WILLIAM WEINSTONE
TH E GREAT S.T-OOW* STRIKE-BV WILI.IAM «ONE,
SECRETARY OF THE MICHIGAN DISTRICT OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A.
PUBLISHED BY WORKERS LIBRARY PUBLISHERS, INC.
P. O. BOX 148, STA. D, NEW YORK CITY. MARCH, U5l
SECOND 1'MNTINC, APRIL, 1937
Library
University of Te*ae
Austin, Texas
The Great
Sit-Down Strike
^
x
J_ he first major battle in the auto industry has just been
fought and won. It was unquestionably a great strike, a
truly militant battle, waged with a vigor and passion which
fc will place this strike side by side with the greatest strikes
^ ^ in American labor history.
It was a significant struggle because it was the first time
<^ inTquarter of a century ,lhelirsMime since the appearance .
of the auto industry, that one of the giants of the motor
monopolies, the biggest of the three automobile companies,
was challenged by organized labor. It was significant
because the battle was spread oyer fourteen states, involved
150,000 workers, affected more than sixty plants, and was
fought against a corporation worth one and a half billion
dollars. It was significant also because it was the oj>ening
battle in the awaited struggle to organize the mass produc-
tion industries and was fought by the newly organized
International Union of United Automobile Workers, led by
the Committee for Industrial Organization. And, finally,
it was of the greatest importance because for the first time
on a large scale American labor has employed a new
wea p 0n — the sit-down strike — and has wielded this weapon
with startling success. That is why the strike aroused nation-
3
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624134
wide attention and was followed with the most intense
interest and concern by millions of working people in all
parts of the nation.
The struggle ended with a victory for the auto workers.
In what does the victory of the auto workers consist?
It consists in the fact that the union was able completely
to paralyze production for forty-four days, to prevent the re-
opening of the plants and as a result to wring from General
Motors the recognition of the right to organize (a right
which has been stubbornly and tenaciously denied by this
open shop corporation), won formal recognition as the
collective bargaining agency for its members in all
the plants and as the sole collective bargaining agency in
the plants shut down by the strikes. By this achievement the
auto workers struck a powerful blow at the open-shop
system in American industry. It also won wage increases
for the General Motors workers and increased wages for the
auto workers of other plants and it won an agreement to
open negotiations between the union and the corporation
for the demands on wages, hours and working conditions
The victory of the union consists furthermore in the fad
that it was able to withstand and repel a series of violent
efforts to dislodge the sit-down strikers, who left the plants
as victors when their terms were met, who twice smashed
the injunctions issued against them and finally caused them
to be scrapped.
It consists finally in the fact that the policy of indus-
trial unionism, of militant unionism and progressive lead-
ership, based upon rank-and-file democracy, has proven
to be the only correct form of organization which can
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effectively meet and defeat the corporations of big capital.
A test has now been made on the field of battle of the
craft union versus the industrial union form of organization
for the mass production industries and in this test industrial
unionism has been entirely and triumphantly upheld.
Let us consider the outcome of the struggle a little more
closely.
The union fought for the right to organize the plants.
This right was conceded by General Motors in words and
denied in deeds by the discharge of workers for joining
the union and dismissing of those wearing the union
button. These were the issues which caused the strikes in
Atlanta and Kansas City. General Motors has now agreed
that the workers may organize and that they may wear
their union buttons.
The union demanded a national conference for collective
bargaining. General Motors refused this demand and re-
ferred the unions to the individual plant managers. As a
result of the strike, such a conference was held and a written
agreement between the union and the corporation was signed
before the shop could be reopened. Now a conference begins
to consider the demands of the union.
The union demanded recognition as the sole collective
bargaining agency for all the workers. General Motor?
declared that it would grant no such recognition, holding
that to be an inviolable and sacred principle of the corpora-
tion. General Motors has now agreed to deal with the
union as the exclusive bargaining agency for a period of
six months (the exact form of the agreement is only a face
saver for General Motors).
General Motors in refusing the request for negotiations
6
declared that it was paying the highest possible wage in the
industry but as a result of the strike, it has already declared
a five-cent hourly increase in wages.
General Motors in its application for an injunction
declared that the stay-in strikers were no longer employees
of the company but at the end of the strike, as a condition
for resuming operations, General Motors has agreed to
return all workers to their former positions without
discrimination.
General Motors had said that it would not discuss any
questions with the union until its plants were evacuated
and its "unlawfully seized plants were restored", but
General Motors finally backed away from this position,
and entered into discussion with the union and entered into
an agreement, and not until it was signed did the workers
leave the plants.
That is why the outcome of the struggle has encouraged
the workers everywhere and raised them to a high pitch
of enthusiasm. That is why the auto strike is giving direct
nourishment and impetus to the drive to organize the unor-
ganized workers in the country. That is why, as a result
of the struggle, a new wave of strikes is beginning in auto,
and other factories, and that is why the Wall Street Journal
now cries out against the strike that "its effectiveness was
obtained by illegal means".
Comrade William Z. Foster is indeed correct when he
says that the "auto strike is fated to play a very important
part in American labor history" and that "it is a sign of
the new era that is dawning in the trade union movement
in this country".
7
How Was the Victory
of the Union Achieved?
J. N the first place, the victory was won because the workers
used and perfected the sit-down tactic of striking which we
shall describe later along.
In the second place the victory was won because of the
fighting determination and profound solidarity which pre-
vailed among the auto workers. The General Motors work-
ers in practically all the states affected by the strike, but
particularly in Detroit, Cleveland, Toledo, Norwood, and
above all in Flint, operated as a single unit, as an army
which responded to every critical situation and to every
danger. Toledo and Norwoed workers came to Flint in
the first days of the strike and greatly strengthened the
fighting lines. General Motors, Dodge, Kelsy-Wheel, Mid-
land, Chrysler and other workers from Detroit and also
from other cities came spontaneously and repeatedly to the
battlefront at Flint and were ready to move to Anderson
and Saginaw to lend a hand in beating back armed thugs
and vigilantes. Workers in Detroit and Toledo shut down
the departments of their plants and left for the Flint
battlefront. In Flint itself on a number of occasions, the
workers on the outside, responding more to the prompting of
8
class instincts than to organized calls, came to the plants,
appearing practically from nowhere to protect the workers
on the inside.
