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Full text of "World Trade Center Property Risk Report Prepared for Silverstein Properties (Released via nistreview.org FOIA request)"

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WORLD TRADE CENTER 

Property Risk Report 



Prepared for 

Silversteio Properties, Inc 




Alternative Insurance Works 

521 Fifth Avenue 

New York, NY 10175 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15001 






DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 



. Hickev 






¥ 



TABLE of CONTENTS 



A) Overview 



B) Discussion of Physical Characteristics of: 
Building Areas 
Construction Detail 
Mechanical Detail 



Appendix 

C) Fire Protection 

D) Flood 

E) Probable Maximum Loss 

F) Maximum Foreseeable Loss 

G) Diagrams 

Sprinkler Risers - Towers 1&2 

Sprinkler Risers - Northeast Plaza Building 

Sprinkler Risers - Southeast Plaza Building 

Sprinkler Main - B-l Level 

Sprinkler Main - Concourse Level 

Standpipe • Tanks & Pumps - Towers 1&2 

Standpipe Main - B-I Level 

Standpipe Main - Concourse Lewi 

Subgrade Occupancies - B-l to B*6 

Store Listing - Concourse & Plaza Levels 

Detail Drawings of Wall Sections - Typical Fire Stopping 

H) PA Memorandum • Asbestos Locations 

I)- Standards 

Risk Classification & Loss Estimates for High Rise Buildings 
FM Data Sheet - High Rise Buildings 
MFL of High Rise Buildings 

J) About Alternative Insurance Works 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15003 



OVERVIEW 



The World Trade Center is one of the most prominent commercial real 
estate complexes in the world and a hallmark of the Manhattan skyline. 

This document discusses many of the physical characteristics of the 
complex, various protection and risk control aspects and some of the 
potentially catastrophic incidents that might occur. 

The discussion focuses on the following components of the complex: 

• The two 1 1 0-story office towers (One and Two World 
Trade Center) 

• The office portion of the two nine-story buildings (Four and 
Five World Trade Center 

• The retail area of the World Trade Center* referred to in the 
report as the Mall which consists of retail space located on 
the Concourse level 

• The Subgrade space, which consists of six basement, levels 
(B-l through B-6) that project about 70 below the 
Concourse. 

It is estimated that 50,000 people work in the World Trade Center and 
that 1 50.000 commuters' travel through the concourse to access Path and 
MTA subway trains, on a daily basis. Annually approximately 2 million 
tourists visit the Observation Deck. 

Much of the discussion of the physical characteristics has been taken 
from documents developed by the Port Authority's real estate advisors. 
The loss estimates (PML's and MFl/s) outlined in the report are 
predicated on conventional risk control conventions of the major HPR 
underwriters. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15004 



Building areas: 



The total building area is 1 1.181,708 square feet and can be brokeo down as follows 



Excaianon: 



Foundation: 



Struauralframing: 



One 

Two 

Four 

Five 

Subtotal • offices 

Retail 

Total 



Stories/ 
levels 

110 

110 

6 

6 



Year 
Built 

1970 
1972 
1977 
1975 

1970 



Gross 
sq. ft. 

4,761.416 

4.761.416 

462738 

581.238 

10,566.808 

614.901 

11.181,709 



The total Subgrade area is 2,656,435 square feet and can be broken down as follows: 



Gross area 

Open area 

PATH use 
Net area 
Parking area 
Usable area 
Operations area* 
Leasable area 

Occupied as of 5/31/00 

Unoccupied as of 5/31/00 

Port Authority 



2,656,435 
(266,963) 
(422,337) 
1,967,135 
(633,575) 
1,333,560 
(810,143) 
523,417 

279.700 
79,217 

164,500 



Operations area includes truck docks and platforms, mechanical equipment 
rooms, refrigeration plant, and verticalpenetratioris 

Construction detail 

The Subgrade was constructed after a massive excavation project removed 1,200,000 
cubic yards of fill from the she. The fill was placed into the Hudson River and also used 
to create 23 acres of the 90-acre Battery Park City complex on which the World Financial 
Center was constructed. 

The structural columns continue down to subgrade level 8-6 where they are 
connected to grillages on concrete piers or rock. The caissons are large circular 
foundation supports set in bedrock to anchor the structures. The foundations are 
connected to a large concrete slab, which forms the lowest basement floor. The 
Subgrade consists of six basement levels of columns and slabs. 

One and Two World Trade Center contain perimeter columns and beams which form 
a closely spaced rigid frame of steel that runs the full height of each building. There are 
rigid frames on each of the four sides of the lower that act together as a tube. This exterior 
tube can resist the effects of gravity and wind. Wind load was determined on the basis of a 
wind tunnel laboratory test. 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15005 



ll'thddnf: 
Flooring. 



Floor loads 



Roof 
Ccihno hetzms 



Three feet. 



In One and Two World Trade r m f-r tk. ^ 

** ** the exception ^ „T£ ? ^^ «*** *" »*« 
eight inches thick. Each floor is briArl* i' ' 7> ,07 « ,os « »<* 1 10. which ar. 

-I floor -sse,^^^ 

are center core, allowing windowed office^ * '*"* r00ms and e,e ™>r shafts 



Typical office floor 



Dead load 
Live load 



Approximately 60 pst 
100 psf reducible 



The exterior walls ofOne and Two WorWT a r- 

wiling windows tigntlv fioed between *H J*?*** cons ' st °f reflective floor to 
exte nor facade of Four SJ£^^2™»- «■ — <»l»n™ ST 
aluminum and glass. rade Cwter «w«« of black-anodixed 

-JE&ESSEi- ."*• — * b »^p — «- »* «, 

World Trade Center have 12 foot ilab^wT t f ' ^ ,e ' Two - Four ' *>d Five 
excep^^ 



Tower and Plaza building ceiling he,gnts 



Floor 

MER 7/8 

40 

MER 41/42 

43 

44 

67 

74 

MER 75/76 

78 

106 

107 

MER 108/109 



One World Trade 
24* 0" 
14' 0" 
28*0" 
14' 0" 
14 '0' 
16*0" 
14' '0* 
28' 0" 

14' 0" 

14' 4 - 

17' 6" 
25' 10" 



Ceiling Height 



Two World Trade 



Note: 1 WTC is s« fe« taller than 2 WTC 



24* 0" 
14' 0" 
28'0" 
12*0" 
14* 0" 
12*0" 
14'0" 
28* 0" 
14' 0* 
14* 4" 

ire* 

25' 10" 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENT! AL 



15006 



The Port Authority The Plaza, Concourse, and Subgrade levels have the following «;lm$ 
heights measured slab-co-slab: 

Plaza, Concourse, and Subgrade level ceiling heights 
Plaza 



Concourse 
Subgrade B-1 
Subgrade B-2 through B-4 
Subgrade B5 and B-6 



58' 0* for the I and 2 WTC lobbies above 

mezzanine 

15' 0" for 4 and 5 WTC 

22' M 

16' cr 

mt or 

rrcr 



Column spacing 



Windows. 



Loading docks 



Hearing: 



One and Two World Trade Center are virtually column free, while Four and Five World 
Trade Center have 3 0-foot-on -center column spacing and 3G-foot-by-30-foot bays. 

The windows are nearly floor to ceiling strips between aluminum columns, 
measuring seven feet eight inches in height and one foot ten inches in width. The • 
windows of One and Two World Trade Center are washed by wash robots which run 
on tracks along the perimeter from the roofs and in the facade of the towers. Four 
and Five World Trade Center window washing is performed by cleaners with the use 
of a mechanical scaffold. 

Loading facilities are provided via Barclay Street and staffed by a security guard. 
The access ramps lead to the Subgrade, where loading docks are provided on level B- 
1. These loading docks consist of 40 bays, which can accommodate large trailer 
trucks up to a maximum height of 1 1 feet, 5 inches on the main truck dock, and 10 
feet 6 inches on the lower truck dock. There are 17 bays on the main truck dock level 
and the balance are on the lower dock. There are also some van spaces. Seven of the 
truck bays are equipped with compactors, accommodating approximately 230 yards 
of refuse. None of the bays is equipped with hydraulic lifts. 

Mechanical detail 

The heating system consists of a perimeter, two pipe induction system and hot water 
baseboard convectors, both of which have local zone temperature controls. The 
Complex purchases high-pressure steam from Con Edison. It is distributed to the 
Complex via steam meter rooms located in the Subgrade. High pressure steam enters 
the Subgrade on level B-6 and is reduced to low-pressure steam tbrough-a series of 
regulating valves. Low-pressure steam risers cany the steam to the MERs in each 
building, where the steam is then distributed to each zone's heat exchangers and air 
handling units/far) coils. The beat exchangers convert the steam's energy to the 
recirculating water. The heated water is then pumped to the fin-tubed heating 
elements by individual constant volume hot water pumps to the various zones in the 
World Trade Center. Each system contains a redundant heat exchanger, as well as 
pumps for back-up duty. The hot water supplied temperature for each of the zones is 
automatically reset and maintained according to outdoor temperature conditions. 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15007 



Thermal 
distribution 



Condenser water 
distribution: 



The automatic control valves which regulate the heat output are sequenced to operate wnh 
the overhead supply constant air volume systems. There are approximately eight 
heating zones (four interior, four perimeter) per floor in One and Two World Trade 
Center and five heating zones in Four and Five World Trade Center (three interior 
two perimeter). 

Steam distribunon system 

High'pressure (125 psig minimum) steam is purchased from Con Edison steam is 
delivered to the World Trade Center via a distribution main which nins under 
Greenwich Street. From the main, steam is piped from the B-! level into the steam 
meter room located on elevation 242 feet. From the steam meter room, it is piped via 
redunoant risers to pressure-reducing valve ("PRV) stations located in the MERs in 
One and Two World Trade Center on floors 7, 41, 75 and 108 There is one dual 
path (high demand/low demand) PRV station located in each MER The low 
pressure side of the PRV stations serves the beating coils in the air conditioning 
supply units and the secondary water systems in each respective MER. Steam 
condensate is collected via a system of drains and pipes under the floors of each 
MER and earned via the low-pressure return CLPR") risers to the next lower MER. 
In the lower MER, the Condensate is utilized by the domestic hot water preheaters 
collected again, and piped to the main condensate collection tank on elevation 24"> * 
feet. Flash tanks, provided in each MER, flash the high- and mediunvpressure 
condensate into low-pressure steam, which is recovered and piped into the low 
pressure steam distribution system. Condensate is then drawn to the B-6 condensate 
tanks. At this point it can be pumped to the 289 MER in Four World Trade Center 
and used again in the domestic water preheat tank and interior reheat system. 

Chilled water distribution system 

The chilled water for cooling coils and secondary water coolers is supplied to the various 
MERs via two chilled water riser systems. For One and Two World Trade Center, one system 
supplies the low zone, which includes the 7th and 41 st floor MERs. the second system serves 
the high zone, which includes the 75th and 108th floor MERs. Branch piping for each MER is 
tapped off the chilled water supply and return risers. A pressure differential bypass assembly 
is provided in each MER. The function of this bypass is to compensate for variations in 
demand on the chilled water supply by the cooling coils and secondary water coolers, thus 
maintaining a consistent differential pressure between supply and return. 

Hudson RivgrMpter 

Water pumped from the Hudson River supplies the complex with redundant 

condenser water via heat exchangers. The pump house for Hudson River water is 

located adjacent to the Battery Park City Boat Basio approximately ©ne-half a mile 

from the World Trade Center. The pump house has two intake tunnels with two 

screen chambers. The north and south chambers contain four turbine pumps each 

producing 13,000to 19,000gpm via 600-hp and 900-hp 2,300 vokmotort,' 

respectively. The water is then pumped via two main pipes, one 60-inch pipe and the 

newly installed 66-inch pipe, to the chiller plant on levels B-5 and B-6 and the 

computer cooling water system on levels B-3 and B4 of the Subgrade. The cooling system for 

the Complex is based upon a chilled water and condenser water circuit svstefn. The chiller 

plant provides chilled water at a temperature of 38 to 54 degrees Fahrenheit. Condenser water 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15008 



£ 

is at a temperature range of 80 to 90 degrees Fahrenheit Chilled water and condenser water 
are provided directly to certain tenants based upon their individual needs at additional ccs: 

Secondary water systems 

In One and Two World Trade Center, secondary water systems for the perimeter induction 
units are provided by 12 independent systems, typically zoned North and West or South and 
East. Each system Consists of a steam-to-hot water converter to generate heating water, a 
cooler (heat exchanger), two circulating pumps (one standby) and a differential pressure 
b\pass. Depending on the season, heated or cooled water is produced \na the converter or 
coolerand distributed by the circulating pump to the induction units. 

Condenser water system 

The condenser water systems provide the medium by which the various tenant supplemental air 
conditioning systems release their rejection heat. These systems are similar to tenant condenser 
water systems in a typical office building. 

The cooling water for these systems is provided by use of river water through heat exchangers 
located in various machine rooms in the subgrade levels. Condenser water is pumped in a 
cascading fashion between systems of plate-and-fiame and/or sheli-and-tube heat exchangers 
located in mechanical spaces in One and Two World Trade Center. A t>pical system has two 
heat exchangers and two pumps (one standby). Cooling water is distributed as required by the 
pumps through risers to the various floors. 

There are 10 of these systems throughout the complex. For example, System No. 2, which 
serves floors 43 to 108 in One World Trade Center, is provided with cooling water by Primary 
System No. 1 This system has an operating temperature range of 85 degrees to 95 degrees 
Fahrenheit, and consists of two shell-and-tube heat exchangers, two plate-and-frame beat 
exchangers and four circulating pumps. The circulating pumps and heat exchangers are sized 
to handle 1,400 gpm each. Tbis system is configured to operate as two separate circulating 
loops. The two sheU-and tube heat exchangers and two circulating pumps serve one loop, and 
the other two pumps and the two plate-and-ftame heat exchangers strvt the second loop. Only 
one pump and one heat exchanger in each loop is required to operate at a time. 

Air conditioning system 

Core areas, consisting of the elevator lobbies, toilets and associated circulation spaces, are air 
conditioned by means of centrally located constant volume air conditioning systems. There are 
no return fens directly associated with these units. These systems provide make-up air for the 
toilet exhaust systems via door louvers In addition, these systems provide ventilation makeup 
air to the various elevator machine rooms. Air is directly exhausted from the machine rooms 
and is not returned or recirculated wkhin the room. 

Interior office areas extending from the building core to a distance of 15 feet from the exterior 
walls are air conditioned by means of centrally located constant volume air conditioning 
systems. Each system supplies one quadrant (Southwest, Southeast, Northwest, Northeast) on 
multiple floors. Each system is interlocked with multiple return fans. Air is distributed to the 
floors via vertical risers. A constant volume air pressure regulator is provided at each office 
floor tap into the respective riser. The hung ceilings are utilized as return air plenums. Return 
fans are provided and interlocked with the respective supply systems. Oily interior and 
perimeter fens are interlocked with return fens. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15009 



The perimeter offices or open office areas exrending from the exterior wall for a distance of 1< 
fe« are conditioned by means of two pipe induction units located below the sill of the 
windows. Induction units utilize a combination of tempered high-pressure air (pnmarv air) anc 
either heated or cooled water (secondary water) to provide cooling or heating. The pnmarv air 
©duces the flow of room air across the coil through which the secondary water is flowing' TV 
induced air is either heated or cooled, depending upon the temperature of the secondary water 
flowing through the coil. The mixture of primary and induced air is then discharged to'the 
room via the gritles on the top of each unit. The function of the primarv air is to provide 
vennlation and dshumidificatioo to offset the latent loads of the area se'rved, and to provide the 
motivating force for the induction and circulation of the room air. The function of the 
secondary water is to offset the relevant heat gains or losses in order to regulate the room 
temperature. The induction units are controlled b>- pneumatic thermostats which measure 
return air and control pneumatically actuated secondary water control valves to maintain room 
temperature. 

TTie primary air is furnished by centrally located, constant volume air conditioning systems 
Each system supplies one exposure (North, South, East, West) of multiple floors. Each system 
is interlocked with multiple return fans. The distribution of air is via vertical risers in the core 
shafts and horizontal feeding ductwork in the hung ceilings directly below the induction units. 

Miscellaneous systems 

Centrally located air conditioning systems are provided for the public areas of the 
building, including the various lobbies and the observation deck and for the elevator 
machine rooms. 

TTie central plant refrigeration plant on level B-5 contains numerous chillers ranging in size 
from 13.8 kV 7000 ton units (7 of them) to 2.3kV 2500 ton units (2 of them) and 10 CHW 
pumps ranging in size from 5,250 gpm to 10,500 gpm. 



I'TC - cktller plant 
add m on: 



The 1993 chiller plant addition ax the B-6 level (elevation 242) was installed to 
provide 10,000 tons of additional cooling capacity. The addition consists of five 
2,500-ton centrifugal machines with 4.16 kV electric driven compressors and five 
400 hp, two 1 00 hp, variable speed 4. 1 6 k V pumps and two 1 00 hp, variable speed. 



The chiller plants have a total capacity of 59,000 tons plus two parallel 2,500-ton drive lines 
with 1 7 CHW pumps generating between 3,000 gpm and 10,500 gpm. 

The central plants condition water to the average requirement in the complex which includes 
One, Two/Three, Four, Five, and Six World Trade Center, and the Concouree and Subgrade, 
Secondary miks, either fen coils or induction units, make final zone adjustments which are 
served by chilled water and condenser water circuitry from the central plants. The system is 
based upon a complex series of hot and chilled water pipes, condenser water pipes, main air 
return ducts and main supply ducts. In addition to the large mechanical equipment and 
refrigeration rooms on levels B-5 and B-6 of the Subgrade, there are eight MERs, each two 
floors in height, serving zones one through six of One and Two World Trade Center along with 
two MERs located on the ninth floors of Four and Five World Trade Center. There are also 
two MERs on level B-6, which serve One and Two World Trade Center, and two MERs on 
subgrade elevations 289.5 and 285,5 serving Four and Five World Trade Center and the 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15010 



Centra! air 
handling systems 
and vennianon 



* 
Concourse. Each MER contains wter pumps for the hot and chilled water and condense* 
water system, ventilation duos, exhaust fens, electric distribution panels and ele\aior hois 
motors. 

The central air handling systems for the Complex consist of air handling units located 
within the 16 MERs. TTiose not located in MERs include transfer fens, exhaust fens 
and garage ramp heaters in the Subgrade. The air handlers consist of hearing 
ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system units, coils and fens. 



Eiccmcai service • 



One and Two World Trade Center contain central air handling systems in the five MERs (B-6, 
7. 41, 75 and 108), and house five t>pes of units peripheral, interior, core, elevator machine 
room, and electrical substation units, along with return and exhaust fans. The peripheral and 
interior units distribute air on a quadrant basis; the core units serve the elevator core in wo 

sections. 

Four and Five World Trade Center contain central air handling systems MERs on the ninth 
floor and in the Subgrade. The ninth floor MERs house peripheral, interior, and core air 
handling units and return and exhaust fens that serve the third to ninth floors. The below grade 
MERs in Four and Five World Trade Center (289.5 and 285 5, respectively) serve the public 
spaces. Plaza and Concourse. In addition, they house auxiliary service outdoor units that serve 
the concourse mall tenants by providing conditioned outdoor air to the air handling units within 
the tenant spaces. There are also small MERs on the third floor of Four and Five World Trade 
Center. 

The Subgrade is serviced by One and Two World Trade Center MERs from B-6, with main 
supply air. The subgrade contains a series of transfer fens, exhaust fens and unit heaters. 

The Power Authority of the State of New York ("NYPA") is the sole supplier of 
electric power and energy to the World Trade Center N*YPA supplies the electricity 
under contract to the Port Authority for the Port Authority's own use and for 
redistribution to tenants. The Port Authority does not purchase electricity for the 
Marriott World Trade Center Hotel (Three World Trade Center) or Seven World 
Trade Center. Electricity for the World Trade Center is obtained from the main substation, 
maintained by Con Edison and located on Barclay St. and West Broadway under 
Seven World Trade Center. The substation supplies the World Trade Center through 
eight 1,200 ampere 13.8 kV feeders. The 13.8 kV feeders are distributed through the 
World Trade Center from the main power distribution center on the B-3 level to 25 
Port Authority owned and operated substations and two refrigeration plants located 
throughout the World Trade Center. All of the transformers in the 25 substations are dry*ype 
transformers. Electricity is sufficient on most floors of the World Trade Center to provide 10 
watts per usable square foot with primary and secondary voltages of 480/277 volt, three phase, 
four wire and 208 V/120 volt, three phase, four wire, respectively via a Bus Duct system in the 
towers. The 10 wans per square foot capacity is more than sufficient for lighting receptacles 
and supplemental HVAC installations. 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15011 



Supplemental HVAC typically takes the form of localized electrically driven water 
cooled units which are required when demand exceeds 4 to 4.5 waosper square foot 
In addition, certain tenants require that their computer operations be maintained ax low 
temperatures 24 hours a day requiring the installation of electrically driven water- 
cooled units. The World Trade Center is served by two backup systems* (I ) scand-bv generator 
systems on level B-6; and (2) tertiary power from Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) of 
New Jersey which can, in the event of an emergency blackout by Con Edison and failure of the 
emergency generator plant qo B-6 level, pick up selected life safety and egress loads. The 
teniae power feeder from PSE&C is delivered via a tap to the PATH feeders run through the 
PATH runnel under the Hudson River to the World Trade Center. In addition, cenain tenants 
are tied into a tenant standby power system, which consists of four 2,200 kw Caterpillar 
1.3 8 kV diesel generators. In the future, this will be expanded to six generators. The generator 
plant is located on the roof of Five World Trade Center. Power is distributed at 13.8 kV to 
various stand-by power substations located in selected MER rooms. Stand-by power is provided 
to certain tenants on a recoverable basis. 

