common, they yet have some attri-
bute in common. We say, e.g. ‘this man is like a lion.’ —
The conclusion from all this is that the highest Self, which
is essentially free from all imperfections and a treasure as it
were of all blessed qualities, in no way suffers from dwelling
within the earth and the rest.

An objection is raised. In the Brthad-Arazyaka, in the
chapter beginning ‘There are two forms of Brahman, the
material and the immaterial,’ the whole material world,
gross and subtle, is at first referred to as constituting the
form of Brahman, and next a special form of Brahman is
mentioned: ‘And what is the form of that Person? Like
a saffron-coloured raiment,’ &c. But thereupon the text
proceeds, ‘ Now follows the teaching—not so, not so; for
there is not anything else higher than this “not so.”’ This
passage, referring to all the previously mentioned forms
of Brahman by means of the word ‘so,’ negatives them ;
intimating thereby that Brahman is nothing else than pure
Being, and that all distinctions are mere imaginations due
to Brahman not knowing its own essential nature. How
then can Brahman possess the twofold characteristics >—
To this the next Satra replies.

21. For the text denies the previously declared
so-muchness; and declares more than that.

It is impossible to understand the text ‘not so, not so’ as
negativing those distinctions of Brahman which had been
stated previously. If the text meant that, it would be mere
idle talk. For none but a person not in his right mind.
would first teach that all the things mentioned in the
earlier part of the section are distinctive attributes of
Brahman—as which they are not known by any other

616 τ yvEDANTA-SOTRAS,

means of proof—and thereupon deliberately negative his
own teaching. Although among the things mentioned
there are some which, in themselves, are known through
other means of proof, yet they are not thus known to be
modes of Brahman, and others again are known neither in
themselves nor as modes of Brahman. The text therefore
cannot merely refer to them as things otherwise known,
but gives fundamental instryction about them. Hence the
later passage cannot be meant as a sheer negation, but
must be taken as denying the previously described ‘so-
muchness’ of Brahman ; i.e. the passage denies that limited
nature of Brahman which would result from Brahman
being viewed as distinguished by the previously stated
attributes only. The word so refers to that limited nature,
and the phrase μοῦ so therefore means that Brahman is not
distinguished by the previously stated modes only. This
interpretation is further confirmed by the fact that after
that negative phrase further qualities of Brahman are de-
clared by the text: ‘For there is not anything higher than
this zot so. Then comes the name, the 7rue of the True;
for the prazas are the True, and he is the True of them.’
That means: Than that Brahman which is expressed by
the phrase ‘not so’ there is no other thing higher, i.e.
there is nothing more exalted than Brahman either in
essential nature or in qualities. And of that Brahman the
name is the ‘True of the True.’ This name is explained
in the next clause, ‘for the pramas,’ ὅς. The term pranas
here denotes the individual souls, so called because the
pt4zas accompany them. They are the ‘True’ because
they do not, like the elements, undergo changes implying
an alteration of their essential nature. And the highest Self
is the ‘ True of the True’ because while the souls undergo,
in accordance with their karman, contractions and expan-
sions of intelligence, the highest Self which is free from all
sin knows of no such alternations. He is therefore more
eminently ¢rve than they are. As thus the complementary
passage declares Brahman to be connected with certain
qualities, the clause ‘not so, not so’ (to which that passage
is complementary) cannot deny that Brahman possesses

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 23.. 617
—— ΘΠ ὯὍἝςτ....-.-
distinctive attributes, but only that Brahman’s nature is
confined to the attributes previously stated— Brahman
therefore possesses the twofold characteristics. That the
clause ‘not so’ negatives Brahman’s being fully described
by the attributes previously mentioned, was above proved
on the ground that since Brahman is not the object
of any other means of proof, those previous statements
cannot refer to what is already proved, and that the final
clause cannot therefore be meant to deny what the previous
clauses expressly teach. The next Sdtra now confirms this
circumstance of Brahman not lying within the sphere of the
other means of proof.

22. That (is) unmanifested; for (this Scripture)
declares.

Brahman is not manifested by other means of proof; for
Scripture says, ‘His form is not to be seen, no one beholds
him with the eye’ (Ka. Up. II, 6,9); ‘He is not appre-
hended by the eye nor by speech’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8).

23. Also in perfect conciliation, according to
Scripture and Smriti.

Moreover, it is only in the state of perfect conciliation or
endearment, i.e. in meditation bearing the character of
devotion, that an intuition of Brahman takes place, not in
any other state. This Scripture and Smriti alike teach.
‘That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by under-
standing, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses
by him the Self can be gained. The Self chooses him as
his own’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23); ‘When a man’s nature has
become purified by the serene light of knowledge, then he
sees him, meditating on him as without parts’ (Mu. Up.
III, 1, 9). Smr#ti: ‘ Neither by the Vedas, nor austerities,
nor gifts, nor by sacrifice, but only by exclusive devotion,
may I in this form be known and beheld in truth and also
entered into’ (Bha. Gi. XI, 53, 54). The scriptural text
beginning ‘Two are the forms of Brahman,’ which declares
the nature of Brahman for the purposes of devout medita-
tion, cannot therefore refer to Brahman’s being characterised
by two forms, a material and an immaterial, as something

618 - VEDANTa-SOTRAS.

already known; for apart from Scripture nothing is known
about Brahman.

24. And there is non-difference (of the intention
of Brahman’s distinguishing attributes), as in the
case of light; and the light (is) intuited as consti-
tuting Brahman’s essential nature by repetition of
the practice (of meditation).

That the clause ‘not so’ negatives not Brahman’s pos-
sessing two forms, a material and an immaterial one,
but only Brahman’s nature being restricted to those
determinations, follows therefrom also. that in the vision
of Vamadeva and others who had attained to intui-
tion into Brahman’s nature, the fact of Brahman having
all material and immaterial beings for its attributes is
apprehended in non-difference, i.e. in the same way as the
fact of light (i.e. knowledge) and bliss constituting Brahman’s
essential nature. Compare the text ‘Seeing this the Rishi
Vamadeva understood, Iam Manu and the sun’ (Brz. Up.
I, 4,10). And that light and bliss constitute Brahman’s
nature was perceived by VAmadeva and the rest through
repeated performance of the practice of devout meditation.
In the same way then, i.e. by repeated meditation, they
also became aware that Brahman has all material and
immaterial things for its distinguishing modes.—The next
S(tra sums up the proof of Brahman’s possessing twofold
characteristics.

25. Hence (Brahman is distinguished) by what is
infinite ; for thus the characteristics (hold good).

By the arguments stated it is proved that Brahman is
distinguished by the infinite multitude of blessed qualities.
And this being so, it follows that Brahman possesses the
twofold characteristics.—Here terminates the adhikaraza of
‘that which has twofold characteristics.’

26. But on account of twofold designation, as the
snake and its coils.
_It has been shown in the preceding adhikaraza that

Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 27. 619

the entire non-sentient universe is the outward form of
Brahman. For the purpose of proving Brahman’s freedom
from all imperfection, an enquiry is now begun into the
particular mode in which the world may be conceived to
constitute the form of Brahman. Is the relatiori of the two
like that of the snake and its coils; or like that of light
and the luminous body, both of which fall under the same
genus; or like that of the individual soul and Brahman, the
soul being a distinguishing attribute and for that reason
a part (amsa) of Brahman?—On the assumption of this
last alternative, which is about to be established here, it has
been already shown under two preceding Siatras (I, 4, 23;
II, 1, 14), that from Brahman, as distinguished by sentient
and non-sentient beings in their subtle form, there
originates Brahman as distinguished by all those beings in
their gross form. ᾿

Which then of the alternatives stated above is the true
one?—The material world is related to Brahman as the
coils to the snake, ‘on account of twofold designation.!
For some texts declare the identity of the two: ‘ Brahman
only is all this’; ‘The Self only is all this. Other texts
again refer to the difference of the two: ‘Having entered
into these three deities with this giva-self, let me differen-
tiate names and forms.’ We therefore consider all non-
sentient things to be special forms or arrangements of
Brahman, as the coils are of a coiled-up snake or a coiled-
up rope.

27. Or else like light and its abode, both being
fire.

The or sets aside the other two alternatives. If Brahman
itself only appeared in the form of non-sentient things—as
the snake itself only constitutes the coils—both sets of
texts, those which declare difference as well as those which
declare the unchangeableniess of Brahman, would be contrary
to sense. We therefore, adopting the second alternative,
hold that the case under discussion is analogous to that of
light and that in which it abides, i.e. the luminous body.
The two are different, but at the same time they are

620 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

identical in so far as they both are fire (tegas). In the
same way the non-sentient world constitutes the form of
Brahman.

28. Or else in the manner stated above.

The ὄν sets aside the two preceding alternatives. One
substance may indeed connect itself with several states,
but the former of the two alternatives implies that Brahman
itself constitutes the essential nature of non-sentient matter,
and thus there is no escape from the objections already
stated under Sdtra 27. Let then the second alternative be
adopted according to which Brahma-hood (brahmatva)
constitutes a genus inhering in Brahman as well as in
non-sentient matter, just as fire constitutes the common
genus for light and luminous bodies. But on this view
Brahman becomes a mere abstract generic character
inhering in the Lord (isvara), sentient souls and non-
sentient matter, just as the generic character of horses
(asvatva) inheres in concrete individual horses; and this
contradicts all the teaching of Sruti and Smriti (according
to which Brahman is the highest concrete entity). We
therefore hold that non-sentient matter stands to Brahman
in the same relation as the one previously proved for the
individual soul in Satra II, 3, 43; 46; viz. that it is an attri-
bute incapable of being realised apart from Brahman and
hence is a part (amsa) of the latter. The texts referring to
the two as non-different may thus be taken in their primary
sense ; for the part is only a limited place of that of which
it isa part. And the texts referring to the two as different
may also be taken in their primary sense; for the distin-
guishing attribute and that to which the attribute belongs
are essentially different. Thus Brahman’s freedom from all
imperfection is preserved.—Lustre is an attribute not to be
realised apart from the gem, and therefore is ἃ part of the
gem ; the same relation also holds good between generic
character and individuals having that character, between
qualities and things having qualities. between bodies and
souls. In the same way souls as well as non-sentient
matter stand to Brahman in the relation of parts,

III ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 30. 621

29. And on account of denial.

Texts such as ‘This is that great unborn Self, unde-
caying, undying’ (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 25), ‘By the old age
of the body that does not age’ (K4. Up. VIII, 1, 5), deny
of Brahman the properties of non-sentient matter. From
this it follows that the relation of the two can only be that
of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished, and
hence of part and whole. Brahman distinguished by
sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state is the
cause ; distinguished by the same beings in their gross state
is the effect: the effect thus is non-different from the cause,
and by the knowledge of the causal Brahman the effect is
likewise known. ΑἹ] these tenets are in full mutual agree-
ment. Brahman’s freedom from defects also is preserved;
and this and Brahman’s being the abode of all blessed _
qualities prove that Brahman possesses the ‘twofold
characteristics. —Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the
coils of the snake.’

30. (There is something) higher than that; on
account of the designations of bridge, measure,
connexion, and difference.

The Sdtras now proceed to refute an erroneous view
based on some fallacious arguments, viz. that there is a being
higher even than the highest Brahman, the supreme cause,
material as well as operative, of the entire world—a refuta-
tion which will confirm the view of Brahman being free
from all imperfections and a treasure as it were of countless
transcendentally exalted qualities——There is some entity
higher than the Brahman described so far as being the
cause of the world and possessing the twofold character-
istics. For the text ‘That Self is a bank (or bridge),
a boundary’ (K4. Up. VIII, 4,1) designates the Selfas a bank
or bridge (setu). And the term ‘setu’ means in ordinary
language that which enables one to reach the other bank
of a river; and from this we conclude that in the Vedic
text also there must be meant something to be reached.
The text further says that that bridge is to be crossed:

622 εὐ VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

‘He who has crossed that bridge, if blind,’ &c.; this also
indicates that there must be something to be reached by
crossing. Other texts, again, speak of the highest Brahman
as something measured, i.e. limited. ‘Brahman has four
feet (quarters), sixteen parts.’ Such declarations of
Brahman being something limited suggest the existence
of something unlimited to be reached by that bridge.
Further there are texts which declare a connexion of the
bridge as that which is a means towards reaching, and
a thing connected with the bridge as that to be reached:
‘the highest bridge of the Immortal’ (Svet. Up. VI, 19);
‘he is the bridge of the Immortal’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5).
For this reason also there is something higher than the
Highest—And other texts again expressly state that being
beyond the Highest to be something different : ‘he goes to
the divine Person who is higher than the Highest’ (Mu.
Up. III, 2, 8); ‘by this Person this whole universe is
filled ; what is higher than that is without form and without
suffering’ (Svet. Up. III, 9-10). All this combined shows
that there is something higher than the highest Brahman.—
The next Sutra disposes of this view.

31. But on account of resemblance.

The ‘but’ sets aside the pdrvapaksha. There is no truth
in the assertion that from the designation of the Highest as
a bridge (or bank) it follows that there is something beyond
the Highest. For Brahman in that text is not called a bank
with regard to something to be reached thereby; since the
additional clause ‘for the non-confounding of these worlds’
declares that it is compared to a bridge or bank in so far as
it binds to itself (sete being derived from sé, to bind) the
whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things without
any confusion. And in the clause ‘having passed beyond
that bridge’ the passing beyond means reaching ; as we say,
‘he passes beyond the Vedanta,’ meaning ‘he has fully
mastered it.’

32. It subserves the purpose of thought; as in
the case of the feet.

III ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 35. 623

Where the texts speak of Brahman as having four
quarters, and sixteen parts, or say that ‘one quarter of
him are all these beings’ (K4. Up. III, 12, 6), they do so for
the purpose of thought, i.e. meditation, only. For as texts
such as ‘ the Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ’ teach
Brahman, the cause of the world, to be unlimited, it cannot
in itself be subject to measure. The texts referring to
measure therefore aim at meditation only, in the same way
as texts such as ‘ Speech is one foot (quarter) of him, breath
another, the eye another, the mind another’ (K%. Up. III,
18, 2).—But how can something that in itself is beyond all
measure, for the purpose of meditation, be spoken of as
measured? To this the next Sitra replies.

33. Owing to difference of place, as in the case of
light, and so on.

Owing to the difference of limiting adjuncts constituted
by special places, such as speech, and so on, Brahman in so
far as connected with these adjuncts may be viewed as
having measure ; just as light and the like although spread
everywhere may be viewed as limited, owing to its con-
nexion with different places—windows, jars, and so on.

34. And on account of possibility.

Nor is there any truth in the assertion that, because texts
such as ‘he is the bridge of the Immortal’ intimate a dis-
tinction between that which causes to reach and the object
reached, there must be something to be reached different
from that which causes to reach ; for the highest Self may
be viewed as being itself a means towards itself being
reached ; cp. ‘The Self cannot be reached by the Veda,
and so on ; he whom the Self chooses by him the Self can
be gained’ (K&. Up. I, 2, 23).

35. Thus, from the denial of anything else.

Nor can we allow the assertion that there is something
higher than the highest because certain texts (‘the Person
which is higher than the highest’; ‘ beyond the Imperish-
able there is the highest, &c.) refer to such a difference.

624 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

For the same texts expressly deny that there is anything
else higher than the highest—‘ than whom there is nothing
else higher, than whom there is nothing smaller or larger’
(Svet. Up. III, 9). So also other texts: ‘For there is
nothing else higher than this “not so”’ (i.e. than this
Brahman designated by the phrase ‘ not so’; Brz. Up. II,
3, 6); ‘Of him none is the Lord, his name is great glory’
(Mahanér. Up. I, 10). ‘

But what then is the entity referred to in the text
‘tato yad uttarataram ’? (Svet. Up. III, 10) ?—The passage
immediately preceding (8), ‘I know that great person, &c. ;
a man who knows him passes over death,’ had declared
that the knowledge of Brahman is the only way to immor-
tality; and the clause (9), ‘Higher than whom there is
nothing else,’ had confirmed this by declaring that Brahman
is the Highest and that there is no other thing higher. In
agreement herewith we must explain stanza Io as giving
a reason for what had been said, ‘ Because that which is the
highest (uttarataram), viz. the Supreme Person is without
form and without suffering, therefore (tataz) those who know
him become immortal, &c. On any other explanation
stanza Io would not be in harmony with stanza 8 where
the subject is introduced, and with what is declared in
stanza 9.—Analogously in the text ‘He goes to the divine
Person who is higher than the highest’ (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8)
‘the highest’ means the aggregate soul (samashé-purusha),
which in a previous passage had been said to be ‘ higher
than the high Imperishable’ (II, 1,2); and the ‘higher’
refers to the Supreme Person, with all his transcendent
qualities, who is superior to the aggregate soul.

36. The omnipresence (possessed) by that, (under-
stood) from the declaration of extent. .

That omnipresence which is possessed ‘by that,’ i.e. by
Brahman, and which is known ‘ from declarations of extent,’
and so on, i.e. from texts which declare Brahman to be all-
pervading, is also known from texts such as ‘higher than
that there is nothing.’ Declarations of extent are e.g. the
following: ‘By this Person this whole Universe is filled’

III ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 38. 625

(Svet. Up. IIT, 9) ; ‘whatever is seen or heard in this world; is
pervaded inside and outside by Narayana’ (Mah4nér. Up.) ;
‘The eternal, pervading, omnipresent, which the Wise con-
sider as the source of all beings’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6). The ‘and
the rest’ in the Sdtra comprises passages such as ‘ Brahman
indeed is all this,’ ‘The Self indeed is all this, and the
like. The conclusion is that the highest Brahman is
absolutely supreme.—Here terminates the adhikarana of
‘the Highest.’

37. From thence the reward; on account of
possibility.

It has been shown, for the purpose of giving rise to
a. desire for devout meditation, that the soul in all its states
is imperfect, while the Supreme Person to be reached by it
is free from imperfections, the owner of blessed qualities
and higher than everything else. Being about to investigate
the nature of meditation, the Sdtrak4ra now declares that
the meditating devotee receives the reward of meditation,
i.e. Release, which consists in attaining to the highest
Person, from that highest Person only ; and that analogously
the rewards for all works prescribed by the Veda—whether
to be enjoyed in this or the next world—come from the
highest Person only. The Sdtra therefore says generally,
‘from thence the reward.’—‘ Why so ?’—‘ Because that only
is possible.’

For it is he only—the all-knowing, all-powerful,
supremely generous one—who being pleased by sacrifices,
gifts, offerings, and the like, as well as by pious meditation,
is in a position to bestow the different forms of enjoyment
in this and the heavenly world, and Release which consists
in attaining to a nature like his own. For action which is
non-intelligent and transitory is incapable of bringing about
@ result connected with a future time.

38. And on account of scriptural declaration.

That he bestows all rewards—whether in the form of
enjoyment or Release—Scripture also declares ‘ This indeed
is the great, the unborn Self, the eater of food, the giver of

[48] Ss

626 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

wealth’ (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 24); and ‘For he alone causes
delight’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7).—Next a prima facie view is
stated.

39. For the same reasons Gaimini (thinks it to
be) religious action,

For the same reasons, viz. possibility and scriptural
declaration, the teacher Gaimini thinks that religious works,
viz. sacrifices, gifts, offerings, and meditation, of themselves
bring about their rewards. For we observe that in ordinary
life actions such as ploughing and the like, and charitable
gifts and so on, bring about their own reward, directly or
indirectly. And although Vedic works do not bring about
their rewards immediately, they may do so mediately, viz.
by means of the so-called affrva. This follows also from
the form of the Vedic injunctions, such as ‘He who is
desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.’ As such
injunctions enjoin sacrifices as the means of bringing about
the object desired to be realised, viz. the heavenly world
and the like, there is no other way left than to assume that
the result (which is seen not to spring directly from the
sacrifice) is accomplished by the mediation of the apdrva.

40. But the former, Badardyaza (thinks), on ac-
count of the designation (of deities) as the cause.

The reverend Badar4yana maintains the previously
declared awarding of rewards by the Supreme Person since
the scriptural texts referring to the different sacrifices
declare that the deities only, Agni, Vayu, and so on, who
are propitiated by the sacrifices—which are nothing else
but means to propitiate deities—are the cause of the rewards
attached to the sacrifices. Compare texts such as‘ Let him
who is desirous of prosperity offer a white animal to Vayu.
For Vayu is the swiftest god. The man thus approaches
Vayu with his proper share, and Vayu leads him to
prosperity.’ And the whole instruction which the texts
give, as to the means by which men desirous of certain
results are to effect those results, is required on account of
the injunctions only, and hence it cannot be doubted that

III ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 40, 627

it has reference to the injunctions. The apparatus of means
to bring about the results thus being learnt from the text
only, no person acquainted with the force of the means of
proof will assent to that apparatus, as stated by the text,
being set aside and an ap(rva about which the text says
nothing being fancifully assumed. And that the imperative
verbal forms of the injunctions denote as the thing to be
effected by the effort of the sacrificer, only that which ‘on
the basis of the usage of language and grammatical science
is recognised as the meaning of the root-element of such
words as *yageta,’ viz. the sacrifice (y4ga), which consists
in the propitiation of a divine being, and not some addi-
tional supersensuous thing such as the apirva, we have
already proved above (p. 153 ff.). Texts such as ‘ Vayu is
the swiftest god’ teach that Vayu and other deities are the
bestowers of rewards. And that it is fundamentally the
highest Self—as constituting the inner Self of Vayu and
other deities—which is pleased by offerings, and bestows
rewards for them is declared by texts such as ‘ Offerings
and pious works, all this he bears who is the nave of the
Universe. He is Agni and Vayu, he is Sun and Moon’
(Mahanar. Up. I, 6, 7). Similarly in the antary4min-
brahmaza, ‘ He who dwells in Vayu, of whom VA4yu is the
body’; ‘He who dwells in Agni,’ &c. Sm~riti expresses
itself similarly, ‘Whatsoever devotee wishes to worship
with faith whatsoever divine form, of him do I make that
faith unshakable. Endued with such faith he endeavours
to propitiate him and obtains from him his desires—those
indeed being ordained by me’ (Bha. Gi. VII, 21-22);
‘For I am the enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices’
(IX, 24)—where Lord means him who bestows the reward
for the sacrifices. ‘To the gods go the worshippers of the
gods, and those devoted to me go to me’ (VII, 23).—In
ordinary life men, by agriculture and the like, acquire
wealth in various forms, and by means of this propitiate
their king, either directly or through his officials and
servants ; and the king thereupon is seen to reward them
in a manner corresponding to the measure of their services
and presents. The VedAnta-texts, on the other hand, give
᾿ 552

628 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

instruction on a subject which transcends the sphere of all
the other means of knowledge, viz. the highest Person who
is free from all shadow even of imperfection, and a treasure-
house as it were of all exalted qualities in their highest
᾿ state of perfection ; on sacrifices, gifts, oblations, which are
helpful towards the propitiation of that Person ; on praise,
worship, and meditation, which directly propitiate him ;
and on the rewards which he, thus propitiated, bestows,
viz. temporal happiness and final Release.—Here terminates
the adhikarasa of ‘ reward.’

e

111 ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, I. 629

THIRD PADA.

1. What is understood from all the Vedanta-texts
(is one), on account of the non-difference of injunc-
tion and the rest.

The Sftras have stated whatever has to be stated to the
end of rousing the desire of meditation—concluding with
the fact that Brahman bestows rewards. Next the question
is introduced whether the vidyds (i.e. the different forms of
meditation on Brahman which the Ved4nta-texts enjoin)
are different or non-different, on the decision of which
question it will depend whether the qualities attributed
to Brahman in those vidy4s are to be comprised in one
act of meditation or not—The first subordinate question
arising here is whether one and the same meditation—as
e.g. the vidya of Vaisvanara—which is met with in the
text of several sakhds, constitutes one vidy4 or several.—
The vidyds are separate, the Parvapakshin maintains; for
the fact that the same matter is, without difference, im-
parted for a second time, and moreover stands under
a different heading—both which circumstances necessarily
attend the text’s being met with in different s&ékhas—
proves the difference of the two meditations. It is for
this reason only that a restrictive injunction, such as the
one conveyed in the text, ‘Let a man tell this science of
Brahman to those only who have performed the rite of
carrying fire on their head’ (Mu. Up. III, 2, 10}—which
restricts the imparting of knowledge to the Atharvazikas,
to whom that rite is peculiar—has any sense; for if the
vidy4s were one, then the rite mentioned, which is a part
of the vidya, would be valid for the members of other
sakh4s also, and then the restriction enjoined by the text
would have no meaning.—This view is set aside by the
Stra, ‘What is understood from all the Ved4nta-texts’ is
one and the same meditation, ‘ because there is non-difference
of injunction and the rest.’ By injunction is meant the

630 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

injunction of special activities denoted by different verbal
roots—such as up4sita ‘he should meditate,’ vidyat ‘he
should know.’ The ‘and the rest’ of the Sdtra is meant
to comprise as additional reasons the circumstances men-
tioned in the Parva Mim4zss4-sitras (II, 4,9). Owing to
all these circumstances, non-difference of injunction and
the rest, the same vidya is recognised in other sakhds also.
In the X4Andogya (V, 12, 2) as well as in the Vagasaneyaka
we meet with one and the same injunction (viz. ‘ He should
meditate on Vaisvanara’). The form (character, rdpa) of
the meditations also is the same, for the form of a cognition
solely depends on its object; and the object is in both
cases the same, viz, Vaisvanara. The name of the two
vidy4s also is the same, viz. the knowledge of Vaisv4nara.
And both vidyds are declared to have the same result, viz.
attaining to Brahman. All these reasons establish the
identity of vidy4s even in different sakh4s—The next
Sdtra refers to the reasons set forth for his view by the
Parvapakshin and refutes them.

2. If it be said (that the vidy4s are not one) on
account of difference, we deny this, since even in
one (vidya there may be repetition).

If it be said that there is no oneness of vidy4, because
the fact of the same matter being stated again without
difference, and being met with in a different chapter, proves
the object of injunction to be different ; we reply that even
in one and the same vidya some matter may be repeated
without any change, and under a new heading (in a dif-
ferent chapter); if, namely, there is difference of cognising
subjects. Where the cognising person is one only, repeti-
tion of the same matter under a new heading can only be
explained as meaning difference of object enjoined, and
hence separation of the two vidyas. But where the cognising
persons are different (and this of course is eminently so in
the case of different sakh4s), the double statement of one
and the same matter explains itself as subserving the
cognition of those different persons, and hence does not
imply difference of matter enjoined—The next Satra

11 ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 4. 631

refutes the argument founded on a rite enjoined in the
Mundaka.

3. For (the sirovrata) concerns the mode of the
study of the Veda; also on account of (that rite)
being a heading in the sam4Z4ra; and the restriction
is like that of the libations.

What the text says as to a restriction connected with the
‘vow of the head,’ does not intimate a difference of vidy4s.
For that vow does not form part of the vidya. The restric-
tion refers only to a peculiarity of the study of the Veda
on the part of the Atharvazikas, being meant to establish
that they should possess that special qualification which
the rite produces; but it does not affect the vidya itself.
This is proved by the subsequent clause, ‘a man who has
not performed that rite may not read the text,’ which
directly connects the rite with the studying of the text.
And it is further proved by the fact that in the book of
the Atharvanikas, called ‘sam4A4ra, that rite is referred
to as a rite connected with the Veda (not with the special
vidya set forth in the Mumduaka), viz. in the passage, ‘this
is explained already by the Veda-observance’ (which
extends the details of the sirovrata, there called veda-vrata,
to other observances). By the knowledge of Brahman
(referred to in the Mumdaka-text ‘let a man tell this
science of Brahman to those only,’ &c.), we have therefore
to understand knowledge of the Veda in general. And
that restriction is ‘like that of the libations’—i.e. it is
analogous to the restriction under which the sava-libations,
beginning with the Saptasfrya-libation, and terminating
with the Sataudana-libation, are offered in the one fire
which is used by the followers of the Atharvan, and not in
the ordinary three fires.

4. Scripture also declares this.

Scripture also shows that (identical) meditation is what
all the Vedanta-texts intimate. The K/andogya (VIII,

1, 1 ff.) declares that that which is within the small space
in the heart is to be enquired into, and then in reply to the

632 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

question what the thing to be enquired into is, says that it
is the highest Self possessing the eight attributes, freedom
from all evil and the rest, which is to be meditated upon
within the heart. And then the Taittiriya-text, referring
to this declaration in the AA&andogya, says, ‘Therein is
a small space, free from all grief; what is within that is to
be meditated upon’ (Mahanar. Up. X, 23), and thus like-
wise enjoins meditation on the highest Self possessing the
eight qualities. And this is possible only if, owing to unity
of vidyA, the qualities mentioned in the first text are in-
cluded also in the meditation enjoined in the second text.—
Having thus established the unity of meditations, the
Satras proceed to state the practical effect of such unity.

5. (Meditation) thus being equal, there is com-
bination (of guzas) ; on account of non-difference of
purport in the case of what subserves injunction.

The meditation in all Ved4nta-texts thus being the
same, the qualities mentioned in one text are to be com-
bined with those mentioned in another; ‘on account of
non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves
injunction.’ We find that in connexion with certain
injunctions of meditation—such as the meditation on
Vaisvanara, or the small ether within the heart—the text of
some individual Vedanta-book mentions certain secondary
matters (qualities, guza) which subserve that meditation ;
and as these guaas are connected with the meditation they
are to be comprised in it, so that they may accomplish their
aim, i.e. of subserving the meditation. For the same reason
therefore we have to enclose in the meditation guaas men-
tioned in other Vedanta-texts; for being also connected
with the meditation they subserve it in the same way.—
Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘what is intimated by
all Vedanta-texts.

6. If it be said that there is difference on account

of the text; we say no; on account of non-dif-
ference.

So far it has been shown that the non-difference of in-

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 6. 633

junction, and so on, establishes the unity of meditations,
and that owing to the latter the special features of medita-
tion enjoined in different texts have to be combined. Next,
an enquiry is entered upon whether in the case of certain
particular meditations there actually exists, or not, that
non-difference of injunction which is the cause of meglita-
tions being recognised as identical. A meditation on the
Udgitha is enjoined in the text of the K/andogas, as well
as in that of the Vagasaneyins (KA. Up. I,2; Bré. Up. I, 3);
and the question arises whether the two are to be viewed
as one meditation or not. The Pfrvapakshin maintains
the former alternative. For, he says, there is no difference

of injunction, and so on, since both texts enjoin as the |
object of meditation the Udgitha viewed under the form of
Prana; since there is the same reward promised in both
places, viz. mastering of one’s enemies; since the form of
meditation is the same, the Udgitha being in both cases
viewed under the form of Pra#a;. since the injunction is the
same, being conveyed in both cases by the same verbal
root (vid, to know); and since both meditations have the
same technical name, viz. udgitha-vidy4. The Sdtra
states this view in the form of the refutation of an objec-
tion raised by the advocate of the final view. We do not
admit, the objector says, the unity maintained by you,
since the texts clearly show a difference of form. The text
of the Vagasaneyins represents as the object of meditation
that which is the agent in the act of singing out the
Udgitha ; while the text of the KX Zandogas enjoins medita-
tion on what is the object of the action of singing out
(i.e. the Udgitha itself). This discrepancy establishes dif-
ference in the character of the meditation, and as this
implies difference of the object enjoined, the mere non-
difference of injunction, and so on, is of no force, and hence
the two meditations are separate ones.—This objection
the Parvapakshin impugns, ‘on account of non-difference.’
For both texts, at the outset, declare that the Udgitha is
the means to bring about the conquest of enemies (‘ Let
us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means of
the Udgitha’ (Bri. Up.); ‘The gods took the Udgitha,

634 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

thinking they would with that overcome the Asuras’—
Kh. Up.). In order therefore not to stultify this common
beginning, we must assume that in the clause ‘For them
that breath sang out’ (Br#. Up.), the Udgitha, which really
is the object of the action of singing, is spoken of as
the agent. Otherwise the term udgitha in the intro-
ductory passage (‘by means of the Udgitha’) would have
to be taken as by implication denoting the agent (while
directly it indicates the instrument).—Hence there is one-
ness of the two vidy4s.—Of this view the next Satra
disposes,

7. Or not, on account of difference of subject-
matter; as in the case of the attribute of being
higher than the high, and so on.

There is no unity of the two vidyds, since the subject-
matter of the two differs. For the tale in the A 44ndogya-
text, which begins ‘when the Devas and the Asuras
struggled together,’ connects itself with the prazava (the
syllable Om) which is introduced as the object of medita-
tion in A Zand. I, 1, 1, ‘Let a man meditate on the syllable
Om as the Udgitha’; and the clause forming part of the
tale, ‘they meditated on that chief breath as Udgitha,’
therefore refers to a meditation on the pravava which is
a part only of the Udgitha. In the text of the Vaga-
saneyins, on the other hand, there is nothing to correspond
to the introductory passage which in the AAandogya-text
determines the subject-matter, and the text clearly states
that the meditation refers to the whole Udgitha (not only
the pravava). And this difference of leading subject-matter
implies difference of matter enjoined, and this again dif-
ference of the character of meditation, and hence there is
no unity of vidy4s. Thus the object of meditation for
the Xhandogas is the prasava viewed under the form of
Prana; while for the Vagasaneyins it is the Udgatri (who
sings the Udgitha), imaginatively identified with Prawa.
Nor does there arise, on this latter account, a contradiction
between the later and the earlier part of the story of the
Vagasaneyins. For as a meditation on the Udgatr# neces-

III ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 9. 635

sarily extends to the Udgitha, which is the object of the
activity of singing, the latter also helps to bring about the
result, viz. the mastering of enemies.—There is thus no
unity of vidya, although there may be non-difference of
injunction, and so on.—‘ As in the case of the attribute of
being higher than the high, &c. In one and the same
sakha there are two meditations, in each of which the
highest Self is enjoined to be viewed under the form of
the pranava (Kh. Up. 1,6; I, 9), and in so far the two
vidyas are alike. But while the former text enjoins that
the prawava has to be viewed under the form of a golden
man, in the latter he has to be viewed as possessing the
attributes of being higher than the high, and owing to this
difference of attributes the two meditations must be held
separate (a fortiori, then, those meditations are separate
which have different objects of meditation).

8. If that be declared on account of name; (we
object, since) that is also (where the objects of in-
junction differ).

If the oneness of the vidy4s be maintained on the ground
that both have the same name, viz. udgitha-vidya, we
point out that oneness is found also where the objects
enjoined are different. The term agnihotra is applied
equally to the permanent agnihotra and to that agnihotra
which forms part of the sacrifice called ‘Kusdapéyinam
ayanam’; and the term udgitha is applied equally to
the many different meditations described in the first prapa-
thaka of the KAandogya.

9. And (this is) appropriate, on account of the
extension.

Since the prazava, which is a part of the udgitha, is intro-
duced as the subject of meditation in the first prapathaka
of the A 4andogya, and extends over the later vidyds also,
it is appropriate to assume that also in the clause ‘the gods
took the udgitha’—which stands in the middle—the term
udgitha denotes the prazava. Expressions such as ‘the
cloth is burned’ show that frequently the whole denotes

636 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the part—The conclusion from all this is that in the
Kkandogya the object of meditation is constituted by the
pravava—there termed udgitha—viewed under the form of
praza; while in the Vagasaneyaka the term udgitha de-
notes the whole udgitha, and the object of meditation is he
who produces the udgitha, i.e. the udgatri, viewed under
the form of praza. And this proves that the two vidyds
are separate.—Here terminates the adhikarana of ‘ dif-
ference.’

10. On account of non-difference of everything,
those elsewhere.

The KAandogya and the VAagasaneyaka alike record
a meditation on Praza; the object of meditation being
Prama as possessing the qualities of being the oldest and
the best, and also as possessing certain other qualities such
as being the richest, and so on (Kz. Up. V,1; Bré. Up.
VI, 1). In the text of the Kaushitakins, on the other
hand, there is a meditation on Praza which mentions the
former qualities (‘being the best’ and ‘being the oldest’),
but not the latter (‘being the richest,’ and so on). This, the
Pdrvapakshin maintains, constitutes a difference between
the objects of meditation, and hence between the medita-
tions themselves.—This view the Sdtra sets aside ‘on
account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere.’
There is no difference of meditation. Those qualities, viz.
being the richest, and so on, are to be meditated upon in
the other place also, viz. in the meditation on Praza of the
Kaushitakins ; ‘since there is non-difference of everything,’
ie. since the text of the Kaushitakins also exhibits the
very same method, in all its details, for proving what it is
undertaken to prove, viz. that Praza is the oldest and best.
And for that proof it is required that Praza should be
viewed as possessing also the quality of being the richest,
and so on, and these qualities therefore have to be com-
prised in the meditation of the Kaushitakins also. Hence
there is no difference of meditation.—Here terminates the
adhikaraxa of ‘ non-difference of everything.’

In the same way. as the meditation on Praga as the

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 12. 637

oldest and best cannot be accomplished without Praza
being also meditated upon as the richest, and so on, and
as hence these latter qualities have to be comprised in the
meditation on Praza of the Kaushitakins, although they
are not expressly mentioned there; thus those qualities of
Brahman also, without which the meditation on Brahman
cannot be accomplished, must be included in all medita-
tions on Brahman—this is the point to be proved next.

11. Bliss and other qualities, as belonging to the
subject of the qualities.

The point to be decided here is whether, or not, the
essential qualities of Brahman are to be included in all
meditations on the highest Brahman.—Since there is no
valid reason for including in a meditation those qualities
which are not expressly mentioned in the section containing
that meditation, only those qualities which are thus ex-
pressly mentioned should be included !—This prima facie
view is negatived by the Satra. The clause, ‘on account of
non-difference, has to be carried on from the preceding
Sftra. <As the ‘subject of the qualities,’ i.e. Brahman is
the same in all meditations, the qualities which do not
exist apart from their subject, viz. bliss, and so on, are to be
comprised in all meditations.—But for the same reason
then such qualities as ‘having joy for its head’ (Taitt. Up.
II, 5) would also have to be included in all meditations on
Brahman !—This the next Satra negatives.

12. Such qualities as having joy for its head, and
80 on, are not established, for if there were difference
(of members) there would be increase and decrease.

The declaration that the essential qualities of Brahman
are established for all meditations, does not imply that
such attributes as ‘having joy for its head’ are equally
established. For the latter are not qualities of Brahman,
since they are mere elements in a figurative representation
of Brahman under the form of an animal body. Otherwise,
i.e. if Brahman really possessed different members, such
as head, wings, and so on, it would be liable to increase

638 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

and decrease, and this would be in conflict with texts such
as ‘the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.’—But if this
reasoning holds good, then all the infinite qualities belong-
ing to Brahman such as lordly power, generosity, com-
passion, and so on—all of which are incapable of existing
apart from the subject to which they belong—would have
to be comprehended in all those meditations on Brahman
where they are not expressly mentioned ; and this could
not possibly be done, as those qualities are infinite in
number.—This difficulty the next Sitra removes.

12, But the others, on account of equality with
the thing.

Those other qualities which are ‘equal to the thing,’ i.e.
which are attributes determining the essential character of
the thing, and therefore necessarily entering into the idea
of the thing, must be included in all meditations, no less
than the thing itself. To this class belong qualities such
as true being, knowledge, bliss, purity, infinity, and so on.
For of Brahman—which by texts such as ‘ that from which
all these beings,’ &c. had been suggested as the cause of
the world—the essential definition is given in texts such as
‘the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman’; ‘bliss is
Brahman,’ and others; and hence, in order that a true
notion may be formed of Brahman as the object of
meditation, such qualities as true being, bliss, and so on,
have to be included in all meditations on Brahman. Such
additional qualities, on the other hand, as e. g. compassion,
which indeed cannot exist apart from the subject to which
they belong, but are not necessary elements of the idea of
Brahman, are to be included in those meditations only
where they are specially mentioned.

But, an objection is raised, if ‘having joy for its head’
and the like are not qualities of Brahman, but merely serve
the purpose of a figurative representation of Brahman, for
what purpose then is this representation introduced? For
if something is represented as something else, there must
be some motive for doing so. Where, e.g. the sacred text
compares the meditating devotee to a charioteer, its body

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 15. 639

and organs to a chariot, and so, on, it does so for the
purpose of assisting the subjection to the Self of the means
of meditation, i.e. the body, the senses, and so on. But in
the present case no such purpose is to be discerned, and
hence it must needs be admitted that having joy for its
head, and so on, are real qualities of Brahman.—The next
Stra disposes of this difficulty.

14. For meditation, owing to the absence of

purpose.

As no other purpose can be assigned, the text must
be supposed to represent Brahman as having joy for its
head, and so on, for the purpose of meditation. In order
to accomplish the meditation on Brahman which is enjoined
in the text ‘he who knows (i.e. meditates on) Brahman
reaches the Highest,’ the text represents the Brahman
consisting of bliss as made up of joy, satisfaction, &c., and
compares these to the head, the wings, and so on. The
Self of bliss, which is the inmost of all the Selfs mentioned
in the text, is by this means represented to the mind in
a definite shape ; just as in the preceding sections the Self
of food, the Self of breath, and the rest had similarly been
represented in definite shapes, consisting of head, wings, and
soon. As thus the qualities of having joy for its head, &c.
are merely secondary marks of the Self of bliss, they are
not necessarily included in each meditation that involves
the idea of that Self.

15. And on account of the term ‘Self.’

That this is so further follows from the fact that in the
clause ‘different from this is the inner Self consisting of
bliss’ the term ‘Self’ is used. For as the Self cannot
really possess a head, wings, and tail, its having joy for its
head, and so on, can only be meant in a metaphorical sense,
for the sake of easier comprehension.—But, in the preceding
sections, the term Se/f had been applied to what is not of
the nature of Self—the text speaking of the Self of breath,
the Self of mind, and so on; how then are we able to
determine that in the phrase ‘the Self of bliss’ the term

640 ~ * vEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Self denotes a true Se/f?—To this the next Sfitra
replies.

16. There is reference to the Self, as in other
places; on account of the subsequent passage.

In the clause, ‘ different from that is the Self of bliss,’ thé
term Self can refer to the highest Self only ; ‘as in other
cases,’ i.e. as in other passages— the Self only was this in
the beginning; it thought, let me send forth the worlds,’
and similar ones—the term ‘Self’ denotes the highest Self
only.—But whereby is this proved ?— By the subsequent
passage’, i.e. by the passage, ‘he desired, may I be many,
may I grow forth,’ which refers to the Self of bliss.

17. If it be said ‘on account of connexion’; it
may be so, on account of ascertainment.

But as in the preceding sections the term Self is seen to
be connected with what is not of the nature of the Self,
such as the Self of breath, and so on, it is not possible to
draw a valid conclusion from the subsequent passage !—It
ts possible, the Sdtra replies, ‘on account of ascertainment.’
For the previous clause, ‘from that Self there originated
the Ether,’ settles in the mind the idea of the highest Self,
and that idea then is transferred in succession to the (so-
called) Self of breath, the Self of mind, and so on, until it
finally finds rest in the Self of bliss, beyond which there is
no other Self; while at the same time the subsequent clause
‘he desired’ confirms the idea of the highest Self. The
term Se/f thus connects itself from the beginning with

.things which are not true Selfs, because the highest Self is
as it were viewed in them.— Here terminates the adhikaranza
of ‘ bliss and the rest.’

