The Idea of Shimer College

SHIMER COLLEGE

FALL, 1969

NftBH'tGrvftH (XUi^ftis ^

Preface

This collection of statements by Faculty Members of Shlmer
College Is intended to enrich some of the more generalieed state-
ments concerning the Shlmer curriculum which appear In the catalog*
The faculty statements were for the most part presented as bases
for discussion at the Faculty Orientation program at the beginning
of the 1969-70 academic year.

The order of presentation begins each division with a catalog
statement. Except for the first item on the curriculum in general ,
the catalog statements are the ones describing the area and inte-
grative comprehensive examinations rather than the individual
courses, but the courses are characterized by the faculty statements.

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CURRICULUM

(From the Shimer College Catalog)

The distinction of the Shimer curriculum is achieved through
a unique welding of general courses, comprehensive examinations,
and epecialtzed courses into a complete academic experience, each
element of which is essentially related to the whole. The faculty
is selected for its commltjnent to the notion that the traditional
scholarly disciplines are intagr^ted but not vitiated at the general
education level.

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THE IDEA OF THE COLLEGE

Denis Cowan
Dean of Faculty, Shimer College

HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE ACTIVE MIND

Higher education relies upon the active mind. The active mind Is
sharpened in the exchange of ideas. Therefore, a college should encourage
the active mind to engage with ideas.

College is a place where ideas come together. Ideas are not confined
to immediate experience. Therefore, colleges should bring together ideas
from the whole human adventure.

The encouragement of the mind and the gathering of ideas are the shared
endeavors of the students and the faculty. That one is more experienced than
the other merely assures us that the voices of other minds than those actually
present are heard and heard well. Thus the ideas of Thucydides, Shakespeare,
Galileo, and Kant can be present and examined along with our own.

Shimer College presents a curriculum wherein ideas are introduced, dis-
covered, and criticized. To introduce ideas the faculty chooses very carefully
some original writings which, in their considered judgment, satisfactorily
engage with the kinds of knowledge that occupy our su&taitied attention. Choices
change as options present themselves and as the faculty reflect upon the
changing significance of subject matter in the relevant world at large. But
freedom so to choose, with the concurrence of colleagues, is a guarantee to
the teacher and the learner that what is introduced is not the choice of non-
academic agencies, be they political, administrative, or religious. This
guarantee is sheltered at Shimer College, but the choices of course material
are not exempt from challenge by students and by faculty themselves. Such
challenge may emerge in the whole context of the introductionj discovery,
and criticism of ideas.

Discovery occurs best within a mode of inquiry. There is a heavy
reliance at Shimer College upon the mode of inquiry generated by discussion.
Discussion presumes a willingn^e*- to c«nt-ei^ tiwr Ti±-s««»eion upon particular
ideas, and particular ideas are introduced from readings. Thus preparation
for discussion requires considerable reading before class in order that the
deliberations may be substantive. At Shimer College sutdents are expected
to read at least five or six hours every day of the week. With such an
intake of ideas and data the discovery of fresh ideas and insights is induced.
Discovery is the satisfaction of the inquiring mind, and its freshness is not
a measure of its newness. Old ideas may be rediscovered or discovered to be
other than what some presumed them to be.

Criticism is the application of one set of ideas to another, thereby
exposing weakness or strength in one of them in terms of the other. Criticism
may be tentative or audacious, and the result of criticism may be sportive or
definitive, but the atmosphere in which criticism is conducted is crucial
to the outcome. Scholarly criticism depends upon investigation and reflection,
and Shimer College recognizes that if criticism is to be effective there must

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be opportunity to establish critical modes outside of the classroom discussion.
Therefore, examinations and theme writing are essential elements of the
educational experience. Within the writing program and the examinations the
student faces the task of supporting his discovered ideas and critical con-
clusions with reasoned reflection.

To enclose these volatile conditions within a fixed pattern of general
courses is Shimer's concern. The pattern has three levels. The six basic
courses are concerned with the development of the skills of analysis, of
logic, and of rhetoric to the end that art, science, and society can be
approached as intellectual and affective experiences. Ihe remaining seven
area courses broaden the base of information and investigative method within
the humanities, natural sciences, and social sciences. The three integrative
courses and the foreign language requirements expect some historical and
philosophical principles to emerge as ways of understanding the nature of man.

The demonstration by the student that something significant has happened
to his own development is not limited to courses and their examinations.
Comprehensive examinations at these three levels present relevant but fresh
material to be prepared independently by the student. The result is that a
student at Shlmer leaxus ta function intellectually bath in and oat. of class-
room aituations .

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THE COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION IN HUMAmilES

(From the Shimer College Catalog)

The general courses in the humanities have three principal
objectives. The first is to acquaint the student with a consid-
erable body of the best works in literature, music, and the visual
arts. The second is to develop skill in interpretation of these
works- The third is to give the student an understanding of some
of the general principles upon which critical judgments and eval-
uations of the arts are made and to develop some skill in the
written application of these principles.

In each course the student is required to study a selection
of works in addition to those discussed in class and to prepare
himself for examination upon these. Although all works are chosen
on the basis of their own merits, the essential aim of instruction
is not to teach the specific works, but rather to use the works
as a means of developing an understanding of various modes of
interpreting and evaluating the products of all the arts.

The Comprehensive Examination in Humanities seeks to test
the student's ability to apply the skills in interpretation and
evaluation which he acquires in the classroom to works which he
studies independently, to make clear and to justify the critical
position underlying his judgment of particular works, to exhibit
a knowledge of some, representative- -works of art, music, and
literature, to write purposefully and with style, as. developed
in Humanities 1, 2, 3, and 4.

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THE IDEA OF THE HUMANITIES

Andrew F, H. Armstrong

Rutgers University; Parsons School of Design; University of
Chicago, A.B. (1958); Mexico City College; University of
Chicago, M.A. (1959), Chairman of Humanities 2, 1969. Shimer
College Faculty Member 1959- .

THE ARTIST'S ACTION, THOUGHT AND PASSION
IN THE GENERAL CURRICULUM

The remarks that follow are meant to comprise a tentative, but only
tentative, restatement of the purposes and ends of the general courses in
the Humanities. The literature sequence of Humanities 2, 3, and 4 Is the
central subject, but anything said here about Humanities 2 can be applied
to Humanities 1, and the ideas related to Humanities 4-A can be linked
without violence to the B and C variants.

While Humanities 1 and 2 direct their attention to differing kinds
of art, they share a basically identical method and goal. They move, through
a structured analysis of form and content, of parts as related to the whole,
toward a recognition and understanding of the artist's craft . Less than
with what he has done in the plastic arts or in music or in literature, they
are concerned with how he has done it. These courses make use of a special
language for each, its terms rendering communicable the how brought to light
through analysis.

Humanities 3 turns from craft to criticism , on the premise that once
the how of the artist is established, the what can be clarified. Humanities 3
mounts interpretation on the analytical base supplied by the two earlier
courses, adding the consideration of the work of art's meaning to that of
its content and form. What the artist has done takes precedence over how
he has done it, although the how is kept ever in view. If form-content
can be said to serve as the focus for Humanities 1 and 2, form-content-meaning
does the same for Humanities 3.

One might reasonably expect that a sequence beginning with analysis and
moving to Interpretation would inevitably settle on evaluation as the pivotal
problem of the final course. While such a progression in theory may be
architecturally satisfying, it tends to crumble In practice. Interpretive
exercises and the study of contending aesthetic systems too often obscure
the ground on which a work can be rated as good and successful or bad and
a failure. Worth becomes increasingly a matter for subjective judgment;
discussion breaks down.

We know that analysis can be amicably practiced, as can interpretation,
in the company of one's peers. Evaluation can not. One can argue form-
content and meaning while appearing to retain an openminded humility, but
evaluation demands larger, less retractable pronouncements at the borders
of presumption. For the student, evaluation becomes more and more a process
to handle alone.

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Should this reasoning so far prove soundj we cannot be expected to .
proceed from the how the artist does it of Humanities 2, through the what
the artist means by it of Humanities 3, to the how much it is worth of a
workable Humanities 4.

In our hunger, however, for order and symmetry, we cannot long be at
ease with a Humanities 4 that is a mere extension of Humanities 3, simply
"more of the same." If Humanities 4 is to hold its place in the curriculum,
it must somehow acquire, for both instructors and students, a sharp yet
meaningful difference from the other units in the sequence.

A real possibility for such a difference may have arrived in the recent
history of Humanities 4. Until three years ago, several features of this
last general course set it somewhat apart from the others, if only in content.
First, many of its readings were the work of still-living and even very
young writers. Second, the course included a grouping of other authors,
old and new, each drawing his inspiration from a common spring- -formerly
the Don Juan legend now replaced by that of Faust. Third, a sizeable block
of the calendar dealt with censorship, once a biting problem for the artist,
but today an issue of rapidly shrinking size.

