The question of unity between the Workers party and the Socialist workers party,

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1 The Question of

UNITY

I BETWEEN THE WORKERS PARTY AND

1 THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

1 By

1 ALBERT GOLDMAN

Introduction by cs\
MAX SHACHTMAN DUC

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Published by
WORKERS PARTY PUBLICATIONS

4 Court Square
Long Island City 1, New York

98

January, 1947

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction by Max Shachtman .... PAG ^

The Question of Unity by Albert Goldman I3"IIZ." 15
Appendices :

Appendix A_Toward a Deepening of the Split... 41

Appendix B-The Principal Obstacle to Unity 41

Appendix ^Resolution for Unity Submitted by 5^

ity of the Political Committee of the SWP 4S
Append D-Wjt-yj. Unit* by the Nationa, Co m -

mittee of the WP 4R

Appendix E-Beplyrf SWP to Stat^^U^'of

Appendix P-Repjy of Woiker7partyto'sWP Letter'"* «
Appendix G-Statement on Unity by W P^^ "

Appendix a^*-*^^ "

Appendix I-Statement of Minority on ''th'e'*' '^0^ ^
Ann ,. T ftem-Frank Resolution at October Plenum 61
Appendix «*£*.****, to SWP Plenum

Appendix K Letter of SWP Minority'to'wo^rs'pa^' ^
on the Question of an Internal Bulletin 71

Append. L^Repiy of Workers Party to Letter of SWP

Appendix M-Resolution on'wion'of'unity'b; EurZ "
^Secretariat of the Fourth InternL

Appendix *^^^^^ "
Appendix O-Statement of the wS^"^™"^ ?5

Appendix P D GS t 10 " ° f the Eur ° pean decretal ! 80
Append x P-Questionnaire to the Workers Party Is

Appendix Q-^TODJe^jM^^- **

April 9 1946 ^^ ° f the SWP ^

Appendix B-^^^^ **

* 87

Introduction

The pamphlet by Albert Goldman is more than valuable for a
study and understanding of the relationship between the Workers
Party and the Socialist Workers Party — it is indispensable.

A series of remarkable historical circumstances, in cruel com-
bination, has reduced the revolutionary Marxian movement to a
comparatively small organization. In the United States this move-
ment is furthermore divided into two contending parties, the
Workers Party and the Socialist Workers Party, both of which
claim firm adherence to the principles of Marxism and to the
Fourth International. It would be idle to deny that this division,
precipitated at the outbreak of the Second World War, makes the
growth of the revolutionary movement harder in this country.

The militant worker who has reached the point of understand-
ing the need of conscious political organization, sees before him
three main movements that speak in the name of socialism.

One is the Socialist party or reformist grouping similar to it.
The utter helplessness and futility of the social-democratic move-
ment in the deepening crisis of capitalism, and its foredoomed
efforts to move toward socialism or even to preserve capitalist
democracy by the method of class collaboration, repel thousands
who seek an effective socialist solution of the. crisis.

Many thousands .more are even more violently repelled by the
official Communist, that is, the Stalinist party. They have begun
to understand that Stalini&rji has nothing whatsoever in common
with socialism, or the interests of the working class, that it is an
instrument for perpetuating the totalitarian police state in .Russia,
and that it aims to. establish a similar state for. a small reactionary
bureaucracy in every country of the world.

Many militants who, for these reasons, are attracted to the
Trotskyist movement, which embodies the authentic ideas of so-
cialist freedom, are puzzled and even disheartened by the exist-
ence of two Trotskyist organizations in the United States which,
at least at first glance, seems.to represent an unjustified division.
There can be no doubt about it: just as the split in the Trotskyist
movement reduces to a considerable extent the possibilities of the
growth of this movement — and these possibilities are now very
great and encouraging — so the overcoming of this division by a
sound union of the two parties. would greatly increase the possi-
bilities of growth and would within a very short period of time

make the united Trotskyist movement a significant force in the
working class and the political life of the country.

The reasons for the split in the Trotskyist movement have been
set forth on numerous occasions in the press of the Workers
Party. They are summarized again in the Open Letter sent by the
Workers Party to the 1946 convention of the Socialist Workers
Party (Labor Action, November 11, 1946). The interested reader
is referred to this material. What the present pamphlet deals with
are the efforts made by the Workers Party and the Minority in
the Socialist Workers Party that was led by Albert Goldman, to
heal this split by uniting the two parties.

The views of those who have fought for unity in the past two
years are adequately set forth by Goldman. Although they are
presented primarily from the standpoint of the comrades of the
Socialist Workers Party Minority, who are now a welcome, valu-
able and significant addition to our organization, we of the Work-
ers Party are able to concur vigorously with the views of the
author. As an appendix, we have included all the important docu-
ments related to the unity question. Taken together, what is pre-
sented to the reader in this pamphlet is all that is needed to fix the
responsibility for the division of the Trotskyist movement in the
United States where it properly belongs, solely and exclusively
upon the leadership of the Socialist Workers Party.

What tied us of the Workers Party to the Socialist Workers
Party Minority from the very beginning, and regardless of big
and little political differences, was our common conception of the
kind of party that the revolutionary Marxists all over the world
must build. We were and are united in the belief that only such
a party can successfully lead the working class in the fight to
establish socialist freedom as stands firmly on the fundamentals
of revolutionary Marxism without ossifying its mind and body by
blind and unreasoning faith in dogma; as considers the struggle
for socialism not an intellectual exercise or a subject for endless
thumb-twiddling debate but a war against capitalist tyranny so
earnest and deeply urgent as to make united discipline in action
an iron tenet of its life; as is so founded, organized and con-
ducted that it not only "allows" but systematically maintains and
encourages the richest possible intellectual life in its own ranks,
the freest exchange of opinion, the widest range of criticism, the
strictest observance of the principles of workers' democracy. In
a word, a party such as Lenin and his comrades sought to built
and maintain, and which Stalin and his camarilla succeeded in
destroying as the indispensable pre-condition to the destruction of
the Russian Socialist revolution.

What united us with the Minority of the Socialist Workers
Party and finally brought its best militants together with us into
one party, is precisely what divided us from the leadership of the
Socialist Workers Party, the Cannonites, and finally proved to be
the principal obstacle to unity.

I

The whole history of the Trotskyist movement, from J the
launching of Trotsky's struggle against the Russian bureauci toy
in 1923, is in large part the history of our struggle against the
ossification that preceded the shattering of the revolutionary
party in Russia. That ossification was carried on in the name of
"monolithism." It was aimed to destroy the revolutionary heart
and mind of the party and thereby destroy every trace of workers'
democracy and socialism. It could not and did not have any other
purpose. Monolithism, "a party hewn of one block," was the poison
introduced into the communist movement by the late Zinoviev, a
revolutionist who had known better times — and better ideas. Un-
der the guise of making the party firm and hard, it squeezed out
of the party all that was revolutionary and life-giving. Under
guise of preventing the revolutionary party from "degenerating
into a sterile debating society," it succeeded in wiping out all de-
bate, all discussion, all thought, everything except blind and
servile obedience to a bureaucratic autocracy. Under guise of
protecting the party from a "petty-bourgeois revision of Lenin-
ism," it ended by destroying everything Lenin stood for and
fought for — everything. Zinoviev's "monolithism" was carried to
its murderous conclusion by Stalinism. Anyone who does not un-
derstand this, who does not draw the lessons from it, who does
not bend over backwards to prevent its recurrence on no matter
how small a scale, may have the best intentions and desires in
the world but he will never help build up a genuine revolutionary
movement capable of laying the foundations for socialist democ-
racy.

To read the record of the Cannonites in the course of the
struggle for unity, to read their documents, to examine their prac-
tices, is to see plainly that in their adoption and application of
the concept of a "monolithic" party they have not only abandoned
the traditions and struggle of Trotskyism in this field, but have
passed beyond Zinoviev to a stage somewhere between the begin-
ning of the Zinovievist "Bolshevization" and the beginning of the
Stalinist "Bolshevization."

"It seems," wrote Frederick Engels to the German socialist,
Eduard Bernstein, on October 20, 1882, "that every workers'
party of a big country can develop only in the course of internal
struggle, this being grounded in the dialectical laws of develop-
ment in general."

That is our view to the letter. In the Socialist Workers Party
today that view is anathema — rejected, sneered at, punished by
disciplinary measures up to and including expulsion from the
ranks. We regard discussion of all questions, free criticism, de-
bate of all the problems of the working class movement, an indis-
pensable and inseparable part of the very life of a revolutionary
party. Without it a party cannot even live, let alone develop and
grow powerful. And we mean not a discussion that is always con-
fined within the four walls of the party, but a discussion before

the eyes of the working-class public as well. Only thus can mem-
bers see how the revolutionary vanguard, which seeks their sup-
port, arrives at its ideas, why it persists in its ideas or why, in
the contrary case, it modifies its ideas. That is how Marx and
Engels and Lenin and Trotsky and Luxemburg and Liebknecht
and all the other true architects of the working-class movement
always proceeded. Anything short of that is tantamount to the
concept that the ideas of the revolutionary party, the way it
works them out, the way it develops them, and the way it alters
them, are the privale affair of the party itself and do not concern
the working class whose role is merely that of the passive recipi-
ent of programs "finished" inside of locked party laboratories,
which usually comes to mean the double-locked Laboratories of an
uncontrolled supreme clique in the party.

The Cannonites regard discussion as an irritating imposition
by people who are irresponsible by definition. They have made
the unique contribution to the movement of opening the party
press to discussion — if it is opened at all — only after the party
has officially adopted a position. That is, you may argue only un-
der conditions which guarantee the ineffectuality of your argu-
ment. The Cannonites regard discussion not as a paramount
necessity for a living movement but as a "luxury"! This term,
which tells us everything we need to know about those who use it,
may be found repeatedly in the polemics directed by the Cannon-
ites against us in the past and more recently against the Socialist
Workers Party Minority. The same term, used in the same con-
text, in the same way, and repeated no less often, may be found
in the early literary assaults of the Russian bureaucracy against
the Trotskyist opposition. The Cannonites did not invent their
gunpowder.

It is this difference over the concept of the party that exploded
the joint attempt of the Workers Party and the Socialist Workers
Party Minority to achieve unity with the Cannonites. We for our
part were ready to make every conceivable concession. But we
made clear from the very beginning that we would not and could
not give up pur concept of a . living, democratic, revolutionary
socialist organization. The prospect of having in. the united party
a large group of trained, educated, and devoted revolutionists,
with views of their own and both the ability and. intention to de-
fend them, was too much for the Cannonites. A life of bureau-
cratic serenity, in which all votes are cast like one, is much more
to their taste. Everything else that divided the two parties was
unimportant in comparison with the difference on the kind of
party that is needed.

As a result, after a number of transparently shabby maneuv-
ers and cynically self-contradictory positions taken on the ques-
tion of unity, the Chicago convention of the Socialist Woi i
Party this November rejected unity with the Workers Party, with-
out, any discussion whatsoever, and with a virtually unanimous

8

I

vote that was as gratifying to the leadership as it was dis-
creditable to the party itself. To make sure that the virtual
unanimity would be transformed as quickly as possible into a
total unanimity, the two leaders of the remnants of the Minority
group, which did not follow the comrades around Goldman into
the Workers Party, were unceremoniously expelled from the
party. After several days of pseudo-debate, in which the Minority
leaders were denounced in the most violent, rude and disloyal way
as "revisionists" and "enemies" of Marxism on one theoretical
and political question after another, they were expelled at the
very end of the convention f or ... breach of discipline! Here too
the petty bureaucrats only borrowed their gunpowder from the
big bureaucrats whom they so sedulously, if unconsciously, ape.

The theoretical and political differences between the Workers
Party and the Socialist Workers Party did not, in our opinion,
play the decisive role in the rejection of unity by the Cannonites.
But this does not mean that it played no role at all or that it will
not play an even greater role in time to come.

Bureaucratism is not always merely a system or means of
imposing a false policy upon a movement. Bureaucratism has
roots of its own, too. Often it is precisely a bureaucratized move-
ment with a bureaucratic leadership that makes it difficult or im-
possible to have a correct policy adopted when it is proposed by
critics of the leadership, or to alter a policy which requires alter-
ation. A bureaucracy always seeks "peace" and "order" in its
organization. It is always sufficiently content with the policy,
program and theories that prevail, unless and until it and it
alone decides that they require modification. It is concerned be-
yond measure with its prestige and authority, with maintaining
and saving face. It is resentful of initiative taken by others which
reflects upon its own failure to take initiative. Rather than credit
opponents and critics by accepting their policies, it will seek to
discredit these critics by persisting in outlived or false policies
about which it itself no longer has firm convictions. If not at
every given moment then certainly in the long run, bureau-
cratism and false policy go hand in hand, they rise — or sink — to
each other's level, they are the necessary complement of each
other. Then, what began or seemed to begin as a dispute over
"organizational" questions clearly becomes a dispute over political
questions which puts the organizational difference into the shade.
In this sense, one of the criminal evils inherent in an ossified
bureaucracy, concerned first and foremost with perpetuating it-
self and maintaining its prestige and authority, with justifying
itself under all circumstances, is its inexorable tendency to con-
vert every normal and small difference of opinion into a violent
factional clash, to exaggerate differences, to stimulate, maintain
and deepen differences artificially, to prevent normal, simple. and
easy correction of the course of a party when it needs correction,
to drive young and unskilled critics to desperation, to exaggera-

9*'

lions of their own, and sometimes even to irresponsible act!
which hurl and discredit the opposition, hurt the party and only
make the consolidation and soli'- justification of the bureaucracy
easier*

in the very early days of the struggle between the opposition
,-ukI the bureaucracy in Russia (Trotsky points out), the party
leadership, in order artificially to deepen and extend the differ
ences, <lu«- Into the historical past of the Russian movement for
all sorts of half-relevant and Utterly irrelevant arguments. To
clothe themselves with the authority of Lenin in the struggle
against Trotsky, the bureaucracy, in part out of deliberate dis
loyalty, in part out of simple lack of understanding of Lenin's
views, raised for the first time the theory of "socialism in a single
country." It is perfectly clear that this theory was put forward
in the first place solely as a disloyal factional weapon against the
opposition. But what was initially invented as an instrument of
the bureaucracy eventually transformed the bureaucracy into its
instrument, so to speak. The bureaucracy became victim of its
own factional excesses. The bureaucracy sought artifically to
deepen the gulf between itself and the opposition and ended by
falling into the gulf itself. The theory of "socialism in a single
country" became practice. In practice, a more natural realign-
ment took place. On the one side, at one stage or another, stood
those who sought to preserve the achievements of the socialist
revolution. To the other side, were driven all those whom powerful
social forces, making this theory their very own, propelled toward
the destruction of the acheivements of the socialist revolution.
Stalin, and the circle around him in 1924, thought that putting
forward the theory of "Socialism in a single country" would be
an effective factional bludgeon with which to smash Trotsky. It
is inconceivable, however, that in 1924 this circle could even
dream of the distance from socialism, that they were destined
to travel under the impulsion of the theory they had themselves
invented and of the social forces awakened and mobilized by this
theory.

In the long run, organization, any system of organization or
administration, does not have and cannot have any independent
significance. Politics exists to serve class interests. Organizations
exist to serve politics. Organization of a certain type is required
for politics of a certain type. If it does not meet these require-
ments, one or the other must, and in the end surely will, be
"adjusted" so that the two conform. In the end, the political line
decides everything.

The possibility of unity between the Workers Party and the
Socialist Workers Party was reopened for the first time since
the beginning of the Second World War, at least so far as the
Workers Party was concerned, by the official decision of the
Socialist Workers Party that the slogan of "unconditional de-
fense of the Soviet Union" was to be taken from the foreground

10

A

position which it occupied in the SWP's political life and retired
to the background; that it would be replaced by the slogan
"Defend the European revolution from Stalinism." The principal
political difference that caused the split in 1940 having been the
question of defense of Stalinist Russia in the war, the Socialist
Workers Party Minority and then the Workers Party itself took
the view that with this change in the position of the SWP, unity
was once more desirable and possible. It is not necessary to dwell
on this. The conclusion is obvious and incontestable.

But it is precisely at this point that the bureaucratic character
of the regime and leadership in the Socialist Workers Party
played its fatal part. To prevent unity, to show that unity was
"politically" impossible or undesirable, the Socialist Workers
Party bureaucracy had to exaggerate and extend and even invent
political differences. That is the only meaning of the classic
bureaucratic formula, not coined but adopted by the leader of
the Socialist Workers Party: "We, on our part, assume that the
course toward deepening the split is necessary and correct; our
attitude flows from that." It is simply impossible to so much as
begin to understand what happened to the struggle for unity if
the full meaning of this formula, first uttered in April 1945 (see
Appendix), is not grasped in all its implications. To avoid unity,
the Cannonites took the course of "deepening the split."

The slogan of "defense of the Soviet Union," which they had
at first decided had "receded into the background," was forcibly
dragged into the foreground, given the same, if not greater,
prominence and emphasis than it had before. Typical of the
bureaucratic procedure, the second change was made without even
so much as an acknowledgment of the first and, it goes without
saying, without consulting the party membership or even the
official party leadership. The second change came as a purely per-
sonal pronouncement by the party leader, as a revelation from
high authority, as a proclamation from the throne, in the form
of a speech delivered at a public meeting in which the slogan was
once more — on purely personal initiative and authority, it should
be emphasized, and without the slightest consultation or authori-
zation from the party itself — hauled into the foreground for the
ingenious reason that . . . the Second World War is still going on.
To this it should be added that the first change, namely, retiring
the slogan to the background, was made while the war was really
on; while the second change, namely, shifting the slogan back to
the foreground, was made months after the defeat of Germany
and Japan!

Since that time, the "Russian line" of the Socialist Workers
Party has been "fortified" in the same direction and with the same
aim of "deepening the split." But even if on a smaller scale,
nevertheless in essentially the same way, that which was so
cleverly contrived as a factional instrument is necessarily acquir-

11 *

[ng a force and motion of its own. The tool manipulates the master
mare than the master manipulates the tool.

A I ;i lime when, far more than ever before, it is so clear that
Stalinism exploits the shibboleth of "defense of the Soviet Union"
lor the purpose of justifying or covering up the most brutal and
reactionary suppression not only of all the elements of the social-
ist revolution and the working-class movement but of whole na-
tions and peoples, the most cynical imperialist spoliation, looting,
annexation and subjugation of other lands — the Cannonites shout
more loudly than ever: "Unconditional defense of the Soviet
Union." At a time when it is so clear that the Stalinist regime
has reached a new low point in its reactionary degeneration, so
clear that its oppression and exploitation of the peoples it rules
has nothing— absolutely nothing — in common with socialism or a
workers' state of any kind whatsoever; when all this has become
so clear that in one part of the Fourth International after an-
other comrades are practically scrambling to get away from the
strangulating and stultifying theory that Stalinist Russia is any
sort of workers' state — the Cannonites feel impelled to proclaim
the proletarian character of Stalinist barbarism more vocifer-
ously and more belligerently than ever before!

A I the same 1im<>, I he Cannonites proclaim in the statement of
their Political Committee of August, L946, that they intend
to lay down, as a condition for membership in the Fourth Inter-
national the acceptance, among other things, of their "evaluation
of the Soviet Union and attitude, toward its defense." That which
Trotsky himself did not consider "a basis for division of the Fourth
International, the question on which Trotsky considered that dif-
ferences were entirely permissible within the Fourth Interna-
tional, the Cannonites now lay down as the "rock-bottom program-
matic criteria operating today to demarcate the revolutionary
tendency from all forms and varieties of opportunism." This
means nothing less than the attempt to plunge a sword through
the Fourth International as a whole. Blind and petty bureaucrats,
they are driven by their excesses to the criminal attempt to split
the International in two in order to justify their criminal oppo-
sition to unity in the United States.

It is possible to be permanently in favor of unity between two
organizations, provided the situation that made the proposal for
unity feasible remains permanently the same. It would be irre-
sponsible and hypocritical on our part if we said that the situa-
tion is the same, at this writing, as it was when the Minority of
the Socialist Workers Party first proposed unity and the National

< ',»,, imi h >f the Workers Party endorsed its initiative. From

our point of view, the interests of the movement would be best
i rved If the development took the direction of yesterday's situ-
nl The Cannonites, however, by proceeding to "deepen the

i>hi," liy exaggerating differences and inventing new ones, are
becoming the prisoners of these differences. From

12

creators of these differences, they are becoming creatures of these
differences. The more reactionary the evolution of Stalinism and
Stalinist Russia, the more vehemently do the Cannonites proclaim
themselves the "revolutionary" partisans of the Stalinist state —
while we proclaim ourselves more vigorously than ever its irre-
concilable enemies. The Cannonites are indeed deepening the split
between us, to exactly the same extent that they are deeping the
gulf between themselves and revolutionary Marxism.

We look upon the advance of Stalinism as the advance of a
new barbarism. The Cannonites who hailed the advance of the
Stalinist army of counter-revolution as the advance of "Trotsky's
Red Army," who insisted upon the "objectively revolutionary
consequences" of the triumph of the Stalinist counter-revolution
during and after the war, who advised the insurrectionary War-
saw people to subordinate themselves to the Marshals of the
Stalinist army — consider the existence and the victories of the
Stalinist state as the existence and victories, in some way or
other, of socialism itself.

The more the Cannonites drive themselves or are driven along
the political road they have taken, the longer is the distance be-
tween us — the longer and the greater.

Between those who want to build a revolutionary party capable
of establishing a socialist workers' democracy, and who prove it
among other ways because they are rigidly devoted to democracy
in their own party, and those who pass off the abomination of
bureaucratic monolithism as the essence of "Bolshevism" or
"Trotskyism," there cannot but be a gulf that grows harder to
bridge. Between those who struggle against barbarism in the
name of socialism and those who see some sort of socialism in
this very barbarism, there is indeed a gulf that nothing can
bridge !

The unity of the working class as a whole in the struggle
against capitalism is always desirable and always necessary. The
unity of revolutionary Marxists inside the working class is not
less desirable and necessary. But we are not and have never been
of that type to whom Frederick Engels referred contemptuously
as the "unity-shouters." We were for unity with the Socialist
Workers Party when, in our opinion, it was not only necessary in
general but also desirable and possible. To talk about unity be-
tween the Workers Party and the Socialist Workers Party now,
after all that has happened in the past two years in particular,
would either be hollow ritualism or pious hypocrisy. Unity be-
tween these two parties, a real and sound and fruitful unity, is
possible now only on the condition that an awakened and re-
oriented membership, aided by a reoriented international move-
ment, imposes a radical change in the reactionary pro-Stalinist
"Russian line" of the Socialist Workers Party and, correspond-
ingly, deposes the bureaucratic regime which is responsible for
keeping this millstone around the neck of the Socialist Workers

13 **

>arty. To talk about unity under any other circumstances is quite
unreal.