Special importance attaches to the great activity of the
women workers who organized "women's emergency bri-
gades" in Flint and who were assisted by women's brigades
from other cities, who participated directly in the struggles,
making up a vanguard of the fighting divisions which added
great strength and solidarity to the workers' ranks and
cemented their unity. One reason for this mobility and
militancy is to be found in the fact that the auto industry.
is composed largely of young people and these people were"
on the side of the strike. Another and more basic reason
for this militancy is the fact that the auto workers had made
several attempts in the past to strike the plants and win the
right to organize and were held in check, were deceived and
betrayed by the A. F. of L. officialdom and by the President's
agreement of 1934. The workers now gave vent to their
accumulated hatred and expressed their determination that
this time matters would be changed. All of which reveals
the fact that in the last years, particularly since the crisis,
the workers have grown in class consciousness, militancy
and solidarity.
Third, the victory was won because of the firm and
united leadership provided by the C.I.O., which brought to
the struggle that degree of aid and unity so essential to
large-scale battles and which has been lacking in the past
in strikes where craft union divisions prevailed. The C.I.O.
under the aggressive leadership of John L. Lewis made it
possible to maneuver with success the ending of the glass
I
strike at a timely moment so as to exert the greatest pressure
upon General Motors. It also helped to work out the strategy
of utilizing the competition between General Motors and
Chrysler and Ford to the benefit of the strike. The C.I.O.
unions sent organizers into the strike, sent delegations and
speakers, helped in picketing as, for example, the steel
workers in St. Louis and other cities, and gave moral and
material aid to the auto union.
Fourth, the victory was won because the craft unions in
sections of the labor movement outside of the C.I.O. gave
their support notwithstanding the treachery and the sabotage
of the Greens and the Freys, as, for example, the support
rendered by the Detroit and Flint Federations of Labor, the
Michigan State Federation of Labor, and for a time the
Cleveland Federation, and numerous craft unions and
unionists. This proves that among the A. F. of L. unions
there is a strong discontent with the policies of the Executive
Council and that it is possible to work hand in hand with
the craft unionists against the Executive Council and secure
the unity so essential at the present time in the important
fights which the C.I.O. and also craft unions will develop
in the near future.
Fifth, the victory was won because of the progressive
leadership of. the international union nationally and be-
cause of the progressive and militant leadership in the most
important areas of the strike. The existence of numerous
rank-and-file leaders especially within the plants gave a
powerful backbone to the strike because here were people
who did not falter or run before the first blows of the
enemy. It was because the old Green-Dillon clique had
10
been cleaned out or pushed into the background, especially
at the most critical points of the struggle in Flint, Detroit
and Cleveland, and a new, fresh, militant leadership had
taken its place that the strike could be carried on with such
vigor and success.
-.Sixth, the victory was won because the union carried out
modern progressive mass methods of fighting. It engaged
in demonstrations and mass picketing; made use of mass
agitation through bulletins and special newspapers, made
successful use of the sound car; introduced mass singing of
labor solidarity songs, and employed the labor theater as
a medium of agitation and education (although on a limited
scale) ; organized mass strike committees based on rank-
and-file representation ; formed relief committees and fought
for state aid, and committees to ferret out spies, held fre-
quent mass meetings and gave reports on all developments;
carried on educational classes; established solidarity of
men and women and unity of Negro and white; and en-
listed and welcomed the support of all sections of the
labor movement. The union appealed to and received the
support of the middle class sections, pointing out the ad-
vantages to them of a victory of the workers and stressing
the common interests of the workers and small business
men in weakening the power of this gigantic trust. It is to
be regretted that the union did not fight for and make better
use of the radio as a means of agitation. Special emphasis
must be laid upon the use of the sound car, which has proven
an indispensable instrument in such fights and should be
introduced everywhere. Care must be taken immediately to
thwart any attempts to restrict its use by laws, attempts
11
which are being made by stealth in auto and steel areas.
These methods, as against the isolated, restricted, narrow
and bureaucratic forms employed by the old Green-Dillon
officials, have proved the only correct methods to be used
in strikes which involve large masses of people.
And, seventh, the victory was won because the union
did not hesitate to use political as well as economic weapons
of struggle. It fought against and exposed the company -
controlled sheriffs, prosecuting attorneys, judges, and po-
lice. It demanded the removal of the share-holding Judge
Black and strike-breaking Chief of Police Wills of Flint,
and laid a demand for the impeachment of the judge before
the Michigan State Legislature and the governor. It de-
manded and secured the deputizing of union men as special
police in Anderson. It called upon and secured the aid of
the La Follette Committee on Civil Rights, which had the
effect of tempering the ruthless violence of the company-
dominated local authorities. It demanded full protection
of the civil rights of the workers and the right of collective
bargaining from the governors of the states, from the De-
partment of Labor, and from the President of the United
States, and in that way fought and to a certain extent suc-
ceeded in offsetting the one-sided use of the state power,
which has always been employed as an agency of strike-
breaking. It cooperated with civil rights conferences, draw-
ing on all sections of the labor movement and middle class
people.
The Michigan Conference for the protection of civil
rights, as well as the American League Against War and
Fascism, proved of inestimable value in promptly organ-
12
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izing local and national protests against company terrorism.
In Cleveland the People's Conference for the Protection of
Civil Rights also served a useful purpose toward the same
end.
Special mention must be made of the role of the Flint
workers and their leaders. Flint was the main battlefield
because it is the heart of the General Motors industry and
for that reason the struggle there was most acute. Special
tribute must be paid to the workers and leaders of the
sit-down strikers in the plants, the leaders and rank-and-file
workers, and its chief organzer, who spread the struggle
to the Chevrolet plant and held firmly to their positions in
the Fisher Body plants to the very last day of the struggle,
notwithstanding the violence, the provocations, and the
attacks carried out against them. The Flint leaders ably
prepared for the strike by the development of a shop
steward system, carried out persistent recruiting, exposed
and eliminated stool pigeons, and understood the importance
of the strike of the bus drivers, which occurred several
weeks before the auto fight, rendering them every aid and
making the strike their own, and in that way organizing
favorable sentiment in the city for unionism. In return they
were well rewarded for their efforts by the assistance ren-
dered them by this small but important body of workers.