The stand-by generator sv*tem consists of six 1,000 kW Waukesha Diesel generators located on 
level B-6 The total plant capacity is at 277/480 votes three phase. All six generators feed into a 
common distribution bus, called the Left and Right Main Distribution Boards. From the Left 
and Right Main Distribution Boards power is fed directly to the Emergency Power Centers 
rEPCO of One, Two, Four, Five, and Six World Trade Center. EPCs are comprised of one or 
more air circurt breakers and two automatic transfer switches. EPCs also supply power to the 
elevator transfer switches for controlled emergency evacuation of elevator passengers. The 
stand-by generator will stan automatically only when power to the emergency lighting panels 
fails. 



Plumbing 



The plumbing system for the World Trade Center is t\pical of other Manhattan office 
-buildings with steel, copper and cast iron piping throughout the World Trade Center. 
Restrooms for men and women are located on each floor of the World Trade Center 
and in the Concourse and Subgrade. 



Sam ton systems 



Storm svstem 



The gravity sanitary system consists of soil and waste stacks and vent stacks which 
serve the plumbing fixtures, mechanical equipment floor drains and kitchen 
equipment on the various floors in the building. The gravity system drains to the 
building drains to a large concrete pipe on the B-l level, which connects the 30-inch 
sanitary line on B-l to the, New York City sewer system. 

The plumbing fixtures, mechanical equipment and floor drains located below grade drain to the 
various sewage ejector pits located on level B-6. The pump discharge from the ejector pumps is 
connected to the building drains, after the house trap, at the building wall. 

Roof drains and leaders convey the storm water by gravity to the various building drains, 
located on level B-l t which connect to the 36-tnch storm watch dram that discharges into the 
Hudson River. Tie subsurface water and the machinery drips are drained into the various sump 
pits located in level B-6. The sump pumps discharge the clear water into two 36-inch storm 
water drains on level B-I. 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15012 



Domestic cold 
water svstem 



Domestic hot 
^ater svstem 



Elevators 



Domestic water: 



There are three pumping nations located in the MERs on level B-l (elevation ">94 feet) 4 1 
and 75. Each pumping station consists of four pumps, a backflow prevtnter, an air cushion 
tank, a high pressure switch, a low pressure switch, main and standbv pressure electnc 
transducer, four individual controllers, a master controller, and a pressure-reducing valve 
system that controls the water pressure in the zone that it serves. 

The domestic steam-fired hot water system consists of hot water preheaters, hot water 
heaters, and hot water circulation pumps for each zone in the building The equipment is 
located in the NfERs on floors 7, 41, 75 and 108. T^e water from the ho: water beaters is 
supplied at 1 05 degrees Fahrenheit to the \anous floors by means of the hot water distribution 
s>*tem. The hot water circulation pumps circulate water through the piping svstem to maintain 
the hot water temperature. 

The Complex^ state-of-the-art internal transportation system includes a total 240 
. elevators and 63 escalators. Each tower building is serviced by 21 high-speed express 
elevator cars, and 72 local cars. In addition, One World Trade Center and Two 
World Trade Center are serviced by 1 and 8 large freight and service elevators, 
respectively. Several years ago a $127 million modernization program to install 'a 
state-of-the-art computerned elevator control system and refurbish elevator cab 
interiors was undertaken. Hie control system project is nearly 50 percent complete, 
and the elevator cab interiors are 1 00 percent modernized. 

Elevators are also being upgraded to include new elevator car operating stations, car 
position indicators, comdor push button stations, lanterns and tactile markers for the 
disabled. This project is 99 percent complete. 108 passenger and three service 
elevators have been completed to date, including the addition of new elevator group 
dispatch, car signal controls, control systems with future capability to add new closed loop 
feedback motor control systems, new static power converters, trail* cables, adjustments, signals* 
lobby panels, safety tests, emergency controls and related hardware. New static power 
converters have been installed on four shuttle cars in Two World Trade Center, two shuttle 
cars in One World Trade Center, and alt local elevators. 

Domestic water for the World Trade Center is supplied by the City of New York 
from the water main on Greenwich Street to the Subgrade. 



Fire and life safcrv 



The World Trade Center is sprinklered (wet system) with a combination fire 
standpipe sprinkler system. The fire system is fed by two, eight-inch fire loops 
located in the Concourse and in level B- J ceilings,- with Siamese connections located 
on the exterior walls of the complex for the use of the Fire Department. Tliere are four fire 
pumps and four fire reserve tanks located in One World Trade Center and four each m Two 
World Trade Center. 

The sprinkler system distributes water from holding tanks filled by the domestic water supply 
and distributed through three risers to One and Two World Trade Cemer. One and Two World 
Trade Center contain one riser per rone, accessible from each floor through the service closets. 
In each tower, the system includes one 5,000 gallon combination sprinkler/standpipe and one 
10,000 gallon tank on the 1 10th floor, and one 5,000 gallon combination sprinkler/stancfcipe 
gallon tank on the 42nd floors. Additional 5,000 gallon tanks are on the TStffloor MER for the 
standpipe system in each tower. Both One and Two World Trade Center contain two sprinkler 
pumps located on the B-l level and 108th floor MER. TTie B-I pumps pressurize the 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15013 



Antenna: 



Telecommunications: 



Subgrade , Concourse, and Plaza bidding sprinkler systems. Tie 5,000 gallon tanks on 42 
shared with the fire standpipe system. 



10 



are 



The sprinkler system for Four and Five World Trade Center and Subgrade are separate from 
those for One and Two World Trade Center. The Subgrade is served by downfeed nsers from 
the B- J loop while Four and Five World Trade Center are served by up'food nserc from the 
Concourse loop. The Concourse loop also serves the stores within the mail. One and Two 
World Trade Center contain two sprinkler pumps each, located in the B-I level and 108th floor 
MER. The B-l pump pressurizes the Subgrade, Concourse, and Four and Five World Trade 
Center sprinkler systems. The pump on 108* floor supplies fire protection water to the upper 
floors (99 to 110). 

In addition, the complex features fire command stations in each lobby which is equivalent to a 
Class E fire alarm and recall system found in most Manhattan office buildings. Important 
elements of the fire safety system are summarized as follows: 

• There are three stairwells per floor in One and Two World Trade Center and five 
stairwells per floor in Four and Five World Trade Center. The stairwells feature fire hoses 
on each floor and the stair-wells are compartmentalized and fire stopped. The stairwells 
are also painted with phosphorescent paint, which glows in the dark. Al minimum, every 
fourth floor is a "re-entry floor" (i.e., unlocked and available for re-entry from the 
stairway). The remaining stairways may be secured for security purposes. Signage 
identifies re-entry and non-re-entry floors. There are no failsafe automatic opening devices 
on the stairway doors. 

• An alarm system with auxiliary lighting, posted fire exits and pull boxes on each floor 

• A detailed fire safety plan including periodic fire drills and evacuation supervisors on each 
floor 

• ^ Powered exit signs and lights, in addition to stair and elevator signs 

• Automatic sprinklers on all floors of One, Two, Four, and Five World Trade Center (with 
the exception of the lobby and mezzanine levels) and the Concourse. 

• A communication system details the location of the detection device on a CRT at the fire 
command station in the building lobby and on a printer and provides an audible alarm. In 
addition, a message is manually sent to the New York Fire Department detailing in what 
building the fire alarm has.sounded. Floor warden stations are located on each floor to 
provide direct communication with the fire command stations, fire director and fire 
department 

One World Trade Center contains a 360»foot weided steel tube antenna mast which 
nses 1,728 feet above ground and is used by 14 television and radio network 
broadcasting in the New York metropolitan area. The mast is protected from 
lightning by a metal earthing cable that connects steel building columns designated 
for earthing. 

The World Trade Center offers telecommunications services from multiple vendors 
via diverse entrance facilities. The number of carriers, together with the degree of 
fiber and copper capacity, in the World Trade Center provides tenants with advanced 
telecommunications services, as well as a variety of disaster recovery options. 
The World Trade Center has an on-site Bell Atlantic switching station, fiber optics 
service from every major vendor, and direct or common-earner microwave 
capability. 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15014 



11 



Bell Atlantic: 



Opcranons control 
center 



Access control 



PortAuthoriry 
Police 



Bell Atlantic provides a full range of telecommunications services to World Trade 
Center tenants The utiliry maintains a switching office in Two World Trade Center 
on floors 10 and 1 Mt can also provide service from its 140 West Street and Pearl 
Street central offices to tenants requiring diverse routing and an alternate wire center 
or the highest reliability and business continuity Bell Atlantic has insulted a 204-fiber 
ring in One and Two World Trade Center that is routed to cover both sides of the buildings. 
Similar systems exist in the Four and Five World Trade Center. The fiber-ring systems assure 
that any single failure will immediately send an alarm to Bell Atlantic utile assuring 
uninterruped service to the tenant. Breakout boxes installed every three floors provide tenants 
wrzh'con veniem access to fiber connections. 

The operations control center, located in the Subgrade, is a sophisticated computer 
assisted monitoring system. Staffed seven days a week, 24 hours a day, it provides 
monitoring of all building systems including HVAC, fire alarm, elevators and 
secunry. The operations control center contains television screens wfiich monitor the 
public areas of the complex through dozens of remote controlled cameras. 

Access from the lobby areas of each building to the office floors is by access card or 
secunry desk check-in only. There are two types of access cards, proximity cards 
and scan cards. Proximity cards are used by tenants and long-term contractors while 
scan cards are used by less frequent visitors. In addition, the World Trade Center 
uses a system of over 100 turnstiles along with security cameras. This system is 
staffed at the security control area and linked by a fiber optic network, the parking 
garage is accessible by access card only; only tenant parking is permitted in the 
Subgrade. The loading docks, accessible from gated and guarded entrances off 
Barclay Street, use an identification system for all deliveries. 

The Port Authority police patrol the exterior areas of the World Trade Center as well 
as the Concourse, Subgrade and PATH station 21 hours a day and respond to calls 
from within the World Trade Center. 



Intcnor detail office 
uoors: 



Plaza retattiloors: 



Floors: 



The office floors in One and Two World Trade Center are shaped with a square 
perimeter and have interior offices that are column free. The core is located in the 
center of each floor containing elevator shafts and stairwells, electric and telephone 
closets, service closets for steam, chilled water and sprinkler risers, and storage 
closets. The core includes a men's room and one or two women's rooms. 

The office floors in Four and Five World Trade Center are 'V shaped with perimeter and 
interior offices and 30*foot column spacing. The core is located in the center of 
each floor. 

One, Two, and Six World Trade Center do not contain "plara retail* space. Four and 
Five World Trade Center contain retail space on floors one through three (the 
Concourse, Plaza, and third floor). The second and third floors in these buildings 
also contain commercial and building service space. 

Floors through die office corridor and lobby areas contain either carpet, ceramic tile, 
granne, marble, terrazzo or terra cona finish. 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15015 



12 



Ceilings: 



Halts. 



Lighting; 



Doors 



Asbestos containing 
matcna!: 



The majority of the ceilings are suspended acoustical tile on the office floors and 
elector comdors. Ceilings in the public areas consist of a variety of masonry t>pes 

Walls in the office areas are covered with dry wall, vinyl wall coverings and paneling 
in some office areas. The lobbies, passenger elevator lobbies' trim, and Concourse 
contain marble and ter-ra coaa finish. 

A combination of fluorescent and incandescent lighting fixrures are used throughout 
the office and retail areas as well as the elevator corridors. In addition, there are 
chandeliers in the lobbies and flood lights on the exxenor areas. 
The majority of the office entrance doors off the corridors are painted hollow or solid 
metal doors. There are also a wide variety of door types depending on use including 
large steel roll up doors for subgrade access. 

The Complex, principally the lower floors or zones of One and Two World Trade 
Center and areas of the Concourse and Subgrade were constructed dunng the time 
period (1 966 to 1 970) when asbestos was used as a Are retardant. 

As a result, sprayed on asbestos is present within the sixth floor catwalks, mezzanine 
substructure, elevator shafts and machine rooms, interior core pipe chases, and 
electric and phone closets of One and Two World Trade Center. Additionally, 
asbestos-containing thermal system pipe insulation is present in the concourse ceiling 
plenum and in MERs, while vinyl asbestos floor tiles are present throughout the 
complex. The Port Authority has removed a large portion of the asbestos material 
t\pically located on the structural columns and on pipe insulation from tenant floors 
in One World Trade Center, and has removed much of the pipe 'wrap insulation found in the 
Subgrade. The practice of containment has not been implemented at the World Trade Center. 

In addition to full-scale abatement projects, the World Trade Center has instituted an ongoing 
operations and maintenance program whereby specific individuals on the staff are trained as 
certified ACM handlers and can respond with appropriate equipment and procedures to manage 
incidental ACM incidents. Tenants whose space may contain ACM haw been formally 
notified. 



Americans With 
Disabilmes Act: 



Building Code: 



The Pott Authority has completed a number of ADA projects. 

Common areas are equipped with access ramps, guard rails, automatic door? and 
elevators for the disabled. Signage and water fountains also have been modified for 
the disabled. There is also an ongoing program to replace all signs on multi-tenanted 
floors with ADA-compliant signs. 

The single tenant floors are, on a tenant-by -tenant basis, in the process of being equipped with 
bathroom facilities for the disabled and all new tenant installations include either both men's 
and women's accessible bathrooms with facilities for the disabled or a single unisex bathroom 

The long-standing policy of the Port Authority has been to assure that the World 
Trade Center meets and, where appropriate, exceeds the requirements of the building 
and fire codes of the City of New York. The Port Authority has provided specific 
commitments to the City of New York that the World Trade Center would be 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15016 



12 



Compliance with 
state and local 

la*? 



operated in conformance with the standards set forth in the New York City Building 
Code (the "Code"). In certain instances the Port Authority has estabhshed'and may 
establish in the future standards that exceed those set forth in the Code, and the net 
lessee will be required to adhere to the Port Authority's standards in such cases. 

Pursuant to existing bi-State legislation, the Port Authority has exclusive jurisdiction 
with respect to certain administrative and governmental matters pertaining to the 
Trade Center. As such, in connection with the Transaction, the Port Authority 
will continue to maintain its jurisdiction and oversight with respect to these areas, 
including: 

• Compliance with applicable building codes, as defined by the Port Authority and subject 
to agreements with the City cf New York, for all future construction projects, both m 
tenant spaces and common areas 

Compliance with fire, environmental, and health codes 

• Operating integrity of the elevator/escalator systems, electrical and mechanical systems, 
as well as the structural integrity of the Complex 

• Administration of the high tension electrical distribution system 

• Port Authority police services 

• Office tenant eligibility- consistent with legislation pertaining to the World Trade Center's 
world trade and commerce function 



On ate parking 



There are \A3 ! parking spaces located in the Subgrade that are available only on a monthly 
basis to employees and tenants of the World Trade Center. It is assumed that the Port 
Authority staff 2nd police personnel will use 1 10 spaces as part of the PA lease free of 
charge, leaving 1,321 for the net lessee(s) to rent. Transient parking is, and under the net lease 
will continue to be, prohibited. 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15017 



FIRE PROTECTION 



FIRE ALARM SYSTEM 



The Fire Alarm system in the WTC combines fire alarm signaling with an intercom, enabling fire 
safety personnel to speak to the person turning in the alarm. Alarms mav be turned in at Break- 
Glass Stations in public and common areas throughout the Trade Center Control and intercom 
equipment for the system is monitored in the Police Security Room located at level B-l. 

An alarm signal is transmined to one of many intercom panels in the Fire Alarm Console where it 
is processed. Each intercom panel represents a separate fire zone and there is a reel-to-reel tape 
recorder that transcribes conversations made over the fire intercom system. 

PA employees test the fire alarm signal boxes monthly. 

SMOKE DETECTION AND ALARM SYSTEM 

There is smoke detection and alarm systems protecting the return air ducts, elevator lobbv and the 
ventilation duct in the Mechanical Equipment Rooms (MER's). 

The return air system has detectors in the hung ceiling of each tenanted floor, in close proximity 
to the intake of the return air ducts. The detectors are connected to a computer-multiplex system, 
which scans each smoke detector and reports alarm conditions to the Police Securin Room on 
level B-l. 

There is at least one smoke detector at the ceiling of each elevator lobbv. directly above the 
elevator call button. These detectors transmit to the Police Securin- Room and cause the elevators 
to return to their main lobby. 

The ventilation alarm system monitors the supply and return air ducts in the MER's. The system 
shuts down the affected ventilation fans and alerts police securin- personnel when smoke or 
products of combustion are detected in the supply or return air ducts. The MER exhaust fan ducts 
are monitored and controlled in a similar manner. 

All detectors are inspected and tested annually by PA personnel. 

TENANT SMOKE ALARM SYSTEMS 

Many tenants have their own smoke alarm systems. These systems are inspected and tested at 
least annually in accordance with the equipment manufacturer's specifications. 

SMOKE PURGE SYSTEM 

After a fire has been extinguished in the Towers the smoke purge procedures draw in fresh 
outside air and exhaust the return air from the building. The Fire Safety Director initiates the 
operation by having the smoke purge switches (there is one for each quadrant) in the MERs 
turned on. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 



15018 



WATER SUPPIES FOR SPRINKLER AND STANDPIPE SYSTEMS 

The primary water supplies for the WTC consist of connections to I2 H city mains and total 
capacity in 14 steel gravity tanks of 70.000 gallons. These water supplies are delivered to 
sprinkler and standpipe systems by a total of 12 pumps. The tanks are automatically refilled from 
a 2" connection to the domestic water system. 

Eight of the pumps are multi-stage, high net head pumps serving the standpipe system. These 
eight pumps are 3-stage. Peerless pumps rated at 750 gpm with net heads from 228 to 360 psi. 
These pumps are situated on the following levels: B-l, 7* 41*, and 75* floors of each tower. 

On floor 1 08 of both towers there are 500 gpm Peerless pumps with a net head of 60 psi. These 
pumps take suction from 5.000-galIon steel gravity tanks and provide water supplies to both the 
standpipe and sprinkler systems for the top floors (sprinklers - floors 99 to 107 and standpipe 
floors 99 to the roof) 

At level B*l there are two separate. 1 500 gpm. Peerless pumps with net heads of 90 psi. taking 
suction from separate 1 2" connections to city mains and supplying the sprinkler systems 
protecting the Northeast Plaza Building (NEPB), Southeast Plaza Building (SEPB). Concourse 
level, and the 6 Subgrade areas. 

SPRINKLER SYSTEMS 

Sprinklers protect all tenanted floors in the towers. The exceptions are: all Mechanical 
Equipment Rooms (MERs), Chiller Plant, Power Distribution Plant and Auxiliary Condenser 
Water Room. 

The design of the sprinkler systems of both towers is similar. The direction of water flow within 
the risers is downward. Each tower has three separate risers, with each serving different groups 
of floors. Riser A supplies the top most floors, 99 through 1 10; Riser B supplies floors 98 
through 32; and Riser C supplies floors 3 1 through I . Water supplies for systems A and B are 
from the 10.000- gallon, steel sprinkler tank on the 1 10* floor. The 5.000-gallon steel tank on 
floor 41 serves both sprinklers from riser C and standpipe systems. The C risers for both 
buildings are interconnected through a divisional control valve that allows isolating in the event 
of impairments. There are separate control valves for each floor in the towers as well as water 
flow switches, tamper alarms and 2" drains. The down risers are equipped with divisional or 
isolation valves on floors I, 15,and 67 of Tower A and on floors I, 15 and 77 of Tower B. 

The 500-gpm 60-psi pumps on floor 108 of both buildings serve to boost water pressure to the 
sprinklers on floors 107 to 99 and the fire hose header on the II 0* floor. As the downward 
distance from the holding tanks increases below the 99* floor additional pump pressure is not 
required. Pressure Control Valves (PC Vs) are used to control water pressure on the lower floors. 

