Saddam Hussein: the fighter, the thinker and the man

Saddam Husseiii; the Fighter; the Thinker and the Man
Part II

Reii^cn and heritage - R^/^duticiiaiy reflecticxis

By Amir Eskander
Translated by Hassan Selim

Chapter 2

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, there has followed, in the wake of the sharp
shock of colonialist penetration of the Arab World, an ambivalent attitude towards its
heritage.

This is because this attitude was forced to pause and consider the "other", and therefore tried
to define its own self In this attempt it was forced to answer the questions, which it posed
itself What was its past? In what way was it connected to it? In what sense was it possible
that its essence should be part of historical continuity that began at a point in the distant past?
In what sense could it cut itself off from that continuity, and be cut off from it? Is the present
a continuation of the past, or does history refuse to repeat itself?

There is no doubt but that the attempt to answer such questions does not, and has not hitherto,
preoccupied more than a few of the traditional scholars and religious lawyers, yet it has begun
to attract, particularly in the years following the Second World War, a continually increasing
number of researchers and intellectuals of differing intellectual viewpoints. But perhaps it is
difficult even today to find a political party that has a serious programme concerning the
matter of religion and heritage either as regards the Arab identity as a whole or that of a
particular area. Generally speaking, the two most important events to occur in recent years
may be said to be the defeat of the Arabs in the June 1967 war and the Iranian Revolution of
1979.

After the Arab humiliation of 1967, some intellectuals claimed that salvation for Arab society
lay only in a return to the pristine springs of Islam, after its deviation from the upright path for
the sake of materialist values" It had estranged itself from the values of its religion and its
heritage, and this was the cause of its defeat.

In 1972, for instance. Shaikh Abd al-Halim Mahmud, the grand Imam of al-Azhar, wrote a
series of articles, which he published in the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram. He claimed in
these articles that the root of the affliction was Greek philosophy, particularly Aristotle,
European philosophy in general, particularly Descartes, and the Arab philosophers headed by
Averroes (Abul Walid Mahommed Ibn Ahmed, Ibn Mahommed Ibn Roshd). In his opinion,
all these caused the decay of the Islamic heritage, which God had sent al-Ghazali to defend.
The solution proposed by the Imam of al-Azhar was a return to the Islamic spring that cannot
run dry; whose constitution is the Koran. "Its message is eternal. It is the straight path, the
everlasting guidance (1)."

To turn to the view put forward by Hussein Shafi'i who was Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt:
"The only society that can challenge Israel is the society of 'There is no God but God' (2)." In
the same month a high-ranking official in the Arab Socialist Union, Muhammad Othman
Isma'il, said in a leading Cairo newspaper: "We preoccupy ourselves with Sinai, but not with
our religion (3)."

We need not be indebted to those who put forward such views, or even to the views
themselves. Their intellectual viewpoint towards the heritage is limited by their perception of
it. It must be made clear that they do not search for the heritage for its own sake. They do not
defend it because of God, their country or history: it is an ideological weapon used by this
group of intellectuals and politicians for reactionary political ends.

At the other extreme we meet a group of intellectuals who reject the religious heritage. We
hear Sadiq Jallal al-Azam, an Arab thinker from Lebanon, writing in his book A Critique of
Religious Thought', "Islam has become the official ideology of the reactionary forces in the
Arab homeland and outside it, connected with the new Imperialism led by America. In the
same way, religion has become the principal source of justification for rule by kings, as
Islamic jurisconsults have declared that the right of kings comes from Heaven and not from
the earth. It has also become the chief ally today of bourgeois capitalism so that it, together
with the institutions it has created, has become a bastion of right-wing and reactionary thought
(4)." He goes on to say, "Religion, when it enters the depths of our lives and influences our
intellectual and psychological composition, contradicts science and empirical knowledge
through and through... (5)".