To wait with folded hands until this takes place is, of course,
an inexcusable absurdity. The task of every conscious revolution-
ary militant, worker and intellectual, is to join and build the
party of revolutionary Marxism in the United States, the Workers
Party. That is the great significance of the step taken by the
comrades associated with Albert Goldman in the Minority of the
Socialist Workers Party. Thi\y represented a tendency in the
Socialist Workers Party. Despite old and to a considerable extent
outlived differences, despite all sorts of disagreements on ques-
tions of tactics, even despite conflicts between us that sometimes
assume very vigorous forms, this group of old and experienced,
as well as of young and new, militants were drawn to the Workers
Party. They joined its ranks. The shift of their party affiliation
is of no small significance. In the more than six years that have
passed since the split of the American Trotskyist movement, the
Workers Party has seen the development in its ranks of different
groups and tendencies, all of which proceeded upon the founda-
tions and within the broad framework of revolutionary Marxist
principle. This is anything but a source of regret to us. What is
significant there, however, is that in spite of what have often
been sharp differences in our own ranks on theoretical and politi-
cal and even organizational questions, we have had no split, we
have had no factional expulsions, and above all, the Cannonite
party has not succeeded in attracting to its ranks a single one
of the groups or tendencies that co-exist in our party.

Without immodesty or smugness, we permit ourselves to con-
clude that both phenomena — the attractive power in the one or-
ganization and the lack of it in the other — are a tribute to the
Workers Party and to the concepts to which it holds so firmly.

MAX SHACHTMAN.
December 4, 1946.

14

THE QUESTION OF UNITY

By ALBERT GOLDMAN

On the surface it appears as if those of us who left the
Socalist Workers Party and joined the Workers Party did so
because the SWP refused to accept the proposal which the
former Minority of the SWP made lor unity of the two par-
ties. If thai were really the case, then whai we did would be
inexplicable. For within out ranks are comrades who have
spent many years in the revolutionary movement and experi-
enced revolutionary socialists do not leave a party because
of a disagreement on a question that is apparently not so
very important.

There can easily be an honest difference of opinion
as to whether unity with a certain party or group is or
is not advisable and necessary. In such a case the min-
ority advocating unity accepts the decision of the ma-
jority and continues its efforts to win the majority to its
point of view. But it was clear to us that the rejection
of unity by the leaders of the SWP was not the result of
an honest conviction that unity is incorrect but rather of
a fear of having too many independent revolutionists
within the party. The rejection of unity was to us final
proof that concepts and methods of organization com-
pletely alien to Bolshevism had been introduced by Can-
non and his followers and that what they want to build
is a monolithic instead of a revolutionary party.

It was of course possible for us to remain in the SWP and
struggle against these concepts and methods but there were
too few of us and too much of our time would have been

wasted in controversies with a clique that almost invariably
succeeded in dragging every intellectual conflict down to its
lowest level.

We joined the Workers Party because we are of the opin-
ion that a union of all the forces striving to build a revolu-
tionary Marxist party— as against a monolithic party— will, in
the long inn, bring the besl results.

Our hopes foj unit) are no'l complete!) destroyed and our
struggle for unity is not over. II there is unity it will mean
that the process of degeneration that has begun in the SWP
will have been slopped. II there is no unity then there is
nothing else to do except to proceed on our path of building
a revolutionary Marxist party.

In 1940 a bitter factional struggle centering around the
issues of the defense of the Soviet Union and the nature of
the regime, led to a split. In my opinion, the comrades who
split and formed the WP made a grave mistake; in their
opinion they were correct. But the split is now part of history
and what is necessary is to unite and not to fight over an in-
cident of the past.

The very nature of the issues upon which the split was
based should have led intelligent and experienced Marxists
to expect re-unification. When informed about the split Trot-
sky wrote that the then Minority was determined to pass
through the experience of an independent party. Such an
expression indicated that he considered the split a temporary
one, because he considered the issues leading to the split as
issues that would be settled in a short time.

They who see in the revolutionary movement a proc-
ess in which sharp intellectual conflict is inevitable and
even necessary do not consider a split a crime for which
one suffers eternal damnation. It is a very costly part of
the life of the revolutionary movement and all efforts
must be made to avoid it. But if a split does occur, revo-
lutionists who are interested in the revolution and not in
their cliques make every effort to unite the divided
forces.

16

Personal animosities are aroused in the course of bitter
factional strife. But what kind of revolutionists are they who
persist in retaining these animosities regardless of the passing
of time and the elimination of the issues that gave rise to the
struggle? Lenin was by no means a gentle person in a fac-
tional struggle. Lenin and Trotsky fought each other fiercely.
But they found no trouble in uniting when the question of
the Russian Revolution, upon which they saw eye >o eye, de-
manded unity.

Alas that so many petty people have found it easy to imi-
tate Lenin in hurling terms of opprobrium, but have found
Lenin's politics too difficult to grasp. And Lenin's politics in-
cluded unifications as well as splits. And the same is true of
Trotsky.

POLITICAL BASIS FOR UNITY

The mere fact that unity of the SWP and the WP would
do away with tremendous duplication of effort would justify
making all efforts for unity. There are now two weekly agita-
tional organs— THE MILITANT with a circulation, let us
say of 35,000, and LABOR ACTION with one of 20,000.
Would not one paper sold to 50,000 workers be much more
effective? And the two papers are so similar in content that
the average worker cannot possibly distinguish between them.
There are two theoretical monthly magazines. There is con-
fusing duplication of effort on all fronts. Such a situation
should be tolerated only if there are profound programmatic
differences.

There are of course differences but they are easily
compatible with membership in one party, provided
there is a willingness on the part of the minority to abide
by discipline in action. The most serious difference is on
the question of the defense of the Soviet Union but in
1940 we of the majority of the SWP, following Trotsky,
contended that there was no justification of a split be-
cause of differences on that question. If that was tru3 in
1940, it is a thousand times more true in 1946 when the

most important question before us is not the defense of
the Soviet Union but the defense of the European Revo-
lution against Stalinism.

: Other differences that developed during the period of
separation are minor in comparison with the question of the
defense of the Soviet Union. Undei no circumstances could
any one of them or all of them put together justify a split or
the continuation of a split.

On the l>;isi< anti-capitalisi program there arc no differ-
ences; on the program of transitiona] demands there arc prac-
tically no differences. Readers of the weekly papers of the
two parties could easily see that during the war, both refused
to support the war on the ground that they considered it, on
the part of the United States, imperialist in character; both
fought against the no-strike pledge; both supported all the
strikes. At present the two parties support the struggle for
higher wages; they advocate the formation of a Labor party;
they demand the withdrawal of the American troops from all
occupied countries; they defend the European Revolution
against the Stalinists and the democratic imperialists.

On the question of the nature of a party both parties
accept the principle of democratic centralism. It is true that
the rejection of unity by the leaders of the Socialist Workers
Party together with other indications point to a Stalinist
trend on the part of the SWP leaders but they deny that; they
insist that they have the true Bolshevik concept of party
organization; so do the leaders of the WP. There may even
be legitimate differences of opinion on the application of the
principle of democratic centralism but such differences should
not prevent unity.

Serious revolutionists must above ail recognize that
the time within which we can build a powerful revolu-
tionary party to lead the masses to socialism is limited.
The invention of the atom bomb gives us, in all probabil-
ity, another post-war period and no more. The serious
tasks confronting the revolutionary Marxist movement
both in this country and abroad demand the strengthen-

18

ing of that movement through unification of the two
parties that represent it.

If I he political situation demands unity why is there no
unity? Upon whom is the responsibility for the failure to
achieve unity and what significance can be attached to the
motives of those who have rejected unity?

ATTITUDE TO THE WP

There was a sharp difference of attitude between the
Minority and the Majority of the SWP towards the WP, even
before the question of unity arose. The difference was be-
tween honest revolutionists interested only in the welfare of
the revolutionary movement and cliquists interested primar-
ily in the strengthening of their clique.

We of the Minority proposed joint action on all questions
where we had no differences with the WP. We proposed a
bloc in the trade unions; we proposed joint anti-fascist activi-
ties; we proposed to avoid the obscene spectacle of having
two small revolutionary groups run competing candidates in
the New York elections. All this we did simply on the propo-
sition that a difference on one issue even though it leads to
a split, does not do away with the necessity of common ac-
tion on issues upon which we agree. The leaders of the Ma-
jority stubbornly refused all of our proposals. The leading
comrades of the WP, on the other hand, agreed with us com-
pletely and were willing to unite in any action where there
was no disagreement.

The attitude of the leaders of the SWP to the WP is re-
vealed by Cannon's expression: "We must deepen the split."
What can that statement possibly mean? It can mean only
a conscious attempt to widen the gulf between the parties
regardless of the fact that they base themselves on the same
fundamental principles and have almost the same immediate
demands. To deepen the split under these circumstances
must mean falsification; it must mean and it did mean dis-
torting the position of the WP on the various questions— all
for the purpose of deceiving and prejudicing the member-

19

ship of the SWP, composed of comrades who for the most
part do not read the WP press.

The comrades of the Minority read the WP press and
told the truth about the contents. We had no difficulty in rec-
ognizing the obvious: that the comrades of the WP are de-
voted revolutionists. The leaders of the Cannon clique either
read the press of the WP and distorted the contents or did
not read the press. In both cases they shouted that the com-
rades ol the WP are "renegades." Our altitude was based on
the truth; the attitude o\ the Cannonites is based on false-
hood.

THE RECORD ON UNITY

I must admit that when the Minority decided to intro-
duce a resolution in favor of unity, the situation was not a
favorable one. The SWP leaders had refused any and every
kind of joint action with the WP. They were teaching the
members that the WP comrades were renegades and that they
should avoid fraternizing with them. On the other hand, the
WP comrades were afraid of unity because they felt that
unity with the Cannon clique would not be a pleasant expe-
rience. We knew that the SWP leaders would start by reject-
ing unity; we did not know how the WP leaders would react
to our proposal for unity.

But in our opinion unity was correct and necessary and
we decided to go ahead with our resolution. The violent re-
action of Cannon to the resolution was a clear indication
that our task would be extremely difficult if not hopeless.
Never has he been so violent as when he shouted that the in-
tention of those who introduced the resolution was to split
the party. Later on he took that back but the violence of his
attitude gave him away. For it disclosed that under no cir-
cumstances would he permit unity and he knew that such
an attitude must necessarily lead to a split.

The Minority did not ask for immediate unity with
the WP. We asked that the leading committee of the
SWP go on record in favor of unity and proceed to in-

20

vestigate the possibilities of unity. That means a dis-
cussion with the leading comrades of the WP for the pur-
pose of finding out whether unity is feasible. We under-
stood that there were difficulties and that it was neces-
sary to begin frank and honest discussions and to deter-
mine whether unity would work out in practice.

From the very beginning of our unity proposal we of the
farmer Minority insisted that unity is not desirable if it
means another violent factional struggle with another split
to follow. We were not and are not afraid of any discussions
but we do not want bitter factional strife.

Throughout the whole controversy we" stood for the prin-
ciple of joim action of the two parties on all issues upon
which there was substantial agreement, for the purpose of
testing out whether or noi the comrades of the SWP and of
the WP could live in one party even though divided by dif-
ferences on various questions. We said that close collabora-
tion would prepare the membership of both parties for unity
and would eliminate the personal antagonisms remaining
from the factional strife of 1940. There is nothing like joint
work in a common cause to make people forget animosities.

But shouting that the WP leaders were renegades and
that the split must be deepened, Cannon reacted violently
against the proposal for unity. To him it means the coming
into the party of several hundred revolutionists who would
be persuaded only by argument, who would not listen to his
banalities with awe and proclaim his anecdotes as the writ-
ings of an inspired historian. JJnity would mean more inde-
pendent revolutionists in the party and he had enough of us
as it was.

A CHANGE OF LINE

To our request to start a discussion with the leaders of
the WP to determine whether unity was feasible, Cannon
answered that no discussion was necessary because the press
of the WP gave us all the information that was necessary to
know that its program and activities made unity undesirable.

if

1

The Minority of course did not want a discussion on pro-
gram; we knew the program of the WP and that is why we
were for unity; what we wanted was a discussion to see whe-
ther unity was practical.

Suddenly there was a change of line on the part of the
SWP leadership. Instead of flat and open opposition to
unity the formula was brought out; "We are neither for nor
against— wait and see." Instead of rejecting any kind of dis-
cussion because the press oi the WP gave us ;ill the informa-
tion necessary, the formula was adopted: "a thorough dis-
cussion and probing of all differences"

Officially the change of line was explained by the fact
that the WP had sent a communication to the SWP, taking
cognizance of the Minority's proposal for unity and indicat-
ing its favorable attitude to unity and willingness to discuss
the question. As serious revolutionaries the WP leaders had
not waited for an official invitation. They knew that the Mi-
nority had made a proposal and immediately took a position
in favor of unity.

Since Cannon had previously stated that the pro-
gram of the WP made unity an unrealistic proposition
and since he stated that the press of the WP gave us all
the information necessary, it would seem that a com-
munication from the WP should make no difference. But
it was evident that unity was a powerful issue in the
ranks of the International and open opposition to if
would not be a good tactic. Comrade Natalia Trotsky
had already expressed herself in favor of unify. If ap-
peared desirable to Cannon to sabotage unity rather
than oppose it openly. This explains the change of line.
Unfortunately the members of the SWP shifted their po-
sition in the same manner that the members of the Sta-
linist parties shift theirs — whenever the leaders decido
that a change is necessary.

When the line was shifted from open opposition to
unity to a "not for, not against, but wait and see" attitude,
a committee was designated to meet with a committee of

22

the WP. Ai one of the meetings the WP comrades indicated
their desire to publish a tendency organ after unity, for
internal party circulation. This was immediately taken up
by the SWP leaders and the party members were told that
the real obstacle to unity was this demand for an indepen-
dent tendency organ. Since the SWP leaders are "smart"
people they did not put this down in writing but spread
it throughout the party.

Thereupon the Minority addressed a communication to
the WP asking the WP comrades to be satisfied with an
internal party bulletin provided the right of a group to
publish its own bulletin lor internal party circulation be
recognized by the SWP leaders. This proposition was ac-
cepted by the WP comrades but then the SWP leaders simply
stated that the question of the tendency bulletin was not at
all important and was not the one to prevent unity. The
programmatic differences were important and these had to
be discussed.

More than six months after the adoption of a resolution
providing for a "thorough discussion" with the WP covering
all of the differences between the parties, the Political Com-
mittee of the SWP presented the WP with a list of about
fifteen questions and requested the latter to state its position
on all of the enumerated questions. This apparently is to
be the beginning of the "thorough discussion," although the
list, of questions was accompanied by a resolution which
stated that on the basis of the answers to. the questions the
coming conventign would definitely decide on the question
of unification.

A DISCUSSION TO PREVENT UNITY

Several questions present themselves in connection with
the list of subjects for discussion. Do not the leaders of the
SWP know the position of the WP on the various questions
enumerated by them for discussion? If not what kind .of
revolutionaries are these who pretend to lead a revolution-

2&

.it \ political party? II they know the position of the WP on
the various subjects do they expect to hold a real discussion,
in the sense <>l trying to persuade the WP comrades that they
are wrong? And suppose the) do not succeed in that task?
Are they not ;il>lc, as political leaders to state beforehand,
on the basis of theii knowledge of the WP program, whether
<>i mil ilic differences permit membership in one party?

And il 1 1 it- "discussion" is for the purpose of acquainting
the SWP members with the program of the WP, how does it
happen, as asked by Max Shachtman, that the members were
;ui<l are all opposed to unity? Are they opposed to it because
they are ignorant of the WP program?

11 one considers the list of questions it becomes clear even
to an inexperienced person that the "discussion" is to be held
not for the purpose of arriving at an honest decision as to
whether unity is possible or desirable but solely for the pur-
pose of giving a political cover to an unpolitical rejection
of unity.

1 quote from ;i statement by the Minority, dealing with
the list of questions to be discussed. "The questions listed by
the PC for discussion include all subjects upon which there
is or may possibly be some differences with the WP. From
the point of view of a discussion on unity they are absurd;
but from the point of view of confusing an inexperienced
membership and killing the possibility of unity the questions
listed for "discussion" were formulated by "clever" people
who see in "clever" maneuvering a solution for the problem
of preventing unity without giving their real reasons for
opposition to unity. . . .

"Undoubtedly the dialecticians of the PC ivill prove that
unity is impossible by citing the law of quantity changing
into quality. One or two differences, we shall be told, may
not be a bar to unity, but fifteen differences create a quali-
tative change.

"What other purpose than the one mentioned above
/an a list of questions have that would fight the battle

24

of 1940 all over again; that asks for a discussion on the
methods, principles and philosophy of Marxism; that raises
such a silly subject for discussion as the attitude of the WP
to the Young Peoples Socialist League; that wants to discuss
subjects that are part of history (India and China during
the war); that wants to revive a discussion on Russia. . . .?

"Honest and serious revolutionists confronted with the
question of unity with another organization would take the
trouble, once the question was raised, to find out the basic
program of the opponent party with which unity was pro-
posed; would follow the agitational press of that party to
see what its position is on the basic questions of the day; to
decide whether the differences that exist are or are not com-
patible with membership in one party; they would find out
whether the membership of the opponent party are willing
to abide by the decisions of the majority; honest and serious
revolutionists would propose a period of cooperation to de-
cide whether unity xvill be followed by harmony in action. . . .

"From the point of view of unity the attitude of the
Workers Party to the war waged by the United States is of
infinitely greater importance than its attitude to China. But
' the former question is not raised in the list of questions.
Prom the point of view of unity the position of the Workers
Party on the no-strike pledge is a thousand times more im-
portant than its attitude to the YPSL but that is not men-
tioned in the list of questions."

If the coming convention of the SWP is not asked to
decide that unity ^it present is not feasible because there are
too many differences, it will be only because we have suc-
ceeded in exposing Cannon's petty maneuver. It is difficult,
however, to find what else he can do— except to state that
the Minority and the WP leaders were not honest in pro-
posing unity and accuse those of us who are sincerely for
unity of using the question of unity as a maneuver for a split.

Conscious of the dishonesty which accompanied every one
of their steps connected with their maneuvers against unity,

25«<

leaders of the Majority decided to smear the leaders of
the Minority and of the WP as dishonest. They discovered
that Max Shachtman had written some letters to me. One
would imagine from the mm created thai they found the let-
ters in my co;it pockei and not in the Bulletin of the Work-
ers Parly, a magazine for discussion <>l party problems avail-
able tO: non-party members as well as to party members. In
the SVVP there is published an internal party bulletin which
is marked in bold letters INTERNAL, and ill smaller letters
"for pariy members only." The leaders of the WP on the
other hand, very properly consider that a revolutionary party
as part of the working class can have no political secrets from
the working class.

In these letters, Shachtman discussed with me the policy
which he thought should be followed by the Minority of the
SWP. On the basis of the absolutely correct premise that
Cannon would never permit unity at the present relative
strength of the two parties, he urged that we leave the party
because it would be far more gainful to the revolutionary
movement. The letters clearly indicate that Shachtman and
the other comrades of the WP were seriously and sincerely
for unity but that they realized that unity was not to be
achieved because of the opposition of Cannon.

With great glee Cannon and his dutiful hand-raisers
pounced upon the letters; they printed them in their secret
bulletin. For the first time since the split Shachtman had
something published in the SWP press. The leaders of the
SWP launched an attack on Goldman and Morrow as initi-
ators of unity proposals for the purpose of creating a split.
Of course Cannon could easily frustrate such a purpose by
accepting unity, but that did not occur to him.

We challenge anyone to read Shachtman's letters and find
a single sentence which would prove the absolutely un-
founded charge that the proposal for unity was the result of
a conspiracy between the Minority and WP leaders to create
a split in the SWP.

Study the record made by the various groups on the ques-

26

tion of unity and you cannot help but conclude that the
Minority and the WP sincerely accepted unity whereas the
Cannonite clique, in a thoroughly dishonest manner, sabo-
taged unity. The record of the Cannonites is a record of
petty maneuverers who fear to meet in intellectual conflict a
large group of independent revolutionists. In the statement
from which I already quoted we said:

"It is tragic enough to see that leaders of a revolutionary
party insist on continuing a split which necessarily is detri-
mental to the movement.

"But what is doubly tragic is that in a movement founded
by a genius who tS the very incarnation of intellectual integ-
rity, a leadership relies not on an honest presentation of a
position but on petty, dishonest maneuvers calculated only
to fool the membership.

"It is clear that a desire to build a monolithic party goes
hand in hand with political dishonesty."

STALINIST GERMS IN THE SWP

The dishonest opposition to unity, though the most im-
portant, was not the only thing that convinced the Minority
that the leadership of the SWP was turning away from a
Leninist-Trotskyist conception of a revolutionary party and
toward a Zinovievist conception. It was Zinoviev who intro-
duced the idea of a monolithic party. Stalirf developed that
idea. In the days when Cannon was a member of the Com-
munist Party, Cannon was an ardent defender of the mono-
lithic party.* He is far more careful now; he does not say that

*In a speech before the New York Workers' School of the Com-
munist Party, a speech that was printed in the Workers Monthly of
November, 1924, Cannon had the following- to say about the nature
of the party:

"It (a Bolshevik party) must be a centralized party prohibit-
ing factions, tendencies and groups. It must be a monolithic
party hewn of one piece.

'What shall we say of our party if we measure it by this
standard? From the very beginning- and even up to the present
day, our party has been plagued by factions, tendencies and
groups. At least one-half of the energy of the party has been ex-
pended in factional struggles, one after another. We have even
grown into the hahit of accepting this state of affairs as a nor-
mal condition. We have gone to the extent of putting a pre-

27*'

le wants a monolithic party as he did in his early days, but
actually he is working to create just such a party. Some ol
his followers substitute the word "homogeneous" for that of
"monolithic."

Cannon was fond of saying privately that he is not a
Trotskyist but a Leninist on the organization question. It
was after Trotsky's death that he said it openly. It is, of
course, perfectly true thai Trotsky had a disagreement with
Lenin on the organizational question but that disagreement
disappeared completely after Trotsky's group united with
the Bolsheviks. For Cannon to say that he is a Leninist and
not a Trotskyist on the organization question means in
effect to say that he rejects the whole struggle of Trotsky
against Zinoviev and Stalin on that question.

