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Full text of "Selected Documents of the Khmer Rouge"

Selected Documents of the Khmer Rouge 



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Table of Contents 

National Anthem of Democratic Kampuchea 3 

The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea 4 

Manifesto of the Periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women 10 

The First Session in the First Legislature of Kampuchean People's Representative 
Assembly 13 

Minute of Standing Committee 20 

Letter of Honorary Red Flag 24 

Statement of the Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK] to the Communist Workers' 
Party of Denmark 43 

Khmer Rouge Security File 62 

An Autobiography by the Khmer Rouge Ambassador to the UN 66 



The National Anthem of Democratic Kampuchea 

The red, red blood splatters the cities and plains 

of the Cambodian fatherland, 

The sublime blood of the workers and peasants, 

The blood of revolutionary combatants of both sexes, 

The bloods spills out into great indignation 

and a resolute urge to fight, 

17 April, that day under the revolutionary flag, 

The blood certainly liberates us from slavery. 



Constttution of Democratic Kampuchea 



Preamble 

On the basis of the sacred and fundamental desires of the people, workers, peasants, and 
other labourers as well as those of the fighters and cadres of the Kampuchean Revolutionary 
Army; and 

Whereas a significant role has been played by the people, especially the workers, poor 
peasants, the lower middle peasantry, and other strata of labourers in the countryside and 
cities, who account for more than ninety-five percent of the entire Kampuchean nation, who 
assumed the heaviest responsibility in waging the war for the liberation of the nation and the 
people, made the greatest sacrifices in terms of life, property, and commitment, served the 
front line relentlessly, and unhesitatingly sacrificed their children and husbands by the 
thousands for the fight on the battlefield; 

Whereas great sacrifices have been borne by the three categories of the Kampuchean 
Revolutionary Army who fought valiantly, day and night, in the dry and rainy season, 
underwent all sorts of hardship and misery, shortages of food, medicine, clothing, 
ammunition, and other commodities in the great war for the liberation of the nation and the 
people; 

Whereas the entire Kampuchean people and the entire Kampuchean Revolutionary Army 
desire an independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign Kampuchea 
enjoying territorial integrity, a national society informed by genuine happiness, equality, 
justice, and democracy without rich or poor and without exploiters or exploited, a society in 
which all live harmoniously in great national solidarity and join forces to do manual labour 
together and increase production for the construction and defence of the country; 

And whereas the resolution of the Special National Congress held on 25, 26 and 27 April 
1975 solemnly proclaimed recognition and respect for the above desires of the entire people 
and the entire Kampuchean Revolutionary Army; 
The Constitution of Kampuchea states: 



Chapter One 
The State 

Article 1 The State of Kampuchea is an independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, 
sovereign, and democratic State enjoying territorial integrity. 

The State of Kampuchea is a State of the people, workers, peasants, and all other 
Kampuchean labourers. 

The official name of the State of Kampuchea is "Democratic Kampuchea". 



Chapter Two 
The Economy 

Article 2 All important general means of production are the collective properly of the 
people's State and the common properly of the people's collectives. 

Property for everyday use remains in private hands. 

Chapter Three 
Culture 

Article 3 The culture of Democratic Kampuchea has a national, popular, forward-looking, 
and healthful character such as will serve the tasks of defending and building Kampuchea 
into an ever more prosperous country. 

This new culture is absolutely opposed to the corrupt, reactionary culture of the various 
oppressive classes and that of colonialism and imperialism in Kampuchea. 

Chapter Four 
The Principle of Leadership and Work 

Article 4 Democratic Kampuchea applies the collective principle in leadership and work. 



Chapter Five 
Legislative Power 

Article 5 Legislative power is invested in the representative assembly of the people, workers, 
peasants, and all other Kampuchean labourers. 

This Assembly shall be officially known as the "Kampuchean People's Representative 
Assembly". 

The Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly shall be made up of 250 members, 
representing the people, the workers, peasants, and all other Kampuchean labourers and the 
Kampuchean Revolutionary Army. Of these 250, there shall be: 

Representing the peasants 150 

Representing the labourers and other working people 50 

Representing the revolutionary army 50 

Article 6 The members of the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly are to be 
elected by the people through direct and prompt general elections by secret ballot to be held 
throughout the country every five years. 



Article 7 The People's Representative Assembly is responsible for legislation and for 
defining the various domestic and foreign policies of Democratic Kampuchea. 

Chapter Six 
The Executive Body 

Article 8 The administration is a body responsible for executing the laws and political lines 
of the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly. 

The administration is elected by the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly and 
must be fully responsible to the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly for all its 
activities inside and outside the country. 

Chapter Seven 
Justice 

Article 9 Justice is administered by people's courts, representing and defending the people's 
justice, defending the democratic rights and liberties of the people, and condemning any 
activities directed against the people's State or violating the laws of the people's State. 

The judges at all levels will be chosen and appointed by the People's Representative 
Assembly. 

Article 10 Actions violating the laws of the people's State are as follows: 

Dangerous activities in opposition to the people's State must be condemned to the highest 
degree. 

Other cases are subject to constructive re-education in the framework of the State's or 
people's organisations. 



Chapter Eight 
The State Presidium 

Article 11 Democratic Kampuchea has a State Presidium chosen and appointed by the 
Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly once every five years. 

The State Presidium is responsible for representing the State of Democratic Kampuchea 
inside and outside the country in keeping with the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea 
and with the laws and political lines of the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly. 

The State Presidium is composed as follows: a president, a first vice-president, and a second 
vice-president. 



Chapter Nine 
The Rights and Duties of the Individual 

Article 12 Every citizen of Kampuchea enjoys full rights to a constantly improving material, 
spiritual, and cultural life. 

Every citizen of Democratic Kampuchea is guaranteed a living. 

All workers are the masters of their factories. 

All peasants are the masters of the rice paddies and fields. 

All other labourers have the right to work. 

There is absolutely no unemployment in Democratic Kampuchea. 

Article 13 There must be complete equality among all Kampuchean people in an equal, just, 
democratic, harmonious, and happy society within the great national solidarity for defending 
and building the country together. 

Men and women are fully equal in every respect. 
Polygamy is prohibited. 

Article 14 It is the duty of all to defend and build the country together in accordance with 
individual ability and potential. 

Chapter Ten 
The Capital 

Article 15 The capital city of Democratic Kampuchea is Phnom Penh. 

Chapter Eleven 
The National Flag 

Article 16 The design and significance of the Kampuchean national flag are as follows: 

The background is red, with a yellow three-towered temple in the middle. 

The red background symbolises the revolutionary movement, the resolute and valiant 

struggle of the Kampuchean people for the liberation, defence, and construction of their 

country. 

The yellow temple symbolises the national traditions of the Kampuchean people, who are 
defending and building the country to make it ever more prosperous. 

Chapter Twelve 
The National Emblem 

Article 17 The national emblem consists of a network of dikes and canals, which symbolise 
modern agriculture, and factories, which symbolise industry. These are framed by an oval 
garland of rice ears, with the inscription "Democratic Kampuchea" at the bottom. 



Chapter Thirteen 
The National Anthem 

Article 18 The national anthem of Democratic Kampuchea is the "Dap Prampi Mesa 
Chokchey" ["Glorious Seventeenth of April"]. 

Chapter Fourteen 
The Kampuchean Revolutionary Army 

Article 19 The three categories of the Kampuchean Revolutionary ArmyPregular, regional, 
and guerrillaPform an army of the people made up of men and women fighters and cadres 
who are the children of the labourers, peasants, and other Kampuchean working people. 
They defend the State power of the Kampuchean people and of independent, unified, 
peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign, and democratic Kampuchea, which enjoys 
territorial integrity, and at the same time they help to build a country growing more 
prosperous every day to improve and develop the people's standard of living. 

Chapter Fifteen 
Worship and Religion 

Article 20 Every citizen of Kampuchea has the right to worship according to any religion 
and the right not to worship according to any religion. 

Reactionary religions which are detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea and Kampuchean 
people are absolutely forbidden. 

Chapter Sixteen 
Foreign Policy 

Article 21 Democratic Kampuchea fervently and earnestly desires to maintain close and 
friendly relations with all countries sharing a common border and with all those near and 
distant throughout the world in conformity with the principles of mutual and absolute 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

Democratic Kampuchea adheres to a policy of independence, peace, neutrality and non- 
alignment. It will permit absolutely no foreign country to maintain military bases on its 
territory and is resolutely opposed to all forms of outside interference in its internal affairs, 
and to all forms of subversion and aggression against Democratic Kampuchea from outside, 
whether military, political, cultural, social, diplomatic, or humanitarian. 

Democratic Kampuchea refuses all intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, 
and scrupulously respects the principle that every country is sovereign and entitled to 
manage and decide its own affairs without outside interference. 

Democratic Kampuchea remains absolutely within the great family of non-aligned nations. 



Democratic Kampuchea strives to promote solidarity with the peoples of the Third World in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and with peace- and justice-loving people the world over, 
and to contribute most actively to mutual aid and support in the struggle against imperialism, 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, and in favour of independence, peace, friendship, democracy, 
justice, and progress in the world. 



MANIFESTO OF THE PERIODICAL 
REVOLUTIONARY YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN 

(From Yuvachun Nung Yuvaneari Padevat, 

No.l August 1973, 

pp. 1-7.) 

In our revolutionary movement today a great mean young men and women have actively 
sought to join together in both the Alliance of Yuv.K.K. [Communist Youth of 
Kampuchea] and in patriotic organizations. And these numbers are continually growing 
in an orderly way. Today, all over the country, the membership of he Alliance of 
Yuv.K.K. counts by tens of thousands of people. In the offices and departments there are 
tens of thousands of young men and women. In the armed forces of all three categories 
(village militia, regional forces, regular forces) there are also a great many young men 
and women. Therefore, if we add them together all over the country, the number of young 
men and women in our revolutionary ranks adds to hundreds of thousands of people, 
whether Yuv.K.K troops, in offices and departments both at the front lines and the rear 
ranks. 

In sum, all young men and women in our revolutionary ranks have all received 
continuous constructive education from the party. Therefore, so far, the movement of 
young men and women has progressed forward both in building each individual and in 
building a movement of revolutionary struggle. Our many young men and women have 
joined in revolutionary activities on all battlefields both at the front lines and in rear areas 
in overflowing numbers. 

In order to explode and push the movement of young men and women toward greater 
strength in accordance with the actual situation, in accordance with our revolutionary 
movement which is bounding ahead, our Communist Party of Kampuchea, even though 
pressed by other matters, nevertheless definitely needs to build an organ to educate - 
construct-nurture the principle of revolutionary political consciousness in our young men 
and women following the direction and the policy approach of the party in order that [this 
principle] becomes more clearly defined. That organ is this periodical Revolutionary 
Young Men and Women which appears monthly. This periodical is an organ of 
revolutionary youth and is under the aegis of the party. 

The intentions of this periodical aim to serve revolutionary young men and women, taken 
together, but also to serve all progressive young men and women in the ranks, too. This 
periodical has a direction toward building our young men's and women's political 
consciousness and their implementation of assignments which will serve the movement 
to fight and strive in the front lines and the rear areas as well as in the offices and 
departments. 



10 



Therefore, this periodical is a periodical to lead, explode and push the movement of 
young men and women to do the concrete work of building-nurturing the principle of 
political consciousness of the party into the revolutionary youth organization and to 
acquire [ for the youth movement] and spread experiences both in the matter of political 
consciousness and regarding the job of implementing various assignments of the 
revolutionary youth organization. That is to say [this periodical]: 

Politically, aims to disseminate, educate, nurture, orient political principles, strategic and 
tactical; the approach to people?s war of the party; the party?s economic approach; the 
party?s socio-cultural approach and the party?s foreign policy goals through concrete 
execution and with experience of building the force of revolutionary young men and 
women. Mentally, aims to disseminate, construct, nurture a revolutionary consciousness 
such as: 

— class consciousness, class struggle, division into classes so that our youth have a proper 
class philosophy; 

— righteous revolutionary principles; 

-- national pride, a proper patriotic spirit. Proletarian nationalism and internationalism of 
our revolutionary movement in order to explode the national principles of the working 
class, of the party; 

-- precepts of unremitting struggle both with the enemy and with nature and in building 
oneself in order to fulfill duties, large and small, which the party assigns in order to have 
maximum victory; 

— a spirit of serving the nation and people, especially the people of the bas areas; 

-- revolutionary heroism in the task of fighting the enemy at the front lines, increasing 
production in the rear area, in fulfilling duties well in offices, etc. 

— high spirit of collectivity, ridding oneself of individual interests in favor of the whole, 
etc 

3. In implementing assignments, aims to: 

At the front lines explode and push young men and women who are combatants, who are 
messengers, who are medics, who carry ammunition, food, the wounded, etc., to 
overcome to fight, rushing to fulfill their individual duties to the maximum; to fight and 
strive as strongly as possible and always firmly. 

In the rear areas explode and push the movement to increase production; the problem of 
solidarity with the people in general; the problem of doing a job with the people of the 
bases: 



11 



— increasing pride in the work of manual activities to become closer to the people of the 
bases; 

— exploding the spirit of the collectivity; spirit of economizing of collective goods and of 
time in the officers and departments and worksites and individual jobs. 

In all, that is, the aim is of building reflexes of our youth toward the overall good and 
increasing their understanding and desire for manual activities; that is to say, changing 
their old worldview progressively and causing the adoption of a new, revolutionary 
worldview as a replacement. 

To summarize, the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women has a direction 
toward building a stand of the political consciousness and implementation of assignments 
of the party and exploding the movement of young men and women so that it becomes 
increasingly vigorous and strong in the interest of serving the movement to fight and 
strive onward both at the front lines and in the rear areas. It also builds reserve strength 
for perpetuating the leadership of the revolutionary movement generally in the future by 
taking the revolutionary movement concretely, both at the front lines and in the rear areas 
and offices, and building it by means of the aspects of political consciousness and the 
task of implementing various assignment. Therefore, the periodical Revolutionary Young 
Men and Women wishes success to the brave young men and women of Kampuchea 
wishes good health and strength and a quick intelligence as well as a strong principle of 
revolutionary consciousness in order to raise the battle standard to fight and strive against 
the enemy on all front to be as strong as possible and continually gain new great 
victories. 

Long Live the brave young men and women of Kampuchea! 

Long Live the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women! 

Printed in Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and 
Discussion Compiled and Edited with an introduction by Timothy Michael Carney 



12 



THE FIRST SESSION 

IN THE FIRST LEGISLATURE OF KAMPUCHEAN 

PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY 

April 11-13, 1976 

Unofficial Translation By Bun Sou Sour 

Documentation Center of Cambodia 

Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly's 

Plan on Decisions To Be Taken in its First Session, First Legislature 

April 13, 1976 

Respected and Beloved Kampuchean People's Representatives! 

From April 11 to April 13 1976, we have opened meeting both in forms of 
committee meeting and plenary meeting for discussion, review on all aspects and all 
qualifications of the agenda of Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly's first 
session in the first legislature. 



Having gone through debates for three consecutive days, the assembly's floor is in 
unanimous agreement with the basic essence listed on the agenda towards a final 
decision. 

Based on the unanimity provided by our session, the Chairmen of the meeting have 
prepared a draft of decision to be taken by the People's Representative Assembly's 
meeting in its first session, first legislature. 

We, on behalf of the Chairmen, would like to read out the draft of decision to the 
floor for final approval and adoption. 

Here we go. 

After the successful election to choose the members of Kampuchean PeoplePs 
Representative Assembly on March 20, 1976, the Kampuchean PeoplePs 
Representative Assembly has conducted its first plenary meeting for the first period. 



13 



The first plenary meeting in the first period of PeoplePs Representative Assembly 
was carried out for three days from the morning of April 11 until April 13, 1976 in 
the capital city of Phnom Penh in a great and warm solidarity atmosphere. The 
meeting focused on all important issues, which have been declared in the agendas. 
The issues are thoroughly discussed in accordance with Constitution of Democratic 
Kampuchea and with great spiritual responsibility for revolution, nation, workers, 
peasants, laborers, male and female youths, and cadres of Kampuchean 
Revolutionary Army. 

After thorough and full examination of all issues, which are listed in the agendas, 
finally the assembly has formally adopted the followings: 

1. About the Evaluation of the Outcome of the General Election Held on 
March 20, 1976 

The assembly's unanimous adoption: The general election held on March 20, 1976 
under careful supervision and monitoring of the election committee and committee 
of ministry of interior has been conducted meticulously according to the principles 
of the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea. Workers, peasants, laborers, male 
and female youths, and cadres of Kampuchean Revolutionary Army have actively 
participated in the election in a super solidarity atmosphere and with strong belief in 
the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, in their relative-representatives, and in 
the anticipation of a brighter future of Democratic Kampuchea of their home 
country. 

2. About the Management of Work Procedures of Kampuchean PeoplePs 
Representative Assembly and the Organization of Standing Committee of the 
Assembly and Various Committees of the Assembly itself 



Kampuchean PeoplePs Representative Assembly was founded by the fresh blood of 
laborers and peasants, which had been flowing like rivers in the struggle and in the 
fight thousand years ago. 

All members of the Assembly are the flesh and blood of workers, peasants, laborers, 
and Kampuchean Revolutionary Army, who used to join in the revolutionary 
struggles, underwent hardship and misery together in the fight against imperialism, 
old and new types of colonialism and its lackeys, experienced happiness and despair 
together for years, and still, we can now live together in the class of laborers working 
in factories, railroads, harbors, rubber plantations, salt fields, dike systems in rice 
fields, and water channels in syndicates, in cooperatives, and in various departments 
of Kampuchean Revolutionary Army fighting relentlessly to build up our nation and 
to defense our country. 

This is the true background of our representatives; there would be no qualification in 
term of representativeness and democratic nature better than the above-mentioned 



14 



points. So far, until these days and from now on our Assembly shall maintain the 
nature as laborers, peasants, and our revolutionary armyPs representatives into the 
future. 

With this viewpoint, the Assembly has unanimously adopted the basic principle of 
work procedures as follows: 

1. Each member of Kampuchean PeoplePs Representative Assembly must continue 
to be representative for their previous local bases, sharing misery and happiness with 
people, trying to understand the feeling of the people, and make sure to be informed 
about peoplePs requests, especially staying closely with syndicates and factories, 
cooperatives, dike and irrigation systems, work sites, their own units, participate in 
building up and defense the country with workers and peasants people, laborers, 
male and female youths and cadres of Kampuchean Revolutionary Army in order to 
suit their ranks of real representatives of workers and peasants people, laborers, and 
Kampuchean Revolutionary Army. 

2. Kampuchean PeoplePs Representative Assembly shall conduct a plenary meeting 
once a year, in order to promote annually the political line inside and outside of the 
country and to observe the activities of the state presidium, government, and judicial 
committee. They shall also observe good and bad points and rectify annual work 
targets of the three state organs. 



3. During the period between each plenary meeting of Kampuchean PeoplePs 
Representative Assembly, there shall be a permanent organization of Kampuchean 
PeoplePs Representative Assembly which is responsible for practicing and observing 
the practice and decisions of the plenary meetings of the Assembly. This 
organization is called Standing Committee of Kampuchean PeoplePs Representative 
Assembly. 

At the same time, the Assembly has also selected members of the Standing 
Committee of Kampuchean PeoplePs Representative Assembly and has also chosen 
members of other commissions of the Assembly. 

