The global class war and the destiny of American labor

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Journal Title: The global class war and
the destiny of American labor /The
global class war and the destiny of
American labor /The global class war
and the destiny of American labor /The
global class war and the destiny of
American labor /

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Month/Year: Pages: (pp. 11-27)

Article Author: Marcy, Sam, 1911-

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REBRINT FROM--1953 Internal Bulletin of Socialist Workers Party
^DISTRIBUTED BY- -Revolutionary Communist League- (Internationalist)
j c.o-POB 1085 New Haven, CT 06504 USA

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by Sam Marcy, Buffalo

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I propose to discuss in this article what I believe to be the basic and underlying issues in the current dis-
cussion. The first one is: Is there an Independent destiny for the American proletariat? The second one is: Whet
is the historical fate of Stalinism in the new epoch of global class war, and how does this affect the task of tne
American vanguard, the SWP?

Let us consider the first issue, is it possible for the American proletariat to carve out for itself an in-
dependent destiny, an independent road toward socialism separate and apart from Europe and Asia? is it
possible to strike out oh an entirely new path, which will lead to the oroad highway of the American Revolution?
After all, is it not true that the American working class is stiil virgin soil, and reaiiy has no allegiance to any
political party in the sense that the Europeans, or the As.ans, or the Latin Americans have? Is it not possible to
start from a new beginning, brush aside the Stalinists as well as the debris of the various socialist sects and
begin anew, dig deeper and deeper into the trade unions, and conduct the struggles there in the spirit of tne in-
dependent class politics of Lenin? If we divorce ourselves from the fate of Europe and Asia, will we not cot 'tne
ear of the workers more readily? If the workers hate Stalinism and Russia, be it for good or for bad reasons, of
what concern is it to us if they will follow us on our path to socialism?

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Such is the situation in Russia, Eastern Europe and China, is it not far better to disregard the whole com-
plexity? Why take the onus of Europe's curses on our back? Why carry a burden which is not necessary,
and certainly not acceptable, to the American workers today and perhaps not oven adaptable to tr.e
American scene? Will we gain more by linking up our fate with the revolutions of the East and of Europe.
or by withdrawing from them? Does what is described as the revolutionary complex in Europe ana As. a
hinder or help us? is the revolutionary reality of Europe and Asia a magnet through which we can draw tne
most advanced elements into our party, or is this revolutionary reality not overshadowed and outwelghec
by the dark spectre of Stalinism? Will we gain more by drawing upon the revolutionary reality in Europe
and Asia, or wiii we lose more as a result of the terrific obstacles which Stalinism puts in our way as a bar
to the American worker?

I have raised this series of questions in a particularly sharp manner because i think it has a close
relevance to the present discussion. I have raised these questions because 1 have felt for a long time tr.at
sooner or later the process of uneven development in the revoiutionization of the world proletariat wouic
place these questions on the agenda in the American party. This would happen because of the tardiness
in the radicalization of the American working class and the fact that the revolutionary center of gravity is
still in the East. The revolutionary center of gravity has been moving with giant strides, but thus far, turtner
and further East, so that by now it has fully in its grip not only the continent of Asia, but Africa and ;he .V:o-
dle East. The tidal wave of world revolution abroad is in sharp contrast to the reactionary trend that has
dominated this country for several years now. That is why the above series of questions must be put on
the agenda and fuily examined.

Let us begin with the most elementary question. Is the American proletariat an independent social
entity? Obviously the answer is no. But let us pursue it a little further with the aid of a quotation from Lenin.

The Link in tho Chain

Lenin wrote:

"The whole of political life is an endless chain composed of an infinite number of links. The

11

whole art of the politician consists in finding and taking firm hold of the link that it is most dif-
ficult to take from you, the most important at the given moment and the one wnlcn best
guarantees to you the possession of the whole chain."

Lenin's reference to the link and the chain offers an almost perfect analogy of the relationship between
the American proletariat and the world-wide proletariat. Tne American proletariat is the link, the^ wor.d
proletariat is the chain. The American proletariat is historically the .-.ic;! Imporiar.t and deceive link for the
fate of the whole chain. But— and this is of the greatest importance— the link is indissolubiy ccnr.ectea
and intertwined with the whole chain. Separate the link from the chain and neither the link nor the chain
exists. If the American proletariat were a social entity not connected with the chain, then we could con-
sider the question of an independent destiny. But the American proletariat is an inseparable and com-
pletely inter-dependent link, not merely of the world proletariat, but of an entire global class camp. Unless
■we view the American working class in this light, we cannot see ii in proper historical perspective, nor can
we analyze the course of its ultimate destiny. In order to fully answer the questions posed, it is absolutely
necessary to consider the new world setting.

I have introduced in the above paragraph the conception of the global class camp, the camp of
which the American working class is an indispensable and key part whose fate, let me repeat, is com-
pletely tied up with it. The conception of our class camp is different today from any other period m tne
history of the working class. There was a period in the history of the working class when its camp was con-
fined almost exclusively to the exploited proletariat. That was in the period prior to the October Revolution
when it had relatively few allies among the oppressed masses in the colonies and dependent countries
when the latter slept the sleep of centuries. Of course they were always allies in a social^sense but not
politically articulate. In the epoch that saw the rise of the victorious revolution in the USSR headed by
Lenin and Trotsky, tne Soviet Union was at the head of the camp of the exploited wnich already induced
. millions of awakened colonial masses. In the epocn of Stalinist degeneration and the consequent .soiat.on
of the Soviet Union, the isolated workers state introduced a monstrous distortion, mutilation and atemiza-
tion within the camp of the world proletariat, in the present epoch our class camp is not only constituted
differently because it is a new historical period, but because it has a number of characteristics which dis-
tinguish it from the previous epocn.

In What Manner lo Our C'sgo Camp Divverent then in the Previous Epoch?

In the first place, the camp of the proletariat today, unlike the previous epoch, has the bulk of the op-
pressed peoples in the colonies and dependent countries within its camp as allies. The mass of peasants, semi-
and non-proletarian elements of the backward countries, which in previous epochs were the reserve of im-
perialist reaction, can now be regarded not merely in a social but in the political sense as well, as having oeen
attracted to and daily becoming more and more part and parcel of the camp of tne proletariat. Tr,e
revolutionary ferment all over the colonial world is testimony to tnis fact. Our class camp is numerically mucn
larger, much more politically conscious than in ail previous epochs. The second characteristic of our c;ass
camp is that it has state ailies, states where the working class, if not in a political sense, then certainly in a social
' and historic sense, holds the ruling power. The third characteristic of our camp, as different, atec from tne
Stalinist epoch proper, is that the deformity and mutilation introduced by the Stalinist leadership at the heac of
this camp is now on the threshold of its exit from the historical scene; whether this be a matter of months, or a
few years is not of great moment. What is of great moment is that the conditions for its existence are si'pp.ng
from under its feet. The fourth characteristic of our class camp is that the new state allies, China ano Eastern
Europe, by their very existence, have so thoroughly undermined the foundations of the imper:a.,st structure tr.at
it can virtually be said that the world relationship of forces has been definitely and irretrievably turned in favor of
our camp. However, this turn in the relationship of forces does not automatically deciae the fate of our camp,
but merely sets the stage for the inevitable struggle.

Our camp, the camp of the exploited, is still characterized by the same deficiencies which have
characterized the exploited, oppressed and subjugated classes in all previous historical epoens. It lacks, tirst
and foremost, at its head, a leadership willing, capable and ready to insure victory in the unfolding cenfiict wan
imperialism. As in all previous historical epochs, tne exploited classes are still bilnoea by tne class enemy's
poisonous ideology of sectionalism and narrowmincedness, the purveyors of whicn are the labor lieutenants of
capitalism and the Stalinist bureaucracy. Our camp needs unity but in large part is characterise instead cy
totalitarianism. It needs revolutionary internationalism but instead is consistently being injected w.th the
chauvinism of imperialism or the no less virulent chauvinism of the Moscow oligarchy, mis enure class camp

12

with all its shortcomings, with all its dire failings, with ali the terrible handicaps of treacherous leadership, is
nevertheless moving onward, not consistently, not uniformly, not everywhere with the same tempestuous
revolutionary sweep, but it is moving steadily and invading the fortresses of imperialism. Our class czrr.p, it
becomes plainer every day, constitutes an invincible and whoily viable social formation. The struggle that It is
conducting is many-sided, it fights its battles not only economically and politically but, as is now evident, with
military means.

Th© Glo'szl Cisca War

Actually, there has been a global war on ever since Korea. The bourgeoisie has long been aware of this,
and its most authoritative representatives are applying the conception of the global war with every new turn of
■the situation. Let us examine this war before we resume our main point, the relationship of the American
proletariat to the entire class camp.