A few incidents that occurred in the last two years indi-
cate the trend toward a monolithic party. When in The
Fourth Intetnational there appeared an article by Joseph
Hansen, in which Cannon was portrayed as the Lenin of
America, there ivas vociferous objection from some of the
party members. Even some of the leaders of the Cannon fac-
tion objected to the article, but only in private; publicly they
defended it. Cannon wrote a letter from Sandstone in which
he stated that those who criticize Hansen's article do not un-
derstand the art of leadership.

mium upon factionalism by giving- factional representation in the
important committees of the party.

"Of course this condition cannot be eliminated by formal de-
cree. We cannot eliminate factions and factional struggle by de-
claring them undesirable. No, we shall make the first step toward
eliminating factions, tendencies and groups, toward creating a
monolithic party in the sense of the Fifth Congress declaration
only if at the beginning we recognize the basic cause of the con-
dition; if we recognize the existence in our party of factions,
tendencies, and groups runs directly counter to Leninism, to the
Leninist conception of what a revolutionary proletarian party
should be."

I do not claim that Cannon would now write or say anything
like the above paragraphs. He is too smart for that. But his ten-
dency is in that direction.

The above quotation shows that at the time Trotsky was fighting
Zinoviev and Stalin on the question of the nature of the party. Can-
non was willing, without the slightest investigation, to accept the
grotesque perversion of a Leninist party put forth by Zinoviev.

28

Dwight Macdonald, writing for his POLITICS, utilized
Hansen's article in an attempt to prove that leader-worship
is part of the Bolshevik concept of organization. I replied to
Macdonald and in the reply mildly criticized Hansen. The
reply was refused publication in the F. I.

James T. Farrell sent a letter to the F. I. in which he criti-
cized Hansen's article and a scurrilous review of Shachtman's
introduction to THE NEW COURSE. The letter was refused
publication and my request on that score was in vain. Can-
non advised Farrell to stick to literature and let experienced
people take care of politics, the same answer that Browder
gave Farrell wh\n he protested against the Moscow Trials.

Four members Of the SWF were censured Eor organizing
a discussion on the Russian t| ntsi ion with some members ol
the WP. This was done at the initiative of the Political Com
mittee at a time when tremendous political problems con-
fronted the revolutionary movement. The censure was in-
tended to prevent the SWP members from discussing politi-
cal questions and even from talking with WP members. To
jus Lily this nonsense Cannon wrote that the party has a right
to control not only the political but the personal lives of the
members.

One of the most disgusting spectacles staged by the SWP
leaders was to instruct the Control Commission to investigate
the "disloyalty" of the Minority. The Minority openly de-
clared its intention to fraternize politically with the WP. It
organized socials and classes, inviting the members of the WP
to participate. I spoke at meetings of the WP members. These
were political aots on our part. The Cannonites transformed
a political question into one of "disloyalty."

All these incidents can be aptly described as Stalinist
germs. They indicate an attitude which is common only
among the Stalinists and is completely alien to Bolshevism.
Were these isolated incidents to be explained on the basis of
habits acquired through participation in the Stalinist move-
ment or did they indicate a trend in the direction of building
a monolithic party? For us unity was the test. The rejection

of unity together with the dishonest discussion connected
with that rejection convinced us that the leadership of the
S WP was consciously on the road of building a monolithic
party. The formal adherence to democratic centralism was
meaningless in view of the actual policies followed on all of
the organizational questions that became controversial issues.
It is not only in the organizational field that signs of de-
generation are visible in the SWP; on the intellectual arena
the level of the party litis taken a sharp descent since the
death of Trotsky. The sole consideration of the leaders of the
party is to see to it that not one iota of the program left by
Trotsky is changed. The fiercest resistance meets any attempt
to introduce a new idea.

INTELLECTUAL DEGENERATION

We have a "finished program," wrote one of the theo-
reticians, E. R. Frank, not meaning thereby a fully rounded
program, as Trotsky meant when he spoke of Lenin's fin-
ished program, but something that is final and unchangeable.
We have an "unchanging program" warned J. P. Cannon.

Two instances illustrate the point. At the October 1943
plenary meeting of the National Committee the official reso-
lution was a compilation of generalities about the coming
proletarian revolution in Europe. Not one word was written
about the necessity of democratic demands as a means to set
the masses in the struggle against the existing regimes and
the Socialist and Stalinist parties. Comrade Felix Morrow in-
troduced some amendments dealing with the necessity of such
demands. That was labeled a petty-bourgeois deviation. Can-
non intervened and offered as his contribution a verbatim
section of the Transitional program.

When Walter Reuther during the strike against General
Motors raised the slogan of a wage raise without a price rise,
the leading theoretician of the SWP, Warde, objected be-
cause it was not included in the Transitional program.

At the last meeting of the National Committee which I
attended, I said that we must indeed be grateful to Stalin

30

thai he did not murder Trotsky before 1940. For had he
killed Trotsky in 1937, the Cannonites would have had no
transitional program to swear by and they would still be
opposing a Labor Party. Had Stalin assassinated Trotsky in
1930 anyone who dared raise the idea that a new party and
a new international should be created would have been des-
ignated by the Cannonites as a petty-bourgeois oppositionist.
Every idea introduced by Trotsky, if offered by someone else,
would have been held up to scorn as petty-bourgeois revision-
ism.

Trotsky's ideas are considered as sacred revelation , dog-
mas to be repealed at every occasion. He who most of all in
sisted that Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action,
who showed over and over again that he was not bound by
any formula and considered the study of reality, oj actual
events, far more important than a quotation from the mas-
ters, has been succeeded by people who "prove" everything
by quotations.

I must relate an incident which shows how little respect
the SWP leaders have for ideas and how, for them, organiza-
tional maneuvers take precedence over ideas. The resolution
' adopted by the International Conference states that it is the
duty of the various sections of the International to "tolerate
the presence of the Red Army only to the extent that it is a
friendly proletarian armed force having as its objective to
guarantee the fulfillment of agrarian reform and the state-
ization of the means of production against imperialism and
against national Reactionary elements, without hindering in<
any way whatsoever the free development of the working class
movement."

We shall not discuss the idea presented, which can be a
product only of political idiocy or of complete aloofness from
reality. It seems that a majority of Cannon's caucus was op-
posed to this nonsense, but all of them voted for the resolu-
tion, the heart of which is this idea about tolerating the
Stalinist army. I say "the heart of the resolution" because

31*<

everything else was practically a repetition of previous reso-
lutions.

The members of the National Committee who were op-
posed to that section of the resolution voted for the resolu-
tion without objecting to the section because they were told
that to raise the question would give the Minority some ad-
vantage. When Felix Morrow made that charge no objection
was voiced, and this was tantamount to admission that he was
correct.

Can such people be called Bolsheviks interested in a cor-
rect political line? No, they are Cannonite cliquists to whom
prestige is more important than political ideas.

A most natural question that I am frequently asked is:
why did not the Minority remain in the SWP to fight for its
ideas? Under normal circumstances a minority is not justi-
fied in leaving a revolutionary party because its ideas are not
accepted. It was possible lor us to remain and by patient,
persistent work attempt to win a majority to our ideas. As a
matter of fact our struggle against the Cannon clique was not
without some success. No more of the leader-worship articles
by Hansen appeared in the SWP press. After our fight against
the idea that members ol the SWP should not even talk with
members of the WP the claim was made that by censuring
four comrades lor discussing the Russian question with WP
members it was not meant that party members should not
talk with WP comrades. The term "renegade" ceased to be
thrown about so freely when referring to the leaders of the
WP. Cannon stopped referring to discussions as "kibitzing."

Our decision to leave the SWP and join the WP was
based on the fundamental premise that if there is no unity
xoe can do far more fruitful work for the cause of revolution-
ary socialism in the WP. Were there not in existence a /tarty
composed of comrades with the same ideas of a revolutionary
party as ours, there would be no alternative for us but to
accept the discipline of the Cannonite majority. But with
such a party in existence it seems much more effective to
unite the forces that are opposed to a monolithic conception

32

of a party than to keep them divided. To unite them means
to strengthen these forces.

A prolonged and severe factional struggle represents a
tremendous waste of energy under the best conditions. A fac-
tional struggle under a regime of people who see in maneu-
vering the solution to all political problems means wasting
ninety per cent of one's efforts on the most petty issues. For
instance, the whole question of unity was transformed into
a question of loyalty and disloyalty. The question of demo-
cratic demands was shifted to an argument as to whether the
United States would or would not send food to Europe— the
leading CannonitVs stoutly maintaining that this country
would not send any food to the European countries.

Another reason for leaving was the Eacl that had we i<
mained we would have been expelled lor Eraternizing politi
cally with the comrades of the WP.

Before we proposed unity and before the WP accepted
our proposal we regarded the comrades of the WP as devoted
revolutionists. After the WP accepted our proposal we re-
garded them as a tendency in the Fourth International, as
Trotskyists. It is significant that the widow of Trotsky who
understands Trotsky's method and approach to problems
better than any one living, speaks of the two Trotskyist par-
ties in the United States.

It was inevitable that the Minority should fraternize po-
litically with the WP. What did this fraternization consist of?
Mainly in discussing the problem of unity and all other po-
litical problems and in getting together in socials and classes.
The fact of the matter is that for most of the Minority com-
rades it was impossible to discuss with the leading Cannonites
and it was easy and profitable to discuss with the WP com-
rades.

The idea of treating devoted revolutionists as renegades
is repulsive. Even if I recognize the necessity of splitting and
remaining apart for a period 1 must treat those who are with
me in the great struggle for a socialist society as revolutionists.
I can fight them on the point upon which we disagree but

33^

act in the friendliest manner and join with them in all ac-
tions on those tasks upon which there is no disagreement.
Cannon's attitude of trying to create a stone wall between
the members of the two parties was hateful to me. Nothing
infuriated and alarmed me so much as the inculcation of hate
among the members of the SWP to the members of the WP.

Under the circumstances, the Minority decided to con-
tinue political fraternization wiih the WP regardless of the
policy of the Majority. I do noi say that the question of
fraternization was a principle with us, although the policy
against fraternization with revolutionists seemed monstrous
to us. Were the SWP a mass party we would have accepted
the policy of the Majority in order to remain in the mass
party. But since the SWP, although larger than the WP, is
still a very small group it seemed to us to be contrary to the
interests of the revolutionary movement to abide by the
policy of the majority.

To the hue and cry raised against us on the ground that
we were violating the principle of democratic centralism we
answered thai this principle should be observed by revolu-
tionists only when iis observance means the building of a
revolutionary party and not when it is used to cover up a
crime against the revolutionary movement. We understand
very well that in the last analysis this means that every revo-
lutionist must judge for himself whether a certain act is so
detrimental to the revolutionary movement that he must dis-
regard the principle of democratic centralism. The rejection
of unity was a criminal act against the revolutionary move-
ment and democratic centralism played a secondary role
with us.

So long as Trotsky was living, Cannon did not openly ex-
press any of his "independent" ideas about organizational
questions. To a few who knew him he confided that he was
"not a Trotskyist but a Leninist" on the organizational ques-
tion. On theoretical, strategical and tactical questions he was
more than willing to follow Trotsky's lead.

Lacking confidence (and justifiably so) in his own ability

34

to deal with theoretical ideas and not having sufficient corf
fidence in any one else, it was only natural for Cannon, after
Trotsky's death, to proclaim that Trotsky had furnished us
with sufficient ideas and that all we need is to follow them.
Anyone who presented any new idea or even a modification
of an old one was looked upon as a disturber of the peace, a
"kibitzer," to use Cannon's expression for those who wanted
to discuss problems. In a movement founded by one who had
nothing of the conservative in him it was declared highly
desirable and commendable to be conservative!

The greatest importance was placed on organizational
questions and by that is meant the creation of a machine
which responds automatically to the will of the controllers of
the machine. The machine was to be kept in good order
through a system of education based on questions and an-
swers derived from Cannon's handbook "Socialism On Trial."
That constitutes the catechism.

The concept of a party as a living organism with intel-
lectual controversy and participation in the class struggle as
the two vital necessities of its life is completely alien to Can-
non. As I indicated above he is the product of the Zinovievist
period of the Communist International. He once wrote an
article declaring that the weakness of the Communist Party
was due to the fact that it was not sufficiently monolithic.

As part of the explanation of the success of Cannon one
must not overlook the role which a machine plays even in a
small organization. Many who otherwise would be working
for a capitalist under adverse conditions find themselves do-
ing easy and pleasant work, find themselves in a position
where they appear as leaders— on a small scale it is true, but
still leaders with some prestige. They could not possibly plav
that role outside of the machine.

The greatest number of SWP members has been re-
cruited since Trotsky's death. They have been educated on
Cannon's concepts of organization and on Trotsky's polemi-
cal exaggerations against the Minority of 1940. Very few of
the members know of The New Course, where Trotsky

35*'

presents a picture of what a real Bolshevik organization
should be. The members arc devoted revolutionists but one
could also say thai of the "third-period" Stalinists (between
1929 and 1934). They arc miliiani, aggressive, self-sacrificing.
But they do tiol have the critical attitude that should prevail
in a revolutionary Marxist party.

BUILDING A REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

The la.sk that confronts us at presenl is the s;nnc that
faced the revolutionary Marxists in the last quarter of a cen-
tiuy-the building of a revolutionary party. We start from the
basic premise that for a successful struggle for socialism the
working class must have its own party composed of the most
conscious, the most militant elements of the proletariat. To
look for a victorious struggle on the part of the working class
in spite of its subjection to the degrading influence of capital-
ism, without the leadership of a party that is composed of
those elements who have to a certain extent freed themselves
from those influences, is Utopian.

The party that we want to build must base itself firmly on
the fundamentals of Marx, Lenin and Trotsky. But it must
be a party where the statements of the great teachers of social-
ism arc not to be considered as sacred dogmas. Our party
must be one where one (an U el perfectly free to introduce
new ideas and challenge old ones; where new ideas will be
met on the plane of argument and not of name-calling. We
want a party which will consider the facts of life much more
important than any theory. In the party that we want to build
controversies will not be settled by quotations but by an anal-
ysis of all the existing factors.

In the party we want to build discussion will not be con-
sidered as "kibitzing" but as a vital necessity for the solution
of problems and for the education of the membership. Dis-
cussion should not be counterposed to activity; it is part of
the activity of a party. It cannot monopolize the life of the
party but without it there can be no purposeful activity.

The backbone of a revolutionary parly must consist of

36

militant proletarians. But we must reject the concept thai
their lash is only to follow the leaders. We must consciously
aim to educate the workers who join the party to have a criti-
cal spirit. We understand very well the difficulties which con-
front, every worker in his attempt to educate himself in the
principles of Marxism. He works too hard under capitalism
to be able to devote many hours to reading and study. But
from the very moment he enters the party a worker must be
made to feel that while he is educating himself he must listen
to arguments carefully arid make up his mind to the best of
Ins ability on the basis of the arguments. A critical attitude
on the part of the rank and file is essential to a revolutionary
party.

Comrade Felix Morrow and other comrades who were
with the Minority have decided to remain in the SWP. While
1 am of the opinion that their efforts there will not be one-
tenth so fruitful as working in the WP I wish them all the
success in the world. Their success is our success for it will
mean eventual unity of the two parties and a tremendous
strengthening of the Trotskyist movement.

Many comrades want an explanation for the situation
that has developed in the SWP. The "theoreticians" of that
party constantly demanded of us to show the "social roots" of
the Cannon clique. Starting from the premise that Stalinist
tendencies must come from a bureaucracy which has social
roots either in a degenerated workers' state or in the trade
union officialdom of a capitalist state, they tried to confound
us by asking lor prool that the clique is part of, the.,degencr-
ated workers' slate or the trade union bureaucracy... We sim-
ply laughed at this lomialistic thinking driven to a non-
sensical extreme.

It is undeniable that when Trotsky was living he did all
of the theoretical thinking for the Trotskyist groups the
world over. We all recognized his great genius and for the
most part accepted his ideas without critical analysis. It was
a tremendous asset to have a Trotsky at the head of out
movement, guiding its intellectual life, but it was also a dis-

37^

advantage in that it prevented the development of independ-
ent thought on the pari of Trotsky's followers. The struggle
in the party in 1940 showed that to many ol the Trotskyists
independenl thinking was ;i subject of scorn. The hardened
Cannonites not only disagreed with the Minority of that
period but they laughed ai the idea of arriving at conclusions
independenl <»l and opposed to Trotsky.

Our part) musi be a disciplined party but its discipline
is not based <>n rules ;inil regulations. It is the discipline of
comrades devoted to a great cause and conscious of the fact
that without discipline in action they can achieve nothing.
It is a discipline based primarily on the correctness of the
leadership and not on the ability of the leaders to order peo-
ple. A living, thinking party is not an undisciplined party; it
has a higher form of discipline than the monolithic party.

Particular ideas and practices which now prevail in the
SVVP and which may be termed "Bolshevism a-la-Cannon"
must be rejected as alien to a revolutionary party. There must
be no build-up of leaders. An opponent pain must not be
considered an "enemy party" when it is close to us in pro-
gram and activities; comrades who for some reason split from
us are not to be considered "renegades," when they are loyal
to the revolutionary movement, and our members must not
be filled with hate toward such comrades.

Distortion of an opponent's position must not be toler-
ated; the position and arguments of an opponent must be
presented with the greatest honesty.

The Cannonite practice of discussing all important po-
litical and organizational questions in a secret bulletin
must be rejected. All good discussion articles on all important
questions should be included in the public theoretical organ;
and the discussion bulletin should be available to all those
who are interested. A revolutionary party is part of the work-
ing class and has no secrets from the workers.

Our very existence is based on our confidence that the
kind of a party we want to build can be built and will be
built. Our confidence stems not only from the fact that such

38

/

a party is necessary but also from the historical fact that such
a party was actually created and succeeded in leading the
Russian workers to a successful revolution. I am firmly of the
opinion that the Bolshevik party under Lenin and Trotsky
was the kind of a party that we want to create.

This does not mean that we defend every act of the Bol-
shevik parly. There is room in our party for those who think
that in such and such a particular case the Bolsheviks were
wrong. To me Bolshevism means the theoretical, strategical
and tactical ideas by which the Russian masses were mobi-
lized for a successful assault on the Russian capitalists and
landlords. Ninety times out of a hundred they w/to sincerely
attack Bolshevism on some organizational or theoretical ques-
tion confuse Bolshevism with Stalinism. Cannonism has fui
rushed another weapon, to those who do not understand but
wish to attack Bolshevism.

One idea that we must put forth and which the Bolsheviks
never thought of mentioning is the necessity to guard against
a bureaucratic degeneration, such as the Stalinist degenera-
tion. Trotsky once stated that it is not the aim of a revolu-
tionary party to guard against degeneration but to make the

- revolution. I cannot accept that idea.

One of Trotsky's great contributions to Marxism is his
explanation for the Stalinist degeneration. He showed that it
was due to the backwardness of Russia and the failure of the
world revolution. The terrible lack of goods with which to
satisfy the needs of the masses created the conditions neces-
sary for the usurpation of power by the bureaucracy. It now
appears most likely that the taking of power by the working
(lass will be followed by a period of scarcity or, under the best
ol circumstances, a period of difficult readjustment. The dan-
ger of a bureaucratization ol a section of the party is very

great. It is too risky to depend solely on favorable economic
conditions to prevent degeneration. We must depend also
upon a party of alert anil independent revolutionists who

will oiler the greatest resistance to any attempt by any section

ol the bureaucracy to usurp the power of the workers.

39

Our party must educate its members to be aware of the
close connection between the great aims of socialism and the
means used to build the party and achieve those aims. The
revolutionary socialist who constantly keeps the ultimate
aims of socialism in view will inevitably reject clique politics,
petty maneuvering and distortion ol an opponent's position
as methods hostile to the achievement of our aims, as meth-
ods laying the basis for a Indue degeneration. The methods
of Cannon an methods ol people who see in the organization
an end in itself and who Eorgel the great aims of our party.

THE WORKERS PARTY

A few days after we left the SWP and joined the WP, the
latter party had a national convention. The delegates showed
an independence that is impossible to conceive of in the
SWP. The constant shifting of delegates, depending upon
the issues and the arguments showed an open-mindedness and
independence that are practically inconceivable in the SWP.
In speaking to the delegates one did not feel as if he were
arguing with a stone wall, a feeling that comes over one when
speaking to a gathering of members of the SWP.

It is true that the SWP at present has greater connections
with the trade unions and has more members and more pro-
letarian members. But the Stalinists have still more members
and more industrial workers who are members. We have su-
preme confidence that in the end a living, thinking member-
ship will attract to itself the best elements among the work-
ers, and by virtue of a correct political line which can come
only as a result of tackling problems on a Marxist basis, will
succeed in winning the masses.

We have received a severe blow because the SWP leaders
have rejected unity. We do not give up our hopes for ultimate
unity. But if there is no unity then we shall continue to build
our party, firmly convinced that the principles upon which i;
is built and an independent revolutionary membership will
contribute enormously to the victory of socialism, which to
us is impossible without democracy and freedom.

40

APPENDIX A

Toward a Deepening of the Split

LThe following excerpt from the article of Martin may be
considered the first official expression of opinion by the leadership
of the SWP on the question of unity with the WP, inasmuch as
the views of Martin are identical in every respect with those of
the leader of the SWP, James P. Cannon.]

Take the question of the Shachtmanites, for example. We wit-
ness an attempt, direct or implied, to revise our estimate of the
petty-bourgeois opposition. But the question is not ended with
our estimate of the Shachtman party; it is only started. What
follows from this estimate, or the proposal to revise it? To what
end is it pointed? If we keep thinking without stopping half-way
we must recognize that our estimate inexorably leads us either
(1) toward reconciliation and unity, or (2) toward a deepening
of the split. The discussion is not completed until that question is
decided and reasons given for the decision.

We, on our part, assume that the course toward deepening the
split is necessary and correct; our attitude flows from that.

— Reflections on the 11th Party Convention, by Martin,
Internal Bulletin of the SWP, April, 1945, page 19.

APPENDIX B

The Principal Obstacle to Unity

Perhaps our greatest gain is in the kind of party we have
succeeded in building. In it, we have living proof that a Bolshevik
party does not mean* the totalitarian prison so many people have
been led to believe it always was and must always be. The demo-
cratic character of our organization is not merely our boast.
Militants and radicals outside our party know the facts and
acknowledge them. Our party is intolerant of any attempts to
curb the intellectual freedom and critical independence of its
membership. All it demands is rigid discipline in action and a
high degree of responsibility in building up the party. It is able
to make and enforce this demand not only because its main poli-
cies have proved to be correct, but because there is no bureau-
cratic regime, "benevolent" or otherwise, in the party. Without;

41 *

ever descending to the futility of a "debating society," our party
has repeatedly had the freest discussions of political and theoreti-
cal questions. Some have been confined to the party ranks, but
the more important ones have also been discussed in public, in
the pages of our New International.' Some of them have been
extremely ardent, even sharply polemical. Groups, ideological for-
mations, of different kinds have existed in the party and continue
to exist; in one form or another, on one question or another, they
will probably always exist. But we have no resolutions calling
for the "dissolution of factions," and if Rood Bolshevik practice
continues to prevail, we shall never have such resolutions. We
have established in our party such a relationship between leaders
and members and of all members with each other, and between
adopted program and criticism of it, that there is no air in the
party for a bureaucratic or clique regime. And there, after all,
lies the secret of the absence of permanent factions, as distin-
guished from ideological groupings. There are no such factions
because there is no soil — a bureaucratic regime; — for them to
grow in.