When censorship, from the course as from the 20th Century, faded away,
whatever value it carried as a synthesizing element, as a study of the-artist-
and-his-social-relations, went with it. Other cultural concerns of the artist
still visible in the balance of the readings quite obviously were not his
alone, since all men, artists or not, take assurance of their individual
reality from the people and things "out there." Moreover, the notion that
art bestows aesthetic dimension on society's abrasiveness seems tritely
axiomatic and therefore feeble in the incitement of arresting and thoughtful
discussion.

But our understandable lapse in attention to one integrative topic
for the readings--society' s policing of art--in reducing our field of view
to the Faustus "syndrome" and "the new writing," rather oddly turned the
course toward cohesion, not away from it: the artist's creative response
to irritation could now be seen to wing home with startling frequency, not
on society's actions exclusively, but on art itself.

The novelist reacts to music, and to Elizabeth-m drains.' s presentation
of legend, as in Mann's Dr. Faustus . Tue poet reacts to painting, and to the
ancient heritage of myth, as in Auden's "Icarus." T'^Hiile Keats stares through
the ode at the urn, Ferlinghetti fixes his gaze, in "The Lonely and Isolate
Satyrs," upon the monolithic newcomer-poets crowding the beach of current
verse. Tlie twenty-odd-year-olds in a Liverpool cellar string syllables on
amplified guitars.

So we come- -at least for the moment, since the curriculum is alive and
wide open to change--to source , the artist's source of irritation. Source
as a simple rubric for Humanities 4 joins with criticism for Humanities 3
^^■^ c^^^f fc for Humanities 1 and 2.

An objection may arise that the idea of the artist stimulated by art itself
is too narrow a consideration for a general course, that it tends to ignore his
traditional preoccupation with mankind's war, inequities and other social enigmas
In answer, one can argue that a semester devoted to art deriving from art, and
thoughtfully planned as to reading content, will avoid sketchy historiographical
interference, and give wider, more vigorous coverage to the purely aesthetic
response.

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THE IDEA OF THE HUMANITIES

T. Nelson Magill

Johns Hopkins, B.A. (1934); Cornell University, M.A. (1937),
Ph.D. (1941); Juilliard Graduate School. Chairman Humanities
Area, 1968- . Shimer College Faculty Member 1966- .

The "idea of the humanities" (if I may be facetious about it) is a
fiood idea! made completely respectable by Matthew Arnold's definition of
Culture: the best that has been thought and said by Man since Man began--
or words to that effect.

Mr. Armstrong has laid out for you a pattern of progressive, structured
exposure to the Humanities chiefly as Literature, through the years of a
student's relationship with humane studies .. .What I propose to talk about
for a few minutes is, is there a signif icant--perhaps even necessary --relation-
ship with a further curriculum, beyond the normal Humanities sequence?

Having completed a sequential study in the Humanities, the student,
usually in his third year, will have likewise completed a sequence in the
Social Sciences and in the Natural Sciences. At this point, the student
will normally concentrate in one or more of three areas... The student
choosing Humanities will concentrate in Literature. Any conjunction with
Music and Art will be only peripheral. But from his brief exposure to
Humanities 1 the student may feel that Art or Music is to him more vital
Humanities studies than singly literature. .. It is here that our "total
liberal education" breaks down, as I see it. A "total liberal education" in
the Humanities should provide the same kind of expansion beyond set guide-
lines that is possible in the Natural Sciences, for example: "Science"
means Physics, Biology, Chemistry, etc., in concentration courses; by the
same token, shouldn't "Humanities" mean Music, Theatre, Painting, Sculpture
as well as Literature and History?

With this in mind, Ben Kneale and I began working up a program of study
we called CREATIVE ARTS. It was implemented into a working syllabus, after
Ben's death, by other staff members and myself. The proposal was endorsed
by the Board of Trustees, but suspended for lack of funds. (Could have paid
for itself in one year!)

Simple plan: a concentration beginning in the third year in a "creative"
area: Painting and Sculpture, Creative Writing, Theatre. Professional
instruction by a post-graduate fellowship holder in each area: he to be
a performer^ and to teach one course in his speciality. (Room and board,
Studio, $1500.) .. ."Learning" not only through instruction but also by example
in performance: an actor in Theatre, a writer perhaps for that Theatre,
a" painter and/or sculptor to have work constantly on exhibit. .. There is no
recommendation for Creative Music here, for our program now comes to an
abrupt and brutal halt by the first semester of the first year. This is
unfortunate; because "Making-Music" was once as vital at Shimer as extra-
curricular Theatre now is. Certainly I hope it can become integral to a
Creative Arts program.

Tell your Congressman to expedite CREATIVE ARTS at Shimeri

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P a in ting

Students majoring in painting would take one course in their major
each semester for a total of six courses. Two elective courses would be
in sculpture, making a total of eight concentration courses in the field
of the fine arts.

There would be required readings in the history and aesthetics of art.
The readings would be developed by the Department of Humanities. An examination
in these readings would be given at the end of each year.

In order to graduate students would have to demonstrate their ability
to accurately render the figure, landscape and still life, and show proficiency
in the following skills: oil painting, watercolor, lithograph, etching,
wood cut and drawing in various media. They would also be expected to master
certain elementary sculptural skills such as work in clay, plaster, wood and
stone.

Sculptur e

Students majoring in sculpture would take one course in their major each
semester for a total of six courses. Two elective courses would be in painting,
making a total of eight concentration courses in the fine arts.

There would be required readings in the history and aesthetics of art.
The list of readings would be developed by the Department of Humanities. An
examination in these readings would be given at the end of each year.

In order to graduate, students would have to demonstrate their ability
to accurately render the figure as evidenced by a portrait, full-figure study
and group of figures and show proficiency in the following skills; stonecarving,
woodcarving, modelling in clay and wax, welding, bronze casting and work in
fiberglass and plaster. They would also be expected to master certain
elementary skills in two dimensional representation such as painting in oils,
etching, woodcut and drawing in various media.

The Creative Writing Program

Those students in the Humanities Area who elect the concentration in
creative writing must apply to the Writer- In-Residence for admission to the
program. Admission will be highly selective; significant samples of each
student's work must be submitted along with a statement of purpose. Due to
the size of the first year's prografn, no more than twelve students may be
admitted to the one concentration course in creative writing (the Writing
Workshop) offered each semester.

Each student must take four workshops in Creative Writing and two concen-
trations in Literature. We recommend that his two electives be taken within
the Humanities Area. Furthermore, to add critical depth to the program, we
suggest that the Humanities Staff develop one course per semester that is
designed to examine closely the technical problems involved in major works
of poetry or fiction (such courses, entitled "craft" courses at some
institutions, would be available to Humanities majors; they would be variations
on the motifs present in the new Humanities concentrations program).

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Instruction in creative writing will take place in Writing Workshops.
The workshop will be open to each duly admitted creative writing student ^ no
matter the stage of his development or the level of his experience in writing.
Since the workshops will grow from the technical and thematic problems of
the students present, each workshop will present a new academic and artistic
experience. Given a talented faculty member and searching students who have
been developing through exposure and practice, simple repetition of subject
matter seems unlikely. Similar workshop programs have been successful at
Stanford and Dartmouth. Through this process the student will be exposed to
the problems inherent in creating all the major forms of imaginative i-nriting
as well as to the challenge of defending or attacking a wide variety of critical
judgments on such work.

The specific structure of each workshop will be determined by the Writer-
in-Residence. Generally, each workshop will consist of instruction in technique
and critical evaluation of original works submitted by students and the published
works of professional vttI ters and critics. The Writer-in-Residence may supplement
class meetings with individual conferences.

At the end of the fourth workshop in Creative Writing the student must
present to the Writer-in-Residence a thesis consisting of a collection of
short stories, a group> of poems, a novella, a novel, or a play. The Writer-
in-Residence must approve the thesis or the student will not be given full
credit for his participation in the program.

The Theatre Arts

A realistic program in Theatre Arts (that could be offered by myself and
an Actor-in-residence responsible for one course per semester) would consist
of four concentrations, three of which would be required of all students in
the program. The third semester would offer an elective choice.

Semester 1: Introduction to the Art of the Theatre . (Required.)

a. Aesthetics of the theatre, and the history of theatre.
Form. Lectures and supplementary readings.

b. Play Production : the fundamentals of technical theatre
crafts, Including elementary stagecraft, lighting techniques,
and scene design. Lectures and workshop.

Semester 2: Fundamentals of Acting, Directing and Design . (Required.)

a- A study of acting "Methods," with exercises, improvisations,
and rehearsals designed to equip the actor with different
approaches to the problem of characterization. Lectures
and workshop.

b. A study of techniques of aural and visual design through which
the director shapes the performance. This examination will
proceed along two lines: 1) study of the writings of leading
theorists and practitioners, and, 2) preparation of scenes
for class presentation and discussion. Lectures and workshop.

c. Introductory Scene Design

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Semester 3: Advanced Acting (elective #1)

Training in voice-production, body movement, period styles
of acting, ensemble playing, and in-depth study of characterization.
Related training in fencing and modern dance.

OR
Advanced Directing {elective #2)

Teaching the actor to act: study of directorial techniques
for assisting actors toward believable characterizations.
Preparation of scenes for class discussion. "Prompt Book"
analysis, and public performance, of a one-act play.

