The Folly of Neutrality (WW II)

General Smuts exposes . . .

THE FOLLY OF
NEUTRALITY

General Smuts Exposes

The Folly Of Neutrality

Speech by the Prime Minister, General the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts, P.C, C.H., K.C,
D.T.D., in The Senate of the Union Parliament at Cape Town on January 30th, 1940.

Issued by the Union Unity Truth Service.

Surrey House p^Si^-, Commissioner St.

Johannesburg e§y§ll£ November, 1939

"ONE COUNTRY AND ONE PEOPLE'

Foreword

Our beloved South Africa is today one of the victims of a new method of aggression - the
Nazi propaganda of deception, distortion and lies. To fight against this the Union Unity
Fund was created; and we believe that by the publication of this speech by General Smuts we
are striking a telling blow for Truth.

The Prime Minister's objective, calm and lucid analysis of the events leading to the war in
Europe and the vital effect of that catastrophe on South Africa's interests came at an
opportune time. There were men here who spoke of "poor Germany" of the "war against
Germany" and represented the terror and aggression of Nazism as a noble attempt to
liberate a downtrodden people.

But the Nazi divisions that goose-stepped into Czechoslovakia; the bombers and mechanised
forces, the army of spies and propagandists that destroyed Poland - these were not liberators
but conquerors. And in their calendar of aggression the name of our country might very well
have been next on the list.

This speech by General Smuts should convince every thinking South African who is not
blinded by racial prejudice that our country in this war has chosen the right course. It is the
privilege of the sponsors of the Union Unity Fund to present this speech to the people of
South Africa.

(Signed) H. N W. Botha.

(Brig.-Gen. H. N. W. Botha, C.M.G., D.T.D. is one of the four distinguished sponsors of the
Union Unity Fund.)

Introduction

On January 28, Parliament by 81 votes to 59 rejected a motion by General Hertzog
"that this House is of the opinion that the time has come for the war against Germany
to be ended and for peace to be restored."

The Prime Minister, General the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts, then asked the Senate to
express its opinion and on January 30 he moved the following motion in the Upper
House :

That this House considering :

(1) That it was in the interest of the Union that its relations with the German Reich
should be severed, and that the Union should refuse to adopt an attitude of
neutrality in this conflict;

(2) that the Union should carry out the obligations to which it had agreed, and
continue its co-operation with its friends and associates in the British
Commonwealth of Nations;

(3) that the Union should take all necessary measures for the defence of its territory
and South African interests and the Government should not send forces overseas
as in the last war;

(4) that the freedom and independence of the Union were at stake in this conflict and
that it was therefore in its true interest to oppose the use of force as an
instrument of national policy;

(5) that the present war was begun by Germany and has been carried on by her with
brutal disregard of the rules of international law and humanity; and that the
Union, of its own free will and in the exercise of its sovereign rights and in its
own interests on the 6th September 1939 severed relations between it and
Germany; and that, however ardently this House and the people of the Union
long for peace and would co-operate zealously for its restoration, the Union
cannot make a separate peace with Germany without forfeiting its honour and
sacrificing its vital interests;

hereby confirms the policy of the Union in respect of the war and the decision taken
by the Government in reference thereto.

The motion was adopted by 21 votes to 13. We republish herewith the speech made
by the Prime Minister in movingthis statement of our country's policy.

The Folly of Neutrality

The Prime Minister : This is the first
opportunity that I have had, after the
election of the new Senate, to attend
this Senate meeting, and I wish both
personally and as head of the Govern-
ment, to express to Hon. Members our
sincere feelings of goodwill and
welcome this body on their starting a
new period in the history of this
Chamber. I am one of those who have
always taken a very serious view of
the functions of this body. I know that
from the time of the National Conven-
tion we always looked upon the Senate
as a very important constituent part of
the Legislature of this country, and if
possible with time its importance has
grown. There was no problem at the
National Convention which gave us
more thought and took more of our
time than the constitution and the

functions of this body, and although
numbers of attempts have been made
since to change its constitution, to
change its mode of election and so on,
no alternative system has been found
which is really an improvement on
what was done thirty years ago at the
National Convention, and I am there-
fore expressing the wish and the hope
that the Senate will continue to
function, this new Senate will continue
to function, to the good of the country
according to the constitution of our
country.

