Skip to main content

Full text of "The Struggle For Peace"

See other formats

the whole territory which will enable subsequent corrections
to be made, in order—so far as it is possible—to meet the
real will of the peoples concerned. I have undertaken to
accept these corrections in advance. I have, moreover, declared
myself ready to allow this plebiscite to take place under the
control either of international commissions or of a mixed
German-Czech commission. I am finally ready, during the
days of the plebiscite, to withdraw our troops from the
most disputed frontier areas, subject to the condition that
the Czechs do the same. I am, however, not prepared to
allow a territory which must be considered as belonging to
Germany, on the ground of the will of the people and of
the recognition granted even by the Czechs, to be left without
the protection of the Reich. There is here no international
power or agreement which would have the right to take
precedence over German right.
" The idea of being able to entrust to the Sudeten Germans
alone the maintenance of order is practically impossible in
consequence of the obstacles put in the way of their political
organisation in the course of the last decade, and particularly
in recent times. As much in the interest of the tortured,
because defenceless, population as well as with regard to the
duties and prestige of the Reich, it is impossible for us to
refrain from giving immediate protection to this territory.
" Your Excellency assures me that it is now impossible
for you to propose such a plan to your own Government.
May I assure you for my part that it is impossible for me to
justify any other attitude to the German people. Since, for
England, it is a question at most of political imponderables,
whereas, for Germany, it is a question of primitive right of
the security of more than three million human beings and the
national honour of a great people.
" I fail to understand the observation of your Excellency
that it would not be possible for the Czech Government to
withdraw their forces so long as they were obliged to reckon
with possible invasion, since precisely by means of this
solution the grounds for any forcible action are to be removed.
Moreover, I cannot conceal from your Excellency that the
great mistrust with which I am inspired leads me to believe
Siat the acceptance of the principle of the transfer of Sudeten