The Standing Committee of Kampuchean PeoplePs Representative Assembly is 
composed as follows: 

1. Comrade Nuon Chea, President 

2. Comrade Nguon Kang, First Vice-president 

3. Comrade Peou Sou, Second Vice-president 

4. Female Comrade Ruos Nim, Member 



15 



5. Comrade Sar San, Member 

6. Comrade My Chham, Member 

7. Comrade Kheng Sokh, Member 

8. Comrade Matt Ly, Member 

9. Comrade Thang Sy, Member 

10. Comrade Ruos Preap, Member 

3. About the Examination, Judgement and Decision on the Request for 
Retirement by King Norodom Sihanouk by virtue of the his statement dated 
April 2, 1976 and the Government Statement dated April 4, 1976 on the 
Request for Retirement of the King dispatched to the assembly 

Having thoroughly examined and discussed the two statements, the People's 
Representative Assembly unanimously does hereby agree with the request for 
retirement of King Norodom Sihanouk. 

By virtue of the great achievement of King Norodom Sihanouk, a patriotic monarch 
who has paid interest-bearing contribution to the nation and the people of 
Kampuchea for national liberation against heinous and barbarous aggressive war of 
American imperialism and its reactionary clique of traitors, including Lon Noll, Sirik 
Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, Cheng Heng, In Tarn, Long Boret, Sosten, the National 
Assembly does hereby agree with the government's requests in the following: 

1. Entitle King Sihanouk "The Hero with the Highest Patriotism". 

2. Build a memorial for inscribing his aforementioned achievement. 

3. Guarantee King Sihanouk's and his family's living standard as high as his honor 
and his status as Head of State and President of National Liberation Front of 
Kampuchea with a yearly pension amounted to US$8,000. 

4. About the Examination, Judgement and Decision on the Request for 
Retirement of the Former Government 

The People's Representative Assembly notes that the Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea, previously known as Royal Government of National Union of 
Cambodia [RGNUC] and established on May 5, 1970, has, in co-operation with the 
people of Kampuchea as a whole and the revolutionary army of Kampuchea, made 
great efforts to fulfill its task of waging People's War for the liberation of nation and 
the people against American imperialism and its reactionary clique consisting of Lon 
Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, Cheng Heng, In Tarn, Long Boret, Sosten until 
the day of victory PApril 17, 1975. 



16 



Given the whole country was liberated, and in accordance with the decision taken by 
the special national congress along with the decision made by the Third National 
Congress, the government jointly arranged for an establishment of the Constitution 
of Democratic Kampuchea, its promulgation and for the election of Representative 
Assembly of Kampuchea. The government, having accomplished major 
achievements, asks for resignation on April 6, 1976. 

The People's Representative Assembly unanimously agrees with the former 
government's resignation. 

5. Election of the State Presidium of Democratic Kampuchea 

Having painstakingly discussed the qualifications of all aspects, the People's 
Representative Assembly elects and appoints the State Presidium of Democratic 
Kampuchea, which is composed of: 

1. Comrade Khieu Samphan, President 

2. Comrade Sao Phim, First Vice-president 

3. Comrade Ruos Nhim, Second Vice-president 

6. Election of the New Government of Democratic Kampuchea 

Having painstakingly discussed the qualifications of all aspects, the People's 
Representative Assembly chooses the new government of Democratic Kampuchea, 
which is composed of: 

1. Comrade Pol Pot, Prime Minister 

2. Comrade Ieng Sary, Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs 

3. Comrade Vorn Vet, Deputy Prime Minister for Economics 

4. Comrade Son Sen, Deputy Prime Minister for Defense 

5. Comrade Hou Nim, Minister of Propaganda and Information 

6. Comrade Chuon Choeun, Minister of Health 

7. Female Comrade Ieng Thirith, Minister of Social Affairs 

8. Comrade Tauch Toeun, Minister of Public Affairs 

9. Female Comrade Yon Yat, Minister of Culture and Education 



17 



The committees within the government framework and put in charge of economics 
are in the following: 

1. Committee of Agriculture 

2. Committee of Industry 

3. Committee of Commerce 

4. Committee of Communication 

5. Committee of Power 

6. Committee of Rubber Plantation 

The Chief of each committee is equivalent in rank to Minister of the government of 
Democratic Kampuchea. 

7. Election of Judicial Committee 

Having thoroughly discussed, the People's Representative Assembly elects and 
appoints a judicial committee chaired by Kang Chap. 

8. People's Representative Assembly's Guidelines On Domestic and Foreign 
Policies of the State Presidium and the New Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea 

The following are unanimously adopted domestic and foreign policies to be 
implemented by the new government of Democratic Kampuchea: 

1)A11 articles and chapters of the constitution of the Democratic Kampuchea shall be 
correctly, completely, and cohesively implemented. The constitution of the 
Democratic Kampuchea is the soul of Democratic Kampuchea and the basis for 
domestic and foreign policies on various fields ranging from political economy, 
social affairs, culture, which stems from the fresh blood of millions of children of 
Kampuchea of several generations. Therefore, there shall be respect, observation and 
implementation at full strength. 

2) Strengthen and extend the force of great national solidarity with higher 
revolutionary vigilance for defense of the country, territory, independence, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity within the existing boundaries and with high 
responsibility for the revolution, nation and our people of Kampuchea. 

3)Strengthen and extend the force of great national solidarity for shock assaults in 
terms of production of all fields, especially agricultural field to the point that a 
maximum yield of rice shall be reached for upgrading the living standard of our 
people and building our country with the speed of great leap forwards. 



18 



4)Continue to implement political line of independence, peace, neutrality, and non- 
alignment of Democratic Kampuchea by virtue of article 21 of the constitution of 
Democratic Kampuchea. 

There shall be strengthening and extension of the solidarity and fraternity with all 
revolutionary movements in various countries in the world, near and far, and with 
figures and youth in the five continents, who love peace and justice, including the 
ones in the United States of America, in order to struggle against imperialism, old 
and new colonies and reactionary forces for the sake of the revolution, 
independence, peace, democracy, fraternity and social development in the 
international arena. 

The firs session in the first legislature of the People's Representative Assembly 
concluded on the evening of April 13, 1976 with great success, revolutionary 
optimism, and strong belief in a glorious future of the nation and people of 
Kampuchea. 



19 



[Unofficial translation by Bunsou Sour; edited by Prof. David Chandler] 

MINUTE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE 

THE FRONT 

11 March 1976 

PARTICIPANTS: COMRADE SECRETARY GENERAL [Pol Pot] 

COMRADE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL [Noun Chea] 

COMRADE VORN [Vorn Vet] 

COMRADE KHIEU [Son Sen] 

COMRADE HEM [Khieu Samphan] 

COMRADE DOEUN 

COMRADE TUM 

COMRADE TOUCH 



AGENDA: SIHANOUK'S RESIGNATION FROM HIS POST 

I. Report on the Resignation of Sihanouk 

Comrade HEM reported to the Standing Committee on the resignation of Sihanouk. 
Sihanouk has sent two letters written in French: 

- The first letter conveys his resignation and explains the important reason for which he is 
resigning. In particular, he emphasizes his various health problems, which do not allow him 
to continue his work. 

- The second letter is a statement addressed to the people of Democratic Kampuchea 
informing them that he wishes to resign from his post before the 20th March 1976. 

During his meeting respectively with the Ambassadors of Mauritania and Senegal, Sihanouk 
has also indicated that he categorically resigns. But during his meeting with the Chinese 
Economic Delegation he grumbled about his illnesses... 

II. Angkar's Opinion 

1. Reason for his Resignation. 

There are two: in the long term and in the short term. 

A. In the Long Term: it is the difference of "classes", the difference between the grass roots 
of the Revolution and his own person and family. He cannot live with us. If in the past he 
was able to remain with us, it was simply because of his strategy. As we no longer go along 
with his strategy, he can onlyremain provisionally with us. It is not the first time that 
Sihanouk has resigned. He did that in 1971 already. 

B. In the Short Term: It is a strategic difference together with the grass roots difference. An 
example was the case when we dispatched our Ambassadors abroad without consulting him. 
The incident has no importance but he would have thought that we no longer have any need 
for him. Thus the wrangle over position continues. 



20 



But the situation has evolved more thoroughly than before. Outside the country, Sihanouk 
can work with us. While inside the country he feels completely lost without any future. He is 
very frustrated. He lacks work, he is bored and the environment that surrounds him, in 
particular his wife who cries constantly, pushes him to the point that he cannot endure any 
longer. In the case that he decides to remain with us, that cannot last either, at the most 1 or 

2 years. As he wishes to leave, his leaving now is the best. 

2. POSITIVE and Negative aspects of his Resignation 

A. Positive Aspects for our Revolution : 

- All the people of Kampuchea will feel a huge surge of relief. The same applies to all our 
cadres and military. As far as the world is concerned, there won't be any problem. 

- We can resolve the problem of the nomination in our State Organisation easily. And under 
these conditions we can work peacefully without any obstacles. 

- Our work in External Affairs will thus be improved because henceforth we will make the 
decisions ourselves, we will express our position by ourselves. Without Sihanouk we are 
clean-cut. 

B. Negative Aspects for our Revolution 

- On the one hand, Vietnam attacks us and treats us as being too far to the left. Sihanouk has 
helped us, so why should we drop him? Vietnam will point out to others, saying something 
bad about us, but good about themselves. But it is a provisional problem only. If in the final 
analysis we remain very close to them, we shall certainly have no problem. 

- On the other hand, the enemy is about to attack us, but we should let them be for say half 
a month. But even if Sihanouk had not resigned the enemy will always attacks us, their spies 
still exist. If the enemy does not cease attacking us, are we going to suffer? No, because they 
cannot isolate us. 

3. MEASURES to be Taken: two directives 

A. First directive: We don't reject him. We ask him to remain in the same 
position. If he wishes to remain with us, he could remain for 5 months, 1 or 

3 years, as long he would like. If he cannot resist, it is not because of us, it 

is not our fault. In fact he won't be able to remain with us. He and his family can see very 
well that they won't have well-being We don't give him any choice, if he does not wish to 
remain, too bad for him. 

Thus we must go and see him and ask him to excuse us for being unable to pay him visits as 
often as we would like, because we were very busy. We SHOULD acknowledge reception of 
his letter. That is why we come together to see him. The Situation of our country is very 
difficult, very poor, the country must face tremendous difficulties. We must resolve all the 
problems with 

national dignity. It is in this way that we can be truly independent. Our position, including 
that of the government, is of always recognizing his noble contribution, HIS deeds and 
efforts for the country, in particular in the international arena. 



21 



The [Khmer] Nation owes him its gratitude for his highly patriotic contribution, something 
which our Assembly has already noted in its resolutions. We respect a lot [our] collective 
decisions once they have been adopted. But we request that he remains with the people. The 
people will 

preserve his nationalist undertakings and we also will congratulate him and will do our 
utmost to implement the resolution of our extraordinary session of the National Assembly. 

B. Second Directive: in the event that he insists on resigning. We thank him. In the recent 
past we fought together, shoulder to shoulder. We very much regret his resignation. We shall 
convoke a meeting of the Council of Ministers to take a decision. If he resigns we won't 
allow him to leave the country. His departure will render the situation complicated to China. 
The enemy does not cease to condemn and criticize us. If we refuse to allow him to leave, 
the enemy can criticize us at least for one month. 

Certain reasonable attitudes of Sihanouk show a patriotic spirit, but his wife has no patriotic 
spirit at all. Consequently, if we are not clear in solving this problem, it is possible that 
unresolved questions will complicate our tasks later on. Thus we should go for the first 
solution and if that does not work, adopt the second one. 

III. ANGKAR'S OPINION (meeting of 13 March 1976) 

Comrade HEM made several reports to the Standing Committee on the Sihanouk problem. 

He has made a categorical decision to resign. He asks Angkar that it TAKE PITY ON him. 

HE lowers and humbles himself only requesting Angkar that it accepts his resignation. This 

resignation is not against us... 

Comrade Secretary General pointed out that it is an important question to be decided by the 

Central Committee of the Party. But Comrade Secretary General has already prepared a 

number of ideas, which WERE supported by the Standing Committee: 

1. To forbid Sihanouk from leaving the country is the first measure to be taken. 

2. It is necessary to call a meeting of the Council of Ministers to submit to it reports on the 
matter, in order for the latter to make a decision and, then, to meet Sihanouk once again, 
with the presence of Penn NOUTH 

It is necessary that arrangements be made to record the conversation with Sihanouk. It is 
necessary to speak to him in such a way for him to keep UP his hopes and allow the 
recording of his conversation. It is for our documentation. 

3. To dispatch telegrams to the sons of Sihanouk asking them to return as soon as possible, 
pointing out that they must come for the New Year and the National Day celebration. We 
must solve this problem once and for all. We must also solve it for the interests of our 
revolution. 

4. Is Our Decision TRUE TO Revolutionary Morality? 

a. As the morality of the Revolution or the interests of the Revolution. The morality of the 
revolution must be based on the interests of the revolution. It is a gam for the revolution. To 
allow Sihanouk to leave is a loss for the Revolution. In reality, Sihanouk is a meek tiger, 



22 



which only has its skin and bones left, without claws and the fangs. HIS beard has also been 
shaven. Thus all that remains is to wait for the day of his death. But if this old tiger is freed 
in the street, all the children would certainly be afraid of it. Certain old men that did not 
know this meek tiger would also be afraid. 

b. Sihanouk participated with us in our Revolution despite his differences with us. That is 
the reason why our Party decided that Sihanouk should become President of Democratic 
Kampuchea. But Sihanouk refuses. Thus it is up to him, he can remain or not, it is his 
problem. 

We consider him as a Senior Personality. We shall not kill him. But vis-a-vis the people and 
the Nation, Sihanouk must also be punished for his fault of having massacred the people. 

Thus our decision is reasonably taken in every respect. We shall not change it. But if he 
continues to resist us, we shall take measures to liquidate him. 

5. Direction of the Evolution of our Revolution: 

Consequently, it is necessary to put an end to feudalism. We have reached this stage. The 
whole feudal regime has been destroyed and definitively dismantled by the Revolution. The 
Monarchy existing for over 2000 years has finally been dismantled. We do not have any 
other alternatives. Reactions will certainly take place, but we must follow the path of the 
Revolution in order to win. 

6. Another Measure to be Taken: 

Henceforth, Sihanouk shall not be allowed to meet foreign diplomats. We shall give them 
valid reasons to explain the situation. 



23 



Letter of Honorary Red Flag 

From 

Communist Party of Kampuchea's Central Committee 

To 

Male and Female Cadres and all cooperative farmers in the districts of Prasot 
(Eastern Zone), Kampong Tralach (Western Zone) and Tram Kak (Southwest Zone) 



Unofficial translation by Bunsou Sour 
Documentation Center of Cambodia 



I. Preamble 

In order to encourage the active involvement of the masses to achieving the tasks of 
defending country, continuing and building socialist revolution with the speed of great leap 
forwards in consecutive years, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea, hereby decides that any district with the best qualifications in terms of 
defending the country, continuing and building the socialist revolution, is entitled to be 
awarded Honorary Red Flag. 

In 1976, when we have just come out of the war, there were shortages of anything. 
In the face of it, all bases, entities, and ministries upheld the flag of combat, while storming 
attacks to vigorously fulfil the party's tasks, with the spirit of high devotion. As a result, the 
political tasks of all fields set for 1976 was achieved with maximum quality, including 
national defense, protection of our revolutionary outcomes, continuation and building of 
socialist revolution. Obviously, a concrete foundation was laid for all bases, entities, and 
ministries to move forward to achieving political tasks of 1977 with great victory in all fields. 

In the great revolutionary movement throughout the country in 1976, the party had 
observed and noted three districts, which can be considered as a role model in the three 
fields?defense, continuation and construction of socialist revolution. 

The three districts are: 

1. The district of Prasot, Eastern Zone; 

2. The district of Kampong Tralach, Western Zone; and 

3. The district of Tram Kak, Southwest Zone. 

1. Exemplary fields of production and settlement of problems arising from 

people's living conditions. The fact is that, these three districts are poor, having 
farming soil with less quality. Villagers had been living in poor conditions since 
the old regimes. However, their rice production climaxed as a result of the 
implementation of the party's 1976 plan. Sufficient seeds were well prepared, 
problems of people's living were tackled, while much a mount of rice went to the 
state. 



24 



2. Exemplary stand: Independence, self-reliance in fulfilling the tasks of building 
socialism, in order to achieve the parly's plan of three tons per hectare. 

3. Exemplary stand of socialist revolution: Good work in this field. Active 
involvement and deep engagement in class struggle in the whole districts, 
especially in the party. 

4. Exemplary stand of collectivism, devotion, consciousness of broad solidarity, 
both in the frameworks of district, region, and zone. 

In recognition thereof, the CPK's Central Committee, decides to award Honorary 
Red Flag 1976 to these three districts. 

II. Honorary Red Flag Award 

Respected and Beloved male and female cadres and all cooperative farmers of the 
districts of Prasot, Kampong Tralach and Tram Kak: 

In 1976, which had just passed by, all of you, both cadres, male and female cadres 
and cooperative farmers, heightened our spirit of sever struggle with the stand of 
independence and self-mastery in breaking obstacles of all kinds. Eventually, you all have 
your jobs well done in the fields of national defense, protection of our revolutionary 
outcomes, continuation and construction of the socialist revolution. This make the three 
districts of yours enjoy rapid progress, which is qualified as model of 1976 for the whole 
country, aiming to provoke a movement committed to achieve the party's 1977 plan with the 
speed of great leap forwards in all fields. 

1. Exemplary fields of production and settlement of problems arising from people's 
living conditions. The fact is that these three districts were poor, having farming soil 
with less quality. Villagers had been living in poor conditions since the old regimes. 
However, their rice production climaxed as a result of the implementation of the 
parry's 1976 plan. Sufficient seeds were prepared, problems of people's living were 
tackled, while much a mount of rice went to the state. 

2. Exemplary stand: Independence, self-reliance in fulfilling the tasks of building 
socialism, in order to achieve the parry's plan of three tons per hectare. 

3. Exemplary stand of socialist revolution: Good work in this field. Active 
involvement and deep engagement in class struggle in the whole districts, 
especially in the party. 

4. Exemplary stand of collectivism, devotion, consciousness of broad solidarity, 
both in the frameworks of district, region, and zone. 

This is a prominent victory of your comrades. Also, it is the prominent victory for 
our people as a whole, our army, our revolution and our party. 

This is a significant contribution to the promotion of country defense, socialist 
revolutionary movement and construction of the socialist revolution, settlement of problems 
arising from the people's living. 

Therefore, the CPK's Central Committee would like to appreciate with revolutionary 
sentiment?touched and warmPro your cadres, and in recognition rhereof, award Honorary 
Red Flag 1976 to all of you. 

Beloved comrades, 

Your districts have received the Honorary Red Flag 1976 from the party. This is a 
great honor for our parry, our cooperative workers and farmers of the whole country as well 



25 



as our army to award your comrades. It does imply that your tasks have been finished by this 
moment. All beloved comrades have to further extend your exemplary qualifications by: 

1. Strengthen and extend the 1976 triumph of yours, by drawing on the past 
experiences in political, ideological, and organization fields, force distribution, 
technical work, defense tasks, continuation and construction of socialist 
revolution, etc. 

2. Further strengthen and extend the stand of collectivism, socialism, self-mastery, 
high spirit of revolutionary responsibility, stand of overcoming obstacles of any 
sorts, for the sake of more successes. In doing so, there must be firm stand, 
constant revolutionary politeness, thorough internal solidarity and solidarity with 
other bases. 

3. Model upon the general revolutionary heroism of our people, cooperative 
workers and farmers. Our army's valiancy is also to be copied. By doing so, your 
comrades will improve yourselves rapidly in the party's political, ideological and 
organizational fields for the sake of your beloved comrades' district progress 
following the plan of 1977 and the years to come. 

4. Based on your comrades' basic qualifications, combined with the active 
engagement, comrades have to achieve the party's 1976 plan of 3-6 tons per 
hectare without fail. Surplus would also be awarded. 

