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No. VI. 




THE 


ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


, 


BY 


LUDWIG FEUERBACH. 


ttrnnslut.eb fram tg.e 
.ctanh O).ermnn 
MHan, 


BY 


MARIAN EVANS, 


TBANSLATOB OF "STBAUS
S LIFE OF JESUS
 


LONDON: 
JOHN CHAP
IAN, 
8, KIN G WI L L I A 1\1 S T R E E T, S T RAN D. 


XDCCCLIV. 



LONDON: 
SAVILL AND EDWARDS. PRINTERS. CHANDOS STREET. 
COVENT GARDEN. 



PREFACE 


TO 


THE SECOND EDITION.* 


THE clamour excited by the present work has not surprised 
Ine, and hence it has not in the least moved me from my 
position. On the contrary, I have once more, in all cahnness, 
subjected my work to the severest scrutiny, both historical and 
philosophical; I have, as far as possible, freecl it from its 
defects of form, and enriched it with new developments, illustra- 
tions and historical testinlonies,-testimonies in the highest 
degree striking and irrefragable. Now that I have thus verified 
my analysis by historical proofs, it is to be hoped that readers 
whose eyes are not sealed will be convinced and will admit, even 
though reluctantly, that my work contains a faithful, correct 
translation of the Christian religion out of the oriental language 
of imagery into plain speech. And it has no pretension to be 
anything more than a close translation, or, to speak literally, 
an empirical or historico-philosophical analysis, a solution of 
the enigma of the Christian religion. The general propositions 
which I premise in the Introduction are no à priori, excogi- 
tated propositions, no products of speculation; they have 
arisen out of the analysis of religion; they are only, as in- 
tleed are all the fundamental ideas of the work, generalizations 


* The opening paragraphs of this Preface are omitted, as having too 

pecific a reference to transient German polemics to interest the Engli::;h 
reader. 



vi 


PREFACE. 


from the known manifestations of human nature, and in par- 
ticular of the religious consciousness,-facts converted into 
thoughts, i. e., expressed in general terms, and thus made the 
property of the understanding. The ideas of my work are only 
conclusions, consequences, drawn from premises which are not 
themselves mere ideas, but objective facts either actual or 
historical-facts which had not their place in my head simply 
in virtue of their ponderous existence in folio. I unconditionally 
repudiate absol'ute, immaterial, self-sufficing speculation,-that 
speculation which draws its material from within. I differ toto 
cælo from those philosophers who pluck out their eyes that 
they may see better; for rny thought I require the senses, 
especially sight; I found my ideas on materials which can be 
appropriated only through the activity of the senses. I do not 
generate the object from the thought, bl
t the thought from the 
object; and I hold that alone to be an object which has an exist- 
ence beyond one's own brain. I all1 an idealist only in the region 
of practical philosophy, that is, I do not regard the limits of 
the past and present as the limits of humanity, of the future; 
on the contrary, I firmly believe that many things-yes, many 
things-which with the short-sighted, pusillanimous practical 
men of to-day, pass for flights of imagination, for ideas never 
to be realized, for mere chimeras, will to-morrow, i.e., in the 
next century,-centuries in individual life are days in the life 
of humanity,-exist in full reality. Briefly, the "Idea" is 
to me only faith in the historical future, in the triumph of 
truth and virtue; it has for nle only a l)olitical and moral sig- 
nificance; for in the sphere of strictly theoretical philosophy, 
I attach myself, in direct opposition to the Hegelian philosophy, 
only to 'realisnt, to materialislll in the sense above indicated. 
The maxim hitherto adopted by speculative philosophy: all 
that is mine I carry with me, the old olnnia l1lea nWC1l1n po'rto, 
I cannot, alas! appropriate. I have many things outside my- 
self, ,,'hich I cannot convey either in my pocket or my head, 
but which nevertheless I look upon as belonging to me, not 
indeed as a mere man-a view not now in question-but as a 
philosopher. I anl nothing but a natzt1'((;llJhilosophc1" in thc 



PREFACE. 


Vll 


d01na in of ?nincl; anù the natural philosopher can do nothing 
without instruments, without material means. In this character 
I bave written the present work, which consequently contains 
nothing else than the principle of a new philosophy verified 
practically, i. e., in concreto, in application to a special object, but 
an object which has a universal significance: namely, to religion, 
in which this principle is exhibited, developed and thoroughly 
carried out. This philosophy is essentially distinguished from 
the systems hitherto prevalent, in that it corresponds to the real, 
complete nature of man; but for that very reason it is antagonistic 
to minds pervertell and crippled by a superhuman, i. e., anti- 
human, anti-natural religion anù speculation. It does not, as I 
have already said elsewhere, regard the pen as tbe only fit organ 
for the revelation of truth, but the eye and ear, the hand and foot; 
it does not identify the idea of the fact with the fact itself, so as 
to reduce real existence to an existence on paper, but it separates 
the two, and precisel)T by this separation attains to the fact itself; 
it recognises as the true thing, not the thing as it is an object 
of the abstract reason, but as it is an object of the real, cOlnplete 
man, and hence as it is itself a real, complete thing. This 
philosophy does not rest 011 an Understanding per Be, on an 
absolute, nameless understanding, belonging one knows not to 
whom, but on the understanding of man ;-t}lough not, I grant, 
on that of man enervated by speculation and dogma ;-and it 
speaks the language of nleu, not an empty, unknown tongue. 
Yes, both in substance anù in speech, it places philosophy in 
the negation of philosophy, i. e., it declares that alone to ùe the 
true philosophy which is converted in B'llCCUJ]li et sanglline1n, 
which is incarnate in 1\lan; and hence it finds its highest 
trÍl.unph in the fact that to all dull and pedantic minds, which 
place the essence of philosophy in the show of philosophy, it 
appears to be no philosophy at all. 
This philosophy has for its principle, not the Substance of 
Rpinoza, not the ego of Kant and Fichte, not the Absolutt) 
Identity of Schelling, not the Absolute 1\Iind of Hegel, in short, 
no abstract, merely conceptional being, but a 'real being, the 
true Ens 1'ealissinuon-lllan; its principle, therefore, is ill the 