The rest of the WTC complex, namely the Subgrades B- 1 through 6, Concourse, NEPB, and 
SEPB are served by a second completely separate fire protection system. This system consists of 
two • 8" loop mains, with isolation valves, feed by two 1500-gpm 90 psi booster pumps. One loop 
main feeds sprinkler risers going down to the Concourse and Subgrades and up risers into the 
NEPB and SEPB are feed through the other loop main. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15019 



Sprinkler systems for the stores in the Concourse are fed off com«i— i 
sprinklers in the common areas. The system was tain inrth Z * ^"^ nsers from the 
in an impaired store would be confined to that « J SZl "" "T*"* 
were feed from a separate unimpaired riser. ■ pnnitiew in the common area that 

The booster pumps deliver fire protection water at 1 50 psi to the loop mains, 
fo^^ 

Standards. All systems are hvdraulicallv designed Officlll^f , ""'^nce wi,h N FPA 
occupancy with a minimum of 0. 1 Sn wTtl ove?£ ^£? "* IfW 1 for n ? ht ^ 
area per sprinkler not exceedine 225 sq ft IroLtion for ^ • 'f U °° ^ ft ' and P ro,ec,ed 

are designed to the requirement' of WPAI U^^ESTS *"* '? S, ° rage arCas ' 
and Concourse Retail Stores are ^^^.fl^^^^STt^? *"" 
max.mum 1 30-sq. ft. per head of protected area. Sq ' ft< * 1,h a 

2S Z^^&tS^iTZ n °r age rf «"*««- is allowed. 
the alarm system insSdln the c»o?et ? ""** "* ' *"*< detec, °' conn «<«» » 

Smoke curtains, in the form of dropped soffits with » u*»... ,.„..„• 
All openings between the main Concourse public corridor* an n , M .™ ^ 

lock* o», „i« prJJ Z Z n^"n:s pS. BS,lre "**"'* valves (PRVs> « — ' • 



WILLIS 

CONFIDENTIAL 15020 



FLOOD 

The World Trade Center ( WTC) is located near the southern tip of Manhattan Island and in close 
proximity to where the Hudson River becomes New York Harbor The westerly side of the WTC 
is within the 100-year flood zone (zone A). A category 2 or 3 hurricane f wind "velocities from 95 
to 130 mph) has the potential to raise the river/harbor water above the level of West Side 
Highway (now known as Joe DiMaggio Highway) that runs along the west side of the property. 

The following table displays the openings on the west side of the property and level that the 1 00- 
year flood would exceed the elevation of the openings. 

OPENING HEIGHT OF WATER ABOVE OPENING 

1 WTC Sidewalk o.OO' 

2 WTC sidewalk o.OO* 
Vista Parking Lots 0,25* 
H Ramp to Hotel 0.85' 
6 WTC West Street Garage |.05' 
C Ramp • Down North Bound 1.25* 
A Ramp - Up South Bound . 1.50* 
B Ramp - up North Bound |.85* 
D Ramp - Down South Bound | ,93' 
6 WTC Vesey Street Doors 2.45' 



The scenario that creates the 100 year flood assumes the storm striking the New Jersey coastline 
somewhere above Atlantic City, tracking nonh-nonhwest, with its eastern edge, where the winds 
are the highest, pushing the storm surge through the outer reaches of New York Harbor (between 
the New Jersey and Long Island Coasts) and up into New York Harbor. This scenario farther 
assumes the storm striking at high tide and when there is a full moon. 

The National Weather Service forecasts and tracks hurricanes. They also provide advisories as to 
where the storm is located, wind intensity and speed as well as the direction of travel. A 
"hurricane watch" is issued for coastal areas when there is a threat of hurricane conditions within 
24 to 36 hours. A "hurricane warning" is issued when hurricane conditions are expected in a 
specified coastal area in 24 hours or less. These warnings, provide ample time for the 
implementation of emergency procedures. With this advanced notice from the National Weather 
Service, a worst case assessment of a tidal surge can be made at least 12 to 16 hours in advance. 
Then in conjunction with the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management (which is located in 7 
WTC) there is ample time to make the decision to close the WTC and protect exposed openings. 

Any seepage of storm water through the exposed and sandbagged openings can be expected to 
migrate through the subgrade levels until reaching level B-6. At this point any seepage would 
continue to flow down on to the Path Train tracks that run at a still lower elevation. The Path 
systems sump pumping system would then evacuate the water. 

The following pages are taken from the Emergency Procedures Manual and illustrates the number 
of sandbags required at each location and the assignments for personnel from each department 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15021 



100 YEAR FLOOD PENETRATION POINTS 



RAMP H TO HOTEL OPENING 16' 
FLOODWATER HEIGHT .85' 
SANDBAG TO HEIGHT 1.25' 
SANDBAGS REQUIRED 92 



RAMP D (SOUTHBOUND) 
OPENING 16' FLOODWATER 
HEIGHT 1.93* SANDBAG TO 
HEIGHT 2,50* SANDBAGS 
REQUIRED 184 



RAMP A (SOUTHBOUND) 
OPENING 16.5' FLOODWATER 
HEIGHT 1.5' SANDBAG TO 
HEIGHT 2.0 SANDBAGS 
REQUIRED 148 

HOTEL PARKING LOTS-WEST ST. 
OPENING 30' 

FLOODWATER HEIGHT .25' SANDBAG 
HEIGHT .50' SANDBAGS REQUIRED 86 



NORTH PROJECTION VENT 
OPENING 11' FLOODWATER 
HEIGHT 3.25" SANDBAG TO 
HEIGHT 1,75* SANDBAGS 
REQUIRED 80 

NORTH PROJECTION DOOR 
OPENING 5' 

FLOODWATER HEIGHT 1.25* 
SANDBAG TO HEIGHT 1.75' 
SANOBAGS REQUIRED 38 



SOUTH PROJECTION OPENING 
14' FLOODWATER HEIGHT 1.5' 
SANDBAG TO HEIGHT 2.0* 
SANDBAGS REQUIRED 124 



6 WTC -WEST ST. GARAG E 
OPENING 60' FLOODWATER 
HEIGHT 1 .05' SANDBAG TO 
HEIGHT 1.55' SANDBAGS 
REQUIRED 516 



RAMP C(NORTHBOUND) 
OPENING 15.5' FLOODWATER 
HEIGHT 1.25' SANDBAG TO 
HEIGHT 1.75" SANDBAGS 
REQUIRED 120 



6 WTC VESEY ST. - DOOR A 
OPENING 3.5* FLOODWATER 
HEIGHT 2.45* SANDBAG TO 
HEIGHT 3.0 SANDBAGS 
REQUIRED 38 



RAMP B (NORTHBOUND) 
OPENING 16' FLOODWATER 
HEIGHT 1.85' SANDBAG TO 
HEIGHT 2.40* SANDBAGS 
REQUIRED 184 



6 WTC - VESEY ST. GARAGE 
OPENING 31" FLOODWATER 
HEIGHT 2.45' SANDBAG TO 
HEIGHT 3.0' SANDBAGS 
REQUIRED 412 



6 WTC - VESEY ST. GLASS DOORS 
OPENING 24' 

FLOODWATER HEIGHT 1.75 
SANDBAG TO HEIGHT -2.25' 
SANDBAGS REQUIRED 240 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15022 



• 



« 



1?»5,1 IIFF SAFETY AND ftfffliRfTY 

• £22? nfl ^ the circumstanc es and activities, respond to the scene of the 

££!»£ aPPr ° Priate ^ Cowwnd * tate assu ™ *• safety 

' L*!, eC ?L SSaTy ' o 00 """** activities with the New York City Fire Department 
and other emergency response personnel. -■»*■» « ni 

• Initiate evacuations, if necessary. 

• Direct use of public address announcements, if necessary. 

• Deploy security officers to secure area(s) and deny access to unauthorized 
individuals. 

• Dispatch "key runs" as appropriate. 

• Authorize use of temporary or special identification cards valid for duration of 
emergency. 

• Authorize and issues temporary parking permits to emergency response 
personnel as necessary. 

• Direct security contractor to have personnel "stand by" as needed 
- Call in additional Life Safety and Security staff as needed. 

12-5,2 PQMCft 

Make all appropriate notifications listed in Exhibit 12A. 

Note: If requested, dispatch officers to close roadways and redirect traffic to 
facilitate the installation of sandbags. 

12-5.3 OPERATIONS anri M AINTENANCE MANAGEMFMT 

• Make all appropriate notifications listed in Exhibit 12A. 

• Secure parking garages and install sandbags as indicated in Exhibit 12D. 

• Request the assistance of Construction if necessary. 

• Inventory barricades, cones, emergency signs and emergency lights to close 
off the peripheral roads and the Plaza. 

• Direct Porters to clear all drains in Plaza, both Towers and truck dock ramps. 

Mechanical B^ffon, 

• Supervisor reports to River Water Pump Station with two craftpersons and 
inmates these procedures: 

Verify that all floor deck hatches in the "un-diked" areas to sluiceways and 

pump station chambers are secured and sealed. 
Verify that all watertight bulkhead doors are secured, namely to the 

swltchgear room and to the traveling screen room. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15023 



In the Event of a Power Failure 

• Start one or both of the emergency pumps and maintain operations even if 
the water rises above the operating floor level. . 

• Recheck the river water level in the sluiceway and throttle the associated 
sluice gate accordingly to prevent flooding. 

Electrical Section 

• Secure affected electrical systems. 

• Operate Emergency Generator Plant as needed. 

• Provide portable emergency power where needed. 

General Maintenance Section 

• Assist in installing sandbags as requested. 
Supervising Engineer 

• Based upon most current weather forecast, perform facility survey and 
identify equipment to be secured. Report findings to Life Safety & Security 
Division and Director's office. 

12-5,4 VERTICAL TRANSPORTATION 

• Direct elevator maintenance contractor to secure affected elevators, monitor 
conditions and make any necessary repairs if necessary. 

12-5.5 CONSTRUCTION DIVISION 

• Assist in installing sandbags as requested. 
12-5.6 PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 

• The General Property Manager responsible for the property involved in the fncident 
will* assume full responsibility as the WTC Liaison Officer and will be stationed in the 
lobby at the Fire Command Station/Elevator Console area. 

• The General Property Managers from the other buildings along with the Senior 
Property Manager and staff of the affected property will assist the Liaison Officer in 
the lobby. 

• The Senior Property Managers and their staff from the unaffected properties will 
report to the Situation Room and Property Management Office at the Operations 
Control Center and activate all telephones, computers and the Emergency Tenant 
Notification System. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 



15024 



The Senior Property Managers will assume all responsibility for disseminating all pre- 

cleared information to staff and tenants. One staff member will act as the official 

scribe, maintaining a constant record of events as they occur. 

The Liaison Officer will be responsible for notifying the Chief Operating Officer and 

Media Relations, rf applicable, and will work closely with Senior World Trade and Port 

Authority Staff as well as all World Trade Center Units - Life Safety & Security, 

Police, Vertical Transportation, Engineers Office, Central Systems, General 

Maintenance, Locksmith Shop, Construction, Project Management and Operations 

Management 

If necessary, a representative from Media Relations will also be in the lobby to field 

questions from the media/press. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15025 



Verify that climax plugs are secured in place in the floor drains located in the 
fresh air intake plenum in areas 1 and 2. 

Notify Operations Control Center and Refrigeration Plant of high water 
conditions. 

Transmit north and south sluiceways high level alarm and diked area alarm to 
verify their performance. 

Place electrical disconnect switches in the off position for the two tubular 
chlorine pumps. 

If sodium hypochlorite solution tanks are empty, or near empty, partially fill 

with fresh water to prevent buoyancy. 
o Provide an emergency water hookup from the hose bib at the water meter to 

the main flushing piping to the river water pump line. 
Place electrical disconnect switches in off position for the domestic water 

bearing lubricants and flush pumps. 
Prior to the tidal serge, place plastic sheets and sandbags over fresh air 

intake plenum and the exhaust fan discharge grills on top deck of Pump 

Station. 

Keep Pump Station chambers empty. 

If tide water rises to one foot above capacity level, contact Mechanical 

Contract Management, Port Authority Chief Maintenance Supervisor or Port 

Authority Maintenance Unit Supervisor. 

• Activities During Actual Tidal Surge (To be performed under the direct 
supervision of the Mechanical Contract Supervisor) 

Select a pump suction chamber that will be dewatered. 

Notify Refrigeration Plant Engineer that ail river water pump will be secured 

for a 10 to 15 minute period. 
Secure all operating river water pumps. 
Close sluicegate #3 or #5 depending on which pump suction chamber will be 

dewatered. 
Close sluicegate #4. 
Start neoessary river water pumps in active pump suction chamber to support 

restoration of Refrigeration Plant 
Notify Refrigeration Plant to start necessary refrigeration machines to the limit 

that one active pump suction chamber can handle. 
Start one river water pump in the pump suction chamber that will be 

dewatered. 
o Intermittently operate one river water pump to lower the water level to a depth 

of 12 feet below the slab. 
The water level in the operating sluiceway should be below the operating floor 

deck but higher than the minimum level required to maintain adequate suction 

pressure. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15026 




WILLIS 



PROBABLE MAXIMUM LOSS 

Probable Mtximum Loss From Fire 

This discussion is based on circumstances and prelection criteria outlined in the "Risk 
Classification and Loss Estimate for High-Rjse Buildings", PM.5.6.1, dated September 1995 (see 
appendix) and the FM's Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 1 -3, titled "High-Rise Buildings'' 
and "MFL of High-Rise Buildings" 

The underlying premise of this PML is that a fire originates on an upper floor (assume 90* floor) 
with the sprinkler protection out of service and that the fire floor is connected to the floor above 
via unprotected, open stairs. 

Under these conditions fire damage would be expected on floors 90 and 9 1 . Floors 93 through 97 
would receive varying degrees of smoke damage and floors 85 through 89 would receive damage 
from the water used to extinguish the fire. 

Assuming that criteria, a building value for a tower of SI . 19b (S250/sf) and a floor value of 
SlO.Sm, then the damage to the fire floors, at 100%, would amount to $21.6m. If smoke damage 
averaged S2m for the 5 floors above the fire or a total of S 1 0m and water damage of 52m to the 6 
floors below the fire floor, then a PML in the range of S40m could result. In reality the 
combustible loading of the typical occupancy in the Towers is not sufficient to create the spalling 
and ensuing structural damage associated with this scenario and a PML in the S10-20M range is 
reasonable. 

The mitigating circumstances are an outstanding, well-trained PA emergency organization and 
the close proximity of the NYC Fire Department that monitors the PA's emergency 
communication channels and would be responding before being called. 

Probable Maximum Loss From Flood 

In the event of a stage 2 or 3 hurricane coming ashore along the New Jersey Coast and coinciding 
with a full moon and high tide, it is possible for the waters of New York Harbor to rise to a level 
where the water level might be slightly higher than some of the grade level openings along the 
west side of the WTC complex. See Flood Appendix for a discussion of this type of event and 
emergency procedures to deal with it. 

The failure at one of the sandbagged openings could allow floodwaters to enter the Subgrade 
levels There could be some build up of water in levels B-1 to B<-5 with the greatest buildup at 
level B-6 with ensuing damage to the electric motors and controls for the New Chiller Plant. 

Assume: 

• Catastrophic failure of the sandbagging protection at the lowest opening - 6WTC 
Vesey Street Door. 

• Tidal flow of 2 knots per hour « 12,200 feet / hour. 

• Opening'allowmg water to enter Subgrade 2.45' high and 30' wide « 73.5sf 

• Failure lasts for 3 hours 

• Floor area of B-6 level - 1/6* of 2,656,435sf or 442,739sf 

Then: Depth of water at B-6 level = 73.5sf X 12,200ft/hr X 3hrs / 442J39sf * 6 feet. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15028 



The nuugaung circumstance to this scenario is that the B-6 level has a large opening into the Path 
train tracks. This opening is large enough to allow major pieces of equipment to be brought to 
this area by Path train, then off loaded into the B-6 level. Therefore storm floodwaters seeking 
the lowest level would leave the B-6 level filling the Path tunnel (if the tunnel's sumps failed). 

Assuming the Path Tunnel to be 1 .5 miles long and having a 30-foot diameter or an area of 
UOOsf 

I .Jmi X 5280&'mi X 1400 ~ a volume of about 1 1 million cu. ft. 

It would take about 12 hours to fill the Path tunnel at this rate of flow, of 2 knots per hour, 
through the failed sandbag dike at the Vesey Street Door. 

Conservative estimates of the potential damage to machinery, electric motors and electronic 
controllers on levels B-l to B-5 run to $2-3m per level or a total of $15m on the high side with 
the potential of another SlOm on level B-6, for a total PML of S25m. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15029 



MAXIMUM FORSEEABLE LOSS 



1993 Terrorist Bombing 

The 1993 terrorist bombing of the WTC resulted in a maximum foreseeable property loss. This 
event shut Tower ! down for 6 weeks and Tower 2 for 4 weeks. The explosion, that occurred in 
the garage area of B-2. caused portions of the Plaza and two Subgrade floors (about 4 bavs by 4 
bays) to collapse on torihe B-6 level damaging mechanical and electrical equipment of the Chiller 
Plant. As large a blast as it was, there was negligible structural damage done to structural 
members. Damage was limited to the replacement of these concrete floors, repairing spalled 
concrete where reinforcing steel had been exposed and rebuilding non-bearing walls. 

The magnitude of this type of MFL loss can be estimated at 5 weeks rent or 1/ 10* of -the $364m 
annual rent or S35m. Plus propem* damage to the building from the 1 993 incident is estimated to 
be S 1 75m and equipment damage of $ !20m or a total of $330m. 

The mitigating circumstance to a reoccurrence is the control that is in place to prevent this from 
happening again. The rigorous security controls now in place have significantly reduced the 
likelihood of this type of incident. No one can gain entrance to the towers without authorization 
from a tenant, presenting a photo ID and being photographed. There is a lower than averace 
probability of a reoccurrence as access to the premises is now severely restricted. Expert opinion 
suggests that there are many more easily accessed sites for any group'anemptine this son of 
protest. The guards physically check trucks delivering to the facility. Deliver documentation or 
manifests are reviewed, as are the contents of the vehicles. The guards use mirrors to examine 
the under carriage of each vehicle before it enters the Subgrade. Substantial mechanical barriers 
allow only one truck to enter at a time. These barriers are'of sufficient strength to lift a car or 
truck 3 or so feet off its tires and immobilize it by suspending it on the barrier. Drivers are 
identified by photo ID. Similar physical barriers have been erected at the entrances to the parking 
garages. The parking patron vehicles and drivers are identified and matched electronically. If 
they cannot be matched entrance is denied. Only employees of tenants have access to the'parking 
garage and a through background check is made before issuing a parking permit. 

Aircraft Striking a Tower 

This scenario is with in the realm of the possible, but highly unlikely. 

In 1946 a military aircraft struck the Empire State Building. Since that time the manner in which 
aircraft afe "controlled* has dramatically changed. In the event such an unlikely occurrence, what 
might result? The structural designers of the towers have publicly stated that in their opinion that 
either of the Towers could with stand such an impact from a large modern passenger aircraft 

The ensuing fire would damage the "skin", in this scenario, as the spilled fiiel would fall to the 
Plaza level where it would have to be extinguished by the NYC Fire Department. The 
replacement of the "skin" is estimated at 35% of the building replacement value or $420m. Loss 
of rents for I year or SI 50m for a total estimate of < $600m 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15030 



500 Yetr Hood 

Conditions surrounding this event are, at best, difficult to document. In the appendix of the report 
a discussion of flood and the procedures to protect against n are reviewed. A significant factor in 
this scenario would be the tidal action. Normal tidal variation, in this area of New York Harbor is 
about 6 feet. The 100-year flood assumes increasing this by about 6 feet and the 500-year flood 
would add another 2 feet. This 500-year storm and ensuing flood would most probably be a 
Category 4 hurricane with prior warning from the National Weather Service and allowing time to 
obtain additional sandbags to raise dikes another 5 feet. If the same catastrophic feilure outlined 
in the flood PML occur, then 3 5 times as much water could enter the opening with the 
expectation that the flood waters would be 21 feet deep inundating the B-6 level and rising 5 feet 
above the B-5 floor. Under these conditions an MFL loss of $200-300m seems likely. 

FIRE 

The following estimates of damage from a MFL fire have been estimated using the criteria 
outlined in FM Global's "MFL of High-Rise Buildings". 