On May 4, 1953, the Nov/ York Times, in an editorial on the crisis in Indo-China, wrote:

"Thus what might seem at first glance to be a small jungle war in the hinterland of a little
and obscure state in the interior of Southeast Asia comes into perspective as part of a
great global conflict that is both physical and ideological. It cannot be divorced from other
developments in that conflict. It must be seen, therefore, in (this) iight . . ."

Thus we see from this authoritative organ of the big bourgeoisie that they regard the war from an
exclusively global viewpoint, and the bourgeoisie has so regarded it for quite a long time. Of course, the
bourgeoisie does not in so many words characterize the global struggle as a global class war. Why should
it? The bourgeoisie must always mask the class character of its precatory wars in the interests of cuplng
the masses.

I believe I was the first one to show that the global war was in reality a global class war. I did this in
a memorandum submitted as material for a pre-convention discussion entitled r.'.c mo rar.durr. or. the Un-
folding War on October 29, 1950. (Internal Bulletin Vol. XII, No. 4) In this memorandum I stated:

"ine tact mat the opening phase of the war may manifest itself (or rather conceal itself),
even if only initially and temporarily, as a war between nations, should not in the slightest
degree obscure its ciearcut class character, it !c r.ct a war bclwcan the naiio.-.o but a war
between the ciaccies ... in this war the geographical boundaries are social boundaries,
the battle formations are class iu'rr.ations, and the world line of demarcation ;s the line
rigidiy drawn by the socialist interests of the world proletariat. Every worker must know
his place as well as his duty."

We must now come back to the elementary generalization made earlier to the effect that the
American proletariat is not an independent social entity but, on the contrary, an unbreakable iink in the
class chain, it must share its fate and its destiny, and since its role is enormous and decisive within the camp, ali
the heavier are its responsibilities to the camp.

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If the global class war has done one thing on the American scene, it has definitely and forever ended
that variety of bourgeois isolationism of which the old Senator Boran was a typical representative. The present
day bourgeois "isolationists" are thoroughly internationalist and profoundly class-conscious of the vital interests
of the entire bourgeois camp. They defend the world bourgeois camp regardless of the political clique which
may head this or that capitalist government, whether it be in Formosa or Belgium. Their isolationism is mereiy a
mask, a trick and device to put across a thoroughly internationalist and imperialist approach. Their viewpoint is
global in character. Theyseek to fight the socialist revolution on a world scale. The difference of opinion among
them does not really rotate around the issue of nationalism vs. internationalism, but on which section of o^r
class camp they should open their next military operation. The most sooer and the most irreconcilable
statesmen of the camp of Wall Street show the most profound class consciousness when thoy defend every
landlord, every bourgeois, every kindred social group on the globe against the invasions of tne revolutionary
movement.

But how does this concern the American working class? Can we not prosecute the class struggle at
home in a way that would not involve the issues raised above?

13

Let us take a typical union on the vast industrial Niagara frontier, where a membership meeting is in
progress. The union is the 1UE-C10 representing the Westinghouse iocal, a iocal by no means extinguished for
its lack of militancy. One of the issues on the agenda is the .VicCarran Act. which is a good issue tor the ml iitants
to fight on. But the resolutions all emanate from the CIO National Office. What is the line of the resolutions? They
call for amendment of the Act, but not of those provisions which victimize radical workers and call for the
deportation of others. They call for amending the Act so that certain categories of displaced persons like ex-
landlords," ex-generals, ex-businessmen, ex-bankers and "people with skills and abilities" from the "Iron Cur-
tain" countries can have easier access to the USA. The resolutions aim to strengthen "democracy" at home by
fighting the- "Reds" abroad. This is "internationalism," the internationalism of the Wail Street banker as
transmitted by his labor lieutenants in tne ranks of the workers.

This variety of internationalism has been raging to a lesser or greater degree for several years
now, and as long as the global class war continues, such a variety of internationalism is bound to continue.
We cannot circumvent it, we cannot get around it, and we cannot chart out a course whicn would avoic it.
(We are not here concerned with what our sparsely placed fractions can do under present conditions; we
are talking about our approach to this question from a longer term perspective). To tne line of imperialist
internationalism brougnt in by the labor fakers, we must have a proletarian, internationalist line wnich
combats it effectively. This calls for an intransigent global class line, which meets the issues raised oy the
labor fakers in a class manner. If we do not do this, then we are leaving the arena to tne Stalinists.

To project a line whereby we avoid taking such a position is charting a course for "socialist"
isolationism, a pale reflection of the hoary bourgeois isolationism that has iong vanished from tne
American scene. It is no effective answer to the imperialist-minded labor bureaucracy, who are lining up
the workers to fight the "Reds" on a global scale to safeguard the "free worid." Their politics are geared to save
the "free world" from "world communism." There can hardly be any national issue in the labor movement of any
scope which is not directly affected by the labor bureaucracy's line on "communism." Even the simplest ana
most elementary issue on Jim Crow or housing, or even any municipal issue which takes on seme snarpness
and momentum, like the issue of loyalty oaths for tenants in federally subsidized housing projects, immed.ateiy
takes on the aspect of a fight against communism, i.e. the giooai ciass struggle, nub i& nuw i.iicniouw.cl.oi,, !o
an issue to the American workers every day in the year.

To fight this issue effectively does not mean waiting for the powder kegs, which American imperialism is
preparing all over the world, to expiode on the home front. It dees not mean waiting for the development of
purely national issues to arise on the domestic scene, which can be separate and apart from tne wor;d strugg.e.
All national issues of any real momentum w.ii be increasingly connected with the international struggle. Our
program, tactics, and strategy must be geared to this.

TAs Trotsky said in The Third International after Lenin,

I "In our epoch, not a single communist party can establish its program by proceeding sole-
ly or mainly from conditions and tendencies of developments in its own country . . . The
revolutionary party of the proletariat can base itself only upon an international program
corresponding to the character of the present epoch, the epoch of the highest oeveiop-
ment and collapse of capitalism. An international communist program is in no case tne
sum total of national programs or an amalgam of their common features ... In the present
epoch, to a much larger extent than in the past, the national orientation of the proletariat
must and can flow only from a world orientation and not vice versa. Herein 'lies the basic
and primary difference between communist internationalism and all varieties of national

socialism." ^

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Now let us see how far the line of our party has been in accord with the conception of the emergence of
two irreconcilable class camps in global conflict for hegemony over society. Let us examine Comrade Cannon's
pamphlet, "The Road to Peace According to Lenin and According to Stailn." Comrade Cannon's pamphlet was
not written in some by-gone era of peaceful development. It was published in 1951 in the midst of the era c; tne
global class war. The author's point of departure is not the existing world of social relationships. True
enough, there is a passage where Comrade Cannon makes allusion to "the class struggle of the workers
merging with the colonial revolutions in common struggle against imperialism." but he does not indicate

14

that this concrete world we are living in is torn by two irreconcilable class camps whose struggle has
already broken out in military warfare, where the casualties are already counted in the millions, v.'here the
fighting is on opposite sides of the class barricades. ,

But Comrade Cannon's pamphlet, as the subtitle incicates, is "accordjng to Ler.in and according
to Stalin." It is the road to peace according to Lenin that we are interested in. The road to peace, as Lenin
taught us, is through ruthless and implacable class war. The war in Korea is a class war. It has to be waged
in that manner. Nowhere in his pamphlet does Comrade Cannon ever characterize the war as a class war.
One has to infer it or guess it. Nor does he view it as part of a general class war. Comrade Cannon points
out that according to Lenin, war in the epoch of imperialism is inevitable. That is true. And it is also good
criticism of the perfidious Stalinist theory of co-existence. But it is not sufficient criticism of Stalin's roac to
peace to say that co-existence is a delusion, and that war is inevitable. It must also be shown that we, the
Leninists, are for the road to peace in this concrete global class war through the vigorous, unrelenting and
energetic prosecution of the war. Our road to peace is fighting the war to a finish through the combined
efforts of the exploited and oppressed in our camp. This also is not shown in Comrade Cannon's
pamphlet. The American proletariat is not depicted as an inseparable detachment of one army In one
class camp whose aim is overall victory over the class enemy. Furthermore, Comrade Cannon does not
deal with Korea as a pi-.aoo of the class war. He does not see the battlefield in Korea as a picket line or one
of a series of worid picket lines demarcating the socialist interests of the global class struggle.' In effect, he
does not deal with the war from a thoroughly revolutionary internationalist point of view.