It might be said that the kind of party we have built up is our
richest possession. In itself, it does not guarantee against making
political mistakes, including serious ones. But it makes possible
a speedy correction of such mistakes if they are made, a correc-
tion without the convulsive crises to which bureaucratized parties
are doomed whenever a serious difference of opinion forces its way
past the lid.

From this standpoint, it might be added in passing, the big
obstacle to the union of the two Trotskyist organizations in this
country is not so much the political differences that exist. Al-
though some of these differences are greater than they were five
years ago, others have become less acute. In any event, people
with even greater political differences could live and work side by
side in a single party provided it were a normal party. It is no
secret, for example, that in our own party close cooperation is
possible between comrades who, on some questions, have greater
differences between themselves than our party as a whole has, on
other questions, with the SWP. The principal obstacle (as this
writer sees it) lies precisely in the sterile, bureaucratic regime
which the Cannonites have imposed upon and continue to maintain
in the SWP, a regime which the new minority in the SWP rightly
describes as Stalinist in its trend. Unity is a precious thing. The
kind of party that would result from unity is, however, far more
important. Our comrades are not disposed for a minute to trade
off what they have built up for any regime that smacks of
Cannonism.

— Five Years of the Workers Party, by Max
Shachtman, New International, April, 1945,
pages 80-81.

42

Resolution for Unity Submitted by Minority of the
Political Committee of the SWP

1. It is now more than five years since the groups which we
designated as the "petty-bourgeois opposition" left the party.
Immediately after the split, they organized the Workers Party
under the leadership of comrades with many years of experience
in the revolutionary movement. After five years, we note that
their activities in the labor movement continue unabated. They
publish a weekly agitation paper, Labor Action and a monthly,
New International; put up candidates in elections; conduct frac-
tion work in trade unions, etc. They took with them in the split
40 per cent of our membership; their present activities indicate
that they have retained a substantial portion of this number and
recruited new elements.

2. Assuming that the Workers Party is but one-third the size
of our party, we cannot ignore the possibility of re-unification of
the two forces on the ground of their allegedly sparse numbers.
Unification would result in a 25 per cent increase of our forces.
More important, unification would return to the party cadre ele-
ments who are the product of decades of Marxist training and
experience and whom we cannot hope to recruit elsewhere.

3. Our attitude toward re-unification must be based on a
political estimate of the Workers Party. This means not to repeat
what we said about the minority at the time of the split, but to
analyze without prejudice the history of the Workers Party and
the character of its program and present activities.

4. With the exception of the important questions of the nature
and defense of the Soviet Union, the Workers Party remains on
the fundamental programmatic basis of the Fourth International.
Its propaganda, agitation and activities are based in the main
on the program of transitional demands adopted by the Founding
Conference of the Fourth International.

5. The acid test of a workers' party is its attitude toward im-
perialist war. Without the slightest hesitation and with no oppo-
sition in its ranks, the Workers Party took a Leninist position
toward its own imperialist bourgeoisie. It has maintained that
position throughout the war. Some comrades deny that this is an
acid test of the revolutionary character of the Workers Party;
they point to the anti-war position of Martov in World War I and
of the Young Peoples Socialist League in this war, as examples
of centrists and/or non-revolutionisms who oppose imperialist war.
The speciousness of this argument is that it ignores the fact that
Martov and the Y.P.S.L. remained in parties dominated by social-
chauvinists, whereas the Leninist character of the Workers
Party's position includes its recognition of the principle that

43 *

Leninists must have their own party and cannot remian in one
party with social-chauvinists.

6. The comrades of the Workers Party have shown that they
remain loyal to the proletarian revolution. On the American scene
the Workers Party has followed the same general course as our
party: against the no-strike pledge and against class-collaboration
through the War Labor Board, for a Labor Party, etc. On ques-
tions of the European revolution, it has likewise followed the same
course as we, and similarly on tasks of liheration of the colonies,
etc. Today the similarity of the two parties' programs and activi-
ties has become still closer, with the disappearance into the back-
ground of the question of the defense of the Soviet Union, and
the appearance in the foreground of the urgent need to defend
the European revolutions against Stalin, a question on which the
Workers Party is in complete agreement with us. It is inevitable
that militant workers will not understand our separation into
parties which they deem to be similar in fundamental program
and immediate aims. Nor can we justly deny to these militant
workers the essentially revolutionary character of the Workers
Party.

The Question of Russia

7. The Workers Party position on the Soviet Union is that it
is a bureaucratic-collectivist state. However, this does not consti-
tute an insuperable obstacle to unity. Within the Fourth Inter-
national there have for some years been currents rejecting the
concept that the Soviet Union is a degenerated workers' state.
Nobody has claimed that the Fourth International must expel
comrades who believe that the Soviet Union is a bureaucratic-
collectivist state or a state of capitalist restoration.

8. Yet there are comrades of the Political Committee who,
while agreeing to the principle that differences on the Soviet
Union are no bar to unity within the Fourth International, never-
theless argue that the comrades of the Workers Party do not be-
long in the Fourth International because they are "revisionists."
But revisionists in the classical sense refers to reformists of the
type of Bernstein, who distort Marxism for the purpose of giving
up the class struggle and the proletarian revolution. The "re-
visionism" of the Workers Party is obviously not to be confused
with Bernsteinian revisionism; the former is a revision of the
Marxist theory of the state in the sense that the WP theory of
bureaucratic-collectivism is not compatible with the Marxist the-
ory of the state; but we must recognize that the Workers Party
agrees with us against Bernsteinian revisionism on the necessity
of carrying on the class struggle to proletarian revolution, and
denies that it has abandoned the Marxist theory of the state,
whereas revisionists make no bones about their abandonment of it.
Only those bewitched by words can fail to distinguish between
Bernsteinian revisionism which has no place in the Fourth Inter-

44

national, and the "revisionism" of those who differ with us on the
Soviet Union but who do have a place in the Fourth International
and actually have a place in several of the parties of the Fourth
International.

9. Another argument against unity is that the "petty-bour-
geois" opposition has continued to move further and further away
from us since the split. This abstract spatial metaphor is not a
valid political proposition. It is true that several political differ-
ences have arisen in the past five years between the position of
our party and that of the WP, but neither singly nor together are
they a bar to unity. There are differences on the question of ma-
terial aid to China; on some phases of our military policy; on our
attitude to the Stalinist parties; differences on the national ques-
tion in Europe during the Nazi occupation may also still exist to ^
a certain extent. But differences on all these questions must be
expected with comrades in our own or sister parties of the Fourth
International. They are not questions upon which difference of
opinion can be expected to lead to a split, assuming the disputants
to be genuine Bolsheviks and sensible. On some of these questions
we had differences in our own ranks and no serious factional
struggle resulted. Moreover, many of those in the WP who differ
with us on these questions would be influenced by our arguments
were they to be in our party; much of these differences can be
laid to the existence of two separate parties. Perhaps also many
of our comrades would be influenced by the arguments of the
Workers Party comrades if they returned, but this is natural and
to be expected. He who objects to unity on the ground of these
differences and possible future differences will only find satisfac-
tion in a monolithic party, a party without differences, which in
reality would not be a party at all.

10. Another argument against unity is that the very fact that
the "petty-bourgeois opposition" split from us shows they do not
belong in the same party with us. This argument amounts to
saying that once we have split there should never be unity again.
It is completely alien to the method of Trotsky, who so often
attempted to heal splits in the parties of the Fourth International.
Following earlier unsuccessful attempts by Trotsky, our French
comrades have recently succeeded in healing a nine-year split
with the Molinierists. Our Belgium comrades have again offered
unity to the Vereecken group, with whom they have more long-
standing and far deeper differences than we have with the Work-
ers Party. The fact that the comrades of the WP split from us is
irrelevant to the question of unity now.

Factor in the Split

11. The Political Committee insists on continuing to character-
ize the WP as "petty-bourgeois" and to use that as an argument
against unity. "When did they change?" is the argument against
those who say that unity is possible now. A date is demanded of

45^<

us. We cannot give it, but we can indicate precisely in what the
change consists.

(a) Our characterization of them as "petty-bourgeois" was
based mainly on the fact that we considered they had yielded to
bourgeois-democratic pressure in abandoning the defense of the
Soviet Union during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact when
bourgeois-democratic public opinion was hostile to the Soviet
Union. But had they continued to yield to democratic public opin-
ion, they would not have adopted q Leninist position on the war,
a position which Indicated thai the comrades of the WP were
capable of resisting Ear greater pressure than was exerted during
the Stalin-Hitler pact.

(b) In the split Burnham was the ideological leader of the
petty-bourgeois opposition. But Burnham left the WP and with
him also a small group influenced by his anti-Marxist theories;
likewise, Macdonald, an anti-Bolshevik, did not find himself at
home in the WP. The departure of these elements was an impor-
tant factor in permitting the group to remain on the fundamental
position of the Fourth International instead of taking the path
first indicated by Burnham.

(c) During the war the petty-bourgeois elements in the WP
found jobs in industry and many of them had their first experi-
ence in fighting in the ranks of organized workers. They undoubt-
edly made many mistakes because of inexperience, but we cannot
deny their seriousness of purpose and their devotion to the labor
movement. We can also expect that the large number of their
members drafted into the army have undergone a significant
transformation through their experience with masses in the war.

These are the specific changes which answer the formalistic
question as to when the WP ceased to be a petty-bourgeois group.

12. Even if it had remained a petty-bourgeois group, that
would be no principled obstacle to unity, for even when we char-
acterized them as a petty-bourgeois opposition the party was will-
ing to keep them in its ranks. Although the organizational ques-
tion was raised in the form of an indictment of the Cannon re-
gime as a bureaucratic-conservative tendency, and although that
question played an important role in the struggle culminating in
the split, the basis of the struggle was the question of the defense
of the Soviet Union. Under the guidance of Trotsky, we took the
position that a split on this question was not justified; that it was
possible and desirable for the minority to accept discipline in
action and to strive further to win the majority of the member-
ship to its point of view. Trotsky proposed that the minority be
given guarantees that factions would not be prohibited; that no
restrictions would be imposed on factional activity other than
those dictated by the necessity for common action; that the min-
ority could choose to have an internal bulletin of its own or a
common one with the majority. The minority demanded the right
to publish a public newspaper agitating against the party posi-

46

tion. This right the majority rejected as irreconcilable with Bol-
shevik procedure. The split occurred because the minority violated
the convention decision denying it permission to publish a public
organ. { - f

13. It is clear from the facts that led to the split that either
the elimination by history of the question of the defense of the
Soviet Union or a willingness on the part of the comrades of the
WP to accept the conditions proposed by Trotsky to avoid the split
should lead to a serious attempt at re-unification.

14. The question of the defense of the Soviet Union has not
been eliminated by history, but it is no longer the burning ques-
tion that it was in 1940. The burning question today is the defense
of the European revolution from Stalin, on which both parties
agree. This creates the possibility of working together again in
one party. No one can say if and when we are likely to bring to
the fore again the slogan of defense of the USSR. The variant of
a fairly long term of peace between the imperialists and Stalin
is more likely to occur than the variant of war. At any rate, it is
necessary to invite the WP comrades to re-enter our ranks, offer-
ing them the same conditions that we were willing to offer them
in order to avoid the split.

The Issue of Unity

15. How the WP will react to such an invitation is not certain.
The important thing is to work out a correct line for our party
on this question: to invite the WP to unite with us on the same
conditions we offered in 1940. We shall benefit no matter what
attitude the WP takes. A refusal on its part can be utilized to tear
away some Of their supporters within and outside their party.
Acceptance means increasing our membership by several hundred
among whom are capable comrades with many years of experi-
ence in the revolutionary movement. It means eliminating a party
whose existence side by side with ours causes much confusion.

16. An attitude which condemns those who split to permanent
separation from the party regardless of their loyalty to the revo-
lution, is incompatible with the true spirit of Bolshevism. In the
course of building a Bolshevik party, sharp differences of opinion,
even bitter struggle and splits, are almost unavoidable. Unifica-
tion after a split, when tempers have cooled, when events have
eliminated or pushed to the background the cause of the contro-
versy, is just as obligatory as refraining from splitting. We cor-
rectly characterized the split as a criminal blunder against the
movement, but that does not justify us in forever barring the
door to those who left us.

17. The unwillingness to unite with comrades who have dif-
ferent opinions has nothing in common with Bolshevism. Such
unwillingness bases itself on the concept of a monolithic party
whose leaders, while granting formal democratic rights of discus-
sion, do not in reality, conceive differences of opinion and discus-

47 *

sion of the differences as a method of building a healthy Bolshevik
party. They do not have confidence in their ability to convince
intelligent revolutionists: they depend upon blind followers. Build-
ing the party to them is to create a machine with a membership
that is docile and accepts unquestioningly the directives of the
leaders. The question of unification with the comrades of the WP
is thus of enormous symptomatic importance in determining the
kind of party we want to build. The party's decision will be a
touchstone indicating the direction in which we shall henceforth
move.

—GOLDMAN.

MORROW.

WILLIAMS.

APPENDIX D

Statement on Unity by the National Committee
of the WP

1. The National Committee of the Workers Party takes note
of the fact that a minority group of the Socialist Workers Party,
led by Comrades Goldman, Morrow and Williams, has presented
a resolution to the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers
Party in favor of the unification of that party with the Workers
Party. The principal ground given in the resolution for unifica-
tion of the two parties is that the main political question in dis-
pute in 1939-40, which led to the split in the Socialist Workers
Party and the formation of the Workers Party, namely, the dif-
ference over the slogan of "unconditional defense of the Soviet
Union," is today no longer as acute and topical as it was when
the dispute first arose; and that the two parties today have a
similar position on the main task in Europe, namely, defense of
the European Revolution from the threat of Stalinism and Anglo-
American imperialism.

2. The National Committee also take's note of the fact that the
Socialist Workers Party itself has officially taken the view that
the slogan of "unconditional defense of the Soviet Union" does
not, at the present time, occupy the prominent position it was
given at the beginning of the war, that it has receded into the
background.

3. The Workers Party stands for strengthening the forces of
the Fourth International in all countries, the United States in-
cluded. Therefore, it also stands for the unity of the Fourth
Internationalists in this country in a manner and on a basis cal-
culated to give the greatest assurances of healthy progress.

4. We are obliged to record our disagreement with the motiva-
tion for the modification of the Socialist Workers Party's position
on the defense of Russia in the war. It is also well known that we

48

\

still have important differences with the Socialist Workers Party
on a number of political and theoretical questions. However, the
range of these differences do not go beyond what is permissible
within the ranks of a single revolutionary party s Furthermore,
our estimate and criticism of the official regime maintained by
the representatives of the majority in the Socialist Workers Party
has not been changed. The fact that these representatives are
now so categorically opposed to unity with the Workers Party,
as well as their opposition to any united action with the Workers
Party, is confirmation of our estimate. Nevertheless, the interests
of uniting the Fourth Internationalists in the United States on a
sound foundation are more important than the regime in the
Socialist Workers Party.

5. The Workers Party is therefore prepared to discuss the
question of unity with the Socialist Workers Party.

6. However, our National Committee proposes that, in order to
test the practical possibilities of living and working together
harmoniously in one united Party, as well as to promote the com-
mon cause in the working class and the labor movement, the
Workers Party and the Socialist Workers Party, through their
National Committees, should arrange for joint consultation and
cooperation in all fields — trade union, political, defense, etc. —
where it is possible, necessary and fruitful.

— National Committee, Workers Party
MAX SHACHTMAN, Secretary

APPENDIX E

Reply of SWP to Statement on Unity of the WP

Max Shachtman, National Secretary
Workers Party
New York, N. Y.
Dear Comrades:

Your letter of August 22 with the enclosed statement of your
National Committee "On the Unification of the Workers Party
and the Socialist Workers Party" has been received and discussed
by our Political Committee. We especially note your declaration,
in Point 5 of your statement, that the Workers Party is "prepared
to discuss the question of unity with the Socialist Workers Party."
We are in favor of such a discussion and will so recommend to the
next Plenum of our National Committee.

In view of the sharp conflicts which resulted in the split be-
tween us and the formation of your own organization five years
ago, and in view of the deep differences which have separated us
since, we believe that the National Committee's consideration of
the question will be facilitated if you will indicate more precisely

4*

and more concretely your view of how the unification is to De
brought about and what form it should take.

We have always proceeded from the point of view that pro-
grammatic agreement on the most important and decisive ques-
tions is the only sound basis for unification; and that, when
divergences of opinion occur, unity can be maintained only by the
scrupulous observance of the democratic principle of the subordi-
nation of the minority to the majority and strict discipline in pub-
lic activity and action.

If, in the course of the discussion, it appears that we are
approaching agreement on the most Importanl political questions,
as well as upon the organizational principle referred to above,
and that unification is a realistic perspective, then systematic
joint consultation and plans for the cooperation of the two or-
ganizations for the carrying out of practical work pending the
formal unification, would follow as a matter of course. But to
attempt to begin with such practical cooperation, prior to a defi-
nite approach to unification, would seem to us to put things up-
side down and lead to a sharpening of conflicts over secondary
questions rather than to their moderation. In our view, "the prac-
tical possibilities of living and working together harmoniously"
flow naturally and inevitably from a basic agreement on the fun-
damental questions, not vice versa. Friction and conflict arise
from political disagreement rather than from personal incompati-
bility. In the long run, the latter is always subordinated to the
former.

In our opinion, the question of unification must be discussed
with complete frankness and seriousness. The aim must be to
effect a genuine unification on a firm and long-lasting basis. We,
for our part, believe that unity would be a good thing if it is
firmly based and leads to the strengthening of the party and the
building up of the party. On the other hand, a unification fol-
lowed by a sharp faction fight and another split would be highly
injurious to the party.

The views set forth above are designed to give a concrete basis
to the preliminary discussions between us. Naturally, we are
perfectly willing to hear and consider any different form of pre-
liminary approach which you may wish to make. If you think that
any exploratory verbal discussion would facilitate the preparation
and organization of the agenda for a thorough-going considera-
tion of the whole problem of unification in all its aspects, a sub-
committee of our PC is prepared to meet with you for such a pre-
liminary discussion. Such a meeting can be arranged on short
notice by a telephone call to Comrade Stein, Organizational Secre-
tary, at the National Office of the SWP.

Yours fraternally,

J. P. CANNON,
National Secretary,
August 28, 1945. Socialist Workers Party.

50

APPENDIX F

Reply of Workers Party to SWP Letter

James P. Cannon, National Secretary
Socialist Workers Party
New York, N. Y.
Dear Comrade:

Our Political Committee has discussed your letter of August
28 on the question of the unification of the Socialist Workers
Party and the Workers Party, and wishes to place before you its
views on the matters dealt with in your communication.

We have taken note, first of all, of your statement that you are
in favor of a discussion on the question of unification of the two
parties and will so recommend to the next Plenum of your Na-
tional Committee. We have no doubt that such a discussion, car-
ried on with the candor and seriousness to which you refer, and
animated by a mutual desire to reach speedily the solid basis for
unity which we believe exists, can result in the consolidation of a
strong and healthy party of the Fourth International in the
United States, with stimulating effects upon the movement in
every other country. The reasons for this conviction have already
been stated in a general way in the Resolution on Unity adopted
by our National Committee and sent to you on August 22.

To us, the central question to settle is the basis for unification,
which, in the concrete case, is the question of the basis for the
revolutionary Marxian party. You state in your letter that the
Socialist Workers Party has "always proceeded from the point of
view that programmatic agreement on the most important and
decisive questions is the only sound basis for unification." As we
have understood this conception, which applies not only to the
basis for unification between two revolutionary organizations but
in general to the basis for the existence and functioning of a revo-
lutionary party, we are able to subscribe to your formula. In the
present case, however, the concrete meaning of the formula is
not sufficiently clear to us. The ambiguity to which it lends itself
is heightened in our minds precisely because of what you call
"the split between us and the formation of your own organization
five years ago, and . . . the deep differences which have separated
us since,"

If, by "programmatic agreement on the most important and
decisive questions," you refer to agreement with the fundamental
principles of Marxism and the basic program of the Fourth Inter-
national as worked out in the whole period, that is one matter.
In that case, any preliminary discussion between us could only
establish the fact that on this plane, the plane of basic program
and principle, the two parties are close enough in their positions
to require and justify immediate unification, on grounds similar
to those which made their membership in one party possible and

desirable in the period prior to the split. We are quite prepared
to engage in such a discussion, but our knowledge of the similarity .
of position of the two parties on this plane, as revealed in their
public documents, causes us to regard such a discussion as a
formality.

In other words, we feel, for our part, that an extensive dis-
cussion for the purpose of establishing "that we are approaching
agreement" on such basic questions is not essential. On these
basic questions, sufficient agreement, already exists to warrant
unification, and a discussion could only record that fact.

If, however, "programmatic agreement" refers to agreement
on those theoretical, political and even organizational questions
that have divided us in the past, that seems to us to be a different
matter. The differences between the two parties on these ques-
tions are not less well-known than the points of agreement. They
relate to such questions as the class character of the Russian
state; the slogan of "unconditional defense of the Soviet Union,"
the application of the Leninist theory on the national question to
the world today, in particular to Europe; aspects of the military
policy of the revolutionary party; application of the principle of
democratic centralism and the question of party regime; and a
number of questions of lesser prominence and significance. In
some instances, these are differences between our party and
yours; in others, it has not always been clear whether our differ-
ences are with positions officially taken by the Socialist Workers
Party or only by individual party representatives. But even if in
every instance, the specific differences were between the two par-
ties officially, that would not, in our view, rule out unification.
Our position on this point has already been set forth with suffi-
cient clarity in the Resolution of our National Committee. We
reiterate it here:

The differences that do exist between the two parties are not,
singly or severally, of a nature that is impermissible within the
framework of one revolutionary Marxist party. It is possible for
the two parties to unite now into one, despite these differences,
because, as our Resolution states, first, there is a sufficient funda-
mental agreement in principle between them, and second, the main
political difference which engendered the original separation into
two parties, namely, the question of "unconditional defense of
the Soviet Union," does not now have the same acuteness or
prominence that it had at the beginning of the war, according to
the declarations of the Socialist Workers Party.