Vlll 


PREFACE. 


highest degree positive and real. It generates thought from 
the opposite of thought, from J\Iatter, from existence, from the 
senses; it has relation to its object first through the senses, i. e., 
passively, before defining it in thought. Hence my work, as a 
specimen of this philosophy, so far from being a production to 
be placed in the category of Speculation,-although in another 
point of view it is the true, the incarnate result of prior philo- 
sophical systems,-is the direct opposite of speculation, nay, 
puts an end to it by eXplaining it. Speculation makes religion 
say only what it has itself thought, and expressed far better 
than religion; it assigns a meaning to religion without any refer- 
ence to the act'ltal meaning of religion; it does not look beyond 
itself. I, on the contrary, let religion itself speak; I constitute 
myself only its listener and interpreter, not its prompter. Not to 
invent, but to discover, "to unveil existence;' has been my sole 
object; to see correctly, my sole endeavour. It is not I, but re- 
ligion that worships man, although religion, or rather theology, 
denies this; it is not I, an insignificant individual, but religion it- 
self that says: God is man, man is God; it is not I, but religion 
that denies the God who is not man, but only an ens 'rationis,- 
since it makes God become man, and then constitutes this God, 
not distinguished from man, having a human form, human feel- 
ingsand human thoughts, the objectofitsworshipancl veneration. 
I have only found the key to the cipher of the Christian religion, 
only extricated its true meaning from the web of contradictions 
and delusions called theology ;-but in doing so I have certainly 
committed a sacrilege. If therefore my work is negative, 
jrreligious, atheistic, let it be remembered that atheism-at 
least in the sense of this work-is the secret of religion itself; 
that religion itself, not indeed on the surface, but fundamentally, 
not in intention or according to its own supposition, but in its 
heart, in its essence, believes in nothing else than the truth and 
divinity of human nature. Or let it be provccl that the his- 
torical as well as the rational arguments of my work are false; 
let them be reflItpd-not, however, I entreat, by judicial 
denunciations, or theological jeremiads, by the trite pbrases 
of speculation, or other llÍtiful expedients for which I have no 



PREFACE. 


IX 


name, but by 'reasons, and such reasons as I have not already 
thoroughly answered. 
Certainly, my work is negative, destructive; but, be it observed, 
only in relation to the unhuman, not to the human elements 
of religion. I t is therefore divided into two parts, of which 
the first is, as to its main idea,1Josith'e, the second, including 
the appenùix, not wholly but in the main, negative; in both, 
however, the same positions are proved, only in a different or 
rather opposite manner. The first exhibits religion in its essence, 
its truth, the second exhibits it in its contradictions; the first 
is development, the second polemic; thus the one is, according 
to the nature of the case, calmer, the other more vehement. 
Development advances gently, contest impetuously; for de- 
veloplnent is self-contented at every stage, contest only at the 
last blow. Development is deliberate, but contest resolute. 
Development is light, contestfi1
e. Hence results a difference 
between the two parts even as to their form. Thus in the first 
part I show that the true sense of Theology is Anthropology, 
that there is no distinction between the 1JJ.edicates of the divine 
and human nature, and, consequently, no distinction between 
the divine and human subject: I say consequently, for wherever, 
as is especially the case in theology, the predicates are not acci- 
dents, but express the essence of the subject, there is no distinc- 
tion between subject and predicate, the one can lJe put in the 
place of the other; on which point I refer the reader to the 
.A.nalytics of Aristotle, or even merely to the Introduction of 
Porphyry. In the second part, on the other hand, I show that 
the distinction which is made, or rather supposed to be made, 
between the theological and anthropological predicates, resolves 
itself into an absurdity. Here is a striking example. In the 
first part I prove that the Son of God is in 1'eligion a real son, 
the son of God in the same sense in which man is the son of 
man, and I find therein the tr'uth, the essence of religion, that 
it conceives and affirms a profoundly human relation as a divine 
relation; on the other hand, in the second part I bhow that the 
:Son of God-not indeed in religion, but in theology, which i
 
the reflection of religion upon itself,-is not a son in the natural, 
A3 



x 


PREFACE. 