Comrade Cannon's pamphlet is largely devoted toward exposing the treacherous co-existence
theory of the Stalinists. That, of course, is excellent criticism. But merely demolishing this theory opens up
no perspective. Stating that the war is inevitable is correct, but it does not by itself indicate a solution.
General references to "the struggle for socialism" are also inadequate. To give "the struggle for socialism
and against the war" a concrete meaning, one must clearly and unambiguously show the roac of
thorough-going revolutionary CGveaiicrri in the camp of imperialism, and the roac ov revolutionary cicfen-
sisrn in relation to the USSR, Eastern Europe, China and the rest of the colonial worid. One must make ab-
solute'^ C^?*" that th^co Sa/a /••r.'";*'/-ilAr.v~.r.V'-ri/ ^o^'rv; r»f iha \>mr[.~) r\rn!.->*ar 1st fip\.y frnrr* nno ctrr^t^r- i.-c.i lina

of defending the socialist interests of the entire ciass camp from imperialist attack. This too is not shown
in Comrade Cannon's pamphlet. He therefore shows no effective revolutionary alternative as against the
Stalinist tactic of the treacherous, vacillating, collaborationist line known as "co-existence."

It may be claimed that Comrade Cannon's pamphlet was directed to the broad masses of workers.
Hence the sharp revolutionary formulations outlined above would be unsuitable. But Comrade Cannon's
pamphlet aims to demolish the theory of co-existence. Tnere are only two groups in the USA at the pre-
sent time who are against the theory of co-existence, the extreme Right and tne extreme Left. By the
nature of the pamphlet, it could only be directed toward those raoical workers wno are against tne
capitalist status quo, against co-existence from the Left. And to these workers it is insufficient to merely
give as the alternative to co-existence the theory of the inevitability of war, without posing in the sharpest
form the complementary tactics of revolutionary defeatism and revolutionary defensism. Otherwise, the
theory of the inevitability of war assumes a fatalistic and utterly passive character.

It has been traditional in our movement to include a section on the unconditional defense of the USSR in
any document or popular pamphlet which deals with war. Comrade Cannon's pamphlet, cealing precisely witn
this question, the question of war, in order to continue this tradition, should contain such a section. But ail that
we can find in Comrade Cannon's pamphlet is a bare reference to the "heritage of October." No one except a
party member could possibly infer from this isolated phrase that our movement is for the unconditional defense
of the USSR.

Such a section— on the defense of the USSR— is all the mere necessary, particularly because Comrade
Cannon goes into such detail in his descriptions of the monstrous crimes of Staiinsim. Where one deals in sucn
meticulous detail with the degeneration of the Soviet state and Stalinism, it is all the more important to make
crystal ciear our defensist position on the USSR. 1 am not for splashing ail over the pages of the iV.liitar.t blazing
headlines of unconditional defense of the USSR. But every worker who is tninking at all about politics
sooner or later approahces us with this question: "Where do you stand on Russia?"

15

The Soviet Union is a contradictory phenomenon. It is a revolutionary social system with a counter-
revolutionary leadership. Comrade Cannon expounds on the concentration camps, frame-ups, etc. What
he says is true. But this truth alone is insufficient.

There was a time when we were practically the only group in the labor movement consistently ex-
plaining this truth from the revolutionary point of view. But today the bourgeoisie has seized upon ;his
aspect of the Soviet state and broadcast it to the four corners of the earth. Today this is practically aii the
American worker hears. It is drummed into his ears day in and day out by the tremendous capitalist ap-
paratus of radio, television, the press and the pulpit. He identifies the reactionary aspect of the Soviet
Union with the entire social system, just as the capitalist class wants him to do. Hence, it is ail the more
obligatory to emphasize the other side of the Soviet Union, its class character, its new social system. It is
necessary to explain that it is a living, viable workers' state, an historic sain of the working class, a con-
quest to be defended.

Unfortunately this is not at all indicated in Comrade Cannon's pamphlet. Nor is it indicated in his
Los Angeles speeches, which are replete with references to the planned economy of what is characterized
as the "nationalized sector" without mentioning that we defend the boundaries of this "sectcr." We are
taking too much for granted if we assume that the American workers will gather that we defend the Soviet
Union, by merely rendering acknowledgement of a superior type of economy.

It is not so much that we have to emphasize the defense of the USSR from the point of view of
military defense, although that too wilt be of importance at a later date. Most important in the emphasis of
the defense of the USSR is its pointed method of shewing to which ciass camp we oelong. By continually
emphasizing defense of the USSR as well as China and Eastern Europe, we make crystal clear that we are
an inseparable part of the entire world camp. It is in this connection that the posing of the defense of the
USSR is more important and more urgent in our propaganda and agitation than ever before.

By consistently and persistently elaborating our defensist position on the USSR, Eastern Europe
and China, we are affirmatively showing our ciass solidarity with our class camp. Now since the issues of
conciliationism toward Stalinism, and Stalinophobia are being raised, is not this the best way to demarcate
and differentiate ourselves from Stalinism — to crushingly answer these mutually opposing accusations, to
show that we not only fight Stalin but are the most vigorous, most loyal and most determined cefenders of
the USSR?

In this connection, a lead article by Comrade Hansen on the death of Stalin contains the same flaw as
Comrade Cannon's pamphlet. As a matter of fact, an examination of our weekly paper for the past several years
indicates a steady and undiminished tendency to play down the revolutionary defense at a time when it is most
necessary and essential. Rare is the occasion when any mention ever appears in our press of tne defense of tne
USSR. It might almost be said that it only lives in the memory of those wno knew our position of old. At a t.rr.e
when the USSR is playing such a tremendous role on the international arena, and at a time when it is most
necessary to expose the real character of the Stalinists, we ougnt to make clear that we are not only for tne
defense of the USSR, but that we are its most determined, most devoted and most loyal defenders. We ought to
make clear that our defense of the Soviet Union is not only revolutionary, but effective; and the bureaucracy is
vacillating, one-sided, nationalistic, and in the long run disastrous. This is our point of departure as against the
Stalinists.

Comrade Hansen's article on Stalin describes his historical role as the agent of counter-revolution and
goes through the familiar crimes of Stalin, covering his long ana infamous career as the leader of the Soviet
bureaucratic caste. I, of course, have no quarrel with his depicting the crimes of the bureaucracy. But nowhere
in this article does Comrade Hansen really indicate cietcr.c-o o: the UGCS. It is wrong and impermissible, that
his vague reference to the defense of the USSR is written in such a way that only a Trotskyist with years of
party membership could possibly guess that we are for this defense. We are, of course, for the ccfer.se,
not only in the sense that the workers of the world in capitalist countries should defend it against im-
perialism, but that in the USSR we are the best soldiers in any such struggle, and the most arce.it
defenders of the social base of the USSR. From Comrade Hansen's article, no one would conclude tnat we
defend the USSR as we defend a labor union against the bureaucrats, that is, by defending it heart and soul
against its ciass enemy and its own misieaciers.

16

Such a bold position, it wiii be objected, will put us way out on a limb, particularly in a country
where the reaction is so severe. This objection may be vaiid to some extent. Still, tactics could be ad-
justed. The main strategical conceptions, however, ir.ust bo made clear as dayi!:,;-.';, even if it means our
temporary isolation.

This general point is a hundred times more valid in relation to China and Korea. Aside from the initial
error that was made in our approach to Korea, the clearcut character of the struggle on the Asian continent as a
class struggle, as a struggle between imperialism and the world-wide working ciass and its allies among the op-
pressed colonial peoples is still not being made clear enough or sharp enough to demarcate us from ail
varieties of pacifists, liberals, or Stalinist supporters. We must make plain that in the struggle in Korea, cr any
other place on earth, between the two class camps, we pursue a line of revolutionary defeatism.
Moreover — and this is very important from the point of view of our differentiation from the Stalinists ana
all sorts of pacifists— we wish to facilitate the victory of our side, our class side, regaroiess of its tem-
porary leadership. At the same time, we mercilessly expose all the reactionary, wrong, inadequate
policies pursued by the Kremlin and foisted upon the leaderships of the colonial masses in Asia, and
counter-pose the revolutionary, Leninist-Trotskyist line to victory. It is to be noted that the Minority's at-
tack on Comrade Cannon's pamphlet does not refer to this vital question.