These facts, too, we believe, could only be recorded by a more
detailed discussion between representatives of the two parties.
From that standpoint, such a discussion would be profitable. By
means of a discussion, to be sure, the character, scope and means
of regulating (eventually, disposing of) these differences could
be established more precisely. But in view of the lengthy period
over which these differences have developed, and the vast docu-

52

mwntary material presented on them by both sides, it is, of course,
most unlikely that they could be eliminated in one, or even two
or three such preliminary meetings, and a completely common
point of view worked out.

The fact cannot be ignored that we have the same firmness and
depth of conviction about the views we hold on a number of theo-
retical and political questions as the comrades of the SWP have
of their views. It is not to be denied, either, that these views re-
late to significant and important questions. Furthermore, we are
the last to minimize the importance of political and theoretical
questions, and of taking a correct position on them.

We do not regard this as a hindrance to early unification,
however. As all of us in the movement have held, a "monolithic"
party is neither possible nor desirable. In the history of the
Fourth International, there have been, and still are, sections in
which the differences on certain theoretical and political questions
were greater than those which today divide the Socialist Workers
Party and the Workers Party. It might be agreed that within the
Workers Party itself, we regard as entirely permissible the ex-
istence of differences in some controversial questions, which are
not less important than those which, on other questions separate
us from the SWP. We not only believe that our differences with
the SWP today are of such a nature as are quite permissible
within the limits of a united revolutionary party, but that they
can be fruitfully debated and best settled by means of comradely
discussion, organized and conducted in the best traditions of demo-
cratic centralism, within the ranks of one party.

These views, if we may repeat, make up our conception of the
basis for unification and the basis for the revolutionary party in
general. If your views are the same as ours on this score, or
similar to ours, we would consider that very little remains for the
achievement of unity beyond the discussion and settlement of
practical organizational steps. Moreover, agreement on this would
dispel any impression that the indispensable pre-condition for
unification of two revolutionary Marxist groups is an agreement
on every theoretical, political and organizational question. How-
ever, if your conception differs in any important respect from
ours, we are prepared to discuss it with the necessary objectivity.
A precise formulation by you would make it possible for us to
express a precise opinion.

There remain three points which are dealt with in your letter.
To the statement quoted above, you add : "... when divergences
of opinion occur, unity can be maintained only by the scrupulous
observance of the democratic principle of the subordination of
the minority to the majority and strict discipline in public activity
and action." To this point of view, too, we subscribe. We have
maintained this view throughout the existence of the Workers
Party. We would of course continue to maintain it within the
united party. To this view, we join the view, likewise well-estab-

5>

lished in the revolutionary Marxian movement, that a minority
has the right and even the duty to disseminate and defend its
special point of view in the party, and that the majority — pre-
cisely because it is the majority and therefore mainly responsible
for the leadership and integrity of the organization — has the spe-
cial obligation to protect the rights of a minority as a function of
its obligation to preserve the rights and Interests of the party as
a whole.

Having these conceptions, we believe that a "genuine unifica-
tion on a firm and lung lasting basis" is possible. It goes without
saying that wo share the view that a "unification followed by a
sharp faction fight and another split would be highly injurious to
the party." No serious comrade could contemplate a unification
of this kind. A faction fight of any sort, much less a split, follow-
ing the unification, would compromise both the party and those
responsible for such lamentable consequences of the unity. In any
case, it seems to us, the unification would have to be followed by a
period of intensive common activity in the class struggle, during
which — while the opinions and rights of any minority would be
respected and protected — factionalism, mutual recrimination, and
judgments of the old division would be abjured.

On the basis of the foregoing, we have no difficulty in meeting
your request that we indicate more precisely and more concretely
our view of how the unification is to be brought about and what
form it should take.

Once it is agreed that there is sufficient accord in our positions
on the fundamental principles of Marxism to make possible
and justify unity; once it is agreed that the differences we do
have (which we do not wish to conceal) are of a nature that may
exist within the ranks of a single revolutionary party — the only
important point left is the discussion of the practical organiza-
tional steps for fusing the two parties into one.

If the comrades of the Socialist Workers Party feel that a pre-
liminary exchange of opinions, especially on controversial ques-
tions, would make for a better and more fruitful understanding
of the respective views among the membership of the two parties,
and would contribute to a smoother passage to a healthy unity,
we are ready to consider the publication under the joint auspices
of the two Committees of a discussion bulletin open to both organ-
izations. If this measure is considered superfluous, and the Social-
ist Workers Party is of the opinion that a discussion of contro-
versial questions is, under the circumstances, better held after
the unity, the decision is in its hands. In that case, representative
Committees of the two parties could, as is customary, arrange the
details of the fusion. A National Committee could be set up sub-
ject to review by the first convention of the united party; simi-
larly in the case of officers of the party. The question of merging
the two theoretical and popular organs could also be settled by the
two negotiating Committees.

54

In our case, as we suppose, in the case of the Socialist, Work
ers Party, all these^ proposals, if agreed upon by the Committees
of the two parties, would be subject to the preliminary approval
of a National Convention.

One further point, in conclusion. We find that we do not agree
with your statement on the possibility or expediency of practical
collaboration in a number of fields, to be carried on between now
and the eventual union of the two parties.

You say that "to attempt to begin with such practical cooper-
ation, prior to a definite approach to unification, would seem to
put things upside down and lead to a sharpening of conflicts over
secondary questions rather than to their moderation."

We call your attention, first, to the fact that it is not practical
collaboration that we are beginning with. Both organizations have
already begun with the question of unification, the Workers Party
by its Resolution in favor of unification and the Socialist Workers
Party by its decision in favor of discussing unification. The fact
that both parties envisage unification as a practical possibility —
and unless they did, further discussion would be superfluous or
deceptive, — creates, in our view, the basis for considering, now,
agreements for practical collaboration in specific, concrete fields
of work. Second, it is difficult for us to see why such collaboration
would necessarily, or at all, lead to a sharpening of conflicts.

On some questions there are, it is true, differences in theory.
But we have always held that it is precisely in those cases where
there is a difference in theory or program between two proletarian
organizations, and not contrariwise, that practical collaboration
is necessary and possible — provided, of course, that the two organ-
izations have a similar standpoint or aim in the practical step.
Such collaboration is not less indicated between organizations
with a similar program. It is certainly ten times more warranted
in the case of two organizations which have already commenced
to discuss the question of unity between themselves.

Naturally, when there are specific political disagreements on
actual tasks, tasks of the day, practical collaboration is not pos-
sible between the organizations involved. For example, we cannot
today have practical collaboration between the parties on the ques-
tion of the election in Detroit. But the two parties can, even now,
we are convinced, reach a high measure of fruitful collaboration
in such matters as a joint fight, or joint consultation in the fight,
for those slogans and aims which we put forward in much the
same way in the trade unions. Similar practical collaboration is
possible and desirable in the case of the New York municipal
elections; in the case of united action against fascists like Smith
and Winrod; in the case of joint efforts on behalf of our comrades
of the Fourth International abroad; etc., etc.

For these reasons, we request that you reconsider your posi-
tion.

* * *

55 „

We have set forth our views on a number of questions as plain-
ly as we can, with the aim of clearing all obstacles off the road
to unity and without concealing: our differences in general or our
differences, to the extent that they exist, on the question of unity
itself. It is quite possible that we have failed to express ourselves
on all questions with the necessary clarity, or have failed to deal
with all the questions of importance. If that proves to be so, in
your view, we are prepared upon request to elaborate our views
on any point germane to the question of unification. We are ready
to deal with any such points in further correspondence, or orally
in a meeting with the sub-committee appointed by your Political
Committee. Meanwhile, we await your reply to the present com-
munication.

Yours fraternally,

MAX SHACHTMAN,
National Secretary,
Workers Party.
September 15, 1945.

APPENDIX G

Statement on Unity by October Plenum of SWP

Max Shachtman, National Secretary
Workers Party
New York, N. Y.
Dear Comrade:

Your two letters dated September 15 and October 4, together
with the resolution of your Active Workers Conference as well as
a report of the oral discussions between the sub-committee of our
PC and a corresponding sub-committee of your organization were
submitted and discussed at the Plenum of the National Committee
held October 6 and 7.

I am sending you herewith a copy of the resolution adopted by
the Plenum.

Yours fraternally,

J. P. CANNON,
National Secretary.
October 10, 1945.

•

1. The proposal for unification made by the Workers Party to
the Socialist Workers Party comes after more than five years of
bitter hostility and struggle between the two organizations.

2. The split in 1940 was preceded by a protracted factional
fight which involved not only the position of the Fourth Inter-
national on the Russian question but the most fundamental ques-
tions of our movement: Marxist theory, tradition, political pro-

56

gram, methods of party-building, the party regime, etc. The issues
in this historic struggle have been explained and amply docu-
mented in the two books: In Defense of Marxism and The Stnuj-
gle for a Proletarian Party.

3. Our characterization of the petty bourgeois tendency repre-
sented by the faction which later became the WP was not predi-
cated solely upon their view of the nature of the USSR and their
attitude toward its defense but upon their rejection of the theory,
methods and traditions of Marxism, a rejection which was rooted
in their social composition and direction. Trotsky wrote : "We, too,
have attempted above to prove that the issue concerns not only
the Russian problems but even more the opposition's method of
thought, which has its social roots. The opposition is under the
sway of petty bourgeois moods and tendencies. This is the essence
of the whole matter." (In Defense of Marxism, page 59, our
italics.)

4. The 1940 split which gave birth to the WP was a heavy blow
aimed at the Trotskyist movement in the United States and
throughout the world. The petty bourgeois faction split our party
at a time of grave social tension and crisis preceding the entry of
the United States- into the war, when every revolutionist had the
responsibility of remaining at his post and adhering without com-
promise to the positions of the Fourth International. This split
broke away forty per cent of the membership from our party and
served to disorient and miseducate many potentially excellent
revolutionists. During the ensuing five years the WP has pursued
the policy of irreconcilable antagonism toward the SWP with the
object of discrediting, undermining and overthrowing it as the
vanguard of the American working class.

5. Despite this, the SWP has not only recouped the numerical
losses suffered in the split, but under the adverse conditions of
the war has made considerable gains in numbers, influence and
prestige. It has become genuinely proletarian both in membership
and in its predominant leadership. It is deeply rooted in the mass
labor movement. Its ranks have become ideologically homogeneous
and steeled in the fires of the class struggle.

6. As a result of the successes scored and the experiences un-
dergone during the war, the ranks of the SWP face the coming
period with unlimited confidence in the prospects of the party and
its eventual development into the mass revolutionary party of the
American workers. The objective conditions are extremely favor-
able for the rapid growth of our party. The profound revulsion
of the peoples all over the world against the consequences of war ;
the resultant radicalization of the masses; the growing militancy
of the American workers expressed in the present national strike
wave — are bound to accelerate the expansion of our party in all
spheres. The response of the workers to The Militant, the steadily
rising rate of recruitment, the establishment of new branches,
and the extension of our influence in the key unions are sure signs
of this trend. ^

57 LIBRARY

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW Y08*
AT ST9NY SRQa&

The Workers Party, by contrast, has shown no ability to
grow and attract workers in significant numbers. It has gained
no significant influence in the labor movement. The disproportion
in the numerical strength of the two parties is growing from
month to month.

After more than five years of warfare against the SWP in an
attempt to supplant it, the Workers Party has come forward with
the proposal for uniting the two organizations. This action marks
a significant turn in their polity ami opens a new stage in the
relations between the two tendencies.

9. In view of this change in the situation, the Political Com-
mittee of the SWI' expressed its willingness to consider and dis-
cuss the question of unification in all its aspects. Its reply of
August 27, 1945, to the letter of the WP stated that "unity would
be a good thing if it is firmly based and leads to the strengthening
of the party and the building up of the party. On the other hand,
a unification followed by a sharp faction fight and another split
would be highly injurious to the party."

10. Unifications, like splits, are the most serious steps in the
life of a revolutionary party. Neither the one nor the other should
be undertaken light-mindedly or precipitately, without the most
scrupulous survey of all the circumstances and the most careful
calculation of the consequences. The advantages and disadvan-
tages of such a move must be carefully appraised in the light of
the tasks and perspectives of the party at the given stage of its
development. A poorly prepared and ill-considered unification
could easily paralyze the work of the party, provoke a new out-
burst of factional animosity and lead toward a new split.

11. The PC pointed out in its letter: "We have always pro-
ceeded from the point of view that programmatic agreement on
the most important and decisive questions is the only sound basis
for unification." That has been the basis of all previous unifica-
tions in the Marxist movement. It is clear that such a basis for
unification does not exist in the present instance. Both parties
acknowledge that the programmatic differences which led to the
1940 split have not been moderated but that, on the contrary,
some of them have been deepened and new important points of
divergence have developed in the interim.

12. Thus we are confronted by the proposition of uniting into
a common organization two tendencies with sharply divergent
political points of view on many questions and sharply conflicting
theories of party organization. This proposed unity without pro-
grammatic agreement, in fact with acknowledged disagreements
between the two tendencies, has no precedent, so far as we know
in the history of the international Marxist movement. In prelimi-
nary discussions between representative sub-committees of the
two organizations, the delegates of the WP emphasized their in-
tention to come into the united party as a separate and distinct
tendency. They stated, furthermore, that they would insist on the

58

right to publish their own discussion bulletin under
control.

13. Can we contemplate, nevertheless, a unification of theTtwo
organizations despite the important differences that exist on po-
litical and organizational questions? In other words, are the dif-
ferences compatible inside of one Leninist party? We have taken
the position that this question cannot be determined by any ab-
stract rule, it can only be answered concretely. Five years ago, the
faction which later became the Workers Party decided that the
differences were not compatible with remaining inside the SWP.
In the five years that have elapsed, life again proved the differ-
ences incompatible, as the WP carried on unremitting warfare
against our organization, our principles, our methods, our leader-
ship. Has the WP sufficiently changed to make these differences
compatible inside our party today? In other words, can a genuine
unity be effected with the WP, as distinct from a purely formal
unity which would actually mean two parties under one roof with
a new split in prospect? This can only be answered with sufficient
concreteness after the most thorough-going discussion and prob-
ing of all differences to the bottom.

14. The extraordinary nature of this unity proposal makes it
all the more imperative that all the programmatic questions in
dispute be thoroughly clarified and all the differences between the
two parties probed to the depth so that not the slightest ambiguity
remains. This preliminary work of ideological clarification and
demarcation is the indispensable precondition for any definitive
disposition of the proposal for unity and a correct settlement of
the relations between the SWP and WP.

15. To this end, this Plenum of the National Committee con-
vened for the special purpose of considering this question there-
fore resolves:

a) To endorse the letter and actions of the Political Committee
in response to the letter from the WP;

b) To authorize the Political Committee to prepare and carry
through a thorough discussion and clarification of the theoretical,
political and organizational issues in dispute, and fix the position
of the party precisely on every point in preparation for the con-
sideration and action of the next party convention ;

c) To reject any united front for propaganda. The SWP must
continue to conduct its propagandistic activities in its own name
and under its own banner and utilize these activities to aid direct
recruitment of new members into the SWP. At the same time, the
Plenum authorizes the Political Committee to invite the WP to
collaborate with our party in practical actions in those cases,
where in the judgment of the Political Committee, such collabora-
tion would be advantageous in serving practical ends without
blurring or compromising political lines.

59 *

APPENDIX H

Resolution Submitted by SWP Minority
to October Plenum

Plenum Resolution on Unity with the Workers Party

1. The Plenum declares that the Socialist, Worki i I
the Workers Party are sufficiently in agreement on lui
to require and justify unity. The political differom •
two are compatible with membership in one revolul m

2. The Workers Party resolution and letters on mill
tute a significant change in the policy of that group III
had justified its split and continued separation from Lin
two grounds: (1) Its opposition to the SWP's dolVii
Soviet Union, (2) the bureaucratic regime in the SWP i
as the question of defense of the Soviet Union recodttd
background, the WP had based its entire justification Cm
existence on the regime in the SWP. Now, however. I In
compelled to admit that it cannot continue to defend III I
it states that "the interests of uniting the Fourth lnt< rn
ists in the United States on a sound foundation are mori
tant than the regime in the SWP." When the WP now i
the political and theoretical differences "do not go bi»j i
permissible within the ranks of a single revolutiomu
is at last accepting the position laid down by our purl
time of the split in 1940.

3. In the united party, the present program of tho HV\ i
prevail, by virtue of the fact that we, as the WP admit
tute the majority. The WP's communications to us cxplii III
ognize the principle of democratic centralism, thus plrdi
as a minority it will be bound by discipline in action,

4. These commitments clear the path of practically nil
cles to unity except one. The remaining obstacle is a 1'em
by many of our members and perhaps also by membi

WP. The factional strife of 1939-40, the split and il

five-years of separate existence have left deep scar, li |
able to eradicate this subjective element before fonunllj
mating unity.

5. We believe the necessary spirit of unity can l>e ci
period of collaboration and cooperation prior to unillcnt
ing declared ourselves for unity, such collaboration and •
tion is conceived by us, not as a united front between
a perspective of separate existence, but as concrete
for unity. Among the preparations there shall he join I

ship meetings, joint discussion bulletins, joint puhli

collaboration in trade union work and other field: oJ

6. The comrades of the WP have asked recognil i

right to publish a bulletin of their own within tl I ml ,

60

right of any tendency in a Trotskyist party is taken for

But to recognize such a right and for comrades to

It, are two different things. Normally, where the party

ill adequate opportunity for discussion in bulletins and the

Llcul organ, the interests of the party as a whole and of the

H are better served by refraining from publishing a sepa-

Itulletin.

, While we explicitly recognize the right of any group within

to have its own bulletin if it so desires, we urge the

of the WP to refrain from exercising this right under

Iven circumstances in order to achieve unity on a proper

We guarantee them ample opportunity to present their

of view.

However, both we and the comrades of the WP will be in a
I position to decide this question at the end of the period of

„ and collaboration. We therefore propose to leave the

i i ion on it until the final steps for consummation of unity,
fie understanding that we do not make it a condition of unity
i he comrades of the WP refrain from issuing their own

Lin,

In view of the above decisions, the Plenum considers that
il a l>asis for collaboration between the majority and mi-
ni the SWP in effecting the steps toward unity with the
The Plenum therefore accepts the offer of the minority to
ihorate in this task and instructs the Political Committee to
presentation to the minority on the negotiating committee.
Plenum takes note of the statement of the minority that,
formed its faction on the issue of unity, it will dissolve its
when unity is consummated, leaving the remaining dif-
fer discussion on the plane of tendency, articles and lec-
in the party organs and branches.

BENNET,
GOLDMAN,
MORROW,
WILLIAMS.

APPENDIX I

Statement of Minority on the Cannon-Stein-Frank

Resolution at October Plenum

I. The resolution is designed to prevent unity. Opposition to

t v is the privilege of any comrade. What is reprehensible in

Cannon-Stein-Frank resolution is its refusal to answer any
, questions which are central to the unity proposal: its eva-
of an answer to the question whether or not the two parties
ufficiently in agreement on basic program to require and
iv unity; its evasion of an answer to the question whether

61 ~ f

or not the political differences between the two p»rtli
patible with membership in one party; its evasion oi n
the question whether or not the aim of the di

Workers Party is to ascertain more accurately the i I( w\ \\

tions of the WP or the aim is to attempt to get the \\ I ■ I
some of its political positions as a precondition ftn null
evasion of an answer to the question whether the Wl" pi
for a tendency bulletin in the united party is or is in. I i -
any tendency in a Trotskyist party.

In their speeches the supporters of the resolution proti
the difference between them and the minority is thai the ml
wants to rush speedily into unity whereas the majoritj
move more slowly. This is completely untrue.
Plenum resolution makes clear, we insist on a considering ,
of preparation for unity by means of cooperation between Hi
parties after a decision by our party in favor of unity. Till ,
of preparation is made necessary above all because the
leaders have prejudiced the membership against unitj

On the other hand, the position of the Cannoi
resolution is not one of moving more slowly toward unitj In
to move at all toward unity.

2. In paragraph 11 the resolution repeats the formul
vious majority documents that programmatic agrecmoi
basis for unification. We of the minority have vainly ulli
to get the majority to state unambiguously what it mean
(1) that the WP must abandon one or more of the pollHi
tions on which it differs from us— an absurd deman.l h
inconceivable that the WP will abandon its position on
sian question, the principal disputed issue; or (2) the I
proposition that the WP, as an admitted minority, mu I
the discipline of the majority program— which the Wl'
already agreed to do.

It was bad enough that the majority insisted ...
ambiguous formula in its first letter of August 27 a
unity proposal— bad since the minority had vainly all,
amend the letter to state that the political different
patible with membership in one party. It was wors<-

his speech of September 1, Comrade Cannon, despite a ,1

tion from Comrade Goldman, refused to specify whal I h«
meant by its ambiguous formula. It is nothing I.
rageous that the majority repeats this patently dislume
mty again now, after the WP negotiating committee h i
edly asked for clarification.

Comrade N. has reiterated the minority position n,
thousand times more important [than the question of ,|,
the USSR] is unification, rather than the existence <>l -
pendent groups who in the fundamentals march under 1 1,,
the same banner. The program of the minority | i •
known to the majority from the former's literature; tin
necessity to discuss it."

62

ll Hie authors of the resolution disagree with that position,

o in their resolution: let them say either that they

know the program of the WP and must now study it, or

thej know the program of the WP and it is in agreement

Ith u on fundamentals or that it is not; let them say whether

",• or do not agree that unification is more important

I he question of the slogan of the defense of the USSR.

\nynne who assumes to play any role as a leader in our party

I\ knows what the political differences are between our

mil the WP. Are these differences compatible with unity?

who thinks they are not compatible should have voted

i unity discussions with the WP. Conversely, anyone who

i"i unity discussions should have been ready to say that the

1 1 differences are compatible with unity. We are confronted

i monstrous paradox. In 1940 and thereafter we of the SWP

maintained that the political differences were compatible

party unity. Now the PC majority refuses to affirm our 1940

in. The argument justifying this refusal is absurd: "Five

fo, the faction which became the WP decided that the dif-

were not compatible with remaining inside the SWP. In

ears that have elapsed, life again proved the differences

mpatible " The WP was wrong when it considered that

tin differences were not compatible with remaining in the same
ind we and Trotsky said they were wrong, and we did not
Ion this position simply because "life," i.e., the mistake of
i In WP, led it to leave the party.