Assume: 

Special Category when 1.5h<H<I.75h 

Sprinkler system on fire floor is out of service 

Perimeter flue space with adequate safing 

NYFD expected to be able to handle an "exterior" fire 

Poke-through / penetrations properly sealed 

No interconnected floors with unprotected openings 

Building value of SI. 2b and floor value of SI 0.8m 

If 5 floors involved in the fire and 25 floors with water damage 

Then 

5X$10.8X70% = $37.8m 

25XS10.8Xi5%» $40.5m 

$78.3m 

A more conservative scenario would have the fire originating just above one MER and 
progressing externally to the next MER where due to the double height (24) the fire would stop. 
The only combustibles in an MER are the filters in the air handling equipment and they are 
sprinklered. The MER's are double floors at levels 7/8, 41/42, 75/76, and 108/109. 

if fire originates on the 43* floor and progresses externally from floor to floor until it is stepped 
at the 75 floor and the first 41 floors have some water damage : 

Then 

42 X $10.8X70% = $234 

41 X $10.8X10%* 5 82 

$316 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15031 



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r.e to in: season o: # .o*. 
iaugr.te: and mo*; 01 ad ceieo:a:ions 
Whether you're p;eppmg /of a casual 
office get-together cr a gaia hcLciy 
feast, youll warn to crea;e a rcerno- 
rabie anc delicious noUaay affas; 

The secret of a succsfsl 1 -! psr.y ;j 
orchestrating the occasion «.c -ou :et! 
comfonable and in control l:r.:; ;.oe 
sue of your gathering so you can 
manage your party easily Or t. f tig-t 
living space rules out heme enter- 
taining, consider some new spices to 
host a private pany rron fu'i service 
restaurants and local bars 
to loft spaces and "occasion "* r -^ 
rooms," hosts are throwing 
parties where they can 
enjoy :he planning and 
entertaining but (usually) 
none of the cleanup Add 
to that all the food, bar and *W 
decor necessities and ^' 
there's plenty of room tor 
personalization The experts 
at Xando Cosi Inc. ta;lor ihe .i«.ti- ,* 
the clients taste and suggest thai the ; 
client add their own personalized 
touches to make sure they teei itke :t> > 
their party, not the caterer*" 

Be sure, however, to plan festivities i 
that fit your budget and schedule. If . 



you dont nave ;he :.rr.± c: :r* rr,c~* 
to prep for a ;^;i jjto'wr. s;; scwr. 
dinner or lavish bu;:ei cp; for : i.r.Cz 
;ou;« affair i'.ke sr. *:pe:;:e: r.ffe:. 
or dessert party Ecce Pams is -:«cv 




•o; jus. iuoi j pany v.*; in fresh baked 
breads, pies and other delectable 
goodies including their mtoxicaung 
Pecan Chocolate Bourbon Pie Ben & 
Jerrys suggests hoscng a holiday ice 
cream party. Choose from more than 
33 flavors as weil as frozen yogurts 
and non-dairy sorbets 



Eiituim Gifts tuittiutd hm &gt I 




from Papyrus. Add j >cnsa ;vn 
Tor smooth, clear ano cr:*'* v -j.-.r: 
and it's a special rcwjrd for these 
who value the handwritten wo«d 
as well as the typed one 

For a new idea, consider civ;!*.;: :> 
"rncntcnng* book. :.*e .Uw:..." 
Ccnmj by Marc levy. Trow 
Borders. Not only is i\ j great 
source for helping som.vr,-; 
ccvelop business wruxg. but :t 
alsc shows you tire about ir.c 
person, as well as their .wrcs: - 



From Papyrus 



WILLIS 




•z'.zi '.r.< rner.u *.orr.e:~c LccCi 
.:.-. c:r.t:ii;:nr .;o,cr* :cxr-::« ;nc 

T.:eri:i::« C:";e: r.jt a?3e;.:*:s 
:r.ss:ce room :.r.rc.Mt-:c c:~i. r.ch 
seses res:ie [o-a :V. vecjiej. sp:cv 
:a*-i r.e.\i to de;:;iie :i.ii> Ar.d try 
;o provide a: .*a«: one veMiJf.ar. 
o::'e:;nc Au Bon Pain ps:;v 
platters L*v:i f .ce iHir.ci :r.it:£* 
:.-j;:j jr.i ,, tii\ic.ti if we:: 
as sandwiches e;' :..re roa$: 
bee:, .ccur.try.curcc bar. 
ar.c srr.okec :urKe:- Ai:h- 
en:ic Italian fare car. re 
customized ;o sui: -ycur 
needs by the *;ai: si 
, Pastabrcak. Or. call Fine 
6r Schapiro for a full range 
■-•f catenng options :ancmc 
irom appetisers to desserts 
Devon & Blakely aiso cners 
.t vast a;r3y of special cater, 
mg services tor ;he hohdav 
reason. 



, Welcome guests to a party filled with 
| warmth and .good cheer — twinkling 
lights, shiny tableware. ;he sparkle ct 
I silver and gold Visit Lynn's Hallmark 
for delightful holiday accents, ihemed 
paper goods and decorations, and 
1 charming keepsake ornaments Lechters 
; cames a full range of fes;^ dinner- 
ware and glasses as welt as parry planers 
I and other essent:ais for hosting the 
i perfect event. And for the final touch 
I rill your parry with festive music from 
. Sam Goody 

' Who to call for Catering 

Devon & Blakely 
Max Guerrero 
2:2-432*022: 

. Ecce Pams 
Dotv Kenu! 
2:2-i"»2*2«0 

Fine & Schapiro Restaurant 
joanne Cr't 
21 2-775-; o30 

New York Marriott 
World Trade Center Hotel 

cvent/Bccking Cc.-.:?r 

:!:-:56t:-5 

Pastabreak 

lei Dvawaro 
212-488.2300 

Windows on the World 
Saics & Catenng Otitce 

:-i:.*:-»-70i: 



Xando Cosi 
Stefan Hartman 
212*653-1625 



TO 
HOLIDAY 
SHOP 

Cole Haan. a Ludin^di, , sij;:;cr .inu 
n;arkctk'r of lu^h-qwjljty h.ir,d- 
crniwd lootwc.nr anc kckssmcs. 
opens ,:i tik- Mai! :his bvs;.'. 
Oiuc\<r ::;cns .;:id «omens c:>>i 
and v'lsual footuv'-ir. mens belts 
-ind hoiKT\. m well js u omens 
handbags .ind personal Icatln-r 
■^OOiii tiy tiMndir. j crjusnunship. 
iicsiyi, innovation nnd ciaractcr. 
Cole H.i^n h.ts gi\cn m producis 
whai can be -truly tV^nbcU as a 
.'iKsier.; .trtiSAn .tcs:l:etic 

Vietoru's Secret, the world's 
most :7ikv.us im^nc shop, is now 
oncn on ilw liucm Street side of 
»:v M...' M.ikc liohd.iy wishes 
vViik t"ic wiih .i pft that dacr'cs 
'.1 ret! or s'limmeis in s.r,:n 

Xando Cosi opens soon at Four 
v\o:U; Tmie C^nier aoii Church 
>i ''• oU'nng the "tjest fiom New 
Voiks favontc casual restaurant - 
Cosi ijiuiw;eitcs .ind catering. 
\.:r.tls eoffec. j:ui a full b.ir for 
:*..;;:;;* ho-r Al;e» 5 00 pm. ,i 
.-.*-.\ Jianer :ncr.u uvcludinj; Cosi 
-xzzM i.tiAiia -ain! iharable au- 
;*eti;ers jr; sewcil up with 
.\'.i:ulos i'aitiouk s mores and coffee 
..s.<*..;.i>. .tij; (.w>ii^«\>. caic uulcs 
."it! Mondri.in*,na;3irc(l decor 
r.:.iUc this ?. £KM spot to grab a 
. t;uick btie ov K'i;ie in wtili tnends 
to wine, diiic and jnwtnd. 

World qC Christinas has also 
i.eturned for the holiday season. 
Located next to Sunglass Hut. the 
seasonal shop offers 3 darling 
scire; ion of holiday goods — 
ornaments, artificial trees, wreaths 
and garlands, toys and corporate 
gifts. Dccofntwc JuiT can also help 
bring holiday cheer 10 your office 

K«B Toys Express is back forthe 
holidays, on the Liberty Strcc: 
side of the Mall The store 15 
stocked with a Ijrcc selection of 
va^uc-piued mercnandisc inclu- 
ding dolls, games, action figures, 
preschool games. Barbie, crafts, 
plush lovs and lots note 



The Mall^oi th'e " 

?WoHdtTrcrfaCenter^ 

- NHJOcjiL- 7.^00 pjn. 

SUNDW 



15045 



PAGE 4 



THE MAIL AT THE TQHID TRADE CENTER 




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COKFIDCKTIAL 



15048 



^f 



THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NY & NJ 



MEMORANDUM 



FROM: 
DATE: 

SUBJECT: 



REFERENCE: 



COPY: 



TO; Joseph Amatuccio, Carla Bonacci, Jerrold Dinkels, 

Frank DiMartini, EricHauser, Louis Menno, 
Edwin Monteverde, Francis Riccardelli, Nancy Seliga 
John Castaldo 
September 19,2000 

ASBESTOS POSITIVE LOCATIONS AT THE 
WORLD TRADE CENTER: UPDATE. 

J. Castaldo to Addressees; Memorandums Dated 5/4/98 
and 12/21/99; Same Subject 

L. Ardizzone, S. Benjamin, L Chachkes, J. Connors, 
\V.Devlin t M. Finegold, M Hurley, MJakubek, 
M.Kirshner, T> Lynch, U. Mehta, G.Meyer, R. Muessig, 
C. Nanninga, A. Reiss, E. Strauss, G. Tabek, P. Taylor, 
F. Varriano. L. Zucchi, Operations Control Desk, S-4 f s 

Attached please find an update to my initial May, 1998 
memorandum wherein the known asbestos locations at the World Trade Center 
were disclosed. The information provided in this disclosure is a compulation of 
available bulk sampling and analytical results from both the World Trade and 
Engineering Departments 1 data bases. 

In compliance with the disclosure requirements of the U.S. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration's asbestos standard, 1 am 
requesting that this information be distributed to all World Trade Department, 
Engineering Department, PA Office Space, and Leasing Division property 
managers, project managers, construction managers, construction inspectors, 
operations supervisors, security supervisors, facility maintanence supervisors, and 
leasing agents associated with the allocation of space, and the design and 
implementation of World Trade Center projects. Additionally, please forward this 
information to those contractors under your administration. If there are questions 
as to the presence of asbestos-containing materials at a particular location, or if 
this scope of demolition and/or renovation work may impact asbestos-containing 
materials, please contact Art Burton, Assistant Environmental Coordinator, at 
435-8364. _ 



\92J03 




WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15049 



Those on the copyline are requested w contact this office 
for the appropriate response action if asbestos-containing materials may be 
impacted by work under your jurisdiction. The Port Authority complies with 
Industrial Code Rule *56 relative to worker certifications, contractor licensing, 
and work procedures if asbestos is going to be disturbed or impacted. Please 
contact me at 435-8518 should you have any questions. 




foc#> 



John Castaldo 
General Manager, 
Base Building Services 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 1 5050 



Asbestos-Containing Surfacing And/Or Thermal System Insulation Materials Located In 
One World Trade Center - Exclusive Of Elevator Shafts 



Full Floor Legations 



Lobby Mezzanine 
1" -6 a Floors: Core 
6* Floor Catwalk 
- 7* / 8* Floor MER 

• 41" /42" FloorMER 
-75* /76* FloorMER 

• 108* .'109* Floor MER 



Random Locations On Floor 



-43* /44 * Floor PA 
Exhaust Duct 

- 82"* Floor 

- 104* Floor 

- Core Electric Closets 
On The 1"- 40* floors 

- Perimeter Electric Closets On The 
30* Floor 



Suberades 



- Bl Level: 

- Core, N/E Quadrant 

- B6 Level 



Convector Ur.i 



-77* Floor 
- 79* Floor 
-88* Floor 
-101" Floor 
- 103" Floor 
• 105* floor 



Asbestos-Containing Surfacing And/Or Thermal System Insulation Materials Located In 
Two World Trade Center - Exclusive Of Elevator Shafts 



Full Floor Locations 


Random Locations On Floor 


Quadr^n* 1 rvariinn 


Convector Units 
-22"* Floor 


-6* Floor Catwalk 


- Lobby Mezzanine 


-s/w, 


43rd Floor 


-10*- 13* Floors 


■7* /8* FloorMER 


Kitchen Exhaust Duct 


-24* Floor 


(Bell Atlantic) 


■ 9* Floor 






-59* Floor 


-41" /42** FloorMER 


■ 19* Floor 
• 20* Floor 

26* Floor 

33" Floor 

71* Floor 

75*/ 76* FloorMER 






•12" Floor 
-79* Floor 
-81" Floor 
-84* Floor 
-86* Floor 
-87* Floor 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



1SOS1 



Asbestos-Containing Surfacing And/Or Thermal System Insulation Materials Located In 

Four And Five World Trade Center 



There is no asbestos-containing sprayed-on fireproofing in Four and Five World Trade Center. 

A cementitious patch has been identified on a beam in the south wing of the southwest portion on the 5* floor in 5 WTC 

Thermal system insulation is present in the form of pipe saddles. 



Asbestos-Containing Surfacing And/Or Thermal System: Insulation Materials Located On 

The Concourse 



There is no asbestos-containing sprayed-on fireproofing in the plenum of the Concourse. 
Thermal system insulation material is present. 



Asbestos-Containing Surfacing And/Or Thermal System Insulation Materials Located On 

The Bl Level And The Truckdock 



Asbestos-containing sprayed-on fireproofing and thermal system insulation material is present. 



Miscellaneous Asbestos-Containing Materials At The World Trade Center 

Base building flooring throughout the facility is vinyl asbestos floor tile (VAT). 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15052 



World Trade Center Elevator Shafts With Asbestos-Containing Surfacing Insulation Material 



One World Trade Center 



Pits and Shafts 



1/2 

3/4 

5/48 

8/9 

16/17 

49 

18/19 

20/21 

22/23 

50 

24/25/26 

27/28/29 

30/31/32 

33/34/35 

36/37/38 



39/40/41 
42/43/44 
45/46/47 
51/52/53 
54 / 55 / 56 
57/58/59 
60/61/62 
63/64/65 
66/67/68 
69/70/7] 
72 / 73 / 74 



Two World Trade Center 



Pits and Shafts 



5/48 

10/11 

14/15 

24/25/26 

27/28/29 

30/31/32 

33/34/35 



36/37/38 
39/40/41 
42/43/44 
45/46/47 
54/55/56 
57/58/59 
63/64/65 



There is no asbestos-containing surfacing insulation material in the J and K elevator cars in 1 and 2 WTC, 
There is no asbestos-containing surfacing insulation material with the .elevator shafts in 4 and 5 WTC. 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15053 



Procedure Manual 



CONFIDENTIAL 



PM.5.6.1 
September 1,1995 



RiSK CLASSIFICATION AND LOSS ESTIMATES 
FOR HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

S l *-!! S!!S^ t U J° « USed ' * con J unctlon *»* p M.5.0. to determine the class and PML 
f°; -f 1 h»sh-rise building except hospltaJ buildings. A high-rise building as defined in 

i-ni-^-A. 008 ^^^ *** muSt be fou « ht eternally because of height l.e.. the upper 
s k0 .!ss are beyond the effective reach of fire department aerial equipment commonly con- 
s;dsrsd to be over 75 ft (23 ml." 

CLASS DETERMINATION 

A fully sprinklered high rise building is to be classed a HPR2. 

?S!£? 8 !L Where PU « b i« P rotecUon * "vaflable and where significant sprinkler protection is 

SfiiSTir*!! !. /' (76 ml "** a slngle pumpm « su PP ! y or m non-sprinklered must 
oe classed a Standard 1. Any risk that does not fall into the above categories is a Standard 



PML DETERMINATION 

iLSSlfl.* 6 PM u °! a h,gh me buUdln fr ma ny construction, protection, and occu- 
f S2*£^ res u must be *w««i. V the building has numerous openings in the floor/celling 
™ «?L ^ 3S SpaCC between curtam wafis and "°or systems, unprotected shafts, or 
op^ntog^ouW be at ° rS ' * ^ C0Uld rapldly Spread W ** Upper fl00r - ^ un P rotected 

™ri?! CaI S w aft eoclosed «** ^s than a 2 hour fire rated wall construction or any 
opening into the shaft with less than l* hour fire rated doors. This would include pas- 
senger and freight elevators. 

• Cable openings without a listed, fire rated through-penetrauon system. 

tera UCal rUn ° fa dUCt wtthout flre dampers, or listed, fire rated through-penetration sys- 

• Atnums and open space light shafts. 

US J2£J" UI f 1 * ■***»* u P° n whether the building is sprtnklered. The location of the 
»2.«»;I«r7? 0r each tt6ot and Ae a«» covered by one system should be considered. The 
aaequacy of hose connections and standptpes should help reduce the PML. 

Sprlnklered Building 

SSL d ^? ,n ? i ** PML " use ** floor ^ «** highest value, then assume the sprinkler 
?rh*w *~ n ts ^P^red and a fire would destroy the entire floor (100% of the floorl. 

u were are noors with vertical openings between them, use the single flre area as 100% of 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 



15054 



PM.5.6.1 

September*!, 1995 CONFIDENTIAL 

floors, these floors should be considered a stogie fire area. When there are no vertical 
openings, start the single Are area calculations eight floors down from the top. 

In addition to the fire damage, water and smoke damage must be considered. For smoke 
damage, use 100% contents and 100% building for the floor above the Are floor and 5% for 
each of the 2 nd thru 6 U floors above the flre floor. Water damage can be calculated using 
25% of the building and 75% of the contents for the floor below the fire floor and 5% for 
each of the 2 nd thru 6 th floors below the flre floor. 

Example 1: A building is 25 stories, with a PO building value of S 15.000.000 or $600,000 
per floor and contents valued at SI 0.000,000 or $400,000 per floor. There is an open 
stairwell between the 10 01 and 11 th floors, protected vertical shafts, proper AS density, 
sprinkler shutoff valves on every floor, and adequate water supplies. (See Figure 1.) 

Fire damage in the single fire area would be 2 x S600.000 ♦ 2 x S400.000 s S2.000.000. 

Smoke damage would be 100% building and contents for the 12 th floor. 5% of the 13 th thru 
18 u " floors or 100% of S600.000 ♦ 100% of S400.000 + 5x5% of SI. 000.000 » 

SI. 250.000. 

Water damage would be 25% building and 75% contents for the 9 th floor. 5% of the 8* thru 
4" 1 floors, or 25% of S600.000 ♦ 75% of $400,000 ♦ 5 x 5% of SI. 000,000 * S700.000. 

Total PD FML would be $2,000,000 + 1,250.000 ♦ 700,000 s $3,950,000 / S25,000,000 * 

0.156 or 15%: round up to 20%. 

Example 2: A building is 25 stories, with a PD building value of Si 5.000.000 or $600,000 
per floor and contents valued at $10,000,000 or $400,000 per floor. The sprinkler shutoff 
valve covers 4 floors. There are no vertical openings. There is proper AS density and ade- 
quate water supplies. Start the calculations at the 14* floor, (See Figure 2) 

Fire damage in the single flre area would be 4 x $600,000 * 4 x $400,000 = $4,000,000. 

Smoke damage would be 100% building and 100% contents for the 18* floor. 5% contents 
for the 19 th thru 23* floors or 100% of S600.000 + 100% of S400.000 ♦ 5 x 5% of 
SI. 000.000 * $1,250,000. 

Water damage would be 25% building and 75% contents for the 13 th floor and 5% contents 
for the 12* thru 8* floors, or 25% of $600,000 + 75% of $400,000 + 5 x 5% of $1,000,000 
* $700,000, . 

Total PD PML would be $4,000,000 + 1,250.000 + 700,000 * $5,950,000 / S25.000.000 » 
0.238 or 24%; round up to 25%. 

Unsprinklered Buildings 

Normally, a 100% PML should be used unless physical characteristics suggest otherwise. 
Such things as fire resistive construction throughout with light combustible Interior load* 
ing. or an office complex with multiple towers and several common connecting levels would 
warrant a lesser PML- When a PML less than 100% Is used, the detailed review of the cir- 
cumstances must be approved by the AVP-ALP. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15055 



CONFIDENTIAL 



PM.5.6.1 
September 1 t 1995 



i** 



ortteTSr 
4 I\HW|| 



•» 1% 

Of 



•I u% 
•t •% 



■4 » . _ 

* Tim 






oiTh»M 
4 r» MM<« c 



rifWi I. Suirwetf Opeainc Between The 10* And 1 l* Floori. 






II 1 41 



it l*i 



fl 



l t 



I t 



I ! 



OTTW 

• I tM**M 



Ui 



Twrw 



< I 






4ltlMH( 

aiwrw 

4ltl 



rtfure a. Sprinkler Shutoff Valves Convening 4 Floors. 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15056 



PM.5.6.1 

September 1,1995 CONFIDENTIAL 

MFL DETERMINATION 

To determine the MFL of a high rise building, construction features must be known If the 
building is constructed with all glass exterior walls, then the MFL would be 100% of the 
enure building. If the building has glass windows and noncombustlble curtain wall for the 
exterior, and interior partitioning the likelihood of a 100% MFL is low. For example- the 
~=plre State Building has small glass windows and concrete curtain watts it could be dif- 
ficult to have a 100% loss of the building. 



W1LL1S CONFIDENTIAL 



15057 



Factory Mutual 

Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 



HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 



1.0 SCOPE , 

2.0 LOSS PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS 

2 i Ccnsiructon .... 

Z 2 rr* PrcrectiO*'. . 