The need for strengthening our position on the defense of the Soviet Union has been apparent for
several years. As long ago as December 7, 1943, Comrade Cannon addressed a letter to me on some of-
ficial business, in the course of which he asked me for my opinion of his "Proposals for a Propaganda
Campaign," I replied to Comrade Cannon on December 14, 1943 as follows:

"Your project should include a more consistent, more clearcut exposition and rearma-
ment of our own evaluation of the USSR and Stalinism in general. This means to re-
interpret the expansion of Stalinism on the European continent and in Asia strictly in the
terms and analysis made by Trotsky in "In Defense of Marxism." In my view everything
that has happened in Europe and Asia can stili be accurately gauged with the yarcstiCk
employed by Trotsky in his analysis of the 1939 events in Finland and in Poland. It appears
to me that there has been some backsliding on this question as evidence oy our co-
thinkers' theses (1S47) which we amenaed attheiast plenum (1948). But the very necessi-
ty for the amendments shows that we were approaching a danger signal." (The reader will
note by the dates that 1 was referring to our co-thinkers' tnesis of 1947, and not the 1951
thesis which is the one involved in the current discussion).

"We stand for the position of unconditional defense of the Soviet Union," my letter con-
tinued, "and all territories of the so-called satellites where the means o; production have
been nationalized and planned economy introduced. Nothing that has happened on the
international arena has in the slightest degree invalidated our position . . ."

In this letter I. also suggested that our magazine "should regularly carry polemical materia; against
. the Shachtmanites, not-withstanding their numerical insignificance in the labor movement." One of the
main thoughts motivating this whole letter was a fear of adaptation to the dominant trend of reaction in
American society.

The defense of the Soviet Union must be implemented in our activity as well as in our propaganda.
It is difficult, of course, to find a way to the masses with this important principle. But the way must be
found.

The Rosenberg Case offers in every respect an accurate gauge of my position toward Stalinism and the
Soviet Union in relation to the American Scene. Let us first discuss the position from the point of view of princi-
ple.

Suppose we assume that the Rosenbergs are "guilty" of stealing important documents, etc., of engag-
ing in so-called espionage. We all know that espionage is an element inseparable from the conduct of the
foreign affairs of any state, be it a workers' state or an imperialist one. It would be the sheerest nonsense
to assert that any state does not spend enormous amounts of money for such purposes. Even a state with
a revolutionary leadership would of necessity have its intelligence department. Why do governments ex-
change naval, military, and air attaches if not lor such purposes? The U.S. Government publicly boasts

17

that it spends hundreds of millions of dollars for espionage in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it is
no accident that Walter Bedeil Smith, now one of the Under-Secretaries of State, is the former heao of the
U.S. Central intelligence Agency (CIA) and was formerly ambassador to Moscow.

Now we are living in the epoch of a global class war, a war which can only end in the demolition of or.e of
the contenders.it is a ruthless and implacable war to the death. Espionage is an inescapable concomitant in the
preparation and prosecution of such a war.

If the Rosenbergs, let us assume, had admitted that they did steal these documents— which is not so in
this case— from a class point of view they would have committed no crime. We do not advocate these tactics.
They are not necessary for the class struggle in the USA, and needless to say, we do not collaborate in any of
these activities. But in the global class war which spans the continents and the oceans these cases are bound to
be legion. Accordingly, from the class point of view and to the extent that circumstances permit, we must ce-
fend them.

If we are to do this, we cannot merely be "me too" supporters. A party which takes its position on this
question clearly, boldly and courageously from the point of view of principle must not merely give support:
it must attempt to seize the initiative in the matter, whenever that is available. It is claimed tact the Zc'.'.';
Worker also kept siient for a time about the case. Sut it seems to me that is ail the more reason why we
should have taken the lead. That would have been an excellent medium for exposing tne Stalinists.

Now the question that immediately arises on the basis of the Rosenberg line I have presented
above is: would it not put us completely out on a limb? That indeed is a crucial question. Still, if we regard
ourselves as having the revolutionary alternative to Stalinist rnetnods; if we regard ourselves as being the
genuine expression of the independent class politics of the proletariat on a world scale; if our party is. tne
historical instrument for giving expression to the needs of the working class, as against the perfidious
methods of the Stalinists: then in taking this bold position on the Rosenberg Case, first of all from the point
of view of the class principle and secondly from the point of view of the oefense of civil rights in general,
we would be presenting a clear and independent class alternative as aistinguishec from tne Stalinists.

Another question that would be raised as an objection to this line is that it would tend to isolate us
even more than we are now. But even if that were the case, it would in the long run pay o:f. Had we bcloiy
taken the initiative in the Rosenberg Case, it is ciear on the basis of what subsequently happened, our
standing with the radical elements might have been appreciably better than it is tocay. I do not tn.nk it
would necessarily have accomplished a great deal as far as concerns party growth, but it mignt have
added to our periphery, and it certainly would have served as an excellent example.

The Rosenberg Case is an outstanding example of our problems in relation to Stalinism on the
American scene. The Stalinists appear in the eyes of most radical workers as the extreme Left. Unfor-
tunately, our party is almost unknown to broad sections of the radical workers of America. A prcoiern for
the party is to be abie to distinguish itself from the CP, not as another variety of radicalism but as tne
revolutionary expression of Marxism and as tne real Communists in contrast to the Stalinists, who ere tne
real "pinks." To be abie to do this in a period of reaction is a truly gargantuan task. Sut unless we make
ourselves clear on just sucn questions, we shall run the risk of not winning the vanguard to our s:ce. I
repeat: we cannot be mere supporters of the Rosenberg Case. We are either the best, the most devoted,
the most conscious, the most conscientious fighters in just such cases, or we are in danger of appearing
as simply another variety of radicals, while the Stalinists wiil appear as the "real McCoy."

We should have made our class position clear in the Rosenberg Case. We should boldly have
taken the initiative in this matter ahead of the Stalinists and carried on the fight in such a manner as to
show to all the world -the difference in approach between genuine Communism ana its Stalinist
counterfeit.

As the Rosenberg Case demonstrates, the party has a tremendous problem in relation to Stalinism, it is
not so much that they steal our thunder. It is that we are not utilizing the vast reserves of our revolutionary Marx-
ist position and are drifting a/or.3 rather than driving a conscious iine.

To pursue the case a little further: I understand from the New York Time;; that there was a
Rosenberg rally at the Triborough Bridge Auditorium in New York which was attended by 10,003
people— a tremendous audience. considering the period we are living in. Now my approach to this ques-

18

tion is as follows: did we do cur utmost to reach these people with our message and literature in the
traditional manner? Did we do all in our power to penetrate the mass of this audience with our ideas? if we
did not then it was a gross error.

Did either the Majority or Minority leaders propose any concrete course of action in relation to this
rally? I don't know. But I do know that if in Buffalo there were a meeting of this character, were It to cons.st
of only thirty people, our party would be there "the fastest with the mostest." This goes not merely for
Stalinist peripheral organizations but for any organization where advanced or liberal elements are
gathered. And this goes hand in hand with our trade union line and in no way contradicts it.

The Rosenberg Case is a world case by now. In treating the Rosenberg Case, what is important for
us as the class vanguard is to present the proletarian world point of view. This is our most va.uabie asset.
.our method of presenting it from the class point of view, particularly as against Stalinism, which presents it
from the point of view of formal bourgeois democracy only.

Of course, we also defend the Rosenbergs from the point of view of elementary bourgeois
democratic rights, and we participate in any organization which defends bourgeois democratic rights
from reactionary incursions. But we cannot regard any such case exclusively from the viewpoint of
bourgeois democracy, since in that case we lose our specific class approach.

The Rosenberg Case— and I am merely using it as a vehicle to express my position and not so
much because of its importance— should also be regarded in another light: from the point of view of tr.e
current discussion on propaganda. The case offered an opportunity for action, for live action. I unders-
tand that there were about a thousand people in a picket line in front of the White House,. demanding
clemency from Eisenhower, in such an action we should participate, because it gives us an opportunity to
test ourselves in combat, an opportunity to fight. For without. !!vo, action, without testing, Without ex-
perience through combat, without matching in action our class line against our opponents, we nave no
opportunity of learning and gauging our results.

I view such an action as the "hard" line against Stalinism, i view it as a field for combat. There is
nothing worse, on the other hand, than merely to watch the developments of the Rosenberg Case or any

"*•'>-•"""'-" - ' ~.. - -J • f--»w -' -J . »■-' •■■•';,■ ^ " - ■-- i_.^ ' ■ y ' " - ' " • O-

any action even on the smallest, the tiniest and most modest scale—idleness, wnicn becomes the
transmission belt for ail sorts of moods ieading to demoralization.

In 1947 the Stalinists projected the idea of a"vetocade" to Washington to protest against the immi-
nent passage of the Taft-Hartley Bill. At that time the CP in the Buffalo area had a considerable infiuer.ee
in the labor movement. We immediately sought to seize the initiative in this vetocade, ana while we didn't
obtain the entire initiative, our comrades did a magnificent job, tested themselves in ideological r.and-to-
hand combat with the Stalinists; and to this day this "vetocade" remains not only one of our most valuable
experiences but also a testimonial to our approach, an approach motivated by a desire to enter into com-
bat, to engage in class struggle activities of any type, and to make crystal clear our independent class and
political approach.