Why does the PC majority cling to its ambiguous formula

programmatic agreement? Is it possible that, after a period,

PC majority is going to confront us with "proof" that the

political differences make unity impossible? But such "proof"

already exist, since we all know what the political differences

in that case, in all honesty the PC majority should have said

with that it does not believe that the political premises

• i i for unity — more accurately, it should have continued to say

ifter the WP proposal for unity as it had said this previously.

In his September 1 speech "explaining" the PC letter's ambig-

on this question, Comrade Cannon claimed he was answering

question when he stated: "It is up to the WP to demonstrate

(he political differences are compatible with unity." Abso-

ilse : we have to determine this question for ourselves,

pendently of what the WP does or does not do.

Comarde Cannon went on to identify this question with the

ion. "Will the WP'ers be loyal this time?" i.e., will they abide

irty discipline. This is a different question. It is a legitimate

ion. In view of the attitude of the WP leaders in the split

■ It), it was necessary to put the question to them. An affirma-

wer to that question assures unity and the WP has an-

.1 it satisfactorily. But, before we asked the WP leaders to

.i that question, our party should have answered for itself

63 *<

the question whether the political differences are compuflbl
membership in one party. Otherwise, it is pointless to U I

leaders whether they will abide by party discipline ml. i

ask them any questions or conduct any discussion*.

Until the PC majority adopts the position that the pol
differences are compatible with party membership, the dan
continue to exist that the PC majority will, on the basi itl

already known to all of us, suddenly "discover" that the p

differences bar unity. In that case it would be clear to all 111

agreement to discuss with the WP was nothing 1ml a

designed to confuse the party and the International.

We demand an answer to this question. Is there null

agreement on the fundamentals of program to make unit;
sible and desirable? One can honestly answer yes or no
refuse to answer the question, after all that has transpln
clearly a subterfuge.

3. The result of this subterfuge is that we are asked i
on the absurd proposal of discussions with the WP witholil
principles laid down as to what shall be the basis for unil
our discussion sub-committee tell the WP negotiator thai
hitter's position on the Russian question is or is not a ba I I

No answer in the resolution. Shall our discussers Loll l In \\ r
negotiators that the aim of the discussions is to ascerl ill
differences, or that the aim is to get the WP to abandon II
tions? No answer in the resolution. Shall our discusser
the differences on organizational questions are or are nol u I.
unity? No answer. In a word, discussions are to 1m carrlwl •■>
without indicating to our discussers the basis on which th(
to discuss. What is the difference, then, between I ho pri
meetings of the Cannon-Stein-Frank committees with I ho \\ r
mittee, and those which presumably will follow the Plenum
previous meetings were characterized by the Cannon-Stci
committee as not negotiations but discussions since, lie
they had no authority to negotiate and no instruct inn; , , M
basis to negotiate. Future meetings, on the basis of thoii h
tion, will be no different than the previous ones. In thai i
call a Plenum and adopt a Plenum resolution? Why, ItkUmmI
cept to go through the motions of pretending to consider 1 1 ■< n
proposal seriously.

4. The WP negotiators have asked a series of key qxw ll
concerning the basis and purpose of the discussions. I
marize these in their letter of October 4 to the Plenum ami ><
quest of the Plenum that it answer these questions. Thej i i

an end be put by the Plenum to the situation where in I
committee is "in a position where it cannot and doci mil
any proposals of its own on the question of unity, when
express itself definitely on proposals made by us, and whoi'(
even unable to declare that the SWP has decided In
opposition to unity itself." They further ask the Plenum

64

. i Kiii "on the series of proposals made by us for the basis on

ih l he unification should be achieved...." These requests are

inly reasonable but one can hardly imagine how discussions

in continue without answering them. Yet the resolution evades

It will be an evasion of its duty if this Plenum closes with-

■ hi answering these proposals of the WP. One can accept them,

in reject them, but to evade them is politically indefensible.

The August 27 letter of our PC, in rejecting the WP pro-

lor cooperation between the two parties, stated it would

lo cooperation at a later date only "if, in the course of the

his, it appears that we are approaching agreement on the

I important political questions But to attempt to begin

ih such practical cooperation, prior to a definite approach to
• l ion, would seem to us to put things upside down and lead
i:npening of conflict over secondary questions rather than
i In ii moderation."

What, then, is the purpose of the resolution in proposing now

Invite the WP to collaborate with our party in practical ac-

in those cases where such collaboration would be advan-

ous in serving practical ends without blurring or compromis-

"ditical lines." According to the August 27 letter of the PC,

Uch cooperation would lead to a sharpening of conflicts unless

Llio fact was first established that we are approaching unification

litely. Now, without establishing this fact, the PC proposes

cooperation. Here is confusion worse confounded.

We bluntly warn the party and the International: Cooperation
ttftor a declaration for unity would prepare the memberships of
parties for unity, but the so-called limited cooperation with-
i inevious declaration for unity can very well serve the aim
til preventing unity. Under the given circumstances it is necessary
foi I hose who sincerely desire cooperation as preparation for unity
o. vote against the formula of cooperation without a declaration
in favor of unity.

Anyone who understands the ABC of politics knows that the

list 27 letter of the PC agreeing to discuss unity with the

\\ I' was a political victory for the PC minority, whose initiative

ted to this development. Quite apart from the principle of

i rity representation, those who initiated the unity proposal

- entitled to participate in the unity discussions. Yet the very
I'C- meeting which sent the letter to the WP also barred the
irity from the PC sub-committee which met with the WP.
And this was merely the forerunner of a renewed barrage

i l the minority which had dared to fight for unity.
In his September 1 speech explaining the PC letter on unity,

nade Cannon accused the minority: "Perhaps their new idea

first and then a bigger split." The "perhaps" does not
l his from being an outrageous accusation. Outrageous not
ly because it is not true, but because if the PC majority were
i on it, unity would be put off to the Greek Kalends. For if

65"

one does not accept the propositions of both the minority and thi
WP that the political differences are compatible with unity; thai

unity is more important than the regime; that iy can bl

achieved on a lasting basis — then no political criteria remain i<n
determining the aims of both I lie minority and the WP. Than
remains then only the capricioui and arbitrary pBychologl
of the PC majority concerning what I foing on In the mind
the minority and the WP. This approach has nothing in common
with Marxist polit

Superficially more pniii [cal wai < ' i ■»«!«• ( lannon'i I'm I he] dei

laration that before unity can take place, the party must fli i1

"stamp out disloyalty In the ranks and restori 'i 1 dpi In the

party." Certainly this would be true were there dl "i.l

indiscipline. But Comrade Cannon falsely applie the 1 term bO
the minority's fraternization and discussion with WP Lead*] and

members. We of the minority declare that tlO amount 0J lUOh
threats and abuse will swerve us from our politically correct
organizationally loyal policy of continuing to urge the WP I"
persist in its course toward unity despite all obstacles placed m
the way. To put off unity until after "stamping out" the pro u
minority is scarcely the prelude which would usher in unitj ' [I
is clear that the attack on the minority as "disloyal" is in n
an attack on unity.

This attack continues at the Plenum. It is "cleverly" left
of the resolution, which tries to assume a statesmanlike lone, luil
it is the main burden so far of all the speeches of the majoi 11
spokesman. On this question, too, we demand an end to amine mi
If the majority really means what it says, then let it adop
unambiguous rule governing the situation: one which would foi
bid the minority from discussing with the WP leaders. In llinl
case we would have to submit to the decision or leave the p
Such a ruling would be proof conclusive of the deep-going di
eration of the party leadership. But its verbal assertion i<> bhl
same effect is also such a proof.

7. It should be obvious to any political person that the abl urd
basis on which the discussions are left — on no basis excepl bh<
whims of the SWP discussers to drag out the talks endle
may soon prove unacceptable to the WP. With none of I hen pro
posals accepted, with no alternative proposals offered, with noth
ing decided by the Plenum, the WP may very well conclude
there is no point in continuing such formless di: < Thl

resolution appears aimed to test the patience of the \\ I' 111
ators to the breaking point by an endless series of pointlc
ings. In a word, it is calculated to throw responsibility fo]
ruption of discussions on the WP, whereas the realitj [1 th tl thl
course set by the resolution must inevitably lead to disruptlo
discussions. We brand this as trickery and declare thai II thi

66

resolution becomes party policy the responsibility for disruption

will be on the shoulders of this Plenum.

BENNETT,
GOLDMAN,
MORROW,
WILLIAMS.

October 7, 1945.

APPENDIX J

Reply of Workers Party to SWP Plenum Resolution

James P. Cannon, National Secretary
Socialist Workers Party
New York, N. Y.

Dear Comrade:

Our Political Committee has discussed the resolution adopted
by the Plenum of the National Committee of the Socialist Work-
ers Party on the question of unity. Before making a definitive
reply to this resolution, we wish to afford the SWP the oppor-
tunity to make clear to us its position on a number of points. They
relate to matters on which the resolution is either ambiguous or
erroneously motivated, or which it does not deal with at all.

Your resolution states that "Both parties acknowledge that
the programmatic differences which led to the 1940 split have not
been moderated but that, on the contrary, some of them have been
deepened and new important points of divergence have developed
In the interim." So far as any acknowledgment on the part of our
delegation to the preliminary discussions is concerned, this state-
I is erroneous, at least in part. The "programmatic differ-
ences which led to the 1940 split" were confined to the question
of the "unconditional defense of the Soviet Union" in the war.
Our delegation did not and could not acknowledge that the dif-
ference on this question has not moderated but deepened. On the
contrary, the first resolution on unity adopted by our National
1 'cimmittee took "note of the fact that the SWP itself has officially
taken the view that the slogan of 'unconditional defense of the
et Union' does not, at the present time, occupy the prominent
ion it was given at the beginning of the war, that it has
needed into the background." The only political difference in-
volved in the 1940 split was the one over unconditional defense of
>ia. If there were other, and programmatic, differences, they
not yet been brought to our attention. It is true that since
the split other differences have developed between the two organ-
ms. It is also true that on many questions these differences
deepened. We have not sought to conceal this fact or its
Importance. We emphasize at all times our attachment to our point
Of view. What we find it necessary to insist upon, however, is that

67 *

these differences, deep as they arc, are compatible with membei
ship in a revolutionary Marxist party, as contrasted with a ps
based on the concepl of monolithism.

Your resolution refers also to "This proposed unity withoill

programmatic agreement." it this refers, as ii seems t<> do, i t

proposal for unity, the Btatemenl la err >ous. We have indeed

mentioned in other documents our " import anl differences with the

SWP on a number of political and n 'etical questions." 11.

nevertheless, we declared thai units ' both desirable and possible!

it was, as stated In our letter to j >( September L6, because of

the "fad that on this plane, the plain' of basic i rram and prln

ciple, the two pariies are close >• gh In their posit to require

and justify immediate unification, on grounds Imilai to |!

which made their membership li i part] post Ible and do treble

in the period prior to the split." If it is your view HOW thai there
is no programmatic agreement between the two parlies, 01 m>
programmatic agreement worthy of significant consideration, an
explicit statement would contribute to the necessary clarification.

Your resolution states further that "This proposed unity with
out programmatic agreement, in fact with acknowledged d
ments between the two tendencies, has no precedent, so I'm a
know, in the history of the international Marxist movement." I hi
statement is also erroneous. Our delegation stated that it wiim
hard to recall an example of a similar unification between divei
gent tendencies in the international Trotskyist movement. Tin i
so largely because the Trotskyist movement was for so Ion
faction, formally or in fact, of what it considered the internati<
Marxist movement. However, this faction (tendency) repeatedly
proposed unity with the then international Marxist movemenl
(Comintern), which meant its unification with the Stalinisl

tion, that is, a tendency with which it had far less in comn n

any field than exists in common between the SWP and the WP

today. Furthermore, the international Marxist movement is i h

older than the modern Trotskyist movement. If the SWT Is con
cerned with precedent, the more than a hundred-year-old histoi
of the international Marxist movement offers any number oi
precedents of good and healthy unifications between group
tendencies with greater divergences than exist between oui

Your resolution concludes with the decision "To reject m
united front for propaganda." This statement is erroneout bi
cause it is misleading. It gives the impression that such mil
fronts have been proposed by the Workers Party. You mu I
aware of the fact that this is not the case. As we recall I hem. not
one of our proposals for united action between the two pai'tli
could be placed in the category of united fronts for pro]
All of them dealt with proposals for united action in different
fields of the class struggle. We proposed, for example, united
action in the Minneapolis defense case; in the tight, again i
cism (anti-Smith campaign); in the trade unions, mi audi qui

68

tions as all progressive unionists, let alone revolutionary Marx-
ists, can and do unite on; in the New York election campaign. We
reiterate our point of view on such practical agreements whether
or not unity between the two organizations is achieved.

A more important question is the question of unity itself. In
our letter to you, dated October 4, we made several specific re-
quests of your Plenum. Except perhaps for the last point, that
dealing with practical collaboration, we do not find in your reso-
lution a specific and precise reply.

We asked the Plenum to take steps to terminate the situation
where your delegation "cannot and does not make any proposals
of its own on the question of unity, where it cannot express itself
definitely on proposals made by us, and where it is even unable
to declare that the SWP has decided in favor of or in opposition to
unity itself."

Your resolution replies with a vigorous attack upon our party.
That is of course its right. The attack can and will be answered
in due course and in such a way as to promote clarity and under-
standing of the differences between the two tendencies.

But the resolution does not in any way inform us, or any other
reader, of the position of the SWP on the most important ques-
tions relating to unity, or even inform us as to whether or not
such a position has been taken.

Is the SWP now in favor of unity, or opposed to it? In the
preliminary discussions, we were informed by the SWP delega-
tion that the Plenum of its National Committee was convoked for
the purpose of giving an answer to precisely this question ; in fact,
that the date of your Plenum had been advanced to give the
earliest consideration to this question. We do not find the answer
in the resolution. At least, it is nowhere stated explicitly. We are
therefore obliged to conclude that the SWP has rejected the pro-
posal for unity, either as put forth by ourselves, by the minority
group in the SWP, or by anyone else, and to act on this conclusion
unless you indicate to us that we are in error.

Is the SWP now in a position to act on the concrete proposals
made by us on the question of unity? In the preliminary discus-
sions, your delegation pointed out that it was not authorized to do
so until its National Committee met and arrived at decisions. We
find no answer in the Plenum resolution to our proposals.

Our delegation stated our point of view as to the basis for the
unification. Summed up in one sentence, it is this: Sufficient pro-
■lammatic agreement actually exists between the two given or-
ganizations to warrant and make possible unity, and the differ-
ences that actually exist are compatible with membership in a
single revolutionary party. On this basic question, your resolution
takes no position except to say that it "cannot be determined by
any abstract rule, it can only be answered concretely." We remind
you that the question was not put by us abstractly, but quite con-
cretely. The nature and views of the two organizations are well

69 *

known to both, and could not be more concrete. Their range 03
agreement is as well known and as concrete as their range of <lif
ferences. Our proposals as to the steps to be taken for effecting
the unity are not general, but specific — concrete. There seems to
us to be no sound reason for failing to take a concrete position

Our delegation states, as your resolution puts it quite exactly,
"That they would insist on the right to publish their own dii
sion bulletin under their own control." We asked that your Plenum
take a position on this proposal, Your delegation Indicated thai

this is what its Plenum would do, Y resolution, however,

merely records our statement, but does nol say If the SWP accepts
or rejects our proposal.

Your delegation at the prelimlnarj din In I

position to make counter-proposals, or proposals of any Km.!, until
the meeting of its Plenum. In the resolution adopted by the
Plenum, we find only the proposal "to authorize the Polil
Committee to prepare and carry through a thorough discui
and clarification of the theoretical, political and organizational
issues in dispute, and fix the position of the party precisely OH
every point in preparation for the consideration and action of the
next party convention." The resolution also states that, ".-ill tin-
differences between the two parties [should be] probed to tin
depth so that not the slightest ambiguity remains."

We for our part welcome any discussion of the difference
tween the two tendencies and are prepared to participate in
the best of our ability so that the positions are precisely fixed and
all^ ambiguity eliminated. But ambiguity on the question of thl
unification itself must also be eliminated.

However, your resolution does not give any indication of how
the discussion is to be carried on, or what its purpose is with
erence to the unification of the two groups.

It is possible that not all the members of the two partis
acquainted with the full nature and the full scope of the differ
ences. A discussion will help acquaint them. But the leadei
of the two parties is quite well aware of the nature, scope and
depth of these differences. It has expressed itself on them repi
edly and in public. This was also established "formal I \
speak, in the preliminary discussions. The head of the SWP dels
gation observed, and rightly, in our view, that for the pre
period the differences are not only known but "frozen." The <i
tion we raised then, and now, was simply this: Knowing thf
nature and scope of the differences as it does, and knowlna al •
that for the present period these differences are "fro
the leadership of the SWP consider that unity is possible
desirable? Does it consider that the differences are compatible!
within one revolutionary party? Your resolution, which
adopted, we note, by the leadership of the pai'ty, fails to
answer to these questions. The same holds true, we
the question asked with regard to the position of the

70

right of a minority in a revolutionary Marxist party to issue a
bulletin of its own tendency inside the party.

We agreed with what you wrote in your letter of August 28,
that "the question of unification must be discussed with complete
frankness and seriousness." You will understand from what we
have written above that we find your resolution erroneously moti-
vated, in part, and in other parts ambiguous or silent on what we
consider the most important questions. We have before us the
statement issued at your Plenum by the minority group in the
SWP on the resolution adopted by the Plenum. It declares: "The
resolution is designed to prevent unity." We do not wish to agree
with this conclusion. That is why, before we arrive at a definitive
conclusion of our own, we wish to have from you a reply to the
questions we have raised in this letter, and elsewhere, and which
your resolution either deals with unclearly or fails to deal with
at all.

Upon receipt and discussion of your reply, our Committee will
be better able to express its opinion in detail and to make any
further proposals it may have. In this connection, we ask you to
consider now the matter which has thus far not been dealt with
in our discussion, namely, the matter of informing all the other
groups of the Fourth International about the developments in the
unity question in the United States, and of the contribution to
solving this question that they are called upon to make.

Fraternally yours.

MAX SHACHTMAN,
National Secretary,
Workers Party.
October 29, 1945.

APPENDIX K

Letter of SWP Minority to Workers Party on the

Question of an Internal Bulletin

Max Shachtman, National Secretary

Workers Party

Now York City, N. Y.

I >ear Comrade:

The SWP plenum resolution on unity, in referring to the pro-
posal of the WP negotiating committee on a tendency bulletin in
the united party, merely states the following: the WP "would
insist on the right to publish their own discussion bulletin under
their own control." Ostensibly, therefore, the SWP majority does
lto1 lake a position on this question. However, in the actual life
of the party it has become clear that the majority advances the
tendency bulletin proposal as a great stumbling block to unity.

For our part, we do not believe that this is the real stumbling

71 *

block to unity. Nevertheless we believe that it should be removed.
The plenum refused to take note in its resolution of our distinc
tion between the right to a tendency bulletin and the exercise of
that right. We believe that the WP should make that distinction
and pledge itself not to exercise, the right in the united party
under the following conditions:

1. That the SWP cooperate closely with the WP for the pur-
pose of preparing the membership oj both parties for unity, and
that after unity I here will he real cooperation of I he SWP and
the WP;

2. That the SWP recognize Hie right of a minority to issue [ta
own bulletin for the purpose of convincing the membership of the
correctness of its views.

Needless to say, nobody could demand nor could the w r com
rades agree, to refrain forever from exercising the right id' a
minority to issue its own bulletin. No responsible minority would
exercise that right without great justification, but no responsible
majority would ever prohibit it from exercising it. If the right is
used unjustifiably, a majority should easily be able to discredit a
minority for doing so. But a united Trotskyist party is so all-
important today that for the sake of it, we appeal to the comradei
of the WP to pledge themselves not to exercise this right, subject
to the conditions indicated above.

Fraternally yours,

FELIX MORROW,
For the SWP Minority.
November 15, 1945.

APPENDIX L

Reply of Workers Party to Letter of SWP Minority

Felix Morrow
SWP Minority Group
New York, N. Y.
Dear Comrade Morrow:

Our Political Committee has agreed to the proposals on the
question of the tendency bulletin made by the Minority Group of
the Socialist Workers Party in your letter of November I . r > Jfoui
proposals afford us still another occasion for reiterating and
amplifying our position. It has been stated with sufficient clarity
in our written communications to the Socialist Worken P
and at the two oral discussions that took place between the dele
gations of the two Parties prior to the recent Plenum WT

What was involved from the very beginning of the d

on the unity of the two organizations was not a detern I

the Workers Party comrades to issue a tendency bulletin of Lholi
own on the very first day of the existence of the projoi Li il HI

Party, regardless of circumstances. For example, so far as our
Political Committee was concerned, this was made clear in the
first report made by its representative to a general membership
meeting of the New York Local of our Party, a report substan-
tially repeated to most of the other Locals of our organization
several months ago.

As you know, the question involved in reality was the right of
the minority in the united Party to issue such a tendency bulletin.
The SWP Plenum Resolution is literally correct in stating our
position as an insistence "on the right to publish their own discus-
sion bulletin under their own control." In the oral discussions be-
tween the delegations of the two Parties, it was not we but the
principal representative of the SWP who called attention to the
fact that, for example, the leadership of the American Trotskyist
movement, himself included, had freely permitted the Oehler
group to publish an internal bulletin of its own inside the organi-
zation in 1934-1935. Therefore, he added, it was not a question of
the "right" to such a bulletin "in the abstract," a right which
could presumably be granted; but rather a question of our "atti-
tude." We could not then and cannot today construe this other-
wise than as a reference to our opinions about the present ma-
jority faction of the SWP. These opinions we expressed candidly
to the SWP delegation. We pointed to what is generally known,
namely, the fact that our comrades do not have sufficient confi-
dence in the present leadership of the SWP, particularly with
reference to its record toward inner-party opponents and critics,
and are therefore concerned with assuring their democratic rights
in the united party by having the minority's right to its own bul-
letin jointly acknowledged by both sides. We are perfectly ready
to admit that abstractly considered this lack of confidence may
prove to be exaggerated, or even groundless. In like manner, we
admit that common work and common experiences in the united
Party may cause the comrades of the Workers Party to abandon
their opinions on this score. They are not ready, however, to
ahandon them merely on demand. What they are prepared to
abandon in the interests of unity, has already been made amply
dear. and precise. We consider it enough. ...