Let us read Adonis, another writer: "Inasmuch as Arabic Culture, in its prevailing inherited
form, has a religious foundation which is a social formulation, it rejects innovation. This
culture changes in its prevailing inherited form without making any real advance (6)." He
goes on to say, attempting to lay bare the courses of reactionary thought in Arab society,
criticizing al-Ghazali: "Al-Ghazali's thought is that which governs the beliefs and aims of
Arab society today. Therefore, the prevailing ideology in schools, universities, television,
broadcasting and books is a force for retreat into the past and the preservation of the inherited
status quo. (7)"

When the Iranian Revolution took place under the banner of religion and in the religious robes
of its leadership, it showed the lack of firm conviction in some of its intellectual leaders and
their representatives who left one intellectual position for its antithesis. A number of Arab
writers with Marxist principles formed a chorus singing night and day the praises of the
Iranian Revolution and its religious leadership. It was not the fall of the Shah and his
reactionary State that surprised them but the sudden discovery that religion, because of the
nature of the new Iranian leadership, was the cause of the Revolution. This led Adonis to say,
"Something which some of us had thought was outside history, suddenly seemed to enter its
wide gate and become its prime mover. What some of us had thought was moribund, now
appears as though it alone is enduring, revolutionary and modem)".

Adonis of course, was not alone. The long line contained some of those whom the present
Arab state of affairs, and the quiescent picture it gave, led to see salvation in the robes of a
man of religion cursing America and imperialism. It also contained traditionalists who wished
to return to the Caliphate system, which breathed its last gasp with the "sick man of Europe"
in 1924. Yet this time it had a new name: the Imam, the Ruhullah, or the Ayatollah. A third
group in this line wished to fight Arab nationalism under the banner of the Islamic
community. Islamic unity and Islamic ideology. The attempt made now by the imperialist
states to enflame religious strife in some of our Arab countries is not without significance in
this regard. The belated discovery by the imperialist states, especially the U.S.A., of the
importance of "Islamic" civilization, and the string of conferences in American universities
and Western research centres on Islamic civilization, is the most recent sign of the age-old
imperialist exploitation of religion and its attempt to strengthen its existing positions and to
gain new ones under its cloak. There is no doubt that this attempt at exploitation goes back
more than a century, both directly and indirectly. This takes the form of a naked attack on
Islam by a small-or large-handful of orientalists, missionaries and university professors, or of

an attempt to stir up strife between the members of different religions and of different sects of
one religion inside the Arab homeland. We cannot forget that Napoleon proclaimed himself a
Muslim in Cairo during the French attack on Egypt, how Great Britain caused discord
between Muslims and Copts during the occupation of the Nile valley, how France acted as an
imperialist in order to tear Lebanon from Syria, especially in the crisis of 1860, and how the
two old imperialist powers tried to inflame religious minorities in Iraq, the Arabian Gulf, and
all North Africa. One of the uncommon achievements of imperialism was that great
orientalists such as Massignon could write a book on 'The Arabic Dialects of Baghdad'; in
which he speaks of the differences in the "languages" of the Sunni, Shiite and Christian
inhabitants of Baghdad.

Saddam Hussein's article 'On Religion and Heritage' assumes great importance for all these
questions. This is not only because it is a far-reaching attempt to put our heads back on our
shoulders, but because it is an important intellectual and political addition to the national Arab
heritage in the modern age, and to the intellectual and political heritage of the Arab Baath
Socialist Party itself

It is the contribution of a man who is not only an intellectual and political leader but also a
statesman with his hands on the reins of power in one of the most important parts of the Arab
homeland.

We must say first that the Arab Baath Socialist Party is a party that has a secular philosophy
and a nationalist nature, and that the Baathist State in Iraq is a secular and nationalist state
both in theory and practice. But this nationalist nature and secular inclination have not cut it
off from religion and heritage. On the contrary, but for its nationalist essence and secular
inclination it might not have been possible for it to adopt its position of link between the
present and the past of the nation.