OR
Advanced Scene Design (elective #3)

At the end of the third semester, the student shall submit a research paper
or thesis relating his CREATIVE THEATRE ARTS study and training with his study
of THEATRE LITERATURE in the general curriculum.

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THE COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION IN NATURAL SCIENCES

(From the Shiraer College Catalog)

The natural sciences program has three aims. The first is to
acquaint the student with some of the major solutions to problems
that man has formulated concerning the physical and biological
worlds. A second aim is to acquaint the student with representa-
tive examples of different kinds of attack upon scientific problems,
that is, with some of the patterns of inquiry which characterize
the physical and biological sciences. The third aim is to develop
in the student those skills and habits which are helpful in the
comprehension and evaluation of scientific thought and conclusions.

The Comprehensive Examination in Natural Sciences seeks to
test the student's ability to formulate the grounds upon which valid
conclusions are based as well as the complex of methods by which
these conclusions are reached, to compare alternative theories
in regard to their scope and adequacy, to utilize scientific
concepts approrpriately in relation to the data for which they
are intended, to deal wisely with scientific generalizations
and with questions of the interrelationship of the sciences, to
employ with understanding and with effect some of the principal
conclusions concerning the natural world, as developed in Natural
Sciences 1, 2, 3, and 4, and Mathematics 1.

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THE IDEA OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES

Don P. Moon

Cornell University, B.E.P. (1957); New York University, M.N.E,
(1958); Nashotah House, B.D. (1965). Shimer College Faculty
Member 1967 .

"We. suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge
of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in
which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on
which the fact depends - "

So ArletQtle Informs us (in his Posterior Analytics). The central idea in
Aristotle's conception of science was the reasoned fact. For an endeavor
to be scientific not only must facts be observed but the facts must also
be deducible from first principles (archai) inherent in the particular
science. For Aristotle science vzas based upon a dialectical relationship
between fact and principle using both induction and deduction. The
principles central to a particular science were obtained inductively and
observable facts deduced from them.

Consider for a moment a person having a headache and a high temperature
who, while sitting in the doctor's office, with one leg crossed upon the other,
notices the fact that his foot goes to sleep more rapidly than would normally
be the case. (There might be some doubt as to the factual nature of this
observation by some scientists who would demand that a measurable physiological
response be substituted for the "sleepy foot" feeling.) Even if it is a fact,
however, it is not scientific fact in Aristotle's sense unless the "sleepy
foot" is deducible from biological principles involving blood flow and other
variables of which I will have to plead ignorance.

A thorough- going Platonist might well chide me for my easy escape into
ignorance, seeing in it the giving up of the ideal of the unification of
all scientific knowledge into a single consistent system. Such an ideal
was supported by the famous German physicist von Helmholtz (creator of the
law of conservation of energy) in the following statement:

"The appointed. .. task of physics is thus to refer natural phenomena
to unchangeable attractive and repulsive forces, whose intensity
depends upon distance. The solution of the problem is at the same
time the prerequisite for a thorough understanding of nature... The
work of science will have been so completed only when phenomena
have been traced back to the simple forces, and when it can be shown
also that the given account is the only possible one admitted by the
phenomena. Then this would have been proven to be the necessary way
of interpreting nature, and It would be the one to which objective
truth should be ascribed."

This unifying ideal of objective truth being finally obtainable in terms
of forces between particles was of course at the center of the development
of classical physics. This particular ideal has been discredited by the
advent of quantum theory, not to mention non-mechanistic biological theories.

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But it is not only this particular ideal which has been brought into question
but the Platonic notion of unified knowledge and the objective scientific
knowledge of Aristotle. Gerald Holton, professor of physics at Harvard
University, has stated the aim of 17th and 18th century science in the
following way:

"Coupled with the theme of universal accessibility of nature has been tne
old motivating methological theme of an underlying — unity and singularity
of natural knowledge- The paths to an understanding of nature may be
infinite, .. .but all the paths have been vaguely thought to lead to a
goal, an understanding of one nature.

"These two connected themata of unlimited outer accessibility and
delimited inner meaning can be vaguely depicted by the device of a
maze having in its outer w^Hs innumerable entrances, through each
of which one can hopefully reach, sooner or later, the one mystery
which lies at the center."

het us contrast this view with selected 20th century comments on science:
J. Larmor (1905 -- Lucasian Prof, of Math at Cambridge)

"There has been of late a growing trend of opinion, prompted in
part by general philosophical views in the direction that the
theoretical constructions of physical science are largely factitious,
that instead of presenting a valid image of the relation of things
on which further progress can be based, they are still little better
than a mirage,"

Sigmund Freud (1932 -- writing to A. Einstein in the exchange of letters

later published under the title Why War? )

"It may perhaps seem to you as though our theories are a kind of
mythology and, in the present case^ not even an agreeable one.
But does not every science come in the end to a kind of mythology
like this? Cannot the same be said today of your own physics?"

Warner Heisenberg (1958)

In science "the object of research is no longer nature in itself
but rather nature exposed to man's questioning, and to this extent
man here also meets himself."

Karl Popper (1959)

"I think that we shall have to get accustomed to the idea that we
must not look upon s.cience as a 'body of knowledge', but rather as
a system of hypothesis; that is to say, as a system of guesses or
anticipations which in principle cannot be justified, but with
which we work as long as they stand up to tests, and of which we
are never justified in saying that we know that they are 'true'
or 'more or less certain' or even 'probable'."

In the minds of many scientists and philosophers the center of the maze is
either empty or contains a mirror in which we see our own image.

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One could go on developing and arguing the idea of the natural sciences
and such a discussion might be valuable. Of more value^ I think, at this
point, is to raise the question which is so often asked by students in the
liberal arts when they are faced with quantum mechanics, with F = ma, or
with the molecular theory of gasses: "What's the idea?"

' In my experience most students, do not come to Shimer with a burning
interest in the study of science. Science is not generally regarded as
the path to the truth by Shimer students when they enter and I sometimes
wonder how many have actually participated in it as a path to the truth
by the time they leave.

A quote from Andrew Greeley (a sociologist at the University of Chicago)
in the Hew York Times Magazine of June 1, 1969, is to the point:

"The extent and the depth of the revolts against positivism come as
a considerable shock to those like myself whose training in the
positive sciences took place in a time when they were totally
unquestioned at the great universities. During the last winter
quarter I put a statistical table on the blackboard and proceeded
to explain the implications. One of my students respectfully but
pointedly observed: 'Mr. Greeley, I think you're an empiricist.
In fact, at times I even think you're a naive empiricist.' The
accusation didn't surprise me because I guess I am an empiricist,
but the tone did, for it was the tone of voice that used to be
reserved for the accusation of being a 'clerical Fascist'.

"The student then went on to deliver a fierce harangue against
'the epistomology of science,' and to assert that the 'imperialism'
of science by which it claimed to be the only valid form of knowledge
...was completely unsatisfactory to his generation."

The class was in complete agreement.

We can of course defend the method and values of science against the
student attacking them- -perhaps by pointing out the value of the scientific
method for sharpening the mind in logical thinking, by quoting C.P. Snow
to the effect that every cultured man should be acquainted with the second
law of Thermodynamics, or by revealing the role played in science by the
beautiful and by creative imagination.

The points we might make in defense of science can in turn be criticized —
in fact one or two of them I myself believe to be totally or partially wrong.
But this would be beside the point because our defense does not really meet
the students' basic concerns. In the minds of many students science already
has two strikes against it: 1) its mathematical formalism and 2) its
involvement in a technology which is seen as often dehumanizing. Shimer
students then become involved In a profound critical approach--an approach
which brings them face to face with the perhaps empty abyss at the center
of the maze- All this before many students have experienced- -have participated
in — the truth that does reside within the scientific community. ,

It seems to me that the only way the majority of students will be able
to encounter this truth is if the endeavor which is science meets them on
the level of their deepest needs--which is certainly not the second law of
Thermodynamics .

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Let me quote Whitehead:

"The solution which I am urging, is to eradicate the fatal disconnection
of subjects which kills the vitality of our modern curriculum. There
is only one subject-matter for education, and that is life in all its
manifestations. Instead of this single unity, we offer children--
Algebra, from which nothing follows; Geometry, from which nothing
follows; Science, from which nothing follows; History...."

The study of Lif e--biology--can be the unifying discipline within
the natural sciences and enable integration with the social sciences and
the humanities. In particular that branch of biology called ecology--
namely the science of the mutual relationships of organisms with their
environment and with one another--seems to me to be the key scientific
discipline in which the needs and interests of the majority of students
mesh with the truth there encountered. From the perspective of the
natural sciences the basic problem confronting twentieth-century man
is an ecological problem. (Sr , DDT, poluted air and water, people living
together in community. . .) .

But not only are the ecological problems significant in themselves,
they lead naturally to considerations of more basic (from the standpoint
of physics) scientific knowledge.

Isotopes, radioactivity, -rays, quantum theory, calculus, periodic
table, genetic transformations, statistical methods, food chains.

