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Full text of "Station Point Grey and Very Special Intelligence: Part 2"

Station Point Grey and Very Special Intelligence: Part 2 

By Patrick Bruskiewich, ©2012 



This public document draws from declassified sources and materials freely 
available in the public domain as of 1 st November 2012. All this documentation is 
available through UBC Library. This article is the second in a series of four. 



The Meaning of Scientific Intelligence 

During wartime, when it comes to the gathering and decryption of messages, the military 
needs of the battlefield takes precedence over diplomatic and technical intelligence 
gathering. And so it has been since at least the time of Julius Caesar. In our modern 
age, anyone setting off with a "manifest destiny" of becoming a great empire or modern 
Caesar must however contend with the profound effect science and technology has on 
modern warfare and States Craft. 

This fact was made apparent to Great Britain in the Great War (1914-1918), and to the 
Allies as a whole during the Second World War, when modern science and technology 
began to profoundly affect the rapidity and conduct of a global war. How this came into 
being is outlined in books by Dr. Vannevar Bush [1] and by Dr. R.V. Jones [2] 

By 1945 "Special Intelligence" had made its mark, with contributions from the four 
corners of the world, not the least being the special intercept work done by the men and 
women at Station Point Grey, on the campus of the University of British Columbia, in 
Vancouver, BC, Canada (refer to Station Point Grey and Special Intelligence: Part 1). 

Scientific Intelligence, in matters relating to radar, electronics, nuclear energy, rocketry, 
aerospace and advance weaponry came into its own during the Second World War and 
continued in importance throughout the six decades of the Cold War and to this very day. 



As the victors choose to write the history of their successes, so went the history of 
"Special Intelligence" and the Second World War. The vanquished also managed to 
have a number of their secrets hidden away during the years of the Cold War. With the 
demise of the Soviet Empire, more of the history of the 20 l century can now be told. 

The Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill would write his monumental six volume epic history of 
"The Second World War", (refer to Fig. 1: Winston Churchill, Ottawa 1941), careful not 
repeating mistakes and indiscretions made in his previous personal history of the First 
World War. [3] 




Fig. 1: Winston Churchill, Ottawa 1941 

(This iconic picture of Mr. Churchill was 

taken in the Speaker's anteroom of the 

House of Commons, Ottawa following 

Mr. Churchill's December 1941 speech 

to Canada's Parliament, Mr. Karsh the 

photographer had just taken away 

Mr. Churchill's cigar, hence the pout) 



In his history of the First World War, Churchill had make mention of the work done by 
the Room 40 at the Admiralty, a revelation which proved to be controversial. It was 
nearly four decades after the Second World War cessation of hostilities before the first 
hints of the ULTRA Secret became known to the general public [4] 



Today we complacently believe that the success of the Allies during wartime was a 
forgone conclusion. In actual fact from its very beginnings the fate of the Allies hung on 



a thin wire, and that wire was connected into radio receivers. Special Intelligence, 
including Scientific Intelligence helped to save the world from disaster. 

During the Battle for Britain in the spring of 1940, the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, 
would make famous a tribute 

"Never in the Field of Human History, has so much be owed by so many to so 
few." 

The popular belief is that these words were for the brave pilots who fought during the 
Battle of Britain, as it was spoken so over the radio in the spring of 1940. As Dr. Gordon 
Welchman, a mathematician from Cambridge University who did pivotal work at 
Bletchley Park would state in his 1982 book "The Hut 6 Story, [5] these epic words were 
meant as much for the silent and invisible army of cryptanalysts and analysts then 
working at Bletchley, who as a matter of course would, in Churchill's own words be "the 
goose that lay the golden eggs". 

Churchill would come to rely upon both Special and Intelligence and its most unique 
offshoot, Scientific Intelligence during the course war both in Europe and in the Pacific. 
The 1942 Little - Denniston Agreement meant that the intercept being collected at 
Station Point Grey were available to the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill's and his War 
Cabinet in London, as well as FDR's Oval Office, and key Allied Operational 
Commanders. In actual fact, some West Coast intercept work began well before 1942. 

Of interest to Canadians may be the role a remarkable Canadian mathematician from the 
University of Toronto played in decryption, a revelation that may come as a surprise to 
many of his students who are still around doing mathematics. Disentangling codes is 
very much like solving puzzles: Mathematicians are very adept at deriving patterns from 
quasi-random collections of information. 



It need be remembered that to assist in their work, cryptanalysts in the 1940's had at most 
tabulation machines, and the people themselves were called "computers." The need to 
plow through countless possible machine settings in the Enigma war is what prompted 
the design-build of the first advanced "electro-mechanical computers". Analog and 
some simple electro-mechanical computers were also being used in gun directors and 
Tracking Data Calculators aboard submarines and naval ships. 

The most famous of the cryptanalyst machines were the PURPLE machines developed 
and built by Arlington Hall and the "Bombes" at Bletchley Park. The "Bombes" were 
designed by a team of mathematicians, which included Dr. Gordon Welchman and Alan 
Turing, specifically to plow through a select menu of possible Enigma key settings. The 
menu had to first be developed by cryptanalysts who looked for specific group rings that 
tied together three letters in a message. The messages were interpreted by means of cribs 
or education guesses, which over time became in themselves patterns. A major weakness 
of Enigma is a letter typed in never returned itself in encryption and so a message that 
might start with "For the High Command Only" would never return the same letters and 
so such exclusion patterns were a weakness that was exploited by Bletchley Park.. 

Much has been written about the wartime military decrypts, however far less has been 
written about the diplomatic, technical and commercial decrypts that relate to Scientific 
Intelligence. This article will look at Special Intelligence how it was used to combat 
blockage runners and German and Japanese wartime cooperation in radar, aircraft and 
beginning with OPERATION JUDGEMENT: The Battle of Taranto and subsequent 
Asaka Maru Affair, and will look at how diplomatic and technical intercepts of messages 
on the Berlin-Tokyo circuit undertaken by Station point Grey played a crucial role in this 
undertaking. 

The next article in this series will look at German and Japanese wartime developments 
and cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, as well as Special Intelligence and the 
final six months of the war in the Pacific (refer to Station Point Grey and Special 
Intelligence: Part 3). 



OPERATION JUDGEMENT: The Battle of Taranto 

In 1940 the brave men and ships of Royal Navy were out numbered, out gunned and at a 
disadvantage with regards to the Italian Fleet in the Mediterranean. 

To address this imbalance the Royal Navy undertook an audacious plan to attack the 
Italian Fleet at its moorings in Taranto harbour using carrier based Swordfish biplanes, 
(refer to Fig. 2 : Swordfish with Torpedo) 




Fig. 2 : Swordfish with Torpedo 

The attack, known as OPERATION JUDGEMENT occurred on the night of 11-12 
November, 1940, in two waves of 21 Swordfish equipped with torpedoes and bombs 
(refer to Fig.3 : OPERATION JUDGEMENT Attack on Taranto Harbour, 11-12 Nov., 
1940) . 



To attack in such a shallow harbour and anchorage as that at Taranto (12 m), the 
"boffins" with the Royal Navy had developed a technique to keep aerial torpedoes from 
diving too deep after their release. The technique involved a drum and wire assembly 
attached beneath the nose of the Swordfish aircraft, from which a wire with a high 
strength and specific Hooke's modulus was attached to the nose of the torpedo. 



During the attack, the Royal Navy Swordfish aircraft flew in low and slow to their 
targets, the large battleships of the Italian Navy. As the torpedoes fell from the aircraft 
the tension of the controlled release of the wire from the drum kept the nose of the 
torpedo horizontal, producing a controlled entry into the water. At the rear of the torpedo 
the "boffins" had attached break-away wooden fins to help ease the torpedo's entry into 
the water, and help them run true instead of dolphining. 



first 
wave 




Fig. 3: OPERATION JUDGEMENT Attack on Taranto Harbour, 11-12 Nov., 1940 

(Source of Schematic: Wikipedia) 



OPERATION JUDGEMENT was a complete surprise and a major victory for the Royal 
Navy. The Italian fleet lost one battleship destroyed and two damaged in the Raid. Shore 
facilities were also damaged by bombs. The following day the Italian Navy transferred 
the remainder of the fleet to Naples to protect against any further air attacks by the Royal 
Navy. [6] The Taranto Raid bolstered the resolve of the English Speaking world at a 
time of predominantly dark news. In Tokyo, the raid was viewed with great interest. 



In the aftermath of the Taranto Raid, the Japanese Ambassador and his naval staff in 
Berlin would be asked by Naval Headquarters in Tokyo to make arrangements for a panel 
of Japanese Naval experts to visit Taranto, and be given full and unfettered access to all 
intelligence collected by the Italians and Germans from the raid. Berlin, in turn, viewed 
this as an opportunity to build a closer working relationship with the Imperial Japanese 
Government in Tokyo. 

The Asaka Maru Affair 

Shortly after the Taranto Raid, the Japanese Imperial Government sent a team of experts 
from their Naval Headquarters in Tokyo to Europe aboard the UN auxiliary cruiser Asaka 
Maru. On her voyage the ship also carried contraband materials to Germany, and would 
bring back to Japan contraband weapons and materials, a belligerent act in contravention 
to established International Maritime Law. 

The outbound voyage of the Asaka Maru began with its departure from Yokohama on 16 
January 1941 under the command of Captain Miura. In addition to her normal crew 
complement, Asaka Maru carries a 40-man "Naval Inspection Group" consisting of 24 
naval officers and 16 civilians. 

The 40-man "Naval Inspection Group" on their way to Europe included: 

> Vice Admiral (later Admiral) Nomura Naokuni (35) 

> Rear Admirals Abe Katsuo (40), 

> Captain (later Rear Admirals) Sato Namizo (39), 

> Captain (later Rear Admirals) Nishina Kozo (44) and 

> Captain (later Rear Admirals) Matsuo Minora (46). 

While the Asaka Maru was in transit from Japan to Europe via the Panama canal the 
Japanese Imperial Government asked the War Cabinet in London and the Roosevelt 
Administration that the Asaka Maru not be the subject to search while in transit through 
the US Administered Panama canal, nor the subject of a boarding and search by the 



Royal Navy while in transit from Panama to Lisbon Portugal, in that the ship was 
carrying diplomatic personnel and special cargo. 

This mission of the Imperial Japanese Navy auxiliary cruiser would become known as the 
Asaka Maru Affair and would be discussed at the Cabinet level in both London and 
Washington beginning the 8 1 of February, 1940. (Refer to Appendix A: War Cabinet 
Memorandum from Anthony Eden, WP(41), 8 th February, 1941, Asaka Maru). 

Quoting the Cabinet documents itself, 

"In the words of Sir R. Craigie, this request for our protection of a ship 
bearing large numbers of officers going expressively to our enemies in Berlin to 
organize a joint front against us 'is in itself impertinent.'" 

After cruising 8,000 miles at an average speed of 15 knots, on 7 February 1941, Asaka 
Maru reaches the Panama Canal. American authorities initially insisted on searching the 
ship before her transit through the Canal but would relent only after extensive diplomacy. 

On February 1941 British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden tabled a 
Memorandum to the War Cabinet in London that brings attention to their attention the 
ASAKA MARU. The war Cabinet meets to discuss the matter. 

In the following days, Lord Halifax, the British ambassador to the United States, brought 
the matter of the Asaka Maru up with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The President 
and his closest advisors recommended against interception of the Japanese vessel. The 
Admiralty in Whitehall also recommends against a blockade. 

Secretly, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill asks the Special Operations Executive 
(SOE)-Far East to study a plan to seize or destroy the ship (Operation "M"). In a series of 
Cabinet meetings (10, 13, 20 and 24 February, 6 and 13 March), a blockade of Asaka 
Maru is discussed. In the end Operation "M" is not put in effect. 



On 9 February 1941 the Asaka Maru departs Cristobal, Panama via the Mona (strait) 
Passage for a ten day sea voyage across the Atlantic arriving on 20 February 1941 in 
Lisbon, Portugal, a neutral port. The Naval Inspection group disembarks the ship and 
travels by train to Berlin, arriving on the February 24 l , 1941, where they are briefed by 
the German Navy and Intelligence about the Taranto Raid. 



The Naval Inspection Group then proceeded to Taranto to undertake their own site visit 
and assessment. The information gathered during their visit to Taranto would prove 
invaluable in the later attack on Pearl Harbour. Several of the members of this Naval 
Inspection group would in fact participate in the planning of the December 1941 attack 
on Pearl Harbour. Parts of at least one un-exploded British torpedo, complete with 
magnetic exploder, may have also been examined by the Naval Inspection Group. The 
UN would copy the break-away wooden fin assembly on the torpedoes they used during 
their Attack on Pearl Harbour. 

While the Naval Inspection Group is on their way to Berlin, Asaka Maru departs Lisbon 
on 24 February 1941 for a short four day journey to Bilbao, Spain. At Bilbao 3,000-tons 
of contraband munitions and supplies from Germany and Switzerland, including 20-mm 
Oerlikon cannons for Zero fighter aircraft, cases of machinery, machine tools, mercury 
from Italy, and numerous military related electronic devices, are loaded. 

The British and Americans, through decrypts and human intelligence, are aware of the 
contraband cargo being placed aboard the ship. In early March 1941, in response to the 
contraband cargo aboard the Asaka Maru, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt orders 
every foreign ship passing through the Panama Canal be searched for contraband. Under 
the new regulations if contraband is found, the ship and cargo are to be seized. 

On 13 March 1941 Asaka Maru departs Bilbao for Japan via the Cape of Good Hope to 
avoid the Panama Canal. This change to the route would be in response to the new 



Panama canal regulations passed by the Roosevelt administration. The Cape of Good 
Hope route would double the distance travelled by Asaka Maru on its return voyage. 

On 22 April 1941, Asaka Maru enters Tokyo Bay after cruising 15, 000 miles at an 
average speed of 15 knots. By the time the Asaka Maru had returned to Japan, planning 
was well underway for the Imperial Japanese Navy for an attack on Pearl Harbour. 

In an irony not lost to most historians, the Japanese based their 1941 plan to attack the 
American ships at Pearl Harbour on plans first set in motion by the US Naval Planning 
Group in 1932 where a naval task force led by two American Aircraft Carriers under the 
command of Admiral H.E. Yarnell, which sailed from California, and undertook a 
successful mock attack by air on Pearl Harbour. The attacking aircraft had complete 
domination of the air, and would have sunk or damaged all the ships in Pearl Harbour had 
the bombs been real. [7] 

During the visit by the UN Naval Inspection Group, and in subsequent discussions with 
their counterparts within the German Government, a number of agreements were entered 
into for coordinated conduct of the war, for intelligence sharing, military cooperation and 
blockade running of men and material between the two wartime allies. The conduit for 
the exchange of such information was the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, and subsequently 
Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima (see Station Point Grey and Special Intelligence: Part 1). 

During the war, Station Point Grey would play a key role in the battle against the 
Blockade Runners moving goods between Germany and Japan, a battle fought by the 
Royal Navy, the US Navy and The Royal Canadian Navy. It was a very successful battle 
of wits between the Blockade runners and the allied navies, (refer to Appendix C: 
Blockade- Running Between Europe and the Far East by Submarines, 1942-1944), 
The Axis never suspected the security of their Blockade running submarines were 
compromised, even when high profile targets as 1-52 and U-864 (see below) were sunk. 



An Agent Named Tricycle 

Planning for the Pear Harbour attack picked up momentum after the return of the Naval 
Inspection Group to Tokyo. Along with Japanese agents in Hawaii, the Imperial 
Japanese Navy sought and established an independent intelligence gathering network of 
Pearl Harbour as a prelude to their December 1941 attack. 

The Abwehr, in turn, asked the Japanese that they undertake special intelligence 
gathering, including passing materials and monies to their agents in London, as well as 
undertake an assessment of the damage and sinking of British ships in the Suez canal. 
These illicit intelligence gathering activities were done by accredited Japanese diplomats 
working out of the London Embassy and the Cairo Embassy respectively. Both MI5 and 
MI6 observed and the British Government dealt with the officials involved. 

The interception and study of written instructions can, like intercepted radio traffic, tell a 
great deal about an adversary's intentions. Shortly following the Naval Inspection 
Group tour of Taranto harbour, and at the request of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the 
German Abwehr made arrangements to send one of their agents, codename TRICYCLE, 
on a special mission to America on behalf of the Imperial Japanese Navy (refer 
Appendix B: Excerpt from Tricycle's American Questionnaire). 

The agent was know to the British and had been turned, by their XX Committee (the 
Double Cross Committee) and was being used to send disinformation to the Germans. It 
seems best to take up the story of TRICYCLE and his mission to America in the words of 
Sir John Masterman who was at the centre of Double Cross Committee's deception 
during the Second World War: [8] 

"TRICYCLE had established himself as a leading and highly placed agent 
in England and had made two visits to Lisbon, the first in January and the second in 
March and April 1941. So much was he trusted that it was arranged for him to go 
to America (at the behest of the Germans) in order to start a large-scale espionage 



network for them there. He accordingly left England on 26 June, stayed for some 
time en route in Lisbon, and finally departed for America, and finally departed for 
America on 1 August, carrying with him his questionnaire . . . 

On 19 August we received copies of the questionnaire from M.I. 6. and this 
questionnaire was read to the Twenty Committee and translations were sent to the 
service members . . . 