2 J S*^C<S C3^!f3> 

2* Fire Deoanx.enr Operation 

2.5 Human Elemen; 



1-3 



January 1959 
nevisec Sspter.oef 1955 
Suserseaes Marco 1530 

Pane r of ic 




Page 



2 

2 

2 

6 

8 

9 

10 



List of Figures 

? «; "^ Typ:cai exte'icr v;inccv; arrangement 3 

Fig 15. Wmcow ne:cnts t ... .,_ " ^ !""."^7T.!"". 3 

F;r 2A Exterior wall class in metal frame Firestoppmg friction fit n space anc swoc.ies Dy " 

dp angle ; " / 4 

F;~ 2z Firesafioc fr;cticn d; into soace and held in place by cu? ancie secures to exieno' 

p*e:as; concsse raoel * \ 5 

? ? 2C F"?3A:'r:C surron wetcsc n piace. ......' 5 

r-.z 22 Ccr.tnuous class extenor ....'.'*.'..".& 

Fig 3 Leaning hign-rtse Ouiidmcs 7 



Fyctory Mutual 

C* ,?v Fa:;ory Muter r niineenn; Ceo A!- ngrtj fcicrvto No p*ft p! tn-.i oscu-re** '-.ay o* fep'ecjse:. stores m t »«tn«v*t system. 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15058 



1± - High-Rtse Buildings 

Page 2 factory Mutual Property toss Prevention Data Sheets 



1.0 SCOPE 

Tms data sheet examines me unique lire hazards, associates wit.n mgn-nse fcuiicmgs wp.cse uop»r floors 
are above the public tire oepaament s ability to fight a fire Irom the eveno' of tne ouiioinc Emonasi's is placed 
en cor.acions mat require special attention including exterior ano mienor toe.saraac. sW orrtecnen lire 
excosure. smoKe control, sprinkle: protection, and manual fire ticnnn; 

2.0 LOSS PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS 

2.1 Construction 

i^ =r new nign-ftse cu:ism;s. me f.re resistance of maior statural comoonents snoutc oe at (east equal 

1 ncj*s iO' hoc sraos and Seams 
3 nours for columns 

2 nours for sr.afts anc chases 

I njjrs for stairwell snr elevator enclosures. 

v.'r-e-e scarier o' miss.-.; ftre.-esistive coatings are encounte'ec n new c existing construction tne maxi- 
mum 3 -ea ot scaling r.at can oe tolerated before repair .s neeoeo »s onty a lew square menes 

v:r.v* -iijn.Sirer.^:r. Csnr-ete (*SC) «s crccosed lor new construct-: s-e r: me esse-* co-.soeranons oat- 
t-e= cr;ow S-.CUIS Cv emoioyec to hm:i spallmg anc wea«c-'«nc ;;: :•■* eortro;* cu-ng t.:c- exposure: 

r c *c-vcs a !:•* 'esistan: rove':**.; ove- :•:* ous* su'tacs r •* - ::*: .;•*■- o* 

: r*cvce a* sr2.:.r*;a; mcoess o* nSC c 

r f/oorfy ;ne HSC mix, as ver.f.ec By l^e test 

!: 3 ■n •es-r-s.od.* of n« cesic-v?' to vt-rfy mat ne rcrrse:. s-re::. - :- :■ -* s* e- jo-t-c variation pro- 
v:;es acecuats Ire resisrance as recommenoec aoove 

2 Tne exterior vemcal spread of fire.in unspnnkierec oudoj.ncs can or mrnim^ed wsn tne aistance between 
ar.y lloor and the bottom of the window on the next story aoove .mat floor (Hi ts at least 2 8 limes me win- 
cow ne.ght (h) .f windows are closed, and at least 3 S times me w.ncow ne.gn? ,f windows can be opened. (See 
r;z 1A.) Exterior vertical fire spread can be prevented if 

H > 2.8 h. if windows are closed (permanently} 
H : 3.8 h. if wmoows can be opened 

Wnen there is more than one wmcow per flocr {in tne vemcal erection; tne distance (H') between the top 
oi the floor of expected fire origin and me op of me towwirtsow on me floor above should De at feast equal 
to 3 6 times tne sum of the winoow heights on an ino.vcuai lice: to neip prevent vemcal exienor fire- 
spread. (See Ftg. IB.) 

H*3.8h, ol 

vvnere* h w = height of lower window plus neignt(s) ol upper wmcowsis) 

Sucn protection <s considered equivalent to H > 26 h. wnen me-e * on-.y one window Tms assumes all win- 
dows are closed. 

Wnen windows can be opened, me following criteria snoui.2 oe me: 
H\*4 ( 8h fo , 

If separation is less than recommenoed above or if tne extenc- wans contain combustibles, me potential 
.or exterior vemcal firespread via windows exists. 

ry s h, + h, 

H'2 3.8 h lol (For Closed Wmoows) 

H' * 4.8 h IOf (For Open Windows) 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15059 



High-Rise Buildings 



1-3 



Factory Mutual Property toss Prevention Data Sheets 



Page 3 



Floor Slab 

flill f II J J J!.' J J J f.J fT 



Window 
Flee: S!ao 



5 J I j irm i i n ■ i j i r f ■ f 

* 4 ^Wtnaow 

T 1m F ' cor s * at> 



n = ?;i\DOvVHH!GHT 
S « SPAN0R5L HEIGHT 



for coet windows: 
H 5 3.8ft 



ro: desed windows: 
h ss 2.8h 



r/e W. T/p Z3: exterior wmcow arrangement 



*. ; 



W ftSSw* 



T/c f£ Wtncsw nevw$ 



• Fbsr 
St«* 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15060 



1-3 



Paje< 



High-Rise Buildings 



Factory Mutual Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 



^ Ooen.ngs eetwee". fcors louno r. snat !s . cn« es an 3 sta-wetis e- «en,- !5S .- -actions b-tweer ll3a , 
S *a S . snou.a. B e protected w,m Factory Mu.ua. Reseat Co^atcn (FM^ a p^ eo an^^eVnS • 
maHy closeo or automatic Cosing .ire doors having a f,re rating o( at .east i V«- nou^e« omewl noteo? 
an= installed m accoroance w.tn Data Sheet 1-23. wwwae noieoj 

4 Openings in floor stabs used lo- utilities (ooke-throug.ns) snou.c be pr « esle - w ,sr, Fwac-a-o-oved fioor 
p»ne:raiion lire stops w::n a 2-nour lire res.stance rating * 00 

5 Panels usee lo- extenor walls should be noncomousnbie Examples mciuce concrete masonry -o"ass 
tot- msutatec steel sanow.cn panels. Tne pane.s ana (rames snou.c oe t,dnt.y secures at'eacMtoor op* 
ver.: outwa.-o oucKH.ng u.noe- l.re exposure). w,.n tne space oetween ,ne panels and tneTloor slate i id *.h 
£ -cncomousnole l.resal.-.ng (fire-stopomg) material sucn as mineral woo. z- ceram- £ ^ Ss iasse- 
a *t resistance test by a recogn,«d testing lab lor a m-n-mur. * two nou-s Because «oo^men S " S arV 
usually ..TOec ,n a nioh-nse building, internal expansion pints between Moor sections are rare^o^ed 
nowever. ,. sucn a station ,s encountered, similar protection as oesenbeo aoove snoutd be recommenoed 
Glass foe- -s net acceotable as firesafmg. The firesafmg snoulc be securely held in place 2 clips mav also 

s 'suVarors-rnVr 38 ^ 06 * o? ,o p,erce - *• ,,resa,,n9 an = h °'- - m p,a=s (s ^ ; « ™« « 



Firestcpptnc (Firesaftng) 



Glass ■- d 



Nsncombustible 
Insulation 
(spandrel area 




fg. 2A Extenot wan giass m metal trams Firestssi 






ens s-aaars; oy da angle. 



Glass exterior cladding may also be utilized as long as .ntencr cJaccng. such as ste-i panels or ovosum 
board. I.m.l.«he wmoow height to wi.n.n the range noted .r. Recommend No 2 abov? 9 ^ 

^StJSSiSSP no ,s u """ d " S0anqrel ne,sms musI * M,,ne = Dy n,ef,or claoa,no sucn as ste " 

222S22?.1fT* 1 T be,weM VM,cal sec,,ons 0! **' « rt « ,$ » * ,s * *•*»!. « a vertical sec 
*on of glass panel spans trom floor to floor w,m horizontal ,o,n: ,h nne with me floor, tne shattering of glass 

snouid«)emesameastn«foropenabiew.nodws(H>3Sni "^ 

Si^ms"? ? i (s,e F, ° 2D) - and ,n6 wno °* s " 1 • ^ teei - " shouici w assumea "«« « h « 

•SS ownn on n!\^ T™^?* 1 ,* 9 n8X, C ' 8 " C8ne! 860v * w,l! ' ema,n "»« anC seal °« «•*"* 
oow opening, on tne lloor aoove the fire il tne wmoow ratio is H 2 26 h 

m^^lT am W f * f ,l * ,nS alum,nun sk,ns ' "fustible .nsutet.on (such as foam plastic) or no 
,nsu.a,.on snouw be completely m.errup.ed at each floor w.tn a earner of epua. lire re S ,stance to that o» the 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15061 



High-Rise Buildings 



Factory Mutual Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 



1-3 



Page 



Glass - 



^r^T -J 



Noneombustole 
insulation 

-Gypsum csard 



Precast 
concrete . 
panel 






»* • •* % 






\ 

Firesafmg 



:•• •"•:". 1 Clip angle 



£%] (=_=> 



|v« : -v< 

(.;.■■■..■] 



r / J£ risesate? tms.: /.; mts jwm *.tj /7« //t p.*-e ay C;p ar.g:» *&:*; :c e*:er:c ;*sc3s; cor.cw? panel. 



Nonccmbustible 
ln$utai;cn 

Gran;t* 




y 



St*et truss* 



*G/sSu~. saarc en s:**i lurr.n; 
cnar,n*'s ov*r *;e»i i.-jss interior 



_ ^Firesafms 


i 


J^^r- «•*■•• - * . 


> 


" f ■ ■- -■— 1 




J; IT 





Ay. £C firesaftng slsscx we:eez *? p:ace 

6 Atriums and other open areas that extend between multiple floors snoulcf be separated from adjacent 
occupied areas by a smoke-tight fire partition having a fire-resistance rating of at least two hours. Open- 
ings snouid be protected with FMRC Aoproved ana laoeileo (no'maiiy clcseo or automatically operated by 
smoke detection) fire doors with a minimum 1-1/2 hour fire rating it vvincpws are provioed in the ftre part> 
tton, they should have a minimum 1-1/2 hour fire rating 

7 Protection against wind and earthquake snould be accomohsnec <n accorcance witn Oata Sheet 1-7 and 
Data Sheet 1 *2. respectively. Roof assemblies on higrvnse byiiomcs snoufc oe designee m accordance with 
those of the following references which apply Data Sheets 1-28.1-29 anc 1-43. ans tne FMRC Approval 
Gwce. 

8 Guioelmes relating to vertical firespreao m Oata Sheet i *3 oo not appiv to leaning mgn-nse buildings. 
(See Fig. 3.) * . ' " 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15062 



1-3 



Pag* 6 



C90SI 



1YIXK3aiiKO0 SITII* 

High-Rise Buildings 



Factory Mutual Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 



, Steel Sill 



Joint Between 
Glass Sections 



Nor.ccmsustibt* Insulation 



Glass 




Concrete 
Ficer 




Ncncs.T.cust.cie Irsula::cn 



. Ccrcrrie 



I 
H 



Ct f. SO, Continuous C3SS ?r;s 



2.2 Fire Protection 

1. Sprinkler protection is cesirapie for all higrwise buildings ans -s ■ecz^rre^zvz ss ?i::cws 

a. For new construction, automatic sp:;r.Kier protection snouts ce prc.v.qec :n-ri;gnout a:i mgrwise 
tuddmgs. 

6. For ex:s:mg suiicmgs. sorm«ier protection snouid oe providee tor areas wiih a significant comoustic;e 
icacmg. 

c. AH atnums should .be provided with sermkier protection at me roof level as wen as at eacn floor, uncer 
corncors or calco^es facing tne atrium, (f tne ceiling or 'oof :s ■no'e tr.an 30 't *3 *ni mgn. rne cc.t,c*js- 
ticte icacmg snouio be maintamea at a irnnuea level 

d. When installing new sprinkler risers m existing fcu.iamgs. vaivec ncse cut:e:s snouid be prcvtdec at 
ail floors w.nere sonnkiers are not proviced. Vaivmg sncjir net te crowcec en tne nser itself, ucsream 
of me lire decanmem pumper connection 



High-Rise Buildings 

F.c.oryMu.ua.Prop.nyLcPr.v^,, 0ata Shf . ls 





F *9 3 LWifig togh-ns* Mam?* 



systems may * hyc ,. auljcally aes.one « fo^s " app, ° P '' a,e '°' ,ne ****** *« p 1P e S pnn£, 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15064 



1 * 3 _ High-Rise Buildings 

Pa $ e 8 Factory Mutual Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 



in ottce or resisenna; areas. springers snouic provice a m:mmun o: C C com s; ft u mm-mm. ove* tne 
most nyoraulicaiiy remote 1500 sq ft (280 sq mj. See Data Sneet 3-26. Section 2.3-2. fa- modifications to oen- 
sates and areas. 

borates witn large staCK rooms snoulo be protectee as outimec n Data S.nee: 2'5N 

ir. me'ca-wie a'52£ sprinklers snoulo provioe a minimum of V5 cai f rnirv$= !: (c mrnrrj;.-., ove* trie most 
hycrauiicaliy remote 2500 sq ft (232 so m). 

f.-i ai; o' tne aoove cases tie nose stream allowance * 250 oal mm *S45 cu crn-mr,;. tr.e ouraaon is 50 mm- 
u^es anc tne springier temperature rating is 1S5 C F (74°Q 

Sre::a r a-ranoements. sucn as storage exn&ihon nails, etc . snouic oe protectee acccrcmc to applicable 
cs:s sneets 

3 =>rovce ar. aoaouate water supply lor fire protection according to Data Snee: 3-26. Data Sneet 3-7N/ 
13-4N. anc Data Sneel 2-8N. Pressure should not exceed 175 psi ('.205 kPa) (12.1 bar) on sprinkler pip- 
mg sr*inKier nsacs anc cackflow preventers. 

- Wne-.ev** ocss:oie cesign wate- supply an; fre protection systems to evoc r.e neec for o*essure reeuc- 
ir,; va'ves Wnen unavoicaoie. pressure reoucmg vaives snoulo oe i^siai'ec m accorcanc* v.-un Data Sneet 
3-11 

5 Provioe stanco:pes for Class II! service witn botn 2 : /?-n (64 mms anc v : :-m (33 mmi hose connec- 
tions m accoroance witn Data Sheet 4-4N. Tne water supply snou.'d be aoie to provide a total oemand of 
50C cai'min ( 1 650 cu cm/mm) plus 250 gal/mm (945 cu om/mmj fo* eacn additional stancoipe at an adequate 
p-essjre a; tne topmost outlet Tne fire oepanment snould be ccntacteo to cetermme needed water pres- 
sure, taking into consecration the operating pressure for tne panicuiar nczzies usee anc friction loss through 
tne nose. The sprinkler and hose demand outlined in Recommenoaucn Nc 2 neec no: be added to the imme- 
catety above cemanos. but shouio be available as recommenoed 

6 install grouped electrical cables according to the National Electrical Coos anc Data Sneet 5-31/14-S 
Cs of& s ana 3us Bars. 

7 Provide a supervisee fire alarm system conneciec to a constancy attenceo location Tne aiarm system 
snould at least monitor waterflow alarms for each sprmkiered floor, all smoke oetectors. ano neat detectors 
m unsonnKlered areas, and should orovide electrical supervision to* fire pumos. tanks and reservoirs in 
accorcance witn Data Sheet 9-1 anc other applicable oata sheets Due to tne large numoer of sprinkler valves 
and tne imoact of a snut valve, constantly monitored valve tampe* aiarms a f e aiso preferred. 

8, Provioe portable fire extinguishers in accordance witn Data Sneet -»5 

2.3 Smoke Control 

Because of the many variables of building construction, contents, etc . onty tne very broaoest of generali- 
ties can be addressed concerning tne features of a smoke-controt system For acomonai information, refer 
to Section- 4.2. Smoke Control. 

i . Ducts for air conditioning and exhaust systems shouic be protectee m accorcance witn Data Sheets 1-45 
and 7-78. 

2. Smoke control for atriums should be provioed as follows 

a. An independent, mecnanical smoke exnaust system snouio oe provided at tne top of tne atrium for 
removal of smoke which nses to this level from tne case of tne atrium or from floors opening to it. The 
exnaust system snould be designed to provice at least six air cnanges per hour m the atrium. When the vol- 
ume exceeds 600.000 cu ft (16, 800 cu mj, tne exnaust system snouic be Designed to provide at least 
four air changes per hour. 

b. The activation of the exhaust system snould be accomphsnec witn smoKe detectors installed at the 
atrium ceiling level, in accordance witn Data Sheet 5-48 ano tne FMRC Approval Gutti* 

c Where practical, the air-handling systems in areas facing the atrium snould be oesigned to pressur* 
ize tnese areas upon smoKe Detection to lessen tne smo*e camace 



WHAIS CONFIDENTIAL 15065 



High-Rise Buildings 1.3 

Factory Mutual Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets p a . e s 



2A Fire Department Operation 

1 In existing unspnnklered builomgs. stairwells or otner enclosures wnere manual lire fig.ntmg equipment 
(stancoipes. fire eximguisners. etc) is located snoulo be protects? as follows 

a Tne enclosures snould nave at least a 2-hour fire rating. 

c Ooe.nncs m tne enclosures snoulc be protected witn nvmmum v. >-nou- tire raise normal*- ciosec or 
a somatically cosra:ec f;.*e eoors 

c Wnere practical, openings to accommodate at least two 2 r -?-m (64 mmj hose lines snould be pro- 
v.asc n tne closure, at eacn floor level, to allow passage of nose lines Irom tne protecteo enclosure. 
T-*se eaenmps snouic oe mamjamec normally ciosea witn caos or oamoers of eoual fire resistance to tnat 
c: ins enc:osu'e Tney snouic .pe used only oy tne fire cepartment o' autnonzec ou»Cing personnel, 

2 7c *eeo tne stairwell enclosures free of smoke during a fire, the enclosures snoulc oe pressurized as rec- 
ommenoec unce* "Smone Control" and Recommenoanon 3 below 

3 A- oceoencen: ac supply system snould be provioed to pressurize ne stairwells as follows 

a Tr.e air c:e!e*aoiy snould be suoplied tnrough a single duct running vertically tnsioe me stairwell 

t A;r injection snouid oe provioed at every ctner floor to ensu-e air movement, w.hicn will maintain ■ 
pressunzation, 

c Tne air-distnoution system should be continuously sell-baiancmc. eliminating tne need lo: extensive 
a^ustmer.ts icliowmg installation. 

c 7-e stsmve! cressL'nzatior: system snoulo be arranges n zones cc-mr-isng a maximum cf 14 sto- 
nes per zone. Tne system snould be Designed to maintain pressurizaticn wun tnree coors open per zone. 

e Pans, powe- supply, and distribution system snoulo De p'oteaec by enclosing tnem in construction 
c 1 at leasi 2-r,our fire resistance 

t if two -different zones are locateo on tne same floor tney snoulc De separated from eacn other by fire 
walls of equal lire resistance to tnat of tne Stairwell enclosure 

4. Combustibles should not be stored in tne stairwell enclosures 

5 Provide a otesel or gasoline emergency generator, cacable of lumisnng .cows* to' eme*sency lighting, 
communication, emergency elevators, fire pump, anc smone control operation as a minimum Tne fuel sup- 
ply snould be acecuate for the full demand for a minimum of two nours 

6 The fire pumps, tne emergency generator or other power suool»es and associated fuel supplies, should 
be protected by enclosing them m construction of 2-nouf fire resistance. 

7 Elevator protection oepends on the size anc type of the builamg Tne following recommendations are 
adaptable to the particular need. 

a High-rise buildings should be designed so that elevator snafts a'e away from tne areas of potential 
fire danger: i.e., on the perimeter or in an isolated core If this is not tne case, elevators ano snafts should 
be otnerwise protected against heat and smoke as recommencec unoe: "Smone Control." 

b. Elevators should be positioned so that activation of a fire alarm in the emergency communication cen* 
ter will send them directly to the first floor or lobby. 

c At least two elevators servicing each floor should nave tne ability to be oedicatec tor fire fighters' use 
and to be operated with special keys. These elevators snoulc oe -in protectee snalts For new construe* 
tion tnese snafts should have a 2-hour fire resistance 

8 An emergency communication center should be established for tne loliowmg functions, according to the 
size of tne Duilomg ano its fire ftazaros. 

a. The control point tor emergency communication. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15066 



1 " 3 High-Rise Buildings 

Pa ?« 10 Factory Mutual Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 



c Tne control oo:.nt fo* emergency ooeraton of aJ; ne eyeing 6i*:::zT.*zr,*r t :zc>: systems sucr. as fans 
elevators.. smone .control, (ire protection, esc 

c The center for directing fire lighting and rescue operations 

2,5 Human Element 

1. An Emergency Organization snouid be established and trameo tor emergency action, it snouid be unoe' 
tne ejection of buiiong management and trained to hancie emergency situations Key personnel should 
incfuoe a person in charge, someone to cad the public fire oepanment. tire pump operator, ana sonnkler valve 
o?e:a:ors. as a minimjm Tne cooperation o! tne building owner anc tenants snoulc oe sought so that ample 
vaned.oerscnne! wiir ee available a; all times to nanole emergencies Tne person in charge shoulo coor- 
c.r.ate wi:n n* pjon: Ure oeoanrnent in planning for any emergency Tness o*ans s.noyio tner. be re vie wee 
annually A person Knowiecceac-ie of tne ouiicmg construction anc occupancy snou!C o* stationed at tne 
C."iic:ng commanc center to assist anc direct tne public fire oepanment. 

2 Tne ire ala'm anc smoke control systems, including alarms an: snutoow.n cevices should be thor- 
cjjniv insos:tec anc cnecKac for proper operation by acecuately trainee personnel at leas: every six months, 
i- 02.-::cj:s: tne ioi:ow:nc equipment snoulc be examined 

a Tne system activating devices, such as fusible links or heat o* smcae selectors, snouid be checked 
to see tnat tney are not covered witn or contain resioues. or are otnerwise impatreo. 

o Fre anc smoke camoers snculd be inspected at least annually to detect damage, obstructions and cor- 
rosion. 

c Heat anc smote cetectcr systems snoulc be insoectec anc testec Manufacture's or installers' rec- 
cm men ca:;ons snoulc be followed m maintaining, inspecting anc testing tne equipment. 

d Tne overall system should be arranges so mat it can fee asecuateiy testec eve*y six montns bv simu- 
late emergency mcoe conditions. 