With the warmest and deepest revolutionary sentiment, the CPK's Central 
Committee would like to wish your comrades consecutive successes in fulfilling the brilliant 
tasks assigned by the party. 

The CPK's Central Committee is strongly convinced that other districts and bases 
will achieve the parly's 1977 plan in all fields, like the districts of Prasot, Kampong Tralach, 
and Tramkak, and even bring about more improvement. Accept, comrades, our greetings 
with the warmest revolutionary fraternity. 



June 30, 1977 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 



26 



Drawing experiences on the political, ideological and organizational stands in 
the great revolutionary movement of the first six months of 1977 



Requests of this text: 

1. The great revolutionary movement under the leadership of the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea in the past 6 months met a number of problems, enriching us with even 
more knowledge of political, ideological and organizational stands in defending the country, 
protecting the authority of the revolutionary workers and farmers for the continuation and 
construction of the socialist revolution. We altogether do the best to conduct research and 
shed more light to the main lessons, which are either principles or guidelines for the future 
practice. 

Draw on the experiences and find more directions to attack enemies for defending 
the country, protect the revolutionary authority of workers and farmers of the party. Draw 
on the better experiences and find directions which motivate the construction of socialism, 
significantly the implementation of the 1977 plan, in the fields of country building and 
settlement of people's living problems. We have to find out keys to them so that more 
storming attacks would be launched. 

We have to be clear on the issues of leadership. Leadership in the party, in all 
bases?from the highest to the lowest levels. 

2. In order to be well prepared for the ultimate attacks in the second half of 1977, 
leading to a complete achievement of the 1977 plan in all fields. 

Therefore, to reach this goal, we raise a variety of issues, which have already been 
done in 1977, for examination: 

We draw on: 

1. Tasks of defending the country, [and] revolutionary authority of workers and 
farmers of the party. 

2. Tasks of making socialist revolution. 

3. Tasks of building socialism, achieving 3-6 tons per hectare. 

I. Tasks of defending the country of Democratic Kampuchea, protecting the 
revolutionary outcomes, the revolutionary authority, the party, the classes, 
people and the revolution army of Kampuchea. 

1. Country defensePExternal Affairs. 

As far as the country defense is concerned, in general, we are in complete control 
and self-mastery of all boundaries: land boundary [and] territorial water, sharing borders with 
other foreign countries. 

The main reasons that our collective people and revolutionary army achieved this 
work: 



27 



[They] have implemented correctly and thoroughly according to the party's 
political lines on country defense. 

[They] have had stand of high revolutionary vigilance toward the enemies. 
[They] have had correct line of activities in the field of defending the country. 

In the country defense movement, i.e. external affairs, we perform correctly and 
thoroughly according to the parly's country defense political lines. The following are our 
experiences of political and ideological stand: 

- Our party, people, and revolutionary army, know even more clearly the image of 
the enemies?without any confusion and dubiety. Our stand of limiting fnend-and-enemy is 
strengthened among our party, people, and revolutionary army by the way the enemies 
committed against us: aggression, expansion, shelling, strafing, espionage, sabotage, stealing 
of cattle, annexation of land for cultivation along the border areas. 

Based on the vivid definition, we enjoy even more active wrath-abetting movement 
towards enemies of our nation, people, revolution, worker-class, collective socialism, and of 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea. At the same time, stand of patriotic consciousness, 
loving people, loving the revolution, loving the worker class, loving the collective socialism 
and the loving party are strengthened. 

[We] become increasingly aware of and adhere to the stand of high 
responsibility in the area of defense of the Democratic Kampuchea. 

Moreover, going through the country defense movement, certain negative 
stands are abolished: middle-of-the-road stand, country defense in an inactive 
manner, country construction-ism, seeing no antagonism with the enemies of our 
nation. 

To sum up, our party, people, and revolutionary army manage to defend the country 
with complete self-mastery, based on the parly's correct stand and guidelines on country 
defense. 

2. Defending the country, the revolutionary authority of workers and farmers 
within the country. 

1. Country defense among the people: 

The country defense among the people are moving on track because of good 
awareness and implementation of solidarity guideline, [and] outstanding gathering of party's 
forces. More significantly, poor worker and peasant class and middle class farmers are 
stronger and extended, becoming a solid foundation for the socialist revolutionary 
movement. 

[We must] carry out indoctrination on the political and ideological guidelines among 
the people, especially those in the local bases. There appears to be more active in terms of 
this area. Selection, strengthening and extending of organizations are smoothly implemented, 
making the components among the people become purer. 

Meanwhile, [we] settle the problems of people's living step by step, making the 
people increase their belief in the party, the revolution and revolutionary army. 



28 



Drawing on our experience, if revolutionary authority in local bases is settled 
properly, i.e., if cooperative is strengthened positively and carefully screened, a maximum of 
people safeguard will be warranted. 

2. Defense inside the party and in our rank 

Situation of defense inside the party and in our rank is much better than before?in 
terms of both quantity and quality. Obviously, we have screened the partypfrom the top to 
the bottom. Basically, many bases have already been settled, except some which remains to 
be done later. 

The screening of networks of enemies burrowing inside improves the quality of the 
party, revolutionary army, male and female combatants as well as the quality of a majority of 
the people, who know the antagonism between us and enemies and other experiences in 
eliminating burrowing enemies and attacking enemies. 

Needless to say, the quality of our party increases, both in political, ideological, and 
consciousness areas. These experiences should be further acquired from within our party, 
revolutionary army and people in order to wove into a net for defeating and dealing with 
burrowing enemies. 

However, enemies burrowing inside do not cease to exist yet. The old enemy 
networks of all sorts are not completely removed. A few remains in bases, entities, offices or 
ministries. 

How can we settle the problems? 

1 . [We] must hold a clear stand and view that we haven't yet cleaned burrowing 
enemies a hundred percent. The remainders enjoy extending themselves. 

2. [We] must take absolute measure in zero-tolerance manner and without 
hesitation. 

The procedure of eliminating enemies burrowing from within expires four months 
already. Please be reminded: 

1. Encourage and educate the masses in the party, core organizations, 
revolutionary army and among the people so that they are clearly aware of how 
the burrowing enemies act. By this way, they will become forces in search of 
enemies and attacking enemies. The same applies to each ministry, base, and 
army. We move step by step. Wherever measures (of eliminating enemies) are 
available, there must be encouragement and education for the masses so that 
they become forces in search of enemies and eliminating enemies. 

2. Essence for searching for the burrowing enemies must be the one of the party's 
political, ideological and organizational guidelines. Check them up to make sure 
they are correct. In this context, what is to be taken as a core? The answer is the 
party. Obviously, party center is the core for the whole country. The same 
applies to zone, region, district, office, ministry. Each spearhead has to have its 
core [forces] in sweeping burrowing enemies away. 



CERTAIN EXPEREINCES IN ADDITION TO OURS FROM APRIL 1977. 

l.To be in self-mastery in advance and to take measure on the right time, there must 
be a clear view toward the constant antagonism, while holding a clear view that enemies of 



29 



all strips have their running-dog agents burrowing within ourselves. Hold this stand in 
advance, while having the spirit of high revolutionary vigilance. And keep track of any small 
phenomenon. 

2. In order to keep an eye on and search for enemies, [we] must base on our the 
positive biography, both in a prior and post revolutionary period. It must consist of 
personal, social and commercial background. Among others, the date of entry into the 
revolution and name of introducers must be included. We used to work in this field with less 
attention. This really affected our parry's principles, making the enemies burrowing within 
[our party] increased in number. We didn't expect that we paid such less attention. We held 
subjective view. Some elements came closer to hold important positions. These individuals 
have had connections since 1955. Generally speaking, [they have been] with the movement 
for a long time. Yet, we were morally lax in grasping hold of their histories. We didn't know 
their circles before their entry into the revolution. 

3. In order to make sure whether they are bad or good elements, enemies or non- 
enemies, there must be examination of application of the party's guidelines. How they 
practice the parry's political guidelines? How are their political, ideological and organizational 
realities? How their implementation of counrry defense guidelines? How do they work in 
terms of socialist revolution [and] construction of the socialism. Leftfism] is wrong; 
right[ism] is wrong. One, two, or many leftist activities or systematic rightist activities cause a 
problem. Where complicated problems occur consecutively which can not be solved, that is 
problem. Consecutively practicing socialist revolution with leftism and nghtism is problem. 
Moral laxness in practicing the guidelines of the construction of socialism is problem. Failing 
to solve the problem of people's living on a constant basis is problem. Our experiences 
show: 

In certain zones, traitorous elements burrowed from within and implemented 
systematic political, ideological and organizational activities in the wrong ways. 
They were morally wrong in the systematic manner. Shortcomings occurred one 
after another. 

There were always disputes among districts, which share the borders with each 
other. We knew that there had to be enemies, who, by our assumption, were new 
evacuees. 

From rhe above experiences, we assume that both the country defense, socialist 
revolution, and construction of socialism must be based on political position, fighting the 
enemies until gaining victory. If we could not attack enemies burrowing inside, it does not 
make sense to win victory in the field of country defense, socialist revolution [and] 
construction of socialism. Only getting rid of enemies burrowing inside from small and big 
organizations, do it means that we can implement the party's guidelines. Real example from 
1976 is evident. Therefore, we must basically rely on the fight against enemies in order to 
defend the country, make the socialist revolution and build socialism. Our masses must be 
aware of this issue. We must constantly fight the enemies. Fight and then substitute our core 
[agents]. Masses can also be our core [agents]. 

4. Problems arising from our activities of attacking enemies. Class issue become even 
more complicated. Many of traitors are petty bourgeois class. Among which there are 
a few peasant class, who actually have no nature of peasants. They become fake petty 
bourgeoisie, whose performance are overwhelmed with joy. 



30 



In summary, it appears that enemies find it so easy to lure [people] on the petty 
bourgeois circle, because such a class enjoy individualism, dogmatism, resentment, [and] 
have tendency to confession [admission]. Their speech, even a word, is always in fluctuating 
manner. 

Other peasants, in bases or ministries, who are also traitors: 

Some of them have been an enemy agent for long time ago or elements are by 
the side of enemies. 

Many others are those who are under the control of petty bourgeoisie. They 
don't understand; they can not awake, as the petty bourgeoisie always curb them. 
The petty bourgeoisie prevent them from enjoying the guidelines, rights, [and] 
party's statute. 

In other words, petty bourgeoisie are a source easy to be convinced by enemies. 
They take the victorious occasion as a time for over-enjoyment, drinking, in a debauchery 
manner... 

Resentment, in any circumstances, and more or less, makes ways for enemies to carry 
out their enticement. The problem is the jealousy stemming from position promotion in 
different times and other contradictions. Taking this opportunity, enemies try to provoke 
troubles, while petty bourgeoisie are motivating others to feel resentment toward the party. 

Worse still, it brings about frustration and complicated situation. It implies that all 
circumstances in favor of enemies are available. This is an experience. The petty bourgeoisie 
[of this kind] include those from cities, rural areas, those who give up monkhood, or middle- 
class peasants or vendor-peasants. Enemies find it harder to entice base people than middle- 
class. So, we have to stand firmly on the party's guidelines. Before we implemented the 
party's guidelines. But we were morally lax. From now on we have to practice the party's 
class guidelines with great quality, tantamount to "great leap forward". 

5. Another experience, we have to rely on the masses to attack enemies. In doing so, 
masses have to be educated about political and ideological areas so that enemies could not 
be broadened. 

For example, we have established a new place [of new elements]. Once we went to 
that place, we were not able to find all enemies, while enemies were able to carry out their 
activities to some degree, as the masses were not aware of that. We encouraged the masses. 
As a result, they found enemies one after another. Therefore, we have to make the masses 
understand, and the party have to be the backbone of the masses. 

Experiences from another place. We made the masses convinced. If they were 
confident in the ministerial committee(s), they would report to the committees [and] party 
branches. They did not produce anonymous reports. Yet, they had to be completely 
responsible for the reports. Experiences tell us that bases also can do this job. 



II. Implementation of tasks of the continuation of the party's socialist 
revolution 

We have strengthened and extended our collective socialism. As the collectivism of 
proletarian class are not to shake and reject, and due to the mass movements under the 
leadership of the party, on the one hand we manage to control situation where we eliminate 
all oppressing class, which are becoming faint gradually. On the other hand, all private 
regimes can not raise their heads. They are under the control of the mass movement, who 



31 



are going deeper. The tools of the oppressing class, namely currency, market, etc., can not be 
returned. The mass movement are in the process of curbing it. This is a phenomenon, 
indicating our victory in the continuation of the socialist revolution. Enemies of all strips are 
not able to re-exist. Instead, they are on the way to a complete collapse. 

In this situation, we continue to storm attacks to sweep enemies away. Defeat and 
attack such enemies as international agents, enemies burrowing inside, class enemies to a 
degree that they could not make any reaction, even a little. 

Another advantage is spirit of consciousness inside the party, the army, poor 
peasants and lower middle-class farmers and middle-class farmers. They are satisfied with 
the socialist revolution. This is the consciousness of political and ideological areas. 

In the last six month, our people worked vigorously with revolutionary optimism. 
This is recognized by the way they: 

1. have enough to eat, good health and are satisfied with the collectivism. Moreover, 
they are enjoying better shelters and medicines for the safeguards of themselves as well as 
their children. During the post-war period, our brothers and sisters see outcomes 
themselves. That's why the revolutionary movement in the field of country construction 
become very active with revolutionary optimism. They are content to have reservoirs, dams 
[and] canals. They witness the accomplishments of themselves and of the poor farmers and 
middle-class farmers. They are contented and feel proud. Most of them are absolute. Poor 
farmers, lower middle-class farmers and middle-class farmers general farmers, and even petty 
landlords who had suffered the war of aggression are also happy. New components 
following April 17, [1975] also accept this regime. 

In total, 95 per cent acknowledge the collectivism of the party's proletarian class. 

At the same time, shortcomings still occur. People and [those] in the [revolutionary] 
rank lack awareness of the brilliant collectivism. The reasons are: 

1. our party has not encourages the involvement of the local masses; and 

2. the enemies in the rank deviate and indoctrinate wrong concept. 

From now on, the revolutionary army, male and female combatants, young and old, 
must be educated from the top to the bottom. Their level for education have to be 
classified. Education at lower level must be deeper. In case of mixed components, 
there must be stretch-out education. 

Dig up people forces for their potential engagement along with political and 
ideological indoctrination. Just a meeting a lone will not do. Indoctrination must be 
the must. 

Our second shortcoming is that food ration of our people in this raining season is 
reduced a little bit. It makes people feel upset to some degree. Of course, we have to solve 
this problem. It must be done as our collectivism is fantastic. Our mobile units can be 
moved to anywhere. They can build reservoir, plant potatoes, banana, etc. However, the 
management offerees are not appropriate yet. Obviously, not all of the forces are used. 

The fact that enemies burrow within and destroy us must be found. Yet, another 
problem is that we are not able to cope with this problem, although we have ability to do so. 
Guidelines on effective implementation and guidelines on effective combat are also not well 
performed. These must be examined and experience must be drawn. 

To review, does it effect the field of guidelines on activities or ideological 
responsibility of the people? Can our shortcomings be worked out? The main issue lies in 
the collective leadership. The drought in our country is not as sever as in other countries. 
Irrigation is also the same case. There must be consecutive farming cycles here, regardless 



32 



who small the farming is. By doing so, there will be success. In some places, they don't do 
farming, although water is available. They wait for big farming, which needs too much water 
that we cannot supply. Instead, if one or two hectare of land is cultivated subsequently, there 
will be no problem of water. In other places, there is enough water, but transplanted rice 
seedlings are not enough. It is simply because of deviation from collective leadership. 

Some other places try not to save the water, while the water is available. This is a 
point to transform disadvantage into advantage. This is just an issue of rice farming. The 
same case applies to diversification of crops. 

Therefore, there must be solution based on this guidelines?doing farming, both big, 
medium and small size. Other crops have to be planted. Each house can have 4-5 clumps of 
sugarcane, and 3-4 clusters of banana. The possibilities vary according to the size of 
farmland. By doing this, houses will be surrounded with a variety of crops. It's not hard to 
do so. It can be divided into two types: cooperative and individual plantation. This will 
contribute to improving living standard, leading to the extension of our collective. 

Why strengthening and extending collective? The answer is to build the country, gain 
support from foreign friends and to defend the country well. 

This requires collective leadership. Sometimes commune and district lack 
[leadership]. So, they need comments from region, which, in case of need, requires 
comments from zone. 

III. The party's tasks of construction of socialism in all fields 

In the past six months, construction of socialism enjoyed much progress in all fields: 
agriculture, industry, social affairs, health, culture and training and education. Our success is 
classified as a network of "Great leap forward". Obviously, many unit throughout the 
country have achieved their plan in this way. However, a few unit haven't done as good. 
They was so slow. 

The unit moving with the speed of great leap forward is the unit responsible for 
irrigation system. Once we achieve plan of each base, we have to move on to another. We 
build irrigation system in a strategic way to supply one or two cycles of harvest per year. It is 
really strategic for cultivation. This is the strong movement in the history of Cambodia. 
"Strong" here implies the gathering of many forces in just a short term for this year's harvest. 
This is our good, basic point. 

This year's work will determine the 1978's plan. There will be no difficulties. By this 
current, in 1980 we will have enough water to guarantee two harvest cycles per year. Early 
this year sees difficulties in the area of water. However, we still can achieve our goal as we 
have irrigation position. To see its advantages, the irrigation must be protected and 
extended. In each zone, there are many major dams. The whole country also has such 
number and quantity. We have never expected that our people can do such a thing in just a 
short period of time. We build the dams, each of which is as big as or bigger than Baray 
Toek Thla. We made it only three or four months. That's why our people strongly 
believe [us]. 

Besides, there were many other units, including Sre Ambil, some dry season rice 
paddies, rubber plantations, section for producing water-pump. These sections were moving 
to some extend with the speed of great leap forward, by achieving the 1977 plan. Some units 
produced much more than others, while some units achieved the 6-month plan. 



33 



Some sections of social affairs [and] culture moved with the speed of great leap. For 
example, we managed to reduce infectious disease, malaria, by 70 per cent. This is not the 
result of equipment, rather it is because of our quick mass movement. 

Our technical section also enjoy such rapid progress, namely section of electricity, 
chemistry,.... This leads us to believe that our children are logically able to grasp hold of 
technical aspect for building the country. 

We believe that we will be able to build up economic foundation with independence 
and self-mastery. 

However, in constructing socialism in all fields for this six month, the 3-6 ton per 
hectare is still problem because self-mastery does not exist yet, and due to objective and 
subjective factors. 

For objective factor, natural phenomenon?drought?has a maximum negative impact 
not only on our rice this early year, but also on other crops. 

Yet, we have to raise our shortcomings for discussion. Obstacles produce 
experiences. Natural obstacle is a good lesson. Do not take it as a bad lesson and let it go 
unsettled. If we don't solve this problem, we can not prevail over the movement. National 
obstacles do not exist only in our country. Other countries have to overcome the same ones, 
which are even bigger than ours. It affects a series of sections, agriculture, industry.... They 
solve this problem, which appears to be harder. Nature changes a lot. This fact makes us 
consider this problem as a lesson. Settle the problem of water on time and extend this field 
until we are in self-mastery. 

Initially and strategically we have to settle the problem of water supply. 

Second, make good use of the existing water. Take opportunity to get it. Don't just 
wait and use it when they are sufficiently available. 

[Early] this year, we dared not to sow seeds for fear that there would be no water 
[rain]. So, when water is available now, there are no rice seedlings. It means there was no 
opportunity for farming. Therefore, to build up socialism as planed, self-mastery in the area 
of water supply is vital. We must settle this problem in the long run. 