The questionnaire itself formed the instructions for TRICYCLE, who was 
being sent over by the Germans to America with a view to establishing an 
important information organization there - important because the greater part of 
their previous organisation had been discovered and broken up. 

The whole questionnaire covers approximately three quarto sheets typed, 
and of this one-third deals with Hawaii and in particular Pearl Harbour ... 
specialized and detailed (e.g. details of named aerodromes, if possible with 
sketches, and the situation of the hangars, workshops, bomb depots, and petrol 
depots are demanded). Another characteristic questions is: 'Pearl Harbour - exact 
details and sketches of the situation of the State Wharf and the power installations, 
workshops, petrol installations, situation of dry dock No. 1 and the new drydock 
which is being built." 

Masterman, The Double Cross System, p. 79-80 

Preparing for the Scientific Intelligence War in the Pacific 

By the spring of 1941 it was evident in London and in Washington that the Imperial 
Government of Japan was preparing for war and so, in turn, the staff at Bletchley Park 
and Arlington Hall prepared as well. 

A little known fact is that the while the United States was still neutral in the spring of 
1941, the Roosevelt White House decided to share their knowledge of the Japanese 
PURPLE code and provided Bletchley Park with two copies of the American version of 
the PURPLE machine, as well as a full run down of the decryption technique and a 



number of key decrypted messages. With this an ever growing cooperation began to 
develop. 

The British also expanded their intercept work in the Far East at their Y-Intercept sites in 
Singapore and Hong Kong. When these sites fell to the Japanese in December 1941 and 
in early 1942 the British turned to Australia, the United States and to Canada in the way 
of a number of sites, such as the naval intercept station at Esquimalt outside of Victoria 
and to Station Point Grey in Vancouver to fill in the vacuum left with the loss of 
Singapore and Hong Kong 

With the 1942 Little - Denniston agreement, Station Point Grey would be tasked to focus 
on the diplomatic and scientific intelligence messages on the Berlin-Tokyo circuit. 

Dr. R. V. Jones, the Father of Scientific Intelligence 

The Allies had a number of capable scientists providing scientific intelligence, however 
the most capable of the lot was a twenty some physicist from England. Dr. Reginald 
Victor Jones (September 29, 1911 - December 17, 1997) was a British physicist who is 
considered the father of Scientific Intelligence (refer to Fig. 4: Dr. R.V. Jones, father of 
Scientific Intelligence). 

Dr. Jones was in his twenties when he took on his wartime role, which led to a number of 
awkward moments with his older colleagues, however, he cultivated and kept a working 
relationship with the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill and key members in the British 
Intelligence. His assessments tended to be precise and accurate, which brought clarity to 
wartime uncertainty. 

Jones' 1978 book "Most Secret War" (also known as The Wizard's War) is one of the 

most interesting treatises to be written about World War Two. The book should be 
required reading for any history student wanting to understand Scientific Intelligence. 




Fig.4: Dr. R.V. Jones, father of 

Scientific Intelligence 

(picture from: Most Secret War) 



In recognition of his central role in scientific intelligence, in the early 1990s the CIA 
created the R.V. Jones Intelligence Award with Dr. Jones becoming its first recipient in 
1993 (Fig. 5: Dr. Jones receiving the R.V. Jones Intelligence Award from DCI 
Woosley). At the awards ceremony the then Director of the C.I.A. James Woolsey began 
his remarks with a short anecdote that puts Dr. Jones reputation in context: 



"I first heard about R. V. Jones some 12 or 13 years ago. In the aftermath of three- 
years' service in the Navy Department, I was appointed to an organization called the 
Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel. I was the far-most junior and least 
prestigious member of this fine panel, and in a meeting one day in 1980 or 1981, an 
extremely clever idea was floated combining technical ingenuity and a truly crafty and 
nefarious twist of mind for dealing with the Soviet submarine threat. 

Either Albert Woolstetter or Charlie Hertsfeld, who is here today, muttered, "That 
sounds like an R. V. Jones idea," and I said, "Who is R. V. Jones?" A hush settled over 
the room. Either Albert or Charlie~I am not sure to this day which one—said, "I thought 
you were a reasonably well-read young man. You have not read The Wizard War!" 

I said, "No." He said, "Go read The Wizard War." I said, "All right"; I did." 

Director of the C.I.A. James Woolsey, 1993 




Fig. 5: Dr. Jones receiving the R.V. Jones 
Intelligence Award from James Woosley 



In a 1997 obituary in the Independent a writer observed of R.V. Jones: 

"As a good Intelligence Officer, R. V. Jones stood by Occam's Razor, writes A. B. 
Sainsbury. He also perceived the truth of another law, defined by his colleague John Crow 
- "Do not believe what you wish to believe until you perceive what you ought to have 
perceived. 

And then - and here whimsicality took over - he adumbrated Crabtree's Bludgeon, a 
fearful blunting of Occam's Razor: "No set of mutually inconsistent observations can exist 
for which some human intellect cannot conceive a coherent explanation, however 
complicated." 

In which case, he observed, all the Intelligence Officers can do is to stand by 
Occam. " 

With regards to Scientific Intelligence, the information relating to German Nuclear 
efforts was the purview of another group of analysts within MI6. Dr. Jones covered 
matters relating to aircraft, missiles and electronics, including radar. 



With regards to the transfer of technology from Germany to Japan during the later stages 
of the war, Dr. Jones with state the following in his book "Most Secret War": 



"Another aspect of overseas operations that might ultimately have predominated 
was the war with Japan. So long as Germany was our main opponent my own duty was 
clear, for it was evident that the Germans were technically well ahead of the Japanese, 
and therefore that my kind of intelligence would have a greater impact in the European 
Theatre. 

But we might be able to help the Allied Forces in the Pacific Theatre by letting 
them know what the Germans had made available to the Japanese in new technology; and 
we could do something to estimate what developments the Japanese had made for 
themselves by what they told the Germans. The Japanese Attaches even sometimes had 
with them men who were specifically termed 'Scientific Intelligence Officers' to assist 
them in gathering information about their ally. 

We watched their activities with interest, and could say, for example, that the 
Germans had supplied early forms of Wurzburg and Lichtenstein radars, listening 
receivers for submarines, and guided anti-shipping bombs, although we noted a 
reluctance to let the Japanese have the latest models. We also learnt of Japanese 
developments in airborne radar as they revealed to the Germans. 

We were thus able to throw a useful sidelight on Japan, and one of my officers 
was posted for a time to Lord Mountbatten's Command in South East Asia. " 

Dr. R. V. Jones, Most Secret War, p 616-617 

Japanese interest in radar technology exchange with Germany began as early as the 1940 
Asaka Maru incident. During the Naval Inspection Group visit, the Japanese were shown 
some German radars and a British MRU (their earliest searchlight-control radar), left 
behind during the Dunkirk evacuation. 

At the centre of the German and Japanese Radar exchange was German-educated Yoji 
Ito a member of the Navy delegation, who was able to obtain information from the host 
on the MRU's pulsed operation (which used a spark gap across the wave guide). Ito 
immediately sent this information home by diplomatic courier. By the end of 1941 work 
had started by the Japanese Navy on their first modern radar. Throughout of the war, 
much of the advanced technology work done in Japan involved the Imperial Japanese 



Navy, including advanced work in the field of nuclear energy (refer to: Station Point 
Grey and Special Intelligence: Part 3). 

As the war developed and more sophisticated radars were developed by the Germans, this 
technology was shared with Japan. The Germans would also send H 2 S bombing radars 
recovered off Allied bombers to Japan as well. Two of the most sophisticated systems 
German system shared with the Japanese were the Wurzburg and the Lichtenstein radar 
systems used by the German Air Force in their efforts to combat allied strategic bombing. 



The Wurzburg and Lichtenstein Radar Systems 

The Wurzburg radar was a ground based radar with a spotlight parabolic and the centre 
piece of the German air defense system. It proved quite effective in directing German 
fighters, day or night, onto Allied bombers, (refer to Fig. 6: Wurzburg Spotlight Radar). 




Fig. 6: Wurzburg Spotlight Radar 



With the introduction of chaff to spoof the German radars, the Wurzburg Spotlight Radar 
would be provided with a rotating dipole transceiver antenna. The Germans would share 
this development with the Japanese (refer to Fig. 7: Wurzburg Rotating Dipole 
Transceiver Antenna). 




Fig. 7: Wurzburg Rotating Dipole Transceiver Antenna 

The Lichtenstein radar was an airborne radar system for all weather and night fighters 
which saw extensive service with the Luftwaffe. Using Lichtenstein, German night 
fighters wrecked havoc with Allied night time bombers during the air war over Europe. 
(Fig. 8: Lichtenstein radar on a ME-1 10 Night Fighter). 




Fig. 8: Lichtenstein radar on a ME-1 10 Night Fighter 
(located at the air museum at RAF Henden) 



The sharing of the Wurzburg radar with the Japanese was of particular concern to the 
Allies in that it this radar system had the range and altitude to detect B-29s as they 
approached the Japan (refer to Fig. 9: Performance of Several German Radar Systems). 




i-V 



BO 



T£D KH ?f>ti 

Distance 



2m ?■<%} M -320 



Fig. 9: Performance of Several German Radar Systems 
The German Radar Systems mentioned in Fig, 5 are 

1. Wassermann FuMG 402 (over water). [9] 

2. Jagdschloz FuMG 404 over land. 
3.FreyaFuMG418kW. 

4. Wurzburg -Riese. 

5. Wurzburg -Riese with GEM A accessories. 

The Wurzburg-Riese FuSE 65 (Wurzburg-Riese means Large Wurzburg), was built by 
Telefunken and used many of the same components as the smaller Wurzburg model D. 
The Wurzburg-Riese had a parabolic antenna, diameter of 7.4 m, and a range of 80 km. 
Azimuth accuracy was 0.2 deg. and elevation 0.1 deg. 



The Wurzburg-Riese radar system was designed to guide fighters close enough to the 
attacking bomber for the pilot to see it visually or for night fighters to locate the attacking 
bomber with their airborne "Lichtenstein" radar. 



The Japanese Navy would sponsor advanced research at a number of laboratories on both 
the mainland and at laboratories on the Korean peninsula. One such group was working 
on advanced technology, including both radar and nuclear technology for the UN at the 
Shimada Laboratory, Technical Institute of the Japanese Navy (refer to Fig. 10: The 
Shimada Laboratory, Technical Institute of the Japanese Navy). 




Fig . 10: The Shimada Laboratory, Technical Institute of the Japanese Navy 

In this 1944 picture is to be found two future Nobel Prize in Physics recipients Hideki 
Yukawa and Sin-itiro Tomonaga (sitting side by side in the front row, sixth and seventh 
from the left). Yukawa would win the Prize in 1949 for his work on nuclear binding and 
his "Yukawa particle", and Tomonaga would win the Prize in 1965 with Feynman and 
Schwinger for their work on QED. 



Several people in the Shimada Laboratory picture would also play a role in wartime 
nuclear weapons research for the Imperial Japanese Navy, including Yukawa (refer to in 
Station Point Grey and Special Intelligence: Part 3). 



One of the technologies transfers from Germany to the Shimada Laboratory in 1943 was 
a recovered working copy of a British H2S radar system recovered off a Lancaster 
bomber that had crash. Earlier in the year, a pathfinder bomber returning from a raid on 
Cologne had crashed in February 1943 in the Netherlands (the H2S set aboard this 
aircraft was in fact the second such set in operational use). At the heart of the H2S 
system was a split anode, strapped cavity magnetron producing centimetre wave 
emissions (refer to Fig. 11: Schematic of a split anode cavity magnetron). 

The Germans would recover the equipment, giving it the name Rotterdam Gerat, and the 
firm Telefunken was able to reassemble the system and develop the Funkgerat (FuG) 350 
Naxos radar detector which was used by German Night Fighters and U-boats to home in 
on the H2S transmissions. H2S was also used on long range Antisubmarine Warfare 
Aircraft. 




Fig. 11: Schematic of a split anode cavity magnetron 
(the split anode and pick-up is around the cathode at the centre) 



At a series of meetings in the fall of 1943 in Tokyo a complete and modern theory of the 
split anode, strapped cavity magnetron would be presented including a detailed theory of 
the magnetron with a parabolic potential by Sin-itiro Tomonaga. A description of these 
talks is given in Appendix E: Theory of Split- Anode Magnetrons by Sin-itiro 
Tomonaga). As well, if you closely read through the manifest listing in Appendix C you 
will find the Rotterdam Gerat explicitly mentioned. 



Scientific Intelligence and Shared Advanced Aircraft Technology 

Dr. Vannevar Bush who headed the scientific developments in the United States during 
the war, wrote an influential book in 1949 titled "Modern Arms and Free Men" in 

describing the war in the air he had this to say: 

"STRATEGIC BOMBING, in which air power carries on warfare on its 
own, began with the Battle for Britain. The Nazis, having overrun the Continent, 
turned their great air fleets against England. We are not concerned with the valor 
and doggedness of the British, alone with their backs to the wall, but with the 
techniques involved in that battle. From the standpoint the tide was turned by two 
factors. First, an interceptor plane, if it could find an enemy bomber in the air, 
could usually bring it down. Second, early-warning radar was present. 

One should expect, in general, that defensive aircraft would outfight the 
bomber. They need have only short endurance ... and most importantly, they 
operate over their own territory, where they can be guided or aided from the 
ground. They should be faster, with a higher rate of climb, and more manoeuvrable 
than the bomber. 

Great bombers are essentially fragile instruments, relatively lumbering in their 
flight, and dependent for their safety upon ignorance on the part of the enemy of 
their intentions or positions. ... In general, bombers must sneak in and thus avoid 
defensive bombers." 

Dr. Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men, p. 48 

The Japanese were aware of the development of the B-29 Stratofortress and understood 
that it was just a matter of time before Strategic Bombing of the Japanese Mainland 
began. The performance of the B-29 set the technical requirements for both defensive 
radar systems and the aircraft themselves. The Japanese did not have any aircraft that 
were capable to taking on the B-29 Stratofortress as it flew high overhead in greater and 
greater numbers (refer to Fig. 12: USAF B-29 Stratofortress Bombers over Japan). 




Fig. 12: USAF B-29 Stratofortress Bombers over Japan 

By late 1943/early 1944 the Japanese saw the writing on the wall and asked that the 
Germans to share the design of their advanced Me- 163 rocket plane and the Me-262 jet 
fighter designs. 

The messages regarding the transfer of advanced aircraft technology from Germany to 
Japan were sent on the Berlin-Tokyo network and intercepted by radio operators at 
Station Point Grey beginning in 1942. The raw intercept were sent to Arlington Hall 
and Bletchley Park as part of the 1942 Little - Denniston Agreement (see Station Point 
Grey and Special Intelligence: Part 1) 

In 1943 the Japanese Ambassador in Tokyo Hiroshi Oshima entered into negotiations for 
the licenses to manufacture the Mel63B and the Walter HWK 509A rocket engine. 



The engine license by itself would cost the Japanese 20 million Reichsmarks, which 
would be paid for by the exchange of gold bullion transported from Japan to Germany by 
submarine. 



Under their technical agreement, Germany was to provide the following by March 1, 
1944: 

> Complete blueprints of the Mel63B and the HWK 509A engine 

> One complete Mel63B, two sets of sub-assemblies and components 

> Three complete HWK 509A engines 

Two of the Yanagi submarines were readied to carry the complete Mel63B, the HWK 
motor, blueprints, and other technical information. Of the two submarines, one was sunk 
enroute 1-29, taking with it the Mel63B, blueprints, and the other data needed for its 
manufacture. 

Following the leads provided by raw intercepts from Station Point Grey, the USN would 
search for and destroy the Yanagi submarines before she entered Japanese home waters. 
The broken-apart Me - 163 aircraft and engine were sent to Kobe, Japan in early 1944 on 
the Japanese submarine RO-501 (ex-U-1224), which left Kiel, Germany, on 30 March 
1944 and was sunk in the mid- Atlantic on 13 May 1944 by the hunter-killer group based 
on the escort carrier USS Bogue. 

Plans and engines were on the Japanese submarine 1-29, which left Lorient, France on 16 
April 1944 and arrived in Singapore on 14 July 1944, later sunk by the submarine USS 
Sawfish on 26 July 1944, near the Philippines, after leaving Singapore. 

With the loss of the complete Mel63B, the HWK motor, blueprints, and other technical 
information, this left only a few notebooks, pictures and basic instructional manual on the 
Mel63B in the hands of naval mission member Cdr. Eiichi Iwaya who rode in submarine 
1-29 and disembarked at Singapore with one HWK engine flown on to Japan. 

The Japanese would run out of time before War's end and not deploy their version of the 
Komet, the Mitsubishi J8M Shusui in their efforts to combat the B-29 (refer to Fig. 13: 
Japanese Version of the Me- 163 Komet Rocket Plane). 







Fig. 13: Japanese Version of the Me- 163 Komet Rocket Plane 

With regards to jet aircraft development, Japan entered the field very late in the war 
relying to the greatest degree possible on the transfer of advanced aircraft technology 
from Germany to their Far East Allies. 

In September 1944, the Japanese air attache in Berlin forwarded a number of detailed 
reports on the German Me262 jet program. A pair of disassembled Me262 fighters left 
Germany for Japan in March 1945 aboard the submarine U-234, but the U-boat and its 
cargo surrendered to the U.S. Navy on 13 May 1945, after Germany capitulated (see the 
Capture of U-234 below). 