human sense, but in an entirely different manner, contradictory 
to :Nature and reason, and therefore absurd, and I finù in this 
negation of human sense anù the human understanding, the 
negation of religion. Accordingly the first part is the direct, 
the second the indirect proof, that theology is anthropology: 
hence the second part necessarily has reference to the first; it 
has no independent significance; its only aim is to show, that 
the sense in ,vhich religion i
 interpreted in the previous part 
of the work 1n1lst be the true one, because the contrary is ab- 
surd. In brief, in the first part I am chiefly concerned with 
'religion, in the second with theology: I say chiefly, for it was 
impossible to exclude theology from the first part, or }'eligion 
from the second. .A mere glance will show that my investigation 
includes speculative theology or philosophy, and not, as has been 
here and there erroneously supposed, conunon theology only, a 
kind of trash from which I rather keep as clear as possible, 
(though, for the rest, I am sufficiently well acquainted with it,) 
confining myself always to the most essential, strict and neces- 
sary definition of the object, * and hence to that definition which 
gives to an object the most general interest, and raises it above 
the sphere of theology. But it is with theology that I have to 
do, not with theologians; for I can only undertake to charac- 
terize what is primary,-the original, not the copy, principles, 
not persons, species, not individuals, objects of history, not 
objects of the chroniql.le scandale'llse. 
If my work contained only the second part, it would be þer- 
fectly just to accuse it of a negative tendency, to represent the 
lwoposition: Religion is nothing, is an absurdity, as its essen- 
tial purport. But I by no means say (that were an easy task I) : 
God is nothing, the Trinity is nothing, the "\V ord of God is 
nothing, &0.; I only show that they are not that which the 
illusions of theology make them,-not foreign, but native mys- 
teries, the mysteries of human nature; I show that religion 
takes the apparent, the superficial in Nature and hUlllanity, for 


* For example, in considering the sacraments, I limit myself to two; 
for, in the strictest sense (see Luther, t. xvii. p. 558), there are no more. 



PREFACE. 


Xl 


the essential, and hence conceives their true essence as a sepa- 
rate, special existence: that consequently, religion, in the 
definitions which it gives of God, e. g., of the 'V ord of God,- 
at least in tho
e definitions which are not negative in the sense 
above alluded to,-only defines or milkes objective the true 
nature of the hUlnan word. The reproach that accorùing to IllY 
book, religion is an absurdity, a nullity, a pure illusion, would 
be \vell-founded only if, according to it, that into which I re- 
solve religion, which I prove to be its true object and substance, 
namely ?nan,-anthropology, were an absurdity, a nullity, a 
pure illusion. But so far from giving a trivial or even a sub- 
ordinate significance to anthropology,-a significance which is 
assigned to it only just so long as a theology stands above it 
and in opposition to it,-I, on the contrary, while reducing 
theology to anthropology, exalt anthropology into theology, 
very much as Christianity, while lowering God into man, made 
man into God; though, it is true, this human God was by a 
further process made a transcendental, imaginary God, remote 
from man. Hence it is obvious that I do not take the word 
anthropology in the sense of the Hegelian or of any other philo- 
SOI)hy, but in an infinitely higher and more general sense. 
Religion is the dream of the human mind. But even in 
dreams we do not find ourselves in emptiness or in heaven, but 
on earth, in the realm of reality; we only see real things in the 
entrancing splendour of imagination and caprice, instead of in 
the simple daylight of reality and necessity. Hence I do 
nothing more to religion-and to speculative philosophy and 
theology also-than to open its eyes, or rather to turn its gaze 
from the internal towards the external, i. e., I change the object 
as it is in the imagination into the objeet as it is in reality. 
But certainly for the pre
ent age, which prefers the sign to 
the thing signified, the copy to the original, fancy to reality, 
the appearance to the essence, this change, Ì1ulslnuch as it does 
away with illusion, is an absolute annihilation, or at least a 
reckless In'ofanation; for in these days illusion only is sacred, 
truth prof(tne. Nay, sacredness is held to be enhanced in pro 
portion as truth decreases and illusion increases, so that the 



xu 


PREFACE. 


highest degree of illusion comes to be the highest degree of 
sacredness. Religion has disappeared, and for it has Leen sub- 
stituted, even a1l10ng Protestants, the appearance of religion- 
the Church-in order at least that" the faith" may be imparted 
to the ignorant and indiscriminating multitude; that faith 
being still the Chl'istian, because the Christian churches stand 
now as they did a th.ousand years ago, and now, as fonnerly, 
the external signs of the faith are in vogue. That which has 
no longer any existence in faith (the faith of the modern world 
is only an ostensible faith, a faith which does not believe what 
it fancies that it believes, and is only an undecided, pusillani- 
mous unbelief-) is still to pass current as opinion: that which 
is no longer sacred in itself and in truth, is still at least to seem 
sacred. Hence the simulated religious indignation of the pre- 
sent age, the age of shows and illusion, concerning my analysis, 
especially of the Sacraments. But let it not be demanded of 
an author who prol)oses to hÍ1nself as his goal not the favour 
of his contemporaries, but only the truth, the unveiled, naked 
truth, that he sllould have or feign respect towarùs an empty 
nppearance, especially as the object which underlies this appear- 
ance is in itself the culminating point of religion, i. e., the point 
fit which the religious slides into the irreligious. Thus much in 
justification, not in excuse, of my analysis of the Sacraments. 
'Vith regard to the true bearing of IllY analysis of the sacra- 
Inents, especiaHy as presented in the concluding chapter, I only 
remark, that I therein illustrate by a palpable and visible ex- 
ample the essential purport, the peculiar theme of my work, that 
I therein call upon the senses themselves to witness to the truth 
of my analysis and myideas, and ùemonstrate ad oClllos, ad tac- 
tzt1n, acl gustu"m, what I have taught ad captllm throughout the 
previous pages. As, namely, the water of Baptism, the wine and 
òread of the Lord's Supper, taken in their natural power and 
significance, are and effect infinitely more than in a superna- 
turalistic, illusory significance; so the oùject of religion in 
general, conceived in the sense of this work, i. C., the anthropo- 
logical sense, is infinitely more productive and real, both in 
theory and practice, than when accepted in the sen.se of theo- 