The Willie McGee Case, which was also under the sponsorship of the Stalinists, is another exam-
ple, Here too we seized the initiative in our area. We gathered thousands of signatures, distributed 6,000
Militants, and carried out a motorcade in the heart of the Negro area.

If there really were any illusions in regard to Stalinism or any type of conciliaticnism, as Comrade
Cannon claims, then it would be al! the more obligatory to participate in such actions. For u is oniy
through experience that illusions are demolished.

Let me cite here something which I consider another tactical slip-up on the part of our party. On
January 29, 1949 I wrote to Comrade Stein proposing that the Political Committee offer Comrade Cannon
as a defense witness, an expert on revolutionary Marxism, as a method of intervening in the C? trials. Oct
purpose, I stated then, would be, along with taking the initiative in this intervention, to show the
revolutionary Marxist line in contradistinction to the Stalinists.

And in a post script written one day later I point out that this wouid "show our solidarity with the
Stalinists as against the capitalist frame-up." "Of course." the letter continued, "the Stalinists wii! never
accept us as defense witnesses. Their refusal then couid be publicly utilized not only to expose them but
also to offer to the labor movement generally an example of our united front tactics in relation to de-ren-
ding all working class victims of capitalist persecution." I further suggested that the party submit what is
known as an amicus curiae brief. The Stalinists themselves would have had no say in either accept. ng or

19

rejecting this brief. But even without acceptance of the brief, the mere fact of its presentation, which would
necessarily have been reported in the capitalist press of the nation, would have shown to the workers of
America where we stood, in spite of the Stalinist leadership, indeed, right over the heads of the Stalinist
leadership, it would have been a clear appeal to the better elements of the Stalinist rank and file and one
that could hardly be distorted.

While I did not anticipate earth-shaking results from this proposed tactic, still it would have been a
method directed toward strengthening and refurbishing our revolutionary position before the world.
Comrade Stein and the Secretariat, however, did not accept the proposal; and 1 feel that this a regrettable
further addition to what has already been said concerning the Rosenberg Case.

To sum up the Rosenberg Case, the fact that it became such a tremendous issue on the American
scene specifically, as well as on the world scene, indicates how Utopian and visionary it is to seek out an
independent course for the American workers, separate and apart from engaging in such struggles as
this. This case demonstrates how inextricably interwoven are the politics of the American scene with those
of the world struggle. In particular it demonstrates how interlinked are the politics of our party with our en-
tire class camp, of which American labor is one of the iinks. And, as we said at the very beginning of cur
article, an indispensable link, and historically the most decisive.

Before going further with the question of the independent destiny of the American working class,
let us consider for a moment the question of the American Stalinists, and our tactics toward them, i ms
flows from the first question. But it interacts with it also. And its consideration will help us to view the
matter from another side.

Tho Trot'dcy Cor.vcrzzV.or.s

jhP TrnRi<v conversations as renorted in the stenogram (Interna! Bulletin. Vol. 15, No. 10) throw a fresh
light on Stalinism and our attitude toward it. The 1S40 discussions with Trotsky are in every way illuminating and
rich in content. It is in these conversations that we see the problem of problems: our relation and attitude toward
the Stalinists when thsy are in their "lew" turn. More than thirteen years have eiapsec since then, years
which have been characterized not only by war but by revolution as well. It is in the light of the new worlc
reality that we must view these conversations and not mereiy in the light of the conditions as they existed
in 1940.

In a note to the discussion by Comrade George Clarke, he states that what is significant in the at-
titude of Trotsky's opponents toward giving Browder critical support is that it "duplicates almost woro for
word today the furious opposition to proposals or a far more restricted nature than critical support cf a C?
presidential candidate. The contrast is further highlighted," says Clarke, "by the fact that the Stalinist
movement has been in a pseudo-left turn for more than five years, and the ferment in their ranks is ob-
viously more deepgoing than in the brief period of the Staiin-Hitier Pact."

That there is and has been ferment in the Stalinist movement today as it was during the time of the
Trotsky conversations is only too clear to require further proof. What we must do before considering the
validity of any tactical orientation toward the Stalinists is to determine the social character of the
"ferment" within the CP. Is the ferment or the dissatisfaction in the Stalinist ranks due to the CP's pacifist
line, its policy of "co-existence," its lack of a revolutionary proletarian line against war? in other words, is
the ferment in the Stalinist movement due to the urgings of the rank and file for a more revolutionary line,
or is it due to the fact that under the furious blows of reaction the C? cannot hold its followers even with a
mildly pseudo-leftist anti-war line? (To make it clearer, is the ferment in the CP due to the fact that the
rank and file are seeking a more revolutionary line, and are dissatisfied with the pacifist, co-existence line
of the CP?) If we examine the ferment in the CP in this light we can only come to the conclusion that tne
ferment is primarily due to the blows of the reaction and the severity of the witch-hunt. In my opin.on, tne
dissatisfied and disoriented elements in the Stalinist movement are in the main leaving the Staiinist ran.<s
not because they want a more revolutionary line but because iney can't stand up under the pressure o; tr.u
reaction and the witch-hunt. Of course, into the ranks of the CP peripheral organizations nave come now
layers, who have just been awakened to political life, and it is from these that we can make our greatest

20

gains. But we must not confuse this question with the questions of the general social character of the fer-
ment in the various CP organizations. Thus the coc'.ai character of the ferment as a whole in tr.e C? ranks
is not at all like the ferment in the ranks of the SP in the early Thirties when the ranks were seeding a
revolutionary progressive line under the impetus of a wave of radicalism throughout the country. Nor is it
the type of ferment which was present in the CP ranks in the late Thirties when the C? was pursuing a
rabidly Rightist course toward fighting fascism in words while doing nothing about it in ceeds.

Our party organized a giant demonstration in the heart of New York City to fight the fascists. The
CP was for fighting them only in words, but the mood of the rank and file was for action, and at least on
that occasion we carried the day. The workers responded by the thousands, and to this moment we con-
sider that a glorious chapter in our party's history.

So the real question before us is: can we gain substantially from the ranks of the Stalinist move-
ment in a period of reaction when the ranks are disintegrating, not because of a revolutionary or
progressive ferment, but primarily due to inability to stand up under the blows of reaction? Tr..s aspect 01
the question of our approach to the Stalinists is not adequately examined in the Minority document. Now 1
am ail for having a tactical aporoach toward the Stalinists and for working in any of their peripheral
organizations, particularly in sucn key cities as New York, Los Angeles and Chicago— where they are
probably five or ten times the size of our own organization.

My motivation for this approach is not based on any revolutionary ferment that exists in these
organizations. Nor is it based on the fact that the labor movement is at the present time in a state of
quiescence. I would be for it even if it were in a state of resurgence. My motivation is based en our
strategical orientation as the world revolutionary vanguard whereby we seek out an opponent poi.t.cal
class current in any area where we can find it for tho purpecoo o? irreconcilable comoat. We regard
ourselves as the world vanguard of the proletariat, as the leader of our entire class camp on a giobal
scale, and we must engage our antagonist who also leads a global class current and constitutes our .most
formidable political rival in the same class camp. We must combat them in the spirit of revolutionary com-
petition for the hegemony of this camp. Even more important than that, is that by seeking out our political

In order to further elaborate this point let us examine the Trotsky conversations in some detail.
Comrade Cannon opens the conversation: "The Stalinists are the problem.^ Why? "Because." says Can-
non, "the workers are unable to distinguish the real difference between us." i he Stalin-Hitler Pact seemec
to disintegrate them, "but it (the CP) was losing just the democrats." 3ut how about the militants? ""hay,"
says Comrade Cannon, "are more devoted than ever (to the CP). Tr.ey believe that the party now .".as 'the
revolutionary line.' " And that exactly was the situation in 1940. There was ferment in the CP ranks, but they
were losing only the pink democratic elements. The militants became more loyal than ever. And tnat is es-
sentially the situation today, only magnified a hundred-fold by the fury of the reaction.

Elsewhere in the conversation Comrade Cannon says, "The problem is to get the CP out of the
road." But how? Trotsky proposes critical support for Browder. Cannon says this will compromise us in
the eyes of the non-Stalinist workers. Trotsky proposes that we "turn our political face to the Statists."
Cannon says, "It has many complications." What were the complications? Among them it "wouid c.srupt
our work among the progressive trade union elements." Trotsky answers, "You are afraid to ceecrr.e
compromised in the eyes of the Rooseveltlan trade unionists." Further. Trotsky shows firm conviction that
if we turn our political face to the Stalinists we will make headway with them, t rotsky says, "I ask for two cr
three hundred Stalinist workers. That is the minimum requirement." The discussion is finally terminated cy
Comrade Hansen leading off with a question: "I am wondring if Comrade i rotsky considers that our party
is displaying a conservative tendency in the sense that we are acapting ourselves politically to the trace
union bureaucracy." And Trotsky replies, "To a certain degree I believe it is so."