The Imperial Japanese Naval staff directed the Japanese aircraft company Nakajima to 
design a jet bomber similar to the ME 262 but with fairly modest requirements of speed, 
range and bomb load. Nonetheless, a handful of Nakajima engineers attempted a direct 
copy of the Me262, the Ki201 "Karyu," ("Fiery Dragon") however it soon became 
apparent that the skills necessary and the industrial foundations needed for such an 
advanced aircraft design did not the then exist in wartime Japan. As a result a similar but 
more modest design was proposed, the Nakajima Kikka ("Orange Blossom"). 

The specifications issued by the Japanese Naval Staffs to Nakajima for the Kikka jet 
bomber were the following: 



> Twin j et bomber designed to defend Japan 

> Maximum speed of 432mph 

> Range: 127 miles with a 1,1021b. bomb load or 173 miles with a 5511b. 
bomb load 

> Landing speed of 92mph 

> A take-off run of 1,150ft. when equipped with two 9921b. thrust 
RATOG bottles 

> Folding wings to allow the aircraft to be hidden in caves and tunnels. 

> The Kikka had to be able to be built by semi-skilled labor 

Designed by two young and talented aeronautical engineers, Kazuo Ohno and Kenichi 
Matsumura, the Kikka was smaller and less capable than the M-262, but well within 
Nakajima's capabilities to design and produce. 

The Kikka, while superficially very similar to the Me262, this Japanese built aircraft was 
for the most part an original design and not a reverse engineering of the Me-262. (refer 
to Fig. 14: Nakajima Kikka Jet Bomber). A comparison of the Me-262 and the Nakajima 
Kikka show some similarities, as well as marked differences (refer to Fig. 15: 
Comparison between the Me-262 and the Kikka) 

The Kikka also served a different purpose than air defence. The aircraft was meant as a 
dash and bomb weapon of last resort. Concurrent with the development of the Kikka, the 
Imperial Japanese Navy was also developing and using kamikaze aircraft as a last resort 
against the approaching allied navies. The kamikaze would be used with devastating 
effectiveness, however, the bravery of its pilots only served to prolong the agony of war. 







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Fig. 14: Nakajima Kikka Jet Bomber 



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Fig. 15: Comparison between the Me-262 and the Nakajima Kikka 
(The ME-262 is in grey and the Kikka is in outline) 



The Japanese design team met these objectives in rapid order, but Japanese industry 
could not at first supply workable jet engines. 

The first pair of engines specified for the plane, Tsu-11 turbojets based on an Italian 
Campini design, only produced 441 pounds of thrust each. By contrast, the Junkers Jumo 
004B engines that powered the Me262 put out 1,980 pounds apiece (refer to Fig. 16: 
The Axial Flow Junkers Jumo 004B engines that powered the Me262). 




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Fig. 16: The Axial Flow Junkers Jumo 004B engines that powered the Me-262 



An example of Jumo 004 jet motor was what was being carried from Germany to Japan 
aboard U - 864 when she was sunk by HMS Venturer, along with four German and 
Japanese aeronautical engineers (see below). This jet motor was at least five years ahead 
of the allies in its design features and performance. 



The Japanese-designed Ne-12 turbojets could put out 750 pounds, but this still left the 
Kikka far short of meeting its requirements and the Navy began to lose interest. When 
several of the important Yanagi shipments failed to get through, the embassy in Berlin 
sent photographs of a cutaway model of the BMW 003B engine that powered the Heinkel 
162 single-engine jet fighter by microdot through South American and then onto Japan. 
Using these photographs, a working model of the axial flow jet engine was produced. 

This Japanese copy, designated Ne-20, delivered 1,047 pounds (vs. 1,830 for the German 
original) but that was enough to bring the Kikka up to specifications (Fig. 17: The Ne-20 
Axial Flow engine that powered the Nakajima Kikka). 




Fig. 17: The Ne-20 Axial Flow engine that powered the Nakajima Kikka 



Though the Ne-20 was not nearly as high performing an engine as the BMW 003B, 
building a working jet engine like the Ne-20 using only technical specifications, some 
drawings and a handful of photographs is a extraordinary achievement. 



Shipment of Recovered Mosquito Aircraft made in Canada 

One of the more interesting untold stories of the Second World War of attempted 
transfers of aviation technology from German to Japan was the unsuccessful shipment of 
a recovered Canadian made de Havilland DH. 98 Mosquito Aircraft. 

The type de Havilland DH. 98 Mosquito was made almost entirely out of wood and 
powered by two Rolls Royce Merlin engines could climb to an operational ceiling 
comparable to that of the B-29 bombing Japan (refer to Fig. 18: A Mosquito of RCAF 
404 Squadron attacks and sinks U-Boat, 2 May, 1945). 




Fig. 18: A Mosquito of RCAF 404 Squadron attacks and sinks U-Boat, 2 May, 1945 

Except for the Me- 163 and the ME-262 there was no other aircraft in operational use in 
1944 that could match the performance of the Mosquito. 



By 1944, the Japanese who are skilled in wood work, were actively looking at reverse 
engineering the de Havilland Mosquito design in an effort to combat the B-29 raids over 
their mainland and to take the war to the Allied Fleet off Japan's shores. 



The Mosquito was without questions one of the great technological achievements of the 
second world war, however, the aircraft's service is over shadowed by more well known 
aircraft types. 

The Germans would try to build their own version of the Mosquito, but the devil is in the 
details. The Mosquito required special glues that were hard to find in wartime Germany 
and when the Allies read through Ultra Intercepts what the Germans were trying to 
develop their own speciality glues, they bombed the one and only company able to 
provide the unique glue, pretty much cuckolding the project for the Luftwaffe. 

To put matters into perspective, in a rather famous fit of anger, Herman Goring would 
say this about the Mosquito in 1943 after a nuisance raid against a radio station 
broadcasting his speech forced the station off the air: 

"In 1940 I could at least fly as far as Glasgow in most of my aircraft, but not now! 
It makes me furious when I see the Mosquito. I turn green and yellow with envy. 
The British, who can afford aluminium better than we can, knock together a 
beautiful wooden aircraft that every piano factory over there is building, and they 
give it a speed which they have now increased yet again. What do you make of 
that? There is nothing the British do not have. They have the geniuses and we have 
the nincompoops. After the war is over I'm going to buy a British radio set - then at 
least I'll own something that has always worked." 

Herman Goring, 1 943 



Fate of some of the U-Boat Blockade Runners (1942-1944) 

The fate of some of the U-Boat Blockade runners (of particular note are U-219, U-195, U 
- 219 U-864, and U-234) is the following: 



Boat 


Depart 


Fate 


U-1059 


Norway, Feb 12 1944 Sunk Mar 19 1944, off Cape Verde Islands 


U-1062 


Norway Jan 3 1944 


Arrives at Penang, April 19 1944 
Sailed for Europe on Jul 15 1944 
Sunk on homeward voyage, Sep 30 1944, off 
Cape Verde Islands 


U-180 


France Aug 20 1944 


Disappeared, Aug 23 1944, in the Bay of Biscay 
Presumably struck a mine and sunk 


U-195 


France Aug 20 1944 


Arrives at Jakarta, Dec 28 1944 
Commissioned under Japanese as 1-506, May 1945 
Surrendered, Aug 1 945 


U-219 


Norway Oct 22 1943 


Arrives at Jakarta, Dec 11 1944 
Commissioned under Japanese as 1-505, May 1945 
Surrendered, Aug 1 945 


U-234 


Norway Apr 16 1945 


The final transport to Japan 
Surrendered, May 16 1945, Portsmouth, NH 


U-864 


Norway Feb 5 1945 Sunk Feb 9 1945, North Sea 



U-195 reached Jakarta on December 28 1944 and delivered the following cargo: 

> electronic equipment including radars 

> several dismantled V-l Flying bomb and its pulse jet motor 

> optical glass, 

> mercury, 

> advanced electric, acoustic homing (GNAT) torpedoes. 



It set out on its return voyage on January 19 1945, but engine trouble forced it back to the 
repair base at Surabaya. With the German surrender in May 1945, the U-195 was seized 



by the Japanese and commissioned as 1-506. She was finally surrendered at the end of the 
war in August 1945. 

U-219 departed Bordeaux on 23 August 1944 in company with U-195 and U-180, and 
carried a large cargo that included: 

> two Japanese officers, 

> uranium oxide for the Japanese Atom Bomb project, 

> blueprints for advanced weapons 

> and part of a consignment of twelve dismantled V-2 rockets 

Both U-219 and U-195 safely reached Djakarta in December 1944. Out bound U -180 
disappeared, Aug 23 1944, in the Bay of Biscay presumably struck a mine and sunk. 

Decrypt of intercepts from Station Point Grey played a part in the fate of U-219, U-195, 
U-219U-864, andU-234. 



The Sinking of U -864 and the Capture of U-234 

U-864 was outbound from Europe to Japan when she was sunk on February 9, 1945 in 
the North Sea west of Bergen, Norway, in position 60.46N, 04.35E, by a torpedo from 
the British submarine HMS Venturer, and was sent to the bottom with special cargo, and 
personnel aboard, (refer to Fig. 19: U-864, on the bottom off Norway, split cleanly in 
two by a Torpedo). 

The Churchill War Cabinet ordered the RAF to bomb the U-Boat pens in Bergen whilst 
U-864 stopped there to undertake emergency repairs after a grounding. This RAF 
bombing raid delayed U-864's departure long enough so that the RN could deploy one of 
its most experienced submariners Lt. James Launders and HMS Venturer to sink U-864 
(Launders and his crew would sink 13 ships by war's end, including several submarines). 



In an epic three hour undersea battle, HMS Venturer would stalk and the send U-864 to 
the bottom when four torpedoes launched at its adversary while both submarines were 
submerged found their mark. This is the first time one submerged submarine had sunk 
another submerged submarine. 

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Fig. 19: U-864, on the bottom off Norway, split cleanly in two by a Torpedo 
(the arrow in this sonar picture points to the forward half of the U-Boat) 

A List of the special cargo and Personnel that went to the bottom with U-864: 



> 65 tonnes of Mercury carried in 1,875 flasks stored in her keel. 

> a complete and new jet engine for a Me 262 (Jumo type) 

> drawings and parts relating to the Me 262 jet fighter 

> drawings and parts relating to theMe 163 Interceptor 

> a complete rocket engine for a Me 163 

> Junkers drawings and parts for the Me262 engine 

> BMW parts for jet engine 

> Wasserfall surface to air parts and drawings (a SAM with an operation 
ceiling of 50,000ft) [] 

> 20 Luftwaffe officers and German and Japanese engineers 



Amongst the passengers on U-864 who perished in the sinking included: 

> Messerschmitt engineer Rolf von Chlingensperg (ME-262 specialist) 

> Messerschmitt engineer Riclef Schomerus (ME-262 specialist), 

> Japanese torpedo expert Tadao Yamoto, 

> Japanese fuel expert Toshio Nakai. 

Of special note is the 65 Tonnes of Mercury, which is now leaking out of the wreck and 
posing an environmental hazard. Approximately 1,500 tons of mercury was purchased 
by the Japanese from Italy between 1942 and Italy's surrender in September 1943. This 
had the highest priority for submarine shipment to Japan and was used in the manufacture 
of explosives, especially primers. 

Also of interest aboard U — 864 is the Wasserfall surface to air missile, parts and 
drawings. The Wasserfall (Waterfall) system was an advanced radar guided surface to 
air missile system that was under development in 1944. The Missile system was meant to 
be guided by the Wurzburg-Riese FuSE 65 radar system. The Wasserfall was never put 
into full operational use by the Germans. [10] 

The U-234 met a far different fate than that of U-864. Outbound from Europe to Japan 
U-234 was ordered to cease all wartime activity, surface and surrender to the allies 
following the surrender of Germany. Seized aboard U-234 was 540 kg of Uranium 
metal and Uranium oxide. The matter of U-234 will be analyzed in Station Point Grey 
and Special Intelligence: Part 3). 



Station Point Grey Berlin- Tokyo Intercept Regarding the 
Blockade Runner UN 1-52 



A number of Japanese blockade runners met a similar fate to that of U-864. One such 
blockade runner is the ill fated Japanese Submarine 1-52 which was sunk en route to 
Europe on the 23 rd of June, 1944 by the ASW air carrier group USS Bogue. 

A typical message intercepted by Station Point Grey regarding blockade commercial 
cargo is the cargo manifest message the Japanese Submarine 1-52. 

From: Berlin (Cmbrk) #710 Parts 1-11 complete 22 June 1944 

To : Tokyo (Rikugunsyo Gunmykyokutyo) Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, War 

Office) 



Committee wire #600. 
Answer to your wire #536a. 

1 . The German Navy has recently taken under consideration plans for loading the 
MOMI with airplane parts. Here in Germany we have presented to the Navy our list 
of #4, and we would like to have you open the negotiations suggested in your wire 
and send us instructions. 

2. The freight hold of the MOMI will take about 35 tons (The MATSU held 35 
tons.) In your negotiations regarding the loading of this craft, we would like to have 
you stress "(a)" of #4. On the MATSU the Army had an allotment of only 4.7 tons 
(the former wire was wrong). Therefore we would like to have you work to obtain 
an assignment of at least 14 to 15 tons. 

3. Along with your negotiations, we here will contact the Naval Authorities 
regarding the order of importance of this freight, please inform us. 

4. Our proposed order of loading (emergency order of loading) 
(A) Articles to be placed in the tube compartment. 

(1) Documents and drawings (urgent articles) 500 kilograms. 



2) Two each of the 103 and 108 types of 30 mm. machine guns for use on planes, 
000 kilograms. 

3) Two sets of the Lotofe 7 "D" bomb sight 180 kilograms. 

4) "FUG" "25" type of wireless plotting device (five sets), "101" (ten sets), "213" 
two sets) 900 kilograms. 

5) Wireless condenser ("0"?) 1200 kilograms. 

6) Vacuum tubes for wireless 520 kilograms. 

7) Luminous paint and luminous materials 200 kilograms. 

8) Parts for electric fuses for use in aerial machine-guns. (Enough for 50,000 
rounds) 70 kilograms. 

9) Atabrine. 1,000 kilograms. 

10) Hemoglobin and coloring matter 60 kilograms. 

11) Balsam 120 kilograms. 

12) Spark plugs and electric generators 1,350 kilograms. 

13) Uranium oxide 500 kilograms. 

14) Steel balls and precision steel balls, 470 kilograms. 

15) Lithium chloride 500 kilograms. 

16) One 20 mm. machine-cannon type "151" (electric action) for mounting on 
planes 500 kilograms. 

17) Fifteen sets of "Wiserzburg" type electric transformer apparatus (but we are 
not including those designated "RO" 3,000 kilograms. 

18) Bosch jet nozzle and pipe for use in motors 3,400 kilograms. 

19) "B"2 type of (enclosed?) speedometer 470 kilograms. 

20) Tool used in making machine guns from "Rheinmetal" 20 kilograms. 

21) Industrial micro-measuring instrument 4 kilograms. 

22) Drawings for all the above, etc. 150 kilograms. 

23) Insulating material "Tororitsuto"b 1200 kilograms. 

24) Two sets of all wave receivers 40 kilograms. 

25) Hobbing tool for gears 3 kilograms. 

26) Iron cartridge case (rolling machine?) 1450 kilograms. 

27) Bosch jet and pile for use in motors 3290 kilograms. 



Total for the above 20, 597 kilograms. 

(B) Beside the items given under (A), above we have some things of large 
dimensions and we are planning to construct a water-tight compartment on deck 
(The Navy is now making plans for this). 

(1) The weight of the Wurzberg type electric transformer apparatus (other then that 
given under (A) above) is not known. 

(2) The "Jumo" 213 "A" type aviation motor 1700 kilograms. 

(3) One set of high-angle fire control apparatus (with remote control) 227 (0?) 
kilograms. 

(C) Things to be stored in keel compartment (articles immersed in sea-water). 

As there is considerable room in this section of this ship we are negotiating here 
and have reached an agreement that the Army should receive a space allotment of 
from 5 to 6 tons. However because of the specific gravity, we can stow a 
considerable quantity of optical glass only. So please negotiate for space for storing 
this glass. When the allotment of weight has been decided upon please inform us. 

(1) Optical glass 26 tons. 

(2) Special steel for use in airplanes 500 tons. 

(3) A large amount of aluminium. 
5. Ammunition. 

As the magazine is small it will be difficult to take more than will actually be 
needed for the protection of the ship so please understand that we are loading as 
small an amount as possible. We would like to stow part of the ammunition and 
weapons in the torpedo compartment: 

(1) For experimental use in the 103 and 108 type 30 mm. machine-gun to be used in 
planes. 61,500 rounds, 2100 kilograms. 

(Ultra Decrypt, NSA Archives) 



Tracking and sinking the Imperial Japanese Submarine 1-52 

1-52 was the largest active submarine of WWII. Code named Momi (Fir or Evergreen in 
Japanese), the 1-52 was a C3 cargo sub that was 108.5 m long with a beam of 9.3 m, a 
draught of 5.12 m and a submerged displacement of 3,644 metric tonnes. The 1-52 had a 
top speed of 17.7 knots (20.5 mph) on the surface and 6.5 knots (7.5 mph) submerged. 
The 1-52 had a range of 21,000 nautical miles without refueling. 