Had the old group of leaders that belonged to the Dillon
clique and that worked hand in hand with the General
Motors Corporation remained in control in the Flint situa-
tion, the outcome of the strike against General Motors would
have been entirely different.
14
The Attitude of the
Government
J? inally, but of first-rate importance among the reasons
for the victory, must be considered the attitude of the gov-
ernment. By the government I mean in this case the attitude
of the Governor of the State of Michigan and of President
Roosevelt. The defeat of the reactionaries in the last election
created more favorable conditions for the winning of the
strike, for it gave encouragement to the workers and was
the signal that the moment was ripe to start the battle. It
brought into office in Lansing and Washington, administra-
tions that were committed to the continuation of the demo-
cratic form of government and which had promised to
assist the workers in obtaining improved standards of living
and the right of collective bargaining. Had the Landon
Republicans come into office they would have taken the
usual hard-boiled Tory attitude on labor unionism and
strikes.
Lenin has noted two methods of rule of the capitalist
class. He says: :
"The bourgeoisie in all countries in practice inevitably elabo-
rates two systems of governing, two methods of struggle for its
interests and for the defense of its domination, and these two
methods now replace one another and interlace in different
combinations. These are, first, the method of violence, the
method of refusing all concessions to the labor movement, the
method of supporting all ancient and dying institutions, the
method of uncompromising rejection of reform. . . . The second
method is the method of 'liberalism', of steps toward the de-
15
velopment of political rights, of reforms, of concessions, etc,
"The bourgeoisie passes from one method to another not
through the malicious design of individuals and not by acci-
dent, but by force of the basic contradictoriness of its own
position."
This is the type of government which rules today in
Lansing and Washington. And the contradictoriness which
Lenin notes in such a position was present even in the short
period of the strike.
The policies of Murphy and Roosevelt were to seek a
compromise in the struggle, to avoid a sharpening of the
conflict, and to terminate it as early as possible, not only
because of the militant mood of labor and the danger of
the struggle passing over to other sections of the labor
movement, but also because of the pressure of a section of
the capitalist class which found the strike harmful to its
interests. The government had to face the outcry of the
reactionaries, the big capitalist interests, that the sanctity
of private property was being violated, and Governor Mur-
phy was called upon to uphold the Constitution, "to defend
private property", to support the courts, and to use the
National Guard to evacuate the plants. There was the ever-
present danger that this pressure would succeed. At one
time the National Guard established virtual martial law
around the Chevrolet and Fisher No. 2 plants and virtually
imprisoned the sit-down strikers there.
If the National Guard was not used it was due to the fact
that both Governor Murphy and President Roosevelt faced
a stiff resistance of the workers and because they realized
that the use of violence with the danger of killing many
worki vs would have aroused the working class of the
16
entire country, would have meant a sharp break with their
labor support, would have meant a shattering blow to the
Democratic Party, and would have led to a tremendous
development of the movement for the independent political
action which asserted itself in the last election campaign
although on a restricted scale.
Consider the forceful position taken by the union. The
telegrams of the sit-down strikers addressed to Governor
Murphy and President Roosevelt are classical not only be-
cause of the passion and self-sacrifice which they expressed,
but also because they voiced the insistance of labor that
history shall not repeat itself and the promises made in
the last election broken. Let us quote from one of these
telegrams to the Governor of Michigan :
"We feel it proper to recall to you the assurance you have
many times given to the public that you would not permit force
or violence to be used in ousting us from the plants. Unarmed
as we are, the introduction of militia, sheriff or police with
murderous weapons, will mean a blood bath of unarmed work-
ers. The police of Flint belong to General Motors. The sheriff
of Genesee County belongs to General Motors, and the judges
of Genesee County belong to General Motors. . . . It remains to
be seen whether or not the governor of this state also belongs to
General Motors. We have decided to stay in the plants. We have
no illusions what sacrifices this decision will entail. We fully
expect that if violent efforts are used to put us out, many of us
will be killed. We take this method to make it known to our
wives, our children, and to the people of the state and country,
that if this result follows from the attempts to eject us, you
are the one who must be held responsible for our death" (Em-
phasis mine — W. W.)
It was because of this forceful position of labor, and it
was because of the growing movement for independent
17
political action, that any compromise was prevented that
would injure the interests of the strike and the union.
Did the Union Win
Its Full Objective?
\3 ID the union win the full objective which it set for
itself? No, the union did not win completely its major
demand of becoming the sole collective bargaining agency
nor was it able to achieve the negotiations of its economic
demands while the strike was still in progress and the plants
still shut down. It is not to be expected that in the first
round of battle, all the demands can be won, because of the
huge wealth of the corporation, its entrenched position in the
local communities, its strong political power and the back-
ing which it received from the steel and financial magnates,
and on the other hand the youthfulness of the union. General
Motors proved a ruthless enemy which did not hesitate to use
every means, foul or fair, to achieve its end of breaking
the strike.
It is clear that such a corporation can be fully defeated
and brought to its knees only by bending the full energies
of the union, only by demonstrating the greatest strength,
and only by succeeding in organizing the largest numbers
of workers into the union before the battle begins. The
union did not prove strongly enough organized to reach
this goal.
18
What are the facts about organization? At the outset
of the strike the union succeeded in organizing a majority
of workers within approximately twenty plants. It was
where the plants were organized to any considerable ex-
tent that they were shut down by strikes. The facts are that
not all the plants were well organized in Flint, Detroit,
or in Michigan, generally, the most strategic centers of
General Motors, and that such strongholds as Pontiac, Sag-
inaw, and Grand Rapids, were practically unorganized.