The founder of the Baath, Michel Afiaq, and states: "Our Party has from the very beginning
sought inspiration in our Arab heritage our spiritual heritage. This is abundantly clear in all
the writings and slogans of the Party, especially in the slogan 'Our nation is one with an
eternal message' (9)." The lecture which he at Damascus University early in his career in 1943
which he published under the title ' In Commemoration of the Arab Prophet' is an example of
how Baathist thought from the very beginning sought revolutionary inspiration from the
heritage. In his lecture he analyzed the essence of Islam and the essence of the personality of
the Prophet as an exceptional leader and great revolutionary. He strove to establish a strong
link between them and us and to show the eternal heroism and humanity, which are of
relevance for us today and guide us on the right path. He saw in the life of Muhammad
greatness able to embrace the life of all the Arabs: "Muhammad was all the Arabs. Let all
Arabs today be Muhammad. (10)

He also said, "Satisfaction with our national heritage does not mean unqualified worship of
the past and traditions, or a languidness in the spirit of creativity (1 1)".

This was because "to seek to understand the eternal experiment in the life of the Arab nation
means an attempt to understand the unique achievement and the human impulses and values
that are revolutionary, but which do not bestow upon the nation rights and distinctions to the
extent of the great responsibility borne by the modern revolution (12)". This was a sentiment
which all intellectual and political leaders of the Baath were to affirm at all times, and to
which Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr gave an inspired and concise expression: "Be modem so long
as you remain rooted. Modernism does not imply the severance of roots (13)."

The past does not become an idol, or the heritage a cold, dead corpse to whom those who
worship the dead prostrate themselves. Rather, "the present is not the mere continuation of the

past. The result of any situation is an eternal moment (14)". As Elias Farah, one of the
Baathist thinkers, put it "The revivification of the heritage does not imply a return to the past.
It implies an understanding of the heritage in a scientific, revolutionary way in the light of the
requirements of the struggle of the Arab nation in its present stage of history (15)."

Michel 'Aflaq returns to this theme more than once in his writings. "We do not turn to the
heritage as do the traditionalists for sake of repetition and tradition-the repetition of Words
and unprofitable tradition. We look at the heritage from our age and its civilization, and then
we look at its problems and its backwardness. But our eyes are new; we do not demand from
the heritage that it should be a substitute for the struggle, which we must begin. We have lived
through the modern Revolution with all its demands, and we have found beyond it our
heritage, which gives us roots. No revolution or contemporary philosophy can replace them. It
is this understanding of the heritage that enables the Party to derive a spiritual and moral
strength from it, on which other governments cannot rely (6)." He affirmed later the
Importance for the Revolution of attachment to the heritage and of the dialectic between the
present and the past: "We can only understand the heritage when we struggle (17)"

This, then, is the nature of the inner link-in Baathists thought-between the present and the
past, modernity and the heritage. It is not a case of retreat under the illusion of salvation in the
past alone. On the other hand it is not a flight from the past in its totality in order to cling to an
imaginary future cut off from roots, or a selective fabrication of history. It is the full
revolutionary possession of the heritage, which can only be achieved by revolutionary activity
that liberates both the masses, and the heritage at the same time.

Saddam Hussein affirms at the beginning of his lecture that "our creed is not a union of all
that the past and religion involve; it is a comprehensive and developed view of life and a
comprehensive solution to constrictions and tenets. It pushes life forward on the road of
revolutionary evolution (18)". "It is a reflection of the present of our nation, but is anterior to
it at the same time (19)."

If the past still exists in the present and influences it, the question of "values" must become
irrelevant. How can the values that existed in the past influence the present in the same way
and through the same perspective? In other words, can values change their form and content
according to time and place and the evolution of societies? To put it in a nutshell: are social
values absolute or relative?

Saddam Hussein replies clearly that social values are "sophisticated, objective standards
(20)", but absolute and relative at the same time. They are "absolute in respect of the shaping
of development in the successive stages of human existence (21)", but relative "in an
estimation of a comprehensive view of life in its general movement in isolation of the
particularities of time and place and other limiting factors (22)".