The Momi had a cargo carrying capacity of 290 tons. The ship's normal complement 
was 94 officers and men. En route to the naval port of Lorient in occupied France it had 
18 civilians engineers, technicians and diplomatic staff aboard. At the time of her sink- 
ing, her cargo included 120 tons of tin ingots, 59.8 tons of raw rubber, 11 tons of tung- 
sten, 9.8 tons of molybdenum, 3.3 tons of quinine, 3 tons of opium, and 2.2 tons of gold 
bars. The gold bars were to be used to pay for the technology exchanges then underway 
between Japan and Germany. 

On March 10 l , 1944 Momi left on its maiden voyage to Europe and her radio traffic was 
closely monitored by the Allies during its transit. Prior to its arrival in European waters, 
the Japanese naval attache in Berlin, Rear Admiral Kojima Hideo, signalled 1-52 that on 6 
June 1944 the Allies had landed in Normandy, and that the port of Lorient was no longer 
a safe destination. 

1-52 was ordered diverted to U-Boat facility at Bergen Norway, and was also instructed 
to rendezvous with a German submarine on 22 June 1944 at 21:15 (GMT) at the co- 
ordinates 15°N 40°W / 15°N 40°W. 1-52 responded with her current position, 35°N 
23°W / 35°N 23°W. These messages from the Naval attache to 1-52 were intercepted at 
Station Point Grey, forwarded as "Priority Intercepts" and decoded at Arlington Hall 
and Bletchley. 



Guided from the F-21 Submarine Tracking Room and F-211 "Secret Room" of the Tenth 
Fleet, a AS W hunter-killer Group, Task Force 5 1 , consisting of the light aircraft carrier 
USS Bogue and five destroyer escort, was tasked to search and destroy submarine 1-52. 

TF 51 was commanded by Commander T. S. Lank aboard USS Haverfield. Task Force 
51 departed Casablanca on 15 June 1944. USS Bogue had 9 Wildcat Fighters and 12 
Avenger Bombers of VC-69 on board and was commanded by Captain Aurelius B. 
Vosseller (refer to Fig. 20: USS Bogue). The five destroyer escorts of TF51 were: 

USS Haverfield, (Commander T. S. Lank, TF 51 commander). 

USS Francis M. Robinson, (Lieutenant J. E. Johansen). 

USS Swenning, Lieutenant R. E. Peek. 

USS Willis, Lieutenant Commander G. R. Atterbury. 

USS Jansen, Lieutenant Commander H. E. Cross. 

This was a very effective task force, sinking 13 German and Japanese submarines 
between February 1943 and July 1945 (refer to list below). 




Fig. 20: USS Bogue 



The USS Bogue formed the nucleus of the pioneer USN antisubmarine hunter-killer 
group and would win a Presidential Unit Citation and three battle stars for service during 
World War Two. 



U-569 


May 22, 1943 


50 deg. 40 min North, 35 deg. 21 min West 


U-217 


5 June, 1943 


30 deg. 18 min. North, 42 deg. 50 min. West 


U-527 


June, 1943 


35 deg. 25 min. North, 27 deg. 57 min. West 


U-613 


June, 1943 


Sunk by DD- 126 in USS Bogue Carrier Group 


U-86 


29 Nov., 1943 


39 deg. 33min. North, 19 deg. 1 min. West 


U-172 


13 Dec, 1943 


26 deg. 19 min. North, 29 deg. 58 min. West 


U-850 


20 Dec, 1943 


32 deg. 54 min. North, 37 deg. 1 min. West 


U-575 [1]33 


13 March, 1944 


46 deg. 18 min. North, 27 deg. 34 min. West [1] 


RO-501 (UN) 


3313 May, 1943 


Sunk by DE- 220 in USS Bogue Carrier Group 


1-52 (UN) 


24 June, 1944 


15 deg. 16 min. North, 39 deg. 55 min. West 


U-1229 


20 August, 1944 


42 deg. 20 min. North, 51 deg. 39 min. West 


U-546 [2] 


25 April, 1945 





[1] HMCS Prince Rupert participated in the sinking of U-575 

[2] U-546 was sunk during Operation Teardrop. Operation Teardrop was an operation to 
protect New York at the East Coast of North American from retaliatory attacks, including 
possible V-l missile attacks, (refer to Station Point Grey and Special Intelligence: 
Part 3) 

On the night of 22 June 1944 about 1,574 km west of the Cape Verde off the coast of 
Africa, 1-52 rendezvoused with U-530 which provided her with fuel, and also transferred 
a Naoxs FuMB 7 radar detector, and an Enigma coding machine, along with two radar 
operators, and German liaison officer for the trip through the Bay of Biscay. 



Arriving in the area of the meeting, Task Force 51 began launching flights of Avengers at 
around 23:00 GMT to search for the submarines. U-530 escaped undetected. At 23:40 on 



23 June, a radar operator on one of the Avengers, detected a surface contact on his radar 
and dropped flares, illuminating the area, and attacked. 

After his first pass, he saw the depth charge explosions just to starboard of the submarine 
— a near miss — and the submarine diving. The Avenger began dropping sonobuoy. 
The sonobuoy (a portmanteau for sonar and buoy) were a device, newly-developed at 
the Harvard University Underwater Sound Lab, that floated on the surface and dropped a 
microphone in the ocean which acted like a sonar source and listened to the sonar echo, 
picking up underwater noise and transmitted it back to the aircraft using FM radio. 

A searching aircraft dropped the sonobuoy, with active pinger ranging sonar, in patterns 
of five, named purple, orange, blue, red and yellow (POBRY) one in the centre and one 
in each quadrant with each spread. The sonobuoy operator was then able to listen in to 
each sonobuoy in turn to search for sounds either emitted by its submerged target, or 
active sonar pings reflecting off the submarine. 

When 1-52 was acquired by the Avenger, a Mark 24 homing torpedo was dropped. Code 
named FIDO the Mark 24 was the Allies first acoustic homing torpedo developed by the 
Harvard Underwater Sound Lab. Within minutes the sonar buoy transmitted the sounds 
of an explosion and the break up of the sinking 1-52. 

The sonobuoy recording of the last few moments of 1-52 can be found in the US National 
Archives in Washington D.C. (the actual sonobuoy recordings can be heard at 
http://hnsa.Org/sound/index.htm#i52wire ). These records were reproduced during the war 
for training pilots. On the recordings the Avenger flight crew can be heard talking, along 
with the sound picked up by the sonobuoy (the recording of the actual attack and the as 
the sound of the FIDO torpedo impacting and 1-51 sinking is presently unavailable). 

Next morning, USS Jansen reached the site and reported it found flotsam, including a ton 
of raw rubber, a piece of silk, and even human flesh (refer to Fig. 21: USN Message 
reporting the sinking of 1-52). 



impair 



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l'r^ f. ? !. to noa-Ka.^1 iftrnri ^*h qr^^p 22.6 lr. irtLir ta Lj-i-jft-r 2 nH 

ctc za.6 njji:; b.* jm» ijy„ 

Fig. 21 : A USN Message reporting the sinking of 1-52 



Over 80% loss of Special Cargo by Blockade Running 
Submarines 



Over 80 % of all special cargo sent by blockade running German and Japanese 
submarines never reached their destination, complements of the radio interception work 
undertaken at intercept stations like Station Point Grey and the cryptanalysis done at 
Arlington Hall and Bletchley, and the work of the RN, RCN and USN. 

This success against the blockade running submarines helped to shorten the duration of 
the war by perhaps two years and saved upwards of thirty millions lives. 

For a nearly complete description of the Allied Success against the Yanagi submarines, in 
the period 1942 to 1944 refer to Appendix C: Blockade- Running Between Europe 
and the Far East by Submarines, 1942-1944, which covers the period of 1 st January, 
1942 to 11 November, 1944. Additional information regarding the Blockade Runners 
can be found in Appendix D: Radio Appreciations Concerning German U-Boat 
Activity in the Far East (January - April, 1945). 

The documents in Appendix C and D are both primary sources of history and are in fact 
declassified ULTRA reports of the period. Almost all that the content that is outlined in 
these ULTRA reports draw from radio intercepts done at Station Point Grey. 

There were a number of strategic materials that Japan needed from Europe, in and above 
advanced weaponry and technology. 

For instance, approximately 1,500 tons of mercury was purchased by the Japanese from 
Italy in 1942 - 1943, for the productions of mercury fulminate used in percussion caps, 
and in batteries and other electrical equipment. On almost every blockade run to Japan 
mercury is to be found on the cargo manifest. Of the 106 tonnes sent by blockade runner 
in 1942 - 1944, only 11 tonnes of Mercury arrived safely, with 95 tonnes lost in transit, 
a 90 % loss. In 1945 65 tonnes would go to the bottom on U-864 alone. 



A tally of some of the other major losses of cargo by the blockade running submarines en 
route to Japan includes: 

> 100 % loss of industrial diamonds shipped (total 1,118 carats) 

> 100 % of platinum shipped (total 12,400 grams) 

> 100% loss of steel balls and ball bearings shipped (over 400,000) 

> 80% of all advanced aircraft drawings and parts 

> 80% of all advanced jet and rocket motor drawings and parts 

> 70 % of all advanced radar and electronic drawings and parts 

> 60 % of all personnel involved in advanced technology work 

An Impressive Allied Success 

All in all, this tally is an impressive Allied success made possible by the radio intercept 
work undertaken at Station Point Grey. The matter of uranium and the extent of 
German Assistance to the Japanese wartime Nuclear weapon program will be discussed 
in "Station Point Grey and Special Intelligence: Part 3". 

As outlined in "Station Point Grey and Special Intelligence: Part 1" the security of 
Station Point Grey with regards to the war in the Pacific was of primary importance. 

It was evident to me that in conferring honorary degrees in 201 1 the University of British 
Columbia erred in matters of scholarship and in matter of law. This matter will be dealt 
with in greater detail in Station Point Grey and Very Special Intelligence: Part 4. 



References: 

[1] Dr. Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men, Simon & Schuster, NY, 1949 

[2] Dr. R.V. Jones, Most Secret War, Hamish Hamilton Limited, Great Britain, 1978 

[3] Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Houghlin-Mifflin, Boston, 1949-1951 

[4] FW. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret , Harper & Row, New York, 1974 

[5] Gordon Welchman, The Hut 6 Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes, McGraw Hill, NY, 

1982 

[6] In subsequent years the Italian Navy cipher would be the subject of intensive 

cryptanalysis by Dilly Knoz at Bletchley and would also be purloined by a beautiful 

secret agent Code Name CYNTHIA working for Bill Stephenson, the Man called 

Intrepid, and his British Security Coordination (BSC). Access to the Italian Naval Cipher 

would help the RN to win a tremendous victory over the Italian Navy at the Battle of 

Matapan in the Mediterranean. Refer to the book by H. Montgomery Hyde, Cynthia, 

Ballantine Books, New York, 1965) 

[7] [Blueprint] Erwin Miller, Blueprint for Pearl Harbour, in Secrets and Stories of the 

War, Readers Digest, Londom. 1963 

[8] Sir John Masterman, the Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945, Yale 

University Press, New Haven, 1972 

[9] The Wassermann bedstead dipole radar, while it had a greater operational range over 

water, lacked the precision needed for fighter interception. The system stood vertically 

and was easily seen in photoreconnaissance pictures and easily destroyed by bombs. It 

was also easily jammed or spoofed. The UN decided against asking for this type of radar 

system from the Germans. 

[10] After the end of the Second World War the Soviets would take the Wasserfall design 

and it would evolve into the famous SAM-2 system that downed U-2 Gary Powers over 

the USSR in 1960 and U-2 pilot Major Rudolf Anderson over Cuba in 1962 during the 

Cuban Missile Crisis. Concurrently, the US would create the Nike missile from the basic 

Wasserfall design. 



[11] see Boyd, Carl. U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence During the Second World War and the 
Sinking of the Japanese Submarine 1-52, Journal of Military History 63 (2): 339-354, 
April 1999. As well as 1-52 (Ref: http: // en: wikipedia . org / wiki / Japanes submarine 
1-52(1943)) 

[App. A] National Archive, War Cabinet Documents London 

[App, B] Refer to Appendix 2, Sir John Masterman, the Double-Cross System in the War 

of 1939 to 1945, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1972 

[App. C] refer: http://www.historv.navv.mil/library/online/blockade running subs.htm 

[App. D] (ref: http://www.history.navv.mil/library/online/srh232.htm ) 

[App. E] Koichi Shimoda, Theory of Split-Anode Magnetrons by Sin-itiro Tomonaga, 

from the Association of Asia Pacific Physical Societies Bulletin, Vol 16, No. 2 April 

2006, p 17-22 



Appendix A: War Cabinet Memorandum from Anthony Eden, 
WP(41), 8 th February, 1941, Asaka Maru 

c 

THlt DOCUMENT IS THE PHOPEBTT Of H[5 BfilTAtfMiC T.UJBSTVS G"-lJ£HHMEH r r 
Printed for the War Cabinet. P'tbrvuTy 1941. 



SECRET. C °PJ No " 

. W.F. (41) 28. 

F*bn:tirtf 9, 1041. 

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK ANP KEY. 



It is rerjwsstnd th&t special care may be token to 
annnre the secrecy of this document. 



WAR CABINET. 



THE " ASAKA. MARU." 



MftnoriinJtun. by th# Secretary of Stale for Foreign Affairs. 

THE ease of the A.w&i Mo™ pressnts His Majesty's Government, probably 
by design, with an awkward problem which, if itnshandied. may hive serious 
L'uh&eqPeTie.es. 

2. The ship is normally a cargo line-r, bin, has been taken over by the 
Japanese Govern in wit . who are wending her to Lisbon inamied Ivy navalj-a tings 
and H,ing the naval eusijrri. She is* armed with wo five-inch jruns. She left 
Japan on the lGl-h January and was duo at the Panama Canal on thn 
7th .February and at Lisbon on -or akiul the £(hh February She was described 
by the. Japanese Ministry of Marine inn communication to the naval attache at 
Tokyo as " a specin) service sbip of the Imperial Japanese Navy sent to Lisbon 
on a Mission to protect Japanese residents in Europe and So SrausporC changing 
military and naval attache i.-i Embassies and Legations " Ir. appears tluit she 
will also be carrying about 30 members ol' the Japanese >"ava.l Mission to Berlin 
;\a welt as some "observers" to obtain technical information for tlfc Japanese 
Navy. In the culnliiuu its lion to the naval attache referred to above the Ministry 
of Marine requested the " whole hearted eo-operalion a>. the Royal Navy in re^nrd 
to the protection of the ship from any danger." 

3. t» the -words of Sir If. Craigiu, this request for our protection for a ship 
bearing jur^e numbers of officers going expressly Ui our enemies in Berlin, to 
organise a joint front against, us "is in itself iaipertimjnt." Bill- apart from, 
this, it is almost certain that the voyage of this ship is an attempt to break 
through our bloelcitde and that the excuse that the utilisation of the ship id due 
to difficulty in obtaining f anilities for tile journey of the Naval Mission via- 
biberia is a more pretext. There is. in fact, evidence that the ship will be used 
:o take Contraband, if not OH her outward voyage to Lisbon, nt any rate on her 
ratiirn. The Japanese admit that the ship is " taking some naval stores only to 
Lisbon" and that "some cargo intended exclusively for the Japanese Nnvy will 
be brought back, coming possibly fnini France, flermanv or Italy." These 
admissions appear amply to confirm uHl" reports that it is intended to ship from 
Lisbon 3,000 tons of machinery and seine smaller items, ft is also suspected that 
it is intended to bring buck in the same ship guns from the Ocrlikon ftuetory in 
Switzerland. 

+. Leg.nl opinion has been songht as to the light of a belligerent to intercept 

a Warship, and, broadly speaking, our view is that the norms I immunity of a 

warship from contraband control is lost if she fails to confine herself to her 

functions as it vogselof war; and we should be the more justified in churning the 

] 13fiS |" 22-212] 



28 



right of search in that- in the i-eecriL case of the NaqtiTu, Hum, which wo allowed 
ro depart, from fUslv with cemiii Genu an and Italian goods on board, wo made 
a clcttr that this was i.hc in^t- Occasion on which vvc can] J countenance enemy 
exports to Japan. 

