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Full text of "The Egyptian Problem"

270
THE EGYPTIAN PROBLEM
effectively than by the boycott of the Milner Commiss and the methods they adopted to enforce it. That i well prove to have been one of the most importan negative, results of the Commission's joi^ney to Eg Not less edifying must have been the insight it ga into the cross-currents of intrigue that fought ben the smooth surface of agreement between the diffe groups of Egyptian politicians. The Party of I pendence claims to have swallowed up all other pai and for the time being there is certainly no other o^gar party in Egypt. But there are not a few diffe shades of complexion even amongst its professed adhen and it would be easy to name a good many men of siderable weight and standing who have never yet scribed to its full programme, though they hesitat put forward a programme of their own. Such me Rushdi and Adli and Sarwat, who held office when Protectorate was proclaimed, and remained in offic through the war, cannot take up quite the same atti as the Paris Delegation towards the maintenance o: Protectorate, however much they may dislike its tinuance and would prefer to substitute some < nexus with the British Empire. Even the leaders o Party of Independence are not all at one in believing an independent Egypt could dispense with su] and assistance from Great Britain. Zaghlul hi has not gone as far as that, or denied that Great B] has specific interests in Egypt which Egyptians take into account. Nor were all at one as to the att to be adopted towards the Commission itself, ventured openly to defy the boycott, but some welc and even sought for opportunities of meeting its mei privately, and passed on the substance of their com tions to their friends or sometimes to the native ". Several ex-Ministers were satisfied that those con1 tions offered a hopeful basis for an ultimate understa even with Zaghlul, and important communications j through confidential channels between them anche Nationalists wished to estrange the sympathies and excite the distrust of men who were most disposed to believe in their cause, they could not have done so more