3 Ail equipment requinng servicing anc testing snoulc e-e r eaci:y accessiDle. anc a practical means should 
be provided for aoeauate cleaning. 

4. Sufficient instrumentation should be provioed for testing anc maintaining the fire protection equipment. 

5 Fire pumps, sonnkler systems and standoipe systems snoulc be maintained, inspected, and tested in 
accoroance vvitn tne applicable FMRC oata sneets. All equomen; anc controls snoulc be clearly identified. 

c Testing and maintenance manuals for otner fire protee;:on ecuionen; snouid be proviced in accordance 
wttn the manufacturers" and installers' instructions. Tnese snoulc mciu-oe operating, servicing, testing and 
troubleshooting instruction. 



PM Sn;r Comm Ftb f990 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15067 



Number: F(A)514.33 

Page i oi 22 
Issued; 01/00 

Title: MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 



Table of Contents 



I. THE REQUIREMENT 

II. MEASUREMENT 

III. INTRODUCTION 

IV. WHEN TO EVALUATE MFL 

V. GENERAL MFL SCENARIO 

VI. BEFORE USING THE MFL DECISION TREE 

VII. USING THE DECISION TREE 

VIII. OTHER BUILDING FACTORS 

IX. PERCENT FIRE DAMAGg 

X. WATER DAMAGE 

XI. SMOKE DAMAGE 

XII. THE INSPECTION 

XIII. THE REPORT 

APPENDIX A 



Page 



,...2 
...2 
...2 
..2 
.,.3 
...4 
...5 
.11 

. 14 

.16 
17 
18 



C^ V?^ ^ U ^ ™^^^ 

Evaluated. Those .Qualifying as Extenor are Uncertified) .....L... J. !.„*...!. jj 

ACTION REOUESTEO 

■* • -. 22 

DISCUSSION 

■" ■• • • 22 



Mo-^i £SJ£ ^ST* ' m wn °* e * ° W " ,n *" Y t0fTr ' * ^W mean*, riraroftc. rTwcn.nct. / "tS 

one.xopy.ng feoorAnj. Of othtrwue. w^oat »nnen perm<ss<on oi Fjcto^y *Mu*i Imuran* Compaq /^ 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15068 



F(A)S14.33 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Paoe 2 of 22 



MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

REFERENCE: FM GLOBAL OPERATING STANDARD (O.S.) 1-3; 
E. D. DIRECTIVE 5-96 DATED 3/15/96: 



t. THE REQUIREMENT 

To communicate complete and accurate high-rise building MFL information to the account team in a consts* 
\ax anc e.ficien; manner. 

It. MEASUREMENT 

A. Tne account team will oe satisfied with accuracy and completeness of higrvnse MFL evaluations. 
S. Imoroved accuracy of high-rise MFL evaluations wul result in optimized reinsurance costs. 

' HI. INTRODUCTION 

A. Tnis PIP provides guidance on analyzing the MFL of high-rise buildings, which are buildings whose upper 
floors are above the reach of ftre Department aenai hoses (usually more than 75 ft. ((23 m)) grade). It helps 
evaluate various unique factors of construction, and tt makes specific use of fire department response. This 
wi:: aliow tne reader to Determine the MFL area, advise wnen to mane tnis determination me first time, and 
give gjioance on tne inspection and report. 

5. Tne P&P text and MFL Decision Tree are an integral unit and need to be used together to properly deter- 
mine tne number of fire doors. Once tne number of fire floors is determined, the text gives guidance on smoke 
and water damage. See O.S. 1-3. "High-Rise Buildings," tor definitions and technical descriptions of van- 
ous construction features. 

C. This P&P was wntten considenng normal construction practices lor High-Rise Buildings. It is expected 
that there will be some unusual features or conditions (such as leaning buildings) where considerable judge- 
ment will be required to augment this guide. 

D. if unusual construction features are encounterec. otscuss them with tne FM Qiooai operations center high 
rise or MFL specialist, standards engineer, or engineering field manager. 

E. These guidelines should not be used wholly or in part for other than high-nse buildings or for occupan- 
cies beyond the scope of this PAP. 

F. As with nonhigrvrise MFL evaluations, protection reliability should be determined using O.S. 3-29. 

IV. WHEN TO EVALUATE MPL 

Analyze the MFL during all candidate, first and regular visits where it has not previously been done. For exist- 
ing locations not evaluated ^ this PAP, re-evaluate only if TIV exceeds $50 million. For any high-rise MFL 
analysis done during special visits, follow the instructions on the "Authorization for Engineering Services** 
Form 135 or equivalent. 

There are instances where a full high-rise MFL analysts should not be done, such as locations where the insur- 
ance companies have limited interests or where the building is only a few stories above the reach of fire 
department aenal hoses. In such cases use judgement. Either do not change the MFL or do an abbrevi- 
ated evaluation, and comment in "Items of Interest" on the report. 

V. GENERAL MFL SCENARIO 

This brief scenano covers the main features ot an MFL high-nse fire, and gives added perspective to what 
follows. 



01999 FasiPY Mutual tnjuranov Company All ngnu r*ttrv«4 

WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15069 



F(A)S14.33 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 3 of 22 



• A fire starts on a floor above the reach of mobile fire department apparatus. In buildings with multi-floor 
openings (stairs, escalators, open atnums) on lower levels or in communities with volunteer lire depart* 
ments. a fire may start on a lower floor and spread upward to involve the high-rise. 

• The floor of origmls fully involved by the time the lire department can actually access the floor and fight 
the lire (delay is expected due to tenant evacuation, discovery time, traffic, set*up time. etc.). 

• Special features of building construction may limit me lire to extensive involvement on only one floor, with 
some lire damage above it due to unprotected poke-throughs. Beyond this, many variations are possible 
based on construction and fire department response. 

• If only interior avenues of additional vertical fire spread are likely (e.g., via poke-throughs. but not atri- 
ums, open stairs, etc.). a paid PFD with good response can generally contain the expected small fires 
above the floor of origin. This would result in fire limited to two floors with heavy damage to the lloor ol ori- 
gin, and lesser fire damage above that (plus smoke and water damage). Variations in construction dis- 
cussed in the text and shown in tne decision tree may increase this two»fire floor scenario to three, lour, 
five or more fire lloors. 

• II exterior vertical spread is possible, the fire can spread by both interior and exterior avenues. It is dra- 
matically more challenging due to increased size, speeo and intensity. Fighting it requires a few hundred 
personnel, extensive breathing apparatus equipment and refitting ability, special planning and training, 
etc. The lire may spread to the roof although favorable features of construction and PFO response may 
limit it to only five (5) floors. 

• If the fire can't be contained within live burning floors, it wilt probably not be controlled at all. It will spread 
to all upper lloors unless stopped by a fire break such as a tall, blank, noncombustible mechanical equip- 
ment floor with blank exterior walls. 

VI. BEFORE USING THE MFL DECISION TREE 

The decision tree is a job aid for predicting the number of fire floors in the MFL area. 

Several assumptions and conditions guide its logic, and apply to those stories located above the elevation 
of fire department reach up the building exterior: 

A. 1. The decision tree is intended for typical high* rise buildings containing commercial, business and resi- 

dential occupancies. It applies to ancillary occupancies common to these buildings like file rooms, retail 
shops, display areas, show rooms, stock rooms, pnnt shops and shipping/receiving areas. It does not 
apply to garment or other warehousing, department stores, malls, garment or other manufacturing. 
It is based on high-rise loss experience of mostly offices and hotels and some hospitals, dormitories 
and shops. 

The decision tree is not intended to apply to other occupancies or to non high-rise buildings. 

2. in occupancies with scant combustible loading, serious tire exposure and spread to upper floors is 
not expected, so this procedure will not apply. (See O.S. 1-3 tor definition of scant combustible loading.) 

B. To qualify as protected steel construction in Table 1, the fire resistance of major structural components 
must be at least equal to: 

1. 2 hrs. for floor slabs and beams 

2. 3 hrs. for columns 

3. 2 hrs. for shafts 

4. 2 hrs. for stairwell enclosures 

if the fire resistance of shaft or stairwell enclosures, lloor slaps or secondary beams is deficient, consider 
the fire will involve all floors above the fire floor, with structural damage limited to the related member. If the 
tire resistance of columns or primary beams is deficient, consider that the fire will involve all floors above 
the fire floor and that major structural damage will occur. Where column fire resistance is less than 3 hours 
but at least 2V* hours, conditions may be tolerable based on Figure 4. No tolerance is allowed tor other build- 
ing members. 



Ot999 P«ciory Mutuii inwrgne* Company All n$K fMtrvtd 
WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15070 



F(A)514.33 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 4 of 22 



C. Except for limited isolated areas, ceilings should be noncombuslible. 
If not: The fire will spread up to all floors rapidly from window to window, 

D. Interconnected stories occur when two or more stories are connected by an open stairway (or equiva- 
lent ready pathway of vertical intenor fire spread). - - *x * or c <*uiva 

1. WhenH> 2.8h and exterior walls of masoniy, granite or concrete construction are connected director 
floor slabs any number of interconnected floors are permitted. (See O.S. 1*3 for definitions of H h ) 
(See result of "N+r fire floors in the deoston tree.) * «* wnniuon* or n. n.j 

2- For all other types of exterior wall construction and H:h ratio*, no more than two stones may have a com- 
mon interconnections) (e.g.. one broken floor slab). A building may have any number of such pairs as 
long as the single broken floor slabs are separated by three or more unbroken floor slabs. If these limits 
are exceeded, consider the fire will spread from these floors up to the roof or possibly to a fire b«afc 
See Figure t for examples, and see Section VIW.H. lor tire break details. 

E. Building fire pumps are considered to be out of service. 

F. There may be poke-throughs (openings tor pipes, wires, etc.) between floors, but there should be no con- 
tinuous openings outside the core areas connecting multiple Hoers. 

G. Where there are continuous multi-floor openings outside the core, there will be lire involvement of the 
entire building above the fire floor. (Small isolated shafts, such as gravity mail drops, need not be consid- 
leShT e$S the/ COnta ' n COnvey0f$ 0f 0ther mecnanisms ,0f suspending combustibles throughout their 

H. The tower is not exposed by abutting structures such as malls, casinos, etc. (whether connected or not): 

1. having an occupancy capable of causing roof collapse thereby exposing the tower (any occupancy 
requmng sprinklers can collapse an unprotected steel roof): and 

2, so large that hose streams cannot reach the tower itself to prevent vertical spread. 

Note: If in this case, the PFD is considered to be unable to prevent exterior spread, the decision tree 
may still be used, but all questions related to PFD must be answered "No." In addition, a high-rise that 
is exposed by such an abutting structure would have many lower floors involved in fire simultaneously: 
unless construction features prohibit intenor and extenor spread, all floors would probably become 
involved. 

In the instances where a high-rise building is abutted by or above a low-rise commercial or mall building 
and a fire in the lower building exposes the high-nse, several evaluations may be required to deter- 
mine the largest MFL area, which might include the tower, the low-nse. or both buildings. In these instances 
the evaluation for the low building should be done Q€t conventional MFL guidelines. 

VII. USING THE DECISION TREE 

The following explanation of terms may be helpful: 

A. "Masonry, Granite or Concrete Walls Connected to Floor Slabs* 

The floor supports the masonry, granite or concrete wall, oris constructed so no floor-wall gap exists or can 
be readily created by the lire. This prevents upward fire spread inside the building at the floor-wall connec- 
tion. Answer -NO" if there are no such masonry walls, or these walls exist but are not connected to the floor 
slab. 

B. "Perimeter Rue Space." 

The space that occurs between the edge of the floor slab and the inside surface of the curtain wail panel 
in modem construction. This can be several inches to more than 1 ft. wide and will allow the passage of lire, 
heat, smoke and water between floors. This space is usually filled with a noncombustible or fire resistive 
matenal called M Fire Sating." 



01999 factory MtAtal lf«urtnce Company. All ngnu r«t*rv*o 

W1LLIS CONFIDENTIAL 1507 1 



F(A)S1449 

MPL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 5 of 22 



FIGURE 1 

-Examples of interconnected floors per assumption/condition 
Section VI.D.2 only. 



"TT" 



38 



37 



36 



JL. 



34 



33 



32 



31 



30 



-* 



29 



28 



27 



26 



25 



24 



23 



22 



21 



20 



19 



16 



17 



16 



15 



14 



13 



12 



11 



10 



Yes - Useable in matrix 



-X- 



No- Not useable in matrix 



■ No - not useable in matrix 



Note: Fire would already be spreading around floor slab edges and via poke-through* for 
conditions of Section VI. 0.2. The "No" arrangements would facilitate significant additional 
interior vertical fire spread to a degree where we expect an uncontrolled fire situation. 



OlMB Futofv Miami iiwurara Cempan/ AM ngtia rcwrvad 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15072 



F(A)514,33 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 6 of 22 



C. "Adequate Sating." 

This asks whether the penmeter flue space has lire sating. A "YES" can include friction-fit sating with minor 
voids. This would still impede upward spread of fire and allow the fire department to gain control. This is 
the cntena tor a YES-NO decision. Note the sating material must be fire-resistant; ordinary fiberglass ther- 
mal insulation does not quality as sating. New tire sating should have a two-hour fire rating as specified in O.S. 
1 *3. For additional information, refer to Engineering Bulletin F9-91. 

D. "PFD Can Control Interior Fire Spread " 

To answer YES. we need all three of the following conditions: 

1 . A fully paid fire department. 

2. A pumping capacity of 500 gpm (1 .9 cum/min) per each fire floor predicted by the decision tree at effec- 
tive pressures < 100 to 125 psi [703 x 102 to 680 x 102 kg sq. m]) at the hose station outlet to support 
hose streams on the fire floors. 

3. Standpipes are in service. This means they are arranged so that no single valve can stop the flow of 
water from the pumper Siamese to all standpipes. In the* rare case that such a single valve exists, is acces- 
sible, and is expected to be checked, consider standpipes to be in service. Note: we can expect it to be 
checked if the site has an adequate valve inspection program and checking the valve is pan of emer- 
gency procedures. 

Also consider the presence of pressure regulating valves (PRVs). Where PRVs are present, they must 
be property set. well maintained, and fire department and emergency organization personnel should be 
familiar with their operation. It not, the tire department should not be credited to controlling interior fire 
spread. (See Data Sheet 3-11 for information and guidance on PRVs.) 

The paid fire department aspect reflects the traditional ability of a department to have the training, per- 
sonnel, and equipment to successfully attack an indoor fire. This is the same general cntena as we have 
been using to mark PAID on the F&EC Survey. 

The ability of fire fighters to prevent both tntenor and exterior vertical fire spread is limited to that por- 
tion of the building within the pumping capacity of the fire department (usually about 30 stories). Above 
the level of adequate water flow, do not credit any fire department to be able to control mtenor or exte- 
nor fire spread. The pumping source is most likely fire department pumpers but it may also include fixed, 
off-site pumps that feed standpipes in the subject building. (See O.S. 3-7N for information about the capa- 
bilities of mobile fire department pumpers.) 



C1W9 Facwrv Mutual insurance Company Aft ngms teatfvtd 

WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15073 



F(A)514.33 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 7 of 22 



E. "PFD Can Control Exterior Fire Spread.** 

This special category of response requires a very large commitment of equipment and specially trained per- 
sonnei. We need the iiems in Section (above) plus an evaluation of the respond.no f tr * aepanment 
The evaluations were based on: " 

1. A minimum of 250 fire fighters available per shift. 
Note: Additional factors to be considered: 

a. Quality ol personnel including training. 

b. Proximity of personal residences (relates to ease of off-duty recall). 

2. Mutual Aid arrangements in place with formal agreements and actual joint training conducted (not nec- 
essarily high-rise specific training); or, manpower level of 500 per shift. 

3. Use of the Incident Command System or equivalent, for fire ground control. 

*. A documented departmental high-rise procedure that covers such Hems as high-rise preplans train- 
ing and general fire attack methods. 

In addition to ihe above, the following favorable factors may have been considered. The fire depart- 
ment: 

5. Will preferably conduct actual field high-rise training drills for fire fighters. 

6. Will maintain detailed building specific preplans for all high-rise buildings. This program should include 
a method of updating the preplan. 

7. Witi preferably have an increased initial response to a high-rise fire or an increased initial response 
to a confirmed fire alarm. ¥ 

These seven items are for information only. Actual evaluations use more detailed critena and normally 
include a visit to the department headquarters. 

A list of public fire departments (see Appendix A) that have been evaluated, including those that qualify 
as being capable of controlling exterior fire spread, is reevaluated and updated annually. Note that If build- 
ing conditions do not permit the fire department to be capable of controlling interior fire spread, an oth- 
erwise qualified department will not be able to control exterior fire spread. Also, if water sources for 
standpipes/hoses cannot effectively reach the upper floors (see Section Vll.0.3), then the fire depart- 
ment cannot be expected to control fire spread on those upper floors. 

F. "1.5h<H<1,75rV 

This is a special category where exterior fire spread is possible, but it may still be controlled by favorable fac- 
tors. In general, these favorable factors assure that fire fighters need to be concerned oni^ with exterior 
spread (window-to-window); all predictable avenues of interior spread would be stopped by the construc- 
tion arrangement. * — ~" — 

This arrangement rules out any interconnected floors, requires excellent fire department response and 
includes two features even better than in other categories: 

1 . Safing is mechanically secured in place — it remains there even if the exterior wall buckles a few inches. 
(See Figure Nos. 2a. 2b, and 2c in O.S. t-3 and Engmeenng Bulletin F$-91 for examples of accept- 
able mechanical sacurement.) 

2. Poke-throughs/penetrations are properly sealed with fire resistant materials or fire rated devices. For 
example, duct dampers rated at two or more hours are provided on ducts as they pass through a floor; or, 
a two-hour rated fire stop system seats floor penetrations for a group of vertical water and steam pipes. 

SPECIAL NOTE: A continuous high level of integrity of these favorable features is critical in this cat- 
egory to limiting the MFL to only five fire floors. These factors should be verified annually. See com- 
ments that follow under "THE INSPECTION." 

01999 Factory Mutual tmuronot Company AH nflWa rtaorv**. 

W1LLIS CONFIDENTIAL X5074 



F(A)514^3 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Pages of 22 



VIII. OTHER BUILDING FACTORS 

A. Atriums 

Atnums that terminate below tne threshold ol high-rise heighf donl adversely affect the outcome of the deci- 
sion tree since they are reachable at all levels by ladder trucks. Atnums that extend up to or beyond the hian- 
nse height threshold can be considered as not contributing to vertical spread if they are arranged in a manner 
equivalent to stair towers, i.e.: 

1. two-hour rated walls 

2. all openings with automatic closing fire doors 
Some mooem hotels have this arrangement. 

If the atrium does not have these cutoff features (e.g.: glass-walled shops open to the atrium) consider H 
as interconnected floors. 

B. Perimeter Air Ouct Penetrations 

Usually this will involve vertical HVAC ducts feeding floor level registers on several floors. 

1 . Consider as a poke-through if a duct is in a fire rated, slab-to-slab enclosure. It may have undam- 
pered outlets at floor level. 

2. Consider as N-inter-connected floors: 

a. if ducts are riot in fire rated enclosures slab-to-slab for N floors. 

b. If duct(s) feed ceiling level registers on N floors. 

C. Steel Protection 

There should be complete coverage at adequate thickness (see specs7drawmgs for thickness require- 
ments). Small holidays (missing coating qf only a few square inches), such as for beam damps, are toler- 
able. Variations in thickness are tolerable as long as overall thickness is there. 

Architectural drawings (sometimes) and specifications (always) have information on fire proofing, and these 
two sources are usually easiest to find- There is no simple guideline tor estimating fire rating of an installed 
material. There are three basic types: insulating (rock wool, ceramic fiber, vermiculite. periite. etc.); energy 
absorbing (gypsum. Portland cement, magnesium oxychloride, etc.); or intumescent mastic coatings [paints 
with spray-on thickness of up to V* in. ([0.6 cm]). Hourly rating varies with types of coating, manufacturer 
coating density, thickness, and the characteristics of the structural steel member. 

If drawings/specs, are not available, it's reasonably safe to use the code requirements in effect at the time 
of construction. The FM Global operations center should have some guidance on local codes. Codes do 
change over time, but once identified, they apply to alf buildings constructed under the code at that time 
thereby saving a tot of individual research efton on buildings in a given area. 

As a last resort, try the following sources: 

1 . City building inspector or building code enforcement division - they may have records for the particu- 
lar site or can provide code requirements. 

2. fire department division dealing with construction safety code enforcement. 

3. Building architect 

4. Building general contractor. 
. 5. fire proofing installer. 

D. Urge Holidays (bare spots In fire-reslstlve coating): 
1 . Are a serious deficiency to a steel member. 



01999 Factory Mutual tmunm Company M rights rtstrvtd 

WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15075 



F(A)514.33 

MR. OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 9 of 22 



2. During construction, holidays are usually corrected via code inspections. 

3. Such code inspections cease once a building is occupied. 

4. II there are laqe holidays on a secondary beam, consider that the team will sag and floor will crack. 
This will increase local damage, but will not increase tne number of fire floors predicted in the decision 

5. If there are large holidays on a column or primary beam, the structure above defomis. AH floors above 
are gutted. (A recommendation to correct this deficiency is almost always warranted.) Note- See O S 
1-3 tor further discussion of bare spots in fire-resistive coatings. ' 

E. Helicopters 

Helicopters have negligible effect on our Ma considerations. They are used mostly for evacuation and res- 
cue. and some departments avoid their use. Helicopters W6 no investigation or reporting unless some 
unusual or essential use regarding response to an MFL fire is anticipated. 