PREFACE: 


XliI 


logy. For as that which is or is supposed to be imparted in the 
water, bread, ana wine, over anel above these natural substances 
themselves, is something in the inlagination only, but in truth, 
in reality, nothing; so also the object of religion in general, 
the Divine essence, in distinction from the essence of Nature 
and Humanity,-that is to say, if its attributes, as understand- 
ing, love, &c., are and signify something else than these attri- 
butes as they belong to man and N ature,-is only sOlnething in 
the imagination, but in truth and reality nothing. Therefore- 
this is the moral of the fable-we should not, as is the case 
in theology and speculative l)hilosophy, make real beings and 
things into arbitrary signs, vehicles, symbols, or predicates of 
a distinct, transcend ant, absolute, i. e., abstract being; but we 
should accept and undel
stand them in the significance which 
they have in themselves, which is identical with their qualities, 
with those conditions which make them \\
hat they are :-thuß 
only do we obtain the key to a (real theory {In(l practice. I, in 
fact, put in the place of the barren baptismal water, the bene- 
ficent effect of real water. How" watery," how trivial ! Yes, 
indeed, very trivial. But so J\Iarriage, in its time, was a very 
trivial truth, which Luther, on the ground of his natural good 
sense, maintained in opposition to the seemingly holy illusion 
of celibacy. But wl1ile I thus view water as a real thing, I at 
the same time intend it as a vehide, an image, an example, a 
symbol, of the" unholy" spirit of my work, just as the water 
of Baptism-the object of my analysis-is at once literal 
and symbolical water. It is the same with bread and wine. 
l\Ialignity has hence drawn the conclusion that bathing, eating 
and drinking are the SUl1una S'll'1n1narUJn, the positive result of 
my work. I make no other reply than this: if the whole of 
religion is contained in the Sacraments, and there are conse- 
quently no other religious acts than those which are performed 
in Baptislll and the Lord's Supper; then I grant that the entire 
purport and positive result of my work are bathing, eating aud 
drinking, since this work is nothing but a faithful, rigid histo- 
rico-philosophical analysis of religion-the revelation of reli- 
gion to itself, the a
()akening of (religion to self-consciousness. 



XIV 


PREFACE. 


I sayan historico-philosophical analysis, in distinction from 
a merely historical analysis of Christianity. The historical 
critic-such a one, for example, as Daumer or Ghillany-shows 
that the Lord's Supper is a rite lineally descended from the 
ancient Cultus of human sacrifice; that once, instead of bread 
and wine, real human flesh and blood were partaken. I, on 
the contrary, take as the object of my analysis and reduction 
only the Christian significance of the rite, that view of it which 
is sanctionecl in Christianity, and I proceed on the supposition 
that only that significance which a dogma or institution has in 
Christianity (of course in ancient Christianity, not in modern), 
whether it n1ay present itself in other religions or not, is also 
the trIte origin of that dogma or institution in so far as it is 
Christian. Again, the historical critic, as, for example, Lütz- 
elberger, shows that the narratives of the miracles of Christ 
resolve themselves into contradictions and absurdities, that 
they are later fabrications, and that consequently Christ was no 
miracle-,vorker nor, in general, that which he is represented to 
be in the Bible. I, on the other hand, do not inquire what the 
real, natural Christ was or may have been in distinction from 
what he has been Inade or has become in Supernaturalism; on 
the contrary, I accept the Christ of religion, but I show that 
this superhuman being is nothing else than a product and reflex 
of the supernatural human mind. I do not ask whether this 
or that, or any miracle can happen or not; I only show u'hat 
miracle is, and I show it not à pr'iori, but ùy examples of 
miracles, narrated in the Bible as real events; in doing so, 
however, I answer or rather preclude the question as to the 
possibility or reality or necet;sity of miracle. Thus much con- 
cerning the distinction between lue and the historical critics 
who have attacked Christianity. As regards 111Y l'elation to 
Strauss and Bruno Bauer, in company 'with WhOl11 I am con- 
stantly named, I merely point out here that the distinction 
between our works is sufficiently indicated by the distinction 
between their objects, which is implied even in the title-page. 
Bauer takes for the object of his criticism the evangelical his- 
tory, i. e., biblical Christianity, or rather biblical theology; 



PREFACE. 