This year although there is negative impacts on the plan of 3-6 ton per hectare, we 
are not hopeless, as it doesn't mean we have no water foundation. Intensive attacks have to 
be made in all forms, ranging from small, medium to big, and [we must be] ready for the 
self-mastery by the end of this year. There must be determination on where should long- 
term rice be cultivated, where to have two time harvest per year, although it appears to have 
rush period. Start transplanting rice seedlings in January. It is not late to harvest two times in 
1978. So, there must be readiness. If we farm mid-term rice, we will harvest two and a half 
times per year. Thus, it will do. But, it will take two additional months from 1978. It means 
that 1977 will stretch to 14 months. This is our view on strategic plan. In doing so, seeds and 
forces have to be prepared. Plan to work in sections, fields, have to be clear. There is no 
need to prepare these things by the end of each harvest season. There must be preparation in 
advance. This is a main issue, as it relates to the plan of 3-6 ton per hectare. If it is evident 
that early in farming season there is no water, we can not let this problem go. Meanwhile, 
where there is not enough water for rice farming, there must be other choices?planting 
potatoes, giant gourd, gourd, pumpkin, etc. 

Our party prioritizes the movement of achieving the 1977 plan in order to upgrade 
the quality of the party itself. Of course, there are obstacles, and they will not cease to exist. 
We, altogether, have to tackle the problems. Guidelines for storming attacks must be set; do 
whatever needs to be done for reaching the goal of 3-6 tons per hectare. 



34 



IV. People's Living Conditions 

Generally speaking, in the past six months, our people's living conditions are 
improved, meaning the party's regiment are implemented. So, it implies that there are active 
movements for socialist revolution and construction of socialism. 

In comparison, it is better than last year. However, referring to the party's 
assignment to storm attack in farming rainy season rice, there are shortcomings. This fact, 
on the one hand, may affect the momentum of farming movement, and on the other hand, 
may affect health to some degree. 

How to settle? Solve [the problems] throughout the country, starting from each base. 
It must be done without fail, for the near future and far future. 

Try harder to solve these raised problems. In doing so, there must be force division 
based on correct guidelines of activities, which are in the following: 

1. Strengthen the responsibility for the people's living standards; 

2. Organize commanders of all levels in a good manner; and 

3. Assign forces in accordance with the correct guidelines of activities: putting 
aside any unnecessary tasks, while prioritizing issue of food supply. 

Therefore, any forces unnecessary must be taken. The whole country consists of not 
less unnecessary forces. In some places, at this movement of speaking, there are still people 
clearing up grass in front of their homes. These forces can be used for the transplantation of 
potatoes. The same applies to other ministries, meaning that crop growing is not really active 
yet. 

[Our] mission statement is "Anything unnecessary is to be taken out." Construction 
of dikes is to be continued. However, the guidelines of constructing dikes must also be 
correct. Our request for the time being is just to curb the water. Therefore, there should be a 
small-scale construction movement. A maximum offeree must be saved for supplying rice 
paddies with water, growing potatoes, banana, and other crops. 

Growing of such industrial crops as quinine [and] a plan for producing balm, can be 
reduced for a period of time. 

The issue of dikes, reservoirs shall be implemented in the same way. [Our] request is 
to curb the water for a while. Decoration and cleaning will be done later. A limited number 
of people shall be reserved for finishing the remaining works to be done and for their 
preservation. Most of the forces have to be sent to production areas, such as growing 
potatoes, pumpkins, giant gourds, gourds, etc. The rest will be well prepared for plowing, so 
that we can be in self-mastery and in good position of intensive farming when water is 
available. Therefore, there must be inspection of each ministry, work site, [and] cooperative. 
Any usable forces in these respective units have to be taken for food production. Don't use 
too much forces at a place. 

Construction of canals, dikes, [and] reservoirs shall be processed at an ordinary 
speed, while final decoration shall be suspended. This will waste time for this rainy season 
rice farming. Work intensively on the growing of crops: potatoes, banana and pumpkins, in 
addition to rice farming. Weaving tasks also need less speed. Weaving scarves will be okay. 
But, weaving burlap must be suspended, as we still have some. If elderly men and women 
jointly grow crops, there will be not less outcomes. 

Thus, there are leading committee and organization offerees. These kinds of things 
must not be promulgated as circular; [We] must go down to the base directly. 

By doing so, there will be settlement, as our situation is not so worse that it can not 
be worked out. [One of] our mission statement is to storm attack with people's war. By this 



35 



way, our people as well cadres can draw on this experience. Mam stand for resolution is self- 
support. All of parly's forces, people, and revolutionary army must be boiling and very brave. 
First there will be obstacles to be overcome. Yet, after that there will be a large quantity of 
crops existing everywhere. 

Self-experiment stems from self-conditioning. If we just wait for food [without any 
action], there will be no experience. The same applies to the whole country and each grass 
root. 

To suit the real situation now, [we] must not do only long-term rice farming alone. 
There should be farming of mid-term rice for eating, while doing long-term rice for 
exportation. It takes twelve months to have the long-term rice harvested. 

V. Situation of the party's leadership 

In the last six months, our party had overcome intensive attacks in all fields: military, 
the rear, farming, social and cultural affairs, ministries, offices, etc. These movements make 
the party condition [itself] to much extend. Moreover, the revolutionary movement enables 
our party to distinguish two aspects: 

First, it shows the trail of traitors burrowing within the party for many years. 
Destructive elements, no-good element, who do not belong to any running dogs 
but affect the revolution, also abort as a result of our six-month movement. The 
movement itself is under the process of screening. Based on [our] observation 
and experience, such elements will continue to exist. 

Second, however, the party enjoys another degree of quality in the first 
semester of 1977. By screening traitorous elements and bad elements, the party 
enjoys relief from pain of abscess [and] venom. Our party is very healthy. Good 
party candidates and cadres upgrades the political, ideological and organizational 
quality. Experiences for the movement are also gained. When seeing enemies as 
network and seeing activities of each network, there must be chains of activities 
and organization. This is for combat. Many vigorous struggle on several battles 
bring us so much experiences and quality of the party's leadership at all levels, in 
terms of political, ideological and organizational quality. The whole country 
makes such a progress. We implement the party's guidelines based on the forces 
of the masses and as a result good resolution is shown. Zone, region, district 
[and] base enjoy the same quality. 

In the field of defense, much more improvement is made. Before there were 
complicated issues, when enemies burrowed to destroy and deviate the party's guidelines. 
While we are going to do this, they intend to do that, by destroying us subsequently. 

By working this out, our party is stronger, and in the process of strengthening and 
extending. 

What experiences result from the six-month combat of construction of party's 
leadership? 

1. It makes us more interested in the class guidelines of the party in organizational 
field. The six-month experience shows even clearer that local class [grassroots] are more 
steady than middle and upper classes. Middle class are less steady than local class. Up do 
now, in all party branches, the local class are at their geographical position, meaning that they 
don't abandon their place. Most of middle class become enemy networks burrowing within 



36 



[their place], make thing more complicated, opposed to the party and the people, and 
prevent the movement [from progress], intentionally or unintentionally. 

Therefore, from now on, there must be better implementation of the party's 
guidelines. The party always raises the issue of class guidelines. Obviously, in the rank of 
leadership, local class increase in number. The base itself also enjoys leadership role. 
However, this is not enough. The future needs more extension of the local class. The base- 
class ensure classness, class standpoint of the party's workers, and overcome several 
movements with obstacles, both subjective and objective, meaning that they do not 
overcome with complicated issues one after another. 

Local class must be allowed to extend themselves in the leadership rank. They are 
needed, as they are better guarantors of the party's policy than the party's ideological and 
organizational fields. 

Ideological field and standpoint are different in the party, although [they are] with 
the movement subsequently. Local class have their trend toward local class themselves, 
rather than middle class. Thus, three must be much more communications among the local 
class. As for the middle class, in the face of parly's consecutive education, indoctrination of 
sentiment toward local class, they are still not stronger than the base- class. 

So, it is clear whether which class are more steady. The petty bourgeois and poor 
farmers enjoy their respective improvement. But, there must be strong [stand.] If not so, the 
petty bourgeois will conquer. This is class struggle inside the party. However, the class 
struggle must be based on natural sentiment and stand of every individual. 

If the local class hold core position, there will be much guarantee. With the local 
class difficult and favorable circumstances are nothing different. Their fighting with enemies 
are more absolute, while production movement of them are also more absolute. This make 
us understand further, for the sake of unity. However, the local class used to work with non- 
local class, who did not experience with this movement. 

2. In the first half of 1977, we manage to sweep clean networking enemies burrowing 
within. Drawing from such experience, [we] do not just see movement; [their] biographies 
are also our target. Who contact who, with introduction from who. [By this way] we know 
[their] circles, sources, where we can conduct [our] search. Thus, biographies must be 
examined thoroughly and consecutively. Once [their] biographies are in a firm grasp, we will 
be confident in the quality of our cadres and party candidates. 

With the scope of our revolutionary tasks, our party candidates have many 
shortcomings, although the quality of our party increases. 

How to settle this problem? What strategic ways to be found out? 

Based on the [current] situation of our party, a part drops from the movement, while 
another part is moving forward. Some are moving very fast, while some other moving with 
medium speed. These kinds of [people] must be conditioned as "new" cadres. "New" here 
implies "new" charge [and] new duty. Therefore, in the whole party, from the top to 
branches, there must be selection of the current cadres according to their qualifications. For 
example, in the branches of district, region, zone or in the army, more work must be 
increased if our cadres improve in terms of quality. This is one of [our] strategies. This 
involves not only organizational field, but also ideological field?clean-cut standpoint. 

Another way to solve the problem is to recruit new party candidates, as we have 
outlined. What are the possibilities of recruiting new party candidates so far? There are two 
aspects. 

1. Difficult aspects for extension: Certain core organizations receive negative 
impact from burrowing enemy. For this case, we do not recruit yet. But it is 



37 



better for recruitment of core organization to start from the masses. This way 
yields better result than recruitment from core organization to the party. 
2. Wherever there are control of correct party organizations, there must be 

attention on the extension, as sources of the previous recruitment are not bad. If 
so, we have some possibilities of extending our party candidates. However, there 
must be more thorough examination. Extension should be made, that is to 
recruit the masses to join the core organizations as they are new forces without 
entanglement in enemy activities or no-good elements. 

VI. Mission statement for 1977 

The mission statement for 1977 is "Storming constant attacks with the great movement of the 
masses at the speed of great leap forward. " 

The basic merits of the statement are in the following: 

1. Awareness infiltrates into the party, people, telling them to implement tasks, 
both big and small, at the speed of great leap forward. 

2. Obviously, there are active involvement in all fields. Most of the fields have 
achieved their goals. This is a real great leap forward, in such fields as building 
reservoirs, producing salt and agricultural tools, and on the issue of getting rid of 
malaria, etc. 

It shows that the statement raised is the standpoint and guidelines for future 
operation. There will be need for education and propaganda on this slogan. Posters on this 
statement shall be made for public awareness. 

Yet, shortcomings still exist. 

1. The impression on this slogan is still limited. Weak memory still prevails. It is not 
as strong as a force of fire to push cadres and party candidates to work closely with the 
masses. It is for this reason that there still some places moving very slow, while other place 
operating in an ordinary manner. The most impressive example is when we met obstacles? 
subjective or objective, big or small, there were complicated issues in certain areas. Some 
places managed to overcome. Some did not. 

Obviously, we saw two weaknesses. One was the problem of early rice and the other 
was food for the people. These two fields did not move with the speed of great leap forward 
yet. The same weaknesses happened to other fields. For example, the people clothes. There 
are, of course, cloth, needle, thread, and sawing machines. But in some places there were 
weaknesses in solving the problems of supplying people with clothes. Crop diversification 
was still not at the speed of great leap forward?that is making the villages full of crops. Some 
villages were full with new crops, although water condition is not favorable. Some other 
villages had had nothing than shelters and the sky. There was no crop. They did not lack 
forces. Both old and young people were at the rear. There was lack of drinking water for 
both people and animals. Lack of well, lack of pond. We give examples relating to the 
putting of the slogan into practice. A portion did with great leap forward, while the other 
lacked awareness of the slogan in the concrete application in each spearhead. 

Why? What experiences we have had on these issues? What are weaknesses? 

1. Awareness about the slogan "great leap forward". 

2. Our main battles succeeded objectively: water, rice paddy. 
Most of sub-battles did not manage to do so. 



38 



[They] were not aware of the slogan of great leap forward. That was why the rears 
rarely achieved the goals set. The weaknesses occurred in the areas of [making] wells 
for drinking and crop diversification. If the rear does not move at the speed of great 
leap forward, it may affect the battlefront. [Educational campaign was] done for one 
time, as the rear failed to follow up. 
This is a real experience. 
What causes the rear less dynamic? 

Management of forces at the rear is not correct yet, due to the following factors: 
Don't know how to manage the forces. 
There is no core [member]. 
For instance, some places saw active movement in farming. However, there was no 

management, no command at the rear, while many forces were free at home. That is the 

reason. 

Thus, there must be organization. Core members are not necessary to be party 
candidates or core organizations. Good masses, who are engaged in the labor work, can be 
our [core] members. Among 10 or 20, there can be 3 to be selected as a committee. By this 
way, there will be good male and female combatants. Of course, there will be no good 
elements. But, their activities will show their nature. Even children can be considered as core 
members among their rank. Only this way can we build up party candidates [and] core 
members, as they are purely from the movement. 

By achieving this plan, both the front and the rear will be strong. The front implies 
rice, while the rear implies vegetation and growing of trees for fruits jack- fruit and mango. 
They are not for additional beauty to people's shelters, but for the health and living of the 
people. 



39 



THE PARTY'S INSTRUCTION ON A VARIETY OF MAIN ISSUES 
IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1977 



The party's instruction on a variety of main issues in the second half of 1977 is 
completely based on the party's political assignments for 1977, additional to the party's 
instruction in April 1977. 

This instruction requests promotion of implementation of 1977 plan assigned by the 
party toward a hundred success or more in the second half of 1977. 

The main issues are in the following: 

I. Paying more attention to the extension of the party's leadership 

In the first half of 1977, the party experienced the following situations: 

Certain elements inside the party, from the top to the bottom, fell from the great 
revolutionary movement of the masses. They were all strips of enemies agents, burrowing 
within our party for a long time. Meanwhile, were destructive elements against our party, 
revolution and the people, acting in higher and lower ranks. 

Many party candidates were absolute. They did not fall into the said categories. In 
stead, they upgraded the quality of their revolution in political, ideological and organizational 
fields. They are qualified to fulfil the party's tasks. 

This is our improvement and great success. On the one hand, we basically managed 
to eliminate enemies burrowing within the party. On the other hand we managed to purify 
and make the party active. 

However, through the experience, our party are well aware that the enemies still 
exist. If we let them stay further, they will be able to extend their networks in the position of 
class enemies, enemies of the revolution and enemies of our nation. Therefore, our party 
resolves to continue to heighten the revolutionary vigilance and gather force in the whole 
party, along with revolutionary army and cooperative workers in order to hunt them down. 
By doing so, our party will be purer and may be purest. There will be neither old nor new 
enemies of this kind. Such measures must be taken deeply and constantly for our party to be 
more active in its leadership role in the revolutionary movement of all fields. Our slogans 
are: "Clean party means strong party, strong revolutionary movement." "Clean party center 
means strong leadership of revolutionary movement in the whole country." "Clean party 
branch of zone means strong party branch of the zone, and strong revolutionary movement 
at village level". ..etc. 

These slogan makes us examine and decide whether our revolutionary movement is 
strong or not. The only factor which determines the strength and weakness is the leadership 
of the party either throughout the country or the party at base level, big and small. In other 
words, in order for the party to be strong, the party must be clean first. (Clean in terms of 
political, ideological and organizational standpoints). For the party to be clean, there must be 
no enemy elements inside the party, who are against and destroy the party. In order for the 
party to be clean there must be one single political line, single ideological and organizational 
line. Such criteria as activity and active combat in the party single line are also qualified. 

In view of the situation where there are shortages of cadres and party candidates, in 
comparison to the great revolutionary movement, huge and deep, at the present and for the 



40 



future, the party decides that the party must be absolutely strengthened on time, by on the 
one hand, paying attention to the strengthening and extending this area among base forces 
of the party: that is to recruit party candidates, core organizations and progressive masses, 
who are nurseries of base sources, providing cadres outside of the party and inside of our 
party. The following steps should be followed: 

1. Cadres of all levels, from the top to the district, army, ministry, office, must be 
strengthened and recruited more. Good elements must be recruited in a timely manner, 
either one or two, in order to increase leadership forces at each level. "Good [elements]" 
here is referred to basic classness of those who have experienced consecutive revolutionary 
movements, grasped hold of and practiced the political, ideological and organizational lines, 
especially those who have overcome obstacles, small and big. "Good" in terms of morality of 
living. "Good" in terms of clear biography easy for examination from start to finish. Once 
we have recruited new forces at each party branch subsequently, the leading forces will 
increase remarkably, in terms of quantity and quality. 

2. Pay attention to recruitment among the revolutionary movement of the 
masses. 

Progressive masses of local class. Recruit them and give them clear 
assignments, either in cooperative, factory, office, ministry, or military. 
For example, in cooperative, [we] have to put them at the spearhead of fertilizer, 
taking care of cattle, growing crops, vegetation, warehouse, barn, plowing tools, 
ranks, knife, axe, and other agricultural tools, plowing, sowing rice, irrigation, medical 
field, children, baby, hygiene, etc. Tram them in the way that they can try and work at 
the same time. In the course of learning and working, they should be selected as core 
members on after another. They must be strengthened. [If] the selected core 
members are from outside of the party, they must certify at [our] present, especially 
claim to serve for a long, strategic term. 

Based on the core members, who are progressive masses, there must be 
selection of good elements in order to extend our core organizations (Yuvakk 
and Backbone). These core organizations come basically from good sources, 
classness and revolutionary movement. 

Based on the strengthened and extended core organizations, there must be 
attention to recruiting new candidates, and they must be selected the soonest 
through the above structure. 
Our request is that from now up to mid-1978 or end of 1978, leading forces must be 
strong. Their number must be increased (from the central to district, base, army and leaders 
in ministry). Only by this way can we push the revolutionary movement of 1977-78 toward 
healthy situation of 1979. 

In the meantime, we also must pay attention to build up forces of second category 
(progressive masses, core organization, and new party candidates). Make them active so that 
they can extend themselves on time. And in mid-1978 or by 1979, our cooperatives, 
factories, and army throughout the country will mostly be sharp and have basic forces worth 
of quality and quantity. With forces of such quantity, by mid-1978 or by the end of 1979 the 
base forces in combination with forces from the higher level can produce a strong leadership 
for our revolutionary movement from the end of 1978 or early in 1979 onward. 



41 



PRINCIPLES OF FORCE BUILDING 

1. [We] must follow the party's organizational principles and extend [forces] as 
many as possible and subsequently. 

2. Must pay attention to extend force as many as possible wherever clean, 
belonging to no enemies. 

3. Pay attention to good elements, without any involvement with enemies. 

4. Establish precisely those components, cadres or individuals, who are 
responsible for such extension, both at zone, region, district, army, or ministry 
levels, in order to guarantee the quality of the groups in charge of this task. Do 
not just introduce generally, to avoid the existence of either burrowing enemies 
or no-good elements, who may be able to extend new forces with their 
directions. 

II. Paying attention to the continuation of attacking external enemies and 
enemies burrowing inside the revolution, so as to eradicate them. 

Our party see clearly our success in the elimination of external and internal enemies 
in the first half of 1977. This is considered as a historic victory following the one gain on 
April 17 [1975]. 