F. Openable Windows 

Openable windows are rare in modem office high-rises in the United States. However, some older build- 
ings, hotels, health care facilities, and some non-United States high-rise buildings do have them. Open 
windows facilitate extenor firespread and we need the larger ratio of H>3.8h per O.S. 1-3 in orcer to pre- 
vent exterior vertical spread since at H«3.8h, the theoretical flame tip height is already at the bottom of 
the window on the next upper story. A ratio less than 3.8h would allow flame to enter an open window; fhis 
would involve direct (lame entry to the floor above and facilitate vertical fire spread. 

With open windows and H < 3.8h, vertical extenor fire spread would be very rapid due to the ready avail- 
ability of combustibles to the flames entenng each upper floor window. 

Using the decision tree and considering openable windows, a "NO" to "Exterior Walls H > 3 8h" would 
lead directly to "Ail Floors Above PFD Reach Involved." A "YES" would follow the normal paththrough the 
matnx. 

Noncombustible balconies of adequate size can deflect flames an<* stop upward exterior fire spread When 
noncombustibie balconies are provided below all openable windows, are at least 4 ft (i^m) deep and 
are continuous or extend at feast 4 ft (1 .2m) beyond the window edges, exterior vertical fire spread should 
not occur. ~ 

G. Smoke Control System 

Building smoke control systems, even if elaborate, have little effect on an MFL scenario. These systems 
are easily overwhelmed by propped-open stairwell doors for tire hoses, broken windows and the large 
extent of smoke production (often orders of magnitude larger than the systems are designed for) These 
systems should not be considered for MFL analysis. 

H. Mechanical Floors as Fire Breaks 

A mechanical floor may serve to stop the vertical spread of fire. The floor stops intenor spread via negli- 
gible combustible loading and good cutoffs. It stops exterior spread if its wails are high enough so exte- 
nor flames don't reach beyond the top of the window on the floor above the mechanical floor. The formula 
that follows will account for this, and Figure 2, Part "B" snows the minimum allowable mechanical floor 
height 

Experience shows that even if \^ to five floors are to be involved in fire, the lower of those floors are con- 
sumed by the time the upper floors are involved. So only up to three floors are expected to be fully involved 
at once. This applies to buildings with no combustible ceilings, with closed winoows. and within other 
assumptions and conditions listed under Section VI.. "BEFORE USING THE MFL DECISION TREE", if 
not. many more than three floors may be involved simultaneously and this will not apply. 



C1999 factory Mutual irtwanea Company Ail ognu fa*att*d 

WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15076 



F(A)S14.33 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 10 of 22 



The chief application as a fin break occurs where H > 2.8h. Here, unfavorable conditions that facilitate 
interior spread may lead to several floors burning simultaneously. Where H > 2.8h. flames exiting exte- 
nor wimmi reinforce each of her neghgibly and a mechanical floor with minima! combustibles can haft 
intenor fire spread. The decision tree shows in this case mat a mechanical floor is always a viable con- 
sideration, and it need not have a slab-to-slab height greater than that of other floors to be effective Note 
that the arrangement of wall-type and interconnected floors is still limited by Section Vt.O. 

Also, note that if H > 2.8h and the building has masonry, concrete or granite walls connected to floor slabs 
we don t need a blank mechanical floor to stop fire ascent The scenano here is that the building con- ' 
stnjct.c-n resists f.re ascent once the fire runs out of interconnected floors. The onry remaining avenue of 

SJ^SI^ ^ """ 3ny ,ife dCpanmcrt fesp0flse cou,d a "«* «*«*? spreading 

In the 1.75 < H < 2.8h range, fire can spread both internally and externally. But there may still be condi- 
tions where a mechanical floor will have both the minimal combustibles to stop interior fire ascent nlus 
have tall enough walls to prohibit extenor flames from passing to the floors above it. 

There are three conditions in this H;h range which could lead to fire spreading to the roof. These are: 

1. inadequate safing 

2. PFD's mat cannot control extenor fire spread 

3. interconnected floors within the limits of Section VI.D. 

if only ONE of these unfavorable conditions is present, we may expect only three floors will be burning 
simu taneousty, A mechanical floor may then still serve as a fire break. A mechanical floor cannot be used 
as a fire break if interconnected floors are excessive (use limits of section VI.D. as a guide) or If H < 1.75h. 

Assuming only tnree floors are burning, a mechanical floor would need a height Br (expressed in num- 
ber of floor heights) to stop extenor spread as follows: 

Equation (1): Br » 4.76h * SI • 2S 

where: 

8r - required height of mechanical floor as firebreak m feet (or meters) 

h « window height in ft. (or meters) 

SL ■ height of tower spandrel (above floor surface) in ft. (or meters) 

S = total height of spandrel in ft. (or meters) 

NOTE: Floor height equals S * h for fire floors. 

EXAMPLE: 

A 30-story protected steel frame high-rise building has no interconnected floors. 12 ft. (3.7m) high sto- 
ries with 5.8 ft (1,8m) high windows, and spandrels centered on the floor slabs. It has a 20 ft. (6m) high, 
17th story mechanical floor with no windows and with negligible combustibles. Fire department appara- ' 
tus can reach the ninth floor. Safing consists of friction-fit fiberglass insulation. The building meets vari- 
ous other assumptions/conditions (e.g.: adequate fireproofmg of steel, sundpipes are in service, etc.) 
and the PFO can control exterior fire spread. What is the MFL fire area? 
SOLUTION: 

H « 2.6K. (e.g M from H • 12 + (12-5.8)/2 -15.1; and h = 5.8). We enter the decision tree in the "1.75h 
< H < 2.8h M category. Since safing is not adequate (because H is fiberglass), the MFL area would be "All 
Floors Above PFD Reach Involved." i,e.. floor 10 and above. 

However, the 17th floor may be a fire stop since there is only one unfavorable condition - the safing. ft 
won t transmit an intenor fire upward due to scant combustibles, so we only need check whether the height 
is adequate to interrupt exterior spread of fire. 

C1999 Ffcio<y Mutuji iwwic* Compjny Aff ngnu rcwvtd 
WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15077 



F(A)5103 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 11 of 22 



We can us* Equation (1) where: 

h m 5.8 

SL « (12 • 5.8)/2 » 3.1 

S« 12-5.8-6.2 

S*h-« 12 

Then Br * {4.78 x 5.8) • .3.1 • 12.4 * 12.2 ft. 

So the mechanical floor needs a slab-to-siao height of at least 12.2 ft (3.7m) to be a fire breax. Since 
the mechanical floor is 20 fL (6m) high, it can interrupt extenor spread. (See Figure No. 2 Part A tor a scaled 
version of the floor heights and predicted flame height.) 

We would be left with a seven-flooc area below the mechanical floor and a 13-floor area above it The 
13-floor area would oe our MFL fire area. 

NOTE: This choice involves burning 13 floors and having damage to the other 17 floors by water The 
seven floor choice would bum only seven floors and do less damage to the other 23 floors by water/ 
smoke. 

Also note Figure No. 2, Part B. The mechanical floor height is the rninimum 12.2 ft. (3.7m) just calcu- 
lated. This visually shows the threshold for vertical exterior fire spread. If the flame tip extends only to the 
top of the window (or lower), vertical spread is not expected. This aspect is built into the H > 2 8h ratio 
for avoiding vertical spread. For example, with only one floor burning and a ratio of H = 2.8h the flame too 
is at the top of the window on the next upper door. 

EXAMPLE: 

Same as before except the 16th story directly below the mechanical floor is 14 ft. (4.2m) high to accomo- 
date deeper steel beams supporting the mechanical floor and that portion of the spandrel is 2 ft (0 6m) 
deeper. This increased distance can be credited towards the required height of the mechanical floor, 
Br > 12.2 ft. - 2 ft m 10.2 ft. (3.1m) 

So. the mechanical floor would only need to be 10.2 ft. (3.1 m) to act as an effective fire break. 
I. Building Dimension Reductions as Fire Breaks 

A high-rise may have one or more abrupt reductions in floor area. Consider ihe reduction deep enough 
to stop exterior spread if its depth is at least equal to the height needed for a mechanical floor break and 
if it covers the entire building perimeter, fn the previous example, we needed a mechanical floor height 
(Br) > 1 2.2 ft (3.7m), so a reduction > 12.2 ft. (3.7m) would be sufficient to stop vertical extenor fire spread. 
J. Asbestos end PCB's; 

See Section XIII.G., THE REPORT. 

IX, PERCENT FIRE DAMAGE 

Use the decision tree (Figure 3) to determine the number of MFL fire floors involved. Then use the follow- 
ing percentages to estimate damage on various floors. 



WILLIS 



01999 Ftetory Mutual tft»urancr Company AH ngm reserved 

CONFIDENTIAL 15078 



F(A)S14^3 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 12 of 22 



FIGURE 2 



18 



A- Condtoont for Exsmpla 



Th» « *a throahoitf for m* vorooml ftama 
tPflMd Thtboof Aaftama must bo at or 
batour th* top of 9* wm*»* touoputror 
■prMd. Our Kh hum oosowm tor ««. 





/5i..X 7 6^ftam)»$ 



B-SamtaaA, out 17th floor 
12^ ft (37 m) hi0fi.no 
floor ht*hl naodad to stop 
ftra spread. 



Tht bottom saoion of machanieal tpandrai. S„in ton cm. may appear dtcptr »*n typical ipandratt to 
oovtr dotptr boamt uauaft/ notdod tor machancai floor* If S„« doapar. wt con coruxtef ffw 17th floor 
«rt brook to bo highor by mot diffarortea. a** S„ war* 5 ft. (1.5 m) tha tffacuvahaigfttofflobrNo. 17« 
Figuro 2B would bt 12311 ♦<$ . Xl* (1.54)m « 14 1 1t (4.3 m). 



WILLIS 



OIPW Factory Mutual truurbnoe Company Afl ngrns rosorvad 

CONFIDENTIAL 15079 



§ 1 

8 * 

I 



1 * 



HIGH RISE MFC DECISION TREE 









flMMMHi 


N» 






' 
















1 








*fWMUi< 

HFiMrMta 




irt<H<im 


Mc 









t*MH«ini, 






66 66 




'HI 

rmnriMf 
fOrtftoti 



J 6 6 6 o ll„ 



Predicted number of noon Involved In fir* 
FIGURE 3 



rnmrto** 



Ym 



pj HO* 



••ft* to MM* 1 



Ha I *fDC«» 
■ RvMUMm 
I FtafefM* | 



rw aim 



6 



rtMFtM** 



I J; 

Kg 

i 

m 

V 

5 

g 

z 
o 

CO 




F{A)514J3 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page u of 22 



TABLE 1 - PERCENT FIRE DAMAGE 

FmenooRW 

BLDQ. % CONTS. •* 

fieiNFORC ED CONCRETE 60 1 oo 

PROTECTED STEEL 70 lW 

NON-COMB. Consider BUg. * Corns, a Total Um 

1 All percentages include demolition costs. 

* Use 25 to 50% of these values to account lor anticipated smaller fire areas in buildings with small subdi- 
vided rooms such as hotels, apartments or hospitals if the following conditions are met: 

• rooms have slab-to-slab partitions or partitions that lit tightly to plastered or concrete ceilings 

• each room has a self-dosing or normally closed fire door. 

X. WATER DAMAGE 

Once the number of fire floors is determined from the MFL decision tree, Table No. 2 may be used to esti- 
mate the vemcal extent and average percent of water damage. 

Example No. 1 : Consider an office building where four tire floors are predicted, and for various reasons involve 
floors 22 to 25. Then from the "F and "W rows of Table No. 2. 14 floors will be water damaged - in this 
case Nos. S to 21. Finally, tor N.14, the average water damage tor all those 14 floors will be 10.7% for build* 
mg and 26.8% lor contents. 

Table 2 is a suggested job aid and reflects some general trends from loss experience. There is generally a gra- 
dient of water damage starting at 20% to the building value and 50% to contents value just below the fire 
floor, and diminishing to zero just after the 4, 8. 14, 21 or 25 floors shown in Table No. 2. The table assumes 
the gradient is uniform. It shows a running average of percentages tor gradients that run the full number 
of expected water damaged floors (as in Example No. 1) and for gradients that are truncated (as in Example 
No. 2 below). 

For example, sometimes the fire lloors will be low enough in the building that below them there will not be 
available the full number of expected water damaged floors (shown in the *W «• row). This means the low- 
est floor will intercept water that would have gone down farther to the other floors. Also, water will stay there 
longer since there are no pofce-throughs. openings., etc. for water to readily drain away. (Floor drains are usu- 
ally available and may eventually evacuate the water, but they have tar less capacity than normal open- 
ings in and around upper floors.) 

As a guideline in this type of situation, figure 40% damage to the building and 75% damage to contents on 
the lowest floor unless you twe reason to believe it will be different. 



Otfttt Ftetoiy Mutual insuraw* Company Aft ngtts r«»*rv*tf 

WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15081 



F(A)514J3 

MPL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Pag« 15 of 22 









TABLE 2 


- WATER DAMAGE PERCENTAGES 






Fm 


2 

4 




3 
$ 


4 
14 


5 

21 


25 




BIDS* 


comts 


BLOG 


CONTS 


BLOG 


COOTS 


BLOG 


COOTS 


BLOG 


| CONTS 


1 


20.0 


50.0 


20.0 


50.0 


20.0 


50.0 


20.0 


50.0 


20.0 


I 50.0 


2 


17.5 


43.8 


10.6 


47.0 


19.3 


48JJ 


193 


I 483 


193 


49.0 


3 


15.0 


37.5 


17,5 


43.8 


18.6 


46.5 


19.0 


47.5 


19.2 


48.0 


4 


12.5 


31.3 


16.3 


40.8 


17.9 


44JB 


18.6 


483 


183 


47.0 


c 






15.0 


37.5 


17.1 


42.6 


181 


45.3 


18.4 


46.0 


6 




1 


13.6 


34.5 


16.4 


41.0 


17.6 


44.0 


16.0 


4S.0 


7 






12.5 


31.3 


15.7 


393 


17.1 


423 


173 


44.0 


a 






11.3 


28.3 


15.0 


373 


16.7 


413 


17.2 


43.0 


9 










14.3 


35.6 


16.2 


403 


163 


42.0 


10 








13.6 


34.0 


15.7 


393 


16.4 


41.0 


11 










12.9 


32.3 


15.2 


36.0 


16.0 


40.0 


12 










12.1 


303 


14.8 


37.0 


153 


39.0 


Nc13 










11.4 


283 


143 


35.8 


15.2 


36.0 


14 










10.7 


26.8 


133 


343 


143 


37.0 


IS 














13.3 


333 


14.4 


36.0 


16 


1 




1 




12.9 


32.3 


143 


35.0 


17 


t 1 


I 




12.4 


31 X) 


13.6 


343 


18 


1 




1 




11.9 


29.8 


135 


33.0 


19 


* 




1 




11.4 


263 


123 


323 


20 


1 










11.0 


275 


12.4 


313 


21 


1 










103 


263 


12.0 


30.0 


22 


1 














11.6 


29.0 


23 


1 














11.2 


26.0 


24 


1 














10.8 


27.0 


25 


1 








i 


I 10.4 


26.0 



P * Pf*6iCie4 numotf Of MFL fire poor* 

w ■ Expected ftumoer o» wetefoanupe *oors 

(Adoaonai floors may ot oanuQtd wntrt water fa* to me bottom oi s»*weiis. e<evator snatu. etc Those require separate eonud* 

eration ) 
N * Actual numotf of floors avertable for water demspc. 

Example No. 2: Same as No. 1. except the four fire floors begin al floor No. 9. Assume the building has one 
basement. Then the basement through floor 6 will contain the water that would have passed through 14 
floors. The basement would sustain 40% water damage to building and 75% to contents. From Table No. 
2. we still have F=4 and N«8 for tne remaining eight floors; so we find thai those eight floors sustain an aver- 
age 15% water damage to building and 37.5% to contents. 

The table also assumes the occupancy is uniform from floor to floor. If a floor has an unusual or concen* 
trated value, the gradient concept in the table may still be useful. The percent damage normally attrib* 
uted to that floor may be used as a guide in assessing seventy of occupancy damage. The percentage 
for any given floor win decrease from 20% in the gradient and is found from: 

Equation (2)*: PERCENTn « 20 (1 • rvy 

W 

where PERCENTn * percent water damage on the n'th floor below the lowest fire floor 

n * the n'th floor below the lowest tire Moor 

W * Table No. 2 value for expected number of water damaged floors 

'NOTE: Note that Equation (2) gives the percent water damage lor a single, specific floor. Percent- 
ages in Table No. 2 are average values lor a group of "N" floors anywhere in the range ot one 
to H VT floors. 



WILLIS 



C1999 Factory Mutual Inturanov Company An fights reserved 

CONFIDENTIAL 15082 



F(A)514.33 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 16 of 22 



Example No. 3; Same as No. 1, and the following data is gathered: 

• Protected steel trame building has 10,000 sq. ft. (929 sq, mj/llr. 

• FM Global insures building and contents 

• Floor 15 has executive offices where contents - S250/sq. ft (0.09 sq.m.) and budding - ZZOO/sa 
ft. (0.9 sq. m.) Otherwise the building value is 5115/sq. ft, (0.09 sq. m.) 

• Other floors have contents ranging from $70 to $H0Vsq. ft. (0.09 sq. m.), but the average is S9S/ 
sq. n. (0.09 sq. ra) 

What is the estimated damage by water? 
Solution: 

Well have the same 14 floors damaged as in Example No. 1, but floor 15 values seem high enough 
to consider their own impact on the total. » v 

The easiest way here is to ligure water damage lor all 14 floors at the $98 and $115 values then add 
to that the additional difference for floor 15 values. 

Floor 15 is 6 floors below the fire, so n«6 and W still is 14. 

Using Equation (2): 

PERCENT 6 * 20 (1 • §£ ) = 12.9% 
14 

The water damage for the building is: 

WATER BL0Q * $H5/sq. ft, (0.09 sq, m.) x 10.000 sq. ft. (929 sq. m.ytlr. x 14 ftr. 

x 0.107 ♦ $(300-1 15)/sq. ft. (0.09 sq. ra) x 10.000 sq. ft (929 sq. m.) x .129 

WATER BLOG . ■« S1.722.700 ♦ 238.650 

WATER eL0o . * S1 ,961,350 

PERCENT, « 50 (1 - M ) . 32.1% (Contents). 
14 

Water damage tor contents is: 

WATER CCWTef/TS = $98/sq. ft. (0.09 sq. m.) x 10.000 sq. ft. (929 sq. mjfllr. x 14 firs, x 0.268 + $ (250- 
98>/$q. ft. (0.09 sq. m.) x 10.000 sq. ft. (929 sq. m.) x 0.321 

WATER C0KTtMTS * 53.676.960 + $487,920 
WATERco*™,., * $4,164,880 
. TOTAL WATER DAMAGE * $1,961,350 + $4,164,880 

» $6. 126.000 (rounded) 
XI. SMOKE DAMAGE 

Smoke damage depends on so many factors that a detailed guideline would be extremely complicated and 
unwieldy. Presently, smoke damage is estimated on an individual building basis. 

However. Table No. 3 does present a general guideline that reflects both the strong tendency ol smoke to 
nse very freely but to diminish somewhat on its impact per floor after rising many floors. Even on floors where 
trie percentage is shown as zero, a smoke odor will likely be present. i.e.. you can smell it but can't detect 
a visual difference after wiping surfaces with a clean cloth. These floors can usually be deodorized with aero- 
sol cleaners at a cost low enough to be negligible for MFL purposes. Table No. 3 is NOT meant to be a rigid 
rule: it is a guideline intended to be modified as needed for local conditions. 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 



15083 



F<A)5 14.33 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 17 of 22 



Example No. 1: 

Consider a 60-story high-rise with H/h*2.9, inadequate sating, an -exterior PFD. and an open stairwell in 
the floor slab of No. 16 and No. 22. Two of three stair shafts terminate at the top floor me other stair shaft 
and three elevator shafts terminate at the top floor with small tightly closed penthouses atop the shafts 
Descnbe the smoke damage percentages. 

Solution: 

The MFL decision tree gives us answers of Yes-No-No-Yes-Yes . five fire floors, and these must involve at 
least one of the open stairs. Consider the five floors at Nos. 15. 16, 17, 18 and 19. Table No 3 indicates 20% 
building and 50% contents damage to the next two floors ~ Nos. 20 and 21. But the open stair in No 22 
is such a ready means of smoke spread thai No. 22 would be similarly damaged to No. 21. 

In addition, fhe tops of stair shafts and elevator shafts would trap buoyant smoke, ft could seep through door 
seams and other possible openings into at least the top floor and cause considerable damage there So fig- 
ure the same 20% building and 50% contents damage due to the heavy smoke concentration. Include more 
upper floors if. in your judgement, local conditions warrant ft. 