xv 


Strauss, the System of Christian Doctrine and the Life of Jesus, 
(which may also be included under the title of Christian Doc- 
trine,) i. e., dogmatic Christianity or rather dogmatic theology; 
I, Christianity in general, i. e., the Christian religion, and 
consequently, only Christian philosophy or theology. Hence I 
take my citations chiefly from men in whom Christianity was 
not merely a theory or a dogma, not merely theology, but re- 
ligion. J\Iy principal theme is Christianity, is Religion, as it is 
the inunecliate object, the i1n.mecliate natwre, of man. Erudi- 
tion and philosophy are to me only the 'Jneans by which I bring 
to light the treasure hid in man. 
I must further mention that the circulation which my work 
has had amongst the public at large, was neither desired nor 
expected by me. It is true that I have always taken as the 
standard of the mode of teaching and writing, not the abstract, 
particular, professional philosopher, but universal man, that I 
have regarded 'lnan as the criterion of truth, and not this or 
that founder of a system, and have from the first placed the 
highest excellence of the philosopher in this, that he aùstains, 
both as a man and as an author, from the ostentation of philo- 
sophy, i. e., that he is a philosopher only in reality, not fo nn ally , 
that he is a quiet philosopher, not a loud and still less a brawling 
one. Hence, in all my works as well as in the present one, I 
have made the utmost clearness, simplicity and definiteness, a 
law to myself, so that they may be understood, at least in the 
Inain, by every cultivated and thinking man. But notwith... 
standing this, Iny work can be appreciated and fully understood 
only by the scholar, that is to say, by the scholar who loves 
truth, who is capable of fonning a judgment, who is above the 
notions and prejudices of the learned and unlearned vulgar; for 
although a thoroughly independent production, it has yet its 
necessary logical basis in history. I very frequently refer to 
this or that historical phenomenon without expressly designating 
it, thinking this superfluous; and such references can be under- 
stood by the scholar alone. Thus, for example, in the very 
first chapter, where I develope thë necessary consequences of 
the stanù-pointofFeeling, I allude toJ acobi and Schleiermacher; 



xvi 


PREFACE. 


in the second clulpter I allude chiefly to Kantism, Scepticism, 
Theism, J\laterialism and Pantheism; in the chapter on the 
"Stand-point of Religion," where I discuss the contradictions 
between the religious or theological and the physical or natural- 
philosophical view of Nature, I refer to philosophy in the age 
of orthodoxy, and especially to the philosophy of Descartes 
and Leibnitz, in which this contradiction presents itself in a 
peculiarly characteristic manner. The reader, therefore, who is 
unacquainted wi th the historical facts and ideas presupposed in 
my work, will fail to perceive on what my arguments and ideas 
hinge; no wonder if my positions often appear to him baseless, 
however firm the footing on which they stand. It is true that 
the subject of nlY work is of universal human interest; more- 
over, its fundamental ideas, though not in the form in which 
they are here expressed, or in which they could be expressed 
under existing circunlstances, will one day become the conlmon 
property of mankind: for nothing is opposed to them in the pre- 
sent day but empty, powerless illusions and prejudices in contra- 
diction with the true nature of man. But in considering this 
subject in the first instance, I 'was under the necessity of treating 
it as a matter of science, of philosophy ; and in rectifying the aber- 
rations of R,eligion, Theology, and Speculation, I was naturally 
obliged to use their expressions, and even to appear to speculate, 
or-which is the same thing-to turn theologian myself, while I 
nevertheless only analyse speculation, i. e., reduce theology to 
anthropology. J\Iy work, as I said before, contains, and ap- 
plies in the concrete, the principle of a new philosophy suited- 
not to the schools, but-to man. Yes, it contains that principle, 
but only by e'Colving it out of the" very core of religion; hence, 
be it said in passing, the new philosophy can no longer, like 
the old Catholic and modern Protestant scholasticism, fall into 
the temptation to prove its agreement with religion by its 
agreement with Christian dogmas; on the contrary, being 
evolved from the nature of religion, it has in itself the true 
et;sence of religion,-is, in its very quality as a philosophy, a 
religion also. But a work which considers ideas in their genesis 
and explains and demonstrates them in strict sequence, is, by 



PREFACE. 


XVII 


the very form which this purpose imposes upon it, unsuited to 
popular reading. 
Lastly, as a supplement to this work with regard to many 
apparently unvindicated positions, I refer to my articles in the 
Deutsches Jahrbuch, January and February, 1842, to my cri- 
tiques and Charakteristiken des modernen After-christenthu?ns, 
in previous numbers of the same periodical, and to my earlier 
works, especially the following :-P. Bayle. Ein Beitrag ZlU. 
Geschichte de? Philosophie 'Lind ]'Ienschheit, Ausbach, 1838, 
and Philosophie und Chr-istenth'llm, l\Iannheim, 1839. In 
these works I have sketched, with a few sharp touches, the 
historical solution of Christianity, and have shown that Chris- 
tianity has in fact long vanished, not only from the Reason but 
from the Life of mankind, that it is nothing more than a fixed 
idea, in flagrant contradiction with our Fire and Life Assurance 
companies, our rail-roads and steam-carriages, our picture and 
sculpture galleries, our military and industrial schools, our 
theatres and scientific museums. 


LUD"\VIG FEUERBACH. 


Bruckberg, Feb. 14, 1843. 



CON TEN T S. 


INTRODUCTION. 
CHAPTER PAGB 
I. 9 1. The Essential Nature of Man . . . . . . . 1 
I. 9 2. The Essence of Religion considered generally. . . . 12 


PART I. 
THE TRUE OR ANTHROPOLOGICAL ESSENCE OF RELIGION. 