Analyzing the conversations in the light of the present international situation, several facts emerge
from the conversations which have a direct bearing on tne controversy today.

in 1940, as we see by the conversations, the CP was in ferment. But like today it was not in
revolutionary ferment. As Cannon puts it, they were "losing just the democrats." And that's what tr.ey are
losing now. These are the elements that are in ferment, moving away from the CP. And tnese elements,
with the exception of layers of newly awakened political elements, are not likely to be moving in our c.rec-

21

tion. Was Comrade Trotsky right then in proposing that we turn our political face to the Stalinists? Yes,
because otherwise we would face a greater danger of adapting ourselves at that time toward the conser-
vative trade union leaders and today to the general dominant trend toward reaction. Was Comrace
Trotsky over-optimistic in his perspective of getting *'a minimum of at least two or three hundred Stailnlst
workers?" Yes, he was. It could net have been done for the reason that the genuine revolutionary
elements in the CP "were more devoted than ever" to it— on the basis of the new pseudo-leftist line. And
this is substantially the situation today.

Should we nevertheless "turn our political face to the Stalinists?" Yes. Not because we wii! necessarily
gain a lot, but because there is a field of combat for us, where we tco'c our c cno ' £: revolutionary program.

What new problem arises out of an examination of the Trotsky conversations in the light of the pre-
sent Stalinist turn to the left on a world scale? it is this: when the Stalinists make a "left turn," particularly ;r. a
period of reaction accompanied by severe repressions, our task in relation to the Stalinists becomes not
easier but tremendously more difficult, for their "leftist" line gives the false impression that tneir nne is tr.e
same as our own. Hence differentiation from the Stalinists becomes an utmost necessity. it bcl.vj a period
of reaction, however, the dl.'.'oror.tiat'.or) in a revolutionary <u'.:oc>.o?i tcr.de; more to izol-.o us sr.-.o.-.:; tr.e
broad mcoccs while not b:\r.r\r.Q appreciable rains <''°^i the 0'?. Thus, even under the best of cir-
cumstances, and even if we had Lenin and Trotsky themselves as the 'leadership in the party we would still
face a tremendous problem. The problem of differentiation from the Stalinists is a ccuble-ecged swore. 1:
we use Trotsky's approach to the question, that is, of turning our political face to the Stalinists, it means of
course a strengthening of our revolutionary line and a sharpening of our class approach. The gains, or
course, from the Stalinists would be modest indeed. But \i wo do no; carry out this approach, wo run '.no
risk ot veering a course toward adaptation.

This course toward adaptation would also be a "differentiation" from the Stalinists, but it is the kind of
differentiation which would make us appear the more "moderate" organization cr an organization that "just prcacr.es
socialism in general." Hence the correctness of Trotsky's line. It teaches us that in a period of react.cn tr.e
revolutionary vaiiyudiu nicy ue^uu.c muic iou.c.cu, wo^. o iui .nC'c .....^.v,..^- ... i..c , ~....c o. >..u .,-. --- ■•■ — ■- — . ••-
supreme merit is that it retains and strengthens the revolutionary capitai of the party, its revolutionary theory ar.c its
revolutionary practice. In this way the vanguard builds for the future.

What Comrade Trotsky said in his Cfcllr.icm and 3o!c'noviorn (p. G) is exactly in point:

"if an unfavorable relation of forces prevents it (the vanguard) from holding the positions
that it has won, it must at least retain its ideological positions, because in them is ex-
pressed the dearly-paid experience of the past."

Tho V7c:.'gog Cuostton

If one were to chart an independent destiny for the American working class, if one were locking for a
road separate and apart from the Stalinists and away from Europe's and Asia's road then it would first appear
that the Wallace movement could have served as a pathway for it.Jhere is no question that the Wallace move-
ment had elements of the classical American populism. But how did it really develop? It was merged w.;h a
current that was globai in character. What gave it such a character? It was the Stalinists, i he Wallace movement
reproduced the "genuine" type of popular American radicalism, but under the given social setting it inevitaoiy
took on political coloration from the world scene.

In the "Roots of the Pany Crisis" the Minority fails to mention the Wallace question. They begin with the
"auto crisis" at the August 1S47 Plenum and then jump to the 1S4S-50 discussion on Eastern curope. Tr.e first
was a trade union turn with which the present Majority finally went along, i he second was a very gooa
• theoretical discussion on the events in Eastern Europe.

But the first concrete step in the party's course toward adaptation to the dominant trend of reaction was
the unfortunate February 1948 Plenum, known as the "Wallace Plenum." The Minority's boiiitlr. fails to mention
the "Wallace Plenum."! do not believe this failure is merely &^Q to tho present Minority's taking a wrong pcs.tlo.-.
(along with the Majority) at that time. It is not necessary for anyone to beat his breast and enumerate ever-/ mis-
take. Nor is it the intention of this document especially to expose mistakes. Since the question of the "roots" o:
the crisis has been raised, however, we must not hesitate to go to the real root of the problem. The Minori-
ty document fails to do this.

22

This failure is because the Minority misunderstood, and still misunderstands, the real nature of the
Wallace-type groupings, and their full significance in the present global class struggle. Everything the Minority
says about the Huberman tendency and the Compass Ciubs was a hundred times more true of the Wallace
movement. The Wallace question was a big issue in every CIO union. Support of Wallace in the UAW or steel
locals did not mean orienting toward the imperialist-minded bureaucracy but oirectiy counter to them, and be-
ing branded as "communist," as pro-Soviet and being red-baited. It did not mean giving up the in-
dependence of the party, but asserting the party's independence of the trade union bureaucracy in a most
uncompromising manner.

The party took the line of least resistance on the Wallace question, certainly at least as far as the
trade union and mass work was concerned. Since the question of mass work as opposed to "propaganda"
work has been posed so sharply, it is all the more important in the interests of a fruitful analysis to search
out the meaning of the position taken at the "Wallace Plenum."

Wallace himself, of course, may be dismissed as an inconsequential individual like Norman
Thomas, whom Trotsky called a "political misunderstanding." Comrade Cannon's characterization of
Wallace and his Idaho singing partner as capitalist politicians was correct, but beside the point. The real
question was: what was the class character of the Wallace movement?

There were two principal answers to this question at the Plenum. The Majority held it was a third
• capitalist party. A minority composed of Swabeck, Mills and Bartell at first viewed it as an emerging labor
party. Both were wrong.

The Wallace movement at that time literally encompassed millions of workers and middle ciass in-
dividuals throughout the country. It was no secret to anybody who was at all acquainted with political
trends in the country that the Stalinists were its core, were practically directing the movement, and con-
stituted the bulk of its activists! The movement had a tremendous appeal to whatever was progressive in
the liberal or radical movement. But as soon as the party constituted itself and selected its candicaies, a
barrage of red-baiting and hysteria descended upon it such as this country nas rarely seen. It was no ex-

The Wallace party was not really a political party at all. It was a Stalinist-directed, working-class
and middie-class movement with an essentially workir.g-clasa character. At the same time it had a much
looser and broader character than their other "fronts," with greater opportunities for us to work in. It was
not at all a "Popular Front" of the Blum type.

The Wallace movement v/as a progressive-radical movement in spite of Wallace. The international
situation, and the intimate involvement of the U.S. in that situation, foreshadowed that the movement
would be red-baited to death. This red-baiting did not occur merely because of the presence ot the
Stalinists !n the movement, but more especially because of the influence of their line upon the movement.
Anything remotely pro-Soviet was, and still is, bound to be red-baited. But could a large radical, zed
grouping of some millions in America today avoid the Soviet question and concentrate only on tnc ques-
tion of wages, housing, etc., alone? Of course not. The Americans for Democratic Action who are mucn
more middle class in character with much less of a mass base and who repeat many of the purely liberal
aspects of Waliace-ism, have not avoided the Soviet question. They take a clearly anti-Soviet position.

Once again — the international problems are intertwined with the national in the most concrete and
intimate way. It is not only that the general world economic and political problems of American im-
perialism will break its hold at home and create the opening for the American workers. (This is the general
schema in Comrade Cannon's internationalism). It is also the specific and immediate effect of the struggle
abroad on the struggle at home. For instance, in the fight against the boss, and in the fight within the union
about how to fight the boss, the "red" issue has never been absent. And today the "red" issue is in-
terlinked with the Soviet issue. If the rank and file did not so link it, the right wing leaders would do it for
them. The global class struggle flares up within the national borders again and again— not, so far, w:th the
fury or clear class polarity that it does abroad, it is true. Nor did the Wallace movement (certainiy not as
.much as the Rosenberg Case) confront us with letters a foot high saying: "I am the Russian question in a
.new disguise."