18, The new (thing is enjoined); on account of
the statement of what has to be done. ᾿

The Sftra discusses an additional question connected
with the meditation on breath. Both texts—the K/andogya
as well as the Vagasaneyaka—declare that water constitutes
a dress for praza, and refer to the rinsing of the mouth

III ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 19. 641

with water. The doubt here arises whether what the texts
mean to enjoin is the rinsing of the mouth, or a meditation
on praza as having water for its dress.—The Pdrvapakshin
maintains the former view ; for, he says, the Vagasaneyaka
uses the injunctive form ‘he is to rinse,’ while there is no
injunctive form referring to the meditation; and what the
text says in praise of the breath thus not being allowed to
remain naked may be taken as a mere glorification of the
act of rinsing. And as ordinary rinsing of the mouth, sub-
sequent to eating, is already established by Smr#ti and
custom, we must conclude that the text means to enjoin.
rinsing of the mouth of a different kind, viz. as auxiliary
to the meditation on praza.—To this the Satra replies that
what the text enjoins is the ‘new’ thing, i.e. the previously
rion-established meditation on water as forming the dress
of praza. ‘On account of the statement of what has to be
done, i.e. on account of the statement of what is not
established—for only on the latter condition Scripture has
a meaning. The beginning as well as the end of the
Vagasaneyaka-text clearly refers to a meditation on the
water used for rinsing as forming a dress for praza; and as
rinsing is already established by Smriti and custom, we
naturally infer that what the text enjoins is a meditation
on breath as having the water used in rinsing for its dress.
This also explains why the K/andogya-text does not
mention the rinsing at all, but merely the clothing of breath
with water.—Here terminates the adhikaraa of ‘the state-
ment of what has to be done.’

19. And (the qualities) thus being equal, on
account of non-difference.

In the book of the V4gasaneyaka, called Agnirahasya,
we meet with a meditation on Brahman called SAzdilya-
vidya ; and there is also a SAadilya-vidy4 in the Brzhad-
aranyaka. The Ptrvapakshin holds that these two
meditations are different since the latter text mentions
qualities—such as Brahman being the lord of all—which
are not mentioned in the former ; the objects of meditation
thus being different, the meditations themselves are different.

[48] Tt

642 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

—This the Satra negatives. The object of meditation is
‘ equal,’ for both texts state the same qualities, such as
“ consisting of mind,’ and so on ; and the additional qualities
stated in the Brzhad-arazyaka, such as the rulership of
Brahman, ‘do not differ’ from those equally stated by both
texts, such as Brahman realising all its purposes, and so on.
Thus the objects of meditation do not differ in character.—
Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘ what is equal.’

20. On account of connexion, thus elsewhere also.

_ In the Brthad-4razyaka (V, 5) it is said that Brahman is
to be meditated upon as abiding within the orb of the sun
and within the right eye; and then the text mentions two
secret names of Brahman—akam and ahar. Here the
Parvapakshin holds that both these names are to be com-
prehended in each of the two meditations ‘On account of
connexion,’ i. e. on account of the object of meditation, i.e.
Brahman being one only, although connected with different
abodes, it is ‘thus elsewhere also,’ i.e. the same conclusion
which had been arrived at in the case of the Sandilya-
vidy4s, has to be accepted with regard to Brahman abiding
in the sun and in the eye. The meditation is one only, and
hence the two secret names apply to Brahman in both its
abodes.—This view the next Satra negatives.

21. Or not so, on account of difference.

This is not so, for as Brahman is to be meditated upon
in two different abodes, the meditations are separate. In
both the SAzdilya-vidyas, on the other hand, Brahman is
to be meditated upon as abiding within the heart.

22. The text also declares this.

That the qualities of that which abides within the sun
and that which abides in the eye are not to be combined,
the text itself moreover shows by specially stating that the
characteristics of the one are those of the other. For such
a special transfer of qualities is needed only where the
qualities are not of themselves established, i.e. where the
two things are naturally different.—Here terminates the
adhikaraxa of ‘connexion.’

III ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 24. 643

23. And for the same reason the holding together
and the pervading the sky.

In the Taittiriyaka and in the khilas of the Razayaniyas
we have the following passage : ‘ Gathered together are the
powers among which Brahman is the oldest ; Brahman as
the oldest in the beginning stretched out the sky. Brahman
was born as the first of all beings; who may rival that
Brahman?’ which declares that Brahman gathered together
all the most ancient powers, that it pervades the sky, and
soon. And as these attributes are not stated in connexion
with any special meditation, we must infer that they are to
be included in all meditations whatever on Brahman.—This
primé facie view is controverted by the Sdtra. The holding
together of all powers, &c., although not mentioned in
connexion with any special meditation, is not to be included |
in all meditations whatever, but to be connected with
particular meditations ‘on the same ground,’ i. e. according
to difference of place. Where those qualities have to be
included must be decided on the ground of feasibility.
The attribute of pervading the whole heaven cannot be
included in a meditation on Brahman as abiding within
a small place such as the heart, and hence the other attri-
butes also which are stated together with the attribute
mentioned cannot be included in those meditations. And
when we find that in meditations on Brahman as abiding
within a small place it is said that Brahman is greater than
the earth, or that the ether within the heart is as great as
the universal ether, these attributes cannot be taken in their
literal sense and hence included in those meditations, but
must be viewed as merely meant to glorify the object
proposed for meditation—Herewith terminates the adhi-
karaza of ‘holding together.’

24. And although (they both be) meditations on
man ; on account of others not being recorded.

In the Taittiriyaka as well as the KAandogya we meet
with a meditation on man (purusha-vidy4), in which parts
‘of the sacrifice are fancifully identified with the parts of

: Tt2

644 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the human body.—Here the Parvapakshin maintains that
these two meditations are identical; for, he says, both
meditations have the same name (purusha-vidy4), and the
same character as stated above; and as the Taittiriyaka
mentions no fruit of the meditation, the fruit declared in
the KAandogya holds good for the Taittiriyaka also, and
thus there is no difference of fruit—This view the Siatra
negatives. Although both meditations are meditations on
man, yet they are separate ‘on account of the others not
being recorded,’ i.e. on account of the qualities recorded
in one sakh4 not being recorded in the other. For the
Taittiriyaka mentions the three libations, while the K 4an-
dogya does not, and so on. The character of the two
meditations thus differs. And there is a difference of result
also. For an examination of the context in the Taittiri-
yaka shows that the purusha-vidy4 is merely a subordinate
part of a meditation on Brahman, the fruit of which the text
declares to be that the devotee reaches the greatness of
Brahman ; while the XZandogya meditation is an indepen-
dent one, and has for its reward the attainment of long life.
The two meditations are thus separate, and hence the
details of one must not be included in the other—Here
terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the meditation on man.’

_ 25. On account of the difference of sense of
piercing and so on. ,

The text of the Atharvarikas exhibits at the beginning
of their Upanishad some mantras, ‘ Pierce the sukra, pierce
the heart.’ The followers of the SAma-veda read at the
beginning of their rahasya-brahmaza ‘O God Savitri, pro-
mote the sacrifice.” The Kaskakas and the Taittiriyakas
have ‘ May Mitra be propitious to us, may Varuma be pro-
pitious.’ The S4zy4yanins have ‘Thou art a white horse,
a tawny and a black one!’ The Kaushitakins have a
Braéhmava referring to the Mahavrata-ceremony, ‘Indra
having slain Vritra became great.’ The Kaushitakins
also have a Mah&vrata-brahmaaa, ‘ Pragdpati is the year ;
his Self is that Mahavrata.’ The Vagasaneyins have
a Brahmawa referring to the Pravargya, ‘The gods sat

III ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 26. 645

down for a sattra-celebration.’ With reference to all this
a doubt arises whether these mantras and the sacrificial
works referred to in the Brahmaya texts form parts of the
meditations enjoined in the Upanishads or not.—The
Parvapakshin affirms this, on the ground that as the
mantras and works are mentioned in the immediate neigh-
bourhood of the meditations the idea of their forming parts
of the latter naturally presents itself. Such mantras as
‘pierce the heart’ and works such as the pravargya may
indeed—on the basis of direct statement (sruti), inferential
mark (liiga), and syntactical connexion (vakya), which are
stronger than mere proximity—be understood to be con-
nected with certain actions; but, on the other hand,
mantras such as ‘May Varuna be propitious’ have no
application elsewhere, and are suitable introductions to
meditations. We therefore take them to be parts of the
meditations, and hence hold that those mantras are to be
included in all meditations—This view the Sitra sets aside
‘on account of the difference of sense of piercing, and so
on.’ The inferential marks contained in texts such as
‘pierce the sukra, pierce the heart’; ‘I shall speak the
right, I shall speak the true,’ show that the mantras have
an application in connexion with certain magical practices,
or else the study of the Veda, and the like, and do not there-
fore form part of meditations. That is to say—in the same
way as the mantra ‘pierce the heart’ enables us to infer
that also the mantra ‘pierce the sukra’ belongs to some
magical rite, so we infer from the special meaning of
mantras such as ‘I shall speak the right,’ &c., that also
mantras such as ‘ May Mitra be propitious’ are connected
with the study of the Veda, and do not therefore form part
of meditations. That mantras of this kind and Brahmana
passages relative to the Pravargya and the like are placed
at the beginning of Upanishads is owing to their having,
like the latter, to be studied in the forest.—Herewith
terminates the adhikarama of ‘ piercing and the like.’

26. But in the case of the getting rid of (it has
to be combined with the obtaining), as it is supple-

646 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

mentary to statements of obtaining; as in the case
of the kusas, the metres, the praise, and the singing.
This has been explained.

The Khandogas read in their text ‘Shaking off all evil
as a horse shakes his hair, and shaking off the body as the
moon frees herself from the mouth of Rahu, I obtain the
world of Brahman’ (K’. Up. VIII, 13). The Atharvazikas
have ‘He who knows, shaking off good and evil, free from
passion, reaches the highest oneness.’ The SAtydyanins
have ‘ His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good,
his enemies the evil he has done.’ The Kaushitakins ‘He
shakes off his good and his evil deeds. His beloved relatives
obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil he has done.’
Two of these texts mention only the shaking off, on the part
of him who knows, of his good and evil works ; one mentions
only the obtainment of these works, on the part of friends
and enemies ; and one mentions both these occurrences.—
Now both the occurrences, although mentioned in several
meditations, must be considered elements of all medita-
tions : for whoever, on the basis of a knowledge of Brahman,
reaches Brahman, necessarily leaves behind all his good and
evil works, and those works unless thus left behind cannot
be obtained by others. Meditation on those two matters
therefore enters as an element into all meditations. The
doubtful point, however, is whether there is option between
the meditation on the abandonment of works, and that on
the obtainment of works by others, and that on both these
events ; or whether in each case all these meditations are
to be combined.—There is option, the Parvapakshin holds;
for the reason that the texts make different declarations on
this point. For, if the meditations had to be combined,
there would be in each case meditation on both the matters
mentioned ; and as such double meditation is established
by the Kaushitakin text, it would follow that the state-
ments of the other texts are without meaning. Thus the
only motive for the declarations made in different places
can be to allow option. Nor must this conclusion be
controverted on the ground that declarations of the same

Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 26. 647

matter, made in different places, are made with reference
to the difference of students severally reading the several
texts; for this holds good in those cases only where identi-
cal statements are made in different texts; while in the
case under discussion two sakhA4s mention the abandon-
ment of. works, and one their passing over to other persons.
Nor can you account for the difference of statement on
the ground of difference of vidy4s ; for you yourself main-
tain that the meditations in question form part of all
meditations.—This view the Sdtra impugns, ‘but where
the getting rid of is mentioned, &c. Where a text mentions
either the abandonment only of works or only their being
obtained by others, both these matters must necessarily be
combined, since the statement as to the works being ob-
tained forms a supplement to the statement of their being
abandoned. For the former statement declares the place
to which the good and evil works, got rid of by him who
knows Brahman, are transferred.—This supplementary rela-
tion of two statements the Sitra illustrates by some parallel
cases. A clause in the text of the Saty4yanins, ‘the kusas
are the children of the udumbara tree,’ forms a defining
supplement to a more general statement in the text of the
Kaushitakins, ‘the kusas are the children of the tree.” The
clause, ‘the metres of the gods are prior,’ defines the order
of the metres which in other texts mentioning ‘the metres
of the gods and Asuras’ had been left undefined, and
therefore forms a supplement to those texts. Analogous
is the relation of the clause, ‘he assists the stotra of the
shodasin when the sun has half risen, to the less definite
statement ‘he assists with gold the stotra of the shodasin ;’
and the relation of the clause, ‘the adhvaryu is not to
sing,’ to the general injunction ‘all the priests join in
the singing.’ Unless we admit that one statement, which
defines some other more general statement, may stand to
the latter in a supplementary relation, we are driven to
assume an optional proceeding, and this is objectionable
as long as there is any other way open; according to a
principle laid down in the Parva Mim4msa (X, 8,15). As
the clauses referring to the abandonment of the works, and

648 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

those referring to their being taken up by others, thus form
one connected whole, there is no such thing as mere
abandonment and mere taking up, and hence there can
be no option between the two. That the text of the
Kaushitakins mentions both thus explains itself, on the
ground that the several declarations of what is really only
one and the same matter are directed to different hearers.—
Here terminates the adhikarama of ‘ getting rid of.’

27. At departing; there being nothing to be
reached. For thus others (also declare).

The further question arises whether the putting off of all
good and evil deeds takes place only at the time when the
soul leaves the body, or also after it has departed and is
on its journey to the world of Brahman. The Pdrvapakshin
holds the latter view, for, he says, the texts declare both.
The Kaushitakins say that the soul shakes off its good and
evil deeds when it crosses the river Viraga in the world of
Brahman ; while the T4zdins say ‘ Shaking off all evil, and
shaking off the body,’ &c., which shows that the deeds are
shaken off at the time when the soul leaves the body.
And when the S4ty4yanaka says that ‘his sons obtain his
inheritance, his friends his good deeds, and so on, this also
intimates that the deeds are shaken off at the time when
the soul leaves the body. We therefore must conclude
that a part of the deeds is left behind at the moment of
death, and the remainder on the journey to the world of
Brahman.—This view the Satra controverts. All the good
and evil deeds of the dying man are left behind, without
remainder, at the time when the soul parts from the body.
For after the soul of him who knows has departed from
the body, ‘ there is nothing to be reached,’ i. e. there are no
further pleasures and pains to be enjoyed as the result
of good and evil deeds, different from the obtaining of
Brahman, which is the fruit of knowledge. Thus others
also declare that, subsequently to the soul’s departure
from the body, there is no enjoyment of any pain or
pleasure different from the obtaining of Brahman. ‘But
when he is free of the body, then neither pleasure nor pain

III ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 30. 649

touches him’; ‘Thus does that serene being, rising from
this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has ap-
proached the highest light’ (K%. Up. VIII, 12, 1; 3); ‘For
him there is delay only so long as he is not freed (from the
body); then he will be perfect’ (VI, 14, 2).

28. As it is desired; on account of there being
no contradiction of either.

The time when good and evil deeds are left behind thus
having been determined on the basis of the reason of the
thing, the several words of the passages must be construed
as it is desired, i.e. so as not to contradict either, i.e. either
the declaration of scripture or the reason of the thing.
Thus in the text of the Kaushitakins the later clause, ‘he
shakes off his good and evil deeds,’ must be taken as
coming before the earlier passage ‘having entered on
that path of the gods.’—Here the Parvapakshin raises a
new objection.

29. There is meaning of the soul’s going (only)
on the twofold hypothesis; for otherwise there is
contradiction. .

It is only on the hypothesis of a part of the good and evil
works being left behind at the time of the soul’s departure
from the body, and another part later on, and the efface-
ment of works thus taking place in a double way, that
a sense can be found in the scriptural declaration of the
soul proceeding on the path of the gods. For otherwise
there would be a contradiction. For if all the works
perished at the time of the soul’s departure from the body,
the subtle body also would perish, and if this were so, no
going on the part of the mere Self would be possible. It
is not therefore possible that at the time of the soul’s
departure from the body all works should perish without a
remainder.—To this the next Sitra replies.

30. (That assumption) is justified; on account of
the perception of things which are marks of that; as
in ordinary experience.

650 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

The assumption of all the works perishing at the time of
‘departure’ involves no contradiction ; since we perceive,
in the sacred texts, matters which are marks of connexion
with a body even on the part of the soul which has divested
itself of all its works and become manifest in its true
nature. Compare ‘Having approached the highest light
he manifests himself in his true form’; ‘He moves about
there laughing, playing, and rejoicing’; ‘ He becomes a self-
ruler, he moves about in all worlds according to his will’;
‘He becomes one, he becomes three,’ &c. (KA. Up. VIII,
12,3; VII, 25,2; 26,2). All these texts refer to the soul’s
connexion with a body. The soul therefore, joined to the
subtle body, may proceed on the path of the gods, even
after all its works have passed away. But how can the
subtle body persist, when the works which originate it
have passed away? Through the power of knowledge, we
reply. Knowledge does not indeed by itself originate the
subtle body, but it possesses the power of making that
body persist, even after the gross body—which is the
instrument for the experience of all ordinary pains and
pleasures—and all works have passed away, so as thereby
to make the soul capable of moving on the path of the gods,
and thus to obtain Brahman which is the fruit of know-
ledge. ‘As in ordinary life.’ As in ordinary life, a tank,
which may have been made with a view to the irrigation of
rice-fields and the like, is maintained and used for the
purpose of drawing drinking-water, and so on, even after
the intentions which originally led to its being made have
passed away.—Here an objection is raised. It may be
admitted, that at the time when a man possessing true
knowledge dies, all his works pass away without a re-
mainder, and that the subtle body only remains, enabling
him to move towards Brahman; but it cannot be held that
the soul in that state does not experience pain and pleasure ;
for we know from sacred tradition that Vasish¢ka, Avantara-
tamas, and others, who had reached intuition of the highest
truth, entered after death on other embodiments, and ex-
perienced pain and pleasure due to the birth of sons, various
calamities, and so on.—To this the next Satra replies.

Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 32. 651

31. Of those who have a certain office there is
subsistence (of their works) as long as the office
lasts.

We do not maintain that all those who have reached
true knowledge divest themselves at the time of death of
all their good and evil works; we limit our view to those
who immediately after death attain to moving on the path,
the first stage of which is light. Persons like Vasish¢ka,
on the other hand, who are entrusted with certain offices,
do not immediately after death attain to moving on the
path beginning with light, since the duties undertaken by
them are not completely accomplished. In the case of
beings of this kind, who owing to particular deeds have
been appointed to particular offices, the effect of the works
which gave rise to the office does not pass away before
those offices are completely accomplished ; for the effect of
a work is exhausted only through the complete enjoyment
of its result. In the case of those persons, therefore, the
effects of the works which gave rise to their office continue
to exist as long as the office itself, and hence they do not
after death enter on the path beginning with light——Here
terminates the adhikarama of ‘passing away.’

32. There is no restriction (since) all (have to go
on that path). (Thus) there is non-contradiction of
sacred text and Smrti.

The question here is whether Brahman is to be reached
on the path of the gods by those only who take their stand
on those meditations which, like the Upakosala-vidyé,
describe that path, or by all who practise any of the
meditations on Brahman. The Parvapakshin holds the
former view, since there is no proof to show that in other
vidyas the going on that path is not mentioned, and since
those other vidy4s—such as the texts ‘and those who in
the forest meditate on faith and austerities, and ‘those
who in the forest worship faith, the True’ (K%. Up. V,
10,1; Bré. Up. VI, 2, 15)—suggest to the mind the idea
of the knowledge of Brahman. This the Sdtra negatives.

652 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

There is no restriction to that limited class of devotees,
since all who carry on meditations have to go on that path.
For on this latter assumption only text and inference, i.e.
scripture and authoritative tradition, are not contradicted.
As to scripture, the K/andogya and the Vagasaneyaka
alike, in the Pa&#kagni-vidya, declare that all those who
practise meditation go on that path. In the Vagasaneyaka
the words ‘ who know this’ refer to those who practise the
meditation on the five fires, while the following words
‘those who in the forest meditate on faith and the True’
refer to those who meditate on Brahman; and the text
then goes on to say that all those devotees go to Brahman,
on the path of the gods. Texts such as ‘the True, know-
ledge, infinite is Brahman,’ and ‘the True must be enquired
into,’ prove that the term ‘the True’ denotes Brahman ;
and as in the A Aandogya the term ‘tapas’ occurs in the
corresponding place, we conclude that both these terms,
viz. the True and tapas, denote nothing else but Brahman.
Meditation on Brahman, preceded by faith, is mentioned
elsewhere also; in the text which begins ‘The True must
be enquired into’ we read further on ‘Faith must be
enquired into’ (ΑΛ. Up. VII, 18, 16; 19). Sm~riti also
declares that all those who know Brahman proceed on the
path of the gods, ‘ Fire, the light, the day, the bright fort-
night, the six months of the sun’s northern progress—
proceeding by that road those who know Brahman go to
Brahman’ (Bha. Gi. VIII, 24). And there are many other
Sruti and Smriti passages of this kind. The conclusion
therefore is that the Upakosalavidy4 and similar texts
merely refer to that going of the soul which is common
to all vidy4s.—Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘ non-
restriction.’

33. But the conceptions of the Imperishable are
to be comprised (in all meditations). There being
equality (of the Brahman to be meditated on) and
(those conceptions) existing (in Brahman) ; as in the
case of what belongs to the upasad. This has been
explained.

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33. 653

We read in the Brihad-drazyaka (III, 8, 9), ‘O Gargi, the
Bréhmanas call that the Akshara. It is neither coarse nor
fine’ and so on. And in the Atharvaza (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5)
we have ‘The higher knowledge is that by which the
Akshara is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor
seized, &c. The doubt here arises whether all the quali-
ties there predicated of Brahman—called akshara, i.e. the
Imperishable—and constituting something contrary in
nature to the apparent world, are to be included in all medi-
tations on Brahman, or only those where the text specially
mentions them. The Pdrvapakshin advocates the latter
view; for, he says, there is no authority for holding
that the qualities which characterise one meditation are
characteristic of other meditations also; and such negative
attributes as are mentioned in those two texts do not—as
positive qualities such as bliss do—contribute to the appre-
hension of the true nature of Brahman. What those two
texts do is merely to deny of Brahman, previously appre-
hended as having bliss, and so on, for its essential qualities,
certain qualities belonging to the empirical world, such as
grossness, and so on; for all negation must refer to an
established basis.—This view the Sadtra refutes. The ideas _
of absence of grossness, and so on, which are connected
with Brahman viewed as the Akshara, are to be included
in all meditations on Brahman. For the imperishable
(akshara) Brahman is the same in all meditations, and
qualities such as non-grossness enter into the conception
of its essential nature. The apprehension of a thing
means the apprehension of its specific character. But mere
bliss, and so on, does not suggest the specific character of
Brahman, since those qualities belong also to the individual
soul. What is specifically characteristic of Brahman is
bliss, and so on, in so far as fundamentally opposed to all
evil and imperfection. The individual soul, on the other
hand, although fundamentally free from evil, yet is capable
of connexion with evil. Now being fundamentally opposed
to evil implies having a character the opposite of grossness
and all similar qualities which belong to the empirical
world, material and mental. He therefore who thinks of

᾿ 654 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Brahman must think of it as having for its essential nature
bliss, knowledge, and so on, in so far as distinguished by
absence of grossness and the like, and those qualities,
being no less essential than bliss, and so on, must therefore
be included in all meditations on Brahman.—The Sitra
gives an instance illustrating the principle that qualities
(secondary matters) follow the principal matter to which
they belong. As the mantra ‘ Agnir vai hotram vetu,’
although given in the Sama-veda, yet has to be recited in
the Yagur-veda style, with a subdued voice, because it
stands in a subordinate relation to the upasad-offerings
prescribed for the four-days’ sacrifice called Gamadagnya ;
those offerings are the principal matter to which the
subordinate matter—the mantra—has to conform. This
point is explained in the first section, i.e. in the Parva
Mimamsé-sdtras III, 3, 9.—But this being admitted, it
would follow that as Brahman is the principal matter in all
meditations on Brahman, and secondary matters have to
follow the principal matter, also such qualities as ‘doing all
works, enjoying all odours and the like,’ which are men-
tioned in connexion with special meditations only, would
indiscriminately have to be included in all meditations.—.
With reference to this the next Sitra says.

34. So much; on account of reflection.

Only so much, i.e. only those qualities which have to be
included in all meditations on Brahman, without which the
essential special nature of Brahman cannot be conceived,
i.e. bliss, knowledge, and so on, characterised by absence
of grossness and the like. Other qualities, such as doing
all works and the like, although indeed following their
substrate, are explicitly to be meditated on in special
meditations only.— Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the
idea of the Imperishable.’

35. Should it be said that (the former reply
refers) to that Self to which the aggregate of mate-
rial things belongs (since) otherwise the difference
(of the two replies) could not be accounted for; we
say—no ; as in the case of instruction.

III ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 35. 655

In the Brthad-arazyaka (III, 4; 5) the same question is
asked twice in succession (‘ Tell me the Brahman which is
visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all’), while
Y4gfiavalkya gives a different answer to each (‘He who
breathes in the upbreathing,’ &c.; ‘He who overcomes
hunger and thirst,’ &c.). The question here is whether the
two meditations, suggested by these sections, are different
or not. They are different, since the difference of reply
effects a distinction between the two vidy4s. The former
reply declares him who is the maker of breathing forth,
and so on, to be the inner Self of all; the latter describes
him as free from hunger, thirst, and so on. It thence
appears that the former passage refers to the inner (indi-
vidual) Self which is different from body, sense-organs,
internal organ, and vital breath; while the latter refers to
that which again differs from the inner Self, viz. the highest
Self, free from hunger, thirst, and so on. As the individual
soul is inside the aggregate of material things, it may be
spoken of as being that inner Self of all. Although this
kind of inwardness is indeed only a relative one, we never-
theless must accept it in this place; for if, desirous of
taking this ‘ being the inner Self of all’ in its literal sense,
we assumed the highest Self to be meant, the difference of
the two replies could not be accounted for. The former
reply evidently refers to the individual soul, since the
highest Self cannot be conceived as breathing forth, and
so on; and the latter reply, which declares the Self to be
raised above hunger, &c., evidently refers to the highest
Self. This is expressed in the earlier part of the Sdtra:
‘The former reply refers to the Self to which there belongs
the aggregate of material things, i.e. the individual soul as
being the inner Self of all; otherwise we could not account
for the difference of the two replies.’—The last words of
the Sdtra negative this—‘not so,’ i.e, there is no dif-
ference of vidy4s, since both assertions and replies refer to
the highest Self. The question says in both places, ‘the
Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is
within all,’ and this clearly refers to the highest Self only.
We indeed observe that in some places the term Brahman

656 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

is, in a derived sense, applied to the individual soul also ;
but the text under discussion, for distinction’s sake, adds
the qualification ‘the Brahman which is manifest’ (sakshat).
The quality of ‘aparokshatva’ (i.e. being that which does
not transcend the senses but lies openly revealed) also,
which implies being connected with all space and all time,
suits Brahman only, which from texts such as ‘the True,
knowledge, infinite is Brahman’ is known to be infinite.
In the same way the attribute of being the inner Self of all
can belong to the highest Self only, which texts such as
‘He who dwelling within the earth, &c., declare to be the
inner ruler of the universe. The replies to the two ques-
tions likewise can refer to Brahman only. The uncon-
ditional causal agency with regard to breath, declared in
the clause ‘he who breathes in the upbreathing,’ &c., can
belong to the highest Self only, not to the individual soul,
since the latter possesses no such causal power when in the
state of deep sleep. Ushasta thereupon, being not fully
enlightened, since causality with regard to breathing may
in a sense be attributed to the individual soul also, again
asks a question, in reply to which Y4g#avalkya clearly
indicates Brahman, ‘Thou mayest not see the seer of
sight,’ &c., i.e. thou must not think that my previous
speech has named as the causal agent of breathing the
individual soul, which is the causal agent with regard to
those activities which depend on the sense-organs, viz.
seeing, hearing, thinking, and knowing ; for in the state of
deep sleep, swoon, and so on, the soul possesses no such
power. And moreover another text also—‘ Who could
breathe if that bliss existed not in the ether?’ (Taitt. Up.
II, 7)—declares that the highest Self only is the cause of
the breathing of all living beings. In the same way the
answer to the second question can refer to the highest Self
only, which alone can be said to be raised above hunger,
thirst, and so on. For this reason also both replies wind
up with the same phrase, ‘ Everything else is of evil.’ The
iteration of question and reply serves the purpose of show-
ing that the same highest Brahman which is the cause of
all breathing is beyond all hunger, thirst, and so on.—The

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 26. 657

Sdtra subjoins a parallel instance. ‘As in the case of
instruction.’ As in the vidya of that which truly is (KA. Up.
VI, 1 ff.), question and reply are iterated several times,
in order to set forth the various greatness and glory of
Brahman.—Thus the two sections under discussion are of
the same nature, in so far as setting forth that the one
Brahman which is the inner Self of all is the cause of all
life and raised beyond all imperfections ; and hence they
constitute one meditation only.—To this a new objection
is raised. The two sections may indeed both refer to the
highest Brahman; nevertheless there is a difference of
meditation, as according to the one Brahman is to be
meditated upon as the cause of all life, and according to
the other as raised above all defects; this difference of
character distinguishes the two meditations. And further.
there is a difference of interrogators; the first question
being asked by Ushasta, the second by Kahola.

36. There is interchange (of ideas), for the texts
distinguish ; as in other cases.

There is no difference of vidy4 because both questions
and answers have one subject-matter, and because the one
word that possesses enjoining power proves the connexion
of the two sections. Both questions have for their topic
Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all; and in the second
question the word ‘eva’ (‘just,’ ‘very’) in ‘Tell me just
that Brahman,’ &c., proves that the question of Kahola has
for its subject the Brahman, to the qualities of which the
question of Ushasta had referred. Both answers again refer
to the one Brahman, viewed as the Self ofall. The idea of
the injunction of the entire meditation again is suggested
in the second section only, ‘Therefore a Brahmaza, after
he has done with learning, is to wish to stand by real
strength.’ The object of meditation being thus ascertained
to be one, there must be effected a mutual interchange of
the ideas of Ushasta and Kahola, i.e. Ushasta’s conception
of Brahman being the cause of all life must be entertained
by the interrogating Kahola also; and vice vers the con-
ception of Kahola as to Brahman: being beyond hunger,

[48] vu

658 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

thirst, and so on, must be entertained by Ushasta also. This
interchange being made, the difference of Brahman, the
inner Self of all, from the individual soul is determined by
both sections. For this is the very object of Yag#avalkya’s
replies: in order to intimate that the inner Self of all is
different from the individual soul, they distinguish that
Self as the cause of all life and as raised above hunger,
thirst, and so on. Hence Brahman’s being the inner Self
of all is the only quality that is the subject of meditation ;
that it is the cause of life and so on are only means to
prove its being such, and are not therefore to be meditated
on independently.—But if this is so, to what end must
there be made an interchange, on the part of the two in-
terrogators, of their respective ideas ?—Brahman having,
on the ground of being the cause of all life, been ascer-
tained by Ushasta as the inner Self of all, and different
from the individual soul, Kahola renews the question,
thinking that the inner Self of all must be viewed as
different from the soul, on the ground of some special
attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul; and
Y4géiavalkya divining his thought thereon declares that
the inner Self possesses an attribute which cannot possibly
belong to the soul, viz. being in essential opposition to all
imperfection. The interchange of ideas therefore has to
be made for the purpose of establishing the idea of the
individual nature of the object of meditation—‘ As else-
where, i.e. as in the case of the knowledge of that which
truly is, the repeated questions and replies only serve to
define one and the same Brahman, not to convey the idea
of the object of meditation having to be meditated on
under new aspects.— But a new objection is raised—As there
is, in the Sad-vidy4 also, a difference between the several
questions and answers, how is that vidya known to be
one ?—To this question the next Sdtra replies.

37. For one and the same (highest divinity),
called the ‘ truly being,’ and so on (is the subject of
that meditation).

For the highest divinity, called there that which is—

III ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 37. 659

which was introduced in the clause ‘ that divinity thought,’
&c.—is intimated by all the following sections of that
chapter. This is proved by the fact that the attributes—
‘that which truly is; and so on—which were mentioned in
the first section and confirmed in the subsequent ones, are
finally summed up in the statement, ‘in that all this has
its Self, that is the True, that is the Self.’

Some interpreters construe the last two Sitras as con-
stituting two adhikaramas. The former Sitra, they say,
teaches that the text, ‘I am thou, thou art I,’ enjoins a
meditation on the soul and the highest Self as interchange-
able. But as on the basis of texts such as ‘All this
is indeed Brahman,’ ‘all this has its Self in Brahman,’
‘Thou art that,’ the text quoted is as a matter of course
understood to mean that there is one universal Self, the
teaching which it is by those interpreters assumed to
convey would be nothing new; and their interpretation
therefore must be rejected. The point as to the oneness
of the individual and the highest Self will moreover be
discussed under IV, 1, 3. Moreover, there is no foundation
for a special meditation on Brahman as the individual soul
and the individual soul as Brahman, apart from the medita-
tion on the Self of all being one-—The second Satra, they
say, declares the oneness of the meditation on the True
enjoined in the text, ‘whosoever knows this great wonder-
ful first-born as the True Brahman’ (Br. Up. V, 4), and
of the meditation enjoined in the subsequent passage
(V, 5, 2), ‘Now what is true, that is the Aditya, the person
that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye.’
But this also is untenable. For the difference of abode
mentioned in the latter passage (viz. the abode in the sun
and in the eye) establishes difference of vidy4, as already
shown under 50. III, 3, 21. Nor is it possible to assume
that the two meditations comprised in the latter text
which have a character of their own in so far as they view
_ the True as embodied in syllables, and so on, and which
are declared to be connected with a special result (‘he who
knows this destroys evil and leaves it’), should be identical
with the one earlier meditation which has an independent

Uu2

660 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

character of its own and a result of its own (‘he conquers
these worlds’). Nor can it be said that the declaration of
a fruit in ‘he destroys evil and leaves it’ refers merely to
the fruit (not of the entire meditation but) of a subordinate
part of the meditation; for there is nothing to prove this.
The proof certainly cannot be said to lie in the fact of
the vidy4s being one; for this would imply reasoning in
a circle, viz. as follows—it being settled that the vidy4s are
one, it follows that the fruit of the former meditation only
is the main one, while the fruits of the two later medita-
tions are subordinate ones ; and—it being settled that those
two later fruits are subordinate ones, it follows that, as
thus there is no difference depending on connexion with
fruits, the two later meditations are one with the pre-
ceding one.—All this proves that the two Satras can be
interpreted only in the way maintained by us.— Here
terminates the adhikarama of ‘being within.’

38. Wishes and the rest, here and there; (as is
known from the abode, and so on).

We read in the K/Andogya (VIII, 1, 1), ‘There is that
city of Brahman, and in it the palace, the small lotus, and
in it that small ether,’ &c.; and in the Vagasaneyaka, ‘ He
is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge,’ and
so on. A doubt here arises whether the two texts con-
stitute one meditation or not.—The two meditations are
separate, the Pdrvapakshin maintains; for they have
aifferent characters. The A/4ndogya represents as the
object of meditation the ether as distinguished by eight
different attributes, viz. freedom from all evil and the rest;
while, according to the V4gasaneyaka, the being to be
meditated on is he who dwells within that ether, and is
distinguished by attributes such as lordship, and so on.—
To this we reply that the meditations are not distinct,
since there is no difference of character. For desires and
so on constitute that character ‘here and there,’ i.e. in both
texts nothing else but Brahman distinguished by attributes,
such as having true wishes, and so on, forms the subject of
meditation. This is known ‘from the abode and so on,’

11 ADHYAyYA, 3 PADA, 38. 661

i.e. the meditation is recognised as the same because in
both texts Brahman is referred to as abiding in the heart,
being a bridge, and soon. Lordship and the rest, which are
stated in the Vagasaneyaka, are special aspects of the
quality of being capable to realise all one’s purposes, which
is one of the eight qualities declared in the KAandogya,
and as such prove that all the attributes going together
with that quality in the AAandogya are valid for the
Vagasaneyaka also. The character of the two vidy4s there-
fore does not differ. The connexion with a reward also
does not differ, for it consists in both cases in attaining
to Brahman; cp. K&. Up. VIII, 12, 3 ‘Having approached
the highest light he is manifested in his own form, and
Brt. Up. V, 4, 24 ‘ He becomes indeed the fearless Brahman.’
That, in the A Aandogya-text, the term ether denotes the
highest Brahman, has already been determined under I, 3,
14. As in the Vagasaneyaka, on the other hand, he who
abides in the ether is recognised as the highest Self, we
infer that by the ether in which he abides must be under-
stood the ether within the heart, which in the text ‘ within
there is a little hollow space (sushira)’ (Mah4n4r. Up. XI, 9)
is called sushira. The two meditations are therefore one.
Here an objection is raised. It cannot be maintained that
the attributes mentioned in the AAandogya have to be
combined with those stated in the Vagasaneyaka (lordship,
rulership, &c.), since even the latter are not truly valid for
the meditation. For the immediately preceding passage,
‘By the mind it is to be perceived that there is here no
plurality: from death to death goes he who sees here any
plurality ; as one only is to be seen that eternal being, not
to be proved by any means of proof,’ as well as the subse-
quent text, ‘that Self is to be described by No, no,’ shows
that the Brahman to be meditated upon is to be viewed as
devoid of attributes; and from this we infer that the
attributes of lordship and so on, no less than the qualities
of grossness and the like, have to be denied of Brahman.
From this again we infer that in the KAandogya also the
attributes of satyakAamatva and so on are not meant to be
declared as Brahman’s true qualities. All such qualities—

662 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

as not being real qualities of Brahman—have therefore to
be omitted in meditations aiming at final release.—This
objection the next Sitra disposes of.

39. On account of emphasis there is non-omission.

Attributes, such as having the power of immediately
realising one’s purposes, and so on, which are not by other
means known to constitute attributes of Brahman, and are
in the two texts under discussion, as well as in other texts,
emphatically declared to be attributes of Brahman, as con-
stituting the object of meditations undertaken with a view
to final release, cannot be omitted from those meditations,
but must be comprised within them. In the KAandogya
the passage, ‘Those who depart from hence, after having
cognised the Self and those self-realising desires, move
about at will in all those worlds,’ enjoins the knowledge of
Brahman as distinguished by the power of realising its
desires and similar qualities, while the text, ‘Those who
depart from here not having cognised the Self, &c., do not
move about at will)” &c., finds fault with the absence of
such knowledge, and in this way emphasises the importance
of the possession of it. In the same way the repeated
declarations as to Brahman’s ruling power (‘the lord of all,
the king of all beings,’ &c.) show that stress is to be laid
upon the quality indicated. It truly cannot be held that
Scripture, which in tender regard to man’s welfare is
superior to a thousand of parents, should, deceitfully, give
emphatic instruction as to certain qualities—not known
through any other means of knowledge—which fundamen-
tally would be unreal and hence utterly to be disregarded, and
thus throw men desirous of release, who as it is are utterly
confused by the revolutions of the wheel of Samsara, into
even deeper confusion and distress. That the text, ‘there
is not any diversity here; as one only is to be seen that
eternal being,’ teaches a unitary view of the world in so
far as everything is an effect of Brahman and thus has
Brahman for its Self, and negatives the view of plurality—
established antecedently to Vedic teaching—as excluding
Brahman’s being the universal Self, we have explained

ΠῚ ADHYAyA, 3 PADA, 40. 663

before. In the clause ‘not so, not so’ the so refers back
to the world as established by other means of proof, and
the clause thus declares that Brahman who is the Self
of all is different in nature from the world. This is con-
firmed by the subsequent passage, ‘ He is incomprehensible,
for he is not comprehended, he is undecaying,’ &c. ; which
means—as he is different in nature from what is compre-
hended by the other means of proof he is not grasped by
those means; as he is different from what suffers decay he
does not decay, and so on. And analogously, in the
K handogya, the text ‘by the old age of the body he does
not age’ &c. first establishes Brahman’s being different in
nature from everything else, and then declares it to be
satyak4ma, and so on.—But, an objection is raised, the
text, ‘Those who depart from hence, having cognised the
Self and those true desires, move about at will in all
worlds. Thus he who desires the world of the fathers,’ &c.,
really declares that the knowledge of Brahman as possessing
the power of immediately realising its wishes has for its
fruit something lying within the sphere of transmigratory
existence, and from this we infer that for him who is
desirous of release and of reaching Brahman the object of
meditation is not to be found in Brahman in so far as
possessing qualities. The fruit of the highest knowledge
is rather indicated in the passage, ‘Having approached the
highest light it manifests itself in its own form’; and hence
the power of realising its wishes and the rest are not to be
included in the meditation of him who wishes to attain to
Brahman.—To this objection the next Satra replies.

40. In the case of him who has approached
(Brahman); just on that account, this being de-
clared by the text.

When the soul, released from all bonds and manifesting
itself in its true nature, has approached, i.e. attained to
Brahman ; then just on that account, i.e. on account of
such approach, the text declares it to possess the power of
moving about at will in all worlds. ‘Having approached
the highest light he manifests himself in his true form.

664 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

He is the highest Person. He moves about there laughing,
playing, &c. This point will be proved in greater detail
in the fourth adhya4ya. Meanwhile the conclusion is that
such qualities as satyakamatva have to be included in the
meditation of him also who is desirous of release; for the
possession of those qualities forms part of the experience
of the released soul itself—Here terminates the adhikaraxa
of ‘ wishes and the rest.’

41. There is non-restriction of determination,
because this is seen; for there is a separate fruit,
viz. non-obstruction.

There are certain meditations connected with elements of
sacrificial actions; as e.g. ‘Let a man meditate on the
syllable Om as udgitha.’ These meditations are subordinate
elements of the sacrificial acts with which they connect
themselves through the udgitha and: so on, in the same
way as the quality of being made of parma wood connects
itself with the sacrifice through the ladle (made of parza
wood), and are to be undertaken on that very account,
Moreover the statement referring to these meditations, viz.
‘whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the
Upanishad, that becomes more vigorous,’ does not allow
the assumption of a special fruit for these meditations
(apart from the fruit of the sacrificial performance) ; while
in the case of the ladle being made of parma wood the text
mentions a special fruit (‘he whose ladle is made of parza
wood does not hear an evil sound’). The meditations in
question are therefore necessarily to be connected with the
particular sacrificial performances to which they belong.—
This view the Sftra refutes, ‘There is non-restriction
with regard to the determinations.’ By ‘determination’
we have here to understand the definite settling of the
mind in a certain direction, in other words, meditation.
The meditations on the udgitha and so on are not definitely
connected with the sacrificial performances ; ‘ since that is
seen,’ i.e. since the texts themselves declare that there
is no such necessary connexion; cp. the text, ‘therefore
both perform the sacrificial work, he who thus knows it

Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 665

(i.e. who possesses the knowledge implied in the medita-
tions on the sacrifice), as well as he who does not know ’—
which declares that he also who does not know the medita-
tions may perform the work. Were these meditations
auxiliary elements of the works, there could be no such
absence of necessary connexion (as declared in this text).
It thus being determined that they are not auxiliary
elements, a special result must be assigned to the in-
junction of meditation, and this we find in the greater
strength which is imparted to the sacrifice by the medita-
tion, and which is a result different from the result of the
sacrifice itself. The greater strength of the performance
consists herein, that its result is not impeded, as it might
be impeded, by the result of some other performance of
greater force. This result, viz. absence of obstruction, is
something apart from the general result of the action, such
as the reaching of the heavenly world, and so on. This
the Sftra means when saying, ‘for separate is non-ob-
struction.’ As thus those meditations also which refer to
auxiliary members of sacrifices have their own results, they
may or may not be combined with the sacrifices, according to
wish. Their case is like that of the godohana vessel which,
with the view of obtaining a certain special result, may be
used instead of the 4amasa.—Here terminates the adhi-
karaza of ‘non-restriction of determination.’