Nevertheless, there are of course those who will call the relative absolute and clothe the
temporal with the garments of eternity. This is a result of the state of a backward society and
its long subservience to forces of colonialism and reaction. Consciously or not, they
eventually solidify whatever is sterile in the present and deprive it of its dynamism and power
to grow and develop. Sometimes they do this in the name of the heritage of the past and its
traditions. At other times they do it in the name of religion. Saddam Hussein tells them with a
biting clarity, "Our Party is not neutral between atheism and faith. It is always on the side of
faith, but it is not a religious Party and there is no reason why it should be (23)".

But the rejectionists who seek salvation only through the past under the illusion that it can be
repeated go to the lengths of blind, hateful partisanship. They make themselves guardians of
society and its present in the name of its past. This had happened in the West as well as in our

Arab societies, only centuries ago. The imaginary tale told by Dostoievsky in 'The Brothers
Karamazov' is a good example. Dostoievsky wanted to show how the "Creed" could be turned
into a dreadful idol, as it was by the cardinals and priests of the Spanish Inquisition that
tortured hundreds to death in Seville. The courts of the Inquisition were headed by a Cardinal
whose name was dreaded because of his power to execute any man on the grounds that he was
a heretic-a heretic as understood by the Cardinal, of course. One day the people of the city
were surprised to find that Christ had appeared on earth a second time. They knew that this
was in fact Christ because of his halo and the miracles that he worked in front of the people.
They would bring him a sick child, he would touch it and say, and "Rise up", and it would rise
up at once. The fearful Cardinal came, and all hearts were hushed. He saw with his own eyes
the Christ surrounded by people at prayer. The mantle of religion fell from his brow and his
bloodstained face became apparent. Christ approached the Cardinal, and religion faced the
man of religion in front of the people. Christ gazed on the man who had killed in the name of
Christianity, and the Cardinal knew that Christ pronounced him guilty. So the Cardinal had
him imprisoned: the "Christian" Cardinal put Christ himself behind bars, then preached on
how Christianity was persecuted on the pain borne by Cardinals in order to prevent it. He
visited Christ in order to explain to him how Christianity itself had changed, and how its new
characteristics were known to the minds of men. Eventually he came to the purpose of his
visit: to tell him how the presence of Christ in the city involved a great danger for
Christianity; how Christ had himself become a threat to Christianity. In other words, Christ
was no longer The Christ. The high point of the comedy was that he asked Christ to leave the
city at once, as an alternative to standing trial for heresy. The Cardinal himself unlocked his
fetters. Alyosha, Dostoievsky's hero in his "Sad Dream", saw him leave, weighed down by
indescribable grief, banished from the city, his city.

How should this bigotry, this oppression of religion, be faced?

There are two ways, both tactical and short-term. The first is "generalization and
obscurantism" for the consumption of the majority. It has to be directed towards the short-
term and can only be used for a short period in order to get through a temporary predicament.
Saddam Hussein has publicly repudiated this: "We do not want to use [such methods] to
achieve any short-term goal. Such are the tactics of the reactionaries and the oppressive
classes in their relations with the masses. All that we want is that the majority of the people
should be on our side at all times. The deep-rooted and essential treatment for the problems of
the people and their basic social and economic environment is to keep well-away from
generalization and obscurantism and to be concerned with specific goals and the active forces
that are on the side of the Revolution at the moment in the struggle when the enemies of the
Revolution and their allies are identified (24)."

The other way is to do battle with the enemy and to have a temporary meeting with him on his
own territory in the hope of infiuencing him and leading him on the right path. Saddam
Hussein rejects this tactical approach as well, since "you must always be clearly distinguished
from the enemy when you face him and hope to vanquish him in those situations when you
are leading the people.

There must be open ground between you and him so that you do not enter his trenches, and
sufficient distance for you to get him in your gun-sights when you fire your gun. But you
should not use cold steel or unarmed combat in your struggle (25)".

What, then, is necessary to repel religious and sectarian fanaticism in our day? The two ways
that have already been discussed are wrong. Clarity and pointedness are very necessary "so
that we become deep-rooted and make the role of our Party that of leader in moving and
changing society (26) ".