:"). Fn.nr) the point of view of economic warfare O-H the .arguments are thus 
in favour of intercepting "he ship. To allow her through wotrit! open Lhe way to 
a new iiml serious leak in the blockade and, ill Sir ft.. Hi-nixie's view, if the 
Japanese succeed in this ease they wii! resort, i.o the same methods on an increased 
sunlfc. This in itself is pet'linn*" of less importance thiiis the; effect, which might 
he produced elsewhere if if beciunE> known that we hail knowingly allowed the 
blockade to be ova. Jed in this way. The Aige-fLi-irn's rue prifpai'iiig to send it nerval 
Juixiliary to fetch shhiil 1 Gentian war ma serial which (hey desire, and wf are (irilv 
proposing to allow them i.o hnvc it in return ['or comrCf-sions satisfactory to 
cun-seives. The Brazilian.-, Aie deeply dissatisfied with mir refusal to allow them 
to have more German nrrns. The L. it ilea us arc pressing us JVn- German srais and 
other goods. If we permit the. Japanese 1u njaiic llii^ shipment it -will lie almost 
impossible to maintain our control of enemy export* to isnnth America in anything 
approaching its presenl slil.tti r>f cfiicir-lii'.y. unfl tin: way will he open to n flood 
oL Geinvut exports with all the consequent ben elk in the enemy rind loss to 
ourselves. Indeed, it. is iit'ohably not an exaggeration [« say tliai- a system could 
be rfipidh- organised winch would jn'iietienlb, nullify our control. 

ei. The objections in intei-i.epl.mri are essentially political. Sir ft. Crtiigie 
mis expressed the view that tire su-onjical possible reaction if to be expected if 
this vessel living the Japanese naval ensign is mleri.'upt.ed, uiid that, us the vessel 
may lie expeetert lo resist, a nt'sl-cliis? incident may be anticipated, 

7. The tjtiesUH.it) terns largely on whether the Japanese are prepared, on 
giTitinds of major policy, to join Germany in the war against us in the i m mediate 
future. Unless tliey jiW so prepared we could no doubt afford, without undue 
risk, to take !t firm line towards any atltMiipt stvHl us this to break our blockade, 
lint, if t.hey are ready for war with us art ion against the Asaka Ma.ru might 
dearly provide the necessary spark and we might thus he placed at a serious 
disadvantage r.is-kvh. the (."luted Htntes. Tr. is ess.ential that, if we become 
involved in war with Japan, it Khali be as the result of dear aggression hy 
Japan, arid it would he disastrous, from the point, of vlcw of American sympathy 
and assistance, if it could lie represented that we hatl provoked war' on such an 
issue as the searching of the A-ytko }tn-Tu, especially if the incident arose out 
of the control. ao\ of cnentv imports, hi it of enemy experts, the im porta nee of 
which is, unfortunately, not as yet. fully appreciated m I tie I nited Slates. 

8. Viewed in t.his li^hr. rl. rimy Iks argued that the interception of ri mete 
Jl.OUO toil!? of ain'-liinery would curt ft inly Hot lie woiib t.lic n-*k. and thai, the best 
course would he t.n let. lhe cargo pass and concentrate orj so handling the niatler 
that it did not become a dangerous precedent. 

y, Aetount mus.1 . however, bw taken of the nature of the cargo. If the 
Japanese, are bent on war the breaking of the blockade in itself will have no 
renl cahie to them, and the i:x pi must ion of their attempt, to do so must us that 
case he sought, ill the intrinsic importance of the -jinn is which (hoy are 
etideavnorinff to bring away from F.ui'ope. It is possible, in fact, that the 
iinu'huiery may be of a type whieh is a vital necessity to t]-:e Japanese Nuet 

10. The retjnesL for protecliott is canity answered on the lines that, as the. 
Asakit Mara is entering area& wliere our enemy is engaged in unrt'strieUid sea. 
war fare against us, w oatttiot undertake n.uy responsibility for her safety. 1 
pi'oj.Hwn?, subject to the concurrence of the C« bi net, to instruct Sir ft. Craigie 
aecorriint'ly, 

11. To this il would lie possible to arid a rotm mini trillion on the followint? 
line, 1 * ■.'■■■ 

fn tfiew of the Japanese statement that the ship will he carry rug caryo 
from Jjisbon. l-lis Majesty's Government cannot regard her as imrntitic from. 
control and must insist, on the normal proof that, the largo is not of enemy 
origin; that is to say, that it. should lie covered hy tiert.i filiates of origin and 
interest issued by TTi^ Majesty's tonsillar officers. As the Japanese Govern- 



moot fire aware. His Majesty's Govummetu oillv permitted th« shipment 01 
certain i^oods in (.he Mir parr- }iaru on condition that no further enemy e\ports 
wore shipped. To \-h\a decision His Majesty's Gowrnment must adhere, and 
if goods of enemy origin are to he on board they will hold themselves free to 
intercept the ship. rieiste the goods and pi nee them in priy.fl. 

la. Rut to state our intention without attempting to carry ir. nut. in- i-n 
reserve fi right uitliout exercising it, seems likely to have every disadvantage, My 
colleagues will doubtless agree, therefore. tb;iL whether "any comjimiiieiitjnii 
regarding interception is made must depend on whether we are in fact, prepared 
to iittertept the ship in the UlsI remn-1.. If we tire not pnjj.iu.nrd to do so it may be 
bettor to blink the fact that cargo is beimn tarried and to say nothing, at ail event's 
n» til inter i.:(:plitiTt is no longer physically practicable-, when a p rotor,! might be 
ricrPSfVirv to f>nve us from admitting an awliwiiL'd piieneiU^nt. 

l;i. When u'e first suspected that the Japanese were preparing t.n utilise 
Lhc A.-nik(t. Mara- for the shipment of poods, Lord Haliftis was ins true: ted to 
explain our .mi^pififliis t.n tin* United States authorities find to ask whether they 
would i>e prepared to ascertain whether the vessel Mas entry mg cargo when she 
pjiiiSfjrl tli t'O! iuIi the pjinni!i:i Pmial. 1 have not yet received any report on the 
reactions of Ok' United Static authorities to this proposal. Ha fore coming 10 a 
decision on the larger question, my colleagues riniy wtsh to try to ascertain bow 
far the United States Government and t.be President himself would cr.nf.tder it 
justifiable to tal^ the risk of war implicit, in any attempt, to sulvjcet the A stika 
Mary- to coatraljaivd control. If this is agreed I would propose to telegraph 
accordingly to His Majesty'* Ambassador at "Washington simultaneously with 
instructing Sir 11. Craigie to moke, ft communication to the Japanese Government 
confuted solely to the question of protection fin tbe line?; of paragraph J CI above. 
T would nlso pnopese (,o in form His Majesty's Ambassador al Lis-bon of the 
position and to request, him to institute nil possible enquiries into the nature of 
the ea.rfto which the Asalm Mart: intends to take on board there. 

A. >:. 
Febrwrti%. 1941. 



Appendix B: Excerpt from Tricycle's American Questionnaire 

Hawaii: Ammunition dumps and mine depots. 

1. Details about naval ammunition and mine depot on the Isle of Kushua (Pearl Harbour). 
If possible sketch. 

2. Naval ammunition depot Lualuelei. Exact position? Is there a railway line (junction)? 

3. The total ammunition reserve of the army is suppose to be the rock of the Crater 
Aliamanu. Position? 

4. Is the Crater Punchbowl (Honolulu) being used in ammunition slump? If not, are the 
other military works? 

Aerodomes: 

1 . Aerodrome Lukefield - Details (sketch if possible) regarding the situation of the 
hangars (numbers?), workshops, 

bomb depots, and petrol depots. Are there underground petrol installations? -Exact 
position of the seaplane station? Occupation? 

2. Naval air arm strong point Kaneche - Exact report regarding position, number of 
hangars, depots, and workshops (sketch). Occupation? 

3. Army aerodromes, Wicham Field and Wheeler Field. Exact position? Reports 
regarding number of hangars, depots and workshops. 

Underground installations? (sketch). 

4. Rodger's airport - In case of war, will this place be taken over by the army or the 
navy? What preparations have been made? 

Number of hangars? Are there landing possibilities for seaplanes? 

5. Airport of the Panamerican Airways - Exact position? (If possible sketch). Is this 
airport possibly identical with Rodger's Airport 

or a part thereof? (A wireless station of the Panamerican Airways is on the Peninsula 
Mohapuu). 



Naval Strong Point Pearl Harbour : 

1 . Exact details and sketch about the situation of the state wharf, of the pier installation, 
workshops, petrol installations, situations of dry dock No.l and of the new dry dock 
which is being built. 

2. Details about the submarine station (plan of situation). What land installations are in 
existence? 

3. Where is the station for the mine search formations [Minensuchverbaende]? How far 
has the dredger work progressed at the entrance in the east and southeast lock? Depth of 
water? 

4. Number of anchorages? [Liegeplaetzel] 

5. Is there a floating dock in Pearl Harbour or is the transfer of such a dock to this place 
intended? 

Special Tasks - Reports about torpedo protection nets newly introduced in the British and 
USA navy. How far are they already in existence in the merchant and naval fleet? Use 
during voyage? Average speed reduction when in use? Details of construction and 
others. 



Reports on Canadian Airforce are of great value. 

All information about number and type (pattern) of front aeroplanes [Frontflugzeuge] . 

Quantity, number and position of the echelons [Staffeln] 

are of great interest. Of special importance is to get details about the current air training 

plan in Canada, that is to say: place and capacity 

of the individual schools and if possible also their numbers. According to reports 

received every type of school (beginners, advanced and 

observer's school) is numbered, beginning with 1 . 



Appendix C: Blockade- Running Between Europe and the Far 
East by Submarines, 1942-1944 



Blockade-Running Between Europe and the Far East by 

Submarines, 1942-44 
[SRH-019] 



1 December 1944 
Blockade-Running Between Europe and the Far East by Submarines, 1942-44 

1. Blockade-running by submarines 

a. Blockade-running between German Europe and the Far East, which began in 1941, at first was 
carried on exclusively by merchant vessels operated by the Germans. The venture enjoyed 
considerable initial success, but in the 1942-43 season (September 1942-March 1943) the losses to 
the blockade-running fleet were so severe that by January of this year the Germans decided to 
discontinue the use of surface vessels. A summary of the record of the surface blockade-runners is 
annexed as TAB A . 

b. So far as is known, the first submarine to run the blockade made the voyage in the middle of 
1942. However, it was not until well into 1943 that the Axis attempted to use submarines regularly 
as blockade-runners. In the spring of 1943 the German Navy converted seven large Italian 
submarines to cargo-carriers for the purpose of running the blockade. In addition to the converted 
Italian craft, at least three Japanese and a considerable number of German operational submarines 
have been used to carry cargo and passengers to and from the Far East. 

c. It is believed that up to November of this year 35 submarines departed from Europe for the Far 

-1- 



East (see TAB B ), During the same period at least 11 submarines are believed to have left Far 
Eastern ports for Europe (see TAB C ). A summary of the record of blockade-running by submarine 
in both directions is as follows: 

1942 

Diretion Successful En route 

of Voyage Voyages Losses voyages 11 Nov 44 



Far East to Europe 


1 





1 


Europe to Far East 


_J, 


_J, 


_0 




2 


1 
1943 


1 


Far East to Europe 


5 


1 


4 


Europe to Far East 


16 


3* 


13 




21 


4 
1944 


17 




(TC 


i 11 Nov) 




Far East to Europe 


5 


2 


1 


Europe to Far East 


18 


10 


y*# 




23 


12 


8 



2 

1 
3 

d. To date, the submarines employed as bkockade-runners have ranged from German operational 
craft of 740 tons to cargo-carriers of approximately 2,200 tons. The cargoes have varied in size 
from approximately 80 tons to a maximum of about 300 tons. The total volume of goods carried in 
both directions in 26 successfrul voyages has been less than 



*Includes the Italian Cagni which surrendered at Durban in September 1943. 

**Includes the 1-29, which arrived safely in July at Singapore, where her passengers disembarked, 
but was later sunk with the loss of her cargo while en route to Japan. 

-2- 



the cargo which could be carried on one of the surface blockade-runners formerly used. 

e. Although the sailings of surface blockade-runners occurred principally in the autumn and winter 
months, so as to enable the vessels to negotiate the Bay of Biscay area when short days and 
weather conditions hamper observation, submarines are used at all seasons of the year. Surface 
blockade-runners used French ports exclusively; although most of the blockade-running submarines 
have departred from, or arrived at, Biscay ports, at least seven of them have used German and 
Norwegian ports. 

f. Submarine voyages between Europe and the Far East require a minimum of from two to three 
months. Frequently, however, more time is consumed, since certain of the German submarines, 
carrying small cargoes, engage in operations in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans while en route.* 



g. At least 10 German submarines are believed to be east of Capetown (as of 11 Nov 44), either 
engaged in operations or making preprations for the return trip. A list of those German submarines 
follows: 



*Some of the German submarines have also engaged in operations in the Far East between 
voyages. 

-3- 



UIT-24 {ex-Cappellini) 

UIT-25 (ex-Tore///) 

U-183 

U-196 

U-510 

U-532 

U-537 

U-843 

U-861 

U-862 

2. Cargoes from Europe to the Far East: 

a. After the Germans suspended blockade-running by surface vessels in January 1944, the Japanese 
decided to sell, lease or otherwise return to the Germans and Italians such items as rolling mill 
equipment, presses, machine tools, prototypes of large guns, samples of aircraft, etc., which they 
wanted but which could not be shipped by submarine. The principal goods retained for shipment for 
the Far East included the following: 

German radar units and other electronic equipment 

Bombsights 

Vacuum tubes 

Optical glass 

Steel balls 

Mercury 

Machine gun ammunition 



Prototypes of communications equipment 

High grade aluminum 

Special alloy steel for aircraft motors 

Chemicals and drugs 

Platinum 

Industrial diamonds 

Plans and drawings for weapons, aircraft, etc. 

b. TAB D lists the items known to have been shipped by submarine from Europe to the Far East in 
the period 1942-44. Other goods wanted by the Japanese, but known to have been destroyed at 
Lorient by the Germans last summer because of the speed of the Allied advance, are Isited in TAB 
E. TAB F contains a list of products not known to have been shipped, but believed to have been 
available somewhere in Europe for shipment to the Far East before the last known departure. 



c. In addition to the cargoes carried to the Far East, a number of German and Japanese engineers, 
technical experts and diplomatic officials have traveled on blockade-running submarines as 
passengers. The names of such passengers are listed in TAB G . 

3. Cargoes from the Far East to Europe: 

a. As indicated above, so far as is known there have been but six successful voyages of blockade- 
running submarines from the Far East in the period from 1942 to November 1944. Little information 
is available concerning 

-5- 



the cargoes those vessels actually carried. However, it is known that from the inauguration of Axis 
blockade-running in 1941 the Germans have made great efforts to get such Far Eastern products as 
rubber, tungsten, tin, molybdenum, quinine and opium, and that the cargoes carried by submarines 
have actually included those items. During the past year the Germans have been particularly 
anxious to get tungsten, molybdenum and tin, and have used operational submarines returning to 
Europe to carry those commodities. Since the Germans need large quantities of the products they 
have tried to get from the Far East, the small amounts of such products that they could have 
received by submarines have probably been of little assistance to them. Further information about 
items transported from the Far East is to be found in TAB H . 

b. The Japanese have taken advantage of submarine transportation to send personnel to Europe, 
principally (i) diplomatic offices and (ii) technicians to study the latest German developments in 
scientific fields. TAB I gives a list of persons known to have been carried as passengers on 
submarines from the Far East. 

-6- 



TAB A 
Blockade-running by merchant ships between German Europe and the Far 

East 1941-44 



1941-42 Season (July 1941-Mar 1942) 



Direction 




of 


Voyages 


Voyage 


Attempted 


Far East to Europe 


14 


Europe to Far East 


_5 




19 




1942-43 


Far East to Europe 


11 


Europe to Far East 


17 



Far East to Europe 
Europe to Far East 



Damanged and 

returned 

to port 



Losses 

(Sunk, Scuttled 

or Captured) 

2 

_0 

_2 

1942-43 Season (Sept 1941-Mar 1943) 

7 

_4 _3 

28 11 _3 

1943-44 Season (Sept or Oct 1943-Jan 1944) 

5 4 

_Q _0 

5 4 



Successful 

12 
_5 
17 

4 
10* 
14 

1** 
_0 

1 



*One of the vessels which reached the Far East, a tanker, was destroyed by explosion after its 
arrival. 

**This vessel was damaged by a mine near the Gironde estuary and part of its cargo was 
destroyed. 

-A-l- 



TAB B 
Departures of Submarines from European Ports for the Far East, 1942-44 





Vessel 


Left Europe 




1942 




1. 


1-30 
1943 


Aug/Sept, Bay of 
Biscay 


2. 


U-180 


9 Feb, Kiel 


3. 


U-178 


28 Mar 


4. 


U-511 

(Satsuki 

#1) 


Apr/May, Lorient 


5. 


Tazzoli 


May, Bordeaux 


6. 


Guiliani 
(UIT-23) 


May, Bordeaux 


7. 


Cappelini 
(UIT-24) 


May, Bordeaux 


8. 


Torelli 
(UIT-25) 


June 


9. 


Barbarigo 


16 June 


10. 


Cagni 


30 June 


11. 


U-188 


June/July 


12. 


U-532 


June/July 



Remarks 



Sunk Singapore, mid-Oct. 



Rendezvoused with Japanese submarine in 
Indian Ocean in Apr. 

Arrived Sabang or Penang Aug. 

Arrive Penang July/Aug. 



Sunk in Bay of Biscay. 

Arrived Sabang late July, Singapore, Aug. 

Arrived Sabang 9 July, Singapore, Aug or 

Sept. 

Arrived Sabang Aug, Singapore, late Aug. 

Sunk en route 

Surrendered, Durban 20 Sept. 
Arrived Penang late Oct. 
Arrived Penang late Oct. 



-B-l- 





Vessel 


Left Europe 


13. 


U-183 


June/July 


14. 


U-168 


June/July 


15. 


1-8 


6 Oct 


16. 


U-510 


3 Nov, Lorient 


17. 


U-1052 
1944 


Dec, Kiel 


18. 


Attilio 
Bagnolini 
(UIT-22) 


24 Jan 


19. 