42. Just as in the case of the offerings. This has
been explained.

In the daharavidya (KA. Up. VIII, 1 ff.) the text, ‘ those
who depart having known here the Self, and those true
desires,’ declares at first a meditation on the small ether,
i.e. the highest Self, and separately therefrom a meditation
on its qualities, viz. true desires, and so on. The doubt
here arises whether, in the meditation on those qualities,
the meditation on the highest Self—as that to which the
qualities belong—is to be repeated or not.—It is not to be
repeated, the Pdrvapakshin maintains; for the highest
Self is just that which is constituted by the qualities—
freedom from all evil, and so on—and as that Self so con-

666 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

stituted can be comprised in one meditation, there is no
need of repeating the meditation on account of the qualities.
—This view the Sitra sets aside. The meditation has to
be repeated. The highest Self indeed is that being to
which alone freedom from evil and the other qualities
belong, and it forms the object of the first meditation ; yet
there is a difference between it as viewed in its essential
being and as viewed as possessing those qualities; and
moreover, the clause ‘free from evil, from old age,’ &c.
enjoins a meditation on the Self as possessing those
qualities. It is therefore first to be meditated on in its
essential nature, and then there takes place a repetition of
the meditation on it in order to bring in those special
qualities. The case is analogous to that of ‘ the offerings.’
There is a text ‘He is to offer a purod4sa on eleven
potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the supreme ruler, to
Indra the self-ruler.’ This injunction refers to one and the
same Indra, possessing the qualities of rulership and so
on; but as, through connexion with those several qualities,
the aspects of Indra differ, the oblation of the purod4sa has
to be repeated. This is declared in the Sadkarshaaa, ‘ The
divinities are different on account of separation. —Here
terminates the adhikarana of ‘ offerings.’

43. On account of the plurality of indicatory
marks; for that (proof) is stronger. This also is
declared (in the Parva MitmAmsé4).

The Taittirtyaka contains another daharavidyé, ‘The
thousand-headed god, the all-eyed one,’ &c. (Mahanar.
Up. XI). Here the doubt arises whether this vidya, as
being one with the previously introduced vidy4, states
qualities to be included in the meditation enjoined in that
vidya, or qualities to be included in the meditations on the
highest Self as enjoined in all the Vedanta-texts.—The
former is the case, the Parvapakshin holds, on account of
the leading subject-matter. For in the preceding section
(X) the meditation on the small ether is introduced as the
subject-matter. ‘There is the small lotus placed in the
middle of the town (of the body), free from all evil, the abode

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 43. 667

of the Highest; within that there is a small space, free from
sorrow—what is within that should be meditated upon’
(Mahanéar. Up. X, 23). Now, as the lotus of the heart is
mentioned only in section X, the ‘ Narayana-section ’ (‘ the
heart resembling the bud of a lotus, with its point
turned downwards,’ XI, 6), we conclude that that section
also is concerned with the object of meditation to which
the daharavidy4 refers. — Against this view the Sdtra
declares itself, ‘on account of the majority of indicatory
marks’; i.e. there are in the text several marks proving
that that section is meant to declare characteristics of that
which constitutes the object of meditation in all medita-
tions on the highest being. For that being which in those
meditations is denoted as the Imperishable, Siva, Sambhu,
the highest Brahman, the highest light, the highest entity,
the highest Self, and so on, is here referred to by the same
names, and then declared to be Narayaza. There are
thus several indications to prove that Narayaza is none
other than that which is the object of meditation in all
meditations on the Highest, viz. Brahman, which has bliss
and the rest for its qualities. By ‘liiga’ (inferential mark)
we here understand clauses (vakya) which contain a
specific indication ; for such clauses have, according to
the Parva Mimams4, greater proving power than leading
subject-matter (prakaraza). The argumentation that the
clause ‘the heart resembling the bud of a lotus flower,’
&c., proves that section to stand in a dependent rela-
tion to the daharavidy4, is without force; for it being
proved by a stronger argument that the section refers to
that which is the object of meditation in all meditations,
the clause mentioned may also be taken as declaring that
in the daharavidy4 also the object of meditation is Nara-
yana. Nor must it be thought that the accusatives with
which the section begins (sahasrasirsham, &c.) are to be
connected with the ‘meditating’ enjoined in the previous
section; for the ‘meditating’ is there enjoined by a
gerundive form (‘tasmin yad antas tad updsitavyam’),
and with this the subsequent accusatives cannot be con-
strued. Moreover, the subsequent clause (‘all this is Nara-

668 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

yana,’ &c., where the nominative case is used) shows that
those accusatives are to be taken in the sense of nomina-
tives.—Here terminates the adhikaraa of ‘the plurality of
indicatory marks.’

44. There is option with regard to what precedes
(i.e. the altar made of bricks) on account of subject-
matter, and hence there is action; as in the case of
the manasa cup.

In the Vagasaneyaka, in the Agnirahasya chapter, there
are references to certain altars built of mind, ‘built of mind,
built of speech,’ &c. The doubt here arises whether those
structures of mind, and so on, which metaphorically are
called fire-altars, should be considered as being of the
nature of action, on account of their connexion with a per-
formance which itself is of the nature of action; or merely
of the nature of meditation, as being connected with an
activity of the nature of meditation. The Sdtra maintains
the former view. Since those things ‘built of mind, and
so on,’ are, through being dxé/¢ (or piled up), constituted as
fire-altars, they demand a performance with which to con-
nect themselves; and as in immediate proximity to them
no performance is enjoined, and as the general subject-
matter of the section is the fire-altar built of bricks—
introduced by means of the clause ‘Non-being this was in
the beginning ’—which is invariably connected with a per-
formance of the nature of outward action, viz. a certain
sacrificial performance—we conclude that the altars built
of mind, &c., which the text mentions in connexion with
the same subject-matter, are themselves of the nature of
action, and as such can be used as alternatives for the altar
built of bricks’. An analogous case is presented by the
so-called mental cup. On the tenth, so-called avivakya,
day of the Soma sacrifice extending over twelve days,

* So that for the actual outward construction of a brick altar
there may optionally be substituted the merely mental construction
of an imaginary altar.

III ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 46. 669

there takes place the mental offering of a Soma cup, all
the rites connected with which are rehearsed in imagina-
tion only; the offering of that cup is thus really of the
nature of thought only, but as it forms an auxiliary
element in an actual outward sacrificial performance it
itself assumes the character of an action.

45. And on account of the transfer.

That the altar built of thought is an optional substitute
for the altar built of bricks, and of the nature of an action,
appears therefrom also that the clause ‘of these each one is
as great as that previous one,’ explicitly transfers to the
altars of mind, and so on, the powers of the previous altar
made of bricks. All those altars thus having equal effects
there is choice between them. The altars of mind, and so
on, therefore are auxiliary members of the sacrificial per-
formance which they help to accomplish, and hence them-
selves of the nature of action—Against this view the next
Satra declares itself.

46. But it is a meditation only, on account of
assertion and what is seen.

The altars built of mind, and so on, are not of the nature
of action, but of meditation only, i.e. they belong to a per-
formance which is of the nature of meditation only. For
this is what the text asserts, viz. in the clauses ‘they are
built of knowledge only,’ and ‘by knowledge they are
built for him who thus knows.’ As the energies of mind,
speech, sight, and so on, cannot be piled up like bricks, it
is indeed a matter of course that the so-called altars con-
structed of mind, and so on, can be mental constructions
only; but the text in addition specially confirms this by
declaring that those altars are elements in an activity of
purely intellectual character, and hence themselves mere
creatures of the intellect. Moreover there is seen in the
text a performance consisting of thought only to which
those fires stand in a subsidiary relation, ‘by the mind
they were established on hearths, by the mind they were
built up, by the mind the Soma cups were drawn thereat;

670 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

by the mind they chanted, and by the mind they recited;
whatever rite is performed at the sacrifice, whatever sacri-
ficial rite there is, that, as consisting of mind, was per-
formed by the mind only, on those (fire-altars) composed
of mind, built up of mind.’ From this declaration, that
whatever sacrificial rite is actually performed in the case
of fire-altars built of bricks is performed mentally only
in the case of altars built of mind, it follows that the entire
performance is a mental one only, i.e. an act of meditation.
—But, an objection is raised, as the entire passus regarding
the altars of mind does not contain any word of injunctive
power, and as the text states no special result (from which
it appears to follow that the passus does not enjoin a new
independent performance), we must, on the strength of the
fact that the leading subject-matter is an actual sacrificial
performance as suggested by the altars built of brick, give
up the idea that the altars built of mind, &c., are mental
only because connected with a performance of merely
mental nature.—This objection the next Sftra refutes.

47. And on account of the greater strength of
direct statement, and so on, there is no refutation.

The weaker means of proof, constituted by so-called
leading subject-matter, cannot refute what is established by
three stronger means of proof—direct statement, inferential
mark, and syntactical connexion—viz. that there is an
independent purely mental performance, and that the
altars made of mind are parts of the latter. The direct
statement is contained in the following passage, ‘ Those
fire-altars indeed are built of knowledge,’—which is further
explained in the subsequent passage, ‘ by knowledge alone
these altars are built for him who knows this’—the sense
of which is: the structures of mind, and so on, are built in
connexion with a performance which consists of knowledge
(i.e. meditation).—The inferential mark is contained in the
passage, ‘For him all beings at all times build them,
even while he is asleep.’ And the syntactical connexion
(vakya) consists in the connexion of the two words evast-

Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 48. 671

vide (for him who knows this), and Ainvanti (they build)
—the sense being: for him who accomplishes the perfor-
mance consisting of knowledge all beings at all times build
those altars. The proving power of the passage above
referred to as containing an indicatory mark (lifga) lies
therein that a construction mentally performed at all times
by all beings cannot possibly connect itself with a sacri-
ficial performance through the brick-altar, which is con-
structed by certain definite agents and on certain definite
occasions only, and must therefore be an element in
a mental performance, i.e. a meditation—The next Stra
disposes of the objection that the text cannot possibly
mean to enjoin a new mental performance, apart from the
actual performance, because it contains no word of injunc-
tive force and does not mention a special result.

48. On account of connexions and the rest, as in
the case of the separateness of other cognitions.
And this is seen (elsewhere also); as declared (in
the Parva Mim4msé).

That the text enjoins a meditative performance different
from the actual performance of which the béick-altar is
a constituent element, follows from the reasons proving
separation, viz. the connexions, i.e. the things connected
with the sacrifice, such as the Soma cups, the hymns, the
recitations, and so on. What is meant is that the special
mention of the cups, and so on, made in the passage ‘ by
the mind the Soma cups were drawn thereat,’ proves the
difference of the performance——The ‘and the rest’ of the
Sdtra comprises the previously stated arguments, viz.
direct statement, and so on. ‘As other meditations,’ i.e. the
case is analogous to that of other meditations such as the
meditation on the small ether within the heart, which are
likewise proved by textual statement, and so on, to be
different and separate from actual outward sacrificial per-
formances.—The existence of a separate meditative act
having thus been ascertained, the requisite injunction has
to be construed on the basis of the text as it stands.

672 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Such construction of injunctions on the basis of texts of
arthavada character is seen in other places also; the
matter is discussed in Pd. Mi. Sdtras III, 5, 21.—The
result of the meditative performance follows from the
passage ‘of these (altars made of mind, and so on) each
is as great as that former one (i.e. the altar built of
bricks) ’—for this implies that the same result which the
brick-altar accomplishes through the sacrifice of which
it forms an element is also attained through the altars
made of mind, and so on, through the meditations of which
they form parts—The next Satra disposes of the argu-
mentation that, as this formal transfer of the result of the
brick-altar to the altars built of mind, and so on, shows the
latter to possess the same virtues as the former, we are
bound to conclude that they also form constituent elements
of an actual (not merely meditative) performance.

49. Not so, on account of this being observed on
account of similarity also; as in the case of Death;

for (the person in yonder orb) does not occupy the
worlds (of Death).

From a transfer or assimilation of this kind it does not
necessarily follow that things of different operation are
equal, and that hence those altars of mind, and so on, must
connect themselves with an actual outward performance.
For it is observed that such assimilation rests sometimes
on a special point of resemblance only; so in the text,
‘The person in yonder orb is Death indeed,—where the
feature of resemblance is the destroying power of the two;
for the person within yonder orb does certainly not
occupy the same worlds, i.e. the same place as Death.
Analogously, in the case under discussion, the fact that the
altars made of mind are treated as, in a certain respect,
equivalent to the altar built of bricks, does not authorise
us to connect those altars with the sacrificial performance
to which the altar of bricks belongs. When the text says
that the altar made of mind is as great as the altar of
bricks, this only means that the same result which is

III ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 51. 673

attained through the brick-altar in connexion with its own
sacrificial performance is also attained through the altar
of mind in connexion with the meditational performance
into which it enters.

_ 50. And by a subsequent (Brahmama) also the
‘being of such a kind’ of the word (is proved). But
the connexion is on account of plurality.

The subsequent Brahmama (Sat. Br. X, 5, 4) also proves
that the text treating of the altars made of mind, and so
on, enjoins a meditation only. For that Brahmaza (which
begins ‘This brick-built fire-altar is this world ; the waters
are its enclosing-stones,’ &c.) declares further on ‘ whoso-
ever knows this thus comes to be that whole Agni who is
the space-filler, and from this it appears that what is
enjoined there is a meditation with a special result of its
own. And further on (X, 6) there is another meditation
enjoined, viz. one on Vaisvanara. All this shows that the
Agnirahasya book (Sat. Br. X) is not solely concerned
with the injunction of outward sacrificial acts—But what
then is the reason that such matters as the mental (medi-
tative) construction of fire-altars which ought to be in-
cluded in the Brzhad-drazyaka are included in the Agni-
rahasya?—‘ That connexion is on account of plurality,’
i.e. the altars made of mind, and so on, are, in the sacred
text, dealt with in proximity to the real altar made of
bricks, because so many details of the latter are mentally
to be accomplished in the meditation—Here terminates the
adhikarana of ‘ option with the previous one.’

51. Some, on account of the existence of a Self
within a body.

In all meditations on the highest Self the nature of the
meditating subject has to be ascertained no less than the
nature of the object of meditation and of the mode of
meditation. The question then arises whether the medi-
tating Self is to be viewed as the knowing, doing, and
enjoying Self, subject to transmigration ; or as that Self
which Pragapati describes (KA. Up. VIII, 1), viz. a Self

[48] ᾿ xX

674 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

free from all sin and imperfection—Some hold the former
view, on the ground that the meditating Self is within
a body. For as long as the Self dwells within a body, it
ἧς a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, and it can bring
about the result of its meditation only as viewed. under
that aspect. A person who, desirous of the heavenly
world or a similar result, enters on some sacrificial action
may, after he has reached that result, possess character-
istics different from those of a knowing, doing, and enjoying
subject, but those characteristics cannot be attributed to
him as long as he is in the state of having to bring about
the means of accomplishing those ends; in the latter state
he must be viewed as an ordinary agent, and there it
would be of no use to view him as something different.
And the same holds equally good with regard to a person
engaged in meditation.—But, an objection is raised, the
text ‘as the thought of a man is in this world, so he will
be when he has departed this life’ (ΧΑ. Up. III, 14, 1) does
declare a difference (between the agent engaged in sacri-
ficial action, and the meditating subject), and from this it
follows that the meditating Self is to be conceived as
having a nature free from all evil, and so on—Not so, the
Piarvapakshin replies; for the clause, ‘howsoever they
meditate on him,’ proves that that text refers to the
equality of the object meditated upon (not of the medi-
tating subject)—To this the next Satra replies.

52. But this is not so, (but rather) difference;
since it is of the being of that; as in the case of
intuition.

It is not true that the meditating subject must be
conceived as having the ordinary characteristics of know-
ing, acting, &c.; it rather possesses those characteristic
properties—freedom from evil, and so on—which distinguish
the state of Release from the Samsara state. Αἱ the time
of meditation the Self of the devotee is of exactly the same
nature as the released Self. ‘For it is of the being of that,’
i.e. it attains the nature of that—as proved by the texts,

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 53. 675

445 the thought of a man is in this world, so he will be
when he has departed,’ and ‘howsoever he meditate on
him, such he becomes himself.’ Nor can it be maintained
that these texts refer only to meditation on the highest
Self (without declaring anything as to the personal Self of
the devotee) ; for the personal Self constitutes the body
of Brahman which is the object of meditation, and hence
itself falls under the category of object of meditation.
The character of such meditation, therefore, is that it is
a meditation on the highest Self as having for its body the
individual Self, distinguished by freedom from evil and the
other qualities mentioned in the teaching of Pragapati.
And hence the individual Self is, in such meditation, to be
conceived (not as the ordinary Self, but) under that form
which it has to attain (i.e. the pure form which belongs to
it in the state of Release). ‘As in the case of intuition’
—i.e. as in the case of intuition of Brahman. As the intui-
tion of Brahman has for its object the essential nature of
Brahman, so the intuition of the individual soul also has
for its object its permanent essential nature. In the case
of sacrificial works the conception of the true nature of the
Self forms an auxiliary factor. An injunction such as
‘Let him who is desirous of the heavenly world sacrifice,’
enjoins the performance of the sacrifice to the end of a
certain result being reached ; while the conception of the
Self as possessing characteristics such as being a knowing
subject, and so on—which are separate from the body—
has the function of proving its qualification for works
meant to effect results which will come about at some
future time. So much only (i.e. the mere cognition of the
Self as something different from the body) is required for
works (as distinguished from meditations)—Here termi-
nates the adhikaraza of ‘ being in the body.’

53. But those (meditations) which are connected
with members (of sacrifices) are not (restricted)
to (particular) sdkh4s, but rather (belong) to all
sakhas.

Xx2

676 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

There are certain meditations connected with certain
constituent elements of sacrifices—as e.g. ‘Let a man
meditate on the syllable Om (as) the Udgitha ’ (KA. Up. I,
1, 1); ‘Let a man meditate on the fivefold Saman as the
five worlds’ (KA. Up. II, 2, 1), ἄς. The question here
arises whether those meditations are restricted to the mem-
bers of those sakh4s in whose texts they are mentioned ;
or to be connected with the Udgitha, and so on, in all
sakhas. There is here a legitimate ground for doubt, in so
far as, although the general agreement of all Vedanta-texts
is established, the Udgitha, and so on, are different in each
Veda since the accents differ in the different Vedas—The
Parvapakshin declares that those meditations are limited
each to its particular sikh4; for, he says, the injunction
‘Let him meditate on the Udgitha’ does indeed, verbally,
refer to the Udgitha in general ; but as what stands nearest
to this injunction is the special Udgitha of the sakha, in
whose text this injunction occurs, and which shares the
peculiarities of accent characteristic of that sakha, we
decide that the meditation is enjoined on members of that
sakha only.—The Sutra sets this opinion aside. The
injunction of meditations of this type is valid for all
sikhas, since the text expressly connects them with the
Udgitha in general. They therefore hold good wherever
there is an Udgitha. The individual Udgithas of the
several sikhds are indeed distinguished by different accen-
tuation; but the general statement, ‘Let him meditate on
the Udgitha,’ suggests to the mind not any particular
Udgitha, but 216 Udgitha in general, and hence there is no
reason to restrict the meditation to a particular sakha.
From the principle moreover that all sékh4s teach the
same doctrine, it follows that the sacrifice enjoined in the
different sakh4s is one only ; and hence there is no reason
to hold that the Udgitha suggested by the injunction of
the meditation is a particular one. For the Udgitha is
only an element in the sacrifice, and the sacrifice is one
and the same. The meditations are not therefore limited
to particular sakh4s.

III ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 55. 677

54. Or there is no contradiction as in the case of
mantras and the rest.

The ‘or’ here has the sense of ‘and.’ The ‘and the
rest’ comprises generic characteristics, qualities, number,
similarity, order of succession, substances, and actions. As
there is nothing contrary to reason in mantras and the rest,
although mentioned in the text of one sAkha only, finding,
on the basis of such means of proof as direct statement,
and so on, their application in all sAkhas, since the sacrifice
to which they belong is one and the same in all sakhds ;
so there is likewise no contradiction in the meditations
under discussion being undertaken by members of all
sakh4s.—Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘ what is con-
nected with constituent elements of the sacrifice.’

55. There is pre-eminence of plenitude, as in the
case of the sacrifice; for thus Scripture shows.

The sacred text (K/. Up. V, 12 ff.) enjoins a meditation
on Vaisvanara, the object of which is the highest Self, as
having for its body the entire threefold world, and for its
limbs the heavenly world, the sun, the wind, and so on.
The doubt here arises whether separate meditations have
to be performed on the highest Being in its separate
aspects, or in its aggregate as well as in its distributed
aspect, or in its aggregate aspect only.—In its separate
aspects, the Parvapakshin maintains; since at the outset
a meditation of that kind is declared. For on the Réshis
in succession telling Asvapati the objects of their medi-
tation, viz. the sky, the sun, and so on, Asvapati explains
to them that these meditations refer to the head, eye, and
so on, of the highest Being, and mentions for each of these
meditations a special fruit. And the concluding explana-
tion ‘he who worships Vaisvanara as a span long, &c.,’ is
merely meant to gather up into one, as it were, the pre-
ceding meditations on the parts of Vaisvanara.—Another
Parvapakshin holds that this very concluding passage
enjoins a further meditation on Vaisvanara in his collective
aspect, in addition to the previously enjoined meditations

678 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

on his limbs; for that passage states a separate result, ‘ he
eats food in all worlds, &c. Nor does this destroy the
unity of the whole section. The case is analogous to that
ofthe meditation on ‘ plenitude’ (bhdman ; ΑΛ. Up. VII, 23).
There, in the beginning, separate meditations are enjoined
on name, and so on, with special results of their own ; and
after that a meditation is enjoined on bhdman, with a result
of its own, ‘He becomes a Self-ruler,’ &c. The entire
section really refers to the meditation on bhiman ; but all
the same there are admitted subordinate meditations on
name, and so on, and a special result for each.—These
views are set aside by the Satra, ‘There is pre-eminence of
plenitude,’ i.e. there is reason to assume that Vaisvanara
in his fulness, i.e. in his collective aspect, is meant; since
we apprehend unity of the entire section. From the
beginning of the section it is manifest that what the Rishis
desire to know is the Vaisvanara Self; it is that Self which
Asvapati expounds to them as having the Universe for his
body, and in agreement therewith the last clause of his
teaching intimates that the intuition of Brahman (which
is none other than the Vaisvanara Self)—which is there
characterised as the food of all worlds, all beings, all Selfs
—is the fruit of the meditation on Vaisvanara. This
summing up proves the whole section to deal with the
same subject. And on the basis of this knowledge we
determine that what the text says as to meditations on
the separate members of the Vaisvanara Self and their
special results is merely of the nature of explanatory com-
ment (anuvdda) on parts of the meditation on the collec-
tive Self.—This decision is arrived at as in the case of the
sacrifice. For to the injunction of certain sacrifices—such
as ‘ Let a man, on the birth of a son, offer a cake on twelve
potsherds to Vaisvanara’—the text similarly adds remarks
on parts of the oblation, ‘there is an oblation on eight
potsherds,’ and so on.—The meditation therefore has to
be performed on the entire Vaisvanara Self only, not on
its parts. This, moreover, Scripture itself intimates, in so
far, namely, as declaring the evil consequences of medita-
tion on parts of the Self only, ‘your head would have

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 56. 679

fallen off if you had not come to me’; ‘you would have
become blind,’ and so on. This also shows that the
reference to the text enjoining meditations on name, &c.,
proves nothing as to our passage. For there the
text says nothing as to disadvantages connected with
those special meditations; it only says that the medi-
tation on plenitude (bhdman) has a more excellent re-
sult. The section, therefore, although really concerned
with enjoining the meditation on the bhdiman, at the
same time means to declare that the special medita-
tions also are fruitful; otherwise the meditation on the
bhfiman could not be recommended, for the reason that it
has a more excellent result than the preceding medita-
tions.—The conclusion, therefore, is that the text enjoins
a meditation on the collective Vaisvanara Self only.—
Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the pre-eminence of
plenitude.’

56. (The meditations are) separate, on account of
the difference of words, and so on.

The instances coming under this head of discussion are
all those meditations on Brahman which have for their
only result final Release, which consists in attaining to
Brahman—such as the meditation on that which is, the
meditation on the bhiman, the meditation on the small
space within the heart, the Upakosala meditation, the
SAandilya meditation, the meditation on Vaisvanara, the
meditation on the Self of bliss, the meditation on the Im-
perishable, and others—whether they be recorded in one
sakha only or in several sikh4s. Toa different category
belong those meditations which have a special object such
as Praza, and a special result—The doubt here arises
whether the meditations of the former class are all to be
considered as identical, or as separate—The Pdarvapakshin
holds that they are all one; for, he says, they all have one
and the same object of meditation, viz. Brahman. For the
nature of all cognition depends on the object cognised ; and
the nature of the meditations thus being one, the medita-
tions themselves are one.—This view the Sitra controverts.

680 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

The meditations are different, on account of the difference
of terms and the rest. The ‘and the rest’ comprises re-
petition (abhydsa), number (samkhy4), quality (gusa), sub-
ject-matter (prakriya), and name (namadheya ; cp. Pa. Mi.
Sa. II, 2, 1 ff.). We meet in those meditations with differ-
ence of connexion, expressing itself in difference of words,
and so on; which causes difference on the part of the medi-
tations enjoined. The terms enjoining meditation, ‘he
knows,’ ‘he is to meditate’ (veda ; upAsita), and so on, do
indeed all of them denote a certain continuity of cognition,
and all these cognitions have for their object Brahman
only, but all the same those cognitions differ in so far as
they have for their object Brahman, as variously qualified
by special characteristics mentioned in the meditation; in
one meditation he is spoken of as the sole cause of the
world, in another as free from all evil, and so on. We
therefore arrive at the decision that clauses which describe
special forms of meditation having for their result the
attainment to Brahman, and are complete in themselves,
convey the idea of separate independent meditations, and
thus effect separation of the vidyas. This entire question
was indeed already decided in the Parva Mim4ms4-sitras
(II, 2,1), but it is here argued again to the end of dispelling
the mistaken notion that the Vedanta-texts aim at know-
ledge only, and not at the injunction of activities such as
meditation. The meditations, therefore, are separate ones.
—Here terminates the adhikarama of ‘difference of words
and the rest.’

57. Option, on account of the non-difference of
result.

It has been proved that the meditation on that which
truly is, the meditation on the small ether within the
heart, and so on—all of which have for their result the
attainment to Brahman—are separate meditations. The
question now arises whether all these meditations should
be combined by each meditating devotee, on account of
such combination being useful to him; or whether, in the
absence of any use of such combination, they should be

Il ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 58. 681

undertaken optionally.— They may be combined, the
Parvapakshin holds; since it is observed that different
scriptural matters are combined even when having one
and the same result. The Agnihotra, the Darsapdirzam4sa
oblation, and other sacrifices, all of them have one and the
same result, viz. the possession of the heavenly world ;
nevertheless, one and the same agent performs them all,
with a view to the greater fulness of the heavenly bliss
aimed at. So the different meditations on Brahman also
may be cumulated with a view to greater fulness of in-
tuition of Brahman.—This view the Satra rejects. Option
only between the several meditations is possible, on account
of the non-difference of result. For to all meditations on
Brahman alike Scripture assigns one and the same result,
viz. intuitive knowledge of Brahman, which is of the nature
of supreme, unsurpassable bliss. ‘ He who knows Brahman
attains the Highest’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1,1),&c. The intuitive
knowledge of Brahman constitutes supreme, unsurpassable
bliss; and if such intuition may be reached through one
meditation, of what use could other meditations be? The
heavenly world is something limited in respect of place,
time, and essential nature, and hence a person desirous
of attaining to it may cumulate works in order to take
possession of it to a greater extent, and so on. But an
analogous proceeding cannot be resorted to with regard
to Brahman, which is unlimited in every sense. All medi-
tations on Brahman tend to dispel Nescience, which stands
in the way of the intuition of Brahman, and thus equally
have for their result the attaining to Brahman ; and hence
there is option between them. In the case, on the other
hand, of those meditations which aim at other results than
Brahman, there may either be choice between the several
meditations, or they may be cumulated—as one may also
do in the case of sacrifices aiming at the attainment of the
heavenly world ;—for as those results are not of an infinite
nature one may aim at realising them in a higher degree.
This the next Satra declares.

58. But meditations aiming at objects of desire

682 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

may, according to one’s liking, be cumulated or not;
on account of the absence of the former reason.

The last clause means—on account of their results not
being of an infinite nature. — Here terminates the adhi-
karana of ‘option.’

59. They belong to the constituent members, as
the bases.

A doubt arises whether meditations such as the one
enjoined in the text, ‘Let him meditate on the syllable
Om as the Udgitha,’ which are connected with constituent
elements of the sacrifice such as the Udgitha, contribute
towards the accomplishment of the sacrifice, and hence
must be performed at the sacrifice as part of it ; or whether
they, like the godohana vessel, benefit the agent apart from
the sacrifice, and therefore may be undertaken according to
desire.—But has it not been already decided under ITI, 3, 42
that those meditations are generally beneficial to man, and
not therefore restricted to the sacrifices ?—True; it is just
for the purpose of further confirming that conclusion that
objections are now raised against it on the ground of some
inferential marks (liaga) and reasoning. For there it was
maintained on the strength of the text ‘ therefore he does
both’ that those meditations have results independent of
the sacrifice. But there are several reasons favouring the
view that those meditations must be connected with the
sacrifices as subordinate members, just as the Udgitha and
the rest to which the meditations refer.

Their case is by no means analogous to that of the
godohana vessel, for, while in the case of the latter, the text
expressly declares the existence of a special result, ‘For
him who is desirous of cattle he is to bring water in a
godohana,’ the texts enjoining those meditations do not
state special results for them. For clauses such as ‘he is to
meditate on the Udgitha’ intimate only that the Udgitha
is connected with the meditation; while their connexion
with certain results is known from other clauses, such as
‘whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the

Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 62. 683

Upanishad, that is more vigorous’ (according to which
the result of such meditations is only to strengthen the
result of the sacrifices). And when a meditation of this
kind has, on the ground of its connexion with the Udgitha
or the like—which themselves are invariably connected
with sacrifices— been cognised to form an element of
a sacrifice, some other passage which may declare a fruit
for that meditation can only be taken as an arthavada;
just as the passage which declares that he whose sacrificial
ladle is made of parnza wood does not hear an evil sound.
In the same way, therefore, as the Udgitha and so on,
which are the bases of those meditations, are to be em-
ployed only as constituent parts of the sacrifices, so the
meditations also connected with those constituent parts
are themselves to be employed as constituent parts of the
sacrifices only.

60. And on account of injunction.

The above conclusion is further confirmed by the fact
of injunction, i.e. thereby that clauses such as ‘he is to
meditate on the Udgitha’ enjoin the meditation as standing
to the Udgitha in the relation of a subordinate member.
Injunctions of this kind differ from injunctions such as ‘he
is to bring water in the godohana vessel for him who de-
sires cattle’; for the latter state a special qualification on
the part of him who performs the action, while the former
do not, and hence cannot claim independence.

61. On account of rectification.

The text ‘from the seat of the Hotri he sets right the
wrong Udgitha’ shows that the meditation is necessarily
required for the purpose of correcting whatever mistake
may be made in the Udgitha. This also proves that the
meditation is an integral part of the sacrificial performance.

62. And on account of the declaration of a quality
being common (to all the Vedas).

The text ‘ By means of that syllable the threefold know-
ledge proceeds. With Om the Adhvaryu gives orders,

684 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

with Om the Hotri recites, with Om the Udgats? sings,’
which declares the prazava—which is a ‘quality’ of the
meditation, in so far as it is its basis—to be common to
the three Vedas, further shows that the meditation has
to be employed in connexion with the sacrifice. For the
meditation is connected with the Udgitha, and the Udgitha
is an integral part of all sacrificial performances whatever.

Of the prima facie view thus far set forth the next Sdtra
disposes.

63. Rather not, as the text does not declare their
going together.

It is not true that the meditations on the Udgitha and
the rest are bound to the sacrifices in the same way as the
Udgitha, and so on, themselves are ; for Scripture does not
declare that they go together with, i.e. are subordinate con-
stituents of the Udgitha, and soon. The clause ‘Let him
meditate on the Udgitha’ does not indeed itself state an-
other qualification on the part of the agent (i.e. does not
state that the agent in entering on the meditation is prompted
by a motive other than the one prompting the sacrifice) ;
but the subsequent clause, ‘whatever he does with know-
ledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that becomes more
vigorous, intimates that knowledge is the means to render
the sacrificial work more efficacious, and from this it follows
that the meditation is enjoined as a means towards effecting
a result other than the result of the sacrifice. And hence
the meditation cannot be viewed as a subordinate member
of the Udgitha, which itself is a subordinate member of
the sacrifice. It rather has the Udgitha for its basis only.
He only indeed who is qualified for the sacrifice is qualified
for the meditation, since the latter aims at greater efficacious-
ness of the sacrifice; but this does not imply that the medi-
tation necessarily goes with the sacrifice. By the greater
vigour of the sacrifice is meant its non-obstruction by some
other sacrificial work of greater strength, its producing its
effect without any delay.—The case of a statement such as
‘he whose ladle is of parwa wood hears no evil sound’ is
different. There the text does not declare that the quality

III ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 64. 685

of consisting of parza wood is the direct means of bringing
about the result of no evil sound being heard; hence there
is no valid reason why that quality should not be subordi-
nate to the ladle, which itself is subordinate to the sacrifice;
and as it is not legitimate to assume for the mere subordi-
nate constituents of a sacrifice special fruits (other than the
general fruit of the sacrifice), the declaration as to no evil
sound being heard is to be viewed as a mere arthavada (i.e.
a mere additional statement meant further to glorify the
. result of the sacrifice—of which the ladle made of parva
wood is a subordinate instrument).

64. And because (Scripture) shows it.

A scriptural text, moreover, shows that the meditation is
necessary for, and restricted to, the sacrificial performance.
For the text ‘A Brahman priest who knows this saves the
sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the officiating priests ’—
which declares that all priests are saved through the know-
ledge of the Brahman—has sense only on the understanding
that that knowledge is not restricted to the Udgatri, and
so on (i.e. not to those priests who are engaged in carrying
out the details of the sacrifices which are the ‘ bases’ of
the meditations).—The conclusion, therefore, is that those
meditations are not restricted to the sacrifices, subordinate
members of which serve as their ‘ bases. —This terminates
the adhikarama of ‘ like the bases.’ -

686 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

FOURTH PADA.

1. The benefit to man results from thence, on
account of scriptural statement; thus Badardyasa
thinks.

We have concluded the investigation into the oneness or
diverseness of meditations—the result of which is to indicate
in which cases the special points mentioned in several medi-
tations have to be combined, and in which not. A further
point now to be investigated is whether that advantage to
the meditating devotee, which is held to accrue to him from
the meditation, results from the meditation directly, or from
works of which the meditations are subordinate members.—
The Reverend Badaraéyama holds the former view. The
benefit to man results from thence, i.e. from the meditation,
because Scripture declares this to be so. ‘He who knows
Brahman reaches the Highest’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1) ; ‘I know
that great Person of sun-like lustre beyond the darkness.
A man who knows him truly passes over death ; there is
no other path to go’ (Svet. Up. III, 8); ‘As the flowing
rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and their
form, thus a man who possesses knowledge, freed from name
and form, goes to the divine Person who is greater than
the great’ (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8).—Against this view the
Parvapakshin raises an objection.

2. On account of (the Self) standing in a com-
plementary relation, they are arthavadas, as in other
cases ; thus Gaimini opines.

What has been said as to Scripture intimating that
a beneficial result is realised through the meditations by
themselves is untenable. For texts such as ‘he who knows
Brahman reaches the Highest’ do not teach that the highest
aim of man is attained through knowledge; their purport
rather is to inculcate knowledge of Truth on the part of
a Self which is the agent in works prescribed. Knowledge,

111 ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2. 687

therefore, stands in a complementary relation to sacrificial
‘works, in so far as it imparts to the acting Self a certain
mystic purification; and the texts which declare special
results of knowledge, therefore, must be taken as mere
arthavddas. ‘As in the case of other things; so Gaimini
thinks,’ i.e. as Gaimini holds that in the case of sub-
stances, qualities, and so on, the scriptural declaration of
results is of the nature of arthavada.—But it has been
shown before that the Vedanta-texts represent as the
object to be attained, by those desirous of Release, on the
basis of the knowledge imparted by them, something dif-
ferent from the individual Self engaged in action ; cp. on
this point Sd. I, 1, 15; I, 3, 5; I, 2,3; 1, 3,18. And Sa.
II, 1, 22 and others have refuted the view that Brahman is
to be considered as non-different from the personal soul,
because in texts such as ‘thou art that’ it is exhibited in
co-ordination with the latter. And other Sidtras have
proved that Brahman must, on the basis of numerous
scriptural texts, be recognised as the inner Self of all
things material and immaterial. How then can it be said
that the Ved4nta-texts merely mean to give instruction
as to the true nature of the active individual soul, and that
hence all meditation is merely subservient to sacrificial
works ?—On the strength of numerous inferential marks,
the Parvapakshin replies, which prove that in the Ved4nta-
texts all meditation is really viewed as subordinate to
knowledge, and of the declarations of co-ordination of
Brahman and the individual soul (which must be taken
to imply that the two are essentially of the same nature),
we cannot help forming the conclusion that the real purport
of the Ved4nta-texts is to tell us of the true nature of the
individual soul in so far as different from its body.—But,
again it is objected, the agent is connected no less with
ordinary worldly works than with works enjoined by the
Veda, and hence is not invariably connected with sacrifices
(i.e. works of the latter type); it cannot, therefore, be
maintained that meditations on the part of the agent
necessarily connect themselves with sacrifices in so far as
they effect a purification of the sacrificer’s mind !—There

688 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

is a difference, the Parvapakshin rejoins. Worldly works
- can proceed also if the agent is non-different from the
body; while an agent is qualified for sacred works only in
so far as he is different from the body, and of an eternal
non-changing nature. Meditations, therefore, properly con-
nect themselves with sacrifices, in so far as they teach that
the agent really is of that latter nature. We thus adhere
to the conclusion that meditations are constituents of sacri-
ficial actions, and hence are of no advantage by themselves.
—But what then are those inferential marks which, as you
say, fully prove that the Veddnta-texts aim at setting forth
the nature of the individual soul ?—To this the next Satra
replies.

3. On account of (such) conduct being seen.

It is seen, viz. in Scripture, that those who knew Brahman
busied themselves chiefly with sacrifices—Asvapati Kaikeya
had a deep knowledge of the Self; but when three Rishis
had come to him to receive instruction regarding the Self,
he told them ‘I am about to perform a sacrifice, Sirs’
(KA. Up. V, 11). Similarly we learn from Sm~r+ti that
Ganaka and other princes deeply versed in the knowledge
of Brahman applied themselves to sacrificial works, ‘ By
works only Ganaka and others attained to perfection’;
‘He also, well founded in knowledge, offered many sacri-
fices.’ And this fact—that those who know Brahman apply
themselves to works chiefly—shows that knowledge (or
meditation) has no independent value, but serves to set
forth the true nature of the active Self, and thus is sub-
ordinate to work.—An even more direct proof is set forth
in the next Sdtra.

4. On account of direct scriptural statement.

Scripture itself directly declares knowledge to be subor-
dinate to works, ‘whatever he does with knowledge, with
faith, with the Upanishad, that is more vigorous.’ Nor can
it be said that this text refers, on the ground of leading
subject-matter (prakaraza), to the Udgitha only; for direct
scriptural statement (sruti) is stronger than subject-matter,

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 8. 689

and the words ‘whatever he does with knowledge’ clearly
refer to knowledge in general.

5. On account of the taking hold together.

The text ‘then both knowledge and work take hold of
him’ (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 2) shows that knowledge and work
go together, and this going together is possible only if, in
the manner stated, knowledge is subordinate to work.

6. On account of injunction for such a one.

That knowledge is subordinate to works follows there-
from also that works are enjoined on him only who pos-
sesses knowledge. For texts such as ‘He who has learnt
the Veda from a family of teachers, ὅς. (ΑΛ. Up. VIII, 15),
enjoin works on him only who has mastered the sacred
texts so as fully to understand their meaning—for this is
the sense of the term ‘learning’ (adhyayana). Hence the
knowledge of Brahman also is enjoined with a view to works
only: it has no independentsresult of its own.

7. On account of definite rule.

Another argument for our conclusion is that the text
‘Doing works here let a man desire to live a hundred
years, &c. (fs. Up. 11), expressly enjoins lifelong works
on him who knows the Self. The general conclusion,
therefore, is that knowledge (meditation) is merely auxi-
liary to works. Of this view the next Sdtra finally
disposes.

8. But on account of the teaching of the different
one, Badardyama’s (view is valid) ; as this is seen.

Knowledge by itself benefits man; since Scripture
teaches that the object of knowledge is the highest
Brahman which, as it is of an absolutely faultless and
perfect nature, is other than the active individual soul.

Badardyana, therefore, holds that knowledge has an in-
dependent fruit of its own. Let the inferential marks
(referred to by the Parvapakshin) be; the direct teaching
of the texts certainly refers to a being different from the -

[48] yy

690 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Self that acts; for we clearly see that their object is the
highest creative Brahman with all its perfections and
exalted qualities, which cannot possibly be attributed to
the individual Self whether in the state of Release or of
bondage: ‘Free from evil, free from old age,’ &c. &c. In
all those texts there is not the slightest trace of any refer-
ence to the wretched individual soul, as insignificant and
weak as a tiny glow-worm, implicated in Nescience and all
the other evils of finite existence. And the fruit of that
knowledge of the highest Person the texts expressly declare,
in many places, to be immortality—which consists in
attaining to Him. The view of knowledge by itself bene-
fitting man therefore is well founded.—The SAtras proceed
to dispose of the so-called inferential marks.

9. But the declarations are equal.

The argument that knowledge must be held subordinate
to work because we learn from Scripture that those who
know Brahman perform sacrificial works, will not hold
good; since, on the other hand, we also see that men
knowing Brahman abandoned all work; cp. texts such as
‘The Rishis descended from Kavasha said: For what
purpose should we study the Veda? for what purpose
should we sacrifice?’ As it thus appears that those who
know Brahman give up works, knowledge cannot be a mere
auxiliary to works.—But how can it be accounted for that
those who know Brahman both do and do not perform
works ?—Works may be performed in so far as sacrifices
and the like, if performed by one not having any special
wish, stand in subordinate relation to the knowledge of
Brahman; hence there is no objection to texts enjoining
works. And as, on the other hand, sacrifices and such-like
works when aiming at results of their own are opposed to
the knowledge of Brahman which has Release for its only
result, there is all the less objection to texts which suggest
the non-performance of works. If, on the other hand,
knowledge were subordinate to works, works could on πὸ
account be dispensed with.—Against the assertion that

III ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 12. 691

Scripture directly declares knowledge to be subordinate to
works the next Sitra declares itself.

10, (It is) non-comprehensive.

The scriptural declaration does not refer to all medita-
tions, but only to the meditation on the Udgitha. In the
clause ‘what he does with knowledge,’ the ‘what’ is in
itself indefinite, and therefore must be defined as connecting
itself with the Udgitha mentioned in the previous clause,
‘Let him meditate on the Udgitha.’ The sentence cannot
be construed to mean ‘whatever he does is to be done
with knowledge,’ but means ‘that which he does with
knowledge becomes more vigorous,’ and that which is done
with knowledge is the Udgitha. The next Sitra refutes
the argument set forth in Satra 5.