Let me close with a quotation from Rene DuBos (professor in micro-
biology) at the Rockefeller Institute:

"Through its emphasis on over-simplified models, the scientific
community is betraying the very spirit of its vocation — namely
its professed concern with reality. Nature exists only in the
form of complex ecosystems, and these constitute the environment
which man perceives, and to which he responds. As human life
becomes more dependent upon technology, it will become more
vulnerable to the slightest miscarriage or unforseen consequence
of innovations, hence the need for studies directed to the problems
of interrelationships within complex ecosystems. Science will
remain an effective method for the acquisition of knowledge
meaningful to man, and consequently for social service only if
its orthodox techniques can be supplemented by others which come
closer to the human experience of reality, and to a kind of social
action designed for fundamental human needs.

"Only through a scientific knowledge of man's nature and of the
ecosystems in which he functions can technology be usefully and
safely woven into the fabric of society. Indeed a truly human
concept of technology might well constitute the force which will
make science once more part of the universal human discourse,
because technology at its highest level must integrate knowledge
of the external world and of man's nature."

-17-

THE IDEA OF THE NAOTRAL SCIENCES

Jack L. Goldman.

University of Chicago, B..A, B.S. (1958).; Loyola University,
M.S. (1961), Ph.D. (1966). Chairman of Natural Sciences 1,
1968- . Shimer College Faculty Member 1957- .

How do we organize what we experience? What William James termed the
"booming buzzing confusion" around us. Defining experience as everything of
which we can possibly be aware, we shall limit ourselves to that cognitive
experience which leads to knowledge. Sciencej art (esthetic activity), and
religion are three examples of how we organize our cognitive experiences.
Thus, science deals with the rational aspects, art with the emotive aspects,
and religion with the transcendental aspects.

Now, it is frequently claimed that science and common sense are diametrically
opposed to each other. Such a claim then provides a good excuse (rather than
a good reason) for "leaving it, i.e., science, to the experts" or for assuaging
our possible feelings of guilt at not being "comfortable" with scientific ideas.
However, if we can show students that science and common sense have a great
deal in common with each other, although their purposes are quite different,
then perhaps we have made a beginning at dispelling much of the mythical
"strangeness" and mystery of science.

The common sense that we are speaking of is not to be equated with
horse sense, which someone once defined as "that which prevents horses from
betting on people", but rather is to be identified as that capacity for learning
from experience which most men have and use in their day-to-day living. The
acquisition of common sense knowledge is for the purpose of survival. On the
other hand, the purpose of science is to find a rational and comprehensive
order in the natural world about us. Having identified what differentiates
these two human endeavors we may proceed to their similarities.

This can be done by considering a sequence of four mutually interacting
stages in our organization of experience, as suggested by L. K. Nash. Three
of these stages are common to both science and common sense, in their organ-
ization of cognitive experience. The appearance of the fourth stage in
science, as an unique characteristic of that human endeavor, provides then
a convenient and fruitful source of questions for the student to ponder.
The identification of discrete organizational levels does not imply in any
sense that the stages actually operate sequentially but merely is a convenient
and useful modality of analysis.

The first stage is from stimuli to constructs, and involves active looking,
i.e., "observation". We proceed from protocol experience, what Margenau
has termed the p-plane to what he calls the c-field, the region of constructs.
Because constructs, as their name implies, are made , constructs can be defined
with a great deal of clarity. So as we pass from the p-plane, the continuum
of our experience, to the c-field, on this first level of organization of our
experience, we gain in exactness. Both science and common sense are active
on this organizational level where much of the subjectivity of our protocol
experience is removed. A common sense construct "woman"; a scientific construct
"height of mercury column in a manometer" are illustrations of this first
level .

-18-

The second stage is from constructs to concepts. E.g., from "woman"
we proceed to "mother"; from the previously indicated scientific concept
we proceed to "pressure." It is here quite often, especially in the physical
sciences, that we introduce the use of numbers. Even if we do not, we still
achieve a greater clarity--a higher level of organization. Since concepts
function primarily as tools to help us organize our experience, we can
determine only whether they are appropriate or inappropriate, fruitful or
not fruitful, rather than whether they are true or false.

The third stage is from concepts to colligative relations, which latter
are relations among the concepts. It is at this level that not only have we
succeeded in achieving greater organization of past experience, but we now
have the possibility of predicting future experience . An example of a
colligative relation in the physical sciences is Boyle's Law.

The fourth stage is from colligative relations to postulational systems
or theories. The emergence of this fourth level is unique to science due to the
fundamentally different purpose of scientific knowledge as compared to common
sense knowledge. A rational comprehensive unity is the goal of science; the
passage from a vast array of colligative relations to a postulational system-
is the majestic unifying process. An example of this fourth stage is the
Kinetic Theory of Gases. Now, all the individual relations (Boyle's Law,
Charles' Law, Amontons' Law) appear as simple deductions from a relatively
small set of postulates. It is at this level that we claim we "understand"
or say we can "explain." It is here where the student encounters models and
analogies, and attempts to gain an insight into their formulation and
experimental verification or disproof.

In its progress towards achieving its own Weltanschauung, science needs
to rely on certain metaphysical principles--principles not amenable to
experimental verification. This "leap of faith" is a necessary step in
formulating just what data or subject matter will be acceptable for
scientific consideration. Whether these principles be a set which includes
invariance, simplicity, and causality or a set which includes determinism,
continuity, and isolatibility , it is emphatically necessary to be not only
aware of their existence but also of the way in x^hich they are used.

It may therefore be expected that a student proceeding through the
four courses of the Natural Sciences sequence will develop an appreciation
and awareness of these principles and of their use. At the same time, he will
be acquiring an understanding of how constructs, concepts, colligative relations,
and theories are developed, tested, and judged. For he will have examined
not only their relation to primary and immediate experience, but also their
mutual interactions and interrelations. In this way, it is hoped that the
student gradually begins to appreciate the dynamic nature of science, and
may perhaps agree with Einstein: "I believe that it is better to know
some of the problems than all of the answers."

-19-

THE IDEA OF MATHEMATICS

Philip S. Marcus

University of Chicago, B.A. (1956), B.S. (1958), M.S. (1959);
Illinois Institute of Technology, Ph.D. (1968). Chairman

Natural Sciences Area, 1967-1968, 1969- . Shimer College

Faculty Member 1966.

MATHEMATICS AT SHIMER COLLEGE

Part of the integrated liberal arts curriculum of the University of
Chicago College under Hutchins was an experimental math course developed by
Eugene Northrop and his colleagues. I had the experience of teaching this
course at Chicago in 1958 and 1959 as an undergraduate teaching assistant
to Professor Alfred Putnam. This was in fact my first teaching experience.
As I became familiar with the course at that time, it consisted of a first
quarter in symbolic logic, a second quarter in analytic geometry (taught in
a rigorous, careful way based on the preceeding quarter), and a final quarter
on the study of some chosen axiomatic system, the choice of which varied
from year to year.

Shimer' s eventual adaptation of this course consisted of a one semester
course devoted in its entirety to symbolic logic. By 1966, the faculty had
concluded that this course just did not work. It was characterized by David
Weiser, Nat. Sci. Chairman and former Dean of Faculty, as "an experiment
that had failed." I personally did not agree with this, because I did not
think that the truncated one semester course taught at Shimer was a fair
version of the original experiment. Nevertheless, it was proposed at this
time to scrap the math course entirely, and include math in the physical
science course, Nat. Sci, 3, as needed there.

It thus became necessary to convince the Faculty that mathematics was
indeed a necessary part of an Integrated liberal arts curriculum, and to
design a new math course that the Faculty would accept. A first, tentative
version of this new math course has now been taught at Shimer for the last
two years. It should be emphasized that the course as it has been taught
for the last two years was never meant to be a final version, only a first
step. It should also be mentioned that the course has not been taught and
administered in the most efficient and well-organised way , but rather has
been taught and administered in an open and exploratory way with an absolute
minimum of staff discipline and an absolute maximum of freedom and creativity
for the individual staff member. This is not to imply that there is great
friction and divergence in the Math 1 staff! Quite the contrary, there
has been a fine atmosphere of harmony, cooperation, and mutual respect.
It is just that we realized that this was a nev?, untried course, that we
didn' t have any final answers on it and that differences in individual
approach would be a good way to explore the possible ways in which the
course might work.

The course, then, in its first tentative version, may now be described.
It reflects its Shlmerian host environment in two significant ways: first,
original readings are included (in translation) and form a basic part of the
course; second, the intrinsic intellectual line of development contains a
historical, even chronological dimension wit hout being a historical development.
In broad outline, the couse starts with Euclid

-20-

and the basic concepts of Euclidean geometry as a deductive discipline, ,
continues with Lobachevsky and the basic concepts of non-Euclidean geometry,
continues with a non-Shimerian study of the computational techniques of
analytic geometry (Descartes may or may not be read at this point), and
concludes with a study of the mathematics behind special relativity (Einstein

has not been read at this point, but he will be in the future his popular

works, not his research papers).