It is true that the union shut down the strategic Fisher
Body plants in Flint and Cleveland and that this worked
greatly to the advantage of the union in paralyzing the
industry. The very audacity of the union in challenging a
corporation which held undisputed sway encouraged the
workers and brought many thousands into the union dur-
ing the strike, but still this was not enough for an industry
employing hundreds of thousands and indirectly affecting
the jobs of a million. The union attempted to widen the
sphere of the strike but its forces were too weak to achieve
success. The union was therefore confronted with the di-
lemma of having carried through a general shutdown with-
out having carried through and declared a general strike
in all the plants. While some 40,000 to 50,000 were af-
fected directly by strikes, another 100,000 workers were
thrown out of work. This gave General Motors the pos-
sibility of crying "that a minority was attempting to dictate
to the majority", to make the struggle appear as a battle
between union and non-union workers, to keep a large
number of workers on the sidelines, and to create to a cer-
tain extent a popular mass cover for the usual strong-arm
19
methods. This they did through such organizations as the
Flint Alliance, through petition campaigns (obviously in-
spired by General Motors and carried through by coercion
but nevertheless successful because of the lack of organiza-
tion in such places), through organizing mass meetings of
"loyal workers", and by staging what might be called a
"pro-company rebellion", through sending delegations to
the governor of the state, and in general creating the danger
of a strong back-to-work movement. This enabled General
Motors also to raise the cry that it was serving to protect
the rights of non-union members.
The A. F. of L. officialdom did its bit in helping this
movement of the corporation along, especially since these
officials fell in with the tactics of the corporation which
claimed that other workers were opposed to the union as
the sole collective bargaining agency. But basically, the op-
position to the strike and the counter-movement attempted
by the corporation had its foundation in the company
unions which were practically untouched in the prepara-
tions of the strike. This insufficiency of organization and
weakness in failing to break into new territories at one
stage of the struggle gave the offensive to the side of Gen-
eral Motors, which seriously threatened the outcome of the
strike. It was at this moment that the Flint workers and
their leader, Robert Travis, conceived and executed a bril-
liant move in achieving the sit-down in the Chevrolet As-
sembly Plant No. 4 which once again gave the initiative
into the hands of the strikers and which virtually put an
end to the back-to-work movement started by General
Motors. It was at this moment, too, that the Flint workers
20
,
stopped a bogging of the strike and a weakening of the
ranks as a result of the defeat suffered at Anderson, where
the leadership was driven out by vigilantes and also because
of a mistake made in calling off the Saginaw meeting.
The insufficiency of organization must be attributed to
the fact that while the union had planned to attack Gen-
eral Moters and to develop a general strike, actually there
was a more or less spontaneous outbreak of the struggle.
The fight against General Motors began at Atlanta with the
strike on November 18, followed several weeks later by the
strike at Kansas City, and towards the last week in Decem-
ber there took place the sit-downs at Cleveland, followed
the next day by sit-downs in Fisher No. 1 and No. 2 at
Flint. A contributing factor here was the glass strike which
threatened to shut down the auto industry and which made
many feel that it was advisable to hit the blow before such
a shut-down occurred. But there is no doubt that General
Motors allowed the strike movement to develop in order to
bring matters to a head, thinking that the union was en-
tirely unprepared and would be defeated.
General Motors had expected to win. It thought that the
armed force which it could put into action against the
strikers through its complete control of the local authori-
ties would enable it to end the strike in double quick
time. Why then did the calculations of General Motors
prove false? It was because General Motors did not reckon
with the leadership of the C.I.O. and the militancy of the
workers and because it was entirely unprepared for and
unable to meet and overcome the new tactic of the workers
— the sit-down strike.
21
Sit-Down Strike Tactics
he big corporations know how to deal with a walkout
strike but General Motors did not know how to deal with
the sit-down strike. The attempts to use the usual methods
of securing an injunction, illegalizing the strike, and break-
ing up the picket lines by armed force, as they attempted
to do in Flint and in the battle before Fisher No. 2 (now
named the "Battle of Bulls Run", because the police did
the running on that day) failed miserably and only en-
hanced the prestige of the union while arousing the in-
dignation of the masses. The attempt to cut off the heat
and food proved likewise to be a boomerang. The General
Motors workers and especially the Flint workers developed
this weapon to the highest degree in the following ways:
First of all they strategically locked themselves in, mak-
ing it difficult to dislodge them without the use of consider-
able force and numbers, while at the same time, by taking
over the gates, they obtained the possibility of freely com-
ing and going and thereby relieved the strain which they
would otherwise have found a serious factor in their "vol-
untary imprisonment". Thus, by coming and going in shifts,
they were able to hold out for a long time and thereby
improved the methods of continually staying in the plants
which was the practice in the Midland Steel, Kelsey-Hayes,
American Aluminum and other Detroit auto strikes.
Second, they developed a complete and efficient organiza-
tion within the plant, establishing a strike committee, and
various sub-committees, and captains, including health and
22
,
sanitation, patrol and policing, trial committee (kangaroo
court), and by means of such organization exercised the
greatest vigilance and control, developing fully both the
strategy and the means of defense against any attacks. The
workers virtually barricaded themselves within the plants
and prepared themselves to use all devices available (but
emphatically barred firearms) within the plant to hold
their positions. In the Fisher No. 1 Plant in Flint, the sit-
down strikers covered the windows with bullet-proof metal
sheets through which fire hoses could be put out to meet
any gas or firearm attack. They organized and drilled
squads in the use of the water hoses for quick and efficient
service. They organized a police patrol which made the
rounds at given hours to detect any untoward movement
of people in adjoining wings of the building occupied by
the office help so as not to be caught by surprise attacks,
etc.
Third, they combined the method of sitting down within
the plant with a system of outside car picket patrol, which
was supplemented by the union by daily outside meetings
through a public address system, carried on by the use
of sound cars. This was further supplemented by large-
scale demonstrations arranged by the union to meet any
critical situation, such as the threat ef evacuation on the
basis of the injunction. Such a combination of an inside
strike with outside mass mobilization and support rend-
ered the use of the sit-down most effective. It was because
of this organized mass support that the corporation wai
frustrated in its efforts to dislodge them. For example on
the day when the evacuation was expected, following the
23
issuance of the injunction, about 3,000 workers formed a
picket line before Fisher No. 1 at Flint, and many thou-
sands more were present and ready to pitch into the battle
if the evacuation were attempted.
Fourth, they worked out the strategy of organizing a sit-
down in the face of the massing of numerous company
guards who were ready to use firearms to prevent the occur-
rence of a sit-down. This they did in connection with the
sit-down in Chevrolet Plant No. 4. The move executed
by the Flint strike leadership consisted in arranging a sit-
down strike of the workers in Plant No. 9, sending outside
union men and women to give them support, and in thai
way engaged the attention of the company thugs of Plant
No. 9 and those of other plants, and while the battle raged
here, organized a march from Plant No. 6 to Plant No. 4,
which was the better organized and the most strategic plant
because it produces motors for all Chevrolet cars, and ef-
fected the successful sit-down in this plant. Thus they com-
bined a march from other plants as reinforcements for the
main point of attack.