11. There is distribution, as in the case of the
hundred.

As knowledge and work have different results, the text
‘of him knowledge and work lay hold’ must be understood
in a distributive sense, i.e. as meaning that knowledge lays
hold of him to the end of bringing about its own particular
result, and that so likewise does work. ‘As in the case of
a hundred,’ i. e. as it is understood that, when a man selling
a field and a gem is said to receive two hundred gold
pieces, one hundred are given for the field and one hundred
for the gem.

12. Of him who has merely read the Veda.

Nor is there any force in the argument that knowledge
is only auxiliary to work because works are enjoined on
him who possesses knowledge. For the text which refers
to the man ‘who has read the Veda’ enjoins works on him
who has merely read the texts, and reading there means
nothing more than the apprehension of the aggregate of
syllables called Veda, without any insight into their
meaning. A man who has thus mastered the words of the
Veda apprehends therefrom that it makes statements as to
works having certain results, and then on his own account

Yy 2

692 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

applies himself to the enquiry into the meaning of those
declarations; he who is desirous of work applies himself
to the knowledge of works; he who is desirous of Release
applies himself to the knowledge of Brahman. And even
if the injunction of reading were understood as prompting
to the understanding of the text also, all the same, know-
ledge would not be a subsidiary to works. For knowledge,
in the sense of the Upanishads, is something different from
mere cognition of sense. In the same way as the per-
formance of such works as the Gyotishfoma sacrifice is
something different from the cognition of the true nature
of those works; so that vidy4, which effects the highest
purpose of man, i.e. devout meditation (dhyana, up4sana),
is something different from the mere cognition of the true
nature of Brahman. Knowledge of that kind has not the
most remote connexion even with works.

13. Not so, on account of non-specification.

Nor is it true that the text ‘Doing works here,’ &c., is
meant to divert him who knows the Self from knowledge
and restrict him to works. For there is no special reason
to hold that that text refers to works as independent
means of a desirable result: it may as well be understood
to refer to works merely subordinate to knowledge. As
he who knows the Self has to practise meditation as long
as he lives, he may also have to practise, for the same
period, works that are helpful to meditation. Having
thus refuted the objection on the ground of the reason of
the matter, the Sdtrakara proceeds to give his own interpre-
tation of the text.

14. Or the permission is for the purpose of
glorification.

The or has assertive force. The introductory words of
the Upanishad, ‘Hidden in the Lord is all this,’ show
knowledge to be the subject-matter ; hence the permission
of works can aim only at the glorification of knowledge.
The sense of the text therefore is—owing to the power of

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 17.° 693

knowledge a man although constantly performing works is
not stained by them.

15. Some also, by proceeding according to their
liking.

In some sAkhds, moreover, we read that he who possesses
the knowledge of Brahman may, according to his liking,
give up the state of a householder, ‘ What shall we do with
offspring, we who have this Self and this world?’ (Bri. Up.
V, 4, 22.) This text also proves knowledge not to be
subsidiary to works ; for if it were so subsidiary, it would
not be possible for him who knows Brahman to give up
householdership (with all the works obligatory on that
state) according to his liking.

16. And destruction.

There is moreover a Vedanta-text which declares the
knowledge of Brahman to destroy work—good and evil—
which is the root of all the afflictions of transmigratory
existence: ‘The knot of the heart is broken, all doubts
are solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld
who is high and low’ (Mu. Up. II, 2,8). This also contra-
dicts the view of knowledge being subordinate to works.

17. And of him who is chaste; for in Scripture
(this is declared).

The knowledge of Brahman belongs to those who have
to observe chastity, and men living in that state have not
to perform the Agnihotra, the Darsapdrzamasa, and similar
works. For this reason also knowledge cannot be sub-
sidiary to works.—But, it may be objected, there is no
such condition of life; for texts such as ‘he is to perform
the Agnihotra as long as he lives,’ declare men to be
obliged to perform sacrifices and the like up to the end of
their lives, and Smriti texts contradicting Scripture have
no authority.—To meet this the Sfitra adds ‘for in Scrip-
ture.’ The three stages of life are recognised in Scripture
only ; cp. texts such as ‘Those who in the forest practise
penance and faith’ (K%. Up. V, 10, 1); ‘ Wishing for that

694 ' VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

world only mendicants wander forth from their homes’
(Bre. Up. IV, 4, 22). The text as to the lifelong obliga-
toriness of the Agnihotra is valid for those only who do
not retire from worldly life.

18. A reference (only) Gaimini (holds them to be),
on account of absence of injunction ; for (Scripture)
forbids.

The argument for the three stages of life, founded on
their mention in Vedic texts, has no force, since all those
references are only of the nature of anuvada. For none of
those texts contain injunctive forms. The text ‘There are
three branches of sacred observance,’ ὅς. (K4. Up. II, 23, 1),
is meant to glorify the previous meditation on Brahman
under the form of the prazava, as appears from the con-
cluding clause ‘he who is firmly grounded in Brahman
obtains immortality’; it therefore cannot mean to enjoin
the three conditions of life as valid states. In the same
way the text ‘And those who in the forest practise penance
and faith’ refers to the statements previously made as to
the path of the gods, and cannot therefore be meant to
make an original declaration as to another condition of
life. Scripture moreover expressly forbids that other con-
dition, ‘a murderer of men is he who removes the fire,’ ἅς.
There are therefore no conditions of life in which men are
bound to observe chastity. This is the opinion of the
teacher Gaimini.

19. It is to be accomplished, Badard&yama holds,
on account of scriptural statement of equality.

Badardyasa is of opinion that, in the same way as the
condition of householdership, those other conditions of life
also are obligatory; since in the section beginning ‘there
are three branches of sacred duty’ all the three conditions
of life are equally referred to, with a view to glorifying him
who is firmly grounded in Brahman. The reference there
made to the condition of the householder necessarily pre-
supposes that condition to be already established and

τι τὰ

III ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20. 695

obligatory, and the same reasoning then holds good with
regard to the other conditions mentioned. Nor must it be
said that the special duties mentioned at the beginning of
the section—sacrifice, study, charity, austerity, Brahma-
karya—all of them belong to the state of the householder
(in which case the text would contain no reference to the
other conditions of life); for on that supposition the
definite reference to a threefold division of duties, ‘ Sacri-
fice, &c. art the first, austerity the second, Brahmaéarya
the third,’ would be unmeaning. The proper explanation
is to take the words ‘sacrifice, study, and charity’ as
descriptive of the condition of the householder; the word
‘austerity’ as descriptive of the duties of the Vaikhanasa
and the wandering mendicant, who both practise mortifica-
tion; and the word ‘Brahmafarya’ as referring to the
duties of the Brahmaégarin. The term ‘ Brahmasamstha’
finally, in the concluding clause, refers to all the three
conditions of life, as men belonging to all those conditions
may be founded on Brahman. Those, the text means to
say, who are destitute of this foundation on Brahman and
only perform the special duties of their condition of life,
obtain the worlds of the blessed ; while he only who at the
same time founds himself on Brahman attains to immor-
tality—In the text ‘and those who in the forest,’ ὅς. the
mention made of the forest shows that the statement as to
the path of the gods has for its presupposition the fact that
that stage of life which is especially connected with the
forest is one generally recognised.—So far it has been
shown that the other stages of life are no less obligatory
than that of the householder, whether we take the text
under discussion as containing merely a reference to those
stages (as established by independent means of proof) or
as directly enjoining them. The next Sdtra is meant to
show that the latter view is after all the right one.

20. Or an injunction, as in the case of the
carrying.

As the second part of the text ‘Let him approach
carrying the firewood below the ladle; for above he carries

696 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

it for the gods’ (which refers to a certain form of the
Agnihotra), although having the form of an anuvdda, yet
must be interpreted as an injunction, since the carrying of
firewood above is not established by any other injunction;
so the text under discussion also must be taken as an
injunction of the different stages of life (which are not
formally enjoined elsewhere). No account being taken of
the text of the Gab4las, ‘Having completed his studentship
he is to become a householder, &c., it is thus a settled
conclusion that the texts discussed, although primarily
concerned with other topics, must at the same time be
viewed as proving the validity of the several conditions of
life. From this it follows that the text enjoining the
performance of the Agnihotra up to the end of life, and
similar texts, are not universally binding, but concern
those only who do not retire from worldly life-—The final
conclusion therefore is that as the knowledge of Brahman
is enjoined on those who lead a life of austerity (which
does not require the performance of sacrifices and the like),
it is not subordinate to works, but is in itself beneficial to
man.—Here terminates the adhikarana of ‘ benefit to man.’

21. If it be said that they are mere glorification,
on account of their reference; not so, on account of
the newness.

The following point is next enquired into. Are texts
such as ‘That Udgitha is the best of all essences, the
highest, holding the supreme place, the eighth’ (Kz. Up.
I, 1, 3) meant to glorify the Udgitha as a constituent
element of the sacrifice, or to enjoin a meditation on the
Udgitha as the best of all essences, and so on? The
Parvapakshin holds the former view, on the ground that
the text declares the Udgitha to be the best of all essences
in so far as being a constituent element of the sacrifice.
The case is analogous to that of texts such as ‘the ladle is
this earth, the 4havantya is the heavenly world,’ which are
merely meant to glorify the ladle and the rest as con-
stituent members of the sacrifice—This view the latter
part of the Sdtra sets aside ‘on account of newness.’

Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 22. 697

Texts, as the one referring to the Udgitha, cannot be mere
glorifications ; for the fact of the Udgitha being the best
of essences is not established by any other means of proof,
and the text under discussion cannot therefore be under-
stood as a mere anuvada, meant for glorification. Nor is
there, in proximity, any injunction of the Udgitha on
account of connexion with which the clause declaring the
Udgitha to be the best of all essences could naturally be
taken as an anuvada (glorifying the thing previously
enjoined in the injunctive text); while there is such an
injunction in connexion with the (anuvada) text ‘ The ladle
is this earth,’ and so on. We thus cannot but arrive at
the conclusion that the text is meant to enjoin a medita-
tion on the Udgitha as being the best of all essences, and
so on—the fruit of such meditation being an increase of
vigour and efficacy on the part of the sacrifice.

22. And on account of the words denoting
becoming.

That the texts under discussion have an injunctive
purport also follows from the fact that they contain verbal
forms denoting becoming or origination—‘ he is to meditate’
and the like; for all such forms have injunctive force. All
these texts therefore are meant to enjoin special forms of
meditation.—Here terminates the adhikaramza of ‘mere
glorification.’

23. Should it be said that (the stories told in the
Upanishads) are for the purpose of the Pariplava ;
not so, since (cértain stories) are specified.

We meet in the Ved4nta-texts with certain stories such
as ‘Pratardana the son of Divod4sa came to the beloved
abode of Indra, &c., and similar ones. The question here
arises whether the stories are merely meant to be recited
at the Asvamedha sacrifice or to convey knowledge of
a special kind.—The Pdrvapakshin maintains that as the
text ‘they tell the stories’ declares the special connexion
of those stories with the so-called pariplava performance,

698 _ VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

they cannot be assumed to be mainly concerned with
knowledge.—This view the Sftra negatives, on the ground
that not all stories of that kind are specially connected
with the pdriplava. The texts rather single out special
stories only as suitable for that performance; on the
general injunction quoted above there follows an injunction
defining wich stories are to be told, ‘King Manu, the son
of Vivasvat, &c. The stories told in the Ved4nta-texts
do not therefore form parts of the pariplava performance,
but are connected with injunctions of meditations.

24. This follows also from the textual connexion
(of those stories with injunctions). .

That those stories subserve injunctions of meditation is
proved thereby also that they are exhibited in textual
connexion with injunctions such as ‘the Self is to be seen,’
and so on. Their position therefore is analogous to that
of other stories told in the texts, which somehow subserve
injunctions of works, and are not merely meant for pur-
poses of recitation.— Here terminates the adhikaraaa of ‘the
pariplava.’

25. For this very reason there is no need of the
lighting of the fire and so on.

The Sdtras return, from their digression into the dis-
cussion of two special points, to the question as to those
whose condition of life involves chastity. The above
Stra declares that as persons of that class are referred to
by Scripture as specially concerned with meditation (‘He
who is founded on Brahman reaches immortality ;’ ‘ those
who in the forest,’ &c.), their meditation does not pre-
suppose a knowledge of the kindling of fire and so on,
i.e. a knowledge of the Agnihotra, the Darsapirzamasa,
and all those other sacrifices which require the preliminary
establishment of the sacred fires, but a knowledge of those
works only which are enjoined for their special condition
of life—Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the kindling
of the fire.’

26. And there is need of all (works), on account

ΠΙ ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 26. 699

of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the rest ;
as in the case of the horse.

If knowledge (meditation), without any reference to
sacrifices and the like, is able to bring about immortality,
it must be capable of accomplishing this in the case of
householders also ; and the mention made of sacrifices and
the rest in texts such as ‘ Brahmazas seek to know him by
the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts’ (Brz. Up.
IV, 4, 22), does not prove sacrifices and so on to be
auxiliary to knowledge, since the stress there lies (not on
the sacrifices and so on, but) on the desire of knowledge.—
Of this view the Sftra disposes. In the case of house-
holders, for whom the Agnihotra and so on are obligatory,
knowledge presupposes all those works, since scriptural
texts such as the one quoted directly state that sacrifices
and the like are auxiliary to knowledge. ‘They seek to
know by means of sacrifices’ can be said only if sacrifices
are understood to be a means through which knowledge is
brought about; just as one can say ‘he desires to slay
with a sword,’ because the sword is admitted to be an -
instrument wherewith one can kill. What we have to
understand by knowledge in this connexion has been
repeatedly explained, viz. a mental energy different in
character from the mere cognition of the sense of texts,
and more specifically denoted by such terms as dhyana
or upasana, i.e. meditation; which is of the nature of
remembrance (i.e. representative thought), but in intuitive
clearness is not inferior to the clearest presentative thought
(pratyaksha); which by constant daily practice becomes
ever more perfect, and being duly continued up to death
secures final Release. Such meditation is originated in
the mind through the grace of the Supreme Person, who is
pleased and conciliated by the different kinds of acts of
sacrifice and worship duly performed by the Devotee day
after day. This is what the text ‘they seek to know
through the sacrifice’ really means. The conclusion there-
fore is that in the case of householders knowledge has for
its pre-requisite all sacrifices and other works of permanent

700 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

and occasional obligation. ‘As a horse.’ As the horse,
which is a means of locomotion for man, requires attendants,
grooming, &c., so knowledge, although itself the means of
Release, demands the co-operation of the different works.
Thus the Lord himself says, ‘The work of sacrifice, giving,
and austerities is not to be relinquished. but is indeed to
be performed; for sacrifices, gifts, and austerities are
purifying to the thoughtful’ ‘He from whom all beings
proceed and by whom all this is pervaded—worshipping
Him with the proper works man attains to perfection’
(Bha. Gi. XVIII, 5; 46).—Here terminates the adhikaraza
of ‘the need of all.’

27. But all the same he must be possessed of
calmness, subjection of the senses, &c., since those
are enjoined as auxiliaries to that, and must neces-
sarily be accomplished.

The question is whether the householder also must prac-
tise calmness and so on, or not. The Pidrvapakshin says
he must not, since the performance of works implies the
activity of the outer and inner organs of action, and since
calmness and so on are of an exactly opposite nature.—
This view the Sdtra sets aside. The householder also,
although engaged in outward activity, must, in so far as he
possesses knowledge, practise calmness of mind and the
rest also; for these qualities or states are by Scripture
enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge, ‘Therefore he who
knows this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient,
and collected, should see the Self in Self’ (Br. Up. IV,
4, 23). As calmness of mind and the rest are seen, in so
far as implying composure and concentration of mind, to
promote the -origination of knowledge, they also must
necessarily be aimed at and practised. Nor can it be said
that between works on the one side and calmness and so
on on the other, there is an absolute antagonism ; for the
two have different spheres of application. Activity of the
organs of action is the proper thing in the case of works
enjoined ; quiescence in the case of works not enjoined and

III ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 29. ΟΙ

such as have no definite purpose. Nor also can it be
objected that in the case of works implying the activity of
organs, calmness of mind and so on are impossible, the
mind then being necessarily engrossed by the impressions
of the present work and its surroundings; for works en-
joined by Scripture have the power of pleasing the Supreme
Person, and hence, through his grace, to cause the destruc-
tion of all mental impressions obstructive of calmness and
concentration of mind. Hence calmness of mind and the rest
are to be aimed at and practised by householders also.—
Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘calmness’ and so on.

28. And there is permission of all food in the
case of danger of life; on account of this being
seen.

In the meditation on prasza, according to the V4ga-
saneyins and the K #andogas, there is a statement as to all
food being allowed to him who knows the praza, ‘ By him
there is nothing eaten that is not food’ (Brz. Up. VI, 1, 14;
and so on). A doubt here arises whether this permission
of all food is valid for him who possesses the knowledge of
praaa, in all circumstances, or only in the case of life being
in danger.—The Parvapakshin holds the former view, on
account of no special conditions being stated in the text.—
This the Stra sets aside ‘in the case of danger to life’ ;
for the reason that, as the text shows, the eating of food of
all kinds is permitted even for those who know Brahman
itself—the knowledge of which of course is higher than
that of praza—only when their life is in danger. The text
alluded to is the one telling how Ushasta Xakrayaza, who
was well versed in the knowledge of Brahman, once, when
in great distress, ate unlawful food. We therefore conclude
that what the text says as to all food being lawful for him
who knows pr4za, can refer only to occasions when food of
any kind must be eaten in order to preserve life.

29. And on account of non-sublation.

The conclusion above arrived at is confirmed by the con-
Sideration that thus only those texts are not stultified

702 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

which enjoin, for those who know Brahman, purity in
matters of food with a view to the origination of knowledge
of Brahman. Cp. ‘when the food is pure the mind becomes
pure’ (Kz. Up. VII, 26, 2).

30. This is said in Smz?ti also.

That for those as well who know Brahman, as for others,
the eating of food of any kind is lawful only in case of
extreme need, Smriti also declares, ‘He who being in
danger of his life eats food from anywhere is stained by sin
no more than the lotus leaf by water.’

31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to
non-proceeding according to liking.

The above conclusion is further confirmed by a scriptural
passage prohibiting licence of conduct on the part of any
one. The text meant is a passage in the Samhita of the
Kazhas, ‘Therefore a Brahmaza does not drink spirituous
liquor, thinking “may I not be stained by sin.”’—Here
terminates the adhikarava of ‘the allowance of all food.’

32. The works of the Asramas also, on account of
their being enjoined.

It has been said that sacrifices and other works are
auxiliary to the knowledge of Brahman. The doubt now
arises whether those works are to be performed by him
also who merely wishes to fulfil the duties of his Asrama,
without aiming at final Release, or not. They are not, the
Parvapakshin holds, for that things auxiliary to knowledge
should stand in subordinate relation to a certain state of
life would imply the contradiction of permanent and non-
permanent obligation—Of this view the Sdtra disposes,
‘The works of the dsramas also.’ The works belonging to
each 4srama have to be performed by those also who do
not aim at more than to live according to the 4srama ; for
they are specifically enjoined by texts such as ‘as long as
life lasts he is to offer the Agnihotra’ ; this implies a perma-
nent obligation dependent on life. And that the same
works are also to be performed as being auxiliary to

Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 36. 703

knowledge appears from the texts enjoining them in that
aspect, ‘Him they seek to know by the study of the Veda’
(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); this the next Sdtra declares.

33. And on account of co-operativeness.

These works are to be performed also on account of
their being co-operative towards knowledge in so far,
namely, as they give rise to the desire of knowledge; and
their thus being enjoined for a double purpose does not
imply contradiction any more than the double injunctions
of the Agnihotra, which one text connects with the life of
the sacrificer and another text with his desire to reach the
heavenly world.—Nor does this imply a difference of works
—this the next Satra declares.

34. In any case they are the same, on account of
twofold inferential signs.

There is no radical difference of works; but in any case,
i.e. whether they be viewed as duties incumbent on the
4srama or as auxiliary to knowledge, sacrifices and other
works are one and the same. For Scripture, in enjoining
them in both these aspects, makes use of the same terms, so
that we recognise the same acts, and there is no means of
proof to establish difference of works,

35. And Scripture also declares (knowledge) not
to be overpowered.

Texts such as ‘ By works of sacred duty he drives away
evil’ declare that sacrifices and similar works have the
effect of knowledge ‘not being overpowered, i.e. of the
origination of knowledge not being obstructed by evil
works. Sacrifices and similar works being performed day
after day have the effect of purifying the mind, and owing
to this, knowledge arises in the mind with ever increasing
brightness. This proves that the works are the same in
either case.—Here terminates the adhikarama of ‘the being
enjoined ’ (of sacrifices, and so on).

36. Also in the case of those outside, as this is
seen. ᾿

704 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

It has been declared that the members of the four
asramas have a claim to the knowledge of Brahman, and
that the duties connected with each 4srama promote know-
ledge. A doubt now arises whether those men also
who, on account of poverty and so on, stand outside the
4sramas are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman, or
not.—They are not, the Pdrvapakshin holds, since such
knowledge is to be attained in a way dependent on the
special duties of each 4sraima; while those who do not
belong to an 4srama are not concerned with 4srama duties.
—This view the Sidtra rejects. Those also who do not
stand within any 4srama are qualified for knowledge, ‘be-
cause that is seen,’ i.e. because the texts declare that men
such as Raikva, Bhishma, Saszvarta and others who did
not belong to 4sramas were well grounded in the know-
ledge of Brahman. It can by no means be maintained
that it is 4srama duties only that promote knowledge;
for the text ‘by gifts, by penance, by fasting, and so on’
(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22) distinctly declares that charity also and
other practices, which are not confined to the Asramas, are
helpful towards knowledge. In the same way as in the
case of those bound to chastity—who, as the texts show,
may possess the knowledge of Brahman—knowledge is
promoted by practices other than the Agnihotra and the
like, so—it is concluded—in the case of those also who do
not belong to any 4srama knowledge may be promoted by
certain practices not exclusively connected with any dsrama,
such as prayer, fasting, charity, propitiation of the divinity,
and so on.

37. Smriti also states this.

Smriti also declares that men not belonging to an Asrama
grow in knowledge through prayer and the like. ‘Through
prayer also a Brahmawza may become perfect. May he
perform other works or not, one who befriends all creatures
is called a Brahmana’ (Manu Smrz. II, 17).

38. And there is the promotion (of knowledge)
through special acts (of duty).

III ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 40. 705

The above conclusion is founded not only on Reasoning
and Smriti; but Scripture even directly states that know-
ledge is benefited by practices not exclusively prescribed
for the 4sramas, ‘ By penance, abstinence, faith, and know-
ledge he is to seek the Self’ (Pr. Up. I, 10).

39. But better than that is the other also on
account of an inferential mark.

Better than to be outside the Asramas is the condition of
standing within an 4srama. The latter state may be due to
misfortune ; but he who can ‘should be within an 4srama,
which state is the more holy and beneficial’ one. This
follows from inference only, i.e. Smriti; for Smriti says,
‘A Brahmaaa is to remain outside the 4sramas not even for
one day.’ For one who has passed beyond the stage of
Brahmaarya, or whose wife has died, the impossibility to
procure a wife constitutes the misfortune (which prevents
him from belonging to an 4srama).—Here terminates the
adhikarama of ‘ widowers.’

40. But of him who has become that there is no
becoming not that, according to Gaimini also, on
account of (Scripture) restraining from the absence
of the forms of that,

The doubt here arises whether those also who have fallen
from the state of life of a Naish¢Aika, Vaikhanasa or Pari-
vragaka are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman or not.
—They are so, since in their case, no less than in that of
widowers and the like, the growth of knowledge may be
assisted by charity and other practices not confined to
Asramas.—This prim4 facie view the Sdtra sets aside.
* He who has become that,’ i.e. he who has entered on the
condition of a Naishzhika or the like ‘cannot become not
that, i.e. may not live in a non-Asrama condition; since
scriptural texts restrain men who once have entered the
Naishzhika, &c., state ‘from the absence of the forms of
that,’ i.e. from the discontinuance of the special duties of
their 4srama. Compare texts such as ‘He is to go into

[48] 22

706 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the forest, and is not to return from thence’; ‘ Having
renounced the world he is not to return.’ And hence per-
sons who have lapsed from their 4srama are not qualified
for meditation on Brahman. This view of his the Satra-
k4ra strengthens bya reference to the opinion of Gaimini.
—But cannot a Naishtsika who, through some sin, has
lapsed from his duties and position, make up for his trans-
gression by some expiatory act and thus again become fit
for meditation on Brahman ?—To this point the next Sitra
refers.

41. Nor the (expiatory performance) described
in the chapter treating of qualification; that being
impossible on account of the Smr¢ti referring to
such lapse.

Those expiatory performances which are described in
the chapter treating of qualification (PQ. Mi. Sd. VI) are
not possible in the case of him who has lapsed from the
condition of a Naish¢kika; since such expiations do not
apply to him, as is shown by a Smriti text referring to
such lapse, viz.‘ He who having once entered on the duties
of a Naish¢kika lapses from them, for such a slayer of the
Self I do not see any expiatory work by which he might
become clean.’ The expiatory ceremony referred to in
the Parva Mimams4 therefore applies to the case of other
BrahmaZarins only.

42. A minor one, thus some; (and hence they
hold) the existence (of expiation), as in the case of
eating. This has been explained.

Some teachers are of opinion that even on the part of
Naish¢hikas and the rest the lapse from chastity constitutes
only a minor offence which can be atoned for by expiatory
observances; in the same way as in the case of the eating
of forbidden food the same prayaséitta may be used by the
ordinary Brahmaférin and by Naishzkikas and the rest.
This has been stated by the Smv%ti writer, ‘For the others
also (i.e. the Naish¢kikas and so on) the same (rules and

Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 44. 707

practices as those for the Upakurv4na) hold good, in so far
as not opposed to their 4srama.’

43. But in either case (such men) stand outside;
on account of Smvzti and custom.

Whether the point under discussion constitutes a minor
or a major offence, in any case those who have lapsed
stand outside the category of those qualified for the know-
ledge of Brahman. For Smriti, i.e. the text quoted above,
‘I see no expiatory performance by which he, a slayer of
Brahman as he is, could become pure again,’ declares that
expiations are powerless to restore purity. And custom
confirms the same conclusion; for good men shun those
Naishzkikas who have lapsed, even after they have per-
formed prayaséittas, and do not impart to them the know-
ledge of Brahman. The conclusion, therefore, is that such
men are not qualified for knowing Brahman.—Here termi-
nates the adhikaraxa of ‘him who has become that.’

44. By the Lord (of the sacrifice), since Scripture
declares a fruit—thus Atreya thinks.

A doubt arises whether the meditations on such con-
stituent elements of the sacrifice as the Udgitha, and so on,
are to be performed by the sacrificer (for whose benefit the
sacrifice is offered), or by the officiating priests. Atreya
advocates the former view; on the ground of Scripture
showing that in the case of such meditations as the one
on the small ether within the heart, fruit and meditation
belong to the same person, and that in the case of such
meditations as the one on the Udgitha the fruit belongs to
the sacrificer (whence we conclude that the meditation also
is his). Nor can it be said that the sacrificer is not com-
petent for such meditation, for the reason that like the
godohana vessel it is connected with an element of the
sacrifice (which latter the priests only can perform). For
the godohana vessel serves to bring water, and this of
course none else can do but the Adhvaryu; while a medi-
tation on the Udgitha as being the essence of all essences
can very well be performed by the Sacrificer—true though

ZZ2

708 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

it be that the Udgitha itself can be performed by the
Udgatri priest only.—Against this view the next Sitra
declares itself.

45. (They are) the priest’s work, Audulomi thinks ;
since for that he is engaged.

The teacher Audulomi is of opinion that the meditation
on the Udgitha and the like is the work of the priest, since
it is he who is engaged for the purpose of performing that
which gives rise to the fruit, i.e. of the entire sacrifice with
all its subordinate parts. Injunctions referring to the per-
formance of the sacrifices such as ‘he chooses the priests;
he gives to the priests their fee’ indicate that the entire
sacrificial performance is the work of the priests, and that
hence all activities comprised within it—mental as well as
bodily—belong to the priests. Capability or non-capa-
bility does not constitute the criterion in this case. For
although the meditations in question aim directly at the
benefit of man (not at the greater perfection of the sacri-
fice), yet since they fall within the sphere of qualifica-
tion of those who are qualified for the sacrifice, and since
the sacrifice with all its subordinate elements has to be
performed by the priests, and since the text ‘ whatever he
does with knowledge that becomes more vigorous ’ declares
knowledge to belong to the same agent as the works which
are benefited by such knowledge, we conclude that those
meditations also are the exclusive duty of the priests.
In the case of the meditations on the small ether, &c., on
the other hand, the text says nothing as to their having to
be performed by priests, and we therefore assume in accord-
ance with the general principle that ‘the fruit belongs to
the performer,’ that the agent there is the person to whom
Scripture assigns the fruit—Here terminates the adhika-
rama of ‘the lord (of the sacrifice).’

46. There is injunction of other auxiliary means
for him who is such, as in the case of injunction and
so on; (the term mauna denoting) according to an
alternative meaning a third something.

Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 46. 709

‘ Therefore let a Brahmana after he has done with learn-
ing wish to stand by a childlike state; and after having
done with the childlike state and learning (he is) a Muni’
(Brs. Up. III, 5). A doubt arises whether this text enjoins
Muni-hood in the same way as it enjoins learning and
the childlike state, or merely refers to it as something
already established.—The Pdrvapakshin holds the latter
view on the ground that as ‘ Muni-hood’ and ‘learning’
both connote knowledge, the word ‘ Muni’ merely refers
back to the knowledge already enjoined in the phrase
‘after he has done with learning.’ For the text presents
no word of injunctive force with regard to Muni-hood—
This view the Sftra controverts. ‘For him who is such,’
i.e. for those who possess knowledge, ‘there is an injunc-
tion of a different co-operative factor’ ‘in the same way as
injunctions and the rest.’ By the ¢ujunctions in the last
clause we have to understand the special duties of the
different 4sramas, i. e. sacrifices and the like, and also such
qualifications as quietness of mind and the like; and by
the ‘ and the rest’ is meant the learning of and pondering
on the sacred texts. Stated at length, the meaning of the
Sftra then is as follows—in the same way as texts such as
‘him Bréhmamas seek to know through the reciting of the
Veda, through sacrifices and charity, and so on,’ and ‘ Quiet,
subdued,’ &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23) enjoin sacrifices and
so on, and quietness of mind and the like, as helpful
towards knowledge ; and as texts such as ‘the Self is to
be heard, to be pondered upon’ (Brs. Up. II, 4, 5) mention
hearing and pondering as helpful towards knowledge ; thus
the text under discussion enjoins learning, a childlike state
of mind, and Muni-hood as three further different auxiliaries
of knowledge.—‘ Muni-hood’ does ποῦ denote the same
thing as ‘learning ’—this the Satra intimates by the clause
‘alternatively a third,’ i.e. as the word muni is observed
alternatively to denote persons such as Vy4sa distinguished
by their power of profound reflection (manana), the abstract
term munihood denotes a third thing different from
learning and the ‘childlike state.’ Hence, although the
phrase ‘then a Muni’ does not contain a word of directly

710 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

injunctive power, we must all the same understand it in an
injunctive sense, viz. ‘then let him be or become a Muni’;
for Muni-hood is not something previously established.
Such munihood is also something different from mere
reflection (manana); it is the reiterated representation be-
fore the mind of the object of meditation, the idea of that
object thus becoming more and more vivid. The meaning
of the entire text therefore is as follows. A Brdhmasa
is at first fully to master knowledge, i.e. he is to attain,
by means of hearing and pondering, to the knowledge of
Brahman in all its fulness and perfection. This is to be
effected through the growth of purity of mind and heart,
due to the grace of the Lord; for this Smrsti declares,
‘Neither by the Vedas nor by austerities, and so on, can
I be so seen—; but by devotion exclusive I may be
known’ (Bha. Gt. XI, 53-54); and Scripture also says,
‘Who has the highest devotion for God’ (Svet. Up. VI, 23),
and ‘ That Self cannot be gained by the study of the Veda,’
ὅς. ‘He whom the Self chooses by him the Self is to be
attained’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23). After that ‘he is to stand by
a childlike state’ ; what this means will be explained further
on. And after that he is to be a Muni, i.e. he is to fix
his thoughts so exclusively and persistently on Brahman
as to attain to the mode of knowledge called meditation.
Having by the employment of these three means reached
true knowledge he—the text goes on to say—having done
with amauna and mauna is a Brahmaza. Amauna,ie.
non-mauna, denotes all the auxiliaries of knowledge different
from mauna: employing these and mauna as well he
reaches the highest goal of knowledge. And, the text
further says, there is no other means but those stated
whereby to become such, i.e. a true Brahmama. The
entire text thus evidently means to enjoin on any one
standing within any 4srama learning, a childlike state, and
mauna as auxiliary means of knowledge, in addition to
sacrifices and the other special duties of the 4sramas.—But,
an objection is raised, if knowledge, aided by pAnditya
and so on, and thus being auxiliary to the action of the
special duties of the Asramas, is thus declared to be the

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 48. 71Ὲ

means of attaining to Brahman; how then are we to un-
derstand the KAandogya’s declaring that a man, in order
to attain to Brahman, is throughout his life to carry on the
duties of a householder '?—To this the next Sdtra replies.

47. But on account of the existence (of know-
ledge) in all, there is winding up with the house-
holder.

As knowledge belongs to the members of all Asramas it
belongs to the householder also, and for this reason the
Upanishad winds up with the latter. This winding up
therefore is meant to illustrate the duties (not of the house-
holder only, but) of the members of all 4sramas. Analo-
gously in the text under discussion (Bri. Up. III, 5) the
clause ‘A Bréhmaza having risen above the desire for sons,
the desire for wealth, and the desire for worlds, wanders
about as a mendicant, intimates duties belonging exclu-
sively to the condition of the wandering beggar, and then
the subsequent clause ‘therefore let a Brahmana having
done with learning, &c., enjoins paxditya, balya, and
mauna (not as incumbent on the parivragaka only, but) as
illustrating the duties of all 4sramas.—This the next Sftra
explicitly declares.

48. On account of the others also being taught, in
the same way as the condition of the Muni.

The injunction, on him who has passed beyond all desire,
of mauna preceded by pdrivragya (wandering about as
a mendicant), is meant to illustrate the duties of all
Asramas. For the duties of the other asramas are taught
by Scripture no less than those of the Muni (and the house-
holder). Similarly it was shown above that in the text
‘There are three branches of sacred duty—he who is
founded on Brahman goes to immortality,’ the term
‘founded on Brahman’ applies equally to members of all
Asramas.—It therefore remains a settled conclusion that

* Kh. Up. VIII, 13.

912 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the text under discussion enjoins panditya, balya, and
mauna as being auxiliaries to knowledge in the same way
as the other duties of the Asramas, such as sacrifices and
the rest.—Here terminates the adhikarawa of ‘ the injunc-
tion of other auxiliaries.’

49. Not manifesting itself; on account of the
connexion.

In the text discussed above we meet with the word
‘balya,’ which may mean either ‘ being a child’ or ‘ being
and doing like a child.” The former meaning is ex-
cluded, as that particular age which is called childhood
cannot be assumed at will. With regard to the latter
meaning, however, a doubt arises, viz. whether the text
means to say that he who aims at perfect knowledge is to
assume all the ways of a child, as e.g. its wilful behaviour,
or only its freedom from pride and the like.—The former,
the Parvapakshin maintains. For the text gives no specifi-
cation, and texts enjoining restraints of different kinds (on
the man desirous of knowledge) are sublated by this specific
text which enjoins him to be in all points like a child—
This view the Sdtra disposes of. ‘Not manifesting itself.’
That aspect of a child’s nature which consists in the child
not manifesting its nature (viz. in pride, arrogance, and so
on), the man aiming at true knowledge is to make his own.
‘On account of connexion, i.e. because thus only the
‘balya’ of the text gives a possible sense. The other
characteristic features of ‘childhood’ the texts declare to
be opposed to knowledge, ‘He who has not turned away
from wicked conduct, who is not tranquil and attentive,
or whose mind is not at peace, he can never attain the Self
by knowledge’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24); ‘When food is pure,
the whole nature becomes pure’ (K%. Up. VII, 26, 2),
and so on.—Here terminates the adhikarana of ‘ non-mani-
festation.’

50. What belongs to this world, there being no
obstruction at hand; as this is seen.
Knowledge, as enjoined by Scripture, is twofold, having

ΠῚ ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 51. o13

for its fruit either exaltation within the sphere of the
Samsara, or final Release. With regard to the former the
question arises whether it springs up only immediately
subsequent to the good works which are the means to
bring it about; or, indefinitely, either subsequent to such
works or at some later time.—The Pfrvapakshin holds the
former view. A man reaches knowledge through his good
deeds only, as the Lord himself declares, ‘Four kinds of
men doing good works worship me,’ &c. (Bha. Gi. VII, 16) ;
and when those works have been accomplished there is no
reason why the result, i. e. knowledge, should be delayed.—
This view the Sftra disposes of. ‘What is comprised in
this world, i.e. meditation, the result of which is worldly
exaltation, springs up immediately after the works to
which it is due, in case of there being no other works of
greater strength obstructing the rise of knowledge; but if
there is an obstruction of the latter kind, knowledge springs
up later on only. ‘For this is seen,’ i. e. Scripture acknow-
ledges the effects of such obstruction; for a statement
such as ‘ what he does with knowledge, with faith, with the
Upanishad that is more vigorous,’ means that works joined
with the knowledge of the Udgitha, and so on, produce
their results without obstruction (which implies that the
action of other works is liable to be obstructed).—Here
terminates the adhikaraza of ‘ what belongs to this world.’

51. In the same way there is non-determination
with regard to what has Release for its result; that
condition being ascertained, that condition being
ascertained.

So likewise in the case of the origination, through works
of very great merit, of such knowledge as has for its result
final Release, the time is not definitely fixed; for here
also there is ascertained the same condition, viz. the termi-
nation of the obstruction presented by other works. A
further doubt might in this case be raised on the ground
that such works as give rise to knowledge leading to final
Release are stronger than all other works, and therefore not

714 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

liable to obstruction. But this doubt is disposed of by the
reflection that even in the case of a man knowing Brahman
there may exist previous evil deeds of overpowering
strength.—The repetition of the last words of the Sfitra
indicates the completion of the adhy4ya.—Here terminates
the adhikaraza of ‘ what has Release for its result.’

FOURTH ADHYAYA.
FIRST PADA.

1. Repetition, on account of the text teaching
(what has to be done more than once).

The third adhy4ya was concerned with the considera-
tion of meditation, together with its means. The Sdtras
now enter on a consideration of the results of meditation,
after a further preliminary clearing up of the nature of
meditation. The question here arises whether the act
of knowledge of Brahman inculcated in Veddnta-texts,
such as ‘He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,’
‘Having known him thus he passes beyond death,’ ‘ He
knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman,’ is, in the view of
Scripture, to be performed once only, or to be repeated
more than once.—Once suffices, the Pdrvapakshin main-
tains ; for as the text enjoins nothing more than knowing
there is no authority for a repetition of the act. Nor can
it be said that the act of knowing, analogous to the act
of beating the rice-grains until they are freed from the
husks, is a visible means towards effecting the intuition
of Brahman, and hence must, like the beating, be repeated
until the effect is accomplished; for knowing is not a
visible means towards anything. Such acts as the Gyoti-
shfoma sacrifice and the knowledge inculcated in the
Vedanta-texts are alike of the nature of conciliation of
the Supreme Person ; through whom thus conciliated man
obtains all that is beneficial to him, viz. religious duty,
wealth, pleasure, and final Release. This has been shown
under III, 2, 38. The meaning of Scripture therefore
is accomplished by performing the act of knowledge once
only, as the Gyotishtoma is performed once.—This view
the Sdtra sets aside. The meaning of Scripture is fulfilled
only by repeated acts of knowledge ‘on account of teach-
ing,’ i.e. because the teaching of Scripture is conveyed

716 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

by means of the term ‘knowing’ (vedana), which is
synonymous with meditating (dhyana, updsana). That
these terms are so synonymous appears from the fact
that the verbs vid, up4s, dhy4i are in one and the same
text used with reference to one and the same object of
knowledge. A text begins, e.g.‘ Let him meditate (up4-
sita) on mind as Brahman,’ and concludes ‘he who knows
(veda) this shines, warms,’ &c. (ΧΑ. Up. III, 18). In the
same way the knowledge of Raikva is at first referred to
by means of vid, ‘He who knows (veda) what he knows
is thus spoken of by me,’ and further on by means of
up&s, ‘teach me the deity on which you meditate’ (KA.
Up. IV, 1, 2). Similarly texts which have the same
meaning as the text ‘He who knows Brahman reaches
the Highest ’—viz. ‘the Self should be seen, be heard, be
reflected on, be meditated upon (nididhydsitavya) ’—‘ Then
he sees him meditating (dhy4yam4na) on him as without
parts’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8), and others—use the verb dhyai
to express the meaning of vid. Now dhy4i means to
think of something not in the way of mere representation
(smriti), but in the way of continued representation. And
up&s has the same meaning ; for we see it used in the
sense of thinking with uninterrupted concentration of
the mind on one object. We therefore conclude that
as the verb ‘vid’ is used interchangeably with dhy4i and
upAs, the mental activity referred to in texts such as ‘he
knows Brahman’ and the like is an often-repeated con-
tinuous representation.

2. And on account of an inferential mark.

Inferential mark here means Smriti. Sm~iti also de
clares that that knowledge which effects Release is of the
nature of continued representation. Meditation therefore
has to be repeated.—Here terminates the adhikaraza of
‘ repetition.’

3. But as the Self; this (the ancient Devotees)
acknowledge (since the texts) make (them) appre
hend (in that way).

Iv ADHYAyA, 1 PADA, 3. 717

The following point is now taken into consideration.
Is Brahman to be meditated upon as something different
from the meditating Devotee, or as the Self of the latter >—
The Pirvapakshin holds the former view. For, he says,
the individual soul ἐς something different from Brahman ;
as has been proved under II, 1, 223 III, 4, 8; I, 1, 15.
And Brahman must be meditated upon as it truly is; for
if it is meditated upon under an unreal aspect, the attaining
to Brahman also will not be real, according to the principle
expressed in the text, ‘ According as a man’s thought is in
this world, so will he be when he has departed this life’
(Kk. Up. Ul, 14, 1). This view the Sftra sets aside.
Brahman is rather to be meditated upon as being the
Self of the meditating Devotee. As the meditating indivi-
dual soul is the Self of its own body, so the highest
Brahman is the Self of the individual soul—this is the
proper form of meditation.—Why ?—Because the great
Devotees of olden times acknowledged this to be the true
nature of meditation ; compare the text ‘Then I am indeed
thou, holy divinity, and thou art me.’—But how can the
Devotees claim that Brahman which is a different being is
their ‘Ego’ ?—Because the texts enable them to apprehend
this relation as one free from contradiction. ‘He who
dwelling within the Self is different from the Self, whom
the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who
rules the Self from within ; he is thy Self, the inner ruler,
the immortal one’ (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3); ‘In the True all
these beings have their root, they dwell in. the True, they
rest in the True ;—in that all that exists has its Self’
(KA. Up. VI, 8); ‘All this indeed is Brahman’ (KA. Up.
III, 14, 1}---4}} these texts teach that all sentient and non-
sentient beings spring from Brahman, are merged in him,
breathe through him, are ruled by him, constitute his body ;
so that he is the Self of all of them. In the same way
therefore as, on the basis of the fact that the individual soul
occupies with regard to the body the position of a Self, we
form such judgments of co-ordination as ‘I am a god—I am
aman’; the fact of the individual Self being of the nature
of Self justifies us in viewing our own Ego as belonging

718 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

to the highest Self. On the presupposition of all ideas
being finally based on Brahman and hence all words also
finally denoting Brahman, the texts therefore make such
statements of mutual implication as ‘I am thou, O holy
divinity, and thou art me.’ On this view of the relation
of individual soul and highest Self there is no real con-
tradiction between two, apparently contradictory, sets of
texts, viz. those on the one hand which negative the view
of the soul being different from the highest Self, ‘Now
if a man meditates upon another divinity, thinking “ the
divinity is one and I another,” he does not know’; ‘He
is incomplete, let him meditate upon Him as the Self’;
‘ Everything abandons him who views anything apart from
the Self’ (Bré. Up. I, 4, 10; 7—II, 4, 6); and on the other
hand those texts which set forth the view of the soul and
the highest Self being different entities, ‘Thinking of the
(individual) Self and the Mover as different’ (Svet. Up. I,
6). For our view implies a denial of difference in so far
as the individual ‘I’ is of the nature of the Self; and it
implies an acknowledgment of difference in so far as it
allows the highest Self to differ from the individual soul
in the same way as the latter differs from its body. The
clause ‘he is incomplete’ (in one of the texts quoted
above) refers to the fact that Brahman which is different
from the soul constitutes the Self of the soul, while the
soul constitutes the body of Brahman.—It thus remains
a settled conclusion that Brahman is to be meditated upon
as constituting the Self of the meditating Devotee.— Here
terminates the adhikaraza of ‘meditation under the aspect
of Self.’