The penthouses are of low value in this case, so neglect them. (Include them if values warrant it) 
Result: 

We estimate the following percentages of damage to buildings and contents by smoke from the above analy- 
sis, and using Table 3; 

BUILDING CONTENTS 
Nos 20 to 22 20 '" go 

Nos. 23 to 37 10 25 

Nos. 38 to 52 !0 25 

Nos. 53 to 59 a 20 

Nos. 60 20 so 

TABLE 3 - HIGH-RISE MFL PERCENT SMOKE DAMAGE 



Floors Abcv* 
Tftt fire 


PERCENTAGES APPLY TO 1NOIVIOUAL SMOKE DAMAGED FLOOR(S) 
Number of Ftrt Floor* 


2 


3. 4. or 5 


26 


BlDG 


CONTENTS 


BLDG 


CONTENTS 


BLDG 


CONTENTS 


First 2 


20 


50 


20 


so 


20 


so 


Next 15* 


a 


20 


10 


25 


10 


25 


Next 15" 


4 


10 


10 


25 


10 


25 


Next 15* 


2 


5 


8 


20 | 10 


25 


Next 15* 








6 


15 | . 10 


25 


Next 15* 








4 


10 | 10 


25 



• IS or tfwouQfi nut HVAC XOftt 

• 1$ or to mocfto*e*J Boor, wfecfttvtr is smautr 

• wtwotfor els* is wmmM by conditions 

Nott ■ Tnt top toor<s) may occumuiat* smofco and susu* oamaoo ptromuott irmdar to me -F*si 2* floors 

XII. THE INSPECTION 

This refers to first-time evaluation of MFL using this P&P. 

A. Advance Notice 

Call before visiting to assure drawings/arrangements/extra help will.be available. 

B. Thoroughness 

Spof check coatings where steel is protected, plus check factors enough to establish a YES or NO m vari- 
ous parts of the decision tree. We recognize only a few floors may be accessible, and this is usually suf- 
ficient to assess the overall quality of a factor. 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15084 



F(A)514,33 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 18 of 22 



Open stairways are important and are worth investigating since ihey may have been the result of post- 
construction renovation. These will usually occur only where a single tenant occupies consecutive sto- 
nes. If these cannot be visited, question both the building manager and the tenant. 

Usual available areas to check: 

1. Basements 

2. Floors being renovated 

3. Idle floors 

4. Minimal interruption areas like storage rooms or switchgear rooms 

5. Penthouses 

6. Mechanical Floors 

If you feel more checking is needed but enough areas are not accessible, 

7. Consider a return visit when more areas may be accessible. 

8. Qualify your conclusions by mentioning the extent to which you were able to check things. 

Note: This problem can usually be avoided by describing your needs to the insured dunng Advance Notice. 
C. Special Category of "1.5h $ H < 1,75 h* 

A building in this category with an MFL limited to five floors depends heavily on above-mentioned favor- 
able factors. The fire will likely be all floors above the original fire floor if these lactors are compro- 
mised. Therefore, these lactors should be verified annually to the extent of detail needed to be confident 
of their continual integrity. This would include checking each floor likely to have interconnections or unpro- 
tected poke-throughs. We should concentrate our effort in areas or floors where: 

1. a tenant expands its space or makes a significant occupancy change (e.g.: adds pipes, cables, dumb- 
waiters, chutes). 

2. tenants have moved In or out. 

3. a tenant occupies two or more adjacent floors. 

4. renovations that may affect fastening of sating. 

XIII. THE REPORT 

Suggested handling covering first-time use of this procedure at a location: 

A. Recommendations • make the usual recommendations where MFL is a factor, e.g.: to reduce to system 
maximum where feasible, alarm service, etc. 

8. Items of Interest • mention study was made using the high-rise MFL analysis for the first time. 

C. LFR Supplement 

1. Use sections for Construction. Protection, etc. as needed to cover factors affecting the MFL: e.g., sal- 
tag. interconnected floors, H:h ratio or fire resistance of various building components. 

Where curtain walls are exterior glass panel tyle. describe tf the panel joints occur at every floor slab, at 
every other floor slab, and where they are in relation to the floor slab. Also describe the arrangement 
of the components being considered for spandrels (waltbpard. rigid insulation, firesaftng, metal panels). 

2. Under the F&EC Survey section of the LPRS. indicate your path through the decision tree, e.g.: -Yes- 
No- Yes-No-No-5 floors/' Briefly discuss smoke and water damage, such as including floors damaged 
and percentages. Cover anything unusual such as severe structural damage or major deviations from the 
fire, smoke or water damage guidelines (Tables 1. 2. 3). 



C1999 Fastory MiAifti insurant Company All ngms ftscfvtd 

WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15085 



F(A)51443 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 19 of 22 



0. Time Charges - an extra day for this type evaluation is not unusual, and an explanation is generally not 
needed. 7 

E. Send the repon-to the FM Global operations center for review, regardless of your review status unless noti- 
fied otherwise by the office. 

F. Since these repofls (even specials) win likely go to the insured, avoid direct reference to "maximum fore- 
seeable loss" in the body of the report, and reference anywhere in the report to your evaluation as a "study ** 
For example, a general term like lire spread potential" is okay in the PURPOSE of a special reoon and 
"evaluation of MFL" is fine in ITEMS OF INTEREST 

G. Cover in the appropriate section of the Report Supplement whether either asbestos or PCBs are present 
If present, briefly discuss their extent and location. There will be exceptions, but asbestos is usually a Con- 
struction section item and PCBs are usually an Occupancy section item. 

State the source of this conclusion: e.g.. "Mr. Chopin reported that the building does/does not have asbes- 
tos or PCBs." Do not make the conclusion based only on your investigation; e.g., don't say There is/is no 
asoestos on site." 

K either is present, determine the MFL as if they were absent Then add a statement on the F&EC Survey 
in the MFL comments section explaining that the presence of this matenal(s) may increase the MFL and that 
a special study, beyond the scope ot this evaluation, would be needed to determine that increase. 

Duration is the lime a fire will bum given fuel loading and various geometric features of a particular build- 
ing floor. 

.1364 LfKAJ 1 * hours 
Duration. fh^CK+t) 
where; 

L = combustible load in LB/FT2 
K * ratio of overall floor length/width 
A„ > floor area, ft2 

f * ratio of total window widths/penmeter 
h r window height, ft 

In metric units of kg., m. s: D « S.S6L ftOU"* 

fh/^fK+l) 



ei*94 Factory Mua*it Inwrsnot Co«np«ny AH right* rtMfvcd 

WIIAXS CONFIDENTIAL 15086 



F(A)514JI3 

MFL OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 20 of 22 



FIGURE 4 

Flow Chart to Determine If Existing Column 

Fire Resistance is Satisfactory 



Column Rabng P«r 
Drawmgs or Code 



Less ths n 
2*1/2 Hrs. 



Ftfe Resistance at 
Least 3 Hrs. 

Per Calculations? 



No 



Fire Resistance at 
Least 2-3/4 Hrs. 
Per Calculation*? 



NO 

T 



Column 
Protection 

Inadequate 



3Hr. or£efler 



2-1/2 Hrto 3 Hr. 



Satisfactory 



Yes 



Satisfactory 



Yes 



~i 



Fire Resistance at 

Least 2 Times 
F*e Duration? 



Yes 



Ato 



Fire Resistance at 

Least3 Hrs. 
Per Calculations? 



.Yes 



No 



Satisfactory 



Fire Resistance at Least 2 Times 
Fire Duraton? 

— r 

Ves 



Satisfactory 



I 
Ato 

I 

. y 



Column 
Proteebon 
Inadequate 



Satisfactory 



Column 
Protection 
Inadequate 



Atofe: Column Fim Res/sfenee can oe es/eut»tod per HMOmrm by R. D*vis whiehtsm (fte 
m MFL Dttormnut tor High-Rise Buildings' Report (£C8$-50). 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15087 



F(A)514,33 

MR. OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 21 of 22 



APPENDIX A 

FILEWrTOP4PFA5103 HIGH*ISE PFD RESPONSE LIST January 1W9 

(U«t Shows .11 PFD. Evaluated. Those Quailing as Exterior are Undented) 



ANNECY OPERATIONS 
No Evaluations Reported 

CANADIAN OPERATIONS 

Brampton. ON 

Burlington, ON 

Calgary. AB (100 ft) 

East York. ON 

Edmonton, AB (100 ft) 

Etobicoke. ON 

Halifax. NS( 100 ft) 

Hamilton. ON 

London, ON (110 ft) 

Markham. ON 
Mississauga. ON 
Montreal. QU MOO ft) 
North York. ON (105 ft) 
Oakville. ON 
Oshawa. ON 
Ottawa. ON ( 10O ft) 
Samia. ON 

Scarborough, ON (100 ft) 
Toronto. ON (100 ft) 
Vancouver. BC( 125 ft) 
Vaugnan. ON 
Windsor. ON 
Winnipeg. MA 

FRANKFURT OPERATIONS 

Budapest. Hungary (150/ft45m) 
Frankfurt. Germany (75ft/23m) 
Warsaw, Poland (I65ftf50m) 
Zunck. Switzerland (65ft/20m) 

GREAT LAKES OPERATIONS 
Cincinnati. OH (100 ft) 
Cleveland, OH (100 ft) 
Columbus. OH (100 ft) 
Detroit, Ml (100 ft) 
Fort Wayne, IN 
Frankfort. KY 
Grand Rapids. Ml 
Indianapolis, IN (135 ft) 
Kalamazoo. Ml 
Lansing, Ml 
Louisvi«e ( KY(100ft) 
South Bend, IN 
Toledo. OH 

LONDON OPERATIONS 
Oslo. Norway 
Stockholm, Sweden 

MELBOURNE OPERATIONS 

No Evaluations Reported 

*Sm*t. coy 4 PFO . Mo r«pon miot » dmom 

"Ort$*n*l I9S« tftitfy 
t )-mftt •trifl fftcft 



MID-ATLAMTIC OPERATIONS 
Anne Arundel Co.. MO (100 ft) 
Baltimore Co.. MO (100 ft) 
Baltimore MP (100 ft) 
Cnanone. NC(HOft) 
Chartston, WV (100 ft) 
Fairfax Co.. VA Masfrt 
McKeesport. PA (75 ft) 
Montgomery Co„ MD (110 ft) 
Parkersburg, WV (100 ft) 
Philadelphia. PA MOO frt 
Pittsburgh, PA (100 ft) 
Prince George Co.. MD (110 ft) 
Washington. D.C. 

MIDWEST OPERATIONS 
Chicaoo. IL (135 ft) 
Kansas Gty. MO 

Milwaukee. Wl f no m 
Minneapolis. MN (110 ft) 
St. Louts, MO (110 ft) 
St. Paul. MN (100 ft) 

NORTHEAST OPERATIONS 
Boston ma** morn. 
Bridgeport. CT 
Buffalo. NY (100 ft) 
Jersey City. NJ* 
Newaik. NJ 
New Haven. CT 
New York. NY" (100 ft) 
Rochester. NY (100 ft) 
Stamford. CT 
Worcester. MA (100 ft) 

SINGAPORE OPERATIONS 
No Evaluations Reported 

SOUTH AMERICAN 
OPERATIONS 

No Evaiuauons Reported 

SOUTHEAST OPERATIONS 
Atlanta. GA (70 ft) 
Cobb Co.. GA (100 ft) 
Jackson, MS (HO ft) 
Jacksonville, FL (100 ft) 
Metro-Dade Co.. FL (100 ft) 
Memphis. TN f 100 m 
Miami, FL (150 ft) 
Nashville, TN (100 ft) 
New Orleans. LA (1 00 ft) 
Savannah. GA( 100 ft) 
Shrevepori. LA* (110 ft) 



SOUTHWEST OPERATIONS 
Albuquerque. NM* 
Oaf las. TX(iOOft) 
Denver. CO (110 ft) 
Fort Worth, TX 
Houston. TX /HQfn 
Oklahoma City, OK (100 ft) 
Phoenix. A2 doom 
SanAntomo.TXOOOft) 
Sconsdaie, A2* 
Tucson, AZ* 
Tulsa. OK 

WESTERN OPERATIONS 
Albany. CA 

Anaheim. CA* 

8akerst«ld. CA* 

Beverly Hills, CA* 

Burbank. CA* 

Clark Co,. NV (110 ft) 

Costa Mesa, CA* 

Culver City, CA* 

El Segundo. CA* 

Fullerton. CA* 

Glendale. CA* 

Honolulu, HI* 

Inglewood. CA* 

Kern Co.. CA* 

las Vegas. NV* 

Long Beach, CA* 

Los Angeles. CA** (100 ft) 

Los Angeles Co.. CA nop fti 

Newport Beach. CA* 

Oceansioe. CA* 

Ontano. CA* 

Orange. CA 

Oranoe Co.. CA (100 ft) 

Oxnard. CA 

Pasadena. CA 

Pomona, CA' 

Portland. OR (100 ft) 

Riverside. CA* 

San Bernadino, CA* 

San Diego. CA (100 ft) 

San Francisco. CA (100 ft) 

San Jose. CA (100 ft) 

Santa Ana. CA* 

Santa Monica. CA* 

Seattle. WA (100 ft) 

Torrance. CA* 

Ventura. CA* 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15088 



F(A)514.33 

MR. OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 

Page 22 of 22 



CONFIDENTIAL • FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY 
Not To Bt Distributed Outside FM Global 

E.O. Directive 5-9G 
[File with PIP F(A)-514.33J 



Factory Mutual 




TO 
FROM 



Distribution 
PC. Blanchard 



INTEROFFICE 
CORRESPOND ANCE 

AT 

AT F&EC Engineering 
DATE March 15.1996 



SUBJECT Use of MFL High-Rise Methodology for 
Libraries 

ACTION REQUESTED 

The MFL high-nse methodology should be applied only to buildings and occupancies outlined in P&P F(A)- 
$14.33. section Vl.A.1. page 4. Libraries are excluded from this P4P's application and those locations where 
F(A)-514,33 has been used should be reevaluated. 

DISCUSSION 

The MFL high-rise methodology is an underwriting tool used lor specific occupancies in specific buildings 
as outlined in P&P F(A)-514.33. It is intended lor use m evaluation of buildings meeting the definition of high- 
rise buildings and within the intended occupancies/These occupancies are commercial, business and resi- 
dential occupancies with small storage locations as part of the occupancy. It is based on high-rise loss 
experience ol mostly offices, hotels, hospitals, dormitories and ancillary occupancies. -Specif* examples of 
occupancies not applicable are cited in the P&P. such as garmet or other warehousing, department stores, 
malls, and manufactunng. 

Another occupancy that ts not applicable to this methodology is libraries. There have been several cases 
where the high-rise methodology has been improperly applied to libraries (at both buitdmgs termed high- 
rise and low-rise). Due to the concentration of combustibles and open landscape arrangement typical to a 
library, these do not meet the intended application of P&P F(A)-514.33. This has resulted in additional rein- 
surance costs not originally expected when insurance was bound. 

Distribution: F(A) Series P&P Holders (023) 



WILLIS 



01993 Ftcrory Mufcul Imwanet Company A* njhu r«s*<vtd 

CONFIDENTIAL 15089 



ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE WORKS 

O 




ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE WORKS, LLC 

OVERVIEW 



Alternative Insurance Works, LLC was founded in November, 1994. AIW's primary 
mission is to offer commercial entities alternative risk management and alternative risk 
finance services, which can most efficient protect asset and operational risks. AIW has 
several principals, experienced in all areas of risk management, risk finance, and 
employee and specialty benefits. In addition to our principals, we maintain a network of 
affiliates and partners throughout the United States and the world, bringing our clients 
services wherever they may be needed. 

AJW prides itself on finding or developing creative, uncommon solutions to both typical 
and extraordinary risk and management needs of its clients; As such, AIW often works 
adjunctively with brokers and agents, to bring the best possible solutions to their mutual 
clients. AIW's compensation is typically fee based, carefully defining our roles and 
responsibilities to the client. 

On the following pages are the biographies of the two AIW principals involved in this 
project, Mr. John Hickey, project leader, and Mr. Tim Breen, project review and assist. 
Also included is a representative listing of AIW's many client relationships and 
experiences. 



teHMentt Park Road. OMGrtewch. Cowucvcut 06fi~0 7t\tpho«c 2Q;-6$-.8003 Fax. 20$*6*^8010 
"IriftiAmut.Swu rQO. AV* rorfcAWj'or* W/ 73 Ubpbon*, 212*292*422* For. f/W7.0£5J 

WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15090 



ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE WORKS 

O 




JOHN P. HICKEY, CSP. PE 

Summary: John Hickey has over 30 years experience in the field of insurance 
and risk management. His specific focus has been in loss control and claims 
management, guiding large, multi-national organizations to most effective ways 
to reduce the costs of risk by controlling risks. John's work with diverse entities 
from petrochemical, to oil and gas exploration, to manufacturers have given him 
a broad set of perspectives when applying loss control and claims management 
techniques. Also, John has worked with many captive insurance and self- 
insurance structures, where pro-active cost containment is critical to the financial 
success of such alternative programs. John's thorough, analytical approach to 
service issues, coupled with a keen insight into client need, make him among the 
most respected risk management executives in the consulting and brokerage 
industries. Below is a synopsis of his career. 

5-1-96 to present: Managing Director of Alternative Insurance Works 
(AIW). 

1 989-1 996: Newman Agency (Bank of New York captive). Vice President & 
Manager - Risk Management Division. 

1987-1989: Oland International. Manager - Risk Management Department. 

1978-1987: Bayly, Martin, & Fay Manager - Technical Services Division. 

1968-1978: Johnson & Higgins. Assistant Vice President & Senior Consultant. 

1957-1968: FIA (now Industrial Risk Insurers) and Allendale. Varied positions 
from Training Director, to Field Supervisor, to Supervisor of Engineering. 

Education: B.S., Civil Engineering, Northeastern University, 1957 

M.S., Occupational Safety & Health, New York University 

Certifications & Affiliations: Licensed in Connecticut and Pennsylvania as a 
Professional Engineer. 
Certified Safety Professional 

Past President of American Society of Safety Engineers - New York 
Past Director & Secretary of Safety Executives of New York 
Member of National Safety Management Society 
Member of Society of Fire Protection Engineers 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 15091 



ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE WORKS 

O 




BACKGROUND AND RESUME OF H. TIMOTHY BREEN 



Summary: Tim Breen has over 19 years experience in the insurance industry. This 
has been principally in risk management consulting to large, multinational corporal- 
ions, as well as guiding organizations in the utilization of alternative risk flnancina 
techniques. Alternative distribution of insurance and related services have also tarn 
a main part of his activities. A few specific accomplishments include the formation of 
seven captive insurers for varied commercial enterprises; the development of several 
finite risk programs for enhancing credits within asset backed securitizations; work with 
The Bank of New York on using insurance products to generate new fee income* the 
creation and management of Marsh & McLennan's Risk Evaluation Group which offers 
risk management consulting to merger and acquisition activity. Tim has published 
several articles on the topic of risk evaluation for corporate acquisitions, as well Vs on 
alternative insurance distribution and funding. Below is a synopsis of his career. 

11-1 5-94 to present: President and Founder of Alternative Insurance Works (AIW). 

1991-1994: UNLTER Corporation. President Managed and developed alternative 
programs for the subsidiary of a reinsurance broker. 

19*9-1991: Newman Agency (Bank of New York captive). Executive Vice President 
Oversaw all business development activity. 

19R6-1989: Marsh & McLennan, Inc. Vice President Created and chaired the 
Risk Evaluation Group (as described above). 

1983-1986: Alexander & Alexander International. Vice President and Director 
of Foreign Multinational Business. 

1978-1983: Fred. S. James & Co. Vice President Commercial account executive 
and Manager of Product Development 

1976-1978: Chubb & Son, Inc. Underwriter for commercial property risks. 

Education: B^, Political Science, Hobart College, 1976 

Various Courses, College of Insurance. 1976-1980 



tf*.wp 



WILLIS CONFIDENTIAL 



15092 



ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE WORKS 






PARTIAL LIST OF CLIENT INVOLVEMENT 



Aviation Investors, Inc. * 
Avnet, Inc. 

The Bank of New York • 

Bayer AG* 

BMW* 

Boehringer Ingelheim 

Campeau Corp. 

CNA Insurance Companies* 

Commodore Resources * 

Continental Insurance Companies 

Crane Corp. 

Oegussa AG 

EFI Electronics, Inc.* 

First Bank of the Americas 
Framatome, S.A. 
Framlington PLC 

General Electric Corporation* 
Liberty Mutual International 
Mars, Inc. 



Morgan Stanley, Inc. 
National Bank of Canada* 
National Westminster Bank 
New York Surety 
PDCA ** 

Pitney Bowes, Inc. * 
Prime Asset Inc. * 

Purdue Frederick, Inc. 

Republic Bank Corp. 
Rhone Poulenc, S.A. • 
SECURE, Inc. 
Stinnes Corp.* 
Thyssen, Inc. 

Tootal, Ltd. * 
Union Carbide 
United Parcel Service * 
UNISYS 

U,N.T.S.* **• 

Young & Rubicam, Inc. * 



Denotes "alternative risk financing structures" used 
Painting and Decorating Contractors of America 
* United Network of Temporary Services, LLC 



v^v^^vx*wps 



WILLIS 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15093