This course serves several "integrative" purposes. First, by studying
the logic of Euclid and the contrast of non-Euclidean geometry, we meet our
obligations to the Logic Corap, or what is now the logic component of the
basic ALR Comp. It is true we spend less time on this than the previous
course, since we are also doing other things. It is also true that the
present course does not maintain a connection with rhetoric as did the
previous course. However, I take the Faculty approval of this nexj course
to indicate a judgement by the Faculty that the connection between mathematics

and rhetoric was net impoitanc enough to preserve the prefious course. I
myself feel that any connection between raatematics and rhetoric is necessarily
forced and artificial, unlike the relationship between mathematics and logic,
or, for that matter, between mathematics and natural science, or even between
mathematics and metaphysics, epistemology, and ontology.

Second, the study of the mathematics of special relativity is very
useful background for Nat. Sci. 3 and Philosophy 5, as special relativity
is considered in both these courses. I have not yet gotten any report or
consensus on the effect of the new Math 1 on these two courses.

Third, the Inclusion of analytic geometry makes the course a more honest
and useful prerequisite for Math 11 (calculus) and further xrork in mathematics
or science.

Wow, the present status of Math 1 has been described. But it has been
stressed that this status is temporary, and that this is only the first stage
of the experiment. I assume that the experiment has been successful these
last two years, and that the basic idea of the course has faculty approval.
But what of the future development of the course?

For the immediate future, I see simply a deepening and refinement of
the treatment of the basic, unifying concept of the course---the concept
of "transformation". Don't forget, the course has essentially been changed
from a logic course to a geometry course. That the transformation concept
Is the most basic concept in geometry is a view first taken by Felix Klein
in his famous Erlangen lectures of 1871. In those lectures, he gave his
famous definition of geometry as the study of invariance under transfor-
mation. This point of view has become increasingly influential in both
mathematics and physics since that time.

This deepening and refinement implies the addition of two new topics.
First, projective transformations (these have already been tried out in the
course by Tom- Burgess) :- Projective transformations arise naturally from
the Renaissance creation of the theory of perspective in painting. The
basic problem is: How do you convincingly represent three-dimensional space
oh?'a two-dimensional piece of canvas? Note that distance does not remain
invariant. Neither does parallellism. What does? Euclid goes out the
window. An entirely new geometry is created projective geometry.

-21-

Second, the explicit study of transformations, or "transformation
geometry" (Euclidean) : Transformations have been "behind the scenes" all
throughout this course, but have not always been dragged onstage and made
explicit. For example, Euclid's theory of congruent triangles involves the
"method of superposition" in which he "places one triangle on top of another"
---without any axiomatic justification! There is a famous quote from Bertrand
Russell: "Superposition strikes every intelligent schoolboy as a dishonest
juggle." What Euclid is really doing, although he may not have realized it,
is transforming one triangle into another by a translation and rotation (and
possibly a reflection). But these translations and rotations, and reflections
are themselves worth studying explicitly. They are more interesting (and
more important) than triangles!

Finally, there will be a slightly different approach to special
relativity. There will be new readings in which Lorentz transformations
are emphasized even more than they are now.

This is for the immediate future. But there are many different possible
directions for long range future development. I will discuss just some
of them.

First, there has been a certain "popular ground swell" for the reinclusion
of symbolic logic. This comes especially from students and faculty not familiar
with the previous course and not acquainted with Faculty action with respect to
the previous course. In fact, this is not out of the question, and Tom Burgess
has moved the course a step in this direction by trying out original readings
In George Boole, one of the creators of symbolic logic.

There would actually be a very nice way of tying symbolic logic into the
course. The course starts with Euclid's axiomatic method. If the course
concluded with the Nagel-Kewmann popularization of Godel's proof, then the
course would appropriately conclude with the twentieth-century discovery of
basic limitations in Euclid's axiomatic method. But there is a danger in
this approach.

The danger is that if the course tries to do many things in a limited
amount of time, it may become a cafeteria-type survey in which everything
is done superficially and no time can be taken to do one thing well. I do
think that if the existing geometric content of the course were efficiently
compressed, it would be possible to include such a really new topic without
losing what we already have and dissolving the bonds of unity which now tie
the topics of the course together. But this cannot be done right away. It
requires a period of efficient consolidation of the existing topic content.

A second tempting future possibility for the course would be to try to
do quantum mechanics as well as special relativity! This would be of great
benefit to Nat. Sci. 4 as well as Philosophy 5, and so would tie the course
even more closely Into the rest of the curriculum. I do not think that anyone
has ever successfully taught the mathematics of quantum mechanics to non-
mathematicians. All the more reason to try it at Shimer! In fact, I think
there may be a nice way to do it with 2x2 matrices. Michel Nicola and I may
look into this. Needless to say, this is all highly speculative!

A third possibility which would appeal to the Social Sciences is to
bring in probability and statistics. It is not at all clear how this would
fit into the present course, but it is certainly worth thinking about.

Finally, it is always a temptation in a first general course to try and
do an introduction to calculus. There are many ways to approach this, and any
one of them would fit well with Nat, Sci. 3, although Nat. Sci. 3 seems at
present to be moving away from this direction.

This is perhaps enough to indicate that the course is flexible and open,
and that the version taught these past two years is only meant as a foundation
for the future. It would of course be easy to do all these things at once
with a full year course rather than the present one semester. But I am firmly
committed to the present one semester requirement, because any expansion^ of
the general program means less room for concentration courses, and this is
unfair to the professional preparation of many students. I am on record as
believing that the professional preparation provided by concentration courses
is equally as important for Shimer as the intellectual orientation provided
by the general courses .

-23-

THE COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

(From the Shimer College Catalog)

The four general courses in this area are designed to acquaint
the student with the major methods and results of the study of man
in society and to train him to apply this knowledge to rational
deliberation about social policy. One purpose of the social sciences
curriculum is to give the student a scientific understanding of his
own and other cultures and of how the individual comes personally
to learn and embody the norms of a given culture. A second purpose
is to teach something of the historical development of democratic
institutions, ideas, and values. A third purpose is to analyze
and clarify the kinds of problems involved when society or the
individual tries to apply theoretical knowledge to social actions.
Although each of the courses contributes something to the achieve-
ment of these major purposes, they are so arranged as to make the
student's progress both cumulative and cyclical. The several
disciplines of the social sciences and of social and political
philosophy are drawn upon throughout the sequence.

The Comprehensive Examination in Social Sciences seeks to
test the student's ability to analyze accurately some important
events and issues In American history and in the situation of the
United States today, to employ objectively and effectively a
variety of conceptions dealing with personality formation and
cultural constraints, to judge the relevance of social science
knowledge to policy action and to the rational choice of ends,
to deal critically with the theory and practice of alternative
social systems in their Implications for freedom, for unity of
purpose, for formulation and Implementation of public opinion,
and for economic action, as developed in Social Sciences 1, 2,
3, and 4.

-24-

THE IDEA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Barbara Bowdery

North Central College, B.A. (1939); University of Illinois, M.A,
(1940); Columbia University, Ph.D. (1951). Chairman of Social
Sciences 3, 1969. Shimer College Faculty Member, 1964- .

GENERAL EDUCATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The Shimer College commitment to general education in the social sciences
as in other areas Is clear. In this commitment and in this tradition are found
the distinctiveness of a Shimer education and an important source of loyalty
to the college.

This paper is an attempt to distinguish some goals or purposes by which
general education is justified and then to comment upon the Shimer general
education courses in the social sciences in terms of these goals and purposes.

Any analysis and evaluation of general education in the social sciences
must necessarily occur within the context of the goals and aims by which
general education, as opposed to education in a discipline, is justified.
The comments comprising this paper will focus on three sets of goals or
aims: 1) the value of imparting a humane tradition of learning about
society, of men's relations to each other, 2) the undesirability of teaching
factual knowledge which will rapidly become outdated or even obsolete and
the desirability of teaching the intellectual skills appropriate to present
and yet-to-be-discovered knowledge, and 3) the importance of education for
life--for citizenship in a society in which ordinary citizens are called
upon to form and express opinions upon a variety of issues.

1. It has been suggested that a civilized and cultivated man should
have some acquaintance with some of the great ideas which have helped to
shape modern society. Furthermore, it has been asserted that the wise and
cultivated man should be aware of significant issues confronting our society,
and in addition he should be able to recognize valid evidence relevant to a
particular issue and to make judgments, wise ones, about them. This view
assumes that there is a traditional core of significant ideas and issues
which have shaped history.

Certainly the Shimer student has the opportunity and is invited to
share in this heritage by reading and discussing some of the great ideas
and works in political and social theory. The contributions of Aristotle,
Rousseau, Locke, the Federalist Papers, Tocqueville are examples of works
with which a well-educated and cultivated person should be acquainted.
The relations between an individual and his society manifested negatively
in the breakdown of 'community' and the rise of 'mass society,' especially
in the urban environment, in 'alienation,' in the 'generation gap' are
inescapable issues in many forms confronting society. Problems of inter-
national relation, of government in economic life, of the role of pressure
groups in the body politic are surely among the most pressing of our times,
as well as of times past. The ability to discourse intelligently about
these matters, from both theoretical and practical standpoints, distinguishes
the liberally educated person.