We can go further and say that even the question of the right
to issue a tendency bulletin is, in a sense, only the formal side
of the matter. Ordinarily, it would not occupy the place of im-
portance it has been given in the discussion on unity. As you so
rightly put it, "we do not believe that this is the real stumbling
I dock to unity." This "stumbling block" is the conception of the
SWP Majority Group of the kind of Party revolutionary Marxists

i Id have and build. Our Party shares with the Minority Group
of the SWP the conception of the Bolsheviks which was fought
for with such emphasis and clarity, especially since 1923-1924, by
Trotsky and his supporters. The SWP Majority, in practice, and
often in words as well, holds the conception of a "monolithic"

73

Paity, which flies in the face of our whole tradition. We are com-
pelled to say now that unity of the two organizations is possible
only if this conception is abandoned. It is primarily in this sense
that the question of the tendency bulletin is so important. It
serves as the concrete test, at the present juncture, of the concep-
tions held on the kind of Party wc must build — a sterile "mono-
lithic" faction, or a united democratically-centralized party of
action in which there is freedom of opinion and grouping, and the
assurance of democratic rights for all views compatible with the
fundamental program of revolutionary Marxism.

This is how the real issue stands. To It, the other considera-
tions can well be subordinated, including the matter of whether
a minority would issue a tendency bulletin the morning after the
unification, a year afterward, or at all. It is in this sense that we
are prepared to accept the proposals of the SWP Minority.
Fraternally yours,

MAX SHACHTMAN,
National Secy., Workers Party.
November 27, 1945.
Copy to:

J. P. Cannon, National Secretary
Socialist Workers Party
116 University Place
New York, N. Y.

APPENDIX M

Resolution on Question of Unity by European Secretariat
of the Fourth International

Having taken under consideration the exchange oi documents

between the SWP and the WP with a view to their eventual unifl
cation, the E. S. on the whole approves the position adopted by
the Plenum of the National Committee of the SWP, October 1945.

The E. S. takes note of the fact that since the 1!>40 split and
throughout the war the WP has been consolidated on such politi-
cal positions as the question of the USSR, the defense of China
and India, the national question in Europe, the existence and
role of the Fourth International during the war, as well as the
conception of the internal regime and of the functioning of the
revolutionary party — political positions which can very well be
considered as programmatical differences that may render prob-
lematic the possibility of these two tendencies coi and
working efficiently in common within the same organization.

The argument that the termination of the war lias acted by
and large to diminish the practical importance of most of these
differences can acquire any weight only after the two organiza-

74

tions have engaged in a deep-going discussion on their respective
concrete conceptions of the actual national and international
policy as well as the regime and the internal functioning of the
party in the United States and the International.

The European Secretariat recommends to the leadership of
the SWP that it elaborate jointly with the SWP leadership a list
of questions to be discussed; that it organize and pursue this dis-
cussion in order to make clear just what degree of agreement
actually exists between the two organizations. It is after such an
examination that the question of the possible unification of the
two organizations can be re-examined anew.
January, 1946.

APPENDIX N

Letter of SWP Minority to the International Conference

To the Delegates of the

Conference of the Fourth International

Dear Comrades:

We hope that our representative will have arrived in time to
take part in your deliberations. In any event, however, we want
you to have before you in writing our answer to the ES resolu-
tion of January 1946 on SWP-WP unity.

First of all it is astonishing to note that the ES resolution,
without any attempt to answer the arguments of the various sec-
tions in favor of unity, merely proclaims in Olympian fashion its
solidarity with the SWP plenum resolution which evaded answer-
ing the question of unity. If the ES represented the unanimous
or well-nigh unanimous sentiment of the International it might
be justified in passing over the arguments of those who favor
unity. But we do not know of a single section which has adopted
the same position as the SWP, much less a single section which
has decided against unity. On the other hand, in addition to the
voluminous writings of the SWP minority there are the pro-
unity resolutions of the RCP of Britain, the RSP of Ireland, the
Spanish Group in Mexico, the letter of Comrade N., the letter of
the National Secretary of the PCC of Italy, the well-known pro-
unity views of the leadership of the BLP of India. In the face of
this situation the ES was obligated to indicate at least briefly
its answers to the arguments of those who favor unity, but instead
it has simply taken sides in a resolution of four short paragraphs.

The ES resolution is absurdly in error when it states that the
differences between the SWP and the WP "can very well be con-
sidered as programmatic differences." Only the Russian question
can at all justly be termed a programmatic difference. But in any
event the readiness of the ES to so characterize the differences
indicates that it presumably knows quite well what the differences

75 *

are. But then it goes oh to repeat the SWP plenum resolution's
formula that the two parties must g - o through "a deepgoing dis-
cussion on their respective concrete conceptions of the actual na-
tional and international policy," etc., before it can be decided if
unity is possible. To any thinking person it should be obvious
that there is a crying contradiction between (1) the ES state-
ments indicating ii knows what the differences are and (2) the
ES statement. 1 1 1 ; 1 1 I lie question of unity cannot be decided until
after a "deepgoing discussion" of the differences. What has hap-
pened is that in adopting Comrade Cannon's tine on unity, the

ES has had to adopt this absurd contradiction as part of it.

We remind you that when we first Introduced our resolution
for unity and proposed to send a negotiating rniiiiii 1 1 1 ee to discuss
unity with the WP, Comrade Cannon answered: "We don't need
to send a committee to meet them in order to find the answer to
these questions. As to their policy in general and their attitude
toward us in particular, we don't need to inquire about that either.
It is clearly revealed in their press for anyone who is interested
to read." Our answer to Comrade Cannon was that we were not
proposing to discuss theoretical, political, tactical questions wit.li
the WP since we could favor unity precisely because we, like
everyone in the leading cadres of the Fourth, already know the
position of the WP on these questions. But it was necessary then
to determine whether the WP would accept unity and subordinate
itself to the majority in the united party. Once the WP did so —
as it did — there was no further need for discussion with the WP
before taking a position on unity.

The first attitude of the majority leaders was, then, opposition
to unity precisely on the basis of their knowledge of the WP. A I
that point they rightly took the position that any leader of B
party should take, namely, that he has been following the pre
of the WP and knows its position on various questions and can
determine his attitude to the WP on the basis of this knowledge.

But at the October plenum the majority made a sudden, unex
plained shift. Fromjknowing everything about the WP and there
fore not seeing any use in discussion, the majority switched to
asserting that the unity fl.ues.tion. could only be answered "after
the most thoroughgoing discussion and probing of all differei
to the bottom." We of the minority branded this shift as a fraud
designed to prevent unity; a fraud necessitated by the fad thai
the majority leaders could not openly admit that their opposition
to unity flows from their unwillingness to unite with Trotsk;
who have differences with them. Wittingly or not, the ES ha
become a party to this fraud by its endorsement of the SWP
plenum resolution which perpetrated it.

Four months have now passed since the October plenum. What
has the majority done about "probing all differences to the bol
torn"? It has held no meetings with the WP leaders nor written
any letters to the WP to organize the discussion. Prei

76

opposition to the idea of organizing the discussion jointly with
the WP, the Political Committee at its October 16 meeting /dopted
the following motion of Comrade Cannon: "Implementation of
Plenum resolution. That we begin the discussion by a series of
articles in the magazine outlining our position on all the ques-
tions in dispute between us and the WP, together with our criti-
cism of their position on the points of difference." This motion has
remained a dead letter. Not a single article has appeared in the
magazine which could conceivably be described as "probing the
differences to the bottom." All you will find in Fourth Interna-
tional are two or three sideswipes at the WP at the tail end of
some editorial. And these, both in letter and spirit, violate the
majority's pretense that it is still weighing the question of unity;
they speak of the WP in terms applicable only to an enemy and
anti-Trotskyist party. In short, there has been no discussion of
the differences between the WP and the SWP.

Despite our disagreement with the whole concept of a discus-
sion of the differences prior to a decision in favor of unity, we
were ready to abide by the majority decision if the disctission
should actually take place. Hence, as against Comrade Cannon's
motion of October 16, we really sought to implement the plenum
resolution, by the following counter-motions at that same Political
Committee meeting:

1. That the Political Committee prepare a list of the questions
to be discussed and the order in which they were to be dealt with
in the magazine. Without such a plan of work, obviously the so-
called "Probing" might drag on endlessly. But the Political Com-
mittee voted down our motion for such a plan of work. ^

2. The plenum had voted down our proposal for a joint dis-
cussion bulletin with the WP. The majority said it would write in
Fourth International and the WP could answer in the New Inter-
national. However, it was obvious that not one SWP member in
ten would see the articles in the New International. We therefore
made a motion that the Political Committee make available to
SWP members through party channels those issues of New Inter-
national containing replies to the SWP articles. This motion too
the Political Committee voted down.

3. The plenum had rejected our proposal for joint SWP-WP
membership meetings as part of the discussion. We therefore pro-
posed an alternative: that as each subject is scheduled for
"probing" we invite a representative of the WP to address our
membership on it, and vice-versa. This motion too the Political
Committee voted down.

4. A large part of the majority argument for its plenum de-
cision had been based on the alleged non-Bolshevik ideas of the
WP on the organization question. We therefore made a motion
bo publish in the Internal Bulletin the principal organizational
documents of the WP referred to in the majority arguments. This
motion too the Political Committee voted down.

77 '

This left the ostensibly projected discussion between the par-
ties without any joint arrangements for the discussion, without
a list of questions to be discussed, without a schedule of the order
in which they were to be discussed, without putting into the hands
of the SWP membership materials indispensable to the discussion.
So what was left of the discussion? Nothing.

Had the majority leaders openly opposed unity, we could have
had an honest and profitable discussion which would have served
to educate the whole movement. 1 1 .- 1 < I the majority leaders under-
taken in good faith a discussion with the WP, it could have sei-ved
to educate the movement. The majority, however, did neither of
these things, so that It became Impossible either to discuss the
merits of unity or the differences with the WP.

This impasse compelled us to the decision to leave the party
unless in the coming weeks we can see any sign that we can rea-
sonably consider as a move on the part of the majority toward
resuming unity negotiations. We communicated this decision to
the majority in a letter dated January 26, a copy of which we
enclose.

Since then we have received the ES resolution and have been
informed by the majority leaders that they accept "the specific
recommendations" of that resolution. We have given careful con
sideration to the one aspect in which the KS resolution does
appear to differ from the SWP plenum resolution. The hitler, as
we have already explained, rejected all our proposals for ap
proaching the WP to organize the discussion joint discussions,
joint discussion bulletins, joini membership meetings, etc. On the
other hand the ES resolution recommends to the SWP "that it
elaborate jointly with the WP leadership a programme of q
tions to discuss; that it organize and pursue tin: on in

order to make clear just whal degree of agreement actually <
between the two organizations."

We take it that the ES means that tin- SWP and Wl' Lade,
ship jointly prepare the questions to discuss, jointly organize,
jointly pursue the discussion. If so, the ES is now propo
essentially the same types of joint agreements for expediting the
discussion that we proposed four months ago.

If the SWP majority leaders were to agree to such a plan of
work, we would consider it a step toward unity. For we are con-
fident that any real discussion of the differences between the two
parties would only serve to demonstrate the correctness of unity.
On one decisive condition: that the SWP majority leadership, in
its meetings and arrangements with the WP, show serious signs
of a desire to "organize and pursue this discussion." In a word,
that the SWP majority does not merely send a representative to
go through the formal motions of negotiating for a joint list of
the questions to be discussed. The distinction between sendin
negotiator and actually negotiating such a list is a very familiar
one to all of us, and we are sure that there will be no diffei

78

of opinion between most of you and ourselves concerning whether
or not the SWP majority is actually negotiating or not.

We shall therefore await the results of the negotiations be-
tween the SWP and the WP for organizing the discussion. If,
however, the SWP majority leaders fail actually to carry out the
ES resolution's proposal that the SWP leadership "elaborate
jointly with the WP leadership" the questions to be discussed, we
shall carry out our decision to leave t^-> party and join the WP.

We know that the WP, which favor, unity, will make every
effort to expedite the discussion. It cannot succeed in doing so,
however, unless the SWP majority leaders make clear, as they
have not yet done, what they mean by the formulas of their
plenum resolution, particularly:

1. "Probing the differences to the bottom." Does this mean
that there are differences or aspects of differences which are un-
clear to them? In that case they must specify what is clear to
them and what is not. For example on the Russian question : what
is it they do not know about the WP position? Merely to put down
on a piece of paper, "The Russian Question," may seem to be
literally complying with the ES proposal to prepare a list of ques-
tions to be discussed, but obviously serves no serious purpose of
clarification.

2. "Programmatic agreement It is clear that such a basis

for unification does not exist in the present instance." Does this
mean that there can be no unity unless during the discussion the
WP abandons one or more of its so-called programmatic differ-
ences? In that case there is no point to discussing at all, since
everyone knows the WP will maintain its political positions. But
if the SWP majority does not require the WP to abandon any of
its political positions as a precondition for unity, then they should
be ready to state in advance that the political differences are
compatible with membership in one party. The political differences
would still have to be discussed but only to educate the member-
ship after a decision for unity. The discussion preceding a deci-
sion on unity should, in all logic, be limited to the only questions
which remain relevant to unity, namely the specific organizational
guarantees demanded by the SWP majority to assure the unity
of the united party. Until the SWP majority leaders answer the
question whether the political differences are compatible with
membership in one party, and until they answer it in the affirma-
tive, it is pointless to ask the WP leaders for organizational guar-
antees that they will abide by party discipline.

We hope that the SWP majority leaders, in formally accepting
the ES proposal for organizing the discussion jointly with the
WP, will employ it for actually proceeding to a reconsideration of
their previous course. Their past conduct permits us no optimism
in this question, but we are ready to exhaust every last possibility
for unity.

We ask you to give to the arguments for unity the consid-

79 *

eration which the ES, if we are to judge from its resolution, did
not give. Your decision in this instance will inevitably constitute
a major precedent for the future. On every continent today the
question of uniting Trotskyist groups into a single section in one
country is posed. As we have stated in our previous letters, we do
not ask you to order the SWP to unite with the WP. It would not
be desirable to force unity. Without wholehearted acceptance by
a majority of the party membership, the unity would not be long-
lasting. What we ask is lfi.it you recommend and urge unity.
Such an expression of the public opinion of the International may
go far to open the eyes of the besl elements who have blindly
accepted the SWP plenum resolution.

With our warmest comradely greetings,

ALBERT GOLDMAN,
FELIX MORROW,
For the SWP Minority.
February 12, 1946.

APPENDIX O

Statement of the Workers Party on the Resolution of the
European Secretariat

To All Delegates to the International Pre-Conference
To All Sections of the Fourth International

The Political Committee of the Workers Party wishes to state
its opinion on the resolution adopted by the European Secretariat
in January, 1946, dealing with the unity negotiations between the
WP and the SWP in the United States. The leadership of the
International and of all the sections and, for that matter, every
member has the right to demand of the Workers Party a frank
and unambiguous expression of its views on the question of unity.
This we have given not only in numerous articles in the public
press but in resolutions formally adopted by our National Com-
mittee, in the exchange of correspondence with the SWP and the
Minority of the SWP and most recently in our communication to
the European Executive Committee. The January 1946 resolution
of the European Secretariat affords us an opportunity to reiterate
our views.

The resolution of the European Secretariat is a shocking docu
ment, which does violence to the program, to the tradition ami to
the best interests of the Fourth International. We deem it n<
sary to appeal to the delegates to the International Pre-Confer
ence and to all of the sections to reject this resolution. The r<
for this appeal is indicated by all we have written and done in i he
past several months on the question of the unification of the Wl'
and the SWP. It can be restated here briefly.

80

The Secretariat "recommends to the leadership of the SWP
that it elaborate jointly with the WP leadership a list of questions
to be discussed," etc. We want to emphasize right at the outset, so
that there can be no possible misunderstanding, that we are and
have always been for the most thoroughgoing discussion with the
SWP on all theoretical and political questions that are in dispute
between us. We welcome such a discussion, whether it is con-
ducted in accordance with "a list" or not. We shall patricipate in it,
to the best of our ability, in order to make clear, again, just what
our position is on the questions in dispute and just wherein we
differ with the positions of the SWP. As in previous discussions
conducted in the press of the two organizations, this new one will
once more make clear not only wherein we differ but also the
framework of our agreement.

But if such a discussion is all that the resolution of the ES
means, namely, a public discussion between two political organi-
zations — whether arranged jointly or not — it means nothing more
than has been taking place for the past six years. In other words,
such a debate obviously need have no more relationship to the
question of unity today than it has had in the past six years
during which it was carried out. In other words, the ES proposes
to do nothing and change nothing in the discussions that have
been carried on through the public press of the two organizations
since the spiit in 1940. The decision adopted by the Political Com-
mittee of the SWP for the purpose of "implementing" the resolu-
tion of the European Secretariat shows that this and nothing else
is precisely the meaning that is given to the resolution.

II.

What is the responsibility of the ES in the situation that has
developed in the United States? To give instructions? Obviously
not. But it has the duty of expressing an opinion on the desira-
bility, possibility and permissibility of a fusion of the two organi-
zations in this country. We regretfully establish that the ES has
completely evaded this responsibility. We do not deny for a mo-
ment that there are many comrades in the Fourth International
who are not informed, or not sufficiently informed, of the nature
and extent of the differences between the WP on the one side arid
the SWP and other sections of the International on the other side.
We remain at the disposal of these comrades and are always pre-
pared to elucidate our position to them. However, the ES cannot
claim to number itself among these comrades any more than the
leadership of the SWP can make this claim.

For six years the leadership of the SWP has attacked our
point of view on controversial questions, as is its full right, in
innumerable articles in the press and speeches from the platform.
Is it possible to assume that these attacks upon our position were
made by the SWP without a clear and adequate knowledge of

81 *

what our position is? Is it not perfectly clear to all comrades that
these attacks could not have been made without their author
having a clear idea of "just what degree of agreement actually
exists between the two organizations" (to quote from the resolu-
tion of the ES) as well as just what degree of disagreement exists
between us.

We repeat that undoubtedly there are many comrades in the
International who require another discussion between the SWP
and the WP before they can express an opinion on the question
of unity. But what will such a discussion bring to the SWP leader-
ship or, for that matter, to our Workers Tarty that both of us do
not already know? That is the question, [s the ES unable to ex-
press an opinion on the question of unity in the United States
because it, the ES, does not know "just what degree of agreemenl
actually exists between the two organizations," because it does
not know just what the nature and extent of the differences are?
Under no circumstances can we make this assumption. In its own
resolution of January 1946 the "ES takes note of the fact that
* * * the WP has been consolidated on such political positions as
the question of the USSR, the defense of China and India, the
national question in Europe, the existence and role of the Fourth
International during the war, as well as the conception of the
internal regime and of the functioning of the revolutionary
party * * *." We must therefore assume that the ES too knows
what our position is on the questions in dispute. Yet it evades its
responsibility in expressing an opinion on whether or not, given
the differences that are known to all of the leading comrade,,
these are compatible with membership in a united section of the
Fourth International. Before it can express an opinion on this
fundamental question, the ES requires another discussion of our
point of view. Toward what end? In order to find out what our
point of view is? But it already knows our point of view. What
is supposed to be added to the knowledge and information of the
European Secretariat by a further discussion? We emphasize
again and again that we welcome such a discussion and shall par-
ticipate in it fully but in such a discussion we will only be able
to repeat what we have been saying for the past few years; we
will only be able to state once more those positions with which the
ES, like the leadership of the SWP, is sufficiently acquainted
More than that we shall be unable to contribute to the discussion ;
more than that the SWP will be unable to contribute to the dis-
cussion.

The resolution of the ES is an inexcusable evasion of respon
sibility. Consciously or not, it is a diplomatic document written
about a question where diplomacy is entirely out of place.

III.

Our conception of the basis for unity has been stated by Ul
so often that it requires no elaborate restatement here. We stand

82

upon the foundation of the principles of revolutionary Marxism
and the program of the Fourth International. On those questions
where there are differences between us, we hold firmly to the view
that our position, no less than that of the SWP, is compatible with
membership in a united revolutionary party and international.
We do not demand as a pre-condition for unity that the SWP or
the International adopt our position on the Russian question, for
example, no more than we would accede to any ultimatum that
we abandon our position on the Russian question. To approach
the problem of unity in the United States on the basis that com-
plete theoretical and political agreement on all questions is the
pre-condition of unity is to give privileged rights to the Zinovie-
vist conception of a monolithic party and a monolithic interna-
tional. That conception, carried to its conclusion by Stalinism
helped destroy the Communist International. We want to resist
even the slightest sign of such a conception in the Fourth Inter-
national. If that is not the conception of the ES and of the other
leading comrades of the International — and we prefer to believe
that it is not — the resolution of the ES has no meaning. A dis-
cussion of those differences that do exist would take place best in
the ranks of a united party and in a normal manner in accordance
with the practices of democratic centralism.

If the public opinion of the International, which is aware of
our political position and our political differences, does not express
itself in favor of unification in the United States, the only con-
clusion that can be drawn is that we are excluded from the Fourth
International because of our differences. But if that is so in our
case today, it will inevitably be so in the case of other comrades
and other groups tomorrow. If we are not included in the Inter-
national because of our views, the others, tomorrow, will be ex-
cluded from the International for their views. If a clear-cut posi-
tion is not taken with regard to our proposal for unity in the
United States today, there is nothing to prevent the exclusion
from the International of the IKD, for example, tomorrow — the
IKD which has already been excluded de facto by the leadership
of the SWP. What applies to the IKD tomorrow may very well
apply to other groups the day after — the Spanish group lead by
Comrade Munis, the minority in the French party, the minority in
the Belgium party, etc.

We ask every comrade of the Fourth International to give the
greatest attention and weight to this question:

For years the International Left Opposition, led by Comrade
Trotsky, repeatedly demanded of the leadership of the Stalintern
that the Trotskyist tendency and movement be restored to full
membership and rights in the international. This demand was not
a demagogical appeal. It corresponded to our fundamental con-
ception of the party. It was made continuously, up to 1933. In
those days we denounced mercilessly the refusal of the leadership

83 *

of the international to heed the appeal of the International Left
Opposition.

You know the deep theoretical and political differences that
divided our movement from the leadership of the Stalintern up to
1933. You know also the differences that divide us from the SWP
and from other sections of the Fourth International. We ask every
comrade to answer this question: Arc the differences that sep-
arate the WP and the SWP, both of which stand .upon the basic
principles of Marxism and i he Fourth International, greater than
or even as greal as, the differences thai divided Trotskyism and
Stalinism up to L983. I > « * you consider thai there was a greater
possibility of justification for being In the .same united parly of

the Stalinists of those days than there is today, for (he two ten
dencies represented by the WP and the SWP being in the sane
united party of the Fourth International?

These, comrades, are the real questions that are posed before
you. There should be no delay in answering them. A false answer
can have only disastrous effects for the future of our Interna-
tional.

IV.