To blur men's understanding and to enter the enemy trenches would "lose us the battle and
inflict on us a defeat that would leave us open to an intellectual crisis at a time when we were
the losers politically, so that we would lose twice: the political ground where we are grouped,
and our intellectual integrity. We would lose our struggle (27)".

But is the repudiation of religion the necessary solution to the dilemma? No. (28).

Saddam Hussein courageously puts the ideal solution, the true strategic and revolutionary
solution, forward: "What we must do is to oppose the institutionalization of religion in the
state and in society-and also to oppose letting the Revolution intrude into religion. Let us
return to the roots of our religion, glory in them-but not bring it into politics (29)."

The conclusion to be drawn is that we should hold fast to the ideal of a popular, secular state,
raised above sectarian differences. All citizens of whatever creed are equal in the eyes of the
state. One citizen can only have merit superior to another because of his attachment to the
country and the Revolution, and his effort in the building of a new society. Let each citizen
believe what he likes of the Books of Heaven, and belong to whatever earthly creed he
chooses.

We must remember that the solution Saddam Hussein proposes is the implementation of one
of the basic principles in all declarations of the rights of man for which humanity has long
striven and paid the price of the deaths of millions of martyrs. For that principle to be
implemented here in Iraq, where there are a number of religious minorities and groupings,
assumes a special significance as Iraq is on the point of being one of the few Third World and
Arab countries that meet the problem of religions and other minorities in this way.

The state that engages in a political struggle disguised as religious, or in a religious struggle
disguised as political, will eventually lose the unity of its people. No matter which side wins
in such a religious struggle, it becomes the state of only a portion of its citizens, a minority
state. It is bad for a state and its institutions to be embroiled in a struggle that appears to be
between the proponents and opponents of religion. The modern state is not an apparatus for
guiding and preaching to the people; its leaders are not new cardinals distributing indulgences
or withholding them. These battles in Third

World and Arab countries and societies are a wide gate for Imperialism and foreign influence
to enter the country. It is rare to find one of these societies in which the leaders engage in such
religious struggles without finding that the hand of Imperialism has been pouring oil and
kindling the fire.

Saddam Hussein has said, "Political entry into religious matters leads to a division of the
people—not only into those who are religious and those who are not, but into the different
adherents of different religions, distinguished from each other by their religious life and
practice (30)".

It must not escape us that one of the main causes of the enfeeblement and then the
dismemberment of the great undivided Arab State that existed in early Islam was the division
between its inhabitants and the rift in its unity caused by the different religious groupings that
numbered more than twenty: Sunnis, Shiites, Alawis, Zaidis,

Shafi'is, Druses, Ibadis, Isma'ilis and the rest, including the early Murji'is, Mu'tazilis, Kharijis
and Batinis. In those days human differences were expressed in religious terms. Despite the
greatness of some of the leaders, their flowing robes covered political and social struggles. As
one of the modern Arab writers who preach "One Islam " has put it, all the events that led to
the appearance of these groupings "were human events and differences. A few of them were
religious, but the majority political and social. Even the religious ones were really political

and social differences masquerading as religious (31)". He continues, "We cannot transform
the battlefields of a thousand years ago into Islamic constitutions that discriminate in favour
of one particular sect, or distinguish between the followers of different sects by writing each
man's sect on his identity card. Islam is one and has no sects (32)".

Even when you are unable to unite a society you should not have recourse to apostasy or
feigned conversion.

Saddam Hussein is well aware of this and says, "Giving way for religious reasons to
reactionary calls involves giving up your role as leader of society, embodied in a
revolutionary movement that is creating a new present and looks towards the future in clear
and unambiguous ways. To renounce it and stand in the ranks of a reactionary movement that
only looks to the past means that you must begin again from the bottom of the ladder (33)".

It is unwise to follow a reactionary movement in the hope of subverting it and freeing it of its
poison, as "the religious reactionaries will be the leaders, not you. Every pathway has its
leaders, and therefore it will not be you that leads the masses along this path, so you will not
be able to divert them in the direction you want (34)".