Wallace's Russian program was the mildest form of conciliation toward the Soviet Union.
Regardless of his charlatanry and unworkable program he gathered around him many supporters wno

23

were genuinely sympathetic to the Soviet Union. And is it so remarkable that this was corvtliincd with ail
the "American" aims — the economic struggle — Taft-Hartley — the Negro question, etc.? This is not an ac-
cidental vagary, or twist, of Sisiirilsni: it is a verification of the inio.-dcpor.dcr.t destinies of the American
and world-wide working classes. •

Comrade Cannon's position was that it would be "crossing class iines" to give critical support to
Wallace. He advocated the "unconditional independence" of the party as the key to winning the masses
for revolution. (But without a clear understanding of the above inter dependence, the independence of the
party could not be clearly understood either). It would not have been "crossing class lines" to give critical
support to Wallace, it would only have been supporting Wallace as Lenin said "a rope supports a hanged
man." It would have been reaching out our hand toward elements of cur own claoo we could not reach in
any other way except through critical support of Wallace. (This, as everybody on the NC knows, was my
position, and it flowed from the international orientation I also elaborated at that Plenum).

■ The Wallace Plenum misjudged an important juncture of recent history. Wore than that, it laid the
basis for the party's adaptation toward the reaction in the following period. Were some of the majority
comrades sectarian in their outlook? Possibly they were. But basically, the line was an adaptation to the
red-baiting opposition to the Wallace movement. Were Comraces Clarke and Cocnran, who voted with
the Majority six months after the "Auto Plenum," sectarian in their outlock? This is a point they should
ponder over themselves.

The minority at the "Wallace Plenum"— at that time the Chicago NC members— saw a radical and
militant movement in which cur party could do useful and fruitful work. Their political tactic of critical sup-
port was correct. Unfortunately, the Chicago comrades did not foresee the direction this new movement
was fated to take. By projecting a "labor party" orientation they had in reality projected a period of upsurge.
They had not perceived that, in one sense, the Wallace movement was a last flickering of radicalism under
the spreading blanket of reaction. Most of all, they did not see the Wallace movement in the light of the
new global setting that ultimately was to decide its fate.

The Minority line today, in this important respect, closely approximates the Chicago minority's line
of February 1943. True, the present Minority wouid not be so rash as to predict great gains from the
Stalinist milieu. But they see it outside of its global framework, aside from its Ir.tcrdcper.dc-ncy, ar,d
hence, one-sidediy. It is not only that tnere are less r.ur.tticro in this milieu today than in the Wallace move-
ment; it is also that the people themselves are much iess receptive (to us), even if they are more political
than the much larger group in the Wallace movement was.

The Majority today seems to continue the same line of adaptation that they presented at the
"Wallace Plenum," thus making the party mere- dependent on the present anti-Soviet prejud.ces of the
working class. The present discussion is proceeding too much like the too-much-forgotten Wallace dis-
cussion. It is proceeding in a masked or half-blinded manner, in which the participants have thought cut
neither their full motivations, nor the fuli consequences of their positions. The Majority's adaptation to the
rightward trend is obviously not conscious or deliberate, but its objective effect is the same.

The Minority, however, while correct in their tactical approach, are wrong from the point of view of
political analysis. The very fact that they characterize the trouble as sectarian Staiinophobia wouid in-
dicate that they see more in the Stalinist milieu than is reaiiy there.

The fact that the Minority persist in characterizing the Majority as "sectarian" surely cannot be
ascribed to excessive diplomacy, softness, politeness, etc. on their part. It would appear, rather, that they
see the field for activity, the movement of the workers, etc. in a different quarter than the Majority, and that
they feel the Majority are "missing the bus" in a practical sense.

To repeat: it is not a sectarian, pathological fear or hatred of Stalinism which motivates the Majori-
ty, it is fear of the reaction, and fear of the generally reactionary mood which pervades most strata of the
labor movement, it is not an abnormal psychological phenomenon, but a perfectly understandable, if
somewhat obscured, political phenomenon.

It is not because the Majority are separate and apart from the labor movement; it is precisely
because the Majority are oriented toward the American iabor movement. The motive and purpose of this
orientation is of course laudable enough taken by itself. But as we all know, the American workers are

temporarily permeated with the mood of reaction. Unfortunately, the Majority is showing a tendency to
cater to this mood.

The Minority, on the other hand, are repeating the error of the Chicago minority on the Wallace
question. In spite of their correct tactical approach they have not, apparently, absorbed the full meaning
of the Wallace discussion, nor of the conversation with Trotsky which they themselves have published.

The question of the independence of the party (which arose in the Wallace discussion), its real in-
dependence, its Bolshevik independence, faced a really fundamental test at the time of the "Yugoslav Af-
fair."

Yho Yl^gg'sv Qycottcn end vha Sniopondortcc o? tto Parly .

Some time after the break of Tito from Stalin, our movement had projected the idea that the inter-
national climate was becoming more favorable for the construction of genuine revolutionary parties ana that
"the parallel crisis of Stalinism and imperialism" created the favorable objective conditions for the development
of independent revolutionary movements away from Stalinism. The Tito affair, according to our co-thinker's
document pointed in that direction and probably was the precursor for other such movements. Between this
period and the period of the Third World Congress, our movement's orientation was one for independent
revolutionary developments separate from and against the Stalinists.

' Tito's break with Stalin was in itself, as an initial step, progressive and revolutionary. But for us to project
the further perspective of. possibly converting the Titoist Communist Party into a genuine revolutionary pa../
was simply a lapse into utopianism. However, certain externa; and purely supenic.a! ev«rus ur.u
pronouncements of the Tito regime impelled our co-thinkers to believe that nothing less than a convers.on ot
the Tito party into an adherent of our movement was in sight. In a lead art;c:e in tne ..'.'....an., tne w/ u<sj
Manifesto of the Yugoslav CP was hailed as "the second greatest event in the h.story of tne wor<mg-c^ss
movement." Actually tnis Manifesto had nothing in it whatever that would warrant sucn a concusio.. ex-
cept a phrase about "a return to tne road of Lenin" witnout inoicatmg wnat tne roao was.

Aside from the fact that at the time of this article in the r^iitani there was already on the mainland
of China a new workers' state, which in reality had been the greatest event in working-class h.story s.nce
the October Revolution, the article had a completely erroneous perspective in relation to Yugoslavia and
the Yugoslav CP. If ever I felt our movement could be completely disoriented I felt that this was tne occa-
sion i made my position clear at the Midwest Party Conference held in Cleveland in May of mat year.
Later 1 wrote a letter to Comrade Warde of the Secretariat, i his letter otters a clue to my position m tne
present internal discussion. 1 quote from the letter of June 12, 1S50:

"Regarding the Yugoslav question, I have not seen a scintilla of objective evidence from
the Yugoslav- or world press, which wouid in any way inoicate a real turn in the political
policy of the Yugoslav leadership. Our uncritical attitude towards the Titoists is wrong,
dangerous and without any justification from tne point of view of tne objective realities of
the Yuaosiav CP. It is a dangerous illusion to believe that the leadership is moving in our
direction, or making any v.sible turn in their political policy.

"I have read Gabe's and Germain's resolutions, and white I believe that Gabe's resolution
is far more acceptable than Germain's, ! oo not think tht it is at ail adequate, since he
leaves out entirely the question of our attitude towards the Tito leadership. The PC shculo
draw up a resolution which should encompass the following points: 1) That Yugoslavia is a
workers' stale, and that an actual social revolution has ta,<en place there, because the
bourgeoisie has been crushed, expropriated, and their political power smashed, i no old
capitalist state apparatus was shattered in the perioo from 1944-46, and a new one
erected based upon the support of the workers and peasants (the mutation o; state torm
took place in the period 1944-46). 2) The worid proletariat must defend the Yugoslav state
against the encroachments of the Soviet bureaucracy ana against world imperialism.
3) The Yuqosiav leadership pursues a national ccc'.a'.icl, not a , rotskyist, course in tneir
foreign and domestic policies. They base themselves fundamentally on the immcu.ato ex-
igencies of Yugoslavia r^v.ci no; on .ho world revolution au t..e fundamental lever, i ney in-
dicate no recognition of the dependence of the Yugoslav state on the worid revolution.
Their foreign policy is adherence to the United Nations, not adherence to tne Fourth inter-
national. 4) Our attitude towards the Yugoslav leadership shouid not be qualitatively

95

different than towards any other labor bureaucracy. We support the progressive aspects
of their struggle against imperialism and the Stalinist bureaucracy. But we must at the
same time consistently and mercilessly expose their reactionary policies, such as a) sup- (
port of the United Nations, b) "reliance on ourselves and only on ourselves" as Tito says,
c) the failure to boldly repudiate Stalinist dogmas of socialism in one country, class
collaboration with the bourgeoisie, d) bourgeois pacificism instead of revolutionary
struggle against imperialist war.