We must properly evaluate this new tactic of the workers.
The sit-down strike has arisen spontaneously from the ranks
of the workers and is a new weapon forged to meet the
problems of struggle against the big corporations. It is a
tactic, however, which is already being employed in small
as well as large factories, in industrial as well as other
plants. It is becoming the principal form of strike struggle
at the present time and for that reason must be paid the
closest attention in order to impart to this method the great-
est consciousness and efficiency. Experience shows what the
24
great teachers of the working class movement, Marx and
Lenin, have emphasized many times, that new forms of
struggle will inevitably arise as special conditions change,
"forms hitherto unseen by active people in the movement".
The sit-down strike is not the old syndicalist tactic of
the folded-arms strike, nor the application of the theory
of the militant minority (the idea that a small group of
resolute people can impose its will upon large masses and
by their sheer determination drag them along irrespective
of their sentiments and convictions). While the number ac-
tually sitting within the plants was a minority of the work-
ers of the factory, nonetheless, the sit-down strike was suc-
cessful because these workers represented and were sup-
ported by a big majority of the workers of the shop. There
is no doubt that the sit-down strikes of the French work-
ers have had the most profound influence in introducing
this instrument among the American workers, but the
changed conditions within the country have favored the use
of the sit-down strike here.
What are these conditions? At first sight is the experi-
ences of the workers in their struggle against the big in-
dustrialists in which they found themselves beset by brutal
force, the breaking up of the picket lines and use of hired
strike-breakers and other acts of violence. It must be re-
membered that in 1930, the picket line of Fisher Plant No.
1 in Flint was broken up and driven out of the city en
masse by the chief of police. This lesson was not lost upon
the Fisher Body workers.
Secondly, the last elections and the defeat of the eco-
nomic royalists have given to the workers the feeling that
25
the government was on their side, would protect them
against the big corporations, and would not so readily
come out against them as a strike-breaking agency. Thirdly
is the growth in consciousness and understanding of the
workers of their strategic importance in the mass produc-
tion set-up, the inter-dependence of departments and plants,
and thus their ability to match the strength of the corpora-
tion by their power to interrupt and stop the whole pro-
cess of production by stopping the movement of the belt.
But the use of the sit-down, the "occupation" of the
plant property, reveal that deeper forces have been at work
in the course of the last years.
Let us consider the question of property and property
rights. General Motors and the ruling class press every-
where set up a howl against the sit-downers, that they had
taken over the factory, and were trespassing upon the rights
of the owners. Mr. Sloan spoke about "holding the factory
for ransom". And the pretentious quack scholar, John P. Frey
of the American Federation of Labor, followed in his
footsteps with talk about the occupation of the fac-
tories. Editorials were written about the sit-down becoming
a daily habit in the life of the people. "How would you
like it if a stranger came into your house and squatted in
your dining room and refused to leave." Such was the theme
of the editorials and new articles turned out in reams by
the capitalist writers. This was intended to shake the morale
of the workers, to scare the small property owners and
turn them against the strike, and to bring pressure upon
the authorities — "sworn to uphold property rights and the
constitution". But matters did not turn out that way. The
workers did not sit down in the factories in order to take
26
them over and dispossess General Motors, They did not
carry out "expropriation", but instead carefully guarded
the property and in fact prided themselves that they took
care of the property and machines "far better than the
plant guards". They declared their readiness to leave the
plants if they were given the assurances and were guar-
anteed that the plants would not be put into operation until
a settlement was reached. The workers did not at all feel
themselves strangers in another man's home. As the Flint
Auto Worker pointed out, the workers of the plant were
part and parcel of the factory. They spent more days, weeks
and years in them than did the owners, many of whom have
never seen the factory and have not spent a single day
within its walls. And thus the workers were not motivated
by revolutionary aims in occupying the plants but were
limiting themselves to a form of pressure to achieve their
immediate economic ends.
They were encroaching upon the rights of the capitalists
—capitalist rights — the right of unlimited exploitation
and ruthless oppression, and were asserting labor's rights,
the right to a decent livelihood under human conditions
of work. But does this not happen in a walk-out strike,
when workers cease to labor and stop the working of the
machinery (the property of the capitalists), stop the hir-
ing of scabs and interfere with the "sacred right" of the
capitalists to make profits, just as long as they ignore the
needs of the working people? And has this not always
been the cry of the capitalists against strikes? Only here,
to be sure, we have a more advanced form of this "inter-
ference" with the sacred and let it be said tyrannical prop-
erty rights.
27
Nonetheless, in this action, we see the maturing of the
idea among the workers that the factories are not merely
the sole property of the owners to do with and to handle
as they see fit, but that there are human rights to be safe-
guarded and that these rights must take precedence over
property rights. Here we see the greater consciousness of
the position of the workers as wage slaves. Here we see
the emergence of the working class as a class. Here we see
the sharp alignment of the classes within the country — a
development which is finding and will find its expression
on the political field. An epochal change is taking. place in
the mentality of the working class. The years of the de-
pression and crisis have shattered the old relationships, have
lowered the prestige of the ruling class and have raised the
independence and self-assertedness of labor. It is this new
strength of the working class which General Motors and
their henchmen encountered in Flint and other General
Motors strongholds; and it is this strength which they tried
to break through the organization of the Flint Alliance, a
combination of foremen, superintendents and local business
men, dependent upon General Motors. It was because of
this strength that the local authorities began to deputize
loyal citizens and threatened to go down to the plants to
"shoot it out". Had it not been for the cool-headedness of
the union leadership, a local civil war could have been
precipitated by the guardians of law and order.
The big corporations in meeting with sit-down strikes will
undoubtedly repeat the tactics of General Motors. The cry
against alleged expropriation will continue. This attitude
of the corporations will make the strike struggles extremely
28
acute. For that reason, in sit-down strikes, the union must
see to it that the aims of the strike are clearly set forth
to the whole population, that it imparts to the middle class
— the merchants and professional people — clear knowledge
of the purpose of the strike and in that way align the mid-
dle elements on the side of the union and the strike, and
that the union leadership hold firmly to their rights and
do not waver before the propaganda onslaughts of the cor-
poration.