4. Not in the symbol; for (the symbol) is not
that one (i.e. the Self of the Devotee).

‘Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman’ (Κλ. Up.
III, 18, 1); ‘He who’ meditates on name as Brahman’
(KA. Up. VII, 15)—with regard to these and similar medi-
tations on outward symbols (pratika) of Brahman there
arises a doubt, viz. whether in them the symbols are to
be thought’ of as of the nature of Self or not. The Parva-

ΙΝ ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 6. 719

pakshin holds the former view. For, he says, in form
those injunctions do not differ from other injunctions of
meditation on Brahman, and Brahman, as we have seen,
constitutes the Self of the meditating Devotee.—This view
the Sfitra sets aside. A pratika cannot be meditated on
as being of the nature of Self; for the pratika is not the
Self of the meditating Devotee. What, in those medita-
tions, is to be meditated upon is the pratika only, not
Brahman: the latter enters into the meditation only as
qualifying its aspect. For by a meditation on a pratika
we understand a meditation in which something that is
not Brahman is viewed under the aspect of Brahman, and
as the pratika—the object of meditation—is not the Self
of the Devotee it cannot be viewed under that form.—But
an objection is raised here also, it is Brahman which is the
real object of meditation; for where Brahman may be
viewed as the object of meditation, it is inappropriate to
assume as objects non-sentient things of small power such
as the mind, and so on. The object of meditation there-
fore is Brahman viewed under the aspect of mind, and
so on.—This objection the next Sitra disposes of.

5. The view of Brahman, on account of supe-
riority.

The view of Brahman may appropriately be superimposed
on mind and the like; but not the view of mind, and so
on,on Brahman. For Brahman is something superior to
mind, and so on; while the latter are inferior to Brahman.
To view a superior person, a prince e.g., as a servant
would be lowering; while, on the other hand, to view
a servant as a prince is exalting—Here terminates the
adhikaraza of ‘symbols.’

6. And the ideas of Aditya and the rest on the
member ; on account of this being rational.

‘He who shines up there let a man meditate on him
as the Udgitha’ (ΔΛ. Up. I, 3, 1).—With regard to this
and similar meditations connected with subordinate parts
of sacrificial performances there arises the doubt whether

720 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

the idea of Aditya and so on has to be superimposed
on the subordinate part of the sacrifice, such as the Udgitha,
or vice versA (i.e. whether Aditya should be meditated
upon under the aspect of the Udgitha, or vice versi)—The
Parvapakshin holds the former view. For the general
principle is that the lower being should be viewed under
the aspect of the higher, and the Udgitha and so on, which
are parts of the sacrifices through which certain results are
effected, are superior to the divinities who do not accom-
plish any result.—Of this view the Sftra disposes. The
ideas of Aditya and so on are to be superimposed on the
‘members,’ i.e. the Udgitha and so on, which are con-
stituent members of the sacrifices; because of the gods
only superiority can be established. For it is only through
the propitiation of the gods that sacrifices are capable
of bringing about their results) The Udgitha and the rest
therefore are to be viewed under the aspect of Aditya and
so on.—Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the ideas of
Aditya and so on.’

7. Sitting ; on account of possibility.

It has been shown that that special form of cognitional
activity which the Ved4nta-texts set forth as the means
of accomplishing final Release and which is called medita-
tion (dhy4na; upAsana) has to be frequently repeated,
and is of the nature of continued representation. A ques
tion now arises as to the way in which it has to be carried
on.—There being no special restrictive rule, the Pirva-
pakshin holds that the Devotee thay carry it on either sitting
or lying down or standing or walking.—This view the
Satra sets aside. Meditation is to be carried on by the
Devotee ina sitting posture, since in that posture only
the needful concentration of mind can be reached. Standing
and walking demand effort, and lying down is conducive
to sleep. The proper posture is sitting on some support,
so that no effort may be required for holding the body up.

8, And on account of meditation.
Since, as intimated by the text,‘ the Self is to be medi

IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12. 721

tated upon,’ the mental activity in question is of the
nature of meditation, it requires as its necessary condition
concentration of mind. For by meditation is understood

thought directed upon one object and not disturbed by the
ideas of other things.

9. And with reference to immobility.

And it is with reference to their immobility that the
earth and other inanimate things—the air, the sky, the
waters, the mountains—may be spoken of as thinking,
‘ the earth thinks (dhy4yati) as it were, and so on. Move-
lessness hence is characteristic of the intensely meditating
person also, and such movelessness is to be realised in the
sitting posture only.

10. And Smrtti texts say the same.

Smrti texts also declare that he only who sits can
meditate, ‘ Having placed his steady seat upon a pure spot,
there seated upon that seat, concentrating his mind he
should practise Yoga’ (Bha. Gi. VI, 11-12).

11. Where concentration of mind (is possible),
there; on account of there being no difference.

As the texts do not say anything as to special places
and times, the only requisite of such places and times
is that they should favour concentration of mind. This
agrees with the declaration ‘Let a man apply himself to
meditation in a level and clean place, &c., favourable
to the mind’ (Svet. Up. II, 10).—Here terminates the
adhikarava of ‘ the sitting one.’

12. Up to death; for there also it is seen.

The question now arises whether the meditation de-
scribed which is the means of final Release is to be
accomplished within one day, or to be continued day
after day, until death—The view that it is accomplished
within one day, as this will satisfy the scriptural injunction,
is disposed of by the Stra. Meditation is to be continued
until death. For Scripture declares that meditation has
to take place ‘there,’ i.e. in the whole period from the
first effort after meditation up to death, ‘Acting thus as

[48] 34

722 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

long as life lasts he reaches the world of Brahman. —Here
terminates the adhikarama of ‘up to death.’

13. On the attainment of this, there result the
non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier
sins; this being declared.

Having, so far, elucidated the nature of meditation, the
Satras now begin to consider the result of meditation.
Scripture declares that on the knowledge of Brahman being
attained a man’s later and earlier sins do not cling to him
but pass away, ‘ As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so
no evil deed clings to him who knows this’ (KA. Up. IV,
14, 3); ‘Having known that he is not sullied by any evil
deed’ (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 23) ; ‘As the fibres of the Ishika reed
when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are
burnt’ (A. Up. V, 24, 3); ‘All his works perish when He has
been beheld who is high and low’ (Mu. Up. IT, 2, 8).—The
doubt here arises whether this non-clinging and destruction
of all sins is possible as the result of mere meditation, or
not.—It is not possible, the Parvapakshin maintains ; for
Scripture declares, ‘no work the fruits of which have not
been completely enjoyed perishes even in millions of aeons.’
What the texts, quoted above, say as to the non-clinging
and destruction of works occurs in sections complementary
to passages inculcating knowledge as the means of final
Release, and may therefore be understood as somehow
meant to eulogize knowledge. Nor can it be said that
knowledge is enjoined as an expiation of sins, so that the
destruction of sins could be conceived as resulting from
such expiation ; for knowledge—as we see from texts such
as ‘He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,’ ‘He
knows Brahman and he becomes Brahman ’—is enjoined
as a means to reach Brahman. The texts as to the non-
clinging and destruction of sins therefore can only be
viewed as arthavada passages supplementary to the texts
enjoining knowledge of Brahman.—This view the Sitra
sets aside. When a man reaches knowledge, the non-
clinging and destruction of all sins may be effected through
the power of knowledge. For Scripture declares the power

IV ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 13. 723

of knowledge to be such that ‘to him who knows this, no
evil deed clings,’ and so on. Nor is this in conflict with the
text stating that no work not fully enjoyed perishes; for
this latter text aims at confirming the power of works to
produce their results; while the texts under discussion
have for their aim to declare that knowledge when once
sprung up possesses the power of destroying the capability
of previously committed sins to produce their own evil
results and the power of obstructing that capability on the
part of future evil actions. The two sets of texts thus
refer to different matters, and hence are not mutually con-
tradictory. There is in fact no more contradiction between
them than there is between the power of fire to produce
heat and the power of water to subdue such heat. By
knowledge effecting the non-clinging of sin we have to
understand its obstructing the origination of the power, on
the part of sin, to cause that disastrous disposition on the
part of man which consists in unfitness for religious works ;
for sins committed tend to render man unfit for religious
works and inclined to commit further sinful actions of the
same kind. By knowledge effecting the destruction of sin, on
the other hand, we understand its destroying that power of
sin after it has once originated. That power consists, funda-
mentally, in displeasure on the part of the Lord. Know-
ledge of the Lord, which, owing to the supreme dearness of
its object is itself supremely dear, possesses the character-
istic power of propitiating the Lord—the object of know-
ledge—and thus destroys the displeasure of the Lord due
to the previous commission of sins on the part of the
knowing Devotee; and at the same time obstructs the
origination of further displeasure on the Lord's part, which
otherwise would be caused by sins committed subsequently
to the origination of such knowledge. What Scripture
says about sin not clinging to him who knows can however
be understood only with regard to such sins as spring from
thoughtlessness ; for texts such as ‘he who has not turned
away from evil conduct’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24) teach that medi.
tation, becoming more perfect day after day, cannot be
accomplished without the Devotee having previously broken
3A2

724 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

himself off from all evil conduct.—Here terminates the
adhikaraza of ‘ the reaching of that.’

14. Of the other also there is thus non-linging;
but at death.

It has been said that, owing to knowledge, earlier and
subsequent sins do not cling and are destroyed. The same
holds good also with regard to the other, i.e. to good
works—they also, owing to knowledge, do not cling and
are destroyed ; for there is the same antagonism between
knowledge and the fruit of those works, and Scripture
moreover expressly declares this. Thus we read, ‘Day
and night do not pass that bank—neither good nor evil
deeds. All sins turn back from it’ (KA. Up. VIII, 4, 1);
‘He shakes off his good and evil deeds’ (Kau. Up. I, 4).
In the former of these texts good works are expressly
designated as ‘sin’ because their fruits also are some-
thing not desirable for him who aims at Release ; there is
some reason for doing this because after all good works are
enjoined by Scripture and their fruits are desired by men,
and they hence might be thought not to be opposed to know-
ledge.—But even to him who possesses the knowledge of
Brahman, the fruits of good deeds—such as seasonable
rain, good crops, &c.—are desirable because they enable
him to perform his meditations in due form; how then
can it be said that knowledge is antagonistic to them and
destroys them ?—Of this point the Sitra disposes by means
of the clause ‘but on death.’ Good works which produce
results favourable to knowledge and meditation perish only
on the death of the body (not during the lifetime of the
Devotee).—Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘ the other.’

15. But only those former works the effects of
which have not yet begun; on account of that being
the term.

A new doubt arises here, viz. whether all previous good
and evil works are destroyed by the origination of know-
ledge, or only those the effects of which have not yet begun
to operate—All works alike, the Pdrvapakshin says ; for
the texts—as e.g. ‘all sins are burned ’"—declare the fruits

a
Iv apHYAYA, I PADA, 16. 725

of knowledge to be the same in all cases; and the fact of
the body continuing to exist subsequently to the rise of
knowledge may be accounted for by the force of an impulse
once imparted, just as in the case of the revolution of
a potter’s wheel.—This view the Stra sets aside. Only
those previous works perish the effects of which have not
yet begun to operate ; for the text ‘ For him there is delay
as long as he is not delivered from the body’ (KA. Up. VI,
14, 2) expressly states when the delay of the body’s death
will come to an end (the body meanwhile continuing to
exist through the influence of the andrabdhakarya
works). There is no proof for the existence of an impetus
accounting for the continuance of the body’s life, other than
the Lord’s pleasure or displeasure caused by good or evil
deeds.—Here terminates the adhikarava of ‘the works the
operation of which has not yet begun.’

16. But the Agnihotra and the rest, (because they
tend) to that effect only; this being seen.

It might here be said that special works incumbent on
the several A4sramas, as e.g. the Agnihotra, need not be
undertaken by those who are not desirous of their results,
since these works also fall under the category of good
works the result of which does not ‘ cling.'-—This view the
Sdtra sets aside. Such works as the Agnihotra must be
performed, since there is no possibility of their results πο
clinging ; for him who knows, those works have knowledge
for their exclusive effect. This we learn from Scripture itself :
‘Him Braéhmazas seek to know by the study of the Veda,
by sacrifices, gifts, austerities, and fasting.’ This passage
shows that works such as the Agnihotra give rise to know-
ledge, and as knowledge in order to grow and become
more perfect has to be practised day after day until death,
the special duties of the 4srama also, which assist the rise
of knowledge, have daily to be performed. Otherwise, those
duties being omitted, the mind would lose its clearness and
knowledge would not arise—But if good works such as
the Agnihotra only serve the purpose of giving rise to
knowledge, and if good works previous to the rise of know-

726 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

ledge perish, according to the texts ‘Having dwelt there
till their works are consumed’ (ΚΛ. Up. V, 10, 5) and
‘having obtained the end of his deeds’ (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 6),
to what then applies the text ‘His sons enter upon his
inheritance, his friends upon his good works’ ?—This point
is taken up by the next Satra.

17. According to some (a class of good works)
other than these, of both kinds.

The text quoted above from one sakh& (‘His friends
enter upon his good deeds’) refers to good works other
than the Agnihotra and the rest, the only object of which
is to give rise to knowledge, viz. to all those manifold
good works, previous or subsequent to the attaining to
knowledge, the results of which are obstructed by other
works of greater strength. Those texts also which declare
works not to cling or to be destroyed through knowledge
refer to this same class of works.—The next Satra recalls
the fact, already previously established, that the results of
works actually performed may somehow be obstructed.

18. For (there is the text) ‘whatever he does with
knowledge.’

The declaration made in the text ‘whatever he does
with knowledge that is more vigorous,’ viz. that the know-
ledge of the Udgitha has for its result non-obstruction of
the result of the sacrifice, implies that the result of works
actually performed may be obstructed. We thus arrive at
the conclusion that the text of the SAyAyanins, ‘his friends
enter upon his good works,’ refers to those good works of
the man possessing knowledge the results of which were
somehow obstructed (and hence did not act themselves out
during his lifetime, so that on his death they may be
transferred to others).—Here terminates the adhikaraaa of
‘the Agnihotra and the rest.’

19. But having destroyed by fruition the other
two sets he becomes one with Brahman.
There now arises the doubt whether the good and evil

IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 19. 727

works other than those the non-clinging and destruction
of which have been declared, that is to say those works the
results of which have begun to act, come to an end together
with that bodily existence in which knowledge of Brahman
originates, or with the last body due to the action of the
works last mentioned, or with another body due to the
action of the andrabdhakarya.—The second of these alter-
natives is the one to be accepted, for there is a text
declaring that works come to an end with the deliverance
of the Self from the current bodily existence: ‘For him
there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the
body), then he will become one with Brahman’ (ΚΛ. Up.
VI, 14, 2).—This view the Stra sets aside. Having de-
stroyed the other good and evil works the results of which
had begun to operate by retributive experience he, subse-
quently to the termination of such retributive enjoyment,
becomes one with Brahman. If those good and evil works
are such that their fruits may be fully enjoyed within the
term of one bodily existence, they come to an end together
with the current bodily existence; if they require several
bodily existences for the full experience of their results,
they come to an end after several existences only. This
being so, the deliverance spoken of in the text quoted by
the Pdrvapakshin means deliverance from those works
when completely destroyed by retributive enjoyment, not
deliverance from bodily existence about which the text
says nothing. All those works, on the other hand, good
and evil, which were performed before the rise of know-
ledge and the results of which have not yet begun to
operate—works which have gradually accumulated in the
course of infinite time so as to constitute an infinite quan-
tity—are at once destroyed by the might of the rising know-
ledge of Brahman. And works performed subsequently
to the rise of such knowledge do not ‘cling.’ And, as
Scripture teaches, the friends of the man possessing true
knowledge take over, on his death, his good works, and his
enemies his evil deeds. Thus there remains no contra-
diction.—Here terminates the adhikarama of ‘the destruc-
tion of the others,’

728 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

SECOND PADA.

1. Speech with mind, on account of this being
seen and of scriptural statement.

The Sdtras now begin an enquiry into the mode of the
going to Brahman of him who knows. At first the soul’s
departure from the body is considered. On this point we
have the text, ‘When a man departs from hence his speech
is combined (sampadyate) with his mind, his mind with his
breath, his breath with fire, fire with the highest deity’
(KA. Up. VI, 6, 1). The doubt here arises whether the.
speech’s being combined with the mind, referred to in the
text, means that the function of speech only is merged in
mind, or the organ of speech itself—The Pdrvapakshin
holds the former view ; for, he says, as mind is not the
causal substance of χθονί, the latter cannot be merged in
it; while the scriptural statement is not altogether irra-
tional in so far as the functions of speech and other organs
are controlled by the mind, and therefore may be conceived
as being withdrawn into it.—This view the Satra sets aside.
Speech itself becomes combined with mind ; since that is
seen. For the activity of mind is observed to go on even
when the organ of speech has ceased to act.—But is this
not sufficiently accounted for by the assumption of the
mere function of speech being merged in mind ?—To this
the Satra replies ‘and on account of the scriptural word.’
The text says distinctly that speech itself, not merely the
function of speech, becomes one with the mind. And when
the function of speech comes to an end, there is no other
means of knowledge to assure us that the function only has
come to an end and that the organ itself continues to have
an independent existence. The objection that speech can-
not ‘become one with mind because the latter is not the
causal substance of speech, we meet by pointing out that
the purport of the text is not that speech is merged in
mind, but only that it is combined or connected with it.

Iv ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 4. 729

2. And for the same reason all follow after.

Because speech’s becoming one with mind means only
conjunction with the latter, not merging within it; there
is also no objection to what Scripture says as to all other
organs that follow speech being united with mind.—Here
terminates the adhikaraza of ‘ speech.’

3. That mind in breath, owing to the subsequent
clause.

That mind, i.e. mind united with all the organs unites
itself with breath; not merely the function of mind. This
appears from the clause following upon the text quoted
above, ‘mind (unites itself) with breath.’ Here, however,
a further doubt suggests itself. The text ‘Mind is made of
earth’ declares earth to be the causal substance of mind,
and the text ‘that (viz. water) sent forth earth’ declares
water to be the causal substance of earth ; while the further
text ‘breath is made of water’ shows water to be the
causal substance of breath. Considering therefore that in
the text ‘mind becomes united with breath’ the term breath
is naturally understood to denote the causal substance of
breath, i.e. water, the appropriate sense to be given to the
statement that mind is united with water is that mind is
completely refunded into its own causal substance—so that
the ‘being united’ would throughout be understood ‘as
being completely merged.’ —The reply to this, however, is,
that the clauses ‘ Mind is made of food, breath is made of
water, only mean that mind and breath are nourished
and sustained by food and water, not that food and water
are the causal substances of mind and breath. The latter
indeed is impossible ; for mind consists of ahamkara, and
as breath is a modification of ether and other elements,
the word breath may suggest water.—Here terminates the
adhikaraaa of ‘ mind.’

4. That (is united) with the ruler, on account of
the going to it, and so on.

As from the statements that speech becomes united with
mind and mind with breath it follows that speech and

730 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

mind are united with mind and breath only ; so we con-
clude from the subsequent clause ‘breath with fire’ that
breath becomes united with fire only.—Against this prima
facie view the Sftra declares ‘that breath becomes united
with the ruler of the organs, i,e. the individual soul, on
account of the going to it,and soon.’ That breath goes
to the individual soul, the following text declares, ‘ At the
time of death all the prazas go to the Self of a man about
to expire’ (Brz. Up. IV, 3, 38). Similarly Scripture men-
tions the departure of praza together with the soul, ‘after
him thus departing the prava departs’; and again its
staying together with the soul, ‘ What is that by whose
departure I shall depart, and by whose staying I shall
stay?’ (Pr. Up. VI, 3). We therefore conclude that the
text ‘breath with fire’ means that breath joined with the
individual soul becomes united with fire. Analogously we
may say in ordinary life that the Yamun4 is flowing towards
the sea, while in reality it is the YamunA joined with the
Ganga which flows on.—Here terminates the adhikarana of
‘the ruler.’

5. With the elements, this being stated by Scripture.

There arises the further question whether breath joined
with the soul unites itself with fire only or with all the
elements combined. — With fire, so much only being
declared by Scripture!—This view the Sitra sets aside.
Breath and soul unite themselves with all the elements;
for Scripture declares the soul, when moving out, to consist
of all the elements—‘ Consisting of earth, consisting of
water, consisting of fire.—But this latter text explains
itself also on the assumption. of breath and soul uniting
themselves in succession with fire and the rest, one at a
time !—This the next Satra negatives.

6. Not with one; for both declare this.

Not with one; because each element by itself is incapable
of producing an effect. Such incapability is declared by
Scripture and tradition alike. The text ‘ Having entered
these beings with this giva soul let me reveal names and
forms—let me make each of these three tripartite’ (Χά. Up.

IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7. 731

VI, 3) teaches that the elements were rendered tripartite in
order to be capable of evolving names and forms; and
of similar import is the following Smrtti text, ‘ Possessing
various powers these (elements), being separate from one
another, were unable to produce creatures without com-
bining. But having entered into mutual conjunction they,
from the Mahat down to individual beings, produce the
Brahma egg. From this it follows that in the clause
‘breath is united with fire’ the word fire denotes fire
mixed with the other elements. Breath and soul therefore
are united with the aggregate of the elements.—Here ter-
minates the adhikaraza of ‘the elements.’

7. And it is common up to the beginning of the
way ; and the immortality (is that which is obtained),
without having burned.

Is this departure of the soul common to him who knows
and him who does not know ?— It belongs to him only who
does not know, the Parvapakshin holds. For Scripture
declares that for him who knows there is no departure,
and that hence he becomes immortal then and there
(irrespective of any departure of the soul to another
place), ‘when all desires which once dwelt in his heart
are undone, then the mortal becomes immortal, then
he obtains Brahman’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7). This view the
Sftra sets aside. For him also who knows there is the
same way of passing out up to the beginning of the path,
i.e. previously to the soul’s entering the veins. For another
text expressly declares that the soul of him also who knows
passes out by way ofa particular vein : ‘there are a hundred
and one veins of the heart; one of them penetrates the
crown of the head ; moving upwards by that a man reaches
immortality, the others serve for departing in different
directions’ (K%. Up. VIII, 6, 5). Scripture thus declaring
that the soul of him who knows passes out by way of
a particular vein, it must of course be admitted that it does
pass out; and as up to the soul’s entering the vein no differ-
ence is mentioned, we must assume that up to that moment
the departure of him who knows does not differ from that

732 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

of him who does not know. A difference however is stated
with regard to the stage of the soul’s entering the vein,
viz. Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2, ‘By that light the Self departs,
either through the eye, or through the skull, or through
other parts of the body.’ As this text must be interpreted
in agreement with the text relative to the hundred and one
veins, the departure by way of the head must be under-
stood to belong to him who knows, while the other modes
of departing belong to other persons. The last clause of
the Sdtra ‘and the immortality, without having burned’
replies to what the Parvapakshin said as to the soul of him
who knows being declared by Scripture to attain to immor-
tality then and there. The immortality referred to in the
text ‘when all desires of his heart are undone’ denotes
that non-clinging and destruction of earlier and later sins
which comes to him who knows, together with the rise of
knowledge, without the connexion of the soul with the
body, and the sense-organs being burned, i. e. dissolved at
the time.—‘ He reaches Brahman’ in the same text means
that in the act of devout meditation the devotee has an
intuitive knowledge of Brahman.

8. Since, up to the union with that (i.e. Brahman)
the texts describe the Samsara state.

The immortality referred to must necessarily be under-
stood as not implying dissolution of the soul’s connexion
with the body, since up to the soul’s attaining to Brahman
the texts describe the Samsara state. That attaining to
Brahman takes place, as will be shown further on, after the
soul—moving on the path the first stage of which is light—
has reached a certain place. Up to that the texts denote
the Sams4ra state of which the connexion with a body is
characteristic. ‘For him there is delay so long as he is
not delivered (from the body); then he will be united’
(Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2); ‘ Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes
his hairs, and as the moon frees herself from the mouth of
R&hu ; having shaken off the body I obtain self, made and
satisfied, the uncreated world of Brahman’ (VIII, 13).

g. And the subtle (body persists), on account of

Iv aDHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12. 733

a means of knowledge, it being thus observed (in
Scripture).

The bondage of him who knows is not, at that stage,
dissolved, for this reason also that the subtle body con-
tinues to persist.—How is this known ?—Through a means
of knowledge, viz. because it is thus seen in Scripture. For
Scripture states that he who knows, when on the path of the
gods, enters into a colloquy with the moon and others, ‘he is
to reply,’ &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3 ff.). This implies the existence
of a body, and thence it follows that, at that stage, the
subtle body persists. The state of bondage therefore is
not yet dissolved.

10. Hence not in the way of destruction of bondage.

It thus appears that the text ‘when all desires which
once entered his heart are undone, then does the mortal
become immortal, then he obtains Brahman’ (Bri. Up. IV,
4, 7), does not mean such immortality as would imply
complete destruction of the state of bondage.

11. And to that very (subtle body) (there belongs)
the warmth, this only being reasonable.

It is observed that when a man is about to die there is
some warmth left in some part or parts of the gross body.
Now this warmth cannot really belong to the gross body,
for it is not observed in other parts of that body (while yet
there is no reason why it should be limited to some part);
but it may reasonably be attributed to the subtle body
which may abide in some part of the gross body (and into
which the warmth of the entire gross body has withdrawn
itself), We therefore conclude that this partial perception
of warmth is due to the departing subtle body. This con-
firms the view laid down in Sdtra 7.—The next Sitra dis-
poses of a further doubt raised as to the departure of the
soul of him who knows,

12. If it be said that on account of the denial (it
is not so); we deny this. From the embodied soul;
for (that one is) clear, according to some.

734 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

The contention that the soul of him who knows departs
from the body in the same way as other souls do cannot
be upheld, since Scripture expressly negatives such depar-
ture. For Bri. Up. IV, 4, at first describes the mode of
departure on the part of him who does not possess true
knowledge (‘He taking to himself those elements of light
descends into the heart’ up to ‘after him thus departing
the Praza departs’); then refers to his assuming another
body (‘he makes to himself another, newer and more
beautiful shape’); then concludes the account of him who
does not possess true knowledge (‘having attained the end
of these works whatever he does here, he again returns
from that world to this world of action. So much for the
man who desires’); and thereupon proceeds explicitly to
deny the departure from the body of him who possesses
true knowledge, ‘ But he who does not desire, who is without
desire, free from desire, who has obtained his desire, who
desires the Self only, of him (tasya) the prazas do not pass
forth,—being Brahman only he goes into Brahman.’ Simi-
larly a previous section also, viz. the.one containing the
questions put by Artabh4ga, directly negatives the view
of the soul of him who knows passing out of the body.
There the clause ‘he again conquers death ’ introduces him
who knows as the subject-matter, and after that the text
continues : ‘ Yag#avalkya, he said, when that person dies, do
the prazas pass out of him (asmat) or not ?—No, said
YAg#avalkya, they are gathered up in him (atraiva), he
swells, inflated the dead lies’ (Brt. Up. III, 2, 10-11).
From these texts it follows that he who knows attains to
immortality Here (without his soul passing out of the body
and moving to another place).—This view the Satra rejects.
‘Not so; from the embodied soul.’ What those texts deny
is the moving away of the prazas from the embodied indi-
vidual soul, not from the body. ‘Of him (tasya) the
pranas do not pass forth ’—here the ‘of him’ refers to the
subject under discussion, i.e. the embodied soul which is
introduced by the clause ‘he who does not desire,’ not to
the body which the text had not previously mentioned.
The sixth case (tasya) here denotes the embodied soul as

ΙΝ ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12. 735

that which is connected with the prazas (‘the prazas
belonging to that, i.e. the soul, do not pass out’), not as
that from which the passing out takes its start—But why
should the ‘tasya’ not denote the body as the point of
starting (‘the prazas do not pass forth from that (tasya),
viz. the body ’)?—Because, we reply, the soul which is
actually mentioned in its relation of connexion with the
pranas (as indicated by tasya) suggests itself to the mind
more immediately than the body which is not mentioned
at all; if therefore the question arises as to the starting-
point of the passing forth of the prazas the soul is (on
the basis of the text) apprehended as that starting-point
also (i.e. the clause ‘the prazas of him do not pass
forth’ implies at the same time ‘the prazas do not pass
forth from him, i.e. from the soul’). Moreover, as the
prazas are well known to be connected with the soul and
as hence it would serve no purpose to state that con-
nexion, we conclude that the sixth case which expresses
connexion in general is here meant to denote the starting-
point in particular. And no dispute on this point is really
possible ; since ‘according to some’ it is ‘clear’ that what
the text means to express is the embodied soul as the
starting-point of the prazas. The some are the Madhyan-
dinas, who in their text of the Brzhad-arazyaka read ‘na
tasmAt pra#4 utkramanti’—‘ the prazas do not pass forth
Srom him’ (the ‘tasya’ thus being the reading of the
Kaava Sakha only).—But, an objection is raised, there is
no motive for explicitly negativing the passing away of the
prazas from the soul ; for there is no reason to assume that
there should be such a passing away (and the general rule
is that a denial is made of that only for which there is
a presumption).—Not so, we reply. The A/4ndogya-text
‘For him there is delay only as long as he is not delivered
(from the body); then he will be united’ declares that the
soul becomes united with Brahman at the time of its sepa-
ration from the body, and this suggests the idea of the soul
of him who knows separating itself at that very time (i. e.
the time of death) from the prazas also. But this would
mean that the soul cannot reach union with Brahman by

736 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

means of proceeding on the path of the gods, and for this
reason the Brihad-drazyaka (‘of him the prasas do not
pass forth’) explicitly declares that the prasas do not
depart from the soul of him who knows, before that soul
proceeding on the path of the gods attains to union with
Brahman.

The same line of refutation would have to be applied to
the arguments founded by our opponent on the question of
Artabh4ga, if that question be viewed as referring to him
who possesses true knowledge. The fact however is that
that passage refers to him who does zo# possess that know-
ledge ; for none of the questions and answers of which the
section consists favours the presumption of the knowledge
of Brahman being under discussion. The matters touched
upon in those questions and answers are the nature of the
senses and sense objects viewed as graha and atigraha ;
water being the food of fire; the non-separation of the
pramas from the soul at the time of death ; the continuance
of the fame—there called name—of the dead man; and
the attainment, on the part of the soul of the departed, to
conditions of existence corresponding to his good or evil
deeds. The passage immediately preceding the one re-
ferring to the non-departure of the prazas merely means
that death is conquered in so far as it is a fire and fire is
the food of water ; this has nothing to do with the owner
of true knowledge. The statement that the prasas of the
ordinary man who does not possess true knowledge do not
depart means that at the time of death the prasas do not,
like the gross body, abandon the giva, but cling to it like
the subtle body and accompany it.

13. Smrzti also declares this.

Smriti also declares that the soul of him who knows
departs by means of an artery of the head. ‘ Of those, one
is situated above which pierces the disc of the sun and
passes beyond the world of Brahman; by way of that the
soul reaches the highest goal’ (Yag#. Smrz. III, 167).—Here

terminates the adhikarava of ‘up to the beginning of the
road.’

IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 15. 737

14. With the Highest; for thus it says.

It has been shown that at the time of departure from the
body the soul together with the organs and prdzas unites
itself with the subtle elements, fire and the rest; and the
notion that the soul of him who knows forms an exception
has been disposed of. The further question now arises
whether those subtle elements move on towards producing
their appropriate effects, in accordance with the works or
the nature of meditation (of some other soul with which
those elements join themselves), or unite themselves with
the highest Self_—The Pdrvapakshin holds that, as in the
case of union with the highest Self, they could not give rise
to their peculiar effects, i.e. the experience of pleasure and
pain, they move towards some place where they can give
rise to their appropriate effects.—Of this view the S(tra dis-
poses. They unite themselves with the highest Self; for
Scripture declares ‘warmth in the highest Being’ (Χά.
Up. VI, 8, 6). And the doings of those elements must be
viewed in such a way as to agree with Scripture. As in
the states of deep sleep and a pralaya, there is, owing to
union with the highest Self, a cessation of all experience
of pain and pleasure ; so it is in the case under question
also.—Here terminates the adhikarava of ‘union with the
Highest.’

15. Non-division, according to statement.

Is this union with the highest Self to be understood as
ordinary ‘ merging,’ i.e. a return on the part of the effected
thing into the condition of the cause (as when the jar is
reduced to the condition of a lump of clay), or as absolute
non-division from the highest Self, such as is meant in the
clauses preceding the text last quoted, ‘Speech is merged
in mind’? &c.—The former view is to be adopted ; for as
the highest Self is the causal substance of all, union with it
means the return on the part of individual beings into the
condition of that causal substance.—This view the Satra re-
jects. Union here means non-division, i. e. connexion of such
kind that those subtle elements are altogether incapable
of being thought and spoken of as separate from Brah-

[48] 38

738 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

man. This the text itself declares, since the clause ‘ warmth
in the highest Being’ is connected with and governed by
the preceding clause ‘Speech is merged in mind.’ This
preceding clause intimates a special kind of connexion, viz.
absolute non-separation, and there is nothing to prove that
the dependent clause means to express something different ;
nor is there any reason why at the time of the soul’s
departure those elements should enter into the causal con-
dition ; nor is there anything said about their again pro-
ceeding from the causal substance in a new creation —
Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘ non-separation.’

16. A lighting up of the point of the abode of
that; having the door illuminated by that (the
soul), owing to the power of its knowledge and the
application of remembrance of the way which is an
element of that (viz. of knowledge), being assisted
by him who abides within the heart, (passes out) by
way of the hundred and first artery.

So far it has been shown that, up to the beginning of
the journey, the souls of them as well who possess true
knowledge as of those who do not, pass out of the body
in the same way. Now a difference is stated in the case
of those who have true knowledge. We have on this
point the following text: ‘There are a hundred and one
arteries of the heart ; one of them penetrates the crown of
the head ; moving upwards by that a man reaches immor-
tality ; the others serve for departing in different directions’
(KA. Up. VIII, 6, 5). The doubt here arises whether he
who knows departs by this hundred and first artery in the
top of the head, while those who do not know depart by
way of the other arteries; or whether there is no definite
rule on this point.—There is no definite rule, the Parva-
pakshin holds. For as the arteries are many and exceed-
ingly minute, they are difficult to distinguish, and the soul
therefore is not able to follow any particular one. The
text therefore (is not meant to make an original authorita-
tive statement as to different arteries being followed by

IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 17. 739

different souls, but) merely refers in an informal way to
what is already settled (viz. by the reason of the thing), i.e.
the casual departure of any soul by any artery.—This view:
the Stra rejects ‘ By way of the hundred and first.’ The
soul of him who possesses true knowledge departs only by:
way of the hundred and first artery in the crown of the
head. Nor is that soul unable to distinguish that particular
artery. For, through the power of his supremely clear know-
ledge which has the effect of pleasing the Supreme Person,
and through the application of remembrance of tha way—
which remembrance is a part of that knowledge—the soul of
him who knows wins the favour of the Supreme Person
who abides within the heart, and is assisted by him. Owing
to this the abode of that, i. e. the heart which is the abode of
the soul, is illuminated, lit up at its tip, and thus, through
the grace of the Supreme Soul, the individual soul has the
door (of egress from the body) lit up and is able to recog-
nise that artery. There is thus no objection to the view
that the soul of him who knows passes out by way of that
particular artery only.—Here terminates the adhikaraza
of ‘the abode of that.’

17. Following the rays. .

Scripture teaches that the soul of him who knows, after
having passed forth from the heart by way of the hundred
and first artery, follows the rays of the sun and thus
reaches the disc of the sun : ‘ when he departs from this body
he goes upwards by these rays only’ (eva) (KA. Up. VIII,
6,5). The idea here suggests itself that the going of the
soul cannot be exclusively bound to those rays, since when
a man dies during the night it cannot follow the rays of
the sun. Hence the text quoted above can refer only to
a part of the actual cases—This view the Satra rejects.
The soul moves upwards, following the rays only; the
text expressly asserting this by means of the ‘ eva ’—which
would be out of place were there any alternative. Nor is
there any strength in the argument that the soul of him
who dies at night cannot follow the rays as there are none.
For in summer the experience of heat at night-time shows

3B 2

740 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

that there are present rays then also; while in winter, as
generally in bad weather, that heat is overpowered by cold
end hence is not perceived (although actually present).
Scripture moreover states that the arteries and rays are at
all times mutually connected : ‘As a very long highway
goes to two villages, so the rays of the sun go to both
worlds, to this one and to the other. They stretch them-
selves forth from the sun and enter into these arteries;
they stretch themselves forth from these arteries and enter
into yonder sun’ (KA. Up. VIII, 6, 2).—As thus there are
rays at night also, the souls of those who know reach
Brahman by way of the rays only.—Here terminates the
adhikaraza of ‘ the following up the rays.’

18. Should it be said, not in the night; we say,
no; because the connexion persists as long as the
body does. Scripture also declares this.

It is now enquired into whether the soul of him who,
while having true knowledge, dies at night reaches Brahman
or not. Although, as solar rays exist at night, the soul
may move on at night also following those rays ; yet, since
dying at night is spoken of in the Sdtras as highly objec-
tionable, we concludé that he who dies at night cannot
accomplish the highest end of man, viz. attainment to
Brahman. The Sitras eulogize death occurring in day-
time and object to death at night-time: ‘ Day-time, the
bright half of the month and the northern progress of
the sun are excellent for those about to die ; the contrary
times are unfavourable.’ According to this, their different
nature, dying in day-time may be assumed to lead to
a superior state of existence, and dying at night to an
inferior state. He who dies at night cannot therefore
ascend to Brahman.—This view the Sdtra refutes: ‘Be-
cause, in the case of him who knows, the connexion with
works exists as long as the body does.’ This is to say
—since those works which have not yet begun to pro-
duce their results and which are the cause of future inferior
states of existence are destroyed by the contact with
knowledge, while at the same time later works do not

Iv ADHYAya, 2 PADA, 19. 741

‘cling ’ (also owing to the presence of true knowledge), and
those works which have begun to act come to an end with
the existence of the last body ; there is no reason why he
who knows should remain in bondage, and hence he reaches
Brahman even if dying at night-time. Scripture also de-
clares this, ‘ for him there is delay only as long as he is not
freed from the body, then he will be united.’ The text
which praises the advantages of night-time, the light: half
of the month, &c., therefore must be understood as refer-
‘ring to those who do not possess true knowledge.—Here
terminates the adhikaraza of ‘ night.’

19. For the same reason also during the southern
progress of the sun.

The reasoning stated above also proves that the owner
of true knowledge who may happen to die during the
southern progress of the sun reaches Brahman. A further
doubt, however, arises here. The text ‘He who dies
during the sun’s southern progress reaches the greatness
of the Fathers and union with the moon’ (Mahanar. Up. 25)
declares that he who dies during the southern progress
reaches the moon; and the other text ‘when this ceases
they return again the same way’ (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 16) states
that he returns again to the earth. We further know that
Bhishma and others, although fully possessing the know-
ledge of Brahman, put off their death until the beginning
of the northern progress. All this seems to prove that
he who dies during the southern progress does not reach
Brahman.— This doubt we dispose of as follows. Those
only who do not possess true knowledge return from the
moon ; while he who has such knowledge does not return
even after he has gone to the moon. For a complementary
clause in the Mahan4rayaza Up., ‘from there he reaches
the greatness of Brahman,’ shows that the abode in the
moon forms for him, who having died during the southern
progress wishes to reach Brahman, a mere stage of rest.
And even if there were no such complementary passage,
it would follow from the previously stated absence of any

742 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,

reason for bondage that the going of the wise man’s soul
to the moon in no way precludes his reaching Brahman.
Bhishma and others who through the power of Yoga were
able to choose the time of their death put it off until the
beginning of the northern progress in order to proclaim
before the world the excellence of that season and thus
to promote pious faith and practice.—But we also meet
with an authoritative statement made with reference to
wise men about to die, as to difference of time of death
being the cause of a man either returning or not returning
to this world, ‘I will declare at which time the Yogins
departing return not, and also the time at which they
return. The fire, the light, the day, the bright fortnight,
the six months of the sun’s northern progress—the knowers
of Brahman departing there go to Brahman. The smoke,
the night, the dark fortnight, the six months of the southern
progress—the Yogin departing there having reached the
light of the moon returns again. These are held to be
the perpetual paths of the world—the white and the black;
by the one man goes not to return, by the other he returns
again’ (Bha. Gi. VIII, 23-26).—To this point the next
Satra refers.

20. And those two (paths) are, with a view to the
Yogins, mentioned as to be remembered.

The text quoted does not state an injunction for those
about to die, of a special time of death; but there are
rather mentioned in it those two matters belonging to
Smriti and therefore to be remembered, viz. the two paths
—the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers—
with a view to those who know and practise Yoga; the
text intimating that Yogins should daily think of those
paths which are included in Yoga meditation. In agree-
ment herewith the text concludes, ‘Knowing these two
paths no Yogin is ever deluded. Hence in all times, Ὁ
Arguna, be engaged in Yoga’ (Bha. Gi. VIII, 27). Through
the terms ‘the fire, the light,’ ‘the smoke, the night, &c.
the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers are
recognised, Where, in the beginning, the text refers to

IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 20. 743

‘the time when,’ the word ‘time’ must be understood
to denote the divine beings ruling time, since Fire and
the rest cannot be time. What the Bha. Gi. aims at
therefore is to enjoin on men possessing true knowledge
the remembrance of that path of the Gods originally
enjoined in the text, ‘they go to light’ (KA. Up. IV, 15,
10); not to determine the proper time of dying for those
about to die—Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘the
southern progress.’

744 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

THIRD PADA.

1. On the path beginning with light, that being
known.

The Satras now go on to determine the road which the
soul of the wise man follows, after having—assisted by
the Person within the heart—passed out of the body by
way of one particular artery. Now of that road various
accounts are given in Scripture. There is a detailed account
in the KAandogya (IV, 15), ‘now whether people perform
obsequies for him or ποῖ, ἅς. Another account is given
in the eighth book of the same Upanishad, ‘ then he moves
upwards by those very rays’ (VIII, 6, 5).