War Clouds Gather

Now, Sir, there is another reason for
which I welcome the opportunity to
address you here, and it is this. There
has been a certain amount of criticism
against the Government for not having
consulted the Senate before in
connection with this most important

subject with which we are dealing, and
I think it is right that in my position I
should state the circumstances under
which this matter now comes before
the Senate for the first time. I need
only remind Hon. Members of the
extraordinary circumstances under
which Parliament met at the beginning
of last September. Parliament came
together in order to prolong the life of
the old Senate. War clouds were
gathering, signs of danger were
appearing in many directions, but I do
not believe there was anybody,
certainly nobody in authority, who
thought that war was approaching in
the immediate future. At any rate we
thought at that time that it was a wise
precaution to secure the life of the
Senate until Parliament would meet in
the ordinary course. The Senate,
according to the constitution, was

expiring in the first week of
September, and if it had come to
expire without provision being made
for the interim, until Parliament would
come together again, there would have
been a very serious gap in the
constitutional arrangements of this
country and anything might have
happened. Even war might have come
and there would have been no
sovereign body in this country to see
to its affairs.

It is for that reason that we came
together at the very beginning of
September last in order, not to deal
with war, because nobody thought that
necessary, but to deal with the subject
of the prolongation of the life of the
old Senate, in order to prevent a gap
from forming. When we met here on
the first day of September there was a
sudden change, a very serious and

unexpected change in the position, and
in the first days of September that war
which we had never expected to see in
our lifetime again, which we had
prayed that the world might be spared
from, that war suddenly and unexpect-
edly burst upon us. To make matters
worse from our particular local point
of view differences of opinion
developed in the Government at the
time and it was found impossible to
adjust those differences, with the result
that they had to be fought out in
another place, and a resolution was
passed there which was adverse to the
Government of the day.

That was on the 4th September. The
Prime Minister resigned that same
day, that same night and practically
the country then was without a
Government. There was no Govern-
ment succeeding at once, and there

was a gap, and from the 5th September
to the 6th September the country was
practically without a Government.
General Hertzog had resigned, his
Government therefore had ended, but
no Prime Minister had succeeded him
and no new Government had been
formed. That, I say, was the situation
from the 5th to the 6th September. In
the meantime on the 5th September,
the day between, Parliament was
prorogued by General Hertzog, quite
correctly and properly, because he was
still in function although he had
resigned. His resignation had not yet
been accepted and it was therefore his
duty to see that things were carried on
in the normal way. On the 5th
September Parliament was prorogued,
and no Message was sent to the Senate
at the time in order to carry over, in
the usual way, the Message of the

lower House to this body to be dealt
with. As I say, Parliament was
prorogued, we went home, a new
Government was formed, and we, as
the new Government, had our hands
very full with the grave tasks before
us.

Not only was it a new Government but
it was confronted with an entirely
novel situation, fraught with danger
enough to baffle any Government in
the world, and we were only too
anxious to grapple with our task and to
carry on. In the meantime a new
Senate had to be elected, which was
another extraordinary feature of the
situation. We had given an under-
taking in another place that although
the life of the old Senate was
prolonged the Government would take
the earliest opportunity to have a new
election, and we had to await the

election of a new Senate before
anything could be done.

I state these facts, Mr. President, to
show that there was no idea of passing
by this House, this important House.
There was no thought of any slight or
ignoring of its dignity. We were
simply involved in a concatenation of
circumstances beyond our control and
it was physically impossible under the
changes which took place with
immense rapidity to send on this usual
Message to the Senate as had been
customary before.

In 1914 where a rupture of relations
took place between South Africa and
Germany a resolution was passed in
another place and sent on as a
Message for confirmation by the
Senate, which did confirm it, but on
this occasion that procedure was not
followed, not for any deliberate

reason, but for the reasons which I
have stated, which shows that the
matter was beyond our control.

Now, Sir, coming to the merits of this
matter before us, there are a few points
which I would stress and to which I
wish specially to draw the attention of
this House. The first is this, that
although there has been very consider-
able and widespread criticism of the
attitude of the new Government, and
of me in particular as Prime Minister,
there is no doubt that to the best of our
ability we have acted and carried out
the policy to which we had been
pledged before, the policy of the late
Government which had been
announced time and again, on one
platform after the other, as being the
policy that Parliament at the proper
time and under the proper circum-
stances would decide what the attitude

of this country would be in regard to
the question of peace or war.