Of course there are differences of opinion about the particular ideas
or issues which are most important. The content of Shiraer College general
courses in the social sciences necessarily reflects the judgment of those
teaching the courses concerning the importance and relevance of particular
issues and ideas. Within the area there is always some diversity of views
on these matters; the final selection of issues and ideas to be included
involves compromise and adjustment among faculty. Nevertheless, I believe
the Shimer general courses in the social sciences admirably fill the function
of acquainting the student with many of the important issuss and ideas and
of enabling him to recognize and analyse valid evidence concerning them.
General education in the social sciences at Shimer can indeed be justified
as a means of sharing in this civilized tradition.

2. Many educators assert that the knowledge 'explosion' is so rapid
that it is impossible to keep pace ^^?ith it; facts learned in college may
be superseded by new knowledge and new facts by the time the student reaches
graduate school. Therefore, it is reasoned, the important thing is not to
teach facts which will rapidly become obsolete, but rather to teach a
student how to arrive at new theories, how to analyze, evaluate, ask
questions, judge competing sets of evidence and explanation. Put somewhat
differently, undergraduate education is not intended to impart specialized
knowledge, but rather it should equip a student to deal intelligently and
effectively with specialized knowledge in graduate school or at some other
later date. One should learn how to learn. Given this justification for
general education, do the Shimer general courses effectively fulfill this
function?

Of course a definitive answer to this question would involve extensive
inquiry into educational techniques, perhaps including experimentation,
over a considerable period of time. Here one can only offer brief comments
and suggestions.

New knowledge is built upon old knowledge; the' discovery of new
knowledge and the invention of new theories do not occur in isolation
from what others have already done. Therefore,, understanding and mastery
of existing learning in particular areas is essential preparation for
inquiry at the frontiers of knowledge.

Some educators assert that a distinctive function of general education
at the undergraduate level is training in the skills of inquiry. The study
of method, of theory construction, of the roles of competing theories enable
a student better to understand processes of generalization concerning
empirical data- This sort of study, when applied to already existing theory,
is held to be particularly useful in preparing a student effectively to
handle the rapid increase in knowledge in his ?Later specialized courses or
research in a discipline.

How do the social sciences area general courses fulfill these goals?
Insofar as rapidly increasing new knowled;5e Is built upon already existing know-
ledge, the Shimer general education cour.'jes do indeed satisfy this requirement
for later specialization. Insofar as general education should encourage the
development of the skills and methods of inquiry for later specialization, the
situation in the social sciences is somewhat different from that in the natural
sciences. The social sciences possess a smaller body of abstract and univer-
sally accepted theory than the natural sciences. It is perhaps more important
for the understanding of societal changes, of particular situations in some
area of society now and in the future to acquire some generalized comprehension
of the institutional framework, now and in the past, of particular elements

26-

I'he problem of selecting the particular areas or institutions of a
society for more intensive study in the general courses then arises. The
particular areas of society which are in fact incorporated into the Shimer
general courses reflect the best judgments achieved through compromise and
consensus, of those teaching the courses at any given time.

General education in the social sciences at Shimer includes little
current systematic theory, except in Social Sciences 3 in which a modest
amount of current systematic economic theory has recently been incorporated.
Perhaps it would be useful to experiment a bit in this direction: an increase
in the amount of more conventional and widely accepted systematic theory
introduced into the social sciences general courses may well prove to enhance
the analytical ability of students when they confront particular issues in
social, economic, and political life. Abstract theory may well be highly
relevant to present and future social, economic, political situations and
problems. It is, however, difficult for an area staff to make the kinds of
deletions of existing course readings in order to make room for even a small
amount of more systematic, and conventional, theory in the social sciences.

3. Another justification for general education in the social sciences
is embodied in the education-for-life view. It is asserted that the real
purpose of education is to prepare the individual for life -^to enable the
student to develop into a humane and civilized citizen. Obviously this goal
is broad and demanding, and many words could be written to develop this view.
I should like to confine my comments to two points. First of all, for the
encouragement of the p,ersonal qualities of character which are humane and
civilized the tradition of liberal learning embodied in the Shimer social
sciences general courses is particularly relevant. There is a cogent case
to be made for the study of some of the great ideas of political philosophy
and of theories concerning the relation of the individual person to the
social structure in which he finds himself. Such study can have a civilizing
and humane influence upon young men and women. These intellectual traditions,
in the social sciences as in the natural sciences and humanities, mark the
cultured man of liberal education. Such an 'education-for-life' is appropriate
for one in any profession or occupation and is independent of particular skills
or specialized knowledge such a cultured man may develop. It is perhaps
important to note in this connection that this education is not to be confused
with a tendency to dilettantism or amateurism.

This view of education for a civilized &nd humane life as a general
goal of liberal learning is actually closely related to the function of
imparting a tradition of liberal learning in the social sciences discussed
earlier.

A second comment I should like to make concerns the education-for-life
of a citizen in a basically democratic state. The citizen is called upon
through his vote and in other ways to make known his position upon particular
issues as they arise. Should slums be cleared and high rise public housing,
set in large grassy areas, be built? Should we always strive for a balanced
federal budget--or, if not, why not and when not? Can the balance of power
concept usefully be applied to the situation in southeast Asia, and, if so,
what consequences would likely follow? These are examples of the vast range

-27-

of questions about which citizens are called upon to have an opinion.
Unless there is some factual information and basic conceptual knowledge
available to the citizen he has little foundation upon which to take an ' ..,
intelligent position on public issues.

One of the criteria used by the social sciences area staff in selecting
subject-matter for inclusion in the general courses is in fact their relevance
to contemporary public problems or issues. This is, of course, not to say
that this is the only or the most important criterion of selection of
materials, nor is it to say that all the most important issues at a particular
time are directly studied. But the notion of education for intelligent
citizenship is an important justification for general education in the
social sciences, and does in fact inform the Shimer program of general
education in the social sciences.

This paper has commented upon the Shimer program of general education
in the social sciences in terms of three basic goals or functions- Other
analysts may justify general education in other terras, or they may wish to
redirect the perspectives embodied here. However, any discussion must take
account of the particular social and historical situation in which it finds
itself. This is the reason for the emphasis that the particular ideas,
concepts, and issues included in the Shimer courses are a product of adjust-
ments and compromises on the part of the area and course staffs. Continuous
critical assessment of particular content selected for inclusion in any
program of general education in the social sciences is essential. Only in
this way can general education remain relevant, alive, and a truly humane
and civilizing force.

Two questions form an appendix to these remarks:

1. What is the proper proportion of a) general education and
b) specialized education in a discipline?

2. How intensive should general education be? Are large assignments,
with emphasis upon general ideas and concepts preferable, or should one
engage in relatively more exhaustive analyses of fewer readings?

-28-

THE COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION IN HISTORY

(From the Shitner College Catalog)

The integration courses are designed to guide the student to
the realization that his world extends beyond his immediate environ-
ment of time and thought. The object is not to indoctrinate the
student to any one attitude, but to provide him with the problems,
materials, and variety of viewpoints with which civilized man,
throughout history, has had to work in arriving at relevant notions
of order.

The role of history in the general curriculum is not confined
to the courses in History. Some problems of political and social
history are involved in Social Science 2, the historical develop-
ment of the arts is not neglected in Humanities 1, and the discip-
linary history is deliberately a part of the structure of Natural
Sciences 1 and 2. Moreover, the analytical skills developed in
Social Sciences 1 and Humanities 2 are appropriate tools in the
study of history.

The Comprehensive Examination in History seeks to test the
student's ability to discuss critically some important epochs in
the growth of Western civilization, to compare particular formu-
lations of history, to analyze chronological and casual relation-
ships, to maintain and defend a valid viewpoint concerning historical
situations of which he is expected to have adequate knowledge, as
developed iri History 5 and 6, in Social Sciences 1 and 2, Natural
Sciences 1 and 2, and Humanities 1 and 2.

-29-

THE IDEA OF HISTORY

Stephen V. Fulkerson

University of California at Los Angeles, A.B. (1941); University
of Chicago, A.H. (1947), Ph.D. (1952). Chairman of History 5,
1969. Shimer College Faculty Member 1967- .

The topic here being The Idea of History , I. am somewhat anxious lest
one of you, one day in the library (not altogether a strange place for anyone
in this audience to find himself) come across R. G. Collingwood' s book of
the same name and conclude he has been stealing my ideas. And so I wish
to absolve him of such a crime--since he ;^n:ote the book thirty years ago!

Around a college, history may be thought of as another subject like
accounting--to be learned ; or something like "moral philosophy," not just
to be learned but to be studied for reasons outside itself. Perhaps the
difference lies in whether history is an end or a means to something--a
vehicle for improving one's understanding, for instilling nationalism.
Protestantism, liberalism--or rationalism; and the opportunities for abuse
become enormous. When anyone starts claiming that "history proves," almost
anything can be proven!

If we seek to avoid this morass and limit history as accounting is--
a subject to be learned--we face immediately two difficulties. One is the
vocational one, namely that our students gain a right to expect employment
when we are through with them, and this has a distorting effect on our
subject. We find ourselves teaching what the student wants- -or anyhow
what his employer wants--irrespective of truth or accuracy.