U-843 


Feb, from a Fr 



Remarks 

Arrived Penang late Oct. 

Arrived Penang 10 Nov, sunk in Java 
Sea, 6 Oct 44. 

Arrived Penang early Dec. 

Arrived Penang 5 Apr after operations in 
Indian Ocean. 

Arrived Penang 18/19 Apr. 
Sunk 11 Mar. 



Feb, from a French Arrived Batavia before 13 June after 
port operations in Indian Ocean. 



20. 



21. 



22. 



U-537 



U-181 



U-196 



23. U-1224 
(Satsuki #2) 



Early Mar, from a 
French port 

10-15 Mar, from a 
French port 

10-15 Mar, from a 
French port 

30 Mar, Kiel 



Arrived Batavia 2 Aug after operations in 
Indian Ocean. 

Arrived Penang 8 Aug after operations in 
Indian Ocean. 

Arrived Penang 10 Aug after operations 
in Indian Ocean. 

Presumed sunk some time after 11 May. 



-B-2- 



Vessel Left Europe 

24. U-859 7-10 Apr, from a 

Norwegian port 

25. U-860 About 15 Apr 

26. 1-29 16 Apr, Lorient 



27. U-198 

28. U-861 

29. U-490 

30. U-862 

31. U-863 

32. U-180 

33. U-195 

34. U-219 

35. U-871 



20 Apr, from a French 
port 

23-26 Apr, from a 
Norwegian port 

About 7 May 

1 June, from a 
Norwegian port 

Loaded Kiel July, left 1 
Aug from Norway 

22 Aug, Bordeaux 

22 Aug, Bordeaux 

24 Aug, Bordeaux 

Late Aug 



Remarks 

Sunk 23 Sept off Penang before unloading 
her cargo, after operations in Indian Ocean. 

Sunk en route. 

Arrived Singapore 14 July, sunk 26 July en 
route to Japan. 

Believed sunk after operations in Indian 
Ocean. 

Arrived Penang Sept after operations. 

Sunk en route. 

Arrived Penang about 9 Sept. 

Sun en route. 

Believed sunk en route. 
En route. 

Believed sunk en route. 
Possibly sunk. 



-B-3- 



TAB C 
Departures of Submarines from Far Eastern Ports for Europe, 1942-44 



Vessel Left Far East Remarks 
1942 

1. 1-30 May/June Arrived Europe Aug. 
1943 

2. U-180 Apr from Indian Ocean, after Arrived Bordeaux July 

rendezvous with Japanese submarine 1943. 

3. 7-8 27 June, Penang Arrived Brest late Aug or 

early Sept. 

4. U-178 Nov/Dec, Penang Arrived Bordeaux 24-25 

May 44. 

5. "Momi"* Nov Sunk near Penang 13 Nov. 

6. 1-29 15 Dec, Penang Arrived Lorient 11 Mar 44. 
1944 



7. U-188 Jan, Penang 

8. UIT-23 Feb, Penang 

(ex- 
Giuliani) 

9. 1-52 Apr, Singapore 



Blown up at Bordeaux 25 
Aug. 

Sunk 15 Feb near Penang. 



Believed sunk in June, 800 
m. W of Cape Verde. 



*This was the first vessel referred to as the "Momi". After it was lost, the name "Momi" was 
assigned to the 1-52. 

-C-l- 



Vessel Left Far East 

10. U-1062 16 July, Penang 

11. U-181 Oct/Nov 



Remarks 

Now en route or sunk. 
En route. 



-C-2- 



TAB D 
Products known to have been shipped on submarines from Europe to the Far 

East, 42-44 



Commodity 

1. Metals and minerals: 

Lead 

Aluminum, high grade 

Platinum 
Mercury 
Industrial diamonds 

2. Steel products: 

Special alloy, steel for aircraft motors 

Steel balls 
Ball bearings 

3. Glass: 

Optical glass 

"Neophane glass," 50 and 75 per cent 

4. Electronic equipment: 

Wuerzburg Fuse 62 [ground radar] 

AEG Company's welder 

Vacuum tubes 

Parts 

Wuerzburg blueprints: type 1 



Amount Shipped 



Amount Known Sunk 



129.96 tons 



325 tons* 

26.5 tons plus 3,740 
boxes 

12,398.94 grams 12,396.94 grams 

106.34 tons 95.34 tons 

1,117.76 carats plus an 1,117.76 carats 
unknown amount 



471 boxes plus 121.8 
tons 

About 3,700,000 

5 boxes plus 308 
packages 



121.8 tons 

About 3,700,000 
308 packages 



72 kgs. plus 4 tons plus 72 kgs. plus an 
an unknown amount unknown amount 



Unknown amount 



Unknown amount 



8 sets 4 sets 

1 set 1 set 

Unknown amount 10 tubes 

Unknown number 

4 rolls plus an unnown 4 rolls 
number of rolls 



*AII tons are metric. 



-D-l- 



Commodity Amount Shipped 

Hohentwiel Anlage [airborne anti-surface 1 set 
vessel radar, Fug 200] with converter and 
antenna 

FUMO-61 [submarine-borne radar] 1 set 



Amount Known Sunk 

1 set 

1 set 



FUMG Seetakt [coastal radar] with 1 set 

converter and drawings 

Wanz Anlage [radar warning device] 3 sets 

Naxos Borkum [German radar to detect 2 sets 
Allied radar transmission] 

Night vision apparatus 5 sets 

Abwurfsender FUG-302 [D/F buoy] 2 sets 

"KDB apparatus" 1 set 

FuG 102 [obsolete electrical altimeter] 3 

FuG 113 [possibly error for FuG 103, 1 

electrical altimeter now in use] 

Oscillograph (Askania) 1 

Captured "Rotterdam" apparatus [British 1 set 
"H2S" blind-bombing device] and 
explanatory documents 

Captured Rosendahl apparatus and 1 set 

explanatory documents [British rearward 
airborne radar] 



1 set 

3 sets 

2 sets 

5 sets 
2 sets 
1 set 
3 

1 

1 
1 set 

1 set 



-0-2- 



Amount Shipped 

4 

9 cases 



Commodity 

"Bold" tubes 

Vacuum tubes 

5. Weapons and ammunition: 

75 mm anti-tank gun, together with 
ammunition and drawings 

13 mm machine gun mount 

Barrels and mountings for 20 mm 
machine gun 

105 mm gun barrel 

20 mm incendiary ammunition 

20 mm armor-piercing and armor-piercing 130 cases 
tracer ammunition 

20 mm armor-piercing incendiary 20 cases 

ammunition 

30 mm armor-piercing and armor-piercing 10 cases 
tracer ammunition 



3 sets 
1 set each 



20 cases 



Amount Known Sunk 

4 

9 cases 



3 sets 
1 set each 



30 mm tracer ammunition 



10 cases 



Unspecified ammunition 165 boxes 

Torpedoes 22 

"Special equipment" [possibly 210 mm 2 sets 
WG-21 rocket bombs together with firing 
tubes] 

"Special equipment" [possibly type BV- 1 set 
246 glider bomb together with plans and 
an "experimental report"] 



2 sets 



1 set 



-D-3- 



5 cases 

1 case 

1 set (of 2) 

1 



Commodity Amount Shipped 

"LMA-3" magnetic mines to be dropped by 5 cases 
aircraft 

"LMB-3" acoustic detonators to be 
dropped by aircraft 

Accessories for above 10 mines 

Simple magnetic mine for submarines 

Magnetic detonator for electric acoustic 
torpedo 

"Special equipment" [possibly magnetic 
detonators for acoustic torpedoes] 

6. Precision optical goods: 

"Sight reflector" 

Optical [circumferential graduator] 

Bombsight parts [possibly for Lotfe 7D 
high altitude bombsight] 

Microscope 

7. Precision instruments: 

Unspecified precision instruments 
Johansson gauges 
"Bild Company transits" 
Screw pitch measuring device 
Ball bearing polishing machine 



Amount Known Sunk 



1 
1 
1 set 



1 box 
5,214 
3 sets 

1 
1 



1 set (of 2) 
1 



1 
1 
1 set 



5,214 
3 sets 



-D-4- 



Commodity 


Amount Shi 


pped 


Amount Known Sunk 


Drawings for ball bearing polishing 


1 set 




1 set 


machine 








Galvanometer 


1 




1 


8. Communications equipment: 








Code machine and accessories 


26 machines 




20 machines 


Field transmitters 


3 sets 




3 sets 


"Main parts" of loud speaking telephone 


2 sets 




2 sets 


sets 








9. Motor parts: 








Exhaust turbine supercharger 


2 sets 




2 sets 


"Special gas cut-offs" 


2 sets 




2 sets 


[Machine parts?] 


66 kgs. 




66 kgs. 



Fuel jet pumps 






35 




10. Chemicals and drugs: 










Eserine galicylate 






200 grams 


125 grams 


Emetine cholate 






Unknown amount 


Unknown amount 


Yellow fever virus 






Unknown amount 


Some lost 


Atabrine for injection 






7,950 ampoules 


7,950 ampoules 


Atabrine tablets 






600,000 


600,000 


11. Miscellaneous: 










Respirators 






103 kgs. 


103 kgs. 


Pressure cabin parts and drawings 
[possibly for the German high altitude 
plan HS 130] 


4 sets 


1 set 


Propulsion equipment of 


rocket launching 


2 


2 


device 










Most of the parts of a 
plane 


British Mosquito 


15 pieces 


15 pieces 


Condensers 






"About" 4,400 


"About" 4,400 



-D-5- 



Commodity 

Electric thermometers 

Carbon rods 

Sample minesweeping cable, 

with "KKG" tubes 

and sample fuses 

Acoustic minesweeping buoys 

Aerial cameras with parts 

Miscellaneous supplies for German 
submarine bases in the Far East 

Miscellaneous luggage and trunks 

12. Drawings and plans: 

'40 type machine pistol and '08 type 
ammunition 

'43 type machine pistol and '43 type 
ammunition 

'42 type machine gun mount, accessories 
and ball ammunition 

'41 type heavy anti-tank rifle and armor- 
piercing and explosive ammunition 

'40 type 75 mm anti-tank gun, and '39 
and '40 type armor-piercing ammunition 

'40 type 75 mm recoilless gun and '39 
type hoillow-charge "B" armor-piercing 
ammunition 

'41 type 150 mm rocket gun and '41 type 
ammunition 

'40 type revolving telescopic sight, 4 
points 

Drawings for Isetta Co., X-type engine 
[for high speed motor boats] 



Amount Sh 


ipped 


Amount K 


3 






30 




30 


40 meters 




40 meters 


4 




4 


1 set 




1 set 


2 




2 


2 




2 


Unknown amount 


Some 


520 pieces 




520 pieces 



All drawings 



Partial blueprints for Lorenz Co. and 
Telefunken Co. radio sets* 



*Certain of the Telefunken plans are believed to have reached Japan. The remaining Telefunken 
blueprints and the Lorenz Co. blueprints were ost on the 1-29. 

-D-6- 



Commodity Amount Shipped Amount Known Sunk 

Drawings of crankshaft grinding jig All drawings 

Drawings of Rheinmetall 13 mm machine All drawings 

gun 

Report on demagnetizing technique used 
by the German Navy at Kiel Degaussing 
Department 

Plans and drawings of British and German 
wooden aircraft (incl. Mosquito) 

Report on nature and use of Sinter iron 
[cryptographic materials] 

Report on performance of motors used by 
the GAF early in 1944 

Plans and diagrams of latest type German 
Navy high speed underwater submarine 

Newsreels for Japanese Navy 2 sets 2 sets 

Drawings of "S equipment" [presumably 
for "S-Geraet" sound-ranging gear]* 

Drawings of Dete "107" [submarine borne 
radar]* 

Drawings of Gema vacuum tubes* 



*Carried on the 1-30 which was sunk, but with the salvage of part of the cargo. 

--D-7-- 



TAB E 

Goods stored at Lorient awaiting Shipment to the Far East 

which were destroyed by the Germans during Summer of 1944 

Commodity Amount 

Destroyed 

1. Metals and minerals: 

Aluminum 1,257 [cars?] 

Mercury 20 tons 

2. Steel products: 

Steel balls 2 boxes 

Ball bearings 114 

3. Glass: 

"Neophane glass" 17,000 pieces 

"Neophane glass 9s" 11,000 pieces 



Photographic lens 

4. Electronic equipment: 

"KDB" fittings 

"Ausfahr head for S set" [oscillator for S-Geraet, German sound-ranging 
gear] 

Aircraft D/F receiver sets 

5. Weapons and ammunition: 

20 mm single mount machine gun and set of accessories 

"H.A." [105 mm] gun (less the barrel, which had been loaded on the I- 

29) 

Ammunition for 13 mm machine gun 

Ammunition for 20 mm machine gun 

Samples of various kinds of ammunition 



3 sets 

1 

18 

1 
1 

5,000 rounds 
5,200 rounds 
680 samples 



-E-l- 



Commodity Amount 

Destroyed 

Set of parts for torpedo fire control gear and cork [word missing] 1,000 kgs. 
drawings 

Magnetic mine 1 

Samples of fuses 60 

6. Precision instruments: 

Gauges: 

Micrometers 917 

Screw taps 6,249 

Gauge-blocks 57 

[word missing] engravers 100 

Attachments 5 

Frames 15 

7. Communications equipment: 

Field teleprinters 6V2 pairs 

Teleprinter and parts 1 

Code machines 70 
Parts of control telephone 

Ultra-short wave transmitter 1 

8. Motor parts: 

Superchargers [possible for DB-627] 3 

Sample parts of feed and condensate pumps 1 set 

9. Miscellaneous: 

Rocket take-off accelerators and accessories [possibly the type used by 

the JU-88] 

Parts for "G.H.G." sets 1 set 

Carbon rods 66 



-E-2- 



Commodity 



Amount 



Minesweeping [gear] not loaded on the 1-29 

Oerliko machine gun tools and accessories 

Magazines [for machine guns?] 

Non-ferrous metal searchlight gear 

Aerial cameras 

Camshaft testing machine 

"Kalte Haerter" [an adhesive used in the manufacture of aircraft] 

"Kauritleim" [an adhesive used in the manufacture of aircraft] 



Destroyed 

90 sets 

30 

1 

3 

1 

1 ton 

1 ton 



-E-3- 



TAB F 

Products not known to have been shipped, 

but believed to have been available somewhere in Europe 

for shipment to the Far East 

before the last known submarine departure* 



Commodity 

1. Aluminum 

2. Steel products: 

Special alloy steel for aircraft motors 

Steel balls 

3. Glass: 

Optical glass 

Lenses for Zeiss Contax cameras 

4. Electronic equipment: 

FuG 25, IFF ("Identification Friend or Foe") equipment 

FuG 101 [Airborne altimeter] 

FuG 213, Lichtenstein anti-surface vessel equipment 

Electric transformers for Wuerzburg units 

"1651 A and 1651 M vacuum tubes" for French Indo-China 

Vacuum tubes, unspecified 

Dete "500" [submarine-borne radar and drawings] 



Amount 
Available 

Unknown amount 



500 tons plus an 
unknown amount 

470 kgs. 



26 tons 
250 

5 sets 

10 

2 sets 

10 sets 

5 cases 

620 kgs. 



*AII known duplications have been eliminated from this TAB, but the possibility remains that certain 
of the items included were shipped to the Far East or were destroyed at Lorient. 

-F-l- 



Commodity 

5. Weapons and ammunition: 

20 mm electric firing machine gun, model 151 
30 mm machine guns, model 103 and plans 



Amount 
Available 



30 machine guns, model 108 and plans 

"Panzerfaust" [anti-tank weapon] and blueprints 

"Panzerschreck" [anti-tank weapon] and blueprints 

Flame throwers 

20 mm ammunition for model 151 machine gun 

20 mm high explosive shells for Mauser MG 151 

30 mm ammunition for model 103 and 108 machine guns 

Boxes of ammunition 

Electric percussion caps 

Parts for electric fuses for aircraft machine guns 

Mines for anti-tank use 

6. Precision optical goods: 

Lotfe 7D bombsights 

Spare gyros 

Testing machines 

Spare parts 

Italian photometers 

Precision measuring instruments 

7. Communications equipment: 

Siemens Hellschreiber equipment 

All wave receivers 

Wireless condensers 

Wireless equipment--ground-air 

Multiple hydrophone installation, cable hook-up diagram 

"Sonore" underwater telephone installation 



3 

100 

2 

2 

3,000 rounds 

700,000 rounds 

61,500 rounds 

Unknown amount 

1,000 

Unknown amount 

15 

4 
3 
3 
5 
3 
Unknown amount 

3 boxes 

2 sets 

530 kgs. 

Unknown amount 



-F-2- 



Commodity 

8. Motor parts: 

Extractor pumps for battleships 

Parts and plans for feed pumps for torpedo boats and cruisers 

Bosch jet nozzle and pipe for use in motors 

Engine testing apparatus 

9. Chemicals and drugs: 

Atabrine 

Hemoglobin and coloring matter 

Balsam 

Trolitul 

Penicillin mold 

Lithium chloride 

Benzyl cellulose 

Sodium formate 

Formic acid 

Influenza virus 

Salicylate of eserine 

200-unit bottles of insulin for French Indo-China 



Amount 
Available 



Unknown amount 
Unknown amount 

3,400 kgs. 
Unknown amount 

1,000 kgs. 