At the same time, however, our party is well aware that both external and internal 
enemies are still striving to fight against our revolution. This is the nature of contradictions 
between revolution and anti-revolution, between people and oppressing class, between 
worker class and capitalists, between collectivism and privatization, between socialism and 
capitalism, between real Marxism-Lenism and anti-revolutionary revisionists, between self- 
reliance and aggression-ism, expansionism, colonialism, imperialism, etc. This kind of 
antagonism exists permanently in the international arena, particularly in our society, while 
opponent class exist in the world as well as in our society. 

Therefore, our party resolves that the whole party, the whole army and the whole 
population must go on with both external and internal enemies, drawing on the experiences 
and in compliance with the party principles and slogans of "isolation of enemies". By doing 
so, [we] can gather forces as many as possible, by strategy number 1, strategy number 2, 
technique number 1, technique number 2, do whatsoever until the enemies are separated and 
going to vanish from the international arena one after another. 

The request for the second half of 1977 is to pay attention to sweeping cleanly away 
enemies in bases, especially in cooperatives. 

III. Starting the storming attacks to achieve the plan of 3-6 tons per hectare 
for the second half of 1977. 

Based on our basic preparation in combination with the active combat in the first 
half of 1977, we must encourage the involvement of reaching the goal of 3-6 tons per 
hectare without fail. To reach this goal, the following issues must be notified: 

First is to strengthen and extend the qualification in terms of materials, that is, being 
self-mastery in water, fertilizer, seeds, fertile soil, farming techniques (sowing, transplanting, 
plowing, raking, preparing farmland, irrigation, labor force of people, and labor force of 
animal. .etc. 



42 



Second is the party's storming attacks. This is a key issue. Continuation must be 
made to strengthen and extend, and improve commanders on each battle. Go on with 
political, ideological, and organizational works. Grasp hold of situations of all field, especially 
the issue of water so that active involvement may happen in small, medium, and large scale: 
farming mid-term rice, long term rice, and growing other secondary crops. Improve 
guidelines on effective activities in all fields, such as the use of water, organization of forces 
for taking care of transplanted rice, sowing and pulling seedlings. These works must be 
organized according to real circumstances, notably the use of machinery, in order that by the 
end of this year, these works are done on time and in self-reliance. Sowing, transplanting, 
and harvesting must be followed one another in order not to waste time. 

To simply put, it requires that commanders be strong in all fields so that 3-6 tons per 
hectare will be achieved from now up to December 1977, but in some places where there are 
objective obstacles, February 1978. 

Our party determines that the rear base must have good management of forces for 
diversification of crops according to their reasons, (i.e. corn, potatoes), strategic trees for 
fruits, etc. Commanders of the rear base must be organized with instructions from core 
members on a daily, ten-day and monthly basis, so as to make the slogans work. "The rear 
base and the front must work together to achieve the party's 3-6 tons per hectare." "The rear 
base is the backbone of the front." 

IV. Striving to solve and improve the people's living standards as rationed by 
the party. 

Based on the party's ration, the whole party, especially cadres who are responsible for 
important tasks at all levels, together with our army and people, must endeavor to solve the 
people's problems of living, to guarantee their health, particularly in three these three 
consecutive monthsPJuly, August, and September. Any places where are qualified must go 
ahead to achieve the parly's plan, while those places where there are weaknesses, must seek 
alternative solutions to fulfil the plan. For any places where meet too many weaknesses, 
experiences of 1976 will be their lessons for encouraging the involvement of settling food 
problems as hard as they can, based on the standpoint of self-mastery, self-reliance, more 
importantly in order to build and spread the in-depth standpoint of self-mastery and self- 
reliance among [people in] the bases, army, and the party. This is a deep political and 
ideological essence, which is a brilliant capital for our progress toward self-mastery and self- 
reliance. The way to tackle the problem of people living is to push [people] into growing 
secondary, strategic crops, including sweet potatoes, potatoes, bean, vegetables, water grass, 
corn, banana, sugarcane, papaya,. ..etc. By growing such crops, the problem can be settled for 
the time being and for the future. Meanwhile, there must attention to the issue of rice, which 
will yield in the near future. The issue of sugar is also to be solved to improve some degree 
of people's living standard. Besides, there must be mutual support within the framework of 
district, region, zone, and the whole country in case of shortages of possibilities of solutions. 

The party's request is that from the next year dry season, the eating ration must be 
guaranteed during the whole year. Technical preparation should be made for the purpose of 
a three-meal ration: breakfast with potatoes, porridge or other foods, plus main lunch and 
dinner. This plan is to be implemented from 1978. Therefore, the plans office production 
and crop diversification must be achieved in the rear base. Preparation offerees, cooking 
pots, firewood, is also the must. 



43 



Besides food, attention must be paid to the maximum settlement of people's living in 
other aspects. Improve their living standards, health, hygiene, shelter, clothing, mosquito net, 
mate, blanket, cooking pots, rice plate, drinking water (wells, small ponds must be made as 
many as possible in cooperatives). 

Our party sees clearly the improvement of our revolutionary movement of 
Kampuchea, both in the fields of defense of the country, protection of the revolutionary 
authority, workers and farmers, continuation of socialist revolution, construction of 
socialism, promulgation of the influence of Kampuchean revolution in the international 
arena, subjectivity and objectivity. Thus, we are completely convinced that under the 
leadership of our Communist Party of Kampuchea, with party central, revolutionary army 
and collective people, being backbone, we must be able to defend the country from now till 
1977. 



44 



Statement of the Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK] 
to the Communist Workers' Party of Denmark, July 1978 

by 

Nuon Chea 

Deputy Secretary, CPK 

On behalf of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, I wish to express our deep thanks for 
your visit to Kampuchea. It is a great honour and a source of encouragement for us to 
have you here... 

I. On Party-building 1960-67 

From the beginning we believed it was necessary to have a party led by the working class and 
to base ourselves upon the contradictions in Kampuchean society. In that period, that is, in 
1960, Kampuchean society was neo-colonial and semi-feudal. The contradiction between the 
Kampuchean nation and US imperialism was very sharp. That was the external 
contradiction. As for the internal contradiction, it was between, on the one hand the working 
class and the capitalists and on the other the poor peasants and the feudal class. At that time, 
capitalists and reactionaries together oppressed our people. 

On the basis of these contradictions, the party determined its revolutionary tasks: to make 
the national democratic revolution; to fight US imperialism and the feudal class; to liberate 
the Kampuchean nation and the poor peasant class. It laid down this strategic line for the 
national democratic revolution: 

(1) The party leading the revolution had to be a party of the working class. It had to lead the 
revolution directly and not allow other classes to lead the revolution or the party. The 
party had to define the forces of the revolution; firstly, the strategic forces in the 
revolution and secondly, the tactical forces in the revolution. 

(2) Strategic forces are the workers, peasants and some of the petty bourgeoisie. Of these, 
we see the working class, as basic class while the petty bourgeoisie was something like 
allied force. National capitalists were supplementary forces. Moreover, we regarded some 
high-ranking personalities within the ruling Class-some big capitalists and officials in the 
civil service and government, and some Buddhist monks -as supplementary forces. 



45 



Those people had to have a patriotic, progressive and national outlook, that is, 
progressive in relation to the reactionaries. 

Based on this classification of forces, we tried to construct a national democratic front for 
the purpose of struggling against US imperialism and its lackey. We wish to stress to you 
that all of these forces depended upon the leadership of the working class and the party. 

(3) Our party chose two forms of struggle: political struggle and armed struggle. These are 
interrelated. The political struggle was promoted through legal struggle and illegal 
struggle, with the illegal being the basic from of struggle. Now we struggle openly and in 
secret with secret struggle as the basis of our struggle. We define the forms of struggle in 
this way as a result of our own experience. Defending, expanding and building our forces 
required working in this way. 

(4) We took up the struggle in the city as well as in the countryside. 

(5) The struggle in the countryside was the basic one, especially the struggle in the most 
backward and remote areas. Those were base areas. 

(6) We recognized that we had to conduct people's war, to overcome all obstacles, make any 
sacrifice, so as resolutely and finally to win victory and to launch a final offensive. We 
resolved never to put ourselves on the defensive but always to take the offensive. 

(7) Our strategic line took as its premises: independence; sovereignty; self-reliance. It was 
based upon the right to choose our own destiny with dignity. 

(8) Our struggle was based on international solidarity with all brotherly parties in the world 
and with all peoples and countries in the world who oppose revisionism, imperialism, 
neo-colonialism and colonialism of any kind. 

These principles and practices are not new. They have been recognized around the world, 
but we review them with you because they reflect our own experiences. We have 
followed these principles in our struggle and we have learned from them. This line was 
adopted by the first congress of our party on 30 September 1960. 

I would like to stress that putting this line into practice was not easy. Especially before 1970. 
In 1960, we were badly affected by the twentieth party congress in the Soviet Union. 
Vietnam also opposed our party line especially the armed struggle, as well as our line of 
independence, sovereignty and self-reliance. The Vietnamese said we had to make the 
national democratic revolution on the basis of the documents of the twentieth congress in 
the Soviet Union. They said it was not clear how the classes in Kampuchea had to be 
divided. They believed the feudal class had a progressive function in Kampuchea and that it 
would be able to make the revolution with us. Moreover, they thought the revolution could 
be achieved through the parliament and on the basis of co-operation among different 
classes. Then and now, they saw and still see our line as putchist and too much to the left. 
But we defended our party line. Having correctly defined our party line and our party 



46 



activities, we sent most of our cadres to work in the countryside. We kept only a few in the 
cities. 

Our army was built from scratch, from a small army to a big army. In the beginning, we 
created some secret self-defence corps. We selected the best youth. Almost all cadres had to 
do illegal work at that time. Only a few worked legally; some in the parliament, some in the 
administration, some in the press. The legal work was for the purpose of mobilizing popular 
forces but the basic work was the work done in the countryside and among the workers; it 
had to be done illegally and secretly. This meant that our enemies-the US imperialists, their 
lackey and the reactionary classes - could not find out who was leading our revolution. They 
knew the names of a few comrades such as Khieu Samphan. 1 They thought those comrades 
were the real leaders of the revolution. But they did not know the real leaders. And as they 
could take action against known people only, most of our leaders were able to work safely. 



During 1960-67, we organized and consolidated many bases in the countryside. The 
movement in favour of production and against land- owners was very strong. Peasants pitted 
their strength against the ruling class. They had nothing but used everything: stones, knives, 
sticks, axes. Some of the wives of poor peasants participated by taking their children to 
demonstrate in front of the National Assembly. Revolutionary forces in the rural areas were 
very strong then. We let our party members from the working class go there to work among 
the poor and middle peasants. 

In the cities, there was a related movement among workers and students. They demanded 
that the government cut off US aid and kick out the US ambassador. Demonstrators burnt 
the US flag and the embassy. 2 

- In the countryside, the movement of the people ignited. Those who were hungry rose up 
against traitors, reactionaries and agents of the administration. The slogan was 'Make the 
National Democratic Revolution', that is, fight US imperialism. The spirit of patriotism was 
very high. Everybody felt they had to fight US imperialism. But we divided the struggle into 
two parts: the national struggle and the democratic struggle. In the latter, we raised slogans 
demanding rights for students, workers and peasants; higher wages; land to the peasants; 
better prices for rice, bean curd and meat and better living conditions for the people. The 
struggle embraced big issues and small and involved all regions and means. The enemy tried 
to suppress us but failed because we fought legally and secretly, big and little battles at the 
same time. In this way, we were able to defend and strengthen revolutionary forces step-by- 
step. 

-Through struggle, we built up the leadership of the party, recruiting good cadres from 
among the workers, peasants, civil servants in the administration, Buddhist monks and 
women. In struggle we were able to temper cadres from all strata. Thus the contradictions 
in our society deepened, the contradictions between workers and capitalists, between the 
peasants and landlords, between workers and government officials. The enemy tried 
harder to suppress our movement. In this situation, confronting these acute 
contradictions, we had a Central Committee meeting. We decided we could no longer 



47 



continue the legal struggle. And that we had to start the uprising. This was in January 
1968. 



The Soviet ambassador in Phnom Penh opposed us. The Soviets said our party was out of 
its mind to launch armed struggle. They began to build a new party aimed against us, 
gathering people who had surrendered to the enemy and who were traitors, opportunists and 
vagabonds. Vietnam also opposed our armed struggle. Vietnamese cadres took action against 
us, by sneaking around giving our cadres pamphlets such as Lenin's Left-Wing Communism: An 
Infantile Disorder. They said we were too left. 

We tell you this in order to point out that Vietnam did not help us! A lot of people 
misunderstand this. It was at tcllat moment that our party consolidated its position as 
independent and sovereign. We realized our case was different. We had to take account of 
the concrete situation in order to resolve our social contradictions. Perhaps it is different in 
other places, but this is what it was like here. We had to determine our line on the basis of 
our own contradictions. The situation was favourable for armed struggle. Because our party 
was united on this principle and this line and our people supported the revolution 
wholeheartedly, the uprising against the ruling classes began in 17 out of 19 provinces. We 
had no weapons to speak of and no aid from outside. We had only a few carbines captured 
from the enemy. Sometimes we had weapons but no ammunition. Sometimes even if we had 
no ammunition we carried rifles so as to frighten the enemy. Step-by-step we were able to 
expand our forces because we followed the party line of people's war. 

II. The Armed Struggle, 1968-75 

The people gave us support by hiding food and by hiding our guerrilla forces and cadres. 
This taught our cadres to be vigilant in following the party line of combining with the masses 
and relying upon the masses. Our army was not very big then. It fought with bows and 
arrows, especially in the northeast base areas. We gained the confidence of the people by 
showing them that traditional weapons could kill the enemy. The people then believed in the 
party line and in the revolution. The enemy used all kinds of weapons especially in the north- 
east where our Central Committee had its base. But this region was very strong; the enemy 
could not do a thing to us. However, the Vietnamese revolution was in trouble then because 
the enemy had built strategic villages in South Vietnam. Having no land to escape to, the 
Vietnamese asked us for refuge and got it. This led to the 18 March 1970 coup d'etat of the 
US. 

The US sought to destroy our revolution, but as we were strong, we began establishing our 
own state power in the liberated areas. We were successful immediately in 70 per cent of the 
rural areas; if the US had not invaded, we could have liberated the whole country by June 
1970. In 1967-68 many people said we were ultra-leftist; in 1970, everyone agreed we had the 
correct position. Everyone followed us. Socialist countries and other countries around the 
world supported us, enabling us to continue our economic, military and international work 
better than before. But I would like to stress that even with favourable conditions we kept 
the existence of our party secret and we continued to build upon the secret struggle as a 



48 



fundamental tactic. We became masters of the situation because we had our bases in the 
rural areas, and because we had the forces of the united front. 3 

At first, we did not notice our contradictions with Vietnam. To be frank, we thought the 
Vietnamese were our friends. But instead of helping us Vietnam came to seize forces, to 
build up its own forces and to grasp our party as a whole. There were lots of difficulties. We 
had to fight the US-Thieu forces sent to help Lon Nol, while at the same time they tried to 
stab us in the back. Our party, of course, decided to resolve the principal contradiction first 
that is, to win victory over Lon Nol. 

The contradiction between us and Vietnam deepened towards 1973 when Vietnam united 
with the US at the negotiating table. The US immediately imposed conditions, obliging 
Vietnam to pressure Kampuchea to come to the negotiating table. They tried but we refused. 
The Vietnamese then made every effort to undermine our revolution. Meanwhile, as 
Vietnam and Laos laid down their arms, the US mobilized all its forces to bomb Kampuchea 
? all its forces in South-East Asia! ? for 200 days and 200 nights, to force us to the 
negotiating table. Our party was resolutely opposed to kneeling to the US. Had we done so 
the Lon Nol traitors in Phnom Penh would have gained time to build up their forces. We 
decided to struggle to the end. We were in any case able to resist the US air war, and by 
defeating the US air war confidence grew in our party line. More and more people were 
convinced that our line was correct I must make clear that awareness of the party line did 
not come overnight or through theoretical studies. It grew as a result of the concrete 
experiences and suffering of the people and as a result of class hatred. It was only through 
practice that understanding of the party line deepened. 

In 1974, the year after the air war, our party decided to launch the final big offensive, to 
liberate Phnom Penh and the whole country in the dry season of 1975. Vietnam was 
naturally informed. The Vietnamese believed the US would not allow us to win. Moreover 
they were not prepared to allow us to have victory in advance of their victory. Consequently, 
they refused to transport ammunition being sent from China and other countries, but 
especially from China. We had to use ammunition captured from the enemy; we received 
nothing from Vietnam. The Vietnamese opposed our winning because they wanted to 
liberate Saigon and then send their forces to liberate Phnom Penh, to build up a political 
apparatus here and to create a new party, thereby eliminating the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea and establishing an Indochinese Federation. 

In spite of these difficult conditions, our party did its best and liberated Phnom Penh on 17 
April 1975, two weeks in advance of the liberation of Saigon. Once we had liberated the 
whole country and secured our independence and sovereignty, that is in June 1975, the 
Vietnamese sent their troops to occupy our island, Koh Way. We defended it and forced 
Vietnam to withdraw. What we want to make clear to you is that, throughout the period of 
national democratic revolution, there was a hard, complicated struggle involving difficulties 
with the Soviet Union and Vietnam but we overcame these and won victory. 

Question: At the time of the founding of the Communist Party, was there any 

discussion of the political line for the period leading to communism? 



49 



It is written in our party programme that we shall continue our socialist revolution and 
advance towards communism after the national democratic revolution, but we did not go 
into details. We worked out our present tasks of socialist construction after liberation. 4 

Our main tasks are to defend our state power and to continue the socialist revolution and 
socialist construction. We have defended our territory and sovereignty since liberation in a 
fierce, complicated struggle, especially against Vietnam. We think this struggle will last a long 
time since Vietnam has enormous ambitions. It wants to force Kampuchea into an 
Indochinese Federation and will pursue expansionist aims in all of South-east Asia. 

As for living conditions, we have basically solved our problems by means of irrigation 
projects. We are accumulating capital for the development of our country on the basis of 
independence and self-reliance. 

III. On Building the Party Ideologically 

Having the right political line was not enough to ensure victory .Our party had to have, in 
addition, a firm revolutionary standpoint. This is partly because So much of our struggle was 
illegal. Thus, sometimes, if our cadres were not ideologically committed, they would 
surrender to the enemy or, once captured, they would tell secrets. To avoid this, we stressed 
ideological education. 