This is not unassociated with the second, namely that we do not have
anything in history like basic principles--as in accounting- -universally
agreed to; and hence, almost anything can be offered in the classroom and
defended as history--or condemned as unhistorical by such a character as
Max Rafferty, whose preference I judge it would be to have the Veterans
of Foreign Wars take over the responsibility for managing the content of
history courses.

We might ask, "How did this come about?" and explain very simply that
at every turn we have two histories, which may be something in the nature
of having two wives. The very devices used to keep one amenable are exactly
what disconcerts the other one!

First, we have history in the sense of what happened, with the historian
the person who studies it. He is the counterpart of the paleontologist
studying paleontology, whose problem is to find enough material--and gain
enough experience handling it--to be able to describe the course of events
and at least in some measure to explain them.

Second, we have history as a work of art, the counterpart of Michelangelo's
portrait of Moses with its tendency to crowd out all other representations--
not, however by reason of its accuracy but because of its appeal . And, just
as none can say how Moses appeared in reality, none can say that your or my
picture of him is inaccurate or does him an injustice; and similarly, none
can say concerning thousands of instances that have got into HISTORY whether
these are more than the work of a skilled contriver which "make sense" and
"seem real-"

-30-

For the reason that the causes of those developments the paleontologist
studies lie wholly in the realm of nature, he very seldom, perhaps never, has
to meet the problems the historian does--who only now and then can account
for what occurred through an earthquake, a plague, a shipx^nreck, a severe winter,
and the like. Instead, the events we call "historical" took place in a man-
made environment not subject to laws and regularities and generally not under-
standable at all except as the artist functioning in a historical guise contrives
some species of structure and backdrop and dreams up rationalizations Clever
enough so most of us feel foolish if we challenge him.

It is true that other scholars, working in the social environment- -which
is the world men make for themselves- -face the irrationalities and uncertainties
of people. But not essentially in the past. The anthropologist may contrive
for us an account of the Hopi Indians; but the Hopi still exist and are avail-
able to further study--as a check upon both fantasy and exaggeration- -whereas
the restrictions upon what an author may say about a medieval manor leave him
some large liberties which the absence of manors in this day and age do not
prevent .

So then, what history must we be concerned with in a college such as
Shimer? If we reject history-as-accounting, then we must face the reasons
why we bother with it at all--and the question, why not eliminate it?

We bother with it because we see it as a means to perhaps more than one
thing--an awareness of its pitfalls, some measure of wisdom in the evaluation
' of human motivation, skill at juggling more variables than anyone can really
handle in a formal system. We also bother because we know that to abandon
history is equivalent to throwing the law out of the window--it mil bring
more evils than we now have.

In addition we are committed to the proposition that history is a ser-
viceable vehicle of integration; besides being a subject for study in itself,
it gives us a way of study for use in approaching other fields. Hopefully,
because it is an art while at the same time making much of its regard for
objectivity and of its claim to certain knowledge, because it employs
scientific data where it can come by them and enjoys a measure of prestige
among political scientists who borrow some of its mythology and findings- -
and it could be also because historians avoid offending important people;
hopefully I say, to employ a current solecism, we have seized upon history
as a sort of scholastic arche-type. We have a belief that students can
exhibit here, better than in certain other areas, a wide diversity of learning.

■31-

THE COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION IN PHILOSOPHY

(Prom the Shimer College Catalog)

The integration courses are designed to refine the student in.
certain disciplines of thought which are more general than those with
which the area courses are concerned. These disciplines therefore
are capable of performing an integrative function. Nevertheless,
sound pedagogy requires that the principal attention in these courses
be given, not to individualistic personal integration, not to sweeping
intellectual integration, but simply to the precise application of
the discipline under consideration.

Works written by philosophers are studied throughout the curriculum,
appearing, for instance, in Natural Sciences 1 and 4, in Social Sciences .-
2 and 4, in Humanities 3 and 4. In all general courses appear situations
rich enough for philosophic analysis. In orienting himself philosophically,
the student's task is to build a comprehensive view of all of his college
work. To assist in making this possible, Philosophy 5 is offered only in
the fall term, while the comprehensive examination is given only in May.
A special reading list calls the student's attention to materials from
the whole curriculum which should be given emphasis in his preparation
for the examination.

The Comprehensive Examination in Philosophy seeks to test the stu-
dent's ability to adopt for himself an Intellectual stance and a philosophic
mode which can ably deal with the assumptions, the comparisons, and the
consequences, Implied and explicit, surrounding major works of the
philosophic enterprise. The examination presumes experiences in dealing
with the organization, methods, and principles of knowledge as developed
in Philosophy 5 and in all of the area general courses.

-32-

THE IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY

Denis Cowan

University of Chicago, A.M. (1942), Ph.D. (1960). Chairman

of Philosophy 5, 1969 „ Dean of Faculty 1966- . Shimer

College Faculty Member 1962- .

The integrative course in philosophy, entitled Organization, Methods
and Principles of Knowledge is a direct descendant of the longer course at
The University of Chicago of the same name. Like Mathematics 1 it was in
recent years subjected to revision in the face of a threat to its continuation
in the general program. In 1966-67 it was offered under a new structure
which was to introduce chosen topics of time, space, and causality presented
by modern thinkers and then in each case followed by ancient and classic
treatments of the same topics. This renovation of procedure changed, not
so much the actual readings, but their order and emphasis. Essentially it
remained a kind of philosophy of science course.

Building upon the renovations, the current form of Philosophy 5 adopted
more carefully the principle of beginning each topic with a modern thinker.
Rather than maintaining a largely scientific concern this formulation of the
study has turned toward three general points of view commonly occurring in
the philosophic enterprize, ontology, epistemology, and cosmology. In
recognizing the similarity between this division and those attributed to
philosophic practice by such divergent minds as Kant and Carnap, the course
could further qualify ontology as the study of affective being, epistemology
as the study of perceptive reason, and the study of cosmology as speculative
universality. Another way of characterizing the different topics is to
suggest that our attention in the first instance is directed to the giveness
which conditions our experience, in the second to the structure of the
experience itself, and in the third to the implications of structured
experience beyond itself.

The three topics are recurring. That is, the course normally deals
with three presentations of the topic, moves to the second with three and
then to the third with three presentations. Thus the first topic, ontology,
includes Buber's, I and Thou , Aristotle's, Metaphysics , Book IV, and Descarte*s,
Meditations . The second grouping for epistemology includes Russell's, Our
Knowledge of the External World , Aristotle's, On the Soul , Book III, and
Hume's, Treatise of Human Nature (selections). The third grouping for
cosmology includes Einstein's, Relativity , Aristotle's, Physics , Book VIII,
and Newton's, Scholium along with Heisenberg on the Quantum Theory . The
three topics are then repeated. Ontology confronts the Abraham paradox
of Kierkegaard, the Symposium of Plato, and Kant's, Metaphysics of Morals .
Epistemology is studied in Kant and the Symbolism of Whitehead, Einstein
and the Meno of Plato, and Kant's, Critique of Pure Reason. ■ Cosmology is
approached through Whitehead's philosophy as described in Part III of
Adventures of Ideas , the Timaeus of Plato, and Kant's, Prolegomena to any
Future Metaphysics . The final two sections, are not as clearly differentiated
because they concentrate on the writings of Peirce, Bergson, James, and
Whitehead without so much topical polarity as the others.

■33-

With regard to the philosophy course's function as integrative for
the curriculum this is perhaps better said in its relationship to the
philosophy comprehensive examination. The course itself requires as
prerequisites the entire span of area sequence courses in Humanities,
Natural Sciences, and Social Sciences. This in itself indicates that the
generalizations and abstractions appropriate to philosophy must, after all,
be derived from and consistent with more particular knowledge. The expec-
tation is for some assured and independent skill in moving through philosophical
problems. The comprehensive examination goes beyond the course requirements
and examination, however, and it is in the preparation of and involvment with
the comprehensive examination in philosophy that the college faculty examines
the ability of the student to deal independently with philosophy in its
relation to areas of social, scientific, and artistic thought. To do this
probably requires that faculty members from area staffs be added to the
committee preparing and grading the philosophy comprehensive examination.

■34-

THE COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES

(From the Shlmer College Catalog)

The integration courses are designed to give the student perspective
into himself and his culture. Such perspective is given depth by giving
it contrast. Through the study of a foreign language the student receives
a fresh view, not only of the linguisitc base of culture, but also of the
thought of a people. Perspective, of course, is not easily taught, but
it is the purpose of the integrative courses to provide vantage points
which may evoke that perspective.

The Comprehensive Examination in Foreign Languages seeks to test
the student's ability to read the language with intelligent comprehension,
and to place the language and its related culture in a framework, as devel-
oped in Foreign Language 1, 2, 3, and 4.

-35-

THE IDEA OF THE FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Dennis Wickman

St. Olaf College; Reed College, B.A, (1963); Cornell University,
M.A- (1966); Freie Universitat Berlin. Chairman of German 1,
1969. Shimer College Faculty Member, 1969- .