Hon. Members know, Sir, that there
was a party in this country pledged to
neutrality under all circumstances, and
they had been trying to force a
declaration of a definite attitude from
the previous Government as to what
line they would take, and the position
taken up, both by General Hertzog and
myself, and generally by Members of
the Government at the time, was this,
that it was not possible, it was not
politic, to make any such hard and fast
definition of policy in advance.
Parliament as the sovereign body of
this country would decide the issue
when the time arose and was in
possession of the full facts and the full
circumstances.

That was our policy. That was the
policy of the old United Party which

we represented and that policy was
carried out with all due formality on
the 4th September. The then Prime
Minister, General Hertzog, did make
his appeal to Parliament. He did not
pass by Parliament, he did not seek
some other counsel from the people.
He stuck to the policy which he
himself had favoured and he made his
appeal to Parliament. Well, I felt it my
most painful and regrettable duty on
that occasion to differ from him and to
lay a different policy from that which
he advocated before Parliament, and
the other place approved the policy
which I brought before it. But I want
to say this, and this is a point I want to
stress, that in the procedure that was
followed there was no violation what-
ever of any policy or of any under-
takings which had been given to the
people of this country before.

It has been urged, Sir, with a good
deal of vehemence, that in severing
relations with Germany, in following
the course which had been followed
before us by the British Government,
we were in this country belittling our
own constitution; we were not doing
justice to our own sovereign constitu-
tion and that we were simply follow-
ing the lead of the British Government
and slavishly following the example of
another Government instead of acting
on our own initiative in the interests of
South Africa. That position, I say, has
been laboured a great deal in the
months that have elapsed since. Let
me say this in answer to all that
criticism, that on this point, too, the
authority of Parliament, of the other
place, the elected House of the people,
was decisive, because that is the very
point which they decided, and they

laid down that it was in the interests of
the Union, that in their opinion it was
in the interests not of Great Britain,
not of some other country in the
world, but it was in the interests of this
country to declare war, and, Sir, I ask
what was the best authority on that
issue?

People may differ now, as they have
differed before, and they may say that
it was not in the interests of South
Africa, that South Africa was not
concerned in this question, but after all
it is for Parliament, it is for the
representatives of the people to decide
that question, and they did so on the
4th September, and they did so again
last week, and we are now appealing
to you, the other branch of the
Legislature, to do the same and to
express your view that the step we
have taken, admittedly one of the

gravest that can be taken in this
country, is one which was entirely
dictated, not by outside influence or
outside interests, but by the vital
interests of South Africa itself.

One thing is quite clear, Sir, that we
have no outside pressure on us of any
kind whatever to take this step that we
have taken. General Hertzog and other
members of the old Government have
repeatedly declared that in this respect
there was not the least criticism to be
levelled against the Government of
Great Britain. They had asked us for
nothing, they had given us no advice,
they had taken no steps whatever; they
had left this matter entirely to the free
decision and unhampered decision of
the people of this country, and so we
have decided. The decision we have
come to has no particular regard for

any other interests. First and foremost
it is in the interests of South Africa.

Well, then, a question has been raised
as to the origin of this business and it
has been said, "Well, we have declared
war, we have severed relations with
Germany because of a dispute which
arose in Poland," and the question is
asked with great vehemence : "What in
the world have we to do with
Poland?", the argument being that we
are not in any way interested in this
foreign question in some obscure part
of Europe.

To appreciate the answer to that, it will
be necessary very briefly to go into the
events and circumstances which
brought about that war in Poland, and
if I delay this for a moment at this
point, it is not to weary Hon: Members
but to show that the Polish war, the
trouble in Poland, does not stand by

itself. It is not a purely Polish business
but it has its ramifications, its roots in
the whole European situation, and that
question affects us in South Africa in
the most vital way.