During the struggle, we encountered many difficulties. For example, cadres separated 
from their families and not ideologically firm would sometimes decide to run back to 
their families and away from the revolution. And sometimes cadres were working 
underground within the enemy administration and receiving very high wages. Lacking a 
firm revolutionary standpoint, they would be bought. Thus our party could see that 
ideology was the key factor in implementing the political line as well as the 
organizational line. Ideological party building was done in two ways: by destroying 
incorrect ideological standpoints and by building up the correct ideological standpoints of 
the party. For example, we had to: 

(1) build up the ideological standpoint of the basic class in the party, the working class 
consciousness. To do this we had to define the different classes in our society and the 
contradictions between them. From this base, we armed our cadres ideologically with 
the viewpoints of the working class. This was done by explaining the spirit of 
sacrifice for the good of all and the need to abandon private ownership in favour of 
collective ownership; and by teaching them party discipline, love of party work, 
methods of self-criticism and ways to unite closely with the masses; 

(2) build up the ideological standpoint of revolutionary patriotism and revolutionary 
internationalism, the first being the fundamental standpoint. By this we mean striving 
energetically to make our own revolution, struggling successfully against imperialism 
and revisionism in our own country. This advances and supports the international 
struggle. To speak only of internationalism while failing to carry out the revolution in 
one's own country is meaningless. We have to be concrete in this. We try to teach our 



50 



people the principle of self-reliance in order to avoid making ourselves a burden for 
friendly countries. While they might like to help us, they must make their own 
revolutions and improve the living standard of their own people. Thus, we try as 
much as possible to avoid outside aid, to overcome all forms of suffering without 
seeking aid unless it is absolutely necessary .On the one hand, we try to avoid being 
too nationalistic, and on the other, to avoid being too internationalist; 

(3) build up the ideological standpoint of constantly maintaining revolutionary ardour, 
especially the desire to be like ordinary people, especially the poor peasants. This is 
why our party cadres and our men and women in the army do not receive wages; they 
are told to serve the party and to receive only from the party. In this way, we avoid 
creating a new ruling class separated from the people; 

(4) build up the concept of the mass outlook and of the mass line, that is, to have full 
confidence in the masses and to live among the masses, especially the poor peasants. 
Only by doing this can the revolution win victory and build its forces. We stress this 
to cadres because there are some who have petty bourgeois class backgrounds, 
specifically intellectuals who lack real confidence in the masses, especially in the 
poor peasants. We try to make them understand that these poor people can do 
everything. They conquered the enemy, do productive work and everything. Because 
they do everything, we must serve them; 

(5) Cadres are also instructed in revolutionary vigilance, that is, taking care to be on 
guard against the enemy; 

(6) We arm them with an understanding of dialectical materialism to enable them to 
analyse things and to understand the ideological standpoints of the party. 

All of these ideological standpoints have been propagated in the branches and cells of the 
party. This was done not by the reading out of documents but by analysing daily 
activities, determining what was done wrongly and correcting shortcomings. 

As for our books, they are only a few pages in length, as brief documents are more suitable 
for poor peasants. We also have some courses, mostly short ones for small groups -in 
underground work for two to three people-once or twice a month. There are also other 
courses held about twice a year in which party members are introduced to revolutionary 
concepts and educated in our political, ideological and organizational line. 



Even now, after liberation, we believe the ideological factor is the determining factor. In 
cadre education, we place stress on destroying old society ideological standpoints which 
remain powerful. Among leading cadres, we also stress the defending and building up of 
working class consciousness. This is to avoid revisionism. When a party becomes revisionist, 
it is not because the ordinary member becomes revisionist but because the leadership leads 
the party towards revisionism. Although we say very little about revisionism outside the 
party, inside the party we have fought a lot against revisionism. It is partly for this reason 



51 



that we avoid using the documents of others. We rely mostly on our own assessments of 
class struggle. This is more concrete. Some of our cadres who have lived overseas, and who 
worked with foreign communist panics, regularly request foreign documents, claiming we 
neglect the study of Marxism-Leninism. But we tell them that Marxism-Leninism develops 
by means of the struggle of the people; our experiences are genuine Marxist-Leninist 
documents. 

IV. The Organizational Line of the Party 

We build the party ideologically and organizationally by relying on our class analysis, taking 
the poor peasant and worker classes as the basic classes. Those who joined from the petty 
bourgeoisie or other classes tried to promote the standpoints of those classes, but they had 
to renounce their old standpoints and develop working class consciousness. Cadres are 
evaluated on the basis of their concrete activities. Their spirit has to be clean uncorrupted 
and without entangling contacts with the enemy. We investigate life histories and class 
background both before and after they join the revolution. We do this to prevent infiltration 
by, for example, CIA, KGB or Vietnamese agents. By adopting these organizational 
principles, we have unity in the party and can cleanse our party of bad elements. We have 
not been 100 per cent successful. The enemy is still attempting to undermine the party. 
Consequently, we are striving to strengthen political and ideological education and to clean 
the party. 

In summation, we can say that our party is integrated and united through this political, 
ideological, and organizational work. It has become stronger and stronger. We have 
learned that, as soon as you have a strong and clean party, you will have a strong 
revolutionary movement. We still have some distance to travel on this path, and the 
enemy, both the imperialists and the revisionists as well as the Vietnamese, continue to 
fight us. Thus, the building of the party continues from one generation to the next. We 
hope to avoid the possibility of the next generation becoming revisionist. If we can guard 
safely the interests of our country, we will also contribute to the struggle in the whole 
world. We know about the emergence of revisionism in the Soviet Union and we are 
saddened by this. And about the destruction of the Indonesian party by the enemy. We 
have learned from these experiences, and the experiences of other parties. We have tried 
not to fall by the wayside. 

Question: Is there a danger ? from outside the country or inside the party ? a danger of 
a new class being created? 

To clarify the nature of the struggle inside the party, yes, there are both dangers. Inside the 
party, there is a contradiction between the standpoints of private ownership and collective 
ownership. If we do not take care, it may become antagonistic. The other contradiction is 
external. Vietnam, in particular, is trying to undermine our party by military, political, 
economic and ideological means. The Vietnamese also try to infiltrate our party. We are not 
worried about the external, military aggression. We worry most of all about the enemy inside. 

Question: Why is illegal work still the fundamental or basic work? 



52 



In this period, after liberation, it is secret work that is fundamental. We no longer use the 
terms 'legal' and 'illegal'; we use the terms 'secret' and 'open'. Secret work is fundamental in 
all that we do. For example, the elections of comrades to leading work are secret. The places 
where our leaders live are secret. We keep meeting times and places secret, and so on. On 
the one hand, this is a matter of general principle, and on the other, it is a way to defend 
ourselves from the danger of enemy infiltration. As long as there is class struggle or 
imperialism, secret work will remain fundamental. Only through secrecy can we be masters 
of the situation and win victory over the enemy who cannot find out who is who. 

This also applies to foreign affairs. For example, the Soviet Union asked to come to Phnom 
Penh at liberation. They were preparing to send men to the Embassy. We said we could not 
possibly receive them and they were furious. We base everything on secrecy. This is in the 
interests of the working classes. 

Question: Why do you not mention the Soviets externally? 



Inside the party we struggle resolutely against the Soviet Union, but we have many enemies 
now ? US imperialism, Thailand, Vietnam ? and for tactical reasons we must limit our 
enemies as much as possible. It should be clear that we oppose the Soviet Union and 
revisionism, but our line has to be different from the line taken in China because we are a 
small country. 

Take another example: our attitude towards 'the three worlds'. We have the same 
standpoint, exactly the same, but as for what we do, we have to bear in mind the concrete 
interests of our country. 

Question: Do you have a party programme? 

Yes we have one but only in Kampuchean. We still have many tasks; we have not done 
enough propaganda work internationally. The Vietnamese enemy has been able to make so 
much international propaganda against us because of shortcomings in our propaganda work 
in the international arena. 

V. On Concrete Work Before and After Liberation 

Before liberation, legal activities concerned work undertaken by different organizations 
such as the students' union, workers' associations, women's association and other 
organizations. We did everything we were allowed to do under the enemy's laws. There 
are also sub-categories of non-legal or non-open activities: semi-open and semi-secret 
forms or semi-legal and semi-illegal forms. Celebrating May 1 st , for example, was both 
legal and illegal. Even though the ruling class might have caught us, we celebrated May 
1 st We maintained the tradition once it was established. Perhaps it is different in your 
place. 



53 



The Communist Party of Kampuchea has never before been legal. This is also true of other 
progressive organizations we created. We developed the tactic of secrecy, firstly, to defend 
ourselves, secondly, to mobilize more forces, and finally to serve our struggle, for example, 
in mobilizing intellectuals. We found they would not join us if we used semi-illegal forms, 
but with legal forms such as celebrations and visiting temples, they joined in. Thus, we made 
them join us step-by-step. Many semi-secret and semi-illegal and secret activities were 
organized so as to protect the wholly illegal and secret activities of the party centre. Thus, 
when the enemy attacked from outside, he struck semi-illegal and semi-secret activities only 
and we were able to defend our party and its leadership. In the neo-colonial, semi-feudal 
society, we had to work in complete secrecy, both inside the party and inside other 
organizations. This also applied to party members working among the masses. Since 
liberation, we continue secret work because we consider the strategic line to be more 
important than tactics. We have published the names of only a few of our cadres and 
members. Not many need to be public. During the war, all of them were secret in this area, 
we learned from the bloodstained experience of the Communist party of Indonesia. 6 

Operating secretly, our organization has the following rules. Three members are required 
to form a cell, for example in a factory. If there are more than three members, a cell 
secretary must direct party work. If there are up to six people, we form two separate cells 
having no contact with each other. Even with five people we organize two separate party 
cells, which work secretly and separately. If the enemy discovers one cell, the other can 
continue its work. There are no direct contacts among cells. In each factory, there is one 
leading cadre. Only he knows this. He can go directly to the leadership. These procedures 
also apply to other sectors such as students. We form cells having no knowledge of each 
other and which are unable to contact each other. The same applies to contacts between 
the designated leading cadre and the leadership. Contacts are arranged through a third 
person. If the enemy captures the leading cadre, he will not be able to identify the 
leadership, only the go-between. This is our secret organization. 



From our experience, secrecy is only one aspect of building up the organization. Of greater 
importance is the ideological level of the designated leading cadres. They must display great 
discipline. We had to be especially careful when work had to be done in the cities. Cadres 
can be forced to leave in a hurry. They should not live with their families. When they do, 
things get complicated. It takes them longer to escape. We have had some bitter experience 
with these things. Afterwards, we decided to observe party discipline more strictly. Permit 
me to say that we are speaking of concrete experiences and conditions in our country. It is 
up to you to decide what you can learn from these experiences. We offer these examples out 
of friendly revolutionary feelings. 



Secrecy meant avoiding the law. For example, we had to make our own identity cards so that 
our names would not appear in the register. If the enemy captured genuine identity cards, 
photos and work permits, it would have been easier to find us. Also, if revolutionaries did 
not have any work, the enemy might have noticed us. We opened a bookshop for ourselves, 



54 



but to avoid letting out any of our names, we took shelter behind a third person and his 
name. During the war many cadres had to leave their jobs periodically, and we had to protect 
them. Contacts and meetings were at night; so were political training classes. We locked 
ourselves up in a room for two or three days until we were finished. Contacts between 
publicly well-known leaders, such as those who worked in parliament, and secret leaders 
were arranged through two or three other persons. We employed various tactics to 
overcome the oppression of the enemy. For meetings in a house, for example, we used 
signals, such as a scarf in front of the house. If the scarf was in place, it was safe to enter it; if 
it was not, the enemy was there. In the beginning we lost many people because the enemy 
knew the secret signals. From this we learned not to go directly into the house but to walk 
around the neighbourhood, maybe go into a shop, drink something and ask about what was 
happening in the house. Sometimes good people would tell us in confidence about the 
enemy. Sometimes the neighbours were not revolutionaries, but they would warn us if spies 
and agents were there. 

We also used couriers for messages, letters, carrying ammunition, etc. Couriers were not 
allowed to know our real places of residence. Other- wise, captured couriers could be forced 
to reveal them. We had to use a bridge of two or three other persons. If a messenger failed 
to show up, we did nothing for two to three days. But after this, we had to move elsewhere. 
When the enemy learned this, they tortured captured couriers right away so as to catch us. 
From bitter experience, we learned to abandon a safe house at once if a messenger was two 
to three hours late. The enemy came immediately a few times and we had to use arms in 
order to allow leading cadres to escape. This should give you an idea of our experiences. The 
tactics and techniques are of secondary importance only; most important is the class 
standpoint of cadres. 



Since liberation, our experience relates to anti-party activities organized inside our party. 
They usually involve CIA, Vietnamese and KGB agents. Our experiences in this area are 
very recent, but it appears from what we have been able to learn that CIA, Vietnamese and 
KGB agents have been working inside the party for a long time. When we observed that 
something was wrong, we thought it was an internal contradiction and attempted to resolve 
it by means of persuasion, self-criticism and so on. For example, the party had to give 
directives to a branch concerning the living conditions of the people. When nothing 
changed, we realized something was wrong. Where there were deviations to the left or to the 
right, we looked carefully into the backgrounds of the cadres. We also sought the opinion of 
the masses. We have thus been able to uncover enemy agents step-by-step. Generally, we 
discovered they had been engaged in enemy activities for a very long time. Sometimes good 
comrades had been imprisoned and tortured and afterwards they surrendered to the enemy. 
Upon release, they served as agents. We welcomed them back, accepted them, without 
looking at what had happened in prison. We now realize they had become agents of the 
enemy. 



55 



It is more widely known that the USA planned to seize power from us six months after 
liberation. The plan involved joint action on the part of the USA, the KGB and Vietnam. 
There was to be combined struggle from inside and outside. But we smashed the plan. 
Immediately after liberation, we evacuated the cities. The CIA, KGB and Vietnamese agents 
there left for the countryside and were unable to implement the plan. People who had 
infiltrated the party could not react immediately, but we discovered them later when they 
planned coups d'etat. Their activities were coordinated with aggression from outside. These 
were not powerful people; their intention was to exploit the opportunity provided by 
Vietnam's attacks to assassinate our leaders and then announce it to the world. However, 
when the Vietnamese attacked, our army defeated them and we caught the traitors inside the 
party. 

Although we say plans have been crushed, we do not mean the enemy has given up. We 
have to continue to build and to defend our party, and our leadership, and to apprehend the 
people who have infiltrated our party. We know the current plan involves not only 
Vietnamese agents, but has something to do with US imperialism and the KGB. All of them! 
A similar thing has occurred in Yemen, both North and South. And in Afghanistan. But as 
these things happen, the face of the Soviets becomes more and more clear. 

Question: Is it co-operation between the CIA and KGB or is it rivalry for control of 
Kampuchea? 

Both. On the one hand they co-operate; on the other, they are rivals. For example, Vietnam 
attacked us last October to December while the US conducted operations near our coastal 
islands and along the border with Thailand with its CIA agents. They compete for control at 
the same time. This is an open form of co-operation. As for the secret one, some CIA agents 
joined up with the Vietnamese in order to come to Kampuchea. Because the US was unable 
to come into Kampuchea, it had to rely upon Vietnam. The Vietnamese do not discriminate 
in choosing agents. They accept anybody who fights the Communist party of Kampuchea. 
Even CIA agents! 



The leadership apparatus must be defended at any price. If we lose members but retain the 
leadership, we can continue to win victories. Defending the leadership of the party is 
strategic. As long as the leader- ship is there, the party will not die. There can be no 
comparison between losing two to three leading cadres and 200-300 members. Rather the 
latter than the former. Otherwise the party has no head and cannot lead the struggle. This 
has been demonstrated by the experience of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Its 
leadership was 90 per cent destroyed. It has taken them a very long time to re-establish 
themselves. Thirteen years have passed since 1965 and the party is not yet rebuilt. We do not 
know how long it will take for them to regain the offensive strength, which they had before. 
To build a good leadership is strategic. It takes 10-20 years to build up a good leading 
communist. If you lose one, you lose a lot. And party secrecy can be lost. 



56 



VI. Building and Leading the Revolutionary Movement 

As we have said, from 1960 we regarded the workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and 
progressive patriotic personalities as strategic forces. The working class is the progressive 
class while the largest class is the peasantry. The others are secondary, allied forces. The 
national progressive capitalists were secondary, tactical forces mobilized in particular 
instances. The next step was setting the strategic line. The rural struggle was the 
fundamental struggle. We divided our cadres between the towns and the countryside, 
according to their abilities. Before 1960 there was some confusion about this. We did not 
have a clear party line. We had developed bases in the countryside but the enemy had 
destroyed up to 90 per cent of them. Moreover, we were not strong in the cities. We 
realized in 1959 that we lacked the strategic forces necessary for advancing the 
revolution! 

It was only after 1960 that we could allocate our forces correctly. Most of them went to 
work among the peasants; slightly fewer worked among the petty Bourgeoisie, the students 
and intellectuals; a very few worked among national capitalists and with high-ranking 
personalities in the administration. Once we had this line we could very quickly build our 
forces. In particular, we built up rural base areas. As the mass movement became stronger 
and stronger, we were able to build up legal and illegal work. We could even mount mass 
demonstrations. From 1962 to 1963, in particular, our forces grew stronger and stronger. 8 

The best of our cadres worked among poor peasants building base areas in the most remote 
regions. They had to transform themselves so as to work among peasants. Initially, there 
were a lot of problems. Meanwhile in the cities, cadres had to become workers. The 
conditions in the cities and the countryside were quite different in rural areas, living 
conditions were very bad but there were few enemies. In the cities, living conditions were 
better but there were many enemies. Both places had advantages and disadvantages. Cadres 
had to be selected accordingly. There was a lot of malaria in the countryside. Some cadres 
refused to work there, but we had work to do and we had to strengthen their ideological 
standpoint. 

When we look back upon this period, we realize we would not have obtained such a big 
victory without first overcoming such obstacles. We see two mam turning points: if we had 
not reorganized in 1960, we could not have launched the armed struggle in 1968; if we had 
not launched the armed struggle in 1968, we would not have been masters of the situation at 
the time of the 1970 coup d'etat. The enemy might otherwise have destroyed our forces. To be 
master of the situation, to rely upon your own forces, to be sovereign ? these words have 
meaning only if we have the forces of the people in our hands. If we do not, they will fall 
into the hands of the enemy. The most important thing was to grasp the national forces in 
our country. This was for us a major lesson. 



We seek to stress the right thing in gathering forces. This is important in all periods of the 
revolution. Today, in the period of socialist revolution, our strength is greater than it was 
during the national democratic revolution. Take, for example, the petty capitalists who were 



57 



evacuated from the cities. Initially they had difficulties living in the countryside, but gradually 
they have become proud of the revolution. They see the prospects for their children, that 
our revolution is clean and that we are independent and sovereign. They know we can 
defend ourselves from Vietnam, and they have confidence in us. As for the intellectuals who 
have remained abroad, some support us. In France, an association has expressed solidarity 
with us against Vietnam. We are stronger now than in the first revolution: 85 per cent of the 
population belongs to the revolution, as workers and peasants, and 80-90 per cent of the 
intellectuals belong to it. Only ten per cent are different. We try to educate these people so 
that they will see that the revolution is good for them and their children. Thus we grow 
stronger and stronger. 

We have gathered forces from different strata in different periods because everyone 
recognizes the patriotic spirit of the communists. The feudalists said bad things about 
Vietnam and the USA without doing anything. They were corrupt and let Vietnam come ? 
100 kilometres, 200 kilometres, half a kilometre ? across the border by corrupting the police. 

The Vietnamese thus crawled into our country by what they tern legal' means, especially 
in Takeo and Svay Rieng. But when power came into the hands of the party, everyone 
saw that we could hold aloft the banner of independence. They realized communists were 
clean, that we live as ordinary people live, while in the old days, when people lived in a 
capitalist way, the society disintegrated. As soon as people understood, they followed the 
communist way and we could easily mobilize forces. 

VII. Forming the National United Front 



How did we make Sihanouk join us? We were able to mobilize forces after the coup d'etat 
because we had made preparations for a long time. We were masters of the situation. We 
had an army; we had some weapons. Thus, we were able to form a united front. We even 
allowed King Sihanouk to become chairman of the front. It meant nothing because we were 
the masters of the situation. Following the coup, Sihanouk was reduced from everything to 
nothing while for us it was the opposite ? in the cities as well as in the countryside. Forces 
from the basic levels of society were essential for getting top levels to join us. That is the 
first lesson. 



The second lesson and experience concerns front activities. We did not have an easy time of 
it. The enemy tried to corrupt Sihanouk ? the USA, the French, the Soviet revisionists ? and 
to split him away from the front. Sihanouk did not leave because we won victory after 
victory at the basic level. Sihanouk would have left us had we not done so, especially in 1973 
when Vietnam sat at the negotiating table with the USA. Sihanouk was scared to be alone; he 
kept asking if we were able to continue the struggle. He wanted to negotiate but we told him 
we would continue the struggle to the end. 