W e should add that when Saddam Hussein emphasized that the state should not force a
religion or a sect on its subjects, he persistently refused any accommodation of a temporary or
technical nature with the reactionaries, and rejected equally the opposite extreme, which is to
proclaim or encourage agnosticism. He always affirmed that the state must have a firm and
principle attitude to this sensitive matter that is liable to flare up quickly in any society. He
was very conscious of two important things: firstly, that generally speaking the reactionaries
are the side to start these battles-some would say that they always are—and secondly, that if
the state is neutral and abandons religious struggles to the protagonists. Imperialism will
always be lying in wait behind the gates, and the state may be unable to provide leadership on
the right path.

As regards the first, Saddam Hussein says: "Let us tell everyone to practice his own religion,
and not interfere with it. But the condition for this is that no one should quarrel on religious
grounds with the policies of the Arab Baath Socialist Party. They must not cloak politics with
the veil of religion or with anything else that conflicts with the Revolution and its goals: for
that could only help the new imperialism (35)." As regards the second matter, Saddam
Hussein affirms the necessity for education, training and culture. Here the factors of the
particular age are important, on condition that they are not used for neutral gradualism but
methodical gradualism. "With his conscious will, man plays a central role in it (36)." He says,
"You must accept the guardianship of the factors of the particular age. But take care that the
reins do not slip from your hand, and do not let the factors of the age be exploited by others-
for then your role will become secondary, and you will lose the leadership (37)".

When the main keys that will guarantee the movement of destiny in its true path have all been
gathered, and we are able to use the factors of our age with perspicacity, caution and
responsibility in the dynamic construction of a new society for all the people and by all the
people, "then there will be no fear of the external enemy waiting behind the fence (38)".

It is taking pride in religion without being embroiled in the politics of religion, having faith
while playing no part in sectarian struggles, and holding fast to the spiritual kernel that
consists of the fight for goodness, justice, sacrifice and progress and is central to the Islamic
message "in a new framework designed for new development and progress (39)".

Saddam Hussein sees quite rightly that the problems of the modern society in which we live
are fundamentally different, as are the solutions, from those which society faced at the dawn

of Islam, when the Religious Law of Islam was formulated. The progress of modern life
involves a reversal of some old laws that caused splits to appear in the Muslim community
and enable imperialism to divide the Arabs and to turn the goals of the Revolution and the
nationhood of the Arabs into a mirage (40).

Let us cite a recent example of how reactionaries attempt to subvert social progress by
appealing to these old laws. On the 25th March 1974, the Egyptian Ministry of Social Affairs
published a proposal to amend the law of individual rights. It asked intellectuals, lawyers and
men of opinion to consider the proposals, stating that it intended to put them before the
People's Assembly for debate and enactment as law. What happened? On the

30th of March-after only four days-a Congress of Religious Doctors at al-Azhar University
rejected the proposals on the grounds that "legislation in matters of individual rights is
properly a concern of al-Azhar, not of the Ministry of Social Affairs or the People's Assembly
(41)".

The proposals concerned the rights of women, but the members of the Congress demonstrated
afterwards so that their anger at the undermining of the right to legislate in religious law
should be made known.

The European reader will be amazed to see that in the late twentieth century we still discuss
and demonstrate—both reactionaries and progressives-on matters that were largely settled in
Europe by the "Bourgeois Revolution" that began with the French Revolution. But he might
remember that such reactionary positions and demonstrations are part of the backwardness in
which European Imperialism has kept us. To plunder our mineral wealth and turn our lands
into mere providers of raw materials and markets for its industrial goods are not its only aims.
The sowing of religious dissension is one of the methods by which it turns the people of the
area against each other and then plunders the raw materials and human resources with ease.
The plundering of the Arab people, and the sterilization of their potentialities and prevention
of them taking their rightful place in humanity are also fundamental aims, as is the quick and
permanent suppression of any national revolution. These are the Arab people who produced a
great and human civilization at a time when Europe was in darkness and its priests and
cardinals were concerned solely with selling Paradise to those who could pay the most money.
It was necessary for that Europe to die so that the modern Western and European civilization
could flourish and the people of Europe enjoy material refinement.