It has been said the Treaty of
Versailles was the root of all this
trouble, that the way that peace treaty
was framed and that the restrictive,
oppressive, harsh provisions made in it
were the cause of all this trouble in
which we have been landed. Now it is
not necessary for me to defend the
Treaty of Versailles, nor would it be
fair and honest of me to do so, because
at the proper time when that treaty was
framed and I on behalf of South Africa
had to express my opinion I expressed
a very adverse opinion on many of the
provisions in the Treaty of Versailles,
and I am not going back on that
matter. The point that I am trying to

make is this, that the Treaty of
Versailles, lamentable as many of its
provisions were, was no worse than
many other treaties.

It was not half as bad as a treaty just
before made by Germany with Russia,
under which Russia was practically
dismembered, large provinces inhabit-
ed by the Russian people were torn
away from it, and the most draconic
terms, the most punic terms, were
imposed on Russia. Nothing in the
Treaty of Versailles is comparable
with what is to be found in a similar
treaty made by Germany with Russia -
but I am not labouring that point. The
matter that concerns us here is this,
that those restrictive conditions in the
Treaty of Versailles had in the course
of time gradually disappeared. The
reparations clauses had become
defunct and had perished, never to

return. The occupation of German
territory along the Rhine by the French
Army also disappeared, and it
disappeared years before the period for
the determination of the occupation
fixed in the Treaty itself. The
provisions in regard to the disarma-
ment of Germany simply fell into
disuse also and from 1933 Germany
was arming at full speed, with the
result that five years after, by 1938,
she probably had the most powerful
army on the whole of the Continent of
Europe.

All these restrictive and somewhat
harsh clauses of the Treaty of
Versailles had therefore disappeared.
One would have thought by that time
that Germany or the rulers of Germany
would have been satisfied with the
success they had achieved. They had

Hitler Promises

When the British Prime Minister, Mr.
Neville Chamberlain, met Herr Hitler at
Munich, the German Chancellor, speaking
with great earnestness, repeated what he
had already said at Berchtesgarden,
namely, that the Sudetenland was the last
of his territorial ambitions in Europe, and
that he had no wish to include in the
Reich, people of other races than German.

A few days later, Adolf Hitler, in his
famous speech, at the Sportpalast, in
Berlin, made another solemn Nazi
promise. He told his followers;

"This is the last territorial claim I have to
make in Europe. I have assured Mr.
Chamberlain, and I emphasise it now, that
when this problem is solved, Germany has
no more territorial problems in Europe. I
shall not be interested in the Czech State
any more, and I can guarantee it. We
don't want any Czechs any more."

Hitler Acts

broken down Versailles, they had
broken the shackles which bound
down Germany, and one would have
thought that they would have been
satisfied with the enormous success
which they had achieved, but they
were not.

There was that in the Nazi revolution
which always tried for more and
always wanted to go to greater
extremes, and so, in 1938, after the
Treaty of Versailles had practically
become defunct, Austria was annexed
by Germany. March 1938 it was
Austria. March 1939 it was
Czechoslovakia and it was then, Sir,
that a complete change came over the
scene. Up to that time, up to 1938,
both the British Government and the
French Government of the time
thought that Germany had a case in
trying to wipe out this restrictive treaty

and it was impossible to wage a war
with Germany whilst she was clearing
away these bonds with which she had
been bound down. Up to that time
both Great Britain and France had
remained passive, but a complete
change came over the scene with the
attack on Czechoslovakia and the
disappearance of Czechoslovakia. And
the reason for the change was clear. In
the first place Czechoslovakia was not
part of the old Germany; had never
belonged to Germany. It was an alien
people speaking a different language,
of different race and descent and had
absolutely nothing to do with
Germany. Germany not only over-
whelmed a small independent people
like that on her border but she was out
for a policy of force and of domina-
tion, and the great eye-opener to the
whole world was the annexation of

Austria. I still look upon that, Sir, as
the greatest blunder that Hitler, who
has many outstanding qualities, has
committed; a blunder which has
precipitated us into this thing in which
we are launched, and has simply
forced his will and military superiority
on a small neighbouring independent
state. And he did this in the teeth of a
treaty which he had with Czecho-
slovakia, in the teeth of repeated
assurances which he had given to Mr.
Chamberlain, both verbally and in
writing. And when a ruler went to
those lengths of breaking his own
word, of abandoning his own stand-
point of bringing together the German
people, and the German people only,
Europe had to sit up and take notice.

