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Full text of "The Struggle For Peace"

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Meanwhile the Opposition continued its attack on the Govern-
ment's more general measures of appeasement. It appeared to
regard the Anschluss^ not so much as a warning of-what must
inevitably come of trying to secure an international order without
either the co-operation of half the Powers of Europe or any
programme for peaceful (as opposed to arbitrary) treaty revision,
but rather as a Jdnd of judgment on the Prime Minister for his
attempts to re-establish contact with the " have-not" powers
that had abandoned the " League" "It seems to me" Mr.
Attlee had said on i^th March, " that this event knocks down
the house of cards which the Prime Minister has been building.
It shows the futility of thinking you con deal with dictator
states" The alternative recommended was a military alliance
with France and Soviet Russia and such of the smaller League
members as could be induced to join in such a crusade and a
challenging intimation to Germany and Italy—the " aggressor
States "—that any interference with the status quo would be
met by their joint arms. In particular it was urged that Britain
should join with France and the Soviet in giving an undertaking
to afford military assistance to C^echslovaJda in the event of
unprovoked aggression. As the German minority in that country\
amounting to three and a half millions or nearly a third of the
total population, was growing increasingly restless under the
C^ech ride which had been imposed upon them ly the Versailles
treaties^ this might easily come to mean that any change in the
existing situation could or^ly be brought about by another world
war. At ten minutes to four on Thursday', 24^ March, the
Prime Minister therefore rose to make an anxiously awaited
Declaration on British foreign policy.