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES T^ A SHIMER EDUCATION:

AN APOLOGY

Lass die Sprache dlr sein, was der K'o'rper den Liebenden; er nur
Ists, der die Wesen trennt und der die Wesen vereint.

If I begin by quoting Goethe's and Schiller's Xenle "An den Dichter,"
I ara not doing so only to show off my German. Nor do I think that the Weimar
Classicists' view that language, like the body for lovers, is the only thing
which separates people's essential beings but also the only thing which unites
them, somehow clarifies the nature of all disagreements which may divide the
Shimer faculty. The problem of the foreign languages is surely not the only
thing upon which faculty members disagree, and its successful resolution would
also probably not unite them in complete harmony.

Goethe's and Schiller's advice to the poet has even a broader relevance
than that. The researches of structural linguistics and anthropology, the
assumptions (or, to some, biasses) of some schools of modern psychology and
philosophy, and the perennial orientation of literary scholars all seem to
support the notion that not only poetry but all serious intellectual progress
in the humanities and social sciences and perhaps in other disciplines as
well Is impossible without some precise notion not only of the cultural
relativity and somewhat arbitrary structure of language in general but also
of the peculiar qualities of the language in which work is being done. It
is a nice irony that a great deal of the support for this idea has proceeded
directly from impulses provided by those archrivals of Weimar Classicism,
the German Romantics--people whom Goethe was fond of describing as "sick."
You never know, I guess, what may turn out to be relevant in the end.

I do not believe that it is possible to know much of the peculiar
qualities of one's own language without some active, practical knowledge of
a second. To quote Goethe again, "Wer fremde Sprachen nicht kennt, weiss
nichts von seiner eigenen." If language is the body of thought, the vehicle
to which thought must continually subject itself but without which it would
be impossible, the awareness of one's own language which comes from a practical
knowledge of it alone is, however useful, somewhat limiting. How can you
come to know your own sexual identity if you have never been exposed to the
opposite sex? Even if it should turn out in the end that he doesn't care to
take up with women, I think every boy should meet at least one girl in his
lifetime, and vice versa.

-36-

How many people, you may well ask, must be forced to subject themselves
to the charms of the opposite sex? Well, how many Europeans have to be con-
vinced that the knowledge of a foreign language is an important intellectual
acquisition? There are probably about the same number of people in each group.
American linguistic isolation may explain the rough going language learning
has had in this country over the years. I believe it is a form of provincialism
which, because of progress in travel and communication, is rapidly disappearing.
Theoretical resistance to the language requirement seems, from my limited
experience, to be far more prevalent among Shimer faculty members than among
Shimer students. Try, on the other hand, to get some Shimer students actually
to study a language. But that is no argument. Try to get some Shimer students
to run around the block.

Is requiring a language a good idea? I am not personally sure that
requiring anything in an absolute fashion is always a good idea, but in a
context in which every other study is required, 1 do not think that there is
any other way to keep any department operating. Languages are, on a day-to-day
basis, often more onerous to students than other kinds of work. X think the
actual requirement of language learning should only be discussed in the frame-
work of the general issue of the harm or good done by requiring courses in any
field. Consensus at Shimer seems to be that it is a good thing; therefore,
requiring some practical confrontation with some foreign language, if you are
going to offer foreign languages at all, is probably also a good thing.

Of what kind should this confrontation be? I do not find the two main
utilitarian approaches very satisfying even on a theoretical level. The view
that foreign languages and mathematics are good intellectual disciplines
sraaks to me too much of the philosophy, "I had to do such-and-such when I was
a kid, and, by God, it won't hurt you to do it either." Most mathematicians
I know feel the same way about this justification of mathematics.

It is true that some experience with a foreign language is useful for
admission to and success in graduate school. Scholarly work is aided and
abetted in most fields by being able to read at least French, German and
Russian. Yet I do not think this should be the primary aim of language
learning. "By their fruits ye shall know them," but in the beginning, it is
best to attend to the needs of the tree. Itmight, for example, be a good idea
to adopt the ETS language testing service, not primarily because it may meet
with some recognition from graduate schools but more because it can separate
the testing from the teaching process in a one-man department. It can also
help to provide the teacher with a realistic set of objectives which optimism
might place too high or defeat and despair might place below the level of
acceptability. But the actual nature of the confrontation with the language
should not be determined by this kind of consideration. I do not believe it
is used in setting up general courses in other fields, and it would be illogical
and inconsistent to argue for this academic course alone as a means to a
post-Shimerian end when all others are treated as something of potential value
to the students so long as foreign language learning actually can (and, I think,
does) have some intrinsic value.

"Discipline" is a word vjhich has, in any case, been somewhat corrupted
since the sado-masochists have begun using it in classified advertisements.

-37'

Thus, a modern language teacher who has studied the language himself
because he finds it not only useful but also interesting and important, will
find it frustrating and self-defeating to teach a student "how to read,"
i.e. ) how to translate. For most non-artistic products which the student might
actually end up reading, there are decent translations available. A professional
translation of even works of art is usually better than what a student may come
up with after two short years of translation exercises. This approach to
language teaching is like asking an artist to organize a course in painting
abound a paint-by-number program. You'll end up with a lot of pictures hanging
around, but it might be reasonably argued that the student has missed the
point. Likewise, I think It is better to have language students reach a level
at which they can actively use the language as it is spoken than to have them
produce refined imitations of translations which are done by someone who
really knows the language. Wot that translation cannot be at times a pedagogical
necessity; it is as an aim that it is inferior. "^^e student should be pursuing
carnal, not abstract, knowledge of the language.

To continue the erotic imagery, a Shimer student is not likely, after two
short years of study, to end up in the form of psychological wedlock known as
bi-lingualism. Yet he can learn the basic structure of the language, acquire
a minimal active vocabulary, and come to know whether further work with the
language is desirable for him. He should be able to read most scholarly prose
with a dictionary. He will have read some literature in his beginning courses.
Hfewill be able to go on to read more, should he so desire, with some knowledge
of the difficulties involved and the means of solving them. He will be very
suspicious of translations, as a rule. He will be existentially , as opposed
to abstractly, aware of the arbitrary, if systematic, nature of linguistic
structure and should be a bit more conscious of the limitations and possibilities
of his own language. Should he really get involved with the foreign language
he may end up writing worse English prose than before. You can't have everything,

A foreign language is a very intricate and complex thing. I was once
told by a student, "I have studied German, but I just hated learning the
grammar. I'd like to learn some more, but I only want to read the literature.
I want absolutely nothing more to do with German syntax." Another suggested
that language teachers could easily save pain by working around the exigencies
of syntax. "I spoke German not absolutely correctly in my last course, but
you could understand me if you put your mind to it, and this teacher really
annoyed me by continually pointing out that I didn't know the grammar." With
no knowlege of the personal situations out of which these comments emerged- -
there may have been some bad teaching at work in both cases--! should say that
the views represented are charming in their naivite but not much to work with
as educational principles. There are better and worse ways of teaching syntax,
but it has to be done somehow. A working vocabulary must be acquired. And I
know of no effective method of attaining either end that does not take time.

Shimer is comparatively stingy in the amount of time it gives its required
language courses. It make up for this by being generous with claims made for
the courses' contents. I am not suggesting that either must be changed--no
one seems really to have enough time, and, students, required to take a
language, are usually happy if they don't have to do everything the catalog
claims they'll be doing,. None of my students in German 3 has, at least,
approached me with the complaint, "I^Jhen are we going to start doing our selected
readings about life and culture? Why are you going over the grammar and
vocabulary of German 21" In any case, the frequent use of "selected" and "some"
makes the catalog descriptions flexible enough to counter this kind of criticism
f artlv adeauatelv .

- JO-

Faculty expectations, however, should be modest. In two three-hour year
courses, a student may be expected to get some fundamental knowledge of a
language which may not be either terminal or all-embracing. If he can
understand most of what is said to him in conversations, understand everything
he reads, given a dictionary and plenty of time, and say almost everything
he wants to say without making so many errors that a native speaker would have
no idea what he is talking about, that is already a great deal. I hope I have
clarified what the wider significance of this practical knowledge should be
at the beginning of this report. And I think that this broader significance
permeates to some degree many aspects of the student's thought processes,
if neither so immediately nor so obviously as, say, a reading of a play by
Shakespeare in a humanities course may contribute to some understanding of
an existential philosopher or a historical movement.

On the other hand, some students do, after two years, have a working
knowledge of the language. It seems a shame not to use it. There might be
ways of doing so in formal course work in other fields which would be profitable
for both the student's knowledge of the language and for his work in the
second field. The specialty for which the carnal knowledge of a foreign
language is most esseiitial is literature, followed at a short distance by
philosophy and history. At Reed College when I was a student, all literature
and humanities students were required to take a third-year concentration
course in the literature of the studied language, A required third-year literature
course for humanties students .might have the added, advantage of expanding the
course offerings somewhat, which seems to be a most effective way of expanding
the scope of intellectual work that goes on at Shimer. Language teachers can
also be recruited to teach something else as well. Even this simple personnel
overlap can do much toward integrating one study with another as it seems to
have done in other fields at Shimer.