II. God as a Being of the U nderstallding . . . . . . . . 32 
III. God as a.Moral Being, or Law . . . . . . . . . . 43 
IV. The Mystery of the Incarnation; or, God as Love, as a Being 
of the Heart . . . . . ! . . . . . . . . . 49 
V. The Mystery of the.S
ffering God. .... . 58 
VI. The Mystery of the Trinity and the .lVlother of God. 64 
VII. The Mystery of the Logos and Divine Image. . .. 73 
VIII. The Mystery of the CosnlOgonical Principle in God. . . . 79 
IX. The ltl ystery of sticism, or Nature in God . . . . . 86 
X. The Mystery of Providence and Creation out of Nothing. . 100 
. XI. The Significance of the Creation in Judaism. . . . . . 111 
XII. The OmnipoteI1ce of Feeling, or the Myster of Prayer . . 119 
XIII. The l\lystery of Faith-the Mystery of l\Iiracle. . . . . 125 
XIV. The Mystery of the Resurrection and of the Miraculous Con- 
ception . . ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 
XV. The Mystery of the Christian Christ, or the Personal God . 139 
XVI. The Distinction between Christianity and Heathenism . . 149 
XVII. The Significance of Voluntary Celibacy and l\Ionachism . . 159 
, XVIII. The Cluistian }leaven, or Perßonal Immortality . . . . 169 



xx 


CONTENTS. 


PART II. 


THE FALSE OR THEOLOGICAL ESSENCE OF RELIGION. 


CHAPTER 
XIX. The Essential Stand-point of Religion. . 
XX. The Contradiction in the Existence of God 
XXI. The Contradiction in the Revelation of God 
XXII. The Contradiction in the Nature of God in general . 
XXIII. The Contradiction in the Speculative Doctrine of God. 
XXIV. The Contradiction in the. Trinity. . . . 
XXV. The Contradiction in the Sacraments . 
XXVI. The Contradiction of Faith and Love . . . 
XXVII. Concluding Application. . . . . . 


PAGB 


. . . 184 
. . . 196 
. . . 203 
. 211 
. . 224 
. 230 
. . 234 
. 245 
. 267 


APPENDIX. 


.. 
I.. 


SECTION' 
1. The Religious Emotions purely Human . 275 
2. God is Feeling released from Limits . . 277 
3. God is the highest Feeling of Self . . . . . . . . . . 278 
4. Distinction between the Pantheistic and Personal God . . . 279 
5. Nature without interest for Christians. . . . . . . . . 282 
6. In God l\Ian is his own Object . . . . . .. .. 284 
,.- 
7. Christianity the Religion of Suffering a . . 287 
8. Mystery of the Trinity. . . . . . . 288 
9. Creation out of Nothing . . . . . 293 
10. Egoism of the Israelitish Religion. . . . . . . 294 
11. The Idea of Providence. . . . . . . . . 295 
12. Contradiction of Faith and Reason . . 300 
13. The Resurrection of Christ . . 304 
14. The Christian a Supermundane Being . . 304 
15. The Celibate and Monachism. . . . . . 305 
16. The Christian Heaven . . . . . . . . . . . 313 
17. What Faith denies on Earth it affirms in Heaven . . 315 
18. Contradictions in the Sacraments I . . . . . . 316 
19. Contradiction of Faith and Love. 
 . . 319 
20. Results of the Principle of Faith. . 325 
2).. Contradiction of the God-
lan. . . 332 
22. .Anthrppology the 1\1 ystery of Theology . .. . . . 337 



THE 


ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


CHAPTER I. 


INTRODUCTION. 



 1. The Essentictl Nature of ]Ian. 


RELIGIO
 has its basis in the essential difference between mall 
and the brute-the brutes have no religion. It is true that 
the old uncritical writers on natural history attributed to the 
elephant, among other laudable qualities, the virtue of religi- 
ousness; but the religion of elephants belongs to the realm of 
fable. Cuvier, one of the greatest authorities on the animal 
kingdom, assigns, on the strength of his personal observa- 
tions, no higher grade of intelligence to the elephant than to 
the dog. 
l3ut what is this essential difference between man and the 
brute? The most simple, general, and also the most popular 
answer to this question is-consciousness :-but consciousness 
in the strict sense; for the consciousness implied in the feeling 
of 
elf as an individual, in discrÏ1nillation bv the senses, in 
the perception and even judgment of outward things accord- 
ing to definite sensihle signs, cannot be denied to the brutes. 
Consciousness in the strictest sense is present only in a being 
to whom his species, his essential nature, is an object of 
thought. The brute is indeed conscious of himself as fin 
individual-and he has accordingly the feeling of self as the 
comUlon centre of successive sensations-but not as a species: 
hence, he is without that consciousness which in its nature, aR 
in its name, is akin to science. 'Vhere there is this higher 
consciousness there is a cap
 bility of science. Science is the 
cognizance of species. In practical life we have to do with 
individuals; in science, with species. But only a being to 
B 