60 kgs. 

120 kgs. 

Unknown amount 

Unknown amount 

6 tons 

15 tons 

570 tons 

51 tons 

Unknown amount 

Unknown amount 

[250?] 



Tubes containing twenty 0.5 gram tablets of "urotrophine" for 
French Indo-China 

Methylene blue for French Indo-China 

One-kilogram bottles of chloroform for French Indo-China 

One-kilogram bottles of chloral for French Indo-China 

Emetine chloral hydrate for French Indo-China 

One-gram tin cans of salicylate of bismuth for French Indo-China 

10. Miscellaneous: 

The "combustion chamber" and other parts of the propulsion 
equipment used by the German planes ME-163 and ME-262 

Rocket take-off accelerators for JU-88 



30,000 tubes 

20 kgs. 

500 bottles 

20 bottles 

50 grams 

100 cans 

Unknown amount 
4 sets 



--F-3- 



Commodity 

10. Miscellaneous (cont'd): 

Aerial photographic cameras: 

20 cm. 

75 cm. 

"HS-18" 
Luminous paint 

Luminous [paint for dials] and samples of finished panels 

Machines for making rifle ammunition 

Machines for making steel cartridge cases 

Surface polishing lathe 

Tools for use in making machine guns 

Spring apparatus for "G7A," description, drawings, etc. 

Spring apparatus for "G7E Tat Roman 2" drawings 

11. Documents and drawings: 

Drawings of "special 'D' tupe, main storage batteries and hydrogen 
absorbers for S56 type" high submerged speed submarine 

Report on cylinder for Daimler motor torpedo boat engine and for 
manufacture of cylinder 

Drawings of turbines from [Deschamag] Co. and suction and 
condenser pumps from [Bruchanns] Co. 

Drawings for pistons for Daimler motor torpedo boat engine 

Diagrams and explanation of FW 190A military instruments and 
equipment 

Explanatory diagrams of electric firing pom-pom gun 

Summarized list of German machinery production together with 
catalogue 

Catalogue of precision measuring instruments 

Production drawings for Rheinmetall electric percussion caps 

Drawing for drilling machines 

Drawings and plans for the manufacture of acoustic torpedos 

Miscellaneous documents 

Documents explaining use of "Bold" 



Amount 
Available 



50 

50 

180 

200 kgs. plus an 
unknown amount 

Unknown amount 

3 
Unknown amount 

1 
20 kgs. 



25 boxes 



-F-4- 



TAB G 
Persons known to have been passengers on submarines going from Europe 

to the Far East, 1942-44 



Azumi 
Barth 

Berner 

Bose, Subhas Chandra 
and his secretary 

Brinker 

Foders, Heinrich 

Gondo* 

Hammitzch, Prof. 

Hanaoka, Lt. Col. 
Kihara, Col.* 

Lange 
Matsui, Capt. 



*Lost en route. 



Left Europe 

Expert on purchases of medical supplies 16 Apr 44 

To be attached to the German Military Attache's 16 Apr 44 
office in Japan 

To be attached to the German Military Attache's 16 Apr 44 
office in Japan 

President, Provisional Indian Government 9 Feb 43 

Radar expert from Gema Company 10 May 43 

Engineer from the Telefunken Company June 43 

Japan's former Assistant Military Attache in Italy 16 June 43 

To be attached to the German Military Attache's 16 Apr 44 
officer in Japan 

Submarine fuel and percussion cap expert 16 Apr 44 

Japan's former Assistant Military Attache in 14 May 43 
Germany 

German Engineer June 43 

Radar expert 16 Apr 44 



-G-l- 



Meguchi 

Minami 

Miura* 

Makatani 

Nomura, Vice Adm. 

Onishi 
Onoda 
Rheinholdt, Lt. Comdr. 

Sakai 

Sakato 
Satake 
Schuffner 

Shiba, Lt. Col. 



Aircraft expert 

Anti-submarine ordnance expert 

Army surgeon 

Internal combustion engine expert 

Former member of Japanese-German-Italian 
Joint Specialist Commission under the Tripartite 
Pact in Berlin 

Anti-aircraft ordnance expert 

To be adviser to the German Naval Attache in 
Japan 

Technician from Sumitomo Co. and expert on 
motor torpedo boat engines 

Expert on medical supplies 

Radar expert 

To be attached to the German Military Attache's 
office in Japan 

Anti-aircraft ordnance and precision optical goods 
expert 



Left Europe 

16 Apr 44 
16 Apr 44 
16 June 43 
16 Apr 44 
10 May 43 

16 Apr 44 
16 Apr 44 
6 Oct 43 

16 Apr 44 

16 Apr 44 

June 43 

16 Apr 44 

16 Apr 44 



Spahn 



Head of Nazi Party in Japan 



10 May 43 



*Lost in route. 



-G-2- 



Sugita, Med. Capt. 

Tanno 

[Urio] 

Yokoi, Rear Adm. 

Yoshida, Lt. Col. 

Woermann, Ernst 



Aircraft expert 

Anti-aircraft ordnance expert 

Former Naval Attache in Berlin 

Submarine fuel expert 

German Ambassador to Nanking 



Left Europe 

10 May 43 
16 Apr 44 
16 Apr 44 
6 Oct 43 
16 Apr 44 
10 May 43 



A German Diesel engine expert 
Ten other German technicians 



June 43 
10 May 43 



-G-3- 



TAB H 
Commodities believed to have shipped from the Far East to Europe by 

submarine 1942-44 



Commodity 

1. Tungsten 

2. Molybdenum 

3. Tin 



4. Gold bullion 

5. Rubber 

6. Quinine 

7. Opium 

8. Japanese electronic 
equipment and 
drawings 

9. Aerial torpedoes No. 2- 
53.3 cm. 

10. Miscellaneous 

documents, including 
weather maps of the 
Indian Ocean, code 



Quantity believed 

to have been 

available for 

shipment 

250 tons 

40 tons 
Large quantities 



Large quantities 



27 tons 
17 tons 



Amount believed 

to have been 

shipped 

80 tons plus an 
unknown amount 

Unknown amount 

178 tons (including 

some molybdenum) 

plus and unknown 

amount 

6 tons 

73 tons plus an 
unknown amount 

3 tons 

2.63 tons 

Unknown amount 



Amount known 
sunk 

50 tons 

See Ttn 

178b tons (including 
some molybdenum) 



2 tons 

54 tons plus an 
unknown amount 

3 tons 
2.88 tons 



All the documents 



books, etc. 



-H-l- 



TAB I 
Persons known to have been passengers on submarines going from the Far 

East to Europe 1942-44 



Emi, Tetzujiro, Comdr. 
Gamo* 

Hagino, Ichitaro* 

Iked a 

Imasato[?] 

Kawakita, Jiro 

Kiyota, 1st Class Petty 
Officer 

Kojima, Rear Adm. 

Kumamato, Hasatochi, 
1st Class Petty Officer 

Maeda, Toshi* 

Minakawa 
Mizuno, Ichiro* 



To study German submarine construction 

Ordnance engineer and expert of the Tokyo 
Mitsubishi Instrument Co. 

A director of the Tokyo Gauge Co. and a gyro 
expert 

To study Italian submarine construction 
To study German jet-propelled planes 



To be Japan's Naval Attache in Germany and 
Vichy France 



Ordnance engineer to study German motor 
torpedo boat 



Engineer of the Japan Optical Works 



Left Far East 

Apr 43 
Apr 44 

Apr 44 

15 Dec 43 

15 Dec 43 

15 Dec 43 

Apr 44 

15 Dec 43 

Apr 44 

Apr 44 

15 Dec 43 
Apr 44 



*Lost en route 



-I-1-- 



Moriwaki, Fujio* 

Murakami 

Nagamori 

Nagao* 

Nakayama 

Okada, Hidetaka, 1st 
Class Petty Officer* 

Okada, Soiichi* 

Okuyama, Ryoitsu, 1st 
Class Petty Officer* 

Samejima 

Satori, Jihei 

Sunagawa, Eamasa* 

Tamai 



German language typist and translator 



Radar expert 



Communications machine expert 



Appointed Japan's Assistant Naval Attache in 
Portugal, October 1944 



Left Far East 


Apr 44 


15 Dec 43 


15 Dec 43 


Apr 44 


15 Dec 43 


Apr 44 


Apr 44 


Apr 44 


15 Dec 43 


15 Dec 43 


Apr 44 


15 Dec 43 



Tamaru, Lt. Comdr. 

Tomonaga, Hideo, Lt. 
Comdr. 

Ukai, Jasuji* 

Umezaki, Kanae, Tech. 
Comdr. 



To study German submarine construction 

Business machine expert of the Aichi Clock Co. 

Apointed Japan's Assistant Naval Attache in 
Spain, October 1944 



15 Dec 43 
Apr 43 

Apr 44 

15 Dec 4 



*Lost en route 



-1-2- 



Waraya, Takeshi* 



Ordnance engineer and expert of the Tokyo 
Mitsubishi Instrument Co. 



Left Far East 

Apr 44 



50 crew members to man the U-1224 on voyage 
to the Far East 



27 June 43 



*Lost en route 



-1-3- 



Appendix D: Radio Appreciations Concerning German U-Boat 
Activity in the Far East (January - April, 1945) 



SRH-232 

US Navy COMINCH 

Radio Intelligence Appreciations Concerning German U-Boat Activity in the Far East 

(January— April 1945) 

(Declassified per Para. 3, E.O. 12356 by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS Date: 2 March 1983) 



Far Eastern Situation 

COMINCH appreciation number one 

My 221317 refers 

Para one 

Only two German U/bs remain in southern ports following the recent departure of four (U-843, U- 

510, U-532, U-861) on transport cruises to Norway. Both are cargo U/bs. U-181 arrived Singapore 

on 15 January for bearing repairs after an abortive start for Atlantic. U-219, lately arrived from the 

Atlantic, was damaged when a Jap munitions ship was torpedoed and blew up in Tandjok Priok late 

Dec and is now being repaired in dock at Batavia. Completion date end of February war readiness 

mid-March. 

Para 2 

Two U/boats are in Kobe for battery exchange. U-183, a 740 tonner, will depart about 9 February 
for Batavia and after refuelling in Balikpapan is expected to operate against US traffic between New 
Guinea and Mindanao alternatively New Britain-Palau area. U-IT-25, Ex-Italian Cargo U/b, is 
scheduled to leave Kobe early March. A similar type, U-IT-24, is now enroute Kobe from Singapore 
to deliver cargo and obtain new battery. 

Para 3 

U-862, a 1200 tonner, is returning to Batavia via Sunda Strait from operations off Australia. U-195, 
a cargo carrier, will return to Batavia in about two months after refuelling an Atlantic bound U/b 
probably south of Madagascar. U-871, a 1200 tonner, may be approaching Batavia via Sunda Strait 
from operations in Gulf of Aden, although it is probable this U/b was sunk in Atlantic last 
September. U-537 and U-863, whose return to port has been ordered, are both considered sunk. 

Para 4 

Batavia is now the main German U/b operating base in the Far East; Soerabaja and Singapore are 

repair ports with latter headquarters for German CO of southern area (Fregattenkapitan Dommes). 

U/b fuel is brought to these ports from Balikpapan by two 12000 ton surface 

tankers, Quito and Bogota, which also transport supplies between the southern bases. Evacuation of 

the southern area by all German U/bs is being considered in event Japs move out. 



Far Eastern situation 

COMINCH appreciation number two 

My 221317 January refers 

Para One 

U-IT-24 left Singapore for Kobe 1 February suffering a battery explosion 3 February but is 



continuing cruise. Best estimate of speed 180 miles per day plus or minus 30 miles. This U/b is 
expected to cruise mainly on surface in view of worn battery and explosion. Known points on route 
are 09-55N 107-36E, 11-1BN 109-14E, 20-25N 112E and 22-50N 119-36E. 

Para 2 

From latter position U-IT-24 track may pass approximately via 24-37N 120-04E, 28N 122-45E, 31- 
11N 125-46E and 33-31N 128-30E which was route taken by U-183 on voyage to Kobe last October 
(later Jap RI may clarify onward route of U-IT-24). 

Para 3 

As this U/boat is carrying important cargo including new German cipher for Berlin-Tokyo traffic 
whose use would result in the loss of much valuable information, it is considered that U-IT-24 offers 
a most valuable target. 



Far eastern situation 

COMINCH appreciation number three 

My 221317 January refers 

Para one 

U-862 arrived Batavia 15 February from operation in Australian waters having torpedoed the Robert 

Walker 24 December off Sydney and the Peter Silvester 6 February about 800 miles west of Perth. 

This U/b arrived Singapore 20 February presumably for overhaul. U-181 is at Singapore undergoing 

major engineering repairs which are expected to take until June, including fitting by Japs of rigid 

schnorchel. 

Para two 

U-219 remains at Batavia to which port U-195 will return from the Indian Ocean via Sunda Strait 
about the first part of March. Ultimate return of both these cargo U/bs to Germany without battery 
renewal is intended. 

Para three 

U-IT-24, due to arrive Kobe 18 February from Singapore, reported having passed 24 North 11 
February and 30 north 14 February. New Tibet cipher carried by this U/b was promulgated 21 
February by German Naval Attache Tokyo. Departure of U-183 from Kobe for Batavia was delayed 
until about 22 February. Her scheduled noon positions for 25 to 27 February are 30-07N 124 03E 
and 26-50N 121-32E and 22-unknown minutes north 119-38E. This U/b will not be able to reach a 
tentative operating area in the Philippines until the end of March by which time German Naval 
Attache Tokyo expects US supply traffic will proceed directly from Guam to new beachheads. U-IT- 
25 is still scheduled to depart Kobe southbound early in March. 

Para Four 

German CO of southern area is now stationed at Penang. Bogota left Singapore 17 February with 

supplies for Batavia and was scheduled to return 20 days later. 

Para Five 

U-864, a 1200 ton U/boat scheduled to depart shortly for the Far East, was sunk off Bergen on 9 
February by a British sub. At present there are no indications of any U/boats in the Atlantic which 
are enroute to the Far East. 

Far eastern situation 

COMINCH appreciation number four 

My 221317 January refers 

Para One 

Two 1200 ton U/bs are undergoing overhaul at Singapore. U-862 with 66% battery capacity, will be 

ready to depart end of April except for desired rest period for the crew. This U/b is to load as much 



rubber as possible and carry 8 torpedoes for interim operation off south east African coast enroute 
to Atlantic. U-181 will have limited navigating capacity by middle of April and final readiness 
including installation of rigid schnorchel by first June for departure Germany with cargo. 

Para Two 

U-183 arrived Batavia 9 March from Kobe. As of 5 March she was still scheduled for offensive 
operations in Southwest Pacific. U-219is at Batavia undergoing repairs to be completed end of 
March. U-195 arrived Batavia 4 March from refueling task Indian Ocean and departed following day 
for Soerabaja arriving 7 March. 

Para Three 

Bogota arrived Singapore 17 March. Quito was due to sail Batavia shortly after 14 March to load U/b 

fuel at Balikpapan. 

Para Four 

U-IT-24 arrived Kobe 18 February for battery exchange. Further repairs deferred departure date 

of U-IT-25 from Kobe southbound until early April. 

Para Five 

German Naval Attache in Tokyo was informed by Berlin on 8 March to count on only two U/bs (U- 

234 and U-876) going to southeast area, leaving Germany in March and April. Each will be a 

transport U/b carrying only 8 torpedoes for possible operation enroute. Comment: U-876 is a 1200 

tonner X U-234 is a 1600 tonner for which charts of Tierra Del Fuego and Pacific areas have been 

requisitioned suggesting route via Cape Horn. Both U/boats are currently estimated in the Baltic. On 

14 March Berlin informed Tokyo there was no longer any possibility of delivery new merchant ship 

recognition signals before August 1945. 

Far Eastern situation 

COMINCH appreciation number Five 

My 221317 January refers 

Para One 

U-183 undergoing diesel repairs at Batavia since 15 March is scheduled to depart 21 April for 
offensive operations in area north of New Guinea to 05N and east of Morotai to 153E. Enroute to 
pass through following points: 05-15S 10S-00E, 04-49S 114-41E, 04-15S 116-51E, 03-18S 118- 
25E, 00-39S 118-13E, 01-30N 120-40E and 05N 125-20E. Noon positions: 22 April 05-12S 109- 
30E, 23 April 04-54S 113-30E, 24 April 04-00S 117-18E, 25 April 02-00S 11, 8-18E, 26 April 00- 
18S 118-30E, 27 April 01-12N 119 Recognition Signals: two white lines on forward deck and Jap 
flag displayed on C/T. Night time: Jap challenge JIG Peter (Alternate King Queen) German reply dog 
uncle (Alternate easy victor). 

Para Two 

U-219 has been loading cargo at Batavia and was scheduled to leave drydock end of March with two 

weeks rest for crew prior to departure for Atlantic. There is yet no confirmation of her sailing. 

Para Three 

U-195 at Soerabaja undergoing repairs expected to be completed middle of May. She will have 

limited cruising capacity after 20 April. 

Para Four 

U-181 and U-862 are at Singapore, with the latter scheduled to sail for Atlantic in May. U-862 is to 
proceed directly to Southeast African coast for interim operations, Berlin having refused request by 
Jap navy that she land agents off Madras coast enroute. 