58 



Thirdly, we found we had to struggle inside the front with Sihanouk at the same time that we 
united with him externally. Sihanouk asked for things; we let him have them as long as this 
did not contradict our strategic policy. We had to be very flexible towards him. The party 
slogan was 'Don't push anybody over to the enemy'. 

VIII. The Urban Struggle, 1960-73 

Our struggle in the cities had two components: the legal struggle and the secret struggle. The 
urban struggle was not as important as the struggle in the countryside but its impact was felt 
all over the country and on an international level. Moreover, the struggle had an important 
effect on the middle level of the ruling class, in spite of the fact that the city was the 
headquarters of the ruling class and its apparatus of oppression. 

Some of the legal work was undertaken in the National Assembly. We did not attempt to 
obtain seats; we used patriotic personalities for making propaganda. These dignitaries did 
not act in the name of the party, but the party was in essence behind the propaganda. The 
work was limited. We just let our people use strategic slogans to arouse the people. At the 
same time, we used newspapers, promoted rumours and asked people to follow the 
deputies whom we had managed to get into the Assembly. In this way, we worked at the 
top, making people follow us while at the same time we worked at basic levels. 

Although we were able to work legally in the National Assembly, our deputies were 
sometimes subject to repression. We would then try to sneak our ideas into other deputies 
by telling them, 'If you say this and this, people will follow you and elect you again'. And 
sometimes they tried it. When our slogans were used before the people, the people 
applauded. The deputies were pleased. Later they would ask us what to say and we would 
then sneak more of our slogans into them. Some of our comrades could not understand this 
and thought that by doing this we might strengthen the influence of the ruling class. But we 
did not think it did any harm. If we could get some of the essence of our ideas to the people, 
then we could get some of these people with us. There were difficulties in the struggle with 
our newspapers. 

When the ruling class realized a particular newspaper had been secretly established by the 
party, it would be closed in less than three months. We would then let comrades write 
anonymously for newspapers of a more neutral nature. Sometimes the paper would cut out 
half the words. We did it nonetheless; to get some ideas out. We also let our people respond 
to reactionary newspaper articles, by writing letters to the editor asking the paper to stop 
printing reactionary views. In the case of the most reactionary papers, those that could not 
be restrained in any other way, we called for mass demonstrations at their offices. In the case 
of Phnom Penh Presse, a CIA newspaper and the most reactionary of them all, we let the 
people sack the place. 9 Among our other activities in the cities, we promoted artistic 
performances among the people and arranged travel to rural areas for festivals, ceremonies, 
and so on. We were thus able to make our forces stronger and stronger at all levels of the 
society. 

Choosing the right slogan, the slogan that suited the situation ? asking not too much, not too 
little in the situation ? was crucial to our work in the cities. We did not use words like 



59 



'revolutionary', 'communist', or 'red', for example. Instead we used words everyone would 
accept such as 'Fight US Imperialism', 'Fight for Sovereignty', etc. People were especially 
scared of words such as 'communist' and 'revolutionary'. But we made them adopt our party 
line, in its essence, by putting out the party line. If in this way we could make people adopt 
the line ? people who were otherwise afraid of 'revolution' and 'communism' ? then those 
people, in spite of their fears, were able to hold aloft our party flag. 

We even worked within the movement of Buddhist monks, making them follow us by 
saying we would defend the country and religion. If the country were to become 
dominated by foreigners, there would no longer be any religion. So monks, too, held aloft 
our banner even if they did not like communism. We worked not only among the rank- 
and-file monks ? they were not so reactionary, in any case ? but also among high-ranking 
monks who controlled large parts of the country. We used slogans opposing foreign 
suppression of the culture of Kampuchea. Monks then became patriotic, supporting us 
without being aware of it. 

We also worked with high personalities such as Penn Nouth. 10 Here, we had to be careful. 
We had to solicit his ideas, not make propositions, not propagate. The high-ranking patriotic 
personalities were not an important force but we were trying to gather all forces in support 
of the struggle, especially in the cities. We asked, for example, 'What would your Excellency 
think if the USA attacked the country?' He would then think about it and we would sneak in 
ideas about what had to be done. The dignitaries then listened to us and spoke to others 
under their influence. Thus Penn Nouth did not know that he propagated for the 
communists. 



These were the different forms of legal struggle in the cities. However, we put most stress 
upon the secret struggle. Without the secret struggle, the legal struggle would not have 
succeeded. These two forms of struggle interacted and complemented each other, but the 
secret work was the most important. 

We had to educate our cadres all the time about secret as well as legal work. When the 
situation was easy, cadres wanted to work legally so as to have the chance to gam a title, 
money, etc. And when the situation was difficult, they preferred instead to work secretly. 
Consequently they had to be educated continuously, so as to be able to remain firm at their 
posts even at the risk of their lives. They could not assume new duties on their own, before 
the party gave authorization. This was ideological work. 



Anticipating difficulties, we took precautions. We set up bases in the countryside that would 
receive people engaged in secret work in the cities. Once secrecy was broken, however, those 
comrades were not allowed into secret work in the countryside. Once out in the open ? 
always open work. We had to be careful about where people went so that no one knew in 
advance. If they did, the enemy could find out. 



60 



When cadres had trouble, they often asked to be sent to the countryside even when secrecy 
remained unbroken. Because of this we had to work step-by-step with their ideological 
standpoint, and we had to keep an eye on those working in the cities ? either secretly or 
legally ? observing especially their living conditions and personal circumstances. Those 
working secretly could not hold jobs as ordinary people did, so we had to assist them in 
finding jobs to some extent. 

In accordance with the party's correct line, we were able to build and to defend our forces. 
Some were destroyed by the enemy, but for the most part we were able to protect them; 
especially after the coup in 1970 when we had large liberated areas. The locations of our 
most important bases were a secret. Even US electronics could not discover them. Although 
US bombings destroyed a lot, they were not very effective because we stuck to our secret 
line of struggle. Vietnamese forces in Vietnam were less well-hidden and less secret than we 
were and because of that more of them were destroyed. Even the Vietnamese here were hit 
more often than we were. 

Our people and soldiers called the B-52s 'the blind ones'. When they came, they dropped 
bombs without looking. They did not care whether they hit anything or not. Our people 
were not too afraid of the B-52s. 

We learned that as long as we preserved our secrecy, our struggle could continue as long as 
necessary. Even US-made artillery was ineffective when it was not known who or where we 
were. Within limits. Some of us were hit But we told our cadres not to be afraid, to keep 
themselves well hidden and then we would all be able to throw out the US imperialists. 

[Nuon Chea concluded his statement at this point as the time allocated for the meeting had 
elapsed.] 



61 



'Security Circular'' 



Office S-21 

(Democratic Kampuchea) 

Phnom Penh 

Circular 



Please all comrades stick to this circular firmly [absolutely]. 



I. Guarding [Enemy] Regulation 

1. While guarding the prison, do not sit, lie against the wall or write anything. Walk back and 
forth. 

2. Do not ask the prisoners their names. 

3. Do not walk away from the spot assigned. Do not enter the cells or open the doors or 
windows to peer at the prisoners inside. 

4. Do not question any prisoner inside the cells, even if you know who they are. 

5. Do not threaten or beat prisoners. If the prisoners disobey the rules or ignore warnings, 
report to your supervisor in writing or by mouth. 

6. If the prisoners try to break the lock, hang themselves, cut their wrists, or attempt to 
swallow screws, shackle their hands behind them and report immediately to your supervisor 
- do not delay. 

7. If a prisoner manages to escape, inform the supervisor at once and assign soldiers to bring 
them back, do not claim that there are no soldiers. 

8. When patrolling, comrade-members of the group and fifty-member units must be present 
at the assigned locations. 



62 



9. Do not sleep or sit against the wall. Walk back and forth constantly. 

10. Cadres and youths have to inspect thoroughly at all four designated times. In other 
words, four inspections are to be conducted in twenty-four hours; at 6 a.m., 11 a.m., 6 p.m., 
and 11 p.m. 

11. When checking prisoners, undress them and let them dress themselves up before leaving 
the rooms. 

12. Prisoners are not allowed to take off their clothes. If they do, punish them by taking 
away all of their clothes. 

13. During patrol, cadres must carefully keep the keys on their person. No keys may be lost. 
If they are lost, do not cut the lock, but look for them until they are found. If a prisoner 
escapes from a room where a key has been lost, comrades who held the key will take all 
responsibility in front of the collective. 

14. Guards must wear military uniform on duty, do not wear short paint. 



II. Lock and Shackles 

1. Before locking the cells, check the lock, shackle rings and shackle bars thoroughly and 
then unlock hand shackles and untie the eyes of the prisoner. 

2. Remaining shackle rings and bars have to be removed from the cells. 

3. Shackle a hand to a leg and stay close to the prisoner when they dispose of their feces. Do 
not stay away from him. 

4. Check the prisoners' bodies when they return from the interrogation room. 

5. The length of the chain must be no longer than a half-meter; in any other case inquire of 
the supervisor. 



III. Measures 

1. Prisoners in houses are not allowed to talk to each other. 

2. Prisoners in our prisons are not permitted to talk to each other either. 



63 



3. Those who guard inside the buildings are not permitted to come outside, for the reason 
that the prisoners might do something bad and not be noticed. 

4. Each house has its own list of prisoners and their room numbers. 

5. For the guns, no bullets are loaded in the magazines attached to the gun, only those worn 
on the body. 

6. Those who guard inside are not allowed to be armed with guns, only sticks. 

7. Each gun has its owner. 

8. Do not leave the gun down anywhere - hold it. 

9. Do keep the gun near the prisoner or carry it close to them. 

10. Tasks should be set forth clearly during changing of the guard. Inform the new guards 
about the condition of the prisoners and other important details. 

11. Disposal of feces and urine and checking the prisoners' bodies is done during the interval 
by the new guards. The previous guards are not allowed to go anywhere until the 
replacement guards have done this initial task. 



Guarding Unit 

1. Guard inside 127 persons 

2. Medical staff 14 persons 

3. List keeper and maker 2 persons 



Total 



143 persons 



Economic (logistics) Unit 

1. Economic (logistics) of the guarding unit 13 persons 

2. Economic (logistics) of interrogation unit 6 persons 

3. Economic (logistics) of the prisoners 7 persons 



64 



4. Collecting and cleaning feces containers 3 persons 

5. Fishers 4 persons 

6. Barbers 5 persons 

7. Pig, chicken and duck feeders 8 persons 



Total 



46 persons 



Messenger Unit 

1. Guard inside special rooms 42 persons 

2. Arresters 8 persons 

3. Vehicle unit 10 persons 

4. Medical staff 2 persons 



Total 



62 persons 



15- and 16-Year-Old Youth 



1 . Medical training 



2. Remaining 



17 persons 
59 persons 



Total 



76 persons 



65 



An Autobiography by the Khmer Rouge Ambassador to the UN 

Khmer Rouge Ambassador to the UN 1975-1992 

Translated by Phat Kosal and Sokha Irene 

Our comrade in charge has reported that our class enemy has brought accusations on me. I 
would like to sincerely and wholeheartedly present my autobiography to the party as follows: 

I. Family 

Real name: Prasit 

Revolutionary name: Sarn 

Sex: Male, Nationality: Khmer 

Marital Status: Married 

My wife's name: Krushna Thourei, French nowadays living in France. 

Children: 2 daughters and 1 son. My oldest daughter is 21 and now joined the revolution. 

The other 2 still under the care of my wife. 

Date of Birth: February 3, 1930, Phnom Penh. 

- My grand father's name: Thiounn, feudal class and reactionary traitor serving the French 
colonist. 

- My mother's name: Bun Chan Mouli, conservative and feudal class, still alive. Age: not 
known and perhaps over 70. 

- My Sibblings: My elder sister: 

- Thiounn Choeun, doctor and Minister of Health. 

- Thiounn Cheoum married. Her husband's name Chhean Vorm, capitalist class. His political 
background is not known and I have not seen him for years. 

- My elder brother: Thiounn Chum (Comprador) capitalist. His political background is not 
known and I have not seen him for years. 

- My elder brother: Thiounn Mom joined the revolution since 1951 and is working in the 
Ministry of Industry. 

I am the youngest one in the family. 

II. From 1930 to 1949 

From 1935 (or 1936!) to 1949: 

I studied in Sisowath High School supervised by the French in Phnom Penh until Grade 6. 
Because I didn't do well in grade 6, the French principal decided to disconnect my studies 
there. My parent parents then decided to send me to Saigon to continue my studies at 
Chasseloup Labat High School. 



66 



From 1941 to 1945: 

I continued my studies at Sisowath High School again until I graduated in July 1949. It was 
that time when the national patriotism idea developed in my mind. It was also the first time I 
had been in some contact with Cambodians. When I graduated in July 1949, the French 
colonist persuaded and indoctrinated me to serve them as my father and grandfather had 
done. To lure me, they granted me a tour trip coverage by sea to Manila City (the 
Philippines) and Hong Kong (July- August 1949). 

III. From 1949 (September) to 1955 (December) 

I continued my studied in France, in September 1949 when I obtained from the government 
half of a full scholarship for my studies until 1952 when the Royal Government cut off my 
scholarship, because I opposed them. My first intention was to study dentistry but I changed 
the major and undertook the study of medicine production and sales. After 2 years' study in 
this area, I again went on to undertake the major of transportation until late 1954. After my 
graduation, the Royal Government then assigned my to work in the railway station. I spent6 
months on an internship at a French railway station. Through the period of 6 years that I 
remained in France, I woke up to the consciousness of national patriotism against the 
French colonists. And I sought to bring about independence and a new era for Cambodia to 
become a socialist state. 

In 1951, I joined the pro-Marxist and Leninist communique, which was founded in Paris by 
Comrade Brother Pol Pot, Brother Vann and Brother Khieu...etc. I was constantly and 
closely involved in all activities until 1955. In 1953, with advice from these brothers, I 
decided to enter into the French party. In 1953, with advice from these brothers, I decided 
to enter into the French party. I n 1953, the French Security Police arrested me and detained 
me for one day to interrogate me about activities of the Khmer Student Association, which 
strongly opposed King Sihanouk, who betrayed the people. At that time, I had only national 
patriotism, not yet class consciousness. My national soul was not at its peak yet because of 
my confusion between national and international patriotism. Therefore, I got married to a 
French woman in December 1954. The reason for such a decision is attributive to the 
education I received from the exploiting French feudal and colonial class. My wrong 
decision has caused me frustration and feeling of regret up to now. During my study in 
France, I didn't have any other friends other than you all within the Marxist and Leninist 
party. I had only one French friend whom I developed closed relationship with. This friend 
was involved in some political activities within the French party before but withdrew himself 
from the party a long time ago. He is also a friend of Comrade Ros Chithor (dead). He is 
now doing his normal business. Whenever I meet him, he and I never talk about Cambodia 
and he rarely ask me either. He just wishes to live a life of comfort. 



IV. From 1956 to 1963 

This is the period of internal chaos. 



67 



I returned to Cambodia in late December 1955. I worked in the Railway station. The 
party advised me to organise a railway station cell and that placed me in charge of educating 
the staff and workers there. Then I kept receiving a lot of advice from the party and I was 
appointed Party Secretary of the railway station cell to secretly educate workers and to write 
for " Observator Newspaper". 

From November 1958 to April 1959: At the request from the Ministry of Railways and 
with the authorisation of the party, I went to do a study tour in Japan. At that time, I was 
aware of the traitorous activities of the traitors, Sam Sary and Dap Chhuon. I also found out 
the espionage activities of a Japanese man named Tada Toma among Khmer students in 
Japan. 

After my return from Japan, I worked in the party railway cell until June 1961 when 
Sihanouk severely attacked me. The class enemy resorted to such attacks because the 
rebellious movement of the railway workers was growing greater and greater. 

The parly had decided that I cut off relations with the party for a while (almost one 
year). The exploiting class administration transferred me to the Ministry of Public Works. In 
1962, the party changed my function to undertake activities of the ruling class and 
foreigners. At that time, I became acquainted with a French colonel named Mare. Through 
this relationship, I received some information but later realised that he was a spy from the 
French Second Bureau (2B). However, it is owing to my keen observation that I did not 
break out our secrecy to him. 

In 1963, after the purge of 34 people, the party laid out a plan to send me to France for 
a while. At first, I was very worried because I did not know how to live in France. Because 
the situation was getting more and more tense, I requested that the party allow me to escape 
to France. The party then agreed. By that time, I saw an escape as a complicated matter for 
me. However, through my relevant educational background in France and through self- 
examination, I found out that the escape was suitable and would help alleviate the problems 
that existed in my life and for my entire family. 

In June 1963, after 2 months of persistent request for a visa from the administration of 
the exploiting class, I obtained a visa and departed to France along with my sister's daughter. 
My two children followed me in December 1963. I went to France via Prague as I wanted to 
take the opportunity to find out information about cities of the country widely known as a 
socialist state. I stayed in this city for 2 days waiting for a connecting flight to Paris. 

Over the past 7 and a half years, I have received a great deal of education from the party 
and have been involved in many activities against the Imperialist and ruling class. I have had 
a lot of experience with workers and intellectuals. Although the enemy actually investigated 
my activities and put pressure on me, I was still happy to struggle against them. However, at 
that time, I was very idealistic. I did not possess a clear-cut conception of class standpoint- 
still blurry. I still enjoyed life of the exploiting class. 

In between 1958 and 1960, the event of revisionism appeared and I did not have a good 
view of that and clear standpoint toward that. For this reason, I just lived up to the parly's 
advice which was that I had to put the national matters above anything else- Cambodia 
matter must be seen as a priority and to stage a Cambodian revolution taking the national 
interest as the most important of all. 



V. From (June) 1963 to (March) 1970: 



68 



When I arrived in France, I taught the Khmer students the internal situation within the 
party to spread out among Khmer students in France. I adhered to the standpoint to 
which the party had advised me to adhere and I was concerned with the conflict between 
the revisionist and Chinese the revisionist and our revolution. The party standpoint and 
concept helped solve to a greater extent the chaotic confusions within the mind of 
Khmer students in France. 

Within the period of almost seven years, my political activities were just within the circle 
of the Khmer Student Association and some other Cambodians. I have established tie 
with my old friends who studied with me. A Mare whom I met in Phnom Penh 
contacted me as well but not as often since he lived very far from us. After the March 
1970 coup, it was obvious that he protected the traitor, Lon Nol. I then broke off 
relation with him in early 1971. 1 did not have any other contact with any other 
foreigners. Nor did I join any activities. I do not even know certain Vietnamese with 
whom our students had connection in Paris. I did not re-established relation with the 
French communist party. I did spend 90% of my time earning a living in order to feed 
my family and to care for my job. 

However, I was at that time very idealistic. I still lived the way of the exploiting class. In 
between 1958 and 1960 the event of revisionism appeared and I didn't have a good view 
of that clear standpoint. For this reason, I lived up to the party's advice which was that I 
had to put the national matter above anything else. The Cambodia's matters must be 
seen as a priority and to stage a Cambodian revolution taking the national interest as the 
most important of all. 

Eventually, I moved to live in France for a while just to await the day when the party 
called me to return. At the same time, I prepared to return to Cambodia, I joined the 
Khmer Student Association in France and tried to educate students there as much as I 
could. Over the past seven and a half years, I completely lost touch with the party. 
During my stay in France, I received some money from my mother. Especially in 1968 I 
received from my mother 50,000 Tranout. 

From 1963 to 1968, 1 worked in a fuel company (coal and oil). In 1960, 1 worked in a 
French Airport in Paris. 