But Hitler did not stop there. Within a
few weeks, after he had swallowed
Czechoslovakia, he was making extra-

ordinary demands on Poland. Now a
curious thing is, Sir, that only a short
while before Hitler had spoken very,
very nicely and pleasantly about
Poland. He actually had a treaty of
non-aggression with Poland which
was still running and that treaty had
still to run for years, a solemn treaty
which bound him not to attack Poland.
But after his victory over Czecho-
slovakia and the advance he had made
there he thought that he was justified
in going further, and without waiting
for any length of time he simply went
ahead and made demands on Poland
which Poland could not agree to. Well,
Sir, I say it was at this stage that a
great change took place. Mr. Cham-
berlain, who was a man of peace, who
had gone all out to preserve peace,
who had incurred odium, criticism,

Hitler Promises ..

On January 26th, 1934, Nazi Germany
concluded a Non-Aggression Pact with
Poland. It provided that in no circum-
stances would the two countries "proceed
to the application of force for the purpose
of reaching a decision of their disputes."
To this the German Chancellor, Adolf
Hitler, Fuehrer of the Nazi Party, added
his personal assurance. Speaking in the
Reichstag on May 21st, 1935, he said :
"We recognise, with the understanding
and the heartfelt friendship of true
Nationalists, the Polish State as the home
of a great, nationally-conscious people."
"The German Reich and, in particular, the
present German Government, have no
other wish than to live on friendly and
peaceable terms with all neighbouring
States."

Hitler Acts

obloquy, in going to Berchtesgarten, to
Godesberg, to Munich, for the sake of
maintaining the peace of the world,
together with other statesmen of the
world, then became convinced that
here was quite a different business.
Here was not an effort to do away with
Versailles and right ancient wrongs,
but here was a case where one state
was out to crush other states and to get
domination, gain a position of
domination in Europe. In order then to
stay the rot and to see that this process
did not go any further the British
Government gave an undertaking to
Poland in which it said if Poland was
attacked and if her independence was
at stake, Great Britain would stand by
her. The French made a similar treaty.
This treaty, this undertaking, this
guarantee, which was given to Poland
was given for one, and one, object

only, and that was to preserve the
peace of the world and not to get into
war. Not that they wanted war with
Germany. If there was anything that
both Great Britain and France were
anxious to avoid it was a war with
Germany, but they gave this under-
taking as a necessary step to peace.
They thought that at any rate Germany
would not act in the teeth of such a
guarantee, a guarantee which, if
broken, meant war, not with Poland
but with Great Britain and with France
also.

But by this time things had gone too
far. Hitler had a treaty with Russia in
his pocket. He thought his Eastern
flank was completely protected and his
army and his air force was big enough
to deal with any force that could be
brought against him by Great Britain
and France. The result is that that

attack took place on Poland. Poland
was overrun, was crushed, in a couple
of weeks, and Poland was ultimately
divided between Germany and Russia.
The step that was taken by Great
Britain and France was a peace step.
That guarantee was meant to preserve
peace and to keep Europe out of war
and what is more, Sir, Hitler knew
when he attacked Poland, by formal
announcement to him and assurances
to him, that this would mean war with
Great Britain and France. And I
say, if ever there was a case where
Great Britain has acted in defence,
where she was attacked, where the
attack was launched against her and
her own life was at stake it was this
case of the attack by Germany on
Poland. There is no way out of it.

If Hitler had thought these powers
would not come in and that he had

only to deal with Poland it might have
been different, but he acted with full
knowledge and with full official
assurance from both these powers that
an attack on Poland without negotia-
tion, without an attempt to come to a
peaceful settlement, would be an
attack on them. I say that in these
circumstances Hitler was attacking not
only Poland but Great Britain and
France also, and what I have said
before on platforms in this country,
more than once, and what was
approved by my colleagues, several of
my colleagues - I suppose all of my
colleagues in the Cabinet at the time -
namely, that if Great Britain were
attacked, if she were really in danger,
if it was a life and death struggle, I do
not see how this country could keep
out of it and we refuse to stand by her.
That had come about. That personal

opinion I mean was completely borne
out by the development of events, and
I say that this is what has actually
occurred, that against her will, against
all her efforts to maintain peace she
has been precipitated into war, not
through a mistake of her own, not
through an unnecessary guarantee that
was given to Poland but through a step
which she thought after the most
careful deliberation was essential for
the maintenance of peace.

