THE VITAL INTERESTS OF BRITAIN Meanwhile the Opposition continued its attack on the Govern- ment's more general measures of appeasement. It appeared to regard the Anschluss^ not so much as a warning of-what must inevitably come of trying to secure an international order without either the co-operation of half the Powers of Europe or any programme for peaceful (as opposed to arbitrary) treaty revision, but rather as a Jdnd of judgment on the Prime Minister for his attempts to re-establish contact with the " have-not" powers that had abandoned the " League" "It seems to me" Mr. Attlee had said on i^th March, " that this event knocks down the house of cards which the Prime Minister has been building. It shows the futility of thinking you con deal with dictator states" The alternative recommended was a military alliance with France and Soviet Russia and such of the smaller League members as could be induced to join in such a crusade and a challenging intimation to Germany and Italy—the " aggressor States "—that any interference with the status quo would be met by their joint arms. In particular it was urged that Britain should join with France and the Soviet in giving an undertaking to afford military assistance to C^echslovaJda in the event of unprovoked aggression. As the German minority in that country\ amounting to three and a half millions or nearly a third of the total population, was growing increasingly restless under the C^ech ride which had been imposed upon them ly the Versailles treaties^ this might easily come to mean that any change in the existing situation could or^ly be brought about by another world war. At ten minutes to four on Thursday', 24^ March, the Prime Minister therefore rose to make an anxiously awaited Declaration on British foreign policy.