Special Advantages
of the Sit-Down
▼V herein are the special advantages of the sit-down
tactic? Observation of a number of strikes leads me to
think that the following are among the most important rea-
sons for the introduction of this tactic:
Sit-down strikes give to the workers a greater feeling of
strength and security because the strikers are inside the
plants, in the solid confines of the factory, at the machines
which are the sources of their livelihood, instead of away
from the plant, moving around in "empty space", on the
sidewalks surrounding the factories.
Sit-down strikes give to the workers greater sureness that
there are no scabs within the plants and no production is
being carried on and makes it difficult to run in scabs. For
29
example, in the walkout strike, the great problem is that
of picketing. Mass picketing — throwing of large masses
around the factory gates — is of the utmost importance if
scabs are to be kept out but even then the problem is ex-
tremely difficult in view of the size of the factory and the
numerous entrances. Take the Fisher Body No. 1 plant at
Flint, This takes up an area of one-half mile around
and requires large masses concentrated at a great number
of points throughout the day and night. With the sit-down
strike the problem of picketing is reduced for, with the
workers sitting in, a relatively smaller picket patrol (this
is absolutely essential so that the workers inside know what
is going on outside) is sufficient to guard against the in-
filtration of scabs.
The sit-down strike furthermore makes it difficult to re-
sume operations even partially where scabs have gotten in
because by holding down one section of the plant it is hard
to begin operations.
The sit-down strike affords strikers greater possibility
of defending themselves against the violence of the police
and company men because they are inside the plants and
are able to bar the way of the attackers and also are able
to organize means of defense and when an attack does oc-
cur, the public understands clearly who are the attackers.
The sit-down strike makes for a greater discipline, group
consciousness and comradeship among the strikers because
of the very position in which they find themselves and there-
by enhances the militancy and fighting spirit of the
workers.
Finally, the sit-down strike arouses the widest sympathy
30
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and support among the working population because of the
courage of the workers in taking "possession" of the fac-
tory and because of the self-sacrifice and hardship which
such action entails. This is particularly the case of indus-
trial communities where the factory is the center of every-
thing.
Of course, the sit-down strike creates its own set of dif-
ficulties and problems. The question of sleeping within the
plant, of contacts with the families, of feeding the work-
ers, of holding the workers within the plants, of keeping
out company men, of guarding against provocations, of the
danger of the stoppage of heat and food, of organizing sets
of inside and outside strike committees, the timely switch-
ing from an inside to an outside strike when the lines do
not hold, etc., all require careful study in order to readjust
the methods of strike organization to the problems of the
sit-down.
The use of the sit-down method of strike does not do
away with the general tactics and strategy in the operation
of strike struggles, that of the necessity for adequate mass
preparation of the strikes, of the building up of the union
as the basis of the strike, or of achieving the largest amount
of mass support among the workers of the plant — all fea-
tures of good strike organization which have generally been
employed in the walkout tactic. I have in mind, of course,
the features of an organized strike.
The sit-down tactic caught the corporations unprepared
but already they are developing counter methods to defeat
it. These methods include the enlargement of company
police, the organization of special groups of "loyal work-
32
ers" forcibly to eject sit-down strikers, to organize their
plants in such a way as to make an approach to the fac-
tory more difficult and thereby isolate and starve out the
workers.
The sit-down strike is not an exclusive method of strike.
It does not replace the walkout strike tactic. Both will be
used but we must state that the sit-down tactic is now part
of the arsenal of weapons which unionism is using, will use
and can use in the struggle against the exploiters.
Tasks Now Facing
the Union
X he position of the United Automobile Workers has been
greatly strengthened as a result of the strike, but it has still
before it the task of the negotiation of an agreement on
the question of wages, hours and working conditions. It
has won an agreement but the agreement has only the value
of the organized strength behind it. General Motors will
contest every inch of the ground in order to prevent the
union from capitalizing on its enhanced prestige and to
prevent it from becoming the only union in the industry.
It will therefore require the utmost vigilance on the part of
the union and continuous activity in order that it may win
a satisfactory settlement of. its demands. Strong-arm meth-
ods used in Anderson and other places show that General
33
Motors is not yet going to abandon the field to the union.
The most important thing is to consolidate the newly
gained membership and to entrench itself firmly within the
plants. Consolidation means above all the establishment of
an efficient shop steward system. Through the establishment
of a department shop steward system the union will have
the forces to carry on recruitment, to defend the condi-
tions of the workers in the shop, to take care of the griev-
ances, and to bar the way to the company men who will
seek to create confusion and steer the workers away from
the union. The establishment of a strong shop steward sys-
tem requires the carrying through of elections, department
by department, plant by plant, instructing the shop stew-
ards in their tasks, and above all, securing shop stewards
who have proven themselves to be militant and active men,
who have demonstrated their loyalty and reliability in the
course of the strike. In the election of shop stewards, non-
union members as well as union members should have the
right to participate, and in that way the shop stewards will
truly represent all the workers of the department.
The necessity for a vigorous recruiting campaign is obvi-
ous, particularly in those strategic places in which General
Motors held out against the union. It is also essential be-
cause General Motors will carry through maneuvers to
build up a competing union. The ineffectiveness of the com-
pany union will undoubtedly compel General Motors to
seek to build up an independent organization which will
remain a creature of the company. Here the American Fed-
eration of Labor will be more than ready to help out the
corporation and to provide an apparent independent front
34
for a company union set-up. Already in Cleveland, there
are signs that the American Federation of Labor intends
to move in and use whatever membership the company
union elements can provide it in order to establish a rival
organization. It will be necessary to expose this move and
to show up the American Federation of Labor as coming
in only with the object of dividing the ranks of the work-
ers and destroying the effectiveness of the International
Auto Workers Union. But at the same time, the union must
be prepared where its own ranks are too weak within cer-
tain departments to send forces into such a set-up with the
object of wresting away the leadership of such independent
union and in that way disrupting the tactics of the com-
pany.
The consolidation and development of the union requires,
furthermore, the continuation of the labor papers that have
been issued by the union during the strike and the estab-
lishment of papers of the union where none have existed,
and the building up of sports groups, athletic teams, glee
clubs, dramatic groups, educational classes, the enlarge-
ment of the women's auxiliary — all of which will power-
fully reinforce the union's strength.