If Hitler had been actuated by the
motives of an ordinary mortal being
that undertaking would have been
sufficient to deter him. But he did not
care. He had never failed. He had
always had success. He was drunk
with success and with power and he
was prepared to defy Great Britain and
France, and the result will be the same
as it was twenty years ago.

Is this the last step, is this the end, is
Poland the last victim? That is where
we are specially concerned in South
Africa. We know from repeated assur-
ances, from repeated statements which
have been made by members of the
German Government, by their organi-
sations and by Hitler himself that the
next chapter is the colonies. To us here
in South Africa the issue is quite a
narrow one. When we discuss our
interest, our own interest, from the
narrowest point of view - and if I may
say so, from the most selfish point of
view - we are brought directly up
against this question: Is it our interest
to keep South-West Africa? If it is in
our interest, can we humanly speaking
protect ourselves and protect our
interest in South-West Africa without
assistance from outside? Now I think
that nobody who knows what is

moving in the world, nobody who
understands the forces, that are
shaping history today, will disagree
with me when I say that we have no
human chance, no earthly chance in
defending South-West Africa if Great
Britain were to stand aside, the British
Fleet were not to protect these coasts,
and a powerful enemy like Germany
has a free run to attack us. Not the
least chance, not the least.

You have these armchair critics and
warriors who will spread their chests
and tell you how they will defend
South Africa and how they will defend
South-West Africa with the last drop
of their blood. They might spare
themselves that trouble and the
sacrifice of their last drop of blood
because the thing is hopeless. If we
have learnt any wisdom from what is
happening in the world of the force of

modern weapons we must feel
convinced that no such defence will be
possible. These are no longer the old
brave days of the Boer War when you
could get on your horse and ride from
one side of the country to the other.
Those days are gone. In the Boer War
I could get on my pony on the borders
of Swaziland and end here at the
Atlantic Ocean. You could do that.
You could defend yourself in a way
which staggered the world, but those
days are gone. You are doomed from
the very start. You will never get into
the fight at all, and poor Poland learnt
this lesson only the other day. She
thought she could defend herself. She
had a fairly big, well-equipped and
highly trained army, but she had not a
moment's chance. In a fortnight she
was squashed and finished from the air
and on the ground, and there is no

question that we could not defend
ourselves if we did not have behind us
the powerful arm of Great Britain, the
British Fleet. It is the English Fleet
that will be our protection in the hour
of danger and to tell this country that
looking simply at the interests of
South Africa we can remain neutral in
this crisis, we could cut away the
protection which we have, we could
isolate ourselves and invite isolation
from our friends, invite the following
of our example, if anybody told me
under those circumstances we could
defend our interests I can honestly say
I do not follow and do not understand
his reasoning.

The position is perfectiy plain, that if
we want to defend South-West Africa,
then we shall have to have powerful
friends in the world and today there is
no more powerful friend, no better

friend, no truer or firmer friend than
Great Britain. Supposing we were to
lose South-West Africa. What would
happen? We had a very curious side-
light the other day on the situation.
You will remember last year I piloted
through this Chamber, through the
other place and this House, a Bill to
take over the policing of South-West
Africa. We had sent a body of police
there to preserve law and order. I did
not put the case too strongly here. We
were at that time up against a very
serious situation in the world and we
did not want through any words of
ours or action on our part to give any
provocation to anybody. We took that
step. Why did we take it? Why did we
take the trouble and court the danger
of sending a body of police to keep
law and order in South-West Africa?
Well, a curious revelation was made in

the other place last week by an old
colleague of mine, Mr. Pirow. The
House will remember that I had said
before on the platform somewhere in
the country that if we had not taken the
step we had taken in South West Africa
of sending police there, that war,
instead of breaking out in Poland
might have broken out in South-West
Africa. We might have been the next
victim and not Poland, and in refer-
ence to that statement of mine my old
colleague, Mr. Pirow, speaking the
other day in the House of Assembly,
made a disclosure there which ought to
be very seriously weighed and ponder-
ed by every man in this country. He
said that I was against the step. I
personally was against the step and it
was he who persuaded General
Hertzog and he and General Hertzog
were for that step of immediately

sending police and running all the
risks connected with it.