2 


THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


,vhom his own species, his own nRture, is an object of thougllt, 
('an make the essential nature of other things or beings an 
object of thought. 
Hence the brute has only a sÏ1llple, man a twofold life: in 
the brutQ, the inner life is one .with the outer; man has both an 
inner and an outer life. The inner life of man is the life whieh 
has relation to his species, to his general, as distinguished from 
his individual, nature. 
Ian thinks-that is, he converses with 
himself. The brute can exercise no function which has rela- 
tion to its specie
 without another individual external to 
itself; but man can perform the functions of thought and 
speech, which strictly inlply such a relation, apart from another 
individual. l\Ian is himself at once I and thou; he can put 
himself in the place of another, for this reason, that to hinl his 
species, his essential nature, and not merely his individuality, 
is an object of thought. 
Religion being identical with the distinctive characteristic of 
Jnan, is then identical with self-consciousness-with the con- 
sciousness which man has of his nature. But religion, ex- 
IH'essed generally, is consciousness of the infinite; thus it is 
and can be nothing else than the consciousness which man has 
of his own-not finite anù lÌInited, but infinite nature. A 
really finite being has not even the faintest adumbration, still 
less consciousness, of an infinite being, for the lin1it of the 
nature is also the lin1it of the consciousness. The conscious- 
ness of the caterpillar, whose life is confined to tt particular 
species of plant, does not extend itself beyond this narrow 
domain. I t does, indeed, discriminate between this plant and 
other plants, but n101'e it knows not. A consciousness so 
limited, but on account of that very limitation so infallible, we do 
not call consciousness, but instinct. Consciousness, in the 
strict or proper sense, is identical with consciousness of the 
infinite; a limited consciousness is no conseÌousnebs; con- 
sciou
ness is essentially infinite in its nfiture.* The conscious- 
ness of the infinite is nothing else tlwn the consciousness of 
the infinity of the consciousness; or, in the consciousness of 


* Objectull1 intellectus esse illimitatum sive omne verum ac, ut 
loquuntur, omne enR ut CllS, ex eo ('on
tat, quod ad nullum non genus 
l o erum extenditur, nullumque eHt, cujus cogno8cendi capax non sit, Jiret ob 
varia obstacula multa sint, qum l o e ipsa non norit.-Gassendi, (Opp. Omn. 
Phys.) 



THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF MAN. 


:3 


the infinite, the conscious subject has for his object the infinity 
of his own nature. 
'Vbat, then, is the nature of n1an, of which he is conscious, 
or what constitutes the specific distinction, the proper lnunanity 
of 111an?* Reason, 'ViII, Affection. To a conlplete man belong 
the power of thought, the power of will, the power of affection. 
The power of thought is the light of the intellect, the power of 
will is energy of character, the power of affection is love. 
Reason, love, force of win, are perfections-the perfections of 
the human being-nay, more, they are abbolute perfections of 
being. To will, to love, to think, are the highest powers, are 
the absolute nature of man as man, and the basis of his ex- 
istence. 
Ian exists to think, to love, to will. Now that 
which is the end, the ultÜnate aim, is also the true basis and 
principle of a being. But what is the enù of reason? Reason. 
Of love? Love. Of will? Freedolll of the will. 'Ve think 
for the sake of thinking; love for the sake of loving; will for 
the sake of willing-i.e., that we may be free. True existence 
is thinking, loving, wining existence. That alone is true, per- 
fect, divine, which exists for its own sake. But such is love, 
such is reason, such is will. The divine trinity in man, above 
the individual nlan, is the unity üf reason, love, will. Reason, 
'Vill, Love, are not powers which man possesses, for he is 
nothing without them, he i::; what he is only by them; they are 
the constituent elements of his nature, which he neither has 
nor makes, the llnimating, determining, governing powers- 
divine, absolute powers-to which he can ol)pose no resistance.t 
How can the feeling nlan resist feeling, the loving one love, 
the rational one reason? 'Vho has not experienced the over- 
whelming power of melody? And what else is the -power of 
melody but the power of feeling? 
Iusic is the language of 
feeling ; melody is audible feelin g-feeling communicating 
itself. 'Vho has not experienced the power of love, or at least 
heard of it ? 'Vhich is the stronger-love or the individual 


* The obtuse materialist says: "l\lan is distinguished from the brute 
only by consciomme:;:s-he is an animal with consciousness superadded;" 
not reflccting, that in a being which awakes to consciommess, thcre takcs 
place a qualitative change, a differentiation of the entire nature. For the 
rest, our words are by no nwam3 intended to depreciate the nature of the 
lower animals. This is not the place to enter ftl1ther into that queRtion. 
t "Toute opinion est assez forte pour se faire exposer au prix de la 
vie." - :
Iont.aigne. 


B 2 



4 


THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


man? Is it man that l)ossesses love, or is it not much rather 
love that possesses man? "\Vhen love imI)els a nlan to suffer 
death even joyfully for the beloved one, is this death-conquer- 
ing power his own indiyidual power, or is it not rather the 
power of love? And who that e"'ler truly thought has not 
experienced that quiet, subtle power-the power of thought? 
"\Vhen thou sinkest into deep reflection, forgetting thyself and 
what is around thee, clost thou govern reason, or is it not 
reason which governs and absorbs thee? Scientific enthu- 
siasm-is it not the most glorious triumph of intellect over 
thee? The desire of knowledge-is it not a simply irresistible, 
and all-conquering power? And when thou suppressest a 
passion, renonncest a habit, in short, achievest a victory over 
thyself, is this victorious power thy own personal power, or is 
it not rather the energy of will, the force of morality, which 
seizes the mastery of thee, and fills thee with indignation 
against thyself and thy individual weaknesses? 
J\lan is nothing without an object. The great modt'ls of 
humanity, such men as reveal to us what man is capable of, 
have attested the truth of this proposition by their lives. They 
had only one dominant passion-the realization of the aim 
.which was the essential object of their activity. But the 
object to which a subject essentially, necessarily rplates, is 
nothing else than this subject's own, but objective, nature. If 
it be an object common to several indiviclnn1s of the Stlnle 
species, but under various conditions, it is still, at least as to 
the form under which it presents itself to each of then1 accord- 
ing to their respective modifications, their own, but objective, 
nature. 
Thus the Sun is the common object of the planets, but it is 
an object to l\Iercury, to Venlls, to Saturn, to Uranus, under 
other conditions than to the Earth. Each planet has its own 
sun. The Sun "which lights and warms Uranus has no physical 
(only an astronomical, scientific) existence for the earth; anù 
not only does the Sun appear different, 1nlt it really is another 
sun on Uranus than on the Earth. The relation of the Sun 
to the Earth is therefore at the same time a relation of the 
E artb to itself, or to its own nature, for the l11eaSUl'e of the 
size and of the intensity of light which the Sun possesses as 
the object of the Eartb, is the lueasure of the diðtflnce, which 
detenniues the peculiar nature of the Earth. Hence each 
planet 110.::5 in its "sun the mirror of its own nature. 



THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF l\IAN. 


5 


In the object whieh he contmuplates, therefore, man becomes 
acquainted with himself; consciousness of the objective is the 
self-con
ciousness of mall. 'Ve know the man by the object, 
by his conception of what is external to hÏ1nself; in it his 
nature beCOl11es evident; this object is his manifested nature, 
his true objective ego. And this is true not lnerely of spiritual, 
but also of sensuous objects. Even the objects which are 
the 11l0st r81note fi.Olll 11lan, because they are objects to him, 
and to the extent to which they are so, are revelations of human 
nature. Even the 11100n, the snn, the stars, call to luan rVWOL 
(TEaVTóv. That he sees them, and so sees them, is an eyidence 
of his own nature. The anÏ1nal is sensiLle only of the beam 
which immediately affects life; while man perceives the ray, 
to him l)hysically indifferent, of the remotest star. l\Ian alone 
has purely intellectual, disinterested joys and passions; the 
eye of man alone keeps theoretic féstivals. The eye which 
looks into the starry heavens, whieh gazes at that light, alike 
useless and harmless, having nothing in common with the 
earth anel its necessities-this eye sees in that light its own 
nature, its own origin. The eye is heavenly in its nature. 
Hence Ulan elevates hiInself above the earth only with the eye; 
hence theory begins with the contemplation of the heavens. 
The first philosophers were astronomers. It is the heavens 
that admonish man of his destination, and remind him that he 
is destined not merely to action, but albo to contemplation. 
The absolute to Ulan is his own nature. The 110wer 
of the 0 bj ect over him is therefore the power of his own 
nature. Thus the power of the object of fepling is the power 
of feeling itself; the power of the object of the intellect is the 
power of the intel1ect itself; the power of the object of the will 
is the power of the will itself. The man who is affected by 
musical sounds, is governed by feeling; by the feeling, that is, 
which finds its corresponding element in musical sounds. But 
it is not melody as such, it is only lnelody pregnant with 
meaning and emotion, which has power over feeling. Feeling 
is only acted on by that which conveys feeling, i. e., by itself, 
its own nature. Thus also the will; thus, and infinitely nlore, 
the intellect.. 'Yhatever kind of object, therefore, we are at 
Rny tÏ1ne conscious of, we are ahvavs at the same tin1e conseious 
of 
our own nature; we can affil'
 nothing without affirming 
ourselves. And since to will, to feel, to think, are 11erfeetions, 
essences, realities, it is impossible that intellect, feeling, and 



6 


THE ESSEXCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


will should feel or perceive then1selves as IÜnited, finite powers, 
i. e., as worthless, as nothing. For finiteness and nothingness 
are identical; finiteness is only a euphemisnl for nothingness. 
Finiteness is the metaphJsical, the theoretical-nothingness 
the pathological, practical expression. 'Vhat is finite to the 
understanding is nothing to the heart. But it is ÌInpossible 
that we should be conscious of will, feeling, and intellect, as 
finite powers, because every perfect existence, every original 
power and essence, is the Ì1nmediate verification and affinl1ation 
of itself. It is Ì1npossible to love, win, or think, without per- 
ceiving these activities to be perfections-impossible to feel 
that one is a loving, willing, thinking being, without expe- 
riencing an infinite joy therein. Consciousness consists in a 
being becoming objective to itself; hence it is nothing apart, 
nothing distinct frolll the being which is conscious of itself. 
How could it otherwise become conscious of itself? It is 
therefore impossible to be conscious of a perfection as an 
imperfection, impossible te> feel feeling limited, to think thought 
limited. 
Consciousness is self-verification, self-affirmation, self-love, 
joy in one's own perfection. Consciousness is the charac- 
teristic mark of a perfect nature; it exists only in a self-suf- 
ficing, cOInplete being. Even lHunall vanity attests this truth. 
A. man looks in the glass; he has complacency in his appear- 
ance. This complacency is a necesbary, involuntary conse- 
quence of the completeness, the lJeauty of his fonn. A beau- 
tiful fonn is satisfied in it
elf; it has necessarily joy in itself 
-in self-contcmplation. This cOlnplacency becolnes vanity 
only when a man piques himself on his form as being his 
indivÎflual form, not when he adnlires it as a speeÏ1nen of 
human beauty in general. It is fitting that he shoul