Nor can the union ignore the challenge which has been
issued to it by the local authorities who have shown them-
selves to be tools of the company. And in such places as
Flint and other industrial communities controlled by Gen-
eral Motors as well. as in Detroit, the union must consider
the question of electing union men into political office, to
oust the General Motors politicians, and to build up local
tabor parties in order to achieve that aim.
35
i
The General Motors strike has set the ball rolling. Other
plants are stepping into line. Strikes are growing in the
independent as well as in the plants of the other big corpora-
tions. The question of an agreement with Chrysler is now
being placed upon the order of the day. The question of
the organization of Ford is not a far distant question. The
union should discuss the lessons from the General Motors
struggle in order to fully prepare itself to tackle these
points.
Activities of the Communists
in the Auto Strike
/Vmong the auto workers there are former miners and
others who have had many years of labor experience. Their
experience made for added solidarity and discipline. In
this strike and the union there were also radical-minded
workers and among this group, in the first place, must be
mentioned the work of the Communist members of the
union as well as the work of the Communist Party itself.
What were the activities of the Communists? The Com-
munists and the Communist Party gave the most loyal back-
ing and support to the strike, to the aims, policies and ac-
tivities of the union and the C.I.O. The Communists worked
ardently and earnestly in helping to build up the union and
tried in every way possible to properly prepare the strike
36
so that it would rest upon a strong foundation. In the strike
itself the Communists sought to imbue the strikers and the
workers generally with the greatest discipline, organization
and persevcrence. There is no doubt that where the
Communists were active and took an outstanding part, par-
ticularly at the most decisive points of the struggle,
there the strike was strongest, and this made for the success
of the whole battle. The Communist workers combated any
tendency to waver in the face of the sharp blows of the
enemy and helped to keep the ranks as firm as possible.
The Party members, not only in the areas of the strike
but in various parts of the country, gave moral and material
aid, helped to collect food and funds, arranged solidarity
meetings, helped the union in the distribution of its ma-
terial, and gave practical assistance in other ways. The Com-
munist Party early recognized and sought to impress upon
every one the decisive importance of Flint as the main battle-
ground of the struggle, and in that way aided in keeping
the eyes of the entire country upon Flint so as to render
that front the greatest assistance.
The Daily Worker contained many columns of news
about the strike, editorials and articles, which pointed out
the problems of the strike struggle, which tried to foresee
and warn against the many dangers that lurked ahead in
the battle. It issued a special supplement of 25,000 copies
each and a total of 150,000 copies, which was undoubtedly
of aid to the strike, and in such places as Cleveland, the
Communists in the strike issued a special shop paper which
dealt with the problems of the strike at the Fisher Bod)
plant.
37
1
The existence of groups of Communists within the shops
was undoubtedly of great help because thereby a core of
experienced people were in the shops to help in the solu-
tion of the new problems connected with the sit-down. The
shop form of organization, the shop groups (units), has
more than justified itself. Where the Party organization
paid attention to these units, there the efforts of many years
of work were fully rewarded. The shop unit form of or-
ganization and the attention to the shops are of even greater
importance today with the development of the sit-down
strike methods.
There were some who raised objections to the distribu-
tion of the Daily Worker in the shops among the strikers,
but quite generally the workers welcomed the paper and
did not interfere with the right of the Communist Party to
distribute its material. The "Red scare" which was raised
at times although timidly and mostly by company men did
not take effect because the workers had learned that where
such scares are created against Communists and where dis-
crimination occurs against the activities of one section of
the labor movement, there the company succeeds in divid-
ing the ranks, there the strike becomes weakened and there
it is easiest for company men to get the upper hand. Where
democratic policies prevail and the opinion of all group?
is allowed, there the consciousness of the workers is high-
est and the greatest unity and militancy obtain. The more
united the struggle, the better the fight and the greater the
success.
Can it be said that everything was done by the Com-
munists and the Communist Party that was possible to help
38
the strike? No, this cannot be said. Not all Party organiza-
tions or all Party members participated in assisting the
strike struggle, a fault which shows that the Party is not
yet sufficiently mobilized for joining in the economic fights
and that sectarian tendencies which keep Party members
away from this most vital task are still prevalent. But this
is also related to the insufficient connection and leader-
ship of the county and state committees with the branches
and membership. The lack of Party organization in such
places as Pontiac, Anderson and Saginaw made it impos-
sible for the Party to render assistance at these places, a
situation which must be corrected in the near future.
The rise of a new labor movement in the auto centers, the
growth of strike struggles, place before the Party more
acutely than ever before the necessity for making the fac-
tories and trade unions the center of its attention, in order
that it might be of greatest assistance. The distribution of
the Daily Worker and Sunday Worker, of literature, must
center chiefly around the shops and the unions, for the
workers are now ready and willing to hear all points of
view with respect to the problems and tasks of the labor
movement. The organization of a speakers' bureau and the
enlargement of the work of agitation and education are also
badly needed, so as to impart to the working class move-
ment a knowledge of the workings of the labor movement
and of the social and political problems confronting it,
and in that way aid in planting the flag of trade unionism
firmly over the giant factories of the country and to en-
large and strengthen the social and class vision of the
workers.
39
i
It is especially urgent to put on a real recruiting drive,
to win to the Party the ranks of active people, and in that
way enable the Party to root itself in the shops, to enlarge
its contacts, and to strengthen itself as an organization
which is influential among the mass of auto workers. But
of great urgency is the necessity of showing to the work-
ers the face of the Party, to show the workers what the
Party is doing so that it may have a full appreciation of the
importance of the activities of Communists in the working
class struggle. This was by no means done to any sufficient
extent during the strike.
So much for the activities of the Communist Party and
the Communists in the struggle.
It is also interesting to discuss the activity of other work-
ing class groups, particularly that of the Socialist Party.
Members of the Socialist Party carried on creditable activity
during the strike and their activities were of help to the
union. Several members of the Socialist Party performed
outstanding work. These were Socialists who were not
infected with the poison of Trotskyism or influenced to any
large extent by the sectarianism of the "militant Socialists",
but followed a true course of mass struggle. In the strike
the Communists cooperated with these Socialist Party mem-
bers (although not on the basis of any formal pact) and
such cooperation proved fruitful.