We wish in this appeal to you to deal with only one more point.
We understand that some comrades have been led to conclude
that our proposal for unity with the SWP is only a "maneuver."
Let those comrades understand fully just what our "maneuver"
has been. From the very beginning of the discussion with the
SWP on this question, we offered to acknowledge that they would
have the majority of the leadership of the united party; to ac-
knowledge that they would have control of the party press and of
all the public activities of the party; to acknowledge that, given
our democratic rights inside the united party, we would be bound
by party discipline in all public activities. We offered to dissolve
our party; to give up our independent newspaper, theoretical re-
view and public activities; to give up all independent public activi-
ties in the class struggle. We demanded at first only an educational
internal bulletin of our own tendency inside of the united party.
Upon the urging of the Minority of the SWP which has also
sought to remove all obstacles to the unity, real or imaginary, we
abandoned even this demand and confined ourselves to proposing a
mutual recognition only of the right of. a minority to issue such a
bulletin for internal use in the party. This is what our "maneuver"
has consisted of. We venture to say that never in the history of
our movement has a group been prepared to make so many con-
cessions, and concessions of such a nature, for the purpose of
achieving unity with another group. If our proposals were nothing
but a "maneuver," all that the SWP had to do to explode it was
to say: "We accept these conditions and we are for the unifies
tion!" // we were engaged only in a maneuver, and {/ I lie SWP
leadership were in any way serious about the unification we would
thereby stand exposed as completely discredited people. But what

' 84

has actually been discredited is the unworthy maneuvering and
the unworthy diplomacy of the leadership of the SWP.

We reiterate to you our request for affiliation made in our
preceding letter to the International Pre-Conference. We reiterate
to you our proposal for the unification of the movement on the
basis we have indicated. The accomplishment of the unification
requires, among other things, the rejection of the resolution of
the European Secretariat. It requires the adoption by the Inter-
national Pre-Conference and by all the sections of a resolution
which will serve to bring to bear the public opinion of the Inter-
national upon the leadership and membership of the SWP in the
United States in such a manner as will really promote the move-
ment for unity here and the establishment of a powerful section
of the Fourth International.

With best party greetings,

POLITICAL COMMITTEE,
WORKERS PARTY.
Max Shachtman,
National Secretary.

APPENDIX P

Questionnaire to the Workers Party

National Committee
Workers Party, U. S.
Dear Comrades:

As instructed by the PC of the SWP, we are communicating
to you herewith a series of motions adopted by the last meeting
of the PC with reference to the organization of the discussion of
questions in dispute between the SWP and the WP, in connection
with the proposal for the fusion of the two organizations.

We believe these motions are self-explanatory, but if any
points seem to you unclear, we stand ready to furnish the neces-
sary explanations either in writing or in oral discussion between
our respective sub-committees.

Fraternally yours,

FARRELL DOBBS,
For the Secretariat.
April 10, 1946.

85"

APPENDIX Q

SWP-WP DISCUSSION

Motions Adopted by the Political Committee of the SWP,

April 9, 1946.

Motion One: The PC is of the opinion that important differ-
ences exist between the SWP and the WP on the following ques-
tions, and that a discussion and clarification of these differences
are a necessary precondition for a definitive decision by the next
party convention on the question of unification of the two organi-
zations.

(1) Evaluation of the split of 1940 and its causes.

(2) Marxist principles and method. The necessity of an aggres-
sive, uncompromising struggle against revisionists of Marx-
ism in every field, including the field of philosophy. The
impermissibility of blocs with anti-Marxists against Marx-
ists.

(3) Attitude toward the Fourth International since the split
of 1940:

(a) The Emergency Conference of 1940.

(b) The existence and functioning of the Fourth Inter-
national since 1940.

(c) The resolutions and decisions of the International
Conference of April, 194f'».

(4) The Russian question.

(5) European perspectives and policy. (The resolution of the
International Conference of April, 1946 — the position of the
AK of the IKD: "Three Theses," "Socialism or Barbar-
ism.")

(6) The national and colonial questions. (India-China during
the war.)

(7) Evaluation of the Stalinist parties and workers' organiza-
tions under their leadership and control in capitalist coun-
tries, and our tactical attitude toward them.

(8) Tactics in the American Labor Movement.

(a) The labor party question in the* United States.

(b) Methods of organizing the fight against native fas-
cism in the U. S.

(c) Trade union tactics and methods.

(9) Evaluation of the YPSL and attitude toward it.

(10) Proletarian military policy.

(11) Conception of the party.

* * *

Motion Two: The Secretariat is instructed to draw up a sum-
mary statement of our position on these disputed questions for
publication in our Internal Bulletin.

86

Motion Three: The Secretariat is instructed to submit to the
National Committee of the Workers Party the above list of ques-
tions which in our opinion are in dispute between our party and
the WP, as a program for discussion between the two parties,
expressing our readiness at the same time to add any other ques-
tions which in their opinion should be included; and if they so
desire, the Secretariat will meet with a corresponding sub-com-
mittee of their organization to elaborate the program of questions
for the discussion.

* * *

Motion Four: The Secretariat is instructed to invite the Na-
tional Committee of the Workers Party to prepare and submit a
summary statement of their point of view on the questions in dis-
pute between the two organizations, preferably in a single docu-
ment of five to ten thosuand words. This document, when received,
is to be published in our Internal Bulletin for the information of
the party members, in the pre-convention discussion on the ques-
tion of unification.

APPENDIX R

Answer by the Political Committee of the Workers Party

National Committee
Socialist Workers Party
Dear Comrades:

I have been directed by the Political Committee of our party
to send you the following reply to your communication of April
10th, in which you include motions on the SWP-WP discussion
adopted by the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party
on April 9th.

Motion Four adopted by your Committee instructs your Secre-
tariat to invite our National Committee "to prepare and submit a
summary statement of their point of view on the questions in dis-
pute between the two organizations, preferably in a single docu-
ment of five to ten thousand words." Motion One adopted by your
Committee lists eleven questions on which your Committee "is of
the opinion that important differences exist between the SWP
and the WP."

We assume that a summary statement of our position on these
eleven questions is intended primarily for the information of the
membership of the SWP. The fact that the leading committee of
the SWP is of the opinion that there are differences between the
two parties on these eleven points presupposes that your party
leadership is sufficiently acquainted with our position on the basis
of official resolutions and documents of our party and of our
articles that have appeared in our press. That being the case, it
.seems to us impossible to set forth our position on these eleven

87 *

points, which embrace some of the most important questions of
theory and policy in the revolutionary Marxist movement, in the
space of five or ten thousand words which have been assigned for
this purpose. On some of the points you list, our party has written
a considerable body of literature which could not be compressed
within so tiny a space without either being: entirely inadequate
for your purpose or without lending itself to involuntary mis-
conception. In either case, the purpose of discussion and clari-
fication of the differences which you consider a necessary precon-
dition for a definitive decision by your next party convention on
the question of unification, would not be served. Consequently, all
we can do in this letter is to indicate our position on your num-
bered questions and to add references to those documentary mate-
rials in which our point of view is adequately set forth.

1. Our party has no official document in which the split of 1940
and its causes are evaluated. However, the prevailing opinion in
our party is that under the concrete circumstances of the time,
our position and conduct were, by and large, correct and that of
our opponents, the majority of the SWP, incorrect. Having said
this, it must be added that we consider it of far greater and more
urgent importance to discuss and achieve the unification of the
Trotskyist movement in the United States today than to debate
the question, however important in itself, of the split in 1940.
The latter cannot fruitfully be substituted for the former in the
present case, any more than in similar cases in the history of the
revolutionary movement. We do not consider a difference of
opinion in evaluating the 1940 split to be a barrier to overlooking
the split by unification of the two parties today.

2. Our party is as firmly committed to the principles and meth-
ods of Marxism as it is opposed to the revision of Marxism in the
sense in which the term "revisionism" has been classically em-
ployed in the Marxian movement. This is clearly set forth in the
"Founding Principles of the Workers Party" adopted by the
founding convention of the Workers Party in 1940, a copy of
which is appended to this letter. In view of the fact that you make
no specific reference to any "blocs with anti-Marxists against
Marxists," we can deal with this question only by the equally
general statement that, as Marxists, we do not consider blocs with
anti-Marxists, such as the Stalinists, against other Marxists to be
permissible or in any way consonant with revolutionary Marxism.

We do not understand why special reference is made to the
necessity for an aggressive and uncompromising struggle against
revisionists of Marxism in the field of philosophy particularly.
Insofar as the dialectical materialism of Marxism is reflected in
the fundamental program and politics of Marxism, we consider
our program and policies to be solidly founded in Marxian theory.
However, neither the fundamental program on which we stand
nor the "Founding Principles of the Workers Party" adopted by

88

...in . I ■ ii»-- convention deals specifically with Marxist philosophy

m..i ii doei no1 make it directly a programmatic question. So far

know, the same holds true of the fundamental program and

decimal ion of principles of the SWP. We know of no proposal to

in .I ■■ I lie philosophy of Marxism a specific part of the program

! the Marxist party.

(a) Our attitude toward the Emergency Conference of 1940

expressed in the communication we addressed to it asking
1 1 1. 1 1 mil- representatives be invited for the purpose of stating our
poinl of view on the split in the SWP, and is therefore part of

record of that Conference. The Conference not only failed to

Invite representatives of our party but even members of our party

were duly elected as members of the Executive Committee of
the Fourth International at the international founding confer-
ence in 1938. Neither our party nor the members of the Executive
Committee referred to were afforded the opportunity to partici-
pate in the preparations of this conference or in its deliberations.
<unsequently, we refused to recognize either the validity or the
correctness of the decisions adopted by this conference on the
iplit in the SWP. With regard to the political decisions taken by

I he conference, as set forth in the manifesto on the imperialist
war adopted by it, we were and remain in accord with it insofar

1 1 corresponds to the point of view of our party,
(b) While recognizing the unprecedented difficulties which
faced an international like ours in the performance of its tasks
e 1940, that is, during the war, we nevertheless believe that

I I failed, both organizationally and politically, to discharge the
duties devolving upon it. The final dissolution of the International

• lariat established at the Emergency Conference of 1940 was
only one of the proofs of this. Here again, there is no official docu-

nt of our party on the subject and we know of none by the

SWP. Our views, generally speaking, have been set forth unoffi-
cially in recent articles in our theoretical press.

I c i The resolutions and decisions of the International Confer-
ence of 1946 which we consider of first importance, namely, the
resolutions on the world situation, and the resolution on the IKD,
have been dealt with in corresponding documents of our party,
Our position on the world situation was. set forth first in our
olution on the national and colonial question in Europe and
i, adopted at our party convention in February, 1944. Our
ition on the world situation today and the tasks of the revolu-
n.v Marxists is contained in a draft resolution adopted by
National Committee for submission to our coming national
: ion. It also contains the necessary references to the deci-
T the International Conference on the IKD. We are append-
both of these documents to this letter. Our position on the
ion taken by the International Secretariat on the question of
Ly in the United States is contained in the letters sent by our
iv to the International Conference before it adopted its deci-

89 -<

sion. This document too is appended. The decisions of the Confer-
ence have in no way altered the repeatedly stated position of our
party m favor of unity with the SWP.

4. We do not consider Russia a workers' state in any sense
whatsoever. We consider it a reactionary social order which we
characterize as bureaucratic-collectivism. We are against the de-
fense of the Stalinist state. More than this it is impossible to set
forth in a few words. We therefore refer you to such well elabor-
ated and detailed presentations of our viewpoint as are contained
in the resolution on the Russian question adopted at our 1941 con-
vention and to that section of our resolution on the international
situation, drafted by the National Committee for our coming con-
vention, which deals with the Russian question and brings our
position up to date in the light of the recent social and political
developments. Both of these resolutions are appended.

5. For our position on European perspectives and policy, we
refer you again to our draft resolution on the international situ-
ation which is appended, as well as to our resolution on the
national question in Europe adopted by our 1944 convention. In-
sofar as our party has taken an official position on the resolution
of the International Conference of 1946 and on the views of the
IKD they are contained in these two resolutions. Our National
Committee and many of the branches of the party have held sev-
eral discussions of the viewpoint of our German comrades as set
forth in the "Three Theses" and in "Socialism or Capitalist Bar-
barism." A continuation of this discussion is even now going on
in the pages of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL. Our party has
not, however, adopted an official position with respect to either of
these two documents as such, except insofar as the political line
of the document "Socialism or Capitalist Barbarism" is dealt with
in the introduction to the document written by the Editorial Board
of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL and approved by our Political
Committee as a statement of its views. This introduction is ap-
pended for the information of your members. We do not know of
any document which gives the official analysis and position of the
SWP on the theoretical and political views of our German com-
rades.

6. Our position on the national and colonial question is the tra-
ditional position of Lenin. We are for the support of all nationally
oppressed countries, colonial and semi-colonial countries in par-
ticular, in the struggle against imperialists. At the same time we
are opposed to supporting any country which is an integral part
of any imperialist camp which is at war with another imperialist
camp, again in accordance with the traditional position of Lenin
and Trotsky. Our position on India and China in the second world
war is set forth, in conformity with these fundamental principles,
in the resolution on this question adopted by our convention in
1944. It is appended herewith.

7. The National Committee resolution on the international sit-

90

nation contains a section which gives its analysis of the character
and role of the Stalinist parties in the capitalist countries and
our attitude toward them. It is appended herewith. This is not
yet the official position of our party but it has been submitted for
adoption by our national convention.

8. (a) Our party is in favor of and conducts a continuous agi-
tation for the formation of an independent labor party in this
country, based on the trade unions. Our detailed position on this
question is contained in the resolution on the labor party adopted
by our national convention in 1944. This is appended herewith.

(b) As is traditional in our movement, we favor the mobili-
zation of the widest sections of the organized working class in
the united front struggle against fascism. The failure at any
given moment to acheive such a mobilization of the working class
and its mass organizations does not exclude the utilization by the
revolutionary vanguard of every possibility of demonstrating
against fascists and fascist demonstrations. The failure of the
SWP to accept the invitation of the WP to organize joint demon-
strations against fascists like G. L. K. Smith at a time when the
mobilization of wide masses against Smtih was a practical impos-
sibility, reveals in our opinion either political short-sightedness or
an inadequate understanding of our tasks in the struggle againal
fascism, or both. Our views on this question are more amply
developed in a pamphlet on the subject written by a member <>f
our National Committee, Comrade Hal Draper, and approved by
the Political Committee.

(c) It is impossible to go into any detail in reply to so gen-
eral a question as "trade union tactics and methods," except to
refer you to the resolution on the trade union question adopted
by our last convention and appended herewith. As can easily be
seen, this resolution conforms both to the traditional position of
the revolutionary Marxists and to the objective situation in the
American union movement.

9. Our evaluation of the YPSL differs in no respect from our
evaluation of any similar half -reformist half-centrist movement.
A sympathetic attitude, especially to those Socialist youth who are
striving, however hesitantly or confusedly, toward a revolutionary
Marxist position, is clearly indicated. That is what we sought to
express in the open letter of our party to tin Detroil convention
of the YPSL in 1945, a copy of which is appended.

10. Our position on military policy is represented by our un-
compromising opposition to imperialist wars and our support of
all progressive wars, particularly those of Hi' 1 working class

against the I 'geois and of natioi ally oppressed peoples against

their imperialist opprea oi We are opposed to capitalist mili-
tarism in all Its forms. Including capitalist conscription. Unlike
the pacifists, with whom we have nothing In common, we are for
the promotion of workers' defense i workers' militia,

as set forth In the program of tha Fourth international. While our

91

party has no official document on the position taken by the SWP
on conscription, it is our view, as set forth in polemical articels in
our press, that this position was wrong and that many of the
arguments and much of the propaganda made for it in your press
was both wrong and dangerous. An unofficial polemical article
written by Max Shachtman in the January, 1941, issue of THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL is available in the bound volume for
that year.

11. Our conception of the nature and purpose, the structure
and principles of the revolutionary party is familiar to all Marx-
ists and is restated by us in the "Founding Principles of the
Workers Party" and in our communications to you on the question
of the unity of the WP and the SWP.

It goes without saying that we welcome any discussion be-
tween the WP and the SWP on all questions in dispute. We
reiterate our point of view that a decision on unity can be adopted
by the SWP, as it has already been adopted by our party, on the
basis of the more than ample knowledge which both parties have
of each other's political positions. Not only the leadership but
also the membership of the WP is sufficiently acquainted with the
differences between the two organizations and with the positions
taken on the points in dispute by both organizations to endorse
the proposal for unification. If it is held that the membership of
the SWP is unacquainted with the nature of these differences, the
documents we have submitted should suffice not only to inform
your membership but to convince them that comrades holding
divergent views on these questions can co-exist in a democratic
revolutionary Marxist party. However, inasmuch as it cannot be
maintained that the leadership of the SWP is unacquainted with
the position of the Workers Party on the questions in dispute, it
seems to us that it is its obligation, as a party leadership, to take
a position on the question of unity and to recommend it to the
membership.

Inasmuch as our party considers itself sufficiently acquainted
with the political views of the SWP to adopt a position in favor
of unification, which it has done, we find no necessity to add any
other questions to those you have already listed. If you, for your
part, find it necessary or advisable to submit a statement of any
length on your position on the questions in dispute and on the
question of unity, we are prepared, it goes without saying, to
acquaint our membership with it immediately. If you find it neces-
sary to ask us any specific questions on specific aspects of our
theoretical or political positions which are not answered by the
documents appended to this letter, we are ready to comply with
your request for further information.

As for the general matter of clarification of the differences
in the ranks of the organization, it is our view that the best and
most fruitful way to proceed, if you consider a discussion an indis-

92

pensable preliminary to a decision on the question of unity, is by
means of a discussion bulletin jointly edited and published by the
two parties and by joint meetings of the membership of the two
parties. We make this proposal for a joint bulletin and joint
membership discussion meetings precisely as one of the stepfl
that would facilitate and accelerate the unification of the two
parties into one and as the best means for a planned and regu-
lated discussion of systematically counterposed views.

It is important, in conclusion, to emphasize that none of the
views or proposals set down above are viewed by us as contra-
dicting or substituting for the views and proposals on unification
set forth by our party in its communications sent to you and to
the International Executive Committee.

Fraternally yours,

MAX SHACHTMAN,

National Secretary

For the Political Committee.

April 30, 1946.

93

'

lions of their own, and sometimes even to irresponsible acti
which hurl ami discredit the opposition, hurt the party and only
make the consolidation and self -justification of the bureaucracy
easier.

In I he very early days of the struggle between the opposition
and the bureaucracy In Russia (Trotsky points out), the party
leadership, In order artificially to deepen and extend the differ
enccs, dUg Into the historical past, of the Russian movement for
all sorts of half-relevant and utterly irrelevant arguments. To
clothe themselves with the authority of Lenin in the struggle
against Trotsky, the bureaucracy, in part out of deliberate dis
loyalty, in part oul of simple lack of understanding of Lenin's
views, raised for the first time the theory of "socialism in a single
country." It is perfectly clear that this theory was put forward
in the first place solely as a disloyal factional weapon against the
opposition. But what was initially invented as an instrument of
the bureaucracy eventually transformed the bureaucracy into its
instrument, so to speak. The bureaucracy became victim of its
own factional excesses. The bureaucracy sought artifically to
deepen the gulf between itself and the opposition and ended by
falling into the gulf itself. The theory of "socialism in a single
country" became practice. In practice, a more natural realign-
ment took place. On the one side, at one stage or another, stood
those who sought to preserve the achievements of the socialist
revolution. To the other side, were driven all those whom powerful
social forces, making this theory their very own, propelled toward
the destruction of the acheivements of the socialist revolution.
Stalin, and the circle around him in 1924, thought that putting
forward the theory of "Socialism in a single country" would be
an effective factional bludgeon with which to smash Trotsky. It
is inconceivable, however, that in 1924 this circle could even
dream of the distance from socialism, that they were destined
to travel under the impulsion of the theory they had themselves
invented and of the social forces awakened and mobilized by this
theory.

In the long run, organization, any system of organization or
administration, does not have and cannot have any independent
significance. Politics exists to serve class interests. Organizations
exist to serve politics. Organization of a certain type is required
for politics of a certain type. If it does not meet these require-
ments, one or the other must, and in the end surely will, be
"adjusted" so that the two conform. In the end, the political line
decides everything.

The possibility of unity between the Workers Party and the
Socialist Workers Party was reopened for the first time since
the beginning of the Second World War, at least so far as the
Workers Party was concerned, by the official decision of the
Socialist Workers Party that the slogan of "unconditional de-
fense of the Soviet Union" was to be taken from the foreground

10

position which it occupied in the SWP's political life and retired
to the background; that it would be replaced by the slogan
"Defend the European revolution from Stalinism." The principal
political difference that caused the split in 1940 having been the
question of defense of Stalinist Russia in the war, the Socialist
Workers Party Minority and then the Workers Party itself took
the view that with this change in the position of the SWP, unity
was once more desirable and possible. It is not necessary to dwell
on this. The conclusion is obvious and incontestable.

But it is precisely at this point that the bureaucratic character
of the regime and leadership in the Socialist Workers Party
played its fatal part. To prevent unity, to show that unity was
"politically" impossible or undesirable, the Socialist Workers
Party bureaucracy had to exaggerate and extend and even invent
political differences. That is the only meaning of the classic
bureaucratic formula, not coined but adopted by the leader of
the Socialist Workers Party: "We, on our part, assume that the
course toward deepening the split is necessary and correct; our
attitude flows from that." It is simply impossible to so much as
begin to understand what happened to the struggle for unity if
the full meaning of this formula, first uttered in April 1945 (see
Appendix), is not grasped in all its implications. To avoid unity,
the Cannonites took the course of "deepening the split."

The slogan of "defense of the Soviet Union," which they had
at first decided had "receded into the background," was forcibly
dragged into the foreground, given the same, if not greater,
prominence and emphasis than it had before. Typical of the
bureaucratic procedure, the second change was made without even
so much as an acknowledgment of the first and, it goes without
saying, without consulting the party membership or even the
official party leadership. The second change came as a purely per-
sonal pronouncement by the party leader, as a revelation from
high authority, as a proclamation from the throne, in the form
of a speech delivered at a public meeting in which the slogan was
once more — on purely personal initiative and authority, it should
be emphasized, and without the slightest consultation or authori-
zation from the party itself — hauled into the foreground for the
ingenious reason that . . . the Second World War is still going on.
To this it should be added that the first change, namely, retiring
the slogan to the background, was made while the war was really
on; while the second change, namely, shifting the slogan back to
the foreground, was made months after the defeat of Germany
and Japan!

Since that time, the "Russian '.ine" of the Socialist Workers
Party has been "fortified" in the same direction and with the same
aim of "deepening the split." But even if on a smaller scale,
nevertheless in essentially the same way, that which was so
cleverly contrived as a factional instrument is necessarily acquir-

11 •*