During my stay in France, I was very much influenced by the French capitalists in terms 
of life style, concept and standpoint. Even though it was because I prepared and awaited 
the day I would undertake my assigned tasks and that I had keenly observed the internal 
situation, that revolutionary standpoint had faded to a great extent. My revolutionary 
standpoint looked blurry and step by step I came to care very much about seeking a 
comfortable life and I failed to educate people there to think about the national interest. 
I was blinded by material things and I didn't realise that this was the concept of 
revisionism until after I was educated after the coup. In fact, if there was not a coup and 
the party didn't call me to operate in Beijing after the coup, I would have been unable to 
correct and change myself and I would have lived in France and served the French 
capitalists forever. The party has put me on the right track and has washed me off 



69 



corruption and has educated me to become a man of grace. The way the party 
introduced to me was rather complicated but it is a clean way full of credit. 

Since I already prepared myself, and had hoped that one day the party would call me 
back and the party had demanded that I stay away from my family for a while, I made 
everything possible to enable my family to become independent and self-reliant in terms 
of earning a living and living in my absence. Therefore all the money deposited in the 
bank was in my wife's name or in both mine and hers. With a capitalist concept, I 
thought that I should buy a house and make payments by salary instalments (by on 
credit) because it gave me more benefit and was much cheaper than renting one. I did 
that in 1965, due to the distance of the house and the fact that I received some money 
from my mother and I could work in the French Airport in Praise, I decided to change 
my address by borrowing additional money from the French Air-line company before I 
sold my old house. All these activities showed that I was drowned in the capitalist 
society. This was required by the regulation of "the Pans Airline" that every one has to 
give 3-month notice if they want to quit their job. This prompted me to follow the 
parly's advice which was to send me to Beijing. I see this as my main disadvantage and I 
have felt regretful up to this day. 

The situation of property ownership is as follows: 

Housing: In 1970 I was allowed by a French notary to live in the house in Paris until he 
died. I would like to confirm that my wife and I saved money to buy this house. My wife 
shared 1/3 of the whole budget. 

Account in the bank: Because the account in the bank was only eligible to my wife I 
really don't have any information concerning the account. I have my own account and I 
allowed my wife to use it. According to information from her 5 months ago, the account 
was valid for 2,700 « RteNat ». However, I really don't know how the money has been 
managed so far. 

All these problems have sometimes caused me feelings of frustration. I haven't figured out a 
clear solution to them yet. To be eligible to sell the house, we must divorce. According to 
the French law, it will take a long time or it may even be impossible, unless both sides 
consent to the divorce. Practically, I had only 2 options-either to divorce my wife or to bring 
my family to live in Cambodia. 

When certain front members handed over their houses back to the party in Paris, I was 
ashamed but did not know how to better approach the matter. Now I am still at an impasse. 

My family: She worked in Khum Orsie. The khum chief is a communist. However, as I 
know she had tried to look for a job at 2 or 3 different places because she had experience at 
being an adviser to the Family Planning Consultancy. I did not know how much her salary 
was. As I presume she just got enough to cope with the family's needs. She joined the 
French party in 1970 but she did not get along very well with the French party. Generally, 
she is a woman who likes to see progress but has the idea of self-comfort. She is also 
uninterested in politics. 



70 



VI. From March 1970 to December 1975 

During this period I actively served the revolution in the front line under the leadership of 

the party until I was able to return to the country. " I arrived in Cambodia in August but I 

stayed only 2 days." 

I arrived in Beijing on July 8, 1970 via Moscow. At that time, most people did not like to 

travel by French planes because these planes flew via Thailand. Over the past 5 years I 

would like to present my activities, concepts, and standpoints toward certain issue as follows: 

Party tasks: I came to Beijing to implement the party's advice. Because I could not come 
to Beijing immediately due to certain reasons I mentioned above, I and our comrades in 
France decided to first send Comrade Thiounn Mom, my brother. Upon my arrival in 
Beijing, my primary target was to contact the party and to present my report to the party 
and to implement the parly's advice. It was only in February 1971 that I had a chance to 
meet the party in Hanoi. In the early stage, due to the fact that I was for a long time 
disconnected from the party and deeply influenced by the French capitalist, my 
revolutionary standpoint was still weak. That was why I found it very difficult to 
implement the party line. Thanks to all constant advisory assistance from the party, I had 
successively renounced individual and personal ownership and I attached myself to the 
party and the revolution again. Subsequently, the party trusted me. It was all these factors 
that motivated me to successfully fulfil the tasks entrusted by the party. In addition, I 
had grasped hold of and understood the element of communism and built myself up to a 
greater extent. It was only after my involvement in the revolution that my life was 
meaningful and bright again. 

Front tasks: Just after my arrival in Beijing, Pen Nut and Sihanouk made me Minister 
responsible for internal correspondence. At the same time Comrade Keat Chhon was 
made Minister and Prime Minister's Assistant(P). I did not ask for this post; nor had I 
proposed I be placed in this place. Sihanouk and Pen Nut treated us this way because 
they wanted to gam more force. Besides, they did not investigate the internal 
correspondence of our party and they were not sure about my background. They just 
knew that I possessed the same position they did. At that time, I was not interested in 
high position. My biggest goal then was to get salary to support my family. Rank and 
reputation were not important to me at all. 

The top Front members were not happy with this assignment. They accused me of being an 
enemy betraying their class, being against their class, blocking their process to grasp full 
power and preventing them from politically negotiating with the imperialist. They said I was 
French because my spouse was French. They accused me because I did not allow them to 
steal money. They said I was a revisionist, Yuon (Vietnamese) etc. 

Besides, I also had some weak points: 

1. I could not understand clearly about the political line of the Front and the activities of 
the party. 



71 



I still had a French attitude. I am not gentle. I sent my family money. All of these due to my 
ex-class, as oppressor. In fact, the class struggle in the high rank Front is very strict. The 
oppressors attacked the party through me because while I had the internal contact I was 
always afraid that people would not like me or would know about my weak points. 

3. With the Vietnamese: 

In late July 1970, 1 went to Hanoi with Chan Seng as the Vietnamese government had 
invited us. Before boarding, I was told by a Chinese comrade that someone wanted to see 
me. It was Vort Samoeun. He was going to fly to Hanoi as well. He told me to keep prudent 
with Chao Seng and to make sure that he had no reason to suspect me. Comrade Vort 
Samoeun sat it the captain's room. I asked him if our party policy accorded with the 
Vietnamese's. He told me that we had mutual trust with the Vietnamese. 

Upon my arrival in Hanoi, I again met him in secret and I asked the Vietnamese for a loan to 
sponsor the Cambodian Student Association in France and to pay back the loan on my 
house in Pans as well. I really regretted it. Whenever I think of it, I am always angry with 
myself and feel much pain. I made such mistakes because I did not have national pride and I 
lacked political experience and I wrongly believed in the standpoint of internationalism. I can 
not forget this event. 

In the first 9 years I misunderstood a lot about the Vietnamese. I mistakenly thought the 
Vietnamese were loyal and respected us. According to this misunderstanding, I reported 
openly through the Vietnamese about our internal situation. That is why the Vietnamese 
knew all our weak points. On February 1971 I met the party again in Hanoi. 

The Vietnamese were trying to lure me to work for them because they knew about my weak 
points— I used to live in France; my grandfather is Vietnamese and a revisionist like him. 

I did not know about the Vietnamese nature until I joined the Front. I thought that the 
Vietnamese were good revolutionary people. That was a great regret I had while I was 
working with the Front. Constant education from the party and practical experience on the 
international arena portrayed to me the tricky mind of the Vietnamese and I saw this as the 
danger to our revolution and nation. Their new and recent attempt to obliterate our party 
leadership machine and to destroy our growing revolution reassure me of the life -and -death 
antagonism between our party and Vietnam. Vietnam never gave up its attempt to swallow 
our territory. Its new congress reiterated an obvious land-swallowing ambition. 

From 1970 to 1971, at an international conference, there was some bilateral cooperation 
between the two countries but from 1972, our delegation was independent even though the 
conference was about the three countries. 

4. With the Russian 

1. I first met the Russian revisionist while I transited in Moscow to continue another flight to 
Beijing. When I arrived in Moscow, Chea San, our Front Ambassador took me to meet the 
leader of a mass organization named Russian Liberty Organization, Chan Seng and Chea San 
explained and thanked them. 



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2. In September 1970, the Front government assigned me to participate in the meeting in 
Berlin, East Germany and the meeting of the Executive Committee of Stockholm on 
Vietnam in order to explain the recent situation in Cambodia, and reply to the invitation. 
There I met the Russian because the organisation was led by the revisionist. They did not say 
anything but spied on us. 

3. In October, 1970, the Front Government assigned me to participate in a conference 
which focused on "The investigation of the genocide commitment by America in 
Indochina". This conference was held in Stockholm, where I met the Russian but we did not 
have an opportunity to chat. They spied on me. 

4. In November, 1970, the government assigned me to join the conference focusing on 
"Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia" in Stock Lomar. On my way via Moscow, I gave a marble 
sculpture to the Russian Liberty Organisation". In Stockholm, the Russian Ambassador 
invited the Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian delegations to join a party at the Russian 
Embassy. The Cambodian delegations comprised Touch Rmn (the traitor), Krin Leang and 
me. At the banquet I thanked the Russian Embassy for their support. On my return via 
Moscow, the Russian Liberty Organisation held a congress supporting the resistance 
movements of the Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian. I made a speech and thanked the 
Russian people for their support for our resistance. 

5. While I was waiting in Moscow to attend the November 1970 conference in Paris, a 
Russian named Akova Longko, who was said to be a Central Committee member 
responsible for Asian Affairs came to meet me in my room at the hotel. "Russia was a great 
power nation but does not tend to oppress Cambodia", he said. He did not acknowledge 
Sihanouk. He would not acknowledge Sihanouk's government unless the Cambodian party 
asked for it. He wanted to meet the Cambodian party. If he could not, he wanted our letter 
asking his government to acknowledge our Front government. 

This is the first time I met with the Russian. I told him that I did not know if there was any 
party in Cambodia but I would inform the leader. 

I informed the party of every single thing that went on in that conversation after my arrival 
in Beijing in December. 

I gave the fax to the Vietnamese after I had known that the party representatives had arrived 
in Hanoi. He/she read and then kept it. The next day they told me to give the fax to the 
party representative personally. 

6. After having met the party and being re-educated by the party in February 1972, the party 
assigned me to participate in the Versailles International Conference for peace in Indochina. 
This conference focused on liberty in Indochina and was recognised by the revisionist. It 
was a mass organisation conference. There was an incident between the Russian and 
Cambodian delegation. The Russian did not agree to include all the Cambodian standpoints 
in the conference decision. After a long conversation held until 3 am., I told them that if 
they still did not put up all Cambodian standpoints for discussion at the conference, they 
should not include put any of them at all. In case they discussed about Cambodia and did 
not state the right point, I would make a protest in a high profile conference. The French 



73 



newspaper and overseas television forecast this argument. Finally, the Russian agreed. Our 
standpoint was to solve Cambodian problems on March 23, 1970 and asked them to 
acknowledge our Front government. 

7. In May 1975, the organisation responsible for the conference in Stockholm on Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia, invited the Cambodian delegation to talk about the Cambodian 
problem. The party assigned me to lead the delegation and ask for an international 
conference focusing on Cambodia issues. The Russian tried every measure possible to block 
the conference from being held. However, after the victory on August 15th 1973, they were 
obliged to support the conference to show that they supported the Cambodian people 

8. The international conference on Cambodia was held in December 1973 in Paris. The party 
assigned me to lead the Cambodian delegation. This conference gave us a victory. The 
Russian became isolated. In my speech, I talked about the friendship between the citizens of 
both nations and the love for liberty and justice, especially among Cambodian, Vietnamese, 
Laotian, Chinese and Koreans. Two or three days later, the conference came to the end. 
Akova Longko, the one I met in Moscow in December 1970, asked to meet me again. I 
accepted the appointment. I had Front people to take part in the conversation in order to 
avoid talking about the correspondence within the parties. There was Ieng Kounsaky among 
us." You said about the friendship among the 5 countries. Does Cambodia want only these 5 
friends? What about those who supported Cambodia? Aren't they Cambodian friends? If 
you still keep saying that, it will affect the relationship between Russia and Cambodia "said 
Akova Longko. It was a threat which interfered in our internal affairs and abused our 
sovereignty. "I mentioned about the friendship with the 5 countries because these countries 
have supported us since the beginning, especially China which supported us in every aspect 
without any condition. Moreover, that country has never interfered with our internal affairs 
as certain countries have done" I replied, akova Longko was very angry and got red in the 
face. Then he changed the subject to talked about the success of the conference. Before he 
said good-bye, he said, "he was very pleased to see me because we have gotten to know each 
other much better". I replied, "Yes, we have known each other more." 

On my way back to Beijing via Moscow, the Russian Liberty Organisation men came to 
greet me at the airport. They invited me for a meal in the airport restaurant because I did not 
have much time in Moscow, I was only transiting. They gave me a warm welcome. They 
advised that Cambodia should write a book about the failure of the imperialist America's 
coup, for it is a surprise in world history. 

It was the last time I talked with the Russian until I went to work at the United Nations 
office in 1975. 

9. Among the revisionists, Cuba was a country which got involved the most with us because 
it was a revisionist country that had acknowledged us since the beginning. In every 
conference, its delegations behaved well and in a friendly way toward our delegations. It is 
just show but in fact, they made very short speeches all the time. I also contacted with them, 
especially Melba Enandes, the third or fourth woman in the resistance movement with Fedel 
Castro. A part from this, we did not have any special relationship at all. I think that the 
Russian and Cubans knew I was a party member because the Vietnamese had introduced 
me. This was one reason why they behaved in a friendly way towards me. Now they also 



74 



know about me. Therefore, this friendship was deteriorating while the party assigned me to 
lead the delegation to Cuba in May this year they did not give us a warm welcome as before. 

10. My theory and standpoint toward Russia. IN 1970-71, 1 did not know what a revisionist 
was; nor did I know clearly about Russia. That was why I wanted the revisionist country to 
acknowledge our country by explaining to them. I thought they had revolutionary quality. It 
would be beneficial for our resistance movement if they acknowledged us. 

The party re-education and the real experiment made me realise about the danger the 
revisionist may caused to our revolution. I have never bothered them, but I will never let 
hem influence our internal affairs or affect our sovereignly and integrity. 

I still have the revisionist quality because I got the influence from the capitalist. That is why I 
always keep prudent whenever I am on mission abroad. Both the revisionist and imperialist 
America knew my background and never reconciled. They did not give up persuading me 
and it is good for me to return to Cambodia, far away from them. The imperialist is our life 
and death enemy. I taught the high-ranking Front both in theory and standpoint that this is 
the last war; so we must resist in order to fulfil all the five essences of the Front. In 1973, 1 
believed that we can succeed without negotiation. The long time resistance did not give me 
much difficulty because I live abroad. Being apart from my family was the only problem I 
had. This long time resistance relied a lot on the international arena, I have never forgotten 
about the absolute resistance standpoint. 



VII. Conclusion 

During these 5 years, I have been very pleased to do my best serving the People Revolution 
Party. It is a very meaningful time in my life because I have participated in the international 
arena and served the party until we completely gained victory. I am very happy to live near 
the party again. 

The influence I got from the French capitalist during my stay (1963-70) is an obstacle in the 
process of building up myself to reach my satisfaction. These obstacles include family and 
personal property. 

In conclusion, I could understand the political line, the theory and the principal of the party. 
However, I could not understand clearly the intervention and the practice of the 
international political line. I recognised this lacking quality after my return in late 1975. 

VIII. The year 1976 

1. After our historic and immense victory, I continued working in the Front until August, 
1975. Then I was sent to work on the International Arena, especially to participate in the 
ministerial conference of the non-aligned countries at the United Nations and in Lima. I did 
not work with the mass organisation, nor the organisation that was led by the revisionist. 

Since then I worked with third countries and " non-aligned countries". While I was in the 
United Nations, I could see clearly the activities and manoeuvres of the United States and 



75 



the revisionist. These 2 nations welcomed the Cambodian delegation warmly and 
enthusiastically. I could see the United States was trying to contact the revisionist Soviet 
through Biyei Lorosy who was sitting west to the Cambodian delegation. I did not do 
anything against this but kept prudent, especially with the United States because they are 
more dangerous than the revisionist Soviet. The recent betrayal made me think about the 
danger of the revisionist to our revolution. I tried my best to develop relationships with the 
third world countries, especially with those who had supported us during the war. I tried to 
get away from the problems that those countries had and persuaded them to stage rebellions 
against the imperialist and revisionist. I encouraged them to strengthen friendships among 
third world countries and individually solve their own internal problems. 

In 1976, at the United Nations conference on marine law, through my visits to the countries 
of Africa and in high profile conference of non-aligned countries in Colombo, I practiced 
the party line and strengthened friendships with those countries to isolate the enemy. 

I noticed that Cuba and Papua New Guinea had not warmly or enthusiastically welcomed 
our delegation led by me. Their high ranking officials had not met our delegation. In Cuba 
they praised the Vietnamese very much. 

2. Socialist Revolution in Cambodia 

Before returning back to the country in late 1975, 1 did not notice that April 17, 1975 was 
the end of the People's Democratic Revolution. I did not realise that currency abolition and 
people evacuation had been practiced in terms of class struggle in order to continue the 
Socialist Revolution and to establish a socialist country. Then I realised that they were very 
important acts that needed to be done after the exhausting war. Besides, they were just the 
necessary measures. This thought of mine had come from the inaccurate internal 
information I had only read the book. 

After having been re-educated, I understand and support the party's measures. The Socialist 
Revolution took place three times in the World history. The first one was in October 1917 in 
Russia led by Lenin. The second one was in October 1949 in China, the third and the last 
one was in April 17th, 1975 in Cambodia. The measures that the party used to continue the 
Socialist Revolution have never existed before. I believed that if it was not for this measure, 
Cambodia would have inevitably faced difficulty and may have lost independence, 
sovereignty and integrity. The sacrifice of one million Cambodian lives would have become 
useless. If not for this absolute measure the Vietnamese may come to oppress our country. 
With these measures, they still seize our land. Therefore, what would happen if the party did 
not use the measure? 

Now the situation of the Socialist Revolution is very good and is better than in Vietnam and 
Laos. Within one year period, we can solve the problem of food shortage. This has never 
happened before. We succeeded in establishing the People's Democratic Revolution just 
after we had liberated our country and our people. Moreover, we have promoted and 
developed the Socialist Revolution. This is extraordinary. The abolition of currency in our 
country is a superb measure which has never existed in world history. I am very proud of 
these commitments and I am going to continue working based on the party line under the 
clear sighted leadership of the party. Besides the abolition of individual property in the 



76 



individual mind is the best way to dig up the roots of the revisionist in the party line. This 
movement has made me realise that I who used to be an oppressor is a subject of the 
Socialist Revolution. I must get rid of the personal property spirit. I gradually get rid of it 
and become more cheerful but I must continue getting rid of it. 

The family property consciousness is still in existence, especially the sentiment with children 
but if compared with the past, it is much better. No matter what happens, I will never forget 
that the party have re-educated and trusted me. During the 1970 coup, the party called me to 
join the party again, I consider that the party has saved my life. With the trust and re- 
education I have received from the party , I took a role in the revolution until the victory and 
have worked to promote and develop the Socialist Revolution. I really do not know what 
would have happened to me if I had not met the party. I can not forget this beneficiary 
action and I will continue improving myself by getting rid of the personal property spirit. I 
will serve the revolution from the bottom of my heart and fill my life with good means. 

This autobiography does not tell every step of my life but I am always pleased to tell 
everything if necessary. 

December 25th, 1976 



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