The Kaushitakins again give a different account: ‘He
having reached the path of the Gods comes to the world
of Agni” ἃς. (Kau. Up. I, 3). Different again in the
Brihad-arazyaka : ‘Those who thus know this and those
who in the forest meditate on faith and the True, &
(Brz. Up. VI, 2, 15). The same Upanishad, in another
place (V, 10), gives a different account: ‘ When the person
goes away from this world he comes to the wind, &—
A doubt here arises whether all these texts mean to give
instruction as to one and the same road—the first stage
of which is light—having to be followed by the soul of
the wise man; or whether they describe different roads
on any of which the soul may proceed.—The Parvapakshin
holds the latter view; for he says the roads described
differ in nature and are independent one of the other—
This view the Stra disposes of. All texts mean one and
the same road only, viz. the one beginning with light,
and the souls proceed on that road only. For that road
is known, i.e. is recognised in all the various descriptions,
although it is, in different texts, described with more of
less fulness. We therefore have to proceed here as in the
case of the details (guza) which are mentioned in different
meditations referring to one and the same object, i.e. we

Iv ADHYAyA, 3 PADA, 2. 745

have to combine the details mentioned in different places
into one whole. The two AAandogya-texts—the one in
the Upakosalavidy4 and the one in the Vidya of the five
fires—describe exactly the same road. And in the Vidya
of the five fires as given in the Brzhad-4razyaka the same
road, beginning with light, is also described, although
there are differences in minor points ; we therefore recognise
the road described in the KAandogya. And in the other
texts also we everywhere recognise the divinities of certain
stages of the road, Agni, Aditya, and so on.—Here termi-
nates the adhikaraaa of ‘ that which begins with light.’

2. From the year to Vayu; on account of non-
specification and specification.

In their description of the path beginning with light the
Khandogas mention the year between the months and
the sun, ‘from the months to the year, from the year to
the sun’ (KA. Up. V, 10, 1); while the V4gasaneyins
mention, in that very place, the world of the Gods, ‘ from
- the months to the world of the Gods, from the world of
the Gods to the sun’ (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15). Now, as the
two paths are identical, we have to supplement each by the
additional item given in the other (and the question then
arises whether the order of the stages be 1. months, 2. year,
3. world of the Gods, 4. sun; or 1. months, 2. world of the
Gods, 3. year, 4. sun), The year and the world of the Gods
are equally entitled to the place after the months in so far
as textual declaration goes; for both texts say ‘from the
months.’ But we observe that the advance is throughout
from the shorter periods of time to the longer ones (‘from
the day to the bright fortnight, from the bright fortnight
to the six months of the northern progress ’), and as there-
fore the year naturally presents itself to the mind im-
mediately after the six months, we decide that the order
is—months, year, world of the Gods, sun.—In another
place (Brz. Up. V, 10) the V4gasaneyins mention the wind
as the stage preceding the sun (‘the wind makes room
for him—he mounts upwards ; he comes to the sun’). The
Kaushitakins, on the other hand, place the world of the

746 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

wind subsequent to light, referred to by them as the world
of Agni (‘ Having entered on the path of the Gods he comes
to the world of Agni, to the world of the wind, &c., Kau.
Up. I, 3). Now in this latter text the fact of the world
of the wind following upon light is to be inferred only
from the succession of the clauses (‘to the world of Agni’
—‘to the world of the wind ’), while the ‘ upwards’ in the
text of the Vagasaneyins is a direct statement of succession
given by the text itself; and as this latter order of succes-
sion has greater force than the former, we have to place,
in the series of stages, the world of Vayu directly before
the world of the sun. But above we have determined
that the same place (after the year and before the sun)
has to be assigned to the world of the Gods also; and
hence a doubt arises whether the world of the Gods and
Vayu are two different things—the soul of the wise man
passing by them in optional succession—or one and the
same thing—the soul coming, after the year, to Vayu who
is the world of the Gods.—They are different things, the
Pdrvapakshin says; for they are generally known to be
so. And there are definite indications in the text that
the world of the Gods as well as Vayu is to be placed
immediately before the sun—this being indicated for Vayu
by the ‘upwards’ referred to above, and for the world
᾿ of the Gods by the ablative case (devalokat) in the XAand.
text, ‘from the world of the Gods he goes to the sun’—
and as thus there is no difference between the two, we
conclude that the soul passes by them in either order it
may choose.—This view the Sftra negatives: ‘ From the
year to Vayu.’ The soul, having departed from the year,
comes to Vayu. This is proved ‘by non-specification and
specification.’ For the term ‘the world of the Gods’ ts
a term of general meaning, and hence can denote Vayu
in so far as being the world of the Gods; while on the
other hand the term V4yu specifically denotes that divine
being only. The Kaushitakins speak of ‘the world of
Vayu’; but this only means ‘ Vayu who at the same time
is a world.’ That Vayu may be viewed as the world of
the Gods is confirmed by another scriptural passage, viz

IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 5. 747

‘he who blows (Vayu) is the houses of the Gods.’—Here
terminates the adhikarava of ‘ Vayu.’

3. Beyond lightning there is Varuza, on account
of connexion.

According to the text of the Kaushitakins the soul goes
on to the world of Vayu, to the world of Varuza, to the
world of Indra, to the world of Prag4pati, to the world
of Brahman. The doubt here arises whether Varuza and
the divinities of the following stages are to be inserted
in the series after Vayu, in agreement with the order of
enumeration in the text of the Kaushitakins; or at the
end of the whole series as stated in the A/andogya Up.
(IV, 15, 5), Waruza thus coming after lightning—The
decision is in favour of the latter view because Varuza,
the god of waters, is naturally connected with lightning
which dwells within the clouds.—This terminates the adhi-
karana of ‘ Varuna.’

4. Conductors, this being indicated.

The decision here is that light, Vayu, and the rest
mentioned in the texts as connected with the soul’s pro-
gress on the path of the Gods are to be interpreted not
as mere marks indicating the road, nor as places of enjoy-
ment for the soul, but as divinities appointed by the
Supreme Person to conduct the soul along the stages of
the road; for this is indicated by what the KA4ndogya
says with regard to the last stage, viz. lightning, ‘There
is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.’ What
here is said as to that person not human, viz. that he leads
the soul, is to be extended to the other beings also, light
and the rest.— But if that not-human person leads the souls
from lightning to Brahman, what then about Varuaa, Indra,
and Pragdpati, who, as was decided above, are in charge
of stages beyond lightning? Do they also lead the soul
along their stages ἢ

5. From thence by him only who belongs to
lightning, the text stating that.

748 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. ;

The only leader from lightning up to Brahman is the
not-human person connected with lightning ; for the text
states this directly. Varuza, Indra, and Pragdpati take
part in the work in so far only as they may assist the
person connected with lightning—Here terminates the
adhikarama of ‘the conductors.’

6. (Him who meditates on) the effected Brah-
man, (thus opines) Badari; because for him going
is possible.

The following question now presents itself for con-
sideration. Does the troop of conducting divinities, Agni
and the rest, lead on those who meditate on the effected
Brahman, i.e. Hiranyagarbha; or those only who meditate
-on the highest Brahman; or those who meditate on the
highest Brahman and those who meditate on the indi-
vidual Self as having Brahman for its Self ?—The teacher
RAdari is of opinion that the divinities lead on those only
who meditate on the effected Brahman. For he only who
meditates on Hirazyagarbha can move; while a person
meditating on the highest Brahman which is absolutely
complete, all-knowing, present everywhere, the Self of all,
cannot possibly be conceived as moving to some other
place in order to reach Brahman ; for him Brahman rather
is something already reached. For him the effect of true
knowledge is only to put an end to that Nescience which
has for its object Brahman, which, in reality, is eternally
reached. He, on the other hand,who meditates on Hirasya-
garbha may be conceived as moving in order to reach
his object, which is something abiding within a special
limited place. It is he therefore who is conducted on by
Agni and the other escorting deities.

7. And on account of (Brahman) being specified.

The text ‘a person not human leads them to the worlds
of Brahman’ (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15) by using the word ‘ world,
and moreover in the plural, determines the specification that
the not-human person leads those only who meditate on
Hirazyagarbha, who dwells within some particular world

IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 9. 749

Moreover, the text ‘I enter the hall of Prag4pati, the
house’ (KA. Up. VIII, 14) shows that he who goes on the
path beginning with light aims at approaching Hiramya-
garbha. But if this is so, there is a want of appropriate
denotation in the clause, ‘There is a person not human,
he leads them to Brahman’; if Hiraxyagarbha is meant,
the text should say ‘He leads'them to Brahm4 (Brah-
mazam).’

8. But on account of nearness there is that
designation.

Hirazyagarbha is the first created being (as declared by
the text ‘he who creates Brahm4’); he thus stands near to
Brahman, and therefore may be designated by the, same
term (viz. Brahman). This explanation is necessitated by
the reasons set forth in the preceding Sdtras (which show
that the real highest Brahman cannot be meant).—But,
if the soul advancing on the path of the Gods reaches
Hirazyagarbha only, texts such as ‘ This is the path of the
Gods, the path of Brahman; those who proceed on that
path do not return to the life of man’ (KA. Up. IV, 15, 6),
and ‘moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality’
(VIII, 6, 6), are wrong in asserting that that soul attains
to immortality and does not return; for the holy books
teach that Hirazyagarbha, as a created being, passes
away at the end of a dviparardha-period; and the text
‘Up to the world of Brahman the worlds return again’
(Bha. Gi. VIII, 16) shows that those who have gone to
Hirazyagarbha necessarily return also.

9. On the passing away of the effected (world of
Brahma), together with its ruler, (the souls go) to
what is higher than that; on account of scriptural
declaration.

On the passing away of the effected world of Brahma,
together with its ruler Hirazyagarbha, who then recog-
nises his qualification for higher knowledge, the soul also
which had gone to Hirazyagarbha attains to true know-
ledge and thus reaches Brahman, which is higher than that,

750 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

i.e. higher than the effected world of Brahma. This is
known from the texts declaring that he who proceeds
on the path of light reaches immortality and does not
return; and is further confirmed by the text, ‘They all,
reaching the highest immortality, become free in the world
of Brahman (Brahma) at the time of the great end’ (Mu.
Up. III, 2, 6).

10. And on account of Smz2zti.

This follows from Smriti also, which declares ‘ when the
pralaya has come and the end of the Highest, they all
together with Brahman enter the highest place.’—For all
these reasons Badari holds that the troop of the conducting
deities, beginning with Light, leads the souls of those
only who meditate on the effected Brahman, i.e. Hirasya-
garbha.

11. The Highest, Gaimini thinks; on account of
primariness of meaning.

The teacher Gaimini is of opinion that those deities lead
on the souls of those only who meditate on the highest
Brahman. For in the text ‘a person not human leads
them to Brahman’ the word Brahman is naturally takea
in its primary sense (i.e. the highest Brahman); the
secondary sense (i.e. the effected Brahman) can be ad-
mitted only if there are other valid reasons to refer the
passage to the effected Brahman. And the alleged impos
sibility of the soul’s going is no such valid reason; for
although Brahman no doubt is present everywhere, Scrip-
ture declares that the soul of the wise frees itself from
Nescience only on having gone to some particular place.
That the origination of true knowledge depends on certain
conditions of caste, 4srama, religious duty, purity of cot
duct, time, place, and so on, follows from certain scriptural
texts, as e.g. ‘Brahmazas desire to know him through the
study of the Veda’ (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22); in the same way
it follows from the text declaring the soul’s going to Brah-
man that the final realisation of that highest knowledge
which implies the cessation of all Nescience depends οἱ

IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 12. 751

the soul’s going to some particular place. - The arguments
founded on texts alleged to declare that the soul of the
wise does not pass out of the body at all we have refuted
above. The argument that the specification implied in
the text which mentions Brakman-worlds clearly points
to the effected Brahman, i.e. Hirazyagarbha, is equally
invalid. For the compound ‘the Brahman-world’ is to be
explained as ‘the world which is Brahman’; just as according
to the Parva Mimams4 the compound ‘ Nish4da-sthapati ’
denotes a sthapati who is a Nishdda (not a sthapati of the
Nishadas). A thing even which is known as one only may
be designated by a plural form, as in a mantra one girdle
is spoken of as ‘the fetters of Aditi.’ And as to the case
under discussion, we know on the authority of Scripture,
Smriti, Itihdsa, and Purdwa, that the wonderful worlds
springing from the mere will of a perfect and omnipresent
being cannot be but infinite.

12. And because Scripture declares it.

And Scripture moreover directly declares that the soul
which has departed by way of the artery in the upper part
of the head and passed along the path of the Gods reaches
the highest Brahman: ‘This serene being having risen
from the body, having reached the highest light manifests
itself in its own shape’ (A. Up. VIII, 12, 3).—Against
the contention that the text ‘I enter the hall of Pragapati,
the house’ shows that he who proceeds on the path be-

ginning with light aims at the effected Brahman, the next
Sdtra argues.

13. And there is no aiming at the effected
(Brahman).

The aim of the soul is not at Hirazyagarbha, but at the
highest Brahman itself. For the complementary sentence
‘I am the glorious among Brahmazas’ shows that what
the soul aims at is the condition of the universal Self,
which has for its antecedent the putting off of all Nescience.
For this appears from the preceding text, ‘As a horse
shakes his hairs and as the moon frees herself from the

752 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

mouth of Rahu; having shaken off the body may I obtain
—the uncreated Brahman-world’ declares that the Brah-
man-world, which is the thing to be reached, is something
non-created, and explicitly states that reaching that world
implies freedom from all bondage whatsoever.—It,is for
these reasons that Gaimini holds that the deities speeding
the soul on its way lead on him only who has the highest
Brahman for the object of his meditation.

Now the Reverend Badardyaza declares his own view,
which constitutes the final conclusion in this matter.

14. Those not depending on symbols he leads,
thus Badardyaza thinks; there being a defect in
both cases; and he whose thought is that.

Badarfyana is of opinion that the deities lead those not
depending on symbols, i.e. all meditating devotees other
than those depending on symbols. That is to say, the
view that those are led who meditate on the effected
Brahman cannot be upheld; nor is there an exclusive rule
that those only should be led on who meditate on the
highest Brahman. The truth is that those are led who
meditate on the highest Brahman, and also those who medi-
tate on the Self (soul) as different from matter (Prakriti)
and having Brahman for its true Self. Souls of both these
kinds are led on to Brahman. Those on the other hand
whose object of meditation is such things as name and so
on, which fall within what is a mere effect of Brahman—
such things being viewed either under the aspect of Brah- |
man, just as some valiant man may be viewed under the
aspect of a lion (which view expresses itself in the judgment
‘ Devadatta is a lion’); or by themselves (without reference
to Brahman)—all those are not led on to Brahman. Why
so? ‘ Because there is a defect in both cases,’ i.e. in both
the views rejected by Badarayaza. The view that those
are led who meditate on the effected Brahman is in conflict
with texts such as ‘ having risen from this body and reached
the highest light’ (Κλ. Up. VIII, 12, 3)—for the nature
of the fruit depends on the nature of the meditation; and

ΙΝ ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 14. 753

the view that those only are led to the highest Brahman
who meditate on the highest Brahman, would stultify texts
such as the one which expressly declares Agni and the rest
of the deities to lead on those who possess the knowledge
of the five fires (‘Those who know this, viz. the Vidy4 of
the five fires, and those who in the forest meditate on faith
and austerity go to light—there is a person not human, he
leads them to Brahman, K%. Up. V, 10). Both these views
thus being defective, we adhere to the conclusion that the
deities lead on to Brahman the two classes of souls men-
tioned above.—This the Sftra further declares in the words
‘he whose thought is that’ (tatkratuZ), the sense of which
is that he whose thought is that reaches that, i.e. that
the nature of what is reached depends on the nature of
the meditation. This argument is founded on the text,
‘According to what his thought is (yath4-kratuZ) in this
world, so will he be when he has departed this life’ (KA.
Up. III, 14), which implies the principle that what a soul
after death attains is according to its thought and medita-
tion in this life; and moreover we have direct scriptural
statements to the effect that those who possess the know-
ledge of the five fires proceed on the path of the Gods, and
that those who proceed on that path reach Brahman and
do not return. Analogous reasoning proves that medita-
tion on the soul as free from matter and having Brahman
for its true Self also leads to the highest Brahman. In
the case of those, on the other hand, who rely on the
symbols (in which they meditatively contemplate Brah-
man), beginning with name and terminating with praza
(‘He who meditates on name as Brahman, Kz. Up. VII,
1 ff.), the meditation is not proved by texts of the two
kinds previously mentioned to lead to Brahman; it rather
is contaminated by an element not of the nature of intel-
ligence, and hence—according to the principle that the
result of a meditation is the same in nature as the medi-
tation itself—the soul of the inferior devotee practising
such meditation does not proceed by the path of light and
does not reach Brahman.—That this distinction is declared
by Scripture itself, the next Sdtra shows.
[48] 3c

754 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

15. And Scripture declares the difference.

The text, ‘He who meditates on name as Brahman, for
him there is movement as he wishes as far as name ex-
tends,’ ὅς. (KA. Up. VII, 1 ff.), declares that those who
meditate on the series of symbols beginning with name
and ending with praa attain to a result of limited nature
and not depending on any particular path. Those there-
fore who meditate on the Intelligent either as mixed with
the Non-intelligent or by itself, viewing it either under the
aspect of Brahman or as separated from Brahman, are not
led on by the conducting deities. On the other hand,
it remains a settled conclusion that the deities speed on
their way those who meditate on the highest Brahman
and on the soul as separated from Prakriti and having
Brahman for its true Self.—Here terminates the adhikaranza
of ‘ the effected.’

Iv ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I. 755

FOURTH PADA.

1. (On the soul’s) having approached (the highest
light) there is manifestation ; (as we infer) from the
word ‘own.’

The Sdtras now proceed to consider the md of superior
existence (aisvarya) which the released souls enjoy.—The
text says, ‘Thus does that serene being, having risen from
the body and having approached the highest light, manifest
itself in its own form’ (KA. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Does this
passage mean that the soul having approached the highest
light assumes a new body, to be brought about then, as
e.g. the body of a deva; or that it only manifests its own
natural character ?—The text must be understood in the
former sense, the Parvapakshin holds. For otherwise the
scriptural texts referring to Release would declare what is
of no advantage to man. We do not observe that its own
nature is of any advantage to the soul. In the state of
dreamless sleep the body and the sense-organs cease to act,
and you may say the pure soul then abides by itself, but in
what way does this benefit man? Nor can it be said that
mere cessation of pain constitutes the well-being of the
soul which has approached the highest light, and that in
this sense manifestation of its own nature may be called
Release; for Scripture clearly teaches that the released
soul enjoys an infinity of positive bliss, ‘One hundred times
the bliss of PragApati is one bliss of Brahman and of a sage
free from desires’; ‘for having tasted a flavour he experi-
ences bliss’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Nor can it be said that
the true nature of the soul is consciousness of the nature of
unlimited bliss which, in the Sams4ra condition, is hidden
by Nescience and manifests itself only when the soul
reaches Brahman. For, as explained previously, intelli-
gence which is of the nature of light cannot be hidden;
hiding in that case would be neither more nor less than
destruction. Nor can that which is mere light be of the
nature of bliss ; for bliss is pleasure, and to be of the nature

362

756 . ‘VvEDANTA-sOTRAS.

of pleasure is to be such as to agree with the Self. But, if
the Self is mere light, where is the being by which light
is to be apprehended as agreeable to its own nature? (i.e.
where is the knowing subject conscious of bliss?) He,
therefore, who holds the Self to be mere light, can in no way
prove that it is of the nature of bliss. If, moreover, that
which the soul effects on approaching the highest light is
merely to attain to its own true nature, we point out that
that nature is something eternally accomplished, and that
hence the declaration that ‘it manifests (accomplishes)
itself in its own nature’ would be purportless. We hence
conclude that on approaching the highest light the soul
connects itself with a new form only then brought about.
On this view the term ‘accomplishes itself’ is taken in its
direct sense, and the expression ‘in its own shape’ also is
suitable in so far as the soul accomplishes itself in a nature
specially belonging to it and characterised by absolute
bliss.—This view the Sdtra rejects. That special condition
into which the soul passes on having, on the path of the
Gods, approached the highest light is a manifestation of
its own true nature, not an origination of a new character.
For this is proved by the specification implied in the term
‘own,’ in the phrase ‘in its own nature.’ If the soul as-
sumed a new body, this specification would be without
meaning; for, even without that, it would be clear that
the new body belongs to the soul.—Against the assertion
that the soul’s own true nature is something eternally
accomplished, and that hence a declaration of that nature
‘accomplishing itself’ would be unmeaning, the next Sitra
declares itself.

2. The released one; on account of the promise.

What the text says about the soul accomplishing itself
in its own form refers to the released soul which, freed
from its connexion with works and what depends thereon,
i. e. the body and the rest, abides in its true essential nature.
—That essential nature no doubt is something eternally
accomplished, but as in the SamsAra state it is obscured
by Nescience in the form of Karman; the text refers to the

Iv ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 3. 957

cessation of such obscuration as ‘ accomplishment. —How
is this known ?—‘ From the promise,’ i. e. from the fact that
the text promises to set forth such cessation. For Praga-
pati when saying again and again, ‘I will explain that
further to you,’ does so with a view to throw light on the
individual soul—first introduced in the clause ‘that Self
which is free from sin, &c.’ (VIII, 7, 1}—in so far as freed
from all connexion with the three empirical conditions
of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, and released
from the body which is due to Karman and the cause of
joy and sorrow. When, therefore, he concludes ‘that
serene being, i.e. the soul, having risen from this body and
having approached the highest light accomplishes itself in
its true form,’ we understand that such ‘accomplishment’
means the final release, i.e. the cessation of all bondage,
which is gained by the soul, previously connected with
Karman, as soon as it approaches the highest light—The
Parvapakshin had said that as in the state of deep sleep
the manifestation of the true nature of the soul is seen in
no way to benefit man, Scripture, if declaring that Release
consists in a manifestation of the true nature of the soul,
would clearly teach something likewise not beneficial to
man; and that hence the ‘accomplishment in its own
form’ must mean the soul’s entering on such a new con-
dition of existence as would be a cause of pleasure, viz. the
condition of a deva or the like. To this the next Sdtra
replies.

3. The Self, on account of subject-matter.

The subject-matter of the whole section shows that by
the Self manifesting itself in its own form there is meant
the Self as possessing the attributes of freedom from all evil
and sin and so on. For the teaching of Pragapati begins as
follows: ‘ the Self which is free from sin, free from old age,
from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires
and thoughts spontaneously realise themselves,’ And that
this Self which forms the subject-matter of the entire
section is the individual Self we have shown under I, 3, 19.
The manifestation of the true nature of the soul when

758 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

reaching the highest light therefore means the manifesta-
tion of that Self which has freedom from sin and so on
for its essential attributes—that nature being in the Sam-
sdra state obscured through Nescience. When therefore
at the moment of Release those essential qualities assert
themselves, the case is one of manifestation of what already
exists, not one of origination. Thus the reverend Saunaka
says, ‘ As the lustre of the gem is not created by the act of
polishing, so the essential intelligence of the Self is not
created by the putting off of imperfections. As the well is
not the cause of the production of rain water, but only
serves to manifest water which already exists—for whence
should that originate which is not ?>—thus knowledge and
the other attributes of the Self are only manifested through
the putting off of evil qualities ; they are not produced, for
they are eternal.’ Intelligence, therefore, bliss, and the
other essential qualities of the soul which were obscured and
contracted by Karman, expand and thus manifest them-
selves when the bondage due to Karman passes away and
the soul approaches the highest light. On this view of
‘manifestation’ there remains no difficulty.—Here termi-
nates the adhikarama of ‘on approaching manifestation.’

4. In non-division ; because that is seen.

Is the soul, when it has reached the highest light and
freed itself from all bondage, conscious of itself as separate
from the highest Self or as non-separate in so far as being
a mere ‘mode’ (prakdra) of that Self ?—The former view
is the right one. For Scriptural and Smriti texts alike
declare that the released soul stands to the highest Self in
the relation of fellowship, equality, equality of attributes,
and all this implies consciousness of separation. Compare
‘He attains all desires together with the all-knowing
Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1) ; ‘When the seer sees the
shining maker, the Lord, the Person who has his source in
Brahman ; then, possessing perfect knowledge, and shaking
off good and evil, free from all passions he reaches the
highest equality’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); ‘Taking their stand
upon this knowledge they, attaining to an’ equality of attri-

ΙΝ ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 5. 759

butes with me, are neither born at the time of a creation
nor are they agitated when a pralaya takes place’ (Bha.
Gi. XIV, 2).— Against this view the Satra declares itself ‘ in
non-division.’ The released soul is conscious of itself as
non-divided from the highest Brahman. ‘ For this is seen,’
i.e. for the soul having reached Brahman and freed itself
from the investment of Nescience sees itself in its true
nature. And this true nature consists herein that the
souls have for their inner Self the highest Self while they
constitute the body of that Self and hence are modes (pra-
kara) of it. This is proved by all those texts which
exhibit the soul and Brahman in co-ordination—‘ Thou
art that,’ ‘this Self is Brahman’; ‘In that all this has
its Self’; ‘All this in truth is Brahman’; and by other
texts, such as ‘He who dwells within the Self, whom
the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body,’
&c.; and ‘He who abides within, the ruler of creatures,
he is thy Self’; as explained by us under Satra I, 4, 22.
The consciousness of the released soul therefore expresses
itself in the following form: ‘I am Brahman, without any
division. Where the texts speak of the soul’s becoming
equal to, or having equal attributes with, Brahman, the
meaning is that the nature of the individual soul—which
is a mere mode of Brahman—is equal to that of Brah-
man, i.e. that on putting off its body it becomes equal to
Brahman in purity. The text declaring that the soul
‘attains all its desires together with Brahman’ intimates
that the soul, together with Brahman of which it is a mode,
is conscious of the attributes of Brahman. The different
texts are thus in no conflict. Nor, on this view of the soul
being non-divided from Brahman in so far as being its
mode, is there any difficulty on account of what is said
about the soul under SQ. IV, 4,8; or on account of the doc-
trines conveyed in II,1, 22 ; III, 4, 8.—Here terminates the
adhikaraaa of ‘non-division, on account of its being seen.’

5. In (a nature like) that of Brahman, thus
Gaimini thinks; on account of suggestion and the
rest.

760 . VEDANTAa-SOTRAS.

Owing to the fact that different texts give different
accounts, the question now arises of what character that
essential nature of the Self is in which it manifests itself on
reaching Brahman. Is that nature constituted by freedom
from evil and sin and the rest (i.e. the attributes enume-
rated KA. Up. VIII,7,1); or by mere intelligence (vig#na) ;
or by both, there being no opposition between intelligence
and those other attributes?—The teacher Gaimini holds
that the soul manifests itself in its Brahman character, i. e.
in a character constituted by freedom from sin, and so on.
These latter attributes are, in the text of the ‘ small lotus,’
mentioned as belonging to Brahman (KA. Up. VIII, 1, 5);
and may hence be referred to as the ‘ Brahman’ character.
And that this Brahman character is the character of the
released soul also follows from ‘suggestion and the rest.’
For freedom from all evil and the rest are, in the teaching of
PragApati, referred to as attributes of the soul (VIII, 7, 1).
The ‘and the rest’ of the Satra refers to the activities of
the released soul—laughing, playing, rejoicing, and so on
(mentioned in VIII, 12, 3)—which depend on the power
belonging to the soul in that state to realise all its ideas
and wishes, It is for these reasons that Gaimini holds that
mere intelligence does not constitute the true nature of the
released soul.

6. In the sole nature of intelligence; as that is
its Self. Thus Audulomi thinks.

Intelligence (consciousness ; aitanya) alone is the true
nature of the soul, and hence it is in that character only
that the released soul manifests itself; this is the view of
the teacher Audulomi. That intelligence only constitutes
the true being of the soul, we learn from the express state-
ment ‘As a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside, but
is altogether a mass of taste; so this Self has neither
inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge’
(Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13). When, therefore, the text attributes
to the soul freedom from evil and the rest, it does not
mean to predicate of it further positive qualities, but only

IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 7. 761

to exclude all the qualities depending on avidya—change,
pleasure, pain, and so on.—For these reasons Audulomi
holds that the released soul manifests itself as mere intelli-
gence.—Next the teacher Badardyana determines the ques-
tion by propounding his own view.

7. Thus also, on account of existence of the
former qualities (as proved) by suggestion, BAda-
rayama holds absence of contradiction.

The teacher Badardyana is of opinion that even thus,
i.e. although the text declares the soul to have mere intel-
ligence for its essential nature, all the same the previously
stated attributes, viz. freedom from all sin, and so on, are
not to be excluded. For the authority of a definite state-
ment in the Upanishads proves them to exist (‘That Self
which is free from sin,’ &c.) ; and of authorities of equal
strength one cannot refute the other. Nor must you say
that the case is one of essential contradiction, and that
hence we necessarily must conclude that freedom from sin,
and so on (do not belong to the true nature of the soul,
but) are the mere figments of Nescience (from which the
released soul is free). For as there is equal authority for
both sides, why should the contrary view not be held? (viz.
that the soul is essentially free from sin, &c., and that the
aitanya is non-essential.) For the principle is that where
two statements rest on equal authority, that only which
suffers from an intrinsic impossibility is to be interpreted
in a different way (i.e. different from what it means on the
face of it), so as not to conflict with the other. But while
admitting this we deny that the text which describes the
Self as a mass of mere knowledge implies that the nature
of the Self comprises nothing whatever but knowledge.
—But what then ἐς the purport of that text ?—The mean-
ing is clear, we reply; the text teaches that the entire Self,
different from all that is non-sentient, is self-illumined, i.e.
not even a small part of it depends for its illumination on
something else. The fact, vouched for in this text, of the
soul in its entirety being a mere mass of knowledge in no
way conflicts with the fact, vouched for by other texts, of its

762 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

possessing qualities such as freedom from sin and so on,
which inhere in it as the subject of those qualities; not
any more than the fact of the lump of salt being taste
through and through—which fact is known through the
sense of taste—conflicts with the fact of its possessing
such other qualities as colour, hardness, and so on, which
are known through the eye and the other sense-organs.
The meaning of the entire text is as follows—just as the
lump of salt has throughout one and the same taste, while
other sapid things such as mangoes and other fruit have
different tastes in their different parts, rind and so on; so
the soul is throughout of the nature of knowledge or self-
illuminedness.—Here terminates the adhikarasza of ‘that
which is like Brahman.’

8. By the mere will; Scripture stating that.

Concerning the released soul Scripture states, ‘ He moves
about there, laughing, playing, rejoicing, be it with women,
or chariots, or relatives’ (KA. Up. VIII, 12, 3). The
doubt here arises whether the soul’s meeting with relatives
and the rest presupposes an effort on its part or follows
on its mere will—as things spring from the mere will of the
highest Person.—An effort is required; for we observe in
ordinary life that even such persons as kings and the like
who are capable of realising all their wishes do not accom-
plish the effects desired without some effort.—Against this
view the Sitra says ‘by the mere will.’ For, in a previous
passage, Scripture expressly ‘says, ‘He who desires the
world of the Fathers, by his mere will the Fathers rise to
receive him,’ &c. (VIII, 2,1). And there is no other text
declaring the need of effort which would oblige us to
define and limit the meaning of the text last quoted.

g. And for this very reason without another ruler.

Since the released soul realises all its wishes, it does not
stand under another ruler. For to be under a ruler means
to be subject to injunction and prohibition, and to be such
is opposed to being free in the realisation of all one’s
wishes. Hence Scripture says, ‘he is a Self-ruler’ (KA. Up.
VII, 25).—Here terminates the adhikarama of ‘ wishes.’

IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 12. 763

10. The absence, Badari holds ; for thus Scripture
Says.

A doubt arises whether the Released has a body and
sense-organs, or not; or whether he has them or not just
as he pleases. The -teacher Badari holds that body and
sense-organs are absent; since the text declares this. The
text—‘ as long as he is embodied there is no freedom from
pleasure and pain ; but when he is free from the body then
neither pleasure nor pain touches him’ (K4%. Up. VIII,
12, 1)—declares that pleasure and pain are necessarily con-
nected with embodiedness; and the text—‘ having risen
from this body and reached the highest light he manifests
himself in his own shape’ (VIII, 12, 3)—declares that the
Released one is without a body.

11. The presence, Gaimini holds; because the
text declares manifoldness.

The teacher Gaimini holds that the Released one has
a body and senses; because the text declares manifold-
ness—‘ He is onefold, he is threefold, he is fivefold, he is
sevenfold’ (K%. Up. VII, 26,2). The Self which is one
and indivisible cannot be manifold, and the various forms
of manifoldness of which the text speaks therefore must
depend on the body. The text which speaks of the
absence of a body refers to the absence of that body only
which is due to Karman; for this latter body only is the
cause of pleasure and pain. Next the Reverend Badara-
yana decides this point by the declaration of his own view.

12. For this reason Badardyama (holds him to be)
of both kinds; as in the case of the twelve days’
sacrifice.

‘For this reason,’ i.e. for the reason that the text refers
to the wish of the Released, the Reverend Badardyaza is
of opinion that the Released may, at his liking, be with or
without a body. This satisfies both kinds of texts. The
case is analogous to that of the twelve days’ sacrifice which,
on the basis of twofold texts—‘ Those desirous of pros-

764 VEDANTA-SOUTRAS.

perity are to celebrate the dvadasdha,’ and ‘ The priest is to
offer the dvadas4ha for him who desires offspring '"—belongs,
according to difference of wish, either to the sattra or the
ahina class of sacrifices:—The next Sitra declares that the
body and the sense-organs of the Released are not neces-
sarily created by the Released himself.

13. In the absence of a body, as in the state of
dream ; that being possible.

As in the absence of a body and other instruments of
enjoyment created by himself, the Released may undergo
experiences of pleasure by means of instruments created
by the highest Person, the Released, although capable of
realising all his wishes, may not himself be creative. As in
the state of dream the individual soul has experiences
depending on chariots and other implements created by
the Lord (‘ He creates chariots, horses, &c., Bri. Up. IV,
3, 10); thus the released soul also may have experience
of different worlds created by the Lord engaged in playful
sport.

14. When there is a body, as in the waking state.

When, on the other hand, the released soul possesses a body
created by its own will, then it enjoys its various delights
in the same way as a waking man does.—In the same way
as the highest Person creates out of himself, for his own
delight, the world of the Fathers and so on; so he some-
times creates such worlds for the enjoyment of the released
souls. But sometimes, again, the souls using their own
creative will-power themselves create their own worlds,
which however are included within the sphere of sport of
the highest Person (so that the souls in enjoying them do
not pass beyond the intuition of Brahman).

But it has been taught that the soul is of atomic size;
how then can it connect itself with many bodies ?—To this
question the next Sitra replies.

15. The entering is as in the case of a lamp;
for thus Scripture declares.

IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 16. 765

Just as a lamp, although abiding in one place only, enters
through the light proceeding from it into connexion with
many places ; so the soul also, although limited to one place,
may through its light-like consciousness enter into several
bodies. It may do this as well as in this life the soul,
although abiding in one spot of the body only, viz. the
heart, pervades the whole body by means of its conscious-
ness and thus makes it its own. There is howeyer the fol-
lowing difference between the two cases. The non-released
soul has its intellectual power contracted by the influence
of Karman, and hence is incapable of that expansive per-
vasion without which it cannot identify itself with other
bodies. The released soul, on the other hand, whose intel-
lectual power is non-contracted is capable of extending as
far as it likes, and thus to make many bodies its own. For
Scripture declares, ‘ That living soul is to be known as part
of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a
hundred times, and yet it is capable of infinity’ (Svet. Up.
V, 9). The non-released soul is ruled by Karman, the
released one only by its will—this is the difference.—But,
a new difficulty is raised, Scripture declares that when the
soul reaches Brahman all its inner and outer knowledge is
stopped: ‘Embraced by the highest Self the soul knows
nothing that is without, nothing that is within’ (Bré. Up.
IV, 3, 21). How then can it be said to know all things ?—
To this the next Satra replies.

16. It refers either to dreamless sleep or to union
(sampatti) ; for this is manifested.

Texts as the one last quoted do not refer to the released
soul, but either to deep sleep or to ‘union’ (sampatti), i.e,
the time of dying ; the latter in accordance with the text
‘then his speech is united (sampadyate) with his mind,—
heat with the highest divinity’ (KA. Up. VI, 15, 1). In
both those states the soul attains to the highest Self and is
unconscious. That in the states of deep sleep and dying
the soul is unconscious and that the released soul is all-
knowing, Scripture reveals. The text ‘In truth he thus
does not know himself that he is I, nor does he know any-

766 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

thing that exists. He is gone to utter annihilation. I see
no good in this’ (KA. Up. VIII, 11, 1) declares that the soul
is unconscious in the state of deep sleep ; and a subsequent
text in the same section declares the released soul to be
all-knowing, ‘He seeing these pleasures with the divine
eye, i.e. the mind, rejoices’ (VIII, 12, 5). The same is
clearly stated in the text, ‘ He who sees this sees everything,
-and obtains everything everywhere’ (VII, 26, 2). That at
death there is unconsciousness appears from the text,
‘having risen from these elements he vanishes again in
them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge’
(Bré. Up. IV, 5, 13). From all this it follows that the
text as to the soul being held in embrace by the prag#a
Self refers either to deep sleep or death.—Here terminates
the adhikaraaa of ‘ non-being.’

17. With the exception of world-energy; on
account of leading subject-matter and of non-
proximity.

The doubt here presents itself whether the power of the
released soul is a universal power such as belongs to the
Supreme Person, extending to the creation, sustentation,
and so on, of the worlds; or is limited to the intuition of
the Supreme Person.—The Pirvapakshin maintains the
former view. For he says Scripture declares that the
soul reaches equality with the Supreme Person: ‘ Free
from stain he reaches the highest equality’ (Mu. Up. III,
I, 3); and moreover Scripture ascribes to the released soul
the power of realising all its thoughts. And these two
conditions are not fulfilled unless the soul possess the
special powers of the Lord with regard to the government,
&c., of the world.—To this the Sitra replies, ‘with the
exception of world-energy.’ The released soul, freed
from all that hides its true nature; possesses the power of
intuitively beholding the pure Brahman, but does not
possess the power of ruling and guiding the different forms
of motion and rest belonging to animate and inanimate
nature—How is this known ?—‘ From subject-matter’
For it is with special reference to the highest Brahman

Iv aDHYAYA, 4 PADA, 18, 767

only that the text mentions ruling and controlling power
over the entire world. ‘That from whence these beings are
born, that through which they live when born, that into
which they enter at death, endeavour to know that; that is
Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. III, 1,1). If such universal ruling
and controlling power belonged to the released soul as
well, it would not be used—as the text actually uses it—
for defining Brahman ; for all definition rests on special
individual attributes. Analogously many other texts
speak of universal ruling and controlling power with ex-
clusive reference to the Supreme Person— Being only this
was in the beginning, &c.—it thought, may I be many’
(Kk. Up. VI, 2); ‘In the beginning this was Brahman,
one only—it created the most excellent Kshattra,’ &c.
(Brz. Up. I, 4, 11); ‘In the beginning all this was Self, one
only—it thought, let me send forth these worlds’ (Ait. Ar.
II, 4, 1,1); ‘There was Narayana alone, not Brahma, and
soon.’ ‘Hé who dwelling within the earth,’ &c. (Bré. Up.
III, 7, 3).—This also follows ‘from non-proximity’ ; for in
all those places which speak of world-controlling power
the context in no way suggests the idea of the released
soul, and hence there is no reason to ascribe such power to
the latter.

18. If it be said that this is not so, on account of
direct teaching; we reply not so, on account of the
texts declaring that which abides within the spheres
of those entrusted with special functions.

But, an objection is raised, certain texts directly declare
that the released soul also possesses ‘ world-energy.’ Com-
pare ‘He becomes a self-ruler; he moves in all worlds
according to his wishes’ (KA. Up. VII, 25, 2); ‘He moves
through these worlds, enjoying any food he wishes, and
assuming any shape he wishes’ (Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5). We
cannot therefore accept the restriction laid down in the
last Sitra.—Not so, the latter half of the present S(tra
declares, ‘on account of the texts declaring that which
abides in the spheres of those entrusted with special func-
tions.” The meaning of the texts quoted is that the

768 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

released soul participates in the enjoyments connected
with the spheres of Hiraszyagarbha and other beings
which are entrusted with special functions. The soul
whose knowledge is no longer obstructed by Karman freely
enjoys all the different worlds in which the power of Brah-
man manifests itself and thus is fully satisfied —But if the
released soul, no less than the soul implicated in the Sam:-
sara, experiences enjoyments belonging to the sphere of
change, it follows that the sum of its enjoyments is finite
and limited, and that hence the released soul is no better
off than the soul in the state of bondage !—Of this doubt
the next Sdtra disposes.

19. That which is not within change; for thus
Scripture declares the abiding (of the soul).

That which is not within change, i.e. the highest Brah-
man which is free from all change and of an absolutely
perfect and blessed nature—this, together with the mani-
festations of its glory, is what forms the object of conscious-
ness for the released soul. The worlds which are subject
to change thus form objects for that soul’s experience, in
so far as they form part of Brahman’s manifestation.
For Scripture declares that the released soul thus abides
within, i.e. is conscious of the changeless highest Brahman,
‘when he finds freedom from fear and an abode in that
which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then
he obtains the fearless’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7). And that the
world is contained within Brahman as its manifestation is
declared in the text, ‘In that all the worlds abide, and no
one.goes beyond’ (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8). The meaning of the
text stating that the Released freely move in all worlds, and
similar texts, therefore is only that the released soul while
conscious of Brahman with its manifestations experiences
also the enjoyments, lying within the sphere of change,
which abide in the world of Hirazyagarbha and similar
beings ; not that it possesses the world-energies—creative,
ruling, and so on—which are the distinctive attribute of the
highest Lord.

20. And thus Perception and Inference show,

Iv ADHYAyA, 4 PADA, 21. 769

That the energies connected with the rule of the entire
world are exclusive attributes of the highest Person, Scrip-
ture and Smritti alike declare. Compare scriptural texts
such as ‘ From fear of him the wind blows,’ &c. (Taitt. Up.
II, 8, 1); ‘ By the command of that Imperishable one sun
and moon stand, held apart’ (Bré. Up. III, 9); ‘He is the
lord of all, the king of all beings, the protector of all
beings’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22). And Smriti texts such as
‘With me as Supervisor, Prakriti brings forth the Universe
of the movable and the immovable, and for this reason the
world ever moves round’; ‘ Pervading this entire Universe
by a portion of mine I do abide’ (Bha. Gi. IX, 10; X, 42).
Scripture and Smriti likewise declare that of the bliss
which is enjoyed by the released soul the highest Person
alone is the cause—‘ For he alone causes blessedness’
(Taitt. Up. I, 7); ‘He who serves me with unswerving
devotion, surpasses these qualities and is fitted for becom-
ing one with Brahman. For I am the abode of Brahman,
of infinite immortality, of everlasting virtue, and of absolute
bliss’ (Bha. Gi. XIV, 26-27). The exalted qualities of the
soul—freedom from evil and sin and so on—which mani-
fest themselves in the state of Release no doubt belong to
the soul’s essential nature; but that the soul is of such
a nature fundamentally depends on the Supreme Person,
and on him also depends the permanency of those qualities;
they are permanent in so far as the Lord himself on whom
they depend is permanent. It is in the same way that
all the things which constitute the means of enjoyment
and sport on the part of the Lord are permaneht in so far
as the Lord himself is permanent. It thus appears that
the equality to the Lord which the released soul may claim
does not extend to the world-ruling energies,

21. And on account of the indication of the
equality of enjoyment only.

The previous conclusion is confirmed by the further fact
that the text directly teaches the released soul to be equal
to Brahman in so far only as enjoying direct insight into
the true nature of Brahman. ‘He reaches all objects of

[48] 3D

770 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

desire, together with the all-knowing Brahman’ (Taitt. Up.
II, 1, 1).—The conclusion thus is that we have to shape our
ideas as to the powers of the released soul in accordance
with what the texts say as to the Lord only possessing the
power of ruling and controlling the entire world, and that
hence the latter power cannot be attributed to the soul.—
But if the powers of the released soul altogether depend on
the Lord, it may happen that He, being independent in all
his doings, may will the released soul to return into the
Samséra.—Of this doubt the next Sitra disposes.