Now, Mr. President, you know what
the reputation is which has been built
up for me in this country. I need not
repeat it here but I am held up as a
firebrand. I am held up as the man
who will invite trouble. I am the man
who will stop at nothing, certainly not
at bloodshed, in order to get my way,
but here you see a curious sidelight
revealed by Mr. Pirow as to what was
the real inwardness of the situation. He
and General Hertzog thought the
position was so serious in South-West
Africa that not a day could be waited.
Not a day's delay could take place
before this force was sent. I, with my
usual cautious nature, may have been
prepared to wait a bit and not rush in
prematurely and perhaps bring trouble
on our heads which would be too

much for us to carry, but they were so
persuaded of the danger that threaten-
ed that there could not be a moment's
delay, and that police force was to be
sent at once. Well, Mr. President, the
inference for this country is this, if
Germany could go to this length in
propaganda of fomenting of strife in
South-West Africa and proceed to
such lengths, that the Prime Minister
of this country, General Hertzog
himself, and Mr. Pirow himself could
not wait a moment but thought that the
outbreak was there, and was there
tomorrow, then things must have been
very, very serious indeed, far more
serious than it has been represented on
the platforms of this country and to the
people of this country. I say, can one
for a moment imagine that Germany
would have gone to all this length, that
all those preparations for trouble

would have been made in South-West
Africa if business was not meant, if it
did not mean to carry it through and to
get that country back by hook or by
crook.

They were following exactly the same
methods which had been followed in
Austria and in Czechoslovakia. You
know the method there. The method
was this, work internally, stir up strife,
create confusion, organise internally,
get at the (is it called) Fifth Division.
What did they call it in Spain? Get the
Fifth Division. Get a body inside the
country to beat it up, break its spirit
and break its defence internally and
that is exactly what was being done in
South-West Africa.

Mr. President, I do not want to say too
much about this country, but we must
be very blind to the signs of the times
during the last twelve months at least

if we do not see the dangers among
which we were living here, too, and it
is only too clear, Sir, that forces were
shaping here which might in a short
time have become just as dangerous as
those subversive forces appeared to
General Hertzog and Mr. Pirow in
South-West Africa. Mr. Pirow himself
evidently was under a deep impression
of the dangers here. He went to the
lengths of asking Colonel Stallard,
who was a political opponent of his,
although a personal friend, to form a
special force against sabotage. What
sabotage? What was the danger that
was threatening in this country? Mr.
Pirow was as convinced as anybody
that there were subversive movements
here in this country being fed and
stimulated underground which might
lead to almost anything, and he was
prepared to have a special force in this

country to deal with those situations.
Well, we have dealt with them. No
special force has been necessary. We
have our police force, and we have our
defence force, and once the situation
was grappled with those dangers to a
large extent - I won't say disappeared
- but to a large extent were driven
away from our doors. It all means this,
Mr. President, that the same methods
that were followed in the case of
Austria and Czechoslovakia and in
Poland, the same forces, the same
course, was being shaped here, and to
tell me after all that this was for
nothing, that this was just fun, this was
just amusement and no business was
intended, is to ask me a thing which I
certainly will not believe. In the propa-
ganda that has been carried on here,
this attack by night and by day against
the people of South Africa, through

propaganda, through these Nazi activi-
ties, are to me a proof that the
intention was that we should be the
next victims, and the people of this
country are determined not to be the
next victim or to be a victim at all.

Another point which has been raised
in argument in this connection is that
this country should have remained
neutral. It requires very little thinking
over the circumstances of South Africa
to convince ourselves that under the
circumstances of this country neutra-
lity is not a practicable policy and you
cannot carry it out. When you have a
situation such as we have in the world
and two great sea powers like Great
Britain and Germany, and you want to
carry out your obligations under the
Simonstown Agreement and other
agreements to which you are bound,
and you want at the same time to give

asylum to Germany's warships and
ships of all kinds in our harbours, you
are creating a situation which in my
opinion simply and finally is an
impossibility. The point is not worth
arguing. To think of Simonstown
being kept as a base for the British
Navy but the other ports of South
Africa being free asylum for German
warships and U-boats and the like, and
to think we can carry on as a neutral
country on that basis is really too
absurd for words.