But the Arab people, with all their immense potentialities and their intimate connection with
their faith and heritage, are rising up once again, despite the yoke of Imperialism and
reactionary suppression.

They are struggling now to discard the burden of their "Middle Ages" and to build a new
civilization that will be both Arab and humanist.

Notes

1) See al-Ahram (Cairo newspaper), a series of articles entitled Sarab wa Ma' (Mirage and
Water), 20-10-1972.

2) See al-Jumhuriyya (Iraqi newspaper), 22-11-1972.

3) Announced in a council meeting of The Arab Socialist Union, 1972.

4) Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, Naqd al-Fjkr ad-Djnj (The Criticism of Religious Thought), Beirut,
Dar al-Tali'a, 1969, p. 24.

5)Ibjd.,p.21.

6) Adonis, ath-Thabjt wat-Mutahawwil (The Fixed and the Changing), Dar al-Awda, 1974,
pp. 27-34.

7) Adonis, Khawatjr Hawla Madhahjr at- Takhalluf al-Fjkri fil-Mujtama'a al-Arabi (Thoughts
on the Aspects of Intellectual Backwardness in Arab Society), paper given in the Kuwait
Council meeting in 1974 on The Crisis of Arab Cultural Development, and published by al-
Adab magazine, Beirut, May 1974, p. 27.

8) Adonis, al-Nahar al-Arabi Wad-duwalli (newspaper), Paris, 22-1-1979.

9) Michel Aflaq, al-Ba'ath wat-Turath (The Baath and Heritage), Baghdad, Dar al-Huriyya,
1977, p. 10.

10) Michel ' Aflaq, FjiSabil al -Baath (Thjkra ar-Rasul al-Arabi), Towards the Baath (In
Memory of The Arab Prophet), Beirut, Dar al-Tali'a, 1976, p. 126.

ll)Ibjd.,p.79.

12) Michel ' Aflaq, al -Baath wa Tahaddiyat al-Mustaqbal (The Baath and the Challenges of
the Future), Baghdad, Dar al-Huriyya, 1977, p. 10.

13) Ahmad Hassan Bakr, al-Mawrid (Iraqi Magazine), dedication to the magazine.

14) Elias Farah, al-Fikr al-Arabi ath-Thawri Amam Tahadiyyat al-Marhala (Revolutionary
Arab Thought and The Challenges of The Stage), Beirut, al-Mu'assasa al-Arabiyya lil-Dirasat
wal-Nashr, p. 34.

15) Elias Farah, Muhawjr Ra'isiyya fit-Turath (Major Central Issues in the Heritage), an
interview with ath-Thawra newspaper, 1 1-7-1976.

16) Michel Aflaq, al-Baath wat-Turath, p. 14.

17)Ibjd.,p.87.

18) Saddam Hussein, Nadhra fid-Djn wat-Turath (A Look at Religion and Heritage), Dar al-
Huriyya (Revolution publications), 1978, p. 3.

19)Ibjd.

20)Ibjd.,p.4.

21)Ibjd.,pp.4-5.

^^) Ibid., p. 5.

23) Ibid.

24) Ibid., p. 6.

25) Ibid., p. 7.

26) Ibid., p. 8.

27) Ibid., p. 9.

28) Ibid., p. 10.

29) Ibid., pp. 12-13.

30) Ibid., p. 26.

31) Ahmad Baha' ad-Din, ad-Da'wa ila Islam Wahid (The Call for one Islam), al-Mustaqbal
magazine, Paris, 22-12-1979.

32) Ibid.

33) Saddam Hussein, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

34) Ibid., p. 19.
35)Ibid., p. 22.

36) Ibid., p. 28.

37) Ibid., p. 29.
38)Ibid., p. 27.

39) Ibid., p. 17.

40) Ibid., p. 15.

41) See Muhammad al-Nuwayhi, ad-Din wa Azmat at-Tattawur al-Hadhari (Religion and The
Crisis of The Development of Civilisation), al-Adab magazine, Beirut, May 1974, p. 79.