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situation. Let us consider for a moment what our object
should be with regard to the Spanish situation. Supposing
that there had been going on in Spain to-day a civil war
without any intervention of any foreign troops whatsoever,
would the party opposite then have been urging us to inter-
vene on one side or the v other ? [HON. MEMBERS : * No !']
The right hon. Gentleman says ' No/ [An HON. MEMBER :
' There would be no war !'] The right hon. Gentleman has
just admitted that in that case there would have been no
desire and no suggestion that it was the duty of the Govern-
ment of this country to intervene on one side or the other.
He has, in fact, admitted that the problem in Spain is the
intervention of foreign troops, of foreign soldiers fighting
either on one side or the other. [HON. MEMBERS : ' No !']
That being so, it is clear that the best thing we can do is to
try to get these foreign troops out of the country, and, seeing
that the attitude of other countries towards the civil war in
Spain is so largely dominated by their own ideas of what is
suitable for their own countries, it is clear that if the policy
of non-intervention had not been pursued, originally at the
instance of the French Government but all 'through with the
hearty and full co-operation of the British Government—
if that policy had not been pursued, there was every prospect
that the civil war in Spain might presently become a European
war of unknown magnitude.
" The events of yesterday have, of course, very largely
knocked the bottom out of this Debate. [HON. MEMBERS :
' Oh !'] I am only quoting what has been said by one hon.
Member after another in the course of this afternoon. Hon.
Members opposite cannot have listened to their own colleagues.
A good many speeches which, no doubt, had been prepared on
another assumption, have had to be torn up, and die right
hon. Gentleman this afternoon was compelled to make a rapid
shift of ground. So, instead of taunting us with truckling
to dictators and with weakness in not breaking off negotiations
if the Italian Government could not see their way to accept
the invitation to the Three-Power conversations—instead
of denouncing us for consenting to discuss this matter once
again in the Non-intervention Committee, he has had to
take up different ground altogether and to throw doub'ts