(By An Hon. Senator: What about
Ireland?) The thing cannot be done.
You will have a situation which would
be absolutely impossible. My hon.
friend says, why does Ireland do it?
But he must remember the circum-
stances of Ireland. We are a united
South Africa. We have unity of people
in this united country and Ireland is a

divided country. Ireland is really two
countries today, and if we were to
follow the example of Ireland I should
like to know what would become of
our union and what would become of
our united South Africa. The thing is
not possible. You can put the argu-
ment in another way. Think of our
trade and think of our transport. Of
course this country has trade relations
with the whole world, but think of the
British Navy at Simonstown and
German warships, the Deutschland, or
the Graf Spee, or U-boats in other
harbours of South Africa. We would
have to allow it if we are neutral. We
shall have to give the same favours to
Germany as we give to Great Britain
and I should like to know how many
merchant ships there will be in our
harbours to carry away our produce in
those circumstances. I wonder what

ship in the world would under those
circumstances, with both sides lying in
wait to torpedo and sink them, come
here, and it is only too plain the
position would be an absolute impossi-
bility. We would have driven away all
our marine transport. We would not
have been able to get to the markets of
the world and South Africa would
have been reduced to a state of isola-
tion which would have been terrible to
contemplate.

Now the last point that has been raised
and the last effort in this campaign of
neutrality that has been made is that
we must now conclude a separate
peace. After five months, after all that
has happened, after we have taken a
firm stand and arranged our defences
on a certain basis, after we have taken
part in this war and taken part in hosti-
lities, practically cleared the enemy

-~i ^_

' Then is no ftuilitm that em cpjdd not tttftttd mtritha if
me did net have bthind its the ptovtrfui arm of Gnat Britain

and the British Fleet." — General Smuts.

away from our shores, and after all
those extreme steps we have taken we

have now to reverse our course and we
have to make a separate peace.

It is not possible. It is not possible
without dishonour and disgrace in this
country, and I do not think that the
people in this country, whatever their
views may be in politics, will be
capable of an act which to my mind
will brand us with disgrace and with
shame over the whole world. We shall
be looked upon as a treacherous nation
and a treacherous people on whom you
cannot rely and whose name will be
mud in the world. I think that is even
worse than anything else that has been
proposed. I can understand that we
could have chosen on the 4 th Septem-
ber to be neutral. It would have been a
ghastly mistake. It would have been a
political blunder of the first water, but
it was possible that we could have
done that. But to have deliberately

resolved on the 4 1 September to go
into the war and then five months
after, after all that has happened, to
back out, would have covered this
country with ridicule, with contempt,
and with disgrace. We would have
been left with no friends in the world.
And should we have made friends of
our enemy? I doubt it. No, Sir, I do not
think that South Africa will ever
embark on that course. We have made
our choice and we shall proceed on the
course on which we are. The name of
this country has been kept clear of
stain, clear of dishonour, in history.
We have had great ups and downs in
this country in its eventful history, but
no one can point a finger of scorn at
South Africa. Both European races
here have every reason and justifi-
cation to be proud of the name that
they have in the world. You can go

anywhere in the world today and the
name of South Africa will carry you
through more than the name of many
other small places, and I say, Sir, we
carry that forward as perhaps the most
precious inheritance from the past.

We have suffered, we have lost, we
have had ups and downs, but we are a
people reputed to be one whose word
you can take, whose bond you can
accept, and whose honour is unstained,
and whatever happens, Mr. President,
that name, that tradition, that inheri-
tance, we are going to pass over
untarnished to those who are coming
after us. I therefore now move this
motion. This House, the second
sovereign body of our Legislature
should be associated with this great
decision. Hon. Members here in this
Senate must be bound just as we have
been bound in the other place. We

shall all be bound in honour, in truth,
and in fidelity to the interests of South
Africa and to keeping her name high
up amongst the nations of the world.

(Official Hansard report compiled in booklet
form by T. C. Robertson of 500 Surrey House,
Commissioner Street, Johannesburg, and
published by the Union Unity Truth Service
from the same address.)

Printed by the Cape Times Ltd., Keerom
Street, Cape Town.

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