But the same cannot be said of the line of policy pur-
sued by the Socialist Party through the columns of its lead-
ing organ, the Socialist Call. While devoting considerable
space to the strike its policies were by no means free from
sectarianism. Take for example the article of Frank Trager
in the Socialist Call of February 6. Here he states that the
40
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offensive wliieh took place in Flint during that week "was
under the spirited leadership of the Socialist leaders". This
statement is not only guilty of unjustified boasting but,
what is worse, separates the leadership of Flint from the
general leadership of the union and the C.I.O., and also
dismisses the leadership of militants who occupied the most
strategic points in Flint and who are by no means Socialists.
But the harmful sectarianism is to be found in another
part of his article in which he states that the offensive
took place because "the Flint auto workers discarded the
futile strategy of long conferences and round table negotia-
tions". The inference here is that the leadership of the
union was wasting its time in useless negotiations (while
the workers were favoring action) and thanks to the So-
cialist Party they finally received it. This is a complete dis-
tortion of the situation and what is more, reveals a lack of
understanding of the tactics of strike leadership. This ap-
parent emphasis upon "action" and scorn for "talk" appear
indeed very revolutionary and are the latest fad of some
leaders of the Socialist Party. But any knowledge of the
situation shows that the action in Flint in taking Chevrolet's
Plant No. 4 became ripe only with the rise in union mem-
bership during the strike and also followed on the heels
of the discrediting of the General Motors officials due to
their very failure to enter into negotiations in Washington,
followed the rebuke which Secretary Perkins administered
to Mr. Sloan, which raised the morale of the workers and
sharpened their militancy and determination without which
it would have been difficult to have carried through such
a sharp battle and such tactics as were involved in the sit-
42
down in Chevrolet No. 4. Thus we see the worthlessness and
lack of reality contained in such high sounding statements
reported above. In general it must be said that the negotia-
tions carried on by the union leadership and the C.I.O., in
contrast to the negotiations of the old Green and Dillion
group, set a new mark in the practice of labor leaders in
making use of negotiations and conferences not to injure
but to aid the work of the men and women on the picket
lines.
Nor can we dismiss the comment made by Norman
Thomas in his column of January 30 on the question of
the sit-down. On the one hand, he endorses the sit-down
strike as a weapon which has obvious advantages for the
workers "beautifully demonstrated in Flint where the spirit
and discipline of the workers have been remarkable". On
the other hand, he remarks that because "the sit-down strike
properly used is a powerful weapon for the workers — it
does not follow that it has no dangers", and says, "if it
is used for the advantage of some small group rather than
for the advantage of the whole body of workers, if it is
used without discipline; if it is used so as to create public
hostility, then the sit-down strike is not an advantage".
It must be remembered that this was written at the very
moment when the General Motors Corporation was publish-
ing full-page ads and the entire press of the country was
crying out that a small group was keeping large masses out
of work, at a moment also when the capitalists were try-
ing to give the impression that the public was aligned
against the sit-down strike method. Of what use is moraliz-
ing on the sit-down and discussion of its disadvantages at
43
1
such a moment? Such a moment requires unqualified, un-
conditional support, and emphasis upon the importance of
the new weapon, so that the workers may master and hold
firmly to it, for any wavering or doubt as to its useful-
ness would only have assisted in weakening the resistance
to the intended evacuation. What conclusions did Norman
Thomas draw from these remarks? He drew the moral "that
the all important thing is not the particular kind of strike
but the kind of union which the workers build". Here is
the essence of the underestimation and wavering upon the
question of the sit-down which the above remarks revealed,
for in fact the particular kind of union that was being built
depended upon the very success of the kind of strike which
was being used, and contrary to Thomas the all important
thing was the most effective use of the "particular kind of
strike" which the workers were carrying through.
This statement of Thomas is typical of the course re-
cently followed by the leadership of the Socialists of evad-
ing a concrete answer to concrete questions and seeking
refuge in balanced statements which are both here and there,
and in "revolutionary" phrasemongering — a phrasemonger-
ing which conceals true revolutionary deeds.
And lastly, a few remarks upon the disruptive activity of
a little sect of Trotskyist followers in Detroit known as the
Revolutionary Workers Group — a split- off and variant of
the main Trotskyist body. This group at the height of the
struggles, at the very moment that the vigilantes were seek-
ing a pretext to attack and when the workers had organized
a formidable demonstration of their strength, issued a leaf-
let the substance of which was to warn the workers "against
44
the C.I.O. disarming them and to call for the formation of
'workers' guard". Such propaganda, which was emphati-
cally condemned and repudiated by the workers and by the
Communist Party, was just the very thing which the com-
pany needed to reinforce its campaign of violence. Such
activities and propaganda have not the slightest semblance
of any revolutionary activities, although the name of the
group has a revolutionary title, and has far more in com-
mon with the type of work which enemies of the labor
movement would conduct — the work of little reactionaries
and disrupters parading as a section of the labor move-
ment.
1 N conclusion, the strike of the automobile workers re-
veals the new forces that are at work within the country,
forces which are driving toward an extension and strength-
ening of the labor movement and which are welding also
the unity of the working class and of all progressive-minded
people, a process which is giving rise to the growth of a
real people's movement— a real people's united front — a
movement which will embrace also the most aggressive
revolutionary-minded section of the working class — the
Communists and the Communist Party. The full effects of
the great and dramatic auto strike of 1937 will be felt in
the coming struggles ahead of us. It will prove to be a
landmark in American labor history.
45
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THE PEOPLE
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Other Pamphlets on the World Situation
MURDER AT THE KEMEROVO MINES
Ernst Fischer . . . 05
Trotskyite Plotters at Work.
HEROIC CHINA— P. Miff . 15
The Struggle for Unity Against Japanese Imperialism.
THE SPANISH REVOLUTION— M. Ercoli . .05
The Class Character of the War in Spain.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE PIATAKOV-
RADEK TRIAL— William Z. Foster . . . .10
The Significance of the Trial of the Trotskyite Wreckers.
THE PACIFIC COAST MARITIME STRIKE
William Schneiderntan 05
How the Great Maritime Strike Was Organized and Won.
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