22. Non-return, according to Scripture; non-
return, according to Scripture.

We know from Scripture that there is a Supreme Person
whose nature is absolute bliss and goodness ; who is funda-
mentally antagonistic to all evil; who is the cause of the
origination, sustentation, and dissolution of the world ; who
differs in nature from all other beings, who is all-knowing,
who by his mere thought and will accomplishes all his
purposes ; who is an ocean of kindness as it were for all
who depend on him; who is all-merciful; who is im-
measurably raised above all possibility of any one being
equal or superior to him; whose name is the Aighest
Brahman. And with equal certainty we know from Scrip-
ture that this Supreme Lord, when pleased by the faith-
ful worship of his Devotees—which worship consists in
daily repeated meditation on Him, assisted by the per-
formance of all the practices prescribed for each caste and
4srama—frees them from the influence of Nescience which
consists of karman accumulated in the infinite progress of
time and hence hard to overcome; allows them to attain
to that supreme bliss which consists in the direct intuition
of His own true nature: and after that does πο turn
them back into the miseries of Samsara. The text dis-
tinctly teaching this is ‘He who behaves thus all his
life through reaches the world of Brahman and does not
return’ (KA. Up. VIII, 15). And the Lord himself de-
clares ‘ Having obtained me great-souled men do not come
into rebirth, the fleeting abode of misery; for they have

Iv ADHYAyA, 4 PADA, 22. 771

reached the highest perfection. Up to the world of
Brahmé4 the worlds return again, O Arguna; but having
attained to me, O son of Kunti, there is no rebirth’
(Bha. Gi. VIII, 15-16). As, moreover, the released soul
has freed itself from the bondage of karman, has its powers
of knowledge fully developed, and has all its being in the
supremely blissful intuition of the highest Brahman, it
evidently cannot desire anything else nor enter on any
other form of activity, and the idea of its returning into the
Samsara therefore is altogether excluded. Nor indeed
need we fear that the Supreme Lord when once having
taken to himself the Devotee whom he greatly loves will
turn him back into the Samsara. For He himself has said,
‘To the wise man I am very dear, and dear he is to me.
Noble indeed are all these, but the wise man I regard as
my very Self. For he, with soul devoted, seeks me only
as his highest goal. At the end of many births the wise
man goes to me, thinking all is Vasudeva. Such great-
souled men are rarely met with’ (Bha. Gi. VII, 17-19).—
The repetition of the words of the Satra indicates the con-
clusion of this body of doctrine. Thus everything is settled
to satisfaction—Here terminates the adhikaraza of ‘with
the exception of the world-energies.’

Here terminates the fourth pada of the fourth adhydya
of the commentary on the S4riraka Mim4ms4, composed
by the reverend teacher Ramanuga. This completes the
fourth adhy4ya, and the whole work ; and the entire body
of doctrine is thus broyght to a conclusion.

3D2

INDEX OF QUOTATIONS.

Aitareya-aranyaka

II, 4, 1,1

4,1, 2.
4. 39 4-

.

Aitareya-upanishad

αὶ τῶν is

Apastambiya-

dharma-sftra

.

.

I, 8, 22, 45 23,2

II, 1, 2, 3.

9, 13-17

Bhagavad-git&
IIjiz..
111, 27.
Ι͂Ιν, 6...

ΟΞ

.

ΟΠ ΚΞ

71, 206, 391,
461, 767
81, 201, 461

417

240

365

140, 397, 612

54.» 769
41ι
627
86, 612 Sq.

X,8 ..

8; 10; 11

IO. «
10; 11
ao. .
39. -
41; 42
42. .

XI, 53; 54
XII, 7
XIII, 1

XVI, 8-19

Brihad-Aranyaka-

upanishad
1,30 3
3,22.

.:...

Ἴ1, 410

558

16

489

21, 71, 102

21, 102

102

86, 577, 612
56.) 769

16, 617,710

ai, ror

72, 571, 577
140, 479
365

553

554

98, 325, 759
140

248

101, 356, 557
263

101, 310

145, 612 sq.
86

γι

558

488

700

356

554

411) 488, 700
101, 263, 557
356

633 54.
575

774 VEDANTA-SOTRAS,
Ilan... 28 III, 8,10 . a:
497 + © « 14, 24, 141, 9. ..... 769
179,374,466, 928. . . 24, 236, 240,
479,543,718 402
4,10 . 2 . 34, 71, 2535 IV,3,1 . . . Gor
589, 718 357 + « « 60, 352, 546-
4,11. . . 46%, 767 548
4,15 - . + 13,179) 199 3,10 . . . 121, Gor, 764
5.3 + + + 575 32145 30. 60
5,13. + + 572 3931. . . 98, 192, 205,
5,31. + +» 574, 578 352,384,469,
5,32. . . 568 765
1,11 . . © 199 3,30. . . 549
1,18 . . . 555, 576 3532. . . 318
1,19 . . « 604 3,35 - . . 98, 192, 352,
2,3 - . . 366 469
33 2 + + 568 3,38 . . . 730
3,6 . . . 633, 615-617, 4 0 6 se 734
624 42. . 546, 689, 732
4,5 + « © 151,179, 188, 495 + » « 478
709 46 . . . 726
46 .. 143, 399, 458, 497 5 + « 738,733
a 4,13... - 547
4,10. . 143 416. . . 336, 349, 366
411... 571: 41... 37:
4,32... 270, 388, 545, 418 . 2. 1 258
551 419 - . « 20,84,143,180,
4913 + - » 192, 435,458 435, 458
4914 6. « 143 4,90. 0. . 13,152
4715. - 58,399 4.22. . . 10,16sq.,188,
5:19 + + + 10,92,191,435 384, 319,352,
IlIl,a,1 . . . 57% 522,547,694,
2,10; Ir . 734 699, 703 sq.,
32,13. . . 586 750, 769
3,23 - + - 436 4,23. . . 10, 17, 700,
4 + 2 6 . 655 709, 722
4,2 . - . 20, 176, 184 4,24. . . 626
5 « « + - 655, 709, 711 4,24; 25 . 352
552. + - 83 4725 - + + 397) 402, 543,
7 « « « « 214, 278-282, 621
307, 576 5,6 . . . 13, 385, 458
Ἴ, 3 εν, 608, 717, 767 5.7 + + + 30
7,38. .. 537, 5.13 . . . 60, 760, 766
7,33 22. . 133 5.15... . «. 20,60,84,183,
7) 3-λδ Ὁ. 227 546
7) 3-23. =. 140, 399 6,12 . - 60
7,9ff . . 242 Vi4 2... . 659
7,16 . . . 214 4.2 + « « 572, 575,586
7,18 . . . 273, 278 4,6 . . . §90
7,22. . . 98, 191, 252 4,22. . . 693
54.,319, 394, 4,24... . 661
468, 549 5 2 © © « 642
7) 23 + « » I9I SQ. 319 5,2 . . . 272,659
8,8 . . . 26, 308 9 - + + » 287, 290 sq.
89 ..ϑ.. . 319, 348, 398, To. 2. . 7445Q.
576, 653 VI,r . . . 1 636

INDEX OF QUOTATIONS. 775

i .-ς-ς-.ς--.ςς..-ς-ς.ςς-ς ςς:---ς-ς--

ΝΙ,1,14.. ... 708 Ϊ,3, 15... - . 13, 262, 360,
2,15 . .. 651, 744 54. 363
748 11,4,͵ΧΓῥ 2. . . 268
216... 74% 4,9 + + + 603
4,10 . 2. . 20
Daksha-smriti . . 411 4,13 2 . « 348
4,12; 1... 335
GaAbila-upanishad . 696 5,8 . . . 12%, 602, 768
5,13 - - - 81, 191, 541,
Garbha-upanishad 3 364 543, 562
5,15 - - . 348
Gaudapida-karika 6,333 - + 348
δ. ee « 226 6,9 ... « 188, 258, 627
1,16... . 22 6,10 . . + 570
111,24 . . . . 241 6,17 . - + 325,348
Gautama- Kaushitaki-
dharma-s(tra upanishad
XI,a9.. 2. © 6 590 1,2 6 2s + 593
3+ 2 + + 744, 746
fs4-upanishad 38. . .. 733
2... + 689 4 2 2 + + 734
8 .... 182 11,14. . . . 417
ee | HT... . . 250-154
3. . + « 206,258
ἢ 88 . . ... 18,558
Katéa-upanishad ᾽
I, ae - 2 269 IV 9. eee aoa 44
1,20... 269 » 19... 3
1,23. . . 608 Ν
΄, 25... όοι Kena-upanishad
1,26... . 361 I,3 0. 2 + 6 1823
2, 6 be on” 593 4 © © . . 183, 188
2,10... 7 Π,3. 0.0.0... 20,83
2,12. . 268, 272
2, 14... 18ε Kbandogya-
2,16-17. . 362 upanishad
2,18 . . . 392, 479, 524, I,1,1 . . . 634,676
541 1,3 ... 696
2,19... 553 2... »« 633 8q.
2,20-25. . 362 2,7 + + « 574
3,22 . . « 181, 267, 424 3,33. . - 623
2,23. - » 15, 267, 617, 38 1. 719
710 6. . . . 635
2,24. . .- 712,723 6,8 . . . 238
2,35. . . 266 7 « 2 « » 238
3,1 . » + 98, 124, 267, Q « « « « 242,635
269, 363 9,I « 2 © 244, 320
3,2 . « - 269 IO; tr . . 246
33 + + - 269 11,5. . 258, 569
393-9. « » 355 Il,2,1 .. 676
3, 3-14» = 363 23,1. . 694
34 + + - 182 IN... - 335, 369
3,9 «+ . . 266, 269, 272 124%. . 248
3, ὈΓΠΡϑ» . 1 + 354 12,6. . . 562,623
3,12 - . + 436 1357 + + + 347, 349, 366

VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

ee oe © © ew ew we ew

257-265, 312,
753

17, 83,85,133,
204,399,458,
674,717

476

264, 315

716

197, 718

14

623

374, 465

716 .

14

338

248

342

274

273 Sq.

373

273

274

274

274

722

744

272, 274, 313

747

749

743

636

574

585

587

588

588, 753

651, 693, 745

588

589, 726

590

688

287

677

630

287, 289, 293
291, 294

291

143, 174, 167

oe ee @

VI,2-8 .
2,1
2,1 fff.
2, I-3
23.
2,33 4
3...
3:5.
3.1 -
392
3) 2-3.
33 -
3.3-4.
3534.
51.
552 .
554 -
6,1.
8...
8,1
84.
8,6.
8,7.
9,2 .
%3 .
97 -
10,2,
14,2.
15,1.
iff.
1,3.
a.
15...
15, I-3
15,4. .
18, 16; 19
433.
23.
23; 24
24,1
25. .
251.
25,2.
26.
26,1.

ee ee © o 8 © © © © ΚΞ ww

eo © © © © © © @ © wo ew ew ew we

141

20, 28, 180,
240,374, 460,
534

200

158

71,81, 85,202,
375, 521, 532
54., 536 sq.

537

435) 730 Sq.

578-583

595

81, 206, 252,
35°, 377,394,
417, 578

579

717

205, 384, 604

206

549, 737

24, 180, 203,
206, 227,252,
399,435,534

318

206

10

318, 608

187, 250, 649,
725,727,732

765

753 564.

183, 300

527

301, 718

302, 307

Ἴ, 300, 458,
551,606,650,
767

17

304

INDEX OF QUOTATIONS. 777
VII, 26,9 . . . 7,14, 23, 60, Μαδᾶηβτβγα»δ-
183,423,428, upanishad
546,606,650, a. 1 ee 625
702,712,763, Ir. - . 468
766 6 . 1 1. 241, 487
VII, r 2... . 82, 420, 673 637... 627
1ff . . . 665 8-11. . . 130
1,I . . © 351, 394, 384, wo... (624
660 X . 1. 1 6 367, 666
1,1 . . 349, 631 Too + eo + 151
13 2 - . 207 23. - . 632, 667
1,5 - . . 26, 83, 143, ΧΙ. + + « 207, 666
195,207,239, 3 + + 6 6 139
241,402,419, 6 . ο΄. 667
476, 546,608, 8-12... . 297
621, 760 XXV(?). . .. γ4ι
6... 7,99) 315 Ἶ
2,1 . . . 428, 762 Mahopanishad 1. . 522
Pe Ae Ae a Maitrayana-
1 « © «© 22 upanishad
Se, OR VEE ea ease
354 + + « 100, 302, 333, | Manu-smriti
392 | Oe τς . 400
40. . . 621, 724 538-9 . . 334
6,2. . . 740 5-8 . ww 410
6,3 +» « « 604 6-8 . .. 461
65 . . . 731, 738 54. 8 . .ὄ .. 407
744 1,17. 6 704
6.6. .. 749 X,40- 6 ee 343
7 « « « « 608 126. . . . 343
8. . 1. 328 ΧΙΙ, 106. . . . 426
7,0. 6 6 13, 132, 161, :
179,314,757, | Mundaka-upanishad
760 ἴ,1,5 . . . 20, 78, 282,
73 + « « 320 308, 653
Il, . . . 606, 766 1,6 . . . 20, 264, 282,
12,1 + « 481, 210, 238, 360, 407, 625
321, 428, 763 1.7. + 6 + 407
32,15; 3.-. . 649 1,8-9. . . 533
12,3. . . 60, 99, 320, 19. 26,81,143,195,
349,428,546, 202, 383,350,
606, 650,661, 405,419,462,
751 54., 755, 537, 550, 612
760, 762 sq. a,r . . . 285
12,335. . 552 2,6 . . . 285
12,4... 60 47 0 2 6 2 7
12,4-5 . . 546 4,7 ff. . . 286
12,5... 766 2,133; 13 . 7
13. . «© « 646, 711, 732 >t 2. 2. . « 286
14... 1,1 .ν 391
ἀεὶ “ον 2 τι 1,2 . « 4381, 282, 287,
1§ . . - - 689,770 420, 624
1,3 + . « 524, 536, 538,
KG@lika-upanishad . 363 sq., 364 572, 577
note, 399 84. oy ree 287, 289, 532

778 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.
Il,1,8 . . . 570 IlI,1,12 . . . 222
2,5 .« . . 296, 622 339 + « « 654
2,6 «© « » 3 417 . . . 152
2,7 « +» » 258, 397 5,21: . . . 672
28. . . . 15, 23, 693, 7,18 . 6 . 554
722 IV,3,1 - . . 274
2,10. . 335 3,17 - συ, 158
31 «νὸν 569 VI. . ww. γοό
III, 1,1 . . . 98, 182, 266, 8,54 - - « 26
299, 610 Χ, 8,15. . . 647
1,2. 6 + 299
1,3. . + « 9989.,298,324, | Rig-veda-samhita
407, 758, 766 I,98 1 . . . 288
ἔν 4. νὸν, 17 V,129,2. . - 572
1.58... 17 ΨΙ, 47,18. . . 126
1,8 . . . 188, 258, 617, 9t4,r . . 6 593
716 ϑι. . . . 475
1,9 ..... 547, 617 88,12. . . 28%
2,3. . « 284 g90,r . . . 292
24 2 « . 17 129,1. . . 125
2,6 . . . 750 129,3. . . 125, 400
8. . . . 99 534. 298,
392,622,624, | Sanatsugitiya
686 Wyse. ee το 283
2,9 . . ὁ Ὁ. ἦθοι 183,
188, 192, 475 | S§akhya-karika
2,10. . . 639 gare ede εὖ 371
Σ 15... τ... 483
δ ἀρὰ ἫΝ τὰ 16. . ... 483, 486, 491
"Ν ον νὸν. 492
Panini 1%... . 492
20; 21 . 492
II, ᾿ és : Η ὃ ria 21. . 2 6 6490, 491
ΠῚ, 2,54. . . 462 pee ἐν ΣΈ.
3» 113... 484 Pa cae 1:
IV, 3, 144. . 230 62 ον pide
V,2,91 . . . 69 Ae ai Ἐξ AE
4,21. . . 93,230 Satapatha-bral
Prasna-upanishad KX... + 668, 673
19 as. 6 488 54. + + + 673
Io. ον 705 6... - 673
16... 17 6, 1,11 . 292
IV, 9 . . 60, 546 6,3,2 . . 263
V,2 2. 2... 312 :
ΝΙ,3. ... . «201, 730 Subfla-upanishad
5. . 60, 546 2 2 6 6 © 429, 239, 280,
8 .. . 183 403 54., 423,
537
PGrva-mim4ys4-sitra VIL... « . 202, 227, 242
δ... . 120, 687 ε΄. + + 133, 140
1,3,3- + . . 408, 523
II, 2,1 ff. . . 680 Svetasvatara-
49. ..... 630 upanishad
WI... ων. 19 1,1.3 - . . 367

Ill,

IV,

VI,

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INDEX OF QUOTATIONS.

7, 139, 145,
468, 566,
718

414, 419

364

81, 139, 191,
469,541,559,
566

139, 144

139
16,23,90,130,
183,192,241,
297,387,522,
686

624

249, 624 Sq.

622

624

292

280, 420, 476

139, 365

139, I9T, 419
54., 468 sq.

414, 419

125, 139, 406,

259

765

365

367

191

81, 241

132, 462

461

612

26, 81, 143,
202,241,419,
462, 476

139, 191, 207,
241, 468

182, 436

139, 469

7

54.) 547;

139, 191, 365,
469
313) 334, 397

10, 20, 241,
402, 612,
622

710

Taittiriya-ranyaka
1,12,7 .. .
ἌΣ τς ον ὦ

94.3) Se Seon

Taittirfya-brahmana

III, 5, 10,5 . .
Taittiriya-samhita

Irajr.

.

Taittiriya-upanishad
pode ark
Wa...

is Ge eer

-
"

i=
Hm

oe eee
oe ee ww ὦ ἃ
rr Ξ Κᾳ.Ι

ANAM A bw ὦ
.

: eee ae ne
yt 2 2
18... .ς
8 . 1. ow ος
8) ὃς δ
8,4 oe
9 se es
HE «os
IN,r 2...

779

7, 16, 207, 241
252
140, 207, 227

330

330
331
587
571

258

591

10, 20, 23, 26-
29, 82, 99,
206, 209,229,
375, 402, 532
54.) 55°

7, 83, 99, 143»
188, 240,244,
536 sq., 550,
681,686,758,
770

414

230

60

550

209, 555, 637

545; 549

229

125, 133, 141,
143,209,213,
226,236,254,
280, 402, 404
$q., 576

83, 414, 465,
521

20, 23, 85, 99,
233,236, 320,
376, 390, 402,
626,656,755,
768 sq.

244, 374, 550

603

212, 612, 755

232, 348, 576,

780 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.
ΠῚ, 1,1 2 2 2 174, 540, 767 II, 3,41 . . 356
1:2... ... 237 3,43;46. 620
δ᾽ es 8 - 260 4,17 - - 585
6,1 + « 20, 84, §50 W,1,1 . . . 422
10,5 » « . 99,237, 767 1,3. « + 120
ἃ ᾿ a,33;2 . . 121
Tandya-maha πᾷ caer ear
brahmana - 609
XX,1a,5 . . 342 ae ane 607
P bs Ee
Vedanta-sfitras 2, 11. . . 20, 86
(cross-references) 3,37... . 155
Ij1,2 ὦ . 532 2.38. . . 715
1,3 “ον 522 3,11... 99
:,5Η. . . 480 3,31 . . - 659
1,12 ff. . . 307 3,42. .. 682
1,15... ... 687, 717 359 - - + 99
1,17. . + 98 4,8 . . . 717,759
1,18 . 2. . 214 426. . . 9,16
1,24ff. . . 335 4,33 - - - 16
1,30. . . 522 IV, 1,1 - . 14
2,3 + + 687 1.3 + + + 24,138, 659
3,7 + © + 324 1,12; 16 . 16
2,8 . . . 427, 607 2,3 δὸς 86
2,2t . . . 98,299 P er ee 323
2, 21}8ἘΕ.,, . . 325 4,1. « « 192, 394
3.1.8... .. 325 4,8 . . . 759
3,3 + + 99 4,17. . « 261, 350
35. + - + 687 4,175 321 . 99, 192
3,14. . . 664
3,18 . . . 687 Vishwu-purisa
3,19 - « . 757 δ᾿... © 2!
4,32. .. 469, 759 jr. 2 ss 92
4,23. + . 173,619 1,35 - + + 93
II, 1,4 . - © 117, 202, 493, a,r.. 93
496 3,6 .. 21, 9T, 93
1,5 . . §76 2,10 . . 93
1,7 «© «© « 430,472 2, 10-14 . 88
1,8;9 . . 471 3,50; 52. 119
1,14... . « §05, 619 3,8 . « s 94
1,21... . . 434 4, 38, . . 21,94
1,322. .. 98, 458, 559, 19,85. . . 253
687,717,759 22,53. . . 87
1,24. « « 486 23, 53-55 - 88
1,27; 28. 476 ,» 12,35... .«- 129
1,33 - + + 406 12, 373 38 127
1,335 35 - 543 123,38. . . 126
1,34; 35 . 470 12, 39; 40;
1,35 . + + 404, 429 43-415.. . 23,127
3,6 . .. 425 12,41. . 128
4,33 - + + 43 12,42. . 139
3,3 2 © - 173 12,43. - 138
3,17 - . . 526 12,44. . 129
3,175 18 . 58,63 12, 45. . - 129
3,18 . . 60, 562 13,85. . . 97
3,32 - + 567 13, 86. 21, 96
3, 37 . 567 14,31... 25

INDEX OF QUOTATIONS. 781

II, 14,31 ff. . 96 VI,7 . - 100
14,32. . . 21,96 7,30. . 99
14,33. . . S01 7,53 - - »- 21,89
14,61. . . ror 7,61-63. . 88
16,23. . . 97 7, 69-71. . 87
16,24. . . 21 7,91. . . 100

VI, 4,38; 39 . 88 7994 + + + 21,97
5,72 ff. . . 87 .

5, 83-87. . 87 YAg#avalkya-smriti

6,12. . . 18 11,167. . . γ36

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS.

amsa, part, 88, 191, 559, 619 sq.

akshara, the Imperishable, 125, 287,
309, 403, 653.

akhyati, the view that the attribute
of one thing appears as that of

Πυθα, chaiker-ia th Vaga
gni chapter in the -
τοῖν (Sat Bra X), 668.

Agnividy&, knowledge of the Fires
(ie. Kb. Up. 1V, 11-13), 274 54.

agnihotra, 635, 725 sq.

agh&tikarman, 517.

anga, subordinate matter, 19.

angin, principal matter, 19.

agada, intelligent, 60, 109.

agadatva, intelligence, 61.

aga, ‘the unborn’ principle, goat,
365-370. ᾿

αασδᾶπα, non-knowledge, Nescience,
107 SQ., 110-112, 114-118, 126
84.) 147, 468.

agiva, non-soul, 516.

anu, of atomic size, 546 sq.

atigraha, 736. :

ativadin, one who makes a final su-

reme declaration, 301, 303-305.

Aditi, the individual soul, 268.

adrishta, supersensuous, transcen-
dental, the unseen principle,
345, 496 Sq., 523, 552, 566.

advitiya, without a second, 399.

advaita-vadin, 436.

advaitin, he who holds the view of
non-duality, 445.

adharma, demerit, 363, 516.

adhikarana, chapter, passim.

adhipati, sense-organ, 504.

adhyayana, learning, 689.

adhyavasaya, the deciding, 571.

adhy&asa, superimposition, 451, 492,

494.

anavasada, freedom from dejection,
17.

anatmatva, absence of selfhood, 36.

anarabdhakfrya, (works) the effects
of which have not yet begun, 725,
727.

aniruddha, principle of egoity, 524--
526.

anirvagantyat4, inexplicability, 106.

anirvakaniyatva, 433.

anirvakaniyatva-vddin, 117 sq.

anisa, 299.

anukf@ila, agreeable, 152.

anuddharsha, absence of exultation,
17.

anupalabdhi, non-perception, 52, 107

sq.

anubhfiti, consciousness, 32, 48, 56.

anumati, favour, permission, 557.

anumé§ana, inference, 298.

anuvada, reference to what is es-
tablished by other means, explana-
tory comment, 14, 45, 678, 694,
696 sq.

anusaya, remainder, 589.

anusmriti, recognition, 507.

anrita, untrue, 125.

antadkarana, internal organ, 447.

antaram, difference, interval, break,
85.

ως ether, atmosphere, 533,
568.

antaryamin, the inner Ruler, 226.

antaryami-brahmana, 214, 319, 356,
422, 457, 537, 544, 627.

anna, food, 285, 374.

anvaya, connexion, presence, 483 sq.

apara, secondary, lowest, 89, 313.

aparokshatva, being that which does
not transcend the senses, 656.

apana, 574 sq.

apurushartha,non-advantageous, 4 40.

apfrva, unprecedented, new, the
supersensuous result of an action
which later on produces the sen-
sible result, 153-155, 164, 330,
626 sq.

apratisankhy4, 505 sq.

abh4va, absence of something, non-
existence, 107 54.) 507.

abhimana, misconception, 571.

abhivim4na, 293.

abheda, non-distinction, 193.

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS.

783

abhyasa, repetition, 17, 680.

amfirta, undefined, 89.

amrita, 585.

amauna, non-mauna (see mauna),
710.

arthavada, an additional statement,
151) 155, 274, 327-330, 672, 683,
685-687, 722.

arthapatti, 117.

avagati, consciousness, 56.

avatara, incarnation, 241.

avidya, Nescience, 22 sq. 101
(avidya karmasamgfia), 106 sq.,
113 Sq., 129, 146 54.) 180, 182 sq.,
210, 212, 271, 438 Sq., 441-445,
iD lie 453, 470, 502 SQ. 544,

761.

avivakya, (day of Soma sacrifice),
668.

avyakta, the Unevolved, 135, 403,
483.

πως unevolved matter, 309.

asvatva, generic character of horses,
620.

asatkarya, 456.

asatkaryavada, the theory that the
effect does not exist before its
origination, 431.

asatkhyati, the view that the non-
existing appears as existing, 118.

asatya, untrue, 129.

astikfya, existing body, 516.

ahakartri, organ of Egoity, 182.

ahamkara, the ‘I,’ egoity, 36-38,
61-67, 71 54., 107, 333, 363, 403,
447, 481, 484, 535, 537 56.) 571,

729.

aham, ‘I,’ 713 a secret name of
Brahman, 642.

ahar, a secret name of Brahman,
642.

ahina, class of sacrifices, 764.

Akanksha, expectancy, 414.

&k4sa, ether, 245, 320, 516, 522.

Adara, conduct, 591.

atm¢khy&ti, the view that the Self
appears as a thing, 118.

Atman, Self, 226, 243, 245, 297, 375
(from apnoti), 571 (= manas).

Atmabh4va, own being, 98.

Aditya, Sun, 237 sq., 242, 719 sq.

Adesa, instruction, 398.

Ananda, bliss, 212, 236 sq.

Anandamaya, consisting of bliss, 11,
230 54., 233, 236 sq.

Anumina, object of inference, 398.

Anumianika, to be inferred, 236.

Abhsa, appearance, 565.

arambhama, that which is taken or
touched, 430, 453 54.) 455 note,
458, 467.

&rambhana-adhikarana, 78.
rhata, a Gaina, 520.

Slambhana, 504.

asrama, stage of life, 147, 521, 702--
711, 125, 770.

Asrava, influx, 517.

itikartavyata, mode of procedure,
178,
indriya, sense-organ, 577.

iksh, to think, aor.
{svara, the Lord, 620.

utpatti, being originated, 182.

udana, 575.

udgatri, 635 54.

udgitha, 8 sq., 19, 633-636, 664 sq.,
676, 682-685, 691, 298 54.) 707

+) 713, 719 SQ., 720.

udgitha vidya, ἊΣ 635.

unmana, measure, 547.

upakurvaaa, a Brahmaéarin who has
completed his course of study and
becomes a householder, 707.

Upakosala-vidya, 651 sq., 745.

upalakshaua, secondary mark, 157.

upasad, certain offerings, 652, 654.

upadana, material cause, 142.

upadhi, limiting adjunct, 134 sq.,
144, 193, 195 56.) 429, 459) 543
559 Sq., 566 sq.

upas, to meditate, 630, 716.

upasana, meditation, 15, 699, 716,
720.

upasana, meditation, 12 sq., 16, 284,
692.

fiha, a kind of cognitional activity,
414.

rita, 124, 267.
ekavakyatva, syntactical unity, 223.

aisvarya, lordly power, superior ex-
istence, 306, 755.

om, omkira, the syllable Om, 311-
313.

784

aupadhika, limiting adjuncts, 191 sq.

kararza, instrument, 178; activity,
action, 574; the instrumental
case, 579.

karmakanda, 3, 144, 151, 409, 411.

karman, action, works, good and evil
deeds, 63, 87 Sq., 94, 101, 128 sq.,
147, 152, 171 564.) 193, 209, 315,
232, 239 8q., 256, 359, 261, 280,
293, 306 Sq., 313, 321 54.) 324,
326, 328, 350, 367, 378, 380 sq.,
387, 420, 424, 428, 459, 478, 580-
592, 597 54.; 607, 11, 616,
756-758, 763, 765, 768, 770.

karma-bhavan4, roo,

karma-mim4msa, 255.

kalpa, world period, 238.

kalpaka, the shaping agent, 440.

kalpana, formation, i.e. creation, 368.

kaly4za, virtuous conduct, 17.

k4pala, skull, 521.

* kAma, desired thing, 601.

karya, thing to be done, 148, 152,
153; effected, 285, 313.

kla, time, 516.

Kundapayinam ayanam, 635.

kriti, action, 153.

kaivalya, isolation, 271.

kriy4, action, works, 17, 574.

kshetrag#a, embodied soul, 63, 88,
89, ror.

khawda, a piece, 559.
khyti, 514.

gati, the going, 570.
quality, attribute, secondary
matter, details, 126, 135, 365, 368,
400, 410, 413, 469, 475, 483-485,
491-493, 513, 553 Sq» 632, 680,

744.

godohana, a sacrificial vessel, 665,
682 sq., 707.

graha, 571, 736.

ghani-bhfita, concreted, 312.
ghatikarman, 517.

katurmukha, tour-faced, 312 sq.
damasa, cup, 366, 665.

karana, conduct, works, 591 sq.
itta, mind, 403, 500, 502, 571.
Aid-rfipa, essentially intelligent, 59.
Aint’, thinking, 571.

Aaitanya, intelligence, 59, 108, 760 54.
daitta, mental, 500, 502.

VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

gada, non-intelligent, 36 sq., 50, 60,

62, 109, 437, 552.
gati, generic character, 46, 135, 518.
giva, individual soul, 91, 205, 209
564.) 212 Sq., 234, 312, 394, 457,
469 54. 516, 526, 561, 563, 610,
ἃ 619, 730, 736.
giva atm, living Self, 226, 457, 578.
givagbana, 312 sq.
givanmukta, released in this life, 186.
givanmukti, release in this life, 186

sq.

gia, knower, 63.

ghatri, knower, 146.

giana, knowledge, consciousness, 56,
126, 146, 341; pl. forms of know-
ledge, 571.

taggalin, 259, 260.

tatkratus, according to what his
thought is, 753.

tattva of the Sankhyas, 372, 475.

tat tvam asi, 129-138.

tanu, body, 88.

tan-maya, consisting of that, 405.

tanmatra, the subtle matter, 404,
481, 535.

tapas, austerity, 517; denotes Brab-
man, 652.

tamas, darkness, 11, 125, 413, 481»
483-485.

tarka, ratiocination, 414.

tu&sha, futile, 129 ; futile non-entity,
507.

tegas, fire or heat, 59, 620.

taigasa, active, 481.

tyat, that, 125, 226, 405.

dama, 19.

dahara-vidya, 82, 665-667.
daharak4sa, small ether, 323.
diksha, initiatory ceremony, 521.
devamiay4, 602.

desa, place, 563.

omen peo 22.
substance, 135, 516 sq.

dvadastha, the twelve days’ sacrifice,
764.

dviparardha, 497, 749.

dvipa, island, 477.

dvaita, duality, 445.

dvaitavadin, (the Vaiseshika) who
holds the view of duality, 445.

dharma, attribute, 32; merit, 181,
362, 516. ἢ

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS. 785

dharani, 89.

dhy4na, devout meditation, 13, 692,
699, 716, 720.

dbyana-vidhi, 184.

dhyai, to meditate or to know, 716.

nadi, vein, 604.

nada, tone, 77.

namadheya, name, 455, 680,

nitya, permanent, 520.

nityanityavastuviveka, 19.

nididhy4sana, meditation, 10.

nididhyasitavya, to be meditated
upon, 716.

nimitta, cause, 176 sq.

niyoga, i.e. apfirva, supersensuous
result of an action which later on
produces the sensible result, 153,
178,

niranvaya, absolute, 505.

nirupakhya, non-entity, 507.

nirgara, decay, §17.

nirvikalpaka, non-determinate, 41.

Nishada-sthapati, 318.

nivara, wild rice, 120.

naimittika, contingent, 333.

naishzika, a perpetual religious stu-
dent observing the vow of chastity,
705-707.

paftkaganaA, ‘ five-people,’ 371-374.
pawtkagni-vidya, 652.

pada, word, 40.

padartha, a thing, 518.

para, highest, 313.

paramatman, highest Self, 259.
paramesvara, highest Lord, 259.

parinama, modification, 402, 404).

517.

paryaya, particular states of sub-
stances, 517 84.) 519.

panditya, learning, 710, 711, 712.

pariplava, a performance of the
Asvamedha sacrifice, 697 sq.

parivragaka, an ascetic, 705, 711.

parivragya, the wandering about as
a mendicant, 711.

putika, a plant, 120.

pudgala, body, 516.

purusha, soul, 360, 526, 530.

purushavasas, to be designated by
the term ‘man,’ 585.

purusha-vidya, 643 sq.

purushottama, the highest Person, 4.

prvapaksha, prima facie view, 8 and
passim,

[48] 3E

parvapakshin, he who holds the
prima facie view, passim.

prakarana, leading subject-matter,
667, 688.

prakara, mode, 138, 227, 400, 458,
542, 758 sq.

prakas, to shine forth, 34.

prak§sa, light, 320.

prakriti, primeval matter, originating
principle, nature, 62, 78, 81, 88
54.) 125-127, 139, 140, 209, 240,
241, 254, 256, 262, 299, 359, 363—
370, 378, 380, 386, 396-398, 405,
406, 424 Sq., 480, 481, 483, 487,
489-494, 526, 553, 555 Sq., 612,
752, 754, 769.

prakriya, subject-matter, 680,

praghamatras, subjects, 251.

‘pranava, the syllable Om, 314, 362,

634-636, 684, 694.

Pratardana-vidya (i.e. Kau, Up. III),
250, 382.

pratik@la, disagreeable, 152.

Pratigia, initial statement, 2017.

pratibuddha atm, the Self of intelli-
gence, 547.

pratisankhya, 504-506.

pratika, symbol, 718 sq.

pratyaksha, perception, presentative
thought, 41, 699.

pratyakshata, immediate presenta-
tion, 15. *

pratyag-&tman, the individual soul,
212. é

pratyaya, consciousness, 511.

pratyahara, complete restraining of
the senses from receiving external
impressions, 89.

prathiman, solid extension, 482.

pradesa, space, 293.

pradyumna, the internal organ, 524-
526,

pradhana, principal matter, non-
sentient principle, 139, 153, 200—
205, 207-209, 236 sq., 242, 256
Sq., 281-283, 286, 298, 308-310,
354-407, 413 Sq., 417, 424 56.,
428, 469, 475, 482-487, 489-492,
495, 522 54.) 530, 533, 554 56.

pradhana, ἃ superior, 610,

prabhé, light, 59, 513.

prayogana, final cause, 136, 153 sq.

pralaya, destruction of the world,
205, 318, 333 Sq., 368, 376, 400,
406, 460, 486, 491, 543, 569, 572,
603, 737, 75%

.

786

VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

prakritika, elemental, 333.

pragfa, knowing, conscious, intelli-
gent, the personal Self, the highest
Self, 384, 469, 547) 549, 766.

prana, breath, 212, 213, 250-254,
373; breathing out, 232, 467;
soul, 379, 382-384, 616; Breath,
a name of Brahman, 206, 301,
303 Sq., 522, 633 Sq., 636 sq., 640
8q., 679, 701, 753 Sq.

praza, pl, organs and vital breath,
60, 206, 554 54.) 568-578, 585 54.)
730, 734-736.

ya, consisting of breath, 92,

211-213, 231 Sq.

prazagnihotra, 295.

pradesamatra, 293.

prapti, the being obtained, 182.

prayassitta, expiatory rite, 706 sq.

prerakatva, prompting quality, 152.

phala, result, 176, 177.
phalavidhi, injunction of results, 274.

badha, sublation, 102.

badhita, sublated, 32, 33.

bilya, childlike state, 711 sq.

buddhi, internal organ, intellect, 210,
213, 267 54.) 356 Sq., 403, 555,

570 54.
brimh, root from which ‘ Brahman’
is derived, 158.
brimhana, growth, 158.
brihat, great, 375.
brihattva, greatness, 158 sq., 259.
brahmaéarya, chastity, 695.
brahmagigfsa, enquiry into Brah-
man, 4.
brahmatva, Brahma-hood, 620.
brahman, 4; from brihat, 375.
brahma-bhavanda, roo.
brahmavidy4,knowledge of Brahman,

275.
brahmasamstha, founded on Brah-
man, 695.

bhakti, devotion, devout meditation,
16, 284, 286, 363.

bhagavat, the Lord, then a holy
person, 4; a name of Vasudeva, 87.

bhagisana, 520.

bhakta, secondary or figurative, 540.

bhava, entity, 107.

bhinna, separate, 444.

bhinnatva, difference, 518.

bhGta, beings, 279.

bhfita, element, 500.

bhatamatra4, objects, 251.

bhfitadi, originator of the elements,
481.

bhfiman, ‘ muchness,’ fulness of bliss,
299-308, 678 sq.

bhfima-vidya (= ΚΔ. Up. VII, 2), 527.

bheda, difference, 31, 46, 193.

bhed4bheda, view that there is dif-
ference and absence of difference
at the same time, 42 sq., 134 Sq-,
189-193, 195, 518.

bhautika, elemental, 500.

bhrama, erroneous cognition, error,
102, 560.

hranti, illusion, 515.

madhu, ‘honey,’ the sun, 335.

madhuvidya, 335-337, 369.

manana, reflection, 10, 305, 709 Sq.

manas, internal organ, mind, 162,
169, 188, 210, 356 54., 481, 497,
570-572, 577.

mantavya, to be reflected on, 415.

mantra, 233-236, 327-330, 562.

-maya, consisting of, made of, 92,
213, 230-232.

Mahat, the Great Principle (of the
Sahkhya), 282, 287, 334, 357,
359) 371, 480 54.) 483 54.) 535-
538, 731.

mahavrata-brahmana, 644.

m4tra, mora (metrical unit), 311 sq.

mAnasa, mental (offering of a Soma
cup), 668 sq.

may, 125, 126, 138 54.) 241 (know-
ledge), 441 54., 602,

mayin, possessing may&, 125 sq.

mithy§, false, 125, 129.

mithy4tva, falsehood, 22.

mukta, released, 516.

mukhya praaa, chief vital air, 572.

mudra, a badge, 520 sq.

muni, 709-711.

mfirta, defined, 89; solid, 165.

mauna, Muni-hood, state of a Muni,
708-712.

yathakratud, according as his thought
is, 753.

yushmad-artha, the objective ele-
ment, 57.

yoga, mystic concentration of mind,
89, 162, 273, 284, 412, 413.

yogayug, practitioner of Yoga, 89.

yogasiddha, perfected by Yoga, 516.

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS.

yogyata, compatibility, 414.
yoni, female organ of generation, 600.

ps ee passion, 11, 413, 481, 483-485.
asya-brahmana, 644.

raga, passion, 598.

rugaka = nishka, 434 note.

répa, form, character, 88, 630.

lakshazd, implied meaning, implica-
tion, 29, 79, 130, 218, 381, 463.

linga, inferential mark, 19, 51, 165,
645, 667, 671, 682.

vastu, substance, 226.

vakya, syntactical connexion, 645,
667, 670.

vakyabheda, split of a sentence, 222
note.

vayu, wind, 533, 745-747.

vasana, a flow of ideas, states of
consciousness, 511, 513.

vik4ra, effected thing, effect, 364,455.

vikriti, being modified, 182.

vig#ana, understanding, knowledge,
idea, 210, 213, 214, 226, 336, 379,
500, 502, 760.

vigtanamaya, consisting of under-
standing, 213, 230, 236, 384 (the
soul in deep sleep).

vid, to know or to meditate, 630,
633, 716,

vidy4,form of meditation onBrahman,
99) 274 Sq, 629-636, 647, 651 Sq.,
655, 657-661, 666, 680, 692, 745.

viniyoga, application, 19.

vipaséit, intelligent, 234.

vipasfittva, intelligence, 234.

vibhava, manifestation, 525.

vibhGti, manifestation of power, 88,
306,

vimoka, freeness of mind, 17.

vivrit, to manifest itself, 38, 445.

viveka, abstention, 17.

viseshana, determining attribute, 135,
563.

vishaya, object, 177.

virya, strength, 517.

vritta, conduct, 591.

vedana, knowledge, 15, 716.

vedana, sensation, 502.

veda-vrata, 631.

vaikarika, modified, 481, 571.

vaikhanasa, hermit, 695, 705.

vaisvarpya, many-natured universe,
483.

787

vaisvanara-vidya, 290.

vyavahara, speech, 161.

vyashti, discrete aspect (of the
world), 578.

vyana, 575.

vyavaharika, conventional, 450.

vyavritti, individual difference, 33.

vyGha, division, 525.

sakti, power, potentiality, 88 sq., 459,
461 sq., 564.

sabda, sound, 40, 77.

sama, 19.

sarira, body, 88.

sakha, 629 sq., 635, 647, 675-677.

Sandilya-vidya, 641 sq.

sarira, joined to a body, 209, 229.

sariraka (doctrine) of the embodied
ard rt a ae

sastra, science, scriptural injunction,
525, 554.

sirovrata, vow of (carrying fire on
the) head, 631.

sila, conduct, 591.

subhasraya, perfect object, 89.

sAdra (etymology), 339.

sesha, supplementary, 153; exclu-
sive subservient relation, 421.

seshin, principal matter to be sub-
served by other things, 153.

sraddhf, faith, belief, 585, 587, 596;
water, 587 sq.

sravana, hearing, 10.

sruti, scriptural statement, 19, 645,
688,

Samyamana, 593.
Samyoga, conjunction, 513. .
savara, a kind of deep meditation,

17.

samvargavicyl (ie. Kb. Up. FV, 3, 8),
248, 338 54.) 341 56.

samvid, consciousness, 56.

samsfira, 71, 90, 123, 181, 397 Sq.,
311, 355, 395; 551; $54, 561, 602,
662, 713, 733, 755 54. 758, 768,
77° 54.

samskara, impression, 6, 502 sq.

samskriti, the being made ready, 182.

samkarshana, the individual soul,
524-526.

samkhya, number, 680.

samgfa, consciousness, 551.

sat, Being, 125, 203-206, 226, 405,
462.

satkfrya, 456.