Para Five 

U-IT-24 and U-IT-25 are still at Kobe for repairs further delayed by bomb damage to dockyard. 

Repairs to U-IT-25 will require at least three months. She may even be scrapped. 



Para Six 

Quito while approaching Balikpapan from Batavia escorted by sub-chaser was strafed and slightly 
damaged by three B-24s 1920 to 2045/12 April. Bogota scheduled to arrive Batavia 20 April from 
Singapore with her next port of call probably Soerabaja. 

Para Seven 

Berlin intends to abandon as German bases Penang and one other port to be designated by German 

CO of southern area whose HQ is now at Seletar (Naval Harbor Singapore). 



Source: Cryptoloqic Documents Collection , Navy Department Library. Also available at the National 
Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, in Record Group (RG) 457, Records of 
the National Security Agency. 



Appendix E: Theory of Split- Anode Magnetrons by Sin-itiro Tomonaga 



AAPPS Bulletin April 2006 



17 



Theory of Split- Anode Magnetrons by Sin-itiro Tomonaga 

Koichi Shimoda 



During the World War II theory of the magnetron was de- 
veloped by S. Tomonaga in collaboration with M. Kotani. 
Assuming a parabolic potential between the cathode and 
the cylindrical anode of the magnetron, he calculated the 
electron orbits perturbed by the oscillating field of the anode. 
Secular change of the electron orbit results in the forma- 
tion of rotating space charge inside the split-anode 
magnetron, which is found to enhance the oscillating field 
when a resonance condition is satisfied. 




Professor Koichi Shimoda 



1. INTRODUCTION 

The magnetron is now widely used in microwave ovens. It 
was invented by A, W. Hull in 1921 [1]. It has a cylindrical 
anode with a co-axial cathode and operates under a magnetic 
field applied along the axis. In the absence of magnetic field, 
electrons emitted from the cathode take straight paths towards 
the anode. When a weak magnetic field is applied, Ihe elec- 
tron orbit will be curved- As the magnetic field is increased, 
the electron orbit will be more curved so that the electron or- 
bit may become tangential to the anode at a magnetic field 
H=H e as shown in Fig. 1. If the magnetic field H is increased 
further, H > H t , the electrons do not reach the anode, but re- 
turn to the cathode. 

The critical field for an anode radius r, and anode potential 
U„ is calculated to be 



where c is the speed of light, m. the electron mass and -e the 
electron charge. 

Assume that the anode potential is fixed, the anode current 
as a function of the applied magnetic field H will drop to zero 
at the critical field H*, as shown by a dotted curve in Fig. 2. 
Instead of the sharp cut-off the experimentally observed cur- 
rents do not show sharp cut-off as shown by a solid curve in 
Fig. 2 for example. Very often high frequency oscillations are 
observed near and slightly above the critical field H c , A. W. 
Hull observed the magnetron oscillation at a frequency of a 
few hundred kilo-hertz, which was increased upto 10 mega- 
hertz in 1924. 

Kinjiro Okabe in Osaka University introduced a split-an- 
ode magnetron in 1927 [2] so that he could generate micro- 



ti 



Hint/,, 



ill 



Koichi Shimoda 
Professor Emeritus 

University cf Tokyo 
1-19-15 Kichijoji-Minamicho 
Musashino 180-003 
Tokyo , Japan 




Fig. !: Electron orbits in a magnetron. 



AAPPS Bulletin Vol. 1 6, No. 2 




H, 



H 



Fig. 2: Anode current of the magnetron as a function of the 
magnetic field. 



waves of 12 cm wavelength or a frequency of 2.5 GHz. Ex- 
tensive studies on split-anode magnetrons, generating pow- 
erful microwaves, have been carried out at the Technical In- 
stitute of the Japanese Navy since 1933. A variety of anode 
structures as shown in Fig. 3 has been investigated and 
developed. 

Most types of these anode structures were called after the 
names of associated flowers. Type T in Fig. 3 was called 
Tachibana (Mandarine- orange flower); type Ya was called 
Yaguruma (Corn-flower): type C was called Kosumosu 
(Cosmos or Rising sun); type U was calledUmcbachi (Japanese 
apricot flower); type Ki was called Kiku (Chrysanthemum); 
type Yu was called Yuri (Lily); and type Ka was called Kago 
(Basket or cage). Type S in Fig. 3 represents a structure where 
every other segments are linked together. In all types of these 
anodes polyphase oscillations as well as push-pull oscillations 
were observed. 

The characteristics of magnetrons with these anodes are too 
complicated to be described in short. 




Fig. 3: A variety of anode structures. 



2. WORKSHOP ON THE THEORY OF MAGNE- 
TRONS 

During the World War 11 a workshop for theoretical studies of 
magnetrons was formed in September 1943 in the Department 
of Physics. Imperial University of Tokyo. Members of the 
workshop were Yusuke Hagihara (Professor of celestial 
mechanics), Masao Kotani (Professor of theoretical chemical 
physics), Tatuoki Miyazima (Assistant Professor of electro- 
magnetic theory), Kiichiro Ochiai (Professor of relativity), 
Takuzo Sakai (Professor of statistical physics), Sin-itiro 
Tomonaga (Professor of field theory) in alphabetical order, 
and a few others. 1 was an observer in most of the meetings of 
the workshop. 

At the second meeting on September 10, 1943 K. Ochiai 
gave a theory based on a kinematical study of electrons, while 
T, Sakai presented a theory based on gas-dynamical approach. 
At the second and third meetings on September 10 and 16, 
1943 T. Miyazima introduced and discussed papers by E. G. 
Linder published in 1938. At the fourth meeting on Septem- 
ber 24, 1 943 S. Tomonaga presented his theory on the assump- 
tion of a parabolic potential, as described in the next Section. 
At the fifth meeting on October 12, 1.943 Dr. S. Mizuma of 
the Technical Institute of the Japanese Navy gave a review of 
experimental and theoretical works performed at the Institute 
since 1933. It was followed by reports of the development of 
the theory of magnetrons by S. Tomonaga and M. Kotani, At 
the sixth meeting on November 4, 1 943 further studies by T. 
Miyazima, S. Tomonaga, M. Kotani and Y. Hagihara were 
reported respectively and discussed. Extensive work by S. 
Tomonaga was finally reported at the meeting on November 
26, 1943. 

Then whole contents of the theory of magnetrons by S. 
Tomonaga were presented in a larger but limited circle in lanu- 
aiy 1944. No journals of the Physico-Mathematical Soceity of 
Japan could be published at that time. The Physical Society of 
Japan was established after the War in April, 1946. Then En- 
glish versions of his papers were published in 1948 [3], to- 
gether with papers by Y. Hagihara [4] and M. Kotani [5], It 
may be noted that S. Tomonaga and M. Kotani jointly received 
the Japan Academy Award of 1 948 for their works on the theory 
of magnetrons. 

3, THEORY OF SPLIT- ANODE MAGNETRONS BY 
S. TOMONAGA 

A brief outline of the theory by S. Tomonaga is given below, 
The readers shall refer to his original papers [3] for details of 
the theory. 

We shall find how electrons in the magnetron move, and how 
the electron energy is transferred to the electric oscillation tak- 
ing place in the resonator attached to the split anode. It is neces- 



AAPPS Bulletin April 2006 



19 




At the Shimada Laboratory, Technical Institute of Japanese Navy, Shizuoka Prefecture in 1944 or 1945. Front row, from left: 
Yuzunt Watase, Tatuoki Miyazima, Taken Nagamiya, Kodi Husimi, Yusuke Hagihara, Hideki Yukawa, Sin-itiro Tomonaga, Masao 
Kotani: Back row. from left: Minoru Oda (the third), Masaichiro Minima (the fifth). (Courtesy of Atsushi Tomonaga.) 



sary for understanding the magnetron oscillation to know how 
tiie phases of electron motions, which are distributed over all 
values between and 2?r, when they leave the cathode, are 
confined to such a range that electrons may move in clusters 
and thus inducing electric oscillations in the anode structure. 



3.1. Unperturbed Motion of Electrons 
We investigate first the motion of an electron when no oscilla- 
tion is taking place in the split anode. Then the Hamiltonian of 
the electron can he written as 



In studying such motion of electrons two distinct methods had 
been used: a particle-mechanical method on the one hand and a 
hydrodynamical method on the other. Although the latter method 
seemed to be preferable since it had no difficulty of many-body 
problem, it was noted that the swarm of electrons in the magne- 
tron was far too rare to allow hydrodynamical approach. 



7/ = J- (p\-'-pl) + % P ,+ -f («£-*) i 3 . (3) 

2m r* 2 



where the Larmor frequency and the critical frequency are re- 
spectively defined by 



We were thus forced to use a particle-mechanical method. 
In this treatment the difficulty of the many-body problem can 
be overcome if the effect of the electron space charge is re- 
placed by a suitably chosen electrostatic potential. 

There are strong presumptions that this electrostatic force 
has the potential of the form 



U (r) = U. (r/r,) 2 , 



i'2) 



eli 

_'.'.'■ 



2cU., 



(4) 



(?) 



The solution of the electron orbit re'" =x+ iy can then be 
written in general in the form 



where r is the distance from the center of the magnetron. If we 
assume that the potential of this form exists in the magnetron, 
it is comparatively easy to develop a theory of the magnetron 
oscillation, as given in the following. 



x = ft cos{i2i r + «i) + ft cos(£3j * + « 2 ), (6a) 

y = ft sin(i3i t + «i) + ft sm(£li I + ay. (6b) 



where 



AAPPS Bulletin Vol. 16, No. 2 





(a) R, : ff, 



(b) fi,:if,= l:l 



Fig. 4: Unperturbed electron orbits in the magnetron (a)forRi =2Ri, and (b)for R< - Rs. 



Qi= »,,-> 



fii= <Bh+ 7 H-^. 



(7a) 



(7b) 



K = m OKi 7 l-a?, = v- m i3f«i - "#" s ' 

2 r; 



represents the energy of the electron rolling at frequency Qt 
and amplitude R\, and 



£, = -m QJ& Jc%,-a%= —mQlRl - -^y- «I (8b) 



Thus the motion of the electron is a superposition of two uniform 

circular motions in the absence of oscillating field: one is the 

rolling motion with radius R, and frequency i and the other is represents the energy of the electron revolving around the cen 

the revolutional motion with Tadius Ri and frequency (h. ter at frequency Qi with amplitude Ri. 



Hour constants of motion aTe given by the initial condition 
of the electron. The aphelion radius where the electron is most 
distant from the center is 



It may be noted (hat the revolving energy is negative since 
the revolving frequency is so low that the kinetic energy is 
smaller than the negative potential energy. 



r = Ri + Ri 

nph 



and the perihelion radius where the electron is closest to the 
center is 



IR:-/?il. 



3.2. Motion of Electrons Perturbed by an Oscillating Field 
When an electric oscillation is present in the magnetron, there 
exists an alternating field due to this oscillation. Perturbation 
of the electron motion will be significant if the frequency of 
electric oscillation is resonant with the proper frequency of 
the electron so that 



When R 2 =2Ri, for example, the electron orbit is shown in 
Fig. 4 (a). For the electron leaving the cathode at the center, 
f-0, we have Rt=Ri so that the orbit may become as shown in 
Fig. 4 (b). 

The energy of the electron in the magnetron can be calcu- 
lated from Eqs. (da) and (6b) in the form 

where 



to = i2i or co = Q 7 



!<)) 



If the oscillating field is assumed to be uniform inside the 
magnetron, we find that the electron energy increases when 
to = Q\ and decreases when £0 = Q 7 . 

In the former case the electron energy increases by absorb- 
ing the energy of electric oscillation. In the latter case the elec- 
tron delivers its energy to the electric oscillation so that the 
oscillation can build up. This is the case for self-sustained os- 
cillation of the magnetron. 



AAPPS Bulletin April 2006 



21 



a 2Q =2?T 
a =¥ 




1 2 3 4 5 



Fig. 5: Temporal changes of the phases CXi of electrons for 
different initial phases (Xzo. 



Then the oscillation frequency of the magnetron is given by 
substituting Eqs. (4) and (5) into Eq. (7b) to be 




Fig. 6: Trajectories of the center of the rolling motion of elec- 
trons in a four-sptit-anode magnetron, where Y/Yo is 
the relative magnitude ofRi. 

Polyphase oscillations may lake place in a split anode 
magnetron, but we restrict our discussions to push-pull oscil- 
lations in this paper, because it is the most important. 

When the number of the anode segments is even, a push- 
pull oscillation is possible, where the voltage of every other 
segments are equal and the voltage of other segments are 
opposite. For example, in a four-split push-pull magnetron the 
oscillating voltages of four segments are given by 



eh i eh 2 2eU, 

Imc \1 2mc mr 2 



This may be rewritten by using Eq. (1) as 



<t>(r a , 9, 1) = VcosW, for < 0< «IZ, and K< 8<?>7l!2 
and 

*(r., 0, = -Vcosfflr,ior JT/2 < < JT, and 3x/2<9<27l. 



2mc 



(II 



-J# 



-hi). 



(10) 



3.3. Motion of Electrons in a Split-Anode Magnetron 

The electric potential inside the anode due to oscillating po- 
tential of the anode segments can generally be expressed in 
the form of a Fourier expansion as 



Here we have assumed that the gaps between neighbouring 
segments are very narrow. 

Because of the four-fold symmetry of the potential only 
terms for 



£J = 2, 6, 10, 14,... 



(13) 



<P (r, 0, i) = Re Z (A a e"" + B „ e""<) (re' 9 ) " 



(II) 



Here the Fourier coefficients arc determined by the Laplace 
equation with the boundary condition given by the potentials 
of the anode segments. 

Perturbation of this potential on the electron motion will be 
significant when the electron orbit suffers a secular change at 
a resonant frequency. The resonant frequency has been calcu- 
lated in general to be 



<?Q 2 + T'Qt-Qi), 



1,2,3, ... 



(12) 



appear in the expansion of Eq. (II). Since higher order terms 
are usually small, we consider Ihe lowest term in the first 
approximation. 

When <J= 2, we have T= 0, 1, and 2. It is found that elec- 
trons cannot deliver their energy to the oscillating field in the 
cases of 1- 1, and 2. Then we consider the case for = in 
the following. 

The resonance frequency in this case is then given by <o = 
2Qi from Eq. (1 2). Calculation of the secular change of elec- 
tron orbits shows that the aphelion radius either increases 



AAPPS Bulletin Vol. 16, No. 2 




Fig. 7: Rotation of the electron cluster in the four-split-anode 
magnetron. 



immediately, or decreases first, reaches a minimum and then 
increases. It is noted that this ultimate increase occurs inde- 
pendently of the initial phase of the electron motion. The elec- 
tron energy decreases as the electron approaches the anode. 
This means that work is done by the electron on the alternat- 
ing potential so as to supply energy to the oscillation. 

The phases of electron motions, which were initially at 
random, are calculated to tend to either nil or 1n!2 as shown 
in Fig, 5. The revolution of the center of the rolling motion of 
the electron, as given by amplitude Ri and phase CLi is found 
to vary as shown in Fig, 6, 

Since electrons are revolving in the laboratory frame at fre- 
quency Qi, the electron cloud rotates inside the split-anode 
as shown in Fig. 7. Then the negative charges of the electron 
clusters induce positive charge in the anode segments whose 
potentials are rising; and they induce negative charge in the 



segments whose potentials are sinking. Thus the oscillation 
in the anode is enforced by the rotating clusters of electrons. 
This is the mechanism of self-sustained oscillation in the 
magnetron. 

In the cases of the six-split-anode and the eight-split-anode 
the rotating clusters of electrons are formed as shown in Fig. 8, 
where the resonance conditions are Q) = 3Q2 and ca =4Qi 
respectively. 

It is obvious that this mechanism of oscillation by rotating 
clusters of electrons resembles very much the mechanism of 
the alternator. The alternating current is generated in the al- 
ternator by electromagnetic induction by rotating magnetic 
poles, while oscillation in the magnetron is excited by elec- 
trostatic induction by rotating clusters of electrons. 

In the second paper by S. Tomonaga polyphase oscillations 
in split-anode magnetrons are discussed in general. Compari- 
sons of the theory with experiments are given in the last sec- 
tion of the paper to show that the theoretical results agree 
satisfactorily with experimental evidences. 

4. REFERENCES 

[1] A. W. Hull, The Effect of a Uniform Magnetic Field on 

the Motion of Electrons between Coaxial Cylinders, Phys. 

Rev. 18,31 (1921). 
[2] K. Okabe, Generation of Undamped Ultra-Short Waves 

by Using Magnetrons, J. Electrical Engineering 47, 575, 

860 (in Japanese) (1927). 
[3] S. Tomonaga, Theory of Split-Anode Magnetrons ! and II, 

J. Phys. Soc. Jpn. 3, 56, 62 (1948). 
[41 Y. Hagihara, Application of Celestial Mechanics to the 

Theory of a Magnetron I, Hand III, J. Phys. Soc. Jpn. 3, 

70,76.81 (1948). 
[5] M. Kotani, On the Oscillation Mechanism of the Magnetron, 

J. Phys. Soc, Jpn. 3, 86 (1948). 




Fig. 8: Trajectories of the center of the rolling motion of electrons (a) in a six-split-anode magnetron, and (b) in a eight-split- 
anode magnetron.