"Our perspective with respect to the Yugoslav C? should be one of building a left wing
from the ranks of that party, and not in fond hopes of regenerating the old leadership. This
does not mean that we should neglect to collaborate with them any more tnan we do with
the other labor bureaucracies. To this, however, must be added the inescapable corollary
of unconditional independence of our party and freedom to criticize in the course of the
collaboration.

"I have noted that there is a little more moderation in the last 2 issues of the r.llliicr.t on the
Yugoslav question, i would advise still further moderation. At any rate this is far safer and
will not put us out on a limb should there be a sudden turn in the Tito leadership which
would be exceedingly embarrassing to us and disorient our membership."

On June 22, Comrade Warde replied:

"By this time you will have received another informative report on internal developments
in Yugoslavia. I believe that your attitude towards the leadership there is entirely too rigid.
Moreover, it flies in the face of established facts. The fact is that we are already in a bloc
with them and our collaboration on many important issues is daily becoming closer and
closer. Our attitude has never been an uncritical one and we have conceded not an iota in
principle in effecting this collaboration. Where we beiieve they are incorrect, we have.
pointed that out in a friendly tone and a comradely fashion. .

"Your appraisal of the evidence about their development differs from mine and -that of
most comrades who have followed it closely. It appears to us undeniable that a genuine
turn toward the left, that is, toward the Leninist standpoint has been taken by them. How

■ G*i liiv; Witt M*"' miiv «L* * Miiui |^ww^ » « O OU i>*^» • m t \s r t , w w« * i . ^ t>V^v<^ *• w • w . y j- w « . f W ..».w*-..v •.

we did not do all in our power to facilitate their progress toward our positions and to try
and have them come over ail the way. Both our actions and criticisms have been an in-
fluential factor in that respect in the past period and wiil have an even greater influence in
the period ahead. The important thing for us is to take full advantage of the opportunities
opening up along the line of my report. This is the biggest political opportunity we have
ever had."

I have quoted this correspondence in full because it has a direct connection with the current con-
troversy. Then, as now, the reaction was raging, not to the same degree, but none the less surely; and the
mass movement in this country, while it was not as quiescent as it is now, was by no means in a militant
mood. Nationally, and particualrly insofar as it concerned Loca: New York, the policy had been to seek out
all Yugoslav organizations and organize brigades to Yugoslavia, since Yugoslavia was our "biggest
political opportunity." This was as good a time as any to counterpose to the Yugoslav orientation mass
work in the trade union movement, as our main task. But the proper approach was take the issue of
Titoism on its merits. I was then, as I am now, for the perspective of sinking our roots deeper, ceepcr, anc
deeper into the mass of trade union workers, no matter how difficult the situation may be. I cid not
counterpose the main arena of our work, the trace unions, as against our "biggest political oppcrtuniy."
That, however, is only one lesson of the Yugoslav experience. One other lesson was that our movement
was searching and probing everywhere (and correctly so) for opportunities, but the objective situation on
a world scale had not opened up such possibilities as yet.

The biggest lesson, however, was with respect to the unconditional independence of cur party. The Tito
episode was really a case in point. No one raised it except myself in the above letter. If the Majority comrades
feel that the unconditional independence of the party is so important in the current controversy. 1 shoulc think
that was the time to have, raised it— at a time when we ran the danger of becoming the tail to Tito's kite. Tne
Titoist movement had no real appeal to the working masses anywhere in the world, precisely because the
Titoists had no Intorr.atlor.aibt perspective and ottered nothing to the communist workers abroad which
was even a shade different from what the Stalinists and reformists offered. The otner important factor in

Ho experience is t

Lents everyv/nen
he case. It indeeo
In our struggle
|ould avoid them.;
ocked by the Sta.i
[ i course does n

ning a' 1 over the v '
,ory as on the wor
[problem. We've
|uding ourselves,
btthemincomba
j that their defeat;
(ire class camp, "i

| repea«.'.

The Tito exp

lions.

It is just as f

koning with thee
fighting a glcoa

lobal camp wfcU

lire camp Is &~<

On the oth€

fitful work," "an

linism must go
olutionary con
rid camp of a!
We cann<
.erican peculi

"In the p
extent t
from a <
betwee

The abc
. fate of mar
ented to
.discussior
feel they hav
ene. Onlytr
fete applies'

26

T

P-

'3,
S3

iry

"3
his
-ith
ary

the
and
lich

ants
cid.
aloe
and
ta in
-save.

at of

,u;ne
How

:o try
in in-
ice in
nilics
nave

i current ccn-
ureiy; and tr.e
s in a rr.i'hiant
en to seek out
our "biggest
entation mass
e the issue of
r, deeper, and
id not

iTito experience is that it offered the happy alternative of circumventing the struggle against §ta„mst
jvements everywhere by a "new independent road." Would that that were so! Unfortunately, tr.a; was
itthe case. It indeed would be a happy alternative if it had objectively existed, but it did not.

In our struggle to vanquish Stalinism, we cannot chart out an illusory independent read whereby
twould avoid them. Our path towards the masses on a world scale, and to a narrower extent in the USA,
blocked by the Stalinists; and it is in mortal combat (and not aversion) that we will come out victorious.
at of course does not depend on our efforts aione but on the turn in the objective conditions, wmch are
ening all over the world. An attempt to chart out on the American arena an independent road :s just as
;sory as on the world arena. As Comrade Cannon said in 1G40 to Comrade i rotsky, " 1 he Stalinists are
fr problem. We've got to get them out of the road." We cannot do this by circumventing tnem, oy
eluding ourselves, by seeking an illusory independent road toward the American workers. We must
»et them in combat, in irreconcilable struggle, with the recognition that they are a global class current,
that their defeat will be the product of the joint efforts of aii the workers and oppressed peopies in our
tire class camp. This will be done and it can be done.

repeat:

The Tito experience showed that it was wrong to project false hopes based on non-existent con-
Sons.

It is just as false that we chart out an independent course towards the American workers without
tkoning with the global class current of Stalinism. We must invade their arena, always conscious that we
e fighting a global social phenomenon. We must orient toward the American working class as a .sector in
global camp which is Indiscoiubly bound to that camp and- dependent on It In no less decree Usn iho
fire camp is dependent on it.

On the other hand we must not conceive the Stalinist milieu in this country as merely "an area for
itful work " "an area where there are advanced people" or proceed on the basis "that the labor move-
, nt io ^,_„ nV . i A r„ ? .^ »k : !: , t? - r.cvcrtcrt ; s ccma"* or ; — ''gent, cv \vc" v , ~-' r *' r "CC ! " ~z~-"~ r "
ilinism must go on, not merely because we think it is a good source for recruiting, but because we aje .n
■olutionary competition with them as one global class current against another for hegemony of tr.e
rid camp of all the proletarians and oppressed peoples.

We cannot proceed to vanquish Stalinism on the American arena merely on the basis of
ierican peculiarities.

Percpccih'O on 'iho American Kcvolullon

"In the present epoch," said Trotsky in "ho Third Internationa: atter Lenin, "to a much larger
extent than in the past, the national orientation of the proletariat must and can flow on,y
from a world orientation and net vice versa. Herein lies the basic and P rirr ' ar y ouferonce
between communist internationalism and all varieties of national socialism."

The above words of Trotsky in no way contradict his statement that "America is the foundry where
efate of man will be forged." i quoted this last statement and elaborated on it in the memorancum v.v.icn
il opocrtuniy." presented to the 1950 Convention. To some comraces, the remarks seemed to be out of place oecause
our movement e discussion was on Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. But I feit they had a relevance to the ciscuss.cn. as
ve situation on eel they have a relevance to the present one. However, they cannot oe iifelosDiy applied to the A...er,can
l ;ene. Only the comprehension of the dialectical inter-unity of both tnese Trotsky concepts and the.r con-
tete application on 'the field of tne American class struggle, will serve to accomplish our historic tasKS.

_ -rw-^iv, • May 20, 1953

r party. Ti.e >uo '

.jority comrade

y, ! shou'.c t'r.ini

) Tito's kite. Th

ely because th

s abroad wni

Dortam factor ij

' be.

ts

97