3E2

788 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

satta, Being, 32.

sattra class of sacrifices, 764.

sattva, goodness, 11, 171 Sq., 481,
483-485; existence, 508.

satya, true, 129, 323, 455.

satyak4ma, realising its desire, 663.

satyakimatva, power of realising
one’s desire, 661, 664.

sad-vidy4, meditation on that which
truly is (K4. Up. VI, 1 ff.), 658.

sannidhi, proximity, 414.

sapta-bhangi-nyaya, the system of
the seven paralogisms, 517.

samanantara, 504.

samanvaya, connexion, 174.

samavaya, intimate relation, recipro-
cal inherence, 163, 219, 498 sq.

samavayi-karaza, intimate cause, 464.

samashti, collective aspect (of the
world), 578.

samashti-purusha, the aggregate soul,

624.
sam sara, a book of the Atharvazikas,

631.
samadhi, meditation, 517, 556.
samana, 575,
sampatti, union, 765.
sampad, to be combined, 728, 765.
sampata, yavat sampatam, 589 sq.
samprasada, serenity, 302, 320.
sambhfita, 533.
sayuktvan, 340.
sarvagfa, all-knowing, 462.

savikalpaka, determinate, 41.

sahak@rin, 504.

sikshat, manifest, 69, 656.

sikshatk4ra, immediate presentation,
16.

sikshin, the witnessing principle, 66,
69.

sAdhya, effected, 182.

samanadhikarasya, co-ordination, 79,
130, 323.

a, equality, 99.

siddhi, proof, definite well-established
knowledge, 56, 449.

suzarita, good conduct, 591.

sushira, a hollow place, 661.

ποτα ied oes 525.

setu, or bridge, 296 sq., 621 sq.

somaragan, 588. i δε

sparsa, touch, 502.

smriti, chi τὸ γοήρ ὑφόναμοι 716.

svayamprakasa, self-proved, 33.

svayamprakivatva,self-luminousness,
47-

svayamprakasata, 449.

svarga, heaven, 313.

svastika, 434, 447.

εὐ γτὶ τ ie one’s own text, 5.

svabhavika, essential, 191.

Hara, 139.

hita, arteries so called, 379, 384,
14.

hetu, reason, 202.

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS.

Abhipratarin Kaitraratha, 341 sq.

Adityas and Vasus, 335-337.

Agatasatru and Balaki, 378-380, 383.

Agni, etymology of, 292.

— world of, 746, 748.

Agnihotra offering to Praza, 294 94.

Agnirahasya, a book of the Vagasa-
neyaka, 646.

Akshap§da, 425 sq.

Altars of mind, speech, &c., 668--
673.

Ahgiras and Saunaka, 284.

Animal killed at sacrifice goes to
heaven, 599.

Aparantatamas, the teacher of the
Vedas, 529.

Apastamba qubled: 187, 410.

Aranyakas and Vedas, their teach-
ing, 530

Arhat (Gin iy the teaching of the,
517, 520.
marathya, a teacher, 293, 391.

Asuras, pa weapons real, 125.

Asvapati eya, 677 "638.

hearvan, eldest son “Y Brahmi,
284.

Atoms, theory of, refuted, 495-500.

— Bauddha ἴω of, 5οι.

— Gaina theory of, 516-520.

Atreya quoted, 707.

Audulomi quoted, 393, 394, 708,

60 sq.
Av4ntaratamas, 650 sq.

Badarayaza quoted, 326, 336, 529,
626, 686, 689, 694, 752, 761,

763.

Badari, opinion of, 293, 592, 748,
750, 763.

Balaki and ‘Agatasatra, 378-380, 383.

Bauddhas, their views of the origi-
nation of the world refuted, 500-
516,

— take shelter under a pretended
Vedic theory, 513.

Being, pure, alone is real, 32 sq.

— and Consciousness, 33, 47.

gaia theory of the, 524-

Bhirata-sambit4, i.e. the Mahi-
bhfrata, 528.

Bhiashyakara quoted, i 100,

Bhiaskara quoted, 45

Bhishma διὰ kao edge of Brah-

man, 7

— put OF a death, 742 sq.

Bodhiyana, his explanation of the
Brahma-s6tras abridged, 3.

Body, definitions of, 420-424.

Brahman, masc. (Nom. Brahmi),
the god, 90, 236, 238, 284, 312
$q., 328, 330.

Brahman, neut. the highest, revealed
in the Upanishads,. 3.

— the abode of Lakshmi, 3.

— enquiry into, 3-156.

— is that from which the origin,
&c., of this world proceed, 3, 156-
1613; creation and reabsorption of
the world its sport, 405 sq.; is
the only cause of the world, 354-
407, 413-479; it creates, 471 54.)
532-540, 767; it modifies itself
into the world, 402-406 ; it is the
world, 88, 430-467; the world
its body, 93-95, 419-434; B. and
the world related as the snake
and its coils, 618-621.

— fruit of its knowledge, 5, 7, 9, 83.

— only is real, 30 sq., 127.

— is non-differenced intelligence,
23, 81, 84; not non-differenced
intelligence, but highest Person,
207 54.

— devoid of qualities, 26 sq.; de-
void of form, 610 sq.

— oneness of, 39, 73, 80.

— highest, is pure Being, 71.

— the subject of Scripture, 74 sq.,
161-200.

— not taught by Scripture to be de-
void of all difference, 78-86.

— free from all imperfections, &c.,
88, 124, 607-618,

790

Brahman, release not due to know-
ledge of the unqualified, 129-138.

— souls ee 138-145.

— etymo of, 158.

-- aed soul relation of, 209-237,
257-353, 467-471, 558-567; the
soul’s aim, 748-754.

— not connected with Prakriti, nor
with Karman, 240.

— is the True, 303-305, 616.

— the Imperishable is, 308-311.

— isthe ‘ object of seeing,’ 311-314.

— small ether in the heart is, 314-

325.

— Person of the size of a thumb,
325 Sq., 347-349.

— gods capable of knowledge of,
326-335.

— used in a double sense, 533 sq.

— is of the nature of slaves, fisher-
men, ὅς.) 559 56.

— light the essential nature of, 611

54.

— is ‘not so, ποῖ so,’ 611 sq., 615--
617, 618.

— compared to reflected image of
the sun, 613 sq.

— light and bliss constitute its na-
ture, 618.

— is absolutely supreme, 621-625.

— its omnipresence, 624 sq.

— meditations on, 637-685, 718-

720.
— the Imperishable and bliss, 653

sq.

— as the Self of the devotee, 716-
718,

Brahman-egg, 127, 334, 731.

Brahman-world, 312 sq. 317 Sq.,
747, 751 56.

Brahmas@ékta quoted, 191.

Brahma-sfitras, their explanation by
Bodhiyana, 3.

Brahma-upanishad, 336, 525.

Breath is Brahman, 246.

— created, 572 sq.

— what it is, 573-575.

— five forms of, 574 sq.

— is minute, 575.

— not an ‘ organ,’ 577 sq.

— water a dress for, 640 sq.

Brshad-Aranyaka, in the Kaava and
MAdhyandina texts, 403, 422 sq.,
faspati, Smriti-writ
ribaspati, Smriti-writer, 409, 412.

Buddha, 4325 sq., 500, 515.

VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Castes, difference of, 564 sq.

Cause and effect, 415-419, 430—
434) 445 “4 453-455 459, 463—
499, 471, 492 SQ., 503 Sq-, 54T-

Chariot, simile of the, 355 sq., 370,
638 sq.

Consciousness itself is ‘ Being,’ 33 ;
is not ‘ Being,’ 47.

— is eternal and incapable of change,
35 Sq.; not eternal, 50-52; capa-
ble of εἰ 54 56.

— and conscious subject are not
different, 36-38.

— its self-luminousness, 47-50.

— not without object, 52-54.

— the attribute of a permanent con-
scious self, 56 sqq.

Creation, 119, 206, 332-334, 374-
3771 399, 401, 405, 410, 460 Sq.,
465 54.) 471 SQ. 474 54.) 532-540,
§68-570, 572, 578-583.

—— amere sport of Brahman, 405 sq.,
476 sq.

— from Prakriti and soul, 490-492.

Death is Nescience, 23.

—of him who knows Brahman,
728-743.

— favourable times of, 740 sq.

— soul in, 765 sq.

Demons possessing men’s bodies,
driven out, 168.

Devas, 238. See also Gods.

Dhrishtadyumna, 595.

Difference cannot be logically de-
fined, 31-33.

— can be eSehiog 39-46.

Dramida-b

601-604.
— foreshadow good and evil fortune,

604.

Dvaipayana, 406.

Earth from water, 536.

Elements, tripartition of, 119 54.
578-583, 586.

— breath and soul combined with
the, 730 sq.

Ether is Brahman, 242-246, 349-353.

— the small, in the heart,

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS.

791

Ether not a mere non-entity, 506 sq.

— created, 532-535.

Expiatory rites, 706 sq.

Eye, Person within the, 237-242,
272-278,

Fata Morgana, 449.

Fathers, path of the, 594, 742.

Fire from air, 535 sq.

— rite of carrying it on the head,
6a9, 631.

Fires, knowledge of the five, 373-
277, 753.

‘ Five-people,’ the five senses, 371-
374. Ι

Food is earth, 536.

— unlawful, when permitted, 701 sq.

Gabala taught by Gautama, 343.

Gaimini, 5, 292, 294, 335, 382 56.)
626, 686 sq., 694, 705 56.) 750,
752, 759 Sq., 763.

Gainas, their theory of the origina-
tion of the world, refuted, 516--

20.

Ganaka offered sacrifices, 688.

G§anasruti and Raikva, 338-343.

Gandharvas, 238.

— town of, 449.

Gautama teaches G&bila, 343.

Gayatri metre, 248 sq.

Gina, 425 54» 531.

God (Lord of all), denoted by
‘Brahman,’ 4.

— is intelligence and everlastingly
one, 33.

— knowledge of, 116.

—the highest Self designated as,
352.

— and Pradh4na, 396 sq., 522 sq.

— not partial, nor cruel, 477 sq.

— Gainas hold that there is no, 516.

Gods capable of knowledge of Brah-
man, 326-335.

— possess bodies and sense-organs,
328-330.

— have several bodies, 330 sq.

— create each in his own world,
472.

— path of the, 594, 651 54.. 742-
744) 747) 149, 75%, 7539 750.

— the cause of rewards of sacrifices,
626 sq.

Grammarians quoted, 60, 79.

Hari, a form of Vishnu, the Lord
and Creator, 87, 93, 527.

— all beings a play of, 406.

Heavenly world non-permanent, 177.

Hells, seven, 593.

Hiranyagarbha, a form of Vishnu, 93.

— created and creator, 334.

— proclaims the Yoga-smriti, 413,

. 539
— and Brahman, 578-583, 748-750.

— world of, 768.

‘I,’ unreality of the, 36-38.

— in sleep, 53, 67-69.

— and the Self, 57 sq., 61.

— persists in the state of release,
69-72.

Immortal, the, i.e. Brahman, 18.

Immortality, Brahman the only
cause of, 296 sq., 690.

— according to Saakhya system,
386.

— means of, 387.

— of him who knows, 731 sq.

Indra, a divine being, 238.

— is Prana and Brahman, 250-254.

— a term referring to the highest
Reality, 522.

— world of, 747 sq.

Intelligence only is true, 23.

Itihasa and Ῥυγᾶπα, 91, 126, 338 56.»
751.

Kahola and Yagfavalkya, 657.

Kaitraratha, 341 sq.

K4lamukhas, a class of adherents of
Pasupati, 520 sq.

Kanfda, 425 Sq. 430, 454) 500, 520,

544.

K4palas, a class of adherents of
Pasupati, 520.

KApeya, 342.

Kapila, 201, 354 56.) 357, 363, 365,
371, 374, 385, 425, 480, 482, 500,
520, 524, 539, 544-

— Smriti of, 408, 410-412.

—the great Rishi, referred to in
Scripture &c., 409.

Karshaagini quoted, 591 sq.

Krvika view, 196.

K4sakritsna, a teacher, 392, 394 sq.

KXaturmukha, go.

Kaushitaki-brahmana, 250.

Kavasha, Rishis descended from, 690.

Knowledge and works, 9-11, 18 sq.,

792

686-696, 698-700, 703, 712 56.)
724-727.

Knowledge is meditation, 15.

— all, is of the Real, 119-124.

— defined, 699.

— auxiliaries to, 708-712.

— sins destroyed by, 722-724.

Krishaa, 525.

Lakshmi, the highest Brahman the
abode of, 3.

Light is Brahman, 247-249.

Lightning, on the soul’s road, 747 sq.

Lord. See God.

M§&dhyamika doctrine of a general
void, 106, 514.

Magician produces illusive states of
consciousness, 75.

Mahabh§arata quoted, 241, 400, 410,

528.
— philosophical systems in the, 529

54.
Maitreya questions Parasara, 92.
Maitrey{ and YaAgfavalkya, 387,

395 56.

Maitreyt-brahmana of the Brihad-
aranyaka, 385 sq., 388, 395 54.

Manu, 410-413, 414.

Μᾶγᾶ, diversity in Brahman through,
22.

— things seen in dreams are, 86.

— Lord of, 397, 406.

Meditation on Brahman, 13-15, 17,
82 sq., 637-685.

— threefoldedness of, 253.

— different forms of, 629-636,

— must be repeated, 715 sq.

— to be carried on sitting, 720 sq.

—to be carried on up to death,

721 Sq.

Mimamsia, the earlier and the latter
part of the, 5.

— what it aims at, 6 sq.

—an antecedent to enquiry into
Brahman, 19.

— opposed to the Ved§antin view,
148-153.

Mirror does not manifest the face,

67.
Moon, double, 133.
— soul’s passage to the, 741 sq.
Mundaka-upanishad explained, 282—
287.

Nitiketa rite, 269.

VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Naésiketas, story of, 269-271, 361 sq.

Narayana, the one God, 227, 229,
239 Sq., 242, 256, 280, 359, 461,
469, 472, 522.

— the highest Self or Brahman, 279,
282, 335, 521, 530 Sq., 667.

— creator, 410, 521 sq., 767.

— promulgator of Paggaratra, 529-
531.

-- des the whole world, 625.

Nescience put an end to by know-
ledge of Brahman, 9 sq., 23 sq.,
66, 145-147.

— appearance of plurality due to it,
9, 22 Sq.

— is wrong imagination of differ-
ence, 25.

— does not originate, 54.

— final release opposed to, 71.

— its essential nature, 72.

— or Karman, 88, ror.

— theory of, cannot be proved, 102-
119.

— the root of all error, τόσ.

— all effects based on, 429, 432.

Nirvana, K&ap4la theory of, 520.

Nothingness, Buddhist theory of, re-
futed, 514-516.

On, the sacred syllable, 362.

Optical delusions, 121 sq., 123.

Organs and vital breath, their origi-
nation, 568-570.

— their number, 570-572.

— their minuteness, 572 7

— ruled by the soul and the divini-
ties, 575-577.

— vital breath not one of the, 577 sq.

Panini, 69.

Pa&éaratra doctrine, 529-531.

Paf#daratra-sAstra, the work of Visu-
deva himself, 528.

Paw#éartra-tantra is authoritative,
524-531.

Parama-samhita quoted, 526, 527.

Parasara quoted, 72, 90, 284, 406,
410, 474, 478, 564, 593.

— questioned by Maitreya, 92.

P&supata doctrine, 529; not to be
rejected absolutely, 531.

Pasupatas, adherents of Pasupati,
520, 523.

Pasupati, doctrine of, 520-523, 529.

Patafigali, 425. :

Paushkara-sambhita quoted, 525.

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS.

793

Perception versus Scripture, 24-
26, 30 54.) 73-78.

— non-determinate and determi-
nate, 41.

— doves not reveal mere Being, 44-
46.

Person, highest, release and rewards
of works from the, 625-628.

Pleasure and pain, 152-155.

Plurality not unreal, 46 sq.

Pradhana. See Sanskrit Index, p.785.

Prag4pati,a being of great merit, 237.

— the Creator, 332 sq.

— the highest Reality, 522.

— teaching of, 673, 675, 757, 760.

— world of, 747 sq.

Prahlada, saying of, 253.

Prakriti. See Sanskrit Index, p. 785.

Prana, offering to, 294 sq. See
Sanskrit Index, p. 786.

Pratardana and Indra, 250-254.

Aina 585.
ravargya ceremony, 644 sq.

Pulastya, teacher of Parasara, 9a.

Purana. See Itihasa.

— does not teach a Brahman devoid
of all difference, 86-102.

Putika plant, 130,

Raikva and Ganasruti, 338-342.

— possessed knowledge of Brah-
man, 704.

R&kshasas, their weapons real, 125.

Rama, 525.

RamAnuga, p. ix sq., 771.

Ran4yaniyas, Khilas of the, 643.

Raurava, name of a hell, 593.

Release, desire of, 4.

— how to be obtained, 9, 58, 83,
129-138, 181, 625-628.

— state of, 69-72, 551, 755-771.

-- ae life impossible, 186.

— what it is, 203 sq., 270 56.) 392.

— according to Buddha, ἐν

— Gaina theory of, 517.

— its time not fixed, 713 sq.

Rishis make or see the hymns, 332 54.

— are the prnas, 568 sq.

Sacrifice, the asvamedha, 697 sq. °

— meditations on elements of the,
707 sq.

— twelve days’, 763 sq.

Sacrifices, five great, 17.

— please the highest Person, 155.

— gods come to the, 330 sq.

Sacrifices, imply injury to living
beings, 598 sq.

— are means to propitiate deities,
626.

Saivas, a class of adherents of Pasu-

ati, 520 sq., 523.

sakhas, the same doctrine conveyed
by all, 80.

Samhitopanishad of the Atharvazas,
191.

ϑαριβᾶγα. See Sanskrit Index, p. 787.

Samvarta, 704.

aren go. ἃ

anatsugata quoted, 23.

Sandilya, 526 <q.

Sankara and Ramanuga, p. ix sq.

Sankara, a form of Vishnu, 93.

Sankarshana, Madhava proclaimed
by, 528 sq.

Sankarshana quoted, 666.

Saakhya system refuted, 282, 354-
407, 424-427, 480-495.

— twenty-five categories of,37 1-374.

— the atheistic and the theistic, 396.

— the Smriti of Kapila, 408.

— outline of, 480-482.

— in Mahabhfrata, 529-531.

— not to be rejected absolutely, 531.

ae inl ly ae

ariraka-Mim its aim, 7, 8 sq.

Sariraka-sastra, its relation to other
philosophical systems, 531.

Sastra constituted by the words of
the Veda, 487.

SAtvata doctrine, 529.

Satvata-sahita quoted, 525.

Saty4yanins quoted, 726.

Saubhari, a being of special powers,
331, 447.

Saunaka quoted, ror, 758.

— and Angiras, 284.

— K&peya, 342.

Sautrantikas, a school of Bauddhas,
510.

Scripture of greater force than per-
ception, 24-26, 30.

— not stronger than perception, 7 3-
78.

— texts, how to be reconciled, 138-—

145.

— the source of knowledge of Brah-
man, 161-200.

— and Smriti, 408-412.

— alone authoritative, 426, 473 sq.

— of tender regard to man’s wel-
fare, 66a.

794 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

Self, its unity with Brahman, 33,

100 sq.

— and I, how related, 37 54.) 57 54.»
61, 72.

— and Nescience one, 54.

— the abode of knowledge, 63.

— is eternal, 63.

— defined, 72.

— consisting of bliss is the highest
Self, 209-237.

— See also Soul.

Siddhas, 238.

Sins destroyed by knowledge, 722—
724.

Siva, a term referring to the highest
Reality, 523.

Sky-flower, 50, 55, 77, 532.

Sleep, soul in deep, 37 sq., 40, 52
54., 67-69, 205 54., 352, 379, 383
54.) 550 Sq., 604-606, 765 56.

Smriti does not teach a Brahman
devoid of all difference, 86—102.

— and Scripture, 119, 408-412.

— of Kapila, 408.

Snake and its coils, 618-621.

Snake-rope, 66, 73, 75, 148 Sq., 433:

Soma, substitute for, 120.

Soul, its relation to Brahman, 88, 98,
133 Sq 138-145, 191, 209-237,
257-353) 391 54.) 394, 467-471,
556-567.

— released, its state, 100 sq., 755-
771.

— enters a body other than its own,
420,

— is not produced, 478 sq., 540-
544. ᾿

— its size, 520, 546-548, 551, 764.

— is a knower, 544-553.

— abides in the heart, 548 sq., 765.

— is an agent, 553-556.

— its imperfections are not Brah-
man’s, 563 sq.

— enveloped by the subtle rudi-
ments of the elements, 584-589.

— followed by the prazas, 586.

— its journey to the world of the
fathers, 589-592 ; of evil-doer does
not ascend to the moon, 592-5963
its descent from the moon, 596-
600.

— in state of dream, 601-604.

— in state of swoon, 606 sq.,

— its journey to the world of
Brahman, 648-651, 728-745.

— in deep sleep. See Sleep.

Souls of gods, Asuras, &c., men,
beasts, trees, &c., 198.

Space. ‘See Ether.

Sruti, 119 sq. See Scripture.

Stage curtain, 234.

Stages of life (Asramas), the three,
693-696, 698-700, 702-712.

Stories, their purpose in Vedanta-
texts, 697 sq.

Sfidras excluded from knowledge of
Brahman, 337-347.

Sugata, i.e, Buddha, 520, 544.

— his doctrine of Nothingness, 514.

— his teaching to be rejected, 531.

Sun, Person within the, 237-242.

— as honey, 368 sq.

— at night, 739 sq.

— knowers of Brahman go to the,
739-741.

Svetaketu, 583, 585. _—

Swoon, soul in state of, 606 sq.

Thou art that, 129-138, 759.

Uddalaka and YAg#avalkya, 280.

Udgitha. See Sanskrit Index, p.783.

Unevolved, the, 354 Sq. 357, 358.

Upakosala taught by the Fires, 27 3-
275, 276 sq.

Upanishad, Pa#éaratra a great, 528.

Upanishads, doctrine of all, 135.

—the way of him who has heard
the, 277.

— mantras and sacrificial injunc-
tions in the, 644 sq.

— See also Scripture.

Ushasta and Yagiavalkya, 656-658,
701.

Vagasaneyins quoted, 263.

— of the Kazva and Madhyandina
branch, 278 sq., 281.

Vaibhashikas, a school of Bauddhas,

510,

Vaiseshikas refuted, 430-467, 495-
500, 517, 552.

Vaisvanara is the highest Self, 287--
295.

— meditations on, 677-679.

Vakyakara, 15-18, 24, 99, 138, 317.

V&amadeva, Rishi, 71, 252 sq., 618.

Varuna, world of, 747 sq.

Vasishtha, 332, 650 sq.

— teacher of Parasara, 92.

Vasudeva, the highest Brahman, 23,
87, 127.

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS.

795

Vasudeva, the world the body of, 129.

— the highest cause, 524 sq., 527,
529.

— See also Vishnu.

Vasus and Adityas, 335-337.

Veda, its study enjoined, 5 sq.

— supplemented by Itih’sa and
Purama, 91.

— Creation by means of the, 331 sq.

— is eternal, 332 sq.

— systems contrary to the, to be
το ούτεα, 523.

Vedanta and Sankhya, 409.

Vedantin view different from Mi-
mamsa theory, 148-156.

Vedartha-samgraha, 78, 138.

Vedas taught to Hirasyagarbha, 334.

— Aparantatamas their teacher, 529.

— and Aranyakas, 530 sq.

Vidura, a Sidra, 338 sq.

Viraga river in the world of Brah-
man, 648.

Vishau, ine highest abode, 87 sq.,
313, 355, 358, 608.

— the highest Brahman, 89, 93,
266, 359.

— the stars are, 126 sq.

— creator, 410, 461.

— See also Vasudeva, and Hari.

Vrittikara quoted, 206, 261, 302, 337.

Vyasa, 3, 709.

Water from fire, 536.
Widowers do not belong to an

a, 705.
Words denote something to be done,
148 sq.
— and meanings, 150 sq.

Works (karman), their fruit limited,

4s 5) 7:

— and knowledge, relation of, 9-
11, 18 sq., 686-696, 698-700, 703,
712 564.) 724-727.

— to precede enquiry into Brahman,
147.

— have a permanent result, 149 54.

— inequality and suffering due to,
478 sq. ' ἣ

— souls return with a remainder of,
589-592.

— rewards of, 625-628.

— good and evil, shaken off by him
who knows, 646-651.

— good, perish on death of Devotee,

724.

World and Brahman, 89, 413 564.)
417, 430-467, 618-621.

— its creation, subsistence and re-
absorption, from Brahman, 156-
161, 266 54.,) 333-335» 477+

YAdavaprak4sa, 459.

YAgiavalkya, 280, 387, 395, 655 56.
Yama and Nafiketas, 270 sq.
—evil-doers under the power of,

5.

Yoga, practitioner of, 89.

— system refuted, 412 sq.

— in Mahabhfrata, 529-531.

—not to be rejected absolutely,
531.

— power of, 742. ᾿

Yogi#aras, a school of Buddhists,
510-513.

Yoga-smriti, 412 sq.

Yogins, knowledge of, 51, 116.

CORRIGENDA.

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SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

TRANSLATED BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

THE RIGHT

AND EDITED BY

HON.

F. MAX MULLER.

This Series is published with the sanction and co-operation of the Secretary of
State for India in Council.

REPORT presented to the ACADEMIE DES INSCRIPTIONS, May 11,
1883, by M. ERNEST RENAN.

‘M. Renan présente trois nouveaux
volumes de la grande collection des
“Livres sacrés de lOrient” (Sacred
Books of the East), que dirige 4 Oxford,
avec une si vaste éradition et une critique
si s(ire, le savant associé de ]’Académie
des Inscriptions, M. Max Miiller.... La
premiére série de ce beau recueil, com-

οδές de 24 volumes, est presque achevée.

. Max Miiller se propose d’en publier

une geconde, dont l’intérét historique et
religieux ne sera pas moindre. M. Max
Miller a su se Vakgrades la collaboration
des savans les plus éminens d’Europe et
d’Asie. L’Université d’Oxford, que cette

rande publication honore au plus haut

egré, doit tenir ἃ continuer dans les plus
larges proportions une ceuvre aussi philo-
sophiquement congue que savamment
exécutée.’

BXTRACT from the QUARTERLY REVIEW.

“We rejoice to notice that a second
series of these translations has been an-
nounced and has actually begun to appear.
The stones, at least, out of which a stately
edifice may hereafter arise, are here being
brought together. Prof. Max Miiller has
deserved well of scientific history. Not
a few minds owe to his enticing words
their first attraction to this branch of
study. But no work of his, not even the

great edition of the Rig-Veda, can com-
pare in importance or in usefulness with
this English translation of the Sacred
Books of the East, which has been devised
by his foresight, successfully brought so
far by his persuasive and organising
power, and will, we trust, by the assist-
ance of the distinguished scholars he has
gathered round him, be carried in due
time to a happy completion.’

Professor BH. HARDY, Inaugural Lecture in the University of Freiburg, 1887.

‘Die allgemeine vergleichende Reli-
gionswissenschaft datirt von jenem gross-
artigen, in seiner Art einzig dastehenden
Unternehmen, zu welchem auf Anregung
Max Miillers im Jahre 1874 auf dem

internationalen Orientalistencongress in
London der Grundstein gelegt worden
war, die Ubersetzung der heiligen Biicher
des Ostens’ (the Sacred Books of the
East).

The Hon. ALBERT S. G. CANNING, ‘Words on Existing Religions.’

* The recent publication of the “ Sacred

a great event in the annals of theological

Books of the East” in English is surely literature.’

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

LONDON: HENRY FROWDE
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, AMEN CORNER, E.C.

A 1000

2 Ἶ SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST:

FIRST SERIES.

Vou. 1. The Upanishads.

Translated by F. Max Miirer. Part I. The XA&ndogya-
upanishad, The Talavak4ra-upanishad, The Aitareya-Granyaka,
The Kaushftaki-brahmaza-upanishad, and The VAgasaneyi-
samhité-upanishad. Second Edition. 8vo, cloth, τος. δά.

The Upanishads κονία δ the philosophy if the Veda. They have
become the foundation of Ihe later Veddnta doctrines, and indirectly
of Buddhism. Schopenhauer, speaking of the Upanishads, says :
‘In the whole world there ts no study so beneficial and so elevating
as that of the Upanishads. It has been the solace of my life, tt will
be the solace of my death.’

[See also Vol. XV.]

von. 11. The Sacred Laws of the Aryas,
As taught in the Schools of Apastamba, Gautama, Visishéha,
and Baudhayana. Translated by Gzore Bturer. Part I.
Apastamba and Gautama. Second Edition. 8vo, cloth, ros. 6d.
The Sacred Laws of the Aryas contain the original treatises on
which the Laws of Manu and other lawgivers were founded.

[See also Vol. XIV.]

vou. ΠῚ. The Sacred Books of China.

The Texts of Confucianism. Translated by James Lecer.
Part I. The ShQ King, The Religious Portions of the Shih
King, and The Hsiao King. Second Edition. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.
Confucius was a collector of ancient traditions, not the founder of
a new religion. As he lived in the stxth and fifth centuries B.C.

his works are of unique intérest for the study of Ethology.

(See also Vols. XVI, XXVII, XXVIII, XXXIX, and ΧΙ,

vou. Iv. The Zend-Avesta.

Translated by James DarmesTETER. Part I. The Vendfdad.
Second Edition, 8vo, cloth, 14s.

The Zend-Avesta contains the relics of what was the religion of

EDITED BY F. MAX MULLER. . 4

Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes. It forms to the present day the sacred
book of the Parsts, the so-called fire-worshippers.
[See also Vols. XXIII and XXXL]

vou. v. Pahlavi Texts. :
Translated by Ε. W. West. Part I. The Bundahis, Bahman
Yast, and Shayast l4-shayast. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.
The Pahlavi Texts comprise the theological literature of the revival
of Zoroaster's religion, beginning with the Sassanian dynasty. They
are important for a study of Gnosticism.
[See also Vols. XVIII, XXIV, XXXVII, and XLVI]

Vous. VI awp ΙΧ. The Qur’4n.
PartsI and II. Translated by E, H. Parmer. Second Edition.
8vo, cloth, 21s.
This translation, carried out according to his own peculiar views
Of the origin of the Qur’én, was the last great work of E. H. Palmer,
before he was murdered tn Egypt.

vou. ΨΙΙ. The Institutes of Vishzu.
Translated by Juttus Jotty. 8vo, cloth, ros. 6d.
A collection of legal aphorisms, closely connected with one of the
oldest Vedic schools, the Kathas, but considerably added to tn later
time. Of importance for a critical study of the Laws of Manu,

Vou. Vit. The Bhagavadgita, with The Sanatsugatiya,
and The Anugita.
Translated by KAsuinAtH Trrmpax TrLanc. Second Edition.
8vo, cloth, ros. 6d.
: The earliest philosophical and religtous poem of India. It has been
paraphrased in Arnold's ‘Song Celestial’

vou. X. The Dhammapada,
Translated from Pali by F. Max Mitzer; and
The Sutta-Nipata,

Translated from ῬΑ] by V. Fausséii; being Canonical Books

of the Buddhists. Second Edition. 8vo, cloth, τος. 6d.
The Dhammapada contains the quintessence of Buddhist morality.
The Sutta-Nipdia gives the authentic teaching of Buddha on some
of the fundamental principles of religion.

4 SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST:

vou. XI. Buddhist Suttas. ;
Translated from Pali by T. W. Rays Davms. 1. The Mahi-
parinibbana Suttanta; 2. The Dhamma-/akka-ppavattana
Sutta. 3. The Tevigga Suttanta; 4. The Akankheyya Sutta ;
5. The Xetokhila Sutta; 6. The Mah4-sudassana Suttanta ;
ἡ. The Sabbasava Sutta. 8vo, cloth, ros. 6d.

A collection of the most important religious, moral, and philosophical
discourses taken from the sacred canon of the Buddhists.

vou. x11. The Satapatha-Brahmama, according to the
Text of the MAdhyandina School.
Translated by Jutrus Ἐσσειῖνο. Part I. Books I and II.
8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.
A minute account of the sacrificial ceremonies of the Vedic age.
It contains the earliest account of the Deluge in India.
[See also Vols. XX VI, XLI, XLIII, and XLIV.]

Vou. XIII. Vinaya Texts.
Translated from the Pali by T. W. Rays Davins and Hermann
Ocpenserc. Part I. The Patimokkha. The Mahfvagga, I-IV.
8vo, cloth, ros. 6d.
The Vinaya Texts give for the first time a translation of the moral
code of the Buddhist religion as setiled in the third century B.C.
[See also Vols. XVII qnd XX.]

von. xIv. The Sacred Laws of the Aryas,
As taught in the Schools of Apastamba, Gautama, VAsish/ha,
and Baudhfyana. Translated by Grore Βύησεκ. Part 11.
VAsish‘ha and Baudhfyana. ~ 8vo, cloth, ros. 6d.

vou. XV. The Upanishads.
Translated by F. Max Mttuzr. Part II. The Kasha-upanishad,
The Musdaka-upanishad, The Taittirtyaka-upanishad, The
Brihad&ranyaka-upanishad, The Svetisvatara-upanishad, The
Pras#a-upanishad, and The Maitrayana-brahmama-upanishad.
Second Edition, 8vo, cloth, τος. 6d.

Vou. XVI. The Sacred Books of China.
The Texts of Confucianism. Translated by Jamzs Lecce.
-Part II. The Yi King. 8vo, cloth, ros. 6d.
[See also Vols. XXVII, XXVIIL]

Vou. XVII. Vinaya Texts.
Translated from the Pali by T. W. Rays Davins and Hermann
OxpenzercG. Part II. The Mahavagga, V-X. The Xullavagga,
I-III. 8vo, cloth, ros. 6d.

EDITED BY F. MAX MULLER. 5

vou. xvitt. Pahlavi Texts.

Translated by E,W. West. Part II. The DA&distén-f Dintk
and The Epistles of Man@sthar. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

Vou, XIX. The Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king.
A Life of Buddha by Asvaghosha Bodhisattva, translated from
Sanskrit into Chinese by Dharmaraksha, a.p. 420, and from
Chinese into English by Samugt Beat. 8vo, cloth, ros. 6d.
This life of Buddha was translated from Sanskrit into Chinese,
A.D. 420. It contains many legends, some of which show a certain
similarity to the Evangelium infantiae, gc.

Vou. Xx. Vinaya Texts.

Translated'from the Pali by T. W. Ruys Davips and Hermann
Oxpenserc. Part III. The ΑἹ ullavagga, IV-XII. 8vo, cloth,
108, 6d,

Vou, XXI. The Saddharma-puzdartka ; or, The Lotus
of the True Law.

Translated by H. Kern. 8vo, cloth, ras. 6¢.
‘ The Lotus of the True Law, a canonical book of the Northern
Buddhists, translated from Sanskrit. There ts a Chinese transla-
tion of this book which was finished as early as the year 286 A.D.

Von, XXII. Gaina-Sitras.
Translated from Prakrit by Hermann Jacopt. Part I. The
Asérénga-Sfitra and The Kalpa-Sfttra. 8vo, cloth, ros. 6d.

The religion of the Gainas was founded by a contemporary of Buddha.
Lt still counis numerous adherents tn India, while there are no
Buddhists left in India proper.

[See Vol. XLV.]

Vou. xx11. The Zend-A vesta.

Translated by Jamzs Darmesteter. Part II. The Strézahs,
Yasts, and Nydyis. 8vo, cloth, ros. 6d.

Vou. xxtv. Pahlavi Texts.

Translated by E. W. West. Part III. Dtna-f Matinég-

Khirad, Sikand-gim4ntk Vigaér, and Sad Dar. 8vo, cloth,
τος, 6d.

6 SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST:

SECOND SERIES.

Vou. XXV. Manu.
Translated by Gore Bijnter. 8vo, cloth, 21s.
This translation is founded on that of Sir William Jones, which
has been carefully revised and corrected with the help of seven native
Commentaries. An Appendix contains all the quotations from Manu
which are found in the Hindu Law-books, translated for the use of
the Law Courts in India. Another Appendix gives a synopsts of
parallel passages from the six Dharma-sttras, the other Smritis,
the Upanishads, the Mahédbhdrata, &c.

Vou. Xxvi. The Satapatha-Brahmaza.

Translated by Jutius Ecextinc. Part II. Books III and IV.
8vo, cloth, r2s. 64.

Vous. XXVII anp XXVIII. The Sacred Books of China.
The Texts of Confucianism. Translated by James Leccr. Parts
IlandIV. The Li ΧΑ, or Collection of Treatises on the Rules
of Propriety, or Ceremonial Usages. 8vo, cloth, 25s.

vou. XxIx. The Gvzhya-Sitras, Rules of Vedic

Domestic Ceremonies.

Part I. Saakh4yana, Asvalayana, Paraskara, Kb4dira. Trans-
-lated by Hermann OLpENzERG. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

vou. Xxx. The Grzhya-Sitras, Rules of Vedic
Domestic Ceremonies.
Part II. Gobhila, Hiranzyakesin, Apastamba. Translated by
Hermann OLpENBERG. Apastamba, Yagfa-paribh4sh4-sftras.
Translated by F. Max Mijtrer. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.
These rules of Domestic Ceremonies describe the home life of the
ancient Aryas with a completeness and accuracy unmatched in any
other literature. Some of these rules have been incorporated im the
anctent Law-books.

vou. xxxI. The Zend-Avesta.
Part III. ‘The Yasna, Visparad, Afrtnagin, G&hs, and
Miscellaneous Fragments. Translated by L.H. Mitts. 8vo,
cloth, 12s. 6d.

Vou. xxx1r. Vedic Hymns.
Translated by F. Max Mixrer. PartI. 8vo, cloth, 18s. 6d.
[See also Vol. XLVL]
Vou. xXxx11I. The Minor Law-books.

Translated by Jutivs Jorzry. Part I. N&rada, Brihaspati.
8vo, cloth, ros. 6d.

e

EDITED BY F, MAX MULLER. 7

Vou. XxxIv. The Vedanta-Sitras, with the Com-
mentary by Sankara#arya. Part I.
Translated by G. Tupaut. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.
[See also Vols. XXXVIII and XLVIIT.]} Ὲ
Vos. XXXV anp XXXVI. The Questions of King
Milinda. ᾿
Translated from the Pali by T. W. Ruys Davins.
Part I. 8vo, cloth, ros. 6d. Part II. 8vo, cloth, 125. 6d.
Vou. XxxvilI. Pahlavi Texts.
Translated by E. W. West. Part IV. The Contents of the
Nasks, as stated in the Eighth and Ninth Books of the
Dinkard. 155,
Vou. Xxxvit1. The Ved4nta-Sitras. Part II. 8vo,
cloth, with full Index to both Parts, 12s. 6d.

VoLs. XXXIX anp XL. The Sacred Books of China.
The Texts of Taoism. Translated by James Lecce. 8vo,
cloth, 21s.

Vou. XLI. The Satapatha-Brahmamza. Part III.
Translated by Jutius EccEuinc. 8vo, cloth, ras. 6d.

Vou. XLII. Hymns of the Atharva-veda.

Translated by M. Broomrizip. 8vo, cloth, 2 Is.

voL. ΧΙ. The Satapatha-Brahmama.

Translated by Jutivs Ecceiinc. PartIV. Books VIII,
IX, and Χ, 12s. 6d.

Vou. XLIV. The Satapatha-Braéhmaza.

Translated by Jutius Eccetinc. Part V. Books XI, XII,
XIII, and XIV. 18s. 6d.

Von. XLV. The Gaina-Sitras.

Translated from Prakvst, by HERMANN Jacosr. Part II. The
Uttarfdhyayana Sfitra, The Sitrakrét4nga Sftra. 8vo, cloth,
125. 6d.

Von. XLVI. Vedic Hymns. Part II. 8vo, cloth, 145.

‘Vou. XLVII. Pahlavi Texts.

Translated by E. W. West. Part V. Marvels of Zoroas-
trianism. 85. 6d.

‘Vou. XLVIII. The Ved4nta-Satras, Part III, with

Rémanuga’s Sribhashya.
Translated by G. Turpavr. [Jn the Press.]

Vou. XLIX. Buddhist Mahay4na Texts. Buddha-
farita, translated by E. B. Coweti. Sukhavati-vyfha, Vagrakkhe-
dik, &c., translated by F. Max Miter. Amit@yur-Dhy&na-
Sfitra, translated by J. Taxakusu. 8vo, cloth, 125. 6d.

8 RECENT ORIENTAL WORKS.

ANECDOTA OXONIENSIA.
ARYAN SERIES. —

Buddhist Texts from Fapan, 1. Vagrakkhedik&; The
Diamond-Cutter.
Edited by F. Max Mitrzr, M.A. Small gto, 35. 6d.
One of the most famous metaphysical treatises of the Mah4yana Buddhists.
Buddhist Texts from Fapan. 11. Sukhavati-Vydha :
Description of Sukhivatt, the Land of Bliss.
Edited by F. Max Miitrer, M.A., and Bunyiv Nanypio. With
two Appendices: (1) Text and Translation of Sanghavarman’s
Chinese Version of the Poetical Portions of the Sukhévatt-
Vyfha ; (2) Sanskrit Text of the Smaller Sukh4vati-Vyfha.

Small 4to, 7s. 6d.
The editio princeps of the Sacred Book of one of the largest and most
influential sects of Buddhism, numbering more than ten millions of followers

in Japan alone.

Buddhist Texts from Fapan. 111. The Ancient Palm-
Leaves containing the Pragf#i-Péramita-H7zdaya-
δόξα and the Ushnisha-Vigaya-Dhérami.

Edited by F. Max Mixer, M.A., and Bunyru Νάνπο, M.A.
With an Appendix by G. Βύημεκ, C.ILE. With many Plates.

Small 4to, ros.
Contains facsimiles of the oldest Sanskrit MS. at present known.

Dharma-Samegraha, an Ancient Collection of Buddhist
Technical Terms.
Prepared for publication by Kenyru Kasawara, a Buddhist
Priest from Japan, and, after his death, edited by F. Max
Mijtier and H. Wenzet. Small 4to, 75. 6d.
Katyayana’s Sarvanukramazt of the Azgveda.
With Extracts from Shadgurusishya’s Commentary entitled
Ved4rthadipika. Edited by A. A. Macpongtt, M.A., Ph.D. 16s.
The Buddha-Xarita of Asvaghosha.
Edited, from’ three MSS., by E. B. Cowgtt, M.A. ras. 6¢.
The Mantrapatha, or the Prayer Book of the Apa-
stambins.
Edited, together with the Commentary of Haradatta, and
translated by M. Winternitz, Ph.D. Ζ γε Part, Introduc-
tion, Sanskrit Text, Varietas Lectionis, and Appendices.
Small quarto, ros, 6d.

OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

LONDON: HENRY FROWDE
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, AMEN CORNER, E.C.

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